Political representation of national minorities: a case study of minority parties in Serbia

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ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation of national minorities. Previous studies have emphasized the importance of descriptive representation and justified the need for affirmative action measures such as reserved seats or a lower electoral threshold to achieve descriptive representation. However, this thesis differs in claiming that substantive representation of minority interests is equally, if not more, important than descriptive representation. It is argued throughout the thesis that an equal right to political representation consists of the right to be present (descriptive representation) and the right to representation of interests and perspectives (substantive representation). Although mere presence of minority representatives might have some symbolic benefits, members of minority groups primarily need the representatives to act in their interests and attempt to influence public policies. Hence, this thesis provides an answer to two important and yet insufficiently researched questions: is descriptive representation a sufficient condition for substantive and if not, in what conditions can descriptive representatives act as substantive?

In aim to understand in what conditions can descriptive representatives act as substantive, this research provides an empirical analysis of the behaviour of the representatives of minority parties in the VIII National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia. More particularly, the analysis includes content analysis of all interventions in plenary parliamentary debates of the 12 national minority MPs in the period between June 2008 and May 2012. The research shows that the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation differs across minority parties. Two groups of MPs can be distinguished from the data: MPs elected on minority electoral lists creating parliamentary group of national minorities in parliament and those who were elected through pre-electoral arrangements with mainstream political parties. It is concluded that minority political parties are not a priori substantive representatives of national minorities and that descriptive representatives elected on minority electoral lists perform better as substantive representatives than descriptive representatives elected on electoral list of mainstream parties. Finally, some institutional changes are suggested which could enhance substantive representation of national minorities.
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AUTHOR'S DECLARATION

I hereby declare that, except where indicated and referenced, all the material contained in this thesis is based on my own research and that it has not been written in whole or in part by any other person but myself.
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1. THESIS OVERVIEW

The aim of this thesis is to analyse the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation of national minorities. Descriptive representation relates to the presence of members of minority groups in parliaments. According to Pitkin’s definition, descriptive representative should resemble the electorate like a reflection in the mirror (Pitkin, 1967, p. 61). A descriptive representative does not need to act for her constituents; mere resemblance by gender, ethnicity, religion or other important group attribute is sufficient to make her a group representative. However, political representation cannot be reduced to descriptive. On the contrary, political representation is better defined as substantive representation - acting in the interest of the represented where a representative is responsive to public opinion, but acts independently and according to his own judgment in the best interest of his constituents. Acknowledging the importance of minority presence in parliament, but arguing that members of national minorities primarily need their interests to be represented, this research asks in what conditions can descriptive representatives also act as substantive. My hypothesis is that the simple presence of minority representatives in parliament does not necessarily translate into the representation of minority interests. I will give several examples below to illustrate this.

In 2004 several national minority MPs in the Romanian parliament initiated the following amendments to the electoral laws: 1) only those minorities already present in the parliament will be granted national minority status; 2) raising the electoral threshold for national minority organizations from 5% to 10% of the average number of votes received by mainstream deputy; 3) minority organizations already present in parliament can compete freely in elections, but others (provided that their minority is recognized) have to present the “list of members comprising at least 15% of the total number of citizens who in the latest census declared themselves as belonging to that ethnicity” (Cârstocea, 2013, p. 15). Additionally, in 2008 all 14 minority MPs voted for the amendment which provided that non-parliamentary minority organizations wishing to run for elections were obliged to
demonstrate their status as “public utility organizations”. This requirement proved impossible to fulfil as the status could only be awarded by the Government decision (Cârstocea, 2013, p. 15-16). The consequence of these changes was that only minority organizations present at that time in the parliament could compete in parliamentary elections in the future. These changes completely eliminated competition to minority organizations already present in the parliament and prevented other minority representatives from competing in parliamentary elections. Examples like this one, showing how affirmative action measures for increased minority representation do not always lead to enhanced minority rights and the achievement of minority interests, are not rare.

Let me give two more examples to illustrate the complexities of minority representation. Elections in Kosovo in 2004 and 2007 brought into parliament 10 representatives of the Serbian national minority. Because of their ethnic origin, they were treated as legitimate representatives of Serbs in Kosovo. However, Serbs in Kosovo boycotted elections in both years and ‘their’ representatives were allocated offices only due to the electoral rules reserving 10 parliamentary seats for the Serbian minority (Verstichel, 2010, p. 82-83). The next example relates to minority representation in Serbia: a Roma representative elected through affirmative action measures claimed that his role was neither to represent Roma, nor his political party, Roma Union of Serbia, but a Serbian citizens and the National Assembly. Identifying himself primarily as Serbian citizen, he claimed: “I will never accept to be Gypsy representative, as some want to imply. I do not want the politics of Gypsy ghetto because I am the same as you, the representative of the National Assembly, with all the obligations and rights we all have here” (Rajko Djurić, 28.05.2007).

While the first example illustrates that the presence of minorities in representative institutions is not always a path towards political equality and the elimination of discrimination, the second example illustrates how resemblance with the constituency, that is, shared ethnic origin, might not be sufficient to secure legitimate representation. Finally, the third example asks what the role of minority representatives is and calls into question the benefits of minority representation if it is restricted to mere presence in the parliament. These examples show that ‘mirror’ representation is not sufficient to secure effective, accountable and legitimate representation of national minorities.

Yet, there are calls from USA to New Zealand to increase the presence of minority groups in representative institutions. There is currently a debate in Brazil concerning how to increase descriptive representation of blacks in Brazilian bicameral parliament, where
half of the population\(^1\) is represented by only 8.5% of Chamber of Deputies’ members and 2.4% of black senators (Meneguello, Speck et al., 2012). The issue of proportional representation of ethnic groups has also been an important issue for UK parliament. It has managed to increase the number of ethnic minority representatives in the House of Commons from 1.82% in 2001 elections, through 2.32% in 2005 elections to 4.15% in 2010 elections (Cracknell, 2012). However, compared to their population share, estimated to be around 12%, proportional ethnic representation is not yet achieved (Office for National Statistics, 2012). In order to increase descriptive representation, many theorists and practitioners propose different affirmative action measures, such as reserved seats or quotas. These measures have already been introduced in a number of countries.

Besides policy proposals and policy studies on the minority representation, majority of theorists of political representation also think of minority representation in terms of descriptive representation (Kymlicka, 1995, Phillips, 1995). Descriptive or ‘mirror’ representation defined as standing for the represented by virtue of resemblance, pays little attention to accountability and effectiveness of representation. However, the examples given above of minority representation in Romania, Kosovo and Serbia show the drawbacks of this approach and call for securing the more effective and legitimate minority representation.

Consequently, this research aims to unpack the relations between descriptive and substantive representation of national minority groups. This thesis combines descriptive and substantive modes of political representation arguing that descriptive representation is needed when members of minority groups are structurally discriminated against, but descriptive representation itself is not intrinsically valuable and sufficient. Therefore, it should be strengthened by substantive behaviour of descriptive representatives. The research asks the following research question: Does descriptive representation lead to substantive? Previous research studies have offered different answers. In some cases descriptive representation had substantive effects (Wüst, 2011, Minta, 2011, Tate, 2003, Minta and Sinclair-Chapman, 2013), while other researchers show that, in the cases they examined, minority representatives failed to improve effective representation of their groups or that other factors, such as political party affiliation, were more decisive (Swain, 1993). These contradictions imply that we still lack robust empirical research to explain the conditions under which descriptive representation leads to substantive. Puzzled by this, this

\(^1\) Afro-Brazilians make 51% of the whole population (Meneguello, Speck et al., 2012).
thesis aims to consider in what conditions descriptive representatives can also act as substantive.

Specifically, this research studies political representation of national minorities in Serbia, which has under EU pressure significantly increased minority descriptive representation. It is important to study Serbia because we still lack substantial empirical data on Western Balkans and as the EU candidate state, Serbian policies on national minority protection and representation are largely influenced by EU conditionality. Studying Serbia can, therefore, help us understand better the EU stance on minority issues. Finally, Serbia has a proportional electoral system while most of the previous research studies on substantive representation focused on countries with a ‘first-past-the-post’ system such as Canada or USA. It would be important to see if and how different electoral rules relate to substantive behaviour of MPs.

1.2. RESEARCH DESIGN

As already stated, this research studies the case of political representation of national minorities in Serbia. Representation of national minorities in Serbia is chosen for several reasons: first, there is a lack of substantial empirical data for Western Balkan countries; second, Serbia has in the last 10 years adopted different modes of minority representation which seem favourable to both descriptive and substantive representation; third, similar affirmative measures have been adopted across Central and South-Eastern Europe with similar results which makes the findings more generalizable; fourth, minority representation in Serbia reflects significantly the EU and OSCE criteria for minority protection. Therefore, this research will help us understand and evaluate EU policies towards ethnic minority representation.

Serbia has been in the last 10 years under EU pressure to increase minority protection and representation. This led to the lowering of the electoral threshold for national minority political parties in 2004. The affirmative action measures helped to increase the descriptive representation of national minorities significantly but there are no studies concerning how it influenced substantive representation. Until now, no substantial direct analytical correlations have been identified between substantive and descriptive representation. It is taken for granted in Serbia that by increasing the number of descriptive political representatives of national minorities, they become substantively represented and equally treated in political decision-making and policy-creation.
Although this research focuses on one particular country, research results will be
relevant for other multicultural societies with a proportional electoral system. More specific
generalizations can be made for Southeastern European countries which share many
similarities regarding national minority representation. First, most countries of
Southeastern Europe are countries with noted homogenous composition of the population
with 80% or more of the population belonging to the majority group. Minorities are
territorially concentrated and make up a significant part of population in some regions or
municipalities. Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Croatia, Serbia and Kosovo “have strong
majorities where most minorities live in part of the country and account for 10-20 percent
of the population. Only Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro are countries,
which are multi-ethnic as a whole with no or no strong dominance of one community”
(Bieber, 2005, p. 51). Second, eight of nine Southeast European countries have a
proportional system, only Albania has a mixed electoral system (Bieber, 2008, p. 17). Third,
PR with a high electoral threshold was disadvantageous for minority representation in all of
them. Therefore, seven countries introduced affirmative action measures to increase
minority representation. While Serbia lifted the threshold, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia,
Kosovo, Montenegro, Romania and Slovenia reserved seats for minorities. Fourth, ethnic
disputes and violent conflicts after the fall of communism took place in almost every
country of Southeastern Europe: “between Romanians and Hungarians in Transylvania,
Bulgarians and Turks in Bulgaria, and Hungarians and Slovaks in Southern Slovakia”
(Gherghina and Jiglau, 2011, p. 49), but also between Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Croats and Serbs in Croatia, Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo. Policies in
favour of minority exclusion were present in numerous governments in the post-
Communist space either in “the form of a) bans and other restrictive measures directed
against minority parties; b) gerrymandering; and c) electoral thresholds” (Bieber, 2008, p.
20). Fifth, political participation of national minorities is channelled through minority
parties rather than through extra-institutional movements or NGOs. The minority party
system has been relatively stable and consistent in most of the countries and “the largest
minorities have been represented by relatively strong parties which have been included in
government in all countries” (Bieber, 2008, p. 27). Sixth, inclusion of minority parties in
legislative institutions in post-communist Southeastern Europe can also partly be explained
by a country’s wish to join the EU. “Rather than the consequence of a particular EU policy,
minority inclusion has been a feature of positive conditionality in the sphere of minority
rights and a clear emphasis of linking minority representation with EU integration” (Bieber,
2008, p. 28).
This research starts by noting essential deficiencies in minority related legislation and a lack of parliamentary scrutiny regarding implementation of minority rights laws and regulations. Serbia has adopted a significant number of minority related laws since the introduction of affirmative measures. Many of them are, however, inconsistent with each other leading to a lack of law implementation. Secondly, although many of the laws are not being implemented and national minorities are largely discriminated against in society, minority MPs are rather quiet during question time. This puzzled me to focus more deeply on substantive rather than descriptive representation. My hypothesis, therefore, is that affirmative actions for better minority representation adopted under the surveillance of the EU and positively assessed in OSCE and EU reports, do not necessarily lead to substantive representation. This research will attempt to analyse the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation and determine under what conditions descriptive representatives can act as substantive. In order to answer the research questions, this research analyses the behaviour and speeches of minority representatives in Serbia and their accountability to their constituency. By doing this we will be able to see whom they are speaking for, which interests and opinions they represent and to correlate it to the theoretical model of good representative behaviour in the interest of minorities, advocating for minority rights and interethnic equality.

Due to the limited scope of this research, only the behaviour of minority MPs from political parties of national minorities will be analysed rather than covering all minority representatives. This requires more detailed explanation. Minority descriptive representatives in the Serbian parliament can be classified into three groups according to the way they are elected to parliament. Minority MPs can enter the parliament as members of political parties of national minority in two ways: first, by running for elections independently or in a coalition of political parties of national minorities, and second, in a pre-electoral coalition with a mainstream party where minority representatives appear on the electoral list of mainstream party. The third group of minority MPs are MPs who are of minority ethnic origin but are members of mainstream parties, which nominate them as candidates on their electoral list. This research will focus on the participation of political parties of national minorities and not all minority MPs because of its limited scope, but also because it is not easy to identify the ethnicity of MPs since there is no obligation of public declaration of ethnicity, the parliament holds no records on ethnicity, only on MPs’ party affiliation, age and residence. Finally, one can have certain ethnic origin, but one does not have to identify oneself with that ethnic group and could not therefore be treated as a minority representative. There would be no way to recognize minority MPs in mainstream
parties unless they publicly state their belonging to a minority group and claim to represent minorities. This would, however, be a significant source of information and a contribution to our understanding of minority representation and should certainly be investigated in future research.

Although they come from the same institutional and socio-cultural setting, it is expected that the way MPs are elected to parliament reflects significantly on their representative activities. This is especially important in PR systems where political parties nominate candidates for electoral lists, while voters vote for the list as a whole. If the research proves that there are significant differences in substantive representation among these MPs, this will mean that social perspectives and experiences do not play a decisive role in the substantive action of political representatives as the theory predicts (Mansbridge, 1999, Williams, 1998, Young, 2000).

In order to answer the research questions, this study applies qualitative research strategy. More specifically, this research applies qualitative content analysis of parliamentary speeches. Qualitative content analysis is most suitable for this research because its aim is to understand the behaviour of MPs and their justification for particular behaviour. I am particularly interested to find out whether minority MPs speak in the interest of minority groups and therefore, the most appropriate method is to look at and analyse these speeches. Speech analysis will allow for a deeper understanding of how effectively MPs represent minorities than other methods would. For example, mere quantitative data such as the number of speeches, the amendments or particular word mentioning could be useful up to a certain point. Yet, they do not help in answering which themes were present in legislative debates, what the intentions of a particular speech or amendments were, who MPs claimed to represent, in which way minority interests were addressed, etc. Also, discourse analysis could have been employed. It would have been most useful in understanding how MPs use discourse to create social reality. Although this would be important, I am more interested in analysing the opposite direction of relations between voters and MPs, that is, how MPs satisfy the needs and interests of voters, not how MPs shape voters’ interests.

1.3. SAMPLE

Serbia introduced the multi-party system in 1990 after the collapse of the communist regime and the disintegration of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia.
That was also a time when the first political parties of national minorities started to emerge. Although national minorities have had their representatives in all parliaments since 1990, they were widely discriminated against during the Milošević regime (1990-2000). The parliament was ineffective and controlled by the ruling party and there was no space for substantive representation of national minorities. Oppositional parties, including political parties of national minorities, chose to focus on non-institutional means of struggle and political activism. The main field of oppositional action was on the streets, during the anti-war protests, and outside of the formal institutions which were controlled by the ruling Milošević party. Oppositional parties, including some minority parties also boycotted elections on several occasions. The parliament as an institution started to regain its strength and influence after the democratic changes in 2000, but it consolidated only after the second post-Milošević convocation (2004-2007) (Pavlović and Antonić, 2007, p. 112). Also, it was only after 2000 that Serbia made its first steps towards minority protection and minority MPs had a chance to be heard and influence public policies.

Because of this, this research will draw data from the VIII National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia (2008-2012). This parliament was also the most effective one in the number of adopted laws (807 laws) and the one in which the most important minority related laws were adopted. Finally, the VIII National Assembly was the only parliament to serve the full term since the introduction of the multi-party system. Five minority parties won parliamentary seats in elections held in May 2008: three of them ran independently for elections (SVM, SDA-SLPS-BDSS, PDD), while the other two (SDP, DSHV) supported mainstream party candidacy. The research sample, therefore, includes 12 MPs of national minority origin present in the 2008-2012 Serbian parliament: 4 Hungarian from SVM (Balint Pastor, Elvira Kovač, Arpad Fremond and Laslo Varga), 2 Bosniak from SDA-SLPS-BDSS (Esad Džudžević and Bajram Omeragić), 3 Bosniak from SDP (Munir Poturak, Meho Omerović, Bajram Šehović), 1 Roma from SDP (Vitomir Mihajlović), 1 Albanian from PDD (Riza Halimi) and 1 Croatian from DSHV (Petar Kuntić).

Another minority party DLR emerged during the parliamentary convocation when MP Jovan Damjanović left SRS, the ultranationalistic mainstream party he was a member of, and formed the political party of the Roma national minority in 2009. Until then, he represented a very strong and critical opposition in parliament and since separation from SRS, he started supporting the government. Although he has a minority origin, he is not included in this research for several reasons: first, in the first half of his term he had the same status as other MPs with minority origin in other mainstream parties. Since this research includes only political parties of national minorities and not all minority MPs in mainstream parties, it would not be justifiable to include Jovan Damjanović, at least in the first half of his term. Second, although DLR was present in the second half of VIII National Assembly, it did not participate in the elections and Jovan Damjanović was not elected to parliament as a Roma representative.
1.4. THESIS STRUCTURE

The thesis is divided into four main parts which connect the theory of political representation to descriptive representation of national minorities in Serbia and my empirical research of the link between descriptive and substantive representation.

Chapter 2 defines key concepts used in this thesis and sets the scene for empirical research. It analyses different modes of political representation and establishes the desired link between descriptive and substantive representation of national minorities. It explains that in cases when members of national minorities do not have equal opportunities to be present and substantively represented in parliament, institutional measures to enhance group representation are needed. As the main research goal is to examine whether descriptive representation leads to substantive and in what conditions, the chapter introduces the indicators for measuring substantive representation. Finally, it considers other possible influences on representatives’ behaviour: electoral and party system and party interests and goals.

Chapter 3 introduces the case study and presents a basis for empirical research of parliamentary behaviour of the 12 minority MPs in VIII National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia. First, a short historical overview of the ethnic composition of the Serbian population is given aiming to explain the territorial concentration of minorities in different regions and existing inter-ethnic cleavages. Second, the state of minority rights and minority relevant legislation are briefly examined to enable us to understand the origins and institutional incentives and constraints for minority representation in Serbia. Finally, the chapter presents the context and levels of descriptive representation of minorities in Serbia since the introduction of the multiparty system in 1990.

After setting the scene for exploring the effects of descriptive representation, Chapter 4 analyses parliamentary speeches of MPs from minority parties present in the Serbian VIII National Assembly. It is corroborated that substantive representation is not a direct consequence of descriptive representation and that other factors such as party independence and accountability to voters also influence representatives’ behaviour. Moreover, even those descriptive representatives who acted in the interest of national minorities tended to represent only their own minority group and those members of the group from the same region as the representative.
Finally Chapter 5 concludes this thesis by summarizing the findings presented in previous chapters. It also offers some tentative recommendations for enhancing substantive representation of national minorities in Serbia thereby calling for further research on substantive group representation, on the consequences of the electoral system for substantive representation and a more in-depth explanation of the different behaviour of descriptive representatives.
CHAPTER 2: POLITICAL REPRESENTATION OF GROUPS

2.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter aims to consider 1) whether groups should be treated differently from individuals, 2) what the most desirable mode of group representation is, and 3) how substantive representation can be achieved and measured. Substantive representation is usually defined as authorized action taken during a fixed term for and in the interest of the represented to whom representatives are accountable. Yet, this definition particularly relates to the representation of individuals. When it comes to representation of groups, their presence in representative institutions is nowadays taken as essential for group representation. On the other hand, mere presence of group members, known as descriptive mode of representation is widely criticized in the classical theory of political representation of individuals (Pitkin, 1967). It is claimed that a focus on descriptive attributes of representatives, distracts us from their actions and prevents us from holding representatives to account (Pitkin, 1967, p. 60-92). If so, should groups also be substantively represented or are there substantial differences between groups and individuals that require different modes of representation? Why is it that groups ask to be represented as groups if their members are already represented as individual citizens?

Starting from an egalitarian liberal position, I will claim that individuals have value, and groups are important only as much as they are important to individuals. Hence, if individuals are put in an unequal discriminatory position because of their group membership, justice would require corrective policy measures directed at groups, but with the aim of helping individuals. For example, if political parties never nominate candidates from minority ethnic groups for elections simply because of their ethnic origin, it is obvious that individuals from minority groups are treated unfairly. If a minority political party despite its policy goals and interests never wins elections because voters decide to vote along ethnic lines and electoral threshold is too high for a minority party to cross it only with minority votes, it is not difficult to conclude that minority parties are essentially excluded from politics. In both examples, affirmative action measures to correct the
unequal starting positions of the members of two groups would be justified in order to achieve a presence in representative institutions.

However, not all members of minority groups want to participate actively in politics but still have the right to have their interests represented. The question is whether there are any minority interests at all separate from the individual interests of members of a minority group. As will be argued, groups themselves have no unified interests or opinions that can be represented. However, if members of minority groups are discriminated against in society because of their race, ethnicity, gender or sexuality, they would all benefit from anti-discrimination policies and implementation of human and minority rights. Therefore, there are still some basic interests that group members share, which arise from a shared experience of discrimination. In other words, they experience discrete acts of discrimination as individuals, but this experience is common to all of them. Recognition of these experiences and group interests does not deny the group differences which cut across them. In the case of national minorities, some of these shared interests are respect for human and minority rights, a better social and economic position in society and a strengthening of anti-discrimination policies. Political representation of national minority groups would, therefore, include speaking for and acting to advance these interests. In societies divided along ethnic lines it is possible that these interests are never articulated. If that is the case, we have to ask ourselves why. Is it because members of minority groups do not want to participate in political institutions, boycott elections or that minorities actively participate in elections but electoral rules are such that winning does not depend on minority votes and hence, politicians have no incentives to advocate for these interests? In countries where the latter is the case, a change of electoral rules at least is required.

Hence, members of minority ethnic groups should have equal opportunities to become political representatives and to be politically represented. However, we still do not know which policy measures are needed to achieve this. As has been stated, members of minority groups should have equal opportunities to be present in parliament (descriptive representation) and to have their interests spoken for and heard (substantive representation). Consequently, we need measures to foster both descriptive and substantive representation. Many of the theorists of group representation claim that substantive representation is a consequence of descriptive representation (Mansbridge, 1999, Williams, 1998). In that case, increasing the presence of minorities in parliament would secure representation of minority interests. If, however, that is not the case, we would need separate policy measures for both modes of political representation. As the aim of this thesis is to examine in what conditions descriptive representatives can also act
as substantive, this chapter will introduce ways of measuring substantive effects of descriptive representation.

When measuring substantive representation, the focus will be on the work of descriptive representatives rather than on the overall advancement in substantive representation. It could be claimed that descriptive representatives raise general awareness of minority issues and make mainstream MPs more responsive to minority interests. There are arguments in the literature that majority MPs are, in the presence of minority MPs, ashamed to propose policies that favour already privileged citizens. These issues are, however, beyond the scope of this research as it is primarily focused on the behaviour and performance of minority MPs.

The literature on political representation consulted in this chapter is mostly theoretical. Theoretical contributions on group representation are highly valuable, especially for understanding the importance and benefits of descriptive representation. Many scholars have also convincingly shown that descriptive representation does not exclude substantive and that descriptive representation might even be necessary to achieve substantive. However, we still lack deep empirical analyses of substantive group representation. We need more detailed analyses of conditions for the realization of substantive group representation, especially ethnic minorities and other disadvantaged groups (Celis, 2012). Also, are there any other factors that influence substantive representation besides the presence of group members in representative bodies? Empirical studies in this area have mostly focused on countries with a first-past-the-post electoral system, mostly USA (Canon, 1999, Swain, 1993b, Tate, 2003b, Whitby, 1997) and Canada (Bird, 2011) and more recently UK (Saalfeld and Kyriakopoulou, 2011). There are only a few rigorous empirical research studies on substantive representation of minorities in PR systems (Wüst, 2011).

The structure of this chapter is as follows: the first part considers classical understandings of political representation aiming to identify the strengths and weaknesses of each representation mode. Since this discussion will primarily focus on individuals, the second section will move on to social groups to investigate whether and under which conditions different modes of political representation can be applied to group representation. If every citizen has an equal right to vote and stand for election, why and when do we need group representation and which groups are entitled to it? I contrast here an egalitarian liberal position to various multicultural positions. The third part considers the symbolic benefits of descriptive representation, while the following section focuses on the substantive benefits of descriptive representation. In the fourth part the elements of
substantive representation and indicators of its measurement are examined. Finally, it is examined how and in which conditions descriptive representation leads to substantive group representation and if there are other incentives and constraints to the substantive actions of representatives. Setting the scene in this chapter will enable us to test the theory empirically.

2.2. MODES OF POLITICAL REPRESENTATION

In her influential book on political representation, “The concept of representation” Pitkin defines political representation as “acting in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them” (Pitkin, 1967, p. 209). According to Pitkin, there are four possible modes of representation: formalistic, symbolic, descriptive, and substantive representation. Pitkin takes the substantive representation view as a basis for defining political representation. This definition is also taken here as a starting point for understanding representation of national minority groups. However, the problem of group representation cannot be properly grasped without previous understanding of other aspects and modes of representation and their interrelations. The aim here is to introduce these concepts and ideas since they will be widely used throughout the thesis.

Formalistic representation has two forms: authorization and accountability. The authorization view concentrates on the formal transfer of authorization where the representative has all the rights to act as he wishes, but the responsibility remains in the hands of the represented. According to the accountability view, “a representative is someone who is to be held to account, who will have to answer to another for what he does” by being reelected or not (Pitkin, 1967, p. 55). Hence, one is a representative when he is formally elected to represent for a limited time period at the end of which he is held to account by being reelected or removed from office. Formalistic representation seems a very narrow definition of representation limited only to the election of representatives, either in the form of being elected (authorized) or being subject to election and therefore accountable. It does not tell us anything about a representative’s competences or obligations. It does not allow us to judge a representative’s performance and quality of his work. As Pitkin notes, “if representing means merely acting with special rights, or acting with someone else bearing the consequences, then there can be no such thing as representing well or badly” (Pitkin, 1967, p. 55). Pettit (2009) is particularly critical of
narrowing representation to authorization. He believes that anyone who makes a legitimate claim to represent the people should be treated as a representative (Pettit, 2009, p. 61-62).

Symbolic representation suffers from similar deficiencies. This model of representation stresses the importance of citizens’ beliefs for political representation. A crucial distinction in symbolic representation is the emotional relationship between represented and representative, the belief of the people that a representative is representing them (Pitkin, 1967, p. 102). A good example would be a king or a queen who symbolizes the nation or state’s unity and as long as people believe that, that person will remain the representative. He represents by how he is regarded and not by his actions. The problem is that a representative cannot be judged on his actions, nor held to account as long as he has symbolic support.

Descriptive representation means that the representative institution should “mirror” the constituency, that is, be composed to correspond accurately to the characteristics of the whole nation (Pitkin, 1967, p. 60). According to this view, the representative should resemble his electorate like a reflection in the mirror. Terms: ‘mirror’ representation, ‘politics of presence’ (Phillips, 1995) or indicative representation (Pettit, 2009) are also used to describe this view of representation. A descriptive “representative does not act for others; he ‘stands for’ them, by virtue of a correspondence or connection between them, a resemblance or reflection” (Pitkin, 1967, p. 61). Understanding political representation as descriptive has many flaws. It fails to comply with accountability requirements since the only important criterion for representation is a representative’s resemblance to constituents. A representative does not have to account for his actions or speeches; he is responsible only for what he is like, for his characteristics. His task is to reflect the already existing opinions of constituents, and the more the representative looks like the represented, the more their interests coincide. But representation in this view does not include any action in the interests of the represented, any creative thinking, or reaching consensus. A descriptive representative cannot act well or badly, he can only reflect his constituents more or less truly and accurately. Descriptive representation might not even require elections at all. Selection of representatives by lots or random sampling could produce an accurate representative sample of the whole population (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 139, Pitkin, 1967, p. 73-75).

Finally, substantive representation means to speak for, act for, and look after the interests of the represented. It is also called ‘responsive representation’ (Pettit, 2009). Hence, political representation is substantive when a representative acts in the interest of
his constituency. Political representation is defined here as ‘acting for’ as opposed to ‘standing for’. For example, one can be authorized to represent his district and can be held to account in the same district. If the same person is a member of a minority group, in a descriptive representation view he would be a minority representative. However, and this is what substantive representation emphasizes, it might come about that the same representative actually acts primarily in the interests of a specific multinational company or industry by which he was not elected nor with which he shares any characteristics. This does not imply that a representative can act as he pleases because accountability is also an important part of substantive representation: “we are expected to act as if we would eventually have to account for our actions. Thus we ought to have reasons for what we do, and be prepared to justify our actions to those we act for, even if this accounting or justification never actually takes place” (Pitkin, 1967, p. 119).

When we look further into the meaning of the phrase ‘acting for’, we notice that it can have at least two different meanings: “on the one hand, it can mean acting instead of; on the other hand, it can mean acting to the benefit of; or it can mean both at once” (Pitkin, 1967, p. 126). In the former it means that a representative is a substitute for those represented. In the latter the focus is on acting in someone’s interest not instead of him. Substantive representation is connected here to agent (delegates)/ trustee debate on the role of a representative and his relations with constituents (Pettit, 2009). It includes the debate as to whether a representative acts in the way the represented instructed him to act or acts independently but in the interest of the represented. A principal – agent relationship in the context of political representation means that the individual (agent) acts instead of other individuals (principal) in front of the audience to whom the action is addressed and with the principal being present in the actions of the agent (Brito Vieira and Runciman, 2008, p. 66-73). Trusteeship reflects the position of independence of a representative who is entrusted to act as he thinks best, according to his own judgment. Pettit argues that delegates “are more or less explicitly directed by represenees” while trustees have “interpretative discretion in determining how to construe their representees” (Pettit, 2009, p. 65).

Pitkin demonstrates that a representative is neither only an agent nor only a trustee, but reflects both roles at the same time: “The represented must be both present and not present. The representative must really act, be independent; yet the represented must be in some sense acting through him. Hence there must be no serious persistent conflict between them. Thus one might suppose that the best examples of representing as activity would be found where absolutely no conflict could occur between representative
and represented, because the latter is a child or otherwise incapable of judging for himself. But that is far from true. The represented must himself be capable of action, have a will and judgment of his own; otherwise the idea of representation as substantive activity is not applicable” (Pitkin, 1967, p. 154). Pitkin further asserts that a representative must act in the interest of the represented and in the way responsive to their wishes: “What the representative does must be in his principal’s interest, but the way he does it must be responsive to the principal’s wishes. He need not actually and literally act in response to the principal’s wishes, but the principal’s wishes must be potentially there and potentially relevant. Responsiveness seems to have a kind of negative criterion: conflict must be possible and yet nevertheless not occur” (Pitkin, 1967, p. 155).

As already said, Pitkin finds the substantive representation view the most convincing one out of the four presented: political representation is acting in the interest of represented where a representative is responsive to public opinion, but acts independently and according to his own judgment in the best interest of his constituents. This research follows the same line of understanding of political representation. Representative action is a crucial element of political representation and representatives need to be held to account for their actions in parliament. The characteristics of a representative, the meanings constituents attach to them or the act of authorization and reelection as an accountability mechanism cannot be treated as decisive for political representation. However, contrary to Pitkin, all these elements of representation need to be taken into account when considering political representation. They cannot be treated separately since they are often interconnected and interdependent. A political representative is not any individual acting in the interest of another individual. To be a representative, he needs also to act with authority and needs eventually to be held to account for his actions. Some authors further argue that substantive representation is closely related to descriptive representation. These arguments are especially strong in the cases of group representation. It seems, however, that Pitkin does not take representation of groups into account when considering political representation. When attempting to apply a substantive definition of the political representation to representation of groups several questions arise: Can social groups be represented? Do groups have interests? If only individuals have interests, can we still apply substantive representation to groups or do we need to use a different model of representation? These questions are considered below.
2.3. REPRESENTATION OF GROUPS – CALL FOR DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION

The primary interest of this thesis is not political representation itself, but political representation of national minorities. The first point to note when considering minority representation is that it differs from representation of individuals as previously discussed. National minority groups cannot be equated with individuals and treated as single units since they consist of a number of individuals with their own different identities and opinions. National minority groups also differ from interest groups because their members have different and often conflicting interests, which makes it impossible for a group to unify around a single set of interests which a representative can advocate for. Individuals, further, do not become members of national minority groups because of their common interests or views, but because they are involuntarily placed in these groups due to their birth. National minority groups can, therefore, be equated with women, sexual minorities or other involuntary groups. Groups to which individuals belong involuntarily and cannot easily choose to leave are known as ascriptive groups (Brito Vieira and Runciman, 2008, p. 111, Williams, 1998, p. 15-16). Examples of these groups are ethnic, sexual, gender and sometimes religious groups.

How could these groups be represented? Before answering this question, it is necessary to understand why an ascriptive group would be represented as a group at all. Although ascriptive status distinguishes them from other social or interest groups (which have an exit option), this is still not sufficient to justify group representation. The answer to this question has to come from our understanding of equality and group rights. It will, therefore, be argued in the following sections that minority groups are entitled to special representation rights when group members do not have equal opportunities as members of a majority group to run for office and be elected and when there are no opportunities for minority interests to be articulated. In these cases affirmative action measures to increase descriptive representation would be justified. However, descriptive representation should not be treated as a goal in itself, but rather as an institutional mechanism for equalizing opportunities for the political participation of members of minority groups.

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3 I use the term ‘ascriptive groups’ simply to emphasize the stability and involuntary character of group membership, i.e. there is no easy exit from the group. There is an important difference between voluntary groups such as football fans, chess player groups, etc. and involuntary groups to which membership is ascribed because of one’s unchangeable attributes such as gender, sexuality or ethnicity. The term is not used here in the context of status or ascriptive identity politics (Gutmann, 2003, p. 117-151).
2.3.1. Equality and group rights

All liberals agree that equality is a basic value of a just society. They also agree that individuals should have equal opportunities to lead the life they choose. The bases of equality are equal legal and political rights, but these rights are not always sufficient to secure equality. If one is denied a job on the basis of one’s ethnic, gender or religious background, then one is being denied equal opportunity. Hence, equality defined as equality of opportunity means that people should have equal starting positions in life regardless of race, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexuality or other group allegiance (Rawls, 1999, p. 52-57). If, on the other hand, someone has a higher income because he works harder than others, this type of income inequality cannot be treated as unjust. People should be responsible for their own choices and accomplishments. Therefore, while structural discrimination based on the ascriptive characteristics or circumstances the people themselves are not responsible for is unjust, inequalities due to personal choices are not.

However, theorists of multiculturalism claim that equality of opportunity does not take into consideration cultural differences and distribution of resources among social groups. Phillips (2004), for example, finds equality of opportunity arguments compelling for the treatment of individuals, but for the social groups, equal outcome is what matters the most because, as she believes, the only way to measure opportunities is by their outcome. According to her, groups have equal opportunities only when equal outcomes are secured. If opportunities were equal, social groups would be proportionally distributed along political, economic and social lines.

There are, however, many problems with extending the notion of equality to equality of outcomes. Equal outcomes mean that everyone should literally be equal regardless of efforts, capabilities, preferences or taste. Consequently, everyone should have the same wage regardless of effort and the less talented should receive more training to enable them to achieve the same position as the more talented. The aim of equality of outcome is to equalise where people end up, rather than where they begin. It severely limits individual freedom, denies the importance of individual responsibility and fails to take into account the diversity of individual preferences. If someone chooses to go to university and later achieves a better salary than the one who decided to start work after high school, there is no injustice there. If someone works hard and saves money, it is not unjust that later he owns a house while his spendthrift friends do not. Finally, if the aim is equality of life satisfaction, should we say that those with expensive tastes deserve a higher income
than the others? Hence, it can be concluded that while the same opportunities should be required, the same success rates should not be expected.

Yet, we still need to discuss the subjectivity of groups to demands for justice and equality. Should groups be entitled to rights and treated separately from individuals? Contrary to liberals who give normative and ontological primacy to individuals, theorists of multiculturalism give an affirmative answer to this question. According to multicultural understanding, there is no individual without culture. People are born into certain ethnic and religious communities which influence the choices that will be available to them and even form part of their individual identity (Taylor, 1992). Since cultural groups come prior to individual, they are entitled to rights. According to them, people are treated equally not when they are treated in the same way but when each group is treated in a way that recognizes and respects its cultural practices and beliefs (Phillips, 2007, Young, 1990). However, there are some differences among them.

Politics of recognition argues that cultural groups have special values and a group identity which differs from other groups and are therefore entitled to group rights and special representation. They claim that groups are valuable to individuals and form part of their identity and therefore, need to be protected. An ascriptive identity group has certain values and interests that form a group’s unique identity, which distinguishes its members from all other individuals (Taylor, 1992, Van Dyke, 1995). According to this view, a secure cultural context is one of the primary, basic goods, the same as health care, freedom of speech or the right to vote. “Liberal democratic states are obliged to help disadvantaged groups preserve their culture against intrusions by majoritarian or ‘mass’ cultures. Recognizing and treating members of some groups as equals now seems to require public institutions to acknowledge rather than ignore cultural particularities, at least for those people whose self-understanding depends on the vitality of their culture” (Gutmann, 1992, p. 5).

This approach, however, produces many objections. The first one is its essentialization of identity. Butler and other anti-essentialist critics show that identities and group differences are socially constructed. Rather than the differences being real, they arise by evoking group identities. These theories strive for the deconstruction of identities and equal rights of all individuals (see Butler and Scott, 1992). Being a woman does not include all a person is; women are at the same time members of different social and interest groups, and have different life experiences that all influence their individual identities (Brito Vieira and Runciman, 2008, p. 112, Butler, 1999, Phillips, 1994, p. 88). There is no universal basis of gender or ethnic identity. Ascriptive group’s members have different interests and
opinions, which are often contrasted and irreconcilable. Some women are liberal, some are conservative; some belong to privileged ethnic groups, some to minority groups; there are religious and nonreligious Roma; there are homosexual as well as heterosexual Muslims. There are many black people who do not consider race as an important part of their identity, nor wish to preserve black culture as such. These diversities prevent us from understanding groups as identity bearers. Hence, evoking specific group rights on the basis of common identity that needs to be recognized, fails to recognize individual identities and conflicts with individual rights.

The same criticism also arises within multiculturalism, or more precisely, the politics of difference. Young notices that members of social groups have their own views, opinions and interests and their identities are constructed through various life experiences, contacts and membership of different social groups. In her words: “Political theory would do well to disengage social group difference from a logic of identity, in two ways. First, we should conceptualize social groups according to a relational rather than a substantialist logic. Secondly, we should affirm that groups do not have identities as such, but rather that individuals construct their own identities on the basis of social group positioning” (Young, 2000, p. 82).

Instead, Young argues, the focus should be on structural differences and discrimination which social groups face. She notes that “the public political claims of such groups, however, rarely consist simply in the assertion of one identity as against others, or a simple claim that a group be recognized in its distinctiveness. Instead, claims for recognition usually function as part of or means to claims against discrimination, unequal opportunity, political marginalization, or unfair burdens” (Young, 2000, p. 103-104). Hence, politics of difference puts forward the following argument: structurally discriminated, oppressed or disadvantaged groups should be guaranteed special rights to help them improve their structural and economic position and achieve equality in the society (Kymlicka, 1995, Mansbridge, 1999, Phillips, 1995, Williams, 1998, Young, 2000). The argumentation starts from acknowledging that divisions and differences in social and economic positions in most democratic societies are formed along race, ethnic, religious or gender lines. Belonging to a national minority does not need to be part of a person’s identity, she could completely reject it, but because of her formal membership in particular of her ethnic group she could be discriminated against in the job market or in decision-making. Individual rights and non-discrimination policies are not successful in dealing with these issues. Hence, many theorists find it necessary to make a shift from liberal difference-blind policies to policies of recognizing and affirming group differences (Young, 2000).
Although these claims for cultural recognition are not based on shared identity but shared experience of oppression, group-differentiated rights and affirmation of groups are still needed. Therefore, both schools of multiculturalism have in common an understanding of equality as equality of outcomes. For example, Young explicitly claims that the aim of democratic political processes is to produce the most just outcomes (Young, 2000, p. 29-30). Moreover, her opinion is shared by other theorists of multiculturalism: “A culturally pluralist democratic ideal, however, supports group-conscious policies not only as means to the end of equality, but also as intrinsic to the ideal of social equality itself. Groups cannot be socially equal unless their specific experience, culture, and social contributions are publicly affirmed and recognized” (Young, 1990, p. 174).

After taking cultural groups into consideration, should we extend the notion of equality to equality of outcomes? We should go back to Phillips’s objection that unequal outcomes are a clear sign that groups do not have equal opportunities (Phillips, 2004). What advocates of equal outcomes suggest is that all occupational and structural positions should be proportionally distributed among all cultural and social groups. However, what if members of some cultural groups favour some professions more than the others? For example, should we really say that justice requires Roma travellers to be present at all levels of education, occupations and political institutions even when their culture demands a different lifestyle? If the condition of equal citizenship rights and equal opportunities is satisfied, there is no need then to interfere with personal choices of individuals. Moreover, it would be unfair to deprive individuals of freedom to lead the life they choose.

Multiculturalists’ demand for public affirmation and recognition of groups can also be justifiably criticized. The claim that all cultures have intrinsic and equal value and as such should be recognized is problematic (Taylor, 1992, p. 66-71). The problem, according to egalitarian liberals, is that we cannot objectively measure the value of culture other than from the perspective of the individual. Value of culture is determined by each individual separately on the basis of how much it means to her. However, we do not need to recognize different cultures as equally valuable to treat their members fairly. “It is not necessary first to establish the equal value of whatever activity is to be protected by the right in question. To make the point, let us think about the equal liberty of religious worship. Because religions have incompatible propositional content, it would be absurd to suggest that they had to be publicly affirmed to be equally valuable. But the case for giving different faiths the same rights does not depend on any such absurd claim: it can be derived from a principle of fair treatment” (Barry, 2001, p. 278).
Another objection to multicultural theories relates to group rights. Kukathas argues that there is no possible justification for group rights. Groups matter only because they are essential for the wellbeing of individuals and only to the extent that they affect actual individuals. He understands groups as private associations of individuals: “Cultural communities should, then, be looked on in this way: as associations of individuals whose freedom to live according to communal practices each finds acceptable is of fundamental importance” (Kukathas, 1995: 238). Kukathas argues that liberalism, with equal legal and political rights for individuals, provides justice to cultural communities through guaranteeing individuals freedom of association and freedom of exit. If however, “an individual continues to live in a community and according to ways that (in the judgment of the wider society) treat her unjustly, even though she is free to leave, then our concern about the injustice diminishes” (Kukathas, 1992, p. 133, Kukathas, 1995, p. 252).

Kukathas is, however, incorrect in claiming that group allegiance is a matter of autonomous choice and that the right to exit applies to all social groups. There is no exit from racial or ethnic groups: others perceive individuals as members of certain racial, ethnic or gender groups based on their appearance, name or skin colour. Unless a person undergoes an operation to change her gender or skin colour there is no way for her to exit the group. Even where exit is possible, individuals should not be forced to choose between important issues such as, for example, employment and religion. If a person is denied a job because of the headscarf she wears, although it does not affect her job in any way, and her religion does not allow her to appear in public without it, should a person be condemned to stay either at home and not work or abandon her religion? Hence, Young is right to claim that justice requires some group-differentiated rights when individuals (or groups) are discriminated against on the basis of gender, ethnicity, race or other group allegiance. However, she is incorrect in her understanding of these rights as permanent and an end in itself. They should only be introduced as a temporary measure until discrimination comes to an end.

Contrary to the politics of difference which prioritizes groups over individuals, I adopt an egalitarian liberal approach which prioritizes individuals and accepts some group-differentiated rights only as pragmatic departures from equal liberty (Barry, 2001, p. 12). Barry contends: “There may be cases in which a system of group-based rights for those suffering from systematic disadvantage will be a way of helping to meet the egalitarian liberal demand that people should not have fewer resources and opportunities than others when this inequality has arisen out of circumstances that they had no responsibility for bringing about. However, special treatment for members of disadvantaged groups is
justifiable only for as long as the inequality persists. We may say, therefore, that the objective of special treatment for members of disadvantaged groups is to make the need for that special treatment disappear as rapidly as possible” (Barry, 2001, p. 13).

We can conclude that individuals and groups are treated equally when all citizens share a common set of citizenship rights and have equal opportunities to make their choices. As long as they are based on equal distribution of rights and opportunities, liberal institutions are just, and individual can be denied only those options that harm other people’s rights. An ideal of equality excludes equality of outcomes. It is expressed in equal treatment and exceptions from universal rights are justified only on condition that people should not have less capital or opportunities than others when inequality is produced by circumstances for which they themselves are not responsible. This conclusion implies that political representation of national minorities has to be understood as an instrument to protect equal rights of individuals and achieve equality, not as a goal in itself. Group representation, as an institutional mechanism, is needed when members of a minority group are denied access to political decision-making. The following section will consider the relationship between demands of equality, institutional mechanisms and political representation of national minorities.

2.3.2. Right to political representation - institutional responses

It was established in the previous section that an equal right to vote has to be supplemented with group-based rights if large groups of citizens are excluded from decision-making. Equality requires that all individuals regardless of their ethnic, religious or any other origin or group membership have equal opportunities to choose their occupation and lifestyle. If party selection committees reject candidates with ethnic minority origin, that is undoubtedly overt discrimination and according to our understanding of equality, requires an institutional response. Phillips corruptedly argues that descriptive representation “matters because of what it symbolizes to us in terms of citizenship and inclusion—what it conveys to us about who does and who does not count as a full member of society” (Phillips, 2012, p. 516-517). If members of national minorities do not have equal opportunities to become political representatives and be politically represented, what kinds of policies are required?
Egalitarian liberalism offers an institutional response in the form of negative and positive policies. Negative policies “are those that provide individual exemptions from generally applicable laws on the basis of cultural practices or (very often) religious beliefs”, while the positive policies “provide advantages to individuals (on the basis of their membership in some culturally defined group) that are not available to others” (Barry, 2001, p. 17). An example of negative policy is an exemption from wearing crash helmets for Sikh construction workers. Positive public policies are connected to various affirmative action measures. Their aim it to correct inequalities based on group or cultural allegiance. An example is the introduction of quotas in education for members of discriminated cultural groups.

There is a variety of potential positive measures for increasing political representation of national minorities: reserving seats, lowering the electoral threshold, designing majority minority districts, party quotas. Each of these measures would foster descriptive representation, that is, increase the presence of members of minority groups in representative institutions. The question is whether a condition of equality would be satisfied as soon as one minority representative wins a parliamentary seat or whether representation proportional to minorities’ share of the total population is desirable. If equality meant equality of outcomes, it would be required to introduce policy measures which secure proportionality in representative institutions. However, if institutional rules are such that minorities can achieve proportionality if they decide to vote in large numbers for minority parties or candidates, then the results only reflect the quality of minority candidates. If, for example, members of a minority group aim to secede and, therefore, do not want to participate in institutions in the current state although they have legal rights and the ability to win a significant number of parliamentary seats in elections, it cannot be concluded that their underrepresentation is unjust. Proportional underrepresentation could also be a consequence of the unattractiveness of political positions, a lack of interest of members of minority groups in politics, the decision of voters to vote for mainstream candidates, etc. Therefore, it does not have to be unfair if minorities are not proportionally present in representative institutions. Affirmative action measures are not always needed if the ethnic structure of parliament does not reflect population structure; they would only be needed if disproportional representation is an outcome of structural discrimination.

We have concluded that effective opportunities for descriptive representation are needed for all individuals to be treated equally in competition for parliamentary seats. However, theorists of politics of difference argue that there are other benefits of descriptive representation that should be taken into account. According to them,
descriptive representatives gives voice to the perspectives of others and make their claims publicly legitimate assuring thereby procedural fairness in setting the public agenda and the hearing of opinions (Young, 1990, p. 185). As a consequence, political decisions and policies become more legitimate (Mansbridge, 1999, p. 628) and the represented regain the trust in representative institutions (Williams, 1998, p. 172). Second, citizens also tend to trust those representatives who they find more similar to themselves (Phillips, 1995, p. 43). Third, descriptive representation can serve as a role model for other group members. It can make them more self-confident about their capability to rule and make political decisions (Alexander, 2012, Brito Vieira and Runciman, 2008, p. 113, Guinier, 1995, Mansbridge, 1999, p. 648-650). Fourth, it maximizes social knowledge expressed in discussion and makes decision-makers more aware of possible solutions; meanings different institutions have among different groups in society; and consequences of particular policies (Young, 1990, p. 186). These symbolic benefits of descriptive representation can additionally contribute to a more equal treatment of members of different social groups.

However, although descriptive representation is usually the focus of discussions on group representation, there is another more important dimension of political representation that has to be taken into account: representation of interests. We have defined political representation as substantive representation, i.e. accountable actions in the interest of the represented and if these interests have no opportunities to be addressed in the parliament, institutional reaction is required. While affirmative action measures protect the individuals who want to engage in politics but are denied access because of their ascriptive characteristics, it is questionable whether they secure representation of minority interests. In a similar way to distribution of rights, groups as such do not have interests, but their members share some common interests that arise from group membership. What these interests are is not easy to tell bearing in mind the diversity of interests and opinions among members of minority groups. Yet, it should be possible to identify a set of issues that are relevant for minority citizens as a group. Following Bird in her research on visible minorities in Canada, “it is possible to identify a set of political issues that likely hold heightened significance for most visible minorities. These include issues of racial discrimination, multiculturalism, immigration and the socio-economic status of ethnic minorities” (Bird, 2011, p. 215). Therefore, acting in the interest of the represented would, in the case of national or ethnic minority representation, mean advocating for anti-discrimination legislation, raising awareness about structural injustices, scrutinizing the implementation of minority-related laws by the government, etc.
The question is which measures should be adopted to increase substantive representation of national minorities? Is there any causal link between the presence of minorities in parliament and representation of minority interests? Is it sufficient to increase descriptive representation to achieve substantive representation as well? Advocates of group representation argue that no one else will represent minority interests better than members of minority groups because they share similar social perspectives and experiences. Social perspectives are the ways people interpret the world because of their structural positions in the society. Structural social positions “arise from group differentiations that exist in a society, collective attributions that have cultural and practical meanings for the way people interact or the status they have” (Young, 1997, p. 365). Structured relations between social groups are usually relations of privilege, on the one hand, and oppression or disadvantage on the other. Those who are not in the same position are often not even aware of experiences and discrimination practices social positions produce (Young, 1990, 2000). Consequently, members of privileged groups are less capable of understanding disadvantaged groups’ needs and interests because their social and economic position can make them unaware of these interests. Second, members of privileged groups might not want to speak for minority interests because their privileged position in society depends on the oppression of others. Third, privileged groups tend to present their interests as universal and if everyone else is silenced and privileged groups’ interests are the only ones heard, they become publicly adopted as universal (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 139, Williams, 1998, Young, 1990, p. 185-186).

However, members of minority groups can abandon the culture they came from or become co-opted into the privileged group (Van Dyke, 1995, p. 50). Minority representatives might have themselves never experienced discrimination so the possibility of representation of perspectives becomes questionable. Also, after being elected as a representative, their social and economic position can significantly change and with it their perspective. In these cases, minority representatives cannot be expected to be better substantive representatives of minority interests than representatives from any other social group. Moreover, the argument that privileged groups are incapable of comprehending and reluctant to understand the needs and interests of disadvantaged groups is not convincing enough. Previous empirical research has shown that MPs from privileged groups tackle minority issues when their mandate depends directly on minority votes (e.g. in majority minority districts) (see Bird, 2011).

In addition, focussing on descriptive representation could also lead to essentializing of group identity and group closure when elections of descriptive representatives depend
on strong group identity centred campaign. Group members are divided along different interest and identity lines, which makes it difficult to gather them around a single political party or a politician. To win support, political candidates often need to strengthen group unity. Unifying processes build a unified identity which excludes all those who do not fit the description thereby narrowing and closing the group (Phillips, 1993, p. 96-97). The claim that only women can represent women and only national minority members can represent their groups, can become an excuse for privileged groups not to advocate for disadvantaged groups’ interests (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 139). When designing positive policies for group representation these objections should be taken into account. Institutional mechanisms should not be such as to impose constraints on candidates from majority groups to fight for minority votes.

Citizens should have an opportunity to choose between different candidates and there should be incentives for majority candidates to run for minority votes and speak for them. When winning elections for a privileged group candidate depends on minority votes as well, he will try to address their interests in the parliament. When a minority candidate has a competing candidate who addresses minority important issues, regardless of the social group he comes from, he will have to be more responsive to win the votes of his constituents.

This leads us to the major objection to descriptive representation: the problem of accountability. Pitkin claims that descriptive representation is incompatible with accountable representation (Pitkin, 1967). Descriptive representation “can lull voters into thinking their substantive interests are being represented even when this is not the case” (Mansbridge, 1999, p. 640). Nevertheless, most considerations of descriptive representation understand political representation as the interplay between descriptive attributes, authorization and accountability (Young, 1997, p. 358-361). If it were enough for someone to have group attributes, we could take any Roma individual from the street to represent Roma people, but it is not so. A representative is legitimate only when he is elected by his constituency to whom he presented his program and ideology and who were convinced enough to vote for him and elect him. The reelection process is a moment when he has to give an account of his actions. Under a supposition that representatives wish to be reelected, elections guarantee good governance and allow us to trust the system (Williams, 1998, p. 166). The problem arises when there is no political competition among minority candidates or parties. If only one minority party runs for election, there is a distinct possibility that it will win minority citizens’ votes regardless of their performance.
during previous mandate because citizens tend to trust more and be loyal to those who they find most similar to them.

To sum up, an equal right to political representation includes opportunities for national minority candidates to run for elections and be elected and opportunities for minority interests to be articulated in representative institutions. Affirmative action measures such as a lower threshold can satisfy the first condition, but whether it can foster substantive representation is a question that requires extensive theoretical and empirical research which my research aims to provide. Therefore, we have to examine whether descriptive representation is sufficient to secure substantive and if not, which measures should be adopted to foster it. The next section will analyse these relationships and introduce indicators for measuring substantive effects of descriptive representation.

2.4. SUBSTANTIVE BENEFITS OF DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION

Theoretical considerations of political representation of structurally discriminated groups focus mostly on the descriptive mode of political representation. Nevertheless, descriptive representatives are often understood as representatives who are, because of their shared experiences and social perspectives, more interested in and more able to take substantive action in the interest of their constituents. On the one hand, representation as ‘standing for’ is treated as incomplete without and inseparable from ‘acting for’. On the other, it is argued that descriptive representation is necessary to achieve substantive. While some authors explicitly claim that both descriptive and substantive representation are inseparable and interdependent elements of political representation (Celis, 2012, Mansbridge, 1999, Williams, 1998), others rather implicitly point to the same relationship (Phillips, 1995, Young, 2000). Williams, for example, defines descriptive representation as a tool to “translate presence into policy influence” (Williams, 1998, p. 7). Young argues that descriptive representation helps group perspectives and interests to be voiced and heard: “From a particular social perspective a representative asks certain kinds of questions, reports certain kinds of experience, recalls a particular line of narrative history, or expresses a certain way of regarding the positions of others” (Young, 2000, p. 140). Therefore, a representation does not mean simply standing for a group, but acting in accordance with shared perspectives in order to challenge discrimination practices.
Phillips believes that substantive in addition to descriptive action is desirable to achieve fair representation of discriminated groups (Phillips, 1995, p. 40-41). She uses the terms ‘politics of presence’ and ‘politics of ideas’ to define the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation (Phillips, 1995, p. 25). Representation in terms of politics of ideas relates to the representation of interests, views, opinions and policy priorities of the represented. According to this, “we can only believe that the sex of the representatives matters if we think it will change what the representatives do” (Phillips, 1995, p. 77). On the other hand, politics of presence is interested in whether the representative body is representative of the citizen body, whether there are obstacles to women or ethnic minorities participating in representative institutions.

In what ways can descriptive representation be beneficial for substantive? What kind of substantive representation can theoretically be expected from descriptive representatives? Theory offers several answers to these questions:

First, descriptive representation can enhance substantive by assuring adequate communication in the context when minorities lack trust in representatives from privileged groups because of the history of oppression (Mansbridge, 1999, p. 641). Descriptive representation can enhance communication between representatives and voters and “the deeper the communicative chasm between a dominant and a subordinate group, the more descriptive representation is needed to bridge that chasm” (Mansbridge, 1999, p. 643).

Second, group representatives can bring new issues to the agenda which would never be articulated if only privileged groups were present in parliament (Phillips, 1995, p. 45). Group representatives can, therefore, help disadvantaged groups to present publicly and defend the need for particular policies and offer their interpretation of the meaning of and reasons for particular decisions (Young, 2000, p. 185). As Phillips contends, “the real importance of political presence lies in the way it is thought to transform the political agenda, and it is this that underlies the greater priority now accorded to gender and ethnicity and race” (Phillips, 1995, p. 176). Descriptive representatives are especially significant when minority interests are not yet fully articulated and a representative needs to act independently, according to his own judgment. In these cases descriptive representatives could recognize them and present them better than others (Mansbridge, 1999, p. 644).

Third, they can also bring new interpretations of existing policies and political issues and challenge them. They can often publicly confront privileged groups’ interpretations of universal interests and opinions and point to their narrowness. Group representation can, therefore makes representative institution in general more accountable because group
representatives question and criticize mainstream positions. In their presence it is harder for privileged groups to claim particular interests to be universal.

Fourth, descriptive representatives can serve as more aggressive advocates of minority interest. We can expect representatives from the same group to share similar legislative priorities. For example, according to Williams, women from different political parties and with different ideological beliefs tend to show higher interest in women’s and children’s issues and welfare policies than their male colleagues (Williams, 1998, p. 171). She also shows that women tend to be better advocates of health care, flexitime and equal pay for equal work. Black representatives in USA show higher support for civil rights and the welfare policy than white representatives, even when the white representatives were elected in the district were the electoral result depended most on black votes and when the black representatives were elected in majority-white districts (Williams, 1998, p. 170). Since minority representatives do not have the same interests, opinions or ideological bases, their proposals and approaches to issues on the agenda might be very different. But they should be expected to show special interest in equality, social policies, antidiscrimination policies, human and minority rights. Hence, minority representatives may differ in what they think anti-discrimination laws should look like and how equality should be achieved. Nonetheless, it is in the interest of both members of discriminated groups as well as minority representatives that legislature adopts these laws.

Raising group relevant issues, proposing policy changes or scrutinizing the work of the executive is part of substantive representation action. These are also often the limits of substantive representation of national minorities because minority representatives constitute the minority in parliament and can easily be outvoted. It does not have to mean that policies will change, or necessary legislation will be adopted. These are reached in an open debate among representatives. What matters is that representatives speak from their own structural positions in society, contributing thus to the inclusion of different people in a decision-making process. Therefore, when measuring the substantive performance of descriptive representatives, it would not be enough to ask how many related laws were adopted, but rather, to ask which amendments a minority representative proposed and how he voted on the issue.

We can conclude that descriptive representatives represent their groups substantively through enhancing communication between representatives and constituents, raising minority related questions, bringing new issues to the political agenda, challenging dominant discourses and interpretations and advocating for human and
minority rights and non-discrimination policies. Therefore, if we are to measure the effectiveness of descriptive representation, we should examine the following data:

- MPs’ personal websites, blogs or social network accounts can be used to see if MPs present themselves as minority or deethnicized representatives and examine the extent to which MPs communicate with their constituents (Saalfeld and Kyriakopoulou, 2011).

- Parliamentary debates’ transcripts: analysis of MPs’ speeches during parliamentary debates could help us determine whether they bring new issues and interpretations to the political agenda. MPs “can choose either to speak or not to speak on certain themes and, in choosing to speak, can bring further nuances to these themes in the form of context or examples” (Bird, 2011, p. 216).

- Number of law proposals: did minority representatives initiate and propose new laws or changes to the existing legislation to better serve minority interests? (Canon, 1999, Haynie, 2001).

- Draft law amendments: revision of amendments to draft laws related to minority interests to check if minority representatives show a special interest in these issues and if they propose amendments in what they believe is the best interest of their constituents.

- Parliamentary questions: analysis of MPs’ questions to the executive about implementation of minority related laws would show how active MPs are in conducting their oversight role (Saalfeld and Bischof, 2012).

- Committee work: some researchers look specifically at committees because they assume that minority representatives can more easily and more convincingly articulate minority interests there than in the plenum (Canon, 1999, Gamble, 2007). However, some committee meetings are not open to the public which makes research difficult. Also, committee membership is often “determined by partisan seat share, thus structuring the nature of debate far more than is the case of parliamentary debates” (Bird, 2011, p. 216).

- Voting: voting on legislation would show how consistent MPs are, if they criticize the proposal during the debates, if they vote against the bill if their amendments are not adopted. Do they generally vote with minority interests in mind? Do minority MPs differ from others in voting decisions?

Previous empirical research studies on substantive representation of women, racial or ethnic groups vary significantly both in the data they use for measurement and the
findings they present. Bird (2011) for example, measures substantive representation by analysing the content of parliamentary debates. Her analysis shows that minority MPs in Canada’s House of Commons tend to address issues directly relevant to ethnic minorities better than other MPs. Casellas and Leal (2011) use a voting variable as an indicator of substantive representation in US Congress from 1993 to 2000 and show that representatives of districts with larger percentages of Latinos or African-Americans tend to be more liberal than other MPs when voting on most, and not just minority related, issues. Voting on legislation (roll-call votes) is the most often used indicator of substantive representation (Lublin, 1997, Swain, 1993b, Tate, 2003b, Whitby, 1997). On the other hand, Saalfeld and Kyriakopoulou (2011) are interested in representation of racial and ethnic minorities in UK. In their research they chose to look at three sets of data: personal websites, voting data and data on parliamentary questions. Findings also vary largely from studies supporting the substantive effects of descriptive representation (Minta, 2011, Minta and Sinclair-Chapman, 2013, Tate, 2003b, Wüst, 2011) to those who argue that minority representatives fail to improve effective representation of their groups or that other factors, such as political party affiliation, are more decisive (Crowley, 2004, Swain, 1993b). These contradictions imply that we still lack robust empirical research to explain the conditions under which descriptive representation leads to substantive.

2.5. WHEN DOES SUBSTANTIVE REPRESENTATION OCCUR?

As we have seen in the previous sections, descriptive representation is desirable but is not strictly necessary to achieve substantive representation. Other factors such as the electoral and party system may also influence chances for effective representation of national minorities. However, this issue has not yet been in the focus of theoretical discussions, nor in the focus of empirical research. There were only a few theoretical attempts to understand where substantive representation happens and for what reasons (Celis, Childs et al., 2008, Eelbode, 2010, Gamble, 2007). The factors considered there can be classified into institutional factors and a representative’s personal or party interests and goals. The electoral system, party system and institutional position of a representative can act as institutional constraints or incentives for substantive representation.

The electoral system dimension consists of electoral formula, district system and ballot structure (Eelbode, 2010). Eelbode considers proportional systems with open lists
and preferential votes the best systems for ethnic minority representation (Eelbode, 2010, p. 9-10). Substantive representation is more likely when electoral rules secure high competition among candidates and plurality of interests and opinions among descriptive minority representatives in parliament (Celis, 2012, p. 525). Although many theorists advocate for reserved seats (Htun, 2004, Young, 1990) or minority designated districts (Williams, 1998) as mechanisms to achieve better representation of ethnic groups, many objections can be made to them in the context of substantive representation. Both mechanisms allocate safe seats for minority representatives, which make them less responsive and accountable. As Phillips notes, “one of the worries about the strategy of ‘safe seats’ for minority representatives is that the politicians may not even bother to cloak themselves in any garb of political ideas” (Phillips, 1995, p. 102). Bird suggests that “support for minority issues within the legislature may actually be greater if there are fewer safe minority seats and, conversely, more non-minority legislators who recognize and are responsive to substantial pockets of minority voter influence within their districts” (Bird, 2011, p. 213-214). This means that a larger number of minority representatives does not immediately mean more substantive representation of the group especially if it is achieved by safe seats, which produce weaker accountability. Another drawback of safe seats is that political participation and citizens’ involvement tend to decrease significantly. As long as the seats are reserved, and constituents are insufficiently active in politics, there are no mechanisms to encourage representatives to act as advocates of minority rights. Substantive representation is, therefore, unlikely to occur in legislative bodies that adopted these electoral mechanisms.

Some authors argue that effectiveness of minority representation might depend on where district representatives come from. For example, those who come from poor districts with high unemployment rates or lower levels of education tend to represent better minority interests than those from more-affluent districts. However, in her research on committee work Gamble proved this variable insignificant (Gamble, 2007, p. 428). Still, ethnic or racial composition of districts might have higher significance (Gamble, 2007, p. 427, Saalfeld and Bischof, 2012). For example, black representatives who come from majority-black districts should represent the minority interest better than those who come from other districts. Therefore, if a representative depends only on minority votes, he will be more responsive to minority interests. As Casellas and Leal (2011) show, in electoral districts where minorities make up a significant proportion of citizens, the chances are higher that they will be more responsive to minority perspectives and interests.
Party affiliation and party ideology can also influence minority representation. There are at least two aspects of the party system that influence the behaviour of a representative: ideology, and dominant rules and practices within a party. For example, left-wing parties tend to be more supportive of minority representation (Eelbode, 2010). Some authors argue that the Democrats in USA are more inclined towards minority interests than the Republicans (Casellas and Leal, 2011, Lublin, 1997). Dominant rules and practices within a party are the second determinant of representatives’ behaviour. Tatari (2010) shows that a strong party whip has a large impact on a representative’s behaviour: “The interviews with Muslim city councillors revealed a counter-intuitive finding, in that, in most cases, political parties are an obstacle to democratic representation of Muslims in Britain, in particular where there is low electoral competition. Most of the Muslim councillors voiced their concern about the strong party whip. Decisions are made within the party group meetings, and councillors are not allowed to dissent with party decisions in the council chamber. There are serious repercussions for dissent, such as suspension of party membership” (Tatari, 2010, p. 58). Parties favour minority candidates for elected office who are “seen to avoid drawing undue attention to their ethnic origin, ethnic identity or public policy questions over racial inequality” (Tatari, 2010, p. 58).

Institutional position can also be one of the factors affecting representatives’ responsiveness. Hall (1987) distinguishes between five institutional positions in parliamentary committee: subcommittee membership, subcommittee position, full committee position, freshman status, minority status. Gamble argues that representatives who have certain positions like committee leadership tend to advocate more actively for minority interests (Gamble, 2007, p. 428, 433). Hall further suggests that minority status should also enhance formal participation in the committee since a minority representative is more likely to be excluded from the informal deliberations. “The markup becomes their opportunity to react to and try to amend the majority vehicle” (Hall, 1987, p. 114). Finally, it is to be expected that first-term representatives still have to learn procedures and rules and to adapt to institutional obligations and expectations and therefore engage less in substantive and risky activities (Saalfeld and Bischof, 2012).

A representative’s interests and goals are another determining factor in a representative’s behaviour. In the analysis of factors that determine participation in US Congress committee decision-making, Hall argues that congressmen goals are one of the important factors: “Committee work is especially costly. Each bill on which a member participates directly diminishes time for other profitable activities: constituency relations, floor action, or involvement in some other committee bill, to name but a few. To
participate the member must expect gains from the labor. I hypothesize here that congressmen selectively participate in order to advance certain political goals” (Hall, 1987, p. 108). Congressmen’s goals might be reelection, serving the district, making good policy, making a personal mark and promoting the president’s agenda (Hall, 1987). These goals should apply to minority representatives’ behaviour as well, both in the plenum and in the committees. Saalfeld and Bischof (2012) suggest that those representatives who pursue goals to redress grievances or advocate for specific policies and oversee their implementation in parliament should be particularly active on minority issues. They argue that representatives can prefer several roles in the parliament: “checking the executive (Policy Advocates); monitoring institutional structures (Parliament Men); making ministers (Ministerial Aspirants); and redressing grievances (Constituency Members)” (Saalfeld and Bischof, 2012, p. 8). Saalfeld and Bischof expect that MPs are particularly active on minority issues if they act as ‘policy advocates’ or ‘constituency members’. “’Ministerial aspirants’ or MPs in ‘position roles’ are generally more constrained and considerably less likely to ask any questions in the Chamber. This applies to all MPs irrespective of their ethnicity” (Saalfeld and Bischof, 2012, p. 9).

Personal experience of oppression or discrimination may also shape the behaviour of a representative and a feeling of belonging to the group might be an incentive for substantive action. Gamble (2007) argues, deriving his view from Dawson, that members of historically discriminated groups tend to associate their lives with the groups and representatives who notice large economic disparities between their social group and the privileged group will advocate more for the group interest.

2.6. CONCLUSION

The aim of this chapter was to unpack the relations between different elements of political representation. We started from acknowledging that divisions and differences in social and economic positions in most democratic societies are formed along race, ethnic, religious or gender lines. It is, then, shown that measures to increase descriptive representation are needed when equal electoral rights do not give equal opportunities to members of minority groups to win parliamentary seats. Moreover, affirmative action measures to increase the presence of descriptive representatives are justified only if they are enacted to challenge social inequalities and discrimination practices.
Equal opportunities for descriptive representation matter because they symbolize equality in terms of citizenship and political rights. However, descriptive representation can also contribute to an increase in trust between constituents and representatives, increasing legitimacy of political institutions and political decisions. It makes groups’ claims publicly legitimate and increases the self-confidence of group members in terms of their capability to rule and make political decisions. Finally, it maximizes social knowledge expressed in discussions and makes decision-makers more aware of possible solutions.

When it comes to substantive representation defined as speaking for, acting for and in the interest of the represented, intra group diversity warns us that groups cannot be treated as individuals. There are no common group interests and opinions the representative should act for. Still, members of disadvantaged groups share similar social positions and experiences of structural discrimination which provide grounds for substantive representation. Consequently, members of a disadvantaged social group show interest in anti-discrimination policies, minority rights and improving their social and economic position in society. Group representatives should have an opportunity to act for these interests and attempt to make political decisions more equal and just.

Several potential benefits of descriptive representation for enhancing substantive representation were identified in this chapter: to assure adequate communication between representatives and constituents, to bring new issues to the agenda and new interpretations of existing policies and political issues, to challenge dominant discourses and structural relations of privilege and oppression and to raise minority related questions and advocate for basic minority interests. Substantive group representation means advocating for anti-discrimination legislation, respect for human and minority rights, raising awareness about structural injustices, scrutinizing the implementation of minority-related laws by the government, etc.

After had been explained the need for both descriptive and substantive representation of disadvantaged social groups, I turned to correlations between them. In order to set the stage for answering the main research question ‘Does descriptive representation lead to substantive and under which conditions?’ I proposed a set of possible data for measuring substantive representation, which are: MPs’ personal websites, blogs or social network accounts, parliamentary debates’ transcripts, number of law proposals and amendments to the bill proposed by descriptive representatives, parliamentary questions, reports and transcripts of committee work and data on voting on legislation.
Previous empirical research studies produced contradictory findings on the correlation between substantive and descriptive representation. They indicate that descriptive representation can act as an incentive for substantive but this does not happen under all conditions. Does this mean that there is no causal relationship between descriptive and substantive representation? If there were strong causal relations between descriptive and substantive representation, we could have expected that descriptive representatives addressed minority issues at least to some extent regardless of other institutional conditions or personal and party interests and goals. This is, however, not the case. In order to understand conditions under which substantive representation occurs and the ways the effectiveness of descriptive representation can be strengthened, empirical research should consider other incentives and constraints for substantive representation. To understand them, possible determining factors were presented. These are the electoral system, party ideology and party rules and practices, representative’s institutional position and representatives’ goals and personal interests. As for now, it can be expected that substantive representation does not follow directly from descriptive representation. However, empirical findings are still needed to support the argument and to suggest measures to foster substantive representation. They will be provided in the following chapters.
CHAPTER 3: SETTING THE SCENE – NATIONAL MINORITIES IN SERBIA

3.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter sets the scene for empirical research of substantive representation of national minorities in Serbia. Serbia is a country with a pronounced homogenous structure of the population with 83.32% of population declaring themselves as Serbs according to the 2011 population census. Yet, Serbia is also a rich multicultural society with more than twenty national minorities. Most of the minority groups are politically organized around their ‘own’ minority political parties. There are 51 registered minority political parties in Serbia representing fourteen national minorities. Despite the rich ethnic diversity of the population and the large number of minority parties, only Hungarian, Bosniak, Albanian, Croatian, Roma, and, more recently, Macedonian minorities have been descriptively represented in the parliament through their minority political parties.

Presence of minorities in the parliament depends on at least several factors: the size, territorial concentration and unity of minority groups, political equality and level of respect for minority rights and electoral and party rules. Almost twenty years after the end of nationalistic and ethnically motivated wars in ex-Yugoslav countries, Serbian society is still highly nationalistic: the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia defines Serbia as the state of Serbs and its other citizens; minorities are largely discriminated against in the labour market; and public surveys show high levels of intolerance especially among youths towards other ethnicities and identity groups (CESID, 2012). In addition, the space for minority representation in Serbia has opened only after the democratic changes in 2000 particularly after the introduction of affirmative action measures in 2004. Amendments to the electoral laws at the beginning of 2004 lifted the 5% electoral threshold for political parties of national minorities in order to facilitate descriptive representation of minorities.

This chapter analyses the context of minority representation, social and institutional incentives and constraints on the presence of minorities in the parliament. Its structure is as follows: the first section explains the ethnic structure of the Serbian population, regional differences, reasons for territorial concentration of minorities and the
dominant role of ethnicity in political organizing. Aiming to understand the context of minority descriptive representation in the Serbian parliament, the second section explores minority related legislation, the status of minorities in society and the implementation of minority rights. The final section traces ‘mirror’ representation of minorities in Serbia since the introduction of the multiparty system in 1990, analyses its changes and briefly explains their causes.

3.2. ETHNIC STRUCTURE OF THE POPULATION IN SERBIA

Among more than twenty national minorities living in Serbia, the most numerous are Hungarians (3.53%), Bosniaks (2.02%), Roma (2.05%), Albanians (app. 0.82%) and Croats (0.81%) (see Table 1). National minorities are traditionally settled in Serbia and form an important part of Serbian society. Except for the Roma, other national minorities are territorially concentrated in particular regions or municipalities in Serbia. The majority of national minorities live in Vojvodina, Northern Province of Serbia. With 66.76% of Serbs, 13% of Hungarians, 2.60% Slovaks, 2.43% Croats, 2.19% Roma and numerous other minorities, Vojvodina is truly multiethnic society (see Table 1).

The majority of minority groups settle in the regions near the borders with their homelands: Hungarians are concentrated in the north of the country near the border with Hungary, Romanians near the border with Romania, Bulgarians in the South-Eastern part of Serbia near the border with Bulgaria, etc. (see Appendix A). Hungarians inhabit the northern districts of Vojvodina (98.9%) - North Bačka and North Banat areas - forming an absolute majority of the population in the municipalities Ada, Kanjiža, Senta, Čoka, Bačka Topola and Mali Idoš. 98.27% of Bosniaks live in Sandžak, the south-western part of the country near the border with Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro. They inhabit three Sandžak municipalities Nova Varoš (4.7%), Priboj (14%) and Prijepolje (34.5%) and form the majority of the population in Tutin (90%), Sjenica (73.9%) and Novi Pazar (77.1%). The majority of Albanians live along the border with Kosovo. According to the 2002 Population Census Albanians form the majority of the population in two municipalities: Preševo (89.1%) and Bujanovac (54.7%) and a very high percentage of the population in Medvedja (26.2%). Croats are concentrated in Vojvodina, mostly in Srem and Bačka. They live in larger numbers in Vojvodina municipalities: Subotica, Sombor, Novi Sad, Apatin,
Sremska Mitrovica, Šid, Ruma and Indjija. Roma are the only territorially dispersed national minority in Serbia living in virtually all parts of the country, from Subotica to Bujanovac. Territorial dispersion affects their ability to unite and mobilize along minority party lines. Their parties are extremely divided, which causes dissipation of Roma votes and electoral failures.

Table 1: Ethnic composition of the population of Serbia and regions in Serbia according to the 2011 Population census (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Serbia</th>
<th>Belgrade region</th>
<th>Vojvodina</th>
<th>Šumadija and Western Serbia</th>
<th>South and Eastern Serbia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>83.32</td>
<td>90.72</td>
<td>66.76</td>
<td>88.57</td>
<td>89.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanians*</td>
<td>0.08 (0.82)</td>
<td>0.08 (0.09)</td>
<td>0.12 (0.08)</td>
<td>0.03 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.11 (3.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosniaks</td>
<td>2.02</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>7.03</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgarians</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunyevtsi</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vlachs</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>2.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gorani</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavs</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarians</td>
<td>3.53</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>13.00</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonians</td>
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<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.23</td>
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<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
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<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.71</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germans</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
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<tr>
<td>Roma</td>
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<td>1.65</td>
<td>2.19</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>3.66</td>
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<td>Romanians</td>
<td>0.41</td>
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<td>1.32</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruthenians</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slovaks</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slovenians</td>
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<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.03</td>
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<td>Ukrainians</td>
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<td>0.03</td>
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<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
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<td>Croats</td>
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<td>0.47</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegrins</td>
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<td>0.60</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
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<td>Other</td>
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<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
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<td>2.35</td>
<td>4.19</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>1.60</td>
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<td>0.08</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.02</td>
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<td>Unknown</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>1.38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


More than 1% of population (2011 census data)
More than 1% (2002 census data)

*Albanians from Pčinjski District boycotted the Census in 2011. The results from the 2002 census, which reflect more accurately the Albanian population, are given in brackets.

The ethnic medley and territorial concentration of national minorities in Serbia is a result of spontaneous as well as planned migrations, assimilation processes, the rising of
national consciousness and natural changes in the population rate throughout the centuries. Many of the regions populated by minorities became parts of Serbia only at the beginning of the 20th century\(^4\). The migration of population was part of the population policies of the countries under whose jurisdictions these regions fell, i.e. the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire, but also the countries that occupied parts of the Serbian territory during the world wars. Although the Serbian population in the present-day regions of Serbia was significant even during 17\(^{th}\) and 18\(^{th}\) centuries, further migrations of Serbs were followed by an enlargement of Serbia, particularly after the Congress of Berlin in 1878 when Serbia was declared independent and was given additional territories, during the Balkan Wars in 1912/1913 and after the two world wars. Before more detailed explanations of the ethnic medley of the Serbian population are given, it should be noted that the term ‘national minorities’ did not exist in Serbia until the beginning of the twentieth century. The awakening of national consciousness (i.e. self-identification with ethnic identity) started later in the Balkans than in the rest of Europe. There was no widespread nationalism before the beginning of the twentieth century even among Serbs, and some ethnic minorities such as Vlachs have still not developed national consciousness, while Germans in Vojvodina reached it only during 1930’s (Markovich, 2011). The process of the Roma becoming an ethnic group started only after the Second World War and their numbers increased over time. Therefore, during the 19\(^{th}\) century and before there were only ethnic minorities and groups in Serbia, but not national minorities.

Until the Balkan Wars, Serbia was an ethnically homogenous state. Its territory consisted of what is nowadays Central Serbia – Belgrade, Šumadija and Western Serbia regions. Its ethnic homogeneity can be explained by large assimilation processes during the 19\(^{th}\) century. These territories formed the Principality of Serbia, the suzerain state of the Ottoman Empire. Although national identity was not developed yet at that stage, religious identity was strong. As the territory was under the Ottomans, the significant ‘other’ were Muslims or Turks which “facilitated assimilation of all other Christian groups into Serbs, a people who came to be focal point of non-Muslim identity” (Markovich, 2011, p. 92). According to the 1866 census, Serbs comprised 86.95\% of the population, the Romanians and Vlachs 10.47\%, Gypsies 2.07\%, and Jews 0.13\%. As members of ethnic groups who shared the same religion with the Serbs assimilated with them, the percentage of Serbs grew to 95.43\% by the census of 1910 (Markovich, 2011, p. 92).

\(^4\) Vojvodina, for example, became part of Serbia in 1918.
Due to the victories in the Balkan Wars, Serbia expanded its territory in 1912/1913 taking within its borders Vardar Macedonia, Kosovo and the northern part of the Sanjak of Novi Pazar. This significantly changed the ethnic structure of the population in Serbia: the percentage of Muslims, particularly Albanians, Turks, Roma and Slavic Muslims, considerably increased. The high percentage of Muslims in the Sandžak region was caused by the emigration of the Christian population, the Islamization of the urban Christian population, the immigration of the new Muslim population, and the transfer of Turkish soldiers to new bases for further Turkish conquests during the Ottoman Empire. Many of the Muslims also immigrated to the Sandžak region during the 19th century from Austria-Hungary, Serbia and Montenegro because the territory was still under the Sultan’s law (Vlahović, 1995). Yet, even at that time, around 50% of Sandžak population were Christians (mostly Serbs and Montenegrins). However, in the period 1961-1991, the Serb and Montenegrin population decreased by 18.63%, and “among others, the reasons were: emigration for economic reasons, religious and national intolerance and the low natural population increase rate” (Rudić and Stepić, 1995).

After the First World War, Vojvodina became part of Serbia, bringing more ethnic groups under its authority. According to the 1910 census data, the majority of the population of Vojvodina consisted of Serbs (33.8%), Hungarians (28.1%) and Germans (21.4%). The number of Hungarians and Germans in Vojvodina increased significantly during the time of the Austro-Hungarian Empire when Vojvodina was under Hungarian jurisdiction. The most numerous among other ethnic groups in Vojvodina at the beginning of the 20th century were Romanians (4.97%), Slovaks (3.75%) and Croats (2.25%) (Djurić, Ćurčić et al., 1995). Croatia and large parts of Romania and Slovakia also belonged to the Austro-Hungary. Since there was no border between today’s Vojvodina and these parts of its neighbouring countries it is not surprising that their citizens also settled in the territory of Vojvodina. In between the two world wars a number of minorities moved to their homeland, especially Hungarians after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The number of Hungarians also decreased because some of the citizens who had declared themselves Hungarians during the Hungarian rule in Vojvodina, now declared themselves members of other nationalities. This was especially the case with Croats who were encouraged to declare their true nationality as the territory became part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. Since Vojvodina officially became part of Serbia in 1918, many

5 “Sanjak” is a Turkish word for Sandžak which means “region, province” and was used in relations between Austro-Hungary and Ottoman Empire to name a Turkish territory which served as a corridor through which the Ottoman empire was connected with its estates in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Vlahović, 1995).
Serbs also migrated to its territory which influenced the increase in the Serb population. After the Second World War almost the whole German population emigrated from Serbia. They comprised only 1.91% of the total population of Vojvodina according to the first post-war census, and 0.37% in 1971 (Djurić, Ćurčić et al., 1995). Also immediately after the Second World War, the colonisation of Vojvodina was organized under the name “Settling of veterans and veterans' families in Vojvodina”. “Most of the colonists came from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia, which means that the population brought to Vojvodina was mostly Serbian - 73.5% Serbs, 10.5% Montenegrins, etc.” (Djurić, Ćurčić et al., 1995). Most of the colonists inhabited the old German settlements. After the colonisation took place, the ethnic structure of the population in Vojvodina significantly changed: in 1953 it consisted of two predominant groups – Serbs with 50.9% of Vojvodina population and Hungarians with 25.6% - while less numerous were Croats, Montenegrins, Macedonians, Romanians, Ruthenians, Slovaks, and others (Djurić, Ćurčić et al., 1995).

The final large migration in Serbia happened during the 1990s. The ethnic wars during the 1990s caused large scale migrations in all ex-Yugoslav states. More than 500,000 Serbs came as refugees to Serbia from Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in the period from 1990-1995 and more than 200,000 internally displaced persons came from Kosovo thereby significantly changing the ethnic structure of Serbian population. Among the internally displaced persons from Kosovo were: 207,500 Serbs, 30,000 Roma and 13,500 Gorani (Bataković, 2011, p. 286). Finally, ethnic conflicts in Kosovo and the final declaration of Kosovo independence in 2008 additionally contributed to the ethnic homogenization of Serbia since many Albanians moved to Kosovo or Western Europe during the 1990s and early 2000s. This resulted in a decrease in the percentage of Albanians in Serbia from 17.1 % (according to the 1991 census data) of the total population to 0.82% (according to the 2002 census data).

Patterns that have produced the current ethnic structure across Serbia, including wars, migrations, border changes and assimilation processes have influenced strong divisions among ethnic groups and produced ethnic cleavage as one of the dominant cleavages in Serbian society. This has also been reflected in the political participation of national minorities. Even since the beginning of the 20th century, mainstream political parties have not been open towards minorities and minorities have preferred their own political parties to membership of mainstream parties. Mainstream party elites have attempted either to assimilate minority representatives or, with the help of the police, prevent them from organizing politically (Antonić, 1998). Depending on their territorial concentration, size of the group, ethnic unity, and electoral and other institutional
incentives and constraints, minority political parties have been more or less successful in organizing themselves politically and securing a presence in representative institutions. This will be explored in more detail later in this chapter, after the introduction of the status of minorities and the level of minority rights in Serbia.

3.3. LEGAL STATUS AND MINORITY RIGHTS IN SERBIA

Serbia has made significant improvements in the protection of minority rights and freedoms in the last decade. The most visible achievements are in the legislative sphere. However, laws are often not implemented and national minorities are still structurally discriminated against in society. Transition to democracy after the elections in 2000 marked the beginning of the new policies and attitudes towards national minorities. Compared to the Milošević regime and nationalistic and war politics during the 1990s when minority rights were heavily violated and minority citizens faced ethnically motivated attacks, violence and hate speeches, the 2000s represented a period of increased legislative protection of minority rights and freedoms. The change was partly motivated by the role political parties of national minorities had in the opposition movement during the 1990s and partly by the new government’s turn towards international cooperation and integration. Joining the OSCE in 2000 and the Council of Europe in 2003, Serbia was requested to make substantial improvements in terms of respecting human and minority rights (Stanovčić, 2004, Stanovčić, 2008, p. 493). The country also ratified the major international conventions and agreements on protection of national minorities’ rights, notably the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities in 2001 and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages in 2005.

The first minority related law, the Law on Protection of Rights and Freedoms of National Minorities (Federal Minority Law), was adopted in 2002 at a federal level. This law

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6 This is especially the case in the field of cultural autonomy. For example, national minorities have the right to education in their own language, but this right is still not implemented in many parts of Serbia where minorities live. Reasons for weak implementation of this right range from the resistance of local governments, to a lack of teachers and professors who speak the language and a lack of school materials in minority languages. Also, the right to official use of minority languages is not practically available in many areas, especially in terms of contacts with public administration.

7 Attacks on members of national minorities, often initiated and organized by the Serbian Radical Party (SRS), include setting fire to properties belonging to minorities, physical violence, media campaigns against minorities and threats that their property will be destroyed or family members harmed unless they move out of Serbia.

8 The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was created by Serbia and Montenegro on 27 April 1992 after the dissolution of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The federation was reconstituted as a
introduced and defined the term ‘national minority’ and recognized a number of individual and collective rights of national minorities. National minorities are defined as:

“any groups of citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia numerically sufficiently representative and, although representing a minority in the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, belonging to a group of residents having a long term and firm bond with the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and possessing characteristics such as language, culture, national or ethnic affiliation, origin or confession, differentiating them from the majority of the population and whose members are distinguished by care to collectively nurture their common identity, including their culture, tradition, language or religion” (Article 2).

Such a broad and open definition allows even the groups with less than 2000 members such as Egyptians, Ashkali, Jews or Czechs (acc. 2011 census) to enjoy all individual and cultural rights as the more numerous ethnic groups. The question is whether there should be a ‘threshold’ number for groups to be recognized as national minorities or not. Recognition of only more numerous groups would give them privileged status compared to the smaller minorities. It would also lead to double discrimination against smaller minorities – not only would they be in a discriminated position compared to the majority ethnic group, but also compared to the more numerous national minority groups. Therefore, a definition of national minorities adopted in Serbia provides more equal treatment of minorities in society. However, this can also lead to fragmentation of minority groups which can hinder the achievement of minorities’ goals and substantive representation of minority rights. If, for example, Bunyevtsi and Šokci were treated as Croats, Egyptians and Ashkali as Albanians and Vlachs as Romanians, the size of Croatian, Albanian and Romanian minority would have been much bigger and they could have expected to have had a more significant influence in society. The bigger the group, the higher are the chances for it to be politically represented. Yet, even under these circumstances, there is no guarantee that members of sub-groups would identify themselves with the larger minority group they are expected to belong to. On the contrary

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they might even assimilate with mainstream group or exist as a ‘hidden minority’\(^{10}\) deprived of any group rights.

To support the argument, I will give an example of the group of Bulgarians in Vojvodina known as Banat Bulgarians (originally: \textit{palćene} or \textit{banátsći balgare}). They are Catholic while Bulgarians in Bulgaria are Orthodox, and their language is different from official Bulgarian (Sikimić, 2007). However, they are not recognized, nor did they request to be recognized as a distinct ethnic group. The problem, however, appears when implementing the rights to education and information in a minority language. Although national minorities have the right to education in their native language, Banat Bulgarians do not have the right to be educated in the Banat Bulgarian language but in official Bulgarian. Although the Banat Bulgarian language can be treated as a Bulgarian dialect, the two languages use different scripts and have substantial differences. Hence, Banat Bulgarians choose to be educated in Serbian and not in what is considered to be their native language, and children find Bulgarian difficult to learn as it is effectively a foreign language. If a more restricted definition of national minorities was adopted, smaller minorities (e.g. Vlachs, Bunyevtsi, Šokci, Egyptians, Ashkali) would probably find themselves in a similar position to the Banat Bulgarians. Hence, an open and more liberal definition of minority groups than the one adopted in the Federal Minority Law is a more just and fair approach.

The other important legal document defining the status and rights of national minorities is the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia adopted in 2006. It guarantees individual and collective rights to members of national minorities (Articles 75-81), special protection to national minorities to achieve full equality and preserve their identity (Article 14, paragraph 2) and opts for affirmative action measures to ensure justice and political equality of minority groups in society. The Constitution of Serbia recognized affirmative action in favour of national minorities, in Article 76, paragraph 3, according to which “there are not to be considered as discrimination specific regulations and temporary measures that may be introduced by the Republic of Serbia in the economic, social, cultural and political life, in order to achieve full equality among persons belonging to national minorities and people who belong to the majority, if they are aimed at eliminating

\(^{10}\) “Hidden minorities are numerically small population groups with common origin and unsolved status in their residence state (they do not ask for minority rights or it is not allowed), they do not have their own intellectual elite, they often do not behave as political actors, and are loyal to their residence state. There is an internal communication within the group: common language, religion, customs; while the long-lasting resistance to assimilation is due to the local tradition” (Sikimić, 2007, p. 11). The term was created by the groups of researchers at the University of Graz, Austria and was used to name the group of officially non-recognized small ethnic groups in Austria, Slovenia and Croatia.
extremely unfavourable living conditions which particularly affect them”. The Constitution also provides for cultural autonomy of national minorities through national councils of national minorities which exercise the right to self-governance of national minorities in the fields of culture, education, information and official use of their language and script (Article 75). However, these rights could not have been exercised without adequate legislative specification and finally, several minority-relevant laws such as Law on National Council of National Minorities (Law on NCNM); Anti-Discrimination Law; Law on Culture; Law on Foundations of Education System; Law on Higher Education; Law on Textbooks; and Law on Amendments to the Law on Official Use of Language and Script, which were adopted during the VIII National Assembly (2008-2012).

Despite large number of legally recognized minority rights and generally positive political discourse towards minorities, it cannot be concluded that Serbia is committed to the protection of minority rights and freedoms. Improvements are rather symbolic and very few substantial improvements in the treatment of minorities are visible. Many laws are mutually inconsistent in the provisions related to national minorities, which is often used as an excuse for their non-implementation. For example, although Law on NCNM; Law on Culture; and Law on Foundations of Education System were adopted on the same day in parliament, they regulated governance of minority cultural institutions in an inconsistent manner. While, for example, one law prescribed that national councils propose members of Management Boards and give consent to the selection of a director in institutions of special importance for education of national minorities, according to the other, national councils had the right to propose at least one board member and give an opinion on the election of director. The Law on NCNM further prescribes that when several national councils nominate institution of culture as institution of special importance for a national minority, each council proposes one member of the Management Board, while the Law on Culture prescribes that they jointly propose one board member. These inconsistencies were often practically resolved by not consulting National councils at all and not having any minority representative in education and cultural institutions. Also, although the privatization of all local and regional media is required by the Broadcasting Law, the Law on NCNM allows national councils to own media in a minority language. The biggest problem in the functioning of national councils is related to institutions of special importance for preservation, promotion and development of the national identity of a national minority. The Law on NCNM does not specify any criteria for nomination of these institutions. This has, for example, led to the declaration of Zoo in Palić as an institution of special
importance for Croatian national minority\textsuperscript{11}. According to current regulation, national councils have the right to nominate any institution as institution of special importance for their minority without local, provincial or state government consent or approval. This causes various practical problems, interethnic tensions and disputes between local governments and national councils. The main problem is caused by the right of the national council (guaranteed by the Law on NCNM) to participate in the governing of these institutions.

National minorities are also widely discriminated against in society starting from negative public attitudes towards some minorities, through discrimination in the labour market, to some direct physical attacks on citizens belonging to minority groups (Bieber, 2007, CESID, 2012). Persuasive indicators of the durability and depth of ethnic tensions are recent surveys showing negative attitudes of the young population towards minorities (YUCOM, 2012). The results show that there is a high social distance among the majority of high school students towards Albanians, Roma, Bosniaks and Croats. Finally, the Constitution itself begins with a discriminative and nationalist tone defining Serbia as “a state of Serbs and all citizens who live in it, based on the rule of law and social justice, principles of civil democracy, human and minority rights and freedoms, and commitment to European principles and values” (Article 1). Making a clear distinction between Serbs and other citizens of Serbia reassures us that policy makers have honest intentions to secure socio-economic and political equality of all citizens.

The introduction of affirmative action measures for political participation of political parties of national minorities in 2004 can also be interpreted in a similar vein (Bieber, 2007, p. 243-244). In order to increase the descriptive representation of national minorities, Serbia lifted 5% electoral threshold for political parties of national minorities. According to the Law on Amendments to the Law on the Election of Deputies adopted in 2004, “political parties of national minorities and coalitions of political parties of national minorities participate in the distribution of seats even when they receive less than 5% of votes of the total number of voters who voted” (Article 81). Minority parties needed to cross only the so-called ‘natural’ or proportional threshold according to which one parliamentary seat equals the number of citizens who voted in elections divided by the

\textsuperscript{11} This is problematic because the aim of introducing the term “institutions of special importance” in the Law on NCNM was to include national minorities in the decision-making in institutions of education, culture and information which are directly relevant to minority culture and identity. Since it cannot be said that Zoo is in any sense important for the protection of minority (or any other) culture, similar practices stultify the regulation that had good intentions and cause protests and resistance of the majority citizens and local governments against the regulation as such.
number of parliamentary seats. ‘Natural’ threshold as an affirmative action measure was introduced rather as a reaction to the failure of minority electoral lists to cross the 5% threshold than as a genuine intention of political inclusion of minorities. Since none of the political parties of national minorities won a seat in the parliament in 2003 elections, this reflected negatively on the perception of Serbia in the international community.

The new Law on Amendments to the Law on the Election of Deputies, lifting the threshold for minority parties, was adopted immediately after the constitution of the new Parliament, only 2 months after the elections. This measure was chosen among many others because of its simplicity, as was explained by the proposers of the bill. The bill was proposed by a group of 53 MPs from the then ruling Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS). This is how Branislav Ristivojević, MP from DSS and representative of the proposers of the bill, explained the proposal: “We proposed the way we consider least painful, the easiest and the fastest and easiest to urgently implement. This is very simple, to simply lift the 5% threshold for political parties of national minorities. This is also not hard to carry out mathematically. Very simple to do. The only change following this proposed opportunity for parties of national minorities is introduction of the category party of national minority. REC could, as we suggested, make a selection. This right would be given only to political parties which advocate in their manifests solely and primarily for the rights of national minorities ... I repeat, this is not the only possibility to solve the problem, but now, urgently, in short period we have to intervene in certain problems in this law, we believe this is the best solution that can be realized in a short time” (Stenographic Notes, 23 February 2004).

Although there were many objections to the bill and suggestions that reserved seats would be a more effective mechanism, all MPs except those from SRS voted in favour of it. As an MP from DS, the second largest opposition party at the time, Bojan Pajtić explained: “it would not be well received if we voted against” (Stenographic Notes, 23 February 2004). Amendments to the Law did not, however, include lowering the number of verified seats. The 5% threshold was too high for any minority party to even think of running independently for parliamentary elections. Therefore, 15 small and minority parties (Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians (SVM), League of Social-democrats of Vojvodina (LSV), Sandžak Democratic Party (SDP), League for Šumadija, Democratic European Movement, Citizen Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians, Croatian People’s Alliance, Democratic Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians (DSHV), Democratic Party of Roma in Serbia, Democratic Alliance of Bulgarians in Serbia, Vojvodina Union, European Party, Party for Sandžak, Liberal Bosniak Organization and Social Democratic Workers’ Party) formed a pre-electoral coalition Together for Tolerance to run jointly for 2003 parliamentary elections. The list, however, won only 4.2% of votes which was not enough for even one parliamentary seat. The coalition was officially formed only 20 days before the elections which potentially caused insufficient voters’ support. Another more important reason for electoral failure of the list Together for Tolerance was its heterogeneous structure due to which none of the minority groups could actually identify itself with it.

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signatures of voters necessary for registering of the electoral list. Equally as mainstream candidate lists, minority lists still needed to be supported by at least 10,000 signatures which made the process of registering for elections very difficult for minority parties.

The urgency for electoral changes can only be explained by the influence of the Council of Europe and the OSCE since there were four years left until the new elections. Indeed, the Council of Europe considered the 5% threshold unfavourable to national minorities and expressed its concerns because the threshold was not lifted for the parliamentary elections in December 2003 (Council of Europe, 2004, p. 26). In the Election Observation Mission Report, published in February 2004, the OSCE also recommended amendments to the electoral law to facilitate the representation of national minorities in the parliament (OSCE/ODIHR, 2004).

3.4. DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION OF NATIONAL MINORITIES IN SERBIA

The presence of national minorities in representative institutions is important because it reflects equal treatment of all citizens regardless of their ethnicity, and political decisions and policy outputs are expected to be more just if they reflect the diversity of the population. If minority representatives are accountable and act in the interest of their constituents, descriptive representation can also have symbolic benefits such as increasing the legitimacy of the system; it can induce citizens from minority groups to have more trust in the political decisions and institutions; and can contribute to the increased self-confidence of minority groups. In Serbia, the affirmative action measures have helped to increase the descriptive representation of national minorities significantly compared to the results of parliamentary elections in 2003 when none of the minority parties managed to enter parliament (see previous section and footnote 12).

The increase in descriptive minority representation could have potentially been influenced by the increased political engagement of minority citizens or a more favourable environment for minority participation. However, the same political parties were politically active prior to and after the introduction of affirmative action measures and the number of votes the minority parties have won in elections has not changed significantly when

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13Before 2007 parliamentary elections the Republic Electoral Commission (REC) decided to allow political parties of national minorities to submit only 3,000 citizens’ signatures with their candidate list, but the Constitutional Court abolished this decision in April 2008 explaining that the REC was not authorized to make such decision.
comparing 2003 and 2007 electoral results, meaning that only affirmative action measures could have influenced the increase in minority presence. In 2003 fifteen different small and minority political parties formed a coalition to run for parliamentary election and won 4.2% of the votes which was insufficient to cross the 5% electoral threshold. The following elections in 2007 brought 5 minority parties to the parliament: Hungarian SVM (1.30% of votes), Bosniak SDA (0.84%), Roma RP (0.36%) and URS (0.42%) and Albanian PDD (0.42%). They won in total fewer votes than the minority party coalition running for 2003 elections, but due to affirmative action measures, they won 8 seats in total (Hungarian 3 seats, Bosniak 2 seats, Roma 2 seats and Albanian 1 seat). Seven minority MPs were elected in the elections a year later: four MPs representing the Hungarian minority, two representing the Bosniak minority and one representing Albanians. The number of the national minority MPs increased after the 2012 parliamentary elections when minority parties won 10 seats through affirmative action measure.

Besides elections through affirmative action measures, minority parties can also enter parliament through the mainstream parties’ electoral lists. Especially parties of smaller minorities tend to make pre-electoral coalition agreements with mainstream parties which guarantee them a safe seat in the parliament in exchange for their support of the mainstream party candidacy. Pre-electoral party coalitions are common in Serbia, not only among minority parties, because the relatively high threshold makes it more difficult for small parties to gather enough votes independently. Since minority political parties have a very limited electorate, many of them support influential mainstream parties in order to secure political representation. Having a minority party on its electoral list allows a mainstream party to present itself as supported by national minorities in general thereby attracting not only votes of the coalition partner’s supporters but also of other minority citizens. This is of particular importance for parties which seek votes from voters in Vojvodina. In the 2004-2007 convocation, two Bosniak minority representatives were elected to parliament on the list of one of the mainstream parties (Jovanović, 2008, p. 23-24, Orlović, 2008, p. 149). SDA supported the Democratic Party (DS) in the elections and their 2 seats were a result of a pre-electoral coalition agreement. In the 2007 elections 4 minority MPs (1 Croatian from DSHV and 3 Bosniak from SDP) entered parliament through the electoral list of the DS. The same minority parties were in coalition with the DS again in the 2008 elections as a result of which Bosniak SDP gained 4 seats and Croatian DSHV 1 seat in the 2008-2012 Parliament. Finally, one Roma representative was elected through the list of the ultra-nationalistic SRS. The last elections in 2012 brought 4 minority MPs into the
parliament through the lists of mainstream parties (Croatian, Roma, Bosniak and Macedonian).

The effects of electoral rules for political parties of national minorities cannot, however, be compared to the electoral results prior to 2003 due to frequent changes in the electoral system and the volatile political climate. The electoral system has changed several times since the introduction of the multiparty system in 1990 primarily to ensure that the ruling SPS has a majority of seats after the elections. Although representation of national minorities was not the reason for the electoral changes, this also had an effect on minority descriptive representation (see Bašić and Crnjanski, 2006, p. 54-59, Jovanović, 2008, p. 45-96, Orlović, 2008, p. 319). The two-round majoritarian system with single-member constituencies was applied in the elections for the National Assembly in 1990. Following elections in 1992 and 1993 were held under the proportional system with 9 electoral districts, 5% electoral threshold and D'Hondt formula for seat allocation (Jovanović, 2008, p. 23). For the 1997 elections, the number of electoral districts increased to 29. The final change to the electoral rules was introduced after the 5th October 2000, when the whole country became a single electoral district, with a retained threshold of 5% and D'Hondt formula. In accordance with these rules, Parliamentary elections were held in 2000, 2003, 2007, 2008 and 2012 except that since 2004 the threshold for minority parties has been lifted.

In the 1990 elections political parties of national minorities won 14 seats, mainly due to territorial concentration and homogeneity of minorities in Serbia: Hungarian DZVM won 8 seats with only 2.6% of votes; Bosniak SDA won 1.7% of votes and secured 3 parliamentary seats; Croatian DSH, Bosniak DRSM and Albanian PDD won 1 seat each with votes of 0.5%, 0.1% and 0.44% respectively. The number of minority parties in the parliament decreased after the following elections as a consequence of the high 5% electoral threshold. Only representatives of the most numerous and territorially grouped minorities were able to cross the threshold. Two parties entered parliament: DZVM with 9 MPs and DRSM with 1. The elections held a year later under the same rules showed similar results: DZVM won 5 seats and a coalition of two Albanian parties, PDD and DPA 2 seats. The increase in the number of electoral districts from 9 to 29 slightly increased the presence of minority representatives in 1997, although the high threshold still represented an insurmountable barrier to most minority parties. Seats were won by: SVM - 4 seats, SDA 3 seats and PDD 1 seat. After 2000 the whole country became a single electoral district which impeded political parties of national minorities from winning any seat as independent candidates. Elections held in 2000 were specific because most of the
oppositional parties, including minority parties, joined forces in the Democratic Opposition of Serbia in order to defeat Milošević. The coalition jointly ran for presidential and federal parliamentary elections on 24th September 2000. Their candidate, Vojislav Koštunica won the elections but the results were recognized by Milošević only after the large popular protest several days after the elections. Shortly after the defeat of Milošević, early elections were organized for the National Assembly of Serbia and DOS won 64.8 % of votes and 176 seats. Eleven of these seats belonged to representatives of political parties of national minorities since 3 minority parties (Hungarian SVM and DZVM, and Bosniak SDP) were part of DOS. Eight seats went to SVM, one to DZVM and two to SDP.

Although national minorities have had their representatives in all parliaments since 1990, parliament was ineffective and controlled by Milošević’s party. National minorities were widely discriminated against both in political institutions and in society. Members of parliament depended on political parties, parliament depended on government and parliamentary Rules of Procedure were often violated in order to marginalize the opposition (Pavlović and Antonić, 2007, p. 91). The main field of oppositional action during the 1990s was in the streets, outside of the formal institutions which were controlled by the ruling Milošević party. Some of the minority parties also boycotted elections on several occasions. The parliament started to gain independence and influence only after the democratic changes in 2000, while it reached a consolidation phase after the second post-Milošević elections in 2007 (Pavlović and Antonić, 2007, p. 112). This is also the time when national minorities became more visible and the first opportunities for minority influence in the parliament appeared. Because of all this, research on the effectiveness of minority representation in Serbia should focus on post 2007 period.

3.5. CONCLUSION

The ethnic structure of the Serbian population is the result of forced and strategic migrations, assimilation processes and the rising of national consciousness throughout the centuries. Frequent changes of borders and authorities over particular territories resulted in unplanned displacement of many ethnic groups outside of their homelands. Most of the minority groups are now concentrated in the regions near the borders with their homelands. The turbulent history of ethnic settlement and especially the recent wars influenced the lack of interethnic cohesion and mutual toleration and produced large ethnic cleavages in Serbian society. Even since the beginning of the 20th century mainstream
political parties were not inclusive towards minorities and ethnic groups have been organized in separate minority political parties.

This chapter focused primarily on the political and legal context of descriptive representation of national minorities after 2000 for several reasons: first, the space for minority influence in political decisions has opened only after 2000 following the democratic changes, the opening of Serbia towards the international community and cooperation with OSCE, the Council of Europe and the beginning of the EU integration processes; second, the first legislative efforts were made after 2000 aiming to protect minority rights and freedoms; and third, Serbia introduced affirmative action measures in order to increase minority presence in the parliament. This period started with changes on the electoral rules introducing PR with a single electoral district for the whole country and a 5% electoral threshold. These changes had a negative effect on the presence of minorities in the parliament. Therefore, affirmative action measures were introduced lifting the threshold for minority parties. Since then, the number of representatives of minority parties in the Serbian parliament has varied between 12 and 14. Among them, only six national minorities have been directly represented: Hungarian, Bosniak, Albanian, Roma, Croatian and since 2012 Macedonian, while other minorities, despite a large number of different minority parties, have not managed to win parliamentary office.
CHAPTER 4: FROM DESCRIPTIVE TO SUBSTANTIVE REPRESENTATION

4.1. INTRODUCTION

Although descriptive representation has so far been the focus of the analysis, what members of national minorities need is their interests to be represented and heard in the parliament. Therefore, we have to direct our attention to the behaviour of the representatives. For minority interests to be represented, descriptive representation has to be accountable and strengthened by substantive representation. Substantive representation in the context of national minorities means that a representative speaks and acts in the basic interests of national minorities: advocates for human and minority rights and antidiscrimination policies, raises the problems minorities face in the society and tackles socio-economic issues of relevance for national minorities. The simple presence of group members in parliament is not sufficient to change the outcome of decision making and challenge structural inequalities and discrimination. Minority MPs are expected to speak for their groups, propose bills and amendments, raise issues relevant for minorities and when necessary use their veto powers to prevent discriminatory and unjust decisions.

Hence, this chapter examines the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation of national minorities in Serbia. Parliamentary activities of MPs from minority parties in the VIII National Assembly (2008-2012) are analysed aiming to understand if descriptive representatives act at the same time as substantive and how they used their parliamentary and government positions to represent the interests of national minorities. To this end qualitative content analysis of MPs’ speeches in plenary parliamentary debates was conducted. This chapter starts with a consideration of institutional incentives for effective and accountable behaviour of minority MPs which give reasons to expect that effective minority representation has occurred during the period analysed. The following section introduces briefly data collection techniques and methods
of data analysis. The third part presents the results of content analysis showing significant
differences in the behaviour of minority MPs and indicating that descriptive representation
does not necessarily lead to substantive representative action.

4.2. INSTITUTIONAL INCENTIVES FOR SUBSTANTIVE REPRESENTATION

Do minority MPs act as substantive representatives of their minorities? There are at least three strong institutional reasons to answer this question in the affirmative. First, minority MPs in Serbia are not elected as individuals but as members of their political parties and these parties are registered as political parties of national minorities. The Law on Amendments to the Law on the Election of Deputies adopted in 2004 defined political parties of national minorities in order to set criteria for the eligibility for the ‘natural’ threshold. According to this definition, “political parties of national minorities and coalitions of political parties of national minorities are those parties whose main goal is representation of the interests of national minorities and protection and improvement of rights of members of national minorities, according to international standards” (Article 13, paragraph 2 and 3). As representatives of a minority party, MPs are, therefore, expected to act primarily as substantive representatives, that is, to act in the interests of their minority.

Second, parliamentary seats are not reserved for national minorities. In order to win the seat minority parties need first to win the support of their constituents\textsuperscript{14}. Hence, the correlation between descriptive representation and accountability to constituents is strong in this case. Despite the ‘natural’ threshold a minority party or coalition still needs a significant number of votes which is especially a challenge for parties from smaller minority groups. The number of votes a minority party or coalition needs to win a seat depends on the turnout, but with the ‘natural’ threshold of 0.4\textsuperscript{15} of votes and an expected turnout of 60\% of voters, one minority seat is worth approximately 16,000 votes. Therefore,

---

\textsuperscript{14} There is a possibility that some voters vote for minority parties without expecting them to act as substantive minority representatives. For example, they might expect them to represent the needs of their geographical region, propose the best economic policies or even, expect some personal benefits. However, previous research has shown that voters in post-communist countries tend to vote along ethnic lines, meaning that those who vote for a minority party vote primarily because of its minority party status (Birmir, 2007, Stein, 2000).

\textsuperscript{15} ‘Natural’ threshold amounts to the total number of votes divided by the number of MPs (100\%:250=0.4\%).
substantive behaviour can be expected at least for MPs that won office through a minority list.

Third, most of the minority parties in the VIII National Assembly were part of a parliamentary majority which itself can be an indicator of substantive representation. Serbian parliament has 250 MPs in total. The parliamentary majority, which also elects the government, is formed by at least 50% plus 1 MP or 126 MPs. Most of the decisions in the National Assembly are passed by a majority vote of MPs at the session at which the majority of MPs are present. However, an absolute majority is needed for a number of major decisions for example the election and the dismissal of government and members of the judiciary, the passing of the budget laws, the giving of approval for the Statute of Vojvodina, the adoption of parliamentary Rules of procedure, and decisions on laws which regulate the enjoyment of individual and collective rights of members of national minorities (see Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, Article 105).

The majority in the VIII National Assembly consisted of 128 MPs from 5 parliamentary groups: For European Serbia (DS, SPO, LSV and minority DSHV, SDP - 78 MPs including 4 SDP and 1 DSHV MP), United Regions of Serbia (URS, 24 MPs), Socialist Party of Serbia – United Serbia (SPS, 15 MPs), Party of United Pensioners of Serbia (PUPS, 5 MPs), Parliamentary group of minorities (SVM, BDSS, SLPS - 6 MPs, without 1 MP from PDD). Due to the narrow parliamentary majority, eleven minority MPs from the parliamentary majority were crucial for decision making either because their presence or their vote was necessary for decisions to be made. Also, two out of the six minority parties held government office. SDP had the Minister of labour and social policy, and the SDA leader was a Minister without Portfolio. Croatian MP Petar Kuntić was part of the parliamentary group of the ruling party, DS and therefore part of the government. SVM had no government office but its 4 MPs were part of the parliamentary majority and without their support a government could not have been formed and parliamentary decisions could not have been made. These parties, therefore, acted as ‘veto players’¹⁶. MP Riza Halimi from PDD was part of the parliamentary group of minorities but did not officially support the government and in several cases voted against the bills proposed by the majority.

¹⁶ A veto player is “an individual or collective actor whose agreement is required for a change in policy” (Tsebelis, 1995, p. 301). Each partner in the government coalition is a veto player because their votes are needed for the policies to be passed. The support of minority parties was necessary for the government to stay in power. Without their votes, laws could not have been passed, i.e. they could jointly veto any policy change. Even in the oversized majority coalitions, where the policies can be passed even if one of the minor partners disagrees, “for the coalition to remain intact, the will of the different partners must be respected” (Tsebelis, 1995, p. 304).
Bearing in mind the institutional incentives presented here and the minority background of all MPs included in the research, substantive behaviour of MPs could have been expected. In order to test these theoretical assumptions, the following sections analyse the behaviour of the 12 minority MPs.

4.3. METHODOLOGY

Aiming to unpack the relations between descriptive and substantive representation of national minorities, this research employs content analysis of parliamentary transcripts of minority MPs’ speeches during the VIII National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia (2008-2012).

There are several reasons for choosing parliamentary transcripts. According to the theory presented in Chapter 2, there are different sets of data which can be used to measure substantive representation: MPs’ personal websites, blogs or social network accounts (Saalfeld and Kyriakopoulou, 2011), parliamentary debates’ transcripts (Bird, 2011), the number of laws proposed by minority representatives (Canon, 1999, Haynie, 2001), amendments to bills, parliamentary questions (Saalfeld and Bischof, 2012), committee work (Canon, 1999, Gamble, 2007) and voting on legislation (Casellas and Leal, 2011, Lublin, 1997, Swain, 1993a, Tate, 2003a, Whitby, 1997). Voting on legislation (roll-call votes) was the most frequently used indicator of substantive representation in previous research studies. However, these researches were conducted in majoritarian, ‘first-past-the-post’ electoral systems, e.g. USA and Canada while, on the other hand, Serbia has the proportional electoral system (PR). The voting behaviour of MPs differs significantly in these two systems. While they are more independent in the ‘first-past-the-post’ system, in PR, party discipline is much stronger and MPs tend to vote according to party lines. Hence, examining voting records would not be very useful in the case of Serbia. Further, the majority of all bills in Serbian parliament are proposed by the government and minority MPs have not yet proposed any minority specific law. Although the number of minority related laws adopted in the VIII National Assembly could be potential evidence of substantive representation, it should rather be linked to the EU integration process and recommendations of international institutions than to the legislative influence of minority MPs. In addition, most of the MPs in Serbia do not have websites, blogs or social network accounts. Hence, bill proposals and communication channels can be rejected as a data
source. Amendments to bills would be interesting to examine but not feasible in this case, because the parliamentary Rules of Procedure do not oblige MPs to submit amendments electronically. Committee work is also not of particular interest to this research for several reasons: meetings in the National Assembly of Serbia take place in camera; stenographic notes or audio recordings are taken only by demand of committee members (Rules of Procedure, Article 80); and committee membership is determined by partisan seat share (Rules of Procedure, Article 24), which structures “the nature of debate far more than is the case of parliamentary debates” (Bird, 2011, p. 216).

On the other hand, during legislative debates and question time MPs have a chance to raise minority specific issues and turn attention to minority problems. All the plenary debates are broadcast on Radio-television of Serbia, the state owned TV station, which makes plenary debates more attractive for MPs as it allows them to send messages to their voters and gain public support. This research, therefore, finds legislative debate transcripts and parliamentary questions to be the most useful data source for measuring substantive representation of national minorities in Serbia. Qualitative content analysis of MPs’ speeches during parliamentary debates can help us determine issues and interpretations that minority MPs bring to the political agenda. As Bird correctly argues, MPs “can choose either to speak or not to speak on certain themes and, in choosing to speak, can bring further nuances to these themes in the form of context or examples” (Bird, 2011, p. 216).

For research purposes, the speeches were downloaded from the web portal ‘Otvoreni parlament’ (Open Parliament). ‘Otvoreni parlament’ is a project of five NGOs with the aim of increasing the transparency of the parliament, inform citizens of the parliamentary work and establish regular communication between citizens and their representatives. It keeps records on all MPs, parliamentary groups and committees and parliamentary sessions, and has all parliamentary transcripts since 1997. Although all these data are officially received from the parliament, they are not available on the parliament web site. After the data had been collected, they were imported to NVivo, a program for computer assisted qualitative data analysis. In NVivo, a speech was taken as the unit of analysis. Analysis took the form of an interpretive thematic coding. The approach to coding was both deductive and inductive.

In the case of parliamentary transcripts all the speeches were coded for themes, with the emphasis on minority related speeches and themes that were present in these speeches. Both a priori and emergent coding were employed. Several main themes derived a priori from the theory: citizenship rights, discrimination, individual minority rights, cultural minority rights, social and economic policies towards minorities and participation...
of minorities in state and government institutions. The other themes such as agriculture, decentralization and the justice system reform emerged during data analysis. Three rounds of coding were conducted. First, with the aim of becoming familiar with the data, detailed emergent thematic coding was conducted. After the first preparatory phase two further rounds of coding were conducted: more general and thematic. In both of them speech was used as a unit of analysis which proved the most useful for further queries and exploration of data. The second round started with creating several codes with the aim of examining: what was on the agenda (e.g. debate on bills, debate on budget, question time); whether MPs spoke about the issues on the agenda or used their time to introduce new issues; whether speech was minority related, general or of regional interest and the type of intervention (e.g. general debate on the bill, explanation of amendments, questions, violation of rules of procedure, etc.). The third round of coding was used for more detailed identification of themes in speeches. It started as a priori coding but remained open for the new themes to emerge from the data.

4.4. RESULTS

Analysis of parliamentary speeches showed large differences in substantive behaviour of minority MPs. Although there were significant differences among individual MPs, they were most visible and most substantive between two groups of MPs: MPs elected through minority electoral lists (SVM, PDD, SLPS-BDSS) and MPs elected through mainstream electoral lists (SDP, DSHV). As previously explained, SVM, PDD and SLPS-BDSS won offices running for elections independently or in coalition with other minority parties, while SDP and DSHV supported DS, the biggest mainstream political party, and as a result of a pre-electoral coalition won an agreed number of parliamentary seats. Detailed findings are presented below in the following order: the first section compares more generally the extent of parliamentary activities, i.e. the number of speeches, number of minority and regionally relevant speeches and relations to parliamentary agenda, while the second involves a thematic analysis of speeches comparing two groups of MPs but also extends to more detailed analysis of the themes present in the speeches of each individual MP according to political party affiliation.
4.4.1. General

There is a large discrepancy among MPs in the number of speeches delivered in parliament. While Balint Pastor and Riza Halimi were very active, Petar Kuntić, Bajram Šehović and Vitomir Mihajlović barely spoke (see Table 2). There were 462 working days in plenum in the 2008-2012 parliament. Riza Halimi was the most active speaking on 78 days and delivering 136 speeches in total. Behind him is Balint Pastor with 92 speeches over 67 days. The least active were: Vitomir Mihajlović with only 1 active day and 2 speeches; Petar Kuntić with 6 days and 6 speeches; and Bajram Šehović with 4 active days delivering 8 speeches. Since all of these MPs are descriptive representatives of national minorities and political parties of national minorities, the only distinction, and potential explanation of the different activity level among these MPs is in the pre-electoral coalition agreements. MPs elected through a minority list were much more active in the parliament than MPs elected through a mainstream list: 7 MPs from minority lists delivered 392 speeches while 5 MPs elected on mainstream lists intervened 102 times in total.

Table 2: Descriptive representatives of national minorities in the VIII National Assembly

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member of Parliament</th>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Electoral list</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>Position in power</th>
<th>Total interventions</th>
<th>Days intervening</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Riza Halimi</td>
<td>minority coalition</td>
<td>Coalition of Albanians of Presevo Valley</td>
<td>Albanian</td>
<td>PDD</td>
<td>opposition</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balint Pastor</td>
<td>minority coalition</td>
<td>Hungarian Coalition - Istvan Pastor</td>
<td>Hungarian</td>
<td>SVM</td>
<td>majority</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elvira Kovač</td>
<td>minority coalition</td>
<td>Hungarian Coalition - Istvan Pastor</td>
<td>Hungarian</td>
<td>SVM</td>
<td>majority</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laslo Varga</td>
<td>minority coalition</td>
<td>Hungarian Coalition - Istvan Pastor</td>
<td>Hungarian</td>
<td>SVM</td>
<td>majority</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arpad Fremond</td>
<td>minority coalition</td>
<td>Hungarian Coalition - Istvan Pastor</td>
<td>Hungarian</td>
<td>SVM</td>
<td>majority</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bajram Omeragić</td>
<td>minority coalition</td>
<td>Bosniak List for European Sandzak - Dr Sulejman Ugljanin</td>
<td>Bosniak</td>
<td>SDLSP</td>
<td>majority</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Esad Džudžević</td>
<td>minority coalition</td>
<td>Bosniak List for European Sandzak - Dr Sulejman Ugljanin</td>
<td>Bosniak</td>
<td>BDSS</td>
<td>majority</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mehro Omerović</td>
<td>mainstream coalition</td>
<td>For European Serbia - Boris Tadic</td>
<td>Bosniak</td>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>majority</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munir Poturak</td>
<td>mainstream coalition</td>
<td>For European Serbia - Boris Tadic</td>
<td>Bosniak</td>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>majority</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bajram Šehović</td>
<td>mainstream coalition</td>
<td>For European Serbia - Boris Tadic</td>
<td>Bosniak</td>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>majority</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vitomir Mihajlović</td>
<td>mainstream coalition</td>
<td>For European Serbia - Boris Tadic</td>
<td>Roma</td>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>majority</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petar Kuntić</td>
<td>mainstream coalition</td>
<td>For European Serbia - Boris Tadic</td>
<td>Croatian</td>
<td>DSHV</td>
<td>majority</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The number of speeches delivered without an analysis of their content is not in itself an indicator of substantive representation, but low parliamentary activity can suggest that a representative was not taking much advantage of his presence. For example, with
only 2 speeches Vitomir Mihajlović can already be expected not to have been a substantive representative of the Roma national minority because he could not have articulated many of their interests by intervening only one day in four years. However, to investigate if MPs articulated minority interests, the next step in the analysis is to investigate how many of the speeches addressed at least to some extent minority related issues. Since national minorities in Serbia are territorially concentrated, issues relevant for the region inhabited by national minority are also interpreted as minority-relevant issues. For example, if a Bosniak MP acts in the interest of people from Sandžak, and the majority of Sandžak population have a Bosniak background, it is obvious that he is speaking in the interest of the Bosniak national minority.

As Table 3 shows, besides higher activity in the parliament, minority MPs elected through minority electoral lists are also more likely to raise minority and regionally related issues in their parliamentary interventions than minority MPs elected through mainstream electoral lists. The table shows significant differences among MPs elected through minority electoral lists and those elected through mainstream lists. MPs from the first group touched on minority related issues in 185 speeches, while the other group mentioned minority issues in only 20 speeches. A high majority of interventions (81.9%) by MPs elected through minority lists was of either minority or regional relevance which indicates a high correspondence between their party manifests and parliamentary activities. MPs elected through coalitions with mainstream parties were less concerned with directly minority related issues but the percentage of minority and regionally relevant issues together still forms a significant share of their interventions (39.2%).

Table 3: Minority related or minority/regionally relevant issues by the type of pre-electoral coalitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total interventions</th>
<th>Minority</th>
<th>Minority or regional</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority coalition list (7 MPs)</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>47.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainstream coalition list (5 MPs)</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These findings suggest that coalition agreements have a significant effect on MPs’ substantive performance. Although all of them have a minority background and represent political parties of national minorities, pre-electoral coalitions with mainstream parties and joint work in the single parliamentary group reflect negatively on the representation of minority interests. This can be understood as a consequence of different locus of
accountability. While SVM, PDD and SLPS-BDSS are directly accountable to their constituents, SDP and DSHV are primarily accountable to their coalition partner, that is, the mainstream political party that secured their seats, and then to their minority groups. Still, the percentage of almost 40% of minority or regionally relevant interventions by MPs from mainstream coalition indicates that there might be some causality between descriptive and substantive representation, but to draw such a conclusion more research is needed. It is clear, however, that substantive representation depends on more than one factor and that the coalitions minority parties make, influence MPs’ performance. Because of their constituency size (there is 0.81% of Croats in the Serbian population), it is less likely that the DSHV would ever run for elections independently or in coalition with other Croatian parties, implying that re-election of its representative depends on successful coalitions with mainstream parties or parties representing different ethnic groups. Since there is no direct accountability relationship between the DSHV and voters from the Croatian minority, there is no pressure of its representatives to act responsibly. The SDP, however, could potentially expect to win office when running independently if Bosniak voters are convinced that the SDP has a better political program than the SDA-SLPS-BDSS. Uncertainty about future electoral coalitions, strategic plans and political goals could stimulate relative accountability to minority interests and therefore explain the SDP’s interest in minority issues.

Are there intra-group differences among these two groups of MPs depending on their partisan affiliation? Table 4 shows that there are some differences, but despite this, all political parties acting independently in the parliament touch more on minority or regional issues than any of the parties in the mainstream coalition. The highest percentage of minority or regionally related interventions was in the speeches of the PDD MP (99.3%). The second were MPs from the SLPS/BdSS who addressed these issues in 85.5% and following them SVM with 69.2%. Both the SDP and the DSHV MPs touched on these issues in less than 40% of their speeches, which is still half as many as the parties in minority coalitions.

Looking at the content of direct minority relevant speeches, one can observe that MPs were tackling either the issues relevant to their ‘own’ minority or more general minority issues. In none of the speeches did MPs address issues specifically related to other than their ‘own’ national minority.
Table 4: Minority and regionally related issues by party affiliation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>MPs</th>
<th>Total speeches</th>
<th>Minority/regional issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVM</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>139 (69,2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDD</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>135 (99,3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLPS/BDSS</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>47 (85,5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>38 (39,6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSHV</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2 (33,3%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Before the actual content of minority related speeches is analysed in more detail, it is worthwhile examining whether MPs pointed out minority issues while discussing issues on the parliamentary agenda or used their time to introduce new topics. As explained in the Chapter 2, descriptive representatives can bring new issues to the agenda which would never be articulated if only privileged groups were present in parliament (Phillips, 1995, p. 45). Table 5 shows that both groups generally spoke about the issues on the agenda approximately two thirds of their time. However, MPs from the first group addressed issues on the agenda from the minority perspective or tackled regional issues more frequently than MPs from the second group. Two thirds of minority or regionally relevant issues of MPs from minority coalition lists were related to the topic debated in the parliament. When MPs from the mainstream lists decided to address minority or regionally related issues, 45.4% of them were related to the agenda and in 54.8% of cases they introduced a new topic. The percentages indicate that MPs from the mainstream coalition were more dedicated to introducing new issues than MPs from the minority coalition. Notwithstanding, the overall number of minority related interventions by MPs from the minority coalition is still much higher in any of the categories than the number of interventions by MPs from mainstream lists.

Table 5: Addressing issues on parliamentary agenda by the type of electoral coalition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total interventions</th>
<th>Minority or regionally relevant interventions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>minority list  (7 MPs)</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>70,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mainstream list (5 MPs)</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>66,4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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4.4.2. Thematic analysis for MPs according to pre-electoral coalition agreements

Thematic analysis of the content of MPs speeches in plenary sessions supports the conclusion made in the previous section that pre-electoral coalition agreements influence the behaviour of MPs in parliament (Table 6). MPs elected on minority electoral lists, i.e. MPs from the SVM, the SDA (SLPS-BDSS) and the PDD most frequently raised issues related to cultural minority rights. For the purposes of this research, the term cultural rights is used as a joint code for the group of following subcodes: education in minority language, minority media, minority culture, official use of language and script and national councils of national minorities. These issues were tackled in 90 out of 321 minority and regionally relevant interventions.

Table 6: Themes in minority and regionally relevant interventions by the type of pre-electoral coalition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Number of speeches of minority MPs (2008-2012)</th>
<th>minority list</th>
<th>mainstream list</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cultural rights</td>
<td></td>
<td>90</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decentralization</td>
<td></td>
<td>52</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour market, employment and development</td>
<td></td>
<td>43</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship rights and emigration</td>
<td></td>
<td>34</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice system reform</td>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination and violence</td>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social status and social policy</td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arguments and disputes</td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence in government and public institutions</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral and party system</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*includes: education in minority language, minority media, minority culture, official use of language and script and national councils of national minorities. 
*includes: Vojvodina budget, regionalisation and regional development, local government financing, decentralization of public property and autonomy of Vojvodina. 
*includes: debate on economic and financial laws, state employment projects, state investments, unemployment and underdevelopment, role of the state in regional economic recovery and regional development. 
*includes: access to personal documents, readmission of Albanians and Roma, dual citizenship issues, emigration problems, asylum seekers and civil registries. 
*includes: equality in front of the law, debate on the location of courts, amendments to Criminal Code and reform of judicial institutions. 
*includes: debate on Antidiscrimination law, discriminatory language and offenses, ethnically motivated attacks and violence, debate on Gender equality law, unequal treatment of minorities and discrimination in labour market.
*includes: social insurance, health issues, mother and child rights, pension system, poverty, refugee status, mobbing, rights of disabled persons, social giving, social housing and social protection.
*includes: disputes among minority MPs, disputes with mainstream MP and personal accusations. 
*includes: representation of minorities in state and local government institutions and public administration. 
*includes: state support to agricultural producers, agricultural subsidies, insurance and taxes in agriculture and import of agricultural products. 
*includes: changes of electoral rules, affirmative action measures for minority parties, financing of political activities and electoral registers.
Decentralization was the second most important theme in their speeches and consisted of demands for increasing the budget of Vojvodina and local governments; criticism of high state centralization; and requests for decentralization and regionalization of the country and decentralization of public property. The greatest share of decentralization issues were brought by SVM representatives who strongly advocated for larger autonomy of Vojvodina - 50 out of 52 of the decentralization interventions were made by the SVM and the other 2 by Riza Halimi from the PDD. MPs from this group also brought economic issues to parliamentary debate. They were particularly interested in employment issues; economic development of regions inhabited by minorities and requested the state to invest in employment projects and regional economic recovery.

Citizenship rights and emigration was a theme particularly present in Riza Halimi’s speeches because, as he was explaining, emigration rate is high among Albanians, especially the youth and Albanians born in Kosovo experience problems with obtaining personal documents. Although there are many Roma asylum seekers in Serbia and the problem of readmission of Roma and obtaining personal documents for them are very acute problem in Serbia, these issues were not tackled in parliament. Justice system reform was another important theme mentioned in 33 interventions although the main theme was the location of the courts. Due to necessary restrictions and rationalizations in the justice system, a significant number of courts had to be closed down. In this debate minority MPs strongly fought for the preservation of courts in municipalities and regions where minorities live.

Discrimination and violence is mentioned in 26 interventions. This theme includes attacks on minority citizens, hate speeches, discrimination in the labour market, and unequal status of different minorities. The theme social status and social policy was more present in general debates than in minority or regionally related interventions. MPs primarily touched on pension and social insurance for citizens from minority groups, poverty of minority groups and health issues. They also advocated equal representation of national minorities in state, Vojvodina and local governments, public institutions and public enterprises (16 interventions) and requested that the state increase the agricultural budget and subsidies, support small agricultural producers and decrease agricultural taxes (11 interventions). Finally, in 8 interventions they debated on the changes to the electoral rules for political parties of national minorities and the financing of political activities. The last theme that remained unexplained is Arguments and Disputes. During the coding, it was noticed that several MPs dedicated much of their time to arguments and disputes either
with mainstream or minority MPs. Most often these were personal attacks and accusations among MPs from different parties of the same minority.

MPs from the mainstream list (SDP and DSHV) barely tackled most important minority related issues. Arguments and disputes either with another minority MP or with MPs from the majority ethnic group were the most frequent subjects of these MPs’ minority or regionally related interventions. Most of these disputes were among Bosniak MPs from the SDP and the SDA (SLPS-BDSS). These two parties are major opponents in Sandžak and there are years of hostility among them and their leaders. The second theme present in the SDP and the DSHV MPs’ speeches (6 interventions) was related to the economic status of minorities. In these interventions MPs advocated state investment in the economic development of minority inhabited regions.

Great discrepancy among MPs from minority and mainstream lists in addressing minority or regionally relevant issues is evident. While MPs from the first group paid a lot of attention to issues of interest to national minorities, MPs from mainstream list barely touched on these issues. This finding strongly challenges the assumption that there is a linear causal link between descriptive and substantive representation. To help us explain these tendencies, the next section looks in more detail at the content of minority or regionally relevant speeches of MPs according to party affiliation. The results will be presented separately for each MP but grouped according to party affiliations bearing in mind party discipline and the fact that MPs from the same party act as a team and share responsibilities.

4.4.3. Themes, priorities and discourse of individual MPs according to political party affiliation

4.4.3.1. Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians (SVM)

Four MPs from the SVM stated clearly what their priorities in the parliament were and under which conditions they were part of the parliamentary majority and supported the government. As Laslo Varga explained during a plenary session debate: “We are trying to support the Government, but through representing the interests of our constituents, those people who, I repeat, sent us to this assembly. We are certainly not in this assembly for power and the fact that we don’t have ministers is the best proof for this statement. This is the reason we cannot be bargained with” (03.12.2008). Their proclaimed role in
parliament is to represent the interests of those citizens who elected them to the parliament and the interests of municipalities and regions where these citizens live. MPs identified themselves primarily with their political party, but often claimed they spoke in the name of all Vojvodina Hungarians. Additionally, Elvira Kovač identified herself as a woman (“As a woman, I am particularly interested...”, “As young woman, I have to say...”, “As we, women, like to say...”) and often represented the woman’s perspective in the parliament.

SVM representatives identified several priorities for their party in the VIII National Assembly: acceleration of EU integrations, economy, agriculture, decentralization and expansion of Vojvodina autonomy and expansion of rights of members of national minorities. In order to achieve these priorities, legislative goals of the SVM in this session of the parliament were: harmonization of Serbian legislation with EU legislation; adoption of the Law on restitution, the Law on direct revenues of Vojvodina and the Law on public property so that Vojvodina finally has its own property; justice system reform; adoption of the Law on foreign investment and the Law on Regional Development; and adoption of the Law on NCNM. Their proclaimed task in the parliament is also to monitor and ensure that other minority related laws respect the competencies of national councils and are not in conflict with the Law on NCNM.

Each of the four SVM MPs was responsible for drawing attention to and achieving some of these priority goals during parliamentary sessions. Balint Pastor intervened on minority or Vojvodina related issues in 80 out of 92 speeches in total. Most attention was paid to decentralization and the cultural rights of national minorities, themes addressed in 38 and 27 interventions respectively. Among decentralization themes, he insisted on 7% of Vojvodina’s share in the state budget, pressed the government to propose the Bill on Public Property, approve the Statute of Vojvodina and define its property, advocated for the delegation of more authority to Vojvodina and establishing statistical regions. Among the cultural rights, he emphasized the need to adopt the Law on NCNM and increase their budgets, advocated for the right of minority citizens to use their language in contacts with public administration, stated the right to write personal or minority institutions’ names according to their language and spelling rules, the right to education in minority language, the importance of the preservation of minority culture and the harmonization of other minority relevant laws with the Law on NCNM. He also advocated strongly for proportional employment of national minorities in public administration. During the debate on rationalization of the justice system, Pastor insisted that the courts in several Vojvodina municipalities where Hungarians live should not be closed down.
Justice system reform was the topic of more than 50% of Laslo Varga’s minority or regionally related interventions. Most of these speeches were efforts to amend the Bill on the Seats and Locations of Courts. Since their amendments were not adopted, the SVM did not vote for the Bill on the Seats and Locations of Courts. In addition, Varga was interested in the cultural rights - particularly harmonization of education laws with the Law on NCNM and expansion of the rights of national minorities to use their native language – and restitution of property confiscated after the Second World War and rehabilitation of all displaced persons, innocently accused and innocent victims – related to Vojvodina Hungarians who cooperated with the Nazis.

Arpad Fremond and Elvira Kovač did not directly address national minorities in their speeches but the issues they brought into the debate are certainly relevant to the Hungarian national minority and are among the most important goals of the SVM. Arpad Fremond was tasked to discuss issues related to agriculture because Vojvodina is an agricultural region and many SVM voters are agricultural producers. He advocated the increase of agricultural subsidies and greater state support to small agricultural producers and proposed amendments to increase the agricultural budget and lower the taxes on agriculture. On the other hand, Elvira Kovač was responsible for social policy and spoke on bill proposals on social protection and social giving, the European Social Charter, harassment at work, the rights of children and young people, maternity and the rights of disabled persons. She also tackled the issues of the financing of minority cultural and education institutions, the right to the use of language and the need for an increased role of the NCNM (in 7 interventions) and raised decentralization issues and advocated for greater autonomy of Vojvodina (9 interventions).

4.4.3.2. Party for Democratic Action (PDD)

Albanian representative Riza Halimi engaged strongly in substantive representation of the Albanian national minority addressing in 135 out of 136 speeches issues relevant to national minorities and three municipalities, Preševo, Bujanovac and Medvedja, inhabited by 94% of Albanians in Serbia. Similar to the Hungarian representatives, he also used the constitutive session of parliament and constitution of the government to present his party

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17 Issues not directly relevant to national minorities were not counted as minority relevant issues during the coding and the analysis. For example, most of Arpad Fremond’s speeches were directly addressing agriculture in Vojvodina and these were, therefore, counted as ‘regionally relevant interventions’, while Elvira Kovač mostly addressed social policy and these speeches were coded ‘general interventions’ (since they are equally relevant for majority and minorities).
priorities and goals and explain his position in power. He decided not to vote for the government because the Exposé of the Government did not mention national minorities at all. He, however, expressed his willingness to support, and indeed supported, the proposals which contributed to the acceleration of EU integrations. He articulated several priorities in his representative work: 1) to address and contribute to the solving of the most sensitive problems of Albanians in Preševo Valley; 2) reorganization of the Coordination body for Preševo, Bujanovac and Medvedja in order to substantively include legitimate representatives of Albanians in its activities; 3) increase in the Albanian presence in state and local government institutions; 4) turning attention to extreme poverty, underdevelopment and unemployment in Preševo Valley; 5) turning attention to the problems in education in Albanian language and recognition of diplomas from Kosovo, Macedonian and Albanian universities; and 6) increasing state investment in socio-economic development of underdeveloped regions. During parliamentary debates he claimed to speak in the name of his voters from Preševo Valley and all citizens from the three mentioned municipalities. He mentioned only once that he was present in parliament not only because Albanians from Preševo, Bujanovac and Medvedja voted for him, but because Albanians from Belgrade and other municipalities in Serbia also voted for him. However, the interests of Albanians from these municipalities were not tackled at all during plenary sessions. His substantive activities can best be described by one of his statements: “Preševo, Bujanovac and Medvedja have only one representative and that is me and if I don’t speak about their problems, no one else will”.

The most frequently discussed issues by Riza Halimi were the collective rights of national minorities and citizenship rights, followed by issues related to the Coordination body for Preševo, Bujanovac and Medvedja, socio-economic issues, discrimination and the inefficient justice system in areas inhabited by Albanians. The majority of interventions on collective rights related to problems Albanians face in higher education (29 interventions), such as non-recognition of diplomas from Kosovar, Macedonian and Albanian universities and a lack of opportunities for education in the Albanian language in Serbia, and problems in the implementation of the right to official use of language and script (9 interventions). He expressed concern that not all minority-related laws would be harmonized with the Law on NCNM due to the high speed of law adoption. However, in many cases these concerns were not followed by the amendments. He also dedicated much of his time to the issues of emigration of Albanians from Serbia and problems with obtaining personal documents faced by Albanians born in Kosovo. The government Coordination body for Preševo, Bujanovac and Medvedja was mentioned in 25 interventions. He reflected on the lack of
transparency of this institution, the exclusion of minority representatives from decision making, its inefficiency and the necessity to reorganize both its structure and its activities. However, in his amendments he proposed the increase in budget of this body. Halimi also warned about high underdevelopment and unemployment in the region of Preševo Valley and retirement issues for Albanians from Serbia who worked in Kosovo (37 interventions). Finally, he pointed out the discrimination against Albanians in the labour market, their insufficient presence in state and local government institutions and public administration, unjust and discriminative decisions in the justice system and the need to keep the court in Bujanovac as the only possibility for Albanians to access the justice system in their native language.

4.4.3.3. Party of Democratic Action of Sandžak/ Social Liberal Party of Sandžak/ Bosniak Democratic Party of Sandžak (SDA/SLPS/BDSS)

Two Bosniak MPs, Esad Džudžević and Bajram Omeragić were elected on Bosniak List for European Sandžak - Dr Sulejman Ugljanin. The leading party in this coalition was the SDA, which had a minister in the government but had no MPs. Two MPs from this list belong to two different Bosniak minority parties – the SLPS and the BDSS. In the course of this research, these three parties are treated as one for two reasons: first, they acted as a single party in the parliament and second, the two MPs often identified themselves during parliamentary debates with the SDA. For example, Bajram Omeragić pointed out that decentralization and regionalization was the goal of the SDA since they formed it in 1990 (15.06.2011). They presented themselves as representatives of the Bosniak national minority in Sandžak and in the whole of Serbia. Their parliamentary interventions were made in the name of Bosniak list and often the citizens from Sandžak. The priorities of citizens of Sandžak and therefore their own priorities are: more economic investment in Sandžak, entering the Schengen White List, acceleration of EU integration which will consequently accelerate the investment in the region of Sandžak and a more efficient parliament.

Compared to the SVM and the PDD representatives, the SDA representatives' discourse was more cooperative and compromising, emphasizing mutual respect in relations between government coalition partners. The tone of their criticism was more requesting than requiring, which was particularly characteristic of the SVM. Bajram Omeragić's speeches are characterized by attempts to balance between his party membership in government and the interests of the citizens in Sandžak. On the one hand,
he emphasized good government projects, and on the other requested the government to do the same in Sandžak. In plenary debates he tended to request the government to aid economic recovery and employment in underdeveloped regions (15 interventions). He also highlighted to the lack of infrastructure in Sandžak and the need to reconstruct roads and construct highways as a precondition for any economic investment (6 interventions). Another 6 interventions were dedicated to the government Office for the Development of Underdeveloped Regions, which is the main government responsibility of SDA minister Ugljanin. Mentioning of the Office had two forms: first, during the debates on budget when Omeragić advocated an increase in the sum allocated for the Office; and second, while justifying Ugljanin’s participation in government and the way the budget is spent in the Office. On the other hand, Džudžević was more concerned about a lack of implementation of collective rights of Bosniak and discrimination issues, i.e. non-implementation of Bosniak rights to education in their native language and official use of language and script, poor conditions for development of Bosniak national institutions in Sandžak and different treatment of minorities in Vojvodina and other parts of Serbia. Finally, it should be noted that a significant number of interventions of both Omeragić (9 interventions) and Džudžević (4 interventions) were arguments with the SDP MPs, competing for higher influence at a local level and disputes over the achievements of the two leaders SDA Ugljanin and SDP Ljajić.

4.4.3.4. Sandžak Democratic Party (SDP)

The SDP is represented by four MPs in parliament: 3 Bosniak and 1 Roma. It is an unusual practice in Serbia that a political party of one national minority appoints a member of another ethnic group to the parliament. If the SDP ran independently for elections, this decision could be more easily explained as an attempt to attract more votes by reaching out to the Roma population in Sandžak especially because the SDP has to compete for the votes of the same electorate with the SDA, another influential Bosniak party. However, since the SDP supported the DS and had reserved seats on their electoral list, other explanations, which require further research, should be considered. Another distinctive feature of the SDP compared to the other parties analysed in this research is that not all of their MPs come from the region where their minority is concentrated. While Munir Poturak comes from Novi Pazar and Bajram Šehović and Vitomir Mihajlović from Prokuplje, both municipalities inhabited in large part by a Bosniak national minority, Meho Omerović is
originally from Belgrade where only 1.1% of the total Bosniak population live. Also, it is evident that the SDP was not acting independently in parliament. The SDP MPs identified themselves in parliament as “representatives of the SDP which acts within the DS”.

Finally, their parliamentary priorities also differ from other parties in the sense that they are not primarily related to the Bosniak national minority. Although the SDP representatives did not directly state their priorities, two very broad and general goals can be extracted from their speeches: better living conditions for all citizens in Serbia and the development of underdeveloped regions. The speeches of the three Bosniak MPs were primarily addressing all citizens of Serbia, while the Roma MP, Vitomir Mihajlović only spoke twice in the parliament and only to respond, as the president of the National council of Roma national minority, to the accusations of corruption in the Roma National council. Munir Poturak was the only SDP representative who emphasized his Sandžak origin in the parliament and his legitimacy to address regionally relevant issues. But the tendency to address overall issues was evident even then as he would, after referring more directly to citizens of Sandžak, almost always add to that the interests of Serbian citizens in general. As president of the parliamentary Committee on Labour and Social Policy, Meho Omerović was primarily speaking in its name during plenary sessions.

Meho Omerović used his time during parliamentary debates to explain government proposals related to social protection; rights of disabled persons; settlement of labour disputes; social housing and pension; and health and social insurance. The only occasion when he touched on Bosniak or Sandžak related issues was during his arguments with MPs from the SDA/BDSS/SLPS (8 interventions). Munir Poturak was partly engaged in substantive representation of national minorities. He touched on minority or Sandžak related issues in 20 of his 31 speeches in total. However, only 5 of these 20 speeches were directly related to national minorities; others more generally addressed citizens of Sandžak. His priority themes were economic development, poverty in Sandžak and successful state projects to combat underdevelopment (10 interventions) and the lack of infrastructure in Sandžak (4 interventions). As well as Omerović, he also engaged in arguments with other Bosniak representatives (4 interventions). He requested that the state invest more in economic and infrastructural development of Sandžak but also used plenary debates to emphasize government efforts and achievements expressing his hopes that members and voters of the SDP would appreciate government efforts in economic development. Bajram Šehović was not very active during parliamentary debates. He only spoke 8 times during the four years of the parliamentary session. During that time he discussed the changes in electoral laws relevant for minority parties, contradiction of laws regulating the rights of
national councils to establish media in minority language and official use of minority languages and scripts.

4.4.3.5. Democratic Alliance of Croats in Vojvodina (DSHV)

The lack of parliamentary activity of the Croatian MP Petar Kuntić prevents any other conclusions being drawn other than he served only as a descriptive representative of the Croatian minority in the parliament. In his few speeches, he wished a happy Christmas to all citizens celebrating it according to the Gregorian calendar, stressed the importance of the Law on NCNM, and during his longer explanation of the Bill on political parties, he briefly pointed out to the provisions significant for political organizing of national minorities. He also explained the importance of the three government proposals on agriculture: the Bill on public warehouses, the Bill on recognition of varieties of plants and the Bill on agricultural extension.

4.5. CONCLUSION

The results of content analysis of parliamentary speeches show large inconsistencies in the behaviour of minority representatives. Although all of the MPs included in this research are members of political parties of national minorities and, except one, were all part of the parliamentary majority and therefore in a position to influence decision making, only some of them could be regarded as substantive representatives. This research considered as substantive representatives those MPs who addressed issues directly relevant to national minorities: citizenship rights, discrimination, individual minority rights, cultural minority rights, social and economic policies towards minorities, participation of minorities in state and government institutions, etc. Additionally, bearing in mind the territorial concentration of national minorities in Serbia, criteria for identifying substantive representatives also included engaging with issues directly and exclusively relevant for the regions with a high percentage of national minorities. Dominant among regionally relevant issues were agriculture, decentralization, regional development and justice system reform.

Two groups of MPs can clearly be distinguished from the data: MPs elected on minority electoral lists creating parliamentary group of minorities in parliament and those who were elected through pre-electoral arrangements with mainstream political party and
later became members of a parliamentary group of the mainstream party. Comparative analysis of the speeches of two groups of MPs during the 2008-2012 plenary sessions shows that: first, 7 MPs elected through minority lists were much more active on the floor than 5 MPs elected through the mainstream list, delivering nearly four times more speeches. For the evaluation of the substantive activities of MPs it is equally important to focus on the decision of minority MPs not to speak as it is to analyse the speeches themselves. For example, among 12 minority representatives, 3 MPs barely ever spoke in parliament, intervening less than 10 times in four years.

Second, MPs from the first group intervened also on minority relevant issues significantly more than MPs from the second group. Since national minorities in Serbia (with the exception of Roma) are territorially concentrated, it was expected that MPs would recognize and address minority issues as regional issues. However, even here, MPs from minority lists addressed issues relevant for the regions inhabited by national minorities to a much greater extent than minority MPs elected through the mainstream list. To illustrate this, 7 MPs from minority lists tackled at least to some extent minority or regionally related issues in 321 interventions, while 5 MPs from the mainstream parliamentary group tackled the same issues in only 40 speeches.

Third, while discussing minority related issues, they adhered to the parliamentary agenda in a higher percentage of their speeches than MPs from another group. MPs from the first group used 72.4% (N= 246) of their minority or regionally related interventions to address issues on the agenda from a minority perspective, while MPs from the other group adhered to the agenda in 45.2% of their minority or regionally related interventions (N= 19). It is worth point out that MPs from the mainstream parliamentary group used a larger share of their interventions to introduce new topics than MPs from the minority group. Yet, looking at the number of speeches, it can be noted that MPs from minority lists were significantly more active in both categories.

Fourth, despite their equal minority status, MPs from the first group addressed more frequently than the others the most important issues for national minorities: collective rights, discrimination, socio-economic issues, citizenship rights and emigration, and representation of minorities in government institutions and public administration. Among the MPs from the SVM, the SDA (SLPS-BDSS) and the PDD, the most frequently raised were the issues of minority cultural rights, decentralization, employment and development, citizenship rights, justice system reform and discrimination and violence. On the other hand, MPs from the SDP and the DSHV, mentioned minorities mostly during personal and party arguments with other MPs or minority leaders. Hungarian and Albanian
representatives led a consistent, principled policy, clearly stated their priorities in parliament and actively represented the interests of their national minorities. Bosniak representatives from the SLPS-BDSS focused particularly on the economic interests of the Bosniak minority and made an effort to balance good relationships with government and accountability to constituents. Prioritizing citizenship over ethnicity, the SDP focused more on general problems in society than on particular minority interests. The Croatian representative spoke only twice in parliament which prevents any relevant conclusion regarding their strategies and priorities in parliament being drawn.

Finally, while MPs addressed mostly the issues relevant to their regions and their ‘own’ ethnic groups, general minority issues were rather neglected and, more problematically, the particular interests of other national minorities which do not have their representatives in the parliament were not at all addressed. In addition, MPs focused on representation of the regions where their ethnic groups are concentrated neglecting particular interests of members of the same ethnic group in other regions or municipalities in Serbia.
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

The aim of this thesis was to understand the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation of national minorities. Previous studies have emphasized the importance of descriptive representation and justified the need for affirmative action measures such as reserved seats or a lower electoral threshold to achieve descriptive representation. However, my research differs in claiming that substantive representation of minority interests is equally, if not more important than descriptive representation. Hence, my research has provided an answer to two important and yet insufficiently researched questions: is descriptive representation a sufficient condition for substantive and if not, in what conditions can descriptive representatives act as substantive? I have shown that the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation differs across minority parties and that representatives elected on minority electoral lists represent minority interests much better than descriptive representatives elected on a mainstream list.

In the following sections, I will briefly summarize the findings presented in the thesis and show what implications they have for the Serbian parliament and beyond. I will also offer several policy recommendations for enhancing substantive representation in Serbia. Finally, I will conclude this thesis by suggesting some possible questions for further research.

5.1. THESIS SUMMARY

From the discussion on equality, it was determined in Chapter 2 that members of national minorities should have not only equal legal and political rights, but also equal opportunities to be nominated and elected as political representatives and opportunities to be represented in political institutions as members of the majority. It was determined that an equal right to political representation consists of the right to be present (descriptive representation) and the right to representation of interests and perspectives (substantive representation). Although mere presence of minority representatives might have some symbolic benefits, members of minority groups primarily need the representatives to act in
their interests and attempt to influence public policies. It was further established in Chapter 2 that understanding of substantive representation cannot be limited to eventual change of public policies but expanded to include representatives’ efforts to change public policies, advocating for human and minority rights and equal employment opportunities for members of national minorities, addressing discrimination problems members of national minorities face in society, amending bills to be more sensitive to minorities, etc.

Starting the empirical analysis, Chapter 3 focused on descriptive representation of national minorities in Serbia and the reasons for introducing affirmative action measures. It was shown, first, that there are more than twenty national minorities in Serbia making up 16.68% of the total population. Most of them settled in Serbia before the First World War and live mostly in geographically concentrated areas. I then analysed the institutional and legal setting to conclude that current legislation in Serbia guarantees equal legal and political rights to national minorities. However, it was identified that there were still good reasons for introducing affirmative action measures. It was discovered that under proportional representation, a single electoral district, a 5% electoral threshold and the D’Hondt method for allocation of seats, members of national minorities did not have equal opportunities to be present in the parliament. Hence, affirmative action measures – lifting the threshold for political parties of national minorities - introduced in 2003 were highly justified. Since then, the number of MPs from minority parties has varied between twelve and fourteen, securing presence for Hungarian, Bosniak, Albanian, Roma, Croatian and Macedonian national minorities.

To determine whether the increase in descriptive representation had any implications for substantive representation, Chapter 4 analysed the behaviour of the 12 MPs from minority parties in Serbian VIII National Assembly. The analysis included content analysis of all interventions in plenary parliamentary debates of the 12 MPs in the period between June 2008 and May 2012. All speeches were coded in NVivo with a speech taken as the unit of analysis and employment of both a priori and emergent coding. The coding was conducted with the main goal of identifying the themes minority representatives spoke on, but also to examine whether the speech was relevant for minorities, the geographic region or more generally and whether MPs spoke about the issues on the agenda or used their time to introduce new issues. I identified ten main themes: cultural rights, decentralization, economic and employment issues, citizenship rights and emigration, justice system reform, discrimination and violence, social status and social policy, presence of minorities in government and public institutions, agriculture, and electoral and party
system. Finally, it was discovered that minority representatives often used the floor for their internal disputes and arguments which I then added as an additional theme.

Although there were several factors that should have encouraged substantive representation such as the lifted threshold, ethnic status of political parties, high competition among political parties of national minorities[^18], and participation in legislative and/or government coalition, the results of the thematic analysis have shown that there is no strong causal link between descriptive and substantive representation. While four Hungarian, Albanian and two Bosniak representatives spoke to a certain extent in the interest of their minorities, three other Bosniak representatives, the representative of Roma origin and a Croatian representative served mostly as descriptive representatives. The main distinction among them, and potential explanation of behavioural differences, lies in the way they were elected to parliament. Those descriptive representatives whose political parties ran independently in elections and were directly elected by voters proved to be more accountable and effective representatives than MPs whose political parties received parliamentary seats as a result of a pre-electoral coalition agreement with the mainstream party. MPs elected on a minority electoral list were generally significantly more active in the parliament, delivered more minority related speeches, and addressed more frequently than the others the most important issues for national minorities. It was also noted that minority MPs tend to speak mostly for members of their own national minorities and geographic regions with a large concentration of their groups. Particular interests of descriptively non-represented national minorities and members of represented minorities in other parts of the country were not addressed by MPs included in this research.

Findings presented in the thesis have important implications for institutional engineering and dealing with diversity, not only in Serbia, but also in other ethnically diverse countries. They especially relate to countries with proportional electoral systems where political representatives are more accountable to their parties than the voters (especially in closed list PR) compared to majoritarian systems where representatives are directly accountable to voters[^19]. The findings are also relevant for international institutions such as the OSCE and the Council of Europe, which monitor the progress in implementation of human and minority rights and offer recommendations to ethnically diverse countries on how to enhance minority representation.

[^18]: Among others, there are in Serbia 6 political parties of Hungarian national minority, 12 of Bosniak national minority, 6 of Roma, 6 Albanian and 2 of Croatian national minority.

[^19]: For example, in PR with closed electoral lists as in Serbia, voters have no say in selecting MPs, they can only vote for the list as a whole. In addition, pre-electoral coalitions allow small parties to avoid the threshold and thereby avoid direct accountability to voters.
5.2. RECOMMENDATIONS: TOWARDS A BETTER MODEL OF MINORITY REPRESENTATION

The findings presented in this thesis suggest that although the presence of minority representatives is achieved in Serbia, members of most national minorities still lack effective and accountable representation. In order to provide members of national minorities with equal opportunities to be represented, institutional rules should foster not only descriptive but also substantive representation. It was established in the second chapter that substantive representation can be fostered or constrained by party goals and interests and institutional factors such as electoral system characteristics, the party system and MPs’ institutional position.

Although all five minority parties included in this research act in the same institutional and legal setting, their behaviour was not influenced by the same electoral rules. This requires more detailed explanation. A minority party or minority coalition which proposes an independent minority electoral list has to cross the ‘natural’ 0.4% electoral threshold to win one parliamentary seat. Since its electorate is essentially limited to adult members of its ethnic group, the party still has to make a significant effort to attract voters and convince them during the electoral campaign that it offers the best political bid. On the other hand, the minority party which decides to join a pre-electoral coalition with a mainstream party does not need strong popular support as it faces no electoral uncertainty. Although the 5% electoral threshold applies to a mixed majority minority coalition, the coalition leader is usually a strong and influential political party for which the threshold does not represent an obstacle. As the number of parliamentary seats and government positions (if the coalition succeeds in forming the government) minority party receives is already determined in the coalition agreement before the elections, the minority party does not need an attractive program and policy promises. As the elections are the only moment when politicians account to voters for what they have done during the term and voters have the chance to decide on their re-election, indirectly elected minority parties cannot be held to account. Moreover, my research has confirmed that MPs elected on mainstream electoral lists did not behave as accountable and substantive representatives while those parties expecting to account for their actions at the end of the term acted in what they perceived to be the interests of their voters.
The question is how non-accountable descriptive representatives could become more accountable. I would suggest, first, an increase in the electoral threshold for coalitions. The electoral threshold for independent party lists could remain at 5%, but should increase progressively with the increase of pre-electoral coalition members. For example, for 2-party coalitions the threshold would be 8%, for 3-party coalitions 11%, etc. As the costs of coalition formation would increase, parties would choose their coalition partners more carefully. Small parties with low electoral support would no longer be desirable coalition partners. The consequence for minority parties would be that they would either form minority coalitions to avoid the electoral threshold or try to become more desirable coalition partners for mainstream parties. In either case, minority parties would need to strengthen their relationships with voters, which would eventually strengthen substantive representation.

However, minority parties can also decide not to participate in elections if they expect there is a possibility of electoral failure. Previous research has shown that small parties decide to enter the electoral race only “if they find sufficiently large basis of support in order to pass the electoral threshold” (Bernauer and Bochsler, 2011, p. 750). Moreover, we have seen throughout the thesis that although there are 51 minority political parties in Serbia representing 14 national minorities, only a few of them participate in parliamentary elections. For example, after 2000 only SVM represented Hungarian national minority in parliamentary elections, while other Hungarian parties remained active only on a local level. It was stated in Chapter 4 that voters in Serbia (as in most post-communist countries) tend to vote along ethnic lines. Consequently, if only one minority party participates in elections it will gain sufficient support of the minority voters to win elections irrespective of its ideology, policy orientation and accountability. If, however, more than one Hungarian political party had opportunities to cross the threshold, more minority parties would enter the race. The result of the stronger competition could be higher accountability and quality of policy proposals. However, current electoral rules in Serbia force parties to self-select because intra-ethnic competition could result in vote dispersion and non-representation. This problem could be solved by increasing the number of electoral districts. Smaller electoral districts suit small parties with territorial concentration of their constituencies.

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20 For example, in parliamentary elections in 2008 in Serbia, the list For European Serbia consisted of 7 political parties, while in the 2012 elections, the lists Choice for a Better Life – Boris Tadić consisted of 6 parties, Let’s Get Serbia Moving – Tomislav Nikolić of 12 political parties and the list Čedomir Jovanović – Turnover was comprised of 8 parties. Each of these lists had to pass the 5% electoral threshold, just as parties that presented independent lists.

21 Fragmentation and lack of self-selection among Roma parties was precisely the reason why Roma parties did not secure any parliamentary seats in 2008 and 2012 elections.
Since national minorities in Serbia are territorially concentrated, increasing the number of electoral districts would foster competition among minority representatives.

It was shown in the thesis that issues, relevant to the geographic region where minority groups are concentrated, are equally important to members of minorities as direct minority related issues. It was also demonstrated in Chapter 4 that minority MPs tend to represent better the interests of members of their groups from the same region than the interests of those members of their minority group living in other parts of the country. Moreover, minority MPs tend to advocate more for the interests of citizens from their region regardless of ethnicity than for the interests of their minority members in other regions or the interests of other national minorities. Increasing the number of electoral districts would further strengthen regional representation and the connections of representatives with their regions. On the one hand, this proves the point of the advocates of descriptive representation that shared experiences are an important condition for minority representation. Albanians in South Serbia and Albanians in Belgrade are perceived and treated differently and face different economic and political situation. Therefore, it is understandable that a representative focuses on her region in the parliament. Yet, this broaches two broad questions: first, if a representative represents mainly her region and minority citizens from that region, are citizens with the same ethnic origin but from other regions discriminated against doubly? Who advocates for the interests of 2.75% of Albanians living in Vojvodina, 1.10% of Bosniaks in Belgrade, 0.20% Hungarians in South and Eastern Serbia when Albanian MPs focus on South Serbia, Bosniak MPs on Sandžak and Hungarian MPs on Vojvodina? Moreover, who should represent the interests of other minorities, descriptively non-represented in the parliament? Second, if shared regional economic and social problems influence a representative’s behaviour more than their ethnicity, could a representative of other ethnic origin but from the same region represent minority interests equally well? If there is high inter-party competition and winning elections directly depends on minority votes, there are no reasons to expect otherwise.

Therefore, another benefit of smaller electoral districts would be higher accountability of mainstream parties to members of national minorities. In smaller districts, mainstream parties would have an incentive to speak for minority interests because they would need the support of minority voters to win the elections. In the current single nationwide electoral district, electoral success of mainstream parties does not depend on members of national minorities because minority groups make up a small percentage of the total population and the accountability pendulum is tilted more towards the headquarters.
of political parties than towards the voters. However, in smaller electoral districts minority votes would carry more weight which would be a strong incentive for mainstream parties to pay attention to their interests. Higher accountability of the mainstream parties to members of national minorities would also reflect on minority parties as a representative’s ethnicity would not be the determining factor of electoral success.

Smaller electoral districts would also benefit members of national minorities currently not present in the parliament. Not only would they have increased opportunities to be elected, but candidates regardless of ethnicity would not be in position to neglect the interests of minority groups that make up a significant percentage of the total district population. Finally, although members of national minorities living in different regions from the majority of their groups would not directly benefit from this proposal in terms of descriptive representation, they might benefit in terms of substantive representation because district representatives would address regional issues in the parliament. In addition, a higher threshold for pre-electoral coalitions with mainstream parties might enforce cooperation among minority parties of different minorities thereby increasing the influence of smaller minorities.

Until now, I have suggested two institutional measures for enhancing substantive representation: increasing the electoral threshold for coalitions and increasing the number of electoral districts. However, we have seen in Chapter 2 that party goals and interests also influence parliamentary behaviour. Indeed, the analysed parliamentary speeches directly indicate that there are differences in the goals and interests minority parties have in the parliament. While Hungarian and Albanian MPs and partly Bosniak SDA representatives emphasized their policy orientation and used their program goals, promises given in electoral campaigns and minority interests to justify their amendments and voting in the perceived interest of their minorities, SDP set more general goals addressing all citizens of Serbia and underdeveloped regions, and speaking only rarely and indirectly for Bosniak national minority. On the other hand, DSHV goals could not be identified at all. Since the analysis of party goals and interests was beyond the scope of this research, further research would have to be conducted for more concrete recommendations. However, proposed institutional measures could also have an effect on party goals. In addition, strengthening intra-party democracy and the accountability of party leadership to party members would lead to higher policy-orientation of the party and therefore, to better representation of minority interests (Strom, 1990).

Finally, it would be wise to reflect on the understanding of equality and group rights discussed in Chapter 2. I have stated that affirmative action measures should be considered
as a temporary mechanism until structural inequalities are removed. The question is whether there would still be the need for affirmative action measures if the above recommended institutional changes were adopted. We have to remind ourselves again that members of national minorities should have equal opportunities to be present in the parliament (descriptive representation) and politically represented (substantive representation). Although smaller electoral districts and an increased electoral threshold for coalitions would enhance substantive representation, affirmative action measures would still be needed as a support to descriptive representation. Namely, the D’Hondt method for seat allocation adopted in Serbia slightly favours large parties and ethnic population structure in Serbia is such that reaching the 5% legal and often higher actual thresholds\(^\text{22}\) would still represent a challenge for small minorities\(^\text{22}\). This particularly relates to the Roma minority whose members are dispersed across the whole country. Therefore, I would suggest that if a minority party does not win any district seats but wins 0.4% of national votes (i.e. crosses the nationwide natural threshold), it should still be awarded a seat.

This leads to a new question: how can it be judged that structural injustices have been successfully removed and therefore, when it is time for the removal of affirmative action measures? Although it is a challenging issue, I would suggest that affirmative action measures would no longer be required once political parties become more multi-ethnic (Bieber, 2008, p. 13). This requires more detailed explanation. Political parties of national minorities emerge because members of minority groups cannot express their concerns and articulate their interests effectively enough through the mainstream parties. If at some point, the interests of minority groups are represented equally well through the mainstream parties and members of minority groups gain the opportunities to be nominated in mainstream parties under equal conditions as politicians from the majority group, it can happen that minority parties will lose significant voters’ support or transform to include members of other ethnic groups. Hence, there will be no need for institutional support of minority parties. This will, however, be possible in Serbia because it chose the

\(^{22}\) Depending on the number of electoral lists, distribution of votes and district magnitude the actual ‘hidden’ threshold can be much higher than the legal threshold. If large parties receive the majority of votes and there are not many wasted votes, the threshold can increase up to the natural district threshold. For example, in a district where 10 representatives are elected, the actual threshold can reach 10%.

\(^{23}\) Electoral results under different electoral rules in Serbia presented in Chapter 3 confirm this statement. For example, in 1997 parliamentary elections were held under proportional representation, 5% electoral threshold, D'Hondt formula, 29 electoral districts and no affirmative action measures for minority parties and only Hungarian, Bosniak and Albanian parties entered the parliament winning four, three and one parliamentary seats respectively.
‘natural’ electoral threshold as an affirmative action measure which to have effect requires that minority parties already have support within their ethnic group. It would be harder to determine when the affirmative action measure is no longer required if the adopted measure was reserved seats. Even if they had no support among minority voters, minority parties would have an incentive to exist and participate in elections because of guaranteed office benefits. However, as I have already stated in Chapter 2, reserved seats are not recommended policy solution anyway as they do not enhance accountability of minority representatives and hence have limited effect. They are only an effective mechanism for increasing the presence of minorities in parliament, but not a mechanism for enhancing substantive representation.

5.3. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FURTHER RESEARCH

The research on minority representation in Serbia has brought several important findings: (1) minority political parties are not a priori substantive representatives of national minorities; (2) minority representatives directly accountable to citizens perform better as substantive representatives than those not depending on voters’ support; and (3) territoriality matters for minority representation. First, the analysis of parliamentary speeches of 12 minority representatives in VIII National Assembly of Serbia has shown that knowing who the representative is, is not sufficient for knowing what the representative does. Moreover, having a political party registered as a political party of national minority with the main goal of representing the interests of national minorities and protecting and improving minority rights, does not guarantee substantive minority representation. Second, minority parties which compete in elections independently or in minority coalitions and owe their seats directly to voters make more effort later in the parliament to represent the interests of their voters. A large incentive for accountable and substantive party behaviour is its wish to remain in legislature even after voters in the next elections evaluate its work and have the opportunity to decide on its future engagement. Elections as a basic accountability mechanism for political representation cannot, however, be applied to small political parties who enter parliament through pre-electoral alliances with bigger political parties. As their existence does not depend on voters’ support and positive evaluation of their behaviour in the parliament, they do not have to act responsibly andaccountably. This could partly be solved by applying a higher threshold for coalitions, which would ensure that only those coalitions are profitable whose partners have significant voters’ support to
add to the coalition. Third, it was shown that district magnitude reflects heavily on minority representation. If minority votes are not spread across the whole country, but regionally concentrated, smaller electoral districts would open up more opportunities for minority parties to be elected. At the same time, a significant percentage of minority voters in the district population would make parties and candidates, irrespective of their ethnic origin more accountable to minority interests, thereby fostering substantive representation.

It can be concluded that there are serious fallacies in the existing minority representation model in Serbia since the ethnic origin of a representative does not necessarily lead to substantive representation of her national minority, and in the cases where substantive representation is achieved, it is narrowly focused only on specific minorities. Hence, to achieve wider substantive representation of national minorities, it would be necessary to shift the focus from descriptive representation to strengthening the accountability relationship between representatives and minority voters. Increasing the number of electoral districts, to make political parties more dependent on minority votes, would be a potential incentive for MPs to speak in the interest of minorities from their districts. In addition, increasing the electoral threshold for electoral coalitions would make even minor coalition partners more accountable and would probably make cooperation among parties representing different minorities more attractive. I am, however, aware that suggested institutional measures cannot be adopted without consideration of other types and aspects of electoral systems and further empirical testing. Therefore, these measures should be treated only as tentative suggestions before more in-depth research is conducted.

Finally, my results raise other important questions for further research. For example, more in-depth research on why descriptive representatives behave differently is needed. What other factors apart from institutional ones, influence the behaviour of minority MPs? Interviews with minority MPs should be carried out to answer these questions. Second, what is the role of minority MPs in mainstream parties? My research has focused on minority parties only, but there are also members of minority groups in mainstream parties. In what sense are they similar or different to descriptive representatives in minority parties? In what conditions can representatives with minority background in mainstream parties act as substantive representatives of national minorities? Finally, comparative research on substantive representation of national minorities in different institutional and electoral systems would significantly improve our understanding of minority representation.
APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: Territorial concentration of national minorities in Serbia

Table 7: Territorial concentration of national minorities in Serbia according to the 2011 Population Census (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Serbia</th>
<th>Belgrade region</th>
<th>Vojvodina</th>
<th>Šumadija and Western Serbia</th>
<th>South and Eastern Serbia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>23.09</td>
<td>26.88</td>
<td>28.27</td>
<td>21.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>25.14</td>
<td>21.54</td>
<td>30.05</td>
<td>23.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanians*</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>21.55 (2.42)</td>
<td>38.75 (2.75)</td>
<td>10.17 (0.55)</td>
<td>29.52 (94.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosniaks</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>98.27</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgarians</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>6.41</td>
<td>8.03</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td>83.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunyevtsi</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>98.58</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vlachs</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>5.96</td>
<td>93.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gorani</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>68.60</td>
<td>15.18</td>
<td>8.94</td>
<td>7.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavs</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>34.59</td>
<td>52.25</td>
<td>7.02</td>
<td>6.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarians</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>98.91</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonians</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>30.63</td>
<td>45.67</td>
<td>8.15</td>
<td>15.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>17.92</td>
<td>15.07</td>
<td>64.62</td>
<td>2.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germans</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>12.25</td>
<td>80.51</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>4.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>18.51</td>
<td>28.72</td>
<td>13.99</td>
<td>38.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanians</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>4.37</td>
<td>86.63</td>
<td>1.93</td>
<td>7.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>40.07</td>
<td>36.13</td>
<td>14.26</td>
<td>9.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruthenians</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>97.77</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovaks</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3.99</td>
<td>95.40</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenians</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>38.16</td>
<td>45.00</td>
<td>7.12</td>
<td>9.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>8.53</td>
<td>85.70</td>
<td>3.49</td>
<td>2.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>13.39</td>
<td>81.23</td>
<td>2.84</td>
<td>2.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegrins</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>25.70</td>
<td>57.47</td>
<td>9.88</td>
<td>6.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>40.34</td>
<td>38.22</td>
<td>10.48</td>
<td>10.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not declare</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>24.30</td>
<td>50.51</td>
<td>9.60</td>
<td>15.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional affiliation</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>4.19</td>
<td>92.84</td>
<td>2.03</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>29.03</td>
<td>18.10</td>
<td>26.47</td>
<td>26.41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Albanians from Pčinjski District boycotted the Census. The results from the 2002 census, which reflect more accurately the Albanian population, are given in brackets.
APPENDIX B: Results of parliamentary elections for political parties of national minorities in Serbia, 2000-2012

Table 8: Results of the 2012 parliamentary elections for political parties of national minorities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral list</th>
<th>Political party</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Votes (%)</th>
<th>Seats (N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minority list</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians</td>
<td>SVM</td>
<td>Hungarian</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party of Democratic Action of Sandzak</td>
<td>SDA</td>
<td>Bosniak</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All together</td>
<td>BDZ</td>
<td>Bosniak</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None of the Above</td>
<td>NOPO</td>
<td>Vlach</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition of Albanians of Presevo Valley</td>
<td>PDD</td>
<td>Albanian</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegrin Party</td>
<td>CP</td>
<td>Montenegrin</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainstream list</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Let’s Get Serbia Moving – Tomislav Nikolic</td>
<td>BNP</td>
<td>Bosniak</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DPM</td>
<td>Macedonian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RP</td>
<td>Roma</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choice for a Better Life – Boris Tadic</td>
<td>DSHV</td>
<td>Croatian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9: Results of the 2008 parliamentary elections for political parties of national minorities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral list</th>
<th>Political party</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Votes (%)</th>
<th>Seats (N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minority list</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarian Coalition</td>
<td>SVM</td>
<td>Hungarian</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosniak List for European Serbia</td>
<td>SDA</td>
<td>Bosniak</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition of Albanians of Presevo Valley</td>
<td>PDD</td>
<td>Albanian</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma Party</td>
<td>RP</td>
<td>Roma</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Vlachs of Serbia</td>
<td>VDS</td>
<td>Vlach</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen Initiative of Goranians</td>
<td>GIG</td>
<td>Gorani</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma for Roma</td>
<td>RPU, NDSR</td>
<td>Roma</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma Union of Serbia</td>
<td>URS</td>
<td>Roma</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegrin Party</td>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Montenegrin</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance of Backa Bunjevac</td>
<td>SBB</td>
<td>Backa Bunjevac</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainstream list</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For European Serbia</td>
<td>DSHV</td>
<td>Croatian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>Bosniak (+1 Roma MP)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbian Radical Party</td>
<td>DLR</td>
<td>Roma</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>
### Table 10: Results of the 2007 parliamentary elections for political parties of national minorities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral list</th>
<th>Political party</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Votes (%)</th>
<th>Seats (N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minority list</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians</td>
<td>SVM</td>
<td>Hungarian</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition List for Sandzak</td>
<td>SDA (SLPS+BDSS)</td>
<td>Bosniak</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition of Albanians of Presevo Valley</td>
<td>PDD</td>
<td>Albanian</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma Party – Srdjan Sajn</td>
<td>RP</td>
<td>Roma</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma Union of Serbia – Dr Rajko Djuric</td>
<td>URS</td>
<td>Roma</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition Hungarian Unity</td>
<td>DZVM, DPVM</td>
<td>Hungarian</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainstream list</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party – Boris Tadic</td>
<td>DSHV</td>
<td>Croatian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>Bosniak</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 11: Results of the 2003 parliamentary elections for political parties of national minorities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral list</th>
<th>Political party</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Votes (%)</th>
<th>Seats (N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minority list</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Together for Tolerance – Canak, Kasa, Ljajic</td>
<td>15 political parties</td>
<td>4.28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainstream list</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party – Boris Tadic</td>
<td>SDA (SLPS-BDSS)</td>
<td>Bosniak</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 12: Results of the 2000 parliamentary elections for political parties of national minorities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral list</th>
<th>Political party</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Votes (%)</th>
<th>Seats (N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mainstream list</td>
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<td>Democratic Opposition of Serbia</td>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>Bosniak</td>
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<td>DZVM</td>
<td>Hungarian</td>
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**LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BDSS</td>
<td>Bosniak Democratic Party of Sandzak (<em>Bošnjačka demokratska partija Sandžaka</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLR</td>
<td>Democratic Roma Left (<em>Demokratska levica Roma</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOS</td>
<td>Democratic Opposition of Serbia (<em>Demokratska opozicija Srbije</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPA</td>
<td>Democratic Party of Albanians (<em>Demokratska partija Albanaca</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRSM</td>
<td>Democratic Reform Party of Muslims (<em>Demokratska reformska stranka muslimana</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DS</td>
<td>Democratic Party (<em>Demokratska stranka</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSH</td>
<td>Democratic Union of Croats (<em>Demokratski savez Hrvata</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSHV</td>
<td>Democratic Alliance of Croats in Vojvodina (<em>Demokratski savez Hrvata u Vojvodini</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSS</td>
<td>Democratic Party of Serbia (<em>Demokratska stranka Srbije</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DZVM</td>
<td>Democratic Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians (<em>Demokratska zajednica vojvodjanskih Madjara</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPTP</td>
<td>First-past-the-post electoral system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSV</td>
<td>Social-democratic League of Vojvodina (<em>Liga socijaldemokrata Vojvodine</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCNM</td>
<td>National Council of National Minorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDD</td>
<td>Party for Democratic Action (<em>Partija za demokratsko delovanje</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR</td>
<td>Proportional representation system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUPS</td>
<td>Party of United Pensioners of Serbia (<em>Partija ujedinjenih penzionera Srbije</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REC</td>
<td>Republic Electoral Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RP</td>
<td>Roma Party (<em>Romska partija</em>)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDA</td>
<td>Party of Democratic Action of Sandzak (<em>Stranka demokratske akcije Sandžaka</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>Sandzak Democratic Party (<em>Sandžačka demokratska partija</em>)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDPS</td>
<td>Social-Democratic Party of Serbia (<em>Social-demokratska partija Srbije</em>)</td>
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<td>Party Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLPS</td>
<td>Social Liberal Party of Sandžak <em>(Socijalno liberalna partija Sandžaka)</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>SNS</td>
<td>Serbian Progressive Party <em>(Srpska napredna stranka)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPO</td>
<td>Serbian Renewal Movement <em>(Srpski pokret obnove)</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>SPS</td>
<td>Socialist Party of Serbia <em>(Socijalistička partija Srbije)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRS</td>
<td>Serbian Radical Party <em>(Srpska radikalna stranka)</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>SVM</td>
<td>Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians <em>(Savez vojvodjanskih Madjara)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URS</td>
<td>United Roma of Serbia <em>(Ujedinjeni Romi Srbije)</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
REFERENCES


Rules of Procedure. Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia 81/06, 74/08, 13/09, 21/10, 52/10, 20/12.


