THE NEGLECTED PILLAR OF RECOVERY: A STUDY OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN POST-WAR IRAQ AND LIBYA

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ABSTRACT

This thesis argues that higher education systems in post-conflict states have the potential to contribute towards more effective post-war reconstruction and recovery. However, while the role of Higher Education in Development was emphasised in the post-WWII era, the specific experience of higher education in post-conflict contexts has escaped the attention of both academics and policy-makers engaged in reconstruction. Furthermore, donor policy attention has not been placed upon utilising the resources of higher education in post-war recovery. The overall aim is therefore to address this gap in the literature by providing global analysis of higher education in post-war recovery. Firstly, a theoretical framework of the relationship between higher education and recovery was constructed in terms of the functions that higher education can perform in contributing to recovery, the features of the post-war environment that hinder or enable higher education, and various policy options available to post-conflict higher education. Secondly, two case-studies of Iraq and Libya were examined to explore the relationship between higher education and post-war recovery. Principally through interviews with academics and policy-makers from case-study countries, the thesis reveals a range of perspectives and voices on higher education during post-conflict recovery and transition. The thesis concludes that higher education should be conceptualised as an important pillar of recovery; the capacity of domestic higher education sectors in post-conflict contexts is an often under-recognised and under-utilised resource of considerable potential value that can connect to a wide range of reconstruction and recovery processes and effectively drive post-conflict recovery and transitions. Given the under-theorised and under-studied nature of higher education and post-conflict recovery the thesis operates in a theory-building mode and offers what is to date the first attempt to construct a global theorisation.
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PREFACE

This thesis analyses the role of higher education (HE) in post-conflict reconstruction and recovery through two empirical case-studies of Iraq and Libya. The central hypothesis is that HE is a neglected aspect of post-war reconstruction and recovery that has potential to act as a key pillar of more effective reconstruction and recovery. The purpose of the study is to advance understanding of the relationship between HE and post-conflict recovery, an area that has received little academic and policy attention. It is posited that greater recognition of the developmental role of HE in post-conflict contexts will make a contribution towards better understanding of the wider field of post-conflict recovery and as such more effective policies.

a) Statement of Problem

The role of HE in post-war recovery is a significantly understudied phenomena. While basic education in conflict, emergencies, and reconstruction emerged as a field of research and practice in the past decade the same cannot be said about HE (Buckland 2005). This, despite the fact that HE has since the late 1990s resurfaced as an important component of global development agendas, driven in part by the importance attached to knowledge and innovation as growth-drivers (Brennan, King & Lebeau 2004; Tilak 2002b). In addition, universities have been held to be crucial in fostering national and civic identities (Davis 2005a) producing high-level skills, enhancing social mobility (Singh 2011), and nurturing critical thinking (Bishai 2008). While HE’s role in development has been the subject of a growing body of research, its role in post-conflict societies has not and remains confined to a small number of studies that address some related areas. Furthermore, no systematic or theoretical studies have addressed post-conflict HE.
This thesis aims to redress the significant knowledge gap that exists in our knowledge regarding the overlapping spheres of HE, development, conflict, and post-conflict recovery. To achieve this, a global view is provided through a comprehensive framework for analysing the impact of conflict on HE and functions of post-conflict HE. The cases of Iraq and Libya are then investigated in some detail to illustrate the global significance of the field of HE in post-conflict recovery.

b) Research Questions

The central question addressed in the thesis is:

**RQ1**: Why should post-conflict states place strategic emphasis on the higher education sector in terms of post-war reconstruction and recovery priorities?

The following sub-questions will also be answered:

**RQ2**: What is the impact of conflict on higher education institutions and systems?

**RQ3**: What functions can higher education perform in contributing towards effective post-conflict recovery?

**RQ4**: What features of the post-war environment influence the relationship between higher education and post-conflict recovery?

**RQ5**: What are the opportunities and challenges associated with various options for higher education recovery and reform in post-conflict societies?
c) Statement of Thesis

The central hypothesis advanced in this thesis is that \textit{HE is a neglected dimension of post-conflict reconstruction that can make significant positive contributions to driving post-war recovery processes}. HE is theorised to have potential to perform a wide-range of recovery-enhancing functions in resolving conflict, supplying graduates with vital skills and knowledge, offering expertise for managing reconstruction, and producing knowledge about peacebuilding and recovery. Further, universities can support economic recovery, nation-building, and democratisation processes that are central to most post-conflict transitions.

A core argument is that strategic investment in HE can strengthen core capacities that are often weakened by conflict; for example, in rebuilding state institutions through long-term sustainable capacity development. Another major area of concern is the place of HE in theories of conflict causation; for example, in the function of HE in mediating unifying or divisive identities in conflict-affected societies.

d) Guiding Claims

Based on the central hypothesis advanced in this thesis three guiding claims are advanced. The approach of the thesis is rooted in an exploratory inductive process of hypothesis formation and theory building rather than deductive hypothesis testing. The following claims are not intended as hypotheses but as an indication of the preconceptions and predictions of the researcher at the outset of the research process.

\textbf{Claim One:} Higher education should be geared towards post-war recovery at an early stage rather than be treated as a stand-alone, long-term concern to be considered once the transition from recovery to ‘normal development’ has been completed
Claim Two: Strategic investments in higher education in post-conflict countries can make a major contribution to building core national capacities critical to long-term post-war reconstruction and development.

Claim Three: The role of the state is critical in mediating the relationship between higher education and successful post-conflict recovery through ensuring that the higher education sector contributes towards the public good.

e) Methodology

The empirical focus is two case-studies of HE in post-conflict recovery; Iraq and Libya. A ‘composite approach’ (Barakat et al 2002) utilising predominantly qualitative methods is employed in the conduct of fieldwork. Data collection methods include elite interviews, focus groups, and observation undertaken during three field visits.

In answering the research questions, the research design follows a ‘most-similar’ case approach; utilising two cases, Iraq and Libya, that share equivalent values on many variables while recording some differences on others. Both Iraq and Libya are ‘most-similar’ in their oil-dependency, legacies of single person authoritarian rule, linguistic and cultural Arab identity, and in their ex-pariah state status which entailed sanctions and international isolation.

Iraq offers a very important test case for theory-building in HE during conflict and recovery. Iraq’s HE system, once leading within the Middle East, suffered from the combination of protracted wars and sanctions from 1980 culminating in the 2003 invasion and post-invasion chaos. Meanwhile the impact of conflict on HE in Libya was relatively low. Furthermore, in contrast to Iraq where initial post-war support for HE was very low, Libyan HE received relatively high priority. These factors entail that Libya is a ‘most-likely’ test case for the thesis that HE can play a major role in post-conflict recovery.
f) Structure of the Thesis

Chapter One will begin by problematizing the research area and defining key terms and concepts. Following that, HE in the developing world is analysed in terms of its evolving historical role and the place of the sector in development theory. The chapter defends a developmentalist position on the role of HE in development drawing on the East Asian developmental states and recent literature on ‘developmental university systems’ (Brundenius, Lundvall & Sutz 2009). In the next section the experience of HE in the Arab region is analysed which provides necessary theoretical and contextual background informing the study. Lastly, the inter-connection of issues surrounding HE and the ‘Arab Spring’ are examined thus illustrating the importance of the sector to transition in the region.

Chapter two analyses the multi-faceted relationship between HE and conflict. To begin, HE and conventional conflict causation theories are analysed; the ‘negative face’ of HE and conflict. First economic-based conflict theories of ‘greed’ and then affective or ‘grievance’ based theories. It is argued that this common dichotomy is unhelpful when it comes to HE given the potential it has to mediate conflict in multiple and complex ways. After this the ‘positive face’ of HE in conflict is analysed in terms of the potential of the HE sector in conflict-affected settings to contribute towards processes of conflict mediation, resolution, and transformation. Finally, the chapter addresses Research Question Two by analysing the impact of conflict on HE in terms of capacity, needs, and distortions. This provides a framework that guides the case-study analysis of the impact of conflict on the Iraqi and Libyan HE systems.

Chapter three analyses the relationship between HE and post-conflict recovery. It builds the theoretical framework for analysing the two case-studies utilising a comprehensive literature review on HE and post-conflict recovery. First, it attempts to explain why there has conventionally been low priority attached to the HE sector in reconstruction strategies and the central argument of the thesis that HE has the potential to in fact function as a pillar of recovery is advanced. The chapter then
proceeds with three sections designed to address Research Questions Three, Four, and Five. First, it is argued that HE can perform a wide range of functions in post-conflict recovery including stabilisation, physical and sectoral reconstruction, statebuilding, economic recovery, nationbuilding, and peacebuilding knowledge and research. Next, in order to understand the HE-recovery relationship the post-war environment of HE is analysed in terms of conjunctural, educational, institutional, structural, and external features. Finally, major options for post-conflict HE including internationalisation and private HE are analysed in terms of the opportunities they offer for driving the recovery of the sector and the challenges and trade-offs involved.

Chapter four presents core methodological issues, choices, and approaches. To begin, the research strategy and design are explained. The chapter then defends the multiple case-study method conducted utilising the qualitative ‘composite approach’; an approach suitable for studying the complex relationship between HE and post-conflict recovery and also for conducting field research in volatile post-conflict contexts. The chapter also addresses philosophical underpinnings and theoretical approaches adopted by the author. Following that, strategic issues of sampling, validity, generalisability, bias, and research ethics are raised and strategies utilised to overcome problems or dilemmas explained.

Chapter five provides an introduction to contextual issues critical to understanding the case of Iraq. To begin, the role of Iraqi HE in development is analysed in terms of its contribution to state formation, modernisation, and industrialisation and factors hindering the developmental role of HE. Then the impact of the Iran-Iraq war, Gulf war, and international sanctions on Iraqi HE will be charted where it is seen that this 1980-2003 period witnessed major deterioration in the sector. Following that the general post-war context of Iraq is briefly described including the reasons for the 2003 invasion and major post-war reconstruction dynamics. In the final section the impact of the 2003 invasion and post-invasion chaos on the Iraqi HE sector is analysed. It is found that looting, violence against academics, and state
breakdown had a major impact on HE capacity, increased the needs of the sector, and distorted the post-war environment.

Chapter six presents the findings of the empirical investigation of HE and post-war recovery in Iraq. In the first section post-war reform and reconstruction of Iraqi HE are analysed, which is vital to understanding the constraints on the sector’s role in recovery. It is found that under the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) the sector was a very low priority, under-funded, and subject to externally-devised reforms that failed to take root. Furthermore, under the CPA and subsequent Iraqi administrations physical reconstruction was not sufficiently addressed. Following this three sections respond each to one of Research Questions Three, Four, and Five. Firstly, Iraqi HE’s contribution to recovery goals is evaluated in its contribution to short-term stabilisation and physical reconstruction, statebuilding, democratisation, economic recovery, and conflict transformation. After that, the features of the post-war environment that explain negative recovery outcomes are analysed. It is argued that while the conventional focus on instability, insecurity, and conflict identifies the most important dynamics limiting the post-war role of the sector other influences including governance and quality were also significant. Finally, debates over major options for HE to contribute to recovery are explored, in particular private HE, decentralisation, internationalisation, and ‘brain gain’.

Chapter seven contextualises key dynamics of the case-study of Libya. To begin, Libyan HE’s role in development is analysed in terms of its positive contribution to state formation, social change, and economic development and also the economic and political factors that limited the sector’s developmental contribution. This historical contextualisation describes several path-dependent outcomes held to constrain post-conflict HE policy. After this the context of Libya’s 2011 uprising, civil war, and post-conflict transition is introduced outlining key recovery challenges. Finally, to address RQ2, the impact of the civil war on Libyan HE is analysed finding relatively low impact in comparison to Iraq.

Chapter eight offers a case-study of HE and post-war recovery in Libya. To begin, the post-war reconstruction of Libyan HE is analysed where it is seen that this
dynamic is less significant than the Iraq case. After this, three sections address RQs Three, Four, and Five. Firstly, the contribution of the HE sector to post-war recovery is analysed in terms of its contribution to short-term stabilisation, DDR, physical reconstruction, economic recovery, statebuilding, transitional justice and conflict transformation. However, it is also noted that research was conducted early in Libya’s transition and that the long-term prognosis is relatively positive. Next, various features of the post-war environment influencing HE’s role in recovery are then addressed including instability, perceived insecurity, weak governance, the ‘legitimacy trap’, and low quality. Finally, debates over HE options are analysed including private HE, decentralisation, and internationalisation where it is seen that participants in general supported a vision for Libyan HE based around internationalisation, public provision, and university autonomy.

Chapter nine begins by offering a comparative analysis of the case-studies of Iraq and Libya. The findings of the cases for each research question are considered in parallel to explain similarities and differences and draw out comparative findings. This is important in generating new empirical findings to supplement those emerging from individual case-study chapters.

Chapter ten begins by stating the major conclusions of the thesis then advances theoretical and methodological recommendations and suggests areas upon which future research could usefully focus. Finally, the chapter’s most substantive contribution is a framework for action intended to inform reconstruction planners and actors on how to best utilise HE resources for the task of post-conflict recovery in future post-conflict scenarios through a set of applied recommendations.
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DECLARATION

I declare that this thesis is my own unaided work. It is being submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of York. The material contained herein has not been published in any other form nor has it been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other University.
CHAPTER ONE

HIGHER EDUCATION: GLOBAL ROLE AND DEVELOPMENT

1.0. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to introduce foundational and contextual issues including definitions, HE’s role in development, and HE in the Arab region. To begin, definitional, conceptual, and philosophical issues related to HE and post-conflict recovery will be addressed. Next, the HE-development relationship is analysed. This is important for understanding post-conflict recovery because in many respects post-conflict reconstruction is about development (Del Castillo 2008; Junne & Verkoren 2005; Barakat & Chard 2005). In contrast to emerging economic orthodoxy advocating deregulated HE and foreign and private provision as key to HE in development, a developmentalist conception of HE as providing public goods geared towards development will be defended. Following this, Arab HE will be examined to provide regional contextualisation and an opportunity to illustrate through concrete examples the theoretical considerations on HE and development. HE in the Arab Spring is discussed next, analysing HE as a factor in instability and also an opportunity for driving Arab Spring transitions.

1.1. Defining Key Terms

As Post-conflict Peacebuilding: A Lexicon (Chetail 2009) illustrates, terminology surrounding peacebuilding and reconstruction is a contested terrain. For example, ‘nationbuilding’ can refer to creating national identity in post-war contexts and also the much wider practice of rebuilding entire countries encompassing tasks from physical rehabilitation to service-provision (Dobbins et al 2007). Similarly,
peacebuilding has both a narrow meaning as implementation of market-liberal democracy in post-conflict contexts and a wide meaning referring to long-term societal processes supporting creation of peaceful societies. To avoid conceptual confusion, some core terms will now be defined.

Call and Cousens (2008) define reconstruction as ‘actions undertaken by international or national actors to support the economic, and to some extent social, dimensions of post-conflict recovery’. Similarly, Del Castillo (2008) views post-conflict reconstruction as primarily an economic development task in more challenging situations. These common definitions focus on economic dimensions of recovery; however, reconstruction has also been understood narrowly as physical infrastructural rebuilding.

Such a narrow definition of ‘reconstruction’ is defended by Etzioni (2004). He criticises scholars equating reconstruction with development, contending that ‘it is preferable to define reconstruction much more narrowly, as the restoration of the condition of the assets and infrastructure of an occupied nation or territory to the same or similar state in which they were found before the outbreak of hostilities’. This focus on restoring the status quo ante can be criticised for prescribing recreation of structural conditions that were original causes of conflict.

Barakat and Zyck (2009) argue that ‘recovery’ includes a transformative and regenerative element recognising that simply rebuilding what is destroyed is often insufficient for sustainable post-conflict transition. Rather, in contrast to infrastructure-focused ‘reconstruction’, post-war recovery offers a more holistic conceptualisation of challenges facing post-conflict contexts. This definition encompasses a wide range of sectors and activities including governance, education, women’s empowerment, refugee resettlement, and health. This thesis conceives of HE as a vital task for post-conflict societies better captured by this holistic concept of recovery than the narrower task of reconstruction. This is first because on conventional understandings HE is conceived as a peripheral task to reconstruction while recovery encompasses a wider range of sectors. Second, as will be argued later, many contributions HE can make to post-conflict societies are
indirect, complex, and interact with a wide range of processes and sectors; therefore, the holistic scope of ‘recovery’ best captures this complexity.

1.2. What is a University?

The primary concern of this thesis is with universities and HE. OECD (2002, p.68) defines ‘higher education sector’ as ‘all universities, colleges of technology, and other institutes of post-secondary education, whatever their source of finance or legal status’ and ‘research institutes, experimental stations and clinics operating under the direct control of or administered by or associated with higher education institutions’ (OECD 2002, p.68). Use of ‘tertiary education’ is often imprecise and ambiguous. Broadly, it refers to all post-secondary education institutions offering academic or vocational qualifications. While HE is the focus here rather than ‘tertiary education’ the sector will be addressed where relevant.

Before proceeding it is necessary to clarify what a university is. One approach is to provide a minimal definition by identifying necessary functions. Teaching is fundamental to impart knowledge and skills to students. This insight is consistent with the definition of ‘university’ as ‘a college or collection of colleges at which people study for a degree’.¹ Alongside teaching, research is central to most conceptions of HE. This is reflected in the more expansive definition; ‘a high-level educational institution in which students study for degrees and academic research is done’.² Teaching and research can be considered the most fundamental features of a university.

While teaching and research are fundamental to the ideal-type university, many universities worldwide are not principally geared towards research. Even in the US, home of many large research-universities, most universities are primarily teaching institutions. In many developing countries the ideal of a combined teaching and

¹ http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/university?q=university
² http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/university
research university is even less common (Altbach 2009). Mission has increasingly been conceptualised as the third university role. Universities have conceived ‘mission’ in various ways, for example, providing public service, enhancing social justice, addressing challenges including climate change or promoting internationalisation (Scott 2006).

HE has important economic and political roles in most advanced nations. In advanced economies research and innovation is considered a critical growth-driver and HE forms an integral role in national knowledge and innovation systems (Altbach & Salmi 2011; OECD 2010a). HEIs produce knowledge through conducting research, train skilled graduates, and utilise their expertise in a wide range of commercial and non-commercial sectors (Weisbrod, Ballou & Asch 2008, p.206). Universities have been held to be central to forming modern nation-states (Reid 2002), for example, performing moral functions in fostering citizenship and national identity (Guarasci & Cornwell 1997; Nemec 2006). HE has been assumed to make better citizens – reflecting the view that more knowledge leads to better values. As Mamdani (2008) states, ‘higher education is where we develop the range of choices which make democracy meaningful in different spheres of life’.

HE is also an important mediator of social justice (Furlong & Cartmell 2009). Two dominant theories are the liberal position and the elite re-production theory. On the former account, HE drives ‘progressive social change’ through meritocracy, civic values, and crucially an ‘open society’ permitting social mobility, equity, and inclusion (see Brennan & Naidoo 2008). In the latter, HE perpetuates social injustice by reproducing powerful elites, reinforcing class cleavages, and legitimising capitalist exploitation through ideological indoctrination (Gellert 1997; Soares 2007; Tomusk 2000; Margolis 2001).

From this discussion it is clear that a single universal definition of the university that transcends context is hard to establish. Another approach is to identify historical university models and their properties. The British model granted universities greater freedom than most Continental universities (Ruegg 2004, p.11) and was primarily based on undergraduate teaching with little research (Shils &
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Roberts 2004, p.165). The Humboldtian model emerged in nineteenth-century Germany emphasising unity of teaching and research with high university autonomy (Ruegg 2004, p.5). The Napoleonic university model, by contrast, was governed by a centralised and highly-interventionist state with strict discipline, specialised colleges, and high conformity with official doctrine (Ruegg 2004, p.4).

These historical university models illustrate the institutional variety of universities. It should be qualified that models represent ideal-types not uniformly implemented in all contexts; for example, the Humboldtian model prioritised academic freedom while restrictions on university freedom were common at times in nineteenth-century Germany (Ruegg 2004, p.5). Transfer and adaptation of foreign university models influenced global HE development. From the late nineteenth-century the Humboldtian model was adopted, remaining influential until post-WWII HE reforms. More recently, the contemporary American model, guided by market-driven competitive logic with selective public subsidies targeted at economically-profitable parts of the system, has been adopted in many countries, in particular Latin America (Rhoades & Slaughter 2006, p.121).

The question of ‘what is a university?’ can also be addressed from a more philosophical perspective. Gilbert Ryle (1983) in The Concept of Mind proposed a thought experiment in which a visitor was shown around a university with all of its lecture halls, sports facilities, dormitories and libraries yet at the end is left asking ‘but where is the university?’ Ryle holds that this illustrates the common human fallacy of the category mistake. The term ‘university’ refers to these constituent physical features and is not greater than the sum of its parts. As Flexner writes (quoted in Scott 2006) universities are ‘not organisms: they are merely administrative aggregations’.

A highly-contrasting ontology is proposed by Karl Jaspers (1959). He holds that the university in its ideal form is sustained by a shared ‘corporative consciousness’ between members holding collective commitment and free and regular communication. University unity was to be achieved by a shared scientific method and philosophy was to play the integrative function. For Habermas and Blazek
(1987), specialisation of knowledge and other changes in universities foreclosed idealist accounts of corporative consciousness sustaining the idea of the university. However, they maintain that communication remains the connecting force throughout the university life-world. Further, Jaspers (1959, p.77) holds that for its vitality universities depends on persons, not institutions.

This brief discussion of the university’s social ontology bears on conceptions of what is at stake in rebuilding HE after conflict: whether the primary task is rebuilding infrastructure, reforming institutions, or revitalising academic communities. Importantly for the central argument of this thesis, HE recovery after war should be a holistic process viewing HE as more than the sum of its parts. Simply restoring HE’s physical and administrative components to a pre-conflict status quo is insufficient; rather, individuals and academic communities are fundamental to post-conflict HE recovery. Furthermore, rebuilding HE is an essentially developmental task and for this reason the chapter will now turn to consider HE’s role in development theory and practice.

1.3. Higher Education and Development

Thinking about HE and development has evolved over time while the context of development has been transformed since most countries gained independence in the 1940s and 1950s. In the next section, an account will be offered that integrates a story about how HE fared in developing countries alongside evolving understanding of HE within development theory. Finally, analysing Arab state HE will illustrate development theories and provide contextualisation for the case-studies.

Before proceeding, it should be qualified that while developing world universities are generally weaker than universities in advanced economies, the importance of universities as social institutions is often very high (Altbach 1998). Another important point is that many developing world universities do not approximate the
Western ideal-type university. In particular, the research function of universities in poor countries is frequently minimal. Despite this variation, university models worldwide share many similarities, a fact owing in part to their transfer during the colonial era, a dynamic which will now be discussed.

1.3.1. Colonialism

Throughout what is contemporarily labelled the ‘developing world’ pre-colonial antecedents of modern HE did exist, in particular, religious scholarly institutions in the Middle East and Africa and a smaller number of institutions approximating modern universities (Lulat 2005; Cleaveland 2008). However, modern HE was exported during colonial occupation. Colonial HE in general was taught in the coloniser’s language featuring limited freedom, curricula, and access (Teferra & Altbach 2004) and supplied professional and administrative classes for ‘native administration’.

Under direct rule colonial powers confidently embarked on the *mission civilisatrice* in which universities inculcated elites with civilised values then transmitted to colonial societies. Loss of imperial confidence and threat of colonial nationalism led to indirect rule which was much more hostile to HE and administered by traditional leaders rather than educated elites (Mamdani 2008). However, students were frequently crucial to emerging nationalist movements; in India, Burma, Vietnam and Indonesia student groups promoted radical ideologies, often after contact with Western education, raised political awareness and actively resisted colonial rule (Altbach 1987, p.141-6).

Late colonial British rule established universities in many countries to manage planned gradual decolonisation transitions, for example, the post-1945 Asquith Colleges in Nigeria, Sudan, Ghana and elsewhere (Lulat 2005, p.227-8). New institutions provided ‘an honest administration, capable of utilizing modern science and technology to sink shafts of modernity deep into traditional African societies’.
(Hargreaves 1973). Notwithstanding these developments, HE was not conceived as central to development until post-independence modernisation, the subject of the next section.

1.3.2. Modernisation, Developmentalism, and Dependency

Post-WWII understanding of HE in development was heavily influenced by modernisation theory: that traditional societies follow a linear path of progress towards the model of advanced societies (Leftwich 2000, p.41). Development was characterised by increased structural complexity, capital formation, technological upgrading, planning, and foreign aid. HE was important; Lipset (1959) argued that HE was a necessary condition for democratic states, defining development as ‘increased income, greater economic security, and higher education’. Further, ‘modernization theorists envisaged modern values being diffused through education and technology transfer to the ‘elites’ of the periphery’ (Leys 1996, p.111).

Foreign assistance to HE was high. Donors held that new political and economic elites must be created to manage countries with very few graduates; at independence the Congo had twelve (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002, p.173), Botswana approximately forty (Siphambe 2000), and Tanzania one hundred (Nyerere 1985). Advanced training was therefore crucial for effective self-rule. Many developing nations viewed heavy investment in high-level manpower through manpower forecasting as an ‘engine of growth’ for emulating development experiences of advanced Western nations (Pscharopoulos 1984; Selvaratnam 1988).

At independence the over-whelming majority of post-colonial states moved to establish national universities as part of de-colonisation (Lulat 2005, p.228). As Mamdani (2008) writes ‘when they became independent, just as sure as the national anthem, the national flag, and the national currency, a national university too became an obligatory sign of real independence’. HE was expected to perform a
range political development functions; forming nationalist elites (Brannelly, Lewis & Ndaruhutse 2011), incorporating masses into HE for nation-building and national integration (Jabbra & Jabbra 1984), while eroding particularistic loyalties such as tribalism through meritocratic public HE (Hughes 1994). However, politicisation also frustrated HE’s developmental contribution; Castells (2009) argues that political, elite formation and ideological functions of universities overwhelmed their educational and economic functions.

HE was conceived as a principal instrument for national development and universities were geared towards developmental goals (Bown 2002; Ranger 1981; Samoff & Carrol 2004; Banya & Elu 2001). Coleman (1986) defines this model the ‘developmental university’ in which ‘universities in Third World countries must be demonstrably relevant for and totally committed to national development’. For example, the University of Dar es Salaam sought to make curricula relevant to development needs and inculcate a socially-concerned attitude in students (Mamdani 2008). However, the ‘developmental university’ project was criticised for supressing academic freedom and autonomy as HE was viewed instrumentally by states in top-down and limited projects of national development. Further, Court (1980) argues developmentalism overburdens HE in developing societies facing many challenges, pressurises universities’ limited resources, and impedes provision of ‘good normal education’.

From another perspective, dependency theory criticised HE in development. Dependency theory holds that advanced nation wealth is maintained by exploiting under-developed nations through unequal global economic structures (Gunder Frank 1974; Leys 1996, pp.45-63). Applied to HE, power and resource inequalities between advanced and developing nations perpetuate ‘Third World’ academia’s dependency on Western knowledge, culture, values, models, and resources (Chossudovsky 1977; Altbach 1981; Arnove 1980; Gareau 1988). Dependency is held to constrain Southern universities’ contribution to development by limiting HE’s relevance to developmental needs and goals (Selvaratnam 1988). Colonial HE legacies and imported Western academic models, values, and knowledge are held
to create disconnected elites and marginalise indigenous culture, languages, and epistemologies (Mazrui 1978; Arnowe 1980; Lulat 2005; Nyamnjoh & Jua 2002). Similarly, Nandy (2000) argues Asian and African universities facilitated expertisation of knowledge defining Western academic culture as the sole source of legitimate authority while sidelining indigenous knowledge.

This brief discussion of developmentalism and dependency illuminates the important tension between conceptions of the university as a principal agent for development and long-standing critique of universities as intellectually-dependent and detached from social realities. Furthermore, HE’s important position within conceptions of modernisation and developmentalism supports the thesis that HE is a crucial pillar of post-conflict recovery and development. However, the next section will address several developments including structural adjustment driven austerity and rate-of-return analysis that may be held to weaken the basis of the argument for a developmentalist approach to HE in post-conflict societies.

1.3.3. Crisis and Austerity


In response to economic crisis in the developing world, many universities were subjected to austerity and structural adjustment. Simultaneously, HE was widely-perceived as sheltered and elitist, failing in its historic mission of leading development, and irrelevant to poor societies’ needs, i.e. ‘Ivory Towers’ (Lulat 2005, p.430). For example, developmentalist missions of African universities in manpower and nation-building by the mid-1970s were either achieved or irrelevant which,
combined with economic crisis, led to the university losing ‘its importance in the eyes of the state’ (Zeleza 2003).

Another factor was HE’s de-prioritisation by donors; a trend tied to World Bank interpretations of human capital theory (Lebeau & Sall 2011), which holds that in addition to tangible goods including machinery, stock, or money, investments in people including health and education are also forms of capital (Becker 1964). Strong education systems predict economic growth because skills transmission to students through education increases lifetime workplace productivity (Thelen 2004, p.8). The World Bank adopted human capital theory in the 1960s, when loans were assessed using manpower planning and lending prioritised vocational and technical skills relevant to labour market needs such as engineering, neglecting other aspects of education (Heyneman 2003).

In the early 1980s a new approach, rate-of-return analysis, was favoured by the World Bank. It provided cost-benefit assessment of educational investments; ‘time and money spent on education builds human capital, hence one should be able to estimate the rate-of-return on such investment, in a way similar to investment in physical capital’ (Pscharopoulos & Patrinos 2004, p.1). Social rate-of-return is measured through impact on productivity and growth while private rate-of-return is measured through individual lifetime earnings. At the individual-level, private rate-of-return from investment in HE is held to be significant with lifetime premiums accruing greater earnings (Pscharopoulos 1988). Contrastingly, social rate-of-return on HE is low compared to primary education because HE is expensive to maintain with much higher unit-cost per student. Pscharopoulos et al permit that social returns to education can vary across contexts but hold that social returns are greater for primary than HE is true in all cases (Birdsall 1996).

This argument had enormous impact both in Bank lending and policies and within the economics of education (Bennell 1996). Public primary education spending was held to be more socially-optimal than HE spending (TFHES 2000). In the 1980s and 1990s, many developing countries experienced Structural Adjustment and HE was a
prominent sector in cuts. Reforms included market deregulation, state asset privatisation, reduced public expenditure on social sectors, and state ‘downsizing’. World Bank HE lending declined and conditionalities on recipient governments diverted funds from higher to primary education. By the 1990s, priority to basic education was strengthened around the platform developed at the 1991 Jomtien Conference.

Structural adjustment altered the university’s position in the developing world. It has been contended that rather than resolve the crisis in HE, austerity worsened it (Robertson 2008; Leveau & Sall 2011). Zeleza (2003) states that a transition occurred from the ‘development university’ to the ‘market university’. Students were expected to pay a proportion, if not all, of study costs due to long-term personal benefits accrued through greater earnings. In many states bureaucratic downsizing and privatisation of state assets eroded guarantees of public sector graduate jobs. Furthermore, austerity triggered social conflict over HE-state relations and resistance by students and faculty members with protests resulting in deaths, harsh repression, and temporary paralysis of HE (Federici, Caffentzis & Alidou 2000). A practice of survivalism describes strategies of academics and students coping with inadequate conditions and resources.

If the overall picture of HE in the developing world follows the broad outlines of crisis, austerity, and rate-of-return logic then rationales for focusing on HE to drive post-conflict recovery and development are considerably weaker. However, the next section will address the emergence of knowledge economy discourse which had transformative impact on conceptualisations of HE’s role in development and arguably also in post-conflict societies.
1.3.4. Re-Emergence of HE and Knowledge Economy

Lebeau and Mills (2008) identify a paradigm shift in understanding HE in development from crisis to transformation. In contrast to negative roles imputed to HE systems in developing countries during 1980s-1990s, by the 2000s HE was increasingly viewed as a means to overcome developmental malaise and trigger growth. One major factor in this shift was the new knowledge economy discourse and eclipse of rate-of-return analysis.

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, World Bank publications began questioning rate-of-return’s soundness as the primary tool for determining the Bank’s educational stance. The Education Sector Review in 1999 argued for integrated approaches to education at all levels, which for Jones (2007, p.215) constitutes admission by the Bank that it had ‘contributed to uneven rather than balanced educational development’. The influential World Bank/UNESCO report Peril or Promise: Higher Education in Developing Countries rejected rate-of-return analysis. Its position is worth quoting at length:

*Educated people are well positioned to be economic and social entrepreneurs, having a far-reaching impact on economic and social well-being of their communities. They are also vital to creating an environment in which economic development is possible. Good governance, strong institutions, and a developed infrastructure are all needed if business is to thrive – and none of these is possible without highly educated people. Finally, rate-of-return analysis entirely misses the impact of university-based research on the economy – a far-reaching social benefit that is at the heart of any argument for developing strong higher education systems (TFHES 2000, p.39).*

The report rejects narrow economism of conventional human capital approaches. Central to the argument is that rate-of-return analysis cannot capture HE’s positive externalities. This is supported by criticisms that rate-of-return analysis fails to account for non-private or social benefits of education (Bennell 1996; Birdsall 1996). Other public benefits include heightened civic consciousness, ability to pay higher
taxes due to higher earnings, and social and charitable missions of HEIs (Altbach
2004, p.24). Furthermore, capabilities approach critiques hold that human capital
theory offers an unsatisfactory and reductionist conception of education and
development that fails to account for human capabilities (Mehrotra 2005; Walker
2010).

More generally, global structural-economic changes, in particular increasing
importance of technological dynamism and innovation as determinants of
competitiveness, made HE central to growth and development (Hershberg,
Nabeshima & Yusuf 2007). As Walker (2010) states ‘the importance of higher
education has thus predominantly been linked to its role of enhancing national
economic competitiveness within a global knowledge-driven economy’. Alongside
capital and labour, knowledge and education are now widely-viewed as growth-
drivers; ‘in the current condition of the global knowledge economy, knowledge
production and technological innovation become the most important productive
forces’ (Castells 2009).

In this context, the World Bank re-modelled itself as a ‘knowledge bank’ – to enable
transmission of ‘best-practice’ from global to national and local levels, where
information-sharing is viewed as equal to loans, and inputs of local or ‘home-
grown’ knowledge drive development (Samoff & Stomquist 2001; Stone 2003). Since
the mid-1990s donors grew increasingly willing to fund HE in developing
economies. Moreover, emerging markets including China, India, and Brazil
invested large public funds in HE and R&D.

Brown, Lauder and Ashton (2011) argue that contrary to initial predictions that the
knowledge economy would provide high-skilled jobs only in advanced economies,
massive investments in HE, science, and technology and outsourcing of knowledge
tasks are driving emergence of high-skill low-pay labour markets in developing
countries including China and India. Knowledge economy discourses imply the
possibility of rapid and dynamic change offering developing countries the promise
of leapfrogging from agricultural exports to twenty-first century technology and
growth. Investment in ICT, HE, and innovation offer the prospect of entry of poor
economies into high value-added sectors. While knowledge economy discourse strengthens rationales for post-conflict investment in HE further support for the sector’s potential comes from the ‘East Asian miracle’.

1.3.5. Developmental States

Another major reason for increased attention to HE’s role in development is the remarkable experience of East Asian ‘developmental states’ including Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. Investments in education and training and state intervention to coordinate tertiary education with economic needs are held to in part explain economic success. In South Korea (Doner, Ritchie & Slater 2005; Sohn & Kenney 2007) and Taiwan (Lin 2004) HE played a significant role in economic transformation, in particular through directing students to industrially-relevant disciplines. Further, Marginson (2011) argues that developmental success of East Asian HE is explained by a Confucian model with four main features; state intervention, universal enrolment, ‘one-chance’ competitive examinations, and substantial public research funding.

However, as Altbach (2004, p.19) argues, ‘contemporary economic development’ in these states was not ‘dependent on higher education’. Amsden (1989, p.238) holds that education was important but not decisive to Korea’s development. Yet tertiary education was important during heavy industrialisation when government focused on S&T thus maximising resources towards developmental ends (Jeong & Armer 1994). Once considerable catch-up was achieved states invested more heavily in HE, coordinating with rapidly industrialising economic sectors.

Late developmental states from the 1990s invested strategically in HE to support innovation and establish world-class universities (Rhee 2011; Lo 2011; Mukherjee & Wong 2011). This sequencing may be held to support arguments for development sequencing prioritising HE after initial investment in basic education and labour-intensive industrialisation. However, East Asian states industrialised earlier than
contemporary developing countries. Since then, the global economic context has been transformed and HE increased in relative importance. In support of this, the top five states for increased tertiary enrolment between the 1990s and 2000s include four states, Ethiopia, China, Tanzania, and Rwanda, identified as potential emerging developmental states (Routley 2012). Furthermore, East Asian transformation falsifies academic dependency theory’s prediction that peripheral academic systems are structurally-confined to peripheries (Gopinathan & Altbach 2005; Postiglione 2005).

East Asian universities performed important functions in elite cohesion and bureaucratic quality; important factors behind successful development (Vu 2007; Evans & Rauch 1999; Henderson et al 2003). Japan (Johnson 1982), South Korea (Evans 1995) and Taiwan (Wade 1990) followed similar patterns with elite university graduates sitting highly-competitive university examinations for prestigious civil service jobs. Formative collective experience fostered an *esprit du corps* in high-level technocrats strengthening elite cohesion and enabling agreement on policy objectives.

More generally, HE fosters ‘developmental elites’ (Brannelly, Lewis & Ndaruhutse 2011) and ‘developmental leadership’ because common experience supports ‘collaborative work or coalitions’ and enables understanding of collective action problems, complex social and economic situations, and broad concepts such as public goods (Leftwich 2009). Reflecting on the developmental state model’s applicability, Fritz and Menocal (2006) state that ‘higher education is likely to play an important role in helping create a competitive and effective senior civil service’.

The above claims relating to elite formation and bureaucracies are relevant to debates in chapter three over HE and statebuilding.3 Furthermore, the discussion in this section strengthens the developmentalist position in contemporary political economy debates over the appropriate mix of market and state forces in HE governance, the subject of the next section.

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3 See section 3.2.3.
1.3.6. Marketisation and Developmentalism

Re-emergence of HE in developing countries was accompanied by growing convergence towards similar HE reforms globally (Brennan, King & Lebeau 2004). Typical HE reforms and policies prescribed by IFIs and international agencies conform to marketised models involving privatisation of public HE systems and increasing user-fees in public HEIs (Collins & Rhoads 2008; Oketch 2003; Munene 2009). Public HE historically dominated most developing countries, except some East and South East Asian states (Umakoshi 2004). However, market reforms and HE’s inclusion as a tradable service under World Trade Organisation (WTO) regulations removed barriers to entry on private and foreign providers (Altbach 2001b). Consequently, HE expansion in the 1990s and 2000s was widely-driven by establishment of private HEIs.

The World Bank held Makerere University to be a model of marketisation, describing its new funding model marked by reduced public funding and a private entry scheme as a ‘financial revolution’ (World Bank 2010b, p.64). However, critics hold that Makerere University’s marketisation led to declining academic standards and eroded the university’s public good functions (Carrol 2007; Mamdani 2007). Similarly, marketisation in Kenyan HE is held to have led to declining quality (Wangenge-Ouma 2008).

In contrast to this orthodox position, a model of ‘developmental university systems’ has been proposed as appropriate for the developing world (Brundenius, Lundvall & Sutz 2009). HE is defended as an important public good and critical national capacity for developing countries that cannot be adequately realised within the marketised model (Naidoo 2011; Tilak 2008; Mamdani 2008; Lebeau & Sall 2011). Naidoo (2008, p.85) argues that powerful national governments and international agencies offer developing countries the policy-preservation of HE provision by foreign and corporate providers in a global marketplace as the best way out of HE crisis. She contrasts this with the reality of advanced economies possessing large public national HE systems. This position is analogous to Chang’s (2003) Kicking
Away the Ladder argument; that rich countries used state-interventionist strategies to become rich and now proselytise virtues of free trade and open economies to poor countries.

However, as Brundenius, Lundvall, and Sutz (2009, p.311) argue, ‘it has become almost trivial to assert that in the knowledge society universities are important institutions’. Research into HE and development has therefore examined mechanisms and processes through which developing world universities contribute to growth and development, for example, university-industry linkages, high-tech clusters, and commercialisation of university research (Brimble & Doner 2007; Sohn & Kenney 2007; Yusuf & Nabeshima 2007). There is growing consensus that an innovation economy is an appropriate goal for most developing countries, however, debate remains over institutions and policies required, in particular the appropriate mix of university-industry-government relations (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff 2000).

A market-liberal position holds that HE can respond to market needs, produce commercially-relevant research and train skilled graduates. The ‘developmental university systems’ model argues for greater state action in fostering robust national innovation systems in which national research universities perform an integral role (Brundenius, Lundvall, and Sutz 2009). University-industry linkages are incentivised, for example, by publicly funding R&D or capital investment in complementarities such as physical infrastructure of hi-tec clusters (Matthews & Hu 2007). Cases where innovation systems are weak, for instance Latin America and Thailand, are partly explained by weak bureaucracy and political will (Arocena & Sutz 2001; Brimble & Doner 2007); two factors present in East Asian developmental states.

Having discussed HE’s role in development through a macro-account of the sector’s history and theory in developing countries it can be concluded that there is a strong intellectual basis for viewing HE as a potentially major driver of development. Furthermore, this developmental argument will be seen to support the rationale for considering HE as a crucial engine of post-conflict recovery and development. Before that, regional analysis of Arab state HE will introduce contextual issues
shaping the two case-studies and enable the generalisations of development theories discussed above to be considered in relation to a particular regional context.

1.4. Higher Education in the Arab World

In this section an analysis of ‘Arab HE’, in particular its developmental role, will be presented. Iraqi and Libyan HE should be understood within the broader context of other Arab states with which they share many important similarities in language, culture, governance, and history. This contextualisation is crucial to understanding the post-2011 region-wide transitions and conflicts referred to as the ‘Arab Spring’.

1.4.1. Higher education and Development

To begin, it should be noted that centres of learning in the Islamic world have played a leading role in the advancement of many fields of knowledge, importantly, mathematics, science, and writing (Hitti 1968, p.410; Saliba 2007). The University of Zitounah in Tunis (est. 734 C.E.), Qarawayyin in Fes (est. 859 C.E.) and Al Azhar University in Egypt (est. 970 C.E.) were all important institutions pre-dating the first established European university, the University of Bologna (est. 1088 C.E.). This is not a mere historical curiosity; rather it is an important aspect of intellectual heritage and a source of pride for modern Arab nations informing contemporary discourse on revitalising academia in the region.

During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries contemporary Arab states were controlled by colonial rulers. While pre-colonial education existed, universities were largely an institutional import from Western countries. In some states a single colonial model was relied upon to found colleges and universities, for example, the British model was implemented (although not fully) in Sudan (Shils & Roberts 2004, p.193) with French influence predominant in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. HE emergence in other Arab states was influenced by various models. Egyptian HE was influenced by both French and British HE, and also the American liberal arts
college in establishing the American University of Beirut (Shils & Roberts 2004, p.192). Furthermore, Egypt was itself important in early development of Arab state HE, offering a ‘national university’ model, faculty members, and branch campuses of Egyptian universities for export (Herrera 2006).

Arab HE has been held to have driven political development (Jabbra & Jabbra 1984). National universities became important institutions of newly-independent Arab states (Herrera 2006). Romani (2009) states that post-colonial ‘geopolitical and nationalist dynamics’ gave ‘higher education a powerful political symbolism’. Arab nationalist states were committed to expanding HE access. In the mid-1990s Arab states spent on average 5.5% of GDP on education, higher than any other region in the developing world (Coffman 1996).

HE systems played a crucial role forming national identities and achieving political autonomy (Herrera 2006). In Iran, Iraq, and Syria HE led to political socialisation, enhanced state legitimacy, and promoted national unity. By contrast, Lebanon’s confessional system and divided politics granted education greater autonomy from political forces producing weaker social cohesion and political nationalism (Jabbra & Jabbra 1984). HE triggered political development and social change through transition from elite to mass enrolment. Nasser’s expansion of Cairo University widened enrolment to include poor and provincial students. Similarly, Syria expanded HE after the 1963 Ba’athist coup with student enrolment at Damascus University doubling in five years, widening access to rural and lower classes to over 50% and 41% respectively (Hinnebusch 2001, p.55). These examples underscore the importance of widening access to regime legitimacy.

Arab HE has been critiqued over its developmental contribution. Academic dependency critiques hold that Arab universities replicate Western universities, disregard local knowledge and values, and maintain neo-colonial dependency (see Mazawi 2005). Said (2003, p.322) writes that ‘the Arab world today is an intellectual, political and cultural satellite of the United States’. As Al-Assad (quoted in Mazawi 2005) argues, imported Western university models produced a hybrid ‘East-West’ academic model which compartmentalised Islamic knowledge in Western-style
institutions thus preventing emergence of authentic indigenous epistemology and perpetuating intellectual-dependency of Islamic societies. However, Mazawi (2005) refutes that Arab universities are transplanted institutions alien to local contexts; rather post-colonial nationalist movements transformed colonial educational legacies in a radical project of expansion and nationalisation entailing various transitions from community-based governance, Islamic, foreign, and private provision of HE to a state-dominated secular model.

HE expansion had several adverse consequences. Rapid expansion contributed to declining academic standards. The failure of HE expansion and investment to raise quality prompted Salehi-Isfahani and Dhillon (2008) to write that ‘no region in the world has invested more in education with less to show for it’. Common problems include low research capacity, large brain drain, high graduate unemployment, and weak technical education (Romani 2009). From the standpoint of human capital theory Arab HE has in general not been effective. Salehi-Isfahani and Dhillon (2008) report that regional rate-of-return studies find very low social returns due to HE’s misalignment with economic needs. Lord (2008) finds that educational outputs do not align with market needs leading to low graduate absorption and low impact on economic growth.

This gap between curricula and economic requirements is partly explained by HE’s public service training function combined with obstacles to adapting to the new structural economic context in which states no longer guarantee universal graduate employment. This dynamic was compounded by public sector retrenchment during structural adjustment and liberalisation during the 1980s and 1990s. Regionally, recent graduates prefer waiting for state jobs with life-long employment than private employment. Egypt’s public sector employs six million university graduates (Anderson 2012) with double Turkey’s proportion of graduates in the labour force, where per capita income is three times higher (Brookings 2012). In this regional context expansion led to over-supply of graduates producing rising graduate unemployment and high youth grievances.
HE formed an element of economic liberalisation strategies pursued regionally from the late 1980s as historically centralised and state-run systems opened to private and foreign providers. During 1993-2009 two-thirds of new universities in the Arab Middle East were private institutions (Romani 2009). Jordanian private HE highlights some region-wide problems; private HEIs, user-fees and parallel courses were introduced in the early 1990s. Burke and Al-Waked (1997) state that the ‘basic problem’ with private HEIs in Jordan is that they ‘were established as a “quick fix” for the mushrooming access deficit in a system without surplus money’. Quality remains low while loan-schemes established in the 2000s are criticised for widening access inequalities as the poorest are excluded from this financing option (Robertson 2008). Private universities were established rapidly in countries with no traditions of endowments or philanthropy towards HE (Al-Lamki 2010).

The American model of marketised and privatised HE has been influential in university reforms since the 1980s, in particular in the Gulf (Mazawi 2005, p.157). Over the 2000s Gulf Arab states invested large funds in public HE to produce domestic skills bases capable of managing post-oil transitions and building knowledge economies. A prominent feature of Gulf HE is the branch campus model incorporating leading foreign universities with the UAE and Qatar accounting for a high proportion of branch campuses globally (Miller-Idriss & Hanauer 2011).

Domestic politics is a major factor influencing Arab HE’s role in development. Political functions including student activism, organisation, and exchanging ideas have been limited by repression or co-opting by authoritarian governments. It is argued that severe restrictions on academic freedom posed a serious obstacle to HE’s social role. For example, the Arab Human Development Report (UNDP 2003a) portrayed poor HE quality as related primarily to low autonomy from political factors and weak facilities. However, students and faculty have been important political actors, led collective action, and provided intellectual leadership. For example, Reid (2002) shows how Cairo University was majorly affected by Egypt’s tumultuous twentieth-century political trajectory while also actively shaping
domestic politics. Many regional states share this mutually constitutive relationship with politics.

War and conflict have powerfully shaped HE in the region, however, according to Mazawi (2005, p.154) literature on Arab HE ‘remains oblivious of this context’. He explains that ‘expansion of higher education across the Arab states occurred in a period ravaged by colonialism, military conflicts, coups d’etat, civil wars, and human populations displacement’. Similarly, the Arab Knowledge Report (UNDP 2009) states:

> Occupation, wars, and internal conflicts have an overwhelmingly disruptive influence on the knowledge society. Not only do they affect its mainstays, in the form of education, technology, and innovation, they also, through the economic destruction, disruption to development, suppression of freedoms, and restrictions on movement, strike at the heart of the enabling environments needed for the establishment of the knowledge society.

These reflections highlight the necessity of explaining HE’s role in Arab development as related to external and political factors of war and displacement in addition to conventional focus on internal factors including educational expenditures and enrolment patterns. Moreover, these insights connect with the issues of stability, conflict, authoritarianism, freedom, and HE which were all salient issues in the ‘Arab Spring’ and will now be explored further in the next section.

### 1.4.2. Arab Spring

Popular uprisings beginning in December 2010 in Tunisia and then Egypt ignited protest movements in nearly all countries across the wider Middle East, in particular, in Yemen, Libya, Bahrain, and later Syria. While outcomes varied with regime change in Egypt and Tunisia, reform in Jordan and Morocco, and civil war in Libya and Syria, similarities in timing and goals of uprisings led to the term ‘Arab Spring’ to be widely-applied. Various explanations for underlying causes
have been offered; per capita income, government corruption, suppressed longing for civil and political rights, and high unemployment (The Economist 2011; Moore 2013).

The term ‘Arab Spring’ connotes a preceding phase; an ‘Arab Winter’ during which the vitality and energy of Arab peoples was dormant and in metaphorical hibernation due to long rule under repressive regimes. HE has been theorised as contributing to this stagnant condition. Didactic pedagogies of teacher-led learning and rote memorisation are held to have delimited critical thinking and therefore reproduced uncritical ‘Arab minds’. Further, authoritarian regimes have co-opted and controlled the Professoriate and student movements, groups often supporting anti-regime ideologies, through university appointments, recruiting academics for government positions, and suppressing academic freedom (Mazawi 2011).

University students were notably proactive in social movements and a leading group in organising collective protests, in particular, in Yemen, Tunisia, and Egypt. This was more remarkable considering widespread perceptions that youth in the region were marginalised from political processes and widely considered to be disengaged from political life prior to 2011. Demands for improved material conditions and basic rights and freedoms are a core commonality of diverse Arab Spring protests (Moore 2013); what Brahimi (2011) has described as ‘post-ideological’ protest. In this context students demanded educational rights, a greater voice in HE governance, better quality education, less crowded campuses, removal of state appointed Presidents and Deans, and reduced political interference in university affairs (Altbach 2011; Anderson 2012).

The greatest single youth grievance across the region is high unemployment and in particular high graduate unemployment (Kocoglu & Flayols 2012; LaGraffe 2012). In the previous section it was seen that HE systems geared to public employment, state retrenchment, and stagnant economies led to mushrooming graduate unemployment. In Tunisia the number of graduates and graduate unemployment rates increased by five times during 1994-2009 with almost one in four university graduates unemployed a year preceding the uprising (Broecke 2012). In addition,
Jordan, Morocco, Palestine, Egypt and Algeria all recorded graduate unemployment levels of 15%-25%.

Campante and Chor (2012) hold that educational expansion combined with economic stagnation and the increased political activism of educated individuals created long-term conditions ripe for uprising across the Middle East. Similarly, Buckner (2013) argues that inability of graduates to find gainful employment and growing inequalities in HE access resulting from increased particularism and privatisation delegitimised Syria’s post-colonial statebuilding project, founded on universal employment and educational access, in the eyes of Syrian youth thus creating conditions favourable for uprising. Similar dynamics occurred in Libya, Egypt and Tunisia where growing education-economy mismatch contributed to state legitimacy crises at the heart of uprisings (Noueihed & Warren 2012, p.38).

Generating employment for regional youth is problematised by demographic trends as 55% of the total population are under 24 while two-thirds are under 30 constituting a ‘youth bulge’ (Brookings 2012) thus necessitating 3-4 million new jobs annually to simply maintain existing unemployment levels.

The Arab Spring increased awareness of HE in the region and prescriptions for how the sector can assist transitional societies. There has been renewed focus on the common theme of improving academic quality and producing market-relevant skills and knowledge (Hamdan 2011). Moreover, HE has been held to be a fruitful sector for long-term strategic investment to produce knowledge and innovation driven economies necessary to stimulating jobs and diversifying away from oil-dependence (Aubert, Karlsson & Utz 2013; Djeflat 2013). The Gulf state branch campus model has been proposed as appropriate for transitional societies (Rubin 2012). However, Anderson (2012) criticises this model for failing to produce high quality research, distorting regional HE, and insufficient engagement with local contextual conditions.

HE has also been viewed as supporting more pluralistic societies with guarantees of meaningful rights and freedoms. With the direction of political and constitutional reforms ongoing, HE in some contexts became an arena for contests between
competing social forces and ideologies including secularism, religious conservatism, liberalism, and traditionalism. In Tunisia banning Islamic headscarves for female students was a contentious political issue while violent clashes were reported between leftist and Islamist students with universities described as ‘ideological battlegrounds’ (Khlifi 2013). Furthermore, some states threatened by Arab Spring type protests have restricted academic freedom, for example, the increased suppression, surveillance, and harassing of academics and students in Bahrain (MESA 2011; Schmidt 2012). In this environment renewed debate has ensued on the threats to and importance of academic freedom in the region (Fanton 2013; Reisz 2012).

Following the Arab Spring regional HE increased dramatically as a policy issue of relevance in Western diplomatic capitals. HE was viewed by some as a critical ‘soft power’ resource for influencing newly empowered elites and future leaders. EU funding for ERASMUS scholarships to the southern Mediterranean was increased in response to the Arab Spring to assist in democratic transitions, mutual understanding, and institution building (EU 2011; O’Malley 2011).

In sum, the Arab Spring brought attention to HE in the region as a structural weakness yet also an immense potential for strategic investment and domestic transformation. Moreover, this discussion raises questions over potential destabilising effects of the sector which are directly relevant to the next chapter on HE and conflict, to which we will now turn.
CHAPTER TWO

HIGHER EDUCATION AND CONFLICT

2.0. Introduction

This chapter investigates the relationship between HE and conflict. This is a necessary step for understanding post-conflict HE because recovery outcomes are shaped in part by the nature of conflict; its main drivers, how it ended, and its continuation in ‘post-conflict’ society. Furthermore, conflict-sensitive recovery strategy is increasingly viewed as important to long-term post-conflict recovery (Barbolet et al 2005; Barakat & Zyck 2009).

HE plays both negative and positive roles in conflict-affected contexts. Students can be viewed as destabilising; HE reproduces class or ethnic privilege while universities are often an ideological battleground. Alternatively, higher learning is thought to foster more civilised and peaceful populations bringing diverse groups together. Moreover, university students and faculty occupy a privileged social position in many developing countries, offering public intellectual leadership. For these reasons HE has been central to many developing world political struggles, for example, early 1990s struggles for democratisation in Africa (Daddieh 1996; Balsvik 1998; Zeilig 2007). Understanding this social function is important to explaining HE’s conflict potential which may seem far-removed from armed conflict.

The HE-conflict relationship is an important yet under-researched area. This chapter provides an overview of theoretical literature on how conflict is related to HE. To begin, theories of conflict causation are analysed in relation to HE. Next, attention will turn to HE’s potential in resolving, mediating, and transforming conflict. Finally, the chapter will describe conflict’s impact on HE in a framework utilised in empirical case-studies of Iraq and Libya.


### 2.1. Higher Education and Conflict Causation

Bush and Saltarelli (2000) analyse education’s positive and negative contributions to conflict; the ‘two faces’ of education. Similarly, Davies (2004a, p.18) states ‘there are three basic positions: that on balance education contributes to negative conflict; that on balance it makes no difference; that on balance it is a force for peace.. education can do all of this simultaneously’. In the following two sections, negative and positive contributions of HE in conflict will be analysed; conflict causation and conflict resolution respectively.

Various theories provide mono-causal explanations of conflict, for example, ethnic rivalries, lootable resources, or human nature. Conflict causation research has been categorised into two broad and crude categories of ‘greed’ and ‘grievance’. The grievance paradigm refers to theories positing factors including inequality, political repression, or ethnicity as the main conflict-drivers (Horowitz 1985; Young 2008). By contrast, the greed hypothesis holds that economic factors explain civil war occurrence; rebellion always occurs where feasible, for example, through presence of easily extractable resources (Collier 2000; Keen 2010, p.28).

By contrast, there is growing recognition that conflict is a complex phenomenon influenced by many factors and processes (Stewart & Venugopal 2005). This insight influences the approach adopted here; there is no linear HE-conflict relationship explainable through a singular theory. Rather, multiple factors mediate HE-conflict interactions with cross-contextual variation in the combination of mediating factors. Various conflict theories are analysed in relation to HE offering a composite explanation drawing on insights from various aspects of the field.

HE has not featured prominently as an area of conflict research. Due to this fact the greed and grievance dichotomy, while simplistic and even a limiting factor in a full understanding of conflict (Ballentine & Sherman 2003), will be employed to present two main strands in theorising the HE-conflict relationship. Following this, an
account will be offered that synthesises both economic and affective dimensions of conflict in relation to HE.

2.2. **Economic Theories of Conflict**

Research has found that large demographic ‘youth bulges’ predict the risk of armed conflict or civil war (Urdal 2004; Urdal 2006). It is held that under conditions of poverty, young men are easily recruited by rebels, prone to political activity, and constitute a general source of instability. However, more recent research holds that ‘youth bulges’ can be a conflict risk or opportunity depending on various mediating factors (Barakat & Urdal 2009). One factor is educational attainment in terms of schooling level or outcome.

One position is that armed conflict risk increases with large numbers of poorly educated young men (Ballentine & Sherman 2003). Opportunity-cost of rebellion is held to entail that ‘the incentive to participate in violent conflict is lower for more highly educated youths’ (Barakat & Urdal 2009; Collier, Hoeffler & Rohner 2006). Three micro-level studies found that rebel recruitment is easier in contexts of low education (Barakat & Urdal 2009). Policy responses to the ‘youth bulge’ include expanding HE. It may be argued that because opportunity-cost of rebellion is greater for higher educational levels, tertiary expansion is a sound strategy for reducing rebel recruitment. A similar argument is reviewed by Thyne (2006); politically active students play a strong role in civil disobedience and therefore civil unrest although given that they have much to lose should not be expected to play a strong role in civil war causation.

An alternative position, Urdal (2006) finds that combination of youth bulge and HE expansion increases risk of political violence because educated unemployment constitutes a significant grievance. Under conditions of economic stagnation, where unemployment is likely to be high, HE expansion may therefore bring risks (Urdal 2004). Further, in ‘youth bulge’ countries educational inequalities better predict conflict than income inequalities (Urdal 2006). In support, UNESCO (2011, p.165)
states that ‘more education is not an automatic panacea for the threat posed by the combination of a youth bulge and mass unemployment... when higher levels of education are not matched by expanded opportunities, however, the resulting frustration can have the opposite effect’.

Goldstone (2002) holds that a high risk of political violence is ‘strongly associated’ with ‘an expanding population of higher-educated youth facing limited opportunities to obtain elite political and economic positions’. However, the argument that HE expansion leads to increased grievances and therefore conflict is contradicted by Ostby and Urdal (2010; 2011) who report that based on three studies of conflict and education there is no evidence that a rapid expansion in HE increases the risk of political violence. Barakat and Urdal (2009) found no evidence for increased conflict risk due to rapid tertiary enrolment expansion in the Middle East and North Africa. Rather, they argue that expansion of tertiary education is likely to lead to political unrest and instability but not armed conflict.

In sum, this debate in econometric literature remains ongoing with no firm conclusion about the HE-conflict relationship. Yet a cognate literature on causes or correlates of terrorism often includes educational level and attainment as a variable and therefore provides evidence on HE’s relative importance in the education-‘terrorism’ relationship. This literature is relevant because it investigates many similar mechanisms and conditions analysed in the above-described conflict and HE literature.

On one side, it is held that ‘poverty breeds terrorism’; poor, hungry and illiterate individuals turn to terror organisations to vent grievances through violence and accrue economic benefits not available elsewhere. Further, poorly-educated individuals are expected to be more susceptible to extremist ideologies. In support, Azam and Thelen (2008) find that countries with greater secondary enrolment levels have reduced risk of terrorist attacks. However, a contrary position finds no causal connection between higher educational levels and reduced terrorism (Krueger & Maleckova 2003; de Mesquita 2005; Berrebi 2007; Brockhoff, Krieger & Meierrieks 2010). Higher educational levels have also been found to have no causal impact on
public support for terrorist attacks (Haddad 2004; Mousseau 2011; Shafiq & Sinno 2010).

Rather, in a study of Muslim countries Testas (2004) finds that higher educational levels correlate positively with incidence of trans-national terrorism. Additionally, micro-level evidence reports that many terrorists are highly educated (Berrebi 2007). Krueger and Maleckova (2003) found that individual Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad members are as likely to have high educational levels as opposed to low while Israeli-Jewish terrorists were more likely to have a high level of education. Sageman (2004) finds that Al Qaeda members are typically well-educated. In contrast to the poor and uneducated ‘terrorist’ a new stereotype is an individual in their early-twenties often with post-secondary education in a technical or engineering discipline (Azam 2011).

At the individual-level those with higher educational levels may be expected to have a high opportunity cost in joining terrorist organisations due to risks it entails. However, Kavanagh (2011) argues that terrorists are most likely to be highly-educated individuals living under poor economic conditions. In poverty-stricken economies there are few market options and low opportunity costs for highly-educated individuals to join terrorist groups. At the organisational-level it has been held that terrorist organisations prefer recruiting highly-educated individuals with more ‘human capital’ because they are more productive in committing acts of terror (De Mesquita 2005; Benmelech & Berrebi 2007) and because investing in education indicates personal commitment to a cause (Krueger & Maleckova 2003).

The above arguments about conditions under which highly-educated individuals join terrorist groups may be applied to recruitment of armed militias and rebel groups during civil conflict. The majority of the literature employs a rational-choice and econometric approach and the findings support the ‘greed’ thesis regarding HE and conflict. By contrast, the next section will introduce theories that posit affective factors as conflict-drivers and analyse their relation to HE systems in conflict-affected contexts.
2.3. ‘Grievance’ Theories of Conflict

If it is accepted that individual rational-agents’ calculations, presence of lootable natural resources, criminal networks, and related factors are principal conflict-drivers then the HE-conflict relationship will be limited to the above considerations. However, conflict theories placing explanatory weight on affective factors including identity, ethnicity, and group inequalities view the HE-conflict relationship as wider than the ‘greed’ position.

Similarly, the ‘New Wars’ thesis describes warfare’s evolution from ‘old wars’ of grand strategy, imperial conquest, high politics, and ideological struggle to globalised cross-border network-warfare involving myriad non-state actors and criminal activity (Kaldor 2001; Duffield 2001). At first sight, HE’s role within this phenomena appears negligible. New wars are held to be conducted primarily by armed groups driven by economic motives such as resource extraction rather than ideology. Universities, by contrast, are seen as sites of ideology and political activism. There exists a gap between the halls of academe and shadowy trans-border networks of insurgency and organised crime. However, another feature of new wars is mobilisation around ethnic or nationalist ideologies; an area in which HE is of relevance that will now be analysed.

One position relating to ethnicity and conflict is the new barbarism hypothesis that emerged in the wake of wars in the Balkans, Sierra Leone, and Rwanda, explaining their emergence as due to awakening of primordial ethnic or tribal enmities (Kaplan 1994). Universities have been held to be victims of the New Barbarism. For example, Astill (2004) writes of the University of Sierra Leone that ‘an army of drug-addled teenage cannibals and rapists seized the university campus at Fourah Bay, on its steep green peak above Sierra Leone’s capital, Freetown’. In such accounts the university is conceived as a bastion of enlightened values and civility under threat from uneducated, uncivilised, delinquent youth.
An alternative position holds that HE has been a cause of ethnic conflict. The Manipulative Elites theory of ethnic conflict holds that identities are constructed rather than primordial and subject to mobilisation by strategic ethnic entrepreneurs (Oberschall 2007). Academics have been held to have constituted important manipulative elites in some conflicts by popularising exclusive ethnic identities or providing ideological rationales for violence (Lebeau 2008). For example, Chege (1996) argues that genocide in Burundi and Rwanda was aided by complicit and proactive intellectual elites including academics propagating racial anti-Tutsi propaganda decisive in mobilising Hutu violence. Chege does not support the view that ethnic enmities were primordial properties of Rwandan society; rather, academics actively mobilised for violence utilising ethnic identity constructs.

In another example, Serbian academia is portrayed as driving pre-war ethnic mobilisation. The 1986 memorandum of the Serbian Academy for Sciences and Arts is held to have propagated Serbian racial superiority (Primoratz 1996) thereby catalysing Serbian nationalism; a decisive moment in conflict-escalation between former Yugoslavia’s nascent nation-states (Dimitrijevic 1999, p.128). While Dragovic-Soso (2004) argues that a more balanced view is necessary, significance lies not in factual accuracy but discursive construction of Serbian academics as prototypical ethnic entrepreneurs.

Beyond these theories in which HE actors’ agency is viewed as driving ethnic mobilisation, the position of HE as an important social institution mediating group identity is also a factor in conflict. A set of explanations of conflict posit identity as a central factor in conflict causation. Differences between ethnic, religious, regional, tribal, kinship or other social groups are held to be critical (Horowitz 1985; Young 2008). On the subject of HE and ethnicity Crawford Young (1981) writes that ‘at moments when cultural polarization is intense in a nation-state, the high levels of political awareness which characterize university milieus are likely to be reflected in powerful ethnic mobilization’.

After long periods of conflict communal divisions frequently become entrenched and inter-group animosities are a facet of daily life. In Cameroon and the Ivory
Coast campuses reflected social conflicts with highly-divisive student politics stratified principally by ethnic or geographic identities (Konings 2002; Sany 2010). Barakat (1977) contends that student activism and HE’s fragmentation along confessional and sectarian lines contributed to Lebanese civil war onset in 1975. In these cases conflict limited HE’s ability to strengthen social cohesion further exacerbating societal divisions.

In situations where group divisions and inequalities co-exist the theory of horizontal inequalities incorporates both ideational and economic factors and arguably enables analysis to move past greed/grievance binaries. Stewart (2008) defines horizontal inequalities as ‘inequalities among culturally determined groups, groups that have salience for their members and/or others in society; for example, among races, ethnic groups, religions, religious sects, regions, and so on’. Group grievances mediated by HE systems have been held to have contributed to conflict. HE is an important positional good and highly valued in many countries for providing social mobility, enhanced social status, and employment opportunities (Silva 1978).

A primary grievance is ethnic inequalities in HE through inequitable student enrolment or faculty membership which have been held to contribute towards conflict. In pre-genocide Burundi HE access was highly unequal with ethnic Hutus historically marginalised through Belgian colonial policy (Ngaruko & Nkurunziza 2000). The 1990s protracted civil war is explained by highly-stratified ethnic inequalities (Nkurunziza 2011) and Buckland (2005, p.10) holds that ‘disparity at the tertiary level was a particular source of resentment’.

The most widely-cited case is Sri Lanka. In the 1970s Sri Lanka’s government initiated a positive discrimination policy to redress imbalance of Tamil students over Sinhalese (Sriskandarajah 2005). This policy of reversing Tamil predominance in HE opportunities has been held to be a cause of conflict; a young unemployed and well-educated minority had great incentive to address grievances through armed struggle (Jayaweera 1997, p.333; Stewart 2005).
Another important case is Nigeria where large regional educational inequalities were a major post-war political issue. Successive Nigerian governments increased federal support to HE to achieve national integration (Akpan 1990). Ukiwo (2007) argues that the state, to an extent, successfully reduced HIs preventing large-scale conflict. However, an unintended consequence was increased regional HE provision in response to federal policy which led to HE serving to strengthen anti-national and regionalist identities. Jinadu (2006) explains that ‘fractured or differentiated citizenship’ has been reproduced in public universities which have been heavily influenced by Nigeria’s multi-cultural and diverse society.

While these cases support the HIs thesis, other divided countries experienced considerable HIs in HE without armed conflict. For example, HIs were present in Malaysian HE in the 1960s when the indigenous Bumiputera population claimed exclusion. After violent riots in 1969 positive HE discrimination favoured Bumiputeras over Chinese and Indian communities aiming to foster national unity through social mobility (Lee 1997, p.173). While this prompted largely non-violent social conflict, there was no armed conflict remotely comparable to Burundi or Sri Lanka; a difference explained by the importance of institutions in mediating ethnic conflict (Easterly 2001).

To conclude, while many societies can experience long-standing HIs in HE and other sectors without risk of conflict, in combination with other conditions, inequality in access to HE may exert influence on conflict dynamics. Furthermore, the consideration of horizontal inequalities enables a political economy perspective that moves beyond dichotomous greed/grievance frameworks to identify interconnected economic and affective bases of conflict. While the above section focused on HE’s potential as a cause of conflict, or the ‘negative face’ of HE, the next section will analyse HE’s role in conflict resolution, or the ‘positive face’ of HE.
2.4. Higher Education in Conflict Resolution and Transformation

The positive face of education in conflict-affected societies has been classified as its peacebuilding role (Bush & Saltarelli 2000). Basic education is held to connect with peacebuilding in multiple ways including its strong socialisation and identity formation role that can foster positive social cohesion (Novelli & Smith 2011), teaching non-violent means of resolving conflict (Davies 2004), inclusion of minority rights, culture, and languages (Barakat, Connolly, Hardman & Sundaram 2012; Brown 2011), and as a return of normalcy that functions as a peace dividend (Buckland 2005; Kirk 2007). In this section the specific functions of HE in contributing to peacebuilding will be conceptualised as lying on a continuum from the short-term domain of conflict mediation, through conflict resolution, to the long-term tasks of conflict transformation and reconciliation.

To start with, conflict mediation refers to third-party intervention to end a particular conflict through communicating with the various parties to the conflict (Lanz, Wahlisch, Kirchhoff & Siegfried 2008; Brahim & Ahmed 2008; Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall 2008). HE features in conflict mediation activities primarily through track-two diplomacy; contacts outside of formal governmental and official diplomatic channels. For example, in the 1950s HE and scientific exchange became a tool for increased U.S.-Russian contact (Schweitzer 2004). In another example, Shoham (1998) argues that Israeli-Palestinian academic encounters functioned as a form of track-two diplomacy positively impacting the Oslo peace process.

Furthermore, HE is arguably important to developing a knowledge and skills base to support mediation efforts in conflict-affected contexts. International conflict mediation has been criticised for neglecting local context (Brahimi & Ahmed 2008), local conflict resolution mechanisms (Mac Ginty 2008) and global ‘best-practice’ (Crocker 2007). An example of a programme in this area, a partnership between Eastern Mennonite University and the University of Hargeisa in Somaliland states its goal as ‘employing traditional mechanisms and best practices in global conflict resolution’ while strengthening Somali research capacity in indigenous conflict
resolution (HED n.d.). Supporting such expertise and knowledge on local and
global mediation practices in conflict-affected countries would enable a more
contextually-relevant and effective field of conflict mediation.

Peace and conflict education has been held to contribute to conflict resolution in
conflict-affected societies (Harris 2010). For example, Firer (2008) argues that ‘peace
education is the basis for any sustainable non-violent relations between parties in
dispute’. Professor Shaubhgya Shah of Tribhuvan University in Nepal describes the
significance of a Masters programme in Conflict, Peace and Development Studies,
collaboratively run by universities in Sri Lanka, Norway and Nepal (Norling n.d.).

> When Nepal was in the midst of an armed conflict with the Maoist rebellion our
> university still didn’t have a program that would allow Nepalese to develop their
> own research capacity, examine and research the conflict, and offer solutions to the
> policymakers. We are now hoping to offer very rational and sound alternatives to
> how conflicts in this country might be resolved

Harris and Lewer (2008) describe their experience in establishing a diploma in peace
studies held in rebel-controlled Colombo during Sri Lanka’s civil war. A key course
outcome was providing relatively depoliticised space where students could learn to
analyse conflict in their society differently. However, limitations of peace and
conflict studies are recognised by Lebeau (2008) who argues that establishment of
such courses in African conflict-affected societies ‘reflects an understanding of the
conflict that identifies individual attitudes as a key part of the explanation for past
conflicts’ and that while this may explain some cases it does not address structural
causes of conflict including youth marginalisation.

HE also has a theorised role in processes of conflict transformation and
reconciliation in conflict-affected societies. Conflict transformation may be defined
as ‘actions that seek to alter the various characteristics and manifestations of conflict
by addressing its root causes over the long-term, with the aim to transform negative
ways of dealing with conflict into positive, constructive ones’ (Austin 2010). Further
‘this concept of conflict transformation stresses structural, behavioural, and
attitudinal aspects of conflict’ (Berghof n.d). HE has been held to have the potential to play a crucial role in transforming the bases of conflict, for example, through reducing deep rooted inequalities or promoting non-conflictual identities.

First, HE is often a place where students meet ‘the other’ for the first time in divided conflict-affected societies.⁴ HE programmes have been designed to maximise this opportunity. For example, in Lebanon where the majority of universities are divided along confessional lines the Lebanese American University (Nassar 1998) and the University of Balamand (Nahas 2008) have both adopted a vision of contributing to national reconciliation through multi-cultural, multi-ethnic education. The LAU has an orientation programme to ease students into the ‘shock’ of encountering such a varied array of backgrounds and to enhance recognition of diversity on campus.

One means through which HE can contribute to conflict transformation and reconciliation is through academic cooperation in conflict-affected contexts. The contact hypothesis posits that contact with adversaries builds bridging social capital enabling relationship formation, cooperation, and trust across dividing lines of conflict (Allport 1954; Amir 1969). Reflecting on a cooperative reform project in Bosnian schools of medicine Simunovic et al (2008) propose that HE is a ‘favourable arena for reconciliation’. They conclude that:

\[\text{Society rebuilding can be promoted indirectly, through formal education and professional engagement, not necessarily by pressing “opposing” sides to talk about reconciliation and sign peace declarations.}\]

Further, Hill (2011) holds that academic activities with a common professional goal across Bosnia’s divided HE system offered opportunities for developing trust, skills, and knowledge which fostered social cohesion. Similarly, deep mistrust between the Kosovan-Serb University of Mitrovica and the Kosovan-Albanian Pristina University made contact between the two institutions politically infeasible. Many

⁴ See chapter three sections 3.2.7. and 3.2.8. for a more in-depth discussion of HE and conflict transformation specifically in the context of post-conflict societies
international organisations emphasised reconciliation and multi-ethnic programmes that ‘had begun to turn people away’ from various initiatives (Heath 2009). In 2007 the university’s rectors jointly attended a conference on European HE in Dubrovnik held to offer a depoliticised space and common goal which enabled communication. Heath concludes that ‘development initiatives that take place on neutral grounds and focus on common goals rather than ‘international community’ reconciliation goals would be more warmly received’.

Arab-Israeli academic cooperation has received significant attention and according to some cooperation has positively supported peace (Scham 2000; Salem & Kaufman 2007; Sriharan et al 2009). For example, Lindsay et al (2008) hold that cooperation between Al Quds University, Israeli universities and the Jewish-American Brandeis University enables ‘meaningful interactions’ and ‘moves toward the core of understanding, acceptance of one’s rival, and the promotion of peace and cooperation’. However, there has also been considerable resistance to Israeli-Palestinian academic cooperation. Kaufman (1993) asks; ‘where does one draw the line between collaboration with the enemy and legitimate academic intercourse between occupier and occupied?’ while many Palestinian academics contend that cooperation legitimises occupation (Barghouti & Murray 2005). Baramki (2010) criticises international donors, unaware of these objections, for attaching aid-conditionalities requiring Palestinian universities to cooperate with Israeli universities.

While academic cooperation may in some places have peace-promoting effects, use of academic contact regardless of context can have unintended negative consequences. Academic links across dividing lines of conflict emerging organically from locally-embedded agency of individuals and academic communities should be supported rather than externally-devised schemes grafted on to conflict-affected contexts. Despite this, political will was found to be a major recommendation for overcoming the obstacles to academic cooperation in Cyprus (Nickolaou 2012, p.199).
At a broader level HE is held to have a role in resolving inter-cultural conflict. Intercultural miscommunication theory holds that conflict is caused by incompatible cultural communication styles and that resolving conflict requires clarifying knowledge about adversaries’ culture and weakening of negative stereotypes (Fisher et al 2000, p.8). On the negative side, closed HE systems may be argued to be a source of cross-cultural misunderstanding. Contrastingly, HE has been viewed as an institutional arena in which inter-cultural dialogue and communication may take place (Bergan & Restoueix 2009). Pursuit of knowledge, central to the self-understanding of the university, is held to combat the ignorance of other cultures underlying cross-cultural conflict (Karamurzov 2010). For example, Zaragoza (2010, p.25) argues for HE’s importance to promoting a ‘culture of peace and understanding’, writing that ‘peace is built through education, culture, science and communication’.

This role of HE in national dialogue is also reflected in the conception of the university as a critical social agent capable of contributing to reconciliation and conflict transformation through promoting progressive values and ideas that transcend the dividing lines of conflict-affected societies. However, this social role may be limited by violent reprisals or contest by other social forces such as non-state armed groups or repressive states who perceive challenges to their interests, identities, and power. As an example, during the Liberian civil war the Doe regime ‘regarded the intellectual and political ferment associated with the University of Liberia as a threat’ (Africa Watch 1991) and closed the institution.

Another example which illustrates well both this critical social role and its attendant risks is the Jesuit-run Central American University (CAU) in El Salvador. Situated in the liberation theology tradition, the institution taught that the bases of injustice could be overcome through social transformation and envisaged an important role for universities (Beirne 1996). The CAU became a leading advocate of national reconciliation during El Salvador’s civil war. However, the institution paid a heavy price when in 1989 six Jesuit priests were assassinated at the José Simeón Cañas
Central American University, including the Rector, an influential figure and proponent of peace talks (Easterbrook 2003b). Brown (1991, p.144) writes that ‘an evident aim of the right wing is not merely the intimidation of individuals but also the discrediting of the two major independent universities as educational institutions’. The UES insisted on maintaining ‘its autonomous role as critical conscience of society with the duty to contest inequities and injustice’ (Harrington 2002, p.100).

Such a vision of HE in conflict transformation is found in the words of a team of African scholars reflecting upon the future role of the university in Burundi in the aftermath of mass atrocities. They write that, ‘the university must make the individual the light of the society. It must train people to transcend their peculiarities and differences to rise to the universal values of justice, equality and solidarity’ (Gahama et al 1999, p.100).

It has been seen in this section that HE does possess a ‘positive face’ (Bush & Saltarelli 2000) in conflict-affected societies in that the sector has the potential to perform a wide range of roles in conflict mediation, reconciliation, transformation, and promoting cross-cultural communication. In the next section attention will turn from the effect of HE on conflict to conflict’s impact upon HE; a crucial step in analysing the field of HE in post-war reconstruction and recovery.

2.5. Impact of Conflict on Higher Education

This chapter has so far reviewed theoretical literature on HE and conflict. This section has two goals; firstly, to contribute directly towards answering RQ2 and secondly, to provide a framework for analysing conflict’s impact on HE to be utilised in case-studies of Iraq and Libya. This is important as a necessary step for analysing post-conflict HE. Firstly, understanding conflict’s impact on HE is
important in understanding the post-war context in which the sector operates and therefore is crucial to evaluating reconstruction and recovery outcomes. Secondly, understanding constraints that conflict can bring about on capacity, needs, and distortions is important to forming realistic expectations about post-conflict HE.

It should be qualified that HE’s actual impact on conflict is not the same across all contexts. Rather, the categories analysed are typical features of the post-conflict environment that affect HE. Moreover, HE’s impact on conflict transformed over time; pre-WWII warfare did not target civilian infrastructure while during total war HE and science were strongly mobilised for the war effort (Rudy 1991). Furthermore, HE was less affected by societal conflict during Cold War inter-state ‘proxy wars’ than the post-Cold War increase in intra-state wars (Kaldor 2001, p.5) often driven by societal divisions and ethnic mobilisation.

In this section, conflict’s impact on HE is analysed in terms of capacity, needs, and distortions. Specific impacts include physical damage to HEIs, weakened resource bases, hostile research environments, and international isolation. To begin, the next section will address physical, human, and institutional capacity.

2.5.1. Capacity

Capacity-building or capacity-development is widely recognised as a central dimension of post-conflict reconstruction and recovery processes (Barakat & Chard 2005; Brinkerhoff 2005). Moreover, Davies (2009) argues that capacity-development for education systems is crucial to addressing the challenges of fragile post-conflict states. In terms of definitions, capacity has both material and human dimensions and involves the capabilities, resources, and conditions that enable the effectiveness of organisations or communities (Chard 2005, pp.4-5). Following this identification of material, human and organisational dimensions of capacity this section will now analyse the impact of conflict on the physical, human, and institutional capacity of HE systems.
2.5.1.1. Physical Capacity

To begin, this section will consider conflict’s impact on physical capacity; a crucial factor limiting HE’s contribution to post-war recovery. Armed conflict can cause widespread and significant physical damage to the infrastructure and facilities of HEIs. Countries where HEIs suffered significant physical damage during conflict include El Salvador (Harrington 2002, p.97), Iraq (Reddy 2005a), and Bosnia (Dizdar & Kemal 1996, p.40).

The case of Afghanistan illustrates this trend; Afghan HE in 2001 was described as ‘in a state of disrepair’ after decades of conflict and occupation (ADB 2003, p.13). UNESCO (2002, p.17) found that at Kabul University ‘about 95% of the classrooms have no furniture, there are no office facilities, toilets are not working, laboratories and workshops are damaged and empty’. Talab (2002) writes that after the Taliban entered Kabul in 1996:

*Books in Dari and Pashtu were carried off; others of other languages were left on the shelves or were burnt to keep fighters warm through the winter. Laboratory equipment was smashed and sold for scrap. Landmines were strewn in the campus gardens. Dead bodies were stuffed down wells.*

Kabul University’s Library that once housed an impressive million-volume collection was depleted to 20,000 items by the mid-1990s by the burning and illegal sale of books (Hekmatullah Sadat 2004). Furthermore, the building was ‘extensively shelled’ leading the library Director to describe it as ‘a mere path through rubble’ (quoted in Knuth 2006, p.151).

HEIs located at war’s frontlines often have their facilities converted into military outposts, bases, or headquarters, although the consequences are vastly undocumented (GCPEA 2012, p.15). This dynamic is reported in many cases including Afghanistan (ADB 2003, p.12; Hayward 2011; Recknagel 2001), South Sudan (Osman 2005, p.125), Liberia (Action Aid 2011, p.40), Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Rwanda (Lebeau 2008). In many
poor countries university campuses are relatively well-equipped, easily adapted for military purposes, and have therefore been exploited often leading to infrastructural damage, looting, and vandalism.

Another reason for physical damage to HEIs during war is intentional targeting as a strategic war aim. For example, the Islamic University in Gaza, suspected of assisting Hamas in bomb production, was bombed in the 2008 Gaza war destroying three colleges and damaging over 75 laboratories worth $55,351 million (UNDP 2010, p.26; PNA 2009). However, HEIs are often affected as ‘collateral damage’ in attacks not targeted at educational institutions. Buildings can be destroyed and academics and students killed as part of blanket bombardment of cities and indiscriminate violence against civilians. For example, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 included generalised destruction of property, looting, and abuse of civilians (Stansfield 2007, p.127). Universities, although not specifically targeted, were destroyed leading to the HE system’s collapse (Altbach 1998). Beyond physical devastation, conflict can have far-reaching impacts on people and for this reason the next section will address human capacity of HE in conflict-affected contexts.

2.5.1.2. Human Capacity

In this section conflict’s impact on HE human capacity will be considered; this is vital to understanding post-conflict HE recovery and accords with the overall argument of the thesis by informing a holistic perspective on recovery beyond a narrow infrastructure focus.

Maintaining sufficient staffing of HEIs can be difficult in conflict-affected settings due to a number of factors including insecurity, brain drain, financial constraints, and obstacles to training and staff development (IIEP 2010, p.277). Violence against HE faculty members and students has led to high death-tolls in some conflicts. For example, in Cambodia from a pre-Khmer Rouge national total of 1,009 HE teaching staff there were only 87 survivors, some of whom emigrated (Sophoan 1997). In
Rwanda 153 faculty members were murdered and a mere 18.54% of pre-Genocide university staff remained (Obura 2003 p.49). This type of high casualty conflict is very damaging to HE human resources.

During conflict there is frequently significant ‘brain drain’ from HE. For example, during decades of conflict Afghanistan lost 20,000 experts and academics through death and displacement (Hekmatullah Sadat 2004; Tierney 2005; MoHE-A 2009). Similar patterns include Bosnia where ‘brain drain’ was classed the most devastating impact of war on HE (Dizdar & Kemal 1996) and Kosovo (Davies 2004a, p.98). Factors driving academic ‘brain drain’ in non-conflict circumstances include economic insecurity, greater opportunities overseas and political oppression whilst in conflict settings physical insecurity, disruption to academic life, and wartime devaluation of academia also drive out-migration.

Eroded human capacity can have a significant impact on quality. An indicator of brain drain in Liberia, at the University of Liberia the percentage of faculty whose highest degree was a doctorate stood at 26.6% in 1982 and fell to 5.3% in 2001 (Barclay 2002). Another example, a single department at pre-war University of Liberia possessed 30 PhDs and 24 MA-holding staff falling to two and four respectively after war (Fields 2007). Similar trends are prevalent in Iraq and Afghanistan where the percentage of faculty holding a PhD in most universities dropped considerably due to human capital flight after decades of conflict. This impact of reduced human capacity on institutional quality connects to the subject of the following section, conflict’s impact on institutional capacity.

2.5.1.3. Institutional Capacity

In this section conflict’s impact on institutional capacity of HE systems will be addressed. This is an important dimension yet one that is often over-looked in the literature. Moreover, the focus on institutional capacity augurs well with one of the
central arguments of the thesis in that building robust and effective institutions is central to post-conflict recovery.

To begin, institutional capacity of HEIs and Ministries is often negatively affected by conflict. Financial capacity is weakened as resources are diverted away from social service-delivery to defence. Reduced public investment occurs when HEIs must cope with additional conflict-related challenges. In the war economy many firms and industries are disrupted restricting opportunities for universities to gain additional income. In private HEIs closed for more than a year wages and fixed expenditures are paid while not receiving non-state revenue streams. Protracted conflicts often precipitate state crisis and breakdown in authority and regulatory frameworks. Weak regulation encourages black market forged certificates and unchecked private expansion producing low-quality ‘diploma mills’ contributing little to development.

Evidence suggests that primary education is more resilient during conflict than secondary and tertiary education. This is in part due to local capacities and community coping strategies that enable schools to operate even during destructive conflict (Buckland 2005, p.25; Rose & Greeley 2006; Davies 2009, p.26). In contrast, HE systems require greater financial support, skilled labour, technical inputs and institutional capacity to function which renders basic education coping mechanisms insufficient to maintain more complex systems (Buckland 2005, p.25; Rose & Greeley 2006). Consequently, in some conflict settings HE ceases to function as a system. For example, in Afghanistan ‘during the years of war, the HE system collapsed: Academic staff and students left, teaching stopped and most buildings were either damaged or destroyed (MoHE-A/IIEP 2004, p.13). In another case, Somalia, the entire education system, already struggling during the late 1980s, collapsed completely with the Siad Barre regime’s collapse in 1991 (Cassanelli & Abdikadir 2007).

It should be qualified that not all societies have HE systems; rather some possess unconnected HEIs
Conflict can reduce HE enrolment through physical barriers to movement, student mobilisation, and closure of HEIs. Lai and Thyne (2007) find strong statistical evidence for civil war incidence reducing primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment. Cases fitting this pattern include Afghanistan where 17,370 enrolment in 1995 fell to 7,881 in 2001 and the University of Pristina in Kosovo where enrolment fell dramatically during 1990-1999, increasing afterwards (UNDP 2006, p.46). In conflict-affected contexts secondary and tertiary enrolments tend to reduce more than primary enrolments (Buckland 2005, p.18). Older students are more likely to be recruited as soldiers or combatants than younger pupils (UNDP 2008, p.31), are more politically active making tertiary institutions more likely targets, and require greater resources to operate (Buckland 2005, p.18). However, this trend is not universal; during long civil wars in Sudan and Mozambique (Beverwijk 2006, p.103) rapid HE enrolment growth continued.

To recap, it has been seen in this section so far that conflict can have a major impact on the physical, human, and institutional capacity of HE institutions and systems. The factors identified will be investigated in the case-studies. However, conflict’s impact on HE goes beyond capacity by increasing ‘needs’, the subject of the next section.

2.4.2. Needs

In this section the range of needs faced by HE sectors in societies recovering from war will be addressed. Before proceeding, it should be noted that the concept of ‘needs’ is a social construction and no essential or objective need can be identified. However, some needs are so widely-considered to be necessary that the level of inter-subjective consensus enables uncontroversial labelling as a basic need, for example, security.

A significant criticism of most approaches to the post-war reconstruction of HE is the neglect of the psycho-social dimension. The traumatic experience of conflict
places a heavy burden on individuals and communities and HEIs must therefore provide psycho-social support to students (IIEP 2010, p.5). A study of education in Gaza after the Israeli campaign of 2008-2009 found significant psycho-social problems including fear, anxiety, increased drug-abuse, everyday distress, and hopelessness impacting students and their ability to learn. Additionally there was a high prevalence of stress and great unmet demand for psycho-social support amongst university faculty members (Kostelny & Wessells 2010). Psycho-social factors can affect students’ ability to learn, reduce university teachers’ productivity, and place an additional strain on university resources.

HE can function as an important means for students and staff to cope with conflict. First, campuses can offer security. As Baramki (2010, p.103) writes of his students at Birzeit ‘the university, however turbulent at times, was often the safest place they knew’. In addition, by offering counselling, student organisation, and faith services HEIs can provide important moral and psychological support to students. Oweini (1998), himself a student in Lebanon during the civil war, writes that on reflection his university days approximate ‘a normal college experience’ and contrast with the widely-accepted narrative of traumatised and disrupted college experience. Low exposure to war trauma amongst a sample of AUB students is explained by the ‘high casualty/low intensity’ conflict but also because ‘the AUB campus was a pleasant environment with tight security, which provided students with a safe haven and a semblance of order in the midst of the chaos of Beirut’. This illustrates that HEIs can provide crucial support and services to students and staff that enable them to cope under conditions of conflict.

Simply re-opening HE is the primary need in countries where many HEIs closed during intense fighting including Liberia (Lulat 2005, p.281), South Sudan (Bishai 2008) or Afghanistan where missed years of learning create logistical problems. Furthermore, where disruption is concentrated in specific regions educational imbalances must be redressed. In these situations, universities face the challenge of providing education to students with varying years of education leading to differentiation in the academic level of students (IIEP 2010, p.277). Similarly, coping
with registration after large flows of displaced persons can create additional logistical hazards. This disrupting effect of conflict may also be considered a distortion of the HE environment, the subject of the next section.

2.4.3. Distortions

In this section distortions of HE in conflict-affected societies will be addressed. In some conflict-affected contexts there may be little observable impact of conflict on HE in terms of physical damage or casualties. After a tsunami causing widespread devastation rebuilding efforts can draw on societal structures and capacities that remain largely intact. However, conflict distorts the context in which HE operates and leads to adaptation of HE systems often with negative consequences. Indirect losses include international isolation, a challenging research environment, and a weakened resource base affecting quality as much as the quantity of education. Such distortions will be analysed now, enabling understanding of factors shaping post-conflict contexts in which HE must operate.

2.4.3.1. Teaching and Research Environment

Conflict-affected contexts pose various obstacles to conducting research and some HEIs therefore shift to operating solely as teaching institutions. For example, in Afghanistan after decades of war and occupation ‘the research culture, at the core of the modern university, had been largely destroyed’ (MoHE-A 2009). Academic knowledge is often devalued during war thus hindering research. In Algeria it is stated of domestic research that ‘the civil war seriously weakened the system, and government interest for science’ (Esau & Khelfaoui n.d.). Research funding frequently falls as it is diverted to defence spending and civilian research capacities may be utilised for military purposes, for example, conducting weapons research or manufacture.
In conflict-affected societies academic freedom, which may have very few protections in the pre-conflict period, is frequently eroded due to various pressures including intimidation, harassment, and violence against faculty members, closure of institutions, and banning of subjects of inquiry. Furthermore, fear during conflict can lead to self-censorship. As Lebeau (2008) writes ‘in almost all war-torn societies, intellectual capital is one of the casualties of the conflicts’. Altbach (2001a) states that ‘universities are very often centers of political and intellectual dissent, and regimes are reluctant to allow institutions the freedom and autonomy that may contribute to instability’. In fragile conflict-affected states, this imperative to maintain stability at academic freedom’s expense is even stronger.

Consequently, certain topics or areas may be difficult to research during conflict. Furthermore, conflict poses logistical barriers to research, for example, access to certain areas may be very difficult. In many developing countries a strong research culture may only be present in several top institutions and national research universities are frequently located in capital cities. During Mozambique’s civil war the Eduardo Mondlane University lost all capacity to conduct research outside the capital Maputo which was spared from fighting (Mario et al 2003, p.9).

International isolation of HE systems in conflict-affected contexts is an important dynamic that can limit cross-border flows including procurement of educational materials and educational exchange through scholarships and conference attendance. For example, during the Bosnian war the cutting-off of universities from advances in academic fields and their inability to import new books or journals was termed an ‘information blockade’ (Benedek 1997). Isolation has massive impacts on countries experiencing protracted conflict. Mahshi (2003) notes that in 2002 the most recent English language publication in Kabul University Library was the 1987 issue of Time magazine. He writes that ‘time froze at universities and institutes of higher learning. They were left devastated by conflict and war, and isolated from the rest of the world’. Such long-term impacts are also a feature of population displacement and societal divisions that are examined in the next section.
2.4.3.2. Conflict Dynamics and Displacement

Further distortions of HE that may emerge in conflict-affected contexts include population displacement and social polarisation. Internal population shifts can lead to some areas lacking HE demand while others are highly over-subscribed, usually due to large population movements to large cities during conflict. In Afghanistan during the early 1990s civil war Balkh University was the only fully functioning HEI and students therefore transferred leading to quadrupled enrolment in five years (Massey 1996). Some areas face the challenge of integrating Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) many of whom tend to be young. In 2004 during Cote D’Ivoire’s crisis thousands of students fled Bouake where the university campus was looted and shut. In response, a temporary campus was opened in Abidjan for displaced students (Sany 2010). Moreover, HEIs can be displaced, for example, Sudan’s long civil war led to displacement to Khartoum of campuses from South Sudan’s HEIs with only partial return since 2006 (Faye 2010, p.22).

Additionally, the ‘international mix’ of HEIs can be affected negatively by conflict. Foreign students flee from fighting and a country’s attractiveness as a study destination can be tarnished by conflict. For example, in 1974-75 non-Lebanese students in Lebanese universities totalled 57.3% and fell to approximately 20% in the year following civil war (Oweini 1998; Nahas 2009). Another example is Kuwait where many expatriate academics left following the Iraqi invasion. In such cases reduction in foreign students can decrease a vital source of additional income while displacement of foreign faculty members can create staffing shortages.

In divided societies the university system can reflect wider societal fractures with group homogenisation in HEIs. This may be captured as the ‘intra-national mix’ of HE. It refers to the degree to which the composition of the student body reflects the national social profile. In Lebanon the intra-national mix of HE was transformed

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6 ‘International mix’ is a criterion in the Times Higher Education University World Rankings 2010-2011. 60% of the score is international-to-domestic staff ratio and 40% international-to-domestic student ratio. See http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/world-university-rankings/2010-2011/analysis-methodology.html#international

7 ‘Intra-national mix’ is the author’s concept
during the 1975-1990 civil war. Universities reflected conflict-induced population movements by fragmenting along territorialised space in ‘ethnic enclaves’ or ‘safe havens’, for example, the splintering of the Lebanese University, the Lebanese American University, and Notre Dame University into various branch campuses across Lebanon’s ethno-sectarian ‘patchwork quilt’ (Nahas 2009; Al-Khatib & Johnson 2001).

Another impact is potentially long-lasting psychological scars on academic communities. As Urusaro (2003) puts in in the case of Rwanda, ‘the site of the genocide on the green hills of the beautiful Butare campus is the final refuge of the sons and daughters of this country, who at times, after having been tracked down like animals, perished under the strokes of their colleagues, their teachers, or their students’. After such episodes of violence there is an increased need for campus-level reconciliation and transitional justice efforts to overcome past legacies. Moreover, given the brutality of the Rwandan genocide and the long-term relative success of post-Genocide HE the academic community may be held to show signs of resilience and coping strategies after a traumatic experience which connects with the subject of the next section.

2.4.3.3. Coping Strategies

Finally, this section must recognise the often considerable coping strategies and resilience of HE communities during conflict. As Barakat (2005 p.262) writes ‘the starting point for assessing the capacity for recovery of any war-torn society is the recognition of the resilience and impressive survival abilities of those who have come through the trauma and hardship of violent conflict’. This concern with coping strategies connects to one of the main arguments of the thesis; that existing HE capacities and resources of conflict-affected societies should be built upon in recovery efforts rather than discarded as defective and built from a ‘blank slate’.
While attacks on education are increasingly well documented, the capacity of HE communities in conflict-affected societies to survive and adapt are not widely-recorded. During conflict HE may cease to function as a system, however, individual and collective coping strategies are still adopted. For example, the parallel education system emerged in Kosovo after ethnic Albanians were effectively excluded from formal education by Serb authorities in 1991 (Nelles 2005). Faculty members held classes in homes and after years in operation the system’s mere existence became a powerful symbol of resistance. Similarly, during civil war the University of El Salvador was shut for four years during which time a ‘University in Exile’ emerged with classes held in rented homes and apartments (Easterbrook 2003).

Coping strategies and stories of resilience during conflict can form powerful narratives of heroism that can strengthen corporative identities in HEIs in post-conflict societies. Benedek (1997) wrote of Bosnian HE that ‘continuation of the teaching process during the war with only minor interruptions was one of the heroic features of this period’. Similarly, Gazan students view education as a defence against Israeli aggression and ‘in a very difficult psychosocial landscape, education remains a powerful potential source of resilience’ (Kostelny & Wessells 2010, p.31). Baramki (2010) describes struggles to provide HE under occupation involving arrests, closures, and checkpoints which gave purpose and fostered solidarity among HE communities. This testimony is supported by Bruhn (2006) who argues that Palestinian universities enabled resistance and contributed to emerging national consciousness. She writes that ‘the space for collective self-expression is central to the university’s capacity to empower communities and contribute to social and political change’.
2.5. Conclusion

In conclusion, this chapter has investigated HE and conflict causation, conflict resolution and transformation, and conflict’s impact on HE. It has been found that HE is theorised to contribute to conflict causation through interaction with both economic and affective processes and that neat dichotomies between ‘greed’ and ‘grievance’ cannot capture the multi-functional role of complex HE systems. It was then seen that HE can contribute to mediation, resolution, and transformation of conflict although the sector’s capacity to do so is limited by various factors. Lastly, it was shown that conflict has both direct and indirect impacts on HE and that the sector tends to suffer more than primary and secondary education. Further, analysis showed that conflict often weakens capacity and increases needs of HE sectors; two factors affecting HE’s role in post-conflict recovery, the focus of the next chapter.
CHAPTER THREE

HIGHER EDUCATION AND POST-CONFLICT RECOVERY

3.0. Introduction

This goal of this chapter is to investigate HE in post-war reconstruction and recovery. HE is typically not a high priority in post-conflict states. The experience of post-conflict HE has received little academic attention and there have been no attempts to provide a comprehensive framework for analysing the field. This chapter aims to redress this imbalance by offering a global view of HE in post-conflict recovery and reconstruction. A central argument is that HE, while often neglected in post-war interventions, has the potential to be a key pillar capable of driving more effective recovery.

The overall goal of the chapter is to address the central research question by analysing key theoretical literature and providing a framework to inform examination of the two case-studies. To recap, RQ1 is as follows:

**RQ1:** Why should post-conflict states place strategic emphasis on the higher education sector in terms of post-war reconstruction and recovery priorities?

To begin, debates around HE and post-conflict recovery are analysed including several common arguments against HE, in particular that basic education should be the priority for post-conflict societies and that HE investment is not appropriate during reconstruction because it is a long-term developmental sector. While responding to and acknowledging some of these criticisms, the next section seeks to demonstrate the connection between HE and a wide range of processes central to post-conflict recovery including physical and sectoral reconstruction, conflict prevention, statebuilding, peacebuilding, reconciliation, and transitional justice. Recognising that HE frequently is constrained in contributing to these recovery processes the following section analyses the conjunctural, structural, institutional,
educational, and external features of the post-war environment that influence the HE-recovery relationship. Finally, the potential of options for HE recovery and development in post-conflict contexts is explored including privatisation and internationalisation.

3.1. The Neglected Pillar of Recovery

The goal of this section is to establish that HE in post-conflict contexts is an under-recognised and under-analysed sector with the potential to drive recovery; in short that HE is a neglected pillar of recovery. To begin, it can be stated that HE is commonly a very low priority in conventional approaches to post-war reconstruction. Buckland (2005) states that ‘much of the energy and resources of the international community have been directed at basic education, while education authorities have been left to their own resources to deal with the needs of the other subsectors’. Kumar (1996, p.20) further explains that:

_Bilateral and multilateral donors have also given economic and technical support to reopen institutions of higher learning- although the amounts are modest and the delivery slow, partly because the functioning of institutions of higher education is not universally perceived as a priority by relief agencies._

In support of this trend, two cases of internationally-administered reconstruction received very low donor or international agency support for HE. The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor initially budgeted no funds for HE in 2000; funds were only released after lobbying by the National University’s rector (Hill 2000). In another case, Iraq received no HE funding in the initial $18 billion allocated for reconstruction. Further illustration, Table 1 below shows that in only Lebanon and Cote D’Ivoire did HE receive more than 50% of total education ODA flows in the first three years following conflict.
Table 1. ODA flows ($ Millions – Constant 2008 prices) to selected-conflict affected countries in the three years after the signing of a peace agreement. Source: OECD-DAC QWERY Wizard for International Development Statistics.

However, it should be qualified that some donors, including France and the Netherlands, allocate substantial sums to HE while the World Bank has become more willing to support tertiary education. A World Bank study argues that post-conflict settings in which secondary and tertiary education are ‘eradicated’ constitute an exceptional category in which conventional wisdom on the developmental priority of basic education is weakened due to the need to restore human capital (Kreimer et al 1998). A review of World Bank education-sector lending in post-conflict countries found that primary education received 43%, tertiary 12%, and secondary 8% (Buckland 2005, p.63). Further, interest in HE in post-conflict states increased in the late 2000s with emerging international civil society initiatives in the area.

Low priority attached to HE is explained by various factors. Firstly, consensus on basic education as a development priority emerged at approximately the same time as post-conflict peacebuilding operations in the early 1990s. In a brief post-Cold War window of humanitarian and developmental optimism it was predicted that end of superpower rivalry would allow transmission of liberal democratic
institutions and markets across the world thus creating conditions for global peace. As De Waal (1997, p.2) writes:

At the ‘end of history’ following the collapse of Communism, the triumph of political liberalism appeared, briefly, so incontestable that civil society and economic prosperity seemed ready, with state repression removed, to spring naturally into place.

Peacebuilding missions focused on the dual imperatives of holding democratic elections and implementation of liberal market reforms. In this narrow conception of peacebuilding there is very little linkage between the central tasks of peacebuilding and HE systems in post-conflict areas.

The 1990 Education For All conference in Jomtien, Thailand, represented a coalescing of global donor and development actors around a basic education agenda. HE rebuilding in this period was impacted indirectly through increased attention to primary schooling and decreased tertiary sector funding. For example, Cambodia, after the Paris Peace Accords in 1991 was not recipient of substantial resources for reconstructing HE (Chamnan & Ford 2004, p.342). Prioritisation of basic education was enshrined in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the goal of universal basic education. Furthermore, Novelli (2010) argues that invading Afghanistan has been retrospectively justified by Western powers through provision of basic education, particularly to girls. As Ghani, Lockhart and Carnhan (2005) argue ‘the degree of consensus on the importance of a primary education, particularly for girls, is so general that it does not bear repetition... the importance of secondary and tertiary education in post-conflict conditions, however, is not yet adequately grasped’.

Education in conflict and emergencies emerged as a field of policy-practice and academic interest in the late 1990s and early 2000s. During the 2000s basic education became widely-recognised as the ‘fourth pillar’ of humanitarian action (Nicolai & Triplehorn 2003) and an important post-conflict sector. A burgeoning academic literature followed this shift in policy analysing education, conflict, and recovery.
from multiple perspectives (Bush & Saltarelli 2000; Buckland 2005; Davies 2004a; Brown 2011). However, the majority of the literature does not address HE in post-conflict recovery. Where HE is discussed, it is often viewed as an expensive and unproductive sector in competition for resources with basic and secondary education (see for example UNESCO 2011, p.120). While mainstream development thinking was beginning to consider HE an important sector the same was not true in the fields of statebuilding and reconstruction.

It should be qualified that the education in emergencies and reconstruction literature is not silent on HE. Buckland (2005, p.32) argues that standardised approaches to post-conflict education do not sufficiently focus on all educational sub-sectors which leads to the ‘danger that postconflict reconstruction will introduce or exacerbate imbalances in the system’. He suggests the need to correct this ‘sectoral imbalance’ through an innovative and system-wide approach including multilateral strategies that enable secondary and tertiary sectors to mobilise critically needed resources.

Furthermore, the narrow peacebuilding approach was transformed by the emergence of statebuilding in the late 1990s and 2000s. While HE remains peripheral to much statebuilding literature the sector is considered important by some leading analysts. HE’s potential in post-conflict statebuilding and reconstruction is defended by Ghani and Lockhart (2008) who argue that failure to prioritise HE led to long-term capacity deficits in Iraq and Afghanistan that seriously frustrated statebuilding efforts. In Afghanistan during the initial reconstruction period HE was a very low priority. Reconstruction was too focused on ‘hard’ issues of security while donor education policy focused on basic education. This position is supported by Haneef Atmar, former Minister of Education in Afghanistan, who argues that failure to systematically address HE resulted from lack of vision for HE and its de-prioritisation. He holds that HE
should have been a central part of an integrated reconstruction strategy focused on building human capital.\textsuperscript{8}

Such a rationale was adopted in post-genocide Rwanda where donor priorities for investment in basic education were in tension with national prioritisation of HE; an important component of national development strategies. In the early 2000s Rwanda spent 33\% of its education budget on HE; a very high figure for the region and post-conflict contexts. Hayman (2007) describes how Rwandan government officials strategically navigated donor demands and resisted external pressures to focus on basic education and a rural pro-poor poverty reduction strategy. National priorities were to pursue a hi-tec growth strategy led by strong ICT and HE sectors with the goal of integrating Rwanda into the global knowledge economy (Uvin 2010). Hayman (2007) holds that the Government pledged to follow donor preferences while in reality implementing their Vision 2020 (Hayman 2007). While HE expenditures were reduced over time largely due to donor pressure, they remain high. Rwanda is held to be a successful example of long-term post-conflict reconstruction and supports the argument for conceiving of HE as a critical national capacity and strategic investment as an alternative to conventional post-conflict strategy.

Another reason for low prioritisation relates to conceptualisations of reconstruction and recovery. In chapter one it was seen that narrow views of reconstruction as physical restoration of the status quo contrast with conceptualisations of recovery as a holistic process encompassing various activities. HE is classified as unrelated to recovery in conceptions of post-conflict reconstruction that are limited to short-term stabilisation and ‘hard’ issues. A wider yet still narrow conception of post-war reconstruction would incorporate Security Sector Reform (SSR), Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), and macroeconomic stabilisation. In this conception HE may still be expected to be viewed as peripheral to recovery. Crucially, when the task facing post-conflict societies is defined as a holistic recovery process the utility of HE as a multi-dimensional and multi-functional

\textsuperscript{8} Personal communication, York, UK 2012
institution with potential to contribute to all recovery sectors and processes can be recognised.

A related reason for low priority relates to sequencing of policies in post-conflict transitions. Sequencing of policies is crucial to successful post-conflict reconstruction (Timilsina 2006), and HE is often viewed as a long-term investment inappropriate for support in the relief and reconstruction phases. White and Cliffe (2000) explain that primary education tends be categorised as a relief activity while secondary and HE are considered developmental activities. They note that the logic guiding this distinction led the EU to reject funding a scholarship programme in Somalia. The conventional rationale behind short-term priorities of relief and reconstruction holds that establishing security, stabilising the economy, and re-establishing critical institutions such as courts should be prioritised above all else in the first phase of reconstruction.

Dobbins et al (2007, p.152) The Beginner’s Guide To Nation-Building is an influential work defending this position. They argue that in immediate post-conflict contexts developing HE systems hinders effective service-delivery in high priority areas including health, basic education, and the legal system (Dobbins et al 2007, p.152). They state that ‘at this stage, projects to reform pension systems, create a stock market, or develop higher education tend to distract from rather than contribute to the effective provision of government services’. Dobbins et al (2007, p.148) continue that:

_Globally, there is considerable capacity in tertiary education. Most postconflict societies would be better off concentrating resources on primary and secondary schools than on state-run universities, at least until economic growth has created a stronger tax and funding base._

Further, they argue that post-conflict countries should concentrate on primary and secondary education, utilising scholarships for study abroad and encouraging private providers to meet post-secondary educational needs. In this ‘division of
labour’ there is no need for state-run universities and national HE capacity. This position connects three areas common to conventional approaches to post-conflict HE; low priority to the sector, private HE, and internationalisation. While the ‘hard security’ approach would rule out HE investment, this approach views HE as a long-term developmental investment potentially appropriate at a late stage of a post-conflict transition after a reconstruction phase prioritising restoration of critical infrastructure including electricity, transport, health systems, and communications networks.

The concept of post-conflict transitions refers to the relief-reconstruction-development continuum to describe the trajectory of recovery in post-conflict societies. However, the reality of post-conflict societies rarely fits a neat linear transition model. UNDG/ECHA (2009) state that transition processes, ‘exist simultaneously, at varying levels of intensity, susceptibility to reversals, and opportunity’. Multiple transitions are underway simultaneously, including from rural to urban, isolated to internationalised, war to peace, or military to civilian. In addition to these often turbulent processes, states are frequently expected to undertake complex processes of institutional engineering including democratisation and marketisation within overall ‘liberal’ post-conflict transitions.

A major argument of this thesis is that HE in post-conflict societies has the potential to act as a critical national capacity that could enable more effective transitions from relief through reconstruction into long-term and sustained development. A similar argument is made by Zeus (2009) who writes that in the context of protracted refugee situations HE can support transition from relief to development. She writes that ‘in the long-run, higher education, while requiring significant financial jump-start and continuing commitment by donors, could contribute to breaking out of the relief-cycle in offering a way to development and self-sustainability’. While HE conventionally understood is not a priority area in post-conflict societies and is classified as a developmental rather than a reconstruction activity it is argued here that strategic investment in HE has potential to contribute to more effective recovery at all stages of post-conflict transitions. The following section provides
numerous other examples and arguments supporting the view that HE sectors can contribute positively to recovery during all stages of transition.

3.2. Core Functions of Higher Education in Post-conflict Recovery

In the previous section it was shown that several influential positions do not regard HE as an important sector for post-conflict investment. It should be qualified that, as described in chapter one, measuring economic and social impact of HE ‘externalities’, for instance increased institutional quality or moral education, is difficult in ‘normal’ development contexts. In post-conflict settings measurement of these variables becomes even more problematic. For this reason, many studies can miss the indirect, mediated, and long-term impacts of HE on post-conflict recovery. This section is designed to specifically address RQ3, which asks:

RQ3: What functions can higher education perform in contributing towards effective post-conflict recovery?

To effectively address RQ3 this section will provide a review of academic and ‘grey’ literature to identify the theorised linkages between HE and post-war recovery. The main functions of HE in relation to central ‘tasks’ of post-conflict recovery will be analysed including physical and sectoral reconstruction, conflict prevention, humanitarian relief, statebuilding, economic recovery, and conflict transformation. To begin, HE’s role in short-term stabilisation and conflict prevention will be considered.

3.2.1. Conflict Prevention and Stabilisation

Ensuring security and stability is widely-considered the most foundational task facing post-conflict societies and a necessary condition of effective reconstruction. As Caplan (2005, p.45) states, ‘public order and internal security are the *sine qua non* of civil rule’ and vital for reconstruction. Preventing outbreaks of violence, civil
unrest, and armed conflict is crucial to maintaining a secure post-war environment. Many ‘post-conflict’ countries run significant risk of slipping back into armed conflict within ten years (Collier, Hoeffler & Söderbom 2008). Conflict prevention has therefore become an increasingly important concern of reconstruction and peacebuilding operations (Ackermann 2003).

HE has a theorised positive impact on post-war security and stability through conflict prevention. Unemployed young people are increasingly perceived as sources of instability in post-conflict contexts (Rose & Greeley 2006; Collier 2000; Munive 2010). As Buckland (2005, p.25) states ‘slow progress in the expansion of secondary and tertiary education tends to create a backlog of frustrated and unemployed youth ripe for recruitment into violence or crime’. HE expansion in post-war environments has therefore been held to reduce likelihood of conflict recidivism by providing educational opportunities addressing grievances including high youth unemployment (Rubin 2009).

A study of HE enrolments in the first five years of peace in a large set of post-conflict cases found that ‘increased enrollments (sic) in higher education in the first five years after the end of a conflict significantly decreases the likelihood of the restart of a civil war’ (Breuning & Ishiyama 2010). The results are explained by increased opportunity costs of reverting to conflict for former rebel leaders and middle-class potential rebel leaders once enrolled in HE.

However, the option of short-term stability through HE expansion can entrench medium and long-term risks. If educational opportunities are much greater than livelihood opportunities then in the medium-term raising expectations of newly educated youth will lead to even greater grievances and conflict risk (Rose & Greeley 2006). This point illustrates the centrality of job creation to successful processes of post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction.

On the negative side, HEIs may be viewed as a destabilising force in post-war settings. Student political action can trigger social conflict with sometimes violent consequences that risk conflict-escalation. For example, in Nicaragua political
contest over the university budget became a highly charged national political issue in 1992 in the post-Sandinista period. On the day of a crucial vote on whether HE would retain its 6% budget allocation a leading morning newspaper ran the headline ‘the 6 per cent vote will determine peace or crisis’ (Arnove 1995, p.47). In another example, students in Cote D’Ivoire acted as peace process spoilers at crucial moments after 2003. FESCI members disrupted identification sessions at which primarily Northern citizens are registered; an important peace process condition (HRW 2008).

HE can make a critical contribution to stabilisation through security sector reform (SSR). Although military universities are generally conceived as peripheral to national university systems they nonetheless constitute part of a diversified HE landscape. In post-conflict countries with weak militaries investing in military education may be argued to be important for developing modern professional armed forces and therefore ensuring domestic security.

This rationale was employed in Afghanistan; the National Military Academy was established in 2005 after a policy-transfer process in which senior US army officers sponsored Afghanistan’s Ministry of Defence to study the US Military Academy at West Point model (Global Security n.d; NYT 2004). Cadets receive four-year degrees focused on engineering and languages. Expected impact on reconstruction is clear; ‘the government hopes graduates will help rebuild roads, bridges, and an electricity grid ravaged by decades of war and neglect’ (Jones 2008). In 2010 construction began on the Afghan National Security University to integrate advanced security services and military training; its $200 million budget dwarfing annual public HE expenditure. It may be questioned whether the benefits of a military university outweigh the opportunity cost of not investing part of the sum in Afghanistan’s under-resourced public HEIs.

Another potential contribution of HE is through Demobilisation, Demilitarisation and Reintegration (DDR); programmes for collecting weapons, breaking up armed groups, and integrating former combatants into society (Muggah 2009, p.3). Very little has been written about HE’s role in DDR processes. In essence, expanding HE
opportunities can assist demobilisation by incentivising combatants to lay down arms and pick up books. A central purpose for re-opening the University of Liberia was ‘to make it an instrument for ending the war – since many of the 60,000 combatants were college students’ that ‘laid down their arms to return to their studies’ (Seyon 1997).

However, it should be expected that HE performs a very limited role in reintegration processes in most post-conflict countries due to low gross enrolment ratios and low student participation in conflict. For example, in a study of ex-combatants in Sierra Leone it was found that 36% had no schooling at all while only 1% had received any HE (Solomon & Ginifer 2008). However, this trend is not universal; some conflict-affected countries have relatively high enrolment and significant participation of university-age youth in conflict, for example Syria, Libya, and Iraq. In another case, when the University of Liberia re-opened in 1991 one-quarter of enrolled students were former combatants.

Technical tertiary education should be expected to have greater DDR benefits than university education because relevant skills could be transferred relatively quickly enabling reintegration through employment. However, former combatants’ skills have also been viewed as having benefits for academic education. Delgado (2008) describes a politics course established in Colombia for former rebels, many of whom had taken up civil and political positions. His findings suggest that experience of fighting may be a valuable resource for ex-combatants pursuing their studies, for example, in peace and conflict studies ex-combatants could offer insights into motivations for participation in conflict.

In sum, HE is not widely viewed as an important aspect of SSR or DDR although the sector could play a theoretically important role within long-term programmes. By contrast, an area where HE has a more basic connection to post-war recovery is providing reconstruction-relevant skills, which will be addressed in the following section.
3.2.2. Physical and Sectoral Reconstruction

HE’s most fundamental role in post-conflict societies is providing skilled graduates and expertise connected to physical and sectoral reconstruction. In general, many sectoral reconstruction processes operate with a short-term relief mentality and insufficiently support sustainable local capacity. Supporting domestic HE capacity in core areas of reconstruction including health, engineering, and basic education early in post-war recovery are long-term investments that enable sustainable capacity and human resources for reconstruction.

As Del Castillo (2008, p.222) writes, post-conflict societies frequently ‘lack basic managerial and technical capabilities’ due to brain drain. Other factors affecting skills and capacities include war casualties, disrupted education systems (Buckland 2006), and HIV/AIDS (Anand 2005). With insufficient numbers of trained professionals in areas including law, medicine, education, or health post-war recovery processes face significant barriers. In short, ‘post-conflict countries face a skills gap at a time when human capital is in high demand’ (World Bank/UNDP 2005). For example, ten years after Mozambique’s war the country possessed seven pharmacists per 16 million people, no certified accountants, and one doctor per 50,000 citizens (Hopper 2006, p.56).

MoHE-A/IEEP (2004, p.6) argues that ‘there is already a great shortage of highly-skilled people in Afghanistan. Unless higher education is expanded, it will be even greater in the future’. Similarly, Barakat (2008) argues that building human capital is crucial to sustainable development in Afghanistan and that neglected HE should be prioritised to meet demand for highly-skilled personnel. A contrasting case of relatively high post-conflict human capital is Lebanon where HE in engineering, architecture, and related disciplines provided reconstruction-relevant skills, for example, Hezbollah’s NGO Jihad Al Bina’a, following the 2006 July War rapidly mobilised 3000-4000 volunteer surveyors, architects, and engineers to rebuild damaged and destroyed homes in a manner more effective than state or donor...
interventions (Barakat & Zyck 2008, p.15). However, it has been cautioned that over-provision of HE courses in security reform, peace studies, governance, and counselling in post-conflict African states led to short-term employment of graduates in aid-agencies while leading to unemployment and irrelevant skills once international agencies move to the next hotspot several years later (Omeje quoted in Grove 2013).

This consideration suggests that HE’s greatest long-term contribution to reconstruction is in providing advanced training and skills in important disciplines and areas rather than narrow skill sets favoured by international agencies. Investment in specific subject areas including medicine, law, teacher training, or economics may be held to produce recovery-relevant skills in critical areas including health, rule of law, basic education, and the economy respectively. For example, medical education should be viewed as a major pillar of post-conflict health reconstruction. Leather et al (2006) state that a major obstacle to post-conflict health development is ‘a void in teaching and training of all cadres of health workers dating back to the preconflict era’. As an example, Deolalikar (1999, p.36) argues that medical education in Cambodia in the mid-1990s was of such low quality that graduates were far short of regional standards thus constituting a ‘major bottleneck’ to health sector rebuilding.

In all of these advanced disciplines investment in human capital is a powerful rationale for post-conflict HE. Support for the hypothesis that high skills or human capital are an important determinant of successful reconstruction can be drawn from post-WWII West Germany and Japan. While both countries were severely affected by war their long-term reconstruction was remarkable. This may, in part, be explained by presence of large numbers of skilled workers able to lead reconstruction and the ‘institutional memory’ that survived physical destruction. As Coyne (2005) suggests in a comparison between post-WWII successes and contemporary ‘failed states’: ‘perhaps it is the case that a different set of knowledge and skills existed in prewar Japan and Germany as compared to Haiti and Somalia’.
In addition to reconstruction-relevant skills, advanced education can provide skills and knowledge for often neglected sectors important to a holistic recovery process. For example, advanced training in psychiatry, archaeology, and social work may be linked to sustainable recovery in addressing psycho-social needs, cultural heritage, and the caring sectors respectively.

Brain drain of highly-skilled individuals is a major dynamic affecting human capital available for recovery tasks. As a response, domestic HE can contribute to re-supplying depleted pools of human capital necessary for recovery by producing skilled graduates. However, HE can also contribute to recovery as a pull factor in a process of ‘brain gain’. Diaspora and displaced populations constitute valuable human resources pools for recovery, for example, in promoting post-conflict governance reform (Brinkerhoff 2008) or providing capital investment (Nielsen & Riddle 2010). Furthermore, frequent disruption of HE in conflict-affected countries combined with the tendency of emigrants to gain advanced education or skills abroad make highly-skilled diaspora an even more valuable asset (PGD/OECD 2010a).

Investment in post-conflict HE encourages skilled diaspora return in several ways. Davies (2004a, p.98) argues that following conflict ‘whether academics return depends at least in part on the future the country holds; the brain drain is worse in poor countries such as Rwanda’. Another factor, Chauvet and Collier (2007) argue that public investment in post-primary education is necessary in post-conflict contexts because educational opportunities are a very important attractor of displaced diaspora whose children are usually enrolled in the host country. The rationale employed by US reconstruction planners for large investments in 1950s Korean HE was that ‘availability of advanced high-quality centers would reduce the outflow of talented students seeking training in foreign universities’ and ‘draw back to Korea outstanding scholars who had settled abroad’ (Dodge quoted in Lee 2004, p.155). From this brief discussion preventing ‘brain drain’ and stimulating skilled diaspora return are further contributions of HE to post-war human capital.
requirements. Moreover, HE’s importance to building high-level human capital is also of direct relevance to statebuilding which will be considered now.

### 3.2.3. Statebuilding

Early 1990s post-conflict peacebuilding missions focused on holding democratic elections and implementation of liberal market-reforms. During the late 1990s and early 2000s post-conflict peacebuilding operations were transformed by new focus on ‘construction or strengthening of legitimate governmental institutions’ (Paris & Sisk 2009, p.1). This development was driven in part by increased academic and policy attention to the state and recognition of limitations to dominant peacebuilding approaches emphasising elections and market-reforms which insufficiently addressed wider institutional post-war contexts.

The statebuilding literature places greater importance on HE than the narrow liberal peacebuilding literature, for example, Ghani and Lockhart (2008). In this section the HE-statebuilding relationship will be considered in terms of several core aspects of statebuilding; rule of law; capacity-building; and legitimacy. To begin, the role of HE, legal education in particular, will be examined in its contribution to the rule of law.

#### 3.2.3.1. Rule of Law

Re-establishing rule of law is a fundamental task of statebuilding and restoring civil administration (Plunkett 2005). Legal education is argued to be crucial to establishing post-conflict rule of law (Waters 2007; Swenson & Sugerman 2011). In many post-conflict countries where legal institutions are often weak, efforts at restoring legal capacity are challenged by insufficient qualified legal professionals. For example, in May 2006 one-third of Afghanistan’s 1,415 judges held HE qualifications (Lister 2007). In 2002 Mozambique’s lawyer-to-population ratio was
1:102,222 compared to 1:400 in England and Wales and 1:4360 in South Africa (Baker & Scheye 2007). In Burundi before the 2004 UN mission there were only 60 defence lawyers present nationally and mostly concentrated in the capital Bujumbura (Sannerholm 2007). Investment in legal education is therefore held to redress this critical shortage of legal expertise to support meaningful legal reform.

Stromseth, Wippman and Brooks (2006, p.185) argue for a ‘synergistic’ approach to post-conflict rule of law reform focused on critical inter-related capacities; law-making, law-enforcement and adjudicatory capacities in addition to legal education capacity. They hold that the latter is often neglected with donors providing short-term training to demonstrate immediate impact. Rather, it is contended that ‘in the long term, effective indigenous legal education is critical to training a new generation’ of legal professionals. Similarly, Sannerholm (2007) writes that in post-conflict states ‘an interesting aspect of judicial reform is that it rarely includes a focus on legal education and support to law schools’. He argues that over-reliance on continuing legal training rather than basic legal education can solve short-term problems but is unsustainable.

Swenson and Sugerman (2011) argue that Afghan legal education has been a neglected dimension of rule of law programmes. They argue that legal education is essential to rule of law because it impacts heavily on how lawyers work and ‘promotes scholarship and practical expertise’ among government officials. In many post-conflict states legal education requires significant curricula reform and professionalization. Afghan legal education ‘prepares graduates ill-suited to address the profound challenges facing Afghanistan’s nascent constitutional order’ (Swenson & Sugerman 2011). As Stromseth, Wippman and Brooks (2006, p.244) write ‘inadequate university legal education can be a serious obstacle to the development of a fair and effective justice system’.

Existing domestic capacity in legal education and related disciplines including criminology and forensics is an often under-utilised resource for post-conflict rule of law and justice reforms. OHCHR (2006) writes that ‘the United Nations overlooks local academic research and expertise, which could enrich all aspects of its rule-of-
law work’. They hold that greater involvement of domestic academic experts would have two major impacts; enhanced contextual understanding of rule of law interventions and increased sustainability of capacity after outside legal advisors leave.

Legal education is arguably more important when transition is accompanied by radical legal, constitutional, and institutional reforms, for example, externally-led post-conflict transitions in East Timor and Afghanistan. Better legal education supplies more legally-trained professionals who can comprehend and address complex changes. Without sufficient legal expertise post-conflict states may have inadequate human capacities for effective self-representation in international negotiations and other forums; an obstacle to ‘local ownership’. For example, supporting indigenous legal education is important to safeguarding representation of national interests in the design and operation of new institutions (Waters 2007). This point connects to the central argument of the next section; that HE can make ‘ownership’ meaningful by supplying advanced skills, knowledge, and expertise.

3.2.3.2. Capacity-Building and Governance

Capacity-building may be defined as ‘means by which skills, experience, technical and management capacity are developed within an organizational structure’ (OECD 2002). Capacity-building has increasingly become a principal form of post-conflict donor assistance. As Chard (2005) explains, donor programming assumes causal links between capacity-building, good governance, and post-conflict recovery. Capacity is arguably central to recovery, for example, Barakat (2005, p.262) writes ‘in essence the post-war reconstruction task is about restoring and developing the capacity of a nation to function and manage all aspects of its collective life’.

HE and human resources are important factors in effective rebuilding of governmental institutions. As Collier (2009) states, ‘a legacy of civil war is usually
that the civil service deteriorates, partly because the society loses skills’. In post-war Mozambique a major obstacle to developing the parliamentary system was the weak human resource base and lack of staff or party recruits with HE (Ostheimer 1999; Manning 2002). Ghani and Lockhart (2007) support the argument for HE in capacity-building efforts writing that:

Good governance depends on a credible path of upward social mobility for young people; this path cannot be created without in-country investment in institutions of higher learning that provide the leaders and managers that would constitute the key constituency for change and make the state, market and civil society function.

The above quote illustrates the link between capacity-building supported by HE, capacity, governance, and recovery in post-conflict societies. Post-conflict statebuilding has been held to frequently prioritise central state institutions and government at the expense of local governance to the detriment of overall peacebuilding outcomes (Berdal 2009, p.127). However, HE provision due to donor assistance was found to be the most critical factor enabling effective local governance in post-war Bosnia because it overcame human resources, staff organisation, and low knowledge obstacles (Pickering 2011).

HE can arguably support long-term sustainability of capacity-building. For example, Ghani and Lockhart (2008, p.142) note how the UN and World Bank warned the Afghan Government against investment in HE, in favour of primary education. They link this failure to revitalize HE with continuous high spending on technical assistance to compensate for ‘low capacity’, many years into reconstruction. Torabi and Delesgues (2008) agree, arguing that neglecting Afghan HEIs post-2001 rendered the sector unable to produce sufficient numbers of competent professionals for a viable ‘exit strategy’ to enable transition beyond extreme dependence on expensive technical assistance. Haidari (2009) concurs, emphasising the priority that must be attached to Afghan secondary and HE to redress massive capacity-deficits produced by initial reconstruction strategies.
Another example, Rugumamu and Gbla (2003) argue that capacity-building in post-conflict Uganda was unsustainable due to ‘inordinate dependency on foreign financing and expertise without any imaginative exit strategies’. They prescribe donor attention to HE to generate human capital and ‘strengthen the country’s ability to nurture, sustain, update and regenerate capacity over time’. Katorobo (2007, p.62) agrees that Uganda’s post-conflict reconstruction suffered from skill-shortage due to large-scale ‘brain drain’ leading to high technical assistance dependence. However, he notes that HE expansion led to oversupply of skilled graduates, unemployment, and further brain drain.

Post-conflict statebuilding requires far-reaching reforms to create and maintain quality institutions and develop functioning service-delivery mechanisms. HE is arguably important for effective post-conflict reforms. Chauvet and Collier (2007) find that societies with higher secondary enrolment are more likely to initiate challenging reforms. In their econometric test secondary education is used as a proxy for a societal knowledge on the assumption that ‘reform will be easier in better educated societies’. Chauvet and Collier (2004) argue that donor aid to secondary and HE in fragile states is a productive investment creating preconditions for reform. They hold that lack of qualified personnel in the poorest countries is a significant obstacle to implementing ‘radical adaptations’ necessary to long-term transformation and that therefore any programmes supplying ‘well-trained individuals’ should be welcomed.

Weak ‘local ownership’ of post-war reconstruction and gaps between local and international priorities has been identified as a major factor explaining the poor record of international post-war interventions (Brinkerhoff 2005; Donais 2009). In response, UN peacebuilding operations increasingly emphasise that ensuring ‘national and local ownership’ is critical to their effectiveness (von Billerbeck 2010). Ownership can be conceptualised as local and national actors’ role in a continuum from participating in, designing, implementing, to controlling post-war projects, programmes, and processes. However, as Chesterman (2007) argues, lip-service to
ownership is often more about ‘buy-in’ or consent than genuine control and should be placed towards the ‘participating in’ end of the above continuum.

HE investment is also held to strengthen ‘ownership’ of statebuilding. As Ghani, Carnahan and Lockhart (2006) argue ‘key to promoting good governance is the local ownership of a state-building agenda. This cannot be promoted without investing in the creation of first-rate institutions of tertiary education’. The dominant approach to post-conflict reform typically involves complex institutional and policy processes including introducing market economies, constitutions, or liberal democratic institutions. To illustrate, Sloper (1999, p.10) argues that due to rapid changes in Cambodia during 1993-1997 former cadres of the two previous regimes were not equipped to provide leadership and enact change while faced with complex transitional issues and challenges. Domestic universities have a comparative advantage in supplying skills to manage complex transitions and reforms, defend national interests, and thereby promote authentic ownership. Establishing specialised courses in critical disciplines, for instance a Masters in Public Administration (MPA), could provide skills-training and upgrading of civil servants and redress reliance on external consultants and technical assistance.

However, it may be contended that theorised benefits of HE to institutional quality will experience significant lag-time because it takes several years to produce new graduates and expand HEIs. While this point contains a partial truth, the above discussed MPA course’s impact could require less than one year between enrolment and training of young civil servants. Another objection may be that impact of HE externalities, including enhanced institutional quality, is very difficult to measure, in particular in post-conflict settings. In sum, while inconclusive, the above discussion suggests that quality post-conflict HE should be expected to have a positive impact on reform and institutional quality although some effects are likely to be realised over the long-term. Beyond capacity, another major aspect of statebuilding is legitimacy, a concept addressed in the next section.
3.2.3.3. State Legitimacy

Legitimacy became a keyword in statebuilding and reconstruction during the 2000s. ‘Strengthening legitimate institutions and governance’ to move past violence is the WDR 2011’s main message while lack or absence of legitimacy is defined as an important dimension of state fragility (OECD 2010b) and post-conflict recovery (Papagianni 2008; Berdal 2009, p.95; Brinkerhoff, Wetterberg & Dunn 2012). HE’s contribution to post-conflict legitimacy has not been discussed before although there are reasons to view the possibility as fruitful.

Legitimacy can be derived from various sources. Performance-based legitimacy may be accrued by states through delivering goods and services. Post-conflict provision of basic education has the greatest potential for increasing performance-related legitimacy (Barakat 2009) although re-opening HEIs shut by conflict can also contribute. Long-term promise and delivery of HE expansion can form a central component of a legitimacy-enhancing social contract. For example, in post-WWII Europe transformation of HE from small elite systems to mass systems formed a significant part of the post-war consensus and social-democratic legitimacy (Judt 2005, p.393).

In addition to performance, legitimacy may be drawn from symbolic and affective dimensions. In newly-independent nations recovering from war, universities are a trapping of modern statehood. Shils and Roberts (2004, p.164) argue that post-colonial ‘universities became part of the symbolic apparatus of progressive civilization, of modernity’. At the domestic-level, the University of Juba, displaced in Khartoum, is a potent symbol of South Sudanese nationhood and its potential return to Juba has been a source of conflict since the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Wallace 2006). HE has been held to confer a degree of international legitimacy, for example, Shillinger (2005) cites the fact the Somaliland has universities as a reason for granting statehood internationally.
After the 2010 Côte d’Ivoire post-election crisis President Ouattara closed all HEIs, heavily looted during crisis, for 18 months while major renovation and development was completed at a cost of $220 million and the power of the student militia FESCI reduced (Fatunde 2011a; AFP 2012). This may be explained as motivated by development thinking; the President stating that ‘as an economist, I am convinced that investment in universities brings the highest yield in development’ (Corey-Boulet 2012). However, this move should be interpreted as driven in part by the need to enhance the new President’s legitimacy and is supported by the renaming of Bouake University to Université Alasane Ouattara. Furthermore, the government aimed to generate international legitimacy, evidenced in the advertorial in BBC Africa Magazine and global media coverage of the story (IRIN 2012). This example illustrates use of HE as a means of accruing performance-related, symbolic, and international legitimacy.

However, HE’s role in enhancing state legitimacy motivates one powerful critique. In post-conflict contexts large subsidies to unproductive HE sectors are arguably maintained to bolster state support amongst urban middle-class constituencies and elite groups. Rather, it is argued, re-distributing educational resources to basic education would support pro-poor growth, rural poverty reduction and conflict-sensitive development strategies. For example, Novelli (2011) argues that Sierra Leone’s prioritisation of HE for urban and elite groups over basic education for the rural and poor was a core factor in educational exclusion and marginalisation, a key conflict-driver. He holds that continued post-war priority to HE was maintained despite government statements backing basic education. Rwanda fits this pattern; donors and agencies argued for reduced HE funding to support more equitable development. Furthermore, Braithwaite et al (2010) hold that education budgets in post-conflict Solomon Islands are ‘badly skewed towards funding for the children of the elite to participate in higher education’.

In sum, it has been seen that HE can in theory play important roles in the main dimensions of statebuilding and that while this possibility is under-recognised in
statebuilding literature there are notable contributions that do recognise the sector’s comparative advantage. Another area where HE in post-conflict contexts represents an under-utilised resource is as a humanitarian actor, which will be addressed next.

3.2.4. Humanitarian Assistance

HEIs have been held to be potentially important actors in contributing to post-war relief and recovery operations. In the post-earthquake rebuilding of Haiti, universities were important in organising relief efforts. Community service emerged at Quisqueya University with medical students running clinics, engineering students assisting in temporary camp construction, and education students offering alternative education (Pankratov 2010). Similarly, the American University of Beirut Center for Civic Engagement and Community Services supported student volunteers in administering a shelter project to support local communities in rebuilding damaged and destroyed houses after the 2006 July War and also in constructing shelters for Syrian refugees in 2013 (AUB 2013).

Refugee HE is a major area in which the sector can contribute during humanitarian crises. Forced displacement is a major consequence of war and some post-conflict contexts struggle with refugees and internal displacement for many years, even generations. Buckland (2005, p.67) writes that ‘the neglect of secondary and postsecondary education typical of postconflict environments is even more pronounced in refugee education’. Refugees face obstacles to accessing HE in their host countries including expectations they pay international student fees, requirements for special permission to study, or denial of access (Morlang & Stulte 2008). Furthermore, donors commonly reject tertiary education spending for refugees because educational provision at lower levels is very low and HE expenditures benefit small elite groups (Dryden-Peterson 2010).

Dryden-Peterson (2010) identifies three main reasons for providing HE to conflict-affected refugees; HE offers protection, refugee demand for HE is very strong, and
HE supports reconstruction through providing ‘human and social capital’ that is a resource upon return. The latter reason supports the central thesis defended here that HE is a long-term developmental investment crucial to post-conflict recovery. One case fitting the theorised return-recovery link is Afghan refugees, many of whom accessed HE opportunities abroad and who constituted a valuable post-war inflow of educated individuals. Morlang and Stulte (2008) argue that the DAFI scholarship Afghan programme successfully facilitated returns because tertiary education provides the ‘skills and entrepreneurial willingness to return early’. Due to shortages in qualified personnel caused by conflict DAFI recipients face positive employment prospects upon return and 70% of scholarship recipient returnees were ‘employed in sectors relevant to the reconstruction and the development of their countries’ (UNHCR 2007, p.6).

However, return creates logistical problems for post-conflict HE including high diversity in the system, possible excess demand, accreditation recognition, and access blockages for refugees (IIEP 2010, p.5). Furthermore, tertiary education provision for Afghan refugees suffered a lack of donor coordination rendering reinsertion into Afghan HE much more complex for administrators and served as a barrier to reintegration (Morlang & Stulte 2008). The recovery perspective on refugee HE accords with the argument of the next section; that a long-term developmental approach is required to maximise HE’s potential in contributing to post-conflict economic recovery.

3.2.5. Economic Recovery

HE tends to be perceived more as a post-war economic problem than opportunity. In poor countries facing numerous post-conflict challenges public HE expenditure may be viewed as a barrier to investment in more productive sectors. Public tertiary education is expensive; in some cases educating one university student equals the
cost of educating over fifty primary students. Furthermore, in transitional societies with legacies of command-economies HE sectors are seen as bloated and inefficient. Another factor, HE in many post-conflict countries produces graduates with skills and knowledge irrelevant to economic or reconstruction needs. HE is therefore often viewed as a lag on economic performance rather than as a potential recovery-driver. However, this section will review ways in which HE can contribute to economic recovery in post-conflict settings.

Given the state’s centrality to creating conditions for economic development, devising national development plans, and providing public goods in most post-conflict contexts (Sisk 2013) HE can contribute to economic recovery by providing expertise in these areas. Additionally, economic recovery faces complex challenges including entrenched war-economies and economic crises requiring responses that demand expertise including macro-economic stabilisation, regulating extractive industries, international negotiations, and participation in global governance regimes. Incentivising return of highly-skilled expatriates in post-conflict settings can therefore aid economic recovery (Chauvet & Collier 2007; Sisk 2013). Furthermore, gearing HE to these challenges can provide expertise, research, and skilled graduates in relevant disciplines that would enable a long-term sustainable approach to building economic governance capacity, generate employment domestically, and avoiding the legitimacy dilemma of relying on ‘outsiders’ to staff key institutions indefinitely.

While HE has a limited short-term impact on tough economic recovery challenges such as macro-economic stabilisation the sector has been held to be a potential engine of post-conflict economic recovery. Agriculture accounts for much employment in post-conflict contexts (Ozerdem & Roberts 2012) and agricultural HE and extension activities are therefore argued to have major potential in reducing unemployment, securing livelihoods, and redressing ‘urban bias’ in reconstruction (Bertelsen 2009). For example, the American University of Beirut (AUB) Land and People relief program mobile clinic offered ‘agricultural and business development advice’ to local communities (GUNI 2005).
HE can support economic transition and private-sector development through adapting business-related courses to new economic challenges and entrepreneurship programmes. For example, the NGO SPARK organised workshops and training on entrepreneurship and business start-ups for university students in post-conflict countries including Kosovo and Bosnia. Furthermore, capital investment in university construction brings economic benefits including jobs and local economic stimulus. For example, the proposed Springvale university campus in Belfast would have been situated ‘in acutely contested territory on an interface between disadvantaged rival ethno-nationalist communities’ (Gaffikin 2008, p.277) bringing a peace dividend by creating significant local employment, stimulating urban regeneration, and deepening Northern Ireland’s knowledge economy integration.

A central argument is that HE can contribute towards economic recovery by replenishing depleted human capital. Post-conflict economic recovery has been linked to HE’s relevance to economic and social needs. Ghani, Lockhart, and Carnahan (2005) write that ‘without higher education geared towards producing responsible citizenship and marketable skills in the economy, neither administrative reform nor competitiveness can be realistic goals’. However, post-conflict HE is often mostly theoretical rather than practical and irrelevant to economic development, therefore limiting its economic impact and reducing its employment generation potential. Furthermore, HE is generally geared towards the formal economy while in many cases much post-conflict economic activity is in the informal economy.

Technical and vocational education and training (TVET) has been held to be more relevant to economic recovery than academic HE. Chauvet and Collier (2007) hold that establishing construction skills colleges after conflict is one of only two potentially justified public expenditures on post-primary education. Barakat (2009) holds that TVET is the educational sector with the best prospects for swift integration with economic reconstruction and livelihood generation. He argues that in Occupied Palestine HE expanded quantitatively driven by nationalist demands
with low economic relevance while TVET suffered due to negative social attitudes towards vocational education despite the sector’s potential to contribute to individual employability and collective economic recovery.

These arguments support prioritising technical rather than HE. While recognising vocational education’s strengths, a balanced approach would support both technical tertiary education and academic HE. Rather than recommend a single appropriate balance for economic recovery the response should be context-dependent and subject to long-term forecasting and planning.

However, balancing demand for skills and supply of graduates in post-conflict societies can be difficult. For example, at Eduardo Mondlane University (UEM) in Mozambique, there were more than five applicants-per-place in economics and management, computer science, and law, yet less than one applicant-per-place in geology, chemical engineering, chemistry, and physics; fields more important to reconstruction (Mario et al 2003, p.19). High institutional autonomy, decentralisation, and unregulated private expansion can produce contradictions including duplicative investments and over-subscribed courses with low job prospects. State regulation is required to align admissions with reconstruction needs. Government interventions include allocating disciplines to students based on performance or offering financial incentives for enrolment in undesirable but socially-productive courses. However in fragile states weak governance and low forecasting capacity are obstacles to alignment.

Beyond human capital, another rationale for post-conflict HE is participation in the global knowledge economy. Reddy (2005b) notes that ‘the move from an industrial to an information society’ is a challenge to universities ‘especially in post-conflict transitional societies’. The example of Rwanda’s Vision 2020 illustrates HE’s prioritisation as central to an economic recovery plan aimed at shifting a country from devastation by conflict towards a knowledge economy. HE was predicted to provide knowledge, advanced skills, and inter-sectoral linkages enabling long-term economic transformation to become ‘the Silicon Valley of East and Central Africa’ (Davis 2012, p.109). In such bold long-term visions for economic recovery HE
constitutes an important investment; however, while knowledge economy discourses increased HE’s prominence within development thinking it is viewed as less appropriate in post-conflict contexts due to myriad challenges and typical low levels of development. HE’s transformative role is also held to be relevant to HE and democratization in post-conflict settings, analysed in the next section.

3.2.6. Democratisation and Civil Society Development

Since the early 1990s democracy promotion and democratisation have become central concerns of dominant international approaches to rebuilding war-torn societies (Kumar 1998, p.5). HE has been argued to support processes of democratisation in post-conflict states. University students are often viewed as a critical group in the promotion of democracy. In the words of the University of Sarajevo’s Rector following the Bosnian war, ‘our students today belong to a generation that will, in due time, themselves be responsible for the development of the new democratic system in Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (Mulabegovic 1999, p.XI).

A historical example is the ‘maximalist’ approach to post-war reconstruction of HE favoured by the Americans in Europe following WWII. The USA prescribed that universities in occupied areas have collaborators removed, curricula revised, and course content remodelled ‘to give solid root to the theory and practice of a democratic society, to serve as the foundations of a ‘new world order’ and to ensure that society’s key valueAllocating body – the university – would act as a sure bastion against any possible return of totalitarianism in the future’ (Neave 2011, p.33). Germany was perceived by the Allies to require ‘re-education’ to steer away from its National Socialist past towards a democratic path.

HEIs have been held to contribute to democratisation and building of civic cultures directly through educational content. For example, a British Council grant to the
University of Pristina in post-war Kosovo allocated funds to five departments; Political Science/Public Administration, Sociology, Journalism/Media; Architecture; and Film Directing. The rationale was that chosen areas ‘all directly related to the regeneration of Kosovo society and of democracy’ and ‘would directly assist in the rebuilding of political and public culture in Kosovo’ (Davies 2002). Furthermore, Davies (2004b) notes that the grant, although relatively small, was an innovative form of post-conflict HE aid offering an alternative to conventional infrastructure and technology assistance.

Another area is the function of campuses in developing countries as ‘training grounds’ for democracy in which young people learn skills of political organisation, electoral campaigning, and advocacy (Luescher-Mamashela et al 2011). Similarly, student participation in university associational life including student politics, associations, and societies can offer the first opportunity to engage in activities and learn skills that constitute important experience for future civil society development.

In addition to skills, student civic participation has been held to contribute to post-conflict democratisation and citizenship by affecting civic attitudes and behaviours. For example, Pouligny (2005) writes that post-conflict civil society development programmes ‘are often seen to carry the best hopes for a genuine democratic counterweight to existing power-brokers and to hold the key to the building of a ‘new’ society’. Davis (2005a), in recommending civic participation including interning, working with youth, or care work for Iraqi students, advances a similar argument stating that:

*Citizenship and service learning promotes a deeper level of civic understanding on the part of university students. Not only do they improve their learning process, but they gain an appreciation of giving to the community... but most important of all, this form of learning helps inculcate civic values in students.*
However, in contrast to this positive contribution of HE in promoting democratisation and civic culture universities can function as training grounds for violence, crime, and corruption. The most widely-known case is FESCI in the Ivory Coast, formally a non-partisan national student union, which functioned as a militia for former President Laurent Gbagbo and controlled campus life. FESCI was found responsible for criminal ‘mafia-like’ activities including extortion, violence against regime opponents, and murder and rape of students affiliated with Northern-based groups (IRIN 2005; IRIN 2007; HRW 2008). Furthermore, the group offered the regime power to mobilise large numbers of people at critical moments and act as spoilers in the peace process (HRW 2008).

Paradoxically, FESCI has been held to have the crucial formative functions theorised above albeit with a negative impact on conventional understandings of civil society development and democratisation. In a Human Rights Watch (2008) report entitled “The Best School” Student Violence, Impunity, and the Crisis in Côte d’Ivoire a former leader of FESCI states that:

*FESCI is the best school for leaders there is. You come out battle hardened and ready to do politics. Ours is a generation that had to come to power one day, so if you see members of FESCI rising up, our view is that it was inevitable and came later than it should have. The arrival of this class will change politics.*

However, many fragile post-conflict countries have a long experience of students providing strong political opposition and therefore constituting a source of state instability. In such situations student associational life may be repressed or co-opted by the state. For example, PRESBY in Cameroon has been alleged to serve as a student and ex-student led repressive arm of Biya’s regime (IRBC 2004). Intense ethno-political violence between rival student groups nearly paralysed the University of Yaounde for several years. A dilemma, then, facing some post-conflict states is the degree to which independent student organising should be permitted to balance the goals of equipping students with skills in public life with the need to
maintain stability. This dynamic of divisive identities affecting the student body highlights a broad theme of the next section; that HE is a major arena in which conflictual identities are negotiated in post-conflict contexts.

3.2.7. Identity and Conflict Transformation

HE plays an important social role in mediating affective issues of national and civic identity in post-conflict societies. HEIs have been viewed as instrumental tools for forging a unified national identity, arenas for promoting civic values, and fomenting grounds of ethnic and political polarisation. In this section various positions in this debate will be assessed. First, however, it is worth reflecting on a historical example. In the wake of Napoleonic wars which ravaged Europe during 1803-1812 the Humboldtian university model, which greatly influenced universities globally, was implemented by Wilhelm van Humboldt with the goal of unifying and rebuilding the defeated Prussian nation (Penington 2010, p.206). Johann Fichte ‘envisioned the emergence of a nation-state with a coherent and inspiring national educational system’ and proposed a ‘total revamping’ of universities and a focus on research (Gonzalez 2011, p.105). The University of Berlin was established with Prussian revitalisation as its mission (Sawyerr 2004).

This concern with nation revitalisation strongly parallels modern post-war nationbuilding. Lemay-Hébert (2009) argues that statebuilding focuses on institutional strengthening and re-constituting typical Weberian states, often neglecting nationbuilding’s importance, defined as fostering shared national identity to enhance social cohesion in conflict-affected contexts. HE may be argued to support post-conflict nationbuilding, for example, through conducting research on and teaching students about national history, languages, and foundational collective myths. For example, the National University of East Timor performed an important role in strengthening national culture and identity in post-independence Timor-Leste with courses and curricula adapted to the country’s cultural, historical, linguistic, and ecological context in an education system previously geared towards
Indonesian national concerns (Boughton 2005). This rationale is defended by the MoHE-A/IIEP (2004):

*Preservation of the nation’s legacy, the heritage and history that is an integral part of forging a national identity as well as the rich diversity in culture and languages, also requires that education play a strong role. Indeed, universities and colleges are the most important custodians of the past and its achievements.*

Millican (2008) argues that in the context of building citizenship in post-conflict countries HE ‘may be better placed working through civil society movements than through promoting the badges of national identity’. This position is motivated by liberal critiques that HE should not be a direct instrument in top-down and paternalistic nation-building initiatives. However, it may be countered that a realist position on HE to forge national identity and social order in post-conflict countries is required. Unlikely support for this position comes from Hobbes’ *Leviathan* where he argues that English universities contributed to disorder and Civil War by encouraging students to question authority and that lasting peace necessitated implementation of a national curriculum designed to produce order (Parry 1998).

An example of a post-conflict HE strategy with the goal of a shared national identity is Afghanistan where the MoHE identifies high quality tertiary education as a ‘key condition’ for national unity. The HE strategy states:

*On the one hand, that involves recognising national diversity and on the other building tolerance, respect for differences and most importantly building a united, democratic and modern Afghanistan which has the loyalty of all Afghans, while preserving the uniqueness of Afghanistan, its history and culture.*

This strategy balances multi-cultural (respect for diversity, tolerance) and civic (united Afghanistan) models of HE in fostering national integration. The multi-cultural model holds that recognition of inter-group difference is necessary for building peace while the civic model posits shared values and beliefs as required to ensure peaceful coexistence (Bacevic 2010). National HE policy interventions are often necessary to translate such stated goals into outcomes. For example, in Nigeria
after the Biafran civil war the state undertook various interventions to ensure that HE supported national unity rather than discord. University Chancellors were selected from states other than their place of origin and students placed on year-long graduate service programmes in a different state (Ukiwo 2007).

However, top-down HE policy interventions are not the only manner in which HE can contribute to nation-building and recovery. While it may be expected that building HE systems after destructive conflict is a complex process requiring some foreign technical assistance and donor resources there are several examples of endogenous community-led HE recovery. For example, Palestinian HE emerged in a context of protracted conflict and occupation (Abu Lughod 2000). In another example, universities developed, albeit slowly, in Iraqi Kurdistan in the 1990s when the area was largely isolated from both foreign contacts and the rest of Iraq (Mojab & Hall 2003). In both cases HE was viewed as an important factor driving emergent national consciousness and identity.

In 1998 Amoud University was established in Boroma, Somaliland through indigenous initiative; the first post-collapse Somali university. $8000 was received from local business leaders, each University Committee member donated $150 and diaspora remittances from Gulf States provided further financial resources (Samatar 2001). The university’s vision was promoting national over sectarian identities held to have contributed to past civil conflicts. Samatar (2001) writes that Amoud University’s establishment holds ‘symbolic significance’ in ‘rehabilitating trust in public institutions and remaking social relations and national identity’. This discussion of autonomous recovery illustrates that bottom-up processes of community-led rebuilding can have strong impact on strengthening social cohesion and communal identity in addition to effectively rehabilitating post-conflict HE systems.

However, rather than functioning as a catalyst of national or civic identity, in many post-conflict states HE has been found to reproduce particularistic identities, for example, by entrenching ethnic, religious, sectarian or class divides. Giustuzzi
(2010) finds that compared to the 1960s and 1970s, Afghanistan’s post-2001 student politics has been ethnicised. Most student organisations and associations serve exclusive ethnic or religious groups while there are growing reports of campus-based ethnic tensions. This example illustrates that the above-quoted positions on HE’s utilisation to promote national and civic identities in Afghanistan must confront social forces moving in the opposite direction.

Post-war Bosnia’s HE landscape fragmented along ethnic divisions, for example the University of Mostar split into two, one for Bosniac and one for Croat populations (Temple 2002). Sabic-El-Rayess (2009) holds that these ‘educational micro-systems’ perpetuated existing ethnic divisions and ‘retarded the solidification of Bosnia’s national identity’. Similarly, Kosovan universities split; the University of Pristina almost exclusively for ethnic Albanian and other non-Serb Kosovan groups with the University of Mitrovica Serb-dominated. In another case, Lebanese universities are primarily exclusive to particular groups. In all of these cases HE may be argued to have played a greater role in solidifying and deepening rather than transforming the affective bases of conflict.

Contributions from the conflict transformation literature hold that HE can transform conflictual identities and promote lasting peace in post-conflict contexts. For example, Bishai (2008) argues that Sudanese universities have potential to be agents of conflict transformation through enabling critical thinking capable of challenging established truths and fostering inclusive identities that transcend existing divisions for example, North/South (Bishai 2008). In general, primary education is formative while HE has the possibility to be transformative. In many conflict-affected societies young people make the transition from insular primary and secondary education to HE where many students have their first possibility to ‘meet the other’ whether based on ethnicity, race, religion, gender, nationality, or political position. In a discussion of student politics in developing countries Altbach (1987, p.124) writes that:
While student populations tend to come from relatively privileged strata of the population, they have relatively greater opportunities to interact with compeers from different social strata. Traditional barriers of caste, ethnicity, tribe and religion seem less important in the meritocratic atmosphere of the university.

Bosnia, Iraq, and Lebanon may be held to offer extreme cases of separation while for most societies, post-conflict or otherwise, mixing and integration in large cities that dominate HE provision is a fact of life. For example, in comparison to secondary schools Northern Ireland’s universities offer ‘a much more heterogeneous social context in terms of religious and national identification’ (Cassidy & Trew 2004). In discussing a human rights course’s impact in post-conflict Sri Lanka, Goldberg states that ‘many Sri Lankans have never had the opportunity to have significant personal interaction with people from other linguistic or religious backgrounds. Fear and mistrust are commonplace’ (Simon 2012).

Post-conflict HE can also contribute towards conflict transformation by reducing group HE access inequalities. However, where enrolment expansion does not address equity problems there is increased risk of restoring the status quo ante by recreating inequalities that were causative factors in original conflicts (Breuning & Ishiyama 2010). Furthermore, post-conflict trends toward private HE provision reduce state capacity to address horizontal inequalities. Without public control or regulation expanded private HE sectors tend to serve the economically better-off. Where horizontal inequalities exist this pattern could reproduce inequalities and grievances.

This brief discussion shows that in post-conflict societies there is no simple linear HE-identity relationship; rather HE can play positive or negative roles. Moreover, a range of views exist on the issue; from a constructivist perspective, that individual identities are relatively malleable and open to change, such possibilities may be convincing. However, realist views may be sceptical of hypothesised impacts of HE on identities and conflict. To resolve this debate, it should be stated that HE can influence identity issues in conflict-affected societies but are limited by structural
context. Another means by which HE can contribute to post-conflict recovery is through advancing transitional justice which will now be addressed.

3.2.8. Transitional Justice

HE can be affected by and a participant in transitional justice issues in post-conflict societies. In societies undergoing radical transitions, for example, after revolutions or wars, ‘lustration systems’ may be implemented. Lustration refers to the removal of circumscribed parties, ideologies, or individuals. Universities, in particular high ranking Professors and Deans, are often affected because of their high social profile. For example, in the former Communist Eastern European countries many Professors viewed as too closely aligned with the Communist state were removed from their posts (Altbach 2001a).

Lustration in academia is held to have a positive impact in delegitimising discredited ideologies and removing a means for outlawed political movements to mobilise students in a renewal of their cause. Further, it signals a break with the past that may be seen as psychologically necessary for HE recovery. For example, under Nazi rule academic freedom was absent; therefore clear rejection of the Nazi past enabled universities to regain autonomy. De-Nazification was carried out by the US in West Germany to remove National Socialist Party members from universities. A dilemma existed in how far academic staff should be purged. In Gottingen University, for example, 28% of faculty lost their jobs in the first two years of de-Nazification. A similar process in Austria, if fully followed-through, would have removed two-thirds of faculty members, requiring closure of universities (Fleck 1995). Ericksen (2000) argues that while flawed, this process ‘still assisted in the German transition to a post-Nazi, democratic tradition’ as academia did not perpetuate National Socialism. However, removing large numbers of academics can negatively impact quality, as will be seen later in Iraq.
HE can also be an important means for overcoming societal trauma after conflict. Academic fields related to conflict and peace can enhance understandings of the past, for example, the Centre for Conflict Management at the National University of Rwanda was established in response to genocide, to understand its causes, and contribute to a culture of peace and tolerance (Urusaro 2003). However, Cambodian universities have been criticised for insufficient coverage of Khmer Rouge atrocities in history courses thus producing secondary history teachers ill-equipped to teach young generations about their national past (Dy 2009).

Furthermore, academic understandings, narratives, and interpretations of past conflicts can influence reproduction of conflict in the present. Hallward (2010) argues that Israeli and Palestinian academics perform an important role in ‘constituting’ conflict, for example, by shaping students’ worldviews through advancing particular interpretations of conflict or influencing student views of ‘the other’ for example through negative stereotyping in textbooks. This negative role of academic work in perpetuating conflict contrasts with the positive potentials of HE research and knowledge capacities to contribute towards reconstruction and peacebuilding, which is the subject of the next section.

3.2.9. Post-conflict Research and Knowledge

Domestic HE in post-conflict contexts can perform an important function in producing and disseminating knowledge of local context, conflict, and recovery. Knowledge of reconstruction and peacebuilding is produced largely in OECD donor organisations, powerful international organisations, and Western universities and think-tanks. This ensemble of organisations constitutes a global conflict and recovery knowledge architecture which transmits and disseminates knowledge and information to post-conflict countries. The World Bank places great emphasis on its role as a ‘knowledge bank’ for development; the World Development Report 2011
confirms its commitment to this role for fragile and post-conflict contexts (World Bank 2011b).

The dominance of global and Western institutions in this system excludes Southern, indigenous, or local voices from debates on fragility and recovery. In support of this point, IDRC/CCNY (2012) in addressing the global architecture of peacebuilding and statebuilding knowledge write that:

Historically, Northern institutions have retained “ownership” of knowledge in these areas and have often overwhelmed Southern voices. Decades of crises have intensified this imbalance, leaving many Southern institutions lacking human, social and economic resources. Cumulatively, this has intensified the shortcomings of educational systems—especially in higher education—in conflict affected countries and diminished the role of scholars in the shaping of public policy and debate.

Post-conflict interventions led by donors and outside actors have been criticised for operating without an in-depth understanding of local context (Barakat 2005). Conceptual frames applied to understanding local social context are often derived from the understanding of external, usually Western, academics or analysts. For example, Da Costa (2012), Finance Minister of East Timor, writes that in 2002 ‘influx of aid, donors and NGOs, national and international, was in full swing as they established their compounds, procedures, plans, agendas and staff; and with them came a vast array of observances and theoretical approaches to the development of our country’. He criticises international agencies for failing to build Timorese staff and agency capacities and for sidelining local knowledge and systems thus producing cyclical instability. In response, building local capacity of research institutions, including HEIs, in conflict-affected and post-conflict countries would enable meaningful local ownership and contextually-relevant knowledge in recovery processes.

Denskus (2009) criticises peacebuilding actors in Nepal for neglecting tertiary education with the consequence that there is little critical local research on
peacebuilding and development. He contends that what local research capacity exists is co-opted into the aid-industry as ‘assistants’ to foreign ‘experts’ preventing locals from finding a ‘critical voice’. Further, he links low tertiary research capacity to the inability to challenge hegemonic peacebuilding models stating that ‘peacebuilding is a process that conforms to global aid discourses, but does not foster critical, reflective research or the establishment of local intellectual agendas to challenge the Western liberal peace model’.

However, research capacity of post-conflict countries on peacebuilding and related areas is often very limited. In many post-conflict countries such research is conducted predominantly through non-university research institutions, for example, the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit or the National Institute for Research and Studies in Guinea-Bissau. Furthermore, Lebeau (2008) argues that research conducted by universities in post-conflict African countries is ‘very rarely handled at departmental or faculty-level but rather through individual contracts with donors, and few research projects are collective or contribute to institutional capacity’. Serhati (2011) argues that in Kosovo lack of relevant domestic expertise in HE is a major obstacle to building capacities for evidence-based policy-making.

Yet it has been argued that HEIs, academics, and domestic researchers in post-conflict societies can contribute towards recovery through research and knowledge production in areas of direct relevance to reconstruction, peacebuilding, and development. For example, Sasa Madacki of the University of Sarajevo describes how in post-conflict Bosnia the paucity of research conducted outside population centres fostered a sense of denial about domestic violence (cited in UNFPA 2010, p.59). He criticises the overwhelming predominance of foreign researchers on Bosnian issues and recommends domestic research capacity in areas such as anthropology capable of investigating neglected yet important facets of the post-conflict society.

These examples support arguments for domestic HEIs as critical elements of post-conflict peacebuilding knowledge capacities. In short, domestic HEIs can provide
local contextual knowledge and understanding that constitute critical inputs into reconstruction programmes and thereby enhance probability of success while enabling meaningful ownership of recovery. This recognition that post-war recovery is highly context-dependent and faces numerous obstacles is the basic insight that the following section explores further by investigating the dynamics, mechanisms, and processes that mediate the role of HE in post-conflict recovery.

3.3. Post-war Environment of Higher Education

The above section reviewed a wide range of functions that HE sectors may perform in post-war recovery processes. Faced with the above tasks of recovery, HE often faces severe challenges in post-conflict environments that impede reconstruction and limit the sector’s positive contribution to recovery. Buckland (2005, p.63) notes that secondary and tertiary sectors tend to experience a more gradual recovery from conflict than primary education. There are many reasons for this observation, including the need for reconciliation, hardened ethnic divisions, displacement of academics, breakdown in governmental authority or absence of a long-term vision; and external factors including government-donor relations. This finding informs RQ4, which will be addressed in this section, and which asks:

**RQ4:** What features of the post-war environment influence the relationship between higher education and post-conflict recovery?

In this section the main obstacles to HE’s contribution to post-conflict recovery will be analysed. These are categorised as conjunctural, institutional, educational, structural, and contextual features of the post-war environment. The section is designed to provide a broad framework for the empirical analysis relating to RQ4 during the presentation of case-study findings in the chapters on HE in post-war Iraq and Libya. To begin, conjunctural features will be analysed because it is found that they are highly significant in shaping the post-war environment of HE.
3.3.1. Conjunctural Features

Conjunctural features refer to those emerging from a conjuncture of various factors, dynamics, and trends. They are viewed as less permanent than structural features although the capacity of individual agents to affect conjunctural features is expected to be limited. To begin, security, widely-viewed as a necessary condition for successful reconstruction, will be analysed.

3.3.1.1. Security

There is strong support for the claim that insecurity is a major obstacle to post-war HE. High levels of violence, crime, murder, kidnapping, and low-level armed conflict mark many societies after formal cessation of war (Berdal 2011, p.53). Such an environment has many far-reaching effects on HE. It is argued that attacks on HE communities have ‘ripple effects through the whole sector and society. Teachers, content and modes of learning are lost. Quality, effectiveness and availability of education at all levels diminish’ (Quinn 2010). Where violence affects HE long into post-conflict periods the impact of conflict is an ongoing process.

Practical difficulties of delivering HE in insecure conditions may be immense, for example, increased absenteeism due to fighting or threat of violence, psychological problems caused by fear leading to distractions from academic work, or an increase in security measures inside the university altering the atmosphere of an academic institution from one focussed on learning to a defensive fortress. Furthermore, where violence is directed at HEIs because they are perceived as Ivory Towers detached from societal needs university-society relations can further deteriorate. Moreover, if outsiders perceive a country as insecure then existing programmes and international cooperation may be cancelled and foreign HE investment or aid may decrease leading to missed opportunities.
3.3.1.2. Conflict

Various dimensions of conflict shape HE-recovery interactions. Firstly and most directly, it was seen in the previous chapter that conflict’s impact on HE can vary greatly between different conflict-affected contexts. It may be expected that where impact on HE is high, for example in Iraq or Afghanistan, the sector’s role in post-war recovery will be much more constrained than where impact is low, for example, Sri Lanka. Where efforts of HE communities are directed towards meeting basic educational needs the opportunity to address reconstruction, reconciliation, or peacebuilding is severely reduced.

Second, how conflict ends is a major influence on typical post-conflict environments (Berdal 2009, p.31) thus shaping HE’s prospects. Where a negotiated outcome resulting in an inclusive peace-agreement or political settlement occurs there is greater likelihood that HE can prosper. Conversely, in the absence of a clear and decisive settlement, for example in Afghanistan, HE prospects are often eroded by protracted conflict, instability, and state weakness. Lastly, ‘causes’ of the original conflict influence HE’s post-conflict role. In societies recovering from civil war communal, ethnic, or religious conflicts and divisions remain highly salient rendering HE reconstruction more challenging (Sall, Lebeau & Kassimir 2003). By contrast, following inter-state war or in newly-independent states such as Timor-Leste societal cleavages should be expected to be significantly less of an obstacle to HE.

A related point is that HEIs must address campus-level need for reconciliation. Students and faculty members represent many social groups in conflict-affected societies and in some cases classroom colleagues fought on opposing sides during war, for example, in Libya and Liberia. University members may have been involved in committing atrocities and their positions in the institution may be threatened. As seen in chapter two, conflict can engulf campuses distorting many aspects of HE. It can therefore be expected that rebuilding HE will be more problematic in deeply-divided societies.
3.3.1.3. Stability and Fragility

The stability and fragility of the post-conflict environment in which HE operates significantly influences the HE-recovery relationship. The concept of state fragility became increasingly influential in development and security policy during the 2000s. A fragile state may be defined as one that is ‘failing, or at risk of failing, with respect to authority, comprehensive service entitlements or legitimacy’ (Stewart & Brown 2009). The overwhelming majority of conflict-affected countries are classified as fragile states which are held to be conflict-prone while past experience of conflict is a state-fragility driver.

While it should be qualified that nearly all post-conflict contexts are classified as fragile contexts, HE systems in contexts experiencing a greater degree of state fragility should be expected to face greater obstacles and to make a lower contribution to post-war recovery. This is because HE systems are complex multi-dimensional institutions requiring high levels of administrative and resource inputs that constitute a difficult service-delivery task (Rose & Greeley 2006). HE systems in ‘fragile’ post-conflict contexts face myriad challenges that are very difficult to respond to due to typically very low capacity and authority of key institutions and agencies including Ministries of HE.

Moreover, general breakdown in state power experienced in many conflicts leads to low governmental coordination and direction that problematizes HE governance. In situations such as Afghanistan or Somalia where conflict caused state-collapse this dynamic is even more pronounced. Restoring physical, human and resource capacities of state institutions involved in HE governance is a vital task in the sector’s post-war recovery. Beyond issues of capacity there is also a need to protect substantive freedoms of academic communities in post-conflict settings, which is the subject of the next section.
3.3.1.4. Academic Freedom and Autonomy

In many post-conflict states restrictions on academic freedom limit HE’s social function and impact on recovery. Academics and students may be subjected to restrictions on core freedoms including freedom of movement and freedom of speech. Academic freedoms including freedom to publish, criticise authority, or investigate controversial topics may be curtailed through formal policies or informally through threats, violence, or harassment. Academic freedom can be threatened by illiberal state authorities, (un)civil society organisations, militant groups, or even university students. Hoole (2007) argues that academic freedom in Tamil controlled areas of Sri Lanka was eroded through day-to-day interference by the LTTE through control of student organisations.

Sall (2001) argues that severe resource constraints are as great an obstacle to academic freedom in Africa as political repression. In discussing universities’ public role in Africa, Sall, Lebeau and Kassimir (2003) write that:

> Academic freedom often comes under attack when it is needed most. In post-conflict transitions, the fear of being seen as a bystander, as not participating in the reconstruction process, or as being unnecessarily critical is very real and, thus, may limit the post-conflict reconstruction of the public sphere.

This quote illustrates the dilemma between granting full autonomy and academic freedom to universities and the need to harness the sector’s potential towards national reconstruction goals. Evans’ (1995) concept ‘embedded autonomy’ may be adapted to suggest an appropriate state-HE relationship for post-conflict recovery; that universities are afforded relative autonomy albeit with strong political will, vision, and incentives to participate in recovery. However, it may be contended that concern with higher-order issues of academic rights and freedoms in post-conflict contexts is meaningless unless the basic and material needs of HE systems are met; a dynamic that will now be addressed.
3.3.1.5. Post-war Recovery of HE

HEIs and their personnel frequently view the end of conflict as an opportunity to address basic educational goods, for instance improving classrooms, raising salaries, and procuring teaching resources. This can be conceived as the desire to restart the process of ‘normal’ academic development that had been reversed by war. The priority for universities that have been damaged, looted or even destroyed during armed conflict is often to rebuild the physical infrastructure of campuses, for example, in Kosovo (Daxner 2010). Dormitories, laboratories, lecture halls, classrooms, and offices may require substantial repair or in some cases building from new. A common form of assistance in early phases is to refurbish buildings for immediate use through clearing any debris, painting and decorating, and providing classroom furniture.

However, in many post-war contexts there is low or no improvement in the overall situation of HEIs. Benedek (1997) writes that the situation of post-Bosnian war HE was one of ‘rapidly increasing numbers of students, but almost no new literature, no functioning laboratories, and often no heating of classes. Dormitories are not repaired, there are no state scholarships, and no advisors to address social problems of students’. At a wider level, failure of reconstruction in other sectors can seriously impede the effective functioning of HE. Weak public service delivery of electricity and water can constitute significant obstacles. For example, students attending lectures at Kabul University four years into the reconstruction phase in 2005 withstood sub-zero temperatures due to lack of heating (Amani 2005).

Beyond these needs for physical and material rebuilding most HE systems in post-conflict contexts also have the need for institutional strengthening, a point that connects to the theme of the next section on the influence of institutional issues on the HE-recovery relationship.
3.3.2. Institutional Features

In this section, institutional features shaping HE in post-conflict recovery contexts will be considered. These are state and institutional capacity, governance, ‘local ownership’ and vision. To begin, the important issue of state and institutional capacity will be addressed.

3.3.2.1. State and Institutional Capacity

State and institutional capacity are key variables affecting post-conflict recovery yet in many post-conflict contexts are weak. Pre-war capacity deficits are compounded by factors including ‘brain drain’, looting, infrastructural destruction, war casualties, state-collapse, and financial crisis. Institutional strengthening and reform are therefore central to donor approaches to post-conflict recovery (Aron 2003; Brinkerhoff 2005), for example, the World Development Report 2011 states that ‘strengthening legitimate institutions and governance’ is its core message (World Bank 2011b).

Institutional capacity development and reform of ministries and HEIs is also a major dimension of post-conflict HE rebuilding. In some contexts, such as Afghanistan, the need for institution building after war is chronic. Following protracted conflict and state-collapse institutional capacity can be minimal to non-existent with many functions performed by foreign consultants. In some post-conflict countries there have been far-reaching reforms of national HE institutions. Mozambique experienced dramatic changes; ‘since the 1990s, after almost 30 years of devastating war, a new higher education system has been practically reinstitutionalised’ (Beverwijk 2006, p.15). New institutions include the National Task Force, the Ministry of Higher Education Science and Technology, a national seminar, and new regulatory bodies for accreditation and quality assurance (Hopper 2006).
However, restoring state and institutional capacity should not be viewed solely through a technical institutionalist perspective; rather, political obstacles are crucial and capacity-building should be supported by strong political will. Like other sectors, HE may be politicised in highly-contested post-conflict environments. Most fundamentally, HE is not autonomous from political forces; rather it is a complex institution embedded in domestic social relations and forces that at once influences and is influenced by politics. Hebert (1999, p. 293) explains how in Cambodia substantial donor and agency efforts to design and implement the National Higher Education Action Plan were brought to a standstill during the 1996 political crisis and re-eruption of violence in 1997. This recognition of the political nature of HE reconstruction is a theme of the next section addressing governance.

3.3.2.2. Governance

Weak or non-existent governance frameworks can be a major obstacle to implementing effective HE reconstruction strategies. A core debate over HE governance is the degree of centralisation. In centralised models the state maintains authority over most aspects of HE policy usually through a government ministry. Lebanon represents a good example of a centralised HE system in a post-war country. However, in many post-conflict states HE governance has been criticised for being over-centralised; centralisation has been argued to constrain development of vibrant university systems and to violate the conditions for academic freedom. For example, in Cambodia various Ministries were responsible for individual HEIs thus creating a major obstacle to coordination and national policy-making (McNamara 1999, p.91).

In many post-conflict contexts there are frequent calls for decentralisation and the granting of additional autonomy to individual universities as a central aspect of rebuilding HE, for example, in Afghanistan (Hopper 2006). Bosnia represents a strong form of post-conflict decentralisation; the Dayton Accords established HE governance at cantonal and entity-levels rather than at the national-level. In this decentralised system fragmented governance led to lack of coordination and
difficulty in achieving national HE goals (Tiplic & Welle-Strand 2006). Further, the absence of state-wide legislation on certificate recognition made it difficult to ensure that Bosnian degrees were recognised across Europe (USAID 2007).

Furthermore, leadership is considered a neglected yet important aspect of basic education reconstruction in post-conflict settings (Clarke & O’Donoghue 2013) and is also held to be critical to university-level governance. Breca and Anderson (2010) in discussing reforms at the Faculty of Education at the University of Prishtina identify replacement of a reformist with a conservative Dean as the main obstacle to reform; a finding highlighting the importance of leadership to successful reform initiatives.

Afghanistan’s HE reform since 2001 has been determined by key MoHE personnel. Michael Daxner (2008), formerly a senior HE adviser to the Afghan government, describes a positive early period under Minister Mohammed Sharif Feyez followed by his dismissal and a conservative backlash from new administrators who maintained old procedures and institutions. He writes that ‘public higher education is hardly breathing within a restrictive bureaucracy’. Hayward (2011) positively appraises former Minister Dadfar and his deputy Babury for reducing corruption in admissions and ‘restoring integrity’ to the MoHE. This example illustrates the importance of national leadership and political will in implementation of post-conflict HE governance.

A further governance-related factor is the balance of public and private provision of HE in post-conflict societies, which can be expected to influence the sector’s role in recovery. Private HE expansion represents a significant opportunity in post-conflict societies (see next section). National-level governance of HE is challenged in post-conflict contexts where private HE expands rapidly beyond the state’s regulatory reach. It may be argued that in predominantly public HE systems a greater contribution of HE to post-conflict recovery goals should be expected.
James (2012) argues that in the US context for-profit HE providers do not serve a public good function. This is in contrast to established non-profit private universities with sizeable endowments. In post-conflict contexts it has been seen that most private universities are unregulated and for-profit institutions. In these situations for-profit private HE’s contribution should be expected to be even less than in the US and other advanced economies. For example, public universities may conduct research on issues of social and economic relevance while private universities tend to function as teaching institutions offering degrees concentrated in a narrow set of popular subjects.

In support of this argument, Tierney (2011) argues that tertiary education can best contribute towards ‘fixing failed states’ through providing public goods. However, it may be contended that private HE is more dynamic and responsive to market needs than bureaucratic public HEIs and therefore can be expected to contribute more towards economic recovery. The issue of what constitutes a public good that HE is apt to provide is closely connected to the issue of advancing a broad vision for the sector within post-conflict recovery, which will be considered in the next section.

3.3.2.3. Vision

‘Vision’ for the future of both HE and the shape of post-conflict societies has been identified as a major variable affecting the HE-recovery relationship. A clear shared vision that includes the major aspects of recovery is argued to be a vital ingredient in supporting effective post-war reconstruction (Barakat 2005, p.249). Common visions can result from the individual initiative of strong leadership or inclusive, participatory processes in which the plurality of visions within post-conflict societies is negotiated and reconciled into a shared national vision. In both cases, political will is considered a necessary condition for a broad vision to affect reconstruction strategy and outcomes.
National consultations on HE have been held to have fostered a shared vision and enabled more effective recovery in several post-conflict contexts. In Mozambique frustrated attempts to rebuild HE in the initial post-war period have been held to be overcome by formation of a consensus on HE (Brito 2003). In 1997 the government initiated a ‘national reflection about higher education’ that led to the Strategic Plan of Higher Education in Mozambique 2000 – 2010. A broad consultative process involved the main university and national leadership stakeholders and led to a coalescing around a vision that conceived of HE as central to development. However, after 2004 elections leadership changes led to a sidelining of that vision (Bailey, Cloete & Pillay 2011, p.105). This example illustrates the obstacles to sustaining long-term continuity in HE visions even in those cases considered relatively successful.

Similarly, in Afghanistan an open participatory process of drafting a Strategic Action Plan for Higher Education led by the International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP) is held to have enabled emergence of a national vision for HE, clarified priorities for donor support, improved coherence between projects and policies, and strengthened the hand of national authorities in negotiations with external parties and donors (Martin & Mahshi 2005). However, McNernery (2009, p.141) criticises the 2005 action plan as too highly politicised for actual implementation and failing to frame a common vision. He states that ‘the lack of a common vision for the sector’ is the major obstacle to effective HE financing with unresolved and contradictory visions held by central government, MoHE, and HEIs. While the above two sources differ in describing Afghan HE both stipulate vision as a central dynamic influencing the sector’s progress.

Tertiary sector recovery is necessarily linked to a ‘broad development vision for the country’ that is often not backed up by political will in transitional administrations (Buckland 2005, p.64). In the absence of agreement on the future of economy and society the process of strategic HE planning may be rendered highly problematic. For example, decisions on priorities including disciplinary focus and research priorities cannot be based on realistic projected scenarios. By contrast, Rwanda’s
Vision 2020 offers an example where HE’s position within an overarching national vision is clearly articulated thus enabling more effective contribution of the sector to post-conflict development. Moreover, in post-conflict societies, in particular where independent civil society is weak and domestic think-tanks and independent research bodies are minimal, national universities can arguably be the best institutional arena for debating and reaching national visions for recovery due to the atmosphere of dialogue and enquiry. Such a shared vision could contribute towards making ‘ownership’ meaningful, a subject addressed in the next section.

3.3.2.4. ‘Local Ownership’

In the context of high donor influence over post-conflict HE there is often a tension between externally-driven rebuilding and genuine national and local ownership. Several authors examining dynamics of post-conflict HE reform argue that domestic actors actively shape, resist, and transform externally-derived reform agendas. A historical example is the gap between US and German views for rebuilding West German universities post-1945. While occupying authorities proposed a wide-ranging reformist agenda, German scholars favoured a much more limited process and resisted (Neave 2011, p.33).

A more recent case, Kosovo’s transitional administration aimed to transfer ‘ownership’ to local power-holders to ensure statebuilding’s sustainability (Narten 2008). Efforts to rebuild HE under international administration generated resistance and were greatly influenced by ‘local actors’ (Den Boer & van der Borgh 2011). University administrators and Professors used various tactics to resist implementation of externally-initiated faculty-level reforms; an exercise of agency by ‘subordinate actors’ very important to project outcomes (Bache & Taylor 2003).

Heath (2009) describes the HE reform environment at the University of Mitrovica as largely constrained by local-level and national-level political factors and ethnic tensions. While there is some space for ‘opening up’ or reform, this dynamic is in tension with ‘closing down’ or resistance by local interests threatened by changes to the status quo. She advocates slow-paced incremental changes enabling long-term
transformation rather than short-term fixes that satisfy donors but risk generating greater local resistance and often failure. A report into Kosovo’s HE law found that it was largely ignored during 2002-2008, stating that ‘the situation can best be described as connivance between Ministers, Ministry officials, Professors of the University of Prishtina and private entrepreneurs in a PBHE (private higher education institutions) Licence lottery, whose rules were unclear and substantially ignored’ (cited in Bristow 2010). This example illustrates the significance of domestic political economies constraining HE reform efforts and dangers of externally-led reforms that exclude key local actors and deny meaningful ownership.

HE transfer in post-conflict societies has been criticised for implementing foreign models and policies in local contexts of which donors are often ignorant. Temple (2002) criticises Western donors for proposing reforms based on an Anglo-American university governance model inappropriate to Bosnia’s context. He argues for ‘examining critically and building on established traditions’ as an alternative. In support, Tiplic and Welle-Strand (2006) argue that Bosnian universities follow a one-size-fits-all approach, directly copying policies and models from abroad. Sabic-El-Rayess (2009) similarly argues that local Bosnian power-holders borrow educational policies from external sources that are transformed during implementation. She writes that unless policies converge with local politicians’ preferences ‘the borrowed policy is either not implemented or it is adapted so that the originally intended impact is rarely allowed to pierce through the institutional layers and reach the classroom level’.

So far in this section cases of interaction between external and internal influences over HE policy and strategy in post-conflict states have been analysed. It may be concluded that externally-driven HE reform denies local ‘ownership’, often remains ignorant of local context, and encounters strong resistance. This is reflected in an assumption on the part of outsiders that in intervening to rebuild HE that conflict has ‘wiped the slate clean’ and new systems may be constructed tabula rasa. In some cases this may even be celebrated as an opportunity. For example, in planning for
agricultural HE in South Sudan it is posited that a post-conflict ‘clean slate’ enables a long-term strategic approach based on transfer of foreign models (Bertelsen 2009). Furthermore, pre-war HE may be judged to have been defective, backwards, or an element in conflict causation. This concern with pre-war HE quality leads to the subject of the next section; the role of educational features in shaping post-conflict environments of HE and recovery.

3.3.3. Educational factors

In this section the educational features of access, equity, and quality will be analysed in terms of their theorised role in hindering or enabling HE’s contribution to post-war recovery. To begin, the issue of access will be considered.

3.3.3.1. Access

Access may be viewed as a factor mediating HE’s contribution to post-conflict recovery. It can be expected that in low access systems HE’s potential impact on recovery is lower while in high access systems potential impact is greater. However, it may be contended that very high access may lead to over-production of graduates, increasing unemployment and therefore hampering economic recovery. Issues of access, demand, and expansion will now be briefly explored.

In many post-conflict countries capacity for HE provision is low and weakened by conflict yet demand is high leading to expansion. A few examples illustrate this dynamic. In its first post-independence year the University of East Timor enrolled students in the absence of proper admissions standards to cope with huge demand which caused practical problems of over-enrolment (Nicolai 2004, p.87). Similarly, Afghanistan’s tertiary enrolment in 2001 was 7,881, down from 17,370 in 1995; a very low figure globally for a country of 28 million (MoHE-A 2009, p.1). Emerging from war in 2001, Afghanistan’s very young population, long denied HE opportunities, drove high demand. Consequently, 20,000 prospective students sat

Rapid post-conflict enrolment expansion may be explained in several ways. First, conflict ending increases optimism about future prospects leading to long-term human capital investments becoming rational at the individual-level. Second, facing high youth unemployment typical of post-conflict states young people choose to enter universities and defer job-searching (Tierney 2011). Third, expansion may occur due to public policy with low human capital stocks and need for highly-skilled individuals viewed as obstacles to development. Fourth, governments may increase access as part of a ‘peace dividend’ to reduce youth grievances related to educational exclusion.

However, despite the trend of expansion most post-conflict HE systems do not have capacity to meet demand due to conflict impacts on capacity and enrolment plus various post-conflict challenges. For example, despite rapid expansion in post-war Mozambique HE opportunities were insufficient, with 10,974 applicants for 2,342 places in 1999 (Mario et al 2003, p.18). In particular where state regulatory authority is low private HEIs emerge to meet excess demand and in some cases account for the majority of expansion.

While expansion may be viewed as necessary in situations of low capacity and high demand, rapid growth can bring problems. Increased quantity in particular where expansion is uncontrolled, can lead to reduced quality. For example, in Bosnia there was a ‘mushrooming’ of HEIs due to HE system fragmentation along political and ethnic cleavages, leading to inefficiency, over-stretch of resources, and poor coordination (Tiplic & Welle-Strand 2006). Similarly, six new universities were established in Nicaragua during 1990-1993 leading to duplication, concentration of graduates in over-subscribed disciplines, and consequently increased unemployment (Arnove 1995). This dynamic constitutes a trade-off between controlled growth concentrating resources on recovery priorities, national universities and elite institutions to maintain higher quality and rapid expansion to meet social demand. While post-conflict states may increase access expansion may
fail to address existing inequalities, an important dynamic examined in the next section.

3.3.3.2. Equity

Equitable distribution of HE opportunities may be posited as an influence upon HE’s contribution to post-conflict recovery. Conflict can lead to uneven disruption to education resulting in a more selective post-war HE admissions system with greater exclusion of minorities, the disabled, displaced persons and other groups (IIEP 2010, p.277). Highly unequal access to HE can lead to significant grievances that are destabilising factors in fragile transitional contexts. In particular, where social divisions in terms of ethnicity, religion, place, or class were significant factors in the original conflict inequalities in access to HE stratified along these cleavages can reproduce the social bases of conflict.9 Ensuring equity is therefore important to conflict-sensitive strategies of HE development in post-conflict societies.

Moreover, improving equity can strengthen public perceptions that post-conflict institutions advance social justice and thereby constitute part of a peace dividend. This may be achieved through affirmative action programmes and academic enrichment to equalise educational levels (IIEP 2010, p.277). Furthermore, where HE provision reflects imbalanced regional development opening new universities or branch campuses in under-served areas can redress inequity. In Angola in 2002 after a 27-year civil war there was one university in the capital Luanda. The government’s post-conflict strategy was opening new universities in various provinces and science and technology institutes in oil-rich provinces (AFP 2002).

However, others argue that class differences in distribution of HE opportunities are a major impediment to achieving educational equity in post-conflict societies and that therefore public HE expenditure should be reduced. For example, Stewart, Brown and Cobham (2009) argue that post-conflict inequalities may be reduced

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9 See chapter two section 2.3. for analysis of HE and horizontal inequalities in conflict-affected contexts.
through progressive taxation and financing options, including reducing subsidies to HE systems because the poor have low access to HE. Beyond issues of access and equity it is important to now turn to HE quality.

3.3.3.3. Quality

HE quality can be expected to strongly influence the HE-recovery relationship. Higher quality HEIs are held to produce better graduates with more advanced skills and knowledge and produce stronger research outputs which both function as valuable inputs into recovery processes. It should be qualified that ‘quality’ is a contested and multi-dimensional concept. However, with regards to teaching three central aspects of quality are inputs, including teaching standards and facilities, outputs including graduates with relevant skills for economic and social development, and processes of how students are taught (Green 1994, p.18).

Pedagogical practice is a major aspect of HE quality. Didactic instruction methods including rote-learning and heavily teacher-led classes are often identified as objects of reform in post-conflict contexts including Cambodia (McNamara 1999, p.90) and Kosovo (Breca & Anderson 2010). Another example, Swenson and Sugerman (2011) find Afghan legal education is characterised by didactic pedagogy, rote memorisation, highly-theoretical classes, and over-reliance on lectures. These ‘outdated’ methods can be argued to limit the potential of student critical thinking skills. It may be argued that this produces individuals more likely to accept violent ideologies and agendas and in so doing increases conflict risk. Participatory learning approaches including student-centred classes are held to have the potential to improve quality and transform student-teacher relations.

Relevance of curricula and research to social, economic, and developmental needs is a further dimension of quality. Under conflict and isolation course content and curricula can remain static for many years. There is therefore often major need for updating curricula to redress pre-war weaknesses and also reflect the altered post-conflict context. Similarly, adaptation of national research priorities to reflect
transitional and recovery needs is important for maximising wider social impacts of research outputs.

To improve quality the implementation of quality assurance institutions is an increasingly common form of HE governance including in post-conflict states. Hopper (2006, p.56) warns that while quality assurance mechanisms can be effective in post-conflict contexts including Mozambique and the West Bank, in others they are inappropriate due to the immensity of other challenges facing the sector and limited capacity to meet those challenges. This variability in the appropriateness of a major post-conflict HE policy response highlights that some contexts are structurally-constrained leaving less space for creative agential responses, a recognition that connects with consideration of structural aspects, the subject of the next section.

3.3.4. Structural Features

Structural features are defined as those emerging over a long time period and are difficult to change. Structural features relevant to the HE-recovery relationship include state strength/weakness, demographics, culture, and history. Firstly, socio-economic structural features will be considered followed by contextual structural factors.

3.3.4.1. Socio-Economic

To begin, demography is an important structural aspect of the post-war environment; post-conflict countries characterised by very large percentages of young persons or a ‘youth bulge’ face a greater challenge of providing sufficient HE opportunities to meet youth expectations. Structural economic features also affect post-conflict HE. It may be predicted that countries with higher GDP levels and GDP growth rates should experience more effective HE reconstruction and greater
utilisation of the sector towards recovery goals. This is because HE systems are complex and relatively resource-dependent institutions requiring large financial investment (Rose & Greeley 2006). Lai and Thyne (2007) find that conflict’s negative impacts on educational expenditures at all levels continue after cessation of hostilities due to physical destruction, loss of governmental revenue and human costs.

Financing options include introducing student fees in public universities, industrial cooperation, research commercialisation, consultancy, establishing private universities, reliance on donor funding, or greater solicitation of grants and charitable donations from wealthy individuals. However, in many cases there are very few opportunities for universities to mobilise resources outside of formal governmental and donor channels because post-war economies often are characterised by slow growth, high unemployment, informal market activity, and macroeconomic instability. In Bosnia the ‘segmented’ postwar economy limited HE financing options and led to student fee increases (Tiplic & Welle-Strand 2006). However, resource-rich contexts offer funding opportunities; in Angola for every barrel of oil 15 cents is channelled into human resource development with three cents reserved for universities in particular for petroleum-related courses (Gomes & Weimer 2011).

3.3.4.2. Contextual Features

Culture has been viewed as an important aspect of post-war recovery. Support for this comes from Coyne (2007) who argues that a common culture and shared beliefs are critical factors enabling successful post-war reconstruction. Furthermore, Rubinstein (2003) argues that cross-cultural differences between local and international actors render already complex peace operations even more complex. It should be qualified ‘culture’ has a very wide meaning that problematizes clarity in social scientific usage. A common definition of culture accepted here is ‘repertoires
of action whose meaning is broadly understood within a given population’ (Ellis cited in Berdal 2011, p.72). It may be expected that societies placing high cultural value on education, for example Confucian societies (Marginson 2011), should be expected to experience more rapid HE recovery. Furthermore, aspects of culture may hinder utilising HE towards post-conflict recovery, for example, conservative academic cultures may be inclined towards restoring the status quo or pre-war HE while being resistant to innovative programmes and new modes of operation capable of transformative reconstruction.

The historical context of post-conflict societies is a major influence on post-war reconstruction and peacebuilding (Berdal 2009, p.41). It can be argued that historical trajectories of HE’s emergence in societies prior to conflict creates path-dependencies constraining the scope of post-war policy-making. Clear historical understanding is therefore vital to inform post-war reconstruction policy. However, interpretations of historical issues related to HE are multiple and contested. For example, Ayres (1999, p.53) explains that many narratives of Cambodian HE adopt a ‘destruction discourse’ that blames all the system’s ills on the Pol Pot regime thus obscuring other long-term causes of weakness and low quality. Furthermore, historical experiences of HE and development shape national expectations about the sector’s post-war role. In particular, external intervention in rebuilding HE systems may encounter resistance from domestic actors who perceive outsiders to have no understanding of historical context and HE’s pre-war role. This influence of external actors is explored in the next section analysing external features in shaping HE recovery outcomes.

3.3.5. External Features

Various external influences upon typical post-war contexts of HE include regional context and external assistance levels. To begin, regional context is an important factor shaping the environment of post-war reconstruction (Berdal 2009, p.38). It
may be expected that HE recovery will be easier in regions marked by amiable neighbourly relations and established modes of cooperation, for example, that opportunities for HE assistance would be more forthcoming after a hypothetical civil war in a Latin American country signatory to the Bolivarian Alliance of the Americas (Alba) than in the Great Lakes region in Africa marked by greater historical patterns of enmity. In the South East European nations formed from the former Yugoslavia’s violent breakup, post-conflict HE has been heavily influenced by the Bologna Process and meeting EU membership conditions. For example, rebuilding Kosovan HE was aligned with the Bologna Process to prepare for future accession to the grouping (Epp & Epp 2010).

Quality of external assistance is another influence upon HE’s contribution to post-conflict recovery. HE tends to be a low donor priority and donor efforts are frequently uncoordinated. Cambodia offers an example of high dependence on donor financing. In 1997 recurrent expenditure-per-student was $163 from government budgets and $350 for foreign aid. However, donor aid was volatile; in 1994 HE received approximately $2.5 million while only $280,000 in 1997. Further, due to complex governance and budgeting procedures and poor coordination many faculties lacked capacity to spend allocated funds while access to funds was high; in 1995 and 1996 the Faculty of Medicine spent only 42.7% and 52% of its approved budgets (Minxuan 1998). Furthermore, donor efforts were highly fragmented and individual donors entered bilateral agreements to provide assistance to individual colleges within the National University of Phnom Pen conditional upon instruction in the donor country’s language. Consequently, multiple languages of instruction became an obstacle to a national language strategy (Duggan 1997). This finding suggests donors may be more attuned to pursuing organisational reputation than recipient societies’ needs.

The level of external assistance is another major dynamic shaping the post-war environment of HE. Most post-conflict countries face considerable resource constraints with many competing priorities. Consequently, mobilising resources for HE rebuilding can be difficult and donor funding is often critical. It may be
expected that where external assistance levels are high the prospects for HE recovery are more positive because of the large resource requirements for rebuilding complex HE systems and the multiple constraints on public expenditure in post-conflict environments. Rose and Greeley (2006) report very little international assistance to HE in fragile and conflict-affected states.

Furthermore, current expenditures typically account for a very high proportion of budget allocations to HE and therefore capital expenditure from domestic sources will remain low, for example, in Burundi (Finnegan 2008). This structural feature entails that donor financing of HE rebuilding, even in middle-income post-conflict countries including Iraq or Bosnia, represents a much needed income source giving donors considerable influence. For example, when Mozambique’s government planned HE expansion in the early 1990s ‘existing public higher education institutions were devoid of financial resources for consolidation and institutional expansion’ and the World Bank loaned over $50 million (Chilundo 2006). However, dependence on external assistance can undermine national ‘ownership’ over HE reform with various negative consequences.

3.3.6. Conclusion

This section provided analysis of the post-war environment in terms of its influence upon the HE-recovery relationship organised around a framework identifying structural, institutional, educational, conjunctural, and external features. While actors in post-conflict societies have little agency to change structural or external features in the short-term, there is greater opportunity to affect institutional, education, and conjunctural features. The relative weight of various features should be expected to differ between cases and will be investigated empirically in the Iraq and Libya case-studies. Furthermore, various options and opportunities presented to HE sectors in post-conflict societies offer different means of overcoming the obstacles and challenges presented above and will be considered in the next section.
3.4. Options and Opportunities

In this section options and trends available for the recovery and development of HE in post-conflict societies will be analysed in terms of private HE provision and internationalisation. The section addresses RQ5, which is re-stated below:

RQ5: What are the opportunities and challenges associated with various options for higher education recovery and reform in post-conflict societies?

While each option can be considered a dynamic affecting the HE-recovery relationship they also reveal broad critiques of conventional practice and the challenges as well as opportunities presented by each option. To begin, the section will now explore the prospects of private HE and privatisation as HE recovery-drivers in post-conflict contexts.

3.4.1. Private Higher Education

A significant trend in contemporary post-conflict countries is considerable growth in the private HE sector. While enabling HE capacity to increase under resource constraints typical of post-conflict states, this trend entails various negative contradictions that frustrate the ability of HEIs to positively contribute to post-war recovery. With state capacity and governance structures often weakened by conflict and their role challenged by other actors including donor agencies, parallel service-delivery structures such as NGOs, or market forces, private and foreign providers can drive post-conflict HE expansion outside of formal regulatory channels.

Proponents of private HE hold that the private sector is vital to bringing much needed investment into under-resourced HE systems. In particular in post-conflict countries where HE is of low quality and low capacity, private providers are held to ‘fill a niche’ that can increase capacity with little to no public expenditure (Hamm & Lehmann 2011). Furthermore, private providers may inject innovation and
competition into HE systems dominated by stifling public sectors and be more responsive to domestic economic and labour market needs. A clear statement of the conventional view on HE in fragile and post-conflict contexts is found in Chauvet and Collier (2007):

*There is little realistic prospect that the government of a fragile state can afford to finance the rehabilitation of its university: other educational priorities will come first. Hence, the sensible solution is likely to be to permit the university to shift to predominantly private funding, through fees, while encouraging it to seek funding for scholarships both from private sources such as the diaspora, and from donors. Beyond this the government can also encourage the establishment of private universities and colleges.*

In contrast to the above position, the feasibility and desirability of public HE investment in post-conflict contexts is defended in this thesis. Various problems and negative consequences can be identified as resulting from rapid post-conflict expansion of private HE. First, in countries with significant resource constraints, the low level of control exercised by public authorities over enrolments and direction of private HEIs can lead to many contradictions and a socially sub-optimal utilisation of scarce resources. For example, after the Lebanese civil war, explosive growth of private universities had a ‘very damaging impact on the country’s higher education sector’ (TEMPUS 2012). Uncontrolled proliferation of confessional private HEIs led to focus on teaching applied professional disciplines including business and computer science which ‘marginalised scientific research’ and created a ‘scattered scientific community lacking a coherent and national research strategy’ (Gaillard 2010). A similar pattern of over-enrolment in business and other market-driven disciplines is found in Cambodia (Kian-Woon et al 2010) and Iraqi Kurdistan (Ala’Aldeen 2011).

Private HE in post-conflict states also raises concerns over equity. Pre-war Cambodia had no tradition of private university education and three private HEIs were established in the 1990s. At one university student-fees were $480 per month while the average annual salary stood at $300 (Minxuan 1998). In situations where
private HEIs account for the majority of post-conflict expansion, access is improved for relatively wealthy groups. Where poverty, inequality, and social exclusion were conflict-drivers this pattern can re-produce and perpetuate conflict dynamics and contribute to instability and conflict risk. In the private model of post-conflict HE state capacity to eradicate inequalities through positive discrimination is limited. On the other hand, most post-conflict states have very low gross tertiary enrolment rates at the end of conflict. Public subsidies to HE have been criticised as serving an elite constituency that is resistant to cuts in its privileged status, for example, in Rwanda.

Post-conflict governance reforms in some states have enabled private provision of HE. In some cases post-conflict states may become signatories to global regulations that impact on domestic HE governance, for example, HE is classified by the WTO as a tradable good and service subject to fair competition rules. Many post-conflict countries have undergone processes of marketisation and liberalisation that have permitted private providers to enter previously state-run HE sectors. In some cases, for example, Iraq or Bosnia, private education may be viewed as important to manage a transition out of state-controlled socialist economic systems into market-led liberal growth models. In these cases private HE may fit better with the ideological and strategic goals of donors and powerful external agents including the World Bank or USAID.

An example of private HE promoted by transitional bodies is East Timor where 14 private HEIs were established during 2000-2004 under very low regulatory supervision to serve a population of approximately one million (Nicolai 2004, p.87). Donors supported establishment of private HEIs rather than aiding the existing public university. An East Timor publication suggests that the reason was that donors believe private universities ‘can be more effective in promoting their vision of an export-oriented, privatized economy’ (Lao’Hamutuk 2003). In a similar vein, Davies (2004a) argues that UNMIK promoted private universities in Kosovo because they aligned with its market-liberal vision for reconstruction. The promotion of private provision of HE in post-conflict countries should be viewed
within this context of a market-driven or neoliberal model of reconstruction and statebuilding.

In contrast to private HE’s role in neoliberal statebuilding, public HE can be held to have greater potential to contribute to post-conflict recovery processes than private provision. Boughton (2005) argues that in East Timor gearing HE content to reconstruction and development goals, such as agricultural extension to improve livelihoods, requires public priority setting rather than free-market principles.

The presence of governance structures offering strong regulatory frameworks are an important determinant of HE contributing positively to post-war recovery (MoHE-A/IIEP 2004, p.19). However, in many post-conflict cases private university expansion has occurred in very weak regulatory contexts. For example, in Kosovo, the UNMIK transitional administration in 2002 legislated for opening of for-profit HEIs, followed by very rapid HE growth (GAP 2008). Many new private universities were of very poor quality and forced to close in 2008 by the MoHE. Similarly, in El Salvador in 1997, five years after the conflict, eight private HEIs were closed after nationwide evaluations (Harrington 2001).

A more extreme dynamic, total collapse of governance structures enables all private HEIs to emerge outside of formal regulatory channels. Private-sector led expansion, particularly under these conditions, can be an unchecked process leading to duplicative investment, profit-driven enterprises, system fragmentation, and low quality education. In Afghanistan some private HEIs were established outside the state’s regulatory authority since 2001. Private universities were legalised in 2007 and in the period 2007-2009 twenty private universities were officially registered by the Ministry (MoHE-A 2009, p.3). Unregulated private institutions are continually established to meet the high demand for HE yet are of low quality.

MoHE-A/IIEP (2004) warns of negative consequences for Afghan HE if the sector expanded without regulatory institutions in place; ‘anyone could establish an
organization and call it a university or college without any legally binding obligations whatsoever either towards students, towards the community or towards the nation’. In this scenario average HEI size could be too small, certain subjects may be over-provided, quality could be highly uneven with no accreditation mechanism to distinguish between degrees, quality controls for staff, libraries and facilities would be absent, and private universities could deplete public HE resources by offering more competitive wages. The above example illustrates clearly many problems associated with post-conflict private HE. Another trend, private HEIs have been linked to increased educational corruption in post-conflict states, for example, by issuing fake degrees. Furthermore, unregulated expansion can lead to increased credentialism or a boom in certificates without a simultaneous boom in learning or quality.

While analysis has so far focused on private or public providers as mutually exclusive, a clear dichotomy between these two poles may be held to be unhelpful and obscure the potential of public/private partnerships. In Mozambique, where post-conflict HE is judged to have been a relative success, initial post-war HE expansion was driven by the public sector and followed by a rapid private sector expansion from 1996. This illustrates the importance of sequencing and the creation of regulatory bodies capable of governing HE prior to widespread opening of the sector to private providers.

An interesting example is Guinea-Bissau where two HEIs, one public and one private, were established after the 1998/1999 war. The public University Amilcar Cabral is ‘managed by a private foundation’ consisting of a Portuguese private university and the national government (World Bank 2008). Due to concerns over public expenditure on HE affecting basic education, the majority of revenues were generated from user-fees with minimal transfers from public funds. A similar path to privatisation was followed in El Salvador where private groups took over administration of public education institutions. In El Salvador, a leading technical tertiary institute was privatised, because technical education was ‘no longer
responsive to the demands of the new economy’ and there were insufficient public resources to reform the sector (Cuellar-Marchelli 2003).

In sum, pursuing privatisation and private HE promises many short-term benefits including low-cost expansion yet is fraught with dangers including unregulated sectors leading to duplicative investments and wasted resources. Another major option that will now be considered, and which can also be characterised as presenting both major rewards yet various risks, is the internationalisation of HE.

3.4.2. Internationalisation

HE assistance to post-conflict countries has often taken the form of promoting internationalisation. Internationalisation is theorised to connect domestic and foreign HE systems and facilitate cross-border flows of skills, ideas, and, cutting-edge knowledge. This circulation is held to contribute positively to reconstruction and development. In fragile conflict-affected states HE’s capacity to meet demand and social needs is often low. Internationalisation is therefore viewed as crucial to filling this domestic capacity deficit. Further, where conflict led to HE’s isolation, as in Bosnia and Afghanistan, re-connection of domestic universities to the international academic community is held to redress negative impacts of isolation. While HE ‘internationalisation’ emerged strongly in the 2000s there is also continuity with historical practices of rebuilding HE. Post-WWII West German HE reconstruction had a highly internationalist character; educational exchange between Britain and Germany was promoted to enable West Germany’s re-emergence from intellectual isolation through re-establishing links globally (Naumann 2007).

Three major forms of cross-border HE have relevance to post-conflict recovery; scholarships, university partnerships, and branch campuses. To begin, scholarships for students in post-war countries are an increasingly common form of HE assistance with several theorised benefits for recovery of post-conflict HE systems.
Postgraduate training in fields unavailable domestically can provide critical human resources. Furthermore, in countries with low domestic postgraduate capacity overseas study is necessary to increase the numbers of PhD holders, particularly in contexts such as Afghanistan in 2010 where after nine years of reconstruction only 5% of faculty members possessed PhDs and 30% Masters degrees (ARTF 2010). In post-conflict societies isolated from international academic life during conflict sending students to leading universities abroad can play an important role in sharing latest developments upon their return. Similarly, students exposed to foreign HE models can contribute to debate on post-conflict HE reform.

During 1979-2001 the Hariri Foundation funded over 30,000 overseas scholarships (ICG 2010). The Foundation encourages scholar grantees to return to Lebanon and apply their new skills in national development and improving HE standards. However, a large number of recipients did not return. This example highlights the risk that scholarships abroad present for perpetuating ‘brain drain’ of skilled human capital. Similarly, Barclay (2002) judges post-conflict scholarship schemes aimed at university capacity-building to have had ‘mixed results’ because they contributed to ‘brain drain’. The mechanisms of restriction, incentive, and compensation intended to stem the flow of the University of Liberia’s skilled graduates all have shortcomings that limited their effectiveness, including lack of implementation capacity on bond payments and the greater material rewards offered by more developed countries rendering incentives non-desirable.

International partnerships between universities have become a principal form of HE assistance globally. The British Council’s Development Partnerships in Higher Education (DELPHE) programme has facilitated partnerships between British and overseas universities including post-conflict countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Sierra Leone. Benefits of partnerships to recipient universities are held to include institutional and infrastructure development, exposure to high academic standards, and research collaboration (Samoff & Carrol 2004, p.116).

In post-conflict countries the partnership model has also been an increasingly common modality for rebuilding HE, for example, Afghanistan’s Strengthening
Higher Education Program is the primary mechanism for rebuilding the national HE system. In its first phase $72 million was provided by the World Bank, first to support five provincial universities plus the University of Kabul in establishing partnerships with foreign universities (Suhrke et al. 2008), and second, for capacity-building programmes in the MoHE. Partner institutions functioned ‘to provide curriculum development assistance, pedagogical and management advice and training of Afghan university staff’ (World Bank 2010a).

However, partnerships may be criticised as a means of HE reconstruction. Samoff and Carrol (2004, p.115) argue that the language of ‘partnership’ has come to describe all of what previously was termed aid in assistance to African HE. They hold that while ownership and cooperation are principles of the partnership discourse many negative dynamics of aid-dependency are reproduced in the partnership model. In the context of HE systems in post-conflict countries this should be expected to be more likely than in ‘normal’ development situations. This is because universities are often weakened and with limited resources which can lead to resource dependence and unequal relationships.

Another growing trend that may be understood as part of internationalisation of HE, but also globalisation and de-territorialisation, is establishment of branch campuses of foreign universities (Miller-Idriss & Hanauer 2011). While this model has not been widely-adopted in post-conflict contexts, partly due to obstacles posed by insecurity and instability, branch campuses of Western universities have been established, for example the American University in Afghanistan. Moreover, this model may be expected to emerge in future post-conflict scenarios, in particular in the Middle East. It may be held that branches campuses have potential to introduce high academic standards into post-conflict countries and stimulate development of university systems lagging far behind international trends. Furthermore, in resource constrained post-conflict states with low resource allocations to HE, branch campuses may be viewed as critical foreign investments that raise domestic educational capacity without significant domestic expenditure. However, the
relevance of this model of HE provision to local development needs has been questioned (Anderson 2012); an objection that applies to post-conflict needs.

The American University system with campuses in Beirut and Cairo has extended to conflict-affected countries with American Universities in Iraq-Sulaimani, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Howell (1993) writes of the American University of Beirut that the “missionary orientation” in education at AUB aims at higher standards of health, respect for human rights, and a more secular, democratic, freedom-loving political atmosphere throughout the Arab world’. This quote illustrates how the American University system forms part of the broader project of promoting democratic and liberal values in post-conflict states.

The rationale that academics in conflict-affected countries represent a critical intellectual capacity that must be preserved is employed in the work of various refugee scholar rescue programmes. During the 2000s, partly in response to the Iraq crisis, scholar rescue programmes were initiated, for example the Scholar Rescue Fund, to support academics that cannot return to their home countries due to threat of harassment, persecution, or deadly violence (Jarecki & Kaisth 2009). While such programmes tend to officially support scholar return to home countries, return cannot be enforced and the programmes may even be held to discourage returns.

Such reasoning is not new however; large-scale programmes to assist academic refugees were established in pre-Second World War Europe, for example, Lord Beveridge established the Academic Freedom Fund in 1933 at the LSE (Zimmerman 2011). However, ‘only a tiny proportion decided to return to their countries of origin’ (Adams 1968). Furthermore, the UNRRA University in Munich existed during 1945-1949 and served displaced academics from across Europe. While the experiment was short-lived, the university’s vision is instructive today. Holian (2008) writes that ‘by virtue of their experiences of occupation, persecution and dislocation, it was argued, displaced persons were uniquely qualified to spearhead the post-war reconstruction of education and culture’.
While the forms of internationalisation analysed in this section offer significant opportunities the field of HE assistance cannot be considered solely through a technical educational lens. Rather, geo-political and strategic rationales influence the amount and type of aid to rebuilding post-conflict HE systems, a dynamic that will now be explored.

### 3.4.3. Geo-politics of HE Assistance

The rationale behind donor policy towards HE in post-conflict contexts is major influence upon HE and recovery. First it may be argued that donors are motivated by economic self-interest and increasingly view conflict-affected countries as a profit-making opportunity for their domestic HEIs. Educational aid would therefore be utilised to build linkages that could lead to commercial deals and enable educational exchange between donor and recipient countries. For example, French education aid consists of over 50% of funds covering ‘imputed costs’ for study in French universities; a pattern criticised for aiding French HEIs over education systems in poor countries (UNESCO 2011).

Another explanation of donor interest in HE in post-conflict settings is that donors are motivated by interest in achieving global security. In a global context where security and development are increasingly viewed as inter-connected (Duffield 2001; 2007) increased HE assistance has been held to reverse under-development and poverty, major drivers of insecurity and conflict. This link is most clearly seen in debates over the root causes of ‘terrorism’ where support to HE in frontline states of the ‘War on Terror’ has been viewed as a strategically important investment. For example, Hillyard (2008), in an article entitled *Arab Education: The Front Line on the War on Terror*, argues that ‘education among all 22 Arab countries’ citizens holds the best long term promise for global security and stability’. Nowhere is this reasoning clearer than in Pakistan; recipient of massive increases in development assistance since President Musharraf’s decision to support the ‘War on Terror’ in 2001. USAID allocates approximately 30% of its educational assistance to Pakistan to HE.
Hoodbhoy (2010) writes that post 9/11 donors and governments rushed to fund Pakistani HE on a rationale of ‘spend more money, get better universities and less terrorism’.

An alternative yet related explanation is that HE assistance is intended to increase strategic influence in post-conflict contexts. This view considers HE a ‘soft power’ resource; defined by Nye (2004a, p.X) as ‘the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payment’. HE assistance and educational exchange programmes are held to increase influence over future leaders and to project a favourable image and spread ideals of donor countries (Bu 1999; Scott-Smith 2008). During the Cold War such programmes were held to constitute ‘the fourth dimension of foreign policy’ (Coombs 1964). Post 9/11, after the initial militaristic and aggressive US response, HE re-emerged as a ‘soft power’ asset in the ‘War on Terror’ (Waterbury 2003; Campbell 2005). American education is held to create long-lasting social networks and ties with strategically crucial individuals; 50% of world leaders backing the ‘War on Terror’ were once exchange visitors to the USA (Nye 2004b).

Mazawi (2005) argues that establishment of American branch campuses in the Gulf should be interpreted in light of concerns over ensuring cultural and economic influence in these strategically important states. In post-conflict contexts, establishment of branch campuses of the American University in Iraq and the American University in Afghanistan can be interpreted as part of a strategy to change public attitudes in countries with considerable hostility towards America. In contrast to the security rationale in which post-conflict contexts posing highest risks to donor countries drive assistance, strategic importance and opportunity would shape support for HE and therefore recovery prospects. For example, support to Iranian HE in the event of a hypothetical future war may be higher based on the soft power rationale than to strategically peripheral post-conflict zones such as the Central African Republic.

From the above discussion it has been seen that post-conflict HE assistance may be viewed instrumentally by donors, whether motivated by security or soft power
rational, and allocated mostly to strategically important areas, for example, Pakistan. While all the above theories have some explanatory weight the soft power theory best explains increased donor attention to HE in strategically important post-conflict contexts. Furthermore, as will be seen later, the recognition by the US of initial shortcomings in its Iraq strategy resulted in a revised position that recognised the utility of a soft power approach to HE in stabilising the country.

3.5. Concluding Remarks

This chapter offered a global view of relevant literature on the HE-recovery relationship from which multiple themes, dynamics, issues, and problems emerge. Firstly, it was seen that, in general, HE is not viewed by the core post-conflict recovery, peacebuilding, or statebuilding literature as an important sector for reconstruction. However, contrary to this, several positions were identified that viewed the sector as neglected and possessing strong potential to drive recovery. Secondly, the wide range of theorised roles of HE in contributing to reconstruction and recovery related goals were presented in terms of stabilisation, physical reconstruction, statebuilding, economic recovery, nationbuilding, research, conflict transformation and reconciliation. This continuum of functions ranging from short-term stabilisation to long-term human capital formation illustrated clearly that HE, at least in theory, connects to post-conflict recovery in many ways.

In the third section major features of the post-war environment mediating the HE-recovery relationship were analysed. While no single case actualises all dynamics and trends identified in this chapter it has revealed typical features of the post-conflict environment of HE. These provide the basis of the analytical framework applied in assessment of Iraq and Libya in terms of HE’s contribution to post-conflict outcomes. Finally, options and opportunities facing the sector in post-conflict contexts were considered.
Throughout, a broad critique of conventional approaches to post-conflict HE emerged. Themes identified include the contradictions and distortions of private HE, the resistance and lack of political will engendered by externally-owned reconstruction and the significant opportunities yet also challenges presented by internationalisation. It was seen that while many hold that outsourcing HE capacity to foreign, private providers and relying on international actors to drive processes of HE recovery is a common post-conflict response a more developmental stance defends a nationally-driven HE system that provides public goods and connects to transitional and recovery needs. In contrast with positions that view HE as a peripheral post-war sector a case has been made throughout for an alternative approach in which HE is conceived of as a vital strategic pillar for leveraging a more robust long-term process of post-war reconstruction and recovery.
CHAPTER FOUR

METHODOLOGY

4.0. Introduction

In this chapter the core methodological approaches, issues, choices, and dilemmas faced by this thesis will be addressed. To begin, the methodological rationale will be outlined in terms of research design and strategy, theoretical framework, and philosophical commitments. In the next section data-collection techniques and fieldwork conduct will be described. The chapter then considers strategic issues and measures employed to mitigate conceptual and practical obstacles to conducting fieldwork and data analysis. Issues of triangulation, generalisability, validity, and recognition of various forms of bias are then addressed. Finally, ethical issues are reflected upon. Throughout, the problematic of undertaking fieldwork in post-conflict settings is analysed.

4.1. Research Strategy and Framework

Academic attention to HE in post-conflict settings is very limited and there have been no previous attempts at constructing a global theory. This thesis seeks to redress this gap. Therefore, the thesis can be considered exploratory research operating in theory-building mode. HE sectors are complex and dynamic systems with multiple functions (Castells 2009; Davies 2004a) while post-conflict recovery can refer to a very wide range of sectors, actors, social processes, or other phenomena.\(^\text{10}\) This complexity entails that no single theory or set of theories can explain all aspects of post-conflict HE. Due to absence of systematic research presenting a global view and the complexity of the field, the first stage of research

\(^{10}\) See chapter one section 1.1. for further discussion of definitions of reconstruction and recovery
consisted of a wide-ranging literature review to construct a theoretical framework to support framing and conceptualisation of key issues.

The framework is applied to guide data collection and analysis in the completion of case-studies, which in their structure to a high degree resemble the structure of chapter three, organised around research questions addressing HE’s functions in post-conflict recovery, features of the post-war environment affecting the HE-recovery relationship, and recovery options. Case-study data was initially structured around this framework. However, during data collection and analysis divergent themes, dynamics, and factors emerged. Consequently, the structure of the two case-studies is not identical but rather reflects idiosyncratic and contextual features that arose from an inductive process of investigation.

This point raises a foundational issue in social science methodology; tension between approaches identifying universal laws or theories and approaches holding that knowledge is bound to particular contexts (Tilly & Goodin 2006). The theoretical framework is formed from a literature review identifying significant findings from diverse post-conflict contexts including post-WWII Germany, post-2001 Afghanistan, and post-genocide Rwanda. It may be countered that the cases are too dissimilar, for example in terms of resource levels, international attention, conflict impact, and status of pre-war HE, to enable meaningful theorisation. It is accepted that cases exhibit many dissimilarities yet it remains feasible to compare experiences and generate findings. While each particular case must be recognised for idiosyncratic features and complexities, ‘comparisons can be highly instructive in pointing to larger issues and problems when intervening in societies ravaged by war and violent conflict’ (Berdal 2009, p.26).

Based on the logic of the rate-of-return approach (Pscharopoulos 1984; Pscharopoulos 1988; Pscharopoulos & Patrinos 2004) reviewed in chapter one, a simple linear causal model of the HE-recovery relationship can be constructed. The model, represented below, posits that HE leads to positive outputs which in turn
lead to better recovery or conversely that HE creates negative outputs that lead to worse recovery. In this conception, outputs include measurable factors including number of skilled graduates, research papers published, or higher individual earnings due to greater education.

![Diagram: Higher Education → Positive/Negative Outputs e.g. skilled graduates → Better/Worse Recovery]

However, this simple linear model offers an implausible account of the HE-recovery relationship. Fine and Rose (2001) argue that the linear model does not recognise education’s embeddedness in contingent and contextual social systems that mediate its contribution to development. In chapter three it was found that the HE-recovery relationship is not linear, automatic, or simple. Rather, multiple factors mediate the relationship which in theory may often be indirect, temporally delayed, and over-determined by competing forces. Furthermore, influential rate-of-return studies have been held to offer unconvincing empirical findings (Bennell 1996; Lauglo 1996).

More fundamentally, the discussion of human capital theory in chapter one touched upon a crucial epistemological issue; it was seen that conventional rate-of-return analysis cannot adequately capture HE externalities. Such externalities, in other words the social or public benefits of HE, include supporting national knowledge production for innovation led growth (TFHES 2000), a moral function in promoting common values, increased productivity of the non-educated (Tilak 2008), and enhanced social justice (Preston & Green 2003). Similarly, Altbach (2004, p.24) identifies the role of universities in developing countries as ‘repositories of knowledge’ and producers of basic and applied research as broad benefits to society that are not captured by rate-of-return analysis. Furthermore, Birdsall (1996) criticises Pscharopoulos for offering a static picture of the costs and returns to
education in developing countries. She holds that social returns to HE may include increased efficiency savings, economies-of-scale from larger universities, and reduced opportunity-cost of teacher training resulting from more graduates.

Such social benefits are important drivers of development in developing countries that are also relevant to post-conflict development. Moreover, another externality of public HE is reducing ‘social distance’ between ethnic, social, and religious groups which is held to reduce transaction costs and reduce conflict over rent-seeking activity (Gradstein & Justman cited in Tilak 2008). This social cohesion externality is of more importance to conflict-affected and post-conflict societies than in ‘normal development’ contexts. This leads to the most crucial aspect of the argument advanced here; most of the functions of HE in post-conflict recovery analysed in chapter three section 3.2 can be conceptualised as externalities of the sector that connect to the wide range of recovery tasks. For example, increased supply of graduates in disciplines related to state functioning has positive externalities for state and capacity building while enhanced civic education has positive externalities that impact upon democratisation processes. However, it should be qualified that externalities may also be negative, for example, it was seen that HE can perpetuate divisive identities in conflict-affected societies with negative externalities on social cohesion.\(^\text{11}\)

Broadly speaking, the economistic human capital and rate-of-return approach is wedded to positivist epistemology that seeks to quantify values of inputs and outputs of educational processes (Marginson 1997; Fine & Rose 2001; Abeysekera 2006). Furthermore, critics hold that this input/output framework conceives of education as a ‘Black Box’ obscuring the wider educational process (Blaug 1976; Samoff 1996; Fine & Rose 2001; Mehrotra 2005). While the utility of this approach should not be disregarded, it is argued that it is insufficient for uncovering complex and often indirect externalities of HE in post-conflict contexts. In contrast to life earnings or additional contributions through taxes, it is held to be very difficult to

\(^{11}\) See sections 2.4 and 3.2.7
accurately measure and quantify HE’s externalities (Tilak 2008; Rizzo 2004; TFHES 2000).

To capture the indirect, complex, and mediated HE-recovery relationship a more advanced model is presented above. In this conceptualisation, both the core economic logic of the input/output model and wider social impacts of HE on recovery through externalities are accounted for. This framework is particularly well suited to post-conflict contexts. Disruption to social and economic systems alters educational rates-of-return which require longitudinal quantitative data to measure; a problematic requirement in conflict-affected contexts. Due to these difficulties in measuring and identifying externalities a thorough understanding is a necessary first step before policy-making or planning for reconstruction. In this way, the thesis makes a specific contribution towards understanding the types of externalities that can make a major impact on recovery goals.

4.2. The Composite Approach

The research strategy adopts a composite approach, a flexible and pragmatic approach combining quantitative and qualitative methods and multiple data-collection techniques that is intended as an innovative approach to conducting research in challenging conflict-affected and post-conflict environments (Barakat, Chard & Jones 2005). The composite approach can be considered a sub-class of mixed-methods approaches; those combining quantitative and qualitative data sources and employing multiple data-collection techniques (Creswell 2012, p.535).
Furthermore, mixed-methods entail that both inductive and deductive reasoning can be utilised in the conduct of research (Read & Marsh 2002, p.240).

The research strategy may be described as a ‘qualitative approach to mixed methods’ (Hesse-Biber 2010); while statistical information is used to triangulate data qualitative data is prioritised. Some level of basic quantitative methods including counting instances of observed phenomena are common in qualitative research (Strauss 2003, p.3) and are employed in this thesis to statistically describe facts and processes shaping structural contexts of the case-studies. Qualitative research, in particular in the interpretive tradition, is concerned with beliefs, attitudes, and meanings attached by human subjects to the social world they inhabit. As stated by Given (2008, p.xxix) ‘qualitative research is designed to explore the human elements of a given topic, where specific methods are used to examine how individuals see and experience the world’.

However, the term mixed methods refers to a broad church of methodological approaches that combine qualitative and quantitative techniques. It cannot capture the comparative advantage provided by the composite approach to fieldwork in conflict and post-conflict settings. The composite approach is considered appropriate because it enables the adoption of a variety of methodological strategies and is suitable for use as part of a case-study approach (Barakat, Chard, Jacoby & Lume 2002). Furthermore, the composite approach is well-suited to this thesis because the field of HE and post-conflict recovery is very under-researched and also complex which entails that an adaptable holistic approach yields the best knowledge-generation potential.

Another important part of the composite approach is triangulation, viewing the same fact, event, or piece of data from various angles. It has advantages in post-conflict contexts where myriad challenges limit the range of methodologies that can be utilised (Barakat & Ellis 1996). Particular problems confront large-scale quantitative research due to the erosion of data-collection capacities during conflict and difficulties of conducting surveys and questionnaires where insecurity hampers accessibility and heightens mistrust thus distorting respondents’ responses.
Quantitative data is frequently therefore hard to collect, unreliable, and difficult to compare. The flexibility of the composite approach to research methodology is appropriate in such challenging environments.

It should also be noted that qualitative case-study approaches are appropriate for exploratory research that offer new insights into complex and under-studied phenomena (Gillham 2000, p.11) and are therefore suited to this thesis. Furthermore, the thesis adopts the position advanced by some researchers that post-conflict reconstruction and statebuilding is decisively shaped by local or indigenous actors that inhabit complex contexts (Torjesen 2013, p.60) and therefore holds that understanding their perspective is crucial. As Mac Ginty and Williams (2009) put it, people must be brought back in to peacebuilding research and for this to succeed careful listening is required. Consequently, qualitative methods are used to understand how actors interpret context and their relation to it (Devine 2002). Most significantly, to assess HE’s contribution to recovery (RQ5), features of the post-war environment shaping the HE-recovery relationship (RQ4), and the utility of various recovery options for HE (RQ5), such a perspective of prioritising insider voices and perspectives of expert participants possessing contextual familiarity and affinity with the cases under study was deemed appropriate.

4.3. Case-study Design

Case-studies are a major approach to historical and qualitative social science research. Gerring (2007 p.20) writes that ‘a case study may be understood as the intensive study of a single case where the purpose of that study is – at least in part – to shed light on a larger class of cases (a population)’. In contrast to large-N studies, in which many cases are subjected to non-intensive investigation, case-study approaches tend to be limited to a single case or several cases. Gerring (2007) holds that boundaries between case-study research and other types of research should be determined in reference to the intensiveness of research into each particular case.
It may be contended that large-N quantitative research has greater potential than case-study research for yielding findings that could establish firm empirical bases for testing theory about the emerging field of HE in post-conflict recovery. However, two main reasons weaken this option. Firstly, there is an absence of established or even speculative theory on the HE-recovery relationship that could serve as the starting point for hypothetic-deductive quantitative study. Rather, a case-study approach was adopted here because the field of post-conflict HE is highly under-researched and in-depth contextual knowledge was viewed as appropriate to generate insights into the area to enable theory-building.

Secondly, several researchers have noted severe limitations on large-scale quantitative research in conflict-affected and post-conflict countries, for example, answers to survey questions being influenced by fear and suspicion (Barakat & Ellis 1996; Chard 2005). This is due to what Haer and Becher (2012) describe as the widely-held assumption ‘that insecurity strongly limits the possibilities of the researcher in collecting quantitatively valid and reliable data’. For post-conflict HE, the scope for a large-N study is limited due to serious data limitations, time and resource constraints, and under-theorisation of the field. As noted above, capacities of post-conflict societies to collect and disseminate reliable data necessary for secondary quantitative analysis are often severely eroded or limited. Many Iraqi experts doubted the credibility of pre-2003 national statistics while the statistical capacity of most institutions was decimated by looting in 2003. For Libya, it has been argued that data was politically manipulated by the Qaddafi regime.

McNabb (2004; p.358) classifies case-studies into three broad approaches: intrinsic case-studies concerned with understanding particular phenomena; instrumental case-studies designed to investigate a broad issue with no specific attachment to case-study phenomena; and collective or cross-case case-studies investigating multiple cases to study a phenomena comparatively and gain insight into whether its characteristics are representative of a universe of similar cases. The approach
adopted here is the latter; a multiple case-study design intended to offer insight into the theorised HE-recovery relationship through study of Iraq and Libya.

However, it should be qualified that initially it was intended that the thesis would consist of the single-case of Iraq. On theoretical considerations, Iraq was selected because HE suffered greatly during the 2003 invasion and its aftermath. Case-selection was however not driven purely by consideration of the weight of dependent, independent, and intervening variables in their relation to the theoretical framework. Rather, initial focus on Iraq came about from the researcher’s prior familiarity with the case and access to participants. Despite these practical and opportunistic considerations the outcome was serendipitous as even after the researcher learned much more about the topic Iraq remains a very important case for any study of post-conflict HE.

Despite this initial intention a multiple case-study approach was adopted. This is partly because difficulties in accessing Iraqi universities due to insecurity posed severe restrictions on the feasibility of in-country fieldwork. In early 2011 the Libyan uprising and civil war occurred, offering an opportunity to conduct fieldwork in a post-conflict environment. A multiple case-study approach was adopted on both practical and methodological grounds. Case-studies provide insights into single contexts and serve as a basis for generalisation. Elster (2007) argues that good qualitative case-studies discern between contextually-unique features of cases and generalizable aspects. While a well-selected single-case approach in which the researcher gains intimate familiarity and contextual understanding has advantages for depth of findings (Chard 2005, p.95) it was reasoned that the under-studied character of the subject at hand entailed that multiple case-studies could generate a broader set of empirical findings from which to build theory.

More importantly, Libya, a country not considered a possible case at the outset of doctoral research, quickly emerged as a ‘most-likely’ case. Eckstein (1975) argues for
'crucial case' case-study methodology in which theory is tested against ‘most likely’ or ‘least likely’ cases. Falsification of a ‘most likely’ case is held to refute a theory while falsification of a ‘least likely’ case confirms the theory. Validation of most or least likely cases confirms the probabilistic truth of the theory. The approach has been criticised for limited generalisability; Gerring (2007) questions how ‘crucial’ any single case can be to a theory, arguing that single cases are inherently limited bases from which to generalise or draw inferences.

While recognising limitations on generalisability to the sample population (post-conflict states), the crucial-case method is a good fit for this study. Libya resembles a ‘most likely’ case while Iraq approximates a ‘least likely’ case for exploring the central hypothesis. In its post-conflict transition Libya possessed large resources, meaningful sovereignty, relatively low impact of conflict on HE, and the highest tertiary enrolment rate in Africa. Iraq while having ample resources faced occupation, protracted violent conflict, pervasive insecurity, and a HE system damaged considerably through war, sanctions, and occupation. While Libya possessed initial conditions that could lead to HE playing a positive post-conflict role Iraq had very poor initial conditions.

King, Keohane and Verba (KKV) (1994, p.45) argue that multiple case-studies can lead to valid inference if and only if the type of data collected is the same across units, between and within cases. This is because data is systematic, consistent, and therefore comparable. They argue that many social science case-studies fail to meet these criteria and are therefore overly descriptive. Due to the exploratory and under-researched character of the subject this type of systematicity has not been possible between case-studies. This is because the Iraq case-study was conducted at a different stage of its post-conflict transition to Libya and fieldwork in Iraq was not possible. However, despite this limitation effort was taken to ensure that the type of data collection was conducted in accordance with the within-case systematic data gathering stipulated by KKV.
4.4. Philosophical Issues

A foundational philosophical issue that will now be examined is the debate over structure and agency. Structural explanations account for ordered and patterned features of context that determine outcomes while agency-centred explanations focus on purposive political action (Hay 2002, p.94). Rather than privilege either, structure and agency have been widely-held to be dialectically related (McAnulla 2002, p.291) recognising ‘the dynamic interplay of structure and agency and material and ideational factors’ (Hay 2006, p.94). This point can be illustrated through the example of institutions, which have been classified by some as static structures constraining action. However, Morgan et al (2010, p.5) argue that institutions are better conceived as resources deployed by actors that enable various forms of action and change. Furthermore, criticisms of new institutionalism as conceiving of institutions as agentless structures have led to recognition of the embodied character of agents within institutions, or the co-constitutive relationship between structure and agency (Leftwich 2009).

In terms this debate, it is argued here that both structure and agency are important and attention will be paid to how agency is exercised in navigating the structural contexts under study. For example, perspectives of Libyan MoHE officials will be analysed regarding how those agents perceive the strategic situation in which they operate and their scope for policy choice. Moreover, case-study methods in political science are held to be appropriate for studying complex interaction between structure and agency (McNabb 2004, p.359). Furthermore, interviews with key actors are held to be a primary means of investigating the balance of structural and situational factors in explaining political events and processes (Rathbun 2008, p.691).

A little made theoretical point relates to structure and agency in moments of rapid social change such as post-conflict transitions. The point has been made that a structuralist perspective cannot account for social change (Hay 2002, p.135). Further,
Hay states that ‘structuralism implies a world of stability’. However, in contradistinction to this view, conflict-affected states offer highly-unstable contexts where social, political, and economic structures may be destroyed, distorted, or under intense contestation. In these contexts it may be expected that room for agency increases as structures are destroyed, rebuilt, transformed, and renegotiated. After periods of intense social change structures may be in flux for a period and then ‘settle down’ to become more predictable. A further point is that in the context of the Middle East power is often held in tight circles among few individuals and rule is highly personalised rather than institutionalised (Owen 2004, p.40).

Finally, the approach adopted in this thesis is influenced by historical institutionalism and the view that ‘history matters’ for contemporary explanation in political science (Tilly 2006, p.417; Thelen 1999). It is held here that contexts faced by policy-makers and HE administrators in post-conflict settings are, to a degree, path-dependent, i.e., constrained by past choices, actions, and traditions (Mahoney & Schensul 2006). Following this premise, the case-study approach is not limited to the conflict and post-conflict HE system but begins with an account of the historical development and pre-conflict context of HE. In the Libyan case, for example, it is shown that HE’s role in Qaddafi’s regime legitimation strategies created a path-dependent trajectory that constrained the scope of post-conflict HE reform.

4.5. Data Collection Issues and Techniques

In this section the techniques of data-collection utilised in the carrying out of the empirical case-study research will be detailed. To begin, the crucial issue of sampling will be addressed. After this the approach adopted to the main form of data collection, interviews, will be explained. This will be followed by a brief discussion of the treatment of textual primary and secondary sources. Finally, the
process of conducting research and fieldwork will be described for the case-studies of Iraq and Libya respectively.

4.5.1. Sampling

Chard (2005) argues that in conflict-affected and post-conflict settings the difficulties of access, distortions to the local environment such as population displacement, and the personal bias arising from potential participants’ increased suspicion of outsiders are all factors that render traditional neat sampling procedures less applicable. Rather, she explains, the practicalities of access and security have a strong effect on the sample frame applied during research. Snowball sampling is held to be effective in accessing difficult to reach populations (Tracy 2013, p.136). Cohen and Arieli (2011) argue that snowball sampling can usefully circumnavigate some obstacles to research presented by conflict-affected settings including lack of information on individuals and organisations to contact. Snowballing is often employed in political research in the Middle East due to various difficulties of accessing specific populations and the ‘culture of suspicion’ that exists (Clark 2006).

It should be noted that this sampling procedure is non-probabilistic and therefore may be charged with introducing forms of bias including the bias from participants recommending further contacts from within their social network who are more likely to share similar demographic, ideological, or professional backgrounds thus limiting the broad representativeness of the sample. This was mitigated through employing multiple snowballs rather than one or two. Initial contacts were made with ten academics and no more than three links occurred down any single snowball line. This limits personal bias such as friendship or similar political views influencing initial contacts’ suggestions.

This form of non-probabilistic snowball sampling was considered appropriate for the research because in both cases the participants were to some degree difficult to
access. In the case of Iraq displaced academics constituted a hidden population although individual academics tended to have extended social networks that could be utilised for effective snowball sampling. In the case of Libya the suspicion of outside researchers in an unstable environment was greatly reduced by the introductions provided by the snowballing technique.

Furthermore, Tansey (2007) argues that non-probability sampling is appropriate in political case-study research that relies on elite interviewing because participants should be selected according to particular criteria. A purposive sample frame was therefore utilised because of the concern of the study with the strategic aspect of HE and post-war recovery which required the participation of high-level officials to address most of the research questions. In selecting potential participants those occupying or formerly occupying strategic and leadership positions in the HE sector or post-war reconstruction were favoured. While these participants can be considered elite actors on a conventional definition other participants including faculty members and administrative staff would not be. For this study, elites will be defined as those possessing expertise on the given topic. Some individuals may not self-identify as elites but will be classified as elites on this definition, for example, Libyan academics possess expertise on the national HE system but are not part of the economic or political elite. Elite interviews are useful for understanding theoretical positions, perceptions, beliefs and ideologies of elites and offer ‘insight into the mind-set of the actors who have played a role in shaping the society in which we live and an interviewee’s subjective analysis of a particular episode or situation’ (Richards 1996).

4.5.2. Primary and Secondary Sources

The first stage of each case-study was a ‘soaking and poking’ process (George & Bennett 2005, p.89) involving wide reading of primary and secondary literature to gain familiarity with contextual factors. For Iraq, this was greatly assisted by observations made whilst working with Iraqi academics. Doctoral theses, primarily
by overseas Iraqi and Libyan students at foreign universities, provide an invaluable resource for understanding historical dynamics of HE. For other general and contextual sources the literature related to Iraq and Libya from political science, development studies, and post-war recovery studies was surveyed.

While the subject of post-conflict HE is very under-researched in academic literature several scholarly sources address the issue. The majority analyse a single university or country with much less global or comparative study. Reportage from analytical news sources is an important source of information on HE in conflict and post-conflict contexts. The Times Higher Education Supplement, the Chronicle of Higher Education, University World News, and the Institute for War and Peace Reporting all offer relatively objective and reliable journalism. Online data searches in archives of these publications retrieved information particularly useful for tracking post-conflict trends in HE.

Statistical data on aid to HE, national educational expenditure, student enrolment, and other indicators was gathered from databases including the OECD-DAC Query Wizard for International Development Statistics, the Development Assistance Database (DAD) sites for Iraq, plus governmental statistics organisations. In addition, secondary sources that provide relevant statistics have been utilised and efforts made to cross-check their validity. However, the most important type of data was gained from interviews which will be addressed now.

4.5.3. Interviews

Semi-structured interviews with pre-dominantly open-ended questions were the primary data-collection technique employed during fieldwork. Rather than pre-determined questions aimed at eliciting short answers, a set of ‘guiding questions’ (Hatch 2002, p.101) were asked to the vast majority of participants with participant responses followed up on and probed to attain in-depth data. This is appropriate due to the exploratory nature of the research which required a qualitative approach
that seeks to understand the perspectives of research subjects, their intentions, beliefs, and systems of meaning that inform their worldview. The majority of interviews were conducted in English with an Arabic-speaking local translator used where necessary.

4.5.4. Iraq Case-study

Primary data collection on Iraq occurred in a non-typical process over the majority of the length of study. Prior to commencing the doctoral programme the author became involved in the Scholar Rescue Fund Iraq (SRF) programme to support displaced Iraqi academics whilst working as a researcher in Amman, Jordan. Through acting as research assistant for Iraqi academics and frequent conversations a degree of familiarity with Iraqi HE was gained. In June 2010 involvement in a workshop partly organised by the Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit (PRDU) on rebuilding Iraqi HE for Iraqi SRF Scholars in Amman, Jordan enabled greater knowledge of Iraqi HE and also access to a valuable group of potential participants. This experience shaped the decision to commence doctoral research on post-war reconstruction and HE in Iraq at the University of York in October 2010.

Between June 2010 and February 2011 involvement as an assistant in an SRF/PRDU project aimed at gearing the research of displaced Iraqi scholars towards rebuilding Iraqi HE enabled further in-depth knowledge of the topic based on contact with Iraqi academics, reading and editing of draft papers, and conduct of the initial stages of PhD research. Furthermore, this experience constitutes participant observation in a programme designed to build research capacity of Iraqi scholars on the rationale that upon their return they would have major impact on Iraqi HE through the relevance and quality of their research.

The above-mentioned project culminated in a conference in Amman, Jordan in January 2011 jointly organised by the Institute of International Education (IIE), SRF and PRDU. In attendance were many Iraqi university Presidents, representatives
from the US Department of State, IIE, and over 100 Iraqi academics. The conference was an important learning tool because papers on Iraqi HE stimulated heated debate and myriad perspectives and arguments were expressed. The SRF programme provided opportunities for observation, informal discussions, secondary document analysis, formal interviews, and gaining contacts for future interviews.

In December 2010 during a three-week field visit to Amman, Jordan interviews with Iraqi academics were conducted. Furthermore, a conference on rebuilding Basra was attended. This was followed by a four week field-visit in Amman in early 2011 with over twenty interviews conducted with Iraqi academics including former and incumbent university Presidents. After fieldwork a number of follow-up interviews were conducted from the UK either via email or in person with interviewees considered important to the study including former Ministers, university Presidents, and academics.

Problems of access were encountered during fieldwork. Due to security obstacles a planned fieldwork phase in Baghdad and Basra was cancelled at a late stage and was unable to take place. Therefore the research attempts to study Iraq while unable to travel there to conduct primary research; a problem reflected upon by contributors to *Iraq at a Distance: What Anthropologists Can Teach Us About the War* (Robben 2009) which documents innovative measures adopted to gain insight and understanding of Iraq without access.

This initial phase of primary research was used to generate findings about Iraqi HE’s history, deterioration, and reconstruction. With little research into post-conflict HE and no theoretical frameworks for understanding the subject at a global-level this fortuitous sequencing of research proved well suited. Conducting primary research in the early stage enabled a broad picture of Iraqi HE to emerge from data. This inductive approach led to generation of categories for analysing conflict impacts and reconstruction efforts. Although based on preliminary findings from
one pilot case-study, these categories and insights were useful in providing a heuristic tool for analysing disparate data sources on post-conflict HE’s global context.

For interviews with Iraqi academics sampling combined purposive and snowballing methods. Access was facilitated by involvement with the SRF project and initial interviews were arranged based on contacts made during this time. The purposive sample frame was based on perceived usefulness to the study, for example, more senior figures such as ex-Deans or those that made convincing points during workshops on Iraqi HE. This non-probabilistic sample method introduces bias unavoidably and is antithetical to random sampling.

While the SRF can be considered a gate-keeper in regulating access to the SRF participants, due to the fact that Iraqis in Jordan are a dispersed hidden population the issue of a single gatekeeper decisively influencing access to an entire population and introducing forms of bias was not a dynamic affecting fieldwork. However, beyond SRF scholars, Iraqi academics living in Jordan were not easy to identify during fieldwork. Interviewees were therefore asked to suggest potential participants.

An issue in the Iraq case is that participants were interviewed outside of Iraq and most were no longer permanent residents of Iraq. It may be held that the special category of displaced Iraqi academics is not representative of the views of most Iraqi academics that remain working and living in their country. One factor mitigating this problem is that the overwhelming majority of displaced Iraqi academics left during 2006-2008 and were present in Iraq in the most critical post-conflict phase. Further, triangulation of reports and facts with other data sources has been employed where possible to mitigate this form of sample bias.
4.5.5. Libya Case Study

A pre-study of Libyan HE was conducted in the UK between February and June 2012, consisting of over 20 interviews and two focus groups with Libyan UK-based postgraduate students and academics plus desk-based research. It assessed pre-war Libyan HE’s historical trajectory, developmental role, and strengths and weaknesses. Furthermore, this phase enabled refinement of interview strategies and questions to be employed during fieldwork.

Participants were asked for advice on conducting research in Libya. Many postgraduate students interviewed were completing studies on Libya and therefore could provide unique insights. The most common advice offered was that introductions or contacts would be important to gaining access and trust of potential participants. Several interviewees stressed that Libya is a relatively closed society and suspicious of outsiders. However, five postgraduate students stated that there are no obstacles to conducting research and that people would be very willing to participate.

From the 12th October until the 7th December 2012 fieldwork was conducted in Libya. One month was spent in Tripoli and visits were made to Baida, Benghazi, Zawiya, Misrata, and Gharyan. Interviews with academics and policy-makers were the primary data-collection method although observation, focus groups, and document analysis were also conducted.

Observation is a simple and unintrusive research method appropriate in post-conflict settings (Barakat & Ellis 1996). An advantage of the method is that in conflict-affected environments which are highly politicised collecting basic facts and impressions from observation can assist the researcher in being seen as a non-threatening presence and therefore eases access to research settings and participants. Taking field notes on campuses, observing behaviour in natural settings, taking photos, and conducting informal conversations were utilised. After
visiting HEIs field-notes and observations were written-up to collate impressions, ideas, and facts gathered.

Elite interviews were conducted with MoHE-L officials, Economic Development Board (EDB) officials, former Ministers, university Presidents and Vice-Presidents, Deans of Faculty, Heads of Department, and other senior academics. Also, non-elite interviews were conducted with students, administrators, and junior academics. Furthermore, three focus groups were conducted; one with senior faculty members and two with students. Focus groups were semi-structured and in part used to cross-check facts, interpretations, and working conclusions in a group situation. Lastly, group conversations with students at various universities, while not classified as formal focus groups, addressed broadly similar issues and were useful in gaining in-depth understanding of student perspectives.

Interview and focus group data in the vast majority of instances was audio recorded and transcribed afterwards. In a small number of cases participants requested handwritten notes rather than audio. Audio recordings have the advantage of capturing nearly all verbal communication, however, they may inhibit responses, in particular in a Libyan context where recording may be associated with intelligence services or Mukhabarat and therefore mistrusted. To mitigate this problem assurances were made to participants over usage of audio recordings. It should be noted that several participants requested that recording cease for a short period while they stated points they deemed sensitive. Furthermore, in several cases a translator was employed, a Libyan male in his mid-20s, and hand-written notes taken. This raises issues of translator bias including interviewees’ trust of the translator and mediation of interview data through the interpretive agency of the translator.

Purposive and snowballing sampling was used to guide the arranging of interviews with Libyan academics. The intention was to access high-level academics and administrators in strategic positions; interviews with senior faculty members were
prioritised over interviews with junior faculty members. Due to gatekeepers and mistrust snowball sampling was necessary to secure many interviews. In some cases interviewees were identified through online information or by contacting university officials. In other cases two Libyan personal contacts were very helpful securing introductions to academics and Ministry staff. Snowballing was pursued to identify colleagues of interviewees that possessed significant expertise. Furthermore, pre-study participants, many of whom remained in the UK pursuing postgraduate studies, facilitated interviews with their colleagues in Libya.

Given that access to parts of Libya was constrained during fieldwork several practical and methodological difficulties emerged requiring creative responses. Access to Bani Walid was impossible due to the military campaign there during fieldwork in late 2012, access to Sabha was limited by insecurity, while access to Benghazi was problematic following the recent killing of Ambassador Stevens and exit of foreigners from the city.

Moreover, in Benghazi the researcher experienced intense suspicion from many potential participants as an outsider in a context in which fears of espionage were rife following the August 2012 US embassy attack. This accords with Sluka’s (1995, p.283) finding that the most common misperception of anthropologists in the field, in particular in dangerous settings, is that they are spies. While this was most pronounced in Benghazi, similar suspicion and mistrust was experienced in other cities due to long legacies of repressive rule under Qaddafi and the general problematic of suspicion reported by scholars of Middle Eastern studies in conducting fieldwork (Clark 2006). Moreover, as Belousov et al (2007) argue, even seemingly uncontroversial topics can become sensitive in ‘crisis-ridden’ situations; an argument that accords with the experience of conducting fieldwork for this thesis.
4.6. Strategic Issues in Data Analysis

As noted, the first stage was a ‘soaking and poking’ (George & Bennett 2005, p.89) desk-based review and in the case of Libya a pre-study consisting of interviews. Data gathered for case-studies during fieldwork was then analysed through coding of emergent categories, themes, and patterns. Based on these, a chronological narrative was constructed that provides a broad overview of key facts, events, dynamics, and processes. Due to Iraq being seven years and Libya one year into the ‘post’-conflict phase during fieldwork the length of the chronological narrative in each case-study varies. The research framework, derived from the literature review, was applied to case-studies to ‘frame’ issues, guide data collection, and structure interpretation and analysis of data. However, the framework did not determine the final structure of case-studies; rather, emergent themes from data analysis led to adaptations of several categories, themes, and factors.

Triangulation is defined by Gerring (2007, p.218) as ‘use of multiple methods, often at different levels of analysis’. It is a common feature of social research, in particular in a post-positivist paradigm, which views a phenomenon from two or more perspectives, and aims at enhancing the validity, reliability, and generalisability of findings (McNabb 2004, p.366; Tracy 2013, p.40). This process of cross-checking data from multiple sources and types of source is a principal means of strengthening the data-collection process and multiple data sources were sought wherever possible. Interviews are the primary data source while published primary sources and secondary literature are employed to strengthen or weaken interpretations of facts, events, and ideas. Furthermore, conferences and workshops provided valuable opportunities to hear many diverse perspectives while news monitoring also informed the study.

King, Keohane and Verba (1994) hold that gathering systematically comparable data is a prerequisite of valid social science inference based on comparative qualitative case-studies. George and Bennett (2005, p.67) stipulate that a method of ‘structured,
focused comparison’ entails that general questions reflecting research objectives are asked of particular aspects of the historical cases under investigation to ensure cross-case standardisation and comparability. It must be qualified that the type of data collected in the two case-studies varies in some respects. First, fieldwork was conducted in Libya for the Libya case-study and primarily in Jordan for the Iraq case-study. The dislocation of the Iraq fieldwork entails several interpretive dilemmas; the inability of the researcher to observe Iraqi HEIs directly and the spatial distance of participants from the system they are reflecting upon.

Another difference is temporal; as Iraq was seven years into the post-war period and Libya one year data on Iraq includes much more published primary and secondary sources.12 Furthermore, Iraq interview data contains more evaluations of success or failure in HE recovery and its contribution to reconstruction. Given that HE sectors are large and complex institutions requiring time for reforms, changes and many types of outcome, the short time since the end of the Libyan war rendered many evaluations of outcomes premature. Notwithstanding these limitations, HE’s contribution to Libyan recovery is evaluated and assessed in various dimensions, for example, in short-term conflict prevention and stabilisation. Rather, much data gathered on Libya analyses various perspectives of Libyan actors on HE’s potential to support post-conflict recovery and forces shaping the post-conflict environment. This approach partly resembles Tilly and Goodin’s (2006) definition of a propensity account; an ‘explanation to consist of reconstructing a given actor’s state at the threshold of action, with that state variously stipulated as motivation, consciousness, need, organization, or momentum’. The case-study thus includes an investigation of Libyan HE’s propensity to contribute to recovery.

Generalisability of findings is a fundamental issue. In research design, case-selection influences the scope of generalisation and selection was guided partially by the rationale of extending generalisability. It should be qualified that neither Iraq nor Libya are ‘typical’ post-conflict cases in all respects and it may be argued that

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12 See the introductions to chapters six and eight for brief discussions of the use of sources.
selection of other more ‘typical’ poor and fragile reconstruction contexts, for example, Liberia or Afghanistan, would have increased the generalisability of findings to the universe of post-conflict cases. However, as Berdal (2009) argues, while Iraq may seem an outlier case incomparable to other post-conflict settings it in fact exhibits extreme versions of typical dynamics shaping post-conflict environments. It should be recognised that Iraq and Libya share significant similarities with other post-conflict cases plus idiosyncratic and particularistic features. Furthermore, the ‘most-similar’ and ‘most-likely’/‘least-likely’ research design strengthens generalisability by controlling for key variables to the extent possible.

Various forms of bias can interfere with the research process and distort the validity and significance of findings, for example, gender, spatial, age, or status bias. To mitigate forms of bias several measures were taken. Furthermore, it is acknowledged that it was impossible to eliminate all influence of bias from the research process. For example, in both case-studies the proportion of male participants is much larger than female participants; this reflects the larger number of male academics in the Iraqi and Libyan HE systems, in particular in top-level positions that the sample selection focused on. In Libya, where no female managers at the MoHE and very few Deans of Heads of Department were interviewed, effort was made to interview other female academics and students which partially mitigated this gender bias. Cognisant of this, a reflexive approach was necessary to identify sources of bias and accommodate their significance while analysing data. Moreover, reflexivity enables researchers to mitigate bias related to the position of the researcher and participant perceptions of the researcher.

4.7. Ethics

Adherence to ethical rules is a defining characteristic of social research in academic settings. In line with disciplinary ethical procedures, the fieldwork plans were reviewed by a supra-departmental ethics board. Full disclosure about the research,
the interview process, use and protection of data, the ability to withdraw from interview at any point, and the option of a guarantee of anonymity was given to participants verbally prior to interviews.

At a minimum, the ethical principle of ‘do no harm’ should constrain social research involving human subjects in conflict and post-conflict contexts (Goodhand 2000; Wood 2006). Many Iraqi participants displaced in Jordan were subjected to harassment, death-threats, or attempts on their life. Others witnessed traumatic events including the murder of colleagues. Kubaisy and Kubaisy (2011) estimate that 85% of displaced Iraqi academics suffer from PTSD of various levels of intensity. Zwi et al (2006) explain that in conducting research with participants affected by violence there is danger of ‘re-traumatization’. As Goodhand (2000) writes, in conflict-affected contexts ‘researchers may inadvertently re-open wounds by probing into areas respondents may not wish to talk about’. While conducting interviews signs of distress or adverse emotional reaction were monitored. In one case, a former Dean and Professor while recounting his university’s destruction in 2003 was visibly upset. When asked whether to continue he responded yes and stated that he wanted the world to know the truth about Iraqi academia.

Anonymity and data protection were crucial ethical issues. Iraqi academics have been victims of widespread violence. One Iraqi academic displaced in Jordan for several years was assassinated in 2011 while en route from Baghdad International Airport to his family home in Baghdad indicating that his attackers were aware of his movements. This illustrates the fear which many participants continued to experience outside of Iraq years after leaving. Understandably, many participants were adamant that their names were not revealed, in particular, where sensitive topics including sectarian and ethnic politics were addressed. In these cases anonymity has been granted. In a small number of cases anonymity was not requested. In Libya the converse holds; most participants did not request anonymity although it was offered to all prior to interviews.
Beyond ‘do no harm’, an ethical obligation on researchers to in some way benefit participants or the wider population of the group, community, or society under study can be claimed, or to ‘do some good’ (Goodhand 2000). This can take the form of providing resources and sharing research findings with participants. Moreover, in particular while conducting fieldwork on Iraqi HE, some academics viewed the interview as an opportunity to redress perceived silence on the crisis of Iraqi academia. This raises the further dilemma of raising expectations among participants about potential benefits of taking part in the research.

4.8. Conclusion

This chapter has provided an overview of the research design, data-collection techniques, and methodological challenges of this thesis. It has been seen that the research adopts a multi-method ‘composite approach’ that nonetheless prioritises qualitative data-collection methods, in particular interviews. A multiple case-study research design is employed with a ‘most-similar’ strategy for case selection identifying Iraq as a difficult test of the central hypothesis and Libya as a ‘most-likely’ case. Data collection was then described introducing techniques and processes utilised, problems encountered, and their mitigation. Next, data analysis was discussed through various core strategic issues including validity, triangulation, sampling, generalisability, and bias. Finally, practical and ethical challenges of conducting fieldwork in a post-conflict setting were discussed.
CHAPTER FIVE

IRAQI HIGHER EDUCATION: DEVELOPMENTAL ROLE AND IMPACT OF CONFLICT

5.0. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to analyse contextual themes important to the case-study of Iraq. Analysis focuses on three key points of contextualisation; the developmental contribution of Iraqi HE, post-war reconstruction, and conflict’s impact on Iraqi HE. To start with, Iraqi HE’s role in development will be analysed. After that, impacts of the Iran-Iraq war, Gulf War, and sanctions on Iraqi HE will be addressed. Next, the 2003 invasion and immediate post-invasion environment of Iraqi HE will be examined. This analysis beginning with the Iran-Iraq war and ending with occupation contributes towards answering RQ2 on the impact of conflict on HE. Furthermore, tracing pre-2003 Iraqi HE’s turbulent trajectory is vital to understanding post-2003 reconstruction, the subject of chapter six.

5.1. Iraqi Higher Education and Development

In this section Iraqi HE will be briefly described from historical antecedents to its ‘Golden Age’ in the 1960s and 1970s. This is important to establish the post-war institutional inheritance of the Iraqi HE system in 2003. Furthermore, the section enables analysis in the next chapter as to whether the historical Iraqi HE model offered an appropriate response to post-war challenges or rather that it constituted a ‘defective’ model necessitating its replacement with a new model constructed from a ‘blank slate’. This issue is also addressed in the final section of the chapter, where the relative weight of internal and external factors in causing Iraqi HE’s erosion is analysed.
5.1.1. Emergence and Expansion

To begin, Iraq’s long learning heritage should be noted; Baghdad was an integral centre for advanced learning and scholarship during the Islamic Golden Age (Norton 2011; Warren 2005). Baghdad in the eleventh-century boasted advanced learning centres including the Nizamiya colleges, preceding Western universities by over 100 years (Makdisi 1961), and Al-Mustansiriya, an important institution in development of Islamic thought.

Modern HE however emerged in 1908 when two colleges, Theology and Law, were established in Baghdad based on the British model. Founding of new colleges was largely driven by industrial and societal demands after WWII (Qubain 1966). Colleges remained small and elite; between the Monarchy’s founding in 1921 and its overthrow in 1958 enrolment increased from 99 to 8,568 (Batatu 1978, p.477). A general consensus holds that academic standards were high during this period.¹³

Development of secondary and HE pre-1958 drove political development by catalysing nationalism and civil associations (Davis 2005b, p.73). Despite colleges’ elite nature, selection was impartial and a broad demographic of students enrolled.¹⁴ Educational institutions and associations reached beyond sectarian divisions, ‘indicative of a developing civic consciousness’ (Davis 2005b, p.73). Two Iraqi participants described pre-1958 HE as the real ‘Golden Age’ of Iraqi HE primarily because of high academic standards and relatively strong academic freedoms.

One year previous to the 1958 coup the University of Baghdad was established, its first academic term starting in 1958. It incorporated several existing colleges plus new departments and faculties (Al-Arif 1986, p.40). Enrolment accelerated after the 1958 coup from 8,568 to 75,270 in 1975/76 (Batatu 1978, p.1120). Initial HE expansion

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¹³ Based on numerous interviews with Iraqi academics
¹⁴ Professor Khalid Ismael, former Dean, University of Baghdad - Amman, Jordan 12/2010
in the 1960s included three new provincial universities and two universities in Baghdad (Qubain 1966, p.220; UNESCO 2004, p.78). Furthermore, the scholarship programme expanded further with more students sent to Western universities (Qubain 1966, p.283; Marr 1970).

Table 2. Expansion of Iraq’s HE system from 1960s-present

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<th>Universities</th>
<th>Technical Institutes</th>
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<td>1960s</td>
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<td>1970s</td>
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<td>1980s</td>
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<td>1990s</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>2000-2003</td>
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<td>2003-2010</td>
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Source: UNESCO (2004, p.78)

From 1968 the Iraqi state, buoyed by rising oil revenues, adopted ambitious national development plans to rapidly accelerate industrialisation. Labour shortages, particularly skilled labour, were the most important obstacle to implementing development plans (Mehdi & Robinson 1983). To supply required skilled labour, in particular science and engineering graduates, the state expanded universities and established technical institutes transforming Iraqi HE from a few elite colleges to a large diversified system. Many research centres, funded by rapidly rising oil revenues, were opened. Tuition, accommodation, meals, and a small stipend were provided free (Qubain 1966).

During this period Iraq was widely-regarded as possessing a regionally leading HE system (Allawi 2007, p.377). In the 1960s and 1970s strengths included high enrolment, strong publishing record, and ample research funds. Many Iraqi academics worked abroad, Iraqi school and university textbooks were donated to other Arab countries, and free HE was offered to international students with all
receiving free tuition, boarding, meals, textbooks, and a small stipend (Qubain 1966, p.232). Many Iraqi academics held that a ‘Golden Age’ of HE existed in this period.

However, rapid expansion was accompanied by declining academic standards (Khadduri 1969, p.156; Qubain 1966, p.231). Problems included fewer facilities, higher student-teacher ratios, reduced admissions standards, and less qualified faculty members. During 1963-1972 49% of students failed preparatory BA exams due to increased workload on teachers (Shaw 1981). While expansion lowered general academic standards, engineering, scientific and medical fields maintained high standards; an OCHA report states that ‘higher education, especially the scientific and technological institutions were of international standard, staffed by high quality personnel’ (De Santisteban 2005).

Didactic pedagogy and weak academic freedom are held to have limited HE’s developmental role. Describing 1940s teaching, Batatu (1978, p.481) identifies rote-learning and memorization as constraining students’ intellectual development. He explains this through government fear that ‘to think meant to raise questions that would have involved, sooner or later, probing into the foundations of society and a rejection of much of what existed’. Roy (1993) reports differentiation in freedom of expression; in traditional scientific disciplines creativity was permitted while in humanities and social sciences free inquiry and questioning of knowledge were not tolerated.

5.1.2. Economic development

As noted above, HE emerged due to ‘need for specialized manpower’ (Qubain 1966, p.220) during rapid industrialisation and modernisation. HE was expected to align with national development priorities and plans. Universities conducted R&D in support of Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) (Harb 2008), offered

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15 Based on interviews with Iraqi academics
16 This finding was confirmed by a wide range of Iraqi academic participants during interviews
consulting services to firms through university contracting offices, tailored curricula
to fulfil market needs, and expanded greatly to provide a skilled workforce. Cooperative research projects between universities and Iraqi firms led to
development of 70 new medicines not previously produced domestically (Arsalan 2003). Universities competed to state their contribution towards industry and R&D.\textsuperscript{17}

While not all universities approximated this model, the University of Technology (UOT), established in 1976, illustrates HE-industry integration. Curricular structure was designed to maximise supply of technicians and engineers, students had mandatory industrial placements, course content was determined by industrial needs, and university and industry maintained reciprocal representation on Boards of governance while there was joint cooperation over student supervision, research projects, consultancy, and evaluations (Al-Naimi & Al-Nassri 1981). The University of Technology was followed by establishment of technical institutes providing specialised scientific and engineering skills.

HE-industry linkages were state-coordinated; a common feature of academic and technological advancement in developing nations (Schiller & Liefner 2007). The Council for Scientific Research (CSR) was established to deepen HE-industry linkages, promoting scientific and medical research with direct industrial application. The CSR was dissolved in 1986 (Duelfer Report 2005), or 1989 according to Bishay (2003). Iraq’s national agricultural system possessed strong institutional inter-relationships and complementarities across research bodies and universities. After the CSR was disbanded withdrawal of its coordinative function negatively affected linkages between research bodies and universities and eroded national agricultural research capacity (Bishay 2003). This illustrates the centrality of state coordination to successfully fostering institutional linkages; an example of

\textsuperscript{17} Professor Mazin Kadhim, former Vice-President, Saddam University and senior adviser to MoHE-I - Amman, Jordan 12/2010
the ‘etatist model’ of university-industry-government relations (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff 2000).

Despite success in some areas HE and industry were far from perfectly calibrated. Labour market supply and demand were unaligned in the mid-1970s as the Iraqi state pledged in 1974 to absorb unemployed graduates into government jobs (Batatu 1978, p.1123). However, overall, HE-industry integration was an important driver of Iraq’s economic growth and developmental gains (Vongalis-Macrow 2006). State intervention coordinated activity and intensified institutional linkages and cooperation. While not approximating the developmental university system model identified in chapter one the Iraqi system exhibited some of the model’s characteristics in integration with industry.

5.1.3. Political Development and Politicisation

HE has made important contributions to Iraq’s political development. HE expansion was a tool of mass mobilisation and nation-building. For example, the policy adopted in the 1970s of establishing one university in each governorate was intended to achieve national integration (UNESCO 2004, p.77). However, by 2003 there were considerable regional inequities in HE access; students per 100,000 of the population varied considerably between regions with 1,400 in ‘south and central regions’ and 670 in the ‘north’ (UN/World Bank 2003).

However, despite these gains, it has been frequently held that HE became increasingly ‘politicised’ under the Baath regime. To assess this claim it is necessary to first consider HE and politics in pre-Saddam Iraq. Iraqi HE has long been affected by turbulent national and regional politics. Before 1958 under a nationalist movement with ‘strong democratic impulses’ and which ‘emphasised cultural tolerance’ (Davis 2005a) Iraq possessed strong academic freedom regionally. Campuses were however not apolitical; resistance to the monarchy was concentrated in HE. Batatu (1978, p.645) writes that in the 1940s ‘colleges in
Baghdad had more the character of revolutionary beehives than of educational institutions’.

During 1958-1968 Iraqi politics was marked by fear and suspicion of coups and counter-coups; a context influencing HE. After the 1958 coup, HE became increasingly politicised as the new revolutionary regime permitted political activities leading to ideological conflict playing out on campuses (Khadduri 1969, p.156). After the 1963 ‘Ramadan Revolution’ HE was heavily affected compared with other institutions. Many students and staff were arrested due to the many communist cells in HEIs (Khadduri 1969, p.200). Another major purge of Communist faculty members by the Ba’ath Party occurred in 1968. It is clear from this brief discussion that HE ‘politicisation’ pre-dates the Baath Party and Saddam Hussein.

However, it is often argued that under the Baath Party ‘politicisation’ intensified. It is held that after the second Baath coup in 1968 the education system, at all levels, was utilised as an apparatus for mobilising support for Ba’athist ideology (Slugett & Farouk-Slugett 1978). National and Socialist Culture was a compulsory course and new university textbooks were introduced to propagate official state interpretations of the past (Davis 2005b). In addition, some colleges were restricted to party members.

In 1979 Saddam consolidated power around himself marking transition from authoritarian to totalitarian rule (Stansfield 2007, p.96). This is commonly held to constitute a critical turning-point in HE. For example, Harb (2008) writes that post-1979 universities ‘gradually lost their intellectual dynamism and became increasingly politicized in the service of the new regime’. Al-Khafaji and Darweesh (cited in Watenpaugh et al 2003) argue that after 1979 the situation became ‘truly unbearable’ with universities losing control over appointments. Appointments, career advancement, scholarships, and admissions are held to have been influenced more by political loyalty than academic merit. Furthermore, Mohamed-Marzouk
(2012) argues that a ‘culture of silence’ was implemented through recruiting faculty members and students to collect intelligence on classmates and colleagues.

However, many Iraqi academics interviewed refute this characterisation holding that HE remained largely meritocratic with assessment according to marks, interview performance, and selection committee discussion albeit with instances of particularistic appointment and admissions. They point out that some Deans and Presidents were not Baath Party members and that career advancement was aided by but not dependent upon party loyalty. For instance, a former MoHE-I scholarship committee member explained that ‘we never prevented non-Baathist students if they got the right marks. However, we would help some Baathists to join by lowering requirements’.18 Furthermore, Munthe (2003b) maintains that quality was maintained because academics ‘were so adept at resisting the politicisation of their subjects’, at least until post-Gulf War sanctions.

In conclusion, politicisation has been present throughout Iraq’s post-colonial history, and did not begin with the Baath coup or Saddam’s leadership. While this provides a more balanced assessment than many accounts it has been seen that politicisation deepened under Saddam’s rule. However, it should be qualified that Saddam assumed power one year prior to the Iran-Iraq war and governed in perpetual crisis until 2003 which could have placed additional burdens on regime security thus explaining greater instrumentalisation of Iraq’s considerable HE capacity. Politicisation may therefore be considered a distortion brought about by war, which is the subject of the next section.

5.2. Impact of War and Sanctions on Iraqi Higher Education

In the previous section it was seen that politicisation and expansion are commonly identified as factors that initiated a decline in Iraqi HE standards. As will be seen, two wars and sanctions were major factors that deepened erosion with long-lasting

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18 Anonymous academic formerly on the Ministry selection committee - Amman, Jordan 12/2010
negative consequences. This historical consideration is particularly relevant to RQ2 and the next chapter on post-war HE because it addresses issues of conflict’s impact on HE and efforts at rebuilding after the Iran-Iraq and Gulf wars.

5.2.1. Iran-Iraq war

The 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war was the longest twentieth-century war and costly in human lives with an estimated 100,000-250,000 Iraqis killed (Stansfield 2007, p.119; Tripp 2008, p.239). By 1983 the conflict was largely a ‘war of attrition’ fought along the lengthy Iran-Iraq border with major impacts on nearby infrastructure and wide regional repercussions (Potter & Sick 2004). Few HEIs were directly affected by fighting. However, with its main campus located on the left/east of the Shatt Al-Arab waterway or the “wrong side”, the University of Basra was on the frontline and repeatedly shelled by Iranian artillery causing damage to facilities and deaths of approximately ten students and three faculty members.\footnote{Former senior faculty member, University of Basra - Amman, Jordan 12/2010}

Physical damage was minimal compared to war’s impact on daily life.\footnote{Ibid} By 1986 Basra University was highly militarised and students wore military uniform and carried guns to classes which continued whilst being bombarded (Al-Derzi 2011). In one college staff and students erected a protective wall by filling iron bookcases with sand around the college perimeter to withstand shelling which occurred periodically while classes were ongoing.\footnote{Ibid}

However, aside from Basra University the impact on HE nationwide was largely indirect. Under war-time political pressures the state further encroached upon HE autonomy, particularly in control of curriculum content (Roy 1993). Further, HE was partially militarised with academics pressed to either join the Ba’ath Party or the Popular Army. Travel for faculty members became restricted severely limiting international conference attendance, academic exchange opportunities, and sabbaticals (Harb 2008; Watenpaugh 2004). Overseas scholarships decreased.
substantially with resources re-directed towards building domestic graduate education capacity (Al-Bakaa 2013). Dissatisfaction amongst faculty members increased leading to a wave of highly-skilled migration.

War had major economic costs calculated at $452.6 billion including external debt, infrastructural damage, and lost GDP revenue (Mofid cited in Alnasrawi 1994, p.100). Moreover, there was a high opportunity cost as development spending almost halted in 1983 with many ambitious projects cancelled (Alnasrawi 1994, p.88). HE was affected by reduced social spending as military expenditure increased from 7.3% of GNP in 1960 to 30.2% in 1987 while health and education allocations fell (Ismael 2003). Subscriptions to periodicals and journals were cancelled and funds re-directed to military budgets (Al-Bakaa 2013). It must be qualified that enrolment increased dramatically during the 1980s while HE expansion plans proceeded. Furthermore, despite wartime manpower shortages students were exempted from conscription until graduation unless failing two consecutive academic years (Jabar 2004; Zangana 2008). However, Jabar (2004, p.123) argues that war had wider impacts on an entire ‘war generation’ who could not experience normal life and career development therefore leading to youth alienation and disloyalty to the state thus eroding Iraqi unity.

Iraq’s HE system has been predominantly public since its emergence. Private universities were permitted from 1987 to increase capacity under isolation and financial constraints of a war economy. After establishment of three private university colleges, Al-Turath, Al-Mansour, and Rafidain in 1988, a MoHE-I decision was taken that private HE could not succeed without removing the best faculty from the public system. Seven more private university colleges were established pre-2003. Under sanctions wages for public HE faculty fell to $5-$10. Meanwhile private HEIs often paid more than double this monthly salary for individual lectures. Public university faculty frequently gave lectures in private institutions to supplement their income. This negatively impacted continuity and
perpetuated a lack of research at private HEIs although attracting many top Professors to teach.

5.2.2. Gulf War and Sanctions

After Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait in 1990 the ‘international community’ launched ‘the most intensive aerial bombardment ever seen’ in a six-week campaign (Stansfield 2007, p.128). Direct physical damage to HEIs was negligible. However, destruction of civilian infrastructure affected universities. In particular, a nuclear reactor and the Nuclear Research Centre were destroyed and research facilities, MIC infrastructure, and associated research centres damaged (Alnajjar et al 2004). Furthermore, after humiliating defeat of the Gulf War the state was highly vulnerable facing domestic threats from mobilised Shiite groups and Kurdish parties. The 1991 ‘southern Intifadah’ affected HE as a large ‘mob’ swept through the south looting state institutions including universities in Babylon, Basra, and Kufa.

After these two wars there were efforts to rehabilitate the limited amount of damaged infrastructure at specific universities. The University of Basra received resources, equipment and staff from other Iraqi HEIs. Rebuilding was reportedly completed within two months (Asquith 2006); a stark contrast with post-2003 rebuilding. In addition, following the Southern Intifadah rebuilding at Kufa and Babylon was rapid with full restoration within one month after which the institutional expansion that was already underway continued.

Rather than direct physical impacts, the most damaging impact on HE was on human capacity. It is estimated that military and civilian casualties plus those killed

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22 For example, former Professor of Linguistics, University of Baghdad - Amman, Jordan 12/2010
23 Senior academic, formerly of both University of Babylon and University of Kufa during this period - Amman, Jordan, 01/2011
24 Professor, University of Basra – Amman, Jordan 12/2011
25 Senior academic, University of Babylon and University of Kufa during this period - Amman, Jordan 01/2011
during 1991 uprisings and deaths due to hardship and disease were 94,000-281,000 (Alnasrawi 1994, p.119). However, no reliable statistics indicate numbers of students or HE sector workers affected. 'Brain drain’ accelerated with major negative impacts on academic standards and staff morale. For example, in one department at the University of Technology six of thirteen faculty members left; replaced with new graduates, MSc holders, and part-time military staff.26

Post-Gulf War sanctions had serious negative impacts on HE. UN Resolution 661, the first instance of UN sanctions to not exempt transfer of scientific information, was described by Hans von Sponeck, former UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq, as an ‘intellectual embargo’.27 Cooperation between signatory countries to UN sanctions and Iraqi HEIs was banned leading to termination of many university agreements.28 Furthermore, it became increasingly difficult for faculty members to participate in academic life abroad.

Procurement became a major challenge. During 1990-2000 no new American or European academic journals legally entered Iraq due to Postal Service regulations (Richards & Wall 2000). While a black market for scholarly publications existed, libraries and collections suffered greatly. Trade restrictions prevented importing much needed materials, for example, items with ‘dual-use’ in chemical or biological weapons production were restricted leading to the notorious banning of pencils. Restrictions on computer imports seriously impeded keeping pace with fast-moving technological change that was transforming societies globally, stunting growth in emerging disciplines of computer science and IT (Arsalan 2003).

Watenpaugh (2004) claims that after 1991 the number of Iraqi students overseas became negligible. However, Qasem (1998, p.97) finds 12,321 bachelors students enrolled abroad in 1995/96, representing 8% of Iraq’s undergraduates (Bashshur

26 Former Professor, Control and Computer Engineering, University of Technology - Amman, Jordan 02/2011
27 http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/202/42490.html
28 Professor Mazin Kadhim, former Vice-President, Saddam University and senior adviser to MoHE-I - Amman, Jordan 12/2010
Additionally, 6.5% of Masters students and 5.4% of PhD students were enrolled overseas in 1995/96 (Bashshur 2004, p.97). While numbers significantly declined these findings contradict the claim that scholarships became a ‘negligible trend’. Destinations of scholarship holders shifted from the US, UK, and Western Europe to the Soviet bloc. A ‘two-tier’ faculty stratification emerged with an older generation possessing degrees from the West and younger products of Iraq’s newly established graduate schools with weaker language skills and fewer PhDs.

Another impact of economic sanctions was compressed wages, for example, from 1992 the average monthly salary for Professors was $100 while the equivalent in Jordan was $1000. Further damage was incurred with currency devaluation and subsequent reduced living standards. Furthermore, economic hardship led to increased corruption and ‘brain drain’ in HE. Al Ali (2005) states that ‘higher education has virtually collapsed and degrees became worthless in the context of widespread corruption and an uninterrupted exodus of university professors in the 1990s’.

Participants commonly view sanctions as more damaging to HE than either the Iran-Iraq or Gulf wars. Isolation, beginning with the Iran-Iraq war and deepened under sanctions, impeded flows of knowledge and skills vital to maintaining quality HEIs. Long-term and systemic effects of isolation are generally considered more serious than damage caused by conflict. However, isolation also led to adaptations that will now be considered.

Porter (2003) identifies the Gulf war and sanctions as probable causes of declining publication levels. All major research institutes published drastically less during 1996-2003 than 1984-1991, except Saddam University which increased publications. Porter argues that university research capacities were directed towards military use. Interviews with MIC and university officials support this explanation. Research funding for universities increased as the state intervened to coordinate HE-military-

29 Former Professor, Faculty of Political Science, Al-Nahrain University - Amman, Jordan 02/2011
industry linkages (Arsalan 2003). The MIC utilised universities for consultancy work including project design, evaluation and R&D (Duelfer Report 2005, p.11). University research centres were aligned with national security objectives for example, developing chemical and biological weapons. University-industry linkages also intensified due to post-war infrastructural rebuilding projects. Currency depreciation reduced HE budget allocations and lowered salaries rendering financial incentives for industrial activities more rewarding for academics (Owen 2007).

Another significant adaptation to adverse circumstances was the shift to a ‘multi-tiered and hierarchical’ HE system privileging elite institutions for producing party technocrats at the expense of traditional and provincial learning centres (Watenpaugh et al 2003). Saddam University was established in 1987 as a small elite university reportedly after Saddam received a report detailing declining academic standards. With financial resources diverted to war, the university’s rationale was to produce a small pool of elite highly-skilled graduates. A Presidential Order enabled Saddam University to use the facilities of any public university and the MIC. In addition, the university paid the highest salaries and attracted many top Professors domestically. A former senior Professor from SU claimed that an evaluation conducted by an Irish university concluded that quality was of a very high standard comparable to many European universities.

However, while resources were increasingly concentrated on elite institutions, HE continued expanding during the 1990s. Over ten technical institutes were established plus universities and university colleges. Ghougassian rhetorically asks ‘why would [Hussein] create all these universities at a time when Iraq was financially strapped?’ answering that ‘for the shrewd politician, he did not want to

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30 Former senior manager, MIC research centre, who remains anonymous - Amman, Jordan 12/2010
31 Professor Mazin Kadhim, former Vice-President, Saddam University and senior adviser to MoHE-I - Amman, Jordan 12/2010
32 The material on Saddam University draws on five interviews with former members of the university
33 Professor Mazin Kadhim, former Vice-President, Saddam University and senior adviser to MoHE-I - Amman, Jordan 12/2010
see the Iraqi youth in the streets, and given the economic conditions of Iraq he did not want to see the youth doing nothing’ (quoted in UCSD Guardian 2004). Furthermore, under isolation the regime sought self-sufficiency by expanding tertiary capacity.

In conclusion, war and sanctions had many negative impacts on HE yet sanctions were the most damaging. It has also been seen that the HE system responded to survival needs under adverse conditions with war and isolation distorting and re-directing Iraqi HE. Rebuilding after the Iran-Iraq and Gulf wars, re-direction of HE to elite and military production, and continued expansion indicate a degree of adaptive capacity on the part of the Iraqi state and HE system not often recognised in accounts of this period.

5.3.2003 Invasion and Post-war Reconstruction

The 2003 invasion of Iraq was a major early twenty-first century event with profound and long-lasting consequences. The invasion was the first ‘pre-emptive strike’ against perceived threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). However, invasion went beyond merely targeting WMD and aimed for regime change (Rogers 2006, p.2). Various reasons were propounded in the run-up to invasion. O’Leary (2009) classifies these as the Bush Administration’s formal goals of removing WMD threat, dismantling terrorist infrastructure and liberating Iraq’s people; Bipartisan Congressional goals of regional stabilisation, removing Iranian influence, and restoring America’s credibility; and goals imputed to the Bush administration including demonstrating US power, establishing military bases, installing a client regime, controlling oil and gas, and serving Israeli interests. Others accused the US of overthrowing Iraq’s regime as ‘imperial grand strategy’ aimed at reshaping the Middle East (Callinicos 2005). Furthermore, Tony Blair appealed to humanitarian rationales while George Bush likened Iraq’s liberal democratic polity to a beacon of light that would spread democracy in an authoritarian region.
Reconstruction planning began prior to the decision to invade. The State Department Future of Iraq project was initiated in October 2001 18 months before invasion. Moreover, Mac Ginty (2003) documents extensive pre-war planning for reconstruction including huge contracts for rebuilding granted in non-competitive bidding processes; a fact prompting critics to impute a further motive for regime change in serving economic interests of large American firms. Moreover, insufficient pre-war planning has also been identified as a major obstacle to effective reconstruction. For example, insecurity has been explained partly by insufficient troop numbers; the Bush Administration was warned of requirements for ‘hundreds of thousands’ of troops yet ignored advice out of ‘ideology and hubris’ (Diamond 2004).

The Bush Administration relied on Iraqi exiles that provided partial intelligence and information, for example, misleading the US on WMD and the positive welcome the Coalition would receive (Phillips 2005, p.7). ‘Pentagon planners assumed that Iraqis would joyously welcome U.S. and international troops as liberators’ while ignoring the State Department’s Future of Iraq Project which foresaw many post-war difficulties (Diamond 2004). Phillips (2005) holds that based on these optimistic assessments Coalition expectations were for an orderly and smooth transition to a liberal-democratic state under which US forces would be welcomed as liberators. Instead, occupation began much more chaotically; public buildings and institutions were looted during April and May while an insurgency emerged. Furthermore, state-collapse empowered localised factions and armed militias, for example, Moqtada Al-Sadr (Dodge 2007, p.23).

From May 2003 until June 2004 the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) ran Iraq. Key early CPA decisions, in particular de-Baathification and disbanding the Iraqi army, arguably led to state-breakdown and insecurity. De-Baathification removed thousands of Iraq’s most qualified individuals necessary to state functioning leading to severe human resource constraints in important institutions. Disbanding the 500,000 member Iraqi National Army provided violent groups with an ideal
recruitment pool of young unemployed males with combat training; a dynamic worsened by absence of DDR programming or incentives (O’Leary 2009, p.7; Ozerdem 2010).

Another important critique is that the CPA implemented a market-liberal growth strategy consisting of privatisation and liberalisation that precipitated the Iraqi economy’s collapse. Harvey (2005, p.7) argues that the US imposed a model neoliberal state so that ‘profitable capital accumulation’ could commence immediately in the interests of domestic Iraqi and foreign capital. Coalition policies in post-war Iraq have been criticised for constituting an externally-driven top-down blueprint for reconstruction (Dodge 2006; Papagianni 2008).

At a general level, Herring and Rangwala (2006) provide a convincing explanation that post-war reconstruction failed because the Coalition prioritised coercion over legitimacy. It is held that military and counter-insurgency dominated reconstruction and stabilisation strategy at the expense of service-delivery and basic needs that could have secured state legitimacy. Reconstruction efforts were generally perceived to have failed as basic goods and services such as electricity were not provided. On top of this, the Iraqi economy remained moribund with very high unemployment, oil production below pre-2003 levels, and industrial collapse.

In June 2004 sovereignty was formally handed to the Iraq Interim Government. The first national elections were held in December 2005 and the Iraqi Constitution passed in October 2005. However, by 2005 Iraq was descending into increasingly violent sectarian conflict, insurgency, criminality, and corruption. Iraq during 2003-2012 was consistently ranked a ‘Failed State’ and was at the centre of the global ‘War on Terror’. Protracted conflict, weak state institutions, very poor service delivery, corruption, organised crime, and population displacement all drove continued state fragility. During 2005-2008 sectarian violence reached very high levels with some analysts labelling the situation a ‘civil war’ (Tripp 2008). Security improvements in 2008 were attributed to the ‘troop surge’ (Ricks 2009) and counter-insurgency strategy becoming responsive to local politics and knowledge; a shift
marked by the Sahwa movement turning away from Al Qaeda (Al-Sheikh & Sky 2011).

Stansfield (2007) argues that the Coalition and international reconstruction actors were largely ignorant of Iraq’s context for example, history, society, culture, or politics. Similarly, it has been argued that the Coalition was informed by a simplified cognitive framing in which complex social relations and identities were reduced to sectarian conflict between Sunni and Shiite and ethnic conflict between Arab and Kurd. This point raises a major debate about post-war Iraq over sectarian and ethnic identity. On the one hand, it is argued that deep ethnic and sectarian divisions that Saddam’s rule ‘kept a lid on’ exploded with disastrous effect after his removal (Stansfield 2007). For some, this provides evidence that Iraq’s varied ethnic and sectarian groups have robust identities and that Iraqi nationalism withered away with the artifice of Saddam’s regime (Kauffman 2006). For example, Nasr (2006) holds that the Ba’ath regime’s fall was widely-perceived by Iraqis as an ‘opportunity to redress injustices in the distribution of power among the country’s major communities’.

Alternatively, post-2003 design of political institutions is held to have contributed to Iraq’s ethno-sectarianisation. Interim Governing Council members were appointed according to ethno-sectarian quotas (Herring & Rangwala 2006). Davis (2008) holds that quotas created strong incentives for ‘sectarian entrepreneurs’ to solicit political support from exclusive ethno-sectarian communities. As Dawisha (2008) writes, under the CPA and subsequent Iraqi administrations ‘ethnosectarianism by word and deed was purposely and purposefully institutionalized in the body politic of the country, as well as being implanted into the mindset of the people’. This process pushed Iraq towards fragmentation and conflict rather than building a unified state with a common national identity.

Around the 2008 elections analysts reported that many Iraqis were tired of sectarian politics and conflict and were eager to endorse centralist non-sectarian candidates (Ghanim 2011, p.114); a trend Visser (2009a) labelled a ‘silent revolution’ towards cross-sectarian politics. However, during 2009-2012 Iraq experienced several
political crises including a protracted de-Baathification process that perpetuated sectarian politics. The last US troops left Iraq in late 2011 with Iraqi armed forces and police solely responsible for security. However, Iraq remained a ‘fragile state’ under widespread insecurity with frequent attacks on state personnel and civilians.

5.4. Post-invasion Erosion of Higher Education

In this section impact of conflict on Iraqi HE will be analysed; a direct contribution towards answering RQ2. This analysis is not limited to the invasion but rather invasion and its aftermath; the immediate chaotic post-war environment during 2003 and 2004. Invasion led to a collapse in state institutions, rule of law, and a ‘chaotic’ environment. Moreover, Iraq in mid-2003 cannot be classified as ‘post-conflict’; rather protracted conflict and insurgency emerged in an anarchic context. Iraqi HE was affected by invasion, its aftermath and occupation in several ways. This section analyses these impacts that occurred during the early years of Iraq’s post-war trajectory.

5.4.1. Capacity

To begin, effects on physical, human, and institutional capacity will be considered as outlined in chapter two. In general it can be stated that the impact of invasion and the post-invasion environment on Iraqi HE was very severe and more intense than almost all cases considered in the literature review.

5.4.1.1. Physical Capacity

Direct physical damage to universities and their personnel through aerial bombing and fighting was relatively minor. Reported incidents include the University of Basra where on 6th April 2003 the faculty accommodation area was bombed causing deaths of approximately seventeen staff and damage to ‘many buildings’ including
laboratories.\textsuperscript{34} Another example, Anbar University was ‘affected very badly’ with damage to facilities and infrastructure when the US army entered campus.\textsuperscript{35}

By April 2003 many significant Iraqi institutions and buildings including the Baghdad Museum and the National Library had been broken into, vandalised, robbed, and/or burned. Iraq’s HEIs were severely affected by post-invasion chaos with one study claiming that 84\% of Iraq’s HEIs were burned, looted, or destroyed (Reddy 2005a). Widespread reports indicate that some campuses were comprehensively targeted with physical features including light fittings, door frames, and laboratory equipment stolen. Al-Mustansiriya University did not possess a single chair or computer after looting (Al-Bakaa 2013) while Basra University was systematically burned. Iraqi participants frequently describe looting’s impact as greater than pre-war damage sustained from wars and sanctions.\textsuperscript{36}

Conventional explanations for looting focus on poles of the ‘greed versus grievance’ debate. On the one hand looters are held to be motivated by self-interest for personal enrichment, responding to the permissive opportunity structure presented by the chaotic situation. On the other hand looters have been portrayed as venting grievances built-up under long repressive rule that were unleashed by attacking state symbols. Mac Ginty (2004) argues that the label ‘looting’ is commonly applied to all types of theft during conflict and used pejoratively to imply rational-choice or ‘greed’ explanations of motivations for looting. Rather, a more complex explanation of various motivations behind post-conflict theft is required and recognition that individuals may hold mixed-motives.

The uneven distribution of looting’s impact on Iraqi universities brings into focus some competing explanations. The widely-cited figure of 84\% of Iraqi HEIs looted, burned, or destroyed does not reveal the spread of destruction with some universities destroyed and some affected only minimally. In Baghdad, the

\textsuperscript{34} Former President, University of Basra – Amman, Jordan 12/2010
\textsuperscript{35} Anonymous former Assistant to President of Al-Anbar University – Amman, Jordan 02/2011
\textsuperscript{36} This view is common but not universal
University of Baghdad’s main campus and Al-Nahrain University received minimal damage compared to the University of Technology, Al-Mustansiriya University and the University of Baghdad’s Adhamiyah campus which were very badly affected. One explanation is that the University of Baghdad and Al-Nahrain are located in the same middle-class district while UoT and Al-Mustansiriya border Sadr City and were therefore nearby targets for its poor inhabitants. The assumption is that poorer inhabitants had greater need to steal goods. Alternatively, it has been suggested that the UoB and Al-Nahrain’s location in a US-protected district ensured very little opportunity for looting.

After looting, many mosques held amnesties during which goods were returned. Some faculty estimated that up to 50% of looted material was recovered, although returns were reported as minimal at some universities. Return of goods may be held to challenge explanations that focus solely on individual economic motivation because returned goods represent foregone profit for individual utility-maximising agents. While this may be partially true as a wide range of goods were returned, frequently the returned items were damaged sophisticated equipment, with little resaleable value. Such goods represent a cost for owners, for example, by occupying space and entailing future risk of punishment after restoration of rule of law.

A grievance-based explanation for uneven distribution of ‘looting’ and destruction is that some parts of the HE system were perceived to be culturally affiliated with the Coalition. For example, one former University of Baghdad Dean reported that departments of English Literature were prioritised for looting and arson due to their association with perceived imperialistic hegemony and aggression of the US and UK.

Several Iraqi Professors held that ‘heroic defence’ of universities by faculty members minimised looting. Al-Nahrain University was minimally impacted by looting. This has been explained through personal qualities of commitment and bravery shown by staff members who patrolled campus with machine guns to deter

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37 Anbar 25-50%, Mosul 40-50%, Mustansiriya negligible.
38 Former Dean, Faculty of Languages, University of Baghdad - Amman, Jordan 12/2010
looters. One Professor reportedly slept armed in his department saying ‘my laboratory is my home, I can’t live without it’.

Similarly, a former lecturer from Anbar University held that there was no looting because the predominantly rural and conservative culture of Anbar is very different from Baghdad and people defended HEIs. This may be termed the cultural explanation for the absence of looting.

Another explanation focuses on foreign actors targeting Iraqi HE. Several former senior faculty members of the University of Basra, which was severely affected, described foreign interference in the university’s destruction. One respondent claimed that a convoy of open-backed vehicles carried groups of Kuwaiti armed forces wearing black t-shirts who proceeded to methodically strip-bare buildings, spray flammable fluid from canisters, and set buildings alight. Kuwaiti motives were held to be retribution for destruction of Kuwaiti institutions and buildings during Iraq’s 1990 invasion and occupation of Kuwait.

It should be concluded that looting cannot be explained by a simple dichotomy between ‘greed’ and ‘grievance’. Closer analysis reveals a range of explanations for the occurrence of ‘looting’, arson, and destruction. Moreover, whatever the motivations, looting crippled the physical and institutional capacity of many Iraqi HEIs although it did so unevenly.

5.4.1.2. Human Capacity

After 2003 many other factors continued to negatively affect HE. Over 600 academics were killed in intense sectarian violence peaking in 2005-07. This in part triggered ‘brain drain’ as over 10,000 academics emigrated along with an estimated 40% of the professional class. Breakdown in university authority empowered student groups linked to militias and political factions. Furthermore, many universities became relatively homogenous in ethno-sectarian composition,

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39 Former Vice-President, Al-Nahrain University – Amman, Jordan 02/2011
40 Former consultant to MoHE-I and lecturer, Anbar University - Amman, Jordan 02/2011
41 Former President, University of Basra, who remains anonymous - Amman, Jordan 12/2010
reflecting the wider conflict. Further, a climate of insecurity, checkpoints, and security walls rendered freedom of movement incredibly difficult. While these trends are briefly mentioned to complete the chronological narrative of Iraqi HE erosion, the same factors will be explored in chapter six.

However, violence against academics warrants closer analysis at this point. During March 2003-October 2008 there were a reported 31,598 violent attacks against Iraqi educational institutions (UNESCO 2010). Up to May 27th 2010 the Associated Press reports 438 academics killed since 2003. The Ministry of Education reported 296 assassinations of academics in 2005. Statistics on the exact number of HE deaths face similar problems to total civilian casualty estimations. The Brussels Tribunal provides a minimum number by listing confirmed killings of named Iraqi academics. As of 19th August 2011 the figure was 471.42

Various explanations have been forwarded for the violence. First, Allawi (2007, p.376) notes that when killings began in 2003 targets were assumed to be ‘pillars of the former regime’. Second, one participant estimates that 60-70% of killings arose from competition between factions, for example, if a militia group wanted to put a preferred candidate into a particular academic post such as Dean or President.43 Third, it must be considered that killings were not targeted at academics per se but professionals, as evidenced by the number of doctors murdered. It has been argued that violence against academics was indiscriminate because targets included all political agendas, ethnic and sectarian identities, and disciplines (Jarecki & Kaisth 2009).

It is also argued that academics were intentionally targeted in a strategy of ‘cultural cleansing’. A study of Iraqi academics found that ‘targeting of academics is perceived to be part of the targeting of higher education as a whole in a deliberate attempt to destroy the pillars the country is built on, and ultimately to destroy Iraq as a nation’ (Paanakker 2009). However, such arguments are difficult to falsify because no individuals have been brought to justice for killings of Iraqi academics.

42 See http://www.brusselstribunal.org/Academics.htm - data accessed 13/10/2013
43 Anonymous former Professor of Engineering, Al-Nahrain University - Amman, Jordan 01/2011
(Al-Bakaa 2013) which renders the assignment of intentions to the violence a largely speculative exercise.

Whatever the motive, the severe impact on human capacity is deeply interconnected with reduced institutional, the subject of the next section, as it must be understood that institutions are not ‘black boxes’ in that they cannot function without individuals who embody institutional memory and praxis (Leftwich 2009).

5.4.1.3. Institutional Capacity

In the context of a highly-centralised HE system state-collapse severely affected the institutional capacity of Iraqi HEIs. With the emergence of myriad political factions, militias, student groups and competing social forces the power of university administrations was limited. Furthermore, uncertainty regarding the division of powers and direction of HE reform was a further obstacle to institutionalised HE. For example, at Al-Mustansiriya University three separate individuals claimed to be the incumbent President simultaneously. While this dynamic emerged in the immediate post-war period it remained a key trend and will be explored in chapter six.44

Furthermore, as will also be seen, de-Baathification removed many presidents, deans and top-level administrators that embodied the institutional capacity of HEIs. Additionally, the MoHE-I was looted and burned several times leading to loss of many records, although some were preserved, hidden in underground basements.45 Similarly, staff at Al-Mustansiriya University took records home thus protecting vital information.46 Considering the heavily paper-based administrative system this constitutes a significant depletion of institutional memory and a major obstacle to effective university governance.

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44 See sections 6.3.1.2. and 6.3.3.4.
45 Professor Mazin Kadhim, former Vice-President, Saddam University and senior adviser to MoHE-I - Amman, Jordan 12/2010
46 Former Professor of Engineering, Al-Mustansiriya University - Amman, Jordan 01/2011
In the context of the destructive looting and consequent erosion of physical and institutional capacity some Iraqi HEIs demonstrated that while their capacities were severely depleted they retained a degree of resilience and capacity. This is illustrated by the challenge of re-opening HEIs; the major priority following invasion and looting.\textsuperscript{47} There were immense logistical challenges in re-starting HE to finish the academic year with no tables, chairs, or light fittings. Staff attempted to recover stolen equipment for example by re-purchasing goods in markets but most was damaged beyond repair.\textsuperscript{48} However, many participants held that faculty members were relatively successful in re-starting their institutions, in particular to finish examinations before the end of the academic year. While in the face of this challenge HEIs showed resilience other stresses and dynamics exerted by the post-war environment could not be withstood and led to distortions of the HE system, which will be examined in the next section.

5.4.2. Distortions

Occupation created a number of distortions of the post-war environment that negatively impacted HE. Roadblocks, security checks, and blast walls emerged to shape Iraq’s urban landscape rendering free movement difficult. Consequently, the amount of time spent by staff and students in universities reduced dramatically. Furthermore, in some areas control by militias and regular fighting completely restricted access to some universities. For example, many students at Diala University, north of Baghdad, were prevented from travelling to their institution (Sa’dawi 2007).

Beyond physical impacts, psychological effects of invasion and occupation were reported. In April 2003 a US army battalion entered and began to use student dormitories of Baghdad and Al-Mustansiriya universities, evicting all students and taking over the entire complex by June 2003. Agresto (2007, p.161) holds that

\textsuperscript{47} Email interview, Dr Tahir Al-Bakaa, former Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research - Response received 05/2012
\textsuperscript{48} Dr Sadiq Nasrullah, Cultural Attaché, Embassy of the Republic of Iraq in Jordan - Amman, Jordan 02/2011
although the incident was relatively minor it was a ‘catalyst in reversing the initial favourable student opinion towards our efforts and towards America’.

Moreover, several participants held that Coalition failure to prevent looting of Iraq’s cultural and educational heritage marked a turning-point in their perception of occupation. Synott (2008, p.208), CPA regional coordinator for Southern Iraq, describes how the President of Basra University requested that looters be shot on sight but was denied because summary executions would have been unlawful thus undermining the international legitimacy of occupation.

Destruction of Iraqi HE was referred to by John Agresto, CPA advisor on HE, as an ‘opportunity for a clean start’ (Ismael 2008). This attitude reflects an assumption on the part of the Coalition and some research bodies49 that Iraqi HE was pathological and the dilapidated state of universities resulted from inherent weaknesses. This framing of looting and destruction as an opportunity can be considered a major distortion of the post-war environment in that it informed a far-reaching approach to HE reform that was insufficiently grounded in Iraq’s contextual realities and incognisant of existing capacity upon which a firmer ground for post-war HE intervention could have been based.

The clean slate perspective is informed by the argument that structural contradictions in Iraqi HE explain negative outcomes of the 1990s and early 2000s. Destruction is then seen as clearing away the discredited state-led Iraqi HE model and enabling a more effective implementation of a new model in the vision of the transitional administration. The argument that structural contradictions in Iraq’s pre-war HE model caused Iraqi HE’s decline is challenged by Khafaji and al-Rawi (quoted in Watenpaugh et al 2003) who locate external factors rather than internal contradictions as the most significant explanatory variables.

While Khafaji and al-Rawi (quoted in Watenpaugh et al 2003) are correct to locate external factors as precipitating HE decline, external factors exacerbated pre-

49 For example, see USIP (Harb 2008)
existing structural tensions. These ‘pre-existing structural tensions’ are not pathological features of an overly-centralized socialist state-directed system necessitating liberalisation, decentralisation, and marketisation. Rather, it was seen earlier that structural tensions of university expansion, declining government expenditure due to war efforts, politicisation, and ‘brain drain’ contributed to systemic vulnerability in HE. Within this fragile context the force of wars, sanctions, and occupation could not be absorbed therefore precipitating breakdown in the system. It should therefore be qualified that Agresto correctly identifies the post-war moment as an opportunity to enact change in Iraqi HE; rather, the criticism is that existing strengths and capacities were not adequately recognised. This argument is further supported by the finding that Iraqi HE exhibited some adaptive capacity even under sanctions during which many external stresses led to overall deterioration.

In sum, this section has provided an overview of post-invasion erosion of HE. Looting stripped most HEIs of physical and institutional capacity after their long struggles for survival under conditions of isolation in the 1990s. It can be concluded that isolation and looting were the two most damaging dynamics affecting the HE system prior to attempts at post-war reconstruction.

5.5. Conclusion

In conclusion, it has been shown that Iraq has a long and proud educational heritage and achieved impressive HE standards relative to the Arab region from the 1960s until the 1980s. Iraqi HE developed rapidly, playing an important role in modernisation and industrialisation. In comparison to regional states Iraqi HE played a positive developmental role in its manpower function, scientific research, and university-industry linkages. However, HE became increasingly burdened with contradictions of expansion and subjected to high levels of political interference. Moreover, the Iran-Iraq war, Gulf war, and sanctions had a major negative impact
on the sector. These factors weakened academic standards and constrained the developmental role of Iraqi HE. This fall in standards marks the beginning of Iraqi academia’s decline from its ‘Golden Age’. Next, Iraq’s post-war context was introduced by reviewing rationales for invasion and the main challenges of reconstruction. Finally, the impact of the 2003 invasion and subsequent occupation on the HE sector was analysed finding severe impacts on the system due to post-invasion looting, violence, and state-collapse. Following on from the above analysis, the next chapter will consider post-war efforts to rebuild the HE system and utilise its capacity in the task of reconstruction.
CHAPTER SIX

HIGHER EDUCATION IN POST-WAR IRAQ

6.0. Introduction

Iraq once possessed one of the leading HE systems in the Middle East yet by 2003 that system was almost in ruins. Iraq’s HE system has been selected for this study because the country experienced three wars, international sanctions, the 2003 invasion, and subsequent attempts at post-war reconstruction. The story of how Iraqi universities were impacted by and responded to these events is highly significant for the study of HE in conflict and recovery. After the widely-accepted failure of Iraq’s reconstruction much lesson-learning and critical reflection on best-practice in post-conflict reconstruction and statebuilding occurred (Bowen 2009). It is important to examine HE’s role in post-war Iraq and to learn the lessons from attempts to rebuild HE.

A note on methodology, throughout the chapter data from interviews with Iraqi academics and policy-makers is cross-referenced in footnotes.\textsuperscript{50} Interviews represent the most important type of data utilised in the chapter. While there is a lack of systematic research on HE in post-conflict contexts including Iraq a number of good quality sources exist; a notable contrast to chapter eight on HE in post-war Libya where very few published sources were available due to low interest in the case and the early stage of Libya’s post-conflict transition during which research was conducted. In terms of sources for this thesis, reliable journalistic reports were utilised for some factual and narrative information regarding Iraqi HE although published academic articles and monographs were privileged where possible. Several sources offer primary data and these were the most valued material

\textsuperscript{50} See chapter four for a more detailed discussion of methodology including the treatment of sources

To begin, analysis of post-war HE reconstruction will be given in terms of needs, financing, CPA-led reform, physical reconstruction, and ‘soft’ assistance. After this, three sections will each in turn address a separate research question. Firstly, Iraqi HE’s contribution to post-conflict recovery will be reviewed finding an overall low contribution. The chapter will then seek to explain this finding through analysis of the features of the post-war environment affecting the HE-recovery relationship. Lastly, perspectives and debates on various options for recovery of Iraqi HE will be explored by considering opportunities they offer alongside possible trade-offs and challenges, in particular internationalisation, private HE, and the potential for ‘brain gain’.

### 6.1. Reconstruction of Iraqi Higher Education

In this section the post-war response to Iraq’s HE sector is analysed in terms of needs, modalities of financing the sector, CPA-led reform, physical rebuilding, and ‘soft’ assistance. This is crucial because it will be seen that in the context of the widespread destruction and distortion of Iraqi HE reviewed in the previous chapter an inadequate post-war response that under-funded and de-prioritised Iraqi HE while neglecting vital physical reconstruction was decisive in shaping the sector’s post-war role. Analysis will focus on 2003-2007 although it is not limited to that period. 2008 is significant due to improvement in security and marks a point at which HE development has been held to have accelerated. The material addressed

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51 John Agresto was Senior Adviser to the CPA on HE  
52 Wayne Bowen was a US Army Civil Affairs officer for Higher Education and Antiquities stationed in Northern Iraq
in the section does not directly address a single research question; rather, it provides analysis of several key dynamics shaping the post-war experience of the sector that is vital to informing the rest of the chapter.

6.1.1. Needs

To begin, Iraqi HE possessed very high post-war needs; from section 5.4 some indicators can be summarised. Firstly, human, physical, and institutional capacity was depleted by invasion and occupation. For physical capacity it was seen that 84% of HEIs were burned, looted, or destroyed. On human capacity, hundreds of academic staff were killed, thousands of faculty members displaced, and the percentage of PhD holders in most academic departments fell sharply. Institutional capacity was also impacted; records were burned and looted, and both university and ministry-level institutions were affected by fragmentation, politicisation, and weakened governance.

In this context, Iraqi HEIs had numerous ‘needs’; financial, human resources, technological, security, and pedagogic. Physical rebuilding and security were unanimously considered paramount priorities by participants. For example, Wayne Bowen, himself stationed in Northern Iraq, reported that university leaders’ main priorities were funds for physical rebuilding, control over finances, and for campuses to be ‘no-go zones’ for Coalition forces. At the destroyed University of Basra three months after looting one Professor when asked what priorities were stated that ‘we are not talking about libraries and laboratories right now; we need chairs, blackboards, and chalks!’ (Ahmed 2005).

However, beyond material needs there are major unmet psychological needs. Kubaisy and Kubaisy (2011) found that an estimated 85% of displaced Iraqi scholars suffered from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder of varying degrees of intensity.

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53 Email interview, Wayne Bowen, former Civil Affairs officer responsible for Higher Education and Antiquities in Northern Iraq, US Army - Response received 05/2012
Personal testimony from participants reveals that many experienced traumatic events that limited their capacity to productively pursue academic careers.

Based on agency needs assessments, Iraqi HE was held to require massive funding in the immediate post-war period. John Agresto estimated that $1.2 billion was required to enable Iraq to ‘take its rightful place in the world’s intellectual, cultural, economic, and political communities’ (Chandrasekaran 2007). The same needs assessment was offered by the MoHE-I. The UN/World Bank Joint Needs Assessment (2003) estimated initial Emergency Rehabilitation/Reconstruction costs of $100 million for tertiary education in 2004. In addition, $1,317 million was projected for Universities Rehabilitation/Reconstruction and $439 million for Technical Institutes Rehabilitation/Reconstruction for 2005-07.

Projected primary education needs were more balanced between 2004 and 2005-07 than for HE; this pattern indicates greater priority attached to basic education, the primary sector entering the reconstruction phase in 2004 while tertiary education was in the emergency phase. In addition, costs for teaching materials and supplies were forecast at $72.2 million for 2004 and $267.7 million for 2005-07. Total capital investment needs equalled $1.856 billion with an additional $339.9 million for MoHE-I supplies and materials during 2004-07. In the next section the extent to which these needs were met in the financing of post-war rebuilding of the sector will be analysed.

### 6.1.2. Financing post-war higher education

*Iannone: Did you receive the funds, the supplies, the resources that you needed?*

*Agresto: We received virtually nothing.*

The above quote from the CPA senior adviser on HE, John Agresto, illustrates the negligible financing of HE in post-war Iraq. In 2003, $18.4 billion was pledged for

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*Iannone (2006)*
Iraqi reconstruction in the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund yet no money was allocated for HE. Simultaneously, USAID allocated $28 million towards an arguably ineffectual and irrelevant partnership programme; a cause of frustration within the CPA (Agresto 2007, p.144). In 2004 $120 million was requested from the US Government and the sum received was $8 million.

Agresto (2007, p.141) explains that with no money from the supplemental, financing HE reconstruction was dependent upon donors. However, despite needs assessments estimating over $1 billion required for HE, at the 2003 Madrid donor conference no money was pledged for the sector. The total figure of DAC country contributions to Iraq’s HE system from Table 3 for 2003-2008 was $63.44 million or 5.3% of assessed needs, based on the MoHE-I assessment.

Table 3. DAC Funding to HE in Iraq 2003-2008 in millions USD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Donors, Total</td>
<td>6.37</td>
<td>13.93</td>
<td>10.93</td>
<td>8.72</td>
<td>10.63</td>
<td>12.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC Countries</td>
<td>6.37</td>
<td>13.93</td>
<td>10.93</td>
<td>8.72</td>
<td>10.63</td>
<td>12.86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD Qwery Wizard for International Development Statistics (QWIDS)\(^{55}\)

A total of $55.36 million was committed and $28.99 million disbursed as ODA flows since 2003. From Table 4 it can be seen that few donor countries provided funds. Half the donors, Spain, UK, and Italy fully disbursed pledges, while Korea disbursed over two-thirds the amount pledged. There is a substantial gap between commitments and disbursements of both UNDG Iraq Trust Fund and the US. Jobbins (2005) reports numerous aid-delivery problems; a university President claimed that less than 10% of pledged aid reached universities. Similarly, Agresto (2007, p.142)

notes that CPA HE spending was impeded by difficulties in accessing World Bank held funds.

Table 4. Committed and Disbursed ODA Flows to Iraq HE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Committed (USD)</th>
<th>Disbursed (USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>15,000,000</td>
<td>15,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP, ITF</td>
<td>20,000,000</td>
<td>20,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>25,000,000</td>
<td>25,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>30,000,000</td>
<td>30,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: GOI Ministry of Planning (MOP) Development Assistance Database (DAD) Iraq

The Qatar Foundation donated $15 million to the Qatar Foundation/UNESCO International Fund for Higher Education in Iraq, providing laboratory equipment and materials, engineering equipment, furniture, and computers in addition to fellowships, textbooks, and conferences that drew global attention to Iraqi academia (UNESCO 2006). However, several participants criticised the UNESCO programme. Former Minister Tahir Al-Bakaa argued that ‘the bureaucracy of UNESCO prevented the arrival of aid in a timely manner’. Another criticism was that the majority of the grant was used by UNESCO for running projects with only 30-40% of funds spent in Iraqi HEIs.

56 Data accessed 7th June 2010.
58 Email interview, Dr Tahir Al-Bakaa, former Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research - Response received 05/2012
59 Former Professor of Engineering, Al-Nahrain University - Amman, Jordan 01/2011
The largest single donor project for rebuilding Iraqi HE was USAID’s Higher Education and Development (HEAD) program, scheduled to run from September 2003 until end of 2005. The $20 million programme funded university partnerships between individual departments in US and Iraqi universities. A main objective was to modernise ‘teaching methodologies, research, and curricula’ (USAID 2004). Agresto (2007, p.144) argues that USAID strategy was disconnected from Iraqi HE needs and prioritised the HEAD Program when there ‘were far more pressing needs’ at a critical early recovery phase. HEAD’s value was more than double the CPA HE budget. Further, HEAD has been criticised for primarily benefitting US universities rather than Iraqi universities that were the intended programme beneficiaries. In sum, USAID’s HEAD Program was expensive and implemented prematurely.

At the national-level, HE funding modalities constitute a major obstacle to effective reconstruction. Budget execution for HE is centralized and treasury-controlled (Ahmad et al 2005). During 1988-1989 academic year Government of Iraq (GOI) education spending was 6.9% of GDP; a relatively high figure by international standards, and 20% of this sum went to HE (De Santisteban 2005). It has been argued that post-2003 funds were too low to meet needs and highly unpredictable. The budget was an estimated $122.1 million in 2004 (GAO 2004, p.73). During 2003-2007 the annual HE operating expenses budget varied in the range of $125-225 million. Former Minister of Planning Ali Baban holds that due to low prioritisation MoHE-I was among the first ministries to experience budget cuts after downwards oil-price fluctuations. Considerable budget variation is identified as an obstacle to effective long-term planning by the MoHE-I (El-Ghali et al 2010).

Furthermore, HE expenditure is overwhelmingly on the current budget (Harb 2008). In particular, wages and salaries are a large expenditure with 50,000

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60 Personal communication with Peter Buckland, Coordinator for INEE - King’s Manor, University of York, 11/2010
61 Average for developing countries of 3.8% (Hassan 2005)
62 Ali Baban, former Minister of Planning - Manchester, England 04/2013
estimated staff in the MoHE-I in 2004 (GAO 2004, p.73). Several participants emphasised the problem; there were significant needs for investment in damaged or destroyed physical facilities and infrastructure but capital investment was negligible due to crippling current expenditure.63

Another theme in interviews was rigidity in funding arrangements. For example, the Dean of Physics at one university returned four million Iraqi Dinars (ID) to the MoHE-I rather than invest in much needed lab equipment, reportedly to please the Ministry.64 In another example, the Iraqi budget is announced on 1st January which one year at Nahrain University led to an announcement in mid-December that two billion ID were to be spent on refurbishment in three weeks leading to massive disruption in the university.65 These examples illustrate a broader trend of universities without the capacity to spend funds on rebuilding work.

Several participants noted that allocation of funds to each public university from the MoHE-I budget has been stated to have been determined by enrolment.66 This funding pattern has been criticised for not basing allocations on individual university needs.67 To illustrate, while some HEIs, including the University of Basra, required large-scale rebuilding others for example Al-Nahrain University did not have significant rebuilding needs. It should be qualified that the Iraqi Cultural Attaché to Jordan contended that this report was not valid and that both enrolment and needs assessment determined allocations.68

In conclusion, HE funding in post-war Iraq at the donor and national levels was low, unpredictable, and inefficiently allocated. This funding pattern constituted a
significant obstacle to rebuilding HE. The situation reflects HE’s marginal position in Coalition reconstruction priorities; a theme explored in the next section on CPA-led reform.

6.1.3. Iraqi Higher Education under the CPA: May 2003-June 2004

In this section the impact of the CPA-led reform of Iraqi HE during the first post-invasion year will be analysed; a crucial period that influenced the post-war trajectory of the sector. In the first months of occupation the CPA made several policy decisions significantly affecting Iraqi HE. First, on 16th May 2003 the CPA issued Order Number One ‘De-Baathification of Iraqi Society’ for removing Baath Party members from public office and exempting them from future public employment. The Order removed academics and university staff from their posts; one thousand according to IU/BUIC/DIUS (2009) or ‘about 2,000’ (Munthe 2003b). At the University of Baghdad alone close to 300 academic staff were removed from their positions (Allawi 2007, p.376). The majority removed were in senior positions; at the University of Baghdad’s Politics Department 65 of 70 staff members were found to be Ba’ath Party members while only six were deemed sufficiently senior for removal (Wong 2004).

De-Baathification emerged strongly as a theme from interviews with many participants holding that it had strong negative consequences. There was near unanimous consensus amongst participants that de-Baathification went too far.69 The process was criticised because many removed academics had only nominal Baath party membership. Membership was held to aid career progression and was not a strong indicator of high-level party involvement.70 At the University of Baghdad the newly-elected President Sami Mudhaffar was tasked with

69 Examples of non-anonymous participants defending this widely held view include; email interview with Dr Mohamed Al-Rubeai, former senior adviser to the MoHE-I and CPA, and Chairman, Network of Iraqi Scientists Abroad; also email interview with Tahir Al-Bakaa, former Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research

70 Professor Mazin Kadhim, former Vice-President, Saddam University and senior adviser to MoHE-I. Amman, Jordan 12/2010
implementing de-Baathification. Predicting the university’s inoperability after firing hundreds of competent staff members, he refused and promptly offered his resignation (Riverbend 2005). In his words, ‘the situation is collective punishment. Some of those are good people, some are very bad people. You don’t punish all people for the same crime’ (Wong 2004).

Many experienced academics were made redundant at a critical moment thus eroding the human capacities of HEIs. In the words of one participant ‘de-Baathification came and threw people away’.71 Further, de-Baathification initiated a reform trajectory that institutionalised sectarianism through ethno-sectarian quotas on academic appointments (Adriaensens 2009); a dynamic that mirrors the wider institutionalisation of sectarianism through ethno-sectarian quotas in national political institutions (Dawisha 2009; Herring & Rangwala 2006). This argument is supported by events of 2011 when 140 faculty members were removed at Tikrit University; a move perceived by the university’s predominantly Sunni community ‘as due to sectarian loyalties rather than historical misdeeds’ (Waleed 2011).

CPA Order Number Eight ‘Travelling Abroad for Academic Purposes’ was issued on 7th June 2003. The order gave University Presidents ‘exclusive authority’ to approve travel requests. Travel restrictions were previously imposed and the order re-established academic linkages between Iraq and foreign universities. Testimony from participants reveals that many were very enthusiastic about the prospect of restarting academic exchanges and linkages. Order Number Eight emphasises HE’s centrality to reconstruction, stating that ‘the free exchange of ideas and the pursuit of academic excellence is necessary to the establishment of self-government in Iraq’ (CPA 2003b). However, the CPA’s rhetorical commitment to HE was not matched with appropriate resources.

In its ‘An Historic Review of CPA Accomplishments’ introduction of legislation changing procedures for selecting University Presidents and Deans is listed as a key

71 Professor of Engineering at Philadelphia University – Amman, Jordan 02/2011
achievement (CPA 2004). The previous system for electing Deans involved the President consulting Department heads, compiling a shortlist, and sending nominations to the Minister. To appoint a University President the Minister would nominate three names to the President’s Office. Career advancement in Saddam-era Iraqi universities was perceived to be subject to regime loyalty. Accordingly, the CPA, under Andrew Erdman, introduced elections with both Deans and Presidents selected by ballot. John Agresto (2007, p.83) writes that elections ‘may well have been the first free elections held in Iraq in decades’. Further, he describes how ‘at the election of their own president and other officials, the professors on some campuses cried’. Introducing elections was viewed as a significant act of liberalisation that would remove power from a Stalinesque autocracy and empower individual universities and faculty members.

Several Iraqi Professors who experienced the first elections offer critical accounts of their impact. First, voting patterns frequently split along sectarian lines. For example, one Professor stated that ‘elections were a mockery’, claiming that Al-Mustansiriyya University’s College of Engineering Deanship elections were split with 24 Shiite faculty voting for one candidate and 23 Sunni faculty voting for a second candidate, while the Dean was elected but assassinated after two years. Another Professor, formerly Vice-President of Saddam University, reported that although many old names re-appeared in elections, other new candidates with no history of leadership or administration were put forward and elected as Deans or Presidents and as a consequence ‘there was chaos’. Elections were cancelled shortly after the CPA was disbanded and sovereignty formally granted to Iraq. The system reverted back to procedures used for decades previously.

Another major area of CPA reform was decentralised governance. In mid-2003 a meeting was convened by the CPA with all Presidents of Iraqi universities. It is

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72 Professor of Engineering at Philadelphia University – Amman, Jordan 02/2011
73 Professor of Engineering and a founding member of the University of Technology. Amman, Jordan 02/2011
74 Professor Mazin Kadhim, former Vice-President, Saddam University and senior adviser to MoHE-I. Amman, Jordan 12/2010
reported that Andrew Erdman informed university Presidents that universities were to gain control of admissions and complete autonomy from the MoHE-I.\textsuperscript{75} Erdman offered the example of the US where a world-leading university system operates with no MoHE and held that Iraqi HE could therefore prosper after closing its MoHE. The Iraqi position was that universities lacked the capacity or experience to fulfil this new role, and that the Ministry should be maintained. Moreover, it was argued that centralised HE was a common feature of all Arab states and therefore decentralisation would not work.\textsuperscript{76} Plans for radical decentralisation were not implemented and the MoHE-I retained centralised control over HEIs.

Other CPA reforms included a new performance-based pay-scale for faculty members under which junior staff could receive higher remuneration than tenured Professors. Salaries increased to approximately $1000 per month in 2003 and $1500 in 2005 (Reddy 2005a). Many participants held that increased salaries were one area of improvement after 2003.\textsuperscript{77} The CPA reform was reversed by the 2007 universities law that increased salaries and re-introduced the former hierarchy and predictability. Salaries rose to approximately $3,150 monthly for Professors in active service; a level favourable in regional terms and higher than Egypt, Syria, and Jordan (1,200 – 1,500 JOD).

It may be asked, what was the effect of above-described CPA reforms? CPA (2004) lists its accomplishments as MoHE-I reform, democratisation of selection for Deans and Presidents, increased salaries, international re-engagement of universities, and an official statement on academic freedom. However, contrary to this positive evaluation, interviews with Iraqi academics indicate that very little was achieved

\textsuperscript{75} Personal communication with Peter Buckland, Coordinator for the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies – York, UK

\textsuperscript{76} Professor Mazin Kadhim, former Vice-President, Saddam University and senior adviser to MoHE-I - Amman, Jordan 12/2010

\textsuperscript{77} Examples of participants sharing this view include a former Professor of Economics, University of Baghdad – Amman, Jordan 02/2011; email interview with Tahir Al-Bakaa, former Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research; Dr Akeel T. Al-Kazwini, Dean of School of Applied Medical Sciences, German Jordanian University – Amman, Jordan 02/2011; an IIE Visiting Scholar at the British Institute in Jordan – Amman, Jordan 02/2011
during the first two years. Moreover, as has been seen above, elections and radical MoHE-I reform were reversed at a later date. Furthermore, it is important to note that the CPA did not include de-Baathification of academia as an achievement, possibly due to its negative impact or more likely owing to sensitivities of presenting the process as driven by Iraqi actors for example, Ahmed Chalabi, rather than the CPA.

The Minister that assumed responsibility for the sector after the disbanding of the CPA stated of its impact that ‘we thought that their performance would be better, although we have to applaud the efforts of some American advisers’. This quote recognises the weak record of the CPA yet also the difficult context in which they operated.

One factor explaining difficulties faced by the CPA was the poor security situation during occupation. On November 24th 2003 CPA adviser Jim Mollen was killed driving an unauthorised vehicle in the Red Zone in Baghdad (Stephenson 2007, p.120). Restrictions on movement reduced contact between Coalition and Iraqi officials leading to deterioration in relationships as Iraqis felt marginalised.

Similarly, several participants who offered criticism of CPA HE strategy contended that reforms were inappropriate considering Iraq’s idiosyncratic contextual dynamics. Kadhim argues that CPA plans to institute elections for Deans and Presidents, to abolish the MoHE-I, and restructure the pay-scale failed because the CPA did not understand Iraqi HE history or the context of Arab education systems. He stated that ‘you can’t abolish what worked for 50 years, you can’t invade and change everything in a few days’. He held that despite CPA reform initiatives Iraqi HE governance circa 2010 remains almost identical to the system in

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78 Former Dean at Basra University – Amman, Jordan 12/2010; a former Professor of Engineering at Al-Mustansiriya University – Amman, Jordan 02/2011; Also, Professor Mazin Kadhim, former Vice-President, Saddam University and senior adviser to MoHE-I - Amman, Jordan 12/2010
79 Email interview with Tahir Al-Bakaa, former Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research
80 Professor Mazin Kadhim, former Vice-President, Saddam University and senior adviser to MoHE-I. Amman, Jordan 12/2010
1980. Another criticism is that CPA HE strategy had ‘no vision’.\textsuperscript{81} Buckland held that plans to disband the MoHE-I were flawed for ignoring the need for centralised control and national manpower planning to calibrate graduate numbers with labour needs; a challenge made almost impossible in a completely decentralised system.

Reflecting on CPA HE efforts, Agresto (2007, p.74) writes that ‘when the Coalition first entered Iraq, the universities were substantially on the side of our forces. By the time I left, it was one of the sectors most against us’. He explains this outcome as related to ‘ill-treatment’ by Coalition military, the ‘psychological and ideological vacuum left by the fall of the regime’, rising religious extremism and the ‘desperate physical conditions of the universities’; the last point highlights a central dynamic limiting the post-war role of the sector which will be analysed in the next section.

\textbf{6.1.4. Physical Reconstruction}

In this section the physical reconstruction of Iraqi HE is analysed; a pressing need after 84\% of Iraq’s HEIs were destroyed, damaged, or looted (Reddy 2005a). The MoHE-I’s immediate post-war goal was rebuilding physical infrastructure, in particular campus buildings, libraries, classrooms, and laboratories (McConnell 2003). Moreover, alongside security, the vast majority of participants cited physical rebuilding as the central priority, in particular, laboratories, lecture halls, classrooms, offices, dormitories, and libraries; in short the critical infrastructure and facilities of HE.\textsuperscript{82}

No national-level statistics on physical reconstruction of HE could be located. However, several sources provide general indictors. Reddy (2005a) reported that ‘40\% of the reconstruction of destroyed buildings have been achieved through the

\textsuperscript{81} Personal communication with Peter Buckland, Coordinator for the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies.

\textsuperscript{82} As stated, this finding emerged strongly from interview data. For example, a senior Professor at University of Technology listed security, rebuilding facilities, and replacing looted equipment as the three main priorities; a common ordering of priorities. Email interview with Arkan Al Taie. Professor of Engineer at the University of Technology - response received August 2013
existing budget’. This figure was quoted as an indicator of progress in a UN report that does not acknowledge a source. Interviews with Iraqi academics provide a clearer picture of HE rebuilding. However, it must be qualified that quoted figures are estimations from individuals and should be viewed as indicative rather than precise measurements.

A former university President claimed that 30-40% of university infrastructure was rebuilt in the first two years while an Iraqi cultural attaché held that 40-50% of infrastructure was rebuilt in the first year. A lower figure was quoted by the University of Technology’s President who claimed that at his institution 10-15% of infrastructure was rebuilt in the first two years while the figure in 2010 stood at 70-80% with rapid progress after 2008. An academic at Basra University, the most affected institution, explained that despite small rebuilding projects ‘you do not feel the impact of reconstruction’. A former senior academic at the same university was more damning stating that ‘no rebuilding has taken place since 2003’ due to vast current budgets.

Agresto (2007, p.149) writes that ‘the first goal of my office – rebuilding the physical infrastructure of Iraq’s burned, damaged, and decayed universities – was a failure at least in so far as direct help from the US government was concerned’. Agresto (2007) explains this as in part due to the allocation of funds to USAID’s partnership programme whilst physical rebuilding needs were paramount. The meagre $8 million for rebuilding HE was allocated to the priority issue of laboratory rebuilding, yet the CPA did not issue contracts swiftly and after months of waiting security deteriorated leading to failure of rebuilding plans (Agresto 2007, p.147). This example identifies under-funding, bureaucratic procedure, and insecurity as obstacles to effective physical rebuilding.

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83 Dr Sadiq Nasrullah, Cultural Attaché, Embassy of the Republic of Iraq in Jordan - Amman, Jordan 02/2011
84 Dr Kahtan Al-Khazraji, President, University of Technology - Amman, Jordan 01/2011
85 Dr Juliana Dawood Yusuf, Lecturer, Faculty of Linguistics, Basra University - Amman, Jordan 12/2010
86 Former President, University of Basra, who remains anonymous - Amman, Jordan 12/2010
Physical rebuilding was also affected by conceptual issues over what constitutes reconstruction. In published material donors assisting Iraqi HE frequently use the terms ‘rehabilitation’ and ‘revitalisation’. For example, in December 2005 USAID published a list of its Top Ten Strategic Accomplishments in Iraq. Number ten, ‘Restoring Excellence in Higher Education’, stated that, ‘university facilities - libraries, computer and science laboratories, lecture halls, and buildings - have been rehabilitated at colleges throughout the country’ (USAID 2005).

However, many participants held that ‘reconstruction’ frequently labels mere refurbishment. It is argued that painting of building interiors and exteriors, and purchase of furniture and fittings is typically described as successful reconstruction while critical infrastructure including laboratories, libraries, and dormitories are neglected.\(^87\) As one participant stated ‘they say there were billions invested in reconstruction but just painted the walls and said it was reconstruction’.\(^88\) Similarly, one Iraqi intellectual reported that many donor claims to have rehabilitated Iraqi educational institutions are on closer inspection often little more than repainting (Barakat & Milton 2010). It was reported that Baghdad University Arts College had its façade repainted annually for several years.\(^89\) This example indicates the lack of rational strategy for altering reconstruction plans where resources are used to meet contractual obligations rather than respond to needs.

One explanation of this discrepancy between what is labelled reconstruction and perceived dominance of HE assistance by refurbishment and rehabilitation is that donors have an interest in presenting mere refurbishment as evidence of successful ‘reconstruction’ (Barbooti 2011). However, an alternative explanation is that a wider conception of ‘reconstruction’ is frequently adopted by donors to include incorporation of human rights, gender equality, new teaching pedagogies, and non-traditional subjects such as peace and conflict studies. These form a wide-ranging HE reform agenda that differs, in the Iraqi case, from a common conceptualisation of reconstruction as rebuilding critical university infrastructure.

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\(^87\) SRF Scholar, British Institute, Jordan – Amman, Jordan 02/2012
\(^88\) Former Professor of Economics, University of Baghdad – Amman, Jordan 02/2011
\(^89\) SRF Scholar and former lecturer, University of Baghdad – Amman, Jordan 01/2011
This dichotomy of Iraqi and international understandings of reconstruction can be illustrated through analysis of official documents of international agencies and donors involved in HE in post-war Iraq. Many statements proclaim success in post-war Iraqi HE. As early as late July 2003 Munthe (2003) wrote that ‘universities have been a rare success story for the post-Saddam regime’, citing democratisation of faculty selection, wage increases, regular committee meetings, and curricula revision as evidence. Some donors or agencies have released press releases or other ‘grey material’ that contain evaluations of their own projects. For example the CPA (2004) Historic Review of its accomplishments listed its successes; the democratisation of selection for Deans and Presidents, the MoHE-I drive to increase salaries of faculty members, the re-engagement of universities, staff, and students with institutions abroad, and an official statement on academic freedom. Another example, USAID (2005) published its Top Ten Strategic Accomplishments in Iraq. Number ten ‘Restoring Excellence in Higher Education’ states: ‘university facilities - libraries, computer and science laboratories, lecture halls, and buildings - have been rehabilitated at colleges throughout the country’. This statement is notable as the only one of the four sources cited here that refers to physical rebuilding as an indicator of success.

Despite the large number of projects completed, there are few publicly available evaluations of HE projects in post-conflict environments, other than the above-reviewed self-evaluations of donors and agencies. One exception is CSIS (2004), an evaluation of reconstruction efforts, based on research conducted during June 2004, that found HE to have the most positive indicators of all education sectors.

US Army units provided another source of HE assistance, in particular, refurbishment and rebuilding of infrastructure and facilities. For example, in Nineveh the US Army provided $250,000 for projects at four HEIs\(^\text{90}\) in addition to electricity generators and fibre-optic cable for internet connectivity.\(^\text{91}\) Another

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\(^\text{90}\) The four HEIs were the University of Mosul, Nineveh Technical College, Nineveh Technical Institute and Al Hadba University College.

\(^\text{91}\) Email interview, Wayne Bowen, former Civil Affairs officer responsible for Higher Education and Antiquities in Northern Iraq, US Army - Response received 05/2012
example, an Army combat team in Baquba rebuilt infrastructure at Yarmouk University College and Baquba Technical Institute which were damaged during militia attacks in 2004 (Skelly 2005). Furthermore, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), assisted in rebuilding HE; from 2005 the PRT education team performed various roles for example, restoring engineering laboratory facilities, consulting on accreditation, and training faculty in student advisory services (NASA 2010). Al-Bakaa held that military cooperation in some areas was very effective but depended on leadership of individual commanders and that the military was sometimes part of the problem rather than solution. The range of assistance beyond physical repair provided by US armed forces connects to the theme of the next section, ‘soft’ assistance to Iraqi HE.

6.1.5. ‘Soft’ Assistance

‘Soft’ assistance refers to forms of HE assistance including textbook provision, library support, and information technologies. CSIS (2004, p.87) reports ‘enormous outpouring of support for Iraq’s universities during the postwar period by foreign universities and the Iraqi diaspora’. Quantity of assistance through textbooks, university partnerships, virtual libraries and other similar schemes was substantial compared to many other post-conflict contexts. However, assistance was largely local and ad hoc. Spurr (2008, p.273) laments that no major foundations offered support, writing that ‘few of the salient international actors have risen to the occasion at a time of need’.

Book donations constitute the single largest form of ‘soft’ assistance. Books were provided by donors, including the Qatar Foundation, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and UNESCO; by civil society organisations including the Books Beyond Borders project that distributed a world-wide call for donations to Iraqi universities; and individual universities and publishers including Duke University and the University of Edinburgh (Johnson 2005; Agresto 2007). In quantitative terms, book

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92 Email interview, Dr Taher Bakaa, former Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research - Response received 05/2012
donations were a qualified success in particular universities and departments. For example, the University of Baghdad’s Faculty of Languages collection was almost replenished to pre-war levels.\textsuperscript{93} In another example, the British Council provided logistical support for shipment of 55 tonnes of donated books (Johnson 2005).

However, various criticisms have however been made of book donations. First, some book-drives were not tailored towards actual needs of university libraries. As Spurr writes, ‘Iraqi faculty and students need books right now—and not simply books to fill the libraries but text books to pass to students, particularly in the hard and applied sciences’ (cited in Johnson 2005). Where criteria for book inclusion existed it was often broad, such as post-1995, and not developed in consultation with Iraqi universities. One telling example is a US Army organised book-drive for the University of Mosul that delivered thousands of books from the US yet months after delivery 95% remained in boxes because most books were primary to secondary-level textbooks with many duplicates (Bowen 2007, p.35).

Another criticism is that book donations reflect donor political agendas. Johnson (2005) quotes a book-drive from a US organisation that received some CPA support:

\begin{quote}

\textit{Think tanks and public policy institutes within the freedom network to donate books and other publications on market ideas to school libraries in Iraq. Since we’re in the business of promoting ideas, what better way to spread the principles and virtues of free-market capitalism!}
\end{quote}

Such statements indicate politicisation of ‘charitable’ action towards Iraqi HE. Further, advancement of free-market agendas through book donations forms part of the wider use of Iraqi education reform as a tool of ‘democracy promotion’ in service of wider Bush administration goals in creating a liberal-market polity (Saltman 2006).

\textsuperscript{93} Former Dean, University of Baghdad - Amman, Jordan 01/2011
Another form of ‘soft’ assistance was support for rebuilding university libraries, which it was seen in the previous chapter were severely affected by post-invasion looting. Spurr (2008) holds that capacity-building for Iraqi university librarians through training overseas was one of the few notable successes in post-war HE assistance. Much assistance for HE libraries was in the form of free or heavily discounted access to online content of academic publishers. For example, the British Council established resource centres at five universities (Johnson 2005). Another example is the US State Department initiative the Iraqi Virtual Science Library, which provides electronic access to journals and online subscriptions. However, Virtual Libraries did not benefit many academics due to the failure of electricity provision and computer shortages caused by looting and under-investment.94 Moreover, such spending may be criticised as an inefficient allocation of resources, particularly when there were pressing physical rebuilding needs.

In sum, HE reconstruction efforts can be characterised as prioritising small-scale ad-hoc projects over physical rehabilitation of critical university infrastructure. When asked about HE reconstruction an Iraqi academic95 replied:

What reconstruction? There has been a reversal – starting in 2004 with the sectarian violence many teaching staff left abroad, either because of direct threat or abduction. Infrastructure was kept as it is. There has been no serious attempt to rebuild the industrial, economic, or educational systems. Some colleges got assistance from NGOs to rebuild some damaged colleges and laboratories. Some NGOs gave furniture. In the University of Baghdad’s Faculty of Languages the Germans aided the German Department, the Italians the Italian Department and so on. There was also some repainting, building of new classrooms, provision of computers (from Germany) and furniture, electrical equipment, lab equipment, and air

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94 Former President, Al-Mustansiriya University – Amman, Jordan 01/2011. Also, former Professor, University of Baghdad – Amman, Jordan 12/2010.

95 Former Faculty Dean, University of Baghdad – Amman, Jordan 12/2010. Also, former Professor of Economics, University of Baghdad – 02/2011
conditioning (from Italy). Additionally, new books were provided for the library, except in Hebrew or Persian!

The above quote illustrates the trend for rebuilding critical infrastructure to receive significantly less resources and attention than ‘softer’ forms of assistance; a situation Agresto (2007) described as ‘all assistance short of actual help’. In sum, physical HE reconstruction was under-funded, a low priority, and mis-conceptualised as rehabilitation. The Iraq experience suggests the need for a holistic HE recovery plan with quick and effective rebuilding of physical infrastructure including laboratories, dormitories, and libraries.

An innovative proposal to assist Iraqi HEIs, a ‘University in a Box’, was proposed by the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) to provide each university with ‘desks, chairs, doors, blackboards, lecterns… whatever was needed to get universities back up to some semblance of normality’ (Agresto 2007, p.145). This type of response would have addressed immediate needs with major impacts on HE capacity at an early recovery stage. However, the proposal was not implemented leading to the failure to meet raised expectations of university Presidents. This section has so far analysed the type of assistance and rebuilding efforts in Iraqi HE; in the next section it will be seen that the forms of HE recovery in some ways evolved over the course of Iraq’s post-war transition.

6.1.6. Transfer of Sovereignty

On 28th June 2004 sovereignty was officially transferred to the Iraqi Interim Government. Political transition was accompanied by both continuity and discontinuity with CPA HE policy. The newly appointed Minister Tahir Al-Bakaa notes five new directions in HE policy under the interim government; increasing faculty salaries by 100%, increasing rebuilding budgets, allocating $100 million annually for scholarships abroad, granting universities autonomy, and establishing
international university partnerships. Increased salaries and rebuilding mark minor modifications, while internationalisation and greater autonomy are continuations of CPA-initiated policies.

In May 2005 the Iraqi Transitional Government was formed and Sami Al-Mudhaffer appointed Minister. In the 2005-2008 period the broad contours of HE policy remained in place with decentralisation, privatisation, internationalisation, and reconstruction spending. With major insecurity during 2005-08 due to sectarian violence, HE suffered considerably. A significant drop in violence in 2008, widely-attributed to the troop surge and Sahwa movement, is viewed as an important moment for HE. Improved security removed several major obstacles to academic life. Importantly, sectarian conflict that threatened universities in the first five post-war years decreased in intensity.

Iraq’s HE system by 2010 was proclaimed to have recovered and moved into a development and internationalisation phase (Lindsay 2012). In January 2009 the ambitious Iraq Education Initiative was announced with $1 billion pledged for overseas scholarships. Additionally, with improved security, international partnerships established between Iraqi and foreign universities increased. These developments brought increased attention to Iraqi HE which was now viewed more as a potential market than a tragic story. Iraq’s HE sector, once a neglected aspect of reconstruction, emerged as a relatively high-profile policy issue. Ambitious HE reform plans were announced in 2011 including greater autonomy, establishment of specialised institutes, and opening of foreign branch campuses with the goal of establishing a knowledge-society (Sawahel 2011). Furthermore, Iraqi HE came to be viewed as a means of stabilisation. Former US Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker (2008b) writes that:

As a barometer for Iraq’s future, University of Baghdad’s Class of 2008 signals a step towards normalcy. In a secure environment, away from the noise of politicking

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96 Email interview, Dr Tahir Al-Bakaa, former Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research. Response received 05/2012
and free from the influence of malign actors, Iraqi students show a strong interest in professional careers as doctors, engineers or scientists, while still possessing a broader appreciation for languages, history and literature.

In sum, the narrative holds that frustrated recovery during 2003-07 was followed by relatively healthier academic development from 2008 under more favourable conditions. At an IIE conference on rebuilding Iraqi HE, it was observed that serving university Presidents and a Cultural Attaché presented such a narrative. However, this narrative was challenged by many participants, the majority of whom had fled Iraq. It was held that the Presidents were attempting to cover over the negative points to promote their universities and secure opportunities for outside assistance and cooperation. This position is also defended by Jawad (2010) in criticising HE Minister Abd Ajaili’s positive appraisal of Iraqi HE (Labi 2010a).

However, with US troop withdrawal in 2011, protracted insurgency, political gridlock, and serious gaps in state capacity Iraq during 2008-2013 remained a fragile state. HE was a source of potential instability in this period. For example, de-Baathification of universities in Salah ad Din was a tense political issue with faculty members removed or demoted in 2006 and 2007. The majority of Sunnis in Salah ad Din province view de-Baathification ‘as a psychological symbol of what they perceive to be a Shia-dominated government’s rejection of their participation in the political process’ (Crocker 2007). In this fragile context de-Baathification of university faculty was feared to significantly increase grievances and potentially turn disaffected citizens towards insurgent groups (Khalilzad 2006). The removal or demotion of 140 Professors at Tikrit University in 2011 sparked a political crisis and inflamed sectarian tensions in the province. Moreover, deterioration of security in 2013 to pre-2008 levels threatened to reverse fragile gains and shatter growing optimism around HE development and international cooperation.

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97 Based on observation of presentations and discussions at the IIE/SRF Conference “Reconstruction of Iraqi Higher Education Post-Conflict”. 26-28 January 2011 in Amman, Jordan.
98 Former vice-President for Academic Affairs, al-Nahrain University – Amman, Jordan 02/2011; also a former Professor of Engineering at Al-Mustansiriya University – Amman, Jordan 02/2011
6.1.7. Conclusion

In this section efforts to rebuild and reform post-war Iraqi HE have been analysed in terms of CPA-led reform, physical reconstruction, and ‘soft’ assistance. The main findings are that CPA-initiated reforms were not developed in consultation with Iraqi academic experts, met with considerable resistance, and in some ways further eroded rather than supported existing capacities. It was also seen that physical reconstruction was unsuccessful, receiving insufficient resources and attention. This was explained by weaknesses in HE financing modalities, HE’s low priority in reconstruction strategy, and a conception of ‘reconstruction’ held by donors and agencies that incorporated a wider set of tasks than physical rebuilding. Rather, ‘soft’ assistance was forthcoming, which while offering valuable resources at a critical moment, arguably was not an optimal resource allocation given the immediate needs presented by physical destruction. In the next section analysis will shift from considering the reconstruction of Iraqi HE to the contribution that the sector made towards post-war recovery.

6.2. Assessing the Contribution of Higher Education to Post-conflict Recovery

In this section Iraqi HE’s contribution to post-conflict recovery will be assessed in terms of the broad categories surveyed in chapter three in order to address RQ3. To begin, stabilisation will be analysed followed by physical and sectoral reconstruction, economic recovery, statebuilding, democratisation, conflict transformation, and reconciliation. It will be seen that Iraqi HE’s contribution to recovery should be judged to be low; a finding that is subsequently analysed in the following section on features of the post-war environment influencing the HE-recovery relationship.
6.2.1. Stabilisation and Security Reform

Iraq’s post-war environment can be characterised as highly unstable with intense violence, weak rule of law, state fragility, and perpetual political crisis. Stabilisation’s emergence as a primary concern of post-war reconstruction interventions was in part driven by the perceived failure to maintain a level of stability sufficient to achieving positive post-war outcomes in Iraq (Gordon 2010; Griffin 2011). While it may be expected that HE is far-removed from hard security concerns of stabilisation, Iraqi HE has been viewed as both driving instability and acting as a bulwark against destabilisation. Iraqi HE’s positive role in stabilisation is reflected in a USAID statement in 2004:

*Iraq’s universities are leading efforts to increase stability and advance democratic progress. Universities provide jobs and opportunities for sound intellectual development to the important demographic of 18-25 year old youth. These intellectual leaders and youths are potential targets for terrorist recruiters, who manipulate them as foot soldiers and seek the technical expertise of scientists and technicians.*

This statement makes a strong claim that post-war Iraqi HE functioned in the manner identified in chapter three by providing an outlet for the energy of young potentially destabilising youth and thereby contributed to conflict prevention.99 It is commonly held that a major driver of state-breakdown and fragility was CPA Order Number 2 which disbanded Iraq’s security forces leaving hundreds of thousands of mostly fighting-age males with little non-military experience unemployed thus enabling easy recruitment for militias and insurgent groups (Al-Marashi & Salama 2006, p.206; Pfiffner 2010).

The USAID claim is that HE reduced this large recruiting pool thus mitigating conflict and insecurity. Looney (2005) supports this claim citing the fact that 83% of

99 See section 3.2.1.
students returned to HEIs in 2003 as evidence of the sector’s positive affect upon stabilisation. However, it should be qualified that security obstacles dramatically lowered attendance rates\(^{100}\) thus limiting the absorptive capacity of the HE sector in relation to stabilisation goals.

Following the Iraqi army’s disbanding no national-scale DDR programme was established. Given Iraq’s high level of secondary education completion and very high percentage of its population in the critical 17-24 age group the HE system could have played a significant role in any DDR process. In this counter-factual scenario purpose and direction could have been provided to young unemployed males through HE opportunities thus mitigating a major conflict-risk.

However, rather than view HE as a tool for stabilisation, US planners and Coalition forces predominantly framed HE as a security threat. Before invasion Iraqi universities were suspected of involvement in weapons programmes including the elusive WMD. In pre-war reconstruction planning the MoHE-I was placed under the Department of Defence as lead agency with two Ministerial functions listed as ‘training/testing facilities of WMD’ and ‘recruitment of scientific personnel for WMD scientists’ (Benashel et al 2008, p.61). Furthermore, the first, albeit short-lived, CPA HE advisor, Andrew Erdmann, was a WMD expert (Asquith 2004). Watenpaugh et al (2003) write that:

> The American agenda for Iraq’s universities is not an unqualified commitment to the development of a system of higher education that will serve as a basis for civil society. Rather counter-terrorism and non-proliferation drive American efforts.

Iraqi HE and academia were considered a limited threat during invasion. Reportedly, one institute at the University of Baghdad-Abu Ghraib campus,

\(^{100}\) Ahmed Seraf, former student, Chemical Engineering, University of Technology – Amman, Jordan 02/2011
suspected of producing anthrax, was destroyed by the Coalition in 2003.\textsuperscript{101} However, HE was still viewed as a security threat during occupation. The universities-terrorism link is made by a report describing the University of Mosul as a ‘safe haven for terrorists who pose as and intimidate real students’ and that its Chemistry Department was ‘actively assisting terrorism on a tactical level’ (Butenis 2008).

Significantly, Iraq’s nuclear and weapons scientists were targeted with two programmes intended to prevent their migration to countries seeking nuclear weapons. Roston (2004) reports that the CPA 2004 budget allocated $60 million to programmes for re-directing WMD scientists; a very large figure compared to the $8 million initially budgeted for CPA HE programming. One participant who was part of the programme argued that they were not structured towards re-skilling Iraqi scientists but rather to prevent their flight and as a result a major potential human capital resource for contributing to reconstruction was not utilised.\textsuperscript{102}

Further into Iraq’s post-war trajectory HE became more fully recognised as a means of improving security. HE was integrated into the Security Sector Reform (SSR) effort through the National Defence University (NDU) established in 2006 by the NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I) and functioning as an umbrella institution for officer education and training. While NDU is not a conventional university it forms part of Iraq’s HE system. The university offers three-year degrees and graduated approximately 3,933 officers across its various programmes during 2006-2011 (NATO 2011).

On balance it can be concluded that Iraqi HE made a moderate contribution to the task of stabilisation although the sector’s potential was limited by the securitisation of the sector and lack of innovative DDR programmes. Another area where Iraqi HE made some contribution to recovery goals, albeit frustrated by various factors, was in physical and sectoral reconstruction which will be considered now.

\textsuperscript{101} Former Dean, University of Baghdad - Amman, Jordan 12/2010
\textsuperscript{102} Dr Rawa Said, Ex-Manager, Iraqi Space Centre. Amman, Jordan 12/2010
6.2.2. Physical and Sectoral Reconstruction

Decades of war and displacement had a devastating impact on Iraq’s human capital leaving the HE sector with an immense challenge of producing graduates to meet post-war human resource needs. This section will assess Iraqi HE’s contribution to meeting human capital needs for reconstruction of key sectors. Furthermore, utilisation of university expertise and capacity in research and consultancy related to post-war reconstruction activities will be addressed.

In terms of HE programmes there was little indication that content and curricula were adapted to reconstruction needs. While new programmes were introduced in subjects including human rights and conflict resolution there are very few examples of new courses on technical or practical dimensions of rebuilding damaged infrastructure. For example, engineering curricula require major revision to meet industrial development and physical rebuilding needs (Mohamed 2012). In particular, petroleum and chemical engineering, geology, and related disciplines are held to insufficiently support oil-sector reconstruction.103

A contrary example, an Iranian university provided assistance to Kufa University through training for architecture faculty members on rehabilitation and sustainability which are of direct relevance to reconstruction.104 Furthermore, in 2011 the British Council (n.d.) DelPHE programme supported cooperation between Salford and Basra universities to establish a built environment research centre to supply Iraqi graduates in rebuilding, urban planning, and project management vital to physical reconstruction. While this is a positive example of international assistance providing relevant skills, such programmes could have had a major impact in the early recovery stages.

103 Former Minister of Planning Ali Baban - Manchester, England 04/2013
104 An Iranian Professor of Architecture - Amman, Jordan 12/2011
Post-war medical education was expected to produce the new generation of health professionals that could rebuild Iraq’s shattered healthcare system. In 1999 Iraq had a doctor-to-population ratio of 53 per 100,000 people, low by regional standards; four times lower than neighbouring Jordan (Garfield & McCarthy 2005). This situation was significantly worsened post-2003 as the Iraqi Medical Association estimated that of 34,000 physicians working in Iraq in 2003 2,000 were killed and 18,000 fled abroad (Webster 2009a). Physicians and academics in health-related fields were disproportionately affected by violence (Webster 2009b). Moreover, health professionals suffered strongly from international isolation as many studied abroad prior to sanctions (Amin & Khoshnaw 2003). The need to restore medical sector human resources was therefore an urgent health reconstruction task. However, Mosawi (2008) found that physician supply from Iraqi medical education was not aligned with healthcare human resources needs.

Moreover, Iraq’s post-war environment was shaped by a major public health crisis (Rawaf 2005). Recognising Iraqi universities’ potential to respond to this crisis Hughes et al (2005) describe their involvement in a capacity-building project to improve expertise, training, and public health service provision in Mosul University’s public health education. However, they hold that in general there are major limitations to this model because in their words Iraqi ‘universities have been unable to help because under-funding and isolation from their professional colleagues has limited their effectiveness’. Moreover, medical knowledge was found to be very limited; only 20% of physicians with post-graduate qualifications had knowledge of evidence-based medicine (Webster 2009b). In a study of Iraqi physicians 21% viewed medical education as the main priority for future health system reconstruction, the second highest priority after administration, 35% (Squires, Sindi & Fennie 2010). These weaknesses limited Iraqi medical schools’ contribution to post-war humanitarian and reconstruction challenges.

Rapid processes of privatising state-owned enterprises, liberalisation, and marketisation (Yousif 2006; Abboud 2008) combined with insecurity, corruption,
and mismanagement triggered collapse of Iraq’s post-war economy. This structural context limited HE’s contribution to economic recovery and reconstruction. Earlier it was seen that Iraqi university-industry linkages and military-university-industry linkages were relatively strong. The former were frustrated by domestic industrial collapse which limited opportunities to conduct research and consultancy while the latter were frustrated as the Coalition did not permit the re-opening of military industries. A former senior MIC scientist stated that while some grants were still available it was less than 10% of pre-war levels. Furthermore, old university-industry collaboration models were disrupted. For example, due to industrial collapse University of Technology students could no longer have placement years in industry thus impeding skills-transfer and reducing employability.

With many reconstruction firms operating in Iraq there were opportunities available for consultancy and applied research. However, Iraqis were largely ignored as employees by many reconstruction contractors, in particular at management-levels (Herring & Rangwala 2006). As Crocker (2004) writes ‘the Bush administration’s reliance on large U.S. contractors to perform reconstruction work in Iraq is not only far more expensive than hiring Iraqi companies, it also means that too small an amount of U.S. reconstruction funds is being used to hire Iraqis, capitalize Iraq’s economy, and build local capacity’.

It should be qualified that some universities did conduct consultancy for reconstruction firms, for example, the University of Technology and Al-Mustansiriya University through their Engineering Consultancy Bureaus. However, in general this may be described as a missed opportunity to harness domestic capacity for reconstruction while at the same time contributing to HE regeneration.

105 Dr Sadiq Nasrullah, Cultural Attaché, Embassy of the Republic of Iraq in Jordan. Amman, Jordan 02/2011
106 Dr Rawa Said, Ex-Manager, Iraqi Space Centre. Amman, Jordan 12/2010
107 Dr Kahtan Al-Khazrajj, President, University of Technology. Amman, Jordan 01/2011
108 Email Interview with Arkan Al Taie. Professor of Engineer at the University of Technology - response received August 2013. Also, Dr Kahtan Al-Khazrajj, President, University of Technology. Amman, Jordan 01/2011
109 Former Professor of Engineering and Head of the Engineering Consultancy Bureau at Al-Mustansiriya University – Amman, Jordan 02/2012
Brain drain and violence against professionals also severely limited the ability of Iraqi expertise to contribute to reconstruction. There was a consensus among interviewees that weakening of Iraq’s professional and academic classes was a central factor explaining perceived failure of post-war reconstruction. Here it is worth quoting Scott Ritter, former WMD Inspector (quoted in Salama & Hunter 2006).

_Saddam was extremely successful in running the country because of the ample reservoir of technocrats at his disposal. While he had people such as Ja’afar, accomplished scientists capable of swiftly rebuilding damaged public services such as water and electricity, the new Iraqi government and coalition forces are lacking in such resources, and therefore not nearly as successful in the reconstruction of Iraq._

_The vital contingent of human academic resources is currently simply not available._

The last sentence of the above paragraph strongly illustrates the point that intellectual capacity is a fundamental factor influencing effective post-war reconstruction. However, a central conclusion from this section is that post-war Iraq’s intellectual capacity was weakened and under-utilised in physical and sectoral reconstruction. Another area in which Iraq’s academic and intellectual capacities were under-utilised was in post-war statebuilding, a vital task that is considered in the next section.

6.2.3. Statebuilding

On statebuilding goals Iraqi HE made a limited contribution due to low resources invested in areas of HE critical to restoring state and institutional capacities. Rathmell et al (2007) find that capacity-building efforts through overseas training of Ministry staff were perceived to be generally ineffective. Efforts to improve governance faced numerous obstacles including insecurity and elite resistance (Brinkerhoff & Mayfield 2005). However, it has been held that if HE had been supported thoroughly at an early stage of recovery and linked strategically to
capacity-building efforts then it could have had a major impact. For example, Ali Baban, former Minister of Planning,\textsuperscript{110} states that:

\begin{quote}
There is a lack of robust focus on higher education – it is a case of the chicken and the egg – we need a critical mass of educated students to be immediate leaders in science and technology – architects, engineers, experts etc – but in Iraq they are not being churned out. Development agencies are filling the gap but half-heartedly. With these graduates there can be genuine ownership over a period of time.
\end{quote}

Similarly, Ghani and Lockhart (2008, p.143) criticise under-prioritisation of HE for precipitating a culture of technical assistance that is implemented by numerous agencies, poorly coordinated, and therefore incapable of addressing ‘Iraqi priorities’. They hold that investing in HE could have enabled much greater long-term sustainability of capacity-building efforts.

In terms of legitimacy, failure to create legitimate institutions drove post-war fragility (Herring & Rangwala 2006; Papagianni 2008). Effective HE service-delivery did not enhance the Iraqi government’s performance-related legitimacy. Rather, destruction of Iraqi universities and continued challenges facing the sector worked to undermine the state’s fragile legitimacy in the eyes of the academic community, students, and the wider public.\textsuperscript{111} To underline HE’s relevance to popular conceptions of legitimacy in the Iraqi context, it should be noted that elite exile politicians and CPA staff were described as touting their academic certificates and credentials in a bid to enhance public confidence in their abilities (Allawi 2007). Furthermore, this credentialist imperative to bolster legitimacy was itself a dynamic negatively affecting HE as it increased the trend of forgeries, degree-mill universities, and academic corruption.

\textsuperscript{110} Ali Baban, former Minister of Planning. Manchester, England 04/2013
\textsuperscript{111} SRF Scholar and former lecturer, University of Baghdad – Amman, Jordan 01/2011; SRF Scholar and former Dean, University of Baghdad – Amman, Jordan 02/2011; former vice-President for Academic Affairs, Al-Nahrain University – Amman, Jordan 02/2011
Establishing rule of law is central to statebuilding and it is held that legal education can support legal and justice institutions in post-conflict societies. As one participant asked ‘how can you actually get people to take part in the system, to respect it, to enrich democratic experience and accept rule of law and all of that when they are not properly educated?’.

Several international assistance programmes were launched to support Iraqi legal education including through the American Bar Association and USAID (Hill 2011). The British Council DelPHE programme in 2010 supported a cooperative project between De Montfort and Kerbala universities on forensic science; a clear recognition of the importance of HE capacity in specialised fields to the complex process of building a modernised justice sector.

However, despite these efforts legal education insufficiently supplied human capital needs in the legal profession. It is reported that ‘the higher legal curriculum is lacking an adequate syllabus’ thus creating an ‘education gap’ that must be addressed to ‘re-build an independent legal system’ (EU 2010). Furthermore, legal education struggled to adapt effectively to the complex changes in the legal and administrative spheres of Iraq’s post-conflict environment. An indicator of this, an Iraqi Professor reported that in some law faculties seven years after the former regime fell Saddam-era law was still taught. Furthermore, Hamoudi (2005) argues that Iraq’s legal education is highly didactic and lacking in clinic-based experiential learning. He states ‘one of the best ways to prepare a student to practice law is to have the student actually practice law’. Iraqi law graduates are found to be lacking in experience that could enable them to have a greater impact on establishing the rule of law and strengthening justice sector reform immediately after graduation.

In addition, legal expertise of Iraqi universities was not mobilised towards transitional tasks. The passing of the Iraqi constitution of 2005 marked one of the

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112 Dr Dlawer Ala’aldeen, former Minister of Higher Education in the KRG and Professor of Clinical Microbiology at Nottingham University. Nottingham, UK. 07/2013

113 Personal communication, anonymous Professor of Law, University of Basra. Conference on Rebuilding Basra. Amman, Jordan 12/2010
most significant moments in the post-war statebuilding process. There was concern in the Iraqi academic community over ‘marginalization of prominent constitutional experts and law professors in Iraqi universities and excluding them from the constitutional commission mandated to draft Iraq’s future constitution’ (UNDP 2003b).

In conclusion it can be stated that Iraqi HE made a very low contribution towards the main tasks of statebuilding. Moreover, given the significance of state weakness to Iraq’s continued post-war problems this could be considered a major missed opportunity. Central to the challenge of rebuilding the Iraqi state was the process of democratisation, which will now be considered.

6.2.4. Democratisation

Building democratic institutions and a democratic culture were central to the US conception of Iraq’s statebuilding project as one of constructing a liberal democratic polity in the Middle East to act as a democratic beacon for the region. Iraqi HE was viewed by several key external actors as having potential to support democratisation. For example, the US State Department’s Future of Iraq Project stresses the importance of post-war HE founded on meritocracy, state regulation of new ethnic or religious HEIs, introduction of elective modules, and offering courses on democratic thought, constitutions, and processes (Department of State 2002). However, democratisation was not a major theme in interview data; rather most participants viewed issues of democratisation and human rights as very low priorities given the immense post-war challenges facing Iraq.

Latif (2005) states, ‘university students represent the most-educated tier of Iraq’s young men and women. The prospect of democracy in Iraq largely rests on the shoulders of these students, as they will be the future leaders and policy makers of this country’. He found that while there was broad support for democracy most students valued democracy for instrumental rather than intrinsic reasons, for
example, holding that 95% believed that universal employment was fundamental to democracy with only 55% reporting the same for freedom to join political parties. Davis (2005a) proposes university-based civic education programmes to address this lack of democratic knowledge.

It was seen in chapter three that in theory HE can function as a ‘training ground’ for political and civic life through participation in student organisations and other campus-based activities. On the one hand, student unions were established with a charter setting out democratic principles to govern student elections. Although, as the Economist (2004) reports, some student elections were cancelled due to fear of violence.

However, participants held that this model was constrained by the perceived need of university management to prevent the infiltration of student groups and activities by ‘outside’ actors such as political parties and militia.\textsuperscript{114} For example, the President of the University of Technology held that he threatened to resign if political and sectarian groups were active on campus.\textsuperscript{115} As a result of this imperative to maintain order on campus the potential of the sector to contribute to civil society and political development was limited.

Yet, as will be seen in more detail later, while universities including the University of Technology and Mosul were held to be relatively successful at maintaining order, others did not possess such control and powerful student groups allied with ‘outside’ parties emerged. In these cases HE was perceived to function partly as a ‘hothouse’ for students to enter illicit networks and intimidate other students and staff rather than as a ‘training ground’.

\textsuperscript{114} SRF Scholar at British Institute in Jordan – Amman, Jordan 02/2011; former Dean, University of Baghdad – Amman, Jordan 12/2010; former Professor of Engineering, Al-Nahrain University – Amman, Jordan 01/2011; former Dean, Basra University – Amman, Jordan 12/2010

\textsuperscript{115} Dr Kahtan Al-Khazraji, President, University of Technology - Amman, Jordan 01/2011
Since 2003 there have been efforts to introduce ‘non-traditional’ subjects to enhance democratisation. Curriculum reform is cited as a relative success, for example, Reddy (2005a) notes the ‘progress’ of introducing subjects including democracy, human rights, and ‘anti-terrorism’; UNESCO (2008) recommends ‘courses and programmes in Iraqi universities that enhance national identity and promote active citizenship, freedom of expression, as well as civil society and human rights culture’; and Harb (2008) proposes introducing ‘conflict resolution and reconciliation, institutions and institution building, civil society, rule of law, women’s studies, and human and civil rights’. However, many new subjects promoted by donors are held in low esteem by participant academics. Iraqi academic culture is therefore viewed as an obstacle to long-term implementation of these courses.

Agresto held that one of his main tasks for Iraqi HE was to ‘give them some exposure to liberal rather than simply specialized education’ (Iannone 2006). Elsewhere, Agresto (2007, p.123) talks of the ‘inconceivability’ of the ‘liberal idea of a seminar’ in Iraqi academic culture geared towards lecture-based instruction in highly-specialised disciplines. He links introducing liberal arts to long-term transformation of Iraqi society in support of establishing liberal democracy. In his view, liberal education would broaden the minds of Iraqi youth and future leaders who would be more open to different viewpoints and tolerant in a plural political system. Further, the structure of electives, minors, and majors in the US system allows self-reflection and individual freedom that ‘might lead to religious and familial reform also, not just educational reform with a political effect’. Agresto reflects on how this transformative vision was not supported by the CPA. A lack of vision was also a limiting factor in the contribution of HE to economic recovery, a dynamic addressed in the next section.

116 This finding is confirmed by Dr Sadiq Nasrullah, Cultural Attaché, Embassy of the Republic of Iraq in Jordan - Amman, Jordan 02/2011
6.2.5. Economic Recovery

In this section the contribution of Iraqi HE to post-war economic recovery is examined. Overall it is found that Iraqi HE made low contribution to economic recovery; a finding explained partly by low quality and lack of research capacity but also by the context of economic collapse that restricted the opportunity to participate in recovery. However, participants expressed a range of views on HE’s role in economic recovery which will now be analysed.

It was seen in section 6.2.2 that engineering and oil-related education was insufficient to meet oil-sector rebuilding needs, the engine of economic recovery. Beyond oil, there is a strong recognition by Iraqis that diversification is vital to long-term economic development yet a clear development vision outlining what form this would take and how it could be reached did not emerge. This made aligning HE with a long-term economic vision impossible. For example, one non-Iraqi participant held that economic recovery requires public-private partnerships supported by investing in HE for private sector skills re-training although insufficient political will existed to make this option viable.

A major economic recovery challenge was gearing HE towards economic needs and requirements. However, amongst participants consensus holds that Iraqi HE was not producing skills and knowledge relevant to economic recovery and development. A Professor from the University of Baghdad in 2007 stated that graduates would have less than 60% of the knowledge they require and therefore lack core competencies to perform their jobs (IRIN 2007b). In part this is explained by weakness of university research capacity. Al Ali et al (2012) note that teaching is not research-led due to barriers including inadequate laboratory space, poor language skills, and insufficient libraries.

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117 For example, Email interview with President of Dijla University College – response received 05/2012. Also Former Professor of Economics, University of Baghdad – Amman, Jordan 02/2011.
118 Khaled Ehsan, Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist, UNDP, Iraq Country Office - Amman, Jordan 02/2011
The KRG’s Vision for Higher Education recognises the imbalance of supply and demand of graduates, stating that ‘our Universities are busy teaching conventional topics without keeping pace with the reality’ (Ala’Aldeen 2009). One participant explained that KRG universities were producing many graduates with insufficient skills to meet future employer requirements. Collaboration with industry in determining curricula content in key subjects including engineering and economics was held to be a viable strategy for reducing the gap between outdated curriculum content and market demands for relevant skills and knowledge. South Korea was cited as an instructive case-study in which universities cooperate closely with firms to provide appropriate vocational and skill-specific training.\textsuperscript{119}

Similarly, in the rest of Iraq enrolments by discipline are sub-optimal in supplying labour market needs. Rigidity in allocating undergraduate places has been a strong trend in Iraq’s centrally administered HE system. Science and technology has been prioritised over social sciences and humanities. Students are allocated places based on a school leavers’ exam with the best pupils enrolled in medicine, engineering, and science. Under the constraints of multiple post-war social and economic transitions there are strong imperatives for planned allocation of university places by discipline. Firstly, to initiate and sustain economic growth graduates must be produced for labour market sectors that require skilled labour.\textsuperscript{120} As Peter Buckland argued, Iraq in 2003 required HE policy to be strongly coordinated with manpower planning.\textsuperscript{121} Secondly, a conflict-sensitive HE policy should reduce graduates in fields with poor employability prospects due to the linkage between high youth unemployment and instability.

However, in the absence of detailed labour market analysis aligning long-term human capital needs with HE is problematic. It is necessary to establish graduate numbers in each discipline capable of absorption by various economic sectors. Dlawer Ala’Aldeen, Minister of HE in the KRG, notes the high proportion of

\textsuperscript{119} Senior Economic Adviser to the Prime Minister of the KRG - Erbil, Iraq, 04/2010
\textsuperscript{120} Former Professor of Economics, University of Baghdad – Amman, Jordan 02/2011
\textsuperscript{121} Personal communication with Peter Buckland
students in the KRG in law. Seven new private universities sought permission to establish law faculties. It was argued that this would flood the market with lawyers and inevitably lead to graduate unemployment. This example illustrates the need for a supervisory state body to coordinate the HE system and avoid contradictions brought about in a fully-deregulated environment.

In conclusion it can be stated that Iraqi HE made a low contribution towards the post-war task of economic recovery. Curricula and course content was not aligned with economic needs, a vision for economic recovery capable of guiding HE reform was absent, and research capacity remained very low. However, it should be qualified that Iraq’s collapsed post-war economy represents a difficult structural context for any HE system to adapt to. The final recovery task to be considered in terms of the contribution of HE to recovery is nationbuilding and conflict transformation, which will be addressed now.

6.2.6. Nationbuilding and Conflict Transformation

It was seen in chapter three that HE can perform a moral function in strengthening the bases of national identity and social cohesion thus supporting nationbuilding. Also, in chapter five it was seen that HE in 1950s Iraq strengthened a unified Iraqi civic nationalism. Furthermore, once Iraqi Kurdistan gained de facto autonomy after the Gulf War HE played an important role in nation-building by promoting Kurdish language, history, and nationalism. In post-2003 Iraq where insecurity, protracted conflict, and communal divisions were present it may be thought Iraqi HE had the potential to perform a similar role thereby supporting conflict resolution and transformation. As one participant stated, ‘education is supposed to transcend and see a larger vision to provide leadership that recognises that

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122 Dr Dlawer Ala’aldeen, former Minister of Higher Education in the KRG and Professor of Clinical Microbiology at Nottingham University - Nottingham, UK. 07/2013
123 This section is relatively brief because many issues relevant to it are discussed in more detail in the next section
124 See section 3.2.7.
125 See section 5.1.1.
pluralistic differences can co-exist. In Iraq higher education needs this function especially in the Disputed Internal Borderlands.\textsuperscript{126}

A strong position on the centrality of HE to Iraqi nation-building was offered by the Minister of HE for the KRG who stated that:\textsuperscript{127}

For nation-building, to actually sustain it, to build it, to make it evolve in a healthy way, to actually then incrementally go towards nation-building - it's the education of individuals, institutions and management and leaders, investing in people. How do you invest in people if you don't have quality graduates?

However, rather than play a similar role in post-Saddam Iraq, it may be argued that Iraqi HE since 2003 has served more to divide than unify Iraqis.\textsuperscript{128} As is discussed in more detail below, in the post-war period universities became divided along ethnic and sectarian lines, campuses were controlled by powerful student groups affiliated with political parties, and HE was in an overall state of disorder. In this context HE served to further intensify societal divisions and fractures overlaying the protracted conflict in post-war Iraq rather than provide an arena for transforming the identity bases of conflict in the positive manner outlined in chapter two.

Similarly, rather than aid transitional justice and reconciliation issues HE has been held to be an obstacle. Re-writing of curricula was carried out to remove Ba’athist influence. However, the wider process of de-Baathification in HE developed into a continuous dynamic that divided academic communities and worked counter to reconciliation goals. There was a widespread perception amongst Sunni academics that de-Baathification was conducted selectively by the Shiite-led government and perpetuated a sense of exclusion and injustice in the wider Sunni community (Hasan 2013). In conclusion, it may be provisionally stated that Iraqi HE made a negative contribution to nationbuilding and conflict transformation; while the

\textsuperscript{126} Khaled Ehsan, Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist, UNDP, Iraq Country Office - Amman, Jordan 02/2011

\textsuperscript{127} Dr Dlawer Ala’aldeen, former Minister of Higher Education in the KRG and Professor of Clinical Microbiology at Nottingham University - Nottingham, UK. 07/2013

\textsuperscript{128} Ali Baban, former Minister of Planning. Manchester, England 04/2013. Also, several anonymous participants agreed with this statement.
evidence for this claim has not been reviewed in this section the basis for the claim is presented below in sections 6.3.1.2 and 6.3.1.3.

6.2.7. Conclusion

In this section it has been found that Iraqi HE’s contribution to recovery was limited and in some respects made a negative contribution. Iraqi academics generally perceive rebuilding of HE as a failure, at least in the first five post-war years. The most positive contribution was in short-term stabilisation and conflict prevention. However, even in that domain the sector’s potential was not capitalised upon; rather HE was itself securitised. Similarly, HE performed some roles in physical and sectoral reconstruction although in the final analysis there was a major missed opportunity to integrate HE with recovery. In terms of long-term goals in economic recovery, statebuilding and democratisation the contribution of the sector was very low. Finally, on nation-building, reconciliation, and conflict transformation the sector made a negative contribution; a dynamic explored in more depth in the next section.

6.3. Post-war Environment of Higher Education

In the last section efforts to rebuild HE were found to have had little success. This section analyses central mechanisms and dynamics shaping the post-war environment of Iraqi HE and why HE made a low contribution to post-war recovery. Drawing primarily on interviews with Iraqi academics, conjunctural, educational, institutional, structural and external features will be analysed. To begin, the central and cross-cutting issue of insecurity will be introduced.

6.3.1. Conjunctural Features

To begin, conjunctural features, those emerging from a conjuncture of other processes and trends, will be analysed. The four features are to a degree amorphous
and have considerable synergies, in particular between security, conflict, and stability and order. These three conjunctural features are among those that most decisively mediated the HE-recovery relationship.

6.3.1.1. Security

A strongly emergent theme from interviews was that participants ranked insecurity as a decisive constraint upon the post-war role of the HE sector. Iraq during 2003-2010 was consistently ranked in the Failed States Index ten worst-performers and was one of the world’s most dangerous places with several overlapping protracted conflicts and insurgencies. As was seen earlier, insecurity posed a major logistical challenge to CPA-led reconstruction efforts. Furthermore, violence against academics was systematic, resulting in large loss of life, general insecurity and widespread fear which made normal operation of HEIs much more challenging. Due to insecurity attendance rates at Iraqi HEIs plummeted; some universities operated at 10-20% of capacity (Krieger 2007a). In one estimate approximately one-third of university students regularly attended classes while another found that in early December 2006 only 6% of faculty and students attended classes at the University of Baghdad (Spurr 2007). Furthermore, in a chaotic Baghdad littered with checkpoints, journeys to campus could take hours and were physically and emotionally taxing.

In the climate of insecurity and violence security regulations were strengthened considerably. At Al-Mustansiriya University a 12-foot blast wall was constructed around the campus perimeter. Furthermore, the presence of Iraqi security guards on campus had negative impacts. Many were militia members and exercised considerable power at university authorities’ expense, pressured staff and students, and interfered with administration. These claims are supported by testimony of

\[129\] Former Professor of Languages, University of Baghdad - Amman, Jordan 12/2010. Also, former lecturer, Department of Political Science, Al-Nahrain University – Amman, Jordan 02/2011

\[130\] A former Professor in the Faculty of Languages at the University of Baghdad stated that there were 50-70 security guards at his college alone
former Minister of HE Abd Ujayli who claimed that guards are often untrained, infiltrated by the Badr Brigade and Jaish al-Mahdi militias, and allowed militants onto campus to kidnap students (Khalilzad 2006).

Moreover, insecurity was a major obstacle to the MoHE-I, most damagingly with the kidnap by around 80 gunmen of approximately 150 employees, academics, and visitors at a Ministry building in November 2006. According to Jawad (2012) the incident occurred in broad daylight with no response from security forces and resulted in execution of most victims. He holds that the MoHE-I Grants department was targeted because it was responsible for validating certificates which threatened many elite fake-degree-carrying politicians with scandal.

Insecurity was consistently ranked by participants as a major obstacle to HE. In the words of one Professor, ‘security is an absolute pre-requisite for reconstruction’. Correspondingly, Al Ali et al (2012) rank lack of security, widespread violence, and political instability as among the major challenges facing the sector. Similarly, Al-Janabi and Urban (2011) attribute failure to reconstruct education to instability, violence, and insecurity; as a result ‘actions remained event-driven, and it has been impossible to re-institute a viable education community capable of fulfilling its mandate’. This statement illustrates insecurity’s impact in constraining strategic thinking and educational practice in a manner also identified in Libya (see chapter eight).

Furthermore, fear of association with the Coalition or the US made cooperative relationships between Iraqi universities and US actors difficult. For example, a Dean at Mosul University expressed desire to work with the local PRT but feared that contact with the US Government would endanger him and his family (Grant 2006). Stuart Bowen reports that management of many Iraqi HEIs requested that Coalition forces deem campuses a ‘no go zone’ for troops. However, he states that this was a

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131 The Minister further noted that it was impossible to change the guards because it might provoke a violent response by the militias.

132 Former Dean, Faculty of Languages, University of Baghdad - Amman, Jordan 12/2010
‘non-starter’ due to the number of attacks, including rockets, IEDs, and mortars ‘originating from the university district or campuses’. Wayne Bowen (2007, p.39) describes how Coalition troops patrolling the University of Mosul in early 2004 disregarded Iraqi security officials, established observation points, and were present on campus overnight. Patrols led to worsening relations between students, the university, and the Coalition.

To isolate security as a factor the case of Anbar University is instructive. During 2005-2007, when Anbar province was the heart of the insurgency, Anbar University main campus was reportedly controlled by Al Qaeda leading to gun battles with Coalition forces who intended to prevent the group recruiting students and producing IEDs in a campus-based factory (Crocker 2008a). Several participants held that after the troop surge and Sahwa movement led to considerable security gains in Anbar province Anbar University, once dubbed ‘the most dangerous place in Iraq’, recovered strongly and should be ranked among the most improved HEIs. For example, one participant argued that Anbar University faced many problems yet made remarkable progress due to security improvement and that a similar pattern occurred in Mosul.133 While other factors are also influential and outcomes over-determined it is clear that security was a decisive feature shaping HE’s post-war environment. A related feature that is also considered decisive is stability and order, which will now be analysed.

6.3.1.2. Stability and Order

The Iraqi Higher Education Council on March 14th 2004 produced the Erbil Declaration which stipulated that HE should be independent, free from religious and political intimidation, and sanctuaries protected from violence (Al-Bakaa 2013). However, in what transpired the Erbil Declaration remained a normative vision far from actual post-war conditions. In his memoir, Agresto (2007, p.74) writes:

133 Dr Sadiq Nasrullah, Cultural Attaché, Embassy of the Republic of Iraq in Jordan - Amman, Jordan 02/2011
The universities had experienced the equivalent of a new birth of freedom with the coming of liberation. Professors knew this and, it seemed, at the beginning, so did the students. But quickly the climate on the campuses was changing. And the impetus for change, a change to a new form of repression, was coming primarily from students.

The above quote identifies students as a main negative influence upon post-war HE. Many participants support this view, holding that inability to impose order on the student body and empowerment of student groups allied to political parties and militias were fatal to the recovery of universities. Students frequently made unreasonable demands on faculty members and issued threats if demands were not met. This claim is further supported by media accounts of student factions’ power over campus life. Student groups reportedly intimidated, threatened, and coerced university staff, for example, to receive good grades (IRIN 2007a). Another example, it is reported that militia members sit-in on lectures and intimidate university staff. Furthermore, Jawad (2007) identifies re-writing of syllabi according to particularistic preferences as one of the trends most threatening to academic freedom.

The rise of powerful student groups was enabled by the chaotic context where centralised political control, law, order, and governance structures largely collapsed. Latif (2006) writes that ‘liberated from the bind of dictatorship, universities have become the hub for the myriad of religious, political and social movements newly emerging after decades of suppression’. In this power vacuum, various groups attempted to exert influence and viewed HEIs as an important site of control. Students allied to ‘parties and sects’ were held to protest repeatedly for ‘unwarranted reasons’ to ‘impose their will and power over universities’ (Al-Bakaa 2013). These political factions allied with student groups came to hold considerable power on some campuses, for example, the powerful Student League allied to PM Maliki at Al-Mustansiriya University.

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134 As noted, this view emerged strongly from interview data and is supported by secondary sources. Examples of participants holding this view include; Former Vice-President, Al-Nahrain University - Amman, Jordan 02/2011
This process has been explained as in part due to campus-based radicalisation as fundamentalist groups filled-in the ideological void left by Ba’athism’s collapse (Latif 2006; Agresto 2007). Similarly, rising student power is related to the ethno-sectarianisation of Iraqi society because the overwhelming majority of political factions are defined by sectarian or ethnic identity. An indicator of this confluence of student politics and sectarian influence, students at one university forcibly secured inclusion of a religious cleric’s teachings in a humanities course covering Kant and Heidegger (Krieger 2007a).

However, while inability to control empowered student groups was found to be a general challenge it did not affect all HEIs equally. Many participants cited University of Technology as a positive case of maintaining order. Relative orderliness was explained through the personal leadership and qualities of the University President.135 The President claimed that he was very strict and threatened to resign if student politics and sectarian parties were active on campus.136 Similarly, relative success at the University of Mosul has been explained as due in large part to the influence of a strong university President. It is argued that the President prevented the type of situation witnessed in some other universities where students aligned with political factions were highly disruptive.137 These two cases identify presence of strong and determined leadership as a crucial intervening variable influencing campus politics.

An alternative explanation is that the UoT’s non-political disciplines spared it from campus-level conflict and rule by students. Two participants claimed that it was not the President’s role but the nature of scientific/technical disciplines that created a relatively de-politicised atmosphere and therefore staff and students were generally not sectarian or ‘extremists’.138 Contrastingly, HEIs with greater social science and humanities provision including Al-Mustansiriya, the Baghdad College of Business

135 Importantly this point was widely emphasised by participants both with affiliation to the University of Technology and those with no institutional affiliation to the university.
136 Dr Kahtan Al-Khazrajji, President, University of Technology - Amman, Jordan 01/2011
137 A leaked US Embassy cable reports on a meeting with the President, stating that he ‘repeatedly insisted that there should be no place for politics at the university’ (Butenis 2008).
138 Anonymous former Professor of Engineering, University of Technology - Amman, Jordan 02/2011; also Professor of Engineering, Philadelphia University – Amman, Jordan 02/2011
and Administration, the College of Fine Arts, and the University of Baghdad have experienced serious conflict and violence between student groups and between staff and students, for example, over curriculum content. However, the University of Mosul case, where positive claims were made about leadership strength limiting politicisation, shows that even in a large and comprehensive university offering a wide range of courses including social science and humanities the presence of strong leadership was viewed as important in ensuring order.

While it may be granted that institutions with highly concentrated social science and humanities students are more vulnerable to student unrest, strong leadership appears to be a significant determinant of order in Iraqi universities. This view is supported by Wayne Bowen (2007, p.75), stationed in Northern Iraq in 2004, who identifies the Mosul University Chancellor as a primary obstacle to effectively running the university. He writes that:

*A university is far more than classroom buildings and engineering equipment. More important are the strategic vision of campus leaders, their commitment to academic freedom, and their willingness to unite students, faculty, and staff to promote progressive ideas and intellectual curiosity.*

From this discussion it is clear that instability and a lack of order on campus were major features of the post-war environment shaping the context of post-war HE. Further support for viewing stability as a decisive issue comes from the Minister of HE for the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Dlawer Ala’aldeen who stated that:

*The only reason why we could do things in Kurdistan, the only reason why I as an individual was able to introduce things that weren’t even in the programme, in the manifesto was because it was stable, Ministers were Ministers, people coming with or without gun means nothing to the Minister – that stability will bring reform,*

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139 Former Professor of Economics, University of Baghdad – Amman, Jordan 02/2011
140 Dr Dlawer Ala’aldeen, former Minister of Higher Education in the KRG and Professor of Clinical Microbiology at Nottingham University - Nottingham, UK. 07/2013
bring evolution – but in Iraq until certain areas become stable you can’t talk about reform, what reform?

However, it should be qualified that the Iraqi Cultural Attaché to Jordan held that instability driven by politicised students decreased as a factor over time, in particular after 2007, although recognising that at its height the above-described dynamic was a major challenge facing the sector.\textsuperscript{141} One major driver of instability in post-war Iraq was the incidence of over-lapping protracted conflicts; a dynamic that impacted HE which is analysed next.

6.3.1.3. Conflict

Post-war Iraq was beset by violence, societal polarisation, and conflict. Conflict-drivers included organised crime, high unemployment, economic collapse, breakdown in rule of law, and occupation. Notwithstanding these, post-2003 intensification of ethnic and sectarian divisions, the ‘ethno-sectarianisation of Iraqi society’, is widely regarded as a major factor driving protracted conflict and violence. The Coalition’s broad post-war strategy increased the salience of ethno-sectarian identities and precipitated civil conflict (Ismael & Fuller 2008; Aitken 2007). Iraqi HE was both affected by this context as campuses became increasingly polarised and also contributed to the process by perpetuating communal and particularistic identities.

Ethno-sectarian conflict is frequently cited by participants as a major obstacle to effective HE reconstruction. Many participants held that prior to the 2003 invasion they were not aware of the ethno-sectarian profile of the vast majority of their colleagues. In the words of one participant ‘in all Iraqi history nothing has determined Iraqi academia based on sectarianism’\textsuperscript{142} In the post-war environment the atmosphere changed at previously secular HEIs as religious and sectarian issues

\textsuperscript{141} Dr Sadiq Nasrullah, Cultural Attaché, Embassy of the Republic of Iraq in Jordan - Amman, Jordan 02/2011
\textsuperscript{142} Former Professor of Economics, University of Baghdad – Amman, Jordan 02/2011
became politicised. For example, at the University of Baghdad, efforts were made to prevent Shiite students from wearing black and completing processions around campus because the rite inflamed sectarian tensions between students. However, contrary to the pre-2003 period, university authorities and MoHE-I could not prevent students celebrating religious festivities.\textsuperscript{143} A former Mustansiriya Professor stated that ‘teaching was subjected to strain of religious activity’. He also noted the effect of many religious festivities on campus, and said that ‘you don’t feel like you are in an academic institution; you feel like you are in a mosque and don’t have the right to criticise’.\textsuperscript{144}

Post-2003 violence escalated in 2005 and peaked in 2007 triggering large population movements with up to 500,000 internally displaced and 1.8 million refugees by November 2006 (Allawi 2007, p.451). In Baghdad, security walls and ‘communal boundaries’ were erected keeping apart many previously ‘mixed’ communities, frequently along sectarian divides (Steele 2009, p.243; Tripp 2008, p.306). With faculty members killed, threatened, and harassed often for their ascribed identity many university staff left their posts including a large number of the participants in this study. Displacement of academics occurred along ethno-sectarian divides. While the extent of this trend cannot be accurately measured due to insufficient data, and notwithstanding reports that the trend was in reversal with the upturn in security since 2009,\textsuperscript{145} testimony from participants suggests that it was considerable.

The staff and student body composition in terms of identity has been transformed due to rising sectarianism as a powerful political force. Some individual universities came to be associated with sectarian and political divides, for example, Al-Mustansiriya was perceived as a Shiite institution while Al-Nahrain a Sunni institution. However, the University of Baghdad retained its ‘mixed’ composition during this period due to its vast size and geographical dispersal throughout the

\textsuperscript{143} Anonymous former Dean, University of Baghdad - Amman, Jordan 12/2010
\textsuperscript{144} Anonymous former senior Professor, Al-Mustansiriya University - Amman, Jordan 02/2011. Also, former Professor of Law, University of Basra - Amman, Jordan 01/2011
\textsuperscript{145} Anbar University, once named the most dangerous place in Iraq, at one point is said to have had no Shiite students attending which is no longer the case.
city. Outside Baghdad, displacement along ethno-sectarian divides occurred, for example, many minorities left relatively homogenous cities including Kerbala and Anbar. The University of Basra, situated in a once highly diverse and cosmopolitan city, experienced decreased intra-national mix, with many minority groups including Christians, Sabaeans, and Sunni Muslims migrating. As Krieger (2007a) writes, ‘militias have made universities throughout the country unsafe for anyone of the “wrong” ethnic group’.

While many faculty members fled, more remained, often due to economic insecurity facing displaced scholars. Faculty members are permitted two years leave at another Iraqi HEI. During intense civil conflict of 2005-2008 many Iraqi faculty applied to use this procedure to seek employment at universities perceived as offering greater security. Staff applying for this scheme in 2007 would have been required to return to their original posts in 2009 after the security situation had improved. This two-year period enabled some faculty members to ‘see out’ the worst sectarian violence in safer locations before returning to their original institution.

Ethno-sectarian conflict within HE and the wider society is the primary explanation offered by interviewees for perceived post-war failures in HE. However, the universities of Mosul and Basra are often held to have recovered relatively successfully since 2003. Relative progress at these universities can be explained through increased ethno-sectarian homogeneity since 2003. Of Mosul, Butenis (2008) explains ‘the university was a bastion of the Baathist system and over the past four years it has become increasingly difficult for non-Sunni Arabs to study and work there’. In contrast to the University of Baghdad where substantial ‘mixing’ is a fact of life and conflicts are still played out on campus, relative

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146 This finding is based on interviews with four current or former Basra University faculty members and also was confirmed during attendance at a conference on the rebuilding of Basra held in Amman, Jordan in December 2010.

147 This finding emerged very strongly from interview data with no participants rejecting the hypothesis that ethno-sectarian conflict was a major factor influencing post-war Iraqi HE.

148 Participants almost unanimously held that Mosul and Basra universities recovered relatively successfully compared to the national average.
homogeneity enabled Mosul and Basra universities to recover in a less conflictual environment.\textsuperscript{149}

This within-case comparison isolates ethno-sectarian conflict as a variable to the extent possible and supports the conclusion that it is a major factor explaining the HE-recovery relationship. While this \textit{de facto} separation positively influenced conditions for successful reconstruction in the short-term, primarily security and stability, the ‘ethnic enclave’ model should be expected to be less beneficial in contributing to long-term peacebuilding goals of overcoming conflict through promoting inter-communal understanding and social cohesion.

In 2011, many Iraqi university Presidents and officials held that sectarianism had receded and was no longer a primary challenge facing HE.\textsuperscript{150} However, dismissal of over 100 Tikrit University faculty members demonstrates the continued divisiveness of ‘de-Baathification’, viewed by some as a smokescreen for pursuit of sectarian agendas. Overall, HE in post-war Iraq negatively impacted conflict dynamics. Any imputed gains of human rights courses, peace and conflict education, and other effects in peacebuilding are outweighed by the re-enforcement of ethno-sectarianism that a divided HE landscape has maintained.

All three features analysed above, security, instability and order, and conflict have been found to form a significant and inter-connected set of obstacles to HE’s contribution to post-war recovery. There is widespread consensus that these three features have been detrimental to recovery outcomes in HE. Further support comes from former Minister of Higher Education Tahir Al-Bakaa who held that terrorism, militias, and intervention of parties were the three main obstacles to HE reconstruction which corresponds approximately to the above three features.\textsuperscript{151} Furthermore, these features restricted the freedom of the sector and connect to the concern of the next section with academic freedom.

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\textsuperscript{149} This explanation was supported by Dr Mazin Kadhim. Professor Mazin Kadhim, former Vice-President, Saddam University and senior adviser to MoHE-I - Amman, Jordan 12/2010
\textsuperscript{150} This position was defended by university presidents at a workshop held between SRF and IIE officials and around 20 Iraqi university presidents in Amman, Jordan in January 2011
\textsuperscript{151} Email interview, Dr Tahir Al-Bakaa, former Minister of HE - Response received 05/2012
6.3.1.4. Academic Freedom

After invasion in 2003 it was expected that a climate of academic freedom and liberation would free the creative energies of a university system long repressed by the Baath regime. Article Seven of the 2004 Erbil Declaration issued by Iraqi academics states that ‘the freedom of thought, belief and clothing is guaranteed to all of the academic community as long as does not interfere with the learning process’ (sic) (Al-Bakaa 2013). However, several features of the post-war environment limited the flourishing of academic freedom.

Freedom of movement of academics is vital for effective functioning of HE but is limited across Iraq by insecurity. An Iraqi Professor held that insecurity in the university was the greatest threat to academic freedom. Movement of academics is restricted and contact hours are dramatically reduced, for example, one professor stating he only visits campus for a few hours per week. To improve attendance levels a national law in 2007 decreed that University staff remain on campus during 8am-2pm, approximately; a move that restricts freedom of movement for university staff.

Restrictions on academic freedom are well illustrated by the case of the University of Mosul. In Mosul during 2003-2004 security levels were favourable yet deteriorated in 2005. Many checkpoints were built and movement became restricted; one academic stated, ‘between one checkpoint and another checkpoint there are more checkpoints’. In 2007 after municipal elections the Peshmerga withdrew and the Iraqi Army was tasked with providing security as ‘insurgency’ shifted its centre of gravity to Mosul. The Army added more checkpoints and built concrete walls with one or two entrances so that all quarters of the city, both East and West, are encircled. Movement of students and university staff became very difficult. To enter the University of Mosul in a car sometimes required over an hour
wait for a search of every vehicle. There have been attacks on students, especially Christian students, waiting in these long lines.\textsuperscript{152}

More fundamentally, political actors including newly emergent militias, political parties, and student factions impeded post-2003 academic freedom. Al-Lami (2010) explains that ‘academic freedom and autonomy in Iraq went from tough state control and repression during the Baath Party regime to chaotic, multi-actor non-state control after the “liberation” in 2003’. One former Professor held that under these conditions of plural threats to academic freedom, while you may criticise, it is dangerous and can lead to silencing, side-lining, threats, or violence.\textsuperscript{153}

Whilst freedom of movement is restricted at the University of Mosul it has been held to have maintained greater academic freedom and more liberal character relative to many universities. Sectarian and political influence has not been strong in comparison to other universities such as Mustansiriyya and other Baghdad universities. This was explained partly through refusal of academics to bow to sectarian influence and due to Mosul’s provincial location. However, it was qualified that the university administration is subject to many allegiances with political parties and factions.\textsuperscript{154}

Furthermore, institutional factors at the governmental and university levels have affected the conditions for academic freedom. First, HE remains highly centralised and did not permit a level of autonomy sufficient for the emergence of academic freedom. Second, at the university-level various threats have arisen. For example, it was reported that the University of Baghdad planned to install security cameras in classrooms to ensure ‘quality’ (Jawad 2010). One participant stated that this was a direct violation of academic freedom used to prevent teachers from addressing critical or controversial subjects.\textsuperscript{155}

\textsuperscript{152} Professor, University of Mosul - Amman, Jordan 12/2010
\textsuperscript{153} Former Dean, University of Baghdad - Amman, Jordan 12/2010
\textsuperscript{154} Professor, University of Mosul - Amman, Jordan 12/2010
\textsuperscript{155} SRF Scholar at British Institute in Jordan – Amman, Jordan 02/2011
It may be concluded that while Iraqi HE may enjoy negative academic freedoms in that no laws formally proscribe the freedom of faculty and students the post-war environment poses many constraints on the exercise of academic freedom; in the words of one participant ‘academic freedom from the point of view of theory is available but in practice is not’. The concern with academic freedom and its impact on classroom teaching and experience connects with the subject of the next section; educational issues and dynamics within post-war Iraqi HE.

6.3.2. Educational Features

Educational features of access, quality, and equity will now be turned to. It is found that while access and equity did not emerge from interview data as strongly as the above-analysed conjunctural features of insecurity, instability, and conflict the low quality of Iraqi HE was viewed widely by participants as a highly significant influence in shaping the HE-recovery relationship in post-war Iraq.

6.3.2.1. Access

It was seen in chapter five that Iraqi HE expanded considerably including throughout the Iraq-Iraq and Gulf wars and subsequent sanctions and by the 1990s possessed a mass HE system with a diversified institutional base. Furthermore, the sector continued to expand following the 2003 invasion. While data regarding access should be treated with caution because it varies between sources some quantitative data indicate that HE expanded continuously from the pre-war to post-war period without interruption. Due to this expansion it can be stated that absolute enrolment levels are not a major factor affecting the HE-recovery relationship in Iraq.

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156 SRF Scholar at British Institute in Jordan – Amman, Jordan 02/2011
As is shown in the table above, total tertiary student enrolment increased annually in 2000-2008 maintaining an upwards trend at a similar gradient since 2000. A similar pattern can be identified from the table below although data is not provided for 2001 and 2003.

Table 5. Total Tertiary Student Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Tertiary Student Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2,050,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2,100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2,150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2,200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2,250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2,300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2,350,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2,400,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6. Tertiary education (ISCED 5 and 6) Enrolment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Tertiary education (ISCED 5 &amp; 6) Enrolment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>300,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>400,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>700,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It can be surmised from this limited data that HE enrolment was not adversely affected by invasion and occupation. Moreover, according to CSIS (2004, p.72) ‘college applications’ rose from 63,000 in 2002-2003 to 97,000 in 2003-2004, a rise attributed by the Ministry of Education to ‘applicants’ beliefs that, with the ousting of the Ba’ath party, they will no longer be denied admission for political or ethnic reasons’. This finding supports the theory described in chapter three that demand

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http://issuu.com/universitiesuk/docs/iraq_final_report
158 UNESCO Institute of Statistics
for HE is high in post-war contexts because the end of conflict is viewed as a rational opportunity to invest in long-term human capital.

However, several participants held that high access was an obstacle to effective HE reconstruction and limited HE’s contribution to recovery. For example, it was argued that continued post-war expansion with already high enrolment ratios was a main challenge because the system was already over-burdened with inadequate resources to improve capacity based on existing enrolment let alone a larger student body.\textsuperscript{159} Similarly, it was held that only half the number of HEIs were required and that having a university in each province spread resources too thinly thus constituting a major obstacle to attaining quality,\textsuperscript{160} a feature which will now be analysed.

6.3.2.2. Quality

It was seen in chapter five that Iraqi HE up until the 1980s was a regionally leading HE system with relatively high quality of teaching and research. However, many participants held that low quality was a central problem facing the sector and limiting its contribution to reconstruction. One participant stated ‘there is no higher education in Iraq now’, identifying the erosion of standards and exodus of staff as the major factors behind the reduced quality.\textsuperscript{161} Another example, the Iraqi Cultural Attaché to Jordan held that ‘lack of quality programmes’ was the second highest priority for improvement. However, there are various dimensions of quality that will now be analysed.

One dimension of quality is the level and competence of teaching staff. As has been seen, widespread violence, de-Baathification, and forced displacement negatively affected Iraq’s human resources. Experienced academics constitute a disproportionate amount of displaced academics. Therefore, less experienced and

\textsuperscript{159} Email interview, Dr Mohamed Al-Rubeai, former senior adviser to the MoHE-I and CPA, and Chairman, Network of Iraqi Scientists Abroad - Response received 08/2012
\textsuperscript{160} Anonymous former Professor of Engineering, Al-Nahrain University - Amman, Jordan 01/2011
\textsuperscript{161} Former vice-President for Academic Affairs, Al-Nahrain University – Amman, Jordan 02/2011
younger staff, most of whom received graduate training in Iraq, filled vacant posts; a fact which one academic ranked as the single largest post-war obstacle to HE.162

The table below indicates the balance of highest qualifications among university faculty members. That just over 50% of faculty members possessed Master’s degrees as their highest qualification indicates a serious skills shortage. Furthermore, 153 scientific sub-fields experienced forced closure due to exodus of advanced expertise from HEIs (Al-Bakaa 2013).

Table 7. Highest Qualification of Faculty Members in Iraqi Universities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of Faculty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Doctorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the staff that remained, poor post-war material conditions negatively affected quality. Despite vast resources committed to reconstruction many basic goods such as electricity163 were in short supply. It was reported that a Professor was forced to write all papers by hand due to electricity shortages and therefore could not publish research (Krieger 2007a). One former Professor explained that low quality of life in terms of insecurity, poor facilities, and lack of communications ‘was not conducive for university staff to be creative and lead to innovation and therefore reflected badly on the university’.164 The President of Kufa University cited poor provision of

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162 Former Dean, Faculty of Languages, University of Baghdad - Amman, Jordan 12/2010
163 Many Iraqis, not just those interviewed for this study, are confounded by perceived failure of the Coalition armed with vast financial resources to restore a basic public good such as electricity
164 Dr Munther Al-Tikriti, former Professor of Engineering, Al-Mustansiriya University - Amman, Jordan 02/2011
electrical power, lack of instruments and chemicals, and insufficient laboratories as the main challenges to the university.\textsuperscript{165} This statement illustrates the centrality of basic physical needs to the priorities of most HEIs.

Furthermore, a common theme emerging from interviews is an emphasis on ‘rebuilding people’.\textsuperscript{166} As one interviewee stated, the challenge is ‘how to rebuild brains and people - we must take into account the human factor’.\textsuperscript{167} This emergent theme from interviews contains a broad critique of Coalition and Iraqi government-led reconstruction of HE that areas including training, psycho-social support for traumatised staff and students, and campus-level reconciliation were neglected. Moreover, it is held that this constituted an obstacle to quality in that the human dimension of rebuilding HE was missing.

Al-Rubeai cites outdated curricula and obsolete pedagogical skills as two of five major obstacles to MoHE-I efforts to reconstruct the university system.\textsuperscript{168} In the immediate post-invasion period, removal of Ba’athist influence from curricula was an immediate priority of the CPA and Iraqi educators. However, the need for curriculum reform was much deeper. For example, in 2003 law school course content had been updated very little over 30 years (Hamoudi 2005). Similarly, the syllabus in microbiology at Basra University in 2003 was ‘decades old’; a problem addressed with training courses on modern techniques and methods (Ahmed 2005). One indicator of progress on curriculum reform is that in 2010 a university law school in Basra was still teaching Saddam-era laws seven years after they became obsolete.\textsuperscript{169}

\textsuperscript{165} Email interview, Dr Akeel Yasseen, President, Kufa University - Response received 05/2012
\textsuperscript{166} Variations including ‘focus on human beings’ and the need to ‘reconstruct people’ were emphasised by participants. An SRF Scholar resident in Syria – Amman, Jordan 02/2011. Also, an SRF Scholar at Princess Sumaya University for Technology – Amman, Jordan 02/2011
\textsuperscript{167} Professor Mazin Kadhim, former Vice-President, Saddam University and senior adviser to MoHE-I - Amman, Jordan 12/2010
\textsuperscript{168} Email interview, Dr Mohamed Al-Rubeai, former senior adviser to the MoHE-I and CPA, and Chairman, Network of Iraqi Scientists Abroad - Response received 08/2012
\textsuperscript{169} Personal communication, anonymous lecturer, Shatt-Al-Arab University College - Amman, Jordan 12/2010
Several reports hold that quality of pedagogical approaches in Iraqi HE is poor and far from international best-practice (UNESCO 2003; Mohamed-Marzouk 2012). Furthermore, an ex-student held that Iraqi students feel that they are oppressed under hierarchical and rigid teacher-student relations. However, it should be qualified that although low teaching standards emerged strongly as a theme from interviews with Iraqi academics outdated pedagogy did not.

Efforts to reform teaching pedagogy face various obstacles. First, poor student/teacher ratios place large workloads on faculty, rendering time-intensive teaching methods a heavy burden. Second, faculty members long-isolated from global ‘best-practice’ offer resistance; Hamoudi (2005) found that resistance to ‘unorthodox and untested’ clinic-based teaching, faculty shortages, and general insecurity were the largest obstacles to pedagogical reform in law schools. It is cautioned that imposing foreign pedagogies will be unsuccessful and that a flexible, gradual, approach recognising existing capacities, resistance, and culture tailored to individual context is required. Finally, pressure from political and religious groups is an obstacle to reform. For example, a religiously-affiliated student group successfully demanded withdrawal of a course on literary interpretation. This is explained by reluctance of groups central to religious knowledge-production to permit a course challenging the epistemic basis of their claim to expert status in that it trains students to offer multiple interpretations.

The finding that low quality was a major obstacle to the effective contribution of HE to recovery is summed up in the words of the former Minister of Planning, who responded to the question ‘do you think that universities have made a positive contribution to reconstruction?’ with the words that ‘no, no. The research is very limited, the quality of higher education is in a bad state, politics intervene in the

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170 Graduate of Mamoun University College working in the Republic of Iraq Embassy in Jordan - Amman, Jordan 02/2011
university and the standard of lecturers and teachers is not good’. Beyond quality, a final educational feature to be considered is the issue of equity in Iraqi HE.

6.3.2.3. Equity

Little evidence was found to indicate that access inequalities were a major dynamic influencing the HE-recovery relationship. However, two areas where equity concerns were raised were scholarship allocations and gender relations. Several participants alleged that control of overseas scholarships under the Prime Minister’s office led to particularistic political and sectarian bias in selection. This is held to violate meritocratic principles and de-legitimise the government in the eyes of academia. However, despite the high degree of significance placed upon sectarianism as a factor, discrimination based on ethno-sectarian criteria in undergraduate admissions did not emerge as a theme from interviews.

In terms of gender, female students are quantitatively well-represented in HE. However, Zangana (2008) argues that deteriorated post-war material conditions caused the burden of survival, family rearing and domestic tasks to fall disproportionately on women reversing long-standing gender equality in educational access, rendering HE a ‘luxury’ item. Female student distribution by discipline shows lower representation in fields offering greater career prospects and social status including medicine and engineering. Further, female academics are not well-represented in high-level academic or administrative positions. According to Taylor-Weathers (2006, p.118) the CPA did not push for greater involvement of women in post-war planning for HE.

Coalition promotion of women’s rights tainted the issue as driven by outside interests therefore prompting considerable domestic opposition, a ‘conservative

171 Ali Baban Former Minister of Planning - Manchester, England 04/2013
172 Professor Mazin Kadhim, former Vice-President, Saddam University and senior adviser to MoHE-I - Amman, Jordan 12/2010. Also a former Professor of Engineering at Al-Mustansiriya University – Amman, Jordan 02/2011
173 See the final section of this chapter on internationalisation of Iraqi HE for more in-depth discussion of the accusation of sectarian bias in the scholarship programme.
backlash’, causing decline in women’s freedoms (Al Ali 2005). This dynamic impacted HE; since 2003 females’ position within HE has been threatened primarily by increased power of conservative religious groups. Religious parties and their proxies on campus attempted to segregate classes by gender and enforce Islamic dress codes on female students (Jarecki & Kaisth 2009, p.46). In support of this, it was reported that security guards at the University of Baghdad tried to enforce Islamic dress on female students.\(^\text{174}\)

Al Ali et al (2012) in a study of female Iraqi academics find that while male colleagues also face many similar challenges most female academics feel disadvantaged because they are female and conclude that there is ‘systematic marginalisation and exclusion’ in HE. At an IIE conference on rebuilding Iraqi HE in 2011 a female Iraqi academic delivered a paper defending a similar finding to Al Ali et al (2012). It was observed that during discussion the overwhelming majority of male Iraqi participants rejected the characterisation of Iraqi HE as strongly excluding females.\(^\text{175}\) This topic was deemed controversial and the male bias in the interview sample for the study in part explains the low recognition of gender equity as a significant dynamic.

In conclusion, in this section it has been seen that educational features were significant although interview data supports the position that quality was more influential in constraining the post-war role of Iraqi HE than equity or access. In the next section it will be seen that institutional features constitute another significant set of dynamics that shaped the post-war environment of Iraqi HE.

\(^{174}\) Former Dean of Languages, University of Baghdad, who remains anonymous. Amman, Jordan 12/2010

6.3.3. Institutional Features

In this section institutional features including governance, vision, and capacity will be analysed. While these factors emerged as significant from interviews with Iraqi academics and policy-makers, in contrast to insecurity and instability which receive widespread media and policy attention when addressing post-war Iraqi HE, institutional dynamics are under-addressed in published secondary sources. To begin, the important issue of ‘ownership’ of HE policy will be addressed.

6.3.3.1. Ownership

A lack of local ‘ownership’ is identified by some analysts as a major obstacle to rebuilding HE. As was seen earlier, the CPA controlled HE policy until June 2004. Watenpaugh et al (2003) criticise CPA HE policy arguing that Iraqi universities ‘have been placed in a subordinate and dependent position... the US is placing itself, with planned USAID HE subcontracts to American universities, in a position to dominate Iraqi educational structures for the foreseeable future’. Moreover, they assert that ‘Iraqis did not design the “bedrock principles” as a formula for reform, but rather they derive from a plan drawn up before the occupation of the country in Washington’. Earlier analysis of CPA-led HE reconstruction also identified resistance by local actors to externally-devised strategies as a major cause of the ultimate failure of reforms to take root.

The perception that reconstruction after the Iran-Iraq war and First Gulf War was fast and effective influences the discourse of some Iraqi academics about post-2003 HE. Such instances of quick recovery are frequently invoked to express frustration at perceived failure of externally-led reconstruction. Post-2003 reconstruction under occupation backed by enormous financial resources is contrasted with the Iraqi-led

176 Section 6.1.3. on CPA-led reform includes findings on ‘local ownership’ relevant here
recovery in the early 1990s with significantly less resources that rebuilt critical infrastructure including bridges and power stations.\textsuperscript{177} Crucially, sidelining of Iraqi expertise and the presence of occupation are held to have driven failed reconstruction.

While ‘ownership’ of HE policy was absent under occupation, after transfer of sovereignty in June 2004 control of HE formally rested with Iraq’s government. After transition HE received greater priority, evidenced by an increased budget and a University Service Law leading to 100% salary increases for faculty members (Al-Bakaa 2013), although remaining a low priority overall. Furthermore, overseas scholarships and international partnerships became central to HE strategy.\textsuperscript{178} However, there was no dramatic improvement in HE recovery due to immense challenges facing the sector. This indicates that ‘ownership’ alone was not a decisive causal factor.

Yet following the ‘Golden Hour’ concept, which posits that the first post-war year is critical to determining long-term reconstruction outcomes (Stephenson 2007), the impact of excluding Iraqi actors from shaping HE policy during March 2003-June 2004 had significant path-dependent effects on the system’s trajectory, including alienating the Iraqi professoriate and deprioritising HE. Furthermore, the absence under occupation of Iraqi actors from devising strategy and vision for HE recovery connects to the subject of the next section.

\subsection*{6.3.3.2. Strategy and Vision}

A common explanation offered by participants for the parlous state of HE is the lack of vision and strategy, two inter-connected phenomena, on the part of both the CPA

\textsuperscript{177} This was a common theme raised by participants. Examples of those that supported this view include; Professor Mazin Kadhim, former Vice-President, Saddam University and senior adviser to MoHE-I - Amman, Jordan 12/2010. A former President of Al-Mustansiriya University – Amman, Jordan 01/2011; a Professor of Engineering, Philadelphia University – Amman, Jordan 02/2011

\textsuperscript{178} Email interview, Dr Tahir Al-Bakaa, former Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research - Response received 05/2012
and transitional Iraqi authorities.\footnote{Professor Mazin Kadhim, former Vice-President, Saddam University and senior adviser to MoHE-I - Amman, Jordan 12/2010} For example, it was held that ‘no particular strategy exists’ for HE reconstruction\footnote{Email interview, Dr Mohamed Al-Rubeai, former senior adviser to the MoHE-I and CPA, and Chairman, Network of Iraqi Scientists Abroad - Response received 08/2012} while Al Sa’dawi (2007) writes that ‘there is a complete absence of any methodological planning to develop universities in Iraq’. Similarly, Al-Janabi and Urban (2011) hold that a strategic plan was expected in 2004 and the failure of strategic planning resulted in ‘waste of several crucial years’. Nasrullah explains that many strategies are proposed but not implemented due to instability.\footnote{Dr Sadiq Nasrullah, Cultural Attaché, Embassy of the Republic of Iraq in Jordan - Amman, Jordan 02/2011} Furthermore, a former Minister of Higher Education held that in particular after 2005 elections and the sectarian quota system which further politicised Ministerial appointments there was a ‘policy of the minister not a philosophy of ministry’.\footnote{Email interview, Dr Tahir Al-Bakaa, former Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research - Response received 05/2012}  Similarly, it was held that five ministers each brought completely new staff thus delimiting the possibility of vertical policy development.\footnote{Dr Sadiq Nasrullah, Cultural Attaché, Embassy of the Republic of Iraq in Jordan - Amman, Jordan 02/2011}

The lack of HE strategy developed in an inclusive consultative process is also held to explain poor HE recovery. UNESCO (2008) recommended that developing a broad national vision for education is made central to future Iraqi educational reform. A consultative process involving representatives from all levels of the HE system, students, government, civil society, and industry would foster a shared vision that could guide HE’s future transformation. In 2008 a process sponsored by UNESCO-Iraq, UNICEF, and the World Bank was initiated to foster a national vision for education at all levels, involving representatives from the Ministry of Education (MoE) and MoHE from both the GOI and KRG (IIEP 2010).

Such a vision, if achieved, may be expected to strengthen HE reform processes. However, HE revitalisation will require a shared national vision of reconstruction in
addition to a sector specific consultation and strategic plan. Buckland (2005, p.64) writes that Iraqi tertiary education shows that:

Reform of higher levels of the system is linked more directly to the emergence of a broad development vision for the society. Such a vision often involves political and educational policy choices that interim political and educational authorities are unwilling or unable to make.

The type of vision to which Buckland is referring may be, for example, whether or not Iraq chooses to pursue a strategy of economic diversification or oil-dependency. Overall reconstruction strategy in post-Saddam Iraq has lacked such a shared vision capable of guiding recovery efforts (Barakat 2005). In the absence of such agreement on the future direction of Iraq’s economy and society the process of strategic planning for HE is rendered highly problematic. For example, decisions on which disciplines to focus resources and the type of graduates to produce cannot be based on realistic projected scenarios.

A lack of vision emerged strongly as a theme from interview data. The absence of vision may be explained by the deprioritisation of HE amongst policy-makers which led to a failure to recognise its potential to contribute towards reconstruction. Furthermore, it is also explained by the divided political landscape that produced several mutually-incompatible visions, demarcated along communal lines, for HE’s role in Iraq’s future. For example, the vision for decentralised HE advanced by the CPA was viewed positively by supporters of federal and secessionist constitutional options while rejected by centralist nationalists; a major political fault-line in post-war Iraqi politics on which agreement around a common vision would be very difficult. Furthermore, weak vision and strategy can also be explained by low capacity, the subject of the next section.
6.3.3.3. State and Institutional Capacity

After invasion and looting capacity of the MoHE-I was weakened. Ministry offices were looted and burned eroding physical capacity while lost records constituted significant loss of institutional memory. ‘Student records, personnel records, faculty files, and many other sorts of records which provide the “nuts and bolts” of education administration were lost’ (al-Tikriti 2005). For example, MoHE-I finances were reportedly ‘in disarray’ due to burning of contracts associated with the UN Oil-for-Food programme (McConnell 2003). A UNESCO (n.d.) Roundtable in 2005 found that ‘urgent needs include the enhancement of the capacity of the MoHE in policy, planning and management of the higher education system’.

Many international organisations, for example, the British Council, DAAD, and UNESCO, implemented capacity-building programmes, mostly for MoHE-I personnel and high-level university administrators. A former consultant to the MoHE-I stated that the Ministry sent many staff abroad on training courses.184 There is limited evidence to assess long-term effectiveness of these efforts. A positive evaluation, British Council (2009) claim that ‘rewards have been immense’ in reference to its programme Connecting Classrooms, Skills for Employability, and Excellence in Higher Education. A more negative indicator, a World Bank (2011a) education sector capacity-building project identified strategic planning and policy-design as critical MoHE-I capacities requiring strengthening.

While the language of capacity was not commonly employed by Iraqi faculty members interviewed for this study the problem was explicitly referred to among the smaller sub-set of participants that held Ministerial, consultant, or aid agency positions.185 However, many participants did explicitly refer to issues of

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184 Former consultant to MoHE-I and lecturer, Anbar University - Amman, Jordan 02/2011
185 Email interview Dr Tahir Al-Bakaa, former Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research; Email interview, Dr Mohamed Al-Rubeal, former senior adviser to the MoHE-I and CPA, and Chairman, Network of Iraqi Scientists Abroad; Khaled Ehsan, Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist, UNDP, Iraq Country Office - Amman, Jordan 02/2011.
governance, which are strongly inter-related with capacity, and which will be addressed in the next section.

6.3.3.4. Governance

Various governance-related obstacles and challenges to HE’s post-war role emerged from interview data. To begin, it should be noted that Iraq’s troubled post-war environment was not a context conducive to stable governance. Rather, divisive politics, state weakness, and low ministerial capacity all problematised governance with negative consequences for the HE sector. For example, former Minister of Planning Ali Baban argued that one of the major reasons for reduced quality of Iraqi HE was ‘quick changes in government’ which prevented stable governance.186 Furthermore, it was reported that many major decisions became subject to prime-ministerial approval thus reducing the MoHE-I’s centrality to HE policy.187

At the university-level politicisation and sectarianisation contributed to breakdown in authority within hierarchical HE governance structures. For example, the University of Baghdad’s University Promotion Committee (UPC) was held to be very weak with a former member stating that ‘if you have no authority then implementation of reform is impossible and cannot succeed’.188 He explained that proliferation of private interests within different committees and political party influence on the university significantly decreased UPC’s power. A necessary condition for effective university governance was held to be influence of a central coordinating committee in all parts of the decision-making chain of sub-groups and committees within universities and up to Ministerial Committees. The same pattern of loss and fragmentation of power was identified within the MoHE-I. Particularistic appointments to ministerial positions eroded technocratic standards expected of civil and university administration. Conflict of interest between heads

186 Former Minister of Planning Ali Baban - Manchester, England 04/2013
187 Professor Mazin Kadhim, former Vice-President, Saddam University and senior adviser to MoHE-I - Amman, Jordan 12/2010
188 Anonymous Iraqi Professor and former Dean, University of Baghdad - Amman, Jordan 12/2010
of sub-committees aligned with different political factions is a barrier to strong leadership within the ministry.

A strong emergent theme from interview data was a technocratic vision for the governance and recovery of the HE sector. In this vision the sector would be run by competent officials in a meritocratic and depoliticised environment. This finding corresponds with the wider technocratic vision for post-war reconstruction held by Iraqis identified by the author in a previous study (Barakat & Milton 2010). However, the overwhelming majority of participants held that this vision was far removed from the reality of increasing particularism and political interference. It was commonly held that in contrast to the relatively technocratic pre-2003 government the post-invasion context led to incompetent party loyalist appointments in ministerial jobs and university leadership and administrative positions with negative consequences for governance and HE quality. A strong statement of the significance of this problem is made by one participant who stated that ‘as long as appointments in official positions remain based on political affiliation no real rebuilding of university infrastructure will materialise’.

Many participants noted that the Minister of HE Ali Al-Adeeb was accused of holding a forged PhD certificate and that this was an indicator of unqualified leadership of the sector.

Bowen’s (2009) report *Hard Lessons* consistently ranks endemic corruption as a major challenge to Iraqi reconstruction. Participants widely-cited corruption as a major obstacle to effective HE reconstruction and several identified corruption as the greatest problem. Budget allocations to HEIs, along with all other sectors, are frequently subject to corruption and theft. Isam al-Khafaji states that ‘corruption is

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189 Examples of participants agreeing with this view include; a former vice-President for Academic Affairs of al-Nahrain University – Amman, Jordan 02/2011. A Professor of Engineering at Al-Nahrain University – Amman, Jordan, 01/2011. A former Dean at the University of Baghdad – Amman, Jordan 12/2010. Professor Mazin Kadhim, former senior adviser to MoHE-I. Amman, Jordan 12/2010
190 For example, a former Dean at Basra University – Amman, Jordan 12/2012
191 Professor Mazin Kadhim, former senior adviser to MoHE-I - Amman, Jordan 12/2010
192 Former Professor of Engineering, Al-Mustansiriya University - Amman, Jordan 01/2011. Also Professor of Engineering at Philadelphia University - Amman, Jordan 02/2011
so widespread that no money is coming to the Universities’ (Krieger 2007a). Furthermore, many participants cited proliferation of fraudulent qualifications as an indicator of HE corruption. A common criticism was that prominent Iraqi politicians were awarded or purchased PhDs without completing any education (Allawi 2007). It is reported that 20,000-50,000 fake certificates were used to gain employment, including many MPs, with black-market fees of around $7,000 for a PhD (Ramzi 2011; Abdul-Kadir 2011). Moreover, one participant described her exasperation at proliferation of forged certificates which would be a major scandal in other contexts but was relegated to the status of a minor problem due to it being not life-threatening.193

In sum, inter-linked institutional features of the post-war environment, in particular weak governance, vision and capacity, were a major obstacle to HE making a major contribution to recovery. Corruption, appointive bureaucracy, low levels of competency, and coordination failures are connected issues. Empowerment of sectarian political parties led to highly-particularistic appointments and standards of relative meritocracy and technocratic competence were eroded. This situation was characterised by breakdown in inter-ministerial coordination and high corruption. Furthermore, intra-ministerial cooperation was reduced as internal political struggles within the MoHE-I became a major obstacle to effective reform. Additionally, there was a lack of cooperation between universities and the Government. Rebuilding ministerial capacity and implementing a whole-of-government approach to HE reconstruction and governance should therefore be central to future recovery strategy. This context of institutional weakness can in a sense also be considered a structural factor, the subject of the next section.

### 6.3.4. Structural Features

While the above-analysed institutional features were found to be significant in shaping the context of post-war HE in Iraq in a manner more stable than

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193 Former Professor of Economics, University of Baghdad – Amman, Jordan 02/2011
conjunctural features they also were affected by the inter-play of structure and agency, for example, in the formation of vision and strategy for the sector or in leadership. Structural features, by contrast, refer to more permanent aspects of the Iraqi context and will be considered now.

To begin, culture did not emerge strongly as a theme during interviews. However, it was raised in relation to a number of other issues and can be considered a cross-cutting theme. For example, it was seen that a culture of corruption and Washa or favouritism was an obstacle to financing and building a meritocratic HE environment respectively. Former Minister of HE in the KRG Dr Ala’aldeen held that while a conservative academic culture was an impediment to reform initiatives in that new concepts and proposals were resisted culture was a surmountable obstacle. Furthermore, it was held that absence of well-developed ‘academic ethics’ in Iraqi universities was a major challenge. Several participants held that academic culture was devastated by war, sanctions, and occupation and necessitated deep revitalisation of academic communities.

A theme emerging from interviews is appeal to Iraq’s educational heritage as a resource upon which to revitalise Iraqi HE in the present. This is reflected in the title of Allan Goodman’s speech ‘Re-building the House of Wisdom in Iraq’. One participant claimed that Iraq should draw on its ‘civilisational heritage’ to restore HE to its former glory. Similarly, a debate over the purpose of rebuilding emerged at a conference in Amman. Yahia Kubaisy criticised UNESCO and other agencies working in Iraq for wanting to restore the past system. In interview with a UNESCO official this criticism was addressed directly; ‘the goal is to restore the level and glory of the past system – not to rebuild the old system’.  

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194 Email interview, Dr Mohamed Al-Rubeai, former senior adviser to the MoHE-I and CPA, and Chairman, Network of Iraqi Scientists Abroad - Response received 08/2012  
195 Dr Diawer Ala’aldeen, former Minister of Higher Education in the KRG and Professor of Clinical Microbiology at Nottingham University - Nottingham, UK. 07/2013  
196 Kubaisy’s criticism is unfair; UNESCO programmes and documents relating to higher education in Iraq reveal a future-oriented direction premised on the transformation of Iraqi higher education rather than merely rebuilding the old system.
This tension reflects the wider debate over the goals of post-war recovery. On the one hand, Etzioni (2004) for example argues that reconstruction should be about restoring the \textit{status quo ante}. However, others, for example Barakat and Zyck (2009) hold that this risks reproducing inequalities and vulnerabilities that led to the initial conflict. This debate illustrates the point that visions of Iraqi HE drawing inspiration from perceived past glories may be criticised for their conservative ideology while visions drawing on transformation and modernisation may be viewed as insufficiently rooted in Iraqi history and culture. In the next section the external dimensions of the post-war environment will be considered; it should be noted that these may be classed as structural in that they refer to the external strategic context in which post-war Iraqi HE operated.

6.3.5. External Features

While regional politics was not frequently raised by interviewees, a minority stated forcefully that external political interference, in particular from Iran, affected Iraqi HE. The argument that regional influence was a major obstacle can be sub-divided into the claim that regional states directly influenced Iraqi HEIs and the distinct but related claim that because HE sector prospects depend upon Iraq’s political context, given that Iraqi politics is determined by regional powers, primarily Iran, Saudi Arabia and the USA, Iraq’s HE prospects are therefore dependent on regional politics.

On the former claim, first and most damningly there is a perception prevalent among some participants that foreign regional powers, in particular Iran and Israel, specifically targeted academics through assassinations.\textsuperscript{197} Beyond this unverifiable claim, several former senior academics at the University of Basra claimed that Iran

\textsuperscript{197} Former senior adviser to the MoHE-I – Amman, Jordan 02/2011; former Dean of Faculty, University of Basra. Amman - Jordan 12/2010; also former President, University of Basra – Amman, Jordan 12/2010
strongly influenced its top-level officials. The US Embassy advocated educational exchange with Basra University to increase US soft power and reduce Iran’s soft power generated by training Basrawi staff and students in Iran (Naland 2009b). Suspicion of a former University of Basra Chancellor’s pro-Iranian sympathies constituted an obstacle to US cooperation while his replacement by a new ‘UK-educated and westernized’ Chancellor in 2009 would ‘set the stage for a sustained and mutually beneficial relationship’ between the university and the US (Naland 2009a). However, there is insufficient evidence on this sensitive political issue to claim that it was a major factor nationally.

On the latter point, it was seen earlier that political dynamics including political influence on campus and sectarian divisions were central influences upon post-war HE. The extent to which Iraqi politics is influenced by external actors is a contested issue. For example, some hold that Iran exerts strong influence on Iraq’s Shiite political parties while others contend that influence is weak (Visser 2009b). One participant in discussing regional influence of Iran and other states claimed that ‘you need to understand politics to understand the reconstruction of higher education’. If it is accepted that political dynamics are the most important obstacle to HE contributing to recovery and that Iraqi politics is overlaid by external powers then the argument can be considered sound. However, while political dynamics are considered central, the argument expressed by some participants that Iraqi politics is determined by exterior forces is not accepted; rather Iraqi politics are influenced by both internal and external factors.

6.3.6. Conclusion

In this section the features shaping the post-war environment in which Iraqi HE operated were analysed in order to explain the finding of the previous section that the sector made an overall very low contribution to post-war recovery. There is a

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198 Former Dean of Faculty, University of Basra. Amman - Jordan 12/2010; also former President, University of Basra – Amman, Jordan 12/2010
199 Former vice-President for Academic Affairs, Al-Nahrain University – Amman, Jordan 02/2011
consensus in the literature on Iraq and the interview data collected for this study that insecurity, conflict, and instability are primary challenges to the effective contribution of HE to recovery. The section has sought to show that beyond these widely-considered features other major obstacles to the post-war role of Iraqi HE include low quality, weak governance, vision, and leadership and unmet educational needs. In the following section the various options and opportunities for overcoming these myriad challenges will be analysed.

6.4. Major Policy Options for Higher Education

This section will evaluate the effectiveness of various HE policy options including private HE, internationalisation, and ‘brain gain’. The overall analysis offers a critique of reconstruction strategies that are commonly presented in media reports as offering positive opportunities with little consideration of potential challenges. Throughout, a range of Iraqi perspectives will be explored to provide an overview of key debates and points of consensus on the prospects of Iraqi HE contributing towards post-war recovery and long-term development. To begin, the major dynamic of privatisation and private HE will be considered.

6.4.1. Private Higher Education

Expansion of private education at all levels has been an important dynamic in post-Saddam Iraq (Saltman 2006). After 2003 establishment of private HEIs was permitted as part of CPA-led economic liberalisation. Many university applications that had lain dormant were processed and eight new private institutions administered by the MoHE-I were established, six in 2004 and 2005. Private HE
expanded rapidly in Kurdistan with eleven new institutions in 2004-2010 and one semi-public university.\textsuperscript{200}

Several participants noted that many new private universities and university colleges had a strong religious nature.\textsuperscript{201} For example, Al Alamein Institute was reportedly established in Najaf in 2008 although it struggled to receive MoHE-I recognition. The institute is notable because a large endowment from the Marja’iyah, a group of senior Shiite clergy, covered around 80\% of costs (Hill 2010). However, one participant stated that ‘political parties started interfering with private colleges in same way as public universities’.\textsuperscript{202} Given the lower capacity and autonomy of new private HEIs, resisting external pressures was held to be more difficult leading to many institutions reflecting particularistic sectarian and political interests.\textsuperscript{203} One participant on the University of Baghdad’s University Promotion Committee described external pressure placed on the committee to permit recognition of certificates from small private religious university colleges and grades from Iranian religious institutions.\textsuperscript{204} These reports support the finding that private HE further strengthened sectarian division and conflict in post-war Iraq.

Among interviewees, further strong criticism of existing private HE emerged. Problems reported include many institutions with no permanent staff relying on part-time lecturers from public HEIs,\textsuperscript{205} poor facilities, high fees, and low academic standards. A quote illustrating the perceived contribution of private HE to reconstruction is that ‘unless private universities increase quality they will create

\textsuperscript{200} Ms. Sameerah Saeed. Assistant to the Director of the Quality Assurance division, MoHE-KRG - Newcastle, UK 02/2012
\textsuperscript{201} SRF Scholar at British Institute in Jordan – Amman, Jordan 02/2011; Dr Sadiq Nasrullah, Cultural Attaché, Embassy of the Republic of Iraq in Jordan - Amman, Jordan 02/2011
\textsuperscript{202} Professor Mazin Kadhim, former Vice-President, Saddam University and senior adviser to MoHE-I - Amman, Jordan 12/2010
\textsuperscript{203} Former President, Al-Mustansiriya University - Amman, Jordan 01/2011
\textsuperscript{204} Former Dean, University of Baghdad – Amman, Jordan 12/2010
\textsuperscript{205} Former Dean, University of Basra – Amman, Jordan 12/2010
more problems than benefits’. There was a general perception amongst participants that many new private HEIs were solely profit-driven; in the words of the President of the University of Technology ‘our job is to make science and technology, their aim is to make money’. More damningly, doubt over the existence of some institutions was raised by participants while others suggested degrees could be bought without education. However, several participants held that private colleges established pre-2003, including Mansour and Mamoun, should be distinguished from private institutions founded since 2003, with the former established while stronger regulations existed and possessing higher academic standards in contrast to many predatory HEIs established in the unregulated post-war environment.

However, some limited support was given to the notion of private HE. Several participants stated that HE should not be free because it leads to complacency; in the words of one participant, through fees ‘students should be made to feel the value of education’. Others argued that not-for-profit private HE should be encouraged to create a balanced system. In general however there was strongest support for the idea of public universities providing public goods including research relevant to development, universal and free education, and public service. This is explained by Iraq’s long tradition of free and universal education at all levels.

Concern over equity issues in relation to private HE was another emergent theme from interviews. Iraq’s GDP per capita is $3,800 and fees at some private

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206 Anonymous Iraqi Professor, former Dean, Faculty of Languages, University of Baghdad - Amman, Jordan 12/2010; Professor Mazin Kadhim, former Vice-President, Saddam University and senior adviser to MoHE-I - Amman, Jordan 12/2010
207 Professor of Engineering at Philadelphia University – Amman, Jordan 02/2011
208 Dr Kahtan Al-Khazrajji, President, University of Technology - Amman, Jordan 01/2011
209 Professor Mazin Kadhim, former Vice-President, Saddam University and senior adviser to MoHE-I - Amman, Jordan 12/2010; Former Professor of Economics, University of Baghdad – Amman, Jordan 02/2011; also graduate of Mamoun University College working in the Republic of Iraq Embassy in Jordan - Amman, Jordan 02/2011
210 SRF Scholar and former Professor of Engineering at Al-Nahrain University – Amman, Jordan 01/2011
institutions represent a significant proportion of this sum; approximately $2,000 annually for accountancy, IT, computer science, management and similar subjects and $5,000 for medicine and engineering.\textsuperscript{211} It was reported that during 2004-2005 fees at private colleges in Baghdad rose dramatically and continued rising because of wage increases in public universities (Kadhum 2005). In one private college in Baghdad annual fees for engineering courses were reported at $50,000.\textsuperscript{212} While Iraqi HE enabled social mobility historically, there was fear that in a new context of growing urban poverty and marginalisation that if private HE were expanded rapidly access polarisation between the wealthy and poor could emerge.\textsuperscript{213}

Shortly after invasion, Fattah (2003) warned that ‘if university privatization is to be administered in compliance with the CPA’s vision, regardless of Iraqi views or experience, it will traumatize the higher education system’. Private HE in the USA emerged organically over a long period and has been supported by strong traditions of private philanthropy and many wealthy individuals. This experience contrasts markedly with often superficial private HE in the developing world. Private HE provision is not deeply-rooted in Iraq’s academic culture yet private expansion is now part of its long-term HE trajectory.

Overall, private HE made low contribution to recovery due to low standards and predatory ‘degree-mill’ institutions while it risks excluding poor students. Furthermore, the emergence of private HEIs in a chaotic post-war environment that lacked regulatory capacity can be considered a de facto process of decentralisation or HE system fragmentation, which is the subject of the next section.

\textsuperscript{211} Dr Sadiq Nasrullah, Cultural Attaché, Embassy of the Republic of Iraq in Jordan - Amman, Jordan 02/2011
\textsuperscript{212} Figure not verified. Personal communication, anonymous lecturer, Shatt Al-Arab University College - Amman, Jordan 12/2010
\textsuperscript{213} Former Dean, University of Baghdad – Amman, Jordan 12/2010
6.4.2. Decentralisation and Autonomy

Granting greater autonomy to Iraq’s universities has been a central post-war policy debate. Successive Iraqi Ministers stated that government policy favours greater autonomy and decentralisation.214 Furthermore, one participant who advised the MoHE-I holds that granting university autonomy was a turning point after which better HE outcomes were achieved.215 However, a strong theme in interviews is that participants hold that there has been minor change in the degree of centralisation.216 The Iraqi Cultural Attaché in Jordan, who offered relatively positive appraisals on other aspects of Iraqi HE in comparison with displaced scholars, stated that ‘there is no greater freedom for universities today than in 2003’.217

Iraqi HE has since its foundation remained highly centralised, except the self-governing KRG. The MoHE-I controls admissions policies, examinations, curricula, textbooks, funding, and many other administrative functions. Local governorates and municipalities exercised little control over substantive components of university governance with local branches of line ministries implementing centrally-designed policies (Ahmad et al 2005). Harb (2008) concurs that post-2003 the system became ‘more open and transparent’ but remains highly centralised.

There have been many calls for decentralisation.218 For example, the President of Kufa University cited decentralisation as his institution’s top priority.219 UNESCO (2004, p.121) advocated decentralisation because it would increase academic excellence and academic freedom. It has been argued that strategies of

214 Email interview Dr Tahir Al-Bakaa, former Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research
215 Email interview Dr Mohamed Al-Rubeai, former senior adviser to the MoHE-I and CPA, and Chairman, Network of Iraqi Scientists Abroad
216 This view emerged very strongly from interviews – participants supporting it include: Khaled Ehsan, Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist, UNDP, Iraq Country Office - Amman, Jordan 02/2011; a former Professor of Engineering, Al-Mustansiriya University – Amman, Jordan 02/2011; former Dean, University of Baghdad – Amman, Jordan 12/2010
217 Dr Sadiq Nasrullah, Cultural Attaché, Embassy of the Republic of Iraq in Jordan - Amman, Jordan 02/2011
218 For example, the International Conference on Higher Education in Iraq, held in Erbil in 2007.
219 Email interview, Dr Akeel Yaseen, President, Kufa University - Response received 05/2012
decentralisation and increasing university autonomy would enable innovation and new educational initiatives currently frustrated by central control (Harb 2008). A selective process of decentralisation has been held to be necessary to move towards a more balanced system. Autonomy to develop new programmes and courses would enable tailoring curricula to local economic and developmental needs. For example, universities and institutes in regions with large oilfields should be free to introduce new courses in petroleum engineering and geosciences. Control over funding would permit universities and technical institutes to attract new sources of revenue, essential while HE investment budgets remain insufficient.

However, it has been cautioned that implementing decentralisation would further increase the influence of local, private, and sectarian interests to dominate the university system, and place an obstacle to the emergence of a shared national vision of HE, which is important to the future prospects of reconstruction. A strategy of ‘centralisation before decentralisation’ could enable rebuilding MoHE-I capacity before granting greater autonomy to individual universities at a later date within the context of a national framework and strategy. Such a strategy was favoured by the KRG Minister of HE who held that granting full autonomy to universities before developing central regulatory authority would ‘lead to the creation of many mini-dictatorships’.

So far the focus has been primarily on Arab Iraq or non-Kurdistan Iraq. The main reason is that post-Saddam era Kurdistan was no longer in the reconstruction phase but rather in ‘normal’ development. However, the experience of HE in Iraqi Kurdistan is an aspect of the debate over decentralisation. Writing of the security sector, O’Leary (2009, p.95) holds that ‘the KRG offers a positive model of what may be possible in the rest of Iraq if the local politicians pursue either regionalization or provincialization’; an argument that may be held to apply to HE. Such an argument

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220 Former President, Al-Mustansiriya University – Amman, Jordan 01/2011; also SRF Scholar - Amman, Jordan 10/2010
221 Dr Diawer Ala’aldeen, former Minister of Higher Education in the KRG and Professor of Clinical Microbiology at Nottingham University - Nottingham, UK. 07/2013
is presented by the reform process in the KRG which involves decentralisation as a main component. The KRG vision has been presented as an instructive model of HE development for the rest of Iraq and the wider region by the former Minister of HE at an IIE conference in 2011 and the question of its applicability was explored in depth during interview.\footnote{Dr Dlawer Ala’aldeen, former Minister of Higher Education in the KRG and Professor of Clinical Microbiology at Nottingham University - Nottingham, UK. 07/2013}

To briefly contextualise the Kurdistan case, while during 2003-2013 Kurdistan was not a ‘post-conflict’ region, long-running conflicts between the Iraqi government and Kurdish militias, the Iran-Iraq war, the Anfal campaign, and the Kurdish Civil War during 1994-1998 had important consequences for HE in Kurdistan. For example, breakdown of a peace agreement between Kurdish forces and the Iraqi government in 1974 led to widespread repression, fleeing of academics and students, and eventual displacement of the University of Sulaimani to Erbil (Mojab & Hall 2003, p.163).

Since 1992 after the Gulf War Kurdistan gained de facto autonomy from the Iraqi state. During the 1990s Iraqi Kurdistan faced the challenge of recovering from these conflicts whilst isolated from the rest of Iraq yet subject to sanctions. Isolation was the major constraint facing Kurdistan’s HE in that period (Mojab & Hall 2003, p.163). However during 1992-2003 universities were rebuilt and rehabilitated, acting as an important institution in the emergent Kurdistan nation and state-in-formation. Moreover, 1990s HE rebuilding was a remarkable success in testing circumstances (Mojab & Hall 2003). Moreover, recovery of Kurdistan’s HE supports the theory of autonomous recovery advanced in chapter four.

KRG-administered universities experienced both similarities and differences in historical trajectory compared to the rest of Iraq. A significant continuity, in 1992 the Kurdistan National Assembly (KNA) adopted the HE ‘governing structures and laws and regulations being applied throughout Iraq’ (Sadik 2008). A major difference however is that the 2003 invasion did not directly affect HEIs in Iraqi
Kurdistan, for example, there was no looting and destruction. Furthermore, the region maintained order and security to a very high degree relative to Iraq or even the wider Middle East region, labelled as an ‘oasis’ or the ‘other Iraq’. Harb (2008) holds that KRG academic freedom is greater compared to the rest of Iraq. However, depictions of KRG as ‘an oasis of stability and tranquillity’ (Krieger 2007b) free from violence were challenged by 2011 protests met with repressive force by KRG security that led to temporary closure of universities.

With re-incorporation of Iraqi Kurdistan into Iraq’s federal structure a 2004 law granted the new KRG de jure in addition to de facto authority over its HE system. HE expanded rapidly post-2003 in line with huge capital investment and a construction boom in the region. In 2008 there were twenty-two thousand students enrolled across five public universities\(^\text{223}\) in the KRG (Harb 2008). A University of Exeter Needs Assessment of Universities concluded that laboratories were often in poor conditions, materials lacking, library and IT systems required upgrading, and pedagogic tools updating (Kaghed & Dezaye 2009). However, it should be qualified that objective HE needs are lower compared to the rest of Iraq.

Former KRG Minister of HE Dlawer Ala’Aldeen embarked on an ambitious strategy to reform HE (KRG 2011). Central to the vision is decentralisation, private HE, focus on research, postgraduate training abroad, and international cooperation. At the IIE conference in 2011 it was observed that there was notable hostility towards the notion that the KRG represented a model for the rest of Iraq; a position explained by historical enmities between the regions. However, it should also be noted that many Iraqi academics at the conference were impressed with KRG vision which was contrasted with the weakness of vision in Iraqi HE. However, a more fundamental difference was noted by one participant who argued that the KRG universities were building a HE system anew and therefore could innovate with new models while the Iraqi HE system had a much longer history and as a result was more constrained by institutional inheritance and path dependency.\(^\text{224}\) Contrastingly, the

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\(^{223}\) There are now six public universities, four private universities, and two public technical colleges.

\(^{224}\) Khaled Ehsan, Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist, UNDP, Iraq Country Office - Amman, Jordan 02/2011
Minister in interview held that stability was the major difference but that the KRG model remained applicable due to the shared history of centralised HE governance.\(^{225}\) The inclusion of international cooperation alongside decentralisation as part of this vision raises the subject of the next section on internationalisation.

### 6.4.3. Internationalisation

Internationalisation has been a central aim of successive Iraqi HE administrations and in particular after 2008 emerged as a growing opportunity for global HE providers. Cross-border HE, university partnerships, scholarship programmes and other means are held to redress damaging legacies of long isolation under sanctions (USAID 2004; O’Malley 2010). Furthermore, it is theorised that creating and maintaining international linkages is a critical means of circulating advanced skills and knowledge crucial to driving post-war recovery and economic growth.

An emergent theme from interviews was support for international cooperation between Iraqi and foreign universities. International university partnerships are theorised to contribute towards domestic HE capacity-building by providing opportunities for knowledge transfer,\(^{226}\) valuable complementarities including specialist training, and advice on developing mechanisms including peer-review and quality assurance systems. In the words of a former Minister of HE, ‘the shortest way to rehabilitate and develop Iraqi higher education is through integrating the sector in the international arena of higher education through partnerships’ (Al-Bakaa 2013).

The partnership model, it was seen earlier, was adopted in the USAID-HEAD programme, criticised for allocating significant funds on specialised partnerships while there were much more pressing needs. In addition, the programme was

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\(^{225}\) Dr Dlawer Ala’aldeen, former Minister of Higher Education in the KRG and Professor of Clinical Microbiology at Nottingham University - Nottingham, UK. 07/2013

\(^{226}\) Former Professor of Engineering, Al-Mustansiriya University – Amman, Jordan 02/2012
found to be inappropriately timed, faced large security obstacles, and largely benefitted US universities. However, it was cancelled after one year. Spurr (2007) writes that ‘these projects, if not stillborn, were left unfinished, the participants thwarted, the Iraqi recipients and partners left high and dry’. Furthermore, one participant held that ‘most partnerships were more like treaties on some aspects than genuine cooperation’.227

While security obstacles continued to pose a major obstacle to university partnerships, this form of cooperation accelerated around 2008 with security gains. Iraqi HE was increasingly viewed as an opportunity for investment rather than a tragic story and partnerships with Western universities increased greatly (Labi 2010b). For example, the British Universities Iraq Consortium (BUIC) facilitates Iraqi universities to link with UK HEIs to gain from training, capacity-building, technical assistance, collaborative research projects, and post-graduate education.

University partnership programmes typically eschew conventional terminology of aid relationships such as donor/recipient. For example, the US State Department’s US-Iraq University Linkages Program stresses ‘the importance of bilateral collaboration in the field of higher education’ (US Embassy 2010). Many participants underlined the importance of equal partnerships. This may be explained as due to increased sensitivity to sovereignty issues after what many termed the humiliation of occupation.

Interestingly, regional cooperation with universities in neighbouring states was not a popular option amongst participants. While some donors and NGOs argue for benefits of regional university partnerships in cost-cutting, cultural familiarity and relevance, several participants held that regional universities cannot offer much to

227 Dr Sadiq Nasrullah, Cultural Attaché, Embassy of the Republic of Iraq in Jordan - Amman, Jordan 02/2011
Iraqi universities. Rather, establishing partnerships with Western universities, primarily in the UK, USA, or Germany was favoured to revitalise academic standards and quality.

While partnerships did emerge as a theme, participants did not support this opportunity as strongly as will be seen in the Libya case in chapter eight. This may be explained as due to the above-noted security obstacles in addition to the myriad internal challenges facing the HE sector such as rebuilding critical infrastructure, the need for reconciliation, and the breakdown in governance that to some extent led to prioritisation of addressing domestic HEIs before seeking to link with external universities.

Another major aspect of internationalisation is overseas scholarships. Since 2003 a range of schemes offered scholarships to Iraqi students for study abroad, for example, in 2003 the Fulbright Scholarship Program for Iraq was re-instated fourteen years after it was halted with twenty students and visiting scholars awarded in the first year (CPA 2003). As can be seen below, Iraqi students studying abroad dropped by approximately 1,000 during 2003-2004 while increasing annually during 2004-2008. Lifting sanctions enabled students to travel abroad more freely and by 2005 the number abroad exceeded pre-war levels. Many participants held that this re-opening to the world was an indicator of post-war progress in HE.

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228 Dr Sadiq Nasrullah, Cultural Attaché, Embassy of the Republic of Iraq in Jordan - Amman, Jordan 02/2011; also, Dr Akeel T. Al-Kazwini. Dean of School of Applied Medical Sciences, German Jordanian University – Amman, Jordan 02/2012

229 Dr Sadiq Nasrullah, Cultural Attaché, Embassy of the Republic of Iraq in Jordan - Amman, Jordan 02/2011
While it has just been noted that there was enthusiasm, although not unanimous, for partnerships, it should be stated that scholarship programmes received stronger support. Iraq has a long tradition of scholarships and many participants framed their support for post-war scholarship programmes as a revival of this tradition which was halted by wars and sanctions. Support for partnerships was softened by conditions in Iraq; by contrast Iraq’s chaotic environment strengthened support for scholarships as a way to gain graduates with advanced skills and knowledge away from the devastated domestic HE system.

Despite the widespread enthusiasm for scholarships as an opportunity there was considerable criticism of planning and implementation of scholarship programmes. Firstly, several participants noted that immediately after invasion scholarships awarded by foreign donors were predominantly in the disciplines of Information Technology, administration, and economics. Prioritisation of these subjects over science, engineering, and technology has been explained by the type of externally-led reconstruction intervention envisioning free enterprise and commercial activity.

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Table 8. Iraqi students studying abroad

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Students from a given country studying abroad (outbound mobile students)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
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<td>2006</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>9000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>10000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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230 Dr Akeel T. Al-Kazwini. Dean of School of Applied Medical Sciences, German Jordanian University – Amman, Jordan 02/2012; Dr Kahtan Al-Khazraji, President, University of Technology - Amman, Jordan 01/2011
231 Former Dean, Faculty of Languages, University of Baghdad – Amman, Jordan 12/2010
as recovery-drivers. However, after 2004 under Iraqi leadership government scholarship programmes favoured engineering, science, and technology.\textsuperscript{232} Similarly, Fattah (2004) notes that during 2003-2004 scholarship awards became ‘thoroughly politicized’. She states, ‘blame must lie in the confusion inherent in the HE sector itself; in the misplacement of priorities and the mis-identification of suitable sectors of the university that could benefit from such programs’. This finding highlights the broader problem of external rather than Iraqi priorities driving post-war recovery efforts under occupation.

The former Minister of HE held that increasing postgraduate scholarship funding to $100 million annually was one of the first steps taken in 2004 after the formal transfer of sovereignty.\textsuperscript{233} A shift in HE revitalisation strategy came with launch of the Iraq Education Initiative (IEI) and a $54 million allocation to send 300 students abroad to complete Masters and Doctorates. On the 25\textsuperscript{th} July 2009 it was announced that $1 billion would be allocated to fund 50,000 students over a five-year period to study abroad at predominantly US and UK universities. Students are legally required to return to Iraq upon degree completion. It is theorised that returnees will rebuild Iraq’s ‘knowledge infrastructure’ and contribute to long-term recovery.

However, investing $1 billion in scholarships may be a socially sub-optimal strategy when vast HE system needs are considered. Iraq’s universities remain in need of capital investment to rebuild vital infrastructure and capacities. HE budgets are predominantly current rather than capital expenditure. It would be more sustainable and maximize long-term developmental impact if a greater proportion of funds went to rebuilding domestic HE through rebuilding physical infrastructure including laboratories and dormitories. It may be concluded that GOI allocation of HE funds prioritises overseas scholarships ahead of physical rebuilding. While many press reports focus on IEI’s phase one a little-noted phase two has reported aims of transforming and modernising the whole Iraqi education system.

\textsuperscript{232} Former Lecturer at Anbar University and advisor to MoHE-I – Amman, Jordan 02/2011
\textsuperscript{233} Email interview, Dr Tahir Al-Bakaa, former Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research
The scheme is implemented by the Higher Committee for Education Development in Iraq, a sub-grouping within the Prime Minister’s Office.\textsuperscript{234} It may be argued that the choice not to run the project directly through the MoHE-I represents a missed opportunity for capacity-building. A whole-of-government approach involving all relevant ministries in reconstruction projects offers a good strategy for strengthening national institutions and coordination. Moreover, several participants held that transfer of scholarship administration is best explained as a strategy of utilising scholarship awards to bolster the PM’s legitimacy and patronage;\textsuperscript{235} as one participant stated, ‘Maliki uses his office and resources just for giving reputation’.\textsuperscript{236} This is further supported by the transfer of appointing cultural attaches from the MoHE-I to the PM.\textsuperscript{237}

Zuhair Humadi stated that the IEI ‘could surmount sectarian tensions. Candidates for study abroad would be picked from each province according to their grade levels, not by sect’ (Rosenbery 2009). However, it has been argued that the selection process is not meritocratic and that political allegiance and sectarian identity are relevant factors (Adriaensens 2009). This is held to reinforce Sunni-Shiite conflict creating divisions and further polarisation within universities. It has been suggested that candidates are assessed largely on the basis of the selection committee consultation and that the need to achieve ‘ethno-sectarian balance’ takes priority over selection on merit.\textsuperscript{238} Other participants held that rather than aim at communal balance the Shiite-led government favoured Shiite students for scholarships.\textsuperscript{239} While this sensitive issue was difficult to explore and claims could not be verified, rather than contribute to conflict transformation a particularistic system of granting scholarships would intensify divisions within HE and Iraqi society.

\textsuperscript{234} Former Lecturer at Anbar University and adviser to MoHE-I – Amman, Jordan 02/2011
\textsuperscript{235} Dr Rawa Said, Ex-Manager, Iraqi Space Centre - Amman, Jordan 12/2010; also former Professor of Engineering, Al-Mustansiriya University – Amman, Jordan 02/2011
\textsuperscript{236} Employee at MoHE-KRG – Newcastle, UK 02/2012
\textsuperscript{237} Professor Mazin Kadhim, former senior adviser to MoHE-I - Amman, Jordan 12/2010
\textsuperscript{238} Former senior Professor, Al-Nahrain University - Amman, Jordan 12/2010
\textsuperscript{239} Former vice-President for Academic Affairs, al-Nahrain University – Amman, Jordan 02/2011
Furthermore, several participants strongly held that scholarship programmes risked perpetuating highly-skilled migration. One participant stated that the security of 100 million ID\textsuperscript{240}, designed to ensure scholarship contract compliance, provides high likelihood of return.\textsuperscript{241} However, it has been doubted that compliance can be enforced because pursuing students who choose to remain abroad requires lengthy and expensive international litigation.\textsuperscript{242} Additionally, students can buy-out their securities. Dr Qais Al-Awqati, an Iraqi professor at Columbia University in New York, noted the risk that the experience of his generation is repeated with many students emigrating overseas (Redden 2009). Several participants held that Iraq’s post-war environment severely limited the possibility of return; one claiming that ‘they won’t return to barbaric behaviour’\textsuperscript{243} while another stated that ‘it is impossible to go back to Iraq with no electricity or security’.\textsuperscript{244} These doubts raise the possibility that IEI will have unintended consequences of deepening ‘brain drain’ thus further depleting Iraq’s human capital. This last point leads to the final opportunity to be considered; ‘brain gain’.

**6.4.4. Brain Drain and Gain**

Displacement of highly-skilled workers and academics since 2003 is considered by many participants to be a major explanation for the perceived failure of post-conflict HE. Initial civil society and donor assistance to HE reportedly led to many Iraqi expatriates and exiles planning their return to Iraqi universities (CSIS 2004, p.71). However, rather than a ‘brain gain’ Iraq experienced a ‘brain drain’ from universities and highly-skilled sectors. Thousands fled to neighbouring countries and beyond, in particular since 2006. One report states that 1315 MA and PhD holders left during March 2003-March 2004; 8% of the total 15,500 academics (Janabi 2004). Some universities were worse affected than others; the former President of

\textsuperscript{240} Approximately £55,262 or $86,169. Calculated on [http://www.xe.com/](http://www.xe.com/) January 12\textsuperscript{th} 2011

\textsuperscript{241} Lecturer, University of Basra - Amman, Jordan 12/2010

\textsuperscript{242} Former Dean, University of Baghdad - Amman, Jordan 12/2010

\textsuperscript{243} Professor Mazin Kadhim, former senior adviser to MoHE-I - Amman, Jordan 12/2010

\textsuperscript{244} Former Professor of Engineering at Al-Mustansiriya University – Amman, Jordan 02/2011
the University of Basra estimated that 30-40% of academics left that institution.\textsuperscript{245} This is part of a wider process of highly-skilled migration as over 40% of professionals emigrated during 2003-2007, across all sectors including academia (Behner 2007).

The majority of participants in this study were displaced Iraqi scholars and therefore represent a strong sample for investigating this issue. Testimony from interviewees includes death threats, attempted assassinations, and sectarian discrimination as reasons for leaving Iraq. Major ‘push’ factors therefore include violence against academics, an insecure environment, and sectarianism. Others held that deterioration of Iraqi HE created poor working conditions while Jordan and Syria provided greater economic opportunities; the major reported ‘pull’ factor. However, while neighbouring countries offered better economic opportunities during 2005-2008, the period of highest displacement from Iraq, the increase in salaries in Iraqi universities combined with worsening opportunities in Jordan and Syria led to these countries offering deteriorating economic conditions. Crucially however, the majority of participants held that despite less attractive economic conditions they planned not to return; a finding that supports the greater weight of security-related ‘push’ factors than economic ‘pull factors’.

Despite these obstacles to encouraging return, Iraq’s displaced talent is considered one of its most important resources for future post-war recovery. As Saadaouï claimed ‘the best people are now expatriates, the level of those within Iraqi universities now is not representative’.\textsuperscript{246} In the words of another participant ‘the Iraqis abroad can lead development’.\textsuperscript{247} Universities struggled to replace displaced staff. The importance of displaced academics is indicated by plans announced by the MoHE-I in 2009, after improvements in security, to attract Iraqi scientists and academics to return (Kami 2009).

\textsuperscript{245} Former President of the University of Basra – Amman, Jordan 12/2010
\textsuperscript{246} Semia Saadaoui, Higher Education Project Manager, UNESCO Office for Iraq - Amman, Jordan 01/2011
\textsuperscript{247} Professor Mazin Kadhim, former senior adviser to MoHE-I - Amman, Jordan 12/2010
While some academics returned during 2009-2012, approximately 70 during 2010,\textsuperscript{248} this represents a small proportion of total displaced academics. This is explained in part by the above-noted ‘push factors’ of insecurity and sectarianism that remain unresolved. Furthermore, several participants criticised the attempts to attract returnees as insufficient. For example, it was argued that during the 1970s and 1980s the government offered strong incentives to attract returnees from Iraq’s first wave of ‘brain drain’ including tax-free cars, land to build houses, and fully-paid conferences held in Iraq.\textsuperscript{249} However, this also suggests that with stronger incentives economic return factors could stimulate return, in particular as the post-Arab Spring context leads to worsening material conditions in Syria, Egypt, Jordan and other neighbouring states.

The recognition of the potential for displaced Iraqi scholars to contribute to HE and recovery in Iraq is present in the Scholar Rescue Fund (SRF) for Iraq statement that it:

\begin{quote}
Hopes to contribute to the preservation of Iraq’s vital intellectual capital and ensure that, when conditions permit, these scholars will be able to return home to rebuild their once flourishing academic communities.
\end{quote}

The rationale of the SRF programme is that unemployed and under-employed displaced Iraqi academics suffer deskilling and therefore decrease in value as a potential resource for rebuilding Iraqi academia. The SRF therefore places grantees at host institutions, mostly in neighbouring Arab states but also the UK and other countries, where they receive an annual stipend of $26,000 and are required to produce an original research paper on any topic. An SRF paper recognises that this support while preserving a vital component of Iraq’s intellectual resources also risks de-incentivising return (Miller, Riendeau & Rosen 2013).

\textsuperscript{248} Dr Sadiq Nasrullah, Cultural Attaché, Embassy of the Republic of Iraq in Jordan - Amman, Jordan 02/2011

\textsuperscript{249} Former Professor of Economics, University of Baghdad – Amman, Jordan 02/2011
Personal involvement in a joint PRDU/SRF initiative to support displaced SRF scholars in connecting their research to reconstruction of Iraqi HE constitutes participant observation for this study. The project rationale was that gearing recipients’ research towards Iraqi HE would enable better contribution to recovery upon their return. Furthermore, the SRF supported various initiatives to link displaced Iraqi scholars with universities in Iraq. For instance, displaced scholars circulated research papers, remotely supervised theses, and recorded video lectures sent on DVD which benefitted 2,500 students (Miller, Riendeau & Rosen 2013). This type of innovative programme fosters positive inside/outside linkages, draws on the knowledge of the Iraqi context held by its displaced scholars, and strengthens the long-term prospects of return.

6.5. Conclusion

This chapter analysed post-war HE reconstruction in terms of major obstacles to rebuilding HE, Iraqi HE’s contribution to post-conflict recovery, and opportunities for future development. Throughout, wide-ranging primary and secondary sources have been drawn upon, with an emphasis on reflecting perspectives of key Iraqi actors. A central conclusion is that reconstruction of Iraqi HE should be judged to be poor. On balance, HE in post-war Iraq made a low contribution to post-conflict recovery, and in some ways had a negative impact on recovery. While the contribution to short-term stabilisation and physical reconstruction was mixed, Iraqi HE made low contribution to statebuilding and economic recovery while negatively contributing to conflict transformation.

Common explanations for the poor record of post-war Iraqi HE are high levels of insecurity and violence against academics. Furthermore, it has been seen that universities came to reflect the wider protracted conflict in the ‘post’-conflict period and promoted division rather than national unity. However, in addition to
insecurity, instability, and conflict this chapter has found other significant features shaping the post-war environment of Iraqi HE including low quality, weak governance, a lack of strategy and vision, missed opportunity to integrate Iraqi universities with reconstruction goals, and the struggle to adapt to the new economic context. Finally, a range of options for overcoming these challenges were analysed. It was found that return of displaced Iraqi academics and internationalisation received widespread support as options while decentralisation received strong but qualified support while private HE was widely viewed by participants as a negative trend. As will be seen in the next two chapters, while Iraq in some ways represents a unique case, many of the mechanisms, dynamics, and processes analysed in this chapter are also present in the case of HE and post-war recovery in Libya.
CHAPTER SEVEN
LIBYAN HIGHER EDUCATION: DEVELOPMENTAL ROLE AND IMPACT OF CONFLICT

7.0. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to analyse two major contextual issues shaping the post-war environment of HE in Libya. The first is HE’s role in development in pre-war Libya and the second is the impact of the 2011 civil war on HE. The chapter will begin by analysing HE’s developmental contribution from its emergence through to its immediate pre-war status. Next, a brief discussion of key dynamics and issues relating to the 2011 civil war and Libya’s post-conflict transition will provide crucial contextualisation for the following section and chapter eight. Finally, the chapter will analyse war’s impact on HE capacity, needs, and distortions thus directly responding to RQ2. First however, HE’s role in Libya’s development will be explored.

7.1. Libyan Higher Education and Development

In this section the developmental contribution of Libyan HE will be analysed. This is important to understanding the post-war context in which HE operated. Throughout, a number of themes, dynamics, and factors held to constrain or enable post-war recovery outcomes in chapter eight will be described. The main question addressed is; to what extent did HE contribute to Libyan development? To begin, HE’s contribution to state emergence, economic transformation, and social change will be reviewed. After that, factors limiting pre-war HE’s developmental role will be analysed including weak research capacity, politicisation, and governance
obstacles. The material is based on interviews with Libyan academics and postgraduate students and a review of academic and policy literature.

7.1.1. Emergence

To begin, HE had no major role in pre-colonial Libyan society. It was not until late Ottoman rule (1835-1911) that ‘modern education in Libya may be said to have begun’ (Deeb & Deeb 1982, p.20). Local educational initiative was prevented under Italian colonial rule (Carey & Carey 1961). Initially, colonial administration aimed to ‘Italianise’ locals and primary schooling was a principal means of achieving this end, with advanced education ruled-out for fear of equipping locals with ‘intellectual arms’ (Pretelli 2011). A legacy of colonial rule, at independence Libya had ‘no preparation for statehood and pathetically few trained people to guide its new economic and governmental life’ (Carey & Carey 1961). Furthermore, through war and resistance Libya ‘lost-through combat, famine, and emigration-perhaps as much as half their population, including much of the educated elite’ (Anderson 1984). In 1949, two years prior to independence, Libya had 90% illiteracy with a mere 20 university graduates (FS 1959).

Establishing a national university was driven firstly by severe shortages of highly-trained workers that entailed dependence of state institutions on foreign personnel and secondly, an acute need for teachers in rapidly expanding schools (FS 1959; Shammas 1962; Mogassbi 1984, p.92). Plans for establishing a university began in the early 1950s with technical and financial assistance from Egypt based on the Egyptian model (Zarrugh 1973, p.304; Qubain 1966, p.417). The University of Libya, established in 1955 in Benghazi, began classes in 1956 with a College of Arts and Education (Landau 1997). A College of Sciences opened in Tripoli in 1957 (FS 1959); its location designed to place science students in Libya’s industrial centre (Qubain 1966, p.416).
Many Libyan academics hold that 1955 until the mid-1970s was Libya’s strongest HE period due to the number of Libyans educated abroad, basis in the British system, and strong rules and regulations.\textsuperscript{250} However, Qubain (1966, p.421) states that after ten years the University of Libya ‘is still in a chaotic state’ and ‘almost every facet of the university requires drastic improvement and strengthening’ including high reliance on expatriate faculty and high staff turnover. Furthermore, the University of Libya was not afforded great autonomy under the Monarchy (Zarrugh 1973, p.308). Yet while political parties were banned, students were politically active (Matar 2006). In summary, while facing problems common to emerging HE systems across the developing world, HE played an important role equipping the state and economy with skilled graduates after colonial rule and WWII devastated Libya’s human capital base.

7.1.2. Expansion

Libyan HE underwent rapid expansion, in particular during the late 1960s and 1970s. After Qaddafi’s 1969 coup enrolment increased from 3,000 to 8,200 in 1972 (First 1975, p.185). During 1970-80 the system expanded from one to eleven universities and from four to fifteen technical colleges (Elzalitni 2008, p.45). Mogassbi classifies 1953-73 as the early period of HE development and 1973-1983 as the era of reorganisation with diversification of institutional types and large enrolment growth (Mogassbi 1984, p.92) as detailed in the 1973 development plan (Elbadri 1984, p.127).

Several reasons explain HE expansion. Expansion in the 1970s was partly driven by skilled manpower needs across all economic sectors (Qubain 1966, p.430). In the words of First, ‘manpower remains the straw that could break the back of the government’s development plans’ (cited in Sankari 1981). Oil’s discovery enabled ambitious development plans requiring many skilled workers; during 1964-69 there was a projected need for 21,998 graduates (Otman & Karlberg 2007, p.98). Later, an

\textsuperscript{250} Interviews with Libyan academics and postgraduate students
estimated 300,000 technicians were required during 1976-1980 while less than 10% of that total was enrolled in relevant programmes (Zubi 1992). Pre-oil HE was geared to administrative and clerical tasks neglecting technical education (Deeb & Deeb 1982, p.31). New economic needs required focus on scientific and applied disciplines (Sankari 1981). Relatedly, HE expansion sought to reduce dependence on expatriate foreign labour (Vandewalle 2006, p.112); a major structural labour market flaw (Zubi 1992).

Furthermore, Libya, like many oil-rich states, responded to social demand for HE through rapid expansion. Demand was driven by a baby-boom and population doubling in fifteen years. Additionally, degrees are a highly desirable social good and minimum requirement for many public sector jobs. The revolutionary regime accrued legitimacy through expanding HE opportunities to new social classes. From this section it is clear that HE played an important role in Libya’s transformation from a small and poor country to a major oil-exporting economy by providing skilled manpower, despite the sector’s limitations in making Libya self-sufficient in human capital requirements.

7.1.3. Developmental Achievements

In the above two sections the developmental contribution of HE to Libya’s emergence as a state and economic transformation were analysed. This section will now provide a more general analysis of the main positive roles of HE in supporting development in Libya. The expansion process described above continued from the 1970s until the 2000s leading to considerable enrolment growth. An oft-cited indicator of Libyan HE success, it possesses the highest tertiary enrolment ratio in Africa with approximately 54% of the relevant age cohort enrolled in 2002, while
Arab states averaged 22% in 2009.\textsuperscript{251} The table below shows high tertiary enrolment for 1999-2003.

**Table 9.**\textsuperscript{252} Tertiary education (ISCED 5 and 6) Enrolment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enrolment</td>
<td>308474</td>
<td>290060</td>
<td>324603</td>
<td>359146</td>
<td>375028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>48.62484</td>
<td>48.62477</td>
<td>50.16374</td>
<td>51.40639</td>
<td>51.38843</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Libya’s population is approximately 6.294 million (est. 2008)\textsuperscript{253} and tertiary students constitute approximately 10% of that number; a significant proportion making Libyan students an important group. Overall, during 1955-2010 eighteen public universities\textsuperscript{254} were established and are either general or specialist institutions (TEMPUS 2011). Additionally, in 2009 there were 16 public high technical colleges and 63 high vocational institutions. From these statistics it is clear that Libya possesses a quantitatively well-developed HE system.

Another facet of Libya’s educational achievements is universal and free public education at all levels. Generous student stipends, accommodation, food, books, and travel expenses have been available. Free HE led to high enrolment rates supporting a social compact between the post-colonial state and citizens enabling middle-class expansion through university education and state employment. Further, Libya historically allocated relatively high levels of public funds to HE. In 1999 68.6% of educational expenditure was allocated to publicly-owned tertiary


\textsuperscript{253} UN Data. Available online at: http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=Libyan%20Arab%20Jamahiriya

\textsuperscript{254} Several figures for the exact number of universities can be found
education; high by international standards.\textsuperscript{255} HE was partially liberalised in the 1990s with more than five private HEIs opened during 1997-2000.

HE had far-reaching impacts on Libyan society, driving significant social change. For example, HE affected tribalism, an important social force in Libya (Tarhoni 2011). Urbanisation and educational expansion weakened tribalism over time through a large and expanding urban middle class (Ahmida 2012). Vandewalle (2006, p.69) writes that ‘as young university graduates entered the different levels of the country’s burgeoning bureaucracies, they brought with them an individual professionalism that often transcended tribal interests or affiliation’.

Research played an important nationbuilding role. Anderson (1986, p.288) writes that ‘the dearth of educated Libyans at independence meant that few of the first generation of educated Libyans could be spared for scholarly endeavors; it was only in the 1970s that significant numbers of Libyans turned their attention to the history and sociology of their country’. This new generation produced valuable research challenging Western perceptions of Libya (Anderson 1984). Qaddafi encouraged research providing new historical interpretations and evidence for long-standing Libyan traditions of resistance to imperialism. Anderson (1986, p.292) notes that while problematic, serious Libyan scholarship increased.

Furthermore, Libyan HE is relatively inclusive regionally, with good provision for the Amazigh minority, women, and rural populations. It has been argued that the Qaddafi regime’s commitment to female education was significant in transforming gender roles (Arabsheibani & Manfor 2002). Gender equity is high in absolute terms with over 50% female tertiary enrolment in 2001; a large increase since 15.8% enrolment in 1976-1977 (Shaw 1981). Moreover, female students constitute approximately 80% of social science and humanities students (Ahmida 2012). Al-Nouri (1995) holds that Libyan universities significantly impacted social attitudes and behaviour and thereby ‘accelerated women’s socio-cultural liberation’.

Libya’s large student population is served by many universities possessing branch campuses in nearby towns and cities. Consequently, most students attend university in their town, city, or region of origin. This is held to have supported Qaddafi’s localist decentralised societal model. Another reason for campus proliferation is the Qaddafi regime’s commitment to female education. Inclusion of women, like other regional countries, faces cultural barriers as families do not want daughters living alone in new cities. Tarhoni (2011 p.46) writes that ‘sharp increase and spread of universities in rural areas in Libya has definitely been in women’s favour, allowing them to achieve their educational ambitions within local environments not far from their family’.

However, proliferation dispersed HE capacity thinly, negatively impacting quality as many branch campuses are small, poorly staffed, and under-equipped; ‘resembling secondary schools rather than universities’. Furthermore, proliferation is also explained as regime patronage to enhance state legitimacy. Qaddafi reportedly often visited villages where he responded to local requests for HE. Many participants also offered a biopolitical explanation; that proliferation was intended to prevent diverse students from mixing on campuses and developing unified identities and social networks capable of supporting collective action and coherent political opposition. Rather, local HE reproduces particularistic and localised identities unthreatening to the regime. Despite apparent tension between political and educational policies, both interpretations of campus proliferation are valid; it served developmental and political functions.

Government-funded overseas scholarships made major developmental contributions; during the 1960s and 1970s scholarship recipients constituted vital high-level human resources that drove development and HE expansion upon return. Isolation saw scholarships reduced and destinations shifted to the Soviet bloc. The programme was re-invigorated with Libya’s détente in the early 2000s and some estimates placed overseas students at 14,000 in 2012. This is held to signal Libya’s commitment to building a skills base necessary for a knowledge economy.
(Spencer 2010). However, scholarship programmes faced several obstacles. Firstly, selection was partly based on particularistic criteria such as tribe or regime loyalty. Second, some recipients remained abroad thus constituting ‘brain drain’. Finally, early 2000s scholarship expansion was held to be linked to enhancing Saif al-Islam’s legitimacy as a future leader through his personal scholarship fund. In sum, scholarship schemes made positive developmental contributions although faced obstacles related to the dual purposes of furthering regime security and political goals.

From this section it can be seen that Libyan HE played an important role in increasing social mobility, promoting gender equality, forming national identity, and driving social change. However, the last two examples of scholarships and campus proliferation suggest that developmental contribution was limited by various obstacles. The next section will explore these obstacles in greater depth, in particular the system’s research capacity and linkage with economic and industrial sectors.

7.1.4. Developmental Obstacles

In this section factors hindering Libyan HE’s developmental contribution will be analysed. It is argued that economic and political factors including low relevance to industry and increasing politicisation under the radical Jamahiriya experiment were major obstacles. This consideration of internal factors will be followed in section 7.1.5. by analysis of isolation under sanctions, an external factor with detrimental consequences, and Libya’s détente with the international community during which HE played a role in ambitious pre-war development plans. First however, economic factors will be considered.
7.1.4.1. Economic Factors

A main structural weakness limiting HE’s contribution to Libyan development is low relevance to economic and industrial needs (TEMPUS 2011). TVET is held to be overly-theoretical with low practical and problem-solving focus (TGN/Mercy Corps 2011; Triki et al. 2010). This mirrors the Arab state HE pattern of disconnection from market requirements (Bashshur 2010). Low relevance is related to focusing on quantity rather than quality (Playfoot 2011). Zubi (1992) argues rapid expansion without attention to quality explains poor HE-labour market calibration in particular in high-level manpower in specialised fields necessary for industrial development. Social science and humanities students are over-supplied with shortages of engineering and technology graduates thus exacerbating graduate unemployment and creating reliance on foreign labour in technical jobs in oil, high-technology, and construction sectors (Rafik et al. 2008).

Libyan HE has very low collaboration with industry (TEMPUS 2011). It was seen earlier that Iraqi HE collaborated successfully with industry to mutual advantage. However, Libya’s domestic industry and productive sectors were much weaker than Iraq’s with fewer opportunities for cooperation and integration. Furthermore, firms and agencies in Libya have low trust in domestic HE with foreign expertise imported. While some exceptions include engineering and medicine faculties at two leading universities, university-industry cooperation is in general low.

Low integration of HE and economic needs is also related to weak research capacity. Poor laboratory and library facilities, low incentives for research, and low linkages with other institutions were all cited as obstacles to research. Many

256 See section 5.1.2.
257 Dr Usama Al-Hadi, Head, Department of Architecture and Urban Planning, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012
258 Dr Hadi Omran Tumi, Head, Civil Engineering Department, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012
259 Dr Abdulatif, Director, International Cooperation Office, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012
260 Dr Abdulbasit Abuazza, Professor and, Department of Physics and Head of Examination and Study, Faculty of Science, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012
interviewees noted that research is highly theoretical and irrelevant to local social, technical and economic problems. Further, it was argued that research has little or no impact and is simply filed away and forgotten. An indicator of this is the decline in the number of biomedical publications due in part to ‘absence of a research culture’ and migration of expatriate faculty (Benamer et al 2009).

Social expectation that degrees are necessary for high social esteem led to many unqualified or under-qualified applicants entering universities, negatively impacting academic standards (Zarrugh 1973, p.324). Another factor, teacher-led pedagogical approaches have been held to limit independent and critical thinking skills. In the early 1970s the University of Libya’s teaching was criticised because ‘it fails to develop in the students the power of independent thought and balanced judgement’ (Zarrugh 1973, p.323). An interviewee stated, teachers were ‘like postmen delivering information to students’.261

Highly-skilled migration also limits HE’s developmental contribution with many thousands of Libyan professionals living abroad in particular in the USA, UK, and the Gulf. A major factor leading to migration is better economic and career opportunities abroad; what one Libyan described as a country that is anti-meritocratic and does not reward talent.262 Other factors include seizure of individual assets and bank accounts in 1981 and the ‘defeat of the technocrats within the ruling elite’ (Anderson 1986, p.265). HE was affected as many faculty members migrated while many scholarship recipients remained overseas. Another factor is political repression, in particular since the mid-1970s and the Jamahiriya’s establishment. This influence of political repression illustrates the wider significance of political factors affecting the developmental contribution of the HE sector, which is the subject of the next section.

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261 Dr Abdulatif, Director, International Cooperation Office, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012
262 Libyan postgraduate student in the UK and former lecturer in Libyan universities.
7.1.4.2. Political Factors

Between Qaddafi’s 1969 coup and the mid-1970s the regime was in a period of consolidation and in search of direction. Qaddafi was a young leader, close to students and to a degree dependent upon them. Obeidi (2001, p.64) in her study of Libyan university students writes that ‘they are an important stratum within society, leading the regime to pay attention to them’. 1975 saw publication of the Green Book’s first volume and intensification of Qaddafi’s ideological project. Before 1976 university students ‘remained sceptical of and relatively untouched by’ Qaddafi’s ideas (Blundy & Lycett 1987, p.139). Students at Tripoli and Benghazi universities were therefore considered the regime’s largest threat.263

During mid-1970s political contestations student protest intensified. Zarrugh (1973, p.326) writes that ‘a spirit of general riot and rebellion has spread among large sections of the university students’. The regime moved to control students and universities in a deepening of revolutionary emphasis. In 1975 escalating unrest triggered large-scale student arrests (Vandewalle 2006, p.100). Peaceful student demonstrations in early 1976 led to mass demonstrations on April 7th followed by violent clampdowns. One year later on the 7th April 1977 gallows were installed at Al-Fateh University and Benghazi’s main square where students charged with participating in 1976 protests were hanged (Joffe 1988). During 1977-1984 many leading student opposition members were arrested and executed.

Repression increased as the regime sought to eliminate ‘reactionary’ students (Blundy & Lycett 1987, p.139). Control was maintained in several ways. First, Revolutionary Committees were established at faculty-level to police campuses, gather intelligence, and organise Green Book events (St John 2011, p.63). Second, leadership and administrative appointments were increasingly dependent on regime loyalty. Third, curricula adapted to ‘reflect the political reality of the Jamahiriyya’ based on the Green Book. Finally, in 1979 military training was made

[263] Interviews with Libyan academics and students
compulsory for students at all educational levels which militarised HE (Monastiri 1995, pp.71-73; St John 2011, p.63). These events significantly affected HE. Student political activity was almost eliminated and university autonomy greatly reduced. Increased politicisation marked the beginning of what the overwhelming majority of interviewees held to be erosion of academic standards.

Further factors impeding HE and development are governance-related. To begin, long-term strategic planning and financial management were very weak. Libyan state institutions were weak across most sectors including HE (Vandewalle 2011). Rule was highly personalised with changes in direction accompanying each Minister. Furthermore, many significant changes were introduced ‘at the whim of Qaddafi’. Several analysts emphasise Qaddafi’s personalised rule (Hinnebusch 1984; Harris 1986, p.43; Entelis 2008, p.174). Several interviewees held that Qaddafi made arbitrary changes to university regulation ‘from a tent in the desert’. For example, in one academic year 5,000 students were admitted to study medicine while capacity was much lower leading to severe problems. Medicine is a highly-desired degree and the move may be explained as patronage without regard for academic standards.

Continuous shifts in HE governance are held to have been an obstacle to development.\textsuperscript{264} The number of universities changed frequently due to mergers and separations. Additionally, universities were affected by changing sub-national governance as shifts in administrative units subjected universities to different regional authorities. One explanation for unstable university governance is weak strategic planning and Ministerial changes. However, many participants held that regular changes were intended to keep faculty focused on immediate demands of learning and re-learning administrative and bureaucratic rules rather than organising collectively and constituting a regime threat. One respondent explained

\textsuperscript{264} Numerous interviewees identified continuous governance changes as a major weakness
that ‘if you have rats in a bag, if you keep it stable they will make a hole and get out but if you shake it they won’t get time to think and make a hole’.265

To conclude, analysis should recognise Libyan HE’s developmental contributions while identifying limitations stemming not only from political rationales but also structural weaknesses in industrial coordination. These internal dynamics were a major reason for Libyan HE’s erosion from the 1980s until the early 2000s. However, as will be seen in the next section, external factors were a major stress on the HE system under sanctions and also an enabler of reform in the mid-2000s.

7.1.5. Isolation and Re-connection

By the 1980s Libya transitioned from elite to mass HE. However, the 1980s brought new challenges to HE. International sanctions negatively impacted Libyan HE which became more isolated from the international academic community. Recruitment of overseas staff became difficult while travel to conferences and academic activities abroad were restricted (Ahmad & Gao 2004), and total Libyan students abroad declined rapidly after 1982. Furthermore, Arabisation of HE and ban on English in 1986 occurred in the context of isolation and regime radicalisation. The symbolic move away from association with imperial powers placed political over educational needs. Prior to this English teaching was relatively strong and many staff received post-graduate degrees from English-speaking countries. Arabisation and sanctions severely depleted Libya’s language skills; many participants view this legacy as a major obstacle to Libyan HE and research. Simultaneously to sanctions, Libya experienced severe economic crisis caused in part by Libya’s falling oil market-share. While HE continued expanding, operating budgets were insufficient, particularly during 1986-96.

Following Libya’s early 2000s emergence from sanctions and isolation HE was a major sector of international cooperation and domestic economic reforms. The

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265 Anonymous PhD Candidate, University of Leeds and former lecturer, Tripoli University Leeds, UK 04/2012
Libyan government in 2006 stated a goal of creating a knowledge economy with massive investment pledged in communications, scientific, and educational systems. In 2005 the ban on teaching English language was officially ended after 19 years. A plan to invest $6 billion in HE and build 25 new campuses was launched. Several scholarship schemes were established sending thousands of students abroad, mostly for postgraduate degrees. It was stated that Libya would be transformed into an ‘Educational Hub of Excellence’ and a ‘multiversity environment’ incorporating foreign universities in a model similar to Dubai or Qatar. Moreover, universities would be functionally integrated into a network of Science Parks in Economic Free Zones (UK International Unit 2010).

From interviews, a range of views emerged on these reforms. Some viewed reforms as economically necessary yet halted by the 2011 uprising while others held that ‘knowledge economy’ discourse was employed as a smokescreen to create domestic and international regime legitimacy. Furthermore, a more nuanced position explained that reforms were championed by well-meaning reformist elements yet faced many obstacles, in particular resistance by conservative old generation power-holders within the regime. Furthermore, these reformists led by Saif Al-Islam formed a group including ‘intellectuals and academics’ from Garyounis University in Benghazi and the Economic Development Board that discussed political reforms and ‘began to create the impression that an autonomous space for political action could be created and permanent change in the repressive political system was on the way’ (Joffe 2013, p.34).

7.1.6. Conclusion

In this section Libyan HE’s developmental contribution has been analysed. In sum, HE made significant contributions to social change and development in widened access, social mobility, and gender equity. However, pre-war HE suffered various weaknesses including weak HE-industry linkages, governance challenges, and politicisation. Furthermore, Qaddafi’s foreign policy led to international isolation.
with severe long-term impacts. Yet HE was a key sector in ambitious development programmes from the mid-2000s and largescale investment was planned. These initiatives were however halted by civil war in early 2011, a major turning-point that will now be examined.

7.2. 17th February Revolution and Civil War

Historic overthrows of Presidents Ben Ali and Mubarak, in Tunisia and Egypt respectively, emboldened Libyan protests in February 2011. At first, protests followed other ‘Arab Spring’ countries with demands focused on better material conditions including housing, social services, and jobs (St John 2012, p.283). However, Libya contrasted with Tunisia and Egypt in the regime’s brutal response, with many protestors killed (Alaaldin 2012), after which demands shifted to regime change and on 17th February a ‘Day of Rage’ was called for.

An uprising began with rapid mobilisation driven by defected army officers leading largely untrained young men with rudimentary weapons. Benghazi fell to rebels quickly followed by other eastern cities including Baida and Tobruk. In April 2011 the Libyan army advanced to Benghazi’s outskirts after pushing most rebel forces into the city. International diplomatic and media attention focused on the imminent possibility of loyalist forces attacking Benghazi’s civilians in retribution for their uprising. Led by President Sarkozy, Prime Minister Cameron and Qatar a diplomatic frenzy constructed an international coalition willing to intervene militarily invoking the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine. Resolution 1973 proposing a ‘No-Fly-Zone’ was put to the UN Security Council. Anticipating

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266 The term uprising is preferred to revolution. As Pack (2013) states ‘both terms imply a complete rejection of the old order and a spontaneous rebellion against it, but “revolution” tends to imply the creation of a new power structure buttressed by an alternative ideological framework, while “uprising” is a more ambivalent term, suggesting an upheaval that does not necessarily have clear goals of a defined leadership’. However, many participants referred to ‘revolution’ and the two terms will be used throughout chapter seven and eight, in particular ‘revolution’ will be used when discussing the testimony and views of participants.
Russian and Chinese resistance assurances were made, both countries abstained and Resolution 1973 passed.

NATO mission Operation Unified Protector began targeting Libyan military and state installations. Poorly equipped and under-trained rebels received arms and training from outside powers, notably Qatar and France. The six-month civil war involved many battles over individual towns, in some cases the same settlement passing between rebel and army control multiple times. Considerable destruction and damage to physical infrastructure occurred in several locations including Misrata, Sirte, Bani Walid, and Zawiya. An estimated 30,000 people died while GDP fell approximately 60% in 2011 as oil production collapsed (ARB 2012). Tripoli fell to rebels in August with Qaddafi killed on October 20th 2011 marking a symbolic and psychological end to war. Intervention was interpreted by Russia, China, Brazil and others as over-reaching Resolution 1973 and constituting regime change.

7.3. Post-conflict Transition

The National Transitional Council (NTC), established as an opposition political movement in February 2011, formed the transitional government until August 2012. The NTC, while possessing high international legitimacy, had less legitimacy domestically and struggled to exert authority throughout continual political crises in a complex post-conflict environment. A transitional timetable promised July 2012 national assembly elections and constitution-making; two principal means of re-establishing legitimate political authority. International agencies and states adopted a ‘light footprint’ approach with the NTC possessing ‘ownership’ of post-war policy; a necessity given concerns with its ‘fragile legitimacy’ and need to not be perceived as another Iraq (Chivvis et al 2012). Ahmed Jehani, Minister of Infrastructure and Reconstruction set out a vision of a ‘Libyan-led’ recovery process, stating to outside actors ‘we will lead, and if you are willing, you will support us’ (cited in Omestad 2011).
Libya faced multiple post-conflict challenges. Security was the single highest priority. Local tribal and ethnic violence, particularly in Fezzan, led to hundreds of deaths, and deepened instability. Salafist groups carried out many attacks, including bulldozing Sufi Mosques and assassination attempts on UK and US diplomatic missions (ICG 2012b). Violent clashes occurred in various towns and cities in particular Tripoli. During war militias formed to combat the regime as a common enemy, mobilising around narrow geographic categories, for example, city, neighbourhood, or even street-by-street. Militias perceived themselves to possess ‘revolutionary legitimacy’ but not the new Libyan army. The Libyan army could not directly control militias and brigades. Consequently, many were incorporated into ad hoc security and armed force groups in a fluid and loose arrangement albeit that enhanced security (McQuinn 2012).

Economic stabilisation initially required unfreezing former regime assets seized by foreign financial institutions. Further, rebuilding damaged oil facilities was an immediate priority and judged an overall success with oil exports resuming after six months, well ahead of schedule. Additionally, rebuilding damaged infrastructure including transport, education, and health was considered a major reconstruction priority. Humanitarian needs constituted another immediate challenge. There were 100,000-150,000 IDPs during late September 2011 (IDMC 2011). While many returned home some groups remained displaced for example, Tawerghans and some black African migrants. Furthermore, treating the war-wounded was a serious public health challenge.

A major task was creating functioning state institutions, after they were essentially hollowed-out by Qaddafi’s idiosyncratic and highly-personalised rule (Vandewalle 2006). This challenge was complicated by centre-periphery relations with war re-awakening and intensifying East-West divisions (Paoletti 2011; Pack 2013). The 2011 uprising began in Benghazi spreading outwards. Many Easterners felt politically and economically marginalised and demanded material improvements. Many powerful NTC members hailed from the east prompting observers to claim that the region was politically dominant while the west militarily dominant. By contrast,
many easterners were aggrieved at perceived low allocation of parliamentary seats and calls grew for regional autonomy.  

Relatedly, civil society development was a commonly acknowledged goal. Under Qaddafi independent civic associations were non-existent. During and after war many independent organisations, media outlets, and community associations formed with great enthusiasm under a more pluralistic environment (IRIN 2011; Chatham House 2012). Further, there was relatively strong international willingness to support emerging civil society which was perceived as crucial to overcoming legacies of dictatorship (Foundation for the Future 2011). From this brief review it is clear that transitional authorities faced a wide range of post-war challenges. In the next section the impact of these challenges and dynamics on the Libyan HE sector will be the subject of examination.

7.4. Impact of the 2011 Civil War on Libyan higher education

In this section, impacts of war on Libyan HE will be assessed utilising the capacity, needs, and distortions framework outlined in chapter two to answer RQ2. The six-month 2011 Libyan civil war led to an estimated 30,000 killed and widespread infrastructural damage. Despite this, conflict in Libya had significantly weaker impact on HE in comparison to the 2003 Iraq war. Rather, war and uprising are more widely-perceived in Libya as an opportunity to develop a HE system long held back under Qaddafi’s rule.

7.4.1. Capacity

Libya’s HE system is quantitatively well developed with the highest tertiary enrolment ratio in Africa and several hundred thousand students serving a population of 6.3 million. Given the suppression of independent institutions under

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267 Observations and conversations with a range of persons in Benghazi and Baida indicate that there is considerable support for federalism and regionalism
Qaddafi, the HE sector constituted arguably the country’s most advanced institutional capacity after the war. In this section the extent to which civil war eroded or distorted this capacity will be analysed.

7.4.1.1. Physical Capacity

Substantial physical damage to HEIs directly resulting from fighting was limited to towns and cities at the frequently shifting combat frontline. For example, the campus in Brega was used by loyalist forces and rebels attempted to wrest control during fighting in April 2011. Misrata University and Sirte University experienced high and significant damage to infrastructure and facilities. Al-Batahady University in Sirte was on the frontline and used as a loyalist forces base. Both the old campus and new campus, which was mid-construction, were damaged during fighting (AFP 2011). On 7th October 2011 tank rounds destroyed a bookstore, computers, and student records plus ‘extensive damage’ to two lecture halls and a guesthouse (AOAV 2012). Similarly, in Misrata, the Medical Technology Faculty was severely damaged with over 90% of buildings damaged or destroyed during fighting after occupation by loyalist forces for two weeks. The frontline moved to nearby Science, Pharmacy, and Medicine faculties causing significant but less extensive damage estimated at around 70% of infrastructure. Other universities withstanding significant war-damage include campuses in Bani Walid and Zawiya.

Another war-related factor affecting physical capacity was temporary campus occupation by loyalist or rebel forces, for example, in Tripoli and Zawiya. Looting and vandalism occurred at HEIs occupied by armed forces, for example, the university in Bani Walid was reportedly severely looted (Zurutuza 2011). Moreover, at Misrata University many facilities were vandalised and expensive equipment

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268 Based on interviews at the Medical Technology Faculty and site observations conducted in Misrata in November 2012
269 Joint interview, Deans of Science and Medicine, Misrata University - Misrata, Libya 11/2012
left\textsuperscript{270}, an indicator that looting was retributive rather than economically motivated.\textsuperscript{271}

Furthermore, looting was reported at other HEIs not on frontlines or occupied, for example, at the Al-Shati Language and Training Centre in Tripoli (Detrie 2011). During the war faculty members met to coordinate response to looting with staff and students protecting some facilities.\textsuperscript{272} Moreover, in the post-war security vacuum, looting and vandalism persisted with many reported incidents. The MoHE-L provided both Misrata University and Omar Mukhtar University money to replace looted goods. Moreover, interviewees at both universities noted that facilities and equipment were thus improved on pre-war levels.

NATO’s ‘No Fly Zone’ included bombing of strategic infrastructural targets and led to minimal civilian casualties. Targets included defence, intelligence, and security apparatuses and no educational facilities were hit according to official statements. However, several claims have been made that the NATO bombing campaign affected HEIs. A report that NATO bombed the 7\textsuperscript{th} October University branch campus in Bani Walid is made by IPS based on interviews conducted there (Zurutuza 2011). It suggests that rumours of Musa Ibrahim, Qaddafi’s spokesperson, sleeping at the campus were the reason for the claimed strike.

Furthermore, it is claimed that a NATO bomb destroyed a Tripoli University campus B classroom; McKinney (2011) describes ‘widespread structural damage to many of the buildings, all of the windows blown out in every one of the eight auditoriums. Doors blown off their hinges. Library in a shambles. Books and debris everywhere. The campus mosque was damaged. Glass heaped up in piles’. McKinney (2011) and others (Press TV 2011) argue that this constitutes evidence of aggressive NATO action against civilian targets contradicting Western media representations of NATO’s campaign as restricted to military targets. Two

\textsuperscript{270} Manager, Reconstruction Office, Misrata University - Misrata, Libya 11/2012
\textsuperscript{271} At Omar Mukhtar University branch campus in Guba computers and cars were stolen. Some cars were returned after war. Dr Ibrahim El-Ghariani, President, Omar Al-Mukhtar University - Baida, Libya 11/2012
\textsuperscript{272} Dr Ahmed Al-Atrash, former Dean, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012
competing explanations have been offered. First, a NATO strike missed its nearby intended military target. This explanation is supported by the building’s proximity to several large military sites. Campus B suffered minor infrastructural damage due to impact of strikes against targets less than 1km away. However, a greater number of staff\textsuperscript{273} and students contended that loyalist forces staged the incident at night to de-legitimise NATO through media reports (e.g. Press TV 2011). Site observations support this explanation based on neat damage to the building’s outer-facing wall that suggests manual force was used.\textsuperscript{274}

In sum, despite the above examples of physical effects of war on HEIs, physical capacity of HE was not a major casualty of conflict. Most campus facilities were unaffected by fighting although several affected HEIs were severely damaged, with some estimates placing the percentage of campuses partially damaged or destroyed by fighting at 5% of national HE capacity. This is a marked contrast to the 84% damage to Iraqi HE described in the previous chapter.

7.4.1.2. Human Capacity

War and uprising impacted Libyan HE’s human capacity. Human resources capacity was under-pressure before 2011 with very high teacher-to-student ratios with classes of over 100 students in crowded faculties. Faculty members and administrative staff were held to lack many managerial, financial, and technical capabilities requiring sustained capacity-building and training.\textsuperscript{275} War placed additional strain on this situation and in 2012 the MoHE-L requested 1,147 Egyptian faculty members to meet staffing shortages for the 2012-2013 academic year (Libya Herald 2012b).

After war some Professors and faculty members active in supporting the previous regime were blacklisted and unable to return to universities. Additionally, others

\textsuperscript{273} For example, Dr Sobhi, Vice-Dean, Faculty of Languages, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012
\textsuperscript{274} See Appendix D Photo C
\textsuperscript{275} Majda Elferjani, PhD Candidate, School of the Built Environment, University of Salford - Salford, UK 05/2012
chose to flee the country or stay at home. In contrast to Iraq, where de-Baathification removed many academic staff, fewer faculty were removed.\textsuperscript{276} Rather, official policy was to remove only those known to have ordered violence or to have ‘stolen Libyan money’. Thus post-Qaddafi lustration had only a minor impact upon HE teaching capacity.

Temporary displacement of some Libyan faculty members occurred in particular in frontline areas. Furthermore, after war many Libyans living abroad including exiles returned in a process of ‘brain gain’. During the war most foreign academic staff left Libya and many did not return creating a relatively minor personnel shortage in some universities. Moreover, many Libyan faculty members and in particular students viewed this positively specifying that Libyan or Arabic-speaking staff could replace poor quality South Asian teachers with poor English skills.

During war many students plus some faculty members mobilised in militias and brigades. A much greater number of students than faculty members were killed. There are no precise statistics on students killed nationwide. However, combat participation of students was extremely high compared to other conflict-affected countries. In Misrata, students comprise 41\% of Revolutionary Brigades; the greatest single background of members followed by private sector workers at 38\% and public sector employees at 11\% (McQuinn 2012). In towns and cities with similar recruitment patterns death-tolls amongst students should be expected to be high. Death-tolls for staff and students include 95 at Misrata University,\textsuperscript{277} over 100 at Benghazi University (Golovnina 2011), and 35 at Zawiya University.\textsuperscript{278}

In many university faculties visited it was observed that commemorative displays for students killed in the war were given prominent position at faculty or university entrances. One display outside Zawiya University consisted of photos of approximately 35 deceased students although with one photo cut-out.\textsuperscript{279} A Professor explained that the student was later found to be pro-Qaddafi. This illustrates a

\textsuperscript{276} No reliable estimates available
\textsuperscript{277} Misrata University pamphlet containing photos of all 95 deceased members of the university.
\textsuperscript{278} Observation of display outside Zawiya University administration building. Zawiya, Libya 12/2012
\textsuperscript{279} See Appendix D Photo G
problem in counting of official statistics; loyalist fighters and students may be excluded from death-tolls.

In sum, war’s impact on Libyan HE’s human capacity is low compared to Iraq. Moreover, many participants viewed the post-war moment as an opportunity to invest in human resources and training, uphold meritocratic appointments, and benefit from returnees with high skills and expertise thus strengthening rather than weakening the human capacity of HEIs.

7.4.1.3. Institutional Capacity

Civil war directly affected institutional capacity of HE through vandalism of records and archives at various campuses. One explanation is that university officials destroyed records of their corrupt practices that may have been subject to legal action in the post-war period. It should be noted that Libyan HE’s dense bureaucracy operates with paper-based rather than electronic administrative and documentation systems. Consequently, many HEIs struggled with this loss of institutional memory. However, protection provided by staff and students is held to have limited the extent of damage to folders and files.

Vandewalle (2006) describes how Qaddafi’s regime produced highly-distorted national institutions leaving the post-Qaddafi state with a major challenge of building effective institutions. The MoHE-L faced this task of institution-building after experiencing war-related impacts including displacement from its main premises and collapse of national-level governance. While most MoHE-L officials reported that civil war produced low impacts on institutional capacity, greater challenges emerged in the complex post-war environment. Moreover, ‘revolution’

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\[280\] Dr Ahmed Al-Atrash, former Dean, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012

\[281\] Dr Tarek Basher Jdeidi, Head, Department of Zoology, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012
was viewed as an opportunity to construct the MoHE-L on more solid institutional foundations.

At the university-level, new post-war needs and challenges placed additional burden on institutional capacity. This observation is supported by site-observations and interviews with administrative staff at various HEIs that reported disruption to enrolment, changed attitude of students, and the insecure post-war context as making their job more difficult by placing competing demands on limited time and resources.

Another impact on institutional capacity was disruption, cancellation, and distortion of various HE capacity-building programmes. For example, a UNESCO programme to improve information technology with nationwide coverage in ten universities was halted in February 2011 and resumed in late 2012 with limited coverage in three universities.\(^{282}\) Notwithstanding these effects, overall institutional capacity suffered little in comparison to Iraq. Moreover, a clear majority of participants held that very little had changed in HEIs due to war in terms of administration, management, or institutional change. However, one area where change was recognised was increased needs, the incidence of which will be addressed now.

7.4.2. Post-war Needs

From fieldwork data, a generalised set of HE needs can be stated. Security was frequently cited as the number one need facing Libya and the HE security environment was generally perceived as positive despite some problems including students carrying weapons and low power of campus security guards.\(^ {283}\) Alongside security, most participants described common unmet educational needs. These needs are not necessarily conflict-related although ‘revolution’ presented a first

\(^{282}\) Head, Computer Science Department, Omar Mukhtar University - Baida, Libya 11/2012

\(^{283}\) See section 8.3.1.1. for analysis of security as a factor affecting post-war Libyan HE
opportunity for many Libyans to openly express their needs and critique their material and educational conditions.

The need for physical infrastructure and facilities was very commonly expressed; additional laboratories, classrooms, and lecture theatres were necessary to overcome insufficient space and resultant over-crowding. Further, a commonly expressed need was for basic services, amenities, and activities as many campuses are lacking in cafes, bookshops, toilets, social spaces, and car parks. It was commonly noted that many campus buildings were secondary school buildings utilised as universities and therefore inadequate for HE. Furthermore, out-of-date and inadequate libraries and very weak internet and communications infrastructure were widely-cited.

In sum, participants viewed Libya’s HEIs as not meeting the criteria of ‘university’ as defined by international standards. In the words of one senior academic, ‘we feel we are not a university and want to match the experience of higher education in other countries’. It was commonly held that universities should be social, educational, sporting, and service-providing institutions.

Beyond these ‘bread and butter’ issues, psycho-social needs were held to constitute a neglected problem. Many students and staff were exposed to traumatic events during the war and many are suffering long-term consequences. For example, in Misrata it is reported that suicide rates increased sharply, many youth turned to drugs and alcohol to cope with stress and trauma, and 21,000 residents are classified as in need of psychological assistance. Furthermore, student behavioural and attitudinal change altered student-staff relations and posed an obstacle to maintaining order on campus. Moreover, psycho-social needs can also be

284 For example, the President of Omar Mukhtar University stated that greater physical facilities and space were the two main priorities of his university. Dr Ibrahim El-Ghariani, President, Omar Al-Mukhtar University - Baida, Libya 11/2012
285 Many participants emphasised lack of toilet facilities, especially for female students, often forced to leave campus to use toilets
286 Dr Taher, former Head, Department of Physics, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya
287 For example Dr Abdulatif, Director, International Cooperation Office, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012. Also, Dr Taher, former Head, Department of Physics, Tripoli University.
288 See section 8.1.1.
289 Joint interview, Dr Khaled and Dr Ali, EDB - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012
considered a major distortion to post-war HE, the wider dynamic of which will be analysed now.

7.4.3. Distortions

During the civil war while Qaddafi’s regime maintained control of Tripoli and Western towns and cities universities were ordered to ‘act as normal as possible’ to maintain order and control. Approximately 150 security and intelligence officials were dispatched to Tripoli University to control the campus.\textsuperscript{290} The regime pressurised faculty members to continue operating universities\textsuperscript{291} and in turn some faculty members pressurised students to attend, for example, by threatening cancelled credits for non-attendance.\textsuperscript{292} Several faculty members explained the difficulty of maintaining a professional and diplomatic approach to students in a highly-charged and politicised atmosphere.\textsuperscript{293}

Several participants reported that prior to Tripoli’s liberation Qaddafi issued an order effectively awarding over 4,000 students in Tripoli scores of over 90% on high school leaving certificates.\textsuperscript{294} This entitled enrolment on socially-prestigious degrees, primarily medicine and engineering. When universities began the 2012 academic year 4,000 first-year students enrolled at Tripoli University’s Engineering Faculty alone, placing enormous burden on a university already operating over-capacity. The move should be explained as an attempt to purchase loyalty of young Libyans and highlights HE’s importance to regime legitimation. Similarly, scholarships were offered for master’s degrees overseas for attending pro-Qaddafi rallies in Tripoli.

\textsuperscript{290} Dr Abdulmonim Alaswad, former Dean, IT Faculty, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012
\textsuperscript{291} Dr Hadi Omran Tumi, Head, Civil Engineering Department, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012
\textsuperscript{292} Obaidat, higher education consultant - Tripoli, Libya 12/2012
\textsuperscript{293} Joint interview, two faculty members, Department of Physics, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012
\textsuperscript{294} Dr Ahmed Al-Atrash, former Dean, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Tripoli University. Tripoli, Libya 10/2012. Dr Usama Al-Hadi, Head, Department of Architecture and Urban Planning, Tripoli, conducted in Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012
After the war, the MoHE-L working under Qaddafi-era laws and regulations were obliged to honour these scholarships creating political controversy and violating meritocratic principles.

War created uneven disruption to HE. HEIs in Eastern cities including Baida and Tobruk closed early in 2011 while HEIs in Tripoli continued operating until August 2011. However, many students boycotted university classes in Tripoli during war and the university was operating below capacity (Elalem 2011). Furthermore, nationwide many male students were recruited to militias and brigades so missed study. Additionally, students living in war-affected areas often could not travel safely to their HEIs. Consequently, HEIs faced major logistical problems with students completing varying numbers of semesters.\textsuperscript{295} Emergency semesters were held during summer and students completing a spring semester were instructed to wait at home until most students had caught-up.\textsuperscript{296}

War-induced population movements also distorted HE. Young people from war-affected areas including Tawergha, Bani Walid, and Sirte enrolled at Tripoli University in 2011 and 2012 leading to further over-crowding and resource burdens. Post-war Libya was marked by enmities between residents of competing towns and cities that affected approximately 5,000 students’ ability to move freely.\textsuperscript{297} One prominent example, around 250 students from Tawergha were unable to continue studies or enrol at nearby Misrata University due to intense animosity over accusations of war-time atrocities in Misrata. Another dynamic, some students recruited by Qaddafi’s army were unable to attend university in their hometowns due to threats.

Moreover, war’s greatest distortion was indirect; the opportunity cost of halting campus construction, described as ‘the world’s largest university building programme’ (Evans 2009). Tripoli University alone in late 2012 had nearly 500,000 square metres of incomplete construction projects with approximately 150,000 more

\textsuperscript{295} Dr Ibrahim Saleh, Deputy Minister, MoHE-L - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012
\textsuperscript{296} Assistant to Deputy Minister, MoHE-L - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012
\textsuperscript{297} Director of Universities, MoHE-L - Tripoli, Libya 12/2012
than 90% complete. All campuses visited for this study had incomplete infrastructure and facilities with foreign contractors not returning due to the insecure post-war environment and lengthy contract renegotiations. Given that physical facilities and space are a major need, programme completion was widely-expected to have substantial impact on HEIs by alleviating massive pressure on space and providing modern facilities. For example, Mohamed Mashena, temporary President of Tripoli University, held that restarting campus construction was the single largest priority facing his institution.

7.4.4. Conclusion

This section has reviewed the Libyan civil war’s impact on HE in terms of capacity, needs, and distortions. In comparison to Iraq where conflict had a severe and direct physical impact across the entire HE system, Libyan HE was affected more unevenly with some areas suffering war-related physical damage while many HEIs experienced few major direct impacts. However, war had a number of indirect impacts including halting campus construction and contributing to attitudinal and behavioural changes of students.

When asked ‘what has changed in the HE sector since the war and revolution in Libya?’ a surprisingly large number of participants held that nothing had changed. The majority of these participants, when probed, were revealed to have understood ‘change’ as referring to physical, institutional, or educational aspects of HE and conceded that when the psychological dimension was included there was an abrupt and significant change in student attitudes and the environment which now enabled academic freedom. While acknowledging this psychological impact of

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298 Mohamed Mashena, President, Tripoli University and Dean, Faculty of Engineering, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012
299 Some companies reportedly demanded 50 or 60 million dinars compensation for equipment stolen during the war. Dr Usama Al-Hadi, Head, Department of Architecture and Urban Planning, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012
300 Mohamed Mashena, President, Tripoli University and Dean, Faculty of Engineering, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012
conflict, the widespread perception that not much had changed in HE due to the uprising and war must dampen any estimation of war’s impact.

The finding that the 2011 civil war had a relatively low impact on the sector would suggest that at the outset of Libya’s post-conflict transition the prognosis for Libyan HE to make a major positive impact on reconstruction and recovery would be positive. In the next chapter the extent to which this positive prognosis was actualised in post-war Libya will be the subject of analysis.
CHAPTER EIGHT

HIGHER EDUCATION IN POST-WAR LIBYA

8.0. Introduction

This chapter presents a case-study of HE and post-war recovery after the 2011 Libyan civil war. In the previous chapter, impacts of war and post-war instability on HE were assessed in terms of capacity, needs, and distortions. In what follows, taking this impact analysis as a starting point, the story of Libya’s post-war higher education trajectory will be told in three sections each directly responding to a research question.

To begin, post-war efforts to rehabilitate Libyan HE will be analysed in terms of physical rebuilding and psycho-social programming. Secondly, in a section designed to address RQ3, the extent to which Libyan HE contributed towards post-conflict recovery and transition will be assessed. Then, to address RQ4, features of the post-war environment mediating the HE-recovery relationship will be analysed. Finally, options facing Libyan HE will be analysed, exploring the perspectives of key actors.

In contrast to the Iraq case where interview data was cross-referenced with various published and unpublished written sources throughout this chapter relies more exclusively on the dataset generated from fieldwork. This is because of the paucity of research on Libyan HE and also due to the early stage of Libya’s post-conflict transition. Data from interviews and focus groups with Libyan academics, university administration, students, policy-makers, and politicians in addition to observations at Libyan HEIs are utilised in this chapter.301

301 See chapter four for more detail on methodology and the conduct of fieldwork in Libya
8.1. Post-war Reconstruction of Higher Education

To begin, rebuilding of Libyan HE will be analysed. As was seen earlier, physical damage to HEIs was uneven with few campuses affected badly. For this reason this section is much shorter than the corresponding section in chapter six on Iraqi HE where reconstruction of the sector was a more significant dynamic. However, rebuilding of Libyan HEIs does reveal some interesting findings. Reconstruction and rehabilitation was funded by an emergency budget with responsibility for implementing rebuilding projects delegated to individual universities. Post-war rebuilding of Libyan HEIs damaged during war will now be analysed principally through the case of Misrata.

Misrata University can be considered a successful case of post-war rebuilding. The extent of damage at the Science and Pharmacy faculties and dormitories was 70%, 90%, and 90% respectively while minor damage occurred in various other faculties. It was reported that 80% of damaged infrastructure and facilities were rehabilitated within one year from October 2011. However, two Deans at Misrata University held that the majority of recovery efforts were refurbishment and rehabilitation rather than rebuilding. They explain that campus buildings received foundational structural damage yet work completed was a short-term and not long-term solution. Despite this limitation, all interviewees considered overall rebuilding and rehabilitation successful. Rebuilding was contracted to Libyan companies because foreign contractors were held to be too expensive and unable to deliver swift reconstruction.

In late 2011 the MoHE-L allocated $4 million to Misrata University for rebuilding based on a needs assessment. However, the director of reconstruction held this amount insufficient to meet rebuilding needs. Furthermore, funds were allocated

302 Assistant to Deputy Minister, MoHE-L - Tripoli, Libya 12/2012
303 Joint interview, Heads of Mathematics and Pharmacy, Misrata University - Misrata, Libya 11/2012
304 Manager of Reconstruction, Misrata University - Misrata, Libya 11/2012. Participants in Tripoli and Zawiya favoured Libyan companies for the same reason
conditional upon exclusive use in rebuilding damaged infrastructure yet the university spent the money also on new PCs and other supplies ‘because you can’t just rebuild buildings and stay and watch’. Support from local businesses and civil society was held to be critical in enabling fast and effective rebuilding. Misrata is a relatively wealthy port city with strong industry and many Misratans operate import/export businesses thus enabling fast procurement. The university appealed to local business to donate equipment or offer below-market rates on supplies. It was further held that Misrata’s high social cohesion ensured local business and civil society goodwill. The Dean of Medicine held that rebuilding was successful because people were happy to participate in the process.

Also in Misrata, the Faculty of Medical Technology is located beside Misrata University yet administered by the MoHE-L. While Misrata University faculties rebuilt effectively the Medical Technology Faculty remained in a dire physical state in late 2012. Given their similarities, differences in rebuilding outcomes can best be explained by the above-noted social cohesion and business goodwill. Given that the Faculty was not part of Misrata University it received no local assistance. Furthermore, Misrata had a level of de facto autonomy from the Libyan state with the powerful Misrata Council directing city-wide reconstruction. Misrata University possessed high autonomy in determining where funds would be spent. After the MoHE-L disbursed funds no monitoring, evaluation, or communication was carried out. In contrast, the Faculty of Medical Technology was highly constrained by bureaucratic obstacles under the MoHE-L. Further, a Faculty official held that no additional financial support was received and that rebuilding would have been much more effective had the Faculty been incorporated into Misrata University.

A similar experience of relatively autonomous recovery was reported in Brega and Sirte where fast reconstruction was enabled by ‘dynamic local leaders’ in coastal...
cities outside Tripoli (Economist 2012). This was supported by the Deputy Minister who stated that Sirte University had been the most successful case of rebuilding with the new university campus complex rated the best nationally.\textsuperscript{310} The President of Sirte University noted that rebuilding funds were provided by the MoHE-L without problems (Economist 2012). This was held to be a positive step given fears that the city would be punished for its role as Qaddafi’s support-base.

\textbf{8.1.1. Psycho-social assistance}

An emergent theme from interview data was that psycho-social programming is one dimension of post-war HE assistance generally recognised to be inadequate. For example, a MoHE-L official admitted that in psycho-social assistance the Ministry ‘could have done more’.\textsuperscript{311} This problem is acute in areas that were heavily affected by fighting, for example, at Azzaytuna University near Bani Walid a lecturer listed that ‘students and staff were terrified during fighting’ as the most severe impact of conflict.\textsuperscript{312} As the Head of Pharmacy at Misrata University argued, physical impacts of war can be addressed relatively easily but psychological effects are much harder to overcome.\textsuperscript{313}

A MoHE-L official stated that the greatest challenge in delivering psycho-social assistance is that ‘students do not come to you’.\textsuperscript{314} This is reflected by the Dean of Science at Zawiya University who described the difficulty in convincing students to first admit that they had a problem and then to voluntarily speak to counsellors or experts.\textsuperscript{315} He held that changed attitudes of students was the largest problem facing his faculty, no assistance was offered, and that outside expertise was required

\textsuperscript{310} Dr Ibrahim Saleh, Deputy Minister for Scientific Research, MoHE-L - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012
\textsuperscript{311} Assistant to Deputy Minister, MoHE-L - Tripoli, Libya 12/2012
\textsuperscript{312} Dr Aboubaker, Assistant, Dean of Economics and Political Science, Azzaytuna University - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012
\textsuperscript{313} Head, Department of Pharmacy, Misrata University - Misrata, Libya 11/2012
\textsuperscript{314} Assistant to Deputy Minister, MoHE-L - Tripoli, Libya 12/2012
\textsuperscript{315} Dean, Faculty of Science, Zawiya University - Zawiya, Libya 12/2012
because many solutions were attempted without success. He identified a cultural barrier to admitting psycho-social problems as shame and social stigmatism at being perceived as weak or defective. One case where some positive results were reported is Omar Mukhtar University (OMU) in Baida where staff were instructed to be patient with students and more participative teaching was encouraged in order to change the attitudes and behaviour of students. While this section has briefly analysed the assistance to the war-affected aspects of Libya’s HE system the next section will turn from rebuilding of HE to analyse the contribution that the sector made to Libya’s post-conflict recovery.

8.2. Higher education in post-conflict recovery

We have 120,000 students and about 5,000 teaching staff, in a country of 6 million. This will tell you how vital this structure is. This place could be the nucleus of a rebuilt country.

The above quote from Faisel Krekshi (quoted in Fordham 2011), Tripoli University’s first post-war President, highlights the optimism that existed after the 2011 uprising about HE’s potential to contribute towards post-war recovery. In describing the university as a ‘nucleus’ it also reflects the central argument of this thesis; HE has the potential to be a strategic pillar of recovery.

In this section HE’s contribution to post-conflict recovery will be addressed through an evaluation of initial outcomes and perspectives of key actors on HE’s role in conflict prevention and stabilisation, democratisation and civil society development, economic recovery, reconciliation, and statebuilding. To begin, the sector’s contribution to short-term stabilisation will be addressed before proceeding to consider longer-term issues.

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316 The Dean also cited examples of faculty members joining brigades and militia but held that psycho-social assistance for the group was not as significant an issue due to their age, education and experience which enabled their coping.

317 Dr Ibrahim El-Ghariani. President, Omar Al-Mukhtar University - Baida, Libya 11/2012
8.2.1. Conflict Prevention and Stabilisation

Libya’s large student and youth population was viewed as a potential source of destabilisation yet also as an important means of achieving stability through giving positive direction to energies of youth.\textsuperscript{318} In the immediate post-war period in October 2011 the MoHE-L set a single priority of restarting HEIs.\textsuperscript{319} The rationale was directly linked to stabilisation; by getting young people and existing students back into classrooms the pool of militia and brigade recruitment would be reduced and there would be less fighting, localised conflict, riots, crime and other similar destabilising phenomena. As the Deputy Minister for Scientific Research stated, ‘as long as the students are at the university, no problem in the street, no problem at home’.\textsuperscript{320}

For example, Omar Al-Mukhtar University’s council decided in November 2011 to re-open the university because ‘students were free in the street, free in the war and with free time, creating a problem for the security situation’.\textsuperscript{321} Registration fees were waived to encourage student return without placing undue burden on them while staff were instructed to be patient with students. Also, lectures were given on how to build a New Libya in which students could freely share opinions in an attempt to change attitudes and return a sense of normalcy.

Re-opening universities after war-related delays was a major logistical challenge requiring substantial administrative and ministerial resources at the expense of pursuing other strategies for rebuilding the sector. While it is impossible to test the counter-factual claim that greater instability would have resulted from higher presence of easily mobilised young men if HE had not re-opened swiftly, it was contended by many participants that HE was effective in the immediate task of returning a sense of normalcy and positively channelling youth energy.

\textsuperscript{318} Dr Ahmad Al-Atrash, former Dean, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012
\textsuperscript{319} Assistant to Deputy Minister, MoHE-L - Tripoli, Libya 12/2012
\textsuperscript{320} Dr Ibrahim Saleh, Deputy Minister, MoHE-L - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012
\textsuperscript{321} Dr Ibrahim El-Ghariani. President, Omar Al-Mukhtar University - Baida, Libya 11/2012
By autumn 2011 after many universities re-opened typical media reports described campus atmosphere as highly positive and optimistic about HE’s potential contribution to post-war recovery (Fordham 2011). Moreover, the attitude of many students shifted from pre-revolution passivity to positive, empowered, and energetic.\textsuperscript{322} Attitudinal and behavioural change occurred as students and staff enjoyed new freedoms to speak and associate, an ethos of volunteerism emerged, and students felt emboldened by revolution to organise collectively and make demands. At the beginning of transition both students and staff were overwhelmingly positive about changes that had occurred. Faculty members welcomed change in students from apathy to a proactive attitude while students perceived the opportunity to enact a revolution inside HE.

However, on the other hand faculty members reported negative changes in student attitude and behaviour including frequently confronting staff aggressively, protesting over minor issues, and non-compliance with rules. In particular, students that had fought in the war were widely-reported to have undergone significant psychological change.\textsuperscript{323} Meanwhile, students grew increasingly frustrated at the slow pace of change within HE and the initial optimism of revolutionary change waned. While many staff viewed students as having ‘misunderstood their freedoms’\textsuperscript{324} and misjudged HE as a sector apt for revolutionary change, students frequently viewed the unchanged ‘management’ of universities as maintaining Qaddafi-era HE and usurping the revolution’s potential.

While channelling youth energy into HE and off the streets was a success in terms of stabilisation the emergence of collective student agency expressed in the form of demonstrations, protests and the new proactive student attitude was a driver of campus instability. Several faculty members described emergence of illegal activities on campus including drug-dealing, prostitution, and widespread carrying of arms that could not be controlled by campus security. At a Tripoli University

\textsuperscript{322} This observation is based on interviews with faculty members and students, supported by numerous media reports.

\textsuperscript{323} Dr Fathi Al Arabi, Consultant to MoHE-L - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012

\textsuperscript{324} The phrase ‘misunderstood freedom’ was used by a significant number of participant faculty members
engineering exam students rioted after a small section reportedly objected to difficult questions. Several Professors at Benghazi University complained that little to no progress was made in day-to-day work due to almost constant protesting by students.

Furthermore, with very few recreational spaces available for young people HEIs experienced the new trend of non-students coming to campuses to socialise with negative effects on campus atmosphere and security. However, it may be suggested that given the lack of recreational spaces for young people the utilisation of campuses for social purposes had a stabilising effect as those non-students were concentrated on campuses rather than the streets where they may constitute a greater security risk.

Interviews revealed competing claims over how universities dealt with student unrest and incidents on campus. On the one hand, the temporary Tripoli University President explained that university leadership met student grievances and protests with dialogue. Similarly, the President of Omar Mukhtar University held that ‘convincing students we are all in the same boat’ was critical in responding to protests and further that his personal intervention was necessary to diffuse protests at Derna and Tobruk campuses. A contrasting method was revealed by the Dean of Science at Zawiya University who stated that university management at that university ‘buried their heads in the sand’ while students protested as there was no better option available than to ignore them. Another similar example, a Dean at Omar Mukhtar University removed the door handle to the outside of his office to prevent people entering. One participant criticised Tripoli University leadership

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325 Dr Usama Al-Hadi, Head, Department of Architecture and Urban Planning, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012.
326 Director, Quality Assurance, Benghazi University - Benghazi, Libya 11/2012. Further, a field visit to Benghazi University was undertaken on two days during which students protested outside the Administration building putting the campus in gridlock with no classes or lectures delivered.
327 This point is based on both interviews with staff and students and also site observations at Tripoli University where many non-students utilised the campus as a recreational space.
328 Dr Ibrahim El-Ghariani. President, Omar Al-Mukhtar University - Baida, Libya 11/2012.
329 Former head, Student Union, Faculty of Engineering, Omar Mukhtar University - Baida, Libya 11/2012. It was reported that the Dean did not listen to student protests and demands although he was replaced in late 2012 by a more responsive Dean who engaged students in dialogue.
for operating in a ‘firefighting mode’ and employing ‘conflict management’ tactics, holding that student unrest and problems were responded to merely to defuse situations without attempting to transform issues underlying continual upheaval.\textsuperscript{330}

It is clear from these examples that a range of approaches to student-faculty relations were adopted. In many faculties and departments relatively young Deans and HODs were appointed based on the theory that they would communicate with students more effectively and have greater moral legitimacy in a difficult environment thus helping to stabilise the situation. An instructive comparison is between the Architecture Department and Computer Engineering Departments of Tripoli University where this approach was adopted. While the young head of Architecture was widely-viewed as very successful in building good relations with students\textsuperscript{331} the Computer Engineering department was reportedly ‘almost a student-run department’ and highly chaotic, leading to the HOD’s resignation.\textsuperscript{332} This comparison illustrates the trial-and-error approach adopted out of necessity in a context in which university leaders confronted new challenges without knowledge of how similar situations were addressed in other cases.

A final fact to be considered in terms of stabilisation, the MoHE-L announced that it would provide monthly stipends of 70 dinars to all students.\textsuperscript{333} It was reported that in June 2013 the stipend increased to 220 dinars.\textsuperscript{334} This move should be explained as an attempt to reduce youth grievances and enhance the transitional government’s legitimacy. In sum, it can be stated that Libyan universities were relatively successful in achieving limited goals of stabilisation and conflict prevention although at the cost of neglecting long-term issues that could have been addressed. A further manner through which Libyan HE contributed to stabilisation was in DDR, which will be considered next.

\textsuperscript{330} Dr Sami Khashkusha, Professor Department of Political Science Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012
\textsuperscript{331} Dr Mohamed Mashena, Temporary President, Tripoli University and Dean, Faculty of Engineering, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012
\textsuperscript{332} Obaidat, higher education consultant - Tripoli, Libya 12/2012
\textsuperscript{333} Head, Training Department, MoHE-L - Tripoli, Libya 12/2012
\textsuperscript{334} Personal communication with students in Libya
8.2.1.1. DDR

A major and unique way in which HE was geared towards post-war recovery was through formal DDR programming. When fieldwork was conducted in late 2012 HE’s role in DDR was limited although many participants held that the sector had potential as an effective aspect of DDR and several participants described various plans underway to send young former combatants abroad. Pack and Barfi (2012) hold that the part-time, non-institutional and regionalised nature of militias renders forcible demobilisation problematic and recommend vocational training as part of DDR.

In the DDR programme administered by the MoE, MoHE-L, and the Warriors Commission, of approximately 30,000 places for training or study abroad around 2,000 were reserved for university-level education with most opportunities in TVET.335 Several interviewees held that sending ‘revolutionaries’ abroad for education and training would ‘open the minds’ of young people to other cultures with a demilitarising effect.336

In April 2013 it was announced that 18,000 degree-holding Thuwar or revolutionaries would be sent abroad to study for Masters and PhD degrees in a programme administered by the Warriors Affairs Commission. According to Waleed (2013) 5,000 would be sent in 2013, 4,000 in 2014, and 4,500 in both 2015 and 2016. This programme is unique as it represents by a very significant margin the largest DDR programme in any country administered through HE opportunities.

However, various criticisms can be made of this programme. First, several high-level participants made the claim that ex-militia and brigade members should be sent abroad to pursue studies to quickly reduce levels of potentially destabilising men on the streets. As such, a major policy rationale appears to be purchasing

335 Head, Training Department, MoHE-L - Tripoli, Libya 12/2012
336 Dr Khaled and Dr Ali, EDB - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012
stability. Programme timing was however criticised for amounting to ‘a mentality of buying rage of students by sending outside’ that would not solve basic educational challenges including stabilisation and resolving internal conflicts, which deserved priority.³³⁷

While it should be acknowledged that this is a potential positive programme outcome, given the vast expenditure and opportunity cost involved it should be concluded that the programme cannot be well-planned and strategically aligned with HE, DDR, and human capital frameworks. The programme should be expected to run at very high cost that could alternatively be invested in developing graduate education inside Libya. This type of investment in self-sufficient capacity may represent a more socially-optimal resource allocation than a hastily-planned programme likely to run over-cost and deepen ‘brain drain’. Furthermore, the programme has been criticised for targeting only Thuwar and excluding female students³³⁸ and non-combatants thus dividing Libyan society rather than having a unifying effect.³³⁹ Another area in which HE contributed to recovery was in relief and reconstruction efforts, which will be examined now.

### 8.2.2. Relief and Reconstruction

HE played a role during the war and its aftermath in humanitarian response. Benghazi University campus dormitories were used to house displaced persons, mainly IDPs from Brega and Ajdabiya (Dziadosz 2011). Omar Al-Mukhtar University’s President held that during the war his university in Baida was one of the only public places where local civil society actors providing relief and emergency assistance could meet and speak freely. He notes that groups met to coordinate giving ‘tools and clothes to ‘refugees’, providing food to poor families, and sharing information on missing persons, stating that ‘it was like a control-room

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³³⁷ Obaidat, higher education consultant - Tripoli, Libya 12/2012
³³⁸ The vast majority of scholarship recipients are male due to socio-cultural constraints on sending female family members abroad alone
³³⁹ Dr Fathi Al-Arabi, consultant to MoHE-L - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012
in the university". Furthermore, it was reported that many students volunteered at hospitals in the East of Libya.

Beyond relief efforts, there was low utilisation of HE expertise and capacity in reconstruction projects. It was seen that pre-war Iraqi HE cooperated with industry, government and military sectors while post-war collapse of universities, industries, and the state prevented these cooperative linkages. In Libya by contrast, post-war HE capacity did not collapse yet Libyan academic expertise was not widely-employed in rebuilding. However, it should be qualified that post-war reconstruction under the NTC was slow due to the government’s transitional nature and that therefore opportunities for university participation were less than in Iraq. Moreover, engineering faculties at Tripoli University and Benghazi University are relatively well positioned to contribute to reconstruction and faculty members at both institutions expect to do so.

A consultancy office at each university coordinates university-industry cooperation. However, consultancy does not offer a significant revenue stream for Libyan universities. Some engineering faculty members in Tripoli, Misrata and Benghazi undertook consultancy work on reconstruction projects although in a private capacity rather than through the university. In the Department of Architecture and Urban Planning at Tripoli University most offers of consultancy work were said to be on a pro-bono basis offering ‘no financial or even moral compensation’. Several participants identified mistrust as at the root of the problem; foreign companies operating in Libya rely on foreign consultants while Libyan companies do not trust domestic universities. Even the large-scale campus construction programme underway years before the uprising was contracted to foreign companies.

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340 Dr Ibrahim El-Ghariani. President, Omar Al-Mukhtar University - Baida, Libya 11/2012
341 Mohamed Yaseen, Registrar, Medicine Faculty, Omar Mukhtar University - Baida, Libya 11/2012
342 See section 5.1.2.
343 Dr Hadi Omran Tumi, Head, Civil Engineering Department, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012. Mohamed Mashena, President, Tripoli University and Dean, Faculty of Engineering, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012
344 Assistant to Deputy Minister, MoHE-L - Tripoli, Libya 12/2012
345 Dr Usama Al-Hadi, Head, Department of Architecture and Urban Planning, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012. Head, Computer Science Department, Omar Mukhtar University - Baida, Libya 11/2012
companies on a design-and-build basis with no involvement of Libyan universities in project design or planning, which was a cause of division and controversy.\textsuperscript{346}

However, it should be qualified that university expertise was utilised in various transitional tasks. The Consultation and Support Group (CSG), a group of 250 Libyan academics, advised the NTC on policy development, developing two influential documents adopted by the NTC, ‘A Vision of a Democratic Libya’ and the ‘Proposed Road Map’ (Hope 2011). The CSG advised on constitutional drafting, disarmament and armed forces reform, ‘an early election, reconciliation, addressing crimes against humanity, and restarting the economy’. In addition, a committee of University Professors has been established to assess needs for rewriting curriculum in primary and secondary schools (Golovnina 2011).

There were also some attempts to incorporate courses and educational content relevant to new transitional needs. One example, the Engineering Faculty at Tripoli University adapted an existing course on restoration and rehabilitation of buildings towards rebuilding war-damaged infrastructure. However, similar examples of courses on reconstruction could not be identified at other universities. Another example is the Translation Department at Tripoli University where a course on transitional terminology was introduced to produce graduates capable of working for government bodies, media, NGOs, or international agencies dealing with transitional issues.\textsuperscript{347} While these are examples of adaptation to post-conflict needs these are exceptional cases rather than indicative of a general trend.

Furthermore, utilisation of Libyan HE to provide research on conflict-related and post-conflict issues was low. This is explained by the research system which despite the vast HE system is poor due to chronic underfunding and marginalisation. An anecdotal account holds that on a trip to Tunisia Qaddafi was asked how much Libya spends on research to which he replied ‘nothing’.\textsuperscript{348} One contrary example of such research is the survey produced by Benghazi University and Oxford Research

\textsuperscript{346} Obaidat, higher education consultant - Tripoli, Libya 12/2012
\textsuperscript{347} Dr Zekia Deeb, Head, Translation Department, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012
\textsuperscript{348} Dr Hadi Omran Tumi, Head, Civil Engineering Department, Faculty of Engineering, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012
International. Another example, engineering faculty at Zawiya University were active in a committee on reconstruction of damaged buildings and infrastructure in Zawiya city and were organising a conference on rebuilding.\footnote{Dr Khalid Karmaji, Dean, Faculty of Engineering, Zawiya University - Zawiya, Libya 12/2012}

In sum, while HE research and consultancy capacity was in part utilised in reconstruction and recovery processes the overall contribution is low. Furthermore, there is a widespread understanding amongst participants that greater involvement of Libya’s academic expertise in reconstruction projects could have multiple benefits including reducing contractors’ costs, additional revenue streams, supplying in-depth contextual knowledge on Libya, and capacity development of HEIs. Another area in which Libyan HE had the potential to contribute towards a major goal of transition was in democratisation and civil society development, which will be considered next.

8.2.3. Democratisation and Civil Society Development

A major goal of Libya’s post-conflict transition is from authoritarianism to democracy. HE capacity in various ways supported democratisation processes although faced various obstacles. For example, student volunteerism was high during July 2012 elections; a vital transitional moment. Additionally, academics worked as consultants in the constitutional drafting process. Furthermore, HE is seen to have potential to deepen democratisation through ICT education in support of e-democracy (Jones et al 2012).

Pre-war curricula did not cover democratic ideas and practice, human rights, or civil society and Libyan’s were estimated to have low knowledge of these areas due to isolation under sanctions (Anderson 2013, p.231). However, highly-educated Libyans, in particular those educated overseas, were more exposed to democracy and therefore HE was viewed as an important means of supporting democratisation through civic education, public outreach, and civil society development.\footnote{Dr Ahmed Al-Atrash, former Dean, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012. Guma El-Gamaty, founder, Taghyeer Party - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012.}
lectures and conferences provided civic education on concepts including democracy, elections, and citizenship aimed at both students and the public, which improved university-society relations. For example, a Democratic Centre was established at Omar Mukhtar University and public lectures were held at Zawiya University’s city-centre campus.

Following Qaddafi’s long suppression of independent associations many civil society organisations emerged post-uprising. HE contributed towards civil society development through both independent student initiative and university or faculty-level programmes. During the war many students were active in newly-formed NGOs and charitable groups, for example, the Al-Mukhtar Group in Baida distributed aid to poor families in the East. \(^{351}\) Students and staff nationwide were proactive in leading campus clean-up campaigns and refurbishing classrooms, \(^{352}\) for example, rehabilitating the badly damaged Sirte University.

During the first few post-war months enthusiasm for participation in civil society activities was very high although students lacked practical knowledge and skills of what to do and how to do it. \(^{353}\) At the faculty-level, organisation of independent student unions for each faculty was permitted, the first reportedly at Benghazi Medical College (Essul 2013). In some cases faculty elections were followed months later by elections for university-wide student unions. \(^{354}\) Similarly, students were permitted to organise official campus-based student organisations and societies. Furthermore, in several cases students were permitted to participate in faculty

\(^{351}\) Interviews with faculty members and a student activist at Omar Mukhtar University - Baida, Libya 11/2012

\(^{352}\) Architecture students worked long hours for 3-4 months cleaning and refurbishing Tripoli University Engineering Faculty. Mohamed Mashena, Temporary President, Tripoli University and Dean, Faculty of Engineering, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012

\(^{353}\) Dr Abdulmonim Alaswad, former Dean, IT Faculty, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012

\(^{354}\) Former Head, Student Union, Faculty of Engineering, Omar Mukhtar University - Baida, Libya 11/2012
meetings. However, it was noted that by late 2012 enthusiasm and euphoria waned and it was ‘difficult to get ten people’ at a civil society event.

It should be noted that some faculty members were concerned with potentially destabilising impacts of student collective action and political organisation. At Tripoli University student organisations and societies were asked to sign a document declaring that their activities did not have a political dimension. It was held that this move would ensure ‘political and foreign agendas’ would not infiltrate campus and that university leadership aware of instability in Iraqi universities did not want ‘the university to become a political arena’. However, this official position was criticised as unenforceable because it is impossible to isolate political from social activity. Furthermore, it was held that Libyan students were relatively unpolticised compared to Egyptian and Tunisian students; a result of the previous regime’s efforts to sanitise and depoliticise the student body.

The Tripoli University Programme for Rebuilding Libya (TUPRL) was launched at Tripoli University in September 2011 and was the most ambitious attempt to utilise HE for democratisation and civil society development. The programme director explained that it was initiated as soon as Tripoli University re-opened in September 2011 and advanced explicitly liberal goals of promoting democratic culture and democratisation through a training-of-trainers programme that when scaled-up would build a nationwide network of civic educators. Furthermore, it was envisaged that the university would play a lead role in galvanising civil society, stabilising Libya, and contributing to successful transition. TUPRL’s vision was much larger with greater public outreach and communication planned, for example, through textbooks and cartoons for school children.

355 Dr Zekia Deeb, Head, Translation Department, Faculty of Languages, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012
356 Dr Sami Khashkusha, Professor Department of Political Science Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012
357 Mohamed Mashena, President, Tripoli University and Dean, Faculty of Engineering, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012
358 Dr Sami Khashkusha, Professor, Department of Political Science, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012
Several senior Professors, a secretariat, and student volunteers maintained the programme which received full backing from university President Dr Faisel Krekshi. TUPRL’s budget was around five million dinars and received pledges of further financial assistance. It was claimed that the programme successfully reached-out to international partners including the US Embassy and UNDP with the director stating that ‘we did a very good job of marketing ourselves’ in a few months, for example, by hosting Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Alain Juppe, and a civil society fair with the Middle East Democratic Initiative.359

On 24th December 2011 the programme was transferred from Tripoli University to the Ministry of Planning excluding the university from the programme and effectively ending it.360 The director held that the newly-incumbent Minister and Deputy Minister of HE rejected TUPRL’s ideological aims. First, it is claimed that new Ministers were conservative Islamists uncomfortable with civil society concepts and the rapid pace of social change advocated by TUPRL. Several participants described how the programme’s opponents likened civil society to ‘an alien object’ that ‘would be rejected by the Libyan body’. Secondly, it is claimed that there was high suspicion that the programme would function as a platform for penetration of Libya by foreign agendas masquerading as international civil society actors.

TUPRL’s director damningly criticised the cancellation and held that no similar programmes were initiated after that leading to him and likeminded colleagues to conclude that little change had been made to HE after the uprising. Another Professor involved in organising civil society initiatives at Tripoli University similarly explained that TURPL’s cancellation was a cause of enormous frustration

359 Dr Ahmed Al-Atrash described the sense of pride at the university accrued from these events which created a good atmosphere for civil society work
360 Dr Sami noted that bureaucracy cannot handle a programme with revolutionary aims and that the TUPRL was effectively ended by the move
and derailed civil society initiatives’ momentum.\textsuperscript{361} When asked why the programme was cancelled she responded that:

\begin{quote}
We have the revolution but also an anti-revolution – some people are not happy about the flow of the tide. People from the 40 years or so under the controlling regime, they employed so many people – it was a very heavy system – it is not easy to eradicate. They don’t easily accept big change.
\end{quote}

Many faculty members held that under Faisel Krekshi, the proactive and liberal-minded first post-Qaddafi Tripoli University President, a strong university vision supported civil society initiatives and explicitly linked HE to democratisation and statebuilding. However, leadership change came about with Dr Krekshi offering his resignation after six months. The change to more conservative leadership was held to have been detrimental to university civil society initiatives as the next President, Dr Medani, was described as a top physician and septuagenarian Professor who represented an older generation less supportive of new or innovative programmes and preferring a slower pace of change. The case of TUPRL illustrates the considerable enthusiasm for democratisation and civil society development yet also the obstacles to utilising HE towards these transitional goals in post-war Libya. Another long-term transitional goal toward which HE struggled to make a major early contribution was economic recovery, which will be considered next.

\section*{8.2.4. Economic Recovery}

Regarding Libya’s long-term economic recovery it is too early to judge HE’s contribution. This section will therefore review some key debates and discourses on HE and economic recovery in Libya. These are diversification, human capital, building a knowledge economy, relevance, and technical and vocational education. Firstly, a consensus holds that diversification is crucial to Libya’s economic vision to reduce oil-dependence, redress unemployment, and stimulate productive sectors. Sectors frequently identified as suitable included renewable energy (especially solar

\footnote{361 Professor, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012. Anonymity was requested on this sensitive issue}
energy), tourism, agriculture, and water. The vast majority of participants viewed HE and in particular TVET as vital to supporting diversification.

A strong emergent theme was that highly-skilled human capital will be critical to economic recovery. As El-Gamaty states, the ‘most important resource that Libya has is its human capital’, constituted by highly-skilled returnees, professionals, academics, and thousands of post-graduate students overseas. It is commonly held that Libya is a rich oil-exporting country with enormous economic potential due to strategic location straddling Europe and Africa, the Mediterranean’s longest coastline, rich archaeological heritage, and small population. Many argue that given these strong initial conditions long-term economic prospects are very good if security is provided and human resources developed. As a principal institution in the human capital formation process HE is held to have a major role in this vision of economic recovery.

Another theme, many participants viewed building a knowledge economy as a major rationale for investment in Libya’s economic recovery. Libya’s highly-educated population and wealth were commonly held to be good initial conditions for embarking on a development path led by information technology, science, and innovation. Investing in domestic HE and research capacity to provide skills and knowledge to support this model was viewed as necessary by some participants. For example, it was held that universities could function as business incubators and should be functionally integrated with industry through science parks to form the basis of a national innovation system. Furthermore, it was commonly held that international university partnerships and research collaborations would be crucial to circulating knowledge and strengthening research capacity to support knowledge-led development models.

362 Dr Ibrahim Saleh, Deputy Minister, MoHE-L - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012
363 Dr Tarek Basher Jdeidi, Head of the Department of Zoology, Tripoli University – Tripoli, Libya 10/2012 ; Ahmad Emrage, President of the Libyan Student Society of the University of Leicester – Leicester, UK 03/2012
364 Guma El-Gamaty, founder, Taghyeer Party - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012
365 Guma El-Gamaty, founder, Taghyeer Party - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012
366 Dr Fathi Al Arabi, Consultant to MoHE-L - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012
It should be qualified that the vast majority of participants saw this knowledge economy model as a long-term aim and recognised that implementation faced many challenges. Moreover, a small number of participants rejected this economic vision; for example, it was held that Libya’s small size and economic structure entail structural dependency as an end-user of research and knowledge and that it would therefore be a waste of resources to invest in national research and innovation systems. It should also be noted that from 2006 official state policy was to invest in HE and knowledge economy development. Participants were divided on the counter-factual claim as to impact this policy would have had if the war and uprising had not occurred. Some held that the plans would have had a large positive impact, others that impact would be substantial in some areas but limited by lack of academic freedom and presence of corruption, while others insisted that plans were merely rhetorical and would not have been implemented by the former regime.

Relevance also emerged as a theme; it was held that HE should connect to local social and developmental needs. For example, Pack and Elmaazi (2013) argue that the University of Sebha in collaboration with Western universities should play a leading role in knowledge transfer to develop the solar energy sector in the underdeveloped Fezzan region and that the university could become a ‘centre of excellence in the Sahel region and node in triggering regional development’. Omar Mukhtar University is also held to have adapted to local developmental challenges by placing agricultural extension at the centre of its expansion plans in Libya’s most fertile region and hosting several conferences and workshops on environmental and agricultural issues.

HE was also viewed as important to supporting economic transition through providing relevant skills including entrepreneurship, SMEs, and private sector development. For example, it was argued that entrepreneurship and business skills should be integrated into all courses and not only business and economics related subjects.\footnote{Dr Fatihi Al Arabi, Consultant to MoHE-L - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012} At an Agriculture Faculty students were required to run small start-up
agricultural initiatives; a project intended to support transition from a socialist to liberal-market economy.\textsuperscript{368} Another example, the NGO SPARK held a Benghazi International Summer University in cooperation with Benghazi University in June-July 2012 to disseminate ‘key concepts of entrepreneurship and business management’ to its 84 mostly student participants (SPARK 2012).

There was a consensus that Libyan HE needed to change to produce skills relevant to labour market needs as it is overwhelmingly theoretical and provides low practical skills and knowledge.\textsuperscript{369} In 2012 a faculty-level review was underway to evaluate curricula changes to adapt to changing economic, social and market requirements. In some faculties, for example, engineering at Tripoli University, curriculum review was undertaken through consultation with firms operating in Libya. Another example, the private Refak University issued a survey to Libyan firms and government agencies for market needs assessment.\textsuperscript{370}

Furthermore, there was general recognition that this structural weakness significantly contributed towards high graduate unemployment. A major economic recovery goal was reducing unemployment, over 30\% in 2012, and graduate unemployment, through stimulating productive sectors and diversification. If achieved, this would provide a ‘peace dividend’ and enable youth to participate in reconstruction thus transforming a major grievance common to ‘Arab Spring’ countries and contributing towards stabilisation.\textsuperscript{371} Aligning curricula with economic needs was in this context advocated to reduce unemployment and given high priority, for example, it was Tripoli University’s second priority.\textsuperscript{372} Furthermore, it was held that professional skills training must be improved to increase graduate employability.\textsuperscript{373} Relatively few obstacles should be anticipated in increasing HE relevance because reforms serve the interests of HEIs, government,

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item Dr Abdullatif Mohamed Karmous, Dean, Faculty of Agriculture, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012
\item See previous chapter section 7.1.4.1 for more analysis of this point in pre-war Libya
\item Mustafa Alfalani, President, Refak University - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012
\item Obaidat, higher education consultant - Tripoli, Libya 12/2012
\item Mohamed Mashena, President, Tripoli University and Dean, Faculty of Engineering, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012
\item Dr Usama Al-Hadi, Head, Department of Architecture and Urban Planning, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
private industry, and students while there is region-wide recognition of the problem. However, a related yet more problematic issue is prioritising technical tertiary education.

Before war and uprising there was recognition that Libya required more practical and technical skills to supply the domestic labour market. A long-standing trend is for high reliance on foreign labour with very high dependence in technical and vocational sectors. Before 2011 there were 1.5 million Tunisian, Egyptian, and other nationality technicians and other workers (St John 2013, p.104) with a Libyan labour force of 1.6 million. A renewed focus on TVET was recommended to redress this imbalance through a process of labour force ‘Libyanisation’.

Post-war rationales for increased focus on TVET were strengthened for two primary reasons. First, TVET holds potential to reduce youth unemployment. Imbalanced tertiary enrolments saw many graduates in fields including medicine or engineering not absorbed by labour markets. Increased technical tertiary enrolment and quality could reduce unemployment by supplying skilled labour to sectors with labour shortages and those with high growth potential including agricultural and industrial sectors expected to drive diversification. For this reason, it was widely-held that technical tertiary education has greater potential than university education in reducing youth unemployment and thus enhancing long-term prospects for stability and post-conflict recovery.

The second rationale is that skills and competencies provided by TVET are more relevant to needs of societies undergoing post-conflict transitions than academic education. It was commonly stated in interviews that rebuilding Libya requires engineers and technicians rather than academics. A quick transfer of students, resources, and policy priority from universities to technical institutes was therefore

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374 See for example Rachid Ghannouchi (2013) on Tunisia  
375 Obaidat, higher education consultant - Tripoli, Libya 12/2012  
376 Obaidat, higher education consultant - Tripoli, Libya 12/2012
recommended to provide quality technicians that could play a role in reconstruction projects.\textsuperscript{377}

That HE should have greater technical emphasis emerged strongly from fieldwork and is relatively uncontroversial. However, large obstacles to focusing on TVET were identified. The lower social value placed upon technical education than university degrees was held to limit TVET’s potential. It is argued that because careers in medicine and engineering are held in high esteem parents will continue to choose to enrol their children in academic degrees rather than TVET.\textsuperscript{378} Another obstacle is strict pay-scales based on grading related to educational level used in public sector employment. Technical institute graduates often must work for 12 years to reach entry pay-levels of new university graduates. Altering this economic incentive structure to reward TVET is a necessary condition for attracting good candidates, for example, through private sector development.\textsuperscript{379}

In sum it can be concluded that Libyan HE at the outset of post-conflict transition made low contribution to the long-term task of economic recovery as curricula was largely irrelevant to economic needs and the system was unbalanced towards academic education. However, research was conducted early in transition and there were indicators that the long-term prognosis for HE to contribute to economic recovery was strong, in particular the curricula review process undertaken at various universities and widespread support for diversification and knowledge-driven development. Another long-term transitional goal where Libyan HE was found to have a limited contribution was in statebuilding, which is analysed next.

\textbf{8.2.5. Statebuilding}

A major task facing post-conflict Libya was statebuilding in a context where state capacity had long been inhibited and national institutions virtually collapsed (Sisk

\textsuperscript{377} Head, Department of Training, MoHE-L - Tripoli, Libya 12/2012
\textsuperscript{378} Dr Salh Buzwaik, Head, Planning Council, Gharyan and Professor, University of the Jabal Al-Gharb - Gharyan, Libya 12/2012
\textsuperscript{379} Dr Fathi Al-Arabi, consultant to MoHE-L - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012
To begin, HE’s contribution to two major aspects of statebuilding will be addressed; legitimacy and capacity.

Establishing legitimate institutions is a central statebuilding task and HE played a role in legitimising the post-Qaddafi state. Elite actors in Libya’s political transition used academic credentials to enhance their legitimacy in the eyes of both domestic and international audiences. Three of Libya’s four post-war Prime Ministers possess PhDs; Jibril, Tarhouni, and El-Keib. Prime Minister Zeidan’s proposed cabinet list of 34 nominee ministers contained 14 PhDs, and 22 with at least Masters degrees (Libya Herald 2012a). Academic credentials of NTC members, in particular positions at foreign universities, were often reported in Western media with the effect of building confidence in the NTC’s technocratic competence in Western diplomatic capitals. Almost all Libyan academics interviewed had greater confidence in the NTC by virtue of its academic credentials, although some were critical of dominance by returnees. While academic credentials accrued some legitimacy from foreign and domestic elites no evidence suggests an effect upon popular domestic legitimacy.

HE was widely viewed by participants as important for capacity-building in national institutions. As Lazar (2012) reports, ‘almost every Ministry that we met with spoke about the importance of sending students abroad for higher education’. Libyan and overseas universities were to provide training for government employees. Ministries were permitted to run their own training programmes for up to six months while all applications for government staff to enrol on degree programmes abroad were administered by the MoHE-L. Ministry of Health was first priority and MoE second in rewarding scholarships for post-graduate study abroad. International opportunities including educational exchange, scholarships, and university partnerships were viewed as important means of supporting statebuilding and capacity-building. For example, Chivvis et al (2012) argue that

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380 Mohamed Mashena, Dean, Faculty of Engineering, Tripoli University – Tripoli, Libya 10/2012; Dr Ibrahim Saleh, Deputy Minister, MoHE-L. Tripoli, Libya 11/2012; Head, Department of Training, MoHE-L - Tripoli, Libya 12/2012; Majda Elferjani, PhD Candidate, School of the Built Environment, University of Salford - Salford, UK 05/2012
research collaborations and partnerships with Western universities could provide high-level human capital and skills necessary for effective statebuilding and public administration. It should be noted that international HE was involved in pre-war capacity-building, notably through the now infamous London School of Economics (LSE) programme.

However, these theorised links between future post-graduate returnees and training current civil-service personnel through international education do not have an immediate measureable impact on statebuilding outcomes. Rather, domestic HE is more strongly linked to state and capacity-building in the short-term. On HE’s contribution to statebuilding it is worth quoting Guma El-Gamaty, who states that:

Many young graduates in Libya have taken a very active role in the revolution, not just militarily, but in all other aspects of the revolution like media, civil society, humanitarian work and so on, and a lot of them are becoming political activists and engaging fully with political transitions and with the process of democratisation, however, when it comes to specific expertise and specific skills to do with management, leadership, with statebuilding and with rebuilding Libya on a strong institutional basis we find that higher education and postgraduate education has not really given us in Libya the required skill levels that we need and this is partly related to the poor quality of education.

Several participants held that research capacity in HE, think-tanks, and other knowledge-producing institutions is vital to functioning of modern states such as the UK or Germany and therefore that Libya should follow a similar model in its statebuilding strategy. Moreover, many interviewees held that research weakness entailed that present contribution to statebuilding and policy-making was low. However, similarly to the quote above, the former Minister of Reconstruction held that the theorised synergistic HE-statebuilding relationship in which HE contributes

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381 Guma El-Gamaty, founder, Taghyeer Party - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012
382 For example, Guma El-Gamaty held that Libyan universities were not acting as experts for government institutions due to the low quality HE. Guma El-Gamaty, founder, Taghyeer Party - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012
to capacity-building and a stronger state in turn offers better resources and opportunities for HE would not work in Libya due to very low HE quality.\textsuperscript{383}

HE was also viewed as critical to providing the leadership required to ensure a successful transition and effective statebuilding process.\textsuperscript{384} However, the Qaddafi regime targeted potential leaders and charismatic figures that constituted a threat to the regime. As Pignon (2012) argues, to achieve the goals of stabilisation and democratisation ‘Libya needs capable, legitimate leaders and technocrats’ yet ‘lacks both the HE system and the network of institutions that allows such leaders to emerge’.

Another core statebuilding challenge was establishing rule of law in a context of weak state authority. It was seen in chapter three that legal education is theorised to be an important yet often over-looked aspect of post-conflict rule of law reforms. An International Legal Assistance Consortium (ILAC 2013) assessment of the Rule of Law in post-war Libya found that legal education suffered from challenges that limited its contribution to rebuilding legal and judicial systems. Law faculties were over-crowded yet the discipline had much lower social prestige than engineering or medicine and therefore received lower quality students.\textsuperscript{385} Teaching was described as highly theoretical with no clinical approaches except at Tripoli University. Furthermore, presence of Qaddafi-era personnel in key positions was held to constitute a university environment that was ‘not particularly reform oriented’, especially older generation Professors slow to adapt to changes; an obstacle to introducing new approaches to legal education such as clinic-based learning. Moreover, one participant held that the challenge of adapting law faculties to the new legal and transitional context was made more difficult due to neglect of legal

\textsuperscript{383} Ahmed Jehani, former Minister of Reconstruction - Benghazi, Libya 11/2012
\textsuperscript{384} Guma El-Gamaty, founder, Taghyeer Party - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012
\textsuperscript{385} Several participants noted that law was held in higher esteem during the 1960s and 1970s when Libya had a relatively strong regional reputation for legal education.
education under the previous regime that governed through force and fear rather than the law. 386

From this section it can be seen that over the long-term there is relatively strong enthusiasm for linking HE to state and capacity-building objectives backed up by political will but that the effects of this will have some lag-time. Meanwhile, domestic HE is characterised by low relevance to transitional goals, which will require significant reform to ensure that the sector makes a positive contribution to institution building by providing high-level human capital, leadership, and research. An area where HE made an important impact on transition early on without the significant lag-time experienced in the field of statebuilding is transitional justice which is considered now.

8.2.6. Transitional Justice and Reconciliation

In terms of transitional justice, a challenge facing HE was transforming a system forged under Qaddafi’s ideological apparatus. University names reflecting Qaddafi-era ideology were renamed offering a symbolic break with the past, for example, Al-Fateh University, named after Qaddafi’s 1969 Al-Fateh revolution, was renamed Tripoli University while the 7th April University, named after the date of 1976 student hangings, was renamed Zawiya University.

Similarly, removing Jamahiriyya studies, a module on the Green Book, was an important early priority. 387 In the Language faculty at Tripoli University the course was replaced with a module on Libyan history intended to provide generalist and civics education. In interview, the lecturer that designed the course explained it would not address modern Libyan history as that would be too controversial and divisive when covering Qaddafi’s rule. 388 However, efforts to replace the module on

386 Dr Ahmed Al-Atrash, former Dean, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012
387 Students were dissatisfied because credits accumulated from completion of the course were cancelled requiring new subjects to be taken
388 Thuraya Al-Wifati, Lecturer, Translation Department, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012
a coordinated nationwide scale were impacted by the TUPRL’s termination as it planned to design civic education modules in replacement.\textsuperscript{389}

Another transitional justice challenge was the fate of Qaddafi-era personnel. Libya consciously avoided perceived mistakes of Iraq’s de-Baathification, a major factor leading to post-2003 HE problems. Rather, the Qaddafi regime ‘old guard’ were incorporated into the new state to ensure stability, although at the cost of delegitimising the state in the eyes of revolutionary actors, and according to Pelham (2012), actually increasing post-Qaddafi instability.

In HEIs, official policy stated that only officials who participated in violence against Libyans or who were known to have stolen public funds were removed.\textsuperscript{390} Additionally, a number left Libya during or after the war. It is difficult to provide accurate numbers of personnel removed for association with the former regime although the number is likely in the low hundreds rather than thousands. One example, Omar Mukhtar University’s President estimated that ‘five to seven’ OMU faculty members chose not to return ‘because they could not face students’ based on common knowledge of their role in the former regime.\textsuperscript{391} Furthermore, students were proactive in pressurising faculty members that threatened students or were strongly supportive of the Qaddafi regime during the war.\textsuperscript{392}

An emergent theme was that faculty members approved the cautious approach to lustration to a greater extent than students. One academic explained that most of those associated with the old regime would be given chances to contribute to building a New Libya. Furthermore, a common position was that the issue should be framed as one of qualifications not loyalty; unmeritocratic appointments led to many under-qualified and incompetent faculty members and other staff who

\textsuperscript{389} Dr Sami Khashkusha, Professor, Department of Political Science, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012
\textsuperscript{390} Mohamed Mashena, President, Tripoli University and Dean, Faculty of Engineering, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012
\textsuperscript{391} Dr Ibrahim El-Ghariani, President, Omar Al-Mukhtar University - Baida, Libya 11/2012
\textsuperscript{392} Anonymous higher education consultant - Tripoli, Libya 12/2012. He explained that his son and his son’s friends planned to threaten lecturers at Tripoli University to force them to leave. In response he persuaded them that staff simply followed orders and the regime could easily identify non-compliant staff so the students should be more forgiving to faculty. While in this case the students accepted this logic numerous interviewees stated that similar instances occurred
should be removed regardless of their ‘loyalties’. However, many students expected greater change in personnel and cite maintenance of ‘Qaddafi’s people’ in their positions as evidence that ‘nothing has changed’. It should be noted that a Dean at Tripoli University explained that difficulties in removing faculty members arose from lack of strong evidence and the requirement that individuals openly accuse others leading to what he described as a ‘dirty game’. On reconciliation and peacebuilding, HE can be said to have made a low contribution to mediating the identity bases of conflict in post-war Libya. As was seen in the previous chapter, HE expansion was accompanied by nationwide campus proliferation. Proliferation was widely-held to constitute a strategy of separating Libyans to delimit possibilities of collective action and mobilisation against the former regime. It was observed that the Arabic word for university Jamia literally means ‘it gathers’ but that Qaddafi’s universities divided. Whether or not this interpretation is accepted, it remains a fact that most HEIs have relatively homogenous regional and social profiles, for example, it is estimated that over 95% of Khoms University students are from Khoms and the surrounding area. Given that regional and local identities constitute underlying societal divisions and enmities that drove conflict in post-war Libya, it follows that regionally homogenised HEIs do not function as arenas in which students mix and associate with ‘the other’ in terms of ethnic, religious, or regional background.

Exceptions to this pattern are universities in Tripoli and Benghazi, the two main cities, where students from across Libya are enrolled. However, it still should be qualified that a rule restricted students to registering at HEIs proximate to their registered place of residence so while Tripoli University and Benghazi University are less homogenous than Zawiya University or Gharyan University, they are much less mixed than other national universities, for instance, Cairo University. Another counter-example is Omar Mukhtar University where students are accepted from

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393 Dr Ahmed Al-Atrash, former Dean, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012
394 See section 7.1.3.
395 Dr Abdulmonim Alaswad, former Dean, IT Faculty, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012
across Libya because its veterinary science, environment, and agriculture specialisms are not offered elsewhere.\textsuperscript{396} The diversity of its student body was held to be a positive resource in stabilising the campus following war because students shared ideas and cultures in a new atmosphere of participation and proactive campus life. However, it must be qualified that data on social profiles of Libyan students was not available when requested from the MoHE-L and the argument here should be treated as a generalisation. Furthermore, while this type of effect on conflict transformation was not a strong theme in interviews it should be expected that there are other positive examples similar to the OMU case.

\textbf{8.2.7. Conclusion}

In this section HE’s contribution to Libya’s post-conflict recovery has been analysed across six dimensions of recovery; conflict prevention and stabilisation, relief and reconstruction, economic recovery, democratisation and civil society building, statebuilding, and transitional justice and reconciliation. The central finding is that the HE sector’s short-term responsive capacity to tasks of conflict prevention, stabilisation, and relief was relatively strong while contribution to long-term tasks of reconstruction and statebuilding was more limited. However, it should be qualified that research was conducted at an early stage and found relatively strong recognition of links between HE and recovery which leads to a prediction that the long-term prospects of HE playing an important role in recovery are good if the challenges and opportunities outlined in the next two sections are navigated effectively.

\textsuperscript{396} Dr Ibrahim El-Ghariani. President, Omar Al-Mukhtar University - Baida, Libya 11/2012
8.3. Post-war Environment of Higher Education

In the above section HE’s contribution to post-conflict recovery was analysed according to its impact across a number of key recovery tasks. It was seen that HE effectively functioned as an agent of stabilisation although it was not strongly incorporated into statebuilding or transitional policy-making. In this section the features of the post-war environment that influenced the above outcome will be analysed to provide an explanation that identifies mechanisms and processes that hinder or enable HE in contributing to recovery. Conjunctural features will be analysed followed by educational, institutional, structural, and external features. Findings of this section form part of the answer to RQ4.

8.3.1. Conjunctural Features

To begin, conjunctural features, which were found to be the most decisive influence in post-war Iraq, will be analysed. It will be seen that while security was less of an obstacle compared to Iraq, instability was a major constraint on the potential of post-war HE contributing to recovery.

8.3.1.1. Security

Security is a significant factor shaping post-war Libyan HE. Most participants held that the security context nationally was ‘chaotic’ and provided a negative environment for HE. During the first six post-war months in particular, militia members and students openly carried guns on some campuses. While campus security was widely stated to have improved after six months many students reportedly carried concealed weapons and security incidents continued. As will be seen in the next section, a major impact of insecurity combined with instability was that faculty members and MoHE-L officials felt limited in their options in

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397 See section 6.3.1.
addressing HE due to availability of weapons, breakdown in rule of law, and the climate of fear characteristic of the post-war environment.\textsuperscript{398}

Campus security in some cities remained poor long after war, for example, several participants reported new social ills on campus including drug-dealing and prostitution. However, security guards were generally unable to act;\textsuperscript{399} a Dean explained that armed security would trigger an arms race due to weapons availability thus leading to a worsened problem.\textsuperscript{400} Campus gates were generally open with no security checks; when a security incident involving students with grenades occurred gates were closed and it took approximately three hours to leave or enter the university.\textsuperscript{401} In June 2013 Tripoli University students planned a strike protesting worsening campus security including an assault on a female student (Tombokti 2013). Furthermore, looting continued, for example, delaying the autumn 2012 term start at Omar Mukhtar University\textsuperscript{402} while Tripoli University offices were found trashed after each vacation.\textsuperscript{403} Dormitories for 250 students and 50 staff members were even occupied by ‘criminals’ at Omar Mukhtar University with security forces unable to enforce evictions.\textsuperscript{404} However, several participants were ‘proud’ that no fatalities occurred on any campus and in comparison with Iraq security should be considered high.

Several programmes or projects were postponed, cancelled or amended due to insecurity. As seen earlier, a massive campus infrastructure building programme initiated in the mid-2000s was postponed leaving many buildings partially completed and some over 90\% completed. The vast majority of contractors were foreign and did not return due to the perception that Libya was highly-insecure. In

\textsuperscript{398} See section 8.3.1.2. and 8.3.4.

\textsuperscript{399} The former head of the Engineering Student Union at Omar Mukhtar University claimed that ‘security guards don’t do anything, they just sit’. Former Head, Student Union, Faculty of Engineering, Omar Mukhtar University - Baida, Libya 11/2012

\textsuperscript{400} Dean, Faculty of Science, Zawiya University - Zawiya, Libya 12/2012

\textsuperscript{401} Dr Usama Al-Hadi, Head, Department of Architecture and Urban Planning, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012

\textsuperscript{402} Head, Department of Computer Science, Omar Mukhtar University - Baida, Libya 11/2012

\textsuperscript{403} Dr Usama Al-Hadi, Head, Department of Architecture and Urban Planning, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012

\textsuperscript{404} Dr Ibrahim El-Ghariani, President, Omar Al-Mukhtar University - Baida, Libya 11/2012
addition, a UNESCO IT programme was scaled-down and plans to establish a research and policy unit at Benghazi University supported by Oxford Research International were cancelled due to security concerns.

However, some participants held that a large gap existed between objective security levels and the media-driven perception that Libya was highly insecure. In their view, media reports focusing on localised violent episodes, in particular the attack on the US Consulate in Benghazi, are a major obstacle to progress in rebuilding HE and attracting investment. A Dean cognizant of this problem stated that he appealed to his students that ‘one bullet doesn’t cost one dollar but billions of dollars’.\textsuperscript{405} From this perspective, despite media images of Libya beset by militia violence, localised conflict and the absence of the rule of law, insecurity was not a major obstacle to daily operations of HE; rather, insecurity constrained the construction programme and the space available to enact reforms and changes to the sector.

Protracted conflict in the ‘post’-conflict period caused disruption to some HEIs, for example, during the siege of Bani Walid in November 2012 Misrata University was closed because a high proportion of Misratan brigades leading the siege were students, while the Bani Walid campus was closed due to bombardment, and Azzaytuna University was closed due to its proximity. However, protracted social conflicts were not found to significantly affect HE directly. While localised fighting, for example in Fezzan, was a major national security concern there was very low direct impact on HE while societal divisions, for example ethnic, regional, or religious differences, were not reflected in high levels of campus-level conflict, contrary to the Iraq case. However, these conflicts produced indirect effects on HE by driving post-war instability; a major dynamic constraining the post-war role of Libyan HE that will be addressed in the next section.

\textsuperscript{405} Dean, Faculty of Science, Zawiya University - Zawiya, Libya 12/2012
8.3.1.2. Stability and Order

Many participants held that stability was a necessary condition for progress in HE. Various sources of instability were identified. First, breakdown in rule of law, weapons availability, and weakness of security forces contributed to general instability shaping the context of HE. Also, violent groups, in particular radical Salafists, were held to have destabilised Libya and to be ‘holding back the university’.\textsuperscript{406} Within HE leadership changes were held to be highly destabilising,\textsuperscript{407} for example, Tripoli University had three Presidents in little over a year while short-terms in office of the NTC led to regular MoHE-L personnel changes. Furthermore, student protests, campus insecurity, and everyday problems over-burdening capacity are all held to have led to institutional instability in HEIs.

A main effect of instability was held to be that decision-making became highly constrained.\textsuperscript{408} Social pressure exerted by students in an insecure context was held to significantly constrain policy-space available to the MoHE-L. HE is a powerful positional good in Libya with high social status conferred upon graduates of prestige colleges including medicine and engineering or overseas scholarship recipients. A MoHE-L official explained that during the first ten post-war months insecurity and student demands ‘had a big, big influence on all decisions’.\textsuperscript{409} Many young people came to the Ministry daily to demand education or training and some even carried weapons, severely disrupting the Ministry and endangering staff. As one academic explained, MoHE-L officials ‘were in danger from many different aspects’.\textsuperscript{410} Some policy options including introducing small tuition fees for students were viewed as impossible to implement in this context ‘because it would lead to another revolution’.

\textsuperscript{406} Dr Sami Khashkusha, Professor, Department of Political Science, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012
\textsuperscript{407} Dr Taher, former Head of Physics, Tripoli University – 10/2012
\textsuperscript{408} Dr Mohamed Amer, Head, Chemical Engineering Department, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012
\textsuperscript{409} Head, Department of Training, MoHE-L - Tripoli, Libya 12/2012
\textsuperscript{410} Dr Tarek Basher Jdeidi, Head, Department of Zoology, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 12/2012
Options available at university-level were also perceived to be limited by social pressure, instability, and insecurity. Libya’s large student body regained collective agency after the uprising and protests occurred over issues including better campus conditions, improved teaching, and student rights. Protests disrupted HE and some faculty reported cancelling reforms or changes due to student action. Students reportedly pressurised universities for many reasons including removal of ‘bad staff’, cancellation of exams, and rescheduling lectures.\footnote{Obaidat, higher education consultant. Tripoli, Libya 12/2012} Furthermore, it was held that students possessed weapons and some attempted to ‘take their rights by arms’.\footnote{Dr Abdulatif, Director, International Cooperation Office, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012.} Many faculty members linked instability to attitudinal and behavioural change in students, in particular those that fought during war, who were more confident, aggressive, and confrontational. Student-faculty relations, hierarchical and rigid before the war, were being contested and re-negotiated posing another source of instability.

Faculty members were curtailed in their ability to remove students and also staff. For example, a Dean held that expelling under-performing ‘permanent’ students was impossible because it was ‘too risky’\footnote{Dr Ahmed Al-Atrash, former Dean, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012} while ‘ghost staff’ could not be fired due to risks of retribution from families. One Dean when asked if student pressure had curtailed the ability to enact faculty-level change replied that ‘it almost eliminated it, it cancelled anything that you think is right for the students, but they think it is not right’.\footnote{Dean, Faculty of Science, Zawiya University - Zawiya, Libya 12/2012}

It was seen above that the post-war environment brought many new needs in HE that compounded pre-existing needs. Furthermore, distortions necessitated adaptation by HEIs. An emergent theme was that meeting increased educational needs, including re-writing curricula and registering students, was intensified by additional burdens of coping with transitional problems including regular student protest and refurbishing damaged buildings, and dominated day-to-day activities of faculty members and administrative staff. For example, the President of Tripoli
University argued that students unaccustomed to protesting overstepped a reasonable level at a time the institution was trying to solve everyday problems. Furthermore, implementing HE rules and procedures in an unstable context was held to be very difficult.\textsuperscript{415}

A significant number of participants held that these everyday short-term day-to-day issues and logistical and practical problems were an obstacle to more proactive responses to transitional challenges and contributing to post-war recovery through programmes, activities, and medium-term to long-term strategic planning. Most participants viewed this negatively, holding that myriad problems in the post-war environment limited their capacity to impact upon ‘building a New Libya’ despite strong enthusiasm and will. However, a smaller number held that short-term strategizing is appropriate for managing HEIs during the early stages of post-war recovery.\textsuperscript{416} These everyday obstacles can also be viewed as constraining the freedoms of Libyan academics, a point that connects with the focus of the next section on academic freedom.

\section*{8.3.1.3. Academic Freedom and Autonomy}

To begin, a clear majority of participants felt Qaddafi’s fall offered a major opportunity to ensure academic freedom. Rights to freely research and publish, organise independently of the state, and to criticise the regime were previously denied. HEIs during 2011-2012 operated largely under Qaddafi-era regulations with no new legal protections for academic freedom. The institutional aspect of academic freedom was therefore not secured; rather, freedom was gained through breakdown of the repressive state apparatus. A clear majority of participants felt that they experienced academic freedom with the ability to teach and research any topic and speak independently. However, a small number held that while under Qaddafi you

\textsuperscript{415} Dr Mohamed Amer, Head, Chemical Engineering Department, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012
\textsuperscript{416} Dr Hadi Omran Tumi, Head, Civil Engineering Department, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012
could criticise anything but his regime after his fall academics were free to criticise anything but the February 17th Revolution and ‘revolutionaries’.417

The new atmosphere of freedom was widely-held to have enabled students and faculty members to participate much more in humanitarian, civil society, and media spheres than would have been the case if loyalist forces had been outright victors in the civil war. As one interviewee stated, there was the ‘smell of freedom’ on campus and ‘freedom could be seen in the students’ faces’.418 However, many faculty members held that students had ‘misunderstood their freedoms’, for example by intimidating staff and protesting over minor issues, thus constituting an obstacle to maintaining order and stability.

It should be qualified that the approach adopted in this case-study of relying primarily on interviews and focus groups poses limitations in addressing this issue. If it is supposed that the above-outlined contrary position is true, that academics are not free to criticise the ‘revolution’, then it follows that self-reports of those claiming that full academic freedom is present are of reduced value. However, this possibility is weakened by the fact that a large number of participants did criticise the NTC’s ‘revolutionary’ leadership for achieving little in their first year and ‘revolutionary’ armed actors for perpetuating security problems.

Despite this qualification, the perceived presence of academic freedom or at least the presence of conditions upon which academic freedom could be established were widely-held to be favourable initial conditions for HE contributing to long-term recovery. To investigate this point, participants were asked the counter-factual question, ‘what would the prospects of the HE sector contributing to development in Libya be had Qaddafi remained in power?’ The most common responses were that nothing would change, the situation would get worse, or that there may be material progress but that it would be meaningless without freedom. The concern with academic freedom in relation to teaching and research links to the subject of

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417 Two participants made this case forcefully and both requested anonymity
418 Dr Abdulatif, Director, International Cooperation Office, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012
the next section, the educational dimension of the post-war environment shaping Libyan HE.

8.3.2. Educational Features

It was seen above that conjunctural aspects of the post-war environment, in particular instability, were a major influence on HE. It will be seen in this section that educational features were also significant, in particular the constraints that low quality placed on meeting the needs for long-term goals of statebuilding and reconstruction.

8.3.2.1. Access

Access influenced the HE-recovery relationship in both positive and negative directions. In short-term stabilisation and conflict prevention, where HE was effective, high enrolment constituted an asset in that the system possessed considerable absorptive capacity towards the young university-age population. However, on improving quality and linking HE to long-term goals of economic recovery and statebuilding high access was widely-considered an obstacle. It was seen in chapter seven that a distortion of the 2011 civil war was increased enrolment in various faculties in order to purchase loyalty to the former regime. In the post-war environment in which universities faced many challenges the additional burden of teaching very large numbers of students in adequate facilities was widely cited as a major obstacle.

The majority of participants held that enrolment was too high and HEIs operated above maximum capacity while a minority viewed the very high enrolment ratio as

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419 For example an assistant to Dr Fathi Akkari stated that high student numbers was the biggest problem facing post-war higher education - Tripoli, Libya 12/2012
420 Dr Abdulmonim Alaswad, former Dean, IT Faculty, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012; Dr Hussain Zurgane, Department of Economy, Tripoli University – Tripoli, Libya 10/2012; Dr Milad Taher, Director of the Planning and Development Department, MOHE-L – Tripoli, Libya 11/2012; Dr Khalid Karmaji, Dean of Engineering, Zawiya University – Zawiya, Libya 12/2012
a positive resource. Many participants, in particular HE consultants and Ministry officials, identified a pressing need to consolidate the sector by reducing the number of institutions.\textsuperscript{421} It is commonly argued that Libya’s approximate six million population does not need 400,000 students across 13 universities. While some held that there should be only three ‘national’ universities in Tripoli, Benghazi and Sebha, a more common position was that there should be six to eight universities. It was recommended that large scientific and technical faculties should be consolidated to gain economies of scale on expensive equipment,\textsuperscript{422} for example, Omar Mukhtar University’s three medicine faculties in Baida, Derna, and Tobruk should be centralised in one location.\textsuperscript{423}

However, as will be seen in section 8.3.4, the unstable post-war context and the role of HE expansion in legitimisation strategies of the former regime combined to place a structural barrier to rationalisation of the HE sector. While Libyan HE is quantitatively strong this does not guarantee equitable distribution of opportunities in the sector, a dynamic which is explored next.

\textbf{8.3.2.2. Equity}

There was less concern with equity than access as an influence upon post-war HE although equity issues were raised. Firstly, minority rights were noted. Several participants held that all minority groups historically had equal access and that therefore equity concerns were not a challenge facing post-war HE policy.\textsuperscript{424} However, several reports indicate that Tebu and other minorities in the south face obstacles to HE participation (Stocker 2013). The post-uprising environment was viewed as an opportunity to gain rights by minority groups. For example, before 2011 Arabic was the exclusive language of instruction. After war, Amazigh was

\textsuperscript{421} Dr Fathi Al-Arabi, consultant to MoHE-L - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012; Mohamed Yaseen, Registrar, Medicine Faculty, Omar Mukhtar University, Baida, Libya 11/2012
\textsuperscript{422} Dr Salh Buzwaik, Head, Planning Council, Gharyan and Professor, University of the Jabal Al-Gharb - Gharyan, Libya 12/2012
\textsuperscript{423} Dr Ibrahim El-Ghariani, President, Omar Al-Mukhtar University - Baida, Libya 11/2012
\textsuperscript{424} For example, Guma El-Gamaty, founder, Taghyeer Party - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012
freely spoken amongst students and it was reported that in the West educational institutions began to teach in Amazigh. This indicates that post-war HE became more inclusive enabling the largest minority group to feel a ‘peace dividend’.

Another major concern is gender equity. In absolute terms female students are well represented. In many faculties female students constitute 70-80% of total enrolment except in engineering subjects (ILAC 2013). However, the proportion of female students from rural areas studying in the top national universities in Tripoli and Benghazi or receiving scholarships to study abroad is much lower than male students due to social norms that young women should not live alone in cities far from their hometown or abroad. Given the strategic priority placed on scholarships to develop post-war HE this may be expected to perpetuate gender inequality in access to prestigious scholarships and therefore the best prospects for career advancement upon return. However, in comparison to Tunisia, where the 2011 revolution was followed by intense public debate and contest over gender relations in HE focusing on Islamic dress codes, gender equity was much less politicised.

Moreover, equity concerns emerged over scholarships with several interviewees holding that disproportionate numbers were awarded to students from hometowns of officials managing the programme. This perception of regional particularism contributes to place-based enmities and animosities that were a major cause of post-conflict division and instability. Furthermore, it was claimed that those loyal to the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist groups were given preference. It should be qualified that this constituted continuity with pre-war favouring of regime loyalists and Qaddafa tribe members. Furthermore, these claims were strongly rejected by MoHE-L officials and could not be independently verified.

However, despite the above three equity concerns, it did not emerge strongly as a theme and should not be considered a major influence upon the HE-recovery

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[^425]: Graffiti and wall art at Tripoli University included much Amazigh art which was interpreted as a newly confident statement of identity enabled by the new campus environment

[^426]: Deputy Dean, Faculty of Arts, former Head, Department of Psychology, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012

[^427]: Dr Sami Khashkusha, Professor, Department of Political Science, Tripoli University. Tripoli, Libya 11/2012
relationship. Moreover, class-based equity concerns were not a theme from interviews. Concerns with inequality based on income did however arise over possibilities of introducing user-fees in public HEIs and private HE expansion with a widespread view that universal free public HE effectively promoted social mobility. Moreover, it was held that Qaddafi recruited poor and disadvantaged youth from rural areas by offering HE opportunities in the expectation that those with less would offer greater loyalty. While equity did not emerge as a strong theme, another educational that did emerge strongly was quality, which will be addressed now.

8.3.2.3. Quality

The most basic HE-recovery linkage is through delivery of good quality education, training, and research. Many participants agreed that poor quality HE limited the sector’s contribution to stabilisation or reconstruction. However, there are various dimensions of quality with each mediating the HE-recovery relationship differently. Highly theoretical and insufficiently practical pedagogical approaches were held to limit transmission of applied skills that would best support reconstruction and recovery. There was some recognition that more student-led and participative learning would improve quality although over-stretched capacity due to large class-sizes and lack of staff training were held to be obstacles to reforms in this direction. Moreover, pedagogy was also framed as an issue for stabilisation in that ‘boring education’ constituted a youth grievance that should be addressed.

Low research quality was held to severely limit HE’s contribution to recovery. Poor facilities, high teaching workloads, low incentives, weak English language skills, and lack of university-industry linkages were commonly cited as indicators of weak research capacity. A related dimension of quality constraining the gearing of HE

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428 Dr Sami Khashkusha, Professor, Department of Political Science, Tripoli University. Tripoli, Libya 11/2012
429 Two officials at EDB. Tripoli, Libya 11/2012
430 For example, Dr Ghanuni held that poor English language skills was the greatest challenge facing efforts to improve research quality. Dr Ahmed Murad Ghanuni, Coordinator, Faculty of Agriculture and International Cooperation Office, Tripoli University. Tripoli, Libya 11/2012
towards recovery and transition was low relevance of HE and research to social, economic, and development needs. However, Libyan postgraduates overseas were widely-viewed as a major resource in that many were pursuing topics related to Libya’s development and would therefore have major impacts on relevance upon their return.

Two strongly contrasting views on post-war Libyan HE hold on the one hand that minor technical fixes are required to ensure that the sector is healthy and contributes to recovery while on the other hand it was held that HE quality was so low it could not make any positive contribution. The first perspective was defended by the former Dean of Science at Tripoli University, who held that his university delivered courses comparable to universities worldwide and was very close to standards set under the Bologna Process. Several participants held that the basic teaching quality was good citing as indicators strong teaching staff educated at Western universities and success of Libyan graduates pursuing postgraduate education abroad. It was conceded that research capacity was not as strong as teaching and that cooperation between Libyan HEIs, domestic industry, and international universities would strengthen research.

The second perspective was offered by Ahmed Jehani, former Minister for Reconstruction, who argued forcefully that Libyan universities were corroded by Qaddafi’s rule. He contended that the thesis that HE could play an important role in reconstruction was valid but that Libya was an exceptional case due to systemic distortion arising from Qaddafi’s defective state-building strategies. He argued that Qaddafi massively over-expanded HE to ‘pretend we are a developed country’ and gave opportunities almost solely based on loyalty leading to the ‘contamination’ of most incumbent faculty members. Rather than minor technical improvements, it was proposed that HE required a ‘complete system transformation’. When asked

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431 Dr Sobhi, Vice-Dean, Faculty of Languages, Tripoli University. Tripoli, Libya 11/2012
432 Dr Mohamed Amer, Head, Chemical Engineering Department, Tripoli University. Tripoli, Libya 10/2012
433 Dr Aboubaker Swehli, Department of Zoology and International Cooperation Office, Tripoli University. Tripoli, Libya 10/2012
434 Ahmed Jehani, former Minister of Reconstruction. Benghazi, Libya 11/2012
what reforms were required, he replied ‘don’t start from the premise that there is something to be made out of this higher education’. This position of starting from scratch is a polar opposite of the view that minor fixes would be adequate.

A more balanced perspective can be defended in which neither pole of minor technical fixes or complete system transformation would be recommended to achieve quality. Introducing quality assurance mechanisms is official HE policy although several participants doubted the effectiveness of this model or the scale of its implementation. Rather than focus on quality assurance many participants viewed reviewing and training faculty members, updating curricula, and ensuring meritocratic appointments as the best means of improving teaching quality. Regarding research quality, investing massively in research infrastructure and facilities, establishing a grant-awarding body, incentivising research and publication, and cooperation with private industry were all commonly suggested. Further, a cross-cutting issue is that consolidating existing quantitative HE capacity would reverse the trade-off between quantity and quality made during rapid system expansion. These concerns with the impact of HE policy options on quality connect with the subject of the next section, the institutional dimension of the post-war environment in terms of its enabling or constraining affect upon the HE-recovery relationship.

### 8.3.3. Institutional Features

In this section institutional features shaping national-level HE policy-making and university-level governance will be analysed including governance, capacity, and leadership. A key task is to analyse perceived constraints upon HE actors’ agency to
reform HE and utilise HE capacity towards recovery. To begin, strategy for post-war HE reform and recovery will be examined.

8.3.3.1. Strategy

To start with, Libya should be classified as possessing strong ‘ownership’ of post-war reconstruction policy. International agencies and foreign states adopted a ‘light footprint’ approach as Libya’s transitional authorities were concerned with their already fragile legitimacy and worked to avoid perceptions of foreign interference or influence (Chivvis et al 2012). Moreover, Libya is a rich country not dependent on foreign aid and attendant conditionalities. Furthermore, a related point is that several participants held that there is a great deal of political will to support and reform HE.\(^\text{437}\)

However, NTC priorities for post-conflict Libya were overwhelmingly focused on achieving domestic security and re-establishing rule of law. HE was a relatively low priority in overall stabilisation and reconstruction strategy. Prioritisation of various sectors is reflected in the March 2012 budget in which 1.1 billion dinars were allocated to the MoHE-L. This is roughly one-quarter of the 4.6 billion to the Ministry of Education while the Ministry of Defence received four billion (Zaptia 2012).

Many academics interviewed claimed that HE’s contribution to post-conflict recovery was limited by low prioritisation and low funding of HE. It should be qualified that the 1.1 billion dinars is the highest HE budget in Libyan history and roughly three-times the 2010 budget of 300-400 million dinars. However, while the budget was high many participants reported large delays in disbursement. Furthermore, in nearly all HEIs the university budget was allocated almost entirely to current spending with negligible capital investment budget. One Professor described how

\(^{437}\) Guma El-Gamaty, founder, Taghyeer Party - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012. Also, Mohamed Mashena, Temporary President, Tripoli University and Dean, Faculty of Engineering, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012
he had 1,000 dinars at his disposal for one academic year and that staff and students
donated to fund activities, workshops, and events.

The MoHE-L’s first post-war goal war was re-starting the HE system; a major
logistical challenge given uneven disruption to HE. Contributing to stability by
getting students off the streets and back into HE was the main objective behind the
drive to resume studies. Second, connecting internationally through scholarships
and partnerships was viewed as an important area of strategic focus. Another area
was to draft and pass a new HE law addressing decentralisation, pay-scales, career
progression, hiring, and strategic planning.438

Various criticisms of MoHE-L strategy have been made. First, it is argued that the
MoHE-L ‘mixed priorities’ by pursuing scholarships, partnerships, curricula
reform, and other ‘long-term’ reforms while the pressing issue of resolving conflicts
went unaddressed.439 It is held that failure to resolve internal conflicts, for instance a
clear chain-of-command and university-state relations, prevented post-war progress
and stability within universities. Second, a strong emergent theme from interviews
was that the Ministry had no clear strategy.440 For example, it was held that the
MoHE-L ‘did nothing’ despite high expectations of change.441 Third, HE policy
under the NTC was criticised for operating in a closed process that failed to consult
or include stakeholders.442 While some of these shortcomings in strategy can be
explained in reference to poor strategic planning and instability the low capacity of
the MOHE-L and the state also constrained strategy, a dynamic that will now be
analysed.

438 Mohamed Mashena, Temporary President, Tripoli University and Dean, Faculty of Engineering,
Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012
439 Obaidat, higher education consultant - Tripoli, Libya 12/2012
440 For example, Dr Sami Khashkusha, Professor, Department of Political Science, Tripoli University -
Tripoli, Libya 11/2012
441 Dr Fathi Al Arabi, Consultant to MoHE-L - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012
442 Obaidat, higher education consultant - Tripoli, Libya 12/2012
8.3.3.2. State and Ministerial Capacity

A primary constraint on post-war HE was low MoHE-L and state capacity. Under Qaddafi the General People’s Committee for Higher Education (GPC) was responsible for HE. It was seen earlier that policy in this period fluctuated with each ministerial appointment, strategic planning was weak, and sudden decisions were made personally by Qaddafi causing numerous contradictions and distortions.\footnote{See section 7.1.4.2.} After Tripoli’s fall and the NTC’s establishment the GPC became the new MoHE-L. The Ministry was under the Minister of Education’s stewardship until Naeem Ghariani’s inauguration as Minister of HE on the 24\textsuperscript{th} November 2011 as part of Abdurrahim El-Keib’s government.

The MoHE-L was held to be limited by physical capacity. In the first post-war months the Ministry had no dedicated premises after which it moved to a location on the outskirts of Tripoli with poor facilities. An indicator of limited policy implementation capacity, it was reported that official policy is that all universities should have a quality assurance office yet Azzaytuna University did not have one in late 2012.\footnote{Dr Aboubaker, Assistant to Dean, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Azzaytuna University - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012} Outside of Tripoli it was commonly reported that the Ministry had poor communications and relationships with individual universities.\footnote{Dr Mohamed Al Asfar, Media Department, Azzaytuna University - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012} The Head of Planning described the impact of these factors on his work, stating that ‘we weren’t stabilised at all. It’s in a mess, a firefighting approach, you cannot consider it planning, you cannot do anything’.\footnote{Dr Milad Taher, Director, Planning and Development Department, MoHE-L - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012}

A MoHE-L official held that the largest obstacle to the Ministry in the post-war period was employee quality.\footnote{Dr Milad Taher, Director, Planning and Development Department, MoHE-L - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012} The head of training argued that the Ministry’s human resources were poor and urgently required comprehensive staff training.\footnote{Head, Department of Training, MoHE-L - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012}
He stated that the Ministry in 2012 employed around 300 while 100 were required. Of the 300 staff an estimated 50% never or very rarely attended work. It was explained that ‘ghost workers’ could not be fired due to complex bureaucratic procedures. Furthermore, the transitional environment constrained ability to fire workers because weapons prevalence meant that families of affected workers could respond violently and threaten Ministry officials. He said that ‘because of the security side you cannot do anything’. Furthermore, low wages at the MoHE-L were held to prevent attraction of the most qualified candidates. The limited capacity of the Ministry constrained the quality of governance of the HE sector, a closely inter-connected dynamic that will now be examined.

8.3.3.3. Governance

Various aspects of HE governance were widely viewed by participants as significantly affecting the HE-recovery relationship. Firstly, many students and academic staff identified corruption as a major problem facing HE. Under Qaddafi’s regime corruption was widespread including in HE (Eljarh 2012). A frequently cited example is that the large-scale campus construction programme and $6 billion HE investment initiative launched in 2006 was incomplete in 2011 due to delays caused by corruption. Several participants described an entrenched ‘culture of corruption’. Furthermore, it was held that the vast majority of officials retained their positions after the war, with no systemic change, and that corruption continued at pre-war levels. While corruption was widely-perceived as a major obstacle it should be qualified that the issue was sensitive to approach during fieldwork.

449 Dr Milad Taher, Director, Planning and Development Department, MoHE-L - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012
450 For example, Ahmed Jehani, former Minister of Reconstruction - Benghazi, Libya 11/2012
451 Dr Ahmad Al-Atrash explained that the culture of corruption was very deep and that officials not benefitting from holding public office were looked down on as ‘unable to help themselves’. Dr Ahmed Al-Atrash, former Dean, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012
Another factor, the short office term length of Libya’s transitional government was frequently cited as a reason for perceived low integration of HE with reconstruction strategy. Many participants held that there was no strategy because the government only held office for one year during which it was impossible to analyse a sector and implement policies. Furthermore, HE policy was held to only be weakly institutionalised with each new Ministerial team largely replacing previous policies leading to high discontinuity.  

Leadership is a major aspect of post-conflict governance identified in chapter three and emerged as a very strong theme from interview data. The strong presence of formerly exiled or diaspora Libyans in transitional authorities is viewed as bolstering the NTC’s legitimacy by many Western observers and states while within Libya there has been both support for and criticism of ‘outsiders’ in government. Minister of HE Naeem Ghariani and Deputy Minister Fathi Akkari spent most of their professional careers abroad. Some participants held that this fact limited the Ministerial team’s ability to effectively lead while others argued that it had a positive impact.

Firstly, it is argued that the Ministerial team entered office without adequate knowledge of Libyan HE. In a country where it is held that relationships and personal contacts are paramount in getting things done, appointing outsiders was held to be very limiting; as one academic explained of the Minister ‘maybe he knew hundreds of individuals in Libyan universities, but Libyan academics would know thousands upon thousands’. Crucially, the Deputy Minister for Scientific Research argued the appointments were not optimal for running the Ministry. He spent his professional career in Libyan universities and noted that Dr Naeem and Dr Fathi relied on his knowledge and intimacy with Libya’s context to work effectively. As

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452 A participant held that Libya suffered documentation problems; newly incumbent Ministers take office with little knowledge of previous administrations’ work and therefore devise policy from zero. Dr Usama Al-Hadi, Head, Department of Architecture and Urban Planning, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012
453 See section 3.3.2.2.
454 This is anecdotally illustrated by the fact that the author received an email from the incoming minister requesting sources on Libya HE in response to an article published by the author on Libya’s recovery and HE in the Chronicle of Higher Education
one academic argued, Libya is a complex society and you cannot simply appoint an ‘American who lives in Washington’ as Minister.\textsuperscript{455}

Another effect of appointing outsiders may be held to be increased attention to internationalisation over domestic reform. Ministers with many social and professional connections in the US or UK are more comfortable arranging international partnership agreements or scholarship programmes than planning changes to admissions, curriculum, or pedagogic aspects of Libya’s HEIs. However, in interviews with Ministry officials this argument was rejected; rather it was argued that outsider status enabled easier communication and connections with international partners although the Ministry’s main focus was internal. Moreover, some participants were highly positive about Ministers who had worked extensively abroad, holding that knowledge, best-practices, and contacts from outside would help develop HE. These debates on Ministerial leadership connect with the subject of the next section on university-level governance.

8.3.3.4. University Governance and Leadership

A large number of participants viewed bureaucratic procedures as a major obstacle to effective functioning of HEIs. Highly-centralised financial management and procurement with lengthy procedures for purchasing small items was widely-cited as a grievance and held to slow replacing and rehabilitating equipment and facilities damaged, looted, or destroyed during war. One HOD noted that his department did not even have ten dinars to spend independently and further that a list of required items sent to the university President was later found to have not been delivered.\textsuperscript{456}

In this context centralised university governance was held to constrain departmental and faculty capacity to adapt to new post-war challenges and opportunities. Similarly, large-scale programmes and international cooperation

\textsuperscript{455} Dr Sami Khashkusha, Professor, Department of Political Science, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012

\textsuperscript{456} Dr Usama Al-Hadi, Head, Department of Architecture and Urban Planning, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012
were centrally-controlled by university administration. One Professor reported that he was disciplined by university administration for simply making email contact with an academic in Germany about potential research collaboration. Moreover, bureaucracy was also identified as a major problem, for example, the President of Omar Mukhtar University stated that the President and not the financial department should control university affairs.457

University leadership was also held to be a major factor influencing HE’s contribution to recovery and transitional goals. Earlier it was seen that the change of Tripoli University’s President from a reformist liberal-minded to more conservative older-generation figure slowed the pace of civil society initiatives. It is clear from this example that leadership strongly influences the vision implemented in each university and therefore the manner in which universities contribute to recovery.

Furthermore, regular leadership changes caused internal political conflict destabilising to the institution. After controversy surrounding Dr Krekshi’s removal/resignation a political schism reportedly emerged with approximately 15 Deans considered ‘pro-Faisal’ while five backed Dr Medani. In November 2012 while fieldwork was conducted, Dr Medani was ‘on vacation’ in America while a ‘temporary President’ Dr Mohamed Mashena assumed his duties after allegations were made that Dr Medani advocated for the Qaddafi regime to diplomats in foreign capitals during the Libyan civil war, leading to counter-allegations and rendering the issue highly sensitive. Notwithstanding the validity of the above claims, they raise the wider issue of political and ideological conflict as a barrier to HE contributing to post-conflict recovery.

Management was also held to be a major obstacle to post-war HE. Many participants held that administrative and leadership positions were frequently held by under-qualified staff who often gained positions due to loyalty to the former regime. Further, it was held that ‘the system’ had become distorted and corrupted by years of mismanagement, corruption, centralisation, and nepotism. This class of

457 Dr Ibrahim El-Ghariani, President, Omar Al-Mukhtar University - Baida, Libya 11/2012
officials were described in particular by younger faculty members as conservative, resistant to change, and an obstacle to innovative programmes and adaptation towards new transitional challenges. Moreover, amongst students the primary explanation for perceived failure of the ‘revolution’ to be enacted in HE is ‘bad management’ and maintenance of ‘Qaddafi’s people’.

A focus group with HODs and Deans in an IT Faculty revealed that these faculty members in strategic positions felt very positive about their collective capacity to change the educational and organisational character of their faculty although they were less optimistic about other faculties.\textsuperscript{458} It was held that because the Faculty was only several years old and the participants were relatively young (35-50) having recently completed postgraduate training abroad they would be able to implement new ideas and innovations without meeting resistance of older senior Professors in large faculties including science where the ‘old mentality’ was deeply entrenched. The finding that mentality was significant relates to the psychological and conceptual obstacles to the HE-recovery relationship analysed in the next section.

\textbf{8.3.3.5. Policy Influences}

It is argued here that low utilisation of HE for recovery may be explained in part by the ‘normal development’ conceptualisation of the task facing Libya detected amongst some Ministry officials and planners. One explanation for ‘normal development’ framing of policy is that MoHE-L and university officials do not have expertise on how challenges of recovery and transition are addressed in other post-conflict contexts.\textsuperscript{459} The Dean of Engineering at Tripoli University held that the only instance of outside expertise consulting on HE in post-conflict transitions at the university-level was a one-day workshop held in Tripoli led by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

\textsuperscript{458} Focus group with Dr Abdul salam Nusari, former Head, Software Engineering Department, Vice-Dean of Faculty. Dr Halal Dbuli, Dean, Faculty of Information Technology. Dr Ibrahim Merhag, Head, Networking Department. Dr Abdulsalam Sherif, Head, Computer Science Department. All at Faculty of Information Technology, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012

\textsuperscript{459} Obaidat, higher education consultant - Tripoli, Libya 12/2012
Another explanation for ‘normal development’ conceptualisation is that policymaking is highly centralised in Tripoli which was not severely affected by war in comparison to areas including Misrata, Ajdabiya, Zawiya, or Sirte thus distorting the reality facing post-war Libya. It may be argued that with policy-makers centralised in Tripoli the experience of conflict-affected areas is distant and therefore not central to policy concerns which are framed as much in terms of ‘normal development’ as recovery. Two participants employed by the EDB, both from Misrata, stated that ‘80% of people, including most of our colleagues, have not seen what we have seen’ with Tripoli having no real war-related problems while Misrata experienced guns, tanks and bombs. It is argued that consequently, innovative thinking on linking HE capacity to conflict-related challenges was not common in Tripoli. The two participants stated that they were a minor voice in proposing programmes in areas including using HE opportunities for DDR in areas including Misrata and Zintan.

A ‘normal development’ conceptualisation may also be held to be present in EDB and MoHE-L policy-transfer and lesson-learning activities. This statement is supported by the fact that Singaporean HE was studied as a model applicable to the Libyan context by both the MoHE-L and the EDB. A Libyan delegation visited Singapore in 2012 to learn about the model and meetings discussing Singapore were held in Libya while fieldwork was conducted. Singapore offers an attractive model for developing countries in many respects, and given HE’s contribution to the country’s developmental state (Gopinathan 2007) it accords with the argument of this thesis. However, there are limits to the Singaporean model’s applicability to Libya in that it emerged in a context of high social order maintained by strong authoritarian governance; two features not present in post-war Libya.

It should be qualified that a ‘normal development’ framing may be argued to be a legitimate approach to policy and strategy because reconstruction is in essence a developmental task and Libya’s post-war environment is more stable than Somalia, Iraq, or Afghanistan. Furthermore, the ‘normal development’ argument is controversial and would be refuted by most policy-makers in Tripoli. However,
interviews with Ministry officials and HE planners revealed very low levels of lesson-learning and comparison with experiences of other post-war contexts. A qualified conclusion can be drawn that a ‘normal development’ perspective, while not a decisive obstacle to HE, represents a conceptual obstacle to maximising HE’s recovery potential. A further set of obstacles that will now be considered are structural features of the post-war environment affecting the HE-recovery relationship.

8.3.4. Structural Factors

While the above section identified a number of significant institutional factors including governance and strategy that shaped post-war Libyan HE this section will consider several aspects of the structural context in which the sector operated.

To begin, culture is a structural factor widely-perceived to constrain Libya’s post-war HE reform efforts. Several aspects of Libyan culture were identified as obstacles. Firstly, social status is a major cultural barrier. It was seen earlier that priority afforded to academic over technical education was viewed as a major barrier to economy recovery.460 Furthermore, within academic education parents had strong preferences for medicine and engineering leading to over-subscription in these disciplines and a large number of ‘permanent students’.461 This credentialist culture was held to be deeply embedded in parent and student worldviews and was predicted to require several generations to change.462 Second, in transition from a socialist state to a market-driven society a culture of state-dependency was held to be a major obstacle. It was held that due to state employment guarantees and an

460 Dr Fathi Al Arabi, Consultant to MoHE-L - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012
461 Assistant to Deputy Minister, MoHE-L - Tripoli, Libya 12/2012
462 Dr Fathi Al Arabi, Consultant to MoHE-L - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012
over-sized public workforce HE employees lacked motivation and delivered very low productivity.\textsuperscript{463}

Furthermore, maintenance of what was referred to as a ‘Qaddafi-era mentality’ was held to be a major barrier to harnessing HE towards recovery. Several participants held that revolution could remove Qaddafi but changing the culture he shaped would take much longer. Negative aspects of academic culture cited include suspicion of outsiders, resistance to change, and corruption. \textit{Wasta} or the culture of particularism, nepotism and favouritism was held to be deeply embedded\textsuperscript{464} which posed an obstacle to implementing principles of fairness and to redressing youth exclusion and marginalisation held to be a major instability-driver. Moreover, while a closed-minded and suspicious attitude hostile to outsiders borne of isolation and repression was held to be an obstacle to international cooperation, Libya was contrastingly described as an open Mediterranean society that had interacted with other cultures for thousands of years.\textsuperscript{465}

High expectations were also identified as a structural obstacle to HE in recovery. Students are typically held by faculty members to have expected all aspects of HE to change quickly post-uprising\textsuperscript{466} and to be impatient with the actual pace of change.\textsuperscript{467} Faculty members, by contrast, were more measured about the pace of change holding that an incremental process is appropriate in HE systems not comparable to political systems. Failure of the first two post-uprising years to meet student expectations led to general disillusionment and loss of initial optimism which problematised student-faculty relations.

Historical path dependency constituted the dimension of the structural context of post-war Libyan HE that most decisively shaped the sector’s contribution to recovery. Post-war HE faced numerous distortions and contradictions caused by

\textsuperscript{463} Dr Salh Buzwaik, Head, Planning Council, Gharyan and Professor, University of the Jabal Al-Gharb - Gharyan, Libya 12/2012
\textsuperscript{464} Dr Salh Buzwaik, Head, Planning Council, Gharyan and Professor, University of the Jabal Al-Gharb - Gharyan, Libya 12/2012
\textsuperscript{465} Guma El-Gamaty, founder, Taghyeer Party - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012
\textsuperscript{466} Dr Mohamed Amer, Head, Chemical Engineering Department, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012.
\textsuperscript{467} Dr Zekia Deeb, Head, Translation Department, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012.
Qaddafì’s rentierist state-building process, however, the power of the MoHE-L, government or individual universities to pursue some reform pathways was seriously curtailed by features of Libya’s transitional context. It has been seen that Qaddafì used HE expansion as a form of patronage intended to enhance state legitimacy, for example through constructing branch campuses in small towns and villages. Similar distortions include large numbers of students enrolled in disciplines such as medicine and engineering leading to high graduate unemployment and the problem of ‘permanent students’ that cannot be removed even after failing classes for many years.

A strong attempt by Libya’s transitional authorities at redressing these contradictions through restructuring, reform, and organisational change would harm the transitional government’s fragile legitimacy and risk having a destabilising impact. Removing campus buildings from poor rural villages that view their university building as a hard won right would risk turning residents against the state which would threaten the primary statebuilding challenge of security provision. As argued by several Ministry officials, attempts at reducing enrolment or closing branch campuses were made impossible due to the absence of the rule of law and possibility of violent reprisals. Given that these are among the changes that in theory would enable HE to make a more positive contribution to recovery, it can be stated that HE’s contribution to recovery is constrained by a structural context that is a path-dependent legacy of Qaddafì’s state legitimation strategy; what will be labelled here as the rationalisation versus legitimacy trap. Another set of features, which may also be considered structural in that they refer to the structural external context in which post-war Libyan HE operated, will now be considered.

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468 Head, Department of Training, MoHE-L - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012; Dr Milad Taher, Director, Planning and Development Department, MoHE-L - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012. Also, Dr Ibrahim Saleh, Deputy Minister, MoHE-L - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012
8.3.5. External Features

While in contrast to Iraq HE in post-war Libya did not require large-scale rebuilding, external interest in the sector was high. Post-war donor and international agency support took various forms, principally funding scholarships and supporting university partnerships. The European Union’s strategic response to the ‘Arab Spring’ focused on the ‘3 Ms’; money, mobility and markets (EU 2011). A ‘major expansion of university scholarships and exchanges’ was an officially-stated means of facilitating increased mobility. Expanding Erasmus Mundus scholarships for Arab Spring countries included large increases for Libyans. Similarly, the US renewed the Fulbright Libya programme and doubled student numbers.

The US State Department and US Embassy strongly supported Libyan HE at the outset of transition. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton (2011) gave a speech at Tripoli University expressing her governments support for ‘rule of law, respect for human rights, trade and investment, and the importance of civil society, academic institutions, and learning’ in Libya. She committed to increasing US-Libya educational exchange by doubling Libyan student numbers in the USA and restarting the national Fulbright Program. Similar statements were made again in August 2012 when Ambassador Chris Stevens remarked that ‘our government and our embassy in Tripoli are committed at the very highest level to the transformation of higher education in Libya and supporting the development of strong ties between educational communities in Libya and the United States’ (IIE 2012b).

In May 2012 a U.S.-Libya Higher Education Task Force was established ‘to expand educational exchanges and cooperation’. The Task Force and Fulbright scholarships are classified as ‘people-to-people programming and exchanges’; a prominent form of US assistance to Libya (State Department 2012). In US government press statements official HE cooperation is regularly referred to alongside assistance for war-wounded, technical advice on transition, and security cooperation as principal US contributions to post-conflict Libya (for example, Burns 2012).
It is clear that the US placed much greater emphasis on HE to support post-conflict transition, at least in symbolic and rhetorical political commitment, than in Iraq, Afghanistan, and many other post-conflict countries. It should now be asked, why has the US supported HE in transitional Libya?

The first explanation is that the US was committed to successful post-conflict transition and viewed HE as one means of achieving this goal. This view was expressed by Samantha Power who stated that President Obama viewed long-term success of Libya’s stabilisation and transition as strongly linked to ‘educational foundations’ and HE, emphasising strong backing for US-Libya international university partnerships (IIE 2012a). This explanation in part amounts to reading the motivations of US policy from its official position and statements. However, two other interest-based explanations can be offered; economic interest and political influence.

Regarding economic rationale, it can be argued that the US government, educational agents, and universities view post-conflict Libya as a fertile market for American HEIs. Rather than viewing Libya through a humanitarian or post-conflict lens the country was widely-perceived as a ‘business bonanza’; a dynamic also experienced by Kuwait following the 1990 invasion by Iraq. This fact is explained by perceived abundance of money due to high oil revenues which would enable substantial easy profits. Furthermore, HE assistance was viewed as creating goodwill intended to ease signing of oil contracts.\footnote{Dr Abdulatif, Director, International Cooperation Office, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012.} With international education growing as a highly profitable and exportable venture in the 2000s, further opening of Libya to outside investment was viewed as a major opportunity.

This perspective is reflected in a Chronicle of Higher Education article entitled ‘Fall of Libyan Regime Brings New Opportunities for American Universities’ (Wheeler 2012) which begins:

\begin{quote}
The images of Libya that linger in many minds are of tanks, black smoke rising from buildings, and militia members brandishing submachine guns. But for academics,
\end{quote}
those images may soon be replaced by one of a Libyan campus with a big “open for business” banner.

Another imputed motive for US interest is projecting political influence or ‘soft power’.\textsuperscript{470} It is theorised that soft power is accrued through HE cooperation by establishing US-Libyan university linkages, promoting US models of HE in Libya, and supporting academic exchanges such as student scholarships and Visiting Scholar programmes bringing effects including enhanced image of America, familiarity with American values, and a Libyan elite with strong personal and professional relationships with the US. It can be argued that the US viewed stability of Libya and the broader region as geo-strategically important and therefore invested greater resources in promoting HE cooperation as a means of ‘soft power’ to act as an agent of long-term stabilisation.

Interviews with Libyan academics revealed that a moderate number agreed with the economic-interest interpretation of US motives. However, a greater number explained intentions as primarily political; for example, it was argued that the US is trying to show America’s positive face to create good regional relationships.\textsuperscript{471} Moreover, several participants viewed any self-interested motives of the US or other international partners as legitimate and mutually beneficial to Libya and her partners.\textsuperscript{472} This analysis of external relations connects with one of the major themes addressed at the end of the next section; the opportunities afforded by the internationalisation of Libyan HE.

\textsuperscript{470} See section 3.4.3. for general discussion of soft power and HE

\textsuperscript{471} Dr Aboubaker Swehli, Department of Zoology and International Cooperation Office, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012; Dr Sami Khaskhusha, Professor Department of Political Science Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012

\textsuperscript{472} Dr Abdulatif, Director, International Cooperation Office, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012
8.4. Options and Opportunities for Higher Education

In this section, HE policy options and opportunities will be analysed in terms of Libyan stakeholder perspectives. Analysis will focus on theorised linkages posited by Libyan faculty members, ministry officials, and students between various options and recovery. The findings presented in this section are in direct relation to RQ5. Options can be broadly categorised as either internal (domestic) or external (international). First, debates on internal options will be reviewed followed by external opportunities.

8.4.1. Internal Opportunities

In this section major domestic opportunities facing post-war Libyan HE will be analysed; private HE, decentralisation, elite universities, and leveraging greater private sector investment. To begin, the possibilities of expanding private universities and of privatising the existing public HE system will be examined.

Establishing private universities received limited and qualified support plus strong rejection. There was near universal recognition amongst participants that existing private HE quality was poor.\textsuperscript{473} In evaluation of a private university engineering faculty one in 100 students passed an assessment test.\textsuperscript{474} A common stipulation was that thorough review and evaluation of private HEIs must be conducted and that the sector should be more strongly regulated by the MoHE-L before further expansion to ensure standards are adhered to therefore guaranteeing quality.\textsuperscript{475} Furthermore, many held that private providers privileged profit over quality and that therefore new private HEIs should be not-for-profit. With these provisos, approximately half of participants saw constructive roles for private HE provision.

\textsuperscript{473} An exception was Dr Mustafa Alfalani, President of Refak University, a private university in Tripoli
\textsuperscript{474} Dr Hadi Omran Tumi, Head, Civil Engineering Department, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012
\textsuperscript{475} Mohamed Mashena, President, Tripoli University and Dean, Faculty of Engineering, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012
and envisaged benefits of a more diversified system which could relieve pressure on an over-burdened public sector, provide competition, and respond more dynamically to market needs. However, many participants rejected private HE, for example, it was held that Libya ‘does not have millionaires’ and that private provision would exclude poor students.476

Another option is for public HE to move towards a marketised model by charging fees. There was some support for fees to increase financial independence from the state thereby supporting greater autonomy. Furthermore, it was held that fee-paying students ‘would feel the value of education’.477 However, opposition held that fees violated traditions of free and universal public education. It was argued that Libya is rich, can afford free education, and moreover that fees were unfeasible during unstable transition ‘because students will not accept it’.478 Furthermore, public-private partnerships received some limited support. Refak University’s President, a private university, held that financial autonomy offered his institution no advantages and was receptive to public-private partnerships.479

Many participants held public goods conceptions of HE in which public HE provision better supplied teaching and research connected to social, economic, and developmental needs. Private HE was viewed as favouring teaching a narrow set of disciplines and neglecting research completely. For example, it was held that private universities should be strongly regulated ‘to make them positive and fruitful for the country’.480 There was therefore a general sense that public HEIs could contribute more strongly towards recovery and development.

Several influential individuals in Libyan HE proposed building a new elite university with very high academic standards and low enrolment. It was theorised the university would provide high-level skills and knowledge critical to long-term

476 Deputy Dean, Faculty of Arts, former Head, Department of Psychology, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012
477 Dr Milad Taher, Director, Planning and Development Department, MoHE-L - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012. Also, Dr Ibrahim El-Ghariani, President, Omar Al-Mukhtar University - Baida, Libya 11/2012
478 Dr Sobhi, Vice-Dean, Faculty of Languages, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012
479 Dr Mustafa Alfalani, President, Refak University - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012
480 Dr Aboubaker Al-Aswad, Department of English Language, University of Tripoli – Tripoli, Libya 10/2012
state and institution building. For some participants this position was explicitly motivated by acknowledgement that Tripoli and Benghazi universities were so large and their problems so intractable that transformation to elite status would take several generations.\(^{481}\) By contrast, entry of small elite universities was predicted to provide competition to Benghazi and Tripoli universities leading to raised standards.\(^{482}\)

While this option is focused on internal capacity several suggestions were made that international cooperation would be vital to establishing an elite institution in a short-time. Moreover, it was also suggested that the new institution incorporate branch campuses of global universities in a model similar to the UAE or Education City in Qatar.\(^{483}\) This possibility would breakdown the division between internal and external opportunities. However, it was contended that the branch campus model was not feasible or appropriate in the short-term due to post-war challenges and need to fundamentally re-structure domestic HE.\(^{484}\)

Another major option is granting greater independence to HEIs. Libyan HE has historically been highly centralised under the MoHE-L. Several arguments for post-war decentralisation of HE governance have been advanced. First, decentralisation is defended for practical and logistical reasons; it is held that given Libya’s vast size and low population centralised administration in Tripoli necessitates frequent travelling to the capital that would be more efficient if administration were devolved to federal bodies in Tripoli, Benghazi and Sebha, or alternatively in individual cities or universities. Second, a developmental localist argument holds that decentralised and autonomous HE would adapt to become more relevant to local social and economic needs.\(^{485}\) Third, centralisation is identified by many participants as perpetuating dense bureaucracy that is an obstacle to running

\(^{481}\) Mohamed Mashena, President, Tripoli University and Dean, Faculty of Engineering, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012
\(^{482}\) Dr Ahmed Al-Atrash, former Dean, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012
\(^{483}\) Guma El-Gamaty, founder, Taghyeer Party - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012
\(^{484}\) Head, Department of Training, MoHE-L - Tripoli, Libya 12/2012
\(^{485}\) Dr Ibrahim El-Ghariani, President, Omar Al-Mukhtar University - Baida, Libya 11/2012. Also, Dr Salh Buzwaik, Head, Gharyan Planning Council and Professor, University of the Jabal Al-Gharb - Gharyan, Libya 12/2012
Fourth, and relatedly, centralisation is held to stifle creativity and innovation while it is predicted that decentralisation would enable universities to develop their own identity through setting priorities, expenditure, and curricula.\textsuperscript{487} However, a centralist position was also defended by participants. It was argued that individual universities have insufficient capacity for self-governance and that Ministerial control was therefore necessary, at least in the short-term to medium-term.\textsuperscript{488} Moreover, HE decentralisation is perceived to be connected with calls for federalism; a highly-politicised issue in a context where East/West relations remained a major unresolved issue in post-war Libyan politics. Centralist-nationalist positions therefore rejected HE decentralisation for dividing rather than unifying Libya and therefore perpetuating instability and conflict-risk.\textsuperscript{489}

All MoHE-L staff interviewed stated that HE should be decentralised and that at least in statute Libyan HEIs were autonomous. For example, it was held that Libyan HEIs have their own statutes and the MoHE-L ‘just monitors faults or complaints’.\textsuperscript{490} The Deputy Minister argued that the Ministry’s vision was to cease governing directly. He said that he hoped the MoHE-L would ‘demolish itself, with just a few offices to evaluate education and that’s it – we don’t want to intervene’.\textsuperscript{491} However, in contrast, the majority of faculty members reported no post-war changes in centralisation. Moreover, it was argued that while centralisation caused implementation problems under the previous regime, since the uprising problems worsened because of need to clarify roles and responsibilities as various stakeholders negotiated and contested their roles in a complex and unstable transitional environment.\textsuperscript{492} Decentralisation is reportedly central to the new HE

\textsuperscript{486} Dr Tarek Basher Jdeidi, Head, Department of Zoology, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012
\textsuperscript{487} Dr Abdulatif, Director, International Cooperation Office, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012
\textsuperscript{488} Mohamed Yaseen, Registrar, Medicine Faculty, Omar Mukhtar University - Baida, Libya 11/2012
\textsuperscript{489} Deputy Dean, Faculty of Arts, former Head, Department of Psychology, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012
\textsuperscript{490} Assistant to Deputy Minister, MoHE-L - Tripoli, Libya 12/2012
\textsuperscript{491} Dr Ibrahim Saleh, Deputy Minister, MoHE-L - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012
\textsuperscript{492} Obaidat, Higher education consultant - Tripoli, Libya 12/2012
law which intended to bring clarity and definition to stakeholder roles and offer greater autonomy to HEIs.\textsuperscript{493}

A further option is maximising potential contributions of international companies and industry to Libyan HE. Most promisingly, the Government of Libya could be encouraged to lobby oil and gas companies to invest more in engineering, geology, and related scientific and technological disciplines. It was argued that oil companies had moral obligations to invest in environmental research.\textsuperscript{494} Furthermore, there was general support for the notion that university consultancy and applied research on behalf of firms and international agencies working in Libya should be promoted by universities and the MoHE-L. For example, a Professor of Chemical Engineering held that most international oil and gas companies did not even have a small office to communicate and cooperate with local organisations yet Libyan universities are strongly positioned to advise and assist.\textsuperscript{495} Relatedly, there was widespread support for a nationalist position requiring firms to make greater use of domestic high-level manpower. It was argued that the Libyan Engineers Guild did not apply strong restrictions on use of Libyan labour relative to other countries.\textsuperscript{496} In particular it was held that providing greater opportunities to a younger generation would reduce graduate unemployment thus mitigating a major grievance and supporting stabilisation.

The greater utilisation of international companies operating in Libya and the branch campus model, both analysed in this section, are options that do not neatly fit the internal/external divide and should be considered alongside the argument of the next section that international opportunities offer a major option for harnessing the capacity of Libyan HE towards recovery and transition.

\textsuperscript{493} Mohamed Mashena, President, Tripoli University and Dean, Faculty of Engineering at Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012
\textsuperscript{494} Dr Aboubaker Swehli, Department of Zoology, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012
\textsuperscript{495} Dr Mohamed Amer, Head, Chemical Engineering Department, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012
\textsuperscript{496} Dr Usama Al-Hadi, Head, Department of Architecture and Urban Planning, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012
8.4.2. International Opportunities

A strong emergent theme from interviews was that internationalisation of Libyan HE would have strong positive impacts on the sector and enable it to play greater roles in recovery. Libya is similar to Iraq where sanctions and ‘pariah state’ status isolated academia. Many participants, in particular older generations, held that legacies of isolation must be overcome through international cooperation and educational exchange. Moreover, greater connection and openness is viewed as a necessity due to changes in the global economy and society.

Academic cooperation through university partnerships between Libyan and foreign HEIs was the most commonly suggested opportunity by participants. It was expected that foreign institutions would provide advanced knowledge, expertise, skills, and resources that are critically important to HE capacity development. Partnerships were viewed as having potential to support programmes in the academic core of teaching and research. More specifically it was held that joint programmes would enable development of Libya’s weak graduate education\textsuperscript{497} and support ongoing reviewing and updating of curricula to meet economic and transitional needs.\textsuperscript{498} Furthermore, international partnerships and research collaborations were central to strategies for improving Tripoli University’s research capacity.\textsuperscript{499}

The IIE hosted events in 2011 and 2012 on Libyan HE and transition that raised awareness of the issue. A ‘key theme’ of an IIE roundtable in 2011 was that ‘emphasis was placed on the urgent need for collaboration between U.S. and Libyan faculty with regards to curriculum development, capacity-building, infrastructure-support, and faculty exchanges’ (IIE 2011). It is stipulated that ‘these new relationships must be based on partnerships rather than assistance-based’. A similar emphasis on partnership is made by Wheeler (2012) who writes that ‘Libyan oil,

\textsuperscript{497} Mohamed Mashena, President, Tripoli University and Dean, Faculty of Engineering, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 11/2012
\textsuperscript{498} Dr Aboubaker Swehli, Department of Zoology, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 10/ 2012
\textsuperscript{499} Dr Abdulatif, Director, International Cooperation Office, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012.
and the cash that comes with it, means that Libya and the United States could work as partners, not as one country doling out resources to the other’.

Interviews with Libyan academics revealed strong support for this partnership model although accompanied by some sceptical voices. A very common position was that Libya had money and needed expertise rather than aid. As one interviewee stated, ‘Libyans don’t need your money, they need your smile’. Many academics held that university partnerships and academic exchange should be pursued in collaborative relationships. Furthermore, it was argued that while university partnerships recommenced in the mid-2000s international partners were still viewed with suspicion as potential spies and that revolution enabled forging partnerships with a more positive vision and relationship. The majority of participants favoured US, UK, or Western European universities on the rationale that as the most advanced they will have largest impact. A minority supported regional collaboration, for example, with Egyptian, Tunisian, or Jordanian HEIs.

However, some doubted the collaborative model’s feasibility predicting that more conventional donor-recipient relationships would prevail. It was argued that while Libya may have large oil receipts many universities have low financial independence and allocate nearly all spending on current expenditure. Foreign assistance for new programmes would therefore be initiated with large discrepancies in resource levels provided by each ‘partner’, expertise of academics, their academic and social capital, and therefore power to define and benefit from the relationship. Furthermore, the role of outside expertise in leading reform and capacity development was criticised on the basis that outsiders do not understand Libya’s context and that the system should be built from the inside. Notwithstanding these objections, a strong consensus held that international academic exchange and collaboration represented a major opportunity for HE.

500 Dr Mohamed Amer, Head, Chemical Engineering Department, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012
501 Dr Abdulatif, Director, International Cooperation Office, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012.
502 Guma El-Gamaty, founder, Taghyeer Party - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012
503 Dr Mohamed Amer, Head of Chemical Engineering Department, Tripoli University - Tripoli, Libya 10/2012
Increasing overseas scholarships was another policy option receiving very strong support from participants. It was commonly held that postgraduate students abroad were a major resource that could drive Libya’s recovery and transition. Various reasons were cited including bringing experiences of foreign university systems to inform Libyan reforms, circulation of cutting-edge knowledge, research training, language skills, forging trans-border relationships that would enable international cooperation, and initiating cultural change. Furthermore, it was held that domestic graduate HE capacity was weak and that therefore overseas scholarship programmes were necessary.

Libyan postgraduate students in the UK interviewed for the pre-study offered strong support for this option. A significant majority argued that the approximately 14,000 Libyan students abroad in 2011 would have major positive impacts on domestic HE and all other social and economic sectors upon return. Many held that postgraduate education in global research universities, very often on topics related to Libya, would enable returnees to conduct socially and economically relevant research thus improving integration of HE and developmental needs.

It should be qualified that it is not surprising that postgraduates exhibit self-understanding that they will positively impact development. However, while the majority were positive other postgraduates offered opposing analyses. A PhD student in Business Management held that PhD holder returnees would be incorporated back into a deeply-entrenched institutional culture valuing hierarchy and disregarding research. He argued that many incumbent Libyan faculty members who received PhDs abroad had forgotten what they learned in the struggle to survive with little to no opportunities to exercise their research skills and he predicted that this trend would continue unless there was major institutional and cultural transformation in HE.

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504 Dr Salh Buzwaik, Head, Gharyan Planning Council and Professor, University of the Jabal Al-Ghab - Gharyan, Libya 12/2012
505 Nabil Eljaadi, PhD Candidate in Business Management, University of Hull - Hull, UK 02/2012
Furthermore, the Deputy Minister for Scientific Research argued that too many scholarships were awarded for study abroad and that spending priority should be placed on establishing graduate schools domestically. He reasoned that postgraduates educated in Libya would focus research on solving internal social problems including health and education while those educated abroad would lack this focus.\footnote{Dr Ibrahim Saleh, Deputy Minister for Scientific Research, Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, Tripoli University - Tripoli, 11/2012}

It should be qualified that in addressing opportunities during interviews there is a risk that participants would perceive that opportunities could be gained from research establishing need for various options that are in their interests. In the case of university partnerships this is a real risk because for academics in Libya, as in many other developing countries, participation in university partnerships offers benefits of additional resources and accrued academic and social capital. The same argument applies for scholarships for study abroad; financial backing during postgraduate degree plus additional social status afforded to graduates of foreign universities could lead Libyan academics and students hopeful of travelling abroad to treat the interview as an opportunity for self-interested advocacy.

In fact, Ahmed Jehani, former Minister of Reconstruction, held that these arguments apply directly to Libyan HE. He suggested that Professors in Tripoli and other cities would offer unrealistically positive evaluations of Libyan HE and frame the issue of opportunities in the terms that international cooperation, in particular partnerships and scholarships, would be sufficient to develop HE.\footnote{Ahmed Jehani, former Minister of Reconstruction - Benghazi, Libya, 11/2012} He interpreted their motives as largely self-interested and deriving from the common desire in Libya to study or travel abroad. While these considerations may be valid it should be noted that a very wide cross-section of participants including those that were not seeking international opportunities offered strong support for this option, for example, very senior Professors that were close to retirement.
In this chapter post-war Libyan HE has been analysed in terms of HE’s contribution to recovery. Libyan HE at the outset of transition had strong potential to contribute towards post-war recovery. The initial conditions were good; along with low impact of conflict Libya possessed ample financial resources, high enrolment, meaningful ‘ownership’, relative social homogeneity, and high external interest. It was seen that the sector made several important contributions to short-term transitional goals of conflict prevention, stabilisation and DDR that constitute relatively positive recovery outcomes. However, it was also seen that HE’s role in physical reconstruction, statebuilding, economic recovery, and reconciliation was more limited.

Analysis of the features of the post-war environment shaping Libyan HE identified instability, weak governance, low capacity, and poor quality HE as the principal influences that explain the low contribution towards long-term reconstruction goals. Finally, opportunities available to the sector were analysed and limited decentralisation and forms of international cooperation were found to have potential to overcome some of the above-noted obstacles and harness HE’s capacity towards long-term recovery and development. Finally, it should be qualified that this analysis was conducted only several years into Libya’s post-conflict transition and that the country’s prognosis for utilising HE towards recovery over the long-term is relatively good.
CHAPTER NINE

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

9.0. Introduction

In this chapter a comparative analysis of the two case-studies of HE in post-war Iraq and Libya will be offered. To begin, the broad comparative findings of the thesis will be discussed followed by three sections that address RQs three, four and five respectively. Finally, the conclusion will explore several comparative findings including the significance of trade-offs and the temporal context in which Iraq served as a learning experience for Libya.

The central hypothesis tested in this thesis is stated below:

Higher education is a neglected dimension of post-conflict reconstruction that can make a significant positive contribution in driving and energising post-war recovery processes

To explore the hypothesis a comparative most likely/least likely case-study approach was adopted for the empirical analysis. A most-similar strategy was employed in which cases exhibit similarities across a wide number of variables and dissimilarity on two crucial variables. Confirming the validity of a hypothesis on the basis of a single most-likely case provides moderate support while confirmation via a least-likely case offers strong support for the hypothesis. Based on this design Libya was considered a most likely case for confirming the main hypothesis while Iraq was deemed a least likely case.

The research demonstrated that Iraq and Libya share many similar features in their historical, developmental, and political profiles. Both countries experienced highly-personalised rule by single strongmen dictators over a long period that

\[508\] See chapter four section 4.2 for further discussion of the most-similar case-study design
relied on similar ideological variants of Arab Nationalism. Both countries are oil exporters and considered rentier states. Furthermore, Iraq and Libya were both labelled ‘pariah states’ and excluded from the ‘international community’ for varying reasons. HE in both countries is quantitatively well developed with high enrolment ratios and a large number of institutions. It should be qualified that Libya’s social composition is much more homogenous than Iraq’s diverse ethnic and sectarian makeup.

Despite these historical similarities the HE systems of Iraq and Libya emerged differently in their respective post-war periods. This is primarily due to two major reasons. First, the differential impact of conflict on the two countries; Iraqi universities were decimated by the conflict leaving very low capacity and sowing divisions into the social fabric of academic life while in Libya conflict’s impact was much lower. Second, the type of post-conflict response to the challenge of reconstruction and HE rebuilding differed; while Libya experienced a rapid restoration of sovereignty, relative security, and support for HE at the end of the war, Iraq was under occupation with a reconstruction strategy that de-prioritised the HE sector. This broad comparison establishes the context for the comparative analysis of the functions, challenges, and opportunities in post-war Iraqi and Libyan HE that will now be presented.

9.1. Contribution to Recovery

In this section the contribution of Iraqi and Libyan HE to post-war recovery will be compared in terms of stabilisation, physical and sectoral reconstruction, economic recovery, statebuilding, democratisation, conflict transformation, and reconciliation. The case-study findings that will now be considered emerged out of a research design aimed at answering the below research question.

RQ3: What functions can higher education perform in contributing towards effective post-conflict recovery?
To begin, in the domain of stabilisation and conflict prevention HE in Libya was found to be a strong success while Iraqi HE played a mixed role. While Libyan HEIs re-opened and attracted the young university-age population off the streets and into education Iraqi HEIs to some extent performed a comparable role. However, Iraqi universities were limited in their absorptive role due to reduced capacity and high insecurity which lowered attendance rates. Furthermore, the social composition of potential militia and insurgent recruits in Iraq consisted of much fewer potential university-age males with completed secondary education than in Libya where students constituted a high proportion of militia and brigade members. Both Iraq and Libya were able to perform this role due to their relatively high enrolment ratios when compared to other post-war contexts.

HE in neither case played a strong role in reconstruction processes through consultancy or research. In Iraq this is principally explained by the destruction of HE capacity, significant ‘brain drain’, the contracting of reconstruction to foreign firms and agencies that neglected Iraq’s expertise, and arguably suspicion of Iraqi scientists as involved in WMD programmes. In Libya by contrast, capacity was not reduced greatly by war yet research capacity was under-developed while domestic and international contractors did not trust Libyan HEIs.

Furthermore Iraq, unlike Libya, had established historical HE-industry-military linkages. With strong early support to rebuilding the sector and under different environmental conditions, in particular greater security, this experience could have enabled adaptation of relevant parts of Iraqi HE to processes of rebuilding and reconstruction. While this contribution would not have been decisive, it may be expected to have contributed to more effective reconstruction through providing local expertise that would be cheaper and more able to navigate security obstacles while building sustainable local skills and capacity in reconstruction. It should be qualified that the relatively low role of HE in Libya’s reconstruction is partly explained by the slow progress in rebuilding. Furthermore, pockets of high skills

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509 See sections 6.2.1 and 8.2.1
510 See sections 6.2.2 and 8.2.2
511 See section 5.1.2
and expertise within Libyan HE, for example top engineering faculties, are expected to play a much greater role after future ‘take-off’ of the post-war reconstruction process.

In neither Iraq nor Libya did HE play a significant positive role in contributing towards economic recovery.\textsuperscript{512} A major challenge in both cases was low relevance of HE curricula to economic needs, highly theoretical content, and insufficient focus on technical education that could supply reconstruction-relevant skills. This finding reflects the literature review in chapter one that identified these challenges as common to nearly all Arab state HE systems.\textsuperscript{513} It should be qualified that Iraqi HE struggled to make an impact on economic recovery due to the economic collapse, lack of development vision, and myriad challenges characterising the post-war environment. Similarly, while Libyan HE was found to be irrelevant to industrial and developmental needs there was wide recognition of the problem and high-level will to review curricula.

In both Iraq and Libya reforms ensuring greater relevance of HE to economic needs, enhancing technical education, and strengthening university-industry linkages were viewed as important to increasing HE’s potential to support economic recovery through economic growth, diversification, and employment generation. However, a major difference was that in Libya, unlike in Iraq, a knowledge-economy discourse was prevalent in which HE had the potential to have a transformative impact on post-war economic development. This difference is explained by the greater challenges that beset Iraq, in particular protracted conflict, unresolved political disputes, and fragile institutions that render this prospect an unattainable goal in the medium-term.

In terms of statebuilding both cases were found to make a low contribution.\textsuperscript{514} It was seen that Iraqi HE was not connected with the task of statebuilding which took place in the context of state collapse and the fragmentation of power across the

\textsuperscript{512} See sections 6.2.5 and 8.2.4
\textsuperscript{513} See section 1.4.1
\textsuperscript{514} See sections 6.2.3 and 8.2.5
country. In Libya it was also found that the contribution to statebuilding was low; the sector was limited by poor quality HE and weak research capacity. Moreover, a key theme that emerged from the Iraq case is that the low investment in HE after 2003, in particular in core skills and human capital necessary for functioning states, was a major missed opportunity to make long-term statebuilding and capacity-building sustainable; a finding that confirms the positions outlined in chapter three such as Ghani and Lockhart (2008). Given the enormity of the statebuilding challenge facing Libya it remains to be seen whether the sector can make a significant contribution. However, it should be qualified that there was widespread recognition amongst participants of the statebuilding potential of the sector, in particular through overseas training, in addition to some political will.

In both cases democratisation was a formal goal of transition and at the outset of the post-war period there was optimism regarding the potential of the HE sector to contribute towards democratisation processes. Students’ roles in driving civil society development and democratisation through organisations and activities, the ‘training ground’ model of HE, was stronger in Libya than in Iraq. However, both cases highlight that the contribution of student activity towards political development was limited by the fear of university authorities that in the unstable post-war environment student organisations would be penetrated by national political parties thus leading to further instability on campuses. It was seen that these fears were actualised in Iraq and that at least some Libyan university officials sought to avoid descent into the conditions experienced in Iraq by placing restrictions on the political nature of student activity on campus.

On transitional justice, neither Iraq nor Libya managed to convert the process of removing the former regime’s legacy from educational content into an opportunity to connect curricula to transitional or recovery needs. However, there were proposals to do so in both cases, with liberal visions of the linkage between HE and democratic transition forwarded by John Agresto in Iraq and the Tripoli University

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515 See sections 6.2.4 and 8.2.3
516 See sections 6.2.6 and 8.2.6
Programme for Rebuilding Libya. Furthermore, the lustration process was approached differently between the two cases. While the de-Baathification process was rightly much criticised for eroding HE capacity\textsuperscript{517} the minimal approach to removal of Qaddafi-era officials from their posts harmed the fragile legitimacy of the transitional government and university authorities which intensified instability on Libyan campuses. Given that this strategic decision was informed by fear of repeating the mistakes of de-Baathification in Iraq the episode highlights that there is no blueprint solution and that a trade-off situation should be approached contextually and carefully.

Neither case demonstrated an overall positive role in the mediation of conflict in the post-war period while Iraqi HE made a negative contribution.\textsuperscript{518} In Libya this was explained by the pre-war pattern of HE expansion which produced high regional homogeneity in the social composition of universities while in Iraq the intensity of protracted conflict and sectarian violence engulfed and distorted the role of HEIs towards sectarian and communal division after which they perpetuated rather than transformed the social bases of conflict. However, it should be qualified that Libya was not beset by inter-communal conflict that unfolded in Iraq. While HE was not a causative factor in the original conflicts, in both cases the sector either perpetuated or intensified enmities, divisions, and conflicts that emerged in the post-war environment. The experience of both cases supports the argument for actions and programmes linking HE to reconciliation at an early stage during post-war transitions.

### 9.2. Post-war Environment of Higher Education

In this section the relative importance of the features of the post-war environment affecting the HE-recovery relationship will be analysed through a comparative

\textsuperscript{517} See section 6.1.3
\textsuperscript{518} See sections 6.2.6, 6.3.1.3, and 8.2.6
discussion of Iraq and Libya. It is worth recalling the research question that this section set out to answer:

**RQ4:** What features of the post-war environment influence the relationship between higher education and post-conflict recovery?

To begin, conjunctural features of security, stability, and conflict will be analysed and are found to be very significant. It will be seen that while insecurity and instability are widely viewed in published sources as being highly significant and this thesis confirms the finding, other dimensions should also be considered, for example, educational, institutional, structural and external features, which are all addressed.

### 9.2.1. Conjunctural Features

It can be stated that in both cases conjunctural features of instability and insecurity were found to be strong constraints upon the HE-recovery relationship. In Iraq insecurity, instability, and sectarian conflict were unanimously viewed by participants as decisive factors while in Libya there was consensus that instability was a major factor and insecurity was also significant. This finding accords with media and scholarly accounts of post-conflict HE that tend to focus on violence, campus-level conflict, and politicisation of HE issues.

Security was revealed by both cases to be a major obstacle to effective rebuilding of HE.\(^{519}\) While Iraq showed that concrete and immediate security problems were detrimental to recovery outcomes, Libya illustrated that perceived security threats were a major obstacle. Iraq was among the most insecure contexts globally between 2003 and 2010 while by contrast, measured by numbers of deaths post-war Libya was much more secure. However, the presence of militias in Libya, the US

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\(^{519}\) See sections 6.3.1.1 and 8.3.1.1
Consulate attack, and other acts of political violence created a perception of insecurity via global media that was out of proportion to the reality on the ground.

It should be qualified that there were real security problems in post-war Libya. However, it was the negative perception of Libyan security that detrimentally impacted recovery outcomes. For example, it was seen that perceived insecurity was an obstacle to foreign companies returning to Libya’s campus construction programme even though there were no attacks on campuses and the many foreign nationals present in Tripoli and other cities in Western Libya. This finding suggests that it does not require high absolute levels of insecurity, such as in Iraq, to have major detrimental effects on post-conflict HE.

Instability and lack of order was also found to be a highly-significant variable in both cases despite the much higher levels of instability on Iraqi campuses. Many participants in both cases emphasised the difficulty of operating a HEI under conditions of frequent student protests and harassment of faculty members and Ministry officials. Furthermore, in Iraq politicisation of the student body created a highly-divisive atmosphere with violent groups empowered at the expense of university authorities which placed a direct constraint upon the actions of university management, for example, forcible changes to examinations and scheduling. In Libya a similar dynamic was reported in which university and MoHE-L officials felt constrained in an environment of multiple threats and no rule of law. However, in Libya instability was manifested less directly than in Iraq, for example, through the threat of violence or protests, which constrained officials who were unaware of the extent of the policy space of their actions.

The type and level of conflict was a central variable that explains differing outcomes across the two cases. Iraq’s protracted conflict engulfed universities and hindered all aspects of HE reconstruction. Meanwhile, conflict did not emerge as a major theme in the case of Libya. The country was not free from divisive social conflicts.

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520 See sections 6.3.1.2 and 8.3.1.2
521 See section 8.3.4
522 See section 6.3.1.3
with issues of East/West divide and fighting in the South or Fezzan dominating post-conflict political life. However, these conflicts did not directly impact upon the operation of the HE sector. Rather, the conflicts were a major driver of instability and thus had an indirect impact on the context of post-conflict HE though the above-analysed dynamic of instability. Crucially, the low direct impact of these conflicts on Libyan HE enabled the sector to adopt a forward-looking stance focused on opportunities for development, in contrast with Iraq where issues of ethno-sectarian division and the need for reconciliation frustrated many forms of progress. This finding highlights the centrality that must be placed on conflict-sensitive HE policy and campus-level reconciliation in post-conflict contexts.

Finally, at the outset of both Iraqi and Libyan post-conflict transitions there was considerable optimism regarding the imminent emergence of the conditions to support academic freedom. However, while in both cases negative academic freedom existed in that the formal barriers of state repression had collapsed, the rights and freedoms of faculty members and students were not deeply institutionalised. In Iraq it was seen that myriad daily challenges to academic freedom emerged including barriers to movement and the fear of harassment, silencing, and violence. Libya by contrast offered better conditions for academic freedom with most participants reporting that they felt free to criticise and speak their minds. However, academic freedom in neither case was decisive in shaping the post-conflict role of HE. In Iraq the research and teaching capacity of the sector was shattered by conflict while in Libya research capacity was minimal due to decades of under-investment. Academic freedom should however be expected to be a major issue influencing the HE-recovery role, either through its presence or absence, in other post-conflict cases where HE research capacity is existent and the sector maintains a strong social role, for example, in public intellectual leadership.

523 See sections 6.3.1.4 and 8.3.1.3
9.2.2. Educational Features

The absolute level of access was not a decisive influence in either case.\textsuperscript{524} Enrolment in both Iraq and Libya was high in the pre-conflict period and also the post-conflict phase. Moreover, Libya, and to a lesser extent Iraq, shows that high access enabled HEIs to play a strong absorptive role in getting young people off the streets and back into classrooms thus strengthening conflict prevention and stabilisation.\textsuperscript{525} However, Libya possessed exceptionally high enrolment, the highest in Africa, and many participants held that this was an obstacle to a rationalised and efficient HE system. While a similar finding was expressed by a minority of participants in Iraq it should be considered that economic efficiency would not be a major priority while the system remained deteriorated with little capital investment and campuses constituted dangerous spaces.

While access was not a decisive factor, the cases do underline the fundamental importance of quality over quantity.\textsuperscript{526} If this point seems trivial or obviously true it remains worth stating clearly. Both Iraq and Libya were found to have had relatively high quality by regional standards in their pre-war HE system although this was eroded by various factors including isolation under sanctions and the impact of war.\textsuperscript{527} Participants in both cases felt strongly that low quality HE had weakened the sector’s capacity to contribute effectively to post-war reconstruction. This point does not augur well for the prospects of HE in other post-conflict cases; of dozens of post-war reconstruction cases in the past few decades countries with higher levels of HE quality than Iraq and Libya arguably include Lebanon, Kosovo, and Bosnia. However, Iraq and Libya should be categorised as having relatively high quality HE system in the universe of post-conflict cases even despite widespread damage to Iraqi HE, for example, in comparison to Afghanistan, Mozambique, or Sierra Leone.

\textsuperscript{524} See sections 6.3.2.1 and 8.3.2.1  
\textsuperscript{525} See sections 6.2.1 and 8.2.1  
\textsuperscript{526} See sections 6.3.2.2 and 8.3.2.3  
\textsuperscript{527} See sections 5.1 and 7.1
Unmet educational needs were present in both cases although they were a major issue in Iraq while less prevalent in Libya. In terms of material needs, many Iraqi HEIs were left in a very poor condition without adequate investment in laboratories, dormitories, and other campus facilities.\textsuperscript{528} Libya, by contrast, experienced some improvement in material conditions that arguably was enabled by the post-war context as outdated equipment was replaced. What both cases forcefully demonstrate is that needs tend to be defined in material terms while neglecting psycho-social needs such as traumatised staff and students and the need for reconciliation.\textsuperscript{529}

A notable finding was that in neither case did equity emerge strongly as a dynamic influencing the post-war role of HE.\textsuperscript{530} However, from the standpoint of the literature review in chapters two and three on horizontal inequalities, ethnic mobilisation, and the distribution of HE opportunities there are strong theoretical bases for viewing equity as a major dimension of post-conflict HE.\textsuperscript{531} This finding must therefore be explained.\textsuperscript{532} Firstly, the relatively low presence of equity may be explained as due to sample bias, for example, male bias that leads to under-recognition of gender exclusion. This was found to be a limitation of the study although measures were adopted to explore equity in terms of gender.\textsuperscript{533}

Secondly, it was seen that both Iraqi and Libyan HE systems were relatively equitable in the pre-conflict period in terms of class, gender, and ethnicity. Crucially, in neither case was inequality a major driver of conflict. Both regimes were committed to women’s education, implemented state socialist policies that widened access to the poor, and did not systematically exclude minority groups.\textsuperscript{534}

Both countries utilised their considerable oil wealth in a rentier model that enabled

\textsuperscript{528} See section 6.1
\textsuperscript{529} See sections 6.1.1, 7.4.2 and 8.1.1
\textsuperscript{530} See sections 6.3.2.3 and 8.3.2.2
\textsuperscript{531} See sections 2.3 and 3.2.7
\textsuperscript{532} In chapter ten section 10.3 the issue of equity in post-conflict HE is analysed in more depth given the low generalisability of findings on equity from this thesis combined with the high theoretical importance that should be placed on equity
\textsuperscript{533} See chapter four for further discussion of methodology including forms of bias and measures taken to mitigate bias
\textsuperscript{534} See sections 5.1 and 7.1
relative success in achieving equitable development compared to other post-conflict states that are typically highly resource constrained. It can therefore be stated that the two cases selected do not allow for wide generalisability of this finding to other post-conflict cases in terms of equity issues due to their unrepresentative particularity as rentier states with high distributive largesse.

However, the cases do reveal some interesting comparative findings with scope for generalisability to Arab region cases. In the post-war period, the first equity concern in both cases was the greater access to places that up until conflict were afforded to supporters of the previous regimes. Furthermore, in both cases scholarship selection processes were charged by some to be particularistic; in Iraq to Shiite students and supporters of Prime Minister Al-Maliki and in Libya in terms of place-based allegiances of officials in charge. The cases reveal that even where repressive distributive states managed to lead relatively equitable growth, in the conflictual and fragile post-conflict environment new enmities and forms of inequality may emerge while development schemes are politicised. This finding supports the need for conflict-sensitive HE policy that addresses horizontal inequalities and satisfies public perceptions of fairness.

9.2.3. Institutional Features

It has been seen that in the small literature on HE and post-conflict recovery conjunctural features of insecurity, conflict, and instability are widely considered to be very significant; a theoretical finding supported by empirical results of this thesis. It was also seen that in terms of the educational dimensions of the post-war environment quality was found to be a very significant influence. It will now be shown that after conjunctural features it is institutional features that taken as a whole can be considered to be the second strongest set of dynamics shaping the contribution of the sector to post-conflict recovery.

535 See sections 6.3.2.3, 6.4, and 8.3.2.2
Firstly, weak state and institutional capacity was a major obstacle affecting HE and recovery in both cases.\textsuperscript{536} Iraq was much more strongly affected by the destruction of physical capacity of HE ministries during conflict than Libya, although both cases suffered the effects on institutional memory brought about by looting and destruction of records in a paper-based administration system. Furthermore, Iraq had more limited financial capacity than Libya where the first post-war budget was much larger than the pre-war budget.

Governance emerged more strongly from both cases than capacity.\textsuperscript{537} Leadership was a strong emergent theme from both cases; in Iraq particularistic appointments to key positions were held to violate a technocratic vision of governance held by participants. In Libya, by contrast, Ministers and high officials were lauded by participants for their technocratic credentials although criticised by some for their status as ‘outsiders’ that did not understand the Libyan context. HE governance was further problematised in both cases due to issues of legitimacy; in Libya the transitional administration possessed fragile legitimacy due to inability to provide security and the above-noted high presence of ‘outsiders’ in the Cabinet. However, Iraq’s legitimacy problem was worse than Libya’s due to occupation and incapacity in effective service-delivery in critical areas, in particular electricity. In both cases issues of corruption, nepotism, and anti-meritocratic appointments within the HE sector further eroded the legitimacy of universities and Ministries thus further weakening HE sector governance.

In terms of strategy, it should first be noted that Iraq did not possess formal ‘ownership’ of HE policy and strategy until the transfer of sovereignty to the transitional government in June 2004.\textsuperscript{538} By contrast, Libya’s NTC had ‘ownership’ of HE policy from the outset of post-conflict transition.\textsuperscript{539} However, in both cases there were de facto constraints on authentic ‘ownership’. In Iraq for instance the fragmented governance of the HE sector, low authority of MoHE-I, and interference

\textsuperscript{536} See sections 6.3.3.3 and 8.3.3.2  
\textsuperscript{537} See sections 6.3.3.4 and 8.3.3.3  
\textsuperscript{538} See sections 6.1.6 and 6.3.3.1  
\textsuperscript{539} See section 8.3.3.1
of political parties greatly reduced the extent to which the Ministry could be said to
own policy. Similarly, in Libya the constraints upon the Ministry in terms of armed
militias or ‘revolutionaries’, the fear of violent retribution, and the rationalisation
versus legitimacy trap all curtail the meaningfulness of ‘ownership’ in that context.

An emergent theme was that post-war insecurity and instability led to the
predominance of short-term thinking and day-to-day survival rather than long-term
strategising on how to rebuild HE which limited the sector’s contribution to
recovery. This was generally held to be the case in Libya although some participants
held that short-termism was necessary in an uncertain transition. In Iraq it was
also held that HE policy and strategy was ‘event-driven’ due to instability. Furthermore, in both cases short terms in office of governments and low
institutionalisation of policy led to HE strategy being dependent upon individual
Ministers and changing regularly.

A finding strongly related to strategy, both cases demonstrate that a weak or absent
vision of HE is detrimental to recovery outcomes although the Iraq case provides
stronger support for this claim. In Iraq it was seen that a broad vision of
reconstruction was absent which problematised HE planning. By contrast, in Libya
the broad contours of such a vision were present, for example, on diversification
and democratisation, although there were obstacles to translating this vision into
HE strategy. The greater degree of societal conflict in post-war Iraq prevented key
actors from coming together to consider the sector’s future. Moreover, if such a
process were to occur it is unlikely that a unified vision could have emerged in the
divisive post-war environment. The case of Libya shows that even without this
strong constraint of high levels of conflict a unified vision can fail to emerge. This
finding confirms the theoretical importance given to vision in chapter three and
highlights the need for inclusive and dialogic processes of creating visions for
recovery in other post-conflict cases.

540 See section 8.3.3.1
541 See section 6.3.3.2
542 See sections 6.3.3.2 and 8.3.3
543 See section 3.3.2.3
Political factors were found in both cases to exert a strong influence on HE. In Iraq, the politicisation of post-war HE is very closely related to the issue of sectarianism.\textsuperscript{544} Political parties had strong influence on universities through student groups acting as proxies on campus. In Libya the penetration of campus life by parties was much lower due to the under-developed political sphere that resulted from Qaddafi’s rule.\textsuperscript{545} One Professor, it was seen, lamented the absence of politically or ideologically minded students. However, HE in Libya was affected by political dynamics in other ways. It was seen that a broad ideological clash between Islamism and liberalism contributed to the termination of an ambitious civil society programme at Tripoli University, some Qaddafi-era personnel were removed from their posts, and students regularly protested.

A further influence upon HE policy was the conceptualisation of the challenge facing the sector. It was seen that in Libya many framings including post-socialist, post-revolution, Arab Spring, and authoritarian to democratic transitions competed alongside post-war recovery in shaping the direction of policy-making. In particular, a ‘normal development’ conceptualisation was found to influence policy-making with the effect of constraining the extent to which attention and resources were focused on social sectors and problems related to recovery.\textsuperscript{546} In Iraq by contrast, although the country was undergoing multiple transitions, the situation was defined predominantly through the lens of post-war reconstruction.\textsuperscript{547}

\textbf{9.2.4. Structural Features}

Resource levels were found to be a major obstacle to HE’s contribution to Iraqi reconstruction.\textsuperscript{548} While rebuilding Iraqi HE received $8 million plus ad hoc donations in the first post-war year Libyan HE received a bumper $1.4 billion

\textsuperscript{544} See sections 6.3.1.2 and 6.3.1.3
\textsuperscript{545} See section 8.2.3
\textsuperscript{546} See section 8.3.3.5
\textsuperscript{547} See sections 5.3 and 6.1
\textsuperscript{548} See sections 6.1.1 and 6.1.2
budget reported as the highest in the sector’s history.\textsuperscript{549} Beyond resource levels, HEIs in Iraq struggled with high current expenditure and low capital expenditure which prevented effective rebuilding of the decimated system. In Libya, however, similarly to Iraq, problems with bureaucratic hurdles, corruption, and slow disbursement severely hampered effective utilisation of funds. Therefore, it can be concluded that it is not simply the level of resources but their quality and modality of distribution that also affects recovery outcomes.

Culture was also held to be an obstacle in both cases.\textsuperscript{550} In particular, Iraq and Libya reveal that \textit{Wasta} or a culture of nepotism and corruption and the social status afforded to academic over technical education were cultural barriers to HE after war. This is explained by the cultural and social similarities shared by the two countries. However, cultural considerations were also found to have enabled effective recovery in some cases. Social cohesion was found to be a factor influencing cases of successful reconstruction of HEIs in both Iraq and Libya. Iraqi Kurdistan in the 1990s saw strong ‘autonomous recovery’ driven by nationalism while Anbar and Mosul since 2003 were widely-viewed as having recovered relatively well in part due to strong communal bonds. Similarly, in Libya the strong local identity and community combined with vibrant a vibrant local economy in Misrata was seen as enabling effective autonomous recovery.

Historical factors were important as constraints imposed by path-dependent trajectories of HE development. In Iraq it was seen that institutions proved to be ‘sticky’ as externally-led reforms mostly failed and HE reverted back to pre-conflict institutional forms.\textsuperscript{551} In Libya, the state legitimation strategy employed by the Qaddafi regime created a binding constraint on post-war policy as consolidating and rationalising widely-dispersed capacity and reducing high enrolment would threaten the transitional government’s fragile and low legitimacy.\textsuperscript{552} These findings highlight the need for historical and institutional analysis of the trajectory of HE

\textsuperscript{549} See section 8.3.3.1
\textsuperscript{550} See sections 6.3.4 and 8.3.4
\textsuperscript{551} See section 6.1.3
\textsuperscript{552} See sections 8.3.1.2 and 8.3.4
and development in other post-conflict cases to fully understand the structural context and therefore the scope of HE policy.

Historical memory was also found to be an influence upon the evaluations of recovery efforts made by Iraqi and Libyan academics. In both cases historical experiences of HE that were perceived to have been characterised by higher standards than those that marked the post-war system influenced the conceptualisation of the visions for reconstruction and revitalisation of the HE sector held by participants. It could be argued that in a society where HE is widely-viewed as having enjoyed a much stronger reputation in a previous historical period within living memory, for example, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, or Libya, societal expectations for HE are inflated based on this collective memory of former glory and therefore a modest contribution of HE to post-conflict recovery is perceived as negligible. By contrast, in a society with a very low base, for example, Rwanda or Mozambique, low expectations can lead modest contributions to be perceived as substantial.

9.2.5. External Features

The level of post-war external HE support differed markedly between Iraq and Libya. Iraq did not receive largescale assistance or rebuilding programmes, with international attention to the sector emerging later during 2008-09. Moreover, the negative influence of regional states interfering with Iraqi politics and HE emerged as a theme equally strongly as did the positive opportunities afforded by external sources. By contrast, Libyan HE received high profile external backing from the US State Department and was viewed as a significant economic opportunity by international HE providers. This situation is partly explained by the nature of occupation in Iraq with low international support that would legitimise illegal

553 See section 6.3.5
554 See section 8.3.5
intervention, the better security climate in post-war Libya, and the pre-war status of Libya as an emerging international education market.

However, the difference can also be explained as partly due to historical timing; the experience of Iraqi HE, in particular killing and displacement of academics, brought attention to HE in crisis situations through the IIE and others, while HE became recognised as a soft power resource in America’s attempt to project influence in the Middle East. The Libyan case at the outset of its post-conflict phase benefitted from the geo-strategic importance of the country in a context shaped by the perceived need to shape the outcomes of Arab Spring transitions and therefore Libyan HE received high external attention relative to other post-conflict cases. However, it should be qualified that the initial enthusiasm for the sector was dampened by the August 2012 US Embassy attack in Benghazi, worsening security in Libya, and the shift of international focus towards Syria. It can be predicted that in future post-war situations in the region, such as Syria, where this confluence of economic and geo-strategic interest combine, international attention to HE will be even greater.

9.3. Comparative Perspectives on Recovery Options

The two case-studies provided rich data on the perspectives of key actors including academics and policy-makers regarding the options for HE and post-war recovery. This section will analyse findings through comparison of the two cases with a focus on major points of similarity and difference.

RQ5: What are the opportunities and challenges associated with various options for higher education recovery and reform in post-conflict societies?

Expansion of private HE and the privatisation of public HE were not viewed as attractive opportunities for development in Iraq and Libya.555 A shared tradition of free and universal public HE combined with negative perception of the limited

555 See section 6.4.1 and 8.4.1
experience of private provision explains lack of enthusiasm for this option in both countries. While expansion of private HE outside of regulatory authority in Iraq led to low quality for-profit HEIs and degree-mills this dynamic had not emerged strongly in Libya, although participants were anticipating it.

Both cases provide strong support for the public goods conception of the link between HE and recovery. An emergent theme is that public HE can better provide research relevant to social and developmental needs, a broad range of disciplines, and a commitment to academic standards rather than profit in a manner that could make a major contribution to long-term reconstruction. This finding supports the argument that in post-conflict contexts the private HE sector should be subject to state regulation. However, it is recognised that in many fragile contexts this is problematic and in section 10.2.3 some recommendations on overcoming this obstacle are proposed.

Decentralisation was viewed as an attractive option by the majority of participants in both Iraq and Libya, two countries with historically centralised HE governance. Moreover, in both cases Ministry officials held that government policy supported greater decentralisation while faculty members described little actual change in post-war state-university relations. However, a centralist position was defended in both cases with the decentralisation debate overlaid by political issues including centre-periphery relations, unresolved constitutional options including federalism, and nationalist versus regionalist ideologies. This politicisation of decentralisation should be expected to emerge in HE debate in other cases where regional enmities and divisions are major features of the post-conflict environment.

Furthermore, the collapse of regulatory authority in Iraq and the fragility of Libya’s post-conflict state suggest that ‘centralisation before decentralisation’ strategies should be pursued in similar contexts to ensure that HE system expansion occurs in accordance with national-level governance frameworks. If this were followed the dynamic of many low quality, unregulated, profit-maximising HEIs could be

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556 See sections 6.4.2 and 8.4.1
limited and educational resources best harnessed towards the goals of recovery and transition.

Both cases show a general tendency to gravitate towards international opportunities rather than domestic investment in HE capacity.\textsuperscript{557} This is best explained by long isolation of both countries from global academia under sanctions which followed strong traditions of international academic exchange.\textsuperscript{558} Furthermore, enthusiasm for internationalisation among faculty members can also be explained by the intellectual and social capital that can be gained from participation in international exchanges and also the potential of scholarships to be utilised as a tool of patronage in a rentier context.

However, it was noted that in Libya there was greater enthusiasm for university partnerships than in Iraq; a difference explained by participants’ perception of the post-war environment, which in Libya was optimistic and permissive of international cooperation while in Iraq the myriad difficult challenges including insecurity, conflict, and state weakness dampened to some extent the support for this option. Rather, it was seen that in both cases support for scholarship programmes was extremely high; while Iraqi university partnerships were constrained by internal conditions in Iraq support for scholarship programmes was by contrast heightened by these same conditions as participants viewed it as a means of supplying skills and knowledge from outside the troubled country.

Finally, ‘brain gain’ or the return of highly-skilled individuals from abroad emerged as a major opportunity. Many exiled and diaspora Libyans returned to take up leadership and management positions in post-conflict Libya; participants expressed pride that most of this class of elite exiles were the products of Benghazi and Tripoli universities in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s.\textsuperscript{559} Iraq by contrast experienced a massive ‘brain drain’ rather than ‘brain gain’ which further eroded the human capacity of the HE sector in addition to the wider professional class.\textsuperscript{560} Furthermore, it was

\textsuperscript{557} See sections 6.4.3 and 8.4.2
\textsuperscript{558} See sections 5.2.2 and 7.1.5
\textsuperscript{559} 8.2.5 and 8.3.3.3
\textsuperscript{560} See section 6.4.4
found that displaced Iraqi academics should be viewed as a potential resource for Iraqi recovery and that programmes in this area should be further supported.

9.4. Conclusion

In this chapter so far the empirical findings of the two cases have been analysed in a comparative manner. One major comparative conclusion is that based on the nature of the impact of conflict and type of post-conflict response, concentrating on HE in Libya will have more and better recovery outcomes than in Iraq. In Iraq it was seen that unresolved social and political conflicts in the post-war period were crucially detrimental to the recovery outcomes of HE. In such a context the guiding rationale for any response to HE should therefore be first on conflict, reconciliation, and healing wounded social capital and later on human capital, research, and knowledge. Meanwhile, in Libya the low impact of conflict and relatively low number of conflict-related obstacles in the post-conflict environment render an immediate focus on human capital, economic recovery, and development to be an appropriate response.

This is borne out by qualitative evidence based on interviews. At a general level, Iraqi participants focused on social and political conflicts; unresolved issues that are a major obstacle to any progress in harnessing HE to reconstruction goals. Contrastingly, Libyan participants tended to dismiss concerns over conflict and adopted a positive and forward looking worldview that focused on opportunities and prospects for development. This contrast in how key actors in the respective HE systems interpret the situations they inhabit revealing the very different stages at which the countries are located.

It can be asked whether failure of the post-war project of rebuilding Iraq could have turned out differently. While some hold that widespread violence and insecurity was an inevitable outcome due to ‘primordial’ enmities Dodge (2007, p.27) holds that there was nothing necessary about the post-war security collapse. It is worth
considering a counter-factual scenario in which several main factors that were held to be detrimental to the HE-recovery relationship are removed. In this scenario, Iraq was not occupied in 2003, widespread looting did not occur, and an inclusive political agreement creates a sovereign government with broad legitimacy that leads reconstruction and prevents high levels of insecurity, instability, and inter-communal conflict. This situation is closer to what transpired in Libya in terms of initial conditions. Yet in this scenario the prospects for HE contributing to Iraq’s reconstruction can be held to be better than Libyan HEIs contributing to post-war recovery. The reasoning behind this assertion is that Iraq possessed a more developed pre-war research capacity and universities were well integrated into military industry and research, an institutional linkage that could have been adapted towards rebuilding and reconstruction needs.

A further comparative finding not explored in the literature review is that the temporal context in which the cases occurred in some ways explains HE-recovery outcomes. It has been seen that the two cases are inter-connected in that Iraq in some ways served as a learning experience for the post-war response in Libya. First, the political fallout of the Iraq invasion made direct Western intervention in Libya political unfeasible and gave rise to a ‘post-intervention’ scenario. Consequently, a ‘light footprint approach’ was adopted in which Libyan authorities had meaningful ownership of post-war policy. Second, the failure of ‘hard power’ in Iraq partly explains the shift to a ‘soft power’ approach including supporting HE to project American influence in the Middle East which led to US political support for Libyan HE. Furthermore, the negative experience of post-war Iraqi HE accelerated the emergence of an international network on HE in crisis that and prompted greater awareness globally of HE in conflict-affected areas. Lastly, limited removal of Qaddafí-era personnel was motivated by a fear of repeating the pitfalls of de-Baathification.

Finally, another comparative conclusion that has hitherto not been considered is that in many aspects of the HE-recovery relationship trade-offs were involved between various goals. For example, democratisation was held to be limited by
stabilisation with political activities of students that could contribute to long-term democratic and civic organisation skills restricted to enhance short-term stability. Similarly, legitimacy was in tension with rationalisation as HE was viewed as a side-payment to enhance fragile state legitimacy while a rationalisation of public provision would have increased efficiency. Other trade-offs include elite universities versus equitable HE opportunities and overseas scholarships versus internal investment. It can be concluded from this that it is impossible to have all good things at once. However, not all trade-offs are zero-sum games and innovative solutions and recommendations to these dilemmas will be explored in the next chapter.
CHAPTER TEN

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

10.0. Introduction

The overarching aim of this thesis has been to investigate the under-studied yet arguably important role of HE in post-conflict recovery. Analysis proceeded by first establishing a theoretical framework based on an analytical understanding of HE’s role in development, conflict, and post-conflict contexts. Through the cases of Iraq and Libya the impact of war on HE, the functions of the sector in contributing to recovery, the obstacles to the post-war role of HE, and the opportunities and challenges associated with various recovery options were investigated and the findings analysed.

The aim of this chapter is to reflect critically on the present study’s contribution and offer recommendations. To start with, the main research findings will be considered in terms of the research questions and hypotheses in order to state the central conclusions. Next, recommendations will be made on methodological and theoretical grounds in addition to suggestions for future research on HE in post-conflict recovery. The central purpose of recommendations is to offer a framework for action on the role of HE to key actors in post-conflict reconstruction.

10.1. Central Conclusion

The main aim of the thesis is to conduct exploratory research into the under-studied area of HE and post-conflict reconstruction and recovery. The central hypothesis and research question in this thesis are as follows:
Central Hypothesis: Higher education is a neglected dimension of post-conflict reconstruction that can make a significant positive contribution in driving and energising post-war recovery processes.

Central Question: Why should post-conflict states place strategic emphasis on the higher education sector in terms of post-war reconstruction and recovery priorities?

The main conclusion of the thesis is that HE represents a potentially major capacity and resource that should be leveraged towards the goals of reconstruction and recovery in post-conflict contexts. While the case-studies of Iraq and Libya do not provide support for all the theorised contributions of HE to recovery they do offer overall support for the hypothesis. Moreover, HE is a neglected sector of recovery and this thesis has sought to provide global analysis of the field. Paraphrasing Hirschman’s insight, development is as much about harnessing existing scattered, under-utilised, and unrecognised resources and capacity than about creating new inputs (Brundenius, Lundvall & Sutz 2009). HE in this sense has been held to constitute such a neglected yet critical pillar for long-term recovery and development in post-conflict contexts.

A major conclusion is that HE in post-conflict contexts should go beyond the provision of ‘good normal education’ to connect the capacity of the sector to the demands of recovery. This may be achieved through sector-wide programming, reforming HE governance, and ensuring that skills and knowledge produced are relevant to recovery. In this sense it may be concluded that the findings of the thesis support the first guiding claim:

Claim One: Higher education should be geared towards post-war recovery at an early stage rather than be treated as a stand-alone, long-term concern to be considered once the transition from recovery to ‘normal development’ has been completed.

Proponents of the more limited role hold that expecting universities to play a proactive role in reconstruction risks over-burdening HEIs with weak capacity to the detriment of their basic functions. Rather, on this view HE can produce a
positive impact through its core teaching and research functions, improving quality, and enhancing access. While it should be acknowledged that HE or any other educational sub-sector cannot alone be expected to have a decisive impact on recovery outcomes it has been argued here that HE represents a neglected yet potentially important capacity in post-conflict contexts that can connect to a wide-range of recovery tasks and processes and that this potential cannot be actualised through adopting a ‘business-as-usual’ approach. Rather, bold and innovative thinking on how to link HE capacity to reconstruction, recovery, and development is required.

The argument that HE should be geared towards serving the needs and challenges of post-war reconstruction and development may be compared to the developmental university model that sought to gear HE to national development goals.\textsuperscript{561} Similarly, a ‘Recovery University’ would be strategically aligned with reconstruction planning to maximise the social impact of HEIs on recovery. Rather than conceive of this model narrowly through offering courses on peace and conflict studies, human rights, governance and related disciplines the recovery university model would harness national HE capacities towards reconstruction and recovery by adapting curricula and content to new economic and social needs, aligning HE with an over-arching vision of reconstruction and long-term human capital projections, and providing expertise and knowledge on a range of transitional concerns. This conclusion which emerged as a major theme of the two case-studies provides strong support for the second guiding claim which is concerned with building core national capacities:

\textbf{Claim Two: Strategic investments in higher education in post-conflict countries can make a major contribution to building core national capacities critical to long-term post-war reconstruction and development}

\textsuperscript{561} See chapter one sections 1.3.2, 1.3.5, and 1.3.6 for discussions of the post-colonial ‘developmental university’ model, HE in East Asian ‘developmental states’, and contemporary views on developmentalist HE
It was seen that in Iraq the failure to link HE to critical capacity-building tasks at an early stage was a major missed opportunity that could have had a significant impact on statebuilding while it remained to be seen if Libyan HE could perform a major long-term role in developing national capacities.

Another conclusion directly related to these considerations with capacity and statebuilding is that HE should be mobilised to support post-conflict reconstruction operations. Barakat and Zyck (2009) argue for an ‘integrated directed architecture of recovery’ to lead the reconstruction process; a joined-up collaborative governance network with national authorities leading planning, policy, and implementation of reconstruction work. It is the contention here that HE, in particular in its role in capacity-building, knowledge transfer for recovery, and human capital formation has the potential support the institutional and capacity development necessary to build such a robust national governance framework for reconstruction.

**RQ2**: What is the impact of conflict on higher education institutions and systems?

In terms of RQ2, the impact of conflict upon HE was found to be one of the most significant dynamics shaping the post-war context of the sector and for this reason a thorough conflict analysis should inform all reconstruction strategy and planning in relation to HE. In particular, the failure to resolve conflicts in post-war contexts can engulf HEIs and become detrimental to their operation and contribution to recovery and society at large. This finding entails a major conclusion that campus-level reconciliation work may often be a necessary first step in creating the conditions for healthy post-war academic development.

Conflict was seen to vary in the impact it has upon HE systems; there is a large difference between short inter-state wars and protracted civil conflicts lasting a generation or more. In the latter HE can become warped and distorted beyond recognition or cease to function as a system. Furthermore, to adequately capture

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562 See section 6.2.3.
563 See section 8.2.5.
564 In particular see analysis of sectarian conflict in post-war Iraqi HE in sections 6.2.6. and 6.3.1.3.
these transformations analysis of conflict’s impact must go beyond direct observable impacts to consider indirect impacts and distortions.

A major conclusion is that the end of conflict represents a unique opportunity to leverage substantial change in domestic HE systems. Conflict disrupts normal patterns and trends of activity, weakens and distorts capacity, increases needs, yet offers opportunities to change existing ways of doing things. If the chance is taken, HE can assist recovery and support long-term development. However, the opportunity offered by the post-conflict moment has often been perceived as a ‘blank slate’ enabling planners to construct model HE systems. However, as was clearly seen in Iraq, this attitude is dangerous. Rather, existing capacities should be recognised as foundations upon which to build and transform.

RQ3: What functions can higher education perform in contributing towards effective post-conflict recovery?

In relation to RQ3 it can be concluded that HE can contribute to a range of recovery tasks. In chapter three it was seen that HE is theorised to contribute to a wide range of recovery tasks in post-conflict contexts; conflict prevention and stabilisation, physical and sectoral reconstruction, humanitarian action, economic recovery, statebuilding, nationbuilding, conflict transformation, reconciliation, and recovery-related research and knowledge. While the cases support HE’s role in contributing to all the above, the short-term capacity of HEIs to absorb potentially destabilising youth, the supply of highly-skilled graduates in areas vital to reconstruction including health and education, integration of HE into long-term sustainable capacity development, and the developmental role of HE systems in supporting knowledge and innovation led economic recovery strategies emerge as the domains in which HE has the most potential to assist effective post-conflict transitions.

565 See section 2.5.
566 See section 3.3.2.4, section 5.4.2. and section 6.3.3.1.
567 See section 9.1
568 See section 3.2
Many of these potential contributions are over-looked and under-theorised in academic literature which is lagging behind practice in the emerging field of post-war HE assistance. Moreover, the connection between HE and recovery is not a simple, linear relationship relying on mono-causal mechanisms. Rather, HE offers positive externalities to post-conflict societies, including institutional development, enhanced civic values, bridging divided communities, and its role as a ‘House of Expertise’ that connect with multiple recovery processes. These linkages are often indirect, complex, and multi-directional which renders their impact hard to assess, for example, due to over-determination and time lags of effects. Moreover, it can be stated that HE-recovery linkages are non-basic and this is one reason for their low recognition. This thesis has sought to identify the myriad processes and mechanisms that connect HE to the tasks of recovery and redress this significant gap.

Another major conclusion is that from the array of potential functions served by HE in post-conflict settings not all may be actualised in a single context. There are inevitable trade-offs and tough choices in HE reform. Policy-makers and planners must deliberate whether to expand access or restrict places; to grant individual freedom for students or allocate enrolments based on public interest; to afford universities a high degree of autonomy or maintain centralised regulatory control; to conserve traditions or to radically reform. Another example of a trade-off is between a concentration on rebuilding a core of elite national universities or supporting a system-wide reconstruction with equitable distribution of resources.

In reality many of these choices may not entirely rest in the hands of public administrators, particularly in fragile states with breakdowns in systems of governance. Furthermore, some of the supposedly dichotomous trade-offs may upon closer inspection reveal themselves to be illusory. However, the concept of trade-offs remains analytically useful for describing and evaluating the kinds of choices that must be confront in the majority of cases.

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569 See chapter four for discussion of this point, in particular section 4.1.
570 See the conclusion to chapter nine for further discussion of this point
RQ4: What features of the post-war environment influence the relationship between higher education and post-conflict recovery?

A major conclusion to draw from the cases in relation to RQ4 is that HE is constrained in making a major contribution to reconstruction and recovery by various features of the post-conflict environment. The cases shed light on the type of obstacles that typically confront HE, inhibit rebuilding, derail promising initiatives, and problematise educational provision.571

Conjunctural features of insecurity, instability, and conflict were found to be the largest obstacles and affect nearly all aspects of HE functioning. This was in some ways to be expected and accorded with the literature review.572 This finding can be expected to have relatively wide generalisability as the three features are present to some degree in all post-conflict settings. However, a major conclusion was that other features beyond insecurity and instability were also found to be significant. This entails that analysis of HE in post-conflict recovery should be conducted in reference to a holistic framework that can capture the complex dynamics, barriers, and opportunities that constitute post-conflict contexts. The major conclusions in relation to these other sets of features will now be briefly stated.

Regarding educational features, quality was found to be centrally important while equity and access were not critical variables. While quality should be expected to be important in many cases there is limited generalisability of the finding that equity and access have relatively low weight. This is because the two cases under consideration were high access systems and relatively equitable in comparison to typical post-conflict cases. However, equity remains very important to analysis of post-conflict HE and is discussed in more depth at the end of this chapter.

Institutional features were found to be significant with the balance of public/private provision, ‘ownership’, vision, and state capacity confirmed as important variables.

571 See section 9.2
572 See section 3.3.1
While ‘ownership’ and state capacity were identified in the literature review and confirmed as important features in the case-studies it was the presence or absence of vision and strategy for HE that had the greatest consensus amongst participants. Post-war HE is also shown to be sensitive to political variables prompting the conclusion that HE is not autonomous from society and that the state should balance the need to depoliticise the issue of HE with the goal of protecting academic freedom while not suppressing the legitimate and sometimes constructive political energy of students and academic staff.

Structural features including history and culture were seen to influence the context of post-war HE policy. Furthermore, path-dependent dynamics of HE provision can shape expectations of youth which in an unstable and insecure context can limit the perceived space for HE reform and strategy. However, the context-dependent and idiosyncratic character of issues related to culture and history problematise broad comparison. However, within the restricted class of post-conflict contexts within the Arab world and the wider Middle East the cultural, social, historical, and political similarities increase the salience of the research findings. Moreover, dynamics including the legitimacy-rationalisation trade-off and cultural barriers to increased TVET apply also to non-conflict affected but transitional contexts in the region such as Tunisia, Egypt, or Morocco.

External influences can shape the post-war environment particularly in opportunities for international assistance and regional cooperation or competition. The scope of the findings may however be limited as both cases, Iraq and Libya, represent contexts that were subject to high levels of external interest and geo-strategic importance that may not be considered typical of post-conflict cases. Notwithstanding this, an important conclusion is that HE in post-conflict settings is increasingly viewed through the lens of soft power and should be expected to be

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573 See section 3.3.2.
574 See sections 6.3.3.2. and 8.3.3.1.
575 See sections 8.3.1.2. and 8.3.4.
576 For discussion of external factors and post-conflict recovery see sections 3.3.5 and 3.4.3 from chapter three, 6.1.6, 6.4.3, 6.3.5 and 6.4.3 on Iraq plus sections 8.3.5 and 8.4.2 on Libya
linked more thoroughly to the political rationales of donors and international agencies in the post-Arab Spring and post-Iraq context.

**RQ5:** What are the opportunities and challenges associated with various options for higher education recovery and reform in post-conflict societies?

It has been seen that HE was a very low priority in peacebuilding missions of the 1990s and that while it remains a low priority overall there is growing interest in and support to the sector in post-conflict contexts. Privatisation and internationalisation are two common trends that are presented as opportunities for HE development. Private provision is advocated for offering the potential to expand capacity, often low due to the impact of conflict, in a situation of low public expenditure due to the numerous competing priorities for reconstruction spending. Moreover, private HE may be thought to respond to economic needs and inject dynamism into economic recovery. However, it has been seen that private HE in post-war societies frequently is unregulated and emerges due to state fragility, low quality, and faces numerous obstacles.

The third guiding claims directly addressed these concerns with private and public HE provision in post-conflict contexts.

**Claim Three:** *The role of the state is critical in mediating the relationship between higher education and successful post-conflict recovery through ensuring that the higher education sector contributes towards the public good*

Both cases provide strong support for this claim. It was seen that private providers in comparison with public universities do not fulfil public goods functions, for example, research on issues of domestic relevance or offering a range of disciplines, rather they concentrate on teaching in marketable disciplines leading to duplication and over-supply of graduates. While a degree of private provision is

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577 See section 3.1
578 See section 3.4.1.
579 See sections 6.4.1 and 8.4.1
to be expected in most post-conflict cases much more attention should be placed on harnessing the sector’s potential to contribute towards recovery goals.

Internationalisation represents a main form of HE assistance and should be expected to increase over the coming decades. Scholarship programmes, international university partnerships, research collaborations, and branch campuses have been the principal modalities of the emerging international HE response to fragile conflict-affected contexts.\textsuperscript{580} Internationalisation is held to circulate the skills, knowledge, expertise, and resources required to build the sustainable HE capacity in post-conflict contexts that could enable long-term recovery.\textsuperscript{581} Over the immediate term cross-border education contains less danger than private provision; nevertheless careful consideration of how to align forms of international cooperation and exchange with long-term development is required. In particular, forms of internationalisation including branch campuses and research collaborations should be evaluated in terms of relevance to local social, economic, and developmental needs.

A major conclusion is that in considering the options and opportunities available for HE in post-conflict contexts key actors should be strategically selective and aim for coherence with recovery objectives.\textsuperscript{582} In particular in fragile contexts where state authority is by definition weak the capacity to ensure that HE provision by private and foreign providers and HE assistance and partnerships maximise their potential to contribute to public goods and the wider tasks of post-war recovery is limited. Moreover, strategies of HE revitalisation should build from existing capacities and strengths rather than pursue wholesale transfer of HE models from abroad. Proposals and recommendations on how to link these opportunities to recovery processes are offered in the following section.

\textsuperscript{580} See section 3.4.2.
\textsuperscript{581} See sections 6.4.3 and 8.4.2
\textsuperscript{582} See sections 6.4 and 8.4 for analysis of the opportunities and challenges involved in options for HE recovery in Iraq and Libya
10.2. Recommendations

To advance the field of post-conflict HE various recommendations can be made in relation to the study. These can be categorised as methodological, theoretical, and applied or practical recommendations. Rather than simply listing recommendations, a discussion will follow that analyses the predicted utility of the various recommendations in light of the conclusions of the thesis.

10.2.1. Methodological Recommendations

Based on the experience of completing this thesis a major theoretical finding with implications for methodology is that the HE-recovery relationship should be viewed as a complex and multi-dimensional relationship manifested in a wide range of processes, sectors, and activities.\textsuperscript{583} The theoretical framework attempted to analyse the mechanisms through which HE could contribute to recovery many of which are classified as externalities or wider social benefits of HE that can impact upon the multiple facets of recovery. Furthermore, it has been held that externalities of HE are for this reason difficult to measure precisely (Rizzo 2004), despite Tilak’s (2008) observation that common-sense understandings of the social benefits of HE have motivated public investment in advanced learning since its emergence in ancient civilisations.

The methodological implication for future researchers is that innovative ways of recognising, identifying, and measuring the non-basic and non-linear contributions of HE to recovery must be developed. This thesis has attempted to develop such means, principally through the theoretical framework in chapter three that identified the theorised functions of HE and the comparative methodology that examined two case-studies intensively in terms of the views and perspectives of key actors from within the two cases that shed light on the complex post-conflict

\textsuperscript{583} See chapter four section 4.1 for an overview of the research framework
environment of HE in its relation to recovery. However, it is recognised that this approach has limitations including the small number of cases considered in this study which weakens the generalisability of conclusions and the constraints on methodological approaches posed by the challenging post-conflict environments. For this reason, if a complete understanding of the under-studied field of HE in post-conflict recovery is to be reached through further research alternative methodological approaches and techniques must be employed to generate knowledge of the field from multiple perspectives.

On a more practical note, in chapter four it was shown that there are several methodological dilemmas and problems typically encountered whilst conducting fieldwork in post-conflict settings including issues of access, trust, fear, and insecurity. Based upon reflection on the experience of fieldwork for this thesis, in particular the field visit to Libya, the following recommendations are intended to contribute to the small but growing area of methodology in post-conflict recovery studies.

- **Trust**: It was seen that during fieldwork in Libya issues of trust arose due to the status of the fieldwork zone as a post-conflict crisis-ridden context, the culture of suspicion borne out of Qaddafi’s repressive state apparatus, and fears of espionage following the August 2012 US Embassy Attack in Benghazi. As a result it was necessary to undertake various measures to establish trust with participants. This involved formal means such as letters of introduction and informal means including mutual contacts who provided an introduction to participants which was important to participants ‘opening-up’, in particular when discussing controversial or political issues.

- **Snowball sampling**: Several contributions to the literature on conducting fieldwork in conflict-affected and post-conflict contexts recommend utilising a snowball sampling technique to overcome some of the obstacles to access

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584 See section 4.4.4. for more detail on the difficulties of conducting fieldwork in this context
that those particular types of settings pose (Cohen & Arieli 2011; Clark 2006). The experience of carrying-out research for this thesis suggests that snowball sampling enabled obstacles to access and availability of participants to be surmounted in both the cases of Iraq and Libya and in this respect supports the findings of others585 that snowballing represents an effective methodological approach to sampling in post-conflict settings.

- **Flexibility:** The Libyan context of state fragility, localised conflict, protests, and the high presence of non-state armed groups posed some logistical problems to fieldwork plans. This necessitated a flexible approach to maximising the time spent during the field. For example, during a visit to Benghazi University student protests which were amongst the most disruptive in 2012 shutdown the institution rendering planned interviews that day impossible to complete. However, this created an opportunity to observe the protests and hold informal conversations with students which provided rich insights that would not have been available during a standard day of interviews. Moreover, in chapter four it was explained that limitations in access to Iraq for fieldwork required flexible strategies including utilising displaced scholars as a sample population and email interviews. This finding supports previous research holding that flexibility is vital to effective research in post-conflict zones (Barakat & Ellis 1996; Goodhand 2000; Deely 2005).

- **Personal relationships:** It is recommended that researchers pay attention to building human relationships in difficult contexts such as conflict-affected and post-conflict countries. It was found that in the field personal relationships enabled the researcher to navigate the practical difficulties of fieldwork. In particular, in Libya, having a close confidante enabled security dangers to be identified thus allowing greater ease of access.

585 See chapter four section 4.4 for discussion of the sampling procedures utilised in conduct of fieldwork
10.2.2. Theoretical Recommendations

This thesis has been exploratory in nature and concerned with theory-building rather than theory-testing. This is due first to the lack of systematic research into HE and post-conflict recovery and the fact that much existing work does not adopt a global perspective. Furthermore, the discipline of post-conflict recovery studies is an emerging field and there are relatively few attempts at broad theorisation of post-conflict recovery (Barakat & Zyck 2009). A major output of the thesis is therefore an original and early theorisation that advances understanding of the HE-recovery relationship. The major theoretical recommendation is therefore that viewing HE as a potential pillar of recovery advances our understanding of post-war reconstruction by recognising the significantly under-utilised resource of HE capacity.

Beyond this increased understanding, a number of novel theoretical insights into HE and post-conflict recovery are offered below.

- **Developmentalism**: A significant element of the theoretical framework advanced in this thesis was the advanced understanding of the role of HE in development. Due to constraints of space chapter one could only provide a broad narrative and analysis of development in relation to HE. However, it is recommended that study of HE in post-conflict contexts views the subject at least in part through the concepts and tools offered by development theory, for instance, the role of HE in driving post-war economic recovery and improving institutional quality.

- **Contextual Understanding**: Analysis of post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery cases requires an in-depth understanding of local contextual issues (Berdal 2009), a finding that applies equally to HE’s role in post-conflict settings. In particular it has been seen that the role of conflict, culture, history, and politics shape the post-conflict environment in powerful ways.

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586 See section 1.3 for analysis of HE in development theory and practice
Moreover, understanding this context is vital for external intervention and assistance to be effective in rebuilding damaged HE systems, in particular in recognising and working with existing capacity.

- **Human capital to capabilities:** While HE has been held to function as an important means of re-pooling depleted post-war human capital stocks, narrow economistic human capital theory cannot capture the scope of HE’s potential contribution to development in post-conflict contexts. Rather, theories of HE in terms of creating the conditions enabling the enhancement of human capabilities (Tilak 2002a; Walker 2010; Mehrotra 2005) better reflect the sector’s holistic and multi-dimensional potential.

### 10.2.3. Applied Recommendations and Agenda for Action

Improving practice in post-conflict recovery processes in relation to HE is an aim of the study and for this end a range of recommendations can be made. Reflecting globally on lessons learned and best-practice from a wide range of cases should be expected to greatly assist policy-makers in post-conflict contexts. However, it is acknowledged that responses must be adapted and tailored to fit the specific and idiosyncratic features of the context in which they are implemented. In this spirit, the following recommendations are not prescriptive one-size-fits-all recipes for success, rather they should be taken as a contribution to a reflective process of considering alternative strategies.

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587 See section 4.1
588 See sections 1.3.3 and 1.3.4 for discussion of human capital theory, rate-of-return analysis, and the critique of these approaches
To executive bodies and reconstruction planners

❖ **Increased and timely funding for HE reconstruction.** It is important to lobby for increased funding to the HE sector at an early stage.\(^{589}\) Over time alternative funding sources can be generated; however short-term needs of rebuilding damaged HEIs may require emergency budgets and capital investment. Other financing options should be pursued, for example, user-fees could be introduced in the medium-term to long-term when supporting institutions such as banking and insurance are in place to mitigate negative equity and access effects. The case for HE reconstruction should be made as early as possible and preferably as part of any early needs assessment.

❖ **Whole-of-government approach.** A central argument of the thesis is that HE connected with many sectors of recovery. To harness the potential of the HE sector for these various sectors it is recommended to integrate Ministries of Higher Education, Planning, Science and Technology, Labour, Finance, Education, and other relevant line ministries into a joined-up governance framework. Furthermore, Ministries could produce a joint human capital/resources plan and offer clear guidance to the HE system on priority areas for enrolments, internal investment, and scholarships.

❖ **Higher Education Council.** At the beginning of transition a Higher Education Council with strong executive backing should be formed under joint stewardship of the MoHE and Ministry of Planning or Reconstruction, or another body responsible for reconstruction planning. Establishing a council would enable the policy-coherence of HE with reconstruction priorities and activities that are crucially supported by high level political will. The council should form a draft charter to form a provisional basis for a national vision for HE. To ensure the legitimacy of the Council its

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\(^{589}\) See sections 6.1.1 and 6.1.2 for analysis of inadequate financing for post-war reconstruction of Iraqi HE
membership should be inclusive and representative of all major social, political and religious groups.

- **National Vision.** It has been seen that weak vision was a major limiting factor in post-conflict HE. It is therefore recommended that national bodies take action to develop a national vision and strategy for HE. It is advised that the process of arriving at a vision is almost as important as the product of that process. For this reason the process should form an open and participatory consultation including all relevant stakeholders. Such a process could bridge divisions within the academic community and coalesce it around recovery goals thus reducing future resistance to reforms by faculty members.

- **Focus on capacity-building.** A major argument of this thesis is that HE has the potential to be an important sector in capacity-building efforts which are central to post-conflict reconstruction. An assessment of capacity in all ministries and agencies should be conducted to identify how HE can support capacity-building at the national-level. Furthermore, scholarship programmes in specialisms not available domestically and investment in domestic HE capacity in disciplines supplying core state functions including law, public administration, and economics could make a major contribution to civil service modernisation and professionalisation. These disciplines and focuses are widely applicable to the task of statebuilding and could form the core of a transitional HE recovery strategy until the Higher Education Council develops longer-term projections on HE priorities as part of a national vision and strategy for the sector.

- **Plan During Conflict.** In the aftermath of WWII the enormous task of rebuilding in many countries included a strong role for HE. In fact,
planning for the reconstruction of HE in defeated Germany (Phillips 1986) and its role in the UK and US (Hook 1942) was taking place years before victory was inevitable. Waiting for the bullets to stop may represent a missed opportunity to consider the long-term basis for HE, a complex and multi-dimensional system, in its integration with post-war planning. Moreover, it should be recognised that scholar rescue schemes such as the Scholar Rescue Fund afford an opportunity to international actors to engage in ‘during the conflict’ brainstorming and planning with displaced scholars for post-conflict HE.

To Ministries of Higher Education and relevant national bodies

❖ ‘Get Your House in Order’. At the start of any transition, Ministries must look thoroughly at internal restructuring, capacity needs, and governance issues – or simply to ‘get your house in order’. Furthermore, Ministries should address these issues at the university-level. In particular, political will is needed to ensure transparency and integrity mechanisms are implemented and to overcome complex domestic political economies that pose an obstacle to reform.

❖ Policy Transfer. Consider the strengths and weaknesses of various models and policies of HE as a step in post-conflict policy-making. While models including the UAE, Qatar, Singapore, and the USA are popular post-conflict countries are advised to look beyond these normal development contexts and consider the lessons learned from other post-conflict and fragile states.592 While there is no one-size-fits-all blueprint careful consideration of past lessons, when contextualised and systematically compared, can improve HE policy. It is recommended that Ministries of Higher Education establish a unit for policy-transfer. Moreover, twinning with foreign institutions could aid the development of recovery planning and strategy

592 See sections 3.3.2.4 and 8.3.3.5 for analysis of policy and institutional transfer in post-conflict HE
through inputs of expertise, resources, and knowledge from outside the country.

- **Establish a Reconstruction Consultancy Office.** To harness existing HE capacity in the rebuilding and reconstruction process an outreach office should be established in major universities or a central ministry. A list of experts could be collated and distributed to companies, government agencies, NGOs, and international bodies working in transitional activities. Benefits would include greater use of national expertise in reconstruction thus stimulating employment, strengthening ownership, and inputs by actors with deep contextual understanding of their society. Furthermore, greater use of university-based personnel in reconstruction projects would provide an additional source of income which could enable universities to achieve greater autonomy from the state where finances were previously dependent on public sources. Moreover, participation in reconstruction activities would strengthen HE capacity and stimulate new knowledge and research into post-conflict recovery.

- **Public-private partnerships.** Where state capacity is weak and unable to effectively regulate expansion of private universities the government can provide an initial financial allocation to private institutions in order that they comply with a minimum level of government regulations such as capping student fees to meet equity objectives, and following national or existing curricula. This arrangement would be based on an agreement that the university will transition from private status to a public-private partnership in the medium-term. This option would enable fast expansion based on the typical high demand for HE in post-conflict contexts and mitigate at least some of the contradictions and distortions of rapid private

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593 For discussion of the utilisation of domestic HE capacity in reconstruction and recovery processes see sections 3.2.2, 6.2.2, and 8.2.2

594 See section 8.4.1 where it was seen that a President of a private university in Libya gave unqualified support to the potential of public-private partnerships
sector expansion seen in many post-conflict settings. While it may be questioned whether the state has the institutional capacity to enforce compliance, this is not the central issue, because it is an incentive or carrot, not a stick. More relevant is that to be effective there must be a degree of confidence that the state will improve its capacity, honour its commitment, and that war will not break out.

**Encourage not-for-profit HEIs.** In post-conflict contexts where private HEIs emerge outside of state regulatory authority the tendency of new institutions to be for-profit institutions that make low developmental contribution\(^\text{595}\) could be ameliorated if assistance was offered to private HEIs in linking with diaspora and local individuals and foundations that could provide grants or endowments. National authorities could in this way provide complementarities including communications, networks, and legitimacy that have the potential to incentivise for-profit universities and colleges to become not-for-profit HEIs. This could have a major impact on the trajectory of private HE expansion and increase the public goods function of these HEIs thereby having a greater impact on long-term recovery and development.

**Elite universities.** To some degree it is advisable to concentrate resources on the strengthening or establishment of elite universities.\(^\text{596}\) In any HE system there is a differentiation of types of institution with large research universities constituting a relatively low proportion. In post-conflict settings the ideal of a research university is often far from the reality of universities. However, the theorised benefits of HE to the core tasks of post-conflict reconstruction and statebuilding can best be served by elite research universities that are expensive to maintain. While expanding access is an

\(^{595}\) See sections 3.3.2.2, 3.4.1, 6.4.1, and 8.4.1 for detailed analysis of private HE as a policy response to post-conflict HE recovery including the finding that many participants qualified their limited support for private universities that any new private providers should operate on a not-for-profit basis.

\(^{596}\) See section 8.4.1 for analysis of the option of establishing a new elite university in Libya
important goal, it is crucial that resources are not spread too thinly to produce genuine domestic capacity able to supply high levels of skills and knowledge for recovery. Concerns with elite and urban bias built into this option are dealt with below.

❖ **Solicit Private Sector Funding.** Firms and enterprises operating in post-conflict countries should consider investing in HEIs. In the long-term, it is of mutual benefit to firms and universities; universities gain resources while firms gain staff with advanced skills geared to their human resource requirements, knowledge of local conditions, and at lower cost than international staff. This model is applicable in particular in resource-rich post-conflict states including Angola or Libya where, for example, oil and gas companies should be expected to contribute towards engineering and related disciplines.

❖ **Incentivise Returnees.** Diaspora and expatriate nationals are a major potential resource for rebuilding university capacity and for general reconstruction in post-conflict countries.\(^{597}\) Incentives should be offered to stimulate returns of highly-skilled professionals who enjoy a comparative advantage in connecting with individuals and institutions outside of the country. However, care should be taken to avoid the creation of antagonisms between existing faculty members and returnees, particularly where the latter will account for many senior positions.

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\(^{597}\) See section 3.2.2 for discussion of incentivising returnees as an aspect of re-pooling human capital for reconstruction and recovery, section 6.4.4 for analysis of ‘brain gain’ in the context of Iraq, and sections 8.2.5 and 8.3.3.3 for analysis of the impact of returnees on post-war Libyan HE recovery
To Donors and Agencies

- **Pooled Funding Mechanisms.** Developing innovative pooled financing mechanisms such as multi-donor trust funds to support HE in fragile conflict-affected contexts would be a major advance. HE requires significant financial resources that are difficult to mobilise in fragile conflict-affected contexts. Pooled funding would enable long-term sustainable financing of HE rebuilding, enhance domestic ownership of HE policy in contexts where Ministries are highly dependent on donor financing, and ensure that the recovery of HE is integrated with the recovery of other sectors.

- **Innovate with other financing options.** Options including micro-financing schemes should be explored particularly in contexts where state capacity is minimal to non-existent, such as Somalia. Such schemes could build on local energy and enthusiasm for HE. Furthermore, access to low-interest loans could widen access and improve equity in fragile contexts where private HE emerges in response to state weakness and where capacity to address equity concerns raised by private provision is low.

- **Support in-country investment.** Donors have been criticised for providing assistance in-kind as scholarships for study in the donor country thus subsidising domestic institutions rather than supporting sustained capacity development in recipient societies. Donors should therefore link assistance to recipient needs and prioritise in-country investment.

- **Integrate capacity-building via higher education.** Donor and agency capacity-building initiatives could benefit from a long-term perspective that utilises domestic HE capacity, for example, supporting the establishment of public administration and public policy departments or investing in existing

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598 See section 3.4.3
capacity in these areas that could make a significant contribution to state and capacity development. One recommendation is that an inter-agency capacity development centre with certificate awarding powers is established in-country where visiting staff can deliver lectures and advanced facilities can be built. If such a collaborative effort were to succeed it could offer an innovative means of improving post-conflict capacity and reduce out-of-country training and capacity building costs. Moreover, in the long-term such a centre would provide an established unit that could either transition to ownership by a national university as a policy and public administration training centre or become a public-private or not-for-profit private degree-awarding body in its own right.

- **Share knowledge and best-practice.** The knowledge-base on HE in post-conflict contexts is very weak. While an increasing number of projects and programmes have been funded in post-conflict HE sectors over the past decade very little has been published in the way of evaluation. Evaluations and assessments of programmes should be undertaken to uncover the effectiveness of current practice and identify common obstacles. Given the emerging status of this field such knowledge would provide a very valuable input.

- **Increase interaction with higher education.** In chapter three it was seen that ‘southern universities’ in conflict-affected and post-conflict contexts are generally excluded from debates over fragility, peacebuilding and recovery at the global level.\(^{599}\) However, they are well-positioned to contribute. International agencies working in post-conflict contexts should therefore seek to integrate domestic academics into policy-making, reconstruction activities, and research and knowledge production activities related to statebuilding, peacebuilding, and recovery.

\(^{599}\) See section 3.2.9
To Higher Education Institutions

- **Curricular Review.** In order to improve the quality of HE and make a positive contribution recovery it is recommended that HEIs take early action to review curricula in light of the altered post-conflict environment.\(^{600}\) To harness the capacity of the sector towards recovery it is important that educational content is made relevant to social, economic, developmental and transitional needs.

- **Faculty development.** It is important to identify training needs and devise programmes of further study to redress any major human resources shortages caused by conflict. Furthermore, by collating this information at an early stage any offers of international assistance such as scholarships or staff training can be better coordinated and address genuine needs.

- **Support Reconciliation.** Where civil conflict is highly divisive, campus-level reconciliation should be prioritised at an early stage. This can be achieved by promoting contact between adversaries through holding meetings, conferences, and sporting and cultural activities which create bridging social capital.\(^{601}\) Furthermore, in divided societies where students may meet ‘the other’ for the first time acclimatisation and cultural awareness training can be provided.\(^{602}\) Beyond the campus, inter-university collaboration and regional university networks can promote wider interactions and reconciliation.

- **Conflict Sensitivity.** A cross-cutting finding of this thesis is that post-war HE policy and practice should be conflict-sensitive. This can be achieved by protecting minority rights through the study of languages, history, culture

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\(^{600}\) See sections 8.2.2 and 8.2.4 for findings relating to curricular review in post-war Libyan HE

\(^{601}\) See section 2.4

\(^{602}\) See section 3.2.7
and identities of local and national communities.\textsuperscript{603} Furthermore, inequalities can be identified and addressed through targeted interventions or affirmative action programmes. For instance, it is recommended that training is provided for staff and students on conflict analysis and day-to-day skills of conflict resolution.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textbf{Revitalisation.} In the wake of conflict academic communities can be fractured, exhausted, and over-whelmed requiring revitalisation of community ethos, corporative identity, and communication channels.\textsuperscript{604} To address this, activities and programmes may be held including workshops, reconciliation work, and social service provision. Furthermore, for this end it is also recommended that HEIs communicate their mission and vision to faculty members, staff, students and the wider public through meetings, local media, and public consultation.

  \item \textbf{Psycho-social needs.} It has been seen in the cases of Iraq and Libya that provision of psycho-social services for traumatised students was poor with negative consequences.\textsuperscript{605} It is therefore advised that HEIs in post-conflict settings place emphasis on the often overlooked psycho-social needs of students, faculty, and other employees that arise following traumatic conflict-induced experience.
\end{itemize}

\textit{On University-Society Relations}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textbf{Focus on public outreach and communication.} It is important to communicate the positive impact of HE through public outreach including public lectures, activities, and media strategies, particularly where public
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{603} See section 3.2.7
\textsuperscript{604} See sections 1.2, 2.4.2, 2.4.3.2, 6.3.2.2, and 6.3.4 for discussions relevant to this point
\textsuperscript{605} See sections 6.1.1 and 8.1.1
perceptions of HE are low and an obstacle to greater state investment in the sector.

- **Ensure Relevance.** It is imperative to connect teaching, research, and mission to social and developmental needs and priorities rather than operating as an ‘Ivory Tower’. Furthermore, in relation to the above recommendation, it is important to communicate this relevance to the wider public to improve university-society relations.

- **Economically and socially benefit local communities.** By providing employment, public facilities, non-university training and skills development, extension projects, and local community development schemes HE can make a positive contribution to local development. This is more important where HEIs operate in under-served and marginalised regions that may be critical to stabilisation and conflict.

- **Spatially integrate with local communities.** Despite the challenging security conditions typical of post-conflict environments there is a need to balance security with openness – it is recommended that universities do not succumb to the temptation of becoming an ‘academic fortress’ (Yacobi 2008). Furthermore, it is advised not to spatially locate new campuses away from residential areas where opportunities for interaction with local communities will be substantially fewer.

**On International Cooperation**

- **Get branding of universities right.** Internationalisation was found to offer many opportunities for post-conflict HE development.\footnote{See sections 3.4.2, 6.4.3 and 8.4.2} To maximise opportunities HEIs are recommended to ensure self-presentation as attractive partners. This can be aided by steps such as maintaining
professional websites including at least a contacts page in English, and a social media presence. This would facilitate cooperation by enabling information sharing and easy communications. Moreover, as shown by the cases of Cote D'Ivoire\textsuperscript{607} and Iraq\textsuperscript{608} HE cooperation can create positive international legitimacy for post-conflict regimes thus promoting further foreign investment in other sectors.

- **Be strategically selective.** Whilst internationalisation brings many opportunities there are also challenges and dangers involved. For this reason it is recommended that HEIs assess all offers of support for the pros and cons rather than rushing unquestioningly into the first offers of cooperation or assistance that are forthcoming. It is important to prioritise cooperation in areas of key strategic concern from the perspective of reconstruction and development.

- **Consider regional and South-South cooperation.** In many post-conflict countries a strong constituency of academics have a preference for cooperation with Western institutions due to their prestige and the reputational capital gained from association with the best universities. However, regional partnerships and South-South cooperation can bring additional benefits including cultural familiarity, spatial proximity, more equal partnerships, and greater probability of long-term sustainable cooperation. It should be qualified that these forms of cooperation are to some degree also subject to risks of dependency, inequality, and self-interested motivations.

- **Connect to global civil society.** It is recommended that the potential opportunities offered by the emerging global network of NGOs, charities, and academic organisations are recognised. Efforts should be made to learn

\textsuperscript{607} See section 3.2.3.3
\textsuperscript{608} See section 6.1.6
about the work of these groups, for example, the Scholars at Risk Network, the NGO SPARK, and the Institute of International Education.\textsuperscript{609}

\textit{To Civil Society}

There is a strong need for more innovative and effective ways of linking civil-society actors to peacebuilding and reconstruction in post-conflict contexts (Berdal 2009, p.141) and HE arguably offers one such means.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textbf{Recognise the potential of universities as sites of civil society development and ‘islands of tranquillity’}. Through supporting campus-based student unions, organisations, and initiatives that function as crucial ‘training grounds’ for organisational, governance, and campaigning skills civil society organisations can considerably enhance the long-term prospects of domestic civil society development.\textsuperscript{610}

  \item \textbf{Civil Engagement Centre}. By promoting volunteerism and recruiting members from the student body for civil society initiatives beyond the confines of the campus civil society actors can encourage a culture of participation and civic attitudes while developing long-term human resources. It is recommended that a centre for civil society engagement is established that could provide civic education, training, and opportunities for participation to the HE community and also the wider society.

  \item \textbf{For international civil society, base assistance on needs identified in-country}. International civil society actors should be cognisant of potential unintended consequences of their actions and resistance to cooperation
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{609} See sections 3.4.2, 6.4.4, and 8.4.2
\textsuperscript{610} See section 3.2.6 for theoretical discussion of this ‘training ground’ model of HE in post-conflict civil society development and sections 6.2.4 and 8.2.3 for relevant findings on Iraq and Libya respectively
being perceived as driven by foreign agendas. Close cooperation and communication with domestic civil society and HE communities is therefore recommended to ensure that assistance coheres with national priorities and visions for HE and transition.

To the Private Sector

- **Communicate human resources requirements.** While much onus is placed on HEIs in aligning with economic needs the private sector can assist in the process by projecting long-term requirements, sharing knowledge with HE and planning organisations, and cooperating in curricula review and course development.

- **Cooperate with universities.** The private sector should recognise that student placements, internships, joint supervision and other forms of cooperation can provide mutual benefit by providing students with skills and experience relevant to the needs of firms and enhancing HE’s contribution to economic recovery.

- **Support student entrepreneurship.** The long-term prospects of private sectors in post-conflict contexts will be stronger in a culture of innovation and entrepreneurship. It is therefore recommended that private firms and companies recognise that students and young people represent a major resource for developing entrepreneurial skills and support programmes and initiatives designed to encourage student initiative and entrepreneurial activity.

- **Seek consultancy and advice from domestic university expertise.** Rather than rely exclusively on imported consultants domestic firms should

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611 See sections 3.2.5, 6.2.5, and 8.2.4
recognise the existing capacity and expertise offered in-country. Large and profitable industries, in particular extractive industries, have a social responsibility to invest in building domestic knowledge and research capacity which in the long-term is in the self-interest of firms because it offers lower-cost expertise with greater knowledge of the local context.612

10.3. Discussion

Given the above recommendations it is impossible to do all at once and it is not recommended that all are even appropriate in any given context. Furthermore, there may even be tensions and contradictions between various recommendations and the major conclusions offered in this thesis. This section will now seek to respond in broad terms to some of the main counter-arguments anticipated to some of the assumptions and arguments underlying the recommendations and conclusions offered above.

Increasing investment in post-conflict HE may be criticised on several grounds including that it perpetuates an urban bias that is inherent in much international reconstruction assistance (on urban bias see Ozerdem & Roberts 2012). While this will often be the case expansion of HE beyond urban centres and capital cities into provincial towns and under-served regions can in fact contribute to reducing uneven educational development by bringing HE to rural areas and furthermore support rural economic development through agricultural extension in areas including animal husbandry and farming techniques, for example, as was seen in Omar Mukhtar University in Eastern Libya.613 Moreover, even the Rwandan post-conflict HE strategy that was criticised for favouring an urban elite constituency over rural pro-poor based development and poverty reduction (Hayman 2007) has in fact contributed to agriculture through research and university outreach (Butare 2004).

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612 See section 8.4.1 for participant views on the potential for international firms operating in Libya investing in domestic HE and research capacity

613 See sections 3.2.5 and 8.4.2
This leads to another criticism, that post-conflict HE has an elite bias that perpetuates existing class divisions, deepens marginalisation, and in particular where ethnic, religious, or regional differences overlap with elite/mass distinctions can constitute a major grievance with potential to threaten stability in fragile contexts. It should be qualified that in all countries globally, there is a degree of elite stratification in HE. Access is often low and demand far outstrips supply. Further, private HE expansion exacerbates elite bias as those who can pay gain access. With the weakening of state capacity and structural adjustment globally private service-delivery expansion has reduced post-conflict state ability to redress horizontal inequalities (Langer, Stewart & Venugopal 2011) and this arguably also applies to private HE. Where state capacity is greater the capacity for managing elite bias is also higher. World Bank (2010b) advice to post-conflict countries including Rwanda and Burundi to introduce user-fees with loan schemes in HE can be expected to reduce state capacity to redress existing inequalities in access and that is in two cases where high levels of inequality have been persistent throughout episodes of violent conflict.

From another perspective, elite theory holds that social and political power is always highly concentrated (Evans 2006). This is frequently more so in poor countries and in war economies where a small number of actors are enriched. Recognising the unavoidable centrality of elites to development, Leftwich (2009) and others have stated that a major task of development is how to create developmental elites. As Brannelly, Lewis & Ndaruhatse (2011) argue HE can play a crucial role in the formation of developmental elites through socialisation and fostering elite networks that later facilitate the solving of collective action problems that hinder development. In post-conflict societies where elites are divided by conflict, dissipated by displacement, and diminished by violence the elite reproduction function of HE can arguably be viewed as a positive form of social renewal and elite re-pooling. This position is supported by Ghani, Carnahan and Lockhart (2006) who argue that investment in tertiary education in post-conflict states ‘enables the formation of elites that would have the mental models and skills to become stakeholders and shareholders in the security of our globalizing world’.
Such a suggestion may be criticised by those favouring popular mass social democracy and widespread participation as an alternative model to elite-led top-down liberal peacebuilding. However, it is the contention here that HE can play a role in elite formation as part of the wider process of enabling the creation of post-conflict developmental states able to catalyse economic and industrial growth and job creation (Barbara 2008; Briscoe 2008; Reinert, Amaizo & Kattel 2010).

Another argument against investment in HE is that post-conflict countries are typically poor whilst facing multiple challenges and can best benefit from utilising the existing HE capacity of neighbouring countries, regional university networks, and further afield foreign universities. Certainly in the short-term, in most cases, funding scholarships for students in priority fields and areas not provided domestically is a sound strategy. However, for HE and research to have a truly developmental role a domestic and public HE sector is vital to connecting knowledge with local social needs and problems.

One recommendation of the thesis, that is to some degree concentrating resources on a national university or several elite universities, and several key disciplines vital to reconstruction, in fact may be argued to intensify rather than mitigate the aforementioned urban and elite biases, while by contrast auguring well with Chauvet and Collier (2007) who wish to see domestic public HE capacity dismantled and advanced degrees bought from overseas. Regarding elite bias, it is highly probable that elite universities will be concentrated in capital cities or large commercial cities. Where this option is chosen it is more imperative to spread universities into rural and under-served areas to mitigate this bias. For elite bias, the concentration strategy privileges elite institutions and this is more likely to favour the social and political elites that disproportionately capture the higher prestige and prospects within the system. To mitigate this problem governments and donors can make additional funding of strategically favoured programmes contingent upon open and meritocratic selection and enrolment processes. This recommendation is not suggesting that no resources be allocated to other universities. Rather, a
temporary rebalancing should be made appropriate to meeting the twin goals of supplying core reconstruction needs and equitable access to HE.

The recommendation that HE should be geared towards recovery in a manner comparable to the developmental university model may be held to raise a point of tension with the suggestion that universities should be afforded greater autonomy and academic freedom should be protected.614 It should be recalled that in the context of the developmental university in Africa the protestations of some academics that academic freedom was violated in the drive to connect universities to the task of development were rejected by proponents of developmentalism as petty bourgeoisie defences of privilege and an unwillingness to contribute to national development (Ranger 1981; Ake 1994). A similar charge may be levelled against the Recovery University; that it must rely on coercive state power that tramples the rights of academics to free inquiry, the freedom to publish, and the autonomy to steer the direction of their universities.

However, steps can be taken to avoid this dilemma. First, national recovery goals that frame the gearing of HE to recovery should be generated from an inclusive and open process that incorporates major stakeholders. This would give academics a voice and build confidence around the goals of recovery in the academic community. Second, in the implementation of recovery priorities persuasive power and incentives should be utilised rather than coercive power. For example, research priorities should be linked to reconstruction, recovery, and development and a nationally-funded grant awarding body established or maintained to incentivise academics to connect with recovery goals.

However, it should be qualified that in the final analysis the state’s coercive power may be necessary to enforce compliance with recovery priorities which should be primary to maintaining the autonomy of units of HE capacity that represent a socially sub-optimal utilisation of scarce resources. This may be necessary given that HE in post-conflict contexts addresses the critical age group (17-24) which is

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614 See chapter one section 1.3.2 for further discussion of the developmental university model
highly politicised and widely considered to pose the greatest conflict risk (Goldstone 2002; Rose & Greeley 2006; Collier 2000; Munive 2010). State action may therefore be required to ensure that the sector maximises its potential to contribute to stabilisation and recovery.

This argument may be unpalatable to some, or even held to be contrary to universal human rights principles. The most developed and effective advocacy networks for HE in conflict-affected countries, the Scholars at Risk Network, SRF, and CARA adopt a rights-based framework and frame the issue in terms of academic freedom (Quinn 2010; Miller, Rendeau & Rosen 2013; Jarecki & Kaisth 2009). It may be contended that this is an argument that empowers semi-authoritarian or authoritarian regimes to discard notions of academic freedom to enforce top-down goals.

It can be stated that this is not the intention behind the argument. Rather, the concept of ‘embedded autonomy’ developed in Evans (1995) to describe state-business relations in Brazil, India, and South Korea can be fruitfully applied in this context to elucidate the type of state-university relationship envisaged. Embedded autonomy refers to cases where the state and business groups embarked on joint projects of development which were enabled by the close personal and professional relationships between bureaucrats and business leaders. The ideal-type for state-university relations in post-conflict settings would be where universities are embedded in a national project of recovery yet enjoy relative autonomy. Crucial to enabling this institutional linkage to emerge is maintaining communications between the state and HE communities and generating goodwill which could itself be achieved through strong political will behind a guarantee of academic freedom. Du Toit (2007) argues that in the context of development, university autonomy should be conceived as part of a social compact; it is the argument here that academic freedom and autonomy in post-conflict settings should be conditional upon a broadly held recovery compact underpinned by an inclusive national vision for the future of the sector.
10.4. Future Research Agenda

As has been emphasised throughout, the field of HE in post-conflict recovery is in its infancy and this thesis is the first to offer a global and systematic view. However, a single study cannot redress the under-development of the field and for this reason an expansion of research in the area would be a welcome development. While the literature review was wide-ranging in order to connect the diverse contributions and cognate literatures addressing issues of relevance to the study a number of areas of future research were touched upon but not explored systematically in this thesis. The following recommendations aim to guide research into useful avenues for the emerging field of knowledge on HE and post-conflict recovery.

- **Micro-foundations:** While this thesis has addressed the macro-relationship between HE and reconstruction strategy, there is much scope for work that investigates at the micro-level the type of HE practice, reforms, or interventions that can contribute effectively to recovery, for example, by providing classroom-level evidence on whether participative pedagogical approaches have any impacts on student attitudes and behaviour that could assist in stabilising fragile post-conflict contexts.

- **Regional analysis:** The scope of the study has been concerned with cases of post-conflict reconstruction defined by nation-state units of analysis. However, as Shahjahan and Kezar (2013) argue, the vast majority of HE research is conducted within a limiting ‘methodological nationalism’ framework. Considering the growing inter-connectedness of HE systems with the plethora of new trans-national and regional HE networks a potentially rewarding new avenue of research would examine HE and post-conflict recovery at other units of analysis, for example, in West Africa or the Great Lakes region. Moreover, the fast growth of scholarship on the ‘Arab Spring’ would benefit from a major study examining the role of HE as an
underlying causative factor in regional uprisings and as an agent in driving post-Arab Spring transitions.

- **Contexts of fragility:** While the dynamic of HE in fragile states has been addressed at various points throughout this thesis, there remains a need for systematic research that investigates the problematic of HE in contexts of fragility. While Tierney (2011) analyses the potential role of HE in ‘fixing failed states’ the concept of fragility better captures the complex and interconnected drivers of conflict, under-development, low economic growth, and state weakness that affect many countries and areas globally (Stewart & Brown 2009).

- **Historical analysis:** More attention should be paid to historical case-studies examining HE’s post-war role. The literature review in chapter three briefly discussed several historical cases including post-WWII Europe, however, due to constraints of space more in-depth analysis of relevant historical cases was not possible. While this thesis has examined two contemporary cases new historical research would provide a much richer comparative base of knowledge and enable more robust analysis of long-term trends, for example, the differences between funding modalities and rationales of HE assistance to post-war settings in the early Cold War and post-Cold War periods.

10.5. **Concluding Remarks**

The above discussion addressed some implications of the thesis, consequences of and tensions between the main recommendations, and responses to counter-arguments. It is intended that the Agenda for Action could support future post-conflict recovery actors in harnessing the sector’s potential towards reconstruction and transition goals. A main conclusion of this thesis is that this represents a
potentially beneficial endeavour and a realistic prospect. While the findings, conclusions, and recommendations offer support to this position it is recognised that the field of post-war recovery and HE remains significantly under-studied and requires further research. This thesis was designed to redress this gap and further it is hoped that it can stimulate greater interest in the area.

It can finally be stated that this thesis concludes that higher education should be conceptualised as an important pillar of recovery; the capacity of domestic higher education sectors in post-conflict contexts is an often under-recognised and under-utilised resource of considerable potential value that can connect to a wide range of reconstruction and recovery processes and effectively drive post-conflict recovery and transitions.
APPENDICES

APPENDIX A – A BRIEF HISTORY OF IRAQ

Modern Iraq’s territories were formally under Ottoman rule until 1918 when British rule was established. British colonial policy constructed a centralised state in which the minority Sunnis were relied upon to rule (Stansfield 2007, p.47). On 14th July 1958 the ruling Hashemite monarchy was overthrown by a coup d’état led by the Free Officers movement (Tripp 2008, p.144). After a tumultuous decade of coups and counter-coups the Ba’ath party gained power in 1968. Iraq under the Ba’ath party developed a strong, single party, highly-centralised state under an ideology of Arab nationalism. Under Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr’s leadership the party enjoyed some popular legitimacy and was characterised by various factions with al-Bakr acting as mediator. However, in 1979 Saddam Hussein emerged as Ba’ath Party leader consolidating power around himself and a much narrower power-base (Davis 2005b, p.177). Saddam was paranoid about internal threats to his regime and power resided in a small circle of close confidants. Over time this circle became more familial drawing heavily on his hometown for support leading to the label the Tikriti Ba’ath.

Owen (2007) argues that Iraq’s 1950s and 1960s economic path was typical of most developing countries in its transition from colonial dependence to a concern with economic development and independence. While oil has been a factor in Iraq’s economy for over one hundred years, in the 1960s oil production and export accelerated rapidly (Zedalis 2009), enabling rapid modernisation and industrialisation in a nationalised and highly-centralised interventionist development path (Mahdi 2007). This phase of ‘developmental nationalism’ (Bunton 2008) driven by increased oil wealth enabled remarkable progress in development, for example, famously eradicating illiteracy and promoting female education.
Oil revenues account for over 90% of Iraq’s wealth and the country is held to be a rentier state (Al Khafaji 2004). Iraq’s economy pre-2003 is often characterised as a prime example of a top-down state-controlled Socialist system. Mahdi (2007) argues that in contrast to portrayals of the Iraqi economy as a Soviet monolith, private enterprise was gradually introduced from the late 1970s in particular after the Iran-Iraq war. Faced with many problems in the 1990s, Iraq gradually permitted greater space for private economic activity.

However, strong developmental gains were reversed by wars and sanctions beginning around 1980. Social problems intensified including increased illiteracy rates, infant mortality, and disease due to deteriorated health and education systems (Ismael 2003; Tripp 2008, p.252). The Iran-Iraq war marked ‘one of the longest and costliest conventional wars of the twentieth century’ (Potter & Sick 2004, p.2), and initiated many economic and social problems as resources were allocated to military rather than social sectors (Ismael 2003). While Alnasrawi (2001) agrees that the Iran-Iraq war, militarisation, and the Gulf War were major factors causing reversal he argues that post-Gulf War sanctions played the largest role in devastating social and economic systems.

Debates over Iraqi identity and nationalism are important to this study. One argument describes Iraq at independence as a British-designed highly ‘artificial creation’ bringing together Sunni, Shiite, and Kurds in a state that empowered the Sunni minority and was kept together through the monopoly of violence (Stansfield 2007, p.47). In this conception communal divisions are deeply embedded while Iraqi nationalism is weak. Visser (2008) holds that the artificiality position is ‘ahistorical’ and that ‘the concept of ‘Iraq’ is enduring’. It is held that Iraqi ‘proto-nationalism’ emerged prior to state formation (Lukitz 2009) due to extensive pre-statehood regional linkages between Baghdad, Basra, and Kurdistan (Visser 2008; Al-Tikriti 2009).
Iraq consists of diverse ethnic and linguistic groups including Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, Christians, Sabaeans, and Yezidis. The majority (60-70%) follow Shiite Islam while around 30-40% adhere to Sunni Islam. Diverse communities were held together under a relatively cohesive national identity under the Ba’ath regime although since 2003 ethnic, sectarian, and communal divisions intensified (Marr 2007, p.42). Various Iraqi regimes from the monarchy onwards ‘focused on fostering national unity and in the process denigrating particularistic, sub-national identities’ (Dawisha 2008). An exception, since independence latent conflict between the central state and Kurdish separatism erupted into outright conflict or ‘civil war’ in several periods, notably the 1970s. Bunton (2008) argues that ‘complex and fluid patterns of social and political identity developed over the course of the 20th century’.

**APPENDIX B – A BRIEF HISTORY OF LIBYA**

Modern Libya’s territories have been ruled by various external powers throughout history including Phoenicians, Greeks, Romans, and Turks (Wright 2010). Ottoman control ended after the Italo-Turkish war (1911-12) followed by Italian colonial rule from 1911. Libya was the staging ground for WWII North Africa campaigns and was lost by Italy in 1943 with a French and British UN administration controlling the territory until independence in 1951 (Vandewalle 2006, pp.24-40).

Post-independence Libya, a federal monarchy under King Idris, faced the challenge of uniting ‘three very different regions’ (Owen 2004, p.53); Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan. The externally-designed state structure reflected British, French and Western interests generally (Wright 2010, p.173). The monarchy’s powerbase was eastern Cyrenaica with Tripolitania the most populous and economically productive region. Pre-independence, most Tripolitanians favoured a central republican system while Cyrenaicans opted for a federal state. This once divisive issue passed without opposition when in 1963, buoyed by growing oil revenues, the King abandoned federalism for a centralised system (Wright 2010, p.180).
Libya at independence had one of the lowest per capita incomes globally ($25) facing such developmental barriers that ‘if Libya can be brought to a stage of sustained growth, there is hope for every country in the world’ (Higgins quoted in Vandewalle 2006, p.51). Growth prospects improved in 1959 with oil’s discovery. In 1961 the first crude exports were traded producing the first significant oil revenues in 1963, marking a watershed in development (Mabro 1970). Libya possesses ‘sweet and light’ crude oil which is very high in quality and demand. Rapid growth in oil exports provided vast wealth and economic transformation. Oil revenues account for a very high percentage of national income and Libya is a prime example of a rentier-state.

In 1969 a coup d’état led by Colonel Qaddafi overthrew the monarchy. Libya’s political centre of gravity decisively shifted from Cyrenaica to Tripolitania. Over the next four decades some held that the regime neglected Cyrenaica to weaken the Sanusiyya as a rival power centre. Fezzan remained marginal throughout; its most prosperous period was when trade Saharan routes ran through its oasis towns such as Sabha (Ahmida 2009). Economically, Qaddafi’s coup initiated a new phase transforming from capitalist to socialist state-controlled during the 1970s (St John 2011, p.90). Qaddafi constructed a distributive state substantially raising living standards (Martinez 2007, p.18) and by 2010 Libyan was ranked 53rd globally in the UN Human Development Index.

In the mid-1970s a major contest within Libya’s state emerged over future direction (Vandewalle 2006, p.100). On one side, technocrats favoured ‘an orderly, planned course of action that included a carefully designed economic plan’ while revolutionaries ‘wanted to pursue a more activist policy that sacrificed some of the country’s riches for the sake of Arab unity and other ideological pursuits’. Dissatisfied with his revolution’s impact, in 1973 Qaddafi and the RCC embarked on a ‘popular revolution’, initiating an experimental revolutionary phase (Anderson 1986, p.262). By 1975 technocratic rationalisation lost to the revolutionary Jamahiriyya experiment. In 1977 Qaddafi established the Jamahiriyya based on his Third Universal Theory; a political system neither communist nor capitalist but
based in nationalism and religion (St John 2011, p.56). In theory a ‘direct democracy’ existed in which the people exercised control in radically decentralised local committees.

In the 1980s deep economic crisis was caused primarily by declining oil revenues, sanctions, and ‘extravagant and ill-judged economic policies’ (Martinez 2007, p.16; St John 2011, p.90; Pargeter 2012, p.146). Libya was forced to adopt austerity measures and living standards declined with significantly falling income levels in the mid-1990s. In 1988 state monopoly on imports and exports ended allowing private enterprises to re-open (Pargeter 2012, p.150).

Qaddafi pursued a highly-interventionist foreign policy, unusual for a small state, supporting national liberation movements in Africa (Huliaras 2001) and the PLO (Joffe 2008, p.197). Martinez (2007, p.59) writes that ‘throughout its first three decades, the Jamahiriya was in a constant state of conflict’, for example, with Chad and briefly Egypt (De Waal 2006). Libya’s support for ‘terrorism’ including alleged bombings of Pan Am and Lockerbie flights brought Libya into confrontation with Western powers in particular the US and UK. In April 1986 ‘Operation El Dorado Canyon’ was launched as US bomber planes from British bases and attack planes from US aircraft carriers bombed locations in Tripoli and Benghazi (Kaldor 1986, p.1). Libya became increasingly isolated from Arab neighbours and the ‘international community’ with sanctions imposed.

The 1986 bombings initiated Libya’s slow transformation from ‘pariah state’ to Western partner (Joffe 2008, p.202). In the early 2000s Libya dramatically shifted foreign policy ceasing its WMD programme, re-engaging with the ‘international community’, and cooperating in the ‘War on Terror’ (Martinez 2007). Soon after, the regime announced far-reaching economic reforms, professed commitment to human rights, and pursued peaceful reconciliation with internal Islamist enemies. Qaddafi’s son, Saif Al-Islam, was the emblematic figure in this reform process. Pargeter (2010) questions whether reform was ‘chimera or reality’, concluding that they are ‘a means of preserving the status quo and the life of the regime’. 
It should be noted that Libya is highly religiously homogenous with almost 100% of its population following Islam. In addition, Arabs are the majority ethnic group with smaller number of Amazigh (Berber). Compared to Iraq, Libya has few significant sectarian cleavages such as the distinction between Sunni and Shiite. However, a small yet growing number of Libyans follow radical Salafi forms of Islam.
APPENDIX C – LIST OF INTERVIEWS AND FOCUS GROUPS

IRAQ

1. Interview with Dr Juliana Dawood Yusuf. Lecturer in Linguistics at the University of Basra. December 2010 in Amman, Jordan.

2. Interview with Ali Baban. Former Minister of Planning and Development Cooperation, Government of Iraq. March 2013 in Manchester, UK.

3. Interview with Dr Akeel T. Al-Kazwini. Dean of School of Applied Medical Sciences, German Jordanian University.

4. Interview with former senior Professor and President of the University of Basra who wishes to remain anonymous. December 2010 in Amman, Jordan.

5. Interview with a former lecturer in the College of Political Science at Al-Nahrain University in Baghdad, Iraq and IIE Visiting Professor at the British Institute in Amman. February 2011, in Amman, Jordan.


7. Interview with former Professor at the Faculty of Engineering and senior administrator at Al-Nahrain University. January 2011, Amman, Jordan.

8. Interview with former Dean of Law at the University of Basra. December 2010, Amman, Jordan.

9. Interview with Dr Kasim M Al-Aubidy. Dean of Faculty of Engineering, Philadelphia University. February 2011 at Philadelphia University, Jordan.
10. Interview with Professor Khalid Ismail. Former Dean of the Faculty of Linguistics at the University of Baghdad. December 2010 in Amman, Jordan.

11. Interview with Dr Majid Al-Ani, assistant to the Cultural Counsellor to the Iraqi Embassy in Jordan. Former Assistant to the President of Al-Anbar University. February 2011 in Amman, Jordan.

12. Interview with Professor Mazin Kadhim. Ex-Vice-President of Saddam University and Dean of the College of Engineering. December 2010, in Amman, Jordan.

13. Interview with former lecturer at the College of Dentistry, Al-Anbar University. February 2011 in Amman, Jordan.

14. Interview with Dr Munther Al-Tikriti. Professor at Philadelphia University in Jordan. Formerly of the University of Baghdad, the University of Technology, Scientific Research Council, and Al-Mustansiriya University. February 2011 in Amman, Jordan.

15. Interview with Professor of Engineering at Philadelphia University and former Professor at the University of Basra. February 2011 in Amman, Jordan.


17. Interview with former vice-President for Academic Affairs at al-Nahrain University. February 2011 in Amman, Jordan.

19. Interview with Dr Sana Al-Omari, former Professor of Economics at the University of Baghdad. February 2011 in Amman, Jordan.

20. Interview with a former President of Al-Mustansiriya University. January 2011 in Amman, Jordan.


22. Interview with Dr Kahtan K. M. Al-Khazraji. President of the University of Technology. January 2011 in Amman, Jordan.


26. Interview with Professor Dr Dlawer Ala’aldeen. Former Minister of Higher Education in the Kurdistan Regional Government and Professor of Clinical Microbiology at Nottingham University. July 2013 in Nottingham, UK.

27. Interview with Ms. Sameerah Saeed. Assistant to the Director of the Quality Assurance division, Ministry of Higher Education, Kurdistan Regional Government. February 2012 in Newcastle, UK.
28. Interview with Professor of Economics, University of Mosul. December 2010 in Amman, Jordan.


32. Email interview with the Dean of Dijla University College. Response received May 2012.

33. Email interview with President of Kufa University. Response received May 2012.

34. Email interview with Dr Mohamed Al-Rubeai. Former senior advisor to the Ministry of Higher Education and Coalition Provisional Authority, and Chairman, Network of Iraqi Scientists Abroad. Response received August 2012.


36. Email interview with Professor Wayne Bowen. Professor and Chair of the Department of History, Southeast Missouri State University and former Civil Affairs officer in the US Army in Northern Iraq. Response received May 2012.
37. Email interview with Dr Arkan Al Taie. Professor of Engineer at the University of Technology. Response received August 2013.

LIBYA

UK-Based Interviews and Focus Groups


39. Interview with lecturer in Computing at the University of Tripoli and PhD candidate at the University of Salford. Salford, UK in May 2012.

40. Interview with Libyan PhD candidate in Food Science at the University of Salford. Salford, UK in May 2012.

41. Interview with Giuma Sasi. PhD Student at Department of Chemicals and Materials, Newcastle University and President of the Libyan Society, Newcastle University. Newcastle, UK in February 2012.

42. Interview with Hamad Warhed. PhD Candidate in Business and Management, University of Hull. Hull, UK in February 2012.

43. Interview with Isaac Larbah. PhD candidate in Control Engineering, University of Hull. Hull, UK in February 2012.

44. Interview with PhD Candidate in Economics. University of Hull, Business School. Hull, UK in February 2012.
45. Interview with Majda Elferjani, PhD Candidate at the School of the Built Environment, University of Salford. Salford, UK in May 2012.

46. Interview with Mohamed Eljarh, PhD Candidate, University of Derby. Derby, UK in March 2012.

47. Interview with Mohamed Gharssalla. PhD Candidate in Media and Communications, Department of Media and Communications, Sheffield Hallam University. Sheffield, UK in March 2012.

48. Interview with Libyan PhD Candidate, University of Leicester. Leicester, UK in March 2012.

49. Interview with Nabil Eljaaidi. PhD Candidate in Management at the University of Hull. Hull, UK in February 2012.

50. Interview with Salah Ghana. PhD Student in Faculty of Biological Sciences, University of Leeds. Leeds, UK in March 2012.

51. Focus group with six Libyan PhD Candidates at the University of Leicester. Leicester, UK in March 2012.

Field Interviews and Focus groups

52. Interview with Ahmed Jehani. Former Minister of Reconstruction, former Chairman of the Stabilization Team of the National Transitional Council, and founder of the Libya Development Policy Centre. November 2012 in Benghazi, Libya.

53. Interview with Dr Adil Al-Wefaty. Engineer and former Professor of Engineering at Tripoli University. November 2012 in Tripoli, Libya.
54. Interview with Dr Fathi Al Arabi, Consultant to the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research. November 2012 in Tripoli, Libya.


58. Interview with Manager of the Department of Fine Arts at the Academy for Graduate Studies. October 2012 in Tripoli, Libya.


60. Interview with Dr Aboubaker. Assistant to Dean of Economics and Political Science, Azzaytuna University. October 2012 in Tripoli, Libya.

61. Interview with Dr Mohamed Al Asfar. Media Department, Azzaytuna University. October 2012 in Tripoli, Libya.

62. Interview with Dr Salh Buzwaik. Head of Planning Council, Gharyan and Professor at the University of the Jabal Al-Gharb. December 2012 in Gharyan, Libya.

63. Interview with Musbah Almontasser. Education Department, Planning Council of Gharyan. December 2012 in Gharyan, Libya.
64. Joint interview with the Deans of Science and Medicine at Misrata University. November 2012 in Misrata, Libya.

65. Interview with Head of Scientific Affairs in the Faculty of Medical Technology in Misrata. November 2012 in Misrata, Libya.

66. Interview with Manager of Reconstruction at Misrata University. November 2012 in Misrata, Libya.

67. Joint interview with Heads of the Departments Mathematics and Pharmacy in the Faculty of Science, Misrata University. November 2012 in Misrata, Libya.

68. Interview with the Head of the Department of Training, Ministry of Higher Education. December 2012 in Tripoli, Libya.

69. Interview with assistant to Dr Fathi Akkari, Ministry of Higher Education. December 2012 in Tripoli, Libya.

70. Interview with Dr Ibrahim Saleh. Deputy Minister for Scientific Research, Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research and former Dean of the Faculty of Engineering, Tripoli University. November 2012 in Tripoli, Libya.

71. Interview with Dr Milad Taher. Director of the Planning and Development Department, Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research. November 2012 in Tripoli, Libya.

72. Interview with Dr Ibrahim El-Ghariani. President of Omar Al-Mukhtar University. November 2012 in Baida, Libya.
73. Interview with former Head of the Student Union of the Faculty of Engineering at Omar Mukhtar University. November 2012 in Baida, Libya.

74. Interview with Head of Computer Science Department, Omar Mukhtar University. November 2012 in Baida, Libya.

75. Interview with Mohamed Yaseen. Registrar of Medicine Faculty at Omar Mukhtar University. November 2012 in Baida, Libya.

76. Interview with Mustafa Alfalani. President of Refak University. November 2012 in Tripoli, Libya.

77. Conversation with six female students of English Language at Nasser University. October 2012 in Tripoli, Libya.

78. Focus group at the Faculty of Information Technology, Tripoli University. Dr Abdulsalam Nuasri, Former Head of Software Engineering Department, and new Vice-Dean of Faculty. Dr Halal Dbuli, Dean of the Faculty of Information Technology. Dr Ibrahim Merhag, Head of Networking Department. Dr Abdulsalam Sherif, Head of Computer Science. November 2012 in Tripoli, Libya.

79. Interview with Mrs Aida Abushagur. Lecturer in Linguistics, English Language Department, Faculty of Languages, Tripoli University. October 2012 in Tripoli, Libya.

80. Interview with Deputy Dean of Faculty of Arts, Former Head of Department of Psychology, Tripoli University. November 2012 in Tripoli, Libya.
81. Interview with Dr Abdulatif. Director of the International Cooperation Office at Tripoli University. October 2012 in Tripoli, Libya.

82. Interview with Dr Abdulbasit Abuazza. Professor of Physics, Department of Physics, Tripoli University - Head of Examination and Study for Faculty of Science. October 2012 in Tripoli, Libya.

83. Interview with Dr Abdullatif Mohamed Karmous. Dean of Faculty of Agriculture, Tripoli University. November 2012 in Tripoli, Libya.

84. Interview with Dr Abdulmonim Alaswad – former Dean of IT Faculty at Tripoli University. November 2012 in Tripoli, Libya.

85. Interview with Dr Aboubaker Al-Aswad. Department of English Language, Faculty of Languages, University of Tripoli. October 2012 in Tripoli, Libya.

86. Interview with Dr Aboubaker Swehli. Department of Zoology, Faculty of Science, University of Tripoli and International Cooperation Office. October 2012 in Tripoli, Libya.

87. Interview with Dr Ahmed Al-Atrash. Former Dean of the Faculty of Economics and Political Science, University of Tripoli. October 2012 in Tripoli, Libya.


89. Interview with Dr Ahmed Murad Ghanuni. Coordinator for Faculty of Agriculture and International Cooperation Office. November 2012 in Tripoli, Libya.
90. Interview with Dr Atigh Alhouni. Professor of Zoology, University of Tripoli. October 2012 in Tripoli, Libya.

91. Interview with Dr Hadi Omran Tumi. Head of Civil Engineering Department, Faculty of Engineering, Tripoli University. October 2012 in Tripoli, Libya.

92. Interview with Dr Hussain Zurganer. Department of Economy, University of Tripoli. October 2012 in Tripoli, Libya.

93. Interview with lecturer in the Department of Archaeology, Nasser University. October 2012 in Tripoli, Libya.

94. Interview with Dr Mohamed Ajaili. Former Head of English Language Department, Faculty of Languages, Tripoli University. October 2012 in Tripoli, Libya.

95. Interview with Dr Mohamed Amer. Head of Chemical Engineering Department, Faculty of Sciences, Tripoli University. October 2012 in Tripoli, Libya.

96. Interview with Dr Mohamed Bakaa. Department of Zoology, University of Tripoli. October 2012 in Tripoli, Libya.

97. Two interviews with Dr Mohamed Mashena, Dean of the Faculty of Engineering, and temporary President of the University of Tripoli. October and November 2012 in Tripoli, Libya.

98. Interview with Dr Nasr Salama. Department of Zoology, Tripoli University. October 2012 in Tripoli, Libya.
99. Two interviews with Dr Sami Khashkusha. Department of Political Science, University of Tripoli. October and November 2012 in Tripoli, Libya.

100. Interview with Dr Sobhi. Vice-Dean of the Faculty of Languages, University of Tripoli. November 2012 in Tripoli, Libya.

101. Interview with Dr Taher. Professor of Physics and former Head of Department of Physics, University of Tripoli. October 2012 in Tripoli, Libya.

102. Interview with Dr Tarek Basher Jdeidi. Head of the Department of Zoology, Faculty of Science, Tripoli University. October 2012 in Tripoli, Libya.

103. Interview with Dr Usama Al-Hadi. Head of the Department of Architecture and Urban Planning, Faculty of Engineering, University of Tripoli. October 2012 in Tripoli, Libya.

104. Interview with Dr Zekia. Head of Translation, Faculty of Languages, University of Tripoli. November 2012 in Tripoli, Libya.

105. Interview with Fatima and Hanan. Two female Masters Students in Department of Zoology, University of Tripoli. October 2012 in Tripoli, Libya.

106. Interview with Ms. Henan Saadi. Head of Studies and Examinations, Department of English Language, University of Tripoli. October 2012 in Tripoli, Libya.

107. Interview with the Head of Archaeology, University of Tripoli. October 2012 in Tripoli, Libya.
108. Group interview with three female archaeology students at the Department of Archaeology, University of Tripoli. October 2012 in Tripoli, Libya.

109. Interview with Thuraya Al-Wifati. Lecturer in Translation Department, Faculty of Languages, University of Tripoli. October 2012 in Tripoli, Libya.

110. Interview with Dr Khalid Karmaji. Dean of Engineering at Zawiya University. December 2012 in Zawiya, Libya.

111. Interview with the Dean of Science at Zawiya University. December 2012 in Zawiya, Libya.

112. Interview with Dr Mustafa Sahoub. President of Zawiya University. December 2012 in Zawiya, Libya.
Appendix D: Photographs

Photo A: Unfinished campus construction at Tripoli University Campus B

Photo B: Looted office at Misrata University
Photo C: Destroyed classroom at Tripoli University Campus B
Photo D: Structural damage to Misrata University

Photo E: Destroyed classroom at Misrata University
Photo F: Heavily damaged building - Faculty of Medical Technology in Misrata

Photo G: Memorial banner at Zawiya University for students killed during the war
## Glossary

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CARA</td>
<td>Council for Assisting Refugee Academics, London</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Coalition Provisional Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSR</td>
<td>Council for Scientific Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDB</td>
<td>Economic Development Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>GOI</td>
<td>Government of Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>HE</td>
<td>Higher education</td>
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<tr>
<td>HEI</td>
<td>Higher education institution</td>
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<tr>
<td>KRG</td>
<td>Kurdistan Regional Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoHE</td>
<td>Ministry of Higher Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIE</td>
<td>Institute of International Education, New York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIC</td>
<td>Military Industrialisation Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoE</td>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoHE-I</td>
<td>Iraqi Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research</td>
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<td>MoHE-L</td>
<td>Libyan Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research</td>
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<tr>
<td>NTC</td>
<td>National Transitional Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRF</td>
<td>Scholar Rescue Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>TVET</td>
<td>Technical and Vocational Education and Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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