MIGRATION, ETHNICITY
AND CONFLICT

The Environment of Insecurity and Turkish Kurdish International Migration

by

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Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

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March 2003
"The Turkish Republic is facing its gravest threat yet. A social earthquake could cut one part of Turkey from the rest, and we could all be buried beneath it."

Turgut Özal, President of Turkey. 13 November 1993.
(McDowall 1996:1)
Abstract

This thesis examines the motivations, mechanisms and prospects of Turkish Kurdish international migration in relation to the Environment of Insecurity as a set of combined socio-economic and political factors triggered by an ethnic conflict. The analysis focuses on three different, but complementary, levels of analysis. The research comprises first, the analysis of the environment of insecurity in Turkey emphasising its broader socio-economic, legal-political, and demographic aspects; second, the patterns and processes of international migration involving Turkish Kurds investigating the motivations, the mechanisms, and the future migration potentials; third, the role of the expression of ethnicity and of ethnic conflict.

A mixed method approach combining qualitative and quantitative methods to address different levels of analysis and different aspects of migration is adopted. The analysis of Turkish Demographic Health Survey data examines the extent to which an environment of insecurity exists for Turkish Kurds. The findings of the Turkish International Migration Survey data outline the patterns of individual migration motives, mechanisms and future intentions. Finally, semi-structured in-depth interviews examine the role of the ethnic conflict and the expression of ethnicity to clarify the relationship between Turkish Kurdish international migration and the ethnic environment of insecurity while also presenting a live account of migration motivations and mechanisms.

The research shows that the environment of insecurity is an issue of ethnic conflict and it constitutes the major facilitating factor in Turkish Kurdish international migration resulting in large asylum migration flows. Due to the armed ethnic conflict between the PKK and the Turkish Army in Turkey during the last two decades of the last century, recent migration patterns of Turkish Kurds are dominated by clandestine migration. Along with legal migrations (e.g. economic, family, education), irregular migration appears as a strong trend involving asylum migration and illegal migration. Tightening immigration controls in Europe also prompts this. The conflict situation also serves as an opportunity framework for some who wanted to migrate. While migration is appearing as a liberating event for Turkish Kurdish ethnicity it is found that Kurdish immigrants have not fully exploited the opportunities for exercising their ethnicity. However, for many, migration from Turkey to Germany is an act of escape and so is an expression of ethnicity.
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Acknowledgements

I am very glad to have had an opportunity to study such a difficult and demanding topic with respect to its political and scientific sensitivity. This study became possible with the support of many people and institutions. I would like to thank the Department of Geography at the University of Sheffield for the supervision and financial support provided during my studies. I also extend my gratitude to the CVCP as they granted the ORS award and the University of Sheffield for the International Research Scholarship. I am also grateful to my supervisors Dr. Deborah Sporton and Professor Charles Pattie and Dr. Doug Watts for their support, encouragement and patience.

I would also like to thank my former supervisor and co-worker Dr. Ahmet Içduygu for his support at the earlier stages of this study and during my five years at Bilkent University.

I also thank Dr. Gülnur Muradoğlu, Veysi Köran and Didem Okutgen for their support at a crucial time, which also partially made this study possible. Besides, I am grateful to my friends Selami, Joan, Salem, Brian, Robert, Julie, Dieneira and others who made this tiresome Ph.D. of the last four years more enjoyable and supported me throughout.

Another group of people at several institutes in Germany and Turkey who provided logistic support for this study are needy to be acknowledged. The author thanks Dr. Hans-Dieter Laux of Geographie Institut at the University of Bonn; Professor Jürgen Friedrichs and Dr. Robert Kesckes at Sociology Institute of the University of Cologne, for their help during the field research in Germany as they provided an office space and facilities. The Demographic Health Surveys (DHS) also deserves special thanks as they gave authorisation for the use of the TDHS 1993 data. The author wishes to thank Dr. Turgay Ünal at HUIPS, Ankara, Turkey and Jeannette Schoorl, NIDI, Den Haag, The Netherlands for the permission to use and help on the use of the TIMS data.

I am also grateful to those who helped me recruiting respondents in Cologne and to those who allowed me to record their migration experiences. Dr. Susanne Schmidt of Navend eV. (Bonn) also deserves special thanks for her support during the fieldwork. I also thank to several community associations in Cologne for their warm welcome.

My final thanks are reserved for my beautiful wife Füsün, parents Perihan and İsa, brothers Adem and Kemal, and sisters Emine, Fatma, and Nihal for their endless support, permanent encouragement and motivation.
Chapter I

Introduction: emigration from an environment of insecurity

1.1. Introduction

The inspiration for this work appeared during my visit to Cizre, a small border town in South East Turkey in 1994. Cizre was one of the main battlefields where brutal clashes had taken place during the peak years of the war between the Turkish Army and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). It is also the oldest urban settlement in the region dating back to 4000 BC. I took a bus to this ancient town and during the journey, I became aware of the naked poverty that was obvious in the region. After the city of Gaziantep, a different world appeared, an endless landscape, vacant shops and petrol stations on both sides of the road and huge military police stations along the 700km from Gaziantep to Cizre. These military fortresses were built as defences against the PKK. Frequent controls on the road by patrolling military police were a usual practice that residents had become accustomed to. A city of soldiers, policemen, and special troops along with a silent populace under a heat over 50 degree celsius welcomed me on arrival. A different regime was in power than that I was used to in Izmir. Every public site in the city was under video surveillance by the police. The explanation for this surveillance was: ‘to provide secure and pleasant living conditions in the city’. This however has never been the case in any western city of Turkey during the same period.

The city looked like a battlefield rather than an urban centre. Damaged, fired and collapsed buildings, the remains of rockets, shootings and bombs were all around the place. The high street was just a dead shopping centre with more than half of the shops closed. Unemployed men were yawning in coffeehouses. The most visible aspect of the town was the sizeable military population in the city and the continuous surveillance all over the city ‘to stop any suspicious action’. This was the exact picture of "the environment of insecurity" discussed in this thesis compiled years after that first visit to ‘an inner country within my own country’.

The international migration literature on migrant groups is dominated by many studies of ‘conventional’ national cases such as the Italians, Irish, Chinese, Jews, Turks and

1 This expression belongs to a Turkish Kurdish poet and performance artist, Yılmaz Erdoğan.
other Asians (see for example Abadan-Unat et al. 1976; Wilpert 1992; Martin 1991; De Rosa 1994; Hannan 1970; Wasserstein 1997; Bates 2001). At the same time, these nationality-based approaches to international migration have paid little attention to minority movements - possibly because of the lack of reliable data (Courbage 1998). This trend has changed in recent years as studies of oppressed minorities have begun to appear more frequently e.g. on the Berbers of Morocco and Algeria (Keohane 1991: Brett 1996) and the Kurds (Behrendt 1993; Hassanpour et al. 1996; Van Bruinessen 1998). There are two reasons for such a shift: a) the influence of ethnic tensions and the revival of these tensions in countries of immigration, and b) the role of new post-modern approaches in the social sciences such as attempts in population geography to understand difference and diversity among migrants (Halfacree and Boyle 1993; Graham 1995; Gutting 1996a). In recent years, there has been a growing literature on Kurds but none of these studies have detailed their migratory regimes (i.e. Entessar 1989; Fuller 1993; McDowall 1996; Mutlu 1996; Barkey and Fuller 1997; Olson 1996). They are either simple historical accounts or political analyses emphasising the situation in the Middle East.

This study aims to understand migration from Turkey as a population movement not only of Turkish but also of Turkish Kurdish people by making visible the latter in the forty year long history of migration from Turkey to Europe. Moreover, it explores the migration patterns and lives of Turkish Kurds in a particular country of destination to understand the role of the expression of ethnicity in migration within a context of migration from an “environment of insecurity” to that of “security”. It aims to present a comprehensive account of emigration of Turkish Kurds using a multi-method approach comprising an analysis of survey data, the TIMS (Turkish International Migration Survey) and TDHS (Turkish Demographic Health Survey), with a qualitative research based on in-depth interviews conducted in Cologne, Germany, one of the major destinations for immigrants from Turkey (Sen 1996:559). Overall, this study will, for the first time, present a comprehensive account of the emigration of Turkish Kurds.

For a better understanding of international migration and migrants in destination countries, studies on oppressed minorities such as Kurds and Berbers are necessary because the migration patterns and processes of these minority populations may differ from the broader regimes of migration that characterise their countries of origin. There are volumes of literature on migrant communities in Western European countries such as the Moroccans in Belgium (Reniers 1997; Lievens 1997b), Algerians in France
Introduction

(Trébous 1970), Pakistanis in Britain (Anwar 1985; Shaw 1988), and Turks in Germany (Abadan-Unat 1976; Gökdere 1978; Gitmez 1983; Atalık and Beeley 1993: Şen 1996). However, there is no distinction made between the internal divisions within these communities under the labels of nation states. Studies on the Kurds have generally focused on Kurdish refugees rather than Kurdish migrants (Sheikmous 1992; Wahlbeck 1996a, 1998a, 1998b and 1999) with very few referring to Kurdish migrant populations (Van Bruinessen 1998; Hassanpour 1996). In this regard, this study is not only an initial study of Turkish Kurdish migration as an oppressed minority but is also a step further in the study of migration of oppressed minorities generally.

1.2. Objectives of the study

This study provides a comprehensive study of the international migration of Turkish Kurds from Turkey to Germany from a comparative perspective. The overall aim of the study is to improve the understanding of the direct and indirect causes and processes of Turkish Kurdish international migration to Germany with regard to the ethnic conflict which declares itself in the form of an environment of insecurity. Furthermore, it gains insight into these patterns and processes of international migration along with the expression of ethnicity through the migration process. The findings are intended to serve as a pioneer understanding of Turkish Kurdish international migration and to provide the basis for improving instruments for policy making and to serve as a reference point for estimating future migration.

This study does not measure the volume of migration but investigates the ways in which migration starts and continues. It focuses on the factors influencing the migration flows. Assuming that migration potential is created by socio-economic factors and political and economic insecurity, the factors and circumstances that turn this potential into an actual migration are investigated. It delineates the individual characteristics and circumstances that determine migration. In other words, which characteristics and circumstances distinguish a migrant from a non-migrant?

At the same time, this study also focuses on questions such as: What characterises the environment of insecurity (EOI) that facilitates Turkish Kurdish international migration? Which specific socio-economic and political circumstances form the material and non-material aspects of this EOI? What is the role of ethnicity and the ongoing ethnic conflict in Turkey in the formation of the EOI? What are the
implications of the ethnic conflict and the expression of ethnicity in the migration process of the Kurds? How do the Kurds relate their relative deprivation to their expression of ethnicity within the context of international migration?

Thus the aim of this study is to analyse Turkish Kurdish international migration with particular reference to migration to Cologne, Germany in relation to the ethnic conflict. The subsequent objectives of this study are: a) to examine the characteristics of the background context which determines the environment of insecurity for the Kurds, b) to identify the Kurds within the Turkish international migratory regime by examining their distinguishing migration patterns, c) to outline Turkish Kurds’ migration patterns in terms of household characteristics and who moves who stays, d) to examine their migration mechanisms in terms of their migration strategies, migration networks, e) to investigate the factors determining future migration trends in terms of perceptions, intentions, and remittance patterns, f) to examine the role of ethnicity and the expression of ethnicity in relation to their migratory moves.

1.3. Organisation of the thesis

This study aims to analyse the relationship between an environment of insecurity and international migration of Turkish Kurds with a specific emphasis on migration flows to Germany. The thesis is organized into seven chapters. A brief synopsis of each follows.

Chapter 2 presents a review of the international migration literature in order to highlight the conceptual building blocks of the study referring to ethnic conflict, deprivation, and migration. The first section of this chapter examines the environment of insecurity as a background conceptualisation in which (or under its influence) international migration took place. Later, the relationships between socio-economic and political deprivation and migration are examined with particular reference to the ethnic conflict between the Kurds and the Turks. The chapter concludes with the examination of the expression of ethnicity on the move. Two central issues in recent migration research of relevance to this study, networks and transnationalism, are also reviewed.

The third chapter discusses the context of Turkish Kurdish international migration. In the first section of this chapter, the Turkish context is reviewed referring to its background association with the ethnic question in Turkey, socio-economic unevenness
and the political context with a historical perspective regarding the Kurdish question. The elaboration of Turkish international migration referring to the potential role of the Kurds is followed by the review of migration from Turkey to Germany and, in particular, Cologne. An evaluation of the numbers of Turkish arrivals to Germany over the time and the number and geographical distribution of Turkish migrants living in Cologne and Germany since the 1960s is also presented.

In Chapter 4, the research methodology is described and the research process is presented. Starting with the appraisal of the use of mixed methods in geographic research, the qualitative and quantitative components of the research are described. The various data sources, data collection, and analysis are outlined. The different stages of the qualitative research are explained in detail and problems in the field are discussed. The chapter is concluded by remarks on how the findings are presented in the thesis.

Chapter 5 is the first analytical chapter of the thesis, focusing on the environment of insecurity that sets a background for Kurdish international migration. It is assessed in three sections emphasising the socio-economic, political, and socio-demographic dimensions respectively. Within this framework, the relation between the environment of insecurity and international migration is analysed with regard to Kurdish ethnicity. In the analysis, the characteristics of the environment of insecurity are outlined in relation both to the Turkish Kurdish population and their Turkish counterparts. At a macro level, Turkey’s comparative position is discussed against the destination countries, while regional discrepancies within Turkey are also investigated. The second section focuses on the political, legal and military aspects of the environment of insecurity targeting Turkey’s Kurdish population. The final section is reserved for a discussion of the socio-demographic aspects contributing to the deprivation that the Kurds experience.

Chapter 6 presents a detailed comparative account of the migration patterns of the Turkish Kurdish population. It moves from the aggregate level of analysis to household and individual levels. The analysis and discussion focus on two main questions: What are the characteristics of migrant and non-migrant populations? How do Turkish Kurdish emigrants themselves formulate their motivations and reasons for migration?

In Chapter 7, the process of migration is analysed in terms of the role of information and networks in migration. The migration strategies followed by Turkish Kurdish immigrants are also discussed in this chapter based on the results of 34 in-depth
interviews. In Chapter 8, the focus of the analysis shifts to migration potentials. Both the findings of the TIMS and the qualitative data are discussed in order to highlight possible future avenues of Turkish Kurdish international migration. Migrants’ and non-migrants’ perceptions of migration are discussed. Individuals’ migration intentions and migrants’ return plans are discussed. Investment patterns of migrants are also discussed to investigate clues for future migrations.

Chapter 9 brings the investigation towards the key aspect of Turkish Kurdish migration in response to the environment of insecurity: the expression of ethnicity. The Kurds’ self-ascription of their ethnicity, their understanding of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ are discussed. The role of international migration in accessing cultural freedoms and the role of ethnicity in managing international migration are discussed. Thus, the first half of the chapter focuses on understanding the relationship between international migration and the expression of ethnicity. The second half examines the changing social relations and perceptions of homeland, diaspora, and return. The analyses presented in this chapter are based on the findings from the in-depth interviews.

Chapter 10 concludes the discussion with a review of the results of the study, including an evaluation of the experiences of migration and ethnic conflict among Turkish migrants in Cologne, Germany within a broader context which is described in earlier chapters.

1.4. Definitions and Notes

This study primarily focuses on international migration of Turkish Kurds from Turkey to Germany with regard to an environment of insecurity facilitated by the ethnic conflict in Turkey. The terms ‘migration’ and ‘migrant’ are mostly used to describe ‘international migration’ and ‘international migrant’. The population under investigation is the Kurds who live in Turkey and are compared with their Turkish fellow citizens. To distinguish the Kurds who live in Turkey from others living in other countries (i.e. Syria, Iraq and Iran), the terms ‘Turkish Kurdish’ and ‘Turkish Kurd’ are used. However, in many places, the term the ‘Kurds’ is also used to refer Turkish Kurdish people.

The analysis of the TIMS data contains phrases to define certain groups of people. These phrases were used in the broader international survey conducted by Netherlands
Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (NIDI) in seven countries and are adopted in this study as well (Schoorl, J. et al. 2000). Accordingly the following categories have been used in the analysis. Households and individuals are grouped according to their migration status: recent versus non-recent and current versus return migrants. Recent migrants are those who have migrated abroad within the past ten years prior to the (TIMS) survey, which was conducted in 1996. Current migrants are those who moved abroad and still live abroad. Return migrants are those who have returned home after living abroad for at least one year.

Throughout this study, the term region will be used synonymously for the region populated mainly by Turkish Kurds. This region may also be defined in terms of the territory, in which an armed ethnic conflict is ongoing since the mid-1980s. This region is defined as “East” in the TDHS survey’s five-region categorisation and consists of the following provinces (Figure 1.1):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Adiyaman</th>
<th>Bitlis</th>
<th>Elazığ</th>
<th>Iğdır</th>
<th>Mardin</th>
<th>Şırnak</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ağrı</td>
<td>Batman</td>
<td>Erzincan</td>
<td>Kars</td>
<td>Muş</td>
<td>Tunceli</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bingöl</td>
<td>Diyarbakır</td>
<td>Erzurum</td>
<td>Malatya</td>
<td>Siirt</td>
<td>Ş.Urfa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hakkari</td>
<td>K.Maraş</td>
<td>Sivas</td>
<td>Van</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although explained in Chapter 4, the TIMS regions were different than those of the TDHS. There were four regions: region one contains two mid-western provinces of Turkey (Uşak and Denizli); region two is composed of two Central Anatolian provinces (Aksaray and Yozgat); and regions three and four are composed of four South Eastern provinces (K.Marash, Adiyaman, Ş.Urfa, and G.Antep), which corresponds to the region East of Chapter 5. Both refer to the Kurdish populated areas: West (region 1 of the TIMS), Central (region 2), and East (region 3 and 4) (Figure 1.1).

Describing the geography of Turkey is also worthwhile for a full understanding of Turkish Kurdish international migration studied here. Turkey is a country lying down in the edges of two old continents Asia and Europe with a large portion in the former and with a large and long lasting claim to be included in the latter. Neighbours are Greece and Bulgaria to the west and north-west; the former Soviet republics of Armenia and Georgia to the north-east; Iraq and Iran to the south-east; and Syria to the south. All the northern and most of the western and half of the southern borders of the country are surrounded by sea. For the main focus of this research the region populated mainly by the Kurds must be identified. It might be defined as the greater south-east region of the country which is bordered by Iran in the East and Iraq and Syria in the South. The East region in the Figure 1.1 may represent the Kurdish populated region.
Figure 1.1. Regions and provinces in Turkey as used in the TIMS and TDHS

TIMS REGIONS: each composed of two provinces as follows:
Region 1 in the West: Usak and Denizli
Region 2 in the Central: Aksaray and Yozgat
Region 3 and 4 in the East: K.Maras and Gaziantep and Adiyaman and Sanliurfa

Source: TDHS 1993 and TIMS 2000
Chapter II

Conceptualising International Migration, Ethnicity and Conflict

2.1. Introduction

To date, the literature on international migration has largely focused on key sub-disciplinary areas, such as labour migration, refugee studies and illegal migration. This division, however, often hides the complexity of migration processes, which may involve different types of flows at the same time. For example, it is often not easy and sometimes impossible to distinguish an asylum seeker from an economic migrant as asylum seeking and economic migration are often interrelated. Another significant point raised by this study is the need to further incorporate political aspects in a coherent way in the analysis of migration, for example in the case of Turkish Kurdish ethnic conflict. This review, therefore, examines the existing literature to incorporate the role of ethnic conflict within international migration. It is not argued here that there is a lack of political approaches to the study of international migration but as the literature shows, isolated views focusing on the political, economic or socio-cultural dimensions have been dominant (e.g. Massey et al. 1993; Schoorl 1995; Cadwallader 1992; Portes 1997; Zlotnik 1998).

Conflict may be a key factor underlying both the decision to move and the volume of ‘border crossings’ and ‘overstaying’.

This study attempts to understand Turkish Kurdish international migration as a unique case involving ethnic conflict within an established migratory regime (the Turkish migratory regime). The main reference point here is the EOI and its influences on the international migration of Turkish Kurds and their expression of ethnicity. Thus it examines the relationship between the migratory move and the expression of ethnicity. In this regard, theoretical considerations comprise an understanding of migration patterns, causes and mechanisms of migration and the expression of ethnicity on the move.

International migration is not simply a movement based on the decisions of individuals or groups on their own. It must also be understood as a part of a broader framework within which migrants are both constrained and enabled. In the case of Turkish Kurds,

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2 Here one can raise the question about conflicts other than the ethnic one and rightly, it has to be noted that all sorts of conflict situations create some kind of hybridisation of migration flows.
the primary framework underpinning migration comprises the ethnic conflict in Turkey and the multi-faceted relative deprivation experienced by Turkish Kurds which interacts with it.

The conceptual framework for this study draws upon the background concept of the ‘environment of insecurity’ (EOI) which provides a basis to incorporate ethnicity, conflict, and migration in understanding Turkish Kurdish emigration. This background can be considered to comprise push factors of international migration but with the addition of ethnic conflict it puts the emphasis more on migration as one of the strategic options imposed on people subjected to the EOI as in the case of Turkish Kurdish migration. This study also considers international migration as a holistic phenomenon associated with a variety of other processes such as ethnic conflict. Given entry difficulties into Western European countries, more clandestine migration flows (e.g. asylum seeker flows from Turkey during the last two decades) are occurring as a result of this EOI. Thus the conceptual framework of this study links the political and the economic influences on migration within the context of the EOI.

Existing theoretical and empirical work on international migration and migrants can be classified into five major areas which focus on: the causes of migration; determinants of its perpetuation; uses of immigrant labour; the integration of immigrants into the receiving society; and changes in both the receiving and sending societies due to migration (Portes and Bach 1985; Portes and Böröcz 1989). However, the two dynamics (causes and consequences) of migration are not separable in migration analysis (Morokvasic, 1984). Migration itself may also constitute a cause for further migration once it was started or it may be a consequence of other events such as natural hazards and conflict situations.

A more holistic approach is ‘transnationalism’ which blurs the distinction between concepts such as ‘origin’, ‘voyage’, and ‘destination’ – as well as weakening distinctions between asylum-seekers and other migrants - and allows consideration of other aspects including the construction of identity on the move.

The following sections of this chapter discuss these conceptual reference points. It starts with the EOI framework, which is followed by the discussion of relevant conceptualisations of international migration. These models are divided into two groups. One comprises those focusing on economic aspects and the other draws more upon political aspects. The following two sections elaborate the networks and the
expression of ethnicity with specific reference to the conceptualisation of transnationalism. The chapter concludes with a summary of conceptual reference points for international migration and ethnic conflict in the context of an environment of insecurity.

2.2. The Environment of Insecurity as a Conceptual Background

The EOI is examined here to help understanding the international migration of Turkish Kurds in relation to ethnic conflict in Turkey and in relation with the established international migration conceptualisations. içduygu et al. have highlighted the effects of “an environment of insecurity as a poor structural context ... on the Kurdish ethnic nationalist mobilisation in Turkey” (1999:991). Although they examined the structural push factors of migration, theirs was not a study of migration but of ethnic conflict. One of the starting points for the initial study was the concept of the ‘relative deprivation’ of Kurds in Turkey (Gurr 1984; Gurr and Harff 1994). Therefore, in combination with understanding of the causes of migration, the introduction of the EOI is helpful, at least in understanding the Turkish Kurdish case. It refers to ethnic conflict and also to socio-economic and political deprivation, all of which play significant roles in international migration.

“A mixture of economic hardship and separatist conflict in South-eastern Turkey swells the waves of Kurdish migrants currently lapping Europe’s shores... Turkey says they are economic migrants... Human Rights groups say harsh tactics against Kurdish separatists drive civilians abroad... Employment (in the Southeast) is scarce and average annual household incomes are around $3,500, compared with more than $11,000 in Istanbul” (Reuters quoted in içduygu et al. 1999:995).

This report by Reuters on Kurdish illegal migrants landing in Italy highlights the potential significance of the EOI (TDN, 18 January 1998).

The EOI is conceptually divided into components of ‘material insecurity’ and ‘non-material insecurity’. “Material insecurity is measured by the relative amount of and secure access to the following: income, material possessions, education, health, state services and life itself. Non-material insecurity is roughly divided into the categories of language, culture (identity) and belonging (the opposite of alienation)” (iczduygu et al. 1999:992). These two kinds of insecurity are interrelated.3

3 içduygu et al. also note “it should be obvious that some variables (such as language) play a role in both material and non-material insecurity. The two kinds of insecurity are of course interrelated; our division of the two is for the sake of conceptual clarity and understanding” (1999:992).
The second part of this conceptual package argues that there exist four strategic options for Turkish Kurds to cope with the material environment of insecurity. First they may preserve the status quo and continue to live in between the two sides, the government and rebels. Second, they can migrate to other parts of the country or abroad. Third, they can support the government forces against rebels. Finally, they can decide to join opposing rebel forces against the government forces (Işduygu et al. 1999:995). These options necessarily result in other strategies related to the expression of ethnic identity (Figure 2.1). In the meantime, these categories referred in the diagram must not be read as excluding each other. In fact they may happen simultaneously or may be preferred interchangeably.
The diagram above depicts migration as a dynamic movement from area of origin characterised by an environment of insecurity to the less insecure destination or to areas which offer a relative security. However, the migration decision making is very likely to be affected by the conditions in and perceptions about both destination and the place of origin. The term actor in Figure 2.1 refers to individuals and groups who are under the influence of the EOI and thereby have to opt suitable strategies which are possible under the given conditions. Migration abroad may be a preferred option within the exit category as opposed to the status quo because of possible ethnic and political freedoms and socio-economic benefits to be gained abroad. In return, the availability of this migration option may also influence the EOI at the origin and the decision making of actors as it may produce remittances to be used to improve living standards back home. Nevertheless, the migration option can also involve some characteristics of insecurity such as discrimination and language barrier despite bringing some other freedoms (Figure 2.1). For example, the dislike of foreigners in Western European societies, racial discrimination, difficulties of settlement after migration can result in another kind of insecure environment which is reflected in the lower part of the diagram in Figure 2.1. The migration abroad option operates as a movement from the EOI at the place of origin towards the destination which may reflect an environment of relative insecurity.

The role of ethnicity in international migration and its transformation through the migration process is discussed in later sections of this chapter, as there can be an interaction between migration and the expression of ethnicity. The coping strategies arising from the EOI however can also influence the choice of ethnic identity or the way in which ethnicity is expressed. Turkish Kurds may opt to completely choose the dominant ethnic identity (e.g. Turkish in this case) with all the components of language and culture and reject the rival identity (e.g. Kurdish). Alternatively they can accept only the civic identity of the dominant ethnicity, call themselves Turkish citizens and keep practising their original ethnic identity in the private realm. Alternatively, as a final option, the dominant identity can be wholly rejected, and a politicised ethnicity takes the stage (İçduyuğ et al. 1999:998). The mechanistic separation of identities here is to provide conceptual simplicity. However one should keep in mind the fact that people generally adopt multiple identities, and strategically use them according to conditions. Hence, they can be changeable and situational.

Within this framework option two on the material side, and option three on the non-material side are significant to international migration. We may expect that a person or
a family, who rejects the dominant ethnicity and its polity, may opt to leave its power realm and move abroad. In cases of high ethnic tension as in Turkey, such refusal may be significant. One may say such responses to the EOI may contribute to migration flows including a very high involvement of asylum seekers.

However neither the role of the EOI nor identity preferences are static. They evolve through movement, as migration is a dynamic process through time and space. This indicates a gap in the conceptualisation of the EOI. The processes associated with such an evolution are the change of environment on the one hand, and the shifts in reactions to and perceptions of it. If we view migration as a response to the EOI then it may follow a path starting from insecurity, going through relative insecurity⁴ and finally settlement in a secure environment. However, on the other hand actors’ perceptions may change. They can begin to consider previous conditions, the EOI of the past, differently than they did before. It may be, for instance, that the next destination is also an EOI. As a third condition, time seems significant. For instance, at the time of migration, the place of origin might have been perceived as an EOI in terms of ethnic conflict or conversely migrants may not have been aware of it. Those who decided to return home might face an EOI in the place of origin because when they were abroad, conditions might have changed or their perceptions about them might have changed, and obviously their identity preferences might have changed in time. Those who choose the exit/refusal option may still suffer from a similar EOI in the aftermath of their departure from the country of origin. This EOI may continue in the destination possibly in other forms such as xenophobia, poverty and legal restrictions.

If the EOI is considered in conjunction with ethnic identity, it becomes more obvious that ethnicity strengthens as conflict rises (Esman 1994). This can be observed both in the form of ethnic conflict in the region of origin or through conflict in the form of discrimination in the destination. Thereby members of the ethnic group who were deprived at the place of origin may continue to live under similar conditions after emigration; what can also be called an environment of ‘relative security’.

The EOI is relative because while there are often some improvements of cultural and political rights, there is no guarantee of economic betterment linked to migration. Moreover, after migration, a new deprivation in the form of discrimination can occur. The receiving country, as a non-involved party in their primary cause, may welcome

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⁴ Thanks to Paul White for suggesting this phrase.
Conceptualising international migration, ethnicity and conflict

their ethno-national challenge. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean an affirmative action leading to high living standards and more employment opportunities for immigrants, which is the case in many European countries (Friedrichs 1998; Faist 1998; Kloosterman et al. 1998).

As shown in Figure 2.1, migration can appear as a strong option among others for those experiencing the EOI. The question here is to incorporate the migration literature including contributions from recent studies of transnationalism in order to understand the case of Turkish Kurdish migration that involves ethnic conflict, clandestine forms, and transnational processes of migration and identity formation. The following sections therefore start by elaborating perspectives on international migration, and then moves on to discuss the role of networks and the relevance of transnationalism.

2.3. Conceptual Considerations on International Migration

The EOI is defined as the background for the conceptual framework of this study. This needs to be synthesised with approaches to the study of international migration which are essential to enhance the understanding of Turkish Kurdish migration. Theoretical pluralism is a necessity for this research since it has to deal with different aspects of a complex population movement which involves international migration, ethnic identity formation, and ethnic conflict and operates at different levels of analysis. The lack of a theoretical unity in migration studies also contributes to such need since different approaches provide explanations for different aspects of the migration phenomenon.

Many scholars have underlined the fact that there is no single, unified, coherent theory of international migration, only a fragmented set of theories – conceptualisations - (e.g. Kritz et al. 1981; Zelinsky 1983; Portes and Böröcz 1989; Cadwallader 1992; Massey et al. 1993; Bauer and Zimmermann 1995). Some have stressed the inadequacy of available approaches as they predict only a small subset of regularities (Stark 1991:56; Stillwell and Congdon 1991:5). Hendricks (1999:417) has recently argued that understanding migration is difficult, hindering the development of a consistent theory of international migration, because “migration observations directly contradict the central implications of common theoretical frameworks” (Hendricks 1999:417).

Theoretical pluralism is welcomed by some researchers because of the complexities of causes, processes and patterns and thus they suggest we do not need a theory of
migration but theories of migrations (Hammar et al. 1997; Bauböck 1999; Faist 1997a). Alejandro Portes similarly argues that “as a data driven field of study, immigration has not had to contend with grand generalizations for highly abstract theorising … the bias has run … towards ground-level studies…” (1997:57). In the same discussion, Portes concludes by stressing “this kind of endeavour” (search for a unified theory of migration) “would be futile. The reason is that the different areas that compose this field are so disparate that they can only be unified at a highly abstract and probably vacuous level” (1997:810).

A final point before the elaboration of theoretical perspectives needs to be noted. This study rejects categorisations imposed by previous studies of migration. Migration and migrants need to be analysed as unified categories to include all kinds of migration flows and migrants ranging from labour migrants to refugees as several recent studies have now recognised bridging the gap between refugee and migration studies (Koser 1997a; McDowell 1997; Wahlbeck 1996b; Cohen and Vertovec 1998; Van Hear 1998; Crisp 1999).

Three building blocks in the conceptualisation of this study reflect three broader areas of central concern in the migration literature that are of relevance to this research: a) economic differentials, b) political differentials, and c) networks. The following three sections present a brief appraisal of these approaches to the understanding of international migration. This elaboration is followed by an examination of approaches to the expression of ethnicity with a particular reference to international migration.

2.4. Economic Deprivation and International Migration

Most of the literature on international migration has been dominated by economic explanations until recently. Neo-classical economic models, linking migration to wage and employment levels have been main-stream for decades. They have focused on the equilibrium in factor markets (e.g. labour markets) of liberal economies. The need for labour in labour-scarce economies with high wages would attract migrant workers from markets with excess labour supply where wages are low until the equilibrium of wages is set (e.g. Lewis 1954: Harris and Todaro 1970; Todaro 1976). The micro-economic model, for example, has focused on cost-benefit analyses for individuals (Sjaastad 1962; Todaro 1976). Sjaastad understood migration as a problem of resource allocation as an investment to increase the productivity of human resources (1962:83). In this
regard, Sjaastad was one of the earliest to use a human capital model (Stillwell and Congdon 1991:138). For the study of Turkish Kurds these models are potentially of relevance as they choose to migrate to Germany and other developed countries although the political context may have shadowed their individual or group preferences for mobility.

By the 1980s, the group aspect of migration had been introduced into the conceptualisation of international migration. It has been discovered that the economically oriented migration decision was not made by isolated individuals but larger units like families or households in order to minimise risks while maximising profits (e.g. Stark 1984). For example Hugo (1998) draws attention to the family dimension\(^5\) by delineating migration as a survival strategy in the context of migration networks, which are discussed in the next section. According to Hugo, “most migration occurs as a result of decisions taken by families rather than individuals acting on their own and it is common for families to allocate family members to different labour markets” (Hugo 1998: 142). Re-allocation of family labour must achieve two goals: income maximisation and risk minimisation.

Another strand of the economic approaches to international migration has highlighted the role of political economy. For example, the dual labour market theory argues international migration is a result of a permanent demand for immigrant labour that is inherent to the economic structure of developed societies (Piore 1979). Thus, the creation of a permanent reserve army of labour is facilitated by international migration. There is often a structural demand for migrant labour as there is a need to fill vacancies in low status jobs which provided little opportunity for upward mobility and which are not wanted by local-native labourers (Gordon 1972; Piore 1979). The secondary sector therefore appeared, characterised generally by insecure and low paid jobs, low cost and less-skilled labour, and by workers lacking political consciousness (Gitmez 1983). In this approach, the migration process is seen as a function of the recruitment process and "is largely demand-based and is initiated by recruitment on the part of employers in developed societies, or by governments acting on their behalf" (Massey et al. 1993:444). However, this has not been proved empirically (Cain 1976) and the

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\(^5\) This is not the first time that the family has been introduced into migration analyses as earlier writings on migration also paid attention on the importance of family in migration decision-making along with individual behaviour (e.g. Beshers 1967).
distinction between these two sectors of economy in “advanced societies is arbitrary, leading to great instability in empirical estimates” (Massey et al. 1993:458).

From a similar ideological point of view, Frank sees migration as an expected result of the inherent tension between the core and periphery, arising from the process of capitalist development (1969). This neo-Marxist view is well known from the works of Wallerstein (i.e. World Systems Theory) and has been developed by researchers including Castells (1989) and Sassen (1991). Massey et al. (1993:447) identify six distinct hypotheses in this strand of migration theory. These refer to migration as part of the inevitable flows of raw materials, labour and capital between the core and the periphery in the course of capitalist development penetrating into the periphery. In this model, migration has little to do with wage and employment differentials between countries but more with market creation and the global economy, and is also affected by colonial links (Massey et al. 1993:448).

In brief, there are two schools of thought, broadly related to the economic school, more or less defining the tendencies among migration scholars: the Neo-classical Economic School and the Conflict School. The former adopts a functional view that understands migration as a voluntary and rational self-calculation by individual agents who eventually move abroad to better their economic conditions on the basis of wage differentials. The latter principally rejects such a perception of migration as a result of self-interested individuals’ conceiving it instead in terms of class structure and conflict (Papademetriou 1989:8).

Within both schools, international migration has been considered against the context of different development levels. For instance Stark and Yitzhaki (1988) underlined relative economic deprivation as a key function that was more important than wage differentials. Appleyard (1992) emphasised the different features of the interrelation between the development processes and international migration. He argued “internal and international migrations are prompted by the same basic processes of socio-economic transformation and development” (Appleyard 1992: 256). Through investigating migration in relation to development levels, a partial explanation was posited to the question as to why there had not been more migration from the South despite ongoing poverty in comparison with the wealth of the North.

There is no a priori rule that poverty must breed migration but there are certain levels of development that must be achieved for migration (İçduygü et al. 2001). Portes and
Bach analysed labour migration from Central and Latin America to the US and pointed out that the bulk of immigrants have come from relatively developed regions (1985:4-5). They summarised the mobility regimes in which emigration occurs; the migratory flow tends to go from regions with mid-level socio-economic development towards relatively developed regions (Portes and Bach 1985). Piore (1979) also implies that although middle-class migration eventually generates a migration stage in which lower and upper sectors of the population also become mobilised towards the developed countries, middle-class migration often remains dominant. In a similar vein, Tomas Hammar argues that "emigration may be expected to grow when poverty becomes less extreme, when literacy, basic education, and professional skills are more widespread, and when young women and men are ready to think not only about the next few days or weeks but about their own future and their children's" (1995:176).

However relative development levels are not sufficient in themselves to explain massive migrations from Turkey to Germany, which started in 1961 despite similar economic conditions prevailing before in terms, for instance, of wage differentials or class structure (Faist 2000: 38). In the case of the movement of Turkish Kurds to Germany, this migration started rather later than their Turkish fellow citizens and went against the rule, challenging the relationship between migration and development levels mainly due to the ongoing ethnic conflict in Turkey. Thus many very poor Kurds have left for Germany as part of massive asylum-seeker flows since the mid-1980s. Thus the economic side of the coin needs to be considered with the political one with regard to asylum-seeker dominance in Turkish Kurdish migration.

The concept of the EOI refers to material and non-material components of relative insecurity. Most of the material components can be explained in terms of economic status (such as lower income, lack of infrastructure facilities) as the approaches reviewed above have proposed. Such economic deprivation on its own may even be considered as a sufficient reason for Turkish Kurds to migrate. However, the EOI places emphasis on the political aspects of migration in relation to ethnic conflict giving migration a political character. The following section examines the intersections between politics and economics in explaining international migration.

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6 More about this literature can be found in Hammar et al. (1997) and Faist (2000).
2.5. Political Deprivation and International Migration

"... present-day internal conflicts generate much more sizeable waves of external refugees than in the past, involving the refugees who do not necessarily seek asylum in the nearest safe country but - with an increasing intensity - head for destinations with well established migrant networks or those offering the most favourable terms of protection, no matter how far away they are located." (Okolski 1999: 149).

The above statement from the Preliminary session of the European Population Conference (1999) indicates the transformation of international migration movements in terms of politically oriented flows. It can be argued that refugee or asylum seeker flows have become an integral part of general migratory regimes in as far as they draw on the same infrastructure: "well established migrant networks."

At another level, political economy approaches have established the directionality of international migration flows between the core and the periphery by referring to uneven development and underlying colonial ties. There are no colonial ties in the Turkish Kurdish case, but one may refer to a core-periphery relationship between Germany and Turkey since the end of the 19th Century. For the current state of Turkish Kurdish migration to Germany and Europe established migration ties since 1960 must be a quite relevant factor.

Refugee flows are often excluded from international migration studies and appeared as a separate (even isolated) discipline of study. The politically forced mobilisation of people has been recognised as a contingent type of “population movement”. For instance, Woods (1982), in his Theoretical Population Geography, did not even refer to refugees while there was no mention in Stillwell and Congdon’s Migration Models (1991) as well. Similarly, Cadwallader (1992) also overlooked the issue. However at the time these texts came out the total number of refugees in the world was about 14 million, almost outnumbering the entire immigrant stock in mainland Europe (UNHCR 2000), notwithstanding internal displacement which is currently roughly over 40 million (Hampton 1998).

World systems theory can be used to fill the political ‘gap’ in migration theory, with regard to its reference to historical links between the regions of the capitalist world economy incorporating colonial ties. Migration is a process of uneven exchange between geographical regions that are defined in terms of core, semi-periphery, and periphery. The system works through a complex network of flows of capital, labour, and commodities between these three regions in the context of uneven capitalist development (Wallerstein 1974; Petras 1981; Papademetriou and Martin 1991). The
strong relations between ex-colonial powers and their former colonies are significant to the direction and size of labour flows, facilitated by cultural, linguistic, administrative, communication and other institutions between sending and receiving areas. These links could, and should, be understood in broader terms as historically established networks in order to understand cases like migration from Turkey to Germany where there had been no colonial affiliation but strong historical links. So in the course of history, "each segment of the core developed a special relationship with a segment of the periphery" (Zolberg 1992:326).

Zolberg (1981 and Zolberg et al. 1986 and 1989) underlines the political forces regulating international migration and draws attention to the role of the state as decisive in international migration beyond the motives arising from the uneven distribution of opportunities. Drawing upon a neo-Marxist discourse, which perceives the world as comprising rich and poor countries, he predicts a future south-north tension in migratory regimes. The tension arises from the growth of the pool of potential migrants in the periphery and in response, the rise of protective walls in the core. He also puts forth the issue of refugees as a significant component of international migration to be considered theoretically (Zolberg 1989).

The systems approach to migration first applied by Mabogunje (1970) perceives migration "as a circular, interdependent and self modifying system" (Ogden 1984:23). This model stands on three components: the stimuli from the environment; institutional control sub-systems; and adjustment mechanisms, as all have an influence on the decision of the individual. Here 'the stimuli from the environment' might be considered as a reference to an EOI involving ethno-political tension.

A further development (at a different scale) of the migration systems approach uncovers the considerable interdependence between the migration experience of various countries of origin or certain countries of destination. Migration systems have been established between countries of origin and destination on the bases of historical, cultural, political or economic linkages, which shape the flows. The role of the state in initiating and shaping migration flows is essential but is accompanied by other processes such as migration networks, labour recruiters, educational recruiters and the like (Kritz et al. 1992). The state level of analysis dominates in this approach to provide a description of the context in which international migration occurs.

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7 Ottoman Turkey's participation with the Alliance forces in WWI and Republican Turkey's admission of Jews suffering from Nazi policies in the 1940s are examples of such a close historical relationship.
Massey *et al.* (1993:454) identified the three main hypotheses of the migration systems approach: a) geographical proximity is not a necessary condition but economic and political proximity are; b) multipolar systems are possible based on overlapping sending countries for a set of receiving core countries and presumably, overlapping receiving countries for a set of sending countries; c) entry into and dismissal from the system is responsive to political and economic changes (see also Bilsborrow and Zlotnik 1995:61). The systems framework considers individuals and households as active migration decision-makers who develop strategies accordingly (Kulu-Glasgow 1992). Systems approaches take both destination and origin into account; attempt to explain stability and mobility; examine elements of the system in combination as interconnected parts, not in isolation; and perceive migration as a sequential event changing over time (Fawcett and Arnold 1987). Therefore they represent a milestone in conceptualisation.

Cumulative causation theory and network theory also briefly touch upon some political structural influences (e.g. political regulations, historical economic and political links) but their main concern is to explain the perpetuation of international migration (Massey *et al.* 1993; Taylor 1992). Cumulative causation theory tries to incorporate network and institutional approaches and also refers to structural changes that affect the migration process gradually. According to this approach international migration continues progressively in ways that make additional movement more likely over time. In the meantime, six socio-economic factors affect migration cumulatively. These are; income distribution, land allocation, agricultural organisation, culture, regional distribution of human capital and the social meaning of work (Massey *et al.* 1993:451, see also Taylor 1992 and Faist 1997b). According to this view, once the migration process is underway, it changes circumstances both at the origin and at the destination and thus the likelihood of future migration may increase. Similarly, regulations restricting inflows clearly decrease further migration. However, these approaches lack an understanding of ethnic conflict situations, for example, Kurds in Turkey or Berbers in Morocco because they focus on state level dynamics overlooking internal ethnic dimensions.

With an inherent political focus, refugee studies, a neglected area of migration literature, can provide some explanation, as it is necessary to incorporate involuntary political and economic movements into the migration literature. Richmond's (1995) study of migrations proposed a framework locating movements on a continuous scale.
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ranging from migration under conditions of free decision making and rational choice (e.g. labour migration, guest workers) to movements characterised by intimidation, crisis and conflict (e.g. refugees, displaced people). He distinguishes underlying factors (e.g. extreme economic inequalities between countries and political instability) and structural limitations (such as legal frameworks) along with immediate precipitating conditions (e.g. the outbreak of war, ethnic conflict, and human rights violations) and enabling contexts (e.g. individual availability of resources) (Richmond 1995). The world systems perspective would place Richmond's model into an international structure which influences social conflicts that for instance trigger refugee flows in Asia, Africa and Latin America (Zolberg et al. 1986).

“Although there is a literature dating back to World War II, in 1981, Stein and Tomasi could still note that ‘traditionally viewed as localised, nonrecurring and isolated flows, refugees and refugee movements stand singularly undefined and notably undocumented’” (in Shami 1996:5). Refugee studies primarily propose typologies to distinguish refugee flows from labour flows; while the latter have economic causes, the former are rather explained in political terms (Suhrke 1995). However, successors have abandoned that simplistic view and incorporated many more variables into their models such as identity, ideology, political and economic causes at the roots and ethnic conflict, war, natural hazards as primary variables resulting in death, displacement, resettlement, refugee flows (i.e. Zolberg et al. 1989; Joly 1992; Richmond 1995; Suhrke 1995, 1998; Rogge 1998).

In reality, it is not easy to distinguish refugees from other migrants. European countries increasingly have been struggling with large asylum applications year by year. The problem for governments is whether they are “genuine” refugees or not. With the exception of the extreme cases such as sudden natural hazards or outbreak of wars, asylum seeker flows are mixed with clandestine migration as in the case of Turkish Kurdish migration to Europe (see Chapters 5, 6, and 7). Koser (1997b) has found the distinction between labour migration and asylum migration vague in his study of Iranian asylum seekers in the Netherlands using a networks approach. He argues the validity of the distinction changes according to the networks, which facilitate and shape the direction of flows. Probably due to the same reason “the traditional countries of immigration have also been major receivers of refugees…” (UN 1998a: 30).
A genuine refugee is described in International Law as one who “has well-founded fear of being persecuted … for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social or political opinion” in the 1951 Geneva Convention (UN 1998a: 109). There must be a real threat and the person must be unable to survive in the country which he or she left behind (Suhrke 1998: 284). Within the framework of conceptualisations assessed, this definition could be reworded as the ‘political migrant’. The category of political migrant comprises both “genuine” refugees and asylum seekers but it may also include illegal migrants who have no political cause but are economically deprived.

Geddes (1995) has explored the ‘democratic deficit’ in his study of minorities’ and immigrants’ rights in the EU. He refers to the lack of political participation for immigrants in the EU policy-making structures. No doubt such a democratic deficit for ethnic minorities would be much more evident in countries like Turkey with a well-known record of human rights violations and armed ethnic clashes. This ‘democratic or political deprivation’ prevalent in the home country can facilitate migration abroad mainly in clandestine ways towards areas promising less political deprivation. This conceptualisation is helpful to understand the Turkish Kurdish case, as they are concerned with overcoming both political and economic deprivation by fleeing to Europe.

Established international migration networks have paved the way for novel paths of international migration. These networks have created a deterritorialised destination [a unique and single imagined territory across all countries of destination which may constitute for instance a sphere including North America and Western Europe together for the Kurds] as well as encompassing deterritorialised ethnicities [ethnic groups that are not attached to a single territory]. Migration is not a process only combining departure, destination and journey phases but a state of being. Many people living in border areas earn their living by trading on the other side [of the border], commuting short distances. Similarly professionals of multinational corporations have been moving from country to country in order to get promoted (Salt 1992). For them, migration is the essential part of their lives and there is a quite enduring circulation. This situation is not much different for other migrants as well. They do not settle but live in a migrant state of being. An illustration tells more about this transformation via the help of networks:

"...a Sri Lankan now travelling to Germany, having neither legal papers nor money does not feel lost and helpless in Belarus or almost anywhere else if he is equipped with a
magnetic telephone card with which he may instantly request cash from a nearby cousin or friend, or get instructions from a (migrant) trafficker." (Okolski 1999:148)

The following section explores the literature on migration networks with regard to the increasingly transnational nature of these networks. Unlike the past, today migrant lives are spread across the borders of multiple states through transnational social spaces which are combinations of ties, positions in networks and organisations, and networks reaching across the borders. These spaces denote not static notions of ties but dynamic social processes (Faist 1999:4).

2.6. Networks and Transnationalism

Networks were always important in international migration but they have been transformed through the influence of globalisation, which can be defined as a "social process in which the constraints of geography on the social and cultural arrangements recede and in which people become increasingly aware that they are receding" (Waters 1995:3). With this challenge, new ways of conceptualising migration have come into existence such as transnationalism. The role of networks and transnationalism in international migration has gained a central place in recent accounts of international migration (Hammar et al. 1997; Portes 1997; Massey 1999; Faist 2000). Technological improvements helped international migration and the operation of transnational corporations. Thereby, transnational networks appeared and paved the way for deterritorialised social relations through networks leading towards transnational communities. Before the discussion of transnational communities in the context of Turkish Kurdish migration it is necessary to understand networks.

Tilly argued people do not migrate but networks do (1990:75). These networks can comprise a complex web of relations comprising economic and political networks of interaction, as well as involve collectives such as groups and associations (Faist 1997a:193), for instance networks of transnational corporations, state-level agreements and affairs, and NGOs such as Greenpeace. Massey et al (1993:448) define migrant networks as “sets of interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants in origin and destination areas through ties of kinship, friendship, and shared community origin.” These links increase the possibility of migration because they lower the cost and risks of international migration and also increase the likelihood of net returns. Networks are mutually beneficial for non-migrants and migrants because they both decrease risks for current migrants while increasing opportunities for
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newcomers. Thus they are inclined to expand, although there is a decreasing tendency in marginal net-gains (i.e. support for newcomers and potential migrants provided by those who have already migrated) from networks because of the increasing burden of potential migrants on residents. Thus, in the long run, residents’ capacity to offer opportunities for newcomers will be decreased (Boeker 1995).

The concept of the “relatives and friends multiplier” used by Nelson (1959:49) can be considered as the earliest use of a network approach in migration studies (see also Woods 1982:147). Another important concept related to the discussion of networks is social capital, which is essential to operate networks, since it allows individuals to cooperate in networks and collectives and to pursue their goals. It “links individuals to social structures ... serves to mobilise financial, human, cultural and political capital” (Faist 1997a:199).

According to Putnam, social capital may be defined as “the features of social organisation, such as trust, norms, and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions... [it is] productive like other forms of capital, making possible the achievement of certain ends that would not be attainable in its absence” (1993:167). One could discuss these ends as the betterment of life in economic, cultural and political terms which social capital makes possible by facilitating co-ordinated action, such as migration.

Migration networks can also institutionalise themselves. “Once international migration has begun, private institutions and voluntary organisations arise to satisfy the demand created by imbalance between large numbers of people who seek entry into capital-rich countries and the limited number of immigrant visas these countries typically offer” (Massey et al. 1993:450). This creation implies human trafficking as well. Migration “networks operate largely outside the sphere of policy makers’ influence” therefore almost all attempts to prevent this type of migration based on networks have failed” (Hugo 1998:146).

Networks are decisive in the perpetuation of international migration but go beyond it. When we think of their institutionalisation or the structures upon which they are based

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8 Similarly, Douglas Massey mentions the 'family and friends effect' while recalling social capital perspectives in his recent account of international migration (1999:306).
9 Portes and Mooney (2000:4) identify three general definitions of the term social capital: 1) as a source of social control; 2) as a source of family-mediated benefits; and 3) as a source of resources mediated by non-family networks. Different definitions of social capital and identified shortcomings in different approaches can be found in Portes and Mooney, 2000 (see also Bourdieu 1980).
then transnational processes arise. Through the spread of networks, social capital has been transferred and transformed into a new dimension, where new communities and ethnicities established themselves as transnational communities. One might call it a ‘post-migration phase’, which generates more mobility. However, this does not necessarily mean an increase in the migrant population but more circulation.\textsuperscript{10}

The aphorism, 'capital is global, labour is local' is challenged by the availability of long-distance mobility networks and the contribution of communication technologies leading to transnationalism (Portes 1997:814). Basch, Glick-Schiller and Blanc-Szanton define transnationalism as a process leading to multi-stranded lives bridging home and host societies in their account of migrants from the Caribbean and the Philippines living in the USA (1994:6).\textsuperscript{11}

Transnational communities can be defined as dense networks across political borders created by migrants in their search for the betterment of socio-economic and political status. These networks enable an increasing number of people to lead dual lives (Portes 1997:812). According to Portes (1998) transnationalism is a reaction of common people against globalisation: “what common people have done in response to the process of globalisation is to create communities that sit astride political borders and that, in a very real sense, are “neither here nor there” but in both places simultaneously” (p.3).\textsuperscript{12}

Faist (1999) identifies three different types of transnational ‘social spaces’: kinship groups, circuits, and communities, which have been ranked according to the breadth of ties among members varying from reciprocity to solidarity. Accordingly “transnational communities characterise situations in which international movers and stayers are connected by dense and strong social and symbolic ties over time and across space to patterns of networks and circuits in two countries - based upon solidarity”: the Kurds are a typical example (Faist 1999:8-9).\textsuperscript{13} He further postulates a line of demarcation

\textsuperscript{10} This caution about the volume of migration reflects studies that show the vast majority of people are not involved in migration (Faist, 2000).
\textsuperscript{11} The authors’ earlier work was the first account of transnationalism in relation to international migration (Glick-Schiller, Basch and Blanc-Szanton, 1992).
\textsuperscript{12} Considering transnationalism as a grass-roots response to globalisation is quite common among scholars and the common explanation relates to improvement of communication technologies (Kearney, 1986; Glick-Schiller et al., 1992; Wahlbeck, 1999).
\textsuperscript{13} Hassanpour also conceives the Kurdish case as a transnational community attempting to establish a deterritorialized nation-state (1999). “The concept of deterritorialisation proposed by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1975) ... is understood as describing the displacement and dislocation of identities, persons and meanings, with the moment of alienation and exile located in language and literature” (Brah, 1996:202).
between a transnational community and a diaspora community based on ties to the receiving countries: “Diasporas can only be called transnational communities if the members also develop some social and symbolic ties to the receiving country. If they don’t we can speak of exile” (Faist 1999:10).

Due to strong communication links, local tensions have the chance to evolve within transnational communities. For example, ethnic conflict can be transferred to the countries of immigration as in the case of Kurds in Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden (Falk 1998; Ostergaard-Nielsen 2000).

Rex (1996) discussed this issue in the context of the ethnic mobilisation of immigrant minorities and underlined some features of transnationalism discussing how transnational communities should be conceptualised:

So far as the homeland is concerned, these migrants will maintain contact with relatives who are there, will visit it and send children there for a part of their education, will send remittances and may seek to acquire property there, and, not least, will continue to take an active interest in homeland politics, often using the relative freedom of the land of settlement to further political causes which are repressed at home. [According to] these homeland concerns ... they are indeed diasporas or at least that homeland interest ... constitutes its main raison d'être. ... Within the land of settlement the main purpose is to gain as much as possible from participation in its institutions. (1996:5)

This conceptualisation is acceptable, with certain provisions, in relation to asylum seeker flows, since they may have a ‘myth’ of a homeland but no chance to “send their children there for education”, for instance. Nevertheless, as Rex stated, these communities still have three points of reference: one is to the homeland, the second is to the land of settlement and the third is to the possible countries of onward settlement (1996:5).

The network-based nature of transnational communities is common either in the form of extended families, ethno-political organisations (Rex 1996), ethnic entrepreneurship (Portes 1997), or solidarity among members (Faist 1999). Therefore it is possible to discuss 'transnational immigrant communities' instead of immigrant communities since social relations emerging from these developments (telecommunication, TNCs, etc.) are not easily confined within the borders of nation-states (Wahlbeck 1999:25). Once social capital is transferred to a transnational space, then its nature defines the basics of a transnational community denying territoriality but keeping its connections with origin and destination. Schierup (1985:153) calls this connection to both origin and country of destination a social field comprising a double existential frame of reference. Wahlbeck reiterates the issue as "it is more fruitful to understand this as something transnational."
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since the social relations of a refugee are largely unrelated to his or her actual geographical location" (1999:27).

The functions and operation of transnational social networks in the process of international migration need to be elaborated. Crisp (1999:6) identifies four basic functions. First, those networks are an important source of information to prospective migrants. Second, migrant networks act as means of mobilising financial resources. For example, potential migrants increasingly are provided for financially not from domestic sources but from sources abroad. Third, they provide the organisational infrastructure, which is necessary for people to move from one place of the world to another, especially in illegal migration. Fourth, these networks provide employment or financial support after arrival at the final destination. They may also erase the distinction between migrants and refugees that has been common in the literature until very recently. These networks link together people from the same family, ethnicity or country and "are far more likely to incorporate a variety of different migrant categories" (Crisp 1999:4). Ethnicity becomes important within these transnational social networks. Ethnic belongings can dominate within some of them and then these relations become crucial for the maintenance of ethnic identity as well. When there is an ethno-political concern as in the Turkish Kurdish case, then the expression of ethnicity may become more substantial. Following the brief introduction of the gender dimension, the final section reviews the literature on ethnicity with a particular focus on the expression of ethnicity in relation to international migration.

2.7. The Gender Dimension in International Migration

Although a vast area of investigation, within the scope of this research, the gender dimension is explored briefly. Scholars increasingly refer to the importance of gender in migration processes (Hugo 1995; Brah 1996; Portes 1997). Gender issues are reflected in relation to the selectivity of migration and decision making processes (Curran and Saguy 1998:4). Female participation in international migration constitutes about half of all flows (UN 1998) although it has not been paid as much attention as it has deserved and is still often unresolved in international migration conceptualisations (Pessar 1999). In forced migration cases such as refugee flows, characterised by a high level of political tension, the decisiveness of selectivity in migration may be diminished, as these moves are often characterised by a total displacement of the
population neglecting gender differences. At the same time, contemporary migration flows are proved to involve more female participation along with the rise of female participation in the labour force than it did in the past (Castles and Miller 1993; Massey et al. 1993; Grasmuck and Pessar 1991; Curran and Saguy 1998).

In a recent account of future prospects for international migration study, gender is highlighted among five themes: “the socially patterned relationship between sexes as they influence and, in turn, are influenced by the process of immigration” (Portes 1997:816). Despite the great emphasis on the paucity of literature on the role of gender in migration processes, writings in this field are growing rapidly as it is realised “women comprise a growing segment of migrations” (Brah 1996:179; see chapters 5 and 7 in Ackers 1998). With regard to the neglected role of gender in migration studies, Pessar admits the increasing volume of research on female migrants but underlines the need for gender-inflected research on both men and women (1999).

Recent studies also elaborated the gender dimension in migration by focusing on, for instance, women as domestic workers and the place of women in forced migration flows (e.g. El-Bushara 2000; Turner 2000; Sweetman 1998; UNOaV 1998). Evidently, there is a need for more research with a gender perspective in order to provide a gender balance in the theory of international migration (Mahler 1999; Grieco and Boyd 1998; Hagan 1998; Bailey and Cooke 1998). The only statement to be made here is this research considers the possible effects of gender differences in Turkish Kurdish migration as social differences based on gender might have influenced the migratory movement. For instance, in Turkey, lack of antenatal care makes the EOI very different for Turkish Kurdish women compared to their male companions (Cindoglu and Sirkeci 2001).

2.8. The Expression of Ethnicity on the Move

The definition of ethnicity is disputed although it has been a popular term in the social sciences since the 1950s. Modern scholars simply defined an ethnic group as a segment of a country’s population, which comes from a specific culture and shares common social institutions (Marshall 1994:157-58). Nevertheless, this study focuses on the

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14 “Ethnicity” first appeared in *Oxford English Dictionary*, in 1953. It means the essence of an ethnic group or the quality of belonging to an ethnic community or a group. A detailed account of the different definitions of ethnicity can be found in Hutchinson and Smith (1993).
expression of ethnicity in the course of migration hence the discussion here is limited to that aim and the detailed discussions of defining ethnicity are omitted. This research approached the expression of ethnicity as a distinguishing marker in migration behaviour.

Globalisation and transnationalism have not diminished the importance of ethnicity but renewed it (Featherstone 1990; Waters 1995). Ethnicity has become a global force floating through the cracks of state borders (Appadurai 1990). The four main points of the discussion for the expression of ethnicity in migration are as follows. First, the expression of ethnicity is a dynamic phenomenon. Secondly, it is an integrated symbolic structure with a time and space dimension. Thirdly, it is individual but with a collective association generated by shared activities. Finally, it is both ascribed by the subject and described by others (Jacobs and Meier 1998; Yinger 1994; Balibar and Wallerstein 1991).

Ethnicity is probably one of the most complex areas of social investigation since it occurs as a result of interactions of several symbolic properties of people. It seems almost impossible to give certain definitions. According to Balibar and Wallerstein, every interviewer knows that when you ask people about their memberships to a “collection-of-people” (nation, ethnicity, tribe, minority, etc.), with a question like “who are you?” there would be so many different answers but the answers would be more definite if the question was rephrased as “who are you if they [another “collection-of-people”] were that?” (Balibar and Wallerstein 1991:91). Ethnic identity, therefore, is relational, but this relationality is not confined to state boundaries as in the case of minorities although some scholars have used it in this way (e.g. Barth 1969).

Identities are rather imagined when they become the identity of a nation-state since geographical spaces created by political borders usually comprise more than one homogeneous ethnic population (Balibar and Wallerstein 1991:121). These different ethnic populations of a nation may have to live together but with conflicting interests. The definition of nation by Anderson has become very famous in the literature: “... an imagined political community and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” (1983:15). Gellner also shares a similar approach by stressing “Nationalism is not the

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15 There have been primordialist, static approaches but these have been rejected for lacking explanatory power in favour of instrumentalist approaches that treat ethnicity as a social, political and cultural phenomenon (see Hutchinson and Smith 1993).
awakening of nations to self-consciousness; it *invents* nations where they do not exist” (1964:169, emphasis is mine).

With respect to the relational and imagined nature of ethnic identity, Kurdish ethno-nationalism also expresses itself in relation to the “other”, namely the Turks. As many scholars emphasise there is another underlying process, that of self-definition or ascription of ethnic identity. “Ethnic identities are neither ascribed nor achieved; they are both...” (Eriksen 1993:57) and “determining factors of ethnicity are the characteristics of self-ascription and ascription by others” (Barth 1969:13).

Almost all approaches to ethnicity itemise its components: Nash also adopts this view and calls them the “building blocs of ethnicity” (Nash 1989:5). The most commonly referred to components are language, shared history, religion and a territory. But they are not necessarily exclusive or compulsory for each case. Among these, language seems the most referred to, probably due to practical reasons. It is relatively easy to identify and in many cases there are available records of distributions of populations according to languages.16 However scholars generally approach ethnicity with caution and adopt a flexible consideration through focusing on different aspects of ethnicity. For instance, in his pioneering essay, Weber underlined the distinguishing power of having a different language and a belief of being different [from the ‘other’] (1961:305). Territorial attachment seems abandoned in defining ethnicity. “Although much of the theoretical writing about ethnicity has been concerned with the attachment of an ethnic group to a territory, in fact ethnic communities are often concerned precisely with their detachment from a territory” (Rex 1996:103). Territorial attachment has not been central in ethnicity debates but boundaries have been important. For Barth (1969) it was based on boundaries but these boundaries were basically psychological in nature, not territorial (Romanucci-Ross and De Vos 1995).

Symbols are also “important factors for action as they are objects, acts, concepts or linguistic formations that stand ambiguously for a multiplicity of disparate meanings, evoke sentiments and emotions and impel men to action” (Mach 1993:39). For Turkish Kurds, the celebration of Newroz17 is one such symbol (Aksoy 1991:13 and Mihatuli 1992:168). There are undoubtedly lots of other elements in the definition of ethnicity.

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16 See Chapter 4 for the issues of data availability on ethnicity.

17 Newroz is a festival celebrated on 21st of March each year among Kurds, but similar festivals are celebrated by many other Middle Eastern societies around the same period of the year as celebrations of New Year and spring. The word Newroz also means “New Year [day]” in Kurdish and Persian languages (See Chapter 7 for more details).
An ethnic group is a group within a larger society having real or commonly accepted ancestry with a historical memory and cultural focus on symbolic elements defined as the characteristic of their ethnicity. These symbolic elements may include kinship patterns, physical proximity or being in contact, religious affiliation, language or dialect forms, tribal affiliation, a common belief in a future project, and nationality along with a consciousness of kind among members of the group. However, the essential element in measuring ethnicity remains self-ascription and description by others.

Depending on the situations, people assume multiple identities, which they use interchangeably. These options are almost infinite; an individual can underline his political identity in one situation while he declares a religious or political identity in another. Similarly, other cross cutting identities could be preferred. However having stated these features of ethnic identity, ethnicity is socially constructed rather than being essential or natural (see Jackson and Penrose 1993). Therefore identity may be subjected to changes or shifts through processes including migration and transnationalisation.

In the process of migration, ethnic or national identities become more visible beside other identities. International migration breeds more ethnic confrontation possibly because it involves ‘foreigners’ in other ‘national’ spheres (e.g. Lever-Tracy and Quinlan 1988; Massey 1993 and Cohen 1997). The expression of ethnicity is considered with respect to White’s (1995) conceptualisation of migration and identity shift. His approach illustrates the dynamic use of multiple identities and their moves in time and space. "A person who initially leaves his or her country as one type of migrant may, depending on the situation and/or the passing of time, becomes another type of migrant" (Wahlbeck, 1999:29).

White (1995) underlines the changes occurring in structures, geographies and people due to migration. He mentions the transformations that occur in the lives of all people involved in migration. “Migration therefore changes people and mentalities” (White 1995:1). People have multiple identities, and migration may influence self-images of these multiple identities which are not stable and migrants may have identity shifts in the same day (White 1995:3). White’s argument on changes resulting from migration may be read as changes during the migration process by drawing it into a continuous

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18 This argument also finds support from the literature which proposes globalisation may exacerbate, forms of social exclusion including nationalism and ethnicity, religious fundamentalism, racism, sexism and localism (Massey 1993:232 and Cohen 1997:169).
life event with more emphasis on its dynamic nature. Thus we can talk about the attempts of migrants to re-create their former life stories, (which possibly evolve and mature during the illegal migration adventure of an asylum seeker, for instance). Another impact can be integration or assimilation as White (1995) proposes. Alternatively, it can be a stand-still alongside the host society which means they just integrate into the immigrant enclave such as Turkish communities in Germany. It should be noted here that these identity shifts are not confined to individuals but can affect the whole society as well.

The shift in identity is a major component of the migration-ethnicity interaction and is reflected in almost all spheres because it alters almost all activities of an individual migrant: employment, income, wealth, patterns of consumption, secularisation or religiosity, plans, wishes and so on (White 1995:3). Migration creates new hybridised styles of life. “Many migrants may not have held a particularly strong view of their own ethnicity prior to movement” (White 1995:3), they may then develop a new ethnicity or strengthen the previous one when they are confronted by “others” in the destination country. Such a multiplicity and the interchangeable use of identities may also lead to syncretism and already some scholars have indicated an engagement in transnational syncretism among second generation Turks in Germany (Çağlar 1995).

The ethno-nationalist nature of identity may cause a stronger loyalty to the emergent ethnic identity rather than assimilation by the host society. In the case of Turkish Kurds, one should also note that Kurdish ethnic identity has recently been re-awakened - and reconstructed - in response to experiences of conflict in Turkey and Iraq and to a worldwide resurgence of ethno-nationalism (Van Bruinessen, 1998:39). In this regard, there has been a rise of Kurdish ethno-nationalism in both the country of origin, Turkey, and in immigration countries of Western Europe. In this case, the movement might appear as a strategy to avoid assimilation in the country of origin: preserving and reconstructing ethnic identity abroad (Findlay and Li, 1999:55).

Multiple identities and identity shifts in relation to the migratory movement “are frequently composite and transnational” (Alund 1999:113). They are heavily bounded by processes of settlement, integration, adaptation, exclusion and so forth. The emergence of new ethnicities along the lines of new solidarities and new alliances in immigration societies is “the fruit of cultural diffusion and social exclusion” (Alund 1999:114), and the ethnic identities created in a multi-cultural society are “not pure.
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original or connected with a fixed past; rather they relate to the dilemmas and conflicts of the present” (Alund 1999:114).

In terms of the maintenance of ethnic identity, networks are also important as they are important for migration and will deserve a special attention in this research. Turkish Kurds “have a well organized and well established network of contacts through committees and information offices all over the world” (Wahlbeck, 1996b: 7). Through contacts with Turkey and with Kurdish communities in other countries, in many ways including television, information bureau, newspapers, bulletins, etc., the ethnic identity of Turkish Kurds may be maintained abroad. A strengthening of their identity might also be expected. These networks can also serve as sources to cope with problems in the destination countries while reproducing and maintaining ethnic identity.

2.9. Concluding remarks

As a comprehensive study of the international migration of Turkish Kurds in response to an ethnic conflict, this study has carefully reviewed the literatures of international migration and ethnicity. Such a vast subject area forces the researcher to consider different approaches from different disciplines such as political science, sociology, anthropology, and geography. This interdisciplinary nature of the research inevitably - and fortunately - requires a hybrid conceptualisation leading also to a mixed methodology which is discussed in chapter four. While migration patterns and processes stand in the territory of international migration conceptualisations, the role of the expression of ethnicity leads the investigation towards the approaches on definition and measurement of ethnic identity. Thereby aims and objectives of the study as defined in Chapter 1 require an eclectic conceptual approach benefiting from different strands and disciplines in order to analyse complex international migration cases which involve ethnic conflict. The conceptual framework employs as building blocks the background concept of the EOI, economic and political approaches to international migration, transnationalism, and a dynamic understanding of ethnicity. First, the conceptualisation of the EOI helps to understand relative conditions, which facilitates international migration given the existence of an ethnic conflict situation. It also hints at the relative environment of (in)security in the country of destination. The EOI provides an insight into the conditions in the area of origin, especially the options and possible strategies leading to migration or staying.
Second, this framework draws on economic and political perspectives on international migration particularly to migration systems and network approaches. These general approaches to international migration help to understand the root causes and the perpetuation of the migration experience. For instance wage and employment differentials or wealth differentials are still evident determinants of migration. However one has to incorporate political and conflict oriented views within these models.

Third, the transnationalism perspective is the glue for the theoretical framework, which helps to understand the mechanisms and patterns of migration as a whole and goes beyond migration by providing explanations about the maintenance of ethnic migration networks, communities and ethnic identities. Active communication links between ethnic immigrant communities in different countries, their connection with their fellows in the country of origin, and their unique recruitment mechanisms are very difficult to understand without this transnational social network approach. Turkish Kurds learn and develop their own (but often unknown until migration) distinct ethnic identity, often for the first time, through a variety of media, such as MED-TV\(^{19}\) or Kurdish language classes in German schools. None of this can be properly understood without reference to transnational ethnic networks.

Fourth, along with the transnationalism approach, understanding the expression of ethnicity on the move has to be focused on the relationship between ethnic identity and ethnic conflict in the case of Turkish Kurds. An armed ethnic conflict prior to international migration can lead to a conflict based expression of ethnicity and may breed more use of transnational communication networks in order to rebuild a strong ethnic affiliation as in the Turkish Kurdish case.

The most significant element of conceptualisation in such complex studies is theoretical pluralism, as now more commonplace in literature on international migration. A mixed conceptual approach may enable the researcher to have a better understanding of international migration and ethnicity. Reality flows outside the grey borders of theorisation and involves macro-micro structures, perceptions, choices, voluntary and involuntary action all together.

Consequently, this study adopts a mixed conceptual framework based on theoretical pluralism. It attempts to combine different perspectives stemming from different

\(^{19}\) Kurdish satellite TV station which broadcasts news, culture and education programs based in England and Belgium with production studios all around Europe.
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...schools of thought and different disciplines in order to provide a useful set of conceptual references incorporate the processes of ethnic conflict and international migration.
Chapter III

The Context of International Migration: ethnic conflict and deprivation at home and abroad

"It is suicide to be abroad
But what is to be at home...
What is to be at home?"
(Samuel Beckett, All that fall, 1957, p.10)

3.1. Introduction

In order to understand the international migration of a particular population and the role of the expression of ethnicity in relation to this movement, an understanding of these movements’ context is necessary, comprising their background and reasons for migration, their journeys and their destinations. Thus in this chapter, Turkey’s ethnic social fabric and the Kurdish question is introduced and linked to the German context of immigration.

To date, the international migration of Turkish Kurds has been overlooked in the literature although they have always constituted a significant component of flows from Turkey since the 1960s. Moreover none of the prevalent ethnic diversities within these flows have been discussed within the literature. Although one can find a voluminous literature on migration flows from Turkey to Europe and Turkish immigrant communities in Europe, there are only a few studies exploring its ethnic and religious diversities (e.g. Gürbey 1995; Franz 1986). Given the dearth of studies on Turkish Kurdish migration, this research is one of the first to explore this particular and largest minority component of both Turkish society and the Turkish migratory regime. This chapter draws on the literature to locate Turkish Kurdish migration within the broader Turkish migration context. However, based on the conceptual framework developed in the previous chapter, three essential areas are examined: 1) Turkey’s socio-economic and ethnic fabric in relation to conflict and migration. 2) The Kurdish population and ethno-nationalism. 3) Germany as a destination country with regard to Turkish Kurdish migration from Turkey.

This review of the context in which Turkish Kurdish international migration has been shaped reflects upon the conceptual premises drawn in the previous chapter. Therefore, along with the socio-economic and political aspects which have been the core concern
for migration studies, ethnic aspects in relation to the conflict between the Turkish and Turkish Kurdish elements are also discussed in relation to the environment of insecurity (EOI) framework which relates material and non-material deprivation to ethnic conflict and migration in Turkey. The EOI is relational and therefore also has a utility in understanding the expression of ethnicity, which may differ throughout the stages of migration process.

The first section of this chapter examines Turkish migration with specific reference to ethnicity. It examines ethnic conflict and its implications, in the case of the Turkish Kurdish population, in a historical context in which the EOI has contributed to international migration. However this interacting nature of migration and ethnic conflict is intertwined with global and regional changes, which also need to be addressed here.

The second section focuses on Turkish Kurdish involvement in migration flows from Turkey in which the role of the Kurdish ethno-nationalist movement is examined as an institution that may affect international migration and the constitution of transnational networks.

The third section of the context focuses on Germany as a destination for Turkish Kurdish migration. It examines the characteristics of the destination by outlining German migration history, the guest worker system, and ethnic (migrant) enclaves in relation to the relative environment of security with specific reference to Turkish migration. The penultimate context is the city of Cologne where one of the largest Turkish and Turkish Kurdish immigrant groups in Germany lives along with a population a quarter of whom are foreign born.

3.2. The Turkish Context; The ethnic question, the Kurds, and international migration

As a developing country on the periphery of the European Union, Turkey has been one of the main contributors of migration streams into Europe since the early 1960s following several bilateral agreements with Western European governments. It is described as a bridge between the continents as well as civilisations and recently this functional geography of the country made it a transit country for thousands of people
from the Middle East, Asia and Africa heading towards Western Europe.\(^{20}\) The country has borders with Greece (and hence the European Union), to the West and Iran, Iraq, and Syria to the East (see Figure 3.1). The Kurds from Iraq and Iran have also used Turkey as a transit country although the ethno-political conditions in Turkey have forced many of its own Kurds to leave the country. However, the country's significance in the international migration market of Europe comes from its dominant position as a sending country with more than three million immigrants with Turkish citizenship resident in Western Europe (Abadan-Unat 1995).

**Figure 3.1. Regions and provinces in Turkey**

Migration flows from Turkey have been transformed according to the changing needs of receiving countries. However, as previous studies have shown, some basic structural factors are important for the perpetuation of emigration from Turkey (İçduygu 1991; Gitmez 1991; Abadan-Unat and Kemiksiz 1986). Economic instability and the problems of development have created persistent migration pressure in terms of, for instance, income and employment differentials. For example, the average unemployment rate in Turkey during the 1990s was around 14% along with inflation rates ranging between 60% and 100% (SPO 1999) and a Gross Domestic Product per capita of $2,900 in 1999 (World Bank 2000). At the same time, the mean unemployment rate for the European Union was 8%, average GDP per capita was above $20,000, and inflation rates were around 1-2 percent (CIA 2000). Turkish demographic trends have also compounded these economic pressures by adding more

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\(^{20}\) For example in 1998, more than 600 illegal migrants were detained in Ankara according to police records (personal communication from F. Aslan, Deputy Chief Police Officer in the Foreigners Bureau, 1998).
people into a limited employment market. Turkey’s population growth rate was estimated at 1.5% per annum during the 1990s, slightly higher than the world average while at least 8 times higher than the European Union (World Bank 2000; Council of Europe 1999).

Migration from Turkey has hitherto been studied from an economic perspective with political aspects often overlooked in the literature. However it is crucial to consider both socio-economic factors and “nationalistic and Islamic-religious aspects too” (Franz 1994:34). Turkey has been a multi-ethnic society since the establishment of the Republic in the 1920s when it inherited the Anatolian territory from the Ottoman Empire where a heterogeneous population of Kurds, Arabs and Armenians were living along with Turks. Turkey’s religious structure had divided society into sections comprising Sunni-Islam and Alevi-Islam as well as Christian minorities.

Turkey, as a successor to the multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire, has faced problems in its transformation to a nation-state. Simultaneous with the upswing of nationalism in Europe, nations under Ottoman rule started their nation-building adventures, and Turks were not an exception taking advantage of being the ruling ethnic group. The last century of the Ottoman Empire was therefore a period of Turkish nationalism (Mardin 1989; Ahmad 1993). This ambitious nationalism was conducive to the development of Turkish nationalism during the early years of the new Turkish Republic, from the 1920s to the 1940s. Throughout the earlier decades of the twentieth century, Turkey witnessed a silent ethnic cleansing; most of its minorities were obliged to leave the country, including Greeks, Jews, and Armenians (see Rodrigue 1997; Augustinos 1997; İçduygu and Sirkeci 1999a; Bora 1995). As the second largest ethnic group after Turks, Kurds were the most problematic for the state, partly because they were also Muslim while almost all other minorities were non-Muslims. They were difficult to eliminate because attacking a Muslim population would cause unrest among Muslim Turks too. They were also difficult to absorb, as they were so many.

The multi-ethnic fabric of Turkish society is based on two axes cross cutting each

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21 This is both due to the impossibility of researching such issues, considered to be “very sensitive” by Turkish governments and due to the unavailability of data and research opportunities. Thus, the economic dimension has dominated the research and overshadowed ethnic aspects although a few have also focused on ethno-political factors (i.e. Franz 1986; van Bruinessen 1992a; Yalçın-Heckman 1991; Barkey 1993).

22 It must be noted here that the period until the end of the 1920s was characterised by forced population movements between the former Ottoman territories and its last stronghold in Anatolia. For instance, many Muslim and Turkic populations fled to Turkey after invasions of Russians and Bulgarians (McCarthy 2001).
other. On the one hand, two religious denominations, namely Alevi and Sunni, divide almost all ethnic groups into two major camps. About 70 per cent of the population is estimated to be Sunni and the Alevi population is about 25 per cent of the whole, with other minor denominations and Christian communities constituting the remaining 5 percent of the total (Özsoy et al. 1992; Koç and Hancioğlu 1999; Sirkeci 2000). It is possible to identify Alevi population concentrations in the north and western areas of the East region although they have spread all around the country. The Christian populations are mainly the non-Muslim minorities of Istanbul privileged by the Lausanne Treaty of 1923.

Two major ethnic groups, the Turks and the Kurds, today dominate Turkey’s population. All other minor groups account for only four percent of the entire population. According to some estimates, the Turks constitute about 78 percent of the population and the Kurds are about 18 percent followed by Arabs making the remaining two percent of the total (Sirkeci 2000, Özsoy et al. 1992; Koç and Hancioğlu 1999).

The Turkish people mainly live in the West, Central and Northern parts of the country whereas the majority of the Kurds live in the East. However, rural urban migration and clashes between the Turkish army and the Kurdish guerrilla movement during the last two decades have caused a dispersal of the Kurds towards the western urban centres of Turkey (Mutlu 1996; İçduygu et al., 1999; Sirkeci 2000). Therefore, all major cities of the country’s west currently have a Kurdish population of at least ten percent. Most Arabs can be found in the border areas of Southeast Turkey neighbouring Syria and Iraq.

Apart from the Turks and the Kurds there are many other ethnic groups in modern Turkey including for example Greeks, Armenians, Jews, Circassians, Lazs, and Georgians. However, their numbers have diminished as many have left the country because of attacks and persecutions targeted at them since the 1920s after the establishment of the Turkish Republic (Franz 1986; Bora 1995). The first and the largest of these flights was the compulsory exchange of populations between Turkey and Greece in the early 1920s; about 2.5 million people were forced to leave the country (Ari 1995; Sirkeci and İçduygu 2001). As a result, there are now very small communities of these minorities with negligible representations in nationwide surveys due to their size. The TIMS (Turkish International Migration Survey, 1996) also
includes very few cases from these groups, unfortunately preventing statistical analysis.

An examination of Turkish Kurdish migration and the expression of ethnicity on the move requires further elaboration of the ethnic dissimilarity between the Turks and the Kurds. In particular, regional differences and their ethnic implications are important. The following section, therefore, focuses on aspects of socio-economic development in Turkey, which is followed by an examination of the Kurdish question and history of international migration from Turkey.

3.2.1. Socio-economic unevenness and implications for migration and ethnicity in Turkey

Regional socio-economic differences and their repercussions on the ethnic segregation of Turkish society may provide some explanations for the international migration of the Turkish Kurds. A recent study examined the relationship between socio-economic underdevelopment and the ethnic question and found a sound relationship between the two in the case of Turkey’s Kurds (İçduygu et al. 1999). This section examines Turkey’s socio-economic development history by referring to differences throughout the country and questions possible underlying ethnic aspects.

A particular literature has emerged on the interactions between international migration and socio-economic development levels (Hammar 1995; İçduygu 1995; Massey 1988; Portes and Bach 1985; Portes 1978). Gedik (1996) underlined that migration is more likely among upwardly mobile middle-class people from middle-level developed areas in Turkey. Some other studies have also endorsed similar findings in other contexts (e.g. Massey et al. 1994; Portes and Borocz 1989; Piore 1979). Therefore it is significant to examine different development levels in Turkey to understand the patterns of international migration and the EOI.

Although there have been no empirical studies in Turkey on the relationship between regional development differences and possible ethnic causes behind it, certain questions are raised.23 Have successive Turkish governments intentionally let the Kurdish

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23 Franz (1994) presents a detailed account of dispersal policies in Turkey and claims some of them were ethnically driven. His analysis provides evidence supporting this view (Franz 1994:228-235). For instance, a Turkish law enacted in 1934 (Law no.2510 of 14.6.1934) reads: "Persons without affiliation to Turkish culture and persons with an affiliation but another mother tongue may be resettled at any time upon orders of the Ministry of Interior for cultural, military, political, social or security related reasons" (Franz 1994:229).
populated region remain underdeveloped; or was it just the simple outcome of harsh natural conditions as the area is very mountainous though rich in natural resources including oil? Whatever the political measures behind the circumstances, the outcome has been a migration pressure affecting the people in these economically disadvantaged regions. This pressure plays an important role in out-migration flows, both towards the industrial centres of Turkey and Europe.

Figure 3.2.
Socio-economic development levels in Turkey by province, 1995

As Figure 3.2 shows, the west of the country is the most developed part while the eastern part lying below the dotted line drawn by myself is the least developed region according to Turkish State Planning Organisation (SPO) data with the notable exception of Batman province which has the largest oil reserves in the country. As the SPO index on which this map was based indicates, less development may mean lack of educational opportunities and health facilities along with a shortage of employment opportunities as a result of very limited investment in industrial, agricultural, and communication sectors. This unevenness expresses itself in the figures of, for instance, per capita Gross National Product, which, in 1997, was $1000 in Hakkari in the East while it was $ 8,000 in Izmit in the West (SIS 2000). Similarly, possibly due to lack of facilities compounded with lower education levels among the female population of the East, the infant mortality rate was 90 per thousand in the East whereas it was 50 per thousand in the West. Similarly, while there are high literacy rates in the West; literacy is strikingly low in the East. For example, it was 90 percent in Izmit but only 55 percent in Hakkari (SIS 2000).

The explanation of regional differences in development levels lies in the history of

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24 Data used in this map comes from the Turkish State Planning Organisation District level Socio-economic Development Index. The index is a composite of indicators of population, employment, education, health, manufacturing industry, construction, agriculture, communication, and finance. The index values range between –1.35 and 7.74, the former indicates the lowest and the latter the highest. A complete description of this index can be found in Dinçer (1996).

25 For locations please see Figure 3.1.
Turkish industrialisation. The period following the World War II was a break-through for Turkey due to the integration of capitalism into the pre-capitalist social formation of Turkey that was accompanied by a large-scale rural to urban exodus (İçduygü 1991:41). The mechanisation of agriculture from the 1950s onwards had a side effect, because it accelerated rural migration to cities and towns as each tractor replaced ten to fifty peasants or rural labourers (Karpat 1973:58). A supporting factor was the official ideology of “industrialisation” and “Westernisation” central to the policies of the new Turkish Republic since the 1920s. Eventually it created strong differences between regional socio-economic development levels, which accounted for the perpetuation of internal migration towards western cities (Gitmez 1983; İçduygü and Sirkeci 1999a).

Since the 1960s Turkey has aimed for “balanced development” in its five-year-plans to eliminate unevenness. These plans, however, have lacked consistency with contradictory objectives following each other from plan to plan mainly due to political instability. For instance, there were six different governments during the third five-year plan from 1973 to 1978.

Regional inequalities in Turkey explain most of its internal migration patterns. Sharp socio-economic development differences created in the course of industrialisation have contributed to rural to urban migration in Turkey (İçduygü and Sirkeci 1999a; Franz 1994). International labour recruitment procedures of the 1960s and 1970s could be cited as another facilitating factor too. Thus, İstanbul and neighbouring provinces along with the western coastal area around İzmir have increasingly attracted most emigrants from these less developed regions since the 1950s.

Accompanied by post-war pronatalist policies, these developments rapidly created an agricultural labour surplus, which exceeded the expansion of employment opportunities created by industrialisation (İçduygü and Sirkeci 1999b). By 1960, the impacts of high unemployment levels in urban areas forced the government to take measures to solve the problem in the form of labour export policies which were built into development

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26 The most important factor here was the effects of Turkey’s incorporation into the capitalist West, which brought hard currency into the country. Starting with Marshall Aid in 1947, Turkey had welcomed foreign capital and channelled it into the mechanisation of agriculture and construction of highways (İçduygü 1991:45).

27 A detailed account of opposing goals in consecutive plans and their impacts on Turkish urbanisation can be found in Franz (1994), pp.203-225.

28 Due to the fact that recruitment agencies and offices were in big cities, many villagers moved to these cities during the 1960s and 1970s. For this reason, early patterns of Turkish labour migration are dominated by migration from İstanbul and Ankara, which were central places for labour recruitment abroad (see İçduygü et al. 1998).

**Table 3.1. Population change in major provinces of Turkey, 1960-2000**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adana</td>
<td>760803</td>
<td>778383</td>
<td>1849478</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>137.61%</td>
<td>143.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ankara</td>
<td>1321380</td>
<td>2854689</td>
<td>4007860</td>
<td>116.0%</td>
<td>40.40%</td>
<td>203.31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antalya</td>
<td>416130</td>
<td>748706</td>
<td>1719751</td>
<td>79.9%</td>
<td>129.70%</td>
<td>313.27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bursa</td>
<td>693894</td>
<td>1148492</td>
<td>2125140</td>
<td>65.5%</td>
<td>85.04%</td>
<td>206.26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Antep</td>
<td>434579</td>
<td>808697</td>
<td>1285249</td>
<td>86.1%</td>
<td>58.93%</td>
<td>195.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>İstanbul</td>
<td>1882092</td>
<td>4741890</td>
<td>10018735</td>
<td>151.9%</td>
<td>111.28%</td>
<td>432.32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>İzmir</td>
<td>1063490</td>
<td>1976763</td>
<td>3370866</td>
<td>85.9%</td>
<td>70.52%</td>
<td>216.96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Içel</td>
<td>444523</td>
<td>843931</td>
<td>1651400</td>
<td>89.9%</td>
<td>95.68%</td>
<td>271.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>27700000</td>
<td>44700000</td>
<td>67803927</td>
<td>61.4%</td>
<td>51.69%</td>
<td>144.78%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: 1960 Census and 1980 Census summarised from SIS (1989a) and (1989b); 2000 Census from SIS (2002).*

According to the summary statistics based on the census data provided by SIS (Turkish State Institute of Statistics) Turkey’s population has grown by around 145 percent since 1960 (Table 3.1). However, due to internal migration, some provinces such as İstanbul, Ankara, İzmir, Bursa, and Içel have doubled or tripled their populations during the last forty years. İzmir's population, for example, rose from one million in 1960 to 3.4 million by 2000. Meanwhile İstanbul’s population reached ten million in 2000 from 1.9 million in 1960 (SIS 1989b, 1993, and 2002).

**Table 3.2. Provinces with highest annual urban population growth rate, per 1000, 1990-2000**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rate</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rate</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Hakkari</td>
<td>66.76</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Batman</td>
<td>44.62</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Şanlıurfa</td>
<td>42.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Van</td>
<td>53.19</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Antalya</td>
<td>44.13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Adıyaman</td>
<td>42.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Şırnak</td>
<td>52.28</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Muş</td>
<td>43.64</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Bitlis</td>
<td>42.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Ağrı</td>
<td>46.31</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Rize</td>
<td>42.56</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Yozgat</td>
<td>40.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Mardin</td>
<td>45.16</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Tekirdağ</td>
<td>42.51</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Iğdır</td>
<td>38.43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: 2000 Population Census from SIS (2002).*

Population decreased in 15 provinces from 1985 to 1990 all of which were located in the East (İçduyuğ and Sirkeci 1999a), despite the fact that 13 of the 15 city centres with the highest urban population growth rates were in the East region (SIS 2002). The 2000 Turkish Census (SIS 2002) found that South-eastern provinces topped the list of fastest growing city centres. Population growth rates in Kurdish populated urban areas had growth rates exceeding those of the most attractive urban destinations in the past such as İstanbul (29 per thousand) and İzmir (24 per thousand); for example, in the cities and towns Hakkari province growth rate for urban populations were 67 per thousand, while
it was 53 per thousand in Van, and 52 per thousand in Şırnak (SIS 2002, see Table 3.2).

The most recent factor causing migration has been clashes between the Turkish army and PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party). These migration figures should be interpreted in the knowledge that most of the least developed areas of the country stand within the region, which is mostly inhabited by Turkish Kurds. It would not be wrong to interpret unevenness in development and differences in migration rates as a reflection of ethnic factors. These record population growth levels in the cities of the South East region are also a direct result of the conflict, which has taken place between the Turkish army and Kurdish guerrilla movement since the mid-1980s. People moved from rural areas to urban centres. The government evacuated more than 3000 villages in the region for “security reasons” in the mid-1990s. Many other villages also were emptied as their residents left because of ongoing clashes and bombings in the rural areas.

3.2.2 The Kurdish question and the Turkish response

"O yıllarda ülkemizde
Çeşitli hükümetlerle
Yetmiş iki dilden
İkisi yasaklanmıştı
İkincisi Türkçe" 29

(Cemal Süreya, 1988, p.25)

The Kurdish Question in Turkey has been on the political agenda for almost a century (Barkey 1993; McDowall 1996; Robins 1993; Entessar 1989; Van Bruinessen 1992a). The main features of the Kurdish question as a threat to the “national unity of Turkey” arose from the establishment of the Turkish Republic in the 1920s following the Treaty of Sevres of 10 August 1920, which prescribed a possible Kurdish state in the region comprising the Southeast of Turkey and some territories of Iran and Iraq (Robins 1993:659). With regard to this, the primary historical causes of the Kurdish question in Turkey can be elaborated as state- and nation-building deficiencies in the early Republican period of the 1920s. However, the solidification of Kurdish ethno-nationalism was a product of the 1980s and 1990s (İçduyu et al 1999). Concurrent with the world wide upswing in ethnic nationalism over the last thirty years, there has

29 "In those years in our country; two of seventy-two languages/ were banned by various decrees the second was Turkish" [translation by Ibrahim Sirkeci].
been an upsurge in Kurdish nationalism in Turkey since the late 1970s, although, there were many previous influential Kurdish movements or rebels before (McDowall 1996).

This particular ethnic group, constituting no less than one fifth of the population, has been a major challenge to pan-Turkish currents since the late Ottoman period. In its many forms, Turkish nationalism, ranging from racism to residency-based fellowship ties, placed emphasis on being Turkish or admitting to be Turkish. Obviously such nationhood based on self-ascription (i.e. accepting being Turkish) is open to ethnic challenges when there are people from different ethnic backgrounds. The reactions of Turkish Kurds should be considered within this context since they have revolted several times during the history of the Turkish Republic (Franz 1994).

Although Kurds enjoyed a tribal autonomy under the Ottoman rule, “the new republic was solely based on Turkish culture and identity, and hence did not permit the expression of Kurdish identity and language within its borders” (İçduyuğu et al. 1999:993). However, the Kurdish presence outside its borders has always been a threat for the Turkish state because such existence (i.e. Kurdish autonomy in Iran or Iraq) may constitute some sort of encouragement for the Kurds. Turkey, like Iran and Iraq, had launched policies aimed to transform her multi-ethnic population into a ‘cohesive civic nation’ but the Kurds were the most difficult ethnic group to integrate because of their large numbers and the tribal structures they preserve (van Bruinessen 1998:39).

The most cited total figures for the Kurdish population are about 25 to 30 million, although there are different estimates ranging from 16 million (McDowall 1996) to over 30 million (Kreyenbroek and Allison 1996). Most of the Kurds live in the upper area of the Fertile Crescent of the Middle East marked by the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers within the territories of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria (Figure 3.3). There are also Kurdish populations in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkmenistan. The geographic distribution of the Kurdish population consists of approximately: 8-15 million in Turkey, 3-9 million in Iran, 3-7 million in Iraq, 1-1.5 million in Syria, 1 million in former Soviet Republics, and 1 million in the Kurdish diaspora (White 2000; Sirkeci 2000; Izady 1999; Schmidt 1998; Kreyenbroek and Allison 1996; LOC 1995; Franz 1994; Chailand 1980).

Roughly half of all Kurds live in Turkey. Estimates of the Turkish Kurdish population are all based on the 1965 Census, which was the last time statistics based on mother tongue were revealed in Turkey. Since then only a few surveys have collected ethnic
information. Projections based on growth rate and migration rate trends indicate a Turkish Kurdish population of 7.5 to 11 million, the majority of whom reside in the Eastern provinces of Turkey (Sirkeci 2000).

The Turkish Kurdish people form part of a Middle Eastern ethno-national community mainly living in Turkey, Iraq and Iran. They speak four different dialects of Kurdish: Northwest Kurdish called Kurmanji (Turkey), Central Kurdish called Sorani (Iraq) and Mukri or Gorani (Iran), and in Central Eastern Anatolia, Zazaki or Dimili (Turkey) (McDowall 1996; van Bruinessen 1998; Hassanpour 1999). The Kurds have been divided religiously as well: 95 percent of them are Muslim; 25 to 30 percent of who are Alevi and Shia, about 60 percent are Sunni and a small minority is Yezidi (McDowall 1996; Kirişçi and Winrow 1997) (Figure 3.3).

**Figure 3.3. Kurdish populated areas in the Middle East**

![Map of the Middle East showing Kurdish populated areas](source:UTexas Map Library)

The Turkish government has declared itself “the Government of both Turks and Kurds and the real representatives of the Kurds who sit alongside the Turks in the Assembly” and has also stated in the Lausanne Treaty, which set up today’s borders in the Middle East, that “Turks and Kurds are equal partners in the Government of Turkey” (Ismet Pasha’s speech at the Lausanne Conference, in Kendal 1980:104). However, immediately after the Treaty, the Turkish government changed their ideas and up until the mid-1980s, it was taboo in Turkey to admit the existence of the Kurdish people.

Kurds have rebelled several times against the Turkish Republic, which banned the Kurdish language in 1924 (Wahlbeck 1999:44). These revolts were accused of being

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30 Throughout the qualitative field research the author had an understanding that Kurdish dialects differ from each other due to the influences of dominant languages in different political geographies. Thus, Kirmanci Kurdish spoken in Turkey involves a large Turkish vocabulary whereas Sorani and Gorani spoken in Iraqi and Iranian Kurdistan are influenced by Arabic and Persian languages.
foreign-led because Turkish governments thought foreign governments initiated them (Kreyenbroek and Allison 1996; McDowall 1996). Significant among the many revolts during the early decades of the new Republic were the insurrections of Sheikh Said in 1925, of Mount Ararat in 1927-30, and of Dersim in 1936-39. All resulted in tens of thousands of deaths as they were harshly suppressed by the Turkish army (McDowall 1996; van Bruinessen 1992b; Kendal 1980).

These revolts brought harsher oppression of Turkish Kurds and the Government implemented more restrictions during the following years. The terms Kurd and Kurdistan were removed from all documents, place names were changed and more importantly continuous arrests and police repression were put into force. From 1950 until the mid-1980s, as a result, there was a relatively quiet environment, with no Kurdish revolts (McDowall 1996).

Throughout the Republican period, Turkish governments denied the Kurds’ existence by using slightly differing euphemisms. They were categorised as “Mountain Turks” in the 1930s and 1940s (White 2000; van Bruinessen 1992). With the military intervention of 12 September 1980, Turkish Kurds gained another identity called “Eastern Turks” (‘doğulu’ in Turkish), a euphemism backed by the scholarly activities of a cadre of academics who invented Kurdish as a dialect of Turkish (LOC 1995; van Bruinessen 1998). In fact it was an Indo-European language related to Persian and has nothing in common with Turkish except some exchanged words (White 2000; McDowall 1996).

The repression of the Turkish Kurdish people was embodied in a denial policy, which was expressed frequently in public. Cemal Gürsel, when declaring himself president after the military intervention in 1960, in Diyarbakır, capital of the Southeast region stated “There are no Kurds in this country. Whoever says he is a Kurd, I will spit in his face” (Müller 1996:177). At another speech, he stated “There was never immigration into our country. Therefore there cannot be any other race in our country other than Turkish. Moreover there is no independent race called ‘Kurd’ on the earth” (Başkaya 1991:59). This was an explicit expression of the denial that had taken place for decades until 1991 when for the first time, the Kurdish “reality” was recognised in the speeches of some political leaders such as President Özal (1991-93) and later President Demirel (1993-2000) (Barkey 1993:55; Müller 1996:181).

A similar attitude was evident towards the name of the Kurdish populated provinces, which were called Kurdistan in Ottoman times. This region was generally under a state of emergency rule and since 1980 has been called “OHAL” that stands for “State of Emergency Region’s Governor’s Office”.

31
The Kurdistan Workers Party (hereafter PKK) appeared in 1978. Its armed struggle against the Turkish government began in 1984 as a response to the massive repression after the military intervention of 1980 (Kreyenbroek and Allison 1998:15). The 1980 coup d'état also needs to be explained in relation to the Kurdish question because the Turkish generals’ decision was influenced by the Kurdish question that posed a threat of secession (Robins 1993:662). Along with the general repression in the following period, the military-led Turkish government followed two pursuits in particular that were targeted at the Turkish Kurdish population: First, a new official ideology was imposed: ‘the Turk-Islam Synthesis’ which aimed at further ‘Turkification’ and ‘Islamisation’. Secondly, a state of emergency was imposed all over the country during the intervention and the three following years. However, this never ended in the Kurdish populated provinces although it was eventually halted in other parts of the country. Thus the region became known as ‘the state of emergency region’ accompanied by the permanent deployment of two of Turkey’s four armies in the region. The number of troops (excluding police and special troops) in the region was 200,000 by 1990 (McDowall 1996:425).

Unlike his predecessors, President Turgut Özal (1989-93) admitted the existence of a distinct population, the Kurds, who live mainly in the Eastern provinces but increasingly spread into the Western cities of the country as well (Sirkeci 2000; LOC 1995). However neither this admission nor development projects in the region could stop clashes, which ended with the arrest of Kurdish leader Abdullah Öcalan in Kenya in 1999 by the Turkish intelligence service (See Appendix 3.1 for protests following the arrest). Between 1985 and 1999, the guerrilla war in the Eastern provinces of the country resulted in a death toll of about 40,000, at least one third of them civilians.

As explained in the previous section, uneven development (or underdevelopment) in Turkey mainly affects the Turkish Kurdish population as they live in the least developed part of the country. By the same token, many scholars viewed the Kurdish question as a result of that underdevelopment (İçduygu et al. 1999; TOBB 1995). Along with many small-scale projects, a grand regional development plan called GAP

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32 The PKK was founded as National Liberation Army aiming at armed struggle as its basic tool to establish an independent Kurdistan. Further discussion of the PKK can be found in McDowall (1996), Wahlbeck (1999:39-60) and White (2000:134-227).

33 GAP (Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi) was initially a coordination of few local projects in Southeast Anatolia. Later, a region called GAP was created including the provinces of Adiyaman, Batman, Diyarbakır, Gaziantep, Kilis, Mardin, Siirt, Şanlıurfa and Şırnak. It basically aimed at regulating the water resources in the region for irrigation and hydro electrical energy purposes (GAP İdaresi 1997).
was launched in 1977 in order to develop the society and economy of the Southeast region (Franz 1994; see also Appendix 5.1). This project has provided some improvements in the region but it has not yet achieved its objectives. Some optimistic estimates expect its completion no earlier than the 2020s, but belief in its failure is more common (Akçay and Akşit 1999:192). Possible benefits of GAP for the region are also doubtful although its usefulness for the further modernisation of the west of Turkey is clear (White 2000:110-112; Kafaoğlu 1991:43-46).

Thus the Turkish official understanding of the Kurdish question has always focused on the idea that it was a threat to national unity. The reasons behind this were argued to be either a foreign-backed act to destroy the Turkish state or internal malpractice leading illiterate masses into a brutal, meaningless conflict. Therefore government responses were always harsh military measures, which brought a long lasting military state of emergency over the areas where Turkish Kurds constitute the majority of the population. Although with the halt of clashes with the PKK, the state of emergency ceased in the majority of Eastern provinces, the state of emergency decree was later renewed in Diyarbakır, Hakkari, Şırnak, and Tunceli provinces (USDS 2001).

Following these conflicts in the region, individually or officially initiated migrations took place towards the urban centres in the region, and to other parts of Turkey or abroad. However there is no register of these movements. Since the mid-1980s the region became a major source of emigration. About 3,000 villages were evacuated for security reasons by the Turkish army, which caused the internal displacement of about 3,000,000 people according to official and unofficial sources (White 2000; Wahlbeck 1999; Kirişiçi 1998; Radikal, 16 July 1998). For instance, by 1990, according to some estimates, Istanbul became the largest Kurdish city hosting about 2.5 million Kurds (Kreyenbroek and Allison 1998:8). Another estimate shows that there must have been Kurdish minorities (of no less than five percent) in almost all the western cities of Turkey according to internal migration trends and population growth since the 1930s (Sirkeçi 2000; Mutlu 1996). Given the paucity of data on the ethnic breakdown of the population in Turkey, Kurdish involvement in Turkish international migration is also difficult to assess but this study aims to shed some light on it. The following section investigates the literature with regard to this issue.
3.3. Turkish international migration and Turkish Kurds

Since the early 1960s, Turkish migration to Europe has attracted researchers and today there is a voluminous literature covering different aspects of the phenomenon. However, the ethnic aspects of this particular migratory regime have been overlooked until very recently (Schmidt 1998; Blaschke 1991; Franz 1986). In this section, Turkish Kurds’ involvement in migration flows from Turkey is discussed.

Commonly Turkey has been cited as a latecomer to the international migration market in the post-World War II period (Abadan-Unat 1995:279; İçduygu et al. 2001:41). However this lateness was also due to legal restrictions on exit from Turkey as it was possible for Turkish citizens to go abroad only after the 1961 constitution (Abadan-Unat 1995:279). In terms of the total stock of Turkish citizens abroad, it can be regarded as primarily migration to Europe because the volume of migrations towards other parts of the world is pretty small. By 1 January 1996, 2,724,000 Turkish citizens

Out-migration from Turkey can be dated back as to the 1920s if the massive exchange of populations of the 1920s and 1930s and forceful deportations during the following decades are considered. İçduygu and Sirkeci (1999a) present a detailed account of these movements along with a brief Turkish migration history.

Source: İçduygu and Sirkeci (1999b).

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34 Collinson comments on the peak in 1973: the “recruitment stop signalled a sudden upsurge in emigration as migrants hurried to bring their families to Europe before any further restrictions were imposed” (1993:73).

35 This graph is borrowed from an earlier published research paper of İbrahim Sirkeci and Ahmet İçduygu. In that study the annual numbers of out-migration were intuitive guesses of expert judgment based on a range of figures provided by different previous studies of Gitmez (1983), Gökdere (1978), and İçduygu (1991). However, these earlier studies mainly referred to the information provided by Turkish Employment Service. Turkish Employment Service reports annual number of labourers sent abroad by country of destination.

36 Out-migration from Turkey can be dated back as to the 1920s if the massive exchange of populations of the 1920s and 1930s and forceful deportations during the following decades are considered. İçduygu and Sirkeci (1999a) present a detailed account of these movements along with a brief Turkish migration history.
were resident in European Union countries (European Commission 1999:36-37). They constituted about 90 percent of Turkish migrants abroad. By the mid-1990s, about 3 percent of the remainder were in Arab countries while another 2 percent were in the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) and the rest in other countries (İçduygu and Sirkeci 1998:14).

Massive guest worker migrations from Turkey in the 1960s marked the second phase. This coincided with Turkey’s development planning during the 1960s and 1970s, which stressed rapid industrialisation on the basis of large-scale capital-intensive industries. Within the scope of this programme extensive job-creation (at least in the short term) was not possible. Out-migration of workers was considered as an immediate solution to Turkey’s growing unemployment problem and worsening balance-of-payments position (Gitmez 1983; Gökdere 1978; Abadan-Unat 1976). Promotion of out-migration was stated as an explicit policy objective in Turkey’s first three five-year plans (Franz 1994; Collinson 1993:65).

Another policy preference for Turkey had been expressed as the priority for out-migration from underdeveloped regions but this remained a gesture rather than an influential policy orientation, reflecting a general negligence of the phenomenon of uneven regional development in governmental planning (Pennix 1982:793). This negligence is evident in very low out-migration rates from the least developed Eastern provinces (Figures 3.5 and 3.6).

Figure 3.5.
Proportion of out-migrants to the total population, by province, 1970

Source: İçduygu et al. (1997)

37 The main goals of these policies were maximising the outflow of individuals and increasing the inflow of hard currency (Penninx 1982). There was also an expectation that those migrant labourers would be learning some skills in highly developed German industry and return back with more social capital as skilled workers. However, this aim was not achieved since there were no receptive industries to employ those who returned and also those who returned were not interested in low paid, relative to the wages in Germany, industrial jobs but instead launched small trade enterprises (Gitmez 1983).

38 Estimations of İçduygu et al. (1997) is based on the 1970 Census.
The second period was marked by bilateral labour recruitment agreements. The first was signed with Germany in 1961 and then similar agreements were made with Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium (1964), France (1965), Sweden, Australia (1967), Switzerland (1971), Denmark (1973), Libya (1975) and Norway (1981) (Franz 1994:307). Although these agreements shaped the initial stages of migratory flows significantly, they did not make a substantial impact on the later stages of flows. "Migratory movements have gained their own dynamics and mechanisms which are quite independent from the previously structured measures of the bilateral migration agreements" (İçduyuğu and Sirkeçi 1998:5).

Related to the worldwide economic stagnation of the early 1970s, the massive labour recruitment halted in 1972 marking the beginning of the third phase (İçduyuğu and Sirkeçi 1998:6; Abadan-Unat 1995:279). Migration did not stop but continued in the form of tourist migration (or illegal migration) and family reunification until the early 1980s (Blötevögel et al. 1989; Rogers 1985; Hale 1978). Another significant shift in European migration was that receiving countries realised those immigrants were not returning but settling down in destination countries as family reunifications and the education of immigrant children become important (Abadan-Unat 1995:279). This period was also characterised by Turkish migration to other destinations such as Arab countries and Australia (İçduyuğu and Sirkeçi 1998; Gökdere 1994) (Figure 3.4).

The fourth phase was characterised by refugee flows following the military intervention of 1980 (Martin 1994:211). This movement was mainly based on the pattern established by earlier labour and family migrations. Most asylum seekers had some relatives or friends in destination areas (Faist 2000:83). After the mid-1980s, Turkish

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39 The question used in the 1990 Turkish Census was: "How many household members are absent now; are they in the country or abroad?" (SIS 1993:194).

40 A minor but important feature of this phase was the first influx of political migrants from Turkey due to the military intervention of 1972. These people led the initial immigrant political and social organisations in countries of destination.
Kurdish asylum-seeker migration marked the era (Faist 2000; Sirkeci 2000; van Bruinissen 1998). Concomitant with the ethnic uprising in Turkey, which also caused a political mobilisation among Kurds already abroad, Turkish Kurds became more visible within international migration flows.

This period can be considered as one of transition. Since the initial arrivals of refugees in large numbers during the early 1980s, European countries introduced visa requirements. For instance, the UK began asking for visas from Turkish citizens from 1989 after the earlier groups of Turkish Kurdish refugees arrived. This also marked the beginning of illegal migration of large numbers: an individual level challenge to the supranational fortress Europe. This period was marked by the rise of “xenophobia against foreigners in Europe. For example, latent anti-semitism was transformed into open anti-Turkism” in Germany (Abadan-Unat 1995:281).

Table 3.3. Turkish migration to Western Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Turkish citizens</th>
<th>Immigration 1997</th>
<th>Asylum seekers 1990-99</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2,080,000</td>
<td>74.1</td>
<td>74,344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>197,700</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>3,426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>138,860</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>2,234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>127,032</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>6,952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>79,932</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2,472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>73,818</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>42,000</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>37,519</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1,153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>18,404</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1,197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>13,605</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,808,870</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>95,037</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: European Commission 1999; Council of Europe 1998; Eurostat 1996a,b,c.

The networks of migration, national-ethnic networks, and family networks played a crucial role in this period. For instance, in 1995, about 90,000 Turkish migrants to Europe were moving for the purposes of family reunion and marriages; about 30,000 of them were asylum seekers (Eurostat 1996a: 7; İçduygu and Sirkeci 1999b: 257-8).

Turkey has been a major source country of asylum seekers in Europe since 1985 (Eurostat 1996a:4-5) (Table 3.3.). Briefly, since the mid-1980s, Turkish emigration has turned into a mass migration of family reunions, refugees, asylum seekers and also illegal migrants. (Böcker 1995:55; İçduygu and Sirkeci 1999b: 257-8; UNHCR 1998b; Eurostat 1996a:4-5). Another recent change in the Turkish international migratory

41 These numbers exclude those who acquired citizenship in the host country. For instance, naturalised Germans who had Turkish citizenship were over 250,000 by 1999 (Ostergaard-Nielsen 2000:7).
regime is an increase in transit migrations. Although there are no certain figures about the numbers involved, thousands of people originating from the Middle East, Africa and Near East have been arriving in Turkey intending to find ways to enter Western European countries every year (İçduygu 1996).

Some researchers have cited figures for Turkish Kurdish migration based on speculation (White 2000; van Bruinessen 1998; McDowall 1996; Robins 1993; Blaschke 1991). According to these researchers, the total number of Turkish Kurds abroad was about 650,000 by the mid-1990s, most of them (about 450,000) in Germany (Migration News 1999; van Bruinessen 1998; Gürbey 1995; Franz 1994). According to Günter, the repressive policies of successive Turkish governments had prompted Turkish Kurds to seek employment in Europe starting from the early 1960s (1990:103). Intensification of repression after the coup d'état of 1980, in the form of armed conflict between Turkish troops and the PKK, forced these Kurds under oppression to seek not only employment, but refuge in Europe by the late 1980s (Griffiths 2000; Wahlbeck 1999). The number of asylum seekers from Turkey was 365,000 between 1985 and 1995 and another 200,000 were added during the 1990s (Eurostat 1996b and 1996c). Human rights violations observed in Turkey during the last twenty-five years have been mainly targeting its Kurdish citizens and most of the cases were related to the practices after the military intervention of 1980 and the armed conflict in the Eastern provinces between the PKK and the Turkish Army. Hence, there is enough evidence to suggest most of these asylum applications were of Turkish Kurds.

With regard to the ethnic problems Turkish Kurds faced at home, it is expected many of them would have wanted to go abroad during this period. However, in a recruitment system under the control of the Turkish government how many of them could realise this desire is another question. Also, as proposed by migration studies (e.g., Hammar 1995), extremely low socio-economic development levels mean lower likelihoods for migration. As the Eastern provinces of Turkey constitute the least developed part of the country, they had lower emigrant proportions; generally less than 1 percent by 1970 (see Table 3.4). An analysis of the origins of Turkish emigrant workers in Europe also indicates a similar picture; until 1980, only 4 percent of about a million were from the Eastern region (Atalik and Beeley 1993:165). After the 1980 military intervention, this

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42 Some pro-Kurdish and pro-PKK sources cite figures far beyond these moderate estimates. For instance, the Kurdish Institute favourably estimates a Kurdish population of 900,000 to 1,100,000 in Europe (Institute Kurde 1999) as opposed to moderate figure of 690,000 by Rigoni (1998) and the lowest figure of 360,000 by Gürbey (1995) for all Kurds in Western Europe.
picture reversed as emigrants from the East doubled their proportion within emigration flows (Table 3.4). On the basis of such a regional distribution, one could expect a remarkable Turkish Kurdish population among the total Turkish migrant stock in Europe. However, it is not possible to estimate due to lack of data on ethnicity of migrants. Therefore, estimates of Kurdish immigrant stock in Europe range between half a million to over a million.

Table 3.4. Geographical distribution of emigrants from Turkey, 1965-1984 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Atalık and Beeley 1993; Gitmez 1983.

There has been no research conducted on the international migration of Turkish Kurds although there have been some studies on their internal migration (see Akşit and Akçay 1999; CHP 1999; TMMOB 1999). We have no means of measuring Kurdish involvement in international migration flows from Turkey although they probably constitute the majority of refugee and asylum-seeker flows from Turkey to Europe during the last two decades (Van Bruinessen 1998:44-45 and UNHCR 1997).

Germany is the major destination for migrants originating from Turkey irrespective of their ethnic origins. After the mass labour migrations of the 1960s and 1970s following governmental bilateral agreements, Germany became the most attractive country for potential migrants because these initial flows established necessary networks for further migration. Today about 75 percent of Turkish citizens in Europe live there, as shown in Table 3.3 above. The next section focuses on migration to Germany.

3.4. Migration to Germany: from guest workers to asylum seekers

Germany was an emigration country until the mid-1950s. Between 1820 and 1960, 15 per cent of the 45 million immigrants arriving in the United States were from Germany (Martin 1994:196). Germany started to import some foreign labour by the beginning of the twentieth century, primarily from Poland and Austria (Blötevögel et al. 1993:83). There were 950,000 foreign workers in 1907 (Castles and Miller 1993:57) and 1,259,880 foreigners according to the 1910 Census (Reimann and Reimann 1979:65).

Following the crisis in 1929, their volume decreased to 100,000 (Castles and Miller
Context of international migration: ethnic conflict and deprivation

1993:61). However, the Nazis introduced a new type of imported labour; 7.7 million prisoners of war and forced labourers from occupied territories were brought to work in factories, mainly to serve the war industry, in Germany in 1944 (Castles and Miller 1993:62; Martin 1994:197).

When the war ended, the reconstruction of central Europe began. As in other Western European countries, Germany achieved extremely high economic growth rates after World War II, and eventually reached full employment by 1960 (Zlotnik 1998). The erection of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 cut off West German industry from one potential labour supply, the agrarian periphery of East Germany and Poland (Bade 1987). The only solution for the labour shortfall was the recruitment of foreign labour from other areas (Gastarbeiter system) (Rist 1978). The recruitment treaties Germany made with countries including Italy (1955) Spain and Greece (1960), Turkey and Portugal (1961), and Yugoslavia (1968) aimed to solve this problem (Martin 1994:198-9). The idea underlying the guest worker system was to recruit seasonal workers, lower paid workers on short-term contracts (Korte 1987:163). However, by the end of the 1970s, it was clear the guest worker system had failed because millions of guest workers had stayed in Germany for more than 20 years despite the fact that they were not needed in the labour market. Table 3.5 shows that the foreign population in Germany grew to 7.5 million by the end of the 1990s: only one third of them were employed (GI-NY 1999; Blötevögel et al. 1993; Korte 1978).

German policy makers considered immigrants as guests and therefore assimilation has not been a major policy despite many local programmes aimed at the integration of immigrant families and children. In the space of ten years, guest workers became foreign residents, and in 1973, recruitment stopped but it couldn’t stop the rise of the number of foreigners (Martin 1994:205). Furthermore, Germany granted citizenship to about 15,000 foreigners per year during the 1980s and 1990s (Castles and Miller 1993:115). Between 1991 to 1993, 22,414 foreigners were naturalised in Berlin and

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43 In the meantime, more than 500,000 Jews fled Nazi Germany by the outbreak of the Second World War (Bade 1987:140). Bade calls it a momentous loss for German cultural life as many of those emigrants belonged to the intelligentsia and over 7 percent had held academic positions (1987:141). Many of these academics arrived in Turkey by invitation and they played a crucial role in the establishment of Turkish universities at that time (İçduygulu and Sirkeci 1999a).

44 The guest worker system was a very well organised recruitment system giving a positive response to any employee request from a German investor in three or four days. Workers were granted one-year residence permits by the recruitment office in Istanbul (Martin 1994; Miller and Martin 1982).

45 In the text, foreigner, foreign born, foreign nationals are used interchangeably and they all refer to people born outside Germany.
almost half were Turkish (Häussermann 1998:144). During the 1990s, Germany was targeted by four major migration currents: refugees and asylum-seekers from all around the world; migrations from Eastern Europe; mass migrations from East Germany to West Germany; and the migration of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe (Blötevogel et al. 1993; Castles and Miller 1993; Martin 1994).

Table 3.5. Immigration to Germany, 1950s to 1990s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Foreign Population (000s)</th>
<th>% of total</th>
<th>Asylum Applications</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>% of total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>484.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>80-85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>686.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>85-90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>469.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>91-93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1,077.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1,462.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>1,400.4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1,694.6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2,107.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2,110.2</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2,053.6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


There is an ironic similarity between German migration policy in the late 19th century and the Turkish one in the 1960s. By the late 19th century German governments considered labour migration abroad as the exportation of social problems as it served to relieve widespread tensions in Germany (Bade 1987:135). By 1960, Turkish officials considered the same option to relieve unemployment pressure arising from rapid urbanisation and slow industrial job creation (İçduygu 1991; Gitmez 1983; Abadan-Unat 1976). There were no colonial or hegemonic linkages between Turkey and Germany but the two countries historically had entertained over a hundred years of cordial governmental and military relations since the times of the German Reich and the Ottoman Empire. They fought side by side against other European powers in the First World War.\(^{46}\) Republican Turkey also developed friendly relations with Germany. As early as the 1950s, Germany became the most important trade partner of Turkey. Both countries benefited from the US development scheme, the Marshall Plan, in the aftermath of the World War II. Thus, Germany and Turkey signed a bilateral

\(^{46}\) German officers assisted the reformation and modernisation of the Turkish army in the 18th century and they were engaged in the construction of the Baghdad railway, a crucial rail route in the Ottoman Empire. There were German commanders among the war heroes of Turkey after the First World War. For instance, German commander Liman von Sanders commanded the victorious troops of the Dardanelles. The same commander was later granted the Pasha title, the highest rank in the Ottoman army.
recruitment agreement in 1961, which paved the way for more than 500,000 Turkish citizens’ entry into Germany over the following ten years (ZIT 1997b: 1: Gitmez 1983:19).

As mentioned before, migration to Germany comprises the vast majority of Turkish international migration (Table 3.3) Therefore the periodisation of migration flows from Turkey reflects the patterns of migration flows to Germany. Early migrants, guest workers, arrived in the industrial centres of the Federal Republic of Germany, namely, Düsseldorf, Cologne, Stuttgart, and Munich. Ford, Mercedes, and Opel were the main recruiters, and so the main residential areas of these pioneer immigrants became neighbourhoods near to factories, such as Mülheim in Cologne where the qualitative field research of this study was undertaken.

Currently, Turkish and Kurdish residents in Germany account for one third of all foreigners and similarly, they comprise about 30 percent of all asylum stock in Germany. As Martin (1991) argued, Turkish migration to Germany is “an unfinished story” and possibly will never end because the established migration networks are very likely to carry it forward. These networks facilitate all forms of migration towards this country. Similarly, the Netherlands, France, Switzerland and Austria have also been popular destinations for Turkish migrants. Although there is a net gain, flows between Turkey and Germany are not one-way. For instance, between 1994 and 1997, nearly 80 thousand immigrants from Turkey entered Germany whereas about 60 thousand of them were leaving per annum.47 Almost 20 thousand newcomers were added to the immigrant population in Germany from Turkey (Council of Europe 1998:188).

Today, the Turks and the Turkish Kurds in Germany compose a considerable portion of the population (Figure 3.7). For example, Turks constitute about five per cent of population in Bremen State, and seven percent in the city of Cologne. The majority of Turkish immigrants live in North Rhine Westphalia and other states of the former “West” Germany although very few reside in the states of the former “East” Germany (Figure 3.7). As their volume increased, Turkish immigrant enclaves appeared in almost all the major cities of Germany, as they constituted 2.5 percent of the total population (Table 3.2). Keup Street in Cologne is a typical example of these segregated

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47 Gitmez (1983) and Gökdere (1978) underline that there is no certain information about return migration figures but they suggest an annual volume of 30,000 until 1974 and after then this annual figure rose up 50-55,000. Therefore as opposed to very well known massive labour migration from Turkey to Germany there has been a massive return migration too.
Although it is argued that Turkish immigrants face problems of integration into German society, newcomer Turks are well integrated into their own isolated communities of fellow Turks.\footnote{48} Turkish immigrants are confined to their own ethnic labour market and have very limited connections with the host society (Friedrichs 1998; Abadan-Unat 1997). However, this isolation is the result of a set of restrictions they face in Germany, for example, language and training limitations are compounded by legal limitations (Çiçekli 1998). Most of them are not competent in German and also do not possess the qualifications gained through formal training or education. Thus there remain two options: to live within a Turkish ethnic enclave or to return home.

Return migration to Turkey is a significant phenomenon, as more than half a million have returned since the mid-1970s, but it is still a myth for many (Gitmez 1983; Abadan-Unat 1997; Gökdere 1994). During the 1970s, Turkish immigrants sent about a
quarter of their earnings to Turkey and invested in land, estates and some launched small businesses (Gitmez 1983). However, from 1980 onwards, in response to further restrictions on labour migration, the duration of stay among immigrants increased and more families joined workers in Germany. This cut off remittances sharply as Turks began to invest in Germany. By the end of 1997, for example, almost one in every ten Turkish families in Germany owned the house they lived in (ZfT 1997a). Although unemployment among Turks was much higher than that for native Germans and other foreigners in the late 1990s, there were about 50,000 Turkish run businesses which employed about 200,000 people in total, the majority of which appeared in the last 15 years. Therefore a more settled community picture appears. As a result of this, they are also interested in politics in Germany and in the EU (ZfT 1997a: 14). Many Turkish candidates have stood for seats in local assemblies and national parliament in the elections. For example, the PDS (Democratic Socialist Party) candidate for mayor in Cologne in 1999 was the Turkish Kurdish teacher, Şengül Şenol: she won less than 10 percent of the vote. After the election of the first Turkish MP (Cem Özdemir, in September 1998) to the German Bundestag, the 1999 elections sent Feleknas Uca49 to the European Parliament.

Turkey exported not only its unemployment problems via labour migration, but also other internal tensions through asylum flows from the 1980 onwards. First Turkish and Kurdish immigrant organisations appeared after the arrival of political migrants escaping from the Turkish military intervention of 1971 (Ögelman 1998:16).50 Expelled left-wing organisations found new blood in Germany after the 1980 coup d'etat whilst Islamic fundamentalists discovered a suitable ground for their political organisations, which were not allowed in Turkey. Many of these organisations maintained an orientation towards Turkey rather than Germany (Ögelman 1998:7). Kurdish organisations appeared relatively later than Turkish ones but eventually, the end results of the exportation of tension from Turkey were visible in Western Europe. At the end of the last century, when the Kurdish leader Abdullah Öcalan was detained, tens of thousands of Turkish Kurds poured onto the streets, occupied embassies, and tens of them even burnt themselves to protest at the arrest (White 2000:187; see also Appendix 3.1).

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49 Feleknas Uca is also a Turkish Kurd.
50 The first Turkish Kurdish organisation in Germany was HEVRA (Association of Revolutionary Kurds in Europe) founded in 1965, which was a small propaganda group. Later in 1979 the first influential Kurdish organisation, KOMIKAR (Workers Federation of Kurds in Germany) was founded.
Initially, many Kurds had participated in the activities of Turkish left wing organisations in Germany. However, as the conflict between the Turkish army and the PKK intensified and the PKK gained more power, radical and pure Kurdish organisations appeared all around Germany. In response to a sharp increase in violent protests, the PKK was outlawed in Germany in November 1993.\textsuperscript{51} Cologne, as one of the key destination cities in the Turkish migration to Germany, was the base for many of these activities.\textsuperscript{52} The following section explores the population of Cologne with regard to its Turkish residents.

3.4.1. A Key Destination; Cologne

In Germany, the Nord Rhein Westfalia (NRW) is the state with the largest stock of foreigners. Cologne is one of the major cities in the NRW and Germany. One in every five residents living in the city is an immigrant. It has the third largest foreigner population after Berlin and Munich (ZfT 1997b: 5; Friedrichs 1998:1754). Although statistical records do not help to delineate the Turkish Kurdish population, it is worth mentioning the breakdown of the city’s residents by nationality.

Table 3.6. Foreigners in Cologne by nationality, 1970-1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>% in total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>22,147</td>
<td>60,212</td>
<td>70,847</td>
<td>77,965</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>16,646</td>
<td>23,232</td>
<td>19,900</td>
<td>21,682</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslav</td>
<td>5,937</td>
<td>9,045</td>
<td>10,561</td>
<td>16,587</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>6,456</td>
<td>7,763</td>
<td>7,638</td>
<td>7,469</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other European</td>
<td>12,912</td>
<td>16,250</td>
<td>18,109</td>
<td>20,495</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7,397</td>
<td>20,819</td>
<td>35,868</td>
<td>47,669</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>72,950</td>
<td>137,321</td>
<td>163,013</td>
<td>191,847</td>
<td>1.014,837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% in total</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\textsuperscript{51} Although there is no official reference to it, the Turkish government might have had an influence on the decision to ban the PKK since it was continuously criticising European governments for supporting the PKK in Europe.

\textsuperscript{52} Although it had local offices in Cologne, the PKK was banned in Germany in November 1993 and these offices were transformed into Workers Clubs. Some of these Turkish Kurdish organisations which have their headquarters in the Cologne region are as follows: Federation of Patriotic Workers and Cultural Organisations (FEYKA-Kurdistan), Federation of Kurdish Workers Organisations (KOMKAR), Alevi Union of Kurdistan (FEK), Kurdistan Red Cross (in Düsseldorf) (HSK), Kurdish Art Centre, Legal Solidarity Association for Kurds in Germany (AZADI), Kurdish Information and Documentation Centre (NAVEND), Kurdistan Islam Party (PIK).
Context of international migration: ethnic conflict and deprivation

Cologne has had a reasonably stable population since the 1960s with a zero growth rate (Stadt Köln 2001) and a population size of around one million. The city has been host to a relatively large migrant community, increasing from 7 percent in the late 1960s to 13.5 percent in 1980 and 19 percent in 1999 (Stadt Köln 2001). During the last two decades the migrant population has increased by almost fifty percent in the city. Although different ethnic groups have added to the city’s social fabric, the major minorities of Cologne remain the Turks, Italians and Yugoslavs. In the meantime, the proportion of European immigrants including Greeks, Italians, Spanish and Portuguese has been decreasing while other foreigners’ increased (Table 3.6).

Turkish nationals have constituted the largest group of foreigners in the city since 1970 (Table 3.6). Although Cologne’s German population has a negative growth rate, their Turkish and Kurdish fellows (7.6% of total population55) were responsible for 16% of live births between 1998 and 2000. The birth rate of Turkish nationals was 56.6 per thousand as opposed to 24.4 among Germans between 1997 and 1999 (Stadt Köln 2001). Generally Turks display high birth rates in Germany resembling demographic trends in Turkey (HUIPS 1994). Thus we may assume even larger demographic differences between Germans and Turkish Kurdish immigrants as recent studies on Turkish Kurdish demography have shown Kurdish people to have higher fertility and growth rates than the Turks in Turkey (Cindoğlu and Sirkeci 2001; Sirkeci 2000; Dündar 1998).

According to Andreas Goldberg, the head of the Migration Research Department of the Centre for Studies on Turkey (Essen, Germany), a recent survey found that Turkish migrants are generally living in “ghettos” near the industrial centres of the big cities in the Ruhr region (Hürriyat, 12 August 1999). The same survey revealed that Turks live within tight-knit communities of people from the same cultural and ethnic backgrounds. Similar findings came out of a Cologne study by Kecskes (1999) who found that within these exclusive neighbourhoods, more than 80% of networks of youngsters were of Turkish descent (Kecskes 1999:5).55 Another Cologne study by Friedrichs also highlighted the highest segregation indices were for Turkish immigrants (around 34) compared to other minorities (around 24) (1998:1756).

53 For example, it was 1,017,000 in 1977, 983,453 in 1985, and 1,014,837 in 2000 (Stadt Köln, 2001).
54 It needs to be underlined that the distribution of populations by age groups displays striking contrasts. The proportion of Turks within the younger age cohorts (0-25) was 16.5% while it was 4.4% in the old age groups (35 and over) (Stadt Köln 2001).
55 Within this Cologne study only a very few Turkish Kurds were interviewed among 50% respondents and they were considered as Turkish in the analysis.
The foreign populations of Cologne live in their own ethnic enclaves, which have been developing for the last forty years. The spatial distribution of the foreign population indicates that some nationalities settled in certain city regions but not in others (Table 3.7). Most foreigners in the city have concentrated in three of the city's nine districts: the Innenstadt (downtown) (16.6%), Mülheim (14.4%) and Kalk (13.4%). These areas also have the highest rates of foreigners among total residents (Table 3.7 and Figure 3.8). Different foreign groups are also segregated from each other. For instance, the largest Italian and Greek groups were in Innenstadt where they run restaurants, pizzerias and imbisses serving the general public whereas the Turkish and Kurdish populations were mostly concentrated in Mülheim with authentic markets serving their own enclave and occasionally visitors from around the Cologne region. Kalk was the second most concentrated residential area for Turks and Italians while it was the least targeted by Greeks (Stadt Köln 1998:22).

According to Goldberg (Hürriyet, 12 August 1999), the residential distribution of Turkish immigrant communities in German cities shows that the Turkish concentration areas are often located in neighbourhoods surrounding the industrial areas or in the city centre. Turkish immigrants in Cologne also display a quite similar pattern as they mainly live in areas near to the Ford factories in the North towards the coalfields of Leverkusen. Almost one fifth of the Turkish population lives in a northeast district with an ironic name pointing to the relative deprivation of foreigners: Mülheim, a literal translation of which is, "garbage home" (see Figure 3.8). A quarter of them live on the

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Table 3.7. The Turkish and foreign population in Cologne by district, 1997 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Districts</th>
<th>Turkish</th>
<th>Foreigners</th>
<th>Foreigners' share</th>
<th>% of all foreigners</th>
<th>Population Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Innenstadt</td>
<td>9,298</td>
<td>31,309</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>137,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rodenkirchen</td>
<td>3,808</td>
<td>14,155</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>95,977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lindenthal</td>
<td>2,027</td>
<td>15,984</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>137,228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ehrenfeld</td>
<td>9,663</td>
<td>20,810</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>96,202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nippes</td>
<td>12,026</td>
<td>22,115</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>109,559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chorweiler</td>
<td>9,024</td>
<td>15,708</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>80,413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Porz</td>
<td>5,372</td>
<td>16,244</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>107,217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalk</td>
<td>13,024</td>
<td>25,310</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>107,574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mülheim</td>
<td>14,719</td>
<td>27,148</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>142,890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Cologne</td>
<td>78,961</td>
<td>188,783</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>188,783</td>
<td>1,014,910</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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56 In some district centres, the proportion of foreign-born population rises up to 40 percent such as Kalk, Chorweiler, and Ostheim (Friedrichs 1998:1760).
57 The Cologne region is named "Bezirkregierung Köln" in German and it comprises many small towns neighbouring the city of Cologne.
western bank of the river Rhine in Nippes and Chorweiler. In the southern districts of Lindenthal, Rodenkirchen, and Porz the share of foreigners is lower than the average (Table 3.7). These southern quarters of the city are known as the wealthiest. This explains why there are hardly any Turkish residents (Figure 3.8).

**Figure 3.8. Distribution of the foreign population in Cologne, 1997**

The housing market is one of the most important factors leading to segregation of this kind according to Friedrichs and is directly related to restrictions including economic limitations (1998:1757). Turkish migrants' financial bidding capacity is not good enough to move into better districts where mostly Germans live. According to household income data for Cologne, 1998, 42 percent of the foreign born had a monthly net household income under DM 2,000 as opposed to 26 percent of Germans. Diverse unemployment rates in the City also reflect the same deprivation experience for foreigners: unemployment was 19.3 percent among the foreign born compared to 13.3 percent among Germans by 1995 (Friedrichs 1998:1757). These indicators are of significance to discussions of Turkish Kurds' migration to an environment of relative security from an EOI.

Difficult-to-prove everyday-discrimination against Turkish immigrants probably plays a role leading towards further segregation. As a non-Christian population with very little in common with the Germans, the Turks' capacity for integration into the host
society is very limited. Besides, their general distance in cultural terms and limited educational qualifications keep them away from high-paid jobs and social mobility opportunities. As non-EU citizens, they are also subject to legal restrictions (Kecskes 1999:2).

Among other factors, risk management and the friends and relatives effect can be seen as factors determining ethnic segregation. It is very likely that newly arrived immigrants with very little or no knowledge of the opportunities in the city would go to the areas where their fellow citizens live. This is probably the most important factor for illegal migrants who need an immediate shelter upon arrival. The combined effect of these factors has been to create ethnic enclaves in all immigrant countries and Germany is not an exception. Although not as famous as China towns, in major German cities, one can find a “Turkish town”. Cologne accommodates at least two of them: Weidengasse in Innenstadt and Keup Strasse in Mülheim.

3.4.2. “Istanbul auf 200 Metern”: Keup Strasse in Cologne

Weidengasse and Keup Strasse are the centres of “Turkish Cologne”. Weidengasse is just around the corner from Köln Haupt Bahnhof (Cologne Main Train Station), where many Turkish restaurants, bakeries, cafes and pubs can be found along with specialist travel agencies mostly arranging flights to remote towns of Turkey rather than popular destinations of Spain or Greece. Visitors can get a taste of Turkey in Weidengasse, but in Mülheim, they can experience what it is like to be in Turkey.

Keup Street in Mülheim has been referred to as “Istanbul in 200 meters” (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 1997:3). It is a “high street” for the Turkish people of the city with boutiques, jewellery stores, grocers, kiosks, bakeries, tailors, accountants, travel agencies, music stores, and so on. It is very rare to hear the words “Deutsche Mark” or “Pfennig” in the interactions, rather they prefer to call it “Lira” and “Kuruş”, Turkish currency terms. Only Turkish newspapers are available in cafés and bars, which completes the ‘feeling of home abroad.’
It is also a place where socialisation takes place and local politics took shape in Turkish café houses and Turkish pubs. The “Cengizhan” with its Turkish flag in the window is a meeting place for Turkish nationalists whereas “Café Fırat” is a centre for Kurdish nationalists. Nearby at the south end of the Street is located the pro-PKK community centre while ten yards away from the north end, is the locale of Turkish nationalists, known as “grey wolves”. To some extent, other cafés and bars in the Street are also affiliated to different interest groups who range from their ethnic membership to religious or political membership. In the surrounding area, Turkish leftwing organisations also have social clubs serving younger members of the community and hosting frequent seminars on topics that include politics in Turkey and discrimination in Germany.

The domination of Islam in the area is clear for all to see. Along the 200 yards of Keup Street there are five mosques as well as offices of religious associations reflecting different sub-denominations of Islam. Veiled girls hang around in groups. The public swimming pool nearby has specific times allocated for use by men or women only in accordance with Islamic rules, which separate women from men in the public sphere. Further down in the street, there is an Islamic Institute run by a major Turkish Sunni-Islam denomination called Sıleymancılar. Alevi-Muslims also have a centre, which was dominated by Turkish Kurdish Alevis when this research took place. The centre organises seminars about the role of Alevism and the tenets of Alevism, and also runs courses to learn to play Baglama (a Turkish string instrument), and courses in Anatolian folk dance.

Despite this obvious polarisation among different groups of Turkish immigrants, it is not possible to state that Turkish and Turkish Kurdish immigrants are living in entirely separate realms. Regardless of the strong tension and polarisation on ethno-political grounds, it is still a common scene for Turkish and Kurdish fanatics to cheer together for the success of Galatasaray in these local pubs of Keup Strasse.

### 3.5. Conclusion

To date there has not been a study of the international migration of Turkish Kurds.

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58 Cengizhan refers to Genghis Khan, the ancient Turko-Mongolid emperor of Central Asia.
59 Fırat refers to the River Euphrates, the largest river in the Kurdish populated areas of the Middle East.
60 Galatasaray, one of the most famous Turkish football teams, won the UEFA Cup in 2000.
except for a few partial accounts which were basically political analyses. Moreover, as a stateless ethnic population they are not visible in official registers which usually collect information on citizenship or birthplace. Due to the ethnic tension in Turkey. Turkish Kurds have been made totally invisible in Turkish official statistics since the 1965 Census. Therefore, almost all the figures of Kurdish migration in this chapter refer to the available literature and are estimates. This chapter reviewed the literature and discussed the wider context in which Turkish Kurdish international migration took place. This was important because migration is an interacting process which affects and is affected by other environmental factors. These factors comprise the socio-economic situation, political environment, and individuals’ own circumstances at different levels such as the global, regional, local, and individual levels. A further analysis of this context with regard to the building blocks of the EOI follows in Chapter 5.

Along with the conceptual framework drawn in Chapter 2, this chapter has described the broader economic, political and demographic aspects of the contexts of Turkish Kurdish international migration. The Turkish context is elaborated in order to highlight the existence of a distinct Kurdish segment in its ethnically diverse structure, which may reflect the EOI as discussed in Chapter 5. The historical account of migration flows from Turkey was revisited for the purpose of highlighting the role of Turkish Kurds within the broader Turkish migratory regime.

Ethnic conflict in Turkey might have contributed to Turkish Kurdish migration and politicised the migration. Turkish Kurdish migration seems effectively related to ethno-politics in Turkey. Therefore the weak literature on Kurdish migration, once again, underlines the importance of this research as a pioneer study of Kurdish international migration.

The following chapters, following the description of research methodology, analyse Kurdish emigration and the role of the expression of ethnicity in relation to the migration process by focusing on their migratory and ethnic experiences spreading from remote villages and towns of Eastern Turkey to the urban centres of Germany. The emigration analysis in the following chapters should be considered in relation to the context described here.
Chapter IV

The Research Methodology

"The individuals and their time- and place-specific lives disappear in the statistics. Narratives give the numbers a human face"  
(Vandsemb, 1995:412)

4.1. Introduction: the research strategy and multi-method approach

The adoption of appropriate research methodologies ideally should be shaped by the question under investigation and not by the availability of certain methods or data. Nevertheless, social research is often data led due to difficulties such as paucity of data as is the case in ethnicity research (Courbage 1998). Therefore, it is necessary to remember the main objectives of the study (Chapter 1) in order to reveal the underlying rationale for the particular research strategy developed to investigate Turkish Kurdish international migration in response to an EOI resulting from an ongoing ethnic conflict in Turkey. The objectives of this study are to reveal the migration patterns of Turkish Kurds, the mechanisms of their migration, and the role of ethnic conflict in this migratory movement. Given the problems outlined in the previous chapter (i.e. lack of ethnic data and lack of past studies on Turkish Kurdish international migration), the analysis of migratory movement in relation to an EOI requires information on the overall process and history of Turkish Kurdish international migration and also needs detailed accounts of the involvement of ethnicity and the expression of ethnicity throughout this migration process.

For the investigation of the migration patterns and process, a specialised migration survey is the most appropriate method for gathering data. Therefore, the Turkish International Migration Survey 1996 (TIMS) data along with the Turkish Demographic Health Survey 1993 (TDHS) data are used. From a conceptual point of view, analysing contextual factors that shape migration movements (e.g. decision to move or stay) was also important. For this aim, some census data from the Turkish State Institute of Statistics (SIS) and socio-economic development data from the Turkish State Planning Organisation (SPO) are utilised. However, two characteristics of this study require an
intensive method as well. First of all, this is the first-ever comprehensive study of Turkish Kurdish international migration requiring an in-depth understanding. Given the lack of ethnic data, there was also a need to undertake primary data collection. However, as there are no available population frames to draw a sample of an ethnic group, a qualitative in-depth investigation remained as a suitable method. Secondly, investigation of the relevance of the expression of ethnicity and the ethnic conflict within the context of migration is a complicated task and is not easy to carry out without detailed accounts of events and personal histories. With this regard, the semi-structured in-depth interview is one of the most appropriate methods of data collection since it allows the researcher to gather the accounts of a specific aspect of respondents’ life histories (Parfitt 1997:99).

The research has therefore sought to combine both the investigation of the generalisable aspects of Turkish Kurdish international migration such as the background characteristics of immigrants and the conflict oriented aspects such as the expression of ethnicity in relation to international migration. This, inevitably, forced the researcher to employ various techniques in the same research. Luckily, the literature also underlines the advantages of employing mixed methods for an understanding of migration (e.g. Graham 1995; Erman 1998; Gutting 1996b; White and Jackson 1995).

For the first part of the investigation, it was necessary to explore the international migration patterns of Turkish Kurds. As migration from Turkey has not been investigated in relation to its various ethnic components up until very recently, the first task was, using extensive sources and methodologies, to distinguish Turkish Kurdish migration patterns from broader Turkish migration. However, an in-depth investigation was needed to analyse the processes through which Turkish Kurds have realised their migratory adventures, since the expression of ethnicity within Turkish Kurdish international migration has not been investigated yet and the phenomenon has not been previously well described.

The next section discusses the rationale of employing mixed methods while later sections outline the use of qualitative and quantitative methods and the main practical and conceptual considerations. The third section depicts the data sources and analysis of the data in the extensive research. In section 4.4, the qualitative research is described focusing on the design of in-depth interviews, interview schedules, fieldwork, the interview process, and the analysis of the qualitative material.
4.2. Mixed methods in geographic investigation

As qualitative methodologies have become more favourable and widely used in human geography, mixed methods have come to the fore in research. Recent debates among human, and more recently, population geographers about the epistemology of geographic research also show that the discipline is quite receptive to a multi-method perspective, especially in the field of migration studies (see Graham 1999; McKendrick 1999; Findlay and Li 1999; Halfacree and Boyle 1993).

The multi-method approach may be described as a practical solution of the qualitative/quantitative dichotomy. It is ‘practical’ because of the growth of research using both methodologies, which undermined that dualism that has been accompanied by the intensification of philosophical positions rejecting quantitative knowledge (McKendrick 1999:41). The quantitative/qualitative divide should be (or must be) considered as a continuum rather than a dichotomy (Graham 1999:77). Choosing this or that method reflects an epistemological strand but it has been argued that it also reflects the structure of power relations as “the dualistic nature of thought positions the quantitative with work, science, objectivity, reason and masculinity, while the qualitative is aligned with home, nature, subjectivity, passion and femininity” (Winchester 1999:61). Such dualistic understanding also assumes a hierarchy in favour of quantitative within the sphere of scientific knowledge. However, in practice, it is not rigidly divided. Qualitative methods can also be used as a complementary adjunct method in quantitative studies (and vice versa).

Apart from the difficulties (of using a single method) raised by the research objectives, the epistemological capabilities and advantages of a mixed method approach underlined in the literature have directed this research to employ a multi-method approach. It is thought that simultaneous use of intensive and extensive techniques may increase the explanatory power of the research as it allows different methods to increase the capacity of understanding (Sayer 1992; Walby 1991; Dex 1991; Berg 1989; Karpati 1981). The literature also highlights subject (migration) specific advantages of using multi-methods. Chapman (1975) claimed that it is not possible to understand migration without in-depth ethnographic research, and Buttimer (1985) underlined the potential of qualitative methods to understand migration in relation to identity processes. Although qualitative methodologies have become more common
and widely used recently, it is now (and also for a long time in population geography) almost a convention for contemporary researchers to employ both methodologies together for better understanding of the processes questioned (Findlay and Li, 1999:51).

The use of specific research techniques depends on the objects of study and the purposes, which are embedded in wider theoretical contexts (Findlay and Li, 1999:50 and Graham, 1999:81). Thus, theoretical preferences could also lead to extremely different strategies ranging from structured interviews to in-depth interviews and narratives as McKendrick exemplifies from migration studies (1999:45).

McKendrick (1999:40) proposes two advantages of using multi-method research in general: First, it is preferred because it deals with weaknesses in existing data sources. Secondly, the breadth of understanding provided by multi-method research is attractive in terms of the academic ideals of scholarship. These advantages are also valid for this particular study due to data problems and the need to understand a phenomenon for the first time.

Mixing methods can also be supported by the logic of triangulation, which may provide completeness, abductive inspiration, and confirmation. The methods complement each other, providing richness or detail that would be unavailable from one method alone (Risjord et al. 2001; Dunbar et al. 1999). Qualitative research is especially helpful and often used when a phenomenon is poorly understood (Knafl and Breitmayer 1991). Another rationale for triangulation is confirmation, since qualitative methods can clarify or support the results of quantitative research (or vice versa). Therefore, this study has also employed mixed methods triangulating quantitative analysis of survey data with a qualitative analysis of semi-structured interviews to describe the patterns of Turkish Kurdish international migration in relation to the ethnic conflict.

4.3. Extensive research: the data and analysis

The research aims and objectives require analysis of the interaction between the EOI, ethnicity, and the international migration of Turkish Kurds. Therefore it requires reference to different data sources. Three different data sources used in the analyses of this research are: a) TIMS (Turkish International Migration Survey 1996) data. b) semi-structured in-depth interviews conducted in Germany in 1999, c) the TDHS (Turkish Demographic Health Survey 1993) data. In addition, other official information sources
are also referred to including the Turkish State Institute of Statistics (SIS) and the Turkish State Planning Organisation (SPO) and some legal documents including the Turkish Constitution.

The TDHS was used for the analysis of the EOI while the TIMS was used in the migration analysis. Both sets of survey data use language as a surrogate for ethnicity. These data provide the first reliable and accurate source enabling the estimation of the demographic and some socio-economic characteristics of Kurds in Turkey (İçduygu et al. 1999). The two main purposes of using the TDHS were to analyse the Turkish Kurdish population in Turkey and to examine the EOI for Turkish Kurds in Turkey in terms of housing conditions and educational status.

The TDHS is based on a nationally representative sample of 8619 households and 6519 ever-married women aged 15-49 years old. The information was collected through two sets of questions that focused on the household and individual. From these two questionnaires three data sets were constructed representing households, individuals and children, the first two of which are used in this study.

The TDHS reveals information about the living conditions of the population by ethnicity although it does not contrast migrants with non-migrants. Variables indicating educational attainment levels and literacy, household size and overcrowding, possession of some basic consumer goods and availability of facilities in the household were used in the analysis of the socio-economic EOI for the Kurds in Turkey. The ethnicity information is collected through a set of mother tongue questions in the TDHS: the mother tongue of the respondent, respondent’s husband’s mother tongue, respondent’s mother’s mother tongue, respondent’s father’s mother tongue, respondent’s husband’s mother’s mother tongue and respondent’s husband’s father’s mother tongue.

To overcome the problem of the lack of information on economic conditions in the TDHS data, an index of socio-economic development levels in Turkey provided by SPO was also referred to for the analysis of the EOI (see Dincer 1996; and HUIPS 1994).

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A note is necessary here about the use of these data. The TIMS is still the only survey data on international migration from Turkey. The TDHS 1993 was the latest available data at the time when this research started. In 2000, the TDHS 1998 became available but there are compatibility problems. The TDHS 1993 is more relevant to timing of migrations which were recorded in the TIMS. Therefore, the researcher used the 1993 TDHS instead of the later version.

For the breakdown of the population in Turkey according to these questions see Chapter 5, section 4.
The TIMS data are used to describe and interpret the individual and household backgrounds that underlie decisions to migrate or to stay. This survey was a part of an international survey of push-pull factors of international migration to the European Union (Schoorl et al. 2000). It is basically focused on migration flows from the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean region (Turkey, Morocco and Egypt) and from Sub-Saharan Africa (Ghana and Senegal) to the EU during the ten year period from 1986 to 1996. For primary data collection in immigrant receiving countries Spain and Italy were selected since these have been recently having sizeable migrant populations from Morocco and Senegal (Spain) and Ghana and Egypt (Italy) (Schoorl et al. 2000). Thus eight country teams (one organising team based in NIDI, the Netherlands) worked on each country survey and the author of this thesis was also a part of the Turkish team consisting 11 members from Hacettepe Institute of Population Studies and Bilkent University (TIMS 2000).

The TIMS, Turkish survey, provides the first comprehensive account of international migration from Turkey. It was conducted in 28 selected districts in 8 provinces of Turkey in 1996. The TIMS aimed to investigate international migration from Turkey by focusing on two categories of populations: those from less developed regions and those from developed regions. Each group was also divided into two further categories: places with more established migration flows; and places with more recent migration flows. The West region is composed of Denizli and Uşak provinces, developed areas with more established migration flows. The Central region contains Yozgat and Aksaray provinces, less developed areas but with more established migration flows. The developed provinces of Gaziantep and Kahramanmaraş with more recent migration flows form the region East 1. Finally, Adiyaman and Şanlurfa provinces stand for the less developed region in the East with more recent migration flows (see Figure 1.1 on page 8). The TIMS researched migration during a ten-year period between 1986 and 1996 in these regions. Therefore, it excludes most of the information about earlier migration flows. Despite all these shortcomings, it is the only survey data on international migration from Turkey gathered until now at this scale.

Four sets of questionnaires were used in the TIMS, which were administered respectively to households, migrants, return migrants, and non-migrants interviewed in Turkey. The target population in the survey were households and their individual members aged 18-65 years. The data comprise two sets: at the household level (1779 cases) and at the level of individuals (4775 cases) in selected regions representing
different development levels and different migration histories. The TIMS data were analysed here in order to describe general patterns of Turkish Kurdish emigration in comparison with the patterns of the Turkish migratory regime. Thus the composition of emigrating populations, their household conditions, employment and educational levels are outlined. The intentions of current migrants and of potential migrants are examined for any future predictions of trends in international migration originating from Turkey. The topics presented in Table 4.1 were covered in the survey questionnaires as individual sections.

**Table 4.1 Topics covered in the TIMS questionnaires**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Household modules:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A Household roster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Information about living quarters and housing conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Economic conditions of the household</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D Remittances</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual modules:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E Social and demographic characteristics and social interaction (and integration)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F Information about work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G Migration history</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H Household composition in country of origin, before the last migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J Economic situation before the last migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K Motives for move(s) abroad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L Information about the last/current destination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M Migration networks and assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N Experiences at destination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P Intentions for future migration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The shortcomings of these two data sets need to be addressed before going into a description of the procedures of analysis. As mentioned above, the TDHS data was weak in terms of socio-economic indicators but was the only recent source (since the 1965 Turkish Census), which included information about the ethnic diversity of the entire population in Turkey. As they reflect socio-economic conditions to some extent, variables including educational attainment levels, crowding and size of households, and housing conditions were used in this study. The TDHS is also the primary source for the estimation of the Turkish Kurdish population in Turkey and has been described in detail elsewhere (Sirkeci 2000; Işıkgöz et al. 1999; Koç and Hancioğlu 1999; Özsoy et al. 1996).

For the TIMS, the general problem was the high non-response rate for many variables. Although the questionnaires used in the survey are extremely rich, the data collected do not reflect this richness. Questions providing background information were fully answered by all respondents but in investigations of the details of migration processes missing cases often outnumbered valid cases. This has led to smaller numbers in the
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analysis of patterns referring to ethnic differentiation. Missing information was also related to another structural shortcoming of the survey: the TIMS conducted interviews with proxy persons in some cases. Proxies were allowed for current migrants, but not for return migrants, who should always be interviewed in person. In the cases where proxies had to be used, questions on attitudes and opinions, as well as certain questions on migrant experience abroad were eliminated (TIMS 2000).

For 46% of all individual interviews a proxy respondent, who was assumed to be capable of answering the questionnaire on behalf of the eligible respondent, answered the questions (TIMS 2000). It was obviously difficult to find current and/or recent migrants for interview at their households in Turkey. Therefore, use of proxy persons was very high in interviews with such migrants (87 and 72 per cent respectively). Use of proxy persons caused a considerable proportion of missing cases ('missing' or 'don't know' answers). For example, “If the group who refused to answer or said they don’t know (probably by proxy respondents) is included, the percentage of undocumented migration increases to 28 per cent.” (TIMS 2000:98).

The TIMS has also a distinct rural bias. It contains a sample population, 60% of which is rural and 40% is urban compared to Turkey’s broader pattern of 70% urban population. To make the data representative, a weight variable is estimated and applied to the data to account for the regional selection of the sample, size and selection of clusters, and migrant statuses of the households (See TIMS 2000, section 13.3). This study therefore has avoided rural-urban differences in the analysis, as TIMS might be misleading on this dimension. Possibly for this very reason, the survey report itself also refrained from using urban-rural comparisons in the analysis (See TIMS 2000).

In the analyses of the survey data (both the TIMS and TDHS), language (mother tongue in the TDHS and language at home when a child in the TIMS) was used as the only marker of ethnicity. These definitions were adopted in this research for practical purposes. Although there is voluminous debate on the measurement and analysis of ethnicity in the literature, language seems one of the most commonly used signifiers of ethnicity (e.g. Barth 1969; Cohen 1978; Hutchinson and Smith 1993; Hirschman 1993).

There are some limitations due to the quality and content of survey data. Nevertheless, analyses of both data sets still provide important contextual information with regard to the EOI and insights for international migration patterns. These are valuable for the examination of Turkish Kurdish international migration in response to an EOI, and they
are complemented by the qualitative interviews, which are described in detail in the following section.

Both the TIMS and the TDHS data were analysed using SPSS. Thus, on a descriptive level, some generalisations were reached such as the relationships between ethnicity and motives for migration, wealth and education. The main purpose of using quantitative surveys (i.e. the TIMS and the TDHS) was to obtain necessary information to outline patterns of migration and to indicate associations between individual variables (Ackroyd and Hughes 1983; Oppenheim 1992). Regression analyses were also run to examine causal relationships between the components of the EOI and migration. These analyses revealed some patterns of Turkish Kurdish migration on the basis of the TIMS data but also pointed to the limitations of generalising from it whilst the intensive research based on in-depth interviews are used to investigate possible contrasts between what the quantitative data present and what immigrants express.

4.4. Intensive research: the interviews and analysis

The intensive component of the research took place over six months in Cologne incorporating semi-structured in-depth interviews combined with participant observation within the Kurdish immigrant community.

The in-depth interview, as a data collection technique, was adopted in this research to collect information about Turkish Kurdish international migration and the expression of ethnicity through this migratory move. Semi-structured in-depth interviewing was chosen as a suitable method to examine different aspects of Turkish Kurdish migration. It was suitable both because this study is the first research on the phenomenon and the semi-structured style would save research time and enable the researcher to focus on certain issues and stories. Thus, in-depth interviews have been the appropriate method in this research to gain insights about the expression of ethnicity on the move.

The key stage of information gathering involved semi-structured in-depth interviews with Turkish Kurdish immigrants in Cologne in order to examine their migration patterns in relation to the ethnic conflict in Turkey and an EOI. Thus, it is possible to say that both parts of the research strategy critically complemented each other and served different purposes. The interviews were conducted at homes or workplaces of immigrants and in some cases at local coffeehouses. The interviews lasted about two
hours on average and most of the conversations were recorded as long as the respondents allowed the researcher to do so. The details of the interviews and the fieldwork are described in the following sections.

4.4.1. Research site

The core information of this study was collected through in-depth interviews conducted in Cologne, Germany. The choice of Cologne in Germany was not an arbitrary one as it was described in detail in the previous chapter. First of all, Germany is the country with the largest Turkish immigrant population in Europe hosting about 70 percent of all Turkish emigrants (see Chapter 3; and also İçduygu and Sirkeci 1999b; Abadan-Unat 1995). The city of Cologne is located at the heart of North Rhine Westphalia State, with the second largest immigrant community in Germany, among whom Turkish immigrants constitute the largest portion (almost half). At the same time, such a large Turkish immigrant community also comprises a large Turkish Kurdish immigrant community (see Chapter 3).

Secondly, Cologne is an important centre for Kurdish social and political organisations in Germany. Many Turkish Kurdish associations’ headquarters such as KOMKAR (Immigrant Organisation of the Kurdistan Socialist Party), FEYKA (Kurdish Women’s Association), and FEK (Federation of Kurdish Alevi Associations) are located there. Cultural centres including the Kurdish Art House (in Neuss, a northern district) have also chosen Cologne as their base. The existence of these institutions is also an indicator of a significant concentration of Kurds in the area providing more public activities than anywhere else. These activities were important for observation purposes and provided access to Kurdish respondents.

Thirdly, a group of practical concerns led to the choice of Cologne as a research site. Personal contacts available in Cologne were also decisive. The researcher had stayed in the city for a period of six months in 1992, knew the area and had friends living there. The researcher’s two brothers and their families had lived in Cologne since the mid-1980s, and were part of the Turkish immigrant community in the city. These connections were helpful in the fieldwork, especially at the stage of settling within the community for the fieldwork. Thus, the researcher gained a position closer to that of an insider rather than being a complete stranger and these previously established networks
were extremely helpful in providing contacts with Turkish Kurdish immigrants and immigrant associations.

During the field research, the researcher stayed in Keup Straße, a street called “Istanbul in 200 meters” (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 1997:3) in Mülheim, a Northeast suburb of Cologne. This area was the main base of the research. It was full of Turkish shops, restaurants, kebab shops, barbers, travel agents, pub-like coffee houses, grocers, and mosques (see Chapter 3 for details). This suburb was heavily populated by foreigners (30%), most of whom were Turkish or Turkish Kurdish (Table 3.4 and Figure 3.7).

4.4.2. Reflexivity: the researcher in research

The researcher took a reflexive approach to data, which is informed by the perspective considering the researcher as an inevitable part of the social world that is being studied (Hammersley and Atkinson 1991; Holland 1999:465). Thereby reflexivity involves a process of being critical about the possible assumptions and biases of the researcher (Payne 2000:312). It also allows the reader to be involved in the process of understanding and interpretation. Thus, the reader may develop his or her own understanding of the issues analysed.

The author’s position as the researcher reflects several aspects starting from the very beginning of the research process as a whole such as formulating a research question, the search for an appropriate environment for realising the project, which involves funding as well as supervision, then tailoring the project according to the resources available (i.e. time and funding). In the meantime, the researcher’s own set of identities interacted with this whole process. This was especially important in the field research due to the subject under investigation: Turkish Kurdish international migration and the role of the EOI due to the ethnic conflict.

Being ethnically Turkish, the researcher’s position must have affected the research because being Turkish is sufficient for many Turkish Kurds to determine their attitudes. They may have considered tailoring their stories accordingly and withholding information given the conflict between the Turkish government and the Turkish Kurdish rebels in Turkey.

The status of respondents and would-be respondents was also important. For example, asylum-seekers might have serious reservations about telling their stories since they are
involved in an ongoing process of decision-making on their application and may have been unwilling to undermine their chances of being granted refugee status by telling detailed stories to a ‘stranger’.

Gender reflexivity was also important. As a male researcher, the author had difficulty gaining access to female respondents among the Sunni-Muslim Turkish Kurdish community. The cultural characteristics and customs of that particular community often prevented the researcher from interviewing its female members.

Finally, it must be noted that these different contexts associated with different identities and situations are not exclusive but overlap. The important point to underline here is that according to such an approach, the interview data is a product of a particular interacting context in which the researcher and respondents have participated. Therefore, it is important to highlight that, as in any other research text, this research was also merely one representation among many possible representations (Hardy et al. 2001:535).

4.4.3. Respondents

A snowball technique was used for the selection of respondents. This was the most convenient method because there was no sampling frame for Turkish Kurdish immigrants in Cologne. Hence a snowball method was employed to generate networks of initial contacts.

Initially, a friend of the researcher’s brother helped him to get in touch with the Turkish Kurdish community in Cologne. She was a Turkish Kurdish refugee who arrived in the early 1990s and she was also an activist in the Turkish left-wing immigrant movement in the city. Initial contacts were very important for the development of the research. She introduced the researcher to some local associations and to public centres such as the Kurdish Workers Union and the Alevi Dergahi, a religious community centre, which the researcher frequently visited and established a familiarity. After the first two weeks, members had begun to recognise him as a friend rather than a stranger. From this point, the researcher had the chance to recruit respondents from this community as well. People who work for or visit these community centres invited the researcher to their political and public activities where he had the chance to see Kurdish weddings.
Kurdistan festivals, exhibitions, and discussion circles involving political youth groups as well as decision-making meetings of some organisations.

A bias is associated with the snowball as a technique for recruiting respondents because there is always a risk of being stuck with a group of people and thereby losing the diversity of the broader population under investigation. To overcome this risk, the researcher did not interview the initial contacts but began recruiting from the second cycle of contacts that he reached with the help of initial contacts. Thus a larger population frame was reached and the researcher followed different snowballs to avoid bias. By doing so it was hoped to gain access to a more diverse groups within the Turkish Kurdish immigrant community.

The first group of informants were asked to put the researcher in touch with their friends who might be subsequently interviewed, who then introduced him to their friends. The process of recruiting respondents continued until 34 completed interviews with Turkish Kurdish immigrants had been conducted. During visits to associations and community centres, the author attended numerous meetings with officers, politicians, facilitators, and local community leaders. These meetings were helpful as they provided some insights into the Turkish Kurdish immigrant population and their activities. Through these meetings and initial visits, publicity about the research was ensured throughout May 1999.

In the meantime, the researcher tried to have as much personal contact with ordinary Turkish Kurdish immigrants as possible. For this purpose, coffee houses, shops, and restaurants in some quarters of the city where Turkish immigrants are concentrated were regularly visited. These visits and contacts were the beginning of a process of participant observation, which was an integral part of the research during the fieldwork. These relations could help the researcher to become a part of the community investigated. Thus he could find a chance to find out more about the lives and experiences of immigrants. These observations were recorded in a research diary in the form of notes.

Although it was hinted in the previous section, refusals in the process of interviewing due to reflexivity are worth underlining here. Due to the ethnic identity of the researcher and the nature of the population (consisting of many asylum seekers and illegal migrants), the researcher experienced numerous refusals. In particular, those people who were reached after two or three referrals often refused to give interviews.
They were suspicious about the researcher and in some cases this was impossible to overcome. Due to such suspicion, it was impossible to conduct interviews with some illegal immigrants and asylum seekers whose asylum process was not yet finalised. Even in cases where the researcher had strong, trustworthy references, respondents were quite cautious at the beginning of the interview although after a while intimate and detailed stories were told. As a Turkish researcher investigating the Turkish Kurdish population, which was largely opposed to the Turkish state, accessing respondents was even more difficult than expected before the fieldwork.

In selecting respondents, people from different backgrounds were contacted in order to enlarge the potential sample to avoid interviewing people with a particular perspective. It had been intended to recruit a balanced sample of immigrants distinguished according to different background categories such as sex, age, arrival year, socio-economic status, and residential origin (i.e. urban-rural or easterner-westerner). However, because of the size of the sample it was not possible to include all these different categories in this study. Although the aim was to include as many people with different characteristics as possible, the final sample was not necessarily representative. In short, the sample comprised emigrants who arrived before and after 1985, the date that marked the outbreak of clashes between the Turkish Army and the PKK and also marks a turning point in the history of Turkish emigration. After 198063 more refugees and asylum seekers from Turkey fled to Europe than other migrants (EUROSTAT 1996b). Because of the difficulties in accessing women, the proportion of female respondents remained less than males. Women often stay at home and due to customs (see Durakbaş and İlyasoğlu 2001; Kadoğlu 1997) they are not allowed to participate in conversations with men. Men are more visible and easily accessible in public spheres.

As shown in Table 4.2, the respondent profiles reflect general background categories, which are also similar to those of the entire population in Turkey (see SIS 2000). Two thirds are from urban areas of Turkey. The age structure seems typical for an immigrant population, as they often comprise individuals of working ages (roughly corresponding to the middle age group in Table 4.2). The educational distribution also reflects some diversity and the high proportion of educated people complies with the assertion that

63 It must be noted here again that 1980 is the year when the last military coup took place in Turkey.
international migration often requires additional skills (Hammar 1995). Appendix 4.2 can be referred to see brief profiles of the respondents.

Table 4.2. Characteristics of respondents, 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of migration</th>
<th>Asylum Seekers</th>
<th>Workers</th>
<th>Family Reunion</th>
<th>Others*</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seekers Reunion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary school and higher</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No education and primary school</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban origin</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural origin</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old age group (40 +)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle age group (25-40)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young age group (up to 25)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Students and professionals.

4.4.4. In-depth interviews

In the field research, semi-structured in-depth interviews were employed. In-depth interviews were conducted in Cologne, Germany during the period between May and September 1999. Interviews mostly took place in the homes and workplaces of immigrants but in some cases meetings at coffee houses and cafes were also arranged for practical reasons. Apart from a few exceptions, all interviews took place after an initial meeting. Whenever the researcher met a potential respondent, he used the first meeting to introduce himself and to discuss the respondent’s broader story (i.e. background). These first meetings were as short as 10-20 minutes. Then a convenient time and place for the interview were arranged at these initial meetings. This was quite helpful because the initial meeting was usually in public places such as meetings, coffeehouses, and restaurants where they were reluctant to talk about their migration stories. Thus, the researcher had the chance to get a glimpse of immigrants’ experiences in public places including coffee houses and their workplaces prior to in-depth interviews. These meetings also provided an opportunity for valuable observations, which were helpful for the analyses of interviews.

The interview agenda was set to cover the whole process of migration exploring the whole experience of migration and the expression of ethnicity within. The investigation put a special emphasis on the ethnic conflict and EOI in Turkey. Therefore, a semi-structured agenda was prepared. The first part of the agenda covered basic background
information including age, sex, marital status, highest educational achievement, and migrant status (e.g. refugee, asylum seeker, or guest worker). The later sections of the interview agenda aimed at gathering the story of migration in a chronological order (see Appendix 4.1).

The second part of the interview focused on previous migration experiences. It was followed by another section on living conditions in Turkey prior to migration to Germany. It also examined ethnic aspects such as relations between the Turks and the Kurds in Turkey and motivations and networks of migration available prior to the migration. Then another section bridged the process of moving to Germany with the experiences of being abroad and the changes due to that movement. The last section aimed at getting information about experiences of discrimination, ethnic conflict, Kurdishness, ethnic rituals, ceremonies, values, and norms. All the sections of the interview agenda were designed to prompt the respondents to make comparisons between the experiences before and after migration and between Turkey and Germany with regard to ethnic experiences (see Appendix 4.1). Nevertheless not all the interviews fitted to the interview schedule planned prior to the fieldwork. They rather followed their own schedule but still covering the basic themes of investigation.

Interviews were conducted in Turkish although initially the researcher was prepared to use Kurdish interpreters during the interviews. However, when the field research started, the researcher realised that most Turkish Kurds spoke Turkish. In fact, many did not know Kurdish but Turkish. Therefore, there was no need to use interpretation because it was manageable in Turkish.

Whilst applying structure to the interview agenda, the principle of qualitative research was not ignored, which states “the enquiry should be as open as possible, not circumscribed by preconceived ideas on the part of the researchers, not inhibited by a tight, structured schedule” (SCPR 1972:11). By using a conversational approach described by Valentine (1998) as “Tell me about...” the aim was to encourage respondents to talk about themselves freely. The process of interview analysis is explained and discussed in the section following participant observation, below. All these conversations were made more meaningful through participant observation in the research site.
4.4.5. Participant observation

Participant observation is a naturalistic research method that allows researchers to place themselves in the community being studied and establish relationships with members of it, whilst observing inner workings and the feelings that accompany them (Cook 1997: Cohen 2000). Participant observation was also employed in this research as a method to compliment in-depth interviews. Therefore a field diary was kept during the field research.

Adler and Adler (1987) identify three different types of participant observation based on membership: peripheral, active and complete. The peripheral membership role is the most marginal and least committed to the social world studied (Adler and Adler, 1987:37). The researcher seeks an insider perspective on people, activities and structures by interacting with the members of the group closely but avoiding involvement in central, functional roles. Active membership requires the researcher to participate in a group’s core social activities actively. They interact as members of the group rather than being an observing researcher. This role attains more reliability, trust and acceptance for the researcher among group members. Complete membership means the greatest participation in group’s activities and the researcher immerses him or herself as a “native” member, which can result in a misleading understanding as they became involved too much in the group (Adler and Adler, 1987).

According to these definitions, peripheral membership was adopted in the field research. First of all, it was not possible for the researcher to involve himself in the Turkish Kurdish immigrant community for two reasons. Firstly, the period for field research was too short (i.e. five months) for complete membership. The time limitation of my research would not allow me to establish insider relations with the group. Secondly, as was mentioned earlier, there was also an ethnicity issue, which prevents active and full membership models of participant observation. Because of being Turkish, it was not possible for the researcher to participate in the activities of the community as if he was a native member. More active participation could cause suspicion among the group members, which was evident because of the researcher’s ethnic origin. Finally, he also did not want to be involved in all activities of the group, which could cause a danger for him in relation to the political context affiliated with the Turkish Kurds’ struggle against the Turkish government.
4.4.6. Problems in the field

Telling a life story is something contextual and interpersonal as well as individual. It is a snapshot of a moment in the reality of an individual. Thus in any case, any story could be different essentially if told to somebody else, or if told in another context. For instance, the arrest of the Turkish Kurdish rebel leader (i.e. Abdullah Öcalan) is a factor that entails a rise in political consciousness among Turkish Kurds abroad and thus it is possible to assume that this fact might have changed the narratives in a more politically oriented manner.

Thus, the limitations mentioned in participant observation were prevalent throughout the fieldwork in Germany in 1999. Three major problems arose in the field research. First of all, the time period in which the research was undertaken was characterised by turmoil due to a striking development in the Turkish Kurdish ethnic movement; the arrest of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK. This arrest resulted in demonstrations by Kurdish immigrant communities all around Europe. Following his arrest, there was the trial of Abdullah Öcalan, which influenced people’s perceptions day by day. The importance of these changes for my research was reflected in two ways: many people became undecided about the Kurdish cause due to the general uncertainty after the arrest and explanations of Abdullah Öcalan during the trial. In most cases, they were reluctant to talk about Abdullah Öcalan and the Kurdish ethnic revival. They seemed confused about what was happening. During the arrest and trial period there was an increase in nationalism among Turkish Kurdish immigrants.

Being Turkish was both helpful and restrictive during the field research. First of all, it made many things easy in the field. For example, there was no problem of translation or interpretation because Turkish Kurds speak Turkish. Although the researcher was not Kurdish, being from Turkey, he gained some sort of insider position. It was easy to understand attitudes to certain norms and values, as most of them were common throughout Turkey such as the status of women. On the other hand, being Turkish caused difficulties too. Within the context of an ongoing ethnic conflict in Turkey between the Turkish army and Kurdish guerrillas, the Turks and the Kurds have been rival, contesting ethnicities. At the same time, the Turks are the ruling ethnicity and therefore they are responsible for the Kurds suffering. Within this context, the first reactions the researcher experienced from Turkish Kurds in Cologne were negative.

64 He made statements quite contrary to the Kurdish cause e.g. he declared that he was ready to serve the Turkish state. These statements were televised for days before the trial.
They were suspicious of a Turkish researcher from the UK. In most cases, they thought that the researcher was affiliated to the Turkish government. While ordinary people tended to be suspicious about his connection to the Turkish government, left wing people also questioned his connection with the UK, as a leading capitalist country. This caused a high refusal rate. The researcher could eventually interview only a small fraction of the people whom he met. Thus the fieldwork became more demanding. Thereby, the time spent trying to persuade immigrants to participate was longer than expected.

Thirdly, the time limitation of this research was a problem. A longer period of field research such as one year or more would have generated better outcomes. The researcher found it difficult to establish himself in an immigrant community. For example, involvement in community activities as a volunteer for a period of one year or so could have provided more insights and more intimate interviews.

4.4.7. Interview Analysis

Analysis of the interviews started with a classification of interviewees according to type of migration: guest workers, family reunifications, asylum seekers and refugees. The interviewees were asked to choose a pseudonym before starting each interview and all interviews were given these names instead of real names. The question was "what is the name that you most like?" The pseudonyms chosen have been used to refer to their stories throughout the dissertation. Often these chosen names were immigrants' favourite names. For example, they preferred names, which they would like to name their children. Therefore, it was also interesting as they may reflect some sort of ethnic preference.

Following that classification, interviews were transcribed. As mentioned above they were conducted in Turkish. It was a difficult task to decide where to use translation. An interpreter or translator could have been used in the field research and all interviews could have been recorded in English instead of Turkish. Alternatively, interviews could be conducted in Turkish, analysed in Turkish and then the findings could be presented in English. First of all, it was not possible to conduct interviews in English because most of the respondents did not speak any language other than Turkish (and sometimes Kurdish). Secondly, if the interviews were conducted in English (with the help of interpretation), there would be a loss of meaning. Then in the analysis phase, the
researcher would be forced to analyse a changed (due to loss of original meaning) set of texts in English, his second language. Thereby there was a risk of losing understanding at all. Given the discussions in the literature, the second strategy seemed more feasible than the first one.

Derrida (1991:250) says that translation can omit the ‘original’ multiplicity of meaning and understanding, but it is a necessity despite the disadvantages (Smith 1996:262). Others have also referred to translation in terms of losing meaning and understanding as a common problem in cross-cultural research (Twyman et al. 2000; Western 1996; Gutting 1996a). Smith (1996) gives examples of translation problems from his research, which required translation from German to English. As Derrida stated above, cross-cultural researchers have to use translation when it is necessary although it is impossible to translate in full. There need to be strategies to minimise interpretation problems.

As a native Turkish speaker, it was the best strategy for the researcher to conduct interviews in his mother tongue with a population who spoke Turkish as their first language although their mother tongue was Kurdish; then analyse these in his mixed language (Turkish and English), and present the findings in his second language, English. Thus, he translated some extracts from the interviews from Turkish to English. These are used in the final dissertation. By doing so, at least some of the linguistic problems, which might occur in the translation process apart from the problems of presentation of findings in a second language, were solved. Thereby, the original meaning could be retained. As Smith (1996) emphasised “any translation seems always to be a reduced and distorted representation of other social texts and practices.”(p.162).

Analysing in-depth interviews has been one of the most challenging tasks in this research because it is a quite subjective process and the investigator has been confronted with a series of interpretive decisions (Riessman, 1993).

After the process of transcription had been completed, full transcripts of the interviews were ready. They were not constructed in dialog form but as continuous texts because there was very little question and answer type dialog during the interviews. The “tell me about...” (Valentine 1997) form was used successfully. Crang (1997:184) suggests that each research project develops its own unique qualitative analysis approach. He also adds that analysis should be included in early research plans by emphasising the
importance of creating the research instruments. Here the importance of the interview schedule increases (see Appendix 4.1). It was developed on the basis of issues studied in previous migration research and needs and novelties of this research. Eventually, the analysis of the material gathered in the fieldwork in Cologne was also developed according to the major thematic lines of the interview schedule.

The second step following transcription was incorporating the notes taken in the fieldwork into interview texts. Actually both processes were simultaneous. The tapes were listened to again after the transcription and the field diary was checked to remember the research environment and to recall some ideas and memories of the field research.

The transcribed texts were then coded according to the thematic structure of the interview agenda and the emerging themes of the collected data. Thus the following areas were identified in coding process: a) previous migration experiences prior to international migration, b) ethnic experiences (i.e. festivities, rituals, discrimination, relations), c) changes through migration, experiences in the country of destination and future plans, d) mechanisms of migration, e) considerations and perceptions about migration.

**Figure 4.1.** Mr. Ali Haydar’s migration moves

At this stage, simple route maps of immigrants were drawn. These were drawn from the interviews indicating what kind of journeys had taken place. These route maps provided a chronological account of the migration movement departing from the
birthplace in Turkey to the place of residence in Germany but also showing the places the migrant had stopped at or passed through during his or her journey to the final destination (e.g. Figure 4.1). This was helpful for further analysis as these maps allowed the researcher to see the overall migration experience of individual respondents. In the route maps, illegal and legal moves or entries, type of migration, area of origin, migration experiences before and after the first international migration were shown (see also Appendix 4.2). For example, Figure 4.1 above outlines the migration moves of Mr. Ali Haydar. He was born in Dersim in 1972 and migrated to Mersin while he was a child. From Mersin, he moved to Ankara and to Izmir for work. In Izmir, he started working for an international shipping company and thus he had the chance to go abroad. After visiting several countries including Russia and Italy, he landed in France, illegally escaping from the ship he was working on. Then, he ended up in Cologne via Bielefeld and filed an asylum application in 1993. In the analysis, these route maps were important tools for me to make comparisons and to see some broader patterns of migration mechanisms.

Along with the third round of reading, open coding for exploratory purposes and axial coding for further in-depth investigation of certain aspects are followed (Strauss 1987; Charmaz 1983). The main themes in the interviews were outlined in the side codes. These notes formed a summary of each interview. This kind of summarising allowed me to see general process of migration and its variation for each immigration form.

Axial coding involved an analysis of one aspect at a time with a focus on relationships between different categories. For example, migration decisions were also analysed in relation to the role of ethnicity and ethnic tension, or in relation to previous migration experiences, education and employment opportunities and so on. However the issue of subjectivity was still there as categories were reflections of the conceptual framework applied. In turn, the interviews were also products of the questions of this particular research. Therefore, the researcher admits that “we see what we have reason of seeing” (Kaplan 1964:133). Qualitative interview analysis is a representation of an experience. It starts from the primary experience under investigation, and goes through by the researcher attending the experience, recording and transcribing the story and the interpretation (Riessman 1993:10).
At this stage, by combining the quantitative analysis of the survey data (i.e. the TIMS) and qualitative analysis within the conceptual framework (see Chapter 3) the structure of the chapters were shaped and a rough outline of this dissertation appeared.

The transcriptions and route maps are referred to throughout the analysis in each chapter. Excerpts from interviews are used to substantiate findings. It was a repetitive round of reading during the course of a long period of analysis. All the interviews were read again at least once for each section to elucidate the findings.

4.5. Presentation of the findings

The data-collection strategy employed in this research has also shaped the presentation of the findings. Two main types of data set formed the basis of the analysis in the present study: first, quantitative data which was based on two nationwide surveys (the TIMS and the TDHS) in Turkey, and secondly, qualitative data which was obtained through the in-depth interviews of immigrants and participant observation in Cologne, Germany. Hence, while the survey data were analysed quantitatively using SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Sciences 10.1.), used in the quantitative type of analyses, the in-depth interviews, containing the oral, autobiographical accounts of migration experiences were analysed qualitatively.

Throughout the study, the most important task was to combine and communicate the analyses of these two bodies of data and to eliminate shortcomings in both. In the presentation of the findings, it was attempted to achieve this task by relating the case studies to some 50 statistical tables and 30 figures drawn from survey data (mainly frequency and percentage distributions). The presentation of results in the form of cross-tabulations was an attempt to quantify the possible answers to the questions of who migrated, why they migrated and in what ways this movement took place. Given the lack of any comprehensive quantitative information about Turkish Kurdish international migration and the need for a better understanding of the whole migratory process from Turkey to Germany, the necessity to evaluate the experiences and characteristics of Turkish Kurdish migrants in a quantitative framework was evident. This quantitative presentation of findings reflects a descriptive account. Thus, the results presented in the form of cross-tabulations could not be considered as the findings of a probability-based statistical examination; they could be seen only as a descriptively quantified account of the various characteristics and experiences of
The Research Methodology

Turkish Kurds. However, statistical tests (e.g. Chi Square) were performed for each relationship shown in the cross tabulations and the hypotheses were found to be statistically significant unless otherwise indicated in the text or in any particular table.

The wealth and detail of the descriptions given in the in-depth interviews made them very useful for understanding the international migration of the Kurds. The basic aim of using interview materials in the form of extracts was to give a self-description of the respondents' migration experiences in the context of an EOI and international migration. This also provided an opportunity to compare the survey data and qualitative material with regard to the patterns and processes of Turkish Kurdish international migration.

The combined presentation of both the case studies which were represented in the form of extracts (which were representative of codes) and the cross-tabulations summarising the findings of quantitative analysis enabled the findings from the two main bodies of data, namely quantitative and qualitative ones, to talk to each other. Thus, they complemented each other in exploring the complex structures and processes of migration. This type of presentation of the findings, and the combination of the qualitative material with the quantitative analysis of migration, determined the general formation of this text.

4.6. Conclusion

This study provides an example of the use of mixed methodologies in population geography research. There have been three basic motivations for the researcher to adopt a mixed method approach. First, it was a necessary to examine broader patterns and insights at the same time. Secondly, it was important to combine the findings of different levels of analysis. Thirdly, a qualitative investigation was crucial to examine the role of the expression of ethnicity because it is often hard to quantify. Thereby, analysis of the survey data and in-depth interviews have been used and connected to different levels of understanding and producing interrelated findings. A multiplicity of methods is preferred instead of relying on a single method despite some inevitable problems encountered at different stages of the research process (McKendrick 1999). Each method was helpful in generating findings at different levels and about different aspects of the research question.
Two problems arose during the course of this research. One is the fact that there is a crucial need for ethnically categorised migration data either in censuses or in the form of well designed surveys. Second is the implementation of qualitative field research: a) the length of fieldwork could be longer and thus the researcher could be better absorbed in the population researched, b) the ethnic identity of the researcher proved to be important. A researcher with a “neutral” (neither Turkish nor Kurdish) background could have gained more insight in research focusing on ethnic conflict oriented social phenomena.
Chapter V

The Environment of Insecurity and International Migration

"All happy families resemble one another, but every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way."
(Anna Karenina, Tolstoi, 1969, p.1)

5.1. Introduction

In Chapter 2, the environment of insecurity (EOI) was defined as a background context for international migration. This chapter examines the details of the EOI for the Turkish Kurdish migratory regime. International migration and its relation to the EOI are analysed here in terms of push factors and the maintenance of international migration networks. Material and non-material environments of insecurity, which facilitate Turkish Kurdish international migration, are examined here in three sub-sections: socio-economic, political, and demographic EOIs.

As the conceptual perspectives of international migration emphasise the significance of socio-economic differences between the sending and receiving regions, the first section focuses on Turkey’s economic position within the global economy. As briefly explained in Chapter 3, regional inequalities within Turkey also require particular attention. Beside the macro level presentation, the socio-economic EOI is analysed at the household level on the basis of housing conditions, education, and possession of durable goods as indicators of welfare status. Levels of socio-economic deprivation are linked to political aspects of the EOI in Turkey in the second section.

Political deprivation, a part of the EOI, in the Turkish Kurdish case can also be considered as democratic deprivation, with regard to Turkey’s record of human rights violations resulting in the erasure of political rights for other ethnic groups in the country. The second section discusses Turkish politics with particular reference to the treatment of Kurdish political movements and their existence.

The third part of the chapter looks into the details of Kurdish social demography compared to the general population structure and patterns of Turkey where the differences in terms of household compositions and other demographic indicators are revealed.
The main information source for this chapter is the household data set of the TDHS (Turkish Demographic Health Survey), which was conducted as a part of the worldwide Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) program (For details, see HUIPS 1994). The household data include information on the living conditions and demography of household members. To illustrate global and regional differences, data from the Turkish State Institute of Statistics, the Turkish State Planning Organisation, and World Bank sources are exploited. For the political EOI, some legislative documents, general literature, and media sources are referred to.

5.2. The Socio-economic Environment of Insecurity

The socio-economic EOI is analysed here as part of the background context facilitating migration which has been considered together with political and demographic EOIs. The first section below introduces the general framework of economic differentials between Turkey and more developed countries, which may help to understand international migration from Turkey to Western Europe. The second part deals with the regional socio-economic unevenness within Turkey with particular reference to Kurdish populated areas. Thirdly, Turkish and Turkish Kurdish households are compared in order to understand the implications of the EOI for the Kurdish population in Turkey. The TDHS data do not allow much detailed analysis of the socio-economic conditions of households but there is nevertheless some valuable information to exploit on housing conditions, households’ durable goods, and educational attainment. Through comparisons between Turkish and Kurdish households and individuals, this chapter reveals the relative deprivation of the Kurds in Turkey, which may influence the likelihood of Kurdish international migration.

5.2.1. Turkey versus destination countries

Socio-economic differences between countries are important to understand international migration flows. It is not a mystery that people from Turkey have migrated to Europe, Australia, and some oil-rich Arab countries but not to the struggling countries of Africa, for instance. The direction of migration flows is very sensitive to geographical and political proximities but more importantly to socio-
economic prosperity differentials (Massey et al. 1993; Castles and Miller 1993; Todaro 1976; Portes and Borócz 1989).

Turkey has made great efforts to liberalise and integrate its economy with the global economy since the early 1980s. After securing currency convertibility in the early 1980s, it entered into a customs union agreement with the EU in 1996. In the meantime, the country gained a pivotal role in developing economic cooperation with Eastern Europe and Central Asia (World Bank 2000). These changes obviously redirected some migration from Turkey to the former Soviet republics of Central Asia. By the mid-1990s, these flows were nearly a quarter of total Turkish emigration (Gökdere 1994; Içduygü and Sirkeci 1998).

The Turkish economy has undergone gradual economic reforms since its early integration within international monetary organisations such as the World Bank in 1947. Currently, its economy is still quite volatile as was seen in the economic crisis of February 2001 (Milliyet-Almanak 2001). This volatility also triggers income inequalities within the country, which in turn breeds more internal and international migration pressures. For instance, 2.5% of the population live in absolute poverty (which means they have less than $1(US) per day per person) (World Bank 2000). This proportion rises up to 10% in some regions. At the same time, 36% of Turkey’s population is unable to purchase their basic needs.

Although Turkey is among the top 30 most industrialised countries, it is ranked after 85 upper and middle-income countries in terms of human development indicators (World Bank 2000). This is mainly due to a poor record of socio-economic indicators including the availability of educational and health facilities.

In comparison with the major destination countries like Germany, France, and the Netherlands, which all have a large intake of Turkish immigrants, Turkey clearly stands far behind on the development ladder. World Bank (2000) figures indicate a huge income gap between Turkey and the EU. For example, its $2,900(US) GNP per capita puts Turkey among the upper middle income countries but still keeps it far behind the main destination countries of Europe, whose average GNP per capita is $25,000(US). Commercial use of energy is slightly lower than the lower middle-income countries and equal to only 30% of the level of use in countries such as Germany, Australia, and the UK. More or less the same disparities are seen in electric power consumption and direct foreign investment. High inflation is another factor contributing to inequality between
Turkey and the destination countries. In 1999, annual inflation by GDP was 52% in Turkey\textsuperscript{65} while it ranged between 0.5% and 2.3% in Western Europe.

5.2.2. The uneven development of Turkey’s regions

Anomalies of economic development in Turkey have contributed to rapid urbanisation throughout the second half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} Century (İçduyuğ et al. 1998). Regional differences in Turkey have facilitated a rural to urban exodus. The share of the urban population in Turkey increased from 19% in 1950 to 74% in 1997 (SIS 2000). However, the significance of regional unevenness in Turkey for this particular study comes from the possible ethnic aspects related to this diversity in terms of socio-economic indicators, since the Eastern provinces of the country are mainly populated by Turkish Kurds (see Chapter 3, Figure 3.2). According to Turkish State Planning Office data (Dinçer 1996), all the south-eastern and eastern provinces of the country have only achieved the tenth level (the lowest) on the development ladder whereas no province in the central, northern and western parts of Turkey were on the two lowest classes of the development ladder. Not surprisingly, all the least developed provinces’ populations are made up of Kurdish speaking majorities. As a result, some of the least developed provinces in the Kurdish populated region have the highest emigration rates in Turkey (see Map 3.5).

A growing awareness of these regional economic differences has resulted in efforts to formulate the Kurdish question into a regional economic development problem (see Yeğen 1999; CHP n.d.; Van Bruinessen 1992a). Aydın (1986) has rejected ethno-political views from a neo-Marxist standpoint. The Kurdish question for him is not an issue of racism or ethnicity but an outcome of the uneven development\textsuperscript{66} of Turkish capitalism (Aydin 1986:45, 24, 28). Based on such economic formulations, the large-scale development project called the GAP (South-eastern Anatolian Project) has been considered as the solution to the problems of the region. Nevertheless, up until the present, there has been no sign of any amelioration. Franz (1994:207) underlines “the idea behind the GAP is to dilute the socio-economic urgency of the Kurdish problem through economic development.” (See Appendix 5.1 for details of the GAP).

\textsuperscript{65} Inflation had exceeded 100\% during the crisis of early 2000.

\textsuperscript{66} Further details of neo-Marxist arguments about uneven development that Aydin follows can be found in Frank (1975), Wallerstein (1992), and Ramazanoğlu (1985).
Recent official statistics indicate an increasing gap between the regions of Turkey: the wealthier provinces in the western parts are getting richer while the poor provinces, most of them in the East, are getting poorer (World Bank 2000). Education and employment opportunities are the most important factors explaining economic inequalities and vulnerability in Turkey and half of the total variation in economic inequality is explained in terms of education and employment status while rural/urban and regional factors explain 20% each (World Bank 2000).

The most recent socio-economic development index of the Turkish State Planning Office also displays the increasing gap between the regions (Dinçer 1996). The socio-economic development index is created on the basis of 15 variables including indicators such as quality of health services provided, literacy rates, schooling and enrolment rates, employment levels, and industrialisation levels.

The development index for the Marmara region, the home of all the major industrial agglomerations in the country, is estimated as high as 1.27, which is followed by 0.45 in the Aegean region and 0.25 in the Central region. However, the other regions have minus scores reaching the bottom level in the East region with a score of -1.46 (İçduygü et al. 2001). More striking figures are available at the province and district level analysis. For example, the six most deprived provinces are Kurdish populated provinces among 80 provinces of the country. All of the least developed

67 The DSDI is constructed through 32 variables which are grouped into nine categories. The first category is population which covers total population, annual growth rate, urbanization ratio, and dependency ratio. The second is based on employment in various industries such as manufacturing, services, financial sector, communications, transportation, and construction. Other measures related to employment such as total number of employers, average number of employees per employer, ratio of wage earners, and ratio of women in total employment are also used in this category. The third category is education which consists of the total literacy rate, the female literacy rate, and the rate of people with higher education. The fourth relates to health in regard to the number of doctors per ten thousand population, and the number of assistant health care providers per ten thousand population. Industrial production is the fifth category with 4 sub-titles which are number of enterprises, annual average number of employees, value added per capita, and total energy. The sixth category is financial/fiscal indicators which are the number of bank offices, proportion of bank credits to total credits in Turkey, saving deposits per capita, and tax payments per capita. Indicators about construction are the seventh category including variables of number of residences per urbanized person, and area of residence per urbanized person. The eighth category is the agricultural indicators including production value of the agricultural products per rural person and production value of the agricultural products for industry over the total production value of the agricultural products in Turkey. The last category, other indicators, includes the variables of value of the unit of a telephone call, number of faxes per ten thousands population, and number of investment subsidies issued between 1990 and 1994. Dinçer (1996). who constructed the DSDI index. states that this index, based on principal component analysis, is tested through a Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin sampling test, and gets the excellent score of 0.91. According to this KMO index the values between 0.5 - 0.6 are bad; 0.6 - 0.7 are fair; 0.7 - 0.8 are good, and 0.8 - 0.9 are very good, and 0.9+ is excellent. For a fuller description of the DSDI. see Dinçer (1996) and Gitmez (1983).
administrative districts are Kurdish populated South East towns while the region is
totally absent among the most developed provinces (Dincer 1996).

The underdevelopment of the eastern provinces is not a recent phenomenon. The region
has always been the least favoured area of Turkey. The west has always been the most
developed region of the country, and the East and South East regions the least
developed areas. According to the 1970 socio-economic development index compiled
by the Turkish State Planning Office, eight of the least developed ten provinces were
Van, Mardin, Bitlis, Mus, Adiyaman, Hakkari, Agri, and Bingol; all are in East and
South-east Turkey (See Figure 3.1, and see also Gitmez 1983: 141).

Another indicator used in the indices mentioned above is the distribution of
employment, which also reflects a similar asymmetry: in 1995, almost 75% of workers
in the East and South East were employed in agriculture, 5% in industry, and about
20% in services, whilst average corresponding figures for Turkey were 47%, 15% and
38% respectively (SIS 1996).

The unequal distribution of farmland has resulted in more poverty for the majority of
people in the East. Only 10% of all households in the region own 60% of all the land,
whilst 8% of the total land area is owned by about 56% of households (Aydin 1986:
50), about 35% owns no land (DPT 1989). White (1998) also argues that one third of
the population in the East are landless and work as labourers while the rest are farmers,
mostly sharecroppers. The ratio of landless families in the East is double that of
Turkey as a whole (White 1998: 141). This is possibly worsened by the fact that
Kurdish households are larger than Turkish ones which forces larger populations to rely
on fewer resources.

Some details of the land ownership patterns in the region by households are displayed
in Table 5.1. Except in Adiyaman and Gaziantep, about half of all households possess
no land. They work as yarici on other people’s land. Most of those who have some land
for farming have only a small plot, which might not be adequate to provide for large
households. Given the low level of industrialisation, these areas may suffer from
acute unemployment and low income, which in turn may create more pressure for
migration.

\[68\] Sharecroppers are those who do not own the land but cultivate it and pay a certain proportion of the
crops ranging from 10 to 80 per cent to the landowner. It is called yarici in Turkish.

\[69\] For example, there are households as large as 23 members according to the TDHS data.
Table 5.1. Landownership structure in some South East provinces, 1989 (% of households)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provinces</th>
<th>No land</th>
<th>1-5 H.</th>
<th>5-20 H.</th>
<th>20-50 H.</th>
<th>50-100 H.</th>
<th>100-H.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adiyaman</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diyarbakir</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaziantep</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mardin</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Şırnak</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Şanlıurfa</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DPT 1989

Socio-economic factors play a significant role in determining migration. Differences in socio-economic profiles may cause flows from one area to another. This explains rural to urban migration in Turkey to a large extent (İçduyuğ and Sirkeç 1999b). Indicators of regional differentials are various. For example, in 1990, 24% of men and 55% of women in South East Turkey were illiterate. These figures were 19% and 45% in Eastern Turkey respectively. But in the same period, they were above the Turkish averages: 11% for males and 28% for females (SIS 1990). Different modernisation and development levels also confirm the disadvantaged conditions of people who live in the Eastern parts of the country. The number of doctors per thousand in the South East and the East was 0.5 and hospital beds per thousand was just 1 according to the 1990 Census whilst these figures for Turkey as a whole were 0.9 and 2.14 respectively (SIS 1996a).

Housing conditions are another set of helpful indicators to explore the EOI. In the South East region, according to the 1990 Census, the proportion of households with piped water was 53%, and 90% of homes had electricity whilst the corresponding figures for the whole of Turkey were 63% and 99.9% respectively (SIS 1993). Households with telephones in the region were about 400 per thousand and 750 televisions were available per thousand. Moreover a large portion of people had neither of these basic communication facilities. At the same time, these figures were 576 and 867 per thousand households for the whole of Turkey in 1993 (SIS 1996b).

Therefore the Kurdish populated regions of the East and South East Turkey are the least developed regions in Turkey. This explicit underdevelopment is very likely to facilitate out-migration from these areas. However, what makes the Kurds different from other inhabitants of these two regions is a question which is dealt with in the following sections. The answer lies in the ethno-political context, which is intertwined...
with the economic environment of insecurity. The following section focuses on the inequalities within these less favoured areas by comparing Turkish Kurds with their non-Kurdish neighbours living together in these areas but experiencing the poverty in their own way.

5.2.3. The socio-economics of Turkish Kurdish households

As mentioned earlier this section is based on an analysis of the TDHS data (Turkish Demographic Health Survey 1993), which provides a chance for an ethnicity-based analysis of Turkey’s population. Although it is not a comprehensive tool to examine socio-economic development levels in Turkey, it still contains valuable information to be exploited. These include data on education and literacy, housing characteristics, and consumption of household durable goods. The analysis demonstrates that the material environment of insecurity affects Turkish Kurds more harshly than their non-Kurdish neighbours. The contrast is presented below as comparisons between the Kurdish speaking population and the others.

Education is one of the best indicators of socio-economic development and is often used for large comparative indices (Dinçer, 1996). It gives a rough idea about the education opportunities and a good idea of the exploitation of these opportunities. There is an increasing trend of school enrolment for the whole of the population as educational levels are higher for younger ages. However, illiteracy is still a big problem for most of the Kurds, especially women. For example, no Kurdish woman aged over 64 had any formal education (Table 5.2). It sharply drops to a level of 60% among younger generations indicating a trend of improvement. The difference between the Kurds and the others is striking: while only 13% and 18% of all women in age groups 6-19 and 20-34 have no education respectively, the corresponding figures for the Kurds are 35% and 61%. Similarly, whilst 84% of Kurdish women aged between 35 and 49 have no education, the corresponding figure is just 38% for the entire female population in these ages. Within the 20-34 age group only 4% of Turkish Kurdish women have completed their secondary school education compared to 24% of all women aged between 20 and 34. More than two thirds of all middle aged women (between 20 and 49) have graduated from primary school whilst only 21% of Turkish Kurdish women were educated to this level (Table 5.2).
A breakdown of the findings based on region and type of place of residence provides more detail on the educational attainment levels among Turkish Kurdish women (Table 5.2). It may be assumed that Turkish Kurds have been offered similar, if not the same, educational opportunities to other people in the same regions. However, in smaller localities, such as towns and villages, the availability and the quality of services might be different from that available in cities. Therefore, the interpretation must be very cautious here to take into account the fact that it is based on the assumption of equal chances for everybody within the same categories of region and residence.

Please note the TDHS household data provides information about the all members of the households of primary respondents which were women aged 15–49.
Not surprisingly, the least favoured region, the East has the highest proportion of non-educated people and also has the smallest groups of primary and secondary graduates for both ethnic groups. The Kurds, in general, seem to have a lower educational attainment in comparison with the others. More than half of Kurdish women have no education. It peaks at 66% in Eastern Turkey. Even in the East, more than half of non-Kurdish and other women have some educational qualifications. Not more than 4% of Kurdish women had a secondary school diploma whilst 20% of their non-Kurdish neighbours enjoyed this privilege. The contrast seems unchanged with regard to the type of place of residence. Although more educational opportunities are available in urban areas than rural areas, only 3% of urban Kurdish women have a secondary school diploma as opposed to 21% of their non-Kurdish neighbours.

It is necessary here to underline a social aspect of the Kurdish population to understand educational inequalities imposed upon Kurdish women. Both the literature and the qualitative research in Germany suggest that the education of women is not welcomed among the Kurds (see CHP n.d.; Yağcı-Heckman 1991). Only very few of the Kurdish women interviewed in Cologne have had the chance to attain formal education. For this very reason, only one of the female respondents had attended university, six of them had earned a secondary school diploma, two of them had completed primary education and the last two had no education. The importance of such cultural attitudes becomes clear with regard to a commonly accepted pattern that international migration often requires some qualifications including education (see Faist 2000; İçduyuğ et al. 2001; Hammar 1995). Therefore migration has been selective of educated women. Related to the social roles, males as expected had more educational qualifications but the contrast between Kurdish men and the others was still there (Table 5.2).

Only 17% of Kurdish men between ages 20 and 34 have completed secondary education compared to more than two thirds of others. Likewise, in the group between ages 35 to 64, only 6% of Kurdish men had a secondary school diploma while more than a quarter of others managed to do so. Throughout all the regions, more than one third of Kurdish males have no education and, except for those living in Western Turkey, no more than 5% had a secondary school diploma in any region. In contrast, only about one in ten of their non-Kurdish fellows had no education while more than a quarter of them enjoyed secondary school graduation. The same contrasting picture can be seen for urban-rural comparisons of both ethnic groups. Although urban Kurds have better qualifications, these are still lower than their non-Kurdish fellows.
A second group of variables defining the EOI for the Kurds are housing characteristics. The analysis reveals the inequalities in terms of the sources of water for the houses, the availability and quality of sanitation facilities and the physical characteristics of the houses. Finally it details the durable goods that households possess.

Table 5.3. Source of drinking water in the house by ethnicity, 1993 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of drinking water</th>
<th>Kurdish</th>
<th>Turkish</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piped into residence</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public tap</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Well in residence</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public well</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spring, river, stream</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rainwater</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanker/stationary tank</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottled water</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of households</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>328</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TDHS 1993 household data

Table 5.3 highlights four main sources of drinking water: piped water, well, shared sources and natural sources including rainwater. While 66% of Turkish-speaking households have drinking water piped into their residence, only 57% of the Kurdish-speaking population have piped water. The difference is clearer in rural households: 25% for the Kurds as opposed to 47% for Turkish households. Of Kurdish households, 20% use water from public sources (public tap and public well) and 16% of them use natural sources including rainwater. In villages, these figures go up to 35% and 29%. Wells are also one of the primary sources especially among rural Kurdish houses (Table 5.3).

Most Turkish households enjoy piped water in their homes. In urban areas, only 3% of them have to use a public tap or go to a well to get their drinking water, which is also about 18% in rural areas. The second source of drinking water in Turkish households is springs (13%), but the third source is bottled water (8%), which is almost unknown in Kurdish households (see Table 5.3). The analysis of the source of drinking water is important because it may indicate two facets of the material environment of insecurity: the availability of healthy water sources and the socio-economic ability of households to get access to these sources.

Analysis of sanitation amenities also reflects the material environment of insecurity from another angle. Lack of access to these facilities may cause many diseases.
particularly affecting children. Modern sanitation facilities are not widely available in Kurdish households. Pit toilets (43%) are often used instead of modern toilets and 3% of urban Kurdish households and 16% of rural ones have no toilet facility at all. About 3% of them have to share their toilet facility with other households. Nevertheless, many Turkish households (86% of urban and 13% of rural) use flush toilets, whilst only 1% of them have to share this facility. Only few Turkish rural households have no toilet facility (Table 5.4).

Table 5.4. Sanitation facility in the households by ethnicity, 1993 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of toilet facility</th>
<th>Kurdish</th>
<th>Turkish</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own flush toilet</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared flush toilet</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closed pit</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open pit</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No facility</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of households</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>328</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TDHS 1993 household data

Rural-urban migration patterns in Turkey are important in understanding the unevenness of socio-economic development. During the massive exodus of rural populations, large gecekondu areas (shanty towns) appeared around the big cities (Şenyapılı 1996). Turkish Kurdish people who have migrated to the big cities of western Turkey also often settled in these less favoured gecekondu areas which have very limited infrastructure (see Baydar 1999; İçduygü et al. 1998b). The non-existence of infrastructure in the gecekondu might be the major cause of urban Kurdish households’ lack of sanitation facilities. However, it is also highly related to the availability of sufficient economic resources to enable them to reach better housing conditions. Kurdish households do not seem to have adequate economic resources in this regard.

Some more aspects of the physical environment can be referred to such as the flooring and roofing of houses but such detail would be repeating the above pattern although flooring and roofing are two key elements in the house determining comfort. For families who are better off, the quality of the floor would be better. In this regard, Turkish Kurdish people are again suffering from low quality living conditions compared to their non-Kurdish neighbours (See for details İçduygü and Sirkeci 1999c).
Table 5.5.a. The mean number of durable goods in possession of household by ethnicity and type of place of residence, 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Average number of durable goods per household</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Turkish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: TDHS 1993 household data*

Table 5.5.a presents a summary of access to consumption goods by ethnic groups and type of place of residence. The average number of items in possession of the household is shown by type of place of residence and ethnicity. On average, while urban Turkish households have 6.2 items in possession, their Kurdish counterparts have 4.6 of them. Similarly, the Kurds in rural areas have 3.3 items whereas the Turks have 4.1. This was estimated using TDHS variables indicating ownership of thirteen specific items: a refrigerator; oven; washing machine; dishwasher; vacuum cleaner; television; radio; video recorder; music set; radio; telephone; more than 30 books and car (detailed in Table 5.5.b). In general, fewer Kurdish homes have devices such as a refrigerator, oven, washing machine, vacuum cleaner, and dishwasher compared to Turkish households both in urban and rural areas. At the same time, rural-urban differences are smaller for the Kurds than for the Turks. This contrast is further revealed in Table 5.5.b and Table 5.6 below.

Table 5.5.b. Durable goods in possession of household by ethnicity, 1993 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Kurdish</th>
<th>Turkish</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refrigerator</td>
<td>88.4</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>81.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oven</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>43.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washing machine</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dishwasher</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vacuum cleaner</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television</td>
<td>83.6</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>76.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Video recorder</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio cassette player</td>
<td>68.7</td>
<td>76.8</td>
<td>72.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Music set</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>39.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Car</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 30 books</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of households</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>823</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: TDHS 1993 household data*
Among the Kurds, 63% of urban and 91% of rural homes have no washing machine whilst among the Turks, only 24% of urban and 75% of rural homes suffer from not having one. Similar disparities are also seen with respect to telecommunication devices. For example, more than half of urban Kurdish homes and more than 70% of rural homes have no telephone while the majority of Turkish homes have one (Table 5.5.b). The availability of particular goods at home has some specific implications. For instance, not having a radio, or television, or a phone, limits the access of household members to the outside world; having a refrigerator prolongs the wholesomeness of foods; having more than 30 books exposes the household members to new ideas; and having a car allows greater access to many services outside the local area.

Electrical appliances such as a refrigerator, television, or radio cassette player, are the most common household durable goods: 91% of Turkish households and 81% of Kurdish households own a refrigerator, and again 81% of Turkish households and 72% of Kurdish households have a radio cassette player. Three in five Turkish households own a telephone line whilst less than 40% of Kurdish households have this utility. Two thirds of Turkish households have a vacuum cleaner compared with less than one fifth of Kurdish households. Cars are almost three times more common in Turkish than Kurdish households.

These findings suggest that a considerable number of Kurdish households experience a lower socio-economic status compared with their Turkish counterparts. In other words, Kurdish households are less likely to have the comfort of various durable goods than Turkish households.

### Table 5.6. Summary of durable goods possessed in homes, 1993 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of items owned</th>
<th>Kurdish Urban</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Turkish Urban</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 to 4 items</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>30.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 to 9 items</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>67.4</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>57.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 to 13 items</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of households</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>823</td>
<td>3525</td>
<td>1714</td>
<td>5239</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TDHS 1993 household data

A count of the number of consumer durables possessed in each household summarises the entire picture (Table 5.6). For example, no rural or urban Kurdish household had all of the 13 articles mentioned above whereas one in every ten Turkish homes had 10 to 13 articles together. At the other extreme, whilst only about one per cent of Turkish
homes had none of the goods, 4% of Kurdish homes had none of these durable goods (Table 5.6). Although it is very difficult to infer a households’ economic condition from the items they possess, it may still give an idea about the relative position of Turkish Kurdish households compared to their non-Kurdish fellow citizens.

Socio-economic deprivation combines with political deprivation in the Turkish Kurdish environment of insecurity, which is characterised by a long-term armed conflict that has resulted in thousands of deaths, hundreds of disappearances, ‘actor unknown murders’\(^{71}\), and assassinations.

5.3. Political Environment of Insecurity

The result of 15 years of armed conflict between the PKK and the Turkish Army can be summarised as follows: 34,795 deaths; about 300,000 Turkish troops in South East Turkey; 21,000 PKK militants; 95,000 Village guards; $96,000,000,000 (US) military expenditure; 908 “actor unknown murders” (including suspicious murders in police custody); 520 disappearances (mostly in police detention); 3428 evacuated villages (due to ‘security reasons’); 2,200 Court appeals against Turkey at the European Court of Justice\(^{72}\); 31 murdered Kurdish journalists; and hundreds of court decisions in Turkey ruling closure of newspapers and journals related to their publications about the Kurdish question (HRW 1999; Mater 1999; Özugr Politika, 1 June 1999; CHP n.d.). Three outlawed Kurdish political parties (HEP, DEP, and ÖZDEP) also need to be remembered. The background to these figures is discussed below.

The political environment of insecurity is analysed with regard to its three realms: the general political atmosphere; elections and party politics; and the military character of democracy in Turkey. First of all, the general political environment needs to be described. Secondly, elections and party politics display the existence of unfair ethnic competition and fragmentation, which also express themselves in geographical terms. Thirdly, military aspects are discussed, since military operations in the Kurdish populated areas are under a special administration called “Olağanıstü Hal Bolge

\(^{71}\) ‘Actor unknown murders’ is a literal translation of a Turkish phrase “faili mechul cinayet”.

\(^{72}\) 558 of them were about village evacuations and arsons in South East Turkey and another 114 of them were about missing people under arrest, torture and unresolved murders in the same region (Hacaloglu 2000).
Valiligı”, literally meaning “State of Emergency Region’s Governor’s Office” under the rule of a governor with extraordinary authority over the region73.

One practical issue needs to be mentioned here: the timing of this analysis corresponds to an unstable period during which time lots of changes occurred in Turkey’s Kurdish question. The cultural and political rights of the Kurds are on the agenda since Turkey has become an associate member of the European Union (EU). Turkey’s admission to the EU is still conditional on improvements in its human rights record (e.g. despite the legislation abolished the death penalty and freed expression in mother languages and also allowed education in mother languages in the last months of 2002). Therefore more improvements in the cultural and political rights of Turkish Kurds are necessary prior to any full integration of Turkey into the EU. In response to this condition imposed by the EU, the issues relating to Turkish Kurdish cultural and linguistic rights have been central to the recent political debates in Turkey. Party leaders, parliamentarians, column writers and some former government officials have joined discussions in favour of lifting the restrictions on the use of the Kurdish language. For instance, the chairman of the Turkish National Intelligence Service (MIT) said that there must be free Kurdish television broadcasts in Turkey although he got an immediate objection from the high commanders of the Turkish Armed Forces (Turkish daily newspapers, 1 Dec. 2000). As a result, it is possible to state that there is an optimistic climate for better conditions for Turkey’s Kurdish population. There is almost an agreement among different segments of general society on free Kurdish broadcasts, or education in Kurdish although each party has its own justifications, which are not necessarily in favour of the free development of Kurdish ethnicity or culture. For instance, some parties defend it to prevent anti-Turkish propaganda in Kurdish by foreign or pro-PKK institutions like MED-TV. Examples of such approaches were published in daily newspapers of every political stance in Turkey during December 2000. However, Kurdish political issues are still subject to long debates and do not seem likely to be realised in the near future. Therefore the present situation still constitutes an EOI facilitating international migration.

73 The OHAL region was composed of six provinces, Diyarbakır, Hakkari, Şırnak, Tunceli, and Van and five secondary control areas including the provinces of Batman, Bingöl, Bitlis, Mardin, and Muş (DPT-BGYU 2000). However, by May 2002, the administration ended in all provinces except Diyarbakır and Şırnak (Hürriyet, 28 May 2002).
5.3.1. General political atmosphere and the legal framework

The political environment of insecurity from which the Kurds suffer is characterised by two basic problems: the military character of the Turkish democracy and a lack of recognition of the rights of ethnic minorities. During the last two decades, almost all human rights violations in Turkey have been committed against the Turkish Kurdish people and the organisations they formed or actively supported. These violations have been reiterated in consecutive reports of international human rights agencies (i.e. HRW 1999).

The only promising aspect for the improvements of human rights and democracy in Turkey has been European pressures to improve democracy in the course of Turkey’s integration into the European Union. The debates on education in the mother language and Kurdish broadcasts following the partnership declaration between the EU and Turkey have been recent examples of this feature.74 Turkish Kurds are also aware of this EU factor and therefore, for example, there were many PKK led rallies of Turkish Kurds around Europe backing Turkey’s application for full EU membership prior to the EU Summit in Tampere, Finland, in 1999 (Hürriyet, 11 December 1999; Milliyet, 10 December 1999; Özgür Politika, 9 December 1999). However, the Turkish Army responds immediately to such attempts at relaxing the political environment even though it is triggered by the EU suggestions. Such ‘balancing’ characterises the transcendent nature of Turkish ‘military democracy’.

Cengiz Çandar, a political journalist, has called Turkey a “military democracy” (1999:130) emphasising the role of the military in Turkish politics and discussing the imperfections of Turkish democracy as an example of ‘illiberal democracies’ in the Third World. The Turkish military constitutes a core element of the Turkish political system through apparatuses such as the National Security Council, whose decrees are generally considered more powerful than any Act of Parliament. It often implicitly accuses the civilian parliamentarian system of being full of “careerism, populism, lacking prudence, corruption, and irresponsibility” (Sakallıoğlu 1997:153). Therefore, the military put itself in a privileged position as the guarantor of the whole system. Thus, politics lacks effectiveness and is subjected to the tutelage of the military, because it is often not possible to challenge the Chief Commanders of the Army. For

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74 November 2000 issues can be found in the archives of Turkish daily newspapers (i.e. Hurriyet, Milliyet, and Cumhuriyet) providing details of these discussions.
instance, when the president of the Motherland Party, a coalition partner in the current government, attempted to discuss the concept of national security in Turkey in a recent party congress, he had to ‘correct’ his comments after heavy criticism from high-rank commanders of the armed forces (Milliyet, 5 and 6 August 2001).

The general political atmosphere in Turkey also involves the denial of the existence of the Kurds in the country. Yeğen (1999:110-128) has examined this denial policy throughout the Republican era and found no sign of admission of the existence of Kurdish (ethnicity) within the borders of Turkey. The 1924 Turkish Constitution explicitly states the impossibility of a Kurdish political existence in the country:

"Article 11: Every Turkish man and woman at the age of 30 or over can be elected to the parliament.

Article 12: Those who cannot read and write in Turkish cannot be elected to the parliament." (Yeğen 1999:121)

The doors of politics were totally closed to the Kurds in the early years of the Republic. At that time, the only political party was the Republican People’s Party (CHP), founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Article 8 of the CHP program clearly prevented Kurdish membership: “Every Turkish citizen can become a member of the Party, only if he or she can speak Turkish and has accepted Turkish culture and all the goals of the party.” (Yeğen 1999:123). There must be no doubt about the inappropriateness of the political environment for Turkish Kurds within such a framework.

Thus the existence of a fundamental opposition questioning the ethnic bases of the Republic seems almost impossible within the context of Turkish ‘military’ democracy. Although a number of pro-Kurdish political parties have been founded since 1991, all of them have been outlawed by Turkish Constitutional Court rulings, except the HADEP (People’s Democracy Party).75 These parties have to be extremely careful because anything associated with being pro-Kurdish or pro-PKK may cause the closure of the party. Similar rules apply to all other opposition political parties. For example, a short play about the liberation of Palestine staged in one of the local branches of the Islamist Welfare Party in Sincan, a small town near Ankara, had been referred among other reasons when the Constitutional Court ruled to shut it down (Sabah. 5 February and 22 May 1997). Similarly, HADEP was also accused for its ignorance about the Turkish flag at its party congress (Sabah, 19 June 1998). Briefly, the Turkish political

75 There is also an ongoing trial to shut down HADEP.
system by nature is opposed to a political environment of security for ethnic groups other than for the Turks and for opposition groups like Islamists (i.e. the Welfare Party and the Virtue Party).

The political EOI experienced by the Turkish Kurds also has a legal background in Turkish legislation. Turkey’s record of human rights violations is not a secret yet still there are many laws violating basic human rights including freedom of expression (HRW 1999). Some Turkish laws exclusively target ethnic minority rights (which usually apply to the Kurds) such as the Anti-Terror Law (ATL), in operation since 1991 (See Appendix 5.3). The ATL is often used to punish free expression dealing with the Kurdish question along with other laws preventing broadcasting in Kurdish, teaching Kurdish in schools, and using Kurdish in political campaigns (HRW 1999). These laws have been the basis for arresting journalists and politicians, confiscating books and publications and closing the newspapers and other media throughout the 1990s in Turkey. The first and foremost of the legal regulations putting Turkish Kurds into danger is article 3 of the current Turkish Constitution: “The Turkish state, with its territory and people, is an indivisible whole. The language is Turkish. These facts may not be changed, nor may any changes be proposed.” This paranoid-sounding article at the very beginning of the constitution aims to stop any possible threat to the Turkish state. The threat is very likely to be Kurdish because they revolted several times in the course of Republican history.

The legal framework denying the existence of the Kurds starts with restricting the use of non-Turkish names. The Civil Code (no.1587) states “...Names may not be given which are illegal or which offend or do not represent the nation’s culture, moral values, traditions, or customs” (Art. 16) [Emphasis added]. ‘The nation’ is not clear in this article, so it was made explicit in the Regulation on Family Names, passed on 24 December 1931 (No.2/1759): “New family names which are permissible are to be drawn from the Turkish language. Names from foreign races and nations may not be used as family names. (Art.5) [Emphasis added]. Within the context discussed thus far, these ‘foreign races and nations’ practically refer to the Kurds. A similar law was also instituted for place names. The Provincial Administration Law (No.5442) which went into effect on 10 June 1949 states: “Village names which are not Turkish and which should be changed are to be brought before the provincial council and changed by the interior minister within the shortest possible time” (Art.1).
The Turkish Constitution is very cautious about the use of the ‘other language’. Article 26 forbids its people to use “any language, which is prohibited by law”. To be sure, it emphasised: “Printed matter, records, audio and video tapes, or any other publications can be confiscated...if they violate this regulation” (Art.26). The law prohibiting the Kurdish language was repealed in 1991 but other laws (No.2559 and Art.8 of the Police Code) still allow confiscation (See Appendix 5.3.).

As use of the Kurdish language was strictly banned for many years, learning Kurdish was almost impossible. Article 42 of the Turkish Constitution clearly states: “in educational institutions, Turkish citizens may not use any language other than Turkish as their native language.” It was also forbidden to learn Kurdish as a foreign language (Law No.2923, Art.2a). “Radio and TV stations are required to broadcast their programmes in Turkish” (Law No.2954, Art.5f).

Associations and political parties have also equally been warned not to use ‘the other language’ in their programs, charters, and propaganda materials (See Law of Associations, No.2908, Art.5 and 6). Political parties are even prevented from mentioning ‘the other’: “Political parties may not claim that there are minorities of religion, culture, sect, race, or language in the Turkish Republic. Political parties may not engage in activities to promote languages or cultures other than Turkish, thereby seeking to create minorities that threaten the unity of the nation. (Law of Political Parties, No.2820, Art.81) [Emphasis added].

These excerpts from the Turkish Constitution and Laws are only a few examples of the legal EOI. Many public figures including Turkish and Kurdish journalists, scientists, and artists have suffered from them. It is necessary to remember here that although many of these laws are dated before the changes in 1991, which allowed a relatively lenient environment for Turkish Kurds, there are still many court rulings that came into force on the basis of these restrictions mentioned above. For example, a local TV station in Diyarbakir was suspended for one year from broadcasting because of broadcasting a Kurdish folk song in 2000 (Hürriyet, 20 September 2001).

76 Details and references of these laws are included in Appendix 5.2.
5.3.2. Elections and Kurdish Politics in Turkey

Even if they could cope with the legal framework mentioned above, Turkish Kurds may still suffer from the manipulation of legal and structural restrictions. The Turkish election system prevents small parties’ entry into the Parliament via a national threshold: parties receiving less than 10% of the vote are not entitled to MPs. There are also organisational requirements. For instance, any political party must have offices opened in more than half of all administrative districts all around the country, which simply ends the chance of success for local and ethnic group oriented political movements. Although the underlying reason for this requirement is to prevent instability and extreme political fragmentation (Evin and Özbudun 1984), it definitely works against the pro-Kurdish parties because they are dependent on a regional population, which constitutes only about 20% of the total population. This means any Kurdish party is very unlikely to achieve the threshold. The following passages give examples from the 1999 elections, which might be described as ‘an electoral EOI’.

Throughout the period of armed conflict, people in some localities were not even able to vote. Many observers reported that there was no ballot box in many villages and vote counts were fabricated (Cumhuriyet, 19 April 1999). Again in some villages, the electorate have had to register and vote within military centres, which is not very convenient for ‘free’ voters in the context of an armed conflict. Many people were not registered therefore they couldn’t vote (Serbesti 1999; Özgür Politika, April issues, 1999).

The campaign against Kurdish parties and candidates was not limited to such alleged ballot tricks. There also have been physical obstructions. Many offices of the pro-Kurdish party, HADEP (People’s Democracy Party) were raided in the few weeks prior to voting day in the 1999 elections, for instance. Another ‘coincidence’ was the arrest of a considerable number of HADEP candidates just before the elections (Özgür Politika, 17 April 1999). Several attempts to ban HADEP, from taking part in the 1999 local and general elections were made but did not succeed. For example, just five days prior to the election, the Prosecutor General, Vural Savaş, had sought to impose a ban on HADEP on the grounds that the party had close links with an outlawed secessionist movement, the PKK. The Turkish Constitutional Court rejected his application. On the
same day, more than a thousand HADEP supporters\textsuperscript{77} were arrested by the police to prevent them staging rallies in South-eastern Turkey, where most of the Kurdish population live. Election rallies and meetings were banned by the police. As a result, HADEP was blocked from campaigning properly in the 1999 election. During the same election campaign, its entire cadre of leaders had been detained on treason charges and successive raids had been made on party offices across the country (Morgan 1999; BBC News, 14 April 1999; Özgür Politika, 16 April 1999).

However, whether there is a conspiracy against Turkish Kurds or not, clearly the free will of some people were violated and these people were most likely to be Kurdish. While legal and military institutions were trying to stop Kurdish parties, the other political parties ironically were trying to appeal to the Kurdish speaking voters of the eastern provinces with a motto: "there are no second class citizens in Turkey" (Tanyol 1999:110).

Despite the barriers, Kurdish representatives were elected, at least at the local level, in the last local elections in Turkey on 18 April 1999; HADEP won 39 of 3079 municipalities. Almost all of these were in the Kurdish populated Eastern region. In the general elections of the same year, HADEP received one and a half million of 31 million valid votes (4.7\%) throughout the country. It could not achieve the national threshold of 10\%, which is needed to send representatives to the Turkish Grand National Assembly, but it heavily defeated all of its rival parties in Kurdish provinces including Diyarbakır, Van, Ağrı, Hakkari, Bingöl, Bitlis, Iğdır, Kars, Mardin, Muş, Siirt, Şırnak. The party won about 50\% of votes cast in these cities and became the first party in the region (NTV 2000).

Before the military intervention of 12 September 1980, these areas had always voted for the opposition parties. After the intervention, they voted for Kurdish candidates on the Social Democratic People’s Party’s lists as there were no Kurdish parties. and after 1991 they generally voted for the Kurdish parties, namely, HEP (People’s Labour Party), DEP (Democracy Party), and HADEP (People’s Democracy Party) (Ölmez 1995).

A political environment of insecurity, beyond these barriers of the election system, also involves illegitimate forms of politics. Among these, paramilitary organisations, ‘actor

\textsuperscript{77} Özgür Politika, pro-Kurdish newspaper published in Germany, stated that 15,000 HADEP’s supporters were arrested prior to this meeting (14 April 1999).
unknown murders’, disappearances and other sorts of legal and illegal precautions taken against Kurdish political parties in Turkey are worth counting.

5.3.3. Military aspects

Whether we call it “military” or “illiberal”, Turkish democracy is heavily influenced by the Army (Sakallıoğlu 1999). The Army, traditionally, has been involved in the politics of Turkey. Such army involvement makes the EOI for Turkish Kurds even harsher. The OHAL (State of Emergency Region’s Governor’s Office)\(^{78}\) government should be the most significant symbol of that as it was set up and essentially run by the decrees of the National Security Council\(^{79}\). The OHAL is a semi-military form of government specifically created for the Kurdish populated region in Southeast Turkey. Besides its role in Turkish politics, the military is also significant because of its involvement in the Kurdish question due to the 15-year old armed conflict (Çandar 1999 and Kadıoğlu 1999).

The role of the Turkish military in the maintenance of an EOI in the Kurdish populated areas is difficult to estimate. However, the armed conflict brought the deployment of more than 300,000 troops in the region along with other security forces including Police, Gendarmerie, Special Teams and village guards (numbering over 100,000) against nearly 20,000 Kurdish guerrilla forces. For ordinary people living there, the existing armed conflict posed a genuine reason to leave their homes for secure areas. The story of one respondent interviewed in Cologne, Eşref Öztürk (22) from Şırnak, describes the situation of people at risk:

"My elder brother had been kidnapped by village guards. Then, he was released after few weeks. He left home to join the guerrillas in 1994; a month after the guards released him. Once you helped or joined the guerrillas you have no chance: all the family is to be blamed. It is the same for families whose members are soldier in the [Turkish] Army. Because when I was younger it was clear that there were the PKK at night and soldiers in the day. You have to deal with both. It was not even possible to recognize who is who sometimes. Lots of police officers were not uniformed. You cannot ask them for their

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\(^{78}\) The State of Emergency Region’s Governor’s Office (OHAL) is the regional government headed by a mayor appointed by the Ministry of Interior, which has been created after the military intervention of 1980 to control the South East Anatolian Region.

\(^{79}\) The National Security Council (MGK in Turkish) is an effective cabinet composed of President, Prime Minister, Minister of Defence and chief commanders of the Turkish Army. The majority of the Council members are soldiers and it generally works through consultancy meetings where the Army acts as the absolute locus of power.
Environment of insecurity and international migration

identity when they ask for your papers or wanted to investigate your house. You can be brutally beaten, picked up, even killed. Everything can happen to you. There are also gangsters farming money: not for the PKK, not for the government. It is to be said that we would prefer soldiers and guerrillas, because they were better. They gathered all the villagers at the village square and questioning and beating was the common place. They were in large groups but when the village guards and Specialist Teams appeared, changes came. These were small groups, without uniform, but with machine guns. What could we do? Should we ask their proof of identity? [Laughing!]

Mr. Öztürk was one of those people who had to leave their homes and fled to Europe seeking a safe haven, far away from the fear of persecution. The lives of many Kurdish politicians, journalists, and writers were shattered along with many shepherds, and villagers who lost their lives during the clashes. The first half of the 1990s was the peak period, when most of these incidents happened, 96 prominent members of HEP (People’s Labour Party), DEP (Democracy Party), and HADEP (People’s Democracy Party), including many Kurdish intellectuals, were murdered between 1990 and 1995 and these murders are still unresolved. Most of these crimes were filed in courts as ‘actor unknown murders’, and possibly never to be resolved (HADEP 2000; Ölmez 1995: 465).

The Police have very often been accused as the cause of the murders due to disappearances under police detention. For instance, the chairperson of the Diyarbakır branch of HEP80, Vedat Aydin, was arrested by the police from his home in 1991. His corpse was found days after on the outskirts of the city. It is believed that he was tortured and murdered by the police. Mehmet Sincar, the Member of Parliament from Mardin, was also murdered by, possibly, the same unknown agents in 1993, and police investigations have not since found even a single suspect. Similarly, many HADEP candidates and party administrators were kidnapped, tortured, and killed either by the police, the Specialist Teams, or ‘unknown murderers’ (HADEP 2000).

In brief, the military involvement in the political EOI was twofold. On the one hand, the existence of a massive standing army force in the region where most Kurds live creates an environment of invasion, as felt by Turkish Kurds. On the other hand, the involvement of military and paramilitary agents in unresolved murders, in and out of

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80 HEP was the first ever pro-Kurdish political party formed in the history of Republican Turkey after the October 1991 elections. The Constitutional Court outlawed the party on 15 July 1993 (Ölmez 1995: The Independent, 18 June 1994).
the Kurdish region, posed an immediate fear of persecution or torture for those people living there.

5.4. The Socio-demographic Environment of Insecurity

The socio-demographic EOI discussed here is related to economic and political deprivation to a degree, as the latent or explicit economic and political restrictions discussed above have driven Turkish Kurds into a situation characterised by higher unemployment, limited health and educational opportunities, and higher risk of persecution. The TDHS household data has been analysed to identify the main characteristics of the Turkish Kurdish population, which may generate an EOI and in turn may create a demographic pressure for international migration.

The size of the Kurdish population in the country and its distribution has always been a controversial issue but at least there seems an agreed range: above 10 million but less than 20 million (Sirkeci 2000:155; Mutlu 1996:517). The lack of straightforward and reliable information is well founded. Existing sources are inadequate and do not provide a satisfactory account of the size and distribution of the Kurdish population. Apart from the paucity and inadequacy of data on ethnicity, there is also a general difficulty in defining the ethnicity of people at both theoretical and practical levels, so that the question of who is considered Kurdish remains controversial (see Chapter 2). TDHS data allow us to estimate the Turkish Kurdish population in Turkey on the basis of mother tongue information.

Table 5.7 displays some estimates of the Kurdish population in Turkey that are based on Census data and estimates. The accounts of Buckley (1994), Minority Rights Group (1991), and van Bruinessen (1998) are based on intuitive guesses without citing any register or census. Mutlu (1996) and Özsoy et al. (1992) based their figures on the projections of earlier censuses. While Mutlu (1996) projecting the 1965 Census reached a higher estimate of the Kurdish population, Özsoy et al. (1992) took the 1935 Census as a reference point and estimated a lower figure (Table 5.7). The difference between the two is due to a possible underestimation, which indicates a decrease in the Kurdish population between 1935 and 1965. It is an underestimation because the Demographic Health Surveys prove that in the Eastern provinces where most Kurds live population growth rates have been higher than the rest of the country (Dündar 1998).
Table 5.7. Estimates of the Turkish Kurdish population as percentages of the total population, 1965-1993.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1935 Census</th>
<th>1965 Census</th>
<th>1990s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Buckley (1994)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority Rights Group (1991)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutlu (1996)</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>10.0*</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Özsoy et al, (1992)</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van Bruinessen (1998)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Estimations from this study</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDHS (by ethnicity variable)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean of mother tongue questions in TDHS</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combination of 6 questions</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>17.8c</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) Projection based on the population growth rate. b) For 5972 households with 31868 individuals. c) Ranges between 15.2 and 16.3. d) For 5970 households who provided information on mother tongue questions and consist 32,130 people. The total size of individuals covered in TDHS is 38,284.

This research estimated three similar figures on the basis of six mother tongue questions available from the TDHS, which are presented in Table 5.8. 15.2% of women interviewed in the survey are Kurdish speaking. Each of the mother tongue questions also gives us an average of 15.8% Kurdish speaking within Turkey’s entire population. The interviewees in the TDHS were asked to indicate their mother tongue from a list that included ‘Turkish’, ‘Kurdish’, ‘Arabic’, and ‘other, with a specification’. They were also asked about the mother tongue of their husband, their husband’s parents, and their parents. The answers were operationalised as follows: if the answer to any of these questions was ‘Kurdish’, the respondent and her household were considered Kurdish. Accordingly, this gives an estimate of 17.8% Kurds in the national population.

Table 5.8. The Kurdish population by mother tongue questions, 1993 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Respondent’s</th>
<th>Her mother’s</th>
<th>Her father’s</th>
<th>Her husband’s</th>
<th>Her husband’s mother’s</th>
<th>Her husband’s father’s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>81.58</td>
<td>79.48</td>
<td>79.22</td>
<td>80.56</td>
<td>78.81</td>
<td>78.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurdish</td>
<td>15.21</td>
<td>15.94</td>
<td>16.32</td>
<td>15.40</td>
<td>16.03</td>
<td>15.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>2.18</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>2.49</td>
<td>2.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other*</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>2.29</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>2.67</td>
<td>2.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>31,908</td>
<td>31,911</td>
<td>31,899</td>
<td>31,899</td>
<td>31,924</td>
<td>31,904</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes other sizeable ethnic groups such as Circassians, Georgians, Greeks, Armenians and Jews.

Source: TDHS 1993 household data

81 Estimates are based on information given by women because the reference persons interviewed in the TDHS were women as the basic aim of the survey is to get an account of fertility patterns and behaviour (HUIPS 1994).

82 Although here the principal marker of ethnicity has been language, one must bear in mind that due to ethnic conflict and assimilationist policies pursued in Turkey, many people may no longer speak Kurdish but still consider themselves Kurdish. Therefore my estimations presented here will possibly remain an underestimation of Kurdish population.
The proportions of Kurds according to each mother tongue question ranged from 15.2% to 16.3% (Table 5.8), and the overall estimate is 17.8% (Table 5.7). The analysis in this chapter has used the highest estimate of 17.8% referring to 5716 individuals in 823 Turkish Kurdish households (Table 5.9). Among total population of Turkey, 17.8% means a Kurdish minority of roughly about 11 million in the country. 83

Table 5.9. The Distribution of the Kurdish population by region, 1993 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Households</th>
<th>Individuals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>70.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>823</td>
<td>5,716</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TDHS 1993 household data

Despite internal migration towards the western urban centres, Turkish Kurds are still associated with a region as they are amassed in the South East part of the country as in the past (see Figures 5.1 and 5.2). This is evident in the findings of this study and in the detailed estimations of Mutlu (1996), which take in- and out-migration rates into account as well as death and birth rates. The proportion of the Kurds within the total population ranges from 25% to 90% in the Eastern provinces according to the TDHS. 70% of Kurds live in the East, and 64% of Kurdish households are in the East (Table 5.9 and Figure 5.3). The difference between the individual and the household percentages is due to large household sizes in the Eastern region.

Figure 5.1. The Kurdish population as percentage of the total population by province, 1965

Source: 1965 Census

83 Turkey’s population according to the 1997 Population Count was 62,811,111 (SIS 1998).
It is to be noted that the Kurdish population has experienced a dramatic dispersal throughout the second half of the century in terms of internal and international migration. The share of the Kurdish population seems to have increased in the western regions of Turkey since 1965 if Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 are compared. In 1965, the Kurdish share of the total population was less than one percent in almost all Western, Southern and Northern provinces of Turkey but it ranged from 25% to 90% in the South East region, the traditional Kurdish speaking areas (Figure 5.1). In the 1990s, their share of the total population rose to 5% in metropolitan areas and was over 1% in all other provinces in Western Turkey, whilst their high share remained almost the same in the East (Figures 5.2 and 5.3). The increase in the western provinces may be explained by the effect of migration from the East to the West of Turkey. However, as these maps have displayed, a substantial increase in the Kurdish share of the total population is clear and which "must be due to high fertility, as well as declining mortality rates" (Koç and Hancıoğlu 1999:4).

Another considerable feature of the Kurdish population is its concentration in rural areas as the low mean urbanisation rate (55%) indicates (Source: TDHS 1993
household data). The urban population amounts to 61% for Turkey as a whole. However, in the West, urban dwellers among Kurds (85%) are higher than their Turkish fellows (75%). A similar pattern is also obvious in the South; 75% of Kurds live in urban areas whereas the corresponding figure for Turks is 65%. This might be explained by massive rural-to-urban migration from the East to the urban centres of Turkey, which are mainly located in the West and South. Some of these attractive metropolitan areas include Istanbul, Izmir, and Bursa in the West and Antalya, Mersin, and Adana in the South. In the Central region, 75% of Kurds lived in rural areas, whereas this figure was only 45% in the East in 1993. On the other hand, these percentages might have also changed over the last decade because of massive evacuations (of villages and hamlets) in the eastern region, which pushed hundreds of thousands to the urban centres within the region as mentioned earlier in this chapter.

Diyarbakir was one such city, and its population boomed during the 1990s from around 373,000 in 1990 to 545,000 in 2000 (Table 5.10). Between 1985 and 1990, net migration rate for the eastern region was 60 per thousand and the region also lost over 570,000 of its over 10 million total population (DPT-BGYU 1999).

Table 5.10. Urban populations and annual growth rate in selected cities in the East, per 1000, 1990-200084

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Province Centre</th>
<th>Population in the Province Center</th>
<th>Annual Growth rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adıyaman</td>
<td>100,045</td>
<td>178,538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batman</td>
<td>147,347</td>
<td>246,678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bingöl</td>
<td>41,590</td>
<td>68,876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diyarbakır</td>
<td>373,810</td>
<td>545,983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hakkari</td>
<td>30,407</td>
<td>58,145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K. Maras</td>
<td>228,129</td>
<td>326,198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musu</td>
<td>44,019</td>
<td>67,927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Şırnak</td>
<td>25,059</td>
<td>52,743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Şanlıurfa</td>
<td>276,528</td>
<td>385,588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van</td>
<td>155,623</td>
<td>284,464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey total</td>
<td>22,776,700</td>
<td>29,833,129</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 5.10 summarizes recent growth rates in selected cities in the Eastern Turkey, which may reflect flows from rural to city centres of provinces since 1990 when growth rates increased drastically. Annual growth rates for many Kurdish populated city centres in eastern provinces have doubled the average growth rate of city centres of all

84 The reader should be careful here since the provinces and capital cities of provinces have same names in Turkey therefore these figures are different from those given in Table 3.2 in Chapter 5.
provinces in Turkey during the 1990s. Relatively well off cities of the region, such as Şırnak, Hakkari and Adiyaman have doubled their populations since 1990 (Table 5.10).

As Figure 5.4 displays the proportion of young people between the ages 0 to 14 (24.6% of males and 22.5% of females) was larger among the Kurds than the Turks (16.8% and 16.2%, respectively). The economically active age group (of 15 to 64) among the Kurds was relatively smaller (25.1% of males and 25.6% of females) than the Turks (29.4% and 32.4% respectively), while the older age group (65 and over; 1.2% males and 1.1% females) was also smaller than for their Turkish fellow citizens (2.7% and 3% for males and females respectively).

Figure. 5.4. Population Pyramids by ethnicity, 1993

Age dependency ratios are 97.3 for Kurds reflecting the 92.7 child dependency and 4.6 old-age-dependency ratios separately. These figures deviate substantially from those of Turks. Corresponding figures for the whole population in Turkey are 62.6, 53.4 and 9.2, respectively. Thus the Kurds seem less likely to have a chance of reaching later ages. Longer life expectancy is closely related to mortality rates and improvements in health care facilities in Turkey.

Table 5.11. Age specific fertility rates by ethnicity, 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Groups</th>
<th>Kurds</th>
<th>Turks</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15-19</td>
<td>0.126</td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>0.078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24</td>
<td>0.284</td>
<td>0.196</td>
<td>0.207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>0.319</td>
<td>0.145</td>
<td>0.167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-34</td>
<td>0.262</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>0.100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-39</td>
<td>0.167</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>0.057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-44</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFR</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Koç and Hancıoğlu 1999; Dündar 1998

During recent decades, fertility has steadily declined in Turkey and so has the population growth rate, which was estimated at 1.58% at the last population count in 1997 (HUIPS 2000). The base of the population pyramid is narrowing for both Turkish
Environment of insecurity and international migration

and Kurdish populations, which indicates declining fertility (Figure 5.4). Dündar (1998) also found a general declining trend in fertility and estimates a faster decline among the Kurds. However, even declining fertility rates for the Kurds are double those for the whole of Turkey (Table 5.11). The Total Fertility Rate (TFR) for the Kurds was 6.2 whereas the corresponding figure was only 2.7 for the Turks and 3.1 for Turkey as a whole. Another point to note here is the gradual decrease of fertility by age among Kurdish women compared to the steep decline observed among their Turkish counterparts after the age of 25 (Table 5.11). Simply, Kurdish women seem to have 3 more children than Turkish women as their age specific fertility is higher for all age cohorts (Table 5.11).

Reproductive health parameters also indicate disadvantaged conditions for the Kurds. Only one quarter of Kurdish women gave birth in medical centres while almost three-quarters of Turkish women used these facilities according to the TDHS 1993 data. In terms of prenatal care visits, slightly more Turks had visits (32%) as opposed to the Kurds (29%) (Cindoğlu and Sirkeci 2001). Accompanied by the lack of health-care facilities in the areas where the majority of the Kurds live, the differences in child and maternal health are understandable. Child and infant mortality rates also differ between the Kurds and the Turks; for the Kurds, the infant mortality rate is about 74, and the child mortality rate is 11, whereas corresponding figures for the Turks are 46 and 8 respectively. The under-five mortality rate is 84 for the Kurds and 54 for the Turks (Koç and Hancioğlu, 1999:8).

Differences in socio-demographic indicators may also influence migration flows from Turkey to Western Europe. For instance, for the whole of Turkey, life expectancy at birth is about 9 years less than that in countries of Western Europe where it is 78 on average. The infant mortality rate is 8 to 10 times higher than that in European countries. For instance, it is 3.6 in Sweden. The population growth rate provides a strong pressure for migration. It is 1.2% for Turkey whilst the corresponding figure is very close to zero growth level all around Western Europe. Given the differences between Turkey’s Kurdish and non-Kurdish populations, we may expect more demographic pressures for migration among the Kurdish segment of the population. Since the population growth rate for the Kurds is almost double that of Turkey (see Mutlu 1996:520 and Koç and Hancioğlu 1999:4).
Kurdish families lived in relatively large households. One quarter had 9 or more members, and 80% had 5 or more members (Table 5.12). Corresponding figures for the whole of Turkey were 6% and 43% respectively. In urban areas, only 28% of Kurdish households had less than five members, and 28% of them had 8 or more. In rural areas, corresponding figures were 13% and 47%. Turkey's averages showed that 61% in urban areas and 45% in rural areas had less than five members; and only 5% in urban and 17% in rural areas had more than 8 members. The mean household size was 4.55 for Turkey and 6.8 for the Kurds. The average size of urban households was 4.2 for Turkey and 6.2 for the Kurds. It was 5.1 among all rural households and 7.8 for Kurdish households (Table 5.12).

### Table 5.12. Household size by ethnicity, 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of members of household</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9+</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Mean size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Turkish</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3,525</td>
<td>4.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>1,714</td>
<td>5.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kurdish</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>6.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>7.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Arabic</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>6.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>7.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>5.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td>7.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5,563</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>3,056</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: TDHS 1993 household data*

Two main reasons for the larger Kurdish household size are a higher number of children and the formation of traditional extended families. Household composition often determines the allocation of resources (both material and non-material) available to household members, and the size of the household affects the well-being of its members.

Another socio-demographic indicator related to the EOI is the level of crowding measured in terms of the number of persons per sleeping room. The mean number of people per sleeping room was 3.9 for the Kurds while it was 2.6 for the Turks (Table 5.13). More than 82% of Turkish households accommodated less than three people in one room whereas only 46% of Turkish Kurds had such comfort. For them, having more than one sleeping room per person was unknown but 2.7% of Turkish households enjoyed this. Kurds lived in more crowded houses. More than half of Kurdish bedrooms accommodated more than 3 people, up to 12 slept in one room while this
proportion was less than 20% among Turkish households (5 and more per sleeping room).

Table 5.13. Crowding in households by ethnicity, 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Persons per sleeping room</th>
<th>Kurdish</th>
<th>Turkish</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 1 person</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 to 3 people</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>79.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 to 5 people</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 to 7 people</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 to 12 people</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean persons per room</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of households 823 5,279

Source: TDHS 1993 household data

5.4. Conclusion

Chapter three has already reviewed the literature to depict an outline of the context in which Turkish Kurds' emigration to Germany took place. Closely related to that context, this chapter has explored the EOI for Turkish Kurds. Socio-economic, legal, political and demographic aspects were highlighted as building blocks of the EOI. Deprivation, restrictions and prohibitions reflecting the EOI through the party system, the constitution, and overall socio-economic conditions were discussed.

The socio-economic EOI was discussed at three levels. Firstly, Turkey's relative socio-economic position was compared to that of the destination countries including Germany to highlight a possible broader pattern that may facilitate migration. Then, disparities between Turkey's regions were analysed to understand the relative deprivation of Kurdish populated areas. To be certain about the Kurds' relative deprivation compared to non-Kurdish people (i.e. Turkish), socio-economic conditions were examined at household and individual levels. The findings from this analysis suggest that the socio-economic EOI is present at all three levels and therefore the likelihood of international migration for the Kurds is expected to be high.

Secondly, the political EOI has been discussed on the basis of evidence from legal documents and examples from actual politics. The evidence presented in this chapter has explained the background story to the large asylum-seeking migration flows witnessed over the last two decades. The political aspects of the EOI in terms of the role of the military, restrictive legal frameworks, targeting particularly the Kurdish population, are complementary to the socio-economic deprivation of the Kurds.
Finally, Kurdish demographic trends were compared with those of the Turks and highlighted that the two populations followed different demographic regimes (Koç and Hancıoğlu 1999:9). Kurds’ fertility rates are higher than the others. Kurdish homes are overcrowded and households are very large, which may create a demographic pressure for international migration. The overrepresentation of younger ages may also contribute to this. When these demographic trends are compounded with socio-economic disadvantage including lack of employment opportunities, migration outflows seem inevitable from Kurdish populated areas.

The following chapters analyse the implications of this EOI for the international migration of Turkish Kurds to Cologne, Germany. Material and non-material components of the EOI are discussed in relation to the Kurd’s emigration. Causes, motivations, and mechanisms of migration, and potentials for future migration are also discussed. The final chapter concludes with the examination of the expression of ethnicity through migration process in order to reveal the role of ethnicity within.
Chapter VI

Migration Patterns and Motivations

"Neither from nor towards; at the still point, there the dance is,
But neither arrest nor movement."
(T.S. Eliot, Burnt Norton, 1944, pt.2)

6.1. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to analyse Turkish Kurdish migration to Germany in terms of migration patterns, determinants of migration, choice of destination, and migration motives. The data used in this chapter come from two sources: the TIMS (Turkish International Migration Survey, 1996) and qualitative field research in Cologne (See Chapter 4).

The previous chapter presented an analysis of the environment of insecurity (EOI) as a background context facilitating the migration of Turkish Kurds. On the basis of the TDHS data and other information sources, detailed comparisons of the Kurdish population with others have been displayed. This chapter focuses on the migration patterns and causes of migration on the basis of findings from the TIMS data and in-depth interviews. Migrant and non-migrant populations are compared throughout the analysis as well as Turkish and Kurdish populations.

The following section describes the general patterns of migration on the basis of an analysis of the household and individual data sets from the TIMS. In other words, it describes who moves and who stays. A later part of the chapter focuses on migration motives and choice of destination by combining both the TIMS data and the interviews conducted in Germany, in 1999.

6.2. Migration Patterns

This section examines the characteristics of those who migrated and those who stayed. The analysis is divided into two parts. The first part describes household characteristics based on comparisons by migration status and ethnicity while the second part focuses on individuals’ characteristics in terms of educational attainment level, employment status, age and sex differences. Following the discussion of the EOI as an important
push factor in the previous chapter, the appearance of return migrants in the following discussions may seem unexpected. However, first of all, the EOI has not necessarily created unbearable conditions for all the Kurds in terms of ethnic oppression and deprivation. Secondly, return migration cases recorded in the TIMS survey were mainly outside the core conflict area in Eastern Turkey (see Chapters 1 and 4).

6.2.1. Characteristics of Households

A quarter of the 1,564 households interviewed in the TIMS had at least one migrant member. About half of them had members who were current migrants and the others had return migrants. The regional breakdown of migration shows some diversity for Turkish households but no distinctive pattern for the Kurds because Kurdish migration patterns are pretty similar for all regions (Table 6.1). In all regions the distribution of Kurdish recent and return migrants are similar.

The West and Central regions, composed of the provinces Denizli-Uşak and Yozgat-Aksaray, have established international migration flows (Abadan-Unat 1976; Gitmez 1983; EC 2000). In contrast, the Eastern region, composed of the provinces Kahramanmaraş-Gaziantep, Adıyaman-Şanlıurfa, is a region bordering the Kurdish populated area and characterised by more recent migration flows (EC 2000). The proportions of Turkish migrant households in the West and Central regions (31% and 34%) were higher than the East 1 (9%) and East 2 (19%). This was probably due to the former’s longer migration history. The earlier years of international migration from Turkey were dominated by the Turks and migrants were mainly drawn from the western and central regions. This historical effect is visible today in terms of the high proportions of non-recent and return migrants in the West and Central regions, compared to the small proportions in the East (Table 6.1. See also Chapter 3. figures 3.5 and 3.6).

Very few Turkish Kurdish households living in the West were interviewed in the TIMS because of the sampling methodology, which was not claimed to be nationally representative. Since rural households dominated the TIMS, very few Kurdish families were contacted because most had already migrated to the West of Turkey, preferring to go to big cities rather than remote villages in Denizli or Uşak provinces for example which were sampled in the TIMS. Thus, although Turkish Kurds are expected to
constitute around five to ten percent of the population in the west of Turkey (see Chapter 3 and 5; also Mutlu 1996), the TIMS includes only 1% of Kurds in the West.

Table 6.1. Distribution of households by migration status and region. 1996 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region of household</th>
<th>West</th>
<th>Central</th>
<th>East 1</th>
<th>East 2</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kurdish</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recent current migration household</td>
<td>0*</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recent return migration household</td>
<td>0*</td>
<td>5**</td>
<td>1**</td>
<td>2**</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-recent migration household</td>
<td>40**</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-migration household</td>
<td>60**</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>335</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Turkish</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recent current migration household</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recent return migration household</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1**</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-recent migration household</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-migration household</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>1,222</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* No cases; ** Less than 5 cases.

Chi Square [Kurdish]: 141.981 df: 9 (Sig: 0.000)
Chi Square [Turkish]: 15.541 df: 9 (Sig: 0.077)

Regional comparisons for the Kurds therefore need to exclude the West region since there were very few Kurdish respondents in the TIMS sample (Table 6.1). In the region East 2, including Adiyaman and Sanliurfa, almost one in three Kurdish households have members living abroad who had migrated in the last ten years. In this regard, East 2 may be distinguished from the Central and East 1 regions which have lower recent migration rates but high past migration rates because of their earlier engagement in migration flows from Turkey dating back to 1960. However, Kurdish migration rates are well ahead of the Turks in all three regions.

It is clear from Table 6.1 that a larger proportion of Turkish Kurdish households (32%) have sent their members abroad than their Turkish neighbours (24%). For 72% of Kurdish migrant households, migration began after the mid-1980s while half of Turkish migrant households sent their members abroad earlier. Nevertheless, the coincidence between the intensification of Kurdish migration and the Kurdish ethnic revival must be taken into account. Kurdish households are more likely to participate in international migration than are Turkish households in the Eastern regions\(^5\) (Table 6.2).

In the eastern region, between 25% and 40% of the population is estimated to be Kurdish (Sirkeci 2000; Mutlu 1996). However, Table 6.2 shows they constitute almost two third of recent migration flows although they are merely one third (221) of the

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\(^5\) The East region includes East 1 and East 2 regions of the earlier analysis for the purpose of an easier presentation of the distinct patterns of the Kurdish population within Turkey.
sample population (764). Turkish Kurds’ participation in migration flows is greater than that of their Turkish neighbours. An explanation may lie in either the different effects of the ethnic conflict on each ethnic group in the surrounding region or in the opportunity framework created by the EOI discussed in the previous chapter. Such an opportunity framework could have led the Kurds to emigrate because they, as members of an oppressed (or disadvantaged) ethnic minority, have a better chance to be admitted as refugees by Western European countries. Thus, the Kurds could be more likely to migrate than the Turks.

**Table 6.2. Migration status of households in the East region, 1996 (%)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Migration Status</th>
<th>Kurdish</th>
<th>Turkish</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recent migration household</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recent return migration household</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-recent migration household</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-migration household</td>
<td>69.7</td>
<td>87.1</td>
<td>82.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** TIMS 1996 household data

An individual’s immediate environment influences her or his migration behaviour. In terms of the relationship between migration and networks, this means families, friends, and the characteristics of the community are important. The highest emigration rates for both ethnic groups were observed in the Central region (see Table 6.1), which can partly be explained by such an effect. This region is composed of two provinces (Aksaray and Yozgat) with long-established migration flows dating back to the beginning of Turkish international migration in the early 1960s (Abadan-Unat et al. 1976b). This long migration history means individuals in the region have more information and easier access to resources to facilitate international migration than individuals living elsewhere. In this regard, it is important to analyse whether there are more migrations from households with a history of past migrations.

Household size reflects migration patterns in relation to the relationship between the number of household members and migration behaviour. Table 6.3 displays the average household size by household migration status for both ethnic groups in all regions and also specifically in the East. The TIMS uses two definitions. The first (A) includes all members of the household who were declared to be part of the household, irrespective of where they currently live; it, therefore, includes household members who live abroad. The second definition (B) includes only those members who currently live in Turkey. This provides an indication of absent household members. An examination of
households, according to definition A, finds that the overall average household size is 5.5 (Table 6.3). The difference between the two definitions gives an idea of the number of household members who live abroad. When migrant households with recent current migrants are examined, the average number of members abroad is 3.1 for Turkish Kurds while it is 1.7 for Turkish households. This also indicates a stronger tendency towards international migration among Turkish Kurdish households than Turkish households (Table 6.3).

Table 6.3. The average household size (pre-migration or five years before the survey) by migration status, 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All regions</th>
<th>The East</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kurdish</td>
<td>Turkish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rec. current migrant household</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recent return migrant household</td>
<td>12.4*</td>
<td>11.7*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-recent migrant household</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-migration household</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>335</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rec. current migrant household</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recent return migrant household</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-recent migrant household</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-migration household</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TIMS 1996 household data *Less than 8 cases

The household sizes for recent migrant households prior to migration were larger than for past migrant and non-migrant households five years prior to the survey. The size difference is even larger in households with at least one recent migrant (6.2). Kurdish households in the East regions are almost the same size as their Turkish neighbours but in other regions, the overall average household size for the Kurds is larger than for the Turks: 5.8 according to definition B and 6.4 by definition A compared to 5.1 and 5.3 respectively for the Turks (Table 6.3).

Table 6.4. The average number of household members abroad and in Germany by household migration status, 1996 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Kurdish</th>
<th>Turkish</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Abroad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recent migration household</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>2.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recent return migration h. hold</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>2.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-recent migration household</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>1.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-migration household</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>335</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TIMS 1996 household data
As Table 6.4 demonstrates, the average number of members abroad is 0.44 for all households, which shows the high involvement of communities in international migration within the survey regions. This figure is 2.42 for households with recent migrants. The average number of members in Germany for all recent migration households is 1. Corresponding figures for Turkish Kurdish households are as follows: the mean number of members abroad is 0.75 (0.37 for the Turks), 2.9 for those with recent migrants (2.1 for the Turks), and the mean number of members in Germany is 0.84 (1.07 for the Turks: Table 6.4). Therefore, on average, Kurds are more likely to be abroad than Turks but fewer Kurds than Turks preferred Germany. High average numbers may indicate a migration pattern involving more than one individual from the same household moving simultaneously. It can also be an indication of chain migration from households, with one individual moving, to be followed at later dates by others from the same household.

**Figure 6.1. The financial situation of households by migration status, 1996**

**Source: TIMS 1996 household data**
Economic deprivation plays an important role in international migration (See Chapter 2). Therefore, to depict the patterns of who moves who stays, it is worth comparing households’ economic situation. Figure 6.1 compares households in terms of their financial and comparative economic conditions. Financial adequacy is measured in terms of ability to afford all the basic needs for the household.

The literature suggests that migration is conditional on having certain level of social, cultural, and economic capital and hence many people want to but only a few migrate (e.g. Hammar 1995; İçduygu et al. 2001). It also suggests that migration is more likely for those people from middle-income groups whereas it is less likely for those from the poorest and richest portions of society (e.g. Hammar et al. 1997; İçduygu et al. 2001). According to this view, we may expect that migrant Kurds were relatively better off compared to their non-migrant neighbours. The distribution of migrant and non-migrant households between different financial status categories is very similar in both ethnic groups (Figure 6.1, A.1 and A.2).

One fifth of Turkish Kurdish migrant households were better off than their neighbours and only one third of them were reported financially sufficient prior to emigration. For Turkish households, the picture is almost the same: almost a quarter of migrant households were reported as financially sufficient or better (Figure 6.1). Therefore the above mentioned hypothesis (i.e. Hammar et al. 1997) seems supported by the Turkish Kurdish case. The differences between different financial categories were found statistically significant in the analysis. About half of migrants in both ethnic groups reported that their financial situation were the same as their neighbours. Only less than a quarter of Turkish Kurdish migrants were better off than their neighbours prior to migration.

However, data on economic well-being is problematic because obtaining actual information is often difficult due to culture specific perceptions and codes of practice. For instance, most people do not want to disclose their actual earnings to either protect themselves from jealousy or because of legal or tax concerns. Also in some cultures, such as Islam, modesty about economic matters is essential. Therefore it is very hard to get a reliable answer to a question asking whether one’s household is better than the others in the neighbourhood. From another point of view, people may also be reluctant to admit their poverty to an outsider. So these findings should be interpreted with care.
6.2.2. Individuals: who stays, who moves

“But you surely know that not just the Kurds, half the Middle East would emigrate if they could. We can’t physically stop them.” (Mr. Sami Abdul Rahman)

These are the words of the deputy prime minister of the Kurdish Regional Government of Northern Iraq (Guardian, August 2, 2001). However half of the Middle East has not, in fact, migrated. Regardless of environmental conditions, only a relatively small fraction of individuals have actually moved abroad: migration also depends strongly on individual characteristics and capacities. The characteristics of individuals have a decisive role in migration. The following analyses focus on some basic contrasts between migrant and non-migrant individuals to answer the question of who stays and who moves.

A voluminous literature on selection of migrants has been built since the laws of Ravenstein (1889). Age and gender were referred to as two of the strongest characteristics for selectivity in migration (Salt and Clout 1976; Lewis 1982). Accordingly Lee (1970) suggested that young adults are the most mobile segment of the population and men are more likely to migrate than women (p.438; see also Chant 1992). The literature has also considered unemployed people and professionals to be the most mobile elements of the population. Many more examples can be found in this regard such as retirement migration (e.g. Rogers 1992). This study has also investigated another area of selectivity: ethnicity.

In order to outline gender and age selectivity patterns in Turkish Kurdish migration, Figure 6.2 presents age and sex distributions for migrants and non-migrants of both ethnicities. It shows among both ethnic groups lesser women involved in migration compared with men. The limited representation of women in migration can be related to cultural characteristics. Migration of single or unaccompanied women is usually not favoured in Muslim societies (Kadioğlu 1994 and 1997). Therefore, it can be assumed that Turkish Kurdish women also often migrated for family reasons including reunification and marriage. Mrs. Şirin Ünsal, who was born in Gaziantep and migrated to Germany in 1967, briefly explained this:

"... For girls, it was not possible to go to the school, even in Gaziantep [an industrialised urban centre]. I was extremely lucky. This has changed recently but still most women in Kurdistan are illiterate... Except for a few political women who arrived recently, the only
way for Kurdish women to come here is marriage. Can you imagine a society that does not let its girls learn would let them to move abroad alone? I never met such women here since I arrived..."

Despite the restrictions mentioned by Mrs. Ünsal, Turkish Kurdish women are more likely to migrate than the Turks according to the TIMS (Figure 6.2). The reason Turkish Kurdish migration involves more women than the Turks may be due to the type of migration. According to in-depth interviews, Kurds are likely to migrate clandestinely as asylum seekers (see Appendix 4.2 for migrant profiles). Therefore most of the respondents interviewed in Cologne were asylum seekers and they had either managed to bring their families or were still trying to do so. Within such an asylum seeking scenario, the pioneer migrant, or key migrant, was often male as it was among the respondents of this study and these males had brought their families, partners and children. Thus, a higher participation of Kurdish women compared to the Turks seems to be related to such ‘chain-family-asylum migration’.

Figure 6.2. Age at last migration for migrants and five years ago for non-migrants, by sex, 1996
Again related to that asylum-seeking scenario, there may also be an ethnic conflict related motivation. Due to ethnic conflict, the first member of the family to migrate often tries to bring others left behind in order to rescue them from the threat of persecution. Obviously this motivation is less valid for the Turks in here. The conflict may cause a general intention among the Kurds to resettle abroad whenever the possibility occurs, whereas their Turkish neighbours could leave their wives at home when they migrated, intending to return home later, with no fear of persecution.

According to these two scenarios, more female participation in Kurdish migration compared to Turkish migration can be a result of the EOI, which forces (and also enables) the Kurds to migrate abroad as small units (i.e. families, couples) instead of individuals. Both the TIMS data and the in-depth interviews have provided evidence supporting such a tendency.

Figure 6.3. Age structure by migration status, 1996 (%)
Figure 6.3 compares the age structure of both ethnic groups with respect to migration status on the basis of information about their age when they last migrated. Ages used here are either migrants’ ages at their last migration or non-migrants’ ages five years ago. Most Turkish Kurds had migrated at a young age, between 18 and 24 (30% of current and 43% of return migrants). The second largest migrant age cohort for them is 25-34. Their Turkish counterparts are concentrated in the age cohort of 25-34. The majority of Turkish current and return migrants migrated in their late twenties and early thirties (38% for current and 46% for return migrants). Few Turks were older than 44 when they last migrated (8% of current and 5% of return migrants). However, for the Kurds, migration continued in these older ages as well. The proportions of Turkish Kurdish migrants in the age cohorts of 45-54 and 55+ are 16% for current and 4% for return migrants (Figure 6.3).

Turkish Kurdish current migration seems to be starting at earlier ages than for the Turks. However, unlike the Turks, there are also quite large proportions of current Kurdish migrants among the older age groups as well (Figure 6.3).

The picture drawn so far shows a spread of migration through all age groups in Turkish Kurdish society although there is evidence confirming the age and sex selectivity hypothesis of the literature on migration. However, the differences between the two ethnic groups (i.e. the Turks and the Kurds) may still find an explanation in the EOI they have experienced differently in Turkey, since many Turkish Kurds fled Turkey in all age groups. As mentioned earlier Kurdish migrants called for their parents and their siblings when they settled in the destination country. For example, Mr. Zivo, one of the Cologne respondents who arrived in Germany as an asylum seeker, had brought all of his family to Germany in the few years after he became a refugee (see Appendix 4.2 for his migration pathway). Similarly, Mr. Eşref Öztürk also arrived as an asylum seeker and was granted refugee status after a few weeks and then brought his wife and parents to Germany (Appendix 4.2). It took 6 months to reunite his family.

Ethnic conflict and its repercussions are felt differently among the Turkish and Kurdish populations as has already been discussed in Chapter 5. There may be some evidence to suggest that Turkish migration appears to be a movement for economic betterment and attracts people who are in the early stages of their lives but not older people. However.

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86 The TIMS adopted the strategy of obtaining age five years ago for non-migrants in order to have a fair account of comparability between migrants and non-migrants. Five years corresponds to the middle point as the survey’s targeted migrations in the ten year period between 1985 and 1995.
Kurdish migration reflects an escape rather than a move-abroad for earning or saving. Relatively high participation of older people in migration flows then seems understandable. Therefore, according to the TIMS data, the average age at first emigration among Turkish Kurds was 34, and average age at last emigration was 39 whereas corresponding figures for the Turks were 30 and 31 respectively.87

Figure 6.4. Country of last destination for recent international migrants, 1996 (%)

![Graph showing country of last destination for recent international migrants, 1996 (%).]

Source: TIMS individual data
Chi Square: 18.402 df: 6 (Sig.: 0.005)

The choice of destination could also indicate motivations for migration because country related characteristics (e.g. large migrant stock, established migration networks, information) may appeal to potential migrants. For example, Germany leads the list of destination countries for both ethnicities although fewer Kurdish than Turkish migrants went there (50% versus 66% respectively) (Figure 6.4). This pattern may be explained by two aspects of the Turkish international migratory regime. First, there has been an established migration system between Turkey and Germany since the early 1960s. This perhaps determined the picture drawn in Figure 6.4 showing migration trends in the ten years between 1986 and 1996. A second reason can be migration networks, which are more developed with Germany than with other destinations, since Germany has been the major destination in Turkish international migration since the 1960s (see Chapter 3).

The second most preferred destination country for Turkish Kurds is Austria. 15% of Kurdish recent migrants migrated to this country whereas only 6% of Turks did. France and Switzerland were the two other major destinations to where about 20% of Turkish

87 The differences between means for the two ethnic populations are also tested by ANOVA and p values for mean calculations are found as follows: age at first migration: 0.049 and age at last migration: 0.000.
Kurds headed. Other European countries including the UK, Sweden, and the Netherlands also attracted about 8% of Turkish Kurds. A contrasting picture appears here in that fewer Turks preferred these other European countries compared to the Kurds. On the other hand, Arab countries including Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan were targeted by just 2% of Turkish Kurds while 6% of Turks migrated to these countries.  

Better economic opportunities in Europe compared to other destination countries have perhaps appealed to all migrants from Turkey who were motivated by possibilities for economic betterment. For the Turkish Kurds, better political circumstances in terms of ethnic relations could have also played a role in deciding the destination but there is no data for a detailed investigation of this issue.

Figure 6.5. Educational level before migration, 1996 (%)

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88 Both the former Soviet Republics and Arab countries are important in the last phase of the Turkish migratory international regime with regard to an increasing volume of contract based labour migration (see İyiduygu and Sirkeci 1998).
Education has been one of the factors most often referred to in international migration studies as an indicator of migration possibilities (e.g. van der Erf and Heering 1995; Massey et al. 1993; Lewis 1982; Shryock and Nam 1965; Bogue 1959; Hofstee 1952). Most literature suggests that the better educated are more likely to migrate. The analysis of this study should probably formulate it as “the relatively better educated” because most Turkish Kurds have had very limited formal education (See Chapter 5). The TIMS data imply that migrants have some basic education but any further education is not a prerequisite (Figure 6.5). When the Kurds are compared with the Turks, it is possible to say that the most educated individuals among Turkish Kurds are attracted by international migration compared to the Turks. Of Turkish Kurdish migrants, 60% had primary education and 20% had secondary education prior to migration. They were clearly more educated than their non-migrant fellows, but there is no statistically significant difference between migrants and non-migrants among the Turkish population (Figure 6.5).

Socio-economic selectivity has also been underlined in the literature referred to above. The socio-economic status of migrants in terms of their relative status compared to their neighbours has been discussed earlier in this chapter (see Figure 6.1, also Chapter 5). Employment differentials may facilitate migration from areas with high unemployment to areas with more employment opportunities. The applicability of this rule to the Turkish Kurdish population is questionable although differences between job opportunities in Turkey and Western Europe are beyond doubt. Findings of both parts of this research (i.e. the TIMS and in-depth interviews) suggest that migrants are likely to be better off compared to their non-migrating neighbours prior to migration. Most respondents interviewed in Cologne reported that they were better off than their non-migrant neighbours when they left for Germany. For many of them, there was also disappointment after migration, because they had to work for wages that were smaller than they had expected before moving. Thereby, relatively affluent Turkish Kurds migrated but they were not able to satisfy their expectations in the destination. Mr. Eşref Öztürk who was a refugee originally from Şırnak province (Appendix 4.2) reported such a mismatch of his expectations with the reality in terms of working hard while expecting an easy, wealthy life abroad:
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"We were farmers there [Turkey]. We had 300 sheep and 100,000 dönüm89 of land...I completed primary school then stopped studying... We were very well off. I never worked there [Turkey]...I swear to God, I am working very hard here; harder than I could ever imagine."

Religion plays a part (which is often overlooked in the literature) in migration from Turkey. Turkey harbours a religious tension dividing its population into two opposing camps: Alevi Muslims and Sunni Muslims. This tension has lasted longer than any other conflicts in the country if we count frequent raids by Ottoman Sultans claiming a link between the Alevi population in Turkey and the Shia state of Persia (Şener 1993). This religious tension often overlaps with the ethnic conflict because of the fact that most Alevis are Kurdish while one third of the Kurds are Alevi (Table 6.5).

Table 6.5. Migration status by ethnicity and religion, 1996 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Migrant status of individual</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>82.2</td>
<td>93.9</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>94.8</td>
<td>91.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alevi</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>76.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TIMS 1996 individual data

The representation of Alevis within the Turkish Kurdish migratory regime is important with regard to women’s participation. Turkish Kurdish immigrants interviewed in Germany very often reported the differences in status of women in Sunni and Alevi communities. There is more room for women in the public life of Alevis than Sunnis. For instance, Mrs. Hazal Dinler, who came to Germany by marriage (Appendix 4.2), stated "men-women relations were very relaxed in our family, because we were Alevis". At the same time, another respondent, Mrs. Ayşe Güzel who was an asylum seeker from Şırnak (Appendix 4.2), was very rarely allowed to go outside the house because of religious attitudes, because she was a Sunni and married to a Sunni man. Probably because of these different attitudes, almost all of the female respondents interviewed were Alevis and most of those women who refused an interview were Sunnis.90 Kurdish Alevi women were not just passive joiners of their husbands but also active participants of migration in search of betterment of their lives. For example, Mrs. Kardelen migrated to Germany alone as an asylum seeker in the early 1980s (Appendix

89 Dönüml is an area measurement. 1 dönüm is equal to 500 square meters.
90 Social relations in terms of religious differences are also discussed in Chapter 9.
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4.2). She took a long route via Iraq, Syria, Greece, and East Germany. In another case, Mrs. Şilan first moved to Germany in the late 1970s as a possible bride for her uncle’s son (Appendix 4.2). Then she decided not to marry and returned home, from where she moved to Istanbul, working there for a few years before deciding to migrate again. She arrived in Germany for a second time in the early 1980s as a worker in a textile factory and settled for good.

Throughout this section, we have discussed the possible influence of the ethnic conflict on international migration status. It has been clear that the Kurds (especially males but also females) are more likely to migrate. The next section investigates the reasons for this migration likelihood expressed by the respondents of the TIMS and in the qualitative field research in Germany.

6.3. Motivations for migration

The patterns discussed so far generally match the previous literature (Chapter 2). For example, the likelihood of migration is higher for males than for females. Past migration experiences of individuals and those close to them in their immediate environment (e.g. relatives, fellow citizens) also increase the possibility of potential migration. Children and the elderly are generally absent from migration flows. However, in the specific case of Turkey, comparisons between Turkish Kurdish and Turkish groups suggest another factor to be important: ethnic conflict, which has been described in earlier chapters as the central component of the broader EOI for the Turkish Kurdish population. Thus, in order to understand the determinants of Turkish Kurdish migration in the context of the EOI, socio-economic conditions and expressed causes of migration are analysed here using the TIMS data, supported by the findings of qualitative field research in Germany.

6.3.1. Correlation between migration and the background variables

To understand the relative influence of the factors we have discussed so far in the first half of the chapter, a logistic regression model has been developed to analyse the comparative influence of these factors. The independent variables in the regression model are region, religion, educational attainment, age, sex, household size, financial situation, comparative household welfare situation, and ethnicity. Migration status
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(coded into two groups: 1 = migrant; 0 = non-migrant) is the dependent variable (Table 6.6). In the equation all variables except age and household size are defined as categorical variables. Categories for these variables were as follows: the regions were West (the comparison group), Central, East 1 and East 2; for financial situation, more than sufficient was the comparison group, and the other categories were sufficient, barely sufficient, and insufficient; the comparison group for comparative financial situation was better off as opposed to the same and worse off; ethnicity is coded as Kurdish (the comparison group) and Turkish; sex is coded as male (the comparison group) and female; the comparison group for religion was Sunni against Alevi and no religion; finally, education is coded as no education (comparison group), primary school, secondary school, higher education.

According to the logistic regression equation, gender difference, regional variation, age difference, and financial situation are the most important factors affecting migration (Table 6.6). Gender difference is the strongest variable affecting migration status (Wald = 180.6). Compared to Westerners, people from the Central region (Exp (B) = 0.948) and Easterners have a lower chance of migration. Migration is very responsive to the financial situation of the household of the individual. People who are from financially adequate households are the most likely group to migrate compared to those from more than sufficient or from inadequate households. It is possible to say the likelihood of migration for the middle category of people is 9 times higher than for richer people (Exp (B) = 9.318). The comparative financial situation of individuals’ households indicates that when they are better off their likelihood of migration is lower (Table 6.6).

Alevi (Exp (B) = 1.780) are also more likely to migrate than Sunni Muslims. The exponential (B) for non-religious group (2.575) indicates that they are also more likely to migrate than Sunnis, although this was not statistically significant (p = 0.184). The Turks are less likely to migrate, other things being equal, than are the Kurds (Exp (B) = 0.638), which can easily be connected to the overall EOI as a facilitating factor for their migration. The results for educational attainment are also not surprising as those with

91 Wald scores are used to indicate comparative significance of each variable in the model. The statistical significance of each of the coefficients used in logistic regression is evaluated using the Wald test where the coefficient is divided by its standard error (Tabachnick and Fidell 1996:598-599).

92 Exp (B) values are odds ratios used for easy interpretation of coefficients, B values, generated by logistic regression. The odds ratio is the increase (or decrease if the ratio is less than one) in odds of being in one outcome category when the value of the predictor increases by one unit. Odds ratio = e^B (Tabachnick and Fidell 1996:282 and 607).
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Minimum educational qualifications (primary school (Exp (B) = 1.812) or secondary school (Exp (B) = 2.414)) are twice more likely to migrate than their non-educated fellows. Those with higher education are half as likely to migrate (Exp (B) = 0.545) but this was not statistically significant (p = 0.189) (Table 6.6). However, it still supports the idea that migration is more likely to attract middle category people rather than those in the lowest or the highest ranks.

Table 6.6. The relevance of some background variables to migration status, 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region (comparison = West)</th>
<th>Migration (B)</th>
<th>Wald</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central region</td>
<td>-.054</td>
<td>.128</td>
<td>.721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East 1 region</td>
<td>-1.325</td>
<td>54.234</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East 2 region</td>
<td>-.669</td>
<td>14.762</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household size</td>
<td>.052</td>
<td>9.224</td>
<td>.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex (comparison = Male)</td>
<td>-.1744</td>
<td>180.579</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.035</td>
<td>72.175</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial situation (comparison = more than sufficient)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sufficient</td>
<td>2.232</td>
<td>47.376</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barely sufficient</td>
<td>1.711</td>
<td>27.307</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient</td>
<td>1.544</td>
<td>21.582</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compared financial situation (comparison = better off)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same</td>
<td>-.523</td>
<td>13.531</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worse off</td>
<td>-.562</td>
<td>10.203</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion (comparison = Sunni)</td>
<td>.577</td>
<td>10.374</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alevi</td>
<td>.946</td>
<td>1.766</td>
<td>.184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No religion</td>
<td>.595</td>
<td>18.267</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (comparison = no education)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>.881</td>
<td>16.224</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>-.607</td>
<td>1.724</td>
<td>.189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity (comparison = Kurdish)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>-.449</td>
<td>13.307</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-.3963</td>
<td>133.346</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Initial \(-2\) log likelihood: 2797.632
Model improvement: 589.76
Significance: 0.00
% Correctly classified: 87.8
Number of cases: 4589
Nagelkerke R Square: 0.231

Source: TIMS 1996 individual data

Migration is quite responsive to the age of individual and the size of household he or she is from; more mature people are more likely to migrate than are the young (Exp (B) = 1.036). In addition, individuals from larger households are more likely to migrate than those from smaller households: larger household size also means greater chance of migration (Exp (B) = 1.053: Table 6.6). This may be explained by added ability to
migrate for those who were from larger households because of larger social and economic capital provided by a large number of people in the household. It simply means more people to support one’s migration but it also means more pressures of expectations by those left behind on this single individual’s migration. However, there is no direct finding of this study to support such a hypothesis which remains a speculation.

The individual effect of each variable in the equation can be seen by examining the Wald scores (Table 6.6). Gender and region have the highest Wald scores (180.6 and 87.1 respectively) indicating they have the largest effects on migration. They are followed by age (Wald = 72.2) and by the financial situation of household (Wald = 59.7). Religion, ethnicity, and comparative financial situation are the weakest three of the nine variable groups according to their lower Wald scores (Table 6.6). Education also does not seem very effective with a relatively low Wald score (28.4). Nevertheless, all the variables tested here were significant in explaining individual respondents’ migration statuses.

The overall model fit is 23% (Nagelkerke R²) in predicting the variation in migration of individuals. The model represents a significant improvement over the null model, which does not take any variables into account (Table 6.6). The equation correctly classified 88% of all cases. However it was better at predicting who stays (99% of these cases were correct) than who moves (only 6% of these cases were correctly predicted).

Although the statistical model presented above has a very good prediction with a high level of significance, it is still important to see how individual migrants formulate their rationales for migration. Beside, the qualitative material can provide some insights for a better understanding of their migration, since the model could explain only 23% of the variation in individual migration. To understand the rest of the variation of the Turkish Kurds’ international migration, their migration experiences need to be analysed. The following section focuses on how immigrants have expressed their causes for migration on the basis of the findings of qualitative research and the TIMS data.

6.3.2. Expressed reasons for migration

The reasons for migration are not easy to identify and even more difficult to measure. Although there are some attempts to make generalisations on migration, they are still
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controversial (see Chapter 2). All we could do is to have an approximate understanding of them. As has already been discussed in earlier chapters, economic and political factors are important determinants of migration. Structural differences between the sending and receiving areas such as wage differentials, uneven distribution of employment opportunities, and wealth differences determine the broader patterns of international migration. However, it is equally important to understand how individuals negotiate these macro structural factors.

Individual level analysis helps to understand the Turkish Kurds’ perceptions of socioeconomic and political unevenness and their implications at the micro level. This section combines the TIMS findings with those from the qualitative research on the causes of migration as the respondents expressed them. The TIMS gathered information about economic, family related and other reasons. Job improvement, employment opportunities, and betterment of income were the most common reasons given for migration by TIMS respondents while family related reasons such as family reunification and marriage were also often referred to. Very few other reasons were encountered, but among those which did feature were education, fear of war or persecution, adventure, and so on. In the qualitative research, the interview schedule focused on reasons for migration, but usually interviewees have hidden their reasons within their broader story. The reasons were often nested in a political narrative revolving around Kurdish ethnic rivalry. Nevertheless, the motivations for migration reported in the interviews were broadly similar to those recorded in the TIMS.

According to the TIMS, most of the current and return migrants were worried about employment prior to their migration. They often reported they could not find a job in Turkey and therefore migrated. A large proportion revealed that in migrating they were looking for a job and a better income while a small fraction reported their migration was for family reasons. Women are an exception as the majority of them migrated to join their spouses or to accompany them. Figure 6.6 presents the most important reasons for migration by ethnicity and gender, according to the TIMS. Findings are presented in two graphs to compare migrants who went to Germany with other migrants. The ‘other’ category for males mostly refers to moves made to avoid
compulsory military service. Within the other category, only one woman went abroad for education but others were unknown.  

Figure 6.6. Main motives for the first migration, 1996 (%)  

Economic motivations such as looking for better jobs and improvement of income were major reasons for men from both ethnic groups but these economic causes constituted a very small fraction of the reasons for women’s migration (Figure 6.6). For women, family reasons were dominant in both ethnic groups. Migration to Germany seems more economic oriented than migration to other destinations. About a quarter of both Kurdish and Turkish women reported migrating to Germany for economic betterment.  

The category of other reasons constituted nearly 30% of answers given by Turkish Kurdish migrants to destinations other than Germany compared to less than 20% for the Turkish migrants. Examining the reasons within the other reasons category may be helpful to analyse the contribution of ethnic conflict. Although the TIMS individual questionnaire included an answer option to report terror and security reasons, only two respondents chose this and puzzlingly enough both of these cases were Turkish! Avoiding compulsory military service was another category related to the EOI in the ‘other reasons’ category. It was a more frequent reason for migration among Turkish

93 The unknown reasons in the other category among the main motives for the first migration could be the result of using proxy respondents in the Survey. Since all questionnaires for women recorded in ‘other’ were completed by proxy respondents.
Kurds than the Turks. This is understandable with regard to the meaning of military service in the Turkish Army for a Kurdish man in the context of an ongoing ethnic conflict. However, because compulsory military service in Turkey means all men are drafted when they reach the age of twenty regardless of ethnicity, many Turkish men, as well as the Kurds, try to escape from it by migrating abroad. Most of the other reasons for migration given by Turkish Kurds were education related while a few of them stated they had escaped from political oppression and persecution.

The differences between the other destinations and Germany with respect to the other category are noticeable. While other reasons constituted just 10% of male migration to Germany, they amounted to almost 30% of reasons for migration to other countries. When we consider these proportions along with the discussion above about avoiding military service and security reasons due to terror activities in Turkey, the difference makes the researcher think of a specific type of migration. Migration to other destinations could involve more asylum migration than to Germany. However, TIMS data do not allow us to distinguish migration types in this regard.

In the TIMS, family related reasons for migration are defined as accompanying the spouse, joining the spouse later, or marriage. Almost no Turkish Kurdish men had moved abroad to marry or to join a spouse compared to 5% of Turkish men. Women’s migration, by contrast, was dominated by marriage moves. 50% of Turkish migrant women went to Germany as brides or to accompany their husbands compared to 25% who went for work. The remaining 25% were born in Germany. For Kurdish migrant women, the movement did not mean more than accompanying a husband, except for a few who migrated to seek employment or for better income.\textsuperscript{94}

Economic reasons were often reported in the qualitative research as well. However, the stories recorded in the qualitative interviews do not suggest an employment crisis for migrants in Turkey prior to their move although they provide further evidence on the predominantly family related migration of women. Most of the Turkish Kurdish immigrants interviewed in Germany said they had a job at home before migration, which provided a pretty good living. In addition, they frequently argued that prior to migration: they had a false impression of living in Germany. They were expecting to earn a lot more in Germany than they did in Turkey prior to migration. Mr. Hasan

\textsuperscript{94} The number of Kurdish women who migrated to Germany for economic reasons were just 3 in TIMS. The corresponding figure for Turkish women was 8.
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Üzmez, a guest worker who came to Germany in 1972 (Appendix 4.2), clearly stated that he was not living in poverty in Turkey:

"...I was born in a peasant family with five children. We were a farmer family when I left for Germany. We were not very wealthy but we never suffered from poverty in terms of basic needs and expenditures there. We were even better off than many of our neighbours in our town..."

Mrs. Saliha Deniz, an asylum seeker since 1995 (Appendix 4.2), emphasises she was well off in Istanbul prior to migration. She escaped from police pressure due to her activities in HADEP (a pro-Kurdish political party):

"...My family was running a big retail store in Istanbul. We all [sisters and brothers] studied at university level. There were no financial problems at home in any period of my life there. We owned a few flats in Istanbul and all my uncles and aunts were economically well off, and of course my elder brother and many relatives have lived here in Germany. Therefore our economic situation was never a reason for migration...but when my family fled to Istanbul from Elazığ it was for work mainly as they told us later..."

Mr. Sefer Demir came to Germany by marrying a Dutch woman. He also had no financial difficulties in Turkey before migration, but the underlying reason for migration was still economic. He met his German citizen, Dutch ex-wife, in Antalya, a holiday resort in southern coast of Turkey, and arranged a contract marriage to last for five years. The project was to benefit from a contract marriage until getting a residence permit as a spouse of a German citizen. For him, this was the easiest way of migrating to Europe. Within the framework of such a contract marriage, he aimed to improve his social and economic conditions, and for him, this was only possible by migration; migration by any means. He developed this idea via his observations from fellow migrants’ visits to his hometown in Turkey when he was a teenager. It can be called as imagined security in relation to the EOI conceptualisation developed in Chapter 2. He says that people in Turkey were misled by the vision of those earlier immigrants who visited Turkey every year and projected themselves as living in great wealth:

"...When I was a child, many of our fellows were immigrants in Germany, Netherlands, etc. They visited the town every year, summer time. These people [migrants] were not telling the truth. They never spoke about their real life here in Germany but always talked about an "imagined" life. It was a paradise... They were always wearing good clothes, suits, eating beautiful food. They were wealthy looking... All of us, youngsters.
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envied them. We wished for the same good life for ourselves too. In those days, all my friends and I thought about coming to Germany whenever we got a chance to move... But now, I know what is happening. It was all a show. They were getting loans before going to Turkey on holiday; loans to buy gifts, clothes etc. Just to give a wealthy impression. Their relatives and friends in Turkey, like me, believed in them and wanted to migrate to here... Deciding to migrate was so simple. They showed off and we admired and eventually came here... After coming here I realised that most of these immigrants were working even harder to pay the price of these parading short stays in Turkey...”

And of course it was not expected that migration to Germany would mean working too hard to earn only a small wage. Needing to work very hard was quite a common complaint among Turkish Kurdish men in Cologne, Germany. As they stated clearly, when they were in Turkey, women did the heavy work. Mr. Eşref Öztürk, a refugee originally from Şırnak province, also revealed the same point: life was more difficult in Germany than it was in Turkey (see quote in page 147).

Only 4% of TIMS respondents refer to the war and conflict situation as their reason for leaving. However, this is still significant as the sample population was not from the region where armed conflicts have taken place. The impact of the ethnic conflict was more obvious in the interviews. They underlined that many Turkish Kurdish parents wanted to send their sons abroad to save them from the clashes between the PKK and the Turkish Army. For many young asylum seekers, the reason was to escape from persecution. If they stayed in their hometowns or villages they would face two choices: to join the PKK or the Turkish Army. There was no third option unless you were very rich. Mr. Eşref Öztürk says that the rich people were able to pay both parties and so they were safe:

“...My uncle is still there [in Şırnak], but he is the rich man of the town. Nobody can touch the rich. He is the richest man of the town. Neither the PKK nor the Army can touch him. Since rich men feed both sides. They are never faced with what I have faced. because both parties, the soldiers and the PKK, have an interest in them. What happens happens to the poor, but nobody else.”

The answers given in the TIMS to the questions about the reasons of migration may hide some other possibilities. For example, Mr. Serbilind came to Germany for

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95 It is also to be noted here that Hacettepe University (a state university) undertook the TIMS with the help of official authorities including provincial administrations. Although it was not an official survey, people, especially those of Kurdish origin, could have refrained from stating political causes, even if they were important, as a precaution.
university education in 1980 but there was an implicit plan to stay because he was also escaping from the ethnic pressure of the Turkish Army:

"...on paper, I came to the university, but actually I came to stay here. What could I do in Turkey? A few months after my arrival, the Army took power and declared emergency rule there."

Many people just searched for a way to migrate to Europe. This may be through education channels, business channels, or with the help of traffickers. Thus increasing Turkish Kurdish asylum migration from Turkey in recent decades should be considered along with this idea of escape. Such a search for security is also the reason for choosing Western Europe as a destination. Although both Iran and Russia are geographically much closer to the Kurdish populated region, they are less likely to provide expected security. The reasons given by migrants for choosing their destination country also highlighted another motivation for migration. In the TIMS, respondents were asked what was their main reason for moving to the specific country of destination where they used to live at the time of the survey. The answers indirectly refer to the significance of migration networks. About half of all migrants moved to a particular country of destination possibly because their relatives or friends were already there.

However, the EOI in the form of an ethnic conflict did not constitute the main group of motivations for Turkish Kurdish migrants but it also served as an opportunity framework. Some of the immigrants interviewed in the Cologne research revealed that they had emphasised the role of the ethnic conflict to increase their chances of obtaining a residence permit. They applied for asylum because they predicted through asylum seeking channel they could stay in Germany. Some of them even made up stories to convince the German authorities and pretended that they suffered from ethnic and political discrimination in Turkey when in fact they did not. For example, Mr. Bayrak utilised the EOI as an opportunity framework. He was living in a Kurdish and Alevi dominated neighbourhood in Istanbul, which was raided by the police several times in the early 1990s. He had two uncles who were guest workers who had arrived in Germany in 1969 and 1973 and they helped his clandestine asylum migration to be successful:

"...In our neighbourhood, everybody wants their children to escape. The police killed many people there. It is also a very poor part of Istanbul. Nobody could find a job there. Nothing to do... I flew on a fake passport and visa... ...went to my uncle's place in Berlin and applied for asylum... I claimed that I was tortured and so became mentally unstable."
But I wasn’t tortured although it was a possibility because I was taken into custody a few times. They sent me for psychiatric examination. I pretended I am mad. Then I got the pass! But I had to attend a psychiatric clinic for eight months, twice a week [laughing]. ...I am sending money to my siblings and mother in Turkey ...”

Mr. Kuzucu had heard that through the PKK people could get refugee status easily in the UK and decided to go. However, instead, he ended up in Germany, with the help of traffickers. His only concern was to make money but nothing else:

“...there were few people who migrated from our village. I thought we had the chance [for residence] because we are Kurdish. Everybody was coming here so I decided to try my chance. I could find a job and earn a lot I thought...they did not give me a work permit. I am staying in a detention centre and not allowed to go further than 30 km. But I am working illegally in restaurants. I am earning about 600 DM (£200) but it is poor...

Everybody in Turkey is expecting me to send money to them. So I also considered entering into the drug business. They say there is a lot more money...”

When the overall findings of analyses of the TIMS and the interviews are examined, three groups of motives were decisive for international migration: economic betterment, escape from the insecurity created by the ethnic conflict, and family reasons. Economic and family reasons were very clearly expressed compared to cautious statements about ethno-political insecurity as a reason for migration. However, some other small scale local surveys conducted in Turkey also suggest that fear of persecution or insecurity due to ethnic conflict has been the major cause of migration from the South East Turkey where most Turkish Kurds live.

Nevertheless, the cases of Turkish Kurdish migrants interviewed in Germany reveals another aspect: the ethnic conflict or broader ethnic oriented EOI in Turkey has also served as an opportunity framework for international migration and thus a reasonable number of Turkish Kurds emigrated. Despite many Turkish Kurdish immigrants interviewed in Cologne had fled Turkey because of either the fear of persecution or actual persecution they suffered, there was also a group of respondents who had a clear intention for migration and benefited from the context of the ethnic conflict. The current state of affairs in international migration in Europe was not allowing people to

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96 According to a survey conducted among migrant women in Istanbul (the largest metropolitan centre of Turkey with a population above 10 million), 35 per cent of migrant women migrated because of the lack of security (Ilkkaracan and Ilkkaracan 1999: 311). In the same survey, it was indicated that 65 percent of those who migrated for security reasons had no education and their socio-economic conditions got worse after migration (1999: 317). Several other surveys also present similar results about migration from the region (Aksıt and Akçay 1999; CHP 1999; TMMOB 1999).
migrate freely. Thus asylum migration appeared as the most suitable strategy for migration. Therefore, some have followed this pathway to gain access to the job markets of Western Europe. However, in the last instance, the EOI described in the earlier chapters is expected to have an influence on the life strategies of all Turkish Kurdish people directly or indirectly.

6.4. Conclusion

Migration patterns of Turkish Kurds are not so different from the patterns common in the international migration literature: migrants are better qualified than their non-migrant fellows in terms of education; are mainly dominated by young males; and cultural characteristics such as religion and perceptions of gender affect composition of migration.

Household characteristics indicate that migrant households belong to poor sectors of their communities in general. Perhaps in response to the ethnic armed conflict in the eastern region, the proportion of migrants was larger in that region than other parts of Turkey. Again due to the very same conflict, the Kurds are more likely to emigrate than the Turks. Compared to Turkish emigration, Turkish Kurdish emigration involved more individuals per household.

Concerning individual characteristics, the TIMS data and interviews indicate an emigrant population dominated by young people with a minimum level of education and who were often working prior to their emigration. However, the Turkish Kurdish average age at emigration was higher than that of the Turks possibly because the ongoing ethnic conflict might have caused unrest (or push for emigration) among them regardless of age and sex. Despite limited representation of women in general among migrants from Turkey, Turkish Kurdish Alevi women were also active emigrants not only joining their partners or families but also migrating in their own right. Nevertheless, for the Turks migration was almost exclusively a male business and women stayed behind to wait for the end of this temporary movement.

In terms of destination preferences, Turkish Kurds are more likely to migrate to West European democratic countries than other popular destinations for Turkish migration flows because they are also concerned with their ethnic freedoms along with economic betterment. For the Turks, migration motives are governed by economic concerns and
therefore a large variety of countries is among the destination countries. However, regardless of ethnicity, international migration from Turkey is largely directed towards Germany. It is related to the history of this migration route and the volume of Turkish immigrant stock in this country.

Reasons for migration are various but the analysis of both the TIMS and the interviews suggest that a vast majority of male migrants were motivated economically, while female migration was dominated by family migrations in the form of accompanying or joining the husband or marrying somebody who already lived abroad. There were differences in terms of other reasons. Turkish Kurdish migrants have been motivated by the ethnic conflict but also with a view of economic betterment. This impact has been formulated as escape from persecution or avoidance of compulsory military service in the Turkish Army. Although it never appeared as the most important reason for migration in the TIMS, some immigrants interviewed in Cologne, Germany explicitly reported that they left Turkey for security reasons. However, regardless of expressed reasons, networks have been one of the most significant factors determining migration. The next chapter focuses on this particular influence of migration networks.

Overall, the analysis of Turkish Kurdish international migration up until here shows that the ethnic conflict in the eastern part of Turkey has triggered migration but it also played a role as an opportunity framework for those who either had the chance to migrate (i.e. qualifications, resources) or had a project of moving abroad (i.e. they had wanted to move abroad for a long time). It is hard to consider the ethnic conflict as an immediate reason for international migration because only a small fraction of people at risk seem to have migrated but it operates as a mega narrative in which other migration motives are also placed. However, both qualitative and quantitative analyses indicated that the Kurds are more likely to migrate than their Turkish fellow citizens. Many Turkish Kurdish fled Turkey to find a secure environment. Therefore their migration in recent years is dominated by asylum seeking flows. Although the analysis of the TIMS data did not provide evidence for people escaping from persecution due to their ethnicity, the Cologne interviews included many accounts of persecuted and threatened people. At the same time, the EOI described in Chapter 5 together with the context defined in Chapter 3 alone is strong evidence supporting the hypothesis that the emigration of Turkish Kurds was largely due to an ethnic environment of insecurity.
At the end of this chapter, one point needs to be explained. Although the EOI has been defined as a very strong push factor forcing many Turkish Kurds to flee Turkey, in the analysis return migrants have appeared. There, a distinction between the TIMS data and the qualitative data should be made. The analysis of return migrants are based on the TIMS data which do not include asylum and clandestine migration due to the nature of the survey as explained earlier (i.e. it was a survey conducted by a state institute). At the same time, with an understanding of the EOI as an opportunity framework, it would not be impossible to return. Therefore the reader should not be confused with the analysis of return migrants in the following chapters.
Chapter VII

Migration Mechanisms

"Kürtler yalan söylemek zorunda; Arnavutlar, doğru." (Cemal Süreya, 1989, p.1)\textsuperscript{97}

7.1. Introduction

Following the exploration of Turkish Kurdish migration patterns in the previous chapter, this chapter focuses on the mechanisms of migration in terms of the role of information, the role of migration networks and migration strategies. Information and migration networks are indivisible components of the migration process. Alongside background characteristics (i.e. sex, age, education, and welfare status), type, amount and source of information are also important in the migration decision (De Jong and Gardner 1981). Information that facilitates migration is channelled through migration networks. Migration strategies are also shaped by the availability and the characteristics of migration network. Therefore personal networks (i.e. familial ties, friendship and community ties) in destination countries appear as a key factor in determining and maintaining international migration (Massey et al. 1987; Boyd 1989; Hugo 1981; Faist 2000).

In Faist’s work (2000:123), networks are explained in relation to social capital and discussed as a factor influencing “differential rates of migration out of various communities within the countries of origin”. They are also important in transmitting remittances and in job and accommodation arrangements before the move. Thus networks minimise the risks of migration. The influence of networks are important in migration decision making in societies in which strong family obligation and reciprocal exchange are dominant and supported by strong ties between migrants and the community of origin (Esveldt et al. 1995). This feature also applies to Turkish Kurdish migration, which is largely dominated by chain migration of family members (Böcker 1995).

The following section examines the role of information in the process of migration. It elaborates the nature of information in terms of sources and type. The second part of

\textsuperscript{97} "The Kurds have to lie; Albanians have to tell the truth." [A literal translation by the researcher].
this chapter focuses on the role of migration networks. The size of networks and
differentiation (by gender and throughout the destination countries) are also examined.
The final part of the chapter elaborates the migration strategies observed among
Turkish Kurdish immigrants with reference to admission strategies, organisation of the
journey, and the costs.

7.2. The Role of Information

Information on the country of destination is considered to be vital in migration
decisions, and it is important for success in adaptation to new circumstances
(Hancioğlu and Ergöçmen, 2000:94). Having information prior to migration can also
influence the plan of the journey. For instance, information on admission rules may
direct potential migrants either to entry with legal documents or to illegal entry. Being
informed about job opportunities in a certain destination country may create an
intention to migrate to that country, a decision possibly facilitated by labour
recruitment agencies. Similarly, people under the threat of persecution for ethnic or
political reasons may try to migrate to countries with a better democratic environment
for their ethno-political existence than their home countries if they have such
information about democracy in different countries. In this respect, information is
decisive in choosing the destination country.

Although the quality of information that migrants had prior to their migratory move is
not known, the TIMS data shows that majority of them had information on their last
country of destination before the commencement of their journey (Table 7.1.).

Table 7.1. Proportion of Turkish Kurdish migrants who had information about
the country of destination prior to their last emigration, 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>According to sex</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By gender:</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By migration status:</td>
<td>Recent current</td>
<td>Recent return</td>
<td>Past current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>72</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TIMS 1996 individual data

It must be noted here that the number of missing cases is quite high in the TIMS data. This is basically
due to the fact that proxy respondents were used in TIMS' interviews. Therefore, their relatives provided
most of the information about current migrants. Hence, in most cases, with respect to information
available to those migrants, their relatives who were proxy respondents could have provided very poor
responses to these questions in the survey. In some of the tables of this chapter, missing cases are
excluded to avoid redundancy. When the proportion of missing cases was extremely high it is included in
tables.
Overall, about two thirds of Turkish Kurdish emigrants had some sort of information about their destination countries prior to their last migration. More women had information prior to migration than men. This may be due to the fact that women moved to accompany or join their spouses in most cases. Thus they knew at least the conditions of their spouses in the country of destination.

Distinguishing recent migrants from the pioneers is important. In the Turkish case, most early migrants were job seekers who were selected by the national employment service and sent to Germany on the basis of contracts made with German employers such as the Ford car factories in Cologne. Therefore the only information necessary to know in the early 1960s was, via the Turkish Employment Service, that there were employment opportunities in Germany. For the people who lived in remote areas of eastern Turkey, this information perhaps became available later than to people in the urban centres (i.e. Istanbul, Izmir, Ankara) of the western regions. Mr. Hüseyin Aksu (53) (Appendix 4.2) heard about labour migration to Germany while he was in military service in 1966 and decided to apply:

"...I thought about coming to Germany while I was in the army in Tunceli. I heard that they were recruiting in Istanbul. After military service, I worked in the Turkish Forestry Administration and saved some money. After the completion of the Keban Dam, the government gave priority to migrate abroad for the people of our region. Then I came to Istanbul, passed health checks and came here...It was an unknown place to us."

This information about labour recruitment provided by German companies in collaboration with the Turkish government in Istanbul was the only initiator for Mr. Huseyin Aksu. He had heard of Germany only in history classes when he was in primary school. Most of those migrants who arrived in Germany during the earlier stages of Turkish migration history (i.e. 1960s and 1970s) had very little information about the country of destination but the key factor here was bilateral labour recruitment agreements between Turkey and European countries. This legal framework made people feel secure although they knew little about where they were going. People who moved later had the advantage of information channels established by those earlier

99 Keban Dam created a huge lake in the territories of two provinces (i.e. Elazig and Tunceli) and forced inhabitants of many towns and villages to evacuate their homes. According to my respondents, the government offered two options for those people: they could either have a small piece of land in other parts of the country or could migrate abroad as they were given priority in a government-controlled labour migration program.
migrants. Therefore, recent migrants who migrated after 1985 had more information prior to their last emigration than those who went earlier (Table 7.1). The launch of Turkish state television broadcasts (i.e., TRT) in the late 1960s and later improvements in telecommunications also played an increasingly important role in regard to the availability of information on the countries of destination. However, it was still the earlier migrants who were the most important source of information (Table 7.2).

Table 7.2. Sources of information about the country of destination, 1996 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Information</th>
<th>Turkish Kurd</th>
<th>Turkish Turk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspapers, etc.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family in Turkey</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family in destination</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has been there before</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agencies and other sources</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing and don’t know(^{100})</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TIMS 1996 individual data

Although they did not give a comparative account of different sources of information, respondents in Cologne mostly referred to their relatives and friends as the main source of information. Mr. Sefer Demir (38), born in K.Maraş province (Appendix 4.2), was inspired by the migrants who regularly visited his hometown while he was young. Expectations from migration were high among those in sending areas. Given the economic standstill in rural communities, migration attracted many young people as the best option for economic betterment (Şenyapili 1996). Hence, Mr. Demir also underlined that he was misinformed by the impressions given by the stories of earlier migrants and as they were just showing off\(^{101}\) (see quote in page 156).

The TIMS data also provide some evidence that family members in the country of destination were the most common source of information (Table 7.2). The reliance on information from relatives in the country of destination was the same for both the Turkish Kurds and Turks.

The types of information immigrants had prior to their last emigration mainly concerns welfare issues such as cost of living, employment opportunities, income levels, and

\(^{100}\) See footnote 98. Despite such a high percentage of missing cases, this table still gives an idea about the sources of information.

\(^{101}\) With regard to migrant remittances, Appleyard (1989) refers to this influence as “remittance multiplier effect” in order to argue that remittances receiving households in the sending areas may create a demonstration effect on other households.
health care (Table 7.3). Although the TIMS data do not provide information about the quality of information, it nevertheless played a role in migration as is revealed in Table 7.3.

Table 7.3. Issues on which migrants had information prior to migration and their role, 1996 (%)\(^{102}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Had Information</th>
<th>Information played a role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Turkish Kurdish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of income/wage</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job opportunities</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of living</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment/disability benefits</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child allowances</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health care system</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admission rules</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools / School System</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitude towards foreigners</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxes</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: TIMS 1996 individual data*

There is a remarkable difference which relates to gender. Both Turkish Kurdish and Turkish women were more interested in having information on health care, education and attitudes towards foreigners than any other items compared to their male counterparts who were more focused on job and income opportunities (Table 7.3). This might be due to childcare responsibilities of women.

According to the TIMS, information on admission regulations and procedures are only of marginal interest to Turkish Kurdish migrants but the qualitative research findings suggested the opposite. Almost all respondents in Cologne were aware of the procedures and regulations about entry into Germany prior to their journey. Some of them were even able to use this to wait for the “perfect time” for their entry. For example, Mr. Ali Haydar was born in Tunceli province (Appendix 4.2) and moved to the coastal city of Mersin (along with his parents) in Southern Turkey when he was young. When he completed secondary school he was determined to migrate abroad:

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\(^{102}\) The question used in the TIMS individual questionnaire needs to be mentioned here. The following two part question was asked to the respondents: “before he/she went to (current country of destination), did he/she know anything about that country on the issues I will read to you now?” and if the respondent says yes to any item then the second part of the question was asked: “Did this information play a role in his/her decision to go?” (TIMS 2000)
"...Everybody told me that it is not possible to stay in Germany with legal documents... I got a job on a ship, first. We were sailing between ports in Turkey, Russia, Italy and France. The ship went to Russian ports several times. But it was useless to jump off in Russia. They were poorer than Turkey... Once, I decided to jump off in Italy, but couldn’t. A year later, in 1993 the ship went to Marseilles, France. This time, I managed to escape and got on the train to Paris, where my aunt was living... From there, her [aunt] husband took me to Bielefeld, by car. I waited for about a month there. I had friends and relatives there... In March [1993], 33 Turkish soldiers were killed [allegedly by the PKK] in Bingöl [Turkey] and then I applied for asylum. It was the best time to apply. I said I was there [in Bingöl] when they were killed. Then I was granted refugee status in few days."

Obviously, Mr. Ali Haydar was aware of tough admission procedures in Germany and he even knew about specific conditions, which may accelerate the process. Therefore he waited for a while, and when a big incident took place in South East Turkey (i.e. killing of 33 Turkish soldiers in Bingöl province in 1993) he applied for asylum. Such a scenario may be relevant in broader terms as well. Rather than specific incidents, the Turkish Kurdish armed conflict as a whole may have had a similar effect. That means many Turkish Kurdish people would have travelled to Europe and filed asylum applications on the grounds that the current ethnic conflict in Turkey was posing a threat to their lives. As many migrants were aware of the dominant European sentiment on protecting human rights, this would be a winning strategy for migration. When human rights violations were evident as in the case of the Turkish military presence in the Kurdish populated areas resulting in numerous torture incidents and village evacuations, then people who intended to migrate abroad might have tried their chances at this specific time period on these grounds. Thus, it is possible to say that having information about admission policies and procedures in Europe is an important factor determining type and strategy of migration.

The importance of having information on admission rules, in another context, was also exemplified by two other cases investigated in this research. Mrs. Kardelen had also utilised such information about the relations between the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and Democratic Republic of Germany (DRG) during the late Cold War era. She had travelled through East Berlin knowing that it was not possible to be sent back to the DRG due to the political context. Similarly, Mr. Murat Mete entered the FRG via East Berlin and filed an asylum application in Leverkusen. (See Appendix 4.2 for case profiles). In both cases, they were members of Turkish political organisations with
contacts in Germany. When suitable conditions appeared, with the help of information on the destination country (i.e. economic opportunities and admission rules) networks are utilised and migration strategies developed.

7.3. The Role of Networks

The “family and friends effect” explained by Massey (1999:306) emphasises the role of networks in international migration. They are functional in both decision-making and in the operation of migration. Migration networks help to reduce the risks and costs of migration and thus facilitate migration (e.g. Wilpert 1992; Faist 2000; Böcker 1995). Their function is not limited to giving assistance before migration but these networks are also important during and after migration by providing information and financial support to migrants. Financing the travel, helping to find accommodation or job are examples of this kind of network support.

The TIMS simply defined migration networks as the presence of family and relatives or friends in the country of destination before migration (TIMS 2000). However, a slightly broader definition may be drawn referring to more than one destination country because of the increasing transnationalisation of migration networks. For example, Mr. Ali Haydar (27) quoted above, got support from his relatives in Paris, France but migrated to Bielefeld, Germany and later settled in Cologne, Germany (See Appendix 4.2). Networks have been initiated by early migrants and established through time. Therefore, later migrants, such as Mr. Ali Haydar, were in a better position to move through these transnational networks of migration. They could locate themselves within these networks and even, if necessary (i.e. in cases of illegal entry) could hide themselves until a good chance appeared to begin legalisation of their status abroad.

Mr. Ali Haydar went to Germany because there was a large community of immigrants from Dersim (his hometown in Eastern Turkey) including some of his friends. He preferred to stay in the larger immigrant community in Germany instead of staying with his aunt in Paris. Therefore this case is also an example of the ways in which multiple networks coexist among Turkish Kurds. Although most have some friends in the country of destination, they usually received crucial help from their relatives at the early stages of their migration but usually not from friends.
Figure 7.1 shows that the vast majority of immigrants have either a family member, relative or friend in the country of destination before migration. Along with policies aimed at tightening borders in Europe, further restrictions and strict controls are imposed upon entry and residence permits for foreigners. Therefore, the importance of networks has increased. Family members in the country of destination constitute most of the migration networks. According to the TIMS data, 42% of Turkish Kurds reported they had relatives in the destination country prior to migration, compared to 66% of Turks. These figures were 30% and 35% among return migrants who had migrated in the last two decades for Turkish Kurds and Turks respectively. A lesser proportion of people having networks among return migrants might be due to the fact that when they migrated there were a limited number of migrants abroad to provide networks for newcomers. However in due time, the migrant stock has enlarged and provided more networks for later migrants.

Figure 7.1. Network status before migration to the country of destination by sex, 1996 (%)

As shown in Figure 7.1, the high percentage of women with a network in the country of destination is mainly due to the type of migration. Most women migrated abroad for family reasons as mentioned earlier. Thus the presence of a parent or partner in the network is often the reason for women’s migration.

According to the TIMS data, networks of Turkish Kurdish migrants were composed of spouses (27%), brothers and sisters (30%), relatives (40%), and friends (30%). Turks have reported similar connections in the country of destination too: 10% of them had spouses in the destination before their migration, 20% had brothers and sisters, 70%

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103 Percentages do not add up to 100 because many respondents referred to more than one person in the country of destination as part of their migration network.
had other relatives, and 15% had friends. These findings suggest that the most important connections for Turkish Kurdish migrants before migration were their families and relatives.

As Schoorl and her colleagues (2000:94) have suggested, the number and nature of linkages are important rather than the simple existence of a network that affects migration. The size and composition of networks, therefore, are significant. The larger the network the greater the possibility of assistance for the migrant. Only 13% of Turkish Kurds had no relatives, friends or family members in the destination country prior to their migration. More than one third had only one person in the country of destination before migration. 30% of them knew two or three people while another 10% had networks consisting of 4 to 6 people. The final 10% of Turkish Kurds had more than 6 people in the country of destination prior to migration. The mean size of network for current Turkish Kurdish migrants was 3.9 persons, and 7.9 persons for return migrants. Turkish networks are slightly greater than the Kurdish ones: 4.8 persons for current migrants and 10.8 persons for return migrants.

The larger networks among the Turks compared to the Kurds can be explained by the size of the immigrant stock in the country of destination at the time of arrival. Therefore, in this case, the presence of about 3 million Turks abroad could support a larger migration network for potential Turkish migrants than the Turkish Kurdish immigrant stock (around 600,000) could do for potential Turkish Kurdish migrants. Thus we may expect an increase in Turkish Kurdish migration to Germany (and other western European countries) due to an increase in the Turkish Kurdish immigrant stock, which means more links to recruit more migrants.

All of the respondents of the qualitative research in Cologne also had some relatives or family members abroad prior to their migration except two cases of guest workers who arrived in the late 1960s. The migration accounts told by these immigrants revealed the importance of these networks. In some cases, potential migrants even considered their networks abroad as an insurance: "I had thought if I can’t do well, then I would go to Germany, to my uncle’s place." This is how Mr. Ali Naki (Appendix 4.2) explained his consideration of migration prior to his move to Germany. This way of thinking was very common among the immigrants contacted during the field research. They often regarded migration to Germany as the most secure life strategy before they moved. Many immigrants arrived in Cologne with such a background joining their brothers and
sisters who were already there before helping to bring over others who were initially left behind in Turkey. Turkish Kurdish immigrants interviewed in Cologne often wanted the rest of their family to join them. The following two examples are helpful to understand the role of the family in chain migration and also the nature and use of networks in the migration process – without neglecting their importance after arrival in the country of destination.

Mr. Zivo (Appendix 4.2) brought all his family including sisters and brothers except his grandparents. His uncle had invited him, and his initial entry to Germany was on a tourist visa although he applied for asylum after arrival:

“My uncle had come here as a guest worker in 1968. My father also came to Germany in 1978 and returned in 1982. He couldn’t find a job here and had to return... My uncle asked me to come here and I came on a tourist visa. I never thought to apply for asylum but after arrival I thought and understood what was going on and decided to apply. In two months I was given a refugee pass... All our family moved here one by one between 1990 and 1995. After myself, first my mother and my younger brother came [in 1991]. Later my father joined us [1991]. Then I brought my sister [1993]. Finally, my elder brother quit university in Turkey and came here [1995]... The younger brother is going to school; dad is working in a factory; mom and sister are not working; and my elder brother and I are running this kebab shop.”

Mr. Ali Naki also came as part of a family chain migration. He was the youngest child and the last migrant in his family. Following his three brothers and one sister, he fled to Europe:

“There were many people from our town who left for Germany in the past. Many of my relatives are also here. They arrived in the past, decades ago. Before myself, my elder brothers and sister came. My sister is in Germany. Two of my elder brothers are in France, and the third is in London. Mum and dad came later and they are staying with my eldest brother in Paris... They all came at the beginning of the 1980s. They had sent me money several times while I was in Turkey. I started a business, a small textile workshop in Istanbul but it did not go well and went bankrupt. Then I decided to go abroad at any cost. My brother in Paris, who is working in the airport, sent me about 30,000 francs (£5000) for that... Three months after my arrival, my mother and father came to France. Now my cousins, and some other relatives are asking us to help them to come over here. Six months ago, my aunts husband sold everything to pay traffickers and went to England. Nobody knew he was coming until he appeared in London. Can you believe that? He just went there and found my elder brother in London. [Laughs]”
Friends and others were often used as a source of information by immigrants interviewed in Cologne. However, they usually get most material support from their kinship networks consisting of family members and relatives. Material support basically includes invitation letters, arranging marriages, financing and planning the journey. These kinship networks also provide information about migration and life abroad (i.e. regulations, strategies of admission, secure ways in the case of illegal migration, income opportunities, etc.).

Almost all Turkish Kurdish immigrants interviewed in Cologne had migrated with the help of their families or relatives in the country of destination. Like Mr. Zivo and Mr. Ali Naki whose stories are told above, many others also followed the same path for migration, which has been characterised by considerable involvement and help from relatives abroad. For example, Mrs. Saliha Deniz (26) departed from Istanbul to Frankfurt and her uncle living in Duisburg paid the costs (i.e. fake EU-Schengen visa and flight) for this journey. Then she received some more money from her aunt who lives in Aachen (Germany) and took a train to Zurich (Switzerland) to meet her elder sister living there. Of course here it must be noted most earlier migrants (i.e. those who arrived in the early 1960s) were bereft of the luxury of having friends or relatives at this scale in the destination.

The TIMS data has provided some quantitative evidence about the nature of help received from migration networks by individual migrants prior to their migration. About one third of both Turkish Kurdish and Turkish migrants, prior to migration, received help from relatives and friends who lived abroad. This was in the form of cash for 20% of Turkish Kurds and 32% of Turks. Only 1% of Turkish Kurds and 3% of the Turks were offered jobs by their relatives and/or friends but 4% of Turkish Kurds and 18% of the Turks had assistance in finding a job. 16% of Turkish Kurds and 32% of the Turks were provided with accommodation by their relatives and friends. About 17% of Turkish Kurds and 34% of Turks have received information about admission into the country of destination. Relatives and friends abroad also helped 14% of Turkish Kurds and 20% of the Turks to get visas. About 10% of migrants brought some other members of their families and friends once they settled down in the country of destination and most of them were spouses and children of migrants. These figures show that Turkish Kurds made less use of networks than their Turkish counterparts. This may be related to the fact that the Turkish migration history is longer than the Turkish Kurdish one creating a larger Turkish immigrant stock than the Turkish
Kurdish stock. Thereby, Turkish immigrants could have benefited from the existence of a large community rather than individual contacts while the Kurds were dependent on their individual networks because their immigrant community was still emerging. Therefore, Turkish Kurdish migrants may have considered migration more risky assuming the size of networks is related to the size of immigrant stock and that networks minimise the risks of international migration.

The role of political and religious organisations in migration networks also needs to be mentioned. The PKK, other immigrant associations including extreme left wing organisations, and religious associations played a significant role in recruiting migrants from Turkey according to Mr. Sefer Demir (38) who migrated from Elbistan, K.Maraş to Cologne with the help of a contract marriage in 1990 but was involved in left wing politics as well. He condemns asylum seekers because they use political organisations for their own – non-political – escape:

"...The contribution of organisations here has been huge. The strategies of illegal migrants and asylum seekers were based on the existence of these political organisations here. Anybody who heard the name of any of these organisations\(^\text{104}\) has come here somehow (as a tourist or illegal migrant) and applied for asylum with their help. But, they were never convinced to such a political identity. Only 10 percent of asylum seekers are really affiliated with any political organisation. Most of them have just exploited these organisations. They come here and attend a few demonstrations then leave the organisation once they have completed the legal procedures of getting a residence permit in Germany. I think among those who arrived after 1990, less than one percent is political."

Mr. Demir was critical about such exploitative behaviour as he was a part of a left wing organisation and thinks his organisation was used by these people. Nevertheless for the organisations the picture might be different. They may welcome these people who intend to formulate their asylum claim in connection with a certain organisation. For organisations, although it is not admitted explicitly, the reason behind their positive attitude may be the expectation of recruiting new members for their political movements or religious sects. Mrs. Şirin Ünsal, who works for a Kurdish association in Cologne, admits that her organisation has provided this kind of help to many people who arrived in Germany in recent years:

\(^{104}\) These organisations include DHKP-C (The Revolutionary Peoples Liberation Party-Front), Dev-Yol (The Revolutionary Course), TKP-ML (The Turkish Communist Party-Marxist-Leninist), etc.
"We brought many people here. They needed invitation letters for a visa, for example, or when they apply for asylum we sent some of our friends to help them. Interpretation, legal advice, etc.... we do these kinds of things... I, myself also brought my elder brother here in 1969; then my elder sister came in 1991 and applied for asylum. Between 1990 and 1993\textsuperscript{105}, all my nephews came here and most of them were granted refugee status here."

Political associations abroad as part of a migration network are also helpful for communication after arrival and settlement in the destination country. Their activities also help people to keep in touch abroad. Thus many people who were friends in Turkey and now living in different parts of Europe met up with each other through associations' activities. The Kurdistan Festival is a typical example of that. It takes place every year in a different German city: Dortmund in 1999, Bochum in 2000, and Cologne in 2001. The Dortmund Kurdistan Festival of 1999 attracted about 100,000 Kurds from all around Europe (see photos in Appendix 9.1). Thousands of Turkish Kurdish immigrants travelled to Dortmund from different parts of Germany and Europe. This festival was a good indicator of the working transnational networks and their role in maintaining ties between people scattered around different countries. For example, a young Turkish Kurdish man, around 25 years old, along with many others took the train from Cologne Mülheim to Dortmund to attend the Kurdistan Festival. His main concern, as explained to the researcher, was to meet his elder sister who was coming from Austria and his elder brother from Switzerland. The political and cultural targets of the festival were the least important motivation for his endeavour. The Dortmund Westfalen football ground and surrounding green were full of people gathered in circles of families and friends. Outside the Stadium was more crowded than inside throughout the day since many people were enjoying the opportunity to meet relatives and friends instead of the program inside. Parents were introducing their children to their cousins, aunts, and Uncles who had probably never seen each other before.

Another similar but smaller occasion was the opening ceremony of a local Alevi centre in Cologne. About 100 guests met on a Sunday afternoon in August 1999. Most of them were living in Cologne but there were also some guests from London, Eindhoven, and Paris. Some of those from outside Cologne were friends of those who established

\textsuperscript{105} The reason for these asylum applications in this period can be related to two facts: first, the clashes between the PKK and the Turkish Army were at peak in this period. Second, the period ended in 1993, since Germany outlawed the PKK in Germany in that year.
the Alevi Centre although there were few invited people who were the representatives of sister organisations in their own cities.

The transnational character of migration networks is displayed especially in the maintenance of ties between Turkish Kurds who arrived in different destinations after migration and in the management of migration especially in the case of illegal and asylum migration. The cases referred to in the previous section provide examples of this. A Turkish Kurdish transnational realm on the basis of routine political, social, and cultural activities has appeared throughout Europe in the last two decades when most Turkish Kurdish migrants arrived.

However, the role of transnational networks is crucial in the journey and in the success of moving from home to the destination. Many Turkish Kurds have moved through the lines of a transnational network when they come to Germany, and for some it was even not the final destination but a station on the route. The following cases exemplify such a transnational aspect in Turkish Kurdish international migration.

Another important feature of these transnational networks are the cooperation of facilitating agents, who themselves are often earlier migrants. They live in different transit countries such as Syria, Iraq, Greece, and Italy and help migrants to reach the final destination areas. For instance, one of the respondents who left Bingöl, Turkey saw only his fellow Bingöl people on the way to Germany via Greece, Albania, Italy and France.

Some people even followed the route via Moscow to reach Germany although it has not been a favourite route. In the past, before the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, because of the political rivalry between the West and the USSR, people followed a route via the countries of the Communist Block. Thus they eliminated the possibility of being sent back. However, today, it is just another strategic option for migration to Europe (Okolski 1999). Although this research did not interview any Turkish Kurds who had followed a route via Moscow, it was the route for Mr. Abdullah Öcalan, leader of the PKK. He stopped at Moscow first at the beginning of his odyssey towards Italy to seek asylum in 1998.106

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106 The leader of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party), Abdullah Öcalan had fled to Moscow in October 1998 following his expulsion from Syria in response to pressures from the Turkish government. A month later he arrived in Rome on a false passport and was arrested on November 12, 1998. After leaving Rome on January 16, 1999, Abdullah Öcalan was captured in Kenya by Turkish troops on February 15, 1999, and sentenced to death for treason for leading the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in its armed struggle.
Mrs. Zekiye Özcan (45), born in the town of Şemdinli (Appendix 4.2), fled Turkey in 1993. Her husband and herself along with their two daughters moved to Germany via Syria, Cyprus, Greece, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Austria. She said "the PKK asked us to migrate therefore we did so."\textsuperscript{107} Her journey was achieved with the help of a transnational network involving the PKK guerrillas in the Middle East, friends in Greece, and traffickers:

"We crossed the border over a night. The guerrillas [PKK] met us in Iraq and made us cross to the Syrian side. Then we moved to Damascus along with some other PKK men. A few days later, we boarded from a Syrian port I don’t know where it was. They said the ship was going to Greece. On route, it stopped in Cyprus for two days. Then we took off for Athens, where some of our friends live. We spent a week with them... They found a gang of traffickers there. The gang took us into Yugoslavia. From there to Hungary and Austria... Finally we arrived in Munich and took a train to Cologne where we had some acquaintances and the Party [PKK] was here... We paid 10,000 DM to the gang for the whole family... After arrival, the Party helped us. The party provided us a lawyer. Then we applied for asylum and were immediately accepted. They placed us into a heim"\textsuperscript{108}.

Transnational networks work also as a risk minimising factor. Migrants think of the availability of acquaintances in several countries as a guarantee. That means even in the worst situation there is somebody to help. For instance, Mr. Haç Kılıç who had been in Germany for two and a half years, and lives in a ‘heim’ (Appendix 4.2). A considerable portion of his family lives in Germany. A lot of friends are also in Germany. His two uncles and three aunts are living in different cities and another aunt is in the Netherlands. He came to Germany to join his wife but after arrival they separated. Although his wife and many relatives have lived in Germany prior to his migration, he entered the country as a representative of a Turkish trade union. His friends in Adana, members of a left wing political party, arranged trade union membership for him. Then some other friends in Germany, who were known to his wife, sent him an official invitation to give an address in a seminar held by their association in Germany. Eventually, he arrived in Germany and applied for asylum. He

\textsuperscript{107} In 1993, there were rumours that the PKK was encouraging migration to Europe. By doing so, the PKK was aiming to intimidate Europe by further massive migration flows.

\textsuperscript{108} The German word ‘heim’ is used deliberately because the respondents often preferred to use this word with a negative connotation in their accounts in order to underline unpleasant living conditions in these asylum detention centres.
has lived in Germany for two years and is dissatisfied with what he got but still has an option from his transnational familial networks:

"...I lost my wife... I sold everything I had in Turkey to come here... I cannot go back... But life is very hard here. I didn't get more than 1000 DM (£330) per month. Usually I work for less than that. What the government gives as 'asylum salary' is not enough... Maybe I will go to my eldest aunt's place, to the Netherlands. She is rich, has no children. She can take care of me... if everything goes wrong, I will go to her."

Mr. Emrah Kuzucu (20), born in a village of Şanlıurfa province, was in Germany for just 8 months at the time of the field research and he was keen to migrate to the UK. He applied for asylum on arrival in Germany following a long and dangerous journey via the Balkans and Austria. Although he made his application on the basis of his affiliation with the PKK, he later clearly stated that he had nothing to do with the PKK and politics. Nothing happened in his village during the clashes between the Turkish Army and the PKK. However, as mentioned above, he had heard that affiliation with the PKK would help. He also thought he would not be granted refugee status because of his weak application. Therefore, he thought of an alternative option, which was to go to the UK and try his luck there:

"...How is it in England? Life must be very good there? ... Do you know how much the government pays to asylum seekers there? Here, we get about 400 DM (£130). I heard from friends it was better there... how can I go to England? Can you help me? In the heim (asylum seekers detention centre), we have to live with many others, especially Kosovans. It is too crowded, the quality is very bad... England is a rich country... I will try to enter but I don't know how, yet... but I have some friends. If I am refused here in Germany, definitely I will go to England..."

The UK is interestingly quite popular among Turkish Kurds. Many Kurdish asylum seekers have a wish to go to the UK. They suppose their chances are better in the UK and the reception is better than Germany. Also they think the UK is richer than Germany. Another reason is probably the language. English is a language taught in most secondary schools in Turkey and so immigrants are more familiar with English than German.

As seen in the cases mentioned above, networks provide logistic support before and after migration, but maybe more importantly the journey itself is often only possible with the help of such networks. This instant support is crucial in clandestine migration and can be in any form varying from providing information continuously to arranging
and paying human traffickers during different phases of the journey (i.e. border crossings). Mr. Ali Naki (27) decided to migrate abroad in 1996 when his business went broke. His route to Germany was via Bosnia, Albania, Italy, and France. Together with a close friend, he left Istanbul for Bosnia where he found traffickers and travelled to Italy by ferry from the Albanian coast. When he arrived at Northern Italy, he was short of money and phoned his eldest brother who was working at the airport in Paris to ask for money. Then he stayed two more days in Milan and withdrew the amount his brother transferred in his name. The next day he paid the traffickers to cross the French border and took a train to Paris, which was his last stop before the final destination, Cologne. He stayed a few days in his brother’s home and then a friend of his brother took him to Cologne by car.

Many immigrants have friends and/or relatives not only in Germany but also in other countries including France, the Netherlands, and the UK. This availability gives both a chance for further mobility and an opportunity to maintain social, political, and cultural activities beyond the borders of individual countries. These moves can be in different forms. As in the case of Mr. Haci Kilimci, they may want to move from Germany to the Netherlands in order to join their relatives as a result of failure. Or there may be a political cause as in the case of the arrest of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK: thousands of Turkish Kurds from all around Europe went to Italy to protest the arrest. People may also travel long distances (i.e. from Switzerland to Dortmund) to meet their friends and relatives in Kurdistan festivals.

Thus migration networks facilitate migration by providing channels of information, guidance, finance, and other sorts of help. Their function is not limited to periods prior to migration or the journey but also after the move it serves as a risk minimising (or insurance) factor. Networks can help in finding housing, jobs, and also arranging admission into the country of destination. In this regard, migration networks are critical in determining the type of migration (i.e. labour, family reunification, student, etc.) and the strategy of migration.

7.4. Migration strategies

Based on the nature of the migration network and individual characteristics in terms of capabilities (i.e. financial, educational) every individual migration move follows a unique path. Citizenship status, extent of family and personal relations, regulations of
the country of destination and country of origin, skills and talents of the individual, and contextual elements including political and geographical environment are important in this regard. According to the combination of these, migrants may plan a strategy involving both legal and illegal mechanisms. The options may range from legal labour migration to illegal asylum seeking migration. Illegal migration increases as admission policies have become strict in countries of destination. Thus legal access has become more difficult, especially if a migration network is not available. However, it must be noted here that migrants can adopt strategies, which involve both legal and illegal mechanisms although they may opt to follow pure illegal or legal procedures.

7.4.1. Legal strategies

Legal labour migration is an option, which requires, for instance, agreement between sending and receiving countries, and increasingly some education and skills. Additionally, individual migrants need to find an employer in the country of destination and also obtain necessary documents from both countries. According to the TIMS, 20% of Turks and none of the Kurds entered the country of destination on a work permit. Here it is necessary to remember that the TIMS data especially comprises people who migrated between 1986 and 1996 only, when massive labour recruitment programs similar to those in the 1960s were not available. In the qualitative research, three guest workers were interviewed: Mr. Hasan Uzmez, Mr. Selami Sevgi, and Mr. Huseyin Aksu (See Appendix 4.2). They migrated to Germany following routine recruitment procedures and health checks in Istanbul in the early 1970s.

A second strategy is family reunification, which has some constraints. For instance, eligibility depends upon having a family member who is legally resident in the country of destination. In the case of having a legal resident family member, the resident’s income and accommodation should be suitable to house an additional person. Further, as in the case of legal labour migration, it is required to obtain necessary documentation from both countries. Four family reunification migrations were recorded in the qualitative research. Mr. Haydar Dogan, one of those interviewed in Cologne, had joined his parents who went there a year earlier as guest workers in 1967.

Contract marriage is another legal option to migrate abroad. The first practical requirement is being unmarried prior to the attempt to migrate. Secondly it is necessary

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109 Recent trends in European international labour migration provide evidence for this. For example, IT sectors in Germany and medical sectors in the UK have been suffering from labour shortages in recent years.
to find a willing marriage partner. Here the potential migrant may need the help of intermediaries who can be friends, relatives or agencies. It brings also some additional costs, the most important of which is the compensation paid to the marriage partner. Then the requirements of family reunification apply. At the end, there is a risk of revelation and expulsion. For instance, Mr. Sefer Demir had arranged a marriage and, on completion of the five year period to qualify for German citizenship, he divorced (and married somebody else who he loved). Contract marriage is also a commonly preferred method of acquiring resident status, which was mentioned as a set goal by some of respondents in the field research and also in the literature (see Staring 1998: Lievens 1997a, 1997b).

Obtaining a tourist or another (i.e. student) visa is also a legal migration strategy. This kind of entry can take several forms depending on the nature of the migration network. It can be a visit to a relative or friend; visit for a meeting (i.e. conference, seminar, sports competition); or a holiday package. A tourist visa can be obtained legally or by fraud or can be a totally fake visa (i.e. duplicated or stolen passport). If the migrant goes for the legal option then she or he should overcome the ‘intending immigrant’ presumption and find a sponsor to guarantee the stay. Also she or he needs to go to the nearest embassy and follow the procedures. For the fraud option, the migrant is required to contact fraud passport providers (often the police are involved) and in some cases s/he has to arrange a deal with a ‘bribable’ consular officer. In addition, he or she should afford high costs of fraud. The risk of revelation and blacklisting will remain as well. Overstaying on a legally obtained tourist visa is also risky as it involves the possibility of losing the chance of being granted visas in the future. Mr. Haci Kilimci obtained a visitor visa with the help of arrangements by his friends and wife and he filed an asylum application after arrival. Similarly, Mr. Serbilind arrived as a university student and on completion of his studies; he upgraded his status to German citizenship after being an asylum seeker for two years and a refugee for five years.

7.4.2. Illegal strategies

The other migration option is illegal entry often with the help of human traffickers. Apart from huge financial costs, this option also involves a high physical danger including the risks of accidental death, injury or murder. Potential migrants should, first of all, secure a considerable amount of money for smuggling fees. Then he or she
should find and arrange a deal with traffickers. Illegal entry into the immigration
country always involves the risk of apprehension and deportation.

Recent decades have brought more clandestine migration for Turkish Kurds as well as
other people from the Middle East including Iraqi Kurds fleeing from Saddam Hussein.
Every day, hundreds of illegal migrants are caught on the borders and shores of Italy,
Greece, and Turkey.

As observed during the field research in Germany, after selling some possessions of the
household to secure funds for migration, a typical migration adventure of a Turkish
Kurd begins with initial contact with one of the international human trafficking gangs
in order to get the necessary travel documents, usually in Istanbul. In some cases, these
can be arranged in nearby cities within the Kurdish populated region such as Mersin,
Adana or in Diyarbakir in the Eastern region. A valid passport can be bought at a cost
of about £1000, although prices vary according to the chosen destination and type of
document.

The second stage is to cross the border, usually to Greece. Land or sea crossings to
Greece cost around £1500. After crossing the border, the first step is to reach Athens,
where the illegal migrant could find traffickers to arrange the journey towards Western
Europe. There are several different routes which migrants mostly use to reach
Germany, the UK, and other West European countries. They can either go by a route
through Albania, Italy, and France or alternatively go via Slovenia and Austria. They
can even fly direct from Istanbul to whichever destination they choose as in the case of
Mr. Öztürk quoted below.

The cost ranges from £700 to £6000 depending upon the choice of route and the choice
of means of travel. After planning, such a journey could take 7 to 30 days if everything
goes all right and then the ‘lucky’ ones have to wait for their one in ten (or even less)
chance of being granted refugee status, which may take more than 6 years in some
cases. The total cost of such a journey from Turkey to Germany costs around £1800.
Some of the respondents in this research have preferred clandestine ways to go to
Germany. They reported the cost of such migrations ranges from £1000 to £2500. Mr.
Eşref Öztürk (22), born in a village of Şırnak province, met traffickers in Gaziantep, an
industrial city in the South East region:

"In total, I paid 6000 DM (£2000) to traffickers and they brought me here. They put me
on a plane with a forged passport and visa. First, I went to G. Antep and met some people
who were known for their help in moving abroad. They said I had to go to Istanbul and find another man. Then I took a coach ticket to Istanbul and found that man. I made a payment to him. After spending three days in a hotel everything was ready. We [he and his wife] went to the Airport. He [trafficker] was a friend of the airport police as well. They [the policeman and the trafficker] talked for few minutes and the policeman let us pass into the passenger lounge. Then we flew to Stuttgart."

Mr. Ali Naki (27) also paid about the same amount to the traffickers for a journey to Germany via another, more dangerous way than Mr. Eşref Öztürk:

"I was together with my best friend; we had known each other since we were children. We were looking for a way to come here and we found a contact of traffickers in Laleli, Istanbul. They said we had to pay 4000 DM (£1300) and after a short bargaining period, we agreed on 3500 DM (£1150). The next day, they brought some documents and passports and then we got on the bus heading to Bosnia with 20 other Kurds. From Bosnia, after waiting three days, we passed to Albania walking across the border. Albanians took us to a harbour the night after the border crossing. By dawn, we sailed towards Italy. We did not know where we were until we arrived in Rome ... The traffickers were always around. We stayed in a small town called Ventimiglia, nearby the French border, for two weeks. Then they put us in a small panel van. The driver was an Italian who has driven us into France via Milano. He left us in front of Nice train station. We paid 450 DM (£150) per head for that border crossing into France ... From Nice we took a train to Paris where my brother was waiting for us."

The TIMS data also provide some evidence showing that clandestine migration has been common among Turkish Kurds: 8% of Turkish Kurds and 6% of the Turks entered the country of destination without papers (i.e. without a valid visa, a residence permit or a work permit). About a further 5% of both groups overstayed their visas. At their last emigration from Turkey, 10% of Turkish Kurds and 19% of Turks entered the immigration country on a tourist visa while 19% of the former and 24% of the latter groups were on another kind of immigration permit. Also 4% of Kurds and 8% of Turks entered the destination country with a temporary residence permit. Of Kurds, 4% had travelled with a student visa whereas only less than 1% of their Turkish fellow citizens had a student visa on their first migration abroad (Table 7.4). Here it must be remembered again that a state institute conducted the TIMS survey. Therefore it is very likely that many respondents might have refrained from reporting their illegal entries. Thus there is a large cluster of "no response" cases (60% for Kurds and 48% of Turks). If we exclude these cases as missing percentages would be much higher than they were
shown above. For example, proportion of visa overstayers could go up to 11% for Kurds and 12% for Turks instead of 4% and 5% respectively.

Table 7.4. Type of visa or permit at arrival in the destination country, 1996 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Visa or Permit</th>
<th>Turkish</th>
<th>Kurdish</th>
<th>Turkish</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overstayed a visa</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without papers</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourist visa</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student visa</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee visa</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary residence permit</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residence permit</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work permit</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applied asylum at border</td>
<td>1*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other arrangements</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Response</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown/missing</td>
<td>1*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>461</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TIMS 1996 individual data
* 1 case

According to these figures, Turkish Kurds seem more inclined to use clandestine ways than the Turks. There can be specific difficulties for Turkish Kurds in obtaining legal travel papers in Turkey, which may facilitate considering illegal migration. However, none of my respondents who arrived in Germany via clandestine ways reported such a difficulty specific to Turkish Kurds. They did not try legal options but often preferred to bypass them because they were biased about it: they often thought it was impossible to migrate via legal ways. The legal way is also often out of consideration because of a high expectation of refusal. It is clear to potential migrants that Europe does not want more immigrants and that legal admission is difficult. Therefore, the higher clandestine migration among the Kurds can also be due to such bias keeping them away from the legal pathway. Thus illegal migration strategies might have been considered as a preferable option among potential migrants. Although there are no statistics, which show the rate of success through legal procedures, high rates of success in illegal migration can make it attractive for potential migrants. Only a small fraction (about 5% for both ethnicities) of those who tried to migrate without the necessary travel documents were unsuccessful according to the TIMS data. Two thirds of Turks succeeded through illegal entry alone while the majority of Kurds needed help from relatives, friends and others (i.e. traffickers, bribable officers).

Overstaying other visas (i.e. student, contract, and business) is also an option for migration. As in the case of Mr. Serbilind, a foreign student can enter on a study visa for university education and when studies are complete she or he may opt to stay in the
country. Or s/he can apply for asylum after completion of her or his course. As mentioned above, more than half of all migrants have entered the country of destination on short stay visas (i.e. tourist, temporary residence, business, and student) (Table 7.4). This may be another indicator of propensity to migrate illegally. The proof for this can be the fact that 10% of all migrants who overstayed their visas. Among the respondents of the Cologne qualitative research, about one third of those interviewed were visa overstays or illegal entrants.

Asylum seekers are difficult to categorise because of their temporary status between legality and illegality. They are often forced to leave their homes. However, because they often arrive without required documents for entry or visas, it is better to discuss them within clandestine strategies of migration. Asylum seekers’ choice of illegal entry is again a reaction to the increasing difficulties in admission. For instance, almost all asylum seekers interviewed in the field research were those who illegally entered Germany. Although, there has been quite a large intake of asylum seekers from Turkey during the last two decades of the 20th Century, most immigrants including asylum seekers who were included in the field research in Cologne were not involved in ethnic clashes although few of them indicated their families suffered from the raids of the Army and the PKK. They did not report ethnic discrimination as well. Most of them were individuals who benefited from the context which was characterised by the ethnic clashes between the PKK and the Turkish Army: A context considered as increasing their chances for entry to and settlement in Germany.

Stories of only three of the Turkish Kurdish immigrants interviewed in Germany were the escape stories of asylum seekers: Mrs. Kardelen, Mr. Murat Mete, and Mr. Eşref Öztürk (see Appendix 4.2). These three were distinguished from the others with regard to the decisive impact of ethnic conflict on their escape, since for the others socio-economic motives were dominant in their decision to migrate. Mrs. Kardelen left Turkey after the military intervention of 1980, and suffered from pressures on her Kurdish oriented political activities. She was involved with Kurdish communist factions and had been tortured several times. Although Mr. Murat Mete also escaped from the military government following the 1980 coup d’etat, he left the country because he was a member of an extreme left Turkish political party. Mr. Eşref Öztürk, on the other hand, had to leave the country as a result of an evening raid by the Turkish Army. He would either face torture or die if he stayed there because his brother was a guerrilla in the PKK. Other Turkish Kurdish asylum seekers and refugees were able to
stay in Turkey but preferred to go abroad. Obviously, escape was not the only option for them. For instance, Mr. Seyhan Bayrak (27) was a successful but false asylum applicant. He was granted refugee status as a result of 8 months efforts following a fake claim of being tortured in Turkey. He pretended that he was mentally unstable as a result of the torture he faced in Turkey. He had been provided with psychiatric treatment for eight months while he was granted indefinite leave to remain in fifteen days following the asylum application.

Mr. Seyhan Bayrak’s case was not the only example of false asylum applications filed in Germany. Within the very small sample (34 immigrants) of this qualitative research in Germany, six of those interviewed admitted that their asylum applications in Germany were fraudulent.

7.5. Concluding Remarks

Information and migration networks play an important role in the international migration of Turkish Kurds. These two elements of international migration are also decisive in developing migration strategies. However, regulations and other broader characteristics (e.g. international relations, regional wars and conflicts) influence migration strategies and indirectly the use of migration networks. As the cases discussed in this chapter show, migration networks are often used to secure access to the destination country and minimise the risks affiliated with migration. Transnational migration networks transmit information about admission rules and entry strategies to potential migrants and also help them through and after the journey. Such reliance on networks can also be considered as a response to the tightening admission policies in Western Europe, which caused a high propensity towards clandestine migration. Transnational networks both facilitate transnational relations between fellow ethnic people after the journey to a destination and also provide flexibility on destination choices.

Findings on the role of information prior to migration confirm previous research (e.g. Fawcett and Arnold 1987; Goodman 1981). For example, potential migrants are more interested in information on economic issues and welfare benefits such as unemployment benefits, child allowance or health care systems. In terms of information sources, relatives and friends are the sources most commonly referred to. In order to minimise the uncertainty about the destination, migrants attribute high credibility to
information from relatives and trusted friends rather than official sources or intermediary institutions (i.e. private agencies). Among different information topics, admission issues are the most known subjects. Possibly due to the difficulties of entry into European countries, Turkish Kurdish migrants are more interested in this area of information.

The role of networks is crucial in both legal and illegal migration. In illegal migration, the networks are more likely to be involved than in legal migration because they provide logistic support during and after the journey. The type of support is also slightly different in these two types of migration. In legal migration, the networks function as a source of information and as a source of marginal support (i.e. sending an invitation) but in illegal migration their functions vary from financing the journey to providing temporary accommodation after arrival. The nature of the network also influences the nature of migration.

In Turkish Kurdish migration, networks are often based on familial ties. In response to the ethnic conflict, these familial networks facilitate chain migration of family members in the long run. Gender difference in networks appears as men often have a larger network than women but a higher proportion of women have networks than men. This is basically because they often accompany or join their husbands or brothers.

Networks are also considered as risk minimising and in some cases as insurance against the worst possibility (e.g. bankruptcy). With the help of transnational migration networks, migrants may opt to move to another country from their initial destination. In so doing, they may cope with the difficulties of life (e.g. finding a job, housing, and refusal of asylum application or resident permit) in the first country of destination.

Clandestine ways are preferred to legal migration: As long as the expectations to migrate via legal procedures are weak, more Turkish Kurdish migrants incline to follow illegal strategies. They may also opt to enter the destination country legally at first and then look for the ways to stay longer. Therefore, tourist and other kinds of short stay visas are often used to enter the destination country with an intention to overstay. Thus, these short stay visas, categorically, have the same function as illegal entry and they are less risky. At least this way does not involve any risk of physical danger. Illegal strategies of migration are increasingly preferred possibly as a response to tightening migration rules in Europe.
As analysed in the previous chapter, the context of Kurdish ethnic conflict in Turkey also serves as an opportunity framework for Turkish Kurds. This is accompanied by a strong belief in the better success chances through clandestine migration among the members of this particular ethnic group. Thus a migration pressure is likely to remain or even to increase from the Kurdish population of Turkey towards Europe. These possibilities are elaborated in the following chapter.
Chapter VIII

Migrants’ Future and Future Migrants

8.1. Introduction

The migration patterns and processes of Turkish Kurds have been explored in previous chapters. The role of ethnic conflict as an opportunity framework and the facilitating role of migration networks have been discussed. Given the availability of similar migration networks (e.g. Boyd 1989), the continuation of the current state of ethnic relations in Turkey (Barkey and Fuller 1997) and, of course, if the present gap between welfare levels (e.g. Martin 1991) in Turkey and Europe maintains, it would not be wrong to expect further migration flows of Turkish Kurds into Europe. However, the migration decision is also influenced by individuals’ perceptions and intentions.

This chapter focuses on migration potentials for Turkish Kurds. The analysis is particularly focused on micro level indicators since the data provided by the TIMS and qualitative research do not support macro level analysis of future migrations. Therefore, the analysis here will remain limited to the perceptions, intentions, and investment patterns of Turkish Kurds. However, it must be acknowledged these are not totally irrelevant to macro level factors. For example, it can be expected that a future trend in increasing racism or xenophobia in Europe could be a factor deterring future migration to Europe while facilitating return migration. Migrants’ experiences abroad are important in deciding return migration as well as it may encourage future migration flows (Ammassari and Black 2001:22).111

110 "Lets go and come back / then might we be better off, lets go and return / I never be daunted to carrying stones, blending mud / and, anyway, you also have luxuriant hair." (Translation is mine).

111 In order to avoid confusion between sections written from the perspective of Turkey and sections written from the perspectives of Germany the reader should bear in mind the distinction in the use of “immigrant” and “migrant.” Throughout the chapter, “immigrant” is used to refer to Turkish Kurdish migrants interviewed in Cologne whereas “migrant” is used to indicate migrants who were interviewed in the TIMS. To underline the difference the TIMS and the Cologne study are also referred to in some places.
Nevertheless, with the current state of affairs, Turkish Kurdish immigrants’ future migration plans seem to be more connected to the changes in the course of the ethnic conflict in Turkey. Many immigrants in the qualitative research reported their intentions to return were conditional on the betterment of ethnic relations in Turkey. However, future migration potentials are not just return migration and migration from Turkey but also transnational movements of Turkish Kurds from their current destination places to other places, which may involve returning to Turkey as well, and it does not necessarily mean the closure of the migration cycle (King 2000).

Studying future migration potentials on the basis of immigrants’ own accounts and based on past trends is controversial because of the nature of the subject under investigation. Plans and intentions can be changed over time and can also be influenced by external events (e.g. an economic crisis in the countries involved in migration), so it may turn into a myth (e.g. Anwar 1979; AlRasheed 1994; Zetter 2000). Therefore, here the main task is to provide a snapshot of migration intentions and potentials and indicate the complicated nature of people’s migration considerations.

Migrants’ and non-migrants’ perceptions about various aspects of migration including life abroad, life in the sending places, cultural differences, socio-economic development are important for the interpretation of migration behaviour as they may affect migration intentions. Hence this chapter starts with an elaboration of perceptions about migration. The second section delineates migration prospects by questioning the intentions of individuals; whether non-migrants would like to move abroad, whether current migrants wish to move to another country or return to Turkey, or whether return migrants intend to move abroad again. The last part analyses the future plans of migrants by questioning the patterns of remittances and investments, which may reveal some patterns helpful to understand future migration trends. Analyses have followed a way in which the TIMS data and qualitative research data talk to each other and provide comparisons between migrants and non-migrants as well as between ethnic groups. It is also worthwhile to notice the contrast between the survey data and the qualitative data.

8.2. Perceptions and Migration Potentials

Perceptions about migration and migrants are based on migration experiences and information about migration. They may turn into aspirations and thus have an impact
Migrants’ future and future migrants on future migration trends. It may also lead to non-migration. Migrants’ own perceptions about their and other migrant’s experiences abroad are influential both on their future plans and also on that of potential migrants. Where potential migrants have positive impressions of migrants’ experiences, this can inspire potential migrants to migrate but if they have negative impressions, this may deter them from migrating. For potential migrants, what they perceive is more important than what migrants suggest or experience. However, referring to the role of networks as emphasised in the earlier chapters, what past and current migrants reported or advised is also an important factor to be counted. Impressions given by earlier migrants are also equally important as is revealed in the case of Mr. Sefer Demir interviewed in Cologne which was illustrated in the previous two chapters.

To understand the future migration trends within the context which has been discussed here, the analyses revolve around three areas of perception. These three areas have been selected because they relate to migration conceptualisations emphasising the role of socio-economic achievement (see Chapter 2). According to the TIMS data they were formulated as follows: a) respect, b) financial improvement, and c) employment. At the same time, the qualitative research findings are also discussed for comparison. The section concludes with the examination of possible advice to be given by migrants to those who may wish to migrate abroad. Respect is a difficult indicator to measure because many different aspects may be involved. This study utilises the perception variables of the TIMS data and compares them with immigrant accounts from the in-depth interviews.

8.2.1. Migration and perception

Migration influences the perceptions of people involved at the migration process. This includes actual migrants and non-migrants. During the process of migration, these perceptions may also change. Perceptions can also play a crucial role in migration decision-making. Although it is a quite complicated phenomenon to measure respect in relation to migration, some trends were found in this study. The researcher considered them significant for understanding future migration trends of Turkish Kurds. Two areas of concentration were marital relations and respect in the society according to the TIMS data. In a conflict situation where Turkish Kurds have been suppressed by the Turkish government. Turkish Kurds might have been humiliated and intimidated due to their
different ethnic origin. Hence, being respected somewhere (e.g. abroad) may become an important factor in deciding migration.

Table 8.1 presents the summary of answers to two perception questions from the TIMS individual data. Respondents were asked whether they agreed or not with statements about migration, migrants and migrants’ lives. It suggests Turkish Kurdish current migrants are more likely to think migrants are respected abroad (94%) than are non-migrants (71%). Among Turkish migrants the picture seems slightly different. Less than half (40%) of current migrants are less likely to think migrants are respected, whereas a clear majority of non-migrants think so (62%). At this point, the ethnic conflict seems to intervene and is explained on the basis of examples from the qualitative research later in this section. Turkish Kurds are concerned about the discrimination against them and the difference between Turkey and Germany and because they feel their ethno-political cause is heard and their Kurdishness is not discriminated against abroad, they are likely to feel respected abroad.

Table 8.1. Perceptions about migration, 1996 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Migrants are respected abroad</th>
<th>Current migrant</th>
<th>Return migrant</th>
<th>Non-migrant</th>
<th>Current migrant</th>
<th>Return migrant</th>
<th>Non-migrant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkish Kurdish Current migrant</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish Current migrant</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>62</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrants are more attractive for marriage than local people.</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish Kurdish Current migrant</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish Current migrant</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>62</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N\textsuperscript{113}</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>594</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>1744</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TIMS 1996 Individual data

However, for the Turks, the issue of respect might be related to something else; xenophobic views towards the Turks in Germany and related discrimination and their isolated lives could be the reason that they are more likely to think migrants are not

\textsuperscript{112} The TIMS individual questionnaire included tens of questions about the norms, values, and perceptions of respondents. Some of the topics covered were ideas about the economic situation in Turkey and future possibilities, employment, opportunities in both Turkey and destination countries, problems of immigrants' children in Turkey, gender relations and attitudes about decision making processes within the family. However most of these questions are not available in the TIMS data set possibly due to very high non-response rate to these questions. Therefore, only these available variables are used in the analysis.

\textsuperscript{113} The reader must be careful interpreting these cross tabulations on perceptions, intentions and potentials throughout the chapter because of a very high rate of missing cases especially among migrants. There were about 185 Turkish Kurdish migrant cases but 121 of whom were recorded as missing. This rate was about 35 percent among non-migrants. For the Turks, the missing rate was around 35 percent for both migrants and non-migrants. Missing cases for migrant cases are mostly related to proxy respondents' incapability of answering questions about perceptions of immigrants. (For the use of proxy respondents see Chapter 4 and TIMS 2000).
Migrants' future and future migrants

respected abroad. Turkish return migrants are also very likely to think migrants are respected (65%). Nevertheless, the difference between Turkish and Kurdish return migrants is statistically insignificant (Chi Square: 3.549, Sig: 0.47).\(^\text{114}\) This can also be interpreted as normal because early migrants were needed and welcomed in Germany when they arrived as guest workers. Nevertheless, the energy crisis-led recession in the global economy and excess supply in the labour market through the 1970s made Turkish guest workers unwanted. However, more than 70% of non-migrant Turkish Kurds still believe that migrants are respected abroad and this may trigger migration flows in the future.

Turkish Kurdish responses are often based on comparisons between Turkey and Germany. They are the oppressed ethnic minority within Turkey and do not feel respected there and so feel better in Germany. There are numerous stereotypes about the Kurds in Turkey. For example, the most common and known saying of the Turks about the Kurds is "dirty Kurds" along side many others including "kiro\(^\text{115}\)" and "lazy".

The issue of respect was also reflected in the qualitative research. Frequently, Turkish Kurdish immigrants interviewed in Cologne gave examples from their contacts with others. The emphasis was on the difference between the Turks and Germans. They reported that Germans understood the Kurdish cause easily but the Turks could not. It seems Turkish Kurdish immigrants have measured respect according to the level of understanding of the Kurdish cause. However, it was also affected by experiences of the past in Turkey. Three examples are presented below to describe these considerations:

Miss. Dilane (Appendix 4.2):

"I have grown up with Germans here; and with Turks. Very few of these German friends remained with me now... Identity is not important for friendship but understanding each other is important. I mean people become friends when they understand each other... It is possible to convince German Nazis even when you tell the truth about what happened to the Kurds in Turkey, but Turks do not understand this. I am always talking to them but they object to whatever I say. They even say to me ‘you are Turkish’. They don’t want to accept my Kurdishness."

\(^{114}\) The relationships mentioned throughout the chapter are statistically significant unless otherwise indicated.

\(^{115}\) "Kiro" is one of the most common sayings about the Kurds and it means uneducated, illiterate, uncivilized in Turkish although it means ‘boy’ in Kurdish.
Mrs. Şirin Ünsal (Appendix 4.2):

"My Turkish friends here were always joking about my Kurdishness and Alevism. They were saying that I could not be Alevi and Kurdish. I was swearing that I am Kurdish and Alevi. I was asking them that for being Kurdish and Alevi should we have a tail or horns? They did not understand anything and continued to tease me. In later years I stopped seeing them. Nowadays, most of my friends are Kurdish. My relations with Germans have always been nicer. May be it is due to the fact that we see Europeans differently. I mean they are modern, developed, educated. I feel myself closer to them rather than the Turks. But I found happiness with the Kurds, especially with Alevi Kurds."

Mrs. Şilan (Appendix 4.2):

"When we were children, Turks were making fun of our Turkish pronunciation...one day my mother, I and our next door neighbour were chatting in our garden in the village. My mother said that ‘let our son get married to your daughter’. The neighbour replied ‘I would give her to a dog but not to a Kurd’...I was seven years old at the time. When we went to the public tap to get drinking water, Uncle Mehmet [an old Turkish man from the village but not a blood relative] was saying, ‘the dog has a God but not the Kurd’."

Possibly these kind of attitudes that the Kurds faced while they were in Turkey, prior to migration, were the reason that most Kurds expect more respect abroad than they get in Turkey. However, the difference between German and Turkish people, observed by Turkish Kurdish immigrants in Cologne, in terms of their attitude towards the Kurdish cause is related to the context that has been characterised by an ethnic conflict between the Turks and the Kurds. Whilst it is a neutral issue of human rights for Germans, for the Turks, it is considered as an issue of a Kurdish threat to their national territorial and cultural unity.

Preferences in choosing a marriage partner also reflect perceptions about migration. Immigrants often share a preference for a marriage partner from the same region of origin (Lievens 1997a: 3). This pattern partly explains the tendency among Turkish Kurdish immigrants interviewed in Cologne preferring to marry their kind of people and often importing their partners from their hometowns. The majority of Turkish Kurds and Turks in Turkey consider migrants as better marriage partners than locals (Table 8.1). This is only challenged by Turkish Kurdish current migrants: only 38% of them are more likely to find immigrants more attractive than locals. Reasons for such attitudes are not possible to explain through the TIMS data. However some of the
immigrants interviewed in Cologne put forth some ethical issues as decisive in choosing a marriage partner. These are virginity and obedience; for men these are two crucial factors when choosing a marriage partner. They often prefer virgin and obedient women, who, they perceive, cannot be found in Europe (see Parla 2001; Cindoglu 1997). The Turkish Kurdish immigrant men often expressed their responses in the following words: “you cannot make a wife out of European woman... They are so ‘different’...”

Kurdish women interviewed in Cologne seem to be more liberated from or less concerned with ethnic preferences in marriage. They did not raise any concern about who they would marry or were married to except Islamic concerns. Islam does not allow or at least does not appreciate marriages of a Muslim woman to a non-Muslim man (Coleman 1994:113). Therefore, for example, Mrs. Şilan stated that she would not marry a German. However, as mentioned in earlier chapters, there was a difference between people from different denominations of Islam. Alevi women were not restricting themselves in the same way as Sunnis did. Mrs. Şirin (Appendix 4.2), for instance, had no reservations against marrying a German or a non-Muslim as she expressed; “the important thing is being human, being honest”.

Compared to women’s concerns about partner selection, Islamic men’s stories were slightly different. Islam does not restrict partner selection for males. The TIMS shows that migrants are less likely than non-migrants to choose a migrant as their partner. Those who gave in-depth interviews in Cologne also confirmed such preferences. Turkish Kurdish men were not willing to marry Turkish Kurdish immigrant women because they thought immigrant women were not “good”. The word “good” means a lot. They think Kurdish women abroad became “open” and not like those in rural Turkey. Most of them do not wear the veil anymore. Some of them work or study and so are in touch with their male counterparts. More importantly they think some of the Kurdish women abroad have lost their virginity before marriage. Obviously, such an approach is not generalisable to all the Kurds but at least contributes to the explanation of why Turkish Kurdish immigrants are less likely to consider their ethnic fellows abroad as their marriage partners. One possible implication of these perceptions is further export marriages: Men living abroad would bring women from their society of origin to avoid the ‘virginity’ problem whilst women would do the same to avoid the ‘religious’ problem.
According to the TIMS data, for a large majority of the population, migrants are perceived as attractive marriage partners while Kurdish current migrants thought the opposite as shown in Table 8.1 above. This pattern finds some explanation in the role of migration in improving living standards. Migrants are usually better off than their local non-migrant fellows. Besides, it is often assumed that migrants are better off as the destination countries are better off than Turkey. Thus, migrants become better marriage partners for non-migrants than locals. Hence, the explanation lies in perceptions about social economic aspects in relation to migration.

8.2.2. Migration and economic improvement

Economic improvement has been one of the most referred motivations for migration in the literature (see Chapter 2). The data used in this study enables an analysis of the migrants' and non-migrants' perceptions about migration. The analysis of the TIMS suggests that most people think moving abroad improves the financial situation (Figure 8.1). Although among non-migrant Turks, the rate goes down to less than 60%, those with previous migration experiences are very likely to be convinced that it does improve the financial situation. The vast majority of Turkish Kurds believe in the magic of migration to improve their financial situation. The probable role of such a conviction in future migration flows of Turkish Kurds, therefore, would not be an astonishing finding. A high proportion of non-migrants who think migration improves their lives may, on the other hand, indicate a strong migration intention among Turkish Kurds (Figure 8.1).

However, Figure 8.1 displays that the current migrant Kurds are less likely than their non-migrant and return migrant fellows to perceive migration as an improving factor for their quality of life although the belief in this direction is stronger among non-migrants and return migrants. The comparison is similar with the Turkish current migrants. One of the explanations for this feature can be found in the disappointment expressed by Kurdish migrants interviewed in Cologne, a few examples of which have already been given (see Chapter 6).
Those immigrants interviewed in Cologne also reported similar considerations. First of all, their most important motivation for migration was betterment of life and secondly, ethnic freedoms. This can be achieved by living in a more democratic environment, or by earning more, or having a job. However, several interviewees could not provide a single positive answer to this question because it was difficult to measure. Some people thought that Turkish Kurdish immigrants live in unpleasant conditions in Germany while indicating political and cultural freedoms and economic opportunities as advantageous gains of emigration from Turkey.

**Figure 8.2. Where is it easiest to find a job?**
Employment differentials are important factors in migration analyses. Interrelated as they are with the idea that migration improves the quality of life, employment opportunities can also influence international migration behaviour. TIMS respondents varied in their assumptions about whether it would be easier to get a job in Turkey or abroad (Figure 8.2). They were asked if finding a job is easier in Turkey or in Europe. A majority of Turkish Kurds believed that finding a job would be easier in a European country than Turkey. As they know by experience, more than 90% of Turkish Kurdish current migrants interviewed by the TIMS think it is easier to find a job in Europe than Turkey (Figure 8.2). The rate is quite high among return migrants as well. However for their fellow Turks in Turkey it does not seem convincing because only about half of them consider finding job in Europe is easier than Turkey. Only 20% of Turkish current migrants think job-hunting in Turkey would be easier than European countries, and none of the Turkish Kurds stand by this view (Figure 8.2).

Given the OECD and World Bank indicators of socio-economic development, these perceptions are not surprising (see Chapter 3 and 5). These respondents are well aware of high unemployment rates resulting in difficulty in finding jobs in Turkey and they assumed employment opportunities are better in Western Europe. The difference, on the other hand, between the migrant and non-migrant populations can be explained by experience. Migrants had work experiences in European countries (and probably in Turkey before migration); therefore they may compare the levels of difficulty and find it easier in Europe. Non-migrants are likely to agree with their migrant counterparts but obviously migrants are the most likely to think employment is easier in Western Europe than it is in Turkey. However, the picture drawn by those interviewed in Cologne seems slightly different.

Turkish Kurdish immigrants in Cologne were often happy with their economic situation in Germany which has been relatively better than their situation in Turkey prior to migration despite the fact that they frequently reported their dissatisfaction with their socio-economic conditions abroad. Male immigrants interviewed in the qualitative research frequently complained about the hardship of work compared to their own experiences in Turkey prior to migration. They admit there are more jobs in Germany but most of these jobs are not suitable for them. They mean these jobs are not accessible for them or they are not eligible for these positions. They are not happy with
the fact that they have to work with Turkish and Turkish Kurdish restaurant owners and retailers in Cologne. However, there are not other options because they often know very little German and the majority of them do not have the necessary skills to be employed elsewhere. Also in many cases, they are staying illegally in the country and therefore have to work in the informal economy. As a result, the major source of employment in Germany for these illegal immigrants is their fellow citizens from Turkey: Turkish or Kurdish small entrepreneurs.

Finding a job is a complicated matter. Although official statistics show that unemployment rates are higher in Turkey than Germany which may imply more employment opportunities in Germany compared to Turkey, finding suitable employment in Germany can still be difficult for Turkish Kurdish immigrants because of the language and immigration status issues discussed above. For example, Mr. Ali Naki (Appendix 4.2) moved to Germany after his boutique in Istanbul went bankrupt. Within a few weeks of arrival, he began to work in a doner-kebab shop as an illegal worker. He was paid less than the minimum wage in Germany: just 500 DM (£160) per month. He would never have worked in such a job in Turkey. Until his bankruptcy, he was earning relatively ‘good money’. He owned a small workshop producing clothes and underwear and a small high street store to sell both his own products and the products of other retailers. Clearly having a small business in Istanbul is not comparable with working illegally in a small doner-kebab shop in Cologne. However, it is important to understand immigrants’ comparative perceptions, which means they may prefer the latter to the former. This was Mr. Ali Naki’s consideration as well. He said he was considering migrating to Germany even if he had not gone bankrupt.

Mr. Haci Kilimci’s (Appendix 4.2) consideration was also similar. At the beginning of the Cologne fieldwork, he was working illegally in a Turkish restaurant in Cologne. He was paid 1000 DM per month, but had not received his salary for four months and the business had closed. He was not happy with his working hours because he had to work from nine in the morning until midnight seven days a week without any social security options. On the other hand, before his immigration, he was running a corner shop in Adana, Turkey’s fifth largest city. He sold everything to finance his immigration and exploited all of his networks to get a visa as a trade union representative. He was not suffering from any financial difficulty in Turkey: indeed, “I was living like a king there”. Evidently he was no longer a king in Cologne at the time of this research when he was unemployed and living in a ‘heim’.
Of course, the cases are not all pessimistic. Especially established immigrants who have been abroad for a longer period are quite satisfied with their financial situation abroad. Three guest workers, Mr. Hasan Üzmez, Mr. Selami Sevgi, and Mr. Hüseyin Aksu (Appendix 4.2), who arrived in Germany in 1970-71, were primary school graduates and in their early twenties when they migrated from Turkey to Germany. All of them were farmers working with their parents in their villages. Moving to Germany as guest workers was the first ever job they found\textsuperscript{116} and it was certainly advantageous because of the high income possibility allegedly attached to a job in Germany. They did not have to sell anything but labour for their migration and they earned \textit{real money}\textsuperscript{117} which was not available in their village life before migration. Previously, they received money only once a year when they sold their harvest.

Perceptions of non-migrants are also shaped by accounts of migration and life abroad given by migrants. In most of the discussions conducted with immigrants in Cologne, the immigrants themselves were undecided whether they would encourage anybody else (in Turkey) to migrate abroad. Therefore, it is worth examining these immigrants' considerations with regard to their advice for potential migrants although in calculating migration potential what is important is what the potential migrants think. Even if current immigrants are ambivalent or reluctant about encouraging others to migrate, if potential immigrants think migrants' lives are easier abroad, they will be more likely to migrate – and they can even form this impression in the absence of any information. The Turkish Kurdish immigrants interviewed in Cologne often did not like their living conditions but given the hardship of life in Turkey, they would still encourage others to move abroad.

As a result of their migration experiences and the perceptions developed through these experiences, some immigrants interviewed in Cologne reported they would still encourage non-migrants to migrate. Turkish Kurdish immigrants interviewed in Cologne often discussed migration as an almost compulsory strategic option in response to the ethnic conflict in Turkey. Those immigrants mostly spoke about the necessity of moving abroad to escape from the conflict. Some of them also claimed that parents forced their children, especially sons, to move abroad to avoid the risk of death

\textsuperscript{116} With the exception of Mr. Aksu who had worked in forestry prior to his migration.
\textsuperscript{117} Mr. Hasan Üzmez used the term “real money” in the interview. He wanted to underline the local economy and self-satisfactory agricultural household economy prior to migration, in Turkey, in which everything needed is produced by family members and only few manufactured items, fertilizers and gasoline are bought from the market using “real money”. 
and torture if they stayed in Turkey. According to this view, parents were also afraid their sons would join the PKK guerrilla forces (see Chapters 3 and 5). For example, Mr. Baran (Appendix 4.2) had not intended to move abroad prior to migration but his parents said “you should go abroad; you cannot stay here. If you stay you will end up at prison.” He said his family was afraid of his intentions: “because I am sure, if I stay there I would go to school and probably will be more involved in politics. Active politics I mean”. Active politics has a clear meaning for Mr. Baran: “going to the mountains” and joining the PKK.

However, on the other hand, most respondents interviewed in Cologne reported that their migration was not political but economic, and for them, economic criteria were decisive to encourage or deter others’ migration. Many immigrants complained about the conditions in which they lived in Germany and told a story of disappointment but at the same time they still considered migration to Germany as a better option than staying in Turkey. Mr. Sefer Demir clearly stated his main motivation for migration: “...but we did not have any reason to come here [Germany] other than our economic expectations. I mean there were no political reasons for me, for instance.” He also adds “but we are Kurdish”. Mr. Emrah Kuzucu (Appendix 4.2) also came for economic reasons: “everybody was coming here. So I did the same. It was entirely economic. I came here to work and earn money.” ‘But we are Kurdish’ here implies that they had at least the minimum ethno-political reason to move abroad declaring ‘being Kurdish in Turkey is not safe’.

The following section elaborates migration prospects in terms of return migration plans of current migrants, return migrants’ intentions to migrate again, and non-migrants’ intentions to move abroad.

8.3. Migration Prospects: intentions and potentials

Throughout the previous passages, perceptions about migration and its implications for future migrations were discussed. Findings suggest that more migration is likely. However, perceptions are not reliable measures to predict future migrations. Despite a huge migration potential (up to 50%) around the world, only a small fraction of people have actually migrated (see Faist 2000; Hammar 1995). This section deals with the migration intentions of migrants and non-migrants in order to reveal possible indicators.
of future migration. The potential for further Turkish Kurdish international migration is discussed on the basis of evidence from the TIMS data and the qualitative research.

Analysis of the TIMS data revealed quite a high rate of intended migration. Figure 8.3 displays the intentions of migrants and non-migrants. Part A of the figure details the intentions of current migrants where Turkish Kurdish and Turkish trends seem different. While 29% of Turkish migrants want to stay in their current country of destination, the corresponding figure for Turkish Kurdish migrants is 42%. At the same time, 31% of Turkish Kurds intended to return home whereas 43% of the Turks wished to do so.

**Figure 8.3. Migration intentions of migrants and non-migrants**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Turkish</th>
<th>Kurdish</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stay in CD</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return to SC</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To another country</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does not know</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Part B of Figure 8.3 presents the migration intentions of non- and return migrants and there it is shown that Kurdish non- and return migrants are more likely to intend moving abroad in the future than are Turkish non- and return migrants. In general, a higher proportion of return migrants than non-migrants intended to migrate abroad. About 60% of Turkish Kurdish returnees wanted to move abroad again compared to only 34% of Turkish return migrants. A similar contrast is available among non-migrants of both ethnic groups as well: whilst only 21% of Turkish non-migrants wanted to migrate, 41% of Turkish Kurdish non-migrants wish to move abroad.
These figures indicate a higher intention among Turkish Kurds to stay abroad or move abroad compared to their Turkish counterparts. It is probably due to the comparative socio-economic conditions of both ethnic groups (See Chapters 3 and 5). As Turkish Kurds in Turkey live in relatively deprived conditions compared to the Turks, they may want to leave these behind and search for a better environment abroad. The ongoing ethnic conflict in Turkey must also be a decisive factor in this tendency.

However, as mentioned at the beginning of this section, only a very small proportion of potential migrants are moving abroad (Faist 2000:1). This observation is applicable to return migration too. As we know from previous studies, there has never been an enormous return migration movement towards Turkey: only a small portion of Turkish immigrants has returned home (Gitmez 1984; Gitmez 1983; see also Anwar 1979). Therefore, the intention observed in the TIMS of around 40% of migrants who want to return to Turkey does not necessarily mean they would return to Turkey immediately or in the near future.

Figure 8.4 summarises the reasons given by current migrants to explain their desire to return to Turkey. Turkish Kurds’ wish to return is related to homesickness and because they believe they belong in Turkey, it is their home, according to the TIMS data. For
the Turks, a dislike of the country of destination, retirement, and low income are also among the reasons.\textsuperscript{118}

The qualitative research can provide a more detailed picture of return (or settlement) plans of Turkish Kurdish immigrants who live in Cologne. An underlined affiliation with a homeland was quite common among them (See Chapter 9). Whilst they were not happy with the current situation of the Kurdish populated areas in Turkey in regard to the ethnic conflict, most Turkish Kurds expressed a strong feeling of belonging to a Kurdish homeland. For example, Mr. Baran explicitly stated: "I do not belong here [Germany]". And he added, "even if it is not free we have a homeland at least". In another case, Mrs. Kardelen (Appendix 4.2) expressed similar feelings in a rather poetic way: "I am here physically but my heart is in there... the land there calls me back, but the comfortable bed here hurts me." Obviously such feelings do not indicate an immediate return home but at least they reflect a wish for return. At the same time, these expressions quoted from Mrs. Kardelen represent an implication of the environment of relative security discussed in Chapter 2.

Thereby, returning home is conditional for Turkish Kurdish immigrants who live in Cologne. It is conditional on the freedom of their homeland. As migration took place in the form of an escape, return becomes conditional and postponed to an indefinite time. For many of them, a return plan is implicitly there. For example Mrs. Zekiye Özcan (Appendix 4.2) said, "we came here for Apo\textsuperscript{119} otherwise we would not stay here even for one minute." Her expression implies both the political nature of their move and their intention for an immediate return whenever the conditions that brought them to Germany have disappeared. Similarly, Mr. Adem Seyda (Appendix 4.2) said, "If it was possible I would return home just now!" Mrs. Fatma Turk (Appendix 4.2) also argued: "they [the Turkish Army] have not left anything safe in our homeland; they destroyed everything, every single building. Where should I return now?" Again the emphasis is on that demand for a change in conditions. Only after the stabilisation of life in their homeland, can return migration be possible. At the same time, these narratives often ended with a sad statement about a ‘compulsory stay’ abroad: "I am very sad; I feel miserable because it is not possible to return to Turkey. My mother and brother are

\textsuperscript{118} Here it must be noted, in the TIMS sample there were only 24 respondents who wish to return; 10 of whom were Turkish Kurdish. Therefore these figures are just to give an idea about return plans of current migrants.

\textsuperscript{119} ‘Apo’ is nickname for Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK.
there. My father has died of cancer and I could not see him before his last breath.” (Mr. Ali Haydar, Appendix 4.2).

Return intentions similar to those quoted above were given by most of the immigrants interviewed in Cologne. However, these are also political expressions aimed at not only return migration intentions but also a political message saying that our homeland is not accessible for us now. Therefore these narratives can be called ‘asylum narratives’ which emphasise political aspects of their migration and the impossibility of return (at least for a while) to their home. However, due to the ethnic conflict situation in Turkey, all types of migrants share similar intentions about return migration. Thus, the asylum narrative is not limited to asylum migrants but others as well.

As a result, four basic approaches to return migration among Turkish Kurdish immigrants in Cologne are observed, but all four virtually mean they will not return home in a foreseeable future, since their return intentions are conditional upon “a suitable situation” in Turkey. These suitable conditions are not defined but often it means an end to the ethnic conflict in Turkey and better living standards in Turkey. The first tendency is to refrain from returning to Turkey or even to cease visiting Turkey for political reasons. These political causes are basically nationalistic (or pro-PKK in most cases) views revolving around the conflict between the Turkish State and the PKK in Kurdish speaking regions.

The second tendency is to refrain from returning to Turkey but to keep visiting for holidays. The immigrants adopting this strategy often do not like Turkey and the life there because of the vulnerable economy, and consecutive economic and political crises, lack of peace among people, etc. In brief, they do not consider Turkey as a safe place to live in.

The third tendency is a ‘wish to return’. This last group of immigrants want to return to Turkey in the last instance but they have often been comfortably settled in Germany. For example, their children live in Germany, are married, working and have no intention of returning to Turkey. Or in some cases, they have investments (i.e. houses, shops) in Germany. They have their friends and relatives in Germany. However, they are also investing in Turkey (e.g. they built or bought houses, villas, and/or offices in major Turkish cities) and they often visit Turkey for annual vacations.

There remains another subject area to be questioned in the consideration of migration potentials. Immigrants’ investment plans may be an important indicator of return plans.
as well. The next section examines the patterns of remittances sent back home and their uses in Turkey.

8.4. Investment Patterns of Immigrants

Migrants' investment patterns are important because they reflect their future settlement or return migration plans. Remittances have been discussed in the literature mostly in regard to their importance for migrant sending countries, especially in terms of their use in development, eliminating poverty, and reducing income inequalities (Stark et al. 1986; Stark 1991; Taylor 1998). However, apart from such influences on development, ties established through remittance flows mean active relations between immigrants and their home country. These relations may facilitate the inclusion of Turkey into their future plans.

Figure 8.5. Remittances received by the household in Turkey

![Remittances received by the household in Turkey](image)

*Source: TIMS 1996 household data*

As figure 8.5 shows, 39% of Turkish Kurdish migrant households in Turkey received remittances from household members who lived abroad. The corresponding figure for the Turks is 21%. Family members, especially spouses, children, and brothers and sisters, sent most remittances (Table 8.2). The lower rate of sending remittances is often related to the duration of stay abroad according to the international migration literature. Remittances from immigrants who have stayed abroad longer often tend to decrease for two basic reasons: close family members may join them and / or relations with other family members and relatives may weaken over time (Martin 1990; Taylor 1998). However, given the assumption that the TIMS sample included basically migrants who had migrated in between 1986 and 1996, then the reasons for the difference between Kurdish and Turkish migrants have to be found in elsewhere.
Table 8.2. Sources of remittances sent back to households in Turkey (%)\textsuperscript{120}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Who send remittances:</th>
<th>Turkish</th>
<th>Turkish Kurdish</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Migrant</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouse</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brother/sister</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>24.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relatives</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TIMS 1996 household data

The patterns of sending remittances can be related to the nature of relations between migrants and their relatives left behind, or it may also be related to economic conditions of the members of the household who stayed in Turkey. If sending remittances and investing at home means stronger ties with home, it is clear that a majority of migrants of both ethnicities are not likely to send remittances. However, given the possibility of transnational lives even if they do send remittances and invest in Turkey it does not necessarily indicate a tendency towards return. Migrants can continue their lives abroad and control their investments without actually returning home (See Ammassari and Black, 2001).

Figure 8.5 can be read differently as it may mean more Turkish Kurdish households seem reliant on remittances from abroad than the Turks. However, when the sources of remittances are examined there seems hardly any difference between Turkish and Kurdish households (Table 8.2). Both ethnic groups received remittances from their family members, and particularly from their spouses, brothers, sisters and children. The only divergent feature is the fact that Turkish Kurds, unlike Turks, also received remittances from friends. This can be related to stronger communal ties among Kurds than Turks. Patterns of the use of remittances elaborated below may cast some light on this issue (Table 8.4). Kurds received more remittances for community purposes than the Turks. These may have come not only from relatives, but also from friends.

Remittance sending spouses often means a divided family. This usually refers a husband working abroad while his dependent wife stays in Turkey. Children sending remittances, on the other hand, often means dependent parents left behind in Turkey.

\textsuperscript{120} Percentages in the table do not total 100 since some households received remittances from more than one source.
Apart from cash remittances, many migrant households also received goods from abroad. 11% of Turkish and 15% of Turkish Kurdish migrant households received goods from their members or relatives who live abroad. While these goods consisted of electronic devices, consumer goods, and clothes for the Turks, they were only clothes and jewellery for Turkish Kurds (Table 8.3).

Table 8.3. Household goods received from migrants (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Received goods from abroad</th>
<th>Turkish</th>
<th>Turkish Kurdish</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Received television and/or hi-fi</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Received other consumer goods</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Received clothes</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Received jewellery</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>402</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TIMS 1996 household data

Table 8.4. For what purpose most remittances were spent in Turkey (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Received remittances</th>
<th>Turkish</th>
<th>Turkish Kurdish</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To pay for daily household expenses (food, clothing, rent, etc.)</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To buy consumer goods (TV, radio, refrigerator, etc.)</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To buy land</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To buy fertilizer, seeds, food for animals, etc.</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To buy/build/renovate a house</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To pay for medical bills</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To repay other debts</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To finance the marriage of family members</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>402</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cash remittances are often used for paying daily household expenses including food, clothing, and rent. Most of the households who received money from abroad used it for their daily expenditures (70% of Turkish and 80% of Turkish Kurdish households who received remittances: Table 8.4). The rest of the money was used for paying medical
bills and financing the marriage of family members in Turkish Kurdish households. Again a very high rate of remittances used for daily expenses probably indicates struggling family economies in Turkey, which are dependent on the money sent from abroad. This may also mean a member or members of the family who live abroad are obliged to take care of the finances of their families left behind in Turkey.

There is a contrast between Turkish and Turkish Kurdish households with regard to remittances received for community purposes. As Table 8.4 above shows 17% of Turkish Kurdish households received such remittances as opposed to 11% of their Turkish counterparts however the difference is not statistically significant (Sig.: 0.096: Table 8.4). Most of these contributions were used for religious purposes including building or repairing mosques, maintaining religious ceremonies and festivities. Among Turkish Kurds, two thirds of all community purpose remittances were used for alms in Ramadan. This is important because it can be an indicator of community level dependency upon remittances received from abroad, since alms in Ramadan can be the only source of income for poor people in some sending areas.

Turkish Kurdish immigrants interviewed in Cologne highlighted the dependency of their households left behind in Turkey. They also reported the expectations of their families in Turkey although they did not mention much about community needs. These expectations are usually in two forms: a) cash and in kind remittances to contribute to the family’s economy and b) help for migration of other members of the family or friends.

Mr. Emrah Kuzucu, for example, is under pressure from his family who live in the village of Urfa, Southern Turkey. He was just 22 when he arrived in Germany in 1998 and the cost of 8000 DM (£2700) for his journey through the Balkans and Austria was paid for by his family:

"The 400 DM (£130) I receive from the [German] government is a very small amount. Those I left behind in the village expect money from me. They don’t know my situation here. I have to send money to them."

At the same time, he was dealing with the expectations of potential migrants in his village in Turkey.

"My friends [in Turkey] ask 'shall we come there'. I say 'no'. 'Don’t come'. I say 'you should acquire a profession first and then you can come here'. I am insisting that 'if you don’t have a profession, there is no job for you here'."
These expectations could be the results of reciprocity between the migrant and those of his or her family left behind. According to the qualitative research, migrants pay a high (higher in the case of clandestine migration) cost for their migration adventure, and the families left behind have often paid this cost collectively. Thus, in return, the family left behind expects some benefits from its investment.

Future plans of migrants can be discussed in relation to their direct investment patterns as well. According to the TIMS data, a very small portion of remittances go towards investments in Turkey (Table 8.4) but the qualitative interviews may shed further light on what immigrants do with their savings. Many of the immigrants interviewed in Cologne reported that they own some real estate or businesses in Turkey. Immigrants’ family members who lived in Turkey ran most of these businesses and properties.

Such investments may be considered indicators of return plans of immigrants but in reality this may not be the case. For example, Mr. Sefer Demir owns two apartments in his hometown, Elbistan, but the story is quite complicated:

“We are stuck here. We cannot move anywhere else; cannot go back to Turkey anymore. I am visiting Turkey from time to time but all our life is here now. You cannot leave everything and go. All my friends are here. Additionally, I don’t like Turkey that much. Everything is rubbish there. People are strange. But I have investments there for the future if we ever return. I bought two apartments for instance. But we bought our home here as well. In short, we don’t plan to return. And I am already a German citizen. My wife will also acquire citizenship soon. Our children are also German citizens. Why should we return to Turkey? We see my parents once a year... what else?”

The case of Mr. Sefer Demir underlines the difficulty of interpretation of investment patterns in relation to the return plans of immigrants. Nevertheless, the general tendency among Turkish Kurdish immigrants is not to return to Turkey even if they are not satisfied with what they have in Germany.

The evidence given by Mr. Sefer Demir’s quote above may relate to the transnationalism as well. As discussed in Chapter 2, transnationalism means migrants can pursue a life strategy which involves more than one country and they can travel between these different locations. In this regard, Mr. Sefer Demir’s investments in Turkey should be considered as economic investments at a transnational level rather than signs of a possible future return migration although it may help his return migration if he decides in the future.
8.5. Concluding Remarks

The EOI in Turkey seemed to be the major determinant of future migration trends. An environment of relative security in the destination country has been emphasised by migrants but they are still inclined to stay abroad as opposed to returning to Turkey. A common attitude of Turkish Kurdish immigrants towards Turkey is that they do not consider the country as a secure place and so they often look for chances in other countries in the case of dissatisfaction in the first country of destination. A similar hope for a better life abroad is common also among non-migrants in Turkey. Therefore, intentions for return migration are likely to be weaker than future migrations from Turkey.

Positive impressions about migration and migrants may facilitate the migration intentions of non-migrants. These can be categorised as material and non-material perceptions. Material perceptions (i.e. employment, improvement of living conditions) related to economic opportunities are known and influence both Turkish and Turkish Kurdish people similarly. But non-material perceptions (i.e. respect) influence the two ethnic groups differently: while Turkish Kurds wish to move abroad for more respect, the Turks are likely to complain about receiving less respect in the destination country. Therefore, the material EOI plays a role facilitating the migration of both ethnic groups whereas the non-material EOI rather mobilises the Kurds.

Due to the ongoing ethnic conflict, Turkish Kurdish migrants tend to advise their fellows who stayed in Turkey to move abroad whereas Turks are less likely to do so. The propensity to send remittances to their households in Turkey is higher among Turkish Kurdish immigrants than their Turkish fellows. Patterns of sending remittances may reflect a dependency among families left behind in Turkey. This argument is also supported by the fact that most remittances are used for daily household expenses in Turkey.

A considerable portion of Turkish Kurdish immigrants would like to return but this is conditional on improvements in political conditions and living standards in Turkey. However, reflecting such a (conditional) wish for return, many immigrants also invest in Turkey. In the country of destination, they buy property as they need but they also buy properties in Turkey for their possible return in an indefinite future. Especially in clandestine forms of migration, high migration costs may create reciprocal financial
relationships between the migrant and his/her family or relatives and friends. These relations, in turn, can create further pressures on the individual living abroad. The pressure can be in the forms of financial expectations or expectations of help for migration of others left behind.

In the last instance, migration is more likely for Kurds than for Turks and unless a solution is found for Turkey’s Kurdish question, any change in this should not be expected. For the same reason, the return migration intentions of Turkish Kurdish immigrants will also be shaped by the possibility of such a solution. Future migrations and migrants’ future in the case of Turkish Kurdish international migration is highly correlated to the ethnic conflict resulting in an EOI for Turkish Kurds. The immigrants’ return intentions were expressed in condition to the situation of ethnic affairs in Turkey, although many of them intend to return as reflected in their investment and remittance patterns.

The next chapter analyses the relationships between the expression of ethnicity and migration process in relation to the EOI. It explores the ways in which the expression of ethnicity is represented within migrants’ narratives. Ways in which the influence of migration been represented by these migrants are also discussed.
Chapter IX

Migration and the Expression of Ethnicity

9.1. Introduction

This study focuses on the relation between Turkish Kurdish international migration and the EOI characterised by an ongoing ethnic conflict. An analysis of the changes in the expression of ethnicity throughout the process of international migration may add to the explanation of the relation between international migration and ethnicity. Previous chapters explored the context for the expression of ethnicity among Turkish Kurdish migrants. This chapter elaborates immigrant stories collected through in-depth interviews to understand the expression of ethnicity through the experience of migration. This may help to understand the role of ethnicity or at least how people formulated their ethnicity in relation to their migration.

According to Barthes (1966) and Lyotard (1984) narratives exist in all cultures, histories, and all languages as a primary method of communication and the expression of experience. These expressions may change according to the context of narration, and therefore it is very likely that the same experience can be narrated in multiple forms emphasising different aspects (Jackson and Penrose 1993).

Individuals have different stories for different situations and often more than one for each experience unwittingly. Within discursive consciousness (Halfacree and Boyle 1993:336-338; Giddens 1984:xxiii), identity narratives are often used in multiple forms interchangeably (White 1995). As discussed in the last section of Chapter 2, narratives can shift within short time periods, even within a day. For example, an immigrant woman may enact a narrative of an asylum-seeker and stranger when she feels humiliated shopping with vouchers in the afternoon. However, in the evening, when

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121 "...and I am watching an 'Americanish' film in Kurdish". Yılmaz Erdoğan is a Turkish Kurdish poet. His emphasis in this poem is on the fact that no matter which language the film is in, he watches it in Kurdish. The word "'Americanish" is used to denote it is in American language.
speaking to her mother on the phone she tells a welfare narrative to convince her mother that she is living well abroad. Thus, the narratives of 34 Turkish Kurdish migrants living in Cologne, Germany reflect only those stories told to the author, a Turkish researcher from the United Kingdom at a particular moment in the summer of 1999. In this regard, it must be noted here that same experiences could be narrated totally different in another context and they are also affected by the agency, and the identity of the researcher (see Chapter 4).

During the course of the interviews, several aspects of ethnicity were explored in order to understand changes in the expression of ethnicity in response to migration and ethnic conflict. The researcher prefers to use “expression of ethnicity” as a working concept in preference to “expression of identity”, which is more complex as it intersects with other identities such as gender, age, and class (Horowitz 1985). A focus on “ethnic identity” is also not suitable for this study because it is constituted from a larger realm of texts ranging from ethnic practices, clothes and patterns of behaviour to belongings and self-ascriptions (Weber 1961, Barth 1969, Eriksen 1993). For these reasons, this study is limited to the analysis of the expressions of ethnicity in the personal narratives of Turkish Kurds who have migrated to Germany.

In the interviews, immigrants were asked to talk about their experiences of ethnic discrimination before departure and at their destination. Their ability to use Kurdish as their mother tongue was also investigated. The assumption here was that any change in the level of use of the mother language might be a signifier of a change in ethnic (or ethno-political) consciousness. The large community of Turkish Kurds living in a particular part of the city of Cologne allows them to live in a reasonably large Kurdish speaking community. Respondents’ perceptions about other Kurds and their feelings of affiliation with them were also researched in conjunction with their feelings about Kurdishness. As an immediate environment with considerable potential influence on ethnic identity, family life was also investigated. It was examined with regard to three aspects; change in the use of language at home; changes in the status of women; and marriage preferences. As a signifier of symbolic representation of Kurdishness, individuals’ experience of “Newroz”, a spring festival, was also investigated. Finally, the expression of ethnicity was researched in the narratives of ‘return’ and ‘homeland’ to understand possible changes in terms of the expression of ethnicity.

The following sections examine these aspects in relation to the themes, which are
drawn from in-depth interviews. The chapter starts with a broader aspect of Kurdish ethnicity: a contest in which Kurdish ethnicity is expressed as a challenge to the Turkish ‘other’. Linguistic freedoms the Kurds enjoyed abroad are examined in the second section. In the last three sections, the practices of the Newroz festival, changing social relations and expressions about the homeland and diaspora are analysed.

9.2. The Kurds and the others: ‘Us’ versus ‘Them’

Immigrants’ stories frequently drew upon comparisons between ‘the Kurdish’ and ‘the Turkish’. The Turkish ‘other’ was always there as a reference point while defining the Kurdish ‘self’. A Kurdish ethnicity is in part constructed around, and in opposition to Turkish ethnicity. The Turkish Kurdish case presents a number of similarities with their number one rival: the Turks. For instance, the PKK allegorically is an equivalent of the Mudafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti (a union of regional resistance committees) of the Turkish Independence War (1919-1922). Similarly, the role of Abdullah Öcalan (Apo), the original leader of the PKK has been likened to that of Mustafa Kemal, founder and the first president of the Turkish Republic. Because of his leadership, Mustafa Kemal assumed the surname “Atatürk” after the war. “Atatürk” literally means “the ancestor of Turks”. A Turkish journalist, Ahmet Altan (1995), was fined 5 billion Turkish Liras, and also fired from the daily, Milliyet, because he wrote an article entitled “Atakürt”. He urged readers to consider Apo as the leader of a Kurdish national liberation war, just as Atatürk was leader of the Turkish liberation war, and to call him as “Atakürt”, which means “the ancestor of Kurds”. There seems a tendency among Turkish Kurds abroad to prove that the Kurds have everything the Turks had. The respondents contested most on the length of time since their ancestors first settled down in Anatolia or their history on the grounds of possessing Anatolia as their homeland. For example, Mr. Zilan says,

“...We, the Kurds, lived in these lands [Anatolia] for more than three thousand years but every school book writes that the Turks came in just after 1071. Whose land is this now? Of course ours. We were here all the time. The Turks are nomads. They migrated always. Our ancestors taught them how to settle...”

Here he also places emphasis on a skill that made the Kurds superior to the Turks: the

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122 At the time, this amount was equivalent of approximately £50 000.
123 The battle of Malazgirt, which marks the first entry of the Turks in Anatolia.
Kurds had known how to settle, how to build towns and they had taught this to the Turks. However, another respondent, Mr. Adem Seyda gave an opposite example of this kind of superiority concern: “...Among our people, the Turks have been perceived as superior, intellectual. They were men of wisdom. They have given advice to us. They were important. Everybody respected them...” Here the Turkish ‘other’ becomes superior in regard to its merits. However, in the former, the time period referred to was the ancient times while the latter looks at the modern times. The following expression of Mr. Serbilind (born in Varto, 1960) also refers to that Kurdish superiority idea within a religious perspective:

“...Kurdish Islam is a model Islam... It is better than what the Turks practice. Kurdish Islam is the Islam of the oppressed people [...] Furthermore, Islam was historically born among us. The prophet Abraham had lived in Urfa [an old city in Southeast Anatolia]. Many other prophets had also lived in our region...”

As mentioned above, views pointing at the similarities between the Turks and the Kurds were also common among the respondents of this research. This, on the one hand, expresses itself as a contestation and on the other hand as a way of justification. It is perceived in a way that if the Turks had the right to be a nation, then, the Kurds have the same right too. Here, Mr. Serbilind gives an example of that kind of justification. He shows the irony of an official Turkish discourse to claim the Kurds’ right to self-determination:

“It is not understandable why the Turks are against our liberation war. During all that long primary and secondary education years, they have taught us that Atatürk’s war of independence inspired all other oppressed nations of the Third World. Why cannot we draw inspiration from him for our own independence?”

Probably as the Turks and the Kurds have been sharing the same geography for centuries, they developed similar organisation systems. Kurdish organisations have been similar to those of the Turks. With the rise of the Kurdish national movement under the leadership of the PKK, and especially with the expansion of its activities towards Western European immigrant communities, a series of Kurdish institutions have been founded. These may also be considered as the ‘ideological instruments’ of an embryonic nation-state (see Althusser 1989). For example, as an alternative to the Federation of Turkish Alevi Associations of Germany, in the early 1990s, the Federation of Kurdish Alevi Associations was set up. Similarly, the Kurdish satellite television, MED TV appeared as an alternative to TRT, Turkish state television with its
programs mirroring those of the TRT. One of my respondents, Mr. Murat Mete commented on MED TV while we were watching it together:

"Kurds copy the Turks. We imitate everything they do, because they are more developed than us. They have better technology. Kurds are at the beginning of everything." [Emphasis added]

In the interviews, many of my respondents reflected similar ideas about resemblances between Turkish and Kurdish institutions and the Kurds’ tendency to imitate the Turks. Turkish and Kurdish ethnicities seem contested in the minds of Kurdish immigrants. The reader should notice the underlined words and phrases in quotations throughout the section as they highlight different uses of the “we-they”, “us-them”, and “Turks-Kurds” dichotomies (Table 9.1). They are almost “evil” and “good” fighting each other. Turkish institutions, behaviour, politics, and anything affiliated with the Turks work as a reference point for the Kurds. Zivo, a refugee, compares the Turks and the Kurds in terms of their punishment behaviour:

"The most radical of the Kurds are PKK supporters. But I never heard of Kurds punishing somebody because of being Turkish. But Turks do that. They killed many Kurds without any reason. They tried to hurt me as well." [Emphasis added]

Table 9.1. Common signifiers of “we” and “they” among Turkish Kurds

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>We/us</th>
<th>They/them</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Kurds</td>
<td>• Turks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Kurds from same provinces</td>
<td>o Kurds from different provinces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Kurds from Turkey</td>
<td>o Kurds from Iraq, Iran, Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o All the Kurds</td>
<td>o Kurds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Turks</td>
<td>o Germans and others</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the other hand, another feature to be noticed here are some respondents’ approaches, attempting to distance themselves from Kurdishness. Few Turkish Kurdish interviewees seemed undecided about their identity: Kurdish, Turkish, we, they? For example, Mr. Haci Kilimci used “we” and “Kurds” interchangeably throughout the interview and he was annoyed whenever he said “we” referring to the Kurds, as he wanted to put a distance between him and the other Kurds. Another respondent, Mr. Seyhan Bayrak was also always saying “they” while he was talking about the Kurds. Such a dilemma leaves many Kurds in between two ethnicities: Kurdish and Turkish.
although some feel equally distant from each of these ethnicities. In the stories of immigrants, "Turkish" and "Kurdish" appear as two ends of the same continuum of ethnicity rather than two opposing ethnic groups.

Table 9.1 above displays the changes in the use of “we/us” throughout the interviews. The main we/they dichotomy appeared as Kurds versus Turks but in many cases, descriptions change. It was very common to consider “we” as the Kurds from the same province or all the Kurds from Turkey. A few respondents counted all Kurds including Iraqi, Iranian, and Syrian Kurds as included in ‘we’. However, in some cases, Turks were also considered as ‘we’. This was not necessarily only in situations describing Turks versus Germans. For instance, Mr. Ali Naki, an asylum seeker from a village in Adiyaman province, generally talked about Turks and Kurds without any distinction referring to both as “we, Turks...” Similarly, Mr. Hasan Kara, an asylum seeker born in the eastern town of Varto, disclosed in a conversation about coffeehouse attending behaviours:

“Our Turks are always like this. After work, all of us go to the coffee house or pub then sit there until midnight.”[Emphasis added]

He refers to the Kurds and himself by saying “our Turks”. Such expressions underline the fact that the distinction between Kurdishness and Turkishness is not clearly compartmentalised in the minds of many Turkish Kurdish immigrants.

Among the Kurds in Cologne, two groups of people are less favoured. The first are people from the town of Palu in Bingöl province who are reputed to be in the heroin trafficking business. The other group is from Pazarçık town in Kahramanmaraş province and they are alleged to be untrustworthy, lacking in moral values, and addicted to amusement places (i.e. casinos, night clubs). Mr. Zivo, born in Elazığ province, expresses his dislike of them:

“I prefer Turks rather than Palu people. Nothing happened there in Palu, but they are all here. They are in that heroin business. They say ‘a fistful of white makes a bus’...I don’t like Pazarçık people because of their cowardice. They are not the ones I can trust. They are everywhere... thousands of them. What I don’t like about them is that they spend all their time in coffee houses. But they are still our people. Many good people are also among them.”[Emphasis added]

124 This means you can buy a bus for the price of a fistful of heroin.
125 Pazarçık is a town of Kahramanmaraş province and has a long migration history and therefore there is a large immigrant population in Germany who came from this town.
However, another less clear distinction is also there: urban versus rural. Those who came from larger towns or cities have a tendency of seeing others as inferior. They try to put a distance between themselves and those from villages of Eastern Turkey. Mrs. Şirin Ünsal is originally from the town of Pazarçık but her family moved to the city of Gaziantep when she was a child. Therefore she prefers to say she is from Gaziantep. Gaziantep is the most urbanised industrial centre and metropolitan area in South East Turkey. She is very proud of being from this city and despises the other Kurds who came from villages or rural towns of the region. But it is expressed with sensitivity. She was sad about those who are ‘inferior’, ‘poor’, namely rural people:

"Kurds who came from big cities are better off and educated. But those who came from villages are in a very bad situation. There are women who don’t know how to get on the bus; don’t know how to open a door. What a pity. They are more backwards than the Turks." [Emphasis added]

Being ‘backward’ here refers to perceived inability to understand the Kurdish cause. Urban Kurds like Mrs. Ünsal consider their rural counterparts rude, uneducated, uncultured, and lazy. On the other hand, Kurds from villages and remote eastern towns accuse those from the cities of western Turkey of being degenerate, having lost their identity, and lacking in respect for the elderly. Due to this opposition, the line of demarcation between Turkishness and Kurdishness in the dichotomy of “we” and “they” as shown in Table 9.1 seems fuzzy in many cases. Such confusion is displayed in the use of language as well.

The Kurdish language is not a primary medium of communication among the Kurds, as it was not in Turkey prior to their migration. Turkish is still the most common language used by them in Germany. The next section discusses the linguistic paradox among Turkish Kurds. On the one hand, there are efforts and opportunities for the rebirth of a unified Kurdish language in the diaspora. On the other hand, due to practical reasons explained below, the language preference of Turkish Kurdish immigrants seems to be in favour of speaking Turkish rather than learning their own mother tongue.

9.3. Releasing the pressure: linguistic freedoms abroad

As language is a signifier of ethnicity (see chapter 2), an examination of the use of the mother language is useful. Whether there have been changes in frequency of use or whether the Kurds prefer to use Kurdish abroad more than they did in Turkey is the
question. Turkish Kurds may enjoy linguistic freedoms following their emigration to Europe, since they have been released from the legal restrictions on the use of Kurdish mother tongue experienced in the Turkish ‘nation state’.

However, two basic reasons make Turkish the most common language among the Kurds. First, most Kurds were not able to learn their language because it was banned until very recently. Second, due to the lack of a unified education in their mother tongue, radically different dialects exist among Kurdish people resulting in sometimes considerable difficulties of communication in Kurdish between people from different locations. Therefore, Kurdish has developed as a language, which has been in use among closed circles like small villages. Thus many different dialects appeared and blocked the language being the medium of communication among the Kurds. There has never been a formal education in Kurdish language in Turkey, which would improve its use as a common language based on unified rules. Thus written Kurdish remained underdeveloped. Moreover, Turkish became the most spoken language among Turkish Kurds as a result of the 1931 Law of Unified Education, introduced as a part of Kemalist reforms following the establishment of Republic of Turkey (see Krayenbroek and Allison 1996; also White 2000; and McDowall 1996).

With international migration, on the one hand, Kurds abroad had the opportunity to develop a unified language through language courses given by local authorities and associations and transnational media (Hassanpour 1996). On the other hand, a mix of languages (i.e. Kurdish, Turkish, and German) is in use among immigrants. Barış, the three-year-old son of Mr. Eşref Öztürk, one of my respondents, presents a good example of this, shouting to his mother “eis ham ker!”, “I eat ice cream”. “Eis” is ice cream in German, “ham” is “to eat” in Turkish and “ker” is “to do” in Kurdish. When his mother asks “Navetá çiya?” (“What is your name” in Kurdish) he responds “Ez Barışım”; I am Barış, which is again a mixture. In Kurdish he should say “Ez Barış” or in Turkish he could say “Barışım” but he mixes both. This is possibly because of the fact that the father and mother speak Kurdish with each other and with some relatives while speaking Turkish with some friends and neighbours. And the small boy gets some German when they go shopping, and when he is at the day care centre and at the

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126 Here it must be noted, according to the Copenhagen Criteria of the European Union enlargement, Turkish Government has recently introduced freedom in education in mother languages in August 2002 (Cumhuriyet, 15 August 2002).

127 Speaking the Kurdish language was banned after the 1925 Rebellion of Sheikh Said and only in 1991 was it legalised in Turkey (Hassanpour, 1996; McDowall, 1996).
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health centre.

Turkish replaced the mother language of Kurds. Muhsin Kızılkaya (2001), a Turkish Kurdish journalist and writer, says:

"Everybody who was exiled from her or his mother language to another language has the same problem; while living without noticing, suddenly s/he realises that these two languages were intertwined, and even the new language replaced the mother tongue."

Most of the respondents from the Turkish Kurdish immigrant community in Cologne also reported a similar experience: They were speaking Turkish rather than Kurdish because it was not possible to understand each other in Kurdish. They were reluctant to learn Kurdish as well. Since most Kurds speak Turkish, it was not worth making an effort to learn another language. This may also be partly due to a lack of opportunities to learn Kurdish. However, it was clear that they have many more formal opportunities (i.e. courses) to learn Kurdish in Germany than in Turkey because most Kurdish immigrant associations run language courses for adolescents and adults although only a few of them are regular. Mother language courses offered in primary schools also provide another opportunity for Kurdish children to learn their mother language in Germany.

These mother language courses may create a unified Kurdish language for future generations. Also with the help of the development of a Kurdish media abroad in recent decades and possibilities of publications in Kurdish in Turkey since 1991, when the Turkish coalition government lifted cultural and linguistic restrictions, the Kurdish language got another chance to be unified. However, currently, most Kurds seem not much attracted to their own language. For instance, MED-TV, a pro-PKK Kurdish satellite TV station, broadcasts in Kurdish and Turkish. However, it seems the viewers did not take MED-TV as a serious medium for learning Kurdish. Mr. Hasan Üzmez (born in Elbistan, 1948), speaks very little Kurdish and watches MED-TV regularly:

"It is good to have our own broadcast. I am always watching it. There are really good, educating programs."

When the researcher asked him whether he has been watching Kurdish or Turkish programs, he replied:

"To be honest, I was trying to watch when MED-TV when it was first launched.

128 For details of Kurdish dialects see Blau (1996) and McDowall (1996).
129 A detailed discussion of similar processes can be found in Anderson’s Imagined Communities (1983).
However, I couldn’t understand its language. I can understand general things they are saying but not the details. Since then I stopped watching Kurdish news. Now I wait for Turkish news and programs. It [MED-TV] also has programs in Turkish."

On another occasion, the researcher visited the Federation of Kurdistan Alevi Associations. There were preparations for a wedding ceremony. The researcher sat in the lounge with others and the TV was on. A few young Kurdish boys were discussing which channel to watch. Some wanted to leave MED-TV on; others wanted to watch Turkish channels. Eventually, they ended up with MED-TV after the intervention of an adult. He explained simply why they should have MED-TV on:

“It is our culture, our language; we must learn it”.

‘Impressed’ youngsters started to watch MED-TV’s quite simple and amateur-looking programs. When “the news hour” program began, the researcher asked for their help to understand what was on the news. They could not have a consensus among themselves and ended up with a discussion on who knows Kurdish and who does not. If one of them said something, another contradicted it: “no, it did not say that.” At the end, the researcher could not get the briefing he asked for. The Kurdish youngsters could not agree on the content of the news the MED-TV broadcasted. They had different interpretations of it although, from the pictures shown, it was probably news about the earthquake in Turkey (17 August 1999) and about aid campaigns. This also reflects the inconsistent nature of the Kurdish language, which struggles to be a common medium of communication against its different dialects.

The programs of MED-TV are aired in every dialect of Kurdish. Mr. Zilan says, “It is sometimes Kirmanc, sometimes Zazaki”. Therefore, it is technically almost impossible for any Kurd to watch MED-TV continuously. It is also not possible to anticipate which program will be in which dialect, especially when they involve guest speakers, who may speak different dialects although they have allocated some periods to particular dialects. These are, of course, understandable problems of a low budget TV station. but they are examples showing how difficult it can be for an ordinary Kurdish individual to survive on his or her Kurdish.

Turkish Kurdish immigrants were also critical of Med-TV. One of them claimed:

“They get news from the TRT (Turkish state broadcast). Other programs are also taken from somewhere else. Only the round table discussions are our production.”

In Germany, at least 7 major Turkish national channels are available either on satellite or on cable.
There is an obvious contest between Turkish and Kurdish languages. Kurdish youngsters are inclined towards using Turkish, as it is easier for them to understand than Kurdish, which has many dialects not allowing a commonly agreed medium of communication. The PKK authorities also appear to be in confusion deciding between Turkish and Kurdish languages. On the one hand, they have to communicate with people and on the other hand, they seem ambitious to create a unified Kurdish national identity. With Kurdish that is not easy, and possibly therefore the only Kurdish daily newspaper, Özgür Politika\textsuperscript{131} and the PKK's official monthly magazine, Serxwebun\textsuperscript{132} are in Turkish while their TV, MED-TV, is half Turkish.

Nevertheless, despite all this confusion, during the last decade Kurdish has become a spoken language in public areas abroad and in Turkey. In Turkey, in the remote villages of the East or in the isolated sub-urban neighbourhoods of the big cities like İstanbul and İzmir, the use of the Kurdish language was a private issue in the past. People spoke Kurdish in their homes and especially with their mothers since males and youngsters were often in education and therefore could speak Turkish, in many cases better than Kurdish. The painful experiences of learning Turkish in schools have been exemplified in Mr. Serbilind's case:

> "Then a primary school was opened in our village too. We did not know how they would assimilate us; whose school was that? At school we were beaten every morning just because we were speaking Kurdish [...] It starts at primary school. We learnt our Kurdishness as we were beaten, thus we learnt how to speak Turkish...brothers and sisters became each others enemy. Each kid was used against each other. They spied for their friends. Whoever spoke Kurdish after school was told to the teacher. At home, brothers were counting each others words said in Kurdish. Then they spied to the teacher. Hence every morning we were beaten at school because we spoke Kurdish at home."

An immigrant Kurdish playwright, Mr. Haydar Doğan who joined his parents in Germany in 1968 summarizes the situation as follows:

> "...Just when they moved to the big cities of Turkey's west and Western Europe, the Kurds realised that they are speaking different dialects which are not understandable for other Kurds coming from other parts of their homeland."

Mr. Zilan witnessed the changes in a suburb of İzmir, Turkey:

\textsuperscript{131} Although it is not officially admitted, this daily is highly linked with the PKK.

\textsuperscript{132} Only the title, Serxwebun, of this monthly is in Kurdish.
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“I was in İzmir between 1980 and 1998. When I was a small child nobody spoke Kurdish outside the home. Our neighbours were not so friendly but I have never seen any discrimination against us. With the rise of the PKK, Kurdish became an issue everywhere. When Turgut Özal [the then President] recognised the Kurdish reality in 1990, people began to speak Kurdish in local markets and coffee houses as well. When I left for Germany in 1998, it was like an official language in a Kurdish populated neighbourhood of İzmir where I spent my childhood.”

Another respondent, Mrs. Saliha Deniz, used the same phrase, ‘official language’, for the situation in Germany: “The official language is Kurdish in Nippes market. Kurds are shouting everywhere freely.” She stated that proudly but she was reluctant to learn Kurdish on the other hand. She says: “it is not reasonable to learn because very few people speak it and they also speak Turkish. Why should I bother? I’d rather learn German.”

Her case is an example of unsettled feelings associated with being Kurdish. She underlines that she was born and lived in İstanbul and learned very little about Kurdishness, since her family kept it secret until very recently due to security reasons. She never wished to be seen as Kurdish or to speak Kurdish, and it was a taboo to express Kurdishness outside the home when she was young. She was educated in Turkish and was proud of her good Turkish until the time she began working for HADEP (People’s Democracy Party), a pro-Kurdish party in Turkey. She feels distant from other Kurds:

“I knew I am Kurdish but it was different in Turkey. Here I never felt my self to be the same as them [Kurds]. They are different. I am trying to understand them...but they are totally different. I do not live like them. They live together all the time. They are still tribal. Women never go out. Stay at home; look after kids, cook, wash! ... not for me.”

On the other hand, this same person registered her one-year old boy’s nationality as “Kurdish” though her husband is Turkish. However, she might feel herself distanced from other Kurds because she spent most of her life in Istanbul, the largest city in Turkey. and cut off from the rest of the Kurds. The urban-rural difference may have played a role here. On the other hand, the majority of Kurdish immigrants originated from the rural towns and villages of Eastern Turkey. For the same reason possibly, the most important Kurdish festivity in Cologne during the period of the field research was “Vanîyê Gel” which translates as the Kurdish Village. It was an exhibition, like a festival, involving folk music and dance performances staged in a village scene (see
The use of Kurdish at home among household members seems unchanged after migration. Among 34 respondents, only two of them reported that they use Kurdish now more than they did before migration. Eight of them use the language less than before and the remaining 24 use Kurdish at the same level as they used in Turkey. Only five of them tried to learn or improve their Kurdish after arrival. Another five considered it as totally useless, preferring to use Turkish or German. It must be noted here that none of the respondents were using Kurdish as the only language and, almost nobody’s primary language was Turkish.

Although Turkish Kurdish immigrants did not (or could not) use it, the Kurdish language found a breath abroad. Many Kurdish texts have been published in Sweden, and also some of the most popular Kurdish singers including Şivan Perwer and Ciwan Haco have settled in, and released their music there. Kurdish researchers and writers such as İ. Serif Vanlı and Amir Hassanpour have found a base in Western Europe and North America. Ordinary people have also benefited from migration abroad which has brought linguistic freedoms such as speaking Kurdish (as much as they could), mother language courses for children, and a Kurdish Media. International migration has contributed to the realisation of the Kurdish language in the public domain by providing a secure environment for Kurds within the borders of Western European democracies. As underlined above, these freedoms have not been largely exploited by ordinary Kurdish people abroad for practical reasons: a) different dialects preventing Kurdish being a common medium of communication. Therefore any publication or broadcast in Kurdish was addressed to only small groups but not the whole community. b) Printed resources in Kurdish have very little chance because Kurdish has not been a written language, and for people who hardly understand it when spoken, there is no chance to read. c) Many Kurds do not wish to be affiliated with the PKK because they either disagree with what the PKK struggles for or they have an unexpressed wish to return to Turkey therefore any affiliation with nationalist pro-Kurdish activity may prevent their chances of doing so, as the Turkish official understanding tends to associate Kurdish with the PKK. For these reasons, Turkish Kurds abroad have either perceived learning and using Kurdish as difficult or found it not worthy or dangerous.

However given the stories of earlier immigrants who arrived before the 1980s, international migration itself is not the sole factor or not even the most important factor.
leading to the greater use of Kurdish and visibility of Kurdishness. Mr. Hasan Üzmez arrived in 1972 as a guest worker spending most of his time with Turks:

"When we first come here all my relations were with the Turks. Everybody was Turkish in the factory and in the neighbourhood. I didn’t know German, so I didn’t want to have German friends at that time too. Towards the end of the 1970s, the number of Kurds increased. But after 1980, the PKK appeared and divisions started and polarisation appeared in a few years. Thereby, I lost some of my Turkish friends. Since then I have spoken Kurdish, time to time, when I am with some Kurdish friends."

Mr. Selami Sevgi, a guest worker who migrated in 1970, reports a similar situation:

"Before the PKK, there was KOMKAR\textsuperscript{133}. We knew we are Kurdish but there was no separation. With the rise of the PKK in the 1980s, we separated from the Turks. Since then we have gone to our own [Kurdish] coffee houses not the Turks’ one. In the past, we were hiding our Kurdish and Alevi identity. Now being Kurdish is not secret, everybody lives it explicitly. It is something to be proud of."

The most significant factor explaining changes in the use of the Kurdish language seems to be the ethno-nationalist movement led by the PKK. Intensification of the armed conflict between the PKK and Turkish troops has had its effects in political and social spheres and has influenced people’s behaviour. Kurdish ethno-national rivalry turned into a broader project of revitalising Kurdish ethno-nationalism. Kurdish journals, newspapers, and books have spread all around Europe and Turkey along with the offices of the PKK and affiliated associations such as the Kurdish Workers Houses. Kurdish people began to express themselves in Kurdish instead of other languages wherever possible. Thus, the Kurdish language left the home and found a place in the public sphere. It became more visible in market places all around Turkey and Europe.

The use of Kurdish names also increased abroad. As a reaction to the official restrictions in Turkey, Kurdish people abroad gave Kurdish names to their children. It is a sign of using the freedom of giving Kurdish names. Some popular Kurdish names preferred by respondents for their children were Rojda, Zelal, Dilan, and Berfin along with some Turkish names with political connotations such as Barış (Peace in Turkish), Devrim (Revolution in Turkish), and Özgür (Free in Turkish). These are typical leftist Turkish names; generally the left-wing families give such names to their children.

\textsuperscript{133} KOMKAR is an umbrella organisation of the Socialist Party of Kurdistan (PSK) for the Kurdish associations in Germany. The PSK was the only Kurdish Party, which began activities in Germany from the early 1970s until the emergence of the PKK in 1978. Now KOMKAR and PSK have very little support among the Kurds abroad.
Another common feature is the use of Kurdish nicknames in private conversations, particularly among those who are more affiliated with the Kurdish political movement. For instance, some of my respondents were called Şilan, Zivo, Dilane, or Serbilind instead of their Turkish real names. However, they use names strategically. For example, they prefer to use their Turkish names when dealing with the Turks. Some of the Kurdish businessmen contacted during the fieldwork used Kurdish nicknames when they were with Kurdish friends but they were called by their official Turkish names in the interactions with other people. Thus, the private nature of using Kurdish still remains to a certain extent.

9.4. Reinventing Newroz

Newroz is an ancient spring celebration in Middle Eastern societies and among some Central Asian Turkic populations. However, due to the political context, it is now often a political manifestation celebrating Kurdish identity and culture among the Kurds. The music, speeches and dances at these parties frequently have a strong symbolic meaning for the participants. The banners displayed at Newroz celebrations have carried slogans such as ‘down with Turkish state terrorism’, ‘Turkish Army! Hands off Kurdistan’, ‘Long live free Kurdistan’, and ‘stop genocide in Kurdistan’. The struggle against the Turkish Government underlined the political meaning of Newroz and it became just another way of demonstrating support for the Kurdish cause during the last two decades of the Kurdish ethnic revival in Turkey.

Newroz is widely celebrated as a spring festival among other peoples of the Middle East, in the form of harvest festivals. However, within the context of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict, emphasis also shifted from the harvest and/or New Year festival to that of a conflict. According to the Kurdish Legend of Kawa, the Kurds under the leadership of a blacksmith Kawa marched against the cruel King Dohuk and freed all the Kurdish people. The Turkish version of the legend tells a story of exodus from Ergenekon, a mythical and mountainous plateau in Central Asia. It is about how the Turkish nation re-emerged following a

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134 Östen Wahlbeck, in his work on Kurdish refugee associations, finds this as illustrative of the political priorities of the associations. Since these political banners did not carry phrases such as ‘fight unemployment among refugees’ or ‘fight racism in the neighbourhood’ (1999:170).
135 Newroz has been celebrated as the beginning of the New Year among nations including Iran, Tadjikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Literally, the word ‘newroz’ means ‘new day’.
136 The spelling of the word also reflects a political viewpoint; Turkish official sources call it ‘Nevruz’ whereas Kurdish sources spell it ‘Newroz’.
period of devastation after a dramatic defeat putting almost an end to the Turkish ‘race’. Interestingly, their story is also related to a journey led by a blacksmith guided by a wolf. In this official version, Nevruz is the day when the Turks found strength and a way out of Ergenekon, and then expanded throughout the World (Hürriyet, 20 March 2001).  

Newroz became a political symbol during the peak years of the clashes between the PKK and the Turkish army. It seems that the PKK considered it to be an indicator of strength (White 2000). The significant moves of the PKK coincided with the times around Newroz, 21 of March. For instance, a general uprising (Serhildan in Kurdish) in South Eastern Turkey began in mid-March 1990 (Mackenzie 1990; Kohen 1990). Therefore, the operations of Turkish troops also came just before Newroz to stop the PKK’s possible manoeuvres. For instance, a few thousand pro-Kurdish activists were arrested in Turkey every year prior to Newroz throughout the intensive years of the conflict.

Mr. Murat Mete, from the province of Elazığ, does not like the way in which Newroz was celebrated though he did not remember any celebration when he was living in Turkey during the 1960s and 1970s:

*Actually, there was nothing like Newroz in Turkey. I visited some parties here. KOMKAR celebrations were more or less like a festival but PKK parties are too much politicised and also they have put Islamists on the forward benches. How come I can sit along side them? It is much more political now. It is not something cultural but political. In the Newroz celebrations, everybody expresses their political messages. The basic message is Kurdish identity, unity, and struggle.*

Immigrant Kurds put emphasis on the symbolic meaning of gatherings like Newroz, since the music and folkloric dance performances helped Kurds living abroad to feel some connection with their homeland. Miss Dilane, who was born in Diyarbakir, came to Cologne in 1979, pointed this out at the Kurdish Village Exhibition in Cologne:

*"The Kurdish community come together with their homeland when they come here and*

137 The Minister of Culture, İstemihan Talay also reiterates the idea that Turks brought Nevruz from Central Asia during the great migration of ancient times at his reception hosting school children from 15 Eastern and South Eastern provinces of Turkey (Hürriyet, “1 March 2001).  

138 The Kurdish journalist and writer Muhsin Kızılkaya (2001) has also referred to the importance of music for Kurdish people. He emphasises the role of Kurdish folk songs broadcasted by Iranian, Iraqi and Armenian radios when Kurdish was totally banned in Turkey (See also Hassanpour 1996:58).
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listen to Kurdish music and dance together. Living on the land doesn’t matter but living the culture does.”

Newroz and annual Kurdistan Festivals are important occasions during which Kurds from different countries meet and enjoy themselves. They are also emotional symbols of freedom. Until the 1990s, the Newroz celebration was officially banned in Turkey, since when the Turkish Government began official ‘Nevruz’ celebrations marking the day of the Turks’ ancient exodus from Ergenekon. A Turkish Kurdish woman describes her feelings at the 1999 Kurdistan Festival in Dortmund Stadium:

“I am here to meet fellows from our village. I am living in Vienna but they are here in Cologne. The last time I saw them was at Bochum [Kurdistan] Festival. Every year I try to attend to see our people.”

However, Newroz celebrations seem a novelty in the lives of most Turkish Kurds. Only a few of my respondents reported that they remembered Newroz from their own experiences prior to emigration from Turkey. Most of them learnt about Newroz in Germany and a few attended their first Newroz celebration in İzmir, İstanbul and Mersin after their initial moves out of the Kurdish populated provinces. Among the respondents, the earliest Newroz was attended in the late 1970s, roughly at the start of celebrations in Germany. Experiences in Turkey show that before the mid-1980s there were hardly any Newroz celebrations. Only two of my respondents reported that they had Newroz festivals, which were interrupted by the military police (Gendarmarie) towards the end of the 1970s. Mrs. Şilan (32), from the Northeast province of Kars, remembers celebrations in their village:

“We were lighting fires on the roofs of houses, visiting every neighbour. Nobody was bothered but some didn’t like it. They were Turks and we weren’t visiting them. There were huge bonfires when I was a small child. Then it was banned in 1978. Soldiers came to the village.”

Turkish Kurds know Newroz celebrations as New Year festivals from the stories told by their grandparents and parents when they were children, but due to the long lasting official repression in Turkey, most of them had never experienced it. Newroz is an outdoor festivity therefore the political nature of the ethnic conflict between the PKK and the Turkish Army intersected with its cultural meaning. Throughout the conflict years, street demonstrations became a measure of the public support of the PKK in eastern Turkey. The stronger the PKK the larger the demonstrations, so more crowded public Newroz celebrations took place. In turn, it meant more suppression by the
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Turkish police forces. The results of this particular challenge can be seen in the death toll of Newroz celebrations during the 1990s (see Mater 1999). Within this context, Newroz turned into a symbol of the ethnic conflict rather than being a part of the ethnic culture. As most respondents reported, it also became a political manifestation, although that situation annoys some Kurds as they wish to celebrate it as a cultural event rather than a political meeting.

Mrs. Zekiye Özcan (born in Şemdinli, 1954) summarises this change in the nature of Newroz with regard to her own experience in the town of Hakkari: "...first our youth burnt car wheels on the hills around the city, since then the soldiers bombarded those hills every Newroz..."

However, Newroz still stands as a signifier of the expression of Kurdish ethnicity. Turkish Kurds in Germany attend Newroz celebrations and declare the fact that they are Kurdish. Such an expression of ethnicity seems to have developed throughout the intensive clashes and their repercussions over the last two decades in Turkey and abroad. Therefore, international migration motivated by the ethnic conflict provided a space of security for Turkish Kurds to celebrate their New Year festival, which has turned into a day of ethnic resistance and a declaration of their ethno-cultural and political existence. Most respondents witnessed or attended their first Newroz after they moved abroad. Nevertheless, the date of the early celebrations weakens the significance of the role of international migration but increases the coordination with the struggle led by the PKK. Even among long-term immigrants, the celebration of Newroz really began after the onset of the armed conflict in the early 1980s.

9.5. Changing Social Relations

This section focuses on changing social relations in terms of decision-making processes in international migration and the gender relations within Turkish Kurdish households. It elaborates the way in which these relations have changed through migration. Some works from the literature on Kurdish social structures, namely Barth (1953), Yalçın-Heckman (1991), and Türkdoğan (1999), are used as a frame of reference to identify possible changes in Kurdish social relations.

In principle, international migration enables women to move further distances but these migration decisions are still limited by their husbands, fathers or uncles (see Chapter 2.
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also Hugo, 1998). For instance, none of the female respondents in this research had decided to migrate by themselves. Two of them were forced to migrate due to political conditions and were led by the decisions of their political organisations. Nine of them were partners and daughters who joined their husbands and parents. However, international migration influences the social relations and reshapes them within the context of immigrant life abroad. Some inevitable changes and shifts also take place. The following discussion follows the questions of how tribal relations were maintained after migration, how gender roles were reshuffled abroad, how marriage patterns were reshaped.

Tribal leaderships

Turkish Kurdish society in Turkey has been characterised by tribal and strong kinship ties (Yalçın-Heckmann 1991; Türkdoğan 1999). This research suggests that tribal ("aşiret" in Turkish and "eşiret" in Kurdish) relationships have been weakened through international migration. Individual migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers usually moved to the places where their relatives and friends and ethnic fellows live but they did not maintain the same tribal relationships in Germany. Some religious and familial patterns have remained. For instance, among Alevi Kurds, "Dede" is still an important figure attracting some respect. The weakening of tribal hierarchical relations can be explained by the geographical restrictions imposed by international migration. For example, once locally strong tribal leaders have lost their authority over their subjects who went thousands of miles away. Mrs. Saliha Deniz's uncle took over the post from his ancestors who had been "Dede" but he had almost no authority now:

"My uncle has lived here in Germany for more than twenty years. He became Dede years ago but it means nothing. People respect him but in the past it was different. Every week tens of people were visiting him. Now they only see him at wedding parties. That's all."

On the other hand, Alevi Dedes who stayed in Turkey are exceptions as they regularly visit their "cemaats" abroad and practice their religious duties. However, most Alevi Kurds are increasingly disillusioned with them. Since the post of Dede has become a lucrative investment, Dedes have been receiving gifts in the form of valuables and cash from their followers. Mrs. Hazal Dinler, born in Dersim in 1971, accuses them:

139 "Dede" is a religious leader with spiritual powers within the Alevi Islam religious system.
140 Cemaat means "community of men". It originates from the Arabic word "cem" which means "gathering". In religious terminology it is the community of believers. In relation to Dede, it means a group of people who follow the same Dede as their leader.
"They exploit people. [Speaks angrily] They do nothing...just come here to collect money, then go. In the past it was ok. They were serving the community, but now?! We heard many of them went back and bought apartments there. They are richer than us. I don’t give a Pfennig any more."

**Gender relations**

Migration has also changed family relations. With the exception of Alevis (White 2000), women’s status is still inferior to men within the family, although there have been some changes. For instance, they are still entirely bound to the decisions of their husbands or fathers and they do not generally participate in decision-making processes. Some interviews of this research were conducted at migrants’ homes, during which the wife did not say anything although there were some exceptions. Whenever a question was directed to women, they either said nothing and disappeared or replied, “I don’t know”, “My husband knows”. It was quite familiar to the researcher, because women’s responses were almost the same as those he observed during the fieldwork of the TIMS in Turkey in 1996. In Cologne, during the public meetings organised by the Kurds that the researcher attended, the behaviour was more or less the same. Many women that the researcher approached refused to talk about their migration experience, some of them just went away, and some others asked the researcher to talk to their husbands. Of course, here it must be noted that if the interviewer were a female, then the result could be different. However, it is not possible to speculate on this here, as this research did not attempt to approach Turkish Kurdish migrant women using female interviewers. Nevertheless, this study suggests as women have refrained to respond, that there is a continuation of male-female relationships after migration. Hence, women are still either reluctant or not allowed to get in touch with other men. For example, during a home visit in the field research, while interviewing Mr. Eşref Öztürk, Mrs. Öztürk did not join the talk even when her husband told her story. She was 19 years old and sitting next to her husband.

Women’s place in the home seems to be changing. For instance, wives now sit together in the same room as their husbands and other guests. Even so there still exists a hierarchy of speaking, which means the older people speak first and more than others but women also join the conversations. Nevertheless, in some cases, it was still not appropriate for women to be seen in public places and also to enter the rooms where men (husband, relatives and friends) sit, even in their own homes. For the very same reason, it was difficult to contact non-Alevi women in the fieldwork. Six of the women
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interviewed were Alevi Kurds and five others were Sunni Kurds. The researcher managed to interview three of them because they were young, had grown up in Germany, and so they were open-minded. The other two were quite old and because of their ages they were able (or allowed) to talk (to other men) in public. All of them I could only contact with strong references from some community leaders. Among Alevi women, contact was easier.

Yalçın-Heckmann (1991) described male dominancy in Kurdish households based on several examples from the Sisin tribe in the province of Hakkari in Turkey. There, household heads were identified as mostly males and very rarely as female. The public sphere, where these household heads act, is also described as “cemaat”, which is defined as “community of men” (Yalçın-Heckmann 1991:159). Fredrik Barth (1953:138-9) also describes women’s non-admittance in that public sphere among the Kurds in Turkey and Northern Iraq in a similar way.

Many Turkish Kurdish women abroad still spent most of their time at home like their counterparts who stayed in Eastern Turkey. Most Kurdish women rarely go out and almost never go alone. This was a frequently reported feature in the field research:

“Kurdish women are living here in very bad conditions. They are locked up at home. ...don't know about anything...don't know the city, don't know Germans. They even don’t go to the KIOSK to buy something and they don’t know where the nearest shopping centre is as well. The only thing they do is to stay at home, sewing and look after children, nothing else. They are never allowed to go for work outside the home too. The husband works, spends most of his time in the coffeehouse but the woman doesn’t go to neighbours even. This is what they earned from moving here” [Mrs. Saliha Deniz]

Mrs. Ayşe Güzel’s experience is another example of this situation. She is not Alevi therefore has no privileged freedoms such as equality with men which is common among the Alevis. She has never met any Germans except the immigration officers in Frankfurt at the time of her first arrival, although she had been in Germany for three years at the time of the field research. Mrs. Güzel summarizes her life confined to her home in Cologne. She only went out a few times when her children were ill except their rare visits to the relatives living in another part of the city:

“I am at home. I look after my two children... cooking... sewing. I watch the TV. We have satellite. All Turkish TVs are available. Sometimes, İbo [husband] takes me to my uncles’ home, here in Porz. Last month, I was there for two days. Once, we went for a picnic.”
Another example of changing gender perceptions was given by Mr. Sefer Demir originally from the Central Anatolian town of Elbistan. He came to Germany on a contract marriage as mentioned earlier. This experience of fake marriage compounded with the urban lifestyle eventually changed his perceptions towards women:

"Since I moved here, the thing changed most has been my understanding of relations between men and women. My first marriage was very effective in this change. A woman lives free and alone despite the fact that she is your wife! Officially she was your wife but in reality she was nothing. However, I was still considering her as my wife. No matter fake or not."

Mr. Demir divorced his contract wife after he was granted a residence permit at the end of five years, and then he married a Turkish Kurdish woman from Kahramanmaraş province, where he was also from. Here the influence of a migration experience on a shift in understanding relations with women is seen. A Kurdish man began to understand the independent existence of a woman. She was his wife but he had no control over her. She was totally free of his control. This was shocking for Mr. Demir at the beginning but later he admitted that was the reality.

**Marriage and ethnic barriers**

Another social institution affected by migration is marriage, which is the arena where ethnicity was expressed explicitly. Fredrik Barth (1953:29-34) and Yağan-Heckmann (1991:211-252) gave a detailed account of marriages among local Kurdish communities in Turkey and Iraq. The details of the ceremonies and procedures of marriages were not within the scope of this research. However, Turkish Kurds' perceptions about inter-ethnic marriages were significant as they reflect an expression of ethnicity.

Kurdish society largely relies on endogamous marital tradition. Studies by the scholars mentioned above in Hakkari, Turkey and in Northern Iraq found that most marriages were among cousins and relatives (Barth 1953; Yağan-Heckmann 1991). Chapter 5 and 6 have already discussed that exogamic marriages are very rare among Turkish Kurds (7%), although it is much more than the Turks (1%) (Source: TDHS 1993). It does not seem quite an appropriate behaviour to marry a Kurd among the Turks.

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141 He made a contract marriage to migrate to Germany (See Appendix 4.2).
142 One of the significant factors directing people to intra-family marriages is bride-money, which is very high. However, in cousin marriages either very little bride-money is paid or not paid at all. The percentage of cousin marriages is estimated to constitute between 50% and 60% of all marriages (Barth 1953:33; Yağan-Heckmann 1991:227).
Similarly, marriages between Alevi and Sunni people are also uncommon. Here in this research, 24 married Kurds were interviewed. Four of them were married to a Turkish person and other two were Alevi Kurds but their spouses were Sunni. All of these people married abroad. Among those who married in Turkey, there was no inter-ethnic marriage.

Mrs. Saliha Deniz, a Kurdish Alevi from İstanbul, is married to a Turkish Sunni man. She comfortably says: “such things are not a problem in our family. My mother asked me once; ‘is he nice to you?’ That was all they said”. However, things are not always so easy. Young people still seek their parents’ consent while going into such a challenging marital union. Mr. Mehmet Yılmaz is an Alevi Kurd from K.Maraş and he is married to a Sunni Kurd from Erzurum. He was confronted by his family’s refusal to accept the marriage:

“Alevis don’t like Sunnis. After I met with my wife, she said that she needed to consult her parents. So did I. I called Turkey to ask for my parents’ consent. My father didn’t say anything but my mum said ‘these Hanifi’s[143] murder us.’ She was too old. My wife’s parents were also silent. Her elder brother had said her ‘if you marry him you would design your own coffin.’ Her elder sister also had been scared of me as I am from Kahramanmaraş. She thought I was Sunni and that I would force my wife to wear a ‘kara çarşaf’[144]. Later she relaxed when she heard that I am Alevi. Eventually they gave consent and we got married.”

Mr. Mehmet Yılmaz experienced a problem of acceptance during his marriage in Germany. Nevertheless, more complicated obstacles may arise in the marriage process in the case of partners from different ethnicities. Mrs. Gülcan Güleyüz tells about her elder brothers’ marriage in Turkey:

“Our neighbours in the village had six daughters. Once my mum was talking to Keziban yenge[145]. She said give one of your daughters to our son. Actually, it was an informal offer. I translated it to Keziban yenge and she replied: ‘we would rather give the daughter to a dog but not to a Kurd’. Her husband was also against such marriage. A week after, her daughter got her personal things and came to our home. The day after she arrived, gendarmeries [military police patrolling in rural areas] came to our home. The girl’s father called them. They couldn’t find anything because my elder brother and

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[143] Hanifi is a branch of Sunni Islam.
[144] “Kara Çarşaf” is a black cloth veil from head to heel. It is common for a woman to wear these among the very conservative, fundamental Islamist communities of the Central Anatolian provinces of Turkey. In Iran it is called ‘Chador’.
[145] Turkish word ‘yenge’ means the wife of one’s brother or uncle but is also used to call any woman.
the girl had run away at midnight by expecting such a thing. Soldiers searched everywhere throwing everything all over the place. The girl’s parents never talked to her and us again."

There are still some strong ethno-cultural problems experienced in inter-ethnic marriages both in Turkey and in Germany. Despite such ethnic obstacles, a considerable number of Turkish Kurds still seem to go for interethnic marriages in Germany. With few exceptions, all the respondents in this research also reported that they were not in favour of such restrictions on marriage. Mixed marriages might also find some explanation in the small scale of the marriage market in Germany. However, there is an obvious trend of relaxing the ethnic barriers on marital practices among Turkish Kurds abroad. The most obvious factor in such a shift is the migration from Turkey to Germany in the particular case of Turkish Kurds.

Although revolutionary transformations have not happened in the social relations among Turkish Kurds after migration, there is some evidence of changes in gender relations, relations between generations, and marriage perceptions and patterns. Migration positively changed women’s status too. Women gained a more visible place in public while young individuals also gained more power in decision-making processes, which had been monopolised by the elderly in the Kurdish homeland. It is certain that Kurds abroad are not in tribe-like social relations as in the Middle East (see McDowall 1996; van Bruinessen 1992a). However, the Turkish Kurdish immigrants have strong emotional affiliations with their homeland, which include its tribe-like affiliations. The following section elaborates the ways in which the Kurds describe their homeland, perceive their diasporic life abroad, prospects and plans for return.

9.6. The Homeland, Diaspora, and Return

Being far away from the homeland does not necessarily mean living in a diaspora. Although there is no agreement on definitions and uses of the term (Tölölyan 2000: 23), diaspora can simply be defined as a social form created as a result of migration from a homeland to at least two other countries and maintaining a collective identity (Safran 1991: 83; Vertovec 1997: 278). Another aspect underlined in the literature is ‘diaspora consciousness’ which is more relevant to our discussion of the expression of ethnicity here. Clifford (1994: 311) describes it as “a lived tension, the experiences of separation and entanglement, of living here and remembering or desiring another
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place”. Kurdish experiences investigated in this study suggest a diasporic profile for the Turkish Kurdish immigrant community in Cologne. When their experiences are reconsidered according to Clifford’s above-mentioned definition, they need to be called a diaspora. They have lived the ethnic tension in Turkey; the tension of being ruled by the Turks, the tension of denial of their ethnic existence. They experienced separation; separation from their ethnic identity and homeland. Finally, they have lived in Germany while desiring a free Kurdish homeland.

Defining a Kurdish homeland is a complicated issue. As mentioned in Chapter 3, Kurdish people live in a territory that is divided by the borders of four nation-states, namely Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. The population is not exclusively Kurdish in the areas referred to as the Kurdish region, but “the dominant culture is Kurdish” (McDowall 1989:5). However, the respondents in this research have narrated the homeland in a loose sense although there is a general tendency to describe it as the Eastern and South Eastern provinces of Turkey. It is loose because they sometimes refer to all Turkey whereas sometimes they also describe the homeland with a regional emphasis. For instance Mr. Murat Mete, who departed from Çeşme, a big port of İzmir, to the Greek island, Chios, remembers the day he left:

“I left Çeşme by boat and soon arrived at Chios... The lights of Çeşme [a coastal town of İzmir] were seen from the Port of Chios. I was upset. The Greek police took me on board a large ferry to Athens. I stayed on the deck for a long while, looking at the lights of Çeşme. Turkey was slowly disappearing from sight. This is the last thing you see. the lights of Turkey. That makes you upset. I knew that I would not return for a long while - 13 years now. I was trying to convince myself that I will return soon. It was just consolation. Disappearance of your country... It was like you hear a friend or relative died and you couldn’t do anything. I was about to cry.” [Emphasis added]

Mr. Murat Mete was a political refugee who left Turkey in 1985. Although he was born in Elazığ, an eastern province, he spent his last few years before departure in İzmir. In his whole interview he referred to Turkey as a whole and he never mentioned returning to his birthplace or to other cities of Eastern Turkey. Although he has no plans for return, he says if it happens he would return to İzmir or İstanbul but nowhere else in Turkey. He described his departure from Turkey, the homeland left behind, in a gloomy way: “disappearance of your country”.

Many other interviewees use the phrase “bizim ora” to refer to their homeland. ‘Bizim ora’ means hometown and its surroundings. Another word often used to express
homesickness is “memleket”. It means homeland, but it is also frequently used to refer to a limited landscape, such as a province. Sometimes, it refers to the whole of Turkey, but generally it means the hometown only. The word “ülke” means country, which is especially used by PKK sympathisers and Kurdish nationalists. It specifically refers to ‘Turkish Kurdistan’. “Vatan” (or Anavatan) means ‘homeland’ or ‘motherland’. As opposed to ‘ülke’, ‘vatan’ refers to the whole of Turkey and has right-wing connotations. Some of my interviewees frequently used ‘Turkish Kurdistan’ and ‘Kurdistan’, too. Table 9.2 displays a range of uses of some Turkish words referring to homeland in relation to their ideological and ethnic stances. It must be noted here that politically oriented expressions such as ‘Kurdistan’ or ‘Turkish Kurdistan’ are used by asylum seekers and refugees rather than the others. The possible underlying factor here seems their concerns about their legal status in Turkey. Kurdish asylum seekers and refugees have no immediate possibility of return because of the risk of being arrested on return to Turkey. Therefore, they are free to take any stance against Turkey. However, the others (e.g. guest workers and family reunionists) might be refraining to use this sharp terminology about the homeland, because they do not oppose the Turkish State and wish to return either temporarily or permanently.

Table 9.2. Turkish words referring to homeland and their affiliations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Homeland:</th>
<th>Türkiye</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vatan / Anavatan</strong></td>
<td>(Neutral)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Refers to the whole of Turkey; right wing; rarely used by the Kurds to refer to Kurdistan)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ora / bizim oralar</strong></td>
<td>Ülkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(A geographical description, used by everybody)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Memleket</strong></td>
<td>(Political word specifically used to call a claimed territory, Turkish Kurdistan; used by Kurdish nationalists)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Used to refer hometowns and surrounding areas; generally used by everybody; rarely refers to Turkey as a whole)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kurdistan</strong></td>
<td>(North or Turkish)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Used by Kurdish nationalists)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Political life for many Turkish Kurds in Germany does not involve German politics (except where this is explicitly on asylum and migration issues) but is focussed on the politics of their homeland, the Kurdish populated areas of Southeast and East Turkey. Thus, Kurdish politics in Germany is mostly focused on improvements of minority rights in Turkey. It is also concerned about the conditions of Kurds living in other European countries or potential migrants willing to enter Western European countries.
European immigration issues are central because everybody the researcher met during the field research had at least one relative who came to Europe and stayed by illegal means.

Their political interest in Turkey is quite understandable as there has been an ongoing war causing more than 30,000 deaths over the last two decades. Millions of people had to leave their homes and farms due to clashes between the PKK and the Turkish troops. They were worried about their properties lost in the war. Moreover, most of them have relatives not only in the Kurdish provinces of the East but all around Turkey. With few exceptions, every Turkish Kurdish immigrant home has a satellite dish not only for Kurdish Med-TV but first of all for Turkish TV. By and large, they ignore German media and issues, except in the case of heightened debates on immigration and asylum-seeking. They have also moved their own political agenda to Germany and are very busy with it. For instance, during the summer of 1999, the most important issue in Germany was the elections. However, the researcher did not hear anything about it from the Turkish Kurdish immigrants although there were also Kurdish candidates for local Foreigner Assemblies. More importantly, one of the candidates for City mayor of Cologne was a Turkish Kurdish teacher. Şengül Şenol, born in Dersim, was the candidate of Party of Democratic Socialism (See Appendix 9.1).

A victim discourse is another indication of a diaspora consciousness. According to Gilroy (1997), diaspora people has utilised some 'biblical narratives'. The most common ones were 'chosen people' and 'the victim' (Gilroy 1997:319). Turkish Kurds are always complaining about the evil spirited alliances built against the Kurdish nation. Miss Sevgi Dönmez, born in Varto, is a refugee and works as a waitress in a restaurant:

"In every country we are oppressed. All betrayals have been against us."

She accuses the German police because of working together with Turkish racists:

"In Turkey, the police and grey wolves are together; here the German police cooperate with them. I have never seen a grey wolf beaten or arrested by German police."

Such feelings of being betrayed are quite easy to come across in the Turkish Kurdish

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146 Grey wolf is the nickname for extreme Turkish nationalists, or racists and fascists in Turkey. Although the term is highly linked to the supporters of the Nationalist Action Party (MHP, currently is in the coalition government of Mr. Bülent Ecevit) it is a common term for all Turkish extreme nationalists.
case. It sounds tragic because the Kurds were among the founding fathers of the Republic of Turkey as they fought for independence in 1920s, too (Mango 1999; Pettifer 1998). Again it is to be said here, the impression the researcher got during the interviews indicates that a ‘Kurdish victim’ or ‘betrayal’ concept is also defined in relation to the Turkish other. Although Iraq (i.e. Halapca) and Iran (i.e. the 1979 Islamic Revolution) have killed thousands of Kurds, the Turkish ‘betrayal’ seems as the most important in the imagination of Turkish Kurds in Cologne.

Kurdish ethnicity expresses itself both as an emerging identity and as an unfinished national identity project. One can identify clues about this in the narratives of Turkish Kurdish immigrants. As mentioned earlier, laypersons have difficulty distinguishing themselves from the Turks. As some Turkish Kurds define themselves Kurdish and Turkish, they may have a dual identity. However, interchangeable referrals to Turkish or Kurdish observed through the interviews may also reflect confusion among the Kurds about their ethnic identity. This can be because of the lack of a commonly defined Kurdish ethnic identity. In most cases, Kurdishness is only defined with an opposition to the Turkish other. The Kurdish victim discourse, which was, earlier, identified as a signifier of diaspora consciousness, is also seen in the narratives of some intellectual Turkish Kurds. The stories of those Turkish Kurds who have been community leaders explicitly reflect an effort to create a Kurdish whole on the basis of cultural, linguistic and political unity. It is also accompanied by the idea of preserving the Kurdish culture. The interview with Mr. Serbilind was a long account of what has to be done to save Kurdish youth, Kurdish culture, Kurdish morality, and eventually Kurdish Islam:

"Kurdish Islam is a model Islam. Allah is with the one who is oppressed, who is in need. Kurdish Islam is the Islam of oppressed people. It is a denied, repressed, and hurt nations’ religion... We, the Kurds, should teach this to everybody. All Kurds must agree on this... Our language is being standardised... we teach our youth how to behave well. Women and men are equal according to the Koran... They are learning the true Islam not the traditional one... We have to protect and maintain our culture. We should protect our children from coffeehouses, from discos, from drugs, heroin. All of them are wasting their time in coffee houses and pubs. We are asking some simple questions: Where is your family, your wife? Do you talk to her every day? No! This is against Kurdish culture. We are inviting them into cultural centres... to talk, to produce something. There is a lot to do. The political part of the project is complete but the morality part is still empty. I have visited heims (asylum detention centres). We are losing the Kurdish youth."
Parents are sending their children from Turkey to save them from possible torture and death. But what is waiting for them here? They are directly going into heroin business. They came from the nature. They are surprised with the metropolis.

He was one of the prominent members of the HÎK (KurdistanIslamic Movement), who came to Germany as a university student twenty years ago and settled down in Cologne after completion of the course. Therefore, the Islamic motives dominate here. However, a relative environment of insecurity is also identifiable in the ideas of both Mr. Serbilind above and Mrs. Ünsal below. Mrs. Şirin Ünsal in the FEK (Kurdistan Alevi Federation) is also referring to some plans about the Kurdish youth though her project is dominated by Muslim-Alevi motives:

“We advise our people not to hide their Alevi and Kurdish identity. In the past, everybody was in "takiyeyen". They were pretending to be Turks and Sunnis. Alevi Kurds have discovered their own identities after thirty years here. Other Kurds came very late, anyway. Before 1985, there was no Kurdish immigrant." [Emphasises added]

The underlined sentence displays another sort of ethnic division among the Kurds. Here in Mrs. Ünsal’s words, non-Alevi Kurds first become 'other Kurds' then nothing in her consecutive sentence: “Before 1985, there was no Kurdish immigrant.” She implies that the Kurds have been liberated after 1985 and since then they have been declaring their identity. In the way she continues to talk about their duties to build up and preserve Kurdish culture:

“The Kurds were not well off in Turkey but ashamed of their Kurdishness and Alevism. This has changed, although the living standards and cultural level is very low among the Kurds here too. Especially the status of women is very sad. They are in a vegetal life here. Their lives are limited to their small homes. They don’t live anything for themselves. The Kurds who came from the villages are in very poor conditions. They don’t know German. They don’t know how to live in the city. But the Kurds generally learn German easier. […] than the Turks, of course- i.e.] We must live together with Germans but we must preserve our own values, moralities, and culture. There are few [Kurdish] people who tried to be German. They lose all their Kurdish values. This is too sad.” [Emphasises added]

Turkish Kurdish immigrants have stopped pretending to be Turks as Mrs. Ünsal described. Before the rise of the ethnic rivalry in Turkey, the Kurds avoided outward

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147 The word “takiyeyen” means a strategy of pretending. Here it refers to Alevi-Muslims who pretend to be Sunni-Muslims to hide their religious identity.
identification as Kurds. Despite the confusion around self-ascription of Kurdishness as is mentioned earlier, they now are openly Kurds and largely not pretending to be something else and not feeling ashamed of their ethnicity. However, reference points are understandably always Turkey and the past life in Turkey, which makes it a relational identity.

This Turkey-oriented life, however, often does not involve a return plan to the homeland. Most Turkish Kurds in Germany, especially those who came earlier, have given up ideas of return, mostly because their lives and their children are firmly settled in German society. Mr. Selami Sevgi is a guest worker who arrived in 1970. His elder daughter is a lawyer in another German city and two sons have their own restaurant business in Frankfurt. All three of them were born in Germany and are German citizens. The more he settled down in Germany, the more the interval between visits to Turkey increased:

"In the past, I counted the days to go back to Turkey every year. We spent all our holidays there. Then my children grew up and set up their businesses here. Most of my relatives also moved here. Now there seems no reason to go to Turkey so frequently. The last time I went was five years ago... This house is my own. I have two shops as well. Now, I am retired. I walk through the parks with my grandchildren. I play dominoes in a coffee house at all other times."

However this settled profile does not exclude him having some investments in Turkey as well, but these are rather part of the transnational life (or investments) of the family:

"Yes, we have some properties in Turkey. In İstanbul, I have five flats; my elder son is taking care of them. He goes to İstanbul every year. We also have a cottage near Ayvalık."

Although, Mr. Sevgi's story had a happy-ending, one of his peers, Mr. Hüseyin Aksu who came to work in the Ford factories in 1970, tells a story of his exhausted hope to return:

"Germany! Germany!... we came and are still here...I visit Turkey every year. Missing only one year during the last thirty years, I go to Elazığ, my hometown, every year. I brought my wife here in 1975. I saw the conditions here in Germany. It was not good for a woman and sent her back. I came here to work for a few years and save money to buy a tractor and a house. But I am trapped here. We will die like that."

148 Ayvalık is a holiday resort town in the Aegean Coast of Turkey.
Plans for settling in Germany are not so strong among the immigrants who came later although the desire for getting German citizenship is enormous, especially among asylum seekers and refugees, for predictable reasons. They speak more about their wishes to be back home and the impossibility of return due to the current conflict between the PKK and the Turkish army or better to say environment of insecurity as defined in earlier chapters (See Chapter 2 and 5). For example, Mr. Hüseyin Kalkan, an asylum seeker who arrived in 1991 and says that “I would immediately return if it was possible”. Another asylum seeker arrived in 1993; Mrs. Hazal Dinler is very dissatisfied with the life in Germany. She translates her wish of return into a political message:

“We, all of us, all the Kurds, want to go back our homes but our land has been occupied.”

However, these expressions can be just a political rhetoric, which rather wants to emphasise the ethnic question in Turkey. On the other hand, feeling of being stuck is also very common. Mr. Sefer Demir has been in Germany for ten years and was granted German citizenship five years ago with the help of his first-marriage. He does not want to return but he is cautious too:

“We are stuck here, can’t move anymore. I visit my relatives in Turkey once in two-three years but all our plans are in here now. It is not possible to leave them and go away. All my friends are in here. On the other hand, I don’t like Turkey too much. People are strange there. But of course I am investing there as well. What if we would go back one day? Who knows? I bought two [multi-storey] apartments there in my hometown. But here also we have a house of our own. In short, there is no return plan for us. And also I became German citizen. My wife will also be; my son is also a German citizen. Why should we return? We already visit my parents once a year in Turkey.”

Return is not only a matter of being settled down in Germany or the impossibility of going back home due to political reasons. There are also cases related to individual success (or non success) stories. Many of the Turkish Kurds in Cologne reported the involvement of youngsters in drug dealing as a result of their desperate unemployment. Migrants’ responsibilities for families left behind in Turkey can be a reason for trying illegal ways of earning money. Many of them have families in Turkey and these families expect them to send money back home. The migrants, in this regard, are obliged to be successful.

Mr. Hacı Kilimci, 40 years old, came to join his wife in Germany in 1997 and then she
divorced him. He has lived illegally, and applied for asylum but he was not expecting his application to be accepted:

"I had a shop in Turkey. Everything was better than here. Look I am living in a dormitory and I am in need of that poor DM 390 asylum salary to live on. I am sure they will not accept my asylum application. I explained my asylum need on the basis of Alevism. I had nothing to do with the Kurdish conflict... I cannot return to Turkey. Not because of ethnic problems, but I cannot. Since I cannot look at nobody’s face there. I will be ashamed of my failure here. I couldn’t earn money. I lost my wife. How can I go back and look at their faces? They all are going to blame on me. I will feel the shame. Only the shame, if I go back. I don’t want to go back."

Mr. Kilimci’s only hope is his 10 year old son. The boy lives with his mother in Germany and access would require his father to stay in Germany. Hence, if the boy wants his father’s company then there will be no problem of residence permit for Mr. Kilimci. Until then, he must stay in Germany, whether legally or illegally.

9.7. Conclusions

"Kürtler 1990’dan sonra Kürt oldu"149

Mr. Zivo’s statement above underlines a fact which is frequently expressed by the Kurds in Germany. The analysis of these interviews suggests that Turkish Kurdish immigrants in Germany today manifest their ethnic identity more frequently and loudly than they did in the past. Two factors seem significant in that change: One is the ethno-nationalist revival of Kurds in Turkey and its repercussions all around the world (especially world of Kurds). The second is the increase in the numbers of the Kurds in Germany by international migration. Hence, Mr. Zivo rephrases what Mrs. Şirin Ünsal said earlier: "the Kurds became Kurdish after 1990”. The use of Kurdish and the expression of Kurdish ethnic identity outwardly appear as important indicators of such process of being Kurdish in these cases observed in Cologne. According to immigrants’ experiences recorded in the Cologne study, there is a clear connection between international migration and the expression of ethnicity and hence with the ethnic conflict, since this expression of ethnicity is often enveloped in a broader ethno-political conflict discourse.

Turkish Kurds either moved abroad due to the ethnic conflict to express themselves

149 “Kurds became Kurds after 1990.”
freely or they utilised the ethnic conflict context as an opportunity framework to realise their individual migration projects. However, the fact is that through migration they arrived in an environment enabling them to express their ethnicity freely. This is clear in their considerations presented throughout this chapter. Nevertheless, the main marker of these improvements in the expression of Kurdish ethnicity appears to be the ethno-nationalist revival led by the PKK since the mid-1980s. International migration seems a key component of the whole picture, which enables the expression of ethnicity that has been triggered by the ethnic conflict. The ethnic conflict had facilitated migration but was not the sole reason. Migration itself has also been a deliberate goal for many Turkish Kurds so it was not a side effect of the ethnic conflict.

Throughout the interviews, a disagreement on the definition of Kurdishness became apparent among Turkish Kurdish migrants. In other words, it can be said that Turkish Kurds expressed their ethnicity in a relational format, often based on comparisons with their Turkish counterparts but not as an entity on its own. At the same time, Kurdishness and Turkishness were intertwined in most cases. A similar mix-up was seen in their understanding of ‘homeland’. Turkey and Kurdistan were often used interchangeably, as in the case of Turkishness and Kurdishness. They did not describe a certain territory as their homeland; and their return plans, if there were any, were usually not directed to a Kurdish homeland but to Turkey. This can be related to the fact that these were the migrants who used the EOI as an opportunity framework.

Turkish Kurds abroad seem attracted to their own political institutions (e.g. Kurdish organisations, Annual Kurdistan Festivals, Med-TV) and the activities of these institutions. For example, the attendance was around 100,000 at the 1999 Kurdistan Festival. Meanwhile, some traditional social institutions, which were effective in the Kurdish populated areas of Turkey, seem to have changed and some have lost their powers. For example, changes in gender relations were evident in terms of the status of women and in men’s perceptions about women and marriage. Similarly, tribal and religious frames of relations have been weakened with the separating effect of international migration, which made it practically impossible for tribal and religious leaders to impose power over the Kurds far away.

In the narratives of Kurdish immigrants, there is a certain rise of ethnic consciousness, and increasing confidence in declaring their Kurdishness, but the emphasis placed gives credit to the development of Kurdish nationalism and the PKK and the upsurge in
clashes since the early 1980s. The effects of international migration seem marginal in
this regard, and migration appears only as a space of enactment, which means some of
the Kurds have found expressing their Kurdish identity outwardly easier after
migration. However, politically, the Kurdish cause gained respect among Western
populations only with the help of demonstrations and informal diplomacy of immigrant
populations in the European capitals (e.g. White, 2000; van Bruinessen 1998). Thus,
the expression of ethnicity has been affected by the combined impact of both the ethnic
conflict in Turkey and international migration. These two factors have mutually
supported each other. While ethnic conflict served as a push factor for international
migration, international migration brought freedoms for Kurdish ethnic groups abroad
which in turn facilitated their ethno-national revival.

Finally, there is a strong relationship between international migration, ethnic conflict
and the expression of ethnicity. On the one hand, Kurdish immigrants experienced a
progressive change in their ethnic practices through migration. Moving from Turkey to
Germany represented a move from oppression to freedom for the Kurds. However,
individual experiences observed in this research do not reflect a total shift in this
direction. Since many Kurds were not involved in Kurdish language and cultural
practices when they were in Turkey and they continued their indifferent attitudes
abroad. Therefore, it is hard to put forth that Kurds have been practising their ethnic
cultures more after migration. On the other hand, behind all such moves towards more
explicit expression of Kurdishness, there lays the momentum generated by the ethno-
national struggle led by the PKK.
Chapter X

Summary and Conclusion

"It requires a very unusual mind to undertake the analysis of the obvious" (A. N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, 1925)

10.1. Introduction

"Just as weather moves from areas of high pressure to low, so too transnational migration flows from areas of high political, social or economic insecurity to what migrants tend to perceive as areas of lower insecurity" (Heisler and Layton-Henry, 1993: 148). The migration movement of Turkish Kurds has also followed this very pathway from an environment of insecurity to an environment of relative security. The aim of this thesis has been to describe and explain the international migration of Turkish Kurds from Turkey to Cologne, Germany from a variety of perspectives and within its broader context of ethnic conflict involving socio-economic and political structures. A comparative perspective has also been adopted to distinguish Turkish Kurdish migration patterns within the broader (and well-studied) Turkish migratory regime. For this purpose, survey data has been analysed comparing Turkish Kurds with their Turkish fellow citizens.

This chapter discusses the various aspects of the research. The next section presents a summary of the main findings, drawing together the results from the different levels of investigation. The third section focuses on the substantial implications of this study while the last section suggests avenues for future research.

10.2. A summary of the main findings

In agreement with the quote at the very beginning of section 10.1 of this chapter, Turkish Kurdish international migration has been a movement from an area characterised by a high level of socio-economic and political insecurity which was embodied in the EOI to an area of lower insecurity. The armed ethnic conflict between the Turkish army and the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) in Turkey and discrimination against the Kurds led them to flee abroad. This armed conflict was an outcome of a long lasting ethnic tension caused by an ethnocentric government in Turkey.
Therefore, one of this study’s major findings is that Turkish Kurdish international migration to Germany was strongly interrelated with the ethnic conflict. This ethnic conflict because of an ongoing ethnic tension turned into an armed conflict in the 1980s and 1990s. The EOI, this study has shown, is also facilitated by this ethnic conflict and acted as a combined set of push factors for international migration of Turkish Kurds. At the same time, as comparisons between Turkish and Turkish Kurdish populations presented in chapters 5 to 8 proved, the EOI is ethnically selective and seems to target the Kurds but not the Turks.

This study defined the EOI as a combination of factors influencing international migration. It involves socio-economic differentials, the immediate political environment, and demographic features. The socio-economic EOI is influential at three levels: differences between Turkey and destination countries, regional differences and differences between the experiences of Kurdish and Turkish populations.

The political EOI as described in Chapter 5 is particularly relevant for the Kurdish population. It is fortified with a discriminating political atmosphere and a legal framework. It includes de facto institutional discrimination in terms of obstructions during election campaigns and discretionary raids into Kurdish organisations’ buildings. Again related to the legal framework and the authoritative nature of politics in Turkey, military involvement is very high and reinforces the pressure on the Kurdish population.

The socio-demographic environment is related to the deprivation of the Kurdish population due to the unavailability of adequate health and education facilities and inaccessibility of them as displayed in the analysis of TDHS data. Larger and crowded households, thus, are exposed to further deprivation in terms of the limited resources available to them. This in turn can cause demographic pressure for international migration.

The second major finding is an unexpected role of the EOI. Given the difficulties and day-to-day tightening restrictions in entry into the industrialised and rich countries of the West, the EOI also serves as an opportunity framework for those who already had a potential migration project. Despite being a minority among all migrants, many Turkish Kurds moved to Germany during the heightened years of the conflict as they thought their admittance chances were high. This brought large flows of asylum seekers into Europe. Obviously, given the overarching pressure of the EOI on the Kurdish
population in Turkey it is easy to find reasons to flee the country. However, for some Kurds who were aware of the difficulties of admission and who had the intention and resources to migrate, the EOI acted as an opportunity framework enabling them to migrate. Here the emphasis is not on the ‘fraudulent asylum migration’ but the role of the EOI as a facilitator. The question raised here should be the definition of asylum migration which is discussed in the next section.

Within this context characterised by strong push factors at home and tightening immigration controls in Europe, the Turkish Kurdish migratory regime, in recent decades, has developed into an irregular migration channel dominated by asylum migration and illegal migration instead of legal migration.

Besides the two major findings mentioned above, the overall patterns of Turkish Kurdish international migration to Germany found in this study could be summarised as follows:

- As mentioned above, the international migration of Turkish Kurds is often due to the EOI as defined in Chapter 2 and described in Chapter 5. The EOI in the Turkish Kurdish case is ethnically determined; therefore, their migratory movement also reflects the ethnicity factor. Comparisons between Kurdish and other ethnic groups in Turkey indicated that Turkish Kurds have followed a different migratory regime despite some similarities found between Turkish and Kurdish migration patterns. The similarities can be attributed to structural factors, for example members of both ethnic groups are citizens of the same nation state therefore they are subjected to the same sort of regulations imposed by that country of origin and by the international relations of that particular country, especially with the receiving countries. However, the differences can be credited to the ethnic conflict and the context of an EOI. The motive for migration for the Kurds often seemed to be to “escape” [from troubles] rather than to “improve” [living conditions]. In other words, it has been migration from an environment of insecurity to an environment of (relative) security as discussed in Chapter 6.

- The fear of persecution expressed as a reason for migration in the Cologne study also explains the importance of asylum and clandestine migration. Motivations for migration are often represented as part of a broader story for Turkish Kurds in Cologne. Economic, family or study reasons are often
enveloped in the context of the ethnic conflict. However, within this contextualisation, economic motivations have been the leading factor for a vast majority of male migrants, while female movement has been dominated by family migrations accompanying or joining their husbands or marrying somebody abroad.

- Although the analysis of the TIMS data did not provide evidence for people escaping from persecution due to their ethnicity, the Cologne interviews included several accounts of people who had experienced persecution. At the same time, the EOI described in Chapter 5 together with the context defined in Chapter 3 alone presents strong evidence supporting the hypothesis that the emigration of Turkish Kurds has been largely due to the ethnic conflict causing an EOI. Thus, for instance, the Kurds appear to be more likely to migrate than their Turkish fellow citizens are.

- Beside the EOI and related features, Turkish Kurdish international migration has been shaped by migration networks involving families, friends, information cycles, and perceptions about migrants and migration. The family plays a crucial role in migration decision-making in the Kurdish case. It also provides almost all the necessary resources through mobilising its assets in the country of origin and its members in the country of destination. Major practical support often comes from family members or relatives whereas the sources of information about migration and destination countries usually include friends and community organisations (i.e. religious, political, and cultural). Among the topics of information obtained prior to migration, economic issues are on top of the list. Later comes information about health care systems. For obvious reasons, another well-known subject is admission issues.

- At the same time, the impact of perceptions gained through observations of earlier migrants was important. Before the migration, many Kurds thought employment opportunities were better abroad and they expected more respect for themselves abroad. However many of them witnessed a mismatch between pre-migration perceptions and the reality they faced afterwards. Expectations and information have also had a great influence on the chosen path of migration: regular or irregular? These pre-migration perceptions are also found
Summary and conclusion

to be important in determining future migration trends as they contribute to the “imagined security” which is discussed later in this section.

- There was, and there is, an agreement among Turkish Kurds interviewed in Cologne about the impossibility of success in migration via legal means. It is expected to be an unsuccessful attempt; therefore, many Turkish Kurdish migrants followed clandestine, irregular paths. This often happened as an illegal entry into the country of destination or as a legal entry followed by an illegal overstay, or asylum application. This study found a tendency among them of avoiding legal migration procedures which were thought to be less successful, by default, probably due to known difficulties in admission.

- Transnational migration networks appeared to be the most important element especially in clandestine migration. In irregular migration, the networks are more likely to be involved than in legal migration because they provide logistic support during and after the journey as discussed in Chapter 7. Such reliance on networks can also be considered a response to the tightening admission policies in Western Europe, which caused a high propensity to move clandestinely. Transnational networks both facilitate transnational relations between fellow ethnic people after the journey to a destination and also provide flexibility on destination choices as they serve also as risk minimising factors. For instance, in utilising transnational migration networks, migrants, once they failed in gaining access to their initial destination, may choose to move to another country to seek better opportunities.

- The nature of the network also influences the nature of migration. In Turkish Kurdish migration, family networks are very functional. Once a member of the family is admitted into the country of destination, he or she acts as a Trojan horse and brings in other potential migrants of the family. Gender differences in the networks appear as men often have larger networks than women but a higher proportion of women have networks than men do due to the fact that they often accompany or join their husbands or brothers.

- Migration patterns of Turkish Kurds are not so different from the patterns commonly referred to in the international migration literature: migrants are often better off compared to their non-migrant fellows: are mainly dominated by young males: are often more educated than non-migrants: and cultural
characteristics such as religion and the status of women affect the composition of migration flows. Therefore, for example, female participation in Turkish Kurdish migration was also variable depending on religious affiliation (Alevi vs. Sunni). Similarly, compared to the Kurdish experience, for the Turks migration was almost exclusively a male business and women stayed behind to wait for the end of this temporary movement. However, the EOI is also relevant here since once to escape is the concern then age, sex, economic, educational differences seems erased in the case of Turkish Kurds.

• Destination preferences are also different for Turkish Kurds and the Turks. The Kurds are more likely to migrate to West European democratic countries than other popular destinations for Turkish migration flows because they are also concerned with their ethnic freedoms along with economic betterment. For the Turks, migration motives are governed by economic concerns and therefore their destination preferences include a larger variety of countries. However, regardless of ethnicity, international migration from Turkey is mainly directed towards Germany, which is largely related to the history of migration to Germany and the volume of Turkish immigrant stock in this country.

• Investigating the role of ethnicity, this study found that the expression of ethnicity of Turkish Kurds has changed through international migration. Turkish Kurdish immigrants in Germany today manifest their ethnic identity more frequently and loudly than in the past. Migration has brought the Kurds into an environment of relative security enabling them to express their ethnicity freely. The main marker of the improvements in the expression of Kurdish ethnicity appears to be the ethno-nationalist revival led by the PKK since the mid-1980s. International migration is also a key component, which enables free expression of ethnicity triggered by the ethnic conflict. However, freedom in the expression of ethnicity was not the first and most important reason for most migrants.

• Among the Kurds in Germany the research found there is a certain rise of ethnic consciousness, and increasing confidence in declaring their Kurdishness, but the emphasis placed gives credit on the development of Kurdish nationalism and the PKK and the upsurge in clashes since the early 1980s. The effects of international migration seem marginal. Migration appears only as a space of
enactment. Hence, some of the Kurds have found expressing their Kurdish identity outwardly easier after migration. However, politically, the Kurdish cause gained respect among Western populations only after the help of demonstrations and through the informal diplomacy of immigrant populations in the European capitals (e.g. White, 2000; van Bruinessen 1998). Thus, the expression of ethnicity has been affected by the combined impact of both the ethnic conflict in Turkey and international migration. These two factors have mutually supported each other. While ethnic conflict served as a push factor for international migration, international migration brought freedoms for Kurdish ethnic groups abroad which in turn facilitated their ethno-national revival.

- There is a strong relationship between international migration, ethnic conflict and the expression of ethnicity. On the one hand, Kurdish immigrants experienced a progressive change in their ethnic practices through migration. Moving from Turkey to Germany represented a move from oppression to freedom for the Kurds. However, individual experiences observed in this research do not reflect a total shift in this direction. It is difficult to claim that Kurds have been practising their ethnic cultures more after migration.

- The return of Turkish Kurds is conditional on improvements in political conditions and living standards in Turkey. However, reflecting an implicit (and conditional) intention to return, many immigrants have investments in Turkey. In the last instance, migration will remain more likely for the Kurds than for the Turks unless ethnic tension is resolved in Turkey. Return migration intentions are also going to be shaped by improvements in ethnic relations. Of course, these changes must be accompanied by substantial economic improvements in the areas of origin to cut back future migration pressures.

- The EOI in Turkey seemed to be the major determinant of future migration trends, too. Despite an environment of relative security in the destination country reported by migrants, they still tend to stay abroad instead of returning to Turkey. Many Turkish Kurdish immigrants have found their places in the lower classes in Germany because either they were unskilled or their skills were not compatible or due to discrimination. However, they still favour advising their fellows in Turkey to move abroad. Similar attitudes towards migration abroad are also common among non-migrant Turkish Kurds in Turkey. Given
the encouragement by experienced migrants and the support (i.e. financial, informational, moral) from them (e.g. see Chapter 8 for remittances): the likelihood of future migrations of Turkish Kurds from Turkey will remain high. However, this is often related to an “imagined security” than the reality. Chapters 5 and 8 provide examples of immigrants who followed their dreams based on the impression they got from earlier migrants visiting their hometowns in Turkey. Eventually, some of them figured out that these were not true and many migrants have just been pretending they had a good life abroad. This kind of attitude creates an “imagined security” about the countries of destination among potential migrants.

10.3. Substantial implications of this study

The previous section has elaborated the contribution of this study to existing knowledge at the level of empirical findings. With this regard, this study is going to fill an important gap in the literature as a comprehensive analysis of Kurdish migration but also as one of a few studies on international migration from Turkey. This contribution has also conceptual implications and implications for policy formulations, and these are addressed in this section. First, the conceptual contribution of this study needs to be highlighted.

Challenging the clearly separated categories of the theoretical assertions discussed in Chapter 2, the findings of this study indicate that the reality is more complicated than that predicted by the existing literature. The categories defined in the conceptual framework often overlap with each other and their boundaries are not clear-cut. For example, options against the EOI are not as clear-cut as they were first depicted in Figure 2.1. It has been found in this study that there are also people who swing between status quo and exit alternatives while their expression of ethnicity may also be a changeable, situational, and / or mixed one.

The researcher has been cautious about the conceptual categorisations when applying the EOI conceptualisation onto the Kurdish international migration case. Categories created for conceptual simplicity were necessary and this study proves that they remain as a problematic area of EOI as a conceptual tool. For instance, the material and non-material environment of insecurity distinction is progressively weakened throughout the thesis. However, as mentioned above, problems related to these categorical
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distinctions referred in this study were not unexpected, since they were just used for conceptual simplicity. Nevertheless, this conceptual framework of the EOI enhanced with a refined set of arguments driven from the international migration literature still stands as a successful attempt.

The theoretical framework set out at the start of this study represents also a good example to support the argument proposed by some scholars such as Portes (1997) and Faist (2000) that there may be no need for a unified theory of international migration but a set of useful approaches. This study has successfully used an eclectic conceptual framework to address different aspects of international migration posed by the complex case of Turkish Kurds involving conflict, migration, and socio-economic deprivation simultaneously.

Hence, the EOI framework used in this research constitutes a real contribution to the field of migration study. This framework can possibly be utilised in other cases. It can be applied to similar cases such as the Berbers of North Africa and Eritreans in the Horn of Africa. The common features of these specific cases with the Kurdish case can be summarised as follows: A) These ethnic populations are living in divided territories. Kurds are living in a geography which is mainly ruled by four nation states, namely Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. Similarly, the Berbers in North Africa is ruled by Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. B) They experienced a long lasting ethnic conflict in different forms ranging from armed clashes to latent tension through assimilation policies of the ruling nation states. C) These ethnic populations are very likely to be distinctively involved in broader migration flows from those countries due to the ethnic tensions they faced.

Thus this study opens new avenues utilising the enhanced EOI framework for further research on these specific cases such as Berbers and Eritreans (e.g. Silverstein 1996; Hoffmann 2002). It is also worth attempting to use this very framework in some other cases such as Bosnians and Kosovans which seem to involve a relationship between ethnic conflict and international migration (Lyon 2002; Hoffmann 2002). With this regard, the main contribution of this framework is its emphasis to the central role of the ethnic conflict in international migration practices of ethnic populations.

This framework, at the same time, constitutes a contribution to the field of asylum migration research. First, it rejects the distinction between economic and political migration because it is often not clear what motivations are involved in migration and
in most cases people have more than one type of motivation to migrate. Then it identifies the components of ethnic conflict with a historical perspective that allows the researcher to examine the current situation with reference to possible ethnic influences in the formation of that particular case. Then, socio-economic deprivation, for example, can gain further importance as an ethnic oriented underdevelopment that can trigger migration flows from a particular ethnic population such as Turkish Kurds. Therefore, asylum migration can be researched more comprehensively by utilising the conceptual framework of this study.

There are also shortcomings of the conceptual framework drawn in this study, which need to be further elaborated and cured in future research. Return migration is rather overlooked. This was due to the assumption that migration in the context of conflict stands as a strategy of escape therefore return migration is less likely. The findings of this research indicate that return migration is also a part of the process. Despite the fact that it was portrayed as a latent option conditional on the improvements in ethnic relations at home (Turkey in Kurdish case), many immigrants are likely to continue investing in their home country. This return option becomes crucial in cases where the ethnic conflict acts as an opportunity framework. In this respect, this study also shows there is a need for future research possibly gathering information in the countries of origin focusing on the return migration prospects.

This study is a contribution to the literature in a sense that some earlier studies could be different if they were informed of the findings of this study. The recent study of Thomas Faist (2000) that has been well praised among the international migration researchers can be such an example. Its understanding of international migration leading to an approach underlining the importance of meso-level in migration research could be changed to include more emphasis on the ethnic conflict and its possible implications for the Turkish international migration to Germany to which Faist particularly made references in his conceptual study. This thesis has proven the utility of such an approach using the EOI as a conceptual background framework and thus it has the potential to change future migration research since it eases the tension between economic and political migration by combining them into a single model where migration can be examined with regard to different economic, political and other motivations involved. In this respect it has also the potential to eliminate compartmentalisation of refugee migration and economic migration since these two fields of study need to talk to each other more than ever given the increasing
hybridisation of international migration flows which tend to involve more migrants with vague concerns about economic differences, political issues, and so on.

Chapter 2 reviewed the existing literature in relation to different theoretical approaches on international migration to incorporate them into the framework of EOI, centralising the ethnic conflict. In this attempt some of them appeared as more useful than the others. Obviously those economic oriented approaches remained important since they are influential in deciding the direction of migration flows but equally important is the individual perceptions of these differences. Imagined security, which this thesis referred, is an example of the importance of perceptions rather than the reality.

The political emphasis of “world system” theorists seems relevant but again the network systems are effectively in force. On the other hand, political proximity against geographical proximity as proposed by the systems approach was a valuable variable that was welcomed in the framework of this thesis. Related to these approaches highlighting the importance of networks, transnationalism stands as an important component within the conceptual package of the EOI framework. Transnationalism is useful to understand the future moves of immigrants as well as the information resources created by transnational communities which clearly enable those potential migrants to think big. They can see most of the options and also they can have the possibility of moving to another place after they reach the destination. These issues are also important in regard to the increasing volume of clandestine migration which requires a more difficult journey involving a network of logistic support throughout the journey as well. The cumulative causation approach of Massey and others (1993) can also be considered as useful at the level of networks and established migration practices.

The political aspects of international migration seem to be separated from the rest of the literature as they tend to focus on refugee studies. However, forced migration (both political and environmental) needs to be incorporated into the models of international migration since, as mentioned earlier, it is often very difficult to identify forced and voluntary elements in migration experiences. Democratic deficit (Geddes 1995) and/or ethnic tensions are significant underlying factors in migration but they might be overshadowed by other more obvious factors such as economic deprivation.

Gender roles have been mentioned in this thesis but not studied in detail. However, especially in terms of ethnic differences, gender relations appeared important.
Therefore future research should also reconsider the gender dimension within the conceptual framework.

From a policy point of view, there is an increasing tendency towards irregular migration among Turkish Kurdish people. Although specific characteristics of this particular ethnic group within a specific context have been highlighted, there still remain some features which can be applied to other similar cases. Therefore, a similar tendency can be found in other (especially developing and underdeveloped) parts of the world. Hence, there is need for improved migration policies with more understanding approaches to asylum migration. These policies are also required to be case sensitive at the ethnic group level rather than considering larger national regimes.

Regarding the fact that many immigrants have either lost their hope for return or never had one, legislation about immigrant minorities needs to be renewed and should seriously consider the permanent settlement prospects of immigrants. Instead of return and deportation programs, sensitive and understanding immigrant integration (or acculturation or incorporation) plans need to be formulated.

At the same time, the EOI resulting from a long lasting ethnic conflict has been the major factor at play in the Turkish Kurdish case. Therefore policy priorities should be given to develop plans and programs to resolve such conflicts rather than immigration control which has proved to be ineffective by the increasing volume of irregular migrants. More international cooperation and enforcement for democratisation in (especially conflict torn) developing areas of the world could help to reduce the destruction of the lives of migrants and their families while providing less need for immigration control. This is not a task exclusive for receiving countries but also for sending countries. The impacts of recent changes in Turkish legislation providing freedom for the use of Kurdish language and outcomes of Turkey’s integration with European Union will possibly be seen soon. These may repress or trigger further migration pressures.

Another significant implication based on the findings of this study is the need for a reconsideration of the tension between economic migrants and asylum seekers. This study clearly shows that immigrants usually followed a mixed and rather complicated reasoning through their migration experience. Economic motivations are often intertwined with other concerns. In most cases, seeking asylum because of a fear of persecution does involve economic worries as well. Family reunification is also
important and immigrants including so-called economic migrants and asylum seekers tend to bring their families into where they live. The bottom line is individuals and households are seeking to better their lives when they decided to migrate and often they are not satisfied with ethno-cultural and political freedoms without economic improvements.

Meanwhile, it is also true that people seeking a better life abroad will tend to take all possible chances to get into the industrialised welfare zones of the West. The migration motivations, therefore, have been complicated and often involve economic and political reasons. Recently, Castles and Loughna (2002) discussed the periodisation of immigration in Europe since the Second World War and they wrapped the history of migration with a focus on asylum migration. According to their discussion, early asylum seekers arrived in Europe as guest workers since they did not want to bother with asylum seeking procedures. Towards the eighties, they arrived with “mixed feelings” and some sought asylum while some did not. The final phase has been characterised by asylum seekers appearing as illegal migrants. Therefore, migration policies should be carefully reviewed and the dichotomy of economic migrants against asylum seekers should be abolished, as the current division between the two does not reflect the complex nature of the current situation.

10.4. Suggestions for further research

The difficulties and successes of this research have suggested some implications for further studies in fulfilling the gaps in the knowledge of Turkish Kurdish international migration. Methodological and practical concerns have also been identified as useful for further research.

This study provides a successful example of using mixed methodologies. Combining data from two nationwide questionnaire surveys (i.e. TIMS and TDHS) with the qualitative material from the Cologne research has proved to be an optimum strategy for understanding Turkish Kurdish migration. Sometimes these two different data sources contradict each other but eventually considering their own strengths and weaknesses, this conflict has produced rich material helpful for the success of the investigation. Future research should follow a similar mixed method approach for comprehensive studies because only by doing so it is possible to see the patterns along with in-depth explanations that can make a difference in understanding.
Some practical methodological issues were also important. First of all, ethnographic research involving the collection of qualitative material needs to be spread out through an extensive time scale. This would be both useful for the improvement and better deployment of research instruments, and for the researcher to familiarise him or herself with the community under investigation. It would also be helpful for a better “on-site on-time” analysis providing a better opportunity for follow-ups.

Secondly, the characteristics of the researcher and that of the subject population appeared to be of extreme importance. Further research should also be careful about the issues of gender and ethnicity, since the researcher in this study found it a significant obstacle. The reception sensitivities of the community under investigation should be carefully handled to get better results. Contesting ethnicities can cause delays in settlement process of the researcher within the target research community as it has been the case for the researcher in Kurdish case. The researcher, a Turkish PhD student from England, had to overcome the biases arising from his being Turkish and investigating the Kurdish immigrants who were likely to be escaping from the oppression of the Turkish nation-state (see Chapter 4 for details). Concerns about the gender relations of the population under investigation also need to be paid attention in future research. The researcher found it difficult to access the female population because he was not allowed to approach women due to the traditions of Kurdish society. At this point, it should also be noted, that specific research on gender roles or research from a women’s perspective could also be a great contribution to the literature, since during this research it was evident that some social processes were described better and with more details by women compared to male accounts.

This study has been a pioneer work on Turkish Kurdish international migration, and it has shown that new and further research is necessary into the complex processes of international migration of ethnic minorities within broader migration flows in Europe. Turkish Kurdish migration patterns have differed from those of their Turkish fellows. Whether these different patterns are peculiar to the Turkish Kurdish case, or whether they are more general features applying also to other ethnic minority cases, needs to be assessed conducting similar studies, ideally through cross-national comparisons and longitudinal investigations. This could also help to understand whether these are universally applicable processes. However, a gap in the literature on international migration still remains: a comparison between processes operating on the regulation side and the individual side. The findings of this study reflected many distinct
individual migration strategies which were developed through tackling with the restrictions imposed by governments of sending, receiving and transit countries. Therefore there is need to conduct focused research on this issue of these individual challenges against structural regulations. Studies in this direction would provide the opportunity of understanding much more successfully the significance of local, national and regional contexts and actions as opposed to the individual strategies and manoeuvres to tackle them.

This study also indicated the fact that there is need for further studies focusing on the “relative insecurity” in the countries of destination. People from areas with lower security will probably continue their pursuit of well being to find the “imagined security”. However, the reality behind this still constitutes the unknown in the literature of international migration and requires further research to be undertaken.

Future research directions should also consider focusing on two subject areas which seemed important after this research: unachieved migrations and illegal migrations. The researcher observed that migration has an important communal dimension. Migration often involves multiple actors determining migration such as family members, household members, and it also involves communication with members of local communities (e.g. neighbourhoods, villages). Many respondents mentioned their friends and relatives who want to migrate. That implies there can be a considerable number of people who want to migrate, or who attempted to move, but failed to do so due to the fact that migration is not an easy task and is increasingly getting more difficult. International migration studies have been dominated by analyses of realised migrations. Recent literature suggests it is important to understand who stays as well as who moves (e.g. Hammar 1997; Faist 1997). Therefore, there is a need for future studies that will primarily focus on these unsuccessful migrations, since the reality of these failed migrations may provide important references for policy making and individual decision making in receiving, sending and transit countries. Such a research would provide insights with the realm of factors which may impede international migration at the individual level, along with the contextual factors as they are perceived by those would-be migrants.

Another direction of research would be more detailed studies of illegal migrations. The research on which this thesis is based unexpectedly involved many illegal migrants. Illegal, irregular or clandestine migration has become increasingly important and the
current state of affairs indicates that this trend will continue in the near future. Southern Europe seems particularly important as it is the border of the European Union, an affluent geography, and the Middle East, a transit and relatively deprived geography. Following the pathway opened up by this current thesis, some important questions for a future investigation on illegal migration could focus on the following issues: a) the dynamics of illegal migration in the Southeastern border of the EU; b) characteristics of undocumented/irregular/illegal migrants; c) perceptions about the potential destinations; d) tackling strategies of individuals with regulatory authorities in the border areas and vice versa; e) possible conflicting areas of supranational regulations and local applications of these rules and f) the role of trafficking networks and possible economic effects of eliminating trafficking in underdeveloped local economies in Balkans.
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APPENDIX 3.1.
Protests following the arrest of the PKK’s leader Abdullah Ocalan, February 1999
[Source: BBC News, 29 June 1999]

Kurds in the German city of Bonn show their feelings. Germany has a large Kurdish population

Protesters gather in Rome in front of the Turkish embassy. Security has been tightened at many US and Turkish embassies
Kurdish demonstrators march down London's Oxford Street

About 1,500 anti-Turkish demonstrators in Moscow chant "'Free Ocalan" and "Turkey is a terrorist"
APPENDIX 4.1.
Interview Agenda

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a.1 sex: male³</th>
<th>a.2 Name of the neighbourhood:</th>
<th>a.3 Marital status:</th>
<th>a.4 Date of arrival?</th>
<th>a.5 No. of children</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>female³</td>
<td></td>
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Birth date: ___________

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a.6 Birth place:</th>
<th>a.7 Permanent residence in Turkey:</th>
<th>a.8 Migrant status:</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>province: _______</td>
<td>city³ town³ village³ name:province/town /</td>
<td>worker: _______</td>
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<tr>
<td>town: _______</td>
<td></td>
<td>political refugee/asylum: _______</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>family reunion: _______</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>other:</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a.9 Occupation?</th>
<th>a.10 Education:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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</table>

b.1. Previous migration experiences; internal, international, types, ways.
b.2. Living conditions in Turkey before migration (economic, social, etc.). Family life, marriage patterns and traditions, relations between generations and gender relations.
c.1. Thoughts about Kurdish question and its relevance to migration and relevant experiences (armed conflict, deaths, evacuations, etc.).
c.2. Knowledge and use of Kurdish in Turkey. Living patterns of Kurdish culture. Legends, Newruz celebrations.
c.3. Social relations in Turkey. with Turks, with Kurds, business, marriage, etc.
c.4. Ethnic and migration networks. Their relevance and contribution to migration
c.5. Reasons for migration.
c.6. Process of coming to Germany; migration decision, ways.
d.1. Experience of the first day abroad.
d.2. Social and personal relations in Germany. Attendance to “kahve”, associations. Relations with Turks, Kurds and Germans. Meeting places. Relations with Kurds in other countries.
d.3. Changes in life style after migration. economic, social, cultural, religious, political, traditions, gender relations, etc.
e.1. Future plans. return, settlement plans, business plans, German citizenship.
e.2. Experiences and ideas on racism, ethnic discrimination. Comparisons with experiences in Turkey.
e.3. Self identification. Feelings about Kurdishness, Identifications with other Kurds (and Turks abroad). Changes in perceptions about self-ethnic identity after migration.
e.4. Thoughts about the lives of Kurds abroad and in Turkey. General considerations about life styles, ethnic relations, etc.
e.5. Leisure activities, behaviours, using spare time (football, picnics, etc.).
APPENDIX 4.2.
Individual profiles of the respondents of the qualitative research

**M01:** Asylum seeker: Mr. Hüseyin Kalkan was born in Karakocan, Elazig in 1969. His family moved to Mersin in 1976, from where he moved to Izmir in 1990 and then illegally he migrated to Germany via Hungary and Austria in 1991. He is married with two children but his family stayed in Mersin, Turkey. Primary school graduate and currently unemployed.

**M02:** Asylum seeker: Mr. Ali Haydar was born in a village of Dersim in 1972. His family moved to Mersin in 1975. He moved to Ankara in 1990 and to Izmir in 1991 for work. When the ship, he working in, arrived in Marseilles, he stepped out and went to Paris in 1993. From there, his elder brother sent him to Cologne via Bielefeld. He is divorced with one son. His family lives in Cologne. He is a secondary school graduate and works in a laundry.
Asylum seeker: Mrs. Hazal Dinler was born in Karakocan, Dersim in 1971. Her family migrated to Mersin in 1976. She is married with one daughter. She met her husband in Mersin and he had gone to Germany in 1991. In 1993, she joined him via Bosnia, Croatia, Slovenia, and Austria on a fake passport. She is a housewife and a secondary school graduate.

Family reunification: Mr. Sefer Demir was born in a village of Elbistan in the province of K.Maras in 1961. In Antalya, he met his Dutch wife and married in 1990. Then migrated to Rotterdam. After five years dissolved marriage and moved to Nurnberg, where he married a Turkish woman with a son. In 1998, he moved to Cologne for work. Secondary school graduate, works as a chef in a Restaurant.
M04: Guest worker: Mr. Hasan Üzmez was born in Elbistan, Maras in 1948. After having passed the health examination in Istanbul came to Germany by train as a guest worker invited by Ford Factories in 1972. Married with three children. All the family live in Cologne. Both children are German citizen. Pensioner. Primary school graduate.

M05: Refugee: Mr. Zivo was born in Elazig in 1974. He is married. He first moved to Istanbul in 1989. A year later, came to Germany as a tourist invited by his uncle in 1991. After a few weeks he applied for asylum and two months later was granted refugee status. He is married. He works in a kebab shop and is a secondary school graduate.
F02: Refugee: Mrs. Saliha Deniz was born in Istanbul in 1973 and married with a son. She came to Germany with a fake visa on a valid passport in 1995. After having visited Frankfurt and Zurich, she decided to stay in Cologne. She was granted refugee status after two years of arrival. She left university after two years and is currently a housewife.

M06: Guest worker: Mr. Selami Sevgi was born in Dersim in 1937 and married with three children born in Germany; all of three are German citizens. He came to Germany in 1970 through the Turkish Recruitment Office and worked in Ford factories until retirement. He is a retired worker and a primary school graduate.
M07: Refugee: Mr. Eşref Öztürk was born in a village of İdil in the province of Sıırık in 1977. He is married with two children one of who left in Turkey. He fled İdil in 1994 following a raid by Turkish troops. He stayed few months in Mersin along with some relatives. Then he went to Istanbul and got a fake passport. He paid a bribe to Police officers at the airport and flew to Stuttgart where his brothers lived and was granted refugee status after a week of arrival in 1995. He works on construction sites and is a primary school graduate.

F03: Asylum seeker: Mrs. Ayşe Güzel was born in Sıırık in 1980. She is married with two children. She moved to the city of Mersin in 1995 and after a year they came to Frankfurt, applied for asylum and are still awaiting a decision. She is a housewife. Her husband goes for temporary jobs. She is a primary school graduate.
M08: Asylum seeker: Mr. Mehmet Çelik was born in a village of Tunceli in 1959. He is married with three children. He came to Germany on a tourist visa by the invitation of his cousin in 1998 and applied for asylum. He was a farmer in Turkey but works in a cafe here. He is a secondary school graduate.

M09: Guest worker: Mr. Hüseyin Aksu was born in the town of Cemiskezek in the province of Tunceli in 1946. He is married with 5 children, three of whom are German citizens and two live in Turkey. He came to work in the Ford factories in 1970 as a guest worker and retired from Ford in 1998. He is a secondary school graduate.
F04: Family reunification: Miss Dilane was born in Diyarbakir in 1977. She came in Cologne in 1979 with her mother to join her father who came earlier in 1973 as a guest worker. She is currently in high school and also attending art courses at the Kurdish House in Neuss, Cologne.

M10: Asylum seeker: Mr. Emrah Kuzucu was born in a village of Urfa in 1976. He is single. In the past, he went to Adana for seasonal work in cotton fields, which was his only migration experience. He arrived in Bonn in 1998 and applied for asylum in Cologne after a dangerous journey on a fake passport arranged in Istanbul via Bosnia, Croatia, Hungary, and Austria. He completed primary school; works in temporary illegal jobs.
M11: Asylum seeker: Mr. Hacı Kilimci was born in Ovacık town in the province of Dersim in 1960. He is divorced with a son. First he migrated from Dersim to the city of Adana in 1984 and where he married. Following his wife's migration due to political reasons in 1988, he arrived in 1997 as a tourist after his wife left him applied for asylum and currently living in asylum detention house and lives on temporary undocumented jobs. He is a primary school graduate.

F05: Family reunification: Mrs. Şirin Ünsal was born in 1949 in the city of Gaziantep. She is married with two children. Her husband was a guest worker. To join him, she moved to Cologne in 1967. She is a secondary school graduate, and works in a council office as secretary.
M12: Refugee: Mr. Murat Mete was born in the town of Elazig in 1960. He is married with two children. His family migrated to the city of Kayseri in 1972 from where he fled to Istanbul after the 1980 military intervention. His family also moved to Izmir. He joined them in 1983 in Izmir and arrested in 1985. After escaping from prison he fled to Germany via Greece, Albania, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany in 1986. Granted refugee status after two years of arrival. He is currently seeking employment and living on social help provided by government. He was quit from high school.

F06: Refugee: Mrs. Kardelen was born in the town of Sariz of the province of Kayseri. She is widowed with one son who is missing since he arrested in 1993. She went to Ankara for education in 1958 and settled down there. During the military intervention of 1980 she was prisoned in Diyarbakir. She escaped in 1982 and fled to Syria. She lives on social help of government. She had to quit from university.
M13: Asylum seeker: Mr. Baran was born in the town of Pazarcik in the province of K.Maras in 1971. He is single and is a high school graduate. Before coming to Germany, he went to Mersin and Antalya for work between 1986 and 1989. He paid 4000 DM (£1350) for traffickers and came to Cologne via Istanbul, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Austria in 1991. He currently works undocumented temporary jobs.

F07: Refugee: Miss Sevgi Dönmez was born in a village of Varto in 1977 and moved to Izmir in 1991 due to an increase in the clashes between the PKK and Turkish troops. She is single and secondary school graduate. She works as waitress in a restaurant. She was granted refugee status after 5 months of arrival in 1991.
F08: Refugee: Miss Gülcan Güleyüz was born in the city of Bingol in 1971 and moved to Bornova, Izmir in 1985. She came to Cologne in 1988 on a fake passport and visa and applied for asylum and was granted refugee status in 1990. She is single and works as assistant to a hairdresser. She is secondary school graduate. Her father came as a guest worker in 1967 after the earthquake in Varto, a town nearby Bingol.

F09: Family reunification: Mrs. Silan was born in a village of Kars province in 1967. She came to Cologne first in 1978 and returned in 1982. She migrated to Istanbul in 1984 and from where she moved to Cologne second time in 1996. She is primary school graduate and is a housewife doing some part-time work as a tailor.
M14: Asylum seeker, later family reunification: Mr. Mehmet Yilmaz was born in the city of K.Maras in 1969 and migrated to Izmir in 1993 for work. From Izmir, he came to Germany on a tourist visa in 1995; first overstayed then applied for asylum and got married in 1996 when he withdrew his asylum application and got resident permit as his family had permanent residence permit. He works in a food factory and is a primary school graduate.

M15: Asylum seeker: Mr. Hasan Kara was born in a village of the district of Varto in 1978 and migrated to Izmir to join his uncle’s in 1980. He moved back to Varto in 1993 for high school and after left for Germany in 1996. His journey was on a trafficking route via Izmir, Istanbul, Hungary, and Austria. He paid 5000 DM for trafficking. He works as a shopkeeper.
M16: University student: Mr. Serbilind was born in a village of Mus province in 1960. He is married with 5 children. He came to Cologne for university education in 1980 and settled down. He is a university graduate and runs a grocery shop and works for the PIK (Kurdistan Islamic Party).

M17: Asylum seeker: Mr. Ali Naki was born in a village of Adiyaman province in 1972. His family migrated to the city of Hatay in 1978. Later he moved to Istanbul for work in 1993, and from there he came to Germany in 1997 with the help of a trafficking gang via Bosnia, Albania, Italy, and France. He is a primary school graduate and single. He works at the local fresh vegetable and meat market.
M18: Refugee: Dr. Zeki was born in a small town of Elazig province in 1939 where he was elected as mayor in 1989. After being wounded in an attack by the Turkish army he escaped to Germany via Istanbul in 1989. He was granted refugee status immediately after arrival. He is married with 4 children. He is a medical doctor but currently unemployed. (Regretfully the researcher heard later he committed suicide).

F10: Asylum seeker: Mrs. Fatma Türk was born in Kiziltepe town of Mardin province in 1938. She is married with two children. She migrated to Istanbul for health reasons in 1963. After being arrested by police and tortured in 1992, she fled to Germany on a fake passport and visa in 1993. She has no education and is a housewife. Her son also was an asylum seeker arrived in 1989.
F11: Refugee: Mrs. Zekiye Ozcan was born in the district of Semdinli in the province of Hakkari in 1954 and married with two children. She, together with her family fled to Germany in 1993 via Iraq, Syria, Cyprus, Greece, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Austria by the help of a trafficking gang. After four weeks of arrival they were granted refugee status. She is a housewife with no education.

M19: Family reunification: Mr. Haydar Doğan was born in a village of Dersim province in 1959 and brought to Munich by his guest worker family in 1968. In 1996, he moved to Cologne to work for the Kurdish House and for his theatre activities. He is single and has a university degree in Journalism.
M20: Asylum seeker: Mr. Şikrû Erdoğan was born in a village of Batman province in 1965. He came to Germany with the help of traffickers via Istanbul, Yugoslavia, Croatia, Italy, and Switzerland in 1998. He is married with 4 children, all of whom are in Turkey. He works as janitor illegally and is a primary school graduate.

M21: Asylum seeker: Mr. Zilan was born in a village of the province Mus in 1977. He and his family migrated to Izmir in 1980 after the military intervention in Turkey. He took a flight to Germany on a fake passport and visa in 1998 and applied for asylum in Cologne after arrival. He is a primary school graduate and unemployed.
M22: Refugee: Mr. Seyhan Bayrak was born in a village of Elazig province in 1972, where he moved with his family to Istanbul by 1975. He took a flight to Berlin on a fake passport and visa and applied for asylum in 1993. After 8 months he was granted refugee status based on a false claim of having been tortured in Turkey. He is single and a secondary school graduate. He works as a waiter in a Turkish Restaurant.

M23: Refugee: Mr. Adem Seyda was born in a village of Mardin province and married with two children. He, with his wife and children, fled to Germany by paying traffickers in 1995 via Syria, Cyprus, Greece, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Austria. They were granted refugee status immediately after their arrival on the basis of their religious (Yezidi) discrimination in Turkey. He is a primary school graduate and works in building construction sites as unskilled labourer.
APPENDIX 5.1.
GAP: The South East Anatolian Project
(Source: http://www.gap.gov.tr/English/ Frames/fr1.html)

The GAP is the largest, most extensive regional development project ever to have been carried out in Turkey. It consists of number of individual dams, powerhouse, and irrigation projects in the Euphrates and Tigris basins in South East Turkey. It covers ten percent of the whole Turkey's land and affects about six million people who live in the region. It is expected by the completion of the project by 2020, Turkey will be able to fulfill its own energy requirements and even to export energy. The project plans the construction of 22 dams, 18 water power plants and irrigation of 1.7 hectares of land. Estimated total cost is around $20 bn. (US).

WHAT IS GAP?
GAP is a multi-sectoral and integrated regional development project based on the concept of sustainable development. Its basic aim is to eliminate regional development disparities by raising people's income level and living standards; and to contribute to such national development targets as social stability and economic growth by enhancing the productive and employment-generating capacity of the rural sector. The project area covers 9 provinces in the Euphrates-Tigris basins and Upper Mesopotamia plains (Adiyaman, Batman, Diyarbakir, Gaziantep, Kilis, Mardin, Siirt, Sanliurfa and Sirnak).

The original initiative consisted of irrigation and hydroelectric energy production projects on the Euphrates and the Tigris. Along the 80s, the project was transformed into a multi-sectoral regional development programme of a socio-economic character. This programme covers such sectors as irrigation, hydraulic energy production, agriculture, urban and rural infrastructure, forestry, education and health. Its water resources programme envisages the construction of 22 dams and 19 power plants and irrigation schemes on an area extending over 1.7 million hectares. The total cost of the project is 32 billion US $. The total installed capacity of its power plants is 7476 MW which means an annual production of 27 billion kWh.

The project is based upon the concept of sustainable development which aims at generating an environment in which future generations can fully develop themselves and reap the benefits of development. Equitable development, participation, protection of the environment, employment generation, spatial planning and infrastructure development are the basic strategies of GAP.

HISTORY OF SOUTHEASTERN ANATOLIA PROJECT (GAP)
The decision to utilize water resources in a rational manner belongs to Ataturk, the founder of Turkish Republic. While the country was making drives forward for development and change in all fields, the need for electricity in particular appeared on the forefront as one of the most urgent. Consequently, the Electricity Survey Administration (EIEI) was established in 1936 upon the order of Ataturk to produce energy from otherwise vainly flowing streams of the country.

Geological and topographical works over the narrow passage of Keban is started in 1938. Then, in the 1950-1960 period, emphasis was shifted by the EIEI on drillings on the Euphrates and the Tigris. Later, upon the emergence of new needs, another organization, the State Hydraulic Works (DSI) was established in 1954.

The first work for the development of water and land resources in the Euphrates basin was started by the Euphrates Planning Authority established in Diyarbakir in 1961. As a result of these works, the "Reconnaissance Report for the Euphrates Basin" appeared in 1964 with clarity on the irrigation and energy potential of the basin concerned. Another one, the "Reconnaissance Report for the Lower Euphrates Basin" followed the first one in 1966.

In 1968, the proposed water storage facilities and hydraulic plants and irrigation schemes of the Lower Euphrates Projects were contracted. These contracted works were completed in 1970. Finally, in 1977 projects related to these two basins were merged and adopted as a single one under the title the "South-eastern Anatolian Project".

The South-eastern Anatolia Project Regional Development Organization was established by the Government Decree no 388 in Force of Law, published in the Official Gazette dated 6 November 1989. Upon the completion of the Project, 28% of the total water potential of Turkey will be brought under control through facilities on the Euphrates and Tigris which jointly flow more than 50 billion cubic meters of water per year. Furthermore, 1.7 million hectares of land will be under irrigation, and it will be possible to generate approximately 27 billion kWhs electric energy annually with an installed capacity of 7476 megawatts.

The high potential generated in both agriculture and industry by the GAP will increase the income level of the Region fivefold and generate employment opportunities for 3.8 million people living in a region whose total population is projected to be over 9 million in 2005.
The GAP is presently the grand project of the Republic of Turkey with its estimated total investment cost, US$ 32 billion. Of which about $ 13.7 billion was actually spent as of the end of 1998 for the realization of the Project.

SOCIAL ASPECTS OF GAP
The GAP strives to eliminate inter-regional development gaps and contribute to a balanced development process. As such, its success largely stems from familiarity with the people of region and their participation and support to the project. Therefore, social surveys and practices basing upon such surveys and studies as “Trends of Social Change”, “Population Movements”, “Status of Women and Their Integration to Process of Development”, and “Problems of Resettlement and Employment of People From Areas to Remain Under Dam Lakes”, the GAP Social Action Plan was phased in to ensure people’s participation to sustainable development.

What is targeted by public investments under the GAP is to materialize sustainable human development. This principle implies the creation of opportunities by which the people of the region can materialize their preferences and full potential in a just and equitable way. In line Multi-Purpose Community Centres (CATOM) for women since 1995. There is cooperation with various governmental and nongovernmental organizations and such international organizations like UNICEF to expand these centres further. The GAP Administration had launched CATOM first in one rural and one urban settlement in Sanliurfa in cooperation with the Governorate of Sanliurfa and the Labour Placement Office. There are 22 such CATOM’s in the region as of the end of 1999.

The project has the objective of raising the status of local women who, for some economic and cultural reasons, have difficulty in access to basic social services, in reaping the benefits of development and change, and in taking part in social processes as equal individuals. The Project has so far reached 15,000 women. The number of CATOM increases upon the request of local people and CATOM activities has already gained a sustained character. The plan for the near future is to give these centres a semi-autonomous and institutionalized character with the support of various voluntary organizations. As such, CATOM activities have a special priority for the GAP Administration.

As far as social projects are concerned, the GAP Administration is also implementing several others including the Rehabilitation of Street Children in Diyarbakir, School Bussing Services in Rural Areas and Youth Projects in Mardin.

GAP AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
At the time when the headway is taken in the context of sustainable human development has reached a point of no return, foreign countries and organization have also increased their contributions to the project. In this sense, the year 1997 was a turning point when the project package “Program for Sustainable Development in GAP” was launched in cooperation with the UNDP.

The basic objective of this joint effort by the GAP Administration and UNDP is to reduce socio-economic disparities in the GAP region. The program stresses on the human dimensions of development through projects on basic social services (education, health and housing), gender equity, urban management, environmental sustainability, institutional and social capacity building and grassroots participation. The program consisting of 29 sub-projects has a cost profile of £3.2.

The World Bank contributes to projects related to the improvement of urban and rural infrastructure in the GAP region. This contribution has become definitive for two projects for the time being. These are “Sanliurfa-Harran Plains On-farm and Village Development Project” and “GAP Urban Sanitation and Planning Project”. The Bank granted 650,000 US Dollars for the preliminary works related to these two projects. The Bank is expected to contribute further £128.5 million for the further stages of implementation.

The cooperation between Turkey and US in the context of GAP is flourishing. The US Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) forwarded grants for the GAP International Airport and GAP-GIS projects. Also, there are promising contacts with Arizona State University (ASU), San Diego University (SDSU) and Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) to conduct joint projects and training activities.

Steps have been taken to conduct joint researches and projects on rural development with the International Centre for Agricultural Research in Dry Areas (ICARDA). There is agreement with the International Cooperation Centre of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MASHAV) to organise joint training courses. At present, training in rural development issues is taking place in Israel and in the GAP region.

GENERAL DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES
To raise the income level in the GAP Region by improving the economic structure in order to narrow the income disparity between the Region and other regions,

To increase the productivity and employment opportunities in rural areas,
To enhance the assimilative capacity of larger cities in the Region,
To contribute to the national objectives of sustained economic growth, export promotion and social stability by efficient utilization of the Region's resources.

GAP SOCIAL POLICY OBJECTIVES
The basic principles of the "GAP Social Action Plan" which is prepared for the improvement of the situation in general, quickens the development are as follows:
· To provide the participation of the regional people in the planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation process to be done for the development of the nature and human resources within the GAP.
· To provide the accessibility of the basic resources and to take measures to increase their productivity.
· To take benefit of the man power and other potentials (finance, equipment, know-how etc.) of the institutions by cooperating with the public institutions, local and volunteer organizations.
· To give priority to the women and youngsters.

PROVINCES COVERED IN GAP MASTER PLAN
Adıyaman
Batman
Diyarbakır
Gaziantep
Mardin
Kilis
Siirt
Sanlıurfa
Sırnak
APPENDIX 5.2.
A language other than Turkish or a language prohibited by law
Excerpts from Turkish Laws and Decrees

(All translations are unofficial and emphasises added.)

Constitution of the Republic of Turkey/Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası
(No. 2709, Adopted November 7, 1982)

Preamble, (Amended: 1995/4121.1) (Paragraph 5)
No protection shall be given to thoughts or opinions that run counter to Turkish national interests, the fundamental principle of the existence of the indivisibility of the Turkish state and territory, the historical and moral values of Turkishness, or the nationalism, principles, reforms, and modernism of Atatürk, and that as required by the principle of secularism there shall be no absolutely no interference of sacred religious feeling in the affairs of state and politics;

Article 4: The provisions of Article 1 of the constitution establishing the form of the state as a Republic, the provisions of Article 2 on the characteristics of the Republic, and the provisions of Article 3 shall not be amended, nor shall their amendment be proposed.

Article 26—Freedom of Expression and the Dissemination of Thought
26.1 Everyone has the right to express and disseminate his thought and opinion by speech, in writing, or in pictures or through other media, individually or collectively. This right includes the freedom to receive and impart information and ideas without interference from official authorities....
26.2 The exercise of these freedoms may be restricted for the purpose of preventing crime, punishing offenders, withholding information duly classified as a state secret, protecting the reputation and rights and the private and family life of others....
26.3 No language prohibited by law shall be used in the expression and dissemination of thought. Any written or printed documents, phonograph records, magnetic or video tapes, and other means of expression used in contravention of this provision shall be seized by a duly issued decision of a judge or, in cases where delay is deemed prejudicial, by the competent authority designated by law.

Article 27—Freedom of Science and Arts
27.1 Everyone has the right to study and teach freely, explain, disseminate science and arts and to carry out research in these fields.
27.2 The right to disseminate shall not be exercised for the purpose of changing the provisions of Articles 1, 2, 3, of this constitution....

Article 28—Freedom of the Press
28.1 The press is free and shall not be censored. The establishment of a printing house shall not be subject to prior permission and to the deposit of financial guarantee.
28.2 Publication shall not be made in any language prohibited by law....
28.4 In the limitation of freedom of the press, Articles 26 and 27 of the constitution are applicable.
28.5 Anyone who writes or prints any news or articles which threaten the internal or external security of the state or the indivisible integrity of the state with its territory and nation, which tend to incite offence, riot or insurrection, or which refer to classified state secrets and anyone who prints or transmits such news or articles to others for the above purpose shall be held responsible under the law relevant to these offences....

Article 42.9: No language other than Turkish shall be taught as a mother tongue to Turkish citizens in teaching and learning institutions. Foreign languages to be taught at learning and teaching institutions and the rules under which schools conducting training and education in a foreign language are to be determined by law. The provisions of international treaties will be respected.

Turkish Penal Code/ Türk Ceza Kanunu (No. 765, Adopted March 1, 1926)

Article 155: Those who, except in circumstances indicated in the aforementioned articles, publish articles inciting people to break the law or harm the security of the country, or make publications or suggestions that make people unwilling to serve in the military or make speeches to that end in public
meetings or gathering places, shall be imprisoned from between two months to two years and be punished with a heavy fine of between twenty-five and 200 lira.

N.B.: The monetary fine in the article written is raised 180 times.

**Article 158—(Amended: 1961/235):** Whoever insults the President of the Republic face-to-face or through cursing shall face a heavy penalty of not more than three years.

If the insulting or cursing happens in the absence of the President of the Republic, those who commit the crime will be liable to imprisonment of between one and three years. Even if the name of the President of the Republic is not directly mentioned, allusion and hint shall be considered as an attack made directly against the President if there is presumptive evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the attack was made against the President of Turkey.

If the crime is committed in any published form, the punishment will increase from one-third to one-half.

**Article 159—(Amended: 1961/235):** Those who publicly insult or ridicule the moral personality of Turkishness, the Republic, the Parliament, the Government, State Ministers, the military or security forces of the state, or the Judiciary will be punished with a penalty of no less than one year and no more than six years of maximum security imprisonment....

If insulting Turkishness is carried out in a foreign country by a Turk the punishment given will be increased from one-third to one-half.

**Article 311—Inciting to commit a crime, Threatening with the goal of inciting panic and fear— (Amended: 1953/6123); (Amended: 1981/2370)**

One who publicly incites the commission of a crime shall be punished in the ways below.

1. If the penalty of the felony incited is higher than the duration of the heavy penalty, a heavy imprisonment of between three and five years;
2. If limited heavy imprisonment or imprisonment is necessary, it will be from three months to three years imprisonment in accordance with the type of crime.
3. In other circumstances, a heavy fine of between 1,000 and 5,000 lira will be applied. (Fine later increased three times according to Turkish Penal Code Article 119).

**Article 312—(Amended: 1981/2370):** One who openly praises an action considered criminal under the law or speaks positively about it or incites people to disobey the law shall be sentenced from six months to two years of imprisonment and to a heavy fine of between 2,000 and 10,000 lira. (Fine later increased three times.)

Penalties given to those who carry out crimes in the paragraphs written above by means outlined in the second paragraph of Article 311 will be increased accordingly.

**Anti-Terror Law/Teröre Mücadele Kanunu (No. 3713, Adopted April 12, 1991)**

**Article 8—Propaganda against the indivisibility of the State—(Amended: 1995/4126.1)**

Written or oral propaganda, along with meetings, demonstrations, and marches that have the goal of destroying the indivisible unity of the state with its territory and nation of the Republic of Turkey cannot be conducted. Those who conduct such activities shall be punished with imprisonment of between one and three years and a heavy fine of between 100 million lira and 300 million lira. If this crime is conducted habitually, imprisonment cannot be converted into a monetary fine... (Parliament amended the Anti-Terror Law in October 1995. Before its amendment, Article 8 punished all so-called separatist propaganda “regardless of the method, intent, or idea behind it.”)

If the propaganda crime determined in the first paragraph is committed by means of periodicals determined in the third article of the Press Law No. 5860, the owner will also be given a monetary fine of an amount up to ninety percent of the past month’s average sales even if the frequency of the periodical
is less than a month. This fine, however, cannot be less than 100 million lira. The responsible editor of the periodicals will be subject to one-half of the monetary fine given to the owner as well as imprisonment of between six months and two years.

If the propaganda crime determined in the first paragraph is committed by press works or other mass communication instruments outside of the written periodicals in the second paragraph, the responsible editor as well as the owners of the means of mass communication will face imprisonment of between six months and two years and a heavy fine of between 100-300 million lira. In addition, if the act is committed by means of radio or television, a broadcast prohibition of between one and fifteen days can be given to the said radio and television stations.

If carried out by means explained in the second paragraph or by methods of mass communication outlined in the third paragraph, the punishment determined in paragraph one will increase from one-third to one-half.

Political Parties Law/ Siyasi Partiler Kanunu (No. 2820, Adopted April 26, 1982)

Article 81: Preventing the Creation of Minorities

Political parties:

a) cannot put forward that minorities exist in the Turkish Republic based on national, religious, confessional, racial, or language differences....
b) cannot by means of protecting, developing, or disseminating language or cultures other than the Turkish language and culture through creating minorities in the Republic of Turkey have the goal of destroying national unity or be engaged in activities to this end;
c) cannot use a language other than Turkish in writing and printing party statute or program, at congresses, at meetings in open air or indoor gatherings; at meetings, and in propaganda, cannot use or distribute placards, pictures, phonograph records, voice and visual tapes, brochures and statements written in a language other than Turkish; cannot remain indifferent to these actions and acts committed by others; however, it is possible to translate party statutes and programs into foreign languages other than those forbidden by law.

The Law concerning the Founding and Broadcasts of Television and Radio/ Radyo ve Televizyonlar I n Kurulus ve Yaylnlar I Hakklnda Kanun (No. 3984, Adopted April 13, 1994)

(Article 4: Broadcasting principles: Radio and Television broadcast are to be carried out in the understanding of public service according to the principles below:

Broadcasts cannot be contradictory to the following:

a) the existence and independence of the Turkish Republic, the indivisible unity of the state with its territory and nation;
b) the national and spiritual values of society....
d) the general morality, civil peace, and structure of the Turkish family;

Must be conducted in accordance with:

h) the general goals and basic principles of Turkish national education and the development of national culture;
i) fairness and objectivity in broadcasting and the fundamental principle of respect for the law....
l) to present news in a speedy and correct way;
m) the principle that broadcasts will not be made that have a negative effect on the physical, intellectual, mental, and moral development of children and youth...

Radio and television broadcasts will be made in Turkish; however, for the purpose of teaching or of imparting news those foreign languages that have made a contribution to the development of universal cultural and scientific works can be used.

Foreign Language Education and Teaching Law (No. 2923)

Article 2

a) The mother tongue of Turkish citizens cannot be taught in any language other than Turkish....
c) Taking into consideration the view of the National Security Council, the Council of Ministers by its decision will determine in Turkey what foreign languages can be taught.

**Decision No. 92/2788, Official Gazette, March 20, 1992**

2—...It had been decided by the Council of Ministers on March 4, 1992 that in official and private courses education and teaching are to be made in the following languages: English, French, German as well as Russian, Italian, Spanish, Arabic, Japanese, and Chinese.

The law concerning fundamental provisions on elections and voter registries/ Seçimlerin Temel Hükümleri ve Seçmen Kütükleri Hakkında Kanun (No. 298, Adopted April 26, 1961)

Article 58: ....It is forbidden to use any other language or script than Turkish in propaganda disseminated in radio or television as well as in other election propaganda.

Press Law/ Basın Kanunu (No. 5680, Adopted July 15, 1950)

**Article 1:** The press is free.

The publishing of printed works is subject to the written directives in this law.

**Article 16—Criminal responsibility for crimes committed by means of the press—(Amended 1983/2950)**

1. The responsibility for crimes committed in periodicals belongs, together with the person who caused the crime, whether the writer, news writer, artist, or caricaturist, to the periodical’s responsible editor. However, punishment’s depriving liberty given to responsible editors without regard to their duration shall be converted to monetary fines.... Responsible editors cannot be punished with security detention.

2. The responsible editor is not required to give the name of writers, news writers, artists, or caricaturists who publish with a pen name or alias. Without regard to the first paragraph, the responsibility for a writing, or a news report, or a picture, or a caricature, where the author of a work is not clear or where the author’s names is not revealed in a true manner by the responsible editor at the latest during the first court interrogation, shall fall to the responsible editor as if he were the person who through writing, or news writing, or making a picture or caricature caused the crime.

3. The responsible editor is not responsible for writings, news, pictures, or caricatures published by the periodical’s owner without his approval. Under such circumstances, the legal responsibility of the responsible editor belongs to the person who publishes the writing, news, picture, or caricature.

4. In crimes that are committed in publications that are not defined as periodicals [books], the legal responsibility belongs to the publisher together with the writer, translator, or artist. However, regardless of the duration, all verdicts giving the penalty of imprisonment for the publisher shall be converted to fines. Computation of the fine is based on the amount mentioned in the Law No. 647 on the Execution of Penalties, Article 4, Paragraph 1. Publishers are not to be penalized with security detention.

In the case where the author of the printed work published as a non-periodical is not identified, the responsibility belongs to the publisher without regard to the aforementioned articles. In the case when the work is published without the knowledge and consent of its writer, translator, or artist, only the publisher becomes responsible as if the one who created the work.

When the above mentioned persons are not identified or a case in a Turkish court is not opened against them, the responsibility belongs to the seller and distributor when the publisher is not known.

In quotations that are made in publications published in Turkey without the consent of the owner, the responsibility belongs to the one who made the quote.

If publication is made in any language prohibited by law, the relevant articles which envision converting into monetary fines and of not giving a penalty of placing under security detention shall not be applied.

**Article 31—(Amended 1983/2950):** The entry or distribution into Turkey of works published in a foreign country that contradict the indivisible unity of the state with its territory and nation, national hegemony, the existence of the Republic, national security, public order, general law and order, the common good, general morality or health can be outlawed by a decision of the Council of Ministers.

Provincial Administration Law/ Idaresi Kanunu (No. 5442, Adopted June 10, 1949)
Article 2/d/2 (Amended 1959:7267): Village names that are not Turkish and give rise to confusion are to be changed in the shortest possible time by the Interior Ministry after receiving the opinion of the Provincial Permanent Committee.

Police Duty and Responsibility Law/ Polis Vazife ve Selâhiyet Kanunu (No. 2559, Adopted July 4, 1934)

Article 8—(Amended: 1985/3233): If the police are in possession of incontrovertible evidence and by order of the district’s highest civil servant, areas where plays are conducted, presentations given, films or videos shown that will damage the indivisible unity of the state with its territory and nation, constitutional order, or general security or common morality can be closed by the police or have their activities stopped. If the reason for the closing or ceasing of activities requires a legal investigation by the state, the investigation file shall be immediately given to the judiciary....

The Law concerning crimes committed against Atatürk/ Atatürk Aleyhine İlenen Suçlar Hakkında Kanun (No. 5816, Adopted July 25, 1951)

Article 1: Anyone who publicly insults or curses the memory of Atatürk shall be imprisoned with a heavy sentence of between one and three years. A heavy sentence of between one and five years shall be given to anyone who destroys, breaks, ruins, or defaces a statue, bust, or monuments representing Atatürk or the grave of Atatürk. Anyone who encourages others to commit the crimes outlined in the paragraphs above will be punished as if committing the crime.

Article 2: If the crimes outlined in the first article are committed by a group of two or more individuals, or publicly, or in public districts or by means of the press will have the penalty imposed increased by a proportion of one-half. If the crimes outlined in the second paragraph of the first article are committed using force...the penalty will be doubled.
### APPENDIX 5.3.

#### Table 5.3.1. Durable goods in possession of household by ethnicity, 1993 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Kurdish Urban</th>
<th>Kurdish Rural</th>
<th>Kurdish Total</th>
<th>Turkish Urban</th>
<th>Turkish Rural</th>
<th>Turkish Total</th>
<th>Total Urban</th>
<th>Total Rural</th>
<th>Total Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Refrigerator</td>
<td>88.4</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>96.2</td>
<td>79.3</td>
<td>90.7</td>
<td>94.7</td>
<td>74.1</td>
<td>87.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oven</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>81.8</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>69.8</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>62.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washing machine</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>76.1</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>53.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dishwasher</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vacuum cleaner</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>74.8</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>49.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television</td>
<td>83.6</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>76.1</td>
<td>95.7</td>
<td>83.7</td>
<td>91.8</td>
<td>92.8</td>
<td>75.5</td>
<td>86.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Video recorder</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio cassette player</td>
<td>68.7</td>
<td>76.8</td>
<td>72.2</td>
<td>83.0</td>
<td>75.9</td>
<td>80.7</td>
<td>79.2</td>
<td>72.2</td>
<td>76.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Music set</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>57.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Car</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 30 books</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total number of households</strong></td>
<td>495</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>823</td>
<td>3525</td>
<td>1714</td>
<td>5239</td>
<td>5563</td>
<td>3056</td>
<td>8619</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: TDHS 1993 household data*
Appendices

**APPENDIX 6.1.**

Table 6.1.1. Some characteristics of household by ethnicity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of persons per sleeping room</th>
<th>Non-migrant</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>52.30%</th>
<th>29.80%</th>
<th>36.40%</th>
<th>47.70%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>35.80%</td>
<td>45.80%</td>
<td>59.10%</td>
<td>38.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3 and 4</td>
<td>11.00%</td>
<td>21.30%</td>
<td>4.50%</td>
<td>12.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5 and more</td>
<td>0.80%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>56.70%</td>
<td>34.60%</td>
<td>50.00%</td>
<td>50.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>37.50%</td>
<td>39.30%</td>
<td>50.00%</td>
<td>38.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3 and 4</td>
<td>5.10%</td>
<td>24.30%</td>
<td></td>
<td>10.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5 and more</td>
<td>0.70%</td>
<td>1.80%</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.90%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Roofing of the house                | Non-migrant | manufactured | 75.10% | 43.90% | 71.40% | 59.10% |
|                                     |             | mud earth | 24.90% | 56.10% | 28.60% | 30.90% |
| Migrant                             | manufactured | 83% | 74.50% |        |       | 80.80% |
|                                     | mud earth | 17.00% | 25.50% |       |       | 19.20% |

| Type of toilet                      | Non-migrant | Flush toilet | 39.10% | 17.80% | 14.30% | 34.60% |
|                                     |             | open pit | 12.10% | 38.70% | 38.10% | 17.70% |
|                                     |             | Latrine | 46.70% | 40.90% | 47.60% | 45.60% |
|                                     |             | none | 1.70% | 2.70% |       | 1.90% |
| Migrant                             | Flush toilet | 27.20% | 11.30% | 50.00% | 23.10% |
|                                     | open pit | 21.10% | 19.80% | 50.00% | 20.90% |
|                                     | Latrine | 50.30% | 65.10% |       | 54.00% |
|                                     | none | 1.40% | 3.80% |       | 2.00% |

| Source of water                     | Non-migrant | piped into house | 59.88% | 49.77% | 28.57% | 57.39% |
|                                     |             | well | 16.13% | 20.44% | 14.28% | 16.92% |
|                                     |             | natural-other | 23.99% | 29.79% | 57.15% | 25.69% |
| Migrant                             | piped into house | 57.10% | 48.50% | 100% | 55.10% |
|                                     | well | 19.40% | 27.10% |       | 21.30% |
|                                     | natural-other | 23.50% | 24.40% |       | 24.60% |

| Water use method                    | Non-migrant | Private | 85.60% | 61.50% | 66.70% | 80.90% |
|                                     |             | Shared | 14.40% | 38.50% | 33.30% | 19.10% |
| Migrant                             | Private | 89.70% | 81.30% | 100.00% | 87.60% |
|                                     | Shared | 10.30% | 18.80% |       | 12.40% |

| Total Non-Migrants                  | 931 | 226 | 21 | 1178 |
| Migrants                            | 293 | 106 | 2 | 401 |

*Source: TIMS 1996 household data*
APPENDIX 9.1.
Pictures from the field research in Germany, 1999

GELİN CANLAR BİR OLALIM!

Köln ve Çevresi Anadolu
Aleviler Birliği
Vogelsanger str- 10
50 823 Köln
Tel: 0221/5626025
Fax: 0221/5626028

HAK DERGAHINDA
TEK CAN, TEK NEFES,
İRİ OLALIM, DİRİ OLALIM

Summer 1999 Activities flyer of the Cologne Kurdish Alevi Association
Appendices

Kurdish crowd in 1999 Kurdistan Festival in Dortmund Stadium

Abdullah Öcalan’s recorded video speech in 1999 Kurdistan Festival
Appendices

Kurdish crowd in 1999 Kurdistan Festival

Map of Kurdistan drawn on the grass in Dortmund Stadion
Flyer of Şengül Şenol, PDS candidate for Mayor of Cologne in 1999 elections
Die Freiluftsststellung Xaniyê Gel wurde erstmals in Düsseldorf, dann in München und Heidelberg vorge stellt. Tausende Menschen wurden von diesem Projekt angezogen. In dieser Freiluftsstellung wird im Zeitraum von 06.06. - 20.06.1999 in einem „Museumsdorf“ das kurdische Dorflleben erfahrbar gemacht. 


Die Ausstellung wird durch Theateraufführungen, Filme, Konzerte, Tänze, Vorträge, kurdische Spezialitäten und sowie durch eine vorgereiste Hochzeit mit allen dazu gehörigen Brauchum ergänzt.

06.06. - 20.06.1999
An der Schaanz
Riebler - AUF
Nähe Jugendgästehaus (DHL) / Köln - Riehl

Invitation flyer for 1999 Xaneye Gel (Kurdish Village) Exhibition in Cologne
Appendices

1999 Xaneye Gel (Kurdish Village) Exhibition in Cologne

1999 Xaneye Gel (Kurdish Village) Exhibition in Cologne
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