Language Policy and Politics: The Central State and Linguistic Minorities in Spain and Italy, 1992-2010

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Abstract

Linguistic minorities are playing a crucial role in determining how states are reimagining themselves in more plural and inclusive ways. Pressure from both supranational and sub-state levels of government has meant that the repression of linguistic minorities by state institutions is no longer acceptable and even attitudes of neglect are widely condemned. However, while there has been a noticeable change in attitudes towards linguistic minorities in many European states, the specific role of the central state in relation to these groups remains ambiguous and merits further study.

This thesis thus compares the language policies of the central states of Spain and Italy between 1992 and 2010, concerning two specific linguistic minorities in each country. These include Catalan-speakers in Catalonia and the German-speaking minority in Alto Adige/Südtirol, which have received considerable recognition and find themselves in a comparable situation within their respective states. In contrast, the Asturian- and Sardinian-speaking minorities have received the most minimal recognition at both the regional and state levels. Three sources of primary data were identified for the purposes of this study: official state documentation and legislation, elite interviews with political and institutional representatives, and state-wide newspapers.

The research reveals the rationales, ideologies and motivations behind the actions of the central states of Spain and Italy in their approaches towards these distinct groups. New insight is provided by considering cases which have not previously been compared, as well as focusing on the typically hidden language policies of the state in contrast to the visible and widely studied policies implemented at the regional or provincial levels. This approach allows conclusions to be drawn on the extent to which both states may be moving away from the traditional monolingual nation-state model and provides recommendations for future approaches to linguistic minorities at the state and European levels.
Abbreviations

Political Parties: Italy
AN – Alleanza Nazionale (right-wing Italian party)
PSdA – Partito Sardo d’Azione (Sardinian nationalist party)
SVP – Südtiroler Volkspartei (party representing the German- and Ladin-speaking minorities in Alto Adige/Südtirol)

Political Parties: Spain
CiU – Convergència i Unió (centre-right Catalan nationalist coalition)
ERC – Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (left-wing Catalan nationalist party)
IU – Izquierda Unida (left-wing Spanish party)
PAS – Partiu Asturianista (Asturian nationalist party)
PP – Partido Popular (centre-right Spanish party)
PSC – Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (centre-left Catalan party federated to the PSOE)
PSOE – Partido Socialista Obrero Español (centre-left Spanish party)

Other
ASTAT – Istituto Provinciale di Statistica (Alto Adige/Südtirol statistics institute)
CIRES – Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Social (Spanish research centre)
CIS – Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (independent research centre on Spanish society linked to the Spanish government)
ECRML – European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages
EBLUL – European Bureau for Lesser-Used Languages
EEC – European Economic Community
EU – European Union
FCPNM – Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities
ISTAT – Istituto Nazionale di Statistica (Italian statistics institute)
RAI – Radiotelevisione Italiana (Italian state-owned public broadcaster)
RTVE – Corporación de Radio y Televisión Española (Spanish state-owned public broadcaster)
UN – United Nations
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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Significance and Aims

A study of the central state at a time when, by many accounts, the traditional nation-state structures appear to be declining in influence, may seem both outdated and redundant. As Eric Hobsbawm claimed as early as 1990, the history of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries ‘will inevitably have to be written as the history of a world which can no longer be claimed within the limits of “nations” and “nation-states” as these used to be defined’ (1992 [1990]: 191). Postmodernist theorists have often gone further, proclaiming the death of the nation-state, and the boundary-conscious existence it sustains. Nevertheless, as will be discussed in Chapter 2, this purported ‘death of the nation-state’ is widely challenged and both the nationalist project and the state structures it supports continue to demonstrate an undeniable hold over the world population (Billig 1995: 191).

What is evident, however, is that all states have been forced to adapt to both a new world and local order, and the traditional structures of the central state have seen significant transformation. In fact, it is precisely the changing nature of the central state over this period that makes it a continued subject of interest. In relation to linguistic minorities, the role of the state has been considerably altered. The nation-state can be seen as ‘the creator of minorities’ (Coulmas 1991: 14) in that it is from within the framework of the nation-state that linguistic minorities draw their status as such. The fictitious nationalist ideal of the monolingual nation-state led to the repression, eradication and disregard of those who spoke languages other than those officially sanctioned by the state. Indeed, both Spain and Italy bore witness to extreme examples of this repression in relatively recent periods of fascist rule. However, contemporary developments, most notably European and decentralising trends, have forced nation-states to rethink this stance. Linguistic minorities do, in fact, appear to be playing a key role in determining how states are reimagining themselves in more plural and inclusive ways. Pressure from both above and below has meant that the explicit repression of linguistic minorities is no longer acceptable, and even attitudes of neglect are often widely condemned. However, while on paper most states do appear to have changed their attitude towards linguistic minorities, these good intentions have not always been translated into action.
Consequently, it is the principal aim of this thesis to investigate the extent to which the central state has moved away from its traditional role as the ‘enemy of linguistic minorities’. In focusing on the state, it is not my intention to overemphasise its importance and, more dangerously, to underestimate the role of the minorities themselves, but rather to investigate its current position and role in the protection and promotion of languages other than the official national language of the state. Although the two country case studies of Spain and Italy cannot provide the definitive answer to this question, the comparative approach allows for significant insight and potential recommendations for future developments in this area.

1.2 Scope
Given the considerable breadth and complex nature of this project, it is necessary to define clearly the scope of this thesis. While other relevant and related subjects will be touched upon, the ambitious nature of this doubly comparative study has meant the need to ensure the focus of attention, the central state, remains at the centre of study. It is therefore essential to clarify what is actually meant by the term ‘central state’. What may at first appear to be a relatively straightforward term is in fact open to considerable interpretation and contestation. The state is essentially a legally defined entity comprised of a formal set of institutions with power over a specific territory (see similar definitions in Barbour 2000: 5; Blommaert 2006: 239; Hill 2009: 19). These institutions include legislative, executive and judicial bodies, and can be located at the central, regional and local levels (Hill 2009: 19). Consequently, although the term ‘state activities’ is often used to refer to those taking place at the central level, to avoid confusion it is necessary to use the qualified term ‘central state’ to refer to those institutions solely under the control of the state-wide authorities, rather than those at the sub-state level. Furthermore, although the central state and its institutions are evidently made up of a huge variety of distinct actors with different motivations and attitudes, for the purposes of this research a certain unity of action and intention must be assumed. This is not to say that the complexities and diverging attitudes of different governing parties, for example, will be ignored, but rather that in order to assess the approach of the central state as a whole, a certain organic unity must be assumed for analytical purposes (Ager 2001: 136).

Studying the approach of the central state towards linguistic minorities constitutes a study of language policy. ‘Language policy’ is again a term that is open to interpretation and, in particular, is often confused with the term ‘language planning’.

Language planning is best defined as ‘deliberate efforts to influence the behaviour of others with respect to the acquisition, structure, or functional allocation of their language codes’ (Kaplan and Baldauf 1997: 45). Although some have applied wider definitions, ‘language policy’ is essentially when this planning is carried out by a political authority, usually a government or state (Ager 2001: 5; Tollefson 1991: 16). The ‘language policy’ of a state, or other political authority, normally consists of a body of ideas, laws and regulations, as well as more informal statements of intent (Kaplan and Baldauf 1997: xi). This content of ‘language policy’ will consequently constitute the primary focus of analysis.

What actually constitutes a linguistic minority is also a contentious question and, as the case studies prove, they do in fact come in many shapes and sizes. To take the broadest definition of this term, a linguistic minority is a group of people who speak a language that is different to the official national language of the state. However, this definition inevitably covers an extremely broad range of groups, including both more established and recent migrant groups, nomadic and territorially concentrated groups, and speakers of lesser-used languages as well as speakers of the official state languages of other countries. In order to maintain a clear focus, I will be analysing and comparing the language policies of the institutions of the central state in Spain and Italy concerning two specific linguistic minorities in each country. The case studies chosen all represent long-standing and territorially concentrated groups within a specific region of the state. The reasons for choosing the specific cases will be discussed in Section 1.4.1, but the principal justification for focusing on these groups is that the dynamics of migrant or nomadic language groups, for example, are too distinct to be dealt with in sufficient detail here.

The period of study from 1992 to 2010 was also selected as an apparent period of change in approach by the wider European community, most clearly marked by the introduction of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (ECRML) in 1992. Although within the specific states much legislation concerning the protection of linguistic minorities may predate this period, it still marks a time when, in appearances at least, it became no longer acceptable within the European context to repress or neglect the linguistic diversity present within state borders. The reality within individual states, as will be analysed, may well be quite different.
1.3 Research Questions

In light of these clarifications of the purpose and scope of this study, the principal research questions to be addressed are:

- What roles do the institutions of the central state play in the formulation and implementation of language policies for specific linguistic minorities?
- What are the rationales and motivations behind the actions of the central state in its approach towards distinct linguistic minorities?
- Is different treatment for different minorities appropriately considered and justified, and does it respond to the realities of distinct linguistic, social and political contexts?
- How are changes and pressures at both the sub-state and supranational levels influencing and altering the role and approach of the central state in its dealings with linguistic minorities?
- To what extent has the state moved away from the traditional monolingual nation-state model to become a genuinely plural and multilingual model of state?

1.4 Methodology

1.4.1 Case Studies and the Comparative Method

A comparative method was adopted in selecting the two equivalent states of Spain and Italy as the principal subjects of investigation over the same period in time. While a single case study might have offered the opportunity to provide more in-depth and intensive study and analysis, the comparative potential of this study was felt to be more worthwhile as it has the possibility ‘to provide rich, contextual descriptions which identify clearly the similarities and differences between cases and places’ (Pierce 2008: 56). As Roger Pierce explains, by comparing two or more cases, researchers can identify potential generalisability and common causal variables, while maintaining an awareness of the specific contexts of each case study (2008: 55).

The selection of these two states, it should be acknowledged, arose primarily from my own experience and knowledge of both Spain and Italy. However, both countries did also demonstrate specific characteristics that made a comparative study both appropriate and potentially rewarding. Country profiles in Chapter 3 will explore such characteristics further, but to illustrate the principal features shared by both countries, both are southern European states and full members of the European Union (the EU). In terms of state formation, both can be defined as regionalised unitary states.
(Bullmann 1997: 5) and both countries contain within their borders relatively large and territorially concentrated, established groups of speakers of other languages. While an extensive list of differences between the two states could also be drawn up, it is these principal common features that make a comparative study worthwhile.

Nevertheless, in designing the research project, it became evident that any attempt to consider the approach of the central state in Spain and Italy to linguistic minorities as a whole would be both unviable and lacking in depth of analysis. Furthermore, selecting just one minority group in both countries risked being unrepresentative and difficult to generalise since, as will be demonstrated, distinct minorities receive hugely different treatment by the institutions of the state. Consequently, in both states, the linguistic minority considered to receive the peak level of recognition by the state was first selected. In the Spanish case this constituted the Catalan-speaking group within the region of Catalonia. Although the Catalan-speaking group actually spreads far beyond the political borders of the Catalan region, it was necessary to clearly delimit the subject of study. In Italy, the German-speaking minority in the autonomous province of Alto Adige/Südtirol1 was selected. This may, at first, appear to be an odd selection since German itself, as the official state language of one of the principal European powers, is evidently not a minority language at the global level. Nevertheless, in the state context, German speakers do constitute a linguistic minority facing similar obstacles and issues to others who speak a language different to the official state language. Both the Catalan- and German-speaking minorities, however, do display a feature considered uncommon to most linguistic minority groups in that they are far from politically powerless. As Dennis Ager states, particularly in reference to the Catalan case, ‘the very fact that their situations form the bulk of the research literature on community languages indicates the degree of political consciousness they have aroused, while they have either thrown off the yoke of political control or have come to some accommodation with the state in which they live’ (Ager 2001: 159). Indeed, this leads some, even from within the minority itself, to question their status as linguistic minorities, since powerlessness is often considered to be the principal feature of minority groups (Nic Craith 2006: 58; Tollefson 1991: 16). However, it is, in fact, this ambiguity and status as ‘powerful’ minorities that renders these cases of continued interest.

1 The name of the area itself is a point of linguistic contention (Grote 2012: 3). A decision has been made to use the official bilingual Italian and German term to avoid any implication of bias.
To offer an appropriate contrast, two minorities with relatively minimal recognition by the state were selected. In Spain, this group constitutes the Asturian-speaking group within the region of Asturias, while in Italy the Sardinian-speaking group on the island of Sardinia was selected. Arguably, there are other groups which have received no recognition and could perhaps offer a greater contrast. Nomadic and migrant groups, in particular, have received little to no recognition, and in Italy there are also the ‘dialects’, which some consider to be ‘regional languages’ (Coluzzi 2008) but are typically ignored by the state. On the other hand, there are also many who would contest the status of Asturian and Sardinian as languages (see Chapter 4). Nevertheless, a line has to be drawn and the easiest method to determine the suitability of these two groups as case studies is that both Asturian and Sardinian do now have some form of official state recognition of their status as languages (art. 2, Law 482, 15 December 1999; Council of Europe, 23 September 2002: 15). Furthermore, unlike migrant languages, they both appear to fall under the remit of the ECRML (art. 1, ECRML). Finally, as established and territorially concentrated groups they offer a more easily comparable point of reference to the Catalan- and German-speaking groups, despite the many other significant distinctions between these cases.

Having laid out the justifications and motivation for selecting these subjects of study, it should be clarified that the intention is not to ‘force a square peg into a round hole’. That is to say, the apparent commonalities between the cases were not intentionally forced, while the differences were ignored. Instead, a considerable awareness of the state-wide picture of linguistic diversity was first obtained from secondary sources and the minorities to be looked at were then selected based on apparent commonalities and differences. Furthermore, within the time constraints of such a large project, significant knowledge of the specific minority and state contexts was sought (see Chapter 3) and taken into full consideration in the process of analysis. However, while a certain amount of relativism is essential in considering each case, it can only take us so far in the search for potential wider conclusions. It is my belief that no case is, in reality, entirely sui generis and it is from this perspective that the comparative approach must come.

In sum, this research project is, in essence, doubly comparative. The principal subjects of comparison are the states of Italy and Spain themselves, but a form of secondary case study, the linguistic minority groups, has also been identified to provide a clearer focus of analysis. To clarify, this means that the two states will be compared, but the approach of each state to two distinct linguistic minorities will also be
compared. This may at first appear to be a fairly complicated approach, but in reality it has provided for a clearer focus of study and the opportunity to explore the full potential of the comparative method.

1.4.2 The Interdisciplinary Approach

In what is principally a study of language policy, an interdisciplinary approach is the only option available. As those who have attempted to define the field of language policy have recognised, there is no overarching theory of language policy due to the complexity of issues involved (Ricento 2006b: 129). As a result, language policy studies have tended to focus on empirical evidence and immediate practical problems (Kaplan and Baldauf 1997: x-xi). Although this study will follow a similar approach, it is helpful to clarify some of the main disciplines from which this research will draw.

As the majority of researchers in this field tend to define themselves as sociolinguists, it is unsurprising that much of the theoretical basis for this research originates from this discipline. An in-depth understanding of language in society and the related field of the sociology of language (Fishman 1972b) is essential to any research project which attempts to analyse and understand attempts by the state to implement policies with the potential and intention to alter language behaviour. Policy studies also merit attention, since language policy can be considered a form of public policy even if it has typically been neglected as a subject of study within the field. An understanding of the policy process, in particular, helps to ensure that analysis and potential proposals for alternative policy approaches are ‘grounded in the understanding of the real world in which policy is made’ (Hill 2009: 6). Nevertheless, policy studies have a tendency to assume the existence of a clear policy-making system and organisational network (Spolsky 2004: 14). As we will find in both the Italian and Spanish cases, this rarely applies to language policy. Indeed, particularly in reference to minority languages, language policy often takes the form of a ‘no-policy policy’ where no explicit policy is articulated while the official state language ‘naturally’ dominates (Fishman 2006: 318). Consequently, there is a need to make visible such policies, and more importantly to explore the motivations which underlie them.

It is here that critical theory is useful for exploring questions of power. Critical Discourse Analysis was one of the first frameworks designed to study language in relation to power and ideology (Fairclough 1995) and James W. Tollefson has helped to define and elaborate on the related field of Critical Language Policy (2006). This approach challenges the traditional ‘objectivity’ of researchers, with a stronger focus on
social justice and the potential social inequality that may result from language policies
(Tollefson 2006: 42-44). Central to this approach is the view that the term ‘minority’
refers ‘less to numerical size than groups with relatively less power, rights, and
privileges than one or more dominant groups’ (Tollefson 1991: 16). The focus on
asymmetrical power relations means that language policy cannot be viewed as merely
attempts to change language behaviour. Robert L. Cooper has articulated this best,
stating that ‘To plan language is to plan society’ (1989: 182).

This emphasis on the wider social and political context in which language policy
and planning takes place also relates to the need to understand the influence of historical
developments. Tollefson, in particular, notes how ‘language policy is embedded in the
rise of the state’ and, given that it is the state that is the subject of study here, an in-
depth understanding of the process of nation-building and state formation has been
Hobsbawm 1992 [1990]) provide an essential theoretical basis for an understanding of
the role language has played in the nation-building process. An understanding of more
recent and relevant political processes and theories which have impacted on state
structures and language policy has also been sought, relating specifically to regionalism,
Europeanisation, multiculturalism and globalisation. Within the time constraints of the
project, it is a danger that an attempt to understand and incorporate such complex
processes and theories may be incomplete. Nevertheless, the need to locate language
policy in real space and time requires a constant struggle to follow and understand the
complexities of wider political and sociological developments.

To clarify, this research will draw principally from the disciplines of sociolinguistics and politics in its analysis, as the principal fields of relevance to
language policy. Other disciplines will also need to be considered as and when relevant.
Given the often legislative nature of the content of state language policies, for example,
a certain awareness of legal and judicial limitations and concepts will be required.
Nevertheless, this is not intended to be a purely descriptive study of the laws and
regulations that make up the state language policies of Spain and Italy. Instead, the
intention is to consider the political and sociolinguistic issues that underlie such
policies. To ensure that this interdisciplinary approach remains valid and grounded in
reality, however, a strong empirical basis must be established to be able to demonstrate
the application and relevance of such theories and, in particular, to support future policy
recommendations (Ricento 2006a: 11).
1.4.3 Primary Data and Triangulation

In light of the emphasis on context and the complexity of the subject matter, the qualitative approach has been taken in the process of data collection and analysis. As Pierce explains, ‘qualitative research provides high quality data and findings, and deep, meaningful insights into underlying values, fears and motivations of agents and actors in the political world’ (2008: 46-47). For this reason, it is often considered the best approach to understanding the complexities of social and political life. Nevertheless, it is sometimes criticised as a ‘soft’ approach in contrast to the ‘hard’ evidence provided by quantitative studies, with the inherent risk of bias in the materials and significant scope for misinterpretation or exaggeration (Pierce 2008: 46). In reality, both quantitative and qualitative approaches contain this risk, but an awareness of such dangers means that there is a need to adopt a rigorous approach to data collection.

The triangulation of data is the principal means of ensuring the validity and reliability of research materials (Wodak 2006: 174). Triangulation essentially involves seeking accounts from three or more perspectives to avoid, or at least compensate for, individual biases in the data, and to pinpoint gaps and inconsistencies between different accounts. As Pierce explains, ‘No single account can ever be regarded as wholly reliable or accurate. Other sources must be sought and used. However, the number of competing sources may be huge’ (2008: 89). This points to one of the challenges in triangulation, which is choosing from among the vast range of data available to ensure the project remains viable. Available data on language policy is problematic since, as previously stated, the content of such policy ranges from concrete laws, regulations and rules, to less visible practices, ideas and informal statements of intent (Kaplan and Baldauf 1997: xi). As Bernard Spolsky establishes, some countries record their language policy in the constitution and written laws and policies, while many do not have such formal and explicit policies (2004: 4). Policy, in general, is often not formally sanctioned by a clear decision or presented as a clearly identifiable course of action (Hill 2009: 15). Consequently, there is a need to incorporate both explicit written language policy documents, such as constitutional clauses and language laws, and to make visible more covert and implicit lines of action. It is for this reason that a variety of primary sources was gathered to attempt to reveal both overt and covert forms of language policy.

Accordingly, three sources of primary data were identified for this research. The most obvious source of data is official documentation produced by the institutions of the central state. Legislation concerning the linguistic minorities concerned constitutes a major and relatively straightforward source of information. Legislation includes both
the Constitution, state laws and other secondary forms of legislation in the shape of
decrees and orders. Judgements from the respective constitutional courts related to
language laws and the specific linguistic minorities will also be analysed to provide
information on both the application of legislation and the approach of the judiciary as an
institution of the central state. Official government reports will be utilised where
relevant, most notably the reports submitted to the Council of Europe by the central
governments on the application of the ECRL and the Framework Convention for the
Protection of National Minorities (FCPNM). Less explicit forms of policy in the form of
attitudes and motivations will also be analysed from statements or speeches by principal
actors from central state institutions. This will include parliamentary interventions,
public speeches, press releases and information provided on the websites of state, and
sometimes regional, institutions. The overwhelming majority of these sources of data
were, in fact, collected from official online sources provided by state institutions, with
the now widespread introduction of comprehensive databases and websites meaning
there was only a minimal need to locate further sources on fieldwork trips.

Consequently, fieldwork trips were undertaken primarily for the purpose of elite
interviews – the second source of data – with relevant actors and expert commentators
on the subject. Interviews, in particular, provided the opportunity to discover the
possible gap between what was being stated or claimed in official documents and the
reality of the application of these policies by actors involved, as well as the real effects
of these policies on the linguistic minority groups concerned. The strong potential for
bias in these interviews, however, was closely considered and, given the importance of
transparency in the interview process, the methodology and challenges involved will be
discussed in greater detail below.

The third primary data source was the principal state-wide newspapers of Spain
and Italy. In Spain, the newspapers were El País, El Mundo and ABC, and in Italy they
were La Repubblica, Il Corriere della Sera and La Stampa. These newspapers were
selected as they had the highest readership within the selected states (Información y
Control de Publicaciones 2012; Prima Comunicazione 2012). Newspapers were again
used to supplement and corroborate information found in the official documents of state
institutions. Newspapers do, however, represent a specific viewpoint and although I will
be relying on newspapers principally for news reporting rather than opinion or editorial
pieces, the question of bias remains particularly pertinent. The selection of the three
principal newspapers in both countries is intended to provide data from the dominant
mainstream state media from across the political spectrum. Nevertheless, all newspapers
can be considered to be what Susan DiGiacomo terms ‘self-conscious loci of ideological production’ (1999: 105). Nationalist theorists have also noted the central role played by newspapers in the daily reproduction of the nation (Anderson 1991: 36; Billig 1995: 48). This makes their role far from neutral in relation to the language policies of the state. For this reason, where information appeared incomplete or questionable, regional newspapers were also consulted as secondary sources of information. Furthermore, as will be discussed below, many of the subjects of elite interviews were elite leaders and members of the linguistic minorities themselves or were proponents of multilingual language policies. Consequently, their bias can, to a certain extent, be seen as oppositional to that of the state-wide newspapers.

While every effort has consequently been made to compensate for the limitations of distinct sources and the biases they contain by using a variety of sources, bias is in fact an unavoidable reality. Even apparently neutral documents such as official reports show the bias of those who compiled and wrote them. The triangulation of data thus remains the best tool to attempt to ensure that no single bias or view dominates.

1.4.4 Elite Interviews
Given the central role of the researchers themselves in the collection of data from interviews, it is necessary to ensure transparency in the interview process to prove the validity of the data collected. In selecting respondents, the aim was not to select those representative of the whole population, but rather elites who could provide relevant information. As Joel D. Aberbach and Bert A. Rockman clarify, ‘respondents are selected on the basis of what they might know to help the investigator fill in pieces of a puzzle or confirm the proper alignment of pieces already in place’ (2002: 673). For this reason, two main types of respondent were identified: decision-makers and actors within state and regional institutions, and expert commentators, primarily from the academic field. Respondents were also selected with knowledge either of the state context as a whole or specifically related to one of the linguistic minorities. Decision-makers and actors could also be separated into the two distinct categories of political representatives and civil servants. While political representatives could provide greater information on the motivations and rationale behind policy, civil servants provided essential information on the implementation and institutional framework in which policy takes place. It should be clarified that the selection of respondents demonstrates a strong bias towards those in favour of more pro-active language policy measures for linguistic minorities. As previously stated, this should be partially compensated for by
data triangulation. However, this strong bias is also inevitable since those who have particularly useful knowledge on existing language policies concerning linguistic minorities tend to be those who have taken a particular interest in either a specific minority group or multilingualism in general.

Potential respondents were typically identified from initial data searches and secondary reading. Key political figures and academic experts were identified from these searches. Online searches also provided contact information for relevant institutions and potential respondents, and all respondents were approached initially by email to confirm availability. Previous research in Asturias meant some of my respondents there were already known to me, and I was also assisted in approaching potential respondents in Catalonia, Sardinia and Alto Adige/Südtirol by my own academic contacts in the UK. Unsurprisingly, not all potential respondents identified agreed to be interviewed. Furthermore, time and financial constraints meant that fieldwork trips were relatively short (7 weeks in total) and the opportunity to arrange additional interviews was therefore limited. However, within this limited time period a significant number of interviews were carried out with a variety of relevant key actors and experts (See Appendices 1 and 2).

The interviews themselves were semi-structured with open-ended questions. The interviews were loosely structured around a few key questions (see Appendix 3), but the questions were also adapted to suit the background and position of the respondent. Open-ended questions were clearly most suitable for this qualitative study, since ‘they have the virtue of allowing the subjects to tell the interviewer what's relevant and what’s important rather than being restricted by the researchers’ preconceived notions about what is important’ (Berry 2002: 680). Every effort was made to avoid leading questions and to ensure the respondents were free to express their views and knowledge as they saw relevant. The questions were only sent to respondents in advance when requested to maintain naturalness and the opportunity to guide the interview as necessary. With the exception of one interview where two respondents were present, the interviews were on a one-to-one basis and were all face-to-face. The interviews were recorded on an audio device and later transcribed to ensure an accurate and full representation of the interview was possible. The interviews were conducted in the official state languages, Italian and Castilian, which was agreed with the respondents prior to the interview. Given the nature of this project, this could be considered a form of ‘language policy’ in itself, but was the only viable option given my limited language skills in the minority languages concerned which were, in some cases, the first language of the respondents.
An ethical review by the University of Leeds was also sought prior to the interviews and all respondents signed a consent form agreeing to participate.

Having dealt with the technicalities of the interview, it is helpful to elaborate further on the validity and reliability of information obtained in interviews. As Jeffrey M. Berry warns, ‘Interviewers must always keep in mind that it is not the obligation of a subject to be objective and to tell us the truth’ (2002: 680). He also warns that some subjects may appear more persuasive than others and may consequently have an excessive influence over the researcher’s understanding of the issue. Prior to the interviews I sought information about the background of the respondents to establish their likely bias and viewpoint. Information provided by the respondents was also cross-checked and corroborated in the process of data triangulation, as well as with the responses of other respondents. Where opinions and views were sought, rather than specific information, these are accurately and fully represented in the analysis with the potential bias taken into consideration at every stage of the research.

Overall, the interviews provided an invaluable source of information which would be difficult or impossible to gain solely from official documents. For an outsider to both the states and the linguistic minorities in question, it is essential to speak to those either actively involved or with many more years of experience researching these cases. While it is not the responsibility of the respondents to be truthful, it is my responsibility to ensure their viewpoints and responses are represented honestly and accurately.

1.4.5 Secondary Data
Secondary data mainly came in the form of academic texts previously published on the wider historic, political and linguistic context of both states, and of the selected linguistic minorities. While many of these sources provide background information, there are also both journal articles and books which focus specifically on language policy within the states and regions concerned over the period in question. Although the approach taken in such texts differs to my own in terms of focus and methodology, they provide essential additional data which were also used to corroborate my own findings from the primary data sources previously identified. It should be clarified that the amount of material available varied for the distinct case studies. The quantity of material, for example, available on Catalan language policy was considerable, whereas the Sardinian and Asturian cases have been little studied. Language use and attitude surveys should also be given specific mention, as a particularly rich source of
information on specific sociolinguistic contexts. However, while the hard quantitative data such surveys provide may be appealing, there are criticisms of their reliability, which will depend on the size and representativeness of samples and the rigour and reliability of the researchers (Baker 2006: 224). Again, the potential bias of such sources was considered at every stage in the research process and cross-checked where possible.

1.4.6 The Process of Analysis

As should now be clear, the huge quantity of material such research uncovers risks making the project unviable within the time constraints. It was in the process of analysis that this became most evident, and consequently the analysis had to be focused as narrowly as possible. It should thus be clarified that this research is not intended to provide a comprehensive and in-depth overview of the language policies of the states in question. This would be far too ambitious an aim if we consider, for example, that entire books or projects are devoted just to the study of one area of state or regional language policy, most commonly the area of education. While such comprehensive studies will be used as secondary data in my research, such in-depth study is not my aim.

Instead, an attempt is made to analyse the state’s approach to language policy by focusing on key events and laws or regulations introduced during the time period under study. Consequently, primary and secondary data were consulted to pinpoint the most significant events and areas of intervention over the period in question. Such events may range from the introduction of a state law on language policy, the state ratification of the ECRML, a Constitutional Court judgement on language policy, the involvement of state political representatives in a local dispute on language policy or the introduction of a new state scheme or project related to language policy or a specific minority. Essentially, these events constitute any occasion when state institutions or their representatives have been involved in defining, shaping or implementing language policies which affect the linguistic minorities in question. Although events and decisions involve different actors and institutions at the state level, inevitably with different motivations, patterns of action do clearly emerge from such events which can be used to demonstrate the priorities and motivations which govern state language policies as a whole.

The comparative level of analysis came later, due to the need to devote sufficient attention to the case studies of Spain and Italy individually. To ensure, however, that the comparative method was fully exploited, the analysis was structured thematically. That
is to say, each chapter of the analysis focuses on a particular subject, rather than a specific minority or country, with the chapter divided into two parts, the first focusing on Italy and the second on Spain. The concluding section of each chapter will draw out the primary comparative elements from both cases. Finally, the conclusion of the thesis will be fully comparative and highlight potential generalizability and common, as well as distinct, causal variables. This approach was most appropriate in allowing for both states to receive appropriate individual and specific attention, while using the comparative method to explore the wider application and significance of the findings.

1.5 Bias and the Outsider Perspective

Having presented my methodology and the aims and scope of this study, it is essential to provide a brief discussion and clarification of my own role. While the necessity to limit and compensate for potential bias in the data has been discussed, what of my own bias as an academic researcher? In an attempt to analyse language issues from a social and political perspective, as Jan Blommaert boldly states, ‘Taking sides is unavoidable’ (1999: 437). Thomas Ricento echoes this view, clarifying that detached ‘scientific’ research on language policy is not possible due to the inevitable prior experiences and positions of researchers on what the potential social ‘good’ of specific language policies may be (2006a: 12). Indeed, Ricento even suggests that it is this element of language policy that is particularly attractive to ‘persons who wish to combine theoretical/methodological rigor with social advocacy’ (2006c: xi). A particular example of this is the concern felt by many researchers in the field for the loss of languages worldwide. Certainly, in my case I was initially drawn to the field by a concern for linguistic diversity and a deep interest in multilingualism.

It is often taken as an assumption that linguistic diversity is positive and that language loss should therefore be prevented. Nevertheless, despite a significant social consensus to this effect, this can, in reality, be considered a ‘philosophically contentious value assumption’ (Kymlicka and Patten 2003: 44). The potential social good of linguistic diversity does, in fact, lack sufficient empirical evidence (Grin 2003a: 171) and consequently such a position requires justification. The view that linguistic diversity is a public good in itself has been most notably promoted by David Crystal (2000: 32-65) and Joshua Fishman (2001b: 2-9). Both share an emphasis on the importance of diversity, in the face of current globalising trends, as a source of

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2 Italy is considered first as the research on Italy was undertaken at an earlier stage, although significant editing of the Italian sections was undertaken later to ensure the comparative aspects with Spain were salient and fully developed.
creativity and enrichment. Languages, as vehicles of distinct cultures and identities, can be viewed as an essential element of such diversity and can consequently be considered to be beneficial for society as a whole. A concern for the loss of languages worldwide can also be compatible with a concern for social justice and the potential marginalisation of the speakers of such languages. This means that a concern for the loss of global linguistic diversity should not be seen as coming at the expense of all other concerns, such as the social mobility and freedom of choice of speakers of minority languages (Kymlicka and Patten 2003: 47). Both this belief in the importance of linguistic diversity and the concern for social justice for the speakers of marginalised languages are positions from which my own research departs. Such views can lead to accusations of an excessive focus on advocacy rather than scholarly analysis in academic research (Spolsky 2004: 128). Nevertheless, by recognising my own position as a researcher and inevitably interested party, it becomes a priority to ensure subsequent analysis is grounded in reality by adopting a coherent methodological framework which prioritises valid and reliable data collection (Ricento 2006a: 12).

Furthermore, it should be clarified that, in reference to the specific case studies, I have no specific loyalties to any political force, cultural movement or linguistic minority group within Spain or Italy. Throughout the research process I remained very much an outsider to the case studies in question, while attempting to acquire a sufficiently detailed knowledge and understanding of specific contexts within the limitations of the time and scale of the project. This is not to suggest that the outsider approach is necessarily superior, and I have relied heavily on the invaluable and detailed sociolinguistic studies normally undertaken by those from within the countries or specific minorities concerned. The interviews were also used to gain access to those with greater knowledge and experience of the specific contexts. As an outsider looking in, as it were, I have been acutely aware of the need for sensitivity to time and place. Nevertheless, evidently having chosen to undertake such a project, it is my belief that the outsider perspective does have something else to offer.

A considerable amount of partiality on the parts of ‘insiders’ is inevitable, with preconceptions and long-standing political or cultural alliances often playing a significant role. Those focusing or looking from within only one case study can also have a tendency to focus on the unique nature of that context, with a reluctance to look at its wider relevance. As this research will demonstrate, the reality is that linguistic minorities can no longer survive by living in their own isolated worlds without engaging with the wider state and global context. It is an unavoidable reality that decisions which
affect linguistic minorities are often made by politicians and civil servants external to
the specific contexts in which these minorities live. Both policy decisions and research
should ideally be undertaken in consultation with those with greater knowledge and
insight into specific contexts, as I have attempted to do in my research. However, there
is also a need to consider broader and more wide-ranging questions about how
overarching policy decisions could be applied in different contexts. This is an ambitious
aim, and one not without its pitfalls and potential for error. Nevertheless, I believe it is
an essential step and could play a vital role in assisting decision-makers in formulating
and implementing broader policies, which are a reality in the current transnational
context, where both minority groups and states must also look beyond their own borders
at wider European and global developments.

1.6 Thesis Structure
Following this introduction to the scope and aims of this thesis, the next two chapters
will provide an extensive review of the literature on the subject of linguistic minorities
in general and the specific case studies. Chapter 2 will focus on the central concepts,
questions and theories to be considered in the thesis, as well as providing an overview
of developments in the wider European context. Chapter 3 will provide detailed historic,
political and sociolinguistic profiles of Spain and Italy, as well as the specific linguistic
minorities to be used as case studies.

Subsequently the thesis moves on to the central analysis, which will be
organised thematically. Chapter 4 focuses on how the central state approaches the
concept of ‘language’, while Chapter 5 moves on to the related question of minority
cultures and identities, and their compatibility or potential to conflict with state-wide
definitions of identity. Chapter 6 will deal more specifically with the interactions
between the state and sub-state levels of government in developing and implementing
language policy.

Chapter 7 focuses on the question of minority language rights in relation to
education and Chapter 8 will consider the broader European context and the external
pressures on both states to offer greater protection to their linguistic minorities. Lastly, I
will offer my conclusions on the role of the central state in the protection of linguistic
minorities in the specific cases of Italy and Spain, as well as drawing wider conclusions
on the European context and offering potential recommendations for future
developments in the field.
Chapter 2: Linguistic Minorities in a Changing Europe

2.1 Introduction

In order to examine the language policies of Spain and Italy, it is essential to provide a preliminary overview of the wider European context which governs and influences the manner in which these states act or fail to act in favour of their linguistic minorities, as well as the primary theories and concepts of relevance to the subject. To begin, however, a brief definition of ‘linguistic minorities’ was provided in the previous chapter, namely those groups who speak a language different to the official language of the state. It is also useful to provide a brief summary of the different forms such linguistic minority groups normally take. These include (in an order that is not intended to be hierarchical):

- Speakers of a language restricted to a geographic area of a state and, with the exception of those who have migrated away from the area, spoken only in that area.
- Speakers of a language restricted to a geographic area, but in more than one state. Normally, this is the case of border regions.
- Speakers of a language restricted to a geographic area in one state, but which is the official language of a neighbouring state.
- Small enclaves of speakers resulting from historic settlements of migrants from other states.
- Nomadic groups of speakers of a language of historic settlement, but who are dispersed throughout the territory of the state.
- Recent migrant groups who speak a language different to that of the state. These may be geographically concentrated or dispersed over the whole of the state.

This chapter, while referring to broader questions relating to all of these groups, will focus primarily on long-standing and territorially concentrated groups (the first three categories), as the case studies all fit this description.

The first section of this chapter will explore theoretical questions, beginning with the subject of language status and the processes of language shift and language death, as well as a discussion of the relationship between language and identity. This will be followed by an overview of language rights and the relationship between language and forms of inequality. The next section will move on to consider the dominant political structure in which linguistic minorities exist, the nation-state. This
will lead on to a discussion of the role of both micronationalist and regionalist movements, and the significance of language in such movements. The final section will be devoted to wider European developments, focusing particularly on recent documents and charters drawn up by both the EU and the Council of Europe. Overall, this will provide both a clear theoretical basis and an overview of the current European context, from which the subsequent analysis will depart.

2.2 Linguistic Capital, Identity and Rights

2.2.1 Language: Status, Planning and Identity

Confusion over the goals and aims of language policy, particularly concerning minority languages, is often compounded by very low levels of awareness of language issues among the general population and sometimes those responsible for enacting policy. To take the most obvious example of such confusion, there is a common misconception that ‘language’ and ‘dialect’ are clearly distinct and defined entities. A lack of mutual intelligibility is often assumed to be a clear distinction, but this is not the case. Many languages with separate statuses can be mutually intelligible and mutual intelligibility can also be a very subjective criterion (Trudgill 2000: 4). Instead, the speech varieties that we have come to classify as languages today have only achieved such status through a process of legitimation and institutionalisation which privileges one language variety over others. Features such as orthography, a uniform grammar, an ample vocabulary and different styles and registers, were not tools ‘naturally’ available to national languages but instead were created in an attempt ‘to produce self-consciously modern, authentic, and unifying standard languages’ (Fishman 1972a: 62). The distinction between language and dialect is consequently a political consequence of the language legitimation processes of the state, and dialects are essentially languages that did not succeed politically. Einar Haugen states this most clearly, writing that there is ‘no such thing as an inherently handicapped language’ (1966: 927). The linguistic sciences have proven that all linguistic systems, be they ‘languages’ or ‘dialects’, are of equal value (Trudgill 2000: 8). However, those speech varieties which have not attained the status of official state languages, be they termed minority languages or dialects, are still generally seen as having an inferior status, principally due to their association with informal, lower class and rural forms of speech.

These distinctions in status between speech varieties are most helpfully illustrated in Pierre Bourdieu’s writings on linguistic capital. He explains how ‘The constitution of a linguistic market creates the conditions for an objective competition in
and through which the legitimate competence can function as linguistic capital, producing a *profit of distinction* on the occasion of each social exchange’ (Bourdieu 1991: 55). This linguistic market is usually created in the process of state formation, with the variety selected as the officially sanctioned state language becoming the ‘legitimate language’, against which other speech varieties are measured and judged as inferior (Bourdieu 1991: 45). Where two or more speech varieties are required to coexist within the same community or territory, the distinctions between different speech varieties become further accentuated. Generally, this wider societal multilingualism results in an increasingly bilingual population, although the aim of ‘balanced bilingualism’ is rarely achieved (Jaffe 2007: 58-59). Instead, a diglossic situation normally emerges with one language becoming dominant. This is linked to the functions assigned to different forms of speech, or ‘*compartmentalized* roles’ as Joshua Fishman describes them in his writings on diglossia (1972b: 96). Diglossia is a concept most notably defined by Charles Ferguson in 1959 and further developed by Fishman, whereby a language of high status and prestige is used for most written and formal purposes, while the language of low status, or a dialect, is reserved for informal purposes and the private sphere (1972b: 91-98). While for the bilingual individual two languages may co-exist in their repertoire, in the multilingual society languages compete for registers and ‘the language that captures the largest number of registers is likely to push out other languages’ (Kaplan and Baldauf 1997: 236).

This process is often referred to as language shift, and can ultimately lead to the disappearance or ‘death’ of a language (Crystal 2000: 79). The pressure to speak the dominant language has generally in the past resulted in the eventual disappearance of the dominated languages as they have become increasingly limited to fewer domains (Crystal 2000: 83). To reverse or prevent such processes and for dominated languages to survive, the language community itself must play the leading role in ensuring its continued use. As Robert B. Kaplan and Richard B. Baldauf Jr. explain:

> If individuals are motivated to use the language, to pass it on to their children, to develop an active community of speakers within which the language is used, and the language is not unduly pressured by a high variety or a dominant external language, then small languages can and will survive. (1997: 275)

Ideally, such efforts will also be supported or coordinated at a higher institutional level, normally taking the form of language planning measures designed by a government body. Since these efforts aim at ‘such massive changes in society’ (Kaplan and Baldauf
Language planning itself is normally divided into two types of activity: corpus and status planning (Kloss 1969: 81). Robert L. Cooper later added a third type of activity in the form of acquisition planning (1989: 33). Corpus planning is largely concerned with linguistic questions, focusing on the form and structure of the language. Status planning, in contrast, concerns the functions of the language and its domains of use, while acquisition planning relates to the opportunity and incentive to learn the language in order to increase the number of users (Cooper 1989: 33; Hornberger 2006: 28; Kloss 1969: 81). Although these activities may seem quite separate, in reality it is often hard to separate them and, to have any chance of success, they should normally be undertaken simultaneously (Fishman 2006: 315-17; Kaplan and Baldauf 1997: 28). For example, there is little likelihood that providing the opportunity to use a language in new domains will have any success without increasing or sustaining the number of users, or without an adequate corpus for use in such domains.

While the process of language planning has been clearly outlined in the form of corpus, status and acquisition planning, the appropriate choices to be made in specific contexts remain problematic and controversial. Fishman has come the closest to providing a clearer framework for reversing language shift, in his Graded Intergenerational Disruption Scale (GIDS), taking into account the different stages of language shift and the severity of intergenerational disruption (2001a: 466). However, the utility of broad frameworks is questionable and, in reality, the potential actions to be taken relating to a specific community must respond to the specific context and needs of that community (Grin 2003b: 69). As Kaplan and Baldauf establish, ‘language planning undertaken without an awareness of the eco-system in which one is intervening can be dangerous to the health of the community’ (1997: 310). This calls for a proper diagnosis of the linguistic, social and political contexts and, most importantly, consultation with those affected, since the perceptions of speakers play a crucial role in determining the status of their respective language. In fact, while official and institutional recognition is important, most vital is the speakers’ own awareness and desire to alter the status of their language which is typically tied to a sense of identity attached to that language.

Given the evident pressures linguistic minorities have been under to abandon their languages in the past, as well as the positions of low prestige and status these languages have been placed in, it represents a huge force of will to revive or even preserve such languages. As Dennis Ager explains, identity is generally the primary
motive for such language preservation efforts (2001: 174). The important relationship between language and identity is an undeniable reality. This is not to return to a primordialist view of language, since the relationship between language and identity for minority groups is just as constructed as the relationship between a national language and national identity for the majority (see Section 2.3.1). Nevertheless, the constructivist argument fails to fully appreciate the continued affective and often political importance of languages for those who speak them. As Stephen May argues, ‘If a particular language comes to serve important cultural and/or political functions in the formation and maintenance of a particular ethnic or national identity, it is important’ (2001: 130). Just because a linguistic identity is constructed, it does not necessarily make it any less meaningful to its speakers.

However, globalisation appears to be undermining previous forms of identification, with some signs of the emergence of a global culture and potentially global identities. Globalisation also makes it much harder to understand how much language shift is planned and by whom, thus making it potentially more difficult for linguistic minorities to gain control over the processes which may lead to language shift and death. Consequently, Fishman argues that globalising processes can lead to the ‘severe dislocation from indigenous, self-regulated social change’ (2006: 324). Attempts by a linguistic community to gain greater self-regulation solely by cutting itself off from the wider world are also rarely a suitable alternative. As Zygmunt Bauman states, ‘immobility is not a realistic option in a world of permanent change’ (1998: 2). This means those unable to participate in the global arena may be at a severe disadvantage, which is a particular danger for linguistic minority groups especially if they lack access to languages of wider communication. Minority groups appear to be particularly vulnerable to globalising forces since, as Monica Heller explains, ‘Unlike the nation-state in which they are minoritized, they do not carry around institutional and ideological baggage which can sustain itself long after the life-support system has been turned off’ (2006: 13).

Nevertheless, globalisation has also seen the emergence of an apparently contradictory ‘localising’ trend, with linguistic minority groups often at the forefront. Linguistic minority groups, however, must still attempt to engage with these ‘globalising’ processes if they are to adapt to this new world order and find new spaces for both their languages and identities. Multicultural and pluralist conceptions of society provide a possible response, particularly with the focus on the potential for multiple identities. Such an approach can help to avoid essentialist views of minority languages
and cultures, while continuing to recognise the importance of group identities. As Ager explains:

In many societies membership of different communities within the state is both possible and indeed normal. Such multiple group membership is represented, linguistically, by the existence of the individual’s language/language variety repertoire and his or her ability to move from one to another. (2001: 197)

Rather than just ‘giving way’ to dominant groups, this demonstrates the potential for linguistic minorities to both maintain the minority language and to learn languages of wider communication, without necessarily resulting in conflict or linguistic substitution.

As previously stated, the aim of ‘balanced bilingualism’ has often proved unattainable, and bilingualism in the past has normally led to eventual linguistic substitution. Nevertheless, these processes of substitution were encouraged by the nationalist ideal of the monolingual norm, while the potential benefits of bi- or multilingualism were ignored. David Crystal consequently argues that:

Many languages in danger of disappearing today would not be in this position today if it were not for the attitudes of most speakers of the large metropolitan languages with whom they are in contact, with most of these firmly believing that monolingualism is the normal and desirable state for people to be in. (2000: 80)

If instead a bilingual ethos were to become more widespread, Crystal believes that the voluntary abandonment of such languages would be far less widespread. Recent years have, in fact, seen signs of more positive attitudes to bilingualism, such as recent research on the metalinguistic and cognitive benefits of a bilingual education (Bialystok 2001). This change in attitude is also reflected in growing international pressure to protect minority languages which ‘is effectively shifting standard policies from assimilation to bi- or multilingualism. Minority language education is now becoming the standard policy in the territories inhabited by linguistic groups other than that of the state’ (Pujolar 2007a: 77). Nevertheless, progress remains limited, and bilingualism is often only expected of minority communities, while dominant monolingual groups remain reluctant to adapt their own practices or make greater efforts to accommodate the demands of minority groups.

2.2.2 Equality and Language Rights

There are, however, signs of a greater recognition of the right for linguistic minorities to continue to speak their languages with the shift towards the recognition of language rights (Kymlicka and Patten 2003: 5). Language rights focus on the rights of the speakers themselves, and the potential inequality and disadvantages that may result
from the use of a specific language. Language choice is often related to social exclusion, since use of a linguistic variety that is viewed as inferior to the standard language means that its speakers ‘are regarded in different ways from other members of society, to their disadvantage, and that they are thus in some way not regarded as equal to other members of society’ (Ager 2001: 87). As Bourdieu states, ‘The sense of the value of one’s own linguistic products is a fundamental dimension of the sense of knowing the place which one occupies in the social space’ (1991: 82). Consequently, many of the threatened or contested languages in the world are spoken by those who are socially and politically marginalised (Brumfit 2006: 40). This means speakers of minority languages are often faced with the choice between remaining loyal to their culture and traditions, but socially disadvantaged, or abandoning them to improve their prospects. The traditional liberal conception of the nation-state also encouraged this assimilation of minority language speakers to the officially sanctioned language and culture, in the belief that improving access to and fluency in the dominant language variety could prevent the marginalisation of speakers of other languages (Kymlicka and Patten 2003: 39). This reflects the traditional nation-building approach towards language planning, and it is true that in the past restricting access to the dominant language was a way for the elites to exclude the masses from power. Consequently, the state now has a duty to provide all citizens with access to the dominant language and must facilitate its learning to ensure citizens do not face such forms of exclusion (Rubio-Marín 2003: 70). Nevertheless, as previously discussed, access to wider languages of communication need not necessarily be at the expense of a community’s own language. As James W. Tollefson explains, ‘By viewing the standard language as the solution to inequality rather than a cause, researchers imply that the mother tongue is the source of the problem and that multilingualism is the aberrant exception’ (1991: 77).

Multiculturalist theorists have questioned this assimilationist approach, most notably Will Kymlicka, who argues that ‘leaving one’s culture, while possible, is best seen as renouncing something to which one is reasonably entitled’ (1995: 86). Kymlicka emphasises the deep bond people have with their culture (1995: 90), focusing on the individual’s choice to determine what is meaningful and worthwhile to them. In reference to abandoning a minority culture, he argues that ‘We cannot be expected or required to make such a sacrifice, even if some people voluntarily do so’ (1995: 87). Language has often been identified as an essential element of a minority culture and identity, and the loss of a group’s language undoubtedly affects the group’s sense of identity and belonging. Again, this does not mean taking a primordialist approach to
language since, as Denise Réaume clarifies, ‘It is not because their language is “in their blood” that a group’s linguistic heritage deserves recognition, but because the group chooses to maintain its allegiance to that heritage’ (2003: 291). Nevertheless, as language shift demonstrates, the reality is that many speakers do choose to abandon minority languages in favour of the dominant language. It is ultimately the decision of the members of the minority language community to continue using their language that will decide the fate of that language (Spolsky 2004: 130-31). Equally, some liberal theorists have argued that attempts at language preservation may go against the choices and interests of the members of the language community, and can consequently be considered illiberal (Kymlicka and Patten 2003: 49).

Nevertheless, this focus on the voluntary nature of language shift is often misleading since, as May argues, ‘if minority languages are consistently viewed as low-status, socially and culturally restrictive, and an obstacle to social mobility, is it any wonder that such patterns of language shift exist?’ (2003b: 150). He describes language shift as ‘at best a “forced choice”, propelled by wider forces of social, political, economic, and linguistic inequality and discrimination’ (2003b: 150-51). While there may be no forced assimilation of the minority group, the low prestige of the languages and cultures of minority groups means that they are often subject to discrimination and disadvantage, and consequently their choice to continue to use their language is severely restricted. Sometimes these negative attitudes are so entrenched within minority groups that the group may be wary of or even hostile to attempts to reverse language shift (Crystal 2000: 86). In such cases, it is questionable whether the state, or any other outsider, has the duty or even right to intervene (Réaume 2003: 293). Nevertheless, Crystal and Fishman argue that there is still a duty to ensure that the communities are informed that the shift to the dominant language is not as ‘natural’ as it may first appear, and that there are other options, such as bilingualism (Fishman 2001a: 454). While the foundation for language maintenance must come from within the community itself, the wider socio-political context must offer the appropriate support for the community to be able to make an informed choice about the survival of its language (Réaume 2003: 292). This ‘freedom to choose’ represents the principal element of language rights discourses. The language rights discourse has been most notable developed by Tove Skutnabb-Kangas and Robert Phillipson who argued specifically for ‘linguistic human rights’ which, in relation to the mother tongue(s), consist of ‘the right to identity with it/them, and to education and public services through the medium of it/them’ (1995: 71).
Language rights have increasingly been seen as essential to a commitment to democracy (Tollefson 1991: 211). This is related to the increasing attention paid to human rights at the international level. Nevertheless, in the initial post-war period human rights were seen as a substitute for minority rights, with their focus on individual rather than group rights (The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948). The more recent focus on a politics of difference has challenged such an approach, with Glyn Williams arguing that ‘Multiculturalism and tolerance involve a critique of how the abstract concern with individual liberty and human rights ignores the essence out of which collectivities are constituted’ (2005: 2222). The maintenance of a language, in particular, is dependent on a collective choice by its speakers, in what Réaume terms a ‘complex group practice’ (2003: 290). It is for this reason that forms of group-differentiated or collective rights are required in order to ensure that the necessary conditions are in place for minority groups to be able to reproduce themselves and their languages. Language rights, though, can also be considered as both a form of individual right and a collective right, despite the fact that such rights are often placed in opposition to each other. Some individual rights may be respected through the recognition of collective rights. For example, the individual right to public education may be respected through a collective right to education in a specific minority language (Kymlicka and Patten 2003: 31).

This opposition often invoked between collective and individual rights normally centres around different conceptions of equality. Most often, those who oppose minority or collective language rights hold to a traditional liberal and universalist conception of formal equality, whereby the state takes what Máiréad Nic Craith describes as a ‘colour-blind’ or ‘culture-blind’ approach and every citizen has identical rights (2006: 177). The validity of group rights has come to be reassessed, in the belief that true equality requires treating differently people who are in different situations ‘to ensure that individuals who belong to a minority have access to the same rights as if they belonged to the majority’ (Grin 2003b: 84). This is often termed substantive equality and, as Ruth Rubio-Marín clarifies, ‘the degree of commitment of the state to notions of substantive equality will determine the scope of protection that is afforded to language groups subject to generalized social prejudice’ (2003: 64). The scope of protection is also often determined by the related concepts of tolerance- and promotion-oriented rights. Tolerance-oriented rights, or ‘negative’ rights, are those most commonly implemented by state powers, and tend to fit the liberal conception of formal equality. These rights primarily refer to the right of people to use their own language in the private sphere,
and, at most, may attempt to combat discrimination on the basis of language choice (Rubio-Marín 2003: 54). A ‘tolerant’ regime is, however, deceptive as it is impossible for the state to remain linguistically neutral since ‘the state simply needs to function in some language’ (Rubio-Marín 2003: 52) or languages, which inevitably means privileging specific languages. Promotion-oriented or ‘positive’ rights, on the other hand, entail an active commitment by the state to ‘the protection of a certain language or languages as defining element of its public culture’ (Rubio-Marín 2003: 54-55). This often entails the declaration of official status for a language, or at the very least some form of institutional use of the language in the public sphere.

Nevertheless, most international conventions and charters contain only tolerance-oriented rights. In particular, the right to official status is rarely, if ever, recommended in international documents, with evidence of a ‘great reluctance to view policies of official bilingualism or multilingualism as “rights” rather than pragmatic accommodations’ (Kymlicka and Patten 2003: 5). More recent documents such as the ECRML, which will be discussed later, have gone further and begun to provide international standards and reasonable expectations for states to provide some level of state activities and services in languages spoken by a significant number of people within the state (May 2003b: 148). These groups are normally those which are territorially concentrated within a specific area, which has led to the tendency to grant minority rights based on the territorial principle. The territorial principle essentially means that certain language rights are granted only within a specific region or area of the state, where a significant community of minority language speakers resides. The opposing personality principle means that all citizens enjoy the same set of official language rights throughout the state (Kymlicka and Patten 2003: 29). The territorial principle is often seen to promote unilingualism within a given territory, especially if the minority language is declared the sole official language within that territory. The personality principle, on the other hand, is seen to be more accepting of bi- and multilingualism where this principle is applied to more than one language (Réaume 2003: 271). Réaume argues that both terms are misleading since language rights in reality follow neither territories nor individuals, but rather ‘viable language communities’ (2003: 274). While language communities are often geographically concentrated and there will normally be a territorial dimension to their language rights, it is the community itself rather than the territory which should be the focus of policy. Furthermore, the territorial and personality principles are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and rarely does a state’s language policy fully conform to either principle. As
François Grin argues, we need to depart from the ‘rigid interpretation of the territorial principle’ in order to ‘generate forms of territoriality that have nothing to do with linguistic segregation, and can actually smooth the progressive evolution of societies towards more wide-spread multilingualism’ (1995: 46). For example, the official recognition of a minority language within a specific territory need not necessarily entail unilingualism within that territory or even within the minority community.

The question of which rights should be applied to which language communities remains, however, a subject of debate. Some international charters may have provided certain standards and expectations but, as Will Kymlica and Alan Patten recognise: ‘Any attempt to define a set of rights that applies to all linguistic groups, no matter how small and dispersed, is likely to focus on relatively modest claims’ (2003: 34). It is impossible to provide a model for all contexts, and proponents of universal linguistic rights must also accept that, for practical purposes, language policies will always involve the privileging of a limited set of languages. It is thus necessary for linguistic rights theories to help determine what can be considered appropriate and reasonable expectations for the recognition of minority languages. Many, for example, have often placed the claims of so-called ‘autochthonous’ and migrant groups in opposition. The privileging of long-standing minority groups is normally justified on the basis of their greater historical and political entitlement (May 2003b: 149), or on the basis that their languages are often more threatened (Grin 2003a: 184). Such groups are also often geographically concentrated, which makes it easier to accommodate their language rights (Rubio-Marín 2003: 75). Nevertheless, there is no legitimate justification for excluding migrant or nomadic groups from some form of recognition of their language rights, particularly if their language use becomes an obstacle to the enjoyment of other rights, such as the right to education (Rubio-Marín 2003: 74). We should also be wary of placing migrant and autochthonous language rights in opposition since, as Grin establishes, ‘the only states where immigrants’ languages and autochthonous minority languages are treated equally are those where neither are given any status whatsoever’ (2003a: 184). A focus on established minority groups does not mean ignoring the claims of other groups, but we must also recognise that state institutions are unable to provide a structure in which everybody can use their own language(s) at all times.
2.3 States, Nations, Regions and Europe

2.3.1 Language and the (Nation-)State

One of the primary features of the nation-state is its recent nature as a political unit, with most historians dating its emergence towards the end of the eighteenth century. The nation-state represented the fulfilment of the doctrine of nationalism, defined by Ernest Gellner as ‘a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent’ (2006 [1983]: 1). Although the terms nation and state are often conflated, ‘state’ in reality refers to a legally defined entity, while ‘nation’ refers to a population with a sense of a shared culture, history and identity, and typically inhabiting a specific territory. The origins of the nation-state are to be found in the nationalism of the French Revolutionaries, which was based principally on the concepts of citizenship and mass participation. The nation-state was seen to be liberating individuals from the tyranny of absolutism with the guarantee of personal autonomy and equality, and the triumph of universalism over particularism, in that the state would treat all citizens identically, regardless of their position, background or status. This triumph meant an insistence on linguistic uniformity, with regional languages viewed as a relic of the feudal past and as an obstacle to the inclusion of all citizens in the civic realm.

In the nineteenth century, new formulations of nationalism would place language firmly at the heart of the nation-state. The German Romantic thinkers, such as Herder, Humboldt and Fichte, took a primordial and essentialist approach to the nation and language, with both seen as natural and immutable, rising up from time immemorial. They viewed language as the essence and soul of the nation, with Fichte declaring that ‘wherever a particular language is found, there exists also a particular nation which has the right to run its own affairs and to govern itself’ (2008 [1808]: 161). This made territorial claims on linguistic grounds possible for the first time, and the principle of nation-state congruence led in some cases to the pursuit of a culturally and linguistically homogenous state. This could be used to justify both the right to claim territory outside of the state and the right to insist on one language within the territory of the state. However, no nation-state fulfilled this monolingual or monocultural ideal, leading to the expulsion, repression, or forced or willing integration of what were consequently termed ‘national minorities’, most notably in Nazi Germany.

Subsequently, after World War Two, the nation-state came to be assessed more critically for, as Eric Hobsbawm writes, ‘The homogenous territorial nation could now be seen as a programme that could be realized only by barbarians, or at least by
barbarian means’ (1992 [1990]: 134). The ‘modernist’ theorists of nationalism attempted to debunk the nationalist notion that the right to nationhood was based on pre-existing ethnic ties, and argued instead that nationhood was principally a product of political modernisation (Gellner 2006 [1983]: 46). Benedict Anderson echoed these views, although he believed Gellner went too far in viewing nations as a fabrication and falsity, and instead coined the term ‘imagined communities’ to describe their construction. Anderson also placed language at the heart of these imagined communities (1991 [1983]: 154), although such an approach has been criticised for taking an essentialist view of languages as constants when they are in fact just as much constructs as the national identities they are invoked to explain (Silverstein 2000: 85-138).

Hobsbawm was the first of the modernist historians to illustrate this point, describing national languages as ‘semi-artificial constructs’ (1992 [1990]: 54). This reflected the fact that the process of nation-building was accompanied by the construction of a standardised national culture, which was also linked to modernisation and the need for mass education and communication. Previously there had been no such need for a real national language, except in the sense of a literary or administrative vernacular, sometimes adapted for oral use as a lingua franca among elites. The advent of print capitalism saw the need for written, structured standard languages. The idea of a single common language consequently became ‘the leitmotif of modern social and political organisation’ (May 2003a: 211). However, while the standardisation of a national culture and language may have been recognised as a constructed process, Gellner and others were also keen to emphasise that it was a necessary result of modernisation (2006 [1983]: 38). Modernist historians tended to view this as essential in the drive for unity and progress, and consequently had little sympathy for smaller-scale forms of nationalism, or what they termed ‘ethnic’ nationalism (Hobsbawm 1992 [1990]: 41). This reinforced the association of national languages with progress and modernity, while minority languages have consistently been associated with tradition and backwardness. The influential liberal philosopher John Stuart Mill voiced similar views in the nineteenth century, arguing that ‘Nobody can suppose that it is not more beneficial to a Breton, or a Basque of French Navarre, to be brought into the current of the ideas and feelings of highly civilized and cultivated people’ (1991 [1861]: 314). This represents a glorification of the civic nationalism of the French Revolution, conceived as modernising and progressive, which liberal theorists have often contrasted with the divisive and separatist ethnic nationalism of the German Romantics and of later ethnic nationalist movements.
However, this reflects a tendency to focus principally on the legal and political dimensions of nationalism, rather than on the cultural and historical aspects, in an attempt to disavow any link between ethnicity and nationalism. Some academics have been critical of this approach, and adopted what could be described as a more ‘ethnicist’ approach to the study of nationalism. Anthony Smith is most representative of this approach, arguing, particularly in reference to Western Europe, that ‘If nations are modern, at least as mass phenomena legitimated by nationalist ideology, they owe much of their present form and character to pre-existing ethnic ties which stemmed from earlier ethnies in the relevant area’ (1995: 57). This does not mark a return to the primordialist approach to nationalism of the German Romantics, but rather a recognition of the enduring and binding ties that many ethnic groups, or ethnies, maintain over centuries and the powerful feelings they invoke, in what Smith describes as a form of ‘participants’ primordialism’ (1995: 35). The modernist approach offers little explanation for the recent resurgence of smaller nationalisms (May 2001: 44), which will be considered in greater detail below, or for why ethnicity remains such a popular choice for mobilisation.

It has also been argued that the civic nationalism of the state is not as neutral as it may first appear (Smith 1995: 101), but in reality represents that of the dominant ethnic group since ‘the ethnic interests of the majority group are legitimated and naturalised as civic ones, which, in turn, are equated directly with modernity’ (May 2001: 53). Consequently, it is often only national minorities who are described as ‘ethnic’, and their attempts to maintain their culture are viewed as irrational and incompatible with the modern world. This idea has been further developed by Michael Billig in his definition of ‘banal nationalism’, whereby the nationalism of the state is ‘overlooked, forgotten, even theoretically denied’ (1995: 17). The national language is equally presented as a neutral language, rather than that of the dominant ethnies, in what Billig describes as a ‘syntax of hegemony’, whereby ‘the part claimed to represent the whole. One form of speaking might claim to be the language of the whole, or one district claim to represent the national culture’ (1995: 88). Consequently, civic and ethnic forms of nationalism cannot be so easily separated and the modern nation-state must be viewed as both civic and ethnic.

Some postmodernist theorists have, however, been quick to predict the decline of nationalism and even states. This theory is attractive to many academics as it appears to reflect current globalising trends and, as Billig states, ‘Given the popularity of the thesis, it is little wonder that the decline of the nation-state is being treated as a truism,
an obvious fact in a postmodern world of few facts’ (1995: 134). There is though, in reality, a continued tendency to rootedness and boundary maintenance, most notable in the resilience and continuing power of nationalism and national identity, as well as national languages. It also remains the case that ‘Pluriethnic or plurilingual societies are seen as problem-prone’ (Blommaert and Verschueren 1998: 195). Nevertheless, the traditional organisation of the nation-state has clearly been challenged in recent years from both above and below.

2.3.2 Regionalism, Micronationalism and Decentralisation

Recent decades have seen sub-state units of government play an increasingly prominent role in the European context, largely due to the growth of regionalism. Regionalism as a movement is hard to define and regionalists do not necessarily pursue the same goals. While some may seek the full integration of their regions into the state, others aim at achieving greater autonomy (Keating 1998: 108). Those, however, who aim at more significant levels of autonomy or even separation are more likely to fit the mould of micronationalist movements which, while sharing some traits with regionalist movements, are distinct in both their form and their demands. The primary distinction between regionalism and micronationalism is that, while regionalist movements still accept the existence of a wider nation at the state level and their participation within it, micronationalist movements typically present an alternative and potentially challenging nationalist vision to that of the state. Micronationalism, or minority nationalism, refers to nationalist movements at the sub-state level, that is to say nations without a state. As Michael Keating explains, in reference to such movements: ‘there remains a profound ambiguity in them, caught between mere regional mobilization on the one hand, and making claims which rival that of the state on the other’ (2001: 64).

As previously mentioned, micronationalism is often the subject of derision and confusion due to the conflation of the terms ‘nation’ and ‘state’. Although most nations aspire to be a nation-state, states and nations do not always easily coincide. Recent years have seen the increasing acceptance of, and search for, alternative options to satisfy the demands of micronationalist movements. While some such movements may maintain exclusive claims to a unique national identity and a consequent incompatibility with the state, many have accepted the potential for multiple identities and thus ‘represent less the assertion of a competing and exclusive nationality than a denial of the idea of exclusive nationality altogether’ (Keating 2001: 22). Micronationalist movements are also commonly defined as cultural or ‘ethnic’ nationalisms, with demands for cultural
autonomy often central to their aims. The symbolic importance of language, for example, often becomes more significant to nations without a state, due to the need to prove their legitimacy as a ‘nation’, while the legitimacy of the state is taken largely for granted. However, just as state nationalism combines both civic and ethnic elements, the most successful forms of minority nationalisms have increasingly sought to emphasise their civic dimension with the avoidance of exclusive notions of identity (Keating 2001: 63).

With both states and micronationalist movements reassessing their visions of a monolithic national identity, new models of state have begun to emerge and gain legitimacy, with the right to ‘self-determination’ for micronational groups often fulfilled internally by reconfiguring the existing state rather than seeking the formation of a new one. Essential to the fulfilment of this right is allowing national, and regionalist, groups institutional access to policy formation and governance, through some form of self-rule. The level of self-rule granted to a minority language speaking group, often located within a specific region of the state, is hugely significant since ‘increasing the levels of self-governance for minorities, gives them enhanced opportunities for the legitimation and the institutionalisation of their mother tongue’ (Hogan-Brun and Wolff 2003: 14). Where previously such groups had often been excluded from language policy as a function of the state, now many linguistic minorities have access to or greater influence over regional or local institutions which are responsible for the design and implementation of language policy. It is for this reason that a primary aim of many minority language activists has been to increase the level of self-rule ‘to ensure that political control is in the hands of the regional language speakers’ (Ager 2001: 36).

European states have also been keen to encourage the decentralisation of the state in recent decades, with the gradual move throughout Western Europe towards a more regionalist state structure. Despite assumptions that central governments are always reluctant to surrender power, decentralisation and regionalisation have been the prevailing patterns of reform and political reorganisation over the past few decades. Top-down decentralisation or even federalist arrangements may, however, still be insufficient to satisfy the demands and needs of a truly multinational state, for example. The increasing popularity of decentralising policies in many states has often been primarily related to increasing efficiency rather than the recognition of a multinational reality (Keating 2001: 52-53). Ferran Requejo argues that truly representative multinational democracy requires more than just formulas for self-government, with the need for ‘regulations that support the multinational character of the state as a whole, by
means of its symbols, linguistic regulations, educational curricula and international representation’ (2001: 125). Furthermore, in regionalised states, Udo Bullmann writes that ‘intergovernmental relations involve a constant struggle by the regional authorities to achieve more room for manoeuvre against the at least partial resistance of the centre’ (1997: 8). In both the regionalised and the multinational state, these struggles for recognition and self-rule do hold the potential for conflict. However, a greater focus on negotiation and a less combative attitude on behalf of both state and sub-state forces also holds the potential for improved democratic representation and accountability.

Wider European developments have also encouraged the renegotiation of state and sub-state relations. In the 1980s and early 1990s, developments across Europe appeared to encourage the establishment of a third level of government and some regions began to promote the idea of a ‘Europe of the Regions’ in an attempt to escape the framework of the state. The importance of the regions appeared to be growing with the Maastricht Treaty providing for the establishment of the Committee of the Regions in 1994 (Keating 1998: 171-72) and marking a move towards regarding regions as ‘legitimate political actors’ (Requejo 2001: 129-30). However, the Committee was given a purely advisory status with formal rights of consultation but no authority to take decisions. In fact, Europeanisation, defined by Tanja Börzel as ‘a process by which domestic policy areas become increasingly subject to European policy-making’ (2002: 6), may have strengthened the powers of state institutions at the expense of the regions. The EU provides institutional space only for national governments, and consequently ‘The shift of the policy-making arena from the domestic to the European level tends to favour national governments vis-à-vis other domestic actors’ (Börzel 2002: 4). The transfer of certain powers to the EU means national governments have been able to re-enter some policy domains previously transferred to the regions. As Keating noted recently, ‘Regions have certainly not managed to bypass their states, as some early observers imagined and self-promoting politicians tried to suggest. Indeed, the most important avenue to the EU has almost invariably been through the national government itself’ (2008: 633).

Nevertheless, European integration and regionalisation across Europe have meant that minority groups are no longer faced with the choice between assimilation or separatism, since there now exist ‘a new array of opportunities in the interstices of the state and international system as vehicles for forms of collective action and representation previously monopolized by the state’ (Keating 2001: 28). This has obviously been significant for minority languages, by providing for alternative arenas in
which these languages can gain recognition and support. Furthermore, European integration has facilitated transfrontier cooperation between regions. In specific relation to regional languages, the ECRML encourages transfrontier exchanges, particularly between regions using the same or similar languages (art. 14, ECRML, 23 June 1992). Furthermore, the introduction of the European Framework for Cross-Border Cooperation between Regions in 1980 has provided for the potential to create ‘Euroregions’. Euroregions refer to transfrontier cooperation structures between regional or local authorities typically located on the borders of neighbouring European states (Council of Europe 2012d). Although these Euroregions may not be specifically focused on linguistic matters, they do demonstrate the possibility of crossing state borders and increasing the profile of specific regions in Europe.

Sub-state units of government have clearly emerged as important political actors across Europe. While we are evidently not seeing a Europe of the Regions, in which the nation-state would dissolve in favour of sub-state forms of government, nation-states have been transformed and are increasingly penetrated by sub-state and transnational forces. For micronationalist and regionalist movements this has meant a shift from a focus on independence or autarky, to the need ‘to engage in policy making in a complex and interdependent world’ (Keating 2001: 64). This is the system in which linguistic minorities must frame their needs and demands. The opportunities available, however, are likely to vary significantly depending on the specific territorial organisation of each state and the position of a specific region or minority within it.

2.3.3 The Multilingualism of European Institutions
Global politics has meant that states do now share certain ‘state’ powers with supranational bodies, and for Europeans the most significant of these is undoubtedly the EU, with estimations that between 60 and 80 per cent of state legislation is concerned with enacting policies agreed on at the EU (Phillipson 2003: 18). The Maastricht Treaty in 1992 signified the formal creation of the EU and the move away from the merely economic role of the European Economic Community, with new powers relating to culture and cultural policy. In reference to culture, the Treaty states that ‘The Community shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity’ (art. 128, Maastricht Treaty, 7 February 1992). European institutions appear initially to be more receptive to minority demands with their declarations of support for cultural diversity and multilingualism. The Council of Europe, in particular, has been the most ardent supporter of linguistic
minorities. The Council is a separate organisation from the EU, and has forty-seven member countries. It was established in 1949 with the aim ‘to create a common democratic and legal area throughout the whole of the continent, ensuring respect for its fundamental values: human rights, democracy and the rule of law’ (Council of Europe 2012a). Most explicit, in reference to minorities, is the FCPNM signed by twenty-two member states in 1995. It includes a commitment ‘to promote the conditions necessary for persons belonging to national minorities to maintain and develop their culture, and to preserve the essential elements of their identity, namely their religion, language, traditions and cultural heritage’ (art. 5, FCPNM, 1 February 1995). It also contains further explicit references to the rights of national minorities to use their language in private and public (art. 10, FCPNM, 1 February 1995), and the right to learn and be taught in one’s own language (art. 12, FCPNM, 1 February 1995).

An even more significant document for linguistic minorities is the ECRML, which was adopted by the Council of Europe on 23 June 1992. The Charter is concerned with languages ‘traditionally used within a given territory of a State by nationals of that State who form a group numerically smaller than the rest of the State’s population’ and to those ‘different from the official language(s) of the State’ (art. 1, ECRML, 23 June 1992). The focus of the Charter is principally on diversity and the safeguarding of languages themselves, rather than speakers and their rights. Part II of the Charter sets out its objectives and principles, and must be accepted by all states who sign the Charter. It encourages specific action for the promotion and protection of regional and minority languages, and promotes respect and tolerance for all languages within a given state. Part III of the Charter lists sixty-eight specific measures to promote the relevant minority and regional languages in the areas of education, the legal system, the administration and public services, the media, cultural activities, economic and social life, and in transfrontier exchanges.

While states which sign the Charter are only obliged to adhere to the principles of Part II, ratification means the state must enact at least thirty-five of the specified measures and is consequently a clear commitment to act in favour of minority and regional languages. This leads Grin to argue that the Charter is unique, in that it is ‘an instrument which, going well beyond the enunciation of lofty standards, proposes specific measures for the protection and promotion of regional and minority languages’ (2003b: 194). Its focus on promotion-oriented rights forces states to act, and it also calls for actual results with a monitoring system established whereby states must provide written reports at three-yearly intervals on the situation of their regional and minority
languages. This heavy commitment explains why many countries were slow to ratify the Charter, which formally came into force in March 1998. It has currently been signed and ratified by twenty-five countries, including Spain. Eight countries, including Italy and France, have only signed the Charter (Council of Europe, 19 April 2013). Although the Council of Europe is separate from the EU, the European Parliament demonstrated its endorsement of the Charter in 1994 with the Killilea Resolution, which urged member states to ratify the Charter and to enact the appropriate measures (Nic Craith 2006: 75).

The EU, overall, has not been as explicit as the Council of Europe in supporting minority languages. In most recent developments, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union was adopted in 2000 and came into force with the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. It embeds linguistic rights in the EU, condemning discrimination on the grounds of language or of being a member of a national minority (art. 21, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 18 December 2000). Article 22 also explicitly states that ‘The Union shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity’. However, it is equally important not to overstate the impact of such documents, since they tend to be largely aspirational, reflecting broad principles, without providing specific measures for implementation (Grin 2003b: 81-2). The European Parliament has been the branch of the EU most sympathetic towards minority languages, most notably with the adoption of the Arfé Resolution on 16 October 1981 (Nic Craith 2006: 74). It drew attention to language as a central part of Europe’s diversity and led to various other resolutions calling for the European Commission to report on measures to protect speakers of minority languages. It also led to the creation of the European Bureau for Lesser-Used Languages (EBLUL) in 1982 (Nic Craith 2006: 75). EBLUL was a non-governmental organisation which championed the cause of regional and minority languages, and was funded by the European Commission as well as local and regional bodies. However, in terms of more recent developments in the EU, progress has been limited. The EU failed to guarantee funding to EBLUL in the long term, which led to a financial crisis in 2004 with the struggle to integrate newer EU members (Nic Craith 2006: 80), and in 2010 EBLUL was forced to declare an end to the organisation.

The EU did declare 2001 the European Year of Languages and in 2003 the European Commission published an action plan for multilingualism called Promoting Language Learning and Linguistic Diversity: An Action Plan 2004-6. The Action Plan encouraged the principle of the ‘Mother tongue plus two other languages’ and stated explicitly that ‘the range on offer should include the smaller European languages as well
as the larger ones, regional, minority and migrant languages as well as those with “national” status, and the languages of our major trading partners throughout the world’ (European Commission, 24 July 2003). However, this ethos of multilingualism that the EU appears to support does not necessarily benefit minority and regional languages for, as Robert Phillipson has pointed out, ‘Multilingualism appears to have become an EU mantra, but the concept is used in various senses and can obscure the extent to which EU multilingualism can serve to confirm monolingualism’ (2003: 129). This reflects the fact that institutional multilingualism within the EU only recognises the official language of each state, and is consequently grounded on the principle that all states have a single dominant language. This has caused particular controversy in Spain since, although Basque, Catalan and Galician are recognised as official languages at the regional level, their lack of recognition at the state level means that they cannot be considered official languages of the EU. Catalans most notably challenged this approach with a resolution passed by the European Parliament in 1990 calling for the translation of EU documents into Catalan and the use of Catalan in dealings with the region (European Parliament, 11 December 1990). As will be discussed in Chapter 7, this resulted in a largely ‘symbolic’ recognition of Catalan as a European language. This points to the hypocrisy of member states demanding multilingualism at the European level but not the state level. Furthermore, the EU informally encourages a greater use of a limited choice of languages with English, and to a lesser extent French, dominating, which reflects the fact that language issues are often fixed pragmatically rather than looking at issues of language rights (Phillipson 2003: 22).

The absence of language rights has also been brought into question in reference to migrant and supposedly non-European languages, which have mostly been ignored in European charters and conventions. EBLUL, for example, did not advocate any rights for non-European languages and they are also excluded from the ECRML. Nomadic European languages such as the languages of Romany groups are also excluded from the Charter’s remit, due to its focus on the concept of territorially concentrated languages. Consequently, the allocation of special rights to one group of minorities and not to others is increasingly controversial. As Tom Cheesman states, ‘A European Union which legislates and passes budgets to protect its aboriginal languages, while still discriminating against all the languages of relative newcomers, must seem simply unjust, and the premises of its policy untenable’ (2001: 163). While such ethical questions evidently need to be addressed by European institutions, they have provided linguistic minorities with further opportunities for action, and the existence of
supranational legal documents in relation to linguistic minorities do ‘give expression to a norm according to which it is no longer acceptable to suppress minority languages actively or simply by neglect’ (Hogan-Brun and Wolff 2003: 4).

2.4 Conclusion

In summary, the state and the nation remain a central area of study in relation to linguistic minorities since, as Camille O’Reilly writes, ‘a belief in the essential link between language and nation, nation and state seems to be as strong – and as troublesome – as ever’ (2003: 21). The state also remains the principal forum of political action and the key framework in which linguistic minorities must act. Nevertheless, while the nation-state will evidently continue to play a determining role in language policy, there is a growing space for the recognition of regional and minority cultures and languages. New models of state formation, in particular, have provided for increasing possibilities for minority groups to gain access to policy-making structures and to participate in joint decision making with the state. Europeanisation and globalising processes have also provided new arenas of political action and less hierarchical forms of governance. Although these may offer new opportunities for minority groups, these new forms of governance are often complex and less transparent. This can make it more difficult to control the processes which may lead to language shift. Consequently, globalising processes and Europeanisation can be considered both an opportunity and a threat, with the state no longer necessarily representing the sole or even primary ‘enemy’ of linguistic minorities.

States which have taken a more tolerant and even supportive approach to linguistic minorities may even represent an ally in the efforts to maintain the linguistic diversity present within state borders. Nevertheless, even where a state may be willing to support linguistic minorities’ efforts to maintain their languages, the question of how to intervene remains problematic. Language rights discourses have provided some international standards for responding appropriately and reasonably to the needs and demands of linguistic minorities. Universal models of language planning approaches, however, are rare, and attempts to reverse language shift require a significant force of will on behalf of both agencies attempting to undertake language planning measures and, often more importantly, the speakers themselves. The following case studies will consequently consider the new challenges and opportunities faced by both linguistic minorities and the states in which they are minoritised within this wider European context.
3.1 Introduction

This chapter is intended to provide overviews of the sociolinguistic and political contexts of the case studies selected, as well as detailing key historical developments prior to the period of study (1992-2010). Both the linguistic composition and the institutional set-up of a specific state play a determining role in how that state is able to, or chooses to, respond to the needs and demands of specific linguistic minorities. Equally, the specific political and sociolinguistic context of a minority group is likely to determine both the demands these groups make on the state and the response of the state itself.

The state profiles will begin with an overview of the linguistic composition of the state, in addition to detailing distinct forms of language policy enacted prior to the period of study. This will be followed by an overview of the state’s institutions, with a particular focus on the division of powers between the state and sub-state units of government. The profiles of the linguistic minorities selected will also deal with both the sociolinguistic context as well as the main institutional and political features of the region or province in which the minority groups are located.

3.2 Italy

3.2.1 Linguistic Variety and Language Policy in Italy

Whilst Italian is now the principal and official national language of Italy, the country’s sociolinguistic context presents us with a much more complex and interesting picture, with around 4.8 per cent of the population (2.5 million people) belonging to groups now legally classified as ‘historic’ linguistic minorities in Italy (art. 2, Law 482, 15 December 1999; Francescato 1993: 311; Orioles 2005: 158). Included in this category are the large linguistic minorities in the north, which have resulted primarily from fluctuating borders. These include speakers of the Gallo-Romance languages of the Franco-Provençal community in Valle d’Aosta, as well as a significant number of speakers of Occitan in Piedmont (Francescato 1993: 315). Slovene-speaking communities are present in the provinces of Trieste, Gorizia and, to a lesser extent,
Udine in the Friuli-Venezia Giulia region (De Mauro and Lodi 1993: 46). Finally, the largest of these groups is the German-speaking community in Alto Adige/Südtirol.

There are also much smaller enclaves of historic migrant communities, most notably the Albanian community which is dispersed in smaller groups across the south and Sicily, the much smaller Greek-speaking enclaves in Puglia and Calabria, and a small enclave of Catalan speakers in the town of Alghero in Sardinia (Francescato 1993: 329-32). Finally, there are the speakers of the three Italian regional languages, Sardinian, Friulian and Ladin, which have recently, in the eyes of legislators at least, been recognised as distinct from the broader group of Italian dialects. Sardinian will be discussed later, but Friulian is in a similar situation in the North-East of Italy (Francescato 1993: 324-25), while Ladin is protected in the province of Bolzano and to a lesser extent in Trento (De Mauro and Lodi 1993: 49-50). In addition to the legally recognised linguistic minorities, there also exist many other Romance varieties which are usually referred to as the ‘dialects’. Despite their limited recognition, they have been the subject of much study in Italy and are still widely spoken (ISTAT 2007; Parry 2002: 50). There is also the largely nomadic Zingari or Romany community, which is present in many regions throughout Italy and speaks both the Sinti and the Rom languages (Francescato 1993: 334). The languages of recent immigrants, particularly those from Romania, Albania and Morocco, are adding to this diverse linguistic context, although these have been largely ignored by the state (D’Agostino 2007: 63-64; Orioles 2003: 50-51).

To place this linguistic diversity within its historical context, the absence of political unity from the collapse of the Roman Empire in the fifth century until 1861 meant there was a lack of linguistic unity and of an explicit state language policy, with a variety of neo-Latin vernaculars taking hold throughout Italy. From the thirteenth century, one of these vernaculars, that of Tuscany, gained particular prestige especially in its written form, principally as a result of its usage by the three great Italian writers: Dante, Petrarch and Boccaccio. As a result, Tuscan was used more and more in cultural circles and, in the sixteenth century, the debate over the need for and the nature of a common vernacular language (la questione della lingua) was finally resolved in favour of the fourteenth-century literary model of Florentine (Maiden 2002: 35). However, with a continued lack of political unity and mass education, Florentine remained the preserve of the educated few and was largely limited to writing and solemn occasions. The other languages of Italy were only gradually assigned the inferior status of dialects,
particularly from the sixteenth century, and remained the normal means of communication for all members of society.

From the start of the nineteenth century there was a growing desire for political unification and the emerging patriots increasingly saw a unified Italian language as central to their vision (De Mauro 1993: 27). However, despite the efforts of politicians and literary figures to make Italian a living language during the Risorgimento, at the time of unification in 1861 Tullio De Mauro estimates that only 2.5 per cent of the population could speak the language (1993: 43). Although Arrigo Castellani suggests this may be too low (1982: 25), most experts agree that the figure is unlikely to have been much higher than 10 per cent. The new institutions of the state, such as the army, the education system and the central administration, did eventually become agents of the spread of Italian, whether intentionally or not. Increasing industrialisation and urbanisation also encouraged the adoption of the language and by the early twentieth century about 50 per cent of the population could use some form of Italian, although probably only about 20 per cent used it habitually (Richardson 2001: 69).

Italy’s linguistic minorities also came to be seen as a problem for the new national government during the Risorgimento period. At the time of unification, it is estimated that nearly 1 per cent of the population spoke a national European language other than Italian (De Mauro 1993: 9). French-speakers in Piedmont became the main concern for the new state. Piedmont had previously been a bilingual principality, with French used particularly by the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie as a language of culture. Nevertheless, in 1861 a member of the newly formed Italian Parliament, Giovenale Vegezzi-Ruscalla, published a pamphlet on the ‘Diritto e necessità di abrogare il francese come lingua ufficiale in alcune valli della Provincia di Torino’ (Marazzini 1999: 177) ['Right and need to suppress French as an official language in certain valleys of the Turin province']. Furthermore, in 1911 a new law meant that French was downgraded from its status as the exclusive official language in schools in Franco-Provençal territories, to merely a subject to be taught in elementary schools (Klein 1986: 70-71).

By 1921, the number of speakers of a language of a different European state had risen to around 2.1 per cent with the annexation of Bolzano, Trento, Gorizia, Pola, Trieste and Zara after the First World War (De Mauro 1993: 10). Initially, on 21 September 1919, the Minister of Foreign Affairs guaranteed maximum respect for the

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1 All translations are my own unless otherwise stated.
institutions and languages of these recently-annexed territories (Klein 1986: 70). However, the rise of fascism and the installation of Mussolini as Prime Minister in 1922 would mean linguistic pluralism would no longer be respected or tolerated. In particular, serious attempts would be made to ‘Italianise’ the border areas where other languages were spoken. The first step came with a decree on 1 October 1923 which sanctioned Italian as the only language of instruction in elementary schools throughout Italy and a later decree of 1925 fully prohibited the teaching of the languages of the border areas (Klein 1986: 72-74). Alto Adige/Südtirol felt the greatest impact of this policy, while in Valle d’Aosta and Piedmont there was no intervention until 1928, largely due to the closer proximity of their languages to Italian (Klein 1986: 103). Overall, it is evident that the repressive language policy towards these minorities did not have merely a linguistic aim, but more importantly, a political goal of assimilating these territories into the national culture (Klein 1986: 78).

After the fall of the repressive fascist regime and the creation of an Italian Republic, the Italian Constitution of 1948 adopted a pluralist line. As well as prohibiting discrimination based on linguistic choices (art. 3, Constitution of the Italian Republic 1948), Article 6 explicitly stated that ‘La Repubblica tutela con apposite norme le minoranze linguistiche’ [‘The Republic safeguards linguistic minorities by means of appropriate measures’]. Article 6 is unusual in that it does not specify the linguistic minorities to be protected, unlike many other constitutional arrangements (Palici di Suni Prat 1999: 21). Nevertheless, its inclusion represented a reversal of the fascist policy, and an attempt and desire to demonstrate that ‘l’Italia non concepiva la protezione delle minoranze come un mero obbligo internazionale, derivante dal trattato di pace e circoscritto entro limiti ben precisi, ma faceva proprio, liberamente e spontaneamente, il relativo principio’ (Pizzorusso 1975: 28) [‘Italy no longer conceived the protection of minorities as merely an international obligation, deriving from the peace treaty and contained within very clear limits, but rather freely and spontaneously adopted this principle as its own’].

However, in the following decades Article 6 was only enacted for what are often termed the ‘national minorities’ (Dell’Aquila and Iannaccaro 2004: 51), which is to say those on the borders who spoke the official national language of the neighbouring state. This was primarily due to the pressure from neighbouring states as well as fear that these territories might secede if their languages were not protected (Coluzzi 2007: 31). In Valle d’Aosta, a Special Statute was passed on 26 February 1948 which establishes that French is equal to Italian, and consequently official deeds can be drawn up in either
language (art. 38, Special Statute for the Valle d’Aosta 1948). However, it is important to note that it is standard French that is offered protection, rather than the local Franco-Provençal language which is the language habitually spoken. Developments in Alto Adige/Südtirol will be discussed later, but the linguistic situation in Friuli-Venezia Giulia is more complex. The allied military government in charge until 1947 in Gorizia and until 1954 in Trieste had established a perfectly bilingual system with Italian and Slovene given equal status. When the administration of these areas was handed over to Italy the status quo was maintained, and international agreements, such as the Memorandum of London of 1954, called for the maintenance of the established bilingual system (Bonamore 2004: 106). The Treaty of Osimo in 1975 also attempted to renew and strengthen the protection of Slovene.

Outside of these areas, however, linguistic minorities have received no protection, meaning that:

per tutti gli altri, la Costituzione non vale. Almeno in rapporto a loro, i governi e le maggioranze parlamentari succedutisi in trent’anni hanno trattato la Costituzione come un inutile, retorico pezzo di carta. (De Mauro 1987: 44)

[for all of the others, the Constitution does not apply. At least in relation to them, the successive governments and parliamentary majorities over the past thirty years have treated the Constitution as a useless, rhetorical piece of paper.]

In the early 1970s, there were signs of improvement with the renowned linguist Tullio De Mauro leading a study of linguistic minorities in 1971, which was originally proposed by the Italian parliament (Marazzini 1999: 199-200). Various attempts were subsequently made to draw up a national law for the protection of these other minorities but were repeatedly rejected by the state parties (De Mauro 1996: 440). The regions also attempted to introduce their own laws to protect their respective minority groups and the so-called ‘dialects’ from the 1970s (Orioles 2003: 17), seemingly in response to the absence of any state action or guidelines (Toso 2005: 261). These laws were often either returned to their senders by the government or approved by the government and then rejected by the Constitutional Court. They were rejected primarily on the basis that it did not fall within the delegated powers of the regions to legislate on measures for the protection of linguistic minorities (Palici di Suni Prat 2000: 102). It thus became clear that only a state law could adapt the founding principle of Article 6 and, in its absence, the regions did not have the power to attribute the status of linguistic minority to a specific group (Piergigli 2000: 637). With this growing consensus on the need for a state law, Bill 612 for the protection of Italy’s linguistic minorities was finally proposed
in the Italian parliament in 1991. However, this Bill provoked a series of intellectual and political objections from both the left and right. These objections were primarily based on fears for Italian national unity, particularly after the recent break up of states such as Yugoslavia, as well as a general disregard for minority languages and mistrust of any form of language policy (Savoia 2003). Although the Bill was passed by the Chamber of Deputies, the government fell before the Senate had a chance to vote (Coluzzi 2007: 57) and a law based largely on the content of this Bill was not passed until 1999. This law, Law 482, will be a primary focus of discussion in the subsequent chapters of the thesis.

In sum, it would appear that Arturo Tosi is right to state that ‘Italy, either because of its recent unification or because of its institutional reluctance, has never invested much energy in language policy, with the exception of the nefarious Fascist attempts’ (2001: 20). Recently, under growing pressure from European institutions and from linguistic minority groups within Italy, the central state appears to be taking a more interventionist approach. For the smaller groups such as the Greek and Albanian minorities, however, campaigns for their protection ‘may have come too late to offer them anything but a stay of execution’ (Moss 2000: 115).

3.2.2 The Italian Republic: State and Government

The Constitution of the Italian Republic of 1948 establishes the layout and institutions of the Italian Republic and the guiding principles to which it would adhere. In terms of laying out a unitary or federal state, the Constitution represents a hybrid vision (Bull and Newell 2005: 117). Sub-national units are established in the Constitution, but there is no second chamber of government to represent the regions. The Constitution also establishes fifteen ordinary regions and five other special statute regions, namely Sardinia, Sicily, Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol, Valle d’Aosta and Friuli-Venezia Giulia. These special statute regions were established by constitutional law (Desideri and Santantonio 1997: 96) and the system of regional government for these regions was defined in their individual statutes which were introduced immediately after the Constitution, with the exception of Friuli-Venezia Giulia whose statute was not established until 1963. As Paolo Coluzzi explains, the special statute regions were ‘all peripheral regions whose separatist or irredentist tendencies reflecting their geographical position, their history and their peculiar cultural traits, caused concern for the central Government on more than one occasion’ (2007: 97). It was thus considered necessary to provide these regions with a higher level of regional autonomy, although
the autonomy granted to each region differs significantly. The ordinary regions would, in contrast, need their statutes to be approved by parliament and it was not until 1977 that legislation was passed providing a legal framework for regional powers and activities (Putnam 1993: 23). The central state also retained a veto over regional legislation and general powers of ‘direction and coordination’ which it regularly used (Putnam 1993: 21). Furthermore, the ordinary regions’ financial structure was almost entirely based on transfers from the central government, of which most were earmarked for specific purposes, thus limiting the regions’ room for action. The result has consequently been described as ‘regions without regionalism’ (Keating 1998: 62).

Recent years have seen significant further developments, most notably with the so-called ‘Bassanini reforms’ passed by the centre-left government between 1997 and 2001. These reforms were confirmed with the modification of Title V of Part II of the Constitution in 2001 (Constitutional Law 3, 18 October 2001). The modified Title V establishes the federal principle of the distribution of powers, listing the exclusive powers of the state and the concurrent powers of the state and the regions in specific areas, while all other areas were left to the exclusive legislative powers of the regions (Constitutional Law 3, 18 October 2001). The reforms also abolished the post of Government Commissioner in the regions, along with any ex-ante controls on regional laws. This means that regional laws can now only be challenged by the central authorities after their passing by referral to the Constitutional Court. As Martino Mazzoleni explains, ‘The formal hierarchical superiority of the state over sub-national authorities and governmental control of regional legislation (exercised by regional prefects) were both abolished’ (2009: 143). The exclusive powers of the state did, however, include the equalization of financial resources and the determining of essential levels of services, meaning that the state maintained significant control and powers to intervene (Bull and Newell 2005: 167). There was also no attempt to transform the Senate into a chamber of the regions, which is an essential step for genuine federalism. As Sergio Fabbrini and Marco Brunazzo explain, ‘One may say that Italy is in a process of federalization, although the amendments to the constitution provide the institutional features for a “strong” regional state’ (2003: 117).

These reforms referred principally to the ordinary regions, and consequently there was initially a fear that they would diminish the privileged status of the special statute regions. However, as Francesco Palermo establishes, ‘although legislative powers are now more or less the same for the special and the ordinary regions, there is still a profound constitutional (and political) difference between these two types of
regions’ (2008b: 37). Thus, while the statutes of ordinary regions are established solely by a regional law (art. 123, Constitution of the Italian Republic 1948), the special statutes have the status of constitutional law which provides a much firmer guarantee of autonomy. Furthermore, the constitutional reform included a ‘most favourable’ clause to be applied to the special statute regions to ensure the powers of the ordinary regions did not exceed their own (art. 10, Constitutional Law 3, 18 October 2001). Indeed, the further the central government moves from a unitary vision of the state, the more likely it is that the special statute regions will also receive further legislative powers, even if recent developments may diminish the distinction between special and ordinary regions.

These institutional reforms have also been heavily influenced by European integration and, most notably, the Maastricht Treaty which drew attention to Italy’s ‘centralist inefficiency’ (Fabbrini and Brunazzo 2003: 105). Italy was one of the six founding members of the European Economic Community (EEC) and it is the country which is most noted for its unequivocal and constant support for European integration. Nevertheless, Italy has a lamentable record in implementing European laws and economic policies, developing a reputation for being unreliable and being dubbed the ‘sick man of Europe’ in the 1970s (Bull and Newell 2005: 217). Since the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, there has been a gradual improvement in the implementation of EU legislation and a greater culture of stability. Both European integration and the development of a more powerful regional level of government have meant the emergence of sub- and supra-national levels of government and consequently, as Martin Bull and James Newell state, ‘policy is something that emerges from consultation and negotiation between decision-makers located in a wide range of institutional settings’ (2005: 155). It should also be noted that Italian politics and governance throughout the post-war period have been marked by clientelistic practices and the existence of highly powerful informal and clandestine institutions, such as the Mafia. This has often resulted in widespread corruption, maladministration and a tendency for important public decisions to be taken outside of democratic institutions (Bull and Newell 2005: 14). In addition, unstable governments have been a feature of the previous two decades, which has also hindered the decision-making powers of the state and the implementation of policy. Nevertheless, the central state, even in its sometimes deficient form in Italy, remains the principal arena of governance in the Italian Republic.
3.2.3 The Sardinian Minority

Sardinian is a Romance language which, with the exception of speakers who have migrated away from the area, is spoken solely on the island of Sardinia. The status of Sardinian as a language has been contested and it has often been treated by the state as one of the Italian ‘dialects’. The constitutional committee which drew up a report on Italy’s linguistic minorities in 1946, for example, did not include the Sardinian speakers in the report (Piergigli 2000: 630-31). The contested status of Sardinian will be discussed further in the following chapter, but it was primarily foreign scholars who recognised Sardinian’s distinct status, most notably the German linguist Max Leopold Wagner (1951: 59). The lack of a unified standard form of Sardinian has, however, continued to cause doubt regarding its status as a language and there are, in fact, distinct varieties of Sardinian used in different parts of the island. The southern Campidanese and central Logudorese varieties of Sardinian are often considered the main forms of Sardinian. In fact, the linguist De Mauro argues that these varieties of Sardinian constitute a diverse branch of Romance languages: ‘L’insieme delle parlate sarde centrali e meridionali è un gruppo a sé’ (De Mauro 1987: 114) [‘The set of central and southern varieties of Sardinian is a separate group’]. The establishment of a standard or koiné form of the language is, however, further complicated by the existence of the Gallurese and Sassarese varieties spoken in the north of the island, which are closer to Corsican and the Tuscan dialect of mainland Italy. In fact, many linguists exclude these varieties from the Sardinian language since ‘si configurano come un diasistema a parte, e vanno inquadrati nel gruppo dei dialetti italiani’ (Blasco Ferrer 1984: 186) [‘they form a separate diasystem, and are members of the group of Italian dialects’]. The speakers of these varieties have also often refused to identify themselves as belonging to the Sardinian linguistic group (Blasco Ferrer 1984: 182; Paulis 1998: 1217).

One of the primary features of the Campidanese and more notably the Logudorese varieties often remarked upon is their proximity to Latin, with Wagner stating that they represented ‘il continuatore più schietto del latino’ (Wagner 1951: 131) [‘the clearest continuation from Latin’]. However, more recently some Sardinian linguists have argued that this is an exaggeration and represents an archaic, romanticised view of Sardinian (Bolognesi 2001: 14). Sardinian does, in fact, display influences of Italian and other Romance languages, reflecting historic developments on the island. Initially, Pisan and Ligurian invasions had a significant impact on the language from 1016 (Blasco Ferrer 1984: 130), but Sardinia was subject to Catalan rule from 1297, with the town of Alghero specifically repopulated by Catalans (Blasco
The kingdom of Sardinia did maintain a certain autonomy under Catalan rule with the famous ‘Carta de logu’ in 1392, one of the earliest known examples of written Sardinian, providing a corpus of Sardinian laws (Blasco Ferrer 1984:141). With the union of Castile and Aragon in 1479, the island passed under Castilian rule, although Castilian was slow to replace Catalan as the primary official language (Blasco Ferrer 1984:162). The use of both Catalan and Castilian had also been largely restricted to the upper classes, with the majority of the island’s population excluded from the contexts in which these languages were required. However, with the exception of the Church, writers and poets have often used the official language of the period rather than Sardinian, which prevented the development of a significant Sardinian literary tradition (Wagner 1951: 405).

In 1720 Sardinia passed back under Italian influence under the rule of the Kingdom of Savoy, but Sardinians continued to display a strong loyalty to their own language (Dettori 2001: 73-74). From 1750, there was an increasing focus on Italianisation, with Italian imposed as the primary official language in 1764, most notably in the school system (Salvi 1975: 57). Nevertheless, this was primarily aimed at replacing Castilian, and Sardinian was even valued as a defence against Hispanic influences. From the 1700s there was also a growing use of Sardinian in poetry and talk of the need to standardise and promote Sardinian (Dettori 1998: 1171). Again, it was largely the upper classes that began to adopt Italian, although Sardinian and Italian bilingualism did gradually become more widespread. In 1847, Sardinia became a province of Piedmont and was no longer officially a colony. Nevertheless, the island continued to be exploited economically and Sardinia would make no contribution to the Risorgimento, demonstrating little enthusiasm for its incorporation into the Italian state (Salvi 1975: 185-90). Sardinia was subsequently subject to the same Italianising influences as the rest of Italy, although continued to maintain a greater isolation due to its island status. Under fascism, Sardinians did not, however, face the same repression as other linguistic minorities since, as Gabriella Klein explains, ‘Per quanto riguarda poi la questione dei sardi, il problema non si poneva neanche: le loro parlate sono classificate semplicisticamente come varietà dell’italiano’ (Klein 1986: 70) [‘As far as the question of the Sardinians is concerned, the problem did not even pose itself: their forms of speech were classified simply as varieties of Italian’].

In the post-war period, as well as the rapid spread of Italian, there also emerged a growing ‘linguistic consciousness’ among Sardinians, with demands for recognition for the Sardinian language from the 1970s. There was a political strand to these
demands led most notably by certain elements of the Partito Sardo d’Azione (PSdA). However, it was the cultural and intellectual movement, often termed ‘neosardismo’ (Dettori 1998: 1190), which had a greater impact. From the 1970s, various proposals for laws were made to protect Sardinian to both the regional council and to the Italian parliament. The introduction of Sardinian into the school system has been a primary focus for demands since, ‘Per tutto il Novecento l’istruzione elementare in Italia veniva accompagnata da una lotta indiscriminata ai dialetti e naturalmente al sardo’ (Berlinguer and Mattone 1998: xxxvii) [‘For the whole of the twentieth century primary education in Italy was accompanied by a campaign against the dialects and naturally Sardinian’]. The 1980s saw a slight change in attitude by the state with a greater focus on the linguistic background of the child and the possibility for dialects and local varieties to be used in the education system. The 1985 Decree on the curriculum for elementary schools, for example, provided the opportunity to learn the local language in elementary schools (Porru 1991: 87-88). Nevertheless, progress was limited, particularly due to the lack of materials in Sardinian and language training for teachers (Euromosaic, 12 January 1995a).

The lack of legal recognition for the Sardinian language also hindered progress, and the Sardinian Statute of Autonomy contains no references to the language or even to the Sardinian culture, and consequently no specific system of minority protection is established (Special Statute for Sardinia 1948). As a result, the language has been generally absent from the public and institutional sphere. The past two decades have seen further developments, with the eventual passing of Regional Law 26 for the Sardinian language on 15 October 1997, after its initial rejection by the Constitutional Court (Cossu 2001: 39). This Law, combined with the recognition provided for Sardinian by the state with Law 482, has allowed for progress in certain spheres and there has been greater institutional support for the language from the regional government. In the regional and local administrations, offices have been established to encourage institutional use of both written and spoken Sardinian since 2006 (Regione Autonoma della Sardegna 2007: 10-13). Within the Sardinian regional administration there is now a Service for the Sardinian Language and Culture, which takes the leading role in implementing and coordinating language planning measures for the Sardinian language (Regione Autonoma della Sardegna 2012). Nevertheless, the institutional presence of Sardinian remains limited and, despite recent projects to encourage a greater presence of Sardinian in schools, teaching of the language remains ‘episodic’ (Corongiu 2008: 121). The presence of the language in the media also remains extremely limited.
and there is no daily or periodical press in the Sardinian language. These developments will be discussed in greater detail in later chapters, focusing particularly on the role that state institutions have played.

This brings us to the contemporary context of the Sardinian language and its speakers. A reliable estimate for the number of speakers is difficult to find, partly due to the confusion over which varieties spoken on the island can be considered varieties of Sardinian and also due to the ambiguous status of Sardinian.² In the report submitted by the Italian state to the Council of Europe in 1999, the approximate number of 1,269,000 speakers was given, although it is not clear from which studies or surveys this figure was taken (Council of Europe, 3 May 1999: 33). The detailed sociolinguistic survey undertaken in Sardinia in 2007 found that 68.4 per cent of respondents spoke a local language (Oppo 2007a: 7), although this included all other local varieties spoken on the island including Algherese, a variety of Catalan spoken in Alghero, and Tabarchino, a variety of the Ligurian dialect. Overall, the number of speakers of Sardinian is likely to be somewhere around the million mark making it, in fact, the largest linguistic minority group in Italy (Euromosaic, 12 January 1995a).

Despite this relatively high number of speakers, the status of Sardinian means it is still under threat, primarily from Italian. Sardinian is more likely to be spoken by the less well-educated, the elderly and those who live in small villages (Oppo 2007a: 10), and is also most used in the family context (Oppo 2007c: 5). This would at first appear to be a potentially diglossic situation, where Italian is the prestigious language (H) to be used on formal occasions, while Sardinian is the language of low status (L) restricted primarily to the private sphere. However, now that knowledge of Italian is widespread throughout the island, there are signs that Italian is becoming dominant even within the family and the private sphere. Since Ferguson’s original definition of diglossia specifies that H is not used for ordinary conversation (Fasold 1984: 39; Ferguson 1959: 336), we may now be seeing instead ‘dilalia’, a term originally coined by Gaetano Berruto (1995: 243), or at the very least a form of ‘microdiglossia’, as described by J. Trumper (1989: 39). Although similar to diglossia, in this phase the language of higher status (Italian) also begins to be used regularly in informal contexts, meaning that the language of lower status (Sardinian) no longer has any exclusive domains for its use and continues

² The most recent ISTAT reports (ISTAT 2002; ISTAT 2007) were particularly ambiguous, as they asked respondents in Sardinia whether they spoke the local ‘dialect’. This meant that those respondents who did not see Sardinian as a dialect were subsumed under the broad category of ‘other language’ and the number of speakers of Sardinian was consequently divided between the two categories (Oppo 2007b: 5).
to be excluded from formal domains. This puts Sardinian in a particularly vulnerable position as ‘vede in questa fase messi in pericolo anche i suoi ambiti tradizionali di impiego, in primo luogo familiare’ (Lupinu 2007: 105) [‘in this phase it sees itself threatened even in its traditional spheres of use, primarily the family’]. The most recent ISTAT survey also shows that the sole or prevalent use of Italian within the family is significantly higher in Sardinia than in many other Italian regions with their own local or regional language varieties, particularly in comparison to the southern Italian regions. 52.5 per cent of respondents in Sardinia claimed to use only or mainly Italian within the family, compared to just 26.2 per cent in Sicily and only 20.4 per cent in Calabria (ISTAT 2007: 5). This has led to a significant decline in the intergenerational transmission of the language, with only 13 per cent of children in the island now brought up in Sardinian (Corongiu 2008: 122).

However, as is common with languages restricted to the private sphere, there is still a strong emotive link to the language, with a general desire to see it survive. This is linked to the previously mentioned ‘neosardismo’ movement of the 1970s and is confirmed by the recent sociolinguistic survey, which found that 89.9 per cent of the sample were strongly in agreement that the local language should be promoted and maintained because it was part of their identity (Valdes 2007: 52). Nevertheless, when compared with other linguistic minority groups, this sense of identity remains relatively weak and, as Giuseppe Corongiu clarifies, ‘Manca la coscienza diffusa, il senso comune di costituire una minoranza linguistica europea come altre’ (2008: 120) [‘Widespread awareness is lacking, in the sense of constituting a European linguistic minority similar to others’]. This lack of awareness is also related to the political context, with the absence of a strong political representation for the Sardinian-speaking minority. Although Sardinia is one of the five special statute regions, a strong sense of cultural and political autonomy has failed to develop, as will be discussed in Chapter 6. There does exist a Sardinian party with a strongly autonomist, and at times separatist, vision, in the form of the PSdA, which formed in the 1920s and initially had a significant impact on Sardinian politics (Salvi 1975: 188-90). The party has tended to focus on economic issues, although in the 1970s language returned to the political agenda and began to take on a central role in autonomist demands (Orioles 2003: 87-88). Nevertheless, the party’s influence in recent decades has remained limited and the Sardinian political class has traditionally paid little attention to the Sardinian culture and language, as is reflected in the Sardinian Statute of Autonomy which makes no reference to either.
In sum, it is evident that the Sardinian linguistic minority is currently in a precarious position. The Sardinian language is still excluded from most formal domains and is increasingly under threat from Italian in the private sphere. The island’s history has resulted in significant dialectal variation within the language and the failure to establish an accepted unified standard. The community has also lacked a strong political class willing to or capable of defending the language and sufficient levels of self-government to take effective action at the regional level. Nevertheless, the current number of speakers of the language is encouraging, as is the strong emotive attachment of these speakers to their language.

3.2.4 The German-Speaking Minority in Alto Adige/Südtirol

The German-speaking group in the province of Alto-Adige/Südtirol (also known as the province of Bolzano) is one of the largest linguistic minorities in Italy and it is now considered one of the best protected linguistic minorities in Europe (Orioles 2003: 94), as well as an example of successful ethnic conflict resolution (Egger 2001: 11). The County of Tyrol was originally a largely independent state but came under Austrian influence from 1363 (Salvi 1975: 228-35) and came under the power of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1867, until it was annexed by Italy in 1919. The Treaty of St Germain in September 1919 placed the southern part of the Tyrol under Italian rule (Steininger 2003: 5-6) and the area was subjected to forced Italianisation under fascist rule. This Italianisation was directed primarily by the Italian nationalist Ettore Tolomei who focused his attentions on the supposed ‘re-Italianisation’ of place names in the area, although these were mostly inventions given that the area had been under Germanic influence for many centuries (Grote 2012: 18). Italian was imposed in the education system and at all levels of the administration in the province. The creation of the Bolzano Industrial Zone also encouraged Italian-speaking labourers and industrialists to move to the area (Grote 2012: 43).

After the Hitler-Mussolini alliance of 1939, residents of the area were given a choice of either adopting German citizenship and being resettled in Austria or Germany, or retaining Italian citizenship but renouncing any claims to the protection of their Germanic culture. Although at first around 86 per cent of the German-speaking population opted for resettlement (Grote 2012: 69), the slow and disorganised process meant that only around 75,000 (37 per cent) left in total, but it left the German-speaking population deeply divided (Steininger 2003: 67). With the establishment of the Salò Republic in 1943, German troops took full control of the Tyrol area and the German
language was reintroduced, along with a brief period of Nazi indoctrination (Steininger 2003: 169). In May 1945, however, the Italian National Liberation Committee took over, raising the Italian flag and reinstating Italian in the local bureaucracy (Steininger 2003: 74). In the same month, the Südtiroler Volkspartei (SVP) was founded with links to Austrian resistance members and in strong opposition to fascist rule (Steininger 2003: 75). The party demanded the right to self-determination and reunification with Austria, and the Allied powers appeared at first to be sympathetic to their claims. Italy was, however, reluctant to lose the region and on 1 May 1946 the Council of Foreign Ministers decided in favour of Italy’s claims to the area (Steininger 2003: 93-96). The Italian government was still obliged to negotiate with Austria on special arrangements for the province which resulted in the signing of the Gruber-De Gasperi Agreement of 5 September 1946 between Italy and Austria. This established the main features of the minority protection regime for the province, including education in the mother tongue, the equal status of both German and Italian in the public administration, and the exercise of legislative and executive autonomy for the area (Gruber-De Gasperi Agreement/Paris Treaty, 5 September 1946). However, although the agreement appears favourable to the German-speaking group, many of the statements within it are extremely vague and confusing (Pizzorusso 1975: 109). The text does not explicitly declare the official status of German, meaning that all official correspondence would subsequently be in Italian with German translations permitted alongside (Alcock 2000: 172).

The Special Statute passed in 1948 also demonstrated a limited interpretation of the Agreement by the Italian government, beginning what Georg Grote describes as a ‘renewed and re-energized phase of Italianization’ (2012: 58). Most controversially, the Statute united the area with Trentino to form the autonomous region of Trentino-Alto Adige. This was seen as an attempt to “diluire” la minoranza di lingua tedesca della provincia di Bolzano in un più ampio complesso di popolazione a maggioranza italiana’ (Pizzorusso 1975: 72) [“dilute” the German-speaking minority in the province of Bolzano into a wider group in which the Italians were in the majority]. After the passing of the Statute there was continued suspicion of the policies of the Italian government with the opening of many Italian schools and public housing projects attracting continued Italian immigration to the area (Steininger 2003: 113). Rome was also slow to repeal many of the previous laws introduced under fascist rule and German speakers continued to be excluded from civil service jobs (Steininger 2003: 114-16). After failed attempts to negotiate with the Italian government, the South Tyrolea
representatives and Austria eventually addressed their complaints to the United Nations (the UN) General Assembly in 1960. This led to the UN Resolution 1497/XV on 31 October 1960, which confirmed the Gruber-De Gasperi Agreement and called upon both countries to resume negotiations to settle the dispute (Steininger 2003: 121). Over the same period, some extremists in the province adopted a bombing campaign, causing increasing tension with the Italian police (Grote 2012: 100-02). In response to the UN Resolution, the Italian Minister of the Interior suggested the creation of the Commission of 19, which included eleven Italian representatives and eight South Tyrolean representatives, to examine the situation and draw up a solution. The Commission of 19 presented its suggestions to the Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro in April 1964, which included many of the demands of the German-speaking minority, particularly the demand for greater autonomy for the province. These suggestions came to form the Pacchetto [Package] of 137 measures which was approved by Austria, Italy and the SVP in 1969 (Steininger 2003: 121-33).

The most important result of the Package was the approval of a new Statute for the region in 1972. Although the Statute did not abolish the joint region of Trentino-Alto Adige, it did pass many of the region’s powers to the provinces making the region effectively a federation of two independent provinces and ensured that power passed back into the hands of the German-speaking majority in the province (Steininger 2003: 134). The main change the Statute introduced concerning the language was to make explicit the equal official status of German and Italian in the province (art. 99, Special Statute for Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol 1972). Significant changes were also introduced in the education system, with Article 19 of the Statute emphasising the importance of teaching in the mother tongue. This resulted in the establishment of three autonomous school boards for the German, Italian and also the Ladin populations, providing for separate schools for each linguistic group, although teaching of the second language is obligatory in primary and secondary schools (art. 19, Special Statute for Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol 1972). The Package and the new Statute also establish the obligation for public administration bodies, judicial offices and courts, and police authorities in the province to use the preferred language of the citizen (Fraenkel-Haeberle 2008: 262-64), although this was not fully enacted until 1988 (Peterlini 2000: 177-78). This led to the gradual introduction of a requirement for all public employees to demonstrate their competency in both languages with the introduction of an exam to gain the ‘patentino’ ['licence'] which attested to their abilities (Decree of the President of the Republic 752, 26 July 1976).
As well as this bilingual requirement, the Statute (arts. 15, 19, 36, 49, 50, 61 and 89) and the ‘Proporz Decree’ introduced in 1976 require that in every grade of public employment, with the exception of the Ministry of Defence and police services in the province, ethnic proportions are enforced (Steininger 2003: 137). This means that positions are allocated to members of the three language groups (Italian, German and Ladin) based on their relative numerical strength within the provincial population. To enforce such a system, individual citizens are required to make a declaration every ten years of their belonging to one of the three ethnic groups in a census (Egger 2001: 31). Although the implementation of all of the measures specified in the Package was initially a slow process, progress improved and in 1992 the conflict between Austria and Italy was finally declared resolved by all parties (Steininger 2003: 143-44). This system of minority protection has remained in place and largely unchanged over the past two decades. Nevertheless, questions remain over the need to adapt this system to the contemporary sociolinguistic context.

To provide an introduction to this context, the 2001 census required all citizens to declare either a ‘belonging’ to one of the three linguistic groups or at least a willingness to be ‘aggregated’ to one of these groups for legal purposes. This found that 69.15 per cent (296,461 people) of the residents of Alto Adige/Südtirol belonged to the German-speaking group. The Italian-speaking group represents 26.47 per cent (113,491 people) of the population, while the remaining 4.37 per cent (18,736 people) is represented by speakers of the Ladin language (ASTAT 2002: 4). The German-speaking population does appear to have slightly increased in size since the 1991 census in which only 65.3 per cent (288,000 people) declared that they belonged to the German-speaking group (Carli 2003: 217; Egger 2001: 31). The German- and Italian-speaking groups are also unevenly distributed across the province with German speakers representing the overwhelming majority in the smaller towns, while Italian-speakers dominate in the major cities. Finally, the Ladin-speaking group is predominantly present only in the two small valleys of Val Gardena and Val Badia (Egger 2001: 33). For this reason, the province is made up of largely monolingual areas, with Kurt Egger explaining that it is ‘solo attraverso l’unione politica il territorio diventa plurilingue’ (2001: 32) [‘only through political union that the territory becomes multilingual’]. It should also be clarified that while it is standard German that is officially recognised in the province, the majority of the German speakers speak an Austro-Bavarian dialect known as ‘Tyrolean’ as their everyday and home language (Egger 2001: 43-44). This dialect is spoken in the northern area of the Tyrol in Austria as well, and there is no specific
South Tyrolean variety. Standard German is also known and used by all, and there have been no real attempts to move the dialect into more formal arenas such as education or the administration (Egger 2001: 45). There is, however, an extremely strong attachment to both the dialect and standard German, which explains the strong tendency for language group reproduction as evidenced in the increase in size of the German-speaking group, which is rare for linguistic minority groups. German, as the official language of a major European power, also maintains a prestigious status.

The prestigious status of German within the province is reinforced by its presence in all areas of the public sphere, particularly since the introduction of the Package measures (Euromosaic, 27 August 1997). Evidently, German is in a relatively privileged position in the province and in the contemporary period is far from under threat. In the past, there has been some evidence of Italian influences on German but not vice versa (Carli 2003: 223), which could be a sign that German is still in a dominated position. The greater influence of Italian on German also reflects the fact that knowledge of the second language of the province has been much more widespread among the German-speaking group. Even today, while 78.1 per cent of Germans have few difficulties in understanding Italian, just 47.7 per cent of Italians can say the same for German (ASTAT 2006: 139-40). There is now no obligation for either group to know the language of the other, since both communities have the option to use their mother tongue with the provincial administration. The fact that Italian and German speakers are educated separately in their respective languages also does not appear to encourage bilingualism. Furthermore, as in many linguistic minority contexts, the Italian-speaking group did not in the past feel the need or desire to learn German, although since the 1990s the situation has improved (Egger 2001: 139). The need to demonstrate bilingual competence in order to gain access to jobs in the public administration has clearly been the primary motive and knowledge of German has also become ‘a determining factor in economic life, particularly in the private sector’ (Baur and Medda-Windischer 2008: 242). To a certain extent, the roles of Italian and German have reversed, with German becoming increasingly dominant. Nevertheless, the 2004 survey carried out by the provincial statistics institute, ASTAT, found that there does exist among all language groups in the province a strong consensus on the importance of knowing the other languages (ASTAT 2006: 204). Furthermore, the coexistence of the different linguistic groups is much less divided than it often appears in the political arena or in the media (Egger 2001: 173). The ASTAT survey confirms this, with the
‘coexistence of ethnic groups’ judged in positive terms by the majority of the population in the province (ASTAT 2006: 205).

In fact, living conditions appear to have improved overall, with the province ‘transformed by the year 2000 into one of the richest areas of Italy, with unemployment negligible’ (Alcock 2000: 180). The achievement of peace and prosperity has been a gradual process over the post-war period, particularly since genuine autonomy was granted to the province with the second Special Statute in 1972. The driving force in the continued development of autonomous government has been the SVP, which has dominated provincial politics since its founding in 1945. It is widely considered the hegemonic party of the German-speaking minority,\(^3\) obtaining an absolute majority in provincial, regional and general elections held in the province since 1948 (Roux and Tronconi 2009: 158-59). As a result, the SVP was ‘considered to be the legitimate counterpart for negotiations to the Italian government’ (Lantschner 2008: 15). These negotiations have enabled the province to reach the peak level of autonomy in the Italian context. Further powers have also been passed to the province since 1992, despite the fact that the central government is no longer obliged by international agreements to do so. The 2001 Constitutional reform, for example, confirmed for the first time the bilingual denomination of the region as Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol and the two autonomous provinces were to be listed in Title V of the Constitution and given further autonomy (art. 2, Constitutional Law 3, 18 October 2001). Furthermore, although taxation remains a power of the state, the province receives back around 90 per cent of the tax revenue collected in the province (Benedikter 2008: 106-09). In sum, the province now has power over all of those areas closest to the everyday life of citizens of the province and is often seen as more effective than the central government (Parolari and Voltmer 2008: 93-94). The parity system for external relations with the state means that no level of government or linguistic group can prevail in fundamental decisions about the governance and current autonomous arrangements in the area (Palermo 2008a: 157), thus limiting the possibilities for the central government to take back powers from the province. The Special Statute for the region also states that ‘the safeguarding of local linguistic minorities’ constitutes a ‘national interest’ (art. 4, Special Statute for Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol 1972), which gives the province greater legitimacy in introducing legislation in this domain (Palici di Suni Prat 2000: 102).

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\(^3\) The SVP does also theoretically represent the Ladin-speaking minority in the province.
Evidently, then, the German-speaking minority in Alto Adige/Südtirol can be considered an extremely privileged minority, which does not display many of the characteristics common to other minority groups such as a decline in speakers, the low status of the language or a lack of access to power and self-government. As Georg Grote establishes, ‘By 2005, the South Tyroleans were the best protected linguistic minority in Europe, if not the world’ (2012: 113). Nevertheless, there are continued questions concerning the position of the German-speaking minority in Alto Adige/Südtirol in relation to the central state. As will be demonstrated in the following chapters, uncertainty remains over how the system will develop in light of continued ethnic divisions in the province.

3.3 Spain

3.3.1 Linguistic Variety and Language Policy in Spain
With over 40 per cent of Spanish citizens residing in territories with two official languages (Siguán 1993: 9), Spain is often considered one of the most multilingual countries in Europe. The majority of the speakers of Spain’s ‘other’ languages are found in what Clare Mar-Molinero describes as the ‘big three’ communities of Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia. These are often called the ‘historic communities’ or ‘historic nationalities’ due to the size of their bilingual population, and distinct cultural and political traits (Mar-Molinero 2000b: 41). Catalonia will be considered in greater detail later but, to provide some brief details on the other two, Galician is the most widely spoken minority language in Spain as the habitual language of 67.2 per cent of the Galician population (Etxebra 2002: 192). However, the language has a low social prestige with strong links to the rural and lower classes (Regueira 2006: 66). In the Basque case, knowledge of the respective minority language is considerably lower and the language is also heavily linked to nationalist parties (Siguán 1993: 73). Unlike the other languages of Spain, Basque is not a Romance language, with its origins and classification still debatable.

Basque is also spoken in the north of the Navarre region (Siguán 1993: 227-36), while Catalan is spoken in the Balearic Islands and arguably also in Valencia, although there is still significant debate over whether ‘Valencian’ can be considered a variety of Catalan or a distinct language (Nicolás 2006: 181). In all of the cases discussed above, the language does now have official status in these territories, whereas in other regions the status of the language is more ambiguous. The Asturian case will be discussed later, but in Aragon there are also remnants of Aragonese in certain valleys of the Pyrenees.
and some small Catalan-speaking areas, although both lack official status in the region (Etxebarria 2002: 100). In Catalonia, in addition to Catalan, there is the smaller community of speakers of Aranese, an Occitan variety, in the Valle de Arán, which was declared an official language of Catalonia in the 2006 Catalan Statute reform (art 6.5, Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia 2006). Finally, some members of the considerable Romany population in Spain speak a mixed language known as Caló and, in the autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla on the North African coast, there are speakers of Arabic and a dialect of Berber (Council of Europe, 21 September 2005b: 9). These have been mostly ignored by both the state and regional governments, as have the recent non-Spanish speaking migrant communities, primarily from North Africa (Turell 2000: 38).

All of these ‘other’ languages of Spain remain politically subordinate to the official language of the Spanish state, Castilian. The Castilian language was in fact initially just one of the five linguistic nuclei which were formed after Latin spread throughout the Iberian peninsula. In addition to Castilian, these include Galaico-Portuguese, Astur-Leonese, Aragonese and Catalan, which would provide the bases for the Iberian languages, along with the Basque language which existed in relative isolation (Siguán 1993: 15). The resistance to the Arab occupation (known as the Reconquest) in the eighth century began in the north, although Castile quickly took on a dominant role in the struggle ensuring the future spread and dominance of the Castilian language. The peninsula remained divided into distinct kingdoms allowing for the development of prestigious literary traditions in the distinct Iberian languages (Siguán 1993: 17). However, in the renaissance period and with the unification of the Crowns of Castile and Aragon (which included the region of Catalonia) in 1479, Castilian began to take on a dominant role with Antonio de Nebrija publishing the first grammar of Castilian, and one of the earliest of any Romance vernacular language, in 1492 (Mar-Molinero 2000b: 19). By the sixteenth century Castilian had become the main language of government and of royal power, and it was in this period that the term ‘Spanish’ began to be used to describe the language, in what Clare Mar-Molinero and Angel Smith describe as a form of Spanish ‘proto-nationalism’ (1996: 2). Nevertheless, there was still no attempt to enforce or encourage Castilian outside of elite circles and, unlike the Italian case, it is clear that the Spanish state existed prior to the creation of any real sense of national consciousness (Siguán 1993: 20).

By the eighteenth century, however, particularly after the Bourbon dynasty took the throne, there were clear attempts to impose a more unified and centralised vision of the state, with the first signs of ‘hard language policies’ to ensure the dominance of
Castilian (Mar-Molinero 2000b: 22). The Real Academia Española was created in 1713 (Mar-Molinero 2000b: 23) and the 1857 Moyano Law also prescribed the standardised Castilian of the Academia as the language of education (Siguán 1993: 29). Nevertheless, Spain’s ‘other’ languages remained the habitual means of conversation within their communities, and the mid-nineteenth century saw literary revival movements in the periphery, the most prominent being the Renaixença in Catalonia (Mar-Molinero and Smith 1996: 7). These cultural movements soon took on a political form, although in quite different forms in distinct regions. All of these movements did, however, reflect what Stanley Payne describes as ‘a reaction against the relative failure of nineteenth-century liberalism in Spain’ (1991: 482). The more successful industrialisation and modernisation of Catalonia and the Basque Country, in particular, led to what Rafael Ninyoles describes as a ‘disociación entre el “poder económico” y el “poder político”’ (1977: 69) [‘disassociation between “economic power” and “political power”’].

Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship from 1923-30 saw the beginning of an enforced Spanish nationalisation project. When democracy was restored in 1930 this ‘negative nationalisation’ served to align periphery nationalist movements with the new republican democratic government (Balfour and Quiroga 2007: 34). The subsequent Constitution of 1931 thus allowed for the possibility for the periphery regions to gain some form of home-rule, with a Statute of Autonomy passed for Catalonia in 1932, although a Basque Statute was not passed until 1936 and the planned Statute for Galicia was never completed (Balfour and Quiroga 2007: 35). It should also be noted that the 1931 Constitution explicitly stated for the first time in Spanish history the official status of Castilian and there were many Republican leaders who opposed the promotion of linguistic diversity (González Ollé 1993: 148-49). It would, however, be the authoritarian Spanish right which would take up what they described as the defence of the ‘sacred unity of the homeland’ (Moreno 2001: 56), with the fascist leader Calvo Sotelo famously declaring he would rather see ‘a red Spain than a broken Spain’ (Balfour and Quiroga 2007: 37). After the victory of Franco’s fascist forces in the Civil War in 1939, all forms of regional autonomy were suppressed (Balfour and Quiroga 2007: 37).

This period also saw the prohibition of languages other than Castilian in the public sphere (Balfour and Quiroga 2007: 28). As Mar-Molinero explains, the Franco period marked ‘a time of state-led policies that are the very embodiment of the denial of linguistic rights’ (2000b: 84). This was particularly true of the early years of the regime
when fines and prison sentences were imposed for the use of these other languages in public, with the introduction of the slogan: ‘If you are Spanish, speak Spanish’ (cited in Siguán 1993: 60). There were signs of growing tolerance from the 1950s and the General Law of Education in 1970 provided the first official recognition of Spain’s other languages (Herreras 2006: 67). However, by referring to these languages as ‘dialects’ the regime continued its denigration of non-Castilian languages with their relegation to primarily ‘folkloric’ and trivial events (Ninyoles 1977: 62-63). This prohibition and denigration of Spain’s languages also provoked a significant opposition movement, particularly in Catalonia and the Basque Country. The harsh repression had a boomerang effect, establishing a link between the struggle for democracy and the defence of these languages (Siguán 1993: 60). Francoism also had the effect of discrediting Spanish nationalism, since, as Luis Moreno explains, ‘the very concept of anything Spanish was regarded by the democratic and progressive forces as synonymous with repression, cultural hegemonic imposition and fear of Spain’s plural reality’ (2001: 58).

As a result, the Constitution passed in 1978 recognised the multilingual and multicultural reality of Spain and thus represented a significant novelty in Spanish history (Siguán 1993: 5). Article 3 of the Constitution deals most explicitly with Spain’s languages and begins by stating that ‘El castellano es la lengua española oficial del Estado. Todos los españoles tienen el deber de conocerla y el derecho a usarla’ (art. 3.1, Spanish Constitution 1978) [‘Castilian is the official Spanish language of the State. All Spaniards have the duty to know it and the right to use it’]. There was some opposition to the use of the term ‘Castilian’, most notably from the Real Academia Española, which sent a message to the Spanish parliament calling for the use of the term ‘Spanish language’ (Moreno Cabrera 2008: 93-95). However, even the political scientist Juan José Linz, who is not noted for his defence of Spain’s other languages, writes that:

Politically any recognition of Spanish multilingualism has to start by recognizing that the other languages are also ‘Spanish’ and agreeing on another term for the majority language. Castilian seems to be the most adequate one. (1975: 432)

Nevertheless, the term ‘Spanish language’ continues to be used in official texts to refer to the language (Herreras 2006: 76). Article 3.1 also gives a clearly preeminent role to Castilian as the sole official language of the whole Spanish state, which means that the language has exclusive official status within the organs of the state and also has official status in all of Spain’s Autonomous Communities (Sentence 82/1986). This clause of the Constitution also establishes a duty to know Castilian, which Mar-Molinero
describes as ‘an astonishingly prescriptive clause’ (1990: 54), as will be discussed in Chapter 7. Article 3.2 does go on to clarify that ‘Las demás lenguas españolas serán también oficiales en las respectivas Comunidades Autónomas de acuerdo con sus Estatutos’ [‘The other Spanish languages shall also be official in the respective Autonomous Communities in accordance with their Statutes’]. This allows for Spain’s unspecified ‘other’ languages to be official within specific Autonomous Communities alongside Castilian. To clarify, this means that while Castilian is official throughout the state, these ‘other’ languages are only official alongside Castilian within specific regions.

Finally, Article 3.3 states that ‘La riqueza de las distintas modalidades lingüísticas de España es un patrimonio cultural que será objeto de especial respeto y protección’ [‘The richness of the different linguistic varieties of Spain is a cultural heritage which shall be specially respected and protected’]. Although the vagueness of this clause means that it is difficult to translate into binding action, it does potentially enable a less restrictive interpretation of the previous two articles, providing for a potentially extraterritorial recognition of Spain’s ‘other’ languages in state institutions (Vernet i Llobet 1994: 122) and for the recognition of non-official language varieties. Spain’s other languages are also referred to in Article 20.3 which establishes the duty to ensure that the media of the state or any public body respects ‘el pluralismo de la sociedad y de las diversas lenguas de España’ [‘the pluralism of society and of the various languages of Spain’]. The ‘Final Provision’ of the Constitution also establishes that the Constitution itself will be published in Spain’s other languages, again without specifying to which languages this refers.

After the passing of the Constitution, the official status of another language was declared in the statutes of six Autonomous Communities: Catalonia, Galicia, the Basque Country, Valencia, the Balearic Islands and Navarre (Etxebarria 2002: 83). It is, however, the subsequent linguistic ‘normalisation’ laws passed by the Autonomous Communities with a second official language which specify more clearly the full consequences of this declaration. These laws were passed in the previously mentioned

4 The term ‘normalisation’ originated in Catalonia, although it is often misunderstood since it was originally borrowed from French where it refers solely to standardisation or corpus planning for a language. In the Catalan and now Spanish context, however, it encompasses both corpus and status planning and, according to Siguán, refers to ‘the process whereby a language, which had at one particular moment in history become marginal due to the presence of another stronger one, now tries to recover its social validity, and thus its prestige and generalized use’ (1993: 88). Although it is now widely used in the Spanish and particularly Catalan context, it remains a controversial term with continued confusion over what the theoretically ‘normal’ use of a language entails (see Section 5.3.1).
Autonomous Communities between 1982 and 1986 (Etxebarria 2002: 96). All of the laws specify action in three major areas: the administration, the education system, and cultural production and the media. These ‘normalisation’ laws were later accompanied by various decrees, rules and orders issued primarily by the Autonomous Communities, but also by the central government in spheres which remained under its control (Etxebarria 2002: 87). Where micronationalist parties dominate, the normalisation laws have been more ambitious and successful, most notably in Catalonia and the Basque Country, and there has also been a wider support among the general population for language planning measures (Siguán 1993: 269). Nevertheless, there are also signs of indifference and inertia among the general population which have limited further progress (Siguán 1993: 275-77). The association between Spain’s other languages and nationalist movements, particularly in the Basque Country and Catalonia, has also provoked fear and debate since, as María Teresa Turell explains, ‘it is still the case in contemporary Spanish politics, particularly in monolingual areas, that any linguistic and cultural differentiation would endanger the view of Spain as an indivisible unit’ (2000: 13).

In sum, linguistic diversity is now a widely accepted and recognised reality in Spain and, as Miguel Siguán clarifies, ‘The institutional acknowledgement of this [linguistic] plurality and the adoption of linguistic policies to ensure and reinforce it, protecting the languages other than Spanish, is one of the most original aspects of democratic Spain’ (1993: 280). Nevertheless, this is by no means a finished process and the language question remains of primary importance in the Spanish context and a highly charged political question. In particular, the relationship between language and nationalism, and how this impacts on the layout of the Spanish state, is a continued source of controversy.

3.3.2 The Spanish State of Autonomies

After the death of Franco and the subsequent Transition to Democracy, the Spanish Constitution of 1978 was to represent the touchstone of Spanish democracy and is the ‘text that still frames the life of all citizens and organizations in Spain thirty years later’ (Balfour and Quiroga 2007: 46). The division of powers and the layout of the state has been one of the most innovative features of the Spanish Constitution, with the Constitution representing a compromise position between continued centralising tendencies and the demands of minority nationalist movements. This is evident in Article 2 of the Constitution which, while recognising the ‘indisoluble unidad de la
Nación española’ ['indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation’], also recognises the right to autonomy for Spain’s ‘nacionalidades y regiones’ ['nationalities and regions’]. This resulted in what is now known as the ‘State of the Autonomies’ (Smith 2009: 599-601). Previously the state administration had been divided into provinces, which were primarily administrative institutions rather than genuine organs of local government (Newton 1997: 112). However, the 1978 Constitution, while maintaining the provinces, also provided for the creation of the Autonomous Communities (arts. 143-58, Spanish Constitution 1978). Although the Constitution did not require it, by 1983 all of the territories of Spain had formed Autonomous Communities (Newton 1997: 123). The Constitution does, however, establish different processes for gaining autonomy with the so-called ‘historic communities’ or ‘nationalities’ able to take advantage of a ‘fast-track route’ to autonomy (art. 151, Spanish Constitution 1978; Balfour and Quiroga 2007: 58). This essentially meant that these communities were able to have their statutes passed and gain powers within a shorter period of time. Despite their different formulations, however, the statutes are similar in content, particularly in terms of institutional organisation (Colomer 1998: 44).

The most important feature of the Autonomous Communities is the powers attributed to them. The Constitution lists the powers that the Autonomous Communities can initially attain, while also allowing for the potential transfer of additional unspecified powers (art. 148, Spanish Constitution 1978). This means that the powers attributed to all of the Autonomous Communities are very similar, with the major exception being the recognition of a different fiscal system for the Basque Country and Navarre, which have a right to collect their own taxes (Balfour and Quiroga 2007: 78-79). The central government has also retained significant powers even in those areas supposedly delegated to the Autonomous Communities. In addition to the exclusive powers of the state listed in Article 149 of the Constitution, the state also retains the power to approve laws in order to ‘harmonise’ the legislation of the Autonomous Communities (art. 150.3, Spanish Constitution 1978). Furthermore, each community has a Government Delegate who is the representative of the central government within the Autonomous Community and is responsible for coordinating the work of the central government with the autonomous government (Moreno 2001: 129; Newton 1997: 114). Article 161.2 of the Constitution also allows the central government to challenge any measures adopted by Autonomous Communities before the Constitutional Court leading to the suspension of these measures until the Court either lifts or confirms this suspension.
This apparently compromise solution to the decentralisation of the state, which maintains both aspects of a centralised and a federal state, has led to some confusion. Although there has been a significant devolution of powers to sub-state units of government, there is no mention of the word ‘federal’ in the Constitution. The open and flexible arrangement provided by the Constitution also means that there is little constitutional guarantee of autonomy which places the Autonomous Communities in a vulnerable position (Fossas 1999: 285). The ambiguities in the Constitution have led to a conflictual relationship between the central government and the Autonomous Communities, and the Constitutional Court has regularly been required to resolve specific conflicts. Attempts by the central government to impose a single model of autonomy in the early 1980s (Moreno 2001: 63-64) encouraged the concept of ‘café para todos’ ['coffee for all'], a now famous phrase (Granja Sainz, Beramendi and Anguera 2001: 200). This refers to the demands by all Autonomous Communities to attain a similar level of autonomy, and has often been bitterly opposed by minority nationalists who see it as an attempt to dilute their unique identity, often centred on the use of a different language (Moreno 2001: 94). This has resulted in a climate of constant political bargaining and competition (Colomer 1999: 47), and has led to a much higher level of decentralisation than was initially envisioned.

The Autonomous Agreements of 1992 did attempt to move towards a more homogenised version of autonomy, with the ‘slow-route’ regions granted additional powers in areas such as education in order to ‘catch up’ with the other regions (Newton 1997: 140). Between 1993 and 1996, all Communities also gained the right to receive back first 15 per cent and later 30 per cent of personal income tax collected in the region (Smith 2009: 600). The 1990s, however, saw the Catalan and Basque nationalist parties play an increasingly important role in the central parliament with the Socialist government from 1993 to 1996 dependent on the support of minority nationalist parties after failing to gain a majority, and the PP government from 1996 to 2000 placed in the same position (Chari and Heywood 2009: 47). This has reinforced bilateral relations, and the minority nationalist parties have continued to push for greater differentiation. Nevertheless, despite these continued obstacles and challenges, decentralisation is now consolidated within Spain. The extent of devolution is demonstrated by the changes in public expenditure, with the percentage of public spending for which the Autonomous Communities are responsible rising from 3 per cent in 1981 to 33 per cent in 1998, while central government spending has dropped from 87 per cent to 54 per cent over the same period (Moreno 2001: 5).
The future development of the State of Autonomies will also be influenced by European developments, which have already had a significant impact on the Spanish state. In the transition period, Europe was seen as a source of democracy and modernisation, and Spain’s integration into the EEC in 1986 was met with enthusiastic support (Newton 1997: 305-06). Initially, there was also strong support for the EU in the periphery, in what Moreno describes as a form of ‘cosmopolitan localism’ (2001: 148-49). Nevertheless, the hopes of some in the periphery of being able to escape the framework of the central state have largely been frustrated, due to the continued dominance of nation-states within the EU and the general exclusion of the Autonomous Communities from decision-making at the state level.

To summarise, since the Transition to Democracy, Spain has increasingly been considered a ‘normal’ European country, with the move away from traditionalist and reactionary politics towards a view of Spain as ‘a peaceful, European, and modern nation’ (Balfour and Quiroga 2007: 83). In contrast to past centralising tendencies, Spain has also become ‘one of the most decentralised [states] in Europe’ (Chari and Heywood 2009: 26) through a generally peaceful process, which has had strong support throughout the state. The Constitution’s open and flexible nature, however, means that the future development of the State of Autonomies remains uncertain.

3.3.3 The Asturian Minority

In Asturias in northern Spain a Romance language is spoken which is known variously as ‘Asturian’ or ‘Bable’, and also sometimes ‘Astur-Leonese’ due to a smaller presence of the language in the neighbouring region of León. A variety of the language is spoken in a small area of north-eastern Portugal as well, where it is known as Mirandese. To the west of Asturias there is also a transitional area with the neighbouring Galicia, where a variety known as Galician-Asturian is spoken (Cano González 2002: 27). The history and situation of the Asturian language is, however, little known outside of the area and some also continue to refer to Asturian as a dialect of Castilian (Herreras 2006: 113), although like Spain’s other Romance languages, it originated as a dialect of Latin. In fact, in the medieval period as the language of the Kingdom of Asturias, initially alongside Latin, ‘el romance asturiano tiene una posición privilegiada ya que es el primer romance al que corresponde una entidad estatal’ (Kabatek 2006: 143) [‘the Asturian language has a privileged position as the first Romance language linked to a state-like entity’]. From the twelfth to the fourteenth centuries there is evidence of a fairly stable use of the language in legal texts (García Arias 2002: 16; Kabatek 2006:
143). Nevertheless, although the Reconquest began in Asturias, as Castile took on an increasingly dominant role Castilian began to dominate in written texts (Etxebarria 2002: 317). While Asturian remained strong in the oral sphere, it would not be until the seventeenth century that Asturian would see the beginnings of a literary tradition (García Arias 2002: 16). This was consolidated in the eighteenth century with a poetic and intellectual movement led by Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos which focused on the study of the Asturian language for the first time. Seen as the beginnings of the formation of a regional consciousness, Jovellanos linked the study of the language to the need for economic and cultural advancement in Asturias (Bauske 1998: 24-27). He also had plans for the development of an Asturian grammar and dictionary but these were never completed (Kabatek 2006: 144). In the nineteenth century, in contrast to other regions of Spain, this movement failed to develop into a more significant cultural or political movement, and industrialisation provoked further language shift. In the early twentieth century, there were some signs of a growing regionalist movement, most notably with the publication of the *Catecismo Regionalista* in 1918, which was heavily influenced by the Catalanist movement (Bauske 1998: 29-30). However, while it did mention the Asturian language, it also viewed it as primarily a dialect and not a central concern (Bauske 1998: 30).

The lack of a significant regionalist movement and the low prestige of Asturian meant that the language was not considered a genuine threat to the unity of the state and the Franco regime even encouraged the study of the language. This can be seen with the creation of the Institute of Asturian Studies in 1946, whose members included many of those who participated in the earlier conservative regionalist movement. However, the focus on the study of the language was based on its historic and folkloric forms and not on Asturian as a living language (Bauske 1998: 36). The Franco regime saw the language as more of a curiosity than a threat and showed what Pablo San Martín Antuña describes as a ‘cierta permisividad particularista’ (2006: 68) ['certain particularist permissiveness']. However, towards the end of the 1960s, some began to challenge this dialectological approach to the language with the First Regional Assembly of Bable in 1973 where a new generation of writers and linguists discussed a new vision for the Asturian language (Bauske 1998: 44-46). This led to the creation of the association *Conceyu Bable* in 1974 for the promotion of the language (García Arias 2002: 18). Since *Conceyu*’s creation the language question has taken on a much more prominent position in the press and politics, with specific demands for the inclusion of the language in schools (Bauske 1998: 60-61).
Nevertheless, at the institutional level the language has still often been ignored. The Statute of Autonomy passed for Asturias in 1981 does not grant official status or even describe Asturian as a ‘language’. The Statute does still provide some recognition, with Article 4 stating that ‘El bable gozará de protección. Se promoverá su uso, su difusión en los medios de comunicación y su enseñanza, respetando en todo caso las variantes locales y la voluntariedad en su aprendizaje’ (art. 4, Statute of Autonomy of the Principality of Asturias 1981) [‘Bable will enjoy protection. Its use, its presence in the mass media and in the education system, will be encouraged, while respecting at all times the local varieties and the voluntary nature of its learning’]. Article 10.1 also states that Asturias has exclusive powers concerning the ‘Fomento y protección del bable en sus diversas variantes que, como modalidades lingüísticas, se utilizan en el territorio del Principado de Asturias’ [‘Promotion and protection of Bable and its diverse varieties which, as linguistic modalities, are used within the territory of the Principality of Asturias’]. This can be seen as a ‘third way’ between the demands for official status and those who preferred to ignore the language entirely (Kabatek 2006: 147). This will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4, but despite this ambiguity the Statute does still commit the Asturian government to both ‘protect’ and ‘promote’ the language (Pérez Fernández 2005: 35).

This commitment led to the creation of the Academy of the Asturian Language in 1980 (Bauske 1998: 144-45), an institution funded by the regional Department of Culture. The Academy has taken responsibility for the standardisation of the language, publishing the first official orthographic rules in 1981, and the first modern grammar in 1998 as well as a dictionary in 2000 (García Arias 2002: 19). Despite this, standardisation attempts have come much later than in other regions and have consequently struggled to gain wide acceptance among the Asturian population (Llera Ramo and San Martín Antuña 2003: 242). In addition to the Academy, a regional Language Policy Office was created in 1985 with the aim of promoting and spreading knowledge of the language (Etxebarria 2002: 99). Nevertheless, the Office was often seen as inactive and ineffective (Bauske 1998: 236-39). There have been some signs of progress in the education system, with the demand for ‘Bable in schools’ becoming the main slogan of the Asturian language movement (González-Quevedo 2000: 167-68). With jurisdiction over education not transferred to Asturias until 1999 (El País, 31 December 1999), an agreement was signed with the Ministry of Education in Madrid for the academic year 1984-85 which led to the introduction of the optional subject of Asturian in six pilot primary schools (Bauske 1998: 183). Although the number of
schools has gradually risen (Pérez Fernández 2005: 29-30), progress has been described as ‘painfully slow’ (González-Quevedo 2000: 168), and the disorganised training and professional recognition provided for teachers have led to fluctuations in student numbers (Bauske 1998: 187; de Andrés 2002: 174). In other areas of language policy such as the media there has also been very limited progress (Bauske 1998: 204-06).

The introduction of the Law for the Use and Promotion of Bable/Asturian in 1998 has allowed for some advances. Passed by the Asturian parliament, this Law attempted to resolve some of the ambiguity concerning the legal status of Asturian, while avoiding the declaration of official status for the language. The Law reinforced the presence of Asturian in schools, the administration, the media and in place names (arts. 4, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14 and 15, Asturian Law 1/1998). Subsequent autonomous governments have not, however, fully exploited or developed the provisions of this Law, particularly in relation to use of the language with the administration (Viejo Fernández 2004: 172-73). The left-wing governing coalition of Asturias in 2003 did give a greater prominence to Asturian in the government’s activities, with the creation of the General Directorate of Cultural Promotion and Language Policy within the regional Department of Culture (art. 8, Asturian Decree 85/2003). Below this a Language Policy Office (changed to the Language Policy Service in 2008) was created, which is primarily responsible for the practical implementation of language planning measures (Pérez Fernández 2005: 40). The main recent achievement has been the creation of the first Plan for the Social Normalisation of Asturian 2005-7, which sets out specific language planning measures (Pérez Fernández 2005: 45). A network of linguistic normalisation offices has also been created in the Asturian town councils, and decrees have been passed for the use of Asturian in place names in several town councils (Pérez Fernández 2005: 60-61).

This brings us to the contemporary sociolinguistic context, with the most comprehensive information provided by the 2002 study conducted by Francisco Llera Ramo and Pablo San Martín Antuña. They found that 38.7 per cent of respondents claim to be regular speakers of the language (Llera Ramo and San Martín Antuña 2002: 188), and other speaker estimates tend to suggest that around a third of the regional population speaks Asturian, which is to say over 300,000 speakers (de Andrés 2002: 172; Viejo Fernández 2004: 171). This places it in a situation easily comparable to that of communities with co-official languages, but the lack of institutional support means there are much lower levels of literacy in the language (Llera Ramo and San Martín Antuña 2002: 182). There are also clear signs of decline in use since the previous study
conducted by Llera Ramo in 1991, which found that Asturian was the exclusive first language of 36 per cent of the respondents compared to just 17.7 per cent in 2002 (Llera Ramo and San Martín Antuña 2002: 99). This reflects a significant decline in intergenerational transmission which is largely due to the low social prestige of the language (Llera Ramo and San Martín Antuña 2002: 324). As in Sardinia, this would again appear to be a case of what Berruto has defined as ‘dilalia’, even if this term is rarely used outside of the Italian context, with Asturian not only rarely used in formal contexts, but also gradually being replaced by Castilian in the private sphere. As well as the language shift to Castilian, another sign of the dominant position of Castilian is the increasing interference of Castilian words and structures in Asturian which has led to the spread of a mixed form of Asturian and Castilian known as ‘meciu’ or ‘amestáu’ (Cano González 2002: 51; de Andrés 2002: 49; Viejo Fernández 2004: 171). The spread of this form has encouraged the view of Asturian as a dialect of Castilian, which it could potentially become if Asturian continues to be significantly influenced by Castilian.

Continued doubts over the status of the language are also caused by the lack of standardisation until recently, although there have been some improvements in popular perceptions with speakers increasingly recognising the unity of the language (Llera Ramo and San Martín Antuña 2002: 84). The different names used for the language do, however, provide an additional cause of confusion. At the start of the Asturian language movement in the 1970s the term ‘Bable’ was often used, but in more recent years this has taken on negative connotations due to its evident links to terms such as ‘babble’ or ‘balbucir’ in Spanish (de Andrés 2002: 151-52). Consequently, the more neutral term of ‘Asturian’ has now become more widespread, despite the continued reference to ‘Bable’ in the Statute and other legal texts. Overall, there does appear to be an increasing linguistic consciousness in the region and, despite its continued subordination, it has become far less acceptable to state the inferiority of Asturian (Llera Ramo and San Martín Antuña 2002: 151). Nevertheless, there are also signs of apathy and, in contrast to what was described as the ‘silent revolution’ in the 1980s, the Asturian language movement appears to have stagnated with clear signs of ‘cansancio, resignación y cierta frustración en la opinión pública’ (Llera Ramo and San Martín Antuña 2002: 314) ['weariness, resignation and a certain frustration in public opinion'].

The lack of priority given to the language in the political arena is also reflected in the absence of a significant regionalist or nationalist movement. The main exception is the Partíu Asturianista (PAS) founded in 1985 which did succeed in electing the first nationalist member of the Asturian parliament in 1991 (Bauske 1998: 173). The party
was also one of the primary forces behind the passing of the 1998 Law for the Use and Promotion of Bable/Asturian, although since 1999 it has failed to elect another deputy to the regional parliament (El País 2007). Bloque por Asturias is another nationalist and left-wing party which, between 2003 and 2007, and again between 2008 and 2010, formed part of the autonomous coalition government with the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) and Izquierda Unida (IU) (Díaz, 1 July 2003; García, 1 November 2008). Overall, however, Asturian politics has been dominated by branches of state-wide parties and most notably the PSOE, which has taken little interest in the language question (Bauske 1998: 130; Wells 2011). In fact, the left-wing IU is the only major party which has adopted linguistic normalisation as part of its political programme (Viejo Fernández 2004: 178). The lack of a distinct vision for Asturias among the political elite has also led to a slow and limited development of autonomy. Asturias did not form part of the ‘fast-track’ group of Autonomous Communities, with its Statute of Autonomy not passed until 1981. The dependence on Madrid is further reinforced by economic dependence on state subsidies, particularly since the decline of the mining industry (Viejo Fernández 2004: 176).

In sum, while it is clear that the Asturian language is ‘una realidad viva y cotidiana, instrumento de comunicación de una parte importante de la población de Asturias’ (de Andrés 2002: 46-47) [‘a daily and living reality, an instrument of communication for an important part of the population of Asturias’], the wider political and social context does not appear to favour the continued use and promotion of Asturian. Although more positive attitudes towards the language have emerged since the 1970s, this has failed to halt the continued regression of the language. As Johannes Kabatek explains, while it may not be impossible to achieve the normalisation of the language, the current situation indicates ‘dificultades mayores que en las otras comunidades’ (2006: 156) [‘greater difficulties than in the other communities’].

3.3.4 The Catalan Minority
The Catalan language is spoken in Catalonia, the Balearic Islands, Valencia, Andorra, French Roussillon, Alghero in Sardinia and a small area of Aragon (Etxebarria 2002:

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5 That such parties tend to define themselves as nationalists rather than regionalists reflects the fact that regionalism in Spain does appear to have taken on negative connotations (Bauske 1998:18). The term regionalism has been rarely used in the Spanish context since around 1918, even if regionalism would at times appear to be a more appropriate term to refer to the demands of Asturian nationalists.
6 There is, as previously discussed, continued debate as to whether ‘Valencian’ can be considered a distinct language from Catalan.
101), with the total number of speakers in all Catalan-speaking areas estimated to be between 6 and 7 million (Etxebarria 2002: 102; McRoberts 2001: 159-60; Siguán 1993: 120-21). It is in Catalonia that the language is most widely spoken and is noted for its continued vitality and significant prestige. This prestige dates back to the medieval period, with the earliest Catalan texts found from the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, when almost all official texts of the Catalan counties were written in Catalan (Woolard 1989: 14). In 1137, the Count of Barcelona unified the Catalan counties with Aragon, and the subsequent development of a powerful seaborne empire led to the spread of Catalan to other territories (Mar-Molinero 2000b: 42). In the medieval period, Catalan also became a true language of culture, with notable literary figures such as Ramon Llull establishing Catalan as a literary language (Pradilla Cardona 2000: 59).

With the union of the crowns of Aragon and Castile in the fifteenth century, the Catalan area began to fall into decline, although it was initially able to maintain its own institutions and there was no immediate attempt to impose Castilian (Balcells 1996: 12). However, in 1716, Philip V abolished all of Catalonia’s political institutions in the *Nova Planta* decree (Woolard 1989: 19). This also led to the exclusion of Catalan from the public administration and justice system, and later the education system. Written and literary usage of the language significantly declined, although in the second half of the nineteenth century a movement known as the *Renaixença* marked ‘the recovery of Catalan as a literary language’ (Balcells 1996: 25). Inspired by the Romantic thinkers, this was a primarily poetic movement, but the cultural movement provided an ‘ideal base for the subsequent spread of nationalism’ (Conversi 1997: 13), and most significantly placed language at the centre of a distinct Catalan identity. Over the nineteenth century Catalonia had also experienced significant industrialisation, creating economic disparity with agrarian and rural Spain, and the Catalan elite grew frustrated with the largely centralised liberal regime. This led to increasing demands for regional autonomy for Catalonia and the birth of Catalanism, initially founded by Valentí Almirall (Conversi 1997: 18). Enric Prat de la Riba developed a more conservative Catalanist vision in 1906 with his definitive statement on bourgeois Catalanism, *La nacionalitat catalana* (Woolard 1989: 24), which also signalled a clear move to a ‘national’ vision of Catalonia with language at the centre of this nationalist vision (Prat de la Riba 2000 [1906]: 148).

Political Catalanism gained increasing ground in the early twentieth century and the coalition Solidaritat Catalana led by Prat de la Riba swept the board in the 1907 general elections (Balcells 1996: 57). The Catalanists also succeeded in 1914 in
securing the establishment of Catalonia’s first government institution since 1714, in the
form of the *Mancomunitat*, which had limited powers but had an ‘important symbolic
value’ in that it governed over the whole territory of Catalonia (Moreno 2001: 51). Prat
de la Riba’s administration also set up the Institute of Catalan Studies in 1907 which,
under the leadership of Pompeu Fabra, undertook the codification and elaboration of the
Catalan language. The first orthographic norms were published in 1913, followed by a
grammar in 1918 and a dictionary in 1932 (Pradilla Cardona 2011: 31). Although
Catalan was not granted official status it did begin to enter into the public sphere and, as
Siguán argues, ‘It is obvious that its standardization and general acceptance has given
Catalan a considerable advantage over other minority languages’ (1993: 116).

Catalanism also turned increasingly to the left with Esquerra Republicana de
Catalunya (ERC) taking up the leading role in Catalonia in the Second Republic. With
the establishment of the Generalitat and the passing of a Catalan Statute of Autonomy in
1932, Catalonia was granted a substantial level of home rule and Catalan was given co-
official status in the region (Woolard 1989: 27). This was to be short-lived, however,
and, with the victory of Franco in the Civil War, Catalonia was to lose all of its
autonomous institutions and all public use of Catalan was immediately prohibited
(Conversi 1997: 111-12). Many Catalans did still maintain a ‘tenacious loyalty to their
language’ (Woolard 1989: 29), and when repression eased up in the 1950s the Catalan
culture and language began to re-emerge from the private domain in the form of a
network of civic and cultural associations with a strong focus on the Catalan language
(Balcells 1996: 145). The repression and the unity of the cultural movement also created
a political consensus in Catalonia in favour of both democracy and autonomy (Balfour
and Quiroga 2007: 133). Nevertheless, the new Catalan political forces did face the
difficult and controversial question of how and whether to integrate the huge influx of
Castilian-speaking immigrants from the rest of Spain. While Catalonia had long been a
destination for immigration, from 1950 to 1975 Catalonia’s population increased by
over a million people and by the 1970s around 40 per cent of the population was born

With the return to democracy, a Statute of Autonomy was passed for Catalonia
in 1979 which, as well as granting significant autonomy to the region, affirmed the
official status of Catalan alongside Spanish (art. 3.2, Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia
1979). However, the Statute appears to push the boundaries of the Constitution,
declaring Catalan to be Catalonia’s ‘lengua propia’ (art. 3.1, Statute of Autonomy of
Catalonia 1979) [‘own language’]. This emphasised the symbolic value of Catalan and
also appeared to give precedence to Catalan within Catalonia (Crameri 2008: 51). However, this privileged role also had to be balanced with the need for a certain level of ‘equality’ between the two languages (art 3.3, Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia 1979). Consequently, the 1983 Law, known as the Language Normalisation Act (Generalitat de Catalunya 2010: 7), guarantees the right for citizens to use either language while establishing ‘a basis upon which Catalan could come to be the dominant language in certain institutional settings’ (Crameri 2008: 52). This privileged or dominant position was central to the aims of normalisation, a term originally coined by the Catalans. This task of normalisation was placed primarily in the hands of the General Directorate of Language Policy which had been created in 1980 as part of the Catalan Department of Culture (Pradilla Cardona 2000: 64).

The complete political consensus in which the 1983 Law had been passed and the significant political will of the governing Catalan nationalist party, Convergència i Unió (CiU), has meant that the past three decades have seen significant progress. In the public administration, for example, Article 8 of the 1983 Law gives citizens the right to address all public administrative bodies located in Catalonia in either official language (art. 8, Catalan Law 7/1983). The most significant progress has been made in the education system, with Catalan introduced as a compulsory subject in schools in 1978 by a Royal Decree (Mar-Molinero 2000b: 159). The 1983 Law also specified that all students should be able to master both Catalan and Castilian by the end of obligatory education and that students should not be separated into different centres of education according to their language (arts. 14.4 and 14.5, Catalan Law 7/1983). This initially led to the emergence of three models, with varying levels of ‘Catalanisation’ (Pradilla Cardona 2000: 78). The aim, however, was to achieve rapid Catalanisation, and in 1983-84 a Catalan immersion programme was introduced in nineteen infant schools (Pradilla Cardona 2000: 78), which was gradually extended to all schools with Decree 75/1992 stipulating that Catalan be used normally as a vehicular language in all compulsory education (art. 3, Catalan Decree 75/1992). This led to the disappearance of the three different models of schools in the 1993-94 academic year, with one flexible model introduced (Pradilla Cardona 2000: 79).

The media have also seen significant developments, most notably with the creation of the Catalan Radio and Television Corporation by the Generalitat in 1983 (Siguán 1993: 166). The Generalitat-owned Channel TV3 and Canal 33, which broadcast entirely in Catalan, have a significant audience comparable and sometimes higher than that of the state-owned channels in Catalonia (Crameri 2008: 114). A new
law for the Catalan language was also passed in 1998, known as the Language Policy Act (Generalitat de Catalunya 2010: 7). This consolidated other measures introduced since 1983, particularly in the area of education (Crameri 2008: 55), as well as introducing new measures in relation to the cultural industries and the socio-economic sphere, where little action had previously been taken (arts. 26, 31, 32, and 33, Catalan Law 1/1998). Additional provisions in relation to the language were introduced in the Statute reform of 2006, such as a ‘duty’ to know Catalan (art 6.2, Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia 2006). The controversy surrounding these changes to the Statute will be dealt with in Chapters 6 and 7.

The success of the Catalan language policy can be seen in recent sociolinguistic surveys undertaken in Catalonia, with the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS) study undertaken in 1998 finding that 97.3 per cent of respondents were able to understand Catalan and 79 per cent were able to speak the language (CIS 1998). A clear development can be seen since 1981 when the first linguistic census was undertaken and only 74.3 per cent were able to understand Catalan and 53.1 per cent were able to speak it (Siguán 1993: 146). The significant increase in knowledge does not, however, necessarily correspond to an increase in use, with the most recent survey commissioned by the Generalitat in 2008 finding that only 35.6 per cent declared Catalan to be their habitual language compared to 45.9 per cent for Castilian (Institut d’Estadística de Catalunya 2008: 172). This is perhaps not that surprising given that 55 per cent also declared Castilian to be their initial language spoken at home (Institut d’Estadística de Catalunya 2008: 171). Nevertheless, gaining knowledge of Catalan is considered an important goal for all those who live in Catalonia, which reflects the high social status of Catalan. The social prestige of the language dates beyond the Generalitat’s attempts at normalisation, and instead reflects the fact that even under Francoist repression Catalan remained the language of the local middle and upper-middle classes (Mar-Molinero 1990: 57). It is the high social prestige of the language that has encouraged the immigrant population to learn Catalan, since the language is associated with social mobility as well as integration with the Catalan community. This has meant that there does not exist a clearly diglossic situation in Catalan, especially now that the language is present and sometimes even dominant in certain areas of the public sphere (Pons Parera 2006b: 284).
However, despite this positive picture, Catalan does still display many features of a minority language primarily due to its lack of association with a state.\(^7\) The fact that Castilian is the official language of the state means that while, with few exceptions, all Catalan-speakers are also fluent in Castilian, this bilingualism is not matched among the Castilian-speaking population (Atkinson 2000: 194). This has led to a trend known as accommodation to Castilian, whereby the traditional etiquette of Catalan-speakers was to switch to Castilian with non-native Catalan speakers even though most now have at least a passive knowledge of Catalan (Woolard 1989: 69). Since the Transition, the Generalitat has tried to promote passive bilingualism whereby Catalan-speakers continue to speak in Catalan, even if the other speaker responds in Castilian. However, this trend is still far from widespread (Boix-Fuster, Melià and Montoya 2011: 154), which limits the contact of the non-native Catalan speakers with the language, as well as limiting the everyday use of Catalan. Castilian is also a powerful world language with a vast cultural market meaning that attaining an equal status for Catalan is ‘arguably an impossible goal’ (Mar-Molinero 2000a: 102).

However, despite the obstacles the language faces, there is still significant support among the general population for the Generalitat’s language policy. The 1998 study by CIS found that 46.4 per cent of the population supported the current language policy while 8.2 per cent believed it should go further (CIS 1998). This is related to the political dominance of Catalan nationalism since the Transition, primarily in the form of Jordi Pujol’s conservative Catalan coalition, CiU. Avoiding separatism, it is defined by its focus on consensus and negotiation and particularly during the 1980s and 1990s was able to attract a wide spectrum of voters (Crameri 2008: 18-19; Dowling 2005: 110). From 1980 to 2003 it controlled the Generalitat and through the autonomous institutions of government attempted to ‘Fer país’ ['build a country'] through a programme of economic, social and cultural reconstruction, with the normalisation of the Catalan language often at the centre of this programme (Dowling 2005: 109-11). CiU’s dominance has been challenged by the Partit dels Socialistes del Catalunya (the PSC), which is linked to the central PSOE but has recently adopted a more Catalanist stance allowing the party to gain control of the Generalitat as part of a coalition in 2003 (Smith 2009: 514).

\(^7\) Although the Principality of Andorra, where Catalan is the official language, can be considered a state-like entity, the size and limited political significance of Andorra has meant that this has had little effect on the minoritised status of Catalan (Vernet i Lloret et al. 2003: 287).
The electoral power of both parties is proof of the broad political consensus on the principles of Catalanism, which is ‘the hegemonic discourse in Catalan politics and has been so since the transition to democracy’ (Balfour and Quiroga 2007: 135). Although separatism is weak, there are some more extremist views with the left-wing ERC adopting an independentist stance in the 1992 elections (Balcells 1996: 195). However, it has moderated this view since entering into coalition with the PSC in 2003 (Dowling 2005: 113). Recent decades have also seen signs of some dissent among Castilian-speaking sectors. The Catalan branch of the PP, particularly under the leadership of Alex Vidal-Quadras in the 1990s, has repeatedly challenged Catalanist policies and, while it has often been a marginal party in Catalonia, it saw its support base increase significantly in 2000 (Miley 2006: 97). An anti-Catalanist party, Ciudadanos de Cataluña, also appeared in 2006 in opposition to Catalanist policies (Smith 2009: 171-72). Nevertheless, in terms of political power in Catalonia, the Catalanist vision remains dominant. It is this Catalanist vision which has provided a strong basis for the creation of an effective and powerful autonomous government and, as early as 1982, 80 per cent of the powers listed in Catalonia’s Statute of Autonomy had been transferred to the region (Balcells 1996: 178).

In summary, Catalan appears to be one of the best situated non-state languages in Europe due to the number of speakers, its official status, its significant social prestige, and the political consensus in favour of the normalisation of the language. Significant levels of autonomy have allowed the Catalan government to implement an ambitious and wide-ranging language policy, which has secured increased knowledge of Catalan throughout the Catalan population. Nevertheless, it remains a language which is minoritised within a state, meaning that there are still significant limitations on the reach and extension of the language.

3.4 Conclusion
These profiles have highlighted the principal features of both the states and minority groups to be studied, focusing particularly on the distinct sociolinguistic and political contexts. In Italy, for example, there is the notable presence of large groups of long-standing communities who speak the language of a neighbouring state as well as the huge variation of distinct Italo-Romance varieties throughout the peninsula. Spain, on the other hand, is primarily characterised by the existence of the so-called ‘big three’ communities of Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia where a different language is spoken. Despite these differences, however, what is noticeable is the existence in both
Spain and Italy of minority language communities which can be considered relatively ‘powerful’ and which have secured significant recognition from the state, as well as weaker and typically ignored communities in comparable positions.

The German-speaking and Catalan-speaking minorities, despite existing in very distinct sociolinguistic contexts, do share a strong political voice, and the implementation of wide-ranging and ambitious language policies means that they are often seen and described as ‘success stories’ (Grote 2012: 1-2). Both, however, do still have a minoritised position within the state and face the obstacles and dilemmas associated with this minority status, such as the need to ensure the continued peaceful co-existence with the state language. In the cases of overlooked and ignored linguistic minority groups, such as the Sardinians and Asturians, the language has an ambiguous legal status which is both a result and cause of its continued low social prestige. Such groups also typically have a weak political voice at the centre and have often made few demands on the state for recognition of their languages. The layout of both states as regionalised unitary states also provides for a comparable political structure. These evident parallels between both the states and the minority groups within them thus provide a clear point of departure for a comparative study.
Chapter 4: The Legal Status of Contested Languages

4.1 Introduction
As established in Section 2.2.1, ‘language’ itself is an ambiguous concept and consequently what does and does not constitute a ‘minority language’ (as opposed to a ‘dialect’) is a highly sensitive and complex question. In reference to Italy, the Sardinian case study offers significant insight into the blurred distinction between different speech varieties, and so will be the principal focus of study. The chapter will first look at how Sardinian has obtained recognition as a ‘minority language’ and the subsequent effects of this recognition, particularly concerning the much-debated standardisation of the Sardinian language. Although debates about standardisation are primarily an internal regional concern, state legislation has had a clear impact on standardising processes within Sardinia and the subject thus merits attention. In Spain, meanwhile, the Asturian language also shares an ambiguous legal status, although debates about standardisation, while still present, were at least partially resolved in the 1980s (Llera Ramo and San Martín Antuña 2003: 242). Over the past two decades, debate has instead been focused primarily on the lack of ‘official’ legal recognition for the language. The precise definition of ‘official’ languages within the Spanish context will be discussed, which will lead on to a discussion of how the ambiguous legal status of Asturian affects decisions made by institutions of the central state concerning the language. Both the Sardinian and Asturian cases will consequently provide insight into the importance of legal recognition for a speech variety and into the position of ‘contested languages’ (Nic Craith 2006: 108) within the typically and often unavoidably hierarchical language order of the state.

4.2 Italy

4.2.1 Law 482 and the Acquisition of Language Status
As explained in Section 3.2.1, before 1999, with the exception of the larger minorities in border areas, Italy’s other minorities had been almost entirely ignored by the institutions of the state. As Valeria Piergigli clarifies, without official recognition by the state:

la minoranza linguistica si colloca, per così dire, ad uno stadio pregiuridico, di mero fatto, che non le consente di beneficiare di misure di protezione dissimili da quelle, generali e generiche, fruibili da qualunque cittadino o individuo. (2000: 631-32)
Nevertheless, in an attempt to extend protection to other linguistic minorities and to clarify to whom Article 6 of the Italian Constitution referred, a law for the protection of Italy’s linguistic minorities was finally passed in 1999: Law 482 of 15 December, titled ‘Norme in materia di tutela delle minoranze linguistiche storiche’ [‘Regulations concerning the safeguarding of the historic linguistic minorities’]. Rather than providing a definition of this term ‘historic linguistic minorities’, a decision was made to list the specific minorities to which the Law referred:

la Repubblica tutela la lingua e la cultura delle popolazioni albanesi, catalane, germaniche, greche, slovene e croate e di quelle parlanti il francese, il franco-provenzale, il friulano, il ladino, l’occitano e il sardo. (art. 2, Law 482, 15 December 1999)

[the Republic safeguards the language and culture of the Albanian, Catalan, Germanic, Greek, Slovene and Croatian populations and of those which speak French, Franco-Provençal, Friulian, Ladin, Occitan and Sardinian.]

However, given the contested nature of language status, the list of languages in Article 2 was inevitably controversial. Some, for example, criticised the restrictive listing of the minorities covered by the Law (Toso 2004: 42-43). The alternative would have been to offer a definition of what constitutes a linguistic minority, but given the ambiguous and relative nature of the terms ‘linguistic minorities’ and ‘minority languages’, this would have been a near-impossible task (Palici di Suni Prat 1999: 93). Furthermore, failing to specify the linguistic minorities would have led to further legal disputes before the Constitutional Court, which would once again have been forced to intervene to interpret which groups constituted minorities. As the numerous cases brought before the Court in previous decades prove, this was not an appropriate solution and, consequently, drawing up an explicit list was an inevitable necessity.

The content of this list was the focus of much criticism. The exclusion of certain groups (most notably the Rom and Sinti groups) is an extremely important issue but has been dealt with in greater detail elsewhere (Orioles 2003; Palici di Suni Prat 1999), and will not be the focus of discussion here. The inclusion of the Sardinian and Friulian communities, however, also caused particularly intense debate due to the contested status of their languages. The inclusion of both languages had caused similar controversy in the previously unsuccessful Bill 612 in 1991 (Savoia 2003) and, although the passing of Law 482 attracted less debate, many still objected to the inclusion of
these languages. In the Chamber of Deputies several objections were raised to their inclusion, principally on the basis that they constituted ‘dialects’ rather than ‘languages’, and so Sardinian speakers could not be considered a linguistic minority.

The Deputy Roberto Menia, for example, argued that:

la fonte costituente non fa alcuna menzione dei sardi e dei friulani come minoranze linguistiche, tanto meno ‘storiche’, come recita il titolo della proposta di legge. Ciò è ovvio, essendo quelle della Sardegna e del Friuli popolazioni italiane come lo sono le siciliane e le lombarde, che parlano un dialetto ‘distanse’ dall’italiano. (Roberto Menia, Camera dei deputati, 25 May 1998)

[the Constitutional source makes no mention of Sardinians and Friulians as linguistic minorities, much less ‘historic’, as the title of this Bill affirms. This is obvious, since the people of Sardinia and Friuli are Italian populations, just like Sicilians and Lombards, who speak a dialect ‘distant’ from Italian.]

Such views were echoed in the Senate, most notably with the opposition of Giulio Andreotti, the ex-Prime Minister of the Italian Republic (Senato della Repubblica, 25 November 1999). Even after the Law had been passed by both chambers of parliament, Andreotti went so far as to ask the President of the Italian Republic, Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, not to promulgate the Law on the basis that Sardinian should not be included for recognition (La Nuova Sardegna, 12 December 1999). Evidently, he was unsuccessful in his request but these examples demonstrate that some political representatives of the state strongly believed that Sardinian should be considered a dialect and consequently be excluded from the remit of Law 482.

Nevertheless, the inclusion of Sardinian in Article 2, as well as the successful passing of Law 482, was proof that a significant consensus had emerged that Sardinian deserved the status of language. Admittedly, some linguistic experts had previously cast doubts on the distinct status of Sardinian, with Giovan Battista Pellegrini writing in 1977 that ‘Se dovessimo considerare nettamente estranei al dominio linguistico italo-romanzo i Sardi e i Friulani, dovremmo ridiscutere la posizione di tante parlate regionali rispetto alla lingua e cultura nazionale’ (1977: 18-19) [‘If we must consider the Sardinians and the Friulians as clearly foreign to the Italo-Romance linguistic domain, then we must also discuss the position of so many regional varieties in relation to the national language and culture’]. More recently, the linguist Corrado Grassi also criticised this distinction between ‘dialects’ and ‘minority languages’ as ‘artificiosa e, al

1 The Constitutional source to which Roberto Menia refers is most likely the report drawn up by a Constitutional commission in 1946 to study the problem of Italy’s linguistic minorities, which indeed does not make any mention of either the Sardinian or Friulian communities (Salvi 1975: 74-75).
limite, mistificante’ [‘artificial and, ultimately, misleading’ (Grassi cited and translated in Parry 1994: 180)]. Consequently, there have also been criticisms of Law 482, and of the earlier Bill 612, due to the exclusion of the so-called ‘dialects’. It is true that, in common with Sardinian and Friulian, the other regional varieties spoken in Italy, such as Lombard, Piedmontese and Sicilian, all derive from Latin rather than Italian. As J. Trumper argues, there are sufficient structural and typological differences between all of the dialects and Italian for them to be considered as distinct abstandsprachen, as in languages by virtue of distance (Kloss 1977: 29; Trumper 1989: 36). Although the linguist Tullio De Mauro has attempted to make a clear distinction between the dialects and the minority languages to be legally recognised (28 November 1991), Mair Parry suggests that the exclusion of these other varieties responded more to ‘pragmatic’ concerns, with any attempt to include all of the dialects likely to increase hostility to the passing of such a law (1994: 181). This is, in fact, proven by the hostility to the original Bill 612 in 1991, which some critics mistakenly believed did refer to all of Italy’s dialects (Battistini, 22 November 1991).²

Nevertheless, to focus specifically on the Sardinian case, a consensus on the ‘language’ status of Sardinian does seem to have emerged, first from experts specifically on Sardinian (Blasco Ferrer 1984: 174; Wagner 1951: 58), but now shared by prominent Italian linguistic experts and most significantly by De Mauro (1987: 114) who played an instrumental role in the design and implementation of Law 482. These experts inevitably focus on the linguistic distinctions between Sardinian and Italian for, as Vincenzo Orioles argues, ‘La distanza tipologica [...] rispetto all’italiano e alle altre lingue romanze, fanno tradizionalmente considerare i dialetti sardi come un gruppo a sé stante nel sistema degli idiomi neolatini’ (2003: 87) [‘The typological distance [...] with regard to Italian and the other Romance languages, means that the Sardinian dialects are traditionally considered a separate group of their own in the system of neo-Latin languages’]. Furthermore, the isolation and island status of the Sardinian minority have emphasised the distinctiveness of the Sardinian language and its separate development

² There has also been opposition to the legal recognition of any of the regional varieties spoken in Italy, including Sardinian and Friulian, from some renowned linguists such as the philologist Cesare Segre and Francesco Sabatini, President of the Crusca Academy for the Italian language, in the belief that the introduction of these varieties into the education system, in particular, represents a threat to the learning of Italian (Segre, 1 December 1999; Sabatini cited in Serra, 15 February 2008). This is a result of the constant struggle to ensure widespread knowledge of Italian since the unification of Italy, although the fact that almost all Italian citizens can now speak some form of Italian may explain why opposition to Law 482 in 1999 was relatively muted. As will be discussed in Chapter 8, the advantages of a bi- or multilingual approach to education have also been more widely recognised in recent years.
from the Italian language. While Sardinian may have in common with other ‘dialects’ in Italy its subordinate political position to Italian, its distinctiveness has confirmed the view that it deserves recognition as a ‘minority language’. There has also been a growing, although still incomplete, acceptance and awareness by the speakers of Sardinian that their speech variety does in fact constitute a language (Marcato 2004: 68). The importance of speaker awareness will be dealt with in further detail in Chapter 5, but suffice to say that a certain consensus had formed within Sardinia and within the academic community, which by 1999 appears to have transferred to the political arena of the state with the passing of Law 482.

In considering whether this consensus was right or wrong, it is useful at this point to remember Máiréad Nic Craith’s comments on the random process of language status acquisition (2006:120). In attempting to make judgements and assign a status to a speech variety, it is always essential to remember the socially and politically constructed nature of these labels. While many in the academic community focus their attention on the internal dynamics of languages, they often fail to recognise that the status of a speech variety is usually decided by political and cultural factors (Trudgill 2000: 4). However, to accept the constructed nature of these labels does not mean to deny their importance or necessity. As Máiréad Nic Craith explains:

Speakers of contested languages are generally unhappy with the lack of status for their speech form. Theoretically they could simply look for alternative classifications to the terms ‘language’ and ‘dialect’, but the use of other options can emphasise rather than reduce the hierarchical implications. (2006: 107)

Some may wish to transcend what can often appear to be unhelpful and unclear labels, but in reality they are an unavoidable and necessary element of a world defined through language, in the generic sense of the term. Nevertheless, the restrictive nature of labels such as ‘language’, so often used only to refer to official national languages, can be expanded to encompass other linguistic varieties. This occurs when a consensus has been reached that, for linguistic, social and political reasons, language status is deemed appropriate as a means of recognising a specific variety as a complete and distinct linguistic system. This is not just a matter of preserving the language itself, but also of providing recognition for the speakers of that language, and ensuring that they have the means to survive and succeed in their own language. Although speakers themselves can attempt to confer the status of language on their own speech variety, the top-down recognition of the state, and other political bodies, should not be underestimated. At a practical level, state recognition is often the only means to ensure the implementation of
an effective language policy, as it is the state that often has control over the principal areas of language policy, such as the education system, the state-owned media and the state administration.

State recognition also offers important symbolic benefits since ‘agli occhi di non pochi Sardi […] la promozione normativa del sardo ha fatto crescere molto il prestigio delle varietà locali’ (Lupinu 2007: 98) [‘in the eyes of many Sardinians […] the legal promotion of Sardinian has significantly increased the prestige of the local varieties’]. With the support of state recognition, action at a regional level to promote the local language is legitimated, and this recognition can also break down harmful prejudices and the social stigma so often attached to minority languages. The state, as one of the highest representatives of political authority, evidently plays an important role in conferring authority on speakers of marginalised languages such as Sardinian. Previously most states chose only to confer this authority on one official national language and actively sought the disappearance of other languages, but Law 482 signifies an attempt by the Italian state to adopt a more pluralist approach and to extend its authority to a wider range of languages and speakers. As Orioles explains, with the introduction of this law, ‘Quelle che erano lingue di serie B, ora non sono più emarginate […]. Non c’è più l’avversione, c’è un atteggiamento di rispetto. Quindi questo è un grande passo avanti’ (III10)3 [‘Those which were “second division” languages are no longer marginalised […]. There is no longer aversion; there is an attitude of respect. This is consequently a big step forward’].

Nevertheless, if we consider the precise wording of Article 2 the speakers in this list do appear to be divided into two groups; the first group is ‘Albanian, Catalan, Germanic, Greek, Slovene and Croatian populations’, while the second is ‘those which speak French, Franco-Provençal, Friulian, Ladin, Occitan and Sardinian’ (art. 2, Law 482, 15 December 1999). This distinction has been the cause of confusion (D’Agostino 2007: 207), with the linguist Tullio Telmon describing it as a ‘strana suddivisione non spiegabile tra popolazioni che sono elencate come etnonimi, come nomi di popolo, e altre invece che sono elencate come popolazioni di cui non si indica l’etnia’ (II14) [‘strange and inexplicable subdivision between populations listed by the name of their ethnic group, while the others instead are listed as populations without indicating their ethnicity’]. This appears to be an attempt to emphasise the ethnic distinctiveness of the first group, while the second group, which includes Sardinian, is only defined as

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3 See Appendix 1 for key to interviews in Italy.
speakers of a different language, perhaps implying that they are still of Italian ethnicity. With ethnicity such a contentious and ambiguous concept, this would appear to be a dangerous area in which to enter. In Chapter 5 we will focus in greater detail on the significance of this distinctive ethnic character, but this division clearly risks imposing an explicit hierarchical division within the linguistic minorities themselves, and appears unjustified and unnecessary given that the later measures to be applied are applicable to both groups.

Some, however, have also criticised the fact that these twelve minorities are all subject to the same measures of protection, despite the hugely divergent political, social and linguistic contexts in which they find themselves (Orioles 2003: 24). Nevertheless, the nature of Law 482 is that it is a general framework law to be applied to all linguistic minorities. The aim is consequently to provide a minimum standard of recognition and protection for Italy’s designated linguistic minorities, in order to avoid the continuation of the previous system, whereby it was only the ‘powerful minorities’ that were able to obtain any recognition from the state. It may be true, however, that the Law does risk oversimplifying the complex sociolinguistic contexts in which these minorities find themselves. The listing of these groups implies that they are clearly distinct and defined entities, whereas the reality is often quite different. If we consider for example the ‘Germanic populations’ to which the Law refers, this covers not one community, but several, from the large German-speaking population in Alto Adige/Südtirol, to the tiny Mocheni, Cimbri and Walser groups. These smaller groups speak a linguistic variety of Germanic origin, but significantly divergent from standard German. In fact, even in Alto Adige/Südtirol, it is actually a dialect of German that is the everyday native language of the local population (Egger 2001: 42-47). Consequently, as Silvia Dal Negro explains, ‘il termine [germanico] risult[a] equivoco e non sufficientemente esplicito a definire i gruppi minoritari di lingua tedesca in Italia’ (2000: 96) ['the term [Germanic] is flawed and not sufficiently explicit in defining the German-speaking minority groups in Italy’]. This tendency of the Law to oversimplify the sociolinguistic situation (Dal Negro 2005: 116) has been widely criticised, and risks hiding the reality of the often complex problems and challenges faced by linguistic minorities. In addition, it is not just a question of wording, since the terminology used in the Law has a practical effect in terms of implementation.
4.2.2 The Position of Sardinian in a Culture of Standards

Law 482 and its subsequent implementation have been widely criticised due to the failure to investigate the current sociolinguistic reality of the linguistic minorities listed. In the Sardinian case, for example, it is widely debated what the term ‘sardo’ ['Sardinian'], as used in Article 2, actually means. As Cristina Lavinio argues, the Law ‘parla di “sardo”, ma il sardo dal punto di vista di una parlata unitaria non c’è. La lingua sarda, quello che chiamiamo lingua sarda dal punto di vista storico e filologico, è in realtà un insieme di parlate’ (II8) ['talks about “Sardinian”, but Sardinian from the point of view of a unitary speech variety does not exist. The Sardinian language, what we call the Sardinian language from a historical and philological perspective, is really a collection of speech varieties’]. Although, as will be discussed later, other linguists may disagree about the unitary nature of the language, the distinct linguistic varieties present in Sardinia are a cause of particular confusion and debate. If we exclude Catalan and Tabarchino as clearly separate linguistic forms within the island, there is still considerable further variation. As established in Section 3.2.3, the Campidanese and Logudorese varieties are typically considered the principal varieties of the Sardinian language, while the Sassarese and Gallurese varieties are often considered not to form part of the Sardinian language.

Nevertheless, there is still confusion as to which varieties Law 482 actually applies. In the 1997 Sardinian Regional Law, Sassarese and Gallurese are also identified for recognition, although as distinct from ‘Sardinian’ (art. 2.4, Regional Law 26, 15 October 1997; Toso 2005: 258). Consequently, Law 482 would not appear to apply to these varieties, as they do not form part of the ‘Sardinian’ identified, and are closer to the Italian language. Others have, however, suggested that as linguistic varieties found in Sardinia, they should be included under the category of ‘Sardinian’, with Daniele Bonamore demanding, ‘Che cosa si vuol fare? Compromettere quel minimo di tutela accordato dal Parlamento italiano con rivendicazioni bellicose e controproducenti?’ (2004: 76) ['What is the aim? To compromise that minimum protection granted by the Italian parliament with belligerent and counterproductive claims?']. As a legal expert not specifically familiar with the complexities of the Sardinian case, however, his statement appears excessively dismissive. Even between the Campidanese and Logudorese varieties there are considerable differences which add to the confusion as to what this label of ‘Sardinian’ actually signifies. The differences are most marked on the level of phonology (Wagner 1951: 291), with a notable example being the presence of the consonant clusters /kw/ and /gw/ in Campidanese due to the influence of Italian (as
in /'akwa/ and /'liŋgwa/), which are typically expressed with a /b/ or /bb/ in Logudorese (as in /'abba/ and /'limba/) (Blasco Ferrer 1984: 179; Jones 1997: 377). There are also some significant lexical differences due to the distinct linguistic influences of foreign rulers (Blasco Ferrer 1984: 178). Nevertheless, as explained in Chapter 3, many experts on Sardinian, from the renowned Austrian linguist Max Wagner (1951) to more recent scholars, agree that these differences do not prevent the recognition of Sardinian as one language and, as Roberto Bolognesi points out, ‘La “frammentazione dialettale” del sardo è un fenomeno comune a tutte le lingue naturali’ (Bolognesi 2007: Section 2.1 [no page]) ['The “dialectal fragmentation” of Sardinian is a phenomenon common to all natural languages’].

The lack of a unified standard form of Sardinian has, however, been the cause of much conflict and debate. The lack of a standard is a relatively common problem for minority and regional languages. This is one of the principal reasons that they often continue to be classified as dialects, and is also why some oppose their entrance into official domains as they are seen to lack these supposedly essential features of a language. For example, with the introduction of Law 482, some questioned how it could be implemented for non-standardised languages. The philologist Cesare Segre asked:


[And we ask ourselves: are there grammars of usage for those languages? Are there people capable of teaching them to students? Is there, for each of these languages, a generally recognised variety to serve as a model for all speakers?]

Evidently, in the case of Sardinian, the answer to most of these questions was negative. However, it is important to remember that official national languages were not naturally endowed with these features, which were instead a result of a state-led process of codification and institutionalisation. While nobody has yet made the effort to do the same for these non-official speech varieties, this does not mean that it is impossible to undertake similar processes for marginalised speech forms. As Einar Haugen states, ‘There are no limits to the elaboration of language except those set by the ingenuity of man’ (1966: 932).

Law 482 does appear to be an attempt to begin such processes for minority languages. It should be stated that the Law does not explicitly deal with the issue of standardisation at any point, but instead appears to assume the existence of a standard written form of these languages (Toso 2004: 50). Article 8.1, for example, provides for
the publication of official acts of the state, the regions or local bodies in the language concerned and Article 9.1 also provides for the oral and written use of the language in the public administration. Particularly for written use in official contexts, a standard form of the language is generally considered a necessity. However, the Law does not go into any specific detail, or even appear to acknowledge, the complicated process of standardisation. The closest that it comes to any indication of how it should be approached is in the regulations for the implementation of Law 482 issued in 2001. In reference to the administration, these regulations state that ‘gli enti locali, nei cui territori si applicano le disposizioni di tutela, disciplinano l’uso scritto ed orale della lingua ammessa a tutela nelle rispettive amministrazioni’ (Decree of the President of the Republic 345, 2 May 2001) ['local bodies, in whose territories the measures of protection are applied, regulate the written and oral use of the language entitled to protection in the respective administrations']. It has consequently been left to regional and local bodies to decide on the necessity of standardisation and how it should be approached. However, while the Law may fail to explicitly indicate the direction these language planning efforts should take, by providing for the written use of these languages it clearly legitimates attempts to create a written standard and has consequently initiated a standardising tendency among the different minority language groups.

In Sardinia, a commission was established in 1998 to draw up a unified written form of the Sardinian language. This was, of course, not a direct result of Law 482, which had not yet been passed, and discussions over the need for a standard unified form of the language had been frequent since the 1970s. Nevertheless, the passing of Law 482, as well as the 1997 Regional Law for the Sardinian language, inevitably gave further legitimacy to the work of this commission and accentuated the need for a unified written standard. The commission was composed of various experts on the Sardinian language as well as institutional representatives, and completed its work in 2001 with the presentation of the Limba Sarda Unificata [Unified Sardinian Language] (Calaresu 2003). However, this model received much criticism, and its attempted introduction highlighted many of the common problems involved in the standardisation of minority languages. As Joshua Fishman writes, language planning for these ‘latecomer languages’ is often criticised for ‘the initial artificiality and unfamiliarity of its products’ (1972a: 76). In drawing up a standard, various compromises and choices must be made between different forms of the language. In the case of Sardinian, there was a particularly controversial choice between the Campidanese and Logudorese varieties,
and a fear that any standard might lead to the ‘sacrifice’ of distinct varieties (Olesen 2005: 309). Although the commission claimed that the Limba Sarda Unificata was based on a mediation between these varieties, most noted that it was closest to the Logudorese form (Calaresu 2003: 257-58). Further criticisms of the commission’s work focused on its lack of reliable data on the current sociolinguistic context and the division between the citizen and the public administration which had ‘privilegiato strategie che vanno solo dall’alto in basso’ (Calaresu 2003: 263) [‘privileged only top-led strategies’]. The commission, it seemed, had largely failed in its aims, and the experience could be seen as a justification to oppose any standardisation of Sardinian.

In fact, there are many in the academic community who oppose such standardising tendencies and have criticised this approach in the elaboration and implementation of Law 482. The principal criticism of the standardisation of regional and minority languages is that it can end up suppressing exactly the diversity it was designed to promote. As Telmon explains, ‘la tendenza è stata quella, di ritrasformare le minoranze in microminoranze e macrominoranze [...]’ (II14) [‘the tendency has been to transform the minorities into micro- and macro-minorities [...]’, and thus risk sacrificing that which truly constitutes a minority’]. By elaborating a single unified standard form, the variations not included within that standard can, as Susan Gal explains, become ‘stigmatized forms’, which can further accentuate hierarchical divisions within the speech community between different varieties (2006b: 21). Gal also describes this process as ‘killing the language in order to save it’ (2006a: 171), as these excluded stigmatised forms are placed at risk of disappearing, thus diminishing the internal variation within the language. Essentially, the damaging effects of official national language ideologies may be recreated at a micro-level:

certe scelte di politica linguistica basate sul riconoscimento di una varietà standard, come quelle adottate in Friuli o in Sardegna, finiscono col riprodurre i processi discriminatori e l’insofferenza verso le differenze, che hanno già caratterizzato l’affermazione della lingua nazionale. (Savoia 2003: 108)

[some linguistic policy decisions based on the recognition of a standard variety, such as those adopted in Friuli or Sardinia, end up reproducing the discriminatory processes and intolerance of differences, which have previously characterised the establishment of the national language.]

This phenomenon has been described by Michael Silverstein as a ‘culture of standards’ or as a standardising language regime (2000). While standardised languages are reified and idealised, other linguistic forms are ignored or dismissed as ‘non-
languages’ (Gal 2006a: 164). This is particularly true of unwritten languages, and Maurizio Gnerre points out that this is the approach taken in Law 482: ‘Le “lingue” dei legislatori sono prevalentemente quelle scritte, visibili e permanenti in libri e giornali, e solo marginalmente realizzate nell’effimero dell’udibile’ (2003: 169) [The “languages” of the legislators are predominantly those which are written, visible and permanent in books and newspapers, and only marginally those used in the ephemeral audible sphere’]. The listing of the linguistic minority groups in Article 2 as clearly definable and distinct groups, or ‘linguistic islands’ supports this viewpoint (Orioles 2003: 25).

The reality of mixed languages, and the often blurred and unidentifiable boundaries between varieties, are overlooked, with the focus on the separate and distinct entities or even ‘objects’ of standard languages. Dal Negro also notes this tendency to promote a symbolic written standard, which appears to be easier than attempting to genuinely ‘sustain multilingual repertoires’ (2005: 123).

Nevertheless, while it is undoubtedly true that we do live in a standardising language regime, this does not preclude the fact that such a regime also has its necessities and advantages. As Silverstein recognises, this regime is the modern cultural order of language that we live in (2000), and if minority languages are to continue to exist within this order then standardisation would appear to be a priority. Although Silverstein and Gal suggest that an alternative cultural order is possible, it is unrealistic to expect relatively powerless linguistic minority communities, such as the Sardinian minority, to attempt the huge and potentially impossible task of creating or defining these alternatives. While anti-standardising ideologies may represent a form of resistance, they do not really offer any challenge to the dominant language, and can mean instead that, ‘Confined to their private domains, cultures may be turned in on themselves and thus face away from where real power is located’ (Grillo 1989: 228).

This proves the essential flaw in the anti-standardisation position. Those who oppose standardisation often fail to offer a suitable and credible alternative to improve the prestige and visibility of regional and minority languages. As Paolo Coluzzi has stated in reference to the approach of many Italian academics towards regional languages: ‘Most of these academics fear any language planning initiatives may lead to a loss of variety, without realizing that an absence of language planning may eventually lead to their death altogether’ (2008: 227).

A significant presence in the public sphere, particularly where written communication is necessary, does appear to require some form of a unified standard. If we consider the present status of Sardinian, there are worrying signs that the use of the
language is in regression. While many speakers would now be opposed to referring to Sardinian as a dialect, Giuseppe Corongiu points out that ‘nella pratica costante di ogni giorno il sardo è trattato assolutamente come un dialetto’ (2008: 118) ['in everyday practices Sardinian is undeniably treated as a dialect']. As established in Section 3.2.3, Sardinian is in a clearly subordinate position, and even in the private sphere Sardinian is giving way to Italian (Corongiu 2008: 122). The increasing presence of Italian in the private sphere has also led to the Italianisation of the Sardinian language (Paulis 2001: 155). In the face of the evident decline and regression of Sardinian, it thus appears that institutional intervention is required to improve the status and visibility of Sardinian if it is to survive, and standardisation would appear to be at least part of the solution. While this approach may be criticised for recreating official national language discourses at a micro-level, this does not necessarily mean that the potential positive results of such an approach in raising the status and prestige of a minority language should be dismissed.

However, if we are to accept standardisation as a justified aim, we must also engage with the challenges it faces, and attempt to minimise the negative consequences of standardisation. The most important part of this process appears to be engaging with the specific sociolinguistic context of each linguistic minority, and ensuring the full involvement of the language community. It, therefore, seems appropriate that Law 482 does not elaborate on specific action regarding standardisation, instead leaving the task to regional and local bodies (Dell’Aquila and Iannàccaro 2004: 57). Even regional bodies, however, cannot be automatically assumed to respond to the needs of speakers, as the previously unsuccessful Sardinian attempt at standardisation demonstrates. Nevertheless, growing demand for a full implementation of Law 482 has meant that the establishment of a unified written form of the language has remained a priority in Sardinia. Consequently, in 2005 a new commission was established which drew up a new unified linguistic code, the *Limba Sarda Comuna* [Common Sardinian Language], which the regional government decided to adopt in April 2006 as the official language of the regional administration, alongside Italian (Bolognesi 2007). However, the regional representatives and members of the commission emphasised that they did not intend to impose this model upon Sardinian speakers, but rather that it would provide a flexible model open to gradual development. As Renato Soru, regional President at the time, states:

Il problema era: ma stiamo cercando di ingessare la lingua, di inventare una lingua in laboratorio? No, abbiamo semplicemente cercato di scrivere in un modo universalmente accettato, e con delle regole universalmente accettate [...],
auspicando poi che quelle regole di scrittura venissero, potessero essere gradualmente accettate. (III13)

[The question was: but are we trying to set the language in stone, to invent a language in a laboratory? No, we simply tried to write in a universally accepted way, and with universally accepted rules […] in the hope that those rules of writing would be gradually accepted.]

Particularly after the criticisms of the previous attempt to create a unified written standard, there was a much greater focus on the dangers of imposing what appeared to be an ‘artificial’ standard upon Sardinian speakers. The Limba Sarda Comuna, for example, leaves lexical choice largely free, although it does specify orthographical preferences which reflect specific phonetic choices, such as the use of the previously mentioned Logudorese forms ‘limba’ and ‘abba’ (Regione Autonoma della Sardegna 2006: 14-24). Although these choices may still appear to privilege specific varieties of Sardinian, there are clear signs that greater attention has been paid to the opinions of speakers themselves. For example, a detailed sociolinguistic study of Sardinia was funded and published by the regional government in 2007 (Oppo 2007b). This study also showed that 57.7 per cent of the Sardinian speakers interviewed were favourable to the use of a unified written form of the language by the regional administration (Valdes 2007: 63).

This does not necessarily mean that they accept the unified written standard produced by the regional government, and there continue to be strong attachments to distinct local varieties of Sardinian (Valdes 2007: 62-63). Acceptance and, indeed, as emphasised by the commission, the further elaboration of a unified standard form is a long process, and it is too early to judge the success or failure of the Limba Sarda Comuna. Nevertheless, Giuseppe Corongiu, as Director of the Regional Service for the Sardinian Language and Culture, is optimistic about its future success: ‘abbiamo buoni risultati […] viene usata nel 70 per cento dei comuni come lingua ufficiale, quindi per noi è già incoraggiante questa situazione’ (II3) [‘we have seen some good results […] it is used in 70 per cent of town councils as an official language. Therefore for us this situation is already encouraging’]. Most significantly, the introduction of the Limba Sarda Comuna has allowed for the implementation of Articles 8 and 9 of Law 482, providing for the written use of the language by the regional and local administration. Both Corongiu and Soru confirm that ‘fintanto che c’erano le diverse varianti, e non c’era LA lingua sarda scritta, le misure di questa legge non potevano essere applicate’ (III13) [‘while there were diverse varieties, and THE written Sardinian language did not exist, the measures of this Law could not be applied’].
Nevertheless, while usage of this unified written form has been explicitly encouraged in the regional and local administration, the situation in the education system is more ambiguous. Giovanni Depau and Iside Zucca did note that the 2003 regional guidelines for the introduction of Sardinian in schools began to show a growing focus on standardisation despite the early stage and seemingly limited success of the process (2005: 288). However, generally in schools in Sardinia, there appears to have been little attempt to introduce the standardised form of the language into the education system, instead relying on teachers to use the local variety with which they are familiar. This is confirmed by Gabriele Iannàccaro’s report, which finds that while there is some support for usage of a standardised form in official administrative contexts, it is not currently considered appropriate in the education system:

Il sardo pubblico è dunque un modo per marcare il territorio come non del tutto o non esclusivamente italiano. Questa variante di sardo pubblico però non deve essere insegnata nelle scuole perché collide con le varianti locali ancor vive sul territorio e vere portatrici del mondo degli affetti e delle tradizioni. (2010: 270-71)

[Public Sardinian is a way to mark the territory as not entirely or exclusively Italian. This variety of public Sardinian, however, should not be taught in schools as it collides with local varieties still present throughout the territory and considered the true carriers of the world of affections and traditions.]

Consequently, teaching of a standardised form of the language has largely been ignored or refused, with a widespread belief that only the specific variety spoken in the local area should be used. As previously discussed, this approach does serve to encourage the continued vitality and internal variation within Sardinian, but evidently may cause difficulties in terms of written usage and in ensuring that Sardinian can fulfil the role of a modern language of communication.

Equally, the central government appears to have taken a non-interventionist stance on the issue and circular letters issued by the central Ministry of Education have contained no references to the teaching in or of standardised forms of the language or different speech varieties. The only notable reference to a standard variety was in a general summary of the experiences of the first three years of application of Law 482 which stated as a success:

immersione nell’ambiente della scuola nella lingua di riferimento e consolidamento della sua variante standard, indispensabile nei casi in cui la stessa entra nelle attività didattiche, ma utile anche quando si intende dare spazio a varietà locali, in quanto rappresenta comunque un modello da seguire. (Ministero dell’Istruzione, dell’Università e della Ricerca 1998-2006)
immersion in the school context in the reference language and consolidation of its standard variant, which is essential in cases where that same language is used in didactic activities, but also useful when trying to provide space for local varieties, in as much as it represents an example to follow.]

This statement does appear to suggest the importance of the consolidation of a standard form, while providing space for local varieties. Nevertheless, it constitutes a fairly vague and particularly unclear commitment, and the main approach at the state level appears to be to give the individual schools the freedom to decide on the form and variety of language to be used and taught. With the standardisation of Sardinian still at a very early stage, future usage in the education system will depend on the success or failure of the Limba Sarda Comuna to gain widespread acceptance and support, which will obviously be a result of action principally at the regional rather than the state level.

To conclude, while there are inevitable dangers and risks involved in standardisation attempts, it remains the principal approach to ensuring minority languages are able to survive as truly modern languages of communication. While Gal offers some tentative alternative suggestions for the use of more mixed linguistic forms, she does admit that ‘These tactics do not necessarily increase the number of speakers of a minority language’ (2006a: 178-79). It is therefore unsurprising that the state reinforces this standardising regime in Law 482, since it remains the only truly successful model of effective language planning. The processes that ensured the survival and elevation in status of official national languages should not be dismissed as inappropriate for minority and regional languages. Nevertheless, a full awareness of the well-founded criticisms of standardising regimes is essential, particularly concerning the dangers of oversimplifying the sociolinguistic context and of excluding speakers in the elaboration and introduction of a standardised form. This means approaching language planning and policy with sensitivity and a full understanding of the relevant speech community.

4.3 Spain

4.3.1 The Legal Status of Asturian
As discussed in Section 3.3.1, the Spanish Constitution establishes much more explicitly than the Italian Constitution the status to be accorded to Spain’s distinct languages. However, while the establishment of Castilian as an official language throughout the state is clear, the granting of official status for Spain’s ‘other languages’ within certain Autonomous Communities in Article 3.2 is more ambiguous. The clause
fails to specify to which languages this refers, except that they are characterised by being ‘Spanish’ as in ‘of the Spanish state’ (Mar-Molinero 1990: 54). Despite this ambiguity, the clause does appear to be fairly prescriptive with the use of the structure ‘serán’ [‘will be’] suggesting, as Antoni Milian i Massana argues, that ‘las demás lenguas españolas deben ser oficiales, y no sólo que facultativamente podrán serlo’ (1984: 134) [‘the other Spanish languages must be official, and not just potentially can be’]. However, as we will see in the Asturian example, this has not been the case.

Before discussing the Asturian case, it is important to clarify what ‘official status’ or ‘officiality’ actually means within the Spanish context. As Glyn Williams establishes, ‘Distinctions between “national”, “official”, “regional”, “lesser used” languages and the like are social constructs’ (2005: 35). As such, the meaning of such terms varies in different contexts and in Spain the Constitutional Court has been required to clarify what the declaration of officiality entails specifically within the Spanish context. Most explicitly the Court declared in 1986 that:

> Es oficial una lengua, independientemente de su realidad y peso como fenómeno social, cuando es reconocida por los poderes públicos como medio normal de comunicación en y entre ellos y con su relación con los sujetos privados, con plena validez y efectos jurídicos. (Sentence 82/1986)

A language is official independently of its situation and weight as a social phenomenon, when it is recognised by the authorities as a means of normal communication within and between them and in their relations with private persons, with full legal validity and effects.

Essentially, in the Spanish context, a language is official when it is used by the public authorities as a normal language of communication, both with members of the public and within the organisation itself. In relation to the education system, the Constitutional Court further clarified in 1994 that the officiality of a language also meant ensuring its presence as a compulsory subject in schools in order to guarantee its knowledge after the completion of obligatory education (Sentence 337/1994). Consequently, official status in the Spanish context is considered to be the highest guarantee of the rights of speakers to use their language and the highest level of protection for the language itself (Pérez Fernández 2006b: 29).

Nevertheless, the mere declaration of official status is insufficient, requiring as it does the introduction of additional measures and laws to ensure that the legal effects of officiality are enacted within a specific region. In fact, Article 3.2 of the Constitution explicitly delegates to the Autonomous Communities the power to regulate and define the scope of this official status, a fact that has been fully exploited by the Catalan
government as will be discussed in later chapters. This can be seen as an attempt to allow for distinct sociolinguistic and political contexts (Vernet i Llobet 1994: 125). Furthermore, the fact that Article 3.2 states that Spain’s language will be official ‘in accordance with their statutes’ has meant that it has been left to the specific statutes of autonomy to make the declaration of official status, rather than the Constitution itself (Sentence 87/1997). Some, such as Milian i Massana, have argued that the phrase ‘in accordance with their Statutes’ actually refers to the possibility to regulate and define the scope of official status, rather than to prevent its declaration (1984: 134). Nevertheless, by providing for the statutes of autonomy to declare explicitly the official status of a language, rather than doing so in the Constitution itself, this formula has evidently resulted in a legal ambiguity and potential ‘get-out clause’ (Pérez Fernández 2010: 171) which is most evident in the Asturian case.

The Asturian Statute of Autonomy is notable for the absence of a declaration of official status for the Asturian language, both when the Statute was originally passed in 1981, and also in later reforms of the Statute in 1991 and 1999 (Viejo Fernández 2004: 172). However, as established in Section 3.3.3, the Asturian Statute does not ignore the question of the Asturian language entirely, providing as it does for the protection and promotion of Asturian (art. 4, Statute of Autonomy of the Principality of Asturias 1981) and for exclusive powers for Asturias over the promotion and protection of Asturian within the region (art. 10.1.21). However, the Statute and its subsequent reforms also notably avoid any classification of Asturian as a ‘language’, instead ‘limitándose a reconocer una realidad, su existencia, y admitir que tiene variantes’ (Pérez Fernández 2010: 175) ['only going so far as to recognise a reality, its existence and that it has different varieties']. By avoiding the naming or classification of Asturian as a language, this can be seen as a way of avoiding the apparent prescription in the Constitution that Spain’s other ‘languages’ will be official. As Milian i Massana argues, the only justification for not making Asturian, and other non-official languages such as Aragonese, official is to consider them not as full ‘languages’, but rather as mere ‘linguistic varieties’ or even dialects of Castilian (1984: 137).

Nevertheless, Article 3.3 of the Constitution, while not providing the same legal recognition of Asturian as a declaration of official status, does still appear to provide for some form of state support for Asturian as a ‘linguistic variety’ of Spain. Specifically, Asturian is entitled to ‘respect’ and ‘protection’ according to Article 3.3, although there has been no clarification of the resulting legal consequences of these terms. While the term ‘respect’ may appear to merely prevent discrimination against these linguistic
varieties and their speakers, ‘special protection’ does imply a more active support for these languages (Milian i Massana 1984: 145). In addition, the ‘promotion’ and ‘protection’ of Asturian in the Asturian Statute of Autonomy provides a legal recognition of the language and entails legal obligations on the Asturian government to take action. As a result, José Manuel Pérez Fernández argues that the Asturian case can be considered to constitute a tertium genus of ‘partial officiality’ since ‘hay un reconocimiento y uso oficial, pero no oficialidad en sentido integral o pleno’ (2006a: 257) [‘there is recognition and official use, but not officiality in the full and complete sense’]. It can thus be seen as an intermediate stage between full official status and no official recognition. This semi-official recognition was reinforced by the introduction of the Regional Law for the Use and Promotion of Bable/Asturian in 1998. This Law was introduced as an attempt to respond to demands for a greater protection of Asturian, as well as provide a clearer legal framework for language planning measures in favour of Asturian (Asturian Law 1/1998; Pérez Fernández 2005: 44).

As in the ‘normalisation’ laws in regions with official languages, the Law does provide for similar forms of intervention in many spheres including the education system, the media and the administration. Article 4, in particular is seen to provide the most significant recognition of Asturian, providing as it does for the right of citizens to use Asturian orally and in writing with the regional administration (art. 4, Asturian Law 1/1998). As Ramón de Andrés explains, ‘Que el asturiano use el asturiano en la administración tiene aspectos que están prácticamente a un centímetro de la oficialidad’ (SI2)4 [‘The possibility for Asturians to use Asturian in the administration is in some respects practically a centimetre away from officiality’]. The Law also provides a much clearer legal framework for subsequent action in favour of Asturian. As a result, ‘linguistic normalisation’ offices have been opened in town councils throughout Asturias (Council of Europe, 11 December 2008: 13). Language policy has also taken on a more formal and institutionalised role in the regional government, with the creation of the General Directorate of Cultural Promotion and Language Policy in 2003 representing, according to its Director, ‘el reconocimiento político mas alto que tiene en la historia de la recuperación del asturiano y en la historia de la democracia asturiana’ (SI1) [‘the highest political recognition in the history of the recovery of Asturian and in the history of Asturian democracy’]. Additional legal recognition of Asturian was also provided by the central state in its ratification of the ECRML in 2001 as will be

4 See Appendix 2 for key to interviews in Spain.
discussed in Chapter 8. Nevertheless, despite some recognition within Asturias and by the Spanish state, the legal position of Asturian remains ambiguous and open to questioning.

4.3.2 Non-Official Languages and the Spanish State

The discussion of the legal status of Asturian may at first appear a merely technical or legalistic exercise, but in reality the ambiguous legal status of Asturian both reflects the social and political status of Asturian and reinforces doubts over Asturian’s ‘languageness’ (Blommaert 1999: 431). The contested status of Asturian was made most evident in the recent controversy surrounding the attempt to introduce a degree at the University of Oviedo, in the capital of Asturias, for the study of Asturian philology. This controversy is particularly relevant to this study of the state, as it was an institution of the central state, the Council of Universities, which played the decisive role. Asturian had, in fact, been present in the University of Oviedo since 1985 when it was first introduced as an optional subject in the postgraduate teacher-training qualification (Pérez Fernández 2011: 259). In 1994, two other postgraduate qualifications were introduced, (‘Specialist in Asturian Philology’ and ‘Expert in Asturian Philology’) and, from 1996, the subject of ‘Asturian language’ was also introduced as an optional subject in the two undergraduate degrees in Hispanic and Romance philology (Pérez Fernández 2006a: 274; Viejo Fernández 2004: 185). However, particularly with the need to provide for trained teachers of Asturian, the Faculty of Philology at the University decided to create a specific degree in Asturian philology in 1996 which was approved by the governing body of the University of Oviedo in 1997 (Cano González 1999: 115).

Despite the autonomy granted to universities in Spain (art. 27.10, Spanish Constitution 1978), the creation of any new degree must also be approved by the central Council of Universities (art. 28.1, Organic Law 11/1983) which is responsible for ‘verifying that the proposed curriculum satisfies certain requirements observed throughout the country, and which have been previously established (number of subjects, number of hours per course, balance between theoretical and practical classes, etc.)’ (Viejo Fernández 2004: 185). Nevertheless, after the request was sent to the Council of Universities, the petition was rejected in 1998, on the basis that ‘Desde un criterio científico, el Asturiano no puede figurar como “lengua” en los planes de estudios’ (cited in Congreso de los Diputados, 31 March 1999) [‘From a scientific viewpoint, Asturian cannot be listed as a “language” in the curriculum’]. With the legal support of the recently passed 1998 Law for the Use and Promotion of Bable/Asturian, a
second request was made in 2001, which was supported not only by the University but also the autonomous parliament of Asturias (Viejo Fernández 2004: 186). The legal and administrative dossier to support this request was also extended with reports signed by professors of philology from Spain and Europe (de Andrés 2002: 110; Viejo Fernández 2004: 186). Nevertheless, the request was again rejected in 2001, and the Council went further in April 2002 demanding the removal of the optional subjects of ‘Asturian language’ and ‘Asturian philology’ from the degrees of Hispanic and Romance philology (de Andrés 2002: 154-55; Viejo Fernández 2004: 186). This despite the fact that in 1996 the Council of Universities itself had previously approved the content of these degrees and the inclusion of these subjects (Viejo Fernández 2004: 186).

The Council clearly used the ambiguity over the status of the language to justify the rejection of the degree in Asturian philology. Again in 2001, despite the presentation of an extensive dossier supporting the classification of Asturian as a language, the Council refused to accept that Asturian was a language and even went on to claim that ‘las diferencias entre lenguas y dialectos son bien conocidas’ (cited in de Andrés 2002: 110) [‘the differences between languages and dialects are well-known’]. As previously discussed, the distinction between a language and dialect is, in reality, far from clear and this quote demonstrates the limited sociolinguistic and linguistic expertise of the members of the Council. The members of the Council itself are the deans from different universities in Spain, who may have no formal training in the subject area concerned, in this case linguistics. It is for this reason that it is generally expected that the Council will respect the expertise of the representatives from the faculty and university making the request. In this case, however, as Xulio Viejo Fernández writes, this rejection appeared to be an ‘outright attack on academic freedom’ (2004: 187).

Although the Council of Universities is an autonomous institution, particularly from the central government, it is still an institution of the central state and, as a prestigious academic institution of the state, its findings have an important effect in placing additional doubts on the status of Asturian. The significance of the decision was made evident in a debate in September 2000 in the Spanish parliament concerning a proposed resolution to condemn the decision of the Council and calling for the government to take action to ensure the creation of the degree in Asturian philology (Congreso de los Diputados, 20 September 2000). The Asturian parliament had already unanimously adopted a resolution of a similar nature (Cano González 1999: 120). However, in the central parliament the resolution was rejected by the leading parties, the Partido Popular (the PP) and the PSOE, and consequently not passed. Of most interest
were the similar reasons given for their opposition. Firstly, the representative from the PSOE stated that ‘no es oportuno llevar al ámbito de lo político aquello que corresponde al ámbito académico y científico’ (Montseratt Palma i Muñoz, Congreso de los Diputados, 20 September 2000) [‘it is not appropriate to bring to the political sphere a question which belongs in the academic and scientific sphere’]. Even clearer was the representative from the PP, who stated that:

> fundamentos jurídicos, científicos y lingüísticos de todo tipo les llevan a rechazar la creación de la licenciatura de lengua asturiana por no considerar al asturiano como una lengua de consideración científica. Y quiero dejar bien claro que el matiz es de consideración científica. (Alicia Castro Masaveu, Congreso de los Diputados, 20 September 2000)

[many different legal, scientific and linguistic reasons lead them [the Council] to reject the creation of the degree of Asturian language due to the fact that they do not consider Asturian to qualify scientifically as a language. And I want to make very clear that the distinction is from a scientific perspective.]

The repetition of the word ‘scientific’ in these statements demonstrates the important role played by supposed ‘experts’, whose views are automatically assumed to be objective and ‘scientific’ rather than political (Blommaert 1999: 429-30). In fact, the refusal to accept the Asturian degree and the classification of Asturian as a language by the Council appears to respond more to political rather than scientific criteria. In particular, the fact that the Council showed no evidence or justification for its decision, and that it was not required to do so by any other body, is particularly questionable. The lack of clear justification is proven by the fact that, in its 2005 report, the Council of Europe called on ‘the Spanish authorities to clarify the situation, and in particular to explain the reasons for the Central Council's decision' (Council of Europe, 21 September 2005b: 23) and there is no evidence of any response to this request from the Spanish government.

It is also interesting that the representatives from the two main Spanish parties accepted the ‘scientific’ judgement of the Council of Universities, but not that of the Faculty of Philology in Oviedo, or of the philological experts who endorsed the report and the creation of the degree. Even the renowned sociolinguist Joshua Fishman weighed in on the subject, stating that:

> Esta es una prohibición antidemocrática, discriminatoria, arbitraria y constitucionalmente ilegal, a la que yo me opongo con toda la convicción que me proporciona medio siglo de investigaciones y publicaciones en sociolingüística. (Fishman cited in de Andrés 2002: 155)
In contrast, the Council pointed to the opinions of ‘prestigious anonymous experts who accepted in Asturias only the existence of several disconnected dialectal patois’ (Viejo Fernández 2004: 185). According to Ana Cano González, President of the Academy of the Asturian Language, these ‘anonymous experts’ would appear to refer to a group of academics in Asturias who opposed the recognition of the Asturian language, and most notably the linguist Emilio Alarcos (SI5). Alarcos was a distinguished Professor of Linguistics at the University of Oviedo and perhaps most significantly a member of the Real Academia Española, the central body responsible for maintaining the ‘unity’ of the Spanish language (art. 1, Royal Decree 1109/1993). Alarcos had also been one of the founding members of the Academy of the Asturian Language, but since the early 1990s had changed his position and begun to oppose any promotion of the Asturian language and most significantly its introduction as a subject in the University of Oviedo (Bauske 1998: 190-92). Alarcos had, however, failed to prevent the Faculty of Philology from voting in favour of the introduction of the Asturian degree, demonstrating that despite his linguistic expertise, his viewpoint represented a minority opinion among Asturian linguistic experts.

According to Ana Cano González, Dean of the Faculty at the time, when the decision was made by the Council of Universities ‘era una época en la que el grupo de Emilio Alarcos […] seguía presionando en contra de todo lo que fuera el asturiano en Madrid’ (SI5) [‘this was a period in which Emilio Alarcos’ group […] continually lobbied against anything related to Asturian in Madrid’]. As the Council of Universities was never forced to explain or justify its decision, it is not possible to discover the precise reasons for the decision by the Council of Universities. However, in light of the significant dossier of evidence presented by the University of Oviedo and the autonomy normally granted to universities, it appears unlikely that the Council would have made such a decision without some significant pressure from those opposed to the recognition of the language. These circumstances demonstrate the extremely political nature of the decision taken by the Council of Universities and, in fact, according to Viejo Fernández, only one member of the subcommittee which came to this decision had formal training in Romance linguistics (2004: 186). Despite the perhaps admirable aims of the politicians from the PSOE and PP to avoid political intervention into academic matters, given the extremely controversial nature of this decision and suspicious circumstances
in which it was taken, the argument that it was based on ‘scientific’ evidence appears far from justified. Equally, if Asturian were an ‘official’ language, a legal rather than linguistic classification, it is unlikely that the status of the language would have been questioned. The ambiguous legal status of Asturian was clearly exploited by the Council to undermine the language and prevent it from occupying a significant place in the university system, under the cover of supposed ‘academic’ and ‘scientific’ reasons despite the absence of supporting evidence.

In fact, this is just one example of how institutions of the central state have used the ambiguous legal status of Asturian to exclude the language from gaining any support from the state. In 1996, for example, the Constitutional Court rejected the petition by the Asturian party Andecha Astur to be able to submit their electoral candidacy in Asturian, on the basis that ‘sólo las lenguas cooficiales se encuentran permitidas como vehículo de los procedimientos administrativos, y el bable no lo es puesto que el Estatuto del Principado no lo establece así’ (Sentence 27/1996) [‘only co-official languages are permitted for use in administrative processes, and Bable is not since the Statute of the Principality does not establish it as such’]. However, after the introduction of the 1998 Law for the Use and Promotion of Bable/Asturian, which did provide for the use of Asturian in administrative contexts, the Constitutional Court interestingly reversed its decision in Sentences 48/2000 and 49/2000. Sentence 49 stated that ‘el hecho de que el asturiano no sea lengua cooficial en la Comunidad Autónoma no significa que se halle prohibido legalmente su uso’ (Sentence 49/2000) [‘the fact that Asturian is not a co-official language in the Autonomous Community does not mean that its use is legally prohibited’]. This Sentence appears to justify the thesis that Asturian can be considered a semi-official language and also establishes that autonomous legislation can provide for official uses of a language without a declaration of officiality.

However, despite this apparent change in constitutional doctrine, the lack of official recognition has not prevented continued challenges to the use of Asturian in official contexts and in the administration. In fact, as recently as 2007 a judge from the Administrative Court of Oviedo submitted a complaint to the Spanish Constitutional Court that the 1998 Law for the Use and Promotion of Bable/Asturian, and specifically Article 4.2 referring to the use of Asturian with the autonomous administration, was in itself unconstitutional on the basis that it represented the principle characteristic of officiality (Auto 27/2010). The Constitutional Court did, however, reject this complaint in 2010 since Article 4.2:
no reconoce al bable/asturiano como ‘medio normal de comunicación’ en el seno de la Administración autonómica, como tampoco le atribuye esa condición en las relaciones que ésta entable con los sujetos privados ‘con plena validez y efectos jurídicos’, notas identificativas de la oficialidad de una lengua determinada. (Auto 27/2010)

[does not recognise Bable/Asturian as the ‘normal means of communication’ within the autonomous administration, and neither does it recognise it as such in relations the administration enters into with private subjects ‘with full legal validity and effects’, both of which are identifying features of the officiality of a specific language.]

The Court thus declared that the right of citizens to use Asturian with the autonomous administration was perfectly acceptable and that it was only the use of a language as the normal means of communication within the administration or with private subjects which was central to the definition of officiality.

Although the Constitutional Court in both of these cases may have eventually found in favour of the use of Asturian in some official contexts, these examples demonstrate that, without official recognition, such use is subject to continual questioning and challenges. Article 4.2 of the 1998 Law for the Use and Promotion of Bable/Asturian is actually fairly limited, in that it does not specify the need for the administration to respond in Asturian. Nevertheless, even this limited use has been challenged and inevitably means that citizens are unlikely to take advantage of this provision, given the confusion over its meaning and the likelihood that such use will be challenged. As Pérez Fernández explains:

La realidad jurídica de la comunidad asturófona pone de manifiesto los interrogantes, las incertidumbres y la inseguridad jurídica de los ciudadanos que ven cómo sus derechos, legalmente reconocidos, se cuestionan de forma casi continua. (2010: 161)

[The legal reality of the Asturian-speaking community highlights the questioning, the uncertainties and the legal insecurity of citizens who see their legally recognised rights questioned almost constantly.]

In addition, the mere fact of being a non-official language automatically excludes Asturian from any support provided by the state for Spain’s official languages as will be discussed in the following chapter. Perhaps the clearest example of the exclusion of Asturian at the state level is the creation in 2007 of the Council and Office for Official Languages to coordinate the state’s language policy (Royal Decree 905/2007). The actions of the Office and Council will be analysed in more detail in the following chapter but, as the name suggests, these bodies were created to ensure the
appropriate usage of Spain’s ‘official’ languages in state institutions, with non-official languages almost entirely excluded. As a representative from the Office confirmed:

El Consejo de lenguas no tiene entre sus competencias la protección de las lenguas minoritarias no oficiales. Solo vela por la protección de las lenguas oficiales, pero es verdad que una de las competencias del Consejo y de la Oficina es promover el plurilingüismo […]. Pero la protección que hacemos no es tan intensa como con las lenguas oficiales. (SI7)

[The protection of non-official minority languages does not fall within the remit of the Council. It only covers the protection of official languages, although one of the duties of the Council and Office is to promote multilingualism […]. But the protection which we provide is not as intensive as with official languages.]

Non-official languages are clearly not included under the remit of the Office and Council, even if they could potentially benefit from some of the extremely limited attempts to promote multilingualism (see Section 5.3.3). In reality, Asturian as a non-official language is usually entirely ignored by the institutions of the central state or is subject to continued challenges to its status as a language.

These examples demonstrate the importance of a declaration of official status in the context of the Spanish state, where the measures enacted by the state to promote or protect Spain’s other languages are almost entirely restricted to official languages. As Cano González argues, ‘En el estado en el que nosotros estamos es fundamental tener el estatus de cooficialidad, si no hay muchas cosas de las que quedas excluido, excluido por principio’ (SI5) ['In the state we live in it is essential to have co-officiality, if not you remain excluded from many things, excluded on principle']. Pérez Fernández, however, believes that the semi-official status of Asturian, which allows for some official uses of Asturian, proves that the declaration of ‘officiality’ is not as important as some claim. As he explains:

Sea oficial o no, ¿tu que quieres de una lengua? Que la puedo usar públicamente y que mi uso sea válido, y puedo estudiar en esa lengua […]. A la oficialidad o no, a mí eso me da igual. (SI9)

[Whether the language is official or not, what do you want from a language? That I can use it publicly and that my use is valid, and that I can study in the language […]. Official recognition or not, it makes no difference to me.]

Indeed, he is right that it is constitutionally possible to introduce Asturian into official contexts without this declaration, as proven by the more recent decisions by the Constitutional Court. Nevertheless, it is also true that taking any measures to attempt to improve the status of Asturian, particularly by increasing its social visibility and presence in the public sphere, is made much more difficult by the lack of official
recognition for the Asturian language. As the Council of Europe report found, the failure to declare Asturian as official:

leads on the one hand to the lack of co-officiality being at odds with the measures that are being taken particularly in the field of administration […], and on the other hand to the fact that Law 1/98 of 23 March on the use and promotion of Bable/Asturian cannot be properly implemented precisely because of the lack of co-officiality of the language. (Council of Europe, 21 September 2005b: 15-16)

This lack of official recognition leads to continued doubts over the status of Asturian as a language, as demonstrated in the case of the Council of Universities, placing it in the dubious and ambiguous position of a ‘contested language’. Such doubts inevitably have an effect on speakers’ own perceptions, with the decisions of state institutions reinforcing the subordinate status of Asturian within Asturias itself.

Nevertheless, while the institutions of the state may be responsible for neglecting or dismissing non-official languages, it is also important to remember that the declaration of ‘officiality’ is the responsibility of the autonomous government of Asturias and not the central government. It is perhaps hardly surprising that the institutions of the central state have doubts over the status of Asturian, given that the regional political class has refused to recognise Asturian as official or even to use the word ‘language’ in its own Statute, as will be discussed in the following chapter. In addition, although the 2002 sociolinguistic survey may have found that the majority of Asturians surveyed were favourable to a declaration of ‘officiality’ (Llera Ramo and San Martín Antuña 2003: 104), the local population is still far from demanding such recognition. The importance of speakers’ perceptions will also be dealt with in the following chapter, but suffice to say that within Asturias a declaration of official status or even a greater recognition of the language is far from a priority for many Asturians, and particularly the regional political elites.

To summarise, it is true that at a general level, ‘The status of official language is neither the only possible way of granting minority languages some kind of official recognition, nor a panacea for all the demands of linguistic minorities’ (Henrard 2003: 41). Nevertheless, in the Spanish context, the state-wide language policy in reference to Spain’s minority languages appears to be based almost entirely on a prior declaration of ‘officiality’. This is demonstrated in the references solely to ‘official’ languages in state legislation and declarations, as well as the repeated challenges to any attempts to introduce more ambitious language planning measures for the non-official language of Asturian. Although Pérez Fernández may be right to claim that the current semi-official status of Asturian theoretically allows for a significant presence of Asturian in the
public sphere, the reality is that in the current context of the Spanish state this semi-official status is rarely recognised. The rigid distinction between ‘official’ and ‘non-official’ languages produces a clear linguistic hierarchy, with Castilian at the top, followed by the ‘co-official’ languages. The rest, including Asturian, appear to be placed in this ambiguous category of ‘linguistic varieties’ almost entirely excluded from any recognition by the state despite the provision in the Constitution that they are entitled to ‘respect’ and ‘protection’.

4.4 Conclusion
By focusing on the cases of Sardinian and Asturian, this chapter demonstrates the difficulties faced by speakers of languages whose status as such is contested, specifically in reference to the protection and recognition that they receive from institutions of the central state. The position of ‘contested languages’ within the state is generally that of ignored or even non-languages entitled to the most minimal recognition. This lack of recognition has clear practical effects, since the state not only maintains control over many areas of the public sphere but also has the power to block action at the regional level. Essentially, there are far more obstacles to ensuring a significant presence of a language in areas of the public sphere without clear legal recognition of the existence of that language. This is proven by the challenges to implementing an effective language policy for Asturian because of its ambiguous legal position. While legal recognition by the state may not be the sole means of improving the status of a language, it is evident that without this recognition such a task becomes far more challenging if not impossible.

Nevertheless, the Sardinian case also proves that the legal recognition of the state may be insufficient if the language lacks the features of standard, codified languages which would appear to be a requirement for usage in some formal domains, such as the public administration. Attempts to undertake standardisation for minority languages remain divisive and highly sensitive, and it is the community itself, or its nearest representatives, which must take the leading role while institutions of the central state are generally too distant to be able to successfully intervene. Care should, however, be taken both within the region itself and at the state level to ensure that the absence of a standard does not become a justification for inaction in all domains and there is a consequent need to consider alternative forms of recognition, particularly for spoken varieties. Admittedly, the institutions of any state face a difficult task in attempting to provide some form of uniform protection for all minority language
communities, while providing a model which is flexible and adaptable to different contexts. Nevertheless, there is an evident need in both Spain and Italy to encourage greater collaboration between the institutions of the state and those either belonging to or representing specific minority communities, in order to improve awareness by the institutions of the state of the distinct contexts in which minorities find themselves. The decision by the Council of Universities in Spain, for example, to reject the degree of Asturian philology demonstrated a clear disregard for the views of both academic experts and representatives from Asturias.

In both Spain and Italy the most notable failing of the state is in the rigid distinction imposed between speech varieties deserving of recognition, namely ‘official’ or legally recognised ‘minority languages’, and other typically unspecified varieties entirely excluded from recognition. The controversy over the recognition of Sardinian, for example, would appear to stem from the fact that other regional varieties (the so-called ‘dialects’) are excluded from any form of state support. A more flexible approach at the state level, with an attempt to encompass the full multilingual reality of the state (Toso 2005: 266), could avoid such rigid divisions and allow for the recognition of Sardinian to be seen not as an insult to speakers of other varieties denied recognition, but as part of a wider policy to support the full diversity of the state. Equally, in Spain, the idea that only ‘official’ languages deserve any form of state recognition presents a clear obstacle to the wider recognition of Spain’s linguistic diversity, as is explicitly called for in Article 3.3 of the Spanish Constitution. This is not to suggest that it is possible to entirely do away with such labels, since institutional action and laws, in particular, do inevitably appear to require clearly defined legal categories in contrast to the accepted ambiguities of academic discourse. Nevertheless, particular care should be taken to ensure that such categories do not become a block to providing any form of recognition for those varieties which do not fit these rigid definitions. The complex multilingual realities of both Spain and Italy deserve much greater attention than has previously been paid by the institutions at the centre. The cases of the Sardinian and Asturian languages serve as just two examples of the potentially damaging impact of policies at the centre which ignore such complexities and, at times, even the existence of these languages.
Chapter 5: The Compatibility of Minority and National Cultures and Identities within the State

5.1 Introduction
Traditional proponents of the nation-state have argued that the citizens of the state should share one culture and identity, with one official national language often constituting the primary representation of a unique national identity. Consequently, as Stephen May explains, ‘nation-state congruence leaves little or no room for minority ethnies to have their historical, cultural and linguistic concerns recognised by and expressed within appropriate state hierarchies’ (2001: 8). However, as established in Chapter 2, European states have been increasingly forced to reassess this monolithic vision and provide space for multiple identities and cultures. This chapter will consider how both the Italian and Spanish states have tried to deal with distinct ethno-linguistic identities existing within the state, using the primary examples of media and cultural policies.

In reference to all four case studies, the existence of a distinct sense of regional, ethnic or national identity will be discussed, specifically in relation to the existence of a distinct language. This will lead on to an examination of the space provided by the state for the cultures and languages of these distinct groups, particularly in reference to cultural policies and the media. Finally, conclusions will be drawn from both the Spanish and Italian cases on the compatibility of national and minority identities, and on whether both states have, or are striving to, become truly multicultural and multilingual representations of their citizens.

5.2 Italy

5.2.1 Ethnic Divisions in Alto Adige/Südtirol
As established in Section 4.2.1, Law 482 appears to make a distinction between two different groups of linguistic minorities. While some have claimed this distinction is inexplicable, the most likely explanation is that ‘le prime [minoranze] si contraddistinguono per un loro carattere etnico oltre che linguistico, mentre le seconde sembrano essere caratterizzate esclusivamente da particolarità linguistiche’ (Dell’Aquila and Iannàccaro 2004: 56) [‘the first [minorities] distinguish themselves by their ethnic as well as linguistic character, while the second seem to be characterised exclusively by
linguistic differences’]. Such a distinction demonstrates that, while language can be a marker of a clearly distinct ethnic identity, this is not always the case. Ethnicity itself is an ambiguous term and is increasingly recognised as a more subjective form of identity, which requires self-assignation or the subjective assignation by others to a distinctive group (Grin 2003a: 171). However, as both Stephen May and Anthony Smith emphasise, the socially constructed nature of ethnicity does not make it any less significant or undeserving of recognition (May 2001: 24; Smith 1995: 34). The association of a distinct language with an ethnic group may be an arbitrary rather than objective criterion, but this does not make it any less significant for its members.

Of all of Italy’s linguistic minorities, this is most clearly the case for the German-speaking minority in Alto Adige/Südtirol. The German-speaking minority has maintained a clearly distinct sense of ethnic identity and language is the principal marker of this distinctiveness. The ability to identify with the culture and identity of the neighbouring state of Austria has reinforced the German speakers’ sense of ethnic distinction from that of Italy. Memories of fascist repression also meant that German speakers feared any close linguistic contact with the Italian group, which was seen as the path to assimilation. Consequently, the minority protection regime established focuses on monolingualism and monoculturalism, with the separation of the different linguistic groups living in Bolzano reinforced by the education system and the quota system (see Section 3.2.4). This approach to minority protection may appear extreme to outsiders, and has certainly not gone without criticism, with Georg Grote noting that some people have even referred to it as a form of ‘cultural apartheid’ (2012: 118). However, it is also seen as a model for allowing distinct ethnic groups to live on the same territory, while preserving their distinct identities (Grote 2012: 118). Providing space and recognition for both the German and Italian groups in the province was an attempt to avoid potential conflict if either group felt its culture and identity was under threat of assimilation. However, while the system established may have prevented further conflict, the lack of integration between the different groups remains a cause for concern for, as Rolf Steininger wrote in 2003, ‘Today there is a formal, distanced cooperation, though by no means are the two groups living and working together in close cooperation’ (2003: 3). With ethnic divisions reinforced by the political and administrative system, contact and communication between different ethnic groups is not institutionally encouraged. Consequently, ethnic tension remains a mobilising factor and a potential cause of conflict.
In recent years, debates over place names have been a particular focus of such ethnic tension, and these debates demonstrate the sometimes fragile relations between the Italian- and German-speaking groups. The question of place names may initially appear a relatively mundane and administrative question, but in reality it can be an extremely contentious question in multilingual contexts. The linguistic forms used in place names are often the principal representation of the link between language and territory (Williams 2005: 4). As a result, where different language groups coexist within the same territory, any attempt to lay claim to that territory by one group through place names is a potential cause of conflict. In Alto Adige/Südtirol, the issue is a particular source of controversy due to fascist attempts to ‘Italianise’ and replace the long-standing Germanic place names in the province (Klein 1986: 95-96). The vast majority of these Italianised place names remained in use after the fall of fascism, although the Gruber-De Gasperi agreement did provide for ‘bilingual topographic naming’ (Gruber-De Gasperi Agreement/Paris Treaty, 5 September 1946). The 1972 Special Statute also delegated legislative powers to the province concerning the designation of place names, but specified ‘l’obbligo della bilinguità nel territorio della provincia di Bolzano’ (art. 8, Special Statute for Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol 1972) ['the duty of bilingualism in the territory of the province of Bolzano'].

However, some in the German-speaking community have claimed that the Italian place names should be abolished, as they are largely inventions originating from fascist oppression (Egger 2001: 167). Consequently, recent years have seen various proposals at the provincial level to reconsider and possibly replace Italianised place names. In 1993, the separatist German party, Union für Südtirol, presented a Bill to reverse the Fascist Decree of 1923 imposing Italianised place names in order to remove all Italianised forms. Two councillors from the more moderate governing party SVP presented a less drastic solution, which was to cancel the 1923 Decree but then appoint a mixed Italian and German commission to decide on the appropriate form of each place name (Vernice, 15 August 1993). Both of these proposals, however, provoked fear among the Italian-speaking community that all Italian place names would disappear. While many of these names may have been fascist inventions, their usage over several decades means they have now become a part of the cultural heritage and landscape. Consequently it could be argued that their removal would mean the Italian community would no longer feel at home or welcome in the province (Egger 2001: 167). Although neither of these proposals was passed, the issue remains unresolved.
It is not just the linguistic form of place names that can be a cause of conflict, but also the cultural and historical associations with a specific name. For example, the most significant conflict over place names in recent years concerned the ‘Piazza della Vittoria’ ['Victory Square'] in Bolzano, a city with a majority Italian-speaking population. The ‘Piazza della Vittoria’ derives its name from the ‘Monumento alla Vittoria’ in the square, a Fascist monument to commemorate the victory of Italy over Austria. Furthermore, inscribed in Latin on the monument are the words, ‘Hic patriae fines. Siste signa. Hinc ceteros excoloimus lingua legibus artibus’ (cited in Grote 2012: 42) ['Here are the borders of the fatherland. Set down the banners. From this point on we ennobled the others in language, law, and arts']. Unsurprisingly, the German-speaking minority has viewed this as a direct insult and attack – particularly as it towers over the traditionally German-speaking area of the city (Grote 2012: 42) – and has called for the removal of this monument. Consequently, the centre-left municipal government of Bolzano decided to change the name to ‘Piazza della Pace’ ['Square of Peace'] in December 2001 as a sign of reconciliation and cooperation (Stella, 1 October 2002). Subsequently, however, the Italian nationalist right of Bolzano called for a referendum to bring back the original name of the square. In fact, while this was a provincial matter, the nationalist right in Rome also became involved, with the vice-president and leader of Alleanza Nazionale (AN), Gianfranco Fini, holding a rally in Bolzano to support the referendum on 1 October 2002. Many, including the ex-President of Italy Francesco Cossiga and ex-leader of the SVP Silvius Magnago, did question the appropriateness of a state representative intervening in what was essentially a local matter (Malagutti, 8 October 2002; Stella 1 October 2002). However, Fini got the result he desired, with 62 per cent voting in favour of returning the square to the original name of ‘Piazza della Vittoria’ (Grote 2012: 170). While the referendum itself only served as a form of consultation, the municipal government did eventually decide to return the square to its original name (Repubblica, 18 October 2002), demonstrating the continued difficulties in attempts to reverse or eradicate signs of the fascist past.

While these may have been principally disputes among specific political actors, the response from the provincial population shows that ethnic mobilisation remains possible. It also demonstrates a lack of integration between the two groups, which is reinforced by the ethnic and linguistic separatism imposed at the institutional level. Although everyday interaction between the two groups may not be as conflicting as these place name disputes suggest, there are clear divisions between the groups and often minimal interaction between them. As Elisabetta Palici di Suni Prat explains, ‘Il
The system of linguistic separatism is the highest guarantee [...] of the maintenance of the language and culture of the minority, but risks accentuating the differences and tensions between the two linguistic groups’]. The system established at the time of the Gruber-De Gasperi Agreement and the Package should be praised for preventing serious ethnic conflict, and for avoiding the forced assimilation of either group. As Grote argues, ‘Two parallel societies are nonetheless better than two opposing ones, especially when one takes into account the painful history of the past ninety years’ (2012: 168). However, the system may need to be rethought to ensure adaptation to the realities of a contemporary society, and to avoid ethnocentrism and the ethnicisation of major issues. The principal failing of the current system is its inability to recognise or fully accommodate the increasing number of full bilinguals. These full bilinguals are now estimated to number around 8 per cent of the population, but are not recognised by the quota system, and are forced to choose between the Italian or German school systems (Cavagnoli 2000: 368). The system established in Bolzano clings to a traditional conception of monolingual, monocultural citizens. Such a model had been easy to implant in the Alto Adige/Südtirol context, where ethnic and cultural divisions were already clearly established, and the state could easily identify the distinct ethno-linguistic groups. However, the state may face a different challenge in the Sardinian context where ethnic divisions are not so clearly drawn.

5.2.2 National and Regional Linguistic Identities in Sardinia

In Section 4.2.1, I discussed the controversy surrounding the recognition of Sardinian as a linguistic minority by the state. However, there the focus was primarily on the concept of ‘language’ itself, whereas often the status of linguistic minority is largely determined by the extent to which a community attaches a sense of group belonging or identity to a language. As Alessandro Pizzorusso explains:

ciò che conta per valutare se ci troviamo di fronte ad un gruppo linguistico suscettibile di esercitare il ruolo della minoranza è che l’idioma del gruppo (identificabile o meno in una lingua diversa da quella della maggioranza) rappresenti – anche se non in via esclusiva – il fattore di aggregazione del gruppo e di separazione di esso dal gruppo contrapposto. (1975: 75)

[what matters in determining whether we find ourselves in front of a linguistic group capable of fulfilling the role of minority is that the idiom of the group (identifiable or not as a language different from that of the majority) represents – even if not
Thus it is not the language or features of the language spoken by a group which determine the status of linguistic minority, but rather the sense of group identity attached to a specific language. It is interesting to note that, on this basis, Pizzorusso excludes Sardinian from the category of linguistic minority at the time of writing in 1975. Developments since then may have changed his view, but many still continue to question whether there truly exists a sense of a distinct Sardinian linguistic identity.

A distinct linguistic identity is often seen as the backbone of cultural uniqueness, and the basis of a consequent incompatibility with the official national culture and identity (Blommaert 1999: 428). In Sardinia, however, there seems to be a fairly weak sense of cultural uniqueness and consequently there is no strong sense of cultural and political autonomy. The political aspect of this will be dealt with in greater detail in Chapter 6, but suffice to say that the so-called ‘fusione perfetta’ [‘perfect fusion’], referring to the peaceful incorporation of Sardinia into the Kingdom of Piedmont and subsequently Italy in 1847, meant that:

La ‘lingua della sarda nazione’ perse il valore di strumento di identificazione etnica di un popolo e della sua cultura, da codificare e valorizzare, per diventare uno dei tanti dialetti regionali subordinati alla lingua nazionale. (Dettori 2001: 88)

[The ‘language of the Sardinian nation’ lost its value as an instrument of ethnic identification of a people and its culture, to be codified and valued, to become instead one of the many regional dialects subordinated to the national language.]

Talk of a Sardinian ethnicity is certainly rare in the Sardinian context, and while there may exist some minor Sardinian nationalist movements which will be discussed in Chapter 6, they are generally weak and insignificant. The future prospects for languages not associated with a strong nationalism or even regionalism with considerable cultural power are often considered bleak (Millar 2005: 200). This reflects the fact that the primary and often most stable language communities remain nations, which are usually able to evoke much greater loyalty from their members, such as the loyalty to the language of that nation which can ensure its effective transmission to future generations.

In fact, the primary motive for the maintenance of a language is the maintenance of an associated identity (Ager 2001: 174), which appears to be fairly weak in the Sardinian case. As Giulio Paulis explains, the Sardinians ‘s’identificano con essa [la loro lingua] meno di quanto facciano altre minoranze linguistiche esistenti in Italia, e viceversa sembrano identificarsi con l’italiano più di quanto accada per altre minoranze
linguistiche d’Italia’ (2001: 161) [‘identify with it [their language] to a lesser extent than other linguistic minorities present in Italy, and vice versa they appear to identify more with Italian than other linguistic minorities of Italy’]. Giuseppe Corongiu, Director of the Regional Service for the Sardinian Language and Culture, echoes this view, stating that there exists ‘un grande affetto della popolazione sarda per la lingua sarda, ma non una consapevolezza di essere una vera e propria minoranza linguistica distinta’ (II3) [‘a great affection among the Sardinian people for the Sardinian language, but not an awareness of being a genuinely distinct linguistic minority’]. Evidently this lack of self-awareness of belonging to a linguistic minority means that many Sardinians do not feel the need for a greater promotion of the Sardinian language, and consequently have not made the same demands on the state as the German-speaking minority.

Nevertheless, there has been a growing linguistic recovery movement in Sardinia, known as ‘neosardismo’. This began in the 1970s with the Council of the Faculty of Humanities at the University of Cagliari adopting a resolution in 1971 calling for ‘il riconoscimento di minoranza etnico-linguistica per la Sardegna e della lingua sarda come lingua naturale della minoranza’ (Sanna 2001 [1971]: 257) [‘the recognition of Sardinia as an ethno-linguistic minority and of the Sardinian language as the natural language of the minority’]. This represented the beginning of a process to encourage among Sardinians a growing consciousness of the Sardinian language as ‘l’elemento coagulo della riscoperta e riappropriazione dell’identità e dell’orgoglio di sentirsi sardi’ (Cossu 2001: 24) [‘the consolidating element in the rediscovery and reappropriation of identity and pride in being Sardinian’]. Recent sociolinguistic studies have confirmed this development, with a 2007 study in Sardinia finding that 89.9 per cent of those surveyed were strongly in agreement that the local language should be promoted as it was part of their identity (Valdes 2007: 48). Even if, as Corongiu establishes, the awareness of belonging to a linguistic minority remains limited, there are clearly positive attitudes towards the promotion of the language and affection for the language as a symbol of Sardinian identity.

In addition, the inclusion of the Sardinian language in Law 482, as discussed in the previous chapter, appears to demonstrate an external recognition of the existence of this distinct Sardinian linguistic identity (Marcato 2004: 68). Vice versa, state recognition may also play a role in increasing this awareness among the Sardinian people of constituting a minority. Indeed, one of the principal achievements of Law 482 was to provide those minorities recognised with a greater awareness of their own status as linguistic minorities, for, as the linguist Vincenzo Orioles explains, ‘C’è una presa di
The citizen gains awareness and the speaker has a greater pride in their language’ (II10). However, the state cannot recognise what does not already exist, and the Law itself is based on the idea that a certain level of self-awareness already exists within the minority population. This is made explicit in Article 3 of the Law, which requires that the designation of the territorial area in which the Law is to be applied must be based on the request of at least 15 per cent of those registered to vote in a specific town, or a third of the town councillors (art. 3, Law 482, 15 December 1999). This Article consequently resolves the difficult issue of determining who actually belongs to the specific linguistic minority, and consequently where the Law should be applied.

Some have criticised this approach as being based on purely subjective rather than objective criteria (Dal Negro 2000: 98). Obviously, there are two risks to this approach: firstly that some towns may falsely declare themselves to be the territory of a linguistic minority; or that a town with a linguistic minority present may be unwilling to declare itself as such. The first appears to be a minor risk, and although there have been some minor incidents of this nature (Orioles 2003: 23), the extremely limited funds available to linguistic minorities (Iannàccaro 2010: 96-97) mean that towns without minorities present have little to gain from declaring themselves as such. The second risk appears greater, particularly among those communities that have faced previous discrimination for speaking a minority language and thus could be reluctant to declare themselves as linguistic minorities due to ‘inferiority complexes’ (Bonamore 2004: 31).

An example of the ambiguity of these criteria can be found in Sardinia. When the researcher Gabriele Iannàccaro contacted schools in towns which had declared themselves as Sardinian-speaking communities, six of the schools declared that no minority language existed in the area. As he explains, ‘Sembra di poter evincere che i responsabili di queste scuole non siano d’accordo nel considerare il sardo come lingua e lo vedano invece come dialetto italiano’ (Iannàccaro 2010: 102) [‘It appears that the directors of these schools do not agree in considering Sardinian as a language and they see it instead as an Italian dialect’].

This represents an important dilemma for language planners, and particularly those at the state level. If in the minority language community itself there is a limited will and desire to be recognised as a minority-language-speaking community, does the state have any obligation or even right to act? Renato Soru, ex-regional President of Sardinia, for example, is sceptical of the role of the state and such laws: ‘la legge non conta nulla, […] conta di più se io parlo in sardo, se i miei amici parlano in sardo, se noi
parliamo in sardo. Le leggi fanno molto poco’ (II13) [‘the law does not count for anything […], what matters more is if I speak in Sardinian, if my friends speak in Sardinian, if we speak in Sardinian. Laws do very little’]. The reality, however, is that in Sardinia many appear to choose not to speak the language, as is proven by the decline in intergenerational transmission (Corongiu 2008: 122). As Matteo Valdes explains, ‘La popolazione dell’isola constata, giorno dopo giorno, il declino delle proprie parlate originarie, si fa complice di questo declino trasmettendo ai figli la lingua del prestigio e del potere’ (2007: 62) [‘The island’s population bears witness, day after day, to the decline of their own original ways of speaking, they become accomplices in this decline by transmitting to their children the language of prestige and power’].

Nevertheless, as the description of Italian as ‘the language of prestige and power’ implies, this focus on choice and the voluntary nature of language shift is misleading, almost implying that these communities live in a vacuum. It is states which typically ensure that the chosen official national language becomes the language of power and prestige within their own institutions (Bourdieu 1991: 46). Through education, the media and the institutional absence of Sardinian, the local population has seen its language and culture devalued and disregarded. As Will Kymlicka explains, ‘If a culture is not generally respected, then the dignity and self-respect of its members will also be threatened’ (1995: 89). Although Sardinian has remained a strong marker of Sardinian identity, its lack of recognition in the public sphere, largely under state control, has meant that many have chosen to abandon the local language. The exclusion of other forms of cultural expression from the public sphere is in fact a defining feature of the traditional vision of the nation-state. Some have argued that modern civic nationalism takes a more neutral approach, with other cultures not expressly prohibited or discriminated against. However, as Michael Billig explains, this merely represents a form of ‘banal nationalism’, as described in Section 2.3.1, whereby the daily imposition and legitimation of the official national culture and language goes ‘overlooked, forgotten, even theoretically denied’ (1995: 17). In fact, it is often not until this dominant nationalist vision is challenged, that we see state-backed nationalism come to the fore.

These nationalist concerns became most evident when the earlier draft of Law 482, Bill 612, was discussed in parliament in 1991. Many politicians and academics expressed their worry that the recognition of these linguistic minorities represented a threat to national unity (Savoia 2003: 96). These concerns re-emerged, although to a
lesser extent, when Law 482 was finally passed. As Palici di Sun Prat explains, quoting the Deputy Roberto Menia from the parliamentary debate over Law 482:


[One of the strongest criticisms is directed at the idea of considering ‘as linguistic minorities, Italian populations which have always been components of the Italian nation, such as Friulians and Sardinians’, with the danger of thus breaching ‘an essential component of national identity, or rather linguistic unity’.

Furthermore, the first article of Law 482 states that the official language of the Republic is Italian (art. 1, Law 482, 15 December 1999), which appears to be an attempt to quell any fears that the recognition of these minority languages would place the Italian language at risk. This is of considerable interest, in light of the fact that the official status of Italian is not stated in the Italian Constitution. In fact, previously, the only legal document that did recognise the official status of Italian was the Special Statute of Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol (art. 99, Special Statute for Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol 1972). This could be seen as necessary to clarify the position of Italian in the region due to the presence of another official language (German), while in the rest of the country the official status of Italian could be viewed as implicit.

Nevertheless, the past decade has seen several attempts to introduce the official status of Italian into the Constitution. This may not seem significant, since Italian already serves the function of the official national language of Italy, and consequently its insertion would merely serve as confirmation of an existing situation. However, it is the timing of these proposals to insert Italian into the Constitution that is of interest, as well as the declared intent of their proponents. One proposal appeared shortly after the passing of Law 482, and appeared to be a reaction to the recognition provided for linguistic minorities. The Bill, for example, stated that ‘È ferma convinzione dei proponenti […] che le stesse garanzie per le minoranze non possano condurre all’avvilimento e all’offesa degli elementi identificativi della comunità italiana’ (Bruno, 5 August 2001) [‘The proponents have a strong conviction […] that the very guarantees for minorities cannot be allowed to lead to the humiliation of, and attack on, identifying elements of the Italian community’]. This statement makes clear that the principal motivation of the proponents was to defend the Italian national language and identity against the supposed threat constituted by linguistic minorities. This could perhaps be
dismissed, however, as merely right-wing nationalist rhetoric since the Bill did originate from the post-fascist AN party. However, a similar Bill in 2006 also found strong support among the centre-left coalition, l’Ulivo (Bei, 13 December 2006). Although the Bill was not subsequently passed, it cannot be dismissed as merely the work of an extremist right-wing fringe since it found support across the Italian political spectrum. This demonstrates a continued belief that the recognition of linguistic minorities constitutes a threat to Italian national identity.

In reality, the threat of linguistic minority groups, particularly in the Sardinian case, is often exaggerated. The majority of Sardinians appear to be reconciled to the possibility of holding a dual Sardinian and Italian identity without conflict. This is demonstrated by the fact that, although the vast majority of Sardinians are fluent in Italian, they are also generally in favour of measures to protect and maintain the Sardinian language (Mongili 2007: 92). It would be ridiculous to view this as a threat to Italian, which will continue to serve its role as the official national language of Italy, with or without its explicit recognition in the Constitution. Multicultural and pluralist conceptions of society, particularly with the focus on multiple identities, could, however, offer an alternative response in both the Italian and Sardinian case. Such an approach helps to avoid exclusivist views of identity or the recourse to separatism, without ignoring the importance of collective identities. The possibility of multiple and hybrid identities may mean that people no longer have to trade in identities, but instead can maintain, for example, both regional and national identities. For linguistic minorities, this can mean the possibility of choosing to maintain their local language, without sacrificing the benefits of speaking the official national language, or even identifying equally with both languages. However, this will also require the state to be able to provide the appropriate space for the distinct languages and cultures of its linguistic minorities.

5.2.3 Linguistic Plurality in the Italian Media

With the increasing recognition of linguistic minorities in recent years, the current stance of the Italian state does appear to be more open to linguistic diversity. As Palici de Suni Prat argues, in the current phase, the approach appears to be to see ‘la tutela delle minoranze linguistiche sempre più come parte del patrimonio storico e culturale della nazione’ (1999: 25) [‘the safeguarding of linguistic minorities more and more as part of the historic and cultural heritage of the nation’]. In fact, this would appear to be confirmed by the Italian President, Giorgio Napolitano, who recognised in his annual
speech in 2006, ‘come fattore di ricchezza e apertura della nostra comunità nazionale, la tutela delle minoranze linguistiche’ (Senato della Repubblica, 15 May 2006) [‘the safeguarding of linguistic minorities as a factor of richness and openness in our national community’]. Nevertheless, in order to go beyond mere words and good intentions, the state must also explicitly provide the cultural space for these distinct cultures and identities to flourish.

In Alto Adige/Südtirol, the German-speaking group has long been provided with the cultural tools to reproduce its identity and language. Again, the ability of a minority to reproduce its identity and language will depend to a large extent on their desire to do so, a desire which is particularly strong among the German minority. The province also has primary powers in the field of culture (art. 8.4, Special Statute for Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol 1972), which, as the Provincial Director for German Culture explains, means that:

Noi abbiamo pochi contatti con lo stato […] perché nel campo della cultura la provincia di Bolzano ha competenza primaria, quindi deve rispettare la Costituzione italiana, deve rispettare le norme europee, però può fare le proprie leggi senza dover tener conto di quelle che sono le leggi statali. (I15)

[We have little contact with the state […] because in the field of culture the province of Bolzano has primary powers, so it must respect the Italian Constitution, it must respect European regulations but it can issue its own laws without having to pay attention to state laws.]

Nevertheless, despite this legislative autonomy in the cultural field, the state does still have a significant involvement in relation to the mass media. The state, for example, provides financial aid for the publishing of local newspapers in the German language. In 2007, the Dolomiten newspaper received 1.6 million euros and the Die neue Südtiroler Tageszeitung newspaper received 836,000 euros (Valentini, 22 October 2007).

Of greater significance has been the provision of German-language radio and television programmes by the Italian state-owned broadcaster, the RAI (Radiotelevisione Italiana). The RAI established a German-language radio station called RAI Sender Bozen in 1960, and in 1966 the RAI seat of production in Bolzano began producing German-language broadcasts for the channel RAI 3 (Alcock 2000: 176).

Although initially the German-language output of these stations was deemed insufficient, the RAI is now committed to providing 550 hours of German-language television and 4,716 hours of German-language radio annually (Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers, 16 April 2010). Furthermore, all recent state legislation concerning the media has made explicit the need to provide ‘specifiche forme di tutela
dell’emittenza in favore delle minoranze linguistiche riconosciute dalla legge’ (Legislative Decree 177, 31 July 2005) [‘specific ways to safeguard broadcasting in favour of the linguistic minorities recognised by law’]. The 2007-09 national service contract for the RAI also commits explicitly to the production of radio and television broadcasts in German for the province (Ministero delle Comunicazioni, 5 April 2007), as well as in the languages of the other border regions, demonstrating that these groups continue to receive a privileged treatment, compared to the more recently recognised minorities. The Italian government also set up special receivers in the 1970s to provide access to German-language channels from neighbouring Austria (Parolari and Voltmer 2008: 87), which is guaranteed in recent legislation (Legislative Decree 177, 31 July 2005). The possibility of accessing the German-language media of Austria is another example of how the German-speaking minority benefits from speaking the language of a neighbouring state. Consequently, it appears fair to say that the German minority has been granted considerable access to German-language media by the Italian state to ensure the continued use and reproduction of the language.

Evidently, this is very much not the case in Sardinia, where the Italian language dominates in the cultural field and mass media within the island. For example, a recent survey found that over half of the respondents had never seen or heard a television or radio broadcast in the local language (Spiga 2007: 77). The absence of Italy’s recently recognised minority languages in the state media was also criticised in a 2001 report by the Council of Europe, which stated that ‘The few infrequent spots on the air in Sardinian, Franco-Provençal or Friulian in fact result from the personal initiative of a few journalists but have no legal basis and receive no funding’ (Council of Europe, 14 September 2001: 12-13). Television evidently has an essential role to play in increasing the visibility of the Sardinian language, particularly among young people. Law 482 appears to recognise this and actually states in Article 12 that in future agreements between the Ministry of Communications and the RAI, and subsequent service contracts, ‘sono assicurate condizioni per la tutela delle minoranze linguistiche nelle zone di appartenenza’ (art. 12.1, Law 482, 15 December 1999) [‘conditions for the safeguarding of linguistic minorities within their territories are guaranteed’]. Furthermore, the regions concerned can also sign an agreement with the RAI for ‘trasmissioni giornalistiche o programmi nelle lingue ammesse a tutela, nell’ambito delle programmazioni radiofoniche e televisive regionali’ (art. 12.2, Law 482, 15 December 1999) [‘journalistic broadcasts or programmes in the languages eligible for protection, in the sphere of regional radio and television programming’].
subsequent national legislation concerning the RAI has also included explicit references to Law 482, with the 2007-09 national service contract stating that ‘Ai sensi dell’art. 12, comma 1 della legge 15 dicembre del 1999, n. 482 [...] la Rai si impegna ad assicurare le condizioni per la tutela delle minoranze linguistiche riconosciute nelle zone di loro appartenenza’ (Ministero delle Comunicazioni, 5 April 2007) ['in accordance with art.12, clause 1 of the Law of 15 December 1999, no. 482 [...] the RAI commits to providing the conditions for the safeguarding of linguistic minorities recognised within their territories’].

Nevertheless, the reality is that little action has been taken, as is recognised by institutional actors at the centre. Franco Guiducci of the Department for Regional Affairs stated that ‘abbiamo qualche difficoltà con l’uso della televisione e della radio perché i fondi, non è che siano enormi [...] , e i costi delle uscite della radio e per la televisione sono elevatissimi’ (II7) ['we have some difficulties with the use of television and radio because the funds, it is not that they are enormous [...], and the costs of radio and television broadcasts are very high’]. In fact, there appears to have been some initial confusion over who was responsible for the funding of minority language broadcasts, as noted in the 2001 Council of Europe report. Minority groups believed that the RAI’s commitment to the protection of linguistic minorities within its laws and regulations meant that the RAI was ultimately responsible for financing these broadcasts. The RAI, meanwhile, believed that ‘it is only required to produce and broadcast programmes in minority languages when such programmes are financed under specific agreements with the State or the regions concerned’ (Council of Europe, 14 September 2001: 13). This confusion seemed to have led to a stalemate, and the Ministry of Communications, which was responsible for coordinating agreements between the RAI and the minority groups concerned, failed to clarify the situation. The Council of Europe’s 2005 report criticised the fact that five years had passed since the introduction of Law 482 with no sign of progress (Council of Europe, 24 February 2005: 6). In addition, the 2004 report by the Italian government to the Council of Europe stated that:

RAI encourages the conclusion of agreements, partly or totally financed by the local authorities concerned (at regional, provincial or municipal level), for programmes and news broadcasts in the protected languages. (Council of Europe, 14 May 2004: 6)

This appears to demonstrate the general unwillingness of either the RAI or the Italian government to make any financial commitment to the broadcasting of programmes in
minority languages, with the responsibility placed instead on the regional or local authorities.

The expert advisor to the Ministry of the Interior on linguistic minorities, Domenico Morelli, explains that:

Per quanto riguarda la Rai ancora si è fatto molto poco [...]. Perché loro [i responsabili della Rai] dicono, ‘Noi trasmettiamo delle trasmissioni che abbiano [...] una certa audience, cioè una certa pubblicità. (II9)

[As far as the RAI is concerned very little has still been done [...]. Because they [those responsible at the RAI] say, ‘We broadcast programmes which have [...] a certain audience, a certain potential for advertising.]

Nevertheless, as the recent Sardinian sociolinguistic survey confirmed, there is a large community of Sardinian speakers and consequently a significant potential market for Sardinian-language broadcasts within Sardinia (although evidently not as large as the state audience for Italian language broadcasts). Furthermore, as a state-owned media body, the RAI’s obligations extend beyond questions of audience and profit. Instead, if the state does truly wish to become a plural and inclusive representation of its citizens, the RAI has a duty to reflect this and provide the space for Italy’s distinct cultural representations, as is also established in recent legislation concerning the RAI.

More recent years have seen some signs of progress, and an agreement was signed on 11 April 2008 between the RAI and the Sardinian region, with the mediation of the Ministry of Communications, for the production of radio programmes in Sardinian (Regione Autonoma della Sardegna 2007: 28). Three thirty-minute programmes a week are now broadcast in the Sardinian language which, while still minimal, does represent ‘Un passo importantissimo per l’uso veicolare della lingua sarda nella comunicazione del contemporaneo’ (Regione Autonoma della Sardegna 2007: 28) [‘An important step in the vehicular usage of the Sardinian language in the contemporary media’]. Action at the state level concerning the media has, though, clearly been unsatisfactory. As Renato Soru confirms:

Con molte difficoltà e con molto ritardo siamo riusciti ad avere un minimo di trasmissioni in sardo. Lo stato avrebbe potuto fare molto di più, sfruttare anche meglio le nuove tecnologie, assegnare delle bande, delle frequenze di radio e televisione specificatamente per le lingue minoritarie e così via. Non è stato fatto. (II13)

[With great difficulty and great delay we have managed to have a minimal number of broadcasts in Sardinian. The state could have done much more, by making better use of new technologies, assigning wavelengths, radio and television frequencies specifically for minority languages, etc. It has not been done.]
Nevertheless, as Soru was keen to emphasise, it is not just the state which must provide cultural space for linguistic minorities and the RAI is not the only broadcaster in Sardinia. There are also various private Sardinian broadcasters and in 2010, for example, the Sardinian regional government did contribute to the financing of seven projects for television programmes in Sardinian by five different regional broadcasters, at a total cost of 159,200 euros (Regione Autonoma della Sardegna, 29 December 2010). In addition, there are other important cultural fields outside of the mass media, such as literature and music, but the reality is that cultural production in Sardinia is generally limited to the Italian language. There is no daily press in the Sardinian language, and most Sardinian authors choose to write in Italian. There has been some progress in other fields, with Giuseppe Corongiu stating that one of the greatest successes has been ‘la musica moderna – diciamo pop, rock, jazz, rap – che usa la lingua sarda. E quello è uno dei settori dove la lingua va per la maggiore, soprattutto fra i giovani’ (II3) [‘contemporary music – such as pop, rock, jazz and rap – which uses the Sardinian language. It is one of the sectors in which the language is on the increase, especially among young people’]. Furthermore, several websites on the Sardinian language have appeared in recent decades, and have served an important role in the promotion of the Sardinian language (Mensingh 1999). However, as Corongiu concludes, ‘i sardi potrebbero fare molto di più per la loro lingua e non lo fanno’ (II3) [‘Sardinians could do a lot more for their language and they do not do it’]. While access to state-owned media is hugely significant, the will to see a cultural and linguistic identity reproduced must come from the minority itself. In Sardinia, this often appears fairly weak, with many limiting their cultural output to the Italian language.

The survival of a language thus appears to require, firstly, the will of the community itself to maintain this language, almost always for reasons of identity, and secondly, a significant presence in the public sphere to provide recognition and prestige for the language and its speakers. As Denise Réaume explains, ‘If there does not already exist a viable community of people committed to the continuance of the language, insistence that others provide life support is absurd’ (2003: 293). Although the decline in intergenerational transmission in Sardinia is a worrying sign, there does still exist a viable linguistic community, which appears increasingly favourable to the promotion and continuation of the Sardinian language. In addition, the cultural movement which began in the 1970s in Sardinia has ensured that some action has been taken to improve the social visibility of Sardinian, for which the regional government has provided some funding and support. Nevertheless, success is still limited by the difficulties in accessing
certain spheres controlled by the state, of which the state-owned media is just one example. Even Soru, who is particularly dismissive of the importance of national legislation, recognises that ‘i ragazzi passano il tempo in casa ascoltando la televisione. La televisione non gli parla in sardo, non crescono più in sardo’ (II13) ['young people spend their time at home listening to the television. The television does not speak to them in Sardinian, they no longer grow up in Sardinian’]. To understand the impact of television, one need only look at the vital role it played in the spread of Italian in the post-war period (Tosi 2001: 13).

Furthermore, rather than leading to conflict between distinct identities, providing space within the national culture for alternative identities can lead to a less conflictual relationship between majority and minority identities. In Alto Adige/Südtirol, as previously demonstrated, there is continued tension between the German and Italian ethnic groups, but this has clearly declined since the state has provided increasing recognition for the German minority. Now that the German minority no longer feels the same threat of assimilation as in previous decades, many have noted that hostility towards the Italian language and culture has declined. Recent surveys have shown strong elements of integration, and increasingly positive attitudes towards bi- and multilingualism, which Cristina Fraenkel-Haeberle describes as ‘an evolution in the linguistic identity of the South Tyrolese that could be defined as a phase of cultural integration without assimilation’ (2008: 277). This change in attitude appears to show the emergence of a South Tyrolean identity, which places greater emphasis on a bilingual provincial identity within the Italian state (Grote 2012: 136), rather than merely looking to the culture and identity of neighbouring Austria.

As stated earlier, now that the German-speaking minority is able to gain access to all areas of the public sphere in its own language, the obligation to learn Italian has actually declined.1 Nevertheless, while some German speakers may no longer feel obliged to learn Italian, the desire to learn the language in an Italy increasingly open to its distinct cultural identities may increase. As the SVP Senator Oskar Peterlini recognises, ‘Abbiamo questo territorio con più lingue; invece di farlo un motivo di scontro, possiamo farlo un motivo di orgoglio’ (II11) ['We have this territory with many languages; instead of making it a source of conflict, we can make it a source of pride’]. Although Peterlini is talking only of the challenge at the provincial level, this is also the challenge for the Italian state. A symbolic, but no less important, gesture that it

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1 Although those who choose to work in the public service must be bilingual, as will be discussed in Chapter 7.
is heading in this direction is the introduction of a stamp on 16 March 2007 with the bilingual denomination of the region Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol (Ministero delle Comunicazioni, [no date]). Although this may at first appear a minor gesture, it constitutes an attempt by the state to represent the multilingual reality of its population both internally and externally. Moves by the state towards a ‘culture of minorities’ (Palici di Suni Prat 1999: 205) and a more collaborative and plural approach could lead to a greater integration of the Alto Adige/Südtirol area into the Italian state.

Nevertheless, the recent place names disputes are proof of continued tension, and also of a continued intolerance and insensitivity to the demands of minority groups among some Italian nationalists. This intolerance was also reasserted in the previously discussed bills to declare Italian as the national language.

These nationalist concerns contributed to a continued reluctance to view the Sardinian group as a genuine linguistic minority, deserving of appropriate measures of recognition and protection. Although the evident distinctiveness of the German minority, as well as pressing international demands, may have made its recognition more of a priority, a pluralistic approach would also mean providing institutional space for those whose cultures and languages are bound solely within Italy’s borders. In fact, the lack of access to the national culture of a neighbouring country for the Sardinian minority means that the recognition of the central state is even more important. Consequently, the state must ensure the appropriate conditions are provided for the Sardinian people to have access to the necessary tools to support the Sardinian culture and language. As explained in Section 2.2.2, while it may be possible to leave or abandon one’s culture, people have a right to maintain it if they so desire (Kymlicka 1995: 86) and consequently the right to the necessary institutional support to make such a choice viable. Nevertheless, the limited will within the Sardinian population to see their language and culture maintained means that, in addition to failing to gain significant attention from the institutions of the state, any intervention from the state is likely to have a limited effect without the full commitment of the speakers themselves.

Robert L. Cooper, for example, lists one of the primary factors in ‘the allocation of language to media’ as the ‘demand by various ethnolinguistic groups’ (1989: 118). Evidently, the Sardinian-speaking group has not made significant demands on the state to provide such space for its language, particularly in contrast to the German-speaking community.
5.3 Spain

5.3.1 Linguistic Nationalism in Catalonia and Spain

As explained in Chapter 3, the Catalan language is often considered to be the backbone of a distinct Catalan culture and identity (Guibernau 2004: 64). This sense of a distinct Catalan identity centred on the language has provided the ideal base for the development of a Catalanist or Catalan nationalist movement. Indeed, it is the centrality of the language in this movement that has led many to describe Catalan nationalism as a form of linguistic, or at least cultural, nationalism. As Elisa Roller confirms, ‘the Catalan case provides a clear example of language being instrumental in the consolidation of a nationalist movement’ (2001: 39). Culture and language evidently play a strong role in all forms of nationalism but, as a stateless nation, the cultural and linguistic elements have taken on a much more salient role in Catalonia without the apparatus of a state to rely on to ensure the diffusion of a Catalan national identity.

As explained in Section 3.3.4, Catalanism is a widely shared political project in Catalonia which ‘has to a considerable degree succeeded in setting the agenda of politics and framing political issues’ (Keating 2001: 154). Within Catalonia itself it has been the strength of the Catalanist movement that has ensured the implementation of an ambitious and wide-ranging language policy in favour of Catalan, leading many to note the relationship between the health of a language and a strong nationalist movement (Pradilla Cardona 2000: 63; Siguán 1993: 268). In fact, while Catalonia may not have state institutions of its own to support and maintain a national culture and identity, the autonomy granted to Catalonia has allowed it to act as a quasi-state (Guibernau 2004: 74), particularly in the area of culture. Indeed, in 1990 the Catalan minister for Culture Joan Guitart stated that, ‘In matters of culture, Catalonia should become the equivalent of a state, Catalan society fully nationalized’ (cited in Crameri 2008: 1). This quote also demonstrates the use of Catalan cultural policy as a ‘nation-building tool’ and central to this policy was ‘the belief that the Catalan language was the crux of Catalan culture’ (Crameri 2008: 17). Consequently, the Catalan language has played a central role in all forms of Catalan cultural policy and not just explicitly language policy. The television, for example, has played a central role in transmitting Catalan identity, with the Generalitat controlling three terrestrial channels which all broadcast in Catalan and whose viewing figures often equal those of state channels (Crameri 2008: 114). Nevertheless, despite this apparent Catalanist consensus, and the strength of the Catalan language and culture, this nation-building project and the normalisation of Catalan have
not been without their critics. As the aim of this thesis is to focus on the policies of the central state, I will avoid going into excessive detail about the debates within Catalonia concerning the actions and policies of the Catalan government, which have been addressed extensively in various other books and articles (Branchadell 1997; Mar-Molinero 1995; Miley 2006; Pujolar 2007b; Santamaría 1999). However, it is important to explain some of these criticisms to provide the context for the subsequent discussion of the actions of the state.

The centrality of the Catalan language in Catalan cultural policy has, for example, meant that Catalan writers who choose to write in Castilian often do not appear to be considered as belonging to Catalan culture (Crameri 2008: 78). This idea is also reinforced by the use of the term ‘own language’ to refer to Catalan and to consequently justify a preferential use of Catalan (art. 2, Catalan Law 1/1998; art 6.1, Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia 2006). This term appears to lay claim to the territory in the name of the Catalan language, despite the fact that even as recently as 2008 Castilian remained the habitual language for 45.9 per cent of those resident in Catalonia, compared to just 35.6 per cent for Catalan (Institut d’Estadística de Catalunya 2008: 172). The idea of returning Catalan to its ‘normal’ position also appears to suggest an idealised past before Castilian was introduced to the area. Indeed, particularly in the early stages of normalisation, there were many sociolinguists and some political parties who supported what Albert Branchadell terms the ‘strong objective’ of normalisation, meaning linguistic substitution of Castilian by Catalan (1996: 22). Although this approach may now constitute a fairly minority view, Catalanism, even in its most inclusive forms, suggests that ‘the native speakers of the language emerge as depositaries of an authentic Catalan identity’ (Pujolar 2007b: 121).

This relates to the accusations that Catalan elites ‘exploit’ the language question in order to gain benefits for themselves (Miley 2006: 1). As proof of this, Thomas Miley points to the fact that representatives from the Catalan parties have a much more Catalanist stance than their voters (2006: 107-08). Outside of Catalonia and specifically in monolingual Spain, the approach of Catalan political elites is often seen in a particularly hostile light, and as an antagonistic attempt to accentuate difference with ‘a language used deliberately and almost artificially as an expression of political protest’ (Linz 1975: 374). In fact, even within Catalonia there have been signs of a break in consensus, most notably with the creation of the civic organisation, Foro Babel, in 1996 which opposed many of the normalisation policies of the Catalan government (Roller 2001: 48; Santamaría 1999: 71-72). In addition, a political party with an explicitly anti-
Catalanist agenda, Ciudadanos de Cataluña, was formed in reaction to the 2006 Statute reform and won three seats in the 2006 regional elections (Balfour and Quiroga 2007: 149).

Nevertheless, it is important not to exaggerate either the opposition within Catalonia or the supposed break in consensus. As Miquel Strubell establishes, there are no clearly ‘ethnic’ parties in Catalonia, with the major parties of PSC and even CiU attracting both native Catalan and Castilian speakers (1999: 12). Outside of the press and on the day-to-day level, relations between both groups are generally harmonious (McRoberts 2001: 177) and it would appear to be an exaggeration to talk of a language conflict. In fact, given the huge waves of immigration in the 1950s and 1960s from the rest of Spain, it is noticeable that there was no clear backlash against these immigrants (McRoberts 2001: 184). Right from the start, the Catalanist movement has been keen to emphasise that Catalans are all those resident in the area (art. 6, Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia 1979), and has generally avoided an emphasis on birthplace. The aim has thus been to avoid clear ethnic divisions, in contrast to the strategy adopted in Alto Adige/Südtirol. This is confirmed by Luis Moreno, Ana Arriba and Araceli Serrano, who explain that ‘Catalonia offers an example of high social integration between both natives and immigrants. Both collectives seem to be interwoven in various degrees and manifestations’ (1998: 78). Equally, given the official status of Castilian in Catalonia and the continued dominance of the language, particularly in the cultural sphere, it is difficult to imagine a future where the Castilian language would disappear, as some critics have feared. In fact, it is the strength and power of the Castilian language which justifies the need for some preferential treatment for the Catalan language within the region itself.

Many of the criticisms directed at Catalan nationalism, and specifically Catalan normalisation policies, are from those who claim that Castilian is a more ‘equal’ or ‘neutral’ language. Such a view often appears to mask a Spanish nationalist ideology, despite claims to the contrary. Since Spanish nationalism was discredited by the Francoist regime, it has become common to reserve the term ‘nationalist’ only for those, such as Catalans, located on the periphery. As Xosé-Manoel Núñez Seixas explains, ‘The purported non-existence of Spanish nationalism is a common belief echoed by prominent intellectuals, politicians and the mass media’ (2005: 121). The denial of Spanish nationalism also translates into a denial of the ‘national’ nature of the Castilian language, which instead comes to be seen as a neutral language. Even the respected social scientist Juan José Linz claimed in 1975 that Spanish nationalism was not a
linguistic nationalism since ‘the Castilian speakers have a sense of national identity not based on language but on history, culture, and a future as a state’ (1975: 374). However, it is more likely that the linguistic aspect of Spanish nationalism is less marked or visible since the dominant position of the language, as the unquestioned language of the state, is taken for granted.

The denial of the national character of Castilian is also related to the denial of the existence of any form of Spanish or state language policy, thus suggesting the idea of a ‘neutral’ state. The linguist Francisco Marcos Marín, for example, writes that ‘España carece de política lingüística estatal’ (1995: 5) ['Spain lacks a state language policy'], which is also echoed by Francisco Marsá who comments on ‘la inexistencia en España de una política lingüística nacional, que contrasta con la diligente actividad que en este campo desarrollan algunas de sus comunidades autónomas’ (1993: 164-65) ['the inexistence in Spain of a national language policy, which contrasts with the diligent activity of some Autonomous Communities in this field']. Such opinions support the view of a linguistically neutral state, but in reality it is impossible for a state to remain linguistically neutral (Rubio-Marín 2003: 52). In fact, while Spain may often have lacked an explicit language policy, in reference to the spheres and institutions which remain under its control it has tended to adopt what Joshua Fishman describes as a ‘no-policy policy’ (2006: 318), which automatically favours the dominant language, in this case Castilian. This will become evident in the next chapter, which will consider the dominance of Castilian in the administrations which remain under the control of the central state.

The attacks on Catalan language policy, particularly in the right-wing press, also demonstrate that when the dominant position of Castilian is challenged in an area of the Spanish state, a form of linguistic Spanish nationalism emerges. This becomes clear in the discourses of some linguists who have defended the dominant position of Castilian and most notably the renowned Gregorio Salvador from the Real Academia Española. For example, he stated in 1989 that ‘Si el español se ha extendido, ha sido por razones puramente intrínsecas’ (1992: 46) ['If Spanish has spread, it is for purely intrinsic reasons’]. The idea of the intrinsic superiority of a language is a clear example of linguistic nationalism (Moreno Cabrera 2008: 76). The past two decades have also seen increasing opposition to Catalan language policies within the conservative Spanish PP which appears to be adopting a more openly Spanish nationalist position, particularly after it won a majority in the 2000 general elections. This term of the PP’s government saw the introduction of decrees for a greater use of the national anthem, a reform of the
history curriculum to focus on a more unified national history, as well as a greater presence of Spanish flags (Núñez Seixas 2005: 133-35). This clear focus on the history and symbols of Spain is evidence of an increasingly nationalist stance, and unsurprisingly has been accompanied by increasing opposition to Catalan language policies (Resina 2002: 108). The opposition of the PP to the 2006 Catalan Statute reform, which will be discussed in the following chapter, demonstrates a strong belief within the party that the autonomous system of government, and the promotion of Spain’s other languages, has reached its limit. Consequently, as Montserrat Guibernau establishes, we may now be seeing ‘the radicalization of a firm state nationalism aiming to impose internal homogeneity to counterbalance, among other reasons, the cultural and political demands of the national and ethnic minorities that it contains’ (2004: 159).

The main danger of the more extreme forms of both Spanish and Catalan nationalism is the fact that both discourses fail to reflect the far more nuanced forms of identity present among the general population of both Spain and Catalonia. A series of studies conducted by the Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Social (CIRES) between 1991 to 1995, for example, found that around 70 per cent of all Spaniards express some form of dual identity (cited in Moreno, Arriba and Serrano 1998: 72). The same is also true in Catalonia, where 67.6 per cent of respondents were found to express some form of dual identity, with only 12.5 per cent declaring themselves to be ‘only Catalan’ (Moreno, Arriba and Serrano 1998: 75-76). Evidently there are fluctuations in these figures over different time periods, particularly due to political developments, but there does generally appear to exist a much higher identification with Spain than is often presented in media and elite discourse (Balfour and Quiroga 2007: 3), with the majority of citizens sharing institutional loyalties at both the state and regional level. It is precisely the dual nature of these loyalties which helps to prevent severe fracture and conflict, and can thus be seen as an essential element of the success of the autonomous state (Moreno 2001: 111).

However, despite the reality of dual and multiple identities, these are rarely reflected in either Catalan or Spanish nationalist discourses, as previously discussed. As Sebastian Balfour and Alejandro Quiroga argue, ‘While the construction of Catalan and, especially, Basque identity has been conducted against the “other” (that is, the Spaniard), the majority of Basques and Catalans do not conceive of Spanish and regional identities as mutually exclusive’ (2007: 15). In addition, there are elements of Spanish nationalism which continue to display exclusivist tendencies, with Juan Carlos Moreno Cabrera going so far as to argue that ‘puede mantenerse que la política
It could be said that the current language policy of the Spanish state is still nationalist in its exclusivist form]. The discussion of the state’s language and cultural policy in Section 5.3.3 will allow us to consider whether this is true but, evidently, there is a need for both Catalan and Spanish nationalist discourses to better reflect the dual identities of their citizens.

5.3.2 Language and Asturian Identity
The Asturian case offers a marked point of contrast to Catalonia, since, as explained in Section 4.3, it is the regional politicians who are responsible for maintaining the ambiguous status of Asturian, reflecting an ambivalence and sometimes even hostility towards the language. It is thus important to understand the motives behind this approach and whether it also reflects a lack of interest in the language among the speakers themselves. The Catalan case demonstrated the importance of the existence of a strong sense of identity and there does appear to exist in Asturias a strong sense of regional identity. This was demonstrated again in the Cieres studies between 1991 to 1995 where, interestingly, Asturias demonstrated one of the highest single regional identities, with 11.3 per cent identifying just with Asturias, a result which was only slightly lower than that of Catalonia (cited in Moreno 2001: 114). A 2002 Asturian study found a much lower percentage of only 5.1 per cent identifying themselves exclusively as Asturian, but 19 per cent of those surveyed still claimed to feel more Asturian than Spanish (Llera Ramo and San Martín Antuña 2003: 65). Overall, it is evident that, as in Catalonia, the majority share their loyalties with both the state and the region, but what is interesting here is that there is an undeniably strong sense of Asturian regional identity, most likely due to the long history of the kingdom of Asturias which provides the region with a clear historical basis (Bauske 1998: 22).

However, it would appear that this sense of regional identity is not necessarily centred on the language. As Ramón de Andrés explains, ‘La ciudadanía asturiana posee una auto-identificación muy fuerte, pero no parece que la sustente especialmente en la lengua’ (2002: 21) [‘The Asturian citizens possess a very strong sense of self-identification, but it does not appear to be particularly based on the language’]. The relationship between the Asturian community and their language is far more ambiguous than that found in Catalonia, demonstrating how languages can be more or less salient as identity markers in distinct contexts. There are still positive attitudes towards the language, as demonstrated in the 2002 sociolinguistic survey, where 31.4 per cent did
identify Asturian as the ‘lengua propia’ ['own language'] of Asturias, compared to just 21.2 per cent for Castilian, while most people (46.4 per cent) opted for both (Llera Ramo and San Martín Antuña 2003: 110). Since the 1970s there has also been a relatively active linguistic recovery movement, as discussed in Section 3.3.3. This has continued to a certain extent over the past two decades, with various protests in favour of officiality taking place between 1996 and 1999 in the regional capital, Oviedo (de Andrés 2002: 22). Equally, despite the fact that the regional politicians decided against a declaration of official status, several town councils in the late 1990s and early 2000s declared the official status of Asturian in their towns (de Andrés 2002: 162). Although these declarations were later declared unconstitutional, as will be discussed in Section 6.3.2, they did demonstrate a significant will among certain sectors of the population to improve the status and presence of Asturias. As Ana Cano González argues, ‘los concejos son los que están realmente a pie de calle […]. Y se veía que estaban a favor de la oficialidad del asturiano’ (SI5) ['the town councils are the ones which are really at street level […]. And it was clear that they were in favour of the official status of Asturian'].

Despite these examples, the past two decades have also seen increasing signs of apathy and the language question remains far from a priority within Asturian society. Returning again to the 2002 study, despite positive attitudes to the language, 53.3 per cent admitted to having little or no interest in the language (Llera Ramo and San Martín Antuña 2003: 264). The Asturian Director of Language Policy also believes that the main obstacle he currently faces is that:

> los hablantes hoy por hoy se sienten posiblemente más representados en el español que en el asturiano […]. Esa lengua en la que se expresan las cosas, que tiene un reconocimiento social, esa lengua en la que hablan los actores en los medios de comunicación, eso no es el asturiano, es el español. (SI1)

> [the speakers now possibly feel more represented by Spanish than Asturian […]. This language in which they express things, which has a social recognition, the language which actors speak in the media, this is not Asturian, it is Spanish.]

This is partly due to the lack of an effective language policy which means little effort has been made to improve the social status of Asturian. However, while this is certainly true, Asturian society has made few demands for such a policy and, as Johannes Kabatek argues, ‘la política lingüística es probablemente más consecuencia que causa’ (2006: 157) ['the language policy is probably more consequence than cause'].

Equally, even the relatively strong sense of regional identity which does exist in Asturias is quite different from the nationalist motivation seen in the Catalan case. This
reflects the fact that Asturian regionalism has always been very moderate in its demands and the region has also maintained a strong link to the Spanish crown while maintaining a certain distinct status as a royal principality since the fourteenth century (Bauske 1998: 23). Asturian identity, while strong, is intimately related with Spanish identity, as is also demonstrated by the fact that only 3.7 per cent of respondents in the 2002 sociolinguistic study considered Asturias to be a nation, while an overwhelming 89.8 per cent believed it was a region (Llera Ramo and San Martín Antuña 2003: 70). There have admittedly been some nationalist parties in Asturias, such as PAS and Bloque por Asturias, as discussed in Section 3.3.3, which have made significant linguistic demands, but their impact has generally been limited (Bauske 1998: 299). Overall, nationalist parties receive few votes and consequently have rarely been able to set the political agenda, as in Catalonia. As Roberto González-Quevedo notes, ‘it is one thing when the political majority is unanimously nationalist and vigorously in favour of the language, and quite another when this consensus is lacking’ (2000: 170). It is no coincidence, for example, that the most ambitious language policies are usually implemented in areas with powerful nationalist movements.

There are exceptions such as the neighbouring Galician example, where there is also a strong sense of regional identity, but without the development of a significant nationalist movement. Nevertheless, the defence and promotion of Galician appears to have been adopted by all major parties in the region (Siguán 1993: 269), while in Asturias none of the major political parties has taken an explicitly favourable approach to the promotion of the language. As Bernd Bauske notes, in Asturias ‘La conexión entre conciencia cultural y conciencia política ha resultado rara vez exitosa’ (1998: 24-25) ['The connection between cultural and political consciousness has rarely been successful']. It is this link between the cultural and political aspects of a nationalist – or even significant regionalist – movement, which appears to be most lacking in Asturias. In relation specifically to the language, while there may be a strong emotive attachment to the language, there is a general reluctance to link this to political demands, which is often viewed as essential to ensure an effective language policy is implemented (Ager 2001: 39). The only exception is the left-wing IU, but the party still has a minority role to play in Asturian politics, and certainly does not have the influence necessary to create a consensus in favour of the promotion of a language, as in Catalonia or even Galicia. The two major parties meanwhile demonstrate an ambivalence and even hostility to the promotion of the language (Wells 2011), as is evident from the reluctance to declare Asturian an official language, despite the obvious benefits that this would have for the
language. The institutional inactivity has also, as the 2002 sociolinguistic study notes, contributed to the growing apathy and frustration in Asturias (Llera Ramo and San Martín Antuña 2003: 334). There is some consensus in Asturian society that the language should be promoted, but this has often been thwarted by the regional elites who have blocked any real progress (Viejo Fernández 2004: 169). In many ways, this appears to be the opposite of Catalonia, where it was the Catalan political elites who appeared to have adopted a much more Catalanist stance than their voters. The reluctance of the Asturian political elite to promote the Asturian language is evident in the activities of the autonomous government, most notably in relation to the media. The first report by the Council of Europe in 2005 noted that ‘at present Bable/Asturian seems paradoxically to be more present in the private media’ (Council of Europe, 21 September 2005b: 20). This clearly demonstrates the lack of institutional support for the language from the autonomous government.

The reluctance to promote Asturian within the region also has a clear effect in the state arena, since outside of the region there is little awareness even of the existence of the Asturian language and certainly no pressure on state institutions to pay any attention to it. In fact, in one example an Asturian politician even went as far as to insist that the state continue to ignore the existence of the Asturian language. This occurred in a session of the central parliament in 2004, where the Secretary of State for the European Union had been invited to talk, and mentioned the potential to use Spain’s other languages in European forums. Unusually, after listing Spain’s co-official languages, he also mentioned the existence of Asturian, as recognised in the Asturian Statute (Alberto Navarro González, Congreso de los Diputados, 10 November 2004). However, in response, an Asturian deputy from the PP asked him to ‘por favor deje el bable. Yo que soy asturiano, le pido que lo deje como está’ (Jaime Reinares Fernández, Congreso de los Diputados, 10 November 2004) [’please leave Bable alone. I as an Asturian ask you to please leave it as it is’]. Although his view cannot be seen to reflect the views of all Asturian politicians, it is one of the very few examples where the language is mentioned in the state arena and does demonstrate a clear lack of political consensus in favour of the language. This undoubtedly has an effect on the attitude and approach of the institutions of the central state. As de Andrés notes:

No hay mucha información fuera de Asturias sobre nuestra situación […]. Las autoridades [estatales], yo creo que no se ocupan de ello porque tampoco desde Asturias se hace el esfuerzo de que sea conocido fuera. Como nuestra política lingüística es muy modesta y pobre pues no trasciende fuera. (SI2)
[There is little information outside of Asturias about our situation [...]. I think that the [state] authorities do not concern themselves with it either because there is little effort from within Asturias to ensure that it is known outside. As our language policy is very modest and poor it does not spread outside.]

In fact, the lack of action taken by the Asturians themselves in favour of their language also means that requests for the state to intervene lack credibility and are unlikely to be taken seriously. For example, in September 2002, there was a rare example of action by the Asturian political class in the state arena. The Asturian parliament unanimously adopted an initiative for a motion to be presented in the central parliament proposing that Spain’s other languages, including Asturian, be present on Spanish stamps and other postal effects in order to recognise the multilingual reality of the state (Francisco Javier García Valledor, Congreso de los Diputados, 10 September 2002). Although initially proposed and presented in parliament by a representative from IU, which is noted for its defence of the Asturian language, this event was unusual in that all of the major parties in Asturias voted in favour of the Bill (Congreso de los Diputados, 10 September 2002). However, when presented in the Congress of Deputies, the motion was rejected, with the PP representative commenting specifically on the contradictory position of the Asturian Socialists, accusing them of trying to:

venir a lavar la cara aquí ahora con la propuesta de que sea Correos del Estado quien resuelva el problema que tiene que resolver su grupo parlamentario, su Gobierno en el Principado de Asturias, y que pudiendo haberlo hecho aún no lo ha realizado. (Isidro Fernández Rozada, Congreso de los Diputados, 10 September 2002)

[give a good impression here now with the proposal that it be the state postal service that resolves the problem which your parliamentary group has to resolve, your Government in the Principality of Asturias, which having had the option, failed to do so.]

The Deputy was referring to the recent reform of the Asturian Statute where it was primarily the Asturian Socialists who blocked a declaration of official status for Asturian (Frechilla, 10 November 1998: 81). As mentioned in the previous section, the PP has often opposed any attempt to provide greater space for Spain’s other languages in state institutions and thus it is no surprise that the PP opposed this motion. Nevertheless, it is clear that the contradictions in the stance of many Asturian political leaders in relation to the language did not help in gaining support for their motion. Asking the state to take action which the regional government often appears unwilling to take itself appears at best confusing and at worst hypocritical.

As in the Sardinian case, the reluctance to use or promote the Asturian language is clearly related to the low status of the language. Although such attitudes are more
common among the political elites, they do also exist among the Asturian population, with the 2002 sociolinguistic study identifying the main cause of decline in intergenerational transmission as ‘el bajo prestigio social y la percepción de inutilidad del asturiano que los ciudadanos tienen’ (Llera Ramo and San Martín Antuña 2003: 324) [‘the low social prestige and the perception that citizens have of the uselessness of Asturian’]. As in Sardinia, it is important not to concentrate solely on the community itself, but also to look at the external factors which influence speakers’ attitudes (Tollefson 1991: 75) with the institutions of the state evidently playing an important role. The significant powers of the Asturian autonomous government, however, do mean that some of this responsibility has shifted to the region itself. Since 1999 the autonomous government has had significant control over education and yet, as will be discussed in Chapter 7, little progress has been made in this area. Although historically the institutions of the state, particularly the education system, certainly played a role in ignoring and even denigrating the Asturian language, in the contemporary context it is evidently the regional political elites who have the potential opportunity to offer the most support for the Asturian language and yet, generally, fail to do so. Evidently, the speakers themselves also have a responsibility to continue using and transmitting their language to future generations, but without significant institutional support this becomes an undoubtedly huge task for a minority language community sharing space with such a prestigious and powerful language as Castilian.

The 2002 sociolinguistic study does, however, demonstrate that there exists a viable linguistic community of Asturian speakers which would be receptive to more effective and wide-ranging language policy measures (Llera Ramo and San Martín Antuña 2003: 181). Even if the regional political elites appear reluctant to support Asturian, this does not necessarily mean that the state should exclude the Asturian-speaking community from any measures it takes in its own institutions in support of the multilingualism of the state. In fact, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the Constitution itself appears to establish exactly this principle in Article 3.3 which provides for the ‘respect’ and ‘protection’ of Spain’s ‘linguistic varieties’ (Pérez Fernández 2010: 166). This potentially provides for a greater involvement of state institutions in the protection and respect of all of Spain’s linguistic varieties, including Asturian. Nevertheless, the attitude of the state appears to have been primarily to ignore the existence of Asturian entirely, as will become evident in the following discussion of the Spanish state’s cultural policies.
5.3.3 A (Multi-) Cultural Policy?

In recent years, there does appear to have been a greater acknowledgement of the multilingual reality of the state. The Head of State, King Juan Carlos, has often used Catalan when addressing the Catalan people (Vernet i Llobet 1994: 131), demonstrating a greater effort by the primary representatives of the state to acknowledge the multilingual reality of Spain. Other developments have also contributed to a greater representation of a multilingual Spain both internally and abroad. Since December 2001, for example, it has been permitted for Spanish Identity Cards to be issued in a bilingual format with Castilian and another official language (Council of Europe, 17 February 2011: 330), as was confirmed in Article 11.3 of the Royal Decree 1553/2005. The inclusion of Spain’s other official languages in documents which have a clear symbolic value and are under the control of state institutions, does represent an advance towards a multilingual state. As Emili Boix-Fuster argues, such measures can lead to a form of ‘banal’ multilingualism, with such usage moving away from being seen as antagonistic to merely a reflection of Spain’s undeniably multilingual reality (2006: 54).

Evidently, however, despite some progress, it remains the case that representations of Spain both domestically and abroad are often that of a monolingual Castilian-speaking country.

One of the areas in which the attitude of the state towards its various languages becomes particularly evident is cultural policy. Despite the significant autonomy granted to the regions to enact their own cultural policies, culture remains an area of action which can be exercised ‘without distinction’ by the state or the Autonomous Communities (art. 149.2, Spanish Constitution, 1978). It is for this reason that the state retains its own Ministry of Culture which is responsible for enacting cultural policies applicable to the whole state, including those territories with another official language (Crameri 2008: 32). There are, consequently, some examples of support provided for cultural output in all official languages. For example, Catalan and Spain’s other official languages have received significant funding and support for literature and publishing. Subsidies for the promotion of publishing and reading are generally available for all official languages (Council of Europe, 23 September 2002: 118; Council of Europe, 17 February 2011: 375-76). This was made explicit in a state Law in 2007 on reading, books and libraries, which stated that:

En la presente Ley se entiende que toda referencia al libro y su comercialización, la lectura y las bibliotecas, tiene como objeto el libro en castellano o en cualquiera de
las lenguas oficiales en las respectivas comunidades autónomas. (art. 1.3, Law 10/2007)

[In the present Law all references to the book and its marketing, reading and libraries, should be understood as referring to books in Castilian or in any official language in the respective Autonomous Communities.]

The same is true in various orders and resolutions issued by the Ministry of Culture which set out the conditions for the subsidies for publishing in all of Spain’s official languages, as well as the translation of books into and out of all of the Spanish languages (Solé i Durany 1994: 213-14; Vilardell i Codina 2001: 295; Vilardell i Codina 2002: 415; Pla 2010: 437-38; Resolution, 29 February 2008). As a result, the amount awarded in state subsidies for publications in the Catalan language was 591,077 euros for 2006, 130,446 euros for 2007, 208,145 euros for 2008 and 147,618.50 for 2009 (Council of Europe, 17 February 2011: 381). The National Prizes for Literature awarded by the Ministry of Culture also specify that they are open to works in any ‘Spanish’ language (Solé i Durany 1993: 174; Solé i Durany 1995: 235; Vilardell i Codina 2000: 336-39; Resolution, 31 March 2003; Resolution, 10 April 2006; Resolution, 22 May 2007). These prizes have often been won by Catalan writers such as Miquel Batllori in 2001, Martí de Riquer in 2000 and Pere Gimferrer in 1998 (Council of Europe, 23 September 2002: 119), as well as Josep Maria Castellet in 2010 (Ministerio de Política Territorial y Administración Pública, 12 July 2011), who have all produced significant works in the Catalan language.

It is important to note, however, that none of these subsidies or prizes appears to be available in support of literature or publishing in the Asturian language. The previously mentioned 2007 Law on reading refers only to official languages, as do the orders and resolutions for subsidies for publishing and the promotion of reading (art 1.3, Law 10/2007; Resolution, 29 February 2008). The National Prizes for Literature, however, would at first appear to be open to works in the Asturian language, since there is no reference to official status. Instead they typically claim to be open to ‘cualquier lengua española’ [‘any Spanish language’] (Resolution, 31 March 2003; Resolution, 10 April 2006; Resolution, 22 May 2007). Nevertheless, reading further on in these resolutions it becomes evident that, although not explicitly excluded, works in the Asturian language are unlikely to be considered since the jury includes only representatives from the academies of Spain’s official languages (Resolution, 31 March 2003; Resolution, 10 April 2006; Resolution, 22 May 2007). The absence of a representative from the Academy of the Asturian Language ensures that works in the
Asturian language remain effectively, if not explicitly, excluded. There is, however, no evidence of any significant protest made by the Asturian authorities at their exclusion from such funding and prizes, again demonstrating the lack of pressure on the state to ensure the inclusion of the Asturian language.

In the state-owned media, we also find Asturian entirely excluded, although again this is unsurprising given that the region itself has made only a minimal effort to provide for Asturian-language broadcasting. In the area of the media the state has the power to regulate the basic norms of the press, the radio and television (art. 149.1.27, Spanish Constitution 1979). The state broadcaster, the Corporación de Radio y Televisión Española (RTVE), has the responsibility to represent the whole state and the Constitution explicitly guarantees respect for Spain’s diverse languages in relation to the state-wide media (art 20.3, Spanish Constitution 1979). In order to fulfil this requirement the state television disconnects daily from state-wide programming and broadcasts in the other official language in the relevant Autonomous Communities (Council of Europe, 21 September 2005b: 166). According to the Spanish government, this means that 1000 hours of programming are broadcast annually by the state-owned media in Catalan (Council of Europe, 21 September 2005b: 166). This would at first appear to be a significant presence of Spain’s other languages, or at least Catalan. Nevertheless, according to a 2007 report submitted by the Spanish state to the Council of Europe, the hours of programming in Catalan appear to have declined significantly between 2001 and 2004, with the number of weekly hours broadcast falling from 26.5 hours in 2001 to 17.28 weekly hours in 2003 (Council of Europe, 30 April 2007: 269). This shows a certain inconsistency in the presence of Catalan.

The situation is even more concerning on the state-wide private channels, with the three terrestrial private channels (Antena 3, Tele5, Canal Plus) devoting no time to broadcasting in Catalan in 2004 (Council of Europe, 30 April 2007: 269). As these are privately owned channels, it may initially not appear to be the responsibility of the state to monitor the content of these channels. Nevertheless, the state is responsible for issuing the licences of these channels and when they were established with the Private Television Act in 1988, there was a notable absence of any reference to linguistic diversity or Spain’s languages anywhere in the Law (Law 10/1998). In addition, no provision was made for the possibility of licensing channels specifically for the Autonomous Communities with their own language. As Joan Pujolar explains, ‘In this way, the Spanish government was creating the conditions for Castilian-based media groups to dominate the Spanish market, conditions in which the articulation of Catalan,
Basque or Galician media groups became extremely difficult’ (2007a: 85). Certainly, it would appear that the 1988 Law allowed for an extension of the centralised monolingual Castilian model (Grifeu 2011: 187). Given the Castilian dominance on all state-wide channels, it is thus hardly surprising that the Catalan government only provides space for Catalan on its own television channels. Even with three Catalan terrestrial channels broadcasting solely in Catalan, the percentage of broadcasting in Catalan on the terrestrial channels within Catalonia still only amounts to around 30 per cent of the total (Council of Europe, 30 April 2007: 269).

The main failing of the state-owned media is, however, its refusal to project throughout Spain a positive impression or representation of its multilingual reality. This has been repeatedly criticised by the Committee of Experts from the Council of Europe in its reports on the implementation of the ECRML (Council of Europe, 11 December 2008: 24). The Spanish government appears to believe that it fulfils its obligation to reflect the multilingual nature of the state by providing limited hours to be broadcast in co-official languages solely in those areas where that language is official. Nevertheless, there is no evidence of any effort to promote a positive image of a multilingual state throughout the territory, which is an evident cause of tension. There is a similar problem in the education system, where opportunities to learn the other languages of Spain are extremely limited outside of the regions in which they are spoken, as will be dealt with in greater detail in Chapter 7. This lack of familiarity with Spain’s other languages outside of their territories does little to improve the often negative view many monolingual Castilian-speaking Spaniards have of the multilingual reality of the state.

The creation of the Council and Office for Official Languages by Royal Decree in 2007 appeared, however, to be a positive step in this direction. The main actions of the Council and Office relate to the use of the official languages in the state administration, which will be discussed in the following chapter. However, the Office also has the task to ‘Promover la difusión en la sociedad española de los valores del plurilingüismo y reforzar la implantación de medidas que coadyuven a tal fin’ (art 3.6, Royal Decree 905/2007) [‘Encourage awareness in Spanish society of the values of multilingualism and to strengthen the implementation of measures towards that aim’]. Nevertheless, on consulting the press releases of each Council Meeting there is no evidence of any significant activity in this field (Ministerio de Política Territorial y Administración Pública, 28 January 2008; 23 June 2009; 6 July 2010). The limited actions of the Office were also confirmed by one of its employees who stated that in reference to activities to encourage the values of multilingualism:
Por ejemplo, hace un año y medio un funcionario de la Oficina acudió a una presentación de un premio. Creo que el País Vasco y Cataluña otorgaron un premio a las empresas que fomentaran el plurilingüismo. Entonces nosotros fuimos allí para apoyarles. O sea la iniciativa no era nuestra pero era como un apoyo institucional para decir que el Ministerio se preocupa por la protección de las lenguas. (SI7)

[For example, around a year and a half ago an employee from the Office attended the presentation of a prize. I think that the Basque Country and Catalonia were awarding a prize to businesses which promoted multilingualism. So we went there to support them. I mean the initiative was not ours but it was a form of institutional support to show that the Ministry is concerned about the protection of languages.]

This example does in fact appear to confirm the extremely limited aims and actions of the Office, with no evidence of any action taken at the initiative of the Office itself in order to promote the values of multilingualism. This, however, may also relate to the very limited size of the Office, with the representative confirming that ‘contamos con una plantilla muy reducida’ (SI7) [‘we have a very reduced staff’]. When asked specifically about any funding available for the promotion of multilingualism, they also admitted that ‘no tenemos mucho dinero para hacer nada. No tenemos un crédito específico para promover el plurilingüismo’ (SI7) [‘We do not have much money to do anything. We do not have a specific fund to promote multilingualism’]. It is thus evident that the Council and Office for Official Languages have taken no significant action in terms of promoting the values of multilingualism among Spanish citizens.

Potentially most revealing of the approach of the Spanish state towards its various languages are the actions of the Cervantes Institute. The Cervantes Institute is a public non-profit body attached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (art. 2, Law 7/1991). The main aim of the Institute is the ‘promoción y difusión del español’ (art. 1, Law 7/1991) [‘promotion and spread of Spanish’], primarily abroad, and specifically to promote the study of the language abroad (art. 3.1a, Law 7/1991). This use of the term ‘Spanish’ clearly refers to just one ‘Spanish’ language, Castilian, and has inevitably meant that the Institute has focused almost solely on the promotion of Castilian, especially under the PP government (Balfour and Quiroga 2007: 170). Moreno Cabrera thus argues that ‘el Instituto Cervantes parece ser representante institucional de una ideología nacionalista castellano-céntrico dirigida desde Madrid’ (2008: 158) [‘the Cervantes Institute appears to be an institutional representative of a Castilian-centric nationalist ideology directed by Madrid’]. As the main cultural body representing the Spanish state abroad, this is hugely significant as it shapes the image and representation of Spanish culture abroad (del Valle and Gabriel-Stheeman 2007: 207). The image of
Spain the Institute successfully projects is primarily that of a monolingual Castilian country, with little reference made to Spain’s other languages.

There are, however, exceptions and some seats of the Institute have offered courses in Spain’s other official languages, beginning in 1994 (Council of Europe, 17 February 2011: 403). In particular, individual centres have held events related to the Catalan culture and language, but the initiative and funding still typically come from Catalonia, rather than the Institute itself. For example, in 1998 the Cervantes Institute in Lisbon offered to host Catalan language courses at the centre. The Catalan President, Jordi Pujol, however, claimed it was not a viable offer since, ‘ Este tipo de propuestas, que no me son nuevas, ofrece las instalaciones del Instituto de Cervantes a condición que la Generalitat financie la totalidad del curso’ (El Mundo, 30 May 1998: 18) [These types of proposals, which are not new to me, offer the facilities of the Cervantes Institute on the condition that the Catalan government finances the whole course’]. The presence of Catalan courses and cultural events at the Cervantes Institute does appear, however, to have become more stable since the Catalan government decided to create its own institute for the promotion of the Catalan language and culture abroad, the Ramon Llull Institute. In 2004, for example, the Cervantes Institute signed a cooperative agreement with the Ramon Llull Institute for the teaching of Catalan and the hosting of events related to Catalan culture in its own seats (Council of Europe, 17 February 2011: 269). Nevertheless, the fact that the Catalan government felt the need to create its own separate Institute does appear to point to the failings of the Cervantes Institute in its limited attempts to provide space for the Catalan language and culture.

In initial discussions over the creation of a separate Catalan institute, the involvement and potential support of the state was, in fact, a matter of significant controversy. The foundation was laid for the creation of the Ramon Llull Institute in 2000, when a collaboration agreement was signed between the Autonomous Communities of Catalonia and the Balearic Islands (Council of Europe, 23 September 2002: 48) in an attempt to improve links with other Catalan-speaking areas (Busquets, 16 May 2001). Most relevant here, however, was the fact that the then Councillor for Culture of Catalonia, Jordi Vilajoana, initially sought also the involvement of the central state in the funding of the Institute (Cordoba Vallet, 25 August 2000). Initial talks appeared promising, but the lack of a formal commitment from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs led to delays in the creation of the Institute (Busquets, 16 May 2001). Talks, however, seemed to be resolved in November 2001 with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reportedly agreeing to provide 50 per cent of the total annual costs, 500 million
pesetas (around 3 million euros), with the Cervantes Institute to be involved in the running of this new Institute, alongside the Catalan and Balearic governments (Busquets and Rusiñol, 14 November 2001).

Nevertheless, in July 2003 the Institute had still received no funding from the state more than a year after its creation, with the central government reportedly stating that it was not ‘obliged’ to provide this funding as the Institute was a consortium of two Autonomous Communities, and not the state (Padilla, 30 July 2003). Vilajoana, Councillor for Culture at the time of the creation of the Institute, confirms that the Institute did not receive any support from the state:

La idea era que el Cervantes participara económicamente. No lo conseguí, no lo conseguí. Conseguí que me aprobaran el Ramon Llull, que hace la promoción de la lengua y la cultura catalana, pero no conseguí que el Cervantes pusiera dinero.

(SI11)

[The idea was that the Cervantes Institute would contribute economically. I did not manage it, I did not manage it. I succeeded in ensuring that they approved the creation of the Ramon Llull Institute, which promotes the Catalan language and culture, but I did not get any money from the Cervantes Institute.]

Andreu Bosch from the Ramon Llull Institute also confirmed that the Institute’s funding ‘depende exclusivamente de las aportaciones de las transferencias del gobierno de Cataluña y del gobierno de las Islas Baleares’ (SI3) [‘depends solely on the contributions from transfers from the government of Catalonia and the government of the Balearic Islands’]. Although, as stated previously, there are still collaboration agreements with the Cervantes Institute, the central state clearly failed to fulfil its early promises to provide significant funding for the Ramon Llull Institute. Once again, any promotion of languages other than Castilian falls almost solely to the Autonomous Communities with the state maintaining its focus on Castilian.

This becomes particularly evident if we consider one of the primary areas of activity of the Ramon Llull Institute: the promotion of the teaching of Catalan in universities outside of the Catalan-speaking territories (Council of Europe, 17 February 2011: 264). Although many of the agreements with foreign universities for such teaching activities existed prior to its creation, the Institute has now consolidated these agreements to create a more formal structure (Council of Europe, 17 February 2011: 265). This has resulted in the quite paradoxical situation that it is easier to study Catalan in countries such as Germany and the United Kingdom, than it is in areas of Spain outside of the Catalan-speaking regions, despite the fact that the Ramon Llull Institute also offers funding for the teaching of Catalan in Spanish universities (Council of
Europe, 17 February 2011: 266). For example, in the 2007-08 academic year, there were only 205 students of Catalan in Spanish universities not located in Catalan-speaking areas, compared to 866 in the UK, 1053 in France and 1953 in Germany (Council of Europe, 17 February 2011: 267-68). It is evidently a result of the efforts made by the Catalan government and the cooperation of foreign universities which have allowed for these impressive results abroad. The Spanish government, however, appears to have made little effort to encourage similar opportunities within its own territory.

Overall, the lack of involvement of the institutions of the central state in the promotion and protection of Catalan, as well as the failure to present the multilingual character of Spain as a positive aspect of its cultural heritage, point to the main failings of the state’s language policy. As the report by the Council of Europe noted:

it is still necessary to convey to the general population the cultural value of this plurilingualism as the exclusively Castilian-speaking population living in autonomous regions with no co-official language tend to see it more as a problem to be overcome than as an indication of cultural wealth to be fostered. (Council of Europe, 11 December 2008: 24)

The lack of efforts to promote the cultural value of Spain’s multilingual reality by the institutions of the state appears to encourage continued hostility in monolingual Spain towards the bilingual regions of the state (Barrera González 2004: 16). A greater presence of Spain’s other languages on the state media and improved opportunities to study these languages outside of their territories could improve interregional relationships and lead to a more flexible approach to linguistic borders. This is not to suggest that all of Spain’s citizens become fluent in all of Spain’s other languages, which evidently has its practical and financial limitations. However, it does appear that greater efforts are needed to increase familiarity and sensitivity to Spain’s linguistic diversity, which could be achieved through a more plural and inclusive approach to both cultural and language policy in Spain.

Both the Catalan and Asturian cases demonstrate that the institutions of the state rarely take the initiative themselves in providing support for Spain’s other languages. The at times exclusivist nature of Catalonia’s cultural policies has been discussed above. Nevertheless, given the often almost exclusive focus on Castilian by the institutions of the central state, this potentially ‘defensive’ approach is hardly surprising, particularly given the reality that Catalan will always be the numerically inferior language in Spain and even in Catalonia. As Boix-Fuster argues:

Los nacionalistas catalanes, vascos y gallegos tendrían que abandonar las reticencias hacia el término español, y los nacionalistas españoles, desde el Estado tendrían que...
aceptar que las lenguas y culturas, y las nacionalidades distintas de las castellanas forman parte de España. (2004: 206)

[The Catalan, Basque and Galician nationalists must abandon their reservations towards the term *Spanish*, and the Spanish nationalists from the state must accept that the languages, cultures and nationalities distinct from Castilian form part of Spain.]

Some of the developments in recent years, particularly under the Socialist government, do suggest steps have been taken in this direction, even if their impact and extent is still minimal. In the Asturian case, however, it would appear unlikely, and perhaps even unrealistic, for the state to provide the support that the regional government shows little will to provide, even if Article 3.3 of the Constitution does provide for this possibility. Perhaps the best that could be hoped for would be that Asturian is not automatically excluded from any actions the state does take in recognising and promoting its multilingual heritage.

5.4 Conclusion

To draw together the case studies from both Spain and Italy, it is interesting to note the different role a language can play in specific contexts. In the cases of the Catalan- and German-speaking communities, language is often considered the primary marker of a distinct identity and culture. Joshua Fishman wrote that ‘A common link between the direction of language planning and the direction of other planning efforts in many countries may be the nationalist ideological underpinnings that they may all share’ (1972a: xi). This also applies to the Catalan case where it is the centrality of language to Catalan nationalism which has ensured the implementation of policies to secure the continued presence, and indeed even dominance in certain spheres, of the Catalan language. In Alto Adige/Südtirol, the strong identification of the German speakers with neighbouring Austria has also meant that, as well as benefitting from access to the large German-speaking cultural market, there is a significant will among German speakers to continue using the language. The dangers of ethnic exclusivity and nationalist excesses in both cases were also recognised, and certainly there is a need to encourage more positive attitudes towards bilingual forms of identification, particularly in the German-speaking case. Nevertheless, it is precisely the strong sense of identity derived from their languages which ensures the perpetuation and survival of the language in both cases.

In the Asturian and Sardinian cases, on the other hand, it remains to be seen whether the weaker attachment to the language community than that in evidence in
national groups evokes sufficient loyalty among speakers to ensure that their language is transmitted to potential future members of these communities. In both cases, despite the existence of increasingly positive attitudes to the language and a strong sense of regional identity, this has failed to develop into a significant cultural and political movement which would appear to be essential in ensuring the implementation of effective language policies. The absence of a significant nationalist movement also means that there is little to no pressure on the institutions of the state to take notice of the Asturian- and Sardinian-speaking communities. Unfortunately, it would appear unrealistic to expect the state to intervene entirely on its own initiative to improve the prestige and status of a language, even if it may well have been the institutions of the state which in the past ensured the subordination and even denigration of these languages.

Nevertheless, both the Spanish and Italian states do appear to have recognised some of the limitations and dangers of the traditional monolingual nation-state model. While state-led nationalism has often foreseen the need to unify its people, both politically and culturally, such projects, by refusing to recognise or allow space for distinct cultures and identities, often end up drawing attention to the differences within and can also be the cause of internal conflict. As Bourdieu explains, ‘the culture which unifies […] is also the culture which separates […] and which legitimates distinctions by forcing all other cultures (designated as sub-cultures) to define themselves by their distance from the dominant culture’ (1991: 167). This would appear to apply to both the cases of Catalonia and Alto Adige/Südtirol, where the previous attempts to forcibly assimilate these territories into the national culture ended up reinforcing the sense of a distinct identity and culture among these communities. Under democratic rule, both the Spanish and Italian states have attempted to reverse these policies to a certain extent, by generally respecting the cultural autonomy of these areas. This has led to the appearance that both states may be moving towards more multilingual and multicultural models, and the Spanish case in particular is often pointed to as a model for the recognition of multilingualism.

However, on closer examination, particularly in relation to the state’s cultural policies and the state-owned media, the institutions of both Spain and Italy remain primarily monolingual in their focus and actions. The impression in both cases remains therefore that the states themselves are monolingual, with some almost ‘anomalous’ bi- or multilingual areas within the state which are clearly demarcated. In the Italian case, in particular, despite the recent passing of Law 482, there is evidence of a continued
struggle to accept that groups without an external cultural link to a neighbouring state can be considered genuine linguistic minorities. This demonstrates an unwillingness to accept linguistic and cultural differences within what is considered to be the Italian ‘nation’. Both states also still expect the financial burden of the promotion and protection of minority languages to be placed almost entirely on the regional or provincial governments concerned, demonstrating a lack of genuine commitment to a multilingual and multicultural state.

There is also evidence in both Spain and Italy of a reactionary nationalist opposition to the recognition and protection provided for linguistic minorities. Although this opposition is most apparent in the traditionally conservative and right-wing parties in both countries, there is still evidence that linguistic and cultural diversity is widely considered to be dangerous or at least problematic. Both states, for example, fail to promote the values of multilingualism at the state level and, in particular, the institutions of both states do little to encourage greater familiarity or sensitivity to linguistic diversity throughout the whole population. A greater recognition of the values of multilingualism could lead to a greater integration of areas such as Alto Adige/Südtirol and Catalonia, which have often felt themselves to be in conflict with the monolingual state. Equally, by promoting the values of multilingualism throughout the state, there may be the opportunity for Sardinians and Asturians to recognise the value of their own languages without the need for a conflicting nationalist movement. There is still evidently a need to overcome the continued nationalist focus on monolingualism, in order for both Spain and Italy to fully recognise and value the multilingual reality which exists within their respective states.
Chapter 6: Political Representation, Autonomy and Jurisdiction over Language Policy

6.1 Introduction
As stated in Section 1.4.2, while the term ‘linguistic minority’ draws attention to numerical size, it often relates more to a lack of power and a politically non-dominant position. Consequently, this chapter will deal with the pursuit and exercise of political power by linguistic minorities within Spain and Italy. In reference to all four minorities, the chapter will consider the division of powers between the state and regional or provincial institutions, as well as the political representation of all four groups at the centre. The chapter will focus specifically on jurisdiction over language policy and the freedom of action of the sub-state levels of government in this area. This will lead on to a final discussion of how this division of powers works in relation to the language use of the state and regional administrations and institutions. Both the Italian and Spanish cases will thus allow for conclusions to be drawn on the importance of regional autonomy and political power for linguistic minorities, as well as considering the complexities involved in the division of powers where language policy is concerned.

6.2 Italy

6.2.1 Political Autonomy and Political Representation in Alto Adige/Südtirol and Sardinia
In Italy there are five special statute regions, as established in Section 3.2.2, and Sardinia and Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol are both included in this category. Most of these regions were characterised by the presence of a significant linguistic minority, which means that regional autonomy could also, to a certain extent, be considered autonomy for linguistic minorities to govern themselves (Woelk 2003: 228). In fact, the Italian government even clarified in their report to the Council of Europe that, ‘The ultimate objective of Italy’s policy in relation to the protection of minorities is […] the recognition of adequate autonomy’ (Council of Europe, 3 May 1999: 68). Nevertheless, this should not be mistaken for preferential treatment for these regions, but rather as an attempt to adapt to the specific and unique situations of these areas (Palermo 2008b: 37). This also means that even among the special statute regions there is a great difference in the level of autonomy granted, which, in theory at least, is adapted to the specific contexts of these regions (Bin 2003: 205).
Looking first at Alto Adige/Südtirol, it is important to remember, as mentioned in Section 3.2.4, that this is not an official region, but the more northern of the two provinces within the autonomous region of Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol. However, since the introduction of the second Special Statute in 1972, the majority of regional powers were passed to the autonomous provinces of the German-dominated Bolzano (Alto Adige/Südtirol) and the Italian-dominated Trento. Alessandro Pizzorusso describes this as a form of ‘autonomia territoriale su base maggioritaria’ [‘territorial autonomy on a majority basis’], with the German minority given majority control over the provincial government, and consequently decision-making powers over those areas delegated to the province (1975: 140). Furthermore, as will be discussed later, the number of areas over which the province has power has continually increased since the introduction of the 1972 Statute.

This form of self-government was principally designed as a form of ethnic conflict resolution in the area for, as Anthony Alcock states, after fascism, ‘The mood of the South Tyrolese as they prepared to negotiate on an autonomy was that never again should Italians have a say in their economic, social and cultural development’ (1992: 20). Furthermore, the central government was increasingly willing to negotiate greater forms of autonomy and language rights to avoid secessionist desires gaining strength and risking the unity of the state. As explained in Section 3.2.4, the SVP has been the principle driving force in the development of autonomous government, as well as in negotiations to secure German minority protection. All of the special statute regions do, in fact, have the possibility to negotiate with the state on the development of autonomy on an equal footing, since, as Francesco Palermo explains, ‘relations between the state and the special regions are not based on hierarchy but, in principle, on parity’ (2008b: 40). However, none have exploited this possibility to the same extent as the SVP in Alto Adige/Südtirol. Furthermore, by engaging in bilateral negotiations with the central government, the SVP has demonstrated its move away from secessionism, and instead has helped define the concept of ‘internal’ self-determination, by remaining within the state but securing sufficient legislative and administrative powers to ensure the survival of the respective minority culture and language (Alcock 1992: 28)

Although the Italian government may take some credit in granting this high level of autonomy to Alto Adige/Südtirol, the credit lies principally with the SVP. As Oskar Peterlini, Senator for the SVP, argues:
Il ruolo non lo assegnerai mai al potere centrale ma sempre alla dinamica, alla forza propulsiva delle minoranze stesse […]. Perché il governo […] si muove quando c’è richiesta, quando c’è movimento, quando c’è pressione. (II11)

[I would never assign the role to the central powers but always to the dynamic, the propulsive force of the minorities themselves […]. Because the government […] responds when there is demand, when there is movement, when there is pressure.]

This pressure has been made effective by the German minority’s ability to create its own political class, as represented principally by the SVP. Evidence of this distinct political class can be easily found in voting patterns in the province, which follow an entirely different pattern to other regions and provinces in Italy (Roux and Tronconi 2009: 158). This capable and stable political class has also led to the establishment of a well-functioning and effective provincial level of government, especially in contrast to the central government, which is often judged to be ineffective and untrustworthy (Parolari and Voltmer 2008: 94). A strong civic culture has developed, and recent years have also seen an economic blossoming, with the province transforming itself from a relatively poor area to one of the richest in Italy by 2000, with minimal unemployment (Alcock 2000: 180). The provincial political class has consequently proved itself more than capable of self-government even to the extent of demonstrating ‘state-like characteristics’ (Grote 2012: 134).

The strength and unity of the SVP also provides it with a significant voice at the state level. Despite the significant autonomy granted, the existence of a strong representation in central government institutions remains important in order to ensure that decisions taken at the centre are not harmful to the minority and province. The special autonomy and minority protection measures applied in the province do also, in fact, have an impact on certain state bodies. For example, provincial presidents of Bolzano play a national role, with their right to intervene in sessions of the Council of Ministers in matters concerning the province (Avolio 2008: 67). The SVP has also played a significant and influential role in determining and supporting the national government. The political instability of the past two decades, and particularly the struggle of the principal political parties to maintain a majority, has placed the SVP in a crucial position. A full coalition agreement was established for the 2006 elections between the SVP and the centre-left alliance led by Romano Prodi. In prior negotiations, the SVP presented Prodi with a list of demands in return for joining the coalition, which eventually went on to be modified to form the coalition agreement between the SVP and Prodi’s left-wing alliance. The principal demands referred to the need to reform the current Statute and to continue the dynamic autonomy process with a
further delegation of powers to the province (Donatini, 17 February 2006). Although, in reality, the subsequently elected Prodi-led government was unable to make much progress due to its instability, this does demonstrate the strong position in which the SVP found itself.

In fact, after Prodi’s opening speech to the Senate in 2006, the SVP Senator Helga Thaler Ausserhofer effectively reprimanded Prodi for his failure to mention the cases of linguistic minorities and autonomy for the special statute regions:

Nel suo intervento, non mi è parso di sentire alcun riferimento a queste realtà e non le nego il mio dispiacere. Sono comunque convinta che si tratti di una semplice svista e che non mancherà di riservare loro [le minoranze linguistiche] in questa legislatura la giusta attenzione. (Helga Thaler Ausserhofer, Senato della Repubblica, 19 May 2006)

[In your speech, I did not seem to hear any reference to these situations and I cannot hide my disappointment. I am, however, sure that it was a simple oversight and that you will not fail to pay them [the linguistic minorities] appropriate attention during this legislature.]

This appears to be an extremely clear reminder of Prodi’s obligations to the SVP, and Prodi responded in kind that:

Vorrei anche ringraziare – non l’ho fatto all’inizio perché voglio farlo in modo specifico adesso – per l’intervento di coloro che rappresentano le minoranze linguistiche del Paese, alla cui tutela diamo un’estrema importanza. (Romano Prodi, Senato della Repubblica, 19 May 2006)

[I would also like to thank – I did not do so earlier as I would like to do so specifically now – those who represent the linguistic minorities of the country, whose safeguarding is of the utmost importance to us.]

The SVP also fulfilled its obligations of support, helping Prodi’s government to pass a vote of confidence the following year (Senato della Repubblica, 28 February 2007). Evidently, the strong political presence of the SVP at the centre has ensured that its demands are continually represented in the national government and parliament, and this has ensured a significant voice for the German-speaking minority.

Special arrangements have also been made to ensure the party’s minority status does not hamper its access to parliament, such as ensuring that, in regions with an officially recognised linguistic minority, the constituencies would be as small as possible to ensure their effective representation (Law 276, 4 August 1993; Law 277, 4 August 1993; art. 1.12, Law 270, 21 December 2005). These special measures supposedly ensured the fulfilment of Article 6 of the Constitution for the protection of Italy’s linguistic minorities, but in reality they only apply to regions where the special
statute explicitly provides for the protection of a specific linguistic minority, demonstrating the continued privileged position of those minorities recognised prior to Law 482. The measure thus clearly excludes Sardinia since its Special Statute contains no references to linguistic minorities. The SVP has, however, been instrumental in forcing linguistic minorities onto the political agenda in general, and, rather than blocking similar protection for other minorities, has vehemently supported such activities. Despite receiving no direct benefits from Law 482, the SVP was one of its main supporters, and has also repeatedly called for the ratification of the ECRML. The system established in Alto Adige/Südtirol for the German minority already goes far beyond both of these documents in terms of linguistic minority protection but, as Senator Oskar Peterlini explains in reference specifically to Law 482, ‘Noi l’abbiamo promossa e sostenuta perché […] questa Legge promuove tutte le minoranze che effettivamente ci sono e questo riconoscimento è importante’ (II11) [‘We promoted it and supported it because […] this Law effectively promotes all of the existing minorities and this recognition is important’].

Nevertheless, the generic support for linguistic minorities of the SVP is no substitute for an individual political voice for other minorities, and the nature of the SVP means that the specific demands of the German minority will remain its raison d’être. In Sardinia, despite the large size of the Sardinian-speaking community, no such hegemonic political force exists to represent their specific demands. There does exist a Sardinian party in the form of the PSdA, which was founded in 1921 and is in fact the oldest autonomist party in Italy. As Eve Hepburn explains, it ‘was the first to demand autonomy and recognition of its nationhood within the modern Italian state’ (2009: 595). In fact, in 1994 the PSdA elected four members to the regional council who also joined the regional government and contributed to the introduction of Regional Law 26 on the Sardinian language (Hepburn 2009: 602). Subsequently, in 1996, the party joined the centre-left national coalition, L’Ulivo, and due to the pact even managed to elect a Senator in the national elections (Ministero dell’Interno [no date]). However, by the 2000s the party’s influence and political weight had significantly declined. Other Sardinian nationalist parties have emerged in the past two decades, most notably Sardigna Natzione which, unlike the PSdA, supports full independence for Sardinia. Nevertheless, it has been subject to splits and divisions, and its overall influence has been minimal (Hepburn 2009: 604-05). Even when the PSdA and Sardigna Natzione formed a coalition in the 2001 regional elections, they only received a total of 3.4 per cent of the vote (Hepburn 2009: 610).
In fact, regional voting patterns have largely followed those of the rest of Italy, demonstrating the failure to develop a separate Sardinian political class (Roux and Tronconi 2009: 158). The majority of Sardinia’s political representatives, especially at the national level, instead come from the major national Italian parties. This is not to say that these individual political representatives may not be concerned with defending Sardinian interests, but this is quite different from a political party whose main purpose is the defence of a specific linguistic minority’s interests. This is reflected in the original Sardinian Statute and right from the start Sardinians were slow to realise the importance of autonomy as a guarantee of effective self-government. As Mariarosa Cardia explains:

si affermò un autonomismo nettamente economicistico, perché non si volle o non si poté disegnare un’autonomia forte, culturalmente motivata, una specificità sarda che non si esaurisse nell’arretratezza e nella povertà economica. (1998: 749)

[a strictly economic view of autonomy was established, because there was not the will or the ability to design a strong form of culturally motivated autonomy or a sense of a Sardinian specificity which was not depleted by backwardness and economic poverty.]

The Sardinian political elites have often appeared more concerned with establishing themselves in Rome, rather than in securing regional autonomy and establishing an effective and successful regional government.

Economic dependence on the central government has also hindered the development of autonomy for, as Palermo states, out of all of the special statute regions, ‘Sicily and Sardinia concentrated more on developing political ties with the central government and on benefiting from the consistent financial aid from the state than on making use of their institutional autonomy’ (2008b: 37). In fact, the Sardinian statute includes a unique clause which is not present in any other statute: namely, a commitment by the state to ‘la rinascita economica e sociale dell’Isola’ (art. 13, Special Statute for Sardinia 1948) [‘the economic and social renaissance of the island’]. Although perhaps appearing at first a generous concession by the state, it in reality sealed the future dependence of the region on the state (Hepburn 2009: 599). Neither Sicily nor Sardinia has taken full advantage of their special status, and economic problems and stagnation mean they have often been treated in a similar way to other Southern regions with an ordinary status. This economic and political dependence on the state has meant a failure to develop the appropriate institutional structure and instruments to ensure an effective self-government.

This dependent relationship on Rome has also meant that the Sardinian politicians have failed to establish a strong and independent voice at the centre.
Furthermore, the recent electoral reforms of the 1990s and 2000s have increasingly meant that a vote for a minority party such as the PSdA is essentially a wasted vote, and has made the continued existence of such parties more difficult. In fact, for European elections, the situation is particularly problematic as the European Parliament electoral law means that Sardinia is placed in the same constituency as the much larger Sicilian region (Law 18, 24 January 1979). This has effectively meant that the Sardinians have struggled to elect a single Sardinian MEP, even from the leading Italian parties, and they have not succeeded in doing so since 1994 (Hepburn 2009: 602). The geographical separation of Sardinia, as well as the strong linguistic minority presence, can be seen as further justification for the need to make special arrangements for the Sardinian electorate. The fact that such arrangements have been made for other minorities, most notably the German-speaking minority, is proof that it would be entirely within reason to attempt to remedy this situation, which is effectively blocking the election of a Sardinian representative to the European parliament.

It does appear that Sardinian politicians are increasingly aware of the need to gain effective representation at the central, and even European, level. In fact, the representatives of the state parties in Sardinia have over the past two decades, as Hepburn establishes, become ‘expert at playing the Sardinian card’ (2009: 606). There has been growing support for ‘real’ autonomy across the political spectrum, with a majority in the Regional Council approving an admittedly primarily rhetorical declaration of the sovereignty of Sardinia in 1999 (Hepburn 2009: 606). Most importantly a coalition of the regional branches of the state’s centre-left parties called the Progetto Sardegna was formed and elected in the 2004 regional elections, which was then transformed into a political party called the Partito Democratic Sardo in 2007 (Hepburn 2009: 610). As well as supporting greater autonomy, the party has aimed at the strengthening of Sardinia’s identity, language and culture in order to build self-confidence and underpin economic development (Hepburn 2009: 611). For example, it was under this regional government that the previously discussed Limba Sarda Comuna was introduced, primarily to support a greater introduction of the language into administrative offices. These recent attempts to provide recognition at the regional level for a distinct Sardinian culture and language demonstrate a growing awareness of the need to provide a strong cultural basis from which to launch an effective political project for regional autonomy. Nevertheless, Sardinia continues to struggle to escape its dependent role on the state, and is certainly unable to establish itself as an equal partner.
in negotiations with the state. As the following section will demonstrate, this has clearly restricted the region’s powers and freedom of action in relation to language policy.

6.2.2 State, Regional and Provincial Jurisdiction over Language Policy

As Martin Bull and James Newell explain, the existence of sub-national, as well as supra-national, levels of government means that ‘policy is something that emerges from consultation and negotiation between decision-makers located in a wide range of institutional settings’ (2005: 155). In the case of language policy, the situation is particularly complicated since it normally impacts on many other policy areas and consequently it cannot be treated as a specific power to be attributed to either the state or sub-state level of government. In Italy, this has been a cause of confusion and controversy, and in a case against the Bolzano government in 1960 the Constitutional Court declared that the province lacked the powers to legislate concerning language use in provincial offices and bodies. The Court confirmed this judgement again in 1961, stating that ‘La competenza normativa in ordine all’uso della lingua appartiene esclusivamente allo Stato’ (Sentence 1, 28 February 1961) [‘Jurisdiction concerning the use of a language belongs exclusively to the state’]. However, in the 1980s there was a notable change in attitude, with Sentences in 1983 (Sentence 312, 30 September 1983) and 1987 (Sentence 289, 22 May-28 July 1987), when the Court began to:

riconoscere la tutela delle minoranze linguistiche, non più come una materia da disciplinare, ma come un obiettivo da perseguire attraverso la legislazione sia statale che regionale, nell’ambito delle rispettive competenze. (Palici di Suni Prat 2000: 102)

[recognise the safeguarding of linguistic minorities, no longer as a subject to regulate, but as an objective to be pursued by either regional or state legislation, in the area of their respective powers.]

These judgements thus confirmed that the protection of linguistic minorities was a guiding principle for both regional and state legislation.

Since the recent reforms of the Constitution, the division of powers has been further clarified in a recent report from the Constitutional Court, which established that:

Dalla richiamata giurisprudenza costituzionale si ricava che l’attuazione in via di legislazione ordinaria dell’art. 6 Cost. in tema di tutela delle minoranze linguistiche genera un modello di riparto delle competenze fra Stato e Regioni che non corrisponde alle ben note categorie previste per tutte le altre materie nel Titolo V della seconda parte della Costituzione. (Corte Costituzionale, 25 February 2010)

[From the relevant constitutional law it can be established that the implementation by ordinary legislation of art. 6 of the Constitution concerning the safeguarding of linguistic minorities creates a model of shared powers between the state and regions]
which does not correspond to the clear categories established for all other matters in Title V of the second part of the Constitution.]

This supposed clarification confirms that the protection of linguistic minorities remains a complex subject, constituting a shared area of legislation, and consequently often a continued source of conflict between the state and regions. However, the system also varies from region to region, especially in the case of the special statute regions, where the level of regional autonomy established typically determines the involvement of the state in language policies concerning the linguistic minorities.

The Alto Adige/Südtirol case, as previously established, represents the peak of autonomy, although in this case on a largely provincial rather than regional basis. However, despite this exceptional degree of autonomy, as Jens Woelk explains, ‘by contrast with independence, even far-reaching autonomy requires some degree of integration into the larger context of the state’ (2008: 122). This means principally that the autonomous actions of the regional government must remain compatible with the legal system of the state. How much control the central government retains, however, has been a matter of continual debate. In 1988, for example, a law was introduced providing the central government with powers of ‘direction and coordination’ (Law 400, 23 August 1988). However, in 1992 a decree was passed which meant that, while in other regions the coordinating legislation of the central government comes into immediate effect, the regional and provincial governments of Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol have six months to adapt their own laws to the relevant national laws (Peterlini 2000: 143). It also placed further limits on the coordinating powers of the state, which was required to negotiate with the territorial authority before exercising this power (Legislative Decree 266, 16 March 1992).

The 2001 constitutional reform also removed the role of Government Commissioner, meaning that the central government can now only challenge regional legislation after it has come into force in all Italian regions (Woelk 2008: 128). As well as the recent limitations placed on the coordinating role of the state, since 1992 there has been the development of what is termed ‘dynamic autonomy’ in Alto Adige/Südtirol (Parolari and Voltmer 2008: 78), whereby further powers have been passed to the province despite the fact that the state is no longer obliged by international agreements to do so. The province now has power over all those areas closest to everyday life. As Sara Parolari and Leonhard Voltmer explain, ‘The impact of the province is felt much more than the rather abstract subjects of national concern: foreign policy, state budget, etc.’ (2008: 93). Furthermore, the province receives back from the
state around 90 per cent of the tax revenue collected in the area (Benedikter 2008: 109). This is considered a highly generous agreement and, as a result, even those areas of shared power with the central government are often dominated by the province due to its control over financial resources.

In terms of the protection of linguistic minorities in the province, there does also seem to be a significant freedom of action. The Special Statute for the region states that ‘the safeguarding of linguistic minorities’ constitutes a ‘national interest’ (art. 4, Special Statute for Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol 1972). In addition, a 1989 Sentence by the Constitutional Court recognised that the protection of linguistic minorities constituted ‘un principio costituzionale che, affermato in via generale dall’art. 6 della Cost., ha nello Statuto speciale per il Trentino-Alto Adige un significato particolarmente pregnante’ (Sentence 242, 13 April 1989) [‘a Constitutional principle which, although established generally in art. 6 of the Constitution, has a particularly important meaning in the Special Statute of Trentino-Alto Adige’]. This gives the province greater legitimacy in introducing legislation in this domain. Furthermore, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the province has exclusive powers in the area of culture, a significant area of minority protection. Education still remains an area of shared power between the state and the province. The province does have primary legislative capacities in certain areas, such as nurseries and vocational institutions. In the areas of primary and secondary education, however, the province shares legislative powers with the state (art. 9, Special Statute for Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol 1972). As Luis Prader explains, this means that ‘Vengono pertanto osservate le riforme scolastiche nazionali di carattere generale, vanno attuati i programmi scolastici vigenti, salvo l’esercizio della facoltà di adeguarli alle esigenze locali’ (2006: 45) [‘The national education reforms of a general character are adopted, the current school programmes are implemented, but with some freedom to adapt them to local needs’]. This means that the provincial directors of education are in continual contact with Rome. As Armin Gatterer from the provincial government explains:

Ci vuole questo continuo contatto perché sempre c’è la necessità di dover rispettare i principi delle leggi statali, anche quando si modificano questi principi per poterli recepire qui in provincia […]. Bisogna tradurre la riforma statale nella realtà locale, e per fare questo ci sono continue trattative. (II5)

[This continual contact is necessary in order to respect the principles of state laws, even where these principles are modified in order to be adopted here in the province […]. We have to translate the state reform into the local context, and to do this there are continual negotiations.]
This example demonstrates the complexity of relations between the state and the province in matters of shared legislative powers. Nevertheless, the Bolzano province has been granted greater control over education in recent years as part of this dynamic autonomy process. A decree in 1996, for example, provided greater administrative powers over education, with the province gaining control over the legal and economic status of all teaching staff (Legislative Decree 434, 24 July 1996). In addition, the German-speaking minority, along with the Slovene- and French-speaking minorities, elect their own representative to the National Council for Public Education, giving them a greater say in the design of school curriculums and concerning education reforms (Prader 2006: 45).

Overall, however, for the German-speaking political representatives the priority remains increasing the level of autonomy rather than having a greater say in policy-making at the centre. As Siegfried Brugger explains:

[Lo stato] non deve neanche fare molto per la tutela della minoranza […]. Meno abbiamo a che fare con competenze statali, più larga la nostra autonomia e anche il nostro autogoverno, e dunque più siamo noi stessi che possiamo tutelare noi […]. Lo stato deve mettere la cornice, lo stato deve mettere le garanzie, e tutto il resto lo dobbiamo fare noi. (II2)

[[The state] does not even need to do much to safeguard the minority […]. The less we have to do with state powers, the greater our autonomy and our self-government, the more we ourselves can protect us […]. The state should provide the framework, the state must provide the guarantees, and everything else we must do ourselves.]

A representative from the central Department for Regional Affairs, which is responsible for relations between the state and the regions and deals with the question of linguistic minorities, also confirmed that the exceptional autonomy arrangements have meant that its role is limited in relation to the province:

È una legislazione completamente autonoma e noi non ci occupiamo della tutela delle minoranze. Ci sono delle commissioni che servono per armonizzare le norme che vengono fatte lì, ma noi non ci occupiamo di questo. (II7)

[It is a completely autonomous legislation and we are not involved in the safeguarding of the minorities. There are commissions to harmonise the regulations introduced there, but we are not involved in this.]

Self-government is viewed as the most effective tool of German minority protection, and current relations with the state appear to ensure that this autonomy and freedom of action is guaranteed.

This has not been the case in Sardinia and nor has the Sardinian region in any sense fully exploited the possibilities of self-government, either as an effective form of
government or as a tool of minority protection. As the most recent Plan for the Sardinian Language made clear, the unequal relations with the state and Sardinia’s dependent role have meant a failure to ‘ricercare competenze primarie sul piano normativo (a differenza di altre regioni a statuto speciale) per la cura del patrimonio culturale e ambientale’ (Regione Autonoma della Sardegna 2007: 4) [‘demand primary legislative powers (in contrast to other special statute regions) for the protection of the cultural and environmental heritage’]. Sardinia’s Special Statute contains no references to linguistic minorities, and consequently no specific system of minority protection is constitutionally established. Sardinia has also often lacked the necessary legislative power in major areas of language policy. As Giuseppe Corongiu writes:

non sono previste assolutamente competenze di questa natura, ovvero in materia di protezione linguistica e di interventi su beni culturali, che afferiscono ancora tutto allo Stato. Attualmente vi è solo una potestà complementare che riguarda la scuola e i beni culturali. Quindi anche questo è un grosso ostacolo dal punto di vista giuridico e legislativo. (2008: 122)

[powers relating to linguistic protection and interventions concerning the cultural heritage have absolutely not been foreseen, and they are still held entirely by the state. Currently there is merely a complementary power in relation to education and cultural heritage. This is consequently a huge additional obstacle from the legal and legislative perspective.]

This again is related to the previously mentioned failure of the Sardinian political class to recognise the importance and value of regional autonomy. In particular, education remains primarily under the jurisdiction of the state, despite the increasing autonomy given to individual schools.

The use of Sardinian in the education system will be dealt with in the following chapter. However, the lack of autonomous powers in this area caused particular controversy in 1994 when a Regional Law for the ‘Tutela e valorizzazione della cultura e della lingua della Sardegna’ [‘Safeguarding and promotion of the culture and language of Sardinia’] passed in 1993, was challenged by the central government at the Constitutional Court, on the basis that the Law exceeded the legislative powers of the region in the area of education. The Court found in favour of the central government, stating that:

gli interventi previsti sono diretti a incidere illegittimamente sulla competenza, di esclusiva spettanza dello Stato, concernente la determinazione degli insegnamenti curriculari mediante l’inserimento nei programmi scolastici di nuove materie. (Sentence 290, 4-13 July 1994)
by introducing new subjects in school programmes, these actions are aimed at
illegally encroaching on the state’s exclusive jurisdiction over the design of teaching
curriculums.

The Sentence also explicitly clarified that the shared legislative powers assigned to
Bolzano in its Special Statute in the area of education for the protection of linguistic
minorities did not apply in Sardinia (Sentence 290, 4-13 July 1994). Instead, the
Sardinian Statute only accords the region the right to ‘adattare alle sue particolari
esigenze le disposizioni delle leggi della Repubblica, emanando norme di integrazione
ed attuazione’ ['adapt the provisions of the laws of the Republic to its specific needs, by
issuing regulations for their integration and implementation’] in the area of education
(art. 5, Special Statute for Sardinia 1948). This provision would appear to give the
region extremely limited opportunities to make any changes to the curriculum or
syllabus, and the Sentence provides no recognition of the existence of a Sardinian-
speaking minority.

As mentioned previously, a new law for the promotion of the Sardinian language
was passed and went unchallenged in 1997 (Regional Law 26, 15 October 1997),
signalling a greater acceptance of the status of Sardinian speakers as a linguistic
minority. Recent national reforms have also provided for greater autonomy for all
schools and regional authorities, including a 2002 reform which provided for a ‘quota
regionale dei piani di studio’ ['regional share in the school syllabuses’] in addition to
the national share (Siviero 2003: 339), which essentially allows for the regional
government to define an unspecified percentage of the school syllabus. Nevertheless, as
will be demonstrated in Chapter 7, the continued lack of regional autonomy and
legislative powers still prevents a more ambitious introduction of Sardinian into the
school curriculum. The state recognition provided in Law 482 may have improved the
situation in Sardinia, but there are also evidently still clear limitations, and not just in
relation to education.

6.2.3 The Use of German and Sardinian in the Administration

The use of the respective languages in administrative contexts offers a particular insight
into how the division of powers in relation to language policy actually works. In Alto
Adige/Südtirol, although the 1972 Statute clearly established the equal status of German
(art. 99, Special Statute for Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol 1972), it was not until a decree
was passed in 1988 that the right to use German with the public administration was fully
implemented (Decree of the President of the Republic 574, 15 July 1988). The system
of minority protection established does now provide for citizens to be able to
communicate in German in all official contexts in Bolzano (Decree of the President of the Republic 752, 26 July 1976; Decree of the President of the Republic 574, 15 July 1988). Public employees are consequently required to sit an exam in both languages in order to gain a qualification known as the ‘patentino’ which attests to their bilingualism. The quota system also provides for a greater presence of German-speaking staff within the administration. It is important to note here that the need to ensure the presence of bilingual staff and to apply the quota system refers to any public authority located within the province, including those under state control. This is made explicit in Article 89 of the Statute, which establishes that the quota system must be applied within the state administrative offices located in the province, with the main exception being the security and military services (art. 89, Special Statute for Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol 1972). The quota system has even been extended to privatised state bodies, such as the railways and postal service, after various complaints before the Constitutional Court (Legislative Decree 354, 9 September 1997; Peterlini 2000: 161-62).

The Italian government has consequently made a significant effort in recent decades to ensure the application of the quota system and the presence of bilingual staff within its own administrations in Bolzano (Woelk 2008: 130). In 1972, for example, only 9.3 per cent of places in the state administration were occupied by members of both the German and Ladin groups, despite the fact that both groups represented 66.7 per cent of the population (Branchadell 2001: 103). By 1999, in contrast, 55.2 per cent of these posts were occupied by native German speakers (Branchadell 2001: 103). While this is still not equal to the 67.99 per cent of German speakers present in the local population at the time (Branchadell 2001: 103), it demonstrates huge progress, and a commitment by the central government to ensure the full application of the quota system within its own administrations. Overall, German citizens do now appear to have their right to use their language with any public authority located in the province guaranteed, with the exception of some continued problems in relation to the police and judicial bodies (Peterlini 2000: 184). The provincial authorities appear to have benefited from sufficient autonomy to prescribe the language use within their own administrations, as well as the cooperation of state representatives to fully implement these provisions in its spheres of power. It is, however, worth noting that this use of German by state authorities is almost solely restricted to the provincial, and at most regional, territory. The German language, for example, has no legal status in the central institutions of the Italian state, meaning that, as the SVP Senator Oskar Peterlini explains, ‘Anche noi come parlamentari […] qui a Roma naturalmente non possiamo
parlare in tedesco, parliamo in italiano’ (III11) ['We also as politicians […] here in Rome naturally cannot speak in German, we speak in Italian’]. In fact, there is no evidence of any serious attempts to provide for the use of any language other than Italian by institutions located at the centre, nor even any serious discussion of this possibility by either the central government or the minority groups themselves, which we will see offers a marked contrast to the Spanish context.

This also applies to the Sardinian minority, but here even use of Sardinian by local and regional administrative bodies is an extremely recent and still incomplete development.¹ As the 2001 report from the Council of Europe noted:

> persons belonging to the Albanian, Catalan, Greek, Franco-Provençal, Friulian, Occitan and Sardinian minorities, in their geographical areas of substantial or traditional settlement, have very limited possibilities, if any, for using their minority languages in dealings with the administrative authorities. (Council of Europe, 14 September 2001: 20)

Article 9 of Law 482 does provide for the possibility to use the respective minority languages before the administrative authorities within the territories of the linguistic minorities concerned, with the exception only of the armed forces and the state police (art. 9.1, Law 482, 15 December 1999). The Law goes even further in providing explicitly for an annual budget of 9,800,000,000 lire (around 5 million euros) to be assigned by the Department for Regional Affairs to the relevant local bodies to ‘garantire la presenza di personale che sia in grado di rispondere alle richieste del pubblico usando la lingua ammessa a tutela’ (art. 9.2, Law 482, 15 December 1999) ['guarantee the presence of staff able to respond to requests from the public using the language granted protection’]. The introduction of Law 482 thus clearly signalled a change in approach, with the central government, rather than blocking measures to promote minority languages, actively providing support and funds for such activities. The 2001 regulations for the implementation of the Law go into greater detail, establishing that:

> gli uffici delle pubbliche amministrazioni […] istituiscono almeno uno sportello per i cittadini che utilizzano la lingua ammessa a tutela e possono prevedere indicazioni scritte rivolte al pubblico, redatte, oltre che in lingua italiana, anche nella lingua ammessa a tutela. (Decree of the President of the Republic 345, 2 May 2001)

¹ In the Sardinian case, as explained in section 4.2.2, the lack of a widely accepted standard also contributes to the limited use of the language in administrative settings, particularly in its written form.
Consequently, the Department for Regional Affairs assigns funds to projects proposed by the different local entities, with the principal aim of providing for the use of the respective minority language in public offices. A percentage of the funds also goes towards cultural activities, and for instituting bilingual place names, but the majority has been used to fund the establishment of ‘linguistic counters’ in local administrative offices, as well as the training of the relevant staff. These counters are essentially offices present in town, provincial and regional bodies, which provide for the use of the respective minority language by employing staff able to use the local language in oral communication with those who require it. The counters also translate documents into the respective language and generally support the promotion of the local language. The funds are assigned by a state commission to the region (Dipartimento per gli Affari Regionali, 1 April 2008), which transfers them to the relevant local entities, and the region also monitors the appropriate spending of these funds. The Sardinian minority has, in fact, received the largest amount of these funds, although this is largely proportional to the number of towns designated minority-language territory, of which Sardinia has the largest quantity. Between 2004 and 2006 Sardinia received a total of 7,421,474.77 euros (Regione Autonoma della Sardegna 2007: 13). In 2008, the Sardinians received 1,124,093 euros (Dipartimento per gli Affari Regionali, 1 April 2008) and in 2010 1,120,595 euros (Dipartimento per gli Affari Regionali, 15 March 2010). Consequently, the majority of Sardinian towns and provinces, as well as the regional government itself, have a ‘linguistic counter’ of some description (II3). In addition, the funding provided by Law 482 has allowed for courses to be instituted by the regional government and the universities of Cagliari and Sassari to train administrative staff, as well as teachers, in the usage of Sardinian, especially in its written form (Regione Autonoma della Sardegna 2007: 23). This can be seen as a major step in developing an effective language policy, with the professionalisation of Sardinian-speaking representatives, and the introduction of Sardinian into the sphere of the public administration. Although the projects must originate from the local authorities themselves, this represents primarily a top-down approach, with the funds and guidelines provided by the central government. Consequently, it may be possible to claim that the state, rather than blocking minority language action, is now actively supporting and initiating language policy measures.
Nevertheless, these activities could still be seen as a continuation of Sardinia’s dependent role on the state which can be problematic for linguistic minorities. This is most clearly demonstrated by the considerable decline in funds provided by the central government in recent years. Initially, around 10 million euros were provided in total in the annual budget for linguistic minorities (Senato della Repubblica, 20 February 2007). However, by 2007 this had been reduced by almost half to 5,879,054 euros (Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana, 27 January 2009) and a further reduction in funds of around 4 million euros was forecast for 2009 (Elenco 1, Law 248, 4 August 2006) with total funds falling to around 2 million euros (Senato della Repubblica, 20 February 2007). Although the funds did rise again in 2010 to over 5 million euros (Dipartimento per gli Affari Regionali, 15 March 2010), this decline demonstrates the precarious position of those minorities who depend on the state for funds and support for minority language use. The funds are also only provided on an annual basis, meaning that the funding cannot be guaranteed for future years. Furthermore, the number of towns which have declared themselves minority-language territory has increased dramatically over the past decade, meaning that these reduced funds have to be shared by a greater number of administrative bodies. Despite the increasing number of ‘linguistic counters’ present in Sardinia, this has meant that those which were established early on with relatively generous state-funding now find themselves struggling to survive. For example, the office in the Nuoro province, originally established in 2003, was reportedly forced to reduce its number of employees, first from sixteen down to nine, and now to only three (La Nuova Sardegna, 22 January 2009).

Nevertheless, the blame does not lie entirely with the central government, and there have also been cases where local bodies, despite being assigned money, have not spent it on the promotion and administrative use of the language. For example, in 2009 the province of Cagliari was reportedly forced to return 550,000 euros assigned to it for the period 2003 to 2005 for the promotion of the language which it had not spent for this purpose (La Nuova Sardegna, 29 July 1999). In addition, 75 per cent of the state funds provided between 2002 and 2007 for the purpose of training regional staff and teachers in the use of Sardinian (543,100 of 723,100 euros) were not actually used (Regione Autonoma della Sardegna 2007: 25). The 2005 Council of Europe report also recommended that, particularly in reference to the Sardinian case, ‘[t]he use of minority languages in official dealings as provided for in Law 482/99 requires a stronger commitment by elected officials and civil servants in the municipal authorities concerned as they are the key actors in this regard’ (Council of Europe, 24 February 2006).
While the Council recommended that the state increase awareness-raising measures to improve implementation by municipal authorities, this lack of interest and enthusiasm is also clearly symptomatic of a continued apathy concerning the use of Sardinian. This demonstrates the continued ineffectiveness of regional and local government in Sardinia which hinders their ability to develop and implement an effective language policy for the Sardinian language.

It is, however, unfair to entirely condemn the regional representatives, since the regional government, in particular, has made significant efforts in recent years to overcome the major obstacle to use in the administration: the lack of a standard form of the language. The adoption by the regional council in 2006 of an ‘experimental’ standard form, particularly for written administrative usage, was a clear signal of a desire to proceed in this direction (Corongiu 2006: 13), despite the continued controversy over standardisation. In fact, as previously mentioned, one of the main criticisms of Law 482 and its subsequent implementation is the lack of attention paid to the specific contexts where the Law would be implemented. In particular, the top-down approach of the state, for example in the granting of funds, does not appear to allow for significant opportunities for the minority groups themselves to have a clearer say in the development and implementation of such policies. The Council of Europe report in 2005 criticised the limited presence of representatives from the linguistic minorities themselves in the technical committee responsible for the implementation of Law 482 and recommended the development of ‘specific consultative mechanisms to institutionalise minority participation’ (Council of Europe, 24 February 2005: 30). Such bodies could provide improved opportunities to address the specific problems of each minority group, such as the lack of a standard in the Sardinian case, and thus provide for a more effective implementation of the Law. As seen in the Alto Adige/Südtirol case, the establishment of joint state and provincial bodies has allowed for a particularly successful implementation of measures for the safeguarding of all minority groups in the region.

The Italian government did respond to these criticisms by stating that it does consult with representative organisations, such as the Comitato Nazionale Federativo per le Minoranze Linguistiche Italiane, which theoretically represents all minority groups. Interestingly, the government’s reply also mentioned the possible creation of an advisory body to be called the ‘Permanent Conference of Minorities’ to include all of the minorities protected by law with the aim of ‘institutionalising the dialogue with minority communities’ (Council of Europe, 24 February 2005: 4). Nevertheless,
although this body was initially created, it appears to have disappeared by the time of the following report by the Council of Europe, which found that the conference was no longer active and consequently:

The Advisory Committee is not aware of any future or existing new forms or mechanisms of consultation for the purpose of improving participation at national level by persons belonging to minorities. (Council of Europe, 15 October 2010: 38)

There do not appear to be any visible mechanisms for Sardinian representatives to have a greater say on the implementation of Law 482 or to establish more equal relations with representatives from the state. While the provision of funds for specific projects is certainly useful, this would also appear to encourage a dependent rather than cooperative relationship with the state, with the precariousness of Sardinia’s position demonstrated by the recent reduction in funds available. Equally, this lack of input from minority groups on the allocation of funds means that these funds may not be used effectively, since the applications for funding must follow the specific guidelines laid out by the state with little input from the minority groups themselves.

In sum, the examples of Alto Adige/Südtirol and Sardinia clearly demonstrate the importance of a strong and independent political voice in order both to gain sufficient autonomy to implement an effective language policy and to ensure the full cooperation of the state in implementing these measures, particularly within its own institutions. If a minority or region is unable to produce its own political class to represent itself and its interests, there is little that the state or anybody else can do. The Italian state, however, could ensure that electoral laws and regulations do not block access for minority parties or their representatives to governing institutions. The attempt by the state to empower regions and local bodies to take greater action with Law 482 does demonstrate the possibilities of an alternative route. However, in Italy such action remains minimal and inconsistent, as demonstrated by the minimal funds assigned for the promotion of minority languages, and the lack of input from the minority groups themselves clearly limits the effectiveness of such action.

6.3 Spain

6.3.1 Autonomous Powers and the Central Government

As explained in Section 3.3.2, all of Spain’s Autonomous Communities now have a high level of autonomous powers (Balfour and Quiroga 2007: 201). Nevertheless, even in fields where the Autonomous Communities have exclusive powers, the state maintains the right to enact laws to ‘harmonise’ autonomous legislation where it
concerns the ‘general interest’ (art. 150.3, Spanish Constitution 1978). This is also true in Catalonia, which is often seen to have a greater freedom of action than other communities, although this claim is questionable. The Constitution, despite mentioning a distinction between ‘nationalities’ and ‘regions’ (art. 2, Spanish Constitution 1978), and allowing for some communities to initially gain greater powers (art 151, Spanish Constitution 1978), does not list any explicit powers to be reserved for the historic nationalities or ‘fast-track’ regions. In more recent years, particularly after the 1992 Autonomous Agreements (Organic Law 9/1992), the approach of the central government appears to have been to prevent an asymmetrical development of the Constitution, with a gradual equalisation of powers for all communities (Fossas 1999: 292). In contrast to the Italian case, the Spanish government appears to have made efforts to ensure that communities with a second official language do not gain noticeably greater powers than monolingual Castilian-speaking regions. Officially bilingual communities do have some minor distinctions, such as a degree of greater freedom in determining the school curriculum, which will be discussed in the following chapter. Nevertheless, the state has generally been reluctant to grant any additional powers to these regions in relation to their languages, as was made explicit in the Spanish government’s 2002 report to the Council of Europe: ‘Linguistic co-officiality does not bestow any specific powers on bilingual Autonomous Communities vis-à-vis the State’ (Council of Europe, 23 September 2002: 35). Catalan politicians have, however, attempted to push and test the limits of their autonomy, sometimes successfully, as will be discussed in the following section.

Unsurprisingly, this is not the case in Asturias, although the region does now have a similar level of powers to Catalonia since the final transfer of major powers in the 1990s. Although these transfers were established in 1992, the specific details still had to be agreed with each community by representatives from the central ministries and the autonomous government. In 1999, many powers, including education, had still not been transferred to Asturias leading to demands in the central parliament for the central government to clarify the reasons for the delay (Congreso de los Diputados, 23 March 1999). From the debate, it is difficult to establish who was actually responsible for the delay, and most likely it involved failings on behalf of both the central government and the autonomous government. As one of the powers to be transferred was related to work, this was a particularly controversial issue due to the struggling Asturian mining industry. The Asturian region has been particularly dependent in recent decades on state subsidies to support the failing mining industry. As well as being an
obstacle to agreeing the transfer of powers, as in the Sardinian case this has led to a dependent relationship with the state, with Xulio Viejo Fernández arguing that ‘the strong economic dependence of Asturias on the central state explains the low political success of Asturianist ideology’ (2004: 176). This dependent relationship also helps to explain the lack of demand or ambitions from Asturian politicians for achieving a greater autonomy.

The delay in the transfer of powers could previously be seen as preventing progress in the protection and promotion of Asturian (Bauske 1998: 181-82). As Bernd Bauske noted in the 1990s, ‘Un problema importante que impide una mejora de la situación de la lengua asturiana es la categoría de segunda clase de la autonomía del Principado de Asturias’ (1998: 297) [‘An important problem which prevents an improvement in the situation of the Asturian language is the second-class category of autonomy of the Principality of Asturias’]. Nevertheless, now that all regions including Asturias have received the transfer of all major powers, it cannot be said that the Asturian government lacks the autonomy to take significant action in favour of the language if it so desired. As José Manuel Pérez Fernández notes:

> En el caso del gobierno autonómico, tiene un marco legal que le permite hacer muchísimas cosas […]. Entonces instrumentos hay, lo que falta sería la voluntad política. (SI9)

[In the case of the autonomous government, it has a legal framework which allows it to do many things […]. Thus there are the instruments, but what is lacking is the political will.]

Evidently, as discussed in the previous chapter, it is the lack of a political will which represents the main obstacle to ensuring a greater presence of Asturian within Asturias.

Nevertheless, there is one major advantage which the Catalan government has over its Asturian counterpart, which is its influence over the central government and parliament. The lack of formal institutions to encourage multilateral relations between the state and the regions has meant the need for each community to establish bilateral relations with the central government, of which the Catalan government has taken particular advantage. This role played by Catalan nationalists at the centre is not new since, as Luis Moreno explains, ‘Catalan nationalism has always attempted to influence Spanish politics and has repeatedly avoided limiting itself to mere regional activities’ (2001: 117). Nevertheless, in the 1990s the role played by Catalan nationalists in the centre appeared to reach its peak, with the dependence of the governing Spanish parties on the Catalan nationalists to support their minority governments. Although CiU has
refused to enter into formal coalitions with the governing Spanish parties, between 1993 and 2000 it formed indirect coalitions to enable first the PSOE and later the PP to form a government. This evidently gave CiU a strong bargaining position (Guibernau 2004: 2) and, in relation to language policy, the need for the PP to maintain its pact of government from 1996 led the party to partially abandon its previously antagonistic and oppositional position both within Catalonia and at the centre.

In fact, the central party removed Alex Vidal-Quadras from the leadership of the Catalan PP, which was seen as a concession to CiU since Vidal-Quadras had been noted for his strong public opposition to Catalan normalisation policies (Miley 2006: 297). In addition, in the pact of government drawn up with CiU, the PP reportedly agreed to support the reform of the 1983 Language Normalisation Act in Catalonia (Pastor, 28 April 1996). This was particularly important, since the PP had been strongly opposed, as will be discussed in the following chapter, to the immersion model adopted in Catalan schools which the reform would attempt to reinforce. However, the central PP’s reliance on the support of CiU meant that the Prime Minister, José María Aznar, ‘se mostraba reticente a causar demasiados problemas a Pujol en Cataluña’ (Miley 2006: 309) [‘was reluctant to cause too many problems for Pujol in Catalonia’]. The party did not, however, remain entirely silent on the issue and the Catalan PP still voted against the passing of the new Language Policy Act in the Catalan parliament in December 1997 (Roller 2001: 47). The PP-led central government did not, however, attempt to challenge any part of the Law at the Constitutional Court, as had previously and would later occur in relation to Catalan language policies.

Consequently, it would appear fair to say that, as Clare Mar-Molinero establishes:

\[\text{[t]he political role that Catalans play in helping the central Spanish government of the day has, ironically, allowed them to exert significant pressure in maintaining and promoting the vigorous language normalisation policies, not least in the area of education. (2000b: 167)}\]

Nevertheless, the role of CiU at the centre during this period has often been exaggerated, particularly in the Spanish media. The legislative support provided primarily by CiU, as well as other regional parties, did not translate into them holding any ministerial role within the government or any leading role in policy-making (Chari and Heywood 2009: 47-48). The weakness of CiU’s position is also demonstrated by the fact that, after the PP gained a majority in the 2000 elections, CiU immediately lost its bargaining powers and privileged position (Guibernau 2004: 3), with the PP adopting
a much more explicitly centralist position. The lack of permanent guarantees or of constitutional protection and the dependence on party bargaining means that the autonomous governments lack any stable or formal role in central policy decisions.

Despite these limits, however, Catalan politicians have certainly been far more successful than their Asturian counterparts in maintaining a presence and impact at the centre and in ensuring Catalan interests are given maximum exposure. The unwillingness of the Asturian political elites to promote the language within the region was discussed in the previous chapter, but there also appears to be a more general lack of a strong Asturian voice at the centre. As Bauske noted in the 1990s:

debido a la falta o la debilidad de los partidos nacionalistas, y debido al fortín que el PSOE tiene en Asturias, se pueden llevar a la práctica centralistas intereses de manera más directa, sin que por ello los socialistas asturianos tengan la misma influencia en Madrid que los socialistas andaluces. (1999: 293).

[due to the absence or weakness of nationalist parties, and the stronghold of the PSOE in Asturias, it is possible to put into practice centralist interests more effectively and more or less directly, without the Asturian Socialists having the same influence in Madrid as the Andalusian Socialists.]

The Socialist Asturian leaders, in particular, have shown a reluctance to ‘cause trouble’ for their Socialist colleagues at the centre, and appear to have adopted a more centralist approach than their Socialist counterparts in other regions. This has meant that the Asturian government and politicians appear to have a very weak voice at the centre, unlike the Catalan politicians or even, as Bauske points out, the Socialists from Andalusia who have been much more vocal in their demands. This again has an impact on the lack of attention paid to the Asturian language in the state arena since, as Ana Cano González summarises, ‘malamente nos van a representar allí cuando aquí actúan como actúan’ (SI5) [‘they are hardly going to represent us there when they act as they do here’]. Equally, although the Catalan politicians do act as a form of general pressure group for a greater recognition of Spain’s linguistic diversity, they are unlikely to offer significant support for the Asturian language and interests due to their desire to avoid an equalisation of their own powers alongside other regions such as Asturias (Bauske 1999: 301). Despite attempts by the state to avoid distinctions between the historic nationalities and the rest of Spain’s regions, Catalonia and the other ‘nationalities’ have had significant success in asserting their differences and ensuring their political voice and demands do not go unnoticed. This does appear to have allowed Catalonia some greater freedom in implementing an increasingly ambitious language policy, although, as will be discussed in the following section, there are still clear limitations.
6.3.2 Language Policy: A Devolved, State or Shared Power?

Many of the cases at the Constitutional Court concerning language policy have been presented by or against the Catalan government, reflecting the fact that the Catalan government has often pushed the boundaries of the autonomous system. This is most true in relation to education, and the two Sentences in 1994 by the Constitutional Court on the Catalan education system were two of the most important cases brought before the Court. The details of these Sentences will be discussed in the next chapter, but in finding largely in favour of the Catalan government, the Court appeared to formalise ‘una cierta asimetría en la ordenación del uso de las lenguas al reconocer que la Constitución permite modelos lingüísticos distintos’ (Fossas 1999: 278) [‘a certain asymmetry in the regimes governing the use of the languages by recognising that the Constitution allows for different linguistic models’]. The decision consequently legitimised both the approach of the Catalan government and the freedom of all Autonomous Communities to determine their own distinct language policies, without excessive interference by the central state. In fact, the Constitutional Court in the 1980s and 1990s had typically found in favour of policies for the normalisation of Spain’s other languages (Vernet i Llobet et al. 2003: 285). Furthermore, in the early 2000s very few cases were brought before the Court in relation to language policy (Vernet i Llobet and Pons Parera 2001: 359; Vernet i Llobet and Pons Parera 2002: 361), which at first appeared to demonstrate a gradual acceptance of the freedom provided by the Constitution for the autonomous governments to enact language policy.

However, in the second half of the decade, this appears to have proven untrue, with several Catalan laws concerning language policy contested at the Constitutional Court. Most significant has been the case brought against the reform of the Catalan Statute in 2006 which introduced several important precepts in relation to language policy. Although the reformed Statute was passed by the Catalan government, the central parliament and a Catalan referendum (Balfour and Quiroga 2007: 6), opposition to the reform has meant that its implementation has been challenged. On 31 July 2006, the PP presented an appeal against a total of 114 articles of the reform (ABC, 8 April 2010), and in September 2006 the Spanish state ombudsman presented a further appeal against 112 articles of the reform (Vernet i Llobet and Pons Parera 2011: 72-73). Although the final Sentence by the Court in 2010 did not confirm all of the challenges made, it did find fourteen articles of the reform to contain clauses which it considered unconstitutional, as well as specifying an additional twenty-seven provisions which required a reinterpretation (Sentence 31/2010). To focus specifically on those clauses
and provisions related to language policy, the Court declared unconstitutional the reference to the ‘normal’ and ‘preferential’ use of Catalan in the public administration (art. 6.1, Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia 2006) on the basis that it could introduce a statutory ‘desequilibrio del régimen constitucional de la cooficialidad de ambas lenguas en perjuicio del castellano’ (Sentence 31/2010) [‘inequality in the constitutional regime providing for the co-officiality of both languages to the disadvantage of Castilian’]. In particular, the Court affirmed that Castilian, as an official language throughout Spain, should also be considered a ‘normal language’ and consequently no explicit preference should be given to either official language.

The Sentence did, however, recognise the powers of both the Statute and the autonomous government to define the limits and scope of the co-official status of Catalan. More restrictive, however, was the interpretation of the right for citizens to address state bodies in writing in Catalan (art. 33.5, Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia 2006). The reformed Statute, by not specifying any territorial limits to this right, appears to suggest that this applies to all bodies under the control of the state and presumably also those bodies located in Madrid. Nevertheless, the Court made explicit that this interpretation would be unconstitutional, and consequently Article 33.5 should only be interpreted as referring to those state bodies located in Catalonia (Sentence 31/2010). Furthermore, the Sentence restated that it was left to the state authorities to legislate concerning the use of other co-official languages in state-wide bodies, if and when it so desired. These findings of the Constitutional Court have been a subject of controversy, and were seen as a direct challenge to both the autonomous government of Catalonia and the central Socialist-led government of the time. The Sentence itself was a result of four years of heated debates, and a particularly tumultuous period for the Constitutional Court (Lázaro, 10 July 2010). The Spanish Prime Minister, José Luís Rodríguez Zapatero, also appeared to be dismayed by the Sentence and, although he refused to criticise its findings directly, he did state in a speech in Barcelona in July 2010 that ‘[m]i posición en defensa del Estatut es conocida’ (cited in La Moncloa, 23 July 2010) [‘My position in defence of the Statute is well-known’]. The case also points to continued ambiguities over which level of government is responsible both for the design and the implementation of language policy. As in Italy, there has been particular confusion over whether language policy itself can be considered a specific ‘power’ to be retained by the centre or devolved to the regions and the Constitutional Court has struggled to come to any clear conclusion on the subject.
One of the most important cases on this subject was Sentence 82/1986, which clarified that the ‘Autonomous Community’ referred to all public authorities present within the territory of that community, be they under state, regional or local control. As a result, the co-official status of a language requires the state authorities to guarantee the option to use either language with their own administrative bodies located within the region concerned (Sentence 82/1986). The Sentence also establishes, however, that it is up to the state authorities to design the necessary legislation and implement the measures to guarantee this use, with the Sentence clearly establishing that autonomous legislation could not substitute state legislation in areas under state jurisdiction. Equally, the Sentence is particularly vague in specifying any timescale or pressure on the state to ensure the implementation of such measures, instead stating that the right to use either language was subject to the adoption of ‘the necessary measures’ which would be guaranteed ‘de forma progresiva’ (Sentence 82/1986) [‘in a gradual way’]. In 1989 the Court did, however, affirm that the specific powers of the state could not be used as ‘un obstáculo que bloquee o vacíe la competencia que sobre normalización lingüística tiene la Comunidad Autónoma’ (Sentence 74/1989) [‘an obstacle to block or render void the power of the Autonomous Community over linguistic normalisation’].

As a result, the Catalan government has attempted in subsequent legislation, such as the Statute reform, to make clear the duties and obligations of state institutions. The 2010 Sentence, however, effectively reasserted the state’s role in deciding precisely how language use and knowledge should be regulated in its own institutions and demonstrated the limitations to the apparent freedom the Autonomous Communities have concerning language policy. This points again to the complications and complexities concerning the attribution of language policy to a specific level of government since, in contrast to education or health policies for example, the content of language policy has a more transversal purpose. Consequently, as Antoni Milian i Massana attempts to clarify, ‘la competencia para regular el uso de la lengua la tendrá quien tenga atribuida la competencia para regular la materia que sirve de soporte a aquel uso’ (1984: 145) [‘the power to regulate the use of the language will belong to whoever has the power to regulate within the relevant area providing for that use’]. It would appear to be for this reason that the Constitution does not list ‘language policy’ as a specific power of either the state or the region. The Constitutional Court has also been reluctant to recognise the clear existence of a specific autonomous power, with a 1996 Sentence stating explicitly that the right to determine the extent and implications of the co-official status of a language could not be considered ‘un título competencial en el
sentido estricto de la expresión’ (Sentence 147/1996) [‘a specific power in the strict sense of the term’].

To summarise, it would appear that the Autonomous Communities do have significant freedom in designing and implementing language policies, while respecting both the co-official status of Castilian within the region and the specific powers of the state. In fact, comments from the central government have at times suggested that they have discharged responsibility for language policy to the Autonomous Communities (Crameri 2008: 64), particularly concerning the promotion and protection of languages other than Castilian. For example, the central government stated in its 2002 report to the Council of Europe that ‘in Spain the power and political and administrative responsibility for promoting regional languages lies with the Autonomous Communities’ (Council of Europe, 23 September 2002: 49). This may at first appear to be a generous concession by the state, but this statement fails to acknowledge the extent to which this freedom is limited by the official status of Castilian throughout the state. More importantly, it also demonstrates a denial of any responsibility the state may have to promote or protect its other languages. This brings us back again to Article 3.3 of the Constitution, which appears to establish a mandate for the state to protect and respect Spain’s multilingual reality. In addition, since it is the state which ratified the ECRML, there is an additional obligation on the state which has ‘overall and final responsibility for the implementation of the Charter’ (Council of Europe, 11 December 2008: 10) and consequently the protection and promotion of Spain’s other languages.

Evidently, given that the central government has tended to adopt a relatively uniform approach to the distribution of powers to the autonomous governments, similar arrangements also apply to the autonomous government of Asturias. In terms of references to any specific powers Asturias has over language policy, the Asturian Statute does, as previously mentioned, establish the ‘promotion’ and ‘protection’ of Asturian as an exclusive power (art. 10.21, Statute of Autonomy of the Principality of Asturias 1981). Nevertheless, as discussed in previous chapters, the lack of official status for the language does place greater limits on the extent to which the autonomous community can determine the use and knowledge of that language, even within the Asturian territory. The Asturian Director of Language Policy confirms that:

Tenemos la limitación que significa que el asturiano no sea una lengua oficial. Por lo tanto, todo lo que signifique la política lingüística en relación con la administración central es muy difícil. (SI1)
[We have the limitation which means that Asturian is not an official language. As a result, anything in relation to linguistic policy which concerns the central administration is very difficult.]

Essentially, even if some official uses of Asturian are now accepted in the autonomous and local administrations, any administrative body of the state located in Asturias has no duty to provide for any official use of Asturian. This was made explicit in 2010 when an Asturian deputy submitted a written question to the central government calling for measures to ensure the use of Asturian with the administration of the state (Congreso de los Diputados, 26 April 2000). The response from the Spanish government, while not entirely discounting the possibility, clarified that it was the responsibility of the Asturian government to establish specific agreements with the state and that ‘La iniciativa corresponde, pues, al Principado de Asturias, como titular de la competencia’ (Congreso de los Diputados, 8 June 2000) ['The initiative thus corresponds to the Principality of Asturias, as the holder of the power']. Although Article 6 of the Regional Law for the Use and Promotion of Bable/Asturian does in fact mention the possibility of signing agreements with state bodies for such use, thus far there have been no serious attempts by the Asturian government to establish such agreements. Again, we see the lack of initiative from within Asturias, and a lack of any apparent duty for the state to take action. In particular, in contrast to Catalonia, the autonomous government has never made any attempts to significantly push the limits or boundaries of these powers, thus explaining the few cases brought before the Constitutional Court.

There is, however, one exception which concerns the local, rather than regional, governments in Asturias. As briefly mentioned in the previous chapter, in 1997 seven Asturian town councils (Bimenes, Carreño, Casu, Llanera, Llangréu, Morcín and Teberga) declared Asturian co-official within their municipal government (Pérez Fernández 2005: 62). Just weeks later, the Delegation of the Government in Asturias, the institution which represents the central government, appealed against these declarations on the basis that they were unconstitutional (de Andrés 2002: 259). This was confirmed by the Asturian Superior Court of Justice in Sentences between 2001 and 2002 which repealed each of these declarations (Academia de la Llingua Asturiana 2002: 3; de Andrés 2002: 259). This decision would appear to be based on the fact that, as specified in the Constitution, a declaration of ‘officiality’ should come from the autonomous regional governments in the form of a declaration in their respective statutes. This was confirmed in a sentence by the Supreme Court in February 2004, which rejected the appeal by the council of Llangréu against the original Sentence based
on a recognition of ‘la competencia exclusiva del Principado de Asturias en materia lingüística’ (Pérez Fernández 2007: 526) [‘the exclusive jurisdiction of the Principality of Asturias in linguistic matters’]. This judgement is difficult to question, with the Asturian legal expert José Manuel Pérez Fernández agreeing that, ‘jurídicamente tenían su punto en razón, porque el ayuntamiento no tiene competencias para decir esto [la lengua] es oficial’ (SI9) [‘legally they had a point, because the municipal government does not have the powers to say that this [the language] is official’]. Consequently, this appears to be less an example of the state limiting Asturian language policies, than a legal paradox created by the Asturian government’s unwillingness to declare Asturian official. As Pérez Fernández confirms, ‘el gobierno central no ha impedido nada, porque el gobierno asturiano no ha pedido nada’ (SI9) [‘the central government has not prevented anything, because the Asturian government has not asked for anything’].

Nevertheless, the Delegation of the Government does represent the central government and appears to have taken particular efforts to ensure immediate action was taken against these declarations. More specifically, the council of Nava in Asturias did not declare Asturian official, but rather introduced measures for the use of Asturian within the town, as was within its powers, which arguably approached co-official status (Academia de la Llingua Asturiana 2002: 3). Despite not representing an explicit declaration of co-officiality, the Delegation of the Government still successfully appealed against these measures, arguing that they would create ‘social alarm’ (Academia de la Llingua Asturiana 2002: 3). This does thus demonstrate an institution of the central state taking particular efforts to limit the reach and ambition of action in favour of Asturian. Nevertheless, the involvement of the central state may again be misleading, since, although the Delegation is a state body, the specific Delegate of the time, Mercedes Fernández, was and is a particularly prominent member of the local branch of the PP (Partido Popular Asturias [no date]). Consequently, as Viejo Fernández hypothesizes:

La persona concreta que desempeñaba ese cargo yo creo que actuó por su cuenta, no tanto por recibir instrucciones desde Madrid […]. Era una persona militant en un partido con cierto peso en la política asturiano y creo que, incluso aunque nominalmente actuara en nombre del gobierno español, yo creo que es una cosa más local. (SI10)

[The specific person fulfilling this role I believe acted on her own account, rather than receiving direct instructions from Madrid […]. She was a member of a party with a certain weight in Asturian politics and so I believe that even if she was acting nominally on behalf of the Spanish government, I believe it was more of a local issue.]
Although this may be mere speculation, it does appear probable that her opposition would have been more related to her own experience as an Asturian representative of the PP than direct orders from the centre, which as we have seen typically takes little interest in the Asturian context. Once again, in Asturias it does not seem to be the case of the central government directly blocking or limiting the protection and promotion of Asturian, but rather the regional political elites.

To summarise, the division of state and regional powers concerning language policy is clearly complex and even the Constitutional Court has often struggled to clarify precisely how this division of powers works. Based on the previous discussion, it is clear that the Autonomous Communities, particularly those with a co-official language, do have significant autonomy in designing and implementing language policies to promote the use and knowledge of the co-official language within the territory of their community. Nevertheless, the state also retains control over the specific language regulations applicable in areas of power under its own control, particularly concerning the state administration. The state also retains the power to ensure the official status of Castilian, as well as the duty for all citizens to know it, is respected throughout the whole territory. Perhaps most controversially, there is also potentially a mandate applicable to both Catalan and Asturian for the state to promote all of its diverse languages and varieties, although this has rarely been acted upon.

6.3.3 The Use of Catalan and Asturian by the Institutions of the State

In focusing on the use of different languages in state institutions in Spain it is important to distinguish between two different categories, since the linguistic obligations differ significantly depending on the type of institution. Firstly, we have what is termed the ‘peripheral administration’, which refers to those institutions under the control of the state but which are based and function within the territorial area of an Autonomous Community. Secondly, we have the central or general state bodies, which are primarily the legislative and executive bodies responsible for the state-wide territory and typically located in Madrid. To begin with the state’s peripheral administration, the Constitutional Court, as explained previously, has established particularly clear duties for the state administrative authorities to ensure the full respect of the regimes of co-officiality within the territorial area of an Autonomous Community. However, in reality the state has been particularly slow to adapt its own administrations to regimes of co-officiality (Marí Mayans 2011: 105)
The primary cause of these delays in the Catalan case is the lack of civil servants employed by the state with the ability to use and understand Catalan. This despite the fact that, as early as 1984, a Law was passed which included a clause establishing the need to ensure that civil servants working in territories with two official languages should have the necessary abilities, which appears to refer to linguistic skills (art. 19.1, Law 30/1984). However, up until 1998 knowledge of Catalan was only considered an ‘advantage’ for 10 per cent of places in the state administration within Catalonia (Vernet i Llobet et al. 2003: 230). Although this increased to 50 per cent after 1998, it was still only considered an advantage and not a requirement (Vernet i Llobet et al. 2003: 238). Implementation has also remained sporadic even since 1998 with huge fluctuations in the number of advertised positions where knowledge of the language is considered an advantage. For example, although by the end of 1998 knowledge of Catalan was considered a merit for up to 52 per cent of positions in the state administration in Catalonia (Solé i Durany 1999a: 279), in 1999 this fell dramatically to only 11 per cent of places (Solé i Durany 1999b: 239). These extreme fluctuations continue for the following years (Vilardell i Codina 2001: 291; Vilardell i Codina 2002: 395), demonstrating a lack of commitment to ensuring the presence of linguistically capable staff. More recently, a 2007 Law on the Basic Statute of Public Employees has laid out more explicitly the need to ensure citizens are attended to in the official language of their choice (art. 54.11, Law 7/2007), but this Law still does not specify the knowledge of the second official language as a requirement for any positions in the state’s administrations.

There does appear to have been more progress in providing language training courses for those already employed in the state administration. Courses in the regional languages are normally supervised by the autonomous governments but cooperation agreements have been signed between the state and the Autonomous Communities for the provision of such courses, the first of which dates back to July 1989 (Council of Europe, 23 September 2002: 105). The National Institute for Public Administration has also set up an Interdepartmental Language Training Programme, which includes promotion of the knowledge and use of all of Spain’s official languages (Council of Europe, 30 April 2007: 219). In 2005, for example, the Institute allocated 354,086.72 euros for the promotion of co-official languages, and 54,160.01 euros specifically for courses in collaboration with the Central Government Delegation in Catalonia (Council of Europe, 30 April 2007: 219). Interestingly, the report by the government also mentions the priority of training needs for staff in Catalonia since the language is ‘more
widely accepted and considered more natural than in other Autonomous Communities’ (Council of Europe, 30 April 2007: 219). This is one of the rare occasions where the central government acknowledges the existence of a distinct and potentially preferential treatment for Catalonia in view of the distinct sociolinguistic context.

Nevertheless, even in Catalonia, the lack of staff able to use both official languages has been repeatedly criticised, specifically in both the first and second reports from the Council of Europe on the application of the ECRML in Spain (Council of Europe, 21 September 2005a: 1). Responding to these recommendations, the Spanish government did establish a joint committee of experts to analyse the use of the co-official languages in the general state administration (Council of Europe, 30 April 2007: 213). However, the committee, while recognising the need for greater efforts to train civil servants, also appeared to find excuses for the lack of compliance, on the basis that ‘the entire population can express itself in, and has a proper understanding of, Castilian or Spanish’ (Council of Europe, 30 April 2007: 214). A further excuse appears to have been offered that the staff in the peripheral administration were ‘numerically unimportant’ (Council of Europe, 30 April 2007: 214). Consequently, it was stated that no special reforms were needed and the committee’s findings demonstrate a clear ambivalence. Despite some signs of improvement in recent years (Council of Europe, 17 February 2011: 334), the full presence of staff with the necessary linguistic abilities is still lacking, particularly in areas such as the military and security forces and, as Isidor Marí Mayans explains, there are still incidents where ‘Catalan speakers either waive their language rights or their attempts to have them respected end up in personal disputes with the civil servant dealing with them’ (2011: 106).

The state ministry websites have, however, seen significant improvements in the translation of content into the co-official languages. The main website providing information regarding administrative services (www.060.es), is available in all co-official languages on the home page, secondary pages and elements required for searching (Council of Europe, 17 February 2011: 322). There has also been a major development in the publication of state laws in the other official languages, with a Decree issued in 1997 providing for this possibility (Royal Decree 489/1997). A further agreement was signed in April 1998 between the state and the Generalitat specifically for the future publication of state laws in Catalan in the Official State Gazette (La Moncloa, 6 March 1998). Subsequently, in 2001, seventeen special issues of the Official State Gazette were published in Catalan (Council of Europe, 23 September 2002: 90). This clearly represents an important development in the usage of Catalan in
official texts by the state, although it should be noted that there are still clear limitations to this development. As has been repeatedly criticised in the Council of Europe’s reports, there is a significant delay of up to six months in the publication of the Catalan edition of the State Gazette (Council of Europe 21 September 2005b: 38; Council of Europe, 11 December 2008: 32; Mari Mayans 2011: 103-04). The costs of translation into Catalan were also initially borne entirely by the autonomous government (Council of Europe, 30 April 2007: 77). The most recent report by the Spanish government did, however, establish that 50 per cent of the translation costs are now borne by the state body responsible for the Gazette and since 2006 there is now only a lapse of half a week between the publication of the Castilian and Catalan versions (Council of Europe, 17 February 2011: 288-90).

The progress made in these fields in recent years is clearly linked to the creation of the Council and Office for Official Languages. Previously the lack of such a body meant there was almost no coordination or cooperation between the central ministries concerning language policy, which appeared to signal the continued unwillingness of the central government to recognise its own obligations towards Spain’s other languages. The lack of coordination has often resulted in the sole use of Castilian in the state’s institutions (Vernet i Llobet 1994: 137) in what can be described again as a ‘no-policy policy’ (Fishman 2006: 318) effectively ensuring the continued dominance of Castilian. The creation of the Council and the Office in 2007, however, signals a move towards a more explicit language policy which aims to ensure and encourage a greater use of Spain’s other official languages. The Council was established as a collegiate body to analyse and coordinate the use of the other official languages within the different departments of the general state administration (art. 1.2, Royal Decree 905/2007). In addition, the Office for Official Languages was set up as a permanent body to provide assistance and support to the Council (art. 8, Royal Decree 905/2007). To explain how both bodies function, the Council itself meets theoretically at least once a year (art. 4.1, Royal Decree 905/2007) and senior members from each ministerial department report on developments and the situation within their own ministry and corresponding institutions (art. 2, Royal Decree 905/2007). The main function of the Office, meanwhile, is to prepare a report prior to the annual meeting of the Council on the use of the official languages within the general state administration. The creation of both bodies can thus be seen as an attempt by the state to gain a greater awareness of the current situation regarding the use of the official languages within its own institutions, and to move towards an increasing acceptance of the multilingual reality of the state.
There have clearly been some positive results from the work of both the Council and Office, as can be seen from the published press releases detailing the main recommendations from each meeting of the Council. As previously mentioned, recent years have seen significant progress in the use of the other official languages on state websites, which has been listed as a priority in all of the press releases issued by the Council (Ministerio de Política Territorial y Administración Pública, 28 January 2008; 23 June 2009; 6 July 2010). The 2009 and 2010 press releases also state as a continued priority the need to improve the knowledge of the official languages among the staff of the general state administration (Ministerio de Política Territorial y Administración Pública, 23 June 2009; 6 July 2010). The Office for Official Languages is now also responsible for preparing the published reports presented to the Council of Europe on Spain’s fulfilment of the ECRML beginning with the most recent 2011 report (SI7). It is noticeable that this report goes into much greater detail on the use of the official languages within the state’s own institutions than previous reports (Council of Europe, 17 February 2011). Again, this signals a clear change in approach in recognising that it is not solely the autonomous governments who are responsible for ensuring the use and promotion of the other official languages.

Nevertheless, despite this positive progress, it is important to clarify that the ambitions and impact of both the Council and the Office remain limited, as is most noticeable on the website of the Council and Office. The first press release by the Council established as a priority the maintenance of a web page on the website of the Ministry of Public Administration where information on the subject would be collected and exchanged (Ministerio de Política Territorial y Administración Pública, 28 January 2008). However, in reality, the site does not appear to have been regularly updated and provides little detailed or original information about the actual use of the official languages within the state administration (Ministerio de Política Territorial y Administración Pública [no date]). The explanation for this may be, as previously mentioned, the extremely limited budget of the Office as well as its size. As the representative from the Office confirmed, ‘La Oficina es una oficina muy pequeña […]’. It might appear to be a body with a lot of people, but there are very few of us working here’. Despite the ambitious aims listed in the 2007 Decree, this is not reflected in the scale of the Office itself and consequently its impact is clearly limited. In addition, despite the fact that the 2007 Decree states that the Council will meet ‘at least’ once a year (art. 4.1, Royal
Decree 905/2007), even this minimal aim has not been met. The first meeting was in January 2008, the second nearly a year and a half later in June 2009 and the third around a year later in July 2010 (Ministerio de Política Territorial y Administración Pública, 28 January 2008; 23 June 2009; 6 July 2010). However, there have been no further meetings of the Council, demonstrating a clear lack of commitment and a negative indication for the future impact or even continued existence of both bodies. In sum, it would appear that the Catalan academic Albert Branchadell would be correct in his assessment that: ‘Prácticamente, es una institución que se reúne el número mínimo de veces, y […] más allá de reunir información no es muy claro que haya ejecutado ninguna decisión’ (SI4) ['In effect, it is an institution which meets a minimal number of times and […] apart from gathering information it is not clear that it has carried out any decisions'].

Needless to say that even the minimal advances in the use of Spain’s other languages, particularly in reference to the actions of the newly created Council and Office, have had no effect on Asturian as a non-official language falling outside of the remit of both of these bodies. As mentioned in the previous section, there is no legal duty or obligation for the state administration located in Asturias to provide for the use of Asturian, and neither has the regional government established any agreements with the institutions of the central state for such use. As the Euromosaic report from 1998 states clearly:

Asturian has not been given an official status, so Spanish is the only language used by the Central Government Administration. If a letter in Asturian is sent to this Administration, it is usually returned unanswered. (Euromosaic, 29 May 1998)

Consequently, Asturian speakers do not appear to have any rights or opportunities to use Asturian with the state administration. However, there is one area where there does seem to have been some collaboration with institutions of the state. The use of Asturian in official place names concerns the state, regional and local authorities, since the decisions on place names are an area of overlapping and shared powers. The Asturian Statute gives the region the power to decide on the official names of its towns (art. 10.1.2, Statute of Autonomy of the Principality of Asturias 1981) and the 1998 Law for the Use and Promotion of Bable/Asturian also provides for the use of the ‘traditional’ forms of place names in Asturias, with a bilingual form where both the Castilian and Asturian forms are commonly used (art. 15.1, Asturian Law 1/1998). Nevertheless, changes to the official names of municipalities must still be noted in the register of the state administration and published in the Official State Gazette before they are
considered official (art. 14.1, Law 7/1985). Consequently, as María Antonia Pedregal Montes, Head of the Asturian Language Policy Service, confirms, ‘En materia de toponimia estamos en contacto con la Delegación del Gobierno […]’, para que el gobierno central en su ámbito de actuación utilice la nueva toponimia’ (SI8) [On the subject of place names, we are in contact with the Delegation of the Government […], to ensure that the central government uses the new place names in its own spheres of action]. Although she admitted that there had initially been problems in ensuring such use by the state, recent years have seen greater progress with the gradual acceptance of Asturian language place names, and this consequently represents one of the few examples of collaboration between the state and the Asturian government concerning language policy. Pedregal Montes also currently acts as the representative for Asturias on the National Geographical Institute’s special commission on geographical names, which issues reports and rulings on place names which are decided by the state authorities. The inclusion of an Asturian representative is a sign of some progress and at least suggests that they may have some impact in ensuring that the Asturian language is not ignored. However, this is an extremely rare example of an attempt to provide for the use of Asturian in any area under the jurisdiction of the state.

For Catalan and the other co-official languages, there has been the clearest reluctance to consider a greater use of these languages at the level of the institutions and ministries of the state located at the centre. The lack of possibilities to use the other official languages at the centre has in the past been seen as constitutionally mandated, since the Constitution only provides for the official status of other languages than Castilian within specific regions (Tolivar Alas 2006: 191-92). Nevertheless, some legal experts have disagreed, arguing that although the other languages may not be official throughout the state, this does not mean they cannot be used in certain official contexts for specific activities (Marí Mayans 2011: 102; Milian i Massana 1984: 154; Vernet i Llobet et al. 2003: 281). The fact that such use is not a constitutional imperative, however, means that it is almost entirely dependent on the political will of the government at the time, which has generally been lacking. In particular, the central parliament has typically functioned solely in Castilian, meaning that all Catalan political representatives have been required to use Castilian on almost all occasions when elected to the central parliament. There has, however, been significant progress in relation to the use of Spain’s other languages in the Senate, in recognition of its theoretical role as the chamber of ‘territorial representation’ (art. 69, Spanish Constitution 1978).
The introduction of Spain’s other languages into the Senate has been a gradual process, and, in fact, when Catalan representatives first presented a motion for their use in 1988, it was initially rejected as unconstitutional (Vernet i Llobet 1994: 132). However, after the Constitutional Court found in favour of the motion in 1990 (Sentence 205/1990), a reform of the Senate’s regulations was approved in 1994 (Regulations of the Senate, 3 May 1994). This reform provided for the use of Spain’s other languages in three specific contexts: the first intervention by the president of the Senate (art. 11 bis), the annual debate of the General Commission of the Autonomous Communities on the ‘State of Autonomies’ (art. 56 bis 7) and in the written correspondence of citizens to the Senate (fourth additional disposition). A further reform was also passed in July 2005, which allowed for the other languages to be used in all sessions of the General Commission of the Autonomous Communities, as well as in the submission of motions, interpellations and questions before the Senate, although with a Castilian version attached (Reform of the Regulations of the Senate, 5 July 2005). Finally, a further reform was passed in July 2010, after considerable debate, allowing for the full use of all of Spain’s official languages in all sessions of the Senate as well as in legislative proposals (Reform of the Regulations of the Senate, 27 July 2010).

Evidently, this represents an extremely significant advance in the use of Spain’s other official languages within state institutions. The provisions made in the Senate were, however, considered an exception since, as the representative from the Office for Official Languages confirmed, ‘el Senado es la cámara de representación territorial y es lógico que se permita el uso. En el Congreso no se permite, sólo en el Senado’ (SI7) ['the Senate is the chamber of territorial representation and it is logical that such use is allowed. But not in the Congress, only in the Senate’]. Despite being considered an exception, this reform still represents the first genuine possibility for extraterritorial and official use of Spain’s other languages outside of the specific Autonomous Communities concerned. In fact, some, such as Ramón Punset, argue that the use of these languages even in the Senate is unconstitutional, since it is a general body of the state, and thus goes against the territorial principle (2007: 70). Nevertheless, the fact that all of these reforms have been passed and have not been challenged at the Constitutional Court would appear to demonstrate that there is, in reality, no constitutional limit to the extraterritorial use of Spain’s other languages.

There was still significant opposition both within the Senate itself and in the press to this reform, with those opposed primarily arguing that it was unnecessary given
that all senators were fluent in Castilian and that the interpreting costs involved were unnecessary and even ridiculous. As an editorial in El Mundo claimed, ‘se produce el esperpento de que unos parlamentarios que en los pasillos hablan la lengua que comparten, tienen que entenderse en los debates a través de intérpretes’ (El Mundo, 19 January 2011) ['we are seeing the ridiculousness of some parliamentary representatives, who use the shared language in the corridors, having to use interpreters to make themselves understood in debates’]. Such statements, which were relatively common in certain sectors of the press, appear to represent an instrumentalist approach which presents Castilian as a neutral language. As mentioned in Section 5.3.1, such views may often mask Spanish nationalist views, but also demonstrate a general failure to understand the importance of the symbolic aspect of languages. The use of Spain’s other languages in the Senate has, admittedly, a primarily symbolic rather than practical function. As Robert L. Cooper establishes: ‘The language of parliamentary debate is peculiarly visible because it occurs in a public setting with immense symbolic significance. Whether or not a parliament has actual power, it symbolizes the state in all its majesty’ (1989: 102). While the symbolic recognition of a language may appear artificial or unnecessary, particularly to those who already speak the dominant language, this recognition of Spain’s other languages is important in confirming that, as established in the Constitution, Spain’s other official languages can also be considered to belong to Spain as a whole, rather than just to specific regions. While the central institutions of the state may be located in the officially monolingual Madrid, it is the entire state, and its multilingual citizens, which they should theoretically represent. Although costs are evidently an important consideration, due attention should also be paid to the symbolic value of such measures and their importance in encouraging more cooperative and inclusive relations between the different areas of the state.

In sum, although the use of Spain’s other official languages within both the peripheral administration and central institutions remains restricted, there have been signs of significant progress in recent years. There are still clear limitations and delays in these developments, which would appear to be partly related to the costs and complications involved in providing for the use of all official languages, but also due to continued opposition to such use within the institutions of the state and the continued acceptance of the ‘natural’ dominance of Castilian. Nevertheless, recent developments particularly concerning the Senate and the creation of the Office and Council for Official Languages do at least appear to suggest that the central government has now accepted that it does have a role to play in ensuring the use and promotion of Spain’s
other languages, as well as an acceptance of the idea that the extraterritorial use of these languages in official contexts may not be unconstitutional. The inactivity of the Council for Official Languages in recent years, however, as well as the unwillingness to extend such use in central institutions beyond the Senate does suggest that any further progress may be limited. Equally, the Asturian language does not appear to have benefited at all from these wider developments in the state context, reflecting both the state’s disregard for non-official languages as well as the continued lack of political pressure from within Asturias for the state to take notice.

6.4 Conclusion

The relationship between linguistic minorities and the political system is complicated but, as has been demonstrated, linguistic minorities must engage with the political system to ensure their continued relevance. Drawing together the evidence from Spain and Italy, it is clear that significant political autonomy is one of the most important factors in the implementation of an effective language policy in support of a specific language. This has been widely recognised in literature on the subject (Grin 1995: 39; Hogan-Brun and Wolff 2003: 14), but the Catalan and Alto Adige/Südtirol cases offer two of the most pertinent examples of the importance of regional or provincial autonomy for the territory where a minority group is resident. This should not be dismissed as merely an instrumentalist search for greater power, since the demand for political autonomy to protect a distinct culture and language is clearly an effective and legitimate tool of minority protection. However, even where extremely high levels of regional autonomy have been granted, it is important to remember that this is still very different from independence. Consequently, strong representation at the centre is also essential for minority groups to ensure both the maintenance of autonomous arrangements as well as the full cooperation of the institutions of the state, particularly in areas of shared power such as the language use of the public authorities.

In fact, with the focus on autonomy in much literature on the subject, the need for a continued commitment by the institutions of the state in the protection of these languages is often forgotten. Representatives from the state in Spain and Italy have often viewed the granting of autonomy as fulfilling all of their obligations towards the state’s other languages, while maintaining a primarily monolingual policy within their own institutions. The fact that these institutions are typically located in the monolingual centre has reinforced this view, even if they should theoretically represent all members of the multilingual polity. Taking this approach to its logical conclusion, it would
appear to reinforce the more extreme demands of some minority representatives in Catalonia and Alto Adige/Südtirol for political independence. If the state is not receptive to demands for greater multilingual representation then members of the minority may decide, as Emili Boix-Fuster explains, that ‘mejor que cambiar al Estado, sería cambiar de estado’ (2006: 56) [‘rather than changing the state, it would be better to change state’]. In the Spanish case, the central government in recent years does appear to have recognised this potential danger, particularly in reference to the Catalan case. In reference to Alto Adige/Südtirol, on the other hand, the approach of the Italian state appears to be the continued granting of greater autonomy and the full use of German within the provincial territory, but no attempt to provide any recognition for the language in central institutions of the state. However, the political representatives of the German-speaking minority do appear to prefer this approach, which reflects the continued attachment to a neighbouring state and a continued reluctance to see greater integration into the Italian state.

A greater adoption of multilingual policies by the state could potentially be beneficial in the cases of Sardinia and Asturias. The Asturian case demonstrates that the devolution of powers does not automatically result in the development of an effective language policy, particularly if the regional politicians themselves are unwilling or unable to ensure its implementation. It would appear naively optimistic to hope for the state to intervene where the regional government has failed as appears to be the case in Asturias, but it would certainly help if the state did not display such a clear disregard for non-official languages. The example of Law 482 in Italy does demonstrate the possibility for the state itself to take the initiative in minority protection and this has clearly facilitated regional efforts to improve the status of the Sardinian language. Nevertheless, there is the danger of such measures continuing to reinforce a dependent and passive relationship with the state. A potential solution would be the creation of bodies which encourage more cooperative and equal relations between state and regional or minority representatives. This need not mean silencing or restricting the political voice of successful minority parties such as the SVP and CiU, but rather ensuring the creation of institutions which encourage the contribution of all regions and minority groups in the design and implementation of state policies.
Chapter 7: Minority and Majority Language Rights in the Education System

7.1 Introduction
Minority rights have gained widespread recognition and support in recent decades, as explained in Section 2.2.2, and language has often played a crucial role in the recognition of such rights. Any right to use or study a specific language in the public sphere typically requires some form of validation from the state (Phillipson, Rannut and Skutnabb-Kangas 1995: 6) in order to ensure provisions are made for speakers to enjoy such rights. Nevertheless, the determination of which rights should be afforded to which speakers and how such rights should be provided remains controversial since it is impossible for a state to provide for the use and/or study of all of the many languages of its citizens in all contexts. These challenges have become particularly salient in both Spain and Italy in reference to the right of students to receive public education in and of a specific language, and this will consequently be the primary focus of this chapter.

In reference to Italy, the first section will consider the recognition of rights for German speakers and the effects this has had on the Italian-speaking group within the province. This will lead on to a discussion of whether the education system is able to provide for members of both groups to be able to learn and use both official languages of the province: German and Italian. Recent attempts by the state to provide for the introduction of Sardinian into the education system will also be considered. In Spain, the initial focus will be on recent controversies over immersion education in Catalonia and the role of the central government in ensuring the continued presence of Castilian within schools. Finally, the presence of Asturian in the education system will be discussed, focusing particularly on how the transfer of powers over education from the state to the region has affected the teaching of Asturian, if at all. Based on all four case studies, conclusions will be drawn on the extent to which both states have recognised the rights of distinct linguistic minorities concerning education in and of their languages.
7.2 Italy

7.2.1 Minority Language Rights in Alto Adige/Südtirol

In Alto Adige/Südtirol, the need for certain rights to be granted to German speakers to use their language became particularly necessary to redress past injustices under fascism, most notably via the establishment of the quota system in 1972, previously mentioned in Section 6.2.3. The original introduction of this measure was aimed at ensuring the German-speaking minority was given appropriate access to employment in the public services, from which, particularly under fascism, it had been largely excluded (Peterlini 2000: 160). This can be seen as a form of ‘positive discrimination’, and may appear to be a fairly extreme form of minority protection. Nevertheless, due to the previous exclusion of German speakers and the continued dominance of Italian speakers in the public services even after the fascist period, it was viewed as necessary to ensure equal access for both groups.

The census requirements for the fulfilment of such a proportional system can still be criticised for curtailing individual rights, since certain rights, such as access to jobs in the civil service and the ability to stand for election, are only accorded on the basis of affiliation with a linguistic group (Lantschner and Poggeschi 2008: 231). The Council of Europe in 2002, for example, expressed concern over this system specifically as it did not safeguard the principle of freedom of affiliation, meaning the ‘right of every person to choose to be treated or not to be treated as someone belonging to a minority’ (Council of Europe, 14 September 2001: 7). The Italian government responded that technically it did still provide for this right, since citizens could choose to be affiliated with the Italian group, which was not officially a minority (Council of Europe, 31 January 2002: 2). The Italian government has also recently made efforts to ensure greater confidentiality in the linguistic census (Council of Europe, 31 January 2002: 3) as well as making it easier to modify and repeal a declaration of linguistic affiliation during the ten-year period between censuses (Legislative Decree 99, 23 May 2005). The system is, however, still clearly restrictive since it requires all citizens to be affiliated with one of the three specified linguistic groups, effectively prohibiting joint affiliation and failing to provide any clear provisions for those who may belong to a different group altogether. The current system may consequently need to become more flexible in light of the fact that there is no longer an explicit ethnic conflict in the province. The appropriateness of measures such as the quota system and the linguistic census will need to be continually assessed for, as Günther Pallaver explains, ‘The
stronger the ethnic conflict decreases (and empirical data documents this clearly), the less one can justify collective protection measures, which are disproportionately affecting individual rights’ (2008: 326).

In particular, now that the proportional representation of each language group has been largely achieved in the public services, the continued necessity for such measures can be questioned. The 1972 Statute actually stated that the quotas should be fulfilled within thirty years (by 2002), but did not clarify what would happen afterwards (Lantschner and Poggeschi 2008: 219-33). It does, however, seem likely that the current system will remain for the time being, although its function may have changed. As Emma Lantschner and Giovanni Poggeschi explain:

in political practices, the prevailing interpretation is to view the quota system – after having reached its original intent as a positive discrimination measure of the minority groups – as a system of power-sharing between the groups, aimed at enhancing their peaceful coexistence. (2008: 224)

Some of the proportional measures in place could now also be seen to favour representation of the Italian group. For example, although the SVP has an absolute majority in the province, the provincial government must also reflect the numerical strength of each linguistic group in the provincial assembly, and the SVP is consequently obliged to include representatives from the other linguistic groups within its government. This measure can thus be seen as beneficial to the Italian speakers who represent the minority at the provincial level, but are still guaranteed political representation. Furthermore, although the system in place in Alto Adige/Südtirol may appear to favour the German-speaking minority, it should be remembered that these minority language rights only apply within the province. Although, at a provincial level, it may no longer be appropriate to refer to German speakers as a minority, at the state level their minority status remains undeniable due to the territorial nature of the rights accorded to the German-speaking minority. As explained in the previous chapter, the German language has little to no legal recognition within the central institutions of the Italian state. As a general rule, if German speakers intend to move to any other area of Italy, they will inevitably lose the specific language rights they are entitled to within the province. Consequently, the extremely favourable conditions granted to the German-speaking minority in Alto Adige/Südtirol should also be considered in relation to the limitations placed on them in the rest of the state’s territory.

Nevertheless, given the extremely high levels of autonomy the German-dominated province now has, some have questioned whether it is still appropriate to
refer to German speakers as a ‘linguistic minority’. The fact that the German-speaking group is dominant both politically and culturally within the province, and that the province now has powers over many areas of jurisdiction, means that its minority status could be questioned (Egger 2001: 32). Certain political representatives of the Italian-speaking group have claimed that Italian speakers are now discriminated against, and should consequently be accorded the status of linguistic minority within the province. These demands have come principally from the far right AN party, and notably came to the fore in Italian parliamentary debates in 2004 over further constitutional reforms. The demands also gained considerable support among senior government ministers in the centre-right governing coalition, with the Minister for Foreign Affairs declaring that ‘Poiché la riforma federale darà più poteri alla regione e alla provincia autonoma, è logico che la minoranza italiana abbia un riconoscimento giuridico e formale’ (Franco Frattini cited in La Repubblica, 23 February 2004) [‘Since the federal reform will give greater powers to the region and the autonomous province, it is logical that the Italian minority be recognised legally and formally’]. The amendment was, however, eventually withdrawn, largely due to internal opposition within the centre-right coalition (Alto Adige, 15 October 2004).

There have been further attempts to give legal recognition to the Italian group as a linguistic minority. In February 2009, for example, right-wing Italian deputies from Bolzano presented a Bill titled ‘Norme per il sostegno della comunità di lingua italiana della provincia di Bolzano’ (Bill 2136, 2 February 2009) [‘Regulations for the support of the Italian language community of the province of Bolzano’]. This Bill, which was never actually discussed in parliament, called for an annual fund of 50 million euros devoted to ‘migliorare l’inserimento nella vita economica e sociale della comunità di lingua italiana della provincia di Bolzano’ (Bill 2136, 2 February 2009) [‘improving the presence of the Italian language community in the social and economic life of the province of Bolzano’]. Another Bill, presented in September 2008 by the same right-wing forces from Bolzano, called for the establishment of a parliamentary commission to investigate the conditions of the Italian and bilingual communities in the province (Bill 1711, 29 September 2008). One of the principal tasks of this Commission was to ‘indagare sull’esistenza di forme di discriminazione diretta o indiretta ai danni della comunità linguistica italiana’ (Bill 1711, 29 September 2008) [‘investigate the existence of forms of direct and indirect discrimination against the Italian language community’]. Although there have as yet been no serious attempts to have such bills passed in parliament, they are a sign that there is concern among some members of the Italian-
speaking population, or at least their political representatives, about their minority status within the province.

It would be easy to dismiss such bills as merely right-wing propaganda and attempts to court controversy and publicity for the right-wing cause. Nevertheless, some have claimed that signs of discontent among the Italian-speaking group are evidenced in the slight decline of the Italian-speaking population in the province, with some Italian speakers reportedly opting to emigrate to other regions.\(^1\) This led to the now infamous, and evidently exaggerated, local headline ‘Marcia funebre per gli Italiani’ (cited in Carli 2003: 218) ['Funeral march of the Italians']. This would appear to echo a 1953 article in the German-speaking newspaper *Dolomiten*, which referred to the ‘death march’ of the German-speaking population due to the continued ‘Italianization’ policy of the Italian state at that time (cited in Grote 2012: 86). Despite this exaggeration, Georg Grote notes that there is now a sense that, ‘As the South Tyroleans have gradually outgrown the notion of themselves as victims, sections of the Italian population have begun to regard themselves as the new victims’ (2012: 171). The clearest sign that the Italian group may no longer be dominant is the growing trend for some Italian speakers to declare their children German speakers and send them to German-speaking schools. This is particularly true in the German-dominated valleys of Bolzano where there are signs Italian speakers are now being assimilated (Alcock 2000: 189).

If it is the case, however, that Italian speakers are genuinely suffering an infringement of their rights as a result of both autonomy arrangements and minority protection for German speakers, this is certainly not legally sanctioned in the regional Statute. Article 2 of the Statute, for example, states that ‘Nella regione è riconosciuta parità di diritti ai cittadini, qualunque sia il gruppo linguistico al quale appartengono’ (art. 2, Special Statute for Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol 1972) ['In the region equality of rights is recognised for all citizens, whichever linguistic group they belong to’]. Although minority protection is the principal aim of the Statute, it also provides for the safeguarding of individual rights for all citizens of Bolzano. The measures of protection in place for the German minority also apply to the Italian-speaking group, such as the right to education in their mother tongue and the right to political representation, which does, as previously stated, guarantee an Italian voice in the provincial government. However, given the previously dominant position of the Italian group, particularly in the

\(^1\) Between the 1991 and 2001 censuses in Bolzano, the percentage of people declaring themselves Italian speakers fell by 1.18 per cent, while the percentage of German speakers rose by 1.16 per cent (ASTAT 2002).
civil service, attempts to redress the balance with the proportional system do have an immediately negative effect on the Italian-speaking population. As Lucio Giudiceandrea confirms, ‘era, almeno in parte, inevitabile che il riscatto della minoranza nazionale sudtirolese comportasse un restringimento degli spazi per la minoranza locale altoatesina’ (2009: 117) [‘it was at least partly inevitable that the liberation of the South Tyrolean [German-speaking] national minority would entail a restriction in the spaces of the local Alto Adige [Italian-speaking] minority’]. This is not necessarily a question of Italian speakers being deprived of individual rights. However, efforts to achieve substantive equality for a minority group will often have a negative impact on a previously dominant group.

Furthermore, the fact that the Italian speakers are still members of the national majority should not be dismissed, despite the high levels of self-government in the province. As Ruth Rubio-Marín explains:

In principle, because a strong structure of decentralized powers can reproduce many of the assimilation pressures at a sub-national level, nothing speaks against characterizing minorities within minorities as such. That said, it is almost certain that the degree of protection that such a minority might need to safeguard its linguistic environment will be significantly less when, at a country level, it enjoys a majority position. (2003: 60)

Italian speakers remain citizens of a state whose principal and official language in all spheres is Italian, as is emphasised again in Article 99 of the Special Statute for the region. Thus, Italian will continue to be an official language throughout the state, including in Bolzano, although German will also have equal status within the province. Nevertheless, the equal status of both languages does place certain obligations on both the minority and majority; obligations which appear to have caused Italian speakers particular difficulties.

7.2.2 Bilingual Obligations and Education in the Mother Tongue

As explained in Section 6.2.3, the system of minority protection established in Alto Adige/Südtirol provides for citizens to be able to communicate in their own language in all official contexts. Bilingualism is consequently not an obligation for citizens, but it can be difficult to find work without knowledge of both languages, particularly since private companies in the province have also increasingly called for bilingual skills. This means there is a strong motivation to achieve bilingualism for career prospects, although until recently it has been the German group that has felt this motivation more strongly, as proven by their much greater success in the bilingual exam to acquire the
so-called licence attesting to their knowledge, the ‘patentino’ (Egger 2001: 184). Italian speakers have shown a much greater resistance, with the ‘patentino’ viewed as a hated and resented document, placing undue and, some argue, unfair obligations on them in order to gain employment. As Lucio Giudiceandrea, himself a member of the Italian-speaking community, explains:

L’italiano, sempre fino a qualche anno fa, era poco attento, diceva, ‘Non è giusto che io venga costretto a parlare un’altra lingua. Io sono italiano, qui siamo in Italia, e se tu come minoranza vivi in Italia, è il tuo obbligo studiare la lingua nazionale ma non il mio obbligo parlare la tua lingua’. (II6)

[The Italians, until a few years ago, showed little awareness, they would say, ‘It is not fair that I am forced to speak another language. I am Italian, here we are in Italy, and if you, as a minority, live in Italy it is your duty to study the national language but not my duty to speak your language’.

This is not an unusual attitude among national majorities, who, while taking for granted the obligation of minorities to learn the national language, view any pressure on themselves to learn the minority language as unfair and even a violation of their own rights. As Denise Réaume argues, ‘Personal bilingualism is not that difficult, as minority-language communities everywhere prove daily. What makes it seem difficult to majority-language speakers is the absence of support for second-language learning, and, one suspects, an ideology of superiority’ (2003: 293). Support for German-language learning in the province will be discussed later, but there is clear evidence of this ‘ideology of superiority’, which has been encouraged by right-wing forces in the province and has prevented Italians from learning German (Guidiceandrea 2009: 78).

This superior knowledge of the second language among the German-speaking population is confirmed in the most recent ASTAT survey, with, for example, 38.8 per cent of Italian speakers claiming they are unable to express themselves orally in German, while only 5.1 per cent of German speakers were unable to express themselves in Italian (ASTAT 2006: 152). The combination of greater enforced contact with Italian, particularly before the new Statute was introduced in 1972, as well as the greater motivation to learn the language in order to be able to advance as a minority has meant that knowledge of Italian is widespread among the German-speaking population. Some also claim that it has been easier for the German-speaking group to learn Italian since the Italian spoken in Bolzano is standard Italian as opposed to one of the Italian dialects. This means that the standard Italian learnt by the German speakers in school is suitable for everyday conversations, and makes it easier for German speakers to communicate with Italian speakers (Mioni 2000: 338). The German-speaking population in Bolzano,
in contrast, typically uses the Austro-Bavarian Tyrolean dialect in their everyday communications, which differs significantly from the standard German taught in Italian-speaking schools (Egger 2001: 43-45). This situation can cause added tension between the two groups, since, as Kurt Egger explains, Italian speakers ‘considerano spesso una esclusione il fatto che in loro presenza si parli il dialetto’ (2001: 46) [‘often consider the use of the dialect in their presence as a form of exclusion’]. Although use of the dialect is an undeniable problem for the Italian community, this should not be considered solely as an attempt by German speakers to exclude Italian speakers, but rather their natural form of communication. The situation is made more difficult, however, by the Italian school system which, as Giudiceandrea explains, ‘trascura completamente il dialetto’ (II6) [‘entirely neglects the dialect’].

The failure of the Italian school system to provide adequate German teaching, in general, has often been the focus for complaints among the Italian-speaking population. In the 2004 ASTAT survey, for example, 67.9 per cent of mother-tongue Italian speakers declared that their school experience had not given them a sufficient knowledge of German (ASTAT 2006: 43). Furthermore, while Italian has always been a subject in the final school certificate exam in German schools, German was made a written and oral exam subject in Italian schools only in 1999 (Egger 2001: 139). Due to limited interactions between the two language communities, the school system is the principal institution capable of providing Italian speakers with the necessary German-language skills. However, as Giudiceandrea explains, while the German school system adapted very quickly to the need to ensure knowledge of Italian, ‘la scuola italiana invece ha scoperto con molto ritardo, solamente negli anni novanta, la effettiva necessità di insegnare il tedesco, e di insegnarlo anche con metodi nuovi in modo efficace’ (II6) [‘the Italian school only discovered very late on, only in the 1990s, the real need to teach German, and to teach it via new methods in an effective way’].

The past two decades have seen increasing calls and attempts to improve German-language teaching in the Italian school system within the province, which reflects a significant change in attitude within the Italian-speaking community. The change in attitude is most likely due to the declining position of the Italian-speaking community, partially as a result of their inferior skills in the second language in comparison to the German-speaking community. The recognition of the need for bilingual skills among the Italian community has greatly increased, even if negative feelings and resentment of these obligations do persist (Soffritti 2000: 347). From January 1999, for example, standard German was introduced as part of a pilot project in
Recent years have also seen various pilot schemes with a greater focus on the vehicular usage of the German language from a young age. This greater focus on German teaching in Italian schools shows how national majority assumptions are clearly being questioned, with learning of the language of the minority, German, now widely accepted as vital, and even beneficial to the Italian community. As Bruna Rauzi Visintin, head of the Italian school system in Bolzano, confirms, ‘[l]a comunità italiana, in primis i genitori e gli insegnanti, ha accettato con entusiasmo le novità introdotte nel corso degli anni’ (2006: 54) [‘The Italian community, particularly parents and teachers, has enthusiastically accepted the innovations introduced over the years’].

Nevertheless, these pilot schemes and attempts to reform the Italian education system within the province have run into opposition from German-speaking political representatives. The SVP, in particular, has argued that the vehicular use of German and the introduction of German into Italian-speaking nurseries go against the principle of ‘mother tongue’ education as established in the Statute, and such use is consequently unconstitutional. Article 19 of the Statute states specifically that teaching throughout obligatory education should be in the mother tongue of speakers (art. 19, Special Statute for Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol 1972). The Statute does also provide for teaching of the second language in primary schools, but only from the second or third year (art. 9, Special Statute for Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol 1972). Consequently, the SVP has repeatedly blocked any attempts at immersion instruction in German in Italian-speaking schools. Memories of fascist repression have led the German group to fear close linguistic contact or possible language mixing between the two groups as the path to assimilation. As Egger explains: ‘Le ferite di quell’epoca sono un trauma per il gruppo tedesco e ogni proposta che preveda anche il minimo cambiamento viene vista come un pericolo per l’intero gruppo’ (2001: 120) [‘The wounds from that era are a trauma for the German group and any proposal which provides for even minimal change is seen as a danger to the entire group’]. Consequently, it is not just potential changes to the German-speaking school system that the SVP fears, but also to the Italian-speaking school system, with immersion teaching in German for Italian speakers viewed as an attempt to dilute the ethnic distinctiveness of the German-speaking group.

Furthermore, the SVP’s dominance over provincial politics gives it considerable power over both the German and Italian school systems and consequently the party is able to block any attempted reforms even when they refer solely to the Italian-speaking group (Pallaver 2003: 298). The possibility of moving towards a more multilingual
approach to education has been blocked by local German-speaking political representatives, who have focused on the symbolic value of the language as specific to each group and who fear that the parallel use of both languages could lead to both languages being learned and used incorrectly (Grote 2012: 118). This was also confirmed by the inspectors for second-language teaching in both the German and Italian schools in 2005, who stated that local politics was holding back any further advances towards multilingual schooling (Fionda 2008: 30-32). The current security of the German speakers’ position does not appear to have diminished fears of assimilation, and the very security of this position means that there may now be a reversal of roles, with Italians putting more effort into learning the second language, while the German population is less concerned with learning Italian (Egger 2001: 186). This reversal of positions may give credit to the idea that it is Italian speakers who now constitute the real linguistic minority, particularly if the governing SVP continues to ignore Italian demands to improve bilingual education. While teaching in the mother tongue is often considered as necessary in guaranteeing the rights of a minority to learn their language, the rigid interpretation of this principle as necessarily requiring the continued separation of both linguistic groups may need to be rethought in order to encourage greater cooperation and integration between both groups. Any future changes to the system established, given the Constitutional status of the Statute, will, however, need to be agreed by both the state and the province, and with appropriate representation of all linguistic groups.

In sum, while it remains inappropriate and inaccurate to refer to Italian speakers in Bolzano as a ‘linguistic minority’, this does not mean that possible infringements of their individual rights should be ignored. The bilingual obligations placed on Italian speakers living in the area, however, do not constitute a violation of these rights, even if such obligations are not placed on Italian speakers in other areas. Those living in a minority language territory may have to accept that it is not just the minority that has the duty to learn the state language, and that certain reciprocal demands may be made of them. Many of the complaints, particularly from the right-wing Italian representatives, appear to be related to the loss of their previously unjust and imposed dominant position under fascism and in the early post-war years. Nevertheless, the minority protection measures originally developed may now need to be rethought, since many of the aims of such measures, such as a greater German representation in the public administration, have been achieved. Further discussion may be needed in order to reassess the suitability of some measures specified in the Package in the 1970s which, as the Council
of Europe asserted, should also ‘allow for developments over time and not be rigidly set in time’ (Council of Europe, 14 September 2001: 7). Representatives of the state should, however, also be cautious in any attempts to intervene, which would only serve to reassert the minority position of German speakers in the state-wide context and thus be likely to lead to a defensive counter-reaction. In particular, declaring the Italian group to be a linguistic minority is not the method to achieve this goal, since this is clearly inappropriate for a group which speaks the universally recognised official language of the state and the joint official language of the province. The provincial and state governments must instead continue to ensure that the Statute continues to fulfil the role of guaranteeing the individual rights of both communities, which may need to be adapted now that formal equality between both the Italian and German groups can be seen as largely achieved. The German political representatives need to be particularly cautious in exerting their majority control over the provincial government and its institutions, given the generous autonomy arrangements secured for the province. As Rolf Steininger explains, ‘A somewhat more magnanimous attitude toward their fellow Italian citizens would surely do no harm today, even if the South Tyroleans never invited them there in the first place’ (2003: 149).

7.2.3 Law 482 and the Right to a Sardinian Language Education

In Bolzano, minority rights have been fully asserted by the German-speaking population, and the current debate revolves not around the establishment of these rights, but rather the need to ensure a greater balance between minority rights and the individual rights of all citizens. In the Sardinian case, however, the idea that Sardinian speakers are entitled to any rights to learn and use their language remains contested, both by the speakers themselves and by central government institutions. Nevertheless, Law 482 appeared to demonstrate a recognition of the rights of the speakers of Sardinian and other minority languages to continue to learn and use their language in both the public and the private sphere. As Anna Cutaia from the Ministry of the Interior confirms, in Law 482 ‘i diritti che vengono riconosciuti sono il diritto alla lingua, cioè [...] nei confronti della pubblica amministrazione, [...] e il diritto all’istruzione della lingua nella scuola’ (II4) ['the rights recognised for minorities are the right to the language, which is to say [...] before the public administration, [...] and the right to teaching of the language in school'].

This new development is particularly important in relation to the education system, since the approach of schools towards different speech varieties is critical in
determining the value accorded to them (Bourdieu 1991: 57). This explains why states have commonly viewed the education system as essential in ensuring the spread and establishment of an official national language, as well as typically the exclusion and even denigration of other varieties. This has undoubtedly been the case in Sardinia since, as Matteo Porru states, ‘la scuola sarda o la scuola italiana in Sardegna […] ha esattamente privilegiato espressioni di cultura altra dalla sarda’ (1991: 8) [‘Sardinian schools or Italian schools in Sardinia […] have specifically privileged expressions of culture other than Sardinian culture’]. The Euromosaic report on Sardinia in 1995 confirms this, stating that ‘The education system plays no role whatsoever in supporting the language and its production and reproduction’ (Euromosaic, 12 January 1995b).

There have been some local attempts to introduce the language into schools, particularly after the passing of Regional Law 26 for the promotion of Sardinian in 1997, which led to the creation of regional funds for schools to encourage the teaching of the language. The central Ministry of Education also initially contributed to these regional funds in 1999 to encourage the promotion of the language (Depau and Zucca 2005: 283). However, the passing and implementation of Law 482 would signal a move towards the direct intervention of the state.

Law 482 established education as one of the key areas of action, providing for the use of the minority language alongside Italian in pre-schools for the ‘svolgimento delle attività educative’ [‘carrying out of educational activities’] and for the use of the language as a ‘strumento di insegnamento’ [‘teaching instrument’] in primary and secondary schools (art. 4, Law 482, 15 December 1999). Article 5 explains the role of the central government, and specifically the Ministry of Education, which is tasked with issuing the general criteria for the implementation of Article 4, with an annual budget of around 1 million euros to be assigned to national and local projects for the study of minority languages and cultures (Portelli 2006: 132). To fulfil this role, the Minister for Education at the time, Tullio De Mauro, established a commission which met in November 2000 and included linguistic experts including Leonardo Savoia, Vincenzo Orioles and Tullio Telmon (Savoia 2001: 17). The criteria drawn up by the commission were then sent in a circular letter to all of the relevant schools in 2001 and the commission met again in July 2002 to assess the projects submitted. The process has subsequently been repeated annually with the members of the commission changing.

Initially, there was a strong sense of optimism over the new direction the Ministry of Education was taking, signalling a clear move away from the stigmatisation of minority and local languages to an active promotion of their use. The early circular
letters also received a positive response from schools. Tullio Telmon, a member of the first commission, writes that his experience ‘era stata abbastanza entusiasmante perché si vedeva la volontà di molte scuole, numerose scuole, di inserire qualche cosa nella loro programmazione scolastica’ (II14) [‘had been quite encouraging because we could see a clear will from many schools, numerous schools, to insert something into their school curriculum’]. There has also been a significant increase over the past decade in the number of projects proposed and approved, going from just 47 in 2001-02 to 215 in 2006-07 (Portelli 2006: 132). Sardinia has seen the most significant increase in projects funded, with none in 2001-02 and 53 in 2007-08 (Ministero dell’Istruzione, dell’Università e della Ricerca 2008). One of the main aims of these projects is to improve the social status of the respective minority languages. As Tiziana Sinesi from the Ministry of Education clarifies: ‘Le iniziative progettuali pongono la loro attenzione in particolare all’ingresso della lingua minoritaria nella scuola, a incoraggiare il superamento di quei comportamenti pregiudiziali connessi all’uso di una varietà locale all’interno di un sistema istituzionale’ (2010: 117) [‘The project initiatives specifically focus their attention on the introduction of the language into schools, in order to tackle those prejudicial attitudes associated with the use of a local variety within an institutional setting’].

Nevertheless, despite this ambitious aim, the reality is that many projects have focused on cultural and seemingly folkloric subjects, sometimes failing to provide more than passing references to the language. This focus has been most notable in Sardinia, with 40 out of 67 schools in a 2010 study declaring that most projects focused more on the local culture than the language itself (Iannàccaro 2010: 109). While cultural projects may not necessarily be negative in themselves, this cultural focus tends to concentrate on traditional and archaic elements. This is evident from some of the titles of projects which received funding, such as: ‘Canzoni e giochi nella cultura sarda’ [‘Songs and games in Sardinian culture’], ‘Il pane nel tempo: ricordi di ieri nei sapori di oggi’ [‘Food through time: memories of yesterday in the flavours of today’] and ‘Viaggio alla ricerca del nostro passato’ [‘Journey in search of our past’] (Ministero dell’Istruzione, dell’Università e della Ricerca 2003; 2006; 2008). Admittedly, there are other projects which are more clearly focused on the language, but a significant proportion displays this seemingly folkloric and archaic approach. Giuseppe Corongiu, Director of the Regional Service for the Sardinian Language and Culture, confirms this approach, stating that ‘La presenza della lingua sarda a scuola è assolutamente episodica, in quanto i grossi investimenti [...] che ci sono stati, sono andati più a favore del
The presence of the Sardinian language at schools is entirely episodic, and in relation to the large investments [...] which there have been, they have typically gone towards patrimonialistic culturalism rather than a genuine linguistic education’.

Although Law 482 itself does refer to both the language and culture, the implication is that the two should coincide with the language remaining the primary focus, when in reality the language appears to be increasingly marginalised in such cultural projects. In particular, although Article 4 of Law 482 provides for the potential vehicular usage of the language, Sardinian schools appear to have made no use of this provision.

The reasons behind such an approach, however, may not lie with the central government, but rather the parents and local community, which play an influential role when schools draw up proposals for projects. Although a recent survey in Sardinia found that 57.3 per cent of respondents were in favour of the use of the local language in schools, the majority are opposed to its usage as a vehicular language, and believe it should only be taught as a subject itself or to study the local culture (Valdes 2007: 53-54). The main reason for opposition to the use of the language in schools was that the language was not ‘appropriate’ for schools (Valdes 2007: 53), demonstrating the continued belief that Sardinian is unsuitable for the transmission of knowledge and complex ideas. Furthermore, many parents are concerned that any use of Sardinian as a language of instruction could jeopardise their children’s opportunities to learn Italian (Valdes 2007: 53), a language essential for future work and economic opportunities.

Consequently, any advances by the state or individual schools towards a more bilingual approach to education are likely to be controversial, and may even find opposition from parents. Nevertheless, if funded projects continue to take a primarily folkloric approach, this attitude will be reinforced among younger generations, and the prestige of the local language will remain minimal. As Gabriele Iannàccaro explains:

Non è sufficiente oggi per una lingua essere legata a valori ideologici e di recupero del passato: ciò le assicura forse una adesione di tipo ideologico o culturale, ma difficilmente garantisce la sua sopravvivenza come codice di comunicazione corrente. (2010: 361-62)

[It is no longer enough for a language to be linked to ideological values or the recovery of the past: that may ensure for it an ideological or cultural commitment, but it will struggle to guarantee the survival of the language as a modern code of communication.]

Iannàccaro argues instead, from his research on the implementation of Law 482, that what is necessary is the move towards treating the minority language as a normal
language of instruction to the point that ‘deve passare come non marcato il fatto che si utilizzi il codice di minoranza per insegnare, poniamo, la chimica e la matematica’ (2010: 362) [‘it should be seen as unremarkable that the minority language be used to teach chemistry and mathematics, for example’]. Obviously, this represents an ambitious aim, but a significant move towards projects with a greater focus on the vehicular usage of the local language would be more effective in ensuring that the language is no longer treated as merely a cultural relic to be preserved, but instead as a true language of communication. Equally, as Depau and Zucca argue, by teaching other subjects in Sardinian, this would also overcome the problem of attempting to insert the additional subject of Sardinian into the already full school curriculum (2005: 289).

To ensure acceptance of such an approach, the local community and parents, in particular, must be made aware of the advantages a bilingual education may offer. In Alto Adige/Südtirol, recent years have seen a growing recognition within both the Italian- and German-speaking communities of the usefulness of bilingualism in German and Italian (Egger 2009: 139-40). However, this may be easier to accept in that context, given the status of both languages as official state languages of two major European powers. The evident advantages, particularly within an increasingly mobile Europe, can be much more readily appreciated given the relatively high level of linguistic and social capital of both languages, at least in comparison to Sardinian. Nevertheless, various studies have found that the benefits of a bilingual education do not derive solely from the social and linguistic capital of the languages concerned. As Stephen May clarifies:

> educational and linguistic research over the last 40 years has demonstrated unequivocally that bilingualism is a cognitive advantage rather than a deficit and that being educated in one’s first language provides the most effective means of subsequently transferring those first-language skills to those of a second language. (2003b: 144)

Tullio De Mauro has also done significant work in this area in Italy, and has long stated that providing for a greater use of local languages in the education system is likely to significantly improve literacy in Italian among those students who use the local language at home (De Mauro and Lodi 1993: 10-15). Consequently, rather than a threat to Italian, and to individual social mobility, a move towards a more bilingual approach could significantly improve the social status of Sardinian, while also improving the status and prospects of its speakers, which is essential for ensuring the survival and effective transmission of the language.

The Ministry of Education does appear to have taken such considerations on board, and the circular letter sent to schools in 2008 emphasised a new teaching method
known as Content and Language Integrated Learning, a method supported by the European Commission, which focuses on the use of a language to teach other content.

The letter went on to state that:

L’uso veicolare e contestuale delle lingue minoritarie per l’insegnamento dei contenuti disciplinari del curricolo come la storia, la geografia etc, ha trasformato le stesse lingue minoritarie storiche in lingue ‘vive’ rendendo il loro apprendimento efficace: non si impara solo ad usare la lingua, ma si usa la lingua per apprendere. (Ministero dell’Istruzione, dell’Università e della Ricerca, 23 July 2008)

[The vehicular and contextual use of the minority languages for teaching of subject-specific content from the curriculum such as history, geography, etc., has transformed the historic minority languages into ‘living’ languages and ensured their effective learning: students do not just learn to use the language but it is also used to learn.]

Although the results of this new focus, given its recentness, are yet to be fully appreciated, both Iannàccaro and Sinesi state that there has since been a noticeable improvement in project proposals, with the focus returning to the language (Iannàccaro 2010: 142; Sinesi 2010: 119). The central Ministry of Education has also attempted to move towards a more coordinated approach to state-led action, in addition to the funding of individual school projects. This is demonstrated by the fact that the Ministry of Education funded a national research project in 2009 to assess the first ten years of the implementation of Law 482 in the education system and its impact (Iannàccaro 2010). The funding of this research appears to demonstrate the Ministry’s commitment to continued action and to ensuring the future success of intervention at the state level.

Nevertheless, despite the positive messages from the Ministry of Education, there are several worrying signs that state-led action is all too often ineffective and minimal in both scale and impact. On a financial level, the original sum of just over a million euros is widely felt to be insufficient and recent years have seen a massive reduction in these funds to around half of the original sum (Morelli 2006: 17). This has been justified on the basis of recent economic problems, but sends a clear message that the promotion of minority languages in the education system is not a priority. The focus on individual projects approved annually also clearly leads to instability since, as the Council of Europe reported, it ‘makes it very difficult to ensure continuity both in the learning process and working methods’ (Council of Europe, 24 February 2005: 29).

Experts in Sardinia would appear to agree, for as Corongiu explains, ‘nella scuola la presenza della lingua è episodica, non sono riusciti a stabilizzare granché, cioè si fanno questi progetti e poi chiude il finanziamento ed è finito il progetto, il sardo scompare’ (II3) [‘in schools the presence of the language is episodic, they have not managed to
establish anything significant, by which I mean they do these projects and then the funding disappears and the project is over, Sardinian disappears']. The ineffectiveness of these projects is also proven by a survey conducted in 2006 in Sardinia, which found that 44.6 per cent of schoolchildren at the time had never experienced use of the local language in school and only 17 per cent had experienced regular use (Oppo 2007a: 40). Cristina Lavinio, an expert on the teaching of Sardinian, also concludes that the approach of the state has been ‘vario, oscillante, e collegato ai finanziamenti messi a disposizione […] non sono mai state cifre elevate, e quindi ben poco si è potuto fare con la 482’ (II8) ['wavering and uncertain, and in relation to the funding made available […] it has never been large sums, and as a result it has not been possible to do much with Law 482’]. Equally, the focus on projects has typically meant that the minority languages are often only used in extracurricular courses, which have less prestige as they are not placed on the same level as the rest of the curriculum (Iannàccaro 2010: 291; Sinesi 2010: 120).

Consequently, there is clear evidence that central government action is having a very minimal effect and Iannàccaro’s report concludes that a new approach may be required (2010: 358). However, given the rapidly diminishing funds at the state level, it would appear that the impetus and funding may still need to be found primarily at the regional and local level. In Sardinia, as discussed in the previous chapter, regional politicians do appear to have recognised the importance of autonomous government and have taken a more active role in the promotion of the language. Nevertheless, how ambitious and effective regional action can be is also severely restricted by the fact that jurisdiction over education remains primarily under state control, despite the increasing autonomy given to individual schools. If the Sardinian regional government does wish to adopt a more ambitious approach and move towards genuinely bilingual education models, it may first want to consider recent events in Friuli-Venezia Giulia, where Friulian now has a similar legal status to Sardinian. In 2009 the Constitutional Court declared that a recent regional law providing for vehicular usage of Friulian in schools was unconstitutional (Sentence 159, 18 May 2009). This demonstrates the fact that, despite the increasing autonomy granted to educational institutions, the central government still retains significant control and powers particularly in determining the language of instruction. As Corongiu explains:

Quello che dice lo stato italiano è questo: ‘Se tu nello statuto speciale di autonomia non hai la competenza sulle specifiche sulle minoranze linguistiche, non puoi
entrare’. Detto questo, si afferma che le minoranze sono importanti, la diversità linguistica è un valore, però, di fatto, c’è un’evidente chiusura. (II3)

[The Italian state says this: ‘If you in the special statute of autonomy do not have specific jurisdiction over linguistic minorities, you cannot intervene’. This said, it is also claimed that minorities are important, linguistic diversity is a value, but in reality there is a clearly closed attitude.]

As discussed in Section 6.2.2, the absence of any reference to the existence of the Sardinian minority in the regional Statute continues to place strict limitations on the activities of the regional authorities, despite its recent legal recognition at the state level. The Friulian case proves that a move towards a more bilingual approach to Sardinian in the education system in future will clearly need to originate, or at least gain acceptance, at the state level.

In sum, the conclusions we can draw from state action concerning Sardinian in the education system are not as optimistic as may first appear from the passing of Law 482. In reality, these uncoordinated, short-term projects have failed to ensure the genuine integration of Sardinian into schools, and action at the regional level remains restricted by the lack of powers the regional government holds over the education system. While we may have moved beyond the explicit stigmatisation and prohibition of use of the local language, the education system in Sardinia remains almost solely the arena of the official state language. Admittedly, however, there is not significant demand for a greater presence of Sardinian in schools, particularly as a language of instruction. This is clearly related to the continued low prestige of Sardinian as well as the continued sense that Sardinians are not a ‘genuine’ minority deserving of the recognition of such rights. However, such views are clearly reinforced by the marginal role assigned to the language and demonstrate that Law 482 has not yet made significant progress in combatting the negative prejudices against minority languages.

7.3 Spain

7.3.1 Immersion Education: Rights and Duties

As established in reference to Italy, the right to education of and potentially in one’s mother tongue is often considered central to any definition of rights for linguistic minorities (Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson 1995: 71), and within the Spanish context education through the medium of other languages than Castilian has been a particular source of controversy, particularly in Catalonia. Catalonia has full, but not exclusive, jurisdiction over the regulation and administration of education (art. 15, Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia 1979), while the state retains control over ‘basic elements of the
curriculum’ (arts. 149.1.30 and 27, Spanish Constitution 1978). This was confirmed with the 1990 Law confirming the decentralisation of education for all regions. Specifically, the Law establishes that the core curriculum set by the state should not exceed 65 per cent of teaching hours for all communities, and 55 per cent for those communities with a second official language (art. 4.2, Organic Law 1/1990). The Law also established knowledge of all official languages within an Autonomous Community as an obligatory subject at all levels of compulsory education within the relevant regions (arts. 14d, 20e, 26a and 27.4, Organic Law 1/1990). As a result, the Autonomous Communities have been given the right and responsibility to introduce a second official language as an obligatory subject and as a language of instruction.

Nevertheless, the extent to which the co-official language is used as the language of instruction has been particularly controversial within the Catalan context. As explained in Section 3.3.4, in 1992 the Catalan government introduced a Decree specifying that Catalan be the ‘normal’ language of instruction in all primary and secondary schools in the region (art 3.1, Catalan Decree 75/1992). This essentially meant the introduction of the so-called ‘immersion’ programme, which had previously only been used as a pilot scheme in Castilian-speaking areas, but became compulsory in all schools from the 1993-94 school year (Mar-Molinero 1995: 51-52). This has ensured the progressive adoption of Catalan as the language of instruction in all schools, with 92 per cent of primary schools having done so by the 1999-2000 school year, although progress has been slower in secondary schools (Vila i Moreno 2011: 128-29). It should be clarified, however, that the introduction of immersion education has not meant the exclusion of Castilian. Castilian remains an obligatory subject in all schools (Areny and van der Schaaf 2000: 9) and, most importantly, it has been repeatedly stated in all language and education legislation in Catalonia that by the end of compulsory education all students must be able to use both Catalan and Castilian ‘normally and correctly’ (art. 14.4 Catalan Law 7/1983; arts. 21.3 and 21.6, Catalan Law 1/1998).

Immersion education in Catalonia has still been a continual source of controversy, with the Constitutional Court called in to intervene in one of its now most infamous cases in relation to language policy. The Sentence was a result of an appeal launched by the lawyer Esteban Gómez Rovira against the original 1983 Language Normalisation Act, but which after various appeals did not reach the Constitutional Court until 1994 (Branchadell 1996: 51). Before being sent to the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court had already passed judgement in January 1994 finding against five articles of the 1983 Language Normalisation Act in relation to education (Branchadell
1996: 51). Specifically, the Supreme Court invoked the rights of parents to choose the language of education for their children (Miley 2006: 268). The Constitutional Court, however, adopted a notably conciliatory attitude in its eventual Sentence (Mar-Molinero 1995: 54). In contrast to the Supreme Court, the Sentence established that while there existed a right to an education, this did not mean a right to choose the language of that education but only to ‘recibir la educación en una lengua en la que puedan comprender y asumir los contenidos de las enseñanzas’ (Sentence 337/1994) [‘receive education in a language that they can understand and take in the content of teaching’]. Most importantly, the Sentence asserts that while there is no constitutional duty to know Catalan, this does not mean that its knowledge cannot be obligatory for students living in an area where that language is official. The Sentence thus effectively allows for Catalan to be used as the primary language of instruction throughout Catalonia, as long as knowledge of Castilian is also ensured. Although the Sentence itself was related to the original 1983 Law and not the more recent Decree extending the immersion system to all Catalan schools, its findings effectively legitimised this approach.

Nevertheless, the Catalan education system has faced continued opposition both within and outside of Catalonia. National newspapers evidently contributed to this controversy with ABC using the now infamous headline: ‘Igual que Franco, pero al revés’ (ABC, 12 September 1993) [‘Just like Franco, but in reverse’]. Various civic organisations also arose within Catalonia during the 1980s and early 1990s to oppose immersion teaching (Mar-Molinero 1997: 157). These were mainly right-wing movements and, while vocal, were relatively small (Mar-Molinero 1995: 53), but a more ‘liberal’ opposition appeared from the late 1990s in the form of the previously mentioned Foro Babel. Most criticisms have centred on the failure to provide for education to habitual Castilian speakers in their mother tongue. Critics have pointed to the supposed hypocrisy of Catalan speakers who under Franco exalted mother-tongue education, but now deny it for Castilian speakers (Herreras 2006: 348; Lodares 2002: 187). The Catalan education system does theoretically still recognise the right to the first years of education in the mother tongue (art 21.2, Catalan Law 1/1998). The fulfilment of this right is ensured primarily through ‘atención individualizada’ [‘individual attention’] which essentially means providing for individual students to receive some specific classes in Castilian separately at the request of their parents (Miley 2006: 275). As a result, some have argued that this system does not effectively guarantee the right to Castilian-language education, since it requires parents to make a specific demand for their children to be treated as an exception (Branchadell 1997: 93;
Catalan and Castilian undoubtedly do not receive the same treatment in the Catalan education system, and some critics have gone further, arguing that the immersion system is aimed at the enforced substitution of Castilian and thus attempted assimilation of the Castilian-speaking population of the region (Herreras 2006: 374). In fact, the PP went so far as to announce the creation of a special commission in 1993 to investigate discrimination against Castilian speakers (Digiacomo 1999: 123).

Although the particularly vocal opposition to normalisation and immersion education remains that of a minority within Catalonia, there are still signs of a general lack of consensus over the need for the immersion model. Various surveys have shown, for example, that there is still significant opposition within the region to education entirely in Catalan, with a 1998 survey finding that 50.2 per cent would prefer half of their education in Castilian and half in Catalan (CIS 1998). As Albert Branchadell confirms: ‘si se ofrece la posibilidad del cincuenta y cincuenta, mucha gente prefiere esto. Es decir que hay una cierta distancia entre lo que proponen los partidos y lo que siente la sociedad’ (SI4) ['if you offer the possibility of half and half, many people prefer this. Which is to say there is a certain distance between what the parties propose and what society feels']. The Constitutional Court also appears to have taken a less conciliatory tone in more recent years. In the Sentence on the 2006 Statute reform discussed in the previous chapter, the Court reasserted that ‘el castellano no puede dejar de ser también lengua vehicular y de aprendizaje en la enseñanza’ (Sentence 31/2010) ['Castilian cannot be excluded as a vehicular language of instruction in education']. Even clearer were three almost identical Sentences by the Supreme Court in 2010 in response to appeals launched by three sets of parents who claimed that they had been denied the right for their children to be taught via the medium of Castilian at all levels of obligatory education (Sentence 6628/2010; Sentence 6629/2010; Sentence 6632/2010). The Supreme Court found in favour of the parents, recognising ‘el derecho de la recurrente a que el castellano se utilice también como lengua vehicular en el sistema educativo’ (Sentence 6632/2010) ['the right of the appellant for Castilian to also be used as a vehicular language in the education system']. The Sentences thus clearly question the current Catalan education model, although given the recentness of the Sentence it is as yet unclear, as Santiago Vilardell i Codina from the Catalan General Directorate of Language Policy confirms, whether the Sentence only affects the three families who made the appeal or whether ‘tiene un carácter más general y puede afectar a toda la enseñanza’ (SI12) ['it is of a more general character which could affect all teaching'].

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The obligation to know Catalan is still, however, unchallenged and the principle of not separating students by language has also been maintained. In addition, the complaints and appeals made against the immersion system do still come from a particularly vocal minority. Proof of this can be seen from the fact that, despite the option to request the first years of education in Castilian, very few parents typically do so. In the school year of 1994-95, for example, only 89 out of a total of 380,000 asked for Castilian language instruction for their children (Branchadell 1997: 91-92). While the lack of demand may also be related to the fact that parents may not want to draw attention to themselves with such requests (Branchadell 1997: 92-93), it does still appear to demonstrate that there is not a mass outcry for Castilian language instruction. The 1994 CIS survey found that 62 per cent of respondents in Catalonia believe Catalan should be the main language of education (Siguán 1994: 61) and the previously mentioned 1998 survey found that 44.5 per cent of respondents wanted Catalan to be the main or sole language of instruction compared to just 4.8 per cent for Castilian (CIS 1998). While a significant number of parents may prefer a greater balance between both languages in schools, there is little evidence of the mass outcry suggested particularly in the right-wing press and by particularly prominent anti-Catalanist figures within Catalonia. In addition, to argue that the intensive teaching of Catalan is an attempt to assimilate Castilian speakers is to forget the fact that the Catalan education system is based on the principle that all students acquire a sufficient knowledge of both languages by the end of obligatory education. As Branchadell explains, ‘seria prou estrany que perseguís l’assimilació un sistema lingüísticoescolar que pretén de proporcionar als alumnes un domini igual del català i del castellà’ (1997: 109) [‘it would be fairly strange for a linguistic education model to pursue assimilation when it aims at providing students with an equal mastery of Catalan and Castilian’]. Significant monitoring has been undertaken by the Catalan government to ensure that students do attain a sufficient knowledge of both languages and studies have shown that any imbalance in favour of a language at the end of obligatory education is still in favour of Castilian, despite the intensive teaching in and of Catalan (Areny and van der Schaaf 2000: 26; Branchadell 1997: 103).

If there does exist a right to education in one’s mother tongue then the immersion system still largely denies Castilian speakers this right. However, while there may be a formally recognised basic right to education, this does not necessarily mean a right to education in one’s mother tongue or a right to choose the language of education. The Constitutional Court in various sentences has made clear that no such right exists in
the Spanish context (Sentence 195/1989; Sentence 19/1990; Sentence 337/1994). The European Court of Human Rights also made a similar judgement in relation to Belgium in 1968, stating that there was no right to choose the language of education in the wider European context (Miley 2006: 285). Nevertheless, the right to education does clearly have a linguistic component since it would be impossible to exercise this right if the students could not understand the language of instruction. Thus, as Antoni Milian i Massana has repeatedly argued, the linguistic aspect of the right to education only concerns, ‘el derecho del niño a recibir la enseñanza en una lengua que le sea comprensible’ (1994: 443) [‘the right for the child to receive education in a language which is comprehensible to them’]. This language may not be the mother tongue, but it is necessary to ensure that all students are able to understand the language of instruction, as has clearly been the case in Catalonia. Special assistance is provided for those students who have not been taught Catalan throughout all or part of their education (arts. 21.7 and 21.8, Catalan Law 1/1998). It should also be mentioned that, as Catalan and Castilian are both Romance languages, Castilian-speaking students are likely to have few difficulties in understanding Catalan. In addition, specifically in order to adapt to the significant number of foreign immigrants arriving in Catalonia, the Catalan education department adopted in 2004 and 2007 a Plan for Language and Social Cohesion. While continuing to prevent the separation of students, it provides for a system of ‘aules d’acollida’ [‘welcome classrooms’], where new students are assigned to a class alongside Catalan classmates, but are separated for several hours to attend intensive Catalan language and culture classes along with other new arrivals to ensure the students’ progressive incorporation into normal classes (Vila i Moreno 2011: 135).

The Catalan government thus makes significant effort to ensure immigrants do not become marginalised or are denied an education due to their lack of knowledge of Catalan.

It is also notable that those who have criticised Catalan language policies for placing obligations and duties on Catalan citizens do not question the existence of one of the most prescriptive language clauses in any constitution, namely the ‘duty’ to know Castilian. While the critics of Catalan policies have argued that there is a lack of freedom for citizens to choose in relation to language use and knowledge, this is in fact true of the policies of all states since, as Miquel Strubell and Emili Boix-Fuster establish, ‘No one claims that all citizens (including migrants and tourists) should be free to choose any language they use, anywhere they like and expect equal treatment in response’ (2011: 5). Certainly no state government would allow for such a freedom of
choice, and this is clearly the case in Spain with a constitutional specification of a ‘duty’ to know a language, which is considered an anomaly in constitutional law (Vernet i Llobet 2007: 30). Although knowledge of Castilian is not explicitly policed (Vernet i Llobet et al. 2003: 92-93), this ‘duty’ does mean that no Spanish citizen can claim ignorance of Castilian in relation to government and state communications, publications and laws. As Kathryn Crameri explains, ‘it gives the state the right to assume that all Spaniards speak Spanish, exempting it from having to engage with them in any other language’ (2008: 50). As there is no constitutionally specified duty in relation to the other Spanish languages, this clearly places Castilian in a privileged position. Thus the pre-eminence of Castilian even within Catalonia is maintained, with citizens still able to claim a lack of knowledge of Catalan but not Castilian.

Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court’s Sentence on the 2006 Catalan Statute reform, despite not accepting that there was a general duty to know Catalan, did confirm that there existed a duty to know Catalan in relation to specific sectors, most notably the education system and the civil service, where knowledge of the language could be a requirement (Sentence 31/2010). This is due to the fact that the right to use Catalan within the region is recognised by both the Catalan and central governments. In order to ensure that Catalans are able to enjoy their rights to use and learn Catalan, this may also mean placing obligations on all those resident in the region. As Sarah Gore and John Macinnes explain:

To turn a formal right to use a language into a practical ability to do so requires that one’s interlocutor at least understands it: everyone has to command both languages. My ‘right’ to ‘use’ one implies your ‘duty’ to ‘know’ it. (2000: 113)

It is for this reason that, where a language is official, the public authorities have a duty to ensure that all citizens have access to that language, which justifies making the study of that language obligatory in the education system (Sentence 337/1994). As Strubell explains, ‘What is at stake is whether it is legitimate to try and defend a discourse which says that Catalans must learn Spanish (of course!) while Spaniards living in Catalonia are under no obligation to learn Catalan’ (1999: 8). The Constitutional Court has repeatedly recognised that this is not the case and consequently Castilian-speaking students have no right to remain monolingual in the Catalan education system (Vila i Moreno 2011: 126).
7.3.2 The Dominance of Castilian and the Territorial Principle

Despite the apparent freedom autonomous governments have to design the curriculum and determine the language of instruction, the central government does in fact continue to assert its authority through the passing of ‘basic’ laws, which have been used specifically to ensure a greater presence of Castilian. The PP government introduced a new Law on education in 2002 (Organic Law 10/2002) and later decrees to implement the Law attempted to significantly increase the number of hours of Castilian teaching. As Crameri explains, this move was ‘a direct result of concerns over the marginalization of Spanish in communities with their own languages’ (2008: 53). This is confirmed in comments from the Spanish Minister for Education, who argued that this measure was necessary as the hours dedicated to the learning of co-official languages ‘se estaban detrayendo casi exclusivamente del castellano’ (Pilar del Castillo cited in Acosta, 23 April 2003) [‘were being almost exclusively taken away from those devoted to Castilian’]. Consequently, a 2003 Decree established the requirement of four hours of teaching of Castilian a week in primary education, which was a huge increase from the two hours of teaching of Castilian previously applied in Catalonia (Acosta, 23 April 2003; Pérez de Pablos, 31 March 2003; Royal Decree 830/2003). This move would make it extremely impractical to ensure an equal number of hours could be dedicated to the subject of Catalan, as had previously been the case, since it would mean spending eight hours a week solely on learning Catalan and Castilian, leaving little room for other subjects (Pérez de Pablos, 31 March 2003). While not directly defying the decree, the Catalan government adapted it to their own context, by continuing to provide for just two hours dedicated to each language, but introducing an additional two hours focusing on structures common to both Catalan and Castilian (ABC, 25 July 2003). In an attempt to maintain an equal balance between the two languages, this was considered by the Catalan government to be a workable solution which would avoid excessive repetition of the same content (ABC, 25 July 2003). The central Ministry of Education, however, was not satisfied with this adaptation (ABC, 25 July 2003), but no significant further action was taken.

Nevertheless, the issue was not forgotten and the Socialist government, despite being typically more sympathetic to Catalan demands, introduced a new Law on education in 2006 (Organic Law 2/2006), followed by a Decree which, despite providing more flexibility for regions with a co-official language, still required that primary schools should teach at least three hours of Castilian (ABC, 13 December 2006; Annex 3, Royal Decree 1513/2006). The Catalan Councillor for Education was initially
receptive to the idea, but rather than providing an additional hour of Castilian teaching, he suggested the teaching of another subject such as maths be in Castilian to fulfil the Decree (El Mundo, 19 December 2006). The Catalan government, however, did eventually launch an appeal to the Constitutional Court on the basis that the Law invaded the autonomous powers of the government (Garriga, 7 February 2007), although a sentence has not yet been issued. The Catalan government has also continued to challenge this provision, most notably by issuing its own autonomous Law on education in 2009, as is within its powers, which reinforces the immersion system and the sole usage of Catalan as the language of instruction (art. 11, Catalan Law 12/2009). Although an additional hour of Castilian may not at first appear to be a major threat to Catalan in schools, these moves by both the PP and Socialist governments demonstrate that the central government still views the defence of Castilian as one of its primary roles (Turell 2000: 18). Arguably, the Spanish government is merely attempting to ensure that the duty of all citizens to know Castilian is fulfilled appropriately. However, as previously discussed, the immersion system does clearly ensure knowledge and use of Castilian by all students in Catalonia.

This fact has not prevented some from arguing that it is actually monolingual Castilian speakers who are the ‘persecuted minority’ within Catalonia. The high social and cultural status of Catalan, as described in Section 3.3.4, is often used as a justification for this argument, suggesting as it does that Catalan and its speakers are far from threatened. The higher socioeconomic status of native Catalan speakers has lent significant prestige to the language by establishing a link between knowledge of the language and social advancement (Woolard 1989: 121-22). This is a particularly unusual context for a linguistic minority, except perhaps for those cases where the language of the minority is also that of a powerful neighbouring state as in the Alto Adige/Südtirol case. The high socioeconomic prestige of Catalan speakers has thus often provoked a backlash with some Castilian speakers seeing it as ‘a potential weapon of oppression’ (Woolard 1989: 142). Ramón Lodares has taken this argument furthest, going so far as to claim that the defence of Catalan is aimed at the creation of an ‘elite enclosure’ of Catalan speakers (2006: 21). This is to take the argument to its most extreme and cynical point, and it should be remembered that the lower socioeconomic status of most Castilian speakers is due primarily to the fact that many, and particularly those who emigrated under Franco, had low levels of education and qualifications, rather than a conscious effort by native Catalans to exclude them (Atkinson 2000: 192). Furthermore, the immersion education system was clearly aimed at ensuring widespread
knowledge among native and non-native Catalans, and the refusal of the Catalan government to contemplate the separation of students by linguistic group (Branchadell 1997: 92) was also aimed at avoiding segregation. As Kathryn Woolard notes, the Catalans:

did not need to devise new rules to protect their access to jobs or privilege, and I see no evidence that nationalist linguistic programs veiled such an intent. What was visible was a fair amount of sensitivity and discomfort about the class implications of language. (2003: 101)

Nevertheless, sometimes this discomfort has led to an attempt by some Catalan elites to avoid references to socioeconomic issues (Pujolar 2007b: 141), which may not help to address the issue.

It is, in fact, precisely the high socio-cultural status of Catalan which has ensured success in guaranteeing the survival of the language, particularly as immigrants to the region have often recognised the need and shown a desire to learn the language. However, it seems unfair to begrudge the language this strong socio-cultural basis which ensures its survival. As May points out,

On the one hand, we have the construction of minority languages [...] as essentially anti-instrumental, as merely ‘carriers’ of ‘identity’, and yet, on the other, when such languages do become useful instrumentally in the public realm, this is held against them as well! (2003b: 137)

This can be seen as one of the dilemmas for all linguistic minorities, since their languages are often dismissed as useless but are equally criticised when they appear to be a potential threat to the previously dominant language. Nevertheless, care should be taken where any language may appear to be a potential block to social advancement or where class connotations take on particular significance as Woolard’s more recent study in the early 1990s demonstrated may be the case in Catalonia (2003: 95-97). Certainly, it is necessary to pay continued attention to the class implications associated with the knowledge and use of Catalan, even if it may cause discomfort among some Catalanists.

The high prestige of Catalan does not, however, prevent the language from being in a minoritised position. In fact, Catalan speakers fulfil all requirements of any definition of a linguistic minority, since they form at most 10 per cent of the population of Spain (Atkinson 2000: 195). Even within Catalonia itself, native Catalan speakers are still in the minority (Institut d’Estadística de Catalunya 2008: 171) and consequently their status as such is undeniable. As Atkinson explains, despite the high socioeconomic status of native Catalan speakers within the region, ‘unusually, this is not reflected as much as one might expect in the language’s position, which is in a sense prestigious
without being dominant’ (2000: 195-96). The dominant position of Castilian is demonstrated in the linguistic behaviour of Catalan and Castilian linguistic communities which, as Atkinson notes, ‘tends towards strategies of accommodation to Castilian’ (2000: 196). This is typical of a dominant and majority language, which Castilian evidently is. Furthermore, although significant freedom has been granted to the autonomous governments in relation to education, even to the extent of allowing for the loss of the dominant position of Castilian in schools, ‘both the central Spanish state and the entirety of the social and political players of Spain’s Castilian heartland keep a close watch on things’ (Vila i Moreno 2011: 144). This is demonstrated by the previously discussed attempts by the central government to reassert the role of Castilian and to ensure that its position is not genuinely threatened.

Consequently, it does appear unfounded to view Castilian speakers as a persecuted minority, since they do not fit the profile or any legal definition of a minority, linguistic or otherwise. In reality, this sense of persecution is more likely to be a perception than a genuine threat (Mar-Molinero 2000b: 163), although it is important to recognise that the perception does exist, since ‘[h]owever erroneous this may be and however insidious its causes […] its psychological significance is inescapable’ (Atkinson 1999: 71). In particular, there is still significant resentment among monolingual Castilian speakers at being required to learn a language in order to live and work in the region. As in Italy, an ‘ideology of superiority’ (Réaume 2003: 293) often appears to play a clear role in the criticisms directed at Catalan normalisation policies, particularly from the centre, in the assumption that speakers of the official state language should automatically enjoy greater rights than speakers of other languages. However, it may also be that absence of support for second-language learning, the other cause identified by Réaume for the failure to learn a minority language (2003: 293), plays an important role. Not in Catalonia, where immersion teaching ensures a high level of bilingual knowledge among all students, but in monolingual Spain where, as mentioned in Section 5.3.3, it is extremely difficult to learn or have significant contact with Catalan. Consequently, some Spaniards may legitimately feel unprepared for the potential difficulties they face in moving to a bilingual area of the state.

This obstacle appears to relate to the primarily territorial system designed by the Spanish state in relation to the promotion and protection of languages other than Castilian which does not facilitate knowledge of these languages outside of the regions in which they are official. The territorial system also ensures that Castilian speakers remain privileged since, while speakers of co-official languages have their rights
restricted to clearly demarcated areas, the rights of Castilian speakers cross all borders within the state (Ninyoles 1994: 153-54). In light of this clear inequality, it is understandable that some of the autonomous governments have taken a particularly defensive or even offensive approach to the promotion and protection of other languages within their territorial limits. As Clare Mar-Molinero argues, ‘it seems clear that only within their territories can these languages [Catalan, etc.] be protected, and the temptations to do this with aggressive, even monolingual policies must be strong’ (1995: 55). If we consider, for example, the rejection by the Catalan government of the idea of slightly increasing the hours devoted to Castilian, the reaction may at first appear excessive. This small increase in Castilian teaching does not in fact appear to be a genuine threat to the immersion system since the huge majority of lessons would continue to be taught in Catalan. Nevertheless, to the Catalan government this appeared to be a further attempt to restrict their territorial defence of Catalan, while the state in turn makes little to no effort to encourage knowledge of the co-official languages elsewhere in the state.

It should be clarified, however, that the territorial principle is often seen as a valid form of minority protection, particularly where speakers of the minority language are territorially concentrated, as is clearly the case in Spain (Cartwright 2006: 200). However, in order to avoid tendencies towards unilingualism at both the state and regional level, what is evidently required is a less restrictive interpretation of the territorial system. It is true that certain sectors of Catalanism have been guilty of such an approach, and the term ‘lengua propia’ may be particularly problematic in suggesting that Catalonia only has one ‘rightful’ language. Carlos Herreras, for example, argues that the term ‘lengua propia’:

> se debe a la adopción, por parte de la legislación autonómica, del principio de territorialidad lingüística, según el cual los derechos lingüísticos de un territorio determinado prevalecen sobre los derechos individuales de sus habitantes, contrariamente al principio de personalidad de los derechos lingüísticos, por el que el derecho a utilizar una lengua depende de la elección del individuo. (2006: 367)

[is due to the adoption in autonomous legislation of the principle of linguistic territoriality, according to which the linguistic rights of a specific territory prevail over the individual rights of its inhabitants, in contrast to the personality principle of linguistic rights, by which the right to use a language depends on the choice of the individual.]

There are, however, several inconsistencies in this statement. Firstly, while he argues for the implementation of the personality principle, he is in fact only arguing that it be applied to Castilian speakers within Catalonia, neglecting to mention that Catalan
speakers do not benefit from the application of the personality principle throughout the state. Secondly, the freedom of citizens to use Castilian throughout the state is fully guaranteed, with the only exception being that they may face certain obligations to know the co-official language if they reside within a bilingual territory. Most importantly, although criticisms such as that of Herreras are often directed at the regional or provincial governments for their implementation of the territorial principle, he fails to recognise that it is the state which has clung to the territorial principle, by only allowing for the use and recognition of the co-official languages within restricted areas.

As a result, it remains the case that the central government is viewed as the defender and promoter of the official state language, while specific regional or provincial governments are solely responsible for the protection and promotion of specific minority languages, as conflicts over education have most clearly demonstrated. This inevitably leads to oppositional relationships and also fails to encourage coexistence and cooperation between distinct linguistic groups. While the Catalan government ensures that all Catalans acquire full knowledge of Castilian through the education system, for example, no attempt is made in other areas of Spain either to teach the co-official languages or at least to encourage familiarity with the plurilingual reality of the state. It is in the light of this clear imbalance in favour of Castilian, that the need and desire for immersion education in Catalonia must be understood. The individual rights of Catalan speakers to use their language are restricted by the dominance of Castilian, which is supported by the institutions of the state. A greater attempt is thus required to encourage more positive attitudes towards the Catalan sociolinguistic context among monolingual Castilian speakers, since their language is clearly secure and their rights to use it guaranteed. The institutions of the state can take a leading role in encouraging such attitudes, rather than accentuating conflicts by attempting to enforce state legislation even in areas theoretically devolved to the regions. The example of attempts to introduce additional hours of Castilian, without any evidence of significant consultation and reflection on how this would affect the learning of the co-official languages, demonstrates that the state continues to view its primary role as the defence of Castilian, rather than the defence of the rights of the speakers of Spain’s many different languages.
7.3.3 Voluntary Asturian Language Education

In contrast to Catalan, Asturian is undoubtedly a language of low prestige which is in a clearly subordinate and threatened position in relation to Castilian, as explained in Section 3.3.3. The perceived inferior value of Asturian leads many to reject the language and the lower social status with which it is associated, particularly when it comes to choosing to pass the language on to their children. As explained in reference to Sardinian, the education system is central to ensuring the recognition of the dominant language and is typically most decisive in devaluing other languages or dialects (Bourdieu 1991: 49). This would certainly appear to have been the case of Asturian with the language almost entirely excluded until recently from formal education and often considered a disadvantage for students. In fact, this attitude has continued right up to the contemporary period with an Asturian school taken to court as recently as February 2001 for imposing small fines on students for speaking in Asturian (de Andrés 2002: 206-07; Viejo Fernández 2004: 173). While the Provincial Court of Oviedo declared that no legal offence was committed (Cuartas, 13 November 2001), this is a clear and relatively recent example of discrimination against Asturian within the education system and evidence that speaking Asturian is still considered by some to constitute ‘speaking poorly’ or at least that it is unacceptable within formal contexts.

Nevertheless, efforts have been made in recent decades by both the autonomous and central governments to introduce Asturian as a subject to be taught in schools. As mentioned in the previous chapter, autonomous powers over education were not transferred to the region until late in 1999. This meant that up until that point the presence of Asturian in schools was subject to yearly agreements between the central and regional governments (Bauske 1998: 181-82). The first agreement for the introduction of Asturian into primary schools on a voluntary basis was signed for the 1984-85 academic year and these agreements were then renewed annually with the subject extended to secondary education from 1988 (de Andrés 2002: 159). This demonstrates that the central Ministry of Education did facilitate the teaching of non-official languages even before the transfer of powers. As is stated in the 1994 agreement, ‘La positiva valoración que del desarrollo de este programa ambas Administraciones han concluido aconsejan su continuidad y profundización’ (Resolution, 26 July 1994) [‘The positive assessment of the development of this programme made by both Administrations makes its continuation and consolidation advisable’]. It is important to note that these agreements also refer explicitly to the
‘Asturian language’ (de Andrés 2002: 159), representing a clear recognition of the language status of Asturian.

However, although jurisdiction over education remained in the hands of the state, the regional government was still responsible for ensuring the provision of teacher training and the preparation of teaching resources (Resolution, 26 July 1994). As a result, the regional Department of Education created a register in 1995 for trained Asturian language teachers (de Andrés 2002: 159). The 1998 Regional Law for the Use and Promotion of Bable/Asturian also included references to the education system, committing specifically to the teaching of the language at all levels as part of the curriculum (art. 10.1, Asturian Law 1/1998). The Law also states explicitly that choosing to study the language could not be a cause of discrimination against pupils or an obstacle to receiving the same education as other pupils (art. 10.3). However, one of the most important provisions of the Law is that Asturian, in accordance with the Asturian Statute (art 4.1, Statute of Autonomy of the Principality of Asturias 1981), can only be taught on a ‘voluntary’ basis (art. 10.1, Asturian Law 1/1998). It is still obligatory for all educational centres to offer the teaching of the language, but a minimum number of eight pupils in primary schools and ten pupils in secondary schools must request it for a class to be established (Council of Europe, 21 September 2005b: 22). As a result, in the school year 2004-05 221 out of 268 primary schools offered the subject, which was taught to a total of 14,845 students (52 per cent of the total number of Asturian students) (Council of Europe, 17 February 2011: 143). By the 2008-09 school year this had increased very slightly to 228 out of 250 schools, and a total of 16,698 students (55.3 per cent of total number of students) (Council of Europe, 17 February 2011: 143). In secondary schools the figures are lower, with just 4,421 out of 29,663 (14.9 per cent) students in 2008-09 (Council of Europe, 17 February 2011: 143).

These figures, however, are slightly misleading, implying as they do a year-on-year increase in Asturian teaching. In reality, the highest number of students studying Asturian in primary schools was in the school year 1995-96 when it was taught to 19,737 students, which means that recent years have actually seen a significant fall in the number of students (Pérez Fernández 2005: 29-30). According to José Manuel Pérez Fernández, these fluctuations are due to ‘la falta de una verdadera planificación y las malas condiciones para la enseñanza del asturiano, sujeta a los vaivenes de la política lingüística […] de los sucesivos gobiernos asturianos’ (2005: 28) [‘the lack of genuine planning and the poor conditions for the teaching of Asturian, which is subject to the constant changes in the language policies […] of the various Asturian governments’]. It
is particularly interesting to note that the highest number of students for Asturian was reached while legislative power over education remained in the hands of the state. This would appear to demonstrate that the need to sign annual agreements with Madrid was no hindrance to the teaching of Asturian, and that the autonomous government has made little to no impact on the teaching of Asturian since it has obtained these legislative powers.

One of the primary obstacles to the teaching of Asturian is the failure of the Asturian government to provide effective recognition for teachers and stable working conditions. As Pérez Fernández explains, ‘el problema más adelante sigue siendo la enseñanza del asturiano, con un profesorado inestable, con una falta de soluciones. Cada año el profesor es diferente’ (SI9) [‘the most pressing problem remains the teaching of Asturian, with an unstable teaching body, with a lack of solutions. Each year the teacher is different’]. A particular obstacle, again related to the absence of officiality, has been the lack of suitably trained or recognised teachers. After the introduction of postgraduate qualifications in Asturian at the University of Oviedo in 1994, the University became primarily responsible for teacher training (Council of Europe, 17 February 2011: 143). Nevertheless, the problems with ensuring the introduction and acceptance of the Asturian language at the University have represented a major obstacle to the training of Asturian-language teachers (Council of Europe, 21 September 2005b: 23). As clarified in Section 4.3.2, this was primarily a result of decisions taken at the centre by the Council of Universities, although with the involvement of regional representatives, demonstrating that the institutions of the central state continue to play an important role.

Despite the signing of annual agreements for the teaching of Asturian, the state also appears not to have always provided the appropriate support and infrastructure to make this possible. In September 1999, for example, a written question was submitted to the central parliament asking for an explanation for the cut in the number of teachers of the Asturian language which ‘dejará sin poder recibir clases de asturiano a cientos de escolares del Principado’ (Congreso de los Diputados, 30 September 1999) [‘will leave hundreds of students in the Principality unable to receive classes of Asturian’]. Clarification was demanded on how ‘va a asegurar el Ministerio que reciban clases de lengua asturiana todos aquellos alumnos de centros educativos públicos que lo hayan solicitado’ (Congreso de los Diputados, 30 September 1999) [‘the Ministry is going to ensure that all those students from public education centres who have requested it receive teaching of the Asturian language’]. The question was, however, never
answered and was declared to be no longer valid at the end of that legislature (Congreso de los Diputados, 4 February 2000). Nevertheless, this does demonstrate one of the dangers of jurisdiction over education remaining in the hands of the central state, since such decisions can be taken without full consideration of the effects on the region’s abilities to implement the teaching of Asturian. The teaching of Asturian thus appears to have been restricted by sudden changes and a lack of continuity at both the regional and state level, placing it in a doubly vulnerable position.

In addition, due to the fact that Asturian is not an official language, the Asturian government does not benefit from any additional control over the curriculum. This means that the central government is allowed to specify up to 65 per cent of the teaching hours in Asturias, with just 35 per cent left to the autonomous government. The additional 10 per cent of control provided to regions with two official languages is hugely significant in granting the freedom to ensure a significant presence of the second official language. This is made clear in the 2006 Royal Decree on primary education, which explicitly states that this additional 10 per cent is to be used for the teaching of the co-official language (Annex 3, Royal Decree 1513/2006). The central Ministry of Education does recognise the presence of a language in the region as is clear in a recent report on education by the central Ministry which stated that ‘En el Principado de Asturias, la lengua asturiana será objeto de protección y promoción, conforme dispone su Estatuto de Autonomía’ (Ministerio de Educación 2010: 619) [‘In the Principality of Asturias, the Asturian language will be protected and promoted, as is stipulated in its Statute of Autonomy’]. This appeared, however, after a list of communities which ‘poseen una lengua propia específica’ [‘possess their specific own language’], once again demonstrating the distinct and unique category in which Asturian is placed. No clarification is given as to what this distinction means in relation to education, but evidently the Asturian government is not seen to require additional freedom over the curriculum for the teaching of its language. However, typically, the Asturian government has made no attempt to gain greater control over the curriculum to provide for increased space for the Asturian language. For example, with the previously discussed attempt by the PP to introduce additional hours of Castilian teaching in 2003, the Asturian government did object to the fact that the Law in general meant an ‘invasión de competencias’ (Pérez de Pablos, 31 March 2003) [‘invasion of powers’]. However, no mention was made of any concern for the teaching of Asturian (El País, 24 March 2003), reflecting the fact that the presence of the language was already minimal and so this provision was unlikely to represent a significant threat.
The limited presence of Asturian appears in fact to be primarily the result of the focus on the voluntary nature of the teaching of Asturian, as repeatedly specified by the autonomous rather than the central government. In secondary schools, for example, Asturian is an optional subject, meaning that it has had to compete with other optional subjects such as French or Information Technology ‘which for immediate practical reasons can be more attractive’ (Council of Europe, 21 September 2005b: 23). Given the low prestige of Asturian, this situation is unlikely to be reversed by having the language compete with other mainstream subjects, particularly French as a global and state language. Overall, the way Asturian has been introduced into the education system suggests a clear lack of desire or will to see the language play a central role in Asturian society. As Xulio Viejo Fernández argues: ‘The optional status of Asturian Language suggests that the people in charge of the educational system have never considered it as a vehicle for providing future citizens with fundamental knowledge’ (2004: 180). Furthermore, the possibility of using Asturian as a language of instruction, which is often considered essential to ensure an adequate knowledge of a language through the education system (Milian i Massana 1994: 104), has never been considered as a realistic option.

Overall, the current presence of Asturian in schools is clearly insufficient in terms of guaranteeing the rights of Asturian speakers to learn their language. As Ramón de Andrés explains, ‘El derecho a la enseñanza del asturian tropieza con problemas frecuentes, tanto de oferta a la ciudadanía como de condiciones laborales de los profesores’ (de Andrés 2002: 174) ['The right to the teaching of Asturian runs into frequent problems, from the way it is offered to citizens to the working conditions of teachers’]. Regional elites, as discussed in Section 5.3.2, have also done little to encourage moves towards officiality or to introducing Asturian as an obligatory subject or as a language of instruction. It is thus hardly surprising that demand for the subject has remained low and the focus on the voluntary nature of the subject is misleading. In reality it appears to require parents to make a marked choice for their children to study that language, which does not appear to be appropriate or beneficial in the case of a language of clearly low prestige. The attitude of both the autonomous and central governments to the teaching of Asturian, including the limited training and recognition provided for teachers of the subject and the limited commitment to its introduction, demonstrates that it is not considered important and this attitude will inevitably impact upon parents when deciding whether to enrol their students to study Asturian. Admittedly, the central government has not played a major role in the development of
this policy, particularly since powers over education were passed to Asturias in 1999. Nevertheless, the fact that the central government does not provide the region with additional freedom over the curriculum in recognition of the presence of another language once again reinforces the marginalised position of the Asturian language and its speakers.

7.4 Conclusion

In sum, the right to education of and potentially in one’s mother tongue is often considered central to any definition of minority language rights and such rights have, in fact, been implemented to varying degrees in all four case studies. The fact that both Spain and Italy provided for the use of certain minority languages in the education system even before the drafting of their Constitutions demonstrates that both states recognised its importance early on (Milian i Massana 1994: 52-53). Nevertheless, the degree to which a minority language is taught or used remains controversial in all four cases, demonstrating the difficulties of designing a model of universal language rights in reference to education. In reality, as Milian i Massana found in his comparative study of minority language education, various models can be considered legitimate to the extent that they must respond to the specific sociolinguistic and sociopolitical contexts. For example, while the separation of students was deemed appropriate in Alto Adige/Südtirol to ensure the survival of the German-speaking group, the separation of language groups was explicitly prohibited in the Catalan case in order to avoid the segregation of students and the accentuation of ethnic divisions. Both models, however, have achieved the relatively peaceful cohabitation of multiple linguistic communities, as well as ensuring widespread knowledge of both the minority and majority languages.

The rigid separation of linguistic groups in Alto Adige/Südtirol may, however, need to be relaxed as the sense of ethnic conflict declines, since the lack of freedom for citizens to choose or change their group affiliation can be a cause for concern. In the Catalan case, attention should also be paid to the class connotations associated with the use of Catalan and Castilian, and efforts made to ensure that linguistic choices do not become a cause for discrimination. Both models do also place clear obligations on the majority group to obtain a high level of fluency in the minority language, which has been the cause of controversy and resentment from some members of the majority group. To accept the necessity of bilingual obligations for linguistic minorities and not for the national majority is, however, patently unfair, even if efforts may need to be made by the state, regional and provincial authorities to ensure that members of the
majority have full access to the minority language as required. The fact that the state language remains official in both contexts and that the rights to know and use these minority languages have clear territorial limits means that the right of the national majority to use and know their language is fulfilled, and any attempts to have them declared a ‘minority’ are patently inappropriate.

The role of the state in cases where the minority group or its closest political representatives have not made strong demands for the recognition of its rights is more ambiguous, as the Sardinian and Asturian cases prove. In Italy, state funds have been provided for the introduction of Sardinian into schools, but the language has been given a marginal role and is often used only for extracurricular cultural activities. In Asturias, it does appear to have been the regional government which is primarily responsible for the marginal presence of Asturian in schools, but the central government also fails to provide specific space in the curriculum for the Asturian language. Evidently, as increasing autonomy over education is granted to regions and schools, the direct impact of the central state has become more limited. Nevertheless, action at the state level could still be influential in ensuring wider acceptance by the community of the suitability of both languages for teaching, which at the moment remains lacking among parents in both regions. Admittedly, this also causes additional obstacles to introducing the language into schools, since there is a limited consensus and even some opposition within the community to its introduction, which makes language preservation efforts questionable (Kymlicka and Patten 2003: 49). Nevertheless, the previous and at times continued stigmatisation of both Asturian and Sardinian, particularly in the education system, is clearly one of the root causes for this reluctance to see the language used or taught in formal institutions. The ambiguous legal statuses of Asturian and Sardinian also mean that there is continued uncertainty over whether their use as languages of instruction is legally permitted by the central government. The lack of any genuine attempts by state or regional institutions to introduce such use will only serve to reinforce negative views of Asturian and Sardinian as unsuitable as languages of instruction, demonstrating the need for a more ambitious approach which must be supported at both the regional and state levels.
Chapter 8: International Obligations in a Multilingual Europe

8.1 Introduction

This final chapter of analysis will consider how external forces may be placing growing pressure on individual European states to take action to protect and support linguistic minority groups. The nature of this pressure may come in various forms, from the specific protection offered by a neighbouring state as in the Alto Adige/Südtirol case, to the more general Europe-wide influence of supranational bodies. The four case studies demonstrate effectively both the advantages and difficulties of securing recognition and support at an international level. The chapter will begin by considering the role of Austria in guaranteeing the protection of the German-speaking minority in Alto Adige/Südtirol, as well as the effects of European integration on the province. I will then move on to consider the significance of recent European treaties, most notably the FCPNM and the ECRML, which were introduced in Section 2.3.3, particularly in reference to the Sardinian-speaking minority. In Spain, the attempts by the Catalan government to secure official recognition for the Catalan language at the EU will be discussed. The impact of European treaties will again be considered, primarily in reference to the recognition of the Asturian language and its speakers. Conclusions will be drawn on the impact of European action, as well as the extent to which linguistic minorities are genuinely able to make their demands and needs heard outside of the political arena of the state. Of particular interest will be the different impact and interpretation of international treaties in distinct state contexts.

8.2 Italy

8.2.1 Austria, Alto Adige/Südtirol and the EU

The principal feature of the regime of minority protection established in Alto Adige/Südtirol is its international status. As explained in Section 3.2.4, this international guarantee originates from the Gruber-De Gasperi Agreement signed in 1946 between Italy and Austria (Gruber-De Gasperi Agreement/Paris Treaty, 5 September 1946). This was further developed with the Package measures, explained in Section 3.2.4, and the passing of a second Statute of Autonomy in 1972 after trilateral negotiations between Italy, Austria and the SVP (Steininger 2003: 121). Nevertheless, the international nature
of the Agreement remained a source of conflict up to 1992, with the Italian government asserting that this Second Statute of Autonomy was ‘a domestic instrument based on national constitutional law’ (Medda-Windischer 2008: 20). Austria, however, maintained its right to challenge any changes or failure to implement the Package measures and the Statute at the international level.

The issue was supposedly resolved in 1992, when the Italian government submitted a note to the Austrian government listing the implementation order for the final Package measures and which also made an explicit reference to the Gruber-De Gasperi Agreement, thus confirming the international dimension of the regime of minority protection (Steininger 2003: 143). This international anchoring of the Agreement was one of the final demands of the SVP and the Austrian government, and consequently both parties submitted their final confirmation that the conflict had been resolved in the spring of 1992, with the UN confirming the resolution of the conflict on 19 June 1992 (Steininger 2003: 143-44). Nevertheless, despite this international anchoring, the final resolution of the conflict is still viewed by the Italian government as the conclusion of Austria’s involvement in the Alto Adige/Südtirol case. The German-speaking minority has, however, continued to look to Austria for support, whenever it has felt its rights or political autonomy to be under threat, as is demonstrated by the headlines ‘Tetto del 4 per cento, la SVP chiede aiuto a Vienna’ (Gorodisky, 19 January 1994) [‘Cap of 4 per cent, the SVP asks Vienna for help’] and ‘Provincia di Bolzano: no ai tagli. “Chiederemo aiuto all’Austria”’ (Corriere della Sera, 18 October 1994) [‘Province of Bolzano: no to the cuts. “We will ask Austria for help”’).

Austria’s role became a particular source of controversy when, in January 2006, the Austrian Parliament discussed the inclusion of a reference to the role of Austria as a ‘potenza tutrice’ [‘protective power’] in Alto Adige/Südtirol in the preamble to a future reform of the Austrian Constitution (Gergolet, 21 January 2006). This led to considerable disquiet within the Italian government, with the Italian President rumoured to have cancelled his state visit to Austria (Gergolet, 21 January 2006). The controversy was further exacerbated when, in response, 113 out of the 116 town mayors in Alto Adige/Südtirol signed a petition in support of the Austrian proposal (La Repubblica, 25 January 2006). Despite the objections of the Italian government, in September 2006 the Austrian Parliament adopted the recommendation to include this reference to Alto Adige/Südtirol (Medda-Windischer 2008: 28). The delays to constitutional reform in Austria (Eberhard and Lachmayer 2008) have, however, meant that this recommendation has thus far made no further progress. This incident demonstrates that
the role of Austria in Alto Adige/Südtirol remains controversial. The 1992 note from the Italian government demonstrated an acceptance of the fact that it did have international obligations to implement the regime of minority protection in the province. This means that if the Italian government fails to uphold these obligations, Austria and the international community would appear to be entitled to intervene. Nevertheless, this Austrian proposal in 2006 was seen as an attempt to go too far in invading Italy’s sovereign powers over the area. Furthermore, it was viewed in Italy as an unnecessary provocation, given the increasingly peaceful relations and undisputed resolution of the conflict.

These peaceful relations have also been a result of integration of both countries into the European Community, which has altered the position of Alto Adige/Südtirol within the Italian state. Austria did not, in fact, join the EU until 1995, mainly because Italy had previously blocked Austria’s membership due to the conflictual relations between the two countries (Steininger 2003: 128). Nevertheless, the conflict resolution in 1992 marked the move to more peaceful and cooperative relations, and this has facilitated cross-border collaboration between Alto Adige/Südtirol and neighbouring Austrian regions. The full implementation of the Schengen Agreement in 1997 has been one of the most significant developments in European integration, with Emma Lantschner arguing that it made the border ‘practically irrelevant’ (2008: 14). This is certainly true in the physical sense, and has evidently led to an intensification of cross-border collaboration, which has also been encouraged by the European Commission, as discussed in Section 2.3.2. In 1993, Italy and Austria also signed a bilateral treaty, establishing the legal basis for cross-border cooperation (Engl and Zwilling 2008: 170-71).

Nevertheless, such initiatives continued to be viewed with suspicion by many states, and initially both Italy and Austria remained distrustful of the creation of a possible Tyrol Euroregion. In a move towards the creation of such an entity, representatives of the Austrian Tyrol, Alto Adige/Südtirol and Trentino created a joint bureau in Brussels in 1995, and although it was initially contested by the Italian government, the Constitutional Court declared that the government could not oppose it (Engl and Zwilling 2008: 168). Further uproar in the Italian media and government was, however, provoked with the so-called ‘Toniatti Proposal’ in the late 1990s, which aimed at creating a separate council, convention and first minister for the Euroregion and was consequently seen as approaching state-like structures (Grote 2012: 131). The proposal was eventually withdrawn, with the Austrian Tyrol, Alto Adige/Südtirol and Trentino
eventually establishing a more informal agreement in 1998 (Engl and Zwilling 2008: 169) and a further declaration was signed in 2001 between the regions allowing for further collective action (Grote 2012: 132). This is a clear example of how regions may now be able to circumvent the state by establishing bilateral relations with other regions, with the Tyrol Euroregion seen as an attempt to limit the influence of both Rome and Vienna (Grote 2012: 130-31).

However, such action remains restricted, principally by the state, with cross-border activities limited to less significant areas of action. The Tyrol Euroregion, for example, is seen as a form of ‘soft’ region, which attempted to distance itself from ideological and ethnic concerns, with a greater focus on private law and practical concerns such as the environment and tourism (Engl and Zwilling 2008: 174-75; Grote 2012: 127-29). As Alice Engl and Carolin Zwilling explain, ‘The experience of South Tyrol clearly demonstrates the importance of functional rather than ideological approaches to CBC [Cross-Border Cooperation], which are less intrusive in regard to the sensitivities of the ethnic and linguistic groups’ (2008: 176). Nevertheless, this wider European focus on interregional development and cooperation has helped to ensure greater autonomy for the region and the minority. While 1992 may mark the end of direct relations with Austria in reference to Alto Adige/Südtirol, Oskar Peterlini believes that this more favourable European context has been influential in guaranteeing further progress for the German-speaking minority, due to ‘l’evoluzione dell’Europa in senso federale e la promozione delle regioni’ (II11) [‘the federal development of Europe and the promotion of the regions’]. The protection of minorities and cross-border cooperation are in fact also encouraged in both the ECRML (arts. 7 and 14, ECRML, 23 June 1992) and the FCPNM (art. 18, FCPNM, 1 February 1995), but these documents have had a minimal impact in Alto Adige/Südtirol, primarily because of the pre-existing regime of minority protection. Nevertheless, such documents may mean that the German-speaking minority now finds itself in a more favourable context for voicing its demands.

European integration has, however, also placed the minority protection regime in Alto Adige/Südtirol under greater scrutiny, with the need to ensure its compatibility with European law. This issue has arisen specifically concerning freedom of movement within the European Union, which may be limited by the special arrangements in Alto Adige/Südtirol. Article 48 of the Treaty of Rome, the original foundation for the European Community, established the principle of freedom of movement and prohibited any discrimination on grounds of nationality (art. 48, The Treaty of Rome, 25 March
1957). It could consequently be argued that the quota system and the requirement to know both German and Italian place considerable limitations on the freedom of movement of European citizens. In 1998, these bilingual obligations were challenged at the European Court of Justice in the case of Roman Angonese (Case C-281/98, 6 June 2000). Angonese left the province to study in Vienna, and consequently did not have the opportunity to sit the exam to gain the previously discussed ‘patentino’, the licence attesting to bilingual knowledge. He later applied for a job at a private bank in Alto Adige/Südtirol, but was informed he would require the ‘patentino’. At the Court he claimed that this requirement to have the ‘patentino’ as the only acceptable proof of bilingual competence went against the freedom of movement principle (Alcock 2000: 189). His claim was upheld by the Court, which concluded that:

Article 48 of the EC Treaty […] precludes an employer from requiring persons applying to take part in a recruitment competition to provide evidence of their linguistic knowledge exclusively by means of one particular diploma issued only in one particular province of a Member State. (Case C-281/98, 6 June 2000)

The Italian state responded to this judgement with a Decree in 2010, which confirmed that other qualifications could also be considered as proof of knowledge of both languages (Legislative Decree 86, 14 May 2010). Nevertheless, it is notable that the Court at no point actually challenged the bilingual obligations themselves, but only the methods for demonstrating such knowledge.

A further example of the influence of European bodies in Alto Adige/Südtirol was provided in the previous chapter (see Section 7.2.1), when the Advisory Committee for the FCPNM expressed concern in 2002 over the linguistic census. Although the Committee did not compel Italy to change the system, the Italian government has made efforts to comply with the FCPNM and the Advisory Committee’s recommendations (Legislative Decree 99, 23 May 2005). Nevertheless, neither this incident nor the Angonese case have seriously questioned or challenged either the quota system or the bilingual obligations placed on citizens of the province, which appears to demonstrate a general acceptance of the protection of minorities as a legal principle throughout the EU (Alcock 2000: 189). European institutions may place legal, and also moral, limitations on the systems of minority protection which can be established and implemented. Nevertheless, as we will see in the Sardinian case, these institutions have also played an influential role in establishing universal systems of minority protection.
8.2.2 The Sardinian Minority in a Multilingual Europe

In Italy, the presence of a kin-state to support the claims of a linguistic minority has often been seen as essential for ensuring that measures to promote and protect a specific minority language are implemented. As Glyn Williams establishes, ‘Stateless language groups lack the kind of support which extraterritorial languages can solicit or obtain from other states’ (2005: 51). This is clear for the Sardinian minority which, without being able to rely on another state, has struggled to make its demands heard. Nevertheless, the evolving European-wide framework may be providing a more favourable context for such demands, particularly since Italy’s ratification in November 1997 of the FCPNM (Council of Europe, 2 May 2011). Although the document does not apply specifically to linguistic minorities, several references are made in the document to the right to use a minority language in both the public and private spheres (arts. 9, 10, 11, 12 and 14, FCPNM, 1 February 1995). In many ways, the content of this document is similar to other EU and UN declarations in favour of minorities and minority languages, but the most important aspect of the FCPNM is the monitoring procedure outlined within it for those states which ratify it (art. 25, FCPNM, 1 February 1995). This procedure requires the state to first draw up its own report on legislative and other measures implemented within the state for the protection of minorities, which is then examined by an Advisory Committee from the Council, composed of eighteen independent experts with specific expertise on the protection of national minorities (Council of Europe 2012b). Finally, the Committee of Ministers, the main decision-making body of the Council of Europe, adopts a resolution with conclusions and specific recommendations for further implementation of the FCPNM.

This monitoring procedure is repeated periodically, and in the Italian case three reports have been published and submitted by the Italian government in 1999, 2004 and 2009 (Council of Europe 2012c). In compiling these reports, the Italian government has been forced to look more closely at the system of minority protection already in place and to justify its actions, or lack of action, regarding Italy’s national minorities. Italy also had to establish to which national minorities the document applied, and it is notable that the Sardinian minority was included (Council of Europe, 3 May 1999: 3) since the term ‘national minorities’ implies the existence of a national consciousness, which, as explained in Section 5.2.2, has often been lacking in Sardinia. However, rather than a recognition of the ‘national’ status of Sardinian speakers, it would appear instead that the Italian government is in this case using the term ‘national minorities’ interchangeably with ‘linguistic minorities’ and Sardinian was consequently included in
line with Law 482. As the Italian report clarified, ‘In the Italian legal system the concept of “minority” is linked exclusively to that of language, or, rather, linguistic minority, on the basis of Article 6 of the Constitution’ (Council of Europe, 3 May 1999: 4). The ‘national’ aspect thus appears to go largely ignored, which, as we will see later, is a direct contrast to the response of the Spanish government.

There are, however, few further references made in the first report to the Sardinian minority, primarily due to the fact that Law 482 had not yet been passed. Nevertheless, the Advisory Committee in its response made it clear that Italy had clear obligations to comply with the FCPNM, specifically in reference to Sardinian and the other newly recognised minorities:

The situation is also not really favourable for the numerically very important Sardinian minority. […] greater effort is required to promote effective equality in political and cultural life between these minorities and the majority population. (Council of Europe, 14 September 2001: 8)

The first opinion and recommendations of the Advisory Committee highlighted the need to ensure the full application of Law 482, and, although there are no sanctions for failing to implement such recommendations, the Council of Europe effectively acts as an external monitoring body for the implementation of this state Law. For example, in the second monitoring round the Advisory Committee highlighted the weaknesses in both the Law itself and its implementation (Council of Europe, 24 February 2005: 5). In its final recommendations the Council of Europe consequently called on the Italian government to:

address the remaining difficulties in the implementation of Law 482/99 on the protection of historical linguistic minorities, including through increasing the volume of minority language television and radio broadcasts and providing further support for educational projects both in terms of resources and sustainability. (Council of Europe, 14 June 2006: 2)

Again, no sanctions are specified for the failure to implement such recommendations. Nevertheless, this monitoring process has clearly helped to assess and draw attention to the shortcomings of Law 482, specifically by identifying the lack of progress discussed in previous chapters in relation to the media and education.

Seemingly more ambitious than the FCPNM is the ECRML since, as explained in Section 2.3.3, it commits those states which ratify it to enact at least thirty-five of the sixty-eight measures listed in Part III which ensure the use of the respective minority languages in various spheres such as the education system, the public administration and the media. However, although Italy signed the ECRML in 2000 (Council of Europe,
19 April 2013), it is yet to ratify it, meaning that the Italian state currently has no commitments to implement any specific measures and is not subject to any monitoring procedure. There have in fact been several bills calling for the ratification of the Charter, particularly over the past decade, and in 2004 one of these bills was finally approved by the Chamber of Deputies (Ministero dell’Interno, 12 February 2004). Nevertheless, when the Bill was passed to the Senate for final approval, questions were raised by representatives from the Lega Nord, the northern federalist party, over the exclusion of the speech varieties of the Veneto and Piedmont, which they argued should also be classified as regional languages and consequently fall under the remit of the Charter (Senato della Repubblica, 1 March 2006). This led to the failure of the Bill, which was sent back to the parliamentary committees to be re-examined. The choice of which languages to include has been a particularly controversial question and this controversy demonstrates the limitations of the Charter in providing a clear definition of what actually constitutes a minority or regional language.

The ECRML does offer a definition of sorts in Article 1, stating specifically that its remit does not include dialects (art. 1, ECRML, 23 June 1992). Nevertheless, as explained in Chapter 4, the distinctions between a language and a dialect are widely contested, and the Charter itself does not go into detail on any such criteria which could be used to draw a distinction. While this vagueness may be understandable given the subjectivity of the term ‘regional or minority language’, it does ultimately mean that the state must determine which speech varieties fall under the remit of the Charter (Palici Di Suni Prat 1999: 208). Law 482 could be seen to have set the precedent in Italy for which varieties did fall under its remit. However, the fact that the ECRML refers to not just ‘minority’ but also ‘regional’ languages means that the case could be made for inclusion of what are traditionally termed the ‘dialects’ since some scholars have more recently argued that these would be more accurately described as ‘regional languages’ (Coluzzi 2008: 216). Consequently, although the inclusion of Sardinian under the remit of the Charter has been little contested due to its prior recognition in Law 482, questions continue to be raised about the need to recognise other regional varieties. As a result, this has constituted a major obstacle to the ratification of the ECRML.

There have been further proposals to ratify the ECRML, most notably Bill 2705 presented in 2007 by Romano Prodi’s centre-left government (Bill 2705, 29 May
The Bill was examined by various parliamentary commissions in 2007 (Senato della Repubblica, 16 October 2007), but no further progress has been made, most likely due to the instability and ineffectiveness of the Italian governments throughout this period. In fact, the lack of ratification can also be seen as symptomatic of the generally poor record of the Italian state in the implementation of European laws and policies (Bull and Newell 2005: 218; Ginsborg 2003: 242). The most recent Bill for the ratification of the Charter also demonstrated a very limited interpretation of what ratification would entail, with the explanatory section of the Bill stating that:

La ratifica della Carta europea non comporta la necessità di emanare norme di adeguamento in quanto l’Italia vi aderisce sulla base di una esistente corrispondenza delle norme che si prevede di accettare con quelle contenute nella legge 15 dicembre 1999, n. 482. (Bill 2705, 29 May 2007)

[The ratification of the European Charter does not require the passing of further legislation due to the fact that the provisions contained in Law 482 of 15 December 1999 already comply with those measures which Italy is proposing to accept.]

The Bill also went on to state that the funds already provided by Law 482 meant that ratification would entail no further financial obligations, despite the limited nature of these funds discussed in previous chapters. The only concession that is made is in Article 4 of the Bill, which states that direct measures will be introduced to ensure a greater presence of the regional and minority languages concerned in radio and television broadcasts. The Bill consequently demonstrates an admission of the failings in this area, and a commitment to fulfil these obligations in the case of the ratification of the ECRML. Evidently if Italy does eventually ratify the Charter, it will be subject to a much greater monitoring of its policies concerning minority languages than currently exists, with the implementation of Law 482 submitted to much greater scrutiny.

Nevertheless, even a signature commits a state to the principles of the ECRML, and, as Máiréad Nic Craith explains, this serves an important function by ‘reminding national states of their obligations towards cultural and linguistic minorities’ (2006: 80). In Italy, it is evident that both the ECRML and the FCPNM have served this function, acting as they did as a catalyst for the passing of Law 482. As Felice Besostri, who was responsible for presenting the original Bill for Law 482 to the Senate, explains, ‘Questa Legge è stata, tra l’altro, motivata dal fatto che se non veniva approvata, praticamente noi saremmo stati inadempienti rispetto agli strumenti già firmati’ (III) [‘This Law was, although falling outside of the period of investigation of this thesis, it should be noted that a further Bill was agreed in March 2012 by the Italian government, but is again yet to be approved by the Italian parliament (Governo Italiano, 9 March 2012).
among other things, motivated by the fact that if it was not approved, we would essentially have been failing to comply with the treaties already signed’). Although earlier bills for the recognition of minority languages had been proposed before the introduction of the ECRML and the FCPNM, these documents do appear to have played a significant role in providing the final impetus for the passing of the Law. This is also demonstrated in the final debates in both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate on Law 482. Proponents of the Bill repeatedly mentioned the existence of such documents as justification for the necessity of such a law. As the Under-Secretary of State for Education clarified in the Senate, ‘L’esigenza di una tutela delle minoranze deriva, peraltro, anche da un impegno comunitario’ (Sergio Zoppi, Senato della Repubblica, 6 October 1999) [‘The need to safeguard minorities derives, moreover, from a Community duty’].

The impact of these European documents is also in evidence in the content of Law 482 itself which, as Elisabetta Palici di Suni Prat explains, ‘presenta inoltre numerose analogie con le disposizioni contenute in documenti internazionali ed europei, intervenuti negli ultimi anni in questa materia’ (2000: 101) [‘presents numerous similarities with provisions contained in international and European documents introduced in recent years on this subject’]. Law 482 specifically states that it is ‘in armonia con i principi generali stabiliti dagli organismi europei ed internazionali’ (art. 2, Law 482, 15 December 1999) [‘in harmony with the general principles established by European and international bodies’]. The measures listed in Law 482 also bear a marked resemblance to those listed in international documents and, most notably, the ECRML (Palici di Suni Prat 2000: 107-08). This demonstrates the evolution of a widespread European consensus on appropriate measures of minority protection, which has had a clear and evident impact in Italy. Furthermore, the 2001 regulations for the implementation of Law 482 make a specific reference to the ECRML in reference to use in the media, calling for the specific implementation of the measures specified in Article 11.1a of the Charter (art. 11, Decree of the President of the Republic 345, 2 May 2001). This clause of the ECRML refers to the need to encourage both the production of programmes in the minority or regional languages concerned as well as the creation of at least one radio station and television channel broadcasting in these languages (art. 11.1a, ECRML, 23 June 1992). Despite the lack of ratification of the ECRML, this demonstrates a clear will to implement the measures listed within it, even if such promises have not yet been fulfilled. European documents are having a significant impact on the Italian government in its elaboration and implementation of measures to
protect and promote minority languages, from which the Sardinian-speaking minority has begun to benefit in recent years.

European action also appears to be increasing awareness of the importance and relevance of minority languages in Europe, and this may be most significant in cases such as that of Sardinia, where previously the language was often viewed as irrelevant and merely a relic of the past. As Renato Soru, ex-regional President of Sardinia, confirmed, these European documents:

aiutano a far comprendere l’importanza delle lingue minoritarie. Aiutano ad aumentare nelle persone comuni la consapevolezza che parlare una lingua minoritaria non è segno di arretratezza, anzi è segno di modernità, è segno di stare più vicino alla sensibilità europea. (II13)

[help to demonstrate the importance of minority languages. They help to increase awareness among the general public that speaking a minority language is not a sign of backwardness, in fact it is a sign of modernity, it is a sign of being more in tune with European thinking.]

The traditional idealisation of Europe in Italy (Bull and Newell 2005: 210; Ginsborg 2003: 243) may also mean that these documents are seen in a more positive light than in traditionally Eurosceptic states. In reality, knowledge of such documents remains limited among the general public and so their effect should not be exaggerated. However, activities for the promotion of the Sardinian language have been increasingly linked to Europe and the wider international context which does appear to contribute towards legitimating such activities. For example, in the list of projects funded by Law 482 in Sardinian schools in the school years 2006-07 and 2007-08, there are two projects titled ‘Parliamo la lingua sarda per stare in Europa’ [‘Let’s speak the Sardinian language to be in Europe’] and ‘La lingua e il sardo – le lingue e l’Europa’ [‘Language and Sardinian – languages and Europe’] (Ministero dell’Istruzione, dell’Università e della Ricerca 2006; 2008). This demonstrates how the European focus on multilingualism and minority languages may be providing alternative ways to promote these languages, which can distance them from the traditionally nostalgic and often backwards-looking approach.

In sum, developments at the European level do appear to have been beneficial to the Sardinian linguistic minority in Italy. As Palici di Suni Prat explains:

Sia a livello internazionale che a livello culturale e di influenza generale gli ordinamenti e le istituzioni europee hanno contribuito in modo particolare a sviluppare questo atteggiamento più costruttivo nei confronti del problema dei gruppi minoritari. (1999: 209)
[Whether at the international level or as a general influence at the cultural level, the European institutions and framework have clearly contributed to the development of this more constructive attitude towards the problem of minority groups.]

This ‘more constructive attitude’ has evidently played an influential role in ensuring the passing of Law 482 and in the development of a growing consensus that the Italian state should take action in favour of the Sardinian language. The Italian state has clearly been susceptible to this international and European pressure, and has been forced to accept that minority languages such as Sardinian are an essential element of European culture deserving of protection and promotion. Nevertheless, despite a notable change in attitude, action itself remains limited as has been repeatedly discussed in previous chapters, demonstrating the fact that the opt-outs and vagueness of international documents continue to limit their impact and effectiveness.

8.3 Spain

8.3.1 Catalan Cultural Diplomacy and the EU

Few regions have attempted to take advantage of the new opportunities available outside of the state system to the same extent as Catalonia, particularly at the European level. Nevertheless, the Spanish state has often viewed the international activities of Catalonia with suspicion and the early optimism over Catalonia’s role in the EU has subsided in light of recent developments. The fact that the Spanish government has sole responsibility for foreign affairs (art. 149, Spanish Constitution 1978) has often allowed it to block attempts by the autonomous governments to intervene in matters related to the EU. In 1993, however, the Constitutional Court did recognise the right of Catalonia to operate abroad in relation to areas under its jurisdiction (Keating 2001: 194). Nevertheless, there is still no formal decision-making role for the autonomous governments at the EU level, with any Catalan hopes for a Europe of the Regions largely disappointed (Balcells 1996: 197). The lack of a powerful state or significant presence in supranational bodies to promote the interests of Catalonia has also meant that the language remains in a potentially vulnerable position in relation to globalising forces, as recognised by Catalan leaders (Guibernau 2004: 155).

In an attempt to respond to this potential threat the Catalan government has focused its attention on what can be termed ‘cultural diplomacy’, which does not face the same legal restrictions as its political counterpart. As Andreu Bosch from the Ramon Llull Institute establishes, ‘No tenemos un estado dentro de la Unión Europea que nos capacite para ejercer una, digamos, diplomacia política. Por lo tanto, la
diplomacia cultural quizás en nuestro caso es más efectiva que acciones políticas’ (SI3) ['We do not have a state within the EU which allows us to carry out so-called political diplomacy. As a result, cultural diplomacy is in our case perhaps more effective than political action’]. Promotion of the Catalan culture and language has consequently been the primary focus of Catalan activities abroad, with the Catalan Consortium for the External Promotion of Culture created in 1992 (Crameri 2008: 180). Although the central government initially attempted to control these low-level activities, it has gradually reconciled itself to these primarily cultural initiatives (McRoberts 2001: 82).

A crucial step was also taken with the previously discussed creation of the Ramon Llull Institute in 2002, designed to ‘coordinate the projection of language, literature and “high culture” outside Spain’ (Crameri 2008: 37). In addition to the Institute there also exists a Ramon Llull Foundation, based in Andorra, which is formed of the government of Andorra, the French Department of the Eastern Pyrenees, the Catalan-speaking town of Alghero in Italy, as well as the Ramon Llull Institute which represents the Catalan government and, until its exit at the end of 2012, also the Balearic government (ABC, 7 November 2012; Generalitat de Catalunya 2010: 228). The Foundation thus helps to coordinate the cultural activities of all of the Catalan-speaking territories, and due to the cultural nature of these agreements there are few to no political or legal blocks to such alliances. This is also true for the many agreements established by the Institute with universities, publishers, museums, theatres and other cultural institutions abroad. This has allowed for significant freedom of action across state borders and the policy has been particularly successful in ensuring the presence of Catalan throughout the world, a presence which at times appears even to exceed that of some small state languages. Nevertheless, this does not diminish the importance of a political presence since, as Bosch recognises, ‘si tuviéramos un estado propio detrás, evidentemente que esa diplomacia cultural se vería reforzada por una diplomacia política más efectiva. No nos engañemos’ (SI3) ['if we had our own state behind us, evidently this cultural diplomacy would be reinforced by a more effective political diplomacy. There is no point pretending otherwise’].

The importance of a political presence in relation to the Catalan language, and particularly the importance of state backing, is most clearly demonstrated by the struggles to see the Catalan language recognised at the EU level. The EU only recognises official state languages as official languages of the EU (Council of Europe, 30 April 2007: 43), which has served to consolidate the subordinate position of Catalan and other non-state languages. The Catalan government, however, has repeatedly
attempted to challenge this provision, most notably by ensuring the passing of a resolution in 1990 in the European Parliament recognising Catalan as a European language (Keating 2001: 192). This recognition was, however, largely symbolic, providing for the publication of treaties and fundamental texts of the European Union in Catalan, the use of Catalan in public information campaigns, the inclusion of Catalan in programmes for the learning of European languages and the use of Catalan in Community offices located within Catalonia (Vernet i Llobet et al. 2003: 287-88). The language was still far from becoming an official working language and it was also not a binding resolution, as proven by the fact that the president of the European Commission in 1994 refused to publish the Maastricht Treaty in Catalan (Branchadell 1996: 99). It is, in fact, only the Council of the European Union, where typically only state ministers participate in decision-making activities, which can change the linguistic regime of the EU (Vernet i Llobet et al. 2003: 287-88). Consequently, any request for genuine official recognition of Catalan would need to come via the central Spanish government. In the 1990s, and particularly under the PP government, this appeared to be an extremely unlikely proposition (Mar-Molinero 2000b: 197; Padilla, 27 September 2001), demonstrating the limitations of Catalonia’s position.

Nevertheless, the return of the Socialists to power in 2004 signalled a dramatic change in approach by the central government, with the Prime Minister Zapatero promising in his investiture speech the intention to request the official recognition of Catalan and other co-official languages in the institutions of the EU (Congreso de los Diputados, 15 April 2004). This appeared to be a high priority for the new government as Zapatero made explicit in a 2004 parliamentary debate:

Desde el día siguiente de la toma de posesión del Gobierno, tanto el Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores, como yo mismo, hemos venido trabajando y realizando una solicitud formal para establecer ese reconocimiento. Lo hemos hecho en todas las reuniones que hemos mantenido con los diferentes Primeros Ministros y líderes europeos. (cited in La Moncloa, 12 May 2004)

[From the day after we took control of the government, both I and the Minister of the Exterior have been working and putting together a formal request to establish this recognition. We have done so in all of the meetings we have had with the different Prime Ministers and European leaders.]

These words were also followed up by action, with the Spanish government submitting a Memorandum to the EU in December 2004 explaining the linguistic situation in Spain and the need to officially recognise Spain’s other languages (Council of Europe, 30 April 2007: 43). In fact, the original aim was to achieve this recognition in the new
European Constitution being drafted at the time (Pons Parera 2006a: 99). This was partially achieved, with a paragraph introduced in the final drafting of the new Constitution which established the concept of ‘Treaty languages’ (art. IV-448, Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe). This additional provision allowed for a non-official translation of the Treaty into languages with official legal recognition within their states, at the request of a specific state (Pons Parera 2006a: 99). Consequently, these languages became a form of ‘tertium genus, standing between the languages whose rights are recognized by the European Constitution and those that have no recognized status at all in the context of European institutions’ (Urrutia and Lasagabaster 2008: 4-5). This addition was the direct result of intervention from the Spanish government and many member states, particularly France, were reluctant to see its inclusion, thus demonstrating the obstacles the Spanish government faced (Urrutia and Lasagabaster 2008: 4-5). This compromise position, however, was clearly unsatisfactory to Catalan politicians since it was still far from full official recognition of the language (Garriga, 20 June 2004).

The Spanish government persevered in its efforts and was eventually successful in securing the passing of Conclusions by the European Council in June 2005 which provided guidelines for the different institutions of the EU for the use of any language officially recognised in the constitution of a member state (Council of the European Union, 13 June 2005: 14-16). Consequently, although Catalan and the other co-official languages would not become official languages of the EU, these guidelines provided for official use of the languages in various contexts. Three main uses are recognised: the right of citizens to use and receive a reply in the language in written communication with EU institutions and bodies, the publication of acts adopted in co-decision by the European Parliament and Council in the recognised languages, and the right of state representatives to use the languages in oral interventions in meetings of the Council and eventually other EU bodies (Council of the European Union, 13 June 2005: 15-16). These uses also depended on the signing of agreements between a member state and each specific EU institution, with agreements signed by the Spanish government and the Council of Ministers, the Committee of the Regions, the Commission, the Economic and Social Committee, and the European Parliament between November 2005 and July 2006 (Council of Europe, 30 April 2007: 44; Pons Parera 2006a: 101). Overall, particularly in light of the significant opposition from some member states, the determination of the central Spanish government in securing these provisions is evident. This is also demonstrated in statements from representatives of the central government,
with the Minister for Foreign Affairs stating the importance of this achievement after ‘un proceso largo, laborioso’ ['a long and laborious process’], in order for the EU to ‘tener en cuenta en mayor medida la riqueza que representa su diversidad lingüística’ (Miguel Ángel Moratinos cited in Carbajosa, 8 November 2005) ['take into greater consideration the richness of its linguistic diversity’]. The commitment of the central government is also demonstrated by the fact that it is responsible for taking on the full costs associated with these new provisions (Martínez de Rituerto, 14 June 2005). The central government also undertakes the translations of relevant documents as well as of written communication by citizens to the EU in the co-official languages (Marí Mayans 2011: 112; Martínez de Rituerto, 14 June 2005).

However, the fact that it is the state which remains responsible for providing and funding translations demonstrates a clear lack of commitment by the EU itself and has also meant that the process whereby citizens can address the institutions of the EU in the co-official languages is extremely complicated. Citizens must first send their correspondence to the central state administration which will then provide a translation into Castilian for the relevant EU institution. Subsequently, the EU institution sends a reply in Castilian to the central administration which should then provide a translation into the co-official language to be returned to the citizen (Martínez de Rituerto, 14 June 2005; Urrutia and Lasagabaster 2008: 5-6). Consequently, there is still no direct contact with institutions of the EU in the co-official languages and the process is extremely slow, which is a clear obstacle to such use. As Santiago Vilardell i Codina from the Catalan Directorate of Language Policy confirms, this provision ‘no ha tenido mucho impacto […]. Es un procedimiento un poco farragoso, creo que no se ha usado mucho’ (SI12) ['has had little impact […]. It is quite a long-winded process; I do not believe it has been used often’]. The use of the co-official languages by state or regional representatives is also restricted, requiring as it does significant advance warning and a specific request to use the language (Urrutia and Lasagabaster 2008: 5-6). In fact, the European Parliament has refused to accept use of the co-official languages in parliamentary interventions (Pons Parera 2006a: 101-02). Overall, it is clear that this recognition for the co-official languages is primarily symbolic, with an extremely limited practical effect. It thus remains the case that, as Nic Craith notes, ‘Official, working languages are members of an elite club which excludes lesser-used language groups’ (2006: 56). Furthermore, the EU has been known to reassert the dominance of official state languages in more general legislation to be implemented in all member states. This has caused particular problems in reference to the labelling of products with
Directives from the EU in 1978 and 1997 enforcing the use of official state languages, and thus representing a clear obstacle to Catalan product labelling (Vernet i Llobet et al. 2003: 267). Overall, although the EU has at times made statements in favour of linguistic diversity, as explained in Section 2.3.3, its actions and own language policies have clearly continued to privilege official state languages, thus ensuring that state languages remain doubly privileged at both the state and international level.

The lack of recognition of Catalan in the institutions of the Spanish state itself has also contributed to the struggles to see the language officially recognised at the European level. It does appear contradictory that Zapatero’s government actively campaigned for the acceptance of official uses of Spain’s other official languages within European institutions, while continuing to limit or prohibit such uses within its own state institutions. The Spanish Constitutional Court, for example, will not accept any appeals written in Catalan, while the European Court of Human Rights does accept appeals written in Catalan (Vernet i Llobet 1994: 133). There thus appears to be an inconsistency in the fact that it is now possible for citizens to address European institutions in Catalan, but often not their own state’s institutions. Admittedly this contradiction is also a result of Catalanist demands, as recognition by the EU has been one of the main aims in the electoral programmes of CiU, while recognition of the language in state institutions has often been neglected (Branchadell 1996: 91). The prioritising of EU recognition is clearly related to the initial hopes of many Catalanists of bypassing the state, although it has become increasingly evident that this is not possible. The process of securing recognition for Catalan at the EU level has demonstrated that the Catalan government must work in full cooperation with the institutions of the central state to achieve any such aim.

8.3.2 The Ratification of the ECRML and the Asturian Language

While the institutions of the EU may not have been particularly receptive to demands for recognition of non-state languages, the Council of Europe has, as previously discussed, demonstrated a much more explicitly positive approach with both the FCPNM and the ECRML. It is interesting to note that, in contrast to Italy, the Spanish government has determined that the FCPNM does not apply to its large minority language groups. The FCPNM itself avoids providing a clear definition of a ‘national minority’, referring only to potential features of such groups, namely religion, language, traditions and cultural heritage (art. 5, FCPNM, 1 February 1995). Evidently, it is not essential to display all of these features and, certainly, the Catalan-speaking minority
would appear to at least demonstrate distinct linguistic and cultural features. As a result, the Council of Europe recommended in its report on Spain that discussions be held with members of these linguistic groups to consider the possibility of them receiving the protection offered by the Convention (Council of Europe, 27 November 2003: 8-10). The Spanish government, however, responded categorically that the concept of ‘national minority’ did not apply, primarily on the basis that these groups displayed ‘no significant ethnic components’ (Council of Europe, 30 September 2004: 4). Although ethnicity is mentioned in the Charter, there is no requirement for any demonstrably distinct ethnic characteristics to be present, as the unchallenged inclusion of Sardinian in the Italian reports would appear to confirm. The more likely reason for the reluctance of the Spanish government to see these groups recognised as ‘national minorities’ is the desire to avoid recognising any distinct ‘national’ status for such groups. This is clear in the reply of the Spanish government, which, in addition to asserting the fact that the constitutional reference to ‘nationalities’ was fully ‘subsumed into the broadest notion of the Spanish Nation’, also asserts that all of the distinct linguistic and cultural groups of Spain constitute ‘a single people, the “Spanish people”’ (Council of Europe, 30 September 2004: 3-4). Both statements demonstrate an evident fear of providing any formal recognition of the existence of distinct ‘nations’ within the Spanish state on the basis of the existence of a distinct language. The reasons for this fear were discussed in Section 5.3.1, but it is interesting to note here how international charters and documents can unintentionally use terminology which can be problematic and controversial in a specific state context. The ECRML, in contrast, was signed and ratified in Spain with little to no opposition or debate within the country.

Spain ratified the ECRML in April 2001, with the Charter entering into force in August that same year (Council of Europe, 19 April 2013). As previously explained, the Charter is an extremely comprehensive document, with clear obligations placed on those states which choose to ratify it. Most importantly, the ECRML clearly identifies the state as the principle guarantor for the protection of minority and regional languages, which has been particularly important in the Spanish case. As discussed in Section 6.3.2, the Spanish state in its own reports on the ECRML has attempted to assert that the responsibility to protect and promote languages other than Castilian has been delegated to the Autonomous Communities (Council of Europe, 30 April 2007: 63). However, as the Council responded in its own report: ‘irrespective of the domestic arrangement of the competences involved, Spain remains responsible under international law for the implementation of treaties it has ratified’ (Council of Europe, 11 December 2008: 10).
This can be signalled as one of the primary achievements of the ECRML, in reminding states of their own obligations in relation to minority and regional languages. It would also appear that the institutions of the Spanish state have gradually begun to accept this role, as is evidenced in the changes made to the content of the reports submitted to the Council of Europe. While the second report, for example, focused primarily on the actions of individual Autonomous Communities, the most recent report in 2011 provided much more comprehensive information on the actions of the state. The notable improvement also coincides with the creation of the Office for Official Languages within the central Ministry of Public Administrations, since this Office is now dedicated to the task of compiling these reports. In fact, the Decree creating the Council and Office in 2007 specifically stated that the need to create both bodies had become particularly evident in light of the ‘compromisos internacionales asumidos por España’ [‘international commitments made by Spain’] specifically in relation to the ECRML (Royal Decree 905/2007). This clearly demonstrates the impact of the Charter in ensuring recognition by the state of its own role in the promotion and protection of Spain’s other languages within its own institutions.

Nevertheless, the ECRML itself has had a minimal impact in Spain, primarily due to the fact that the central government has often claimed that the level of protection offered to its minority languages is already higher than that specified in the Charter (Council of Europe, 23 September 2002: 46). This partly explains why the Charter was passed with little opposition or controversy in Spain, as it was seen to entail minimal additional obligations for the Spanish state due to the regimes of co-officiality already present in regions such as Catalonia. Given the significant presence of the co-official languages in various sectors of the public sphere, this was partly true, and the Council of Europe itself did note that the recognition of Spain’s other official languages ‘places Spain in the forefront of the European countries seriously committed to the protection and promotion of regional or minority languages’ (Council of Europe, 21 September 2005b: 158). The Charter may, however, be more important in providing recognition for languages which have previously often gone ignored or unrecognised (Nic Craith 2003: 69), as in the Asturian case. Asturian was interestingly not included in the original draft of Spain’s declaration of ratification of the Charter. However, amendments proposed in the central parliament by the mixed parliamentary group and CiU (Congreso de los Diputados, 15 December 1999; 19 October 2000) for the inclusion of Asturian and other non-official languages were accepted. This consequently signalled the clearest recognition by the Spanish state of Asturian as a ‘regional or minority language’.
The final wording of Spain’s declaration is, however, ambiguous, since it effectively appears to establish two categories of regional and minority languages:

se entienden por lenguas regionales o minoritarias, las lenguas reconocidas como oficiales en los Estatutos de Autonomía de las Comunidades Autónomas del País Vasco, Cataluña, Illes Balears, Galicia, Valenciana y Navarra.

Asimismo, España declara, a los mismos efectos, que también se entienden por lenguas regionales o minoritarias las que los Estatutos de Autonomía protegen y amparan en los territorios donde tradicionalmente se hablan. (Instrument of Ratification, 15 September 2001)

[regional or minority languages are understood as those recognised as official in the Statutes of Autonomy of the Autonomous Communities of the Basque Country, Catalonia, the Balearic Islands, Galicia, Valencia and Navarre.

For the same purposes, Spain also declares that those languages protected and covered by the Statutes of Autonomy in the territories where they are traditionally spoken are also considered as minority or regional languages.]

This second category would evidently include Asturian and although the text makes a distinction between the two categories, the use of the phrase ‘a los mismos efectos’ [‘for the same purposes’] appears to imply that both official and non-official languages will be given a similar treatment in relation to the application of the ECRML.

Nevertheless, later on in the declaration the specific measures to be applied from Part III of the Charter are only listed as applying to the first group of ‘official’ languages and consequently the second group of languages appears only to be covered by the more general principles established in Part II of the Charter (Council of Europe, 21 September 2005b: 9). The declaration does specify that for this second group of languages, ‘se aplicarán todas aquellas disposiciones de la parte III de la Carta que puedan razonablemente aplicarse’ (Instrument of Ratification, 15 September 2001) [‘all of those provisions of Part III of the Charter which can reasonably be applied will be applied’]. However, the vagueness of this statement essentially allowed the central state to avoid committing to any specific measures to support non-official languages such as Asturian. Thus, the Spanish government limited its obligations towards languages such as Asturian by ratifying the Charter in an extremely unusual way. The Asturian legal expert José Manuel Pérez Fernández is particularly critical of this approach, arguing that: ‘Con esa fórmula ambigua España lo que hizo fue inventar una nueva forma de suscribir […]. Para mí es una forma de ratificar ilegal. O sea que no está prevista en el propio Tratado’ (SI9) [‘With this ambiguous formula, what Spain did was invent a new way of ratifying […]. For me it is an illegal form of ratification. By which I mean it is
not foreseen in the Treaty itself’]. It can be presumed that it is the non-official status of languages such as Asturian which is the basis for this decision, but there is no requirement in the ECRML for such a legal status and it is languages without such official recognition which could potentially benefit the most from the new opportunities offered by the Charter.

It is still significant that non-official languages such as Asturian were identified in the Instrument of Ratification. Most importantly, it provides some form of legal recognition of the existence of the language at the state level, which had previously been almost entirely lacking. Although the commitment of the state in reference to Asturian seemingly only derives from the vaguer principles established in Part II of the Charter, these do still entail clear obligations. Part II specifies, for example, the need for ‘resolute action’ to promote the languages, specifically by ensuring the use of the languages in public and private life, and by ensuring the teaching of the languages at all appropriate stages (art. 7.1, ECRML, 23 June 1992). Although these commitments are still fairly vague in contrast to the measures specified in Part III of the Charter, the Committee of Experts\(^2\) has clarified that states must adopt a clear and coherent policy for those languages only protected under Part II of the Charter to ensure adherence to these principles. The failure of the Spanish government to do so was, in fact, directly criticised by the Committee of Experts in the second monitoring cycle: ‘What seems to be symptomatic and recurrent for Part II languages is the lack of a language strategy, bodies and financial means’ (Council of Europe, 11 December 2008: 10). The lack of a strategy in reference to Asturian, particularly at the state level, is related to the lack of accurate information about the language within the institutions of the central state and specifically the lack of consultation with Asturian representatives on the current position of the language. In the second report provided by the Spanish government, for example, the Autonomous Communities with a co-official language were asked to contribute their own detailed reports to be included in the state’s own report (Council of Europe, 30 April 2007: 63). The exclusion of Asturian is made explicit, with the reference only to the ‘six Autonomous Communities having their own language’, namely Catalonia, the Basque Country, Valencia, Navarre, Galicia and the Balearic Islands (Council of Europe, 30 April 2007: 63-65). No mention is made of any consultation with the government or any institution in Asturias, which is also reflected

\(^2\) The Committee of Experts is composed of one member from each state which has ratified the Charter. The experts are selected on the basis of their ‘recognised competence in the matters dealt with in the Charter’ (art. 17, ECRML, 23 June 1992).
in the paucity of information provided on the Asturian language, even in the section of the report which deals only with Part II of the Charter (Council of Europe, 30 April 2007: 73-103). This absence was repeatedly criticised in the Committee of Experts’ own report which ‘urges the Spanish authorities to provide updated official information’ (Council of Europe, 11 December 2008: 7).

The lack of consultation has also led to inaccuracies in the information provided by the state on the situation of the Asturian language. The first report by the Spanish government in 2002 stated in reference to Asturian that ‘[t]here are doubts as to its linguistic unity since Asturian has not been standardised or written down’ (Council of Europe, 23 September 2002: 15). The Council of Europe, in its own report and after consultation with relevant representatives in Asturias, however, found that ‘the work of standardisation of Bable/Asturian has now been completed by the Academy of the Asturian Language’ (Council of Europe, 21 September 2005b: 15-16). Despite this clarification, the next report by the Spanish government in 2007 repeated that ‘[a]s indicated in the previous report, the process of standardising and writing down Asturian has not been completely finished’ (Council of Europe, 30 April 2007: 13). This demonstrates a clear lack of consultation with the relevant authorities in Asturias, although it is unclear whether the incorrect information itself came from the autonomous government or the central government. It is, however, the central government which has a duty to ensure the accuracy of information submitted in the final report, and the fact that this misinformation was repeated in Spain’s second report is particularly indicative of a failure to do so.

This lack of reliable information provided by the state has been partially corrected by the work of the Committee of Experts, which has gone to great efforts to ensure that the information obtained is accurate and complete. As Ana Cano González explains:

>vienen los de la Comisión para ver el cumplimiento de esa carta y evidentemente convocan a gente de Asturias […]. Convocan a representantes de la Academia de la Llengua Asturiana, este año fueron los Xuristes pol Asturiano y también la Xunta pola Defensa de la Llengua, que es una asociación cívica. (S15)

[The people from the Committee come here to monitor compliance with the Charter and evidently they gather together people from Asturias […]. They meet representatives from the Academy of the Asturian Language, this year they also met the Lawyers for Asturian and the Council for the Defence of the Asturian Language, which is a civic organisation.]
The criticisms of the Committee of Experts concerning the lack of consultation by the Spanish government also seem to have had a clear effect, with the Asturian authorities explicitly consulted for the third state report (Council of Europe, 17 February 2011: 136). According to the Head of the Asturian Language Policy Service, María Antonia Pedregal Montes, her office submitted a report on Asturian language policy in 2009 and a complementary report in 2010 which were added in to the final state report (SI8). The information provided on Asturias has significantly increased as a result, although Pedregal Montes still objected that the final report ‘no respetaba enteramente el contenido de la información que nosotros le mandamos, sino que había solo recogido algunas partes de nuestro informe original’ (SI8) ['did not entirely respect the content of the information which we sent to them but instead included only parts of our original report’]. This is perhaps unsurprising given the quantity of information received by the Office for Official Languages and the need to produce a coherent final report in line with the Council of Europe’s guidelines. As the representative from the central Office for Official Languages confirms, ‘pidieron informe a todas las comunidades autónomas, a un montón de ayuntamientos, o sea fue un trabajo muy laborioso’ (SI7) ['reports were requested from all of the Autonomous Communities, from a huge number of local councils, it was an extremely time-consuming job’]. Overall, despite some continued discrepancies, there is clear evidence that the compilation of the reports and coordination with the Asturian government has significantly advanced, as is demonstrated by the improvement in terms of the length and quality of information in the most recent report. This is an important development in ensuring a greater understanding by the institutions of the Spanish state of the Asturian context, even if solely as a result of the specific criticisms of the Council of Europe.

Nevertheless, the implementation of the ECRML should not be merely an information-gathering exercise and the intent is theoretically to ensure that states respond to the obligations laid out within it to ensure the protection of their regional or minority languages. The actual response to the final recommendations made by the Council of Europe in each monitoring round appears to be inadequate. In reference to Asturian, the most important recommendation has been to ‘consider in collaboration with the Asturian speakers, the possibilities of improving the current level of protection provided by the Statute of Autonomy to Asturian’ (Council of Europe, 11 December 2008: 151). Most significantly, the second report criticised the weak legal status of Asturian and pointed to this as a clear obstacle to the promotion of the language (Council of Europe, 11 December 2008: 13). There is, however, no evidence at either
the state or regional level of any attempt to respond to these criticisms, with no change to the legal status of Asturian considered since the recommendation was made public in 2008. Although this is evidently a short period of time, the third report by the state in 2011 provided no response to this recommendation, demonstrating the limited impact of the ECRML. In particular, the lack of sanctions to ensure compliance means that the impact of the Charter is likely to remain minimal. As Robert Phillipson notes, ‘[t]he opt-outs and alternatives in the Charter permit a reluctant state to meet the requirements in a minimalist way, which it can legitimate by claiming that a provision was not “possible” or “appropriate”’ (2003: 154). This would certainly be the case for Asturian with its exclusion from the remit of Part III of the Charter seemingly lacking any clear justification, a justification which was also not requested by the Council of Europe. Overall, the impact of the Charter within Asturias itself would appear to be minimal, but it does still provide a clear framework for the protection of the Asturian language. As Ana Cano González establishes, the Charter: ‘sirve para que se Monte esto en los medios de comunicación, para que para la próxima ya hay un poco más de cuidado y [...] por lo menos que hablen de la situación que hay’ (SI5) [‘helps to ensure that the issue appears in the media, so that in the next report more care is taken and […] they at least talk about the situation which exists’]. Most importantly, the inclusion of Asturian under the remit of the Charter does signal a clear legal recognition of its status as a minority or regional language. The monitoring process has also forced the central government to improve the information it has on the Asturian language, even if any practical effects on the status and uses of Asturian remain minimal.

**Conclusion**

It would appear that the early optimism of regional politicians and minority groups that developments at the supranational level would diminish the role of the state has been largely disappointed, with nation-states remaining the ‘bedrock of the political world order’ (May 2001: 5). The importance of a state power in relation to the protection of a minority group is clearly demonstrated in Alto Adige/Südtirol, where it is a kin-state – in this case Austria – which has provided the support and necessary political power to ensure the demands of the German-speaking minority are recognised (Medda-Windischer 2008: 28). The limitations imposed in the absence of a state power are also clear in the Catalan case, where, despite the strong Catalanist political voice and the international presence of Catalan culture, the Catalan language has struggled to gain official recognition within the EU. Even the limited recognition now obtained for the
language has only been possible due to the full cooperation and commitment of the Spanish central government towards this aim. The privileging of state languages, despite statements from the EU in favour of multilingualism and minority languages, is evident and has consequently only served to reinforce their dominance.

Nevertheless, important international treaties have been introduced, although notably not by the EU itself but by the separate Council of Europe, which have made significant progress in developing a European framework for the protection of both minorities and their languages. Documents such as the FCPNM and the ECRML have provided international standards and expectations of reasonable levels of recognition and protection for linguistic minority groups. The effect of such documents is proven in Italy by the notable similarities between the state Law 482 and the ECRML, thus demonstrating the desire of the Italian state to conform to European expectations. The reception of these documents within the Spanish and Italian states also demonstrates the difficulties of attempting to define universal models of minority protection, with the terminology used to describe both the languages and the speakers themselves proving to be particularly problematic. In Italy, the continued debate over the distinction between ‘dialects’ and ‘regional languages’ has been a major obstacle to the ratification of the ECRML. The terminology used in the FCPNM, on the other hand, has been particularly problematic in the Spanish context. The use of the term ‘national minorities’ has led to a reluctance to apply the treaty to linguistic minority groups such as the Catalans for fear of legitimising any claims to ‘national’ status. This is a notable contrast to Italy where the FCPNM has even been applied to the Sardinian minority despite the undeniably weak sense of national consciousness. However, it would appear to be precisely this weak national consciousness and consequent lack of threat to the unity of the state which has allowed for the seemingly unproblematic application of the term ‘national minority’.

Both of these examples demonstrate the dangers of international documents when it comes to their application within a specific state or regional context. Both the FCPNM and ECRML do demonstrate an awareness of such dangers by allowing for significant flexibility in their application. While this would appear essential for broad treaties to be applied in often very different contexts, this flexibility can also lead to ineffectiveness. Essentially, power remains with the state to determine the ‘appropriate’ implementation of such documents, which means that it is dependent on the willingness of individual states to ensure their effective implementation. The application of the FCPNM to the Sardinian minority, for example, does not appear to have had any
tangible results beyond identifying the continued shortcomings in the application of Law 482. The ECRML, with its list of specific measures, does appear to require a greater commitment from individual states. Nevertheless, the power again remains with the state to determine which measures should apply to which languages and, as the Asturian case demonstrates, a state may even recognise the existence of a specific minority language within its territory but make no commitment to applying any of the measures listed for that language. Obviously, the intent of the Charter is that such a decision should not be an arbitrary choice (no. 46, Council of Europe, 5 November 1992), but it clearly allows for states to adopt a minimalist interpretation of the Charter (Phillipson 2003: 154). The ineffectiveness of the ECRML is most clearly demonstrated by the fact that many of the recommendations made by the Committee of Experts in Spain, such as the need to reassess the legal status of Asturian, appear to have had no visible or concrete response from the institutions of the state.

Nevertheless, the monitoring procedure outlined in such documents does appear to have a positive effect. In particular, the documents themselves identify the state as the duty-holder in the protection of minority languages and their speakers. This has been particularly significant in the Spanish case, where the attempts by the central government to claim that such obligations had been devolved to the regions were rejected by the Committee of Experts. Thus, while not attempting to remove control over language policy from the regional level, the Charter effectively reminded the Spanish government of its own obligations within its own spheres of activity. The monitoring procedure also ensures that the institutions of the central government are forced to become aware of the existence of the different language groups present within the state, which is particularly important for those groups that have often gone unrecognised or ignored. The application of the ECRML in Spain, for example, has provided the clearest legal recognition of the existence of the Asturian language at the state and also international level. In addition, both documents appear to offer legitimation to speakers of these languages, positioning them in a wider European context where a more positive attitude to linguistic diversity appears to be the consensus. Nevertheless, the direct effect on speakers of Sardinian and Asturian should not be exaggerated due to the extremely limited knowledge of these documents outside of official language policy circles. Action at the European level, despite appearing to be more prestigious, often still remains distant from individual citizens and consequently speakers of the languages. Rather, these documents provide a point of reference for those designing and implementing language policies at both the state and regional level.
While language policy remains largely an internal matter of the state, with European and international organisations often unwilling to intervene directly, recent developments do appear to encourage a greater understanding and assessment of a state’s duties towards its linguistic minorities.
Chapter 9: Conclusion

In the course of this study, several parallels have emerged between the case studies which provide significant new insight into the role of the state in reference to linguistic minorities. Evidently the minorities and states studied should by no means be considered to represent all cases, but the findings that emerge should be recognisable and potentially applicable for both researchers and policy makers in other state and minority contexts. In particular, this thesis highlighted factors which influence the institutions of the states of Spain and Italy in their treatment of distinct minorities. Unsurprisingly, the success of both the Catalan- and German-speaking minorities in securing the recognition and support of the state can be primarily explained by the existence of a strong political and cultural movement to represent the interests of both minority groups at the centre. The cases of Catalonia and Alto Adige/Südtirol demonstrate the continued importance of some form of pressure to ensure the state adopts more pluralist policies (Ager 2001: 106) and both groups have been instrumental in forcing linguistic minorities onto the political agenda at a more general level. It also appears inevitable that those minorities who most forcefully assert their needs and demands will receive greater protection and improved treatment. It is interesting to note that it was primarily the perceived threat of these ‘powerful’ minorities which resulted in their repression under fascist governments, and in a complete reversal of policy has now ensured respect for their demands by the central state. This reversal partially represents an attempt to redress fascist repression, but would also appear to be an attempt to diminish the threat such minorities might pose to the unity of the state by ensuring these groups feel represented and recognised at the centre.

The claims of such groups are also supported by the pre-existing high social prestige of their respective languages, which appears to provide a strong basis for an effective political and cultural movement linked to that language. This points to the anomalous nature of both cases, since the languages of minority groups are typically marked by their low status. This is clearly the case in Asturias and Sardinia, where both languages are in a subordinate position in relation to the official state language, primarily due to their exclusion from the public sphere and particularly the education system which has traditionally remained in the hands of the state. Interestingly, however, this exclusion has been largely ensured by a policy of neglect rather than explicit repression as in the cases of the Catalan- and German-speaking minorities under
fascist rule. In reality, even without explicit repression, Asturian- and Sardinian-speakers have in recent history seen their languages discredited and often dismissed as ‘dialects’ or even ‘primitive’ forms of speech unfit for the modern world, and the speakers themselves have often assimilated these views. The perceived invisibility of such a policy, however, may explain why in Asturias and Sardinia there is a limited awareness of the impact of the central institutions of the state. In both regions there does at times appear to have been an excessive focus on individual speakers and their ability to make a choice to use their languages. There is a naivety in this position, flattering as it does the individual and ignoring the constraints placed on them by the low prestige of the respective language which is continually reinforced by the exclusion of that language from domains of powers. In contrast, it is the critical awareness of the often negative influence of the state, particularly in the past, which has made the Catalan- and German-speaking minorities more powerful and determined to ensure the state is made aware of their demands. This is not to demonise the central government and institutions of the state as malevolent or repressive forces, but only to demonstrate the importance of ensuring linguistic minorities take a critical rather than passive position in relation to the external forces which affect their freedom to continue to use their languages. Weaker and marginalised groups will only become more marginalised by discourses, which often originate from within the minority community itself, that imply they are completely free in their choices.

The low statuses of Sardinian and Asturian have both contributed to and been reinforced by the absence of a strong political and cultural movement capable or even willing to make demands on the state for the recognition and support of the respective languages. The absence of such a movement is also related to the reluctance of both regions to fully establish themselves as autonomous regions, which in both cases seems to stem from economic stagnation and a consequent dependence on the direct support of the state. These economic problems have had a twofold effect, leading to both the largely unsuccessful prioritising of economic matters over cultural concerns, as well as an unwillingness to threaten this dependent relationship by posing any challenge to the state. It is interesting to note, in contrast, that Catalonia and Alto Adige/Südtirol are two of the richest regions within their states. This is not to suggest that it is the promotion of their languages which has ensured the economic success of both regions, but their examples do suggest that a focus on economic development and cultural interests need not be mutually exclusive and can even be complementary. At the very least, there are no apparent benefits if regional politicians ignore the existence of a local language or
attempt to devalue it and the regional culture with which it is associated as has often been the case in Asturias. Equally, the extremely low prestige of both Asturian and Sardinian makes the need for effective language policies to improve their position much more urgent. This leads to a contradictory situation, where it is precisely in those contexts where the community is less committed to action in favour of the language that action becomes a more pressing need.

In both cases, increasing the level of autonomy for the regional government thus becomes questionable as an effective means of minority protection. In both Catalonia and Alto Adige/Südtirol, the freedom of the provincial and regional governments to design and implement their own policies for the protection of their respective languages has often been viewed as the main and sometimes sole priority. This has encouraged the view that autonomy is the most useful tool for the protection of minorities and their languages, but this is only the case where there exists a powerful minority group which is capable of governing and creating ‘state-like’ entities able to design and implement effective language policies. Thus it is not the granting of autonomy itself which guarantees that the language of the minority will be protected, but the existence of an effective regional or provincial elite committed to the continued use of that language. For less powerful minorities such as those of Asturias and Sardinia, increasing opportunities for autonomous government does not automatically result in the development of an effective language policy, as regional politicians are typically unwilling or unable to ensure its implementation. This leads to the question of whether the state should or could take any action where a minority language community, or at least its closest political representatives, show a limited desire to gain recognition or support. Nevertheless, if we are to recognise that a general feature of minority groups is their powerless nature, then the state must find alternative forms of recognition or support for such groups which do not solely rely on the existence of a powerful political force capable of both defending minority interests at the centre and enacting effective regional policies. A state policy aimed at supporting and protecting minority groups should precisely be aimed at intervening where groups may be less powerful.

State legislation may also be more prestigious and effective in those contexts where state intervention is viewed with less suspicion and, in particular, where local and regional government action is less effective. Law 482 in Italy does demonstrate a step in this direction, with the state taking the initiative in designing measures of support and recognition for minority groups which have not previously made demands on the state similar to those of the German-speaking minority. In the Sardinian case, the Law has
legitimated and facilitated regional efforts to promote and support the Sardinian language. However, there is evidently a danger that relying on state intervention serves to reinforce a dependent relationship on the centre, which places the minority in a precarious position particularly in light of the fluctuations in state funding. As minority groups, particularly those with little power, have little input in the elaboration of state policies and the definition of priorities at the centre, an entirely dependent relationship on the state is problematic for minorities. A potential solution could be providing more opportunities for interaction between representatives of minority groups and those at the centre responsible for designing and implementing state policies. The creation of central bodies which encourage more cooperative relations could potentially provide a greater representation of all minority groups, and avoid both dependent and conflictual relations with such groups. Equally, the institutions at the centre should be wary of creating a precedent that it is only those minorities which make their demands most forcefully heard, sometimes through the establishment of conflictual relations, which are recognised. Such an approach risks encouraging tension between the centre and the periphery, rather than a more cooperative and collaborative approach.

Nevertheless, asking the state to take action where the regional government is either unwilling or at least uncommitted often appears to be an unrealistic demand. At the very least the institutions of the state could ensure that they do not act as an obstacle to even the most minimal progress achieved at the regional level, which has often been the case in both Spain and Italy. To prevent such obstacles, it would appear that some form of legal recognition of the existence of these groups and their languages is required at the state level. The legal recognition of a language is normally a requirement to ensuring that effective language policies can be implemented and that the introduction of a minority language into the public sphere is considered legitimate. State recognition has been one of the most significant developments in the recent history of the Sardinian language, not by ensuring intervention at the state level which remains limited, but rather by removing many of the pre-existing legal barriers to regional intervention. The question of legal recognition in the Asturian context is more complicated because the decision to declare the ‘official’ status of a language is effectively devolved to the regional government. In the Spanish state-wide context, a declaration of ‘officiality’ appears to have become the sole determining factor for securing the recognition and support of the institutions of the state. This means that Asturian is usually automatically excluded from any support from the state for the promotion and use of its language. While evidently a greater commitment at the regional level is required to resolve this
legal ambiguity, the institutions of the Spanish state could also help by taking a less rigid approach to the distinction between ‘official’ and ‘non-official’ languages, and by providing greater room for other forms of legal recognition.

The importance of legal recognition by the state and not just by regional authorities also reflects the fact that even wide-ranging autonomy is very different from independence. Even with the high levels of self-government in Alto Adige/Südtirol and Catalonia, language policy remains a shared concern of the state and region or province, as has been repeatedly demonstrated throughout this thesis. With the focus on autonomy in much literature on the subject, the need for a continued commitment by the institutions of the state to the protection of these languages is often forgotten. Both states have given the appearance that, by respecting the cultural autonomy of these areas, they are moving towards more multilingual and multicultural models of state, with the Spanish case in particular often pointed to as a model for the recognition of multilingualism. However, in reality, the policy appears to promote less the vision of a multilingual state than that of a monolingual state with seemingly ‘anomalous’ and clearly territorially delimited areas where the use of other languages is permitted. Such a policy appears to reinforce the traditional nationalist policy of ‘one territory/one language’ and may explain why minority groups in Catalonia and Alto Adige/Südtirol have sometimes been accused of attempting to lay claims to the whole regional or provincial territory in the name of their language. While such tendencies in both regions should be open to criticism, they are not as widespread as is often presented in the state-wide media and, most importantly, it should be remembered that it is the state which has clung to the territorial principle by only allowing for the use and recognition of the co-official languages within restricted areas. This has served to reinforce the view that the central government exists solely to defend and promote the state language, while the autonomous governments do the same for their specific minority languages, inevitably leading to tension between state and sub-state levels of government.

A solution could be found with the introduction of language policies which have a greater focus on multilingualism at the state level. Interestingly, it would appear that the Constitutions of Spain and Italy established the basis for such policies prior to the period of study, and to a certain extent could be considered more ambitious than the subsequent actions of the respective central governments. The reference to the safeguarding of linguistic minorities in Article 6 of the Italian Constitution of 1947 appeared to establish it as a founding principle of the new Republic, while Article 3.3 of the Spanish Constitution of 1978 makes more explicit the state’s role in ‘protecting’ and
‘respecting’ its linguistic diversity. However, in both states the default position of the central government remains the almost exclusive promotion of the dominant state language. Admittedly, due to the now widespread knowledge of the respective state languages, the policies of both states have not been so much to explicitly enforce the state language but rather to ‘allow’ it to dominate. Due to the lack of clear enforcement, this dominance has come to be seen as almost ‘natural’, but on closer inspection of the actions and policies of central state institutions it becomes clear that the use of the state language is repeatedly prescribed from the centre. This becomes particularly clear when we consider the language use of the institutions of the state itself, which function almost solely in the state language. This can be explained by their location in the (at least officially) monolingual capital, but it should be remembered that the institutions of the state represent not solely the capital but the entire multilingual polity.

This is not to suggest that the institutions of a state should be able to function and respond to requests in all of the languages of the state’s citizens, which is evidently an impossible and extremely costly proposal. However, the supposedly ‘natural’ dominance of the state language should be questioned, and institutions of both Spain and Italy could make a much greater effort to develop policies which encourage a greater recognition of the values of multilingualism throughout the state. Increasing the presence of other languages in the media and improving opportunities to study the other languages of both states outside of the regions in which they are spoken, for example, could lead to greater sensitivity throughout the state towards linguistic diversity. Such an approach could also encourage a greater integration of areas such as Alto Adige/Südtirol and Catalonia, which have often felt themselves to be in conflict with the monolingual state. In fact, the cases of the Catalan- and German-speaking minorities appear to prove that it is the greater recognition of their languages which has ensured less and not more conflict. Even in Alto Adige/Südtirol, where ethnic divisions are most clearly drawn, the implementation of measures to support the German-speaking minority has allowed for less hostile attitudes towards the Italian language and culture to develop (ASTAT 2006: 194; Steininger 2003: 148). This demonstrates that providing recognition and support for linguistic minorities can actually prevent fracture and division within the state, rather than being a threat to the unity of the state, as has been the traditional nationalist view. Equally, by promoting the values of multilingualism throughout the state, there may be the opportunity for Sardinians and Asturians to recognise the value of their own languages without the need for a conflicting nationalist movement. In particular, now that widespread knowledge of the state language is
guaranteed in both Asturias and Sardinia, it is necessary to emphasise to speakers the values and possibility of bilingualism, and the fact that monolingualism in the state language is not the only, or most desirable, option (Crystal 2000: 80).

The introduction of Catalan and the other co-official languages into the Spanish Senate is a sign that the Spanish government is taking steps towards such an approach and the introduction of the Office and Council for Official Languages at the centre also signalled that the Spanish government has accepted its own role in promoting and protecting languages other than Castilian. In fact, one of the main indications of the previous lack of commitment of both Spain and Italy to genuinely multilingual policies has been the absence at the state level of a prominent and transparent language policy. It is this lack of a coordinated and effective policy that has typically ensured that the institutions of both states fail to go beyond their voiced commitments to promoting linguistic diversity by taking genuine action. In Italy, for example, it remains the case that language policy at the state level is not delegated to any specific department but is instead split between different ministries. There is some logic to this approach, since language policy means intervening in many different areas such as education, culture and the media. Nevertheless, some form of cross-ministry body could allow for the development of a more coordinated and effective approach. Given the many signs that the implementation of Law 482 has thus far had extremely limited success, such a body could ensure that there is a genuine assessment of the effectiveness of current efforts and funds directed at the protection of linguistic minorities, rather than merely tokenistic projects which have little genuine impact and are consequently a waste of resources. Overall, the lack of coordination and of a clear body at the centre to implement transparent and effective language policies in Spain and Italy has ensured the continued dominance of the state language through a form of ‘no-policy policy’ (Fishman 2006: 318).

The continued dominance of the state language, however, is no accident, as is demonstrated by the typical nationalist backlash at the state level when the state language is seen to be threatened. Admittedly, this backlash is typically led by specific right-wing forces and media outlets, but the institutions of the state have often been susceptible to their demands or have at least done very little to quell them. In particular, suggestions that there is an attempt to eradicate the state language in both Catalonia and Alto Adige/Südtirol should be dismissed as untrue, since such an approach is not sanctioned in any autonomous legislation or policy in either area. This does not mean ignoring some of the concerns which remain in both regions, such as the rigid divisions
between language groups in Alto Adige/Südtirol and the need to ensure those who migrate to both areas do not face immediate discrimination due to their linguistic choices. Representatives of the state should, however, also be cautious in their attempts to intervene, particularly by using their remaining powers to reassert the dominance of the state language. Such an approach will only serve to support the calls for independence or secession among certain minority representatives in Catalonia and Alto Adige/Südtirol.

In reality, if state languages are genuinely threatened it is far more likely to be due to the global spread of English and global developments in general which are affecting both states and the minorities within them. Globalising trends remain unpredictable but would appear to place minority languages in a particularly vulnerable position due to the small size of minority language communities and their restricted cultural spheres. Furthermore, despite early predictions to the contrary, these globalising trends have not significantly diminished the importance or centrality of the state, at least during the period of study. Due to the unpredictability of globalisation, there has been a tendency to accept the fading of the state as a reality rather than one among many potential outcomes. To take the state out of the equation, when in reality it shows few signs of disappearing, is to fail to engage with the current context in which minorities exist. Certainly, models of state are adapting due to pressure from above and below but states remain at the heart of the global political order and any study of language policy should continue to recognise their dominant role. This is most clearly demonstrated in the disappointment of many Catalanists in the European project, which has both failed to provide significant opportunities to bypass the state and has also allowed state languages to become doubly privileged at the European level. While the EU has often made positive statements in favour of multilingualism and linguistic diversity, its policies and actions have only served to reassert the importance of a state in order to secure recognition for a language. While evidently it would be impossible for the EU to provide institutional space for all of the many languages of its member states, there is a need to reassess this privileging of state languages and the absence of any genuinely effective action to support minority languages. The recognition provided for Catalan at the EU, for example, was not a result of the EU’s efforts but rather due to the pressure exerted by Spain and its willingness to assume responsibility for the costs this recognition would entail.

The Council of Europe has played a more unequivocally supportive role in increasing awareness of the need to support and promote minority languages,
specifically by reasserting the central role of the state as holding clear and unavoidable responsibilities. However, both the FCPNM and the ECRML demonstrate the problems with attempts to create universal models. Although both displayed a flexibility in how they were to be implemented, the terminology used in their titles has meant that their applicability within a specific context has been either problematic or deemed inappropriate. The reference to ‘national minorities’ in the FCPNM does appear to be unhelpful, implying as it does the need for minorities to have some form of distinct ‘national’ consciousness to be deserving of protection. The obstacles to the ratification of the ECRML in Italy, in contrast, due to the continued debate over the distinction between ‘dialects’ and ‘regional languages’, would appear to be more unavoidable since international documents must decide on some terms to effectively describe the object to be recognised. The distinct obstacles to the implementation of both documents demonstrate the importance of context and the fact that models for the protection of linguistic minorities are not easily transplanted from one context to another. As François Grin recognises, ‘language policy cannot be homogenous (that is, it cannot be the same everywhere), because the political, social or economic situation can vary greatly from state to state’ (2003b: 69).

It is this awareness of the need to pay attention to the specific context in which minorities are placed which has guided this comparative study. In particular, the research has partially shifted the focus onto weaker minority groups to demonstrate the need for the state to move towards a fairer assessment of the needs of all minority language groups, and not only those who may already be powerful enough to ensure their survival. There is also a clear danger in suggesting that the successful models of Catalonia and Alto Adige/Südtirol could be transplanted successfully to the entirely distinct contexts of Sardinia and Asturias. Due to the fact that the demands of the Catalan- and German-speaking minorities were made and responded to at a much earlier stage, the route taken by both groups has seemingly defined the approach of the respective states in their treatment of linguistic minorities at a general level. Such a route is often, however, an unrealistic goal for weaker or less clearly defined minorities, and only responding to the demands of so-called ‘powerful’ minorities is in some ways contradictory since minorities are often defined by their lack of access to power rather than merely numerical size. This may mean that the Catalan and German-speaking cases are in many ways the anomaly rather than a realistic model for other minority groups to follow. This does not mean that the wealth of experience in both areas relating to language policies should be ignored, particularly in the form of research on language
education. Nevertheless, the parallels drawn between Sardinia and Asturias demonstrate that there may be more to learn from minority groups outside of a specific state’s borders whose experiences are more readily comparable and consequently beneficial. The aim of this comparative study has thus not been to suggest there is one answer or model to follow in reference to all linguistic minorities, but rather to demonstrate that the state should engage with the specific contexts in which such groups find themselves. The main priority for both Spain and Italy should be to develop a more transparent and coordinated approach to language policy at the state level, with a greater focus on collaboration and cooperation with the language communities concerned.

This is not, however, to overestimate the role of the central state or suggest that state laws or policies are the ultimate or sole answer in ensuring the survival of linguistic minorities and their languages. As has been repeatedly stated throughout the thesis, it is the community itself which must be committed to the survival of that language, but we should remember that linguistic minorities continue to derive their minoritised status from their position within a state with a distinct official language. The state still has an extremely important role to play, as it maintains significant powers and influence. Attempts to reverse language shift, aiming as they do at ‘massive changes in society’ (Kaplan and Baldauf 1997: xi), require the support, coordination and resources of all institutional levels and the state, in particular, remains one of the highest representatives of political authority. In fact, globalisation and unconstrained economic forces may be far more likely to lead to the eradication of minority cultures and disregard for the rights of minorities without the presence of a state to support the claims of minority groups. Consequently, while in the past states may have been viewed as the enemy of linguistic minorities, they now have the opportunity to become potential allies in the maintenance and support of minority languages and cultures within the state. This comparative study, however, has demonstrated that, while in both Spain and Italy there has been a clear commitment in words and statements to such an approach, the actions of state institutions clearly represent a continued idealisation of the monolingual nation-state norm. Even in the cases of Catalonia and Alto Adige/Südtirol where effective language policies have been implemented, it should be recognised that these successes have often been possible in spite of, rather than because of, the institutions of the state. In reality, we still appear to be living with the legacy of the nationalist model of state which was consolidated in the nineteenth century, with the continued belief that cultural and linguistic homogeneity represents an essential step in the march of human progress.
Furthermore, despite some advances in the past two decades towards a greater recognition of multilingualism at the centre, there were worrying signs towards the end of the period of study that recent economic problems in Spain and Italy may lead to a reversal of such policies. The future of the Council and Office for Official Languages in Spain, the impact and funding of which were already insufficient, looks even more precarious and in Italy there has been a huge decline in the funds provided for the implementation of Law 482. The fact that this trend began even before the economic crisis truly took hold demonstrates the continued lack of commitment to such multilingual policies at the centre. The danger is thus that the progress made in recent decades towards multilingual models of state will be sacrificed on the altar of economic expediency just at a time when a continued ideological and financial commitment is required. It is true that policies aimed at promoting the values of multilingualism and of providing specific support to distinct languages may be costly and the state inevitably has limited resources. Nevertheless, if such policies can add to the cultural wealth of the state as well as promoting greater cohesion and solidarity between the citizens of the state then the financial cost can be justified. As David Crystal argues, ‘it does indeed cost a lot of money to cope with the diversity of the world’s languages. The fallacy is to think that it is money wasted’ (2000: 30). Furthermore, a focus on the economic cost of such measures can offer a convenient mask for maintaining the dominant position of the state language. Although costs are evidently an important consideration for institutions of the state, due attention should also be paid to the symbolic value of such measures and their importance in encouraging more cooperative and inclusive relations between the different areas of the state. In particular, the economic crisis of the state is only likely to reinforce demands for independence among powerful minorities, as has already been the case in Catalonia. Consequently, rather than promoting a single monolithic identity centred on one national language, states must continue to find ways to integrate and represent the diverse languages and identities of their citizens to ensure their continued legitimacy.
Appendix 1: Key to Interviews (Italy)

II1 – Felice Besostri (Interviewed in Milan, 24 September 2010)
Italian Senator from 1996 to 2001 for the governing centre-left coalition (l’Ulivo). Sponsor in the Senate for Bill 3366 for the safeguarding of linguistic minorities which was passed as Law 482 in 1999.

II2 – Siegfried Brugger (Interviewed in Bolzano, 8 September 2010)

II3 – Giuseppe Corongiu (Interviewed in Cagliari, 17 September 2010)
Director of the Regional Service for the Sardinian Language and Culture from 2008 to the present day.

II4 – Anna Cutaia (Interviewed in Rome, 7 September 2010)
Director of the Department for Historic and New Minorities, at the Italian Ministry of the Interior in 2010.

II5 – Armin Gatterer (Interviewed in Bolzano, 9 September 2010)
Director of the Department for German Culture within the provincial administration of Bolzano (Alto Adige/Südtirol) in 2010.

II6 – Lucio Giudiceandrea (Interviewed in Bolzano, 9 September 2010)
Journalist for the production centre of the RAI in Bolzano and writer of various essays and publications specifically on the subject of Alto Adige/Südtirol.

II7 – Franco Guiducci (Interviewed in Rome, 21 September 2010)
Head of the Service for Policies relating to Special Autonomies and Minorities, at the Italian Department for Regional Affairs in 2010.
II8 – Cristina Lavinio (Interviewed in Cagliari, 16 September 2010)
Professor of Linguistics in Education at the University of Cagliari, with specific research experience on the teaching of Sardinian and Italian in schools.

II9 – Domenico Morelli (Interviewed in Rome, 7 September 2010)
Expert advisor to the Italian Ministry of the Interior on linguistic minorities in 2010 and President of the National Federative Committee for Linguistic Minorities in Italy (CONFEMILI).

II10 – Vincenzo Orioles (Interviewed in Udine, 14 September 2010)
Professor of Linguistics at the University of Udine. Member of the technical committee established by the Italian Department for Regional Affairs from 2000 to 2001 which was responsible for designing the regulations for the implementation of Law 482. Member of the commission for linguistic minorities at the Italian Ministry of Education in 2000.

II11 – Oskar Peterlini (Interviewed in Rome, 22 September 2010)
Senator for the SVP in the Italian Senate from 2001 to 2013. President and Vice-President of the Regional Council of Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol between 1988 and 1998.

II12 – Tiziana Sinesi (Interviewed in Rome, 7 September 2010)
Representative from the General Directorate for the Education System and School Autonomy at the Italian Ministry of Education, and specifically responsible for coordinating teaching activities in minority languages.

II13 – Renato Soru (Interviewed in Cagliari, 20 September 2010)
Regional President of Sardinia from 2004 to 2008, as founder and leader of the centre-left coalition Progetto Sardo, which would later become the Partito Democratico Sardo.

II14 – Tullio Telmon (Interviewed in Turin, 13 September 2010)
Professor of Linguistics and Dialectology at the University of Turin. Member of the commission for linguistic minorities at the Italian Ministry of Education in 2000.
Appendix 2: Key to Interviews (Spain)

SI1 – Alfredo Ignacio Álvarez Menéndez (Interviewed in Oviedo, 5 and 7 October 2011)
General Director of Language Policy in the Asturian regional administration from 2011 to 2012.

SI2 – Ramón de Andrés (Interviewed in Oviedo, 4 October 2011)
Professor of Asturian Philology at the University of Oviedo since 1985. Head of the Language Policy Office in the Asturian regional administration from 2003 to 2007.

SI3 – Andreu Bosch (Interviewed in Barcelona, 22 November 2011)
Head of the Department for Language and Universities at the Ramon Llull Institute from 2009 to the present day.

SI4 – Albert Branchadell (Interviewed in Barcelona, 21 November 2011)
Professor of Translation and Interpreting at the Autonomous University of Barcelona and President of the Organisation for Multilingualism, an activist group with the primary aim of ensuring recognition by the Spanish state of multilingualism within its own institutions. He is also the author of numerous publications on Catalan language policy.

SI5 – Ana Cano González (Interviewed in Oviedo, 6 October 2011)
President of the Academy of the Asturian Language since 2001. Professor of Philology at the University of Oviedo and Dean of the Faculty of Philology from 1997 to 2008.

SI6 – Isidor Marí Mayans (Interviewed in Barcelona, 23 November 2011)
President of the Philological Section at the Institute of Catalan Studies. He also held various posts including Deputy Director General in the General Directorate of Language Policy of Catalonia between 1980 and 1996.
SI7 – Office for Official Languages representative (Interviewed in Madrid, 28 November 2011)
Anonymous representative from the Department for Relations with the Autonomous Communities, within the Spanish Ministry of Territorial Policy and Public Administrations. Responsible for the Office for Official Languages in 2011.

SI8 – María Antonia Pedregal Montes (Interviewed in Oviedo, 5 October 2011)
Head of the Asturian Language Policy Service from 2007 to 2013, and responsible for the implementation of language policies designed by the Asturian General Directorate of Language Policy.

SI9 – José Manuel Pérez Fernández (Interviewed in Oviedo, 7 October 2011)
Professor of Administrative Law at the University of Oviedo, with specific expertise and various publications on the legal status of Asturian and the ECRML.

SI10 – Xulio Viejo Fernández (Interviewed in Oviedo, 4 October 2011)
Professor of Spanish Philology at the University of Oviedo, with specific expertise and numerous publications on Asturian sociolinguistics.

SI11 – Jordi Vilajoana (Interviewed in Barcelona, 22 November 2011)

SI12 – Santiago Vilardell i Codina (Interviewed in Barcelona, 24 October 2011)
Legal advisor within the General Directorate of Language Policy of Catalonia in 2011.
Appendix 3: General Interview Questions

- What is your own role and what experience do you have in relation to the actions of the central state concerning linguistic minorities?
- Over the past two decades, has the protection of linguistic minorities been a priority for the central government?
- How much freedom of action do the regions/provinces/Autonomous Communities have in designing language policies to promote and support minority languages?
- In which specific areas of language policy are the institutions of the central state more involved?
- What specific funds or types of support are provided by the institutions of the central state for the promotion of minority languages?
- Have institutions of the central state ever blocked or prevented action or policies in favour of linguistic minorities since 1992? When?
- How do the institutions of the central state determine which groups or languages should be protected?
- How do specific linguistic minority groups have their needs and demands represented in the central parliament and institutions of the state?
- What impact have European treaties such as the ECRML and FCPNM had within the state?
- What forms of collaboration exist between linguistic minority groups, or their regional/provincial representatives, and other states or regions?
- Are the rights of linguistic minorities to use and learn their languages restricted to the regions in which they are located or do certain rights also exist throughout the state?

1 These questions were adapted to the terminology used in distinct state and minority contexts, as well as to the expertise of the interviewee. Further questions were also asked relating to specific minorities, events or policies.
Appendix 4: Map of Italy
Appendix 5: Map of Spain

Catalonia

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