BRADFORD'S MUSLIM COMMUNITIES AND THE REPRODUCTION AND REPRESENTATION OF ISLAM

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This thesis studies the creation of Bradford's Muslim communities, in particular the impact of migration on Islamic identity. To this end it begins by mapping the contours of Islamic expression in South Asia, especially the development of distinct maslak, discrete schools of Islamic thought and practice. These were, in part, a response to the imposition of British imperialism in India. The settlers from South Asia also came from a variety of areas, with their own histories, regional languages and cultures. The ethos and character of Islam, which is shared by different sects, is studied unself-consciously at work in the establishment of Muslim communities in Bradford, generating separate residential zones and a network of businesses and institutions, religious and cultural, developed to service their specific needs. The leadership, resources and ethos which the different maslak could draw on, and the institutions they created to reproduce the Islamic tradition in the city are explored and the extent to which these connect with the new cultural and linguistic world of young British Muslims. Attention is then focused on the education, status, functions and influence of the 'ulama, critical carriers of the Islamic tradition in this new context. The role of the Bradford Council for Mosques is examined both as a bearer of the Islamic impulse to unity, transcending the regional, linguistic and sectarian differences, and as an emerging authority, locally and nationally. The study concludes by exploring the challenges facing Muslims - youth, gender, intellectual tradition, and da'wa, invitation to Islam - as British expressions of Islam struggle to birth.

ABSTRACT

This thesis studies the creation of Bradford's Muslim communities, in particular the impact of migration on Islamic identity. To this end it begins by mapping the contours of Islamic expression in South Asia, especially the development of distinct maslak, discrete schools of Islamic thought and practice. These were, in part, a response to the imposition of British imperialism in India. The settlers from South Asia also came from a variety of areas, with their own histories, regional languages and cultures. The ethos and character of Islam, which is shared by different sects, is studied unself-consciously at work in the establishment of Muslim communities in Bradford, generating separate residential zones and a network of businesses and institutions, religious and cultural, developed to service their specific needs. The leadership, resources and ethos which the different maslak could draw on, and the institutions they created to reproduce the Islamic tradition in the city are explored and the extent to which these connect with the new cultural and linguistic world of young British Muslims. Attention is then focused on the education, status, functions and influence of the 'ulama, critical carriers of the Islamic tradition in this new context. The role of the Bradford Council for Mosques is examined both as a bearer of the Islamic impulse to unity, transcending the regional, linguistic and sectarian differences, and as an emerging authority, locally and nationally. The study concludes by exploring the challenges facing Muslims - youth, gender, intellectual tradition, and da'wa, invitation to Islam - as British expressions of Islam struggle to birth.
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INTRODUCTION

AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

This thesis is a contribution to the Community Religions Project (CRP) conducted under the auspices of the Department of Theology and Religious Studies at the University of Leeds. The CRP proved a congenial and appropriate context for a thesis concerned to explore the contours of Islamic identity as they were emerging within the consolidating Muslim communities of Bradford. This involved a consideration of the impact of migration both as a precipitant of community formation and as generating a new problematic of reproducing the Islamic tradition in an alien environment. The enormity of the task facing Muslims can be realised when it is remembered that the majority of settlers were possessed of little formal education and came from rural areas in South Asia where Islam was the majority religion. Thirty years later their children and grandchildren are British, urban and educated in a context where they are a religious minority. The task of transmission and appropriation of a religious tradition in such a context, a dynamic process involving change and continuity, is the focus of the thesis.

While this task conforms to two of the three declared aims of CRP I hope that it will incidentally contribute an illuminating case-study to clarify 'the relationship between religion and ethnicity', the third concern of the project (Knott, 1984, p.6). Here 'religious studies' as a discrete field of study, albeit multidisciplinary drawing on the humanities and increasingly the social sciences, has a particular contribution to make (Smart, 1990, Knott, 1992). It can complement the works of social scientists who traditionally in their studies of Bradford either focus on one 'ethnic' community, usually the Mirpuris, or use categories of nationality - Pakistani - as an organising principle (Dahya, 1974, Khan, 1977). Such works have 'failed to provide plausible accounts of the role and significance of religions...in the lives of the groups they have described' (Knott, 1992, pp. 4-5). A 'religious studies' perspective is more alert to the commonalities across ethnic boundaries generated by a shared faith. Such solidarities are often given organisational and
institutional expression, locally, nationally and internationally. These networks and trans-national links can often escape the attention of the sociologist and social anthropologist when focusing on one ethnic minority. This is particularly the case in social science disciplines which are still inclined to view 'religion as the passive instrument of ethnic identity' (ibid., p. 12).

My own interest in Islam in South Asia and the challenge facing Muslim communities in Bradford is rooted in two facts. Firstly, I spent six enjoyable years in Pakistan at the Christian Studies Centre, an ecumenical institute committed to improving Christian-Muslim relations in a country where Christians number three or four per cent of the population. For three years as a research student and then a further three years as a member of staff I had the opportunity to study Islamic belief and practice variously expressed in a modern Muslim state. The focus of my research was contemporary, lived Islam. This experience has confirmed for me the contention that 'nobody can now write with meaning about the world of Islam if he does not bring to it some sense of a living relationship with those of whom he writes' (Hourani, 1991, p. 4). I also began to understand the feelings and anxieties of a religious minority, in this case Pakistani Christians.

The second fact is that after leaving the Christian Study Centre I began working for the Anglican diocese of Bradford in 1985. As an Adviser on Inter-faith Issues I was able to develop my interest in Christian-Muslim relations in the city, a situation where Muslims are in the minority and share many of the fears and anxieties of Christians in Pakistan. The research for this thesis was formally undertaken between 1988 and 1992. This period represents a watershed in the developing identity of the Muslim communities locally and nationally. It includes both The Satanic Verses affair and the Gulf crisis when Muslims became the focus of unprecedented media interest and suspicion. My hope is that this thesis, by documenting the diversity and debate within the Muslim communities in Bradford, will contribute to exploding the myth of the supposed existence of a monolithic, undifferentiated 'fundamentalist' Islam. In this way I
will begin to discharge my debt to Muslim friends in the city without whose active co-operation I could not have written the thesis.

METHODOLOGY AND PERSPECTIVES INFORMING RESEARCH

Religious studies remains eclectic in its methodology and ethos. Each researcher inevitably borrows from a variety of disciplines in so far as they promise to illuminate the chosen field of study. I have drawn particularly on history, Islamics and social sciences. A distinguished historian of Islam has stressed the importance of studying societies in terms of their institutional systems since ‘an institution encompasses at once an activity, a pattern of social relationships, and a set of mental constructs’ (Lapidus, 1988, preface). The thesis clearly bears the impress of this advice.

One exciting frontier from which I have learned much is that of Islamic studies and anthropology; its focus on the study of Islam in local contexts has generated many useful perspectives (Martin, 1982). This formulation seeks to marry the horizon of textual studies, dear to historians and philologists, with that of ethnographic studies of localised expressions of Islam produced by the anthropologists. By attending to the carriers and interpreters of texts in contemporary contexts it was possible to escape the pull of a two-tiered model of religion which divided religionists between the literate few, bearers of the 'great' tradition and the uninformed many, embodiments of the 'little' or 'folk' tradition (Eickelman, 1982). This two-tiered model — rooted in the baneful influence of David Hume's *The Natural History of Religion* written in the 1750s (Brown, 1982, pp. 3-21) — blinds us to the practices which are shared by the elite and non-elite and the dynamic interaction between text, interpreter and changing context.

If Islam is not to be reduced to an ahistoric essentialism nor atomised into infinitely plastic constellations of beliefs and practices research has to be rooted in Muslim communities. The interface between Muslim communities and wider society is where what is "traditional" in Islam is necessarily subject to ongoing debate and interpretation... the crucial issue is to elicit the implicit and explicit criteria as to why one interpretation of
Islam is considered more normative than others at particular times and places thus integrally relating (Islam) to both (its) carriers and contexts (Eickelman, 1982, p12).

Like other researchers I have had recourse to anthropological methods of participant-observer when studying phenomena not amenable to historical-philological methods. I have also assimilated in a weak sense the perspective and methodology of the practitioners of the phenomenology of religions in which the researcher's judgments about value and truth of the religious data under investigation are deliberately suspended (epoche). I see the ideals embodied under the term epoche as admirable when it comes to mapping and seeking to understand the diversity of belief and practice with which one is confronted (Sharpe in Open University, 1977, pp. 78-82). However, I am less sure that personal convictions can be so easily put into parenthesis. The debate and diversity within Muslim communities, not least on sensitive issues of religious freedom, gender, participation in the mainstream institutional life of society and what counts as an appropriate education for 'ulama already evokes strong passions within the Muslim communities. In seeking to describe such charged issues the researcher's personal preferences will inevitably show. I can only hope that mine do not effect the clarity with which I have sought to explain positions with which personally I have little sympathy.

RESEARCH STRATEGIES AND FIELDWORK

By the time I formally began research I was already involved in a number of organisations and forums where Muslims were active. These included the Community Relations Council - renamed Racial Equality Council in 1991 - Concord, a local inter-faith group, the Standing Consultative Committee for Religious Education - later metamorphosed into the Standing Advisory Council for Religious Education (SACRE) - and the management of the Inter-Faith Education Centre, an innovative local authority initiative to provide resource personnel from all the city's religious communities to implement an agreed r.e. syllabus to which all faith communities subscribed. In the impersonal jargon of the social scientist these arenas provided me with key
'respondents' with whom I was already working on issues of education, equality of opportunities and racial justice.

In these organisations I made contact with Muslims active in local politics and the Bradford Council for Mosques. I want to put on record the support which the leadership of the Council for Mosques extended to me and without which I could not have completed a survey of Bradford's mosques and supplementary schools. The leadership was always courteous, patient and unfailingly helpful with my many questions and interviews, formal and informal. I also found that the fact that I was a practising Christian was an asset rather than a liability. As an Adviser on Inter-Faith Issues I was also directly involved as a participant in Muslim-Christian relations during The Satanic Verses affair and the Gulf crisis, of which I have written elsewhere (Lewis, in press).

My research was also helped by visiting Azad Kashmir and Attock in 1989 as part of a three week study tour involving twelve Christians and Muslims from Bradford. We visited the areas from which the majority of Bradford's Muslim settlers came and enjoyed their hospitality. We were particularly fortunate in Azad Kashmir to be hosted by Pir Maroof Hussain Shah, a distinguished religious leader in Bradford. Although I had earlier spent six years in Pakistan I had not before visited Azad Kashmir. This visit confirmed for me the strong on-going links between these areas in Pakistan and Bradford.

Clearly in research of this sort gender is a limiting factor. As Barton found in his study of the Bengali community of Bradford Muslims any non-Muslim researcher has to respect the constraints of purdah (Barton, 1981, pp.10-12). Therefore, this thesis inevitably largely reflects the world and concerns of Muslim men. However, a decade after Barton's research the situation is changing quite dramatically with increasing numbers of educated young Muslim women entering the job market. Recent research by the Policy Studies Institute indicates that 34% of the 16-24 year old women from Pakistani backgrounds are now working as against 13% for the 45-64 year-olds (Jones, 1993, p.88). This has meant that I have been able to interview some Muslim women and their perspectives and concerns are not totally invisible.
While I had the support of the leaders of the Council for Mosques throughout the trying days of Rushdie affair and Gulf crisis it was evident that there were pockets of suspicion and animosity towards myself and my research. This was largely confined to members of youth groups in the city. In this period I had a couple of threatening letters warning me that my studies were not welcome. Given the charged atmosphere of those days such antagonism was not altogether unexpected and, in retrospect, what is more noteworthy is how much continued support and encouragement I enjoyed from Muslim friends and contacts. However, it is true to say that few Muslims understand the rationale and logic of religious studies. Where religion still serves to define community identity the ideal of 'impartial study' and epoche seem odd or subversive. After all Islam does not exist to be interesting to researchers! Those Muslim intellectuals who do understand the subject area are often suspicious of it as another manifestation of 'orientalism' or see it as a Trojan Horse carrying with it a cargo of 'the norms and values of...the Judaeo-Christian tradition and sometimes Western liberalism ...inimical to Islam' (Antes, 1989, p.150).

TITLE AND CONTENTS

My chosen title was intended to point to Muslim communities as the proper focus of this study. The plural was chosen deliberately to underscore the empirical fact that Muslims belong to a variety of linguistic, regional and sectarian groups. With the phrase the reproduction and representation of Islam I wanted to signal my interest both in the institutional mechanisms which had been developed to reproduce an Islamic identity and ethos and the groups who sought to present and represent Islam to the wider society.

Chapter 1 delineates the culture-specific character of Islam in South Asia and identifies the distinct maslak, schools of thought and practice, which the settlers brought with them to Britain. Chapter 2 provides an empirical study of the formation of the Muslim communities in the city, the creation of residential enclaves and the network of businesses and institutions, religious and cultural, developed to service the specific needs of the communities. This
includes the pattern of interaction which developed between Muslims and the local state. Chapter 3 focuses on the self-conscious reproduction of Islamic institutions undertaken by the three main sectarian traditions within the city. In particular it reviews the extent to which key issues were addressed in an attempt to connect with the world of English-educated and English-speaking Muslim youngsters.

Chapter 4 reviews the status, functions, education and influence of the 'ulama, religious practitioners who have a crucial role in the transmission of the Islamic tradition. Chapter 5 shifts attention to the history and activities of the Bradford Council for Mosques, an institution of central importance in seeking to identify a unitary agenda around which Muslims belonging to the diversity of traditions within the city could co-operate. The highly public role of the Council during The Satanic Verses affair and the Gulf crisis allow us to explore the contested issue of which organisations embody Islamic perspectives and represent Islam to the wider society.

Chapter 6 is more impressionistic and speculative. It seeks to explore several important challenges facing the Muslim communities in the 1990's as they seek to present Islam as challenging and relevant to modern society: these include Muslim youth, women, the intellectual tradition and da'wa, inviting non-Muslims to Islam. A conclusion rounds off the thesis and suggests some important issues for future investigation.
1

ISLAM IN SOUTH ASIA

Many of Bradford's mosques teach Urdu from language text-books produced for schools in Pakistan by the Punjab Text Book Board, Lahore. This series of eight readers are not for religious education but their content reflects much of the unself-conscious religiosity of South Asia. Most of them begin and end with a prayer and 1 in 8 of the stories are explicitly religious. Volume two includes a revealing account of children visiting the mazar, shrine, of a famous sufi, al-Hujwiri (d. 1071), buried in Lahore. The children are taken there to celebrate al-Hujwiri's death anniversary, when his soul was considered to have been wedded to God. The word used in the text for this celebration is 'urs, wedding. This day is a local holiday in Lahore.

The border of the story contains a vibrant pictorial commentary on the activities at and around the large shrine complex. The children play at the local fair, coloured lights adorn shops from which devotees buy sweetmeats and flowers - the latter to be placed on al-Hujwiri's tomb. A huge throng of people, men and women, wait patiently to pray within the hallowed precincts of his tomb. Others queue for the free food distributed on such occasions - the langar - and are entertained, as they wait, by men dancing to the accompaniment of drums. Al-Hujwiri is known popularly as Data Ganj Bakhsh, the master who gives treasure, and many delightful tales are told of how he acquired this name.

These Urdu text-books are full of the heroic exploits of South Asian sufis, variously referred to as 'friend' (of God), 'guide' or simply 'elder' - wali, murshid, pir/shaikh. However, the text-books have also had to take account of reformist impulses within Islam. Instead of dwelling on al-Hujwiri's miracles there is the insistence that he taught non-Muslims the Qur'an and explained its meaning to them. The narrative omits to mention that al-Hujwiri wrote a celebrated Persian treatise on sufism, Kashf al Mahjub, unveiling the veiled, and was more at home in initiating devotees into the mysteries of what his
distinguished translator refers to as 'Persian theosophy' (Nicholson, 1976, preface)

The shrine of Data Ganj Bakhsh is a good reminder that even a universal religion is necessarily clothed in a culture-specific dress. People are not 'religious-in-general', but 'religious-in-particular'. They follow specific religious traditions, with texts, history, rituals, and leaders specific to a group. These are transmitted in a language, with music, persons, and gestures joined in rituals that have meanings in a specific social location and in 'native dress'... (Williams, 1988, p.280).

This chapter will explore something of the culture-specific character of Islam in South Asia. This involves some understanding of the world and presuppositions of sufism. It also requires attending to Muslim responses to the collapse of Mughal power and the gradual imposition of British rule. This latter was the context which was to generate that repertoire of sectarian options carried to Bradford by Muslim settlers. These sought, alternatively, to defend, reform or reject sufism. To understand the distinctive profile and ethos of these trajectories of South Asian Islam - the issues which exercised them and over which they disagreed, the social groups to which they appealed and their differential exposure, and consequently, varying responses, to the impact of western culture - is a precondition for understanding the resources different groups in Bradford could draw on as they sought to root themselves in the radically different environment of a western, industrial city.

1.1 INSTITUTIONAL SUFISM

If we follow a distinguished historian of Islam and describe Islam as a pluriform Sunni-Shari'a-Sufi tradition, within South Asia the critical institution is the tariga, sufi order (Lapidus, 1988, p.221). The consolidation and spread of Islam in South Asia turned on the activities of the sufis who followed in the wake of the Turkish and Afghan armies from central Asia, which swept into India through the northern and western passes, and created the Delhi
Sultanate (1206-1555). While elsewhere in the Muslim world sufism, differentiated into different orders, was the late flower of Islamic culture, it is almost co-terminous with the consolidation of Islam in South Asia, which thus bears its distinctive impress (Lawrence, 1978).

At the heart of sufism is the relationship between the guide, murshid, and the devotee, murid. Since the murshid is considered to be close to God, the devotee is to approach him with respect and unquestioning obedience. In the words of the al-Hujwiri:

...the sufi shaikhs are physicians of men's souls... the Apostle (Muhammad) said: 'The shaikh in his tribe is like the prophet in his nation' ... 'He who hurts a saint (wali) has allowed himself to make war on Me (God)' (Nicholson, 1976, pp. 55 and 212).

The friends of God were His elect, believed to be able to perform miracles to validate the truth of Muhammad's ministry, and organised into an invisible hierarchy, which maintained the processes of nature and guaranteed Muslim victories (ibid., pp. 213-214). They were an alternative point of cohesion for the Muslim community, untouched by the political vicissitudes, which had seen the Abbasid empire fragment into competing successor states by the tenth century. They were revered by their devotees as mediators between man and God and bearers of God's healing. Their tombs became an accessible and alternative focus for pilgrimage (Lewis, 1985, pp. 28-31). The sufis and their devotees generated a rich vernacular tradition of devotional hymns. These were to root Islam in the hearts and minds of the majority, who were either unlettered or not acquainted with the languages of high Islamic culture (Eaton, 1978; Schimmel, 1975). They were the creators and custodians of regional languages and culture (Shackle, 1978). The activities of sufi dynasties, centred on their shrines, were the key element in a process of the gradual Islamisation of non-Muslim tribes (Eaton, 1984 and 1985).

The devotion they could command from their followers soon translated into landed wealth and power. On frontier zones they could function as warriors (Eaton, 1978). With the eclipse of Muslim political power, sufi dynasties were centres of regional opposition to non-
Muslim power. Whoever has captured power sought to enlist their support. In the creation of Pakistan in 1947 the Muslim League had to wean many of the pirs of the Punjab away from their traditional support for the Unionist party, an inter-communal party of landlords (Talbot, 1988). In 1980 General Zia convened a one-day conference of the country's leading pirs to seek their endorsement of his policy of Islamisation, since the 'majority of the population is not only under your influence but in a way under your command' (Lewis, 1985, p.54)).

Sufism has always had its critics, not least from within the movement itself. Al Hujwiri's celebrated handbook on sufism, Kashf al Mahjub, warns against antinomianism and charlatans:

"The outward and the inward aspects (of faith) cannot be divorced. The exoteric aspect of Truth without the esoteric is hypocrisy, and the esoteric without the exoteric is heresy. So, with regard to the Law, mere formality is defective, while mere spirituality is vain...ignorant pretenders to sufism...who have never associated with a spiritual director (pir), nor learned discipline from a sheikh, (and) without any experience have thrown themselves among the people...hath trodden the path of unrestraint" (Nicholson, 1976, pp. 14-17).

These criticisms have been rehearsed down the centuries and reform movements within sufism periodically emerged to insist on the centrality of Islamic law and the need to remove customs which smack of reprehensible novelty, *bid'at*. It is important to stress that reformers of sufism emerged from within the movement itself, since too often a false dichotomy has been drawn between 'saint' and scholar (Cornell, 1983). This overlooks the fact that many an *'alim* (pl, *'ulama*) - scholar of traditional, Islamic disciplines, whether *qur'an*, *hadith* or jurisprudence - was also a sufi or devotee (Makdisi, 1981, Metcalf, 1982, Robinson, 1987).

It is the posthumous functions of the sufi cult, especially the activities around their shrines, which have frequently brought the movement into disrepute. Lawrence wryly observes that such a cult was 'not invariably consistent in tenor with the teaching or example of the venerated, deceased master' (1982, p.33). It is not without irony
that al'Hujwiri's shrine in Lahore, Pakistan, has become the centre of a thriving cult, despite attempts to annex it to reformist impulses. He is regarded as the patron 'saint' of Lahore, who enjoyed 'supreme authority over the saints of India... no new saint entered the country without first obtaining his permission' (Schimmel, 1980, p.8).

A further anomaly is that not only do 'the most famous shrines... not invariably house the most worthy shaykhs' but some shrines may not house actual saints at all! (Lawrence, 1982, p.42). Historians and anthropologists concur in identifying mythic saints, who are nonetheless the centre of intense devotions (Fruzetti, 1980; Roy, 1983). One problem is that no formal process for canonization exists in Islam, since legal experts were divided as to the very existence of a category of holy men 'to whom one has recourse before and after their deaths, as intercessors... for obtaining divine graces, even miracles' (Massignon, 1982, ii. p. 20). Therefore, in default of such a process, local consensus often became the arbiter of sanctity, often with paradoxical, if not perverse, results.

Little wonder that living sufis often distanced themselves from the religiosity surrounding many shrines. The distinguished sheikh, Ahmad Sirhindi (d. 1626) in one of his letters to a female devotee drew attention to practices he considered reprehensible:

...women pray to stones and idols and ask for help. This practice is common, especially when smallpox strikes; and there is hardly a woman who is not involved in this polytheistic practice... they sacrifice animals at the tombs of Sufi saints, even though this custom has been branded as polytheistic in the book of Islamic law. They observe fasts in honour of the saints, though God alone is entitled to this homage... (Friedmann, 1971, p.70).

Almost identical criticisms were made by distinguished South Asian scholars in subsequent centuries, whether Shah Waliullah (d.1762) or Ashraf Ali Thanawi (d.1943) (Baljon, 1986, pp. 189-190, Saroha, 1981, pp. 18-19). The work of anthropologists like Fruzetti indicates that, such criticisms notwithstanding, suspect patterns of piety and religiosity persist today. One reason for this is that there exists a
group who benefit from such practices, namely, the custodians of the sufi shrines and their relics (tabarrukat). Shrine and relic, since they are thought to be impregnated with the pir's active and powerful presence (baraka), guarantee to their custodians a share in the generosity of pilgrims and devotees. Their control was often disputed and could become the object of unedifying litigation, adding fuel to their critics (Jeffery, 1981; Gilmartin, 1984; Mann, 1989). The continuing influence of such holy men in present day Pakistan and the beguiling corruption to which the whole phenomenon is exposed is sensitively portrayed in a recent novel by an author who writes under the pen-name Adam Zameenzad (1987).

1.2 MUSLIM RESPONSES TO COLONIALISM

The collapse of Mughal power in India and the gradual imposition of British control was deeply unsettling for Muslims. All religions began a process of re-evaluation of their ideals, organisation, priorities and practice. The colonial encounter precipitated the formation of a wide range of new sectarian developments (Jones, 1989). Muslims were no exception. In understanding the variety of responses among Muslims, ranging along a continuum between isolation and accommodation, a crucial variable was the extent to which such movements were led by anglicized individuals, exposed to the 'colonial milieu', a term Jones uses:

to indicate areas of time and place where the indigenous civilizations of South Asia came into active contact with British rule. A sphere of military and political control was established first, while the zone of cultural interaction evolved slowly from within the conquered territories. Conquest did not necessarily create the colonial milieu for all individuals or for a given region; that was determined by human interaction, by those who found it expedient or necessary to become part of the new colonial world and culture which it contained (1989, p.3).

If contemporary expressions of Islam in South Asia are largely the product of this encounter, five traditions are of particular importance, since all have been transposed to Bradford: the reformist Deobandis, the quietist and revivalist Tablighi Jamaat, the
conservative and populist Barelwis, the Islamist Jamaat-i-Islami and the modernists. 5

1.2.1 The Deobandis

The Islamic seminary, madrasa, from which this group takes its name, was founded in 1867 in Deoband, a small town a hundred miles north of Delhi. Its founders, Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi (d. 1877) and Rashid Ahmad Gangohi (d. 1905), were acutely conscious of the extent to which power had shifted away from the Muslims to a new British and Christian elite, and their aim was, above all, to preserve and promote an Islamic identity in a changing world. Although both were classically trained 'ulama, they were dissatisfied with the quality of Islamic education then available.

Their seminary not only re-emphasised traditional standards through the study of Hanafi law, but sought to use this as a bulwark against the inroads of non-Islamic influences. In devising their curriculum 'there were no spokesmen for including English or Western subjects' (Metcalf, 1982, p. 102). This rejectionist stance towards non-Islamic knowledge is clearly seen in the comment by their distinctive luminary Ashraf Ali Thanawi (d. 1943) that 'to like and appreciate the customs of the infidels' is a grave sin (Saroha, 1981, p. 23). The institution also promoted a distinctive ethos, which de-emphasised purely local ties in favour of the separate unity and identity of the whole group of Deobandis, whatever their geographic origin...fostering a style of Islam that preferred universal practices and beliefs to local cults and customs...and emphasising the diffusion of scripturalist practices and the cultivation of an inner spiritual life (Metcalf, 1978, pp. 132-134).

However, they were no mere traditionalists. Besides drawing upon British educational institutions and missionary societies as a source of organisational inspiration for their seminary, the Deobandis also made extensive use of the press, the postal service and the rapidly expanding railway network to spread their message, and to elicit subscriptions, from far and wide. Freed, in consequence, from the
obligation to respond to the whims of a few local benefactors - and hence from the vagaries of family control which had reduced so many of its rivals to conditions of crippling dependence - the seminary in Deoband soon began to set new standards of scholarly excellence and institutional continuity for north Indian Islam; a position which was further reinforced by the movement's consistent use of Urdu, rather than Persian, as a lingua franca.

The founders of Deoband were reformist sufis, as well as 'ulama. As spiritual guides to many of their students they saw themselves as exemplars rather than as intercessors. They took their responsibilities as sufi directors seriously:

The granting of initiation took place only after a period of contact in which the good intentions of the disciple, the spiritual perfections of the shaikh, and the personal compatibility of both were shown. Often there would be a prolonged stay with the shaikh and substantial instruction in the disciplines and traditions of the order (Metcalf, 1982, pp.162-163).

As reformist sufis, Deobandi scholars opposed much of the shrine cult as an unacceptable accommodation to a non-Muslim environment. Ashraf Ali Thanawi (d. 1943), a rector of Deoband and considered one of the leading sufis of his generation, in his encyclopaedic Urdu work, Bihishti Zewar, Heavenly Ornaments, reminds his readers that to sacrifice an animal, to fast or take a vow, in the name of a shaikh and to keep his photo and recite his name, as an act of devotion, is tantamount to disbelief (kufr) and associating another with God (shirk). To respect any place equal to the Ka'aba and to believe that pirs can relieve all ills is exposed to similar strictures. Finally, Thanawi seeks to undercut the function of pirs as intercessors by insisting that only those promised by God and Muhammad will unequivocally enter heaven (Saroha, 1981, pp.18-19 and 393).

While the Deobandis consequently set out on a reformist trajectory, the all-embracing Islamic unity which they hoped to generate proved elusive. It is not difficult to see why. Most of their support came, initially, from the ashraf, the well-born Muslim elites, who claimed
descent from outside India and who drew their income from land, trade or government service. Yet a principle target of their reformist activities was the beliefs and practices of the rural peasantry. In this context the efforts of the twentieth century revivalist movement, Tablighi Jamaat, were to complement their work.

1.2.2 Tablighi Jamaat

The founder of 'the faith movement', popularly referred to as the preaching party, Tablighi Jamaat, was Maulana Ilyas, (1885-1944). He himself was a sufji and 'alim, who had trained at Deoband and taught at the Deobandi seminary in Saharanpur (Haq, 1972). Ilyas was concerned to develop the work of his father in Delhi, who had sought to preach the basics of Islam to the Meos, Muslims from Mewat, south of Delhi, who had come into the city in search of work. The Meos were little more than Muslim in name, largely ignorant of Islam and shared many Hindu names and customs. Such groups were potentially vulnerable to the efforts of the Arya Samaj movement to reconvert Hindus who had become Muslim or Christian (Faruqi, 1971).

Ilyas became aware that neither the traditional sufji hospice nor the Islamic seminary were really organised to touch the lives of such people. Most Meos could not be expected to spend eight years or more in a seminary and sufis were not in the habit of going out of their hospices on preaching and teaching tours. Disillusioned with the madrasa mode of Islamisation he resigned his prestigious teaching post at the Deobandi seminary at Saharanpur and in the 1920s and 1930s he developed his innovative movement, which sought inspiration from the methods used by the Prophet at the beginning of Islam, when neither seminary nor sufji hospice existed.

The aim of his movement was to embody and commend the qur'anic injunction of sura 3:104: '...that there might grow out of you a community (of people) who invite unto all that is good, and enjoin the doing of what is right and forbid the doing of what is wrong' (Asad, 1980, p. 83). Ilyas, in pursuit of this aim, eschewed all controversial issues and avoided any political involvement. His emphasis was on individual moral and spiritual renewal, the
precondition, he contended, for any authentically Islamic endeavour in the public domain.

What was striking about Tablighi Jamaat was its expectation that all Muslims should devote time to door-to-door revivalist activities and thereby contribute to creating an Islamic environment. The discipline, mutual service, congregational worship, prescribed study and shared activity created the movement's distinctive style of self-reformation, within a supportive and egalitarian context. Its minimalist six-point programme reflects its sufi ethos. Its mobility has provided a medium of religious education on a mass scale. It may be termed as a unique experiment in adult education (Faruqi, 1971, p.68).

Many Muslim scholars have recognised its value and involved themselves and their students with the movement. The Rector of India's prestigious Muslim academy, Nadwat al 'Ulama, Sayyid Abul Hasan Ali Nadwi, in an address to 'ulama. in 1944, warned that if they did not participate in Ilyas' venture they would become 'an untouchable minority to whose culture and way of life the common people would become total strangers; even their language and ideas would be unfamiliar to the general public necessitating a translator between the two' (Haq, 1972, p.133).

It is evident that many have listened. Until recently the ethos, methods and impact of Tablighi Jamaat has been largely ignored by scholars of Islam. It is apolitical and does not attract the attention that the self-consciously ideological, Islamist movement commands. However, its huge following world-wide is beginning to be noticed:

Its 1988 annual conference in Raiwind near Lahore, Pakistan, was attended by more than one million Muslims from over ninety countries ...the second-largest congregation of the Muslim world after the hajj (Ahmad, 1991, p.510).

Its unsophisticated, anti-intellectual yet activist ethos attracts 'semi-educated people from small towns and cities', shopkeepers, teachers and government officials. Also,
for many recent migrants from the rural areas to the urban centers of Pakistan... (it) is not 'only a community of worship and a source of spiritual nourishment but a badly needed substitute for the extended family left behind (ibid., p. 515).

The rapid extension of the Deobandi tradition from the more educated and urban to the 'lower classes and rural settlements' has been commented on by scholars (Metcalf, 1982, p. 248, Alavi, 1988). It is likely, although unremarked, that the credit for this must go, in part, to the activities of the Tablighi Jamaat. The movement remains within the Deobandi tradition and shares 'its rejection of popular forms of religion such as veneration of saints, visiting shrines, and observing the rituals associated with popular sufism' (Ahmad, 1991, p. 517).

1.2.3 The Barelwis

The Barelwi tradition is the most local and contextual of the various expressions of Islam in South Asia. It takes its name from the home town of its founder, Ahmad Riza Khan (1856-1921) of Bareilly, Uttar Pradesh. A member of the Qadiri sufi order, Ahmad Riza used his considerable scholarship to defend the legitimacy of the popular world of shaikhs and shrines, where devotees come to seek the help of pirs (living and dead), as intercessors between themselves and God. The central importance of having a pir, a spiritual guide, is reflected in the Urdu language, where to be be-pir, without a pir, has the connotation of being vicious, cruel and pitiless (Platts, 1974, p. 202).

Deobandi criticisms notwithstanding, it was the pirs and their devotees who constituted the very core of popular Islam. It was they who generated and propagated devotional songs in vernacular languages, and who thus rooted Islamic teachings in the minds of the rural majority, most of whom had no access to the languages of high Islamic culture - Arabic and Persian. The topography of pre-Islamic India was the spatial projection of alien religions and cultures with their own histories. Sufism often appropriated, actually and imaginatively, such territory by establishing shrines on sites
earlier venerated by Buddhists and Hindus (Schimmel, 1980, pp. 34 and 134). These shrines became the centre of a rich annual cycle of religious festivals, celebrating the Prophet's birthday, his ascension (mi'raj), the death anniversary of the founder of the order as well as those of other revered sufis. Thus Islam in South Asia acquired its own sacred topography, a projection of its own religious history.

Many of these practices were much more defensible in Qur'anic terms than Deobandi textualism might seem to suggest, for the disagreements between the two groups ultimately turned on distinct exegetical traditions, which supported their very different interpretations of the nature of God, the status of the Prophet and holy men. Ahmad Riza, using well-established sufi arguments, insisted that the Prophet had 'knowledge of the unseen' and was bearer of God's light, which the 'friends of God' also reflected. For the Deobandis, however, such claims were deemed excessive and encroached on prerogatives belonging to God alone.

Such theological differences, passionately held, generated a luxuriant sectarian literature and in the early decades of this century a fatwa war, whereby Barelwi and Deobandi declared each other non-Muslim, kafir, and sought endorsement of their respective anathemas from 'ulama in the Hijaz (Metcalf, 1982, pp. 309-311). It is hardly surprising that Tablighi Jamaat activities are banned in Barelwi mosques (Ahmad, 1991, p. 523). Mutual recrimination between Deobandi and Barelwi can flare up into open conflict today (Alavi, 1988, p. 86).

### 1.2.4 The Jamaat-i-Islami

The Jamaat-i-Islami, the Islamic Party, is of rather more recent origin than the others. It was founded in 1941 by Maulana Maududi (1903-1979), a journalist rather than the product of an Islamic seminary. For Maududi, Islam was an ideology, an activist creed and legal system, aspiring to regulate all aspects of life. He criticised the 'ulama for obscuring Islam's dynamism with medieval commentary and fossilised law; he argued for the need to move beyond taqlid.
conformity to the teachings of Islamic law, crystallised in the middle ages - and for the exercise of *ijtihad*, scholarly effort, intended to 'ascertain, in a given problem or issue, the injunction of Islam and its real intent' (Saulat, 1979, p. 143).

In *A Short History of the Revivalist Movement in Islam*, Maududi reviews previous reform movements in South Asia. While acknowledging their achievements he considered the main reason for their failure was their lingering sympathy for sufism, in general, and the master-disciple (*piri-muridi*) relationship in particular:

as soon as *bai'at* (act of allegiance) is performed, the disciples start developing a servile mentality... (which) does not leave any difference between the spiritual guide and the gods other than Allah. It results in the incapacity of all mental powers of discrimination and criticism... the disciple is completely obsessed with the guide's personality and authority... the reference to 'divine inspirations' further strengthens the shackles of mental servility... detached from the world of reality they become wholly absorbed in the world of wonders and mystery... (1972, pp.112-113).

He was no less scathing in his attacks on those who sought to introduce alien, western ideologies, whether communism, socialism, capitalism or nationalism, into the Muslim world. All these, he argued, threatened to fragment and destroy the transnational Muslim community, the *umma*. For him westernisation was the new barbarism, threatening to return Muslims to the very *jahiliyya* - the emotive term for pre-Islamic paganism - from which the Prophet's message had rescued them (Sivan, 1985, pp.22-23).

Maududi's response to these challenges is clear from an article he wrote in the 1970s reviewing his life's work:

the plan of action I had in mind was that I should first break the hold which Western culture and ideas had come to acquire over the Muslim intelligentsia, and to instill in them the fact that Islam has a code of life of its own, its own culture, its own political and economic systems and a philosophy and an educational system which are all superior to anything that Western civilisation could
Yoffrey: I wanted to rid them of the wrong notion that they needed to borrow from others in the matter of culture and civilisation (Robinson, 1988, pp.17-18).

To embody this ethos he founded the Jamaat-i-Islami, a politico-religious party whose aim was to place trained cells of the righteous in positions of social and political leadership, with the object of transforming Muslim countries into Islamic, ideological states. Maududi's prolific writings have been translated into many languages, including English and Arabic. He has had a considerable following amongst the Muslim Brotherhood and has been courted by the Saudi Arabian government. 7

In Pakistan, the party appeals, as Islamism does elsewhere, to the products of expanded tertiary education in the cities, successful but unsatisfied people. Separated by their education from traditional communities, they are not part of the political elite. Like the uprooted peasants and bazaaris, these states turn to Islam to symbolize their anxieties, their hostilities to the powers, domestic and foreign, that thwart them, and their dreams of a more perfect future (Lapidus, 1988, p.890).

This constituency, in Pakistan, initially comprised many refugees from north Indian cities, muhajir, with few local roots and thus willing bearers of a trans-regional Islamic identity, which they hoped Pakistan would embody. The majority of the theoreticians and intellectuals of the party, academics, lawyers and journalists, come from this group (Ahmad, 1991, pp.498-499). An additional source of support has come from an expanding 'trader-merchant class...physically located in the urban areas but ...rooted in traditional rural culture ...antagonistic (to)...the erstwhile dominant urban class of bureaucrats, professionals and industrialists' (Mumtaz and Shaheed, 1987, p158). The trader-merchant class was never part of the 'colonial milieu', and was thus excluded from the Anglicized sub-culture of that urban elite. For them, Islam, the public rationale for Pakistan, became a vehicle of repossessing and reasserting their own identity after the religious and cultural dislocation of colonialism, and a stick to beat the traditional urban
elite, dubbed 'West-intoxicated' by Islamists.

While the party can influence government policy during periods of authoritarian rule it has not done well at the polls. There are various reasons for this. As an urban-based movement attracting the educated Jamaat-i-Islami has little appeal to most of Pakistan’s rural voters, who comprise some 70 percent of the population. The party has also had to compete with two other self-consciously Islamic parties, Jamiyat Ulama-i-Pakistan (JUP), a party representing Barelwi interests, and the Jamiyat Ulama-i-Islam (JUI), representing Deobandis. Both gained a larger share of the national vote than Jamaat-i-Islami in the 1970 elections in Pakistan; none did particularly well, though, for between them they polled less than a quarter of the national vote (Syed, 1984, pp.144-145).

The fact that Jamaat-i-Islami is opposed by Islamic parties also brings the legitimacy of their politised perception of Islam into question. Three distinguished members of Jamaat-i-Islami—Maulana Manzoor Numani, Maulana Abul Hasan Ali Nadvi and Maulana Wahiuddin—were to leave the movement accusing it of being overly concerned with temporal power and politics and of neglecting the basic purpose of Islamic da’wa, which is to bring people closer to God and raise their religious consciousness. (Ahmad, 1991, p.529).

The three scholars who left now support Tablighi Jamaat. The mutual rivalry between the two movements is sharpened by the fact that both appeal to similar constituencies.

1.2.5 Islamic Modernism

Reform and revival have been integral to Islam in South Asia and preceded the impact of colonialism. In this regard Shah Wali Allah of Delhi (d.1762) was a figure of unusual importance, and aspects of his legacy were welcomed and appropriated by subsequent thinkers, who had to address the intellectual challenge posed by colonialism and western culture. Particularly valuable was Shah Wali Allah's sense of history and the development of Islamic thought; therefore he favoured the exercise of ijtiham in Islamic law, since 'every age has its own
countless specific problems and cognizance of the divine decisions with respect to them is essential' (Baljon, 1986, p. 167).

Among a gallery of thinkers who have sought inspiration from the reformist tradition within Islam in order to respond to the multifaceted challenge of western civilization, three illustrate distinct, but overlapping responses, at different times. Syed Ahmad Khan (d. 1898) sought to reinterpret Muslim theology to accommodate the 'challenges of Christian preaching, historical criticism and the "new sciences"' (Troll, 1979, p.xix). Muhammad Iqbal (d.1938) in his celebrated lectures, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, first published in 1934, responded to twentieth century developments in science and philosophy. Fazlur Rahman (d.1988), notably in his monograph, *Islam & Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition*, while building on the insights of his predecessors, considered it vital to address 'the basic questions of method and hermeneutics' in *qur'anic exegesis* (1982, p.2). Only, thus, could modernism be rooted in the Islamic tradition and avoid the excesses and extravagances in interpretation of earlier modernists, which had brought the movement into disrepute and furnished its critics with easy targets.

Many modernists share the Islamist impatience with, and antagonism to, sufism. Iqbal condemned sufí pretensions to be a spiritual elite, with a privileged access to God, rooted in mystic lore and practice, available only to the initiates. Iqbal considered such claims to be the result of the pernicious 'Persianisation' of Islam, evident from the tenth century, whereby:

Muslim democracy was gradually displaced and enslaved by a sort of spiritual Aristocracy pretending to claim knowledge and power not open to the average Muslim ... (which ran counter to) the great democratic Prophet ... (in whose teachings) there is absolutely nothing esoteric ... justifying any gloomy, pessimistic mysticism ... The regeneration of the Muslim world lies in the strong, uncompromising, ethical monotheism ... preached to the Arabs thirteen hundred years ago (Wahid, 1964, p.81-83).
Fazlur Rahman shared Iqbal's concern to present Islam as an activist, ethical tradition and insisted that the Qur'an undercut those who would justify intercession by the Prophet or 'saints'. While he acknowledged that the Hadith literature is loaded with references to intercession of the prophets on behalf of the sinful of their communities ...(and in popular Islam 'saints')...the Qur'an seems to have nothing to do with it. On the contrary, it constantly speaks of how God will on the Day of Judgment bring every prophet as a witness over the deeds of his community, a witness whereby the people will be judged (1980, p.31).

Syed Ahmad Khan, writing after the failure of the 'mutiny' in 1857, had other more pressing priorities. He envisaged 'the re-emergence of a bureaucratic and administrative elite who would guide their fellow Muslims into co-operation with the British-Indian government, and do so on the basis of a mixture of Islamic and Western education' (Jones, 1989, p. 83). The vehicle Syed Ahmad hoped would realise such hopes was the Muhammadan Anglo-Indian College founded at Aligarh (1875). Aligarh and several initiatives it spawned, notably the Muslim Educational Congress (1886) and the Muslim League (1906) certainly lent to the Muslim communities in India a distinct identity. Aligarh embodied the willingness of the old Mughal service elite 'to make adjustments in the education of their sons ... to achieve under altered circumstances levels of social prestige and occupational achievements analogous to what...(they) had been able to experience, or aspire to' (Lelyveld, 1978, p.xvi). An analysis of the careers of Aligarh's alumni over its first twenty five years indicates it met such hopes with 'two-thirds of the former students ... government employees' (ibid. p.324).

Aligarh, with an English Principal recruited from Cambridge University in 1883 - the first of a group of able Cambridge graduates to teach there - deliberately used English as the medium of instruction 'an intentional instrument of acculturation to Victorian values and ideas' (ibid.p.207). However, neither Aligarh nor the Muslim Educational Congress ever became a vehicle for Syed Ahmad's radical rethinking of Islamic thought. Indeed, support for Aligarh
was conditional on Syed Ahmad taking a self-denying ordinance not to be involved in religious education. Religious instruction was supervised by a separate governing body, intent on avoiding controversy, and thus enshrined a conservative ethos.

The failure of South Asia's premier modern, Muslim, academic institution - it became a Muslim university in 1920 - to marry modern knowledge and Islamic study has cast a long shadow. Muhammad Ali (d.1931), a famous old boy of Aligarh, remembered that the students either played truant during the weekly 'theology hour' or busied themselves by 'writing humorous verse or drawing rude and rough caricatures...our communal consciousness was...far more secular than religious' (Iqbal, 1966, p.22). Indian politics became the centre of interest and the Muslim League a vehicle for Muslim separatism and the creation of Pakistan. Given the primacy of English, western disciplines and the marginalisation of Islam at Aligarh the dilemma was to what extent it was an Islamic college rather than simply a college for Muslims. Similarly, Pakistan - the struggle for which involved Aligarh alumni - has been bedevilled by the debate at to whether it was intended to be simply a nation for Muslims or an Islamic state (Munir, 1979, Syed, 1984, Alavi, 1988).

Because Islamic modernists in South Asia were outside the ranks of 'ulama they were regarded with suspicion by the latter and therefore have 'not been able to influence the custodians of the shari'ah to any large extent' (Rahman, 1966, p.427). Because neither educational institution nor political party existed to promote Islamic modernism it has always maintained a somewhat fugitive existence. Muhammad Iqbal was, arguably, the only serious student of modern philosophy of whom Islamic modernism in South Asia could boast and he died in 1938. Fazlur Rahman's attempt to institutionalise modernism, when Director of the Central Institute of Islamic Research in Pakistan, from 1962-1968, was undermined by opposition from 'ulama, Jamaat-i-Islami political activists and the indifference of a secularised elite (Rahman, 1976; Rahman, 1982).

In Pakistan today the main bearer of modernism is the women's movement. The Women's Action Forum, WAF, came into being in 1981.
In 1979 the Hodood Ordinance was promulgated, as the first step in Zia'a so-called process of Islamization. The Ordinance covers adultery, fornication, rape and prostitution (etc.)...The implications of this ordinance were not to come to light until the autumn of 1981, when a session judge sentenced a man and a woman to being stoned to death and 100 lashes respectively under the provisions of the Ordinance. The case was the catalyst that galvanized women into forming a pressure group to counter anti-women moves (Muntaz and Shaheed, 1987, p.73).

Since the process of Islamization was supported, initially at least, by the 'ulama and Jamaat-i-Islami - who allowed themselves to be co-opted into Zia's government - the WAF felt constrained to oppose these measures within the framework of Islamic discourse. Otherwise, as they belonged to the urban, professional classes and part of the dominant elite, they could have been dismissed as but another expression of its West-intoxicated, secularism. At their second national convention WAF, as part of their struggle for women's rights, decided to 'expose the difference between maulvis and Islam as a first step, and between progressives and conservatives as a second' (ibid. p.159). In their attempt to capture the Islamic high ground WAF has acted as a magnet for a vestigial modernist sentiment and have been able to draw on the researches of Dr Riffat Hassan, Pakistan's pioneer feminist theologian.

In a recent review of the process of Islamization in the 1980s a Pakistani legal scholar contends that all it did was to exacerbate sectarianism within Islam and expose the intellectual bankruptcy of the 'ulama and Jamaat-i-Islami. He concludes by insisting that:

The future of Pakistan, therefore, seems almost inescapably linked to a reassertion of the Aligarh spirit and the reformist Islamic movement that can be traced from Shah Wali Allah to Syed Ahmad Khan to Iqbal...(Faruki, 1987, p.75).

1.3 CONCLUSION

It is well to stress the enormity of the challenges confronting Muslim migrants in Bradford. Most were to come from rural backgrounds
in majority Muslim areas. The traditions of Islam, which sought to respond to the intellectual and cultural challenges of the West—Islamism and modernism—appealed to literates in urban areas, and were thus under-represented amongst Bradford's Muslims. A later chapter will ask how accessible to Bradford-born Muslim youngsters is the taken-for-granted religiosity of their fathers, implicit in the Urdu text-books from Pakistan, which many continue to use in the mosques (3.2). With the exception of East African and Indian Muslims, the majority of Muslims in Bradford were confronted, for the first time, with problems on being a minority. The next chapter will explore how South Asian settlers sought to recreate Muslim communities in the midst of a non-Muslim social, institutional and cultural world.
2 THE FORMATION OF BRADFORD'S MUSLIM COMMUNITIES

2.1 MIGRATION, THE NATION-STATE AND ISLAMIC LAW

The Urdu term for migrant/refugee, *muhajir*, is from the same Arabic root which gives us the word *hijra*, the migration of the Prophet Muhammad from Mecca to Medina in AD 622. This obligatory migration involved abandoning property and blood ties in Mecca to support the nascent community of Muslims in Medina. This event resonates through Islamic history, with the Muslim calendar measuring the passage of time from that event, AH, the year of the Hijra. Muslims across the centuries have readily identified themselves with this prototypical migration. The very existence of Pakistan is rooted in a convulsive migration experience: 'with the partition of the subcontinent in 1947 some 8 million predominantly Urdu-speaking Muslims arrived in Pakistan' (Donnan and Werbner, 1991, p. 10). These *muhajirs*, with few local roots, were often the carriers of a trans-regional Islamic identity, and supported the Jamaat-i-Islami party, who wanted to translate Pakistan from a nation of Muslims into an Islamic, ideological state.

A recent study of the dynamics of *hijra* within the Islamic tradition, extrapolated the following relevant points from a selection of pertinent Qur'anic texts:

1. It was an obligation of physical movement towards self-definition in the nascent Muslim society;
2. *hijra* was closely associated with *jihad* (armed struggle);
3. *hijra* established a bond of relationship among Muslims...

The important question which subsequently exercised Muslim thinkers and jurists was to identify situations when *dar al Islam*, the House of Islam - where Islamic power and law prevailed - ceased to be so and thus made *jihad* or *hijra* mandatory.

Such questions were far from being academic. Within thirty years of the Prophet's death, during the caliphate of 'Alī (AD 656-661), the rebellion against him by a group named *khawarij*, "those who go out", established 'the third major political trend in early Islam...a
rejection of both Sunni and Shi'i positions' (Enayat, 1982, p.6).

Their rebellion was rooted in an uncompromising adherence to the letter of the Qu'ran, a repudiation of arbitration in a dispute where right and wrong seemed clear and an egalitarianism governing the election of rulers.

In Western languages contenders for power may rise or fall... in Islam... ambitious Muslims move inward rather than upward; rebellious Muslims secede from, rather than rise against, the existing order. The earliest - indeed the paradigmatic - movement of rebellion against the existing order was that of the Khawarij, "those who go out"... their movement was expressed as horizontal, not vertical (Lewis, 1991, p.13).

In this context an act of withdrawal is tantamount to declaring the domain from which one withdraws is no longer dar al Islam, despite protestations to the contrary.

Events soon outstripped Islamic jurisprudence. Islamic law had been developed within the early imperial phase of Muslim history, when it was plausible to suppose the Islamic imperium might one day include all the lands of the infidel, and 'The People of the Book', and thus a division of the world into dar al harb, the domain with which Islam was (potentially) at war, and the dar al Islam, into which it was to be incorporated, made some sense. India during the British Raj sharply focused the discontinuity between theory and practice.

An historian of the Muslims in British India highlighted this disjunction:

Muslim jurisprudence could offer no clear prescriptions ... where a large Muslim population lived permanently under a non-Muslim government... where the balance of power was permanently tilted in favour of the infidel; where there was no generally accepted Imam or khilafa (to focus opposition and declare whether the conditions were propitious for an armed struggle)... and where... a large non-Muslim majority (was) ready to take advantage of any mishandling of relations with their foreign rulers (Hardy, 1972, pp. 109-110).

While Muslims in India had recourse, at different times, to both jihad and hijra 'the Hanafi majority view has been that if Friday and
the religious holidays can be observed, the land is *dar al Islam* (Masud, 1990, p. 40). 4

The political situation in the twentieth century has further complicated the labours of Muslim jurists: In a world of nation-states, some of which have Muslim majorities, others Muslim minorities, what and where is to count as *dar al Islam*? The modern world is not the *dar al Islam* of the middle ages. It is no longer possible for a Muslim to travel, migrate or settle in any part of the trans-national, Muslim community, the *umma*. Even countries which have Muslim majorities may have a secular constitution, be repressive regimes, indifferent to Islam or uncongenial for Muslim minority sects.

The question of what was to count as *dar al Islam* and whether it required embodiment in a separate nation-state was particularly agonising for Muslims in South Asia on the eve of British withdrawal. It is worth rehearsing the divergent attitudes of the leading Islamist, who chose to move to Pakistan rather than stay in India, the *'ulama*, and a distinguished Indian modernist, who felt Muslims could retain their identity as a minority in India. Muslims in Bradford are heirs to the practical impact of such discussions - the fragmentation of pre-partition Indian Islam into three nation-states - and a continuing confusion of the status and imperatives of a Muslim minority.

The influential Islamist, Maulana Maududi (1903-1979), was equally dismissive of Muslims supporting the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League. For Maududi, nationalism, whether Indian or Pakistani, was anathema, seducing Muslims from Islam. In a lecture in 1940, with ironic prescience, he argued that a nation state 'bearing the label of Islam' (Pakistan), run by census Muslims, 'far removed from Islam in their ideas and modes of behaviour', would be 'bolder and more fearless than a non-Islamic state in suppressing an Islamic Revolution. Such a Muslim national state will pass a sentence of death ... for acts which a non-Muslim state will punish only with imprisonment' (Maududi, 1980, pp. 26-27). 5
Pre-partition 'ulama themselves were divided on the wisdom of creating a separate Muslim nation, a majority sharing Maududi's suspicion of the motives of the western-educated leaders of the Muslim League, and thus opted to support a composite Indian nationalism (Hardy, 1971, pp. 31-39). The bearers of Pakistani nationalism, the Muslim League, comprised many members from the Muslim minority provinces, belonging to the 'salariat':

...the product of the colonial transformation of Indian social structure in the nineteenth century and it comprised those who had received an education that would equip them for employment in the expanding colonial state apparatus as scribes and functionaries (Alavi, 1988, p.68).

The 'ulama, who opposed Muslim separatism, eschewed the communal option, but did not 'put a high premium on the aspiration of educated Muslims for jobs and other economic opportunities. The Muslim League, on the other hand, was more communal than religious in that it concentrated all its energies on reservations, weightages, and guarantees for the share of Muslims in political 'power' (Agwani, 1986, pp.28-29). While it is inadequate to explain the emergence of the Pakistan movement solely in terms of a particular class analysis (Talbot, 1988) it is instructive that the indifference of many 'ulama to such economic factors meant that their advice often went unheeded, and they were often left having to construct an Islamic rationalisation for developments which they regretted. As we shall see few anticipated the implications of economic migration to the non-Muslim world.

A third category of Muslim thinkers opposed Pakistan for a combination of practical and religious reasons. Abul Kalam Azad (1888-1958), a creative Muslim scholar and India's first Education Minister, thought partition far from being an answer to religious communalism would exacerbate it 'by creating two States based on communal hatred' and cast the large Muslim minority left in India as 'aliens and foreigners' in their own country; further, 'the very term Pakistan ...suggests that some portions of the world are pure (pak) while others are impure' which flies in the teeth of the prophetic tradition, which states, 'God has made the whole world a mosque for
me'; finally, he questioned the viability of holding together West and East Pakistan in a tragically prophetic comment:

'It is one of the greatest frauds on the people to suggest that religious affinity can unite areas which are geographically, economically and culturally different. It is true that Islam sought to establish a society which transcends racial, linguistic, economic and political frontiers. History has however proved that after the first few decades...Islam was not able to unite all Muslim countries on the basis of Islam alone (Azad, 1989, pp.150-151, 201 and 248).

If the proliferation of nation-states has made the issue of what is to count as dar al Islam ambiguous, not least in deciding whence and whither one is to migrate to defend it, a new type of hijra, economic migration, has emerged, which raises new issues for Islamic jurisprudence. Should Muslim economic migrants in the West see themselves as 'international commuters' (Ballard, 1990, p.221), intent on returning to their homeland, when they have earned enough money, or should they choose to settle in dar al kufr, the house of unbelief? A distinguished Muslim scholar in Britain acknowledges that 'Muslim theology offers, up to the present, no systematic formulations of the status of being in a minority' (Badawi, 1981, p.27).

Thus to map the movement of Muslims into Bradford is to anticipate a good deal of variety in the pattern and timescale of settlement. Pakistani and Bangladeshi migrants maintained strong links with their respective home lands - both majority Muslim areas - sustained by 'the myth of return' (Anwar, 1979), and, even when effected by changes in immigration rules, were much slower to bring over their entire families than the Sikhs (Ballard, 1990). Their ongoing link with the watan, homeland, is evident in the fact that the majority enjoy dual nationality and prefer to send their dead back to Pakistan or Bangladesh for burial.

Gujarati Muslims, however, had less attachment to Hindustan/India, in a state where they numbered only 8.5 per cent of the population (Williams, 1988, p.88), and, where internal events, such as the Shah
Bano case and the Babri mosque saga, had deepened their insecurity and exacerbated their sense of being an embattled minority. Thus, as will become clear, their family consolidation occurred more quickly than that of the Pakistanis and Bangladeshis and their greater emotional distance from their homeland is evident in the fact that their dead are usually buried in Bradford, and that the Indian government does not allow dual nationality. Those South Asians who were 'twice migrants' and fled or were expelled from East Africa in the late 1960s and early 1970s represent a distinct category of migrants, in that they collapsed the four phase pattern of migration - pioneers, chain migration of unskilled workers, consolidation of settlement and the emergence of a British-born generation (Ballard and Ballard, 1977, pp. 28-43) - into one movement.

Since Islamic history and Islamic law offer so few practical guidelines for Muslims living as a minority we should expect to find experimentation and some confusion as Muslims sought to negotiate a modus vivendi with the majority community, aimed at preserving and transmitting an Islamic identity to their children. It is better to speak, initially, of Muslim communities, in the plural, since it is evident that Muslim migrants were bearers of distinct, even antagonistic, histories, culture and languages. Against this background, in a subsequent chapter, we shall explore the extent to which different Islamic sects exhibit a solidarity across linguistic and regional differences, and seek to identify the commonalities which began to emerge as the number of Muslims born and educated in Bradford increased.

It is wise to stress experimentation and confusion as communities seek to respond to new and unfamiliar challenges. This, of course, can lead to some exasperation, when those Muslims, who operate happily within a traditional Islamic worldview, seek simply to restate the received wisdom. Ahmed Deedat, a popular Muslim preacher and controversialist from South Africa, in one of his recent visits to Bradford, insisted that the justification for migration and settlement as a minority in Britain must be 'neither easy living nor the dole but jihad or da'wa, invitation to Islam' (St. George's Hall, 8-8-1991). Since jihad was thrown in for rhetorical effect, given his
love of military metaphor, Ahmed Deedat was arguing that the only rationale for *hijra* to a non-Muslim state was the desire to invite others to Islam. This contrasts with the stance and publications of Dr Shabbir Akhtar, a Bradford Muslim, locally educated, who has little patience with an Islamic chauvinism which refuses to engage with the intellectual and social realities of British society. He can turn on its head the traditional Islamic prohibition from entering *dar al kufr* — the presumption that Muslim life, property and religion is not safe — by claiming that 'the freest Muslims live in the West and in Iran. Everywhere else, Islam is an outlawed political force'. (Akhtar, 1989, p.89).

Other Muslims, impatient of the disparate histories, experiences and expectations of Muslim communities in Britain, seek to create and institutionalise an elusive, national unity. Thus Dr Kalim Siddiqui, in his inaugural address to the 'Muslim Parliament', boldly declares that 'Western civilization is the modern world's sick man... destined for oblivion... (with Islam) the antidote to a morally bankrupt world'. The handpicked members of the 'Muslim Parliament' (MMPs) — including five from Bradford — are urged to draw inspiration from the Prophet, who 'showed us how to generate the political power of Islam in a minority situation and how to nurse ... it until the creation of an Islamic state and the victory of Islam over all its opponents' (4-1-1992 — video tape of opening of the 'Muslim Parliament'). Such heady rhetoric is accompanied by a desire to rewrite the actual history of Muslim migration into Britain, by locating it within a particular, Islamic perspective.

Siddiqui's grand aspiration and inspirational style contrasts markedly with the sober analysis of the situation facing Muslims in Britain given by the information officer of Bradford's Council for Mosques at a recent conference on 'Racial Equality in Europe'. In it he reminded his listeners that, the majority of British Muslims are economic migrants. They have come to this country in order to escape the harsh socio-economic realities in their countries of origin. They have come here in search of a better economic deal and improved life opportunities. This simple fact frequently gets overlooked and instead all kinds
of hidden agenda... are attributed (to us) in order to explain our presence in this country and... in Europe. Allow me to emphatically state that most of us do not harbour any thought of colonising Britain and Europe. We are not here on a mass conversion spree. We do not seek to dismantle the political, socio-economic fabric of this society. We have no such grand hidden ambition or grand plan. We entertain no such illusion (Ahmed, 1991).

Deedat, Akhtar, Siddiqui and Ahmed - preacher, intellectual, ideologue, and pragmatist - exemplify some of the voices heard within Bradford's Muslim communities today. An empirical study of migration, settlement and community formation will enable us to understand the changing contexts within which such discourse occurs. The four speakers are concerned to identify priorities the communities should pursue, locally and nationally, if a future is to be secured for a Muslim presence in Britain. That such issues are being discussed, in English, in a variety of public forums, indicates that many Muslims in Bradford are no longer sustained by the 'myth of return' but see their future in Britain.

2.2 MIGRATION, SETTLEMENT AND THE MOSQUES

Undivided, pre-partition India had long provided recruits for Britain's merchant navy. The tradition became established that, firemen ... for Bombay crews were Pathans and Mirpuris and for Calcutta crews the majority of engine-room hands were from Sylhet ... The other parts of the crew were also recruited on a regional basis... (thus) in Bombay the deck crews came from Gujarat... (Adams, 1987, pp. 22-23).

The first Muslims in Bradford were such a group of seamen, who in 1941 were 'directed from seaports such as Liverpool, Middlesborough and Hull to munitions factories and essential wartime industries in the Bradford and Leeds areas' (Dahya, 1974, p. 84).

The early history of migration and settlement into Bradford, the push and pull factors operating, have been well documented (Rose, 1969, chapters 5-8; Dahya, 1974, pp. 82-88; Khan, 1977, pp. 64-71; Barton, 1986, pp. 55-77). There is no need here to do more than identify some
of the important stages in that story. The 1961 census indicated that there were some 3,376 'Pakistanis' in Bradford— which, of course, included West Pakistanis and East Pakistanis, the latter would be described as Bangladeshis as from 1971, when what was then East Pakistan seceded from West Pakistan. The majority were unskilled, male workers, with only 81 women enumerated in the census.

Numbers increased in the early 1960s, first to pre-empt the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962, which closed the door on automatic right of entry for Commonwealth citizens and introduced a system of work vouchers. These latter were classified into three types: 'A' for those with specific jobs to come to; 'B' for those with special skills and qualifications and 'C' for those who were unskilled and without any firm promise of work—preference was given to ex-servicemen (Rose, 1969, pp. 72 and 83). Barton noted, in his study of Bangladeshi Muslims in Bradford, that 'the issue of vouchers, especially in the category 'C', was seen in Sylhet not as a form of regulation but as direct encouragement on the part of the British government' (Barton, 1986, p. 51).

In 1965 the issue of further vouchers was suspended. However, since there was still a demand for labour,

in the late sixties... an increasing number of Mirpuri men began, following one of their periodic trips home, to bring their fourteen and fifteen year old sons back with them to Britain. Young enough to be permitted to enter as dependants— and thus avoiding the bar on males— it would not be long before they left school and started work. But seeing this as a "loophole" which should be closed, immigration officers began to insist that if dependents were to enter, the whole family must come (Ballard, 1990, p. 234).

Tariq Mehmood, who himself came to Bradford from Pakistan in the early sixties, includes a moving account of the impact of such a migration process on a young ten year old in his novel, Hand on the Sun. The novel also offers an unusually frank picture of this cat and mouse game with immigration officials (Mehmood, 1983). In the event the phenomenon of chain migration of single men was not to end until
the Immigration Act of 1971, which did permit the entry of dependants. Local authority figures suggest that by 1981 there were 32,100 people whose family origin was in Pakistan and Bangladesh and by 1991 53,250, or one in nine of the population of the City of Bradford Metropolitan Council. An attempt later will be made to breakdown such figures into regional components, including Gujaratis from India and East Africa.

The establishment of mosques and supplementary schools reflects the shift within the migrants' self-perception from being sojourners to settlers, albeit leaving open the possibility of some final return to the home country in the future. As Barton reminds us:

When they originally migrated most Bengalis suffered an almost total lapse of religious observance; yet migration was not perceived as a threat to their heritage. It was possible to live on the margin of British society, avoiding any deeper involvement than work necessitated... The migrant lived and worked in Britain on behalf of his family, who, it may be surmised, prayed on his behalf (1986, p. 177).

The investment needed for a mosque and imam, to lead prayers and teach children, both reflects and was a precipitant of community formation.

Dahya's seminal article on Bradford's Pakistani communities, based on research done in the early 1970s, outlined a two-stage process of community formation whereby an initial tendency towards fusion - in which pioneer settlers associated together regardless of their regional, caste or sectarian origins - gradually gave way, as numbers grew, to fission and segmentation; in this second stage of fragmentation ties of village-kinship and sectarian affiliation grew steadily more significant as the basis of communal aggregation (Dahya, 1974, pp. 77-95). This process, which Dahya illustrated with reference to housing settlement in the 1960s, can also be seen in the proliferation of mosques and supplementary schools.

In 1959 the city's first mosque was opened in a terraced house in Howard Street. It was run by the Pakistani Muslim Association, and its trustees included both East and West Pakistanis from a variety of
sectarian traditions. Fusion gave way to fission over the next few years as Howard Street mosque came to be dominated by settlers from the Chhachh, a district on the borders of the Punjab and the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan. The appointment of a Pathan trained in the Deobandi tradition as its first full-time imam, in 1968, also gave it a clear sectarian character.

Fission was proceeding apace. In 1961 the Bradford Muslim Welfare Society - most of whose members were from villages around Surat in Gujarat, India - established their own Deobandi mosque, in a house in Thorncliffe Place. Soon afterwards, Pir Maroof Hussain Shah, from District Mirpur in Azad Kashmir, formed Jamiyat Tabligh ul Islam, the 'Association for the Preaching of Islam', and in 1966 opened the first mosque in the Barelwi tradition. Table 2.1 classifies by sectarian allegiance the number of mosques and supplementary schools in existence in 1989. These include a mosque open to all students and not aligned to any one sect, an Ahl-i-Hadith mosque and an Ahmadiyya mosque, a heterodox sect whose right to belong to the Muslim umma is hotly contested, and whose activities in Bradford have been the focus of protest (see 3.3). Map 2.1 plots the location of these mosques according to sectarian identity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECT</th>
<th>MOSQUE</th>
<th>SUPPLEMENTARY SCHOOL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BARELWI</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEOBANDI</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAMAAT-i-ISLAMI</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AHL-i-HADITH</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHI'A</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AHMADIYYA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NON-ALIGNED STUDENT</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.1 Estimate of mosques and supplementary schools belonging to different sects in 1989
The creation of mosques and supplementary schools reflects the growth, location and differential settlement patterns of distinct regional and linguistic communities. Table 2.2 makes this clear by enumerating both the number of mosques and supplementary schools formed each decade and the number each regional group control. Map 2.2 locates and identifies such mosques and supplementary schools on the basis of regional control.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOSQUE</th>
<th>SUPPLEMENTARY SCHOOL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. 1960-69</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. 1970-79</td>
<td>11 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. 1980-89</td>
<td>14 7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A. Mirpur, Punjab, Chhachh, Gujarat(2).
B. Mirpur(3), Punjab(3), Chhachh(4), (East African) Gujarat(2), Bangladesh(1).
C. Mirpur(14), Punjab, Chhachh(2), Bangladesh(3), (Student mosque).

Table 2.2 Estimate of the number of mosques and supplementary schools established in each decade and the regional groups controlling them.
A = Attock District area known as "the Chhachh" (7)
B = Bangladesh: mainly from Syhet District (4)
G = Gujarat: mainly from Surat District (4)
M = Mirpur District Azad Kashmir (18)
P = Punjab (in Pakistan) (5)
S = Student mosque - catering for University, college and converts (17)
This data of mosque formation enables us to hazard some broad generalisations about community formation. The Indian Gujarati community did not delay settlement and already had its two mosques by 1962. This suggests that earlier estimates of Gujaratis in Bradford at this period are much too low, whether Bowen's figure of 61 people in 1961 or Dahya's figure of three households in 1964 (Bowen, 1988, p.20; Dahya, 1974, p.87). A second group of Gujarati Muslims, also from Surat, arrived from Kenya in the late 1960s following its independence in 1966. While they, initially, worshipped with the Gujaratis from India, they soon sought to give institutional expression to their different histories and caste identities. In 1971 and 1978 they established two community centres, which included supplementary schools.

The Bangladeshi community has been slower to shift from male settlement to family consolidation: it had no mosque until 1970 and its other three mosques had to await the 1980s - 1984, 1985 and 1987. Family consolidation of the Mirpuris has also been an extended process. While their first mosque was functioning in 1966 the bulk of their centres - 14 out of 18 - did not open until the 1980s. The bulk of the Punjabi and Chhachhi centres were complete in the 1970s.

The settlement trajectories of the different communities not only vary, somewhat, in time, but also in space. The Bangladeshis cluster in three wards, Undercliffe, Little Horton and Bowling. The Gujaratis overlap with them only in Bowling, and have also settled in University and Heaton. The Chhachhis/Pathans live in five of the inner city wards: Undercliffe, Little Horton, University, Toller and Bowling. The Mirpuris are dispersed throughout six wards, living in the same wards as the Chhachhis, except Undercliffe, but are also found in Heaton and Bradford Moor. The Punjabis are scattered throughout the city, since they are active in sectarian traditions, such as the Shia, which only has two centres in the city, or those with only a single centre - Ahl-i-Hadith, U.K. Islamic Mission and the Ahmadiyya.
Figure 2.1 Bradford Electoral Wards 1991
Showing the seven inner-city wards where mosques and supplementary schools are located.

A  Bradford Moor
B  Bowling
C  Little Horton
D  University
E  Toller
F  Heaton
G  Undercliffe
All 30 mosques and 9 supplementary schools are located within a radius of 1½ miles from the city centre, within seven inner city wards (Figure, 2.1). Since a majority serve local constituencies - their proliferation reflecting the need for accessible centres for young children to attend qur'anic school in the late afternoon - this suggests that suburban drift is not yet a major feature of Muslim communities. Only one mosque is purpose-built - three others are under construction - the rest are in converted terraced houses, disused mills, cinemas or churches. Five of these seven wards returned Bradford's nine Muslim councillors in 1991 (all labour) and all seven have large concentrations of the different Muslim communities. Table 2.3 correlates the location of mosques/supplementary schools, Muslim councillors and the percentage of 'Asian' electors in each of these seven wards. 15

The following comprise an estimate of the relative sizes of the different Muslim communities in the City of Bradford Metropolitan Council in 1991. The largest originate from Pakistan: 30,250 from District Mirpur in Azad Kashmir; 5,500 Panjabis, mostly from Jhelum, Gujar Khan and Rawalpindi; 10,000 from the Attock district of Chhachh; 1,800 Pathans from Bannu, Chhachh, Hazara, Kohat, Mardan and Peshawar. Bangladeshis from Sylhet number 3,500. Indians and East Africans from Surat district in Gujarat number 2,300 and 900 respectively.16 This gives a total of 53,250, or one in nine of the population.

While 9.35% of the electorate were from 'Asian' backgrounds in 1990 about 23% of the school children in the district were from Muslim backgrounds, as against 2% Sikh and 1% Hindu. The age-structure of the Muslim communities is significantly different from the majority community. Nationally 45% of Pakistanis and 47% of Bangladeshis are under 16. This compares with 20% in the white community.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WARD</th>
<th>MOSQUES</th>
<th>MUSLIM COUNCILLORS</th>
<th>% ASIAN ELECTORS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little Horton</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toller</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bradford Moor</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bowling</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heaton</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undercliffe</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.3 The number of mosques-supplementary schools, Muslim councillors and per centage of 'Asian' electors in the wards where the Muslim population was clustered in 1991.

2.3 THE ARTICULATION OF RELIGIOUS AND CULTURAL AUTONOMY.

2.3.1 Economics and the creation of a distinct cultural world

The proliferation of mosques and supplementary schools reflect a huge economic investment by Muslims in the city. The priority given to the creation of religious institutions is an unambiguous signal of a determination to pass on the Islamic tradition to their children and grandchildren. This task has been facilitated by the creation of substantial Muslim residential zones, where they feel secure and can continue to practise a measure of social control over their children. These residential enclaves have spawned an astonishing array of businesses providing goods and services specific to Muslim cultural and religious needs. These provide the immediate focus of this section.
In Bradford, in the early 1980s, the local authority was sympathetic to Muslim concerns to consolidate their religious and cultural identity. This was a reflection of an emerging political will, nationally and locally, to identify and ameliorate the deprivation underlying the earlier explosion of urban violence across the country (Hiro, 1992, pp. 80-96; Scarman, 1983, pp.18-36). The local authority in November, 1981, committed itself to a twelve-point race relations plan, the preamble to which asserted that, along with positive action to encourage equal opportunities and to fight racial disadvantage, 'we also recognise we are a multi-racial, multi-cultural city and that every section of the community has an equal right to maintain its own identity, culture, language, religion and customs' (emphasis mine). This commitment was to be expressed in a number of welcome initiatives in education and in the channelling of national and local resources for the provision of youth and community centres, responsive to Muslim sensibilities.

A study in 1985 of 'Asian' businesses in Bradford mapped their dramatic rising curve. In 1959 there were five, in 1970 260, in 1980 793 and at least 1200 in 1984 (C.B.M.C., 1985, p.4). Their rapid growth correlated with the dramatic contraction and recession in the textile and engineering industries, which accounted for the loss of 34,000 jobs - over fifty per cent of their labour force. Unemployment had a disproportionate impact on 'Asians' since in 1980, while accounting for 8% of the labour force, they represented 20% of the textile workforce (C.B.M.C., 1988). It is evident that many of the newly unemployed sank their personal savings into small businesses, often at great risk: only 1 in 7 had any relevant experience before going into business (C.B.M.C., 1985, p.27).

The profile and analysis of these businesses is instructive. Some 75% were retailing, within which category over 50% were food; less than 20% cloth shops and 10% news-agents. Services was the next largest category within which over 50% were restaurants and takeaways. Two thirds of all businesses were located in seven inner city wards, set amidst the 'Asian' residential areas (22% in University ward alone), where commercial properties were cheap. These businesses generated jobs for about 15% of the economically active 'Asians' in the city.
Over half of the proprietors employed their wives; indeed, over half of those employed belonged to the owner's family. Of those employed outside the family over 80% were 'Asian' (ibid., pp. 5-8).

If many of the first generation settlers worked 'long hours on all-Pakistani night shifts (in textile mills)' thus having 'minimal contact with the indigenous population' (Khan, 1977, p. 76) their children often find employment in 'Asian' businesses, which similarly involve little interaction with those outside their communities. This is especially so where they provide services specific to the 'Asian' communities, e.g. halal butchers, shops providing Punjabi, Hindi and Urdu audio and video cassettes, specialist goldsmiths, jewellers and cloth retailers.

One specialist service of interest is that provided by a local hakim, Mazhar Rana, who offers 'the most effective Unani herbal remedies along with diet information' (promotional literature). The hakim, a term from an Arabic word meaning wise, is trained in the principles of classical Greek medicine, unani tibb; according to these principles of humoral physiology, elaborated in the works of Hippocrates, Aristotle and Galen, illness results from an imbalance between the four humours, related to four primary qualities: blood (damp and hot), phlegm/mucus (damp and cold), yellow bile (dry and hot) and black bile (dry and cold). The task of the hakim is to help the patient conserve or restore his own inner symmetry.

The methods of diagnosis include taking the pulse, physical examination of urine and the taking of a case history. Once the humoral imbalance is identified a treatment of herbs and appropriate diet is prescribed to restore balance. The hakim is part of Islamic culture, where medicine is understood as 'an ancillary dimension of religion' (Metcalf, 1982, p. 192). The distinguished Islamic seminary of Deoband has a department of unani tibb (ibid., pp. 191-193) and many large and famous sufi shrines, such as that of the Chishti mystic, Nizamuddin Aulia, (d. 1325) at Ajmer, near Delhi, include a herbal-medicine clinic (Moinuddin, 1991, p. 5).
Mr Rana, born and educated in Bradford, now runs the family business, founded by his father, a Pakistani hakim, who came from Sialkot to Bradford in 1964. After taking 'A' levels Mr Rana gained a diploma in herbal medicine and homeopathy from an 'International College, Natural Health Science' in London. He imports herbs from South Asia and his clientele are South Asians in diaspora in Britain, Europe, U.S.A. and Canada. Local ulama both buy herbs from him and refer patients to him. The hakim has certain obvious advantages over a western G.P.: he will spend longer with the patient—twenty minutes to an hour, when the average for G.P.s is five to seven minutes; he shares the world of assumptions and language of the patient; he can offer a holistic therapy including diet, herbs and religious advice. Since he is able to diagnose a variety of ailments by, inter alia, feeling the pulse and thus not requiring the removal of clothes, his methods are especially congenial to Muslim women. In conversation Mr Rana broadly analysed the complaints he dealt with as 35% gastric, 15% skin, 15% arthritis, 10% depression (mainly women) and 15% psycho-sexual.

Mr Rana, a British Muslim, has thus managed to translate into Britain alternative ‘systems of medication and diet...tried and tested for centuries’ (promotional literature) in South Asia. He exemplifies a new generation of British Muslim professionals, bi-lingual and bi-cultural—his promotional literature is in Urdu and English—who can operate in both cultures. He will refer patients to allopathic practitioners for certain complaints e.g. syphilis, since it can be cured free on the National Health Service with a course of penicillin. Mr Rana's service means that Muslims in Britain can, as in South Asia, continue to 'participate in a pluralistic medical system, and choose among health professionals representing different secular, as well as religious, medical traditions' (Lyon, 1991, p.145).

Many Muslims from South Asia consider a knowledge of Urdu is vital for the preservation of religion and culture, not least because it remains the lingua franca of the majority of South Asian Muslims and the language in which an enormous amount of Islamic literature is written and into which a large part of the rich store of Islamic
scholarship, in Arabic and Persian, has been translated. In this context any initiative which seeks to keep knowledge of Urdu alive is of great importance: three local commercial ventures are significant in this regard. In 1974 an Urdu magazine was launched in the city, the Ravi. After a precarious start it was taken over in 1976 by a Pakistani migrant from Gujrat in the Panjab, Mr Shaikh Maqsood Ellahie. In that year about five hundred copies fortnightly were printed. In 1992 it has a print run of eight thousand copies - since 1979 it has been a weekly - a quarter of which are sold locally and the rest are distributed to Pakistanis in Britain, Europe, the Middle East and America.

While Ravi is a weekly offering news and comment, Ujala, a monthly, Urdu, literary magazine was launched in 1989. The Urdu word means day-break/splendour and the magazine is self-consciously in the South Asian progressive writers' tradition. This tradition can be dated to 1935 when a manifesto was issued by the Progressive Writers Movement insisting on the need for literature to be socially relevant and a vehicle to combat the evils of 'hunger, poverty, social backwardness and slavery'; the more radical wing of the movement also 'ridiculed in strong terms the oppressiveness of religion and tradition' (Matthews, Shackle and Husain, 1985, p.121). The production of Ujala was possible since the printing technology had been developed to launch a firm of the same name, in 1982, which offered a service of translation, typesetting and printing in South Asian languages. Some two thousand copies are printed, of which a quarter are distributed locally. The proprietor of the firm, Mr Fazal Mahmood, is involved in both ventures. Mr Mahmood, born in Gujar Khan, in the Panjab, Pakistan, came to Bradford as a fifteen year old in 1972. Before starting his own business he was a community worker in the city.

The third and final commercial venture which needs to be mentioned as a vehicle and expression of the continuing vitality of Urdu in the city is Bradford City Radio. The Independent Radio Authority granted the franchise to a group of local investors in June 1989 to set up a commercial radio station aimed at the ethnic minority communities in the city, who were not served by either of the other local radio stations. Its programmes are in Urdu, Hindi, Panjabi and English.
Along with these local initiatives the London edition of the Pakistani, Urdu daily, Jang is also read in the city and Yorkshire Television is beginning to cater for the distinct linguistic and cultural traditions of South Asia: in May 1991 it launched a season of 'Asian' films with sub-titles and also produces an 'Asian' music and culture show, 'Bhangra Beat' (Telegraph & Argus, 24-5-1991). Since the early 1980s the Local Education Authority has found funding for some thirty five teachers of 'community' languages in some of the middle and upper schools in the city. The libraries have specialist librarians to provide a service in vernacular languages. It would seem that Urdu has a continuing constituency and future in the city, able to sustain a variety of commercial ventures.

A walk around the Muslim areas of the city also indicates many outlets of Pakistani firms and South-Asian goods: Pakistan International Airlines, Habib Bank, two large book shops selling books and magazines in Urdu and English, imported from Pakistan — much of it explicitly Islamic. All the goods and services one would expect to find in any British city are also provided by members of the Muslim communities, who because they are often bi-lingual naturally attract members of the 'Asian' communities e.g. the Muslim lawyers in the city have their practices in largely Muslim areas.

It is evident that many of the commercial structures, which sustain and develop a separate cultural and religious world, were often created and supported by the children and grandchildren of the first settlers. This is a necessary corrective to the view of an earlier researcher that there would be increasing disaffection amongst Bradford-born and educated Muslims resulting from the differential participation by parents and children in three distinct, social arenas: the homeland, the Muslim communities in the city and the majority society (Khan, 1977, pp. 85-87). Such disaffection clearly does exist and is rooted, in part, in a communication gap between parents and children (see 6.1). However, it is reasonable to suggest that where parents and children can communicate in a common language, Urdu, the impact of inter-generational tensions are minimised.
Writing about Pakistanis in Bradford in 1972-73 a researcher lamented that the community was 'fragmented with no "grass-root" organisations' (Khan, 1977, p.74). It would not be possible, over fifteen years later to say the same thing: while the mosques represent the largest investment by the Muslim communities to preserve religious, cultural and linguistic distinctiveness there has also been a proliferation of often complementary and overlapping associations and organisations reflecting diverse linguistic, cultural, and political allegiances. Some appeal mainly to the elders, others to youth and many straddle both groups. This dense network of voluntary, community initiatives - some funded in partnership with local and central government - both support and express a measure of cultural autonomy.

To glance at lists of organisations affiliated down the years to the local Community Relations Council - renamed Racial Equality Council in the autumn of 1991 - or those seeking funding from the local authority is a revealing index of the plethora of such voluntary associations. They vary from localised groups with a narrow focus, such as the Gujar Khan burial society, collecting regular subscriptions from those originally from that area of the Panjab in Pakistan to enable them to send their deceased back for burial, to the two day-centres for the elderly run by the Council for Mosques. There are Urdu cultural groups, who meet to read poetry, and a variety of regional self-help associations such as the Attock Cultural Association, the Azad Kashmir Muslim Association, the Bangladesh Porishad (for Sylhetis), the East Africa Muslims Society, and the Pukhtoon Cultural Society (for Pathans).

In 1979 the Bradford Council for Voluntary Services and the Local Authority, Youth and Community Department, both appointed community development workers for the 'ethnic minority' communities in the city. They were able to tap into central government 'Urban Programme' money to finance, inter alia, a range of youth and community centres, which benefited the different Muslim communities in the city: the Kam-and Centre and Grange Interlink Community Centre, were opened in
1982, the Pakistan Community Centre in 1984, and the Frizinghall Community Centre in 1986 – all include youth provision. Three youth centres, largely catering for Muslims, also began functioning in the 1980s: the Bangladesh Youth Organisation in 1982, al Falah in 1985 and Saathi Centre in 1986. The latter was, initially, hospitable to the pan-Asian, anti-racist Asian Youth Movement (AYM), founded in 1978. However, AYM's anti-racist stance, from its early days, had to contend with the powerful centrifugal pull of Hindu, Sikh and Muslim identities, and the tension between 'Asian' and Afro-Caribbean communities (Hiro, 1992, pp.172-175, Mehmood, 1983, 126-132). AYM did not survive the return in the late 1980s to community consolidation around separate Hindu, Sikh and Muslim identities.

Most political parties in Pakistan and Azad Kashmir have branches in the city. The Pakistan Peoples' Party (PPP), formed in 1970 as a bearer of 'Islamic socialism', established a branch in Bradford in the same year. The Pakistan Muslim League (UK) also has a branch in the city; along with Tehrik-i-Istiqilal, The Movement for Stability. The All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference (UK), the party which campaigns for Kashmir to join with Pakistan, opened an office as early as 1986. There are also a few members of the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front in the city, who want Kashmir to be independent of both Pakistan and India. The party which toppled Banazir Bhutto's PPP in October 1990, the Islami Jamhoori Ittihad, the Islamic Democratic Alliance, has had its Bradford satellite since the autumn of 1989, when one of its leading members, General Zia's son, Ajaz al Haq, visited Muslims in the city. On the 24th October 1991, designated 'Kashmir Day', the Kashmir Centre U.K. was launched in a meeting at the city's Pakistan Community Centre. Its aim was to support the fundamental right of self-determination 'brutally and savagely denied to the ...people of Kashmir by the illegal and oppressive Indian military forces of occupation' (promotional literature).

South Asian and British politics interact in various ways. To the bemusement of political commentators, a PPP candidate stood for the local Manningham ward elections in 1970, although 'what the policy of the PPP would be in Bradford's City Council...was something of a mystery!' (Le Lohe, 1979, p.197). In 1971, 1972 and 1973, with the
memory of civil war between West and East Pakistan still very much alive, it was not surprising that West Pakistanis in Manningham twice voted against co-religionists from Bangladesh and frustrated their hopes of election (ibid., pp.195-196). A local mosque committee was active in the campaign opposing the Bangladeshi candidate (Dahya, 1974, p.93). Bradford’s first Muslim councillor was a Bangladeshi, Munawar Hussain, who was co-opted as an alderman in 1972. This category of alderman was allowed to fall into abeyance in 1974 with local government re-organisation whereby Bradford from being a county borough was metamorphosed into a metropolitan district council.

By 1981 the city had three Muslim councillors, all Labour. One of them, Councillor Hameed was also President of the Bradford branch of Tehrik-i-Istiglal. By 1991 the city could boast nine Muslim councillors who were thus in a position to adopt an advocacy role on behalf of their communities. They included Councillor Ajeeb, the city’s first ‘Asian’ Lord Mayor in 1985-1986. Seven of the Muslim councillors were from Azad Kashmir, thereby reflecting their numerical dominance in the city; one was an East African, originally from the Panjab, and the other was a Bangladeshi, elected in 1991, in a largely Pakistani/Azad Kashmiri ward. This latter indicates that a new generation of younger politicians was beginning to develop tactical alliances across regional and linguistic divides. In this connection it is also significant that a Muslim woman was elected in 1992, the first Gujarati and first Muslim woman councillor in the city.

Two of the same young councillors who can engineer such alliances are also involved on the management of the Kashmir Centre U.K. Its secretary, Councillor Rangzeb, organised a visit to Kashmir by a delegation including two local M.P.s, representing the two main parties, in February 1992 (Telegraph & Argus, 1-2-92). With a general election in the offing neither political party could afford to appear indifferent to an issue in South Asia of great concern to a majority of their Muslim constituents. We have moved a long way since 1970 when a member of a Pakistani party could seek election in Bradford. Twenty years on local M.P.s cannot afford not to be well-informed about Pakistani and Azad Kashmiri politics.
Education has always been a possible source of friction between the Muslim communities and the local authority. Muslim anxieties about aspects of the educational system were evident as early as 1973. In that year Mr Riaz Shahid, standing as an independent candidate in a local election, was pressing the local authority to provide more single-sex, girls' schools. He defeated the labour candidate in the ward election, and just failed to pip the Conservative candidate (Le Lohe, 1979, p.197). Another researcher writing of the same period lamented that:

Mainstream schools in Britain are essentially monocultural and mono-lingual. The culture and language of ethnic minority children is not taught and, in most schools, not acknowledged or recognised as an additional skill to be valued (Khan, 1977, p.83).

A geographer mapping the social and ethnic geography of Bradford in the 1970s, musing on the 'cultural self-sufficiency' of the Muslim communities, noted that 'education...constitutes the principal "leak" in an otherwise fairly closed system' (Richardson, 1976, pp.175-176). Worries about education were to be a main trigger for the creation in 1981 of the Bradford Council for Mosques.

What is important to notice here is that the local authority did adopt a series of educational measures to honour the pledge given in its 1981 twelve-point, race relations initiative that all communities in the city had 'an equal right to maintain its own identity, culture, language, religion and customs'. From 1979 the policy of dispersing 'Asian' children throughout the city's schools — 'bussing' — intended to assist their acquisition of English by avoiding mono-lingual 'Asian' schools and ensuring some mutual contact between them and indigenous children was dropped, under pressure from parents, local politicians and a Commission for Racial Equality Investigation (Halstead, 1988, pp.37-39).

Local educational authority memoranda, under the new educational banner of 'multi-culturalism', sought to respond to Muslim concerns about dress codes for girls, single-sex swimming and physical education; they showed flexibility over extended visits to South Asia, introduced halal food in some schools, renegotiated the agreed religious education syllabus in 1983 and funded a pioneer Interfaith
Education Centre in 1986, with assistants from all the city's faith communities. Capitalising on generous subventions from the Home Office to meet 'special needs' of ethnic minority children - section 11 - the authority had, by 1989, some 280 language support staff, 97 nursery nurse posts, 40 home-school liaison posts, 18 bi-lingual assistants, and 34 community language teachers. While there were few 'Asian' teachers among the authority's five thousand staff a variety of initiatives, not least by Bradford and Ilkley Community College in setting up bi-lingual access courses, has seen their number increase to about 130 in 1991.

These measures, meant to reassure Muslim parents that the state sector of education could accommodate most of their 'special needs', were dogged by dispute. An educational researcher has reviewed the controversy in the city in the mid-eighties, sparked by articles written by a local headmaster, Mr Ray Honeyford, who challenged much of the conventional wisdom on multi-culturalism. This research suggested that the local authority on such issues as single-sex education and extended leave for children to visit South Asia 'indicated a value judgment which gives priority to the preservation of cultural identity over the promotion of social integration and cohesion' (Halstead, 1988, p.27). Whatever the truth of such a contention a local teacher, writing in 1987, pointed out that Muslims in the city would have less 'inter-cultural contact' than would have been the case a decade earlier:

The cultural boundary may be conceived of as moving in time and space, ten years ago it was arrived at on beginning school, now it is met when the child leaves the middle school - and home area - to attend upper school (Shepherd, 1987, p.265).

This statement is true but potentially misleading: only fifteen per cent of 'Asian' children were ever bussed (Halstead, 1988, p.38); as soon as schools are not seen as a vehicle of social engineering then, inevitably, first and middle schools approximate to neighbourhood schools, and thus reflect the composition of those areas. It is not altogether surprising that by 1989 some forty-five local schools had an 'Asian' intake of 70%+, of which 10 were middle schools and 4 upper schools. A survey of pupils transferring to upper school from
middle school in 1991 showed some 672 Muslim pupils concentrated in four upper schools, whose total intake was 80%+ Muslim, while 603 were distributed between 17 other upper schools. This indicates that just under half the Muslims transferring to upper schools in the city do not attend the four, largely, Muslim-intake, upper schools adjacent to their core residential areas. Other educational vehicles of social interaction include the prestigious, private Bradford Grammar School, with at least 5% of its 1200 pupils Muslim, and the new City Technology College, opened in September 1990 and drawing from inner city wards, with more than 15% of its students Muslim in 1992. In all, we need to allow for a larger measure of 'inter-cultural contact' than Shepherd's research might lead us to postulate. However, for the present argument, the important point is that the city's schools have sought with a measure of success to reflect the concerns of many Muslim parents, who themselves can choose the pace at which the primary socialisation of family, mosque and Muslim peers can yield to the secondary socialisation of schooling amongst non-Muslims.

The 'institutional completeness' which Dahya noted in the mid-sixties has persisted and been enhanced by the proliferation of culture-specific goods and services, organisations and an education system which, with local authority encouragement, has similarly sought to support rather than subvert religious and cultural distinctiveness. Such institutions continue to make explicit the Muslim communities' 'refusal to adopt local norms or to surrender its...identity' except as part of a process of local negotiation (Dahya, 1974, p.95). The conclusion of a recent anthropological study of Muslims in Manchester holds for Bradford's Muslims:

the stress on cultural independence is not a permanent barrier to participation in the outside world... it constitutes a protection from stigma and external domination...the one-way deterministic approach which defines immigrants as 'victims' is unable to account for the dialectic process which interaction between the immigrant group and the state generates. This process results in the increasing integration into wider structures while, simultaneously, it fosters a separate cultural institutional identity (Werbner, 1991, p.141).
2.3.3 Multiple identities and the criss-crossing of regional, sectarian and caste loyalties

What is also apparent in Bradford is that the Muslim communities have a multiplicity of centres of influence—nine Muslim councillors in 1991, a Council for Mosques and an emerging business and professional elite. A later chapter will seek to identify more closely the respective spheres of influence and tensions between these groups (5.3). However, it is important to illustrate how Muslims can belong to a variety of religious, political and cultural associations, as well as change allegiances within the kaleidoscope of such groupings, and yet still contribute to strengthening a distinctive multi-layered cultural and religious tradition. This is particularly important for an understanding of the constraints within which the city's religious leadership and Muslim activists have to operate.

Three examples will suffice to illustrate the range and diversity of these cross-cutting allegiances. Mr Ishtiaq Ahmed came to Bradford from Gujar Khan in 1967 when he was ten years old. His father belonged to the Barelwi school of thought and Ishtiaq attended a mosque in that tradition. In upper school in Bradford he joined the Islamic Youth Movement (IYM), founded in 1974, the vehicle of the Jamaat-i-Islami tradition. He later became its national General Secretary.

In 1979 he was appointed the Bradford Council for Voluntary Services' first community worker charged with developing 'ethnic minority' services. In the mid-1980s he was active in race relations, employed in Calderdale's race relations department, and a founder-member, with a Bangladeshi, Mohammed Salam, of a radical group called the Black Workers Collective (BWC) which was set up in Bradford to organize black workers and defend their interests and democratic rights (Halstead, 1988, p.113). In 1987 he and Salam were dubbed 'young Turks' by the local media, when they were appointed chairman and vice-chairman, respectively, of the Bradford Community Relations Council, replacing some of the better known elders. By 1990 he was information officer of the Bradford Council for Mosques and had returned to his Barelwi roots, representing one of their mosques.
If Mr Ahmed is an example of an educated Muslim, who is bi-lingual and bi-cultural, and whose progress turns on considerable natural abilities, allied to a keen strategic sense, eager to forge alliances across linguistic, sectarian and religious divides, our second example, Raja Najabat Hussain, self-consciously operates more within a regional and biradari network.22 He came to Bradford in 1977 from Azad Kashmir when he was already twenty two years old. In Azad Kashmir he organised a new students’ group, the Muslim Students’ Federation, an activist group favouring a united Kashmir, allied to Pakistan. In England he became the General-Secretary of the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference. In 1988 he was a member of the Bareli Jamliyat Tabligh ul Islam executive committee in Bradford 3, which controlled six mosques and supplementary schools; he sat on the Council for Mosques, was chairman of the Karmand centre and Bradford Moor Conservative Party, and vice-chair of the Bradford Law Centre. His power base was unashamedly the bains rajput biradari, the largest, he maintained, in the Muslim community. In 1988 all members of the Bradford 3 Jamliyat Tabligh ul Islam executive belonged to the same biradari, as did the President of the Council for Mosques that year and the chairman of the Pakistan Community Centre.

While Najabat Hussain is proud of his biradari and their extensive influence, as Director of the Kashmir Centre U.K. he is quick to point out that its advisory group includes members of other biradaris – high status jat and low status artisan castes, kammis, alike: many of the latter have availed themselves of the educational opportunities in the city to acquire professional qualifications and some have become councillors. The advisory group, in fact, cuts across biradari, sectarian, regional and generational differences. Amongst its younger members it numbers two councillors, a social worker, a college lecturer; the elders include the Deobandi secretary of the Council for Mosques, from Chhachh, and two Punjabi businessmen, one of whom is the President of the Islami Jamhoori Ittihad, at present the ruling party in Pakistan.

The membership of the Islami Jamhoori Ittihad is our third and final example of the labyrinthine alliances which criss-cross the different Muslim communities in the city. In Pakistan the party is a coalition
of different religio-political groups, which joined together to topple the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP). These same groups joined it in Bradford: the Muslim League was represented by its President, Raja Hamid Rashid, one of the two Punjabi business men involved in the Kashmir Centre U.K., himself a Barelwi, active in the Hanafia mosque in the city and a member of the Council for Mosques. The U.K. Islamic Mission - a vehicle of the Jamaat-i-Islami tradition - was represented by their President, a Punjabi, Umar Warraich, a retired health inspector in the city. The Ahl-i-Hadith was represented by another Punjabi businessman, Mr Awan and the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference was represented by the ubiquitous Najabat Hussain, an Azad Kashmiri Barelwi. What is significant about this group is that membership of distinct, sectarian traditions, often with a history of mutual antipathy, does not prevent individuals co-operating on a different platform.

The reproduction in Bradford of much of the commercial, political, linguistic and institutional world of South Asia allows for a large measure of religious and cultural autonomy. This is not to suggest that the Muslim religious leaders endorse it all uncritically. Nor is it assumed that all Muslims are devout. Yet, for all that, Islam is part of their cultural and ethnic identity. As to whether Islam or, perhaps, Pakistani nationalism will be given particular salience depends on context: during the Rushdie affair youngsters rallied around Islam as a vehicle of ethnic identity; after Pakistan won the cricket world cup in March 1992 many youngsters celebrated by driving through parts of the city in high spirits, waving Pakistani flags, some a little too enthusiastically (Telegraph & Argus, 26-3-1992). The religious leadership, of course, hope that the explicitly 'Islamic' component in identity will assume greater importance.
Dr Tariq Modood characterises South Asian Muslims in Britain generally as 'a semi-industrialised, newly urbanised working class community that is only one generation away from rural peasantry' (1990, p.145). This is certainly true of Bradford, where most of the first settlers in Bradford had little if any formal education. This is hardly surprising since many came from the least developed areas of Indo-Pakistan. A majority came from Azad Kashmir, an area, pre-partition, under the control of the Maharajas by whom it was 'shamefully neglected' and which 'contained hardly any schools' (Rose, 1969, p.59). Even today, for Pakistan as a whole, according to Dr M.Afzal, General Zia's Minister for Education in the 1980s, 'educational statistics are appalling: 8 per cent of its population are educated up to primary, 2 per cent secondary and 0.02 per cent university level... (official statistics are 'padded' and inflated)' (Ahmed, 1988, p.201).

In such an environment, sound rather than sight is crucial for the transmission of a religious tradition. Printed books remain scarce and the teacher has to be attuned to the oral-aural dimensions of literacy - dimensions to which typographic cultures tend to be insensitive given their assumption of the primacy in language of written or printed words. Walter Ong has helped us understand the lineaments of an 'orally constituted sensibility and tradition' (1988, p.99). In such an environment mnemonic tricks are essential to solve effectively the problem of retaining and retrieving carefully articulated thought... (whether) heavily rhythmic, balanced patterns, in repetitions or antitheses, in alliterations and assonances, in epithetic and other formulary expressions... in proverbs which are constantly heard by everyone so that they come to mind readily (ibid., p.34).
In an oral culture words are recalled rather than looked up: ‘knowledge is hard to come by and precious, and society regards highly those wise old men... who specialize in conserving it’. Orality also fosters personality structures that in certain ways are more communal and externalized, and less introspective than those common among literates. Oral communication unites people in groups. Writing and reading are solitary activities that throw the psyche back on itself (ibid., pp. 41 and 60).

Ong's comments can illuminate the persistence of three features common to traditional Islam in South Asia, where literacy has been confined to the few. Firstly, the omnipresence of the Qur'an as 'spoken word, a recited word, a word that makes itself felt in personal and communal life in large part through its living quality as sacred sound' (Graham, 1985, p. 40). Indeed, qur'anic recitation - qira'a - is a basic discipline of Islamic studies rooted in the qur'anic imperative of sura 73:4: 'chant the recitation carefully and distinctly' (ibid., p. 35). Bukhari, the most prestigious collection of prophetic traditions, includes one which states that 'when the Qur'an is recited, there descends with the reciting the divine presence (sakina)' (ibid., p. 214). Little wonder that throughout South Asia - and in Bradford today - many youngsters will devote years to committing to memory the entire Qur'an and thus acquire the coveted title of hafiz. Further, a qari, a reciter of the Qur'an, who has mastered the science of tajwid - 'the adornment of recitation' (S.E.I., 1981, p. 557) - will be much in demand for public and domestic occasions.

Secondly, respect is accorded to the bearers of Islamic knowledge, with 'authoritative knowledge... transmitted from person to person' (Robinson, 1992, p. 14). A student in an Islamic academy sits at the feet of his teacher, who would dictate a text to his pupils, who might write it down, or frequently would commit it to memory... subsequently, there might be an explanation of the text... the completion of the study of the book would involve a reading back of the text with an explanation. If this was done to the teacher's satisfaction, the pupil would be...
given an ijaza, (which means 'to make lawful'), a licence to teach the text. On that ijaza ...would be the names of all those who had transmitted the text going back to the original author. The pupil was left in no doubt that he was trustee in his generation of part of the great tradition of Islamic learning handed down from the past (ibid., p.10).

Similarly, within the sufi tradition, a sufi would trace his ancestry right back to the Prophet. In Bradford Pir Maroof Hussain Shah, an influential local leader in the sufi tradition, has a printed genealogical tree which traces his spiritual ancestry back to the founder of his order in Gujrat, Pakistan, Haji Muhammad Naushah (1552-1654) and thence to the Prophet Muhammad. In all, Pir Maroof is thirty-fourth in a chain, silsila, including the Prophet’s son-in-law Ali and great sufis like Abdul Qadir Jilani (d.1166) buried in Baghdad. Pir Maroof is critical of free-wheeling, self-styled spiritual guides and insists on the importance for any pir to belong to an order, to have his own spiritual guide and to have his permission to initiate devotees.

Thirdly, in popular piety qawwals, devotional songs, committed to memory, have brought consolation and spiritual nourishment to Muslims in South Asia for over six hundred years.

Under the guidance of a spiritual leader...groups of trained musicians (qawwals) present in song a vast treasure of poems which articulate and evoke the gamut of mystical experience for the spiritual benefit of their audience. Through the act of listening — sama’— the Sufi seeks to activate his link with his living spiritual guide, with saints departed, and ultimately with God... The music serves to kindle the flame of mystical love... There is no Qawwali experience more vivid and profound than the 'urs of (a great Sufi saint of the past), the commemoration of his own final union with God on the anniversary of his death (Qureshi, 1986, p.1).

Qawwalis, with their devotion to particular sufis and their shrines, are a treasured component of South Asian Islamic piety and their impact conforms to the dynamics of oral-aural performance. The stress
is on the repetition of known and familiar sufí poems, with a shared repertoire of image and metaphor, invested with a wealth of highly elaborated symbolic content. 'As a result, much meaning can be conveyed in a few words... (charged) with great associational and connotational power' (ibid., p.83).

These three traditional features of the transmission and expression of Islamic knowledge - the essential orality of the Qur'án, a highly personalised transfer of knowledge through accredited teachers and the popularity of sama': 'mystical concert and dance' (Schimmel, 1975, p.503) - although persisting, have increasingly been exposed to scrutiny and challenge. The introduction of lithographic printing in nineteenth century India began a process, yet to be completed, whereby human consciousness was effected by the shift from oral to written speech, from an emphasis on sound to sight.

The reformist Deobandi tradition, with its popularization of teaching emphasising correct belief and practice, as an antidote to more localised, customary expressions of Islam, is inconceivable without printing. Printing also facilitates a shift from rote learning to an emphasis on understanding. This is evident in an encyclopaedic Urdu work for women, Bihishti Zewar, Heavenly Ornaments, first written in 1906 by Maulana Thanawi (d.1943) - a book which has undergone innumerable revisions and has been translated into English and is used in some Deobandi mosques in Bradford. The author of a partial translation and commentary of Bihishti Zewar notices that Thanawi urges a teacher using it to make sure that the girls, should always repeat the lesson in their own words... and if there are two or three of them they should ask each other questions. The teacher is to teach only what the girls can grasp... This is far from technical reading aloud in an unknown language or rote memorization of fixed texts (Metcalf, 1990, p.20).

The 'ulama who used the printing presses assumed that the printed book could reinforce learning systems that already existed, to improve them, not to transform them' (Robinson, 1992, p.18). Books were not envisaged as dispensing with teachers. This is evident in the advantages Thanawi itemises for urging a woman to have a
spiritual guide, a pir:
a faulty understanding can misguide you...a master, however, can explain the right path; a second advantage is that reading something in a book is often not as effective as a master's explanation. This is in part because of his blessed power (baraka). Moreover, a disciple fears embarrassment before the master if she falls short in some good work...the third advantage is that, because a disciple loves and believes in the master, her heart wants to act as he teaches...the fourth advantage is that the disciple does not take it amiss if the master is harsh or angry in giving her good counsel (Metcalf, 1990, p.199).

For Thanawi the bewildering range and suspect nature of much printed material made a teacher essential. He himself went as far as prescribing and proscribing lists of books he considered either worthwhile or harmful. Bihishti Zewar was intended, after all, for an oral, public world. It was to be read aloud, discussed openly, taught in groups...his proscribed list...perhaps intended to discourage...the privacy of reading silently, of creating a private world of one's own inner voice by losing oneself—a terrible image, in Thanawi's view—in books like novels (ibid., p.21).

In the long term, however, print challenged the 'ulama's monopoly as custodians and privileged bearers of the Islamic tradition. The printed book could render the reader independent of the need for an authoritative teacher and impatient of their necessary conservatism: 'By storing knowledge outside the mind...print downgrade(s) the figure of the wise...repeaters of the past, in favour of discoverers of something new' (Ong, 1988, p.41). New trajectories of Islamic thought and practice were developed by those who were not accredited 'ulama, who simply by-passed their time honoured disciplines of study. Such are the majority of modernists and Islamists.

Modernist and Islamist alike created their own separate institutions of Islamic study and research. The modernist Fazlur Rahman completed his formal study in Western universities, institutions outside the control and often beyond the comprehension of many of the 'ulama. In
1962 he was appointed director of the Islamic Research Institute, a modernist centre set up by the Pakistan government in 1960 as an alternative to their centres of study (Rahman, 1976). Jamaat-i-Islami, the movement generated by the Islamist Maulana Maududi - a journalist rather than a product of a traditional Islamic seminary - established its own rival Islamic Research Academy in Karachi in 1963 (Ahmad, 1991, p. 473). Jamaat-i-Islami, which appeals to many educated Muslims, is also 'a product of print culture... in significant measure sustained by print, a large part of its income comes from the sale of Maududi's works' (Robinson, 1992, p. 27).

The characteristic products of print, whether newspapers, tracts, or books have replaced the 'oral, mobile, warm, personally interactive lifeworld of oral culture' (Ong, 1988, p. 80) with a 'community in anonymity' (Anderson, 1983, p. 40), or perhaps better 'communities in anonymity', given the inevitable pluralism of voices claiming to speak and write within an Islamic perspective. The irony now is that the emergence of the electronic media - whether radio, television, audio and video cassettes, which depend on writing and print for their existence - has created what Ong has dubbed an age of 'secondary orality'. Secondary orality bears some resemblances to primary orality in its 'participatory mystique, its fostering of a communal sense... but (it) generates a sense for groups immeasurably larger than those of primary oral culture' (Ong, 1988, p. 136).

Some Muslims from within a traditional, Islamic culture have not been slow to understand and exploit the potential of the electronic media. Ahmad Deedat, the popular Muslim preacher and controversialist from South Africa, and a frequent visitor to Britain, invariably makes video tapes of his debates, as well as producing written pamphlets. Since these are also in English they are enormously popular with Muslim youth. In Bradford few of the self-consciously Muslim groups are without their stock of his videos. Similarly, the tapes of respected and much-loved qawwals from Pakistan are very popular in Bradford, whether Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan - a regular visitor to Britain - or the Sabri brothers. In November 1989 BBC2 broadcast a programme entitled 'Rhythms of the World', which featured Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan in concert in Birmingham, where he had been invited by
local Muslims to celebrate milad, the Prophet's birthday. Video copies of this programme were soon circulating among Muslims in Bradford.

The challenges facing the Muslim religious leadership in Bradford are awesome. How are they to provide personnel, develop appropriate organisations and generate resources to meet the needs of communities with often conflicting expectations? On the one hand, there are the elders in the community, the majority of whom are rural people from South Asia, without formal education and who speak a local 'oral-based' dialect — dubbed a 'restricted linguistic code' by linguists — and on the other hand, educated, literate, 'text-based' English speakers, who use an 'elaborated linguistic code.'

The rest of this chapter will consider the different sectarian groupings in the city and explore their ethos, leadership, networks, resources and priorities. In particular, the focus will be the extent to which each tradition has begun to address the needs of the burgeoning young Muslim population, British born and educated. In this regard, four issues are especially important: Firstly, which traditions have produced materials in English? Secondly, which have succeeded in establishing Islamic seminaries in Britain? Thirdly, which groupings are hospitable to youth work? Finally, which have the resources and willingness to utilise the electronic media for transmitting aspects of the Islamic tradition?

3.2 PIR MAROOF AND BARELWI INITIATIVES

When the history of the Muslim presence in Britain is written the contribution of 'pioneer' religious leaders like Pir Maroof Hussain Shah should not be overlooked. Pir Maroof's energy and range of initiatives are extraordinary. Born in Chak Swari, in District Mirpur, Azad Kashmir in 1936 he came to Britain in 1961. At the same time as working for almost a quarter of a century in textile mills he sought to respond to the religious needs of his community. In 1963 he established the Jamiat Tabligh-ul-Islam, the Association for the Preaching of Islam. Membership forms for the association spell out its aims as, inter alia, to spread the teachings of Islam among
Muslims and non-Muslims in the light of the holy Qur'an, Hadith, the consensus of the community and the Hanafi law. The association was also committed to follow the spiritual teachings/mysticism (tasawwuf) of the majority of the leaders of the Qadri, Chishti, Naqshbandi and Suhrawardi orders. By 1989 of the eleven mosques and seven supplementary schools in the Barelwi tradition in the city, eight mosques and six supplementary schools belonged to his association.

While Pir Maroof directly controls the association's central mosque at Southfield Square, his relation to the others, which have their own mosque committees, is to provide appropriate mosque personnel and the syllabus to be studied, to arbitrate in disputes, and to organise the major religious festivals which punctuate the Muslim calendar. In the late 1960s he also set up centres in Sheffield and Oldham—often raising interest free loans to help the local mosque committee buy the appropriate properties. At the same time, he was establishing dar al-'ulum, seminaries, to train 'ulama. One in Chak Swari in 1985, another in 1968 near the location of the family shrine in Dogah Sharif, Gujrat, Pakistan. To complete the prescribed course of study for an 'alim, Pir Maroof himself had had to go outside Azad Kashmir to the large urban centres of Jhelum and Rawalpindi in the Punjab. Therefore, he wanted to provide local centres of training in areas starved of such institutions.

Pir Maroof's first love is tasawwuf and he has a fine library of standard works in Arabic, Persian and Urdu. He himself writes devotional poetry in praise of God, hamd and the Prophet, na't. In 1985 on his brother's death he succeeded him as a spiritual guide in the Qadiri, Naushahi order, which traces its ancestry back to Haji Muhammad Naushah (d.1654). As early as 1961 he had organised a Naushahi circle for devotees.

With this range of responsibilities Pir Maroof has a punishing schedule involving up to five months travel a year: some four months are spent in Pakistan visiting his devotees, murids, and two seminaries; a month is spent in Holland, France, Belgium and Germany visiting his devotees among the Pakistani diaspora and organising the
festivities which surround the birth of the Prophet, the death anniversaries of the founder of his order, and that of his brother, Pir Syed Abul Kamal Barq.

As a spiritual guide Pir Maroof performs a range of pastoral tasks. In one meeting he mentioned the sort of anxieties and questions which led people to seek his advice. A marriage registered under British law is dissolved and the wife is given a divorce without the husband’s approval – uncertainty will then remain as to whether such a divorce is Islamically valid. His prayers and a ta’wiz, amulet, are sought to offer relief for a range of pressing anxieties, whether an important examination or an immigration case – the latter, particularly, can assume the nature of an unpredictable lottery given the vagaries of British immigration law. A few come complaining of being possessed by an evil jinn – most, he insists, are really cases of hysteria (in women), or possibly epilepsy or even high blood pressure. Pir Maroof will usually pray for them, offer a ta’wiz and, where necessary, refer them to a G.P. Some murids come worried by persistent dreams and seek his interpretation of them. Increasingly, families are split over the issue of arranged marriage and he seeks to mediate between parents and children. Education is a source of continuing worry to parents – is the food halal, what should their stance be on sex education?

Pir Maroof is also involved in a wider political and religious arena. In 1973, while on pilgrimage to Mecca, he created the ‘World Islamic Mission’ (W.I.M.), an umbrella organisation for Barelwi dignitaries, with its head office located in his mosque at Southfield square in Bradford. Pir Maroof was its founder and vice-President, with its first President Maulana Noorani, leader of the Barelwi political party in Pakistan. Under W.I.M.’s auspices two important works of Ahmad Riza Khan (d.1921), founder of the Barelwi maslak, tradition – were translated into English. The first of these was his Urdu translation of the Qur’an, which has a preface written by Pir Maroof, commending its translator’s commitment ‘not only (to) the literal meaning of the Qur’an and the Sunnah but also its spiritual message, the love and devotion for the Messenger and his full Cosmic Status of unlimited knowledge of the unseen’ (Fatmi, 1985). The second was his
famous *durud sharif*, litanies in praise of the prophet, known as *Salaam* - each verse in Urdu ends with that word - which is often read at the conclusion of Friday prayers in their mosques.

It is worth rehearsing some of the verses from the *Salaam* which give us an unrivalled insight into the status of the Prophet in this devotional tradition:

- Blessed be Mustafa, mercy for mankind,
  - God's light, the right way to find.

- Blessed be the splendour of the next world,
  - Dignity, justice and grandeur of this world.

- Blessed be the source of knowledge divine,
  - Outstanding and the last in the Prophet's line.

- Blessed be the point of Life's hidden unity,
  - And also the centre of its visible diversity.

- Blessed be the giver of blessings diverse,
  - On whose account God created the universe.

- Blessed be the prime cause of creation,
  - The final medium of salvation (Qureshi, 1981, pp. 29-31).

Such devotion to the person of the Prophet both explains the passion which informs rivalries with other Muslim groups who seem to derogate from the honour properly due to the Prophet and prepares us for the anger which fuelled and sustained the opposition to *The Satanic Verses*. W.I.M. is clearly intended as a counterweight to the Mecca-based 'Muslim World League', a vehicle for those whom Barelwis scornfully dismiss as Wahhabi, whether Deobandi, Jamaat-i-Islami or Ahl-i-Hadith. The chairman of the 'Muslim World League' in 1982 delivered a *fatwa*, a legal decision, declaring the event and devotions surrounding the Prophet's birthday to be an 'evil innovation' (Schimmel, 1985, p.148). An English translation of this ruling was on the notice board of one of the Deobandi mosques in Bradford in 1990.
The issues dividing Barelwi and Wahhabi were made very clear at the Hijaz Conference, a large gathering organised by W.I.M. at the Wembley Conference Centre in May 1985. In the presence of a galaxy of dignitaries, including Pir Maroof and Maulana Noorani, the conference attracted more than 3,000 participants from all over Britain. Formal resolutions were passed: condemning Saudi officials for confiscating and allegedly destroying translations of the Qur'an by Ahmad Riza Khan and devotional books; complaining about the draconian measures to which Muslims in Madina and Mecca were exposed when they sought to celebrate the Prophet's birthday; seeking assurances that remaining sites associated with the Prophet, his family and companions would be respected and maintained; objecting to the fact that the 'Muslim World League', ostensibly intended to foster Muslim co-operation, was staffed almost entirely by Wahhabis, who accounted for only 2 per cent of the Muslim community world-wide.

A back-handed compliment to the Barelwi influence was a book published the same year in Arabic and English, entitled Bareilawis: history and beliefs, by a leading Pakistani Ahl-i-Hadith scholar, Ehsan Elahi Zaheer. This polemical work was written in Arabic to alert Muslims in the Arab world to the beliefs of this 'superstitious and innovating sect' whose activities are on the increase' — explicit mention is made of their activities in England (Zaheer, 1985, pp.26-27).

Local and national gatherings and processions on the occasion of the Prophet's birthday continue to be the central event in the Barelwi calendar. Pir Maroof organised the first public procession through the streets of Bradford on the occasion of the milad in 1984. Such regional gatherings are often advertised in the national Urdu press, and Pir Maroof's procession in 1988 was promoted in the Urdu daily, Jang (14-10-88). In 1987 Pir Maroof was chosen by the World Sufi Council to be its representative in Britain. The council was headed by Dr Sheikh Shams uddin al Fassi, a Saudi Arabian, belonging to the Shazili sufi order. Under its auspices Pir Maroof organised in the autumn of 1987 and 1988 enormous milad gatherings in Hyde Park, London, comprising some twenty five thousand people: coaches came from Nelson, Birmingham, Manchester, Sheffield, Walsall, Oldham,
Leicester, Coventry, Halifax, Woking, Leeds, Bradford, Peterborough, Middlesborough, Derby, Darlington and many other cities...Na't, Darood and Salaam were presented in honour of the Prophet' (The Islamic Times, December 1987, p.16). Jang carried a report and pictures of the 1988 gathering on its front page (31-10-1988).

Pir Maroof's myriad activities have been bedevilled by personal and political rivalries, which, along with economic recession, have brought the financial viability of some of them into question. In February 1986 the foundation stone of an ambitious purpose-built mosque was laid, 'expected to take two years to build ... (at a) cost of around £8.5m' (The Islamic Times, December, 1985, p.20). By 1990 the scheme had to be pared back to £1 million: the rapidly increasing numbers of young children meant that priority had to be given to building local, accessible mosques and supplementary schools, while promised Arab sponsorship proved elusive - Dr Fassi only gave £20,000 of the £120,000 promised. Although over £400,000 had been spent on the mosque by 1992 it was still years away from completion.

Money was not the only problem. As early as 1974 Pir Maroof's leadership was challenged by a rival Barelwi group, the Hanafia Association, many of whose members comprised local business men who were either devotees of another Azad Kashmiri Pir, Alauddin Siddiqui, or supporters of the Pakistan People's Party, antagonistic to Maulana Noorani's party in Pakistan and therefore critical both of Pir Maroof's choice of him as President of W.I.M. and the platform offered to Noorani to speak at W.I.M.'s first big gathering in Bradford in 1974. The Hanafia Association announced its plans to build another purpose-built mosque close to Pir Maroof's chosen site. Mutual recriminations grew steadily more vicious and led to a 'stabbing incident' between rival factions (Telegraph & Argus, 27-9-79). Since then Pir Maroof's pre-eminent position has been further eroded by the establishment of two more large Barelwi mosques, each owing allegiance to other pirs: Suffat ul Islam (UK) Association in 1985 and Sultan Bahu Trust in 1986.9

Although Pir Maroof's supporters still control many mosques and supplementary schools, limited resources and disputes between 'ulama
and biradari; 'localised intermarrying caste group!' (Werbner, 1990, p.46), who often control the mosque committees - have meant that Pir Maroof has had considerable difficulty in keeping his best 'ulama. Maulana Arshad al Qadri and Maulana Azmi, Vice-President and General-Secretary of W.I.M India and U.K. respectively, both stayed for three years only, leaving in 1976 and 1979 - the latter moved on to a mosque in Manchester; Maulana Nishtar joined the rival Hanafia Association in 1982. In 1989 of eight trained 'ulama, fourteen huffaz, and ten part-timers working in the Jamiyat Tabligh-ul-Islam centres the General-Secretary of the association considered only four to be really competent scholars in Arabic and not many more knew English. Pir Maroof, as well as depending on three of his cousins and three of the products of his seminaries in Pakistan, relied on eight Gujaratis, a situation widely acknowledged to be less than ideal with the mother tongue of most of the children Punjabi rather than the Urdu which the Gujarati 'ulama also know.

The worst effect of intra-Barelwi rivalries has been the failure of Pir Maroof's vision to see his Islamic Missionary College, set up in 1974, develop into a fully-fledged Islamic seminary, capable of training a new generation of English-speaking 'ulama and thereby freeing the mosques from the need to depend on South Asia for personnel. The three 'ulama listed earlier who left Jamiyat Tabligh-ul-Islam were all well-trained and respected scholars and were, respectively, Principal and governors of the Islamic Missionary College. Other reasons for the failure of the college are also instructive: it was short of sponsorship, parents were reluctant or unable to finance their son for the six or seven years of study required; the college could only take students after they completed their state education - the college did not have resources to establish a preparatory private school - by which time the gap between the world of western education and that of a traditional Islamic seminary was almost insuperable. Finally, the salary they could command as an 'alim was little more than £70 a week in 1989, probably a third of what they might earn in a mill.

The General-Secretary of Jamiyat Tabligh ul Islam considers the teachers in mosque and supplementary schools to have three essential
tasks with regard to the youngsters: to teach them to read the Qur'an in Arabic; to teach them Urdu — thereby giving them access to Islamic literature as well as facilitating communication between parents and children; and to furnish them with essential knowledge of Islam. The literature available and in use in the mosques turns on the preferences and competence in English of the teachers. Generally, where a text book is used for Islamic knowledge it is an Urdu work, Hamara Islam, Our Islam. This work takes for granted the vocabulary and tradition of the Barelwis: In answer to the question, 'What is the sign of love for the Prophet?' the importance of zikr, durood sharif, milad and the recitation of salaam are all mentioned; the importance of the intercession of the Prophet on the Day of Judgement is emphasised; attending the shrines of the sufis and participating in their jurs as a vehicle of blessing is stressed; the miracles of the latter are detailed — walking on water, flying in the air, revealing what is happening far away, raising the dead etc.; an important distinction is made between good and ruinous innovations in religious practice with the former, bid'e hasana, deemed acceptable (Khan, n.d. pp. 20, 105, 118, 119-20 and 194).

For teaching Urdu most of the teachers use the Urdu text books produced by the Punjab text book board, Lahore, used in Pakistan's schools. These reflect the unself-conscious religiosity of Pakistan as illustrated in chapter one. Muslim youngsters brought up in Bradford, who have never seen a shrine, still less experienced its carnival atmosphere, must find the taken-for-granted religious world of their parents and teachers inaccessible to them. A few of the mosques use the Urdu books produced for Bradford schools which draw on the imagery and experience of British children.

If parents are literate in English they can supplement the teaching in the mosque with material from the The Islamic Times, produced in Stockport. This monthly magazine, started in the autumn of 1985, has some limited circulation in Bradford — the editor is a murid of Pir Maroof. The magazine is clearly in the Barelwi tradition with extensive selections from Ahmad Riza Khan's voluminous writings, translated into English. It also includes material for children and women. While it began in English only it soon became bi-lingual,
English and Urdu. The editorial on its fifth anniversary thanked its readers for their continuing support and noted that its independence and 'Islamic integrity' remained intact since, unlike most other journals, it was not funded by 'foreign Middle East governments' and thus could reflect and analyse the problems of the British Muslim community rather than be 'mouth-pieces of...foreign governments...not bothered about the Muslim community in Britain' (November 1990, p. 4). This is an accusation often heard in Barelwi circles.

The Barelwi tradition is not unsympathetic to the need for some youth provision. The difficulty is that there are few in the community with any understanding of organised youth work. Maulana Azmi encouraged the formation of the Muslim youth group for boys, al Falah, in 1979, and this group continues to draw on the support of 'ulama in the Barelwi tradition. Its new building was opened in 1985 and the plaque celebrating this fact bears the name of a Pakistani sufi, Naqeebullah Khan Shah, who usually visits Britain annually. Many of the management are his murids. The centre has good recreational facilities and a library of Islamic books and videos. Barelwis are quite prepared to utilise the electronic media, where resources permit. The range of activities al Falah can offer tends to depend on the vicissitudes of local authority funding.

Provision for girls/women, outside supplementary schools, remains very limited. A major factor is that many of the house-mosques have neither space nor resources to build the additional, separate, ablution facility and prayer hall needed to render their premises usable for women. Only two of the Jamiat Tablígh-ul-Islam mosques have a prayer room for women. However, both Barelwi purpose-built mosques under-construction include space for women to pray and to participate in Friday prayers. Maulana Nishtar is unusual in that he teaches a separate class of girls Arabic to G.C.S.E. level. The situation is well described in an editorial in the Islamic Times:

The young boy from his childhood may be sent to the madrassah for Islamic education, he will be expected to pray... talk to the Mullahs freely, join Islamic groups, attend Islamic conferences or summer camps... As for girls, apart from some parents sending their
girls to the madrassas there is hardly any other form of participation in Islamic activities... (February, 1989, p.2).

3.3 DEOBANDI AND TABLIGHI JAMAAT

The management of Bradford's fourteen Deobandi centres is much more ethnically diverse than that of the Barelwi mosques and supplementary schools. Seven are controlled by Pathans and Punjabis from Chhachh in Pakistan, four by Suratis from Gujarat in India - two of which by Suratis who migrated to East Africa - and three by Sylhetis from Bangladesh. Within the Chhachh constellation of mosques, and indeed outside it, the Howard Street mosque - known formally and constitutionally as the 'Muslim Association of Bradford, but popularly referred to as 'Howard Street' - enjoys a certain primacy: it was the first mosque to be established in 1959; it developed an expertise in dealing with local bureaucracies, particularly necessary if planning permission was to be successfully achieved; it helped raise interest-free loans for property; it has burial facilities which some of the others do not have; it circulates its timetable of prayer times to half a dozen mosques.

Howard Street's first alim, Maulana Lutfur Rahman, was President for some twenty years of a national umbrella organisation for Deobandi 'ulama, the Jamiat-e-Ulama Britannia, J.U.B., founded in 1967; its mosque committee includes Mr Sher Azam, a successful local businessman who assumed national prominence during The Satanic Verses affair as President of the Bradford Council for Mosques. Finally, Howard Street also functions as the centre in Bradford for the revivalist activities of Tablighi Jamaat.

The Twaqulia mosque enjoys a similar pre-eminence amongst the Bangladeshi centres and for broadly similar reasons. Mention has already been made in 2.2 of the separate institutional expression given to the East African Gujarati community in Bradford, over against those from India. Although the management of the mosques is generally controlled by one of these distinct regional and linguistic groups, the congregations using them are by no means so exclusively defined. Punjabis and Mirpuris regularly worship in large numbers at
the Gujarati mosques. Some 10 per cent of the children at the Twaqulia mosque also fall into this category and a provision is made there for Urdu to be taught to them - while Bengali is taught to the other children. The interaction between Gujarati and Pakistani is facilitated by the use in the mosque and in the education of the children of Urdu, the lingua franca of the Deobandis.

These links between Deobandi mosques, controlled by different regional groups, are being strengthened. Most significant is the relationship developing between the mosques and the two flourishing Deobandi seminaries; one was set up in 1975 at Bury, fifty miles from Bradford, and the other in 1982 at Dewsbury, ten miles away. The Dewsbury institute is also the European centre for the revivalist Tablighi Jamaat, which every Christmas hosts a huge gathering from all over Western Europe, comprising as many as eight thousand people. Virtually every Deobandi mosque now has students at one or both of these seminaries. Three of the largest mosques - the Chhacchi controlled Howard Street, the Sylheti Twaqulia and Surati Blenheim Road mosque - each has ten or more students at the two centres. Blenheim Road mosque has eleven students at Bury and seven at Dewsbury. Many of the mosques also send groups to the weekly, Thursday evening Tablighi Jamaat teach-in at Dewsbury and host the monthly groups from Dewsbury, who lead revivalist activities over a week-end.

The importance and range of interactions between Bury and Dewsbury and the Bradford mosques cannot be exaggerated: Maulana Lutfur Rahman, the President of J.U.B., is also a murid of the Principal of Bury, Yusuf Motala. The present Vice-President of J.U.B - Maulana Naem - imam of the Abu Bakr mosque in Bradford, also teaches part-time at the Dewsbury centre. In the autumn of 1989, Howard Street mosque appointed its first English-speaking 'alim, the son of Maulana Lutfur Rahman, and the first graduate from Bury to be appointed to one of the city's mosques. In 1990, Blenheim Road mosque appointed the first graduate from Dewsbury to be employed in the city. In Bury and Dewsbury the Deobandi mosques have institutions which are beginning to free them from their dependence for mosque personnel on South Asia. The local education authority supported this
development and began from 1984 and 1985 to fund students going to Bury and Dewsbury. In 1990 fifteen students at each institution were being financed to complete their respective courses of study, six years for Bury and seven for Dewsbury.¹¹

Both dar al 'ulum are managed and largely staffed by Gujaratis. This testifies to the importance of this comparatively well-educated community, used to living as a small minority in the non-Muslim environment of India.¹² There are close links between the two centres. The Principal of Bury, Yusuf Motala, is a product of the Deobandi seminary of Mazahir-i-'Ulum at Saharanpur, twenty miles north of Deoband. He was directed by his sheikh, Maulana Zakariya (d.1982), the leading luminary of the institution, to establish a dar al 'ulum in England. Maulana Zakariya was one of the most influential figures in the Tablighi Jamaat and author of the latter's hugely influential text book, Tablighi Nisab, the Preaching Course. Although Mazahir-i-'Ulum has a similar syllabus to the seminary in Deoband, its ethos can be considered 'less intellectual and more Sufi in orientation' (Metcalf, 1982, p.133). A visitor in the mid-1980s discussed the differences with its treasurer who insisted that:

Deoband was intended to resist the British by non-violent methods, the military option having been tried fruitlessly in 1857. But the Mazahir-i 'Ulum had, since its very inception, opted out of this world (dunya); it had remained committed only to the faith (din) (Agwani, 1986, p. 119).

Bury, then, owes its inspiration, much of its syllabus and its ethos to Saharanpur. Tablighi Nisab is recited every day as part of shared devotions. Its students attend the huge Christmas gathering at Dewsbury, while a few of the students from the latter establishment spend their last year studying the authoritative collections of prophetic traditions at Bury, since Dewsbury does not have staff to teach them. The main mechanism for recruitment for both centres is the informal Tablighi Jamaat networks, nationally and internationally. The same teacher, Mr Minhas, advised both on devising the syllabus for a private boys' school for those thirteen to sixteen year-olds attending both dar al 'ulum, to conform to the dictates of British law. The need to provide some minimal British
syllabus for those under sixteen years old— in South Asia one can start an 'alim course at nine years old—and the absence of Persian are the main differences between Saharanpur and Bury/Dewsbury.

The main difference between Bury and Dewsbury is that study is subordinate to Tablighi Jamaat at Dewsbury, where students are expected to spend a week-end every month, some of their holidays and a year at the end of their studies engaged in such activities. In Bury, they are free to join Tablighi Jamaat groups during their holidays. The last year at Dewsbury is spent, for the majority who do not go to Bury, in a Karachi or Delhi dar al 'ulum to complete the study of prophetic traditions. In Bury, many after completing their curriculum go on to further studies at al-Azhar in Egypt or Madina University in Saudi Arabia to study Arabic, hadith, Prophetic tradition, or fiqh, the science of Islamic jurisprudence. The priority for Bury is education and the seminary is part of a larger world of Islamic scholarship than Dewsbury.

The focus here will be on the ethos and curriculum of the private boys' school. The content of the 'alim course will be considered in the next chapter. Since the private schools of Bury and Dewsbury are similar attention will be directed at the latter only. Dewsbury has some three hundred students, the majority of whom are from outside Dewsbury and board. One hundred and forty of these students attend the private school. The priority for most of those attending is the hifz class, to learn the Qur'an by heart in Arabic, without at this stage understanding its meaning; for most of those who stay on to complete the 'alim programme, understanding the Qur'an begins in the third year of their seven-year course of study.

In the three years at the private school they will also learn correct pronunciation of the Qur'an—tajwid—develop competence in Urdu and study a basic Urdu text on Islam, entitled Tālim-ul-Islām, Lessons in Islam, written by the distinguished Deobandi scholar, Mufti Kifayatullah (d. 1952). Urdu is the medium of instruction for Islamic studies, taught in five morning lessons. Mastery of Urdu is considered of crucial importance. It is the sine qua non of transferring to the 'alim course, since it is the medium of
instruction and text books are studied in Urdu. When translation of
the Qur'an from Arabic is undertaken the language into which it is
translated is also Urdu.

Much of the afternoon is devoted to what are described as 'duniawi,'
worldly, subjects, to conform to the dictates of British law. By 1989
maths, history, English, science, geography, social studies, law and
Urdu were time-tabled of which four were offered to G.C.S.E. level:
English language, general science, maths and Urdu. The medium of
instruction was English and separate staff taught this curriculum - 1
Bengali, 3 Pakistanis, 3 Gujaratis and 1 non-Muslim Englishman. All
the other staff, with one exception, were Gujaratis, 7 teaching hifz
and 10 teaching the 'alim course. The day is organised around the
five daily prayers, which all attend. This can mean a long day:
getting up in the summer before 5.00 a.m. and then going back to bed
for a couple of hours.

The buildings are new and comfortable with teaching methods
traditional: most pupils wear traditional South Asian Muslim dress,
sit on the carpeted floor, with a low bench for books. There are no
televisions or videos, since they are deemed to transgress the Islamic
prohibition against representation of living creatures. Radio is not
allowed since it is seen as a possible distraction from study and the
student might be tempted to listen to music, frowned on within the
Deobandi tradition.

What seems evident is that the students, in the morning and
afternoon, live in two unrelated linguistic and cultural worlds.
There seems to be neither co-ordination nor consultation between the
staff who teach the duniawi syllabus in English in the afternoon and
those who teach the Arabic/Islamic course in the morning; through the
medium of Urdu.

An example may illustrate this: in the morning they
will study Lessons from Islam, in Urdu, by Mufti Kifayatullah and
read about the miracles wrought by the Prophet, including 'splitting
the moon,' based on surah 54:1 of the Qur'an. This is interpreted
literally (Kifayatullah, n.d. Book 3, p.27). In the afternoon they
will study general science in English. A possible discordance between
these two worlds is neither acknowledged nor addressed.
The methods of teaching remain heavily influenced by the traditional oral emphasis of Islamic studies. This was picked up in an H.M.I. report on the school in 1985, which remarked, that:

Arabic and Islamic studies are tested orally...many lessons take the form of exposition by one teacher of subject matter from a textbook. Pupils are encouraged to understand but not usually to question or discuss critically (D.E.S., 1986, p.8).

The traditional method of dar al 'ulum, practised at Bury and Dewsbury, is for the student to master a series of set texts: thus a group studying a selection of hadith from the famous twelfth-century collection known as 'Mishkat', will in turn read out aloud the hadith in Arabic, then translate it into Urdu. The teacher will correct the Arabic or Urdu translation, where incorrect, and give his interpretation of its meaning. This latter will be taken as normative and when the students are examined, orally or in writing, the teacher's interpretation will be reproduced. The emphasis is on mastering a given corpus of works and reproducing accredited interpretation rather than engaging in individual speculation. This was not understood by the H.M.I.s who worried about the absence of individual expression evident in the centre, whether the absence of 'individual lockers...posters or decoration of any sort...(or guidance for) imaginative and personal writing ...(and argued for) the value of allowing boys more independence' (ibid., pp. 3, 11 and 8).

The impact of Bury and Dewsbury on the Deobandi mosques of Bradford is multifaceted. Mufti Kifayatullah's Lessons from Islam, in English and Urdu, remains the favoured Islamic text book in supplementary schools. A new generation of English-speaking 'ulama, products of Bury and Dewsbury, suggest that this will continue to be the case - the two 'ulama, trained by these centres, now working in Bradford use this textbook. Even more significant for understanding the ethos of Bury and Dewsbury is the importance each attaches to daily public readings from Maulana Zakariya's Tablighi Nisab, the Preaching Course, the 'set text of Tablighi Jamaat, in the religious formation of all students. If for many of the Barelwi mosques the recitation of the devotional Salaam at the end of Friday prayers offers a unique window into their ethos and priorities for many of the Deobandi
mosques in Bradford the equivalent text is Tablighi Nisab. This work is daily recited in most of the mosques for between ten and twenty minutes after the afternoon prayer of 'asr.

**Tablighi Nisab** is largely a compilation of Qur'anic verses and hadith belonging to a genre of faza'il, merit/blessing literature as distinct from masa'il, problem literature which concerns itself with the application of Islamic law in society - the preserve of the trained 'alim. This compendium includes the booklets of Maulana Zakariya and begins with 'stories of the (Prophet's) companions' (1938), 'blessings of the Qur'an' (1929), 'blessings of (the five daily) prayers' (1939), 'blessings of zikr' (1939), 'blessings of tabligh' (1931) and a book by Maulana Ihtesam al Hasan Kandhalwi (d. 1944) Muslim degeneration and its only remedy (1938).

The tone and content are earnest and eschatological. The first chapter of book one is entitled, 'Steadfastness in the face of hardship' and begins with rehearsing the suffering and abuse the Prophet encountered in Ta'if as he sought to engage in tabligh. The episode ends with the exhortation:

We get so much irritated over a little trouble or a mere abuse...does (this) become the people who claim to follow the magnanimous prophet... (who) after so much suffering at the hand of the Taif mob... neither curses them nor... works for any revenge, even when he has the full opportunity to do so (Zakariya, n.d. p. 18).

The second chapter is entitled 'fear of Allah' with a sub-section 'the prophet reprimands the Sahabah's (his companions) laughing'. Chapter three is entitled 'abstinence and self-denial of the Sahaba', chapter six, 'sympathy and self-sacrifice'; chapter nine is 'pleasing the Prophet' and twelve, 'love for the Prophet'. The importance of prayer, obligatory and superogatory, is stressed: it is 'the first and foremost item to be reckoned with on the Day of Judgement' and zikr is considered superior even to giving in charity (ibid., p. 85 and 'blessings of zikr', p. 37).

Kandhalwi's booklet, although written in 1938, continues to resonate with Muslim minorities in the West. Kandhalwi worried that,
The Muslim youth affected and influenced by the so-called modern trends or the Western way of life, take pleasure in laughing at the very ideals of Islam and openly criticize the sacred code of Shariat as being out of date and impractical...we seem to possess a hidden inferiority complex towards our religion and faith (ibid., pp. 5 and 23).

The answer he offers is to reaffirm the 'wisdom and guidance' of the Qur'an and seek to conform one's life to the shari'a, 'the path of true success and righteousness' and not worry about the absence of state power (ibid., pp. 6 and 19).

In the past, Kandhalwi insists, Muslims considered tabligh, glossed as 'enjoining the good and forbidding evil' (sura 3:104) as the preserve of 'ulama and sufis (sheikh/pir), but this is to overlook the responsibility laid on the entire Muslim community to discharge this task. This is the central innovation of the movement: to involve all, not simply religious professionals, in the task of tabligh. 'The first and foremost thing to do is to change the aim of our life from material motives and acquisition of wealth to the propagation of...Islam'. In pursuit of this, controversy is to be avoided, tabligh to be engaged in and leisure spent either in reading good books or in the company of pious and learned companions (ibid., pp.22, 28 and 34).

It would be wrong to suggest that these pietist and politically quietist notes are the only ones heard in Bradford's Deobandi mosques. The Jamaat-e-Ulama Britannia, J.U.B., the umbrella organisation for Deobandi 'ulama in Britain, to which at least half the Bradford mosques are affiliated, has a more active and combative stance on certain issues. The priorities of the J.U.B are listed in their 1987 calendar: to press for the acceptance by Parliament of Muslim family law; the establishment of separate Muslim girls' schools as an immediate priority and the elimination of the evil Qadiani beliefs, shirk and bid'at'. Qadiani refers to the Ahmadiyya sect.

The Secretary General of the J.U.B., in conversation, itemised its activities as organising various conferences, regional and national,
on the Life of the Prophet — hosted in Bradford by the Bangladeshi Twaqulia mosque in 1988 and the Gujarati St. Margaret's Road mosque in 1989; seminars on the practice and meaning of pilgrimage and Ramazan were delivered; posters and calendars produced, and a network of trained muftis developed, able to answer questions about the application of Islamic law. In the autumn of 1989 they organised at Birmingham Central Mosque the fourth international 'Tauheed and Sunnah' conference on the topic of jihad: the Imam of the prestigious Haram Sharif mosque in Mecca attended and speakers were invited from South Africa, Pakistan, India, Azad Kashmir and Afghanistan, to talk about the Islamic movements and struggles in these countries. The posters of the J.U.B., often in English and Urdu versions, adorn many of the Deobandi mosques: the three in evidence in Bradford are 'Ramazan — do's and don'ts', 'The heretic beliefs of Shias' and 'The Ugly face of Qadyanism'.

The passion and vehemence which continues to inform sectarian differences is seen very clearly with regard to Deobandi attitudes to those who belong to the Shi'ite and Ahmadiyya traditions. The traditional reasons for antipathy to Shi'ite Muslims are clearly laid out in a book entitled Khomeini, Iranian Revolution and the Shi'ite Faith by a leading Deobandi scholar Maulana Nomani (b. 1905), with an introduction by another distinguished Indian scholar, Syed Abul Hasan Ali Nadwi (b. 1914) — both active supporters of Tablighi Jamaat (Ahmad, 1991, pp.516 and 529). 16.

The reasons given for such a study, produced in English and Urdu to maximise its circulation, are illuminating: 'the importance of beliefs is declining dangerously in the eyes of our new generation' thus instead of evaluating Muslims by reference to the Qur'an and sunnah, criteria for praise or blame turn rather on 'the establishment of a government in the name of Islam, acquisition of power and throwing challenges to western powers'; thus Khomeini is eulogised and 'the object of hero-worship...in the same manner as...Kamal Ataturk of Turkey and...Nasser of Egypt'; further Khomeini's beguiling appeal for different Muslim sects to bury their differences in the name of Muslim unity, blinds many to his ambitions to export Shi'ite revolution and to destabilise the Arab countries;
thus Khomeini's writings are cited indicating his 'perverted assertions and diabolical beliefs' whether elevating the Shi'ite imamate 'to the place of divinity...and rank (higher)...than the Prophets (or) his outrageous condemnation of and vituperation against the Companions' (Numani, 1985, pp. 4-8; 191-192). 17

The Ahmadiyya movement is, usually, disparagingly referred to by Muslim critics as 'Qadianis' or 'Mirzai-s', after the name and birth place of their founder, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (d.1908), a landowner from Qadian in the Punjab. Opposition to them has often destabilised Pakistani politics (Munir, 1979). The main reason for the anger they arouse is the personal claims made by their founder, which seem to compromise the finality of the Prophet's prophetic status. In Pakistan the movement in opposition to them has been led by the Deobandi ulama. In 1984 physical and legal harassment of the movement led to the present leader's flight to Britain, where he established his headquarters. 18 In Bradford the small community has had a centre for worship since 1980.

If the Barelwis met at Wembley in 1985 to criticise the Wahhabis, the Deobandis have since 1985 hired the same arena to organise an annual international conference to condemn the Ahmadiyyas. The vehicle for this opposition, although organisationally separate from the J.U.B., nonetheless involves their chief officers. The 1988 conference, reported in the British Urdu press, was under the Presidency of the J.U.B. vice-President, Maulana Abdul Rahman. This conference rehearsed the litany of observations and demands routinely made at such conferences: 'Qadiani' activities and literature in British schools, universities and colleges, where they continue to masquerade as Muslims, should be exposed; the political asylum given to them by West Germany for 'alleged' persecution in Pakistan was regretted; the actions of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Libya, Iraq and United Emirates declaring them Kafir and, thus; a non-Muslim minority, were applauded; the Pakistan government was requested to remove them from key civilian and military posts, to confiscate their presses and to impose the shari'a punishment against them for apostasy (Millat, 23-8-88).
Opposition to the Ahmadiyyas in Bradford spilled over into the public domain in 1986. Civic and religious dignitaries had been invited to attend a 'Religious Founders Day' at the city's central library in September. The theme of the meeting - religious understanding - seemed admirable as did the publicity by the organisers, the Ahmadiyya Students Association. However, the phrase 'Peace Be Upon Him' - used after the names of Islamic Prophets - had been appended to the names of Ram and Guru Nanak, figures revered in the Hindu and Sikh traditions. This detail plus the Ahmadiyya insistence on organising the meeting as 'Muslims' enraged many local Muslims. Therefore, the Bradford Council for Mosques led a demonstration against the meeting, which resulted in its cancellation and in the ensuing melee some seventeen protestors were arrested (Telegraph & Argus, 6/7-10-1986).19

Deobandi mosque personnel in 1989 comprised some nineteen 'ulama and nine huffaz, of whom four and six, respectively, had good English. The higher percentage in the latter category is explained by the success a large mosque like Howard Street has enjoyed in training English-speaking youngsters to complete a course of hifz and to co-opt some of them to continue teaching in the mosques. The fact that the majority of 'ulama are still not confident in English explains why the books used in most Deobandi mosques tend still to be in Urdu, even where there is an English translation of the study, as is the case with the Islamic textbook that almost all the mosques use, Ta'lim ul Islam, Lessons in Islam, written by Mufti Kifayatullah (d. 1952) - the same work taught to the students at Dewsbury.

Like the Barelwi text book, Our Islam, the Deobandi choice reflects their priorities and concerns: no mention here of such a category as good innovation, bid'at e hasana, rather innovation is deemed the gravest sin after unbelief, kufr, and polytheism, shirk. Needless to say traditional Barelwi practices and beliefs are mentioned as falling within all three categories: the claim that the Prophet has 'knowledge of the unseen', asking for the intercession of a sufi, circumambulating the shrines of such a sheikh/pir as one might the Ka'bah at Mecca, constructing elaborate graves for them and decking
them out with coverlets and holding fairs at their shrines (Ta'lim ul Islam, n.d., Book 4, pp. 22-26).

Inevitably, given their date and provenance, such works reflect the world, imagery and problems of a largely pre-industrial, rural India. Thus five pages are devoted to an exploration of what renders water in a well unclean and thus not usable for ritual ablutions. While some of the mosques use the same Urdu text books used in the Barelwi mosques, those produced in Pakistan, others use the local authority ones, supplied by the supplementary schools officer, in an attempt to harmonise mosque and school Urdu lessons; others, again, produce their own worksheets, without illustrations.

What is also evident is that some of the larger mosques were beginning to build up a lending library of books in English for the children. These are mainly produced by The Islamic Foundation in Leicester whose publications will be considered in the next section, where the focus is the Jamaat-i-Islami tradition. There is no equivalent magazine in Urdu or English/Urdu to the Barelwi Islamic Times to act as a forum for addressing problems in Britain within a Deobandi perspective. Such scarce resources as are available have been allocated to funding a full-time specialist in Islamic law. In 1988 a Gujarati, Mufti Ismail Rachholvi, was appointed full-time in Bradford to run an Institute of Islamic Jurisprudence U.K. - his activities complement the labours of two other local Muftis who also teach at the Dewsbury and Bury seminaries.

Another pressing priority, identified by the J.U.B. - the provision for separate education for women - has also begun to be addressed. The Howard Street mosque manages the small private Muslim Girls' Community School, which they set up in September 1984. Virtually all the girls come from the Pathan/Chhachhi communities. The school's intake used to be about seventy, but was halved in the autumn of 1989 when the fees were raised from £450 to £700 per annum.

Another initiative of importance was the creation in September 1987 by the Bury dar al 'ulum of a boarding school and teaching block for girls - Madina-tul-Uloom Al Islamiya - at Shenstone, Kidderminster.
It takes girls from eleven years old, who, in tandem with a British school curriculum, can enter the five year course of training to qualify as an 'alima, and thus teach girls and women Islam. Once again the contribution of the Gujarati community is paramount. All ten female staff in 1990 were Gujaratis who taught on a voluntary basis – one of whom was from Bradford. The school transferred to Bradford in the autumn of 1992, where an old hospital building was bought for £500,000 – negotiations with the local authority were conducted on behalf of Bury by Mr Sher Azam, the ex-President of the Bradford Council for Mosques (Telegraph & Argus, 3-4-1992). The move was made for a number of reasons including the advantage of having the school in an authority sympathetic to Muslim concerns, and also located much nearer Bury, which would be able to supervise it more closely; such scrutiny is necessary after a very critical HMI report in 1991, which attracted considerable adverse national publicity (Independent, 4-9-1991).

Only two Deobandi mosques have some separate prayer facilities for women. This is in line with their traditional perception that women are better advised to pray at home and are not obliged to join in Friday, congregational prayers. Thus the influential advanced text book on prescribed Islamic behaviour written by Maulana Thanawi (d.1943), Bihishti Zewar, Heavenly Ornaments, repeats the prophetic tradition that 'the best mosque for women is the inner part of the house' (Sãoroha, 1981, p.424). This was also the position of Mr Sher Azam in an interview given to the national newspaper, where he reiterated another prophetic tradition to the effect that 'the reward for women is 27 times greater if they pray at home and 27 times greater if men pray at the mosque' (Independent, 9-9-1991).

Traditional Muslim scholarship is convinced that the women's place is at home, where she is in less danger of transgressing Islamic norms by finding herself in the company of non-related males. That such a perspective is widely shared is evident from a resolution passed in a national conference of Muslims held in Bradford and organised by the Bradford Council for Mosques. The resolution sought 'exemption from the community charge for those single Muslim women who choose not to register for welfare benefits/employment for religious reasons and
The Deobandi tradition, heavily influenced by the ethos of Tablighi Jamaat, with its prohibition of television and video, music and dance, its sobriety and seriousness, is not sympathetic to youth work outside revivalist activities. The only exception in Bradford is the East African Gujarati Muslim caste association, the Khalifa society. As well as their two centres in Bradford, they are networked through The Federation of Gujarati Muslim Khalifa Societies of U.K. to centres in twelve other cities in the country. The federation arranges caste marriages, has national football and cricket tournaments, limits the size of marriage dowry and has developed arbitration mechanisms for disputes in the community. Its two centres in Bradford have a range of recreational and cultural activities for both sexes.

3.4 THE U.K. ISLAMIC MISSION AND THE STRUGGLE TO ESTABLISH A VIABLE YOUTH MOVEMENT

The main bearer of the Jamaat-i-Islami tradition in Britain has been the U.K. Islamic Mission. A review of the Mission's history and diverse activities, celebrated in its twenty-fifth annual conference on August 1988, offers a useful window into its achievements and priorities. It began in 1963 with a group of students and young professionals mainly from Pakistan. Their first conference in 1964 was addressed by the Indian scholar Abul Hasan Nadvi, who urged the importance of da'wa and creating a Muslim identity; in 1965 one of two guests at their conference was Professor Khurshid Ahmad, one of Maulana Maududi's trusted lieutenants.

Also in 1965 they invited Maulana Alvi from Pakistan to give leadership to the young group - he became Director of U.K. Islamic Mission. The dependence on Jamaat-i-Islami personnel from South Asia is a constant in the history of the Mission and related groups in Britain. With the personnel came their 'ideology', the very term ideology used of Islam is central to the Islamist tradition with its activist thrust and comprehensive ambitions. Thus the first sentence
in a brochure introducing the Mission's work reads: The UK Islamic Mission is an ideological movement. It stands for the establishment of the will of Allah in the life of the individual as well as society. Islam is a faith and a way of life, a world view and a socio-political order...a complete and all embracing order of life based on the unity of God.

In his Presidential address to the 25th annual conference Maulana Ahmed insisted that whether in Europe, America and other non-Muslim countries: 'If the Muslim settlers...want to safeguard their progeny, property, businesses...the only way, safe and certain, is to convert the indigenous population to (a) Muslim majority' (U.K.I.M., 1988(b)).

A priority of the Mission from the start was the identification of young leadership, its education and the provision of appropriate literature in English. Thus in 1965 it decided to offer 10 scholarships per year...to outstanding students engaged in Islamic movements', which within a decade would produce a nucleus of committed young people prepared to work for the establishment of an Islamic way of life' in 'dar-ul kufr', House of unbelief. (U.K.I.M., 1988(c)). With money from King Fahd of Saudi Arabia in 1967 they established, in co-operation with the Federation of Student Islamic Societies, FOSIS, a students' hostel. The Mission was also instrumental in the creation of several important institutions: the first chairman of the Muslim Educational Trust, MET, set up in 1966, was a member of the Mission. MET produces Muslim literature in English and personnel to teach Islam in schools. Its textbook Islam: Beliefs and Teachings, written by Ghulam Sarwar in 1980, has been repeatedly revised and reprinted, and had sold more than a hundred thousand copies by 1992. It is in use in the two mosques in the Jamaat-i-Islami tradition in Bradford.

Islam: Beliefs and Teachings inhabits a different world from either of the Deobandi or Barelwi textbooks considered earlier. Sufis and sufism do not feature in the index; mention of zikr or any other devotional exercise is conspicuous by its absence; the mi'raj is the only miraculous event allowed in the life of the Prophet. Instead we have chapters devoted to the economic and political systems of
Islam—this firmly locates Ghulam Sarwar within the Jamaat-i-Islami tradition. Also chapters on women and Islam, including one on the issue of polygamy, since 'the fact that a few Muslims have more than one wife has become a matter for propaganda against Islam' (Sarwar, 1980, p.171). This, then, is a textbook written in English, self-consciously apologetic in content and tone, seeking to address some of the questions and anxieties of Muslims in Britain.

The Mission produced an Urdu monthly Paigham — The Message — and in the 1970s was active in the establishment of Impact International, a monthly magazine in English which continues to cover developments within the Islamist movement world-wide. The Mission also claimed that the Islamic Foundation, established in 1973, owed its inspiration to suggestions made by their workers to a member of Jamaat-i-Islami, Ghulam Mohammad, when he was in Britain. The Islamic Foundation is the publishing and research wing of Jamaat-i-Islami in Britain. Two of Maulana Maududi's most trusted supporters are involved in it: the chairman of the foundation is Professor Khurshid Ahmad and Mr. Khurram Murad was its Director from 1978-88. Among the established Pakistani leadership these were 'the only two well known Jama'at leaders...known to have had a foreign education' (Bahadur, 1978, p.149). Murad studied engineering and Ahmad economics at the University in Leicester, the town where the Islamic Foundation is located.

The Islamic Foundation has a huge multi-lingual publishing business. Its English publications include many of Maulana Maududi's works in translation, as well as studies by Khurshid Ahmad, Khurram Murad and others. Its new centre was established at Markfield in Leicester in 1989. Set amidst 9.3 acres...with a network of buildings, capable of housing all the research, educational, training and youth activities...it is bracing itself to play its part in leading the Muslim communities of the UK and Europe to face the challenges of the 1990s and the approaching 21st century' (The Islamic Foundation: objectives, activities and Projects, n.d.). It has an audio-visual unit, which has produced, inter alia, fourteen audio cassettes of stories for children based on the foundation's books, video cassettes on the Prophet's life, Daw'ah in the West, and a cassette-slide
programme introducing Islam and an audio-cassette course on 'ilm al-tajwid, the science of reading the Qur'an. The foundation is also home of Young Muslims UK, the youth movement in the Jamaat-i-Islami tradition and their publication, Trends. Farooq Murad, the son of Khurram Murad, was the national amir, leader, of Young Muslims UK in 1988.

The U.K. Islamic Mission took pride in the 3,000+ children it had taught in its 38 branches, which include 22 mosques and Islamic centres nationally, and in the 300 non-Muslims of various nationalities who had embraced Islam through their labours in the previous twenty five years. The mission also derived satisfaction from "the systematic work carried out by the Young Muslims (which) gives fresh hopes and opens new avenues...among youth...in 17 cities" (U.K.I.M., 1988(a)). Young Muslims UK are linked constitutionally to the mission: the latter's executive appoints an advisor to the Young Muslims and the U.K. Islamic Mission President and central council can remove the President and disband the central council of Young Muslims for grave violation of their constitution (paragraph 23 of their 1984 constitution).

In 1977-78 the Mission conceded to the request of its Bangladeshi members to be allowed to form a separate organisation, Dawat ul Islam, to promote work among that community. As one would expect there is considerable overlap in membership of The Islamic Foundation, U.K. Islamic Mission, Dawat ul Islam and Young Muslims UK. One researcher has estimated that in 1987/8, excluding Khurram Murad and Khurshid Ahmad, of the twelve members of staff of the Islamic Foundation, five were members of the mission and two, including the acting director-general, were members of Dawat ul Islam (Andrews, 1991). The executive committee in 1987/88 of the National Association of Muslim Youth, NAMY - another initiative in the Jamaat-i-Islami tradition - founded in the early 1980s with D.E.S. funding, included Farooq Murad as chairman, the national leader of Young Muslims, Dr Munir Ahmed, as General-Secretary - the amir of the Bradford branch of Young Muslims - Ataullah Siddiqui, the mission's advisor to the Young Muslims and member of the foundation and a bevy of other Young
Muslims. This indicates the importance those in the Jamaat-i-Islami tradition attach to youth work in Britain.

The career trajectory of another activist, Mr Mashuq Ally, illustrates the priorities and ethos of the Jamaat-i-Islami tradition in Britain. Mr Ally was an active member of the Islamic Youth Movement, IYM, itself, as we shall see, founded in Bradford and the predecessor to the Young Muslims UK in the 1970s — and on the editorial board of The Movement, the IYM magazine, which anticipated Trends, that of Young Muslims UK. He was later involved with The Islamic Foundation, did research at the Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim relations, Selly Oak Colleges, Birmingham, became a vice-President of U.K. Islamic Mission and then course supervisor of a joint honours degree in Islamic Studies at St David's University College, Lampeter; in this latter capacity he appeared in Trends (Vol. 2: 4, 1988). Certainly Mr Ally’s promotion from youth movement to U.K. Islamic Mission executive and thence to a career in education, where he is able to present a sympathetic Islamist perspective, is a route which the mission envisaged many ex-members of the IYM/Young Muslims would follow. This expectation, however, was to prove difficult to realise in Bradford.

In South Asia, Jamaat-i-Islami has drawn the bulk of its supporters from the products of modernisation, teachers, lawyers and engineers, amongst whom Maududi’s scathing criticism of the ignorance and obscurantism of many of the ‘ulama struck a resonant chord. Since most of the Muslim settlers in Bradford were of rural origin, they provided little in the way of a natural constituency for U.K. Islamic Mission, people ‘for whom (its) ideological rigour and studied rejection of Western ideas (was) attractive and popular’ (Modood, 1990, p. 150). Thus, although a circle was established as early as 1968 and ran classes for children in the 1970s from 17 Marlborough Road, the first U.K. Islamic Mission mosque in Bradford had to wait until 1981, to be followed in 1985 by another organised by the Bangladeshi Dawat ul Islam.

The Bangladeshi mosque is the larger. It caters for some hundred male worshippers on a Friday, of whom some forty per cent are Pakistani.
It has three full-time Bangladeshi 'ulama, one of whom studied in Madina University in Saudi Arabia and is funded by a Saudi da'wa organisation. The mosque has its own separate youth group for boys and some recreational facilities. The U.K. Islamic Mission draws on a smaller, largely Mirpuri constituency and has had constant difficulties finding a permanent 'alim, having had four up to 1988. Their present 'alim is a well-educated product of the Jamaat-i-Islami seminary in Lahore. Unfortunately he has little English and thus has limited access to the rich vein of materials in English produced by the Islamic Foundation. The situation has not been helped by the failure of the U.K. Islamic Mission to sustain a viable dar al 'ulum; an abortive attempt was made in Manchester in 1985 but had to be closed in 1987.

The situation with regard to youth work proved more promising. In 1971 the Muslim Educational Trust, MET, seconded a Pakistani member of Jamaat-i-Islami, Ahmad Jamal, to study in Bradford and to begin part-time youth work and Islamic teaching in schools. He was based at 17 Marlborough Road. By July 1972 the local education authorities yielded to MET pressure and allowed Muslims to give religious instruction in the city's secondary schools after school hours (Halstead, 1988, p.232). Through the schools Ahmad Jamal recruited a core group to form a youth movement. The Islamic Youth Movement, IYM, was born and liaised with other groups in the country. The Bradford group held weekly study circles, imbibed the works of Maulana Maududi and other Islamist activists like Syed Qutb, networked with other groups in the country, enjoyed national camps in the Lake District, and in 1976 started their quarterly magazine, The Movement, 'secretarial services (for which were) provided by the Islamic Foundation' (The Movement, January 1977, p.1).

To read excerpts from The Movement is to find oneself in the familiar Islamist world of discourse. Relationship with Allah, it is stressed, is not a process which confines our lives to the mosque and isolates us from the society at large... (nor) demands that we live a life of passiveness and timidity, but on the contrary it fosters an attitude of greater concern for the society and mankind so that it may be saved from
the fire of hell... zikr/remembrance of Allah... need not... of course be done in a traditional way... in its simplest form it involves the carrying out of every act in Allah's name and thus to remind oneself whether the particular act will please or displease Allah (ibid., pp. 5 and 7).

Thus the group cleverly co-opts zikr, a word heavily freighted with devotional meanings within traditional Islam, to serve an activist end.

In another article entitled Muslim youth and cultural dilemma several themes are enunciated, which were to be repeated during the next fifteen years:

The increase in the number of Muslim youth running away... (is rooted in) the stubborn and often senseless rituals... carried out in the name of Islam... Muslim youth... fail to see... why 'drainpipes' are better than flares... (they are exposed to) meaningless Arabic lessons under tortuous maulvis... The challenge of the host community, which stands for free thought and takes pride in democracy, does not allow the Muslim youth to blindly follow rituals which is not Islam. It demands an explanation or it imposes a sense of inferiority and cultural backwardness which ultimately suggests assimilation... The existing Muslim community does not represent Islam... think of the (Hindu-influenced) exuberant marriage social ceremony in a Muslim home and a host of other social customs... Islam (does not) ask for any specific style of trousers - Islam simply wants certain parts of the body to be covered (The Movement, July, 1977, pp. 4-6).

Unquestioning obedience to an 'alim, learning the Qur'an off by heart - the stuff of oral culture - are no longer acceptable to these literate and able young men, exposed to the challenge of a questioning and confident culture. IYM gave them space to retain pride in their Islamic identity, while able to distance themselves from and critique aspects of Pakistani culture in the name of Islam. Most came from Deobandi and Barelwi backgrounds and were attracted to an Islam which was intelligible, accessible through English and gave them a feeling of being part of a world-wide Islamist movement, which in God's time would prevail over a Godless West.
However, by the end of the 1970s the **Islamic Youth Movement** was almost moribund in Bradford. Far from providing the next generation of leadership for **U.K. Islamic Mission** three of the four key activists, who had remained in Bradford — two of whom were, respectively, national President and General-Secretary of the movement — never joined the mission, and the one who did eventually left. All four still speak warmly of the **IYM**. In retrospect, they continue to value the confidence and organisational skills it encouraged them to develop and the movement's aspiration to relate Islam to society at large. Nonetheless, the reasons for their leaving the **Islamic Youth Movement** and distancing themselves from **U.K. Islamic Mission** are instructive. The rhetoric of an Islamic state, on which they were nourished, while within the realms of practical politics where Muslims are in a majority, began to pall when the **Jamaat-i-Islami** tradition was but one component in a Muslim minority in the West. The movement was seen as elitist and dismissive of the traditional world and values of their parents, and could cause divisions in the family.

They also began to notice that **Jamaat-i-Islami**, while rejecting as un-Islamic the uncritical devotion of a murid to a sheikh/pir, was in danger, paradoxically, of elevating the person and works of Maulana Maududi to a similar status. Yet Maulana Maududi's scholarship was open to question. By the late 1970s Bradford members of IYM were expressing some disillusionment with the parent body in Pakistan. With the overthrow of Pakistan's Prime Minister, Zulfiqar Bhutto in 1977, **Jamaat-i-Islami** had thrown in their lot with General Zia's unelected military regime. One commentator noticed that under General Zia the leadership of **Jamaat-i-Islami** passed into non-ideological hands and it became extremely thuggish with university branches becoming gun-toting fascist paramilitary organisations ... (enjoying) government patronage... (it) moved from religious radicalism to become an arch-conservative religious legitimiser of a military dictatorship (Modood, 1990, p.152).

The endless struggle in the way of God, jihad, while at times exhilarating, at other times, could seem exhausting, joyless and emotionally arid. Three of the group admit now to enjoying the more
emotional world of the gawwali and two are back in a Bareli tradition. Also, any youth movement without paid workers - by the late 1970s the last of the three South Asian personnel seconded to this work had left - leaves a huge burden on its young leaders, who eventually leave for university and start working.

It remains to be seen whether the Young Muslims UK can avoid some of these pitfalls. It formally came into being in Bradford in the autumn of 1984, the successor to the defunct IYM. It has been fortunate to enjoy the services of a dedicated local G.P., Dr Munir Ahmed and his wife, who organises the meetings for the 'sisters'. This latter is an innovation since attempts in the 1970s to get such a group off the ground failed. Young Muslims UK holds an annual camp for males and females. Over a thousand attended the one in 1988 at Wolverhampton, with a packed programme from a Wednesday evening to Sunday afternoon. Its new magazine, Trends, is attractively laid out, professionally produced and contains an excellent 'agony aunt' section, where youngsters can raise any issue which worries or perplexes them. The questions range from masturbation, the Islamic position on watching television, girl friends, western clothes, religious freedom, women's rights, divorce, polygamy, and contraception. With regard to contraception Dr Jamal Badawi distances himself from Maulana Maududi's strictures against it and argues for situations where it is not haram e.g. if man and wife are students and want to attend to their studies (Vol. 3:4, p. 30). This example indicates that some questioning of Maulana Maududi's legacy is beginning to be possible.

In 1989 in Bradford Young Muslims UK had three male groups and two female groups, meeting in local community centres and at the U.K. Islamic Mission mosque, each of which attracted between 15-25 people. Their gatherings combine recreation with study. One local leader wryly remarked that the rhetoric of Islamic state notwithstanding, the main focus of the local groups was to keep Islam alive for youngsters as a living option, for which good reasons could be advanced. Also, the aim was to create an environment in which questions could be asked and aspects of received Indo-Pakistani culture, such as excessive self-display, expensive gifts and Hindu customs at weddings, could be challenged.
In Bradford in the late 1980s Young Muslims UK began to distance themselves from the UKIM mosque so as to develop a more independent public persona. Their library of books, pamphlets and videos were moved to another address and many began to pray at the mosque in the city intended for college and University students. This was, in sectarian terms, a neutral place and the language spoken was English, more congenial to many of the Young Muslims. This is now—in 1992—where they meet. One factor behind the move was the failure of Dr Munir Ahmed to feel at home in the U.K. Islamic Mission mosque. In 1986 Dr Munir Ahmed and a Pakistani Jamaat-i-Islami friend had been given U.K. Islamic Mission membership and authority in the local mosque. In the event the cultural and linguistic gap proved too great: many in the congregation were not ready for the address at Friday prayers to be in English; they resented the equality assumed by these educated, young men with their elders and they were not enamoured of the Western dress worn by them.

Perhaps it is not surprising that a sense of being a beleaguered minority under attack runs through Young Muslims UK publications. In 1986 Khurram Murad wrote an essay, which is part of their required reading entitled, Muslim Youth in the West: towards a new educational strategy, in which he asked rhetorically,

Should...we accept to live as a grudgingly accepted minority sub-culture, always under siege, always struggling to retain the little niche it has been allowed to carve out for itself? That perhaps is the destiny to which most of us seem resigned (1986(a), p.8).

Khurram Murad's answer was to argue for the creation of a 'potent counter-culture'. To aim merely to survive was not enough, since 'a tiny cultural island in a vast alien sea, constantly under siege by high and mighty waves, can hardly hope to escape intrusion and encroachment' (ibid., p.7).

The dilemma for Young Muslims is that it is questionable whether the Jamaat-i-Islami tradition has developed, at present, the intellectual resources for living creatively and with good conscience with minority status and relative powerlessness in a pluralist state. The central preoccupation of the Islamist movement world-wide has been to
capture power and translate the Islamic ideology into practice. The emphases have been activist rather than reflective and intellectual. This ambivalence runs throughout Young Muslim literature: thus in a moving editorial in a 1991 issue of Trends, reviewing the tragedies, which had overwhelmed the Islamic world, whether the Gulf crisis, the plight of the Kurds or the atrocities being committed in Kashmir, Mahmud al Rashid, the editor, remarked that,

"The Muslims today are full of anger and many have lost even the ability to dream of better times ahead. But worst of all some of us blame Islam for our troubles. And some even harbour a feeling that just being a Muslim is a curse - something to be hidden or played down" (Vol.3:7, p.30).

Rashid returns to the example of the Prophet at Ta'if - the same episode which features so prominently in the Tablighi Jamat compendium of traditions - where he was mocked and humiliated but did not lose hope. Yet, in the same issue there is a full-blooded reiteration of the principles of the Islamist movement: 'we want...in every region...a government of Allah, and we should enforce the Shariah of Allah...We are an organisation of Truth, Power and Freedom' (ibid., p.7).

By 1991 many of its energetic leaders in Bradford had moved on and there was a lull in activities. Such continuity the Young Muslims had enjoyed in Bradford was largely due to the devoted work of Dr Munir Ahmed, but by 1992 he was 32 and Young Muslims could not rely on him indefinitely to fulfill such a role. Until the movement acquires some paid workers, institutional continuity, locally, will remain precarious. Further, the dilemma for the ex-members, namely where they might feel at home when they graduate from the youth movement, had not been resolved. U.K. Islamic Mission still did not seem attractive for activists like Dr Ahmed. It remains to be seen whether an initiative launched in 1990 in Leicester will address this need. In June 1990 The Islamic Society of Britain was formally inaugurated by members of UKIM and ex-members of Young Muslims UK, including Mr Mashuq Ally and Mr Farooq Murad. This society seeks to embody 'a more creative and imaginative outlook ...(raising) the
consciousness of Muslims about their Islamic contribution to British society' (Trends, vol. 3:6, 1990, p. 11).

3.5 RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT

The three main traditions of Islamic expression reproduced in Bradford, the Barelwi, Deobandi/Tablighi Jamaat and Jamaat-i-Islami, each exhibits strengths and weaknesses when measured against the checklist of four questions posed at the end of 3.1. This can be clearly expressed in tabular form (table 3.1). These questions sought to identify some of the challenges Islamic traditions faced if they were to connect with the linguistic and cultural world of Muslims born and educated in Bradford. These same issues will be considered more explicitly from the perspective of young Muslims themselves in a later chapter (6.1 and 6.2).

What is evident is that all three Islamic traditions maintain strong links with their parent organisations in South Asia. In the case of the two Deobandi seminaries their curriculum and ethos unmistakably bear this South Asian impress. While Young Muslims UK are self-consciously western in dress and unashamedly modern in their use of the electronic media, their Islamic ideology owes more to Pakistan than Britain. The Barelwi tradition, while hospitable to change, is largely frustrated in giving it institutional expression by shortage of funds and personal rivalries carried over from South Asia.

As yet there is no clear answer to two other important questions facing all three traditions. The first is the extent to which some questioning of the traditions will be tolerated as their relevance for Muslims in the West is scrutinised. The next chapter will seek to shed some light on this important issue. The second question is the extent to which sectarian differences can be managed so enabling Muslims to co-operate in tackling new issues they all face in Britain. Chapter five explores this question.


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Table 3.1 The extent to which the different Islamic traditions are hospitable to the needs of young British Muslims
The scholars and religious functionaries of Islam—the 'ulama—do not enjoy a good press in South Asia. Islamist and modernist alike have sought to bypass them and their institutions, blaming them for projecting a fossilised Islam, which does not connect with the concerns of the modern world. A Pakistani anthropologist, after lengthy and intimate discussions with the 'ulama, concluded that for them 'the outside world simply does not exist. The works of Marx or Weber are unknown' (Ahmed, 1992, p.43). Members of the revivalist Tablighi Jamaat pay them formal respect but insist that every Muslim has a responsibility for 'enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong' (sura 3:104)—the qur'anic rationale for preaching, tabligh—and challenge the view that 'tabligh is the sole and special responsibility of the "ulema' (Hasan, n.d., pp. 10 and 16).

Muslims touched by sufism often dismiss them as pedants concerned with the mere externals of Islam, an unflattering assessment with a long history in South Asia. Thus Dara Shikoh (d.1659), sufi and poet, and heir apparent of the Mughal Empire, could write, "Paradise is there; where there is no molla". In the true mystical spirit, he emphasized immediate experience as contrasted with blind imitation (Schimmel, 1975, p.362).

One of the founders of the Deoband seminary, Maulana Nanautawi (d.1880), in trying to hold together a reformed sufism within the scholarly disciplines of the dar'ul 'ulum, lamented that 'among the Sufis I have the stain of maulawiyyat'—maulvi-itis (Metcalf, 1982, p.139).

In the new and challenging environment of Britain these accusations are repeated by a generation of educated and English-speaking Muslims. Dr Shabbir Akhter, a member of the Bradford Council for Mosques from 1988-1990, observed that, traditional Islam is in sorry decline; many in the educated classes are repelled by it. By refusing to address the problems that plague the modern mind...Islam is gradually losing
control...over the daily life of secularised believers (Akhtar, 1990, p.160).

An Indian Barelwi Imam, resident in Britain for some fifteen years, recently provided an insider's perspective on his fellow imams active in Britain. He painted a bleak picture:

The majority ...lack a thorough knowledge of Islam. Their knowledge is limited to the sectarian parameters. (they) do not know anything about the context in which they are resident. They can neither speak the English language nor are they acquainted with the socio-political context of the dominating British culture. (the Imam) is dogmatic or does not know how to reason (Raza, 1991, pp.32-33).

This chapter will review the functions of the 'ulama; explore the economic and contractual insecurity with which many have to live; identify the difficulties for those trained in South Asia to feel at ease in the very different linguistic and cultural environment of Britain, even if they know English; consider the curriculum studied in the dar al-ulum, both in South Asia and Bury; and, finally, ask why their activities in the supplementary schools remain a cause of concern for many Muslims. This will enable us to evaluate some of the accusations levelled against the 'ulama and contribute to understanding their continuing role in the education and religious formation of local Muslims.

4.1 THE WORLD OF THE IMAM AND MUFTI

The term 'ulama is the plural of the Arabic noun, 'alim, which means a learned man. The term is used in a specialist sense, denoting scholars of religious knowledge, who have completed an accredited course of study in an Islamic seminary, dar al-ulum. The category of 'ulama comprises a variety of religious practitioners, ranging from the Imam - prayer leader in a mosque - to such specialists as the mufti, experts in Islamic law, able to give an advisory decision, fatwa, on a range of questions put to them. An 'alim will be variously referred to in South Asia and Bradford as a mulla, maulvi, maulana, or 'allama, in an ascending scale of respect.1
This section will rehearse the roles of six local 'ulama, which illustrate the variety of tasks they fulfil and the extent to which some have a public role outside the mosque, an issue also addressed in chapter five, where their circumscribed role in the Bradford Council for Mosques is reviewed. The six men chosen include a father and son. This should enable us to compare the continuities and discontinuities in attitudes and perspectives of an 'alim educated in Britain with an 'alim educated in Pakistan. Two others are mufti-s, important figures who have remained largely invisible in studies on Muslim communities in Britain.

'Allama Shah Muhammad Nishtar, the Imam of a large Barelwi mosque, referred to in the previous chapter (3.2), is not only a certificated 'alim but also has an M.A. in Arabic from the Punjab University, Pakistan. He has been in Bradford for some twenty years, has a good command of English, taught in local schools and colleges, is much respected in the community and enjoys a commanding position in a mosque, whose committee he selected. He has overall responsibility for teaching about one hundred and fifty children and he himself teaches a group of girls Arabic G.C.S.E. in the mosque through the medium of English. To help him he has a full-time assistant, a Mirpuri 'alim, and four part-time teachers, one a local liaison teacher, also with an M.A. in Arabic from the Punjab University. 'Allama Nishtar has also fronted the efforts to raise money for a new purpose-built mosque, not far from that being built by Pir Maroof's association (3.2). The foundation stone was laid in November 1982. Some ten years later it is almost complete, costing about £1 million and drawing extensively on the generosity and voluntary labour of many of his congregation.

He is a member of the Imams and Mosques Council of Great Britain – one of two umbrella organisations set up in London in 1984, largely reflecting the Barelwi/Wahhabi divide – and a local consultant for them in Islamic law. In 1991 he was selected as one of the five Bradford members of the 'Muslim Parliament' – inaugurated in January 1991 – an organisation established by Dr Kalim Siddiqui, the Director of the pro-Iranian Muslim Institute, intended to embody The Muslim Manifesto (Nielsen, 1991). Those who worship in the Bradford mosque
comprise people from Mirpur, Gujjar Khan and Chhachh, the majority of whom have little formal education. Allama Nishtar worries that most parents are content for their children to imbibe little more than the minimalist Islamic education to which they were exposed in Pakistan. This involves devoting a couple of years to learning to read the qur'an in Arabic, without understanding it - completion of which is understood to carry religious merit, sawab - and knowledge of the formal prayers and their accompanying rituals.

While the Prophet's birthday is celebrated in the mosque, Allama Nishtar has little patience with the expense of organising and advertising a public procession, which he feels is often little more than an exercise in self-display by local leaders. He prefers to spend the money on developing a good lending library of books in English, Urdu and Arabic. Within the sufi tradition himself, he likens religion to a banana: the externals of religion, qur'anic study, hadith and Islamic law are the 'outside', zahir, strong for protection; but sufism is the fruit 'inside', batin. Both are necessary. He is alert to the need to help youngsters disentangle aspects of South Asian culture from Islam e.g. he reassures youngsters that there is nothing un-Islamic about western dress, so long as the wearer conforms to qur'anic canons of modesty.

In education, influence, status, public role outside the mosque and security, Allama Nishtar has few equals in Bradford. He owns his own house and has a compliant mosque committee. More typical of the city's ulama with regard to influence and public visibility is a Gujarati 'alim, Maulana Abdullah. Although he has little English, he is well-trained, having completed a ten year programme at a Deobandi dar al 'ulum in Gujarat, India. He serves a small house mosque, whose worshippers are from Chhachh in Pakistan. His register of pupils at the mosque school indicated that his thirty seven students all live in the surrounding four streets. The register is an innovation encouraged by the local authority's supplementary schools officer, who had also left some books on Islam in English, for use by the children. The imam depends on the large Howard Street mosque for lists of prayer times and for use of their funeral facility. He lives in a small tied-house owned by the mosque committee and can usually
expect about fifty worshippers on a Friday. He works alone in the mosque, lives a quiet, unobserved life, with no public role.

Imam Mahmud al Hasan is bi-lingual, having had all his formal education in state schools in Bradford, before going on to Bury dar al 'ulum at thirteen. Imam Hasan, in the autumn of 1989, became the first Deobandi imam appointed in Bradford to graduate from a British dar al 'ulum. He considers the functions of the imamate are: to lead the five daily prayers; to teach the children in the supplementary school; to give the friday khutba in Arabic; and the accompanying address in Urdu; to preside over the rites of passage at birth; to whisper the call to prayer, azaan, into the child's ear; to solemnise the marriage contract, nikah, and prepare the dead for burial; to prepare ta'wiz, amulets, for those fearful of the evil eye; to offer advice, within his competence, on the application of Islamic teaching and law, on a range of issues put to him.

It is worth expanding and illustrating such categories to identify changes in style, content and approach, between Imam Hasan and his father, Maulana Lutfur Rahman. His father, a Pathan, trained in Pakistan and without a working knowledge of English, was imam in the mosque for twenty years, a trustee of the Bury dar al 'ulum, and President, for most of that time, of the Jamiat-i-Ulama Britannia, a national umbrella organisation for Deobandi 'ulama. The Friday address would see few differences between father and son: Imam Hasan's address comprises a twenty five minute qur'anic exposition in Urdu, without notes - he is working his way through the whole qur'an, using in his preparation the multi-volume commentary by a famous Pakistani commentator, Maulana Shafi (d.1978), recommended for use at both Bury and Dewsbury.

The obvious differences become apparent in teaching children in the mosque. While both will use Mufti Kifayat Ullah's textbook, 'Ta'lim ul Islam, Lessons in Islam, Imam Hasan is able to make sure that each lesson is read in Urdu and English and will pause to illustrate a point with reference to the children's world. Thus when listing the things not to do in a mosque reading Batman cards and playing marbles are added! He can also recommend a new boardgame in English,
entitled 'Steps to Paradise', which tests Islamic knowledge. The game includes a board with a colourful, imagined picture of paradise at its centre, dice and 150 Islamic question and answer cards, which contain some 600 questions, 150 hadith quotations; instead of using paper money to acquire property as in the game 'monopoly', the player builds up a bank of different coloured sawab/religious merit cards, which contain anything between five and fifty thousand units. The aim of the game is to get enough correct answers to acquire sufficient religious merit to enter paradise. We have moved a long way from the environment and ethos of a traditional mosque, staffed by a South Asian imam, described by Dr S.M. Darsh - an Egyptian who was imam of the prestigious 'Islamic Cultural Centre', in Regent's Park, London - as 'stern, long-bearded and intolerant of the most trivial breaches of the behavioural code' (Darsh, 1980, p.40).

Many in the mosque will come to both father and son with similar worries. Thus, taxi-drivers, aware of Islam's prohibition of alcohol, will ask whether it is sinful for them to take customers to pubs and clubs where alcohol is consumed. Imam Hasan's response is that it is allowed since they are no more personally responsible for what their clients do than the owner of a house is personally responsible for the adulterous behaviour of a tenant who rents his property. Imam Hasan is aware that on certain issues, such as whether or not contraception is allowed, men will approach him but not his father. This is largely a difference in outlook: his parents' generation were much more reticent about the whole area of sexuality than his, brought up in England.3

If father or son feel a question is outside their competence they can refer the issue to a mufti, a specialist in Islamic law. Bradford's Deobandi 'ulama can refer to Mufti Sacha, a teacher at the Dewsbury dar al 'ulum. The availability of mufti-s has always been a priority for the Deoband tradition, which pioneered the provision and publication of advisory decisions, fatwa-s, in late nineteenth century India. In a Muslim state a mufti was a court official, who delivered such fatwas for the guidance of the qazi or judge. In British India the Deobandi mufti began to give such fatwa-s directly to believers. This form of guidance 'in the innumerable details of
life... created a distinctive pattern of religious fidelity, whatever the vicissitudes of political life" (Metcalf, 1982, p. 47). Deobandi mufti-s also began to publish collections of their decisions as a way of disseminating their reformist understanding of Islam, in the face of customary practices, deemed un-Islamic.  

Mufti Sacha was joined in Britain in 1988 by his old teacher, Mufti Kachholvi, who started in that year the Institute of Islamic Jurisprudence, U.K., in Bradford. Mufti Kachholvi is a full-time mufti, while Mufti Sacha combines this responsibility with his teaching at Dewsbury. Both are Gujaratis, trained in India and accredited 'ulama, who have specialised in Islamic law. In addition Mufti Kachholvi was designated a khalifa, a successor, of the famous hadith scholar, Maulana Zakariya, author of the Tablighi Nisab, the authoritative and widely used textbook of the revivalist, Tablighi Jamaat.

Both mufti-s keep copies of all their written fatwa-s. Since these provide a unique window into the day-to-day concerns of British Muslims it is worth exploring some of the continuities and discontinuities with the questions asked by Muslims in South Asia. In an advertisement, in English, Urdu and Gujarati, reporting the activities of the institute, printed two years after its opening, it was stated that Mufti Kachholvi had dealt with some 350 written questions and 150 enquiries over the phone. Individuals 'share their predicaments... over many issues, ranging from simple queries on prayers, fasting, zakat, hajj... to more complex ones on marriage, divorce, custody, inheritance, investments'. It pointed to the anxieties many Muslims felt at having to go through civil courts regarding divorce, custody, inheritance. 'Many divorces pronounced by the courts are invalid in the eyes of shari'ah. It is unfortunate that many husbands abuse the system to their wife's detriment by not pronouncing the talaaq...' (Institute report, n.d).

Some of the issues both mufti-s addressed were common to Britain and South Asia. Thus one enquiry concerned whether it was lawful to have pictures on a prayer mat - the answer given was that such did not render prayer invalid but, since decoration tended to distract the
attention from God, it was better not to use illustrated prayer mats. Another questioner asked who should lead funeral prayers and whether its status was equivalent to salat, one of the five daily prayers—the answer was that the imam of the mosque was responsible for the prayers; if he was absent a relative of the deceased could decide who should lead them and, finally, such prayers did not carry the merit of salat.

Most enquiries dealt with Muslim family law, since the rulings of British courts could create problems. The abuse of talaq, the pronouncement of the divorce formula by the husband—mentioned in the report—refers to the insistence that for a divorce to be lawful, according to traditional, Hanafi fiqh, the man must pronounce talaq. This could leave a woman in the anomalous position where she was divorced according to British law but not according to Islamic law—if her husband refused to pronounce talaq—and thus could find it difficult to remarry within the Muslim community.

A detailed letter to Mufti Sacha by an accountant offers an unrivalled insight into the anxieties of a devout Muslim in a non-Muslim business environment. The accountant listed the following questions which suggest he was thinking of setting up his own firm, and wondered if the shift from employee to self-employed would exacerbate or relieve his dilemmas:

1. In accountancy it is normal practice to prepare accounts for business of all types, which include off-licences, pubs, insurance consultants, building societies...Is it permissible to prepare accounts for such:
   a) as an employee?
b) as self-employed?

2. Clients often consult accountants to seek advice on obtaining bank/building society loans and mortgages to purchase or expand businesses or homes.
a) Is it permissible to give advice to such clients:
   (i) as an employee?
   (ii) as self-employed?

3. Is it permissible to charge or pay 'goodwill' when selling or buying an accountancy practice (i.e. taking over the clients)?

Mufti Sacha replied that with reference to the first question, it was lawful, if an employee, but better not to prepare such accounts if self-employed. With regard to the second question it was allowed if one's job depended on it, otherwise it was better to avoid having to give such advice. Further, if the client was a Muslim it was incumbent on a Muslim accountant to remind him that loans/mortgages were haram, illegal with regard to Islamic law, since they involved interest. His answer to the third question was that such was not allowed but it was permissible instead to leave some goods in the building and charge for them whatever the accountant decided. This latter was an example of a hilah, or legal device, developed to circumvent the full rigours of the law.

On certain issues there was a difference of opinion between the two muftis. Thus one felt that television and video were haram. This was consistent with Mufti Kifayatullah's teaching in Ta'lim ul Islam that visiting the cinema and theatre was sinful (Kifayatullah, n.d. Book 4, p.27). The other felt that it depended on the content of the programme, with sport, documentaries and educational programmes allowed.

One issue which troubles many Muslims, in all traditions, is the issue of mortgage. Everyone agrees that it is haram, since it involves interest. However, there was a variety of views about whether it was ever permitted because of circumstances. One mufti argued that if there was no rented accommodation available and the alternative was going on the street then it was possible to contract a mortgage. The other felt that this latter could never happen in Britain, given the elaborate safety net of welfare provision, therefore it remained haram. The issue becomes particularly poignant for mosque committees since many worshippers are not happy about
praying behind an imam who owned a house bought on a mortgage. In the 1970s, pre-recession, with few mosques and cheap housing many a congregation would dig deep into their resources and provide an interest-free loan for an imam. However, it was conceded by some Muslim leaders that with recession, the proliferation of mosques and house prices rocketing in the 1980s, some imams had recourse to mortgages, albeit with a bad conscience.

It is evident from this review that, within Bradford, the 'ulama comprise an amorphous category, including a trained specialist, the mufti, a few who enjoy a public role outside the mosque, and those whose world is largely circumscribed by their duties within the mosque. Since the majority of settlers in Bradford—from whom the mosque committees are largely drawn—came from rural areas they understandably preferred as imams people from their own district, who knew their locale and dialect, and who shared their view of the role of an imam and his responsibilities with regard to their children. They, after all, remain the employers of the imam. However, such appointments were not always possible. In 1989 of nineteen 'ulama employed by Deobandi mosques nine were Gujaratis, five serving a mixed congregation but four were employed in four mosques controlled and serving a Pathan/Chhachh constituency. In the same year Pir Maroof’s Bareliwi organisation also relied on eight Gujarati imams (3.2). 5

4.2 ECONOMIC AND CONTRACTUAL INSECURITY

A Muslim political scientist provides a useful window into the social status of Pakistani 'ulama, where the term is used:

loosely ... and tends to include the entire religious establishment. At the base is the imam, who leads prayers in the village mosque. He is usually semi-literate, and has some rudimentary knowledge of Islamic theology. The village community regards him as a low-ranking functionary equal to the barber, washerman, cobbler, or carpenter and compensates him partly in kind. He may be consulted in some matters, but he will not be admitted to a leadership role, unless he belongs to a higher caste, has independent income, and leads the prayers as a labor of
love... The imams, and especially (those)... who deliver the Friday orations at the larger better-known mosques in cities, are more learned and command greater respect (Syed, 1984, pp. 219-220). 6

It is evident that Bradford's seventy 'ulama - used as a hold-all to include all mosque personnel - occupy positions right across this spectrum. The lowly huffaz, (plural of hafiz), of whom there were thirty in 1989, in addition to learning the qur'an off by heart, often have little more than elementary knowledge of Islam, and their position is akin to the village imam. The remaining 39 'ulama' in Bradford are more variegated in status: nine had University and college degrees from South Asia, in addition to their formal 'alim qualifications. The greatest difficulty most face is that they are not fluent in English. Only half a dozen have a good command of English. 'A major disincentive to learning English is insecurity - economic and contractual.

Only three of the 'ulama had formal contracts of employment. Many, who came to Britain as visitors, have to renew their visas annually, and are very much at the mercy of their mosque committee, since the latter have to confirm to the Home Office that the 'alim is still wanted. Those who stay for five years enjoy rights of domicile and, if they have acquired a particular reputation as a good speaker, qur'an reciter; or learned English, gain a measure of autonomy, since other mosques may want to employ them. Many of the 'ulama are clearly dissatisfied with this state of affairs, since it also means they have to be very careful about criticising committee policy or seeking to implement changes. Since they are mosque committee employees very few are on those committees. It is hardly surprising that Dr Zaki Badawi, the chairman of the national Imams and Mosques Council of Great Britain has 'proposed a model contract for imams and instituted a pension scheme...(since they) should be secure'. He sees this as a necessary corrective to the 'contempt' Muslims have developed for their imams (Islamia, 1992, p. 15).

The economic situation of the majority of the 'ulama is also precarious. In 1989 an 'alim who was paid more than £80 per week was the exception, and many had to live on less. Of course, some
accommodation was provided, but this could vary between a room in the mosque, a tied-house or, if the imam was very fortunate, a house bought with an interest-free loan. There are various reasons why the 'ulama are badly paid. One factor is that the general economic situation of the Muslim communities in the city is parlous, due to the dramatic recession effecting the very industries for which they were recruited (2.3.1).

Another reason that there is little money for the wages of an imam is that many mosque committees are still burdened with large expenses over and above the costs incurred in buying a building to be used as a mosque. Many of these buildings were bought before planning permission was sought for converting them into mosques. Mosque committees, then, often found themselves required to make expensive alterations to satisfy stringent building controls and fire precautions. It needs to be remembered that as late as 1992 only one mosque was purpose-built, although with three more under construction; for the rest, two are in converted cinemas, three in old church buildings, nine in industrial premises/mills and over twenty in houses. Because the community is still relatively new to Britain resources have not been accumulated to provide religious endowments, augaf, for the maintenance of such buildings and provision of salaries. This means that the wage for the imam has to come out of weekly contributions of the congregation and the sums charged for teaching children. This latter is seldom more than £1 a week per child and even this may have to be reduced where families have large numbers of young children. One or two of the larger mosques have additional sources of income, such as rented property, car parking space and large rooms, which can be let out for social functions, such as weddings. However, these remain the exception.

There is also little central or local government funding available for centres devoted to religious purposes. £100,000 from the Department of the Environment was provided in 1983 for essential repair work to supplementary schools in the city, which included non-Muslim premises; similarly, in 1988 the local authority made another £100,000 available to help them satisfy new stringent fire precautions. Three mosques in the city enjoyed from the early
eighties Community Programme funding for teaching community languages on their premises. For the rest the mosques had to compete with other groups for such funding as was available for voluntary groups in the city.

In 1988/89 Bradford's Urban Programme funding of £3 million pounds included a component of 30 per cent for ethnic minority projects. Among the recipients were a few mosques: six successfully made bids for funding in the category of environmental improvement, for either buildings or environs. But such amounts were generally no more than £10,000. One other mosque qualified for £19,000 under the social-needs category, to provide adequate heating provision in what was a disused mill, for a day centre for elderly Asians (CIAC, 1989(c), pp. 16, 35-36). Very little of the fabled petrol dollar wealth of the Arab countries finds its way into Bradford's mosques either. The fact that the city is still waiting the completion of a large central, purpose-built mosque, thirty years after the first house-mosque was established, gives the lie to rumours of such funding.

Another important factor which militates against the payment to ulama of a realistic wage is the experience and expectations many of the elders brought with them from their villages in South Asia. There the imam would be paid, in part, in kind, and through ex gratia payments: these would be made during the rites of passage, over which the imam presided; during the month of fasting, when an imam, with a skill in qur'anic recitation, would be expected to recite the entire qur'an; other ulama, who enjoyed a reputation as a reciter of devotional hymns would be involved in the cycle of sufi festivals, which punctuate the Barelvi year; some would be involved in khatam i qur'an, completing the entire qur'an, to invoke God's blessing, intervention and protection at times of 'illness, risk or danger' (Shaw, 1988, pp. 130). Such payments, when made in Bradford, however welcome, do not amount to a regular wage. Indeed, among some ulama there is a reluctance to accept such monies for fear of compromising, by commercial considerations, that right intention, niyat, a precondition for acceptable worship and devotion.

Inadequate remuneration could prove one of the most powerful
dissuasives for able British Muslims choosing to become 'ulama. In 1989 only one 'alim in the city could tap into foreign funding, a graduate of Madina University, supported by a Saudi Arabian religious foundation. Pir Maroof and the UK Islamic Mission have both failed to sustain viable dar al 'ulum, in part for this reason (3.2 and 3.4). Three of the most able local 'ulama, all with good English, have already left local mosques; two of them have gained postgraduate certificates in education and have joined the state education system. The third is pursuing the same route. The three represent the main traditions of Islamic expression in the city, the Deobandi, the Barelwi and the Jamaat-i-Islami. Even the English-speaking graduates from Bury and Dewsbury, so important for the future staffing of the city's Deobandi mosques, may follow suit. One of the two employed in Bradford's mosques has begun to establish a local business. He may continue to teach in the mosque but he can no longer afford to be their imam. British Muslims, trained in dar al 'ulum in this country, necessarily have different expectations from South Asian elders about what counts as a realistic wage.

4.3 OCCIDENTALISM AND THE CHALLENGE OF LIVING IN TWO CULTURES

It is not easy to live in two linguistic and cultural worlds. Dr Munir Ahmad, an educated, British Muslim was unable to assume authority within the UK Islamic Mission mosque, in part, because of these difficulties; of course, the difficulties were exacerbated by trying to operate across an oral and literate cultural divide, complicated by class differences (3.4).

If Dr Ahmad found this movement difficult within a shared Islamic context it is worth exploring the pitfalls that attend attempts to move from a South Asian Muslim environment into a British educational and professional world. Mention has already been made of three 'ulama, all educated in South Asia, who have left the full-time employ of their Bradford mosques to pursue teaching qualifications. Such a move requires a certain boldness since it involves engaging with another linguistic and cultural world, which is not considered morally and religiously neutral but rather subversive of Islamic religion and culture.
Mohammad Raza, an imam himself, in seeking to explain what he sees as a renewed sectarianism among British Muslims, locates it within a reaction to the secular context.

If a Muslim goes to a restaurant, he cannot eat meat because it is not Halal... If his girls are going to a mixed school, he fears that his daughter will become pregnant. If she attends any classes on sex education, he fears the teacher will teach her how to have sex. He fears sending his children to educational institutions because they may indoctrinate them with secular values. He does not want his children to watch television because explicit love scenes are sometimes shown... Such Muslims may seem to have become paranoid about Western culture, society and civilization (Raza, 1991, p.23).

This response, dubbed 'occidentalisrn' by a celebrated Pakistani anthropologist, can, in part, be understood by the anxieties which Raza and others attach to the word 'secular' (Ahmed, 1992, pp. 177-179). Most of the ulama consulted in Bradford gloss the term by two Urdu words, ladini and ghairmazhabi. Both mean non-religious and carry the association of irreligious/anti-religious. Mr. Liaqat Hussain, the President of the Bradford Council for Mosques in 1991 and 1992, and himself a Bareawi, pointed out, in conversation, that the religious opposition to the Pakistan Peoples Party (P.P.P.) in Pakistan was rooted in the perception that it was socialist, secular and therefore irreligious. 'The Muslim Manifesto - a strategy for survival', published by the Muslim Institute in 1990, can speak of 'the demands of rampant, immoral secularism...(within) a post-Christian, largely pagan, society' (The Muslim Manifesto, 1990, pp.30-31). Here, within Islamist discourse, the 'secular' is similarly derided.

The 'secular' is almost universally described in contemporary Islamic writings, by modernists, Islamists and traditionalists alike. The same author who laments the emergence of 'occidentalisrn' in Muslim attitudes to Western society insists, in the same work, that "secular" and "Muslim" are by definition incompatible words... There can be no Muslim without God', thus secular is being interpreted as equivalent to atheism (Ahmed, 1992, p.173).
A few dissenting voices do exist and two are particularly instructive. Maulana Azmi, an Indian 'alim who used to work in Bradford, arguing out of his Indian experience, considers that the widely shared perception, that 'secular' necessarily implies irreligion, is simply wrong. In India, he contends, a secular state can offer security to Muslims since it is compatible with acknowledging that religion is important, but that in a religiously plural environment the state does not allow believers in one religious tradition to enjoy a privileged status. All are citizens with equal rights. Indeed, in India, Muslims are allowed to conform to their own Muslim family law. The second dissenting voice is D.H. Khaled, who was Associate Professor, Islamic Research Institute and Lecturer in Pakistan Studies, University of Islamabad, Pakistan during the 1970s. Khaled observed that, the Urdu translation of secularism as la-dini has wrought havoc in India and Pakistan... (since vested interests) have succeeded in attributing to secularism not only a western origin but also an essentially Christian character... By doing so they have given secularism the stigma of a foreign ideology, whereas in reality it is ... a sociological process and... a method of religious reform (Khaled, 1974, p. 34).

Progressive writers in Pakistan today seek to avoid this trap by transliterating the English word into Urdu and then offering a contrary interpretation of it. A book of essays by Syed Sibte Hasan, Navid I Fiqr, Invitation to Thought, written in 1982, included an essay entitled 'secularism'. The book was reviewed in the Pakistan press and one reviewer, 'Zeno', noted approvingly that, the most essential aspect of the analysis is the contention that secularism has no antireligious connotations as our fundamentalists are fond of arguing. It merely means aspects of life which have to do with the world as opposed to those which are called spiritual (Dawn, 21-1-1983).

Imam Haneef Qamar, one of two Bradford 'ulama to negotiate successfully the transfer from the South Asian to the British educational system, and gain a postgraduate certificate in education
from a local polytechnic, is innocent of such semantic subtleties. It is to his credit that he persisted with his studies in an environment routinely labelled and understood by fellow imams as 'secular'/irreligious. So far very few from an 'alim background have completed such courses. Three other 'ulama, who attended a preliminary course put on by a local college to help them manage the transfer, dropped out. Imam Qamar enjoyed certain advantages over other 'ulama, in that his educational background was broader than most; as well as being a Barelwi 'alim he had gained an M.A. in Islamic Studies from the Punjab University in Pakistan. His M.A., unlike many 'alim courses, included the study of Islamic history, other religions, Islam and science, as well as study of the Qur'an, hadith and fiqh, Islamic jurisprudence.

Much of the method, ethos and content of his educational course was unfamiliar and involved different levels of difficulty and anxiety. To rehearse the difficulties an exceptionally well qualified 'alim from South Asia experienced in negotiating two educational systems, located within distinct social, cultural and linguistic worlds, is revealing. It highlights the huge task facing South Asian 'ulama in Britain, who want to connect with the experiences and concerns of the increasing numbers of British Muslims, who are graduates of institutions of higher education in this country.

Imam Qamar found the main difficulty with which he had to contend was his imperfect grasp of English. The medium of instruction for an 'alim in Pakistan will be Urdu. He will also be expected to develop a good knowledge of Arabic and a working knowledge of Persian. For studies at a Pakistani university some knowledge of English is expected but not a mastery of the language. Thus to succeed in the British educational system most South Asian students will be at a disadvantage unless they previously attended the few good English medium schools patronised by the elite.

Imam Qamar also found the methods of study unfamiliar. In Pakistan the focus of study, whether in a dar al'ulum or in many state universities and colleges, is mastery of certain textbooks. In Britain he was expected to be at ease with the world of projects and
written assignments. The questioning approach to education was also new: in a mosque the imam's opinion is dominant and the student is not expected to question it; an attitude of deference to authority which has transferred to many teachers in higher education in Pakistan. Further, according to Imam Qamar, the assumption is that the imam knows everything and is expected to answer any query immediately. For him to say that he does not know, or that he needs to consult a book, is taken as a sign of incompetence! This is very much the expectation of those operating from within an oral rather than a literate culture - the majority of the elders in Bradford's mosques (3.1).

As regards the subject areas with which he was expected to be acquainted, in preparation for teaching in Britain, he had most difficulties with music, art, dance, P.E. and sex-education. A South Asian Islamic culture with its gender specific dress codes, intended to preserve modesty, its preference for single sex institutions after girls reach puberty, its reticence about uncovering the human body in public and discussion of sexuality in mixed company, all run counter to assumptions and practices taken for granted in the British educational system. Seen within the context of British educational practice, modelling human figures out of clay can seem a very innocent activity, but for Imam Qamar it was tantamount to idolatry, since it usurped the place of the creator. Explicit illustrations of the human body and mixed sex education were also the cause of anxiety. What is remarkable is that Imam Qamar stayed the course.

Other difficulties were practical as he sought first to understand and then negotiate appropriate responses to the conventions of a very different social arena. As an imam, he wore a definable 'uniform', easily recognisable within a South Asian Muslim environment, the traditional shalwar qamiz, achkan, top coat and hat. Outside a Muslim context this same traditional dress could invite unwelcome attention, even racist taunts. However, to change into a western suit could open him to the criticism from members of his congregation, who happened to see him, that he had changed his identity and become westernised. The irony, as he himself noted, was that many of his congregation themselves wore western clothes. Social gatherings with fellow
students were attended by anxieties: would there be alcohol; would halal meat be available, how would he cope with a knife and fork? A Muslim is expected to eat with his right hand, while a fork is usually held in the left hand. Imam Qamar, like many Muslims, would cut the food with their knife in their right hand and eat it also with this hand by shifting his fork from left to right. Such skills can soon be acquired, but initially a measure of unfamiliarity contributes to increased psychological tension.

Although his course comprised men and women there was only one other male on it. He admits that had he been the only male he might not have persevered. Other problems were created by the difficulty of participating in the Friday congregational prayers. There was limited time between lectures and assignments during which the student was supposed to eat lunch and go the library. One final area of sensitivity was that as an 'alim he enjoyed a respected position within his community. On teaching practice this was not understood and he was expected to do tasks which were either demeaning or with which he was unfamiliar, whether tying children's laces or washing dishes. He was able to laugh at this, in retrospect, since he realised no insult was intended.

Imam Qamar recognises there was no ill-will involved and that staff, when they became aware of his disquiet, were supportive and helpful. However, he often felt isolated and was often reluctant to share his anxieties for fear of being misunderstood or considered difficult. His experience illuminates the many pitfalls an educated 'alim encounters when moving from a Muslim majority culture, like Pakistan, into the very different social and cultural world of a British college or university. In the next section, which considers the sort of curriculum an 'alim might study in South Asia and Britain, the experience of an English educated 'alim will be explored and will offer a useful counterpoint to Imam Qamar's experiences.

4.4 CURRICULUM AND CHANGE IN THE DAR AL 'ULUM

The need for changes in methodology and curriculum of Islamic seminaries in South Asia has exercised individual scholars for over
two-hundred years (1.2.5). Modernising governments in Pakistan, eager to introduce legal changes, have established Islamic research centres to bypass the perceived obscurantism of the dar al 'ulum (3.1). Alongside such attempts to develop a corpus of modernist scholarship, South Asian governments have also sought to introduce changes in the curriculum of the Islamic seminaries. Such attempts to introduce changes in methodology and curriculum have had only limited success. It is necessary to understand both the dynamic for change and the resistance to it from the 'ulama in South Asia if we are to understand the world of Bury and Dewsbury and the challenges they face in Britain in developing a curriculum relevant to a new environment.

The imperative for change can be illustrated from the famous work The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam (1934) by Muhammad Iqbal (d.1938), the South Asian poet and philosopher. Iqbal illustrated the need for reform and the dead hand of figh, Islamic jurisprudence, with a striking example:

In the Punjab, as everybody knows, there have been cases in which Muslim women wishing to get rid of undesirable husbands have been driven to apostasy... 'Does the working of the rule relating to apostasy, as laid down in the Hedaya, tend to protect the interests of the Faith in this country?' (Iqbal, 1982, p. 169).

Iqbal's point was that in the widely used twelfth-century compilation of Islamic case-law Hidaya, (guide) by Marghinani (d.1196), divorce was considered the unilateral prerogative of the husband, and that apostasy alone provided a way out of an impossible marriage for a woman, since this same text declares that in such cases 'a separation takes place without divorce' (Hamilton, 1987, p.66). This example is of more than academic interest since this same venerable work, Hidaya, is one of the key texts studied in both the Bury and Dewsbury seminaries.

Iqbal's answer to this dilemma was to have recourse to the principle of ijtihad, independent reasoning, to 're-interpret the foundational legal principles in the light of ... (contemporary) experience and the altered conditions of modern life' (Iqbal, 1982, p.168). This, of
course, raised further difficult issues, namely who was competent to exercise such *ijtihad*, if the need for it was granted; also, how important was the study of Islamic history in contextualising such venerable works as *Hidaya*, a preliminary to legal reform, and how was the community to arrive at consensus, *ijma*, on contested issues? These issues of authority, competence and how to arrive at consensus on contested issues have continued to bedevil Pakistani politics. For traditional jurists *ijtihad* is not a faculty to be applied to any and every issue but only to those questions on which no *ijma*, consensus, has been reached. The Deobandi, Maulana Mufti Mohammad Shafi, the leading *mufti* in Pakistan, argued that the category of irrevocable *ijma* was rooted in the Qur'anic verse:

> And whosoever acts hostilely to the Messenger after guidance has become manifest to him and follows other than the way of the believers, We...make him enter hell...(4:115) and the hadith, 'My community will never unite in error'...(thus) the *ijtihad*...of individual jurists were to be considered as based on surmise...(until) a verdict is confirmed through *ijma* or consensus of all jurists...(then it can) attain almost as much sanctity as the Revealed Commandments (Faruki, 1974, p.49).

It is clear why the distinguished Pakistani scholar, Fazlur Rahman, could insist that the debate between modernist and traditionalist could only move beyond sterile name calling if the 'basic questions of method and hermeneutics were ...squarely addressed' (Rahman, 1982, p.2). Too often issues were simply resolved by the political expedient of packing committees. Thus in 1956 a Pakistani Commission on Marriage and Family Laws called for reforms in marriage, divorce and inheritance, and most contentiously sought to limit the possibility of polygamy. The commission of seven members only included one 'alim, who vehemently dissented from its recommendations. Similarly, the Council of Islamic Ideology, set up in 1960 as an advisory body for the Pakistani government, always included a substantial majority of members outside the ranks of the 'ulama, until the pendulum swung the other way in the 1980s (Malik, 1989a., pp. 8-9).
While there has been no meeting of minds on issues of methodology - *ijtihad*, and how to arrive at consensus, *ijma'*, in the area of legal change - Federal governments in Pakistan have sought, with only a little more success, to introduce changes in the curriculum the 'ulama study in dar al 'ulum. In 1962 the first of a number of government reports, intended to enable the 'ulama to take a 'full part as citizens' by widening their outlook and 'to increase their mental horizon', recommended the inclusion of such subjects as mathematics, English, social sciences and modern Arabic, while cutting back on logic, philosophy and certain books of Islamic law (ibid., pp. 7-8).

In 1979 another national committee published its deliberations, named after its chairman, the Halepota report. This time various incentives were offered to the dar al 'ulum to introduce changes in curriculum. Equivalence between their certificates and a B.A. awarded in state universities and colleges was proposed, thereby enabling 'ulama to teach Islamic Studies and Islamic Ideology in such institutions. English was made compulsory for those wanting to teach other subjects. It was envisaged that a third of the time-table would be devoted to modern subjects, including now, Islamic history and comparative religion, while the books for such subjects would be prescribed by the Department of Education, thereby bridging the gap between state and religious institutions. Money from centralised collection of *zakat*, itself a controversial innovation, was also to be made available to dar al 'ulum prepared to co-operate. The Deobandis, particularly, resisted this process of centralisation and bureaucratic control and launched 'a nation-wide campaign against it, calling the Government 'secular' (*la-dini*; lit. without religion)' (ibid., p. 10).

A scholar who has studied this process considers the government has had little real success in seeking to integrate the curriculum of the state educational system with that of the dar al 'ulum. At primary level such integration did not occur except for a willingness by some mosques and dar al 'ulum to use state provided text books for Urdu and arithmetic. All refused to include 'Pakistan studies', intended by the government as a vehicle of national integration, since they
were not interested in promoting nationalism. Little more than lip service was paid to the inclusion of other subjects. The resistance of the ulama to the introduction of new subjects was, in part, rooted in the fact that they themselves were simply not trained to teach such subjects themselves (Malik, 1989b, pp. 231, 243 and 238). Some in-service training for ulama was offered by an 'Ulema Academy', set up in 1961 in Lahore, but inevitably its impact was limited to the few who participated in its courses (Rahman, 1982, p. 122).

If such attempts must be judged a failure in a Muslim majority state like Pakistan it is hardly surprising that a non-Muslim government in India never tried. A Muslim minority are understandably sensitive to any interference by the state in their educational institutes or Muslim family law. The furore which attended the Shah Bano judgement in 1985 indicates the strength of feeling on such issues (Lateef, 1990, pp. 192-201).

It will now be clear that ulama in Bradford, trained in South Asia, unless they have additional qualifications from universities and colleges, are unlikely to be able to engage with the intellectual and cultural world of Britain. Dr I.H.Qureshi (d.1981), a chancellor of Karachi University, and himself a distinguished educationalist, writing of the situation in Pakistan, pessimistically concluded, that,

"(the leaders of traditional education) have neglected modern knowledge to an extent that there is no scope left for a dialogue between those who have received a modern education and the graduates of the seminaries... The seminaries are doing useful... work in the preservation of the classical learning and providing ill-paid, ill-educated and ill-informed imams of the mosques (sic). It is quite obvious that such education cannot help the growth of religious consciousness (Rahman, 1982, p.111)."

The Deobandi dar al 'ulum in Bury and Dewsbury face a huge task if they are to avoid many of these same dilemmas. The curriculum of the Bury dar al 'ulum, established in 1975, will be the focus of the present discussion since it preceded that of Dewsbury (1982) and has
developed links with Al-Azhar in Cairo and Madina University in Saudi Arabia, where many of its students go after completing their six-year programme of study. Dewsbury is in some respects a derivative of Bury, sharing much of its syllabus but closed to the wider academic world, Muslim and non-Muslim alike; its students spend a final year in Pakistan or India and their studies are unapologetically subordinate to the practice of revivalist preaching (3.3). Indeed, Hafiz Patel, in charge of Dewsbury, is not himself an 'alim, but the national organiser of the revivalist movement, Tablighi Jamaat in Britain.

In 1989 the six-year syllabus at Bury started with the basics of the Arabic language, grammar (sarf), and syntax (nahw), taught through Urdu text books; elementary works in Arabic on literature and language; the life of the Prophet, his companions and the history of early Islam, taught in Urdu. In the second year more difficult books in Arabic on grammar and syntax are introduced, along with a text book on composition in Arabic and translation exercises from Arabic into Urdu. Arabic literature and language are given priority. History drops out and fiqh, Islamic jurisprudence, is introduced, through selections from a Hanafi text. Qur'anic recitation, tajwid, also makes its first appearance. The third year includes the same stress on Arabic with the addition of Arabic rhetoric, and for the first time Qur'anic commentary, tafsir, with half the Qur'an translated from Arabic into Urdu. A beginning is made on the study of the principles of Islamic jurisprudence. The life of the Prophet, selections from hadith and tajwid complete the year's study.

The fourth year includes classical Arabic literature, Arabic rhetoric and the second half of the Qur'an is translated from Arabic into Urdu. An elementary work of logic is introduced as an aid to understanding the Qur'an. The principles of Islamic jurisprudence are further explored, hadith and tajwid completes this year's study. In the fifth year there is study of an Arabic text book mapping the changes in language from classical to modern Arabic, a Hanafi text book on the terminology and the principles of Hadith selection, a short Arabic commentary of the Qur'an by Suyuti (d. 1505), written in co-operation with his teacher, known as tafsir al Jalalayn,
Tibrizi's famous compilation of hadith, Mishkat al-Masabih, 'niche of the lamps' (sura 24:35), Marghinani's Hidaya, a text of kalam, apologetic theology, on articles of belief, al-'aqaid, by Nasafi (d.1143) and tajwid. The final year is devoted entirely to reading in Arabic all the six collections of hadith, along with Imam Malik's Muwatta, and translating them into Urdu.

This syllabus reflects the scripturalist and reformist Deobandi emphasis on the traditional sciences, manqulat, of qur'an and hadith as against the rational sciences, ma'qulat, of logic and philosophy, favoured in the influential eighteenth century syllabus — dars-i-nizami — devised by the Firangi Mahall dynasty of scholars (Robinson, 1987). There is, nonetheless, some continued dependence on dars-i-nizami in such works as Suyuti's short qur'anic commentary, Tibrizi's compilation of hadith, Nasafi's text-book on kalam, apologetic theology, and the Hidaya. The distinguished Indian Arabist and historian Maulana Shibli Nu'mani (d. 1916) was critical of the dars i-nizami syllabus' dependence on the slight works by Suyuti and Nasafi, which he felt had hardly begun to do justice to the rich treasury of Muslim scholarship in the area of tafsir and kalam (Faruqi, 1963, p.29). The same criticism could be levelled at Bury's curriculum.

The potential of history as a valuable tool for a contextual appreciation of the strengths and weaknesses of key Islamic texts — not least the twelfth century Hidaya — has yet to be explored at Bury. Its emphasis on hadith, with some twenty per cent of the timetable devoted to it, means that outside the first year's cursory study of early Islamic history, there is no other study of Islamic history, nor any exposure to great Muslim thinkers such as al-Ghazali (d.1111) or Ibn Khaldun (d.1406) or indeed the Indian scholar, Shah Wali Allah (d.1762), one of the few South Asian scholars whose work in Arabic — Hujjat Allah al Baligha — is studied at al-Azhar in Cairo (Baljon, 1986, p.10). Only in the private school, catering for boys between thirteen and sixteen years old, are English and modern subjects studied at all (3.3). Since so little Islamic history or Islamic philosophy is studied, it is difficult to envisage the graduates of such a centre developing the confidence to study British philosophy, history and literature, still less...
politics; economics; and more recent disciplines such as the social sciences and psychology.

It would, however, be wrong to assume that Bury is impervious to change or that it would be impossible to move from such an educational context to a western university. Mahmud Chandia is a young 'alim who has successfully traversed three educational, linguistic and cultural worlds: a graduate from Bury in 1988, a B.A. in Islamic studies from al Azhar in 1990 and an M.A. from the Department of Middle Eastern Studies of Manchester University in 1992.

Mahmud considers that Bury has benefited from its links with al Azhar, which already has had some impact on curriculum and teaching methods. He instanced the inclusion of the book by the Indian scholar Abul Hasan Ali Nadwi (b.1914) on developments within the Arabic language, from the classical to the modern age - Nadwi, an Arabist has been an important bridge between the South Asian Muslim communities and the Arab world (Sivan, 1985, pp.28 and 36) - and in 1990 the famous tafsir by Baidawi (d.1288) was introduced to complement the shorter work of Suyuti. With regard to methods one major innovation, borrowed from al Azhar, has been the inclusion of a 10,000 and 15,000 word thesis at the end of the fifth and sixth years. Such a thesis can be written in Arabic, English or Urdu and involves some minimal research.

The Principal of Bury had also encouraged a few students to go on to study Islamics, law and Arabic at British universities. Mahmud was confident that, in time, this would have a further impact on Bury in both the content of the curriculum and methods of study. He acknowledged, however, that Bury was a long way from getting its courses in Islamics and Arabic accredited by British universities. They had been told that if they introduced some 'A' level studies their students could, at least, transfer to a British University more easily than at present.

Mahmud conceded that his move to Egypt had not been easy. Bury has an arrangement with al Azhar, whereby their students can miss the first two years of the B.A. in Islamic Studies, which are of a general
nature and proceed to either specialist studies in hadith, fiqh or tafsir for the final two years. Mahmud opted for hadith. What he found difficult was the medium of instruction, Arabic, since Bury focuses on classical rather than modern Arabic. Also, Bury is a relatively, self-contained, all male boarding school and to negotiate the move into the chaotic, cosmopolitan city of Cairo, was far from easy. The teaching methods, however, were traditional and familiar.

Mahmud's comments on the transition to Manchester University are revealing. His course involved him in four subject areas, classical Arabic, modern Arabic, Islamic thought in its formative period in the first four centuries and the history of the Ottoman Empire. Here the difficulties were largely with English, and an unfamiliarity with the methods of teaching and the general ethos of a western university. He had not studied English for ten years since completing 'O' levels. Thus, like Imam Qamar, he found this difficult; not least his lack of acquaintance with the technical vocabulary in his area of study. There was also a heavy dependence on essay writing which had not been the case at Bury or al Azhar.

The ethos of a western university was very different from what he was used to, not least the presence of male and female students: Bury and al Azhar were concerned to initiate the male student into the accumulated wisdom of a religious tradition, personalised in the life and teaching of a respected teacher. In Manchester, he felt, disciplined study was concerned with the intellect rather than character formation. A favourite phrase was 'hypothetically speaking', which for Mahmud meant that study could degenerate into intellectual games. One final difference was that in a western university there was more emphasis on secondary literature and less on close textual study of primary texts, as compared to Bury and al Azhar.

What was surprising was that Mahmud had not encountered the works of modernist Islamic scholarship in Egypt. He had, for example, not studied any of the works of the greatest of Azhar's reformers, Muhammad Abduh (d.1905). He had gained a cursory knowledge of western scholarship in his study of Islamic Thought at Manchester. However,
Mahmud appeared innocent of the concerns and anxieties of modernist Muslims. Thus he expressed no difficulty with the section in Hidaya, which, in the context of prescribing rules of evidence, insists that in most cases 'the evidence required is of two men or of one man and two women, whether the case relate to property ... marriage, divorce, agency, executorship ...' (Hamilton, 1987, p.353). The formula 'one man equals two women' has been extrapolated from a qur'anic verse touching on witnesses to a financial transaction, where the reasons are stated: 'if one of them (women) should make a mistake, the other could remind her' (Asad, 1980, p.63, translating 2:282).

The traditionalist, nourished by such esteemed works as Hidaya, considers,

the law that two female witnesses equal one male is eternal and a social change that enabled a woman to get used to financial transactions would be un-Islamic. The modernist...would say...when women become conversant with such matters...their evidence can equal that of a man (Rahman, 1980, pp.48-49).

This whole debate, a storm centre in Pakistan in the 1980s, and one of the factors behind the emergence there of a women's movement - (Muntaz and Shaheed, 1987, pp. 106-110) - has simply passed Mahmud by and he exhibited no understanding of why such teaching might be considered problematic to some of his Muslim contemporaries.

Various Muslim institutions in Britain have reflected on the desiderata for a curriculum in a dar al 'ulum in Britain, whether the 'Muslim Parliament' in its educational white paper published in 1992, or 'The Muslim College' in London in its 'provisional prospectus'. All agree on the need to teach in English, and to add history and philosophy, Islamic and Western, to the traditional curriculum of qur'an, hadith and fiqh. If 'The Muslim College' is right to insist that for Islam to 'survive and prosper in modern Europe it must learn the techniques and frames of reference of modern European culture' (Provisional Prospectus, n.d. p.5) then it is clear that Bury has a long way to go. The Barelwi tradition seems more hospitable to such an engagement with modernity. In the Urdu prospectus for the 'Islamic Missionary College' in Bradford, written in 1974, it was already pointing to the necessity for training 'ulama
in bi-lingual skills, and sought to offer a three year programme for 'ulama, including science, philosophy, administration and the comparative study of other religions and ideologies (Islamic Missionary College prospectus, 1974, pp.3-4). Sadly, this initiative foundered because of funding problems and personality clashes (3.2).

4.5. SUPPLEMENTARY SCHOOLS: A CONTINUING CAUSE OF CONCERN

More than ten years ago a researcher, who studied a mosque and its Imam in Bradford— one of the best trained of the city's 'ulama— noted that in its qur'an school the children, for the most part, 'work without direct instruction or supervision and the room can become very noisy and chaotic'; 'the Imam ... enforces a degree of order by use of a short cane' and that 'imitation and repetition are the chief methods of learning' (Barton, 1986, p.158).

The qur'an school/supplementary school, held after state school, continues to be the focus of deep anxiety among many Muslims. Mention was made in 4.1 of the changes in style of teaching, discipline and use of English books introduced by 'ulama trained at Bury or exposed to the British educational system. To these can be added the handful of huffaz, educated in Britain and English-speaking, who now do some teaching in the supplementary schools. Such welcome changes should not obscure the fact that such remain a minority. Classes still often remain large, sometimes as many as seventy children in one room, whose ages can range from five to sixteen.

In the autumn of 1983 a 'supplementary schools' officer', was appointed by the local authority, to begin to bridge the gap between teaching methods in supplementary schools and state schools, and to provide in-service training for such teachers in the area of language teaching. In 1990 a distinguished Muslim educationalist from Bradford, in a paper delivered at a national conference in the city, could almost repeat word for word comments made by the supplementary schools' officer in his 1986 report:

There are grave doubts expressed by almost everyone about the nature of supplementary provision, style of teaching, methods of instruction, disciplinary procedures...it may be said that they
meet the needs of ritualistic self-identity...but one doubts whether the majority...come anywhere near meeting the spiritual and actual (needs)...of our children (Cheema, 1990, p.5).

The style of teaching remains highly authoritarian, the cane is still in evidence and its continued use was supported by the Bradford Council for Mosques, despite a ban on corporal punishment in state schools (Telegraph & Argus, 28-8-86). The leader of Bradford's 'Young Muslims', Dr Munir Ahmad, in seeking to identify the reasons why so many young Muslims were adopting what he dubbed a 'pop-cum-bhangra' lifestyle, far away from Islamic norms, noted that 'at the first opportunity (the boys) rebelled against a religion, which has sometimes been literally beaten into them' (The Muslim News, 15-12-89).

The favoured text-books, whether for community languages or Islam, remain those written in South Asia. The supplementary schools' officer, in conversation in 1990, acknowledged that despite the good intentions of the local authority, there were few takers for in-service courses and little demand for the English books the local authority were willing to supply. Once again the lack of confidence in English remains a huge disincentive to use such books. In 1991/2 neither the U.K. Islamic Mission nor Ahl-i-Hadith mosques in Bradford have an Imam competent in English, able to use the excellent teaching syllabus in English, both traditions have produced.

An additional discontinuity between state and mosque school is that the latter offers little space for questioning. The ethos of dar al 'ulum and mosque alike, is to absorb and reproduce the teaching of the 'alim. This is echoed in the practice of Pakistan's primary schools, where,

the major emphasis in school tests was the accurate memorization and reproduction of the lessons in textbooks (and) the main determinants of what the teachers teach ... is a kind of dreary tradition of 'survival teaching' handed down from one hard-pressed, undertrained teacher to another...(a) tradition, rigid, formal and unimaginative in the extreme (Butler, 1988, pp. 102-3).
It seems that Muslim parents have begun to lose confidence in many of the 'imam-s.' A Muslim educational researcher, who studied a Bradford middle school in 1985/6 with a ninety per cent Muslim intake, found that all wanted Islamic religious education in the syllabus. At the same time, they were almost unanimous in their opinion that (the) imam should not be appointed in schools to teach religion but qualified Muslim teachers. The parents have said that these imams inculcate the germs of anti-western education and their young children soon get trapped in their magical and fantasy world (Din, 1986, p.77).

It is clear, in the words of Mahmud Chandia, the young 'alim who successfully negotiated three educational, linguistic and cultural worlds, that 'the imam is not a role model for young people'. Many parents also entertain doubts about the imam's competence to connect with the world of their children. Even where an able student, like Mahmud, becomes an 'alim, it is an open question whether mosque committees will be able or willing to offer him the salary and job security he deserves. There is a real danger that there will be a haemorrhaging of the most able into the state educational system.
'Settlement by tiptoe' was the striking phrase used in a 1981 Bradford Council report to characterise the history of migration into the inner city over the previous twenty years: a dual society had emerged, whose members looked outward to mainstream British society for jobs, schools and services, but who still looked inward in their desire to preserve their traditional culture, religion and language. While the city had been free of the racial and inter-communal unrest which had marked other cities in that year, the authors of the report worried that we have no direct knowledge of Asian needs and requirements, and we have no automatic way of knowing the issues they feel important... (we need) some new channel of communication between the Council and the communities - something to compensate for the lack of political representation (CEMC, 1981, p.49).

Ten years later a national newspaper discussing the opening of the controversial 'Muslim Parliament' in London cited with evident approval the remarks of the President of the Bradford Council for Mosques, for whom this new initiative was 'a cruel joke for the Muslim community', threatening both to raise unrealistic expectations and fix in the public mind 'the image of every Muslim being a warlike separatist, ready to fight jihads at every opportunity'. Mihir Bose, who wrote the piece, contrasted the unelected 'Muslim Parliament' with the Bradford Council for Mosques 'an elected body... probably the most representative voice of Islam in the land' (The Sunday Telegraph, 5-1-92).

This chapter explores the significance, locally and nationally, of the Bradford Council for Mosques, formally constituted in September 1981. The Council for Mosques was an institution whose time had come. Bradford Council had found that 'new channel of communication' it had sought - at least for Muslims - and other public bodies welcomed the creation of an organisation which they could consult on a range of issues. Many Muslims in the city supported its creation as an advocate and pressure group for their concerns.
This chapter divides naturally into three sections which, cumulatively, will enable an assessment of the large claims made for the Council for Mosques' significance by Mihir Bose. The first section reviews the Council's early history and some of its activities from its creation until the publication of the *The Satanic Verses* in September 1988. During this period, the Council for Mosques was essentially a local body with a modest remit to address issues of concern, especially in the area of education. However, it was to gain in confidence and to develop its campaign skills as it became embroiled in a number of public controversies. The second section unravels some of the important issues interwoven in *The Satanic Verses* affair. This convulsion in inter-communal relations catapulted the Council for Mosques onto the national stage; its personnel were active both in seeking to translate anger and outrage at the novel into institutional unity at a national level, and to begin a debate on a range of issues exercising Muslims in Britain.

The final section moves forward to the Gulf crisis and its aftermath. The Gulf crisis raised acutely and painfully for the Bradford Council for Mosques the difficulty of creatively managing the multiple identities and loyalties of local Muslims, whether to Britain, to countries in South Asia, or to the *umma*, the world-wide Muslim community. The Gulf war also saw Muslim politicians in Bradford involving themselves in public debate and disagreement with the Council for Mosques. Muslim professionals and businessmen, too, were organising themselves into self-consciously Muslim groupings and taking initiatives independent of the Council. This section seeks to map relationships between the Council for Mosques and these two other centres of influence amongst local Muslims and thus clarify the issue of the loci of authority in the Muslim communities.

5.1 THE COUNCIL FOR MOSQUES: A VEHICLE FOR LOCAL UNITY

The six founding members of the Bradford Council for Mosques represented all traditions of Islam present in the city. Three were local businessmen - the most successful was Mr Sher Azam, whose name was to become almost synonymous with the Council for Mosques in the late 1980s, at the height of the Rushdie affair. Mr Sher Azam was
to be President of the Council for almost half of its first decade, which speaks both of the importance of the Deobandi presence in the city - Mr Azam was President or vice-President of the Howard Street mosque for the previous six years - and the trust and respect he commanded across the different traditions. Pir Maroof, another of the founding fathers was never an elected officer of the Council but his Barelwi organisation, Jamiat Tabligh-ul-Islam, always provided the President or one of its two General-Secretaries throughout this period, except during its first year.

The first President of the Council for Mosques was Mr Umar Warraich, a public health inspector. He was the only President who did not belong to either of the large Barelwi or Deobandi groupings in the city and his presidency testifies to his role as the prime mover behind this initiative. Mr Warraich identified three interrelated concerns which led him to propose the creation of such a Council: Muslims required a common platform from which to negotiate with the local authority in the vexed arena of educational provision, the focus of widely shared anxieties; a Council for Mosques could manage and reduce sectarianism and create a forum for members of different mosques to meet; finally, such an organisation would be in a strong position to elicit financial help from local and central government.

It is no accident that, with the exception of Pir Maroof, none of the prime movers behind the Council were 'ulama. Indeed, the Council has never had an 'alim as President. The role of the 'ulama within the Council was severely circumscribed from its inception. The Council was, in part, intended to relate to public bodies in the city and most 'ulama possessed neither the language, skills, nor experience to fulfill such a task. Further, the Council was intended to minimise sectarian differences, another reason for limiting their active involvement. Umar Warraich and other of the founding fathers, however, were used to co-operating in a variety of local political and social arenas which included men with different sectarian, regional and caste loyalties (2.3.3). As employees of mosque committees the 'ulama were effectively excluded from the Council by its constitution which declared ineligible for membership anyone who
'held a paid position in the Council or with any member organisation'. They served a consultancy role when required.

The Council for Mosques' constitution was framed to maximise co-operation. Thus, the Council was committed to non-interference in the internal affairs of its member organisations and could only support the views of one of its members when these were not at variance with those held by other constituent bodies. The only group excluded from the Council was the Ahmadiyya sect since the constitution included the clause that the Prophet Muhammad is 'the last prophet and there can be no new prophet till the Day of Judgement'. The constitution also declared that one of its objectives was 'to promote understanding, unity and Islamic Brotherhood'. In this regard it has been more successful than a similar initiative in Birmingham which fragmented into rival mosque councils (Joly, 1987, p.8). The President and Secretary-General had to belong to different organisations. This constitutional coda has meant that in Bradford whenever the President belonged to the Bareli group - invariably Jamiat Tabligh ul Islam - the General-Secretary was a Deobandi and vice versa, thus preventing any rupture between the two most numerous groupings in the city.

Mr Warraich's hopes for the Council for Mosques were to prove realistic. The city council supported the Council for Mosques with a Community Programme grant of £13,000 enabling it to purchase a large semi-detached house to serve as its headquarters. From 1983 until the autumn of 1988, when the ground rules for Manpower Services Commission (MSC) projects were redefined, the Council for Mosques was the centre for an ambitious MSC scheme providing at its height some fifty workers servicing a range of projects: two centres for the elderly, a variety of advice workers, male and female, for the various mosques and Islamic centres, and a service for women in hospitals and clinics.

The success the Council for Mosques enjoyed in the 1980s in getting the local education authority to be responsive in the curriculum and ethos of local schools to their religious and cultural traditions turned on two main factors. One has been considered in an earlier
chapter and concerned the education authority's willingness to respond under the new educational banner of 'multi-culturalism' (2.3.2). The second factor was the political support they could muster locally. This was facilitated by the overlapping membership and co-operation between Muslim councillors and Muslims active in the Council for Mosques and the Community Relations Council. When an issue fell clearly within an anti-racist framework the Council for Mosques was able to capitalise on tactical alliances with other minority groups, involved in the CRC, and mobilise political support through Muslim councillors; since 1981 there was cross-party political support for a twelve point race relations plan (2.3.1).

It is worth stressing the significance of the Community Relations Council (CRC) as an organisation where Muslim councillors and Muslims active in the Council for Mosques could meet. The CRC has functioned as a nursery for Muslim politicians, where the necessary skills, confidence and contacts were developed. Five Muslim councillors were active in the CRC in the 1980s. The cross-cutting membership is clearly seen with Councillor Ajeeb. Ajeeb was to be the first South Asian chairman of the CRC from 1976-1983 and held other positions in the organisation throughout the 1980s. He was elected a councillor in 1979 and for two years was senior supervisor of the MSC project located at the Council for Mosques, a position from which he resigned when he became the first 'Asian' Lord Mayor in 1985. In 1984, a crucial year which saw the resolution of the halal meat crisis and the beginning of the Honeyford affair, the CRC executive included two councillors - Ajeeb and Hameed - and the President of the Council for Mosques, Mr Sher Azam, and Mr C.M.Khan, the President for the following two years. Thus the CRC was the main forum where officers of the Council for Mosques and Muslim councillors met and where support for Muslim concerns in the wider community could be tested.

Three major educational controversies in the early 1980s highlight both the influence the Council for Mosques enjoyed and its limits. In 1982 Bradford education authority had issued guidelines to schools - *Education for a Multi-cultural Society: Provisions for Pupils of Ethnic Minority Communities* - intended to accommodate Muslim cultural and religious needs within one educational system and within the
framework of a common school curriculum. As part of this package of measures the authority stated that it was 'considering the provision of Halal meat in schools and...actively investigating ways in which this can be done' (CBNC, 1982). The wild card in the pack was the Muslim Parents Association (MPA), which in January 1983 submitted a request to convert five schools, with a largely Muslim intake, into Muslim voluntary-aided schools, two first schools, two middle schools and one upper school. The education authority clearly wanted to maximise concessions to Muslims so as to preserve the integrity of the local education system by undercutting support for the MPA.

On the 17th July 1983, the Council for Mosques and members of the education authority met. The Council for Mosques was frank that there was no consensus on the MPA proposals since Muslims in Bradford comprised 'different ethnic, national and sectarian strands'. However, they had rejected, for practical reasons, by a margin of thirteen to eight, with four abstentions, the particular MPA proposal. They were not convinced that 'this organisation would be able to run and administer (let alone finance) the five schools'. There was a sting in the tale for the education authority: the Council stressed that they had not taken a decision on the principle of separate Muslim schools and that it would become increasingly hard to convince its members that 'what was good for Catholics was not good for Muslims unless the Authority did all in its power to honour its new found commitment to multi-cultural education in both spirit and letter' (cyclostyled report of the meeting provided by the Council for Mosques).

The Council for Mosques, by rejecting the MPA proposal - a spectre which continues to haunt the education authority - won the gratitude of the authority, which did not delay in providing halal meat to fourteen hundred Muslim children in September 1983. The intention was to extend the service across the metropolitan area and within two years to provide such meals to all of the authority's fifteen thousand Muslim pupils.

Far from being the end of the matter the publicity surrounding the provision of halal food triggered an angry campaign led by animal
rights activists, who objected to the fact that the prescribed method of slaughter precluded the pre-stunning of animals. In December an editorial in the local press, entitled Prejudice, worried that 'behind the veil of respectability offered by the animal rights people, racists have relished the chance to criticise Muslims in our community' (Telegraph & Argus, 12-12-83). One animal rights campaigner refused to pay her rates and courted imprisonment. In February 1984 the Bradford Council conceded to requests for a full debate on halal meat in full council.

The Muslim community was angered by this decision which seemed to threaten their recently won right, as tax payers, to have school meals which their children could eat. The Council for Mosques began to mobilise. It circulated an appeal, in Urdu, Historic Decision on Halal Meat, to Muslim parents asking them to boycott school on 6 March - the day on which Bradford Council would debate the issue - and, with their children, to demonstrate outside City Hall. A large majority of Muslim parents heeded this appeal, with an estimated ten thousand children taken out of school and many participating in the demonstration.

The Council for Mosques could rely on a broad-based alliance of groups to support them. The Community Relations Council was incensed that a racist backlash threatened to reverse a decision to meet the 'special needs' of a minority community. Muslim councillors spoke eloquently in the crucial debate on 6 March in the Town Hall.

Councillor Iftikhar Qureshi (SDP) warned the city council that if 'it went back on its decision it would be regarded as unworthy and biased by the Muslim community' (Telegraph & Argus, 7-3-84). In the event the Bradford Council voted by fifty nine votes to fifteen to retain halal meat. The local press dubbed the furore over halal meat as 'the issue of the year' (Telegraph & Argus, 30-12-83). A public boycott of schools and thousands of Muslims demonstrating outside City Hall guaranteed the national media, too, were beginning to take an interest in the city's Muslim presence.

No sooner had the halal debate been resolved when another controversy erupted. This time it turned on articles written by a local
headmaster critical of the city's multi-cultural and anti-racist policies. Mr Ray Honeyford, the head of Drummond Road Middle School, was to signal his misgivings about such issues as early as November 1982 in an article in the Times Educational Supplement, TES, under the heading Multi-racial myths. However, it was only in early March 1984 that his opinions entered the public domain when his article in the January edition of a small circulation, right-wing journal, The Salisbury Review, entitled Education and Race - an Alternative View, was summarised in the Yorkshire Post (Halstead, 1988, pp. 246-247).

Press coverage of Mr Honeyford's opinions triggered a conflict which was not to be resolved until December 1985 when he agreed to take early retirement and accept a cash settlement of £71,000. In between these two dates an astonishing saga unfolded: a Drummond Parents' Action Committee came into being, pressing for the head's dismissal; an alternative school was set up in the local Pakistan Community Centre; Mr Honeyford was first dismissed and then his reinstatement was upheld by the High Court; an adjournment debate in the House of Commons was granted to a local Conservative MP, Marcus Fox; a boycott of the city's schools by Muslim pupils proved abortive; the Prime Minister, Mrs Thatcher, invited the head to attend a discussion of educationalists, and finally the Appeal Court overturned the High Court decision and thus allowed the local authority to resolve the affair.

The Council for Mosques was involved although, unlike the halal issue, they neither initiated nor fronted the campaign, which was done by the Drummond Parents' Action Committee, DPAC. The Council for Mosques had been alerted to Mr Honeyford's comments in the Salisbury Review by Mr Nazim Naqvi, one of the founder members of the Council for Mosques and a future chairman of the DPAC (Halstead, 1988, p. 59).

Marcus Fox, in the adjournment debate in the House of Commons, sought to identify the issues and groups behind the protests against Mr Honeyford. According to the MP the consequences of the affair, 'go beyond the issue of race relations or...education. They strike at the very root of our democracy...the freedom of speech...(Mr Honeyford) dared to suggest that in a classroom dominated by
coloured children white children suffer educationally...Who are Mr Honeyford's detractors?...they are all on the Left of British politics. The Marxists and the Trots are here in full force...(in collusion with those who) recently formed an alternative school...some people in the area wanted a separate Moslim school in the first place. Therefore it was not difficult to get a bandwagon rolling (Hansard, 16 April, 1985, p.234-236).

Mr Fox, in articulating what became the 'Authorised Version' of the Honeyford affair, ignored the possibility that a Head Teacher, in a school comprising some ninety per cent children from a Pakistani Muslim background, needed to show some professional reticence in publicly criticising both aspects of their parents' home country and features of Islam (Murphy, 1987, p 105). Mr Fox also managed to pass over in silence the ethics of a situation in which a Head chose to criticise his education authority's policies on multi-cultural education, or the wisdom of doing so in a periodical committed to repatriation of ethnic minorities (ibid., 1987, pp. 105-109).

One irony of the affair was that Mr Honeyford was by no means unsympathetic to many Muslim attitudes; the writer Hanif Kureishi, in an essay on Bradford, was able to identify several overlapping concerns between Mr Honeyford and Mr C.M. Khan, the President of the Council for Mosques during much of the crisis. However, such commonalities were obscured by the Head Teacher's intemperate asides and innumerable non sequiturs in both the September 1983 Times Educational Supplement article and that in the January 1984 Salisbury Review. Pragmatic concessions to Muslim sensibilities such as allowing girls to wear tracksuits in PE were variously described as 'capitulating to Moslem extremists' and 'religious fanaticism' by those intent on subverting sexual equality by a 'purdah mentality'. The term 'fundamentalist Moslem', as imprecise as it is sinister in connotation, was bandied about. Halal methods of killing animals were presented as 'indifference to animal care' in conflict with 'one of the school's values - love of dumb creatures and respect for their welfare' (Telegraph & Argus, 26-11-85).
Mr Honeyford compounded his folly by rehearsing stereotypes about West Indians and Indians and thus ensured the Community Relations Council's support for the DPAC campaign to remove him from the school (Annual Report, CRC, 1984/5, p.2). Since in 1984 the CRC included on its executive committee two Muslim Councillors and two members of the Council for Mosques the campaign against Mr Honeyford was assured of wide support.

The Council for Mosques was involved throughout the campaign, often as a moderating voice, increasingly worried at the escalation of tension. On 21 June 1985 there was a demonstration numbering some four hundred and twenty marchers. There were eleven speakers: six Pakistanis, two Bangladeshis, one Hindu, one Sikh and one white....Mr C. M. Khan (President of the Council for Mosques) was effective to the extent that he curbed the would-be rabble-rousers. Despite their efforts, and the high percentage of Angry Young men in the audience, everyone dispersed quietly (Murphy, 1987, p.124).

With Mr Honeyford's return to the school in September 1985 picketing intensified and children were given stickers to wear in their classrooms on which was written, 'Honeyford Out' and 'Ray-CIST', as well as bearing leaflets insisting that the Head Teacher had 'insulted your religion, and your culture' (ibid., p.127). On 15 October the DPAC declared a Day of Action and the Council for Mosques issued a leaflet in Urdu urging Muslim parents to boycott the city's schools on that day in protest against the Head who had 'displayed defamatory opinions against Asian and African parents' - a clause indicating that the Council never presented the issue as simply one involving Muslims.

If the Council for Mosques were hoping for a boycott as successful as that against the threat to halal meat in 1984 they were disappointed. This time only one in four children was withdrawn (Halstead, 1988, p.107). After this debacle the Council for Mosques decided to support a cooling-off period. Mr Sher Azam explained to the CRC that after consulting with the parents and assessing the situation in the city as a whole they realised that they could not fight a campaign when
the majority of the population was not on their side' (CRC minutes of executive meeting, 22-10-85).

The Council for Mosques was understandably anxious. One mosque had withdrawn in 1985 objecting to the politicisation of the Council under the Presidency of C.M. Khan, a member of the Labour Party - Mr Khan was to be the first and last President who was a member of any political party: Mr Warraich, a founder member of the Council, had tried to set up an alternative mosque council in 1985, the Council of Masajid and Islamic Centres. Mr Warraich's initiative, which included little more than the UK Islamic Mission mosque and the Dawat ul Islam mosque, was to prove abortive but it does indicate disquiet with the direction the Council for Mosques was taking under C.M. Khan. Anxiety was evidenced by the poor response to the Council for Mosques' request to Muslim parents to withdraw their children from school on 15 October in support of the DPAC Day of Action.

The Council for Mosques' reputation and standing had been diminished by its involvement in the Honeyford affair, both within the Muslim community and in the city at large. Mr Honeyford's opinions on three important inter-related issues - racism, free speech and accountability, the nature and limits of multi-culturalism - were never exposed to open debate but merely shouted down. Both right and left of the political spectrum were responsible for this: the right for lionising Mr Honeyford as a doughty defender of freedom of speech and the left for demonising him as a racist. Neither perspective allowed for any real debate on such issues as:

- how to resolve the tensions between the preservation of the distinct cultural identity of minority communities on the one hand and the encouragement of social integration on the other (Halstead, 1988, p.84).

In a campaign the Council for Mosques did not even control locally and which soon moved out of a local into a national political arena, Muslims found themselves tarred with the excesses committed by opponents of Mr Rushdie. The Honeyford affair was misconstrued as simply a 'Muslim' issue with negative terminology - fundamentalism, extremism and fanaticism - and disturbing images of 'Muslims' fixed
in the public mind; pictures of angry parents and children baying for the head’s blood outside the gates of the school were flashed across the nation’s television screens. Marcus Fox’s 'Authorised Version' of the affair even presented Muslims, with others, as a threat to democracy with their supposed attack on freedom of speech - an accusation anticipating those made against Muslims in the Rushdie affair. The often moderate and pragmatic stance of the Council for Mosques’ leadership remained invisible. Thus the resolution of the issue in December 1985 with the Headmaster’s early retirement and financial settlement was a pyrrhic victory for the Council.

5.2. THE SATANIC VERSES AND AN ELUSIVE NATIONAL UNITY

5.2.1 The Council for Mosques and local protests.

On the 28 May 1985 a civic service was held for the new Lord Mayor, Councillor Ajeeb. Since he was the first Muslim to hold the office the service was held in a mosque - the central mosque of Jamiat Tabligh-ul-Islam in Southfield Square. Civic dignitaries attended the service which included selections from the Bareli devotional poem Salaam, translated into English. The verses chosen included the following in praise of the Prophet:

Blessed be my strength in misery,
My hope and wealth in poverty.

Blessed be that rose of nature,
Glorious symbol of Creator.

Blessed be the look affectionate
Caring; kind and compassionate.

Blessed be that magnanimous mind,
Which sought God's mercy for mankind.

Blessed be his mission of Islam
Replacing violence by peace and calm.
Blessed be the Prophet's family members,  
Who are all like heavenly flowers (Service sheet, p.3).

Much has been written about The Satanic Verses affair. If the sense of outrage which galvanised the Muslim communities in Bradford, when news of the 'contents' of the novel began to circulate, is to be understood, two factors have to be kept in mind. Firstly, although the book was published in Britain news of its 'contents' and the shape of the indictment against it were formulated and mediated to Bradford's Muslims by their co-religionists in India (Appignanesi and Maitland, 1989, and Ruthven, 1990). In that country marked by troubled and deteriorating inter-communal relations it is hardly surprising that the distinguished Sikh writer Kushwant Singh, an editorial adviser to Penguin Books in India, on reading a novel in which 'the Prophet had been made to be a small-time imposter' advised against publication (Impact International, 28 October - 10 November 1988, p. 14). Secondly, the city's Muslims shared with their South Asian co-religionists a deep devotion to the Prophet. It is hard to exaggerate the veneration of the Prophet which informs Islamic piety and practice in South Asia in all traditions, but especially amongst the Barelwis as evident in the Salaam (3.2).

Any work which can be construed as insulting the Prophet can be guaranteed to unite the most diverse groupings of Muslims in South Asia and throughout the South Asian Muslim diaspora. Forty years ago the historian Wilfred Cantwell Smith, writing of Islam in South Asia, noted that,

Muslims will allow attacks on Allah; there are atheists and atheistic publications, and rationalistic societies; but to disparage Muhammad will provoke from even the most 'liberal' sections of the community a fanaticism of blazing vehemence (Schimmel, 1985, p.4)

In 1924 a Hindu in Lahore published a work in Urdu with the deliberately provocative title, Rangila Rasul (The Pleasure-Loving Prophet), portraying the Prophet as a libertine. This book so enraged Muslim sensibilities that its author was murdered by two Muslims. They themselves were considered martyrs when they were sentenced to
death and executed by the British. The British, to forestall a repeat of this episode, introduced Article 295A to the Indian penal code making it an offence to 'insult or outrage the religious feelings of any class' (Ruthven, 1990, p.37). The sentiments underlying such an enactment have been given a sharpened focus recently in Pakistan. In July 1986 the National Assembly of Pakistan adopted the Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill which, provides that whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation or by any imputation, innuendo or insinuation, directly or indirectly, defiles the sacred name of the Holy Prophet...shall be punished with death or imprisonment (Dawn Overseas Weekly, 17-7-1986).

The Satanic Verses, seen through South Asian Muslim spectacles, could hardly fail to trigger outrage. Bhikhu Parekh, deputy chair of the Commission for Racial Equality, in one of the most perceptive of the early articles on the book and the furore it was to generate, argued that journalists and 'high-minded literary critics' alike, were unlikely to have understood the work fully given its distinctly Bombay ambience, argot and allusions; further, the chapters dealing with "Mahound" (Muhammad) and his new religion are suffused with subtle allusions and insinuations likely to be lost or misunderstood by those not well-versed in the history of Islam...Muhammad is called a "smart bastard", a debauchee who after his wife's death, slept with so many women that his beard turned "half-white" in a year...his three revered colleagues...are "those goons - those fucking clowns"...Like any great religious text, the Koran is full of rules and injunctions about forms of worship, helping the poor, concern for those in need, moral purity, self-discipline and surrender to the will of God. The Satanic Verses mockingly reduces it to a book "spouting" rules about how to "fart", "fuck" and "clean one's behind"...These remarks lack artistic justification...they insult and provoke the devout: they challenge Muslim men to stand up and fight back if they have any self-respect and sense of honour (New Statesman & Society, 24-3-89).
Bhikhu Parekh, a professor of political theory, a non-Muslim from a Hindu background, had taken the trouble to read the novel and to elicit comments from Muslims who had also read it. It was not simply those unschooled in the subtleties of magic realism who could find the novel offensive. There is no need here to comment on the novel as fiction, the vexed issue of authorial intent, nor to attempt some assessment of the mutual responsibility of Mr Rushdie and his readers, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, issues exhaustively treated by others. The value of Professor Parekh's comments is simply to underline the fact that the book's contents were inevitably explosive amongst Muslims from a South Asian background.

The Bradford Council for Mosques kept a documentary record of the letters they sent, the replies they received and the coverage given to their protests in the local and national media between October 1988 and the end of March 1989. From this record it was clear that their response to the publication of the novel in Britain on 26 September 1988 was initially shaped by expectations informed by a South Asian legal and cultural context, which gradually yielded to the painful realisation that the British situation was markedly different. The Council's decision to burn a copy of the novel on 14 January 1989 - which ironically emphasised how little the Muslim elders understood of their new legal, political and cultural context - was part of an attempt to draw attention to their continued anguish and anger when confronted by continued incomprehension, by politicians and media alike.

The first letters in their file are those in Urdu and English from the Deobandi organisation in Blackburn, Hizb ul 'ulama, The Society of Muslim Scholars in the U.K. This largely Gujarati association sent the Bradford Council for Mosques an account of the novel summarised by two editors of Urdu newspapers published in Delhi and in Surat, Gujarat - summaries of the novel, drawn, in all probability from interviews with Mr Rushdie in the Indian press - with the recommendation that Muslims should petition 'either Her Majesty the Queen, the Prime Minister or the Home Office Minister' to ban the book.
Mr Sher Azam, President of the Council for Mosques throughout the period 1988-1990, then wrote to the Prime Minister on 12 November, rehearsing much of the contents of the Blackburn letter. Mr Azam made no claim to have read the novel himself:

informed about the novel...The Muslims of Bradford and all over the world are shocked ...(since) the writer...has attacked our beloved Prophet...and his wives using dirty language which no...Muslim can tolerate...(Mr Azam then repeats the summary of the novel in the two Indian Muslim papers e.g.)...an Indian film star named GIBRIL FARISHTA ...is supposedly a reincarnation of the Prophet Mohammad...MAKKAH is called "EVIL CITY". The author...also mentions ,"The Devil's synonym Mohoud (sic) which means ...

MOHAMMAD.

Mr Azam took heart that the Indian government had already banned the novel and appealed to the Prime Minister to follow their example. He focused on the 'distress' the work had caused Muslims. There were no threats to the author and, unlike the Blackburn letter, he did not refer to Mr Rushdie as an apostate, murtadd, a serious accusation in Islamic law.9

This was the first of a series of letters the Council sent to the publishers, local MPs and councillors, the UN, and Bradford's chief executive. They urged Bradford Local Authority to refuse to provide the book to libraries, schools and other educational institutions. The response from Viking publishers was predictable: they insisted that as 'a serious publisher' they were committed to 'freedom of expression'; they disavowed any intention to offend by publishing the novel; they quote Mr Rushdie's comment that the offending sections of the work occur 'in a dream, the fictional dream of an individual movie star and one who is losing his mind, at that' and finally pointed out that the work had been acclaimed in certain sections of the Indian press, had been shortlisted for the 1988 Booker Prize and had just won the fictional category of the Whitbread Award.

The responses of two of the local MPs are instructive. Pat Wall reminded the Council for Mosques of his advocacy for Muslims when victims of racism but reminded them that the government had recently made a fool of themselves in trying to ban 'Spycatcher' which proved
counterproductive and 'resulted in a colossal increase in the sales internationally'. Another MP who proved sympathetic to Muslim sensibilities was Max Madden. His constituency included a large proportion of Muslims from whom he was able to gauge directly the depth of anger and outrage, still invisible to the majority of the local community. Mr Madden suggested to the publishers that they might insert a statement by Muslims as to why they found the work offensive and urged a television debate between Mr Rushdie and his Muslim critics. In his letter to the publishers Mr Madden drew attention to 'the extraordinary anomaly in modern multi-faith Britain' of a blasphemy law which only protected the established Christian faith.

It was the Council for Mosques' misfortune that they invariably misread the situation in Britain. Their initial letters fuelled the suspicion that they wanted to ban a novel by a distinguished author on the basis of little more than hearsay. Only later did they co-opt on to the Council, as an individual member, Dr Shabbir Akhtar, a Cambridge graduate in philosophy, who was able to forcibly argue a Muslim case in the national media and in his book, Be Careful with Muhammad. The Council's appeal to the Bishop of Bradford for 'justice' and a 'change in the law of blasphemy' was only made after the book-burning episode, at a regional rally the Council organised on January 14, 1989, had alienated would-be sympathisers. In an editorial in the Yorkshire Post, under the heading Satanic Fires, Muslims were excoriated as 'intellectual hooligans' manipulated by demagogues into burning a book most had not read and they were likened to the Nazis (18-1-89).

For the national media Bradford had become the epicentre of the shock waves convulsing the Muslim communities across Britain. Ayatollah Khomeini's intervention a month later was to prove disastrous for the Muslim campaign in Bradford and in Britain. Two members of the Bradford Council for Mosques' executive exacerbated the situation by allegedly supporting the fatwa, the legal decision sentencing to death the author and publishers responsible. A public outcry ensued and the West Yorkshire Police passed on these comments to the Crown Prosecution Service. The local press reported that 'the world's press
converges on Bradford' as the Council for Mosques held an emergency meeting distancing themselves from these comments. The general secretary insisted that they had been misquoted and that 'we do not support the Ayatollah... he is not our leader... we are living in England... and do not take directives from him' (Telegraph & Argus, 17-2-89).

The Council for Mosques was now centre stage but no more in control of presentation of the issues than it had been in the Honeyford affair. A process of demonisation of Muslims already begun in this earlier episode now accelerated (Parekh, 1990). Sometimes local Muslims themselves colluded in this process. Dr Shabbir Akhtar penned a defence of 'religious fundamentalism' in a national daily, arguing that 'any faith which compromises its internal temper of militant wrath is destined for the dustbin of history' (The Guardian, 27-2-89). Since the article introduced him as a member of Bradford Council for Mosques the impression was left that the Council was full of passionate 'fundamentalists'. His book on the Rushdie affair showed that he, too, had learned from this episode: militant wrath was now qualified by the adjective 'constructive'! (Akhtar, 1989, p. 102).

As with the Honeyford saga media images of angry demonstrations and inflammatory placards projected and fixed in the public imagination a fearsome and negative picture of Muslims and served to alienate rather than enlist support. In June 1989 a rally organised by the Council erupted into sporadic violence engineered by a small group of Muslim youngsters. This appeared on the front page of the local press with a coloured picture of an effigy of Mr Rushdie 'daubed with red paint and slogans such as 'Kill the Pig' (Telegraph & Argus, 17-6-89). The Bradford Council for Mosques was to suspend public demonstrations locally, when violence flared again at what had been a peaceful Muslim youth rally. The Council concluded that 'open-air rallies were too vulnerable to provocateurs and others looking for trouble' (The Guardian, 28-5-90). By then the damage had been done, not least by the media's 'remorseless tendency to trivialise, or where feelings are running high, to polarise' (Ruthven, 1990, p.118).
The Council for Mosques found that on this issue the Muslim communities were increasingly isolated with few allies, with the exception of the MP Max Madden and the established church (Lee and Stanford, 1990, pp. 85-96, Lewis, in press). The Community Relations Council was caught in a dilemma: Mr Rushdie was respected for his views on anti-racism and his written and video materials were widely used. Moreover, *The Satanic Verses* included much material congenial to the left and accessible to an anti-racist constituency. Therefore, the CRC decided to 'adopt no position on the book... (since) the specific issues relating to the concerns of the Muslim community...are of a religious nature...the best people to represent (their) concerns...are the properly constituted religious organisations in the city* (CHv1/CRC Annual Report, 1988/9, p. 8). This was somewhat disingenuous since the CRC had supported Muslims earlier on the provision of halal meat, an avowedly religious issue, specific to that community. However, the report pertinently observed that recent events had increased the awareness of all of us about the significance of religious demands in meeting the specific needs of ethnic minority communities. Perhaps we have been too ready to fit all issues into an equal opportunities framework at the expense of those needs which are of a specifically religious nature (*ibid.*, p. 8).

5.2.2 The national and international dimensions of the campaign

It was clear to the Council for Mosques that concerted national action was required both to direct the anger the book generated into constructive channels and to bring pressure to bear on the government. The difficulty was to create a national body which could transcend the Barelwi/Wahhabi split. Here the Bradford Council for Mosques had a vital role to play in that it included both groupings and was supported by two personalities who enjoyed a national following in both traditions, Pir Maroof and Mr Sher Azam. Mr Sher Azam's role in lending credibility to any such national initiative was crucial. He was President of a respected local Council for Mosques which had several significant gains to its credit, and whose campaign experience had been honed in lengthy, local campaigns. Moreover, Mr Azam was already known outside Bradford through his
involvement with the The Council of Mosques U.K. and Eire. This organisation, created in 1984, was sponsored by the Muslim World League, based in Mecca, and chaired by the Director of the London branch of that organisation. Its policy was to have a British Muslim as vice-chairman and Mr Azam held that position from 1986-88.

Thus, "when in October 1988 the U.K. Action Committee on Islamic Affairs, UKACIA, was formed in London to oppose the book, its convener was a Saudi diplomat, Dr Mughram Al Ghamdi, Director of Regent's Park Mosque, and Mr Azam was one of its twelve-strong steering committee. The presence of Mr Azam and Mr Maan of the Islamic Council of Scotland, who both belonged to groupings comprising various sects, meant that there were always some Barelwis affiliated to UKACIA, including Pir Maroof's World Islamic Mission. The UKACIA was a useful mechanism for bringing pressure to bear on the government through Muslim ambassadors in London and lobbying the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, OIC.

Mr Azam was one of a UKACIA delegation attending the OIC meeting from 13-16 of March, 1989, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The UKACIA lobbying of the OIC met with qualified success when the Organisation adopted a declaration against blasphemy which, while not endorsing the Iranian fatwa, urged member states,

to ban the book...to prevent the entry of its author in all Islamic countries and (to call) upon publishing houses to immediately withdraw the book from circulation and ... to boycott any publishing house that does not comply (Ahsan and Kidwai, 1991, p.334).

The UKACIA newsletter in July 1989 offered a realistic assessment of the difficulties confronting their campaign, reminding its readers that the Muslim community in Britain was:

not a homogenous community...not yet a united community...an inexperienced community ... (with) a lot to learn. Compared to other communities it has as yet no effective clout in the seats of power, in the media or in economic circles ... (However, for the first time) people whose work was localised or limited to members of their own particular school of thought have now got to know,
meet and appreciate others. Muslims as a result of this campaign are beginning to learn more about the political and legal processes of the country. It is heartening to note the support from some MPs, leading members of the Church, the Jewish and other religious communities. (Bulletin UKACIA, July 1989).

The UKACIA was not the only group seeking to mobilise Muslim anger. On 1 April 1989 Dr Kalim Siddiqui, Director of the pro-Iranian Muslim Institute in London, in his presidential address to a conference convened to consider the Implications of the Rushdie affair, suggested 'symbolic breaking of the law' might be necessary. This suggestion was quickly repudiated by the UKACIA. However, many British Muslims were growing restive with the UKACIA's apparent lack of success and Barelwis, particularly, were inclined to put it down to a want of resolve and commitment to defend the Prophet's honour on behalf of the Saudis and their surrogate organisations.

An individual member of the Bradford Council for Mosques voiced such impatience. He noted that many Muslims 'applauded Khomeini as a hero' since he had 'stood up for the honour of the Prophet' in contrast to 'the deafening silence' from the Arab heartlands. The vigour of the Saudi response to the prospective showing in Britain of the film, Death of a Princess - deemed an insult to the Saudi royal family - which triggered a withdrawal of ambassador and a hint of economic sanctions, was contrasted to their 'unduly soft approach' when confronted to an insult to the Prophet. This was put down to their being Wahhabi and thus having 'no adequate appreciation of the greatness of Muhammad' (Akhtar, 1989, pp. 64 and 83).

It is to the credit of the Bradford Council for Mosques, under Mr Azam's presidency, that they deftly negotiated these difficult crosscurrents without fragmenting. They continued to explore all avenues to influence public opinion, taking local initiatives and cooperating with the UKACIA when the situation required a national response. In April 1989 they sent questionnaires to all MPs to gauge the level of support for their campaign. Only fifty replied but an analysis of these made it clear that in all the furore, 'Muslims have never really presented their case clearly, for example, to explain
that they have no fear of intellectual... criticisms... (but) what is untenable is a slur on the integrity of the Prophet' (The Muslim News, October 1989).

When the Minister of State at the Home Office, John Patten, set out the government's thinking on the issues raised by the Rushdie affair in an open letter to 'influential British Muslims' on 4 July 1989, The Council for Mosques chose to be part of a considered national response written under the aegis of the UKACIA. Mr Patten argued that the government had been 'guided by two principles: the freedom of speech, thought and expression; and the notion of the rule of law'. The only principle the government and law could 'realistically protect' was that 'individuals should be free to choose their own faith and to worship without interference, in an atmosphere of mutual respect and toleration'. The UKACIA rejoinder pressed for amendments to the law of blasphemy to include within its purview non-Christian works clearly antipathetic to 'mutual respect' (UKACIA, 1989, pp.5-9).

On 17 July the Bradford Council for Mosques launched a ten-point charter during a public demonstration. The charter included lobbying local and national politicians, making future electoral support conditional on a positive response and the establishment of a Muslim think-tank to combat anti-Muslim propaganda in the media. They continued to participate in and to organise regional meetings. From 8-12 January 1990 they organised with the UKACIA a five-day vigil outside the headquarters of Viking Penguin in London.

Although Muslims did not succeed in banning the book the Bradford Council for Mosques' campaign, as it unfolded, indicated that certain lessons had been learned. Nothing shows this more clearly than the shift from book-burning to vigil as a way of winning a more sympathetic hearing for their grievances. The Council also organised a national conference of Muslims in Bradford on 29 April 1990. Under the title of 'Fair Laws for All' they sought to 'begin a nationwide debate on the future of Muslims in this country', and structured the day to include input on Muslim aspirations and anxieties in the areas of education, social and economic life, political participation and
the responsibilities of mosques and 'ulama (promotional literature).
Realising how isolated Muslims had become the conference invited the
Bishop of Bradford, leaders of the Hindu and Sikh communities in the
city, as well as local politicians. According to Sher Azam the
conference was an attempt to begin a new phase in the campaign to
enlist the support of key institutions by convincing them 'through
discussion of the rights of our cause' (Yorkshire Post, 30-4-90).

What was impressive about the conference was the range of speakers
enlisted, locally and nationally. These included Mr Yusuf Islam, a
leading British Muslim convert, Maulana Rabbaní, the President of the
Jamiat-e-Ulama Britannia, the umbrella organisation for Deobandi
'ulama, Pir Wahhab Siddiqui, a distinguished Barelwi from Coventry,
Dr Asif Hussain, a sociologist and the Director of Muslim Community
Studies Institute in Leicester and Mr Akram Khan-Cheema, a Bradford
educationalist, who was the chairman of the education sub-committee
of The Council of Mosques, U.K. and Eire. It is hard to imagine any
other Muslim organisation in the country enjoying the trust of all
the sects and able to host such a gathering of professionals and
religious leaders alike.

The emphasis of the conference was on the need for a constructive
engagement with the nation's institutions, political, social and
educational. Muslim concerns were articulated in an idiom accessible
to the non-Muslim majority: Akram Khan-Cheema coined the helpful
slogan of 'special but not separate' to encapsulate Muslim demands on
the educational system. There was a readiness to be self-critical.
Yusuf Islam upbraided the 'ulama for being slow to engage with
contemporary issues, whether genetic engineering, abortion or
ecology. Such a conference was a tribute to the realism of the
Bradford Council for Mosques and a refusal to allow Muslims to
withdraw into sullen resentment.

5.3 AFTER THE GULF CRISIS: WHO SPEAKS FOR MUSLIMS?

5.3.1 The Council for Mosques and the Gulf crisis
The Council for Mosques throughout The Satanic Verses affair was aware of the need to work out a pattern of relationship with other Muslim groups, nationally, and trans-national organisations within the umma, which did not suggest that their agenda was being dictated by Muslims outside Britain. This difficulty was compounded by a local community with limited resources: if many mosques had problems in paying their 'ulama a living wage it was not surprising that national initiatives often depended on foreign funding and could involve Muslims in rivalries between different Muslim powers. The umma was after all an 'imagined community' which, with the end of the Caliphate in 1924, had no recognisable centre, political or symbolic.12

One aspect of the Rushdie affair, often invisible to non-Muslims, was a growing impatience with the seeming lack of zeal exhibited by Saudi Arabia in using its influence to bring pressure to bear on the British government. Such antagonism was fuelled by sectarian differences between South Asian Barelwis and Saudi Arabian Wahhabis and exacerbated by the bitter experiences of many South Asian Muslim guestworkers in the Arab Gulf States. In the 1980s there were some two million Pakistanis working there. Many had little sympathy for their employers, who were considered to have squandered the oil wealth, a trust from God, and amongst whom 'courtesy to strangers...(had been) lost in the transition from camel to cadillac' (Ahmed, 1988, p. 178).

Anti-Saudi sentiment amongst Muslims from a South Asian background was much more public during the Gulf crisis. Many Muslims outside the Barelwi tradition were aghast that the Saudis could invite, inter alia, American and European forces onto Saudi territory - albeit under a UN mandate - for defence and, if necessary, for an offensive to liberate one Muslim country, Kuwait, from the aggression of another. To add salt to Muslim wounds there were some two thousand Jewish personnel among the huge American presence, with Jewish rabbis to minister to them, and reports of 'the first mass observance of the Jewish festival of Purim on Saudi Arabian soil for more than 800 years' - in contravention of Saudi law (The Independent, 23-2-91).
While Saudi Arabia was home of the most revered centres of Islamic devotion and pilgrimage, Iraq, too, contained many sites sacred to Shia and Sunni alike: the shrine at Karbala, the site of the martyrdom of Hussain, the grandson of the Prophet, was one of the great pilgrimage centres of the Muslim world. Many Barelwis from South Asia visited the shrines of holy men in Iraq, particularly that of Abdul Qadir Jilani (d. 1166), buried in Baghdad, the founder of the trans-national Qadiri order (Schimmel, 1975, p.249). Pir Maroof of Bradford traced his spiritual ancestry back to the Prophet via Jilani, whose shrine he regularly visited. It was little wonder that the possibility of a war in proximity to such sites evoked fear and anger.

The majority of the public was, of course, innocent of such Muslim sensitivities. Iraq was perceived to be the aggressor and with other UN forces British troops were preparing for the possibility of war. This situation required great wisdom on the part of British Muslims if their public pronouncements were not to be heard as partisan and unpatriotic. Between August 1990, when American and British troops began to enter Saudi Arabia and 14 January 1991 - the UN deadline for Iraqi withdrawal for Kuwait - the Bradford Council for Mosques was central in mobilising Muslim opinion in Britain to voice their concerns about developments in the Gulf. This time Barelwi perspectives and personnel were more in evidence and, as events unfolded, criticism of Iraq became so muted as to suggest a pro-Iraqi stance. When this happened Muslim councillors in Bradford, better able to assess the dangers of such a stance in the middle of a war with Iraq, publicly distanced themselves from the Council.

On 12 August 1990, the Bradford Council for Mosques supported a declaration produced by Muslim organisations which had met at the Islamic Cultural Centre in London to discuss the developing crisis in the Gulf. The declaration pressed for the recall of British forces, indeed, all non-Muslim forces from Muslim territories in the Gulf and insisted that current national borders ...are artificial divisions. The nation of Islam (ummah) is one...and national borders cannot be more sacred than the security of Muslim blood and land. The build up of
non-Muslim military forces in the vicinity of Islam's most holy shrines...is not acceptable...Any government in Muslim lands cooperating with the non-Muslim armies cannot demand the support of Muslims worldwide ... (and) the present imbalance of wealth and resources among various peoples within the Ummah (should be remedied)... (press release).

The declaration deplored 'the name of Islam being used for national interests or the desire (sic) of one or other Muslim ruler if they do not themselves obey Islamic law'. This comment, alone in the declaration, could be interpreted as a veiled criticism of Iraq, whose invasion of Kuwait was otherwise passed over in silence. Such a declaration was a useful indication of Muslim suspicion of nationalism, seen as a creation of the West to fragment the umma, but hardly seemed to engage with, still less to address, the realities of Iraqi aggression, the trigger of the immediate crisis.

Increasingly Barelvi members of the Bradford Council for Mosques were prepared, over the next few months, to take unilateral anti-Saudi initiatives. While six Muslims, including the President of the Council, Sher Azam, and Yusuf Islam, visited the Iraqi embassy in London on 16 August calling for the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait and access to a Muslim peace-keeping force, Mr Liaqat Hussain, the Barelvi General-Secretary of the Council for Mosques, a few days later, led some two hundred Bradford Muslims, as part of a large national demonstration outside the Saudi embassy in London, protesting against the presence of Western troops in the country. Mr Hussain declared such Saudi behaviour to be 'an act of treason against Islam' (Telegraph & Argus, 20-8-90).

On 1 September Muslims met in Bradford and a statement signed by Sher Azam was sent to the Queen and members of the Government. The statement, inter alia, criticised the government's 'provocative' act in dispatching British Forces to the Gulf, interpreted as part of a western conspiracy 'to eliminate the threat of a Third World Muslim Power developing economic and technological capability equal to that already possessed by the West and its close allies such as Israel' (press release). The meeting also mandated a group of seven to visit
Iraq and Saudi Arabia on a fact-finding tour. The group included two Members of the Council for Mosques, Sher Azam and Liaqat Hussain, the assistant of Pir Maroof. In January Pir Maroof, the founder of the Bradford Barelwi organisation, Jamiat Tabligh-ul-Islam, was the only Bradford delegate of eight British Muslims invited to a three-day conference in Iraq of Muslims from all over the world. On his return, Pir Maroof had convinced himself that the Iraqi President had learned the folly of his ways in the war with Iran. 'Now he knows that Islam must come first...' (The Guardian, 21-1-91).

The resolutions of a national Muslim conference at Bradford on 20 January a few days after the war had begun, while consistent with earlier Muslim pronouncements, came as a shock to non-Muslims in its one-sidedness: the resolutions insisted that 'the USA led aggression against Iraq must stop and these forces withdraw from Muslim territories; the Saudi ruling family was condemned for allowing non-Muslim forces access to the Islamic heartlands and declared unfit to be the custodian of Mecca and Madina; therefore, it was every Muslim's duty to 'restore (their) custody to rightful hands...and work towards the restoration of the Khilafat (Caliphate)'. It was clear that there was a debate within the ranks of local Muslims attending the meeting: Mr Azam was 'barracked when he proposed more moderate resolutions condemning the Iraqis as well... and calling for simultaneous withdrawal of ... (Iraq's) troops from Kuwait and Western forces' (The Guardian, 21-1-91). Mr Azam, however, was no longer President. Mr Liaqat Hussain, a Barelwi, now held this position.

Such conference resolutions, understandably, drew much adverse comment from the local and national media. More inflammatory comment from the Council for Mosques was to follow. On 13 February - after a tragic episode when Baghdad civilians were incinerated in an attack on what was wrongly identified as a military target - the Council for Mosques issued a press release headed Baghdad Massacre. It amounted to an astonishing and intemperate attack on the British government, whom it held responsible for the massacre. It declared that, these deaths must...be avenged in accordance with Islamic law...The House of Islam is at war with all those who attack it's
interest including those so-called Muslims who are fellow conspirators with the forces of western imperialism (Press Release, 13-2-91).

Local Muslim politicians — well placed to assess the damage such statements were doing to community relations and public perceptions of Muslims — for the first time since the The Satanic Verses affair quickly stepped in and publicly criticised this Council for Mosques' statement. Councillor Ajeeb pointed out that outrage at civilian casualties was not confined to Muslims, cautioned against 'talk about vengeance', insisted that 'politics and economics — not religion — was the cause of the war and reminded Muslims the 'we are at war with Iraq' (Telegraph & Argus, 14-2-91).

Mr Muhamed Riaz, a Tory candidate for a local ward, challenged the perception that the Gulf crisis was a holy war by pointing to the innumerable Muslim powers fighting under a UN mandate against Iraq and the fact that (Arab) Christians, not least in Iraq, were on both sides. He pointedly remarked that 'the views, actions and emotional statement' by any individual or Muslim organisation does not do justice to the city's 60,000 Muslims since no individual nor organisation has ever been 'given the mandate by ... the Muslims of Bradford to act as their representative or spokesman' (Telegraph & Argus, 16-2-91).

In 1981 there were only three Muslim councillors. This under-representation of Muslims had been a factor in the local authority's willingness to support the Council for Mosques as a channel of communication with Muslims in the city. Ten years later the situation was quite different. After the May elections in 1991 there were nine, and in the following year eleven, Muslim councillors, all Labour, the ruling group since 1990. Indeed, by 1992 Councillor Ajeeb was deputy leader of the Labour group and Muslim councillors began to enjoy influence commensurate with their numbers. Since the Muslim councillors were elected to wards where a large percentage of voters were Muslims they could properly claim they had as much right as the Council for Mosques to reflect on the Gulf situation and publicly
voice opinions as Muslims, however uncongenial to some members of the Council.

5.3.2 Muslim businessmen and professionals find their voice

Muslim councillors had become a significant centre of influence in the city, able and willing to contest the opinion of the Council for Mosques on certain issues. They were not alone. Muslim businessmen were growing in confidence and generating initiatives which signalled that they too were going to be increasingly important participants in debates in the city touching Muslims. Two developments were particularly important in this context, the establishment of Bradford City Radio and the creation of an Eid Committee.

Bradford City Radio, BCR, was set up in 1989 to serve the ethnic minority communities (3.3.1). It included investment by Muslim businessmen, its chief executive was a Muslim and it employed some Muslim staff. Its chief executive saw the value of BCR as, inter alia, rendering public the many debates within the Muslim communities, including a forum for Muslim women - publicly invisible until then. BCR did not shy away from controversy. In August 1990 they invited Councillor Hussain and a local businessman, Zafar Khan, both Muslims, to take part in a phone-in to discuss the 'Muslim Manifesto', a draft document drawn up by the the Muslim Institute in London, which proposed the creation of a 'Muslim Parliament'. Between sixty and seventy per cent of those phoning were against the manifesto.

The programme generated a public controversy conducted in the local press between the Muslim councillor who had participated in it and a future member of the 'Muslim Parliament', Mr M. Siddique, with the latter complaining that the programme 'distorted' and 'mocked' the manifesto (Telegraph & Argus, 3-8-90). Mr Siddique was also the leader of a local Bareliwi youth group, grandly named The Muslim Youth Movement of Great Britain - one of a number formed in the wake of the Rushdie affair, which proved short-lived. Councillor Hussain responded by criticising Mr Siddique for damaging race relations locally with his 'bizarre, confusing and often conflicting views on
Muslim affairs'. While the phone-in gave an opportunity to canvas a wide spectrum of local opinion 'the Muslim Youth Movement', he claimed, represented 'only a handful of people' (ibid., 7-8-90). In January 1991 BCR broadcast a two-hour English-speaking phone-in with Mr. Rushdie, despite some local opposition and threats, again from 'the Muslim Youth Movement'. BCR also released details of their local radio poll which 'suggested that 90 per cent of Muslims were against the fatwa' (The Independent, 6-1-91).

The Eid Committee came into being in the spring of 1991. It comprised nine local businessmen and professionals, most young men, born or educated in Britain, belonging to different sects. Most of their parents migrated from rural or urban Pakistan. Their spokesman, Mr. Aurangzeb Iqbal, was a successful lawyer, a member of a local Barelwi mosque and an accomplished poet in English. Their first event was a two-day weekend celebration of the festival - eid - which completes the month of fasting. Their aim was to involve people from the non-Muslim community; therefore, they had invited schools and colleges and arrangements had been made to bus in residents of old people's homes (Telegraph & Argus, 28-3-91).

This was to be the first of a series of events for which they were responsible. The Eid Committee organised a large charity dinner after the Bangladesh cyclone disaster for Muslims and non-Muslims alike, which raised over £12,000. They held an Eid Mela, a community fete in July to celebrate the end of the month of pilgrimage. In all the committee has sought to break down barriers between communities as well as develop good links with city dignitaries. Such self-conscious philanthropic work reflects a new confidence among the Muslim professional and business elite, aware of the need to project positive images of the Muslim community to counteract the proliferating negative ones, generated after The Satanic Verses affair and the Gulf crisis.

In 1992 the same Mr Iqbal negotiated a license for a pioneer radio station to broadcast during the whole month of fasting from 6 March to 6 April, Radio Fast FM. This community radio was to provide religious programmes throughout the month. It was Radio Fast FM, not
the Council for Mosques, which hosted a debate among 'ulama of various sects in the city as to why they were unable to agree on dates for the month: in 1992 Muslims found themselves starting and ending the month on three different days. This caused hardship in families, chaos and embarrassment in factories, businesses and schools.17

These remarks are not intended to suggest that a Muslim councillor, a Muslim businessman/professional and a member of the Council for Mosques inhabit separate and competing worlds. It was clear from an earlier chapter that Muslims have multiple identities, linguistic, cultural, sectarian and political, with members of different sects and from diverse regions belonging to the same South Asian political parties (2.3.3). Similarly, businessmen featured prominently among the founders of the Council for Mosques and there was an overlap in membership between Councillors, Community Relations Council, Council for Mosques and the business community.

In the early 1990s Muslims in Bradford are very much part of the political, administrative, economic and cultural life of the city. An example of co-operation between the Council for Mosques, local authority and councillors was the permission granted to the Council for Mosques by the directorate of Housing and Environment in September 1991 for eight mosques to use loudspeakers for three azan—the call to prayer—on a trial basis of three months. Significantly permission was given for only three of the five daily prayers: fajr, the dawn prayer before sunrise, and 'isha, the night prayer, were excluded to minimise the possibility of public complaint. In December the authority, having monitored the noise levels and environmental impact, gave the Council for Mosques permission to continue broadcasting the three azan and extended this permission to include a further seven mosques. In all, this decision reflected a healthy pragmatism by all those party to the agreement.

Nonetheless, it is clear that it has also become more difficult to identify one unambiguous source of authority in the Muslim community. For a time it seemed that the Council for Mosques fulfilled that function. However, it needs to be remembered that as early as 1983
the Council for Mosques, in rejecting the proposals of the Muslim Parents Association, frankly admitted the debate and diversity within its own ranks, inevitable in a Council reflecting 'different ethnic, national and sectarian strands' (5.1). The debate and disquiet within sectors of the Council surfaced again during the Honeyford affair when one mosque withdrew and, for a while, an alternative council emerged. The impressive solidarity exhibited by the Council during The Satanic Verses affair has probably served to obscure the debate and disagreement amongst Muslims inside and outside the Council on a range of other issues.

Throughout the 1980s where it enjoyed success, whether over the issue of halal meat in schools, or educational changes responsive to their concerns, the Council had always worked closely with Muslim politicians and the Community Relations Council. However questionable some of the Council's decisions were during The Satanic Verses affair, it showed itself able to learn quickly from its mistakes. It was inevitable that once the number of Muslim councillors multiplied that they would increasingly be consulted by the local authority and public bodies. Similarly, with the growing confidence of the Muslim businessmen it was not surprising that they, too, would search out a public role for themselves. In the 1990s it is evident that there are now these three centres of influence, each capable of initiating or participating in Muslim debates and activities.

This is not to belittle the Council's achievement. Its importance in lending credibility to national Muslim organisations was an acknowledgement of its ability to transcend sectarianism, its grassroots support and the respect with which its leaders, especially Pir Maroof and Sher Azam, were held in Barelwi and Deobandi circles outside Bradford. Mihir Bose's assessment of the Bradford Council for Mosques, with which this chapter began - 'an elected body...probably the most representative voice of Islam in the land' - was not without some substance. However, in the 1990s there were other elected and non-elected bodies who could properly question the extent to which the Council was mandated to act as the representatives or spokesmen of Bradford's Muslims.
On 25 August 1991 the U.K. Islamic Mission held its annual conference in Bradford. The morning session was a seminar exploring 'Muslim Rights in Britain' to which distinguished local Muslims were invited. The seminar, chaired by Mr Ajeeb, a local councillor, was conducted in English and was a sober rehearsal of the agenda and anxieties of British Muslims. The conference was held in the wake of a worrying industrial tribunal decision - Commission for Racial Equality v. Precision (26-7-91) - which confirmed that a (Rotherham) employer was not guilty of unlawful direct discrimination under the terms of the Race Relations Act by refusing to employ Muslims.1

Dr Wasti, a Bangladeshi speaker, and a Vice President of U.K. Islamic Mission, presented his shopping list of Muslim demands, which included: new legislation to prevent discrimination against Muslims in employment, housing and education; legislation to prevent the defamation of Islam, accommodation of Muslim family law and the provision of voluntary-aided Muslim schools. Another speaker, Dr Mustafa, urged a patient engagement with British institutions and participation in issues of contemporary concern, such as the environment. Mr Mashuq Ally (see 3.4), who was involved as a Muslim consultant in the industrial tribunal, reminded the conference of some unpalatable stereotypes of British Muslims, which underpinned the Rotherham employer's refusal to employ them - terrorists, analogous to the I.R.A., and racist in their own practices - stereotypes which they must challenge by their involvement in the wider society.

Mr Riaz, a local Muslim and Conservative parliamentary candidate for a Bradford constituency, likened seminar participants to 'frogs in a well', scarcely aware of the world outside, still less of how to relate to its structures. He urged Muslims to vote for the five Muslim parliamentary candidates selected in constituencies across the country by mainstream parties and not to worry about which party they represented. The priority, he insisted, was to transcend their differences - regional, linguistic and sectarian - and capitalise on
their numbers in key marginal constituencies to return some Muslim MPs to Westminster.

The seminar's stress on pragmatism, increased participation in the institutional life of the nation, especially politics, and a willingness to engage in self-criticism was seen as the key to winning a sympathetic hearing for Muslim concerns. These emphases seem congenial to increasing numbers of Bradford's Muslims. When Bradford schools came bottom of the national league table testing seven year-olds in English, science and maths in December 1991 Muslim leaders agreed to use the mosque schools, which many young Muslim children attend after state school to learn the Qur'an and Urdu, for additional English tuition. The local authority would provide training for the teachers in the schools and provide books and equipment. Mr Sher Azam, for the Council for Mosques, welcomed the initiative as 'building on the strengths of our system' (Telegraph & Argus, 20-2-92).

Similarly, Bradford's Muslims voted for the mainstream political parties at the time of the general election in 1992 rather than the British Islamic Party. South Asian and local issues continue to exercise the majority of the eleven Muslim councillors in 1992 (2.3.3). In that year unemployment was hitting minority communities twice as hard as the white community and in the inner city University ward, with the highest concentration of Muslims, 'almost half of the young people (were) without jobs' (Telegraph & Argus, 21-11-92).

Muslim councillors and the Bradford Council for Mosques have many gains to their credit in the 1980s, as documented in the previous chapter, but realise that certain issues are not amenable to local solutions since they require legislative change. To this end both groups are pressing to have a voice nationally, whether in Parliament or in explicitly Islamic organisations (5.2). What is clear is that any organisation which seeks to reflect the diversity of Muslim groupings in Britain today and enjoy grassroot support among different sects cannot afford to ignore the Bradford Council for Mosques. If the 'Muslim Parliament' fails it may well be because
it opted to select individuals itself and thus bypassed established organisations.

The U.K. Islamic Mission seminar included one angry voice dissenting from its general plea for a patient engagement with British institutions, locally and nationally. Dr Munir Ahmed, the Bradford President of Young Muslims UK, fulminated against the preoccupation with 'little rights as a minority'; he poured scorn on the panacea proposed of 'a few Muslims by name in Parliament'. Dr Ahmed pointedly reminded the seminar that the Prophet did not labour in Mecca for thirteen years for minority rights but rather to rid society of idolatry and to achieve success in this world and the hereafter. Muslims were in Britain, the land of kufr (disbelief), not to ask for 'petty little things' but to offer the greatest gift, Islam and the Qur'an, a light for all to 'save' ourselves and the whole of humanity from the fire'. He bewailed the lack of unity in the community, seduced into competition for state grants, and insisted that God would look after the rights of the community once they behaved like real Muslims. Dr Ahmed sought to recall the seminar to the challenge implicit in Islam: guidance for all, a religion of the Book intended 'to prevail over all other ways of life'.

Dr Ahmed's passionate desire for da'wa, to invite others to Islam, and his impatience with the compromises inevitable in any shared life in a democracy point up an abiding dilemma faced by Muslims in a minority situation. The dilemma was articulated by Wilfred Cantwell Smith three decades ago in his seminal work, Islam in Modern History. Writing about Muslims in the secular Republic of India he noted that,

The question of political power and social organisation, so central to Islam, has in the past always been considered in yes-or-no terms. Muslims have either had political power or they have not. Never before have they shared it with others (Smith, 1977, p.286).

To share power with others, whether locally or nationally, means for Bradford's Muslims working within political parties, whose priorities, ethos and culture owes nothing to Islam. The Rushdie affair and the Gulf crisis showed that British political parties were
not particularly hospitable to Muslim sensibilities and concerns. Yet within a democracy - if the option of a separate Muslim party is discounted - there is no alternative. In such an environment community identity rather than personal piety counts: numbers translate into votes. This was the logic of Mr Riaz's position at the seminar. For Dr Ahmed, within an Islamist perspective, mere community belonging and customary practices are not enough. They can obscure true Islam and be a barrier to da'wa.

Certainly 'customary practice' is being increasingly exposed to careful scrutiny by young British-educated Muslims, male and female, inside and outside the Islamist perspective. This was the burden of a conference held in Bradford in April 1990 to discuss 'The future of Muslim youth in Britain'. The conference was organised by The Muslim Youth Movement of Great Britain - a Barelwi youth group formed in Bradford in the wake of the Rushdie affair (5.3.2). 'It was the first time that youths of both sexes addressed the conference on a national level, in the presence of their elders' (The Muslim News, 27-4-90). The conference was characterised by anger at the community's powerlessness in the face of The Satanic Verses and unusual candour about the difficulties facing Muslim youth.

A journalist who covered the meeting captured its tone and content well:

It is a confusing time to be young, Muslim and British. Responding to the Rushdie affair, Muslim cries for unity, and the renewal of an Islamic identity have exposed disunity and the fractured intellectual tradition of a religion transported from several different countries. Several of the younger delegates said the Muslim leadership in Britain was bankrupt of ideas. It is the difficulties of living a religious life in a secular society which should be addressed...instead...elders insist on fighting the battle of Pakistan in Bradford... Dr Sheila Qureshi, an industrial chemist, (remarked that) '(youngsters) learn the Koran in Arabic, which they don't understand. There is a communication gap between the elders and the young...The Koran says we are caretakers of the world. We should be involved in Green politics. We are not taking part in our host country enough' (The Guardian, 26-3-90).
The 'ulama were conspicuous by their absence from the platform. Two reasons can be advanced for their non-attendance: the conference was in English, with which most of the 'ulama are not at ease, and many, especially in the Deobandi tradition would not participate in a gathering which included women. The President of the Council for Mosques, who did attend, conceded that the youth were right to criticise the elders, who had not done enough, especially the 'ulama: 'We need to be sure that the 'ulama, who come from a long way away, are equipped'. Dr Asaf Hussain, a sociologist and writer, pleaded for strategic thinking, careful study of the Qur'an, and warned against de-politicising Islam. The Head Mistress of the private Muslim Girls Community School in Bradford was scathing in her indictment of her own community. She criticised a minimalist Islam, which considered regularity in prayer and learning Arabic enough, with 'no intellectual attempt to engage with issues'; 'mothers are the best school yet they are not allowed to read the Book' (e.g. not welcome to study the Qur'an in most mosques); she angrily asked, 'How can I seek knowledge when the doors are closed by Muslim men. We need the language and skills of this country' (not slogans and emotionalism).

This chapter will explore four important issues raised at these two conferences. Firstly, what efforts are being made to connect with the world of young British-educated Muslims in their late teens and twenties so that Islam does not simply remain but one component in an inherited culture, of declining significance and relevance? Secondly, the 1990s is likely to see more Muslim women in work and in public life, can their concerns and aspirations be accommodated within an Islamic discourse? Thirdly, what resources are being generated from within the Islamic intellectual tradition in English to address issues of concern to British Muslims, an increasing number of whom are not fluent in South Asian languages? Finally, how do Muslims, locally, assess the prospects for da'wa, an important issue if Islam is to be seen as authentically British rather than a South Asian import?
6.1 A MUSLIM OR ISLAMIC IDENTITY FOR THE YOUNG?

At the height of the Gulf crisis in a Bradford Upper School with a largely Muslim intake it was evident that most youngsters were pro-Iraq. Yet, in this same school, throughout the crisis, no more than two or three prayed in the area set aside for prayer. This episode illustrates the distinction between Muslim and Islamic identity. The youngsters felt that, as with the demonisation of Islam in the wake of the Rushdie affair, their Muslim communal identity was once again under attack from negative media coverage. This perception, however, did not translate into prayer.

"How to translate a residual Muslim identity into a self-consciously Islamic identity is the challenge facing Islamic thinkers and leaders in the 1990's. The issues are complex: how much of traditional South Asian religiosity is accessible, relevant and transferable to youngsters in Bradford? Who has the confidence of young Muslims and can thus be the agents of this process of religious transmission?"

Writing of young Muslims in neighbouring Keighley, an anthropologist identified one group largely missing from this process in Britain. In Pakistan and Bangladesh, many facets of religious nurture are in the hands of grandparents who see the children daily; here, relatively young parents often lack the religious knowledge which such grandparents, who are not present in this country, would normally impart. Thus the great interest in establishing and supporting madrassahs (Vertovec, in press).

An earlier chapter documented the role of the supplementary schools (4.5) and concluded that most 'ulama were not role models for youngsters. Few had enough English to connect with their world of experience or understood the questioning ethos of schools. Muhammad Azam, a young professional in Bradford, spent five years in Saudi Arabia learning Arabic and then completed a degree course in modern Arabic and Middle Eastern Studies at Durham University, and is thus possessed of an excellent knowledge of Islam, traditional mosque culture - a member of a Deobandi mosque in the city - and the British educational system. Mr Azam offered a bleak analysis of the situation
facing many young Muslims, who inhabit three cultural arenas: the school with its individualistic and critical ethos; the authoritarian mosque which teaches a minimalist Islamic curriculum, and the home, where after mosque school the young are exposed to South Asian videos, with their beguiling fantasy world of music, drama and dance.³ He itemised three desiderata for the mosques: the two hours youngsters spend there should be enjoyable, inviting affection rather than fear; the subjects should link with those taught in the state school and there should be opportunities for recreation.

Relations between older adolescents and parents are seldom easy, but within Muslim communities in Bradford this uneasy relationship is exacerbated by a growing linguistic gap. The Muslim researcher who studied a Bradford Middle School in 1985/6, with a ninety per cent Muslim intake, observed that already,

Most of the times, parents were at a loss to understand their children because they have given up speaking in their mother tongue, practising their religion and were becoming disrespectful and arrogant to their parents...their children soon begin to adopt English standards and ideas. They start to question not only traditional customs but also religious ideas which seem strangely alien to life in a Western materialistic society (Din, 1986, pp. 6 and 75).

These are adolescents who have finished at the mosque schools and for whom most mosques have no other facilities. Many parents and religious leaders are perplexed and confused. This was very clear in a report written in 1989 by Muslim youth workers and local residents urging local authority support for a newly formed West Bowling Youth Association. The report indicated that Muslim elders were intimidated by the youngsters milling around one particular area and usually responded by urging them 'to visit the local mosque'; the youngsters had little opportunity 'for personal development by way of participation in a social or youth club' since for the elders 'recreational activities (outside school and mosque) are ... seen as little more that a hindrance (to secular and religious study)'. Once again this lack of mutual support and understanding was attributed to 'the breakdown of communication' between English-speaking youngsters
Increasingly it was the upper schools and youth and community centres, set up in the 1980s - which catered for Muslim youth - which created a social space where youngsters could develop and enjoy a distinctive youth culture. Since the majority of mosques had neither the interest, space, resources nor trained personnel to develop youth provision, this increasingly became the preserve of trained youth and community workers, of whom in 1992 some twenty were Muslim. The community centres were sensitive to Muslim culture and would provide sessions for young men or young women only, but were not self-consciously Islamic organisations, such as Young Muslims UK, The Muslim Youth Movement of Great Britain or Al Falah (3.2). Music is a central component of this youth culture and offers a useful case-study of the tensions between Muslim and Islamic identity.

Bradford has a growing number of 'Asian' bands, two of which have a national following. Naseeb - an Urdu word meaning destiny - founded in 1988. This bhangra group appeared live on BBC television in February 1991 to promote their first album, 'Break in the City', and their music was promoted by the local ethnic minority radio station, Bradford City Radio. The other, Fun-da-mental, is more controversial. This band emerged in the summer of 1991 and was enthusiastically profiled in a popular music weekly, which declared that their live performances are more like political rallies than gigs. Samples of Louis Farrakhan, Malcolm X and Enoch Powell's 'Rivers of Blood' speech and the fact that the group dress like PLO terrorists further fuel the excitement... their tracks have, however, not been welcomed by their community elders and the group were recently banned from two Asian music TV shows. As well as being unhappy with their Islamic chanting and the extracts from the Koran ... the programme producers were livid at the fact that 'Righteous Preacher' openly supports the fatwa against Salman Rushdie (Melody Maker, 9-5-92).

A recent release by the group was warmly praised in the English section of Jang, the Urdu daily produced in London:
Lyrics praising Islamic scriptures, Asian culture and condemning the West's oppression of them are sung in a newly released cassette single called 'Peace, Love and War'. So if you are confused about your roots and your identity, it might be worthwhile giving this enthusiastic group a try (Jang, 7-8-92).

In Jang, then, such music was being presented as a vehicle for consolidating identity and even a means of Islamic teaching. A young Muslim Councillor in Bradford, Mr Ashiq Hussain, recently complained to Yorkshire Television about their launch of Asian films and the music programme, Bhangra Beat. His complaint was not that films and music were subverting Islamic values but that such programmes were on too late and needed to be rescheduled 'to a more acceptable time, otherwise the viewers might find a trip to their local video libraries a conventional alternative' (Telegraph & Argus, 4-6-91).

The councillor's acceptance of bhangra music was not shared by the Council for Mosques. In 1988 the Council publicly protested to the education authority when they discovered that some upper schools were playing bhangra music and holding discos during school lunch times. The President of the Council for Mosques was not amused: 'What these children are doing is forbidden by Islam... Muslims regard disco dancing as sexually suggestive and is therefore banned by the Islamic faith. Exposing the body of a male or female in such a way as to attract the opposite sex is forbidden... by having discos during the day the schools are not leading the children to proper development and preparing them for the exams' (Telegraph & Argus, 16-5-88).

The Council for Mosques which had been careful to distance itself from the fatwa against Mr Rushdie could hardly be expected to be happy with the existence of Fun-da-mental, a band claiming both to use music to articulate Islamic sentiments, in general, and to defend the fatwa, in particular. Self-consciously Islamic youth groups have realised that a more nuanced view towards music is likely to win them a hearing. Thus Young Muslims UK have begun to produce their own music cassettes. One is entitled 'Lost Identity', the other 'The Hour'. However, they are worried by the spread of bhangra music for
the same reasons as the Council for Mosques. They also feel that many parents mistakenly support such music in the hope that it 'brings them back to their culture... they think that their children must learn to mix-in with the Western culture, while not forgetting their own' (Trends, vol. 3:2, n.d. p.8).

Two recent initiatives by young Muslims in their twenties working in journalism and the media to entertain, educate and inform young Muslims in Bradford are worthy of comment. The first is a magazine, Sultan, launched in 1989, and the second Radio Fast FM, which broadcast during the month of fasting in 1992 (5.3.2). The managing editor of Sultan, Miss Irna Khan, targeted young sixth-formers, for whom there was little material seeking to address their interests and questions.

While there were one or two short articles, adverts and poems in Urdu most of Sultan was written in English. Its first issue contained articles on careers for South Asian women and the religious and cultural constraints within which such choices were made; a feature on a double Muslim wedding and another on the experiences of a Bradford Muslim visiting her parents' village in Pakistan; other topics included an interview with an Indian law student, an article on car maintenance, recipes, the top ten South Asian films and music reviews.

The magazine was intent on providing positive images of South Asian Muslim culture, thus building up the self-esteem of its readership. However, it was not uncritical. A Muslim youth worker was interviewed on the topic of arranged marriage.

In the past women have turned to him for help when pressure has been on them to get married. The way he sees arranged marriages is somewhat different to the view of the overall Asian male community. His support for arranged marriages is purely on Islamic grounds. This being that a woman cannot be forced into marriage, and that she has the right to refuse a chosen partner. Otherwise the marriage is void... Our society is so male dominated and women hardly have a voice, and this is wrong... If Islam was followed correctly and positively, women would have an equal place in
society. So give women their rights!" (Sultan, 3, November-December 1989, p.16)

It is significant that a Muslim youth worker, rather than an 'alim, was approached for his comments. He was assumed to be sympathetic to the issue and to have some smattering of knowledge, culled directly from Islamic literature, whereby he could appeal to Islam against the norms of a patriarchal culture, often confused with Islam. This modernist sentiment is echoed in an article profiling Benazir Bhutto, the first female Prime Minister of Pakistan, a possible role model for Muslim women. Benazir's criticisms of her predecessor, General Zia, are repeated with evident approval:

From 1979, Zia tried to take away any form of democracy Pakistan had... by using Islam in a negative and degrading way. Zia was enforcing laws which were not in any way progressive, which degraded women and insulted the Muslim religion. True Islam is a progressive and pure faith...the dictator used (Islam) to prevent women being equal in Muslim society (ibid. p.20).

The driving force behind Bradford's first Muslim radio station is Mr Masood Sadiq, chairman of the Bradford branch of the National Union of Journalists and a lecturer in media studies. Radio Fast FM was intended to flag up the achievements of local Muslims, reflect their interests and provide some space for programmes in English, including translations of the Qur'an, to cater for the increasing number of local Muslims whose first language is English and who have only a smattering of Punjabi and Urdu. In conversation he remarked that in providing English material on Islamic themes there was no one in the local community he could turn to so he had to rely on audio tapes produced by Dr Jamal Badawi, an Egyptian, who is a Professor of Management Studies and an 'alim in Canada.

Mr Sadiq is also the resident media expert for Q News, an innovative, national, Muslim weekly produced in English, which began publication in March 1992. It includes a fortnightly column by Dr Syed Darsh, an Egyptian, and ex-imam of the prestigious Regent Park mosque, who answers questions about issues troubling British Muslims. Q News is sponsoring a forum in early 1993 for Muslims under twenty one,
provocatively entitled, 'Beyond beards, scarves and halal meat: Is there a British Muslim identity in the 21st Century?' The promotional literature identifies some of the issues confronting the young, whether an inability to distinguish between culture, tradition and Islam, the lack of positive and relevant role models, inadequate preparation for coming to terms with domestic and public life in a challenging and ever-changing environment or a lack of forums and facilities enabling the development of community relations, personal development and family enrichment.

It is clear that young professionals such as Mr Sadiq and Miss Khan with their command of the print and electronic media are prepared to simply by-pass local 'ulama and religious leaders in their effort to provide relevant and accessible information in English for young Muslims. They are eclectic in the material they use and impatient of sectarianism.

6.2 MUSLIM WOMEN: A PLACE IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN?

Research into the situation of 'first' generation South Asian migrant women in Bradford twenty years ago, noticed that, unlike Sikh or Hindu women, few Muslims worked outside the home. This was for two reasons. Most, from rural and uneducated backgrounds, lacked the social and linguistic skills, or were prevented by the cultural and religious constraints of purdah, which rendered working outside the home unacceptable (Khan, 1980, p. 279).

In 1992 two Muslim women gained public recognition in Bradford, one was elected as the first woman chair of the Racial Equality Council, the other became the first woman councillor from any of the city's ethnic minorities. They represent but the most dramatic expression of an increasing number of Muslim women working in the public, private and voluntary sectors of the city. Four factors, cumulatively, explain this change: restrictive immigration procedures, education of girls, recession and sex equality policies.

A Muslim education development officer, 'Yasmin', who works in a local upper school with many Muslim girls, explained how,
paradoxically, the multiplication of difficulties in getting a husband from South Asia had worked to the advantage of some Muslim girls. If a woman had money in the bank, a house in her name and a full-time job her chances of getting a fiancé into Britain increased markedly. These factors helped 'Yasmin' to encourage many parents to allow their daughters to stay on in the sixth-form and acquire a larger range of marketable skills and qualifications. Further, with recession beginning to hit the ethnic minority communities disproportionately hard, more parents were beginning to allow their daughters to work and thereby supplement the family income. Finally, the local authority was expanding the opportunities for single-sex job-training in the multiplying community centres.

Some of these factors pushing Muslim women into the workplace also benefited women from South Asia, who had come to Bradford to marry. 'Saira' came from Mirpur to marry when she was nineteen years old. She already enjoyed education up to 'matriculation' level in Pakistan - the equivalent to GCSE in Britain. In Bradford after her marriage she continued her studies and passed GCSEs in English and 'A' level Urdu. When her two children were at school she had started working as an interpreter with the local health authority. She admits that she and her husband had to confront opposition from her extended family to her working, not least because it was in a mixed environment. Once again economic necessity prevailed. 'Saira' considers herself fortunate. She enjoys the stimulus of the job and values the freedom driving a car gives her. Anthropological studies of the South Asian Muslim communities in Oxford and Manchester suggest that such changes in the education and work culture of traditionally patriarchal communities is increasingly common (Shaw, 1988, pp. 161-167 and Werbner, 1990, pp. 149-150).

As with the dynamics of migration to Britain, rooted in economic rather than religious imperatives (2.1), the religious leaders have again been overtaken by the logic of developments over which they have little control. This time recession and changing immigration procedures are seeing more Muslim women in further education and in the workplace. This poses uncomfortable questions for the custodians of the Islamic tradition, the 'ulama. Most Muslim women are educated
In a western tradition which makes few concessions to Islam, and increasing numbers are working outside the home, exposed to non-related males and thereby transgressing gender specific norms.

As was evident in chapter three the different Islamic traditions have reacted variously to this challenge. The Deobandis have two private fee-paying schools for girls, seeking, thereby, to preserve purdah. Tablighi Jamaat increasingly provides separate meetings for women. Barelwis such as 'Allama Nishtar seem more willing to educate girls and allow some to continue on to further education - the Barelwi youth movement, The Muslim Youth Movement of Great Britain, allowed male and female to share one platform in addressing their conference on the problems facing young Muslims. The Jamaat-i-Islami youth wing, Young Muslims U.K, caters separately for young women and girls, although both male and female attend their annual camps. However, only four mosques, at the end of 1992, provided any facilities for women to attend Friday prayers. In all, the formal provision for women is extremely patchy. The exasperated comments of Mrs Nighat Mirza, the Headmistress of the private Muslim Girls Community School, at the youth conference, also raises questions about the relevance of what little is provided.

Some recent research has begun to contribute an answer by helpfully mapping the main pattern of relationship between Islam and ethnicity in the experience and multiple identities of Muslim girls. The research focused, inter alia, on Muslim girls, between fourteen and eighteen years old, attending an all-girls state school in Bradford. Three of the four correlations they identified seem particularly significant. One group of five were 'well-versed in and comfortable with' South Asian Muslim culture. 'They enjoyed weddings and festivals, family visits, Hindi and Urdu films, and preferred the fashions of shalwar qamiz. They expressed considerable interest in ...pirs (holy men) and taviz (amulets), and were dutiful in their fasting ...and prayer with other family members'. A second group of six were 'devout and (yet) ...critical of the traditional culture and nominal religiosity often adhered to by their parents ... All were well-versed in scripture, in the details of religious practice, or both...' and a final group of three were neither Islamically
oriented nor at ease with traditional South Asian culture. 'None had been religiously nurtured, and all had little experience of Qur'an classes, family fasting and prayer. They saw themselves as rebellious, and had experimented...with relationships, nightlife and smoking' (Knott and Khokher, in press).

The researchers wisely saw the young women as bearers of multiple and changing identities. What was important was their recognition that it was possible for a young woman to be bi-lingual, enjoy some of the benefits of English cultural life, and yet remain fundamentally at ease within a Barelwi tradition - the world of pirs and taviz - thereby endorsing much of the unself-conscious religiosity of their parents. The research also suggested that someone who operated most readily in English is likely to be attracted to Young Muslims U.K. or the progressive and secularist stance of activists in the Women against Fundamentalism movement. Whatever the intrinsic attraction of such religious and ideological options more research is required to establish possible correlations between them and language: a prima facie case can be made for assuming that where a person is fluent in English but not in Punjabi or Urdu the Barelwi or Deobandi traditions are likely to be less accessible and the traditional religious practices of their parents problematised. For such people religious belonging has to be more self-conscious.

The research of Knott and Khokher can be queried at one point. They seem to suggest that the main catalyst for challenging aspects of traditional South Asian Islam is the Islamist tendency of Young Muslims U.K. This is also the position taken by Yasmin Ali in an otherwise stimulating essay on Muslim women in the North of England (Ali, 1992, pp. 112-118). In reality, anyone exposed to the writings of Benazir Bhutto or Imran Khan, role models for many South Asian Muslims, runs up against a modernist sentiment, which also invites a reappraisal of aspects of traditional South Asian Islam and culture. This is clearly the ethos of the Bradford magazine Sultan. It is also the declared emphasis of the women's movement in Pakistan, which has deliberately sought to 'expose the difference between maulvis and Islam as a first step, and between progressive and conservative Islam as a second'. This prevents the movement being dismissed as
culturally inauthentic and 'Westernized' (Mumtaz and Shaheed, 1987, pp.158-159).

What is clear is that aspects of Islamic belief and practice are now being contested within all the traditions. The woman teacher who can insist that 'by teaching about Islam we are giving them (Muslim girls) the tools with which to challenge and fight for their rights. Empowering women doesn't frighten men but creates a more stable society... is neither Islamist nor modernist but the Head of the Muslim Girls Community School in Bradford (Khanum, 1992, pp. 125-126). This school serves a Deobandi constituency, including some of the most vulnerable and least wealthy families. The majority of parents would send their daughters 'back home' so as not to be forced by law to attend a non-Muslim school or struggle to try to find other means of dealing with what they see as a major dilemma (promotional literature, 1989).

Mrs Nighat Mirza, the headmistress, a science graduate, presents herself as a role model for parents and girls. Initially sceptical of the need for such a separate school she sees it as part of her role to coax reluctant parents into trusting their daughters more and giving them more freedom, including allowing them to go on to further education. "I keep telling the parents: "I'm a Muslim woman. I have a career, I have a family". I have to persuade them that it's all right... without threatening them! (The Independent, 9-9-91).

British-educated Muslim women, unlike many of their parents, who had little if any formal education, have direct access to the sources of the Islamic tradition in English. This can lead to searching questions. A Barelwi magazine, which circulates locally, devoted one and a half pages to answering a question from a Miss S.Qureshi, namely, 'How can men and women be equal in Islam, if the evidence of two women is treated as equal to that of one man in the Islamic court?' (The Islamic Times, 5:11, 1990, p.10). Such a question, today, is just as likely to be prompted by reading literature from Pakistan, where this remains a burning issue for Muslim women, as by any direct acquaintance with western feminism (Mumtaz and Shaheed, 1987, pp. 106-110).
Women attracted to Young Muslims U.K. and its Islamist perspective are no more enamored of all aspects of that movement than those within the 'Barelwi' or Deobandi tradition. A recent double page spread in Trends, written by a woman, was provocatively entitled 'A Woman's Place in Power'. Nilofer Alaud-Din quoted the hadith used by Pakistani 'ulama to challenge Mrs Bhutto's legitimacy as Prime Minister — 'The nation which puts the woman at the helm of its affairs will never attain to well-being' — and then discounted this 'infamous' tradition as 'weak'. She expressed dismay at 'such un-Islamic chauvinism' and rebuked members of Jamaat-i-Islami for their frequent recourse to 'sarcasctic and derogatory' comments about Mrs Bhutto's claims to power. She concluded that the only relevant question the Islamist movement was entitled to address to a leader, male or female, was whether or not that leader supported Islamic reforms (Trends, 3:3, n.d. pp. 10-11).

This article generated angry and spirited responses. Yasmin and Laila Rajab-Ali, in the next issue, challenged the writer's contention that the hadith, which appeared in Bukhari, the most respected collection, was weak. Further, Yasmin insisted that the scholarly consensus that a woman cannot rule a country is 'reinforced by the fact that a woman cannot lead the prayer in a mosque and that two female witnesses are equal to one male witness in a trial'. Laila also pointed out that for a female head of state to attend meetings with men would itself be un-Islamic and recalled prophetic traditions recorded in Bukhari and Muslim that stated that a woman must be accompanied on journeys lasting more than a day and night by a male companion, whom she cannot marry, a mahram. For the Rajab-Allis such teaching seemed cumulatively to discount the possibility of women ruling (ibid., 3:4, n.d. pp. 4 and 26-27).

It would be misleading to suggest that Muslim women spend most of their time agonising over the status-of-women-in-Islam! Many like 'Saira', a health authority interpreter, are grateful for the increased freedom they enjoy, compared to their parents' generation, and regret the pockets of obscurantism in the community such as 'a pre-occupation with dopattas, making sure women do not cut their hair and caste marriage' (quotation from an interview). She had resolved
to teach her children about Islam herself rather than expose them to the rote-learning regimen of many of the mosques. Increasingly, women like 'Saira' or the journalist Ms Irna Khan, are happy to keep their distance from the 'ulama, and content to learn about Islam from books.

6.3 RENEWING THE ISLAMIC INTELLECTUAL TRADITION: THE TASK AHEAD

British Muslims are heirs to a fragmented Islamic tradition, with most of the 'ulama and university graduates inhabiting separate intellectual worlds, with little meeting, still less creative interaction, between them. A distinguished Pakistani scholar, familiar with both intellectual environments, concluded his study of Islamic education and its response to modernity, with the observation that,

the state of Muslim scholarship is, generally speaking, so poor that it is at times disheartening...in the Middle East the level of intellectual life in the Islamic field is pitiable. In the subcontinent, where better quality is perhaps available, a sober historical scholarship that would anchor it meaningfully and reliably is lacking...(Rahman, 1982, p.150).

The situation in Britain is further exacerbated by linguistic diversity. The 'ulama educated here are still trained through the medium of Urdu and within a distinct South Asian cultural tradition, which makes few concessions to their new location (4.4). British Muslims, by contrast, are increasingly more at ease in English than Urdu. Commercial considerations have forced even Urdu newspapers printed in England to introduce some measure of bi-lingualism. Thus, the Urdu daily, Jang, began to publish a weekly supplement in English at the end of 1991; a year later Awaz began to appear in a bi-lingual daily edition. In 1989 an English monthly digest, The Muslim News, was first published, followed in 1992 by the polished and professional weekly, Q News. All of these dailies and periodicals circulate in Bradford.

The few Muslims who write in English, self-consciously addressing Islamic themes, usually lack a knowledge of Arabic, and thus would
not be taken seriously by the 'ulama (Ahmed, 1992, p.162). They, in their turn, berate the 'ulama and traditional Islam for being confined to a 'ghetto' (Akhtar, 1990, p.9). The task confronting Muslims in developing the Islamic tradition in English is thus considerable. It is by no means clear which institutions are equipped for such a task. It is difficult to envisage the 'ulama and their centres of learning as equal to such an undertaking (4.4).

Reviewing Islamic centres in Britain and the West Akbar Ahmed noted that, they are centred around one man of learning and dedication. In spite of a general ideological and intellectual sympathy for each other they remain somewhat isolated from one another. There are, therefore, no schools or theoretical frames which are being developed; nor are young intellectuals, working under learned scholars, being groomed for scholarship. It is still too much of a hit or miss method (Ahmed, 1988 p.205).

In a later work, Ahmed worried that such centres, financed by Saudis or Iranians, 'assume a surrogate position for the larger political confrontation in the Muslim world' (Ahmed, 1992, p.168). This raises the suspicion that such centres are not primarily concerned with developing Islamically grounded responses to the problems a Muslim minority faces in Britain.

Dr Shabbir Akhtar has recently mapped out with great clarity certain desiderata for an Islamic engagement with the western intellectual tradition. 'In an age more hospitable to rational philosophy than to dogmatic theology' there was an imperative to develop 'a critical koranic scholarship' and 'a natural theology, responsive to the intellectual pressures and assumptions of a sceptical age, which could be used to remove some kinds of conscientious doubts about the truth of religious claims' - such a natural theology was necessary since Akhtar was prepared to allow for the phenomenon of a principled rejection of Islam based on reason, morality and knowledge. Such an acknowledgement is alien to the Qur'an which by itself is 'clearly deficient for the purpose of developing any adequate theory of modern rejection'. For Akhtar such intellectual tasks are urgent with the Qur'an 'palpably becoming a dead relic from a dead past... fast
becoming an irrelevance to our daily lives, to the mental travail of ordinary existence' (Akhtar, 1990, pp. 17, 66-7, 112).

The burden of modernity is that in a context of secularity, and religious and ideological diversity, unself-conscious religiosity is no longer a credible option and unreflective piety a liability - 'fate and destiny have been largely replaced by choice and decision as central categories of thought in the contemporary world'. Even fear of a Day of Judgement can no longer be relied on to sustain belief: 'the distant terrors of Hell are... insufficient even to motivate deeply religious people'. It is not surprising that Dr Akhtar is not impressed by rejectionist or isolationist responses to all things western and reminds Muslims that, "the West" is no longer some amorphous realm, some abstract foe, out there ... Muslims are in the West'. He concludes by excoriating the conceit entertained by many Muslims that 'contempt for our current situation of secularity and religious pluralism is an adequate substitute for an intellectual reckoning with it' (ibid. pp. 20, 150, 204).

Dr Akhtar's plea for Muslims to accept that they are British/Western and to develop an Islamic thought and praxis responsive to the social, institutional and intellectual realities as they exist in Britain today, provides a context in which self-consciously, Islamic endeavour must be assessed. The rest of this section will briefly review a selection of readily accessible Islamic literature and opinion in English addressing three issues of contemporary concern: religious freedom, the relationship between science and Islam, and the status of women in Islam.

In the midst of the Rushdie debate the Minister of State at the Home Office, John Patten, had outlined the government's thinking on a range of issues generated by the novel and Muslim responses to it. His open letter to 'influential British Muslims' included the remark that the one principle the government could realistically protect was that 'individuals should be free to choose their own faith' (The Times, 5-7-89). Mr Liaqat Hussain, the President of the Bradford Council for Mosques in 1991 and 1992, voiced the traditional perspective on such a freedom in an interview:
There is no such thing as freedom in religion. You have to tame yourself to a discipline. We want our children to be good Muslims, whereas this society wants children to be independent in their thinking (Khanum, 1992, p.136).

Freedom to accept or reject religion is clearly a living issue in a pluralist environment. One questioner in Trends pointedly asked:

I am seriously thinking of leaving Islam, but someone told me that I can't. I think this is silly and such statements only make me dislike Islam more. So can you tell me why he would say it and what are the consequences for a person who wants to leave Islam for a different religion...or ideology? (Trends, vol.2:2, 1988, p.23).

The answer given to this and to the similar question, framed in slightly different terms in a later issue, was that,

If a person wants to renounce Islam, he can, but it is a punishable sin in Islamic society. It is like treason. Islam is not just a religion but a system for organising human life. It is an ideology and Muslims are soldiers who carry forward this truth and are struggling to remove falsehood from the earth...no army can operate successfully by allowing treason...But, the punishment of death, is applicable in an Islamic society (ibid., vol.2:5, 1989, p.13).

In Britain, it was conceded, one was free to leave since Islam is not established. If it was, then you would not like to leave (ibid., vol.2:2, 1988, p.23).

Trends operates from within an Islamist framework originally developed in majority-Muslim contexts - Egypt and Pakistan - and these answers indicate how little thought Islamists have given to the question of living with integrity as a minority, the situation today facing a quarter of the world's Muslims. Religious freedom for the individual, as enjoyed in the West, is not seen as a positive good but rather an unfortunate necessity to be borne.12

Dr Akhtar's response to such a question is markedly different. He sees the situation of Muslims as a minority in the West, not simply as a situation to be deplored but as providing a new context in which
Muslims are enabled to rediscover Qur'anic teaching overlaid by tradition. Thus he argues that God wills a voluntary response to Him, rooted in 'reflection and morally responsible choice'; therefore, 'heresy and apostasy are morally more acceptable than any hypocritical attachment to orthodox opinion out of fear of public sanctions'. He seeks to ground such a stance in two Qur'anic verses - 'There should be no compulsion in religion' (2:256) and 'To you your religion, to me mine' (109:6) - which together could begin to undergird 'a specifically Islamic manifesto on freedom of conscience and conviction' (Akhtar, 1989, pp.76-77). In this regard, Dr Akhtar has a precedent in the work of the distinguished Pakistani scholar, the late Fazlur Rahman, for whom the source of the Islamic law of apostasy was 'not the Qur'an but the logic of the Islamic Imperium' (Rahman, 1985, p.15).

The history of the relationship between science and religion in the West has been controversial and complex. A recent monograph displays 'the diversity, the subtlety, and ingenuity of the methods employed, both by apologists for science and for religion, as they have wrestled with fundamental questions concerning their relationship with nature and with God'. This same study warns that 'when the history of science is hijacked for apologetic purposes (whether by religious thinkers or secularists) it is often marred by a cultural chauvinism' (Brooke, 1991, pp. 5 and 42)). Cultural chauvinism is an apt phrase to describe The Bible, The Qur'an and Science, by Maurice Bucaille, a work, hugely influential among Muslims, first written in French in 1976 and translated subsequently into English and Arabic. This work purports to do three things: review the teachings of the Bible and the Qur'an on natural phenomena, evaluate such material in terms of 'the cast-iron facts of modern science' - the Qur'an is judged to have passed this test, the Bible to have failed - and argue that science can illuminate Qur'anic verses which 'until now have remained enigmatic' (Bucaille, 1979, introduction).

This work has spawned a new generation of 'Islam and science' monographs, described by one Muslim scholar as 'Bucailism', whereby enthusiasts claim to have discerned in the Qur'an everything from the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics to the big bang (Sardar,
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1985, p. 168). 13 Ziauddin Sardar judges such works 'dangerous' since the Qur'an is misconstrued if understood as a text-book of science rather than 'a book of guidance'. The Qur'an becomes hostage to developments in science - few philosophers or historians of science would speak so unambiguously today of 'cast-iron facts of modern science'. Finally, such a stance undercuts any Islamic scrutiny of the scientific imagination. Sardar explains the popularity of such works as psychological and apologetic: 'It reinforces their faith in the Qur'an and Islam...and confirms their belief in the superiority and universal validity of Western science' (ibid., pp. 78 and 168).

Bucaille remains very popular, despite such strictures. The anti-Christian controversialist Ahmad Deedat, a Gujarati resident in South Africa, utilises Bucaille's work and distributes his writings through his organisation, the Islamic Propagation Centre International, with its British headquarters in Birmingham. Deedat is in a long tradition of Christian-Muslim polemic, which can be traced back to a series of debates staged between Karl Pfander, a Christian missionary, and Maulana Rahmat Kairanaawi in Agra, north India, in 1854 (Powell, 1975/6). Indeed, Deedat claims to have been inspired by the latter's book, Izhar al Haq, the demonstration of truth (Deedat, 1985, p. 62). His organisation sells this nineteenth century work of religious polemic in an English translation.

Deedat has a considerable following in Britain. He packed the Albert Hall in 1985 and his almost annual visits to Britain invariably include Bradford on its itinerary. His last tour in the autumn of 1989 saw him entering the lists against Mr Rushdie with a scabrous little pamphlet in which he convinced himself that once the British public woke up to the fact that The Satanic Verses also lampooned the Queen, the Prime Minister and white women it would be immediately banned (Deedat, 1989, pp. 14-18). His popularity can be gauged by the fact that his 1989 lecture in Bradford was packed out, attracting more than two thousand people (Telegraph & Argus, 3-10-89). At this meeting he distributed free a lecture by Bucaille, The Qur'an and Modern Science. Deedat has recently published a booklet, Al Qur'an, the miracle of miracles, which included a chapter on 'science and the

What is surprising is that such a figure whose work is by turns tendentious and abusive was the recipient in 1986 of the Felsal Award, a prestigious and lucrative prize given by Saudi Arabia for services to Islam (The Straight Path, vol. 7:2/3, 1986, p. 21). Such a prize inevitably lends a certain lustre to a writer and polemicist who contributes nothing to a serious Islamic engagement with modern science or non-Islamic religious traditions.

The issue of the status and function of Muslim women is assuming a greater salience in Islamic literature. Nadeem Ahmed, a young Muslim sociologist, writing in a widely-circulated educational newsletter, can take for granted that mosques are 'usually ridden with pensioners and infants... are almost wholly male institutions. No wonder so many British born Muslim women/girls grow up detesting Islam' (Link International, vol. 4:1, 1989, p. 2). Mohammad Raza, in his monograph on Islam in Britain, devotes an entire chapter to 'Muslim women and freedom'. Raza considers that 'the veneer of Islamic culture is spread thinly' over a South Asian patriarchal order to lend it legitimacy. He is anxious that if women are not enabled to distinguish between patriarchal customs and Islam 'the social distance and estrangement of Muslim women from the community will increase'. Raza is confident that Muslim women who study the Qur'an and Sunnah 'as primary and secondary sources' will be equipped to challenge such repressive customs (Raza, 1991, pp. 5 and 90-96). Dr Shabbir Akhtar is also convinced that the time has come for Muslim women themselves, to interpret the sacred text and question the traditional male bias that has patronised their oppression for so long... (nonetheless) some divine imperatives may seem, to a modern secularised conscience, demanding and harsh (Akhtar, 1989, p. 100).

Many Islamic authors, writing in English, agree that an 'oppressive patriarchy' obtains within Muslim culture (Sardar, 1990, p. 168). There is less clarity on its cause. Akbar Ahmed considers colonialism the main villain (Ahmed, 1988, p. 185). Undoubtedly this exacerbated
the situation but seclusion and exclusion of women from the public domain pre-dated western imperialism. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest both were articulated very early within Islam, with the freedoms enjoyed in commercial and political life by Khadija and A'isha, wives of the prophet, soon negated by the codification of Islamic law (Smith, 1985).

It is clear that apologetic is no substitute for research of Qur'an, Sunnah, the early history of Islam and the development of Islamic law. Until this is done any re-interpretation of Islam will remain insecurely grounded in the face of the massive weight of traditional scholarship and Islamic law. However uncongenial to the apologetic imagination, it might be less a-historical to argue that 'patriarchal norms' are written into the Qur'an and Sunnah, as traditionally understood, and that a huge task awaits those bold enough to challenge such venerable readings, enshrined in Islamic law.

The influential manual on Islamic norms for women, Bihishti Zewar, Heavenly Ornaments, by Maulana Thanawi (d. 1943), a work translated from Urdu into English, continues to be very popular in Muslim bookshops in Bradford and widely used in Deobandi mosques. This work, written by the most respected Deobandi 'alim of his generation, takes for granted that what would now be dubbed 'patriarchal norms' are underwritten by the Qur'an, Sunnah and Islamic law. The work makes explicit that women should be secluded from all but close male relatives, should pray at home rather than in a mosque, cannot initiate divorce proceedings, and when acting as witnesses to a wedding two women are required to substitute for one of the two men required (Saroha, 1981, pp. 288, 304, 342 and 424). The book includes two hadith from the most prestigious collections of Bukhari and Muslim, which presuppose that women were created 'ontologically inferior, subordinate and crooked' (Hassan, 1985, p. 147).

Dr Riffat Hassan, a Pakistani academic, who has studied these traditions about the creation of woman - absent from, and she would contend contradictory of, the Qur'anic data - argued that most were borrowed from the Genesis account with 'Muslim biases...added to the adopted text' to render their connotations the more damaging to women
The first hadith is worded thus:
'Treat women nicely, for a woman is created from a rib, and the curved portion of the rib is its upper portion, so if you would try to straighten it, it will break, but if you leave it as it is, it will remain crooked. So treat women nicely (ibid., p. 147) and the second adds the detail that Eve—Hawwa in the Islamic tradition—was created from the 'left' rib of Adam (Saroha, 1981, pp. 463-465).

She noticed that the Genesis account nowhere specifies that it was the 'left' rib, nor explicitly mentions its 'crookedness' or 'curvature'. In Arab and South Asian Muslim culture, the 'right' is auspicious and the 'left' its opposite. Dr Hassan contended that traditional hadith criticism, which focused on a study of the reliability of the transmitters and the chain of transmission to establish their authenticity and reliability—nidan criticism—needed to be supplemented by criticism of their content, matn, to ascertain whether such were in conformity with Qur'anic teachings.

Such a task is as urgent as it is controversial. Hadith remain the second source of revelation, after the Qur'an, within the developed Islamic corpus and undergirds Islamic law. The angry response in Trends to an article criticising an hadith in Bukhari, used to challenge the legitimacy of women rulers, indicates the psychological and emotional investment many Muslims have in defending the reliability, even sanctity, of these venerable traditions. Fazlur Rahman was convinced that such critical study would 'not only remove a big mental block but should promote fresh thinking about Islam' (Rahman, 1982, p. 147). Until this debate is widely joined by Islamic scholars, conversant with the primary sources in Arabic, and able to develop a methodology to assess such traditions, any re-appraisal of the role and status of women will be vulnerable to accusations of infidelity and succumbing to western fashion.

It is not surprising that scholars such as Shabbir Akhtar and Akbar Ahmed are silent on these issues. Since neither are Arabists they are not equipped to undertake such a sensitive issue as the critical sifting of hadith. Until it occurs apologetic must do service for
serious scholarship, with 'ulama and British Muslims engaged, at best, in shadow boxing. Where exchange takes place it is usually perfunctory and polemical. The losers are British Muslims, who, unless they have studied Islamics at university, are unlikely even to be aware of the scholarly labours of someone of the stature of the late Professor Fazlur Rahman, the distinguished Pakistani scholar, who ended his academic life at Chicago University, where he produced a number of stimulating and accessible monographs and essays on the Qur'an, Islam and the Islamic intellectual tradition (Rahman, 1979, 1980 and 1982). Rahman, in seeking to be faithful to the sources of the faith, while open to the academic disciplines and questioning of the modern world, remains a largely untapped resource for local Muslims.

6.4 INVITING OTHERS TO ISLAM: PROMISE AND PREDICAMENT

'Shazia' is a young Muslim in a Bradford school. When young she identified 'Islam with Pakistaniness':

My image of a Muslim before was Pakistani, shalwar kamiz, brown or whatever. I'd never considered anyone white being a Muslim, until I became involved with the organisation (Young Muslims UK) and came into contact with different people.

'Such converts had really impressed her, giving her faith in the religion of her birth... (it) "keeps me going, seeing more people entering Islam and taking it seriously"' (Knott and Khokher, in press).

New Muslims can thus serve to legitimise the faith, remind South Asians that Islam is a universal faith, loosen the link between ethnicity and religious identity, and, where they bring an inquisitive mind to their new religion... may contribute to the continuous evolution of Islam helping to mould it to fit the conditions of contemporary European society' (Gerholm, 1988, p.263).

The important question remains: who is to engage in da'wa - call/invitation to Islam - and tabligh, preaching? These two words, da'wa and tabligh are usually bracketed together in discussions by South Asian Muslims on how to commend Islam to non-Muslims in the
Unlike Christianity, Islam—outside the Ismaili sect—had not formed distinct institutions or associations to engage in 'missionary' work. Such organisations only developed in the nineteenth century, in response to Christian missionary activities. While Christians, in justification of the missionary imperative within their tradition, point to 'the great commission' in St. Matthew's gospel (28:18-20) there is no similar verse in the Qur'an. However, Muslims often see da'wa and tabligh as implicit in the following Qur'anic verse:

You are the best ummah (community) raised for the benefit of mankind. It is your duty to enjoin good and forbid evil because you believe in Allah (3:104).

This was one of the verses Maulana Ahmed cited in his Presidential address to the U.K. Islamic Mission's twenty-fifth annual conference at Manchester in August 1988. The conference was devoted to the theme of 'Islamic Da'wah in Western Europe' (3.4). The addresses delivered at this conference, in addition to an important booklet by Khurram Murad, a past Director-General of the Islamic Foundation in Leicester, Da'wah among non-Muslims in the West (1986(b)) —required reading for members of Young Muslims U.K.—provides an honest review both of the difficulties such Muslims have in commending the imperatives of daw'a and tabligh to their co-religionists and non-Muslims in responding to it.

The reluctance of many Muslims to engage in da'wa is explained by a multiplicity of factors: a lack of co-ordination and internal feuding among the four hundred and fifty plus Pakistani organisations in Britain absorbs all surplus time and energy; with the economic recession particularly hitting South Asian Muslims a preoccupation with making ends meet becomes paramount; lack of close ties with non-Muslim neighbours renders protestations of da'wa empty; an emphasis on preserving cultural, linguistic and ethnic identity, suggests that to become a Muslim means becoming South Asian culturally, and reinforces the suspicion that Islam is alien to European culture; Islam's troubled relationship with the West often topples over into 'emotive diatribe, abusive polemic, against the West, the white man or the Hindu'; too often da'wa does not connect with the concerns and
experiences of average British people; 'why should Islamic da’wah remain unconcerned with the questions of nuclear weapons, unemployment, old age...?' (Murad, 1986(b), pp. 22-23).

Those in the Jamaat-i-Islami tradition insist that da’wa is the responsibility of all Muslims. Not so the Barelwi tradition. This is clear from the (Urdu) prospectus for the 'The Islamic Missionary College', set up in Bradford in 1974, by the Jama’iyat Tabligh ul Islam, The Association for preaching Islam (3.2). The college was intended for ‘ulama, who had completed their traditional course of studies, but who did not have English or other languages. They were to be trained in a range of subjects, including science, philosophy and comparative religion, enabling them to preach to non-Muslims. Muslims who had graduated from British colleges and universities, while knowing English, were not deemed capable of da’wa and tabligh since their knowledge of Islam was judged inadequate.

If there was disagreement between different Muslim traditions as to who was responsible for da’wa and tabligh there was also some confusion as to the implications of these terms. Tablighi Jamaat, the preaching organisation, networked to many of the Deobandi mosques in Bradford, has its European headquarters nearby in Dewsbury (3.3). While it encouraged all Muslims to engage in tabligh, the movement did not seek, by and large, to address non-Muslims (Haq, 1972, pp. 45 and 180). Tabligh had been interiorised, confined to Muslims, and understood as 'a process of self-reformation and...service to Allah...to win (His) good pleasure' (Troll, 1985, p.148). For this reason activists in Young Muslims U.K. were critical of it for its supposed failure to engage in an 'organised social, economic and political struggle to establish the Islamic way of life' (Trends, 1989, 2.5, p.13).

Organised activities apart, most become new Muslims through marriage or sufi groups. This is the judgement of Dr Abdul Rashid Skinner, a local psychologist, and founder member of the Association of British Muslims (ABB) in the late 1970s. Dr Skinner's judgement is corroborated by one of the few pieces of research into this group (Ball, 1987). Mr Daud Owen, its present President, explained the
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reason for the association and offered a typical profile of its members in a letter to the national press:

This association was set up originally to help converts to adjust to being Muslim Britons and the descendants of immigrants to adjust equally to being British Muslims... The association represents the majority of converts, and a typical profile is middle class, professional, often public-school educated, monarchist, conservative, and involved with genuine mystic paths and masters (The Independent, 26-8-91).

Dr Skinner, in conversation, agreed with Mr Owen's comments but added that most of the six hundred families who are networked through AEM belong to the Naqshbandi sufı order, a transnational, reformist order active in South Asia, Central Asia and the Arab world (Robinson, 1982, pp. 118-125). Dr Skinner, himself within the sufı tradition, in 1987 and 1988, unsuccessfully contested inner city wards in Bradford on a Conservative/Muslim ticket, opposing South Asian Muslims, who represented Labour.

The need for such a support network as AEM is significant and indicates the difficulties many new Muslims have in feeling part of South Asian Muslim communities. To sustain an Islamic identity in public requires social support. Sociologists argue that, 'To have a conversion experience is nothing much. The real thing is to be able to keep on taking it seriously: to retain a sense of its plausibility' (Berger and Luckman, 1967, p.158).

Dr Skinner admits that, with the exception of one local South Asian Naqshbandi sufı, South Asian expressions of sufısm seem to owe too much to Hinduism to be sympathetic or accessible to him. He is able to sustain his Islamic identity through Friday worship in English in the local mosque at Neal Street, which serves an international student community and his activities with AEM - he is now vice-President. He also attends regular meetings in London as a member of the Union of Muslim Organisations of the UK and Eire, one of a number of national bodies seeking to co-ordinate and speak for Britain's Muslim communities (Nielsen, 1992, p.47).
If Dr Skinner became a Muslim through sufism Mr Sufyan Gent did so, at a formal level, through marriage to an Iraqi. However, he only became an active Muslim on moving to Bradford in 1987. Unlike Dr Skinner, Sufyan's spiritual odyssey owes nothing to sufism. Discovering the Neal Street mosque he joined a Qur'anic study group, conducted in English. He found himself attracted to the austere and activist Wahhabi tradition, with its discipline and clear set of rules. By 1992 he was President of the small Bradford branch of The Islamic Society of Britain (ISB) (3.4).

The ISB conducts its business in English, attracts Muslims who see their future in Britain, and who want to present Islam as relevant to British society. Locally, it draws from the international student community attending the Neal Street mosque - where it holds its weekly meetings - the few local English and Afro-Caribbean Muslims, and ex-members of Young Muslims U.K. Such an English-speaking community is a vital support for Sufyan, who like Dr Skinner, lives outside the inner cities where the majority of South Asian Muslims live.

As with Dr Skinner, Sufyan finds it difficult to relate to aspects of South Asian religiosity and culture. He worries about a reactive identity exhibited by many young South Asian Muslims. He offered two illustrations: local graffiti, such as 'Islamic Jihad against whites' and the common application of the term kafir, non-believer, to white people. Since many British people are Christians, they are covered, Sufyan contends, by the Qur'anic category 'People of the Book', and should, therefore, not be spoken of as kafir, with its pejorative overtones.

Mr Gent is not alone in expressing concern at such symptoms of a growing divide between the 'ulama and British Muslims. Other Muslim commentators are beginning to worry about 'the growing and uncontrolled phenomenon of lay preachers...emerging due to a vacuum in effective religious leadership' (Islamia, 19, July 1992, p.14). Their knowledge is often shallow, the Islam they propagate narrow and intolerant (Ahmed, 1992, pp. 155-156). This intolerance was demonstrated in Bradford in March 1990 when a Muslim youth group
responded angrily to a proposed visit to the city by Dr Zaki Bädawi. Since Dr Badawi's views on the Rushdie affair were uncongenial to them they distributed a pernicious hand-out in which they labelled him an 'enemy of Islam', declared his presence in Bradford a 'sin', and sought to dissuade him from coming. The same organisation pointedly ignored a Council for Mosques plea to halt street demonstrations in May 1990 after they had earlier been involved in a street fracas (Telegraph & Argus, 2-5-90).

It is evident that, for the moment, new Muslims have little impact locally. They may be respected for adding lustre and legitimacy to Islam but find themselves marginalised in Muslim deliberations. Indeed, it would be hard to imagine either Dr Skinner or Mr Gent at home in the Council for Mosques, whose business is conducted in Urdu. The poor showing of the British Islamic Party, in part, can be attributed to the centrality Muslim converts played in it. Such were strangers to biradari politics, the crucial networks for mobilising Muslim votes. Similarly, impeccable Islamic credentials were not enough for Dr Skinner to win the crucial Muslim vote in local elections.

6.5 SUMMARY

It is evident that Muslims in Bradford are committed to participating in the mainstream of British political, institutional and intellectual life. A refreshing candour and self-criticism characterises much of the debate within the communities and Muslim women are increasingly participants. There are signs of a British Muslim culture developing with its own music, print and electronic media, and questioning ethos, whether the proper role of women, the relationship of South Asian Muslim culture to Islam, or the desire to contribute an Islamic perspective to contemporary debates such as the environment. As yet, much of what passes for Islamic writings in English, with a few exceptions, are apologetic or polemical works rather than serious scholarship. However, a new generation of professionals has emerged more eclectic in its reading habits and, through its command of English, able to access a wider world of scholarship.
Many of these developments have simply bypassed the 'ulama. The social control religious leaders can exercise is diminishing, not least over women, whether in school, community centre or the workplace. For young Muslims the significant other is more likely to be a Muslim youth worker than an 'alim. It remains an open question as to whether more than a small proportion of the 'ulama will be able to command the respect of British Muslims. Youngsters retain a Muslim community identity. Whether more than a small number will seek to adopt a self-consciously Islamic lifestyle in Britain remains an open question.
CONCLUSION

Bradford in the 1990's contains significant Muslim residential zones. Here Muslim communities feel secure amidst a relatively self-contained world of businesses and institutions, religious and cultural, which they have created to service their specific needs. The concentration of Muslim voters has also been translated into a sizeable number of local councillors. Muslims have demonstrated an increasing willingness to engage in the public life of the city, whether as councillors, members of the Racial Equality Council, or professionals and businessmen involved in charitable activities.

As Muslims have developed an understanding of local government, as officers and councillors, they have learned to co-operate with the Council for Mosques to ensure that local services are responsive to their special needs. This is particularly evident in the field of education where the local authority has sought to accommodate Muslim aspirations and allay their anxieties. While I have suggested that there are three overlapping centres of influence amongst local Muslims, namely the Council for Mosques, councillors and a professional and business community, on many issues their activities are mutually supportive. This is very clear in the steps taken to secure a future for the Urdu language, important both as a means of communication across the generations in families, a *lingua franca* for many Muslims from South Asia, and a storehouse of Islamic literature and Muslim culture. Thus many schools and local colleges provide the opportunity to study it up to examination level. It remains one of the languages of the local community radio station, supports a flourishing local audio and video cassette market and two Muslim book shops, is taught in many of the local mosque schools, and remains the *sine qua non* for admission to the two local *Deobandi* seminaries. Consensus on the importance of Urdu also transcends sectarian divisions.

The significance of Urdu points to the continuing vitality of links with South Asia. These are evident, *inter alia*, in the constant to-ing and fro-ing of politicians and religious leaders. Such links are institutionalised with political parties, especially those from
Pakistan and Azad Kashmir, having offices in Bradford. All the main Islamic traditions active in the city - Barelwi, Deobandi and Jamaati-Islami - retain strong links with their parent organisations in South Asia. Most mosques, outside the Deobandi tradition, continue to rely on 'ulama from South Asia to staff their mosques. Many students at the two Deobandi seminaries in Dewsbury and Bury also spend time in India and Pakistan, either at a seminary or engaged in Tablighi Jamaat tours.

One unexpected finding of the research was that the influence exercised by Gujarati Muslims in Bradford was disproportionate to the small communities actually settled in the city. Gujarati Muslims largely staff and run both Deobandi seminaries, one of which is also hugely influential as the European headquarters of Tablighi Jamaat. They also manage the new private Muslim Girls' School, transferred from Kidderminster to Bradford in the autumn of 1992. Gujaratis feature prominently as 'ulama in all sectarian traditions in the city. The regional organisation for Gujarati 'ulama in the Deobandi tradition; Hizb ul 'ulama, based in Blackburn, had a major role in alerting the Bradford Council for Mosques about the 'contents' of The Satanic Verses. Clearly the impact of the Gujarati 'ulama in creating Islamic institutions - largely Deobandi - in the North of England able to transmit the religious heritage to a new generation of British Muslims is considerable. Future research might investigate why they rather than Pakistani 'ulama - many of whom are also in the Deobandi tradition - developed such institutions. A necessary precondition for such influence is once again Urdu as a common language for Islamic discourse in South Asia.

Leadership in the Muslim communities, whether as councillors, businessmen or the Council for Mosques generally turns on mastery of Urdu and English. Only thus can they both win the confidence of elders in the Muslim communities - many of whom have little English - and be active in the majority community. What is evident is that many young Muslim councillors are equally at home in Labour politics and political and cultural associations rooted in South Asia. Where the new generation of Muslim politicians has been educated in Britain this common education and shared competence in English also
strengthens links transcending South Asian regional and linguistic solidarities.

It is also possible to argue that where religious leaders are bi-lingual and bi-cultural a creative encounter with British society is possible. To respond to the many bewildering challenges posed for the Islamic tradition as a minority in the West presupposes a rootedness in Islam — which for most 'ulama in Bradford means a Muslim tradition mediated through South Asian history, culture and languages — and an acquaintance with politics, law and culture in Britain today. Some of the activities in 'Allama Nishtar's Barelwi mosque indicate a pattern of patient engagement with wider society. He has built up an excellent library of Islamic books for use by students, many in English. He also teaches girls Arabic G.C.S.E. through the medium of English. A second example is the principal of the Bury seminary — which increasingly provides 'ulama for the city's Deobandi mosques — encouraging some of his students to go on to study Islamics, Arabic and law in British Universities. He is alert to the need for some of the English-speaking 'ulama to be exposed to western traditions of scholarship.

Both of these examples furnish instances of continuity and change within traditional Islam, as its custodians and interpreters seek to respond to the challenges of teaching British Muslims. However, the dilemma facing traditional Islam in both its Barelwi and Deobandi forms is that the majority of 'ulama are not bi-lingual, at least in the crucial sense of having a mastery of English, and with it an informed understanding of British culture. Therefore, they find it difficult to understand, still less engage with, the world and concerns of young British Muslims. Even in South Asia there is a widening gap in mutual comprehension between the products of the tertiary education and the Islamic seminaries. This gap is exacerbated in Britain where increasing numbers of British Muslims are only fluent in English. In Bradford, Islamist and modernist are generally not competent in Urdu and thus hold aloof from any involvement with the Council for Mosques, whose meetings are generally not conducted in English.
The implications of this disjunction in experience and cultural formation between many British Muslims and the 'ulama are wide-ranging and worrying. Many Muslims sympathetic to Islamist or modernist views simply by-pass the 'ulama. Their Islam is culled from pamphlets or such books as have been written or translated into English. It is, at best, a haphazard introduction to the riches of the Islamic tradition, lacking the disciplines and methodology of traditional scholarship. At worst, such works as are accessible are either polemical diatribes against the West or simplistic appeals to return to the sources of the Qur'an and sunnah and discount fifteen hundred years of history and disciplined reflection. It is not surprising that some scholars active in the Islamist tradition are themselves signalling the dangers of such a cavalier attitude to history, which can topple over into extremism (Qaradawi, 1981).

It would be alarmist, however, to suggest that Bradford offers a home for radical Islamism. More pressing a worry for many Muslim elders is that because Islam is inaccessible to many youngsters, beyond the minimalist diet to which most are exposed in mosque schools, Islam becomes simply one component in their cultural identity, a condition of community belonging, inescapable but of decreasing relevance to their daily lives. They may continue to keep the two main religious festivals, eschew pork and alcohol, enjoy the occasional gwawali, continue to marry within their biradari and identify with co-religionists across the world, whether in Kashmir, Palestine or Bosnia, but for the rest they will exhibit little real engagement with the tradition and keep their distance from its bearers.

The fact that increasing numbers of British Muslims are mono-lingual should not be dismissed as merely a liability. Mastery of English enables British Muslims from a variety of ethnic, regional and linguistic backgrounds to communicate and begin to work together. The Islamic Society of Britain, a new Jamaat-i-Islami venture, conducts its meetings in English and self-consciously seeks to present Islam as increasingly rooted in this country, rather than a South Asian import. It offers the possibility of a creative exchange between British Muslims, whether by origin from South Asia or English-speaking Muslims from different parts of the world, including British
converts. It will be interesting to see if this promise is realised in the next few years.

Initiatives such as The Muslim News and Q News, both professionally produced Muslim community papers with a national circulation, are themselves contributing to the emergence of a British Muslim identity. Q News, especially, appeals to young, educated Muslims, impatient of sectarianism, and is able through an international language, English, to access innovative and relevant Islamic scholarship. It also means that there is a growing market for Muslims in Britain writing in English. One encouragement in the last few years is the appearance in English of a number of books, scholarly and popular, which seek to address the challenges facing Muslims in Britain (Akhtar, 1990, Raza, 1991, Ahmed, 1992).

There are other institutional developments which augur well for the emergence of a British Muslim identity. In 1991 a pioneer B.Ed. course began at Westhill college in Birmingham, incorporating Islam as its main subject, taught by Muslim scholars. The Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, also in Birmingham, involving Christian and Muslim scholars, offers an increasing number of Muslim students accredited degree courses in Islam, as well as research programmes. Engagement with the mainstream intellectual tradition is also evident in the fact that in the 1980's 'up to half the annual intake of undergraduates choosing to study Arabic at British Universities... are British Muslims' (Nielsen, 1992, p.113). It is also to be hoped that from such a pool of Arabists - a majority according to Dr Nielsen from South Asian backgrounds (personal communication) - some will go on to specialise in Islamic studies and thus provide a reservoir of British Islamic scholars, able to operate across Islamic and Western traditions, and thus facilitate a creative dialogue.

Future researchers wanting to understand the dynamics of change and continuity within Britain's Muslim communities in the 1990's will have to attend more to the interaction of local communities with such institutional developments elsewhere and the plethora of national organisations, which have emerged in the last few years. Leaders of
the Bradford Council for Mosques have been active in many of these national initiatives, not least because the Council has been able to manage and transcend sectarian loyalties, a precondition for the emergence of successful national associations. Muslims in Bradford have learned to participate in, and influence, what sociologists call the local state. However, there is a growing recognition that on a range of issues Muslims need to be in parliament and part of national bodies if they are to successfully lobby for changes, whether in the legal or educational system.

Another issue for future research will be to document the extent to which Islamic discourse can accommodate the aspirations of educated Muslim women, increasingly working in the public, private and voluntary sectors in the city. A recent collection of articles exploring the interface between women and religion included three contributions from Muslim women, two of which examined the lives of Muslim women in Bradford and the North of England. Both writers felt that there was an imperative need to challenge 'the hegemony of the (male) community leadership...and to reinvigorate the secular and progressive traditions' within these communities (Ali, 1992, p.123). There was no mention of searching out allies amongst the proponents of 'progressive' Islam. This latter has been the strategy adopted by the women's movement in Pakistan where, by working within this religious and cultural tradition, the movement has sought to guard against its dismissal as being culturally inauthentic and 'Westernized' (Mumtaz and Shaheed, 1987, pp. 158-159).

What is evident in Bradford is that the lively debate and diversity which characterises Muslim communities in South Asia continues in Britain. Muslims in the city continue to have multiple identities - regional, 'caste', sectarian - continue to speak a variety of languages, and many continue to enjoy dual nationality. These communities have weathered the crises of The Satanic Verses and the Gulf war, when they were the object of public vilification and suspicion, without a withdrawal into sullen resentment. For this considerable credit needs to be given to the leadership of the Bradford Council for Mosques. The challenge facing Muslims in the 1990's is the extent to which there are the intellectual and
imaginative resources within the Islamic tradition to engage with the religious, intellectual and cultural traditions of the west. Islamic traditions developed in South Asia contain a variety of perspectives honed in conflict with British hegemony ranging from accommodation to isolation and defiance. The need now is for a critical and constructive exchange both within these traditions and with the majority society.

'Allama Nishtar's new purpose-built mosque is almost complete. With its striking golden dome it will beautify the Bradford skyline. It represents a huge investment of time, money and devotion and signals clearly that Bradford is where Muslims see their future. It is a building of which they and the city can be proud. This mosque stands as a visible expression of developments within the Muslim communities. In a period of little over thirty years Muslims from being hidden away on the margins of Bradford life have assumed an increasingly public profile. They have succeeded in reproducing Islamic institutions to secure a future for the Muslim presence in the city. As to who will represent Islam to wider society is unclear. Much will depend on how central government, the media and other national institutions respond to them and whether Muslims can feel secure and accepted.
INTRODUCTION

1. The Community Religions Project (CRP) was established as a research group in 1976 within the department of Theology and Religious Studies at the University of Leeds. CRP studies contemporary religions of minority communities in Britain, has established a resource data base and publishes a series of monographs and research papers.

2. These suspicions by Muslim scholars are not without foundation and raise difficult and disquieting questions of principle. Three were helpfully and provocatively formulated by Professor Waardenburg, a specialist in religious studies in the Faculty of Protestant Theology of the University of Lausanne, during a conference in Marburg in 1988. The conference was intended 'to contribute to the long-term planning of the International Association of the History of Religions (IAHR) by exploring the institutional and ideological constraints on the study of religion to be met with in various parts of the world' (Pye, 1989, preface). In this context Professor Waardenburg identified three issues of principle raised by the interface between religious studies and Muslim communities. Their importance merits reproducing them in full:

   Which definitions of religion are used by Muslim scholars of religious studies, applicable to Islam and other religions? Are such definitions acceptable to Western scholarship? Is not part of the tension between Western views of religious studies and Muslim views...an implicit debate about what kind of behaviour is associated with religion, and whether a value-free definition of religion is feasible and recommendable?

   What are the minimum conditions for embarking on religious studies in a given cultural context such as the Muslim one? Does the interest in other cultures and their religions not presuppose a minimum of intellectual and spiritual freedom, and freedom from attacks launched either from outside or from inside the scholar's society? To what extent is the liberal bourgeois societal structure, as the context within which religious studies developed in Europe, a necessary context of religious studies?

   To what extent can hidden ideological and other biases in western religious studies be revealed not only in historical retrospect or through critical analysis, but also in considering Muslim and other religious and ideological objections to them, so that their proper nature becomes clear? (ibid., p. 152).

Ninian Smart in a recent essay clearly considers the liberal framework for religious studies as essential:

   ...It is most important...not to abandon the liberal framework in which various points of view are encouraged and in which scholars are free to carry on with scientific and impartial delineation of the subject-matter. There is a danger that the ethos of the modern university will be identified as merely
western...and in a post-colonial backlash Religious Studies will be reduced to various theologies (Islamic, Hindu and so forth) (Smart, 1990, p.299).

There is clearly a need for this debate to continue to help clarify the extent to which Religious Studies, as a field of studies and discipline, is necessarily dependent on a particular social and intellectual context.

1. ISLAM IN SOUTH ASIA

1. The battle of Plassey in 1757 gave the British effective control of Bengal; by 1803 Delhi was occupied and much of the United Provinces - the traditional centre of Muslim rule and culture in India - was within their control; the two Anglo-Sikh wars of 1846 and 1849 led to the British annexing the Punjab.

2. Lapidus rightly points out that, Islam has no master science as Christianity has in theology, and no unified definition of itself. Within the Sunni complex there are numerous collections of hadith, several equally valid versions of the law, several acceptable theological positions, and different schools of mysticism (Lapidus, 1988, pp.221-222).

Such an understanding of Islam is to be preferred to an 'essentialist' definition which seeks to explain Muslim societies with reference to 'the concept of a single, unchanging nature of Islam and what it is to be a Muslim' (Hourani, 1991, p.57). It is wise to avoid the use of the term 'orthodox' to describe Islam, since this term belongs to the Christian tradition with its councils and synods vested with authority to distinguish between true and false doctrine. Islam knows no such authority nor gives to doctrine the privileged position it possesses in Christianity (Makdisi, 1981, pp.251-262).

3. This latter tradition (hadith) belongs to a category known as divine tradition (hadith qudsi), ascribed to God on the authority of Muhammad. In an important study William Graham has challenged a scholarly consensus that such traditions were late fabrications made by mystics to validate their ecstatic experience. Graham contends that such traditions are well attested in early and genuine collections of hadith and thus belong to a primitive element in the Islamic tradition. 'Not only is the divine saying not a late blossom of...sufism... (but rather) a strong argument for the deep roots of Sufi piety in early Muslim spirituality and the prophetic-revelatory event itself' (Graham, 1977, p. 110).

4. Although the term 'sect' was a category developed by the sociologists Max Weber and Ernst Troeltsch to define a religious association over and against the 'church' and thus like 'orthodox' belongs to a Western cultural tradition its use is not so limited. An Urdu equivalent to sect and sectarian exist in common usage e.g. firqa and firqaparast. In Urdu the word maslak, 'path', is used for discrete schools of thought and practice, such as Barewi and Wahhabi. Within contemporary Islamic discourse it is not uncommon for one maslak to refer to
another in disparaging terms e.g. Barelwis often use Wahhabi in this sense, where the term carries the pejorative overtones of 'sect' in English. Still Bryan Wilson's warning, in the context of a discussion of the term 'sect', needs to be heeded:

...it has been characteristic of sociological theory - perhaps influenced in this respect by the model afforded by theoretical physics - that its concepts should be valid for a spaceless and timeless social universe, without regard to cultural specificity or historical contingency, as if geography and history had no relevance for theoretical models and constructs... (thus despite) the appearance of a conceptual apparatus of considerable generality and abstractness, there were concealed within it elements that depend on the specific assumptions of the Christian tradition...

5. Islamism is to be preferred to 'fundamentalism', a term derived from the American Protestant tradition. Etymologically there is neither Arabic nor Urdu term for 'fundamentalism', although there are terms for reform, revival, renewal and modernity. Nikki R Keddie reminds us that:

the term 'Islamism', which apparently originated in both Arabic and French in North Africa, and has begun to be used in English... has the great practical value of being the term most acceptable to Muslims (1988, p. 13).

6. 1. The profession of faith - a reminder of God's Oneness and His Lordship; 2. the five daily prayers; 3. knowledge and remembrance - knowledge of God's commands and remembrance, zikr, a technical term for sufi devotional practices; 4. respect for every Muslim - an attempt to transcend the sectarianism of Islam in South Asia; 5. sincerity of intention - to prefer the Hereafter and divine approval to the luxuries of the present, transitory world; 6. to spare time - for training and revivalist activities. The six points and the interpretation is taken from Ansari, 1978.

7. Maulana Maududi was a consultant in 1960 when the syllabus for the new Madina University was drawn up - intended to rival the venerable al-Azhar in Egypt, probably the most famous centre for Islamic studies in the Sunni community world-wide; in 1962 he was elected a founder member of the Muslim World League based at Mecca, an organisation intended to mobilise opinion against Nasser's Arab socialism. Both Maududi and one of his influential Pakistani successors, Professor Khurshid Ahmad, have been recipients of the King Faisal International Prizes for services to Islam. Maududi won the first such prize in 1979 and Ahmad in 1990.

2. THE FORMATION OF BRADFORD'S MUSLIM COMMUNITIES

1. For Muslim minorities in the West today, exercised by the question of how to express their self-identity in a non-Muslim polity, two earlier episodes are urged by some Muslim scholars as providing useful models for living in a non-Muslim environment, free to express their religious identity, without
the necessity of a further hijra or recourse to jihad. The first is the migration to Abyssinia, a Christian country, between 615-622 AD and the second, the pact of Hudaybiyyah, 628-30 AD, a written pact between Muslims and non-Muslims (Masud, 1989).

2. Exemption from both categories, flight or fight, was allowed to anyone who was weak, mustad’af - women, children and the infirm (ibid., p.119). These categories are still part of Islamic discourse in Britain. At the height of the Rushdie Affair Dr Shabbir Akhtar, a Muslim scholar and apologist from Bradford, could write an article in The Guardian, entitled Whose light? Whose darkness?, in which he insisted that, those Muslims who find it intolerable to live in a United Kingdom contaminated with the Rushdie virus need to seriously consider the Islamic alternatives of emigration (hijra) to the House of Islam or a declaration of holy war (jihad) on the House of Rejection (27-2-1989).

3. 'The People of the Book' as bearers of a 'revealed book' - Jews and Christians - are categorised in Islamic law as distinct from the heathen and enjoy certain rights within a Muslim polity as a 'protected minority' (SEI, 1981, pp.16-17).

4. In Islamic jurisprudence there are four, major, extant schools of law within the majority Sunni tradition - Hanafi, Hanball, Maliki and Shafi’i - all named after famous scholars in early Islam. In South Asia the Hanafi school predominates. For their geographical distribution see Schacht, 1964, pp.65-67.

5. Ironic and prescient since Maulana Maududi was himself sentenced to death in 1953 by a Martial Law court in Pakistan for writing an article against the Ahmadiyya sect, who in that year became the object of sustained and violent attack. The death sentence was commuted to imprisonment (Ahmad, 1976, p.70).

6. Dar al-Islam and the related dar categories are now being defined more frequently with reference to the question: from where does one not need to migrate? Answers to this question have produced categories such as dar al-’ahd (the land of pact), dar al-sulh (the land of truce), and dar al-aman, (the land of peace), in which a Muslim's freedom to practise his religion is protected by covenant (Masud, 1990, p.44). These categories are used in Bradford along with dar ahl al-Kitab (the land of The People of the Book).

7. Both the Shah Bano case in 1985 and the continuing Babri mosque saga in Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh, feeds Muslim insecurity and contributes to the sharply rising curve of religious communalism in India, so marked a feature of India in the 1980s (Talbot, 1991).

Shah Bano Begum is a divorced Muslim woman whose right to maintenance from her husband was upheld by the Indian Supreme Court. This ran contrary to Islamic law, which limits the obligations of the husband to a waiting period of three to four months between separation and final divorce - 'iddat - during which time it can be established whether she is carrying a child by her former husband, for whom he is responsible. A perceived
attack on Muslim Personal law has always been considered in
South Asia as tantamount to an assault on the very foundations
of Muslim identity. 'The Muslim Family Laws Ordinance' enacted
in Pakistan in 1961, reforming the law in a modernist direction,
similarly met with sustained opposition from the 'ulama (Rahman,
1968).

Babri mosque is a mosque built on a site of a Temple, destroyed
by the Mughal Emperor, Babur (d.1530). It is one of a series of
sacred Hindu sites targeted for liberation from Muslim
'occupation' by the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, an umbrella
organisation for various Hindu groups. The first attempt was
made in October 1984 (Van der Veer, 1987).

8. This is also the burden of the writings of Syed Abul Hasan Ali
Nadwi (b.1914), a distinguished Indian scholar, secretary of the
prestigious Nadwat al Ulama academy, Lucknow and, like Maulana
Maududi, a recipient of the prestigious Saudi Arabian Faisal
Award for services to Islam in 1980. See particularly his book
of talks given to Muslims in the West, especially chapter 10,
'Main Duty of Muslim Immigrants' (Nadwi, 1983, pp.125-133). This
book is published in Britain by The Islamic Foundation,
Leicester, the publishing and research wing of Jamaat-i-Islami.

9. A supplementary school is a centre where the different religious
communities in the city teach their children something of their
language, culture and religion. When taken to refer to Muslim
schools the terms madrasa or qur'an school are often used. They
differ from a mosque in that they are exclusively places for
teaching children rather than worship.

10. Ahl-i-Hadith, the followers of the (prophetic) tradition, are a
late nineteenth century Indian reformist sect. They accepted the
classical collections of traditions in their totality as genuine
and gave them priority over the four schools of Islamic law,
whenever the latter seemed at variance with the traditions
(Ahmad, 1967,pp.113-122).

11. To argue that one regional group controls a mosque means just
that rather than implying that no-one outside that community can
belong to the mosque committee.

12. The proliferation of mosques and supplementary schools mirrors
the rising curve of Muslim children in the city. The following
are Council figures for children of school age, 5-15 years, of
Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin: in 1971, 3,256 or 4% of all
school children; in 1981, 6,464 or 8%; and in 1991 - an estimate
- 17,754 or 22% (CBNC, 1984). There are no separate figures for
Indian Muslims. These figures include Keighley, some ten miles
from the city, which has a small Muslim population of some
4,000+. However, the number of mosques and supplementary schools
enumerated are those in the city of Bradford - the focus of
research - excluding the few in Keighley (for Keighley see
Vertovec, in press).

13. The Gujaratis from East Africa - Khalifa - belong to an artisan
caste of barbers (etc.), while the majority of those from India
belong to a landowning caste, the vohra jat. The East African
Rhalifa are usually professional, urban and bi-lingual—
including English—while the majority of those migrating from
India are rural with little English. It is not surprising that
it is the Rhalifa community which provided the first Muslim
woman councillor in 1992. For the meaning of caste in a South
Asian Muslim context see footnote 22.

14. The U.K. Islamic Mission is a vehicle for the Jamaat-i-Islami
tradition in Britain. The Bangladeshi community has one mosque
in this tradition but is organised under a separate association
in Britain, Dawat-ul-Islam, Invitation to Islam.

15. The term 'Asian' is used when statistics do not distinguish
between Muslim, Sikh and Hindu and functions as a short-hand for
all these communities. There are probably 10,000 Sikhs in the
city, although increasing numbers of these are moving into
suburban areas, some of which fall outside Bradford and in wards
belonging to Leeds. There are possibly 8,000 + Hindus.

16. These figures are estimates based on such local authority
figures as are available, discussions with community leaders who
run associations for different regional and linguistic groups
and the guesstimates of earlier researchers.

17. The station changed hands in 1991 and became part of Southall
'Sunrise Radio'. This has generated some criticism by local
Muslims to the local press claiming that this has led to a bias
towards non-Muslim, Indian perspectives and language (Hindi) to
the detriment of Urdu (Telegraph & Argus, 10-5-1991). It has
fuelled support for a local pirate radio station, run by
Muslims, Paradise City Radio (Telegraph & Argus, 8-11-91).

18. This is not to play down the incidence of racial exclusion but
simply to point out that for such professionals bi-lingualism
can be a marketable asset.

19. None of these centres is exclusively for the use of Muslim
communities but all are located in largely Muslim areas and
their ethos and management reflect this fact.

20. Indicative of the consolidation of allegiances around religious
identity is the emergence in the 1980s of three umbrella
organisations for the three religious communities: in 1981 the
Bradford Council for Mosques, in 1984 the Federation of Sikh
Organisations and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad. For the limited
social interaction and tensions between these three communities
see Singh 1992.

21. I have excluded reference here to the three schools which serve
Kelghley, ten miles from the city.

22. Biradari, literally means 'brotherhood', and has been usefully
defined in a recent anthropological study of Pakistani Muslims
in Manchester, as a 'localised intermarrying caste group'
(Werbner, 1990, p. 48). Chapter 3 of this same study includes a
thorough discussion of what counts as zat/'caste' in a South
Asian Muslim context— an ongoing centre of debate among social
scientists. In South Asia zat are broadly ranked according to
one of three categories: *ashraf* (noble), *zamindar* (landowner) and *karmi* (artisan/servant). Ashraf trace their ancestry back to foreigners, whether Sayyids, who claim to have the Prophet's blood in their veins, Pathans from Afghanistan, Moghuls from Central Asia and Quraishis from the Arabian peninsula.

Werbner considers Punjabi Muslim *zats* resemble Hindu castes in being:

1. hereditary; 2. ideally endogamous; 3. recruited from occupational categories and ethnic groups; 4. comprehensive and ranked hierarchically... (and) differ from Hindu castes in that (1) the Muslim *zat* system is not based, except at its extremes, on notions of ritual purity and pollution... (thus) commensality between members of all *zats* is permitted... (2) ritual services are not necessarily provided by a 'pure' caste but by lay specialists... (3) all Muslims are equal in matters of law, worship and religious conduct...*(ibid., p. 85)*.

3. THE REPRODUCTION OF ISLAMIC INSTITUTIONS IN BRADFORD

1. The extent of padding is clearly substantial with Pakistan claiming a 26 per cent literacy rate. However, an 'Action Plan for Educational Development, 1983-1988', itself acknowledged: a dropout rate of 50 percent between the ages of 5 and 9; the existence of ghost schools, which do not exist, but inflate government figures and large discrepancies in school attendance between one province and another, and within provinces between urban and rural, male and female *(Butler, 1988, pp. 91-94)*.

2. While *sama* is 'the most widely known expression of mystical life in Islam' *(Schimmel, 1975, p. 179)*, it is controversial. Islamic theological opinion has prohibited it as dangerous and unlawful. An introduction to Islam, entitled 'Lessons in Islam', written by a distinguished Indian scholar, Maulana Mufti Muhammad Kifayatullah (d. 1952), widely used in Bradford's Deobandi mosques in both its original Urdu and English translation, lists as a sign of the Day of Judgement, inter alia, 'the abundance of singing, dancing and revelries' *(n.d., Book 2, p. 13)*. Naqshbandi and Suhrawardi orders prohibit its use or permit it without the use of musical instruments. Islamic tradition recognizes and cultivates the chanting of religious texts, especially the Qur'an. Cantillation of zikr, remembrance of God, has Qur'anic warrant *(Sura 33: 40 and 13: 28)*.

In religious cantillation...musical features are subordinated to the religious text and function and thereby legitimized. Singing on the other hand, is characterized by the presence of independent musical features which exist for their own sake, most of all the sound of musical instruments... *sama* has normally included the use of instruments, particularly of percussion, to reinforce the element of zikr repetition which is considered to be inherent in it *(Qureshi, 1986, p. 82)*.

3. To put these differences in perspective two observations drawn from Ong are helpful. Firstly, 'standard English has accessible for use a recorded vocabulary of at least a million and a half words... a simply oral dialect will commonly have resources of
only a few thousand words'; secondly, 'the restricted linguistic code can be at least as expressive and precise as the elaborated code in contexts which are familiar and shared by speaker and hearer. For dealings with the unfamiliar, expressively and precisely, however, the restricted linguistic code will not do; an elaborated linguistic code is absolutely needed' (Ong, 1988, pp. 8 and 106, emphasis mine). Such comments provide a context for a widespread anxiety voiced by religious and community leaders that there is little communication between parents and children in many homes.

4. There is considerable interaction between these orders in South Asia, not least in valuing treasured works such as Abu Hafs 'Umar Suhrawardi (d.1234), 'Awarif al Ma'arif, the benefits of knowledge, which sought to regulate sufi corporate life. Pir Maroof listed this as one of the key works for understanding sufism. The main differences turned on attitudes to the state - many of the Chishti sufis kept their distance, while at the other extreme Naqshbandi sufis were reformists, who sought to influence those in power (Lewis, 1985, pp. 44-47, 74-77).

5. Ta'wiz belong to a religious landscape troubled by the evil eye and spirits, often malevolent - the Qur'anic jinn - which cause human misery. The Qur'an refers to itself as 'a healing and a mercy' (17:82 and 10:57); two chapters of the Qur'an, suras 113 and 114 are known as the mu'awwizatan, the two who preserve. There is a prophetic tradition that recounts that the Prophet used 'to seek refuge in God from jinn and the evil eye until the the mu'awwizatan came down, after which he made use of them and abandoned everything else' (Robson, 1975, vol. 2, pp. 951-952). Thus amulets with Qur'anic verses have long been part of the high Islamic tradition of healing. Maulana Thanawi in his celebrated reformist Bihishti Zewar, Heavenly Ornaments, devotes a section to appropriate amulets for a range of complaints ranging from the desire of a woman for a son, stomach ache, depression and the removal of poverty. For depression the Qur'anic verse sura 37:47 - 'Wherein there is no headache nor are they made mad thereby' (Pickthall, n.d. p. 440) - is to be written in Arabic on a piece of paper, placed within an amulet and worn around the heart (Saroha, 1981, pp. 480-483).

6. The founders of the Deobandi dar al 'ulum were also skilled interpreters of dreams. It has to be remembered that, medicine was widely understood to be not an objective science but an ancillary dimension of religion...the efficacy of cures was understood to depend on the will of God, not on principles tested by experimentation and observed results. Hence the piety of the practitioner, who was close to God, was considered of great importance (Metcalf, 1982, pp. 191-192). Here was a holistic view of healing with the sheikh/pir combining the confessional with the psychiatrist's chair.

7. Mustafa, the Arabic for the Chosen, refers to the Prophet. Such devotion has seemed excessive to modernists like Fazlur Rahman, who considers such to amount to the 'mythification of the person of the Prophet Muhammad' (Rahman, 1982, p. 41).
8. For a brief characterisation of this order, founded in Egypt, see Schimmel (1975, pp. 249-251).

9. Suffat ul Islam takes its name from a group of companions of the Prophet, models of piety, poverty and renunciation of the world, whose home was the suffa or veranda of the mosque at Medina. Hujwiri's celebrated eleventh century handbook on sufism, Kashf al Mahjub, unveiling the veiled, has a short chapter devoted to this group (Nicholson, 1976, pp. 81-82). Since 1985 they, too, have begun a public procession through the streets of the city on the occasion of the Prophet's birthday. Its route is different from that of Pir Maroof. Sultan Bahu is a famous seventeenth century Indian sufis poet born in the Jhang district of the Punjab, in present day Pakistan (Krishna, 1977, pp. 27-39).

10. Twaquilia is the focus of a recent monograph (see S.W. Barton 1986).

11. From the autumn of 1991 such local authority discretionary grants were to be awarded for a maximum of four years.

12. According to the 1981 census of India, Gujarat has only 8.53 per cent Muslims (Williams, 1988, p. 88).

13. This was one of the anxieties expressed to me by Mr Minhas, who had advised both institutions on setting up such schools. He also worried that since there was a reluctance to pursue 'A' level studies and the Islamic qualifications of both dar al 'ulum were not accredited by any British University the career prospects of 'graduates' from both centres, who did not want to work in a mosque, would be blighted.

14. The distinguished eighteenth century Indian scholar Shah Wall Ullah of Delhi (d. 1782) dissented from such literalism and cited another scholar's opinion to the effect that:

   This phenomenon was occasioned by a cohesion of small particles of water into, so to speak, one plane. Behind it there was a mountain or a dense cloud. Together these produced the effect of a mirror. When the moon was reflected in it, people observed two moons in the sky. Since a part of the reflected and part of the real moon was concealed, two halves were seen in the sky (Baljon, 1986, p. 105).

   Since another work by this scholar on principles of interpretation of the Qur'an - al Fawz al kabir ft usul al tafsir - is part of their 'alim course it is, perhaps, a little surprising that such speculations are not included.

15. Five Bradford mosques are listed in a 1988 J.U.B. list and one was missing - Twaquilia, which hosted a regional J.U.B. gathering in 1988. These comprise all the large Deobandi centres in the city, including Gujarati, Bangladeshi and Pakistani mosques.

16. My copy was bought in September 1987 from Bury, at the opening of the new mosque and teaching block. The opening ceremony was to have been conducted by Dr Abdullah Omar Naseef, the Secretary-General of the Muslim World League, and prayers conducted by the Imam of the great mosque in Mecca, but internal
political tension within Saudi Arabia meant both were unable to attend.

17. The J.U.B. poster 'The heretical Beliefs of the Shias', adds to these two points their alleged adulteration of the Qur'an and the concept of temporary marriage, mut'a.


19. The Barelwi 'ulama have no more love for the Ahmadiyyas than the Deobandis. However, they are less critical of the Shi'ite tradition since they share with them a devotion to 'Ali, through whom many orders trace their spiritual ancestry. Many Muslim scholars have identified striking parallels between devotion to sufis, organised into a spiritual hierarchy, and Shi'ite devotion to their imams. The famous North African scholar, Ibn Khalidun (d.1408), drew attention to these in his famous Muqaddimah (Rosenthal, 1987, vol.3 p.93).

20. The mi'raj, the ascent, tells of a mysterious journey in which the Prophet was spirited away to Jerusalem and thence, with the angel Gabriel, ascended to heaven. It is an elaboration of a statement in sura 17:1 of the Qur'an. It is hugely important in the devotional life of ordinary Muslims, as well as sufis (see Schimmel, 1985, pp.159-175).

21. Thirty years ago the historian of Islam, Wilfred Cantwell Smith, perceptively remarked that Maulana Maududi, was: the most systematic thinker of modern Islam; one might even wonder whether his chief contribution, in the realm of interpretation, has not been for good and ill his transforming of Islam into a system (Smith, 1977, p.234).

22. This decision must have been very difficult for UKIM, since like the Jamaat-i-Islami movement in general, it focuses on the transnational identity of Muslims, and is very critical of linguistic and regional differences institutionalised in different mosques.

23. One of the most distinguished Muslim scholars, Dr Fazlur Rahman, has from the first worried that the activist stance of Jamaat-i-Islami was not wedded to serious scholarship. He tells of an illuminating meeting with Maududi in Lahore, after he had passed his M.A. and was about to pursue his Ph.D. studies. Maududi remarked, 'the more you study, the more your practical faculties are numbed...It was no matter of surprise to me that, when (he) decided to retire...his successor was...an obviously well-meaning lawyer...without any pretensions whatever to Islamic scholarship (Rahman, 1982, p. 117)

4. FUNCTION, EDUCATION AND INFLUENCE OF THE 'ULAMA

1. Mulla, is a Persian transformation of the Arabic, mawla, which means, inter alia, master, patron, protector; maulvi, and
maulana mean respectively, 'my master' and 'our master';
t'allama means 'very learned'.

2. The Imams and Mosques Council of Great Britain was set up in 1984 by Dr Zaki Badawi, an Egyptian, who used to be imam of the prestigious mosque and 'Islamic Cultural Centre' in Regent's Park, London. Dr Badawi, a graduate of both al Azhar in Egypt and London University, is one of the few Muslim scholars active in Britain today who is equally at home in the world of traditional Islamic discourse and that of modern academic disciplines. In 1988 he also began the 'Muslim College', in London, intended, inter alia, to offer training, for ulama from Britain and overseas, to understand western society and culture. This venture was funded by the Libyan 'Islamic Call Society' which has allocated five million pounds to a trust fund to meet all expenses (Islamia, July 1992, p.14). In 1984, and also in London, The Council of Mosques U.K. & Eire was established, sponsored by the 'Muslim World League', Rabitat al 'Alam al Islami, based in Mecca. The chairman of the council for its first five years was Dr Hassan al Ahdal, who was also the Director of the Muslim World League's London office (An-Nida, September-October, 1989, pp. 3-4). Inevitably Barelwi personnel gravitated towards the the Imams and Mosques Council, while those within or sympathetic to a Wahhabi tradition, were drawn within orbit of The Council of Mosques.

3. Imam Hasan would distinguish three categories: parents advised by a doctor to allow a space between children for reasons of health; parents worried about the economic implications of having more children and those newly married without children, wanting to delay parenthood. He would advise the latter not to use contraception, but would point out that coitus interruptus is Islamically licit. To those within the second category he would stress that economic anxiety is not an Islamic reason for indulging in contraception, since God has promised to provide: '... do not kill your children for fear of poverty; it is We who shall provide sustenance for them as well as you. Verily, killing is a great sin' ( 17:31, Asad, 1980, p.422). This verse is also used to oppose abortion. With regard to the first category, Imam Hasan is sympathetic to recourse to contraception, as a temporary measure, for health reasons.

4. Other traditions followed suit, a situation which could topple over into a 'fatwa war', as when the Barelwi Ahmad Riza Khan enlisted ulama from the Hijaz in the Arabian peninsula to endorse his anathemas against the Deobandi scholars as kafir (Metcalf, 1982, pp. 309-310).

5. This section excludes mention of the pir-s, because they are employer of ulama rather than the employed, and, in the person of Pir Maroof, their concerns and functions have already been reviewed (3.2). However, it is worth recording that many pir-s, indeed Pir Maroof himself, also undergo the training of an 'alim.

6. The fact that the village imam is paid in kind is probably at the root of the criticism in South Asian literature that such are 'greedy and gluttonous' (Syed, 1984, pp.222-223). This

7. Ahmed has cleverly coined the term 'occidentalism' to stand for that mood of angry rejection by many Muslims of 'orientalism' - western study and cultural perspectives on the Muslim world - dismissed as merely a handmaid of western colonial domination of the Muslim world.

For many Muslim scholars working in Africa and Asia, imperfectly grasped bits of Marxist dogma, nationalism and religious chauvinism create incorrect images of the West... (as) peopled by creatures whose sole purpose is to dominate, subvert and subjugate them...there are many in whose work paranoia and hysteria pass for thought and analysis (Ahmed, 1992, p.177)

The term 'orientalism' was popularised in Edward Said's famous book of that name first published in 1978. Albert Hourani's recent study, *Islam in European thought*, includes a helpful characterisation of the three senses in which Said uses the term and a nuanced rejoinder to it (Hourani, 1991, pp. 83-84).

8. It is worth recalling that the distinction between church and state is foreign to Islam, and with it the vocabulary this distinction generated. Thus, in classical Arabic, as well as other languages which derive their intellectual and political vocabulary from classical Arabic, there were no pairs of words corresponding to spiritual and temporal, lay and ecclesiastical, religious and secular. It was not until the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and then under the influence of Western ideas and institutions, that new words were found, first in Turkish and then in Arabic, to express the idea of the secular... (even today) there is no equivalent to the term "laity", a meaningless expression in the context of Islam (Lewis, 1991, p.3).

9. Professor Vatikiotis reminds us that the Islamist:
...in arguing the case and calling for the construction of an Islamic society and political order, guided by the word of God and governed by His revealed law...oppose secular political orders...as belonging to the 'age of ignorance' (jahiliyya) and as having an infidel provenance from the West and East alike (Vatikiotis, 1987, p.85).

10. An abbreviated edition of an eighteenth century translation into English by Charles Hamilton was published in 1870 by Standish Grove Grady, since 'this work has been made a text-book by the Council of Legal Education, for the examination of students of the Inns of Court, who are qualifying themselves for the call to the English Bar, with a view of practising in India'. Sections such as those rendered obsolete with the abolition of slavery were omitted. In the preface Grady also entertained the hope that the work would be 'found useful in promoting the study of the (Islamic) law in universities in India'. Such has proved the case with the work reprinted in Pakistan. My copy is dated 1987 and printed in Lahore, Pakistan.
11. *Ijma*, consensus, one of the sources of Islamic law, is an elusive concept, since there is neither agreement as to who should be consulted nor mechanisms for formulating it. It can usually only be detected retrospectively. Thus Bernard Lewis argues that it is tantamount to "the climate of opinion" among the learned and powerful...there may be differing *ijma*’s influenced by different traditions and circumstances in different parts of the Islamic world (Lewis, 1973, p.226).

12. The title is taken from a qur'anic verse, 6:150, and is translated by Pickthall as 'Allah's is the final argument' (Pickthall, n.d. p. 150). A scholar of Arabic characterises this work as, a kind of encyclopaedia of Islamic sciences... (which) treats not only the fundamentals of *dīn* but a variety of other subjects including metaphysics, politics and economics. Underlying all of it is an emphasis on the rational basis of the ordinances of God (Smith, 1975, p.164).

13. Mr Burhan ud Din questioned a hundred Muslim parents (all male): 73 Pakistanis, 15 Bangladeshis and 12 Gujaratis.

5. BEYOND SECTARIANISM: THE ROLE OF THE COUNCIL FOR MOSQUES

1. The other four members, along with Pir Maroof and Mr Sher Azam, were Mr Nazim Naqvi, President and founder of Anjuman-e-Haideria, the earliest of the city's two Shia centres, Mr Abdul Haq Pandor, President of the Gujarati controlled Deobandi mosque at St Margaret's Road, Mr Mohammad Ansari, President of the city's only Ahl-i-Hadith mosque and Mr Omar Warraich, President of the UK Islamic Mission mosque in Byron street.

2. Mr Azam was recently profiled in the business section of the local press. He heads the Al Halal Supermarket and Cash & Carry - an Islamic co-operative - which has 'forty staff, a turnover topping £2.5 million and is on the city's tourist trail of attractions', a signal achievement for someone who, as a nineteen year old, had arrived in Bradford thirty years earlier without a word of English (Telegraph & Argus, 1-10-92).


4. Councillor Hameed, when chairman of the Community Relations Council, was embroiled in a local controversy when he joined a Council for Mosques' demonstration against the Ahmadiyya sect on 29 September 1986, which brought calls for his resignation.

5. Kureishi identified the following values as shared by Mr C.M.Khan, the Council for Mosques and Mr Honeyford: the pre-eminent value of the family ... the importance of religion in establishing morality ... the innately inferior position of women...(a dislike of) liberalism in all its forms, and ... an advocate of severe and vengeful retribution against law-breakers (Kureishi, 1988, p. 180).
6. During the Rushdie affair Jamiyat Tabligh-ul-Islam in Bradford published a pamphlet, *The Satanic Verses Affair: an Invitation to Blasphemy and Insult* to explain the dismay and outrage the contents of the novel provoked. Verses from the *Salaam* were cited to illustrate the fact that to 'Muslims the Holy Prophet is more precious and closer than all the valuables they hold so dear' (Siddique, n.d., p. 7).

7. In 1938 a furore erupted in Britain and the Empire when Muslims had become aware of the contents of H.G. Wells's *A Short History of the World*, which contained an unflattering picture of the Prophet presented as a 'shifty character' and a man 'of very considerable vanity, greed, cunning, self-deception and quite insincere religious passion'. In certain particulars this episode anticipated the Rushdie affair: an aroused Muslim sentiment extending beyond those who actually read the offending passages; the suggestion that the outrage was politically manipulated; demands that censorship be imposed; and the dilemma of a government that for strategic reasons must defuse an explosive situation of international proportions but must also oppose the suppression of expression (Piscatori, 1990, pp. 767-768).

8. This legal amendment is part of the continued assault on the Ahmadiyya movement.

9. Apostasy carries the death penalty for men in Islamic law (S.E.I., 1953, p. 413). Mr Rushdie was also seen as guilty of sabb al nabi or shatm al rasul, insulting the Prophet, which involves a similar draconian punishment (Ahsan and Kidwai, 1991, pp. 52-53).

10. Ironically the visual media did not attend the book-burning and the only record of the incident was the video made by the Council for Mosques itself. Thus, whoever wanted to show it contributed to Council funds!

11. Such a display of vicious self-righteousness by some young men was hardly surprising when a scholar such as Dr A. Kidwai, a member of the Jamaat-i-Islami Islamic Foundation in Leicester, was prepared to endorse incitement to violence as a strategic tool against critics. In an article in *Trends*, the journal of Young Muslims UK, he could write:

   *Allah... has guaranteed the purity of the Holy Qur'an till the Day of Judgement and it is, therefore, our collective responsibility to safeguard its authenticity by incitement to murder people like Salman Rushdie and his heinous supporters. This should serve as a lesson so that others will not dare innovate conjectures against Islam in the future* (*Trends*, 1989, 2:5, p. 27).

   Such a sentiment seems incongruous in an academic with a doctorate in English, who had been a reader in the Department of English at Aligarh University, India, before joining the Foundation in Britain.

12. The phrase 'imagined community' was coined by Benedict Anderson to refer to nations. The members of the smallest of nations will 'never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even
hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion ... all communities larger than primordial villages...are imagined' (Anderson, 1983, p. 15). This seems an apt phrase to describe the umma, which like a nation is difficult to describe, constantly re-imagined, yet remains the focus of devotion and fierce loyalty.

13. The other delegates were Yusuf Islam (Union of Muslim Organisations), Idris Mears (Murabitun European Muslim Movement), Bashir Maan (Islamic Council of Scotland), Ahmad Versi (Editor of The Muslim News) and Bassam Fattal (Protocol officer and translator) (The Muslim News, October 26 1990, no. 20, p. 1).

14. The Caliphate/khilafat has exercised a strange fascination for South Asian Muslims. An ill-starred khilafat movement was launched in India in 1919 to prevent the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, in the name of loyalty to the Caliph, at a time when Arabs and Turks themselves were wearying of this institution - indeed, in 1924 the Turks abolished the caliphate (Ahmad, 1987, pp. 123-140). The fact that some seventy years after its abolition Muslims in Bradford can make quixotic references to its restoration points to its continuing imaginative appeal.

15. The ruling labour group held fifty of the ninety seats in 1992. In addition to the eleven Muslim councillors there was one Sikh councillor. Muslim councillors were elected to the posts of deputy leader, vice chairman of the Labour group and chairman of the housing and environmental services committee (Telegraph & Argus, 12-5-92).

16. Despite the anger aroused by The Satanic Verses affair there were few local incidents of violence and intimidation. The worst was an anonymous death threat to a local college lecturer should a lecture go ahead which he had organised - to be addressed by Dr Badawi, the Principal of the Muslim College, in London. The college authorities decided it prudent to cancel (Telegraph & Argus, 1-3-90).

17. An agreement of all Muslim sects on one date for the sighting of the moon, the beginning and ending of the month of fasting, has proved elusive. Often in Britain it is not visible to the eye - according to some Hadith a pre-condition for starting the fast. How then is the date to be agreed? For some recourse to Morocco, the nearest Muslim country is enough, for others Saudi Arabia or Pakistan is consulted, and there is a group who favour consulting the meteorological office in London. These issues are often interwoven with sectarian allegiance, with Barelwis suspicious of Saudi Arabian practice. Sometimes a precarious accord has been secured only to be undermined with the arrival of 'ulama from South Asia not party to the earlier agreement.
6. **LOOKING FORWARD: MUSLIM COMMUNITIES IN THE 1990s**

1. Race Relations legislation in Britain is now shot through with inconsistencies. The Race Relations Act of 1976 criminalised discrimination on the basis of race/ethnicity. Definitions of race/ethnicity have been tested in the courts: the House of Lords delivered a judgement in 1983 (Mandhla v. Lee), which allowed Sikhs to be defined as an ethnic group and thus protected by the act. The recent industrial tribunal decision that Muslims were not an ethnic group meant that 'employers can be prosecuted for not employing Sikh and yarmulka-wearing Jews but may lawfully refuse employment to Muslim women who insist on wearing the hijab' (Modood, in press).

2. The Islamic Party of Britain was launched in September 1989 at London's Regents Park Mosque. Its leader and General Secretary are converts, Daud Musa Pidcock and Mustaqim Bleher. This is seen as partly an explanation for their poor showing in elections, since they are unfamiliar with the biradari networks, the key to understanding how South Asian Muslims vote. In the 1992 general election they put up three candidates for Bradford constituencies. In all they lost their deposits. In Bradford West, with an estimated 16,000 Muslim votes, Pidcock canvassed 471 votes; in Bradford North with 7,000 Muslim votes their candidate won 304 votes.

3. Alison Shaw's research of the Pakistani community in Oxford showed that where couples eloped this was not necessarily a result of being exposed to western liberal values but rather could be located within 'a distinctly Pakistani romantic idiom ... (the stuff) of the Urdu and Hindi films avidly watched by east Oxford Pakistanis' (Shaw, 1988, p.170).

4. The Bangladesh Youth Organisation, the Karmand Centre and Grange Interlink Community Association were set up in 1982; the Pakistan Community Centre in 1984, Frizinghall Community Centre and Saathi Centre were established in 1986 and the West Bowling Youth Organisation in 1989. Most of these centres are not exclusively Muslim but the majority of their users are, given their location.

5. This comment should not be interpreted as a justification for such procedures. It is evident from reading the annual reports of Himnat - a project set up in November 1989 to help young 'Asian' women caught up in domestic problems - that a pressing concern remains support and advocacy for those women who go to South Asia, marry there, return home, often with a child, to find that their husband cannot get permission from the Home Office to join them or have to wait an interminable time for such permission to be granted.

6. As well as the community centres listed above there are a number of centres for women only, e.g. The Asian Women and Girls centre (1979), the Millan centre (1989) and a £160,000 training centre for 'Asian' women - Nur-e-Nisa (Urdu for Light of Women) - opened in October 1992.
7. Characteristic are comments from an interview with Imran Khan, in which he asserted that British Muslims must understand that, Islam is a progressive religion. It's meant for all times. They shouldn't confine it to any period, era or a golden age. It should be developed all the time with new ideas. Islam is freedom of expression, it's debate. It should grow, it should evolve: the guidelines are in the Qur'an (Q News, Vol. 1:18, 31 July 1992, p. 10).

8. The science of hadith defines traditions into sahih, sound, hasan, good, da'if, weak, or sagim, infirm. All those in Bukhari and Muslim are considered sound. The sound and the good are recognised as valid bases for legal decisions (Robson, 1975, introduction).

9. A recent pioneer study of just such hadith by a Moroccan sociologist and Islamic feminist indicates that the authenticity of such uncongenial hadith can be challenged by working with the very criteria established by famous hadith scholars themselves (Mernissi, 1991).

10. Such organisations in Britain are the Islamic Academy in Cambridge, the Islamic Foundation in Leicester, the Muslim College and Muslim Institute, both in London. Jorgen Nielsen's assessment of such institutions is more sanguine. He contends that it is difficult to establish a 'direct correlation between funding source and subsequent policy' (Nielsen, 1992, p.122).

11. Dr Akhtar's well-argued and deeply serious study earns him an astonishing rebuke from one Muslim reviewer, who dismisses it as a piece of self-indulgence, allowing full reins to an unsubmitting, un-Islamic, intellect... (whereby) he strings together a series of blasphemous but ever unorthodox, meditations (S. Parvez Manzoor, The Muslim News, no. 24, 15-2-91, p.5).

12. In so far as it is possible to speak of a mainstream Islamic position on religious freedom it approximates to that of the Roman Catholic Church before the Second Vatican Council. A position characterised by a historian thus: there cannot be liberty to teach error... where Catholics are in a majority the government of the State has the duty to encourage them and to discourage Protestants and unbelievers. Where Catholics were in a minority, the government of the State had the duty to give them the freedoms of religion which they needed (Chadwick, 1992, p.119).

13. The 'Islam and science' genre of apologetic first appeared in the nineteenth century, when Islamic thinkers such as Jamal al-Din Afghani (1839-97) sought to respond to the criticism of Ernest Renan (Hourani, 1991, pp.29-30). In India Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817-98) sought to show that the Qur'an and modern science were perfectly compatible (Troll, 1979, pp.144-170).
GLOSSARY

'ālim (pl. 'ulama), a learned man, particularly in one of the religious sciences.

'ālima, a learned woman (as above).

bā'at, vow of allegiance to a sufi by a devotee.

da'wa(h), 'invitation' to Islam.

hafiz (pl. huffaz), one who has memorised the Qur'an.

ashraf, the well-born, Muslims in India of foreign descent.

baraka(t), 'blessing', holiness inherent in a holy persons or objects.

bid'a(t), (reprehensible) innovation, where something is added to or deviant from the Prophetic tradition.

biradari, brotherhood, fraternity.

dar al Islam, 'House/domain of Islam' - lands under Muslim rule - in contrast to the dar al harb, the abode of the enemy, war-zone.

dars i nizami, syllabus of religious education developed in India in the eighteenth century.

dar al 'ulum, 'House of sciences', advanced Islamic seminary.

durud, formulae of blessings for the Prophet.

fatwa, formal legal opinion pronounced by a mufti (q.v.).

fiqh, Islamic jurisprudence.

firqa/parast, sect/arianism.

hadis, hadith, tradition from the Prophet containing his remarks on a given situation and based on a chain of transmitters.

hadith qudsi, divine tradition ascribed to God on the authority of the Prophet.

Note: based in part on Metcalf, 1982, pp.361-368, Schimmel, 1980, pp. 261-276, and Platts, 1974. Urdu speakers do not pronounce some of the letters their alphabet shares with Arabic as Arab speakers, these are then transliterated differently into English. Thus the Arabic word transliterated dhikr in English is transliterated zikr when the same word is used in Urdu. In the glossary I have included the Urdu word first and then added the Arabic transliteration, where both are used in the text. Where a bracket is included around a letter in a word this indicates a common variant used in transliteration of Urdu.
hakim, a practitioner of the classical Muslim system of medicine.

hamd, poetry and devotional literature in praise of God.

haram, actions forbidden by Islamic law.

hijra, 'emigration' of the Prophet from Mecca to Medina in 622 A.D., which begins the Muslim era, and by extension any migration from what has become an environment hostile to Muslims.

ijaza(t), permission, particularly for a student to teach a religious text he has successfully completed under the guidance of an accredited teacher.

ijma', 'consensus', one of the roots of Islamic jurisprudence, whereby there is general acceptance of a custom or decision by legal experts of a certain period within one of the schools of law.

ijtihad, 'striving', individual inquiry seeking to go back to the roots of Islamic jurisprudence, and thus by-passing taqlid, (q.v.), the solutions codified and accepted by one of the legal schools.

imam, (1) leader of the ritual prayers; (2) the leader of the Muslim community; (3) an honorific for a great scholar; (4) in the Shi'ah (q.v.) tradition the leader of their community in the line of 'Ali and Fatima, the Prophet's daughter.

jahiliyya, the time of 'ignorance', pre-Islamic paganism.

jihad, war against non-Muslims; in the sufı tradition the struggle against one's baser instincts.

jinn, creatures mentioned in the Qur'an, made from fire, and thought to be able to help or hinder human beings, who thus seek to control them.

kafir, a non-Muslim practising infidelity, therefore it has a pejorative meaning.

kalam, scholastic and apologetic theology.

kammi, artisan 'castes'.

khalifa(h), in political theory the successor of the Prophet; in religious life the accredited successor of a pir (q.v.).

madrasa(h), institute for teaching 'ulama.

manqulat, traditional sciences of qur'an and hadith.

ma'qulat, rational sciences of logic, philosophy etc.

maslak, 'path', school of Islamic thought, e.g. Barelıwi, named after the home town of their founder, Ahmad Riza Khan of Bareilly (d.1921).
mazar, 'place of visitation', grave of holy man.

milad an nabi, the Prophet's birthday.

mi'raj, 'ascension', the Prophet's heavenly journey when he is considered to have come into God's presence.

mufti, an expert in the shari'ah (q.v.).

muhajir, migrant or refugee, often as part of a collective withdrawal from a situation which has become intolerable for Muslims unable to practise their faith.

murid, follower of a murshid (q.v.).

murshid, 'guide', a sufi able to lead devotees on the mystical path, also known as pir and shaikh, the Persian and Arabic, respectively, for 'elder'.

na't, poetry and devotional writings in praise of the Prophet.

pir, see murshid.

purdah, 'veil', the seclusion of women.

gawwali, singing and playing devotional songs as part of certain sufi traditions, especially at the mazar.

sama', 'hearing', listening to music usually within a sufi circle.

shaikh, see murshid.

shari'a(h), the totality of rules guiding the individual and corporate lives of Muslims, covering law, ethics and etiquette.

shi'a(h), shorthand for shi'at 'Ali, 'the faction of 'Ali', the minority tradition within Islam which considered that 'Ali, the Prophet's son-in-law, should have been his rightful successor. This trajectory of Islam developed variant understandings of authority, political and religious, to the sunni (q.v.) majority.

shirk, 'associating' someone or something with God, the greatest sin for Islam since it threatens His singularity.

silsila(h), the 'chain' of spiritual descent whereby a sufi traces his ancestry back to the Prophet.

sunna(h), the tradition of the Prophet, the customs and norms which Muslims should emulate.

sunni, shorthand for ahl us sunnah wa'l jama'ah, 'the people of the custom and the community', the majority of the Muslims who accept the sunna and the authority of the first generation of Muslims which underwrites the integrity of the sunna, in contrast to the Shi'ah (q.v.).
tafsir, commentary on the Qur'an.

taqlid, 'imitation', following the rulings on the shari'ah arrived at by recognized authorities within the various schools of law.

tariqa, mystical 'way', referring to sufi orders, acknowledging a common silsilah (q.v.).

tasawwuf, sufism, the most common term for the mystical movement in Islam which began as asceticism and then developed theories and practices of mystical love and gnosis. The tariqa (q.v.) is the institutional expression of this movement.

ta'wiz, taviz, an amulet, often prepared at a mazar, containing Qur'anic verses (etc.) for protection.

umma(h), community, especially the Prophet's community, the transnational world of all Muslims.

'urs, 'wedding', celebration of a sufi's death anniversary when his soul was considered to be united to God.

wali, 'friend' of God, a sufi deemed to be close to God.

zikr, dhikr, 'remembrance', the repetition of divine names, or religious formulae, intended to foster religious experience and recollection of God, an essential exercise for sufis and their devotees.
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