‘A Luminous Constellation Pointing the Way? The connectivity of Rioplatense & US union and state-formation, 1815-1820.’

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Abstract
'A Luminous Constellation Pointing the Way?' aims to make sense of the connections between the United States and the River Plate between 1815-1820. Based on a connective and comparative approach, the thesis arrives at a different understanding of the United States in a hemispheric perspective. The picture that emerges is of the United States as a weak and vulnerable power struggling against the effects of its post-colonial inheritance. Both out of necessity, because of the United States' weakness, and out of hemispheric solidarity, US Americans sought out allies and enthusiastically embraced Spanish American independence. Rioplatense Americanos reciprocated in their enthusiasm for the United States, and sought to adapt information on the US Federal model to their own local circumstances. A sense of shared American identity and the similarity of North & South American post-colonial inheritances meant information shared between the hemisphere was particularly useful and readily susceptible to local adaptation. These similarities meant that policy solutions for maintaining independence from Buenos Aires to Baltimore had a shared base, but diverged according to each places own circumstances creating local responses to hemispheric problems. US legislators sought to retool their economy in order to realize an 'American System' that would increase the power of the Americas against Europe and integrate the US into Spanish America, an area US Americans considered more promising than their own country.
List of Contents

Abstract.......................................................................................................................................2
Acknowledgements....................................................................................................................4
Author's Declaration.................................................................................................................5
Introduction...............................................................................................................................6
Chapter One..............................................................................................................................13
Chapter Two............................................................................................................................48
Chapter Three.........................................................................................................................79
Abbreviations........................................................................................................................106
Appendices.............................................................................................................................107
Bibliography..........................................................................................................................118
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Author's Declaration

I declare that all the research presented here is both original and my own work. The word count of the thesis is 33,121 words.
Introduction

Between 1776 and 1826 large parts of the Americas left European empires to become independent nations. While formal independence from Europe was achieved, the American hemisphere remained deeply influence by a ‘post-colonial’ inheritance. To dissolve political ties with Europe was one thing, but to erode the lingering influence European colonialism had on forms of government, economic output and trade patterns proved much harder to overcome. This thesis considers how two parts of the Americas, the US and the Rio de la Plata (River Plate), faced these problems in a connective manner. Not only did the inhabitants of both polities work together on these problems, but for some the solution to both problems was to create more connections and greater integration between the Americas. Connections exist between Baltimore and Buenos Aires, or Montevideo and Massachusetts, and these connections shaped the development of the state in both regions.

In 1776, both thirteen North American colonies and the River Plate began important reorganizations. Both regions had been less exciting parts of the British and Spanish empires, respectively, compared to the British and Spanish cash-crop producing islands such as Jamaica and Cuba, and the parts of the mainland Spanish Empire which exported precious metals, such as Alta Perú and Mexico. Previous to 1776, the North American colonies had existed as separate entities with no other unit of governance connecting them than the metropolitan capital of the Empire in London, while the River Plate region had formed part of the Viceroyalty of Perú, where a significant portion of the King’s power was delegated to his ‘Vice-King’ based in Lima. On July 4 1776, thirteen North American colonies rebelled against the metropole forming the United States. Under a month later, on August 1, the River Plate region was reorganized into a new ‘Vice-Kingdom’ made up of twelve Intendencias and Gobernaciones, units of local government, each equivalent in size, if not bigger, than the individual North American colonies, join by a Viceregal capital in Buenos Aires.

While the organization of the River Plate into a new Vice-Kingdom transitioned smoothly within the Spanish imperial framework, becoming an independent nation proved more disruptive for the thirteen States of North America. A lengthy war against the British metropole was overcome with the assistance of a French alliance and Spanish and
Dutch aid. Independence was secured by 1783, but the lingering influence of colonialism hindered efforts to form a common government. Colonies had become States, and had only created a weak common government unable to raise taxes to pay international debts or be respected as an independent nation capable of forming treaties. In the River Plate, rapid economic development accompanied the new Viceregal status. Buenos Aires expanded from a small backwater of a town to a major entrepot in the Spanish American empire, exporting silver extracted from Potosí in Alta Perú and hides and other raw materials to Spain in exchange for European produced manufactured goods shipped from Spain within the monopolistic trade framework set up by the metropolitan government.

By the end of the 1780s, the failing United States had reformed to create a stronger federal union, and the 1790s saw their fortunes reverse. Economic development began with lucrative cash crops and grains exported to those markets to which the United States were allowed access by other nations. But their fortunes were really stimulated by the onset of the French Revolutionary wars. The US, which had secured its independence in alliance with France, reneged on that alliance and remained neutral throughout the wars, allowing US commercial houses and mercantile vessels to capture a large proportion of the ‘carrying trade’, as the US flag was neutral, their vessels could carry goods between belligerent European states, between Europe and the Americas, and between ports within the Americas. This disruption to traditional imperial patterns of trade began the inter-American connections explored in this thesis. Traditionally, Spanish America had been shut to all vessels other than those who held monopolistic trade routes, and all trade was conducted through Spanish ports, principally Cadíz. Some of these restrictions had been lifted in the 1770s to allow trade between Spanish American ports, but the French Revolutionary wars allowed neutral vessels to visit Spanish American ports. The Buenos Aires trade was increasingly conducted by North Americans and other neutral nations from 1797 onwards. By 1800, per capita GDP in the River Plate was slightly higher than in the United States.¹

The Napoleonic Wars were driving change in both the River Plate and the US. In

1808, Napoleon invaded Spain, ended the Spanish monarchy, and proclaimed his brother King of Spain and its Empire. The government of Spain had all but ended, and revolutionary councils (juntas) formed to organize resistance. In Spanish America, the colonial government continued to operate as before but without any metropolitan centre. The Spanish juntas formed a central government which claimed to be the legitimate replacement to the Spanish Imperial metropole. While much of Spanish America acquiesced to these claims, the city council in Buenos Aires rejected the legitimacy of this government, and began a de facto independence from 1810 while pledging notional allegiance to Ferdinand VII, the legitimate heir to the Spanish throne. The wars had increasingly involved the United States. Their status as a neutral carrier was challenged by European navies, particularly the British, with their vessels seized as contraband and US seaman impressed into the British navy, challenging the basic rights of a nation. The Embargo Act of 1807 attempted to force the Europeans to respect US neutrality by prohibiting trade. US manufacturing was a nascent branch of US economic activity as a result of British colonial policy which, like the Spanish Empire, had attempted to prevent manufacturing establishments in the Americas. The Embargo, acting as a form of protectionism, stimulated these manufacturers. In Buenos Aires, British manufactures, now looking for new markets to replace that of the US, flooded the port city disrupting the few manufacturing establishments found in the River Plate. The failure of the Embargo Act led to a more aggressive policy solution, declaring war on Britain in 1812, which proved a further stimulant to US manufacturing establishments, which grew in response to a British blockade of the US Atlantic coastline.²

The United States had grown to eighteen states by 1812, and held an extensive territory in the western part of North America acquired as part of the Louisiana Purchase. The States and the federal territory of the US was bound together by a common federal government. The federal structure had bound these States into a viable union, but the weakness of that union was demonstrated by the War of 1812. Northern States threatened to secede in response to a war which seriously damaged their commercial interests, New Orleans, which held the key to the Western States’ loyalty to the federal government, was shown to be poorly defended as enemy troops could use Florida as a base from which to occupy the port city, and a lack of military preparedness made the US campaign in Canada

ineffective and allowed the British to invade and torch the federal city in Washington D.C. in 1814.

The weakness of the US Union was demonstrated, though territorially it did not fragment. In contrast, the territorial integrity of the Vice-Kingdom of the Rio de la Plata badly fragmented. While Buenos Aires had declared de facto independence, it had to persuade other parts of the River Plate to accept its revolutionary act, often by force. While many of the Intendencias and Gobernaciones, which restyled themselves Provincias, were persuaded to join with a Buenos-Aires centric United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata, Several regions refused: Montevideo, the port-city and hinterland on the east bank (Banda Oriental) of the River Plate and the Northern Provinces in Alta Perú (modern Bolivia) remained loyal to the interim government in Spain, while Paraguay, the enclosed province found at the northernmost point of the Rioplatense river system that drained into the Atlantic, declared its own independence and remained aloof. A Congress of the United Provinces formed, and an executive was based in Buenos Aires which directed a war on three fronts to regain the traditional boundaries of the River Plate. Montevideo was retaken, but General Artigas, who had been tasked with re-establishing the River Plate’s control there, rebelled against the Executive in Buenos Aires, an executive perceived as increasingly centralist and despotic. Artigas inspired a confederalist rebellion, forming a loose league of pueblos libres (free cities), of those provinces along the littoral of the Rioplatense river system. By 1815, that league of provinces had spread into the interior of the United Provinces, bringing the government based in Buenos Aires to an end, promising the reunification of the United Provinces along a less centralist basis.

1815 also saw the close of the Napoleonic Wars, and with it the War of 1812. With Napoleon finally defeated, Europe began a conservative restoration of monarchies. European monarchs formed a ‘Holy Alliance’ against further revolutionary movements, and the major European powers co-operated together in the Congress of Vienna. Ferdinand VII was restored to the Spanish throne in 1814, and, swept up in the counter-revolutionary fervour of European restoration, resolved to restore Spanish America firmly to the status of colonies, rather than seek reconciliation with autonomously governed Spanish American provinces. Now the United Provinces, which before had faced a struggle characterized as a civil war between Spaniards, now turned towards a war between colonists and metropole, between Americanos and Spaniards. The Rioplatense
Americanos could find opposition to reinvigorated Spanish colonialism, and the prevailing European conservative spirit. Similarly, US Americans experienced a renewed nationalism as Americans, and empathised with their South American “brethren”. The United Provinces, regrouped in Congress in Tucuman and provoked by Spanish colonialism, declared their own independence on July 9 1816. The members of Buenos Aires’ city council wrote to Thomas Halsey, the US Consul in Buenos Aires, inspired by the United States example as an independent federation of republics. The US, now, was for them a “luminous constellation pointing the way opened by providence to the other people of this part of the Globe.”

This thesis charts these types of connections, connections between US and Rioplatense Americans between 1815 to 1820 in the post-Napoleonic world. Both portions of the Americas feared war with Spain; the River Plate could be subjected anew by an army of reconquest, or the US could find itself embroiled in war with Spain over the Floridas or due to US citizens involvement in the Wars of Independence as privateers and suppliers of aid and munitions. Both the US and the River Plate felt the common problem of the conservative restoration in Europe. The US Federal Government hoped to see Spanish American independence, but treaded carefully in case US recognition of the new American states triggered a joint European reaction which could involve the US and the Spanish American insurgents in an inevitable defeat against a united Europe. The United Provinces desperately sought alliances or recognition in a bid to confirm their independence. This concern prevailed as they sought to frame a permanent constitution and form of government. And both struggled against their post-colonial inheritances. The United Provinces inherited a territory that had weak central control over the various provincias with limited forms of financing the central government, mostly via customs revenues. The United States, imbued with a new sense of nationalism, questioned their republic’s economic role in the global trading system. Manufactures established during the War of 1812 now competed once more with British industrial power, and policy-makers looked for solutions to create a more balanced US economy in order to end economic dependency on Britain.

These common problems were dealt with in a connected manner. Commissioners

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and agents of US America visited the River Plate to understand and extend the idea of a hemispheric system of independent states, forming a common American interest or system free from European colonialism. US merchants and diplomats in the region acted as connective points in a network of information that flowed between the US and the River Plate which informed the debate around a form of government. For US American policymakers, their connections with Spanish America led to knowledge of both the common problems the Americas faced, and helped them to formulate common solutions. The US President James Monroe sought a hemispheric system, and explained that system to Spanish American insurgents via agents dispatched across Spanish America. With information provided by Spanish Americans legislators such as Henry Clay formed a package of legislative reforms known as the ‘American System’, designed to retool the US economy to end economic dependency, reduce trade with Europe, and integrate the US economy in the hemisphere. In Buenos Aires, Congressmen tasked with forming a government opted for a constitution formed around the US Constitution, but adapted towards British forms of bicameralism, in the hope that either or both the US and Britain would recognize the new polity.

By 1820, the outlines of an ‘American System’ of republican polities bound together by mutual trading links and a common interest against Europe was starting to emerge. But other factors were working to undermine this emerging ‘American System’. The weakness of the common government in Buenos Aires and the centrifugal tendencies found in the provinces, factors inherited from the Spanish colonial system, led dissident provinces to bring down the common government in February 1820.

The 1818 US Commission and Monroe’s hemispheric agents is the subject of Chapter One, the 1819 Constitution of the United Provinces is explored in Chapter Two, and the ‘American System’ of 1820 is studied in Chapter Three. As Spanish Americans referred to themselves as *Americanos*, and they spoke of one hemisphere, América, the thesis will try to undo our modern understanding of the American hemisphere as divided into two culturally distinct Americas, one *Latino*, the other *Anglo* (a distinction becoming increasingly untenable in the US), and also avoid the tendency in the English language to use the term America and the United States interchangeably. Throughout, I will use América, accented, to refer to the entire American hemisphere. Similarly, the thesis will refer to Rioplatense *Americanos*, a term more accurate than ‘Argentines’, an identity
which did exist, but was used infrequently and indefinitely in comparison to the term *Americanos*. Those inhabitants of the United States will be referred to as US Americans in order to distinguish between the varieties of other Americans throughout the hemisphere.

Within the US, there existed a significant number of enthusiasts for Spanish American independence and US integration with the Americas. I will refer to these people as US *Americanistas*. Some within this group of US *Americanistas* did not think of América as exclusive to the United States. Whilst their citizenship may have been to the US, their attachment belonged to the hemisphere. I will describe these people as US *Americanos*, a subset of the *Americanos* found in Spanish America. These new terms are necessary in part due to finding new problems, such as US *Americanos* living in Buenos Aires, claiming US citizenship, but firmly celebrating the United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata as their *patria*, or fatherland. Or people born in the US who claimed citizenship in the United Provinces. Or more complex still, people born in British America, but who held United Provinces and US citizenship, moving between the two depending on which citizenship suited them better at that moment, who expressed loyalty and attachment to América over and beyond the claims on them by their citizenship granting states. All of these people are *Americanos*, the history of whom and their role in shaping the development of states in the Americas is the subject of this thesis.
Chapter One
To “Indulge a little peep into futurity”: The 1818 US Commission to South America

On October 31 1817, Caesar A. Rodney, a Delaware lawyer, politician and former-Attorney General who had been appointed as a commissioner to visit South America by James Monroe, sent the US President a lengthy manuscript book review he had written on one of the latest works on Spanish America. He had just received it from his Delaware bookseller, and would have posted it immediately to Washington D.C had the “Southern mail” not already been closed. Rodney forwarded Monroe what he believed to be the only copy in the country and thought the President would appreciate its importance. Rodney advised Monroe should read it for himself “if you can snatch a moment, from your numerous avocations, to devote to its perusal.” Rodney’s review of Outline of the Revolution in Spanish America celebrated the extent of the resources the insurgents of Spanish Americans had at their disposal and marvelled at the “great Mexican mineralogists” based in Mexico City, the then most populous city in the Americas. But why should Monroe have even cared? Conventionally, the Commission to which Rodney was appointed is remembered as a clever setup to delay recognition of the new South American states for reasons that would benefit Monroe’s political ambitions. But Rodney offered a very different explanation of what the Commission was going to do. The reason for sending the Commission was the “necessity of more authentic information, on which to found a permanent system in relation to the Spanish provinces, in whose independence we have a deep stake.” But was Rodney’s understanding of the Commission correct?

The 1818 US Commission to South America is not traditionally seen as part of the early development of the ‘Monroe Doctrine’. Sent by Monroe in late 1817 to visit the Rio de la Plata and Chile, conventional histories of the commission assert that it was a diplomatic set-up engineered by President Monroe, who, pressured by the prospect that congressional leaders would persuade Congress to recognize the new Spanish American republics against his wishes, sent the mission in order to both postpone further debate on the issue while the Commission took an extended sojourn in South America and produce reports that the executive could use to justify further procrastination on the issue of recognizing the new South American states. In contrast, this chapter offers an alternative
view of the commission. Rather than a one-off event in Monroe’s diplomacy instructed to return with pre-determined reports that would warn against recognition of the new Spanish American republics, the Commission was actually part of a series of hemispheric agents sent to encourage the idea of a hemispheric system of states independent from Europe and bound together by political, economic, and cultural connections. It was extensively prepared for and animated by a feeling of hemispheric American identity and solidarity, and did build transnational connections and exchanges between the US and the Americas. The Commission had a further intent; to subtly hint that the US would back Spanish America if Europe intervened to curtail what contemporaries could perceive as an emerging hemispheric system of independent American republics, opposed to an Old World balance of power system of allied European empires and monarchies, an idea expressed more directly in the 1823 President’s seventh annual message to Congress that came to be known as the ‘Monroe Doctrine’. Ironically, while the commissioners were sent to lay the foundations for a hemisphere of independent confederacies, or even one hemispheric confederacy, independent of Europe, their reports offered sharply divergent assessments on the viability of the Rioplatense Union as the commissioners held very different ‘theories of union.’

There are various histories of the Commission. On why the Commission was sent, Watt Stewart. “The South American Commission, 1817-1818.” The Hispanic American Historical Review, 9, no. 1 (1929): 33-37, 50, tends towards the view that it was designed to produce reports that would aid the administration’s policy of nonrecognition, though outlines four primary reasons; public opinion, correct fact-finding, establishing good will with the insurgent governments, and “perhaps the strongest” motive; excuse for further delay in recognition. Harold Peterson, Argentina and the United States 1810-1960 (Albany: State University of New York, 1964): 37-38, agrees with Stewart’s four reasons, though finds the “delay” motive less plausible, and offers additional reasons such as reviving American commerce, and that the “decisive reason” to finally send the mission was the need to explain the US’ plan to occupy Amelia Island, and concludes that fact-finding was probably the most important; William Earl Weeks, John Quincy Adams and American Global Empire, (University Press of Kentucky, 2002): 54-55 extends the “delay” hypothesis to include the acquisition of Florida as an additional and primary motive for sending the commission, 54-55.

On the various works that conclude the Commission had little impact, see Stewart, “The South American Commission, 1817-1818,” 55-59; Petersen, Argentina and the United States 1810-1960, 45-47; Wayne D Rasmussen, “Diplomats and Plant Collectors: The South American Commission, 1817-1818.” Agricultural History, 29, no. 1 (1955): 22: “little influence” on politics, 31: “scientific results...were more important”, Rasmussen misses the connection between politics, botanical inquiry, and inter-American integration, which will be explored in this chapter. See particularly Laura Bornholdt, “Baltimore as a Port for Spanish-American Propaganda, 1810-1823.” (Yale University, 1945): 177-181, and William F. Keller, The Nation’s Advocate: Henry Marie Brackenridge and Young America, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1956, chapters 14 and 15, for the view that financial or political interests on the part of the commissioners motivated their findings. Bornholdt’s view that the financial interests of a ‘Carrerista’ faction who included Bland, Skinner, Porter and Poinsett materially shaped the commission is weakened for two reasons. First, Monroe was considering sending an agent to Chile long before the ‘Carreristas’ had an agent on the commission, see Richard Rush to James Monroe, 28 June 1817.
The US Revolution had created a new nation in the world, unlike other inter-imperial conflicts which usually resulted in territories exchanging hands between empires. Nations, those entities that had the power to form treaties with other nations, had usually guaranteed their security against other nations by forming alliances. Small nations would ally with larger nations in order to protect themselves from geopolitical threats, while other territories would enter into empires as dependencies. But from 1793, the independent United States attempted to eschew this balance-of-power system that had failed to stop warfare between nations. At home, the thirteen states had confederated into a union, rather than exist as individual sovereign nations. The federal union’s foreign policy, most famously outlined in Washington’s Farewell Address, was to desist from ‘entangling alliances’ with any other nation in order to avoid becoming complicated in future European wars. While the US would not be obligated to enter into war with their allies, they also were weakened by their lack of allies, and were probably fortunate that their fragile status as an independent nation without alliances coincided with the French Revolutionary wars, leaving the European powers in too distracted a state to consider recolonizing the United States.\(^6\)

The outbreak of the French Revolutionary Wars tested this foreign policy ideology. The federal government administration stuck to its policy of ‘strict neutrality’ despite intense domestic support for entering in the conflict on the side of republican France, opposition that include the future president James Monroe. The US’ status as a neutral nation allowed its mercantile vessels to pick up most of the ‘carrying trade’ of Europe as its vessels were not subject to privateering by the belligerent powers, generating great wealth.

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\(^6\) The Treaty of Alliance with France was effectively annulled by the Neutrality Proclamation of 1793, see, John Lamberton Harper, *American Machiavelli: Alexander Hamilton and the Origins of U.S. Foreign Policy*, (Cambridge University Press, 2004), Chapter 8. Of course, the US policy of avoiding ‘entangling alliances’ and maintaining neutrality does not amount to US isolation from the world, or even demonstrate an ability of the US to remove itself from the international system, see Eliga H. Gould, *Among the Powers of the Earth: The American Revolution and the Making of a New World Empire*, (Harvard University Press, 2012).
for US merchants and allowing the US federal government to begin consolidating
independence. But the effects of the Napoleonic Wars began to make themselves felt in the
US, challenging their national security. In the exigencies of war, Britain increasingly
violated the rights of the US as an independent nation leading to a thirty-two month war
between the two nations starting in 1812, while the French invasion of Spain in 1808 had
left Spanish American colonies *de facto* independent.

By 1815, the US navy and privateers had shown that the nation could hold its own
against an overstretched Great Britain, but the end of the Napoleonic Wars began a period
of peace which challenged US geopolitical security. Far from finding itself in a world
moving towards universal republicanism, Europeans restored their monarchs who in turn
established a ‘Holy Alliance,’ an alliance which developed into a system of congresses
where European powers could organize cooperation on foreign policy matters. The
restoration of Ferdinand VII to the Spanish monarchy in 1814 and his subsequent dispatch
of a military force of reconquest compelled those areas of Spanish America which sought
regional autonomy to declare independence. While viewing these new polities declaring
themselves independent and American nations, the US maintained its policy of ‘strict
neutrality’ while continuing to treat rebel Spanish Americans as participating in a ‘civil
war’, thus allowing both Spain and the insurgents equal access to US ports. As the rebel’s
claims that they were able to maintain their independence became more credible, and the
insurgency began to spread to other regions of Spanish America, the western hemisphere
presented both huge risk and huge opportunity for the United States. If the insurgents
continued to contest Spain alone, the end outcome might be that the US would found itself
neighbouring a continent of American republics with a shared interest in maintaining
their independence from European imperialism. Spanish American territory such as
Florida, Cuba or Texas might become part of the United States by treaty with Spain, or the
insurgents might voluntarily join the North American Union. Alternatively, if the US
actively supported the insurgents it could have led to a damaging war with Spain or rouse
the attention of the Allied European powers who would either aid Spain to suppress the
insurgents into colonies, or conquer and partition the Americas between themselves,
leaving the US surrounded by hostile European powers.

Monroe’s foreign policy aim was to increase the geopolitical security of the US by
gaining territories such as Florida and help create an independent hemisphere of states
without alliances with Europe. It is well known that by 1823, almost an entire hemisphere of independent American states had come into being, and that Monroe issued a written statement via his annual message to Congress which expressed that the hemisphere should be off limits to further European colonization, an act which the US would look unkindly upon, hinting that the US could intervene against European recolonization attempts in the Americas. But it is less well known that Monroe deployed a series of agents to begin creating a hemispheric system of states by 1817, and that the President understood that he had made known to the European powers this ‘doctrine’, by inference, as early as 1818. Agents went to the River Plate, Chile, Peru, and later Venezuela and Columbia from 1817 to 1820 to extend a hemispheric system. These hemispheric agents have received much less research than the comparable 1818 US Commission, and are too infrequently referenced in histories of Monroe’s foreign policy. This is because, as we will see, while the Commission shared many of the same instructions and goals as the other agents in Spanish America, the Commission was sent to ensure further outcomes which meant that it was heavily publicized compared to the other agents whose work was not, in general, made public knowledge. This chapter will analyse these hemispheric agents’ voyages: the preparation, their activities in Spanish America, and the reports they produced.7

* * *

The context in which Monroe decided to send agents, and the selection and preparation of agents and commissioners, shows that Monroe’s foreign policy was animated by an enthusiasm for América as a hemispheric entity, a desire to create a hemispheric system of states, and a concern for the geopolitical security of the United States. The first act towards sending a commission to South America, one of the earliest acts of his Presidency, in April 1817, coincided with the period when Monroe was planning a tour of the Union. The original intention of Monroe’s tour of mid-atlantic, northern, and mid-northwestern states in 1817 was to review the condition of US military establishments. Monroe hoped that an in depth knowledge of these establishments would help him to make better decisions on future military infrastructure programmes. The National Intelligencer

7 See Appendix 1.
praised the president’s intended tour, noting that “there is no information so satisfactory, none upon which as much reliance can be placed, as that obtained by personal observation”. As Monroe planned his own information-gathering tour of the United States, and two days after the National Intelligencer article, he took the first action towards sending a commission, offering Joel Poinsett the role of commissioner. Further, on the day Monroe offered Joel Poinsett the commissioner role, he had heard of disturbing news from the French minister to the United States. The minister warned Richard Rush, the acting secretary of state, that Europeans were planning intervention in the Americas of which the US were not aware. The French minister’s conversation did three things; it offered the US a chance to join a triple entente with France and Spain against Britain, it proved that Europe could enter into warfare in the Americas, and it demanded to know US policy towards Spanish America. Monroe declined the entente offer, explained that the US wished to see independent states which it would recognize in due course, and was prompted to gather fresh intelligence around which to form a new policy. Monroe’s early presidential agenda was security based. Convinced that European conflicts were a permanent feature of modern geopolitical life, the President began an immediate effort to improve military installations in preparation for future conflicts, whilst sending his own parallel information-gathering commission to South America. The immediate rationale for sending a commission was founded in inter-american security concerns.8

How the commissioners were selected tells us a great deal. The time taken from the first attempt to appoint a commissioner to the departure of the Commission (April until December 1817) has been seen as a deliberate set-up designed to delay recognition. Actually, Monroe had been advised by Caesar Rodney, just before he was appointed a commissioner, that Congress, and not the President alone, had the power to recognize nations. Monroe hoped that the commissioners would return quickly to the United States with information to aid Congress in its decision. The delay was occasioned by the initial difficulty of finding commissioners, and, as Lewis points out, the illness and death of Rodney’s son made the earlier departure of the Commission impossible. The delay was

8 On the presidential tour and the National Intelligencer article, see Daniel Preston, and Marlena C. DeLong. The Papers of James Monroe: A Documentary History of the Presidential Tours of James Monroe, 1817, 1818, 1819, (Greenwood Press, 2003), xvii, 14. For the Poinsett letter, see Stewart, “The South American Commission, 1817-1818”, 32. For the disturbing news from the French Minister, see notes made by Richard Rush dated April 24, 25, 30 in James Monroe Papers, Reel 6, DLC.
simply beyond the control of any one person. Additionally, the choice to send three commissioners is telling. A one-man commission would have been a cheaper and better solution if the administration wanted to guarantee unfavourable reports. But the great expense of the Commission, costing at least $34,405.20, equivalent to $641,000 today, made it a very expensive form of political set-up, and suggests that the Commission was to complete important work worth funding, work Richard Rush was keen to prioritise “knowing the importance you [Monroe] attach to it.”

At least four other men were offered the position of commissioner who refused or were sidelined. In total, ten men were approached or considered as potential commissioners and secretary: Joel Poinsett [South Carolina], William Cumming [Georgia], Nicholas Biddle [Philadelphia], Caesar A. Rodney [Delaware, occasionally Philadelphia], Mr Smith [Baltimore], John Graham [Virginia, later Kentucky], John B. Prevost [New Jersey, later New Orleans], Walter Jones [Virginia], Henry Marie Brackenridge [Pittsburgh, later Baltimore] and Theodorick Bland [Virginia, later Baltimore]. What is notable in the selection? Firstly, the absence of men from northern states. This could just reflect Monroe’s own patterns of sociability, having never visited New England. But rising public interest in the newly independent states threatened to challenge Monroe’s prudent policy of delayed recognition. One possible explanation is that Monroe selected men from areas he expected would either feel most enthusiastic or most threatened by US recognition of South America. Westerners hoped that inter-American integration would open up new markets for their produce, whilst mid-Atlantic states looked for increasing manufacturing output to be exported to South America via New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore. Southern plantation states saw no immediate

\[9\] On Rodney’s advice to Monroe, see Caesar A. Rodney to James Monroe, 6 June 1817, James Monroe Papers, Reel 6, DLC. Richard Rush’s correspondence with Monroe implies that the key consideration on where the commissioners should visit would be whether they would have enough time to “be back in time before the session of Congress begins.” See Richard Rush to James Monroe, 28 June 1817, James Monroe Papers, Reel 6, DLC. Rush also stated that “It is not supposed that the mission will last longer than January next.” see Richard Rush to Henry Marie Brackenridge, 17 July 1817, Henry Marie Brackenridge and Family Papers, ULS Archives Service Center, University of Pittsburgh Library System, accessed July 16, 2013, http://digital.library.pitt.edu/u/ulsmanuscripts/pdf/31735051657629.pdf. For the delay, see Rodney to Monroe, 6 June 1817, James Monroe Papers, Reel 6, DLC and Rodney to Monroe, 8 June 1817, Ibid., William Earl Weeks gives John Quincy Adams, with his “mastery of bureaucratic intrigue”, too much credit for this delay, see Weeks, John Quincy Adams and American Global Empire, 54-55. See Appendix 2 for the calculations on the Commission’s cost. On today’s value of the Commission, I have used Samuel H. Williamson, ‘Seven Ways to Compute the Relative Value of a U.S. Dollar Amount, 1774 to present,’ Measuring Worth, 2013, accessed Dec 16 2013, http://www.measuringworth.com/uscompare/. See Richard Rush to James Monroe, 20 July 1817, James Monroe Papers, Reel 6, DLC.
commercial interest in recognition. The staple commodity goods of the southern states such as cotton, rice, and tobacco, could not be exported to South America, and would, it was believed, within a few years compete with southern exports in global markets.10

But those representatives from Southern States repeatedly refused an invitation to join the Commission. If the mission had been designed to send anti-recognition advocates to South America, it had miserably failed. All four of the final line-up of the commission, Bland, Brackenridge, Graham and Rodney, could empathise with those who felt an interest in recognizing an independent Spanish America. Bland, resident of Baltimore, had served as a legal representative for the growing privateering community who sailed for Spanish America and resided amongst a city whose citizens already felt the benefit of exporting flour to Mexico, Brazil and Buenos Aires. Brackenridge, originally from

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Monroe’s first visit to New England was during his tour as President, see Daniel Preston, and Marlena C. DeLong, The Papers of James Monroe: A Documentary History of the Presidential Tours of James Monroe, 1817, 1818, 1819, xviii. On Westerner’s interests, see Weeks, John Quincy Adams, 91-92. Fitz’s research on ‘Baby Bolivars’ shows that only in New England did the naming of children after Bolivar not take off. Even in the Southern states along the Atlantic, the numbers of Baby Bolivars was roughly the same as the Mid-Atlantic, North-Western and South-Western States, see Fitz, Our Sister Republics, 176. Lewis Williams, a representative from North Carolina, explained that Spanish American independence would lead to competition with southern commodities in international markets, and that unless the South industrialized, the region would have “nothing to carry on extensive commerce with those people”, therefore the South only had “a moral interest in their cause.” See Lewis Williams to constituents, 7 April 1818, in Noble Cunningham, Circular Letters of Congressmen to Their Constituents: 1789-1829 Volume III, 15th Congress to 20th Congress 1817-1829, (Chapel Hill NC: Univ. of North Carolina Pr., 1978): 1020.
Pittsburgh, and Graham, who had been Secretary of the Orleans territory under Jefferson and had negotiated trade issues with Spanish officials, would have understood the Western States’ hope that their exportable goods would continue to find stable export markets from New York, Philadelphia or Baltimore, or in future would increasingly find their way down the Mississippi river system to New Orleans by steam boat and onwards to South America via the circum-Caribbean. Rodney, whose home state of Delaware was an early leader in manufacturing establishments, received congratulations on his appointment from E.I. Du Pont, whose gunpowder establishments on the Brandywine river were already supplying South America via Baltimore, writing to remind him that South America was of the “utmost consequence for the future destinies of this country”, and perhaps “of the whole world”.

Once appointed, agents were advised of the scope of their missions via written instructions. These instructions were often used in public situations. Congress could demand instructions to be printed, European diplomats could be shown the documents, and instructions were often presented to foreign officials in Spanish America. For this reason, the instructions alone do not offer a complete guide to the intent and ideas that animate the sending of these agents. Frequently, agents and commissioners activities surpassed the scope of their instructions, and it is possible that Monroe outlined more active roles for agents in private conversations. It would seem that Monroe asked his hemispheric agents to do several things. First, to collect information that would allow the administration to decide whether the new polities in América were viable and could sustain their independence, and to help the administration to understand how a hemispheric system would work in practice. Second, to explain to the new governments that the US had not extended recognition in order to help América avoid a war between the continents, rather than a deliberate delay due to disdainful or selfish motivations. Third, to lay the groundwork for a hemispheric system by facilitating and cultivating transnational connections. The 1818 Commission shared these instructions, but had

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For Bland representing privateers, see David Head, “Sailing for Spanish America: The Atlantic Geopolitics of Foreign Privateering from the United States in the Early Republic.” (State University of New York, 2009): 94, 197–199, and "Highly Important Law Case", Box 1, Bland Papers, MS 134 H. Furlong Baldwin Library, Maryland Historical Society. For Baltimore’s enthusiasm, see especially Fitz’s account of Baltimoreans wearing cockades with the colours of revolutionary Montevideo, Fitz, Our Sister Republics, 204–205, and for weapons traded, Ibid, 200, and especially Appendix III, 343–354. For Baltimore's flour exports, see MFPOTUS1818-B, 116. For the Du Pont-Rodney correspondence, see E.I. du Pont to Caesar A. Rodney, 21 July, 1817 Box VB5; "Caesar A. Rodney" in Rodney Collection, 1700–1884, Delaware Historical Society.
additional goals. First, the Commission would make public that the US was considering recognition, and imply that the US would aid the insurgents if Europe aided Spain. Monroe remembered in 1819 that the Commission was designed to have this effect, and he thought that it had worked:

It might fairly be inferred from that measure [the sending of the Commission], by the allies, that if they took part with Spain, the United States would take part with the Colonies, although they [the US] were under no positive obligation to do it, and that presumption doubtless formed a motive with them not to engage in the war with Spain so long as the U. States abstained from taking part with the Colonies, even by the recognition of their independence.

Monroe suggested that the Commission signalled to Europe the start of an informal alliance of the Americas. Indeed, the President’s language suggests a departure from the ‘entangling alliances with none’ policy to a recognition that the US must participate in the balance-of-power system. In a world where evaluating the strength of a nation’s alliances was the calculus that decided war or peace, sending the 1818 Commission ensured that “our weight was thrown into the scale of the colonies in a way to be felt by the parties.”

Additionally, the Commission was also calculated as a safe means to understand European attitudes to South America. Monroe wished to recognize the new Spanish American states, but only when it was known that no adverse effects would come from it. But how could the US know how Europe would react to recognition? Making it clear that the US was investigating recognition allowed a sounding of European opinion, without giving grounds for any warlike response. This can been seen from the commissioners’ arrival in Rio de Janeiro. Thomas Sumter, the US Minister to the Portuguese Court in

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12 For evidence that Monroe could have outlined more explicit instructions to the commissioners in private, see JQA’s diary entries for November 15 1817, page 274, November 17 1817, page 275, accessed August 20, 2013, http://www.masshist.org/jqadiaries. On both occasions Adams “found” the President already engaged in conversations with commissioners, proving that Monroe, not Adams, was directing the commissioners activities. For Monroe’s memories on why he sent the Commission, see Stanislaus Murray Hamilton, ed. The Writings of James Monroe, Volume VI, 1817-1823. (G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1902), 95-96. Whether Monroe’s opinion that his ‘doctrine’ was understood and influencing Europe by 1818 is actually true remains to be established in further research, but the important is that Monroe, either based on evidence or incorrectly inferred by the inaction of the Congress at Aix-de-Chapelle, understood that the ‘doctrine’ was known five years before it was formally published in 1823.
Brazil, was unchecked in his response to the administration’s decision to send the Commission, complaining of the “nonsensical conduct of this [US] government in rousing the attention of Europe abruptly”. He explained that the arrival of the *USS Congress*, carrying such illustrious US citizens, had been interpreted as a party of men sent to recognize the United Provinces. Sumter worked feverishly to stop any negative impression of the US Commission’s intent from leaving Brazil to Europe, explaining to the Spanish Minister in Rio the nature of the commission, who was satisfied when he saw the text of the President’s 1817 Message to Congress. Sumter let Monroe know in uncertain terms the consequences in Europe of his ‘hemispheric system’ building:

> Those who are dextrous at misleading others will point out dangers of allowing our republican institutions to extend themselves...and of our being, and becoming, at the head of an american interest, or system, which is...in opposition to the interest and system of europe... and which some madmen in this gov’t and others in some spanish colonies, who judge their own strength solely by their distance from Europe, have spoken of forming.

Monroe learnt from the Brazilian reaction that unilateral recognition was premature. He commented to former President Madison that “this experiment [the Commission], so far shews that if a step, involving no very serious consequences, is viewed with such unfavourable eyes, in what light one of a bolder character would be seen.”

The preparations of the various agents sent in 1817 demonstrate that they were animated by enthusiasm for América and its entire hemispheric independence and had been sent to further an integrated hemispheric system. Placing the 1818 Commission in the context of other agents sent to South America at the same time is essential to aid our understanding. Two missions stand out, those of Jeremy Robinson and William Worthington, as they were both appointed around the same time as the 1818 Commission, and interacted with the commissioners in South America, forming a kind of fraternity of

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US American agents. The following analysis will consider the 1818 Commission in comparison with these contemporary US agents in South America.

Jeremy Robinson had been appointed early in Monroe’s presidency, but had suffered great delays due to illness. On the eve of his departure, the federal government had become impatient with his constant setbacks, and so revoked his credentials and ask for the return of his advance. For many diplomatic officials like consuls, the federal government stipend was minimal, and they had to engage in private commerce to support themselves. Despite losing his agency, Robinson went anyway with the view of setting himself up as a merchant, and spent the next five years providing the State Department with intelligence unpaid. Despite his original remit as agent for seamen and commerce, Robinson prepared for his role as if it extended to being a kind of ambassador for hemispheric-American integration. He pressed friends heavily to both make known his future role in South America to US merchants and magnates such as John Jacob Astor, and also to acquire letters of introduction to leading South Americans, as he was “desirous of doing all in his power to draw nearer those friendly ties that ought to connect the two Countries.” The editors of the Medical Repository, a New York medical journal, accepted Robinson’s kind offer of circulating their texts in South America, and confided their confidence in Robinson to extend “commercial relations between the Northern & Southern States”; that is, of hemispheric América. As Robinson waited to depart from New York, Samuel Mitchill, former Congressman, enthusiast for South American independence and founder of the Lyceum of Natural History of New York made contact with Robinson. Mitchill had completed an exhaustive literature review of botanical works on the American hemisphere, introducing his attempts to bring together all “the historical information extant, relative to the plants of the western hemisphere” by affirming that “plants are of great importance in the economy of the world”, and he was careful to snap up Robinson as an informal agent for creating a network of correspondents for his new scientific institution.¹⁴

¹⁴ For example, Robinson had letters of introduction to Astor, Girard and Bayard. See William Lee to John Jacob Astor, 26 April 1817, in Peter Force Collection (Jeremy Robinson Papers), Reel 60, DLC, William Lee to Stephen Girard, 26 April 1817, Ibid, and William Lee to Le Roy Bayard, 26 April 1817, Ibid. He received letters of introduction to Pedro Gual, Bernardo O’Higgins, Jose Miguel Carrera, for instance, see Ibid. See William Thornton to Ruggles Hubbard, 30 April 1817, Ibid, for “desirous of doing all in his power to draw nearer those friendly ties that ought to connect the two Countries.” For the Medical Repository correspondence, see Editors of the Medical Repository to Jeremy Robinson, 25 September 1817, Ibid. Robinson joined the Lyceum in the September before departure, see Lyceum of Natural History to Jeremy Robinson, 22 September 1817, see Ibid. For Mitchill’s discourse, see Samuel Mitchill,
Robinson passed the Fourth of July 1817 prior to his voyage in Virginia, where his party toasted to their South American brethren, and to “emancipation without anarchy, independence without despotism!” But William Worthington, fellow member of the corps of US inter-American agents, celebrated on the same day in 1817 a more exotic Fourth of July at sea off the Cape Verde isles. At one o’clock the captain of the ship delivered an oceanic oration on independence on his way to Buenos Aires. Worthington thought the novelty of the event would fascinate US Americans at home and considered its publication essential. Whilst never published, his manuscript survived. Captain Barker was the orator of the day. He first read the Declaration of Independence. Toasts were heard; Worthington offered one to “The American Stars & Stripes - May they always form a guide to the Friends and a Scourge to the Foes of Freedom in every Quarter of the Globe.” Then Barker offered an oration tinged with an hemispheric understanding of US independence. The Captain argued the cause of republics was hopeless in Europe. US independence itself was threatened by the Congress of Vienna, and US security would be fortified by homogeneous governments in America:

I should like to see Republican America from Cape Horn to the Regions of the North, willing and Capable from having the best forms of government, of asserting and enforcing its rights in all cases of conflict against the other three quarters of the Globe.

But Barker thought the idea merely wishful thinking at the present. “The finest portions of America” [that is, South America] suffered from attacks of "Civil Discord". He gloried in the War of 1812, prior to which he had feared that US Americans could have relapsed into the "bosom" of the British Empire, losing their "individuality" as a nation, whilst the war had happily created a distinct sense of Americanness. But when Barker chose to remember the war, he celebrated one of its lesser known conflicts, David Porter's action in the Bay of Valparaiso, which had “immortalized American valor.” When in hemispheric América, independence took on new meanings.¹⁵


¹⁵ For Robinson’s Fourth of July, see document dated 4 July 1817 in Peter Force Collection (Jeremy Robinson Papers), Reel 60, DLC. For Worthington’s Fourth of July, see “Mr Worthington’s Diary from New York to Valparaiso in 1817 & 1818” in Despatches from U.S. Ministers in Buenos Aires, 1817-1906,
It was evidently common to prepare for a mission by reading up prior to one’s arrival. Worthington recorded extensive reading in his diary during the voyage to Buenos Aires, working his way through Humboldt, collections of Maritime and US Laws, three volumes of Niles’ *Weekly Register*, and consulting maps in preparation for his mission. On board, he had taken to practicing astronomy, and advised readers to take astronomical equipment in one’s sea equipage. The “star spangled firmament” offered pleasing contemplation as he wistfully commemorated the Battle of Bladensburg and the torching of Washington D.C. by the British, at which he was present. While he never expected to be so far from home on the battle’s anniversary, the star-gazing impressed on his mind a strong sense of the power of providential nature of his mission. If the providential firmament was star-spangled, Worthington and Monroe’s other hemispheric agents were hoping that their activities would create luminous constellations of sovereign states in the American hemisphere.  

There are a few important aspects to draw out of the start of the Robinson and Worthington missions. The 1818 Commission was dreamt up at the same time. It places them, then, inside a series of commissions planned in the early days of Monroe’s presidency, in order to understand and create a hemispheric system. That system was being imagined by enthusiasts for by US Americanistas, enthusiasts for hemispheric Republicanism who prepared for and looked to create such as system in person in South America. It is essential that we consider the 1818 Commission as similar to those of the Worthington and Robinson missions. The 1818 Commission was also extensively prepared for, and excited by an enthusiasm for inter-American integration. Contrary to existing historical analysis of the commissioners that suggests they were predisposed by either an expectation to agree with administration policy or their own financial interests, the preparations involved acquiring a large number of books for the mission to use in order to prepare them for their information gathering. John Graham informed Brackenridge that the Department had provided a fund “out of which we can purchase such books as we shall want”, and advised him that to bring any specialist books that

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would not be easily available in New York, the original planned point of departure, with him. Brackenridge replied to Richard Rush that he had set out finding the works of “most valuable information”, and trusted that Graham would already have bought the standard texts: Humboldt, de Pauw, Molina, Maws, Bolingbroke “&c”. Brackenridge advised that he had studied South America for the last eight years, and that unfortunately much of the best information were in “detached serials” and essays in the “English and American journals”, an example being the *North American Review*’s recent article on Pernambuco, which was particularly “excellent”. Brackenridge evidently did forward some of his private specialist collection onwards to New York, where it was stored with the Navy Agent until his arrival.\(^{17}\)

When the departure originally planned from New York was cancelled, the Secretary spent the remainder of the time in Washington D.C. pouring “like a ravenous wolf” through Jefferson’s recently donated book collection at a decidedly under-patronised Library of Congress. The product of his reading was *South America: A Letter on the Present State of that Country to James Monroe*. The pamphlet expressed the two spheres concept, of distinct American and Old World hemispheres destined to be separated by interest, and advocated early US recognition. Published anonymously by ‘An American’, it is often seen as a brazen attempt by Brackenridge to swing public opinion against Monroe’s cautious approach to recognizing South America. But Charles Bagot, the British diplomatic representative in Washington, suspected that its impossibly low purchase price was due to secret federal government subsidies. In the context of understanding Monroe to have been crafting an implicit warning about the United States’ intention to create and protect a hemispheric system, Brackenridge’s pamphlet, widely read in the US, reprinted in England, and translated and published in France by De Pradt, Europe’s leading advocate of South American independence, seems more calculated to accompany news of

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\(^{17}\) For “out of which we can purchase such books as we shall want,” see John Graham to Henry Marie Brackenridge, 29 July 1817, Henry Marie Brackenridge and Family Papers, ULS Archives Service Center, University of Pittsburgh Library System, accessed July 10, 2013, http://digital.library.pitt.edu/u/ulsmanuscripts/pdf/31735051657702.pdf. Henry Marie Brackenridge to Richard Rush, 28 July 1817, Despatches from Special Agents of the Department of State, 1794-1906. Vols.3-4, Microfilm Publication: M37, Reel Number 2, RG59, Records of the Department of State. For Brackenridge’s specialist collection, “your books have been put in a canvas bag which is left at the Office of the Navy Agent in this city subject to your orders,” see James Biddle to Henry Marie Brackenridge, 3 October 1817, Henry Marie Brackenridge and Family Papers, ULS Archives Service Center, University of Pittsburgh Library System, accessed July 10, 2013, http://digital.library.pitt.edu/u/ulsmanuscripts/pdf/31735051657785.pdf.
the Commission to Europe as part of an implied ‘warning’.  

If the personnel connected to the 1818 Commission had read their instructions carefully, they certainly prepared for and viewed the mission strangely. Consider for example the Columbian Institute, a chronically underfunded precursor to the Smithsonian consisting of a group of Washington gentlemen and politicians interested in promoting useful scientific knowledge which acted as a ‘think tank’ for nation-building legislation. They considered the Commission a useful opportunity to fulfill its original vision; to collect seeds from across the United States and disseminate them throughout “this extensive continent”, the Americas. The Institute worked to get a botanist on the entourage accompanying the commission, and William Baldwin, a surgeon and keen botanist, learnt from the Navy Department that his appointment as ship’s surgeon had been due to the Columbian Institute and his specific expertise in “Natural History”. The Institute planned for Baldwin to carry and distribute a copy of its constitution to the River Plate to encourage correspondents to send specimens back to Washington D.C.

This brings the Commission within the kind of domestic activity the Institute was engaged in. The Institute sent out a survey to its correspondents seeking similar information on the interior of the United States to the kind of information the commissioners were asked to provide on the River Plate and Chile. One of the surviving replies, from William Darlington, botanist and occasional Congressman for West Chester County, PA., who had been more than incidentally corresponding with William Baldwin about botany and the 1818 Commission, connects the domestic and hemispheric into one project of creating a system to support independence. The Commission, then, was very much part of a zeitgeist in the US Capitol for the collection and analysis of useful information in a centric point in order to understand how the parts could connect as a whole, or system, and devise appropriate policy. Baldwin, the surgeon, aptly describes this element of the Commission. He wrote Darlington, the botanist-congressman, bragging

18 For Brackenridge in the library of Congress: “the librarian and myself being about the sole occupants for several months,” see Keller, The Nation’s Advocate, 187. For the ‘subsidised price’ and translations of the pamphlet, see Kellern, The Nation’s Advocate, 190-191.
19 For the Institute’s original vision, see “Record of Proceedings of The Columbian Institute”, 1, Box 4: “Minutes of the Columbian Institute”, SIA RU007051, Columbian Institute, Records, 1816-1841, with related papers, 1791-1800, Smithsonian Institute Archives. For Baldwin’s appointment and the Columbia Institute’s Constitution, see William Darlington, ed. Reliquiae Baldwiniatae: Selections from the Correspondence of the Late William Baldwin with Occasional Notes, and a Short Biographical Memoir. (Philadelphia: Kimber and Sharpless, 1843): 245.
(and punning on the ship’s name) that he was “a member of Congress”, in which the “the ensuing session, I suspect, will be uncommonly interesting,- from the political topics, relative to South America, which will probably be discussed.” On a more serious note, William Baldwin praised the department for furnishing the commissioners with “all works, that could be collected, which throw light onto the interesting country which it is our object to visit”, including works on Science and Natural History, and let Darlington know his joy at the prospect of visiting the region, and his pleasure that the Navy Department were willing to grant “any indulgence that I required, which came within their limits to grant”. The voyage would allow him to investigate the “productions” of the River Plate, which were little known in the United States. His enthusiasm was shared:

All [on board] seem animated with the prospect of contributing something, during this voyage of discovery (as it may be termed), which will redound to the honor or interest of their country.

The interesting nature of the voyage attracted a crew of over 400, an unusually large voyage which was oversubscribed to due to the “desirable object among the naval gentlemen to engage in it.” The mission the USS Congress prepared for was a “voyage of discovery”, emphatically not a predetermined exercise in confirming the correctness of the existing administration policy. 20

On a warm February Summer’s day of 1818, the four most prominent US Americans to sail up the Rio de la Plata, the estuarine gateway to the river system which, draining from the Brazilian Amazon, connected the then new polities of the United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata, Banda Oriental, Entre Rios, the city-state of Santa Fe, and Paraguay, viewed the pretty cityscape of Buenos Aires from a rickety and leaking brig appropriately named Malabacada (Badly Finished). It was hardly the vessel the long anticipated commission

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20 For Darlington’s survey, see ‘A Report by a Mr. Darlington, about Chester county, Penn,’ ”Reports of Committee of the Columbian Institute’ 1816-1820.” Box 1, SIA RU007051, Columbian Institute, Records, 1816-1841, with related papers, 1791-1800, Smithsonian Institute Archives. For Baldwin’s view on the preparation of the Commission, see William Darlington, ed. Reliquiae Baldwinianae, 248, 251. For numbers of crew, see Henry Marie Brackenridge, Voyage to South America: Performed by Order of the American Government, in the Years 1817 and 1818, in the Frigate Congress. Volume I, (Baltimore, Published by the Author, 1819): 101-102.
sent from the ‘great’ and ‘fluorescent’ republic of the North were expected to arrive in. In fact, the austere arrival hoodwinked officials prepped to greet the US Americans with an outburst of enthusiastic ceremony.\textsuperscript{21}

But how would the Commission extend hemispheric integration? And how could they determine the viability of the newly independent United Provinces? Could it sustain its independence? Was the new union a stable federation of provinces? Carried as far as Montevideo by the public ship \textit{USS Congress}, the commissioners made for an impressive assemblage of the United States’ leading political families but also a tinderbox of divergent personalities and political views. On board \textit{Malabacada} included Caesar A. Rodney, former Attorney General who was related to a signer of the Declaration of Independence and acted as the \textit{de facto} leader of the commission; Theodorick Bland, Baltimore lawyer and son of an anti-federalist member of the 1788 Virginia Ratification Convention, keenly analytical but uncompromising in his opinions; John Graham, career bureaucrat who had recently deputised as interim Secretary of State, and a steady pair of hands who spoke some Spanish learnt during his diplomatic service in Madrid, and Henry Marie Brackenridge, lawyer, author and son of the celebrated political writer Hugh Henry Breckenridge, who was flamboyant, eccentric and knowledgeable on Spanish America, having lived and learnt the language and \textit{hispanic} customs in New Orleans, and having read around the region extensively.\textsuperscript{22}

If the brig felt precarious, the mission itself must have felt more so. Constantly delayed, with uncertain line-ups of commissioners and with a final decision to despatch it coming just weeks before sailing, followed by a two and a half month journey from Norfolk, Virginia to the River Plate which descended into internal squabbling between the commissioners and an unanticipated and unwelcome attendance at the consecration of Dom João VI as monarch in Rio de Janeiro, there must have been at least a short sense of relief to finally feel the sand under their feet at Buenos Aires. But if the arrival had been arduous, how exactly would the novel task of evaluating a new polity much bigger than the United States whilst being surrounded by a strange language and perplexing local customs measure up?

The layover in Rio de Janeiro had been particularly influential. Before the

\textsuperscript{21} Keller, \textit{Nation’s Advocate}, 203. Rioplatense newspapers frequently referred to the US in such terms.

\textsuperscript{22} Brackenridge had changed the spelling of his surname, as he found his contemporaries spelt it with an ‘a’ anyway.
Commission left, US Americans such as Brackenridge had welcomed Brazil, where the Portuguese royal court had fled to in 1808, as an American state, even though it was a monarchy. Though monarchies were more likely to engage in warfare than republics, so US American logic ran, it still was an American monarchy, and would form part of a system that benefitted América. But their time spent in Río was particularly disturbing for these republicans. The pageantry, the regalia, the officer’s uniforms, the residents of Río’s lack of interest in public affairs all turned the commissioners more than a little queasy, especially as they chose to watch the celebrations accompanying the coronation of the first European monarch in América from the safer distance of the deck of their vessel, rather than attending it in person. The unease was even noted in the normally factual logbook of the USS Congress. Captain Arthur Sinclair recorded that he could see that the new King was “corpulent” with a pleasant though not "very intelligent countenance”. Brackenridge reported that all the vessels in the harbour fired salutes for the new monarch, including the USS Congress. The vessels were dressed in the globe’s national flags, exhibiting for Brackenridge “one of the most splendid appearances I ever witnessed.” But on examining the different flags, it was discovered that “ours was not among them”. Taking offence, Captain Sinclair resolved to take no further part in the ceremony. At night, all the vessels were illuminated in the “most curious manner”, except the Congress, which alone and unlit, seemed to “mourn the event.” Brazil, it seemed, had made a choice, by this design of not including the US flag among the nations of the world, to orient itself towards the European balance-of-power system. As the hopes of a hemispheric system including Brazil receded, Buenos Aires presented an even more important horizon for a system of independent republics in the Americas.23

The commissioner’s fellows agents in the River Plate had already begun the task of integrating the hemisphere, and found that other US Americans had already pioneered integration efforts. Jeremy Robinson had arrived a couple of months previous to the 1818 US Commissioners. He found himself in Buenos Aires on February 22 1818, where a grand celebration of Washington’s birthday was set to take place. Robinson skipped the event due to ill health, perhaps, as we will see, nauseous from the prospect of the company he

23 Brackenridge, Voyage to South America, Volume I, 130, 149-150. ‘Journal of the U.S.S. Congress, the Citizen, and the Canton’, MS 24, Special Collections & Archives Department - Manuscripts, United States Naval Academy.
would have to keep, but found himself amongst Rioplatense *Americanos* toasting to the ‘father of the Continent’ anyway. George Washington enthusiasts were summoned by the salutes of US merchant vessels waiting in the roads of the estuary. The US American community, several British captains, merchants and their diplomatic agent, and high profile Rioplatenses such as Esteban Gascon, the Secretary of the Treasury and Act of Independence signer and Manuel Luis de Oliden, Governor of the Province of Buenos Aires, assembled to celebrate hemispheric independence. The symbols of the day understood the meaning of independence of the Americas to be ‘Union’; “Over the chair of the vice president were placed the flags of the United States, and United Provinces, and the word ”UNION”. The party contained a portrait which serves as an neat metaphor for the US Americans in Buenos Aires; a borrowed painting of George Washington hybridized by the blue and white patriotic paraphernalia of the United Provinces. After all, hemispheric *Americanos* born in the US also needed patriotic symbols for their idea of the *patria*, and adaptation came quickly and cheaply with readily available decorative bunting. The commissioners and other agents were confronted with a strange new world of US Americans already existing in América. Robinson reported aghast that “there was present at dinner one Dutchman, one Englishman, one Trans-atlantic American, one hermaphrodite Yankee & Mr Nixon.” His observation may sound like the start of a bad, jingoistic joke, but the effects of hemispheric-American integration on a US citizenry with a loose attachment to their *patria* and a capacious understanding of ‘American’ had led, in Robinson’s view, to a dismal excess contrary to the supposed benefits of integration.

Whilst there is very little research on US Americans in Buenos Aires, at least one hundred and twenty visited or resided there previous to 1820. They formed a dynamic community consisting of long-term merchants who embraced their hemispheric identity and other resident merchants who retained their US Americanness or attachment to their own particular state of the union, both of whom celebrated Washington’s Birthday and the Fourth of July at the ‘American Hotel’; privateers who congregated in the less upmarket,

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24 Robinson, diary entries, 7. 17, 19, and 22 of February 1818, 'Diary Feb-Apr.1818', in Peter Force Collection (Jeremy Robinson Papers), Reel 62, DLC. At the alternative celebration of Washington’s birthday, one gentleman gave a toast to “the union of the amn ct [American Continent].” For Washington’s birthday celebrations, see ‘From the Philadelphia American Sentinel’, *City of Washington Gazette*, 29 September 1818, 2. The description does not specify ‘bunting’ exactly, but does say that the portrait was decorated with the borrowed “patriotic fair” of the neighbourhood, and bunting seems like a reasonable estimation.
‘dirty noisy’ Hannah’s House near the shoreline and led nomadic lives between Buenos Aires, the sea, Baltimore and prize vessels captured from Spain or Portugal; US American artisans plying their trades far from home such as the twenty to thirty ‘Americans’ working the River Plate’s first beer factory, and free blacks from Philadelphia working the incoming cargoes on the city’s shores, all mixing with transient captains, crews, visitors and diplomatic agents passing through for business and pleasure.\(^\text{25}\)

Indeed, there was an ‘effeminacy’ to the lack of patriotic attachment to the United States which Robinson found offensive. Joel Poinsett, who had openly espoused the patriot’s cause, and even planned military campaigns and entered into combat with them, had not only lost his character as a citizen and public functionary, but also as a “man”. Despite Robinson’s zeal for expanding commercial relations to mutually reinforce the economic independence of both North and South America, he balked at these ‘hermaphrodite’ Americans. Privateers had become “estranged or alienated citizens of the United States, many of whom were unworthy of the name.” At a dinner of twenty Americans, “captains, merchants, supercargoes and Privateersmen” who talked a good deal of nonsense, he lamented that he could only find three “bona fide Americans.” Given this gap between attachment to the US, the sense of belonging to América, and the ease with which US Americans merged comfortably into greater América, it is not surprising that rumours circulated in British Newspapers, reprinted in the Buenos Aires press, that someone of the United Provinces government had approached the commissioners with a request to annex themselves to the United States of America. The Washington birthday celebrants toasted to hemispheric integration and looked forward to the arrival of the commissioners, who they had discovered were landed across the estuary in Portuguese-occupied Montevideo.\(^\text{26}\)

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\(^{25}\) For the US Americans in the River Plate, see Appendix 3. On the lack of literature on US Americans in the River Plate, consider for example that there is no equivalent for US American merchants to the monograph by Vera Blinn Rober, *British Mercantile Houses in Buenos Aires: 1810-1880*, (Harvard University Press, 1979), or that their is not a monograph on William White, a US American merchant whose extensive collections of papers is found in the Archivo General de la Nación, Buenos Aires. While most of the attention has deservedly gone on British merchants in Argentina, the US Americans before 1850 had a “prominent” place in the River Plate trade, see Sluyter, “The Hispanic Atlantic’s Tasajo Trail,” (*Latin American Research Review*, 45, no. 1 2010): 110. For a short work on US Americans, see Silvia C Mallo, “Ingleses y Norteamericanos En Buenos Aires 1770-1850,” (Enrique M. Barba En Memorium, *Estudios de Historia*, 1994): 325-337. Mallo points out the difficulty of researching US Americans, as they often declared themselves as ‘Ingles’, for unknown reasons.

\(^{26}\) Robinson, diary entries, 5, 7, 17 28 of February 1818 and 3 March, 'Diary Feb-Apr.1818', in Peter Force Collection (Jeremy Robinson Papers), Reel 62, DLC. 'From the Philadelphia American Sentinel', *City of
These concerns about US American interactions with Rioplatense Americanos did not quell the agents attempts to integrate the hemisphere. Indeed, the 1818 Commissioner’s work had already been pre-empted by agents who arrived before them. On arrival in late October 1817, Worthington approached the United Provinces’ Secretary of State Gregorio Tagle, and propositioned him with a series of questions almost identical to those that would be asked by the commissioners to which he would like answers, pre-empting the 1818 US Commission by six months. For Worthington, the future may bring a united hemispheric interest and "free social intercourse" between the Americas. Worthington’s advanced connection-building efforts would ensure the two peoples would “not be brought together as perfect strangers”. To coax Tagle into providing him with answers, he, unsolicited, provided the United Provinces with the same information on the United States that he sought about the River Plate. He concluded his introduction with a postscript: “Let the New World in all its transactions, endeavour to avoid degenerating into that political hocus pocus by which we have seen nations disposed of and portioned out, as if they were matters of personal property.”

His frankness did the trick, and Worthington proceeded to conclude a commercial treaty with the United Provinces, an overly zealous step contrary to the understood purposes of his mission. With the United Provinces integrated, he left for Chile, offering the same commercial treaty for consideration. By May 1818, Worthington had proposed to Chilean Supreme Director O’Higgins a constitution. Republican and inspired by the United States, which had been a “prototype” from which he adapted his suggested document, the constitution was to be formed for the benefit of both Chile and the World. Worthington was mere intermediary, connecting Chile to the United States' gift to humanity; “an improved System of Civil Polity under the form of a confederated Republic, of a more perfect character than till then had even been enjoyed.” But he was not insistent on the US as an exact model on which to follow, happily imagining O’Higgins himself dictating the constitution, avoiding the need to repeat troublesome “conventions and Congresses in this Part of the World where they have had no proper political bases to go upon and [had] degenerated into wild Theorists and factious experimenters.” The heavily

Washington Gazette, 29 September 1818, 2.

27 William Worthington to Gregorio Tagle, 30 October 1817 in Despatches from U.S. Ministers in Buenos Aires, 1817-1906, Microfilm Publication: M69, Reel Number 1, RG59, Records of the Department of State.
adapted Constitution would grant peace at home and respect abroad, ingredients necessary for Chile to fulfill its role as mutually reinforcing member of a hemispheric interest.\textsuperscript{28}

Worthington directed his activities towards weightier and more traditional stuff like Secretaries of State, commercial treaties, and constitutions. But Robinson, who arrived a few months later, placed his faith in the powers of gentleman-scholars to shape the hemisphere. Quickly retreating from a Buenos Aires that already faintly resembled, according to his agent Worthington, an “English colony,” Robinson concentrated his activities in Chile and Perú, the new frontiers of independence, hoping to nip British advances in the bud before they could begin. Robinson was engaged with creating a hemispheric system via the extension of intellectual exchanges of information and articles: ideas, books, seeds, drawings, silver matches, and human and natural histories of Chile were the stuff of a future hemispheric-América. His activities included diffusing books by Benjamin Rush amongst readers in Lima, organising book contracts for the translation and publication of a manuscript history of Chile in the United States, creating a network of correspondents for the Lyceum of Natural History in New York, and obtaining patent rights for operating an extraction machine for *aguardiente* and vegetable matter, which Chilean leader O’Higgins saw as compatible with Robinson’s “adhesion” to the “Causa Americana.”\textsuperscript{29}

The desire to prove American potential comes through strongly from his interactions. Both Robinson and his acquaintances were hoping not only to prove the potential and genius of the Americas, but to lead the enlightenment, displacing it from its European perch. Peruvian *Americano* physician and enlightenment gentleman Hipólito

\textsuperscript{28} For the treaty with Buenos Aires, see "Twenty four Articles on Commerce & Seamen Between the United States of America and the United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata concluded by Mr Worthington & Dr Alvarez on the 1st January 1818 – At the City of Buenos Ayres", 1 January 1818. For the Constitution for Chile, see 'W. G Worthington’s Constitution for Chile of 25th April 1818', both in *Despatches from U.S. Ministers in Buenos Aires, 1817-1906*, Microfilm Publication: M69, Reel Number 1, RG59, Records of the Department of State.

\textsuperscript{29} For the English colony: “in a few years this very Country would, to a stranger, more resemble an English than a Spanish Colony”, see William Worthington to John Quincy Adams, 1 January 1818, in *Despatches from U.S. Ministers in Buenos Aires, 1817-1906*, Microfilm Publication: M69, Reel Number 1, RG59, Records of the Department of State. For the collection of articles to send back to the United States, see See Santiago Tevera to Jeremy Robinson, undated, in Peter Force Collection (Jeremy Robinson Papers), Reel 61, DLC. For distributing Rush’s works, see See Jeremy Robinson to Doctor Perez, 22 November 1818, Ibid. For the Chilean history to be published in the US, see See Fransisco Antonio Perez to Jeremy Robinson, 4 February 1819, Ibid. For the Lyceum contacts, see below (ftn 30). For the patent, see Echeverria (Gobernador Intendente de la Provincia de Concepcion) to Jeremy Robinson, 19 August 1819, Ibid. For O’Higgins’ approval of Robinson, see See O’Higgins to Pueyrredón, 2 April 1819, Ibid.
Unanue, who had already corresponded with Thomas Jefferson and had written *Observacions sobre el clima de Lima*, a defensive tract on American climate, expressed in garbled Spanglish the idea eloquently if somewhat unintelligibly:

> the scales of knowledge enclined [sic] till now on the side of Europian [sic] Nations begins to be removed, and North American glorious occupations are reducing the needle of the balance under an equal foot, to the end that the knowledges being equiposed [sic] in old and new-world both.

Likewise, Francisco Antonio Perez, a Chilean who had served in the revolutionary juntas in 1813 and would later be a Senator in 1822, thought it was possible to unite humanity by exchanging ideas. For Perez, to be a member of the New York Lyceum was to “promote the exchange of ideas between two countries, destined by Nature & by their best interests to be united.” Robinson’s story is attractive to a scholarly readership. His actions look distinctly modern and familiar; an academic literary agent connecting publishers, readers and academic societies in the US and South America with grand ambitions to form transnational bonds of human unity. 30

Like Robinson and Worthington, fellow US American agents in South America, the commissioners were active and encouraging pro-hemispheric integration. They visited leading political figures, and may have encouraged them towards more US American solutions to independence and constitution-making. The commissioners visited the leading members of the executive, and conducted several interviews to aid their reports. Visiting the Congress in-session was “interesting” to Rodney, and they met constitution-makers in the early stages of drafting a permanent constitutional document. The feeling of a potential US American alliance that the commissioners created might have reinforced the decision towards a less monarchical constitution. Certainly the commissioners presence overlapped with a fertile period of constitution-making. In and around February,

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30 Robinson received works from Hipolito Unanúe to send on to the lyceum, He also signed up José Gregorio Paredes and Fransisco Antonio Perez to correspond with the lyceum. Juan Engana expressed an interest, Don Garcia del Rio was offered membership, and Manuel de Salas refused as he did not have anything to write. See Hipolito Unanúe to Jeremy Robinson, 17 October 1818; José Gregorio Paredes to Jeremy Robinson, 4 November 1818; Juan Engana to Jeremy Robinson, 31 January 1819; Fransisco Antonio Perez to Jeremy Robinson, 4 February 1819; Jeremy Robinson to Don Garcia del Rio, 7 February 1819; Manuel de Salas to Jeremy Robinson, 17 February 1819, in Peter Force Collection (Jeremy Robinson Papers), Reel 61, DLC.
when the Commission arrived, the constitution-members exited a deadlock and finished a first complete draft by May 1818, just after the departure of the commissioners.\textsuperscript{31}

A hemispheric system was being created in the River Plate in tangible ways. First there was the back-and-forth of exchanging gifts. Brackenridge received a copy of a translated history of the US and a volume of Spanish language US constitutional texts, confirming for him the republican and hemispheric sympathies of Buenos Aires and the potential for a hemispheric system, whilst returning a copy of Carey’s \textit{Olive Branch} to an influential Congressman, extending knowledge about the US political system. The United Provinces’ executive made sure the commissioners received commemorative medals celebrating the recently arrived news of Chilean independence. Rodney donated his to the American Philosophical Society. This sociability is represented in Brackenridge’s published journal of the voyage. Brackenridge made one acquaintance that has an important effect on extending the expression of a hemispheric System. He met and dined with \textit{El Censor} editor Camilo Henriquez. Days later, that periodical printed the first of several extracts of Brackenridge’s \textit{South America} letter to President Monroe, which outlined the idea that the world would divide into two independent spheres. Henriquez would go on to write a play that celebrated the United States which was actually set in Philadelphia. Henriquez celebrated the United States; “America advances with gigantic steps towards greatness and a prosperity without example”, the asylum of virtue compared to the Old World: “Europe is so Corrupt!”\textsuperscript{32}

The apex of hemisphere building work came at a fantastic celebration of the United States which turned into an unprecedentedly extravagant party that lasted the night. It was organized by v and Lynch, merchants central to the US-Rioplatense trade. The description, printed in a Buenos Aires newspaper, and translated and printed in US newspapers, is worth pausing over. The commissioners were:

received in a grand court, brilliantly illuminated with dazzling lustres,

\textsuperscript{31} Congress was “frequently interesting”, see \textit{MFPOTUS1818-A}, 17. See Chapter Two for the making of the 1819 Constitution.

and covered with a canopy from which the flags of the United States and of independent Spain [sic] proudly waved above a circle of two hundred ladies. A band then played Washington’s March to loud applause, followed by toasts to the commissioners.

There was jubilation at the arrival of the commissioners, which offered the tantalising “prospect of an amicable commercial and political intercourse.” A feast and ball unlike any seen before in Buenos Aires then commenced which detained the “spell bound” guests. Even US Americans attendant were “really astonished at the splendor of the scene”. The guests celebrated and danced until the morning's “glorious” sunlight interrupted the festivities. The Buenos Aires newspaper's description added that the commissioners were widely praised by the attendant Rioplatense Americanos, and the opulence signified that “Such... is the early influence in the cause of humanity, of a union between the two great parties of the new world.” Though, the Rioplatense editor noted, nothing “positive” had taken place, no firm action such as a treaty or recognition, everyone was convinced of the “anticipated rewards” of the Spanish American struggle for independence. The wealth of the US-Rioplatense trade had pulled out all the resources it could to convince guests of the potential of América independent and republican against Old Europe. The USS Congress departed with the commissioners not long after, but left Bland in South America to travel across to Chile in order to conduct similar fact-finding work.33

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Monroe’s agents had confirmed the viability of a system of independent American states. Worthington had sent back reports detailing the potential military value of the gauchos (herdsmen) of the pampas (grasslands) if organized into a cavalry in defense of the River Plate. Monroe forwarded the collected information to Josiah Meigs, surveyor general at the federal Land Office, member of the Columbian Institute, and personal friend of Worthington while he had lived in Washington. For Meigs, the reports derived from Monroe’s agents contained “more information concerning those vast regions, than was possessed before by all the world,” information which had “illuminated, what was almost

33 'Our Commissioners', Baltimore Patriot & Mercantile Advertiser, 27 June 1818, 2. The account was extracted from a Buenos Aires newspaper. Also 'Extracts of a Letter from a Respectable American Gentleman, Resident in Buenos Ayres, Dated April 25, 1818', The New-York Columbian, 3 July 1818, 2.
total darkness.” For European powers contemplating the subjection of the region, the
descriptions of the “gauchos”, the “pampas”, the “mountain torrents” and impassible
“cordilleras” of the Andes would be enough to “cool” their recolonizing “ardour”; “I think
in future America will be left to itself”, Meigs projected.34

The public first got a taste of the Commissioners’ reports in November 1818 when
the Rodney and Graham reports were appended to the President’s annual message to
Congress. Bland’s report was delayed, and only published in December, accompanied by
an extra report written by Poinsett, based on his previous experience in Spanish America.
The reports continued to encourage hemispheric integration in unexpected ways. When
they finally were received they were welcomed as beneficial to the United States. The
American Philosophical Society’s secretary Du Ponceau responded in thanks to articles
received from Rodney, and added that the knowledge acquired by the commission “would
eventually procure good for the country”. The commissioner’s were careful to suggest
areas where the United States’ trade could grow in these emerging markets. The reports
have much overlap with the work of the Swedish monarch’s agent in South America,
Johan Graaner, who also produced a report at the same time as the Commission.
Graaner’s report, like that of the US Commission, made observations on the politics of the
United Provinces and the durability of the union, and gave estimates on the potential for
Swedish iron to find markets in South America, and the kind of goods that might return in
future Swedish-United Provinces trade circulations.35

Baldwin, the USS Congress’ surgeon, had collected extensively in the Rio de la
Plata, and on his return worked classifying his South American plants. Whilst in Buenos
Aires, Rodney, Brackenridge and especially Baldwin had passed much time with the
eminent botanist Bonpland, who had settled in the River Plate after achieving universal
acclamation for his work with Humboldt in the New World. Baldwin prepared a lengthy
work for publication in which he had not thought to separate plants into North and South
American categories. Advised by Philadelphia botanist Zaccheus Collins that it was too

34 William Worthington to Gregorio Tagle, 30 October 1817, Despatches from U.S. Ministers in Buenos
Aires, 1817-1906, Microfilm Publication: M69, Reel Number 1, RG59, Records of the Department of State.
Josiah Meigs to James Monroe, 17 January 1817, James Monroe Papers, Reel 6, DLC.
35 For the commemorative medal and Du Ponceau’s praise of the mission, see Peter S. Du Ponceau to
Caesar A. Rodney, 12 August 1818, Folder 13, Box VB23; “Caesar A. Rodney & others” in H. Fletcher
Brown Collection of Rodney Family Papers, Delaware Historical Society. For Graaner’s report, see Jean
Graaner, Las Provincias Del Rio de La Plata En 1816 : Informe Dirigido Al Príncipe Bernadotte,
long, and to disentangle the plants into two American continental classifications, he submitted a paper and specimens of plants to the American Philosophical Society. Bonpland had shared information on the potential for agricultural improvement in the River Plate, and sent a larger collection of specimens to Rodney before the USS Congress had departed. Rodney and Bonpland had agreed that they would interchange specimens via the inter-American Atlantic trade, and sent samples of South-Georgia island cotton back to Bonpland.\textsuperscript{36}

The American Farmer published articles celebrating Rodney and Bonpland’s initiative. John Skinner, the journal’s editor, had received news that Bonpland had travelled up to Paraguay, at thirty-three degrees latitude, to plant the cotton and that Bonpland had agreed to send more specimens via the USS Constellation. Skinner seems to have discovered the information from Samuel Mitchill, the New Yorker who had Jeremy Robinson advancing his interests in South America, or one of Mitchill’s associates, as he refers to the United States as the “Freedonian States”, a term Mitchill had suggested for US Americans to use in order to create a patriotic attachment to their states. ‘Freedonians’, with this gift of cotton, according to Skinner, had given South Americans a greater gift than constitutionalism or liberty. The benefits, by inference, being that growing cotton in Paraguay would augment their power and independence by cultivating valuable exportable staple goods. The striking aspect is the mutual benefit of the exchange, if anything with the benefit weighted towards South America. US Americanistas were helping their hemispheric neighbours to cultivate cash crops in direct competition with the US South.\textsuperscript{37}

\textsuperscript{37} ‘Bonpland’s useful exertions in the region watered by the river la plata,’ 25 August 1820, The American Farmer, Containing Original Essays and Selections on Rural Economy and Internal Improvements, with Illustrative Engravings and Prices Current of County Produce, 2:176. The American Farmer was published by John Skinner, the relative of Bland who had lent money to Carrera. Skinner is often portrayed as an arch-rival of the Rodney faction and a leader of a grouping of US Americanistas who peddled a strand of thought that argued that the US should exclusively support Chile. That Skinner actually celebrated Rodney’s initiative suggests less acrimonious relations between the factions within the US Americanistas.

The exchange of cotton seeds also seems to have an inferable anti-slavery aspect, given that the consequences of such exchanges would be the amelioration of the value of slave-based economies in the South, in favour of South American free soil cotton. South America had prioritised gradual emancipation of slaves via ‘free-womb’ laws in the early days of the revolution, see George Reid Andrews, Afro-Latin America, 1800-2000, (Oxford University Press, 2004): 57 for a comparative view of when the Spanish American republics passed anti-slavery legislation. Bonpland’s decision to travel up to Paraguay looks informed by climate theories that argued that similar minerals would be found and plants would thrive in roughly the same latitudes on both sides of the equator. Georgia is at 33 degrees of latitude. On the importance of climate theory I have consulted
Indeed, the interest in learning from other areas with similar climates continued. Another article in *The American Farmer* complained that US farmers in Virginia and Maryland did not make enough use of oxen. Browsing the world for areas of a similar climate for “beasts of burden” best adapted for hot summers and a “tropical” climate, it was found that India, the West Indies, and South America used oxen. Comparing oxen of the world, the article was sure to criticise the “round duck-legged breeds of the European” but was not so jingoistic in its assessment of US oxen compared with the oxen of the *pampas*. Bland’s report was evidence that the South American oxen and the ‘Spanish’ method of yoking were superior, and recommend them both to farmers and provided a handy diagram to help them to begin using oxen for cultivating corn fields. Challenging the US stereotypes of ‘Latin Americans’ we might expect, it was the US oxen that had a “sleepiness of countenance” compared to South American oxen remarkable for “activity and sprightliness”.

Further benefits stemming from integration came via Bland, who had brought back large numbers of specimens of a particularly fertile and robust Chilean variety of wheat, which were given to Skinner. In December 1818, coinciding with the publication of Bland’s report, Skinner distributed the seeds to friends to plant and report back the results of experimentation for publication in his journal. Correspondents reported favourable results in Virginia, but less so in Maryland. Abei Seymour celebrated the “valuable acquisition to our country”. He read Bland’s report previous to planting the wheat, before deciding where and how to plant it. Correspondents wrote back that it was up to three times more productive than average wheat. Robert Bowie, a tobacco planter who was usually little interested in “small grain” reported excitement at the wheat, and congratulated Bland, the “meritorious citizen, who, in the midst of his publick duties, had the providence to bring it home for experiment, in the climate and soil of his own country”. While inter-American identities were encountered during the mission, planting Chilean seeds back home firmly defined ‘our country’. The cycle of exchange continued, when some of the wheat sown had contained an exciting Chilean barley, which was ‘reseeded’ among the network of correspondents, and David Porter, navy commissioner and US *Americanista*, published in Washington DC newspapers that he had instructed his servant to send specimens to

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Nicholas Guyatt, *Climate Change in early America*, (unpublished manuscript).

anyone who requested them. The first years experimentation was promising; for those with the seed, “let them make a full and diversified trial of it.” But with what progress were South Americans making with their own ‘full and diversified trial’ of a union of federative republics? The reports offered divergent assessments.39

The Commission divided upon the following lines. Rodney and Brackenridge returned positive that the outlook for the United Provinces was positive that the US should immediately recognize the new federal-nation. Graham broadly agreed, but insisted on writing his own report to dissent from Rodney on some issues, while Bland entirely disagreed that the United Provinces would prove a viable union, and insisted that the US should back Chile as the more promising long-term partner in a hemispheric system of republican independence. The reports signal three areas of analysis; the strength of the River Plate’s institutions and metropole, the diversity of its territories, ‘productions’ and peoples, and the actual and potential bonds of interprovincial trade that would bind the union together.40

Rodney, while primarily satisfied that both the institutions and the metropole were functioning to bind together the union, Bland saw the evidence differently. Despite the US political experiment of a federation of states with a weak metropole, the idea of the necessity of a strong metropolitan centre point of union remained prevalent. Rodney was convinced that Buenos Aires deserved its status as metropole, being the apex through which interprovincial and international trade circulated through. The Act of Independence had caused a “cordial union, existing between the confederated states” and the previous grievances of the provinces had now calmed as institutional arrangements had been put in place, and disputes would be settled by the twenty-six person congress of provincial representatives. Those provinces that had previously held grievances and sentiments of disunion were immoral. Santa Fe’s inhabitants were “extremely jealous”, “immoral”, “insubordinate”; Cordoba’s “more superstitious” and “less patriotic”. In contrast, the metropole was upholding the union with its “great exertions and perseverance” and


40 The reports are enclosed in two different documents, one from November and one from December 1818, both with very similar and lengthy titles. To avoid confusion, abbreviations will be used, and the full reference is available in the Abbreviations section of the thesis. Rodney’s and Graham’s reports were published in MPOTUS1818-A, Bland’s report is found in MPOTUS1818-B.
“cheerful devotion to freedom and independence.” But Bland was suspicious of strong central government, and thought that the existing institutional arrangements centred in an overbearingly powerful metropole would be unstable. Bland favoured a weak central government, even writing a 1463-page manuscript ‘Analysis of Constitutions’ where he praised the existing division of state and federal powers into distinct “spheres of action”, and he expressed doubts while in Chile on “these energy men” who wanted a more consolidated and energetic central government for the US. Bland’s research discovered that only a minority of the population of the Rio de la Plata actually adhered to the Buenos Aires-centric union, and that only 26 of 71 representatives were actually sitting in Congress. US recognition would exacerbate the problems of the metropolitan dominance of the union, the United Provinces would realize what US unionists had predicted the consequences of disunion would look like at home, a confederated republic splintered into a “number of petty kings and princes.”

Additionally, Rodney and Bland disagreed on how the ‘problem of diversity’ would affect unionism in the Provinces. Large federal unions could have considerable disadvantages, as well as benefits. Large unions could create diverse ‘productions’, which were beneficial as it would create internal markets, as each provinces had different articles to trade with each other. But large unions could create too diverse regional interests which would cause problems when framing common foreign and trade policies, could create interests between regions with different geographies, such as seaboard and interior provinces, and could be populated by too diverse peoples who would not cohere together in a union. Rodney lessened the importance of diversity, but not by ignoring it. He noted that the Provinces extended “150,000 square leagues”, and surveyed the diverse geographical diversity of the western pampas (plains), the northern mountainous valleys (Alta Perú) and the eastern country perfect for agricultural settlement (The Banda Oriental and Littoral Provinces). But this diversity was beneficial. The United Provinces’ span across several latitudes allowed to to house within itself all the “varieties” of “productions” found in the torrid and tropical zones. Bland, in contrast, found problematic

41 For Rodney’s analysis, see MFPOTUS1818-A, 22, 17-18, 20-21, 25. For Bland’s position on weak central government, see ‘Analysis of Constitutions’, 236, Box 2, Furlong Baldwin Library, Maryland Historical Society, and Robinson’s observation that Bland was not fond of “these energy men”, ‘Diary Feb-Apr.1818’, in Peter Force Collection (Jeremy Robinson Papers), Reel 62, DLC. For Bland’s analysis of institutions, see MFPOTUS1818-B, 14-15, 56, 58.
examples of diversity caused by extension territory. He quickly dismissed the idea he heard of a confederation of all Spanish America as “fanciful”. “Selfish interest”, the necessity of “local circumstances” and divergent “habits and customs” would stop any such confederation, and Bland worried the United Provinces were already experimental in its size, being bigger than the United States. Like the US, it had a troubling geographical mix of provinces seated “between sea shores and mountains” which created different interests. Certain areas were destined to develop into even greater diversity. While the Banda Oriental and Entre Ríos was perfectly suited for agriculture, Córdoba, Santiago, Tucumán and Salta would develop as pasturage states. Other provinces, like Paraguay were held out to be destined for disunion due to the “productions” of their country. As Paraguay could produce everything from the torrid and tropical zones within itself, and wanted little luxury, the had little need for intercourse with the world, including the other provinces. Additionally, Bland found the types of people in the United Provinces troubling, compared to Rodney who did not. “Indian Blood” was intermixed across the provinces in unequal proportions, with some mixture in the cities, the gauchos (herdsmen) containing one-third to a half mixture, and the northern Andean provinces being entirely made up of civilized indigenous peoples.42

Further, Bland and Rodney differed on interprovincial trade. US Americans when at home and abroad held the quantity of interprovincial trade in high regard when calculating the bonds of union between states or provinces. For Bland, roads and rivers were the means “by which internal exchanges are effected, points at which they draw together, and meet the commerce of foreign nations” and were the “cords by which a nation, or a union is bound together”. These bonds were essential for union, “as by so many nerves, each province is made sensible, that it belongs to one whole, and every limb is made to brace itself in the common cause of all.” For Rodney, the diverse natural ‘productions’ of the River Plate would travel in an interprovincial trade. The La Plata river system provided “easy communication” across a “vast extent” while a land based trade supplying horses, mules, and cattle northwards coupled with goods “readily” moved by abundant oxen and mules moved goods such as maté (herbal tea) from Paraguay, brandies and wines from Mendoza, and hides, skins and furs from various regions which circulated around the provinces, bonding the union. In contrast, Bland finds weak bonds of

42 For Rodney’s analysis, see MFPOTUS1818-A, 18-19. For Bland’s analysis, see MFPOTUS1818-B, 22, 13, 25-26, 41-42.
interprovincial union caused by commerce. Areas like the *pampas* presented impassible barriers which did not allow for commerce to be carried by carriage, and certain areas such as San Juan were only connected to Buenos Aires by mule packages, and not by carriage-bearing roads. Bland feared that the existing bonds of union were merely the result of colonial monopolies, and that independence would see interprovincial commerce fragment. The geography of the upper northern provinces meant that cheaper routes which took their exports away from Buenos Aires towards Chile would be found. Packets between Jujuy and La Paz cost five times more than sending packets between the similar distance of the Mendoza to Buenos Aires road, due to the Andes. Similarly, the Rioplatense river system would be “waters of bitterness and discord”. Independence in the River Plate has seen commerce take new more profitable routes once outside imperial trade ‘monopolies’. As Baltimore had gone from provincial backwater to flourishing port-city, Bland pointed out that Entre Ríos had too begun to flourish as a port for international trade until Buenos Aires had jealously stopped the port’s exterior commerce. These monopolistic tendencies by the excessively powerful metropole had already caused disunion with the Banda Oriental, causing supplies of timber from that region to cease, forcing the United Provinces to rely on imports from Brazil and the United States, weakening internal bonds of union.43

The commissioners had ended up projecting their own politics and their own hopes and fears for the United States onto the United Provinces. Rodney, Brackenridge and perhaps Graham were too optimistic in their assessments of the Rioplatense union in the hope that they had uncovered the start of a hemispheric system of independent, confederate unions. Bland’s analysis of the River Plate’s problems was closer to the reality; the region did break up into ‘petty fiefdoms’ controlled by provincial caudillos (charismatic dictators). His recommendation that Chile would prove a more stable partner for the US proved correct, though Bland’s own ardour for hemispheric independence led him to overstate Chilean potential. Despite Chile’s lack of republican institutions, Bland convinced himself that her resident’s would force the O’Higgins “military despotism” to accept representative government. Unlike the River Plate’s harmful diversity, Bland found a pleasing homogeneity in Chile, and only a helpful diversity where it existed. Chile’s population had been ‘whitened’ by their change in climate, moving from hispanic climates

43 For Bland’s theories on interprovincial trade, see *MFPOTUS1818-B*, 30-31. For Rodney’s analysis, see *MFPOTUS1818-A*, 18, 22. For Bland’s analysis, see *MFPOTUS1818-B*, 31-32, 37.
to swiss-style Chilean valleys. Despite geographical barriers to interprovincial communications, in “happier times” Chileans would deploy their “energy” and “industry” to fashion roads out of Chile’s mountain ridges with little labour of maintenance, and Chileans would developed seabound trade between the provinces, which had been illiberally restricted under the colonial government. The Chilean territories clung uniformly to the Pacific seaboard, without any of the complications of interior and maritime provinces, and the diversity of ‘productions’, agricultural in the South and mineral in the North, meant the provinces were interdependent on the continuing union of the Chilean state. In fact, Chile was just like a utopian version of the revolutionary United States. A thousand mile stretch of seaboard protected by a range of interior mountains could easily describe Chile or the thirteen revolutionary US colonies. For Bland, A US citizen might “imagine himself among the mountain forests of his own country” when in Chile, where the number of inhabitants per square mile was roughly the same and the climate was not “materially different”.44

The commissioners had been successful in furthering the idea of a hemispheric system. But their reports presented a confusing outlook for international observers. The US might recognize the United Provinces in the immediate future, or could delay that recognition for considerable time, depending on the report that was read. Rodney and Bland had diverged due to diverse theories of union. The major post-publication debate surrounding the reports followed similar lines and can be sketch as follows: Were all humans equally capable of creating republican government? Whilst US Americans might have agreed that the future of the Americas was a continent of republics, the speed in which that could be accomplished proved contentious. The commission divided into two strands of thought; those who argued that republicanism was contingent on a certain set of conditions for their success, against those who believed that all humans, or at least South American humans, were equally ready for republican government. Those grouped in the latter strand, including Bland, could not bring themselves to recognize an imperfect republic in the United Provinces, with monarchical tendencies and without all the celebrated freedoms enjoyed by US Americans. Brackenridge offered another option. People needed to be prepared for republicanism and freedom. Those conditions in which republicanism thrived in the United States did not exist in South America. The United

44 For Bland’s analysis of Chile, See MFPOTUS1818-B, 107-108, 82-83, 76. For similarities with the US, see MFPOTUS1818-B, 75, 89.
Provinces should be tolerated despite not offering the full complement of republican constitutional freedoms, and the US should unreservedly recognize the new polity without delay. The acrimonious public propaganda war had forced an elderly Thomas Jefferson to determine on avoiding the noise surrounding South America by simply refusing to read any new information about the region. But when Caesar Rodney sent Jefferson a copy of Brackenridge’s two volume journal of the voyage, Jefferson wrote Rodney back with a clearer perspective on the issue. In turns out the great democrat agreed that it was necessary for elites to prepare people for freedom. Reading *A Voyage to South America* had pleased an ageing Jefferson, who considered the hemisphere work for a “new generation” of US Americans. But still, he was happy to “indulge a little peep into futurity.”

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45 Thomas Jefferson to Caesar A. Rodney, 2 January 1820, in Folder 17, Box VB23; “Caesar A. Rodney & others” in H. Fletcher Brown Collection of Rodney Family Papers, Delaware Historical Society.
Chapter Two

“For What do we search other models?”: North American Federal Union in the Río de la Plata and the Constitution of 1819

As the four members of the 1818 US Commission to South America crossed from Montevideo to Buenos Aires, Henry Marie Brackenridge, the secretary of the Commission, struck up a conversation with a fellow passenger. A clerk from Buenos Aires, “a bookish type”, offered Brackenridge his political opinions. He found Rousseau to be “visionary”, but admired Thomas Paine’s *Common Sense*, had read copies of the US constitutional documents and Washington’s Farewell Address. The incident raises all kinds of intriguing questions. How had the clerk and other Rioplatense Americanos come to be familiar with the US Constitution and consider adaptable for their circumstances? Did the clerk’s interest in US political documents make him a partisan of confederalism and Artigas, the breakaway leader of the ‘League of Free Cities’ or a more federal-unionist solution? Did enthusiasm for the US result from these interactions with US Americans? Was there any relation between print, reading, public opinion, and constitution-making and did Congress go on to adapt US documents for their own constitution-making efforts?46

The United Provinces of the Río de la Plata (or of South America, as they sometimes styled themselves) were loosely based around the colonial viceroyalty of the same name. Since an act of *de facto* independence from Spain was taken on 25 May 1810 by the Buenos Aires city government, the provinces had badly fragmented. Similar to the United States, the territorial organization of the River Plate suggested federalism. The Viceroyalty was a mixture of centralism, and local autonomy, with provincial institutions such as *cabildos* delegated certain amounts of local power. Unlike the United States, which did not have a common government based in America before independence, the various provinces shared a common governor, the Viceroy, based in Buenos Aires. The tendency towards federalism was exacerbated during the wars of independence. The common government established in Buenos Aires was without effective sources of revenue other than customs duties. The weakness of the centre allowed for territorial fragmentation. The northern provinces (that make up modern day Bolivia) had remained loyal to the interim government in Spain, while in 1811 Paraguay had seceded altogether, and from 1814 the Banda Oriental (modern

46 Brackenridge, *Voyage to South America*, Volume I, 270.
Uruguay) and the littoral provinces across the river led by General Artigas, had formed a separatist confederal league of *pueblos libres* (free cities) in opposition to the central government based in Buenos Aires, which had become increasingly more centralist. In opposition to Buenos Aires, armed forces compelled the central government to end. By 1815, the existing institutions of the United Provinces, the Constituent Assembly and the Supreme Director, were brought to an end. The United Provinces were to be reconstituted on a federalist basis, and a new Congress would meet in 1816 in Tucumán, one of the most northerly cities of the territory that still remained part of the United Provinces, rather than the capital Buenos Aires, in order to pacify provincial sentiment.

The July 9 1816 Act of Independence, the most famous act of the Congress which met in Tucumán, formally severed ties with Spain, yet nearly all of the governing institutions of the colonial period remained in place, except that which had been replaced since 1810. The existing institutions were either those inherited, or those written in temporary constitutions known as *reglamento provisorios*. After declaring independence in mid-1816, the River Plate’s congressmen came to consider the question of a permanent constitution. Two disputes immediately surrounded that project. First, the division between those who argued that the circumstances of the country were best suited to a constitutional monarchy versus a federative republic. Second, those who argued that the time was not apt for writing a permanent constitution against those who insisted it was. Disagreement delayed the decision, but the geopolitical imperative of gaining recognition forced the issue. A Constitution, it was thought, would encourage other nations to consider the United Provinces’ claim to be worthy of recognition under the law of nations. By late 1817, the Congress had appointed five congressmen to draft a provisional document. But how did they go about their task?

Did they borrow from other constitutional models? This is a question historians have recently pursued. The increasing focus on ‘transnational history’ has driven

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48 Julio Saguir, *¿Unión o Secesión?*, 145.
historians of constitutionalism, following on from other studies of inter-cultural exchanges, to study the ‘borrowings’ between constitutional documents. What emerges is a sense of the dense networks of exchanges of constitutional information. These kinds of questions have been explored by historians for over a century, and the recent debate surrounding the influences on the 1824 Mexican Constitution; either US or Spanish, reopens a debate from the early twentieth century. Nevertheless, recent historical works have stressed anew the multiple influences one constitution could have, and note how constitutions were often hybrid documents. But how do we account for the multiple variations across the dozens of constitutional documents from the early nineteenth century? Did contemporaries imagine each variation as a result of an effort to perfect a universal document? Contemporaries actually placed great stress on their local circumstances. Gabriel Paquette’s study of how contemporaries engaged with foreign models (including constitutions, but also much wider examples of examining foreign models) argues that they they engaged in ‘emulation’ of foreign models but always considered their applicability to local circumstances. This chapter builds on these works by arguing that contemporaries defined an ideological maxim that stressed that foreign constitutional information could be useful, but only if it was adapted to the territory’s circumstances, such as the habits, education, and social stratification of the people, and the geography, climate or ‘productions’ of a country, a maxim which is here termed ‘organic constitutionalism’. This study argues that while the information available was global, the use of that information was instinctively local.


For an example of the ways other constitutions have been studied, there has been 3 approaches. First, to compare lots of constitutions, as in Roberto Gargarella, “Towards a Typology of Latin American Constitutionalism, 1810-60,” (Latin American Research Review 39, no. 2, 2004): 141–153. Approaches which stress the intertextuality of constitutions form the other 2 approaches. First, by identifying the multiple influences on one constitution, using the 1819 Constitution as an example, see Ravignani, Emilio Ravignani, Historia Constitucional de La Republica Argentina: Notas Tomadas Por Los Alumnos Luis R. Praprotnik y Luciano M. Sicard, Volume I, (Buenos Aires: Talleres-Casa J. Peuser,
This complicates how we label political actors. When Bolivar famously declared that the US Constitution was “the best on earth”, but that he would rather that South America adopt the “Koran” than the US federalist model, he was speaking not as a centralist but as an advocate of organic constitutionalism, arguing that the US Constitution did not conform with South America’s circumstances. For those contemporaries, like Bolivar, who advocated ‘organic constitutionalism’, labels such as ‘federalist’ or ‘centralist’ break down, as they could have advocated a strongly centralist government for one country, but a weak confederal league of states for another country, depending on its circumstances.

Problematically, the history of Rioplatense constitution-making has been written with a narrative of political parties in view. While political parties as recognizable entities did not yet exist in the Río de la Plata, various factions or interests are ascribed to contemporaries; such as provincianos against porteños (a division between those of the interior provinces against those of the city of Buenos Aires), federalistas against unitarios (those in favour of a federal form of government against those who favoured a centralist government). Other groupings are less commonly used to describe the various factions. Henry Marie Brackenridge could discern certain people were whigs, while the English in Buenos Aires could identify leaders of a tory party. Graaner, the visiting swedish agent in the provinces, revealing described what historians would now describe ‘unitarios’ as ‘federalists’, who were divided between a constitutional monarchy and the “constitution of North America”, with other parties of provincialists, royalists and artigistas. Other factions could be found based on geopolitical orientations, for example a “pro-North American” faction. The constitution-making efforts which originated from the 1816 Congress of Tucumán led to the Constitution of 1819. The literature on that constitution most frequently utilises the

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1926): 289 which, based on the content on the Constitution, surmised that the constitution-makers had copies of French, Spanish, and US constitutions, as well as copies of earlier Rioplatense constitutional projects from 1813, as well as the provisional constitutions of 1815 and 1817. Second, scholars have chosen one constitution and tracked its influence around the world, most recently for the 1812 Spanish Constitution, see Manuel Chust, ed. 1812: El Poder de La Palabra, (Barcelona: Lunwerg, 2012). Or, for example, several works have noted the influence of British constitutional arrangements in Spanish America, see Beatriz Dávilo, “The Rio de La Plata and Anglo-American Political and Social Models”; Catherine Andrews, “Los Primeros Proyectos Constitucionales En México y Su Influencia Británica (1821–1836),” (Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos, 27, no. 1, February 2011): 5–43; Karen Racine, “‘This England and This Now’: British Cultural and Intellectual Influence in the Spanish American Independence Era”, (Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 90, no. 3, 2010), 423–54. As far as I am aware, a fourth approach, to synthesise the entirety of the literature to track the intertextuality of all the constitutions in the Atlantic World across the Age of Revolutions, has not been attempted.
primary divisions of federalists and centralists, porteños and provincianos. The traditional narrative suggests that a Congress dominated by porteño centralists forced upon the provinces an excessively centralist constitution, who in response rejected it, and in turn led to a civil war between the provinces and the central government, which ended in the latter’s defeat and the collapse of the common government.50

But there is good reason to question this narrative. José Chiaramonte has shown that the ‘federalists’ were actually much closer to advocating a form of confederalism with a very weak central government. They proposed more of a pact between provinces than a federal union. This suggestion was found to be profitably applied to other ‘federalists’ in Spanish America, prompting a general reassessment. Historians of Mexico have most effectively rethought the central division between centralists and federalists, arriving at more nuanced definitions of political positions, such as confederalists, radical federalists, moderate federalists, and centralists, or federalist unificationists, central unificationists, antifederalists, and confederalists. Rethinking the central narrative of centralists against federalist, in these terms, as historians of Mexico have done, has yet to take place for the history of Argentina. Yet such work would be profitable. Take for instance Dean Funes, a congressman, and one of the region’s leading intellectuals and public orators. He is normally classified as a ‘unitario’ centralist, but, as he explained himself, as he was from Córdoba he was naturally inclined towards the “federative system,” and that circumstances had led him to advocate a “concentration of strength.” Funes went on to be the very person chosen to publicly endorse the 1819 Constitution by a written oration that forms an appendix to the document. If Funes, the provinciano inclined to federalismo could support the 1819 Constitution, perhaps it was not so centralist after all? It is the contention of this chapter that 1819 Constitution was actually federal-unionist, that many of those who supported it were not ‘unitarios’ but federal unionists. As Genevieve Verdo

50 Simon Bolivar, El Libertador : Writings of Simon Bolivar, (Oxford University Press, 2003): xxxviii. This suggestion, that Bolivar was an ‘organic constitutionalist’, rather than an outright opponent of federalism, solves the tension of Bolivar still borrowing from the US Constitution “when it served his purpose”, which Billias labels as “inconsistent”, which is exactly the point of ‘organic constitutionalism’, in that different circumstances lead to different, ‘inconsistent’ constitutional solutions. See Billias, American Constitutionalism Heard Around the World, 126. For literature consulted on the 1819 Constitution, see fn 78. For descriptions of parties, see Graaner, ‘Las provincias del Río de la Plata en 1816’, 92. For North-American factions, see Emilio O’Campo, La Última Campaña Del Emperador Napoleón y La Independencia de América, (Buenos Aires: Claridad, 2007): 44; For Tories, see Dávilo, “The Río de la Plata and Anglo-American Political and Social Models”, 382; For Whigs, see Brackenridge, Voyage to South America, Volume II, 13.
has pointed out, other aspects of the traditional narrative, such as the view that the provinces rejected the Constitution, is incorrect. The provinces did not reject it, as it was a carefully crafted federal unionist document based on the US Constitution, but adapted to create a Senate modelled on the British House of Lords, and to preserve a metropolitan system of territorial arrangement inherited from the colonial period.\footnote{For Chiaramonte’s convincing argument that the federalistas were actually confederalists, see among many works José Carlos Chiaramonte. “El Federalismo Argentino En La Primera Mitad Del Siglo XIX,” in Federalismos Latinoamericanos : México, Brasil, Argentina, (edited by Marcello Carmagnani. Mexico: El Colegio de México : Fideicomiso Historia de las Américas : Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1993): 81-132. For Mexican varieties of federalism, see Catherine Andrews, “The Defence of Iturbide or the Defence of Federalism? Rebellion in Jalisco and the Conspiracy of the Calle de Celaya , 1824”, Bulletin of Latin American Research, 23, no. 3 (2004): 321. Jaime E Rodríguez, “We Are Now the True Spaniards’: Sovereignty, Revolution, Independence, and the Emergence of the Federal Republic of Mexico, 1808-1824’, (Stanford University Press,2012): 325-236. For Funes’ tendencies towards a “federative system”, see Brackenridge, Voyage to South America, Volume II. 10. For Verdo explaining that the constitution was not rejected, as is commonly asserted, see Geneviève Verdo, “El Dilema Constitucional En Las Provincias Unidas Del Río de La Plata (1810-1819),” (Historia Contemporánea, 33. 2006): 533.}

Returning to the question of how the makers of the 1819 Constitution went about their task, the sources used here to explore that question are diverse. The 1819 Constitution, which only lasted a few months and did not have chance to go fully into effect, has understandably not received much scholarly investigation compared to constitutions that had longer legacies, such as the Argentine Constitution of 1853. Another reason for this is related to the scant sources available. Much research only uses the Constitution itself, but additional material is available. The \textit{El Redactor de Congreso} offers brief accounts of the congressional sessions that debated the constitution. Further, archival material that only have recently been available to historians presents us with several draft editions of the constitution, as well as notes taken by constitution-makers. Additionally, the chapter draws on archival material that has been misplaced which, therefore, has not been used by historians of the Constitution.\footnote{I have used Constitucion de La Provincias Unidas En Sud-America, Sancionada y Mandada Publicar Por El Soberano Congreso General Constituyente En 22 de Abril de 1819, (Buenos Ayres: Imprenta de la Independencia, 1819); El Redactor Del Congreso Nacional 1816: Reimpresión Facsimilar, Buenos Ayres: Museo Mitre, 1916); Ricardo Levene, Documentos Del Congreso de Tucumán : Oficios de Los Directores, Apuntes de Correspondencia, Notas de Oficios y Órdenes Del Congreso, Asuntos Pendientes Ante El mismo, y Borradores de Sesiones de de Sesiones Del Congreso de Tucumán, 1816-1820, (Publicaciones del Archivo Histórico de la Provincia de Buenos Aires. t. 12, La Plata: Taller de Impresiones Oficiales, 1947); and the following collections at the AGNA; documents relative to the Congress and Sanchez de Bustamante contain the drafts of the Constitution and related correspondence, among other things, see the finding aid in Graciela Swiderski, Congreso Constituyente (1816-1819), Sánchez de Bustamante (1716-1836), (Buenos Aires: Archivo General de la Nación (Argentina), 1996). Bustamante possibly wrote to editors as ‘Cives’, or atleast knew Cives, as a letter to Agrelo, then editor of the Gazeta de Buenos Ayres, is found in his papers, see Cives a Pedro Agrelo, 4 April 1811, document 5 in.
The chapter also draws on the debates taking place in periodicals and newspapers to recreate the types of considerations congressmen would have held. Is it possible to use such material as a reliable proxy? Newspapers printed in Buenos Aires were a relatively new phenomena, and the period 1815-1820 showed growing numbers of publications. Papers were edited by those from backgrounds similar to congressmen. Of the congressmen who signed the Act of Independence in 1816, seventeen were lawyers and thirteen were priests, all of whom had graduated from universities in Charcas (modern Sucre, Bolivia), Córdoba or Santiago de Chile. Editors, similarly, were often lawyers or priests, and frequently had political experience in earlier legislative or executive institutions. For example, Manuel Moreno (lawyer, former State Secretary) edited *El Independiente* during 1815, and contributed towards *La Cronica Argentina*. Vicente Pazos (graduate in natural and canon law, former priest) edited *La Cronica Argentina*, Pedro José Agrelo (lawyer, as a congressman in the 1813 Constituent Assembly he had drafted a constitution) edited *El Independiente* during 1816 and later *El Americano*, Camilo Henriquez (priest, who in 1812 worked on a constitution with Joel Poinsett in Chile) edited *El Censor* from 1817, and Manuel Antonio Castro (lawyer, chair of the Academy of Jurisprudence, who in 1818 became Governor of Córdoba) edited *El Observador Americano*. The debates taking place in newspapers were the written accounts of the concerns of men with similar backgrounds, a mixture of lawyers and priests with constitution-making, congressional or executive government experience, to those in the Congress. Further the papers of Sanchez de Bustamante, one of the committee of five who drafted the original document, show that he read local newspapers extensively and contributed to newspaper debates by submitting letters under a pen name. It seems reasonable, then, to use newspapers as a proxy to understand the ideology of those behind the formation of the 1819 Constitution.53

*Legajo 1, Fondos Documentales ‘Sánchez de Bustamante (1716-1836)’, AGNA. However, documents that should be in the ‘Congreso Constituyente (1816-1819) collection, are filed in ‘Colección Casavalle’, probably misplaced for historical reasons. The documents provide details on congressmen voting for articles of the constitution.*

In 1816 *La Prensa Argentina* reprinted a letter by the pseudonymous ‘N’ perplexed by his fellow *Americanos* interest in European monarchies; “If we have in our own continent a people of brothers that are rising rapidly by their moderation and by the wisdom of their laws, for what do we search for models in the old world that have involved the europeans in such misery?” Not everyone agreed, but they still had to deploy these appeals to American patriotism. Another correspondent ‘Oran Utan’, disagreed, arguing the English Constitution was perfect, and that French constitution-making had run afoul by attempting to add to it with their imaginations and genius. The task was simple; “the natural spirit of the American is imitation, we do not need to seek any other model.”

The correspondents outlined two approaches which I term ‘organic constitutionalism’ and ‘constitutional universalism’. Organic constitutionalism argued that existing constitutional models could be adapted, only if the constitution-maker considered carefully the circumstances and nature of the people, society, climate and even geography of the state. It was by far the dominant idea, expressed dozens of times. Constitutional universalism, the idea that constitutions could be perfected and transplanted wholesale from state to state, only occasionally featured. When it did, constitutional universalism was most often paired with the English Constitution, and not the US American document. Recent historical inquiry has been successfully challenging the centre-periphery model of knowledge diffusion. One reason for this, this chapter argues, is that contemporaries held an ideological maxim antagonistic to such ‘knowledge diffusion’; constitutional knowledge of other countries could only be useful if highly contextualised against and adapted to local circumstances.

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54 For ‘N’’s advocacy of the US model, see *La Prensa Argentina*, 4 June 1816, No. 38: 6131. For Oran Utan’s advocacy of the English model, see *Gazeta de Buenos Ayres*, 14 October 1815, No.25: 98-99. The article is also signed ‘José Quispe y Apaza’, suggesting Oran Utan was a playful nickname he deployed.


While the development and relative fortunes of ‘organic constitutionalism’ and ‘constitutional universalism’ have only be traced in one place across five years in this chapter, it would seem that
Nearly all international constitutional information was selected and considered against its applicability to local conditions. Consider for instance the bizarre case of Rioplatense rusophilia. A disproportionate amount of attention charted the progress of Russia across the period, despite hardly any Ruso-Rioplatense connections. Any person would, if their only knowledge of Europe had come from the regional press, have had a much better idea of St. Petersburg than London, Paris or Madrid. Russia offered a model of enlightened centralism that unionists found comforting. Russia’s circumstances, according to elitist opinion, were similar to their own; vast expanses of ‘unsettled territory’ interspersed with settlements of ‘unenlightened’ populations, making democracy unappealing. *El Censor* noted that the elite’s key aims, the rapid advance of population, territorial settlement and expansion, and economic growth, had been achieved both in the US and Russia due to their political systems. Rioplatense aims and circumstances could be achieved by adapting an enlightened centralism or even despotism without having to engage in the messy world of republicanism, democracy, and federalism. How then, did Rioplatense *Americanos* search for constitutional information? When critically searching the globe for templates, four criteria structured the conversation; First, a concern to select a constitution that would have geopolitical advantages, Second, designing a government that would maintain independence from Spain, Third, finding a form which suited the circumstances of the people and the nature of the territory they inhabited and finally, finding a form that would be compatible with existing political arrangements. Russia made sense as the people and extent of the territory were similar, it had rapidly realized its potential, increasing the extent of its empire and influence, making Russia geopolitically smart in European affairs.\(^56\)

These two correspondents, ‘N’ and ‘Oran Utan’, offered these suggestions in the

\(^{56}\) On Russia, see *El Censor*, 3 April 1817, No. 81: 7034; *El Censor*, 23 May 1818, No. 140: 7393-7394; *El Censor*, 4 July 1818, No. 146: 7427-7428; *El Censor*, 18 July 1818, No. 148: 7440-7441.
context of living in an unrecognized State which believed England or the US held out the greatest hope of recognizing their independence. The analysis here may give the impression of a lopsided attention to Anglophone constitutions. But this is the reality of the printed articles from 1815 onwards. There is an inescapable conclusion that anglophone constitutional arrangements had acquired a priority by 1815 over the French and Spanish alternatives. Constitutional design felt the pull of the geopolitical imperatives. One editor asked what constitution was needed “to twin ourselves” with the North Americans? Rioplatenses had constant access to US Americans suggesting that they should adapt something similar to their own model. Of the arguments in the US debate on whether the United States should intervene or maintain neutrality, pro-immediate recognition voices carried further and louder than their more cautious fellow citizens who advocating neutrality, creating the perception that recognition came with ideological strings attached; a government similar to the US was necessary for their recognition, it was believed. The United States might recognize the United Provinces, but so too might England. The leaders of the insurgent governments in Chile and Buenos Aires, O’Higgins and Pueyrredón, both warned that their states must adopt a form of government pleasing to the ‘continental system’ of European monarchy in order to gain recognition. Some noted the pernicious disruption that this geopolitical problem exercised over the debate; “we are fluctuating between the various systems of government that govern the various nations that could recognize us.”57

The condition of the people and territory was also a major consideration. Contemporaries were particularly concerned with the question of whether the people had achieved a general enlightenment, and whether virtuous leaders were widely dispersed. Their ideas on this were often negative, which directed them towards forms of government where lawmakers was least exposed to the influence of the people and concentrated in

57 For ‘twin ourselves’, see La Estrella del Sud, 26 September 1820, No.6: 7889. For ‘fluctuating between model constitutions, see El Censor, 29 June 1818, No. 144:7417. For examples of US American advocates for Spanish American independence being published in the River Plate, see El Censor, 18 December 1817, No. 118: 7257: “we [the US] are their natural allies”; El Censor, 5 March 1818, No. 129: 7323-7325 carries an article of a US American on the recognition of Chile asking how they [US Americans] can help Chile to “constitute a form of Republican government similar to that of North America?” For O’Higgins’, even the “topography” of Chile made it compatible with monarchy, the “continental system” of Europe, see Diego Barros Arana, Historia General de Chile: Tomo XII, (Editorial Universitaria: Centro de Investigaciones Diego Barros Arana, 1999): 38. For Pueyrredón’s concern that recognition needed to take account of the European monarchical restoration, see Julio Saguir, ¿Unión o Secesión?: Los Procesos Constituyentes En Estados Unidos, 1776-1787 y Argentina, (1810-1862), (Buenos Aires: Prometeo Libros, 2007): 145.
Buenos Aires, where some believed the most virtuous citizens to be gathered. Finally, there was an appreciation of the benefits of the tradition arrangement of the territory along metropolitan lines. The polity was arranged along the following lines; the territory was divided into provinces. Buenos Aires was the capital of each of the provinces, and the provinces were considered ‘dependent’ on that city. Each province had a capital, and had cities and towns which were ‘dependent’ on it. It was understood that this three-tiered territorial arrangement was calculated to promote stability. Whilst confederation of equally powerful territorial units would lead to conflict, metropolitan territorial arrangements were like the universe; with a sun circulated by planets, which itself was circulated by satellite bodies, achieving a perfect order. These final two considerations, the circumstances of the people and territory and an appreciation for metropolitanism, were the most serious argument against adapting a US federal model. Yet the the US American model was considered because of geopolitical imperatives, admiration of its rapid expansion and commercial progress, the supposed (though contested) similarity of the anti-colonial struggle in which they engaged, and the example the US held out of the potential of the Americas.  

How, then, had contemporaries become familiar with ‘organic constitutionalism’ and how did it change the behaviour of constitution-makers? Manual de un Republicano para el uso de un pueblo libre (Manual by a Republican for the use of a free people), a pamphlet published in Philadelphia, explained organic constitutionalism in more depth. Of one hundred books advertised in the River Plate between 1810-1820, four were printed in the United States. Manual was one of those books, and it offered a transnational manifesto for budding constitutionalists. The anonymous author chose to set up the Manual as a dialogue between an US American maestro and his South American ‘disciple’. After a six month tour of the “diverse” States of the North American Union, the disciple returns to Philadelphia burning with questions, having been unable to participate in discussions on the leading topic of the day, politics, which surprised the maestro given his

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On the lack of educated and virtuous elites outside of Buenos Aires, Gazeta de Buenos Ayres, 30 March 1816, No. 49: 202 which claimed it derived the argument that federalism would not work as not enough “wise men” were to be found to form individual provincial congresses from The Federalist, see also El Censor, 9 October 1817, No. 108: 7199-7200 for an article on scientific societies, which doubted whether there would be “in one province ten men with sufficient philosophical knowledge”. For admiration of US growth, El Censor, 29 May 1818, No. 140: 7393. On Rioplatenses considering their struggle as “so similar” to that of the US, see El Censor, 25 January 1816, No. 22: 6634, which translated extracts of a history of the US Revolution by “Winterbotan” for that reason.
disciple’s knowledge of “greek, latin, sacred history, natural history, chronology, geography, astronomy and mathematics”. The disciple explains that these sciences are just the “secondary materials” of the main discussion, politics. The disciple next wonders if foreigners should bother locals with their constitutional observations. “I will say to you that our Government can be examined as well by the foreigners as by ourselves,” affirmed the US American maestro, who encouraged the observations of “foreigners” as they were better placed to see the defects in the constitution, as their views offered a helpful perspective unbiased by “national preoccupations” and “private passions.” The discussion is later moved on to consider the nature of transnational constitution-making: “Can any law be convenient to all nations?” What kind of circumstances demand the alteration of constitutional law? The maestro points towards Rousseau’s advice that constitutions must harmonise with the local conditions; the ‘habits’ of the people, the interior and exterior relations, and the climate could all modulate constitutional design. The constitution of a people “confined to agriculture”, for example, would not be suitable for other states dedicated to “maritime traffic”, or manufactures. This would require adaptation. Some principles, however, seemed to be universally applicable, such as the separation of powers, as deduced from universal historical experience.\textsuperscript{59}

The \textit{Manual} is important for several reasons. In it, politics was thought of as a kind of overhanging structure in which all the other branches of knowledge formed a part. But, constitution-making was a certain type of science. Some aspects, the \textit{Manual} argued, were universally applicable to all humans. But a great part of it was modulated by environment. In many ways, the difference is that between the physical and biological sciences. Constitution-making, rather than taking place in a transnational ‘laboratory’, was much more like botany. The type of environment and society would affect the type of constitution needed, in the same way mild variance in environment could create diversity of species over time. Via Rousseau, as referenced in the \textit{Manual}, but also from Montesquieu and Filangieri, contemporaries had absorbed ‘organic constitutionalism’. These were the kinds of works banned under the Spanish Empire, but read clastendinely

and probably internalised as a kind of truth that Americanos were permitted from knowing. As the Manual conceded, some aspects of constitutional design might be universal, and the extent to which a constitution might be ‘perfected’ for all humanity was up for grabs in debates between constitution-makers. The Manual gives not only an insight into theories of constitution-makers, but also their culture. It might seem a strange paradox that patriotic state-formation, forming states of patriots attached to their own country rather than imperial subjects loyal to distant metropoles, could at the same time be cosmopolitan. But a kind of cosmopolitan patriotism guided these constitution-making efforts. Congressmen could and should reach out to transnational observers and commentators who held opinions on their home state’s constitutions, in order to improve it. 60

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Did ‘organic constitutionalism’ effect how Rioplatense Americanos interested in the North American Union interacted with information from and people of US America? As pointed in Chapter One, large numbers of US Americans visited and resided in Buenos Aires. Their journals note an extensive amount of conversations entered into with locals about “general politicks”, providing a key opportunity for information about constitutional organization to be transmitted from one legal culture to another. This tendency to talk about political information extended to non-elite US Americans. Even a young runaway-turned-soldier managed to get in a conservation with the Governor Lopez of Santa Fe about the US political system; He “questioned me about my own country, its government, customs, laws, &c.” US Americans themselves also point towards a general interaction between locals and other international actors. William Worthington, one of Monroe’s agents in the region, noted the pernicious influence of Europeans in South America, who argued that whether the form of government was “Monarchy or a Republic” was of little consequence, so long as it was “Constitutional”. As the importance locals placed on ‘organic constitutionalism’ shows, we should not think of Rioplatense Americanos as the victims of some great power rivalry when selecting constitutional models. Indeed, those US Americans in the River Plate adhered to the idea of organic constitutionalism.

60 Manual de un Republican para el uso de un pueblo libre, 10, 17.
Brackenridge explained that to operate transnationally, observers had to practice “the contemplation of human nature, under its various modifications”. He characterized those who insisted that the US Constitution was perfectly exportable in its entirety as narrow-minded and “childish.” When Brackenridge argues that “if we make a present of our constitution to the South Americans” we would need to send US Americans in put it into operation, he is not arguing that Rioplatenses are incapable of US self-government, but that US Americans must accept that Rioplatense constitutions will have to be adapted to their “habits and laws [which] are entirely different.” The analogy Brackenridge offers is to US federalism itself. There were “shades of difference” between the states of the union, and that the constitutions of “Massachusetts or Virginia” would not suit every other state.

This commitment to organic constitutionalism holds true for other US Americans in the United Provinces and Chile. Both Joel Poinsett and William Worthington offered constitutions for Chile. Both were ‘adapted’ versions based around the US, with the former inverting the US Constitution by granting all powers not delegated to the provinces as remaining in the central government, whilst Worthington placed great stress on Chile’s Swiss like geography as a key indicator that a federative government was the best adaptation. Chile’s valleys suggested federal republicanism, as each valley’s separation from the other encouraged a sense of independence. The geography, too, fostered a republican sociability, whereby the terrain forced the nobility to get off their ‘high horses’, well, actually “mules”, and to walk among the people, making them “induced to experience and practice equality.” Neither were US Americans married to republicanism when they

61 For examples of US Americans talking politics with Rioplatenses, see Benjamin Keen, *David Curtis DeForest and the Revolution of Buenos Aires*, (New Haven : Yale University Press, 1947): 59; William Worthington characterized his interactions as non party politic, remaining on safe topics of "general politicks", see William Worthington to John Quincy Adams, 10 January 1818, in Despatches from U.S. Ministers in Buenos Aires, 1817–1906, Microfilm Publication: M69, Reel Number 1, RG59, Records of the Department of State; Robinson’s diaries and Brackenridge’s published *Voyage*, where he iterates at least forty distinct conversations with numerous Rioplatenses across two months, are good examples of US American sociability leading to exchanges of constitutional information, for Robinson’s diaries, see Peter Force Collection (Jeremy Robinson Papers), Reel 62, DLC, for Brackenridge’s conversations, see Brackenridge, *Voyage to South America*, Volumes I and II. For the runaway, see John Anthony King, *Twenty-Four Years in the Argentine Republic*, (London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1846): 16. For Europeans attempting to influence the forms of government debate, see William Worthington to John Quincy Adams, 7 March 1819, Despatches from U.S. Ministers in Buenos Aires, 1817–1906, Microfilm Publication: M69, Reel Number 1, RG59, Records of the Department of State. For Brackenridge on organic constitutionalism, see Brackenridge, *Voyage to South America*, Volume II, 41, 281, 257, 282.
contemplated the best adaptation. When Bland met John Prevost in Chile, they engaged in a heated debate between Prevost who declared himself a republican who hated democracy and advanced the view that a monarchy was better for Chile, against Bland who insisted on a republican future.62

What role, then, if US Americans understood that they could not simply gift their constitution, did they play in Rioplatense constitution-making? One pamphlet imagined a Dialogue between a Citizen and a North American casting the US American in the role of news provider:

“American: Do you know Chile, Caracas, and Mexico fell in the hands of the Spanish, because of the lack of order?”

This was particularly accurate, as sea captain Thomas Taylor was responsible for delivering bundles of newspapers from Baltimore to the Rioplatense periodical editors. Extracts from US newspapers, whose news on the Americas easily reached Buenos Aires before British Newspapers, the other main source of international news, were able to reprint it. This was particularly important for unionists who tracked the fortunes of Mexico and Venezuela, learning from experience that confederation caused a lack of unity that had failed to guarantee their fellow Americanos independence.63

But the biggest contribution that informed the debate was that of David de Forest, an arms merchant and privateer armador who happened to dabble in the Philadelphian

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62 For Joel Poinsett’s more centralized version of the US Constitution for Chile, see Collier, William Collier, and Guillermo Feliú Cruz, La Primera Mision de Los Estados Unidos de America En Chile, (Santiago de Chile: Imprenta Cervantes, 1926): 79. For Worthington’s constitution for Chile, see 'W. G Worthington’s Constitution for Chile of 25th April 1818', both in Despatches from U.S. Ministers in Buenos Aires, 1817-1906, Microfilm Publication: M69, Reel Number 1, RG59, Records of the Department of State. For Worthington’s analysis of Chile’s circumstances and the effect it would have on their form of government, see William Worthington to John Quincy Adams, 7 March 1819, Despatches from U.S. Ministers in Buenos Aires, 1817-1906, Microfilm Publication: M69, Reel Number 1, RG59, Records of the Department of State.

63 For the dialogue, see Dialogo entre un Americano del Norte y un ciudadano de las Provincias-Unidas de Sud-America sobre el libello publicado en Baltimore por los proscriptos Agredo, Moreno, y Pasos, (Buenos Ayres, 1818): 3-4. For evidence of Thomas Taylor supplying newspapers, see El Censor, 15 January 1818, No. 122: 7284. For US newspapers as the source of news about the Americas, see for example 'Extraordinaria', Gazeta de Buenos Ayres, 14 August 1818, which cites boats from Baltimore bringing the latest news on the brave Venezuelans and the “illustrious” Bolivar.
spanish language book trade. He imported what amounted to a glut of texts; most importantly de Sena’s *Historia Concisa*, a translated history of the US, and *La Independencia de la Costa Firme Justificada*, at least 5000 copies of which circulated around Spanish America containing several works of Thomas Paine, the Declaration of Independence, Articles of Confederation, US Constitution and several state constitutions. De Forest appears to have received a large quantity of copies around 1816, as they were advertised frequently across the period, suggesting at least huge availability, if not huge sales. De Forest then sold those books from his auction house set up in 1814, or onwards to bookstores, such as the “libreria de Don Javier”. One enthusiast, Antonio José de Escalada, father-in-law to the liberator San Martin, purchased a large number of these books and was distributing them freely around Buenos Aires. De Forest had also opened his small library to neighbours, donated an amount of books to the public library in Buenos Aires, and helped to arrange for his friend General Belgrano’s translation of Washington’s Farewell Address to be printed in Brazil and distributed in Buenos Aires.64

How then was information from US America used in printed debates? Print was widely consumed. Around 2000 copies of each paper were produced and circulated in the entirety of the United Provinces, the confederalist rioplatense provinces, Chile and even Baltimore. Mostly, interaction with print was oral. Printed works were read and heard after church, in shops, bars, cafés, and at tertulias (intellectual gatherings), with one copy circulating around entire neighbourhoods. So print provides a reliable, although not exact, index of the ideas circulating amongst contemporaries. As Fabian Herrero has shown,

64 De Forest advertised the books in local newspapers, see Keen, *David Curtis DeForest and the Revolution of Buenos Aires*, 101. For examples Books advertised in the US in newspapers: *La Independencia de la Costa Firme* and *Historia Concisa* recommended as books that could “fortalize and enlighten them”, see *El Censor*, 11 April 1816, No. 33: 6703; A history of the revolution of North-America, available in castellano for three pesos, see *El Censor*, 4 April 1816, No. 32: 6697; *La Independencia de la Costa Firme* and *Historia Concisa* advertised in *La Prensa Argentina*, 16 April 1816, No. 31: 6093. *El Manual de un Republicano* advertised in *El Independiente*, 20 October 1816, No.6: 7771; History of the revolution of North-America, for 12 reales, and *La Independencia de la Costa Firme* for one peso, in San Fransisco street, see *La Prensa Argentina*, 23 July 1816, No.45: 6180 For the print run of *La Independencia de la Costa Firme*, see Manuel García de Sena, *Historia Concisa de Los Estados Unidos Desde El Descubrimiento de La America Hasta El Año de 1807*, (Caracas: Fundacion Eugenio Mendoza, 1952), XIV. For sales of books from De Forest’s auction house and sales to librerias, see *Gazeta de Buenos Ayres*, 14 December 1814, No. 133 and ‘Argentine Financial Records - Cash Book 1814-1816’, 'Folder 22' in 'Box 5' MSS 177, De Forest Family Papers, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University. For Escalada distributing books on the US, see Brackenridge, *A Voyage to South America*, Volume II, 14-15. For De Forest opening his library to neighbours, see Keen, *David Curtis DeForest and the Revolution of Buenos Aires*, 93. For De Forest’s book donations to the Public Library, see Keen, *David Curtis DeForest and the Revolution of Buenos Aires*, 81, 126-127. For Belgrano’s translation, see Keen, *David Curtis DeForest and the Revolution of Buenos Aires*, 94.
there was extensive consideration of the US model and federalism in Buenos Aires print. But print was dominated by ‘unitario’ editors. Given the traditional narrative of (con)federalists against centralist ‘unitarians’ we would expect to find a wholly negative contemplation of the US model. But some editors were far more ambivalent, suggesting many were federal-unionists, rather than (con)federalists.65

Consider the writings of Chilean exile Camilo Henriquez, who showcased details of a series of US State Constitutions in El Censor. Henriquez had been an editor in Chile who had worked with Joel Poinsett and José Miguel Carrera on a ‘unitarian’ constitution in 1812. His previous editorials had made clear his disregard for confederation, which would lead to anarchy, and imitation of the US without considering a people’s circumstances, which he thought the French had done. But he found it useful to publish details of several US American state constitutions. He particularly highlighted Maryland as noteworthy of attention, admiring its history of amendment which gradually changed it from an aristocrat to a more democratic form. It is clear that this appealed to Rioplatense Americanos convinced of the prematurity of democracy in their territory. Subsequent articles made explicit the anti-democratic nature of Henriquez’s thinking, arguing for an elite-driven “preparation of the pueblos for liberty”. The series of articles confirms two things; an appreciation by ‘unitarians’ for federal union as a system that accommodates regional circumstances by allowing for diversity, and secondly, the practice of critical reading as evident in the stated preference for the Maryland Constitution. Henriquez noted that the power of forming electoral regulations should be located at the local level, being a purely ‘municipal’ issue. US federal-unionism worked because this devolution of power led to elections “accommodated to their [the states] particular circumstances, to the genius, habits and principles.” Rioplatense federal-unionists existed and read other models mindful of their own circumstances and the necessity of adaptation.66

Many, admittedly, objected to the United States as incompatible with the existing metropolitan territorial arrangement of the United Provinces. Indeed, the Gazeta de


66 For Maryland’s constitution analysed, see El Censor, 4 December 1817, No.116:7247-7248. For expressions of the need to prepare people for liberty, see El Censor, 22 January 1818, No. 123: 7288-7289 and El Censor, 29 January 1818, No. 124: 7293-7295.
Buenos Ayres offered a précis of The Federalist which interpreted it as an argument against confederation. Confederalists argued for the equality of all territorial units in the United Provinces, and this offended a variety of natural orders. For El Censor, those confederal breakaway movements threatened to dissolve society itself. If pueblos (cities) and provinces could dissolve links within the United Provinces, families could dissolve the bonds within their pueblos, entering into their “own radical sovereignty”, living without dependence on any superior. Confederalism, the article explained, was undermining the foundations of the social contract; where families contracted together to form pueblos, pueblos contracted together to form provinces, and provinces contracted together to form the metropolitan state. It is noteworthy that each of these contracts caused dependencies; wife to husband, family to pueblo, pueblo to provincial capital, and provincial capitals to metropole.67

What was this guiding set of ideas about territorial organization? It stemmed from colonial metropolitanism, which had created this system of metropole, province and pueblo within each vice-kingdom in the Américas. Burkholder and Johnson the relationship here as being like a hub and spokes of a wheel. But a different metaphor makes more sense from the independence period onwards and was used by contemporaries themselves. The relationship was akin to a planetary model; the metropole as sun, with the provincial capitals each inside the orbit of the metropole and each having their own satellites, ‘pueblos’, inside their orbits, each with different powers and force allocated to them. Contemporaries enjoyed utilising the metaphor. Buenos Aires was the “sun” that “vivified” the provinces, or the National Congress a sun that “naturally calls” the provinces to a centre. Metropolitanists found confederation an unnatural system of territorial organization. Henriquez, the Chilean editor, noted that if all territorial units held equal force of attraction and repulsion, anarchy would ensue, and pointed to Adam’s Defence of the US Constitutions as advocacy of constitutional design based on fundamental laws seen in the universe. Some congressmen were prepared to group the United States amongst renegade anarchists such as Artigas, Caracas, and Paraguay who promoted the unworkable system of “particular independence” from city to city. When asked to recognize the independence of the pueblo La Rioja from Cordoba, Congress refused, stating that the inequality of territorial units was not a “mere theory” but an

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67 Gazette de Buenos-Ayres, 30 March 1816, No.49: 201-201: For the unity of provinces linked to social bonds of dependency, see El Censor, 5 October 1815, No. 7: 6527-6528.
imperative idea that maintained order. Whatever form of constitution was decided upon; it would need to address the centrifugal tendencies of the regional bodies.\footnote{Mark A. Burkholder, and Lyman L. Johnson, *Colonial Latin America*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998): 81. For expressions of planetary metaphors, see *El Redactor del Congreso*, 31 May 1817, No.20; *El Censor*, 8 February 1816, No. 24: 6648: a National Congress would work with the same virtue as a sun which “naturally calls to its centre all the bodies of our solar system”; *El Censor*, 26 June 1817, No. 93: 7108. Confederations always led to divisions into smaller territories, as seen from Ancient Greece, and would lead America to divide into “1000 small and pitiful states” according to *El Censor*, 14 August 1817, No. 100: 7149-7150. For Congress’ decision to return La Rioja to the jurisdiction of Cordoba, see *El Redactor del Congreso*, 1 June 1818, No.31 and Levene, *Documentos del Congreso de Tucumán*, 50.}

Discovering whether the US was a harmless Union or a dangerous confederacy was essential. History was particularly illuminating. Many commentators pointed out that the Articles of Confederation were defective, and had needed to be fixed. The suspicion confederacy could not work was heightened by the translation choice of de Sena, rendering the opening lines of the US Constitution “in order to form the most perfect union.” De Sena admitted that his translations had sought to overturn previous translations made in Philadelphia which he argued had given an incorrect “construction”. His own choice of words orientated the meaning of the Constitution towards a more consolidated government. Washington, a name continuously misspelled and very probably pronounce ‘Jorge Guasinton’ by locals, was the figure called on to provide the historical context for this ‘most perfect union.’ The Farewell Address was translated and printed, and his letter to Congress explaining why the states needed to cede sovereignty in order to create a more orderly government was praised. Even in radical writings from Paine safe passages that extolled bland words on continental ‘buckles’ being too loose, or “its not in numbers, but in unity that our strengths lie” could be found and marshalled to contextualise the failure of confederacy in the US.\footnote{De Sena explained that he had copied literally from an earlier Spanish translation of the US Constitution, but had taken care to ensure to correct passaged that had given “a construction entirely contrary to the original.” “Una union la mas perfecta” could be read to mean either a union that is more perfect, or to from the most perfect union, see Manuel Garcia de Sena, *La Independencia de La Costa Firme Justificada Por Thomas Paine Treinta Años Há*, (Philadelphia: T & J Palmer, 1811): 176, 190. For Washington’s letter to Congress, see *El Censor*, 31 July 1817, No. 98: 7140-7141. For use of Thomas Paine’s writings, see for one example among dozens, *El Censor*, 25 July 1818, No. 48:6814. Rioplatenses could point to ancient forms of confederation, “All ancient confederations dissolved”, to show that confederacy did not work, see El Censor, 7 August 1817, No. 99: 7143-7146. For Rioplatense understanding that ‘w’ was pronounced “gua”, see the ‘Notes’ on an imprint of the ‘Acta de Independencia’, Leg. 2471, Colección Dr Celesia, AGNA.}

Others disagreed, still seeing the US as a confederation. It is not too difficult to see why, US Americans were hardly sure themselves. Many dismissed the US on this basis.
But *La Prensa Argentina* insisted that “we must look at North America” regardless of its original confederal status, as it had rebalanced powers in a centre that caused order. The US Americans’ “great advance” in the science of government had confounded previous failed attempts to exercise a central sovereignty which was balanced against the rights of the “pueblo” without disturbing public tranquillity. The article went on to make strange claims for the rights of the US States, who could reject a law in writing within five to ten days of its promulgation, forcing the law to be reconsider and only passed by a higher majority of two-thirds of Congress. This invented check was apparently a “wise measure” that had produced “good effects”. From reading Spanish-language pamphlets printed in Philadelphia, the editor had absorbed nullification and states’ rights rhetoric.\(^{70}\)

Indeed this divergence, whether the US was a confederation or a union, was the greatest difference when interpreting the model. If it was a union, it was worth looking at, but if it was a confederation, it was surely defective. Whilst some successful models could be adapted, it was possible via historical inquiry to show that confederation had never worked. Information on the English and US American constitutions was used to triangulate between what form of government US America had, how the English model differed, and to determine the position in which Rioplatenses found themselves. *El Censor* noted the translation of liberty from England to North America, but that in comparison there lacked a ‘centre of unity’ in the United States. The editor’s observation helped locate the US as a confederacy rather than union. The United States’ future thus seemed uncertain; ‘I hope their course [ the US] won’t be interrupted’, suggesting that advocates of the US model might need to consider how to adapt it towards a strengthened union.\(^{71}\)

One periodical in particular offers an important example of how ‘organic constitutionalism’ argued against federalism, and both how ideas and texts were selected and adapted to the local circumstances, and also another example of a ‘unitarian’ with federal-unionist sympathies. *El Observador Americano* (The American Observer) offers us the best evidence of organic constitutionalism, and its prominence amongst Rioplatense Americano constitution-makers. It was edited by Manuel Antonio de Castro, a lawyer in Buenos Aires and chair of the Academia de Jurisprudencia, which organised public events on legal matters, including one on ‘forms of government’. His ideas, then,

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70 *La Prensa Argentina*, 2 July 1816, No.42: 6155-6157. The article took material from *Manual de un Republican*, 33, which first made the claims about states’ rights.

71 *El Censor*, 22 August 1816, No. 52: 6846.
offer an insight of the kind of ideas circulating amongst editors, readers, and constitution-makers. Across a series of article, *El Observador Americano* made the case that a constitution must be adapted to the circumstances of the country. Castro, the editor, declared himself for a ‘tempered monarchy’ as the constitution best adapted to the country. In later editions, he turned his attention towards the unenlightened majority of the population, who were in favour of a ‘federal government’, and promised the reader that future issues would offer a ‘detained’ and ‘serious’ analysis of federal government, of which “América of the North” offered the only successful example.\(^{72}\)

When the periodical considers federalism, the paper does not turn to *The Federalist*, or lengthy discussions of particular articles or the US Constitution. The articles first considers how the US Constitution is adapted to US Americans, and then looks at the failed case of the French importation of the US model. The editor notes how US constitutionalism is predicated on certain conditions; the moderation of fortunes, the equality of conditions, the laborious life, the simplicity of customs, the power of imposing taxes, and the tradition of the colonies to give itself laws even while under the British government, and the examples of austerity and simplicity of “Guillermo Pen”. With these factors established as the necessary conditions needed before ‘liberty’, *El Observador Americano* noted the failure of French efforts to import the US model; “Paris below the same constitution, of the frugal, tranquil and philosophic Pensilvania [sic]!” French constitutionalists had taken insufficient note of their own circumstances; the large nobility, the powerful clergy, the extensive bureaucracy, and the “empire of luxury” and corruption that had made US republicanism an unlikely model for success in France, whose cabinets had “wanted to give laws to the world” rather than adapting models by considering themselves first.\(^{73}\)

Before considering US federation as a prototype, Rioplatense Americanos had to

\(^{72}\) *El Observador Americano*, 21 October 1816, No.10: 7711 previews discussion of federalism; 30 September 1816, No. 7: 7695 argues for a ‘tempered monarchy’. Passages which stress the importance of constitutional adaptation to circumstances are found in No. 7: 7694: “The form of government most convenient to our América”; 16 September 1816 No. 5: 7680 cites the problem of adapting democracy to the “custom”, “temperament of the people”, “locality” and another “thousand circumstances”; 9 September 1816, No.4: 7674 argues that government must be congenial to the locality, climate, spirit, character, habits and extension of the nation; 26 September 1816, No.2: 7661 places the origins of organic constitutionalism with “Roseau”, and that the Congress will choose the form of government most convenient to our “defence, conservation, and prosperity”; 19 August 1816, No.1, 7656: The congress will determine the form of government, and “will organize the constitution analogous to the nature of our government.”

\(^{73}\) *El Observador Americano*, 14 October 1816, No.9: 7706.
look to their own circumstances, or the physical, moral and political circumstances. The physical circumstances were defined as the climate, extension of territory, and quality of terrain. Poised to consider each of these factors in turn, physical, moral, and political, across a series of articles, *El Observador Americano*, like many periodicals, ceased without warning, often due to lack of funds to continue printing. But not before explaining how the River Plate’s climate and extension of territory were unsuited to federation. Dismissing Montesquieu’s argument that climate entirely explains differences in form of government, pointing out that Asia had once been the home of liberty but now suffers a vile “slavery”, the editor speculates how climate might affect Rioplatense Americanos. Whilst climate may have a greater effect on ‘savage’ peoples, the behaviour of ‘civilized’ peoples were much less sympathetic to climate, as ‘moral’ factors such as education and law regulated the body. Happily, too, climate most seriously affected humans in extremely hot or cold areas. Surveying the United Provinces from the Rio de la Plata until the Desaguadero, on the banks of Lake Titicaca, the editor found, problematically, that though most areas were in temperate zones, some areas, such as Paraguay, or Potosi, suffered extreme heat or cold. Similarly, the United Provinces were mostly populated by dispersed numbers of people outside of the main cities, who were ‘less civilized’; cultivators, ranchers, and ‘indian’ communities, who were more sympathetic to the climate’s negative effects. The editor found that this “diversity of climates is very noxious to the federal system.” If pueblos (cities) could form their own constitutions, this diversity might lead them to form diverse and opposing “constitutions of government.” These constitutions might then be impossible to unite under a federal constitution. This would, he predicted, lead to constant warfare between cities as in ancient Greece.

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74 *El Observador Americano*, 14 October 1816, No.9: 7706.
government, pointing out that Asia had once been the home of liberty but now suffers a vile “slavery”, the editor speculates how climate might affect Rioplatense Americanos. Whilst climate may have a greater effect on ‘savage’ peoples, the behaviour of ‘civilized’ peoples were much less sympathetic to climate, as ‘moral’ factors such as education and law regulated the body. Happily, too, climate most seriously affected humans in extremely hot or cold areas. Surveying the United Provinces from the Rio de la Plata until the Desaguadero, on the banks of Lake Titicaca, the editor found, problematically, that though most areas were in temperate zones, some areas, such as Paraguay, or Potosi, suffered extreme heat or cold. Similarly, the United Provinces were mostly populated by dispersed numbers of people outside of the main cities, who were ‘less civilized’; cultivators, ranchers, and ‘indian’ communities, who were more sympathetic to the climate’s negative effects. The editor found that this “diversity of climates is very noxious to the federal system.” If pueblos (cities) could form their own constitutions, this diversity might lead them to form diverse and opposing “constitutions of government.” These constitutions might then be impossible to unite under a federal constitution. This would, he predicted, lead to constant warfare between cities as in ancient Greece.

The ‘extension of the territory’ of the Provinces, according to a similar logic, prove problematic for the new polity. If confederate states were too small, predatory states would overturn it with superior force, but if they were too large, it would be destroyed by some kind of ‘interior vice’. Proponents of federalism imagined two potential future federations, either of the Rio de la Plata alone, or with Chile and Perú joining the confederation. In the latter case, proponents either imagined a confederation of three ‘united’ states into a confederacy, or dividing each state into smaller units, forming a federation of provinces. The latter case was particularly problematic. Chile and Peru may not want to be republics, especially with the dismal example of the (dis)United Provinces. In which case a confederation of German-style monarchies and free cities would be needed; problematic as the United Provinces lacked the ‘entangling’ bonds like the German confederation. Worse still, the United Provinces might adopt the form of confederated states, and then Chilean and Peruvian monarchies would refuse to confederate due to the incompatible form of government. *El Observador Americano* speculated that Portuguese arms had already been encouraged to occupy the eastern part of the United Provinces due to their

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75 *El Observador Americano*, 28 October 1816, No.11: 7716-7718.
form of government, and if Chile and Peru formed monarchies and the United Provinces chose a republican confederate constitution that tends to reduce the power of the government, “do we not run the risk of [being] a small republic at the side of monarchies?”

*El Observador Americano* outlined a few solutions to the problem of Rioplatense local conditions. A “tempered monarchy”, with a National Legislature would be able to deal with this problem of diversity better. Such a legislature would have the power to design law which would intervene to “soften” climate-inspired diversities where they were dangerous, foment them when it was advantageous, or “respect” them where they were benign. This kind of argument places Castro firmly within the ‘unitarios’. We would expect him to outline a strongly centralist ideal constitution. But when he imagines how a functioning ‘federal’ system would need to work, his objections are not that it is not centralist enough, but that it would require ‘a genius’ to put it into action. The kind of description the editor offers of how to improve confederations is similar to the kind of reforms that the 1787 US Constitution made to the Articles of Confederation. Rather than increase the types of powers the central government would need to take cognizance of, Castro asked for “three supreme powers” at the level of central government [executive, legislative, and judiciary] to “maintain alliances, and federation”, and to “understand the high and general affairs of all the nation.”

The US federal model had been extensively considered by Rioplatense Americanos. It met many of their criteria when considering local circumstances, and they were aware of the potential problems when adapting it, especially the jarring juxtaposition between the US model’s equality of territorial units against the metropolitanism of the United

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77 *El Observador Americano*, 28 October 1816 No.11: 7718. The powers that a central government would need, according to Castro, were similar to those the United Provinces already held (although at times struggle to enforce), and similar too to the powers of the federal government of the United States: “For this, the common government, and not the particular governments, must have power to declare war, and make peace, to fix laws on prisoners of land, and sea, and its division; of concede licenses of privateering, and creating tribunals that take notice of pirates, and other capital crimes committed on the high sea, and send and receive ambassadors, of negotiate and concluded treaties or alliance, and conclude the questions between two or more states over limits and jurisdiction, of coin money, and regulate its value, of name general officials for the armies, and civil officials for the affairs of the nation, of contract loans, of creating bills on the credit of the federation, of fix the sum of general taxes &c.” Essentially, Castro is describing the point that Edling makes, that the 1787 Constitution gave more ability to enforce existing powers, rather than give many new powers to the federal government. See *El Observador Americano*, No.12: 7724.
Provinces Capital, provinces, and pueblos structure. These 'unitarian' editors, too, had shown themselves to be ambivalent towards federal-unionism, or a 'well-organized confederacy'. How, then, if at all, did these considerations combine to make the 1819 Constitution?

It is an unquestioned commonplace that the 1819 Constitution was excessively 'centralist'. The traditional narrative advances the view that the capital city dominated the construction of the constitution, put forward an excessively centralizing text which was rejected by the provinces, ultimately provoking dissident rebels to invade the capital and end the common government. But as has been pointed out, 'unionist' commentators were far from advocating centralism in printed sources, and there was extensive consideration of federation and US constitutional templates. The Constitution was crafted by a committee of five between late 1817 until May 1818, and then considered and amended by Congress from July 1818 for a further nine months. Congress asked the provinces to collectively pledge an oath to the Constitution on 25 May 1819, and provinces began electing senators and preparing for the Constitution to take full effect. Armed forces ended the common government in February 1820, bringing the 1819 Constitution to an untimely end. How did the consideration of adapting international constitutional models to local conditions shape the writing of the 1819 Constitution? The constitution-makers left little indications about what took place during the drafting process, by from a variety of sources, we can see the US federal model exerted more influence than previously thought, and that the document was influenced by the idea of 'organic constitutionalism'.

Contrary to the expectation that constitution-makers would be looking to centralize power, the constitution-makers showed an appreciation of distributing power to the provinces, as long as it was balanced or checked against another power. Serrano, a key congressman from Alta Perú and a member of the drafting committee of five, had spoken in 1816 for an hour on the advantageous and disadvantageous of federation, making him well placed to understand designing federal-unions. Serrano was later referenced as helping to write an 1821 pro-federal unionist pamphlet published in Tucumán. The pamphlet proves the point that the 1819 Constitution was design as federal-unionist. Arguing against the Federalistas opposed to the true meaning of federalism, a strong union and “é Pluribus Unum”; “the supporters of the [1819] Constitution of the Constituent Congress, are in fact more truly Federalistas that their Opponents.” Drafts show that the committee of five toyed with adapting a clause from the Massachusetts State Constitution which would have allowed the pueblos (cities) to peacefully assemble to discuss grievances and send them to the Congress. It was behaviour uncharacteristic of centralists, given that it was common knowledge that Artigas favoured the Massachusetts Constitution as the most democratic. The clause was adapted to require the city to warn their municipal governor that they intended to gather, adding a potential check on any democratic excesses, and differed from the US clause to require that their representations be ‘moderated’.79

In fact, the US served as a ‘template’ or ‘prototype’, a highly adaptable starting point, rather than some kind of model to be arranged carefully according to instructions. The final draft the committee produced shows a group without reverence for the US document; carefully rearranging, rewording, and rejecting wherever they considered desirable. The best example of this is shown by comparing the powers of Congress in both the United Provinces and US Constitution. Appendix 4 demonstrates how clauses, such as

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79 For Serrano’s appreciation of the advantages and disadvantages of federalism, see El Redactor del Congreso, 3 October 1816, No. 10. The fact that Serrano could see the advantages of federalism would suggest that he would be reluctant to create an excessively centralist constitution. For the pro-federal unionist pamphlet, see un Coronel Mayor de Exercito, Opiniones de Los Publicistas Mas Celebrés, Sobre Las Diversas Formas de Gobiernos Libres, (Imprenta de Tucuman, 1821): IV-V. For Artigas’ preference for the Massachusetts constitution, see Brackenridge, Voyage to South America, Volume I, 241 and Billias, American Constitutionalism Heard Round the World, 123. For the drafts considering the Massachusetts clause, see see Article 107, “Proyecto de Constitución”, 25 May 1818, Document 171, Legajo 7, Sala VII, AGNA.
article 36, 39, 44, and 45 have exactly or near exactly the same wording as in the US Constitution. But other clauses are entirely missing, and several have no equivalent in the US document. Further, all clauses relating to war powers are grouped together in a more rational order and promoted to the start of Congress’ list of powers, adapted to the exigencies of continuing and expected future wars with Spain and Portuguese Brazil. We do not know exactly what copies of the US Constitution they used, or how they used them, but with the impression the drafts give its easy to imagine US Constitutions defaced by heavily annotated marginalia, or even constitution-makers taking their scissors to the document in order to rearrange and remove sections. This irreverence for the US Constitution is even more clearly seen in its largest departure. Informed by the idea of checks and balances, the constitution-makers rebalanced bicameralism. The British Constitution, it seemed, offered a more orderly balance of local representation checked against guardians of the ‘national interest’. It also proved the most controversial change.

After five months of drafting, the proposed constitution went before Congress, who proceeded under voting regulations established earlier in 1816, which stated that all constitutional matters were to be approved by two-thirds of Congress, and certain constitutional issues would be resolved using the ninth of the Articles of Confederation. It is clear advocates of US federal-union held some sway in the Congress, and the extent of their power is seen in the revisions made to the Senate. The committee of five had proposed lifelong membership and a complement of other English inspired measures to create a ‘national’ body as a check on the provincial interests in the lower House. But the Senate as an issue had effectively stalled the revision process, with the same few clauses debated, voted upon, and carried over to future sessions for over two months without much progress. Several members suggested revisions that were voted upon. Gallo, representative for Santiago de Estero, insisted that the clause must be reformed to the exact wording of the US model. Godoy, a representative from Mendoza, offered a compromise of 9 year terms in exchange for an explicit reference in the Constitution that the form of government was ‘federal’. The impasse seemed indefinite and threatened to derail the whole project. But it was Villegas, the federalist representative from Cordoba

80 For the powers of Congress, see William Walton, ed, Constitution of the United Provinces of South America, (London, 1819): 31-32. The Congressmen probably used copies found in De Sena’s Independencia de la Costa Firme, given that they definitely considered the Massachusetts Constitution, which was including in De Sena’s volume.
who brokered the solution. Brackenridge, the secretary of the 1818 Commission, remembered Villegas as peculiarly inquisitive and enthusiastic for all things US American, and gave him a copy of Carey’s Olive Branch in attempt to curb his enthusiasm. Perhaps Villegas gleaned some insight in the art of compromise from Carey’s work on party political factionalism in the US? He discovered a final wording that reduced Senate terms to twelve years, with a one-third part of the senate to be renewable every four years; an acceptable compromise between confederalists, federal-unionists and centralists that allowed the draft constitution towards ratification.

What, then, does the final document say about federal-unionism and centralism? There is a wealth of evidence that contradicts the idea that the 1819 Constitution was ‘centralist’. Those attributes of power that the central government held that are more centralist than the US government; the explicit national sovereignty, the election of the Supreme Director by the Congress, rather than the provinces, and the guarantee of citizenship by the common government rather than the provinces, were already found established before 1819, proving that those few elements that we can consider centralist were not the result of a ‘centralizing’ document. Further, centralism would have meant the concentration of power. Actually the 1819 Constitution largely leaves in place the existing distribution of power between the common government and the provinces. The list of powers that Congress attributes to itself is based around the US Constitution.

81 The agreement that votes on constitutions would require two-third majorities, and that in some circumstances relating to issues regarding border disputes, divisions of jurisdictions, the Congress would use the mode found in the ninth article of the Articles of Confederation, was agreed in 1816, see El Redactor del Congreso, 23 August 1816, No.6. Saenz, representative from Buenos Aires explained, far from Buenos Aires being dominant in the Congress as is often claimed, it was Buenos Aires that had to fight to get the regulation that all constitutional affairs were to be passed by a majority of two-thirds vote in Congress, to stop the powers of an “enemy plurality” of other provinces grouping together against the capital. With this precaution, the representatives from Buenos Aires entered into discussion on the constitution, see ‘Informe del Dr. D. Antonio Saenz diputado en el Congreso del Tucuman a la Junta Electoral de Buenos-Aires’, ‘Impresos Varios’ 1816-1819’, Sala VII, Leg. 2471, AGNA.

For the original wording of the Senate, see “Proyecto de Constitución”, 25 May 1818, Document 171, Legajo 7, Sala VII, AGNA: “They will continue in the post during the time of their good behaviour.” On the various compromises proposals; for Godoy’s 9 year-term for senator’s compromise in return that an explicit reference to the government being federal, see October 14 1818 and again on October 16 1818, ‘Colección Casavalle’, Legajo 2308, AGNA. For Gallo’s and Villegas’ compromise, see October 16 1818, ‘Colección Casavalle’, Legajo 2308, AGNA. Villegas’ compromises gained 15 votes, but Gallo was still holding out for the same system as the “North American” senate. Villegas’ amendment was voted again on 27 November 1818 receiving 18 votes, see ‘Coleccion Casavalle’, Legajo 2308, AGNA. See, Walton, Constitution of the United Provinces of South America, 27: for Villegas’ compromise as written in the final Constitution. For Villegas meeting Brackenridge, see Brackenridge, Voyage to South America, Volume II, 13.
Comparatively, it grants some more powers than the US Congress, and denies itself other powers, and on balance is only slightly more centralist than the US equivalent. Take for instance the clause regarding patents. In this clause the US Congress is given the power to promote the ‘arts and sciences’. But this is deliberately absent from the comparable 1819 clause. In fact the 1817 provisional constitution had delegated the power to form such institutions for developing the ‘arts and sciences’ to the provinces. The 1819 Constitution, which stated that all constitutional clauses of the previous provisional constitution that did not contradict the new document remained active law. As the 1817 Constitution granted this power, and the 1819 Constitution explicitly refused to take it back, it is clear the constitution-makers intended to keep this power delegated.\(^\text{82}\)

Further examples are evident. The centralists wanted a republic or monarchy ‘one and indivisible’. But the 1819 document is ambivalent over the right of the pueblos to recover its original sovereignty, providing for ‘managed’ secession if approved by the House of Representatives, the body understood to represent the provinces’ collective sovereignty. The United Provinces’ Supreme Court’s jurisdiction is almost identical to that of the US, only increasing its jurisdiction over one extra type of case in which disputes between two cities within the same province occur. The drafts of the constitution had considered a clause asking the Supreme Court to ensure that the autonomy of local courts did not mean that the legal system would fragment until the point that lawyers could not practice in all parts of the Union.\(^\text{83}\)

What kind of constitution had they made then? It is best characterized as an asymmetric federal-union. Asymmetric, as it is a gathering of territories in a federative union, but with the territorial units; metropole, provinces and pueblos, enjoying unequal powers due to the colonial legacy of metropolitanism. The constitution-makers used the

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\(^{82}\) Those powers which were more centralist had been established before the 1819 Constitution. For instance, Pueyrredón had been elected by Congress in 1816, Congress had long had powers to grant citizenship, and transferred those powers to the Supreme Director in 1817, and the 1817 Reglamento Provisorio speaks of the “Sovereignty of the Nation.” See Appendix 4 for the comparison of the Congressional powers in each Constitution.

\(^{83}\) A Republic ‘One and indivisible’ had frequently been offered as an alternative option to a federation, but Article 83 allowed for the “alienation or dismemberment of any part of the territory” with the consent of two-thirds of the House of Representatives, see Walton, Constitution of the United Provinces of South America, 36. See Appendix 4 for comparisons of the Supreme Court’s powers in both the US and the River Plate. For the clause that was considered to prevent the possibility of provincial legal regime’s preventing lawyers from working throughout the country, see Article 97, “Proyecto de Constitución”, 25 May 1818, Document 171, Legajo 7, Sala VII, AGNA.
US American document as a template, but reverse engineered its bicameralism towards the British model, and conserved an inherited Spanish system of territorial organization which they thought seemed to work. The Constitution was approved April 1819, and an oath was sworn to it on 25 May 1819. Congressman Funes was asked to write the manifesto explaining the Constitution. He was evidently proud. The congressmen, he explained, had avoided the pitfalls of ‘complicated’ confederation, despotism, monarchy, democracy and aristocracy, whilst enjoying the benefits of all of them. By condensing the best of history, politics and other Constitutions into one document, this “adapted” Constitution was so good, he suggested, it was, “as much as possible, approaching perfection.”

By January 1820, nearly all the provinces of the union had elected senators for the forthcoming congress, and had spent time writing the Supreme Director querying specific details. The Constitution was acceptable to the provinces, and did not trigger the fall of the common government in February 1820. When it did fall, Sanchez de Bustamante pointed out that all the provinces had consented to the fundamental law; no province had “protested” at the time they swore the oath on May 25 1819. The Constitution had a life beyond 1819. The Republic of Tucumán, made up of today’s northern Argentine provinces, adapted it as their own constitution. *El Tucumano Imparcial* wondered why the government had fallen earlier in the year, perhaps race had something to do with it? Even the “blacks” in Haiti had managed to establish a form of government. It was quickly translated in London, Paris, and Leipzig, printed in an abbreviated format in a US American paper, and reprinted in Madrid along with Bolivar’s Angostura Address. US editor Hezekiah Niles thought that the outlines he had seen of the Constitution “boldly strike for freedom”. The French translator saw it clearly as a republican document, and dedicated his work to Lafayette and the spread of universal republicanism. French law students were presented it as a model constitution for study. Friends and critics read the Constitution in South America, the US, Spain, Great Britain and France, and wider Europe, it was, after all, new material for the cycle of transnational circulation and adaptation of constitutions.

84 For Funes’ appendix to the Constitution, see Walton, *Constitution of the United Provinces of South America*, 65.

85 *El Tucumano Imparcial*, 14 August 1820, No.1. For the edition published in Leipzig, see Karl Friedrich Hartmann, *Die Spanische Constitution Der Cortes Und Die Provisorische Constitution Der Vereinigten*
Chapter Three
“\textit{A sublime but hazardous extension of our political system}”: \textit{hemispheric integration, economic independence, and Clay’s Sistema Americano}

Manuel Pizarro, a merchant born in Toro, Spain but resident in Mendoza, South America was in trouble. Like everyone born outside Spanish America residing in the United Provinces following the promulgation of the 1817 Provisional Constitution, Pizarro had to apply to gain the status of citizen or be excluded from a host of benefits inaccessible to mere residents. But Pizarro had not given “decisive proofs of his adhesion to the \textit{Sistema Americano}.” Hundreds of other residents born outside Spanish America also submitted their own applications, each one a personal declaration of independence from the Spanish monarchy. Up north in the United States, US congressman Henry Clay would first coin the phrase ‘American System’ in 1820 to define a new set of legislation such as a National Bank, protectionist tariffs, and internal improvements such as roads and canals, a set of policies which extended the federal government’s powers to intervene in the domestic economy. But well before Clay first used the term ‘American System’, residents of the United Provinces, from merchants to \textit{pulperos} (bar and storekeepers), were cataloging evidence to support their claims to ‘adhesion’ to the ‘American System’. But what did ‘American System’ mean for \textit{Rioplatense Americanos}, and what implications, if any, does their usage of the phrase have for our understanding of Clay’s ‘American System’? This chapter will first consider and account for the similarities and differences between the \textit{Sistema Americano} and Clay’s ‘American System’, and then explore a literature produced in the US which detail how and why US Americans should integrate with the Americas, a literature that Clay read and served as a programme of legislation.

There is a growing body of literature that notes the connections between Clay’s congressional activism for recognizing South American independence and his domestic policies that form the core of the ‘American System’. Despite the various ways Sexton, Fitz, Lewis, Morley and Campbell explore the convergence of domestic and international issues relating to and the overlapping meanings in the creation of ‘American Systems’, the mainstream understanding of Clay’s ‘American System’ remains a purely domestic one. Despite these works, it would be fair to say that the hemispheric aspect of Clay’s ‘American System’ is still not well understood, given that we have been recently advised not to
confuse “Monroe’s foreign policy ‘American System’ .... with Henry Clay’s American System, a domestic economic programme consisting of tariffs, internal improvements, and a national bank, originally proposed in 1824.” This chapter builds on the existing works that complicate Monroe’s hemispheric policy with Clay’s American System in a few ways. First by pointing to the similar problems and sentiment across the Americas when crafting economic policies. Second, by explaining why US Americans looked to South America as the emerging world market, and finally how and why US and Spanish Americans crafted policy solutions in order to integrate the US economy into hemispheric commerce.  

Henry Clay, a House Representative from Kentucky, Speaker of the House of Representatives, and of the republic's leading orators, is credited most often as being the leading architect of the ‘American System.’ Clay is also notable as being an early champion of Spanish American independence, vocal in his call for immediate recognition. These two parts of Clay’s politics are most often treated separately. Clay outlined the hemispheric dimensions of his ‘American System’ legislation across speeches made in 1818, and in 1820, the year he first used the phrase ‘American System’, a system which sought to achieve via the creation for a national bank (achieved in 1816), a protectionist tariff to encourage the growth of US manufactures (achieved in 1816, but a further attempt failed in 1820), and federally funded internal improvements, a contentious project due to its doubted constitutionality (which, in general, were funded by the States, rather than the federal government). While Clay would champion an ‘American System’ to end economic dependency on Great Britain, Rioplatenses were looking to create a Sistema Americano that would secure political independence, and, ironically, in order to do that, place themselves under the same type of economic dependency on Great Britain that Clay wished to end.

Following the new regulation of the Congress of the United Provinces that people born outside of Spanish America were not automatically citizens, hundreds of applicants

bought into the idea of América and formally declared their attachment to the new order of things. Across hundreds of citizenship applications, there are some commonalities from which we can begin to understand their own idea of an ‘American System’. All express, at times formulaicly, their ‘adhesion’ to the system. There was enough flexibility in the application process to express different ideas of what kind of system potential citizens were adhering to. Some were adhering to an ‘American System’, but others were committing to a ‘Patriot’, ‘Liberal’, ‘National’, or ‘Independence ‘System’. From these documents, it's clear that América was synonymous with the patria, independence from Spain, exercising the rights of a ‘nation’ to trade, and liberal commerce. Some applicants offered their own short list of grievances and complaints against colonialism, similar to those sections of the United Provinces Manifiesto of Independence, or the US Declaration of Independence. The United Provinces, according to Francisco Manuel Gandia, were declaring independence from “ungrateful and unjust European Spaniards”. For José Joaquin Amenabar, the “just rights” of América would be sustained by new and “wise governments”. Amenabar did not mean individual human rights, but the rights of a community to declare themselves a nation, independent and free “from the Spanish Government”. For both José Banos y Flores and Father Fray Ramon, independence was the “just cause” of América. Freedom to trade was the 'liberty' Americanos sought, and both Julian de Amenabar and Carlos Ruana declared their “deference for the liberal system”. To complete their personal declarations, applicants announced the severance of ties with Spain and recognized the United Provinces. Juan Gonzalez declared his “absolute renunciation of subjection to the Spanish monarch” while Francisco Fernandez made clear that he “recognized” the sovereignty of the United Provinces, which was more than any nation had been prepared to do by 1818.87

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87 We should be wary of any document produced when its author is motivated by financial interests. The applications might not be genuine expressions of attachment to the idea of a patriotic system. But it seems likely that the documents do demonstrate the applicants’ genuine sense of belonging. The applications offer us an approximation of how ordinary residents understood their role in the “new system”. First, many hundreds if not thousands of Spanish-born residents must not have submitted applications in 1818; if the financial rewards were so great, they mostly failed to respond as the government of the United Provinces did not see a corresponding influx of applications. Additionally, the process was rigorous. Applicants had to undergo questioning from local officials and provide an abundance of written evidence, often dating back to the early days of the revolution in 1810, demonstrating activities consistent with good citizenship. All of the citizenship application data referenced here is taken from AGNA, ‘Cartas de Ciudadania’, X-7-1-6. The documents are unbound and unpaginated, so a more precise reference is impossible, henceforth any quotes referring the citizenship applications can be found in this folder. The applications are mostly from 1818.

Applicants used the phrase ‘American System’ and other variants on the theme; for example
Why, then, were Rioplatenses talking about sistemas americanos? The choice of the word Americano is the most obvious to explain. As the documents show, América was synonymous with patria or nation. As Gerbi catalogues, an extensive European literature surrounding the degeneracy of the Americas had appeared in the eighteenth century, accompanied by counter-arguments by Americanos arguing against both the idea that animals and humans degenerated in the New World and that European colonialism was justifiable by their superiority. This ‘American’ identity, and not national identities, which were later created haphazardly and with varying success, animated Spanish American insurgents. It is clear, however, that América was as much an idea as it was a patria for those applicants born in Europe or US and British America. A common set of sources that US and Rioplatense Americanos referenced supporting the rights of and enthusiasm for América. Thomas Paine’s writings were widely referenced, and the translator’s of Paine’s works to Spanish made an important decision to translate America as ‘América.’ When Paine had spoke of America, he meant North America only. This natural choice to decide Paine meant hemispheric América translated the meaning of the US Revolution as significant for the whole hemisphere.

Consequently, Rioplatenses embraced the cause of American potential with enthusiasm, and referenced US Americans as brethren Americanos. A typical example of this is Larrañaga, an intellectual of the Banda Oriental. His oration commemorating the opening of a public library listed the kinds of books contained for Montevideanos to consult. Readers could look up their “rights” in the constitution of Britain in Blackstone and in collections of translated US Constitutions, and understand the principles of North

"adhesion to the American System" (Juan Gonzalez), "my adhesion to the American System" and "the American independence system" (Juan Fransisco Pensado), "the sacred system of liberty and independence of América" (Ruperto Albarelos), "system of national independence" and "system of independence of America" (Jose Joaquin Amenabar), "adherent to the system of América" (Jose Banos y Flores), "the American System (Manuel Pizarro), "new system" (Jose Antonio Garcia), "system of liberty" (Ruperto Albarelos), "adhesion to our system" (Jose Banos y Flores), "our system of liberty" (Pedro Ramos), "liberal system" (Julian de Amenabar), "our system of liberty" (Padre Fray Ramon), "our system" (Juan Jose Bellido), "adhesion to the liberal dogma" (Juan Gonzalez), "addict to the system" (Antonio Mont), "the new system" (Carlos Pozo), "system of the country" (Manuel Bos Puchatto), "system of the patria" (Manuel Rincon y Escudero), "liberal system" (Carlos Ruano), "patriotic system" (Thomas Thelar or Taylor), "patriotic system" (Ramon de Villa), "system of liberty and independence" (Vincente de Bustos), "system of civil liberty" (Juan Manual Hernando), "our system" (Domingo Jose Llano).

Paine refers to the continent of America as one eighth of the habitable globe. North America makes up 16% of the world’s surface, around one-eighth (which would be 12.5%). But South America, at 12% of the surface, means that the Americas in total equals 28%, which is greater than two-eighths of the globe. Thomas Paine, Common Sense, 1776, 32.
America from a book of Paine’s writings. With these resources, the city of Montevideo could reach the wisdom of “the most cultured cities”. With similar resources the “United Provinces of North America” had produced so many eminent men within a “few days”. US Americans were global leaders in the various fields of knowledge; Adams and Hamilton in science of government, Franklin in physics, Winthrop in astronomy, Ramsay in civil history, Jefferson in the natural sciences, and had made world leading discoveries; the conductor of Franklin, the planetarium of Rittenhouse, the wheat mills of Evans and the steam machine of Rumsey. The discoveries of these Americanos, however, would never eclipse Washington, who “will be always the most brilliant star of América.” For Larrañaga and many others, the new ‘American’ system would bring about enlightenment and realise the potential of Americanos.  

But why did the Americanos need a system? The idea of ‘System’, as Clifford Siskin argues, was a “genre” of the late enlightenment. From Linnaeus’ “natural system” to the French philosophes’ Encyclopedias, the Enlightenment had sought to systematize useful knowledge. But this type of system, the ‘American System,’ is in the same vane as the ‘colonial system’, or Napoleon’s ‘Continental System’. It was, like physiology, a kind of systems analysis, an attempt to understand how the parts operated to create the whole. As Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations had pioneered, the study of the interrelating policies of colonial empires could explain their varying wealth. Policies, operating in tandem as a system could achieve policy goals. Napoleon’s ‘Continental System’, for instance, served a policy goal by starving Britain of export markets on the continent. The Rioplatense Sistema Americano and Clay’s American System were designed to preserve and further political or economic independence.

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89 Dámaso Larrañaga, Escritos de don Dámaso Antonio Larrañaga: los publica el Instituto Histórico y Geográfico del Uruguay, (Montevideo: Imprenta Nacional, 1922): see 136-144 particularly.
of colonial empires could explain their varying wealth. Policies, operating in tandem as a system could achieve policy goals. Napoleon’s ‘Continental System’, for instance, served a policy goal by starving Britain of export markets on the continent. The Rioplatense *Sistema Americano* and Clay’s American System were designed to preserve and further political or economic independence.90

The replies that the applicants gave reveal that they thought that the State wanted its patriots to ensure their public displays of commitment to the *patria*. Several applicants stressed that their public conversations, or public readings of printed material, had furthered the *sistema americano*. Spanish colonial society had been made up of a large populace who remained illiterate, and relied on oral transmission of information. Not only were conversations and readings about the efforts of the State to achieve independence, and how the inhabitants could support their efforts, essential to making active citizens, but such public displays of support countered either Spanish European propaganda against independence, or printed or manuscript propaganda that was circulated from dissenters such as Artigas or Carrera. Juan Francisco Cabo emphasized his willingness to converse with “all classes” and that he read the papers in public. Banos y Flores had engaged in continuing conversations in support of independence, and sustained opinions against European “enemies of the system”.

Ending colonial practices and building public support for the independent government in Buenos Aires was part of the system. Though the United Provinces’ main aim when constructing a system of government was to finance the insurgent war against Spanish Loyalists, and to preserve independence. One consideration above all underpinned this aim: capital. The viceregal government in Buenos Aires had relied on remittances from the export of silver from Potosí to the metropole to fund its government. With Potosí under the control of the Spanish Loyalists, the state was starved of finance and the economy was starved of specie. The new system of government, then, was geared towards finding new taxable sources of revenue, and acquiring specie for circulation. The chronic shortage of specie was detrimental to the future stability of the union itself. *El Censor* warned that local communities in Chile and Perú had begun to solve the specie problem by coining their own currency out of non-silver substances such as copper, lead

and even wood and earth. What seems a genius local solution to the problem frightened the editor of *El Censor*, who thought it could form the basis of the fragmentation of the union. If each community refused to accept the coinage of the other, interprovincial trade would fragment and the union would cease. To solve this problem, the state created a British style National Bank to distribute paper money, a measure that did not go without criticism, which is also true of the United States. Further policies sought to establish a mining company in La Rioja, one territory that the United Provinces *did* hold under its control still, and later to found a new mint in Cordoba, in order to coin this new source or precious metals. Puerreydón, like Clay, justified his economic policies on the basis that to achieve a “full independence”, it was essential to undo the “system of our previous oppressors.”

But immediate capital shortages were solved by forced loans from merchants. The most common way citizenship applicants replied to the challenge of demonstrating their adhesion to the *Sistema Americano* was to document their willful contributions to forced loans, voluntary donations of capital, or some other means of providing service towards financing the State. Juan Francisco Cabo gave a 100 peso loan and a later loan for 1500 pesos. Ruperto Albarellos had given contributions and loans "without opposition". Juan Manuel Hernando included a cut out of the *Gazeta de Buenos Ayres* which recorded that he had given gold to the state. José Joaquin Amenabar had collected taxes and contributes and offered “personal services” to the state gratis. Contributions were often big, but small contributions counted too. Domingo Cabezas provided a certificate showing he donated twenty pesos voluntarily. Ramon de Villa’s argument that he had given services that had “been in the sphere of his scarce resources” was accepted as a legitimate one. More direct contributions to sustaining the insurgency were possible. Juan Francisco Cabo contributed by giving weapons as the state “lacked arms”. Francisco Fernandez was willing to “resist with arms”.

* Rioplatenses were also creating a new economy. Domingo José Llano showed his activism in destroying the colonial economy by his willing to “commerce with the

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Republicans”, an act which demonstrate his “liberal ideas”. One applicant, Ruperto Albarellos, successfully argued that his economic connections with the Spanish peninsular had meant that he had been unable to be a “public defender” of the Sistema Americano until now, against his wishes. This individual’s reliance on European commerce for sustenance was the Rioplatense state’s own problem on a national scale. In order to find a new source of financing for the state, the United Provinces turned to foreign merchants, especially the British. The custom duties on the import of British manufactures would provide a source of revenue. While Henry Clay’s American System was calculated to end economic dependency on British manufactures, as we will see, Rioplatense exigencies meant that placing themselves under British economic dependence was the obvious solution. Like Clay, some Rioplatenses saw this new Sistema Americano as an opportunity to undo the legacy of colonial economic inheritances by using protection to stimulate manufactures. Saladeros (producers of salted beef for export) argued that “below the colonial system, industry slept in a slumber” and blamed Spanish imperial policy since 1762 for the underdeveloped Rioplatense economy. El Censor concluded that the lack of agriculture and manufactures meant that the provinces must have been “oppressed”, and suggested that the United Provinces could quickly industrialize, compared to the US where trees needed burning and ground clearing, in order to end the “strange” dependency on abroad for things like cheeses and butter. Hat makers, like their counterparts in the US, pleaded protection for the good of the country, arguing in similar terms of the “necessity, utility, and advantages that will result for the country” if their factories were protected by tariffs, while Mendocino wine growers printed pamphlets supporting raised tariffs against imported wine, which they compared to Bostonians rejecting imported tea from Britain at the start of the US American revolution. Unlike the United States however, those seeking protectionism to undo the colonial inheritance as part of the Sistema Americano were to be disappointed. It was imperative to continue exporting raw materials Europeans wanted in order that custom duties on things like European wine and British textiles would fund the central government.93

93 Representación de Los Hacendados de Buenos Ayres, Al Exmo. Supremo Director, Para Al Restablecimiento de Los Saladeros, Exportacion Libre de Todos Los Frutos Del País, Arreglo Del Abasto de Carnes, (Buenos Ayres: Impr. de Niños Expositos, 1817): 9, 28; El Censor, 4 July 1818, No. 146; El Censor, 19 December 1818, No. 170; Levene, Documentos del Congreso de Tucuman, 184; Representación Que Los Apoderados de Los Hacendados de Viñas de La Provincia de Cuyo Han Hecho Al Excmo. Señor Director de Las Provincias-Unidas Del Rio de La Plata, (Buenos-Ayres: Imprenta del Sol, 1817): 22.
Hundreds of applicants were granted citizenship because of their adhesion to the system, including Manuel Pizarro, the hopeful applicant who could not demonstrate his adhesion to the “American System.” The consequence of Rioplatenses also speaking of ‘American Systems’ is that it might be profitable to consider Clay’s advocacy of the same phrase as a similar response to the exigencies of postcolonial state formation. In fact, this chapter argues it is only possible to understand the meaning of Clay’s ‘American System’ in a hemispheric context. Not only were Rioplatense Americanos dealing with similar problems, and offering comparable policy solutions as their counterparts in the United States. But interest in new South American markets acted as a stimulus for the creation of Clay’s American System. Often Clay’s policy ideas are defined as an inward-focusing, domestic turn towards creating a home market by policies such as tariffs, internal improvements, and a national bank. But Clay’s original ‘American System’, as expressed in 1820, meant the integration of the US economy into the Americas. Only by understanding Clay’s ideas in the context of his interest in the Spanish American insurgency can we get towards a fuller understanding of its origins and purpose. By understanding the US as a post-colonial and economically dependent state similar to others emerging in the Americas, this chapter offers a different analysis of the ‘American System’ circa 1820; which should be defined as a system designed to integrate the US into the Americas in order to reduce exposure to uncertain markets by changing the shape of trade circuits, creating a complementarity of sectional interests and ending economic dependency, in order to preserve the union.

* It is generally agreed that following the War of 1812, a wave of economic ‘nationalism’, of which Clay’s American System was a part, swept over the United States. But the word ‘America’ had different meanings in the United States challenging our understanding of the post-1815 ‘American’ economic nationalism. Brackenridge, the 1818 US Commission’s secretary, had pointed out that the appellation ‘American’ had fallen peculiarly on the United States, due to being the first “of the colonies” to declare themselves an independent governments. But the Spanish American revolutions were forcing US Americans to
reconsider the character of their neighbours, who they had previously assumed to be Spaniards, but now looked as if they were also fellow Americans. As Niles explained in his weekly register, US Americans did not use “of America” to mean “of the United States”. This was a specific usage of British merchants, who broke down markets in the western hemisphere by region, such as the markets of ‘America’ [i.e the US], ‘South America’, ‘Canada’, or ‘West Indies’. For Niles, US Americans referred to themselves only ‘as citizens of the United States’, whilst ‘America’ and ‘Americans’ meant the whole hemisphere. The exclusive overlap of the United States and ‘American’ did not exist for many. Their attachment to América was greater, literally, than the boundaries of the United States. 94

It was possible for US Americans to imagine their identity as a hemispheric one. Shared histories and geographies could be found or made. Several works attempted hemispheric histories, tied together by common themes of European settlement and colonialism, though often with separate narratives for British and Spanish America. Geography, too, could be a source for the advocacy of one América, rather than two. Morse’s geographies were frequently reprinted with American hemispheric-centred world maps, helping to perpetuate the idea of a ‘western world’, in this period meaning the Americas, separate from an ‘eastern world’; Eurasia and Africa. There was speculation that the Andes might extend throughout all the Americas, and that the Rockies actually connected down through Mexico, Central America until South America. José Correia da Serra, the Portuguese minister and active participant in US intellectual life, wrote in the American Philosophical Society’s Transactions of the amazing fertility of Kentucky, the land between the Alleghenies, the lakes, and the “Andes”. This was, however, wishful thinking on the part of proponents of an integrated America. According to a history which asked its readers to study the separate history of “North America” only, it was a “mere theory to think the mountains of North America connected to the Andes.” 95

95 For hemispheric histories, see Richard Snowden, The History of North and South America: From Its Discovery to the Death of General Washington, Volume I (Philadelphia: Benjamin Warner, 1819); John Lendrum, A Concise and Impartial History of the American Revolution : to Which Is Prefixed, a General History of North and South America, (Trenton: Re-printed and published by James Oram, 1811); W. D Cooper, Cooper’s Histories of Greece and Rome, of South and North America, (Plymouth, Massachusetts: Joseph Avery; Belcher & Armstrong, Printers, 1808). See the maps that separate the world into two hemispheres in Jedidiah Morse, The American Universal Geography: Or, A View of the Present State of All the Kingdoms, States and Colonies in the Known World, (Charlestown: Published by Lincoln & Edmands, 1819). For the Andes bordering Kentucky, see Da Serra, ‘Observations and Conjectures on the Formation and Nature of the Soil of Kentucky. By J. Correa de Serra - Read, April 21, 1815’ in Transactions of the American Philosophical Society: Held at Philadelphia for Promoting Useful
Niles’s location in Baltimore perhaps explains his hemispheric understanding of América. As the port closest to South America that connected US manufactured goods from the north and mid-Atlantic states to the hemisphere, Baltimore stood to gain the most from inter-American commerce. Baltimore supplied Buenos Aires with flour, and more importantly with privateering vessels and crew. After the close of the War of 1812, the shipbuilding and privateering activities of Baltimore needed new markets, and the South American independence struggle was the obvious solution. Many of the veterans of the War of 1812 joined a small exodus of US Americans offering military and naval services to the Patriots. It was easy for the two conflicts to merge into one as they moved between an anti-colonial war against Britain to a similar one against Spain. While many of the privateers served for purely financial reasons, David Head demonstrates that politics motivated many of those involved. US Americans applications are found among the citizenship papers at Buenos Aires. Juan Chase explained that he was in the service of the United Provinces as one of America’s “sons to defend it from all continental invasion”. Thomas Taylor, who held US citizenship, but potentially was born on Bermuda, was sailing in “defense of the liberty of América” and was among the persons adhering to the “patriotic system”, defending the “patria from the Spanish government.” Baltimore privateers belonged to América, not the United States.  

These privateers served as a connective point between South America and

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Knowledge, Volume 1, (Philadelphia,1818):174. For the denial that the Andes were also in North America, see John Talbot, History of North America, Volume 1, (Davies, and Company, 1820): 172. John Kidd, too, had also denied that the Andes and the Rockies were joined, see John Kidd, A Geological Essay on the Imperfect Evidence in Support of a Theory of the Earth, (Oxford, At the University Press for the author, 1815): 145-146.

Baltimore. They travelled between the two with prizes, and carried the latest printed materials to editors in both halves of the hemisphere. Baltimore editors frequently made use of the ‘coffee house’ books. Located in the Baltimore Merchant’s Exchange building, the coffee house served as an area in which merchants, privateers, and editors could mix and where one could go to use the library of books on South America and read the latest pamphlets and newspapers from the region. Niles’ printing house was at one point located next to the exchange, and he frequently references the “coffee house books.” Consequently, Baltimore offered the most detailed information on how to convert the US economy to produce exports for hemispheric outlets. Niles, for instance, reprinted British instructions for the navigation of the Rio de la Plata in order that US captains would also have access to the best information to avoid shipwreck in the difficult waters surrounding Buenos Aires and Montevideo. The most detailed information on commercial integration came from Hezekiah Niles, Baptis Irvine, Manuel Moreno, Vicente Pazos, Manuel Torres, Henry Marie Brackenridge, and Theodorick Bland, all of whom lived or had lived in Baltimore and published their works either in Baltimore, Washington DC, Philadelphia or New York. All of these men were US Americanistas, and their enthusiasm for hemispheric integration found publication in a corpus of works on the subject. Niles’ Weekly Register, Irvine’s Strictures, Pazos’ Letters on the United Provinces of South America, Torres’ An exposition on the commerce of Spanish America, Bland’s report on Buenos Aires and Chile, and Brackenridge’s Voyage to South America, all of which were read by Henry Clay and shaped the formation of his ideas of an ‘American System’.

But why should the US integrate with the Américas? The answer is the potential value of Spanish América when fully cultivated. US Americans with soil depletion in the Atlantic States and acres of western land often frustratingly inaccessible from ports due to geographical barriers, looked on with envy at their southern ‘brethren’, who they admitted

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97 For the ‘Coffee House Books’, see Laura Bornholdt, “Baltimore and Early Pan-Americanism: a Study in the Background of the Monroe Doctrine,” (Smith College Series Studies in History, 34, 1949): 25. Brackenridge and Bland were both part of the 1818 US Commission to South America (see chapter one). Brackenridge’s published an account of the mission, which caused Irvine, a newspaper editor a friend of Bland, to publish a lengthy rebuttal in Strictures. Strictures was written with the aid of Manuel Moreno, a Rioplatense revolutionary and editor. Both Moreno and Vicente Pazos, also a Rioplatense editor, were exiled from Buenos Aires in 1817, and settled in Baltimore - though Pazos moved considerably during his time in the US. Pazos published a series of letters to Henry Clay with information on the United Provinces. The kind of information Pazos provided built on the publications of Manuel Torres, a Venezuelan enthusiast for Spanish American independence who had settled in Philadelphia in 1796 and connected Spanish Americans with his contacts among the US American elite.
had the greater rub of the luck in terms of the land they inhabited. They were even prepared to attribute this blessing of fertile land with ready “communication” to markets by endless rivers to God’s providence, an idea normally reserved for the United States itself. US Americans read that those natural canals were “the gift of a bountiful providence”. Onís, the Spanish minister to the US, when arguing against US recognition, tapped into these ideas of a providential blessing to stoke up US American fears that South America would eventually eclipse the United States in wealth and power. It being “beyond question” that Mexico had a more temperate climate, richer soil, and greater and more abundant natural “productions”, an independent New Spain would deprive the US of future immigrants and the vivifying “commerce of these states.”

It was generally agreed that South America offered astonishing potential. It was the emerging market in the world. Buy why did South America offer so much potential? Carta Esferica, a map of the Rioplatense river system drawn and printed in New Haven in 1819 offers a clear indication of the interest. It contains all the details we would expect US commercial interests to look for, such as the names of rivers and the soundings. But its level of detail is surprising. The map is bilingual, clearly to be marketed for a South American audience as well, and it shows with great precision the networks of dozens of tributary rivers which ‘water’ the Banda Oriental and spread upwards to Paraguay. The map shows a region whose future value as an exporter would be tremendous, with thousands of acres of uncultivated land, and also crucial supplies of wood needed for ship building, a resource becoming increasingly scarce in the US. All of this within easy access of navigable rivers taking exportable crops to ports on the Atlantic. Not only were the navigable rivers attractive, but the diversity of climates shaped understandings of the future market value of Spanish America. Because South America spread across several latitudes, its variety of climates offered a great diversity of ‘productions’.

Just how great a market did South America offer? US Americans were happy to engage in speculation about the size of the market they might have access to, if they could

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supply the right goods. Bland’s Report, one of the documents produced following Monroe’s 1818 Commission, estimated with specificity the future value of the Chile and Pacific coast trade at “six millions one hundred and fifty eight thousand dollars.” Strictures predicted the commerce of “South America and the Pacific....may soon be worth 15 or 20 million dollars a year to this nation.” This projected value for US commerce in South America was but a slice of the total calculated value. Manuel Torres’ *An Exposition* calculated the total exports to be valued already at close to $100 million.\(^{100}\)

In fact, América offered perhaps unlimited potential to house all the world’s “productions” inside herself. This could be realized via the experimentation in the Americas with seeds from around the world. David de Forest, the US-born citizen of the United Provinces, when on a trading voyage in French Guiana, noted that Indian spices such as nutmegs, cloves, and cinnamon, were growing in the colony as a result of an order from the French monarch. He collected branches of each spice tree himself to take back to his “own Country” where he longed to establish a plantation, and commended the French monarchy’s instructions to handplant these spice trees; “An excellent thing for America”. As pointed to in chapter one, the 1818 Commission to South America resulted in new exchanges of seeds. These exchanges, such as growing Chilean wheat in the United States and Georgia South Island cotton in Paraguay, at first glance might seem calculated to reduce hemispheric integration. If staple crops that would have been imported to the United States from South America were now growing in the US, there would be no necessity to trade? Perhaps, but countercyclical trade, given the harvest seasons were reversed in the different halves of the hemisphere, would mean trade was still beneficial. Further, these kinds of experiments can be seen as attempts at specialization on a hemispheric scale, rather than the global scale called for by economist David Ricardo.\(^{101}\)

Indeed, this potential was so great that the Americas could be a world enclosed in itself. This often seems to be a kind of unspoken assumption in the arguments surrounding the Americas. Europeans, however, were more explicit, not least because realizing hemispheric potential would reduce, or even stop, European commerce in the Americas. América stretched through all the “five zones”, meaning that it possessed “every


\(^{101}\)‘Journal Number 4 1804-1805’, 50-52 in ‘Folder 7’, MSS 177, De Forest Family Papers, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University.
variety of climate, soil, and productions which the earth affords”. Having “two summers and two winters in the year”, compared to Europe’s one, allowed for greater self-sufficiency. European paranoia went further and probably helped US Americans to understand the benefits of integration posed for themselves and the dangers it presented to Europe. One *Sketch of the United States* argued that the “United Americans”, that is, US Americans, were trying to establish the independence of not only the Antilles, but all of America. This, for Europe, would be catastrophic. Not only did Brazil, Peru, and Mexico produce much of what Europe could, it also produced much which Europe could not, like coffee. “America, consequently, stands in no need of the productions of Europe, but the latter cannot do without those of the former”. As the source of the world’s precious metals, the independence of América from Europe would re-orientate the centre of world commerce from the Mediterranean to America.102

Whilst some thought that Buenos Aires offered the most promising market for US commerce, others had become convinced that the dissolution of the Spanish Empire, and the inevitable decoupling of Brazil and Portugal, would reorient world commerce towards the American Pacific seaboard. Theodorick Bland’s report, Brackenridge’s *Voyage*, Pazos’ *Letters* and Irvine’s *Strictures* all advocated a future Pacific-oriented world economy. Bland understood that the colonial system created unnatural trade flows to serve the metropolitan centre. A liberal commerce, Bland argued, allowed articles to take the most “natural” trade route, by which he meant the most profitable, which he understood to be the shortest route, and he had spent a great deal of time gathering notes on the distances between towns in order to show that Potosí’s silver would flow to the nearest ports on the Pacific. This silver, as specie, was believed to have been the source of European “industry”, and would now stimulate the Pacific rim economy instead. Bland identified three trade routes in the Pacific, all of which would be supported by access to Chilean ports. Chile would also support the US settlement on the Columbia River, supply the settlement with essential goods and providing a market for the settlement’s staples, ship’s spars and lumber.103


103 MFPOTUS1818-B, 114-121.
Brackenridge’s *Voyage* agreed that the “table lands” around lake Titicaca, capable of supporting “twice the population of France”, would send its produce via the lake to the Pacific. The new circuits those goods would take by the aid of steam-boat was too “rash” for “conjecture”, but fortunately the “city of Washington” would only be thirty of forty days away by steam from La Paz. Pazos rejoiced that the collapse of the Spanish empire would now allow the project dreamed of for “three centuries”, the Panama Canal, which would change the course of navigation to “the east” towards the Americas. Mexico and Peru would trade its precious metals for US and European manufactures, and Asian silks and spices. The US stood to benefit more than Europe due to its proximity to Mexico. *Strictures* outlined US trade routes that still involved European manufactures. US staples such as tobacco would be traded in Europe for manufactures suitable for the Buenos Aires and Pacific coast trade. After proceeding around cape horn, touching at “Conception, Arica, Guayaquil” and perhaps the Columbia River settlement, vessels would then take seal skins and sandalwood to Canton.\(^4\)

These new potential markets were particularly attractive to Westerners like Henry Clay, who stood to benefit from new markets for their agricultural surplus. The Western Review projected a future where “our sister America [South America] shall be what we are now” [an agricultural republic], whilst the United States, given its earlier independence, will have expanded to the Pacific. North America would be connected by “a thousand sails unfurled on Columbia’s bosom” to beyond the Rocky Mountains, where a crowded population shall “ply its busy labours”, and “the star spangled banner will wave on the ramparts of splendid cities erected on Pacific’s shore.” This version of the ‘American System’ did not end in creating an enclosed domestic market, but creating a North American inter-state commerce sitting firmly between and connecting Atlantic and Pacific world trade. Historians normally argue that the Lewis & Clark voyage killed off the idea of a internal Northwest passage, but Jeremy Robinson, an observer in Chile and appointed by Monroe’s as one of his hemispheric agents, understood that the joint Prevost-Biddle mission was sent by Monroe to secure the Columbia River settlement with the view that future internal improvements would connect the Columbia and Missouri rivers. The Western Review obviously agreed, given it saw itself as connected to the future US Pacific

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by “sails” though on the bosom of Columbia. Funchion has recently argued that the ‘American System’ meant Kentuckians, who earlier had a “translocal imagination” which connected them with the wider world, re-imagined themselves as a sub-national region within the United States. But this vision of a Pacific oriented and hemispheric system is consistent with earlier ideas which imagined Kentucky as the future centre of the globe, having “on all sides a communication with the whole globe” allowing it to be the “emporium and protector of the world.”

Considering South America led to an appreciation that the Americas had been part of a ‘colonial system’ Brackenridge’s *South America* letter quoted an English article which described the Americas, in their former status burdened by the monopoly system, as “little more than kitchen gardens to their own mother countries.” Not only was South America a useful market to integrate into commercially, it was an imperative concern for US American economic independence. The British ‘colonial’ system was worryingly extending itself. An article like “The Empire of Commerce” was typical of these fears. The British, using the “European system” of colonialism, already had a foothold in South America via Brazil, an informal colony. Brazil would be even more dependent on England as it found itself “amidst a new galaxy of republics- touched by them on the south and the north and the whole of the eastern base of the Andes.” With Brazil as puppet, England could array the new republics against each other, and “gain command of the riches and power of that vast and only half explored region.” US commercial activity in the Americas was essential for stemming European encroachment. *Strictures* warned that both the Russians and English were sending squadrons to California or the northern Pacific, and Spain would grant Britain some combination of Cuba, Manila, the Philippines, or some points on “the shores of La Plata, or the pacific.— Mark my words” Irvine warned. An American System would be a counterpoint to the increasingly powerful British ‘colonial system’, a part of Henry Clay’s thinking that remained until at least 1832.

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105 *The Western review and miscellaneous magazine*, Volume. 2, (Lexington: Kentucky, Published by William Gibbes Hunt, 1820); 104. For Robinson’s ideas on a northwest passagge, see Jeremy Robinson to James Monroe, 29 July 1819, Dispatches from Special Agents of the Department of State, 1794-1906. Vols.5-6, Microfilm Publication: M37, Reel Number 3, RG59, Records of the Department of State: “The trade with China may carry down the Columbia rivers to the Western countries down the Missouri and Mississippi Rivers by boat and steam boat navigation.” John Funcion, “Reading Less Littorally: Kentucky and the Translocal Imagination in the Atlantic World.” Early American Literature 48, no. 1 (2013): 84.

Anti-colonialism had been a starting point for the manufacturing interest. As Peskin points out, the advocates of increased manufactures in the United States had coalesced around the introduction of Merino sheep. The ‘merino-mania’ was not only about enriching the United States. There is an obvious anti-colonial aspect too. Spain had held a monopoly on merino, threatening anyone who exported the sheep from the peninsular with death. Introducing merinos into the United States would reduce the wealth of the Spanish nation, provide raw materials for manufacture in the United States, and then allow commerce to carry those materials to where Spain usually found markets for them. Weakening the Spanish Empire strengthened the independence movement of the insurgents in Spanish America.107

How would inter-American integration affect the US economy? Hemispheric commerce would stimulate manufacturing in the United States. Pazos’ Letters provided a detailed assessment of the kind of goods marketable in Peru, and the goods that the United States could procure there in return. He noted that “if the United States shall participate in this trade, their manufactures shall thereby be encouraged.” Only “foreign” and not “domestic demand” could make manufactures flourish in the United States, Pazos warned. US manufactures such as coarse cottons, ships, leather, furniture, hats, castings, nails, and carriages had a competitive advantage over every other nation in Peru. Irvine’s Strictures built on Pazos’ assessment of US articles suitable for commerce in South America. Arguing Pazos had been too reserved, he listed seventy-two distinct items that US merchants could profitably export to South America, and added that he was “confident that any Yankee trader could make the list a third longer” This kind of information, the lists of marketable articles, had already been provided to US merchants by David De Forest. In anticipation of starting a commercial house in Buenos Aires, he planned a trip through the US; “I expect to visit all the commercial towns North of Virginia.” Indeed, only those middle and northern state ports had the manufactures that De Forest listed in his designs in the River Plate, see Irvine, Strictures, 147-148. For the transfer of parts of the Spanish Empire to Britain, see Irvine, Strictures, 145. For Henry Clay’s anti-colonialism remaining until 1832, see Calvin Colton, and Henry Clay, The Life, Correspondence, and Speeches of Henry Clay, Volume V, (New York: A. S. Barnes & Company, 1857): 453-454.

letters as suitable for export to Buenos Aires.\textsuperscript{108}

New markets in South America offered another stimulus to US manufacturing; incredible competition. Monroe’s hemispheric agents were discovering on the ground what US Americans were speculating back home. Worthington pondered in his writings back to the US that South America would become the United States’ main competitors, “I have no doubt of it”. Staple goods were at risk “Where can they grow finer Tobacco & cotton than in Paraguay?”, whilst “wheat, flour, and almost anything in Chile” could be produced and “tobacco, sugar, rice &c.” would be exported from Peru. Worse still, Chile’s abundance of precious metals, and its ability to attract silver from Potosí, would mean that it would capture the East India and China trade, not the US.\textsuperscript{109}

Increased competition would still further weaken the ability of US agricultural surplus to find European markets, which had proved dangerously unstable. In contrast, South America offered the United States the opportunity to reduce exposure to unstable Atlantic markets. Foreign markets were unstable not least because of potential disruptions in transatlantic trade. European warfare had disrupted trade across traditional transatlantic patterns. Even if Europe was to be stable in the future, the US’ faster rate of population growth would mean correspondingly that US agricultural surplus would rise faster than European demand. Additionally, the current commercial activity of the United States was overly dependent on exports to Britain. John Melish’s \textit{Letter to James Monroe} noted that British policy was to secure their cotton supplies from their “colonies and dependencies”. In future, southern and southwestern cotton would not find a market in Britain, which would be supplied entirely by cheaper cotton from India, the West Indies and South America. South America, in contrast, would, by stimulating manufactures, diversify the post-colonial US economy; two markets are better than one, and “three are preferable to two.” Rather than the “existence” of the US resting on “contingencies”, South American integration would, by stimulating domestic circulation and internal commerce, ensure that US independence should no longer “be trusted to winds, waves, foreign whims and


The aim of the new American system was for agriculture surplus to be manufactured in the US, rather than supplying the raw materials to British manufacturers. The goal was not to create a hermetically sealed domestic trade; the end was world commerce. Carey's *The New Olive Branch*, asked:

“Would not broadcloths from Young's or Dupont's manufactories- or shirtings and sheetings from Shneck's or from Waltham, load a vessel as well, and pay as good a freight, as from Leeds or Manchester? Would it not be at least as profitable to themselves [merchants]...to export cargoes of home made goods to South America?”

Hemispheric integration could stimulate an ailing commerce in the United States. Clay’s speech on the tariff in 1820 pointed to the problems the commercial interest in the United States faced. US commerce had been unnaturally stimulated by the “convulsions” in Europe. US neutrality had allowed US American merchant vessels to capture a large portion of the world’s carrying trade, and disruptions to the traditional patterns of trade had driven demand for US agricultural surplus. By 1820, Clay could predict that the European Congress-system would stabilise Europe for the foreseeable future. This would mean the US would lose its position as carrier of European goods as a neutral nation. The consequent spare capacity of US commercial vessels could be filled by supplying “South America” and other international markets with manufactured articles.

Not only did the South American trade offer massive commercial opportunities, but it offered a *better* kind of commerce. *Strictures* argued commerce was harmful to republican societies, and offered evidence to show the negative effects of US commerce. Internal, homespun trade would have been better to preserve republican “simplicity” and

“virtue”, but the the US commercial habit was beyond the “rubicon”. Current trade flows had introduced luxury, “monarchical ideas”, and “extravagant habits.” The European trade stole the US’ “native wealth”, while the China and East India trade withdrew much needed specie from US circulation necessary for internal trade, and brought back “unwholesome luxuries”, presumably such unrepublican items as silk garments. The South American trade was, in contrast, “productive”, calculated to bring back safer articles, such as precious metals and agricultural goods. Matthew Carey agreed current commercial flows were having a negative effect. They “deluge their native country with foreign goods, drain it of its specie, and destroy its productive industry” as oppose to a South American trade where US manufactures were exported and specie imported.\(^\text{113}\)

Integration within the Américas would enhance domestic exchanges in the United States. For Irvine in *Strictures*, commercial integration would stimulate US domestic “agricultural industry”. The silver mines of Potosí still contained unlimited silver. This, when coined, would enter the United States, removing the injurious “paper coinage” issued by aristocrat banks bent on subverting republican institutions. Increased 'specie payments' would aid commerce by multiplying exchanges or quickening circulation. It is difficult to underestimate the importance of specie to domestic exchanges. The US had found it difficult to establish its own coinage as a medium of exchange. In New England, State-chartered bank notes acted as the circulating medium, but through the rest of the country, foreign coinage, mainly Spanish pesos had continued to be the means of exchange, particularly in the western states and territories. In the Missouri territory, the Spanish peso was the *de facto* currency. When specie shortages occurred, exchange became near impossible. The solution, paper money issued by banks backed by specie reserves, had a limited impact. Banknotes suffered depreciation of value as more and more banks had turned out to have issued banknotes without adequate specie reserves. This problem was exacerbated by supercargoes in the commercial states who demanded Spanish milled peso coins to use in the China trade. The US had become *the* main supplier of Spanish peso coins to China, where the coin was the ‘silver standard’ used in China’s own domestic trade. This drained specie from the Western to the Atlantic states, in order that commercial voyages could exchange specie for Asian manufactured clothing. Spanish pesos circulating in the United States made it easy to understand that the US had


Inter-American commerce would offer further benefits. An ‘American System’ would allow the republican states of the Americas to act as mutually supporting allies against European ‘despotism’. Pazos outlined the benefits of commercial exchange. The “two Americas”, “rich in resources”, would erect a formidable barrier against the encroachments of European tyranny. The US could achieve this by a “close connexion with their sister Republics in the south” and with an alliance protecting the welfare of both parties. The alternative, was a hemisphere of monarchies, and the transplantation of the dismal system of European warfare. Indeed, some were prepared to go further. Hemispheric América might not just mean commercial integration, but political integration. Isaac Briggs, a US federal government engineer who produced data used for the creation of the 1816 Tariff, suggested in obscured phrasing in which “those whom I address can understand me”, that in response to Spanish American independence, “I think we ought to stand prepared to avail ourselves of a passing good, when it can be lawfully offered to our acceptance.” If Briggs seemed to think Spanish America could join the union, others advanced that the United States itself could join a larger hemispheric confederation, whose government would be based at Panama. These kind of suggestions forced hemispheric integrationists to differentiate themselves from their more enthusiastic US Americanistas. Brackenridge had to make clear that he was not one of the visionaries who wished to see a government at Panama, suggesting that the idea was common enough to require this clarification. He offered a milder version of hemispheric political integration, independent governments would “form a chain of confederacies, united by a thousand communities.” When Clay first introduced his hemispheric system idea in a congressional session of March 1818, he immediately become confused with those who
advocated full political integration. Forsyth, speaking against Clay, argued that incorporating Buenos Aires into the union would be “a sublime but hazardous extension of our political system” that risked the security and happiness of the US people themselves.\footnote{115} 

South America, as pointed out by US and Spanish American observers in US printed materials, was a stimulant to seek policy solutions to create this ‘American System’. Indeed, Clay’s interest in recognizing South America had meant that he was keeping track of all the literature being published on the region, which allowed him to absorb the logic of inter-American integration in order to form an ‘American System’. Pazos’ Letters had been addressed to Henry Clay, and Vicente Pazos sent Clay a copy himself. Clay wrote Pazos to thank him for his copy, which he had not received as he had been touring in New Orleans, where he had seen Pazos’ book everywhere, especially on the steamships. Clay knew Manuel Torres personally, who he described as a “South American of very extensive information”, especially on this “quarter of the globe”, and was commendable for his anxious devotion “to the Independence and Liberty of his Country.” When Torres had crafted a new plan for the Bank of the United States to make use of the “precious metals”, Clay introduced Torres to Langdon Cheves, the Bank’s president, and recommended Torres’ plan to Cheves. Clay’s papers also show that he read Strictures, Brackenridge’s Voyage, and the 1818 Commissioners’ reports. His 1820 speech on a minister to Buenos Aires also confirms that he had been reading either original copies of Buenos Aires newspapers, which was not improbable, or translations in US newspapers, when he stated that “he never saw a question discussed with more ability than that in a newspaper of Buenos Ayres, whether a federative or consolidated form of government was best”.\footnote{116}

\footnote{115 ‘Agriculture, Manufactures, &c.’, Niles’ Weekly Register, 3 February 1816, 9:231, 389. For plans for a hemispheric confederation in Panama, see William J Thornton, Outlines of a Constitution for United North and South Columbia, (Washington City, 1815); An American, South America: A Letter; 34, 8; ‘Mr Forsyth’s Speech’, Niles’ Weekly Register, 2 May 1818, 14: 348, 156. 
116 Henry Clay to Vicente Pazos, 27 July 1819, in PHC:2, 701-702; On Manuel Torres, see Henry Clay to Langdon Cheves, 13 December 1819, PHC:2, 278; On reading Strictures, see Henry Clay to Henry Marie Brackenridge, 7 March 1820, in PHC:2, 789; On reading Brackenridge’s Voyages, see Henry Clay to Henry Marie Brackenridge, 28 August 1819, in PHC: 2, 704; On reading the commissioner’s reports, see Henry Clay to Caesar A. Rodney, 22 December 1818, in PHC:2, 618. On reading Rioplatense newspapers, see Annals of Congress, House of Representatives, 16th Congress, 1st session, 2228.}
What then did US Americans need to do to effect this desired integration? US Americans engaged in an early form of international political economy. They sought to understand the relationship between domestic economic policy, the productions of the United States, and how those productions would fit into the changing geopolitical landscape, a landscape most notably being reshaped by the loosening of European colonialism throughout the Americas. Policy and government regulation could achieve these ends. There was a newness to this form of thinking. Baptis Irvine described this as “geographico-commercial inquiry”.¹¹⁷

Tariffs would protect US manufacturers from foreign competition. By raising the price of imported articles, tariffs would protect US nascent manufactures from European competition. These manufactures could then either find a market at home or be exported to South America. The National Register had argued that the Chilean trade would be “encouraged and promoted by increased protection.” In fact, both the 1816 and the 1820 tariff were calculated to protect manufactures which would then find markets in South America. Niles pointed to Isaac Briggs as a key in the design of the 1816 Tariff. Brigg’s report to Congress concludes that “South America” would be the market for manufactured goods. Similarly, in 1820 Clay predicted that US agricultural surplus would continue to be exported to Europe, still bringing in European manufactures despite the tariff. These European imports, if they found competition with US manufactures, could be re-exported to “South America”.¹¹⁸

Internal improvements connecting the Western and Atlantic States would create a complementarity of interests and bind the two sections together. Canals and roads would change the shape of flows of articles. The Erie Canal, for instance, was promoted as preserving the union by recharting goods from the northwest to New York rather than Canada. Without artificially enhancing the territory to create ‘union’, western goods would increasingly flow to New Orleans. This created two hazards for the union. Firstly, the US’ weak military protection of New Orleans could encourage rival powers to occupy it as part of their empires, as US Americans suspected the British had intended during the War of 1812. Secondly, without any commercial connections, the West might feel no interest in continuing a union with the Atlantic States, and form a separate confederacy, in order to

¹¹⁷ Irvine, Strictures, 110.
¹¹⁸ ‘Agriculture, Manufactures, &c.’, Niles’ Weekly Register, 3 February 1816, 9:231, 389; ‘Speech on the Tariff’, 26 April 1820, HPC:2, 832.
set their own commercial policies. By connecting suppliers of raw materials to manufacturers in the Atlantic States, both sections would feel a joint interest in the prosperity of the other, and agricultural and manufacturing interests would be harmonized, rather than antagonized. Western agriculturalists needed the US to find new markets for their goods, and were consequently the most enthusiastic for South America. Fitz calculates that the highest frequency of Fourth of July toasts for Spanish American insurgents was in the West. It is not accidental that Western agriculturalists in communities aspiring to build canals connecting themselves to the Mississippi renamed their town Bolivar.¹¹⁹

A National Bank, the third traditional element of Clay’s American System, would facilitate exchanges. By establishing a regular and plentiful supply of coinage for domestic usage, the Bank of the United States would allow the exchange of goods from the agricultural sections of the union to the manufacturing sections. This provided the basic framework for diversifying the productions of the US, and allowing them to circulate to more stable internal and hemispheric markets. Additional legislation that supported an ‘American System’ was regulation of Western public lands. For example, Congress gave land grants to French agriculturalists in Alabama on the condition that they grew olives and grapes. The consequences of this kind of policy is easy to imagine. Growing olives and grapes in Alabama could lead to the manufacture of wines and oils in the US, rather than from Europe, withdrawing European commercial vessels, and thus Europe’s pernicious interest from the Américas, while leading to at once a reduction in European power and increase in that of the hemisphere. Reshaping trade flows was smart anti-colonial activism.¹²⁰

Like the Sistema Americano in the River Plate, Clay insisted that the ‘American


¹²⁰ ‘Lands Allotted to the cultivation of the Vine and Olive’, American State Papers, Senate, 17th Congress, 1st Session, 472-474. The Rural Magazine reprinted advice from the National Intelligencer recommending the cultivation grapes for manufacture into wines, brandies, and dried fruits, as complementary to the project of raising tariffs for the “encouragement of our agricultural and manufacturing industry.” This was in response to the “East Indian and South American cotton” that greatly injures “our markets.” See The Rural Magazine, and Literary Evening Fire-Side, Volume 1, Issues 1-12. (Philadelphia: Richards and Caleb Johnson, 1820); 69.
System’ in the US included the behaviour and spending patterns of citizens, right down to the level of households. As the citizen of the United Provinces’ individual actions could shape a new system by supporting liberal commerce, Clay pointed to households like that of Isaac Shelby. Shelby’s household had mixed agriculture with manufactures. The whole family was usefully employed by the spinning wheel or the loom, or in the dairy. Every member of the family was ‘clad in their own hands’. This all contrasted with the household dependent on the “store”, where the man is at the tavern, of with his lawyer planning “depositions” or “injunctions”. Ordinary citizens could reshape colonial dependencies by their consumption habits. The consequences of European clothing was the moral degradation of the American character; wives and daughters “flirt[ing] about in their calico and muslin gowns”. If the hemisphere’s independence relied on virtuous citizens, European style-goods introduced European habits and tastes.\footnote{\textit{Speech on the Tariff}, 26 April 1820, \textit{HPC}:2, 834.}

The end result of a hemispheric ‘American System’ would be the preservation of the union. David Armitage has recently argued that the significance of the US declaration of independence in a global context was not the statement of human rights and equality, but its outlines for a new system of independent states. Given the failure to make progress on the equality of men due to the persistence of slavery, contemporaries understandably thought that the significance of independence was a new state system for the world. But independence meant not just independent states, but unions of states. Rather than solve what Lewis describes as ‘the problem of neighbourhood’ by empire, or the balance of power system constructed by ‘entangling alliances’, the union of states under federal forms pointed the way to human happiness. Clay’s American System was calculated to preserve this system of union for posterity. Being too heavily enmeshed in the British colonial system had almost rendered the union asunder during the War of 1812. If Carey’s \textit{Oliver Branch} had smoothed over party political tensions, his new work looked to rid the United States of the source of those tensions. Carey’s \textit{New olive branch} began by comparing a table illustrating the chain of effects stemming from "PROTECTED" and "UNPROTECTED" domestic manufactures. The end result of protected domestic manufactures was "cordial attachment to a good government," contrasting with an ‘unprotected’ nation where “disaffection” towards government was the conclusion.\footnote{David Armitage, \textit{The Declaration of Independence : a Global History}, (Harvard University Press, 2007). \textit{Carey,The New Olive Branch}, front matter, unpaginated.}
By 1820, when Clay first used the phrase ‘American System’ the Kentuckian congressional leader had been forced into an early political retirement to recover his finances depleted by the Panic of 1819. Clay had two major successes in building his ‘American System’ in the House of Representatives. Both the Tariff and the Minister for Buenos Aires had passed the House, though both failed to make it through the Senate. Clay reflected on this as success. A coalition of the majority of the population’s representatives had been built, but there was more to do. Clay’s ‘American System’ activities did not end with retirement. He maintained correspondence with the Navy Commissioners in Washington. One of the commissioners was David Porter, the US Americanista and advocate of Chilean recognition. Clay wrote the Navy Commission on behalf of a manufacturer with a query about the possibility of Kentuckian hemp being manufactured into sails for the use of the navy. Rogers, one of the navy commission, replied back with details on how to manufacture, and confirmed that the commission would like to spend more money in “the western country”. At a Lexington public dinner in June 1820, Clay reflected on his activities in Congress, working for internal improvements, manufactures, and South American independence. He also re-evaluated the Monroe administration’s policy. On South America, Clay had supposed the administration differed greatly from his own views, but now he considered the difference was “rather as to the time and the mode, than as to the substance.” He now admitted that the administration had been working towards the “the same great end” by negotiating with European powers for a joint recognition of independence. This was perhaps more “prudent” than Clay’s “deliberate” policy. Whilst the executive paid regard to other nations, Clay had wished for “a course exclusively American” (emphasis added).123

123 Henry Clay to John Rodgers, 24 June 1820 and John Rodgers to Henry Clay, 8 July 1820, in PHC: 2, 875, 877; “Toast and Speech at Lexington Public Dinner”, 7 June 1820, PHC:2, 869-870.
### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AGNA</td>
<td>Archivo General de la Nación, Argentina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLC</td>
<td>Library of Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MFPOTUS1818-A</strong></td>
<td>President of the United States, <em>Message from the President of the United States at the Commencement of the Second Session of the Fifteenth Congress, November 17, 1818, Read, and Ordered to Lie Upon the Table</em>, Washington, E. de Krafft, 1818.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHC</td>
<td>Hopkins, James F, eds. <em>The Papers of Henry Clay</em>. University of Kentucky Press,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendices

#### Appendix 1: Monroe’s Hemispheric Agents 1817-1820.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>AGENT(S)</th>
<th>PLACE</th>
<th>PURPOSE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1817-1818</td>
<td>Rodney, Graham, Bland, Brackenridge</td>
<td>Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Chile, Island of Margarita</td>
<td>&quot;To obtain information from South America on all subjects the United States might be interested in&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1817</td>
<td>William Worthington</td>
<td>Buenos Aires, Chile, Peru</td>
<td>&quot;To establish and promote commercial relations with Buenos Aires, Chile, and Peru.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1817</td>
<td>Jeremy Robinson</td>
<td>Buenos Aires, Chile, Peru</td>
<td>&quot;To establish and promote commercial relations with Peru&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1817</td>
<td>James Biddle, John B. Prevost</td>
<td>Columbia River, Lima, Chile, Buenos Aires.</td>
<td>“To proceed via Cape Horn north along the California coast to the mouth of the Columbia River, take peaceful possession of that area in the name of the United States, return to Lima and Buenos Aires and there obtain general information regarding the condition of the respective countries.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1818</td>
<td>Baptis Irvine</td>
<td>New Granada</td>
<td>&quot;To obtain restitution for property taken from citizens of the United States or to obtain from Venezuela indemnity for its loss.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1819</td>
<td>Oliver H. Perry, Charles Morris</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>&quot;To convey the good wishes of the United States to the Governments of Buenos Aires and Venezuela; to explain the stand of the United States&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
on neutrality; and to protest acts of piracy committed under South American flags and the destruction of United States property”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Agent</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1820</td>
<td>Charles Todd</td>
<td>New Grenada and Venezuela</td>
<td>“To obtain information concerning New Granada and Venezuela; the promote friendly relations with these countries; and to obtain indemnity for claims.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix 2: The Cost of Hemispheric Agents 1817-1820

The total cost of the US 1818 Commission has been calculated by totalling the expenses related to those who travelled with it, and the provisions supplied from Baltimore. This is the minimum possible total. The figures have been extracted from US public documents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agent</th>
<th>1817</th>
<th>1818</th>
<th>1819</th>
<th>1820</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COMMISSION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Graham</td>
<td>7000</td>
<td>7172</td>
<td>5500</td>
<td>(3820.72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caesar A. Rodney</td>
<td>6555.56</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theodorick Bland</td>
<td>2550</td>
<td>6000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. M. Brackenridge</td>
<td>??</td>
<td>1484.48</td>
<td>??</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Beatty</td>
<td>2640.39</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miles King</td>
<td>460.16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Breese</td>
<td>542.61</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing provisions?</td>
<td>??</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER AGENTS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John. M Forbes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2250</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

124 Public documents do not break down the cost of the USS Congress’ expenses, for example. The State Department’s accounting seems less than perfect. ‘?’ donate an expense that other sources show was claimed, but was not publicly declared. There are some irregularities, for instance why did John Graham get paid so much?

125 An Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of the United States. For the Year 1817, (Washington: E De Krafft, Printer, 1818); An Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of the United States. For the Year 1818, (Washington: E De Krafft, Printer, 1819); An Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of the United States. For the Year 1819, (Washington: E De Krafft, Printer, 1820); An Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of the United States. For the Year 1820, (Washington: E De Krafft, Printer, 1821).

126 This was a cost incurred as minister of Brazil, and has not been used to calculate the cost of the commission.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Amount 1</th>
<th>Amount 2</th>
<th>Amount 3</th>
<th>Amount 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>George Graham</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>828</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baptis Irvine</td>
<td>1250</td>
<td>2192.02</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Morris</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John B Prevost</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>2300</td>
<td>3350</td>
<td>6100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George C. Read</td>
<td></td>
<td>521.99</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles S. Todd</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3975</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William D. Worthington</td>
<td>1250</td>
<td>5664.11</td>
<td>1545.94</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix 3: US Americans in the River Plate before 1820
This list is by no means exhaustive. There are no reliable censuses from which to construct such a list. The data has been collected from a variety of sources. I have cited for each one primary or secondary document which serves as evidence of the individual being a US American in the River Plate. I have left the name spelt as most commonly found in the sources; many US Americans hispanicized their names while in Spanish America.

1. Silas Atkins
   a) *Documentos Para La Historia Argentina, Tomo XII*, Buenos Aires: Compania Sud Americana de Billetes de Banco, 1919: 127.
2. William Baldwin
3. Antonio Balls
   a) *Gazeta de Buenos Ayres*, 7 March 1818, No. 61: 155-156
4. Captain Barnes
   a) ’Diary Feb-Apr. 1818’, in Peter Force Collection (Jeremy Robinson Papers), Reel 62, DLC.
5. John Bickford
6. Henry Marie Brackenridge
   a) Brackenridge, Henry Marie Brackenridge, *Voyage to South America: Performed by Order of the American Government, in the Years 1817 and 1818, in the Frigate Congress*, Volume I, Baltimore: Published by the Author, 1819.
7. Alejandro Bret
   a) *Documentos Para La Historia Argentina, Tomo XII*, Buenos Aires: Compania Sud Americana de Billetes de Banco, 1919, 194.
8. Theodorick Bland
   a) Bland Papers, MS 134 H. Furlong Baldwin Library, Maryland Historical Society
9. Guillermo Bon
   a) *Documentos Para La Historia Argentina, Tomo XII*, Buenos Aires: Compania Sud Americana de Billetes de Banco, 1919, 130.
10. Francisco Bond
11. Felipe Bueno
   a) *Documentos Para La Historia Argentina, Tomo XII*, Buenos Aires: Compania Sud-Americana de Billetes de Banco, 1919, 190.

12. Daniel Carson

13. Jorge Carpinter
   a) *Documentos Para La Historia Argentina, Tomo XII*, Buenos Aires: Compania Sud-Americana de Billetes de Banco, 1919, 124.

14. Juan Chase
   a) AGNA, ‘Cartas de Ciudadania’, X-7-1-6.

15. Commodore Chaytor

16. Juan Coon
   a) *Documentos Para La Historia Argentina, Tomo XII*, Buenos Aires: Compania Sud-Americana de Billetes de Banco, 1919, 192.

17. Samuel Curson
   a) Miss.551.3.M56, Meteorology Collection, American Philosophical Society.

18. Ezequiel Damricle
   a) *Diego Barros Arana, Historia General de Chile: Tomo XI*, Santiago de Chile: Editorial Universitaria, 1999: 71

19. Andres Davis
   a) *Documentos Para La Historia Argentina, Tomo XII*, Buenos Aires: Compania Sud-Americana de Billetes de Banco, 1919, 192.

20. David DeForest
   a) De Forest Family Papers, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University.

21. Julia DeForest
   a) De Forest Family Papers, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University.

22. John Devereux

23. John Dieter

24. Mr Dunn
   a) ‘Diary Feb-Apr.1818’, in Peter Force Collection (Jeremy Robinson Papers), Reel 62, DLC.

25. Carlos Eldredge

26. Tomas Esmich
   a) *Documentos Para La Historia Argentina, Tomo XII*, Buenos Aires: Compania Sud-Americana de Billetes de Banco, 1919, 194.

27. Jona H. Falconar
   a) Falconar Papers, Furlong Baldiwn Library, Maryland Historical Society
28. Juan Fellows  
a) Diego Barros Arana, Historia General de Chile: Tomo XI, Santiago de Chile: Editorial Universitaria, 1999: 71

29. Guillermo P. Ford  
a) Gazeta de Buenos Ayres, 7 March 1818, No. 61: 155-156

30. John M. Forbes  
a) Despatches from U.S. Consuls in Buenos Aires, 1811-1906, Microfilm Publication: M70, Reel Number 2, RG59, Records of the Department of State.

31. George Fracker  

32. Luis Gardanero  
a) Documentos Para La Historia Argentina, Tomo XII, Buenos Aires: Compania Sud-Americana de Billetes de Banco, 1919, 130.

33. Enrique Grant  
a) Documentos Para La Historia Argentina, Tomo XII, Buenos Aires: Compania Sud-Americana de Billetes de Banco, 1919, 200.

34. George Green  

35. Eduardo Guels  
a) Documentos Para La Historia Argentina, Tomo XII, Buenos Aires: Compania Sud-Americana de Billetes de Banco, 1919, 200.

36. Mr Guyer  
a) 'Diary Feb-Apr.1818', in Peter Force Collection (Jeremy Robinson Papers), Reel 62, DLC.

37. Thomas Halsey  
a) Despatches from U.S. Consuls in Buenos Aires, 1811-1906, Microfilm Publication: M70, Reel Number 2, RG59, Records of the Department of State.

38. Mr. Hibble  
a) 'Diary Feb-Apr.1818', in Peter Force Collection (Jeremy Robinson Papers), Reel 62, DLC.

39. Henry Hill  
a) Henry Hill Papers, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University.

40. Richard Hill  
a) David de Forest to Henry Hill, 2 February 1813, in 'Folder 15', Box 3, De Forest Family Papers, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University.

41. John Higginbotham  
a) Gazeta de Buenos Ayres, 7 March 1818, No. 61: 155-156

42. Matheo Arnaldo Hoevel  
a) Documentos Para La Historia Argentina, Tomo XII, Buenos Aires: Compania Sud-Americana de Billetes de Banco, 1919, 273.

43. Richard Hughes  
a) Sala X, X-1 -4-14, AGNA.

44. Mr Hyde  
a) 'Diary Feb-Apr.1818', in Peter Force Collection (Jeremy Robinson Papers), Reel 62, DLC.

45. Diego Jackson  
46. Captain Jenkins  
a) The Berks And Schuylkill Journal, 4 July 1818, Reading, Pennsylvania, 3:5,3;  

47. David Jewett  

48. Juan Jhepard  
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   a) Allen White to William White, 4 September 1818, Legajo 7-1-6-4, Sala 7, AGNA.

95. William Worthington
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96. Juan Zimmerman

97. An American Lady, married to a Brazilian merchant named Mr Cadiz
   a) 'Diary Feb-Apr.1818', in Peter Force Collection (Jeremy Robinson Papers), Reel 62, DLC.

98. Fransisco (Tailor, Free Black person)
   a) *Documentos Para La Historia Argentina, Tomo XII*, Buenos Aires: Compania Sud-Americana de Billetes de Banco, 1919, 141.

99. Juan, (Carpenter in Matanza, Buenos Aires Province)
   a) Legajo X-8-10-4, Sala X, AGNA.

100. Proprietor of 'Hannahs House', presumably a US American named Hannah,
    a) 'Diary Feb-Apr.1818', in Peter Force Collection (Jeremy Robinson Papers), Reel 62, DLC.
A “native” from New Orleans
102-121. "20-30” American Operators in Juan Thwaites’ beer factory

Appendix 4: Comparison of the Constitutions of the US (1787) and United Provinces (1819)

**Powers of Congress**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1819 Rioplatense Constitution</th>
<th>1787 US Constitution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Art 32</strong> to enact decrees of war and peace</td>
<td>Art. 1, sect. 8 To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>33</strong> to establish duties, and for a time not exceeding two years, to impose contributions proportionately equal in the whole territory of the state.</td>
<td>Art. 1, sect. 8 raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money for that use shall be for longer than 2 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>34</strong> fix, according to proposals of executive power, number of sea and land forces needed for time of peace</td>
<td>no equivalent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>35</strong> order national navy to be built and equipped</td>
<td>Art. 1, sect. 8 to provide and maintain a navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>36</strong> to receive loans on the funds of the State.</td>
<td>Art. 1, sect. 8 to borrow money on the credit of the United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>37</strong> to regulate the form of all trials, and establish tribunals inferior to the High Court of Justice.</td>
<td>Art. 1, sect. 8 to constitute tribunals inferior to the supreme Court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>38</strong> to create and suppress offices of all kinds</td>
<td>no equivalent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **39** to regulate interior and exterior commerce | Art. 1, sect. 8 To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, among the several States,
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Art. 4, sect. 3</th>
<th>Art. 4, sect. 3, similarities powers granted, but power shared between the US Congress and State Legislatures.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Art. 1, sect. 9</td>
<td>Art. 1, sect. 9 No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another; nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no equivalent</td>
<td>no equivalent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art. 1, sect. 9</td>
<td>Art. 1, sect. 9 No money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law; and a regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art. 1, sect. 8</td>
<td>Art. 1, sect. 8 to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times, to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their respective writing and discoveries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art. 1, sect. 8</td>
<td>Art. 1, sect. 8 to coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin; and fix the standard of weights and measures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art. 3, sect. 2 The judicial Power shall</td>
<td>Art. 3, sect. 2 The judicial Power shall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supreme Court Jurisdiction</td>
<td>Supreme Court Jurisdiction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
from foreign nations; of those in which a province may be a party, or which may arise between Province and Province, or towns of the same Province, regarding limits or other contested rights; of those which may arise out of contracts between the Supreme Government and individuals; and, finally, of those concerning public functionaries, treated of in Articles 20 and 28.

extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority; to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party; to Controversies between two or more States; between a State and Citizens of another State; between Citizens of different States; between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
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