Professionalisation of election campaigning in South Korea

Joo Yeon Lee

Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

The University of Leeds
Institute of Communications Studies

August 2013
The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

This copy has been supplied on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement.

The right of Joo Yeon Lee to be identified as Author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

© 2013 Joo Yeon Lee and the University of Leeds.
Acknowledgements

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to the following people, whom I would like to thank.

First of all, I gratefully acknowledge the academic support from three great supervisors, Prof. Gary Rawnsley, Dr. Robin Brown, and Dr. Katrin Voltmer. They always encouraged me a lot and their invaluable support always gave me fresh ideas and the courage to finish this – the hardest journey I have ever met in my whole life.

I also have to send special thanks to my family. During my course, they always stayed with me and tried to listen to all of my concerns and worries. In particular, my parents respected what I want to be and gave me huge courage to study abroad to achieve my own dream. In addition, my sister was always happy to be my best friend and did not mind talking with me, disregarding the time and place. Thus, I could feel that I am not alone and depressed too much whenever I was homesick. If I imagined that I did not have their huge support and encouragement, I definitely would not have been able to finish and approach this final stage.

I must thanks to my husband who has taken the greater part of my long PhD journey with me. Although he was always busy doing his work in South Korea and we had to live separately during my course, he always paid attention to me and tried to hear my constant grumbling. Therefore, it would not have been possible to finish this PhD project without his respect about my career and future life. I always think that you are the best husband to me in the world.

I would like to thank my all friends in the UK and South Korea and the ICS colleagues who were happy to meet and talk with me and concerned about me.
during my academic years in the UK. Thanks especially to Helen Wong and Bingqing Xia, Dr. Daniel Mutibwa, Eun-Ji, Cho who encouraged me and cheer me up whenever I was depressed.

Last but not least, I must send special thanks to Prof. Jong-ki, Kim, Prof. Chun-sik, Kim and Sang-wook, Lee and Su-wok Park and all interviewees of this thesis.
Abstract

In recent years, many scholars in the field of political communication have discussed professionalisation of election campaigning in dealing with the development of mass media and technology as well as the increased demand for external campaign professionals in the political process. It is true that parties have struggled to manage these on-going alterations efficiently as well as scientifically to attract more voter attention within their limited budget. Naturally, political parties need to seek external campaign professionals’ helps to make a more professionalised election campaign.

Accordingly, this research utilises two different dimensions – external and internal - to figure out the notion of professionalisation in election campaigning. Firstly, this research aims to demonstrate how and by how much political parties’ presidential election campaigns in South Korea have become more technically sophisticated in mass media mobilisation and the adaptation of new technologies. Secondly, this research will look at how the relationship between external campaign professionals and political parties has been changed and how political parties have made their organisation more ‘systemic’ and ‘tactical’ using communication technologies.

To answer these research purposes, this research will choose three presidential elections (1997, 2002 and 2007) and two major parties – the Grand National Party and the Democratic Party - in South Korea. This will enable the researcher to look at historical alterations and compare election campaign strategies between each of the parties to figure out whether they seek different campaign strategies, and, if so, why they choose differently. Therefore, this research will analyse the data of 25 semi-structured interviews conducted with campaign managers who either were or are inside one of the party organisations and of external campaign professionals who are outside the party organisations in three different periods to answer the research questions.
As a result of the above, this research found that professionalisation of Korean election campaigns is underway because both parties have tried to adopt new campaign practices and manage their organisation in a more efficient way. However, due to strict campaign regulations in South Korea, this finally led to the situation that parties cannot invest money into designing competitive campaign strategies through the liberal use of mass media and campaign technology. In addition to this, it is confirmed that both parties have increased the number of external campaign professionals in order to deal with new campaign practices and the relationship between parties and external campaign professionals has become a business relationship.
The table of contents

Acknowledgement
Abstract
List of Tables
List of Figures
List of Abbreviations

Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1. Research background ................................................................. 1
1.2. Research questions ........................................................................ 4
1.3. The process of democratisation and the changing media environment in South Korea ................................................................. 8
1.4. The definition of key terms in this study ........................................... 16
1.5. Chapter structure ........................................................................... 18

Chapter 2 Literature Reviews
2.1. Introduction ................................................................................... 20
2.2. The growth of professionalisation in election campaigning .............. 22
   2.2.1. The evolution of election campaigning ...................................... 22
   2.2.2. Americanisation and Modernisation in election campaign literature ..... 25
   2.2.3. The conceptualisation of professionalisation of election campaigning ... 29
   2.2.4. Dimension of professionalisation of election campaigning ........... 34
2.3. The external dimension of professionalisation of election campaigning ....... 37
2.4. The internal dimension of professionalisation of election campaigning ....... 38
   2.4.1. The definition of campaign professionals in election campaigning ....... 38
2.4.2. The relationship between campaign professionals and political parties .42
2.4.3. The alteration of political parties as campaign organisation .............46
2.5. Summary of this chapter .................................................................48

Chapter 3 Case study: South Korea

3.1. Introduction ....................................................................................50
3.2. Political system ..............................................................................51
  3.2.1. The history of democratization in South Korea .........................51
  3.2.2. The history of political parties and political regionalism ..........55
  3.2.3. The historical alteration of party structure ...............................58
3.3. Media system ..................................................................................67
3.4. Campaign regulations ....................................................................70
3.5. The review of the style of previous election campaigns before the 1997
    presidential elections .................................................................73

Chapter 4 Research Methodology

4.1. Introduction ....................................................................................76
4.2. Overview of case study .................................................................78
4.3. The rationale of the South Korean case ........................................80
4.4. The period of the research .............................................................84
4.5. Description of semi-structured interview data materials ...............87
  4.5.1. The general scope of interviews ...............................................87
  4.5.2. The scope of interviewees for semi-structured interviews ..........88
  4.5.3. The guide to the semi-structured interviews ............................95
  4.5.4. The process of semi-structured interview ...............................96
  4.5.5. Data analysis ...........................................................................98
Chapter 5  Results and discussion

5.1. Introduction .................................................................104
5.2. Political situation in South Korea from 1997 to 2007 .................105
5.3. The external dimension of professionalisation of election campaigning ..113
  5.3.1. The utilisation of media ..............................................114
  5.3.2. The utilisation of campaign technology ................................129
    5.3.2.1. The results of CAMPROF index ............................130
    5.3.2.2. The use of opinion polls .....................................134
  5.3.3. The alteration of campaign activities .............................141
    5.3.3.1. Political TV advertising ......................................142
    5.3.3.2. Political TV debates ..........................................160
  5.3.4. The discussion of labour-intensive and capital-intensive campaigns ..169
5.4. The internal dimension of professionalisation of election campaigning …178
  5.4.1. The influx of campaign professionals: the role and power .............178
  5.4.2. The relationship between campaign professionals and political parties 190
  5.4.3. The alteration of management of party organisation ....................200
5.5. Discussion about media-intensified campaign style in South Korea ......206

Chapter 6  Conclusion and discussion

6.1. Introduction ........................................................................216
6.2. The summary of the research ...............................................217
6.3. The summary of the results of this study .....................................221
6.3.1. The external dimension of professionalisation of election campaigning .................................................................223
6.3.2. The internal dimension of professionalisation of election campaigning .................................................................227
6.4. Limitation and suggestions for future studies ........................................231
   6.4.1. Limitations of semi-structured interviews ........................................231
   6.4.2. Suggestions for future studies .........................................................232

References .........................................................................................................................237

List of Appendices

  APPENDIX A. Campaign regulation in South Korea .................................267
  APPENDIX B. The historical changes of political advertising legislation ....268
  APPENDIX C. Semi-structured interview guide ..............................................269
  APPENDIX D. Method of analysis of interview data set .............................275
List of Tables

Table 2.1. Two approaches to the concept of Americanisation ..................27
Table 2.2. The definition of professionalisation of election campaigning ......32
Table 2.3. The dimension of professionalisation of election campaigning ......36
Table 3.1. The number of voters in two regions in South Korea .................55
Table 3.2. Vote Share of each candidate of the GNP and DP ...................56
Table 3.3. Political Party Typology .....................................................61
Table 4.1. Party creation and the number of members of the National Assembly ..................................................................................83
Table 4.2. The alteration of ruling party in South Korea .........................83
Table 4.3. Information of the each presidential election from 1997 to 2007.....84
Table 4.4. Historical changes of the utilisation of mass media in South Korea..86
Table 4.5. The list of semi-structure interviewees ....................................95
Table 5.1. The historical alteration of the system of primary election ........111
Table 5.2. The alteration of campaign activities from the 1992 to the 1997 presidential elections .................................................................116
Table 5.3. The different strategy of political TV advertising between PR Bureau and special team for PR .........................................................150
Table 5.4. The historical change of the process method of political TV debates for presidential election .........................................................169
Table 5.5. The details of parties’ campaign expenditure in the 1997 presidential election .................................................................173
Table 5.6. The government subsidy for election expense in 2002..............174
Table 6.1. The comparison of electoral system in Asian countries...........236
List of Figures

Figure 1.1. The main political information route of voters .................................. 11
Figure 1.2. The difference of Political Information channels between generations ........................................................................................................................................ 13
Figure 2.1. Different type of political consultants ............................................. 44
Figure 3.1. The history of party structures since 1990 in South Korea .......... 58
Figure 3.2. Internet usage rate and Internet users in South Korea .............. 69
Figure 5.1. Candidate Lee Hoi-chang’s political TV advertisement (GNP) in the 1997 presidential election: ‘The Song of Victory’ .......................... 146
Figure 5.2. Kim Dae-jong’s political TV advertisement (DP) in the 1997 presidential election: ‘With DJ’ ................................................................. 148
Figure 5.3. Candidate Lee Hoi-chang’s political advertisement (GNP) in the 2002 presidential election: ‘Danger vs. Safety’ ........................................ 151
Figure 5.4. Candidate Rho Mu-hyun’s political advertisement (DP) in the 2002 presidential election: ‘Evergreen’ ......................................................... 153
Figure 5.5. Candidate Rho Mu-hyun’s political advertisement (DP) in the 2002 presidential election: ‘Tears’ ......................................................... 155
Figure 5.6. Candidate Lee Myung-bak’s political advertisement (GNP) in the 2007 presidential election: ‘Help me’ ......................................................... 157
Figure 5.7. Candidate Lee Myung-bak’s political advertisement (GNP) in the 2007 presidential election: ‘The foul-mouthed grandma’ ............ 158
Figure 5.8. Candidate Jeong Dong-yeong’s political advertisement (DP) in the 2007 presidential election: ‘Hip-hop talk’ ......................................... 159
List of Abbreviation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAMPROF</td>
<td>Campaign Professionalisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>Campaign Professionals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCC</td>
<td>Camp Created Contents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLP</td>
<td>Democratic Labour Party (Minjoo Rodong Dang in South Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>Democratic Party (Minjoo Dang in South Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>Grand Nation Party (Hannara Dang in South Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KISA</td>
<td>Korea Internet &amp; Security Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNEC</td>
<td>Korean National Election Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMP</td>
<td>New Millennium Party (Saejeongchi Kukminhoei in South Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMDP</td>
<td>New Millennium Democratic Party (Saecheonnyeon Minjoo Dang in South Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCC</td>
<td>Proteur Created Content</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCC</td>
<td>User Created Content</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United New Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTCOK</td>
<td>The United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1. Research background

The establishment of a healthy democracy has become of global concern. Many academic observers have explained that it can be realised through the participation of citizens in free and fair elections and open competition between political organisations (Dalton, Shin, and Jou, 2007). Amongst various political activities, the election is typically deemed as ‘an essential component of representative democracy’ (Norris, 2000, pp.1), creating a legitimate political competition for parties and candidates to acquire political authority to hold public office by voting (Webb, Eula, and Gibbons, 2013), and connection between voters and political actors. For this reason, parties and candidates try to maximise the voter’s political support based on the concept of persuasion and mobilisation of the public. In particular, these endeavours by parties and candidates to garner political support and to achieve their goal during elections emerge as the process of election campaigning (Farrell, 1996).

Election campaigning is considered as one of the key activities for political parties since it has a major impact in determining electoral outcome (Butler and Ranney, 1992; Webzine, 2010). To be specific, the importance of election campaigning has been the focus of an immense amount of academic interest in recent years because societal and electoral changes brought about by the arrival of a modernised society have rapidly influenced the political process (Swanson and Mancini, 1996; Mancini, 1999). Unlike previously where a high level of party loyalty and party attachment existed, nowadays, political parties have to woo voters via various kinds of methods in order to survive in the world of politics (Gibson and Römmele, 2001; Mair, Müller, and Plasser, 2004). This means that political parties have to devise a method to prolong their political life through all the creative skills they have in designing election campaigns. Naturally, such efforts by political parties or candidates are portrayed by means
of the efficient management of election campaigns, which consist of various
types of campaign professionals, and scientific campaign skills such as opinion
polling, telemarketing, narrowcasting, and structured and efficient party
organisation (Katz and Mair, 1994; Farrell, 1996; Gibson and Römele, 2009;
Tenscher, Mykkänen and Moring, 2012).

Furthermore, designing of distinctive campaign strategies using the latest
campaign techniques seems to be important nowadays (Farrell and Schmitt-Beck,
2002). Hence, this has led to the dramatic growth of campaign professionals and
political consultancy markets, and of private sectors to provide help for parties,
such as the designing of political advertising, image-making consultation and so
on. This has clearly been evident especially in the USA where the industry of
political consultancy and businesses regarding election campaign management
have been successfully established since the 1930s (Mancini, 1999) as well as in
some Asian countries. In other words, the cooperative relationship between
parties and campaign professionals, who can help parties or candidates in
conducting campaign activities through their specialised skills - including media
consultants, advertising companies, pollsters, and image coordinators for election
campaigns - is more essential nowadays, even if the level of its intensification
will differ according to the socio-political environment in a particular country.

Drawing on these observation, many scholars in the field of election campaigns
agree on the increased use of campaign professionals and efficient campaign
strategies, including the adoption of new campaign tools and new media as a key
features of contemporary campaigning (Herrnson, 1994; Mancini, 1999; Thurber,
2000; Plasser and Plasser, 2002; Scarrow, 2004). In addition, they concur with
the fact that political parties have continued to review campaigning practices and
have improved campaign strategies to correspond with the ever-changing
electoral environment. As a result, academics have begun using the term
'professionalisation' to understand these current alterations of election campaigns
in modern society (Mancini 1999).
Similarly, Rawnsley's (2006) maintains that social liberalisation and political democratisation, including constitutional reforms and liberalisation of the media, has led to far-reaching changes in election communication, which in turn has led to "a growing of professionalisation of election campaigning that is evident in the way candidates communicate with the voters, mobilize their supports and respond to changes in public opinion" (pp.114). That is, it can be assumed that the meaning of professionalisation in the election campaign arena is connected to the improvement of campaign strategy, including the phenomenon of the extensive use of campaign professionals, in response to ever-changing electoral environment because liberalised media do no longer serve as a mouthpiece of political elites.

In particular, given that an election campaign is defined as the process by which a campaign organisation such as candidate, parties, and special interest groups approach their final aims (Farrell, 1996, pp.161), designing a strategic election campaign is a principal requirement for political parties to meet their goals such as the maintenance of their political lives. Put more descriptively, Butler and Ranney (1992) explained that it is notable that parties should consider not only what voters want and need, but also how their chosen political issues and arguments should be presented to the public to maximise votes when creating election strategies. Besides this, they have to think about how their organisation could be the most efficiently structured and which media and other techniques will help to transmit their message most directly. That is, ultimately, the most decisive factor – on which victory or failure can depend – is how well the parties produce strategies and how well they utilise the newest campaign techniques.

Taking all things into consideration, it is important to examine the phenomenon of the professionalisation of election campaigns from the perspective of party organisation. In particular, when the professionalisation of election campaigns is examined, two important matters should be considered. Firstly, understanding the process of political and media development in a given country is essential for investigating professionalisation of election campaigns, as these elements are
important factors that lead to the alteration of election campaigns (Plasser and Plasser, 2002; Karlsen, 2010b; Rawnsley, 2006; Karslen, 2010). Secondly, it is important to investigate how individual parties differ in their response to ongoing changes in the electoral environment, because they do not try to adopt new media and campaign skills at the same time (Gibson and Römmele, 2001).

Therefore, this research aims to analyse the historical changes in campaign practices and organisational structure adopted by political parties and the impact of campaign professionals on party organisation in South Korea over a 10-year period. Furthermore, this study investigates whether the alteration of election campaigns in South Korea could be explained in the context of professionalisation theory. In doing this, this research focuses on two different parties—the Grand National Party (GNP) and the Democratic Party (DP)—to study the professionalisation of election campaigns in South Korea. The research involves semi-structured interviews with campaign managers inside party organisations and campaign professionals, and an analysis of campaign material used by the two main parties in three elections between 1997 and 2007.

1.2. Research questions

The current studies of professionalisation of election campaigns tend to be more focused on the alterations in election campaign activities caused by the development of mass media and campaign technology and the extensive use of campaign professionals, rather than the inside changes of party organisation, e.g. the alteration of relationship between parties and campaign professionals, and of the organisational map (Agranoff, 1976; Butler and Ranney, 1992; Sparrow, 2004; Schaffer, 2006). Although a few studies of changes to party organisation in relation to the growth of campaign professionals in election campaigns have been accomplished (Farrell and Webb, 2000; Gibson and Römmele, 2009), these studies seem far away from the common occurrences in explaining the process of alteration of election campaigning from a broad perspective. For example, some academics have stated their concerns about party decline as a final consequence
of professionalisation (Green and Smith, 2003), especially in the USA where candidate-focused campaigns have intensified; whereas other scholars have insisted that the phenomenon of party decline would not happen in some European countries such as the UK, which has a strong party-focused campaign style (Farrell and Webb, 2000; Norris, 2000; Kolodny and Dulio, 2003). This means that the results of some studies, which focused on several cases in the USA and in European countries, cannot be applied to other countries, such as those in Asia, which do not have a similar political- and economic- system.

With the aforementioned research interests, this research will address the growing effect of mass media and new technologies and the accompanying influx of campaign professionals into party organisations whilst discussing the professionalisation of election campaigns in South Korea. Therefore, it will firstly demonstrate how and by how much Korean parties’ presidential election campaigns have become more sophisticated as a consequence of mass media mobilisation and the adaptation of new technologies. Secondly, it will investigate how much Korean parties have increased the use of campaign professionals to improve their campaign skills, and how the relationship between political parties and campaign professionals has changed. Thirdly, it will analyse how and by how much political parties have made their organisation more ‘systemic’ and ‘tactical’ by using communication technologies in the context of a more professionalised model of party communication.

Amongst the studies which deal with both alteration of campaign activities and party organisation, Gibson and Römmele (2009, p.267-268) identify four different campaign activities where professionalisation might frequently occur:

‘Firstly, the adoption of new tools (high-tech and computerised) and intensification of existing methods (opinion polling, focus groups); Secondly, a shift in the overall style of campaigning to a more capital-intensive and continuous mode; Thirdly, a re-orientation in the relationship with the electorate toward a more interactive and individualised engagement; Finally, the
Given this classification, the main research questions and hypotheses are designed to identify the degree of professionalisation of election campaigns in South Korea, and to do so within the context of overall alteration of election campaigning. The questions are classified according to two dimensions of professionalisation, external and internal, which we may assume as the major changes in campaign activities and party organisation. In particular, professionalisation theory in this research will be divided into two different dimensions, external and internal alteration of professionalisation, through an analysis of underlying theoretical frameworks: the external dimension will include the alteration of campaign practices caused by the adoption of developing mass media and technologies in designing election campaign, whilst the internal dimension will focus on the alteration of political parties as campaign organisations resulting from the influx of campaign professionals. Therefore, each dimension leads to its own hypotheses:

The external dimension of professionalisation of election campaigning

Q1. The adoption of new tools and intensification of existing methods:
What and how differences in campaign activities were accomplished by the utilisation of mass media and new campaign technology in each presidential election? Has this finally led to the alteration of campaign style? How have the Korean parties responded to these new tools of communication?

H1-1: Political parties will try to approach their work differently especially after an election defeat, including using contemporary communication technologies and campaigning practices.

H1-2: New campaign styles caused by media and campaign technology developments will therefore become more capital-intensive.
The internal dimension of professionalisation of election campaigning

Q2. The influx of campaign professionals:
What kind of campaign activities have campaign professionals performed in the presidential election campaigns between 1997 and 2007? How has the relationship between party personnel and campaign professionals changed?

H2: Political parties will try to increase the engagement of campaign professionals to improve their campaign strategies, especially in the adoption of new campaign skills and electoral environment.

H2-1: The hierarchy in decision-making for election campaigns will change from a top-down structure to a more flat hierarchy because of the growing influx of external campaign professionals.

Q3. The alteration of political parties as campaign organisations:
Does the increased influx of professional consultants into the party organisation result in centralisation of the party organisation? How have parties changed their organisation since the introduction of campaign professionals?

H3-1: Political parties will be centralised to manage their resources efficiently as well as effectively.

H3-2: Political parties will be focused on training their party personnel to be more ‘professional (or skilful)’ in managing mass media and new technology efficiently.

H3-3: Political parties will expand their organisation to deal with mass media and new technology, and will therefore concentrate investment on developing these departments within their organisation.
1.3. The process of democratisation and the changing media environment in South Korea

This study selects South Korea as a single-case study to investigate professionalisation of election campaigns. Accordingly, it is important to explain why this study chooses South Korea rather than other countries. According to Yin (2009), it is most important to select a case in which the phenomena that lead to theoretical conception can be observed extensively. Although Merkens (2004) stated the accessibility of a case is the most important factor in choosing a suitable case, this section concentrates on an explanation of why South Korea was chosen for a single-case study and why this case is suitable to examine professionalisation of election campaigns.

Before starting to explore the South Korean case, it is worth knowing what kinds of factors will be important to examine professionalisation theory. Mancini (1999) explains that the term professionalisation has been popular due to the results of telecommunication development, which could affect the change of social systems. In particular, he argues that professionalisation in the field of campaigning can be divided into areas where campaign professionals are engaged. Moreover, it is important to acknowledge the process of democratisation in South Korea to understand the alteration of election campaigns. Thus, this section explains briefly about the three main points regarding to South Korea such as the process of democratisation, media-oriented campaigning, and use of campaign professionals.

**Democratisation in South Korea**

Democratic elections in South Korea were held from the 1987 presidential election onward. Although presidential elections prior to the 1987 presidential election appeared to take on the form of a democratic election, these elections had the basic structure of non-democratic elections (Jeong, 2002).
Political power of the ruling party (GNP) was still strong in the 1987 election due to the bias in seats of proportional representatives of local constituencies rather than the other parties. Many difficulties plagued minor parties, whereas entrance into politics having been easy for larger parties, which discharged many assemblymen to local districts. Such problems in the political system caused many disadvantages for minor parties.

Although a change in the political system proceeded slowly, the ruling party, which was able to monopolise funds prior to the period of military regime, could not maintain its exclusive access to funds, as post-transition regulations incorporated an equal distribution system as a matter of principle starting with the 1987 presidential election (Seo, 2008).

Until the 1997 presidential election, strong regionalism in South Korea enabled one party (GNP) to be able to rule for a prolonged period of 40 years, starting from the previous republic era. However, the GNP, which advocated an autocratic rule for the following 40 years, initiated a historical political change in the 1997 presidential election. The 1997 presidential election is therefore considered an important period of regime transition and a milestone in the democratization process. At the same time, the government widely allowed campaign activities using mass media. As a result, these political and media developments created a new electoral environment for political parties. Although a change in government occurred again in the 2007 presidential elections, it cannot be denied that such political development and liberalisation of mass media largely affect the alteration of election campaigns.

---

10 In the context of political communication, regionalism means that voters in a particular region are supportive of a particular candidate or political party, depending on their political ideology. However, the meaning of regionalism in South Korea differs slightly, because a sense of party belonging is expressed strongly depending on a region rather than political ideology.
Media-oriented election campaigning

With so many rapid changes in the political and electoral environments, parties and candidates in South Korea have radically overhauled their campaign strategies recently. Academics in South Korea are worried that parties are weakening gradually, transforming into the type of electoral-professional party that highlights election success over everyday practice and requires an ever-increasing number of campaign professionals to co-ordinate responses to the ever-changing electoral environment (Park and Jang, n.d.; Sun, 2009; Park, 2006). Furthermore, election campaigns in South Korea are tending to become more media-oriented (Lee and Lee, 2004; Kim and Kim, 2005). According to Lee and Lee (2004), South Korean parties have invested huge amounts in the use of mass media, whilst an official election research document by the Korean National Election Commission (1998, 2003 and 2008a) states that most voters are influenced by mass media, especially television and newspaper. As seen in Figure 1.1, TV was chosen by voters as the first main route to obtain political information in each presidential election and newspaper was the second one. In this graph, the important thing is that the proportion of the use of newspaper as a main route in obtaining political information has gradually decreased whilst the percentage of the Internet has steadily increased.

In particular, since 2000, the strong effects of the mass media on voters and their rapidly evolving use of and response to that mass media have caused an increase in the level of unpredictability during a campaign. Accordingly, the advance of the information society in South Korea has prompted many news articles to comment that the influence of mass media goes beyond mere information communication. These news articles also argue that the Internet will soon be acknowledged as one of the main communication tools in election campaigns, given the characteristics of the Internet such as the power of interactivity and the freedom of networking without geographical limitations (Sun, 2009; Lee, 2006; Kwon, 2006; Kang, 2002; Lee, 2009).
More specifically, in South Korea, there are reasons why online campaigns are considered so essential even though the Internet only featured for the first time in the 2000 general election. Firstly, this is the fastest growing Internet industry in Korean society. The number of Internet users in South Korea exceeded 24 million in 2000, which is three-quarters of Korean voters, and over 7,000,000 households are now accessing super-speed communication networks. The spread of the Internet in Korea is the fastest among Asian countries and, according to a recent report of the Korea Internet & Security Agency, the number of Internet users per household is the largest in Asia.

Secondly, in the 16th presidential election in 2002, 55.7% of candidates running for the National Assembly had Internet websites: presidential candidate Rho Muhyun, Rho was supported by an Internet community called Rosado, whose activities produced effects as powerful as other ordinary election campaigns, spotlighting the importance of Internet media (Kang, 2002; Lee, 2009). Such communities are different from candidates’ websites in that supporters of a specific candidate gather out of ideological and voluntary intention to carry out advertising, mobilisation and fundraising activities. This type of community was quite effective as they had a high level of solidarity, clear political goals and

---

1 Source: The official reports of the Presidential Election, KNEC (1998, 2003, and 2008a)
shared political information among their members. With these characteristics, they succeeded in engaging in activities equivalent to ordinary election campaigns and in increasing support for their candidate. This phenomenon stemmed from an attempt to increase voter turnout among the younger generation, who are increasingly uninterested in politics (Kang, 2008; Hwang, 2006; Yun, 2008). As a result, almost all South Korean parties have invested money in online political activities, and political parties’ awareness of the importance of the Internet as one of the primary mass media tools which can be used in election campaigns has increased. Consequently, all these changes have led to an increase in the rate of employment of skilful Internet professionals (Sun, 2009).

However, these changes in the electoral environment caused by the development of mass media require parties to be more accurate in targeting their campaigns because voters have much greater access to political information. As seen in Figure 1.2, for instance, voters in a 20-30 age group use the Internet as a major source of political information, more so than the older generation. Hwang (2006) suggests that a large number of the voters, who often visit parties or candidates’ websites and are politically active on the Internet, are probably of the younger generation. Therefore, the parties need to consider more sophisticated campaign strategies based on their own detailed target research since the emergence of the digital divide between generations. Consequently, online campaign strategies, have received much attention from parties, candidates, and political science theorists as their latent efficiency has become increasingly clear.
Use of campaign professionals

Since election campaigns became media-oriented in 1998, South Korean parties have had to face new problems, deal with many new difficulties, and be evermore creative in their strategic planning. These parties have naturally sought out experts in various fields such as politics, media, and even computer science in order to create efficient election campaigns. Political consultants in the US have been working actively since the 1980s (Sabato, 1981); the current situation in South Korea seems to be that of a transition period from the initial to the middle stages, but not the mature stage, in the use of such campaign professionals in party organisations.

Therefore, there was relatively little academic discussion about the problems, effects or the change of campaign strategies that resulted from the influx of Korean campaign professionals. Another reason for the absence of academic discussions about these subjects before the 1997 presidential election, which was focused on the style of a traditional campaign, is that voters at least had strong

---

Figure 1.2. The difference of Political Information channels between generations\(^1\)

\(^1\) Source: The official report of the Presidential Election (KNEC, 2007)
party identification: political parties could easily mobilise voters when required, and campaign professionals were needed only to work on the production of political advertising during the election period. Consequently, the influence caused by the influx of campaign professionals into the political process was excluded as a major consideration by the parties. However, the development of mass media and technology in the late 1990s and the growing use of campaign professionals in election campaigns have radically altered the campaign process in South Korea. Since then, campaign styles have become ‘media-oriented’ and ‘image-oriented’ and so more volatile than traditional campaigns that could assume stable voting behaviour (Jeong, 2002).

There were two landmark changes in the electoral environment, which are directly related to the growth of campaign professionals in party organisations, in South Korea in the 21st century. Firstly, the revision of electoral law has given parties and candidates more freedom to use opinion polls during campaigning (Kim and Kim, 2005; Sun, 2009). Importantly, since the DP\(^2\) attempted to open the primary election for the 2002 presidential election, the importance of the pollster as one type of campaign professional has increased. Secondly, the arrival of the Internet facilitated improvements to communication systems within parties and in campaign strategies, intensifying the need to hire campaign professionals (Kang, 2002; Kang, 2008).

Therefore, even though the influx of campaign professionals into party organisations is relatively recent in South Korea, it is true that their influence and the speed of development is as fast as ever (Weekly Han kook, 04/Apil/2007; Weekly kyunghyong, 17/July/2007). Furthermore, according to the recent documents of the National Election Commission in South Korea (2007), it is reported that parties have been increasing their budgets for the employment of skilled campaign professionals such as media consultants, advertising companies, pollsters, and image coordinators for election campaigns.

\(^2\) The official name of DP in the 2002 presidential election was New Millennium Democratic Party (NMDP).
On the other hand, a lot of research about election campaigning in South Korea has concentrated on the fragmentary results such as the utilisation and the effect of media (Kim, 2002; Jeong, 2003; Jang, 2008), the effect of political advertising (Kim and Kim, 1998; Kim and Kim, 2005; Lee, 2008; Choi, 2008) and negative campaigns (Kim, 2004; Kang, 2009a), rather than looking at the evolution of election campaign in a broad sense. Although they explain that some changes of election campaign style were caused by on-going electoral environment, this was as one of the elements in the explanation of the current problems or situations in South Korea rather than detailed information of how Korean campaign style has been altered and how parties have improved their campaign strategies in a historical context. This is clearly shown in Song and Park’s research (2007). They reviewed studies on election campaign activities conducted thus far and proposed suggestions for election campaign studies as follows: 1) theoretical framework or reasoning tools should be developed for the purpose of explaining the mass media effect in a systematic and detailed way, and 2) a systematic theory is needed, which can explain how a voter's selection of a candidate depends on the type of campaign message from a wider perspective.

In particular, the most remarkable alteration in Korean campaign studies is that many studies have focused on the way of developing candidate image and the analysis of political TV advertising from the 2000s onwards because of the strong effects that TV has had on election campaigning. For example, Lee (2006) examined a cognitive mechanism inducing concrete feelings in voters towards a certain candidate and analysed how mass media campaigns affect the role of such a mechanism in elections. Accordingly, this study used five cognitive assessment factors (issue proximity, political interest, leadership evaluation, morality evaluation, inner political efficacy) to find out voters’ emotional response to candidates, based on the cognitive evaluation theory of psychology. This study found that voters’ feelings are based not on unreasonable elements, but on their cognitive evaluation of a candidate, which was analysed to have an important effect on the selection of a candidate and political participation in existing theoretic discussion on voting practices.
Curiously, despite the scholars’ increased interest in scientific tools and effective strategy in election campaigns, few Korean scholars have attempted to explain the evolution of election campaigning. Although there are some arguments that Korean campaigns have become modernised and Americanised, these studies do not provide specific information about how each party has responded to these modern technology and communication tools, or about how they have continued to improve their campaign skills to achieve their aim. Instead, most electoral research in South Korea has focused on the possible effects of modern campaigning such as political cynicism and the change of political participation, and the method of campaign strategies such as the efficient design of campaign messages via analysis of voters’ behaviour. Especially, such studies applying professionalisation theory in explaining the evolution of election campaign are very hard to find in South Korea. Thus, this study will provide a different perspective to look at the historical changes of election campaign, such as how political parties’ campaign activities have been changed in response to the ongoing development of media and technology and how a changed electoral environment affects political parties’ organisation.

1.4. The definition of key terms in this study

**Professionalisation of election campaign**

The rapid changes in election campaigning and the large variety of new campaign strategies and tools have made it necessary to develop new theoretical concepts to systemically describe and explain these developments. Naturally, research agendas have developed the concept of professionalisation to explain this phenomenon (Blumer, Kavanagh, and Nossiter 1996; Farrell and Webb 2000; Lilleker and Negrine 2002). Therefore, this study will employ the concept of professionalisation to analyse the changes that are going on in election campaigning in South Korea.

3 Alternative concepts will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.
In general, the scope of professionalisation in election campaigns can be interpreted from different perspectives. For instance, some scholars point out that the professionalised campaign is connected to the increased use of campaign professionals by political parties (Mancini, 1999; Plasser and Plasser, 2002). Other academics look at professionalisation as strategic vote management (Plasser and Plasser, 2002) or as the essential changes in the relationship between political system and media system (Holtz-Bacha, 2007). From another point of view, Negrine and his colleagues (2007) argue that changes in campaign practice stem from notions of modernisation, a continual process that naturally tends to replicate across borders. In this sense, professionalisation is a kind of modernisation and is a natural process that does not stress one particular field such as growth of new communication technology. They also stated professionalisation allows chasing the changes that have been presented from thoughts, activities and concerns of a party in the past. Although each scholar has a somewhat different viewpoint in giving a definition of professionalised campaign, they agree that professionalised campaign should be linked with the process of change in party organisation. That is, it can be generally interpreted that using the concept of professionalisation in election campaigning it is possible to detect a relationship between evolution of the use of a campaign practice and the alteration of a party organisation. Therefore, professionalisation of election campaigns is defined for this research as a continuous review process of each party to design a competitive campaign in response to the alteration of socio-political environments and the parties’ unceasing efforts to deal with new mass media, campaign technology and campaign professionals.

**The key dimension of professionalisation of election campaigning**

Based on an investigation of previous research in professionalisation of election campaigning, two different dimensions are deduced by which to examine professionalisation theory throughout the South Korean case. Briefly, the external dimension is about the results of the alteration of election campaigning caused by the adoption of mass media and campaign technology, whilst the
internal dimension is about the results of the alteration of party organisation resulting from the increased use of campaign professionals. Accordingly, these two dimensions have three main features respectively (See more details in chapter 2).

1.5. Chapter structure

This research is composed of a total of six chapters and each one represents an entire process used to approach the aim of this research.

The second chapter discusses alternative concepts of modern political campaigns such as Americanisation and modernisation. In addition, the chapter provides arguments about why the notion of professionalisation is most effective in conceptualising the different dimensions of the current election campaigning strategy. Accordingly, this literature review will help strengthen the argument of this study through providing academic evidence from existing studies.

Chapter 3 will cover the information about South Korea as a case study, including political and media systems, electoral paradigm, and campaign regulation, which are all necessary for this study to discuss. To be specific, a brief history of Korean democratisation and of the establishment of political parties will be presented. In particular, the history of each of the parties is the most important section in order to understand the results of this research. Furthermore, this chapter will provide the information about media systems such as historical alteration and development of the utilisation of mass media. Finally, given that all campaign activities are strictly controlled by campaign regulations, an explanation about campaign regulation, which is affected conducting campaign activities in South Korea, will be presented.

Chapter 4 will deal with the details of the research methodology used for this study, and, therefore, it will be divided into four sub-sections. At first, an
explanation of the advantages of case study and the purpose of semi-structured interview with campaign professionals and campaign managers inside the party organisations as a main methodology for this study will be provided. Then, the explanation of why it is sensible to investigate the Korean case in this research will be presented. Afterwards, detailed information about the process of semi-structured interviews such as the scope of interviewees, the interview guide, the process of interview, and ethical considerations will be described. Lastly, this chapter will introduce the CAMPROF index as a tool by which to present the results of the alteration of external dimensions of professionalisation focused on the utilisation of mass media and campaign technology in a historical context.

Chapter 5 will demonstrate in detail the results of the investigation into South Korea’s case in order to answer the research questions and hypotheses. Accordingly, this results chapter is broadly divided into two large parts based on two different dimensions, internal and external, as stated in the literature review chapter. In presenting the results of the external dimension of professionalisation of election campaigning, the four sub-sections are composed of the main campaign activities in South Korea. On the other hand, the results of the internal alteration of professionalisation will be divided into four separated sections – the influx of campaign professionals including the change of their role and power, the alteration of the relationship between campaign professionals and campaign managers inside party organisation, centralisation of parties and the change of party structure.

Chapter 6 as the conclusion will summarise the empirical results of the study in the light of the research questions and hypotheses that have guided it. In addition, the conclusion will reflect on the effectiveness of the concept of professionalisation and whether it helps us to understand the alterations of Korean election campaigns. Lastly, this chapter will provide the summary of limitations of this study and suggest further challenges for future research.
Chapter 2 Literature Review

This chapter will concentrate on the conceptualisation of professionalisation of election campaigning through discussion of the current academic arguments. From different perspectives of academic scholars, the current research focusing on professionalisation theory in the election campaign field can be summarised as three viewpoints: 1) the natural alteration of election campaign style caused by modernisation of society (Swanson and Mancini, 1996; Papathanassopoulos et al., 2007; Holtz-Bacha, 2007), 2) the sophisticated campaign strategy using campaign technology and new media (Scammell, 1998; Gibson and Römmele, 2001; Negrine 2007), and 3) the alteration of party organisation resulting from the influx of external campaign professionals and of the relationship between parties and these external campaign professionals (Mair, Müller, and Plasser, 2004; Gibson and Römmele, 2009; Tenscher, Mykkänen, and Moring, 2012). Given that parties still play a main role in conducting election campaigns, this research will suggest that professionalisation theory can be interpreted as the ongoing process of political parties reviewing and improving their campaign strategy in accordance with modern technology and mass media. To strengthen the argument, this research will show different perspectives on professionalisation theory through reviews of the current academic research.

2.1. Introduction

Towards the end of the twentieth century, there were many dynamic changes in political communication around the world. Amongst these current changes, one of the most serious considerations between scholars is the decline of the traditional function of political parties caused by the central role of mass media in the political process (Mazzoleni and Schulz, 1999; Farrell and Webb, 2000; Plasser, 2001; Espíndola, 2002; Mair, Müller and Plasser, 2004). There is no doubt that political parties need various kinds of mass media to communicate with the voters, and, therefore, the relationship between mass media and political
parties is indispensable nowadays. In particular, since the arrival of TV in the political process, it is true that the relationship between these two areas is closer than ever before. That is, it has informed the arrival of media-driven democracy, in other words, ‘mediatisation’ of politics (Mazzoleni and Schulz, 1999).

Although there are many debates over the positive or negative effects of its phenomenon, it can be said that the development of mass media has had much influence on all political processes, especially in the areas such as political campaigning and party PR in general, which are mainly in need of the support of mass media. Moreover, it has been much more important since the final goal of political parties has become more focused on raising the possibility of winning elections through voter maximisation rather than by other means, such as party policy and ideology advocacy, due to the alteration of the electoral environment. For instance, the unfavourable conditions surrounding the electoral environment such as a growing political apathy, a decreased level of party attachment, and increased floating voters have encouraged the evolution of election campaigning in certain ways (Farrell, 1996). Naturally, political parties need to obtain a great deal of support from the electorate and this has consequently set the stage for the creation of a scientific as well as a professionalised election campaign through the careful adoption of new campaign techniques and new media.

As a result, these changes in the political arena have allowed the influx of campaign professionals who can deal with campaign practices efficiently as well as professionally much better than political parties or politicians can (Thurber and Nelson, 2000). This is because the development of mass media and technology has happened at too fast for non-professionals; furthermore, these latest campaign techniques have made campaign management too complicated for politicians (Sabato, 1981). In addition to this, some unpredictable factors, such as voters’ highly volatile behaviour and the repaid distribution of political information especially related to bad things, e.g. rumours and scandals caused by new media and technology developments, would require political parties to handle these crises with professionalised campaign skills.
Therefore, this chapter will firstly present in general the current central arguments related to the evolution of election campaign literature in order to conceptualise professionalisation of election campaigns. Afterwards, it will concentrate on a discussion of what the general trend is from the perspective of globalisation, and of the differences between the other concepts, especially ‘Americanisation’ and on ‘Modernisation’, and professionalisation of election campaigns. It will be worth discussing here to avoid the criticism that professionalisation is just a concept like Modernisation and Americanisation, which are often argued to describe the current features in modern election campaign. Furthermore, it will be also worth to justify why the professionalisation concept would be a reasonable one for this study to use to examine the alteration of election campaigns in South Korea. Finally, the specific dimensions of the phenomenon of professionalisation that will be examined throughout the case study will be demonstrated through academic arguments.

2.2. The growth of professionalisation in election campaigning

2.2.1. The evolution of election campaigning

There have been academic efforts to investigate the evolution of election campaigns in the past decades in the West: ‘pre-modern, modern, post-modern’ (Norris, 2000; Plasser and Plasser, 2002), ‘phase 1, 2, 3’ (Farrell and Webb, 2000), ‘labour-intensive and capital intensive’ (Farrell, 1996), ‘inter-system and intra-system’ (Bowler and Farrell, 1992), ‘the Newspaper Age, the Television Age, and the Digital Age’ (Farrell, Kolodny, and Medvic, 2001), ‘mass propaganda, media campaigning and political marketing’ (Wring, 1996), and ‘the decades of the pollster (1960s), the advertising agency (1970s–1980s) and the political party professional (1990s)’ (Harrow, 1990). Despite the use of different terminologies, the authors are all agreed that various kinds of changes in election campaigning have been mainly influenced by mass media revolution and the development of campaign technology. Although the strategy of election campaigning is not just composed of mass media and campaign technology, the arrival of TV in politics has led to a complete transformation in the method of the
management of election campaigning.

These alterations in election campaigning were first found in the USA and this trend has been observed elsewhere (Plasser and Plasser, 2002). To be specific, US campaigns in the 1970s were transformed by the effect of television, which shifted the focus from the party to the candidate (Farrell, 1996). This has proved to be an essential change, with the growth of individual campaigns that are more focused on candidates' image than on party image, and the increasing importance of paid television advertising with consequently rising campaign budgets (Lilleker and Negrine, 2002). In addition, the influence of the mass media has led to parties having to become more scientific and efficient as voters become less passive and more able to access a much wider range of useful information from home. Therefore, it is assumed that the dominance of television was the strongest factor in the evolution of campaign strategies during the 1970s.

The trend that receives the second most attention is that of the increase in use of sophisticated campaign techniques such as opinion polls and focus group as scientific methods to gauge public opinion, and of the latest techniques such as narrowcasting to help distribute campaign messages. These techniques have tended to evolve with the development of technology and communication channels (Agranoff, 1976; Butler and Ranney, 1992). Therefore, the questions generally asked by academics concerning this topic are mainly about which campaign techniques are most effective in the design of election campaigns (Katz and Mair, 1994; Farrell, 1996; Plasser, 2001).

Thirdly, the change relating to the second trend is the phenomenon of an increase in political consultancy in the political process. In fact, the development of technology and mass media has led to the creation of a new breed of campaign professionals such as media specialists and political consultants who have a broad sense of politics and mass media. Consequently, researches have paid attention to how deeply these external campaign professionals should be embedded within the party organisation, how far the effects of consultants are accepted inside a party, to what extent party members recognise the need for
such consulting works, and how parties can create beneficial relationships with them (Farrell, 1996; Gibson and Römmele, 2001; Plasser, 2001; Ward and Gibson, 2003; Negrine, 2007). However, there are many debates between scholars due to the differences of each nation in the use of campaign professionals. In effect, the extensive use of campaign professionals is found in the USA, where the industry of political consultancy has been well developed (Thurber and Nelson, 2000; Johnson, 2001). According to Plasser and Plasser (2002), there are some differences in the degree of professionalisation of European and USA campaign professionals because of different media and political systems. They explained that ‘communication channels in Europe are significantly more fragmented, more informal, and more strongly aligned along ideological and programmatic party alliances’ (Plasser and Plasser, 2002, pp.253). Moreover, the industry of political consultancy is segmented by party loyalties and campaign professionals’ political background.

Fourthly, there is the adoption of business marketing concepts into election campaigning; that is, the arrival of political marketing concepts. Political marketing is a relatively recent phenomenon, which involves a strategy of design, rationalisation and conveyance of modern political communication, (Lilleker and Lees-Marshal, 2005; Savigny, 2003). In this sense, political marketing helps to apply sophisticated marketing frameworks, which can be developed from a survey of demands of the electoral market, target segmentation, and political behaviours, to election campaigns for political parties (Lilleker and Lees-Marshal, 2005). Briefly, in order to adapt effectively to the changing political environment and administer an election campaign in a systematic way, political marketing has an urgent need for an efficient management of resources and a persuasive communication technique. Therefore, the reasons for introducing such a marketing concept to politics are: 1) the increasing costs of political campaigns require efficient management of resources; 2) an enhanced recognition of voters and development of the decision-making process requirements for parties’ systematic strategies and approaches; 3) the efficient management of available media has become vital; and, 4) election campaigns have gradually changed from being candidate-centred to scientific and systematic strategy-centred.
Finally, the current features of election campaigning have led to the emergence of what has become known as the ‘personalised campaigning’ (Swanson and Mancini, 1996; Plasser and Plasser, 2002; Römmele, 2003; Schultz and his colleagues, 2005) and the ‘permanent campaigning’ (Farrell and Schmitt-Beck, 2002; Norris, 2000) in the context of thematic change in election campaigning. The personalised campaigning is defined as the growing trend for the candidate’s personality to be located at the heart of the campaign message. It often happens in candidate-centralised election campaigning rather than in party-centralised. On the other hand, Norris (2000) notes that post-modern campaigns involve a shift from the ‘long’ towards the ‘permanent’ campaign. In addition, she points out that many political consultants in post-modern campaigns (such as communications consultants, pollsters and market research analysts) are involved in politics on a regular basis, rather than just during the ‘official’ campaign.

The five above-mentioned features have been regarded as typical alterations of election campaigns in contemporary society, especially in media-centralised countries, despite the difference of speed of development of mass media and technology between the countries. From this point of view, the effects of ongoing development of media and campaign technology seem to be decisive factors leading the alteration of the election campaign paradigm in a broad sense.

2.2.2. Americanisation and Modernisation in election campaigning literature

Many academics in the field of election campaigning have recently suggested that similar changes to election campaigns take place around the world, despite many differences in the various political systems, electoral culture and media systems (Swanson and Mancini, 1996; Plasser and Plasser, 2002). Without a doubt, many countries demonstrate similar features and common concerns in the context of historical changes in election campaigns although the extent and pace of this evolution varies according to the country. In order to explain the alteration in each case, many studies have adopted the concept of ‘Americanisation’ or ‘Modernisation’. Although the perspectives of looking at alterations in election campaigning slightly differ between the two concepts, they are commonly
regarded as synonyms for the concept of professionalisation (Mancini, 1999) because its central argument focuses on how to understand the current alterations of election campaign style. Accordingly, this sub-section will explore literature on Americanisation and Modernisation to make clear their differences compared to professionalisation theory before conceptualising the professionalisation concept.

**The concept of Americanisation in election campaigning**

The theory of Americanisation has attracted attention because of the phenomenon of the close resemblance of USA electoral practices to those in other countries. In general, the USA is treated as a leader of electioneering innovation (Blumler, Kavanagh, and Nossiter, 1996) because of its developed industry of political consultancy and accompanying export of their skills to other countries, government educational support to promote the industry, an accumulation of experience and knowledge, and the burgeoning literature about their know-how in dealing with election campaign, etc. In addition, scholars who advocate the Americanisation theory argue that the increased use of scientific methods and American campaign practices have modernised every area of campaigns globally to a previously unseen level (Epstein, 1967; Sabato, 1981; Mouser, 1983; Luntz, 1988; Butler and Ranney, 1992; Newman, 1994; Swanson and Mancini, 1994; Kaid and Holtz-Bacha, 1995; Negrine and Papathanassopoulos, 1996; Norris, 2000).

Such high demand for USA know-how and political consultants has led to an argument that election campaigning around the world is being ‘Americanised’. Plasse and Plasser (2002) point out that Americanisation could be divided into two different approaches: Modernisation and Diffusion (see Table 2.1).
Table 2.1. Two approaches to the concept of Americanisation¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modernisation Approach</th>
<th>Diffusion Approach</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Americanisation as a consequence of the Modernisation of media systems and voter-party relationship</td>
<td>Americanisation as a consequence of the transnational diffusion and implementation of US concepts and strategies of electoral campaigning</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Source: Plasser and Plasser (2002, pp.17)

More specifically, they indicate that Americanisation, under the diffusion approach, can be deemed ‘directional convergence’ between the USA and other countries such as European and East Asian ones. Therefore, it can be interpreted as a kind of adoption of USA campaign practices and campaign skills by other countries, and eventually the style of election campaign becomes similar to that of the USA despite a different political system and culture. With regard to this point, many scholars highlight that the concept of business marketing is beginning to be used more in political communication and the adoption of political marketing has been indispensable in the management of election campaigning like in the USA (Harrow, 1990; Wring, 1996; Scammell, 1997; Savigny, 2003; Lees-Marschment, 2001). Thus, the USA, which is a pacesetter of innovative campaign tactics and a leader in sharing its knowledge and experiences with other countries, has become a standard model for other countries who might want to adopt or learn from its practices.

**The concept of Modernisation in election campaigning**

The modernisation approach differs from diffusion in the respect of understanding changes. This concept is based on the modernisation theory: all kinds of changes in political communication occur due to fundamental on-going alterations in politics, society, and media systems (Mancini, 1999; Norris, 2000; Papathanassopoulos et al., 2007). Therefore, some similarities in election campaigns between countries are not due to the influence of the USA but, rather, that the consequences of modern society and the phenomenon of modernisation in society have caused progressive modifications of traditional styles and strategies of political communication. The academics supporting this approach
point out that alterations in election campaigns could be presumed differently depending on political culture and system-specific elements although their pattern might seem to be similar between countries at the beginning of the adaptation of a new electoral environment. For example, Norris’s (2000) terminology has been often cited by many researchers looking at the evolution of election campaigning in respect of modernisation. She points out that the process of evolution of election campaigning could be understood as the ‘evolutionary process of modernisation’ which transforms party organisation, mass media system, and the electorate. Thus, she insists that the process of alterations in election campaigning could not be the same between nations because of different political and media systems, the electoral culture and so forth.

Swanson and Mancini (1996) define the modernisation process as ‘increasing functional differentiation within society that leads to growing numbers of subsystems of all kinds that develop to satisfy the specialised demands of particular groups and social actors’ (pp.253). From this perspective, the modernised election campaigns can be driven by parties’ combined efforts to deal with the changing election environments and create a common strategy through the mobilisation of scientific tools in current society. In effect, the discussion of Modernisation began as an attempt to widen the definition of Americanisation in order to overcome restrictions in describing the changes of election campaign practices (Bowler and Farrell, 1992; Butler and Ranney, 1992; Swanson and Mancini, 1996). Thus, Modernisation can be described as a general social process that is adopted or adapted in countries which have similar features of ‘social complexity’ (Swanson and Mancini, 1996), even if the degree of modernisation appears differently in given countries. Accordingly, Modernisation in election campaigns can be said to be the natural result of parties wanting to re-define their purpose (Negrine, 2007), and is interpreted as globalisation in the modern election campaign (Swanson and Mancini, 1996).

However, critical scholars in this field state that the concept of modernisation tends to offer an oversimplified perspective in the explanation of modern campaign changes due to placing too much stress on general alteration of
election campaigns. In particular, the discussion of modernisation began by supporting a much broader description of the changes in political communication rather than specific changes in election campaigning. Thus, it is useful in tracing a general trend of the alteration of election campaigns from a macro perspective; more to the point, however, it does not seem enough to support direct evidence of how individual political parties have transformed their organisations and why they have specifically as well as strategically improved their campaign skills and strategy in response to socio-political and technological changes. Furthermore, in consideration of two arguments that parties have changed their structures according to their own specific factors such as party organisation culture and the historical outcomes of elections (Hamel and Jana, 1994), and all parties do not try to adopt the new campaign skills at the same time (Gibson and Römmele, 2001), the two theories discussed above are not enough to offer a rich interpretation in the explanation of the difference between each individual party. Therefore, given this research is focused on the comparison of each individual party under the same electoral systems in dealing with the on-going alteration of election campaigning in a historical context, looking at only the two theories seems not to be sufficient to meet the requirements of this study.

2.2.3. The conceptualisation of professionalisation in election campaigning

In order to conceptualise the concept of professionalisation of election campaigning, it is important to investigate what arguments have been made in the existing studies and what elements have been examined in order to comprehend the concept of professionalisation of election campaigning. In particular, this will help make a strong argument for why it is preferable for this research to choose the concept of professionalisation over other terminologies to explore the alteration of election campaigning in South Korea. Furthermore, this will provide academic evidence to develop the framework for the explanation of the dimension of professionalisation of election campaigning for this research. Therefore, the following sub-section will focus on explaining the definition and dimension of professionalisation of election campaigning through an investigation of the underlying literature.
The definition of professionalisation of election campaigning

With such rapid changes in the political environment, there is an increasing demand for effective approaches to elections in response to the development of mass media and new communication technology. Moreover, the growth in the influx of campaign professionals into political parties – due to the parties’ needs within the political process – seems to forecast the arrival of a new style of election campaigning. Naturally, academic interests in the area of election campaigning have concentrated on discerning its changing process and many scholars agree that election campaigning has been professionalised in many aspects (Farrell and Webb, 2000; Farrell, 2002), especially since the age of telecommunication began (Farrell, 1996; Mancini, 1999; Strachan, 2003).

In earlier research, academic observers have endeavoured to explain how to understand an ambiguous term such as professionalisation in the context of political communication (Blumler, Kavanagh, and Nossiter, 1996; Lilleker and Negrine, 2002). From amongst these, Lilleker and Negrine (2002) explain that ‘professionalisation is about the changing nature of political campaigns’ (pp.98). However, they also argue that it can raise a question about whether the use of the terms professionals or professionalism or professionalisation is useful for understanding the current alterations of the whole political campaign process. This is because the interpretation of the evolutionary process of political campaigning involves an element of historical context as changes - especially in political campaigns - occur every day regardless of the degree of their impacts in different countries of origin. Thus, it is claimed that we should be careful in using the term of ‘professionalisation’ when demonstrating the changing process of political campaigning (Lilleker and Negrine, 2002).

Following on from this, some researchers have tried to provide more descriptive definitions of professionalisation based on the wider spectrum of evidence of each case study. As seen in Table 2.2, in order to investigate the notion of professionalisation of election campaigning, some researchers concentrate on the alteration of election campaigning caused by the proliferation of technological
and media developments (Mancini, 1999; Sparrow, 2002; Negrine, 2007). For this reason, these studies seem to focus on one particular area which has been most influenced by these developments, such as election campaigning and governing communication skills. Mancini (1999, pp.231) explains that ‘professionalisation as the trend of globalisation can be understood in relation to the result of telecommunication development’. Moreover, Negrine (2007, pp.10) points out that professionalisation of election campaigning is ‘a process of adaptation of new technologies and new mass media’. Thus, these studies in the context of political communication tend to draw more attention to the improvement of campaign strategies in the way of the adoption of new campaign technology and new media. Naturally, the aim of these studies is to trace the differences and continuities in the historical context of election campaigns.

In addition to this, recent researchers tend to be more focused on the growth in the use of campaign professionals in the political process, such as highly qualified technicians in dealing with the latest technology, media consultants, even political consultants, as a following result of the adoption of the developments of mass media and campaign technology (Herrnson, 1998; Norris, 2000; Plasser and Plasser, 2002; De Verse, 2011). Therefore, they generally explain how election campaigns have been changed, and then, present how these on-going developments of the electoral environment have led to the alteration of party organisation. Herrnson (1998) states that professionalisation of election campaign is the increased number of specialised campaign activities conducted by campaign professionals. In a similar line, Norris (2000, pp.146) indicates ‘the move from amateur to professional campaign is marked by more frequent use of specialist consultants, public-relation experts, and fund-raisers’ influencing decisions made by candidates or party officers. Plasser and Plasser (2002, pp.344) also explain that professionalisation can be found in the phenomenon of ‘the cooperation with professional advertising agencies and the inclusion of external marketing and communication experts in the strategic planning process’. Table 2.2 summarises the definition of professionalisation of election campaigning through an investigation of the underlying literature explained above.
Table 2.2. The definition of professionalisation of election campaigning

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scholars</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lilleker and Negrine</td>
<td>‘Professionalisation is about the changing nature of political campaigns’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2002, pp.98)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mancini</td>
<td>‘Professionalisation as the trend of globalisation can be understood in relation to the result of telecommunication development’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1999, pp.231)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negrine</td>
<td>‘A process of adaptation of new technologies and new mass media’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2007, pp.10)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herrnson</td>
<td>‘The number of specialised campaign activities performed by professional political consultants’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2000, pp.859)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norris</td>
<td>‘The move from amateur to professional campaign was marked by more frequent use of specialist consultants, public-relation experts, and fund-raisers influencing decision formally made by candidates or party officers.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2000, pp.146)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plasser and Plasser</td>
<td>‘The cooperation with professional advertising agencies and the inclusion of external marketing and communication experts in the strategic planning process’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2002, pp.344)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De Verse</td>
<td>‘The increase of campaign personnel, more sophisticated targeting of key voters, increased expenditure on publicity, the growing use of campaign techniques’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2011, pp.128)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nowadays, it is assumed that academic scholars all concur with the arguments that professionalisation of election campaigning started from the fast-growing adoption of new mass media and campaign technology and the increased need for campaign professionals, who are good at dealing with mass media and new campaign technologies (Norris, 2000), as a following consequence. Accordingly, the US campaign seems to be typically considered a highly professionalised one, due to a dominant position in performing a sophisticated campaign strategy using the latest technology and a well-developed industry of campaign professionals.

Unlike these speculations, Scammell (1998) insists there is no evidence that the USA election campaigning has been professionalised. Along with the use of her term ‘political folk wisdom’ (pp.10), she explains that US campaign managers tend to use their experiences and observations from the previous election campaigns as the most important sources in the creation of new campaign strategies. Thus, the US election campaign can be defined by commercialism rather than professionalism because of a growing tendency of common knowledge, the educational training for campaign professionals, and the
production of self-conscious campaign practices to export to other countries. She argues that the term professionalisation can be interpreted as having predominate features such as ‘unique body of campaign knowledge and consummate propagandistic skills considered essential to electoral success’ (pp.5), rather than just performing high-technological campaign skills. In other words, the central argument of professionalisation can be accompanied with a deep consideration of the cultural and institutional factors in a given country rather than just applying common technical knowledge about campaign strategy. From these perspectives, she concludes that US campaigning may be at a low level of professionalisation than in other democratic countries. Similarly, some academics insist that the process of political democratisation such as constitutional and electoral reform can lead a meaningful alteration of political communication including election campaigning strategy (Martz, 1990; Rawnsley, 2006).

In addition to this, Gibson and Römmele (2001) point out that previous research in the field of professionalisation of election campaigns tends to place too much focus on some changes such as voter volatility, political cynicism, and technological developments. Consequently, they argue that it has failed in the explanation of why each of the political parties has a different style of campaign and creates different campaign tactics to mobilise voters, even though they are under the same political and media system. Furthermore, election campaigns are the process by which political organisations pursue maximum votes as their final aim (Farrell, 1996). Given this, Gibson and Römmele insist the term of professionalisation can be understood as a concept that leads to the systematic reformation of party structure in the use of scientific campaign practices. From the same aspect, Negrine (2007) explains that the distinct field of professionalisation in political communication is currently seen as the process of adaptation by an individual party organisation to make better election campaigning in accordance with on-going social transformation and technological developments. Thus, the alteration of a party organisation itself as a consequence of the process of adaptation of new mass media and campaign technology should be considered when the phenomenon of professionalisation is examined.
Taking all the perspective discussed above into consideration, there are three principal elements in conceptualising the professionalisation of election campaigns: 1) ‘party organisation’ as a main agent of campaign management, 2) ‘campaign professionals’ who are taking a vital role in dealing with new campaign practices, and 3) ‘a series of changing processes’ which often occur in the course of the adoption and the adaption of new electoral environments. Accordingly, professionalisation of election campaigning can be defined for this research as a continuous review process by each party to design competitive campaigns in response to the alteration of socio-political environments and each party’s unceasing efforts to deal with new mass media and campaign technology and campaign professionals.

2.2.4. Dimension of professionalisation of election campaigning

As explained above, in order to investigate the evolution of election campaigning from the perspective of professionalisation, Gibson and Römmele (2009, p.267-268) identify four different party activities where professionalisation might frequently occur:

‘Firstly, the adoption of new tools (high-tech and computerised) and intensification of existing methods (opinion polling, focus groups); Secondly, a shift in the overall style of campaigning to a more capital-intensive and continuous mode; Thirdly, a re-orientation in the relationship with the electorate toward a more interactive and individualised engagement; Lastly, the re-structuring of power relations between national party and local party with an increasing centralisation of power’ (p.267-268)

In addition, Farrell and Webb (2000) explain that the professionalisation of election campaigning could be divided into three different dimensions: technical development, resource development, and thematic development. According to them, technical development is directly connected to the use of mass media and new campaign technology such as telemarketing, e-newsletters and so on. On the other hand, resource development is related to the alteration of party organisation itself. Thus, it generally includes the use of campaign professionals, the
campaign agencies that could help out political parties, the relationship between these and the party organisation and feedback from voters. Lastly, thematic development is associated with campaign events and campaign communication strategy.

Based on the arguments about professionalisation of election campaigning, the topic can be divided into two different dimensions: the external and internal alteration. At first, as seen in Table 2.3, the external dimension of professionalisation is about all results of the alterations of election campaigning in dealing with new campaign practices conducted by political parties. Thus, it consists of three different features: the alteration of use of new mass media and campaign technology, the alteration of campaign activities through the intensification of new and existing campaign practices, and the alteration of campaign style, whether new campaign styles caused by new mass media and campaign technology developments would lead to a capital-intensive style. Therefore, these features will help examine how each of the political parties accommodates the new campaign practices, and how they have improved their campaign style.

In contrast, the internal dimension of professionalisation focuses on the results of the alteration of party organisation caused by the influx of campaign professionals. In particular, it is argued in this research that professionalisation of election campaigning should be dealt with at party organisation level itself because every election campaign is based on party organisation and on the use of internal resources, even if their strategies change according to the current environment and their current needs, inward or outward. Accordingly, the party, whether or not it is weaker than before, still exists at the centre of the political process, and it has to adapt to changing circumstance (Farrell and Webb 2000). As a result, the internal dimensions is composed of three features: the influx of campaign professionals, the alteration of the relationship between campaign professionals and political parties from ambiguous to conflict such as the alteration of the role of campaign staffers inside the party organisation, and the
centralisation of political parties as providing campaign organisation caused by the efficient management of campaign practices.

Table 2.3. The dimension of professionalisation of election campaigning

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Dimensions</th>
<th>Main features</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>External dimension</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionalisation of</td>
<td>1) Use of new mass media and campaign technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>campaign communication</td>
<td>2) The alteration of campaigning activities through the intensification of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>new and existing campaign practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3) The alteration of campaign style from labour-intensive to capital-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>intensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Internal dimension</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionalisation of</td>
<td>1) The influx of campaign professionals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>party organisation</td>
<td>2) The alteration of the relationship between campaign professionals and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>political parties from ambiguous to conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3) The centralisation of party organisation caused by the efficient management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of campaign practices</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Therefore, this is about how much campaign managers, especially the group of campaign managers inside party organisations such as politicians and paid internal party campaign staffers, can reach a high level of competence in dealing with election campaign practices. For instance, in the past, only campaign professionals were fully aware of the importance of the establishment of an efficient campaign strategy using mass media and campaign technology. Thus, all roles in relation to publicity, such as how to produce campaign issues as well as how to transmit them to voters, and what the public’s concerns or interests are, were only fulfilled by campaign professionals in the past. Naturally, the only thing that politicians could do at that time was to establish firm party policies. Therefore, it meant that the role between campaign managers and campaign professionals was generally separate, and they might not need to know each
other’s areas. However, contemporary society forces the internal party campaign staffers to be external campaign professionals more and more. Naturally, campaign managers inside party organisations would try to learn about how to deal with mass media.

2.3. The external dimension of professionalisation of election campaigning

Drawing on the broad spectrum of academic observers’ arguments about the professionalisation of election campaigning, the proliferation of technological developments such as mass media and campaign technology is a decisive factor of professionalisation of election campaign (Mancini 1999). Accordingly, these studies are focused on the alteration of campaign strategies by way of the adoption of new campaign technology and new media. As Farrell (1996) points out technology development has had an influence on the changes in election campaigns because technology development can provide new campaign tools for the intensification of old campaign practices.

As another example, Scarrow (2004) points out that German parties have continued to centralise and professionalise their campaign practices. In particular, he explains that the growth of political parties’ expenditure and the use of new campaign technology have led to the arrival of the professionalisation of election campaigning. Naturally, these circumstances in Germany have allowed parties to increase their employment of campaign professionals and the level of the party’s reliance on them has become intensified. As a result, he insists that the power of campaign professionals has been expanded at all levels of campaign operations.

Moreover, Strachan (2003) explains that the arrival of telecommunication tools including radio, television, computers and the Internet can give candidates ‘efficient ways of communicating across time and space’ (pp.4). Thus, Strachan argues that the main difference between these new tools and old practices in election campaign is the difference of effectiveness in dealing with new
campaign practices because new campaign practices require the mastery of new skills.

In addition to this, academics in the field of election campaigning point out that election campaigning tends to change from labour-intensive campaigning to capital-intensive because of increased expense in dealing with new media, new campaign technologies and the employment of campaign professionals (Farrell, 1996; Farrell and Webb, 2000; Wlezien, 2002). To be specific, Farrell (1996) explains that election campaigning is divided into two different stages: labour-intensive campaigning and capital-intensive campaigning. That is, the style of labour-intensive campaigning is the time for the reliance on mass public meetings, volunteers, and whistle tours whilst the style of capital-intensive campaigning leads to ‘television-centred, highly specialised and money- and message-driven form of campaigning’ (Plasser and Plasser, 2002, pp.84). Thus, modern election campaigning seems to be towards capital-intensive campaigning due to increased use of mass media and high-tech campaign techniques.

2.4. The internal dimension of professionalisation of election campaigning

2.4.1. The definition of campaign professionals in election campaigning

There are some notable critiques of ‘professionalisation’ such as a weakening of party identification and party decline caused by the increased use of new communication technology and the fast growth of campaign professional power (Nord, 2006). Amongst those critiques, the most vigorous academic discussion is that the definition and scope of campaign professionals remains unclear; that is, many have raised questions about who can be called campaign professionals (Lilleker and Negrine, 2002). This may be directly related to the matter of whether the previous campaigners, who worked in the time when traditional campaigns were prevalent, were called campaign professionals, and how they can be defined in the context of the current research typologies. Perhaps this is
due to the ambiguous definition of campaign professionals and its injurious use without providing any definite descriptions. In effect, many people point out that the ambiguous understanding of who campaign professionals are and what they actually do in election campaigns has added to the confusion in conceptualising the concept of professionalisation in election campaigns (Sabato, 1981; Medvic, 2003). Therefore, it is worth clarifying here the identity of campaign professionals and the range of their activities in the election campaign process.

The successful definition of the concept of ‘campaign professionals’ is not an easy task: it has been used in many different fields such as medicine, education, and engineering. Especially in these fields, the word ‘professionals’ as a sociological term is adopted in general in order to refer to a group of people who have prestige and power because of specialised skills, which are authorised by qualified officers such as doctors and lawyers (Succi and Walter, 1999). In addition, Buttery and Wright (1997, pp.8) defined professionals as a group of people ‘who are undoubtedly recognising their ‘professionals’ adherence to a code of ethics designed to place’. From these points of view, it may make sense to say that professionals are a specialised group of people who have exceptional ability in relation to one particular area. Accordingly, if this is applied to the election campaign field, campaign professionals are the people who have the ability to deal with sophisticated techniques that can be applied to campaign activities such as surveying, the production of political adverts, telemarketing services, developing campaign messages, political advices, and so on. Although there still remains a sensitive issue of how their skills are authorised without any certification, it is clear that they are people who provide specialised skills to parties or candidates for payment (Medvic, 2003). Therefore, workers inside parties may not be called campaign professionals in the context of Medvic’s definition.

On the other hand, the definition of campaign professionals has been used in a slightly different way in election campaigning studies. In the earliest studies, campaign professionals in election campaigning are defined simply as the people who have specialised skills and experience in dealing with mass communication
(Kelley, 1956). Following this, they are also defined as ‘a specialist in political communication’ (Napolitan, 1972, pp.2) or ‘campaign professionals’ who serve campaign activities, such as providing general advice, polling services, direct mailing, and so forth, to candidates or political parties or any kind of political organisation (Sabato, 1981). However, these concepts cannot avoid criticism due to the reason that the scope of campaign professionals tends to be limited. Even though the latter definition seems to be much closer to reality and more specific in defining the campaign professionals’ role, these definitions primarily focus on political consultants’ activities.

More detailed studies have recently taken place, such as Johnson’s (2001), which compared the meaning of amateur and campaign professionals in the field of election campaigning. First of all, he defined amateurs as a group of people who have personal ties with candidates or political parties. Thus, they might individually work for political parties or candidates and be rewarded after their candidates are elected. Thus, almost of them have their own private job and they tend to work for the political party on a part-time basis. Conversely, the group of campaign professionals surely differs. He points out the people in the group of campaign professionals have objective perspectives about candidates and election campaigning itself. Accordingly, their final aim is to make their candidates or political parties win. Even though his research contributes a good answer to the difference between amateurs and campaign professionals in election campaigning and gives an attention to a consideration of the identity of campaign professionals, it also tends to simplify the classification of their role.

In a more developed study, Plasser and Plasser (2002) indicate that there are two different types of campaign professionals: party campaigners and external consultants. The former are people who are engaged in party organisations and are paid by the political parties themselves. Conversely, the latter group literally means people who are paid by the parties as well as having an individual income from outside the political party. Thus, the authors argue that external consultants can be defined as ‘the people who act as principals or senior partners of their respective firms, or campaign experts working for advertising, marketing or
survey research companies’ (pp.9).

Medvic (2003) developed these definitions into a more specific one. He argues that the definitions in previous research were still vague in explaining about who can be included into professional groups. He insists that research (Kolodny and Logan, 1998; Bowler and Farrell, 1992; Plasser, 2001) based on the membership lists of particular political consulting groups like the International Association of Political Consultants (IAPC) or published lists from the magazine of ‘Campaign and Elections’ results in the possibility that other people, who work as political consultants but do not want to pay an expensive membership fee, could be excluded from their research. Moreover, it is possible to confine research to the people who participated in countries where the industry of political consultancy is prominent, such as the USA or Western Europe. In addition to this, he argues that there are many non-consultants such as academics and internal party campaign staffers. Thus, he suggests the method of how to define campaign professionals has to be changed, with the inclusion of more specific criteria. Firstly, campaign professionals in election campaigns are people who are paid by political parties in order to serve campaign skills and provide tactics to promote the electorate. Secondly, they must be involved in more than two election campaigns, but it does not matter which kind of election (local, general or presidential elections). Moreover, he explains that academic advisors who are paid by political parties may be included in the category of campaign professionals. However, he argues that academic advisors are not campaign professionals if they are friends of candidates who are running a campaigning. Thus, he insists that those advisors who work for several candidates can be called campaign professionals. Finally, the experience of campaign professionals regarding election campaigning is also important. Thus, he suggests that those who can be called campaign professionals should have worked at least one election cycle. From his perspective, campaign professionals can be defined as the people who are paid by political parties for their specialised campaign skills and are - the people with wide experience regarding election campaigns.
2.4.2. The relationship between campaign professionals and political parties

There has been much research focusing on the discussion about the relationship between political parties and campaign professionals, with many cases especially in the USA where the industry of political consultancy has been fully developed (Kolodny and Logan, 1998; Thurber and Nelson, 2000; Farrell, Kolodny, and Medvic, 2001; Plasser, 2001). In particular, since the ever-changing electoral environment and the increase of unexpected electoral factors such as unstable voter behaviour and of the importance of campaign roles, many academics have paid attention to the matter of how political parties have responded to these changes (Mair, Müller, and Plasser, 2004). In general, these academic interests are largely divided into two aspects: positive and negative. First of all, scholars in the positive line indicate that campaign professionals can help parties or candidates in conducting campaign activities efficiently as well as effectively through their specialised skills (Kolodny, 2000). Indeed, the relationship between the two groups is described as a cooperative one (relationship) because the campaign professionals assist with some campaign activities parties or candidates are unable to carry out (Luntz 1988; Henson, 1994; Kolodny and Logan, 1998). Conversely, scholars who advocate a negative effect argue that the power of political parties has seriously weakened due to the influx of campaign professionals into party organisations and the growth of their power (Thurber and Nelson, 2000; Plasser and Plasser, 2002; Kolodny and Dulio, 2003; Mair, Müller and Plasser, 2004). Nonetheless, there is no doubt that the current political parties have continued to need the help of campaign professionals, whether it is in a negative or positive way, in order to map out a creative as well as a competitive campaign strategy, although the level of the use of these people differs according to different systems in the country of origin.

Accordingly, a number of studies have suggested various perspectives of how to examine the relationship between external campaign professionals and parties. Kolodny and Logan (1998) explain that the relationship can be classified into two perspectives: ‘allied view’ and ‘adversarial view’. First of all, in the case of the ‘allied view’, political parties, in general, employ campaign professionals and
have total control over all campaign activities performed by them. Naturally, campaign professionals’ value and respect the aim of the specific political parties. Parties have an important role to play in mediating opinion between candidates and campaign professionals. Thus, Kolodny and Dulio (2003) noted that ‘in the allied view, political consultants may be more properly viewed as part of the party ‘network’, that is, as party-connected actors who are surrogates for the larger permanent staffers that the parties once had’ (pp.733).

On the other hand, campaign professionals concentrate on campaign activities that parties cannot deliver in the aspect of ‘adversarial view’. From this perspective, campaign professionals examine the value of their products (candidates) and the electoral market, and consider how to make their products appeal to the voters. Thus, Kolodny and Dulio contend that the original aim of campaign professionals of this type is to win as many elections as they can, and then they believe that the number of successes will be directly related to the increase in the number of clients. That is, this view is similar to the perspective of ‘exchange process’ as argued by Plasser (2001) in examining the relationship between external campaign professionals and parties. Overall, it can be inferred that, from the allied view, parties may see external campaign professionals as a subordinate partnership whilst the partnership between external campaign professionals and parties maintains an independent relationship looked at from the adversarial view.

There is another interesting study focused on in Farrell, Kolodny, and Medvic’s research (2001, p.12-15) about the relationship between political parties and political consultants in the USA. They indicate that the relationship can be divided according to ‘the background of political consultants and the type of clients that consultants are taking on’ (pp.13). They emphasise the importance of technical skills in managing modern campaign practices, and raise a question of how parties have continued to improve and develop their skills, especially in the digital age. As argued by Kolodny (1998), parties can be arranged according to two options: firstly, they serve some campaign activities that candidates want
through the improvement of their own skills, or, secondly, they have to rely on campaign professionals to conduct modern activities instead of performing these themselves. Whatever it is, there is no doubt that their relationship has been essential to cope with the on-going electoral environment.

Therefore, on the basis of the arguments in Farrell, Kolodny, and Medvic (2001), the background of political consultants is divided into four types (see Figure 2.1).

Figure 2.1. Different type of political consultants

As seen in Figure 2.1, the first type is the group of strategists. They are described as a new form of political consultant and ‘take on commercial clients for government affairs work such as lobbying’ (pp.13). However, it is expected that this type may only appear in the US, where the industry of political consultancy is firmly developed or its influence is strong. The second type is called traditional politicos. Political consultants who are in this group form their own companies after leaving their job in government and political parties. Thus, these people have some knowledge about political issues and party matters as well as the necessary know-how regarding the political process. The type of vendor in the
third group is the group of political consultants who provide technical skills to political organisations, such as web-designing and computer software companies. Naturally, they do not have any political background and concentrate on using cutting-edge technology to help the party to become visible to voters. Finally, there are the marketers. They come from non-government areas and mainly work for non-government clients. Therefore, this type of political consultant could keep a distance from political parties and maintain an independent position far away from them. If these types of political consultants are applied to Kolodny and Logan’s typology (1998), political consultants who are involved in the second type, known as ‘tradition politicos’, can be understood in the context of the allied view as they could highly possibly be considered as part of the party network and would respect the purpose of political parties. In this sense, the ‘vendors and marketers’ groups can also be directly related to the adversarial view as they have more independence in working with parties and their job provides their specialised skills to parties.

However, Farrell, Kolodny, and Medvic’s typology (2001) will not fit every country especially considering important points that this research focuses on regarding the US case, where the industry of political consultancy has developed and political consultants vigorously work for any political parties’ activities such as fundraisings and lobbying, not just for election campaign activities. Nonetheless, taking the background of campaign professionals into account is important in investigating some questions of how they come to be involved in the political process, and, further, of how they keep their relationship in the historical context (Karlsen, 2009). For instance, if campaign professionals worked for certain parties and then, set up independent political consulting companies after leaving the parties, it is highly likely that they would end up working for the party in which they were based. However, this is just only an expectation, and, we cannot be sure whether those campaign professionals would really work for the party they left. Therefore, this means that those campaign professionals are hard to be described in terms of Kolodny and Logan’s research (1998). Therefore, the inference about the relationship between political parties and campaign professionals discovered from investigating the background of campaign
professionals is necessary in order to understand how they have built on their relationship, what type of campaign professionals parties prefer, and, furthermore, to understand how their relationship has changed in terms of historical context.

2.4.3. The alteration of political parties as campaign organisations: centralisation

It is noticeable that election campaigns cannot be designed without large-scale support from party organisations and their extensive internal resources (Herrmson, 1988). Although the extent to which the degree of the power of party organisations is somehow different according to their own system – for instance, there will be a difference between countries where there are candidate-centralised electoral systems, like the USA, and countries which are party-centralised, like the UK. Many academics agree on the phenomenon of a weakening of the power of political parties, further on party decline (Thurber and Nelson, 2000). The central argument of those studies is that the current negative changes of electoral environment, such as the decline of party identification and the increase of party apathy, as well as a high reliance on external campaign professionals rather than on party organisation, have raised a question about the loss of the power and authority of party organisations compared to the past (Plasser and Plasser, 2002). Especially, Plasser (2001) argued that the phenomenon of the decline of party organisations has been raised in countries which have candidate-centred democratic systems, like the USA. On the other hand, other researchers insist that parties always consider how they deal with such rapid electoral changes as one of the main agents of political process, although it is true that their power has weakened as a negative result of media-centralised democratic systems. Therefore, this has led to the evolution of party organisation rather than the decline of the party, if anything (Cotter and Bibby, 1980; Paterson, 1996; Farrell and Webb, 2000; Plasser and Plasser, 2002; Kolodny and Dulio, 2003).

In particular, Kolodny (2000, p.112-116) argued that the academic debates relating to the theory of party decline come from the lack of understanding about the role of party organisation. To give a clear classification, she explains that
party role can be divided into three different perspectives: ‘party in electorate, party in government, and party as organisation’. Apart from the concept of ‘party in government’, the other two concepts are deeply connected to the role of parties as campaign organisations. First of all, in the case of the concept of ‘party in the electorate’, she explained that there is no doubt that parties devote much of their time to courting voters’ attention through various kinds of publicity methods, even if the rate of party identification has been increasingly down. Moreover, the extensive use of campaign professionals that is pointed out as a decisive factor of party decline does not actually affect the alteration of party organisation and party ideology. This is because almost all of those campaign professionals are generally unknown to the public, except for some campaign professionals who have had a high profile. Moreover, their role is not for a long-term period, but for a short-term period, especially in election time. Therefore, she argued that it would be more beneficial if campaign professionals engage in the process of political coalition between parties rather than a matter of how long they have been together with candidates or party organisation. In effect, it is hard to find a case in which campaign professionals or political consultants can engage and express their opinions regarding the intrinsic matter of politics such as the establishment of political policy, except in the USA where the industry of political consultancy and its education system has been highly developed. Thus, it may be said that the extensive use of campaign professionals will not have too much influence on the alteration or the role of party organisation if they act as advisers or assistants to give useful information to the candidates and political parties using their specialised skills.

As for the second concept, this is ‘party as organisation’, which emphasises the nature of party organisation itself. Aldrich’s study (1995) insists that parties’ executives tend to strengthen their solidarity (or cohesiveness) to approach a fixed purpose such as a campaign task. However, Aldrich argued that party organisation functions tend to be more like service providers than resource providers. The biggest difference between the two concepts concern how much a party organisation has power in designing campaign activities. To be specific, in the view of service provider, candidates considered party organisation as a
subordinate partnership to them because they consider party organisation as an institution, which provides services they want; whereas, from the perspective of resource providers, party organisations have an independent power and provide efficient services for candidate. However, Kolodny argues that party organisations seem to provide a transactional service (Herrmann, 1988) by matching candidate to resource providers. In addition to this, she insists that the importance of parties being able to choose their function from two options: developing their skills using new campaign techniques or maintaining their original functions such as mobilisation of the voters and management of party members. From her argument, it can be assumed that the role or the function of party organisation can be changed according to their own choice rather than by the increased use of campaign professionals. Moreover, it can be inferred that the party organisations have continued to fit their functions into an ever-changing electoral environment rather than losing their power. Therefore, the alterations of campaign activities by political parties can be seen as part of their endeavour to respond to ever-changing political environments (Katz, Müller & Plasser, 2004) under the assumption that parties continually review and reformulate their practices to meet different circumstances (Katz and Mair, 1995). Overall, it can be seen that the party, whether or not it is weaker than before, still exists at the centre of the political process, and it has to adapt to changing circumstances.

2.5. Summary of this chapter

This section has tried to conceptualise the concept of the professionalisation of election campaigning through a review of previous academic studies. The section first provided an overview of previous election campaigning studies and introduced five important features for examining historical trends in election campaigning. These features were: the influence of mass media, the increased use of sophisticated campaign techniques and scientific methods, the growth in use of campaign professionals, the adoption of marketing concepts into election campaign strategy, and the emergence of personalised and permanent campaigning.
Secondly, the section discussed the concepts of Americanisation and Modernisation, which are commonly introduced into studies on the evolution of election campaigning to highlight differences with professionalisation theory. Americanisation was defined as a specialised term to refer to the increased use of scientific methods and the adoption of American campaign techniques in a globalised form; Modernisation was defined as a natural result of election campaigning caused by social and technical developments.

Based on these definitions, the section thirdly tried to provide more detailed information to aid the conceptualisation of professionalisation theory. To this end, the different arguments about the professionalisation of election campaigning were introduced; professionalisation of election campaigning was then defined as an on-going process undertaken by political parties to review their old campaign practices and develop new, improved ones in accordance with the ever-changing electoral environment. In addition to this, this research emphasises that institutional and cultural factors could affect professionalisation of election campaigning in a given country. Therefore, it means that the level of professionalisation of election campaigning would differ between country and even party. From these perspectives, two different dimensions to the professionalisation of election campaigning were also introduced – external and internal. In brief, the external dimension focuses on professionalisation of campaign communication, for example in terms of the use of mass media and campaign technology, the alteration of campaign activities, and overall alterations in campaign strategy; the internal dimension concentrates on professionalisation of party organisation, for example in terms of centralisation, or the influx of campaign professionals and the relationship between these professionals and parties.

Finally, this section gave more detailed information about the main features of the two different dimensions analysed for this research. The section explained why the main features chosen for this study, and outlined different academic perspectives in defining campaign professionals. Two relevant studies on the relationship between parties and campaign professionals were introduced – Kolodny and Logan (1998) and Farrell, Kolodny, and Medvic (2001).
Chapter 3 Case study: South Korea

3.1. Introduction

As touched upon earlier in Chapter 2, many academic observers agree that the alteration of election campaign style has been as a natural consequence of modernised society (Farrell, 1996; Norris, 2000; Plasser and Plasser, 2002). Therefore, they explain that it is deeply connected to the level of societal changes and electoral environments. Even though there are somehow different perspectives on the understanding of the evolution of election campaigning, the central points of these views clearly show that the style of election campaigning has altered in response to the changes of electoral environments in a given country (Webzine, 2010). Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to give information about the case of South Korea before discussing the phenomenon of the professionalisation of election campaigns in the context of professionalisation theory.

All kinds of changes in political communication occur based on the structural systems each country has such as its political system, media system, electoral system and so forth (Farrell, 1996; Hallin and Mancini, 2004). In particular, the field of election campaigning is largely influenced by these systems as well as by campaign regulations (Plasser and Plasser, 2002; Webzine, 2010; De Verse, 2010). It may be true that in some countries where campaign regulations are loose, such as the USA, it could be possible to mobilise and to develop their campaign practices more easily than in others which are restricted by electoral law, such as South Korea and Japan. Therefore, it is objectively important to understand those political and media systems and campaign regulations at first before exploring the research interests of this study. Accordingly, this chapter will attempt to give a detailed explanation about: 1) political/electoral system, 2) media system, and 3) campaign regulations in South Korea.
3.2. Political system

3.2.1. The history of democratisation in South Korea: Military dictatorships until 1987

The history of democratisation in South Korea has lasted over 25 years since the end of the military dictatorships in 1987, which began after the Second World War in 1945. As a result, the Korean Peninsula gained independence from Japan and was placed under a four-power trusteeship – the USA, UK, China and the Soviet Union – on the 28th of December 1945. Citing demilitarisation as the main reason, the USA arrived in Seoul and the Soviet Union in Pyongyang. The Soviet Union insisted that political parties and any kinds of political organisation in Korea against the agreement of trusteeship in the Korean Peninsula should be excluded from the establishment of interim government in the country. However, the USA adhered to the opposite opinion on it because they had to occupy the Korean Peninsula to keep the Soviet Union in check. Consequently, their negotiations broke down in 1947 and this led to the division of Korea into north and south based on the 38th parallel. Afterwards, the USA decided to bring this matter to the attention of the UN. The UN General Assembly announced a general election in the Korean Peninsula to establish a unified government in February 1948. However, the Soviet Union, which had insisted on unification through communisation, rejected it and eventually the Korean peninsula was divided into two different independent countries, The Republic of Korea, known as South Korea, and The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, known as North Korea.

4 According to McCune (1947), it was expected that military occupation would not last for a long period when Korea was occupied by Russian and United States troops. However, this was delayed because it took a long time to establish governing commissions. While Russian and the United States discussed the plan about the establishment of governing commissions for Korea, they agreed two premises: ’1) the American and Russian commands in Korea would work together for the ultimate independence of Korea, and 2) the Korean people would accept the imposed plan and that their leaders would cooperate with one another and with the occupying power’ (p6). However, they did not cooperate and Koreans, especially South Koreans, desperately objected because they wanted to establish an independent government.
Following intervention by the UNTCOK⁵ (the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea), South Korea held a general election on the 10th of May, 1948 and Rhee Seung-man from the JaYu party was elected as the Chairman of the National Assembly later that month, in respect of his previous political career later. The Republic of Korea was established on the 15th of August in the same year. At that time, Rhee Sung-man and Rhee Si-young, who was an independence activist, were elected as president and vice president respectively. Since then South Korea has been led by three dictators – Rhee Sung-man (1948-1960), Park Chung-hee (1961-1979), and Jeon Doo-hwan (1980-1987) - until the establishment of a new era of the 6th Republic on the 25th of February 1988. Even though there were around 50 political parties from 1945 to 1948, the USA, as occupying power during this time, instructed all parties to inform them of their property and membership. In consequence, the number of political parties dropped suddenly from 50 to around 14 at this point. Afterwards, the few surviving parties such as the HanMin Party and JaYue Party tended to depend on the political and social elite - except for one party, called the GongSan Party, which took the form of a mass party in Weber’s(1880-1960) typology, growing out of the labour movement to recover workers’ rights (Sim and Kim, 2006).

The main features of the era of the 1st Republic, led by Rhee Sung-man, were the cultural split across the country between urban and rural areas and the political split between the democratic and the anti-democratic forces (Kim, 2008). According to Kim (2008), the influence of American methods of education and the diffusion of USA culture into South Korea awakened a yearning for liberal democracy around the urban areas and it eventually caused an imbalance in the culture. In addition to this, Sung-man tried to retain his political power over 15 years through amendments to constitutional law and political stratagems. As a result, the voice of instigation against his dictatorship rose from the people, especially those living in urban areas. On the other hand, these societal changes and the people’s agitation led to the launch of a new Democratic Party, known as the MinJoo Party, in 1955. Although touted as an alternative, in fact, they turned

---

⁵ UNTCOK was organised to watch and to manage free and fair elections in Korea after the Second World War in 1945.
out to be exactly the same as other political groups who just wanted to acquire political power after the natural death of Rhee Sung-man in 1965. Therefore, the establishment of the MinJoo Party was an epoch-making contribution to the history of political parties because the political structure of democratic verse anti-democratic was newly formed in South Korea; however, it is true that the struggle of the MinJoo Party against the Jay Party – who were supported by the dictatorship of Rhee Syng-man - was inadequate at that time because their political activities were passive (Kim, 2008). In 1960, in order to extend their political power, Jayue Party fabricated an election to elect Rhee Sung-man’s supporter Rhee Gi-boung as the next vice-president. This led to the organisation of a democratic revolution, known as the ‘April 19 Revolution’, which was orchestrated by students in order to annul the election result. This eventually led to the end of the era of the 1st Republic in South Korea.

The 2nd Republic started in June 1960 and the political system changed from a presidential system to a parliamentary system to prevent the return of a dictatorship. However, these efforts ended up collapsing because of the 5.16 military coup d'état in 1961. It was led by General Park Chung-hee (1961-1979), a military commander, who decided to take over the government because of dissatisfaction at his slow promotion and the corruption of senior officers in his military group. As a result, the 3rd and 4th Republic eras were born, which lasted for over 10 years, until the assassination of General Park Chung-hee on the 26th of October 1979.

Great agricultural policies and the image of General Park Chung-hee as the ‘son of a farmer’ gave strong support to the MinJoo GangHwa Party, which was led by him. However, as the major industry altered quickly from agriculture to light industry because of the industrialisation in South Korea, they seemed to lose their supporters gradually (Kim, 2008). As an alternative, the MinJoo GangHwa-Party started to devote themselves to reviving particular areas of the economy especially in Gyeong-Sang Province - which is in the south-east part of South Korea, as well as being the hometown of General Park Chung-hee - rather than in Jeolla Province, which is in the western part of South Korea. As a result, the
imbalance of economic development between the two provinces led to serious regionalism and it was the beginning of the regionalism of politics in South Korea (Kim, 2008).

After the death of General Park Chung-hee in 1965, Choi Kyu-hwa was chosen as his successor. Then Chun Doo-hwan seized political power on the 12\textsuperscript{th} of December 1979. However, the people and the opposition parties criticised the morality and the quality of President Chun, who was elected by indirect election, and it resulted in the declaration of democratisation on the 29\textsuperscript{th} of Jun 1987, known as the 6.29 declaration of democratisation\textsuperscript{6}. It was announced by Roh Tae-woo, as a candidate of the Minjoo Justice Party, and the content was about an acceptance of the system of direct election of the President in the 1987 (13\textsuperscript{th}) presidential election. However, the procedure for its agreement was not led by the public but by the political elites, to put out conflicts in civil society before the 1988 Olympic Games. In addition, political parties had to reach an agreement in a short period of time due to the intervention of the USA (Kim, 2008).

From a historical perspective, the 6.29 declaration of democratisation in 1987 is understood as an important event, transferring the role of the political sphere from the conflicts between civic society and government to the conflicts between political elites (Kim, 2008). Besides, the collapse of a unified MinJoo Party, a party organisation whose members had democratic inclinations, was to imply a failure of the 1987 presidential election. Since then, Korean parties have been established according to three political elites - ‘Kim’ Jong-phil, ‘Kim’ Young-sam and ‘Kim’ Dae-joong - based on their hometown.

\textsuperscript{6} Saxer (2003, p49) points out a total of eight points of importance with regard to the 6.29 declaration of democratisation: ‘(1) speedy constitutional revision through agreement between opposition and ruling camps, leading to direct presidential elections before February 1988; (2) revision of laws to guarantee free and fair presidential elections; (3) amnesty for Kim Daejung and restoration of his civil rights, and all political prisoners, except those charged with violent crimes, to be released; (4) guaranteed respect for human rights; (5) a free press, including allowing newspapers to base correspondents in provincial cities, and a withdrawal or revision of the Basic Press Law; (6) the institution of local autonomy, with principles of independence and self-reliance guaranteed for all levels of society; (7) guarantees that political parties could carry out legal activities in an unfettered way, and the fostering of a political climate in which dialogue and compromise prevail; and (8) a nationwide campaign against violent crime and corruption’.
3.2.2. The history of political parties and political regionalism

Korean politics is characterised by frequent political coalitions between parties, and the formation of new parties, according to their political interests. Since the progress of democratisation in 1987, several new parties have been formed, often out of the remains of older parties. 1987 also saw the beginning of what has been called the golden age of the three Kims: ‘Kim’ Jong-phil, ‘Kim’ Young-sam and ‘Kim’ Dae-joong, who maintained political hegemony and powerful leadership (Kang, 2009; Shim and Kim, 2005; Shim, 2004).

Since then, Korean parties have firmly established the current political party structure with these three politicians as the central figures and this has consequently caused the intensification of regionalism of politics in Korea. Strong regionalism in the actions of voters gave the Grand National Party (GNP) the opportunity to rule for a prolonged period of 40 years, starting from the previous republic era. In 1997, the GNP caused a historical regime change in that year’s presidential elections. In addition to this, such regionalism of politics has led to an imbalance in regional development: in the past, most of the rich classes resided in the Gyeong-sang province, the south-east part of Korea, while the middle-lower class lived in Jeolla province, in the west. Inevitably, such economic imbalances have influenced the political system, as well as deflecting voting preferences towards one party, the GNP. Furthermore, Gyeong-sang province holds a more dominant position than Jeolla province in the total number of voters due to its size, and this might be one of the additional reasons for prolonged GNP rule, as seen in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1. The number of voters in two regions in South Korea ¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>The 1997 (15th) presidential election</th>
<th>The 2002 (16th) presidential election</th>
<th>The 2007 (17th) presidential election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gyeongsang province</td>
<td>26.2% ²</td>
<td>25.4%</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeolla province</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Sources: KNEC (1998, 2003 and 2008a)
² Each percentage is calculated on the total size of vote divided by the number of actual local electoral vote.
Even though it is impossible to say that all voters in the same district support the same party, the majority tend to vote for one particular party. This phenomenon has been confirmed several times, as witnessed by the outcomes of presidential elections (Horiuchi and Lee, 2008). As seen in Table 3.2, for instance, in the 1997 presidential election, candidate Lee Hoi-change of the GNP garnered an average of over 50% of the vote from Gyeong-sang Province whereas his vote from Jeolla Province was just over 5%. Conversely, Kim Dae-Joong as the candidate of the DNP incredibly received over 90% of the vote from Jeolla Province even though he just gathered below 5% of the Gyeong-sang Province vote. The outcomes of the 2002 and the 2007 presidential elections showed similar results for the parties’ candidates and therefore political regionalism is considered as the most important factor for parties when managing election campaign strategy (Kim, Choi and Cho, 2008).

Table 3.2. Vote share of each candidate of the GNP and DP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>The candidate name</th>
<th>Gyeong-sang Province</th>
<th>Jeolla Province</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pusan</td>
<td>Daegu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Hoi-chan, Lee (GNP)</td>
<td>53.3%</td>
<td>72.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dae-joong, Kim (DP)</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Hoi-chan, Lee (GNP)</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>77.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mu-hyun, Rho (DP)</td>
<td>29.9%</td>
<td>18.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Myung-bak, Lee (GNP)</td>
<td>57.9%</td>
<td>69.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dong-yeong, Jeong (DP)</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Source: KNEC (1998, 2003 and 2008a)
2 Gyeong-sang Province and Jeolla Province are largely divided into two parts, north and south respectively. To give more details, Gyeong-Sang Province has three metropolitan cities, Pusan, Daegu and Ulsan. Amongst them, Pusan and Daegu are well-known areas which mainly support the GNP. Meanwhile, Jeolla Province has one metropolitan city, Kwangju.

Due to the dominance of political regionalism in South Korea, parties - with the exception of the GNP and DP - cannot survive long due to a lack of support from voters in an historical perspective, although South Korea is a multi-party system. Therefore, the other parties often form coalitions in order to survive and to

---

7 For this reason, some scholars tend to think that the political system in South Korea is closer to a two-party system rather than to a multi-party system (Hsieh, 1997).
challenge the two major parties. In fact, the matter of political coalition does not just belong to minor parties. In the historical perspective, the typical structure of Korean parties is that they are formed by one particular politician, which give politicians and parties a chance to form a coalition and break the relationship easily according to their interests (Kim, 1969). For this reason, parties do not have any definite political ideological differences between them (Kim, 1995) and politicians’ desires often focus on their own successful career or promoting good fellowship between politicians rather than party matters such as strengthening party ideology. Naturally, politicians tend to just concentrate on the outcome of the election to assure their future (Kim, 1995) and sometimes they leave the party if they are not sure about the election result. In particular, parties who have less party members try to form a coalition to win an election in spite of different political perspectives. This phenomenon explained above is clearly presented in Figure 3.1, which shows that the DP was split into two different parties in 1995 because the party leader, Kim Dae-joong, returned to the political world after announcing he was retiring from political life in 1992. Some politicians who supported Kim Dae-joong followed him to establish a new party, Kukmin Hoei, and the others joined the GNP when it was first established in 1997. Afterwards, Kukmin Hoei was split again due to the new establishment of the Uri party, which was formed by politicians who insisted on political reform. Consequently, this has led to a weakened party structure with a short party history and absence of strong partisanship (or party affiliations).

---

8 According to Kim (1995), Korean parties seem to have a conservative disposition in the perspective of party ideology because they aim for a gradual change under a system of liberal democracy rather than for entire changes in the current situation.
3.2.3 The historical alteration of party structure

Changes in political parties have been studied in Western countries since the 19th century, but in South Korea research on changes and crises in political parties only started in the 1960s (Kang, 2002). This is because those earnest studies on changes in political parties were made only after the democratisation movement in South Korea, although Korean political parties began to be established just after Liberation in 1945. In addition, the recent development of mass media and new technology and its increased use, electoral alterations caused by the impact of modernisation of society such as electoral volatility, and the low level of party loyalty in election campaigns have heightened the need for the discussion of party crises.

Therefore, since the demonstrations of the 1960s, many efforts have been made by Korean scholars to explore how Korean parties have dealt with an ever-changing political environment that might define their characteristics. Moreover,
Korean scholars discussed the subject of party decline and the political crisis in South Korea much more than in the West because of the weakness of the institutionalisation of political parties and a growing political mobility (Kang, 2009). More specifically, according to the public polls and official documents that were produced by the National Election Commission in South Korea (1998, 2003, and 2008), these problems have become more serious since the mass media became engaged with politics.

Meanwhile, there is no doubt that many studies about the alteration of party structure in South Korea have focused on the typical Western/European typologies – cadre (Duverger, 1951), mass (Weber, 1880-1960), cartel (Katz and Mair, 1970-), catch-all (Kirchheimer, 1945-), and electoral professional party (Panebianco, 1998-) to explain the Korean party cases (Kang, 2005; Joo, 2009) (see Table 3.3). As briefly presented in Table 3.3, the typology of political parties is broadly divided into 5 terminologies. Firstly, a cadre party, the concept of which was introduced by Duverger, is characterised by the facts that most political party members were from the elite class, and that such parties relied on the members’ donations for their finances. Secondly, a mass party is defined as the opposite term to a cadre party and, as the major difference in the functions of political parties is whether or not they mobilise and involve the public and interest groups in their internal processes. Janda and Colman (1998, pp.612) explain that the ‘mass party model defines party organisations with reference to their relationships with civil society’. Thirdly, a catch-all party type has been introduced by Otto Kirchheimer (1945) due to the effects of social changes in politics, such as internal separation between labours caused by the economic developments and the easy acquirement of political information caused by the improvement in education and the development of mass media. As a result, parties transformed into a catch-all party type to represent all social community members regardless of social class. Fourthly, in the case of the cartel party, it is defined as large-size political parties, which rely on national subsidies and cooperation with other parties in order to get subsidies from the government (Katz and Mair, 1995 and 1997). Finally, Panebianco (1982) introduced an electoral-professional party type. He points out that organizational change occurs
due to social structural changes and technological changes. Therefore, he explains that

‘The electoral-professional party may turn out to be but a transitory and comparatively short-lived phenomenon. 1) the electoral-professional party will turn out to be an intrinsically unstable institution, foretelling the dissolution of parties as organizations. 2) the second possibility is that an ideological backlash will take place, i.e. an attempt by the existing parties to resume their traditional expressive functions and former identities, returning to the extremism (leftist or rightist) of their far-off origins. 3) real political innovation: more often it enters from the outside and is brought into the system by new organizations and political leaders who enter into competition with organisation already in power’ (pp.274).
Table 3.3. Political Party Typology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Central role</strong></td>
<td>By the Elites</td>
<td>By the bureaucracy</td>
<td>By the central office</td>
<td>By the central office</td>
<td>By the professionals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type</strong></td>
<td>Elite Party</td>
<td>Membership party</td>
<td>A medium between States and Interest groups</td>
<td>Representatives of States</td>
<td>Electoral Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Financing</strong></td>
<td>By the Elites</td>
<td>Membership and Collateral Activities</td>
<td>Various kinds of contributions</td>
<td>National funds</td>
<td>Interest Groups and Public Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Party channel of communication</strong></td>
<td>Interpersonal networks</td>
<td>Party/sown channels of communication</td>
<td>Competition for accessing non-party channels</td>
<td>Privileged access to government channels</td>
<td>Mass media and interpersonal contact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Campaigning</strong></td>
<td>Personal networking &amp; Irrelevant</td>
<td>Labour-intensive Mobilisation campaigning</td>
<td>Labour and Capital-intensive Campaigning &amp; Persuasion campaigning</td>
<td>Capital-intensive campaigning</td>
<td>Capital-intensive &amp; Personalised and Targeted &amp; Candidate-centred as well as issue-oriented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutionalisation</strong></td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak or strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hierarchy between ordinary member and party elite</strong></td>
<td>Top-down</td>
<td>Bottom-up</td>
<td>Top-down</td>
<td>Mutual-autonomous statocracy</td>
<td>Mutual-autonomy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Party Leadership</strong></td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak or strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Representative style</strong></td>
<td>Trustee</td>
<td>Delegate</td>
<td>Entrepreneur</td>
<td>Agent of state</td>
<td>Representatives of interest groups within the organisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, some Korean political studies by academics have insisted that it is difficult to explain the alterations to Korean political parties with this typology, due to the very different histories and political cultures involved (Shim and Kim, 2004; Kim, 2008b; Kang, 2009; Lee, 2009). They even suggest that the closest definition of the Korean party model is that of the ‘hodgepodge party’ (Kim, 2008, pp.74), which shows every characteristic of each party in the typology, rather than conforming mainly to just one, as seen in the European model. This is because parties must pursue essential changes and adaptations to reflect themselves according to the particular voting climate and circumstances of the country they are operating in, rather than correspond to typology developed for the West. Therefore, Korean scholars still argue about how Korean parties can be defined and how their form will be changed.

Nonetheless, many researchers in South Korea believe the power of party and identification has been weakened in the electoral process, and traditional characteristics and means of parties have faded in modern society since parties have adopted new systems - such as primary election in 2002 (Kim, 2008a; Lee, 2008). Nowadays, party identity is easily changed by voters’ interests and the parties have a tendency to follow the public’s opinions too much without consideration of their own political beliefs. Related to this issue, some Korean scholars criticise that there are no differences of party ideology and identity between parties and, more seriously, that the parties are only interested in how to consolidate their political power. Therefore, most studies at a party level are focused on how to produce candidate and party images rather than on competitive political issues and how to use the newest, most advanced tools in their campaigns.

Taking all the above into consideration, it may be hard to define Korean parties using the Western model of political party types. Nevertheless, the next sections will firstly demonstrate how Korean parties have conformed to the Western model, and will then analyse a definition based on the historical background of party development to give more understanding about the alteration of party organisation.
1948 – 1981 (1st - 12th presidential election)

As explained above, around 50 political parties, which resembled the cadre party, which is organised by a few political elites and has a weak linkage between political elites and voters in Duverger’s (1954) typology, appeared after 1945. As a result the US, as an occupying power from 1945 to 1948, instructed all parties to inform them of their property and their membership. In consequence, the number of political parties dropped suddenly from 50 to around 14 at this point. Afterwards, the few surviving parties tended to depend on the political and social elite, similar to the characteristics of the cadre party. Otherwise, there was one party (called the GongSan Party), which took the form of a mass party in Duverger’s (1954) typology, growing out of the labour movement to recover workers’ rights (Sim & Kim, 2006).

However, the GongSan Party could not survive because of the situation at that time: oppression by other political parties and by the USA meant that most parties established after 1948 were a type of cadre party. This is clearly evidenced by the fact that most political party members were from the elite class, and that such parties relied on the members’ donations for their finances. In the subsequent changes to the political environment, the HanMin Party and JaYu Party, which were both cadre parties, faced difficult situations which were caused by a loss of support. However, their oppression of the GongSan Party meant that the Korean political system could not achieve transition from cadre parties to mass parties (Kang, 2002; Shim, 2008). The failure of the GongSan Party was also due to internal conflict between the old and new generations, and consequent frequent coup d’états. Subsequently, these problems not only threatened the survival of the party but also incurred people’s distrust. Despite the GongSan Party’s efforts to unify the old and new generations, these situations allowed political power in Korea to be maintained by a small number of political elites until the 1990s (Jin, 2004).
1984 – 1997 (13th - 15th presidential election)

Firstly, until 1984, cadre parties seemed to be transforming into a mixture of mass and cartel parties. For example, the SinHan-MinJoo Party was formed as a mass party in 1985. They participated in the democracy movements and tried to mobilise the public to campaign for their rights. In this sense, they were definitely different from the other political parties, which still depended on a few political elites rather than mobilisation of the masses. However, this new party still featured a top-down hierarchy (Shim and Kim, 2004) and still depended on an elite minority for their finances, rather than on a party membership fee. Despite this, they found support among the public and became the fastest-growing party in South Korea.

Cartel parties began to be arranged in 1987. According to Katz and Mair (1995 and 1997), they are defined as large-size political parties, which rely on national subsidies and cooperation with other parties in order to obtain subsidies from the government. In South Korea, cartel parties introduced because of the difficulty of raising political funds. Thereafter, all political parties agreed to depend on a national subsidy to maintain their organisations.

After this event it was possible for even minor parties to create national structures and have local offices, just like the ruling party, which had previously monopolised political power, because every party had an equal subsidy opportunity (Shim and Kim, 2005). A further consequence of this new political environment was that the issues of competition between parties and their opinions were moderated like Katz and Mair’s explanation (1995).

Given such alterations in South Korea’s political landscape after 1987, Korean parties tended towards the cartel model. However, full transformation from cadre to cartel party model was not achieved because the management of political parties by ‘the three Kims’ in this period was totally undemocratic in intra-
democracy. This is because political parties still kept a top-down hierarchy rather than introduced an autonomous stratocracy.

In general, cartel parties operate as a mutually autonomous system, and depend on fairly distributed national subsidies (Katz and Mair, 1995 and 1997). However, the reality is that all political processes were controlled by just a few major political parties and national subsidies were distributed to just a few major parties that monopolised political power. Therefore, it can be seen that the party system in South Korea was still in the cadre mode even if some parties seemed to be transforming into mass parties (Jin, 2004; Joo, 2009). As Katz and Mair (1995) note, particular types of party tend to outlive the circumstances that facilitate their initial emergence. That is, two types of party model may coexist at the same time: in the South Korean case, the 1985 to 2002 period saw cadre, cartel and mass parties all competing together. Therefore, each of the Korean parties in this period had very different management and organisational styles according to their unique ideologies and aims.

Despite their differences, almost all party organisations commonly operated in a non-democratic, costly, and factional way. In particular, high election costs were inevitable for parties because they had to mobilise their party members in election campaigns, although they did not do so when it came to electing party leaders and candidates for government officials (Kim, 1994; Jin, 2005; Kang, 2009).

**The 2002-2007 (16th-17th) presidential elections**

From 2002, the three Kims’ influence on South Korean politics declined, and this power vacuum created a demand for reform of political parties. This change of regime was a major event for the GNP, never previously defeated in an election, and it caused huge changes in all political parties as well as in the political system - particularly since the DP won the presidential election in 2002 in a new candidate selection process, similar to a primary in the USA. It was a new challenge to elect a candidate of the DP for presidential election by the masses.
Following this new attempt by the DP at modernisation of the electoral process, political parties have recognised the importance of the mobilisation of the public. Besides, problems in the current political environment, such as the political cynicism and decline of party identification already mentioned, have forced parties to focus more on elections than on other activities. The current political system, in which parties are judged by election results, requires parties to mobilise large numbers of supporters in order to survive.

Political parties can be regarded as representatives of the masses and as mediums to resolve the conflicts of interest groups (Duverger, 1954). This means that the masses can support and be supported by one particular party according to their political interests, and that political parties can exist thanks to this support. Therefore, the most important factor in the typology of mass parties is the mobilisation and participation of the masses. As such, the new candidate selection method chosen by the DP was successful in mobilising voters, especially young voters, and in boosting party membership.

On the other hand, a mass party is seen as the opposite of a cadre party and the major difference in the functions of political parties is whether or not they mobilise and involve the public and interest groups in their internal processes. Given these characteristics of the typical mass party, the new attempt by the DP in 2002 is definitely the first evidence of the existence of a true South Korean mass party.

However, a simple explanation of South Korean political parties as taking the form and attributes of a Western mass party is also difficult because of a few different features compared to the European typology such as finance system. Besides, all the previously mentioned problems that characterise the South Korean political landscape still remain. Therefore, Korean academics are saying that the only way forward is for political parties to take an electoral-professional form (Joo, 2009; Park, 2010). Furthermore, they agree that parties are actually likely to naturally transform into the electoral-professional model because they are spending so much time on publicity or on stimulating voters rather than other
activities. They say that a special time for preparing publicity or campaigning does not now exist, and that parties now have to do this every day in order to maintain support: this new urgency is a consequence of the impact of mass media and new technology.

### 3.3. Media system

Many studies have already reported that the influence of mass media goes beyond information communication and reaches the information receivers’ socialisation process (Gerson, 1966; Adoni, 1979; McLeod and Lee, 2012). In particular, the socialisation function of mass media can be found easily in political areas. This is because mass society is formed as the scale of society expands and, in such a mass society, communication through media can achieve more effective information communication between senders and receivers than can direct political interaction between politicians and citizens. Especially in the election period, media can play not only a mediating role between candidates and voters but also a role for promoting participation. In this sense, there is no doubt that mass media have practically an inseparable connection to politics; therefore, it is worth investigating media systems in Korea before exploring the interests of this research.

Like the historical alteration of utilisation of mass media in the West, the core feature of election campaigns in South Korea was characterised by the introduction of TV into the political process in the late 1990s. Television was brought to Korea in 1961 but was not available to all citizens at that time (Jeong, 2002). Besides, as mentioned before, this was the transition period to democracy in South Korea which continued until 1972 (Jeong, 2002); therefore, the role of TV in politics was not as effective as it is nowadays.

Despite the late introduction of TV compared to in the West, South Korea has achieved a high-level growth of information society in a short period. To be specific, HLKZ-TV was the first commercial TV station, introduced in 1956, and
it was ranked 15th in the world and 4th in Asian countries at that time. A colour TV service started in 1980 and this was followed by the arrival of Cable TV in 1995 and of digital terrestrial television broadcasting in 2005. The government planned to end the analogue broadcast service on the 1st January 2013.

In particular, South Korea is considered as one of the leading countries in terms of access to the Internet. Access has become accelerated due to government policies for digital information age such as Cyber Korea 21 (1999-2002), the e-Korea Vision 2006 (2002-2006), and the U-Korea Master Plan (2006-2010) since Kim Dae-jong’s government in 1997 (Kim, 2009; Freedom house, 2012). Especially in 1997, the government encouraged citizens to have and access a computer as well as publishing a policy for the dissemination of computers to ward against computer illiteracy. For this reason, many observers indicated that one reason for rapid growth of the Internet in Korea has been accomplished by government-led initiatives (Freedom house, 2012). Since then, Korea has become a national power in the information industry field, especially in the area of the Internet.

To give more details, the first attempt of connecting the Internet in Korea was achieved in 1982 and general dissemination of the Internet has been conducted by the ‘KORNET’ service of Korea Telecommunication Authority since 1994. By 2000, the number of Internet users had exceeded 24 million, which is three-quarters of Korean voters, and 7,030,000 households were accessing super-speed communication networks. Recently, the age range of the Internet user has widely expanded and Internet-based activities such as e-government, e-commercial, Internet banking and shopping have been well utilised in many ways. In particular, government programmes about the swift establishment of high-speed Internet access and its cheap price has allowed South Korea to achieve an advanced information society in the world.

The spread of the Internet in Korea is the fastest among Asian countries, and Korea is ranked 1st in the Asian region and 17th (82.7%) across the globe in access to the Internet, according to the KISA’s (Korea Internet & Security
Agency) recent report and Internet World Stats as seen in Figure 3.2. This phenomenon was reported in other countries and *CNet news.com*, a worldwide magazine of the IT industry, published articles titled ‘South Korea’s digital dynasty’ in 2004 (Kanellos, 2004). According to these articles, the popularity of online communication and political discussions via the Internet has been growing in spite of the government’s controlled media regulations. Furthermore Korea is considered as one of the most ‘wired’ countries because local Internet companies normally show off their power rather than global companies such as Google, Yahoo and Facebook, unlike in most other countries (Freedom house, 2012). For example, NAVER, as the top local search engine (portal) in Korea, is much more popular than Google. In the same line, Cyworld and KAKAO story are being welcomed as online communities as opposed to Facebook. Especially the function called Minihompy on the website of Cyworld, which is a personalised website, had an eighth of the population as registered users in 2011 (eMarketer, 2012). Consequently, this means that big companies such as Google, Yahoo and MSN which provide various kinds of the Internet-based services are still trying to compete with local companies.

Figure 3.2. Internet usage rate and Internet users in South Korea

![Figure 3.2. Internet usage rate and Internet users in South Korea](image)

1 Source: KISA (2012)
Moreover, many observers expect a rise in the Internet usage due to fast growth in the Smartphone market (Freedom house, 2012). According to KISA’s recent survey (2012), the growth of Internet usage via Smartphone has been dramatically increased and it has allowed Koreans to appreciate the value of the Internet as an important tool in their daily life.

3.4. Campaign regulations

Many scholars explain that campaign regulations in each country are one of the most important elements in understanding historical alteration of election campaigning in a given country (Schafferer, 2006; Lee, 2008). In fact, campaign regulations vary according to their own electoral system, political system and the degree of development of mass media, etc. Nonetheless, campaign regulations could explain about how mass media and campaign technology has been adopted; therefore, it is valuable as a definitive yardstick to measure the extent to which election campaigns have been modernised.

In South Korea, up until 1987 the election regulations had been changed several times by previous presidents who wanted to retain political power (Jeong, 2002). This was because the political system also claimed to stand for democracy, but it looked like anti-communism rather than democracy. Moreover, the presidents before 1987, Rhee Seung-man and General Park Jeong-hee, were always busy working out how to prolong their power and they did not hesitate to go through electoral reform. This is clearly presented in the historical event, known as the ‘Yushin Constitution’, in 1972⁹. At that time, General Park Jeong-hee declared a prohibition on political advertising via mass media (Jeong, 2002). Needless to say, this played a kind of defence mechanism to protect them against any kind of

---

⁹ The Yushin Constitution is the constitution of the Fourth Republic. General Park Jung-hee introduced this constitution on 17th October, 1972 for the purpose of political innovation backing up the reunification of the fatherland which is a supreme task for South Korea. The basic characteristics of the Yushin Constitution at the time of amendment was claimed as ‘Orientation to peaceful reunification of fatherland, localization of democracy and reconfirmation of practical economic equality’ but in fact it was an amendment for the long-term seizure of power by General Park. It allowed violation of people’s basic human rights and dictatorship by the president because of an overgrowth of presidential authority in power organization.
opposition force. Strictly speaking, there is no doubt that campaign regulation as the authentic meaning of democratic format came into force with the 12th presidential election in 1987 after the 6.29 declaration of democratisation in Korea. Thus, Act 1 of the electoral law clarifies that that ‘Under the Constitution of the Republic of Korea and the Local Government Act, the election is carried out by the public’s voluntary basis and democratic procedure and it also aims to contribute to the advancement of a democratic form of government against preventing corruption related to election’.

Since then, with the strong effect of mass media on modern society and the advance of the information society in South Korea, new media and the latest technology have been rapidly introduced in political campaigns. As a result, the Public Office Election Law was launched in 2004 and it has been changed rapidly in response to these developments, in particular against the election pattern of low efficiency and high expenditure (Kim and Kim, 2005). It was further altered several times for several reasons under the purpose of applying it flexibility. When looking at regulations with regard to election campaigns until now, they are mainly focused on the matter of adoption of new media and of public opinion poll. This means that the swift actions of the Public Office Election Law reflect the powerful influence of media-centred election, which means the provision of information by mass media, on elections in Korea and resultant changes (Kang, 2009).

Taking this into consideration, the reason that the Public Office Election Law is considered more important in South Korea than in other countries is that the country adopts the positive system, which enumerates all election campaign methods one by one (Shim & Kim, 2006). For this reason, the Public Office Election Law is amended promptly whenever a new instrument that may influence election campaigns emerges. For example, since the recent 2010 local election, changing provisions on the period for the distribution of election

---

10 The 6.29 declaration of democratisation has a deep meaning to Koreans. It was announced by Roh Tae-woo, who was a leader of the Democratic Justice Party as well as a presidential candidate in 1987, to give democratisation for the people and to accept a formal request for a first direct election on 29th of June 1987.
bulletins has been under discussion. According to the current Public Office Election Law in South Korea, election bulletins can be distributed five days before the Election Day but, considering the time for delivery to the voters’ hand, the period is considered too short. Hence, many studies have pointed out the inefficiency of this campaign regulation (Jang, 2008).

Furthermore, it is being discussed to amend the Public Office Election Law in connection to the Internet media, which has been settled as a major instrument of election campaigns, and election campaigns using mobile phones, a newly emerging electronic medium. In particular, the power of interactivity and networking free of spatial limitation in the Internet media distinguishes the Internet clearly from conventional media, and, therefore, it is considered extremely necessary to revise the Public Office Election Law adequately.

To be more specific, regulations on political TV advertising and TV discussion in South Korea are stipulated in detail in Chapter 7 Article 82 of the Public Office Election Law, amended on 4th August, 2005 (See the more details in Appendices A and B). According to these articles, in the case of TV discussion, television and radio broadcasting systems can invite one or more candidates or debaters during an election period, ask about the political party’s platforms and policies, and present and discuss their opinions (Kim, 2003). Moreover, according to Article 59, which is about days available for political discussions during the election campaign period, political discussions can be held from the last day of candidate registration to the day before the Election Day. However, the period for discussions is different according to election type. For example, discussions are allowed from 120 days before the Election Day in the presidential election, and from 60 days before the Election Day in the general election.

In South Korea, and particularly in the presidential election, political discussions are allowed to candidates endorsed by a political party with five or more members of the National Assembly, those endorsed by a political party that won over three-hundredths of valid votes in the previous presidential election or the
previous election for the proportional representative members of the National Assembly, and those whose average support rate in opinion polls during the election period is over five-hundredths.

3.5. The review of the style of previous election campaigns before the 1997 presidential election

The history of political newspaper and TV advertising

The history of political newspaper advertising in Korea can be traced back to the days of the Liberal Party in 1952. In the previous presidential elections for the 1st and 2nd Republics, political advertising could not appear due to the overwhelming power of Lee Seung-man. As the starting point of political advertising, candidates Lee Si-yeong and Cho Byeong-ok advertised their seven major policies including the establishment of democracy, the reform of administration, national defence, financial and economic policies, the development of rural areas, and social policies under the headline ‘Our Stands and Policies’ in Dong-a Ilbo on 3rd August 1952 (Lee, 1993). At that time, however, most of the political advertisements were merely public statements.

In the 3rd presidential election, held on 15th May 1956, highly symbolic election slogans were adopted and advertised in the form of an intensive appeal, showing a step towards advanced political newspaper advertising. In the 4th presidential election, political newspaper advertising began to shape its formative frames through exchanging slanders and fierce offences and defences in daily newspapers, and in the 5th presidential election, much more developed patterns were observed. In the 5th presidential election, advertising techniques were also improved considerably. For example, while most political newspaper advertisements in the past used texts, symbolic things such as ‘bull’ were now used. Based on today’s political advertising analysis level, previous political advertisements could not be called political advertising, but, from the 5th
presidential election, they began to show techniques that may correspond to ‘Seven Propagation Strategies Used in Political Propaganda’ classified by the Institute of Propaganda Analysis in the US (Lee, 1993).

In the presidential elections in the 1980s, political newspaper advertising was spotlighted as an important factor in electoral races more than ever, and opened the age of active political communication (Lee, 1993). Particularly from the election in 1987, more refined and westernised forms of political newspaper advertising began to appear in Korean politics.

Entering the 1990s, getting away political advertising limited to printed media, political TV advertisements emerged for the first time. In the 14th presidential election, political advertisements on the TV were mainly for explaining the candidates’ policies or issues. The form was monotonous, and the dark-coloured screen dealt with heavy and serious issues. Of course, such programmes used only simple graphic techniques. Later, in the 15th presidential election, many advanced patterns of political TV advertisements appeared and they used visual and auditory elements including colours for maximising the effect of the TV. Furthermore, emotional advertisements were also made as well as political advertisements dealing with issues. In the 16th presidential election in 2002, new political environments were created with the emergence of ‘media politics.’ This provided comfort and a convenient environment for voters to connect with political advertisements that, with the use of various colours and technical effects, looked somewhat emotional, and many of the advertisements appealed to voters’ emotions rather than presenting the candidate’s policies and issues.

Along with these changes, specific legal provisions were applied to political newspaper advertising in 1963 and The Presidential Election Law enacted in the same year stipulated regulations on political advertising in newspapers - which had been performed without rules until that time - providing a fixed frame for political newspaper advertising. To be specific, permission regarding TV advertising has improved since the 15th presidential election and the number of
advertisements in newspaper and broadcasting dramatically increased during the 15th presidential election in 1997. For instance, parties were allowed to run advertisements in the newspaper 70 times in the 1997 presidential election as compared with four times in the 1992 presidential election. That is, it is needless to say that media democracy was launched in Korea during the 1997 presidential election (see Appendices A and B for more details).
Chapter 4 Research Methodology

4.1. Introduction

This research aims to analyse how South Korean parties have managed their party organisation and campaign practices with campaign professionals in a response to continual changes in the electoral environment since the 1997 presidential election in South Korea. Therefore, it will address the growing influence of campaign professionals on party organisation while discussing evolution of party organisation of professionalisation in political communication. Firstly, it will demonstrate how and how much parties’ presidential election campaigns have become more technically sophisticated as a consequence of mass media mobilisation and adaptation of new technologies. Secondly, it will analyse how and by how much political parties have made their organisation more ‘systemic’ and ‘tactical’ using communications technologies in the context of a more professionalised model of party communication. Thirdly, it will analyse the relationship between political parties and professional consultants to investigate the changes to party structure that professionalisation theory suggests. Consequently, this thesis will discuss how these alterations in party organisation have contributed to the phenomenon of professionalisation in political communication in South Korea.

In so doing, two major South Korean parties, the GNP and DP, are selected for this study. The most important part of this study is to see if there are any differences in the campaign practices between the two different parties. Differences could occur because the parties would conduct different campaign strategies based on their historical achievements and different party culture such as political elites’ minds, party ideology, and a decision-making system, as explained by Gibson and Römmele (2009). In reality, it is assumed that these two parties are in the same election environment but seem to seek out different campaign strategies. Overall, through comparison of the two parties’ cases, this study provides an opportunity for discussion of the extent to which the
professionalisation theory in the field of election campaigns can be applied to the case of South Korea.

As argued earlier in the literature review, the professionalised election campaign theory, which can offer a multi-dimensional approach to the changing process of election campaigns through in-depth discussion, is more focused on a gradual shift in the utilisation of campaign practices by each political party. In particular, many studies that have dealt with the concept of professionalisation to understand the historical alteration of election campaigning have indicated that the degree of professionalisation differs according to social and political systems in a given country (Farrell, 1996; Rawnsley, 2006). As a result, many scholars explained that a hybridisation approach is reasonable to analyse the alteration of the election campaign of each different case due to the different political and electoral systems in every country (Plasser and Plasser, 2002; Karlsen, 2010). Therefore, this study will examine in depth the pattern of change in Korean parties’ campaign activities in the context of professionalisation of election campaigns.

As stated earlier in the literature review chapter, the concept of professionalisation is defined here as ‘the whole adaptation process of political parties to a new electoral environment’. Accordingly, the whole process of professionalisation of election campaigns can occur when two aspects of the alteration fuse together: 1) the technical improvement of campaign activities corresponds to the development of mass media and campaign technology as an external dimension of professionalisation of election campaigns, and 2) the organisational change of political parties such as the increase of departments’ power in relation to PR, the growth of campaign professionals, and the change of relationship between internal party campaign staffers and external campaign professionals as an internal dimension of professionalisation of election campaign. Although the increase of the influx of campaign professionals caused by the utilisation of modern campaign technology would be a possible influence on potential organisational changes of a political party, it may not be one of the factors in undergoing substantial changes of party organisation. Therefore, this
study will not deeply discuss the matter regarding the alteration of party organisational form such as mass party, electoral-professional party and so on.

Accordingly, to understand these different aspects, this study has chosen semi-structured interview as a main research method to achieve the purpose of this research as explained above. In particular, an in-depth investigation through semi-structured interviews with external campaign professionals and internal party campaign staffers will be helpful to lead a more detailed discussion about those results of external and internal alteration of professionalisation of election campaigning. In addition to this, measurement of the degree of professionalisation between two parties, the GNP and DP, will clearly show up the differences in dealing with mass media and new technology using the CAMPROF index as presented in Gibson and Römmele’s research (2009).

For this reason, this chapter addresses detailed information in relation to the research methodology of this study. In that sense, the following sub-chapters will provide some contents such as discussions about case study and in-depth interview as the main methodology of this study, the research periods, the procedure and process of in-depth interview and so on.

4.2. Overview of the case study

Single-case studies can help raise exploratory questions which can strengthen the evidence of an existing theory through a specific explanation despite the difficulty of generalisation (Yin, 1990). Since most theories in political contexts have been developed and discussed in Western countries such as the USA and in European countries, due to the advanced growth of those countries, it is essential to apply those theories in other countries. In particular, in terms of election campaign research, US literature has shown that the area has strengths because of a great number of skilful campaign professionals in the extensive industry of political consulting, accumulated know-how in dealing with mass media communication, and the demands for USA campaign practices by other countries.
Recently, there has been agreement over the similarities between nations, but researchers have started to discuss the differences because the alteration of election campaigns occur based on different systems in a given country.

Drawing on the current interests, there are three main reasons for having chosen the case study as the research method. Firstly, it is necessary to test the applicability and acceptability of theories being discussed by academic scholars in a real case. The verification of the applicability of these new theories has an important meaning in that it may allow the possibility of widening the scope of theories by supporting different perspectives. In particular, considering that many discussions and studies have vigorously been made in the West, we should determine how applicable such new theories are to other countries, such as in Asia.

Secondly, it is necessary to examine the phenomena that accompany existing theories. When normative theories proven in the past need to be re-established in accordance with the current environment, the case study is helpful in strengthening the theories as important evidence in the verification of phenomena (Eisenhardt, 1989). The concept of professionalisation of election campaigns discussed in this study is an on-going subject that reflects current changes in the election environment and key issues among academic scholars in the existing theories of Americanisation and Modernisation. By testing the newly discussed theories in a substantial case today, we have an opportunity to lay some theoretical groundwork (Anderson, 1983).

Thirdly, it is possible to validate a theory using practical data (Gillham, 2000). Quantitative and qualitative data such as interviews, questionnaire surveys, articles, and statistics when used in a case study can be important evidence for the validation of a theory. Furthermore, this data may provide opportunities to identify exogenous factors that have not been recognised theoretically.
4.3. The rationale for the South Korean case

Although the reasons for why a Korean case is selected for this study are explained in the introductory chapter, the aim of this section is briefly to review the reasons for selection of a Korean case as part of the methodology.

Firstly, South Korean elections have been significantly influenced by regional politics. Regionalism of politics in South Korea has faced differences in political behaviour as well as political participation between local people. It has shown quite different features in comparison with other countries that have the same problem such as the UK, Spain (Park, 2003). Admittedly, it can be said that politics of regionalism in South Korea come from blind partisanship and party loyalty. In spite of that, blind faith in a party is still an important factor that affects a voter’s decision. For this reason, it is obvious that almost all candidates who want to run for election hope to join the main parties, the GNP or DP, and this has eventually permitted the parties to have stronger power than those in other countries. In particular, it is reported that each party tends to focus more on the vulnerable areas that do not receive a lot of voters’ support (Seoul Shinmun, 05/Dec/1997; Segye Times, 02/Oct/2002; SBS news, 17/Dec/2007). As explained in Chapter 3, the GNP is strongly supported from Gyeong-sang province whilst the DP receives many votes from Jeolla province. However, the current research argues that this phenomenon is declining and the generation gap has been strongly increased by the emergence of the Internet as a new medium. Therefore, each of the parties has had to design a campaign strategy through a sophisticated electoral market survey to deal with the new electoral environment and, actually, this has raised the argument that election campaigning has to be improved with a certain level of professionalisation.

Secondly, election campaign practices today are reliant on advanced technology, particularly in South Korea, where the Internet has been regarded as the most powerful and efficient medium for campaign purposes since 2000. Although this phenomenon is not limited to Korea among Asian countries, the country ranks
first in Asia in the spread and use of the Internet. In the presidential election of 2002, for example, official political advertisements were broadcast through the TV, with candidate Rho Mu-hyun’s political advertisements causing a great sensation. As a result, supporting voters collected and distributed information through the Internet unofficially and this had a greater impact than expected: it was a key element in Rho’s eventual victory. Furthermore, South Korean voters, in particular the younger age group, use the Internet as a major source of political information. This behaviour is evidenced by the large number of voters visiting the candidates’ websites and the many supporter communities appearing on the Internet (Hwang, 2006). For this reason, South Korean Internet election campaign strategies are drawing the attention of scholars, and how to handle and utilise the Internet is emerging as a critical factor in campaign strategies.

Thirdly, South Korean election campaigns utilise many scientific tools (Kwon, 2006). A representative scientific method of election campaigns is an opinion poll. In South Korean election campaigns, opinion polls are used by parties as well as journalists as frequently as media articles containing political information. To voters, moreover, the reliability of opinion polls is higher than any political article, and this perception of high reliability has a direct impact on voters’ decisions. Thus, parties opt to use more efficient surveys or tools to communicate with voters.

Fourthly, the number of media consultants and agencies is increasing. The advance of technology and the maximisation of media influence are expanding the role of consultants and so increasing the number of consultancy agencies. These days, political parties are contracting-out such political services as the production of political advertisements, advice on strategic techniques, and opinion polling, and even foreign consultants are joining the South Korean market (Schafferer, 2006).

Lastly, Western trends, especially in the US, are adopted quickly in South Korea. The US trend has a strong influence on not only political and economic factors
but also on every corner and level of society in South Korea, including political campaigning. Furthermore, the rapid development of technology and its effects is creating many changes in modern society similar to those in Western society. In the same context, the pattern of change in election campaigns, especially the alteration of campaign activities, shows the trend of Westernisation or Americanisation as supported by many scholars (Tak, 2000). For example, Internet election campaigns began to appear in 2000 and political advertisements are spreading with the development of campaigns focusing on candidates’ images. Furthermore, mobile phone campaigns were utilised by parties in the 2007 election. Taking all these things into consideration, research has shown that the South Korea model is valuable in examining the phenomenon of professionalisation in election campaigns.

Therefore, two parties, the GNP and DP, have been chosen for this study for the following reasons: 1) the degree of practical use of new communication technologies, 2) the degree of institutionalisation, the stability, and sustainability of the political party, and 3) different election histories. Firstly, since the adoption of new communication technologies, party organisers have had a tendency to replace their original bureaucrats with professional consultants. Secondly, these two parties have been chosen for their stability and sustainability. In particular, the GNP and DP are more stable and have more political power than the other political parties, although South Korean politics is characterised by frequent coalitions between parties (see Table 4.1). Since the single member district system was restored in the 1998 general election in South Korea, it has been held at four-year intervals. In addition to this, South Korea has a unicameral system of legislature, composed of 299 lawmakers. Therefore, it is crucially important that the members of the National Assembly are from as many parties as possible because this gives strong political power to each party. As seen in Table 4.1, over a 10-year period, the GNP has had an average of 50% of the total seats on the National Assembly whilst the DP has had an average of 36% of the total seats. Given that South Korea politics normally comprises more than nine parties every year, it can be interpreted that the GNP and DP have stronger political powers than the others.
Table 4.1. Party creation and the number of members of the National Assembly

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political parties</th>
<th>Party creation</th>
<th>The number of members of the National Assembly</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(46.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>December 1951</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(26.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>June 1955</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLP</td>
<td>January 2000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2 As explained in Chapter 3, the original root of GNP was the Jayu Party. Thus, the date of the GNP’s party creation was marked as the date of the JaYu Party’s party creation.
3 The DP was split into two different parties, the Ur party and MDP, caused by internal dispute after the 2002 presidential election. Therefore, the Ur party secured 152 seats and the MDP secured only nine seats in the 2004 general election.

Furthermore, it is important that the political parties maintain their ‘independence’ during the research periods, to allow comparative analysis. Finally, they occupy the same electoral environment but have different histories in terms of presidential election results. As mentioned in the case study chapter and seen in Table 4.2, the GNP sustained their power over 40 years until the 1997 presidential election. The reason that the GNP could hold political power for such a long time is due to the political background of their creation. In effect, the GNP was firstly established in November 1997; however, the party’s original political root goes back to the time when the Minjoo Jayue Party was first established in 1990. The Minjoo Jayue Party was created through the merger of three parties, the Minjoo Justice Party led by President Rho Tae Woo, the Unified Democratic Party, and the Sinminjoo Republication Party, and, therefore, they became the largest ruling party at that time.

Table 4.2. The alteration of ruling party in South Korea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The presidential election</th>
<th>The ruling party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Until the 1997 presidential election</td>
<td>GNP (Grand National Party11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>DP (Democratic Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>DP (Democratic Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>GNP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11 A reminder that the official name of the DP was New Millennium Party (DP) in the 1997 presidential election, New Millennium Democratic Party (DP) in the 2002 presidential election, and Unified New Democratic Party (DP) in the 2007 presidential election.
According to Gibson and Römmele (2009), the use of professionalised techniques for election campaigns may be accelerated when political parties are facing a difficult time, such as the loss of electoral support or a change of party leader. Bearing these points in mind, analysis of these two parties, the GNP and DP, is a good way to test the argument that professionalisation is overtaking South Korean politics, and to attempt to measure this change. In addition to this, Table 4.3 shows detailed information of each presidential election in South Korea such as the rate of overall voter turnout and voter share. It is also evidence of why the GNP and DP are considered as the major parties in South Korea.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The method of election</td>
<td>A direct election</td>
<td>A direct election</td>
<td>A direct election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The president-elect</td>
<td>Dae-Jung, Kim (DP)</td>
<td>Moo-Hyun, Rho (DP)</td>
<td>Myung-Bak, Lee (GNP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall turnout</td>
<td>80.7%</td>
<td>70.8%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main candidates’ vote share</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Hoi-chang, Lee (Grand National Party, 38.7%)</td>
<td>1. Mu-hyun, Rho (New Millennium Party, 48.9%)</td>
<td>1. Dong-young, Jeong (United New Democratic Party, 26.1%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Dae-joong, Kim (New Millennium Party, 40.3%)</td>
<td>2. Hoi-chang, Lee (Grand National Party, 46.6%)</td>
<td>2. Myung-bak, Lee (Grand National Party, 48.7%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. In-jae, Lee (Kukminsindang, 19.2%)</td>
<td>3. Young-gil, Kwon (Democratic Labour Party, 3.9%)</td>
<td>3. Hoi-chang, Lee (Independent, 15.1%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Younggil, Kwon (Kukminsungri 21, 1.2%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| The total number of candidates | 7 | 6 | 10 |

1 As noted in the table, there were seven candidates, six candidates, and 10 candidates in the 1997, 2002, and 2007 presidential election respectively. However, this table summarises the candidates who obtained the highest share of the vote in each presidential election.

4.4. The period of the research

As stated earlier, all campaign activities in Korea are restricted by an electoral law, called ‘the Public Official Election Act’. For this reason, some research has suggested that reviewing the historical alteration of campaign regulations is the easiest way to understand the big trend of campaign changes in South Korea (Lee,
It is obvious that campaign regulation is generally established based on the electoral environment of the times and it could lead us to discover what differences have actually taken place over time. Furthermore some countries that have stringent campaign regulations, such as Korea and Japan, cannot be discussed without a deep understanding of campaign regulations.

South Korea has dramatically modernised itself in the last 50 years and campaign regulations have been revised several times to keep up with the changing electoral environments. In particular the amendment of election campaigns has been accomplished in order to reflect the ever-changing media environment because the influence of mass media on politics has seriously increased and the swift attempts of parties or candidates to utilise new media has been gradually observed (Jeong, 2002). Although there have been many debates about whether the increased use of mass media has consequently brought positive aspects to parties or candidates, it cannot be denied that campaign activities using mass media have widely diversified in many different ways and their effect has increased. Accordingly, it is important to investigate how Korean parties have dealt with these alterations and how they utilise them to ensure their survival in a serious competition between parties under severe campaign regulations. When looking through campaign regulations especially related to mass media, it is clear that there has been a huge increase in regulations relating to campaign mediums such as newspaper, TV and the Internet over the last 20 years.

Roughly speaking, campaign activity using newspapers was first allowed in the 13th presidential election in 1987. Accordingly, parties then started to run a small amount of newspaper advertising. After that, in the 14th presidential election in 1992, the first TV advertisements arrived and the era of TV had arrived in Korea. Afterwards, the first TV debate took place in the 15th presidential election in 1997 and the Internet has been used since the 16th presidential election in 2002. Finally, campaign activities using mobile phones were introduced in the 17th presidential election in 2007. To be more exact, there was an alteration of election campaign activities caused by the advent of new media in the period of
the 13th, 14th and 16th elections. On the other hand, there were some attempts to enhance the effect of existing mass media in a professional way in the 15th and 17th presidential elections as seen in Table 4.4. Given that the research period of this thesis is from the 15th to 17th elections in South Korea, it means that the Korean election campaign entered into the golden era of TV. Table 4.4 summarises the historical changes of the utilisation of mass media in South Korea.

Table 4.4. Historical changes of the utilisation of mass media in South Korea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presidential election</th>
<th>Existing mass media</th>
<th>New media</th>
<th>The difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1987 (13th)</td>
<td>Party organ</td>
<td>Newspaper</td>
<td>The arrival of new media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992 (14th)</td>
<td>Newspaper</td>
<td>TV</td>
<td>The arrival of new media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997 (15th)</td>
<td>Newspaper TV</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>The intensification of media strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002 (16th)</td>
<td>Newspaper TV</td>
<td>The Internet</td>
<td>The arrival of new media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007 (17th)</td>
<td>Newspaper TV</td>
<td>The Internet</td>
<td>The intensification of media strategy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Accordingly, this research covers the period from 1997 to the 2007 presidential election. The reason for this is as follows: the 1997 presidential election was the first to be held in which mass media, especially television, featured in the electoral process. For instance, political advertising and political debate appeared on TV for the first time in the 1997 presidential election. Besides, the 1997 and 2007 presidential elections were remarkable historical years in Korean politics because of a change in party regime, as explained in Table 4.2. In particular, this period was highly significant for South Korea because a change was made in the electoral process from ‘party-oriented’ to ‘candidate image-oriented through mass media’ (Lee, 2008).
4.5. Description of semi-structured interview data materials

4.5.1. The general scope of interviews

In general, interviews as a research method is divided into three different approaches: structured, semi-structured and unstructured. Firstly, the structured interview is described as a useful research technique for researchers who want to discover common or different figures between a respondent’s answers when they are asked same questions (May, 2011). Thus, interviewers should maintain neutrality and try not to affect any influences on the interviewee’s answers. For this reason, the structured interview is often used for survey research, such as large-scale telephone interviewing.

Secondly, the semi-structured interview is described as a research method that allows more freedom to interviewees than the structured interview when responding to the interviewer’s questions. Although the questions being asked to interviewees are specific according to the research, interviewees are given more freedom in formulating their responses (May, 2011). Thus, it is necessary for interviewers to understand the contexts of what they want to hear from interviewees and to maintain ‘a balance between structure and openness’ (Gillham, 2005, pp.79). For this reason, Gillham (2005) explains that this method is ‘the most important way of conducting a research interview because of its flexibility balanced by structure, and the quality of the data so obtained’ (pp.70).

Finally, the unstructured interview is a research method that relies on the interviewee’s response. As such, interviewees have a high level of freedom and they allow talking about ‘the subject within their own framework of reference’ (May, 2011, pp.124). This type of interview is therefore suitable for research such as narrative analysis.
Given this, this study used a semi-structured interview research method to obtain insights into historical changes in presidential election campaigning in South Korea from 1997 to 2007. In particular, this study aims to explore how the relationship between external campaign professionals and campaign staffers within party organisations has changed over the 10-year period. Naturally, it is important to hear real experiences from those who were involved in this process to investigate the changes in campaign strategies and their impact on political party organisation. Moreover, it is important to find out any valuable information such as campaign strategies and historical changes of election campaign, which might not be known accurately to outsiders. Therefore, semi-structured interview are considered a suitable method to investigate the professionalisation of election campaigning.

4.5.2. The scope of interviewees for semi-structured interviews

The definition of external campaign professionals and internal party campaign staffers

As stated above, in order to achieve an effective sample of interviewees it is important to have clear understanding of the target group of the study. That is, we have to define who external campaign professionals are. Sabato (1981, pp.8) explains, ‘political consultants are campaign professionals engaged primarily in the provision of advice and services (such as polling, media creation and production, and direct-mail fund raising) to candidates, their campaigns, and other political committees’. Moreover, Manicini (1999, pp.237) points out that ‘political consultants define the lines of campaign strategy as well as their organisation and management’. According to these definitions, campaign professionals tend to be largely composed of political consultants. However, in South Korea, it is hard to find people who can be called political consultants as the industry of political consultants is not well developed.

Although there are a few political consultants who work for political parties, it is
true that they are limited in number; the information on their role and activities is not well-known to the public. Moreover, the scope and role of independent political consultants in South Korea is not as wide as in the USA. For instance, advertisers normally engage in the production of political advertising during the election campaigning period. However, they do not want to be called political consultants and treat the relationship with political parties similar to a business relationship. That is, they see political parties as one of their customers and they just offer their specialised skills to political parties. Thus, they want to be known as advertisers rather than political consultants. This also applies to other campaign professionals such as pollsters and image consultants. Only a few independent political consultants would choose to be called political consultants.

Therefore, this research will use the term ‘external campaign professionals’ rather than the term ‘political consultants’. Accordingly, campaign professionals in this research can be defined as ‘those individuals employed by political parties for their expertise and skills in dealing with the media’ (Lilleker and Negrine, 2002, pp.99). That is, those who are able to, or claim to be able to, manage the process of change are the campaign professionals. In the context of political communication these are opinion pollsters, media advisers, advertising companies, image-trainers for candidates, and sometimes also academics who offer advice to political organisations based on their working experience.

Although Lilleker and Negrine (2002) include all people who have a basic knowledge of dealing with mass media into the category of campaign professionals, whether or not they are paid party staffers, this research excludes party staffers from the group of external campaign professionals because this research is interested in the relationship between internal party campaign staffers and external campaign professionals. Therefore, the list of interviewees is divided into two groups: internal party campaign staffers for each party and external campaign professionals.
The recruitment process of internal party campaign staffers

According to the definition given above, the internal party campaign staffers will consist of people in specific departments who might be involved in election campaigns or campaign management and of people who work as and are working for politicians’ aides. In other words, the group of internal party campaign staffers in this research is limited to people who have been involved in campaign activities, especially in the department of mass media, new technologies, and PR inside party organisation. In addition, politicians’ aids who have an important role in the decision-making process for election campaigning are considered for interviews for internal campaign staffers.

In the present political situation in South Korea, this is a small number of political elites who play an important role in the decision-making process and have control over all kinds of campaign activities. Thus, in order to compile the list of interviewees for this research, I searched for politicians who were engaged in the management of election campaigning and who played important roles in the final decision-making process for each party’s campaigning via online and offline newspapers. As a result, a total of 11 politicians, six for GNP and five for DP, were selected as potential interviewees and I contacted them via email. However, all those who were contacted declined to be interviewed or did not reply to my mail. After that, I tried to contact them via telephone, but it was obvious that they did not want, or did not have time, to be interviewed.

Perhaps it is understandable that politicians are afraid of speaking about some issues, especially those related to party strategies. Furthermore, unlike in the US where political consultants can share campaign strategies with each other, all campaign matters in South Korea are considered to be politically sensitive issues, which the parties do not want to be exposed to a wider public. Although some journalists or previous internal party campaign staffers who have left party organisations have released some issues related to internal communication and the decision-making process, I have to say that the options were very limited.
Therefore, I decided to interview politicians’ aides who worked with them very closely as an alternative way to understanding the dynamics of election campaigning. The process of recruiting these people was also difficult. Furthermore, it was hard to find aides who were engaged in the 1997 presidential election because some of them had retired already or were no longer politically active. Thus, it was hard to find any contact details, such as e-mail addresses or mobile numbers. It was also difficult to find information about them in news sources such as newspapers and magazines because the names of politicians’ aides are rarely mentioned. As a result, I asked for help from a politician who I know personally and who was able to provide me with a list of politicians’ aides. When I contacted them by telephone and explained what information I wanted to hear and why I wanted to interview them, some accepted the invitation to be interviewed; however, the others wanted me to send the interview questions before they accepted the interviews. After sending a brief guide and ethical issues (in Korean) to them, a total of five political aides, two for GNP and three for DP, agreed to be interviewed. Although I was unable to access politicians who had played an important role in the campaign management process directly \(^\text{12}\), the information politician aides provided was very helpful to understand the hidden story about the decision-making process for election campaigning, which could not be heard from internal party campaign staffers who worked in the departments of mass media, new technologies and PR inside the party organisation.

In addition to the interviews with these politicians’ aides, internal party campaign staffers were also interviewed. Therefore, these departments have been extracted from each party's organisational map, and interviewees chosen are the people who had experience as a member of a campaign team during the research period – the 1997, 2002, and 2007 presidential elections. Based on the development of mass media and a growing recognition of the importance of PR, the PR department had been subdivided into two or three departments depending on their role. For instance, the PR department was subdivided into the digital media

\(^{12}\)This could be one of the limitations of this research, as will be explained in the conclusion chapter.
team and the offline media team. In more detail, the digital media team mainly works on the management of party websites and computerised databases, and developing Internet communication systems, whilst the offline media team normally deals with any political news which is aired on the broadcasting system. This trend was apparent for both parties, GNP and DP, although specific department names are slightly different between them. As a result, the people currently working in the PR department were contacted at first to obtain contact information about the people in charge of the presidential election campaigning during the period from 1997 to 2007.

Moreover, it is important to also include previous internal party campaign staffers who have left the party organisation because they may give more objective opinions than the current members, who are highly likely to be biased, for whatever reason. To contact them, I found contact information in the official party website and telephoned them directly. Although I explained the purpose of the research and the reason why I wanted to interview them, they wanted to meet me in person so I went to the office to answer their questions. They also wanted to look through the interview questions before finally agreeing to be interviewed. Given this research is focused on the historical alteration of election campaigning, I needed to interview people who worked on the 1997, 2002, and 2007 presidential elections, and the people who were interviewed introduced me to the other people who could give a help or were senior people in charge. As a result, a total of seven people, four for GNP and three for DP, were interviewed.

In addition to this, two of the internal party campaign staffers in the Democratic Labour Party (hereafter DLP), as a typical minor party, are interviewed. This is because all parties conduct research about the campaign strategy of the opposition parties, especially the GNP and DP. Thus, the views of DLP campaigners can provide additional information from an outsider’s perspective on the campaign strategies of the two major parties.
The recruitment process of external campaign professionals

As explained earlier, the group of external campaign professionals was much harder to organise because they are, in general, not well-known people, except for a few independent political consultants. In fact, the GNP and DP make extensive use of external campaign professionals to support their election campaign; even the scope of external campaign professionals is much broader. For example, it is reported that the GNP has more than 800 external campaign professionals including political consultants, pollsters, private advertising companies, professors as advisors, and even the technicians who manage their party’s websites. In addition, according to interview results stated in Schafferer’s research (2006), Korean parties sometimes hired foreign political consultants even if parties did not have great benefits from them at that time. However, who they were and which party they worked for was not noted. Therefore, the first thing I had to do for this research was to determine the criteria for classification.

Unlike the US, in South Korea there are many non-paid workers amongst external campaign professionals, in addition to well-known independent political consultants and commercial companies such as polling, advertising, and technical advisors. The emergence of paid workers has only recently happened. For example, in the 1997 presidential election, almost all external campaign professionals except commercial companies were volunteer-based, although they received some rewards after the end of the election. Since the 2002 presidential election, paid workers have increased; however, pay was not standardised until the 2007 presidential election. Accordingly, given the research period of this study, the group of external campaign professionals was organised according to the length of their experience. That is, they are all people who have worked in at least two presidential elections, whether or not they were paid, and who have engaged in a particular area that needed specialised skills because the parties could not deliver in these areas, such as polling, advertising, media consultants, and electoral market surveying, etc. In particular, professors and advisers who just simply give some ideas to political parties are excluded from the group of external campaign professionals as they do not play an important role in the
management of campaigning and they do not need to make a deep relationship with internal party campaign staffers. That is, the people who can be called external campaign professionals for this research should have a deep or business relationship with the parties. Taking all things into consideration, a group of external campaign professionals is composed of pollsters, political consultants, and political advertising producers. However, it cannot be said that they represent all external campaign professionals in South Korea over the 10-year period.

I made a list of external campaign professionals to interview and reviewed newspapers to find out who would be the best for this research. After drawing up the list, I was introduced to two independent political consultants by professors who were my supervisors when I was in postgraduate school in South Korea, and they subsequently introduced me to the other campaign professionals who might be helpful for this research after interviewing. In particular, one of them who I was introduced to met with me before commencing the interviewing in South Korea to give some information regarding Korean parties and the market of campaign professionals; it was helpful to confirm the interview questions one more time.

The overall number of interviewees for semi-structured interviews

Taking all things into consideration, 14 interviewees were interviewed for internal party campaign staffers whilst the external campaign professionals group including political consultants, pollsters, and advertisers is composed of 11 people. In total, there were 25 people as interviewees for this research. Table 4.5 summarises the list of interviewees for the semi-structured interviews as explained above.
Table 4.5. The list of interviewees for the semi-structured interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of party</th>
<th>Internal party campaign staffers</th>
<th>External campaign professionals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLP</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.5.3. The guide to the semi-structured interview questions

This section focuses on the explanation of how to develop semi-structured interview questions. As explained above, a total of two question guides for semi-structured interviews, one for internal party campaign staffers and the other for external campaign professionals, were developed according to different groups of interviewees. Naturally, internal party campaign staffers will be often asked about the questions regarding party matters such as how and when campaign management teams are organised, what their role is and how it has been changed. Whereas, external campaign professionals will be asked about the questions such as how far they have participated, whether their role has expanded over 10 years, and how they think the relationship with party campaign staffers. In particular, this research adopted the questions that were mentioned in Negrine’s research (2007) to formulate questions about the role of campaign professionals. He explains that campaign professionals can be identified according to several perspectives. Accordingly, he recommends that the following questions should be asked:

‘1) Are they different kinds of professionals, some of whom play a more strategic role than others? 2) Have professionals taken key decision-making powers away from party bureaucrats? 3) Do they share responsibilities with them or do they defer them? 4) Do professionals give shape to political ideas or do they alter the political ideas when they give shape to them? 5) Do they alter the political character of political parties?’ (pp.42).
Along with this, the researcher created a literature review and collected news articles prior to the fieldwork, which will be helpful to draw up a more detailed guide for the semi-structured interviews. Of course, all questions will mainly be structured for the analysis of the hypotheses that were stated earlier and the general interview questions for both groups will be involved in each question guides. For instance, the general questions for all interviewees will be as follows: what kind of political activities are they involved in, and what they perceive the main changes to be during the research period of the 1997 to 2007 presidential elections (see Appendix C).

4.5.4. The process of the semi-structured interviews

This section aims to explain the procedure of semi-structured interviews to give a deeper understanding about how to collect data sets. Before starting the explanation about the procedure, the ethical issues involved in this research will be discussed.

In general, it is necessary to consider ethical issues when research deals with sensitive subjects such as sexual violence and matters related to privacy in conducting qualitative research. The key point of ethical issues is the matter of confidentiality and the privacy of the people involved (Darlington and Scott, 2003). Accordingly, this research followed the formal procedure of ethical consideration in the AREA Faulty Research Ethics Committee of the University of Leeds in 16th of Jun 2011 before carrying out the fieldwork. All matters related to research such as the aim of the research, the main questions, the details of interviewees, the research schedule, and consent form were issued. Accordingly, I explained the aim of this research, the process of ethical issues, and all matters relating to the process of interview briefly before starting interviews, and all interviewees signed a consent form.
After the formal approval about ethical issues, I started to carry out interviews in South Korea for approximately 4 months. As explained above, I met one campaign professional to check the choice and wording of questions for the semi-structured interviews. This input by an insider was important for me because I had very limited sources of campaign professionals. Furthermore, in the case of internal party campaign staffers, I met two people for a pre-test. Parallel to this, I tried to read as many as resources as possible via offline and online newspapers, as well as any other journal articles related to party matters. Based on this information, the question of the interview guide were more focused and better organised, which gave me more confidence during the interviews.

As stated above, it was difficult to make an appointment with the interviewees because they hesitated to give an interview and almost all e-mails that were sent to request interviews received no response while I was still in the UK. Thus, most contacts were established by using personal connections, and I finally met the first interviewee from each party on 18th July 2011. After these meetings, the first interviewees introduced me to other people who may be connected to my research. This snow-ball recruitment process for internal party campaign officials was very similar to the process for external campaign professionals. Even though I finally achieved a sufficient number of interviews, this was a slow process and the actual period of interviewing had to be prolonged by around a month in additional to the initially planned time.

On average, each interview took at least 60 minutes, with the longest taking 120 minutes. This depended on how much information the interviewees had to share and how keen they were to give that information to me. In general, interviewees asked what my research was, and sometimes asked what my opinion was in relation to specific questions, especially in the case of the interviews with internal party campaign staffers. Whenever I was asked, I tried to give very brief and general answers to avoid distracting interviewees from expressing their own opinions. Moreover, my responses and gestures to interviewees were important
in drawing answers from interviewees and I tried to give a nod of assent whenever they answered.

Almost all of the interviews were conducted in their offices or a coffee shop in the National Assembly Building, depending on their preferences. For data analysis, I asked for the interviewees’ approval to record their interviews and they agreed with this. Moreover, in order to reduce any kind of confusion which might happen and ask questions efficiently to the interviewees, I interviewed internal party campaign staffers of GNP at first, and then those of DP. After finishing the interviews with the internal party campaign staffers, I started to interview external campaign professionals. In addition to this, I contacted them via email whenever I needed to ask further questions and they kindly replied if they could answer.

4.5.5. Data analysis

To analyse the semi-structured interviews I first transcribed all text materials in Korean. This process took an average of 2-3 days per interview, because interviewees’ responses were sometimes unclear, rendering the process a slow one. After finishing the transcription of all interviews, I highlighted important arguments of interviewees and characterised these arguments according to external and internal dimension of professionalisation. I then built up a specific analytical framework according to the hypotheses and main features of the professionalisation of election campaigning (see appendix D).

Once the analysis had been completed, I chose supportive arguments to be used as quotes and translated them it into English. Since the Korean and English language are very different, it was sometimes very difficult to translate the quotes. To ensure a high level of accuracy I hired a professional translator and reviewed the translations carefully for correct meaning.
In addition to the analysis of semi-structured interviews, as stated above, this research chooses to conduct the investigation through the historical changes in the parties’ bank balance, which will give a definite yardstick in confirming the current issue being discussed - that the campaigns have become capital-intensive since parties have utilised these technical developments into their campaigning. Besides, it will be evidence of whether Korean parties truly have increased their expenditure to invest in those activities.

Secondly, in order to investigate the relationship between political parties and campaign professionals as one aspect of the internal dimension, this study will use the framework of Kolodny and Logan’s analysis (1998) to construct interview questions and investigate these relationships. They examined how political parties have a role in training political consultants and divided it into two perspectives, adversarial view and allied view, to look at the relationship between parties and professional consultants. Briefly, they insist that professional consultants tend to act like advertising agencies in the case of the adversarial view. Moreover, they give some advice and suggestions about campaigns for political parties and generally work for their own company. On the other hand, in the case of the allied view, they help to support more specific technical services that parties cannot provide for themselves.

In addition to this, this research uses the fourfold typology, as explained in the research of Farrell, Kolodny, and Medvic (2001), in order to investigate the background of campaign professionals, and its trend to demonstrate any changes in the influx of campaign professionals in a historical context. In effect, the typology they mentioned seems to be limited when applying it to the South Korean case because it is mainly built based on the US case, where the industry of campaign professionals, especially political consultants, has been vitalised. However, it can be helpful to examine any variation or alteration in the relationship between political parties and campaign professionals, and, further, how the relationship has been altered. In particular, in the case of South Korea, parties have continued to hire external campaign professionals and most believe that this industry has rapidly increased, although the size and scope of the
industry of political consultancy is much smaller compared to the USA. Therefore, investigating the background of campaign professionals is especially useful in the case of South Korea, where parties seem to be in the transition period in the use of campaign professionals, and therefore can be considered as entering into the initial stage of professionalisation. Given this, it is worth investigating the process of involvement of campaign professionals in the campaign process, and, further, how their relationship has altered over 10 years using the fourfold typology in Farrell, Kolodny, and Medvic’s research (2001).

4.5.6. The explanation of additional documents

In addition to semi-structured interviews with external campaign professionals and internal party campaign staffers, this study needed additional documents and resources that could help investigate the process of professionalisation of election campaigning in South Korea. This was because interviewees could not remember all issues I was interested, especially those concerning campaign expenditure. Therefore, any types of sources that could confirm the accurate amount of campaign expenditures such as official reports or a white paper published by KNEC (Korean National Election Commission) were used to complement the information obtained in the interviews. These numbers were used as indicators for the degree of modern election campaigning becoming more capital-intensive due to increased use of external campaign professionals and modern campaign technology. It is also one of the features of the external dimension of professionalisation, which will be examined for this research. Moreover, it will be helpful to answer hypothesis 1-2, political parties will try to approach their work differently, including using contemporary communication technologies and campaigning practices, and a new campaign style will therefore become more capital-intensive. As explained in Farrell and Webb’s (2000) study, tracing expenditure of party campaigning will be a good way to confirm the question of whether Korean election campaigning has been towards the capital-intensive style.
This research used two sets of materials to trace accurate information about party finance: official reports submitted by political parties to KNEC and newspaper articles. In the case of the official reports submitted to KNEC, all political parties had to report details of their finances to KNEC every month. In particular, all parties had to report details of campaign expenditures after the end of the presidential election, because parties that qualified for an election subsidy were able to receive a government subsidy after submitting their campaign expenditure report. Furthermore, the public have a right to look through the information on campaign expenditure of political parties except for the official election period if they make a request to KNEC via the official process, and then obtain their approval. Even though there is likely to be a lack of evidence showing how much political parties have exactly spent on their election campaigning, this data can be helpful to estimate their approximate campaign expenditure. Moreover, newspaper articles in regard to party finance and interview materials are evidenced here to supplement insufficient information. Furthermore, additional research on political parties’ expenditure and interview materials are evidenced here for this research.

4.5.7. The explanation of CAMPROF (campaign professionalisation) index

To illustrate the differences between the GNP and DP in the utilisation of campaign technology and mass media, this research measures the degree of professionalisation in political communication based on the CAMPROF index, as demonstrated by the research of Gibson and Römmele (2009). Given that political parties have changed their organisation and their political activities according to different considerations, similar levels and types of change cannot be assumed between them, even if they do occupy the same political environment within one country (Smith, 2009). Briefly, the CAMPROF index ‘is designed to measure and compare the parties’ use of professionalised campaign techniques during an election campaign’ (Gibson and Römmele, 2009, pp.265), and it can help discern the technological shift of election campaigns through providing numerical data about the question of how much parties have utilised
new campaign technology such as telemarketing, e-letters, opinion polls, and so on. Therefore, this index can be considered useful in measuring and comparing the two parties’ performances and levels of professionalisation. To be more specific, 10 different variables in the index of CAMPROF are as follows (Gibson and Römmele, 2009, pp.285):

(1) Use of telemarketing for contacting own members and outside target groups.
(2) Use of direct mail to own members and outside target groups.
(3) Presence of an internal Internet communication system.
(4) E-mail sign up or subscription list for regular news updates.
(5) Outside headquarters.
(6) Continuous campaigning.
(7) Use of outside public relations/media consultants.
(8) Use of computerised databases.
(9) Use of opinion polling.
(10) Conducting opposition research.

However, this research may have limitations in using CAMPROF index in the South Korean case because this tool is designed to analyse professionalisation in Western countries and, in effect, it was examined using a German party’s case as an example. Accordingly, modification is needed in order to be able to apply it to the South Korean case due to different electoral systems, which will be explained later. For example, Gibson and Römmele measure the level of use of telemarketing and direct mails through three different scores from 1 to 3 on the basis of the proportion of the population that was contacted by the parties. That is, the ‘party that contacts over 50 percent of constituencies or 1 percent or more of the voting age population is scored as 3. Score 2 means whether party contacts one-quarter and one-half of constituencies or 0.5-1 percent of the voting age population’ (Gibson and Römmele, 2009, pp.286). However, Korean parties can only contact party members and are not allowed to contact ordinary people if they are not party members. Due to this strict rule in South Korea, measuring the extent to which parties have used telemarketing and direct mail to court voters is
not an important matter, especially in the comparison of major parties’ different strategies.

Nonetheless, it is still useful in showing the result of the change of technical development in a historical context and strengthening an interviewee’s opinions to look at the phenomenon objectively. Therefore, this research will also conduct a pre-survey to identify other factors that should be considered for the South Korea case, with systematic document analysis such as newspaper articles, official documents (submitted by parties whenever each presidential election has finished), National Election Commission documents and party periodicals. All materials featured here are considered the most accessible and revealing data necessary to delineate the characteristics of election campaigns and the evolution of party organisation in South Korea, and will help in the design of questionnaires for in-depth interviews.
Chapter 5 Results and discussion

5.1. Introduction

This chapter will present the results of two dimensions of professionalisation of election campaign: the external and internal dimensions. Therefore, the results of this study’s research questions and hypotheses will be displayed through the analysis of the results of 25 semi-structured interviews with campaign professionals and campaign managers inside the party organisation.

Before the demonstration of specific results according to the different dimensions, this chapter will firstly explain the political situations in South Korea because the election campaign strategy is designed in tandem with the political situations of the time. Moreover, it may help understand the question of why each party conducted different styles of election campaigning although they were in the same electoral environment.

Afterwards, this chapter will display the results of the external and internal dimensions of professionalisation of election campaigning. Given that the interest of this study is focused on the comparison of two different Korean parties’ election campaigning in examining professionalisation of election campaigning, both parties’ results will be appropriately presented based on the comparison between two parties.
5.2. Political situations in South Korea from 1997 to 2007

The 1997 presidential election

In 1997 the electoral environment surrounding the GNP was not as good as it had previously been, due to several reasons. First of all, there was a poor relationship between the governing party (GNP) and the opposition party due to the rushing through of a revised labour law in December 1996. Furthermore, people had become disillusioned with a back-scratching alliance of government and businesses after the news that the bankrupt conglomerate Hanbo Steel Cooperation, called cheabal in South Korea, was deeply connected with a few GNP politicians and especially Kim Hyun-chul, a son of the president at that time (Solinger, 2001). However, the worst scandal to engulf the GNP was the allegation that the candidate Lee Hoi-chang’s son had become involved in military conscription corruption. Naturally, the approval rating of this candidate decreased dramatically and the application to the IMF (International Monetary Fund) for relief, which was necessitated by a bad performance by the government, heightened the level of distrust of the GNP. Consequently these all-political scandals were driving the GNP into a corner.

Nevertheless, the GNP started to prepare for the presidential election and held a party convention to select the candidate for the time. Unlike the other parties, the GNP had difficulty in agreeing on a suitable candidate and they exposed an internal discord. Although Lee Hoi-chang was narrowly elected, Lee In-jae - who was a strong contender against Lee Hoi-chang - expressed dissatisfaction with the process of candidate selection, and his followers left the party and he announced his plans to participate in the presidential election after creating a new party, known as ‘Kukminsindang’ in South Korea. In particular, such behaviour of political elites in the GNP, such as raising an issue about a replacement for Lee Hoi-chang due to a decline in his approval rating and showing a tendency

\[13\] For more information, the GNP was the ruling party in 1997 and the scandal of Kim Young-Sam, a president in 1997, worsened the GNP’s image at that time.
towards sympathy with Lee In-Jae’s defection, was interpreted as Lee Hoi-chang’s leadership inside the GNP was weak. In effect, Lee Hoi-chang failed to show his strong leadership and this consequently increased the doubt about his qualifications and ability to be a prospective president (The Hankyoreh, 01/Oct/1997). Naturally, the support rate for Lee Hoi-chang dropped and he ranked third on the poll result of approval ratings between candidates. Taking a number three ranking as a candidate of the ruling party was an exceptional circumstance in South Korea, and, therefore, it obviously meant that the GNP was facing a crisis.

However, these all-bad performances by the GNP and the emergence of a serious economic crisis such as the IMF crisis when the GNP was the ruling party in 1997 offered a great chance to the DP (formally known as MDP in 1997)\(^\text{14}\). Kim Dae-joong, the DP candidate, is a well-known politician, who has a considerable insight into economics, and is the most influential of the three Kims. In effect, GNP’s candidate Lee Hoi-chang was considered as a newcomer in politics compared to Kim Dae-joong. Furthermore, Kim’s approval rating sharply increased after he successfully formed a coalition with another candidate, Kim Jong-phil from the United of Jayue Party who had a great deal of support in Chungcheongdo, which is province in the west of South Korea.

The 2002 presidential election

There was a remarkable institutional change, the first adoption of primary election, in the 2002 presidential election. Practically speaking, this is regarded as an important event because it led directly to the alteration of the election campaign process and a high level of voter participation. First of all, parties

\(^{14}\) As mentioned earlier, Korean parties often tend to change their official name especially when they have a new party leader or any new political elites join a party. In historical perspective, the DP launched as a united party of the two majority-opposition parties, named as Sinmin Party and Minjoo Party, in 1991. At that time, Kim Dae-Jung was the party leader of the Minjoo Party and naturally many of the political elites who follow him joined the Minjoo Party. Despite his efforts to win several presidential elections, he announced his retirement from politics when he failed in the 1992 presidential election. Afterwards, he returned to politics and the Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) to participate in the 1997 presidential election.
changed the method of candidate selection from a vote of the party members to primary election (also called a people participatory contest). Since the DP’s victory\(^\text{10}\) in the 1997 presidential election, their approval rating had dramatically decreased due to public dissatisfaction about government performance at that time; and, what is worse, the approval rating for Lee Hoi-chang, the GNP’s candidate, had increased. For this reason, the DP (formally known as New Millennium Democratic Party, NMDP) needed a new way to overcome these unfavourable conditions and announced a new method of candidate selection \((Munhwa Ilbo, 27/\text{April}/2002)\). Although there were many arguments between political parties, primary election was positively supported by the public who were tired of the old style of candidate selection. According to Lee (2012), the first adoption of primary election caused by the DP is regarded as a significant political event in the way that parties have started to open a new route for political participation of voters by allowing ordinary people to participate in the method of candidate selection. To be specific, prior to the 1997 presidential election, only party members could choose their candidate, but from the 2002 presidential election ordinary people could also engage in the process of candidate selection. Therefore, this means that, compared to in previous presidential elections, parties now increasingly tried to communicate with voters to encourage their participation.

According to a report by KNEC (2003), in the case of the DP, their structure for primary election totalled 70,000 Electoral Colleges, which consisted of 15,000 representatives, 20,000 party members, and 35,000 ordinary representatives. The method of selection of those Electoral Colleges is clearly specified in the DP’s party regulation. For instance, the 15,000 representatives consist of four different groups: members of the central committee who are elected in a meeting of representatives of district party chapters, 25 local assembly members who belong to the DP, party executives in the central party, and three people who received recommendations from members of the National Assembly who belongs to the DP.
After structuring Electoral Colleges for primary election, DP’s candidates visited cities and provinces to conduct primary elections. In a similar format, the GNP organised a total of 50,000 Electoral Colleges, comprised of 25,000 party members and 25,000 representatives of ordinary people. In effect, the adoption of primary election was widely considered an epoch-making event in three main aspects: the separation of party hegemony and presidency, the democratisation of the decision-making process of party organisation, and the invigoration of voters’ participation.

However, there was a more negative perspective due to the immature behaviour of some DP’s politicians (Kim, 2002). In particular, it arose due to the behaviour of some politicians inside the DP who were not happy with the fact that Rho Muhyun was elected in a primary election, and who insisted on a re-primary election and the invalidity of the original election. They pointed out the continued decline of candidate Rho’s approval rating and complete defeat in local elections. In fact, it was reported that about 85.7% of politicians inside the DP agreed over the issue of a re-primary election and the establishment of a new party (*Seoul newspaper*, 03/Aug/2002). Besides this internal conflict, Rho had to deal with the matter of a single candidacy agreement with Jeong Mong-jun from Gukmin Tonghap 21 Party before the actual date of registration of the candidate for the 2007 presidential election. During this process, Rho and Jeong agreed on a single candidate decided by the result of opinion polls after a political TV discussion. It was a very different way compared to the process of single candidate agreement in previous elections. That is, it confirms the fact that South Korean election campaigning has definitely entered the era of media-democracy.

Overall, the foregoing discussion of the DP’s internal discord magnified the problem of the relationship between party organisation and candidate while conducting the election. Although parties tried to put all resources into election campaigning when the official election period started, there is no doubt that there was an uncomfortable mood between them. Naturally, Rho relied more on his private camp and Rhosamo, was his fan-club community, rather than an official
campaign organisation inside DP when he entered into the primary election. Practically speaking, it is true that the absence of strong leadership caused by the political retirement of the three Kims has slowly loosened the relationship between party organisation and candidate. However, in the 2002 election, this phenomenon became prominent, and, therefore, it led to the intensification of candidate-centralised election campaigning in South Korea.

Unlike the DP, the GNP seemed to be stable during the 2002 presidential election. Although there was internal conflict due to the different opinions about whether they should conduct primary elections between party elites like the DP, the party organisation seems to have been consoled by Lee Hoi-chang’s huge win in the primary election against the DP.

**The 2007 presidential election**

There was no equal competition between the GNP and DP (formally known as UNDP in 2007) in 2007 as a huge number of people supported the GNP due to a bad performance by the DP over the previous 10 years. Accordingly, there was a monotonous mood during the election periods, and many issues, which were argued in the GNP’s primary election, became the main sources of discussion whilst conducting election campaigning (You, Na, and Lee, 2007). In particular, there were many issues in relation to Lee Myung-bak, the GNP’s final candidate. For instance, several times the DP mentioned Lee’s corruption scandals and bank frauds such as BBK’s gate event which was a big issue, by suggesting the fact that Lee was implicated in the scandal of a bankrupt investment company BBK. Nonetheless, Lee’s approval rating hit 50% whilst he was preparing for the presidential election and his landslide victory was already expected at the beginning of this period (Kwon, 2007). Because of this, the DP continued to attack the GNP using Lee’s qualifications as their reason, and this finally led to the intensification of a negative campaign.
The DP revealed many internal discords whilst conducting primary elections. The candidates who were engaging in primary elections announced their refusal to participation in primary elections because of illegal electioneering, which was caused by the compulsory mobilisation of Electoral Colleges. These internal problems inside party organisation caused a decline in the participation of voters for the DP’s primary election - although they adopted a mobile vote to encourage voting (Cho, 2007). For this reason, the reputation of the DP, as the first largest party in the Assembly at that time, seriously decreased.

In contrast to these political situations, there was no dramatic change in the media environment - unlike in the 1997 and the 2002 elections - although the Internet became very popular and its usage increased. To be specific, there was frequent use of TV in election campaigns because of the first adoption of TV debate in the 1997 presidential election. In addition, the Internet campaigning had intensified since the 2002 presidential election. In this sense, it is a bit hard to say that there was no new media which was applied in the 2007 presidential election compared to the two earlier presidential elections. Therefore, almost all campaign activities remained as similar to the 2002 presidential election although each party’s performance in dealing with new media such as the Internet in election campaigning became more sophisticated than in the 2002 presidential election. If anything, election campaigns seem to be long-term because of the prolonged period of the process of primary election (KNEC, 2008a).

**Summary of this section**

Based on the political situations in South Korea as presented above, this section will be briefly summarised as follows. First of all, the ruling party firstly changed from GNP to DP in the 1997 presidential election because the approval rating of the GNP dramatically decreased due to several political reasons such as the party’s internal disorder. Unlike the previous presidential elections, voters have started doubting value of political system that maintained from military dictatorships and their political beliefs. Furthermore, in the 2002 presidential
election, the growth of political participation of educated young voters created a new sphere of electoral environment and made a big achievement of political development. Whereas, candidate Kim Dae-Jung of the DP was the one of the people amongst the three Kims - Kim Young-sam, Kim Dae-joong, and Kim Jong-phil - who influenced the formation of Korean politics - and his approval rating gradually increased since he successfully formed a coalition with Kim Jong-Phil.

Second, primary election as a new method for the selection of candidates was firstly adopted during the 2002 presidential election. Although it was adopted because of the DP’s idea that it would get more attention from voters (because the DP found it hard to elect a candidate who had the entire country’s support compared to the GNP), it had a sensational effect at that time. In effect, it was difficult to see if the people supported the previous method of selection of candidates for presidential election, which was through a party convention. This is because party members considered the party interest angle rather than wishing to represent the majority of citizens. However, the adoption of primary election in the 2002 presidential election was considered as a good system to contribute to intraparty democracy and to maximise political participation of voters. In this regard, Table 5.1 shows the historical alteration of the system of primary election.

Table 5.1. The historical alteration of the system of primary election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Structure</th>
<th>The 1997 presidential election</th>
<th>The 2002 presidential election</th>
<th>The 2007 presidential election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>Format</td>
<td>The Electoral Colleges</td>
<td>National Convention of a party</td>
<td>Primary election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12,068 representatives of party</td>
<td>50,000 electoral colleges (15,000 representatives of party +10,000 party members +25,000 ordinary voters)</td>
<td>231,384 electoral colleges (46,196 (20%) representatives of party + 69,496 (30%) party members +69,496 (30%) ordinary voters +46,196 (20%) opinion polls)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>Format</td>
<td>National Convention of a party</td>
<td>Primary election</td>
<td>Cut-off pre-primary election + open primary election</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As seen in Table 5.1, both parties selected their candidate for presidential election through a national party convention in the 1997 presidential election. Afterwards, both parties adopted a primary election to select their candidate in the following presidential election in 2002. To be specific, the GNP structures totalled 50,000 Electoral Colleges, composed of 15,000 party representatives, 10,000 party members, and 25,000 ordinary voters for the primary election. That is, the basic structure in the formation of the Electoral Colleges for the primary election is party members and ordinary voters in the proportion 50:50. Although the DP’s structure was 70,000 Electoral Colleges for the primary election, proportions were the same as the GNP’s. In the 2007 presidential election, the GNP increased the number of Electoral Colleges compared to the 2002 presidential election. The most interesting feature of the 2007 primary election is that the GNP included opinion polls’ results as one way of obtaining voters’ intentions. Whereas, the DP invited 1,680,000 ordinary voters for the primary election and they did not allow any party members to the primary election. The form was like a combined style, a cut-off pre-primary election and open primary election.

To be more specific, the DP executed a public opinion poll for three days on 10,000 people from the Electoral College and 2,400 from the general public to select five out of nine candidates in total in the primary election for the 2007 presidential election. Then it determined the final candidates who would compete in the main competition by reflecting the results of the poll as 50%-50%. The rules of the main competition were selected as three methods in total, which are general Electoral College, mobile Electoral College and opinion poll. Total competition period was a month. Total number of valid votes from polling places

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Structure</th>
<th>The 1997 presidential election</th>
<th>The 2002 presidential election</th>
<th>The 2007 presidential election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>The Electoral Colleges</td>
<td>4,360 representatives of party</td>
<td>70,000 Electoral Colleges (15,000 representatives of party + 20,000 party members + 35,000 ordinary voters)</td>
<td>1,680,000 Electoral Colleges (1,680,000 ordinary voters)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹Sources: KNEC, 2003; Yoon, 2008
and mobile voting accounted for 90%, and the results of the poll for 10%. Anybody could actually become an Electoral College by application unlike 2002, when there was a limitation on mobilization.

On the other hand, the GNP also elected candidates through competition like the DP. In the presidential election of 2007, they showed a more systematic look through various discussions unlike the 2002 presidential election which was processed hastily. First of all, the number of Electoral Colleges was expanded from 0.1% to 0.5% of qualified voters. Accordingly, it was changed from 40,000 to 230,000 people. Additionally, the composition of the general Electoral College was changed to include 20% and 40% of the people under age of 40 from 30%. Finally, the Electoral College was made up of 231,384 voters, such as 20% of representatives (46,196), 30% of party members (69,496), 30% of National Electoral College (69,496) and 20% of Poll (46,196).

5.3. The external dimension of professionalisation of election campaigning

As stated in the literature review, professionalisation of election campaign is broadly divided into two dimensions, the internal and the external. Therefore, in this sub-chapter, this research will firstly present all the results of the external dimension. As explained earlier, the external dimension of professionalisation of election campaign focuses more on the alteration of practical campaign activities rather than the internal change of party organisation such as the alteration of the role of party organisation by the influx of campaign professionals, and of the relationship between political parties and campaign professionals. In other words, it is about how parties have utilised new media and new campaign technology, and, consequently, how campaign strategy has altered over 10 years, looking at different party cases.

Most importantly, this study will compare the campaigns of two parties, the GNP and DP (NMP, NMDP, and UNDP), in order to confirm whether each party has
practically differed in dealing with new media cutting-edge technology, and, therefore, has conducted different campaign strategies in the same electoral environment. It will be helpful to prove the arguments that the phenomenon of professionalisation of election campaign could have happened differently according to each party’s environment such as party size, the history of election results, and party structure. Accordingly, the results will be displayed according to the list of sub-sections: 1) the utilisation of media, 2) The utilisation of campaign technology including the results of the CAMPROF index and the use of opinion polls, 3) the alteration of campaign activities, especially focusing on political TV advertising and TV discussions, and 4) the alteration of style of election campaign such as the change from labour-intensive to capital-intensive campaigning.

5.3.1. The utilisation of media

As explained before, the arrival and utilisation of TV in politics has made about dramatic changes in the management of election campaigns in South Korea. Although mass media formats such as newspaper and radio have been utilised by political parties similarly to in previous election campaigns, their influences upon voters started to decrease because of TV since the 1997 presidential election. In effect, this trend was reported several times by academics and campaign commentators. According to KNEC (1998), it was researched that TV was the most powerful campaign medium and almost all respondents answered that political information on TV strongly influenced their votes in the 1997 presidential election.

Besides the effects of TV in the election campaign area, the electoral environment in South Korea has faced one more dramatic change due to the arrival of the Internet. As stated before, since the first arrival of the Internet in 1982, it was firstly utilised as a campaign medium in the 2000 general election, and then the power of the Internet in the 2002 presidential election was stronger with young voters especially the 20-30 age group. In effect, the on-going process
of adoption of new media in politics has caused the decrease of the effect of printed media, and, eventually, it has launched a new paradigm for election campaigns. Therefore, Korean parties need to develop their campaign strategy, especially media strategy corresponding to the new media environment.

Accordingly, this sub-section will discuss how campaign media has been utilised by political parties and explain what kinds of campaign activities have been less used or newly adopted, starting from the 1997 presidential election.

**The 1997 presidential election: the beginning of the TV campaign era**

With the political difficulties described above, there was a big challenge for political parties upon the first arrival of TV debates. Although many scholars cite Korean election campaigning utilising TV from the 1992 (14th) presidential election (Jeong, 2002), they also agree that the intensification of TV campaign strategies actually began in the 1997 (15th) presidential election with the arrival of TV debates (*Polly news*, 11/Dec/2012). In addition to this, it is clearly seen in the amendment of the electoral law, which was made before the 1997 presidential election.

To be specific, the amendment to the electoral law was aimed at breaking the pattern of ‘high expenditure and low efficiency’ and covered new content about TV campaign activities instead of diminishing the number and category of small printed documents such as pamphlets and leaflets, and changing from an outdoor speech to an indoor speech (*KNEC*, 2009). To be specific, the number of election advertising broadcasts including radio and TV increased from five in the 1992 presidential election to 30 times in the 1997 one. In addition, election advertising in newspapers appeared as many as 70 times in the 1997 presidential election. This was an incredible number compared to the fact that it was limited to only four times in the 1992 presidential election.
In contrast, it is stated in KNEC’s (1998) report that the number of outdoor speeches dramatically decreased and even the production of small printed matter like business cards was completely abolished in the 1997 presidential election. For example, it was possible to hold outdoor speeches up to 1,500 times in the 1992 presidential election; however, this was later reduced to only one occasion in some districts and boroughs. In particular, this change was encouraged by the new article of electoral law that outdoor speeches that mobilised masses of people were transformed into indoor speeches, regardless of specific time and location. As a result, parties could only hold 294 speech meetings although they were allowed up to 335 times in electoral law (see Table 5.2). In the face of these facts, there is no doubt that the 1997 presidential election was a transition period between labour-intensive methods to capital-intensive ones, as stated in Farrell’s research (1996). Naturally political parties challenged the new electoral environment, and devoted much times to designing media-centralised campaign activities such as political TV advertising and joint political TV discussion.

Table 5.2. The alteration of campaign activities from the 1992 to the 1997 presidential elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaign method</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>1992 (14th)</th>
<th>1997 (15th)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper</td>
<td>Political advertising</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV</td>
<td>Political advertising</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political debates</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TV speeches</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The public mobilisation</td>
<td>Outdoor speeches</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>335</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 According to Cho (1998), the amount of political advertising through newspapers actually decreased. This is because candidates in the 1992 presidential election could place adverts four times in each daily newspaper. Given that there were more than 60 newspapers at the time of the 1992 presidential election, it was estimated that there were more than 240 advertisements per candidate, although there was a difference in the number being used by candidates depending on their financial state. However, in the 1997 presidential election, a total of just 70 advertisements per candidate were allowed.

15 Because of the strict campaign regulation in South Korea, political TV advertisings and jointed political TV discussion is considered as principal campaign activities using TV. Thus, the more detailed discussions about these two activities will be displayed on the 5.5.2 section.
The 2002 presidential election: the emergence of the Internet

As explained above, the utilisation of mass media, especially TV, was vigorously launched in the 1997 presidential election, and South Korean campaigning entered the era of media-democracy. Naturally, the style of labour-intensive election campaigns, which are focused on mass rallies and outdoor speeches, has gradually decreased since the 1997 presidential election. There are no difference between the 1997 and the 2002 presidential election in dealing with conventional media such as TV and newspapers because the campaign regulations remained the same. Thus, parties were allowed to advertise up to 70 times in newspapers and no more than 30 times on TV and radio, and they were allowed four political TV discussions in the 2002 presidential election. Moreover, TV and endorsement speeches were allowed up to 11 times during the 23 days’ official campaign period before the actual presidential election date. Like the 1997 presidential election, in 2002 there were a total of 62 political discussions conducted by the press (KNEC, 2003). In a broad sense, there seemed to be no differences in dealing with TV and the other campaign activities compared to the 1997 presidential election; however, there was a remarkable achievement for Internet campaigning in the 2002 presidential election. In effect, the first Internet election campaign in South Korea was the ‘National Simultaneous Local Election’ in 1995, at which candidates provided information through PCs and election campaigns were formed using bulletin boards through PC communication. The following presidential election in 1997 was a turning point from PC communication to the Internet (Lee, 2008). At that time, some candidates had already opened their individual websites although the websites were not utilised as a major campaign instrument. This is because the Internet was not as popular as TV, with the introduction of political TV discussions, due to voters’ limited accessibility to the Internet, although a total of four times the amount of political discussions were held via the Internet and it certainly raised the voters’ interests (Dong-a Ilbo, 11/Nov/1997).
Afterwards, in South Korea, the Internet began to be used in earnest from the April 2000 general election for the members of the National Assembly (Back, 2002; Schafferer, 2006). Since then, the Internet has broadly and largely influenced electoral outcomes and election campaigns. Although it was reported that 477 (45.9%) out of 1,038 candidates in the 2000 general election for the members of the National Assembly operated websites, most of these websites were built hurriedly only three months before the election (Jeon, 2008). Thus, this early trend in Internet political campaigns is distinguished from the trend in the 2002 presidential election, in terms of the method of usage of the Internet in election campaigns.

Since the 2002 presidential election, the Internet is believed to be the most important medium in the political campaigns of South Korea (Hwang, 2002). In particular, voters believe that their political channels are being diversified and, consequently, that their political participation is being promoted. Conversely, political parties can communicate with voters and spread their campaign issues more easily as well as efficiently. In addition, parties can conduct election campaigns at a lower price than previously. Amongst these advantages in the utilisation of the Internet, the most important thing is that the composition of elections has changed from a regional competition between Gyeong-sang and Jeolla provinces to a generation gap between the 20-30 age group and the over-40s (Interview with DP5; Shin, 2002). However, the Internet does not always bring positive aspects for parties in South Korea. For instance, the rejection movements against corrupt candidates promoted on the Internet by civil organisations including The People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (Chamyeo Yeondae in South Korea) in the 2002 general election won fierce support from voters as they raised the political issue of ‘driving out inadequate politicians’ from the voters’ viewpoint. Different from representative election-related civil movements in the past that mainly used assemblies, these new civil movements opened the ground for voters to exert more powerful influence and participation in politics using the Internet as a new campaign medium (Hwang, 2002). This means that parties cannot treat the voters in the traditional way anymore and, further, there will be more campaign issues that parties have to
manage. Consequently, it has become problematic for parties because they may not anticipate issues such as the sudden exposure of scandals and rumours, in real time. As a result, South Korea seems to have entered into the era of permanent election campaign since the intensification of media-centralised campaigning including the Internet as a new medium. CP4 and GNP4 noted:

‘… In effect, the official period of election campaign permitted by electoral law means nothing to parties, but rather, just a formal rule. … It is true that election campaigning has been permanent. … I do not think the majority of voters are significantly stimulated by campaign activities such as political TV discussions, advertising. … They already have a typical image about each candidate. … How does it form? It is from TV, the information source from the Internet that people view daily.’ (Interview transcript, CP4)

‘The normal party activities are allowed 24 hours and 365 days. Nowadays GNP and DP do publicity work in the Internet, TV news, and newspapers everyday, and then, we receive evaluations from the voters afterwards through election. … See campaign slogans such as ‘prepared person’ of Kim candidate in 1997, ‘a clean liquidation of political corruption’ of Rho candidate in 2002, and ‘economic president’ of Lee candidate in 2007. All of these are related to their background and images.’ (Interview transcript, GNP4)

In sum, in the 2002 presidential election election-related sites were largely divided into three types (Jeon, 2008). First, political forum sites providing general political information offered news and information related to elections and politics and promoted healthy political discussion among the site users by opening political forums. Second, the sites of civil organisations related to the general election provided information such as corrupt candidates to be rejected, and engaged in activities for the reform of political culture, which was their basic goal. Third, the websites of political parties and candidates basically provided political information, declared public promises, and distributed news about the activities of the political party or candidate. Compared to the 1997 presidential election, in the 2002 presidential election, most activities through the PC communication network were Internet election campaigns using bulletin boards. For instance, the candidates opened many interactive communication channels
through their private websites, such as email, free bulletin boards, online opinion polls, and discussion rooms. Especially, some candidates held cyber speech meetings or cyber supporter meetings in the virtual space of their websites and, furthermore, provided various contents like videos, animations and characters in order to attract Netizen’s attention (Shin, 2000).

In particular, the Internet in the 2002 presidential election encouraged voters, especially the younger generation such as people aged between 20 and 30, to engage in political activities in many aspects. In other words, the Internet offers political motivation to the group of young voters, who are generally uninterested in politics, and, further, gives a sense of political purpose to the group of people that wants to change political convention. In addition to this, it means that parties have been able to design campaign strategies according to voters’ preferences in using campaign media. As briefly indicated earlier, for example, there was an incredible Internet campaign, ‘Rhosamo’ conducted by the voters who supported candidate Rho, which received a lot of attention from Korean academics in the 2002 presidential election (Park, 2012; Jeong, 2004). Briefly, Rhosamo, which is the first politician’s fan club, was organised voluntarily by several Netizens when candidate Rho of the DP (formally known as NMDP in 2002), who ran in Busan under the mottos of regional integration and peace between the east and the west, failed to get elected in the 1999 general election. The number of members was estimated at approximately 61,800 and it was the biggest online community in 2002. Therefore, it was maintained for a long period and waged political activities continuously. In particular, during the 2002 presidential election campaign, their activities were largely expanded, e.g. fundraising, the production of T-shirts and mobile ring tones, and developed into a movement to increase young people’s participation. In relation to this, DP5 said that

‘Rhosamo was comprised of mainly young voters. In addition to this, Rho candidate emphasised clean liquidation of political custom and the differentiation between young and old-aged politicians. … Therefore, the voters, especially young people, were motivated and looked at DP in a new way.’ (Interview transcript, DP5)
A notable point is that the members of such communities made efforts to create a healthy political culture while doing their best to get their candidate elected through online and offline activities. Similarly, there was the Internet community, ‘Changsarang’, for candidate Lee Hoi-chang of the GNP. The membership of this online community was around 11,600 from its organisation in November 2000 (Lee and Seo, 2002). Like ‘Rhosamo’, it worked online at the beginning, and then started to work offline to support Lee in the 2002 presidential election. Each member of this community shared some political information and social activities through the official website. However, one thing that should be noted is that people in these two communities are all volunteers and, therefore, it was not controlled by political parties. Nonetheless, most DP as well as GNP interviewees agreed that those communities’ activities were, in effect, better than online campaign activities performed by the parties, and the influence of campaign activities such as mobilising people and raising funds was much stronger in terms of effectiveness. GNP2 said that

‘The biggest advantage of ‘Rhosamo’ to DP in the 2002 presidential election was that DP did not need money to operate it because it was organised by the supporters of Rho candidate. … That’s why it was very effectively operated and motivated. They had a very clear aim and motivation. … They did not need to care what the other people said, and even, check what DP thought about them. … Therefore, they engaged in or organised all campaign activities whatever they wanted. Furthermore, they find out and spread out our rumours [GNP’s rumours].’ (Interview transcript, GNP2)

Besides these typical communities in support of the two candidates, according to a newspaper article of Lee and Seo (2002), there were seven online websites and 64 communities for candidate Lee Hoi-change of the GNP, and 16 websites and 84 communities for candidate Rho Mu-hyun of the DP, which were all operated by voters. It cannot be said that political parties operated all these websites. However, it cannot be denied that there was a strong influence of Internet campaigning in the 2002 presidential election, and, consequently, the DP were

---

16 There were many big issues about whether campaign activities of ‘Rhosamo’ were contrary to election campaign regulations. In effect, the National Election Commission announced the order of closure of communities which organised campaign activities for particular candidates such as ‘Rhosamo’ and ‘Changsarang’ (Seoul Economy, 20/Nov/2002)
the main beneficiary in the utilisation of the Internet as new campaign medium, whether the DP intended this or not.

The 2007 presidential election: the intensification of Internet campaigning and the arrival of mobile vote

Almost all campaign activities used in the 2002 presidential election continued in the 2007 presidential election. Therefore, like in the 2002 election, parties were allowed to advertise no more than 70 times each in newspapers, and up to 30 times each on television and radio. In addition to this, candidates could attend four joint political TV discussions, as well as giving up to 11 endorsement speeches on TV (KNEC, 2008a). The biggest difference between the 2002 and the 2007 presidential elections was the decline in the attendance at political discussions by candidates, who now tended to avoid these because of strategic campaign planning (Lee, 2008). Although political TV discussion will be discussed more in the following section, it turned out that candidates were worried about the fall in their popularity caused by their participation in ineffective political debates on TV.

In the case of Internet campaigning, it was believed that it would be intensified in the 2007 election due to its great success in the 2002 presidential election. Naturally, parties and candidates devoted more time to the creation of campaign activities on the web (Kang and Dyson, 2008). No doubt, there were a huge number of politician’s websites, communities, web-blogs, and Minihompy in Cyworld in the 2007 presidential election. Korean campaign observers indicated that the 2007 presidential election became the significant year that UCC (User created content) would be emphasised, compared to the 2002 presidential election (Jung, 2007). It can be interpreted that there were several attempts to

---

17 It is similar in form to Facebook. In general, it provides all kinds of online activities such as uploading and pictures, promoting friendship, chatting, and joining online communities. According to an article in emarketer (30/May/2012), the popularity of Minihompy was higher than other global sites such as Facebook, Yahoo, and MSN before 2012. It is reported that Facebook has been as popular as Minihompy since 2012, but the other global companies are still struggling.
stimulate voter participation beyond the recognition that the Internet is valued as one of the better campaign tools to communicate with voters, in comparison to conventional media such as newspaper and TV, and to share political information as well as to exchange political opinion. That is, it is not an exaggeration to say that the 2007 presidential election was the election where Internet campaigning was intensified.

However, it was reported that the Internet campaign was not as successful or popular as campaign observers had expected (Im, 2007). Although parties invested a lot of time and a huge amount of money on Internet campaigning, especially in the case of the GNP which failed to win the 2002 presidential election due to a poorer performance than the DP, it did not play a key role in mobilising the voters. There were many reasons why Internet campaigning slowed down a bit compared to the 2002 presidential election; the severe campaign regulations in relation to Internet campaigning was the main cause that was pointed out (Kim, Lee, and Kim, 2007). In addition to this, there were many CCC (Camp Created Content) and PCC (Proteur Created Content) rather than UCC (Yoon, 2007). According to Yoon (2007), campaign professionals produced the most uploaded video clips. Thus, it can be said that the original purpose of the diffusion of UCC, in terms of invigoration of voters’ participation, was debased by the intervention of the parties. From this sense, strictly speaking, it is hard to say that the use of Internet campaigning performed by parties was not much improved in the 2007 presidential election compared to the 2002 presidential election.

To be more specific, according to a white paper (2008) by the DP\(^{18}\), they managed a total of six websites for election campaigning in the 2007 presidential election. First of all, they ran an individual website for candidate Jeong and an official party website to contain all the information related to a candidate and the

\(^{18}\) As explained in the part on the history of political parties in South Korea, Chapter 3, the DP changed their title several times. Therefore, the official name of DP was New Millennium Party (NMP) in the 1997 presidential election, New Millennium Democratic Party (NMDP) in the 2002 presidential election, and Unified New Democratic Party (UNDP) in the 2007 presidential election.
party. In general, they utilised these websites to spread their campaign issues and any news in relation to the campaign. In addition to this, the DP promoted voter participation and received policy suggestions from the voters through a website called Naesesang Datkeom\(^\text{19}\) (http://www.happy1219.com) in South Korea. Moreover, they operated another website, known as Ppulttong\(^\text{20}\) in South Korea (http://www.happyman.com), to manage all kinds of video-clips. Interestingly, they ran candidate Jeong’s wife’s website, to show Jeong’s emotional characteristics. All of which had banner-ads to connect voters directly to candidate Jeong’s Minihompy website and blog. The differences between the 2002 and the 2007 presidential election is that in the latter parties operated more websites related to their candidates and each website had its own specific functions, as explained above.

Despite these efforts, many Korean observers judged the DP’s 2007 presidential election Internet campaign to be less successful than the 2002 one (Yoon, 2008; MBC news, 20/Dec/2007). In effect, the DP had many problems in the preparation of the 2007 presidential election campaign due to internal conflict resulting in the late establishment of their official election committee. On a more serious note, since the result in the polls predicted an overwhelming victory for candidate Lee Myung-bak of the GNP, the DP employed a negative campaign against the GNP, especially referring to candidate Lee’s ‘BBK scandal’, which is a stock price manipulation incident regarding the BBK company\(^\text{21}\). Moreover, the DP’s situation was further inflamed by the frequent appearance of news reports in the conventional media such as TV and newspapers due to the party’s internal conflict (DongA Ilbo, 30/Oct/2007; The Hankyoreh, 24/Nov/2007). In particular, there was a differentiation in dealing with the Internet between the GNP and the DP because the GNP was devoted to the improvement of Internet campaigning after the loss of the 2002 presidential election. DP3 and DP5 commented:

---

\(^{19}\) It means ‘my world’ in Korean.

\(^{20}\) It means ‘sparks’ in Korean.

\(^{21}\) It was a stock price manipulation incident regarding a BBK Company which was raised during the 2007 presidential election. It was particularly highlighted due to a doubt about the relationship between a representative of the BBK Company and candidate Lee Myung-bak. Consequently, the GNP did not receive positive responses from voters but, rather, its support decreased (DongA Ilbo, 22/Dec/2007)
'We [DP] did not have any specific strategy for Internet campaigning in the 2007 presidential election. … In effect, the two remarkable reasons of our success in Internet campaigning in the 2002 presidential election were invaluable support from ‘Rhosamo’ and the lack of preparation of the GNP at that time. … I remember that they [GNP] prepared a lot due to the loss of the election in the 2002 presidential election.’ (Interview transcript, DP3)

‘If I make a list about the alteration of the use of mass media, I can say that the 1997 presidential election was TV, the 2002 presidential election was the Internet, and the 2007 presidential election was … nothing. In effect, we [DP] should have more built in sophisticated campaign strategy in the utilisation of mass media in the 2007 presidential election than previous elections if we are following these steps. However, we did not. … Rather, campaign strategy using media was worse than before’. (Interview transcript, DP5)

From DP3’s comment, it is assumed that the firm trust in traditional media caused by the conventional political elite culture inside the GNP gave some benefits to the DP in the 2002 presidential election. Although South Korean campaigning is influenced more by political situations of the time such as political coalition and internal conflicts rather than the utilisation of efficient mass media, it cannot be denied that the campaign strategy of the DP was less improved than that of the GNP; strictly speaking, it was a slowdown in terms of the utilisation of mass media.

On the other hand, as explained above, the GNP were fully ready for Internet campaigning after the loss of the 2002 presidential election by the narrowest of margins due to the lack of preparation in Internet campaigning. According to GNP5, the GNP mobilised all kinds of party resources into Internet campaigning and they had a higher expectation about its effect. GNP5 said that

‘In the 2002 presidential election, our main concern was just how to manage the party and candidate’s websites, and how to advertise the candidate Lee through these websites. … In effect, we were not overly concerned about the method of how to mobilise people via online campaign activities at that time. We [GNP] did more old care media. … However, in the 2007
Continually, GNP5 stated that the GNP took a lot of care in online political adverts. For this reason, GNP 5 argued that they had to reduce budget estimates on political advertisements in newspapers dramatically, especially in local papers. Like the DP, the GNP also operated each party and candidate’s websites, communities, and Facebook to communicate with the voters. In particular, they ran a specialised website to broadcast their speeches and any campaign activities live across the country. Furthermore, the GNP conducted election campaigning via mobiles, although this was not very effective at that time. Taking all things into consideration, the GNP has gradually improved their campaign strategy through analysing the failing factors of previous elections, although they were a bit slower in the context of the speed of adoption of new media.

**Summary of the section**

Almost all interviewees agreed with the alteration of election campaign paradigm caused by the development of media. It is true that political parties need all kinds of media to communicate with voters and try to utilise these in response to a changing society. As a result, parties have to give careful attention to these developments and continue to improve their campaign strategies with them. With regard to these changes to parties, all interviewees said that it is not surprising news but just a natural phenomenon. In addition to this, they indicated that efficient use of mass media in election campaigning has been a decisive factor in the outcome of elections in South Korea. In particular, its importance has been deeply emphasised since labour-intensive campaign activities such as canvassing and outdoor speeches were restricted by a new electoral law in 1994, known as The Public Official Election Act, to assuage the election pattern of low efficiency and high expenditure. In relation to this, CP5 indicated that
'It is true that Korean parties have conducted various kinds of campaign activities using media although doubts still remain about the question of which one is a dependent variable in diffusion of media democracy between a revised campaign regulation encourage on the increase of party’s campaign activities using mass media and of party’s various use of mass media lead to campaign regulation’s change’. (Interview transcript, CP5)

Under the changing electoral environment, Korean parties seemed to have no choice but to adapt to these changes without any consideration of how they affect their campaigns. DP1 stated that

‘We do not actually have much time to consider whether we have to adopt new media in our campaign if voters use it well in their current life. No matter what it is and how we deal with it at the beginning of adoption, what we can do is to utilise it immediately not to keep up with the others’. (Interview transcript, DP1)

Thus, it is hard to say whether South Korean parties have adopted new media and new campaign technology by their conscious and strategic attitude.

It is shown that South Korean parties have accomplished various kinds of campaign activities by the adoption of new media and communication technologies in each presidential election from 1997 to 2007, especially since the arrival of TV in election campaigns in the early 1990s.\(^{22}\) (Kwon, 1992; You, 1997). Briefly, the first political discussion on TV was introduced in the 1997 presidential election (Kim, 2002), and, following the presidential election in 2002, the Internet was utilised (Kang, 2011). Moreover, in 2007, a mobile vote was conducted by the DP.\(^{23}\) (Lee, 2007). Accordingly, it does not need to be said that South Korean parties have made every endeavour to adopt new media and

---

\(^{22}\) In fact, in South Korea, TV as a medium for political discussion was introduced into the election campaign in the 1987 (13\(^{th}\)) presidential election, as mentioned in Chapter 2. However, its effect was not strong at that time because of a low rate of distribution. Therefore, Korean scholars mention the time, when media politics started as being from the 1992 (14\(^{th}\)) presidential election (Jeong, 2002; Kim and Kim, 2005).

\(^{23}\) As explained earlier, DP is an abbreviation of The United New Democratic Party. It was formed in 2008. (See historical party changes in Chapter 1 for more details about it.)
communication technology during these periods, despite the turbulent development in media. Furthermore, almost all interviewees generally agree that the extensive use of mass media and new campaign technology by political parties can be understood as the result in the change of campaign paradigm caused by the advent of new media; that is, by the modernisation process. The two interview transcripts presented below clearly express this.

‘Even though surrounding electoral environments such as a bad relationship with media companies, [and] less than friendly assessment of the previous government in 2002 had a bad influence on the DP, the reason the DP could win the presidential election was because campaign paradigm totally changed at that time because of the arrival of the Internet.’ (Interview transcript, DP5)

‘Since political TV advertising was firstly introduced for the election campaign in the 1987 presidential election, the arrival of television has totally altered the election campaign paradigm in following presidential election. Afterwards, the Internet in 2002 performed the same role as TV in the 1987 presidential election.’ (Interview transcript, GNP2)

As noted in interview transcripts and campaign regulations, it is true that there is a high level of reliance on mass media in election campaigns in South Korea. In relation to this issue, DP5 commented that parties seem to have the hardest time in designing campaign strategy especially when no new media is introduced. How much parties have struggled to show something new in their campaign and how important the meaning of novelty is in designing campaign strategy can be clearly understood. According to DP5, the arrival of the Internet as a new medium in political campaigning in the 2002 presidential election was not that difficult to utilise because the Internet was in general use, was very popular with the public and had the potential to draw the voters’ attention at that time. In particular, he explained that most people do not care about whether the party has a high standard of skill in management of new media, especially in the initial step, and the judgment of a successful campaign is determined according to whether the party appeals to voters’ tastes. Whereas, DP5 states that formulating a media strategy in the 2007 presidential election was a big issue for DP because
the Internet was not a new medium anymore to Koreans as every party had utilised it since the 2002 presidential election. To make matters worse, the public’s aspirations to change a party in government were highly serious due to a bad assessment of the DP’s achievements whilst in office. Naturally, election agendas focused on candidate Lee of the GNP, and his approval rating increased. In particular, his career as a successful businessman was strongly emphasised during the then worst economic situation in Korea in the 2007 presidential election. Although there was a new campaign approach of mobile voting by the DP, and it was successfully popular at that time, its popularity did not last long. Compared to the 2002 presidential election, it is therefore assumed that parties had no greater benefit in utilising mass media in the 2007 presidential election because the appearance of new media was not obvious. For this reason, the election campaign accomplished by the utilisation of mass media in the 2007 presidential election did not seem to work. Consequently, it is inferred that taking great advantage of the adoption of mass media in election campaigns is highly related to two issues in South Korea: 1) the proper timing and sophisticated targeting tactics; that is, when new media is introduced first and who uses those campaign media; 2) the time when candidates are equal in competition with no differences in election pledge.

5.3.2. The utilisation of campaign technology

This section will present the result of how Korean parties have adopted cutting-edge campaign technologies and have utilised these in their campaigning over the 10 years in question. Therefore, this section will focus on answering one of the research questions, which is what and how differences in campaign activities were accomplished by the utilisation of campaign technologies, using the CAMPROF index and interview materials. In addition to this, this section will confirm whether or not hypothesis 1, political parties will try to approach their work differently especially after an election defeat, would be accepted.
5.3.2.1. The results of the CAMPROF index

Tenscher, Mykkänen, and Moring (2012) argued that the CAMPROF index, which was introduced by Gibson and Römmele (2009), is designed to measure new media technology and campaign structures such as the formation of personnel and communication resources. Accordingly, presenting the results of the CAMPROF index is helpful in understanding historical changes, especially when focused on the utilisation of campaign technology and its following consequences such as the use of campaign professionals in South Korea. However, as explained in the methodology chapter, measuring and presenting figures of the results of the CAMPROF index using the Korean case in a historical context is somewhat difficult due to several reasons - such as lack of information about party resources and restrictions of campaign regulations.

Accordingly, the results are presented according to variables which are stated on the CAMPROF index - (1) use of telemarketing and direct mail, (2) presence of an internal Internet communication system, (3) e-mail sign up or subscription list for regular news updates, (4) outside headquarters, (5) continuous campaigning, and (6) use of outside public relations/media consultants - based on interview materials.

(1) Use of telemarketing and direct mail

First of all, both parties use telemarketing and direct mails to contact voters; however, under campaign regulations, they are only allowed to contact their own members. In relation to this issue, DP3 commented that these activities do not actually give benefits to the party compared to their efforts and investments on these activities. It is because parties cannot contact ordinary people, and can even only contact party members who agreed to receive calls and mail when they

---

24 According to campaign regulations in South Korea, parties are allowed to send direct mails only to constituents who are registered on the list of party members and agree to receive this service.
registered with the party. In the same line, GNP5 noted that they cannot even know and check whether party members who receive direct mails read all the mail a party sends. Therefore, GNP5 argued that a party does not think direct mail would bring strong effects to the party itself. Nonetheless, both parties send regular e-mail subscriptions once a month in non-election periods, and once a week or more than once a week in election periods.

(2) Presence of an internal Internet communication system

Secondly, it turned out that both parties have had internal Internet communication systems since the 2000s. In the case of the DP, they made their Intranet system after the 1997 presidential election and the GNP have utilised one since 2004. Although the DP utilised the Intranet system earlier than the GNP, full utilisation has been accomplished since 2004. Furthermore, the two parties have utilised it with the purpose of it providing a communication tool between internal party campaign staffers. Despite their original aim, it turned out that the function of the Intranet system was not efficient for them. DP3 noted:

‘It is hard to say that the establishment of the Intranet system has been achieved in a way of communication medium between internal party campaign staffers. … Whenever we need to communicate, phoning and fax service are much easiest way than using the Internet system, … In effect, we should use computers in [the] party office in order to use the Intranet system, but we often work outside’ (Interview transcripts, DP3).

Due to these problems, the function of the Intranet system has changed from communication medium to storage of official documents. This situation also happened in GNP. GNP4 noted:

‘In general, we use the Internet for the storage of official documents. However, we prefer using online messenger services such as MSN or NateOn online messengers to communicate and to notify daily news between party staffs. Since the smart phone arrived in South Korea in 2010, these
Although they agree that the Intranet system is not efficient, it turned out that both parties have continued to find different ways to revitalise it in response to technology developments. For example, the GNP have started to rebuild their system, although they are still not convinced of the efficiency of the Intranet system, whilst the DP have created a new mobile application which can help paid party executives to access the system frequently whenever internal party campaign staffers want to use it. In these ways, both parties have tried to develop the Intranet system; however, it does not seem to be used for election campaigns.

(3) E-mail sign up or subscription list for regular news updates

In the case of e-mail subscription newsletter, it is revealed that both parties send a regular e-mail newsletter to voters who registered on party websites and consented to receive it, one per month. In the case of election periods, parties often send e-mail newsletters whenever they have any news updates for voters.

(4) Outside headquarters

Thirdly, both parties have outside headquarters, especially during campaign periods. As explained earlier, Korean parties have had candidates’ private camps since 1997. Although this team is set up for election campaigns, it turns out that almost all important decisions related to campaign activities are decide by private camp. In particular, this situation occurs more in major parties rather than in minor parties.
(5) Continuous campaigning

Fourthly, party organisation could conduct election campaigning activities after the end of the ballot within a party in the 1997 presidential election, and the end of the primary election for presidential election from the 2002 presidential election. In effect, Korean parties conduct official campaign activities 21 days before the actual Election Day. Although parties cannot start campaign activities earlier due to campaign regulation, DP5 and DP3 noted that Korean campaigning has been permanent style. DP3 commented that

‘There is a distinction between the headquarters of a political party and the private camp. The headquarters of political parties can engage in election campaigning after the primary election …3 months before the actual election Day, but camp may be established up to 1 year before election day’ (Interview transcript, DP3).

In addition to this, DP5 said that ordinary images of parties or candidates tend to influence voting decisions because voters no longer have a high level of party attachment.

(6) Use of outside public relations/media consultants

Sixthly, both parties have occasionally employed media consultants and opinion poll companies, especially in the campaign period. The most remarkable feature in using external campaign professionals in presidential elections from 1997 to 2007 is that the number of those employed has increased and their role has been expanded. Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that they are used on a temporary rather than a permanent basis²⁵.

In addition, the two party organisations have improved and have operated their training sessions in relation to new media skills. In effect, developing training

---
²⁵ The internal dimension of professionalisation of election campaigning will be discussed in more details in the section 5.4.
sessions for internal party campaign staffers and legislatures including party leaders and candidates is necessary to make a successful campaign (Wlezien, 2010). Although many interviewees in the group of internal party campaign staffers stated that training is not as efficient as they expect, it cannot be denied that the contents of training have developed in accordance with the changing electoral environment.

From these results, it can be asserted that there are not many differences between parties in the utilisation of new technology if the state of their finances is similar to each other under South Korea’s strict campaign regulations. This is understandable because major parties try to utilise all the best party resources so far as circumstances permit.

5.3.2.2. The use of opinion polls

As mentioned before, the growth of technological advances such as, telephone canvassing, computers, direct mail, and fax machines, and the intensification of the scientific campaigning methods such as opinion polls have continued. Moreover, the power of voters is stronger in the electoral process because they can use various personnel communication channels - computers, the Internet, PDA, and mobile phone etc. - according to their tastes in post-modern society to obtain as much political information as they want. For this reason, parties devote resources to adopting the latest campaign technology into their campaign. Amongst the various kinds of new technology from the 1990s to 2000s, what is mostly used for election campaigns in Korea is opinion polls.

In South Korea, the utilisation of opinion polls started in the 1987 presidential election. Up to now in South Korea, they have been utilised in various types of elections and their influence on election outcome has increased; although the history of opinion polls is shorter than in both the UK and USA, where polls have been used for over 100 years. In particular, Park (2002) explained that polls have contributed to achieving the improvement of electoral culture in terms of
quality by building on unique survey methods that have been specialised for South Korea through trial and error. In addition to this, he exemplified the result of the 1997 presidential election, which was reported by the KOREAN Gallup poll company, as a concrete example in his research. In the 1997 presidential election, the Korean Gallup foresaw the election outcome and the prediction was successfully fulfilled with few minor errors, e.g. less than average 0.3% errors against the actual rate of turnout. Accordingly, Park argued that it is now the time to increase the accuracy of voting about opinion polls.

Moreover, in South Korea, under strict campaign regulations dealing with campaign technologies such as sending an e-mail subscription newsletter and direct mailing, the extensive use of polls has been considered the best method as well as providing objective data that parties or candidates can reference in designing election campaigns. Thus, it can be said that the utilisation of opinion polls made a technological breakthrough that led to a scientific campaign in the historical Korean context in spite of a short history of utilisation in the country.

**The historical alteration of the utilisation of opinion polls from 1997 to 2007**

As briefly explained above, one of the remarkable features of the 1997 presidential election campaign was the extensive use of opinion polls by broadcasting and newspapers companies compared to previous elections. From the 1987 to the 1992 presidential elections, they were mainly used by parties, civic organisations, and academia rather than the press due to a low level of awareness of and trust in them. Furthermore, it was prohibited to inform the public of the result of polls from the start date of the official election campaign period until midnight on Election Day. However, it was officially permitted to broadcast the result of the presidential election forecasting survey at the end of the vote in 1997 and this has consequently led to the expansion of the use of opinion polls (Park, 2002).
In addition to this, the utilisation of opinion polls by parties or individual candidates was widely as well as vigorously performed. According to the interview with CP7, there were many surveys to investigate party dynamics and the relationship between their own factions, along with a great deal of polls of approval rating during the official period of election campaign. That is, it meant that polls were mainly carried out to investigate whether a particular politician who wanted to run for primary election would be a final candidate for presidential election. Thus, CP7 noted that individual candidates basically used opinion polls in order to prove their suitability and popularity to the others, and then establish their own campaign strategy to win in a primary election. Although parties asked private poll companies for their approval ratings after the final candidate was elected, CP7 and CP8 commented that there were actually more surveys which were asked for by individual politicians before primary elections rather than during the official period of election campaign. This was because the final candidates in the 1997 election were elected by a vote of the party members, unlike the mixed form of the vote of the party members and people’s participatory contest in the 2002 and the 2007 elections. Accordingly, building on a sound position inside the party through good support from party members might be a priority to ensure that a particular individual was the final candidate of each party. In particular, party members wanted to elect a candidate to win and, therefore, the result of opinion polls were the heart of the whole issue of party members. Given this, individual candidates who wanted to run for primary election might need to know the dynamics of political power inside the party in order to create a tactical strategy based on careful surveys. Thus, CP7 indicated that the institutional environment referred to above in 1997 strongly emphasised the importance of the establishment of campaign strategy through polls.

‘Until the 1997 election, I saw several cases that candidates who were not fully supported by the public were elected through a tactical campaign strategy. … It might be because of the different process of candidate selection compared to the current one. ... The matter of how to form relationships with party members and politicians who belonged to the party was a key success for every candidate to be elected.’ (Interview transcript, CP7)
Moreover, it is reported that polls strongly influence a political coalition. As mentioned in Chapter 3, South Korean parties have been formed by particular politicians, who have rich political experience and knowledge as well as being from their hometown, rather than by similar political ideology. Accordingly, the political support for a particular party is clearly divided according to local constituencies. Thus, the opposition parties tried to unite for a single candidacy agreement, except the GNP, which has more support and party members. Especially, the GNP has held an unchallenged position in historical political dynamics in South Korea as they have maintained a regime for more than 40 years. Under this unique political situation, it is referred to in several interviews (CP2, CP7 and CP8) that polls played a key role in the negotiation of a political collation. According to a newspaper article from *The Hankyorech*, many observers believed that candidate Kim Jong-phil of the United Liberal Democratic Party, the second biggest opposition party in the 1997 presidential election, would not unite with the DP and agree on a single candidate if the approval rating of candidate Kim of the DP maintained an average of 15% (Baek, 1997).

Furthermore, the result of polls caused a factional strife in the GNP. Lee In-jae, who was one of the preliminary candidates of the GNP’s primary election, pointed out the fact that his approval rating was higher than that of Lee Hoi-chang of the GNP. Afterwards, he was defeated by the GNP after losing the primary election and organised a new political party, called Kukminshindang, in South Korea. Consequently, supporters of the GNP were split and it was a decisive factor of the GNP’s election defeat in the 1997 presidential election. Through the two cases describe above, it can be said that polls had a greater influence on more political issues such as coalitions and the formation of factions than on a direct electoral outcome.

In the 2002 presidential election, there was extensive use of polls by political parties and their influence was greatly increased in comparison to the 1997 presidential election. The press reported that poll results of candidate’s approval
rating were close-run things every day, and even the main issues on TV news relating to the election campaign were about them. In particular, the reflection of the results of polls in the DP’s primary election was enough to indicate their importance. Furthermore, voters answered that the results of polls mostly affected their voting choices (KNEC, 2003). Many observers argued that South Korea was experiencing a flood of opinion polls (Hankuk Ilbo, 20/Nov/2002). Accordingly, parties and candidates were sensitive to poll results, and were in constant fear of their approval rating decreasing. In effect, some politicians in the DP requested a re-primary election because of the decline Rho Mu-hyun’s approval rating that was presented in newspapers in the 2002 presidential election. Furthermore, polls were utilised for the main method of the selection about a single candidacy of opposition parties, between the DP and Kukmintognhap 21 Party. Despite many criticisms about the problem of the samplings, the methods, and the interpretation of poll results, and a blind faith of parties and candidates, such cases show how much the power of opinion polls has increased and affected the campaign process more so in the 2002 presidential election than in the 1997 presidential election.

Entering into the 2007 election, a huge number of polls were utilised due to a reduction in the prohibition period of the announcement of the results of polls in newspapers and TV from 22 days before the actual Election Day in the 2002 presidential election to six days in the 2007 presidential election (KNEC, 2009). In particular, the 2007 presidential election is considered as a victory for polls (The Hankyoreh, 14/Dec/2007). This is because Lee Myung-bak, the GNP candidate, continued to rank number one in almost all surveys for around a year, and newspaper articles issued those results constantly. Furthermore, the importance of polls has risen because they were firstly adopted by the DP’s primary election in the 2002 presidential election, and have been utilised in the GNP’s primary election. Thus, it is no exaggeration to say that the poll actually was a key role in Lee winning. Moreover, various kinds of poll methods such as FGI, focus group interview with professionals beyond telephone survey, have been applied and have been requested by parties and candidates.
From a historical perspective in the utilisation of polls in Korean election campaigns, CP7 and CP8 expected that there were many more polls conducted and research undertaken in the 1997 presidential election than in the 2007 presidential election, unlike the general expectation. As a reasonable explanation, CP7 guessed that this might be due to a better state of party finance. Compared to the current situation, parties might have had many ways of receiving sponsorship from big companies or any other support funds in the 1997 presidential election. Thus, it might be easier to do it. In addition to this, the most important thing is that there was a difference in the context of tactical usage of polls between the 1997 and the 2007 presidential elections. To be precise, parties or each candidate used polls and surveys at first to ensure that they were their party’s final candidate, and then they used simple polls such as the approval rating of a selected final candidate in the 1997 presidential election. On the other hand, in the 2007 presidential election, parties utilised polls to select a candidate who is valued as a competitive candidate against other parties or who is popular with the public, at first, and then they used them to understand the fact of their current situation. In addition, CP5 explained that parties have understood more and more about what the role of polls is and how to utilise it properly for their election campaign.

‘They [parties] understand that polls [are] only way to check what voters want to parties or candidates. … Since the emergence of the Internet, it is true that the method of party communication that can help reach to voters has widely expanded. However, it is applied to the special groups especially young voters or voters who have often used the Internet. They are not representatives of whole voters.’

(Interview transcript, CP5)

In other words, polls were regarded as a scientific campaign tool in the 1997 presidential election whilst parties were utilised to discern their candidate’s accurate positions during the election campaign period. With regard to this, CP7 gave a real case:

‘… He was an incumbent National Assembly member who belonged to a private camp of presidential election. One day,
he asked us to change the results of polls because he was afraid if a presidential candidate would be down-cast at the poll results during his election campaigning. .... He even knew already that the result of the poll was exactly accurate and their approval rating had decreased.’ (Interview transcript, CP7)

This case clearly shows the low awareness of politicians. At that time, they widely believed that they considered opinion polls as one of the campaign tools needed to achieve their final aim of winning an election and forming political coalitions rather than reading the mind of the public such as interests and requirements. Therefore, the utilisation of opinion polls in the 1997 presidential election can be interpreted as developing quantitatively compared to previous election campaigns due to their popularity and somehow sufficient financial state. However, in terms of cognition and knowledge about the utilisation of opinion polls, it was hard to say that polls were performed qualitatively. Whereas, in the 2007 presidential election, each party had a better understanding about what opinion polls are about and how to utilise them. CP5 said that parties conduct polls on a permanent basis, not just for election campaigns nowadays. It means that the utilisation of polls by parties has expanded and their importance has been recognised by parties.

According to CP4, parties have considered opinion polls as a kind of communication medium. Therefore, they try to understand the minds of voters through polls at first whenever any important issues are raised, and then they try to reflect voter opinion into their policies and campaign issues. Therefore, the role of opinion polls seems to be an intermediary link between parties and voters. Therefore, it can be said that the utilisation of opinion polls from the 1997 to the 2007 presidential election has developed quantitatively as well as qualitatively due to their popularity, the new emergence of primary election as the new rule of the selection process, and the arrival of unexpected variables in an on-going electoral environment. CP2 noted:

‘In comparison with the election campaign from the 1997 to the 2007 presidential election, the biggest difference is the adaptation of scientific campaign tools in election campaigns.
such as opinion polling. The previous elections before the 1997 presidential election seemed to have competition between political parties or between the local areas. Since the elections have grown fiercer and no one could expect the result of an election because of unexpected variables such as floating voters, parties have tended to rely more on opinion polling.’ (Interview transcript, CP2)

In conclusion, under severe campaign regulations in South Korea, there is little difference between the parties if their financial conditions are similar (see campaign regulations in Chapter 3) because parties tried to utilise these campaign technologies as much as they could. Nonetheless, it is true that there are differences in the adoption of the latest campaign technologies in a historical context. Therefore, there are no big differences between the GNP and the DP; however, there is steady progress in the utilisation of campaign technologies, especially opinion polls, between presidential elections.

5.3.3. The alteration of campaign activities

Due to strict campaign regulation in South Korea, as stated earlier, all campaign activities especially using mass media are heavily limited. However, it is no exaggeration to say that TV has played a key role as the main medium in election campaigns in South Korea since the 1997 presidential election, when campaign activities using mass media were actively utilised (Jeong, 2002). Therefore, the major campaign activities via TV are divided into two: political TV advertising and TV discussion. In the case of political TV adverts, their effects and importance have been recognised since the 1992 presidential election. On the other hand, political TV discussion received a lot of attention when it was first established in the 1997 presidential election due to the high expectation that it could break the pattern of high expenditure in conducting campaign activities (Kim, 1997; Kim, 1997). Naturally, these two are regarded as typically important campaign activities in South Korea. Therefore, this section will focus on

26 Although other forms of media such as newspapers were also utilised at that time, it is true to say that their effect on voters gradually decreased after the arrival of TV into the political arena during the 1997 presidential election (KNEC, 2003 and 2008b).
answering one of the research questions: how differences in these campaign activities were accomplished by each party. In addition to this, this section will confirm whether political parties will try to approach their work differently, especially after an election defeat.

5.3.3.1. Political TV advertising

The 1997 presidential election

The 1997 presidential election saw the biggest improvement in political TV advertising quantitatively as well as qualitatively. However, one of the most impressive aspects was the first adoption of business concepts into political TV adverts (Cho, 1993). In other words, previous advertising before the 1997 presidential election mainly attempted to deliver a candidate’s policies to the voters; thus, its form was simple and easy. Although political TV advertisements were first established in the 1992 presidential election (Tak, Kaid, and Lee, 1997), they were not very different to the newspaper advertisements in the matter of stressing a candidate’s policies. However, there was a clear difference in advertising strategy between TV and newspapers in the 1997 presidential election. According to Cho’s research (1998) about the analysis of political advertising in the 1997 presidential election, TV advertisements were much more focused on a candidate’s image rather than on campaign issues, whilst newspaper advertising dealt with both subjects evenly.

Perhaps it would be inferred that campaigners have gradually established a differentiation strategy in accordance with the attributes of mass media. For example, TV tends to strengthen intimacy between candidates and voters and create familiarity with campaign issues and the shape of campaign activities due to its effectiveness (Lang and Lang, 1984). Whereas newspapers can help deliver detailed information about a candidate’s policies and campaign issues to the voters. Accordingly, given the different characteristics of TV and newspaper,
political TV advertisements would be better at producing the emotional content needed to appeal to the voters whilst newspapers would deliver rational campaign issues. In this respect, the 1997 presidential election in South Korea has a significant meaning in that political advertising was at least based on the wider understanding of the characteristics of each campaign medium despite many arguments that newspaper advertisements could not deliver substantive campaign issues and detailed information to voters, and that TV advertisements were much too focused on candidate image (Kim, 2000).

Within the general outline of political advertising in the 1997 presidential election, it was also observed that somewhat different campaign strategies existed in each of the parties, according to the political situations they encountered. In the case of the GNP, as mentioned above, they had many political difficulties, which they had to manage in the election campaign period, internally as well as externally. In order to overcome the internal organisational problems such as a deep division within the party organisation and the voters’ negative viewpoint of them as a governing party due to the corruption of the government at that time, candidate Lee Hoi-chang had to concentrate on showing the differentiation of his future government from the current one. Thus, his election campaign motto was ‘the candidate who keeps a promise’ (Lee, 1997) and his slogan was ‘a clean politics, sound economy – a clean candidate Lee Hoi-chang’ (Kim, 1997). It was produced to differentiate him from the other candidates who just focused on the ‘economy’. Furthermore, there were negative catchphrases that were targeted solely at candidate Kim Dae-joong of the DP, who was the strongest opposition candidate, such as ‘Let’s root out the corruption of black money and make a clean breast of the past’ and ‘3 Kims’ liquidation’ (Kim, 1997).

Along with this, political TV advertisements were also produced for the same purpose. In total, the GNP produced seven political advertisements and it was revealed that six were ‘emotional’ advertisements focused on the candidate’s image. In Devlin’s research (1986) about the analysis of presidential television
commercials between 1952 and 1984, he explains that advertisement ‘spots’ can be divided into seven categories: 1) talking head ads, 2) negative ads, 3) cinéma vérité ads, 4) documentary ads, 5) man-in-the-street ads, 6) testimonial ads, and 7) independent ads. Amongst these types, research shows that the GNP mainly used documentary style and phrases which emphasised a candidate’s honesty and responsibility, compared with the numerous use of testimonial ads by the DP (Cho, 1998).

Despite the GNP’s efforts in the adoption of modern communication, their advertisements were subjected to severe criticism from many observers (Cho, 1998; Kim, 1998; Kim, 2003). The first reason was the GNP failed to send a constant message to the voters whilst the DP, as the most powerful opposition, tried to transmit just one campaign message - ‘economy’ - on a whole series of political advertisements (Cho, 1998). Perhaps the GNP as ruling party in 1997 thought that they should not need to choose ‘an economical revival’ as a main campaign message because the result of a bad economic situation in 1997 was a by-product of a bad performance by the government. Thus, the GNP tried to bypass this issue and to drive voter attention away from it. However, the GNP’s advertisement strategy eventually failed to express what they exactly wanted to say to the voters because of their incoherent messages.

In the interview with GNP2, another problem of the GNP’s advertising strategy was pointed out. GNP2 insisted on an old-fashioned style without considering the TV characteristics. In addition, GNP2 commented wistfully

‘DP tried to graft music video format onto political TV advertisements. … Although we did new attempts, we did not derive many advantages from TV. For example, we also mobilised around 200 people to make a political TV advertisement in the 1997 presidential election like we mobilised a mass of people when we held outdoor speeches in previous elections’. (Interview transcript, GNP2)
For example, ‘the song of victory’ is considered as a typical advertisement by the GNP in 2007. Although it attempted to adopt a new style with the use of a popular Korean song, ‘Seoul’, as the main background music of an advertisement, the GNP still mobilised many people to appear in TV advertisements, as seen in Figure 5.1, although it was not necessary in producing political TV advertising. In regard to this, GNP2 pointed out DP’s advertisement, ‘With DJ’, which seemed to be like a professionalised commercial music video compared to the GNP’s advertisement, ‘The Song of Victory’, given that both advertisements adopted the same style. Continually, GNP2 explained that the song chosen by the DP was very popular with the younger generation, and campaign managers inside the GNP expected that the target audience of the DP advertisement titled ‘With DJ’ was young voters. This is also argued in Choi’s study of Korean political advertisements from the viewpoint of political marketing (Choi, 2008). In his research, he argues that Kim Dae-joong, the DP’s candidate, who has a progressive inclination, attempted an unprecedented style of advertisement, whilst Lee, the GNP’s candidate, has a conservative disposition and tried to produce general advertising (pp.260). Furthermore, GNP2 stated that the reason why the GNP produced normal spots was because of the conventional thoughts of the politicians who mainly had important roles in the management of election campaigns. That is, it can be said that the custom of political parties themselves and the value of political elites, as will be explained more later, are significant factors in the alteration of election campaigns in South Korea.
Figure 5.1. Candidate Lee Hoi-chang’s political TV advertisement (GNP) in the 1997 presidential election: ‘The Song of Victory’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Video</th>
<th>Audio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The appearance of a subtitle ‘Clean politics, Sound economy’.</td>
<td>Let’s select a clean person, this time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The people, who hold a flag of candidate number 1, are parading through the city.</td>
<td>Let’s unfold powerful Korea together with him.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The flag parade and smiling children.</td>
<td>Let’s select No. 1, the healthy candidate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The appearance of labourers and candidate.</td>
<td>Let’s open the future with Lee Hoi-Chang.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The scene of candidate number 1.</td>
<td>Clean politics, Sound economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The appearance of farmers and the scene of the candidate’s political activities.</td>
<td>No. 1 Lee Hoi-Chang, to presidency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The scene of Korea-Japan football matches and of cheering at World Cup games.</td>
<td>Let us all select Lee Hoi-Chang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The computer graphical scene that highlights the candidate number 1.</td>
<td>No. 1 Lee Hoi-Chang</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 This frame of table is quoted from the Choi research (2008, pp.248), and the content is re-structured by the author.

On the other hand, the DP established a sophisticated campaign strategy, especially in political TV advertising and political TV debate. Although the DP were more superior in political situations than the GNP, as mentioned above, Kim Dae-joong of the DP also had weaknesses such as his health\(^{27}\) and the doubt that he would be able to raise sufficient funds. Furthermore, the GNP held onto political power for 40 years and the major companies as the biggest and the most powerful fund suppliers were deeply associated with the party. Thus, the DP were

\(^{27}\) When he ran for the election, he was 74 years old whilst Lee, the GNP candidate, was 63 years old. The reason the GNP pointed out his health problem was not just an age matter. He was severely tortured several times when he was young because of his participation in democratic movements. For this reason, many people suspected that his health was not good enough to conduct state affairs.
under favourable conditions in fund-raising and making networks with large companies, called *cheabol* in Korean, which could privately support political funding for parties. In particular, external campaign professionals as well as private campaign agents wanted to work for the GNP. With regard to this issue, an DP party executive, DP8, talked about how difficult it was, explaining that

‘It was hard to compile a list of suitable people for PR in the 1997 presidential election. In effect, external campaign professionals normally consider first whether it will bring disadvantages to them. … Thus, the position of DP as the opposition party in their [campaign professionals] perceptions was lower than GNP. … Perhaps they even might not want to be asked for PR tasks until before the time when the approval rating of Kim candidate of the DP was higher than Lee candidate of the GNP (Interview transcript, DP8).’

Despite the unfavourable factors surrounding the DP discussed above, the campaign of candidate Kim Dae-joong of the DP is considered as the best campaign strategy in the aspect of being scientific in campaign method and systemic in the creation of campaign organisation. CP2 explained that the 1997 election was an issue-centralised election whilst the 2002 and 2007 presidential elections focused on candidates’ images. Furthermore, CP2 insisted that the main competitive structure in the 1997 presidential election was whether or not people voted for candidate Kim Dae-joong, rather than the fair competition between Lee of the GNP and Kim of the DP. For instance, if there are some voters who do not want to vote for candidate Kim Dae-joong, they tend to vote for the candidate of the GNP because Koreans tend to square candidate image and party image. Thus, it did not mean that they really preferred Lee Hoi-change to Kim Dae-joong. For this reason, it is believed that the DP needed to establish sophisticated campaign tactics in developing campaign messages and positioning their candidate’s image based on a careful survey of the electoral market (Choi, 2008).

In the case of Kim of the DP in the 1997 presidential election, political TV advertising received high praise for its scientific campaign strategy. With deep consideration of Kim Dae-joong’s weakness and strengths, the DP selected ‘I am confident (I feel safe)’ and ‘economy president’ as catchphrases, based on his
political experiences and knowledge. Accordingly, the DP constantly tried to highlight these messages in their political advertisements. In particular, the most popular advertisement was the ‘With DJ’ (see Figure 5.2). It used a popular Korean pop song, ‘Dance with DJ. DOC’, after changing its original lyrics. This song appealed especially to the younger generation because it was easy to follow. When the advertisement ‘With DJ’ went on the air, many observers mentioned it was a new attempt to attract the voters (Kim, 1998; interview with GNP2). GNP2 described the situation when they watched this advertisement: they felt that they failed in the strategy of political TV advertising in the 1997 presidential election.

Figure 5.2. Kim Dae-joong’s political TV advertisement (DP) in the 1997 presidential election: ‘With DJ’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Video</th>
<th>Audio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The candidate Kim Dae-joong is smiling with children.</td>
<td>I know that good things will happen. I feel that a good world will be opened.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The appearance of people who have various kinds of job.</td>
<td>We can do it. Bright future and hopeful tomorrow.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The appearance of family, office workers, and members of the National Assembly.</td>
<td>Happy home, stable society, strong state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The scene of weddings, office workers, and cheering at World Cup games.</td>
<td>I am confident with Kim Dae-joong. We can solve all the problems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The appearance of politicians Jeong Han-young and Choi Jong-phil.</td>
<td>Let’s make our happy world with ‘DJ.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The appearance of children, labourers, and university students.</td>
<td>I am confident with Kim Dae-joong. He can fulfil economic unification.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The appearance of a subtitle ‘I am ready’. The close-up scene of a candidate.</td>
<td>Our prepared president, we can make with ‘DJ.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I have been really prepared passionately. I can do well. Please, give me just one chance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The prepared president, No.2, Kim Dae-Jung.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Source: This format of picture is quoted from the Choi research (2008, pp.245) and is revised by the author of this thesis.
The advertisement ‘With DJ’ is composed of many scenes of Kim Dae-joong along with people in various kinds of jobs in order to highlight Kim’s intimacy with the people. In addition, the overall format of the advertisement seems to be rationalised by including constant messages like ‘I am confident (I feel safe)’ and ‘He can fulfil economic unification’ in the lyrics (Choi, 2008). Most importantly, the reason this advertisement received a lot of attention from many observers is because it was the first attempt at target segmentation strategy for political advertising. That is, the DP aimed at young voters as the main viewers for Kim’s ‘With DJ’ advert, whilst the target audience of candidate Lee Hoi-chang’s TV advertisement ‘The Song of Victory’ was all voters. In addition to this, as explained in Choi’s (2008) research, Kim’s image to voters strongly tended to be close to progressive disposition and changes whilst Lee’s image had a conservative inclination and stability in the positioning map of candidates’ image. Overall, it can be said that the DP’s strategy regarding political TV advertising was appropriate action when considering Kim’s image at that time.

Besides these two typical advertisements, there were distant differences in strategies between the GNP and DP. According to Cho’s research (1998), the GNP tended to change their slogans, the format, and layout of advertisement constantly across media during the campaign period, whilst the DP continued to show the consistency of message as well as format. As a result, Cho mentioned that the GNP’s strategy looked more de-professionalised than that of the DP, and perhaps it might be evidence of internal discord between campaign managers and campaign agents. Therefore, the GNP’s advertisements were produced with rather inconsistent campaign messages. Like this, it can be understood that political advertising, especially the DP’s, in the 1997 presidential election showed the party’s new attempts to develop their previous skills, although each party perused somewhat different strategies. Despite differences between parties, those advertisements performed in the 1997 presidential election are still valued in the aspect of the first adoption of commercial advertising strategy into political advertising.
The 2002 presidential election

Like the previous situation of the GNP in the 1997 election, Kwon, who worked for the PR department of the GNP in the 2002 election, pointed out that there were disagreements about the strategy of political TV advertising between the special team for PR, which is mainly comprised of campaign professionals, and an internal PR Bureau (Kwon, 2003). As a result, he argued that it led to the failure to create competitive adverts compared to those of the DP. As seen in Table 5.3, he explained that campaign professionals wanted to aim at producing advertising based on ‘rationality and logic’ whilst internal party campaign staffers within the PR Bureau desired to make ads focusing on ‘emotion and humour’ (pp.31).

Table 5.3. The different strategy of political TV advertising between PR Bureau and special team for PR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PR Bureau (Internal party campaign staffers)</th>
<th>Special Team for PR (External campaign professionals)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Title of TV advertising</strong></td>
<td><strong>Main contents</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Street Light</td>
<td>Warming scene of an old couple lighting street light with a light bulb taken from their house</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Management</td>
<td>Showing various driving careers such as using a bicycle, a car and an airplane</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upgrade Korea</td>
<td>Utilise game image, deliver message on enhanced policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harmony</td>
<td>Various classes of people dancing to the logo’s song</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main strategy</strong></td>
<td>Emotion and humour</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1Source: Kwon (2003, pp.30)

In effect, although the first advertisement, ‘Danger vs. Safety’, for Lee Hoi-chang, the GNP candidate, which was made by mainly campaign professionals, went on the air, the response from voters was too negative because the
advertisement was mainly aimed against Rho Mu-hyun, the DP’s candidate. Briefly, the content of the advertisement is as follows. The first part of this advertisement gives tension by editing a child and a bus, which is speeding. The child chooses a safe bus finally and then sees that the previous bus, which was speeding, has had an accident. On the TV advertisement, the driver who of the safe bus is Lee Hoi-chang whilst the bad driver is described as Rho Mu-hyun. After the ad was aired, the GNP established a new department called ‘a central executive committee’, which consists of highly experienced incumbent politicians. From this perspective, it means that campaign professionals have good sense in producing modern style of advertising; however, they did not understand politics at that time. In addition to this, it is assumed that perhaps it would be hard to create groundbreaking ideas for advertising due to the absence of authority of the special team for PR and the PR Bureau caused by internal discord of communication between the two groups. As a result, the GNP’s continued internal discord led to the failure to transmit a constant campaign message (Kim, 2003).

Figure 5.3. Candidate Lee Hoi-chang’s political advertisement (GNP) in the 2002 presidential election: ‘Danger vs. Safety’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Video</th>
<th>Audio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A passenger who could not catch the previous bus gets on board another bus.</td>
<td>Korea is a vehicle that should be driven more carefully than any other time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accident of the previous bus.</td>
<td>Who can give us peace of mind?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crying Child.</td>
<td>Popularity at one instance cannot be a qualification of president.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smile of bus driver. Running bus.</td>
<td>You know better which is safer.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nation

1 Source: The picture is quoted from the Choi research (2008, pp.258) and the contents are reformed by the author of this thesis.
On the other hand, the DP’s (formally known as NMDP in 2002) adverts were mainly positive as well as having an emotional style. As explained in the section of the political situation in the 2002 presidential election, the DP focused on candidate Rho Mu-hyun’s image like a successful human story. These emotional contents were enough to provoke voters’ emotions. In particular, Rho’s previous political achievements, such as his attempts against regionalism of politics, which is characterised as an old custom in South Korea, and work experiences as a human rights lawyer, appealed to the tastes of young voters. DP5 and GNP4 stated:

‘… Whenever I think it would be possible to make a syndrome like the candidate Rho [DP] in 2002 if the candidate Lee [DLP] had had the same political advertising like Rho. It might be not. … It is true that a TV advertising strategy is important more than ever, however, it should harmonise with the other materials such as the image and historical career of the candidate.’ (Interview transcript, DP5)

‘To be honest, Rho Mu-hyun had a human story the public liked. … Those who were heartily sick of an old custom of politicians or parties, especially young generations, believed that he would be the only person who could be a representative of them to break political corruption.’ (Interview transcript, GNP 4)

Accordingly, the DP selected the catchphrase ‘a lawful Korea, honest Rho Moo-Hyun’ and concentrated on the differentiation of their candidate’s image compared to the others (Ko, 2002). In addition to this, the DP did not respond directly whenever the GNP blamed them for corruption of the government of the time, but used indirect methods like ‘we will deal with 21st century’. Although there was a late establishment of The Election Committee, which was caused by many problems whilst conducting the primary election such as disapproval of the result of the primary election, it was reported that the DP was excellent in the production of advertising in terms of strategy (Kim, 2003). That is, the DP had a clear target base on both political TV and newspaper adverts. For instance, there are two political TV advertisements which were popular with voters in the 2002 presidential election: ‘Evergreen’ and ‘Tears’.
Firstly, as seen in Figure 5.4, the main background of the ‘Evergreen’ political advertisement is the candidate playing the guitar. The kind of scene where the candidate plays the guitar and sings the song to the tranquil melody of a piano with a dark tone background had not been seen in any previous advertisements. While the past candidates tried to shed light on and show their virtues including their leadership and strength, the majority of Rho Mu-hyun’s advertisements were those that made efforts to emphasise his contented and humane aspects. This work is also one of Rho’s representative advertisements, which puts focus on the emotion given to the so-called ‘386 Generation’\(^{28}\) by the background song *Evergreen*.

---

*Figure 5.4. Candidate Rho Mu-hyun’s political advertisement (DP) in the 2002 presidential election: ‘Evergreen’*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Video</th>
<th>Audio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The candidate plays the guitar and sings the song ‘Evergreen’ to the accompaniment of a piano.</td>
<td>The people are President.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moreover, the narration is accompanied with scrolling text that appeals to the people.</td>
<td>When I fell down hit by regionalism, it was you people who made me stand up.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>When I was not able to stand in an election as I did not receive black money, it was you people who sent me piggy-banks(^{1}).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The president, who owed only the people, Rho Mu-hyun.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

\(^{28}\) Park (2007) summarised that ‘The 386 Generation, named after the 386 computer, was coined in the 1990s to describe those in their late 30s and 40s who were born in the 1960s and attended university in the 1980s. It is the 386 Generation who spent most of their youth fighting for democracy under authoritarian rule and who had a shared generational experience and culture for the first time in Korean history. They are now in decision-making positions in all fields, including political, economic, social and cultural areas. The 386 Generation will go down in history as a very active and passionate group of people who toppled a military dictatorship of more than three decades and built democracy in South Korea’ (*East-West Center Insights news June*2007).
I will work only for you people.

The people are president.

You can see Roh Mu-hyun when you think twice\(^2\).

The new president of the Republic of Korea, Roh Mu-hyun.

| Background music | Protest song ‘Evergreen.’ This song, preferred and sung frequently by students in the 1970s who desired democracy, had been banned by the government but the ban was lifted in 1988.
|<The lyrics of ‘Evergreen’>| See the green pine leaves in that field. There is no one caring for them Though they get caught in rainstorms and snowstorms They fully enjoy their own green to the end of the world The sad and bitter previous days, come never again We will sweat and realise We will be green leaves in the wild field. Though we have just a little as we shed tears hand in hand Even if the road where we go on is far and tough We will go on and finally win. |

\(^1\) ‘Wish Piggy-Bank’ was made by Rho’s fund-raising support. In terms of a different fund-raising method compared to the traditional way, where voters generally support a particular party rather than one candidate, it was valuable and meaningful.

\(^2\) The pronunciation of ‘twice’ is the same as the number 2 in Korean. Candidate Rho’s number in the 2002 presidential election was 2 and his campaign team put this sentence into all his advertising to remind people of his number.

In the same line, the main target of the ‘Tears’ series is the working class who wanted to change their life and live a better life. As seen in Figure 5.5, this advertisement focuses on showing Rho’s remarkable historical political behaviours such as being at the forefront of breaking down regionalism of politics and enduring hard the process of primary election despite adversity. That is, it aims at stressing Rho’s honesty and challenging spirit.
Like this, the DP’s advertising strategy that had a clear target base stimulated a positive response from voters. According to DP5, the DP conducted an electoral market survey before the production of those advertisements, and received responses from Netizens before broadcasting. Furthermore, DP3 stated that there were many adverts on online communities and websites produced by voters, not by parties. Even, the number of those advertisements online was beyond measure and spread very quickly to many voters.

Taking all the above-mentioned points into consideration, there is no doubt that in 2002 both parties, GNP and DP, had better knowledge of the utilisation of TV for political adverts than during the 1997 presidential election. Accordingly, they used various kinds of techniques to draw voters’ attention and at least attempted to create the style of political advertising that voters wanted. However, the two parties had different campaign strategies. Although there are many reasons for
this, such as internal discords, political situations, the absence of internal communication, it cannot be denied that the DP improved their skills and had a better understanding of ‘media logic’ than the GNP did.

**The 2007 presidential election**

As indicated earlier, political TV advertising was not as influential or as efficient in the 2007 presidential election as that of the 2002 presidential election because the approval rating of Lee, the GNP’s candidate had been around an average of 50% for a long time. However, there was a distinct change in the way to approach voters, that is, the intensification of emotional advertisement.

The most remarkable point in the 2007 presidential election was the GNP’s political TV advertising. As explained above, in general, it is true that the GNP’s adverts were more focused on producing ‘rational and logical’ advertising than emotional. It cannot be said that their advertising strategy was not as good as the DP’s in the 2002 presidential election although they also launched emotional adverts. GNP4 pointed out that they were devoted to the production of political TV advertisements although there were some criticisms because candidate Lee’s advertisements were similar to candidate Rho’s emotional strategy (Kim, 2008). For example, Lee produced an emotional style of advertisement titled ‘help me’, as seen in Figure 5.6. Briefly, in this advert, one scene highlighted Lee shedding tears whilst he meets working-class people in the market area. In particular, this advert is focused on showing Lee’s sympathy through an emotional approach. However, it was exactly same form that Rho had used before, as presented in Figure 5.5.
Figure 5.6. Candidate Lee Myung-bak’s political advertisement (GNP) in the 2007 presidential election: ‘Help me’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Video</th>
<th>Audio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Various commoners along with marketplace scenes are shown to be tired of life. Then, a commoner’s festering and blistering hands are shown to reflect his tough life, and backgrounds appear suggesting how tough commoners’ lives are. Elderly people are crying in candidate Lee Myung-bak’s arms and the candidate is shedding tears in sympathy. Unsmiling citizens are shown first, and then new light is shed on their laughing faces in tandem with the audio commentary, ‘I promise without fail to give you your smile again by reviving the economy for common people.’</td>
<td>I have met many people in the marketplace and street. They constantly talked me ‘Help me. Help me. Please help me.’ An elderly woman cried and held me when she said to me. I also cried and everyone who was there cried. Although we are facing with bad economy situation, I can definitely revive it. I promise without fail to give you your smile again by reviving the economy for common people. The practicing president of economy, No. 1 Lee Myung-bak promises to achieve.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nonetheless, the GNP’s new attempts received a positive response from the voters. As a typical advert that took centre stage, this is ‘the foul-mouthed grandma’. In this advertisement, an old, lower-class woman speaks with an accent to Lee, asking him to revive the economy, as presented in Figure 5.7. In effect, ‘president of economy’ as Lee’s catchphrase somehow gave a heavy atmosphere (or image) to Lee; however, his image was changed through producing softness and warmth in the scenes to this advert.
Figure 5.7. Candidate Lee Myung-bak’s political advertisement (GNP) in the 2007 presidential election: ‘The foul-mouthed grandma’

There is an elderly female owner of a Gukbapjip (a kind of Korean restaurant mainly serving gukbap, boiled rice served in soup, and it is a typical restaurant for working-class people) in a deep snowy night.

She gives gukbap to Lee and he eats with a healthy appetite.

She shouts at Lee to recover the national economy and Lee promises to do it.

What the hell is going on in the middle of night huh? Hungry? Why you fucking guys fight everyday without fruit?

It is very difficult for us to lead a life.

What will you achieve now that you have opened Cheong-gyeo-cheon¹?

Want more? Eat, bastard.

Lee Myung-bak is hungry. The era in which anyone can succeed with efforts.

In order to open the era for the people’s prosperity, Lee Myung-bak thinks there is no time even to have a meal.

Now that you have finished the fucking meal, you should revive the economy, got it?

I will revive the economy. The practicing president of economy, No. 1 Lee Myung-bak promises to achieve.

1. It was a Restoration Project to improve Seoul’s environment and to make a development in the balance between Southern and Northern parts of Seoul when Lee was Mayor of Seoul. Although it was successfully completed, there are still many different opinions about cons and pros.

Conversely, in the case of the DP, most of their advertisements were unwelcomed, unlike during the 2002 presidential election, because the format of political TV adverts were similar to those from the 2002 presidential election or focused on negative appeals in order to attack Lee. For example, Figure 5.8 shows one of candidate Jeong Dong-yeong’s political TV adverts. Briefly, ‘hip-
hop talk’ focused on enumerating the weaknesses of Lee Myung-bak, the GNP’s candidate, such as fake employment of his children and the stock manipulation scandal. Thus, this advert stresses the fact that Lee was not suitable to be a good president whilst Jeong was described as a good president. Although the DP tried new methods by using hip-hop music to attract many young voters’ interests, as seen in Figure 5.8, it did not lead to increased interest from voters at that time.

Figure 5.8. Candidate Jeong Dong-yeong’s political advertisement (DP) in the 2007 presidential election: ‘Hip-hop talk’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Video</th>
<th>Audio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Have you watched the news about disguised employment? Yes, I do.</td>
<td>Have you seen disguised employment?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have you heard of stock-in-trade manipulation? No. No. I do not want to hear these news articles anymore.</td>
<td>Have you heard of stock-in-trade manipulation?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>While he talks about success in front of people, he is said to misappropriate taxes in the back. He is a man of double-dealing.</td>
<td>No. No. Stop. Stop. Talking about a success in a person’s presence. Pocket a tax in the back. You are a man of double-dealing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We never support this kind of person. Then, is there a good candidate for presidential election? Of course. Then, Will we are able to have good jobs if we elect a good president? Of course. How many will we have? 2.5 million good job positions will come. We will all escape from unemployment.</td>
<td>No way. Disagreement! Is there a good president? Yes. Then, does he create more jobs? Yes. How many? 250 million. Is it for everyone?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>He is a high school student. He studies very hard. Abolition of the college enrolment examination Abandoning the enrolment system? Wait, then, who will do all this?</td>
<td>He is a high school student. He studies very hard. Abolition of the college enrolment examination Abandoning the enrolment system? Wait, then, who will do all this?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Video</td>
<td>Audio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This is my younger brother, a high school student.</td>
<td>Jeong Dong-yeong, Who? Jeong Dong-yeong.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>He is not able to receive private lessons due to lack of money, and</td>
<td>No. 1 happy family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hence has difficulty studying.</td>
<td>The good president, Jeong Dong-yeong.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We will get rid of your concern about costs for private lessons</td>
<td>ONE. Keep, keep, keep. ONE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with the abolition of the current college enrolment system.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you believe schooling will be happy if you are liberated from</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the examination hell?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Then, who will be able to do it?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This is Jeong Dong-yeong here.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who again?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 1, the candidate Jeong Dong-yeong.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 1, who makes a state of happy families.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeong Dong-yeong, the good president.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In particular, DP5 explained that all political situations surrounding the DP, such as internal discord and Lee’s overwhelming approval rating, actually made the DP less motivated in conducting all campaign activities. Accordingly, it did not present any marked features than the 2002 presidential election. Therefore, its advertising strategy seems to be more de-professionalised than before.

### 5.3.3.2. TV political debates

It is no doubt that the most important step in election campaigns was the arrival of TV debates in the 1997 presidential election. As noted earlier, there were many discussions about the necessity of the establishment of joint TV discussions since the era of media democracy arrived in the 1992 presidential election due to political TV advertising. However, it took a great deal of time to carry on TV debates due to several reasons such as immature electoral culture\(^\text{29}\), especially in the form of discussion, and the problem of the principle of equity between candidates. Nonetheless, the newly revised electoral law finally approved TV debates in 1997 and candidates are required to attend more than three joint TV debates.

\(^{29}\) As explained before, South Korea was under a dictatorship until 1987. In the following presidential election in 1992, it is actually hard to see that Korean’s electoral culture was fully matured compared to the other democratic countries.
discussions on public broadcasting (KNEC, 1998). In addition to this, there are a total of 30 appearances on TV talk shows and political discussions, e.g. 12 times on television broadcasters, six times on radio broadcasters, 11 times in newspapers, and once in a media organisation (KNEC, 1998). In effect, it was reported that there might be more than 100 discussions if the number of discussions that were hosted by civic groups and local newspapers were included (Yang, 1997).

Unlike a positive expectation that political discussions give more detailed political information to the voters against the phenomenon of intensification of a candidate’s image due to the arrival of TV, immoderate numbers of discussions, as described above, cause side effects such as losing the public’s interest due to repeated questions and the candidates’ formulaic answers (Jeong, 2002). Furthermore, there were several major problems, for example, the form and the candidates’ attitudes. Although the large numbers of political discussions repeatedly dealt with normal subjects, the average interest rate in political TV debates was highly measured. According to a research survey (Lee, 2002) and a newspaper article from Donga Ilbo (16/Dec/1997), the average viewing rating of each debate was over 50% and more than 80% of voters got useful political information from joint TV discussions. The most reasonable explanation of why TV debates were so popular in South Korea was because of the prohibition of traditional campaign activities such as large-scale outdoor speeches (Chun, 2007). The second reason might be the fact that the voters wanted to compare definite differences of political opinions about the major political issues between candidates (Jeong, 2002). Therefore, parties and candidates devoted their time to creating a differentiated strategy in order to court the voters, although the first attempt of joint political TV debates contained many controversial issues that needed to be revised afterwards.

Lee, the GNP’s candidate, aimed vigorously at perfection, as it is expected by the public. According to GNP5, the GNP established a committee for political TV debates and it was subdivided into two special departments, the policy committee
and TV discussion task force (TF), to work smoothly. The policy committee took charge of formulating policies through careful discussions with several experts in various fields in society like those working in previous presidential elections. Whereas, the team called the TV discussion task force (TF) focused on dealing with the matters regarding just TV discussion such as developing technical knowledge about how a candidate would respond to questions and attack the opposition in a proper way. In particular, during the IMF crisis in 1997, the policy committee devoted their time to mapping out economic policies more than other campaign policies. Unlike the policy committee, the TV discussion task force (TF) focused on the candidate’s image consulting on how to lead discussions or how to express opinions properly. In addition, they believed that Lee would be stronger in debating given he was justice of the Supreme Court and projecting confidence was a significant part of political TV discussions.

On the other hand, although the electoral environment surrounding the DP, e.g. a bad relationship with the press, was not favourable to them, Kim’s private camp clearly knew his strengths and weaknesses and where they could help him. First, they expected a political TV discussion would be a decisive battle showing Kim’s ability and knowledge. Hence, they aimed to achieve synergy by exposing him as many as approximately 80 times in political discussions and creating an image like ‘a person who is very knowledgeable about the economy and is a prepared president’. In effect, all these ideas tied in closely with the image of the rational presidential candidate that the voters wanted at that time because of the serious economic crisis in 1997 in South Korea.

On the other hand, CP6, who worked privately and secretly for the GNP, stated that they knew that the DP needed to produce as many campaign issues as possible due to the inequality of the relationship with the media, especially with newspaper companies. Therefore, participation in large numbers of political discussions

\[30\] In South Korea, it is important to make a good relationship with the major newspaper companies. In particular, the effect of newspapers as a campaign medium was higher than other media forms such as TV until the 1997 presidential election. In particular, the role of newspapers as a route of political information source for voters, especially the over 40s was important in the 1997 presidential election despite the strong effect of TV (Jeong, 2002).
discussions might be the best way for the DP to expose their campaign issues to the voters. It was clearly explained in the interview with CP6, who said that

‘In 1997, the key success of media campaign strategy was how many times we [each party] exposed our campaign issues on newspapers or TV. Although many observers mentioned that the candidate Kim [DP] succeeded by the dint of TV advertising and an efficient strategy of TV discussion, I suppose that the reason why he tried to take part in political discussion as much as he could was to produce many issues on mass media.’ (Interview transcript, CP6)

To be specific, according to DP5, it was revealed that Kim’s attendance in political discussions was in excess of 80 times. DP5 also said that they could not even count the actual figures of attendance at political discussions at that time. In particular, DP5 pointed out that all campaign staffers of the DP recognised the fact that the positive outcome of the election in the 1997 presidential election would be settled by TV debates. DP5 stated that they believed that they would win if Kim could show his knowledge about economic matters through his previous political experiences. As Kim was already a well-known politician, with a great deal of economic experience, it was a good opportunity for him to urge that Lee, the GNP’s candidate, be held accountable for the IMF crisis and a bad performance from the government. Therefore, the DP’s principal strategy for TV debates focused on the matter of how they can transmit consistent messages and show Kim’s ability, some training about the ability of readiness of wits against any kinds of circumstances whilst debating on TV, and image training in order to avoid appearing brusque as well as cold. This might be important because TV debates that were aired live for an hour transmitted all information without any editing. Thus, the DP held a TV debate simulation to prepare for the actual battles, with several experts in economics as the external campaign professionals as well as politicians with an encyclopaedic knowledge of economic areas.

In conclusion, the strategy of the DP as mentioned above is clearly shown in Lee’s research (2002) about the rhetorical strategies of candidates in the 1997 TV debates. He observes that Kim Dae-joong, the DP’s candidate, pointed out his
ability and strengths by offering rational solutions about the problems that South Korea was encountering at that time. In addition to this, Kim Dae-joong attacked Lee Hoi-chang, the GNP’s candidate, for the bad performance of the government of the time, which could be a weakness of Lee’s candidacy. Besides these message strategies, Lee (2002) insisted that Kim Dae-joong reinforced the power of persuasion by not using too much jargon, in order to help the voters’ understanding.

On the other hand, Lee Hoi-chang, the GNP candidate, often attacked Kim Dae-joong regarding the scandal about illegal political funds and the ‘dustbin’ of political history relating to bad political performance, in order to emphasise his morality and integrity. Moreover, too much stress on the differentiation against the government of the time caused Lee Hoi-chang to fail in building a good candidate image. Although Lee Hoi-chang changed his campaign strategy to a more positive one, it was not enough to change the voters’ recognition of him. Furthermore, the GNP’s campaign strategy emphasising morality and integrity was inappropriate due to the exposure of a political corruption scandal regarding Lee Hoi-chang’s son’s military service. With regard to his overall strategy for political TV debates, many observers pointed out that it was not a good definitive strategy given the political situation of Lee Hoi-chang and the GNP (Lee, 2002).

Entering into the 2002 presidential election, the parties realised the effect of political TV discussion through their experience of the 1997 presidential election. Accordingly, the GNP and DP prepared well at the beginning of the campaign period and hired campaign professionals who specialised in designing efficient campaign messages for TV discussion (Korean Economic Daily, 11/Dec/2002). To be specific, there was a high level of participation by academics due to making several scenarios according to different subjects such as economics, social issues, and welfare. In addition, both candidates had several simulations with political elites and campaign professionals before their attendance at the TV discussions. Therefore, unlike the 1997 presidential election, there were not many differences between the two parties in the 2002 presidential election.
The most remarkable feature of the attendance at the TV discussions was that minor parties started to want to participate in joint TV discussions due to the medium’s strong effect. DLP1 noted:

‘In spite of our endeavour to attend Political TV debates, it was not allowed by the law in 2002. … We [DLP] agree with these regulations because there are too many parties that are not in existence at the time but form suddenly to participate in elections in the election period. Nevertheless, we thought the attendance of TV discussion as many as we can was the most important campaign activity to exposure our party.’ (Interview transcript, DLP1)

Because of the late establishment of the DLP in the early 2000s, their low level of awareness compared to both the GNP and DP was a priority task they had to deal with in the 2002 presidential election. For this reason, they devoted a lot of time to presenting political debates organised by mass media companies, as many as they could. Furthermore, minor parties believed that it was the cheapest way for them to inform the public of their policies as well as their brands. With regard to this, DLP 2 mentioned that the only way they could do it was to attend any political debates, whatever their subjects.

Whereas, the candidates in the major parties, GNP and DP, tended to avoid political debates (Segye Times, 25/Oct/2002) as they realised it would have a more negative effect on them if their candidates could not properly cope with the questions being asked. Unlike printed media, on TV it is possible to produce vivid appearances such as the candidates’ reaction, attitude, and even ability to handle problems in a crisis. Given this, the candidate could make all kinds of mistakes they did not expect to make although they had prepared well beforehand. In effect, incomplete preparation for TV debate was pointed out as the most serious reason for the GNP’s election defeat in the 1997 presidential election (Korean Economic Daily, 04/Dec/2002). In addition to this, the interests of voters in political TV debates gradually decreased because they could not get any good information and hear any answers about questions they really wanted to know (Jeon, 2002). It was researched that the viewing rate for TV debates in the
2002 presidential election was an average of 5% whilst it had been an average of 20% in the 1997 presidential election.

This phenomenon of decreasing level of participation in TV discussion of the major parties’ candidates was more serious in the 2007 presidential election. Due to the reason stated above, candidates did not want to actively participate in TV discussion (MBC news, 02/Dec/2007). Furthermore, the interest of voters about TV debate decreased because the way in which TV debates proceeded was no longer attractive to voters.

**Summary of the section**

As stated earlier, this section focuses on the alteration of campaign activities especially using TV in South Korea - political TV advertising and TV political debates – to answer one of the research questions, what and how differences in campaign activities were accomplished from the 1997 to 2007 presidential election. In addition, this section demonstrates whether the GNP and DP (NMP, NMDP, and UNDP) would try to approach their work differently, especially after an election defeat. Therefore, the following paragraphs will provide a brief summary of the above discussion.

Since the first arrival of political TV advertisements in South Korea in 1992, it is no exaggeration to say that parties made remarkable improvements in designing political TV adverts in the 1997 presidential election. As discussed above, parties started to understand media logic and gradually established a differentiation strategy according to the attributes of mass media. Accordingly, from the wider perspective of historical changes of political TV advertising, it can be said that many TV adverts in the 1997 presidential election used an emotional approach to appeal to voters and new attempts like adopting commercial advertising style were achieved. In the following presidential elections in 2002 and 2007, this trend was continued and the parties’ skills were much developed compared to the
1997 presidential election. In particular, the use of an emotional approach was seriously intensified due to its popularity, and it eventually led to some criticisms because there was no differentiation between parties.

Nonetheless, there is a difference between the GNP and DP (NMP, NMDP and UNDP) in the degree of speed of technical improvement in designing political TV advertising. First of all, the GNP was a bit slower in the adoption of a new style of advertising through lack of understanding of the attributes of mass media, compared to the DP in a historical perspective. As explained earlier, TV tends to help strengthen intimacy between voters and candidate by providing visual content whilst newspapers tend to provide more detailed campaign issues and information to voters. Thus, it would be better to stimulate voters’ sensibility by using an emotional approach in designing TV advertising. However, the GNP’s TV advertisements in the 1997 and the 2002 presidential elections were more focused on negative appeals and campaign issues rather than on emotional appeals. Whereas, the DP’s adverts concentrated on stressing the candidate’s good image and this intensified over the 10 years. In addition to this, the DP had a clearer target segmentation strategy for political TV advertising, as confirmed by the 1997 and the 2002 cases, which could help the DP to transmit consistent messages to voters. However, the GNP tended to change their slogans, format, and campaign messages across media in the 1997 and the 2002 presidential elections.

Despite these differences between the two parties, the parties have two things in common. Firstly, from the results of analysis of historical change in TV advertising, the matters of party organisation itself such as the outcome of election and the custom of political party were pointed out as important reasons in producing TV advertising. In addition, it helps to answer the question of why they had different styles of TV advertising in the face of the same electoral environment. Secondly, it is confirmed that both parties have tended to change the style of TV advertising after election defeat or in such a case that a party is placed under the state of unfavourable political situations. From this perspective,
it can be said that hypothesis 1-1 political parties will try to approach their work differently especially after an election defeat is confirmed.

On the other hand, the first arrival of political TV debates in the 1997 presidential election created a lot of attention because of the expectation that voters and candidate can communicate directly as well as that campaign expenditure would be reduced. In effect, the GNP and DP (NMP, NMDP, and UNDP) attended about 100 TV debates including three official TV debates, which were organised by KNEC, in the 1997 presidential election. Moreover, it was researched that TV debates were the most effective campaign activities when voters made a final decision (Kwon, 1997). However, many problems such as the form of TV debate and the method of discussion were pointed out, and, therefore, its form has been revised to address these problems over the 10 years. As seen in Table 5.4, the time for questions from the host has been reduced and the time of mutual discussion between candidates has been increased to improve the quality of discussion by asking questions directly between candidates. In particular, the 1:1 discussion between candidates was highly esteemed by Korean campaign observers (Lee, 2007).

Despite the improvement of the TV debate system, the rate of attendance of candidates at the TV debates has decreased due to the reasons of fear of lacking preparation ability against negative attacks from candidates of the opposition parties and public indifference. In particular, it was confirmed that candidates in the parties, who were placed under unfavourable political situations, strongly tend to unite against the most promising contender. As a result, TV political debates were seriously full of negative comments between candidates and did not provide useful information for voters, especially in the 2007 presidential election. Therefore, unlike political TV advertising, it cannot be said that there were many differences in the preparation process for TV political debate such as hiring campaign professionals, between the GNP and DP. Although the TV debate system has continued to develop, the quality of political discussions between
candidates was rather better in the 1997 presidential election in than the 2007 presidential election.

Table 5.4. The historical change of the process method of political TV debates for presidential election¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presidential Election</th>
<th>The process method</th>
<th>Times</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Keynote speech (all participants)</td>
<td>1 min. per candidate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Answering the host’s questions</td>
<td>The host’s question 30 sec.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Answering 1 min and 30 sec.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Counterarguments 1 min.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mutual discussion between candidates</td>
<td>Questioning 1 min.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Answering 1 min and 30 sec.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Counterarguments 1 min.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Answering the host’s questions</td>
<td>Questioning 1 min.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Answering 1 min and 30 sec.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Counterarguments 1 min.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Closing speech</td>
<td>2 min. per candidate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Keynote speech (all participants)</td>
<td>1 min. per candidate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Answering the host’s questions</td>
<td>The host’s question 30 sec.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Answering 1 min and 30 sec.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Counterarguments 1 min.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A three-way discussion between candidates</td>
<td>Questioning 1 min.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Answering 1 min and 30 sec.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Counterarguments 1 min.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1:1 discussion between candidates</td>
<td>Questioning 1 min.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Answering 1 min and 30 sec.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Counterarguments 1 min.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Closing speech</td>
<td>2 min. per candidate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Keynote speech (all participants)</td>
<td>1 min. per candidate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Answering the host’s questions</td>
<td>The host’s question 30 sec.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Answering 1 min and 30 sec.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Counterarguments 1 min.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mutual discussion between candidates</td>
<td>Questioning 1 min.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Answering 1 min and 30 sec.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Counterarguments 1 min.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Common questions and answering</td>
<td>1 min and 30 sec. per candidate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Closing speech</td>
<td>2 min. per candidate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹Source: Jeon, 2007

5.3.4. The discussion of labour-intensive and capital-intensive campaigning

This section will demonstrate the results of the discussion about the alteration of election campaign style, especially focusing on the change from labour-intensive to capital-intensive campaign style. It is also to examine whether hypothesis 3, a new campaign styles caused by the attempts of adoption of media and technology developments will become more capital-intensive, will be accepted. To
demonstrate it, this section will present the results of tracing campaign expenditure of political parties in each presidential year and the results from the interviews.

**The 1997-2007 presidential election: the increase of campaign expenditure**

There are many arguments that modern election campaigning tends to be capital-intensive campaigning, which is characterised by some important television-centralised as well as highly money-centralised features (Farrell, 1996, Plasser and Plasser, 2002). As Farrell and Webb (2000) commented, tracing party expenditure is one of the important factors in understanding the dynamic change in election campaigning. It also can be helpful to trace the historical records of a party’s finance such as which campaign activities have been invested in more, and what historical differences have existed between parties in their expenses through the comparison. Moreover, it is good evidence of whether the style of election campaigning approach has changed from labour-intensive campaigning to capital-intensive campaigning.

However, in South Korea, it is hard to estimate accurate information of a political party’s expenditure because they are unwilling to share this even though they are requested to inform KNEC of the details. According to the election campaign regulation in South Korea, almost all political parties should give details of their expenditure to KNEC within 40 days after the election is finished, in order to receive a government subsidy (KNEC, 2008). However, the information is not allowed to be viewed by the public and only political parties can access it. Furthermore, DP2 points out that it is generally admitted that this information reported by political parties is not accurate.

*It is well known that political parties do not want to report actual expenditures to the KNEC*[^31]. … In particular, we might

[^31]: When looking into the history of election management of South Korea, it was found that the composition of the election management agencies was grounded on individual election laws from the US Military Government in the First Republic. In the Second Republic, the National Election
spend more than 10 times as much money as that regulated by election regulation rules for election campaigning.’ (Interview transcript, DP2)

In fact, the Public Office Election Act, called the Integrated Election Law in South Korea, was revised in 1994 because of the increase in election expenditure. For this reason, mass public meetings and mass mobilisation of outdoor speeches, which encouraged parties or candidates to spend a large amount of money on their campaigning, were severely restricted by new election regulation. In reality, the official amount of election expenses authorised by law for election campaigning in the 1997 presidential election decreased by 15% compared to the 1992 presidential election. To be more precise, in 1997, it was 31,040,000,000 Korean won (= £17 million) compared to 36,700,787,000 Korean won (≒ £21 million) in the 1992 presidential election. In effect, there were several reasons why it decreased, e.g. the reduction of the length of official campaigning period from 23 days to 21 days and of the number of office workers in an electioneering office from 59,058 to 4,155, the reduction of the number of outdoor speeches, and the increase of the National Treasury (KNEC, 1998). Furthermore, the government believed that the modern style of election campaigning using mass media and new communication technologies might cost less than the traditional way. Ironically, it is reported that the rate of total campaign expenditure in the 1997 presidential election increased by 2.7% against a limited amount of election expenses compared to the 1992 presidential election (KNEC, 1998). It cannot be said for sure, but the utilisation of media-centred campaigning might not be as cheap as expected. In particular, Korean parties have to pay for all campaign

Commission (afterwards KNEC) became a legitimate agency to guarantee fairness of election management for the first time in the history of South Korea. In 1960, the National Election Commission Act was enacted and proclaimed as an individual law. On December 26, 1962, the KNEC was designated as a constitutional institution at the fifth amendment of the Third Republic, and the KNEC was established on January 21, 1963. It is composed of nine members (three appointed by the president, three elected by the National Assembly, and three appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court), and the tenure of members is six years. The members of the KNEC are not allowed to join political parties or to engage in politics. Their major authority is to make rules. In other words, the KNEC can enact rules regarding election and referendum management or regarding party operation within laws and can enact internal rules unless these violate existing laws.
activities until the end of the official campaign period, and then parties which win the election or receive over fifteen hundredths of the total votes can get a national subsidy after the election (KNEC, 2008). However, this national subsidy covers campaign activities using mass media such as the expense of posters, political newspaper and TV advertising, the outdoor speeches, and pay of campaign staffers of an electioneering office.

To be more specific, there were many differences on the list of parties’ campaign expenditure compared to previous elections although the emergence of media-centralised campaigning had been forced by the revision of official election law. In the 1992 presidential election, focused investment was made on traditional campaign activities such as canvassing, mass rallies, which were needed for mass mobilisation, and the support for campaign activities of party members or volunteers, all of which are mentioned as the main features of the labour-intensive (Farrell, 1996) or pre-modern campaign style (Norris, 2000). Accordingly, it is reported that each party invested over 50% of the total campaign budget on these traditional campaign activities whilst the expenditure for media-centralised campaigns was less than 30%.

Whereas, there was a huge amount of investment in media campaign activities in the 1997 presidential election. To be more specific, as seen in Table 5.5, in the 1997 presidential election, each party spent an average of 7,538,000,000 KRW (≒ £4,188,000) on political TV debates, approximately 1,000,000,000 KRW (≒ £556,000) on political TV advertising, and around 4,000,000,000 KRW (≒ £210,000) on political TV advertising.

32 National Subsidy in South Korea means that the government gives the funds necessary for the operation of parties according to the provisions regulating their protection and cultivation of parties. In the subsidy, there are party subsidy (ordinary subsidy) and election subsidy for elections. National subsidy is calculated by multiplying 800 to the number of qualified voters of the parliamentary election and is provided quarterly. Such national subsidy is distributed according to the number of parliamentary seats, rate of obtaining votes and whether there is a 'parliamentary negotiation group'. First of all, the party with a 'parliamentary negotiation group' will take 50% of the national subsidy. Next, the party with 5~19 seats takes 5%, and parties with less than five seats will have 2%. In the case of election subsidy, the amount resulting from multiplying the total number of qualified voters to 800 in the year of election - such as presidential election, parliamentary election and local government elections to which parties can nominate their candidates - is arrived at and then the amount is distributed to parties according to parliamentary seats and the rate of obtaining votes.
£2,223,000) on political adverts in newspapers (Kim, 2000). In Kim’s research, it is explained that major parties spent over 50% of the total of their limited amount of election expenses for just campaign activities using mass media.

Table 5.5. The details of parties’ campaign expenditure for media campaign activities in the 1997 presidential election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TV speeches</th>
<th>TV adverts</th>
<th>Newspapers adverts</th>
<th>Personnel expenses</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lee Hoi-Chang (GNP)</td>
<td>₩7.3 billion (≒ £4,056,000)</td>
<td>₩1 billion (≒ £556,000)</td>
<td>₩4 billion (≒ £2,223,000)</td>
<td>₩1 billion (≒ £556,000)</td>
<td>Around ₩13.5 billion (≒ £7,495,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kim Dae-Joong (DP)</td>
<td>₩7.6 billion (≒ £4,270,000)</td>
<td>₩1 billion (≒ £556,000)</td>
<td>₩4 billion (≒ £2,223,000)</td>
<td>₩1 billion (≒ £556,000)</td>
<td>Around ₩13.7 billion (≒ £7,661,000)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Source: Kim, 2000
2 This includes all types of speeches on TV such as supporting speeches, candidate speeches, and TV debates.

Even though these official figures may not fully explain the argument that South Korean campaigning has leaned towards a modern campaign style, it will be enough to put forward objective evidence to support the argument that the 1997 election was in the transition period between labour- and capital-intensive campaigning. In particular, given that many interviewees commented that traditional campaign activities such as mass rallies, building on personal networks, and visiting local areas were still very important in the 1997 presidential election despite less party investment compared to the 1992 presidential election, the above-mentioned argument is completely supported. Although there are still many different opinions about the question of which one of the two, traditional campaigning or modern campaigning, is more expensive, it is true that the emergence of media-centralised elections has somehow increased parties’ expenditure since the 1997 presidential election.

From the 2002 presidential election, it can be clearly seen that each party invested more money in publicity activities than in the 1997 presidential election. In particular, the government officially announced the provision of subsidies for campaign activities using mass media in 2002; parties’ campaign activities via mass media have become highly invigorated. The government subsidy for election expenses, in general, is provided to parties where the candidate is elected...
or the rate of total turnout of the candidate is over a hundredth of a percent of the number of valid votes. For this reason, there were big differences between the GNP and DP, especially considering that they have a similar finance condition (KNEC, 2003; see Table 5.6).

Table 5.6. The government subsidy for election expense in the 2002 presidential election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate and Party</th>
<th>Outdoor speeches</th>
<th>TV speeches</th>
<th>TV adverts</th>
<th>Newspapers adverts</th>
<th>Internet</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lee Hoi-chang</td>
<td>₩568,235</td>
<td>₩4,201,661</td>
<td>₩632,854</td>
<td>₩3,113,333</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(GNP)</td>
<td>(£334,255)</td>
<td>(£2,538,353)</td>
<td>(£382,326)</td>
<td>(£1,880,861)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rho Mu-hyun</td>
<td>₩557,132</td>
<td>₩4,201,661</td>
<td>₩635,288</td>
<td>₩3,113,333</td>
<td>₩4,677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(DP)</td>
<td>(£327,724)</td>
<td>(£2,538,353)</td>
<td>(£382,326)</td>
<td>(£1,880,861)</td>
<td>(£556,000)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Source: KNEC 2003
2 Unit: ₩1,000 (Korean won)

The most interesting thing to note from Table 5.6 is that the GNP did not receive any subsidy for Internet activities, unlike the DP. Although it is mentioned that the cost is just related to the expenditure to manage Internet websites, it cannot be denied that the GNP invested less money in Internet campaigning than the DP did. In relation to this issue, GNP5 explained that they focused on publicity activities in traditional media such as newspapers and TV rather than the Internet, and, therefore, naturally, they had neither money nor time to invest in any kind of Internet campaigning, in effect.

To be specific, the GNP spent 66.1% (₩22,603,205,000 ≡ £13,655,297) of the limited amount of election expenses provided in the Public Official Election Act whilst the DP spent 78% (₩26,651,408,000 ≡ £16,100,943). For example, according to an article in Hankuk Ilbo (20/Dec/2002), in the case of the DP, the largest campaign activity expenditure was on publicity activities using mass media, which was estimated to be around ₩18,879,000,000 (≡ £11,405,390). That is, the DP spent approximately 70% of the total campaign expenditure on mass media publicity. Whereas, it is reported that the DP spent hardly any of the money on labour-intensive campaign activities especially the need to mobilise
people, compared to the 1997 presidential election. This point also applies to the GNP in the 2002 presidential election. On the other hand, in the 2007 presidential election, it was shown that both parties spent a similar amount of their election expenses. As is to be expected, publicity activities via mass media were the highest costs and the second was canvassing. For instance, the GNP spent ₩23,000,000,000 (≒ £13,895,014) on just publicity, which was 60% of the total amount of their election expense (Na, 2007).

Even though these official figures may not fully explain the argument that South Korean campaigning has been more towards a capital-intensive campaign style, it will be enough to put forward objective evidence to support the argument that there are signs that Korean campaigning has been moving towards a capital-intensive style from a labour-intensive one since the 1997 presidential election. To be more precise, South Korean election campaigning is in the transition period between two styles. In particular, given that many interviewees (DP1, DP5, DP7, GNP2, GNP5, CP2, CP3, CP5, and CP6) commented that traditional campaign activities such as mass rallies, building on personal networks, and visiting local areas were still very important in South Korea despite the lower degree of parties’ investment compared to the 1992 presidential election, the above-mentioned argument is completely supported. It is also argued in Plasser and Plasser’s research (2002). They argued that ‘capital- and labour- intensive styles are not contradictory’ (pp.84); most of the electoral democracies they researched have a combination of styles. Therefore, they argued that ‘we have to be cautious about prematurely announcing the replacement of traditional personal forms of campaigning by distant mediated modes of appealing to voters’ (pp.84). However, it is true that the emergence of media-centralised election has somehow increased parties’ expenditures since the 1997 presidential election, although there are still many different opinions about the question of which one of the two, traditional campaigning or modern campaigning, is more expensive (Interviews with DP1, DP5, GNP2, and CP5).
Summary of this section

Given all the above discussion, it can be inferred that South Korea’s campaign style is a combined style between labour- and capital-intensive campaigning, especially from the 1997 presidential election due to the intensification of political TV advertising and the first emergence of political TV joint discussion. Although the style of capital-intensive campaign has been strongly emphasised, it cannot be denied that traditional campaign activities such as whistle-stop tour, local public meeting, and spread of information from mouth to mouth (Mouth advertising) were still decisive factors until the 2007 presidential election. In particular, DP1 explained that there are some differences between rural and metropolitan areas. That is, the style of labour-intensive campaigning is strongly important in local areas whilst the capital-intensive campaign is more focused on the areas around the capital. Furthermore, DP1 argued that parties have continued to need to conduct different campaign strategies to appeal to different generations since the emergence of the Internet. Thus, campaign strategy in South Korea has been specialised according to different characteristics of the voters, such as ages, areas and the preference for mass media; and, therefore, it has finally led parties to invest a huge amount of money into election campaigning to improve their campaign skills.

The argument that the style of election campaigning in South Korea has been more towards the form of capital-intensive campaigning is clearly shown in the difference of the amount of election expense and of the number of campaign activities between major and minor parties. For example, the finance of the DLP, as a typical minor party in Korea, was not as plentiful (or good) as that of the major parties, GNP and DP, in the 2002 presidential election, which was the peak age of media-centralised election. DLP2 noted that they did not conduct all election campaigning that they were officially allowed to by the Public Official Election Act due to a finance matter. This means that, although the DLP used the Internet as the cheapest campaign medium than other media forms in the 2002 presidential election, it was not enough to promote them to voters against the two
major parties, GNP and DP. As mentioned by Farrell and Webb’s research (2000), no modern campaign practices are cheap. In particular, the Korean electoral market has led minor parties to engage less in modern campaign activities. For example, Korean parties have to buy the airtime to broadcast their advertising from newspaper and broadcasting companies and the price tends to more than double especially in the official electioneering period compared to an ordinary day (Schafferer, 2006). DLP2 noted:

‘In fact, it is very hard to conduct media campaigning if parties are not rich. Buying advertising space of newspaper or a prime time of TV for TV adverts is extremely expensive especially in the official election campaign period. … The price of these might be as large as two or three times than ordinary cost.’ (Interview transcript, DLP2)

Related to this, DLP1 also indicated that the lack of party’s finance is an obstacle to adopting new media and new campaign technologies. However, DLP1 and DLP2 pointed out that the problem of finance is not just related to minor parties, but also affects major parties. As mentioned above, the newly revised Political Fund Law in 2004 strictly prohibits illegal political funds of parties coming from major companies, especially conglomerates, called cheabol in South Korea. Since then, major parties are also struggling to raise funds, and they have to find a way to distribute their resources within a limited budget. Therefore, whether or not they are a major party, election campaign strategy has been designed to create maximised effects in efficient distribution of campaign budgets, and it has eventually led them to manage their campaign practices in a more professional way, especially in using mass media and campaign technology. Taking all the above-mentioned points into consideration, it can be said that the Korean election campaign has slowly followed some characteristics of a capital-intensive form of campaigning such as being money-driven, television centralised and specialised in style although it also cannot be denied that the labour-intensive campaigning style is still important in South Korea. Therefore, this result supports hypothesis 2, new campaign styles caused by media and campaign technology developments will therefore become more capital-intensive.
5.4. The internal dimension of professionalisation of election campaigning

In this section, the results of the internal dimension of professionalisation of election campaigns, the influx of campaign professionals and the alteration of political parties as campaign organisation are presented. In this sub-section, the research will present the results of these main features: 1) the influx of campaign professionals and the discussion about their role and influence in a historical context, 2) the relationship between political parties and campaign professionals from ambiguous to conflict, and 3) the centralisation of party organisation caused by the efficient management of campaign activities. The cases of the GNP and DP (NMP, NMDP and UNDP) will be compared to examine whether the two parties had any differences over the 10-year period. Unlike the results for the external dimension, the internal dimension is perhaps more influenced by party-specific variables such as political elite culture, party ideology, and hierarchical system and so on. Nonetheless, it can help investigate the general trend of the alteration in the use of campaign professionals, and, further, explore how the relationship between parties and campaign professionals has altered in a historical context. Given that there are limited sources and research focusing on this relationship in South Korea, those results, demonstrated here, will be valuable in providing information for future research.

5.4.1. The influx of campaign professionals: the role and power

The 1997 presidential election

In the two previous presidential elections, 1987 and 1992, there was little evidence of the use of campaign professionals. Although there were some cases where major parties had campaign professionals, their roles and scope were very limited. For instance, according to Jeong (2002), major parties employed a few advertisers outside the party in the production of political newspaper advertising, such as Lee Dae-woo and Kim Yeom-je in the 1987 presidential election. In
addition, there was the participation of commercial companies. In addition to this, parties asked for some advice from experienced campaign professionals in the USA (Schafferer, 2006; interview transcript with DP5). This may be because the process of elections before the 1997 presidential election had been similar to the style of labour-intensive campaign mentioned by Farrell (1996) although political TV advertising began in the 1992 presidential election. In those days, parties believed that the mobilisation of party members, the management of personal relationships, and whistle-stop tours were the most important instrument of election campaigns. Therefore, there were only a few campaigns using TV. For this reason, campaign activities were limited to just two areas, political advertising and public opinion, although there were increased numbers of campaign professionals participating compared to the 1987 presidential election, which was the first democratic election in South Korea. In particular, the opposition parties found it difficult to get support from commercial companies to produce election advertising due to the political situations which were explained in Chapter 3 (Jeong, 2002). Therefore, for the DP it was hard to find commercial companies to help them.

Unlike previous elections, in the 1997 presidential election, parties started to believe that they needed campaign professionals’ help more than before due to the intensification of media-centralised campaign activities by the revision of official campaign regulations in 1994. Given this, it transpired that the two main parties tried to employ campaign professionals, especially those who could deal with mass media and understand their logic, such as highly experienced broadcasters and journalists (interview transcripts of GNP2, GNP4, CP6, DP4 and DP5).

In the case of the GNP, they created a new planning committee to prepare for a media-centralised election campaign one month before the actual election date (Kim, 1997). It was not an official election emergency organisation inside the party, but a specialised group which was comprised of a cadre of highly experienced politicians and a few broadcasters as external campaign
professionals. In effect, it was reported that there were internal conflicts between politicians close to candidate Lee Hoi-chang and the other politicians due to the loss of authority of central organisation by the weakening of Lee’s leadership (Hankuk Ilbo, 01/Sep/1997). For this reason, the GNP established a new planning committee to quell internal conflicts and to cope with difficulties they encountered, and they held the decisive authority in the management of campaign activities.

As typical external campaign professionals, commercial companies were involved in producing political adverts for TV as well as newspapers. Mostly, these commercial companies were selected through official presentation competitions. In addition to this, there was an increase in the involvement of private opinion poll companies. In addition, there were many advisors who were close to candidates, although they cannot be viewed as campaign professionals in the terms of Medivic’s (2003) classification of campaign professionals. The biggest feature of the creation of the central organisation for election campaign in the 1997 presidential election is that the cadre of professionals were politicians rather than campaign professionals. The role of campaign professionals was a kind of assistant to help conduct campaign activities that the GNP did not manage. Accordingly, they cannot be viewed as a type of political consultants who has a strong influence on overall campaign strategy by contributing their skills and knowledge like US political consultants. That is, they were just technical specialists who provided their skills to parties.

This phenomenon was clearly shown in the DP case as well. The DP formed their election polling committee based on politicians and external campaign professionals close to candidate Kim. In particular, the cadre of politicians who were engaged on this committee were highly experienced people in the media industry. For example, as key members, Jeong Dong-yeong was a famous newsreader and You Jea-kun was a TV anchor, while Yoon Heung-ryeol was a famous CF director. However, the DP encountered many difficulties in the employment of campaign professionals. As mentioned above, it was because
commercial companies were unwilling to do the work for the DP due to political pressure. Nonetheless, unlike the GNP, it turned out that there was cooperation between the official party organisation and the private camp of the candidate due to strong leadership by Kim, the party candidate (interview transcripts with DP2 and DP7).

Furthermore, the DP tried to employ paid external campaign professionals to prepare for media-centralised campaign activities, especially for joint political TV debates. CP3 said that

‘1997 was a remarkable year in the way that scientific campaign techniques such as opinion polls and joint political TV debates have been first adopted. For this reason, the DP needed to hire professionals who could deal with this matter. … It might be the first time to hire paid professionals from outside the party.’ (Interview transcript, CP3)

It means that there were more unpaid advisors and volunteers rather than paid professionals in the 1997 presidential election. In addition, it was revealed that the DP tried to form the central committee with members who were knowledgeable about TV, and therefore, the committee was made up of people who were TV programme producers. Besides this, for the production of TV advertisements, the DP employed three commercial companies and positioned Yoon Heung-ryeol, who was a famous CF director and has his own advertising production company, as the head of team publicity. Given he is one of the members of the central campaign organisation, this demonstrates that the DP tried to monitor the work of external campaign professionals.

In conclusion, there were no differences between the two parties in the use of external campaign professionals, apart from the fact the GNP hired external professionals from the press industry whilst DP employed TV producers. This may be as a result of the closer relationship between the GNP and the press companies compared with that of the DP, as explained in Chapter 3, the case study. As typical external professionals, there was the involvement of
commercial advertising companies in the production of political TV advertising and polling companies. Unlike advertising companies, parties outsourced all polling work to private poll companies. In addition, according to Schafferer’s research (2006) about the degree of professionalism, it turned out that parties that used external campaign professionals had some problems. His research found that the GNP and the DP commonly indicated these three problems: ‘1) lack of identification with the political parties, 2) lack of knowledge about current issues and political trends, and 3) superficiality of advice offered by the consultants’ (pp.130). It meant that their work was not professional in accordance with the political situation, although commercial companies started to join the political process in the 1987 presidential election. In other words, all external campaign professionals were kinds of technical specialists who were not familiar with politics, but could contribute their skills to the parties. Therefore, it can be said that the scope of their work and their role was simple as well as quite limited in the 1997 presidential election, although there was an increase in the number of external campaign professionals to deal with TV debates, political advertising, and opinion polling.

**The 2002-2007 presidential election**

Following a sudden change in the electoral environment caused by the emergence of the Internet as a new medium in the 2002 presidential election, there was extensive use of external campaign professionals by political parties. As mentioned earlier, the 1997 presidential election was a transition period in media-democracy, and there is no doubt that the 2002 presidential election was the year that media-centralised campaign activities became more intensified, particularly in comparison with the 1997 presidential election. Furthermore, parties and candidates had to consider a new way to promote the participation of voters due to the adoption of the primary election system. For this reason, parties needed to court voters ever more than before, and this led to the extensive use of external campaign professionals to design efficient campaign strategies.
Although there was an expectation that there would be an increase in the use of external campaign professionals in relation to Internet campaigning in the 2002 and 2007 presidential elections, the level of external campaign professionals was similar to that in the 1997 presidential election. In other words, political elites who could deal with mass media still had control over the main campaign activities and external campaign professionals helped with some campaign activities that parties could not deliver. The work in relation to polls was also outsourced as in the 1997 presidential election; however, the most remarkable change from the 1997 to the 2007 presidential elections was that pollsters had become staff in the candidate’s camp. It meant that parties recognised the importance of polls. This was understandable because polls were actually utilised the most due to the emergence of primary elections which reflected the results of polls conducted with non-members. In relation to this issue, CP2 explained that there was no one who could deal with polls in the private camp or in the party organisation, as in the 1997 presidential election. That is, CP2 noted that it is hard to say that political elites had a high level of knowledge about campaign technology whilst they had a better understanding of how to deal with mass media. CP2 commented:

‘When I joined private camp in the 2002 presidential election, my job was to publish the result of opinion polling based on a professional perspective and to forecast the result of the election. At that time, I could express my opinion in relation to my work although I belonged to a private opinion polling company and I was not in the office 24 hours. … This work for me was a kind of extra project. … However, there was no one who could deal with the work related to polls.’ (Interview transcript, CP2)

Like this, the use of external campaign professionals by political parties has been slowly expanding since the 1997 presidential election. There are many private companies for opinion polling, political advertising, PR, and image-making consultants in the camp. Since the intensification of campaign activities using TV, the role of media consultants has expanded, and, incidentally, there was the participation of image-trainers and coordinators who could help improve a candidate’s image on TV. Furthermore, their role seemed to have expanded more
since candidates started to appear on entertainment shows such as talk shows. In addition to this, many newspaper articles increasingly began to report about the candidates’ dress sense so therefore candidates had to pay attention to their image. That is, the importance of visual elements had increased. However, it transpired that the role of external campaign professionals as independent political consultants was very limited, especially in the presidential election. CP2 and CP3 noted:

‘The engagement of independent campaign professionals happened from the 2002 presidential election. … Perhaps there will be a few cases in South Korea where independent campaign professionals who are not specialised in one particular area such as TV advertising, polling are joined in the camp.’ (Interview transcript, CP2)

‘… In fact, our role is much more limited in the presidential election campaign than the local election. In the case of the local election, we [external campaign professionals] control all the resources and the candidate follows our decision, whatever we do. However, it is different in the presidential election. Even though a few political consultants engage in the camp, I must say that it was hard that independent campaign professionals were engaged in camp as camp staff. This is because politicians play an important role in the management of election campaigns instead of campaign professionals.’ (Interview transcript, CP3)

From these interview transcripts, it can be interpreted that the position of external campaign professionals in the 2002 and 2007 presidential elections was still at a kind of advisor and assistant level because political elites still played a key role in the management of election campaigns, although the power of private camp had increased more than party official organisation compared to the 1997 presidential election.

In conclusion, there were no remarkable differences in the employment of the other external campaign professionals between the GNP and the DP. The GNP hired three advertising companies and the DP had two companies. In addition, they outsourced polling work to highly qualified private companies, although pollsters have become to be recognised as one of the members of a candidate’s private camp since the 2002 presidential election. Their power has not increased
nor can they participate in the final decision-making process; however, it can be said that candidates and parties have acknowledged their importance. Besides this, there were a huge number of advisory panels that were composed of academics and renowned people in many different areas. It was reported that the GNP had more than 800 people, and the DP officially had 80 people in the 2002 presidential election. However, the real figure within the DP was thought to be more than 1,800 because they had implemented the cyber advisory panel group in the beginning period of the election campaign (Kim, 2002; Cho, 2002). To give more evidence, CP2 said that

‘… In general, when the candidate is finally confirmed, each party starts to conduct polls by not party officers inside party, but pollsters outside party organisation. … There were some cases in which pollsters who worked for party organisation were in charge in the overall process. However, in these cases, it is hard to say that they are kind of party officers because they joined in private camp after leaving parties and engaged in private poll company.’ (Interview transcript, CP2)

It means that parties wanted to hire external professionals who know the dynamics of the political party although they had left the party organisation. In the other words, in the involvement of external professionals, the type of ‘Traditional Politico’ as stated in Farrell, Kolodny, and Medvic’s research (2001) - political consultants who are in this group have their own companies after leaving their job in government and political parties - increased in the 2002 and 2007 presidential elections. Perhaps it would be of benefit to parties to control and communicate with them rather than with external professionals who understand political sectors to a much lesser extent. Furthermore, the decision-making process of parties would be much easier and efficient by assigning campaign professionals like the traditional politico type to the main patricians in communicating with the other campaign professionals and even inside party campaign management. Overall, although there were many vendor and market types of campaign professionals such as advertising companies, the most remarkable difference between the 1997 and the 2007 presidential elections is the extensive use of campaign professionals like the type of traditional politico. Besides this, it is revealed that there were a huge number of advisory panels
comprised of academics and renowned people in many different areas. From discussions explained above, it can be said that hypothesis 2, political parties will try to increase the engagement of campaign professionals to improve their campaign strategies, especially in the adoption of new campaign skills and electoral environment, is confirmed.

**Summary of the section**

In general, campaign professionals are broadly divided into three groups in South Korea: commercial companies, independent political consultants, and advisors on a voluntary basis. In effect, there is a limitation in applying Medvic’s classification (2003) to the South Korean case. This is because in his view people who give advice to political parties as a close friend cannot be seen as political consultants. However, party finances are not sufficient to pay for all kinds of campaign professionals in South Korea. For this reason, there are still many unpaid campaign professionals within party organisations. Furthermore, unlike in other countries where there are concerns about the decline of political parties caused by the influx of campaign professionals to the party organisations, Korean parties, especially political elites, still hold more power than campaign professionals.

The biggest difference between previous and current campaign professionals is that the current campaign professionals want to be independent from the political parties. In addition, it is confirmed from the interview results that this tendency become more and more significant. Until the 1990s, the people who could be called campaign professionals were people who came from PR teams in the party organisation or worked for the mass media industry. For this reason, it is clearly shown that campaign professionals who have been employed in the previous presidential elections have a deep personal relationship with political parties. Therefore, it cannot be said that they were campaign professionals who had political consulting work as their main job like the current campaign
professionals, although their role was the same as that of the current campaign professionals. In relation to this issue, CP1 stated:

‘The biggest difference in political consultants from the 1997 to the 2007 presidential election is their change in identity. In 1997, campaign staffers inside party organisation and political elites did not think that campaign professionals are the people who has specialised in election campaigns. Also campaign professionals did not think of themselves as experts in dealing with mass media.’ (Interview transcript, CP1)

For example, Lee Dae-yub, who worked for the 1997 presidential election, was Project Director in the Korea Broadcasting System before he joined the camp. In addition, Jeon Byong-min, who was one of the first generation of political consultants in South Korea, was a not professional campaign expert but a kind of politician. That is to say, they were not campaign professionals for the election campaign.

Entering into the 2002 presidential election, the increased use of campaign professionals was noticed compared to the 1997 presidential election. As a good example, candidate Rho Mu-hyun had to push forward a single candidacy agreement with Jeong Mong-jun, candidate of Kukmintonghap 21, another opposition party. The two parties reached an agreement about the method of candidate selection using political TV discussion and the result of opinion polls. For this reason, they had to hire two private poll companies, Research & Research and World Research. However, it is reported that the director of planning and coordination for the election campaign was a professional pollster rather than an internal staff member inside the party organisation (Weekly Chosun, 12/Nov/2012). According to this article, Hong Seok-gi, as a representative pollster of the DP, an important role in designing survey questionnaires and creating sampling methods than the two private companies did. In other words, these two private poll companies just conducted polls and informed the parties of the results, whilst Hong Seok-gi was charged with the creation of a basic campaign framework. This is meaningful in two different aspects: first, it would show that the power of campaign professionals had
increased from the 1997 presidential election. Although polls were also outsourced to commercial companies and any members of political elites engaged in polls in the 1997 presidential election, the fact that parties hired an independent pollster in their private camp meant that they had started to consider the importance of the adoption of campaign technology. Second, the degree of the participation of campaign professionals was more clearly classified according to the role they took. For instance, independent political consultants had a high level of responsibility compared to campaign professionals who came from commercial companies. From the 2002 case of the DP, Hong Seok-gi had more responsibility than private poll companies. That is to say, even though they can be called campaign professionals in general, the level of influence between campaign professionals differs based on their role. On the other hand, campaign professionals in the 2007 presidential election had their own specialised skills such as designing of campaign strategy like political consultants in the USA, advertising and polling, and provided their skills to political parties or candidates. There were more independent political consultants who did not have a government or party background, but mainly focused on just political consultancy works.

Therefore, applying these historical alterations into the typology of Farrell, Kolodny, and Medvic’s research (2001), it can be interpreted that many campaign professionals in the 1997 and the 2002 presidential election were the traditional politico type, which is defined as political consultants who have their own companies after leaving their job in government and political parties. By contrast, since the 2002 presidential election, external professionals greatly seem to be like a mixed type between the type of marketers and the type of vendor. This is because they mainly work with parties and candidates although they come from a non-government background. CP1 and CP2 noted:

‘I think my job is just to establish the campaign message strategy for the election campaign. Therefore I do not care about how the strategy will be practiced in the period of the election campaign. The accountability for the campaign strategy’s success is not my work but paid party executives’ work. It is the limitation of the role of political consultants in
South Korea, it will be much better to keep the relationship between political parties and professional experts because we never request any special consideration for a job position.’ (Interview transcript, CP2)

‘We do not want to get involved in the area of politics as well as of party organisation. Accordingly, we do not want to know about their finances and the relationship between politicians etc. We have our own specialised skills and know how to use them in an election campaign.’ (Interview transcript, CP2)

Along with the alteration of the type of campaign professionals, CP2 explained that the scope of campaign professionals in South Korea has been divided into two types. One is a type of campaign professionals who deals with all campaign matters, such as independent political consultants, whilst the other is a type of campaign professionals who has a specialised knowledge of one particular area such as advertising and polling company. The former type manages all campaign activities from electoral market survey to designing campaign strategy including polling and advertising services. Accordingly, they run, in general, local elections rather than presidential elections. On the other hand, the latter type of campaign professionals has their own specialised skills, for instance, how to develop campaign messages or how to interact with voters. In general, political consultants in this type greatly tend to participate in private camps. Taking all things into consideration, it can be said that the most significant feature between the 1997 and 2007 presidential election is the alteration of campaign professionals’ identity with the increase of their power and role caused by the enlargement of the industry of political consultancy. However, it should be noted that these alterations happened to independent political consultants rather than commercial companies as another part of the group of campaign professionals. As a result, hypothesis 2-2, the hierarchy in decision-making for election campaigns will change from a top-down structure to a more flat hierarchy because of the growing influx of campaign professionals, seems to be partly accepted in South Korea; however, it cannot be said that it will definitely happen in the future.
5.4.2. The relationship between campaign professionals and political parties

As discussed above, it has been shown that the use of campaign professionals has increased and, therefore, their role has also been varied and specific. It means that South Korean parties have responded to the on-going changes in the electoral environments, and the proper use of mass media and campaign technology, and have deployed the parties’ resources efficiently; factors which have been decisive in designing a campaign strategy. On the other hand, the reason why parties are hiring many campaign professionals is that they do not know how to manage this development themselves: the adaptation of telecommunications for election campaigning is happening too rapidly for parties to manage it themselves (Sun, 2009).

As Kolodny and Logan (1998) explained, there are two different types to define the relationship between political parties and campaign professionals. Briefly, there is the business relationship defined as ‘adversarial view’. It mainly occurs at the relationship between political parties and campaign professionals such as private companies which provide specialised skills - opinion polling, political advertising, and image marketing company- to political parties or candidates. Thus, campaign professionals in the case of the ‘adversarial view’ concentrate on examining the value of their products (candidates) and the electoral market, and consider how to make their products appeal to the voters. Conversely, in the case of the ‘allied view’, political parties, in general, employ campaign professionals and have total control over all campaign activities performed by them. Therefore, campaign professionals respect the aim of political parties and the relationship between parties and campaign professionals is much closer than in the adversarial view.

Perhaps analysing their relationship into just two perspectives will cause oversimplification of the issue. Despite this, given that the industry of political consultancy in South Korea is in the initial phrase and there is still a huge number of advisors working as volunteers rather than paid campaign
professionals, this typology is worth applying to the South Korea case. Therefore, this section will address how to change the relationship between parties and campaign professionals using Kolodny and Logan’s typology (1998) in a historical context.

**The 1997 presidential election**

As noted earlier in the explanation of the role of campaign professionals, there were many commercial companies that participated in the production of political TV and newspaper advertising. Although it was officially announced that there would be selection via fair competitions, it has turned out that parties and commercial companies have maintained a long-term relationship (Interviews with CP2, CP5, and CP6). First of all, the GNP hired total two big commercial companies, *HANCOME* of Hanhwa Group and *KOREAD* of Haetae Group, which were subsidiary companies of major companies, which is called *chaebol* in South Korea, for the 1997 presidential election. Related to this issue, CP6 mentioned that

‘They there was not fair competition between companies. They were all companies close to parties or candidates in many aspects. …. Furthermore, they [campaign professionals] knew already about which party would be of more benefit to them’ (Interview transcript, CP6).

From this perspective, it can be inferred that the relationship between parties and campaign professionals was strongly correlated, although it looked like an independent rather than a supportive role on the surface. Regardless of the fact that commercial companies, as one group of campaign professionals, work closely with the leader’s office or the central party organisation, it is true that they were selected by parties and connected to candidates through the party organisation. In other words, they were viewed as party networks, and, therefore, it can be said that their relationship is interpreted in the context of the allied view rather than the adversarial view, in terms of Kolodny and Logan (1998).
On the other hand, the DP also employed commercial companies for the production of political adverts. The commercial companies that they selected had a special relationship with the DP or a candidate because they had worked with them before. Although they were not big commercial companies, unlike those working with the GNP, they were more successful in managing their role. This was because the DP’s candidate, Kim Dae-joong, held a strong leadership in leading the different organisations, and, therefore, the conflicts between party organisation and campaign professionals in the candidate’s private camp were minimised in the 1997 presidential election. Most importantly, according to DP7, the power between party organisation and private camp was balanced and they worked together to have the candidate elected. Perhaps it was because Korean parties were established centring around a few particular politicians, like a type of boss system as explained before, and candidate Kim Dae-joong was the last politician amongst the three Kims who strongly influenced Korean politics. Thus, the DP could be efficiently organised by Kim’s strong leadership in the 1997 presidential election. Except for the difference in managing the party organisation as described above, there was no difference between the GNP and the DP in the perspective of the relationship between parties and campaign professionals.

The 2002 presidential election

As stated earlier, the emergence of the adoption of primary election first by the DP has caused a weakening of the authority of the party organisation at the same time as increased the power of each candidate’s private camp. This is because the central election committee of the party organisation is newly structured after the final candidate is selected in the primary election. In general, the candidate’s private camp and party official organisation are officially combined into a committee to prepare the election campaign. In this process, naturally, there was friction between the members of the private camp and the members inside the party.
In effect, since the 2002 presidential election, the power of the private camp has increased more than that of the official PR teams inside the party organisation. CP2 commented that

‘In effect, camp becomes a head to control over all campaign activities. … For instance, if there are some people in charge of polling work inside party organisation and private camp, a person from private camp in general has control over all polling works’ (Interview transcript, CP2).

Although there are many reasons for this, the most important one is the high degree of the candidate’s trust in the private camp. CP1 explained that there is a different purpose in the creation of campaign strategy between internal party campaign staffers and the people from the candidate’s private camp. This is because party officers tend to be more concerned about their party than they are about the candidate whilst the people in the private camp consider candidates as the most important factor when designing campaign strategy.

This problem was also pointed out in the interview with GNP2. GNP2 commented on the fact that campaign managers inside the party organisation agree over the importance of the role of campaign professionals, and they believe that external campaign professionals are more knowledgeable in dealing with mass media and campaign technology. However, the main problem is that campaign professionals are, in general, lacking in understanding about the characteristics of politics. In other words, they need political savvy. In relation to this issue, GNP2 emphasised that it is highly possible to fail in the creation of a campaign strategy without cooperation between the two groups, campaign staffers inside party organisation and campaign professionals.

With a similar opinion, DP1 indicated that campaign professionals are not the people who know and understand political situations and party ideology. In particular, a few campaign professionals, who come from the non-government
sector or do not have any experience about elections, did not know well about even campaign regulations in the 2002 presidential election. Accordingly, DP1 stated that parties needed highly experienced external professionals rather than just technical specialists and, therefore, they employed campaign professionals who had worked for the party organisation before, as well as having special campaign skills.

This is a good example of the different style of party organisation between the GNP and DP. According to Kwon (2003), there were some conflicts between the official PR team inside the party organisation and the PR team that was specially organised by campaign professionals who helped candidate Lee Hoi-chang to produce political TV advertising in the 2002 presidential election. It was because the role allocations between the two groups were not clear and, further, there were conflicts of attribution between them (Kim, 2003). Moreover, the two teams had very different opinions about the production of TV adverts, as stated in the section about the explanation of political TV advertising. The PR team inside the party organisation wanted to change Lee’s image, e.g. make him look cool and straightforward, through fun and emotional adverts based on their previous experiences. However, campaign professionals wanted to maintain his original image. With relation to this issue, Kim (2003) explains that there was not any chief manager who could deal with these internal discords in the GNP. Although the reason about why they had different opinions on the production of TV advertising is not explained in Kwon’s book (2003), it can be inferred from the interview transcript of GNP2. GNP2 noted that they realised that they need to change somehow Lee’s negative image that voters had in the 1997 presidential election. From this perspective, perhaps internal party campaign staffers wanted to focus on showing friendly, warm and funny emotional pictures rather than rational and logical images due to the experiences from previous elections. According to Kim (2003), campaign professionals in the GNP who came from commercial areas did not have any experience of electioneering and, therefore, they greatly tended to emphasis Lee’s advantages no matter what these were. In particular, they might expect that Lee’s rational image - he was a justice of the Supreme Court in his previous career - was the best for the situation that voters
were disappointed in the corruption of the government in the 1997 presidential election. Naturally, such continued conflicts led to failure in designing constant PR campaign strategy and, finally, it was criticised as one of the GNP’s big mistakes (interview transcripts with GNP2; *Hangyore*, 06/Dec/2002).

The DP, however, employed experienced external campaign professionals. In particular, they established a new PR team, called PMI (Press, Media, Internet)\(^3\), with highly experienced senior politicians (Kwon, 2003; Kim, 2003). With priority given to these senior politicians, 30 advertising experts were involved as volunteers. That is, the DP placed senior political elites, who have much experience in elections and have good knowledge in dealing with mass media, as the head of the two PR teams, publicity and media team, and campaign professionals who are familiar with these senior politicians were assigned to their team, unlike what the GNP did. Consequently, this led to efficiency at work and in the decision-making process. DP5 said that the decision that senior politicians who participated in the 1997 presidential election were assigned to the head of the main PR teams consequently led to clarification as to where the responsibility lies between party organisation and campaign professionals, although there was no strong leadership from the candidate and the cooperation that had existed between camp and PR team inside the party organisation in the 1997 presidential election was not in evidence in 2002.

Above all, the greatest difference between the 1997 and the 2002 presidential elections is the process of the involvement of external campaign professionals. To be specific, in the 1997 presidential election, the employment of campaign professionals was mainly done by political parties. Although the candidate camp also existed in the 1997 presidential election, it cannot be said that the power of the private camp was higher than that of the party organisation. But rather, the power of the party organisation was higher than that of the private camp because parties elected a representative of the party organisation as the final candidate for election in the 1997 presidential election whilst parties elected a final candidate

\(^{3}\)This will be discussed in the result section on the alteration of party structure.
of presidency to face the other parties regardless of their intention in the 2002 presidential election. That is to say, the function of parties seems to have changed since the difference of political ideologies between them has become less distinct. As a result, parties started to consider such exciting (stimulating) political events such as primary election in the 2002 presidential election to court voters, and this led to the increased need for campaign professionals.

Accordingly, this led to many alterations in the process of preparation of electioneering, such as increased influx of campaign professionals and the relationship between the parties and those campaign professionals. In the influx process, campaign professionals joined the candidate’s private camp at first to prepare the primary election, and then the members in the candidate’s private camp and party officers in the PR team inside the party organisation were combined after the end of the primary election. That is to say, campaign professionals had more personal relationships with candidates rather than with the party organisation. Thus, there was a tension between internal party campaign staffers and campaign professionals in the 2002 presidential election.

**The 2007 presidential election**

Although there were no huge differences in the use of external campaign professionals quantitatively compared to the 2002 presidential election, the relationship between political consultants and political parties has been permanent since the arrival of TV in the political process, and, thus, a kind of long-term period of preparation of election has arisen, like in the US. CP1 noted:

‘It is true that the relationship between one particular politician and one particular political consultant tends to have a long-term relationship. … It is because of cooperation between politicians and political consultants. For example, if there are politicians who want to run for any kinds of elections, they should need to control mass media at first. Naturally, they need political consultants who have already a deep relationship with journalists. … Once the triangle relationship between a
politician, a political consultant and a journalist has been established, it is hard to break.’ (Interview transcript, CP1)

Accordingly, parties and candidates wanted to make a long-term relationship with campaign professionals, especially independent political consultants who understand their organisation and have the same political ideology. Related to this matter, DP1 noted that campaign professionals who are engaged in their organisation are people who have the same political ideologies or at least political orientation. Thus, politicians and independent political consultants who help them have only a long-term relationship under this situation in South Korea. In addition to this, CP2 explained that keeping a secret about campaign strategy is a common manner in the political consultancy industry. In that sense, the long-term period of relationship may be not a recent phenomenon caused by the arrival of new media and new campaign technology, but a natural situation in South Korea.

However, it has turned out that the case of commercial companies such as image marketing and political advertising is different. Unlike independent political consultants, these companies are normally connected to one particular party, to which they provide their skills. Although they normally work with one particular party, they try to stay neutral. In particular, this tendency strongly tends to be present in poll companies. As explained earlier, they have been more independent than the others - although they have engaged in private camps since the 2002 presidential election - because no one in the party organisations can intervene in carrying out polls. Moreover, parties want to show the results of reputable poll companies to voters and, therefore, this has led to poll companies being more independent. Even though their service has been more expanded than before, e.g. from simply surveys about the approval rating of candidates to providing prediction investigations based on objective figures from polls, it cannot be said that they have a deep relationship with parties and candidates, like independent political consultants have.
CP4 as a pollster commented that it is important to remain neutral between political parties because the poll companies work for all political parties whenever the parties need them. However, there are some poll companies that have a deep relationship with a particular party due to their political orientation. However, CP4 explained that poll companies have a huge amount of work in relation to other industries and, especially, working with political parties does not bring a fair margin of profit to poll companies. Nevertheless, they still maintain a good relationship with the parties due to their personal relationship with them, although there are no big margins for poll companies from a business perspective.

On the other hand, ironically, it has turned out that there are different opinions between internal party campaign staffers and external campaign professionals in looking at their relationship. Almost all interviewees agreed on their uncomfortable relationship, and even that they were cynical about each other. CP1 said that

‘The tension between internal party campaign staffers and external campaign professionals is a bit weird. It is because of the stereotype about campaign professionals. … Sometimes internal party campaign staffers do not think that they need some helps from campaign professionals because they think their campaign skills are good enough compared to us [campaign professionals].’ (Interview transcript, CP1)

As stated earlier, internal party campaign staffers seem to believe that external campaign professionals do not know much about electioneering and political process. That is, the role of campaign professionals is just to provide their skills on a temporary basis, especially when there are special circumstances such as election periods, and, therefore, they will not affect anything concerned with party organisation. For this reason, internal party campaign staffers normally have a high level of expectation of the role of campaign professionals. This is clearly shown in an interview with CP2.

‘They [internal party campaign staffers] have a cynical attitude to external campaign professionals. Also they always
anticipate that we have super-high technical campaign skills and will conduct dramatic campaign strategy like a magic.’ (Interview transcript, CP2)

By contrast, campaign professionals think that internal party campaign staffers need to learn about media logic. When questioned whether they think internal party campaign staffers need media training, campaign professionals answered that internal party campaign staffers need to update their skills. CP2 explained that

‘Especially from the 2007 presidential election, the high level of a party’s competence in dealing with digital media has become important because parties have to upload and transmit their news continually through these new forms. Nonetheless, parties will not hire any campaign professionals on a permanent basis because of their limited budget. Therefore, internal party campaign staffers should improve their skills, even if it is not an election period.’ (Interview transcript, CP2)

Although the relationship between internal party campaign staffers and campaign professionals does not represent the relationship between party organisation and campaign professionals, it cannot be denied that the relationship between internal party campaign staffers and campaign professionals in the 2007 presidential election became a source of increasing conflict since campaign professionals wanted to be more independent from the parties compared to the past, and they started to see their relationship from a business viewpoint. In particular, under the Korean situation that all final decisions are generally made by candidates, it has been more serious since candidates have become more reliant on campaign professionals. Thus, it can be interpreted that the relationship between candidates and campaign professionals, especially in the case of independent political consultants, has been personally as well as officially closer than before whilst the relationship between internal party campaign staffers and campaign professionals has been somewhat less close (or has become estranged). Nonetheless, in general, it is true that the relationship between political parties and campaign professionals from the 1997 to the 2007 presidential election in both parties seems to have changed from an allied view to an adversarial view.
Summary of this section

As discussed above, it turns out that the relationship between parties and campaign professionals has slowly been altered over a 10-year period from an allied to an adversarial view in the context of Kolodny and Logan’s research (1998), depending on campaign professionals’ particular roles. To be specific, as campaign professionals, individual political consultants tend to have deeper personal relationships with candidates. However, some campaign professionals who help parties in dealing with modern campaign technologies and specific campaign activities such as political advertising and political TV debates seem to have business relationships with political parties. Thus, it can be said that the increased use of campaign professionals by political parties since the 1997 and up to the 2007 presidential election has led to a subdivision in campaign professionals’ roles, which as a result has produced different outcomes in shaping relationships with political parties according to what they (campaign professionals) do.

5.4.3. The alteration of the management of party organisation

This section will present the result of how Korean parties have managed their organisation over the 10 years. Therefore, this section will focus on answering one of the research questions and confirming whether or not hypothesis 3-1, political parties will be centralised to manage their resources efficiently as well as effectively, will be accepted. In addition, this section will present the answer of whether hypothesis 3-3, political parties will expand their organisation to deal with mass media and new technology, and will therefore concentrate investment on developing these departments within their organisation, will be accepted. However, this section will not present the results of the difference between the GNP and DP due to lack of information, especially in the DP case. As stated in Chapter 3, the DP was split into different parties several times from the 1997 to the 2007 presidential election. Therefore, the DP did not keep any specific
information about their organisation. Given this limitation, this section will explain the general alteration of party organisation based on the interview results.

It is noticeable that every election campaign is based on the party organisation and on the use of their internal resources, even if their strategies have changed according to the current political environment and their current needs. As mentioned previously, the party, whether or not it is weaker than before, still exists at the centre of the Korean political process, and it has to adapt to changing circumstances. So, alterations in campaign practices can be seen as one of the signs that parties are adapting to changed political environments (Katz, Müller and Plasser, 2004) under the assumption that parties continually review and reformulate their practices to meet different circumstances (Katz and Mair, 1995). Therefore, the matter of whether party organisation is centralised is important in the management of efficient campaign strategy.

Unlike the 1997 presidential election, the 2002 presidential election has many politically remarkable events such as the emergence of primary election and internal discord within parties. In effect, it caused a conflict between party official organisation and candidate’s private camp. Furthermore, a kind of boss system in political parties authorises more power to key politicians, e.g. the three Kims, and parties have followed this old custom. In particular, the first establishment of people participatory primary election has led to the intensification of the power of candidates rather than parties. Of course, this is not to say that the establishment of primary election is just one reason for the intensification of candidate-focused election campaign. There are more distinct reasons such as the decline of party attachment. However, it cannot be denied that the emergence of primary election has decreased the authority of party organisation, and, therefore, it has sometimes caused internal discord in party organisation and conflicts between party organisation and private camp, especially election campaign periods.
For example, in the case of the GNP, they created a new election planning committee to prepare for a media-centralised election campaign one month before the actual election date in the 1997 presidential election. It was not an official election emergency organisation inside the party, but a specialised group, called the candidate’s private camp, which was composed of a cadre of highly experienced politicians and a few broadcasters as campaign professionals. In effect, it was reported that there were internal conflicts between politicians close to candidate Lee Hoi-chang and the other politicians due to the loss of authority of the central organisation by the weakening of Lee’s leadership (Hankuk Ilbo, 01/Sep/1997). For this reason, Lee relied more on campaign professionals in his camp rather than on campaign organisation although the GNP established a new election-planning committee to quell internal conflicts and to cope with difficulties they encountered. However, in the 1997 presidential election, the parties rather than the candidate’s camps held the decision-making authority for the management of campaign activities.

After the 1997 presidential election, it is true that the power of party organisation slightly decreased although the phenomenon of centralisation of party organisation was maintained until the 2007 presidential election. Since the adoption of people participatory primary election in the 2002 presidential election, party members and political elites have been no longer able to elect the candidate they wanted, and this has consequently led to a conflict between candidate and party organisation. For this reason, candidates have relied on their private camp rather than on the party organisation, although it was clearly shown in the DP’s case in the 2002 presidential election, due to serious disagreement between the political elites about Rho My-hyun’s victory in the DP’s primary election, that GNP candidate Lee Hoi-chang also tended to rely on the private camp. CP6 and CP1 stated that

‘… It is true that the opinion of camp has more power than party organisation because of the different level of candidate’s reliability’ (Interview transcript, CP6)
‘When the election campaign started, the main body of campaign organisation is the candidate’s camp rather than the political party office. In general, the people, who make the final decision for the election campaign, are all in the camp. … The candidate tends to be reliant on some particular campaign professionals who have a deep personal relationship with the candidate (Interview transcript, CP1)’

Even though the power of the party organisation has decreased relatively compared to the increased power of the private camp, it is true that they cooperate in conducting election campaigns under the candidate’s command, and this has led to the centralisation of the party organisation. Accordingly, under the Korean system, the centralisation of the party organisation may be an inevitable consequence in South Korea.

Although there are no direct changes to the centralisation of party organisation, political parties in South Korea seem to change their organisation in accordance with the current electoral environment and especially after a defeat in election. For instance, parties have tried to establish new departments for PR and invest their budgets into these departments. According to GNP5 and GNP7, the GNP tried to invest more money into expanding departments related to PR and campaign activities. Thus, it turned out that the GNP expanded PR departments and the Internet department has strengthened since a defeat in the 1997 presidential election.

In addition, this organisational change also occurred to DP. DP has strengthened the power of departments related to media and publicity. In particular, the DP employed Kim Hun-tae, who is a practicing independent campaign professional, as a chair of strategic planning on August in 2011. From this case, it can be seen that it would be possible to transform the structure of Korean parties to the electoral-professionals party type, as stated in Panebianco’s research (1988). However, it may be a hasty generalisation in looking at the change of party organisation in South Korea, because there are still stereotypes when looking at campaign professionals because it has turned out that internal party campaign staffers tend to think that campaign professionals are just outsiders. Accordingly,
they think that there are two different individual positions between external campaign professionals and campaign staffers inside party organisation in the management of election campaigns. GNP1 and GNP3 noted

‘It is obvious that everyone who is in political parties should know politics as well as the mass media in order to manage political parties well in response to the current electoral environment. Although it is a bit biased, we assume that it takes more time to learn what politics is than learning about how to deal with mass media.’ (Interview transcript, GNP1)

‘Internal party campaign staffers know more about what kind of party activities we need rather than campaign professionals. In fact, campaign professionals have much wider perspectives in the management of election campaigns. Conversely, we [internal party campaign staffers] know party matters more than campaign professionals.’ (Interview transcript, GNP3)

From these interviews, it is clear that the phenomenon of internal party campaign staffers replacing campaign professionals – which is mentioned as one hypothesis of the electoral-professional party type – will not really happen in South Korea, although it is true that political parties employ many more campaign professionals in the many areas to deal with the current electoral environment compared to the past.

Some scholars include how many campaign professionals have been engaged into a political party’s activities to measure the degree of professionalisation of election campaigning. However, it could not be said that this is directly connected to the result of the degree of professionalisation in a given country. It can be accepted as a natural response in the utilisation of mass media and new technology in election campaigns. Especially in South Korea’s case, the reason political parties hire campaign professionals for their election campaign is that they want the best people who can deal with these technical issues well and have a special knowledge about how to manage mass media issues. In fact, parties do not want to hire too many campaign professionals because they believe that they are better than campaign professionals. Accordingly, it will be highly possible for Korean parties to separate their role properly and cooperate with campaign
professionals rather than replacing the position of the current internal party campaign staffers with campaign professionals. Therefore, parties may desire to employ the people in a special area they might not know well or do not want to learn about in any depth.

**Summary of the section**

Given South Korea has many elections every year, it is true that political parties in South Korea need help from campaign professionals continually. In addition, they devoted much time to changing their campaign strategies and organisation structure such as the establishment of a digital PR team, the increased power and number of PR teams. In related to this issue, it is obvious that parties are trying to respond to cope with the ever-changing electoral environment. CP1 said that

‘As far as I know, it is few cases that independent political consultants could manage the election campaign by themselves rather than politicians until 2005. It was possible to give some advices to political parties as one member of private company, not as independent political consultant. However, it is true that parties have been changed their organisation in accordance with the ever-changing electoral environment.’ (Interview transcript, CP1)

In particular, it is turned out that organisational changes are often happened after a defeat in elections. That is, it is proved that parties have tended to be more professionalised in the utilisation of media and technology as well as structuring efficient party organisation after huge election defeats.

Moreover, CP2 noted that candidates intend to hire campaign professionals, especially independent political consultants, as permanent staffers, after the 2007 presidential election. However, CP2 pointed out that this would not easily happen in the case of Korean parties due to the problem of party finance. Therefore, this cannot guarantee that South Korean parties have been
transforming into Western model of party type such as electoral-professional party.

5.5. Discussion about media-intensified campaign style in South Korea

This section presents the common arguments of interviewees about the alteration of election campaigns in South Korea. As noted earlier, one interviewee insisted that Korean election campaigning is just a media-intensified campaign style rather than a scientific campaign using sophisticated data. From this perspective, this section discusses why Korean parties have become devoted to the utilisation of mass media. Furthermore, Korean election campaigns often tend to be characterised as ‘Americanisation’ despite many differences in political, media, and electoral systems, as stated in the literature review chapter. Accordingly, this section will discuss why the concept of professionalisation would be preferable to the term of ‘Americanisation’ to explain the alteration of election campaigning in South Korea.

The serious competition between parties

As a decisive factor in the growth of use of mass media by Korean parties in election campaigns, some interviewees stated a serious competition between parties resulting from the current government aid for parties. As mentioned earlier, the current party system has stemmed from the negotiations between political elites who had an inclination towards conservatism in 1987 (Kim, 2008). Since then Korean parties are generally divided into two political camps – Conservative and Democratic – according to their inclination. However, many studies have reported that there are actually no distinct differences in their policies and this has been more serious since the resignation of the three Kims, who had predominated political achievements and political careers. As a result, parties have received less support from the voters, which has eventually led to the decline of party loyalty and party attachment.
Following this, Korean parties have relied more on gathering politicians who are well known to the voters or have good publicity in order to receive a benefit from the government subsidy for a party. According to the National Assembly Law article 33, ‘any party which has more than 20 members of the National Assembly can be a floor negotiation group.’ (Republic of Korea, The National Assembly Act article 11456). In the Political Fund Law, article 11376 mentioned that the ‘only party that forms a floor negotiation group can get a subsidy from the government’. Consequently these legalisations and serious party competition caused by a collapse of strong party ideology have led Korean parties to devote a lot of time to seeking popular politicians and celebrities who are often exposed in mass media. This is because parties have to aim to gain more votes from swing voters, especially in the 20-30 age group, since they have engaged in a similar policy line. In general, the 20-30 group is sensitive to new trends and tend to vote too.

One interview phrase explained this situation well:

‘Korean parties are highly dependent on government subsidy to maintain their parties. … They are desperate to win elections because subsidy is given to political parties according to the number of members of the National Assembly. In order to get more subsidies, each party has to publicise their candidates mobilising the best resources they have. … In the past, there were different target groups between parties. … Since the definite differences in political policies between parties have blurred, almost all parties are on target to gain many voters from swing voters, especially in the 20-30 generation. As a result, parties have to invest more money to adopt new media given the characteristics of the young generation.’ (Interview transcript, DP)

In fact, this is not the only matter belonging to the period of election campaigning. However, one fact is obvious: that parties cannot get rid of the great help they receive from mass media since the era of media democracy has emerged.

The attitude of candidates and the mood of the party
The attitude of candidates is commonly listed by almost all interviewees as one of the main elements in growth of the use of mass media in an election campaign. In fact, this has been confirmed through the DP’s successful use of the Internet as a new medium in the 16th election campaign in 2002. When asked a question about the background to the adoption of the Internet, DP 5 pointed out it was an actual candidate, Rho, who had the idea. DP 5 stressed the final decision about the management of the election campaign is totally up to the candidates in Korea. Continually he said, ‘although there are many campaign professionals from various fields and it is true that the candidates are more reliant on them nowadays, they are all just advisors.’ Thus, DP 5 mentioned that it is an important factor whether the candidate keeps an open mind and has up-to-date ideas. With regard to this, one of the campaign professionals described candidate Rho:

‘The candidate Rho is widely known amongst politicians as a person who deals well on line and has even ran his website by himself in 2002. As far as I know, there might be no politicians who believed the effect of the Internet at that time. Conversely there were many politicians who believed the strong effect of traditional media. Nonetheless I have heard that he had wide knowledge about the application of the Internet before he was elected as a president candidate.’ (Interview transcript, CP1)

On the other hand, the GNP was in a very different situation compared to the DP. There is no doubt that the GNP is treated as the richest party in Korea and accordingly the GNP’s resources are better than those of the other parties. In fact at the beginning of the 2002 election campaign, many people expected the GNP would win the presidential election. However, the result was clearly exceptional. Many reasons have been cited for the GNP’s failure; many scholars have commented on a late response to Internet campaigning as the most fundamental reason. Related to this, almost all interviewees as internal party campaign staffers of the GNP stated that it might be a different attitude in looking at mass media. It was obvious that the GNP had a better relationship with traditional media companies, especially in the field of newspapers, than the other parties did. Accordingly, they would possibly be more heavily reliant on traditional media as
a main communication channel, which consequently could lead them to not having any interest in other media platforms or strategies. The case below would be a good example to explain a widespread problem for the GNP.

‘We had a meeting after the first TV advertisement was broadcast in 1997. In fact, some paid party executives realised we would lose the election because the DP’s one was much better than us. While we were busy trying to show Lee’s tenacity and leadership, DP focused on making a friendly mood using a K-pop titled ‘the dance with DJDOC’ with the slogan of ‘we could pass through a national crisis together’. When we told Lee and the other politicians, they could not understand why it was a matter and who was DJ DOC at that time. … It was the unpalatable truth.’ (Interview transcript, GNP2)

Like this, the attitude of the candidate seems to be an important factor when trying something new in election campaigning. CP5, an interview participant in the group of campaign professionals, also stressed the importance of the candidate’s attitude. Also, CP5 emphasised that ‘an election campaign is a battle against time. Thus, a matter of who preoccupies the latest campaign techniques and new media in advance is a sensitive issue nowadays.’

Along with this, party culture is also mentioned as a significant element in the adoption of new media. According to the interview materials, the final campaign strategy is determined through considerable discussions with politicians, paid party executives, campaign professionals, and advisors, although the candidate has the final decision. This is because the winning of elections is regarded by the party itself as a value victory from a tough fight between parties that want to assume the reins of government in the wide perspective. Thus, some interviewees mentioned that it would be difficult in the management of professionalised election campaigning if the current politicians ignored the effect of new media and were lazy about improving their knowledge about these new developments.

34 DJ DOC is a Korean trio pop group and they were popular to young people in 1997. The song named ‘The dance with DJ DOC’ is one of the most famous songs and candidate Kim used the song in his TV advertisement after changing the lyrics.
As a good example, GNP 4 indicated that the candidates and politicians who are in the major parties sometimes tend to overlook the importance of adapting to new media and new campaigns because they too believe the profile of each political party and the loyalty of party members. This seems to be a factor for the GNP more rather than for the other parties due to the close relationship between the GNP and major newspaper companies. Although it is not limited to the Korean case, it has been treated as a prominent problem in Korean politics. The big three major newspaper companies, known as Chosun/Joongang/Donga in South Korea, are very biased in favour of the GNP and, besides, the approval rating for the GNP is generally expected to be about 35% of the total vote. Thus, GNP4 is a bit more flexible in seeking out the other communication channels. As a result, these attitudes of politicians and candidates could be one of the reasons why the GNP invested less in Internet campaigning than the DP did, although they were in an advantageous position for the 16th presidential election in 2002.

However, this case does not only apply to the GNP. Almost all DP interviewees mentioned that they are less conservative than the GNP, but the characteristics of politicians seem to be not very different, whether they are in the GNP or in DP. Despite the success of the DP's Internet campaigning in 2002, it is revealed that a principal agent of the Internet campaigning was a fan club of candidate Rho, known as ‘Rhosamo’. That is, the DP recognised the Internet would be utilised more than before, but they did not have a specific strategy about it. DP5 said,

‘We did not expect Rho Mu-hyun to be elected as a final candidate at that time. Therefore we actually did not know how to publicise him. However the activities of Rhosamo based on the Internet was better than any other campaign activity. … In my opinion, it is no exaggeration to say that Rhosamo left a way open for activating the Internet campaigning.’ (Interview transcript, DP5)

35 Although there are different perspectives about the actual figure of the approval rating for each party, it is generally thought that for the GNP it is around 35% of population and for the DP it is around 32%. This is commonly mentioned by each of the GNP and DP interviewees.
It cannot be said that in 2002 the DP knew nothing of the effect of the Internet, but at least it is understood that the DP also seemed to take a passive role in the adoption of new media, like the GNP did.

From a wider perspective, this may be understood with the concept of culture of political organisation. Hofstede (1984) mentioned culture as being the expression of a set of values. To be exact, culture is understood to be ‘the collective programming of the minds which distinguishes the members of one human group from another.’ (21) From this perspective, politicians as a bigger group in the field of politics could share the same values as each other even though their propensity could be changeable later according to each political organisation’s ideology. Consequently, they might share core values at least and it will not be easy to change their attitudes, which adhere to traditional values. Related to this issue, one interviewee stated:

‘I sometimes feel that almost all politicians tend to resist the certain kind of changes in dealing with new media and technologies and are lazy in improving their knowledge. … We ran a workshop about social media for their election campaign one year ago. Some politicians asked me why they should learn this and even they doubted the effect of social media. … Even though they are just a few politicians, it is the real world.’ (Interview transcript, DP1)

The change of election campaign paradigm

Almost all interviewees agreed that the alteration of election campaign paradigm had been caused by technical developments especially in the area of media and new technology. It is obvious that political parties need different kinds of media to communicate with voters and try to utilise these in response to a changing society. As a result, parties have to give careful attention to these developments and continue to improve their campaign strategies with them. With regard to these changes in parties, all interviewees said that it is not surprising news but just a natural phenomenon. In particular, they indicated that efficient use of mass
media in election campaigning has a decisive effect on the outcome of elections in Korea since campaign activities using face-to-face communication strategies such as canvassing and outdoor speeches were restricted by revised electoral law in 2004. In relation to this, CP5 indicated that

‘It is obvious that Korean parties have conducted various kinds of campaign activities using media although doubts still remain about which one is a dependent variable in diffusion of media democracy between a revised campaign regulation focused on mass media activities and party’s various use of mass media’ (Interview transcript, CP5).

Under the changing electoral environment, Korean parties have no choice but to adapt to these changes without any consideration. DP1 said

‘We do not actually have much time to consider whether we have to adopt new media in our campaign if voters use it well in their current life. No matter what it is and how we deal with at the beginning of adoption, what we can do is to utilise it immediately not to keep up with the others’ (Interview transcript, DP1).

In fact, Korean parties have accomplished various kinds of campaign activities by the utilisation of new media and communication technologies in each election from 1997 to 2007, especially since the arrival of TV in the election campaign in the early 1990s. For example, the first political discussion on TV was introduced in 1997 (Kim, 2002), and, in the following presidential election in 2002, the Internet was utilised (Kang, 2011). Moreover, in 2007, a mobile vote was conducted by the DP. Accordingly, it is needless to say that Korean parties have made every endeavour to adopt new media and communication technology during these periods despite the short and turbulent development in media and communication technology.

36 In fact, in Korea, TV was introduced into election campaigning in the 13th presidential election in 1987, as mentioned in Chapter 3. However, its effect was not strong at that time because of a low rate of distribution. Therefore, Korean scholars explain the time when media politics started as being from the 14th presidential election in 1992 (Jeong 2002, Kim and Kim 2005).

37 As explained earlier, DP is abbreviation of United New Democratic Party. It is formed in 2008. (See historical party changes in Chapter 3 for more details about it.)
Although this could possibly cause an argument as to which one takes place first between a party’s efforts and the change of voters’ media use pattern in the field of politics, internal party campaign staffers generally understood it as the result in the change of campaign paradigm caused by the advent of new media.

‘Even though the surrounding electoral environment includes such things as a bad relationship with media companies, a less friendly assessment of the previous government in 2002 had a bad influence on the DP, the reason DP could win the election was because campaign paradigm had been totally changed at that time because of the arrival of the Internet.’ (Interview transcripts, DP5)

‘Since Political TV advertising was introduced for election campaigning in 1987, the arrival of television in election campaigning has totally altered the election campaign paradigm. Following this, the Internet in 2002 performed a similar role to TV in 1987.’ (Interview transcripts, GNP2)

As apparent in interviews and campaign regulations, it is obvious that the level of reliance on mass media in spreading out campaign news is of a high standard. More specifically, DP5 used a good phrase to evidence it: ‘In my opinion, this is the hardest time for parties especially when no new media is introduced’ (Interview transcript, DP5). According to DP5, it was not that difficult to use the new medium of the Internet in the 2002 election campaigns. This is because the Internet is popular with everyone and any kind of Internet activity is enough to draw voters’ attention at that time. In particular, DP5 mentions that nobody cares about whether the party has a high standard of skill in the management of new media, especially in the initial step, and the judgment of a successful campaign is just determined according to whether the party appeals to the voter’s taste.

On the other hand, DP5 states that formulating a media strategy in 2007 was a big issue for the DP because the Internet was no longer a new medium to Koreans and every party had utilised it since 2002. To make matters worse, the public’s aspirations to change a party in government were highly serious due to a bad assessment of the previous DP’s achievements whilst in office. Naturally, election agendas focused on candidate Lee of the GNP and his approval rating
increased. In particular, his career as a successful businessman was strongly emphasised in the worst economic situation in Korea in 2007. For this reason, the election campaign accomplished by the utilisation of mass media in the 17th presidential election in 2007 did not seem to work. Consequently, it could imply that taking great advantage of new media in election campaigns is highly related to two issues: 1) proper timing - that is, when the new media is first introduced; 2) the time when candidates are equal in competition with no differences in election pledges.

The Korean culture

In this changing electoral environment, Korean parties have to show different campaign strategies to draw voters’ attention whenever a new election is declared and this is revealed as a main burden of Korean parties when conducting an election campaign. All interviewees agreed with the strong influence and the importance of strategic use of mass media. However, they point out how difficult it is for parties because of Korean characteristics and culture.

GNP2 supposed the meaning of adoption of new media is like a passing fad to parties. As a good phrase about Korean culture, Jeon mention that the reason the IT industry has spread out into Korean society is because of a Korean characteristic called the fast fast culture, known as 8282 culture in South Korea (cited from Kang, 2012). He points out that Korean are not afraid of accommodating new changes, but, rather, they really enjoy it. Consequently, it has become a chance to make Korea a driving force of IT power, but, on the other hand, it has destroyed a traditional culture.

When applying the fast fast culture into election campaigns, it could be deemed a positive side in the aspect of driving voters’ interests using new media. From this perspective, political parties in Korea might be easy targets in the utilisation of new media especially if it appeals to the interests of any targeted voter groups.
For instance, the Internet campaign conducted by the DP in 2002 is a good example. In contrast, this unique culture could rather lead parties to de-professionalisation in many aspects such as a lack of unified campaign strategies, efficient distribution of party resources and so on. It is because parties might rush to adopt any kinds of campaign activities without deep consideration. This is clearly expressed in the interviews. Typically, CP5 said, ‘Korean election campaigning cannot be said to be a well-prepared campaign. The most important thing is to cope with difficult situations whenever it happens’ (Interview transcript, CP5). The election campaign conducted by GNP in 2002 would be a good example for this. DP3 said,

‘We know it is important to communicate with voters via mass media nowadays. However, actually, we do not want to try to invest huge sums of money to improve media campaign skills due to a sudden change in using mass media.’ (Interview transcript, DP3)

According to the interviews with DLP internal party campaign staffers, the Internet in South Korea is being treated an old medium already and people do not feel it is an attractive medium anymore. Besides, he points out that the Internet may not be considered as an up-and-coming medium for the 18th presidential election in 2012 in Korea even though it will differ depending on how parties utilise it strategically. To sum up, the Korean characteristic could encourage parties to adopt new media quickly into their campaign, but then, it could hamper the qualitative growth in management of mass media. Of course, this might apply to every democratic country. However, it could be part of the supplemental evidences for why Korean parties have struggled with this issue.
Chapter 6 Conclusion and Discussion

6.1. Introduction

This dissertation aimed to investigate the phenomenon of professionalisation of election campaigning, which has been vigorously debated between academic scholars, by taking South Korea as a case study. Thus, this research focused on exploring the question of how each party has managed its party organisation and campaign practices with campaign professionals in response to continual changes in the electoral environment in the context of professionalisation of election campaigning. As mentioned Chapter 2, the concept of professionalisation is defined as a continuous review process by each party to design competitive campaigns in response to the alteration of socio-political environments and the party’s unceasing efforts to deal with new mass media and campaign technology, and campaign professionals. Therefore, it can be said that ‘professionalisation expresses itself in more conscious and sophisticated use of campaign practices’ (Plasser and Plasser, 2002, pp.248) and efficient management of party organisation.

In order to examine professionalisation of election campaigning in South Korea, this research divided it into two dimensions: external and internal alteration, consisting of three main features respectively. To be specific, the external dimension is composed of three main features: 1) the utilisation of mass media and campaign technology, 2) the alteration of campaign activities, and 3) the alteration of campaign style. On the other hand, the internal dimension consists of three features: 1) the role of campaign professionals, 2) the relationship between campaign professionals and political parties, and 3) the alteration of management of party organisation. The comprehensive findings of this research have revealed that South Korean political parties showed in general a high level of professionalisation by fast adoption of new campaign technology and the increased use of the mass media in their election campaigns, although there were
some differences in terms of speed between the parties. However, the role and the authority of campaign professionals are low in spite of their increased use as well as the growing level of reliability on them. In addition, there is no influence on the alteration of party organisation resulting from the increased use of campaign professionals although it is found that the role and the great importance of PR departments has been stronger than before. On the basis of the results presented in each chapter, this concluding chapter will present a comprehensive summary of this research and results according to two different dimensions. Finally, the limitations of this research and the suggestions for future studies will be mentioned in this chapter.

6.2. The summary of the research

The purpose of this research was to test whether the theory of professionalisation of election campaigning that has been argued to exist in the West could be applied for the South Korean case as well. Given this theory is still vague and an on-going subject of discussion even in the West, this research tries to explain historical alterations of election campaign which have been made by two typical political parties – GNP and DP – in South Korea over the 10 years in question.

As stated earlier, there are many different approaches when looking at historical changes of election campaigning and measuring the extent to which election campaigning has been professionalised. Nonetheless, there are three factors that are commonly mentioned by previous scholars when examining professionalisation of election campaigning in the technical perspective as an external dimension of professionalisation of election campaigning: sophisticated use of media and campaign technology, the alteration of campaign activities through the intensification of new and existing campaign practices, and the alteration of style of election campaigning from labour-intensive to capital-intensive. On the other hand, from an internal dimension viewpoint, there are three different aspects: the influx of campaign professionals, the change of
relationship between political parties and campaign professionals from ambiguous to conflict by the increased use of the latter, and the centralisation of party organisation in order to manage campaign practices efficiently. Thus, this research can give a broad sense of understanding about how and by how much political parties have adopted and adapted new media and new technologies in order to win elections.

Chapter 1 as the introduction to this study provided a general overview of this research. Therefore, the purpose of this research and the research questions as well as hypotheses through appropriate academic discussions in relation to the evolution of election campaign literature especially focusing on the phenomenon of professionalisation was presented. In particular, given that this study focuses on the South Korea case to investigate the phenomenon of professionalisation of election campaigning, a brief explanation of why the South Korean case has been chosen for this study has been explained. Finally, a brief explanation of chapter structure has been outlined in this chapter.

In Chapter 2, this research tried to conceptualise the phenomenon of professionalisation of election campaigning in the context of campaign literature. As mentioned before, the overall national campaign may be more orchestrated and better organised, more ‘professional’ to use the language of political communication, but it is a form of professionalism that is constantly changing and redefining itself (Negrine, 2002). In particular, the core question of what professionalisation means is related to the possibility of distinguishing between ‘amateur’ and ‘professional’ campaigns (Mancini, 1999). In fact, whenever argument about professionalisation is made, many academics point out what the difference between amateurish and professional campaign is. If professionalisation is defined as a response of political parties to make their campaign practices better or to adapt more technical campaign skills to mobilise more volatile voters than before, it is actually meaningless to argue between the terms amateurish and professional. In fact, no amateurish campaign strategy exists because campaigners always try to use the best materials whenever
elections are held. Thus, Negrine (2007) insists that the theory of professionalisation could be used for analysis of the development of ‘what went on before’ rather than using a standard to distinguish amateurish campaigns. Given that election campaigning, as one of the key activities of political parties, is a typical way to recognise these changes, professionalisation of election campaigning is an on-going process made by political parties to review their old campaign practices to make new ones much better in accordance with the ever-changing electoral environment. In addition, it means the term professionalisation can be directly connected to the level of competence of management of election campaigning (Nord, 2007) because political parties have tried to utilise all kinds of campaign resources regardless of whether they are old or new. To give a concrete example, it is true that the newspaper seems to be regarded as outdated medium compared to TV or the Internet. However, political parties have still used it as one of the main mediums even though the working methods used by political parties have differed. Accordingly, it is important to demonstrate what kinds of media have been used for presidential elections over the 10 years in question and how they have been used differently in designing election campaign strategies in the context of competence in election campaigning.

On the other hand, some scholars indicate that the level of professionalisation could differ between political parties even if every political party went through the process of professionalisation of election campaigning (Gibson and Römmele, 2002). This is because parties generally devote themselves to re-designing their campaign strategies based on their previous experiences as well as knowledge (Scammell, 1997; Negrine, 2007).

In the third chapter, this study explained about the South Korean case in order to provide detailed information that will help understand the research results. Therefore, political system, electoral system, and media system were explained, and, further, a brief explanation of the style of previous election campaigning in South Korea was described. The fourth chapter provided an explanation of the
research methodology. Accordingly, this chapter provides valuable information about the procedures of semi-structured interview, the list of interviewees, the research period and schedule, and further ethical consideration.

In the fifth chapter, the research questions and hypotheses were examined throughout the South Korean case. To recap, the research questions and hypotheses are as follows:

The external dimension of professionalisation of election campaigning

Q1. The adoption of new tools and intensification of existing methods:
What and how were differences in campaign activities accomplished by the utilisation of mass media and new campaign technology in each presidential election? Has it finally led to the alteration of campaign style? How have the Korean parties responded to these new tools of communication?

H1-1: Political parties will try to approach their work differently especially after an election defeat, including using contemporary communication technologies and campaigning practices.

H1-2: New campaign styles caused by media and campaign technology developments will therefore become more capital-intensive.

The internal dimension of professionalisation of election campaigning

Q2. The influx of campaign professionals:
What kind of campaign activities have campaign professionals performed in the presidential election campaigns between 1997 and 2007? How has the relationship between party personnel and campaign professionals changed?

H2: Political parties will try to increase the engagement of campaign professionals to improve their campaign strategies especially in the adoption of
new campaign skills and electoral environment.

H2-1: The hierarchy in decision-making for election campaigns will change from a top-down structure to a more flat hierarchy because of the growing influx of external campaign professionals.

Q3. The alteration of political parties as campaign organisations:
Does the increased influx of professional consultants into the party organisation result in centralisation of the party organisation? How have parties changed their organisation since the introduction of campaign professionals?

H3-1: Political parties will be centralised to manage their resources efficiently as well as effectively.

H3-2: Political parties will be focused on training their party personnel to be more ‘professional (or skilful)’ in the efficient management of mass media and new technology.

H3-3: Political parties will expand their organisation to deal with mass media and new technology, and will therefore concentrate investment on developing these departments within their organisation.

6.3. The summary of the results of this study

It might be true that, from a broader perspective, the changing role of the mass media in election campaigns in South Korea is not distinct from the role it has in Western countries, but two things are worthy of note: 1) the fact that the adoption of mass media has been quickly accomplished by parties in response to the rapid development and distribution of mass media;\(^{38}\) and 2) political parties seem to be

\(^{38}\) There were more negative than positive issues when televised political debates began in 1997, such as inexperienced presenters, the format of TV debates and the perception of the candidates, because of the lack of preparation. In fact, there were more than 100 televised discussions in
flexible in their initial attempts at dealing with new communication technology, despite severe campaign regulations. It cannot be denied that political developments such as regime transition and constitutional reform have created a new sphere of election campaigning amounting to a growth of the notion of the professionalisation of election campaigns. In addition to this, since the government allowed the liberalisation of mass media around the time of the 1987 presidential election, the election campaign strategies produced by political parties have been more professional than before. In other words, the alterations undergone by the socio-political environment, such as the high level of intense party competition caused by electoral reform, the extensive use of mass media by political parties, and the development of campaign technology, have accelerated the professionalisation of election campaigns in South Korea.

From a wider perspective and looking at a general trend among recent election campaigns, each party’s campaign strategies regarding the use of mass media seem to be similar. This may be because of the strict campaign regulations in Korea. In addition, it is becoming harder to discern differences between party campaign strategies, since the ultimate goal of every party is winning elections. Yet the process of creating a campaign is not similar among parties due to the many differences between them, such as party size, the mood of the party, historical achievements and party ideology. Moreover, it has been confirmed that the differences between parties regarding adoption of the Internet existed as far back as the 2002 presidential election. In the next sub-section, the results of two different dimensions of the professionalisation of election campaigns are presented in order to draw a conclusion and to lead to an in-depth discussion about the South Korean case.

1997 and, consequently, this had a negative effect on political parties. Afterwards, in 2002, candidates participated less in TV debates and, as a result, TV’s effect has decreased from when it was first introduced (You, 1997; Jeong, 2002).
6.3.1. The external dimension of professionalisation of election campaigning

There is no doubt that all parties address the problem of decline of party members and party support and try to find a new method of communication through which to interact with the voters. Moreover, it is true that parties are struggling more in dealing with modern technology, due to the lack of finance, especially in the election campaign period. Different from the past, the 2000 general election was the starting point of election campaigns using the Internet in earnest. Going beyond the simple opening of websites, political parties and candidates executed activities promoting voter participation including the operation of Internet broadcasting stations and the recruitment of Internet supporters and cyber press corps. This phenomenon is understood to be one of the attempts by the parties to increase the turnout of young voters, who are becoming increasingly uninterested in politics. Therefore, the emergence of the Internet in the 2002 presidential election as the best option for the parties has been very welcomed by them in terms of the enlargement of party communication methods at a lower price than the other methods.

As presented earlier, there is no doubt that the accelerated pace of technological advances in recent years has benefited parties in South Korea: the use of opinion polls, computerised systems and direct mail marketing has become standard practice. Similarly, these advances have also empowered voters by making possible the utilisation of a wide variety of communication channels through which to receive and transmit information according to their preferences. For these reasons, the parties and candidates at the centre of election campaigns have had to become experts in these sophisticated techniques and have also had to call on the assistance of professionals more and more (Agranoff, 1976; Butler and Ranney, 1992; Kavanagh, 1995; Mayhew, 1997; Lees-Marshment, 2001; Farrell and Schmitt-Beck, 2002; Plasser, 2002). The parties and candidates have been required to create competitive strategies within limited budgets, to mount campaigns that will successfully woo voters, and to use scientific approaches that
maximise resources as efficiently as possible in order to gain advantage (Agranoff, 1974), all of which require professional assistance.

Nonetheless, it is hard to say that the increased use of modern campaign technology and new media utilised by political parties has led to the alteration of party structure in South Korea. In addition, it is doubtful whether the endeavours of parties to adopt these modern campaign skills have consequently contributed to the revitalisation of voter political participation, as mentioned in many studies (Heinderyckx, 2010). That is, these attempts by the parties seem to stimulate the voters’ curiosity about something new, but it is still questionable whether they are connected to a gradual increase in political participation in Korea. This has been proven already through the comparison between the 1997 and 2007 presidential elections.

Taking all things presented in previous chapters into consideration, it can be surmised that there are differences in the speed of adoption of new media and campaign technology and the method of utilisation between the GNP and DP, although both parties seem to be similar in its adoption. In particular, it is true that GNP is a bit slower than DP in its adoption. As presented several times in interview transcripts, it turned out that the political elite’s culture in the DP has achieved the fast adoption of modern technology, although the GNP was in a better electoral environment such as having abundant party resources and good relationships with offline media especially newspaper companies, than the DP. In other words, although the GNP had adopted modern technology, their already good electoral environment meant that they did not show radical progress in the 1997 and 2002 presidential elections than DP.

After two failures in the presidential elections, the GNP has started to alter its party organisation and redefined its campaign strategy. In particular, since the 2002 presidential election, it turned out that the GNP has conducted a deep investigation about the reason for the failures and has thrown away its old
campaign style. This process is easy to find in other countries’ cases (see the UK case in Denver et al.’s research (2003)). As a result, it turned out that the GNP conducted a new style of campaigning in the 2007 presidential election compared to previous presidential elections, 1997 and 2002, although there is some criticism that the GNP’s campaign strategy seems to be similar to the DP’s campaigning in the 2002 presidential election, especially in the case of political TV advertising.

As indicated earlier, given that professionalisation of election campaigning can be defined as a continuous reviewing (learning) process of political parties reflecting on socio-political environments in order to create competitive election campaigning through the use of efficient campaign practices, it can be interpreted that the GNP’s campaigning has slowly professionalised whilst the DP’s one has tended to be de-professionalised. In the case of the DP, they built the best strategy by the adoption of new media and showed a new style of campaigning in the 1997 and 2002 presidential elections. However, it cannot be denied that they conducted a less successful campaign strategy in the strategic aspect and the utilisation of mass media in the 2007 presidential election compared to 2002, even though they were in a less favourable political situation than the GNP, as stated in the interview transcripts. Therefore, it can be said that the GNP has gradually been professionalised despite the slow speed whilst the DP has been de-professionalised in conducting election campaigns in the context of professionalisation of election campaigning. To be more precise, both parties have conducted media-intensified campaigns rather than scientific campaigns.

CP5 (campaign professional) agreed about the above and explained that the 2002 and the 2007 presidential election campaigns were ones that were solely focused on mass media. Continually, CP5 insisted that the establishment of a scientific campaign strategy cannot be measured by some kinds of criteria such as the question of the extent to which mass media was utilised more than before. In other words, scientific campaign styles should be accompanied by careful target segmentation through FGI (Focus Group Interview) and a market analysis. From
this point, CP5 argued that Korean campaigns tend to concentrate only on mass media strategy, such as which party adopts new media first, rather than on sophisticated campaign strategies through in-depth investigation, even though it would be possible to develop their campaign style with a scientific approach based on the great improvement of mass media and technology from the 1997 to the 2007 presidential election.

It is clear that Korean election campaign strategy has been transformed by heavy reliance on especially mass media and campaign technologies and increased employment of campaign professionals and specialist advisors by political parties. However, this seems to lead to a serious gap between major and minor parties rather than between GNP and DP. In addition to this, it is true that Korean election campaigns have been capital-intensive rather than labour-intensive. Strictly speaking, there seems to be a transition period from capital-intensive to labour-intensive. Although the Public Official Election Law has been revised with the purpose of preventing parties spending huge budgets on their campaigns in order to mobilise people, this has led parties to spend more money on the creation of effective campaign strategies using new technology. Since Korean parties think that the fundamental initiative in designing campaign strategy is to find out how to mobilise people and to encourage them to vote, they seem to adopt more methods in order to maximise voter engagement. This also means that parties should invest their budgets into sectors that they had not considered previously, such as the employment of campaign professionals and the more frequent use of opinion polls. In other words, they have only to spend their money when rallying great support for their campaigning.

Taking all things into consideration, it can be said that professionalisation of Korean election campaigns is on-going because each party has tried to adopt new campaign practices in a more efficient way. However, due to strict campaign regulations in South Korea, this finally led to the situation that parties cannot invest money into designing competitive campaign strategies through the liberal
use of mass media and campaign technology. Secondly, the labour market industry, especially with regard to campaign professionals, has not yet stabilised in South Korea like in the USA. For this reason, some campaign activities should rely on commercial companies that are not in the political arena.

6.3.2. The internal dimension of professionalisation of election campaigning

It is revealed that parties have increased the number of campaign professionals to adopt new campaign practices. Korean elections, especially major ones such as the presidential election, have been heavily dominated by political elites inside party organisations, no matter how many campaign professionals have been engaged or how much political parties need their help. Although their relationship might be better based on a party’s growing recognition of the essential needs of campaign professionals, party elites still seem to think of them as part-time campaign assistants who give technical help in designing election campaigns. Furthermore, it turns out that the relationship between campaign staffers in party organisations as insiders and campaign professionals as outsiders is more sensitive than the relationship between political elites and campaign professionals.

To be specific, political elites played important roles in controlling all campaign activities in the 1997 presidential election. It cannot be denied that there have been high numbers of external campaign professionals employed since the first establishment of political TV advertising and the beginning era of media-centralised democracy. However, there were some differences in the formation of election camp and party official organisation. In the case of the DP (MDP), they formed campaign organisations with key politicians, relatives, and campaign professionals who have a deep and lasting relationship with a candidate. On the other hand, the GNP hired campaign professionals who have a deep relationship with the candidate rather than with the party organisation. Although it is true that both parties hired campaign professionals in the same manner, the major difference is that candidate Kim Dae-joong of the MDP controlled the party
organisation and his private camp at the same time whilst candidate Lee Hoi-chang of the GNP could not control his party organisation efficiently due to internal discord (Kwon, 2003). Accordingly, the relationship between Lee’s private camp and his party’s official organisation was not good, and this finally led to a failure in the election at that time. Perhaps these side effects in the 1997 presidential election would be understood as happening due to the transition period from a labour-intensive campaign style, which concentrates on mobilisation of voters, to a capital-intensive campaign style, which focused on the utilisation of mass media and new technology. In addition to this, two main factors, e.g. political elite’s low level of knowledge of media logic and campaign professionals’ low level of understanding of political issues, produced these results.

Moving onto the 2002 presidential election, the significant feature is that there was a high degree of participation of voters to help campaigning for candidate Rho of the DP, although there were no differences in the use of campaign professionals between the two parties. Therefore, it cannot be said that the increased use of campaign professionals in the 2002 and the 2007 presidential elections compared to the 1997 presidential election led to election success. Nonetheless, it is true that the role and scope of campaign professionals has gradually expanded more than in previous presidential elections. Furthermore, the main reason why parties are hiring many campaign professionals is because they do not know how to manage this development themselves: the adaptation of telecommunications for election campaigning is happening too rapidly for parties to manage it themselves (Sun, 2009).

Related to the alteration of the relationship between parties and campaign professionals, Kolodny and Logan’s study (1998), as explained earlier, concludes that the relationship between parties and campaign professionals, especially campaign consultants in the USA, has changed from allied view to adversarial view through the analysis of surveys and interviews with 341 political consultants. In the case of South Korea, it can be said that the relationship
between parties and campaign professionals has differed according to type and role of campaign professionals. For example, it is researched that the relationship with some campaign professionals who engage in production of political advertising and polls has altered from allied view to adversarial view. In particular, the relationship with campaign professionals who take charge of polls has clearly transformed from allied to adversarial view given that parties have continued to contract poll work to reputable poll companies and parties have wanted to utilise the results of polls to comprehend their actual position, like a market survey in commercial industry.

Unlike the work related to polls, in the case of production of political advertisements, it turns out that the role of internal party campaign staffers was limited in the 2007 election compared to the 1997 election. Although these changes in the role of internal party campaign staffers are clearly shown on the surface, it is true that the role of campaign professionals has increased more than that of internal party campaign staffers. That is, internal party campaign staffers give advice related to political matters, such as campaign regulations, campaign professionals who come from commercial industry do not know whilst campaign professionals concentrate on the production of political advertising. Perhaps it is because parties need modernistic as well as sophisticated skills to court voters since political advertising has had a more image-centralised than issue-centralised focus from the 2002 election onwards. Given this, it may imply that the relationship with campaign professionals who engage in the production of political advertising has continued to change from allied view to adversarial view.

In particular, political elites who take charge of important PR tasks have become professionalised in dealing with mass media through their experiences. In addition to this, it has turned out that the power of political elites in Korean parties is still higher than that of campaign professionals. Interestingly, the numbers of political elites who have experienced elections or have deep knowledge in dealing with mass media and campaign technology have increased, rather than there being an increased number of campaign professionals
participating in elections. In effect, until the 1997 presidential election, key members amongst party elites were composed of a few politicians who had a high reputation with voters or had built a good career in the field of politics. However, since the 2002 presidential election, they are considered as key members of the campaign committee if they have good skills in managing election campaigns, regardless of their age and political career.

On the other hand, in the case of minor parties, almost all campaign professionals were volunteers or the parties got some help from their party members. What is more, the definition of campaign professionals seems to differ between the major and minor parties. Major parties have paid campaign professionals, even if some campaign professionals, such as academics and advisers who have high-ranking positions in the commercial area, are not paid.

Last but not least, it is hard to say that Korean parties have transformed their structure into the type of political party such as electoral-professional party due to the increase in the influx of campaign professionals into party organisations. Although there was some alteration of party organisation such as establishment of new PR teams and expansion of the role of PR teams, it cannot be seen that Korean party structure has altered to a new form. CP4 noted:

'It may be possible that the engagements of campaign professionals and commercial companies will continue to increase in the future because it cannot be denied that parties cannot deal with all campaign activities especially in modern society. However, I do not think that those external campaign professionals will take over the role that internal party campaign staffers have done. … However, rather, it may be highly possible that internal party campaign staffers do their job such as mobilisation of voters and we [campaign professionals] do our job such as providing technical supports.'
(Interview transcript, CP4)

In addition to this, CP4 insist that Korean parties are not campaign parties because the level of internal party campaign staffers’ knowledge about media logic is not as high as or at least the same as external campaign professionals'.
Accordingly, it might be possible for Korean parties to change into a new form, but this may take a long time.

6.4. Limitations and suggestions for future studies

This research has investigated the phenomenon of professionalisation of election campaigning in South Korea over 10 years. To do this, the study was divided into two dimensions of professionalisation of election campaigning - the external and the internal. Although this thesis has tried to deal with the historical alteration of election campaigning in South Korea in the perspective of professionalisation, it is not enough to cover all matters related to election campaigning. Therefore, in presenting limitations and some suggestions for future studies it will be worth developing the concept of professionalisation of election campaign studies.

6.4.1. Limitations of semi-structured interviews

First of all, this research has a general limitation that many qualitative studies explain. As stated earlier, the results that were analysed and explained in this study were obtained from the interview materials from many in-depth interviews. Given two facts - that the time of the interviews was at the end of 2011 and the targeted elections for this research were 1997, 2002, and 2007 - it cannot be denied that almost all of the interviewees had limited memories of previous election campaigns. Although interviewees could remember some important matters and could offer an explanation of the general trends about election campaigns in a broad sense, this research may omit some important matters that need to be analysed for the South Korean case.

Secondly, this research investigated the relationship between internal party campaign staffers and the campaign professionals. As explained in chapter 5 and earlier in this one, politicians have more authority in the management of election
campaigns than do campaign professionals in South Korea. Although an attempt was made to interview politicians who were official members of campaign organisations of political parties between the 1997 and 2007 presidential election, they all rejected the opportunity. Alternatively, their aides (politicians’ secretaries) were interviewed. Thus, there are some limitations to gaining a fuller picture of the inside story that can support the results of this research.

Thirdly, there is also a limit to the amount of information interviewees gave. As noted earlier by one of the interviewees, Korean political parties tend to be reluctant to expose their political matters. Naturally, interviewees were sensitive about being asked some questions related to political or party matters and they avoided answering.

6.4.2. Suggestions for future studies

The structure of party organisation and party elites’ culture

As explained throughout this thesis, factors such as political elites’ culture and the structure of party organisation are important elements of investigating the professionalisation of election campaigning. For instance, despite the GNP’s abundant party resources and the stability of their organisation structure in the 1997 and the 2002 presidential election, they were unable to win the presidential elections in these years. Conversely, inferiority of the DP’s electoral environment compared to that of the GNP led to strong strengthening of party organisation until the 2002 presidential election, and finally, it led to DP’s success in 1997 and 2002 presidential election.

It is difficult to say with certainty that the changes in campaign strategies of the major South Korean parties were driven by changes in the media environment and the rise of new communication technologies. As stated in chapter 5, there is
evidence that changing media environments and the emergence of new communication technologies are in themselves not sufficient to understand processes of professionalisation in election campaign. Instead, we have to pay attention to the culture of party organisation, especially the culture of political elites who interpret the changing environment and play a key role in determining how to respond to these change. Thus, it is important to consider party organisation factors for further studies in analysing the notion of professionalisation of election campaigns.

Moreover, contrary to the assumption that major parties, especially those with abundant party resources, would display a higher degree of professionalisation than minor parties because the utilisation of new media and new campaign technology is expensive (Gibson and Römmele, 2009), this research showed that minor parties tend to be professionalised more quickly than major parties in the utilisation of new campaign communications, especially digital media. As an interviewee of the DLP1 noted, the lack of party finance has led to a situation where internal party campaign staffers have become professionals in dealing with new campaign technologies because they have to consider how to conduct their campaign strategy efficiently within limited budgets. In addition, a small number of party campaign staffers and political elites seem to find it easy to achieve agreement in designing election campaigning due to the simplification of the decision process in smaller parties. Accordingly, if the concept of professionalisation is defined as a party process to review and redefine campaign strategies to achieve the final aim of winning electoral majorities, as proposed by this thesis’s conceptualisation of professionalisation of election campaign, minor parties would have a high level of professionalisation of election campaigning although their ability to utilise cutting-edge technology is restricted compared to major parties. This underlines the assumption that political parties with a more progressive party culture would tend to responsive to the changing electoral environment. Therefore, future scholarship is encouraged to compare minor and major parties, and the specific role of party organisational factors in the choice of campaign strategies.
Suggestions for comparative studies

As stated earlier, many scholars have suggested that similar changes to election campaigns take place around the world, in spite of differences in political and electoral systems (Mancini and Swanson, 1994; Mair, Müller and Plasser, 2004; Schafferer, 2006). It is true that many countries demonstrate similar features and common concerns in the evolution of their election campaigns, although the extent and pace of this evolution varies widely. So far, the focus of comparative studies has been mainly on investigating the similarities and differences of campaign practices caused by fundamental changes in social and technical developments.

In addition, according to the burgeoning literature on new trends in election campaigning, there have been many cross-national studies that investigate the changes in campaign practices associated with the theories of Americanisation, Modernisation, Political Marketing and Professionalisation in Western countries. However, analysis of these theories focuses almost exclusively on Western rather than Asian countries.

Conversely, there are only a few comparative studies on election campaign in the Asian region, and even less attention has been paid to the effect of professionalised election campaigning on party organisation in this region. As noted earlier, Schafferer’s (2006) work is the only recent monograph on the subject. For instance, his work focuses mainly on identifying and describing the general changes shown in the election campaigns of seven selected Asian countries – Taiwan, South Korea, Mongolia, Japan, Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines. However, his approach is based on the issue of standardising campaign practices, as exemplified in the works of Plasser and Plasser (2002), rather than identifying the differences that exist between parties within each of these countries in analysing professionalisation of election campaigns.
In fact, the main aim of comparative studies on Asian countries is to test the applicability of Western campaign models in non-Western contexts, assuming that Western countries that are undergoing social and technological changes have already formulated effective strategies to deal with these changes, ahead of those in Asia. However, this approach fails to take into account the economic, cultural and political differences between the West and Asia. Therefore, future comparative research should investigate election campaigning in Asia as cases in their own right, rather than as variations of, or deviations from, a pre-existing Western model.

In particular, according to many scholars (Bartels, 1992; Norris, 2000), economic level is closely related to the development of technology and social systems, and political and electoral systems directly influence election campaign strategy styles and even the degree of professionalisation in each country's campaigns (Schafferer, 2006). Moreover, as highlighted in many previous studies regarding the evolution of election campaign practices, the spread of new media is taken into account because the pattern of change in campaigns is closely associated with the advance of media and technologies, with the Internet being highlighted as a major medium for campaigns. Moreover, the range of campaign activities is one of main factors that activate a professionalised campaign. Therefore, considering economic levels, political and electoral systems, new media systems and the current levels of communication technologies, this research suggests the Taiwan case is especially shown to amongst all other countries to have a similar system as that of South Korea as can be seen in table 6.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>The use of skilled experts</th>
<th>Campaign activities</th>
<th>New media system</th>
<th>Political System</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Taiwan</strong></td>
<td>Yes (Internal and external)</td>
<td>Opinion polling TV Ads</td>
<td>TV, The Internet</td>
<td>Unicameral Plurality (5 years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South Korea</strong></td>
<td>Yes (Internal and external)</td>
<td>Opinion polling TV Ads</td>
<td>TV, The Internet</td>
<td>Unicameral Plurality (4 years)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Source from Schafferer (2006)
For example, both South Korea and Taiwan have similar historical records, which the ruling parties have changed twice times between the 20th and 21st century. This is indicative of the similar changes in party organisation needed for overcoming historical electoral defeat from the perspective of the party-centred professionalised campaign. In addition, both countries have presented resembling political issues such as military issues and in the long-term, one party control in politics (Wang, 1994). Given this, comparative studies between Asian countries that have had similar historical changes in electoral systems, as well as the development of mass media and technology, will be worth using in the development of professionalisation theory by providing pertinent cases.
References

Books, Journals, and dissertations

Adoni, H. 1979. The function of mass media in the political socialization of Adolescents. Communication Research, 6(1), p.84-106.


247


Newspapers and Magazines


# APPENDIX A. Campaign regulation in South Korea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provision</th>
<th>Contents of amendment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Article 8 and 8-5</td>
<td>Internet newspapers under the Act on the Guarantee of Freedom and Functions of Newspapers, etc. are included in Internet media companies under the Public Office Election Law, and Internet media companies are regulated to be fair in reporting and criticizing political parties’ platforms, policies, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 8-6</td>
<td>Internet Election News Deliberation Commission investigates the fairness of election news carried by Internet media companies, and may order the insertion of corrected news if the contents of news are considered unfair.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 64</td>
<td>The poster used in election campaigns should contain picture/name/number/name of the party/career of the candidate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 65</td>
<td>Candidates can publish a booklet with not more than 16 pages for the campaign.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 70 (Advertisement)</td>
<td>For the campaign, the candidate can make election advertisement regarding policies of the party and opinions of the candidate about specific issues using television and radio. Each advertisement, however, cannot exceed one minute.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 71 (Candidates' and Others' Speech)</td>
<td>It is allowed within 11 times per television and radio respectively. The candidate or supporters that the candidate appoints can make speeches on TV or radio within 20 minutes per time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 73 (Candidates' Career)</td>
<td>KBS should broadcast picture/name/number/age/the political party, job and other major career of the candidate that election committee of the electorate provides up to twice per candidate during election campaign period. More than 8 times in presidential election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 82-6</td>
<td>When an Internet media company provides bulletin boards, chatting rooms, etc. on its Internet website during an election campaign period so that site visitors may post articles supporting or opposing specific political parties or candidates, it should verify the real name of the writers by a real name verification method provided by the Minister of Government Administration and Home Affairs, and delete articles without the mark of 'real name verification.'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 82-7</td>
<td>A candidate who wants to do Internet advertising should report the Election Management Committee in the corresponding election district of the name of the Internet media company, the period of advertising, the cost of advertising, etc. in writing including the advertisement manuscript and a copy of the advertisement contract before the date of advertising.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 108</td>
<td>No Internet media company is allowed to announce, quote or report the process and results of opinion polls forecasting support to a political party or the successful candidate from 6 days before the election day until the voting is over on the election day.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX B. The historical changes of political advertising legislation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presidential election</th>
<th>Contents of laws related to political advertising</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **13th (1987)**      | · A political party (or candidate) (can advertise political views, the political party's platforms and policies, etc. in daily newspapers 3 times or less / the regulation on the number of daily newspapers in each advertisement was removed.)  
                      · The size of advertisement is width 37cm×height 17cm (full-size advertisement allowed) |
| **14th (1992)**      | · Newspaper advertisement (A political party or candidate can advertise in each newspaper 4 times or less during the election campaign period)  
                      The size of broadcasting advertisement is width 37cm×height 17cm (full-size advertisement allowed)  
                      · Broadcasting advertisement (5 times or less in each television and radio station during the election campaign period)  
                      · The length of each advertisement time cannot exceed a minute. |
| **15th (1997)–Present** | · Newspaper advertisement of election campaign (Article 69 of the Act on the Election of Public Officials and the Prevention of Election Malpractices)  
                           · A political party or candidate can advertise 70 times or less after candidate registration until 2 days before the election day.  
                           · The size of advertisement width 37 cm×height 17 cm (full-size advertisement allowed)  
                           · One advertisement in a daily newspaper is counted as one advertisement.  
                           · Broadcasting advertisement of election campaign (Article 70 of the Act on the Election of Public Officials and the Prevention of Election Malpractices)  
                           A political party or candidate can advertise 30 times or less in each television and radio station.  
                           The length of each advertisement time cannot exceed a minute / Rebroadcasting is also included in counting.  
                           · (Restriction of) newspaper advertisement of platforms and policies (Article 137 of the Act on the Election of Public Officials and the Prevention of Election Malpractices)  
                           In case of an election resulting from the expiration of term, a total of 50 or less advertisements can be made in daily newspapers from 120 days before the election day to the day starting the election period / Contents of election campaign cannot be included. |
APPENDIX C. Semi-structured Interview guide

1. General questions about the changes in election campaigning in South Korea:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Variable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Which year did you participate in presidential election campaigning? And which party were you in? What was your role?</td>
<td>General information about an interviewee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What kinds of campaigning activities did you take charge of while in election campaign commission (camp)?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>It is often mentioned that media is the most important factor in the management of election campaigning nowadays, how much do you agree with it or how do think about this? (According to an answer) Can you give me any examples of this?</td>
<td>Media-oriented election campaigning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Which ones do you think are a main factor in influencing the change of election campaigning strategy in each of the presidential elections?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. The external dimension – the use of mass media and campaign communication technology:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Variable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.1 What kinds of media have been used for election campaign over 10 years?</td>
<td>The use of media and new media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Any changes? Any differences in its use</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.2 How do parties use new media such as the Internet?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- How has it changed?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- What are the biggest differences between each election?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- What do you think the advantages/disadvantages of the use of these new media during election campaign?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Questions</td>
<td>Variable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 2.1 | What kinds of activities using ‘new’ communication technologies have been performed in each of the presidential elections?
<p>| - | Which area (ex. Media or campaign strategies or technical support or advertising or public opinion, telemarketing, direct mail) | The use of campaign technology |
| - | Why has it adopted? Who made the decision of adoption? |
| - | If a party used it in a different way, how? And why? |
| 2.2 | How many times do you send e-mail subscription newsletters (telemarketing/direct mails) to voters? |
| - | (If parties send e-mail newsletter and direct mails/ conduct telemarketing), how many times did the party do? How has it performed? |
| - | Do you think it is effective to send party information in e-mail or newsletters, whatever, to voters? |
| 2.3 | Do you have a computerised database? |
| - | How often do you use it? (Frequent/occasional use/none) |
| - | Do you refer to it for target segmentation? |
| - | How do you manage or develop it? |
| 2.4 | How does the party use the results of opinion polls? |
| - | Have the polls been conducted by external professionals from a private poll company? |
| - | Do you have a campaign professional who can conduct polls in the party organisation or private camp? |
| 2.5 | Does the party have an internal intranet communication system? |
| - | Since when? How has it operated? |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Variable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 3      | 3.1 What kinds of campaign activities were performed in each of the presidential elections?  
- Which area (ex. media or campaign strategies or technical support or advertising or public opinion)  
- How many people were mobilised for that? (ex. Amount of political consultants and party staff)  
- Degree of investment  
- Differences (if an interviewee participated in two or three campaigning management), if yes, why?  
- The most effective area amongst campaign activities in which the party invested. Why?  
- The less effective area, why?  
- How the party managed professional groups if they had to? | The alteration of campaign activities                                      |
| 4      | 4.1 Has party expenditure increased in presidential election campaigning?  
- If yes, why?  
- How much did the party spend in utilising mass media and new technology?  
- The level of effectiveness in the consideration of parties’ investment | The alteration of campaign style                                          |
|        | 4.2 What was the parties’ main consideration when spending their budget in presidential election campaigning? Any differences? If yes, why?            |                                                                          |
3. The internal dimension - the influx of campaign professionals and the alteration of campaign organisation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Variable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1      | 1.1 What is the role of campaign professionals in each presidential election campaigns?  
- What area  
The degree of power of campaign professionals to decide campaign activities  
Who has the final decision of control over all campaign activities?  
Any differences between each election?  
In general, when did you join private camp?  
1.2 What was your previous work experience in relation to election campaigning? (Just ask for campaign professionals)  
If an interviewee worked for a party, which department were you in?  
What role has this experience played in your current career?  
If an interviewee did not work for a party, what was your role? (Political affiliations, government, communication or journalism, private sector, public sector, other etc.)  
1.3 In general, it is often argued that political parties are employing more campaign professionals to deal with the ongoing electoral environment. Do you agree? | The role of campaign professionals |
| 2      | 2.1 How was the relationship between party staff and external staff such as campaign professionals?  
How does the organisation of parties transformed in response?  
Do you think the power relationship between party and campaign professionals has been changed go through each presidential election from 1997 to 2007? | The relationship between campaign professionals and political parties |
| 2    | Degree of change (increasing/ as same as/ decreasing)  
|      | - Any examples?  
| 2.2  | What do you think how much you are familiar with (or have a deep relationship with) party organisation? (Just ask for campaign professionals)  
|      | What functions do political parties perform better than campaign professionals? (Just ask for campaign professionals)  
|      | What functions do campaign professionals perform better than political parties? (Just ask for internal party campaign staffers)  
| 2.3  | What is the role of party staff inside the party organisation in presidential election campaigns? Any differences between each election?  
| 2.4  | Do you have any training courses about how to deal with mass media and campaign technology for internal party campaign staffers to make them more “professional”?  
|      | (If yes)  
|      | What kind of training, what is the purpose of such training  
|      | Effectiveness?  
|      | Benefits  
|      | (If no)  
|      | Why? Future plan?  
| 3    | 3.1 How do party organisations manage to prepare presidential election campaigning?  
|      | - Any differences over the last 10 years?  
|      | - How was the relationship between central party (headquarters) and the local party during the presidential elections? Do you think there is a clear boundary between them (asking about his opinion of it)?  
|      | The alteration of management of party organisation |
In general, political parties in South Korea are especially characterised by a propensity of local party according to the party leader’s native place. So were there any differences in the management of the local party over 10 years?

3.2 What kinds of activities does the local party normally participate in during a presidential election campaign?

- How was the list of local party membership managed?

- Since the revision of electoral law (electoral reform) in 2004, what are the advantages and disadvantage for political parties? Since then, how has the party managed their local party? What has been the biggest difference compared to before?
Appendix D. Method of analysis of interview data set

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The use of media and campaign communication technologies (DMCT)</th>
<th>Coding</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Analysis Unit</td>
<td>Coding</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Use of media</td>
<td>DMCT-UM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Use of campaign technologies</td>
<td>DMCT-ACT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opinion polling</td>
<td>DMCT-OP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telemarketing</td>
<td>DMCT-TELE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct mail</td>
<td>DMCT-DM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intranet system</td>
<td>DMCT-INTRA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-mail subscription newsletter</td>
<td>DMCT-EMAIL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside of campaign headquarters</td>
<td>DMCT-HEADQ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuous campaign</td>
<td>DMCT-CONTINUE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computerised databases</td>
<td>DMCT-DATABASE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition research</td>
<td>DMCT-OR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Labour vs. Capital intensive</td>
<td>DMCT-LC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>DMCT-LI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>DMCT-LC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Finance</td>
<td>DMCT-PF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The use of campaign professionals in election campaign (UCP)</th>
<th>UCP-ROLE CP</th>
<th>UCP-RCP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Role of campaign professionals</td>
<td>UCP-ROLE CP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) The relationship between CP/PARTY</td>
<td>UCP-RCP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The alteration of party organisation (APO)</th>
<th>APO-ROLE PARTY</th>
<th>APO-SE</th>
<th>APO-PEP</th>
<th>APO-EC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) The role of political party as</td>
<td>APO-ROLE PARTY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign organisation</td>
<td>APO-SE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Centralisation vs. Decentralisation</td>
<td>APO-PEP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Professional electoral party</td>
<td>APO-EC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Additional unit for further discussions</th>
<th>CR</th>
<th>DPROF</th>
<th>PFA</th>
<th>UD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Campaign regulations</td>
<td>CR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Discussion of Professionalised election campaign</td>
<td>DPROF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Party final aim</td>
<td>PFA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Useful discussions</td>
<td>UD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>