THE NATURE OF
CHRISTIAN MYSTICISM
IN THE THOUGHT OF BARON
VON HÜGEL AND GEORGE TYRRELL

by

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ABSTRACT

This thesis seeks to establish the place of Baron von Hügel and George Tyrrell in the revival of interest in mysticism at the beginning of the present century. Though leading figures in the modernist movement in the Roman Catholic Church, their collaboration on the subject of mysticism was central to their friendship and work. They helped to retrieve the central concerns of mystical theology after a retreat from mysticism which had affected the Church since the condemnation of Quietism in 1699. Their account of Christian mysticism, which involved a critique of Buddhism, neo-Platonism and pantheism, rested on a world-affirming attitude to creation, a balance between divine transcendence and immanence and the articulation of a legitimate panentheism. It also involved a positive acceptance of the bodily-spiritual unity of human nature and ordinary experience as the locus of mystical encounter with God.

Their account also emphasised the reality of direct contact between God and the individual, and the affective and cognitive dimensions of mystical experience. They asserted the centrality of mystical union as a dynamic communion of life, love and action which is the primary goal of the Christian life. They emphasised the necessity of contemplation, understood not as passive inaction, but as a profound energising of the soul. Asceticism, the embracing of suffering, self-discipline and a right ordering of human affection, was also judged indispensable. Moreover, they believed that only in the context of the intellectual and institutional elements of religion, does mysticism find its true theological locus in Christian life and reflection. Their comprehensive definition of mysticism opened up the possibility of understanding both the uniqueness of Christian mysticism, and the reality and value of non-Christian forms of mystical experience as genuine encounters with the divine. Accepting a universal call to mysticism, they held the mystical way to be the way to full humanity which is also the individual's realisation of divinity.
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INTRODUCTION

MODERNIST RESEARCH AND MYSTICAL THEOLOGY

Research on the subject of modernism has become such a 'growth industry' that even ten years ago it had reached the stage of 'bibliographies of bibliographies' and 'research about modernist research'.[1] It is possible to speak of a 'renaissance in Roman Catholic Modernist studies' since interest in the modernist movement at the beginning of the twentieth century is reflected in numerous studies of the questions raised by continental thinkers such as Loisy, Labertthonniere, Le Roy, Duchesne, Blondel, Minocchi, and Buonaiuti. Attention has also focused on its historical connection with Liberal Catholicism and liberalising tendencies of later decades. The very range and complexity of the issues justifies Lash's description of the 'Modernist minefield'.

In 1964 Alexander Dru criticised Martin Clark's claim that the contribution of modernism to theology had been largely lost.[2] Dru maintained that modernism manifested the vitality of Catholicism at the time and he lamented the lack of an adequate history of modernism which acknowledged the 'wholesale transformation of thought' and the eventual 'revival which followed it.' Aubert described recent publications on modernism, stressing the interest in von Hügel and the nature of the repression sanctioned by the condemnation.[3] In 1970 Vidler returned to the subject he had treated in his major study in 1934 where he had been mainly concerned with Loisy and Tyrrell.[4] His description of modernism as a disparate phenomenon synthesised by Pius X, has been accepted by many scholars before and since. The later study was
concerned with the limited nature of modernism in England and 'lesser lights', such as the 'unrecognised modernist' Edmund Bishop.

More recently, John Kent surveyed the shifting perspectives in modernist studies, faulting Schoenl and Ranchetti for claiming Pius X to be the 'uncriticizable defender of the faith' though they regretted the repression and its consequences for Liberal Catholicism.[5] Kent claimed the case for Pius X was less easy to defend once Poulat had shown the Pope's personal involvement in Mgr Benigni's rigorous enforcement of integralism.[6] New ground was broken in modernist research by Daly's _Transcendence and Immanence_, rightly described as the 'best theological study of Modernism', not only for clarifying the term _modernism_, but for identifying the intellectual climate within which not only modernism but other contemporary movements can be better understood. Daly welcomed the emergence of theologians prepared to concede the 'theological importance of what the modernists were saying.'[7] Denying any substantial distinction between modernism and Liberal Catholicism, he questioned the accepted terminology and its clear application in terms of orthodoxy or heterodoxy, seeking rather to examine in detail what each modernist actually wrote.

When this is undertaken it becomes clear that Blondel, for example, combined an interest in mysticism and a profound commitment to intellectual renewal in the area of philosophy, with sharp criticism of modernism. Bremond was devoted to the mystical tradition yet sympathetic to Tyrrell's critique of Church authority. Abbot Butler avoided scriptural, philosophical and theological areas of study, prepared to 'fall back on mysticism and pietism.'[8] This focus on the specific writings of individuals is particularly important in the case of von
Hügel and Tyrrell who felt that mysticism presented the most effective means to theological renewal. Their works have been studied anew from a variety of perspectives and since Vatican II some have suggested that their writings anticipated emphases now accepted by ecclesiastical authority, including beliefs once rejected under the condemnatory rubric 'compendium of all heresies'. Though the appeal to the 'spirit of the Council' in support of hitherto heterodox positions is often less than convincing, Reardon has claimed that it was not so much 'Newman's Council', as some have suggested, but the Council which 'the Modernists, other than the most extreme, would gladly have welcomed if they had lived to see it'.

Thomas Loome, above all, has presented invaluable documentation and an impressive overview of the whole modernist question. Though criticised by Kent as 'the most rigorous attempt to release Liberal Catholicism from the embrace of Modernism', Loome's work has helped broaden the perspectives within which modernism must be understood and we have found many of his judgments accurate and persuasive. The major criticism of him centres on the claimed originality of his 'new orientation in modernist research', and his aggressive rejection of conclusions which differ from his own. His view of von Hügel as a modernist sui generis has been seen by some as a misguided attempt to free the Baron from the charge of heterodoxy. But Loome's contribution to modernist research is inestimable, a point of reference for all subsequent discussion. Characteristically, his criticism of Poulat and Rivière, showed their failure to acknowledge Tyrrell's early use of the term 'modernism' with its general connotation of 'modernity' rather than any specific theological associations. Tyrrell described himself as
a Liberal Catholic and the term *modernism* often implied simply an attitude of openness to modern thought and culture.

These studies and many others have been used in various degrees as necessary background to the present thesis. Though this is not a study of modernism, the modernist crisis remains the historical background and theological context for examining the place of von Hügel and Tyrrell in the revival of mysticism at the beginning of the present century. They have an enduring relevance for the Church not only because they perceived the need for a considered theological response to the intellectual and cultural shifts of the time, but also because they found that the Church's mystical tradition offered the most solid theological foundation for the re-appropriation and re-expression of Christian truth in a time of transition, when change seemed to threaten doctrinal and institutional expressions of religion.

There is a revisionism implied in the present approach since it demands a broader interpretation of the work of von Hügel and Tyrrell than has usually been offered. We have sought to place them and the questions they raised in context by reference to other writers on mysticism in the same period, and in the unfolding of that tradition in the present century. Though von Hügel and Tyrrell were different in a variety of ways, they were both deeply involved in modernism and critical of the manner in which ecclesiastical authority was exercised, though Loome rightly stresses von Hügel's fundamental loyalty to the spirit of Ultramontanism, however critical he was of some of its political manifestations. The Baron died in 1925, his life reaching far beyond the modernist crisis, and there seemed greater consistency and solidity in his personality and his work. Some of his later positions, which Loome
took to be the recovery of orthodoxy, were the fruit of reflection on the successes and failures of that movement. In the case of Tyrrell, his total involvement in modernism to the end of his life in 1909, determines and easily distorts one's assessment of his spiritual writings. The fact is that at the time of the modernist movement there was a distinct and definable mystical revival and their part in it is clear from their letters and published works. Quite simply, they believed mysticism to be the central religious question.

The relationship between modernism and mysticism is not explored in great detail here though it is accepted that their desire to retrieve the central concerns of mysticism is inseparable from their commitment to modernism. We shall explore rather the issue to which Marlé gave prominence in his *Au Coeur de la Crise Moderniste*, and which Whelan made the subject of a full length study, though he over-schematised von Hügel's thought and at times rendered it even more obscure by the use of contemporary 'theological' jargon.[13] Citing a letter to Blondel which reveals the Baron's awareness of being occupied with questions far different from those at the forefront of Loisy's or Le Roy's work, Marlé referred to 'those spiritual concerns' of the Baron which were 'always of still greater moment to him than the interest he took in discussion of a directly intellectual kind.'[14] This raises the question of the Baron's uniqueness among the modernists because of his attachment to mysticism. But we shall show that it was a concern which Tyrrell shared.

What follows is in some ways an attempt to rescue von Hügel and Tyrrell not only from the earlier tendencies of party historians but also from more recent tendencies which claim them as standard-bearers of liberal positions, rigidified and entrenched since Vatican II. Even
accepting Cowling's view that 'the past an historian needs is the past he wishes to propose in the situation that he is addressing', there remains the possibility of a submission to the facts which allows a story to be told which the actors in the story might themselves have recognised.[15] Loome claims that it is 'not without significance' that the Baron's *Mystical Element* was completed in the summer of 1907, only two weeks before the syllabus *Lamentabili* was promulgated. Moreover,

the picture of von Hügel (and, for that matter, of Tyrrell, who read and corrected the entire manuscript of over a thousand typewritten pages) engrossed in "Saint Catherine of Genoa and her Friends" in the midst of the Modernist controversy is not one that ought to be forgotten.[16]

The presentation and argument that follows has grown from the conviction that this observation establishes the fundamental starting point for a proper understanding of their most enduring contribution to Christian thought. Necessarily, this treatment places great reliance on primary sources: their works and the published and unpublished correspondence.

The importance of von Hügel and Tyrrell is to be found primarily in their overriding desire to recover and engage with the deepest and most abiding dimension of Christianity, its mystical tradition, in all its depth and richness. Their commitment to mysticism reminds us that only through a re-engagement with that mystical tradition and the life it offers can the Church renew itself and be of service to the world. Any aggiornamento which is to be more than superficial cosmetics must be rooted in living doctrine and a living community of faith which are nourished by a living spirituality. This is probably the only way through the present theological impasse, which by its very description in the political terminology of left and right, appears alien to the spirit of fraternity, truth and charity which should characterise the Christian Church.
CHAPTER ONE

MYSTICISM AND MODERNISM:
VON HÜGEL AND TYRRELL
AND THE MYSTICAL REVIVAL

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY REVIVAL OF MYSTICISM

At the height of the modernist controversy, the very year of its condemnation, Augustin Poulain's monumental scholarly work on mystical theology, *Des Grâces D'Oraison*, received high praise from Pope Pius X through Cardinal Merry del Val for its reliance on the 'incontestable doctrine of the old masters' and its presentation in a 'form that our age requires.' The first edition had been greeted by Cardinal Steinhuber in similar terms for its attempt to dispel the obscurities of the approved masters and reconcile their apparent contradictions, and for expressing their spirit in a language 'modern times demand.' These reactions, from official defenders of Roman theological orthodoxy who vigorously pursued the modernists, reflect the perception of mystical theology as a 'specialism' with its own tradition, language, interpreters and masters who were concerned with those 'souls aspiring to perfection.' They also reveal an acceptance of the need for a re-expression of mystical theology in terms intelligible to a new age.

Poulain's study, published in 1904, was one attempt among many to recover mysticism and assert its central place in Christian theology. Significantly, at the same time Baron von Hügel was hard at work, with the collaboration of George Tyrrell, on his monumental study of mysticism as illustrated by the life and teaching of Catherine of Genoa, a
laywoman, saint and mystic. In fact, Poulain had asked von Hügel to review his *Graces* though the Baron found it 'fearfully dry, and full...of the "intuition-essentially miraculous" nonsense, or at least something not unlike it.' [2] These studies were simply two instances of a great revival of interest in mysticism at the beginning of the present century.

Latourette has described the growth of mysticism in the late nineteenth century, a period which saw a marked increase in manuals of devotion, including what was 'technically known as mystical theology', which he defines with the help of Devine's *Manual of Mystical Theology*, as 'a science and experience that increases, extends, and perfects the love of God.' [3] He suggested that the repeated re-issuing and translation of devotional manuals and treatises and the 'spiritual classics' was 'evidence of the large and continuing numbers of those who engaged in the practices with which they dealt.'

However, Latourette's claim that in this emerging field Poulain's book replaced all others is an exaggeration. Poulain was indeed a 'great scientist of mysticism' who quarried the mystical writings of the past seeking their pastoral relevance for his own time, hinting too at the strides that would be made in the twentieth century in the study of mysticism. [3] Though an important landmark, the study was simply one instance of the revival. In 1906 and 1911 Abbot Butler reviewed the variety of writings which he took as a 'significant indication of the attention and interest' that mysticism was evoking, an interest which has not diminished in this century, taking a variety of forms, embracing philosophy, psychology and theology. [4] He criticised Poulain's excessive systematization, but praised von Hügel's study as 'closely compacted
original thought on the philosophy of religion' whose contribution was to
warn against the 'pursuit of a too exclusive mysticism.'

Referring particularly to the emergence of psychological and
neurological knowledge that would be utilised in the study of mysticism,
Johnston places Poulain in perspective, noting that he wrote when 'the
science of mysticism was on the verge of an earthquake that would shake
to its foundation and make his Teresian revolution look like a tiny
tremor.'[5] A further help to situate Poulain's work is Considine's
remark that it was concerned with the orderly evolution of the 'interior
life.'[6] This very terminology of interior life or inner life,
increasingly common at the time, reflects the impact of a revival of
spirituality, another significant term which itself had ceased to be a
reproach and had become a 'description of ways of prayerful piety'
suggesting a 'link with the ideas of ascetics or mystics.'[7]

Pepler's observation that during every period of human turbulence,
'enthusiasm flared up for mystics and mysticism', throws light on the
revival of mysticism at the turn of the century, even though this
period reveals more of a fin de siècle feeling of change and transition
rather than great turbulence.[8] Similarly, Woods has recognised that
the beginning of the century was the real watershed in the recent
history of mysticism. He claimed that the upsurge of enthusiasm among
many in the 1960's and early 1970's for a whole range of movements and
experiences offering a way out of war, racism, political corruption and
religious institutionalism, was itself linked to a growing interest in
mysticism which had its roots in earlier decades. He recognised that
this upsurge was 'little more than a sudden breaking on the shores of
popular consciousness seventy years after the tide of interest in mysticism began rising steadily.'[9]

Considine hinted at the complexity of this mystical revival when he noted the prevalence of 'Occultism and Theosophy and Spiritualism in its different branches.'[10] Similarly, when Benson noted 'of all phases in religious thought that at the present day are attracting attention, none is more prominent than that of Mysticism', he described the diversity of this interest: Christian and non-Christian, Mahatmas in London revealing The Way, lives of Catholic contemplatives by Presbyterian ministers, the appearance of Theosophical and Buddhistic societies given to its study.[11] Indeed, because of this diversity mysticism was considered by some merely a 'form of brain-weakness', and many Catholics too viewed it with suspicion or incomprehension. For this reason Benson felt it important 'at such a time as this' to say something of 'that strain of mystical thought which has always found a place in the Catholic Church.'

Since the beginning of the twentieth century many writers have recognised this revival of mysticism. Waite remarked in his 1906 Studies in Mysticism that mysticism had for long been something of a taboo subject, and that there had been a time when it was felt that every 'reference to the mystic life or its literature should be prefaced not so much by an apology for the undertaking as for a certain deficiency in taste.'[12] His belief that the situation had now changed was confirmed by others. In 1909 Algar Thorold observed: 'During the last ten years there has been a continuous stream of English books about mysticism, beginning with the "Bampton Lectures of 1899, and sympathy with this side of religion appears to grow steadily.'[13] In 1932 Dean
Inge himself looked back to his Bampton lectures on Christian mysticism and saw them as having coincided with 'the beginning of a great revival of interest in the subject.'[14] He further analysed that revival as a reaction to the generally contemptuous attitude of the nineteenth century to mysticism and its usual associations with foggy irrationality, cataleptic trance and what he called, rather sweepingly, the 'debased supernaturalism' of Catholic piety in Roman Catholic countries. Singling out Vaughan's *Hours with the Mystics*, he noted that even those who treated this neglected subject did so with an air of superficiality, mild mockery and incomprehension. This popular view of mysticism as a 'fog in which heresy conceals itself' was expressed in Gasquet's amusingly dismissive definition: 'begins in mist and ends in schism.'[15]

Inge felt that a more positive interest was to be found among continental philosophers and the Quakers who had continued to make 'valuable contributions to the literature of mysticism.'[16] And though his tone was critical, he acknowledged that in the Roman Church 'the study of mysticism has always been encouraged.' He identified two reasons for the recent revival. First, the renewed desire to acknowledge the apologetic weight of the *testimonium Spiritus Sancti* as the primary ground of faith. This grounding of an apologetic in the experience of the individual soul, an approach which lay at the heart of the mystical theology expounded in Christian tradition, was in fact one of the strongest connections between modernism and mysticism. His second reason was the emergence of the 'new science of psychology', associated particularly with James and the concern with religious experience. But he believed that since the chief interest centred on the states of consciousness it 'never penetrates to the heart of the subject.' Insisting that mysticism was simply and essentially about prayer, he consistently
criticised Catholic mysticism, and what he took to be its excessive interest in abnormal phenomena and the strangeness and oddity of the cloister. In placing his own book in the context of the revival of mysticism Inge also helps to situate other contributions. Admitting that his own interest was primarily philosophical, he noted that the recent study of the Christian mystics, especially those of the Roman Church, owed much to Evelyn Underhill. He also described von Hügel's 'great work on St Catherine of Genoa' as a 'storehouse of learning', and noted the work of Rufus Jones and other Quakers who had helped towards an understanding of mystical religion.

In a more recent study, Aumann sought the origins of the mystical revival in Germany earlier in the nineteenth century: 'the fact that at its very beginning the twentieth century was the scene of a sudden increase of interest in mystical questions and systematic spiritual theology may be attributed in large part to the writings of Joseph Görres and his German contemporaries.'[17] Though he develops this with reference to Preger, Hausherr, Weibel, Haver, von Bernard, Hettinger and Helfferich who wrote between the 1830's and the 1890's, such a historical judgment is questionable, and one which he implicitly corrects elsewhere. In terms of the early twentieth century re-appropriation of mysticism, the debt of the Christian Church was quite clearly to France, not only as represented by living witnesses to the mystical life such as Thérèse of Lisieux and Charles de Foucauld, but in the sense that the principal questions in mystical and ascetical theology were taken up chiefly by French theologians before and after the First World War.

This whole concept of a mystical revival needs to be set in historical perspective since it necessarily presupposes what Kelly
calls a 'demise of the mystical element of religion', for which, he rightly observes, von Hügel held Kant largely responsible.[18] The 'Kantian retreat from the mystical element in religion' produced an impoverishment in religion exemplified in the school of Ritschl and Herrmann whom both Tyrrell and von Hügel were to have in their sights when defending the normality of mysticism and its centrality in religion. But the determined exclusion of mysticism from the life of faith, which had traditionally characterised Protestantism, had also found its proponents within the Catholic tradition. The ensuing conflict within Catholicism, which may be formulated and interpreted in a variety of ways, is the necessary background to any understanding of a mystical revival. The story has its roots deeper in history and is more complex than the influence of individual philosophers, however seminal their thought. The whole Quietist controversy was its clearest manifestation.

If there was a 'great outburst of popular Quietism' in the late seventeenth century, it is also true that by the close of that century, as Underhill claimed, 'the Quietist movement faded away'.[19] But this is a rather misleading description of a concerted and aggressive attack on mysticism in all its forms which characterised post-reformation Catholicism. Adopting such a perspective, the condemnation of Quietism in 1699 becomes simply the most effective outward assault on the mystical element, what Bremond called the 'rout of the mystics'.[20] Not only was error condemned; there was a 'retreat from the interior, mystical element of religion with the condemnation of Quietism and Fénelon'. If we are to understand the contribution of von Hügel and Tyrrell to mystical theology in the early twentieth century, the main elements of this retreat from mysticism need to be understood.
Another way of formulating this historical shift is to speak, as Chapman did, of a 'reversal of tradition'. Taking up this theme, Kirk noted the role of Protestantism in the eventual demise of the contemplative mystical tradition, against what he took to be the original Reformation impulse. He felt it was more remarkable that it should lapse in the Catholicism of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. So, in both Protestantism and Catholicism 'contemplation, or the ideal of communion with God as the culmination of approach to Him through worship, suffered a very serious eclipse.' Even in 1919 Butler described the contemplative tradition of Augustine Gregory, and Bernard as 'neglected chapters in the history of religion'.

Relying chiefly on Bremond and Chapman, Kirk sketched the growth of an anti-mystical faction in Spain between 1570 and 1580, the culmination of two generations of suspicion originally directed towards the sect of Alumbrados or Illuminati. Perceived to be tainted with Lutheranism, this sect and those connected with it, were also felt to be a dangerous mystical trend stressing the individual possession of inner light higher than ecclesiastical authority. The chief result was that 'mysticism of every kind once more became suspect.' A further dimension of the reaction was the extension of the inquisition in the feud between Dominicans and Jesuits. Jesuit teachers had been favourable towards mystical thought and of course the Carmelites boasted two great mystics in Teresa of Avila and John of the Cross, though their teaching was often received with suspicion rather than comprehension.

In the fear and uncertainty of ecclesiastical authority, moreover, there was a situation ripe for the machinations of the Dominican Melchior Cano, whom Kirk describes as the 'evil genius of the reactionaries', at
the right hand of the Grand Inquisitor de Valdes. When the attack was directed against the Jesuits, it centred on Ignatius himself and the rector of Salamanca, Balthasar Alvarez, who had directed St Teresa. A 'non-mystical' interpretation of the Ignatian Exercises as purely mental meditation became the norm. This was reinforced by the stress of Francis de Sales on 'mental prayer'. Aquaviva's decree in 1599, that contemplation must not be prohibited, simply indicated the reality of the tension, though in practice a 'strong mystical school' flourished in the French Jesuit province, at least until the condemnation of Molinos and the new reign of intolerance brought the extinction of Quietism and much else in the mystical tradition.

Outside the Jesuits the emerging distinction between acquired contemplation and infused contemplation also helped to save mysticism from oblivion. But effectively, contemplation, mystical prayer, the vision of God, realities central to mystical theology, were relegated in pursuit of goals such as 'preludes', 'composition of place', 'considerations' and 'resolutions' as the chief elements in meditation, a form of prayer beyond which few were encouraged to aspire. This 'reversal of tradition' involved what Kirk described as 'the virtual denial of almost all that is distinctive in the Christian life of prayer.' The mysticism of both Jesuit and Carmelite spirituality was under constant threat, with the result that discursive meditation became the norm and highest mode of prayer and contemplation came to be seen as the vocation of the few. In the case of the Jesuits, Rodriguez became the most able exponent of the view that contemplation is 'extraordinary and sublime' and not to be sought after, and that meditation has as its main purpose the formulation of resolutions to advance oneself in perfection. Ordinary prayer, that is non-contemplative prayer, was thus
the only prayer considered practical and profitable. Even Moran's defensive view of the effects of this position concedes that many influential Jesuit writers commended this teaching widely to ordinary Christians, ensuring that the reversal of tradition, which 'belittled contemplation and mysticism of every kind', received added impetus.[27]

The condemnation of Quietism, then, was the definitive triumph of the anti-mystical forces within the Church. It is important to note the consequences of this triumph which render both the modernist crisis and the mystical revival intelligible. Aumann rightly insists on Innocent XII's sympathy for Fénelon and the mildness of the actual condemnation, but he notes too the eventual realisation of the Pope's fears for the demise of mysticism. He maintains that not only was Quietism given the death blow in 1699: 'mysticism fell into disrepute and, except for the efforts of a few writers, "the eighteenth century saw almost the complete rout in France of Catholic mysticism."'[28] Mysticism was so thoroughly discredited that in the early eighteenth century 'the standard works on the subject were practically unknown'. This was compounded by the revival of Jansenism with its human-centred stress on ascetical effort and disaffection for mysticism. Though resisted by de Caussade, Schram, Emery and others who transcended the conflicts of Quietism and Jansenism, it proved difficult to reinstate mysticism in the face of the recurring and deeply-rooted forces of reaction. Despite outbreaks of interest in mysticism in Germany in the mid-eighteenth century, the continued presence of solid French spirituality, and the influence of the engaging Augustine Baker who, according to Pourrat, 'revived mystical traditions in England', providing a 'link between the fourteenth-century mystics and modern times', this suspicion of mysticism largely persisted to the end of the nineteenth century.
One scholar to recognise the central importance of this historical background in understanding both modernism and mysticism at the start of twentieth century was Alexander Dru. He maintained that the decision against Quietism in 1699 was followed by 'the extinction of the spiritual, mystical tradition, which was ridiculed and equated with "enthusiasm"', and noted that Péguy spoke of a 'mysticism in reverse' particularly in the nineteenth century when Christianity 'largely forgot its spiritual or mystical heritage.'

He went on to point out that the change wrought by Péguy, Blondel, Bremond and von Hügel was signalled triumphantly by Bouyer in his 1961 *Introduction to Spirituality* where Quietism, having been the *crux theologorum* for two hundred years, was dismissed in one sentence as a pseudo-problem.

A summary of this view of a demise and revival of mysticism is offered by Knowles: 'all general interest in mysticism was absent both within and without the Catholic Church for some two centuries before the twentieth.'

Regarded with suspicion and generally left to their directors and theologians interested in such matters, mystics were felt by many to belong to the fringes of Christian experience. Like Inge, Knowles spoke of the growing interest of scientific psychology in the morbid and abnormal elements commonly associated with mysticism. Much of this study centred on the *varieties of religious experience* with little interest in theological questions. In reaction to such an approach, with what Knowles called its tendency to materialism, rationalism, and agnosticism, some Christian thinkers directed their interest to the recorded mystical experience of saints and mystics of the past: 'works unpublished or long out of print became, and have remained, popular.' Underhill's bibliography alone testifies to the great number of translations of the spiritual classics recovering the wisdom of the
mystical tradition. Though right to suggest that many such studies simply amassed and compared accounts of mystical experience, displaying little interest in theological analysis, it is questionable whether William James, von Hügel and Evelyn Underhill can all be described in this way. It is a particularly inadequate assessment of von Hügel. Moreover, it ignores completely Tyrrell's contribution.

VON HÜGEL AND TYRRELL AND THE MYSTICAL REVIVAL

If we accept this view of a demise and revival of mysticism, it is easier to understand Gabriel Daly's description of the baleful effects of the condemnation of Quietism on theology. The suspicion directed not only at Schleiermacher, but the notion of 'religious feeling' and the fait intérieur of Pascal 'hardened into rank hostility' with the condemnation of modernism in 1907. But Daly's contention about the use of the term mysticism by the modernists must be challenged. The question is vitally important since it concerns the nature of the enterprise which engaged von Hügel and Tyrrell for the whole of their lives and is the central theme of the present thesis. His argument is that the term 'mystical' as used by the modernists designated a 'mode of thought which they believed to be most appropriate for responding to transcendent truth.' He maintains not only that the term is unsatisfactory since it has no agreed meaning, but also that the modernists chiefly 'used it loosely to describe a mode of thought antithetical to scholasticism.' He then claims it is not the word that is important but the situation which led to its being invoked. Though there is some truth in this view it cannot be accepted as it stands.
All that he says about the modernists wanting to overcome the alienation of feeling and reason, and their desire to find the place of experience and feeling in religious apprehension, is defensible. But it was precisely to reshape theology, by recovering its central concerns, such as the depth and complexity of the act of faith, the experience of the spiritual through the material, and the vitality of personal commitment, that both von Hügel and Tyrrell turned decisively to the mystical tradition. By mystical tradition we mean precisely that diverse but constant stream of thought and reflective experience within Christian history which placed the interiority of faith, the direct experience of God, the practice of contemplation, and the mystical union with God, at the very heart of the account of the Christian life. Certainly Loisy employed the term in Daly's broad and imprecise sense throughout his Mémoires, and such a breadth of meaning is also possible to detect at times in von Hügel and particularly Tyrrell. But such a use of the term is secondary when compared with its application in the more precise sense drawn from the spiritual tradition.

Daly rightly suggests that Bremond was particularly alive to the consequences of the condemnation of Quietism, but the same is no less true of von Hügel and Tyrrell. However much they shared with Loisy and other modernists, on this question they stood apart, bearing witness to the centrality of the mystical writers of the past and present as pointing to a correct reorientation of theology and in determining ecclesiastical priorities in an age of intellectual ferment. For this reason, Daly's wish to replace the term mysticism with Claudel's sensibility is misguided. Notwithstanding the inevitable difficulties inherent in the word mysticism, such a strategy would endanger a true understanding of the modernist connection with an
enduring element in Christian history: mystical theology and the contemplative tradition. So, even though the term sensibility may effectively evoke that 'spiritual quality' which the modernists were seeking to place at the centre of theology, it tends to obscure rather than reveal the fundamental interest in, and commitment to, the mystical theology of the Catholic tradition which so characterised the work of von Hügel and Tyrrell. It is one of the purposes of this thesis, to vindicate this judgment.

In 1915 Herman maintained that 'it has become a platitude to speak of a mystical revival', though he also claimed that 'British theologians have with notable exceptions neglected Mysticism.' In addition, he wanted to enter the important qualification that it was an interest in mysticism rather than mysticism itself which was being revived. Persisting with the distinction, she identified the recurrence of mysticism in the ebb and flow of Church history, and suggested that 'it may be argued that we are on the verge of a true revival of mystical religion.' Nonetheless, she maintained that 'a present-day revival of interest in Mysticism must be accepted as a fact.' His debt to Inge, Underhill and Rufus Jones was acknowledged, and there was the inevitable tribute to the Baron: 'I have also, in common with all students of Mysticism, to acknowledge my indebtedness to the erudite and penetrative work of Baron von Hügel.' What she failed to acknowledge was the real revival of interest this side of the channel and that von Hügel and Tyrrell helped to provide a bridge between that continental renaissance and the characteristic concerns of Anglo-Saxon theology.

In the context of this thesis, the most important and pivotal fact is that at the height of the modernist movement and the mystical
revival von Hügel was himself immersed in the study of the mystical element of religion. The two volumes on St Catherine which appeared in 1908 occupied him for ten years and in its genesis he was constantly assisted by Tyrrell. There is a vital truth here which Neuner put succinctly: 'Sein Modernismus und seine Frömmigkeit sind die beiden Seiten der gleichen Sache.'[34] Tyrrell implicitly acknowledged this in his revealing observation that *The Mystical Element* was 'a great vindication of the reality and religious depth of "modernism".'[35] Unlike other individuals of the period, von Hügel and Tyrrell belonged both to the modernist controversy and the revival of mysticism. Though their place in the former movement has been explored exhaustively, a full appreciation of their role in the latter is still lacking. Yet the fact is that references to von Hügel and Tyrrell became commonplace in works treating spirituality, their names frequently associated with the revival of interest in mysticism.

Tyrrell believed that the Baron’s two volumes, though not the last word, were certainly 'the fullest word that has yet been spoken on the subject.'[36] He went on: 'They include and add to all that has yet been said, and no future addition will be solid that does not include and take account of them.' After von Hügel’s death William Temple claimed that it was arguably 'the most important theological work written in the English language during the last half century.'[37] Whatever the truth of this view, *The Mystical Element* was one of the few books of the period which subsequent generations have judged seminal in the field of Christian mysticism. As works on mysticism multiplied, von Hügel was gradually placed in perspective. Hughes noted how the subject had been more widely treated by French writers than English but then stated that von Hügel’s 'masterly study of St Catherine of Genoa and a series of
illuminating essays' had 'thrown light on many a difficult subject, and made it easier for us to understand the Catholic point of view'.[38]

In 1930 Underhill observed that since the first edition of her work in 1911 the study of mysticism in England and on the continent, had been 'almost completely transformed.'[39] Like Inge and Knowles, she explained this by reference to the labours of religious psychologists (even the destructive potential of psycho-analysis serving a useful purpose of clarification), and the growth of theological and philosophical interest in transcendence and the metaphysical claims of the mystics. She also saw more clearly the Baron's theological and philosophical importance in terms of his stress on the Supernatural, the 're-instatement of the Transcendent, the "Wholly Other", as the religious fact'. This represented 'the most fundamental of the philosophic changes which have directly affected the study of mysticism.' She acknowledged her own debt to von Hügel's 'classic' study which had become a 'constant source of stimulus and encouragement', and her considered judgment was that The Mystical Element was indispensable: 'The best work on Mysticism in the English language.'

In view of the numerous references to von Hügel in the literature on mysticism at the time and since, it has been readily accepted that he was 'more than a modernist'. Loome made the point in discussing the Baron's attachment to 'two Catholicisms', describing him as an 'enigma', a modernist sui generis, 'that rarest of all birds', an "ultramontane-modernist".[40] Even this is only a part of the picture. Few would agree with Heaney's effective dismissal of the Baron's mysticism as of little consequence and the claim that his work on this question has not endured. There is ample evidence to contradict this view. In Geraldine Hodgson's
Judgment, von Hügel was 'the greatest student of mysticism in our day.' Maisie Ward described him as 'a saint and mystic as well as a scholar and a thinker.' Lester-Garland noted the 'fervent intensity' of his spiritual life which 'shines through all that he wrote.' Chambers thought him 'undoubtedly a great spiritual and intellectual awakener' reflecting the fact that 'his sanctity and scholarship were blended in a somewhat rare way.' And though a simplification, there is some truth in Hazard-Dakin's claim: 'primarily a religious man, von Hügel was a philosopher only in self-defence.' As Trevor suggests, early spiritual experience decisively turned him towards 'spiritual communion with God, his life-long vocation of prayer and the study of mystical contemplation.'

This emphasis is found too in de la Bedoyère's Life, Holland's Memoir, Nédoncelle's Study, and Vidler's A Variety of Catholic Modernists where the distinguishing feature of the Baron's modernism is described as 'the degree and the depth of his mystical attachment to the church of Rome.' It has been summarised most adequately by Loome who shows von Hügel's main criticism of Italian fellow-modernists, the 'besetting weakness' of their modernism, was their lack of the 'finest, deepest R.C. spiritual training': 'There is probably no element in von Hügel's life that set him so far apart from the others involved in the "modernist movement" as did his profound attachment to the Church's spiritual tradition and his almost childlike reverence for "the Saints."'

What is also to be noted is that this interest was not confined to the later von Hügel as some have suggested. Kent is simply wrong to claim that in his 'post-Modernist vein' the Baron 'moved aside from the crisis in his study of Catholic mysticism, The Mystical Element in Religion (sic). The substance of the book, on which he began work
before the turn of the century, was completed over a year before the condemnation of modernism, though he laboured on with final corrections.[44] Similarly, though noting von Hügel's consistency, Sherry's claim that from 'about 1905 his interest in mysticism began to predominate over his interest in Biblical criticism' is wanting in accuracy.[45] The Baron was already absorbed in his original article on Catherine's mysticism in 1897, had written detailed letters to Tyrrell on mysticism in 1898, had recommended and discussed numerous mystical works with Maude Petre in 1899, and, even earlier in 1889, had published two articles on the spiritual writings of Père Grou for The Tablet, and in 1894 had written on Fénelon's *Spiritual Letters* in Bishop Hedley's edition, for which he had been partly responsible.[46] It was truly a life-long interest, though certainly his authoritative standing as a student of mysticism reached its height at the time of his death in 1925. Martin Green's record captures this: 'Fr d'Arcy said that year that one could hardly pick up any book on mysticism by an Anglican, Non-Conformist, or even rationalist, that did not echo the Baron's opinions and manner.'

Even if von Hügel's role in the mystical revival is established, the fact remains that Tyrrell's fundamental commitment to mysticism has more often been overlooked than taken seriously. Edward Norman continues the tendency of Vidler and others to see Tyrrell rather narrowly merely as critic of authority, proponent of intellectual freedom, and the relativity of dogma, a view disclosing an unwillingness to admit his profound commitment to mysticism.[47] Further, although acknowledging von Hügel's 'vision of a mystical element in Christianity', Norman expressed the mistaken view that the Baron was 'less concerned with the institutional Church', a point which he seeks to sustain by reference
The Mystical Element of Religion. This could hardly be further from the truth, and raises questions about his judgment of modernism.

Similarly, though Tyrrell was undoubtedly an opponent of Ultramontanism, condemning what he called the evils of Vaticanism, Romanism and Jesuitism, Holmes's stress on this negative element of his thought, however dominant it eventually became, does not capture the 'whole Tyrrell'.[48] Nor can he be categorised simply as a 'Dogmatic' or 'theological' modernist by virtue of his hostility to scholasticism. Such one-sided interpretation became the norm among those associated with the Modern Churchman, the literary home of modernism in the Church of England, where Tyrrell assumed the stature of the idealised theological prophet broken on the wheel of narrow ecclesiastical authoritarianism. Moreover, although von Hügel and others drew a parallel between Tyrrell and Newman and their painful membership of the Catholic Church, Hastings exaggerates somewhat in eulogising Tyrrell for his intellectual martyrdom, his sharing 'so utterly in the condemnation and lonely death of the saviour.'[49] This view also failed to place Tyrrell in a wider context, and lacked any reference to his attachment to Catholic mysticism.

There have been other attempts to place Tyrrell into a context which respects not only the complexity of his times but his own enigmatic and many-sided nature and diversity of interests. One of the least helpful was Meriol Trevor's study which, despite the elements of truth, exaggerated the importance of Tyrrell's emotional immaturity, alluding to the sexual undertones in some of his relationships.[50] Altogether more perceptive were Ronald Chapman and Gabriel Daly who both acknowledged the psychological penetration and the spiritual depth in
much of his work. Weaver's study of the Tyrrell-Ward correspondence looked forward to a broader understanding of late nineteenth English "modernism" and Tyrrell's place within it. Sagovsky has sought to relate him to the English literary tradition following Bremond's claim about Tyrrell's dependence on Matthew Arnold. Coulson and Prickett have developed this theme at some length, the former particularly relating Tyrrell to 'Newman and the Common Tradition' and a wholly non-scholastic mode of religious thought.

Furthermore, Schultenover recognised the shift from the earlier to the later Tyrrell and explored particularly the intellectual foundations of the early thought and writing of one who was 'inclined by nature to a life of study and prayer, quiet reflection broken only by the cure of souls and occasional essays on spiritual matters.' For some the tragedy of Tyrrell was the 'waste of his gift as a spiritual master', the fact that his greater work was left undone. And though he goes some way to acknowledging Tyrrell's serious interest in mysticism, there is insufficient awareness that, at his best, Tyrrell shared von Hugel's lifelong ambition and passion for a 'deeply spiritual and intellectual centrist position within the Roman Catholic tradition' and that the mystical writers of the past were felt to offer a means towards this.

Though this emphasis remains only partially explored in Ellen Leonard's study, she too offered the possibility of seeing Tyrrell in a truer light, acknowledging his deep 'interest in mysticism' and his emphasis on the mystical aspect of Catholicism, which 'seemed to have been largely forgotten in the Catholic Church of the eighteenth and nineteenth century.' She pointed out that the focus for his work was not that of the scholar but the spiritual director: 'his interest was
religion, devotion, the spiritual and mystical life.' Schoof agreed, observing that 'he was more directly concerned with Christian life itself and with Christian mystical experience and believed that these could no longer be nourished by the dried up formulae of the prevailing theology.' Schoof agreed, observing that 'he was more directly concerned with Christian life itself and with Christian mystical experience and believed that these could no longer be nourished by the dried up formulae of the prevailing theology.'[57] Gary Lease also pointed out that spirituality was uppermost for Tyrrell, determining both his reaction to authority in general and his own excommunication in particular.[58]

It is clear, therefore, that some more discriminating recent studies in modernism, demand a positive reappraisal of Maude Petre's view that one of Tyrrell's chief characteristics was a 'profound spirit of mysticism', and that had he been left alone there could have been a revolution in the understanding of religious truth but not a rebellion.[59] She claimed this on the basis of his most enduring and spiritual works such as *Nova et Vetera* and the early article on the primacy of spirituality and its determinative role for theology, 'Theology and Devotion' which he himself claimed contained the 'kernal of all that he really ever wanted to say.' Her charge was that von Hügel had 'impelled an incautious man into the fight' and then expected restraint in the conflict. Her conviction was that Tyrrell was 'intended for a spiritual and moral pioneer; one that could breathe new life into the ascetic and devotional life of the Church.' She felt that if he had followed this inspiration alone he would have remained in the Church and 'done greater work than he did.' To write on the reality of the spiritual life and the union of the soul with God in prayer, she claimed, was more important than all else: 'To how many did not his words and writings come as a new revelation of spirituality.' Driven by this impulse alone, he would have been chiefly a spiritual liberator since his 'true field of action was strictly spiritual and uncontroversial.' This
resolved the question of what she called 'Tyrrell's true mission'. This aspect of Tyrrell's work has been appreciated anew in recent reflections which have treated his devotional writings and highlighted the centrality of the living Christ to true Christian spirituality. Thus Moran spoke of Tyrrell as 'more thoughtful' and demanding than the majority of devotional writers of the time. Healey has dwelt on some aspects of Tyrrell's spirituality and others have drawn attention to his cultivation of a strong devotion to Christ's humanity 'which he never left', and which is reflected in his notion of the 'mystic Christ'.

Von Hügel agreed with Maude Petre's assessment. He wrote to Tyrrell: 'God has made you for something deeper and greater' than controversy; 'in mystical intuition' and love Tyrrell would give and get his 'most real self.' The Baron spoke of Tyrrell's 'deep mystical, contemplative habit and attrait', stating that he was 'by nature and grace a Mystic whose faith was primarily love and vision', but who was 'drawn away from his true call and attrait.' He valued Tyrrell's collaboration in The Mystical Element, but knew that he contributed in his own right to the mystical revival, paying tribute to that work which remained untouched by the conflicts and controversies of modernism.

The Baron was clearly delighted when Gardner, in his Dante and the Mystics recorded his debt to the 'two illuminating essays on Mysticism by George Tyrrell' in the Faith of the Millions and to von Hügel's 'monumental study of the Mystical Element of Religion.' It was the occasion for him to remark to Maude Petre that whatever judgment would be made on Tyrrell's modernism, and particularly his last phase, 'large parts of his work and influence' would remain 'simply untouched, simply fruitful, constructive, classical.' He was grateful to have been
associated with Tyrrell through the storm and precisely with his 'most unfading, his permanent side and work', his thought on mysticism. In the heat of controversy he wrote to Tyrrell hoping he could return to that 'deep great spiritual life' which was his great strength: 'you are a mystic: you have never found, you will never find, either Church, or Christ, or just simply God, or even the vaguest spiritual presence and conviction, except in deep recollection, purification, quietness, intuition, love.'[65]

This belief was expressed even more strongly by Geraldine Hodgson who felt that Tyrrell was 'as mystical as any man of our generation', and that his spiritual writings would remain when his others had been forgotten.[66] She wrote that his 'intrinsic mysticism' appeared in the whole tenor of his life as well as his early essays, his letters and the introduction to Mother Julian's Shewings. Since mysticism was not merely a strand in him but 'something more like the woof of him', his true mission was to be seen in terms of mystical revival. She felt he displayed the specific traits of 'Englishness' in spiritual teaching: simple directness, absence of elaboration, marked quaintness, and a wit ready to play over the gravest matters. She offered a glowing tribute:

Had Tyrrell been placed in circumstances where his underlying spirituality could have had full scope, had he been left untroubled by doctrinal disputations, theological criticism, and heady German philosophy, then English Mystical Literature might conceivably have been enriched by some treatise not wholly unworthy to stand in the great line which begins with the name of Richard Rolle.[67]

Despite the number of hypotheses in these remarks, they point to one of the essential elements of Tyrrell's thought. Though speculation may seem indulgent there is some interest in wondering, as she does, about Tyrrell's fate had he been a Benedictine rather than a Jesuit. In freeing Tyrrell from narrower interpretations, she performed a valuable service.
'Whatever men may think of other aspects of his life and faith, surely no-one will deny that there was a large mystical element in Tyrrell.'

Others have described Tyrrell variously as 'a genius', 'a creative artist', and among those who 'devote themselves to the betterment of man's spiritual life.' A year after his death a discerning friend wrote rather poetically that 'his mysticism was one which ever fed the wells of action from secret heights and hidden springs.' More cautiously, Watkin perceived the fatal combination of opposites in Tyrrell: 'a man of brilliant endowments and deep spirituality, but unbalanced and easily influenced, too ready to make the latest theory the measure of truth.' This is borne out above all, perhaps, by Tyrrell's repeated naive references to the 'assured results of criticism.'

Finally, such an estimation of Tyrrell's true mission is also suggested in an otherwise rather unsatisfactory study by Michele Ranchetti, who viewed modernism as essentially a movement of reform with distinct stages. Tracing the progress of modernism into the Italian Rinnovamento movement, he found three phases: 'Loisy's, the exegetical; Tyrrell's, the mystical; and now, the political.' Though he claimed, with no evidence at all, that after the rout of modernism von Hugel 'withdrew into personal suffering or private, irrational spirituality', he rightly contrasted Loisy and Tyrrell in terms of spirituality since the latter's personality was 'clearly a more religious and mystical one.'
SCHOLASTICISM AND MYSTICAL RENEWAL

If this attempt to place von Hügel and Tyrrell decisively within the revival of interest in mysticism is to be convincing, it is necessary to show that their perception of the contemporary situation and the motives expressed in their writings are consistent with such an interpretation. Even a cursory glance at their letters and writings reveals a recurring theme: the need for spiritual renewal through a re-engagement with the Church's mystical tradition.

Von Hügel and Tyrrell were sharply critical of the narrowness and rigidity of much current spirituality, which they took to be a desiccation of true contemplation resulting from the demise of mysticism and the dominance of scholasticism. What Ratté called 'highly individualistic devotionalism', Maisie Ward described as a spirituality in which scapulars, medals and the Rosary could seem more important than the Mass, private revelations were dwelt on more than the Gospels and La Salette was talked about more than the Trinity.[73] Though there is always a danger of spiritual snobbery in such judgments, the description at least helps to bring the issue to the fore. This critical view of much existing spirituality was shared by such as Blondel, Bremond and writers whose field of interest was more spiritual and devotional. In the case of von Hügel and Tyrrell, whatever the flaws in their critique, and its negative consequences, the original intent was rooted in a genuine desire to restore some of the neglected elements of a rich, spiritual tradition. At the theological level they sought to relegate what Gabriel Daly has called 'supernatural rationalism' in order to rediscover the 'interior, living, mystical source of all true religion.'[74]
The concern of von Hügel and Tyrrell with mysticism is revealed in their critique of the dominant scholasticism. Relying largely on Aubert's summary of the reassertion of neo-Thomism in the pontificates of Leo XIII and Pius X, Daly perhaps caricatures the theological hegemony which he names 'Roman fundamental theology' and which he describes as 'religiously inept and spiritually sterile'.[75] Though Daly's argument seems to place too much weight on Billot's influence, he is right to see him as the guardian par excellence of what Tyrrell mischievously called 'the new theology'.[76] But despite the monolithic appearance of scholasticism at the time, scholastic theologians were capable of self-criticism, as Joseph Rickaby's books clearly show. A leading opponent of modernism and defender of scholasticism he could still present a not uncritical account of this theological system.[77] Furthermore, even the scholasticism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries failed to stifle the spirituality of Hedley, Mercier, Marmion, Vonier, Chapman and other spiritual writers who also fostered a renewal of spirituality.

Nonetheless, there is some value in noting the chasm between Billot's 'strictly logical, indeed surgical, analysis of the act of faith' as primarily intellectual assent, and the emphasis of the mystical tradition on intuition and experience, or Pascal's ordre du coeur, as vital to the personal response to God.[78] In such a conflict of categories, scholasticism tended to relinquish intuition to the mystics, 'those saintly eccentrics' who belonged to the rare realm of contemplative prayer rather than the theological arena where clarity and certainty reigned. Again, although rather caricaturing, Daly does capture the nature of the conflict: 'The mystics could be allowed their preoccupation with the apophatic as long as they kept away from dogmatic theology.'[79] But the question is open to a wider interpretation than that offered by
Daly since a right balance in the relationship between the various branches of the theological sciences is a problem with a long history. A unitary approach to revelation and Christian experience has been a perennial issue, the tension between dogmatic and mystical theology being but one variation on this theme, though it is right to see this as reaching a critical outbreak in the modernist crisis. Indeed, the revival of mysticism is only comprehensible in such a context. It is clear from the manner in which they criticised the dominant scholasticism that von Hügel and Tyrrell were explicitly defending the whole tradition of thought and reflection common to the mystics.

Tyrrell spoke in biblical imagery of his personal journey from scholasticism. He was only able to understand the mystical thought of Nicholas of Cusa in its early scholastic form having 'struggled out from the Egypt of Scholasticism to the more liberal land of Promise'. He blamed his scholastic training for his tendency to moral cowardice and spiritual sterility, claiming to feel personally the destructive effects of the 'virus of scholasticism', not merely as a theological method but as a mentality wedded to authoritarianism. Criticism of the spiritually stultifying effects of scholasticism appeared in early essays, though it was much more vehemently expressed later. Wanting to take as his theological point of departure the lex orandi, which is essentially a matter of experience, he registered his opposition to the scholastic emphasis on logical reasoning and dogmatic statement.

Tyrrell placed this theological conflict in historical context, agreeing with the claim in Lindsay's history of the Reformation that the mystics had preserved truths neglected by medieval theology. He suggested that scholastic theology 'did not touch the mystical life of the
Church, which went on in the old order among the laity, fed by the patristic and especially the Augustinian tradition.[83] The pious mind described by a Kempis was averse to what Tyrrell called the 'scholastic modernists'. He noted that Gregory IX's encyclical of 1223, recently used against the modernists was originally directed against the 'scholastic disturbers of patristic tradition', an example of irony which Tyrrell clearly relished. He believed that a 'stale and traditional' scholasticism penetrated the general mind of the Church and 'withered up the mystical life of the Church, as it has been doing these 400 years', though not entirely successfully since the Church could not disown the mystics or the pre-scholastic tradition out of which Protestantism grew.

There is a distinct historical perspective here, revealing Tyrrell's perception of a demise of the mystical tradition and a need for its re-assertion to overcome the scholastic hegemony. However, he confesses his incompetence as a historian, suggesting that von Hügel would explain more in half an hour than he could in a year: 'It is, almost exactly, his subject and speciality.' But he is confident enough to claim that in the case of a great mystic like St Bernard 'scholasticism and mysticism were kept in water-tight compartments', and that the same was true to a lesser extent of St Thomas, though the latter's originality and fidelity to Augustine would always have resisted the aridity of later scholasticism. He applied the practical consequences of all this when he counselled an enquirer: 'Read William Law and the mystics and put dogmatic problems out of your head.'[84]

Von Hügel shared Tyrrell's dissatisfaction with scholasticism though never experiencing the conflict as sharply, partly because his intellectual formation was broader and partly because he had no responsibility for teaching in any official ecclesiastical institution.
The extent to which the Baron was hostile to scholasticism has been a matter of some debate. Though familiar with St Thomas and exponents of scholasticism, he did not believe that the scholastic framework was the only form for expressing Catholic dogma. Against de la Bedoyère and Heaney, Barmann claimed the impossibility of finding in von Hügel a scholastic or Thomistic interpretation of Christianity as normative and absolute. There is little doubt that the Baron accepted the value and autonomy of historico-philosophical research and scientific criticism and reacted against a 'narrow anti-historical scholasticism'.[85]

Like Tyrrell he appealed to a whole tradition of thought which owed little to the scholasticism of the thirteenth century or any other period. The hostility was not to the expansive spirit of St Thomas but to the manualists who had narrowed and rigidified the principles at the root of the Thomist synthesis. It was a criticism voiced not only in the philosophical circles from which von Hügel drew ideas but by such as Huvelin whose spiritual influence was formative. He felt there had to be a definite choice between two classes of mind: the 'mystical and the positive' and the 'scholastic and theoretical'.[86] Like Tyrrell, he chose the former. Von Hügel turned decisively to a broader and richer tradition which included the 'scholar-saints' of post-Reformation Catholicism, particularly Fénelon. Unlike Tyrrell, however, he combined critical scholarship and devotion to the piety and sanctity of the Catholic spiritual tradition with loyalty to Rome.

Some of his earliest recorded remarks on these spiritual writers express von Hügel's awareness of the new demand for spirituality. In 1889 he was already speaking of a 'transition period such as our own...an age of hurry, of noise, of restlessness and self-consciousness', times
which 'cry aloud for the ever-increasing production of a spiritual life altogether different in kind from what the world can either reproduce or understand'.[87] He presented Grou's teaching precisely to meet such needs. Indicating his desire to overcome the anti-mystical spirit, he acknowledged that if quietism was an error and danger, there was also error in a 'misinformed timidity which sees quietism everywhere'. Defending the balance and wisdom of Fénelon's spiritual teaching five years later, there was a note of frustration in the face of present spiritual needs. He felt that the twin danger of either over-emphasising the intellect or neglecting it needed to be met by 'fuller, more balanced and peaceful, more ethical and traditional types of Christian life than we seem of ourselves to have the time and strength and patience either to develop or to discover, or even often, alas, to understand.'

An exchange of letters with Tyrrell in 1898 indicates the task von Hügel and Tyrrell felt called to undertake. The Baron compared and contrasted the interpretation of mysticism by the 'ecclesiastically approved mystics' with his own view.[88] He noted the points on which he judged the saints to be 'profoundly right': that God is incomprehensible yet apprehensible, the primacy of the heart over reason in our knowledge and experience of God, and the necessity of self-purification. But then he stated his divergence from their belief that such an approach demands a 'turning away from the particular, by abstraction, and absorption...leading away from the particularity of the creature to the simplicity of the Creator'. This allows no place for 'science, at least experimental, observing science' and destroys the motives for an ever-costing 'reform in and of this visible world'. He reformulated this teaching in terms of a more harmonious complementary relationship between the 'world-denying' and 'world-affirming' attitudes.
found in the Christian tradition. This was one of the central themes of his whole religious philosophy, recurring repeatedly in his writings, and herein lies one of his most enduring contributions to mystical theology.

Schultenover notes that these letters are also important in enunciating 'themes that one finds subsequently in Tyrrell's works.' Tyrrell's reply indicated that his own thought had been moving in a similar direction since he too was looking for a way of replacing the tendency to abstraction with the concrete way of the true Christian mystic. They both recognised the paradox that although many of the Christian mystics erred in the formulation of their experience, their actual practice and the experience itself was more balanced and healthy.

It is also interesting to note the positive, non-polemical cast of Tyrrell's mind at this time. His advice is temperate and considered, reflecting the scholarly nature of their exchange on these specific questions of mystical theology. He suggested the Baron 'abstain from all direct condemnation of the mistakes in exposition made by some mystics', and simply put forward his own 'true exposition of their inner mind' so that no alarm would be taken. It was a tactful strategy and one which Tyrrell himself originally adopted before shifting to a more combative and polemical position marked by the use of bitter and intemperate language.

Whatever their many other interests and areas of concern, von Hügel and Tyrrell were striving to reconstruct a uniquely spiritual theology in which the suspect categories and concepts of 'heart', 'experience', 'intuition', 'affection', and 'feeling' could be wholly embraced and positively integrated into theology. Both sympathised with Loisy's aim 'to renew theology from top to bottom, to substitute the religious spirit
for the dogmatic spirit', a desire born of his personal experience of the 'chilling effects of rigid dogma on spiritual experience'.[91] But among the modernists von Hügel and Tyrell were uniquely devoted to the mystical tradition, and the Baron alone retained a profound attachment to the Church, holding to the complementarity of dogmatic truth and mystical truth, both in his religious philosophy and in his personal life.

The Baron was seeking what he called 'a synthesis of Sanctity and Science, in the Church and for the Church'.[92] The juxtaposition of the two terms reveals his chief aim, suggesting the relationship between modernism and the revival of mysticism. Elsewhere he expressed the hope that Wilfrid Ward would transcend mere impoverishing apologetics and move into 'those regions where the constant personal struggle after science and sanctity, light and love' replace 'much wearisome and irritating arranging, balancing and trimming' which tends to forget that God and his truth always remain 'so high above, so deep beyond our plumbing'.[93] He held to the complementarity of sanctity and science as the key to spiritual renewal and theological development in the Church. Ryan has made the valuable point that von Hügel major work was on spirituality precisely 'because he experienced the theological crisis in these terms'.[94]

The term science had a broad reference to all forms of empirical knowledge and intellectual endeavour, its meaning closely related to the concept Wissenschaft, as Neuner points out.[95] Since a scientific mentality was felt to characterise the modern world, modernism was essentially bound up with a perception of the profound challenge the scientific ethos presented to theology.[96] The Baron carefully distinguished modernism in its narrow sense as the 'strictly
circumscribed affair, one that is really over and done', from modernism as the 'set of attempts to express the old Faith and its permanent truths and helps - to interpret it according to what appears the best and the most abiding elements in the philosophy and the scholarship and science of the later and latest times.'[97] If the modernism at the beginning of the century was but one instance of this perennial modernism, one attempt at such an accommodation, then, on the basis of these distinctions, the Baron's desired synthesis of sanctity and science can be interpreted precisely as a synthesis of mysticism and modernism.

The phrase 'in the Church and for the Church' revealed another vital characteristic of the Baron's approach, his fundamental loyalty to institutional religion, which prompted Loisy to call him 'the true Father of the Church, the true Augustine'.[98] For von Hügel, the mystical revival has its roots and its ultimate meaning within the Church. He felt it was vitally important that the highest mystical attitude found its fullest expression in the life and teaching of devoted members of the Roman Church, particularly the Doctors and Models of the Church who exemplify wholesome and true mysticism against all false and distorted forms. His regard for the saints, which at times reveals a remarkable childlike simplicity and devotion, went beyond a mere hagiographical interest. His works are replete with references to the canonised saints who offered a rich source for theological reflection both in terms of their spiritual teaching and their personal witness to sanctity. Although it was not an uncritical attitude to the saints, his perception of their didactic value in presenting the challenge of mysticism remained, and his abiding devotion to them was crucial to the ideal of spiritual renewal.
This 'pastoral' motive was ever-present in von Hügel's mind. Even in the course of assembling a detailed argument for God's immanence as the core of Christian mysticism, his thought turned to the need to apply this to individuals, being a truth which needed to 'become again more common amongst believers.'\[99] This motive was again evident in his reflections for the Bishop of Winchester's committee on religion in the army. He was convinced of the need to foster a sense of the richness of life and religion, inspiring in 'Tommy' a spirit of adoration.\[100]

In the task of recovering the mystical tradition, von Hügel had a sense of mission which drew him to others. The attraction to Maude Petre, for instance, was to the 'deeply and living mystical way' of her religion and her growing interest in mysticism.\[101] But it was a 'costing' mission, involving personal suffering, 'isolation and interior loneliness' in the work of preparation for 'Christ's ampler day.' His belief that God wanted to use him and others in 'making, not merely registering, history' centred chiefly on the mystical questions raised in his study of St Catherine.\[102] He hoped that the fruit of his battling and toiling with these 'great realities and problems', which he felt had made him more of a person, would be able to 'enter into other minds and hearts, and grow and bring fruit there.'

In seeking to recover the spirituality of the Christian inheritance, which he believed had been intuitively apprehended chiefly by the mystics, he was aware that this created problems for exponents of official theology. Following Laberthonnière's censure by Rome, he felt they understood as little, of 'even sane and sober Mysticism' as they did of 'critical and scientific method.'\[103] He criticised those whom he felt might be 'entirely right on the dry, critical side of things' but had
'nothing and will know nothing of what I am profoundly convinced is its corrective and supplement, mystical aspiration and action.'

The Baron's commitment to spiritual renewal is expressed nowhere more clearly than in the preface to *The Mystical Element*. Though a self-consciously scholarly work, it treated a topic which had the widest application. Though acknowledging his work was Catholic in outlook and intention, he felt the very nature of the subject drew him into sympathy with those glimpses of the truth and sincerity found outside the Church, and with 'our poor storm-tossed human race.'[104] Though described as an exploration of 'the main elements of all fully developed piety and religion', it was, quite simply mysticism and its implications which he explored in his greatest work.[105] He wanted to promote among his 'fellow-creatures and fellow-Christians', that 'growth in spiritual personality' which is the goal of all human improvement. Significantly, he also observed that 'the interest in such fundamental questions and experiences is most certainly growing constantly and solidly in all European fields of culture.'

Von Hügel sought the renewal Christian mysticism out of its roots in tradition and based on a perception of contemporary needs: 'more than ever the spiritual life appears now as worth the having.'[106] In response to Tyrrell's references to Mother Julian's teaching, for instance, the Baron noted 'how ripe what is best in the world now, is for this kind of truth', hoping that God would bring labourers able to carry it out more and more. His study of Catherine of Genoa, John of the Cross, the mystics in general and their relation to Christ, was undertaken to stimulate life and love and to spur others on to 'fuller religious insight, force and fruitfulness'. Even such a massively erudite
study as *Eternal Life* emerged out of a practical spirituality and was directed to its cultivation. He told his niece: 'I wrote the thing praying, read it as written, Child!' Although it has not always been fully recognised by historians of modernism, this 'pastoral' or spiritual motive remained uppermost in von Hügel's mind.

This desire to encourage spiritual growth and renewal is also evident in von Hügel's letters of direction. Despite Fenton's attack on his 'utter incompetence in the field of sacred theology', his 'sinister' counsel, 'baneful' influence, and the damning charge that 'there can have been few "spiritual directors" in the history of the Church whose influence accompanied, if it did not occasion, so many failures of Christian life', there is another opinion.[107] Though Crehan tended to support this view of his 'bumbling ineptitude', and though the Baron himself confessed his failure in direction, Gwendolen Greene and Evelyn Underhill spoke with great admiration of the spiritual help he had offered. The latter described him as 'the most wonderful personality I have ever known - so saintly, so truthful, sane and tolerant.'[108] Neuner captures this dimension of the Baron's contribution to spiritual renewal: 'Als Autor eines der bedeutsendsten Bücher über die Mystik wurde er zum weithin geschätzten und verehrten Berater in allen Fragen des geistlichen Lebens. Spirituelle Briefe nahmen einen immer breiteren Raum in Seiner Arbeit ein.'[109]

As regards Tyrrell, despite his self-deprecating remarks and his repudiation of the role of spiritual master, speaking of the 'unauthorised tyranny of the "Père directeur"', he gained a reputation as a reliable adviser and confessor. [110] Deploring what he called 'the "Machère enfant" style and claiming his duties as confessor involved no
commission to direct or 'drive people's souls', he was a valued retreat
giver and sought-after guide with a 'gift for dealing with difficulties of
all kinds', especially intellectual and spiritual problems, on one
occasion receiving the scientist Mivart on the recommendation of the
Archbishop of Westminster.

TYRRELL AND JESUIT MYSTICISM

There is ample evidence that Tyrrell also perceived his work in
terms of spiritual renewal. Although his aggressive outbursts against
authority and the prevailing theology recur like a constant refrain
throughout his writings and letters, there were times when his
criticism was more measured, revealing the grieved heart rather than
the perplexed intellect. A real insight into his method and intention
is found in his response to those 'scholastic critics' who had criticised
his 'Mysteries a Necessity of Life' for fideism and doctrinal
individualism. He republished the paper precisely to illustrate his
position: to show 'how far I stand from rationalism or "ethicism", and
how near to mysticism'.[111] The thought of the essay is seminal,
forming the basis for his discussion of the nature of faith and mystical
experience, balancing what he took to be the excessive clarity of a
cataphatic theological method. Like the Baron, he believed that to help
individuals discover a sense of mystery and 'otherness' was an
essentially apologetic task, and one which found its exemplars in the
mystical tradition.

Tyrrell was vehement in his criticism of those who found
'nothing mysterious, or beautiful, or awful' about religion, those for whom
it had 'the same kind of interest as the multiplication-table, and no
He felt the present times offered ample evidence of the 'narrow pride of rationalism' which applied the method of the exact sciences to matters of an entirely different order, an attitude 'abhorrent of all that savours of mysticism.' He perceived in the 'present times' a spiritual challenge, but he also saw the need for a reconciliation of the Catholic faith with the 'ever-shifting attitude of science and history' so that the Christian could live both in his Church and in his age. Unfortunately, he opted for the unsatisfactory strategy of driving a wedge between faith and its intellectual formulation, sharply distinguishing theology from experience, seeking to place the latter beyond the reach of intellectual criticism. But even then he conceded that 'in all controversies the Church must instinctively take the side that best protects the spiritual life. Her criterion is purely opportunistic.' At other times, he was more positive in turning to the mystical tradition for insight and direction.

Like the Baron, Tyrrell saw modernism as a more complex phenomenon than either Fascendi or some fellow modernists perceived. True modernism was the 'synthesis of orthodoxy and criticism', and he felt von Hügel and Loisy were 'the true modernists', united in the 'search for a synthesis' by which each 'seeks along his own path.' Though he turned to historical criticism largely under the influence of the Baron, his deepest desire was for mysticism to find its true place in the Church: 'One can only trust that the need to which poetry and mysticism minister are of the very substance of our soul and will assert themselves in spite of every stifling influence.' Complaining that 'the controversial spirit is barren of all permanent fruitfulness for oneself and others', he sought the renewal of spirituality. In the midst of the modernist crisis, he sought leisure for what he called his
'heart's desire', a 'purely religious treatment of the Oratio Dominicus.' Significantly, he wrote to Bremond a year earlier: 'I am engrossed in mystical investigations which have alienated my interest from all earthly things, and made molehills of ecclesiastical mountains.'[118] By 1907 Tyrrell claimed he had said what he wanted on the question of apologetics and thought rather of continuing the 'devotional or semi-devotional line of "Nova et Vetera".'

With his 'blend of mysticism and practicability', as Maude Petre called it, Tyrrell demanded that the human elements of the Church needed strict human control, precisely because it was 'the great spiritual guide of mankind.'[119] It was for this reason that he sought its renewal through a recovery of its mystical tradition. In identifying the spiritual problem of the times he regarded merely secular knowledge as a threat, a belief rooted in his critique of rationalism in theology but also, as his autobiography reveals, in his early experience of his brother's dominating and devastating intellectual prowess. He believed that the 'interior life was never more difficult, never more apt to be underrated, neglected, forgotten than in these days, when knowledge is multiplied to the hurt of wisdom'.[120] Believing that the 'vulgar spirit of the age' was also telling on common Catholic piety, he was in search of a mysticism which would both foster and meet the desire for an 'occasional drop, if not a full continual draught, of the living water.' Since 'true mysticism is easily perverted to false' and 'false mysticism is destruction to many', he felt it was vital to struggle for a genuine mystical renewal. He condemned the ignorance and philistinism of priests and religious who 'speak with a superior contempt of "mysticism" without any attempt to discriminate between false and true', and the rejection of those workings of the Holy Spirit which do not conform to commonsense.
Even in some of his more controversial works Tyrrell expressed this concern for spiritual renewal. In *The Church and the Future* he recognised the 'cry of the spiritually starving multitudes, robbed of the bread of life' which will drown the chatter of theologians and awaken in the Church a concern for the 'weightier realities of the Gospel.'[121] His distinction, though too easily drawn at times, between the results of purely theological industry and the fruit of 'the Christian life as lived by the Saints', reflected his separation of school theology from theology which emerged out of spiritual life and experience. In *Christianity at the Crossroads* his vigorous defence of the Catholic Church, despite what he felt to be its present state of corruption, centred on its fidelity to the Gospel and the witness of the saints. Considering the 'spirituality exhibited in her saints, canonised and uncanonical', her 'ascetical tradition', and her unwillingness to tamper with what has been the 'vehicle and sacrament of much spiritual life and experience', the Catholic Church is seen to be true to the religious idea of her Founder.[122] However, he had come to the view that if this inheritance was to be retained, there must be a revolution embracing theology, ecclesiology and authority, speaking of the 'force of mental and spiritual energy' which must 'blow to atoms the worn-out fabric of Jesuit-Catholicism'. He believed, quite simply, that the mystical revival was a matter of survival for the Church: 'the stimulation of religious experience and reflection is therefore an essential condition of the Church's vitality and growth, without which the walls of the ecclesiastical city will prove all too narrow for the thronging generations of the future.'[123]

In seeking a 'wider and kindlier interpretation of Catholicism', the motive is revealing.[124] He believed mere external uniformity was
'spiritually worthless and even disastrous', a danger to personal religion and the souls of those who use and practice it. Since he thought the Church was essentially a school of sanctity, he drew a sharp distinction between the 'Rome of the Saints and Mystics' and the Rome of the theologians and curialists. Experiencing the Church as an oppression which sat on his soul 'like a nightmare', he claimed to understand how for 'Savanarola and the medieval mystics Rome seemed anti-Christ'. Though such a line of thought can be simplistic and idealistic, ignoring the hard reality of what incarnation involves, it drew Tyrrell further into mysticism in his search for an alternative tradition.

Tyrrell admitted in one of his earliest essays that the Church suffered from pendulum swings in respect to mysticism. He felt the present excess of rationalism, had dried up the 'springs of tenderer devotion', producing a solid practical piety which did not allow for any spiritual experience which could not be thoroughly dissected.[125] What he considered negative, uninspiring maxims circulating in manuals of piety and volumes of ascetical theology had been inculcated in the rigidly-disciplined atmosphere of the seminaries and other institutions with certain unhealthy consequences.[126] He claimed that in reacting against Protestantism the Church had stressed the 'abuse of mysticism' rather than its truth, with the result that the faithful had 'become timid in respect to any mode of prayer that cannot be formulated and submitted to authority for inspection and approval.' He condemned those who perpetuated the present system offering little more than 'temporary palliatives' to deal with the 'spreading epidemic of unbelief'.[127] Moreover, when the attempt had been made to take up the Church's rich spiritual heritage it had often been misused: 'unwary and unstable souls
had been warped and perverted by the *Imitation of Christ*, John of the Cross and the *Spiritual Exercises*.\[128\] Nonetheless, it was the whole tradition of which these were a vital part that he and von Hügel sought to recover and integrate into theology.

The Church's main task, as Tyrrell saw it, was to minister to the 'stifled soul' of his practically-minded generation by showing herself as 'the heavenly Rachel, the Mother of Contemplative Love, acknowledging the value of Martha's ministrations, yet holding to Mary's as the better part.'\[129\] He saw much evidence of the need for a mystical revival, claiming that 'those who understand our times' know that 'if the Church is ever to get hold of the men of good-will outside her pale, it will be through the satisfaction she offers to the ineradicable mystical appetite of the human soul, which rationalism starves but cannot kill.'\[130\] This conviction was the root of his commitment to both the mystical revival and modernism, both of which stressed the need of the individual for God, the primacy of personal experience, and the growing desire for inwardness and spirituality. Confined to mystical theology viewed as a 'specialism' for the minority, such a line of thought could be tolerated, though safely disregarded. But if pursued as a corrective to scholastic theology, it was readily felt to be a threat to the objectivity of revealed truth, endangering the intellectual component of the act of faith, and weakening ecclesiastical authority.

Tyrrell's evident desire to make available the riches of the spiritual tradition reflects a basic fidelity to his Jesuit vocation. His traditional works of piety, *A Handful of Myrrh* and *Another Handful of Myrrh*, which originated as parish talks (though he later described them as his 'least loved progeny') were the result of his desire to bring
out of the Church tradition both 'new and old', and to present truths which would contribute to spiritual renewal. A letter to Thurston in 1900 reflecting on the origin of the rosary also reveals a genuine interest in traditional piety.[131] It is worth noting Gardner's remarks that Tyrrell clung to much that other liberals dispensed with and that sometimes he 'put the new wine into very old bottles', a truth which is explained by his having been trained in 'the Jesuit School'.[132] But his contribution was greatly welcomed in some circles. His *Nova et Vetera* was described as 'one of the freshest and most original additions to our ascetic literature'.[133] With *Hard Sayings* and *Faith of the Millions* it drew appreciation for his 'sincerity and religious devotion.' Before the end of the nineteenth century it was observed that 'Father Tyrrell has already made himself the reputation of being one of the most thoughtful and suggestive of our modern spiritual writers.'

Tyrrell's work on the spiritual classics and lives of the saints also illustrates his place in the mystical revival. In 1898 he sent von Hügel a copy of the English translation of Henri Joly's *Psychologie des Saints* for which he had written a preface.[134] Tyrrell approved of Joly's distinction between purely psychological or physiological phenomena and the activity of God, and the desire to present the saints as 'lovable' and to be imitated not merely regarded as distant objects of wonder. He saw in Joly a welcome departure from a narrow hagiography which owed more to 'folklore' than to a historically reliable or theologically sound understanding of Christian sanctity. He expressed this in terms of two contrasts: the 'essence of sanctity' against the 'extraordinary gifts and "charismata"', and the 'clothing and expression of sanctity' against the 'underlying substance'. Avoiding the confusion of the 'phenomena of sanctity with its substance' was also uppermost in
the Baron's intentions as he sought to reveal the abiding element in the
sanctity of Catherine of Genoa. After receiving Joly's book, von Hügel
replied that although it was 'not a profound or deeply spiritual' essay,
its 'sane and sensible open-mindedness' made it a balanced presentation
on 'a subject that cryingly wanted such treatment'.[135]

Tyrrell's early essays and meditations were born of a deep concern
for spiritual growth among those he served, not only at Stonyhurst but in
the parishes at St Helen's and Farm Street. In his attempt to draw from
the well-springs of the Christian spiritual tradition, Tyrrell the Jesuit
was naturally attracted to the charism of St Ignatius Loyola as a means
to help renew contemporary spirituality. He wanted to recover Ignatian
mysticism, the authentic spirit of the Exercises, beneath the 'accretions'
of the 'theological logicians'. In this respect Tyrrell belonged to those
nineteenth century writers who rediscovered the late medieval mystics and
felt that the non-mystical interpretation of most Jesuits represented a
stifling of that movement.[136]

Though he never fulfilled his ambition to publish a new and helpful
edition of the Ignatian Exercises, the constantly expressed hope
illustrates his abiding concern to present spiritual teaching to meet
the spiritual needs of Christian believers: 'It always seemed to me the
only possible way of slowly and quietly creating, not a new spirit but
the old spirit of the S.J. in those days when flexibility and
accommodation were the secret of a greatness on whose name and shadow
we are now subsisting.'[137] He felt the central ideas of Ignatius, the
key to his greatness, were innovation, flexibility and 'vitality',
placing the spirit of the founder always beyond mere laws of
preservation. In this light Tyrrell could attack the so-called solid
spiritual reading of the Jesuit ascetics recommended to him during his training. Such 'drivel', derived from Jerome Platus, Scaramelli, Lancicius, Druzbicki, Rodriguez and Le Gaudier presented 'sanctity in syllogisms', 'banalities and fallacies', the 'arid waste of scholastic asceticism' which he contrasted on one occasion with Lacordaire's *Conferences on God* which seemed like a 'cool spring'.[138]

Similar judgments are found throughout his autobiography and letters, revealing the negative impulse to explore a richer spiritual tradition and genuine mysticism. He believed that Catholic rationality had 'killed mysticism for the time being' and agreed with Kegan Paul that 'only through a revival of mysticism' would Protestants be recovered to the Church.[139] For this reason he wanted to show decisively that Ignatius was 'a thorough mystic' whose spirit had been distorted. He wanted to embark on a 'wild and presumptuous effort to treat the "Exercises" more or less mystically' which might help to resist the 'dry rationalising tone so prevalent.' It had been his 'dream for years' and was already accomplished in rough by January 1899. This 'Tyrrellian comment on the "Spiritual Exercises"' found its eventual but incomplete form in *The Soul's Orbit* which, with *Hard Sayings*, are 'all that remain of the great original scheme.' The fact that the original intention endured again points to the main direction of his work.[140]

Tyrrell also held a 'long-cherished' desire to publish a translation of a life of Ignatius, though he felt Joly's work had preempted this.[141] Even after he had decided to abandon his work on the *Spiritual Exercises* 'for political reasons', he was still preoccupied with the mystical tradition, wanting to prepare a new edition of Mother Julian's *Shewings*. To read his writings is to become aware that however
diverse the influences on Tyrrell, he was, like von Hügel, formed by the mystical tradition, the lives and the teaching of the saints and mystics. In his *Much Abused Letter* he insisted he was saying no more the 'saints and doctors' of the Church had said repeatedly.[142] He set 'what is most characteristic of Christianity in the lives of the saints' against a mere contingent theological system, or the 'complexities of ecclesiastical teaching and ordinances.'

Tyrrell shared von Hügel's desire to retrieve the tradition of sanctity and mysticism from the borders of theological enquiry, to reintegrate it into theological reflection, reinvigorating the spiritual life as a means to renewal in the Church and the world. This placed him within a specific tradition in Jesuit history, among those 'spirituals' who constantly sought what they considered the true 'Ignatianism' in preference to 'Acquavivaism' and that 'Jesuitism' which both he and Bremond came to abhor.[143] At its heart, the question of Ignatianism concerned the nature of true Christian spirituality and mysticism. But his quest for a mystical interpretation of the Ignatian Exercises also placed in a broader revival of mysticism.

Tyrrell based his claim to be heard on his professed fidelity to the mystical tradition. This was clear in his letter to the Bishop of Southwark after his excommunication. He claimed to have been 'brought into, and kept in, the Church by the influence of Cardinal Newman and of the mystical theology of the Fathers and the Saints.'[144] Though we are not wanting to claim that modernism was a movement of spiritual reform and mystical renewal, the two movements are related in a way which has not yet been fully explored in studies of 'the modernists'. Our contention is that two of the leading figures in the modernist
movement, von Hügel and Tyrrell, are to be situated definitively within that general revival of interest in mysticism recognised by numerous scholars and historians at the time and in subsequent decades. This belief has implications for an understanding of both movements. To accept the truth of Neuner's remarks 'Der Modernismus war zu einem guten Teil ein Aufbruch des religiösen Geistes', is simply to admit, as Dru suggested, that 'a history of the Modernist movement which isolates it from all the other aspects of the life of the Church, the cultural and social, and last but not least the spiritual and mystical...conveys a basically false impression.'[145]
CHAPTER TWO

THE VON HÜGEL—TYRRELL FRIENDSHIP
AND THEIR COLLABORATION ON THE
SUBJECT OF MYSTICISM

A SHARED INTEREST IN MYSTICISM

Maude Petre described the relationship between von Hügel and Tyrrell as a 'somewhat tragic friendship'.[1] Almost thirty years after that friendship had ended with the death of Tyrrell she expressed at some length her strong personal conviction about the nature of this relationship which had endured for twelve years following their first meeting in 1897. In particular she sought to establish what she felt were its negative effects on Tyrrell whose devoted disciple and literary executor she had become. But there is a tendency to distortion in her picture, particularly in the Story of a Friendship, which is only overcome by dealing directly with the von Hügel-Tyrrell correspondence.

The extensive and virtually intact correspondence between von Hügel and Tyrrell from 1897 to 1909 remains the most important and revealing documentary source in any discussion of their friendship.[2] What emerges from an examination of this material is their enduring interest in religious philosophy and mysticism. Though their letters are replete with references to personal, ecclesiastical, theological questions, plans for meeting and writing, and the exchange of books, papers and ideas, a constant and recurring theme is mysticism. At the heart of their personal friendship there was an abiding spirit of fruitful collaboration on the subject of mystical theology.
Tyrrell not only referred to von Hügel as his 'alter ego', but spoke of him as one 'who has been a sort of conscience to me.'[3] Even allowing for Tyrrell's characteristic tendency to hyperbole, this suggests a personal closeness and depth of shared interest. Similarly, von Hügel wrote of Tyrrell as the Catholic with whom of all English-speaking ones, he felt himself 'the most completely at one.'[4] On another occasion he stated that 'not a day, often not an hour has gone by, but I have not felt myself in most close and grateful community of interests, principles, tone and aim, and have not thanked God with the greatest spontaneity for your existence and your help.'[5] Despite a genuine meeting of minds on many questions they were quite different temperamentally. Von Hügel, the ordered, disciplined, scholarly autodidact contrasts sharply with Tyrrell, the volatile, unpredictable essayist subject to 'countless moods'.[6] Tyrrell described himself as a 'hopeless tangle' and spoke of his 'imperfect psychic chemistry', though von Hügel saw in him a 'specifically religious passion and instinct'.

As their friendship deepened, von Hügel also saw in Tyrrell a 'hunger for spiritual life and experience as the means, the end, and the test of all fully human truth and truthfulness, which I have ever so gratefully loved in you.'[7] He admired Tyrrell's 'deep religiousness and delicate spirituality' and the 'rare spiritual instinct' manifested in his books. He expressed both his admiration and his debt to Tyrrell: 'Father Tyrrell was ever a mystic, and I myself have found full religious peace only since deeply spiritual Catholic clerics helped me to understand and to imitate the simpler elements of the great Catholic mystics. So we have a central requirement and help in common.'[8]
Quite early von Hügel felt Tyrrell to be 'a person of consideration in England', and even after the latter's departure from the Jesuits in 1906, he wrote to Maude Petre of Tyrrell's 'beautiful mysticism, his faith and love in the midst, in spite, in a sense because of obscurity and trouble within and without.'[9] Ten years after Tyrrell's death the Baron had reached the conviction that whatever his gifts and obvious spirituality Tyrrell's audience was inevitably small and select; 'much as one loved and loves Fr T., much as one still felt and still feels there is to learn from him one still feels him not to be an influence directly for the many', and here below 'at least the spiritually and mentally trained among us can learn from his...most brilliant and subtle intellect and from his special, touching virtues, without losing their peace.'[10] Von Hügel felt Tyrrell to have been more 'intellectually alive' and active in his own particular spiritual interests than most of his other friends: in him 'the mystical attract is a point that really speaks volumes, all round.' It was this spirituality to which the Baron constantly drew the attention of others. He wrote to a Jesuit friend: 'What a truly admirable man you have got in this Fr Tyrrell, that is a truly remarkable mind, so deep and wide, so spiritual and ever growing.'

The respect and the debt were mutual. Tyrrell confessed that as a solitary thinker he needed the stimulus of the Baron's more rigorous approach: 'Every time I meet you I am poked on a little further; but like a wheelbarrow I am not susceptible of sustained impetus, but stick where I am dropped', content with 'knitting the new thoughts into the old.'[11] Struggling through Eucken in German ('the mazes of your mother tongue') which von Hügel had often suggested he should learn, he referred to the 'great help and stimulus such as contact with your mind affords me always in a degree more than I experience from any other.' Responding to
the Baron's praise of an essay of his, Tyrrell remarked that there was nothing there that he had not derived from the Baron directly or indirectly. He expressed gratitude for von Hügel's letters, 'the epochs of my quiet life', though hoping that the Baron would not thereby sacrifice his work which was needed for 'more universal ends.'

Tyrrell admitted the 'strong developing influence' of von Hügel's friendship on his mind and how this had brought greater unity to his own thoughts. For his part, von Hügel was indebted to Tyrrell for helping his daughter Gertrud who had suffered from what Tyrrell called 'spiritual and religious indigestion' under her father's influence. Though in general, the Baron felt a 'large union of aims and ideas' with Tyrrell, there were times when tension appeared, especially when Tyrrell felt the Baron was settling for compromise having impelled others into the modernist fray.

One of the more formal occasions for their meeting and discussion was the Synthetic Society, described by Root as 'a unique, interdenominational, philosophical and religious society in existence in London from 1896 to 1910.' After the first meeting von Hügel wrote to Ward: 'I saw Fr Tyrrell on Saturday last and thought him such a capital man, just the sort we want'. Ward suggested Tyrrell should join the Society after the Baron's remarks that he was the 'largest and ripest mind we have got among our English clergy'. Though Tyrrell was sympathetic to the broad ecumenical aims of the group, and felt at one with von Hügel and Ward, he was diffident about his own possible contribution. Moreover, he found some of the proceedings desultory and lacking in rigour though it remained an occasion of cooperation with von
Hügel: 'Tyrrell assiduously read all the papers and commentaries and shared his reactions with Ward and von Hügel.'[15]

Another significant occasion for exchange was the London Society for the Study of Religion which von Hügel founded in 1904 with the Joseph Wicksteed. It became a means by which much of von Hügel's teaching would permeate other denominations, achieving a popularity which remained greater among Anglicans than Catholics. It is clear from their correspondence that Tyrrell was usually aware of the papers the Baron was to give or had given and also attended some of the meetings.[16]

Although there is much truth in the claim that von Hügel was the leader and chief communications officer of the modernist movement, it is also true that in many of his suggestions for reading and meeting individuals the area of interest is mysticism.[17] When Tyrrell was visited by Albert A Cock, an Anglican clergyman who was 'intensely keen about mysticism', he was referred to the Baron.[18] Not sure that he could manage the Mystical Element, Tyrrell recommended one of his own reviews of it. The point was that Cock was 'modern enough in his mind and ancient enough in his sympathies to have just the right difficulties about it [mysticism] which your book answers.' A similar instance a year later was the meeting with Emil Wolff of Munich, a 'platonist and mystic', a 'lover of Nicholas of Cusa, and of Erasmus', and translator of Thorugh Scylla and Charybdis.[19] He had read volume one of the Mystical Element and Tyrrell handed him on to the Baron who could better understand his learning and 'tell him the right people to know in Oxford.'[20]

Tyrrell frequently suggested Maude Petre should consult the Baron on various questions, often relating to mysticism. Noting that after
the first meeting of von Hügel and Tyrrell, there followed a 'constant interchange of books and thoughts', and that on some matters the relationship was unequal; for instance Tyrrell admitted that he had learnt all he knew of German thought from the Baron. Observing that von Hügel's two main interests were mysticism and historical criticism, she claimed that 'on the first of these subjects he both consulted and advised his friend - they met as equals', whereas on the second Tyrrell had all to learn. Most of their serious exchange on mysticism relates to the Mystical Element of Religion, but before looking at this we shall briefly note some of their general exchanges on spirituality.

In 1898 Tyrrell wrote to the Baron about Hard Sayings: 'may I send you a copy of my new spiritual book when it appears?' He continued to send material for the Baron's comment, criticism or approval. Von Hügel was demanding in return, commenting on the papers sent him and recommending numerous books, prompting Tyrrell to confess his sense of 'ignorance and inadequacy' which was 'healthily deepened' by the reading sent to him. Von Hügel expressed his gratitude for Tyrrell's 'What is Mysticism?', his rendering of Silvio Pellico's Dio Amore, and for External Religion. He also welcomed 'The Relation of Theology to Devotion' in 1899 as the 'finest thing' Tyrrell had done. He then described their deep mutual interest:

It is a deep encouragement to me in my work, - not only my book, but my poor life's work generally, - which is entirely along these lines...to find you giving such crystal clear expression to my dearest certainties, to the line of thought and living which alone can and does bring me light and strength; and to find too, that you are let to say these things, in your Order and by your Order.

Shortly afterwards, following the lectures to Oxford university students, Tyrrell wrote implying that no-one but the Baron really understood him,
to which von Hügel replied sympathetically, and with more recommended reading: Blondel, Ollé-Laprune and Grou.[26]

Tyrrell's references to Mother Julian of Norwich in 1899 also drew the Baron's approval: 'I must read Mother Julian: how grand that bit is!'[27] Some months later von Hügel noted how important Tyrrell's work on the English mystic was for his own book, and was soon welcoming the second of Tyrrell's papers on Mother Julian, the last in the Duckworth series.[28] Tyrrell's interest found further expression in the 1902 edition of The Revelations and also in Religion as a Factor of Life. Von Hügel revealed that he took much of Tyrrell's work, including that on Mother Julian and Oil and Wine, as 'spiritual reading'.[29] In this correspondence the Baron also claimed that not since Newman had there been a Catholic whose work appealed to him as much as Tyrrell's. Despite losing his professorship at Stonyhurst, Tyrrell's continued importance was clear to the Baron who remarked on the 'splendid verve and strong, mellow tone' of his writings which were 'so full of the mystery of faith and the world unseen' and which pierced 'the very heart of questions.'[30]

This collaboration and exchange of ideas is also evident in Tyrrell's work on the saints. The Baron felt his preface to Joly's Saint Ignatius in 1899 was 'uncommonly interesting' and full of promise, and he looked forward to reading it thoroughly.[31] Von Hügel remained a constant stimulus to Tyrrell in his interest in the sanctity of the Christian centuries and his desire to present an effective spirituality for his own time. To this end, he encouraged Tyrrell to compile a selection from Nicholas of Cusa.[32] Significantly, in view of what we have said about the conflicting interpretations of Ignatianism, the Baron also recommended 'your own Balthasar Alvarez', hoping that Tyrrell would
write about him. The tradition reflected here is that of the sixteenth century Spanish spiritual writers whose names included Peter Alcantara, Luis de Granada, Francis Borgia and Luis de Leon. In von Hügel’s own book, Alvarez was with the ‘great Jesuit mystics’, and the reader is reminded that he was 'declared by St Teresa to be the holiest mystical soul she had ever known'. The Baron felt that Tyrrell could 'fish his deep, great fragments of thoughts and writings out of that dreary, well-meaning da Ponte's biography', avoiding the 'wretched "scientific" jargon of the schools', revealing 'one of the deepest and tenderest of God's saints, a Jesuit too. And why should such a service not come from you? He is as wide and deep as God's sky and ocean'.

Tyrrell's preface to the *Imitation of Christ* offered another focus for sharing thoughts on Christian mysticism. Von Hügel noted: 'The "Imitation" Preface is most stimulating, and, I see, naturally with encouragement, that you have utilized my "synthetic" paper'. He then offered a detailed critique of some of the points raised. The impression from this letter is of the Baron's desire to pursue a technical and scholarly exchange with someone whom he not only respected as a friend and spiritual guide but as a specialist theologian of mysticism. When Tyrrell sent 'Mysteries as a necessity of life', he acknowledged the Baron's inspiration: 'it is redolent of our Richmond rambles'. In his reply von Hügel recommended Troeltsch's *Geschichte und Metaphysik*. On another occasion von Hügel was recommending Smith's *Select Discourses from the tradition of Cambridge Platonism*. In suggesting there were 'noble things in it', perhaps the greatest appeal to the Baron was their attraction to the 'scholastic principle of synthesis between faith, reason and revelation', but also their dislike of scholasticism as such. But their tendency to a 'kind of Neoplatonic mysticism', combined with a
paradoxical reaction against divine transcendence, distinguished them sharply from von Hügel.

It was not only saints, mystics and theologians of the past who featured prominently in their discussions of mystical theology, but contemporary writers. Though it was von Hügel who introduced Tyrrell to continental scholarship, particularly Loisy, Maude Petre's claim that he introduced him to the philosophy of M. Blondel was incorrect.[38] Soon after their first meeting Tyrrell had written to von Hügel: 'Blondel I had already received from Fr Bremond and had read without much profit for his style is obscure, especially to me whose language is scholastic though my thought is mystic'. Blondel was part of their ever-expanding shared intellectual world which included Bergson, Le Roy, Semeria, Duchesne, Scotti, Minocchi and Buonaiuti. Significantly, Blondel remained prominent in their discussions, precisely as the exponent of what Tyrrell called 'the way of concrete-minded Blondellian mysticism'.

The diversity of the emerging interest in mysticism noted in the previous chapter, is reflected in the letters of von Hügel and Tyrrell. There are references to Joly, Boutroux, Gosselin, William James, Saudreau, and Gardner all of whom produced works on mysticism. Other names appear which reveal the central significance of mysticism in their exchanges. One such is Récejac whose Fondements de la connaissance Mystique the Baron recommended for its attempt to relate objective and subjective elements in 'mystical visions'.[39] Schultenover noted the parallel between von Hügel and Récejac: 'their ideas on mysticism are largely concordant'. And the Baron duly noted the agreement of Récejac and Tyrrell on the need to find the mean between scepticism and superstition. Tyrrell replied stating he had not read Récejac but knew
the name, though he soon wrote saying he had found him helpful in his work on ethics. His own current reading included Lejeune's *La Vie Mystique*, though he revealed that his interest in mysticism was under strain due to his present conflict with authority: 'I find all this irritation untunes me and throws me out of sympathy with what is after all the only satisfying side of religion.'[40] Consequently, he asked the Baron to select the proposed anthology from Nicholas of Cusa which he might translate.

Another significant name to feature in their correspondence was Hugo Münsterberg, whose *Psychology and Life* was used by Tyrrell in his *Religion as a Factor of Life* and who was part of what the Baron called the 'Blondel-Münsterberg-Fichte line'; stressing the place of science in the moral-spiritual purification of the human personality.[41] In Tyrrell's philosophy of religion the Polish Madame Zamoyska also exercised an influence since he had reviewed her *Sur le travail*. Again it was a shared interest since the Baron was familiar with her work, noting that she was a visitor to Paris and 'an old friend of Ollé-Laprune' and 'received ideas from him as did Blondel.'[42] Among other figures who featured in their correspondence mention should be made of Abbé Henri de Tourville. Von Hügel suggested Tyrrell read Hémaur's paper on de Tourville whose *Piete Conflantes* was 'evidently an admirable book: the kind of thing you should review and push.'[43]

Finally two contemporary students of mysticism appear in their letters: Algar Thorold and W R Inge. Both von Hügel and Tyrrell were acquainted with Thorold by 1901. Tyrrell knew of him and his mystical studies and had exchanged ideas and books with him. By the end of his life von Hügel knew Thorold well and had reason to be grateful for his
work in seeing through a new edition of the *Mystical Element*. In the case of Inge, his suggestion that Catholic Modernism was merely a version of liberal Protestantism was to a great extent the catalyst for Tyrrell's final statement on modernism and Catholicism in *Christianity at the Crossroads*. Having earlier contributed to the revival of interest in mysticism, Inge returned to the subject in 1907 in his *Personal Idealism and Mysticism* after which von Hügel wrote to Tyrrell with reference to its criticism of Tyrrell and also its appreciative references to *The Soul's Orbit*. Inge had written a good deal on both modernism and mysticism, his first series of *Outspoken Essays* contained a piece on 'Roman Catholic Modernism' from 1909 and one on 'Institutionalism and Mysticism' from 1907, and his appearance in the von Hügel-Tyrrell correspondence at this stage points to these two inseparable threads of their spiritual and intellectual endeavour.

**TYRRELL'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE MYSTICAL ELEMENT OF RELIGION**

However great the collaboration between von Hügel and Tyrrell in the general study of spirituality and mystical theology, it is above all their specific shared labour on *The Mystical Element of Religion* which reveals the true depth and extent of their cooperation. Though Ellen Leonard exaggerated when describing Tyrrell as 'almost co-author' of the book, he certainly played a vitally important role in its genesis, another fact which helps to situate him within the revival of mystical theology.

After an operation in June 1897 von Hügel started to write a three thousand word article on St Catherine of Genoa for *The Hampstead Annual*. Though this original essay was small in compass the Baron gave himself to it with vigour: 'all my poor brains must go into my St Catherine
article'.[47] He was meticulous and unsparing in producing the piece, admitting it was 'the biggest grind in the way of actual writing' he had yet undertaken.[48] The subject, Caterina Fiesca Adorna, the Saint of Genoa, 1447-1510, was simply one among a variety of possible titles. Perhaps he chose Catherine, as Barmann suggests, because he was familiar with the physical locale in which she had lived and since he had been interested in her life for some years, or even because it seemed a more manageable enterprise than a better known saint.[49] He claimed that he only agreed to write on Catherine 'as an alternative for the original proposal made to me, to write on St Catherine of Siena, or St Teresa, or St Francis of Assisi.'

There was, however, a genuine personal interest in the Genoese saint, and evidently a real devotion. Later, he noted several reasons for studying Catherine: her doctrine of 'the soul's self-chosen, intrinsic purification' which he had come to know through Newman's Dream of Gerontius; his familiarity with the environment of Genoa over twenty years, the appeal of scholarly historical work on the 'apparently hopeless complication of the records of Catherine's life and doctrine'.[50] At the root of all this was the perception that close contact with 'a soul of most rare spiritual depth' would offer great insight into the 'greatness, helps, problems and dangers of the mystical spirit'. He told his niece that his interest was precisely in one who though a heroic Christian 'was almost a Neo-Platonist, an Institutional who, in some ways, hung loosely on institutions' and a deep thinker beset with psycho-physical disturbance.'[51] In other words, he took an unlikely and unpromising example precisely to illustrate the absolute necessity of the three elements even when they seemed least apparent. Thus, paradoxically, his study of Catherine would illustrate his growing conviction about the
essential unity and inseparability of the three elements of religion. In the event this study became all-absorbing: 'having begun to write a biography of St. Catherine, with some philosophical elucidations, I have finished by writing an essay on the philosophy of Mysticism, illustrated by the life of Caterinetta Fiesca Adorna and her friends.'[52]

The first indication of Tyrrell's interest in the Baron's project appeared in 1897, by which time he must have already heard of the proposed article: 'I am expecting S. Catherine's appearance anxiously; and so is Maude Petre who is much interested in mysticism.'[53] This remark suggests that from the very beginning the work was understood as a study of mysticism rather than a purely biographical presentation. The voluminous correspondence between von Hügel and Tyrrell which followed until 1909 contained numerous references to The Mystical Element which grew from this original article. In the event of further illness, it was Tyrrell who revised and corrected the proofs for the original article. Then, at the suggestion of the editor of The Hampstead Annual, the Baron embarked on an expanded theological and spiritual work which grew into two huge volumes of 450,000 words ten years later.

In her Story of a Friendship Maude Petre discussed at some length The Mystical Element 'with which Tyrrell was to be a good deal concerned', and suggested that it was 'not generally known how much labour he contributed to its final form.'[54] But recently Thomas Loome claimed that his 'share in the responsibility for this massive two-volume work is well known' since 'the story is told, through extensive quotations from the Tyrrell-von Hügel correspondence' in her Story of a Friendship.[55] Though it is true that Maude Petre indicated some aspects of their cooperation, using extensive quotations from their
letters, she cited only thirteen of the seventy or more letters in which reference was made to The Mystical Element. This selectivity suggests a case for re-examining these letters to reveal the full extent of their cooperation. De la Bedoyère held that von Hügel 'turned for advice on mystical questions to Father Tyrrell, in the spirit of a puzzled student naturally seeking the help of a devout priest trained and interested in these matters', and Maude Petre suggested that Tyrrell was a help with the 'final form of the book', since von Hügel 'realised his own literary deficiencies'. Further, Barmann claimed that 'at nearly each stage of the book's growth...von Hügel discussed aspects of it with Tyrrell.' These claims can be 'tested' by reference to the relevant correspondence.

One of the issues in the early correspondence was the difficulty of enunciating the connection between Catherine's precarious health and her sanctity, particularly how signs of hysteria should be interpreted, since some felt they detracted from the ideal of a wholesome and healthy spirituality. The Baron was quite able to resolve the problem theologically to his own satisfaction, but there remained the problem of communicating this to his 'reading public, both Catholic and Protestant.' Of several possible solutions which occurred to him, he was inclined to refer to St Catherine's hysteria as 'a nervous disorder or illness pointing out at the same time how little or nothing was known of such things' in her time. His main anxiety was that to admit, or even allude to, hysteria in relation to a canonised saint would horrify many who might still associate it with impurity of some kind, or take it to render 'uncertain and fantastic' all else connected with the saint.

Tyrrell was hesitant in reply, having no satisfactory solution to put before the 'muddle-headed public'. He favoured referring directly
to *hysteria* but understood simply as a nebulous and uncertain concept: 'I should be inclined to insist that it is but a *name* for the unknown cause of a group of symptoms'. The exchange continued with a brief reply from the Baron: 'Grateful thanks for your very helpful letter; it will help me, I know, most materially.' Then he expressed his hope for Tyrrell's further help, wanting him to 'criticise everything objectionable', and suggest any other changes as an 'act of charity.' The Baron acknowledged the debt to Tyrrell when he sent the proofs: 'I think you will find several traces of your helpful letters.' He also looked forward to resuming his labour on St Catherine, hoping for Tyrrell's further cooperation: 'I trust to be able to come back upon all these and suchlike matters on a more reasonable scale later on, and perhaps to be again helped by your kind and most valuable advice.'

Maude Petre's account took up the story of *The Mystical Element* at the end of 1905, having briefly indicated that there had been references to it in some of the correspondence from 1901 onwards and remarking that 'Tyrrell was always very insistent on von Hügel setting anything else aside', in order to concentrate on the opus magnum.[60] In fact Tyrrell's help and encouragement were apparent before the new century began. In 1899, while still at Stonyhurst, Tyrrell wrote, hoping that von Hügel was 'actually at work on St Catherine and not weakening down' his resolution by 'over-deliberation', a comment which is very revealing. On many occasions Tyrrell expressed his irritation at the scrupulosity which the Baron brought to his scholarship, an attitude quite different from his own. The heaviness and seriousness of the Baron's temperament are evident on every page of his monumental study. Neither was the subject such as to relieve the tedium of the analysis or the method adopted. But whatever the differences, the fusion of interest and commitment remained.
Having spent the summer of 1900 on the work von Hügel reported progress to Tyrrell, raising questions about the handling of difficult and conflicting texts, and also thanking him for his paper on the 'Wallawashees' which he felt exhibited a 'truly Catholic temper and philosophy of spiritual growth and experience.'[61]

Soon after, von Hügel stated that he had completed the general philosophical part of the book and was immersed in the biographical part prior to the final 'special philosophico-theological discussions suggested by her life.'[62] He was now facing a more personal problem which he expressed in terms of Mabillon's controversy with de Rancé and the former's witness to the compatibility of scholarship and sanctity. Thus, he grasped that no intellectual activity was contrary to the spiritual life in the case of a life marked by prayer. This ideal of 'Mabillonism' which 'required a deeper, truer asceticism of the whole man' sustained the Baron in his own scholarly work where he sought a personal synthesis of science and sanctity. Tyrrell's advice helped towards this integration of learning and sanctity.

In 1901 Tyrrell expressed his misgivings about the Baron's absorption in the minutiae of textual and theological analysis, wondering if he were not planning the book 'on too large a scale', suggesting he might bring out what he had already done.[63] There was perhaps a slight note of exasperation on Tyrrell's part at the prospect of the Baron labouring on for years to come, which was precisely what happened. Von Hügel replied claiming that on his recent trip to Milan he had recovered his 'life current', and his visit to Genoa had inspired a renewed commitment to his book: 'If only Providence gives me now some 3 or 4 months of peaceful regularity ...I think I will really or certainly
complete my poor _magnum opus_, one way or the other'. He was sure it had
helped his own growth, and hoped it would achieve much more. This
professed determination and the apologetic tone suggest that the earlier
criticism had in fact registered with von Hügel, though Tyrrell still
believed that the Baron loved complexity for its own sake.

As though to make amends for his earlier chiding, Tyrrell soon
wrote expressing his genuine hopes for the work:

I do, of all things, want your book to get finished, for in it you
will have, so to say, brought forth your _'Verbum Mentis'_ and left a
record of your individual mind in a way not possible in more fugitive and fragmentary brochures dealing with less wholly congenial subjects.164

Tyrrell believed the study would express the quintessential von Hügel: 'I think St Catherine will call at least one half of your power into
evidence.' He then expressed his willingness to be part of the process:
'needless to say, I shall be delighted to do anything in the way of proof
reading etc. that may lighten your labour.' This consumed a good deal
of his time and effort towards the end of his life.

Tyrrell's offer of help meant a great deal to von Hügel. When
working on the 'Doctrine chapter' which he was finding 'as difficult as
anything in the book', he welcomed the offer: 'the thought of your kind
help to come helps cheer me on... When you do come to see it all, I shall
of course, be grateful for any help.'65 There followed the clearest
indication of precisely what the Baron most valued in Tyrrell's
cooperation: 'the two points on which I would desiderate your special kind
attention, are my English, and my orthodoxy. What lies between these two
poles I am more confident about.' He wondered whether Tyrrell could
find 'the bit or bits' in Benedict XIV's _De Servorum Dei beatificatione
et Beatorum canonisatione_, referring to the relation between these two
processes and the question of the approbation of the holy person's doctrine. Practically, von Hügel wanted to know whether and to what extent one remained free to criticize and dissent from the latter. He also sought Tyrrell's help in finding a passage in St Thomas Aquinas excluding the possibility human acts produced by God without cooperation.

Though unable to supply the *ipsissima verba* the Baron sought, Tyrrell gave his answer:

Conformity to the current authoritative teaching of the day is all that is required for 'sanctity'; unintentional errors especially in regard to later doctrinal developments are no slur on a man's faith or rather orthodoxy - else where would S. Augustine or S. Thomas or all ante-Nicene Saints be sent to?²⁶⁶

The position summarised by Tyrrell was duly incorporated into the section entitled *Catholic principles concerning the teaching of Canonised Saints*, in the chapter on Catherine's doctrine.²⁶⁷ Tyrrell also supplied the detailed references required from St Thomas, from the *Summa*, and parallels from *Opusculum*. It is important to note that Tyrrell's help is apparent not only in this connection but in a variety of passages where St Thomas has been introduced into the discussion. In Chapter XIV, for instance, on 'Mysticism, Pantheism and Personality', Tyrrell's 'Meaning of Analogy' from *Lex Orandi* has been utilised in the Baron's exposition of the teaching of Aquinas on our 'direct semi-consciousness of God's indwelling.'²⁶⁸ Thus, Tyrrell's critical understanding of the Angelic Doctor, which had caused him so much trouble at Stonyhurst, was to prove valuable to von Hügel in his attempt to present Catherine's mystical doctrine in the context of the Church's theological tradition.

Willing as Tyrrell was to cooperate with the Baron, he sought to restrain his scrupulosity and keep the work within manageable limits. His expressions of anticipation, which recur throughout the letters, were
clearly intended to encourage von Hugel to move speedily to conclude the work: 'I am most anxious to see your St Catherine, & am delighted to think that you can speak of the New Year as seeing it substantially finished.'[69] No sooner had Tyrrell expressed this hope than the Baron began to indicate further delay and the 'costingness of the struggle', and the need to clear up important parts of volume two.

In the midst of his difficulties with the Jesuits and the diocese of Westminster, Tyrrell continued to encourage the Baron. He wished that volume one could be produced without delay: 'Things are so uncertain and the publication of I would tie you down to the rest, besides provoking criticism which would help you in II. Else you may be led astray into the "Geography of Palestine".'[70] The final remark illustrates amusingly but sharply Tyrrell's misgivings about the Baron's pedantry which was always liable to lead him into unproductive diversions from the central theme of his work. Offering further help, Tyrrell invited him to move to Richmond: 'if you wanted quiet, and all the tranquilising influence of a sleepy Hollow, & Nature unspoilt, you could not do better than to bring your S. Catherine down here.'[71]

Perhaps Tyrrell's most trenchant criticism of the Baron's over-absorption in the book appeared in September 1902. He spoke of the desirability of finishing it as soon as possible, leaving aside if necessary all 'tempting amplifications' to a later volume: 'I fear your enthusiasm for the subject and your thirst for completeness may beguile you on interminably.'[72] With the practical experience of the writer, Tyrrell then reminded von Hugel that the relative value of the work must be considered as well as its absolute value:
you must consult the capacity and the interest of some sort of public; and indeed, their pockets. To get a hearing, is all-important; & over elaboration may frustrate that end. I know it is the hardest of all sacrifices to say a thing less fully and exactly than one can and would like to say it, for the sake of simpler and less prepared minds; but one does not write books for angels, but for men.[73]

A friendly challenge followed: 'I don't expect to hear from you till you send me the MS of S Catherine.' But Tyrrell's exasperation reached a new pitch a month later when he threatened to burn all the Baron's letters until the book was finished: 'I had rather you reserved every scrap of your energies for that work.'[74] A little later Tyrrell wrote that he 'wished to Heavens that S Catherine were out of your hands and in mine.'

At the beginning of 1903 Tyrrell believed the end was in sight: 'I am told your S. Catherine is all but ready; and I hope it is no exaggeration; for another month or two of it will kill you.'[75] Tyrrell's 'prediction' was wide of the mark since the work continued and the Baron survived! Tyrrell genuinely felt that the Baron was too important to so many 'scattered sheep' to be easily spared. Since von Hügel claimed to be working hard on the book 'with all but Sunday breaks', Tyrrell accepted that he must simply wait on the Baron's good time, until the 'little utterance' was ready. Nonetheless the work remained significant in their correspondence with Tyrrell agreeing to review the manuscript.

Early in 1904 Tyrrell responded encouragingly to a letter which is no longer extant: 'I am glad to hear that S. Catherine grows apace.'[76] But it was not until a year later that von Hügel was able to report definite progress, expressing too the mental strain involved. When Tyrrell asked if the book was due to appear, since he would be 'glad of some such occupation soon', there was also a new note: 'circumstances may easily make any acknowledgement of my cooperation
undesirable but I hope they need not interfere with the thing itself.'[77] He was also considering an unsigned review article on the book for the Edinburgh Review or Quarterly Review: 'That would stimulate my critical faculties in going through the MS.' In the light of Maude Petre's suggestion that von Hügel wished to distance himself not only from modernism but from Tyrrell himself, it is clear from this letter that it was Tyrrell who first suggested concealing his involvement in the work. It is true, however, that the Baron took up the offer with an alacrity that indicated a certain relief at the leeway now open to him.

In his reply, von Hügel spoke of the work which was 'drawing nearer and nearer to that consummation'.[78] He described rather graphically tunnelling through 'many a hard rock stretch, many a hot spring, many a slushy land slip', and though the journey was not yet complete, the end was in sight with some 'hard, knotty points' still needing treatment. He expressed his desire to have Tyrrell's continued help: 'I shall certainly continue to be most grateful for your reading it through, and giving more of your criticisms - when it is ready for that.' Then the Baron stated his dilemma: if Tyrrell's canonical position became precarious, a practical problem would arise as to whether he could acknowledge Tyrrell's help. Clearly, von Hügel was perplexed at having to make a practical judgment about the book's chances if such an identification with Tyrrell were admitted: 'it feels so horribly mean to let you have the trouble and give the valuable aid of such attentions, and to say nothing formal and by name of thanks, in the Preface to the book.' He then wondered if Tyrrell would be prepared 'to waive that ordinary expression of gratitude', and to remain his 'unofficial but most real censor.' The debt to Tyrrell was certainly genuinely felt, as he indicated in a letter which Maude Petre failed to include in her account:
'I forgot to thank you cordially for volunteering to write an anonymous 'Quarterly' or 'Edinburgh' paper on my book. I gratefully accept, it will be most helpful to me, and may, as you say, help you over the toil of going through the MS critically.'[79]

Although Tyrrell was travelling a good deal in 1906 after leaving the Jesuits, he announced: 'So now whenever S. Catherine is ready, I am.'[80] He returned to England from France hoping for a quiet stay in London, remarking that 'S. Catherine will want attention'. In reply, the Baron referred to the back breaking nature of the work, the need for further correction and also complained that Tyrrell's uncertain movements were as much of a problem as his own failure to complete the work. Von Hügel suggested meeting in Paris or Brussels where he could do 'a 2 or 3 weeks thrash through my performance with you.'[81] But when Tyrrell announced that he would lodge in Clapham, von Hügel hoped they would dine daily at his home in Vicarage Gate to 'get through my St Catherine.' He then proposed that Tyrrell should actually move to Kensington. So, whatever misgivings von Hügel may have had about the public acknowledgment of Tyrrell's help, he was still relying heavily on his stated intention to read and possibly correct the final draft.

In the event, Tyrrell moved to the Praemonstratensian Monastery at Storrington and suggested the Baron move there too to finish his work. But just over two weeks later Tyrrell was back in Paris though still expressing his commitment to The Mystical Element: 'I reserve all my remaining intelligence for St. Catherine, whom you will send as soon as she is ready.'[82] Tyrrell's hasty and unpredictable movements, apparently the outward expression of a much deeper interior instability, made him unable to discuss the book viva voce, though he conceded there may even
be 'some advantages of accuracy and brevity in the littera scripta.'
Writing from France ten days later, for the first time in the whole correspondence, Tyrrell counsels delaying the appearance of the book in view of the growing opposition to Modernism in Rome: 'Is St. Catherine coming? ...It will be no harm if she waits for the storm to clear. There must be a lull, if not a reaction, with the death of Pius X.'[83]

It is interesting to observe that the growing tension between von Hügel and Tyrrell which Maude Petre alleged, is nowhere clearly apparent in their correspondence. The Baron seemed uncertain about her claim to have observed a growing coldness in the relationship: 'you warned me that you noticed a certain drifting apart between Fr. T and myself.'[84] For his part Tyrrell seems to have been unaware of the alleged growing distance. In fact he requested her help in finding 'some menage near the Baron just for the time of my work with him', stating explicitly he would be 'glad to be near the Baron.'[85]

Unless one is to charge Maude Petre with a certain mischievousness in creating a problem which did not really exist then one must accept her interpretation of von Hügel's letter to her on 3rd July since this seems to be the origin of her 'perception' of a growing coolness in the relationship. But the Baron was simply confirming his long-standing impression of Tyrrell as 'very impulsive' and distinctly embitterable. He felt that beneath Tyrrell's unpredictable, volatile nature which made him a 'poor fighter' and one who should avoid collisions with authority, he saw something more: 'He is too utterly sensitive, in a sense feminine a nature not to get dried up, embittered, unbalanced over such conflicts. Yet if this is true, the situation is indeed difficult: for it would be difficult on its directly spiritual, his spiritual side.'[86]
Maude Petre, who was always 'protective' towards Tyrrell, clearly over-reacted to such frankness. Tyrrell himself was distressed and hurt by her suggestion of the Baron's growing antipathy, wondering whether she had any solid reason for thinking the Baron "nearly abandoned me". I never had the slightest suspicion of so much as a cooling on his part.[87] However, his ever vulnerable nature then became rather uneasy as he wondered if there was 'more than he knew', and whether perhaps he was 'living in a fool's paradise'. Then a note of bitterness entered his reflections as he seemed to sense there may be cause to suspect the conditional or provisional nature of the Baron's friendship. He realised that were he to leave the 'apron strings of this old Roman harlot' he might well lose von Hügel's support. As he put it: the Baron would more than 'drop me' with haste, though conceding that this would be entirely justified! But these were little more than speculations and what Tyrrell really thought was revealed in a letter two days later when he received a 'bushel of letters from the very Baron himself, and an assurance that S. Catherine is on her way in the form of 2 large parcels to be paid on delivery - I am not yet abandoned it seems, except by Providence.[88] Unless one charges von Hügel with complete disingenuousness it is difficult not to be moved by his expression of friendship when he spoke of himself to Tyrrell as 'your close, very close friend - full of sympathy, righteous anger, sorrow and trust with you and for you.'[89] Moreover, their continued and indeed intensified collaboration on The Mystical Element was the strongest indication that Maude Petre's interpretation was false.

Von Hügel's chief concern was Tyrrell's growing estrangement from the Church and how far his increasing bitterness and lack of discretion would distort his assessment of The Mystical Element. And yet,
paradoxically, his respect for Tyrrell's competence in the field of mystical theology was never more clearly stated than at this time: 'You know how sincere was (indeed is) my conviction, that I could nowhere secure a more competent, valuable critic of it [his book] than him.'[90] And since the Baron himself had decided to avoid any 'break with the authorities', he had felt for quite some time that it was an act of friendship involving an obvious risk to ask Tyrrell to be involved. He had maintained this view, he claimed, up to three weeks previously, at which time Tyrrell was due back in Storrington. Von Hügel then stated his present misgivings which reflect a strange mixture of self-preservation, the demands of loyalty, and a perceptive assessment of Tyrrell's present limitations. He was distressed at Tyrrell's indiscretion, writing on postcards what most would only include in registered letters, suspecting this would affect his capacity to do justice to the two volumes. He was also worried that all would know Tyrrell's share in the book and his dilators would make much of his association with it. Von Hügel claimed he was willing to pay this cost, recognising Tyrrell was a thoroughly competent critic. But he wondered whether Tyrrell could manage at present the proper attention, peace and quiet the subject-matter and the intricacies of the book demanded.

At the same time von Hügel could still speak of Tyrrell's 'beautiful mysticism, his faith and love in the midst, in spite, in a sense because of obscurity and trouble within and without.'[91] The reliance on Tyrrell thus survived all these doubts and misgivings. Tyrrell himself was still waiting for the work on S. Catherine: 'Let her be sealed and registered and bound by every bond of safety.' After despatching the book, von Hügel wrote: 'I feel downrightly guilty at sending you such a wheelbarrow full - almost as much as the entire remains of Tintagel Castle - when you
must be extra weary and badly wanting a rest from literary toil[92]

There followed guidelines for reading the manuscript, prefaced with a characteristic expression of admiration for Tyrrell's competence:

I know of no one who combines, to anything like the extent to which you do so, a knowledge of and interest in the subject-matters here discussed, the methods here applied, the ideals aimed at, and - I know and appreciate this particularly - the weakness and the limits of the workman at work here.[93]

This confidence in Tyrrell, which endured throughout the whole period of the work, also disclosed the Baron's lack of confidence in his own ability. He wanted Tyrrell to view volume I, attending particularly to four points where he felt he was most likely to have failed: literary repetitions, inconsistencies, obscurities and unnecessary or insufficiently advantageous boldness and novelties. The Baron was also rather unsure as to whether its great length would be acceptable. Tyrrell was soon absorbed in the text of The Mystical Element: 'S. Catherine has been getting here 6 solid hours a day for 9 days'.

Tyrrell soon reported that he had started volume II and was getting the hang of the Baron's thought. He spoke of his 'poor attempts at comment and suggestion' which he hoped the Baron would not take too seriously, revealing a determined desire to minimise his own contribution: 'I feel it would take me a year of study to form a really competent judgment on a work of such depth and subtlety. I can only speak for the prima facie impression on the ordinary intelligent reader.'[94] In a letter which again Maude Petre did not cite, von Hügel thanked Tyrrell for his labour on the manuscript, and the 'most valuable' criticisms which would be carefully weighed: 'I feel quite ashamed at all the many hours you have given to this work, away from your own writing, and can promise, I think, ever to remember it most gratefully.'[95]
Tyrrell's 'modesty', when he spoke of his 'feeble notes' to be taken with 'many grains of salt', whether genuine or merely conventional, was certainly rejected by von Hügel who repeatedly recorded his debt.[96] The Baron stated that he did not want 'to take any further publishing steps before getting the book into the kind of shape which a mature study of your notes will help me to see it ought to assume.'[97] The Baron also revealed he was already 'carrying out all the formal and sequence changes' Tyrrell had suggested. Again, it seems significant that this letter was ignored in Maude Petre's account. As if to correct her impression, von Hügel wrote to her at this time:

When Fr T sent me back my St. C. Ms about 10 days ago, he joined to it quite an Essay of sympathetic adhesions and criticisms on the book. They are truly invaluable; and I am going thro' it all once more, with his proposals before me. I was so pleased with these pages too, because, upon the whole, they were sunny and expansive, and at the end he said I must really let him be by me when the first proofs come in, to help with them.[98]

Quoting Tyrrell's own words, the Baron then expressed his sadness at Tyrrell's stated desire to have his name removed from certain parts of the text of the book: 'I am going to ask you [to] erase my name where it occurs in 2 or 3 places of a certain little MS.'[99] The Baron wondered if a new vexation had descended on Tyrrell prompting this request for deletions, or whether it presaged some imminent 'more "revolutionary" action' requiring him to be free from any commitment to the book.

It became clear to the Baron that Tyrrell's growing disaffection centred not merely on the Jesuits but the Church itself. Despite such tensions, Tyrrell's letters continued to express his keen interest in the book and his wish to be associated with it. The correspondence at this point also contains one of the most detailed references to the actual text of The Mystical Element which Tyrrell had worked through so meticulously. It is a comment on Chapter IX in Volume II concerning the
psychologist James Ward to whom von Hügel had alluded along with Bergson, H. Jones, Blondel, Volkelt, Münsterberg and Mercier. Tyrrell criticised Ward's psychological presuppositions and also the Baron's lack of clarity on the important 'psycho-physical and temperamental' question, and the "science-purgation" theory: 'I feel you have there caught a great idea by its soaped tail and must dig your nails in deeper if you are to hold it.'[100]

Despite the Baron's misgivings about Tyrrell's present ability to give proper consideration to *The Mystical Element*, he continued to rely on him. He sought help with an article on the Fourth Gospel for the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*: 'I shall be, as ever, deeply grateful; for you are sure to be able greatly to help, - you have such a wondrous gift of lucidity and of seeing where and why I am foggy. You have this and much else, that helps greatly.'[101] But still chiefly concerned with *The Mystical Element*, he again recorded his debt to Tyrrell:

I want, then, at this milestone in my long journey, to thank you, once more, most gratefully, for all you have done in this matter - a toilsome bit of help, by which I have profited greatly. Every one of your critiques has been considered; all the large proposals for re-arrangement, and the small stylistic criticisms have been accepted; and the intermediate proposals are not being forgotten.[102]

The following year the Baron announced the book would be published in September and he asked Tyrrell to go through the second volume, knowing Tyrrell's help would be 'specially valuable'.[103] There were six points which he asked Tyrrell to 'remember or consider'. These concerned structure, style, layout, content and possible errors. First, he wanted Tyrrell to advise him on the divisions of the chapters: 'pray help me towards short but very clear and helpful headings especially to these subsections'. Secondly, as many footnotes as possible were to be
suppressed or shortened. Thirdly, the Baron felt that he may have strayed too far afield in his chapter on immortality and so looked to Tyrrell for advice: 'If you think so, I pray suggest where to excise.' Fourthly, the Baron states: 'I shall be much obliged if you will, besides, break up any other over long sentences into short or shorter ones.' Fifthly, he conceded there were places where he was 'wrong or muddled as to Scholastic Theological positions. In these cases, you would kindly draw my attention, and I would try to eliminate or improve the peccant passage.' His final point was that if Tyrrell went through all this it would spare him going through the same volume himself.

The proof reading and revision was clearly a joint endeavour. He allowed Tyrrell considerable latitude in proposing detailed alterations: 'If you wrote down the pages where any substantial change, or omission, of "fact" or declaration is proposed...I would then be able to send straight to Dent.'[104] Finally von Hügel apologised for the vast work load he had imposed on Tyrrell though he hoped that his kindness would be rewarded 'very abundantly'. A postscript confirmed the extent of the Baron's dependence: 'I have added the 2nd copy of the Preface to the parcel to you, as you may find there things to suppress or modify.' Tyrrell's commitment was undiminished, writing from Boutre: 'Letter received this morning. I will do my best with the MS.'[105]

However favourably disposed to the Baron's work, Tyrrell described it to Bremond as an 'absurd book' because it was unclassifiable. He expressed his honest feelings rather severely:

The Baron has sent me his S. Catherine again for revision. A hopeless book; a battery of heavy artillery to bring down a flea. He never asks himself: will this interest people who have not spent 10 years on the subject and for whom S. Catherine will seem a very mediocre personnage?[106]
This unflattering opinion was followed by a remark the significance of which is not entirely clear: 'As to his book, he must know that a saint's life and treatise on mysticism, published without an imprimatur is ipso facto condemned.' It may reflect the Baron's conflict between obedience to the Church and loyalty to the modernist movement. It is possible that he had thought of not seeking an imprimatur in order to retain credibility with the Rinnovamento group and other modernists.

To von Hügel himself Tyrrell was rather less astringent in his remarks about the work which had been so much part of their life and labour for ten years. He observed that it could 'never be anything but a difficult book - for the few and not for the many...Long as it is, it is a hundred times too short for the matter compressed within its limits.' Von Hügel thanked Tyrrell for his 'most kind and valuable work' on volume II: 'I have already read your general remarks and criticisms, and see their wisdom. I shall do all I can to carry out the improvements suggested.' The Baron accepted Tyrrell's criticism of the lack of clarity on the 'science-purgation theory', suggesting it was a principle he was better able to live than to express.

Tyrrell welcomed the publication in a review he sent to the Nation and the Guardian. After the Baron asked for the return of Tyrrell's review copy, to remind him of 'the Friend's ever ready helpfulness and kindness', he thanked Tyrrell for the review: 'I feel that you are right in your criticisms of my style, etc; perhaps also as to St. C's slightness for the purposes to which she is put in the book. I must not judge your praise; I can only hope that some of it may be deserved.'
Since the point about style obviously annoyed von Hügel, he was delighted that Emile Boutroux had written in admiration, thus allowing him to conclude that at least one reputable scholar had not felt that he had been talking to him 'through some thick fog or curtain, which most people, even of those who find me of use, feel about my writing if not my talk.'[110] The remark about St Catherine's 'suitability' for such a treatment also touched a nerve. Having laboured ten years on the life and teaching of one particular saint, it required considerable equanimity to accept the suggestion that it might have been more profitable to have studied another more illuminating individual. It was an opinion Tyrrell held to the end, as he wrote in the Quarterly Review: 'One sometimes regrets that Baron von Hügel did not select for his illustration some of the richer and less monotonous mystics.'[111] Tyrrell felt that by comparison with Teresa, Francis, John of the Cross, or Mother Julian, Catherine's personality 'seems thin and shadowy', though on one occasion he suggested that the Baron had made her the 'patroness of liberalism.' Though von Hügel was aware of the difficulty in choosing Catherine, Tyrrell's remark could hardly be seen as anything other than a direct criticism of the choice. The implication was that however thorough and erudite the study of Catherine, it could not bear all the weight placed on it in terms of elucidating the central features of Christian mysticism. But Tyrrell's final remarks were positive and full of praise. He felt that since the two volumes 'compressed the learning and reflection of a lifetime', they deserved a place as 'a classical treatise, not merely on mysticism but on the whole philosophy of religion.'

Maude Petre's claim that von Hügel turned to Tyrrell anxious 'to share with him his own intellectual and spiritual treasures', and of a 'sharing spirit' which became 'a bond of union between men widely
separated in place and thought', is fundamentally sound. But one must question her claim that 'von Hügel impelled an incautious man into the fight, and then expected him to exercise restraint and caution in the very thick of the medley.' This is not to deny the element of truth in this view since the Baron himself admitted some culpability for Tyrrell's difficulties: 'I cannot let him bear all the blame, where I did so much to stimulate his thought and knowledge.' But since Tyrrell was a free agent with a mind of his own the evidence requires a balance which is not always apparent in Maude Petre's account. In her more unprejudiced moments, when she is obviously nearer to the documentary evidence, her description of 'their fundamental spiritual sympathy' is eminently sound. This sympathy is nowhere more evident than in their cooperation on The Mystical Element of Religion which is rightly seen as 'one of the happiest episodes of their long friendship.' Her final judgment on Tyrrell's contribution is, if anything, rather an understatement: 'George Tyrrell thus took a part - not wholly negligible - in the final construction of the work for which von Hügel's name will ever, and chiefly, live.'

The fact that 'the whole period of the two men's relationship coincided with the gradual growth of the Baron's book', illustrates the centrality of the mystical question to their friendship and also the depth of their collaboration. Almost a year before his death, Tyrrell remarked to von Hügel: 'I have come too absorbed in your own absorptions to be a very restful distraction.' But differences remained. Tyrrell felt the inadequacy of what he called von Hügel's 'abstractions' in the face of the 'Vatican spirit of police-religion': 'one feels the unreality of Euckenism and Hügelism in the face of the perishing multitudes. There is a sort of "Palace-of-Art" aloofness about
the attitude.' And again when confronting what he called the 'heat, noise and idiocy of London' he asked: "How is Hügelian religion to remedy all this?" A few Hindoos in Piccadilly had more meaning in their faces, more humanity, than the rest put together.'

Yet, despite this huge correspondence over a period of ten years and the help Tyrrell had offered, the Baron's expressions of dependence and gratitude, there was no acknowledgement in the most obvious place, the preface to the first edition. This seems one of the most obvious points against emphasising the debt to Tyrrell. But this question contains the whole paradox of their respective stories. When von Hügel started work on his book there was at least a suspicion of heterodoxy in respect of his views on biblical and other questions. Tyrrell, however, was still a sought-after spiritual guide, appreciated for his works of devotion and in reasonable standing with the Society of Jesus and the Church. His orthodoxy had not yet been impugned. But by the time of the publication of the study of Saint Catherine the situation had changed completely. Though still under some suspicion von Hügel had escaped condemnation and was a tolerable presence in official Catholic circles and even enjoyed considerable standing in the world of scholarship. By this time Tyrrell had been denounced and excommunicated and was living in ecclesiastical exile though still producing theological works of some interest and appeal however unacceptable to Catholic orthodoxy.

We have seen that von Hügel struggled with the problem of how to acknowledge his debt to Tyrrell and still present the book as a thoroughly Catholic and orthodox treatment of mysticism acceptable to the Church. His exclusion from the Preface of any direct reference to Tyrrell's part in the work may be thought to settle the argument about
von Hügel’s disloyalty and instinct for self-preservation. But one might claim that since von Hügel struggled to remain a ‘man of the Church’, he simply could not be expected to acknowledge his debt to one who had become so bitterly hostile to the Church he himself loved so much. But by the time of the second edition of *The Mystical Element* in 1923, modernism was safely in the past, and so was Tyrrell. Having left behind his role as ‘Colporteur and Vermittler’ in the modernist movement, von Hügel had found a measure of peace and spiritual stability, and was prepared to express publicly his gratitude to Tyrrell who had been dead fourteen years.[115] His major reservation about Tyrrell during the final stages of the book's preparation in 1908 had concerned the danger of Tyrrell’s unbalanced or clouded judgment and his lack of inner peace resulting from the vehement battle with ecclesiastical authority. In his otherwise warm acknowledgment of Tyrrell's contribution to the book in the Preface to the second edition, this particular reservation is repeated. But the debt to Tyrrell was at last stated publicly and prominently:

Father Tyrrell has gone, who had been so generously helpful, especially as to the mystical states, as to Aquinas and as to the form of the whole book, for so many years, long before the storms beat upon him and his own vehemence overclouded, in part, the force and completeness of that born mystic.[116]

So, *The Mystical Element of Religion* remains an enduring monument to an impressive personal relationship between two Christian scholars concerned with the central questions of mysticism. Schultenover's judgment is both concise and accurate: "there was almost complete unanimity in philosophical-theological matters, and, more important, a much deeper spiritual and affective bond."[117] Neuner's remarks are equally perceptive: 'Theologie bei der persönlichen Frömmigkeit und der Glaubenserfahrung, also bei der Mystik anzusetzen, war das Verbindende zwischen den beiden Männern.'[118]
CHAPTER THREE

THE CRITIQUE OF NON-CHRISTIAN MYSTICISM

The exploration of the nature of Christian mysticism by von Hügel and Tyrrell was undertaken in the intellectual context of an emerging study of comparative religion, with a predominant interest in its mystical dimension, and a rediscovery of the roots of theology in the early Church. Their approach to Christian mysticism proceeded by way of negation, clarifying how it differed from both Buddhist and neo-Platonic mysticism. In three essays on true and false mysticism in 1899, Tyrrell set out the essential elements of Christian mysticism over against Oriental and neo-Platonic mysticism. A year earlier in his essay on Catherine of Genoa, von Hügel had made passing reference to the weakness of Buddhism. Surveying the history of the human search for the 'wisdom of the mystical way', he suggested that experience revealed 'great movements of world-flight and longing for rest', citing as examples primitive Christianity, early and eastern Monachism, neo-Platonism and Buddhism, and contrasting them with great movements of world-seeking, such as classical Hellenism and the Renaissance. To understand their contribution to the study of mysticism some familiarity with their reflections on these systems is required. Further, an examination of their rejection of pantheism leads directly into a consideration of the relationship between divine transcendence and immanence, mystical experience and union. The purpose of this chapter, then, is to lay the foundation for understanding their account of Christian mysticism by examining their critique of Buddhism, neo-Platonism and pantheism.
BUDDHISM

We are not chiefly concerned with the question whether von Hügel or Tyrrell provided an adequate or even fully accurate account of Buddhism, its origins, history, or any of its specific doctrines. It is quite clear that they neither intended nor achieved this. Our interest is rather in the principles governing their critique of Buddhism so that we may throw into clearer relief their understanding of specifically Christian mysticism. It should be noted from the outset that Tyrrell readily confessed he was no specialist but 'a mere layman in comparative religion', and that von Hügel admitted his lack of first hand experience of Oriental religions and his reliance on secondary sources, especially the work of Oldenberg and Lehmann on Buddhism.[2] As in most areas of his work, Tyrrell did not cite the sources for his understanding of Buddhism, but it may reasonably be assumed that they were not vastly different from those of the Baron. Indeed the distinct similarity in their general perspective and the manner of presentation suggest agreement and a reliance on similar literature. This is also clear from Tyrrell's remarks to von Hügel that he and Maude Petre had just finished Blondel's *L'Action* 'and live now in the midst of Oldenberg's Bouddha which you recommended over three years ago.'[3]

In the light of what he judged to be the true mysticism of the Christian tradition, itself subject to alien and distorting influences throughout history, von Hügel found Buddhism incomplete and inadequate since its end was held to be not in 'seeking and finding Personality in self and the absolute' but in 'flying from and losing Personality'.[4] For the Baron, no account of mysticism was adequate which did not stress its goal as the fulness of the self's life and personality in the Divine
Life and Personality. He dealt with another series of questions relating to Buddhism when he asked whether progress was really traceable in religion at all.[5] *Progress and Religion* was a wide-ranging though at times dense and obscure discussion in philosophical terms of a theme which constantly pre-occupied the Baron: the relationship of the abiding and Eternal to the contingent and changing. Most of the address dealt with Judaism and Christianity, followed by a brief reference to Confucianism, Buddhism and Mohammedanism. *Nirvana* was held to be precisely a release from the 'ceaseless flux of re-incarnation' which was felt with such horror on the part of the human subject. He claimed that this view, though exaggerated, grasped an essential truth: that constant change is a fact of human experience and that 'cessation of life is one end for man to work and pray for.'[6] This desire for release, which is 'the authentic cry of the human soul when fully normal and awake', is a confirmation of the Jewish and Christian search for permanence in change, 'for a Simultaneity, the support of our succession.' Elsewhere he described Primitive Buddhism rather as 'a grand prelude, an impressive clearing of the stage, for Religion than as a religion proper.'[7] Its positive value lay in its 'intense sense of the mutability and the unsatisfyingness of contingent life.'[8] But because it lacked a distinctly personal or divine personal dimension, the Baron saw Buddhism as 'an extraordinarily immanent, self-absorbed, estimate of, attitude towards, life, and as a spiritually attuned moralism; and not as directly a religion at all.'[9] He maintained this position to the end of his life.[10]

The point at which the Christian religion diverges most radically from Buddhism was stated in clear terms in *Eternal Life* where he asserted that *Nirvana* did not represent a positive affirmation of eternal
life but the elimination of succession, endless flux and transmigration from which the individual longs to escape. Although, negatively there is no place for the apprehension of 'full spiritual life', the horror of constant movement stimulates the 'human soul's deeper and deepest life.' So Buddhism experiences a true need but one which it cannot ultimately satisfy since its goal is purely negative escape: 'not Desire, and not Consciousness, not Life, and yet not Death.' This stress on finitude and the consequent pessimism of Buddhist mysticism is thus deemed inadequate by von Hügel who demanded a much more positive account of the goal of all human striving, intellectual and spiritual. He pointed out that the Buddhist lack of conviction or idea of God was not to be dismissed as an entirely negative apprehension since the 'longing for Nirvana' and the 'cessation of all consciousness' is 'quite magnificent as a prolegomenon of all religion.' Expressed positively, this realisation is only possible because of 'the Real Presence of God' in the Buddhist mind and a clear indication of the 'dim, inarticulate sense of what the Abiding means.' For T S Eliot this letter captured the Baron's essential position on Buddhism: 'admirable in his combination of sympathy with firm Christianity.' In an earlier reference to non-Christian religions von Hügel had also claimed that all furnish their followers 'with (imperfect) conceptions of God' as well as 'with (imperfect) conceptions of Christ (Moses, Mahommed, Buddha, etc.).'

Although von Hügel had relatively little to say about Buddhism in The Mystical Element, he offered another glimpse of the way in which it differed from Christian mysticism, noting its stress on 'abstruse reasoning and pessimistic emotion.' In the second volume his dependence on Oldenberg and Lehmann is apparent again when he refers to the 'agnosticism' of the Buddha on the question of whether the perfected
saint lives on after death, and the tendency to see annihilation as the end of the journey beyond created things. Since 'Buddhist belief maintains itself on the knife's edge' of the two alternatives of 'new being' or 'nothingness', a judgment must be framed in terms of profound paradox: 'The desire of the heart, as it longs for the Eternal, is not left without something, and yet the thinking mind is not given a something that it could grasp and retain.'[16] This was the negative side of the Baron's positive belief that dogmatic truth taught by the Church was necessary to the mystical way. However, despite the inadequacies of the Buddhist way, its distinct mystical element is openly acknowledged in the Baron's discussion of the three elements. So, the living reality, 'the Buddhist Mysticism of Thibet', is still instructive on this central element of religion, though its limitation is precisely its failure to grasp the significance of the temporal, finite and contingent in approaching the divine.[17] In the Baron's view, the intellectual agnosticism of Buddhist mysticism and its world-denying and world-fleeing negativity represent in effect a 'dead end' for the human spirit which perceives that endless flux is not the ultimate reality and knows that all created things can never be other than unsatisfying and unable to meet the deep-rooted human desire for eternity.

Tyrrell's reflections on Buddhism were even more fragmentary. But, unlike von Hügel, its non-dogmatic strain exerted a distinct attraction. Though it is doubtful whether he made a great effort to grasp the nature of Buddhist mysticism, his allusions reflect an understanding which was at once both personal and positive although, like von Hügel, he was ready to dismiss what he considered its largely negative attitude to the created order and human striving. However, its acceptance of doubt, unknowing and darkness, and its resignation to the irrationality of life,
represented a real attraction for him especially since dogma gradually became an intellectual and spiritual burden which he found impossible to bear. So, despite this ambivalence, or perhaps because of it, Tyrrell's personal appropriation of Buddhist mysticism illuminates the specific nature of Christian mysticism and its particular tensions and paradoxes.

For Tyrrell the first difference between Christian mysticism and Oriental mysticism is the latter's stress on the 'destruction of personal distinctness and absorption into original nothingness' which is alien to the fulfilment envisaged in Christian mysticism.[18] Further, the Buddhist stress on ecstasy as essential to sanctity distinguished it from Christianity where it is never more than a 'psychical accident', though the Buddhist rightly admits of no ecstasy without sanctity. Tyrrell also notes that at times Christian mystics have been prone to enunciate principles not entirely consistent with professed Christian belief, thus conceding too much to 'Oriental pessimism or nihilism'. Another criticism of Buddhism was directed at its attitude to human and created reality:

A régime that would thus stunt the mind and affection, and remove the very soil from which alone the idea of God can spring up and draw nutriment and increase, belongs properly to the mysticism of the Buddhist who is seeking rest in the minimum of spiritual activity through the fixed contemplation of Infinite Void.[19]

The contrast between Buddhist and Christian mysticism is between starving the soul and filling it. Since the Buddhist 'seeks to eradicate every natural affection', and the Christian 'seeks to strengthen and purify it', Tyrrell concludes that 'the striking superficial resemblance between the retirement of the Buddhist monk or hermit and that of the Christian contemplative or mystic covers a substantial difference of infinite moment.'[20]
Tyrrell expressed the negativity of Buddhism some years later when discussing Schopenhauer's pessimism and 'his conviction of the total and irremediable badness of life' which drew him towards a sympathy with Buddhism and its antagonism to the will to live and struggle for self-preservation, viewed as the cause of so much sorrow and suffering.[21] Though the Buddhist and Christian experience the same frustrating and limiting realities of life they are led to different conclusions about its significance. The Christian does not argue from his present discontent to the existence of an Ideal, but from the growing realisation that here there is no rest, that the horizon will always recede, and that finitude is our inevitable doom. Thus, our progress is like that of an imprisoned bee over the window-pane by which we learn that we cannot get through. From this experience Buddhism 'draws the lesson of self-limitation and extinction', whereas Christianity 'draws the lesson of a new kind of supernatural life of union with, a love of the Divine Will'.[22] Despite its brevity, Tyrrell's most trenchant criticism of Buddhism, in which he states its direct antipathy to Christianity, is to be found in Lex Orandi. There is a striking parallel with von Hügel's belief that Buddhism should not really be thought of as a religion, but 'only an ethical system, a way of life, or rather of death, with whose pessimism the denial of immortality is perfectly consonant.'[23] For Tyrrell, Buddhism sees a future life as 'a calamity from which men should seek eventual deliverance by flight and voluntary self-limitation', and which 'believes in no God, which denies the worth of life; that is without faith, without hope; intent only on finding escape from sorrow in silence and extinction.'[24] To claim that Buddhism was not a religion, however, was not to deny its value. Indeed Tyrrell finds a parallel with Christianity precisely here, since the Christian (mystic or not) is
required, like the Buddhist, to put his trust in a community and become part of a 'way of life' rather than a 'school of thought'.

Tyrrell's ambivalence allowed for a positive appraisal of certain Buddhist beliefs. He felt that the doctrine of transmigration, in stressing that of its very nature a good deed must bring forth good fruit and an evil deed, evil results, made the Jewish-Christian doctrine of heaven, hell and purgatory appear 'clumsy by comparison'. The point is not developed, a reminder that so many of Tyrrell's essays were, as he admitted, merely beginnings or preliminary statements of possibilities which reveal more about his predispositions than his final state of mind. He displayed this positive attitude again when he suggested a parallel between the respective founders of Christianity and Buddhism, maintaining that Christ himself was as 'deeply penetrated' as Buddha with the 'sorrows of life'. In view of these and similar statements, Maude Petre was perceptive in her introduction to the *Essays in Faith and Immortality*, drawing attention to the 'elements in the following essays which would probably appeal to the self-detached spirit of Eastern mysticism', though observing that such self-detachment was in fact 'a characteristic of all true mysticism'.

The resemblance between Buddhist mysticism and certain aspects of Christian mysticism concerned Tyrrell as he struggled to disentangle secondary or alien elements from the true in the Christian mystical tradition. Though genuinely devoted to the latter he was prepared, as was von Hügel, to note and criticise the incidence within it of imbalance and conceptual confusion which had sometimes distorted its theological expression. His references to Thomas à Kempis on several occasions reveal a desire to acknowledge and delineate the parallels
between certain elements of the Christian tradition and Buddhism. Proposing an essay on à Kempis, he expressed his admiration both for Buddhism and the *Imitatio Christi*:

Much as I love à Kempis — for I love Bouddha too — I cannot but see in it this ethics of self-humiliation rather than the ethics of self-expansion, and a profound unbelief in the value of our mortal life. It is Buddhism mitigated by a belief in the life beyond this — mitigated by hope.[28]

He then acknowledged that this was a difficult and complex 'long business' which he must not attempt to deal with yet. But the problem was still on his mind a month later when he wrote: 'I have begun reading à Kempis again with a view to writing something. His world-weariness is strangely Oriental and Christian at once'.[29]

It is interesting that the previous year in a letter in which he described himself as a 'hopeless tangle', Tyrrell was already exploring the relationship between the spirit of Buddhism and the spirit of Thomas à Kempis. In his comparative examination of different forms of spirituality, the latter served to embody a certain dominant strand in the Christian tradition, and both had become important threads in his own psychological and spiritual tangle. Yet the world-negating ethos of Buddhism necessarily failed to foster true contemplation, which requires not the denial but the affirmation of creation: 'we must not be like the Buddhist contemplative stupefying our minds even to the bare consciousness of existence; God has made all things good and god-like in some degree, we must ascend from the likeness to the original.'[30]

Though he rejected what he called the 'Boudhistic contempt for life' and its 'stoic callousness to pain and affliction', Tyrrell felt the attraction of Buddhism.[31] Thus, 'Were it not for its pessimism, its despair of the world, its contempt of l’avenir, I should say Buddhism was better than our fussy, strenuous struggling reforming gods'.[32] This
question touched Tyrrell deeply as he sought to come to terms with the mystery of the cross and a Christianity which, he held, crucified individuals in the belief that the world is thus made better and conquered for God. In the end

it is only that wild yet irresistible fanaticism that saves one from à Kempis & the Bouddha. At all events I think the world like the flesh is intended to be struggled with and not fled from and that in the grip of conflict the muscles of the soul are developed and our personality brought out in a way which even their aiming at tranquility could never effect. There is great energy in the crucifix as contrasted with the slumberous Bouddha images. And yet -.[33]

The key phrase is And yet-. The image of the 'slumberous Bouddha' had long held an appeal for him: 'I used to keep a Buddha under my crucifix - to the shock of my confrères. Henceforth, I shall keep a cow - a sacred cow, emblem of the quiet weary East with its Quand même? "After all?"'[34] In the same letter he describes the 'best mysticism' as that which realises that 'our best God is but an idol' since true mysticism must become wordless and unknowing: 'There the Buddha is so right; for we do not know, we cannot know.'[35]

Despite the attraction of Buddhism Tyrrell perceived its inadequacy. He found a parallel between 'the pseudo-mysticism of the East' and of 'the quietists of all times and varieties', quoting with approval Pater's reference to the "old Indian dreams of self-annihilation".[36] But even here, Tyrrell believed, the quietist was nearer the truth since his motives were at least likely to be less negative than those of the Buddhist whose motive for asceticism and mysticism lay in the principle that all desire must be suppressed. The emptying of the mind is thus required by the belief that the body, this life and this world have no meaning in themselves. He described the chilling negativity and pessimism of the Buddhist mystical way: 'Existence is evil, matter is evil, desire is evil, thought is evil - this is the principle that
justifies Oriental asceticism and mysticism.'[37] Thus, in Tyrrell's view there is a chasm between Buddhist and Christian mysticism both at the practical and theological level.

Tyrrell's final statement on Buddhism appeared in Christianity at the Crossroads in 1909 where he embraced fully a truth he had perceived as early as 1903, that Christianity's relation to other world religions was 'just the whole question'.[38] His brief reflections on Buddhism there indicate how he might have embarked upon resolving this 'whole question' had he lived. Whatever the resemblance between the two attitudes the difference in motive and final direction is all important. The negativity of Buddhism is again seen as mitigated and balanced by Christianity. The following of Christ and acceptance of the cross is the key to a proximate pessimism which acknowledged that a transitory form of existence must give way to a higher and more permanent form of existence. Christianity's pessimism is thus overcome by positive faith; not a shallow optimism but a profound hope, a deeper, ultimate optimism. Thus, Buddhism is merely one half of a process which is vital to spiritual development since pessimism and Christian optimism are 'two stages in the same process of spiritual growth - a process that we find arrested in Buddhism.'[39] So, the Buddhist shares this Gospel pessimism 'though not the hope that alleviates it.' The 'grey wisdom of the world-weary East' is only half the truth, Nirvana merely an expression of transcendental life by way of negation, and the pessimism of Buddhism is 'final and not merely provisional'. It offers only a passive 'gazing with quiet amazement at our ant-like turmoil and activity, our hopes, our dreams, our moral strugglings with the impossible, our terrible seriousness about shadows', and ultimately gives no answer to our reason which brings us 'to the edge of a chasm that faith fears to leap.'[40]
It may be thought with some justification that the understanding of Buddhism articulated by von Hügel and Tyrrell was, at best, rather fragmented and inadequate, and at worst, inaccurate and misleading. The tendency to treat Buddhism as one monolithic whole with no reference to the important distinction between Theravada and Mahayana Buddhism or the relationship with Taoism in China and the emergence of Pure Land or Zen Buddhism is one flaw. This failure was also reflected in the view of Nirvana as apparently little more than the annihilation of self. One discerns, a lack of subtlety and nuance in their understanding which, it must be remembered, was always derivative, dependent on the research of others. Awareness of the limitations and inadequacies of the available secondary material should obviate too sharp a critique of their treatment which, in any case, was not intended as systematic or exhaustive. Interestingly, Maude Petre was distinctly unhappy with Tyrrell's rather too clear-cut criticism of Buddhism which appeared in *Lex Orandi*. She clearly felt that he had misunderstood Buddhism. His view of its total disbelief in God and its denial of any worth in life and its lack of faith and hope were roundly rejected by her in the margin of her copy where she had written: 'No! This is utterly incorrect!' Similarly in her copy of von Hügel's *Eternal Life*, she indicated misgivings by scoring and underlining his summary of the defects of Buddhism.[41] Nonetheless the book revealed his appreciation of the similarity between Eckhart and Buddhist mysticism, a view anticipating that of Suzuki many years later.

Whilst accepting the flawed and limited appreciation of Buddhism on the part of von Hügel and Tyrrell, their critique may still serve as an indication of the positive principles of mysticism which they were defending. They believed that the mystical way of the Buddhist was inadequate chiefly for its failure to acknowledge God's presence in his
creation and in the individual, and uniquely in Christ. In addition to its seeming rejection of suffering and evil as illusion, its unrelieved pessimism in the face of the ceaseless flux of life, its agnosticism and refusal of the mind's desire to attain truth, its tendency to suppress the emotions and feelings in the interests of a negative, world-denying and world-fleeing movement away from the concrete. Similarly, its rejection of the exigencies of human experience as the locus for apprehending the divine marked it off from Christian mysticism.

There were, as we have noticed, differences of perception and emphasis between von Hügel and Tyrrell. The latter, typically, seemed to be more deeply touched by the lived reality of Buddhism and increasingly felt its positive attraction especially as he recoiled more and more from attachment to the Church's dogma and authority. Though he found the agnosticism of Buddhism more congenial as time passed, he retained a critical position with regard to its doctrine of extreme detachment and negation of the value of struggle and suffering. Von Hügel never shared Tyrrell's rejection of ecclesiastical authority, clinging to the Church and its authority as the necessary context for the growth and realisation of true mysticism, and retaining a firm adherence to its dogmatic teaching as the indispensable complement to the mystical way of knowing. But for both of them, the distinctiveness of Christian mysticism, which reflection on Buddhism helps to highlight, is derived from the incarnation and redemption, the historical events of Christ's passion, death and resurrection, and the continual renewal of these events in the life of the Church and its individual members.
NEO-PLATONISM

In his introductory chapter to *The Mystical Element* von Hügel's brief section on the neo-Platonists Proclus and Plotinus concludes approvingly with a quotation from Edward Caird who 'aptly calls' Plotinus the "Mystic par excellence".[42] But in the section on the Areopagite in the second volume there is a rather more nuanced description of Plotinus as 'that great soul, the prince of the non-Christian Mystics'.[43] Elsewhere Plotinus is described as 'the prince of Mystic philosophers'.[44] Though it may seem merely a shift of terminology it is arguable that this change of expression signifies von Hügel's desire for greater precision in describing mysticism. He resisted the view that all mysticism was homogenous and believed there remained fundamental differences between the neo-Platonic mysticism of Plotinus and Christian mysticism. Hence, the evident desire to use precise language in his description. The points at which the two had converged in history and the nature of the influence exerted by one on the other became a distinct pre-occupation for the Baron and indeed for Tyrrell. The distinctiveness of Christian mysticism was articulated within a broad exposition which included repeated reference to neo-Platonic mysticism.

The Baron recognised that Plotinus was a philosopher and writer demanding serious attention since historically he represented the main non-Christian channel for the diffusion of neo-Platonism into Christian theology. In 1899 the Baron had offered to Maude Petre a list of recommended reading to prepare her for a systematic study of the German mystics, and at the head was an English translation of the *Select Works of Plotinus*.[45] In the *Mystical Element* he wrote of the the 'great mystical soul' Plotinus, stating that his philosophy, 'the last great
attempt at synthesis of the ancient Greek mind, will have to occupy us in such detail throughout a great part of this book.'[46] He agreed with Phyllis Hodgson, a writer on English mysticism, in her protest at the exclusion of Plotinus from 'the choir of great Mystics' in a study by Dom Louismet.[47] At the root of the Baron's enduring interest in Greek philosophy was a respect for Plato whose works he recommended on numerous occasions.[48]

Though Tyrrell's references to neo-Platonism were less direct and less expansive than von Hügel's, some light is gained from an examination of the general terms in which he seeks to discern its influence on Christian mystical thought. Tyrrell maintained that the very word *mysticism* had come into 'bad odour' with certain thinkers partly through its association with the 'delusions of visionaries and the extravagances' of gnostics and neo-Platonists as well as the excesses of many Christian mystics. The problem had been that some Christian mystics had been misled by a 'resemblance in terminology and statement, as well as practice and discipline, between the false and the true' not realising there was a 'difference of infinite moment in principle and substance'. Consequently, some had striven 'to mingle into one system elements as uncongenial as oil and water.'[49]

In one of his most concise discussions of the neo-Platonic influence, Tyrrell used the term *mysticality* for 'a sort of false mysticism' which over-emphasises mystical needs whilst neglecting emotional, moral or intellectual needs.[50] This is not to deny the basic 'mystical need' which is undoubtedly a deep and genuine desire of the human heart, but rather to acknowledge that 'its perverse cultivation' is alien to Christian mysticism. It is precisely this one-
sided fostering of the mystical which leads to mysticality. There follows a perceptive historical observation regarding the 'relation of mutual permeation' in the 'Hellenic world in which Gentile Christianity first took shape'. Both the mysticism and 'mysticality' of this world were congenial elements for Christianity. Tyrrell then notes that 'its purest though subsequent culmination is associated with the name of the neo-Platonist Plotinus.' Despite the dissimilarity, there were enough parallels to ensure a fruitful interplay of ideas between this system and Christian thought: 'however over-speculative and intellectualist, however extravagant in its dualistic contempt of the body as the antagonist rather than the complement of the spirit, there was much in this mysticism for Christianity to work upon.' But he also contrasted Christianity as 'a religion of the crowds, of the poor and simple, a religion altogether practical and concrete', with neo-Platonism, as 'so largely philosophical and abstract, the monopoly of a small intellectual aristocracy, whose ideal attainment was mental ecstasy rather than moral devotion.' He made a similar point when conceding Sabatier's view that the 'the School is always more or less the gateway to mysticism...possible only to an elect and subtile mind'. But he qualified this by saying 'this is certainly true to a large extent of neo-Platonic mysticism, and of some Christian mystics who have been entangled in that system'.

Nonetheless, Christianity perceived in this philosophy, with its aspiration after higher things, contempt for things of this world and a hunger and thirst for righteousness, a parallel with its own doctrine of the two ways, the flesh and the spirit, death and life, and its call from earth to heaven, with its saints, martyrs and confessors 'who lived the exalted life that the philosophers but dreamed of.' But Tyrrell insists on the contrast, suggesting that the Greeks wanted the
philosophy but not the historical reality: the Cross of Christ. To reject this is to seek nourishment from the 'turbid streams of philosophical speculation.'[54] So Tyrrell's final judgment was severe: Christianity had been 'saturated with the rival spirit through the influence of gnosticism and Neo-Platonism.'[55]

Surveying the Christian mystical tradition, von Hügel identified the neo-Platonic contribution at various points and examined how the Christian experience had been influenced by the philosophy of Plotinus who, for the Baron, stood as the chief exponent of a Platonism developed and transformed by mystical fervour. The Baron noted the depth and complexity of this remarkable Greek mind whose 'obscure writings' were 'utterances of the most delicate spiritual experience and of the noblest religious passion and tenderness.'[56] He observes that Plotinus was 'an even more intensely and exclusively religious spirit' than Plato, and one whose life was marked by a 'ceaseless conflict' within, between the formal principles of the philosopher and the 'experiences of a profoundly religious soul.'[57] It was a recurring tension among the Church Fathers who sought to articulate their experience of the Christian mysteries in the context of the received philosophy of Plato and his interpreters.[58]

This pervasive presence of neo-Platonism in Christian theological history was held responsible for some of the distortions in otherwise thoroughly Christian mystics. This is not to suggest that von Hügel's critique was a wholesale rejection of neo-Platonism; he believed there to be positive and acceptable elements in Proclus, Philo, and above all Plotinus which had actually helped the conceptual elucidation and articulation of the Christian mystical way. The Baron's capacity for painstaking analysis and his desire for precise articulation, which at
times may appear as mere intellectual scrupulosity, are impressive on this question which has often been resolved too clearly and hastily, and consequently with a want of accuracy. He agreed with Heiler in identifying the dependence of the medieval mystics on Plotinus and, perhaps more than had been admitted, on Proclus too: 'I also believe, with you, that Proclus has often been utilised too fully, and that he then seduced to agnosticism and pantheism.'[60] Noting that even the Fourth Gospel reflected the influence of Plato through Philo, this renders Greek philosophical influences on later thinkers like Augustine or Suso more understandable.[61] Tyrrell shared this view, acknowledging that 'already in the New Testament, in the writings of St John and St Paul, we see the accommodation of Christianity and Hellenism in process; on the one side, the full acknowledgment of the mystical interest, on the other, the emphatic protest against its usurpations.'[62]

Von Hügel was critical and discriminating in identifying the neo-Platonic influence in Christian history. The figure of Augustine is preeminent among those bearing the fruits of neo-Platonism which, in von Hügel's interpretation, 'doubtless means above all Plotinus' [63] In Augustine's case 'we have to deal with the very great and tender Plotinus, in all that does not directly belong to Christianity.'[64] Though his thought can be traced throughout the whole of Augustine's teaching, Plotinus is not the only influence since Augustine's view of the fate of the soul after death and its relation to the body bears clear traces of Jewish theological concepts deeply embedded in the Old Testament.[65] But in his philosophical reflections on duration and simultaneity, space and time, he acknowledged Augustine's debt to Plotinus.[66]
Von Hügel agreed with many scholars in acknowledging the crucial significance of Denys the Areopagite in the diffusion of neo-Platonism within this tradition: 'The Areopagite writings at the end of the fifth century still further emphasize and systematize this neo-Platonic form of mystical speculation, and become indeed the great treasure-house from which above all the Mystics, but also the Scholastics, throughout the Middle Ages, drew much of their literary material.'[67] This judgment of Dionysian influence was common among many contemporary scholars and has been confirmed by historians and theologians of repute throughout the present century.[68] He was aware of the complexity of the Christian mystical tradition and alert to the different currents of influence running through the Christian Mystics: 'the Pre-Pauline and Pre-Philonian stage' and the stage of 'Paul, Philo, and John, through Clement and Origen, on to Gregory of Nyssa and Augustine'; and the stage from 'the Pseudo-Dionysius onward, down to Nicholas of Coes inclusive, and which, to this hour, still largely influences us all.'[69]

In the writings of Pseudo-Dionysius the Baron sought to uncover what he called 'the Areopagite's neo-Platonic sources, the dry, intensely scholastic Proclus' and the prince of the non-Christian mystics, Plotinus.[70] The influence of Plotinus, Proclus and Plato himself is discovered at certain crucial points of Dionysian thought, especially concerning the understanding of God's action and the soul's reaction. On the question of Mystical Vision and Union in the Divine Names, the Baron maintained that Dionysius 'everywhere follows Proclus'. But this view is qualified by acknowledging the distinct traces of a Plotinian contribution.[71] The Baron rightly detects in Dionysius the concepts and terminology of the Enneads, concluding that 'the noblest Neo-Platonist sayings are again furnished by Plotinus'.[72] Elsewhere von
Hügel noted the prevalence of the Dionysian system: 'The influence of the Areopagite was notoriously immense throughout the Middle Ages, - indeed unchecked, - along its Proclian, Emanational, Ultra-Unitive current, - among the Pantheists from the Christian, Mohammedan and Jewish camps.'[73]

In the light of Bouyer's critique of the limitations of nineteenth century historical scholarship, one may wonder whether von Hügel had not accepted too many contemporary assumptions in studying early Christian sources.[74] The Baron did note the limitations of Dionysius who was unable to oppose neo-Platonic influence with 'such massive personal experience' with which other Christian mystics had defended specifically Catholic principles; but he was also aware of the diverse influences on the Areopagite.[75] Not only did he note that his greatness came from Plato, Plotinus and above all the Pauline and Johannine books, and his littleness from Proclus and the Byzantine of his entourage, he also appreciated the centrality of the Eucharist in the Dionysian scheme. Thus the doctrine of deification in the Areopagite, though having 'preformations' in Plotinus, was in essence determined by the theology of the Eucharist: 'the Areopagite's teaching that the chief means and the culmination of this deification are reached and found in the reception of the Holy Eucharist will no doubt also have stimulated Catherine's mind: "The Communicant is led to the summit of deiformation, as far as this is possible for him."'[76] For our purposes, the value of the Baron's perception of the Dionysian contribution is not only its remarkable accuracy, but how it indicates some of the emphases in his own understanding of Christian mysticism which he sought to free from the constricting influence of neo-Platonic mysticism.
This interpenetration of Christian and neo-Platonic ideas was raised in a letter to Abbot Butler in which von Hügel expressed the belief that the two works on the *Hierarchies* had only influenced the subsequent tradition in terms of their general scheme whereas 'the Divine Names and the Mystic Theology tinge and shape the feelings, images, and ideas of these mystics always considerably, and, at times almost exclusively.'[77] Von Hügel observes that when describing one of her experiences, Battista Vernazza wrote of her progressive assimilation to God in such a way that one may detect both scriptural and neo-Platonic elements: 'here especially we can trace the large Neo-Platonist (Dionysian) element in Battista's Mysticism' but 'coloured and Christianised' by the Latin Vulgate.[78] In St Catherine herself the neo-Platonic influence was traced at several points; with reference to God's action on the soul, the symbols used to describe such action, the soul's reaction, and the notion of deification which was formally taught by Dionysius: 'there are preformations of this doctrine in Plotinus and echoes of it throughout Catherine's sayings.'[79] With regard to the teaching on heaven, a clear connection is established: 'here Plato again touches Catherine through Jacopone.'[80] But Catherine's ideas on the elevation of the soul, though involving a markedly Platonic distinction between an upper true world and a lower world, owes more to a 'deeply Christian consciousness of "pride" and "humility", in their ordinary ethical sense' and thus her view 'rises sheer above all Platonist and neo-Platonist apprehension.[81]

Since the neo-Platonic influence on Eckhart has been so consistently asserted, it is no surprise to find von Hügel expressing the deep debt of the German mystic to Plotinus. On the question of the relation of the human soul to God the text of the ninth book of the Sixth Ennead is cited by von Hügel to illustrate the nature of ecstasy in the Plotinian
scheme, concluding with the famous phrase 'And this is the life of the Gods and of divine and blessed man...a flight of the alone to the Alone.'[82] His point is that 'Eckhart gives us both Plotinian positions - the Godlikeness and the downright divinity of the soul.'[83] The Baron's conclusion is succinct: 'When speaking systematically Eckhart is strictly Plotinian.'[84] And again the meeting of Christian tradition and pagan philosopher is seen in Ruysbroek who 'combines a considerable fundamental sobriety with much of St Paul's daring and many echoes of Plotinus.' Finally, the distorting influence of neo-Platonism was evident even in a theologian as great as St Thomas and a mystic as great as St Teresa. The Baron informed Tyrrell that in St Teresa's own Life he detected a belief that God's activity in the soul could be free of human cooperation, a view he characterised as 'a bit of Neo-Platonism, which I hardly expect St T anywhere formally repudiates, tho' he may not anywhere formally endorse it.'[85]

The critique of neo-Platonism, revealed in their correspondence of 1898, centred mainly on what might be called the 'way of abstraction' and the negative attitude to the human body. The purification of the soul which is acknowledged as essential to the mystical journey is not achieved 'by turning away from the particular, by abstraction and absorption more and more in the general', thus leading away from the 'particularity of the creature to the simplicity of the Creator.'[86] Elsewhere the Baron speaks of 'the largely excessive, not fully Christianizable, doctrines of the Neo-Platonists as to the Negative, Abstractive way, when taken as self-sufficient.'[87] Again this is ascribed to Plotinus, 'the first expressly to put the Godhead, - in strict obedience to the Abstractive scheme, - beyond all Multiplicity.'[88]
One consequence of this, which von Hügel certainly repudiated, was that 'there actually is, no logical place in this theory for science, at least experimental, observing science: and the motives for (ever-costing) reform in and of this visible world are weakened or destroyed.'[89] Opposing the way of abstraction, the Baron stresses the need for a 'double process: occupation with the concrete and then abstraction from it.' This stress on the concrete and the particular as the means for encountering the Absolute and the Universal has a corollary in the understanding of the nature of God Himself. Thus, 'God, I like to think with Lotze, is the supremely concrete, supremely individual and particular, and the mental and practical occupation with the particular must ever remain an integral part of my way to Him.'[90] The Baron then notes that taking seriously the sensible, the material, and the earthly is expressed preeminently in the doctrine of the sacraments which, of course, had no place in non-Christian mysticism. To stress the particular is also to stress the personal. He regretted Catherine's tendency to formulate her deepest experiences of God in the abstract impersonal terms imitating Dionysius in speaking of God in words 'derived from extended or diffusive material substances or conditions, Light, Fire, Fountain, Ocean; and from that pervasive emotion, Love, strictly speaking Desire, Eros.'[91] For von Hügel to speak of 'God Himself' is to speak in personal terms of the nature and being of God. The alternative is less than Christian: 'a Neo-Platonic depersonalising of the soul.'[92]

Tyrrell agreed with the Baron, asserting that the 'future consummation of the mystical life is utterly antagonistic to that destruction of personal distinctiveness and absorption into original nothingness which is the goal of Oriental and even Neo-Platonic
Abstraction, like distraction, is not a result of the strength but of the limitation of the human mind. The 'dying to self' which may be considered a central ascetical principle of Christian discipleship is markedly different in motive and direction from the abstractive way of denial and death of self to be found in neo-Platonic mysticism. However, he concedes that this distinction has often been obscured in the Christian tradition:

To say that through Neo-Platonic influence this vital distinction has never been lost sight of, would be to fly in the face of known facts; to say that it is not clearly contained in the utterances of Catholic saints and teachers, when they are combating pseudo-mysticism and quietism in its various forms, and are so forced to a closer consideration of the matter, is no less a deviation from truth.

Tyrrell revealed that his own interest in these questions had been prompted by the study of W. Pater's *Plato and Platonism* in which, he felt, the author 'confounds the *Ens abstractissimum* of Neo-Platonic contemplation and the *Ens determinissimum*, or as you would say *concretissimum*, of the Christian mystic'. Pater understands by "pure being" 'the last residue of an analysis and abstraction', a barren idea almost identical with "pure nothingness". But when it is used of God such a concept is the result of synthesis not analysis and is 'incomprehensible for its very fulness'. Thus, as Plato at times slips into the concept of the "fulness of being" in the *Symposium* and *Phaedrus*, 'many Christian mystics slip into the "emptiness" or *minimum* of being in their attempted exposition of their theology and mysticism.' Tyrrell then conceded that this was not exactly the point that von Hügel had raised but hoped it was of some help. He expressed the point rather more lucidly a year later: 'In this positive sense, Pure Being is the most concrete of all conceptions; the result not of abstraction, but of composition; it means the infinite Fulness of Being, and not the
It is clear what Tyrrell is rejecting: 'Whenever mystics seem to say that the concept of God is reached by mere generalisation and abstraction, rather than by synthesis, they are undoubtedly out of harmony with themselves.' Here then is one of the most telling criticisms of neo-Platonic mysticism: its tendency to impersonal abstraction, its flight from the particular, the sensible, the concrete, the material, and its exaggerated emphasis on the intellectual or speculative dimension of the mystical journey. It was a judgement shared by contemporaries like Inge and Chandler who wrote of the method of negation and abstraction as 'one bad legacy of Plotinus to the Christian mystics.'

Von Hügel and Tyrrell recognised that this abstractive way threatened the doctrine of the Incarnation, the mystery which reflects the centrality of the human body in God's revelation and redemption. Here is the crucial point of divergence between Christian and neo-Platonic mysticism. Though devoted to the 'great current of fully Catholic Mysticism', von Hügel recognised that even ancient Christian mysticism had at times borrowed from a 'profoundly anti-Incarnational philosophy' influenced by a 'predominantly Neo-Platonist framework'. Nonetheless, the latter had also contributed 'nobly spiritual maxims' and 'exquisite psychological descriptions'. The Baron found errors lingering elsewhere in the Christian mystical tradition. He maintained that in eliminating emotion from the life of God many traditional theologians had been influenced by an 'intensely Greek, aristocratic, intellectualist conception' which held the contingent and historical in disdain, asserted the superiority of productive, energising activity, and presented God as unsocial, occupied with Himself alone. This flaw, which posited 'a purely Transcendental, Deistic God', remained
especially unacceptable to von Hügel who, for all his stress on the transcendent otherness of the divine, was never to lose sight of divine immanence, which functioned as a kind of controlling principle demanded by the central truth of the Incarnation. Further, these errors are to be found in Plotinus, Eriugena, Eckhart and even the orthodox scholastics, and St Thomas himself who 'attempt at times to combine, with the noblest Platonic and the deepest Christian teachings, certain elements, which, in strictness, have no place in an Incarnational Religion.'

Since the mysticism von Hügel expounded was rooted firmly in time and place, the stress on exclusive transcendence in Greek thought was clearly unacceptable in view of its 'all-devouring Abstraction.'[102] Contrasted with his 'mixed mysticism', which rested firmly on the Incarnation, the neo-Platonic system was 'profoundly anti-Immanent, anti-Incarnational: a succession of increasingly exalted and increasingly empty Transcendences, each of which is, as it were, open upwards but closed downwards.'[103] He repeatedly identifies the imbalance in the mystical tradition by reference to this neo-Platonic 'incapacity to find any descending movement of the Divine into Human life.'[104]

Tyrrell too was alert to the neo-Platonic tendency to exclusive transcendence, stressing the centrality of the Incarnation and the immanence of the divine. In Christ the redemption of nature reaches its unique culmination: not only does the visible order become the effective symbol, of the invisible, Jesus himself was the 'great sacrament and effectual symbol of the Divine Life and Spirit.'[105] Since spirit is reached through the phenomenal, 'pure spirit is a pure abstraction.'[106] Tyrrell judged that the appeal Christianity had exerted on the Greek mind was simply that it seemed to 'promise a philosophical unification
of thought, and to admit of harmonious statement in the categories of Platonism, whereas in reality the cross was the most powerful repudiation of 'intellectualism in religion.'[107] He spoke of the 'Apocalyptic Vision of Christ' which rejected all 'Alexandrine and pseudo-Dionysian symbolism' and 'the cold constructions of intellectualism', emphasising the 'correlativity of the spiritual and the phenomenal', which had its ultimate expression in the Incarnation. This apocalyptic symbolism is 'truer to our spiritual needs than that of Hellenic intellectualism.'[108] He was simply reiterating, in different terms, the point he had made in response to Sabatier: the veil of the Sacred Humanity is the 'Jacob's ladder making an open causeway between earth and Heaven, bridging over the else impassable gulf, and making accessible to the poor and simple, heights never before ambitioned but by the wise and prudent.'[109]

Closely related to this question was the neo-Platonic attitude to the body. Von Hügel's description of St Catherine's dualistic, neo-Platonic conception of body and spirit, made clear its distortions:

Their difference and incompatibility; the spirit's fleeing of the body; the spirit's getting outside of it, - by ecstasy, for a little while, even in this earthly body's death, for good and all; the body a prison-house, a true purgatory to the soul; all this hangs well together, and is largely, in its very form, of ultimately Neo-Platonist or Platonic origin.[110] He contrasted this with the teaching of the synoptic Gospels and St Paul, though he noted that the latter in some of his expressions had hinted at a 'Platonist attitude towards the body's relation to the soul.' The sharp contrast between Christian and neo-Platonic views is then stated. The latter excludes 'any and every kind of body from the soul's final stage of purification and happiness' whereas the Christian conception 'necessarily eliminates that keen and abiding dualism characteristic of the late Greek attitude.'[111]
The Baron was not suggesting that Catherine had incorporated the whole theoretical edifice of neo-Platonism into her theology. He did claim that she had combined the Platonic form with the Synoptic substance, thus allowing the Plotinian stripping of the soul's numerous garments to stand not simply for the rejection of matter and material attachments but the setting aside of 'various evil self-attachments and self-delusions of the soul.'[112] Neither did she accept the neo-Platonic belief that the senses are the primary source and occasion of all sin which thus becomes simply the 'contamination of spirit by matter.' Catherine also rejected the notion that the body was impure or sinful in itself. So, for all her reliance on neo-Platonic terminology and some of its concepts, Catherine retained enough of the truly Catholic theological framework to ensure a basic fidelity to Gospel asceticism and spirituality. For example, though ecstasy for the neo-Platonist was essentially an escape from the body with its sin and limitation, Catherine's desire for ecstasy, which remained undiminished, was understood as a movement from division and trouble into unity and peace, 'loving Him and His whole system of souls and of life, and one's own self only in and as part of that system.'

Though Tyrrell appreciated the positive contribution of Plotinian neo-Platonism to Christian thought, he spoke of its 'dualist contempt of the body as the antagonist rather than the complement of the spirit'.[113] He described the task he felt he had undertaken: 'My honest belief is that I am but counteracting a virus of Neo-Platonism and Gnosticism which for centuries has been struggling to choke the good seed of Gospel asceticism, and whose hour is now come.'[114] With regard to Bouyer's comments mentioned above one should note here perhaps that Tyrrell too may have been rather too disposed to identify
every real and alleged aberration in the Christian mystical tradition as the outgrowth of the neo-Platonic seed sown in the early history of Christian thought.

Tyrrell felt that the neo-Platonic contempt for the body was simply a corollary of its anti-incarnationalism. He believed that the assertion that 'the Word was made flesh' established the deepest gulf between Christian mysticism and that of neo-Platonism or any other system which failed to 'minister to the deepest needs of our double nature - of this embodied spirit which embodies its purest thought in images derived from the senses.' [115] Indeed the discarding of this necessary 'imaging of God' was actually 'a point of perfection with the body-loathing Neo-Platonist' who had fostered 'hatred and contempt of matter and of the body and all connected with it, as proceeding from the principle of evil.' [116] This characterised not only neo-Platonists but Gnostics, Manicheans, Catharists, Puritans, and kindred schools.

Tyrrell included in his essay some lengthy extracts from Pater's Plato and Platonism in the course of which he made the point that an abstract notion of Pure Being was logically connected with the neo-Platonic concept of ecstasy which he criticised for its unacceptably negative attitude to the body, involving the flight of the pure spirit, treating the body as nothing but an encumbrance to be set aside. [117] He believed that despite the clear traces of this belief in the mystical doctrines of Eckhart and Tauler and some other exponents of Christian experience in the Middle Ages, it was opposed by the fundamental truth of Christianity, that the human body has become the vehicle for divine-human encounter and that God meets individuals in their bodily-spiritual totality.
PANTEISM

It is sufficient simply to state the doctrine that 'reality comprises a single being of which all things are modes, moments, members, appearances, or projections' to make clear the unacceptability of pantheism to Christian belief.[118] But a further description indicates the enduring appeal of pantheism to the 'mystically-minded', even within the Christian tradition: 'the particular attraction of pantheism lies in the fact that it represents an all-embracing unitive experience, for it implies the fundamental oneness of all phenomena.'[119] Insofar as the search for unity is at the heart of mysticism, it follows that the sheer simplicity of pantheism represents a tempting solution to the problem of the relationship of human and divine. But historically the Church's official judgment on pantheism has been severe.[120] Since 'exclusive immanentism' can be considered a version of pantheism we may note that it was implicitly condemned by Pius X in his response to modernism.[121] The authoritative statements reflect a belief deeply rooted in the Church's theological tradition: the fundamental incompatibility of pantheism with the Christian revelation of God as the Creator and Sustainer of the Cosmos and the Supreme Being who is distinct from his creation though truly present in all things.[122]

The only direct official use of the term 'pantheist' in the modernist crisis was in the anti-Modernist Oath of 1910 though it was used with no great precision. It referred to the Modernists who 'say that there is nothing divine in the sacred Tradition or - what is still worse - who admit it in a pantheistic sense'.[123] In this judgment of ecclesiastical authority pantheism was perceived as the doctrine behind the denial of the Church's divine nature rather than a philosophical
system distorting mysticism. But to understand the critique offered by von Hügel and Tyrrell it is important to note that pantheism has been a recurring temptation within the Christian mystical tradition. Von Hügel and Tyrrell accepted the rejection of pantheism whilst retaining its positive insights.

Their period witnessed a renewed interest in pantheism and an awareness of its appeal to Christian mysticism. Von Hügel returned frequently to the question of pantheism, agreeing with Troeltsch on 'the immense power of Pantheism at the present time.' Though in 1905 he himself had stated decisively that 'Pantheism, the doctrine that God is equally in all things' was 'profoundly false', he felt obliged some years later to account for 'the prevalence of Pantheistic 'religion'' and the dominance of 'the pantheistic mood and outlook'. Although pantheism as such had 'no room for objective individual immortality', and was thus unacceptable to Christian belief in a personal relationship with God which survives death, even a pantheist like Spinoza, with all the limitations of his system, has much to teach the Christian. Nonetheless, the judgment is clear: 'We have agreed upon holding Pantheism to be the born and arch-enemy of religion.'

In examining von Hügel's critique of Pantheism it is apparent that he was not dealing merely with a dead theory from the past but an increasingly prevalent attitude among philosophers whose interests he shared, whose works he read, and whose ideas were a constant stimulus. He observed that many current attitudes were 'consciously or unconsciously, full of Pantheism and Subjectivism'. The root of this pantheism he held to be 'a thirst for totality, where everything is necessary to all the rest; but a totality, and that is all.' Further, this
totality some believe to be God and even want it to be the object of adoration. Von Hügel was adamant that neither this pantheism nor subjectivism could 'permanently satisfy the spirit and mind of man.' Christian mysticism rests on a definitively revealed relationship of God and the world which denies 'their simple identification.'[130] Pantheism destroys the balanced mysticism which both von Hügel and Tyrrell were seeking. What was at stake in their critique of pantheism was quite simply true mysticism as against false mysticism which von Hügel also described as Pure or Exclusive Mysticism: 'It is very certain that Pure Mysticism and Pantheism are one.'[131]

In The Mystical Element von Hügel raised a point which also preoccupied both Inge and James, 'the question as to any intrinsic tendency to Pantheism in Mysticism as such, and as to the possible unity of such tendency.'[132] It is a pressing question since in the mystical tradition pantheism has been associated with those who continued the 'Proclian current', through the Areopagite, Duns Scotus and Eckhart who 'consistently develops the Pantheistic trend of a rigorous Intellectualism.'[133] Von Hügel agreed with James in holding that the pantheistic tendency prevailed in the measure to which Dionysian speculation held sway, and he also implied that negative theology itself had been prone to agnosticism and pantheism. Within this perspective the Baron also identified John Scotus as exemplifying the lapse into pantheism whereas St Thomas exemplified the opposing strain in the tradition, consistently guarding against the 'Pantheistic tendencies special to strict Realism.'[134] But after Dionysius the most significant channel for the diffusion of this tendency was Eckhart, a point of view which has been variously interpreted and qualified by subsequent writers.[135] In two dense and difficult paragraphs in which he cites
Eckhart from Pfeiffer's edition and quotes Denifle's attempts to clarify the Meister's theology, von Hügel's own judgment seems at first unclear. As so often in *The Mystical Element* the Baron raises several points of an issue, records the views of others, but then the discussion terminates with no firm conclusion. He thus ends by simply citing two of the Meister's propositions with the judgment that it is not surprising that they were condemned by Pope John XXII in 1329.[136] We have to wait another ten pages before the Baron makes his position clear, speaking of the 'deeply religious temper and the strongly Pantheistic conceptions of Eckhart in the Middle Ages.'[137]

Von Hügel asserted that there was a pantheism which was not necessarily religious at all, such as the supposed pantheism of aesthetic thinkers like Lessing, Herder and Goethe which was really a secondary and inconsistent element in otherwise theistic philosophies. Having stated that the true element in pantheism, which Christian mysticism must retain, will be found in a sound doctrine of divine immanence, the Baron examines the 'differences and points of likeness' between mysticism and pantheism. In dealing with the similarities the Baron notes 'three special *attraits* which necessarily bring *mystically-tempered souls* into 'at least close proximity to Pantheism.'[138] First, the great thirst for a unity and oneness which is less and less possessed of multiplicity, together with a transition to holding this unity as exclusively immanent rather than purely transcendent. Second, the mystic, like the pantheist, will seek to abandon self-centredness. Losing self and dying to self, the mystic will tend 'to enlarge the range of this petty self' and approach other souls more and more. He was uneasy with the concept of an individualistic mystical quest directed to purely individual perfection and the soul's individual union with God.[146]
Despite the fact that he felt 'individualism' of this kind had found its way into Christian mysticism, it could never be considered anything other than a distortion of the truth since it endangered belief in the necessity of the Church as a distinct social reality and salvation as the inheritance of a communal kingdom. Thirdly, since the mystic habit of mind is directed away from the successive and temporal towards the simultaneity and eternity of God, it finds great difficulty in conceptualising these truths, a fact which accounts for the 'Pantheistic-seeming trend of almost all the Mystical imagery'. He suggests that such simultaneity can really only be represented to the mind pictorially by spatial imagery of 'co-existent Extensions' such as air, water, light or fire, and the unavoidable conclusion is that 'these representations, if dwelt on at any great length, will necessarily suggest a Determinism of a Mathematically-Physical, Extensional type'. Hence the materialistic, mechanical and pantheistic character of the concepts and vocabulary which are often found in the Christian mystical tradition.

Von Hügel dwelt on the paradox that pantheism had rendered 'profound, irreplaceable services' to religion precisely in the areas where it had threatened to destroy true mysticism. He agreed with Pattison in maintaining that the Christian way of conceiving God as 'the soul of souls' rather than in Deistic or Hebraic terms as 'another, higher Person' requires a belief in God's 'indwelling presence' and perfection attained through sharing His life which Christian mysticism proclaims.[139] Insofar as this central tenet of pantheism had become unhinged from its proper context it simply needed to be integrated into true mysticism. Indeed, only a 'Pantheistic-seeming Mysticism' discovers the 'truly spiritual function and fruitfulness of Deterministic Science'.[140] Only by shifting away from the petty concerns of self to 'a great kingdom of
souls, in which Man gains his larger, spiritual, unique personality'. Seeking examplars from the Christian tradition to illustrate his point he claims that 'the greater Partial Mystics' represent the strongest historical evidence of this truth about the purificatory power of science: 'Nicholas of Coes, Pascal, Malebranche are but three men out of many whose mysticism and whose Mathematico-Physical Science thus interstimulated each other and jointly deepened their souls'.[141] Lastly, the service rendered by such pantheistic mysticism is in presupposing 'a general, usually dim, but most real, religious sense and experience, indeed a real presence and operation of the Infinite and of God in all men.'[142] Since this 'mystical sense' is central to the Baron's religious philosophy and his understanding of mysticism, he is making a significant claim for pantheism. However, he is swift to stress that this view implies no 'indifferentist blindness' to the great differences between the religions of the world, nor an unawareness of the need for revelation and the historical element of religion as essential to the full development of this 'sense of the Infinite'.

Despite all this, von Hügel's firm conclusion is that Christianity 'excludes complete and final Pantheism' and that such purely pantheistic explanations of unity, self-surrender and divine action remain 'ever incomplete and transitional.'[143] So, any appearance of pantheism in the Christian mystics must be interpreted as legitimate immanence or panentheism, the doctrine that God is in all things but not simply the sum of all things; God in nature but distinct from it as Creator and creation. His critique is not merely a rejection of pantheism, with which he had 'no personal sympathy', but the assertion of the vital principle of divine immanence.[144] This position resembles that of Teilhard de Chardin who felt the truth in pantheism needed to be assimilated into Christian
mysticism.[145] Whilst rejecting 'ultimate pantheism' von Hügel thought that a strain of pantheism could be considered a stage on the way to true mysticism and he would have sympathised with Teilhard's view that pantheism was a species of 'natural mysticism of which Christian mysticism can only be the sublimation and crowning peak.'[146]

The Baron's growing vigilance with regard to pantheism is revealed in his discussion of Pringle-Pattison's *Idea of God* in 1918, his address on the apocalyptic element in the teaching of Jesus in 1919 and his comments to Kemp-Smith in 1920 on Webb's Gifford lectures. By this time he was clear that the essential flaw in pantheism was its rejection of a 'Personalist God'.[147] Although his treatment of pantheism remained incomplete, his basis position was established, especially its incompatibility with Christianity. Criticising Evelyn Underhill, he maintained that nothing could be more 'anti-mystical' than the 'Proximate Futurism of the authentic Jesus', and asserted the 'magnificent massiveness of the anti-Pantheism' of his teaching which was a 'permanent service to religion of the very first magnitude.'[148]

Unlike von Hügel, Tyrrell's remarks on this subject are relatively few, so that it seems unwise to draw too many firm conclusions. His brief comments to Waller in 1902 are interesting but elusive: 'A strange being surely that Margaret Dowson! Linking the semi-pantheism of Wordsworth with Catholic mysticism so harmoniously. And indeed one feels they are and ought to be but complementary to one another.'[149] The implicit belief here, which seems not too disimilar from von Hügel's, is that some 'versions' of pantheism or semi-pantheism may reflect little more than an aesthetic sensibility which is not necessarily incompatible with true mysticism. Despite the paucity of direct references to
pantheism the question of God’s relationship with nature was a recurring one and Tyrrell felt he was steering a way between two unacceptable extremes. When *Oil and Wine* was re-issued in changed circumstances in 1907, Tyrrell identified pantheism as one of its flaws: 'In avoiding the false "transcendence" of Deism I may have drifted too near the Charybdis of Pantheism in search of the middle course of Panentheism: in urging the unity, I may have endangered the distinctness of souls.'

There is more than a hint in the context that he felt this a tiresome admission to make though it does seem a genuine acknowledgment of an undoubtedly strong tendency of his mind. Daly's remarks on this sentence are helpful: 'Since the judgment is unsolicited and uncoerced (censors being no longer a hazard and he being free to write what he pleased) it should be weighed carefully.' Daly is also right to stress the importance of what he calls Tyrrell's most striking 'immanentist' and 'monist' passages in *Oil and Wine* especially in the reflections entitled 'God's Life is Ours'. What is said there about the soul having 'no reality except in conjunction with the reality of God, who is her foundation and support' and about He who is, 'in conjunction with her and with his whole creation - as it were, one Self, one Subject', could indeed be paralleled with numerous quotations from the classical mystics. However, as Daly's argument proceeds, one is forced to pause since it seems unnecessary to conclude that panentheism was a specifically Hügelian category and that Tyrrell would not have known for what he was searching had the Baron had not alerted him to it!

The questions raised by pantheism touch the central theme of revelation, the nature of God and his activity. Tyrrell was at one with von Hügel on the vital importance of a personalist understanding of God
and of the need to resist the threat of pantheism: 'the belief in the personality of God is all-essential for the satisfaction of our religious cravings, as a presupposition of trust, love, prayer, obedience'.[152] It is also vital in 'bringing out the transcendence in contrast with the all-pervading immanence of the deity' and 'as checking the pantheistic perversion of this latter truth by which, in turn, its own deistic perversion is checked.' He then presents his fundamental criticism of pantheism: 'God is not only in and through all things; but also above all things' and 'between these two compensating statements the exact truth is hidden from our eyes.' Here is Tyrrell's characteristic unwillingness to claim more than the facts allowed, so that the essential paradox is preserved. The precise relationship between God and Nature is thus 'unstateable', being neither identity nor diversity, neither oneness nor twoness; 'hence, such questions as pantheism, monotheism, polytheism fall through.'[153] What is also implied is a contrast between the demand made on dogmatic theology to assert positively a distinction and the inclination of mysticism to remain content with a statement of the mystery which must simply be embraced. In a more meditative vein, he denied pantheism by recourse to the image of nature as God's garment: heaven and earth are 'the very garments of God; not His substance; no part of Him, as pantheism would have it.'[154]

For Tyrrell, the purely philosophical quest for ultimate unity must invariably fail since 'the ultimate unity is a mystery.'[155] And this is true quite literally since the 'solution' is found in the mystery of the Trinity where a superpersonal unity is 'in some sense' prior to the multiplicity of Divine Persons, a unity in which 'they being many are one'. As in the case of Buddhism, he believed that no system which endangered this personal distinctness could be a sound theological basis
for a Christian account of mysticism. He had already claimed that pantheism misinterpreted our inner consciousness by proposing the individual's absorption in God.[156] He wanted to assert that God as spirit is a "power within us, not ourselves which makes for righteousness", i.e. "which bids us subordinate our individual self and interest to an absolute and universal interest, which is that of our deeper, unknown, spiritual self."[157] Tyrrell struggled a good deal with this problem of the relationship of the individual soul to what he called, rather enigmatically, the general soul and, writing to Maude Petre in 1901, he suggested that Mother Julian held the key to a correct synthesis of the two antinomies which he and Petre held between them. So the fourteenth century mystic 'reminds us both that the whole is in each part; and each part in the whole.'[158] He then suggests that on the basis of this fact the Russian legend of "I am thyself" could well be true. And if this were true it would explain and tie together 'so many natural and supernatural mysteries' that 'one wonders how far and in what sense it is pantheistic and heretical.' The matter is left there in a rather incomplete and unsatisfactory way, and the very incompleteness indicates the extent to which Tyrrell was uncertain how exactly to steer his middle course to avoid effective pantheism.

In Christian theology, since pantheism threatens divine transcendence, it must be refashioned to express the transcendence of God the Creator who is at once apart from creation, yet intimately involved in it as its Sustainer. Tyrrell does not deny that the Creator has left his mark in his creatures and indeed in the whole of creation, but the chief manifestation of his immanent presence is through the moral goodness of character found in human beings where the "image" of the indwelling God is present. Indeed, Tyrrell goes further in stating
that 'the conception of Nature as being, apart from man, a direct 
expression or self-manifestation of the Divine character is responsible 
for the moral and spiritual perversions that are everywhere associated 
with polytheistic or pantheistic Nature-worship' and to worship the 
'caricature of divinity' is really to worship the Devil.[159] What must 
also be noticed from Tyrrell's scattered remarks is that the 
establishment of these basic principles prepares the way for his central 
claim that in Nature God works through Conscience since 'Conscience is 
the key to it all'.[160]

In view of the parallel with Teilhard de Chardin, a final 
comparison may be helpful. If the 'passion for unity and universality 
remains the most basic mystic intuition', von Hügel and Tyrrell certainly 
shared this intuition.[161] Though less disposed to pantheism than 
Teilhard, they sought to construct a similar synthesis. All three 
acknowledged the permanent value of pantheistic experience though seeking 
to transform it into a more personalist mysticism. They accepted the 
possibility of a 'progression from naturalistic, monistic pantheism to 
theistic and pan-christic mysticism', and that 'rightly understood, 
pantheism can be seen as close, and even necessary to Christianity.'[162] 
But Teilhard would have faulted their negative judgment of pantheism and 
their unfavourable assessment of what he called 'living pantheism'. And 
they, like Blondel, would have been shocked by 'the realism of Teilhard's 
pantheism'.[163] However, their use of the term 'panentheism' signalled 
their desire to preserve some elements of pantheism. The 'search for 
unity and universality' in their understanding of mysticism, and their 
positive though guarded appraisal of the 'pantheistic tendency' within 
and outside the Christian tradition, drew them close to Teilhard's own 
mysticism in certain important respects.
CHAPTER FOUR

THEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CHRISTIAN MYSTICISM

TRANSCENDENCE AND IMMANENCE

From their critique of the various false or incomplete versions of mysticism we are able to discern the shape of Christian mysticism in the thought of von Hügel and Tyrrell. Neo-Platonism was seen to rest on an exclusive abstract transcendence of the divine; pantheism on exclusive immanence, both distorting the relationship between human and divine reality. The term panentheism signalled their desire to express the relationship of God and humanity in terms of Christian revelation and theological tradition. For von Hügel it denoted 'an intense consciousness of the prevenient, all-pervasive presence of God', and for Tyrrell it was pursued as 'the middle course' in an attempt to avoid the 'false "transcendence" of Deism' and the 'Charybdis of Pantheism.' It was in fact employed as a corrective to the pantheistic strain which they felt endangered the valid principle or method of immanence. For both von Hügel and Tyrrell it was a synthetic term whose precise content could only be grasped by a fuller exploration and elucidation of the mystery of God's transcendence and immanence. In this sense Dakin was right to suggest that 'a term like "panentheism" formulates rather than resolves the difficulty.' The resolution of the problem is to be found in the important exchange on the problem of transcendence and immanence and the conclusions which followed from this.
It is possible to see this question of transcendence and immanence as crucial to the whole modernist crisis, as a way of conceptualising one of its central philosophical and theological conflicts.[4] But what is claimed throughout this present work is that von Hügel and Tyrrell belong not only to the modernist controversy but also to another struggle: the attempt to recover some of the riches of a neglected mystical tradition. In this context, the relationship between transcendence and immanence had been a recurring question for those mystical writers who had sought to record their personal spiritual experience: how to understand and express the transcendent God as immanent in his creation, or, in more personal terms, how to conceive of the contact and union of the individual human soul with God. Naturally, von Hügel and Tyrrell turned to the Christian mystical tradition in order to meet this problem.

Daly is right in claiming that von Hügel 'regarded the question of divine transcendence as the most crucial issue in the religious thought of his day.'[5] Loisy thought the Baron obsessed by the notion and Maude Petre maintained that it was the chief reason for the cooling of relationships with other modernists.[6] Loisy considered von Hügel's 'morbid preoccupation' was a psychological illness, though the Baron felt it was vital to defend the principle of transcendence in order to preserve the ontological foundation of true religion.[7] There was more than a hint of personal animus in Loisy's remarks since the Baron was making it clear by 1910 that 'a distinctly sceptical, purely immanenist current' had now become 'painfully evident' in Loisy's work. [8] This goes some way towards explaining the apparent obsessive nature of the Baron's concern: the danger of its total negation by an absolute, exclusive immanentism.
The real issue was not whether a method of immanence was useful as part a cumulative attempt to link man's contingent nature with the transcendent God, but how to avoid falling into a system or doctrine of immanence which trapped God within the limitations of human subjectivity thus distorting Christian spirituality.[9] For the Baron immanentism had become quite literally the 'counter tyranny'; almost as pernicious as the 'tyrannous Transcendentalism' of scholasticism.[10] Significantly these remarks belong to 1910 which tends to support Nedoncelle's claim that from 1910 to 1912 the Baron 'was especially preoccupied with establishing the existence of a transcendent reality, and he became hypersensitive to any contrary opinion'.[11] Though a rigid chronological division is inadvisable in assessing such movements in von Hügel's thought, it is worth noting that it was precisely at that time that he welcomed what he claimed was an observable shift among scholars on this issue: 'It is most interesting to note how strong again is now the current against all exclusive Immanence'.[12] But even by 1907 it was already a subject of tense and animated exchange with Tyrrell whose mind was positively attracted to immanentism. The occasion then was Tyrrell's attempt to steer a way between the respective positions of Billot and Campbell though the essential issue went much deeper.[13]

In his earlier devotional works Tyrrell had sought to express God's nearness to his creatures. In his reflections on St Paul's words from Acts: 'in quo vivimus et movemur et sumus', he asserted that 'all movement and change' proceed from the free-will of God whom we see "labouring" continually within us and without us, and asked us 'to see in every incident and accident of each hour the hand of God' whose 'free-will is the first and immediate mover in all'.[14] In 1898 his thoughts on the spirituality of St Ignatius turned to the presence of God in
conscience and the relationship of the soul and 'her Spouse.'[15] Von Hügel found these reflections entirely congenial, claiming that the 'teaching as to the immanence of God' which 'runs throughout the whole book' is 'dear to me'.[16] But in the review of *Idealism in Straits* just over two years later Tyrrell was also clear on the importance of 'bringing out the transcendence in contrast with the all-pervading immanence of the deity' as a check to pantheism.[17] Similarly, in *Lex Orandi* he warned of the danger of seeing God's immanence 'as that of a veritable *anima mundi*, part and parcel of the whole'.[18] That Tyrrell's contribution 'is to be found in the attempt he made to reconcile "transcendentalism" with "immanentism"' is also apparent from the appended note to this chapter where he described the manner of God's communication: 'He is not known merely as "something", but as the root and source of everything as immanent no less than transcendent'.[19]

Von Hügel's early remarks on the problem reveal a similar desire to incorporate an immanent approach. In 1900 he had spoken of the God who 'made us in order that in a sense we might make Him, in and for our minds and wills'.[20] This may have been one instance where, as Maude Petre suggested later, the Baron had been tempted by immanentism in a way that he would later want to repudiate.[21] Another instance is found in von Hügel's criticism of Mivart where he decries the latter's 'apparently total want of sympathy and appreciation of any Incarnation doctrine, any immanence of the divine in the Human', a flaw which the Baron held to be 'strangely shallow', reflecting the severe limitations of the purely scientific mind.[22] But a distinct shift of emphasis can be located even before the end of the first decade, and seems to have been linked to his growing suspicion of the adverse 'spiritual effects' of 'sceptical Immanentism' on individual modernists which
became clear at the time of *Lamentabili* and *Pascendi* and their prolonged aftermath.[23] Prior to that he seemed readily disposed to accept Tyrrell's soundness on the question of immanence. In fact it was the Baron rather than Tyrrell who shifted his position.

The key to understanding the different emphases of von Hügel and Tyrrell on this question is to be found in their correspondence in the summer of 1907. The letters followed Tyrrell's article 'Da Dio o dagli uomini?' in *Il Rinnovamento*. Essentially a plea for democracy in the Church, it opposed 'sacerdotalism' and its consequences for the concept of authority. Since priesthood is *from* the people as well as *for* the people, *from* the Spirit *through* the community, this must determine the nature of all authority in the Church, from priest to Pope. Tyrrell maintained that what he took to be a distortion of authority within Catholicism had its origin in a failure to grasp God's immanence as well as his transcendence. Taking seriously divine immanence requires acceptance of the primacy of the collective over the individual exercise of authority.[25] Phrases like 'God immanent in the collective mind and conscience of the community', 'God immanent in the spirit of man' reflect Tyrrell's desire for a 'more adequate expression of the immanence of Divine Authority in the human spirit, in conscience both individual and collective'. Tyrrell thought the prevalent view within Catholicism that the priest was 'the delegate of a purely transcendent, not of an also immanent God', represented the triumph of Caesarism in the Roman Church, and towards the end of his life he became bitterly obsessed with rejecting what he considered absolutism in all its forms, especially that of Rome.[26] So, one of the chief motives for his immanenism was a strenuous resistance to a 'tyrannous transcendence.' Though it was von Hügel who coined the phrase, it was Tyrrell who gave it precise
application in terms of ecclesiastical polity. Moreover he believed this claim that authority came from 'God or Christ as immanent in the community' was truer to 'the teaching of S. Paul and the Gospels'.[27]

Tyrrell felt that he was simply repudiating an alien unscriptural Deism, or 'limited Deism', which permitted the notion of a 'direct "telegraphic" communication between Heaven and the rulers of the Church'.[28] But even in this most 'immanentist' essay there is a desire for balance: 'the underlying and complementary truth of the Divine Immanence' demands acceptance of a real transcendence. The key to this balance is Christ himself who 'spoke, and had to speak the language of pure transcendence' but whose 'whole life and teaching and spirit implied the truth of immanence'.[29] So Tyrrell was not claiming to articulate a mere theological preference; he was pitching his argument much higher, claiming fidelity to revelation, above all the life and teaching of Jesus himself. Herein lies the real force of his critique. In this article he relegates the Old Testament's 'imaginative and pictorial presentments' such as 'God as mainly transcendent, as outside and above the world and humanity', in favour of the immanence of the New Testament. He had made a similar point two years previously: 'I am doing St John's First Epistle now, & have been so much struck with the Immanentism of it all - that God is not seen or known except as a spirit in man. This God is not even first cousin to Jahweh'.[30] Although one may at times want to question Tyrrell's exegetical assumptions, the appeal to biblical evidence was a recurring feature of his discussion of transcendence.

It is with von Hügel's response to 'Da Dio o dagli Uomini' that the growing contrast with Tyrrell on transcendence and immanence becomes most clear. Whilst admiring much of the article ('so strong and true, so
pathetically winning') the Baron expressed some misgivings which in the absence of 'coherent criticism' were intended to suffice for the present.[31] He feels strongly that Tyrrell's 'treatment of the old transcendent conception of God as requiring to be reformulated, en toutes pièces, by an immanent one, is somehow a bit of most tempting, yet nevertheless impoverishing, simplification.'[32] The Baron also desired a reappraisal of the exercise of authority in the Church, but felt the loss of transcendence was too heavy a price to pay, precisely because it took the very heart out of true religion. He agreed that God was not in any spatial sense outside or above us, and that such images should be understood in terms of 'spiritual experience and spiritual reality', but what was really at stake, in jettisoning the 'old transcendent conception of God', was nothing less than 'that noblest half of the religious experience of tip-toe expectation, of unfulfilled aspiration, of sense of a Divine life, of which our own but touches the outskirts'.[33] Von Hügel felt this was a radical impoverishment. Though Tyrrell was not in fact advocating a total rejection of the 'old transcendent conception of God', the vehemence of his language made such a reaction understandable.[34] The Baron's further point was to reject any dualism in speaking of these two complementary aspects of God's nature, and to assert that the spiritual experience of which Tyrrell spoke, was 'essentially as truly of God transcendent as of God immanent'.[35]

In his reply and the subsequent correspondence Tyrrell's motives become clear. In his firm and reasoned self-defence he claimed that there was in fact no conflict between them. He certainly did not withdraw his main point: the unacceptable consequences for the exercise of ecclesiastical authority of an over-emphasis on transcendence. Rather
he repeated it with greater force: 'Believe me we are quite agreed about
the transcendence question', though he criticised those for whom
transcendent meant 'deistic outsideness, & would justify the notion of a
special telegraph between Heaven & and the Pope beaming messages no man
may control or question. One dare not give them the word to play
with.'[36] This was the heart of the matter. Tyrrell probably felt that
from his scholastic training he knew better than von Hügel the mind of
the 'opposition'; the real issue was how to resist what in effect amounted
to Deism which was as much a danger to spiritual experience and
spiritual reality as immanentism. Both von Hügel and Tyrrell claimed
that we can have no knowledge of the transcendent God which is not
mediated through our immanent experience of him. Their manner of
expressing that differed and it was not simply an obsession on Tyrrell's
part, but intimate knowledge from inside that system of thought, which
alerted him to the necessity of using the word transcendence with great
circumspection, knowing as he did the inability of the prevailing
scholastic system to accept the complementary truth of immanence. Even
in his writing Tyrrell was always on the battlefield in conflict with
known opponents, whereas the Baron was more measured, less polemical,
contributing from the relative comfort of the study. But soon Tyrrell
seemed to grow weary of the battle, looking forward to leaving
theological controversy to 'return to "Nova et Vetera" and simpler
matters'[37] In fact he never did retire from the conflict, and the issue
of transcendence and immanence continued to exercise him.

The question of transcendence and immanence was a major issue in
their respective reviews of Campbell's The New Theology.[38] Tyrrell
felt von Hügel's review was 'as great and somewhat clearer' than the
earlier 'Experience and Transcendence' article though he was still
obviously perplexed that the Baron suspected he had not done justice to
divine transcendence, stating again in self-defence: 'I feel sure that if
you had read my *Lex Credendi on the First Petition* you would never have
doubted my soundness on the point of divine transcendence.'[39] Though
Tyrrell mistakenly referred to the section on the *First Petition* instead
of *The Invocation*, this is a most significant claim since it reveals
his belief that he had resolutely maintained the principle of
transcendence and also that the clearest expression of it was to be
found in his reflections on prayer. Since Tyrrell claimed that *Lex
Credendi* contained his strongest statement of that crucial principle
which the Baron felt he had neglected, this exposition is essential for
grasping his thought on divine transcendence.

In the course of this detailed and lengthy treatment of the
principles of Christian prayer Tyrrell deals with the question of
transcendence and immanence from the point of view of its practical
application to the spiritual life. As his reading of the Johannine
Epistles informed his understanding of the centrality of immanence as the
mode of God's revelation in the New Testament, so it is the biblical
evidence which governs his belief that transcendence is fundamentally an
Old Testament concept deriving from the prophetic experience of awe and
wonder in response to the all-powerful and awesome reality of God.
Although prayer involves real contact between God and man, 'it can be no
ture prayer which simply lowers God to the heart and mind of man'.[40]
The truth is that God has stooped down to man and it is God alone who
bridges the chasm between heaven and earth. Nonetheless the human
tendency is to bring God down to the human level, an inclination which
in itself may be the expression of man's need to feel the closeness of
the divine, but which so easily becomes a distorted quest to manage and
control God. In this sense 'the more human He becomes, the less He is
divine, all-seeing, all-mighty, all-loving, all-good.'[41] But such a God
imprisoned in our human limitations is denied the power of raising us up
above ourselves.

The underlying theme of these reflections was the 'otherness' of God.
Against the 'debasing tendency' stands the 'spirit of the great prophets
of Israel', chief among whom was John the Baptist: 'in them the sense of
God's greatness, His otherness from man, His transcendence, was all-
dominating, and filled them with a burning, reforming zeal against
materialistic and unworthy conceptions of the divine majesty.'[42] This
was a recurring theme in much of Tyrrell's writing; the need constantly
to re-shape our human concepts of God, however costly may be the
breaking up of our false images and idols. Since the Bible itself
reflected this historical process, the paradox was that having triumphed
over animistic conceptions of the divine presence, the Old Testament
witness to the transcendence of God had itself become an obstacle to the
fuller truth about God's nearness. For the realisation of this truth new
and decisive revelation was required, God himself must speak. Thus the
key to a proper understanding of transcendence and immanence is God's
Word becoming flesh in the Incarnation. God's nearness and immanence
was 'the truth of which Christ was the living revelation'.

So, the fact that God has become man represents the definitive
solution to the problem of transcendence and immanence. In presenting
a brief resumé of this central Christian doctrine Tyrrell again turns to
Johannine theology, referring to the prologue of the Fourth Gospel: Christ
is the 'Only-begotten' who makes the Father known since he comes from
the very heart of the Father. Tyrrell's 'immanentism' is manifest in what
looks like the outline of a 'low ascending Christology': 'He [Christ] looked down through the depths of his own spirit as through a crystal well of light into the abyss of all life and being, into the bosom of God, "the Father of spirits".\(^{[43]}\) It is in Christ, in his 'mystic awe' and reverence, but also in his 'boundless feeling of childlike love and confidence', that the reality of transcendence and immanence is both experienced and embodied. This was also the view of von Hügel who dwelt on the principle of 'incarnationalism' whilst resisting a total Christocentrism in the manner of Schleiermacher, an attitude which, he felt, had contributed to a distorted doctrine of immanence in opposition to transcendence.\(^{[44]}\) For his part, Tyrrell was quite convinced the balance was to be found in the Christ of the scriptures. To Galilean fishermen, in whose minds 'heaven stood for distance and transcendence, for a world other in kind than our own', a term like 'Father in Heaven' had a dual reference both to difference and likeness between human and divine and also 'warned them that they were on holy ground and in the region of mystery'.\(^{[45]}\) This latter point was crucial for Tyrrell as for von Hügel. Both were agreed on the absolute centrality of that 'tip-toe expectation', that sense of touching the fringes of the Divine Life of which the Baron spoke.

Von Hügel and Tyrrell were agreed that a real transformation has taken place through Christ; fear of the distant transcendent God has become reverence for the loving Father who reveals Himself in Christ. This has the most far-reaching consequences for mysticism, as Tyrrell points out. A 'crude mysticism' sees divine power alongside nature, looking for God not in order but disorder, storms, portents or even 'abnormal states and phenomena of the spiritual faculties'.\(^{[46]}\) Jesus, however, is the teacher of 'true mysticism': 'He has taught us to see God,
not alongside of nature, but to see nature in the bosom of God, and God through and in nature'. In this approach Tyrrell rejects firmly any notion of a 'God of the gaps' where God is sought in the 'faults and lacunae' of science' rather than 'in the darkness from which it comes and into which it vanishes, a darkness which faith alone can enlighten.' Thomas à Kempis is quoted, 'Where Thou art there is Heaven; and where Thou art not, there is hell', to support the assertion that 'the spiritual order enwraps and permeates the physical and makes with it one intelligible unity'. To speak of God in this way is to make clear that in the Christian life and spirituality 'all is grace': the 'Divine Life is not something that we draw forth from ourselves, but rather something that we appropriate'. A proper understanding of transcendence and immanence, therefore, ensures that we avoid mistaking divine gift for human achievement. Gathering together the threads of his presentation, Tyrrell concludes with a lucid statement which has the clearest implications for mysticism:

God is transcendent; He stretches beyond the world in every direction; infinitely higher, deeper, wider. But it is only through, in, and with the world that we are one with Him; we must take it all into ourselves, into our thought, feeling, and will, if we would possess Him. That mysticism is doomed to sterility which would seek Him, like the entombed hermits of Thibet, in absolute silence and darkness, which would empty the mind and heart of every creature in the vain hope of finding more room for God.

God ever remains transcendent but He is also immanent; he has entered the human condition in such a way that human experience has become the definitive locus of encounter with him.

Tyrrell felt that in these reflections he had adequately expounded the truth of divine transcendence. In view of his own stated feelings about the importance of these passages it is best to place 'what are arguably the most immanentist pages in all Tyrrell's writings'
(in *Oil and Wine*) in the context of this exposition in *Lex Credendi*. He admitted that extreme immanence in the form of pantheism had been the dominant theme in the earlier essays. The correct approach to understanding Tyrrell's thought on transcendence and immanence was suggested by von Hügel. When the Baron said 'Father Tyrrell was ever a mystic', it was not simply a tribute to a trusted friend who had died in ignominy, but partly an allusion to the range and volatility of Tyrrell's mind, and his attraction to the 'language of mysticism' in expressing his thought. For Tyrrell, truth was to be found at the extremes. He appears at times 'like the Areopagite' with an insistence on the 'utter Transcendence of God', regarding all concepts of Him as 'equally worthless'. But, 'in a another mood, God's Immanence becomes so over-emphasised, that we get something like an *Anima mundi* or *Anima animarum* conception.' However uncongenial this shifting of thought may have been for the Baron, he was at this stage in little doubt that this movement and change reflected the *keenness* of Tyrrell's dual sense of God's immensity and God's closeness to us. The fact remains that the most 'immanentist' passages in *Oil and Wine* show that Tyrrell's language belongs recognisably to the mystical tradition and Johannine theology.

Von Hügel's own manner of expressing his position was markedly different, though it may be claimed that the overall result was not too dissimilar: a synthesis in which both transcendence and immanence find their true position only in relation to each other. In this way both tyranny and counter-tyranny were resisted and overcome by a kind of theological symbiosis. For Tyrrell the truth had been found largely through dwelling on the Johannine mysticism of the New Testament and against the background of the poetic and paradoxical language of the mystical tradition, the emphasis falling on different aspects of the
tradition at different times. In contrast, von Hügel's thought, scattered throughout his works over a period of more than thirty years, generally reflects a measured attempt on almost every occasion to balance transcendence and immanence. He was in search of a 'rich middle position' between the two 'tyrannies'. Though 'Sceptical Immanentism' was perceived as a 'variety of Fichteism', he conceded that some of its roots could be found much deeper within the Christian mystical tradition.[50]

He sought to establish his 'rich middle position' precisely on the basis of that tradition but understood in its totality and through its representative figures. For example, he felt St Catherine's mystical doctrine offered the possibility of a combination of 'The Two Ways: the Negative Way, Transcendence; the Positive Way, God's Immanence.'[51]

When the Baron discussed contemporary philosophers, in The Mystical Element and elsewhere, they were often assessed and judged with reference to the principles of mystical theology, especially this question of transcendence and immanence. His controlling motive, as he wrote to Tyrrell in 1905, was 'not in the least to get rid of all Metaphysics, all Transcendence' but on the contrary 'to show how Metaphysics and Transcendence of some, indeed definite, kind, are in all religion: and how these are still imperative and possible.'[52] To insist on this 'middle position' was to assert the fundamental belief that 'the sense of Givenness, of Prevenience, of a Grace, of something transcendent' has 'in part become Immanent to our human world as a Fact within this factual world'.[53] The achievement of this position is signalled by von Hügel's use of the term 'immanent transcendent'. It will become clear later that the synthesis went beyond the merely verbal and that the terms are not reversible. At present we simply note how the term was used in his Edinburgh address of 1914: 'religion has for its object, not directly the
world, even as a totality, but God as distinct from, although sustaining
the world...its object is not only immanent but transcendent, is an
immanent transcendence, something that we do not make but find."[54]

The terms used in this way were indicative of a whole attitude of
mind, not merely labels denoting abstract principles. Von Hügel believed
that the protagonists of absolute immanence and the protagonists of
absolute transcendence were talking about two different concepts of
religion. He came to believe more strongly than ever that if religion
concerned itself with anything less than the 'immanent transcendent' it
descended to the level of a purely human enterprise or became 'pure' and
unacceptable mysticism:

La différence capitale et décisive m'apparait donc maintenant être la
différence entre la Religion conçue comme phénomène purement intra-
humaine, non évidentiel au delà des aspirations la race humaine; et
la Religion conçue comme essentiellement évidentielle métaphysique,
leffet en nous de plus que - de plus que n'importe quels faits et
désirs purement humains.[55]

Thus, religion must realise its own nature as 'a Givenness, a
Transcendence in Immanence, an Incarnation, a witness to the full life
there with glimpses and suggestions of it here.'[56] Otherwise Feuerbach
had been vindicated through the triumph of a system of exclusive
immanence, achieved through the failure of theologians to preserve the
principles of mystical theology in the realm of doctrine.

The reviews of Campbell's *The New Theology*

To discover the real foundation of the Baron's emphasis we must
return to the writings of 1907 when he and Tyrrell were expressing their
thought in the context of Campbell's *The New Theology.*[57] Their
respective reviews summarise and reveal the difference between them.
Tyrrell's is shorter, altogether slighter and less penetrating, but not without insight. He sees the major issues in sharp focus: the contrast between preacher and theologian, the need for prayer to inform theology, the importance of struggling for an apologetic which takes seriously Christian experience. Von Hügel's is much longer, weightier, and more considered. He is analytical and discursive, covering all the points in detail. But for both of them, the heart of their critique of Campbell is the question of transcendence and immanence. Tyrrell acknowledged that an 'over-emphasised transcendence' prompts the search for a 'restatement of religion in terms of immanence', though believing such a reformulation offers 'immediate and palpable relief - but only for a moment.' Such immanentism effectively destroys mystery or 'the eternal riddle of existence - of the irreducible, the irrational, with which finite reason is ever in conflict', and also the mystery of evil is explained away rather than explained. Campbell's identification of God and man in his use of the word "self" is as unacceptable to Tyrrell as to von Hügel: if I am to God simply as a part to the whole, then 'who is the responsible self or subject of the deeds that are at once mine and His?' Further, 'how can I explain my moral and mystical experiences of union and alienation, of friendship and hostility, in regard to what I feel to be a Power not myself that makes for righteousness?'

Von Hügel also perceived the threat to the individual and his distinctness from the divine, but he dwelt at greater length on Campbell's inconsistency in maintaining that we have nothing to do with God as transcendent, but know Him only as immanent, proclaiming 'two modes of God - the infinite, imperfect, conditional, primordial; and the finite, conditional and limited being, of which we ourselves are expressions.' The Baron invokes Pseudo-Dionysius to maintain that
we cannot *comprehend* what God is even as Immanent but rather *apprehend* Him as the Transcendent who is immanent in our experience. So at this point the word *transcendence* is in need of clarification since it cannot have the meaning of 'something utterly beyond any and every vestige of inarticulate feeling and indirect effect within us and upon us.'[61] In actual religious experience Transcendence does not mean this. Transcendence is neither a conclusion of common-sense or higher mathematics, but the truth that emerges from an apprehension of God 'however indirect and implicit, immensely operative in the dynamism of man's multiform deepest life.' The idea of 'tip-toe expectation' appears again as the Baron speaks of 'that intense other-worldliness' which is a vital part of all the deepest religions and which is particularly revealed by Christianity. Without the sense of the *transcendent* both mystery and adoration collapse and the heart of religion is removed.

In support of this position the Baron introduces not only the Areopagite but Augustine and St John of the Cross to whom he adds the witness of Kierkegaard and Troeltsch. Augustine's expression 'Thou hast made us for Thyself, and restless is our heart until it rests in Thee' represents an 'apprehension of Transcendence' as 'immanent in man's heart when touched by grace.'[62] The Spanish mystic's conviction as to God's transcendence is also based on 'the soul's deepest experiences here below', i.e. precisely by using what von Hügel would have called the 'method of immanence'. In presenting his case for the 'immanent transcendent', von Hügel also calls upon St Teresa of Avila who asserted the 'indwelling of the transcendent God in the soul.' The Baron concludes: 'In this way we avoid a Deistic, spatial outsideness and distance of God, and yet His Immanence involves no identity, His Transcendence is fully preserved. We get a *Panentheism*, but escape all
Pantheism.' In pleading for a restoration of this truth among believers, the Baron rightly claims that it was a truth 'so dear to St Paul and other great Christian saints.' Again, the mystical tradition witnesses to the essential truth of religion; the 'hankerings after Pantheistic Immanence' are met in 'St Teresa's way' by the 'recognition of God's likeness and unlikeness to us, of His immanent nearness, prevenience and all-encompassing presence'. Tyrrell might well have claimed that this was precisely what he had been saying all along! It is clear then that for von Hügel and Tyrrell a proper understanding of the relationship of transcendence and immanence was the most effective repudiation of both Deism and pantheism, and they established this chiefly by dwelling on the theology of the New Testament and the mystical tradition.

That Tyrrell himself never abandoned this quest for the right balance on this question is evident from his last work Christianity at the Crossroads. However, the terms transcendence and transcendent were there used with such frequency that there was a danger of their being effectively drained of real content or appearing as mere ciphers for aspects of experience not readily explicable in terms of visible, contingent reality. A rigorous response to Liberal Protestantism, the book asserts forcefully the 'theology of unfulfilled aspiration'. Von Hügel in general approved, especially of Tyrrell's treatment of the question of transcendence and immanence. The following year, by which time Tyrrell was dead, the Baron informed Maude Petre that he had been in correspondence with Buonaiuti whom he felt was making a 'serious attempt' to present Fr Tyrrell as 'at bottom or eventually, a pure Immanentist'.[63] He felt that reference to Christianity at the Crossroads was sufficient to refute this. Again, Tyrrell had taken his stand on the evidence of the New Testament: 'It is vain to deny that
Jesus imposed, with the authority of divine revelation, and as a matter of life and death, that vision of the transcendental world which the Church had clothed in a theological form. He was clear that religion 'has to do with the transcendent - with the other world, not with this.' He remained critical of the concept of transcendence as used in scholasticism, claiming its influence on later Christian mysticism through Alexandrine and Scholastic philosophy remained 'notorious'. In this tradition it derived from a 'thought-out system' rather than, as the Baron had stressed, being 'moulded by spiritual experience', and thus an 'important truth' was imperilled in consequence.

But Tyrrell also wanted to stress that religion must be an affair of this world since this is precisely where human beings are situated. So he emphasised that 'only so far as the absolute is also immanent, and mingles with the world's process, can religion have an object.' One might question the precise nature of this 'mingling', though Tyrrell's clear intention is to assert the nearness of the Transcendent to human experience and the process of individual spiritual growth. Despite the rather abstract descriptive language Tyrrell is speaking quite simply about growth in the Christian life and the dynamics of our relationship with God. Thus, 'this process of man's self-adjustment to the immanent-transcendent implies action and reaction.' So, the term immanent transcendent which von Hügel used so decisively to hold together the duality of God's nature was already in use in Tyrrell's description of the manner of God's relationship with the individual. Christianity at the Crossroads thus represents Tyrrell's final considered statement on transcendence and immanence, as on so many other questions. He held the the survival of Christianity depended on resolving this question.
Shortly before the appearance of this final 'manifesto', and therefore only weeks before he died, Tyrrell affirmed his agreement with von Hügel on this question:

If we cannot save huge elements of transcendentalism, Christianity must go. Civilisation can do (and has done) all that the purely immanent Christ of Mat Arnold is credited with. The other-world emphasis; the doctrine of immortality was what gave Christianity its original impulse and sent martyrs to the lions.[66]

The final 'proof' of transcendence is Christ's resurrection, 'our critical and central dogma. "If Christ be not risen" etc. If I cannot maintain that I will not stop at Campbell's half-way house.'[67] The ultimate resolution of the problem of transcendence and immanence is found in the historical Christ, crucified and risen. Thus the Incarnation, and the whole Christ-event, remains the key to understanding the divine-human relationship and therefore the nature of mysticism. Von Hügel expressed this connection most clearly in an exposition of Johannine theology of mutual indwelling: 'There is then a profound immanence of Christ in the believing soul, and of such a soul in Christ; and this mutual immanence bears some likeness to the Immanence of the Father in Christ, and of Christ in the Father.'[68]

In view of the clear indications of Tyrrell's final position it was understandable that von Hügel should present his friend as a champion of divine transcendence in his tribute in the Hibbert Journal in 1912. Some years later, though, Tyrrell was ranged with Loisy on the matter of immanentism when the Baron suggested some important critical distinctions: 'Son Oil and Wine, 1907, contient déjà certain immanentismes que je n'aime pas. Son Christianity at the Crossroads, 1909, est un mélange de choses profondément chrétiennes et catholiques et de pages fiévreuses et désorientées.'[69] Tyrrell's 'mélange' had always been a problem for von Hügel who demanded clarity in theology even if he
himself found difficult to express it. From the warmly defensive tribute
of 1912 to the criticisms of 1921 von Hügel's own position had become
more clearly identifiable as 'critical realism', as evidenced for instance
by his letters to Norman Kemp-Smith.[70] It is also true that he had
become so conscious of the 'counter-tyranny' of immanentism and those
who had lost their Christian faith through its exclusive pursuit, that he
failed to recall that Tyrrell's most immanentist thought was to be found,
significantly, not only in his most anti-scholastic outbursts but also in
his most overtly mystical passages.[71] From first to last Tyrrell's
theology moved between attractive devotional prose on spiritual themes
and sharp invective, between the mystical and the combative. In this
connection Schoenl's claim that 'Tyrrell's tendency toward immanentism
and subjectivism in his theological and philosophical thought was
restrained by his Christian mysticism' is not entirely accurate.[72] It
is more correct to say that it was his profound attraction to Christian
mysticism which inclined him to immanentism in his theological and
philosophical thought.

HUMAN EXPERIENCE AND THE 'SENSE OF THE INFINITE'

Given that the transcendent God is immanent in his creation, the
next logical question is how is God actually sensed, experienced and
apprehended by the individual? This is a question at the heart of
mystical theology. But if Aumann is right in believing that 'most
controversies on the mystical question arise from the lack of agreement
on the terminology to be used', some clarification and elucidation of the
terms employed in discussing mysticism is also required.[73] If some
of the problems present themselves directly in terms of the profusion of
linguistic forms, the treatment of mysticism by von Hügel and Tyrrell
raises its own particular problems in this regard in view of the great variety of terms used to describe the human experience of God: 'sense of the Infinite', 'intuition', 'immanent experience of the Transcendent', 'Power making for Righteousness', 'sense of the Ideal', 'conscience'. The interplay of these and other terms in numerous essays, articles and reviews presents a considerable problem for any precise understanding of their thought on the central mystical question: the nature of human contact with God. But this is the inevitable problem in all mystical theology in which it is generally accepted that our theological language can never adequately describe experiences which are usually claimed to be of their nature incommunicable. In fact William James believed this quality of 'ineffability' was a characteristic feature of mysticism, though it is a notion not without its critics.[74]

For von Hügel and Tyrrell, to insist that the immanent Transcendent was definitively expressed in the Incarnation was to lay the foundation for understanding human experience as the ineluctable locus of every meeting with the divine. The individual is called to a dynamic spiritual life, the very dynamism of which reflects the alternating activity of God himself, the Transcendent who is ever immanent because always revealing himself. In *The German Soul* von Hügel expressed it thus:

The uncompromising Transcendence and the compromising Immanence, the intense touch of God the Supernatural, and the genial dilution of it within the human nature which, in its essential qualities and needs, is good and comes from him, are both necessary and closely interrelated in our Christian call and work.[75]

To explore these descriptions of 'genial dilution' and 'intense touch of God', is to discover the heart of mystical experience. Human nature, which is good and God-given, was not conceived as a static receptacle, but the dynamic locus of a rich variety of experiences, bodily, affective and spiritual, where the senses and emotions are engaged in the apprehension
of the divine. The different terminology used by von Hügel and Tyrrell should not obscure their essential agreement that sense impressions, feeling and reflection are the occasion for the cumulative gathering of disparate experiences and for growth in one's knowledge of God. Against any rejection of what he called 'sensible vehicles' in the spiritual life, the Baron held that the mystical journey was not a 'floating above' but a 'penetrating into' reality.[76]

Similarly, Tyrrell felt that the Incarnation was proof of 'God's design to restore faith through sense' which thus becomes our way back to him.[77] So, 'Spirit is awakened on occasion of Sense when Sense responds to stimulations from Realities other than itself', and the Baron maintained that it was Catholicism alone which stood for this 'great fact of Spirit and Sense, Spirit in Sense, Spirit through Sense.'[78] Tyrrell also envisaged something of a dialogue taking place between Absolute Transcendent Reality and limited, finite human personality. In words similar to von Hügel's, he asserted that the 'sense of the Absolute is given not beside but in and with and through the sense of the Ideal in every department.'[79]

A constantly recurring theme in their writing on mysticism was the non-discursive dimension in all human experience and mystical experience in particular. Terms such as sense, feeling and intuition assume crucial importance in their understanding of experience as the medium through which God is apprehended by the individual. Though it is not our main concern, the apologetic question is the immediate background to much of their treatment of experience and epistemology. For both von Hügel and Tyrrell the depths of the human heart must be explored to disclose evidence for the presence of the Infinite.[80]
Von Hügel ascribed a vital significance to intuition in the cognitive process in general and this became the foundation for understanding its central role in the acquisition of mystical knowledge. He describes intuition as 'the most indispensable, the truest form of experience' which underlies reason. Though itself not 'directly analyzable', it is 'indirectly most operative' and can be described as an 'instinct of the soul'. In his apologetics he relegated 'deductive reasoning' in favour of the argument from 'intuitive experience' which he defined elsewhere as 'an intuition or feeling of Reality'. Thus, the words intuitive and Intuitive-Emotional recur in his description of the specifically mystical element of religion and serve to evoke the 'immensely potent, sense and feeling' and 'immediate experience of Objective Reality, of the Infinite and Abiding, of a Spirit not at all unlike yet distinct from our own.'

Without denying that 'to look for a neat systematization of or transparent precision in the Hügelian philosophy of religion is to court disappointment', a helpful place to begin is the paper on 'Experience and Transcendence' from 1906. The opening paragraph indicates the prevailing intellectual ethos: the growth of the inductive method of science and the need for Catholic thought to respond by shifting its ground from a deductive, 'discursive and abstractive method of approaching and conceiving truth'. Such a shift was felt to be not merely a defensive tactic but an approach amply justified by the best Catholic tradition since 'the intuitive method has ever had its place in Christian and Catholic thought, in the writings of the mystics.' The Baron then poses the question: 'how can man, the Finite and Contingent, solidly experience the Abiding and Infinite?' It is the central epistemological problem 'as to the possibility and nature of our Knowledge or Experience of God', an issue which is at the heart of mysticism. His answer is to
bring forward the evidence for some 'direct and deep, though dim and only indirectly ascertainable, experience by the human soul of the Infinite and God.'[87] It is claimed that only relatively recently, through the work of Leibniz, has the distinction between the 'reality and immense operativeness of dim Experience' and 'reflex Knowledge' come to be recognised. The very inclination to recognise the Idea of God is found within human nature, and both Kant and the research of William James are invoked to support the case for a universal though 'dim experience' which reaches beyond the ordinary consciousness of the finite and relative.[88]

Von Hügel claimed that the evidences for mankind possessing in a 'dim though powerful way' a 'sense of the Infinite' were 'impressively profound'. The Infinite is held to press in upon and influence all individuals in various ways and degrees and this claim is based on the universal and specific human characteristic described as a 'keen sense of our relativity', or a consciousness of the approximate, contingent and reversible character of our knowledge of the world around us. But precisely with this sense of the relative and finite there emerges 'an ineradicable, indeed heightened sense of and longing for the Infinite and Abiding.'[89] It is exactly this 'clinging, penetrating, stinging sense of the relative and finite' that points to 'a contrasting Other'.[90] Some years later he would write that a 'large range, variety and delicacy of sense-stimulation is the normal condition, occasion, vehicle, and material for any deep apprehension and vivid understanding of the profounder, spiritual levels, energies, and facts found by or given to the soul.'[91] He expressed it too in his letters of spiritual direction: 'a wholesome, full sense of the Infinite arises and is renewed, within us, not only by recollection but also by contact with the contingent, with matter, time.
and space', so that 'the sense of the Infinite and of the Finite spring up together and condition each other.'[92] It was also described not only as a sense of God's omnipresence and prevenience to be cultivated, but a sense of our 'pathetic limitations' against the 'great background and presence of the Infinite and Abiding'. Even in the most 'contingent-seeming soul' this sense is evidence of 'at least some dissatisfaction with the Finite.'[93] Moreover, this sense can be said to constitute our very humanity: it is 'the centrally human sense; without which we would be no more truly men'.[94]

Up to this point in the 'Experience and Transcendence' paper the Baron had presented empirical evidence for the 'sense of the Infinite' which he claimed could be uncovered by reflection on human experience. Such a sense is, as it were, inherent in our very awareness of ourselves and our world with its relativity and contingency. But the question arises: what is the significance of this 'Sense of the Infinite' for faith in God? Rejecting the simplistic view that philosophy concerns itself solely with the Infinite while religion has to do with God, von Hugel maintains that these two approaches, though distinct, find a point of convergence. The 'confusedly concrete sense of the infinite' described here is distinct from the secondary 'reflex, philosophical, clear, abstractive idea of the Infinite' which is an intellectual construct.[95] To find a place explicitly for religion the Baron must claim that this 'universally human sense of the Infinite' has already found 'Self-Manifestation in the Infinite' which is the central feature of God's historical revelation. It is implicit that there is 'a certain affinity and likeness' between this Spirit and man's spirit. Claiming that the 'penetrative power' of the Infinite over our minds and lives is itself proof of its 'spiritual character' the conclusion is then assured: 'nothing
that was less than Spirit could thus profoundly move spirit.'[96] A good deal of what the Baron wanted to say about the significance of this sense and its relation to the first stages of mystical knowledge was expressly drawn from the mystical tradition, supported by reference to modern philosophers.[97] His conclusion is that 'man's experience of God is not a mere discursively reasoned conclusion from the data of sense; rather the experience of the divine Spirit and the spirits of his fellow-men takes place on occasion of, and 'as a kind of contrast, background, and support to, the actuation of his senses, imagination, reason, feeling, and volition'. [98] The Baron also noted that it was a sense of 'Givenness, Prevenientce, of a Grace, of something transcendent having in part become Immanent to our human world as a Fact within this factual world.'[99] As regards the apologetic force of this position the Baron is at best arguing from the psychological to the ontological and must acknowledge, as Tyrrell did, that there is an implicit process of interpretation at work which is ultimately determined by belief in historical revelation.

The Baron's mind moves often between philosophical statement, prayerful reflection and spiritual direction, terms and concepts taking on their specific meaning in the process and the diversity of application. The idea of the sense of the Infinite appears in a wide variety of contexts often acquiring different nuances. In addition, it has been claimed there was a shift of emphasis in his thought between the earliest version of the paper on 'Experience and Transcendence' and its final form.[100] Regarding the two presentations, one important conclusion for our purposes is that by the time of the reworked paper, the idea of the sense of the Infinite has become more assimilated into a specific philosophical framework the main purpose of which is to support an
empirical theological understanding of mysticism and the soul's union with God. One consequence is that the second presentation draws more heavily on the mystical tradition and asserts more clearly that mysticism is found in different degrees, from the elementary inchoate sense of the Infinite to the full mystical union.

Von Hügel's meaning is usually conveyed chiefly through cumulative argument rather than precise articulation. The term *sense* seems to be employed consistently in a broad, inclusive fashion. Noting its synonyms helps to indicate how it gathers up various dimensions of experience and clarifies its central function in the Baron's treatment of mysticism. Despite Beattie's claim that 'sometimes it indicates "awareness" or recognition, and almost a straightforward equivalence with "apprehension", it is really only at the end of the 'Experience and Transcendence' paper that there is any distinction between *sense* and *apprehension* and this seems more a slip of the pen or lapse of thought rather than a point of any significance. Elsewhere it is quite clear that the terms are interchangeable, as for instance throughout the review of Campbell's *The New Theology* and this article. Further, the word is at times simply interchangeable with 'experience' understood as a broad pre-discursive inarticulate awareness of the whole as distinct from 'concurrent Attention' and 'subsequent reflex Knowledge'. On another occasion it is closely related to the idea of 'longing' for the Infinite which elsewhere is described as 'our true home'. Overall, the word *sense* seems to indicate a specifically conscious experience or awareness, with overtones of immediacy and spontaneity, of the deepest spiritual realities and ultimately God, but always on the occasion of and in contrast to finite, contingent realities.
With regard to the term *Infinite* Beatie speaks of the Baron's 'perplexing usage', though on examination it hardly seems as perplexing as he suggests.[104] Its initial purpose is simply to provide a contrast to 'finite' and 'contingent' and all that denotes the relativity and transitory nature of much human experience. But its actual content is clearly revealed by examining the various contexts where its parallel with the terms 'Other', 'Absolute', 'Abiding' and 'Infinite Spirit' and of course 'God' is manifest.[105] Thus, consideration of the whole of von Hügel's writing 'indicates that it is used primarily as a synonym for "God".'[106] Furthermore, since von Hügel was seeking initially to establish a philosophical foundation for his treatment of mysticism, the term 'Infinite' was probably deemed more appropriate than the more directly theistic term 'God'. But in all the key passages where the experience of the divine is indicated by the term *sense*, it is to be interpreted in terms of a personal relationship between the individual and the God of Christian revelation.

The nature of this sense or experience of the Infinite is also revealed by a number of qualifying adjectives which recur throughout the Baron's treatment. At times it is described as a 'keen' sense or consciousness of our relativity. It is a sense which is subject to change; at times undeveloped and in need of strengthening and cultivating, at other times 'strongly operative'.[107] The most common descriptive terms used in connection with it denote opaqueness and imperviousness to clear analysis. Thus, it is a 'direct and deep, though dim and only indirectly ascertainable, experience by the human soul of the Infinite and God'. The 'reality and immense operativeness of dim Experience' is distinguished from 'all clear analysis'. Relying on Kant at one point the Baron maintains that the 'idea of God', though not yet
the fully personal God of revelation, is 'at the bottom of our soul'. The description of the 'dark region and activity' within the individual where 'ideas and principles' which are not the result of sense-perception are present, vividly evokes the depth and interiority of the human experience of the divine. It is the word dim which occurs most often, though it too is modified by the terms direct and deep. The Infinite is sensed in a 'dim though powerful way', the dimness being rooted in the individual's 'present physical and psychical limitations.' Though such dimness and obscurity characterise not only his knowledge of the divine but his ordinary awareness of contingent realities, it acquires a mysterious depth and intensity in relation to the Infinite. Nonetheless this 'dim, deep experience' does involve the acquisition of knowledge, but such that makes 'our reflex knowledge of God to appear no knowledge at all.' It remains a 'confusedly concrete sense of the infinite, spontaneously at work in the living human soul and compact of feeling as much as reason'. And although Clement Webb was critical of the Baron's stress on the obscurity and non-rational element of intuition, it allowed him to assert the opaqueness of all human apprehensions of the divine which of their nature exceed the 'analytic powers of the clear human reason.'[108] Moreover, it served to proclaim the transcendence of God: 'we shall ever have to look up to God, to apprehend, not comprehend Him.'

In rejecting 'Ontologism' (the view that God is held in a directly clear and distinct manner with certainty and independently of the contingent), the Baron observed that 'Reality, when apprehended by us, is ever in part obscure.'[109] Though Sherry asserts that von Hügel rejected any 'claim to direct awareness of God' or a 'direct experience of God', this is easily misunderstood. The Baron insisted that there could be direct contact between divine and human reality, however dimly and
obscurely the divine may be apprehended, and however incomplete the formulation of such an experience might be. One reason for speaking of dimness and darkness was to indicate that apprehension cannot be totally identified with the reality apprehended, and to avoid the suggestion that the sense or experience of the Infinite could be assimilated to the experience of looking directly at an object. It is Kelly who manages to capture the subtlety of von Hügel's position by drawing a parallel with John Baillie's distinction: 'ontologically there is a real, direct relationship between man and God', though we do not grasp the Absolute 'separately or alone.' Knowledge of God can thus be spoken of in terms of 'a mediated immediacy.'

Von Hügel regarded the obscurity not simply as a matter of accepting the mystery of being human and the limitations of the cognitive process, but of acknowledging the mystery of God himself: 'there must always be a kind of dimness and obscurity in relation to things so fundamental' so that our knowledge of the Absolute remains 'obscure and confused.'[110] The sense of the Infinite, however dark and shadowy, originates in the sense of the Finite which is the initial experience from which religion is born, and it is this sense that becomes ever more pervasive in the mystical life. He held to this position consistently. The 'ordinariness' of such experience and its continuity with the rest of life is revealed in the claim that this dim, deep and confused sense is awakened and sustained on occasion of, in contrast to, but 'well inside the same man's many-levelled, manifold impressions and stimulations.' The Baron's overriding desire was always that individuals should discover 'Spirit at work in the visible world.'
Tyrrell's thought on the 'sense of the Infinite', though not identical with von Hügel's, closely resembled it. Speaking of the 'sense of the Absolute' and the 'sense of that ultra-reality which lies behind all finite reality', he was in search of the truths that would furnish an 'experimental criterion of belief'.[111] He distinguished the 'religious sense' from the aesthetic, scientific, and moral sense in human nature.[112] The question was what is the place of a 'religious sense' in our conscious life which seeks a 'progressively accumulating apprehension of the world we live in'. In meeting this question Tyrrell, like the Baron, identifies in human experience a contrast between our present 'disappointment and dissatisfaction' in the face of our present attainments with the 'further stage of the Ideal which lies far away on the new horizon'. But for Tyrrell the matter is more complex since the Ideal is not to be identified with the Hügelian 'Infinite'. Rather the 'Ideal' seems to represent the human perception of that which draws us higher and further; but 'no measure of the Ideal however vast can equal the Absolute'. Tyrrell's thought is by no means clear at this point and one must surmise that this intermediate stage of the Ideal seems to be a human 'projection', a sum of ideals, as when he speaks of the 'Ideal' as a combination of the moral, scientific and aesthetic sense.

More light is cast on the matter by his remarks on the Baron's 'Experience and Transcendence' paper to the Synthetic Society. He pointed out that we do not argue from our 'discontent with present attainments' to the existence of an Ideal which is only relative like the horizon, but from 'the slowly acquired realisation that there is no rest for us'; that the horizon always recedes, that finitude is our inevitable doom.[113] There is a distinctly reflective element here which seems absent in von Hügel's description of the sense of the Infinite. On its negative side
this sense springs from a 'revolt against the finitude of the finite, the transiency of the transient, the relativity of the relative'. More positively, it is a hunger which originates in the fact that 'God has made us for Himself and our soul is restless till it rest in Him.'

Here, perhaps like von Hügel, Tyrrell's 'apologetics of experience' appears at its most unconvincing. Genuine religious commitment must also be determined by communal witness and a coherent theology, since it is admitted that 'raw experience' of human finitude alone is open to a variety of theistic and non-theistic interpretations. Still he claims that our dissatisfaction with this projected Ideal, our 'restlessness and discontent', and our very capacity to make such a judgment 'makes it evident that we possess within us a standard or criterion, a certain obscure consciousness of the Absolute and Infinite.'

Why this should be a sense of the Absolute rather than ultimate nothingness and emptiness is not entirely clear. However elliptical Tyrrell's thought appears, the general position that experience of the finite is the occasion of a real sense of the Infinite is remarkably close to that of von Hügel. Though impersonal terms such as 'That', 'It', 'Ideal', 'True', 'Fair' abound, it is clear that both 'sense' and 'Absolute' are employed by Tyrrell for distinctly personal realities. On its negative side it might be described as a 'sense of incurable dissatisfaction with anything that is less than infinite and eternal', or an 'ineradicable discontent, which is the very nerve and mainspring of all upward effort'. Its positive dimension is 'personal communion with God' as the principle end of life which begins when our 'religious sense' gives to us the 'secret presence of the Absolute and Infinite.' And the way is through the finite: 'Through the creature we can get to the Creator, through the finite to the Infinite.' Like the Baron, there is posited a distinction between 'God as
He is given to our experience and as He is represented in the constructions of our religious understanding. To the end of his life Tyrrell conceived spirituality not as escape from the material world but encounter with the Infinite through it: 'It is in and through what we call the material order, the world of sensible phenomena, that the spiritual element of our being is brought to consciousness and tries vainly to know and realize itself.'[116]

It is as this sense is born that reverence and adoration emerge as basic forms of response. That this 'sense of the Absolute and Infinite' also engages our affectivity is apparent from his definition of this sense as 'the consciousness of certain realities to which we have to adapt our conduct, of certain feelings and intentions with regard to the same.'[117] Thus we are called to 'love of the Absolute', a love that will be 'distinct from all our other loves'. This religious sense is also subject to change and development beginning with 'an incurable spiritual restlessness' which becomes 'that sense of God, that love and need of God' which is 'deepest in man's spiritual nature' though often the last to come to explicitness.' It becomes in saints like Augustine, Jerome, Basil, Gregory, Bernard, Aquinas and Anselm and others who pursue contemplation, 'a singularly real, rich and massive sense of God.'[118]

Like the Baron, Tyrrell stressed the immediacy of this sense and its distinctness from the discursive thought which may follow it. It is a 'sense of God' which has been 'formed in our heart and intelligence', a sense of 'some special nearness to the realities of eternity.'[119] In The Church and the Future, where he was grappling with the concept of 'Religion as a Spirit', the term sense was defined as the 'apprehension' which gives birth to energy and love in response to the revelation of
some vital truths, what he calls 'truths of immediate intuition and contact.'[120] This apprehension is called a 'sense', to express its 'intuitive immediacy and to distinguish it from any formal conception or inference of the understanding.' An outline of Tyrrell's epistemology is also found here where he states that although we put the world together as it is given to us by the action of outward sensations aided by general communal experience and reflection, there are other dimensions to our apprehension of reality. His reflections on conscience help elucidate the 'religious sense' and this requires some examination of the idea of revelation as experience. It is here that the depth and interiority of Tyrrell's theology becomes evident.

The term conscience is used by Tyrrell in a variety of contexts to indicate the interior working of the Spirit of God. It appears in the discussion of the 'Power making for Righteousness' where it has a distinct ontological character: Christ is God, meaning that He is Conscience Incarnate.[121] Elsewhere it has a pronounced ethical flavour whereas in other places the content seems more wide-ranging. In Lex Credendi he wrote: 'it is with Conscience in the widest acceptation - moral, intellectual, and aesthetic Conscience - that the spirit-life begins.' [122] Here it is identified with the 'sense of the universal, imperative interests to which those of one's separate self must be wholly subordinate', the sense that we are 'instruments of the Divine Will, manifestations of the Divine Life.' If conscience is allowed to grow, our spiritual perception and understanding will grow, and this will be the development of a living faculty', a 'spiritual sentiency', 'spiritual intuition' and will result in the 'growth of our ethical understanding.'[123] At other times the meaning is rather more nuanced. The same Creator Spirit who works in nature is also at work as
conscience in the individual, 'the difference being that, from the very idea of the spiritual life, man is, in this latter case, the conscious co-operant of the Creative Spirit'.

In 'Revelation as Experience' Tyrrell dealt with the nature of Revelation: whether it is to be considered as divine statement or inward spiritual experience which inspire human statements.[124] For our purpose what is to be noted is the constant stress on the depth and interiority of the experience of the divine when he seeks to answer the question whether God has 'some proper and natural mode of communication, some way of affecting the soul, moving the will, kindling the heart'. Though initially concerned with the historical biblical evidence, the argument holds good for all human experience of God. The 'truer idea of revelation' which Tyrrell proposes is 'a revelation written in the heart and consisting in the indwelling spirit of Christ, present to all men at all times'. It is a revelation which consists in 'felt promptings and guidings of the finite by the infinite will' and not simply the reflex interpretations of them. Significantly, Tyrrell calls upon the mystical tradition to illuminate this distinction between 'God's action and man's reaction' and to support the reality of an 'inward stimulus and attraction towards the divine' which he also calls the 'divine action and stimulation'. It asserted that only because there is divine life and spirit within ourselves can we interpret these impressions and 'interior experiences' as having their source in God. Again, Christ is the model for such experience since he himself drew 'knowledge of Heavenly things' not only from the prophetic and apocalyptic writings, but 'from His own mystical experiences.'
Religious experience gives us what Tyrrell repeatedly calls 'A Power which makes for Righteousness'. This Arnoldian concept and its extensive use by Tyrrell can appear impersonal and moralistic. However, the 'communion or moral union of spirits in God their transcendent source and immanent bond' is the experience which makes possible the conviction that God is that 'Power to which alone man renders an absolute obedience and worship, an unlimited self-sacrifice.' Appealing to Newman's stress on the individual's inner moral experience, Tyrrell suggests that if this Power happens also to be physically omnipotent and intellectually omniscient - well and good, but these are not the attributes that command our worship.

As early as 1899 Tyrrell was suggesting that his faith, insofar as it must be 'rooted in some kind of experience' and not merely in propositions or hearsay, rested upon 'the evidence of a power in myself and in all men "making for Righteousness" in spite of all our downward tendencies.' This was the 'solid core' of faith, whatever secondary and supplementary reasons or experiences may be adduced in support. The specifically Christian element is found in the 'concrete and intuitive recognition of the full manifestation of that said Power in the man Christ as known to us historically.' Though the legacy of Newman apparent here would later be set aside, the 'Power making for Righteousness' remained a vital part of Tyrrell's theology.

Tyrrell's use of Arnold's phrase was in fact flexible, so it should not be too surprising to find that the exact original terms are not always applied, as though Tyrrell were each time making some significant shift of thought. It is always worth remembering his claim to be little more than 'a weaver of materials gathered from many quarters'
which often produced fabric very different from the original texture from which they were torn. This Power is a Power within, not ourselves, which is transcendent and immanent, and is clearly understood in the personalist terms of the Christian God: 'Hence I conclude that if experience gives us a Power that makes for Righteousness it gives us God.' Experience 'reveals God as every cause is revealed in and with its effects: it reveals Him not as a statement but in the moral and religious impulse that proceeds from Him.' In identifying this Power and Cause with God, Tyrrell now admits that this rests on a 'legitimate theistic interpretation of that experience.' The real question, he suggests, is what do we mean by God? He often recalled the scriptural description of God as the Reality 'in which the soul lives and moves and has her being'. In analysing our spiritual experience we find a converse of action and reaction between ourselves and a 'Power not ourselves that makes for Righteousness' which is no 'blind brute force' but 'a spiritual will drawing our wills into union and personal relationship with itself.' It is not therefore merely a moral experience but also 'a religious and mystical experience.'

As von Hügel insisted on the dimness of the sense of the Infinite, Tyrrell also stressed the essential obscurity, opaqueness, and darkness of the meeting with God. Thus as we 'strain through the darkness' what is met in the soul is a 'vague "Power that makes for Righteousness".' We have a 'confused sense of the Absolute', an 'obscure consciousness of the Absolute and Infinite' whose light is known to us in a 'luminous mist', an oxymoron which became a common linguistic device in the mystical tradition. Tyrrell also treated the theme at greater length in a separate essay under the title 'Mysteries a necessity of life'. Surveying the different senses in which the word mystery is used he
begins by claiming that 'life is solemn and significant' and that 'the ultimate whence and whither are wrapt in impenetrable mystery'. Here mystery stands for the 'altogether unknowable Beyond'. There is also the realm of the unknown in everyday experience, as there are truths of religion which can be 'known dimly' within man's present limitations.'

The hiddenness and obscurity of the 'sense of the Whole' reflects the fact that life seems governed by some 'secret universal power' directed to some 'secret universal ends' or 'dim ends' which cannot be formulated. An 'inborn discontent' impels us into the region of the 'dimly knowable', to a 'life infinite in every dimension, because it is the life of the Infinite, and as such unattainable, though indefinitely approachable, by the finite.' The higher life to which we are called is only ever 'dimly conceived', a 'twilight vision' and 'imperfectly realised', though it is the ultimate goal of all our striving, the 'mystery of mysteries and the source of all others.' His thought at this point closely parallels that of von Hügel. The 'vague but irrepressible sense' which is the source of our 'incurable discontent with the partial and finite' stimulates us to pursue the 'secrets of that Whole Life, eternal and infinite'. We have a 'vague and thin' sense of the 'hidden Divinity' which is formed within us and which is said to be 'apprehended confusedly...as a dim light intensifies.' Maintaining with St Paul that 'our life is hid with Christ in God' (Gal.2.2), it is personal faith which draws us into what Tyrrell calls, rather awkwardly, the 'over-natural life' which he identified with 'mystical experience'. He remarked that the Kingdom of God consisted not in finally solving the insoluble, but in being reconciled in obscurity and darkness to the will of God.
At one level, Tyrrell's stress on mystery was simply another aspect of his persistent scathing attack on various forms of rationalism, whether of the scholastic or Liberal Protestant variety, and those for whom everything was clear, commonsense and obvious, 'who can define a mystery but have never felt one.'[137] But the concept also functions more positively on two complementary levels, as it did for von Hügel. It signified the inherent limitation and inadequacy of the human mind in apprehending the Divine; 'In dealing with mysteries, truths fringed with darkness, there will always be gaps and seeming contradictions in our attempted unifications'. Von Hügel felt this was a distinct characteristic of Tyrrell's mind: 'Father Tyrrell used to say very strikingly that we poor mortals always only know the middle of things - both their first beginnings and their ultimate ends are and remain unknown to us.'[138] Secondly, mystery reflects the nature of God, the Infinite whose 'precise nature and form lies shrouded in mystery.'[139] Since God remains hidden, revelation and mystery are two names for one thing. Eternal truth is revealed to us so far as God gives us a twilight glimpse of the rough outline, of some little corner of the picture here and there. It is a mystery because so much of the detail is unrevealed.[140]

Though God has spoken in history 'it is a polysyllabic word of which we miss the ends and therewith the meaning; and unless He is to be found within each soul He is practically unfindable.'[141] But even this meeting with God in the soul is itself dark and mysterious. The Pauline phrase 'in a glass darkly' recurs repeatedly, and the 'darkness' of the spiritual journey continued to exercise a distinct attraction for Tyrrell. The deeply personal root of this emphasis in Tyrrell's theology is evident in many places, including the earlier meditations 'Gleams in Darkness, and 'Darkness'.[142] Ultimately, the dimness and obscurity of the sense of the Infinite and mystical experience are determined by the
nature of the God who lies hidden, the Deus Absconditus, the God who 'half reveals and half conceals Himself'.[143] This raises the question of the cognitive content of mystical experience and its relation to dogma. But here Tyrrell is simply reflecting the age-old emphasis on the via negativa found among some of the greatest Christian mystics who knew that the path to God was through the 'cloud of unknowing', the dark and obscure ascent of the mountain. The problem was that for Tyrrell this approach bordered on an unrelieved 'agnosticism' so decisive was his eventual rejection of the conceptual value of dogma which von Hügel, for his part, held to be the complement to fully Catholic mysticism. For Tyrrell the darkness was not only congenial, but a strange source of 'security': 'I am content to be much in the dark; perhaps I prefer it, as God seems nearer.'[144]
CHAPTER FIVE

MYSTICAL EXPERIENCE
AND UNION WITH GOD

THE DOCTRINE OF THE 'SPIRITUAL SENSES'

What has come to be known as the 'doctrine of the spiritual senses' has a long and interesting history in the Christian mystical tradition though it is not our purpose to present a survey or detailed analysis of it here. Neither von Hügel nor Tyrrell developed this doctrine in any significant way but at the heart of their mysticism one finds expressions taken from the realm of sense perception and applied directly to the soul's contact with God. This represents a deepening and development of the concept of sense discussed in the previous chapter. Since mystical experience is thus described in terms of the operation of 'spiritual senses' by analogy with the physical senses, the question arises: what is the precise significance of this use of analogy in their mystical theology?

In von Hügel's description of the soul's meeting with God it is the sense of touch which is predominant. The same is true of Tyrrell, though he also refers to a richer and more comprehensive 'spiritual sense imagery'. But neither showed himself explicitly aware of the origins of the doctrine in Origen or its development at the hands of Gregory of Nyssa or Bonaventure. In terms of their sources, von Hügel owed much to St Augustine and the Carmelite tradition, whereas Tyrrell's debt was largely to St Ignatius and probably Mother Julian of Norwich. More importantly, for both of them the use of sense imagery to describe
mystical experience reflects a desire to retain and utilise the language of the mystical tradition and to recover an 'affective' and indeed 'sensual' dimension in understanding the individual's relationship with God. This imagery also served to reinforce the belief that Spirit is encountered through, with and in sense, and that human experience is the locus for apprehending the Infinite and for mystical union with God. It is a terminology which preserves the truth that there is an essential unity between the inner and outer dimensions of the individual whose total, bodily-spiritual nature is created by God and called to union with Him. The danger of what Chapman called the 'tyranny of sense' is overcome by a positive appropriation of the doctrine of creation and redemption and their implications for Christian anthropology and spirituality.[2]

In von Hügel's remarks about the intense touch of God and its dilution within human nature, the underlying truth is that what he called, rather awkwardly, our 'amphibious life', is basically good and God-given and so, precisely in its duality, will be engaged in our 'Christian call and work'.[3] The Baron points out that his intention in speaking of the touch of God is to emphasise the 'persistence and vividness' with which God is apprehended and loved by us. He notes that the 'actual touch' which gives rise to this 'sense' is to be understood in terms of the 'enveloping and penetrating presence, of the Infinite Spirit, God upon, around and within our spirits'.[4] He sought to relate the touch of the 'Abiding, Infinite, Spiritual' and the touch of the 'Fleeting, Temporal, Material', the implication being that we may become as vividly aware of the one as we are of the other. That his terminology is fluid and imprecise, and strictly speaking inconsistent, is evident from the article in the Albany Review where 'sense' and 'touch' become
synonymous so that we read of the 'most real sense or touch of the Infinite' which falls within the 'living, operative experience of all deepest religion.'[5] Though for him sense usually indicates the intuitive awareness of the Infinite there is here a certain confusion of terms which obscures momentarily the distinction between the objective activity of God and the subjective impression of the individual, but then his description of a 'mingling' of God's Spirit and our spirit raised the same problem. Such flexibility is also apparent later when reference is made not to the direct touch of God himself, but to the experience of being 'touched by grace'. But behind the inexact language this analogical use of the term touch was intended precisely to broaden the range of understanding so that God's action could be described as 'felt', and as 'tangible' to the 'interior senses' as physical touch is to the outer senses.

The final instance where the verb 'touch' is used in this article discloses its depth and interiority, taking us to the core of mystical experience. Von Hügel cites St Teresa of Avila and other witnesses to the mystical tradition who, despite what he considered their theoretical and linguistic extravagances, held that 'in its depths, the human soul is actually touched, inhabited by God, the Creator Himself, and not only by Grace, a creature.'[6] This truth was incorporated into The Mystical Element where, in addition to the Christian mystics, classical and contemporary philosophers were claimed in support of this belief in 'the ontological presence of, and the operative penetration by the Infinite Spirit, within the human spirit.'[7] Here he asserts with great clarity that personal spiritual experience is 'directly touched, affected, in part determined, by the Infinite Spirit Itself.'
The central element in this analogy of touch becomes clear in the Baron's discussion of Schleiermacher where he notes that religion is essentially 'Contact between Realities...with intuition and feeling as consequences of this contact'. What he called 'true direct contact and experience' is evoked by reference to this touch of God, though it remains within our overall obscure experience. Apart from its directness and the superiority of the knowledge afforded by this contact, other dimensions of touch are apparent: 'He it is Who, however dimly yet directly, touches our souls and awakens them, in and through all those minor stimulations and apprehensions, to that noblest, incurable discontent with our own petty self and to that sense of and thirst for the Infinite and Abiding'. So, God's touch is also a recurring phenomenon and is not to be confined to the higher reaches of the mystical life, but understood as the initiating action of God which stimulates the very sense of contingency from which develops the fuller mystical experience. At this point there is some resemblance to the teaching of St John of the Cross for whom the toques sustanciales are 'divine acts in the depth of the soul, which stimulate the soul to further and further intensities of love and longing.' What Rowan Williams has said of the function of the term 'substantial touch' can be applied to von Hügel who also wanted to express 'a level of contact deeper and more comprehensive than the functioning of any of the 'faculties' - something other than ordinary subject-object perception.' There is a necessary and unresolved tension in this terminology between the specificity of 'spiritual sense experience' and the underlying reality of contact between the soul and God. It was not von Hügel's intention to suggest there were identifiable sensations which proved the reality of mystical experience or union.
What also becomes clear is the decidedly 'affective' quality of this experience of touch, captured in the repeated use of St Augustine's famous words: "Thou hast made us for Thyself, and restless is our heart until it rests in Thee." In his own version of this maxim the Baron uses the analogy of the physical senses to indicate the basic spiritual appetite which is 'deepest in the heart and soul of man, the God-touched and the God-hungry'.[12] Von Hügel's use of the Confessions is significant since Augustine was the author of 'the most truly immortal passage on the five spiritual senses.' The Baron made several references to Augustine in his treatment of mysticism. He refers to the record of the scene at Ostia in the Confessions where Augustine speaks of touching the region of unfailing plenty: 'we touched It slightly, by an impulse of all our heart (modice, toto ictu cordis).)' A little later reference is made to 'our touch, by our rapidly passing thought, of the Eternal Wisdom which abideth above all things'[13] This use of Augustine, whom Cuthbert Butler held to be one of the great patristic exponents of affective mysticism, indicates the essential connection between the sense imagery of touch and an emphasis on the affective dimension of spirituality.[14] However, here the meaning of 'touch' has been reversed again; now God is the object of the individual's touch. This flexibility is certainly not without precedent in the mystical tradition. Ruysbroek, for example, stated succinctly this twofold meaning: 'We feel that we touch and are touched, that we love and are loved.'[15] But behind the variation of language is its intended evocation of the immediate, affective, tangible, vivid nature of the soul's contact with God.

Discussing Catherine's use of such terminology, the Baron recognised her debt to Dionysius. Tracing the occurrence of 'presence', 'presenza', 'μαραυια', he found the influence not only of Dionysius but
Proclus.[16] Her use of 'contact', 'touch', συν&ν to indicate 'God's direct action upon the soul', was also a favourite term of both Dionysius and Proclus. For Dionysius this 'touch' is neither 'sensible' nor 'intelligible'; for Proclus it describes 'perfect spiritual contact', which was also the basic meaning of the term when used by von Hügel himself. And whatever his malign influence, Plotinus was held to have made a lasting contribution to Christian mysticism by stressing 'the substantial touch of God in ecstasy.'

Although within the Christian mystical tradition there is a belief that 'divine reality can be felt', it is also true, as Poulain and Maréchal have shown, that the exact meaning of the word feeling has been a matter of some dispute.[17] During the latter part of von Hügel's life Catholic theologians were again in conflict on the matter though he himself had no difficulty accepting the possibility of direct experience of God and the feeling of His presence in the soul. His sense of the Infinite was very much a matter of feeling, just as intuition possessed a distinctly affective quality: the confusedly concrete sense of the infinite, spontaneously at work in the living human soul and compact of feeling as much as of reason, requires careful distinction from the reflex, philosophical, clear, abstractive idea of the infinite, which is purely intellectual and has obviously little or no connection with religion.[18]

Von Hügel criticised Hermann's dismissal of 'feelings' in relation to faith in Christ with the forceful question: 'how can I apprehend and accept even Christ Himself, if I have not some response within my soul, of which feeling is one of the chief?'[19] He claimed that the historical knowledge of Christ which is the heart of Christianity must be interiorised, and become a matter of positive feeling and response. The truths of Christianity solicit the human heart and engage the feelings,
a belief to which the mystical tradition clearly testifies. Stressing the role of feeling, he cited Acts of the Apostles: "that they should seek the Lord, if haply they might feel after Him and find Him, though he be not far from every one of us; for in Him we live and move and have our being." (17:24-28) This emphasis, like the stress on sense or intuition, places intellectual apprehension in its proper context. This point is made with reference to John of the Cross whom the Baron cites at length on two separate occasions: 'One of the greatest favours, bestowed transiently on the soul in this life, is to enable it to see so distinctly and to feel so profoundly, that it cannot comprehend Him at all.'

This element of the via negativa, which appealed greatly to the Baron's subtle and complex mind, represented a vital truth of experience: 'we can thus increasingly apprehend Him - can know really about Him, the head, the source of all reality and of all sense of reality. But we cannot encircle Him, map Him out, exhaustively explain Him.'[20] The vital distinction between apprehension and comprehension is most readily evoked by his use of the word feeling. In this regard the mystics become like the Saints in Heaven where those who 'know Him most perfectly perceive most clearly that He is infinitely incomprehensible.' This knowing by unknowing is a familiar mystical theme as is the idea that the life of grace on earth anticipates the blessed life in Heaven. What is also significant is the unity between feeling and sight which find their ultimate fulfilment in the eternal embrace and vision of God in heaven. Von Hügel also insists that the initiative always remains with God: 'it is far, far more God who must hold us, than we must hold Him.'
Though there is no extensive use of the full imagery of the five senses, there are several other references to the relationship between sense perception and spiritual apprehension. In one of these, von Hügel likens the spirit to 'a gloved hand, which, let it move ever so spontaneously, will ever, in the first instance, present the five senses with a glove which, to their exclusive tests, appears as but dead and motionless leather.'[21] Though not the most satisfactory analogy, it states the paradox that the soul's experiences transcend, though they remain dependent on, and determined by, the bodily senses. Positing such a close relationship between outer and inner senses it also offered a potentially rich source of reflection which, however, von Hügel only partially exploited.

Another important reference to the five senses occurs in the discussion of some of Catherine's experiences which he groups together as her 'psychic impressions'.[22] The first is connected with 'the sense of touch' where she possesses a 'feeling of mostly interior, but later on exterior, warmth', or even intense burning within or without. There are some vivid descriptions of tangible sensations, and what he calls 'piercing psycho-spiritual perception' is described by the terms *arrow* or *wound*, and the perception itself as a *ray* or *spark* of divine love. The Baron's conclusion reveals his desire to hold together both the intellectual and affective dimensions of mystical experience. These descriptions illustrate the joy and influence of God's presence, the soul's apprehension of God as 'light for the understanding and warmth for the affections and will.' The theological comment on this terminology is also crucial: "her teaching thus gained a vividness of quasi-directly sensible experience, of something in a manner actually seen and felt,
since it was built up out of suggestions derived from direct sensations and psycho-physical states.'[23]

A further brief allusion to the response of the senses relates to Catherine's devotion to the Eucharist when, in one instance, she experienced 'so much odour and sweetness' she 'straightway turned to her Love'.[24] In her turning from the sensible to the spiritual, the ultimate and the personal, the Baron finds a parallel with the attitude characteristic of the spirituality of John of the Cross. But regarding hearing and sight, there is little evidence of their importance, though there is an elusive reference to the Vita and the words 'God let her hear interiorly', and also of Battista Vernazza hearing 'mystical utterances.' Other references to sense images occur later when the soul's appropriation of God is spoken of in terms of the desire for bread. Von Hügel notes that 'here the image for the nature of the appropriation has been shifted from the least noble of the senses, taste and touch, to the noblest, sight: there is still a longing, but it is a longing to see, to exercise and satiate fully the intellectual faculties.' This indicates not only that the different senses denote qualitatively different dimensions of interior mystical experience, but that each dimension seeks real contact with God.

Further indications of the rationale of this sense imagery appear in his description of Catherine's psycho-physical impressions which are held to be not merely 'distantly illustrative' but as 'somehow one with the spiritual realities for which they stand.'[25] The problem this raises is posed as sharply as possible:

Is not e.g., Catherine's joy at this stage centred precisely in the downright feeling, smelling, seeing, of ocean waters, penetrating odours, all-enveloping light; and in the identification of those waters, odours, lights, with God Himself, so that God becomes at
last an object of direct, passive, sensible perception? Have we not then here at last reached pure delusion?[26]

The answer is negative because the mystic simply adopts the principle that the mind is 'deeper and more operative than sense, and God's Spirit as penetrating and transcending both the one and the other.' What follows is the nearest von Hügel comes to an interpretation of the theological and psychological significance of the doctrine of the spiritual senses. He suggests that the correct interpretation is to understand these psycho-physical impressions and projections as indeed sense-like but really mental though produced by the presence and action of the Spirit within the mind or the pressure of spiritual realities upon it. But this whole mental process with its 'spatial- and temporal-seeming embodiments, these sights and sounds, has only a relation and analogical likeness to, and is not to be identified with, those realities of an intrinsically super-spatial, super-temporal order.' This explanation illustrates the central principle of the Baron's theology, that the transcendent Spirit, immanent in the human spirit and on occasion of sense, effects 'an ever-increasing apprehension of Himself, accompanied in this spirit by an ever-keener sense of His incomprehensibility.'

Finally, a parallel is drawn between St Catherine's remarks about seeing 'as though with the eyes of the body' and St Teresa's visions with 'the eyes of the soul' and her true visions in which she 'saw nothing with the eyes of the body, nothing with the eyes of the soul', but simply 'felt Christ close by her'.[27] The Baron makes the point that the test of all such claims to vision and experience is 'ethical fruitfulness', and concludes with the warnings of John of the Cross on the inadequacy of all such impressions and the danger of delusion for those who do not 'yield to the Spirit in detachment from sense.
Supernatural spiritual knowledge is not dependent on 'visions, revelations, locutions, and spiritual impressions', but 'contemplation which is the work of faith and which is 'confused, obscure, and general.' It is interesting to note here von Hügel's fundamental ambivalence towards the via negativa of John of the Cross whose apparently negative attitude to the world of sense is criticised, but whose authority is invoked when it supported the Baron's contention about the limitations of sense perception and his generally sceptical attitude to visions and locutions. But one of the strengths of von Hügel's treatment of mysticism is precisely this desire to do justice to both these dimensions of spiritual experience: to acknowledge and affirm, and yet ultimately transcend, sense experience.

**Tyrrell's thought on the 'Spiritual Senses'.**

Tyrrell made use of a broader range of spiritual sense imagery than von Hügel, and he too was seeking to emphasise the primacy of affectivity in mystical experience. What he called the 'sane mysticism of the Gospel' stood over against 'the intellectualism of the false mystic which would cripple the will and dry up the fountains of feeling'. The spiritual life, or 'spirit-life', is a 'strengthening and perfecting of the natural or psychic life' since it rests on a fundamental truth of revelation: the 'permeation' of the human by the divine. He is clear that such 'permeation' is a felt reality. Elucidating this conviction he too accepted the limitations of language and the difficulties inherent in the terms used by the mystics. This was particularly evident with regard to their implicit psychology: 'it must be confessed that the mystics have in many respects a psychology of their own, difficult to disentangle from the necessarily figurative
language in which it is wrapped.'[29] He stressed the fact that 'all that
ascetical and mystical teaching which is directed to the government of
the very inmost movements of the spirit is of necessity couched in
metaphorical language', and offers a sort of guidance from analogy. This
meant that 'only by giving the soul certain attributes of the body can it
figure to itself some analogy of the tie between body and soul.'[30]
Tyrrell then proceeds to use some of the richest elements of this
figurative language in these early articles on mysticism and in later
essays.

In Tyrrell's earliest references to this imagery, Ruysbroek is
presented as exemplifying that element in the mystical tradition which
identified love as some sort of 'apprehensive faculty' which reveals the
presence and nearness of God of which the intellect remains blind.[31]
Tyrrell judged this to be merely an 'elliptical form of expression' since
perception is an act of the mind and not the will or affections. But
then he goes on, not entirely logically, to concede that although
knowledge precedes love there are 'blind instinctive movements of the
will' which are wholly independent of our perception. On the basis of
this distinction he claimed that 'the permeation of the soul by God' is
a matter of inference not intuition. He states that God sometimes seems
to flood the souls of the saints with a joy which would normally follow a
direct intuition of Him within the soul. He cites in support the words
of Ignatius in the Exercises on the free activity of God in the soul
'without any foregoing emotion or the apprehension of any object from
which such joy could arise through her own acts of understanding and
will.'[32] In the light of extensive study of the Exercises, one may
question his interpretation of the Ignatian 'consolation without previous
cause', but the main point to note at the moment is Tyrrell's reference
to sense imagery in order to explain the distinction. Thus, they 'feel, though they do not behold, the Divine presence', and from this act of will a special nearness of God may be inferred, though the prior act is 'an act of the will alone'.[33] On this view, mind and heart relate uneasily, and Tyrrell invariably gives priority to the heart: 'we see that the reach of the heart is more extended than the reach of the mind; that it can reach to the depth of the soul, where light fails the intellect; that it can touch what the mind cannot see.'[34]

Here again is Tyrrell's characteristic suspicion of the mind and his uncertainty as to how to ascribe any definitive role to the intellect in apprehending God, an attitude which at times borders on absolute anti-intellectualism. Noting that there are also degrees of touch, since what he calls 'mental touch', vision or intuition may become fuller penetration, he then claims that no created intellect can ever comprehend God though the 'Blessed gaze upon Him with varying degrees of intuitive penetration.'[35] But then he states that 'the mystics seem to think that, without any sort of intuitive penetration, the mind at times is brought into simple contact with God in such a way that no idea or mark is made upon the mind, for the mind can in no way apprehend God.' Coherence and consistency are lost at this point and one is left with the simple fact of Tyrrell's abiding ambivalence to the intellect and his consequent inability to find the true role of cognition in mystical experience.

It may be thought that Tyrrell himself exemplified the dilemma he described as a conflict between scholastic psychology and the experience and language of the mystics. The basic position for which he is struggling, but which he seems unable to formulate clearly, rests on a
distinction between apprehension which is indeed *intellectual*, since the mind is engaged, and *intellectual* understood as the operation of exclusively *discursive* reason.[36] Though he had earlier accepted von Hügel’s distinction between *apprehension* and *comprehension*, and stressed contemplation as the ascent of the *mind* to God, he failed to express this adequately, and effectively relegated the mind in mystical experience.

It was in seeking to elucidate this distinction that Tyrrell employed the analogy of the 'spiritual senses'. His frequent use of the term *touch* drew him further from the prevalent scholastic theology and close to the idea of the 'spiritual senses' in the mystical tradition. He sought to articulate the real, vivid, but incomplete nature of our apprehension of God: 'we touch the smooth sphere of the infinite, but we cannot lay hold of it', though 'confused traces' of such experiences may be left in the memory.[37] Despite this desire to stress the strictly 'non-rational' element of our apprehension, he did not wish to disengage the mind completely from this process. He found evidence that St Teresa frequently 'felt God with the finger-tips of the mind, by an act which was distinctly perceptive and not merely affective.' For this purpose he coined the phrase *tactual intuition* which has a 'longer reach than apprehensive and penetrating intuition.' Thus, 'we can touch many things not within our grasp.' Accepting the idiosyncracies of the mystics' psychology, its incompatibility with scholastic psychology, and also the theological position that on earth there is no direct mental penetration of the Divine substance, Tyrrell was in search of a middle way. He defined this *tactual intuition* as 'something less than face-to-face vision' though 'something more than the quickest inference, a sort of coming behind and touching the hem of God's garment.'
scriptural image and use of the gospel incident on which it is based had been a distinctive feature of the traditional doctrine of the 'spiritual senses'. The more Tyrrell sought to articulate his deep-seated distrust of the human intellect the more he emphasised the role of the heart or the will in coming to know God. In his meditation on John's Gospel 15.10 in *Oil and Wine*, we read that only the image or symbol of God can be touched by our mind whereas 'He Himself can be touched by the heart where His will is felt striving with our will, and His spirit with our spirit.' Indeed God can be 'embraced and held fast in the embrace of action'.

In the context of Tyrrell's overall theological position, shifting and unpredictable as it certainly was, there remained an unresolved tension between his view that all the faculties of the soul were operative in religion and his deep-seated distrust of the mind. Von Hügel criticised *The Church and the Future* precisely for exalting the heart and affections to the effective exclusion of the brain. Though sympathising with the 'entirely understandable' reaction against 'Intellectualism', he felt Tyrrell's position represented an unworkable exaggeration. His own *via media* rested on 'getting higher up or deeper down than either Sentimentalism or Intellectualism', to a realisation of unity and harmony in the soul's operation, which resists the rejection of any part of the self in life or religion.

Tyrrell himself knew that by stressing 'feeling' in describing human contact with God he was treading on dangerous theological ground, though his overriding intention was to repudiate intellectualism. Anticipating the inevitable criticism, he entered a caveat against the sentimentalism and emotionalism which, he observed, had come to be
associated with Schleiermacher.[41] His main purpose in using feeling in conjunction with sense imagery is to express the immediate, vivid, and tangible contact of the soul with God. In several instances it is specifically the will of God that is said to be felt: 'we might know and feel His will experimentally'.[42] In this way we gain 'experimental knowledge' of God Himself which is dependent on the frequency, constancy and intensity of our experiences. At other times it is God Himself who is said to be encountered by 'direct contact and experiment.' The concept of feeling became dominant in his understanding of religion and it is in relation to the individual's response to Christ that it takes on its full significance.[43] The essays in *Oil and Wine* and *Hard Sayings*, where he is closest to the mysticism of St Ignatius, reflect the centrality of feeling in the relationship with the person of Christ. This 'Christ mysticism', redolent with the spirit of Ignatius, is evident throughout his writings. In *Lex Credendi* the depth and interiority of the spiritual life are explained in affective Christocentric terms: 'it is not possible to feel with Christ, unless we think and will with Him, nor to think with Him, unless we feel with Him, for the spirit-life is one and indivisible.'[44] Without denying the debt to Blondel, Bergson and others, the influence of Ignatius remained dominant in Tyrrell's thought on the nature of mystical experience.

Related to this emphasis on the affective element in religious experience was the definition of religion as 'the life of friendship with God and with His friends'.[45] Speaking of knowing God 'intimately and experimentally...talking with Him as a friend with a friend', Tyrrell was taking up another vital theme from Ignatius and the Christian mystical tradition. Hugo Rahner has observed that what medieval tradition knew as the *familiaritas cum Christo*, was central to
Ignatian mysticism, finding its clearest expression in the 'Application of the Senses'.[46] Ignatius was the point of convergence for the patristic and medieval forms of the doctrine of the 'spiritual senses'. The uniting of thought and feeling, head and heart, proposed in the Exercises was an essential requirement if the exercitant was to be detached and open to discern the will of God. Tyrrell clearly accepted what Rahner calls the 'more elevated' interpretation of the 'Application of the Senses', which is seen as the essence of affective Ignatian mysticism rather than simply a method of vivid imaginative meditation.

In this view the *sentido* of the Exercises, through which the soul by grace feels and almost breathes the presence of God, is seen as the supreme end of discursive prayer. The will of God is thus sought through direct contact, and this must be the source of all ethical striving: 'it is in matters of conduct that the instinctive guidance of the Divine Spirit is felt directly.'[47] Thus, conscience is 'a spiritual sense of what is right', and is thought of as 'a feeling, a taste, a touch, an intuition' and 'like all senses it is sharpened by practice, dulled by disuse, destroyed by violation and abuse.' If 'the word sentir is fundamental to Ignatian prayer', it is because the exercitant is called through his spiritual exercises to 'abandon himself to the divine contact and feel the things of God.'[48] Tyrrell was an entirely faithful exponent of this emphasis in early Jesuit mysticism, and his emphasis on feeling owed much more to Ignatius Loyola than Schleiermacher, a further indication that he was a better Jesuit than probably either he or his critics ever realised. In addition, it is worth noting the parallel with Mother Julian, for whom Tyrrell retained a deep respect, who also describes the experience of God as 'a feeling of his intimate presence.'[49]
It is evident that Tyrrell also gave clearer expression than von Hügel to other aspects of spiritual sense imagery. Though for the Baron sight and touch are at times conjoined in his use of this analogy, Tyrrell seemed to be particularly attached to the sense of taste in describing the human experience of God. In this respect he drew close to the recurring and vivid 'motif of mystical tasting' of European mysticism, the chief expressions of which often utilised the words of Psalm 33: 'Gustate, et videte quoniam suavis est Dominus' (33.9). In this tradition, experience described in this form was invariably linked with the acquisition of knowledge; 'this tasting of God also implies a spiritual knowledge of him.' Following the tradition of affective mysticism, Tyrrell again distinguishes the mere statement of the theologian or philosopher that 'God exists' from the 'actual personal experience' of the one who has 'learnt to taste and touch and handle and relish the Divinity as communicated to creatures'. This distinction was thoroughly congenial to Tyrrell, reflecting again his scepticism towards all attempts to grasp the divine through discursive reason.

Mystical knowledge acquired by taste is thus held to be superior to other forms of knowledge: 'this "taste" or "tact", which love begets in us, is certainly a far safer and more useful guide than any power of reflex reasoning, however highly cultivated.' Such experience, therefore, possesses a distinct cognitive quality and content: 'if God gives Himself to us in this life to be felt, tasted, and touched rather than seen or pictured to the mind, it must not be forgotten that these forms of direct experience are in their way true knowledge.' Tyrrell asserted the superiority of such experience: 'we have no "real" knowledge of God whatever in this life except so far as we have tasted and loved His sweetness as shared by creatures'. Taking up the language of the
scriptures, he stated the vital distinction: 'Gustate et videte, says the Psalmist; though he would say: It is not the mere idea of God's sweetness that will sweeten life's bitterness, but only the experimental proving of it.' In this regard, Tyrrell was again close to Ignatius and other exponents of the affective nature of mystical knowledge.[54]

Poulain maintained that since in the corporeal order taste and smell 'are only a special kind of touch', when applied to the spiritual order they are to be understood as 'interpretations of certain kinds of union'.[55] For Tyrrell too, the idea of spiritual taste suggests a depth and intimacy of relationship through which true knowledge is acquired. This is the clear meaning of his claim that we are saved by faith and knowledge of God which is a 'knowledge of direct contact and experiment, a matter of tasting, touching, and feeling'.[56] Again the underlying position assumes a sharp contrast between 'notional speculative knowledge' and a 'real knowledge that comes of intimate contact.' Speaking of 'interior faith' Tyrrell stressed that religion was 'a matter of experience' and 'experimental knowledge of God', not in some vague general sense but in the sense of a profound union with God.[57] Again he took up the words of the Psalm 'Gustate et videte' - "Taste and see how sweet He is", which he interprets: 'Do not reason about God' but rather 'go and let Him mingle His life with your life, His will with your will, and see what sweetness and strength He will bring into your existence'.

Since Tyrrell acknowledged the limitations of human language in describing divine activity and the danger of translating our 'higher inward experiences, our religious, social and moral affections and aspirations' into external physical reality, what was his purpose in using this range of terms from the realm of 'outward reality'? [58]
he answered that it seemed quite simply the surest way of distinguishing 'truths of immediate intuition and contact' from mere 'symbols of the sensuous imagination' or rational concepts.[59]

He then offered the clearest rationale for using the imagery of the 'spiritual senses':

The experiences of our consciences and of our religious sense are no whit less real than those of sight, hearing and touch. But their full implication, and the sort of world, and order of reality, from which they proceed is densely obscure, since we can discuss the matter with others only through language derived from the outer world.[60]

The psychology of the mystics which Tyrrell had described as 'difficult to disentangle', is thus pressed into service in the form of this imagery since it is the least inadequate way of expressing the reality, the depth, and the directness, of God's activity, and also for its potential in overcoming a 'pernicious schizophrenia between body and soul, brain and heart.'[61] Ignatius had used it precisely in this way, and it 'belongs to the very essence of Ignatian mysticism' to which Tyrrell showed himself fundamentally faithful. This tradition, originating in the early Fathers, and recurring throughout the history of Christian spirituality, was revived by the Jesuit founder in his richly imaginative mystical theology, though it suffered decline under the impact of the reaction to Quietism.

In helping to restore the sense imagery of Ignatius, Tyrrell was also recovering the wisdom of the English mystics who had placed great emphasis on sight, touch, taste, smell and hearing as modes of describing contact with God. Tyrrell, the student of Mother Julian, was fully aware of the role of such images in the Shewings, a classic text from a great period of English mysticism which he had edited and introduced: 'There
will be many secret touches that we shall feel and see, sweet and spiritual...we shall see Him truly and feel Him fully, hear Him spiritually, smell Him delightfully, and taste Him sweetly! We shall see God face to face, simply and fully.[62] So, what happens in Tyrrell's exposition of mysticism is something like the process described by Johnston in the case of the author of the *Cloud of Unknowing*. The fourteenth century author transcended the inadequate terminology of his scholastic psychology in order to employ more the rich 'vocabulary of traditional mysticism', speaking of 'tasting' the 'soft love of Jesu' and thus 'pointing to a delicate point at which the love of God is mystically savoured in the depths of the spirit'.[63]

In conclusion, Karl Rahner's remarks about the 'absence of a specific doctrine of the five senses in classical modern mysticism' and its having 'attracted fresh attention' in the 'more modern period' helps to place von Hügel and Tyrrell in context.[64] Though Rahner's historical divisions are not entirely clear, he is likely referring to the post-Quietist dominance of scholasticism in mystical theology which endured into the late nineteenth century and which von Hügel and Tyrrell were seeking to replace. Many of their contemporaries were also rediscovering the language and meaning of the 'spiritual senses'. There is, for instance, a clear parallel with de Grandmaison whose use of this imagery indicated the 'affective richness' of knowledge of God gained by the soul.[65] But the limitations of some contemporary presentations also throws into clear relief the treatment of von Hügel and Tyrrell.[66]

At the beginning of the century it was Poulain who, above all, definitively recovered the traditional doctrine of the 'spiritual senses' and expressed it systematically with reference to patristic, medieval,
Carmelite and more recent mystical theology. The question he set out to answer was: 'does the soul possess intellectual spiritual senses, having some resemblance to the bodily senses, so that, in an analogous manner and in divers ways, she is able to perceive the presence of pure spirits, and the presence of God in particular?' The mystics reply that there is indeed a 'spiritual sight', a 'spiritual hearing', a 'spiritual touch', and also a 'spiritual taste and smell'. Moreover, these senses are not to be understood in terms of 'mere metaphors' but in terms of 'some close analogy'. It was precisely in this way that von Hügel and Tyrrell employed this terminology in their treatment of mysticism.

Although there is no developed doctrine of the 'spiritual senses' in either von Hügel or Tyrrell, their use of this analogy reflected a basic fidelity to the mystical tradition in which that terminology held a distinctive and privileged position. Their reluctance to use the more extensive imagery of sight, hearing and speech is possibly explained by their desire to avoid the identification of mysticism with the physical phenomena of locutions or visions which they treated with some caution. The significance of this imagery lies partly in its evocation of the affective richness of mystical experience and its superiority over purely discursive knowledge. Though such experience engages the mind it is more precisely the mind in the heart, a truth rooted in the mystical tradition, which they were seeking to grasp and articulate.

This imagery also has the connotation of specificity; as there are separate specific acts of the physical senses touch, taste, smell, sight and hearing, so there are distinct experiences of God, located in the particularity of time and place, and engaging distinct dimensions of consciousness. One encounters the reality of God in such a way that
one is able to feel and sense and know that Reality as palpably and as consciously as if one had been touched physically, or tasted, or seen, or heard, or smelt with one's physical senses. And this is not simply a vague, general, pervasive sense of the divine but rather specific spiritual acts in which God is apprehended by the soul in a particular, vivid, and concrete manner. This does not diminish the strong conviction of von Hügel and Tyrrell that such mystical experience usually originates with the general inchoate sense of the Infinite, stimulated and occasioned by the sense of the relative and finite. Rahner claimed that 'the direct character of mystical experience is always described in images which are derived from the world of sense perception'.[69] In the case of von Hügel and Tyrrell one may claim even more. Their overriding intention in using the traditional sense imagery was to evoke the depth and richness of mystical experience, and its immediate, direct, specific, affective, and cognitive nature.

THE MYSTICAL UNION OF THE SOUL WITH GOD

The concept of union with God, however it may be understood, has been a recurring theme in many discussions of mysticism.[70] From the mysticism of the Fourth Gospel and St Paul, through the Fathers and the influential Dionysius, who spoke of 'mysterious union', the unfolding Christian mystical tradition has testified to the belief that union with God is the end for which human beings were created.[71] Zaehner states succinctly that 'in Christian terminology mysticism means union with God'.[72] For both von Hügel and Tyrrell the ultimate aim of all spiritual endeavour and the goal of the Christian life was precisely union with God.
Von Hügel did not adopt the familiar divisions and gradations of the spiritual life which featured prominently in manuals of mystical theology. Devine and many of the manualists were seeking to systematize mystical doctrine, especially to synthesise the teaching of the Carmelite mystics and other elements of the mystical tradition.[73] The Baron pursued a different method. Though he focused on historical exemplars and drew mystical teaching from the manifestation of grace in individuals, particularly the Saint of Genoa, he showed no great interest in establishing gradations of the mystical life.

Although the Baron was aware of the division into purgative, illuminative and unitive ways, it did not feature significantly in his discussion of mysticism, and he did not dwell on the 'spiritual nights', central for St John of the Cross. Nevertheless, the idea of progression is not absent, nor is he unaware of the cost of the spiritual journey in both physical and spiritual terms. Moreover, system and structure are not lacking since his own framework for treating mysticism is that of the three elements. The point is that von Hügel accepted wholeheartedly the uniqueness and freedom of the individual's way to God and though this meant that he often failed to note similarities between different accounts of the mystical way his attitude remained a valuable corrective to the chroniclers of the mystical life and illustrates 'the need for caution in mapping out a general theory; and in this respect his silence is a lesson.'[74] However, he did accept the consistent Catholic teaching that union with God was the goal of all mystical endeavour.[75] The union which constitutes the heart of mysticism is understood by the Baron as the developed sense of the Infinite, now fully and consciously realised within the soul as the God of Christian revelation.
Even though the Baron offers no thorough systematic exposition of the mystical union, an outline is found in the two complementary presentations in 'Experience and Transcendence' and the section of the *Mystical Element* on the relations between God and the human soul. Theologically, he is pursuing a middle way between the two extremes of Deism and pantheism, identifying and rejecting the view that a part of the individual is divine, or a part of God. He recalls St Paul's words (from Epimenides) in Acts 17:28 describing the human relationship with God: 'in Him we live and move and have our being'. In the *Mystical Element*, though referring to Plato and Aristotle, it is again Paul who is held to provide one of the deepest and by far the most influential Christian schemes for understanding the relations of the human soul to God.[76] At the centre of the Pauline anthropology, in Romans 8.11, is the idea of the indwelling Spirit, *Pneuma*, which cannot be thought of as part of man's original endowment, but rather the transcendent Spirit which, by faith, becomes an immanent principle. Paul's assertion that we are temples of the Holy Spirit is based on the 'personal, mystical experience, of the indwelling of Christ in the regenerate human soul.' However, the Baron warns against an over-literal interpretation of spatial concepts or phrases suggesting identification in the Pauline mystical passages. Texts such as 'Christ, our life', 'to live is Christ', and 'I live, not I, but Christ liveth in me' (Col.3.4; Phil. 1.21; Gal. 2.20) are all open to such distortion, as were many Plotinian expressions.

The exposition in the *Mystical Element* also identifies the distorting influence of Eckhart who claimed both the Godlikeness and 'downright Divinity' of the soul. Though accepting that the soul bears the image of Divine Nature, the Baron rejects the notion of *das Funkelein*, or spark of the soul, which is 'Increate and Uncreatable'.[77] On this
question he was at one with Eckhart's critics. Significantly, Ruysbroek becomes the central witness to the truth von Hügel wants to articulate. The position of the 'great Low Countries mystic', who combined much of St Paul and many echoes of Plotinus, is appropriated by the Baron with only one modification. The distinction between the essential and actual 'unity of our spirit with God' is the difference between unity at the level of nature, which confers the eternal Image of God 'without mediation or intermission', and the unity caused by grace, which confers God's Likeness. In Ruysbroek's view, the loss of His likeness involves our damnation. Where von Hügel disagrees is in the distribution of the image and likeness among nature and grace respectively. For him the doctrine would be improved if image and likeness 'were both taken as, in various degrees and ways, the work of Grace in and with Nature.' The Baron was aware that this influential theology of image and likeness was rooted in patristic reflection on the biblical account of creation, and that it did not depend on any scholastic theory of nature and supernature, a truth to which the mystical theology of the Eastern Church also testifies.

At the heart of his exposition von Hügel claims that St Teresa of Avila established the authoritative theological position on the nature of God's indwelling and the mystical union. He quotes from her Life the truth gained from a 'learned Dominican', that God Himself and not simply his grace was present in her soul: 'To look upon Our Lord as being in the innermost parts of the soul'; 'The living God was in my soul'; 'the life which God lived in me.' He approves of her 'strikingly persistent conviction that the soul holds God Himself as distinct from His graces, possessing thus some direct experience of this His presence', and observes that this was also proposed by Schwab in his 'admirable
monograph on Gerson'.[82] He cites him with approval: 'the whole effort of true Mysticism is directed, whilst not abolishing His Transcendence, to embrace and experience God, His living presence, in the innermost soul.'

The Baron noted the limitations of scholasticism on this question, though quoting a statement from De Beatitudine, 'long attributed to St Thomas', about souls who are the 'tabernacle of the living God', a passage 'closely like St Teresa'.[83] A more recent exponent of this teaching is Cardinal Dechamps who applied the idea of a pierre d'attente to human nature in order to evoke its incompleteness and interior disposition for its supernatural end which is union with God.[84] Von Hügel also claimed that it was the simple synoptic teaching of our Lord 'that God is in man, and man is in God'. Since he does not include references, it is uncertain which texts he had in mind. Reference to John's Gospel would have served his purpose better with its greater insistence on mutual indwelling. Nevertheless, he confidently rejects the 'ultra-unitive' and pantheistic accounts of the divine-human relationship: 'our position would hold God Himself to be present in the soul, yet He is present as it were under and mingled with the human spirit itself, with its never complete docility and its ever necessarily limited capacity of assimilation to the Divine Spirit'.[85]

In addition to these expositions, there is a revealing discussion of mystical union in the context of his exposition of St Catherine's spiritual teaching. She is presented as struggling with the intellectual influences of classical philosophy and various elements in the Christian mystical tradition. Though he felt she had successfully assimilated the essential Christian truths on the mystical union of the soul with God, he notes that many of her descriptions were 'strangely abstract
and impersonal.'[86] Seeking to explain why she failed to speak more clearly in traditional personal terms of Father, Friend or Bridegroom in her accounts of mystical experiences, he suggests this may have been due to the fact that she had 'never known the joys of maternity, and had never, for one moment, experienced the soul-entrancing power of full conjugal union.' However appealing the Baron's vivid description of the conjugal union, it hardly seems a convincing explanation since the rich marital and sexual imagery of which he speaks had its origins and reached its most potent expression in a tradition precisely where celibate chastity and virginity were held in the highest esteem and faithfully practised.[87] His second explanation seems nearer the truth, that her silence most likely resulted from her 'somewhat abnormal temperament' and her exclusive mentality which he had earlier characterised as 'highly nervous, delicately poised, immensely sensitive and impressionable'.[88]

Von Hügel felt Catherine also exemplified the persistent temptation of certain strands of the mystical tradition to speak of union with God as identification. This was just as pronounced in the case of Battista Vernazza from whom he quotes: 'the soul, when purified, abides entirely in God; its being is God.'[89] For Catherine too her 'rare thirst, her imperious need, for unification' took the form in its 'theoretic presentation' of the extreme and unacceptable suggestion that the true self seemed literally to be God and that her state of quiet was marked by 'a complete motionlessness or even immovability.' But in her actual life, according to his painstaking examination of the biographical sources, this unification remained balanced and fruitful, an enriching endeavour 'to harmonize and integrate the ever-increasing elements and explications of her nature and experience.' Examining her
sayings concerning the soul's longing 'to unite itself to God through love', and her description of the 'God who seems to have nothing else to do than to unite Himself to us', the Baron sees here her soul's 'hunger for the possession, for the interiorization of God.'[90] Despite the inadequacy of her language, Catherine had a deeply mystical temperament and attrait which sought the centre of the soul, needing to find there one reality alone: God or Self and not two: God and Self. This reaches its most striking expression in the claims that 'my Me is God', 'my being is God, not by simple participation but by a true transformation of my Being.' Catherine was struggling towards a personalist understanding of mystical union and since it is a relationship where love is given and shared, it can only be described in the apparently extravagant language of love. One consequence of such personalism is her belief that each individual has different God-given capacities and that all are called to possess Him according to their respective capabilities.

However, the Baron wanted to counter the recurring tendency, which he found even in some 'approved' mystics, to identify the soul and God (what James called the tendency to monism in all mysticism) with the view that God is apprehended in a growing personal relationship in which loss of the false self is merely a stage towards the rediscovery of the true self 'as a Person, in union with and in presence of an infinite Spirit and Personality.'[91] The 'union of wills' of which he speaks is the result of a growing, deepening affective relationship motivated and sustained by love. Love is always central and determinative in mystical theology, rescuing mysticism from impersonalism and false notions of identification. For von Hügel, it is specifically Christian mysticism which has
fully experienced and proclaimed that "God" is "Love", and that the greatest of all the soul's acts and virtues is Charity, Pure Love. Hence the Pure Act of God, and the Action of the God-like soul are conceived not, Aristotle-like, as acts of pure intelligence alone, but as tinged through and through with a noble emotion.[92]

He felt Catherine was close to the Pauline insistence that our love of God is an act of the will and 'nobler than our intellection of Him.' Citing from her *Vita* the Baron presents the truth in two stark phrases: 'Love is God Himself'; 'the Divine love is the very God, infused by His own immense Goodness into our hearts.'[93] The consequence is that 'as the intellect reaches higher (*supera*) than speech, so does love reach higher than intellect.' Tracing Catherine's doctrine of the afterlife, the Baron also notes her perception of the 'work of Love' within her soul and her teaching that there is Life Eternal 'in every place where there is union with that same Love, God.' He feels this truth is captured in the image of the Good Shepherd who is the 'lover of each single sheep and of the flock as a whole.[94] Since this creative love is central to Christian mysticism, he instructs his niece to cultivate the 'presence of the Infinite Lover and comprehender of your soul' who makes possible growth in the virtues, especially love.

Although von Hügel accepted the necessity of using such imagery and analogy to describe mystical union he acknowledged its hazards. Having described the soul's union with the simile of the absorption of food into the body, he notes that Catherine then uses a 'much less apt comparison of the transformation of gold by fire.'[95] This is an important point since the ambiguous imagery not only reflects the 'confluence of antagonistic doctrines', but also reinforces the hesitation in the teaching which produced it. Having admitted the intrinsic difficulty of finding an 'appropriate simile for so metaphysical a doctrine', since the imagery 'always becomes so ambiguous at this point',
von Hügel undertook a critical dissection of this imagery in order to trace how the idea of the identification of the soul with God actually emerged. He wanted to resist the inevitable implication in this image of gold transformed by fire. Though it suggests that the soul is not moved spatially but changed qualitatively, the identification of the soul and the fire, which represents the purifying God, is also implied. It is a teaching which he rejects, providing a sounder alternative. The advanced soul is 'grounded upon, environed, supported, penetrated and nourished by Him who is its origin and end.' At this stage 'all the soul's actions tend to coalesce to simply being' which comes to be felt as the 'simple effect of the one direct action of God alone.' Again it is the Incarnation which embodies this truth since it is the ultimate expression of the 'mysterious closeness' of God Himself to all our secret pain and perplexities.

Since mystical union is the fullness of a loving relationship with God, von Hügel claims that Catherine's 'grace-stimulated craving' for breadth and expansion, concentration and depth, is met and nourished by the 'rich and awe-inspiring greatness of God and of His world of souls.' Mystical union is emphatically not a flight from this world since Catherine loves God's Light and Love everywhere, so that union with Him is sought literally in each moment, in 'the particularity, of God's self-communication and of the creature's response'. Nor is this introverted self-absorption, but union with the Other. The Baron also contrasts the fruitful energising he calls action with activity which he characterised as a certain feverishness. Union with God is not realised through inactivity, and there is no great stress on passivity which James took as one of the four marks of mysticism. Union is attained by rational, loving, free-willing creatures in every moment.
by 'the whole-hearted willing and doing, by the full endorsing, of some one thing, - some one unique state and duty offered to the soul in that one unique moment.[99] The constancy and depth of this willing and feeling in the soul at each moment may produce the impression of 'one single state, even one single act.'[100] But paradoxically, to speak of state in this way is not thereby to adopt a static view of the mystic's relationship with God but to evoke the persistence of the desire for Him and the sheer abiding fact of His presence and call in every moment. The living, all-embracing dynamic of this relationship is then expressed: 'thus Ethics are englobed by Religion, Having by Doing, and Doing by Being' so that in the fullest life, 'higher things suppress the lower, but so that each stimulates the very things that it transcends.'

This means that the soul's deepest life is found in a 'right affection and attachment' and ultimately by the rejection of the false self and the 'attaching of the true self unto God.'[101] It is clear that the 'fundamental cleavage in the soul's life is not between things successive...but between things simultaneous, between the This and the That, and at the point of sin and of self-seeking.' Holiness is conceived as a 'life engaged in an ever-increasing ethical and spiritual energising', which seeks constantly its actual centre in the soul, the source of ever-expanding being. This is crucial since it establishes the ethical dimension of the soul's union with God, that it is a union at the level of the active will, and also the indispensability of asceticism to true mysticism. Summarising his argument, the Baron states that Catherine's most emphatic sayings assert that the essence of Heaven 'consists in the union of the finite with the Infinite Will' which harmonises with her teaching that Heaven begins here below, a traditional notion that a truly spiritual life is already a foretaste of the life of Heaven.
Catherine's thought on the way to union is discussed in relation to her use of the Areopagitic writings. Noting the traces in early Christian tradition of the Proclian 'union which is above silence', and the neo-Platonic pursuit of 'union above knowledge', the Baron finds the Dionysian emphasis on 'Mystical Quietude and Silence' echoed in Catherine. But her teaching does not follow the Dionysian threefold path of purgative, illuminative and unitive stages of the inner life. Neither is she concerned with the neo-Platonic intermediaries, so intent is she on 'immediate intercourse with God.' But she does take up the element in Dionysius which insists on 'direct contact between the soul and the transcendent God' so that any notion of intermediaries is transformed into a simple acceptance of 'successive stages of purification and of ever more penetrating union of the one soul with the one God.' The Baron approves of her acceptance of deification through the Eucharist, though he regrets her unwillingness to follow Dionysius in stressing that even the sinner possesses 'as it were a faint echo of Union and Friendship'. He finds her conception of the 'oneness of our union with Him' rather narrow and inadequate, lacking not only a sense of His 'overflowing richness', but also an appreciation of the communal dimension of mystical union. At this point he felt the abstractive scheme of neo-Platonism had triumphed and produced an excessive individualism in her thinking. His own approach was to stress the ecclesial dimension of mystical union, that God is present in the soul as the centre of the Kingdom of God linking all souls.

Von Hügel returned to these questions in response to Campbell's *New Theology* in which the ontological identity of human and divine was asserted in resolving the problem of transcendence and immanence. Admitting that this seemed to have been proposed even by some orthodox
Christian mystics, the Baron again found the explanation in the inadequacy of language. Their actual belief had always to be distinguished from the 'vivid first-hand descriptions of the feeling which possesses the soul as to its own state, when it finds itself in a condition of profound spiritual quiet and union'.[103] The subjective impression may be that the soul is without acts at all or that all multiplicity disappears, and that the identity of the soul and God is an ontological fact. But he rejects such a 'mysticism of inaction', remarking that in states of 'direct absorption in the presence of God', the acts which are present absorb all one's power and are more numerous but unperceived due to their 'ease, swiftness, harmonious interpretation and vigour'. An equally telling criticism is that such absolute identity would 'bring the spiritual life to a standstill', as would the opposite belief in the 'complete unlikeness between the soul and God' or its impermeability by the Divine Spirit. St Teresa again provides the true account of what the mystic is really feeling: 'the human soul is not, in any of its depths and reaches, God or a part or mode of God', but in its depths the soul is 'actually touched, inhabited by God.' This overcomes both 'Deistic, spatial outsideness and distance of God' and also all pantheism, whilst preserving both his transcendence and immanence.

Finally, it is as the soul advances that God's action is seen to be 'operating in and through and with our own'.[104] The doctrine of grace reaches its characteristic expression here in the theology of union. The dynamic reciprocity envisaged is captured in his statement that 'man will never be so fully active, so truly and intensely himself, as when he is most possessed by God' who does not replace human action but works as 'yeast working in meal'. The soul's union with God is one instance of the general principle that grace works through and perfects nature:
For Spirit and spirit, God and the creature, are not two material bodies, of which one can only be where the other is not: but, on the contrary, as regards our own spirit, God's Spirit ever works in closest penetration and stimulation of our own; just as, in return, we cannot find God's Spirit simply separate from our own spirit within ourselves.\[105\]

In the individual's inner life, God's Spirit and one's own spirit 'rise and sink together'. This was the real issue in the exchange with Tyrrell in 1901 where the Baron felt that to claim there were acts or states without human cooperation was a 'perfectly...intolerable doctrine.' Rather there is a relationship of person to Person in a loving union of wills; God mingling His life with ours in what one might describe as a 'mysticism of action.' This not only rejects a neo-Platonic view that our final end is the 'coalescence of our unselfconscious soul with the unselfconscious One', but asserts 'the ever-increasing union of two eternally distinct, self-conscious personalities.'\[106\] Accepting that joy was a mark of true holiness, mystical union is seen to produce recognisable effects: 'there is no zest comparable to the zest, the expansion, the joy brought to the soul by God and the soul's close union with Him.'\[107\]

Whatever the merits of von Hügel's treatment, with its desire to avoid excesses and affirm the essential truths of mystical union, it is not entirely satisfactory. A fully rounded Christian mystical theology dwells on the truth that union with God is essentially a sharing in the relationship of the Three Persons, Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Von Hügel certainly considered the Trinity a crucial revealed doctrine, presenting it as the definitive refutation of pantheism.\[108\] The fact that it hardly featured in his presentation of the mystical union remains a flaw
from the point of view of Christian theology, and indeed distinguishes
him most clearly from Tyrrell.

**Tyrrell: mystical union and the Trinity**

Turning to Tyrrell's thought on the union of the soul with God, it
is immediately apparent that his overall approach differed from that of
the Baron. He never embarked on a major systematic study of mysticism
and detailed references to the teaching of the mystical tradition are
rare, beyond a clear acknowledgement of the debt to St Ignatius. However,
his treatment of mystical experience in shorter, more reflective essays,
in some respects offered richer possibilities than did a more substantial
philosophical presentation. In his *Manual of Mystical Theology* Devine
cited an early essay by Tyrrell (dealing with the opening words of the
*Spiritual Exercises*) at the point where the discussion turned to the
'tenth degree of contemplation' on the 'Perfect Union or Spiritual
Marriage.'[109]

In 'The Soul and Her Spouse' Tyrrell stated that 'the soul depends on
God's dwelling in its substance'.[110] This is the 'natural life of the
soul' which is distinguished from the 'supernatural life' or Eternal Life
which is described as God 'dwelling as light in the mind and as love in
the heart, and who is the object of that light and life.' This traditional
distinction, which von Hügel had adopted, was central for Tyrrell. And
although the life of the soul on earth as well as the next life is to
see God and to love Him, at present it must be 'through a glass darkly,
in a riddle', whereas there it will be 'face to face'. Describing this
indwelling, Tyrrell stressed the priority of God, suggested by the
synoptic idea of the Kingdom within and the Johannine image of the Vine
and the branches: 'we dwell in God, just because God dwells in us'. The affinity between God and the soul to which the Baron referred is also clear here. Since the 'whole structure and movement' of the soul 'cries out for God', heaven may be thought of as simply 'the love of God perfected in the soul; the entire cleaving of the soul to God, whom she embraces with mind and heart.' Tyrrell emphasised the affective nature of the soul's union with God who has drawn 'the soul of man from His own side, and she is restless till she returns thither again.' He describes the soul as 'God's Spouse; made for His embrace, made to bring forth in herself His Word, His Image, His Beloved Son.' It was this part of the essay Devine noted when distinguishing spiritual marriage in general from the expression as 'applied by mystical writers to the highest degree of contemplation.'

Seeking imagery to describe this union, Tyrrell uses a simile drawn from familiar sacramental piety. If the soul is our capacity for God, then just as the gleaming monstrance exists 'simply and wholly as a receptacle for His Sacramental Presence' our soul too 'is such a monstrance; and its highest beauty and glory is from Him who dwells in it, and shines through it.' Another less satisfactory image is used: the soul is thought of as a candle on which God descends as a flame and 'transforms her substance into His own likeness'. Though the inevitable destruction of the candle points to the inadequacy of this image, the basic truth Tyrrell wants to establish is sound: 'God is not the soul, nor is the soul God; but as the candle is for the flame, so is the soul for God.' Like the Baron he rejected any identification of the soul with God.

The conscious union of the soul with God, which is the goal of the Christian life, begins with the sense of his presence in the soul.
Tyrrell spoke of *penetration* and *permeation* in describing God's dealings with his creatures: 'He permeates all finite existences.' If God is present to all things 'permeating and penetrating their inmost substance', how much more does he become involved in the depths of the individual who is a temple of his presence and the place where his 'image is most perfectly and nobly displayed.' Tyrrell also appropriates the traditional theological distinction found in Ruysbroek, who assumed central importance in the Baron's exposition. God's indwelling is twofold: in the 'indestructible nature of the soul' which does not depend on the consent of the creature and, secondly, by grace. This is the basis for his view that mystical union is the development of the life of grace with which we are also required to cooperate. If God is to dwell in us as sanctity, truthfulness, justice, purity, patience, meekness and love and if he is to crown these natural virtues and elevate them by grace and his indwelling Spirit, producing faith, hope and charity, then 'he must wait upon our will; he must stand at the door and knock until we open and receive Him.'[113]

Two distinct but complementary tendencies may be observed in Tyrrell's thought on God's indwelling. There is a thoroughly Christocentric emphasis which draws its inspiration from such Pauline texts as 'I live, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me.'(Gal.2.2) There is also a stress on conscience as the 'mode' or vehicle of God's intimate presence to the individual. These strands are woven together in the view that the indwelling Christ touches and shapes that intimate centre of the soul which is conscience, the seat of God's presence and the place of union with him. Developing the theme of the Galatians text, Tyrrell asserts that if 'all Christian sanctity is simply the presence of Christ, of God Incarnate dwelling in the soul, uttering Himself, asserting Himself there'
then we are sanctified 'in proportion as Christ lives and dwells in
us.'[114] This presence of Christ is cultivated by prayer when 'restless
energy must be still', when the soul is 'united to the Divine Soul of our
Saviour in all its imaginings, reasonings, aspirations, sentiments,
through the indwelling of that same Spirit which sanctified his Soul and
the soul of His Mother and of all His saints.' This union is the
beginning of eternal life. What might be called Catherine's 'realised
eschatology' finds a parallel here in Tyrrell's claim that if Heaven
is the state in which we see God face to face and enjoy his presence
continually, then sanctity is 'Heaven begun upon earth.'

In the meditation 'Christ in Us' Tyrrell reflects at greater length
on the crucial text from Galatians which had so preoccupied von
Hügel.[115] For Tyrrell, what distinguishes Christian mysticism from
other forms of spiritual endeavour is, of course, Christ and his
revelation. The life of Christ within us is distinctly a 'personality, a
will, a spirit striving with our spirit' and not merely 'some unattached
impersonal tendency towards righteousness'. The centrality of the
Incarnation could not be clearer, since it is Christ's humanity which
'adds new definiteness to the mystical life.' Further, the divine action in
the soul is mediated through the sacramental life of the Church which
is the meaning of Tyrrell's description of 'the God who dwells and works
in the hearts of the multitudinous members of the Eternal or Mystical
Christ.'[116] A corollary of this is that 'union with God means
necessarily and identically union with the whole body of His Saints'.[117]
The concept is widened even further in the claim that 'union with God
means union with all that are God's - whether actually or potentially.'
Describing the nature of this indwelling, he states: 'True union with
Christ is union of will and aim and enthusiasm.' The deeply affective
nature of this union is evident when he claims that dying to the psychic life we 'become simply and purely organs of the Divine Life' and it is truly 'God or Christ who feels in us, who thinks in us, who wills in us.'

The second main emphasis in Tyrrell's thought on mystical union takes us back to conscience, in the cultivation of which are the beginnings of the spiritual life. Since it is conscience that puts the individual 'en rapport with a personality other than his own', it is here that he comes to union with God.[118] Conscience is simply the place where we hear a voice calling us to "Cleave to the right", a voice of 'one who is with us yet over us.' Tyrrell accepts the determinative power of conscience, though his descriptions at times seem contrived. It is the 'highest point of our soul' where 'our being runs into His as the stalk which buries itself in the earth that begets, supports, and nourishes it', a 'little stalk by which the soul is united to God as to the parent of its moral life', a 'narrow channel' through which the 'Divine Life is poured into our veins'. Here Tyrrell comes near to the idea of the apex of the soul or synteresis or the view of a mystical faculty which he elsewhere rejected. But the balance is maintained: 'human excellence is not the perfection of this faculty or of that, but of all united under the rule of conscience.' Though conscience is understood with a variety of nuances, all serve to denote the nearness of God who prompts, guides and draws the human will into contact with His own. In following conscience the individual must 'no longer think of himself as I, but rather as we'.

The depth and intimacy of conscience and the reality of God's presence in its processes was expressed in the meditation 'God in Conscience'. Through conscience we share the life of God which is truly
invigorating and leads to our full development. This is the heart of the mystical life and union. If it is in 'recognising God's will and presence in the urgency of conscience that the interior life consists', then 'union and peace with God is but union and peace with conscience viewed in a higher and truer light.'[119] This 'intimate communing' with God is a direct consciousness of his will which he achieves by inclining our will to his with the result that we can truly speak of 'God and the soul which He has wedded.'

Tyrrell also raised the question about the "bearing of our actions upon our vital union with God through conscience."[120] Following conscience, which means being 'knit ever more firmly to God', has an ethical dimension, so that disobedience and sin dispose us for a fall and the rupture of our relationship with God. He is in basic agreement with von Hügel, asserting that the essential will-union with God is attained through action in the conduct of our daily lives. Static concepts of union are rejected in favour of an emphasis on the 'active, dynamic union with our conscience', a harmony of our inward life with the promptings of the Divine Spirit within.[121] It is the closest spiritual union of 'perfect sympathy and mutual understanding' in which God is at the very centre and in the 'very act of our knowing and willing and feeling: that our experience must in some sense be His also - that in all our afflictions He is afflicted, and in all our gladness He is rejoiced.' Even a static conception of the 'soul clinging to God' is inadequate since God is the Agent in every right action, the 'principal Lover in her well-ordered love.' It is a union of activity which is perfected by love. Knowing that we are in deepest union with Him, we begin truly to know God and ourselves. With some justification, Tyrrell believed he was simply drawing out the essential teaching of St Ignatius whose Exercises
proposed that we feel our way in the spiritual life judging the consolation and desolation which attend certain actions and as they further or hinder our 'true spiritual growth and union with God.'

So, mystical union consists in an active and affective intimacy:

If here we are to touch Him and be immediately united with Him, it is not in thinking about Him but in acting with Him. For every good action of ours is His also - the offspring of the marriage of our will with His; the seal and pledge of the active union, the union in action, of our soul with Him.[122]

In stating that God was the cooperant with every movement of our faculties, Tyrrell was also completely faithful to St Thomas, though he was more prepared to use a broader range of analogy and simile in trying to grasp the nature of this process. What he called a 'continual magnetic attraction' of God, that centre of goodness, 'draws us ever closer to union with itself'. And although the imagery at times becomes quite impersonal, the mingling of two streams, for example, the personal nature of the process is never lost. The vital truth is that it is 'in movement and action that we are united to God and our life is mingled with His.'

Any description of the union of the soul with God would fail to meet the requirements of Christian theology were it not to emphasise its essential quality of love. Tyrrell turns to this question in his comments on the Johannine text 'God is love' (I John 4). Entitled 'God's Life in Ours', his reflections begin with the assertion, central to mystical theology, that knowledge of God involves a 'direct experimental knowledge of God's action in us', but a knowledge which 'follows upon Love.'[123] Having established that it is through purification of both mind and heart that 'God is apprehended and loved', he also claims that this love is not merely a possibility in the soul's union with God, but
defines its very nature.[124] Thus, 'it is in the inward and outward exercise and operation of love, that we dwell in God and He in us.'

Stressing that this indwelling is active and dynamic, a distinct process, it is clear that the union with God takes the form of a dynamic loving relationship rather than an inactive state of rest or absorption.

For this reason, he approves of the language of the mystical tradition: 'Mystics delight to see in Him the Soul's Spouse and Lover.' And so our energies, impulses, and appetites are to serve that 'sovereign Love, which is but the Will of God seeking expression through the co-operation of the rational creature, created for no other end than this.' The deepest appetite in the soul is for the life of God. Moreover, if the love of which God is the origin and end, and which is powerfully at work in the soul in union with him should cease to work in me and mingle itself as the fundamental or governing element in all my action, all the reality and coherence of my life and aims would disappear.

Tyrrell's philosophy of religion always returned to this central truth of mysticism, that the aim of all spiritual and ethical endeavour was 'personal communion with God', the chief characteristic of which was love.[125] Religion is just this loving union with God: 'this love of God, this dynamic union with the infinite will, is the very substance and reality of our spiritual living and being'. It is love that effects this union of wills, love that constitutes it nature, and fullness of love that is its ultimate goal. The 'will-union' of which Tyrrell speaks so often is 'neither more nor less than mutual love', a 'personal affection between ourselves and God.' If 'some such degree of union' is the end of every journeying in search of God then our happiness consists in the contemplative love of God.'[126]
Mystical union is not annihilation of self but fulfilment of the self in God. Tyrrell was strenuous in refuting what Pater called the 'mystic doctrines of Eckhart and Tauler.' He denied the idea of a 'union which can only be attained by the literal negation of self, by a kind of moral suicide', since true mystical union is 'the consciousness of the perfect harmony between God and the soul; the innermost soul as the receptacle of God now filled with Himself.' It is not a sense of oneness and confusion but of harmony, of two in one, and of 'ineffable "sameness" in mind, love, and life.' Moreover, this is not a human achievement, but the operation of grace. Tyrrell's image of the soul as constructed by God as the harp is constructed for the hand of the harpist is traditional and serves to indicate the 'manner of his indwelling', and is a more vivid expression of the doctrine of grace, that God's action and the soul's action are 'two co-efficients of one and the same spiritual life.' To quote one of his definitions: 'Grace is simply the indwelling of God.' But the relationship between God and the individual is cooperative: hence his difficulty with what he took to be Ignatius's relegation of the human element in the 'consolation without previous cause'.

Tyrrell's concern with the soul's union with God was not confined to his earlier period. In Christianity at the Crossroads he spoke of the inward experience of Christ who is one with the Father, a oneness not merely as a 'moral sense of accordant wills' but a union with reference to 'some mystical experience, some intuition of sameness in otherness', and so he is the abiding model for our own union with God. Incarnation and Christology remained pivotal in his understanding of union since it is Christ, in whom the 'union of wills' was so unqualified, who embodies this central truth of Christian mysticism. Indeed, it is Christ who makes possible the mystical quest since 'He
felt, not merely His own union with God, but the power of uniting other souls to Himself and, through Himself, with God.'[130] Though Tyrrell is at times imprecise, speaking vaguely on one occasion of individuals being satisfied only by 'some sort of union with and appropriation of the infinite and eternal', the language is usually clearer. Union with God is the purpose of human existence, and the individual's 'own ultimate perfection'. He simply reflects the traditional position that we may become by grace what Christ is by nature. His claim that the 'Divine Will is ever transforming and developing itself' and that 'union with it involves a like self-transforming on our part', is also entirely consonant with the Catholic mystical tradition, especially as crystallised in Carmelite mysticism in which the final goal is the transforming union when the soul becomes 'truly God by participation.'[131] In his last statement on the matter he spoke of the 'great truth that conscious union with God is the fullest realisation of humanity, the secret of that personality which sets man above nature.'

Though his preoccupations shifted considerably over a period of twelve years Tyrrell's thought on union with God remained constant. It is however his earlier writings which offer the richest treatment of the major mystical themes. The contrast with von Hügel is also clearest here. He had written of the inner life of separateness and personality in God Himself in whom 'ultimate unity is a mystery' which yields not to philosophy but personal experience.[132] Like von Hügel he pursued the question with reference to the witness of the mystics and their experience. However, his interpretative framework was more directly theological than philosophical. This had important consequences for the final orientation of their respective accounts. Whereas von Hügel failed to set his theology of union firmly in the context of the
doctrine of the Trinity, Tyrrell at least presented an outline of union as participation in the life of the Triune God. In this way, both the nature of God and the soul's union with the Trinity are disclosed. In the Trinitarian life there is a superpersonal unity prior to the multiplicity of Divine Persons, 'a unity in which they being many are one, and in which we too are, not merged but unified without prejudice to personal distinctness.' Describing this union, Tyrrell quotes a remark of Catherine of Genoa which the Baron felt to be the heart of the matter: 'we feel an internal necessity of using the plural pronoun instead of the singular.'

At this point we may recall Tyrrell's critique of non-Christian mysticism which claimed that 'it is in the mystery of the Trinity that Love finds that archetype which the pantheist or Buddhist seeks in vain.' Love's 'craving for union, absorption, identification, and its conflicting demand for distinctness', is fulfilled in the mystery of the Trinity which is a union 'carried to its infinite perfection', a 'union and friendship' in eternal love which is a model of the soul's union with God. For Tyrrell only a trinity of persons adequately satisfies the 'highest ideal of personal love,' and mystical union is in fact a sharing in the very life of the Trinity, Father, Son and Holy Spirit. It is a union of distinctness and fusion and not 'the union by which a drop is absorbed and dispersed in the ocean, losing its separateness and individuality'. At the heart of Christian mysticism personal love seeks fulfilment in union with Divine Love, which at once universal and personal. The likeness between the soul and God in the natural order is transcended by the order of grace where 'there is not merely a likeness, but a sameness of being and operation: a mystical participation of the Divine Nature.'
Tyrrell thus proposes a thorough trinitarianism in which, though the operations of the Three distinct Persons derive from one principle, and are in a real sense one operation, they are also truly the operation of each Person. The gift of the Holy Spirit is vital in this process. If union is the ultimate goal, it always begins with the reality of 'the Spirit mysteriously mingled with the spirit of man'.[134] God's love, which works within us by grace, is distinctly the operation of the Holy Spirit, but in and with our own spirit: 'it is we who love and it is the Spirit who loves'.[135] This is the core of Christian mystical experience: the activation of the gifts of the Holy Spirit whose chief gift is love. Though God becomes the 'ground on which our soul rests and walks', he is not a part or constituent of our personality. Rather, the soul becomes 'the instrument of the indwelling Spirit' by whose operation we are taken into communion with the Three Persons.

It is clear that, like von Hügel, Tyrrell proposed not a mystical union of static passivity, but a 'mysticism of action' which culminates in a union of wills. Since this way of speaking is easily misunderstood it is worth citing Gilson who notes the essential 'affectivity' of this concept: 'the substance of God will never be our substance, the will of God will never be our will, union with God can never be anything but the accord of two distinct wills, and therefore this union with God can be effected in no other way than be and through love.'[136] Tyrrell claimed that the 'life of union with the Divine Will is alone the true life, the eternal life.'[137] It is a dynamic reality in which action is not opposed to rest and in which, through all the soul's struggles, God is met and life is shared: 'union with God is union with the Divine Life and action, with the undisturbed centre of the cyclone.'[138] The absence of any suggestion of destruction of personal identity in Tyrrell's concept
of union marks his agreement with the Baron and indicates their fidelity to an essential truth of Catholic mystical theology. However close the union, it remains a union of two distinct personalities, a union which respects the integrity of each, a union of 'communication, action and being', not identification or absorption of the human by the divine.[139]

But a contrast between the two accounts is also apparent. In the light of Tyrrell's trinitarianism, von Hügel's thought on mystical union appears somewhat incomplete. In terms of a specifically Christian theological perspective, the Baron's philosophy of mysticism is transcended by Tyrrell's adumbration of mystical theology in which there is both a distinct Christological and pneumatological emphasis and a stress on the Trinitarian life as the ultimate locus of the mystical union.
If the ultimate goal of the Christian life is union with God, which develops out of the sense of the Infinite and direct contact with the divine, prayer is to be understood as one of the indispensable means to that end. Von Hügel believed that prayer in the form of recollection was one of the dispositions 'necessary for the soul's union with God.'[1] Tyrrell also held that 'it is by prayer in its widest sense that this union with the Divine Will is fostered'.[2] The Baron wrote on prayer throughout the whole of his life, including the modernist crisis. He saw it as one of the 'most infallible of helps' and, at the height of the conflict, he wrote of the 'humble, prayerful frankness' which remained a source of strength coming from God and leading to Him.[3] Also in the very heat of the controversy, Tyrrell was working on the Lord's Prayer, believing there was 'no other way so effective as that which teaches men to pray - in the widest sense.'[4] These were not simply perfunctory asides; in their treatment of mysticism there was a distinct theology of prayer underlying their practical spiritual guidance.

VON HÜGEL ON THE THEOLOGY AND PRACTICE OF PRAYER

Von Hügel's Beaconsfield addresses on the truths about God and the soul which determine the nature of prayer are not a completely developed theme, appearing somewhat contrived and incomplete.[5] But the principles expressed derived from his own experience of 'fifty years endeavour in these matters', though he insisted they reflected scriptural and Church teaching. He claimed that although some of these truths
had been 'largely ignored or explained away', they reflected the 'never extinct Christian and Catholic experience.' He believed he was simply presenting ancient Christian truths, found in Augustine, Bernard and Teresa of Avila, which 'remain unsurpassed', but presenting them in the light of the clarifications offered by 'human psychology and epistemology' in the previous thirty years.

The first fact, that 'God is a stupendously rich Reality - the alone boundlessly rich Reality', reflects his stress on divine transcendence. Without this sense, that he is God 'already apart from His occupation with us', the whole tradition of apophatic theology which gives prayer its 'deepest awe and widest expansion', is denied. A further conclusion is that 'not even Jesus Christ and His Redemption exhaust God.' He praises Fénelon's letters for their 'tender devotion to Christ' whilst admiring their freedom from all 'excessive Christocentrism.' This criticism of Christocentrism, or Fanchristism as he once called it, which threatened the centrality of Christ in mysticism was uncongenial to Tyrrell whose spirituality took Christ as its point of departure and dwelt on the scriptural witness to Jesus. As in the case of mystical union Tyrrell's emphasis is more thoroughly Christocentric.

The second fact turns on a distinction, which he had earlier found unhelpful in the discussion of the theology of image and likeness, between the natural and supernatural modes of God's outward activity. These remarks summarise the fuller treatment of the relationship of nature and supernature which he presented the previous year. This distinction expresses not only the richness of God's activity, but brings 'charm, freshness and freedom essential to religion at its best.' Aquinas, Dante, St Francis and Giotto are seen to embody the truth that
nature is the expression of God's goodness, though the truth had been submerged in the 'impoverished philosophy and the thin theology' of the later Middle Ages.[8] The polarity and friction which such a distinction involved reflects the fruitful activity of supernatural grace elevating nature. But the tension thus introduced into the life of prayer is balanced by a détente, to the 'verge of relaxation'. The God of nature and supernature is also God of the détente and the tension, the source of all that is 'wholesome and homely' and 'ardent and heroic'. This operation of the supernatural is 'constitutive of the spiritual-moral life.'[9] The natural affections, the beauty of nature, the 'honesties and decencies of social and political life', are not rejected but utilised in the spiritual growth of the individual. Prayer governed by this positive operation of the supernatural in the natural is freed from 'dullness, monotony and the like - these subtle dangers of the spiritual life.' The Baron's experience as a spiritual director is evident in his observation that such dullness and oppression beset 'much of the spiritual practice of many religious persons.'

In describing God's freedom in contrast to human freedom as the third doctrine, von Hügel is straining to express its precise effect on prayer, remarking vaguely that 'the persistent and vivid apprehension of this fact will greatly help our prayer'.[10] The main point is that God's freedom belongs to his perfection, a truth which determines the relationship of creature to Creator. Thus are we humbled before God, a virtue which determines true prayer in which we 'look up to, adore God, the Perfect Freedom, which contrasts so grandly with our own poor little freedom.' This seems little more than a detail of his assertion of the richness of God in contrast to human reality.
The fourth fact is that 'God is the Supreme Good', a truth to which, he notes, St Augustine above all bore great witness.[11] If God is 'our divine rest and divine delight' then 'our prayer will be immensely enriched and expanded by a persistent cultivation of this sense of God as our true home.' Whatever temporary goal may motivate our prayer, its direction is Godward, its final end is union with God, our true home.

In the fifth fact von Hügel describes the likeness and unlikeness between God and his creatures, which finds expression in the belief that God is Pure Joy and that the Deep Suffering of Jesus reveals compassio in God Himself. Though believing that 'our prayer will profit greatly if we thus hold firmly to this double truth', which rests on the Christological definition of Chalcedon, he failed to develop the point, claiming simply that it will prevent our diminishing God or dehumanising Jesus.[12] Here, at least in principle, is the balance to his critique of excessive Christocentrism.

The next fact, that we need God much more than God needs us, has a more direct bearing on our prayer. Since God is the Absolute Cause, Ultimate Reason, our Sole True End and Determiner, 'the most fundamental need, duty, honour and happiness of man, is not petition, nor even contrition, nor again even thanksgiving; these three kinds of prayer which, indeed, must never disappear out of our spiritual lives; but adoration.'[13] Again, Augustine is held to be the greatest teacher of 'overwhelmingly adoring prayer', which needs assertion more than ever in the face of 'pure immanentisms' and 'sentimental anthropocentrism which fill the air.' This recurring theme is linked to the belief that there should be growth and development in prayer which must 'greatly deepen and widen out'. He believed that 'the first and central act of religion
is adoration, sense of God.'[14] True religion fosters 'the sense of an overflowing Existence distinct from our own and in the Adoration of the same.'[15] Thus, his most characteristic assertion of the sheer isness and transcendent otherness of God, finds its direct consequence in this stress on adoration. The 'need of Adoration' was rooted in the 'sense of the Objective, Full Reality of God.'[16] It was above all the mystics who bore witness to this truth: 'the Infinite in Man' and our consciousness of it, are both the cause and the object of 'the adoring awe of all truly spiritual Mystics, in all times and places.'[17]

The final fact, The Prevenience of God, is described as the 'root-truth of all our previous positions.'[18] The Johannine Epistles and St. Bernard are cited in support, though one of its most ardent proponents had been Augustine whom von Hügel surprisingly overlooks. The Baron claims that prayer will 'gain in depth and aliveness' if we acknowledge God as the true inspirer of all our fruitful thoughts and wishes. If God 'secretly initiates what He openly crowns', then prayer begins with God's inspiring grace and finds its end in him. Prayer is thus gift and task, a divine and human action in which we express both our creatureliness and our likeness to God.

Von Hügel concludes this first address claiming that the denial or positive exclusion of any one of these facts will damage Christian prayer, though he points out that not all these facts will be operative at the same time in the one individual. At different stages of spiritual growth one may predominate, and it will be sufficient if they flourish within the Church as a whole. His overall concern is that these truths should bring 'much depth and breadth, much variety and elasticity into our prayer.'[19]
In the second address on the 'seven psychological facts and laws' concerning the soul, von Hügel shows himself an acute observer and wise counsellor on the spiritual life. His first point is that distractions, dryness and fruitlessness in prayer are usually the result of faulty dispositions prior to formal prayer. He advises a more adequate relationship between prayer and life, a wiser ordering of the active life, citing Fénelon's counsel to place action 'within a circumambient air of leisure... for the spirit of prayer and peace.'[20] This is achieved by quiet concentration in each moment on the special content of that moment. In a striking image, the spiritual life is likened to the action of the sun which touches and illumines successively different points of the sundial. There is here a hint of the balance and moderation of the Benedictine spirit and also the vital importance of the 'present moment' found in de Caussade. The consequences for both prayer and life are far-reaching: 'every minute is thus taken separately as the dear will and the direct vehicle of God."

Asserting the 'ceaseless interdependence of Soul and Body', as the second fact, the Baron was taking up a theme which he had developed at great length in his study of St Catherine.[21] Though the general truth of this fact is unassailable, the claimed consequences for the practice of prayer are less convincing. Again Fénelon is cited as advising the limits that should be applied to the Prayer of Quiet which, though seemingly effortless and refreshing, involves a high 'neural cost'. He felt that Grou exemplified 'sobriety in prayer', a healthy balance between a 'wholesome natural interest and action, and a deep supernatural interest and action.' Moreover, there must be positive acceptance of dryness and desolation which are indispensable to the life of prayer. He felt St Teresa's vivid descriptions of spiritual dryness reflected a
deeper self-knowledge than the Indian convert Sadhu Sundar Singh who claimed never to have experienced such desolation in the thirteen years since his conversion. Von Hügel speaks of the normality and necessity of such desolation and 'desert stretches' which point to the need to modify prayer, moving between prayer of quiet, ordinary meditation and vocal prayer, perhaps even having to be content with 'but a few uttered aspirations.' His final counsel is that in such times of desolation we must not become self-preoccupied but, like the saints, turn to the thought and love of God. He was sure that dryness and emptiness were 'irrereplaceably profitable', since they were a sharing in the cross.[22]

The third psychological fact represents one of the central themes of his teaching, the vital importance of individuality and the necessity of following one's own attrait in the spiritual life. Though the term attrait is never fully defined, here it is used synonymously with 'particular calls and gifts'.[23] It evokes the particularity of one's personal character and temperament, the specific traits by which God draws the individual to himself. It speaks of the uniqueness of one's individual relationship with God, both in terms of particular gifts to be used and crosses to be embraced. Thornton takes the Baron's term to mean a person's 'natural spiritual propensity, his inclination towards or attraction to particular forms of prayer.'[24] It is rooted in a 'reverence for each other's spiritual individuality', and transcends the mere superficial differences between individuals.[25] For von Hügel, one's attrait is 'unchangeably inherent in each soul's vocation to what it is, and still more to what it is called to be.'[26] In using this term attrait von Hügel indicated those 'acts, habits, intentions, self-conquests' which belong especially to the soul at its deepest and most peaceful moments. The soul is called to fix upon these dispositions and
virtues to make the the 'central objects of its prayers and endeavours.' It is vital to this 'spiritual self-cultivation' that all endeavour should be 'saturated with prayer - by the spirit of prayer and by definite prayer, vocal, mental or of quiet.' These forms of prayer will also be largely chosen according to one's attrait or 'the need, and the experience of the particular soul.' This was not to sanction individualism, but to accept that no soul can be a 'jack-of-all-trades'; it must develop its 'own special gifts' for the common good. He quoted with approval Fr Faber who, after describing the Ignatian method of prayer, exclaimed with relief: 'This, then, my dear brethren, is St Ignatius's way to heaven; and, thank God it is not the only way!' He would have approved of Chapman's counsel: 'pray as you can, and don't try to pray as you can't.'[27]

Understanding the centrality of the individual's attrait is essential to a true view of the Church which the Baron likens to a diverse garden. But Maude Petre observed that he tended to treat souls like dittos, and he himself acknowledged the failures that accompanied his efforts at spiritual direction.[28] It was Tyrrell who obliged him to observe this rule with his daughter Gertrud. Once accepted, it became a guiding principle in his whole spirituality. What is surprising is the absence of reference to de Caussade who, above all, had made constant use of this idea of the attrait.[29] The Baron was familiar with his writings, an aspect of his attachment to the whole tradition of post-tridentine French spirituality, but does not dwell on his teaching beyond a passing mention in the Mystical Element where, with Grou and John Vianney, he is held to have continued the sound mystical tradition after the Quietist controversy. The likely explanation is that de
Caussade so permeated the Baron's thought that explicit acknowledgment seemed unnecessary.

In claiming that the 'Incarnational side of religion may never be despised nor forgotten', but must find some definite place in the spiritual life, it may be thought that von Hügel was qualifying his critique of Christocentrism.[30] However, in this fourth fact he sought to replace abstract mysticism with belief in God's condescension in 'the Historical, Traditional, Social, Sacramental', rather than specifically in the person of Christ, though he does refer to 'the words and deeds of Jesus'. Formless recollection and prayer of quiet are legitimate prayer and may at times be more appropriate for certain people than vocal prayers, formal meditations or Church services. He insisted on the importance of daily spiritual reading and 'direct Recollection', but, in the light of the Church's tradition and his own experience, he asserted that such prayer of quiet would 'remain safe and wholesome only if some daily vocal prayers, and some more or less frequent Church attendances and sacramental acts and receptions, continue active within this same soul's life.'[31] Such a mixed régime, with frequent confession and daily recitation of the rosary, had been his own practice under Huvelin's direction. Though each must discover the 'particular form of prayer' to which God calls one, the demands of Church membership must be balanced by 'a certain regular amount of the other kinds of prayer and worship.' The communal experience of the Body of Christ is the context for personal prayer. He asserted this sacramentality, 'the indebtedness of spirituality to Sense', against Heller's puritan interpretations of the words 'worship in spirit and truth' in the Fourth Gospel.[32]
The fifth fact concerns the right attitude to the sex-instinct and the dangerous sin of pride which is the 'sin of sins'.[33] Purity is described as a 'fleshly virtue' which does not reject the body, and pride and self-sufficiency are felt to be a greater threat to the Christian's spiritual life. His application of these truths to the life of prayer is the result of personal experience and may only be convincing to the extent that one can identify with such experience. This conviction about purity freed him from 'much previous scruple and depression', whereas the conviction about humility anchored him more deeply in the life and spirit of Jesus.

Though the Baron discusses the 'right attitude towards Temptation and towards Sin', as the sixth fact, its precise implications are left unclear.[34] He cites Augustine with approval: sin can become the occasion for a grand humility, the tempted but sinless Jesus being the great model for imitation. Though again rather general, his concluding paragraph suggests that since God is the 'living Reality beyond all sin and temptation', this is the source of our hope which strengthens prayer.

The seventh and final fact is that joy is the divinely intended end of our lives and this is linked with a noble asceticism. The vocation of all Christians is to love God, the source of our joy. The Baron approved of the authoritative principle of Catholic spirituality that joy is a mark of true sanctity, believing Huvelin could possibly be canonised but not Newman, since he felt the latter never escaped his melancholic temperament and Puritan training. But again, its exact significance for prayer is not drawn out, beyond the suggestion that 'our prayer will greatly benefit by the great facts and discriminations we have been considering.'[35]
The subject of prayer also featured in many of his personal letters. He wrote of the alternating movement of prayer and action at the heart of life, a movement of the mystical mind from the 'centre of intense light' to the area of 'twilight' and darkness, and then the return from such weary 'borderwork' to sink back upon its centre, its home of peace and light.[36] Prayer and recollection take place in the recesses of the human heart where the immanent Transcendent is met and dwelt upon. Prayer is an exercise in assimilating and absorbing, recollecting and unifying such experience. It is from such 'states of recollection' that the soul moves outwards again 'to love, to work, and suffer for God and man, beyond its previous level.'[37] There is no gulf between 'ordinary life' and some special realm where prayer takes place. Since stimulations from without are occasions for the individual's encounter with the divine, 'it is in recollection and solitude that he assimilates them.'[38] Prayer must become an abiding reality in life, ensuring cohesion and stability amid the diverse movements in daily living. It is the dynamic, recollective element in personal spiritual growth and the most intense and fruitful form of action. Though von Hügel stressed adoration, a vital place is ascribed to reflection and recollection, which integrate the touches of God in one's life, and intercession, the movement away from self towards God and others.

TYRRELL'S REFLECTIONS ON THE LORD'S PRAYER

In *Lex Credendi* Tyrrell's discussion of prayer focused directly on the teaching of Jesus, though in *Lex Orandi* he followed a similar method to von Hügel, drawing out the significance of Christian doctrine for the practice of prayer. Treating the different senses of the term prayer, he spoke of formal 'spiritual exercises', directed to
'religionising' our conduct, but also of prayer as the life of Charity, of Divine Love, of will-union with God and His Saints.'[39] Integrating the insights of these books we have his basic theology of prayer.

Accepting that 'the prayer of Christ is at once the deepest and most succinct expression of the Spirit and Life of Christ', a life which we are called to reproduce in ourselves, it follows that it is the 'norm of all pure prayer and indirectly of all pure belief.'[40] In this sense the Credo is simply the 'explicitation' of the truths latent in the Pater Noster. Tyrrell's exposition of the prayer of Christ begins with the basic catechism definition, originating with John Damascene, that prayer is the 'lifting up of the mind and heart to God.' Prayer is the utterance of the individual's spirit, an act in which feeling, vision and will blend together and find their deepest expression. In prayer the spirit 'pierces down to the root and beginning of all reality from which it springs, and stretches up to the end and summit of all reality towards which it strains and struggles.' Prayer is concerned with what he calls 'the Ultimates', and in its contact with Reality it attains Truth. Tyrrell also describes prayer as the whole of the spirit-life, as communion with God: Laborare est orare - to work is to pray, to think is to pray, to love is to pray.' But beyond this implicit prayer there is 'conscious explicit prayer' in which the spirit concentrates on 'the religious aspect of life - on God, or on things precisely in their relation to God.' Prayer thus embodies the spirit life so that we 'find what man is in his deepest self - if only the prayer be real, his very own.'

For Tyrrell, the Our Father is the 'criterion of all Christian prayer' and the measure of belief, since belief and prayer are 'so inextricably interwined.'[41] Though not presented in the gospels as a
prayer which Christ himself prayed, it expresses his spirit. Prayer will thus range from the real and vehement, the strong cries of Gethsemane and Golgotha, to the tumultuous and incoherent times of impatience when one searches for a vocabulary to utter one's needs, and moments of tension when 'speech may be completely paralysed.'

Tyrrell notes that in the Sermon on the Mount, which is the context for the teaching on the Our Father, Christ repudiates all hypocritical and complacent prayer which seeks human praise. In prayer we put ourselves 'honestly face to face with conscience, with the Father who seeth in secret', and even public prayer must proceed from the 'secret chamber where the soul meets God.'[42] Though vocal prayer is never rejected, the Lord warns against 'much speaking and vain repetitions.' The truth is that 'no prayer avails but that which the Holy Spirit puts into our heart, and which is therefore an expression of the Divine Will.'

Tyrrell criticised mechanical prayer, the 'babbling or gabbling or vain repetition which our Lord reprehends.' He denounced Roothaan's analysis of meditation and Le Gaudier's 'terrible machinery of sanctity', deploring a misplaced notion of the ex opere operato doctrine which ascribed to the bare words of a prayer the efficacy which could only come through the inward prayer of conformity to God's will.[43] Although such defective forms of prayer may indeed manifest a legitimate human desire for closeness to God, they may reveal a misguided desire to manage and manipulate God. But true prayer seeks 'the glory of God and not the glory of men', which raises human beings to the likeness of God, not vice versa.[44] He criticised some recently composed prayers which he felt hardly represented the 'spontaneous upliftings of the heart and soul to God', and were unlikely to wake any affectionate sense of kinship of the soul with God.[45]
The *Our Father* revealed the motive and content of true Christian prayer; because it is the prayer of the bride-chamber embodying the spirit of Christ's message and mission it is also the prayer of the kingdom in which the Lord's disciples cry *Abba, Father.* By the end of his life, however, he was less convinced of the unique significance of this dominical prayer, writing that the 'genuine utterances of Christ about prayer merely echoed the better spirit of his own religion', especially the developed Rabbinical position. Though this may be true of some elements of petitionary prayer, it cannot be said of all Christian prayer precisely in view of the title *Abba* and the coming Kingdom which he had earlier recognised. Expounding the theological meaning of the Lord's Prayer, he notes that the opening invocation brings the soul 'face to face with God in the secret chamber of the heart', determining the correct relationship of mind, feeling and will which is the 'condition of communion and converse between the creature and the Creator.' The name *Father* not only evokes both divine transcendence and immanence, but establishes an affective relationship on which 'the right to appeal is grounded.' He felt that the invocation 'Our Father who art in heaven' brought our spirit into accord with His, determining our 'inward attitude of prayer in the presence of God', recalling us to the love which surrounds and permeates it.

Tyrrell spoke of God as the principal object of our will and the 'term of our unqualified love and worship and reverence.' Though noting the human need to represent God in order to love Him and pray to Him, he refuted extreme immanentism in order to preserve the otherness of the divine. A concept of God as merely *anima mundi* would undercut that vital attitude of adoration and reverence at the core of religious consciousness. The argument was exactly that adopted by von
Hügel. In a sense it was a more pressing concern for Tyrrell who built an apologetic of experience on the presence of a religious sense, which was taken to reveal a basic need which in turn disclosed something of its divine Object. What he called the 'sentiment of adoring (latreutic) reverence' owed its unique quality to the sense of the 'absoluteness and infinitude' of 'That which alone can satisfy the spiritual hunger which no idealisation of the finite, however great, could possibly satisfy.'

In *Lex Credendi* he refers to revelation which proclaims a direct love for the Fatherhood of God. Christ's childlike confidence, reverence and love which bear witness to this, were fed not by mental inference, but 'begotten by direct spiritual contact with the divine.' For Tyrrell, more clearly than for von Hügel, Christ reveals and exemplifies adoring prayer: 'no philosophy of God's infinitude and unlikeness could equal the truth implied in Christ's reverence and mystic awe.' The saints also witness to a sanctity which is a 'strange blending' of awful reverence and familiar tenderness, a lowly confidence and daring love at the root of the invitation *Audemus dicere: Pater Noster.* Like the Baron, he stresses here God's otherness, unlikeness, infinitude as the motive of 'that reverence, awe, and worship which is even a more primary element than love, confidence, and sonship.' The right balance of transcendence and immanence, is never merely a question of conceptual equilibrium, but determines our prayer which 'transforms mere awe and wonder into filial reverence and love.' Though at times reverence appears to be for Tyrrell a rather solemn, ponderous response to the divine, as in the remark that 'a bright soul like Francis of Assisi or Philip Neri has often a deeper religious sense than a more sombre reverential mind', it retains this quality of affectivity and tenderness since it is 'part of the very substance of love.'
Tyrrell respected the manifold nature of God's revelation and the variety of response which reflects both the richness of that revelation and the complexity of human spiritual needs. He felt that the true 'mystic appetite' was only ever satisfied by this sense of otherness, requiring the destruction of a 'crude mysticism' which would bring God alongside nature, rather than finding Him in and through nature.[51] His early meditations dwelt on praise as the individual's response to God, speaking of 'two distinct duties, praise and thanksgiving: thanksgiving for what God is to me; praise for what He is to Himself.'[52] Such prayer should mark the spiritual life from its beginnings to its end, and find expression not only in times of favour, consolation and blessing, but also in times of darkness, temptation and calamity. At the heart of the Church, above all in its liturgy, there is collective praise of the Triune God, and the end of the Christian life is not an individualistic vision of God or static repose, but a 'fellowship in joy and praise.'

Even though Tyrrell was as resolute as von Hügel in asserting the centrality of reverence and adoration in Christian prayer, he did so by dwelling more directly on the Fatherhood of God. Since Christ is the great revealer of God's Fatherhood, this demands a focus on the person of Jesus which is always apparent in Tyrrell's theology of prayer: 'Christocentrism, the direct adoration of Christ as personally identical with God, is the essential characteristic of Christian as distinct from any purely theistic religious sentiment.'[53] He was still defending such 'Christ-worship' to unitarian ministers towards the end of his life.[54] He believed that devotion to Christ was determinative in the development of doctrine. His Christocentrism also found expression in the doctrine of grace. Like the Baron he asserted the prevenience of grace and quoted Augustine in support, though without attributing the
If the spirit-life is 'essentially a converse, a communication, a passing out of self into God...an affair between two; a mutual giving and receiving,' the priority is always with God. Tyrrell clearly states the dependence of the spiritual life on God's activity: 'without grace it is unthinkable', and, 'the initiative must be from God' as in all the rest of life.

The stress on grace has profound consequences for prayer: 'It is He who "teaches us to pray", who gives us the desire to pray; to arise and go to our Father.' Indeed, 'we pray but God prays in us.' It is also by prayer that we strain forward to meet Him; that we open our arms to receive the kiss of peace. We thus become sons of God by spiritualising our affections and thoughts, by raising mind and heart to God in a real process of divinisation. If the 'Divine Life is not something we draw forth from ourselves, but rather something that we appropriate', it is Christ who imparts it to us, who alone has given us power to become children of God. In treating the doctrine of grace and adoption Tyrrell could not resist reiterating his anti-intellectualism. Not only does this doctrine emphasise the 'mysteriousness of the Divine Nature and Personality' and the dogma of the Trinity, resolving the tension between finite and infinite, it seems to have been inspired by 'the spiritual needs of souls starved by the abstract and one-sided teachings of purely intellectual thought.' This seems at first sight another apodictic generalisation bearing on Christian history. However, it followed his brief allusion to the claim that it was out of the contemplative experience of the early Church that the doctrine of the Trinity came to be authoritatively articulated. This was the historical basis for his belief that the *Lex Orandi* shaped the *Lex Credendi*.
In his exposition of the Our Father Tyrrell raised the problem of petitionary prayer. Though it hardly seemed to concern the Baron, Tyrrell referred to it on numerous occasions as a theological problem which had no satisfactory resolution at the theoretical level, though the fact that it was embedded in the teaching of Christ reflects its centrality in the spiritual life. The question is raised in relation to the phrase 'Hallowed by Thy Name' which he took as the first petition, and in the context of 'Belief in God's Omnipotence' in Lex Orandi. In the latter he wrote that "the object of Hope, Prayer viewed strictly as an exercise of religion, is the inner life of will-union with God...that is, Love and the consummation of Love."[59] This statement of the primacy of love sets petitionary prayer in proper context. In practice it means that though one may legitimately pray, as the Lord instructs, for daily bread, this is less a petition than 'an expression of trustful indifference as to the temporal needs of the future.' Moreover, prayer for temporal favours that is not also a prayer for grace is little more than superstition, though it may be properly transformed by an attitude which is 'duly conditional and submissive.' If prayer is to be saved from such magical notions it must be founded on an 'absolute dependence on God' and linked to the truth of God's omnipotence; 'prayer implies that the whole thing is in His hands.' Describing the pain and challenge of faith, which bids one 'weep and cry and pray', he maintains this is not despairing prayer, but a laying hold of that 'solid rock of reality on which his moral and spiritual life is built.' This was the meaning of his remark that 'the first and most essential characteristic of true prayer is reality', a truth which he felt was too often neglected in the routine teaching on prayer.[60] He sought what he called true 'spiritual health' where prayer is offered passively, not in a spirit of fatalism, but a spirit of faith and confidence. It is a critique of 'prayer of
presumption' which is no more than a 'lazy evasion of the duty of vigilance and of the use of natural means that are to hand', a prayer which ultimately demoralises.[61]

Tyrrell struggled with the problem of petitionary prayer. Believing that an elemental faith in an 'other-world Wisdom, Power, and Providence greater than our own' makes prayer 'as natural to man as speech', he also granted that the instinct to what he called 'prayer of petition and impetration' was too spontaneous and too universal among religious people not to be well founded on the truths about the spiritual life.[62] Though explicitly sanctioned by Christ, he felt that experience told against the 'literal truth of the common doctrine as to the efficacy of prayer.'[63] He sought to resolve this tension by claiming there was more than a 'literal sense' to the doctrine of the efficacy of prayer. The 'sacramental sense' of the doctrine rests on the belief in the 'organic connection between every member of the spiritual world', which means that every sincere and selfless desire for others 'will tell in the long run' since 'bread cast on the waters will return after many days.' This is not a matter of logical proof but of faith. It rests on a view of the spiritual world which has its own causality and laws of providence. Here Tyrrell distinguishes God's transcendence and his immanence in nature, where nature is viewed as a free, intelligent process obedient to her own laws. But a practical paradox remains: we are to pray for temporal needs, though often denied the assurance of seeing the answer in any recognisable form. This did not disturb Tyrrell, but rather confirmed that 'exaggerated trust in such prayer is no friend to moral effort or to true faith.' It also confirmed his view of faith as a struggle with darkness and doubt. Finding the Breviary
living again after a 'long transition period of death', he wrote that 'one has to pass through atheism to faith.'

Tyrrell distinguished prayer of mystic contemplation from petitionary prayer which is addressed to the Power and Providence which rules this world. Though critical of the distortions to which petitionary prayer easily gives rise, he did not deny 'all external causality to prayer.' He felt that 'prayer and persuasion', which he drew together in his idea of petition, was a real determining factor in human life, 'modifying but not interfering miraculously with the course of nature.'

Though the extension of our knowledge of physical laws has matured our view of prayer, he accepted that prayer to God could indeed be 'effective of alterations in the realm of appearances', but to claim that this necessarily implies miracle is a confusion of thought. Here one can detect Tyrrell's abiding unease with any apologetic argument from the miraculous. Hence his belief that prayer, like all other aspects of religion, was intelligible only to the mind touched by faith and willing to accept mysteries as a necessity of life.

Acknowledging that 'philosophy in its present stage' raised problems for the doctrine of 'prayer efficacy', Tyrrell also adopted his familiar tactic of appealing to revealed religion which 'calls us back to the more human conception of the All-Father' and the invitation 'Ask and you will receive, seek and you shall find'. But such a text must be interpreted in the light of the petition in the Lord's Prayer, 'Thy Kingdom come', the 'central and governing petition of the whole prayer, which is the prayer of the Kingdom.' He identifies the coming of the Kingdom with the 'doing of His Will', the dominant desire of Christ's heart. Prayer is thus directed not to one's own spiritual perfection, but
for something outside oneself, 'for it is God's Spirit that prays in him for a divine and universal end.' Nonetheless, such selfless prayer sanctifies individuals since sanctity consists in being elevated to sharing the divine outlook and the Divine Will, in dying to self and living to God. The essential change wrought by prayer is thus located decisively within the individual who prays.

At this point the connection between prayer and the mystical life is most apparent. If mysticism culminates in will-union with God, prayer is the means to realising this union. What he calls the 'Prayer of Conformity', which says "Not my will but Thine" belongs to a 'higher level of faith and hope than the Prayer of Petition.' Such prayer indicates greater faith, hope and love than petition. Despite accepting petitionary prayer, there is more trust in 'leaving the thing in silence to God' who knows all our desires. But the prayer of conformity is no mere act of resignation, but a petition for greater conformity. Tyrrell reflects a dominant element in traditional Catholic spirituality when he claims that 'Fiat voluntas Tua sicut in Coelo et in Terra is, after all, the prayer of prayers' which expresses and deepens our 'full-hearted assent to God's ways and methods as being surely the wisest and the best.' Such prayer is the index of mature faith.

For Tyrrell, the doctrine of the incarnation indicated some vital truths about prayer. In rejecting Christological heresies, the Church preserved the truth that Christ was fully human and fully divine, a doctrine shaped by devotion to Christ. In Christology important truths for prayer were at stake, such as 'the infinite value of the individual soul, the ineffaceable dignity of personality.' Such doctrine also represents the 'supreme consecration of that sacramental principle which
is so potent a factor in the development of spiritual life.' Thus, bodily human nature, is the 'channel of communication between spirit and spirit.' In a theologically rich passage Tyrrell states that the 'sacred humanity of Christ is the sacrament of sacraments' which confers on all nature a sacramentality such that 'through Him and in union with Him' the visible order becomes the effective symbol of the invisible. This was the theological basis of the belief that prayer is bodily-spiritual act, a grace-inspired activity of the incarnate spirit, which finds its proper locus in the Church.

VON HÜGEL'S DISCUSSION OF QUIETISM AND CONTEMPLATION

Alban Goodier stated that however 'mystic-minded' the Baron was, 'we do not remember that he treats anywhere explicitly of those higher forms of prayer which are usually discussed and examined by mystical theologians.'[71] We have noted the lack of interest in those gradations of contemplative prayer found in many manuals of mystical theology. But Goodier's conclusions that the Baron was 'too much in his age and of it to lose himself in the abstract', and that he 'wrote only from experience and observation of his own', are unsatisfactory. Though St Catherine was indeed studied with the tools of modern scholarship and much of the presentation of mysticism reflects his personal interests, it bears practically and directly on the higher forms of prayer. And although the limitations imposed by his particular choice of subject are evident at many points, the central figure around which the main theme is organised, Catherine of Genoa, was preeminently a mystic given to mystical contemplation. Though his exposition of her doctrine is set in the context of a lengthy discussion of Quietism and the Pure Love
controversy there remain vital practical insights into contemplative prayer.

Though Knox maintained that Quietism was 'a direction of the human mind, not a bunch of conclusions', certain propositions can be held to characterise its mentality.[72] Von Hügel believed that the questions raised by Catherine's teaching reached their crystallization in the Quietist controversy. He noted that Catherine's craving for 'simplification and permanence of the soul's states' and the 'true Mystic's affinities' was reflected in her practice and teaching on quietude and passivity.[73] Discussing the chief quietist tendency of the one single act of the soul and its passivity in relation to God, he introduces the traditional theme of contemplation and action, distinguishing 'direct experiences, impressions, and instinctive requirements of the soul' from their psychological and philosophical elucidation.

In the mystical tradition reaching back to the patristic period von Hügel discovered a dual tendency, emphasising on the one hand the 'soul's simple receptivity', expressed in the terms 'Passivity, Fixedness, Oneness', and, on the other hand, an emphasis on grace awakening, purifying, and completing nature, such that 'every divine influx is also ever a stimulation of all the good and true energy already...present in the soul.'[74] Its characteristic terms are 'Action, Growth and Harmony.' He again affirms a crucial distinction between activity and action, the former having the connotation of feverishness and disorientation in the personality, whereas action denotes fruitful concentration, expansion, and direction of energy. He suggested that activity and action relate to each other as scruple to conscience.[75] Despite its 'demonstrably dangerous suggestions and frequently scandalous history', the term
passivity has been prominent in the reflection of Christian mystics, because of the need to express the character of givenness and grace in God's dealings with the soul in contemplative states.[76] The term action which St Thomas adopts from Aristotle is not opposed to passivity, but denotes God as the 'One Pure Act' who is 'sheer Energy, His very peace and stillness coming from the brimming fulness of His infinite life.' Since the mystical union is realised above all in contemplation, it is chiefly contemplatives who 'call forth and dwell upon this sense and presence of the Infinite and Abiding.'

The continuum on which von Hügel placed ordinary psychology and religious or mystical psychology is evident in this exposition. Contemplative states share the characteristics of all states in which the mind is absorbed, whether in some great poem or philosophy or character. In such cases 'the mind or soul energises and develops, in precise proportion as it is so absorbed in the contemplation of these various over-againstnesses' so that it ceases to notice its own action.[77] The mind is so engrossed, so keenly active, that it does not advert to its own existence, and indeed loses 'all clear consciousness of the mind's very existence.' Rather randomly, he alludes to Nelson at Trafalgar, Napoleon at Waterloo, Ignatius in the Amphitheatre, and Savanarola at the stake to illustrate his point that the 'absence of the direct consciousness of the self' is 'truly characteristic of the deepest, most creative, moments of full external action.' Applying this principle of psychology to the 'various stages and kinds of the Prayer and States of Quiet', he reiterates that such passivity, or action in his sense, is the 'condition in which the soul attains to its fullest energising.' Such 'mystic Contemplation of the Eternal' is the 'highest force of the soul.'[78] He rejects the misconception that the more divine action is
at work in such states of prayer the more the soul's action is supplanting. Rather, the divine action will 'stimulate and inform the human action' like the energy that 'pushes the tender sap-full fern-buds up through the hard, heavy ground.' The contrast is not between the number of God's acts and those of the self, but between divinely-informed acts and merely natural acts or self-seeking, sinful acts. So the harmony, simplicity and unification which characterises the soul in such a 'one-seeming Action or State' consists rather in a number of 'inter-penetrating acts and energies, all worked up into a harmonious whole', the single acts remaining 'unnoticed by the soul itself.'

Contemplation is discussed in the context of a historical sketch of the Quietist controversy, in which von Hügel's judgments are nuanced and perceptive, reflecting the vital importance of the issues, the complexity of the period and the personalities involved, and an overriding desire to learn the lessons for a contemporary understanding of mysticism. He recognised both the truth and the exaggeration contained in the main exponents of Quietism, believing they represented a distortion rather than a complete subversion of the mystical tradition.[79] Identifying the tendency to error found even in the 'approved mystics', he noted the causes which had conspired to 'arrest or deflect the analysis of most of the Mystics themselves concerning Simplicity.'[80] In addition to confusing cessation of activity with the 'very fullness of action', and mistakenly regarding interpenetrating acts as one act rather than an underlying habit informing each successive act, the Quietists also misconceived ecstasy.[81] The suspension of the senses or ligature, which has often been associated with such contemplative states of mind, led to the assumption that such a state of suspension affected the soul too.
Distinguishing the chief actors in the Quietist drama, Molinos, Fénelon, and Madame Guyon, the Baron criticises Bossuet who, on the question of passivity, was 'distinctly less normal and sober than Fénelon.' Significantly, the 'anti-mystical' Bossuet is faulted much more than Fénelon who taught that in no state does the soul lose all capacity to produce virtuous acts or vocal prayers or external exercises. Fénelon remained a considerable influence on von Hügel who described him as one of the writers 'who has helped me most directly and most copiously in my own interior life.' He defended Fénelon for clearly recognising the term passivity, as used by the sound mystics, did not denote 'an entire inaction of the will', which would be heretical, but rather contrasts with activity or 'restless, and hurried excitation.' This was precisely the Baron's position, and one for which he found ample testimony in the mystical tradition which he adumbrates with a characteristic sweep, from St Paul, the Fathers, Franciscan and Dominican mystics, and the German, Italian, French and Spanish mystics who simply unfold and concentrate the wisdom of mystics of the 'mixed type' such as Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas, and Ignatius Loyola. Placing Rome's condemnation of Quietism in the context of the Church's mystical tradition he wanted to resist the more recent suspicion of contemplation which had taken root through fear of Quietism. Though accepting that Quietism as the doctrine of the One Act and Passivity in a literal sense, was 'most rightly and necessarily condemned', he was convinced that the Prayer of Quiet, and various states and degrees of an ever-increasing predominance of Action over Activity, - an Action which is all the more the soul's very own, because the more occasioned, directed, and informed by God's action and stimulation, - these, and the other chief lines of the ancient experience and practice, remain as true, correct, and necessary as ever.
The Baron listed 'four Quietistic aberrations' which enabled these psychological and theological misconceptions to take hold. The sharpest point is that the 'error of Quietism' lay chiefly in its effective defence of 'dreamy ease', 'impatience of the necessary details of life', or 'fanatical attachment to some one mood or form of experience', errors which have 'ravaged not a few wills and souls.'[85] The standard accounts of Quietism support his historical analysis.[86] The earliest use of the term Quietists in its invidious sense, found in Naples in 1682, was directed against those who had forsaken external and imaginative elements of spirituality 'through the misapplication of spiritual Quiet and Passivity'. The neglect of vocal prayer and the institutional elements of religion was the first abuse fostered by Quietism. Stressing the relationship of contemplation to other forms of prayer, the Christian life in general, and the role of the Church as 'one of the chief means for avoiding delusion', he invoked the wise example of St Teresa. Thus, 'if the prayer of quiet will give special colour, depth, and unity to those more contingent-seeming practices, these practices will, in return, give a particular definiteness, content, and creaturely quality to that prayer.' This is why the Church had repeatedly and 'most wisely condemned the suppression of all vocal prayer in even the highest states of perfection', though he admitted it would be difficult to find evidence that every mystic or Desert Father had maintained this balance.[87]

The second Quietist abuse concerned the relationship between contemplation and action which had preoccupied so many of the Fathers and spiritual writers. Von Hügel recognised the danger of 'disobedience and singularity' in over-emphasising the mystical element, but equally appreciated the danger of 'distraction and absorption away from the Unum
Necessarium of the soul.'[88] He felt that Grou exemplified the right balance between the prayer of Quiet and vigorous critical work on the Greek and Latin classics throughout the mystical period of his life. This 'sobriety in prayer' reflected a 'wholesome natural interest and action, and a deep supernatural interest and action' which overcomes both 'fanaticism' and 'puritanism'.[89] Thus, 'attachment and cultivation' and 'detachment and renouncement' will ensure both spaciousness and depth in the Christian life and prayer. He used the image of the honey-gathering bee to express the relationship between prayer and action. It contains his most characteristic themes: balance, tension and fruitfulness:

The great rule is, Variety up to the verge of dissipation: Recollection up to the verge of emptiness: each alternating with the other and making a rich fruitful tension. Thus we gather honey from all sorts of flowers, then sort out, arrange, unify and store, the honey gathered. After which we again fly out on our honey-gathering expeditions.[90]

The image is reminiscent of St Teresa's description of the bee 'constantly flying about from flower to flower', which she links specifically to growth in self-knowledge and humility.

Using the example of Fénelon and Augustine, 'deeply recollected men' who were yet immensely active, the Baron teaches that contemplation does not require extreme 'other-worldliness'. He found his niece's openness to the good and beautiful a rare and precious gift, a kind of 'deep faith - a true prayer.'[91] He wanted her to mix this attitude with a habit of 'little exclamations of gratitude, of union with, of adoration of God, present in all this truth, beauty, and goodness.' Despite emphasising the sacraments, spiritual reading, and vocal prayer, prayer of quiet and the call to recollection have priority. In the struggle for this 'true grace', this 'Prayer of simple Quiet', there are two stages: the striving to drive away all the distractions that would prevent it, and 'a living,
somehow self-acting recollection - with God, His peace, power and presence, right in the midst of this rose of spiritual fragrance."[92] It is essentially a quiet loving of God freeing one from excessive self-preoccupation.

The Baron spoke frequently of this 'simple Prayer of Quiet', hoping that she would be given 'touches, short dawns, of it, now and then.'[93] Goodier claimed that the Baron used this term 'prayer of quiet' in a sense different from Bossuet, Olier or St Teresa.[94] However, Teresa's own use of the phrase was not entirely clear or consistent.[95] For the Baron, it is silent, recollective, 'formless prayer' which is a 'deep grace' and, with a typically florid phrase, 'a darling force and still joy for the soul.'[96] As the beginning of contemplative prayer, where stillness, rest and joy become dominant under the impulse of grace, the term, as he uses it, does reflect the experience of the Catholic tradition.[97]

The Baron felt that Catherine's healthy, fruitful absorption in prayer was a 'particularly deep Prayer of Quiet' or Prayer of Union.[98] Accepting her biographer's description of these states as 'ecstasies', though Catherine herself did not speak of them so, his analysis of these states of absorption is significant for grasping the nature of contemplative union. They are 'times when the conscious region of her soul, a region always relatively shallow, sinks down into the ever-present deep regions of subconsciousness.' These absorptions constitute the 'moments of the soul's feeding and harmonization' which enrich and concentrate it for the service of others or for further growth. Such experiences, marked by fruitfulness as well as obscurity, give to her sayings a 'beautiful margin of mist and mystery', a sense of incomprehensibility, but also a sense of the soul's capacity for
'intellectual adumbration', of the truths in which our whole spiritual life is rooted. Though such experiences of depth possess cognitive value, Catherine's own description are 'strangely abstract and impersonal.' The precise relationship between the conscious and subconscious life of the individual was a problem for von Hügel. He felt drawn to find 'direct divine impulsion and illumination', within or outside prayer, only during some form of consciousness, and to discover in subconscious states only 'an indirect divine action.' But he confessed he was open to modification on this: 'the undeniable strength infused into the soul, at times, when apparently subconscious only, gives me pause.' It is likely he wanted to express the truth that contemplation is the ever deeper interior penetration of the individual by means of what Johnston calls 'vertical thinking' as contrasted with 'horizontal thinking.'

The third Quietist abuse centres on the contempt or neglect of morality. Von Hügel exculpates both Fénelon and Madame Guyon in this regard, though he knew their exaggerated teaching on the 'inwardness' of religion was open to misinterpretation as a rejection of norms of outward conduct. His statement of the true position is succinct; the body of an action does matter as well as its spirit. What the contemplative aims for is not the 'supersession of morality' but its deeper development and integration. Such prayer will be accompanied by growth in the virtues. He felt the prayer of quiet would make his niece 'humbler, sweeter, more patient, more ready to suffer, more loving...towards God and man.' But it cannot be attained without moral striving: 'a homely heroism will feed this prayer of speechless love; and the speechless love will feed the homely heroism.' Thus, he decisively rejects not only any separation between prayer and action in general, but between contemplation and moral endeavour in particular.
The fourth abuse relates to what he calls a 'hardly classifiable' fanaticism resulting from the Quietist errors: the recorded death of a young German Lutheran girl seeking to imitate the crucifixion. It may be felt that the presentation of such an unusual example would have been unnecessary to bring out the 'strength and weakness of Quietism.' More importantly, he concludes with the crucial distinction of his whole argument, between a 'wrongly understood Quiet and Passivity', or 'Quietism in its unfavourable, condemned sense', and true contemplation with its necessary quietude and passivity. Kirk judged this one of the Baron's chief contributions to mystical theology.

The Baron's judgment that Quietism accentuated the 'least satisfactory' explanatory elements the 'older Mystics', reflecting the adverse influence of neo-Platonism, is basically sound. But he still felt that Quietism acknowledged some of the basic needs of the individual soul, such as thirst for 'Unity, - Unification, Synthesis, Harmonisation' when faced with an atomised world, the need for a balance between attachment and detachment, mistakenly met by an excess of the latter. In addition, Quietism meets the intense spiritual need for concentration and absorption by stressing a 'profound and spiritually renovating sense of God.' He believed that Quietism realised this need was 'ignored and starved in the lives of most religious souls', though erroneously adopting another extreme, making this 'inarticulateness and wise indirectness of striving' into the sole test of the religious life. Lastly, the individual's honest acceptance of dependence on God for growth in the virtues is duly recognised by Quietism but wrongly understood as God supplanting rather than directing that activity. Quietism is thus seen to be a distorted response to genuine spiritual needs correctly perceived. Against these distortions, true prayer, even in
the most advanced souls, will be characterised by a series of correct emphases: a right multiplicity and attachment; an acceptance of images, thoughts, feelings, and external acts as necessary stimulations for a 'wise strengthening prayer or states of Quiet'; a right personal initiative and responsibility as the means for God's activity. Fear of Quietism must not undermine a positive acceptance of the rest and passivity central to contemplative prayer. He cites St Thomas lamenting for the just soul who 'ever seeks God and never tarries to enjoy Him'.

A further question which casts light on the nature of contemplation is that of Pure Love or Disinterested Religion. For the Quietist, the single perfect act of the perfect soul must necessarily be an act of pure love. Rejecting the doctrine of pure love in its extreme form, von Hügel accepts a 'moderate and solid Pure-Love teaching' which acknowledges that if the interior life is a continuous stream of countless and various acts, then pure love must actually inform all of those acts.[106] This is the very 'culmination of the interior life' which can only be understood by replacing an abstract conception with an 'incarnational and synthetic one.' He does this in the light of New Testament teaching and the Pure Love controversy in the seventeenth century. St Thomas is also discussed at some length as the Baron establishes the position that all souls in a state of grace have some 'incidental beginnings of Pure Love' and the progress of all consists in the degree to which the variety of the soul's acts become 'informed and commanded by the supreme motive of all motives, Pure and Perfect Love.' Such pure love is characterised by the desire to give rather than to receive, though this purity is attained not only by the 'prayer of formless abstraction and expectation', but also by the contemplation of the contingencies of our God-given nature. It is not simply the degree
of disoccupation with the contingent, but the degree of freedom from self-seeking and the harmonising of these contingencies under the motive of pure love that is the 'standard and test of Christian perfection.'

In determining the relationship between pure love and contemplation, he is content to adopt the teaching of Abbé Gosselin and Fénelon both of whom he quotes at some length. If 'there is no true Contemplation without much Pure Love, there can be much Pure Love without Contemplation.' [107] Here he articulates an important distinction between contemplation and meditation, understood as distinctive 'discursive acts' which are the ordinary foundation of the interior life. The former consists in 'non-reflex acts' which are 'so simple and peaceful as to have nothing salient by which the soul could distinguish one from another.' This is the 'simple and loving look' described by the mystical saints, the 'ordinary prayer of perfect souls, or at least of those that have already made much progress in the divine love.' Fénelon maintained that passivity, or action in von Hügel's terms, was not precisely pure love but the 'mode in which Pure Love operates': it is not the purity of love but the effect of that purity. But the Baron also concedes Gosselin's point that even without contemplation the soul can arrive at a 'very high perfection', though all prayer which is effective often includes direct acts which 'form an admixture and beginning of contemplation.'

Fénelon's thought on this question is also judged authoritative. Passive contemplation is pure contemplation whereas active contemplation is mixed with hurried and discursive acts. When contemplation ceases to have this hurry and activity it becomes passive, or peaceful in its acts. Again, this is not empty passivity but a 'free and loving look of the soul' (both adverbs are important) which is also an act of
understanding.[108] This contemplative state is wrought by God, but not without our cooperation. So, 'the substance of such Passive Prayer, taken in its specific acts, is free, meritorious, and operated within us by a grace that acts together with us.' The Baron concludes that such spirituality allows a real continuity between origins and goal, whatever changes of degree and form may be apparent.

Although he referred to acquired and infused contemplation and held that some individuals were called to contemplation as a 'special vocation, the Baron stressed the 'Mystical way' as a progressive deepening of the 'dim experience of the Infinite' into 'various degrees of the Prayer of quiet and of Union.'[109] His approach is unlikely to satisfy those seeking crystal clarity or mathematical precision in describing the mystical journey. His emphasis lay rather on the uniqueness of each individual's way to that perfection, and the closely woven texture of all spiritual experience from the lowest to the highest. Though there are indeed different moments and degrees it is the same God acting throughout the life of prayer.[110] Turning finally to St Thomas, Gregory Nazianzen and Fénelon, von Hügel concludes with the assertion that however the doctrine of pure love may be misused, 'the very perfection of Christianity is Pure Love.'[111] And it is this emphasis on Pure Love which, according to St Thomas, is a 'certain participation in the Infinite Love, which is the Holy Spirit', that is one of the marks of Christian contemplation as distinct from all 'Neo-Platonic static abstractions.'
TYRRELL ON CONTEMPLATION AND ACTION

Unlike the Baron, Tyrrell did not dwell on Quietism in his treatment of mysticism, though one of his reviews of *The Mystical Element* expressed his basic thought on the controversy and its lessons for contemporary mysticism. He too distinguished the condemned elements of Quietism from those which remained valid. He held that the 'Quietist tendency...towards a complete simplification and reduction of the spiritual life to one act, or sort of act...the immediate act of God...received passively by the uplooking, silent, expectant soul, and identifying it with God' was 'characteristic of mysticism.'[112] He too drew a distinction between the Quietist experience and the false analyses of it, and identified its aberration as the confusion of 'fullness of energising' with utter stillness, by which he meant an unprogressive state or static rest. The absorption of the 'quietistic state', can easily be misinterpreted. Agreeing with von Hügel, he suggested that the occurrence of quasi-cataleptic states of 'ecstatic concentration', with its bodily stillness and rapt attention, may have led to the false assumption of an inward stillness or catalepsy. Citing Ribot's psychology of attention he claimed that precisely the opposite was the case.[113]

Tyrrell believed that the Quietism condemned by Rome was the 'analysis not the thing'.[114] But he also believed that Quietism erred in practice by its 'depreciation of religious reasoning' and the 'institutonal interests of the Church', though its contempt for theology is described, characteristically for Tyrrell, with manifest sympathy. Quietism represented a perennial tendency in mysticism against multiplicity, atomism and externalism, in the direction of a 'complete and renovating immersion in God', insisting on the givenness of all religious
experience. Only an insistence on the inseparability of the three elements of religion balances an exaggerated stress on inwardness. This critique is simply extended to the Pure Love doctrine which is also held to rest rather on excessive inwardness and 'false analysis'. Fénelon was right in protesting against gross and lower self-regard since true love of God necessarily ignores the claims of individual selfhood, but allowing the mystic to express an exaggerated willingness to be damned ignores the truth that the essence of eternal loss is an absence of love and an unacceptable indifference to God's glory.

Though the Prayer of Quiet featured only briefly in Tyrrell's early essays on mysticism and in passages gathered into Essays on Faith and Immortality, he sketches a progression from religion in its infancy, which he characterised as 'speechless and inactive', to religion which becomes 'vocal and articulate' in explicit worship.[115] Such developed religion prays with mental understanding and the body; it is the worship of the image of God reflected in the individual. But when the realisation dawns that this is a mirrored reflection, the soul is in sorrow and discontent since it now knows that 'He is so near us, yet ever behind us.' It is as though the soul has come full circle since 'religion in its deepest exercise becomes voiceless and inarticulate once more, as in its infancy, yet how differently!' The contrast is between the 'negative simplicity of childhood' and this 'dear-bought simplicity and lowliness of spiritual maturity.' Such maturity expresses itself in the prayer of quiet in which the soul rests 'like a babe in the arms of God', where it is 'passive, silent dependent, saying nothing.' Tyrrell is speaking of 'voiceless, wordless converse', the Prayer of Quiet of which à Kempis wrote. The author of the Imitation, from which Tyrrell quotes, prayed for oneness with God in uninterrupted love, a desire springing
from a weariness with all thought and images and a craving for peace and silence. Tyrrell's comment is that such weary prayer has an 'inseparable sense of unreality and distance from God.' But in making progress on the spiritual journey, the individual 'longs for the voiceless prayer of inward quiet and repose, of dynamic union with the will and life of God.' This twofold experience is usually taken to indicate the call to deeper, silent, more contemplative prayer. And such prayer is itself not simply the means to union with God. This voiceless contemplative prayer of inward repose, at its deepest level, is the mystical union.

Tyrrell's account of contemplative prayer suffered from the erratic unpredictability of his mind and the intellectual shift from the relative stability of a scholastic theological framework to a more uncertain religious philosophy, further complicated by an increasingly embittered criticism of many aspects of the Christian spiritual tradition. Though not denying the 'contemplative nisus', he maintained it was not obligatory: 'I verily believe this is the teaching of Jesus Christ; and I don't believe the Apostles knew of meditation, or contemplation or the prayer of quiet or any other prayer than the Pater Noster i.e. petition for the welfare of man.[116] He also claimed that what he called the 'current view' was a result of 'Neo-Platonism reinforced by scholastic intellectualism', and he was sure it would 'all pass away.' Though some of the distinctions in mystical theology appear relatively late in Christian history, such a statement is hardly a balanced judgment. The discussion which follows owes more to Tyrrell's considered reflections than to stray remarks.

Tyrrell agreed with von Hügel that contemplation was a particularly intense form of action. This action, which surpasses the exercise of
every virtue, is an apprehension by 'gazing fixedly on God as the Source and Sum of all goodness and excellence.' It contrasts with Ignatian meditation and any prayer which involves gazing upon some concrete incident in order to draw practical fruit from it. Tyrrell would have accepted Guardini's formulation that in contemplation 'our mode of thinking changes' since such prayer has the 'tendency to become ever simpler and more silent.' Though the term contemplation has been applied to imaginative meditation, (it was in this sense that St Ignatius used the term), what Tyrrell rightly calls the 'more ancient sense of the word', indicates rather 'an action which is an end in itself, the highest kind of action whereof the soul is capable' and to which all other prayer is directed. And though love is the fruit of such contemplation, it also defines contemplation 'in the stricter mystical sense of the term.' Rejecting what he called 'morbid quietism', a deadening of the mind and affections, his mysticism of love requires contemplation to be an act of love too. Tyrrell claimed that 'the eternal unchanging life of the soul, both here and hereafter, consists in an action which may be described almost indifferently as "contemplative love" or as "loving contemplation."' Thus, 'Love is itself a contemplative act', the mind's gazing on that which is its food and eternal life.

Tyrrell believed that if constant successive acts of love are secondary to an 'habitual, deep-down, unconscious love of God, which from time to time is awakened into consciousness', then 'the active and the contemplative life are both lives of unbroken love.' The former consists largely of actions which spring from love, whereas in the latter these conscious acts are its direct and principal aim. Since in the Christian spiritual tradition Martha and Mary have been taken to exemplify this distinction, it was natural that Tyrrell should exploit
the typology suggested by the text of Luke 10.39f. He claims not only that Mary's was a privileged vocation not for exact imitation by all, but also that her example must not be taken as a justification for a prayer which seeks to empty the mind or which withdraws from reading, social life or action, or God's creation, in pursuit of 'external solitude and internal vacancy.' Tyrrell is claiming that not everyone is called to the specific contemplative life as institutionalised within the Church. By 'aptitude and vocation' the contemplative is called to 'sit at the feet of Christ and gaze up into His face.' But if the end of all contemplative prayer is the kindling of love, the 'fuel of this flame is the whole world of God's creation and providence' to which we have access through observation, reflection and action. This requires discipline and a training of the powers of reflection, attention and concentration.

Tyrrell retained enough respect for the Ignatian method to claim that fertility of imagination, properly disciplined and integrated, remained a powerful aid to contemplative prayer in which we ascend from all that is good and God-like in creation to its source and origin. So there will be alternation rather than separation, a combination of inner and outer activity, though the 'spiritual element - the inner face of action - is the principal...the unum necessarium.'[122] He insisted that contemplation was neither 'mere rest' nor 'mere idleness'. Nonetheless, Mary's sitting and listening 'symbolizes a certain restfulness of soul which is the essential condition of inward hearing' where the memory and attention are quietened and in a 'patient expectancy' and contentment one waits on God. There is no clear Hügelian distinction between action and activity, but certainly a contrast between passive, empty, rest and intense, fruitful energy or action. Though such action issues in certain observable effects, it is itself marked by 'stillness and steadfastness.'
So the terms action and contemplation must be used with caution to avoid distortion. To deny the value of activity other than contemplation would weaken and impoverish the very faculties which are exercised in prayer. In moving from a notional to a real apprehension of God, what Tyrrell calls 'piecing together an ever fuller image of God from the fragments of divinity scattered among creatures', prayer itself becomes more fruitful.[123] He resolved the relation of contemplation and action with the same image used by von Hügel. The one who desires prayer 'must be as the bee, alternating between its cell and the flower-world outside; now industriously amassing new matter, now building up what it has amassed; often abroad, yet only that its home hours may be more fruitful.'[124] Tyrrell felt the great achievement of Francis de Sales was to establish an Order in which 'action was to minister to and secure the health of contemplation.' Such contemplation was no mere diversion but a 'direct means or instrument' for forming the soul by a 'healthful balance of its faculties' and for feeding its thought with the 'fuel of experience.'[125]

Referring to the 'homes of contemplation' which have furthered civilisation and rational development, Tyrrell claims that true contemplation fosters rather than dries up the personality. The great masters of contemplative prayer, Augustine, Jerome, Basil, Gregory, Bernard, Aquinas, and Anselm, for example, were also deeply involved in the intellectual life of their day. The retreat or withdrawal of the Christian is a rejection of dissipation in pursuit of concentration, serving life, not death. Whatever expands the mind serves contemplation since 'to starve the mind and then to lock it up in a cell to contemplate God would be to expect bricks without straw.'[126]
Tyrrell believes that the contemplative simply does 'more continuously, intensely, and perfectly only what all servants of God do from time to time in brief liftings-up of the mind to God.'[127] He sought to articulate the nature of contemplation 'in the stricter or mystical sense' to remove the common misapprehensions surrounding it. Despite a certain ambivalence, his insistence that contemplation was properly an end in itself partly reflected his critique of an excessive stress on mental prayer. More positively, contemplation is 'the sovereign end of all prayer and life.' Moreover, at this stage in his life, before the rigorously anti-intellectual strain began to dominate his thinking, Tyrrell was still happy to assert that 'the appetite of the mind is for Truth', and that the highest and best life consists in a 'full knowledge of the Best.' This is a solidly Thomist notion found, for instance, in the writing of Bishop Hedley and it has its roots in Western mystical theology.[128] The movement of the mind to the Eternal Mind, eternal life as 'gazing upon God's Face', 'Joy at beholding Him who is the Truth', are descriptions which represent and evoke an energising not only of the will and affections but of the mind. This is the act of contemplation which is 'a sort of anticipation of the future life of vision', and which culminates in the visio Dei.[129] Since the eternal life of heaven is one of contemplation and praise, 'man touches his highest here on earth when for some brief moment he anticipates Heaven and dwells in loving wonder on the features of Divine Truth.'[130] Expressing the distinction between contemplation and meditation, he asserted that the former was an 'unprogressive act of the mind, involving no process or discourse or change.'[131] He observed that such a concept was increasingly unintelligible to modern philosophy which tended to identify life and action with movement and 'getting on', and the notion of eternal rest or vision as little more than negation of consciousness and activity.
Turning directly to the object of contemplation, Tyrrell was critical of the inadequate and contradictory distinction between 'God in Himself' and God as the 'Source and Cause of the affections He produces in our mind and heart.' At best the claim to know God in himself evokes the 'mystery of that union of the beatified spirit with God in Himself' which is called, by analogy, knowledge or vision. The truth is that 'on earth, God can be contemplated only as the hidden source of His works.' This principle has wide implications, not least in determining a right attitude to material creation. It also allows Tyrrell to articulate a view of contemplation familiar in strands of the patristic tradition. To speak of 'self-contemplation' is to invite misunderstanding, though it evokes the intimate link between self-knowledge and knowledge of God, formulating a truth accepted by Athanasius, that 'the soul is the mirror wherein, according as its capacities are more and more unfolded and realized' we see the fullest finite revelation of God.

Since, 'the soul's centre is God', as John of the Cross put it, this in itself justifies an immanent approach to the divine which takes as its point of departure the depth and interiority of the individual where God himself is revealed. The God who is contemplated is present in the depths of the soul, and becomes accessible to human experience, especially through contemplative acts. This was what he meant by 'sustained ecstatic acts proper to mystic contemplation.' Tyrrell sees a process of movement and growth, speaking of 'mystical contemplation of whatever degree', and a progression from 'practical contemplation' to an acts of 'theoria' or 'speculative contemplation'. The contemplative quest is to 'enrich the significance of the word "God"...by observation, meditation, and reflection', which clearly suggests a qualitative growth in knowledge. Thus, God contemplated with the 'deepest feelings of
humble awe, wonder, praise, and love', such that the individual ultimately finds his best and most unselfish happiness in contemplative love.

The rest of Tyrrell's discussion of contemplation returns to Pater's study of Plato and neo-Platonism, particularly the concept of *Pure Being.* Reshaping the definition of *Pure Being*, Tyrrell states that it is the 'most concrete of all conceptions', denoting not emptiness, but composition and fullness. The descriptions of both void and fullness resemble each other, creating a confusion of terminology which is to be expected when mystics seek to record their experiences. Agreeing with von Hügel, Tyrrell remarks that 'it cannot be denied that Christian mystics and contemplatives have frequently failed in the analysis of their own mental processes and have laid themselves open to the false charge of nihilism.' It is necessary to distinguish 'pseudo-mystic contemplation' the object of which is the void, from 'true contemplative knowledge' derived from the 'positive idea of the Fullness of Being.' In the former contemplation the mind most nearly attains conscious annihilation, thinking of nothing, lacking any sense of rest and quiet. He dismisses such unconsciousness, negative, hypnotic rest as the pseudo-mysticism of the East and of the 'quietists of all times and varieties.' Such has the same attraction as 'narcotics and sedatives' and is in sharp contrast to what he calls the 'Christian quietist' and the 'fervent love of the saints.' The mental act which the 'Fullness of Being' calls forth is one of 'supreme concentration and simplicity' which issues in knowledge in its highest and fullest sense, a tranquil resting of the mind in the all-satisfying fruit of its labours.' Opposing the extreme passivity of Quietism, or any notion of gazing into the void, Tyrrell tends to create the impression that the attainment of contemplative knowledge is the result of sheer mental effort or will-power, speaking
of 'the truth won at the cost of thinking and comparing and putting together.' This 'voluntarist' strain is generally balanced by reference to the need for grace and the sacraments, though at this point the emphasis definitely fell on contemplation as the 'fullest of all thoughts' and the 'most intense action of self-realisation of the soul.'

From the psychological point of view, contemplation is marked by a lack of process, the absence of comparison, building up or dissecting, and the 'perpetuated wonder and joy of the first shock of vision' with no sense of weariness or satiety.[137] Tyrrell finds confirmation in St Augustine's description of such 'contemplative rest and joy in the thought of God', quoting at length from the Confessions.[138] This is an act by which 'the soul eternes itself', whether in a brief vision of God grasped through his creation or the 'unending face-to-face contemplation of the Blessed in Heaven.' The soul that sees God 'brings forth in itself the likeness of God.' The whole purpose of life is to see and know God, not with speculative knowledge but with the real knowledge that comes from a life shared, a knowledge inseparable from love. One must recall here all that has been said about the sense of the Infinite, the all-embracing nature of contact with God and the engagement of the 'spiritual senses' which operate as a mode of insight or enoptike in the patristic sense of contemplation. Against a false mysticism in which God is 'the very ghost of an abstraction' and where contemplation 'hypnotises the mind' through a 'sterile, negative purification', Tyrrell affirmed a more 'positive purification' which consisted in the exclusion of darkness by the introduction of every kind of light and a pure, deep love.[139]
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ECSTASY

Tyrrell rejected any radical discontinuity between contemplation and more basic forms of prayer which dispose and prepare us for 'those moments in which we simply rest and gaze upon the fruit of our labours, upon the simple thought of God Himself which has been slowly generated within us.'\(^*\) In this connection he deals briefly with ecstasy. He claims that if 'in every case the act of love is at least incipiently ecstatic', it must also be allowed that there is a connection between mysticism as a rich and real 'sense of God' and mysticism which implies a 'certain involuntary rapture in which the whole attention is wrested from everything else by the thought of God'. But the difference derives as much from the variety of individual temperament as divine activity.

He claimed that the continuity between the 'ordinary Christian's simple act of love' and 'the ecstasies of the saints' was a matter of observation and experience.\(^*\) If even the contemplation of a fair landscape or sunset absorbs our consciousness to the annihilation of time, still more does the sole thought of God captivate the mind to the 'oblivion of self and of all beside.' If there are common moments of fruition, when a void is filled by intense consciousness, leaving a sense of timeless, eternal joy, how much more is this true of the joy of God, the consciousness of his fulness of Being, the knowing and loving experienced by the saints on earth. Such is the joy that contemplation secures on earth when the 'spellbound mind' is fixed on the thought of God such that 'time and the things of time' seem non-existent.\(^*\)

By analogy, Tyrrell appeals to the common experience of an intense state which has 'rapt the soul out of itself, absorbing all consciousness of time and of everything else, interior and exterior.' He regards these
brief "ecstasies" as 'common and normal' and, significantly, little different from those of the mystic, 'save as to their object, frequency, and duration.' There is a parallel with the experience of sudden fright or joy where the soul is paralyzed because all its energies are gathered to one point. But the crucial truth is that 'at that point all is energy and activity, though without movement or progress'; there is simple rest in the object of the mind.

Tyrrell rejected the neo-Platonic tendency to treat ecstasy as an 'act of a distinct faculty of the mind.'[143] In addition, he dismissed other mistaken notions of ecstasy, distinguishing a 'true ec-stasis' from the false notion of 'stasis or stupefaction'.[144] A truer concept of ecstasy evokes the all-embracing and intense manner in which the concentrated attention of the mind is directed to its object and the way in which it is absorbed and captured to the effective exclusion of all else, even the consciousness of self. However, Tyrrell seemed to remain uneasy with such a notion, especially if taken as an ideal to be pursued. If ecstasy is understood as the 'entire absorption of consciousness by some vivid object, to the destruction of explicit self-consciousness and of all sense of time or of other things', it is not a point of perfection but rather of imperfection which reflects our inability to concentrate intensely on more than one point.[145] Thus the Beatific Vision of the saints cannot be thought of as 'strictly ecstatic' since the fullest self-knowledge and self-consciousness co-exist with the vision of God. Christian contemplation lays the stress on the 'intense consciousness of God' rather than complete absence of self-consciousness. It is in this sense that ecstasy must be understood. Tyrrell emphasises not its psycho-physical concomitants, but rather the gathering up of consciousness and its absorption in this one thought which is a
'foretaste of the absolute unchanging rest of the face-to-face vision in Heaven.'[146] Such abnormal intensity of the interior act, though a frequent occurrence in saints and contemplatives, may simply be the result of psychical weakness, so that in stronger souls the more intense love may remain unecstatic. So, Tyrrell suggests that abstraction, like distraction, may indicate not the strength, but rather the limitation of the human mind. The conclusion is that the Christian 'never regards ecstasy as more than a psychical accident, or as even of any particular value as an index of sanctity.'

Von Hügel's position was essentially the same. In terms of a progression from prayer of quiet to 'absorptions of an approximately ecstatic type' the latter bear some resemblance to the absorptions of the philosopher, musician or poet.[147] But what he called 'mere psycho-physical forms and phenomena of ecstasy, of vision, of hearing voices' were not considered a necessary sign of sanctity. Like Tyrrell, he believed ecstasy owed more to a 'peculiar psycho-physical organisation' than personal holiness. He traced this particularly in the temperament and 'neural constitution' of both St Catherine and St Teresa, but found it also in other saints like Maria de Pazzi, Margaret Mary Alacoque, Catherine of Siena and Francis of Assisi. Von Hügel also discovered the association of ecstasy and madness, 'a sacred madness', in Plato's description of the ecstatic orgiastic worship of Dionysius Sabasios, though Farges expressed horror at the very suggestion of such a connection.[148] But the presence of ecstasies, visions, and voices among the mentally disturbed was taken by von Hügel precisely as confirmation that such phenomena were secondary in the lives of the saints. Within a Christian perspective such phenomena are to be accepted 'only in proportion as they convey some spiritual truth of importance to
it or to others, and as they actually help it to become more humble, true, and loving.'[149] Though saints who experienced such ecstasies were doubtless braced by them and helped by the interior light thus gained, the significance of such states lies beyond their psycho-somatic manifestations. The Baron maintains that even though most of the Christian ecstasies of history were probably happier, richer, more fruitful in religious truth and holiness with the help of such ecstatic states, the 'psycho-physical forms' are always less important than the 'spiritual-ethical content' of such phenomena.[150] The test for assessing the value of such experiences will be that adopted by St Teresa, following the wisdom of the mystical tradition in general: the effects or fruits in the practical moral life. Thus, 'this doctrine is still the last word of wisdom in these matters.'[151]

In their assessment of ecstasy both von Hügel and Tyrrell are found to be on one side of a divide among mystical theologians of the period. Evelyn Underhill, having originally noted three distinct aspects of ecstasy: physical, psychological and mystical, observed in her 1930 edition of Mysticism that 'no responsible student now identifies the mystic and the ecstatic', and cited William James as having disentangled the substance of mystical apprehension from its 'psycho-physical accidents'.[152] From within a Christian theological perspective von Hügel and Tyrrell made their own contribution to this clarification. They were aware that 'the classical Christian mystics have always recognised the ambiguous nature of these phenomena.'[153] Most writers of the time, like von Hügel and Tyrrell, disagreed with Poulain's assessment of ecstasy as a vital or necessary stage to mystical union though not discounting its possibility, and indeed its recurrence among many of the Church's orthodox mystics. As representative of this emerging view,
Johnston records de Guibert's position that ecstasy was no more than an occasional and unimportant by-product of the second stage of mystical prayer due to physical or psychical weakness.[154] Von Hügel and Tyrrell would have accepted this view, and the claim of Francis de Sales that 'there are many saints in heaven who were never in ecstasy nor rapture of contemplation.'[155]

Von Hügel and Tyrrell adopted a position now acceptable to many authors, though Farges would have regarded it as an example of reductionism.[156] The essence of ecstasy is a 'passionate concentration on God and a sense that one is outside of oneself for absorption in God.'[157] They accepted that in the contemplative experience of union, the attention is captured to the temporary exclusion of all else, what Ribot called 'a single state of enormous intensity.'[158] The whole person centres on God's presence which produces a 'psycho-synthetic effect throughout the various levels of the person's being.'[159] Whether there is any suspension of the faculties of sense or external psycho-physical phenomena is secondary, though in Christian tradition the association has often been assumed. Thus, for Augustine, 'when the attention of the mind is completely averted and withdrawn from the senses of the body, it is more especially called ecstasy.'[160] If the eyes do not see physical objects and no sounds are heard, this is what Maréchal called the 'empirical negativity', as distinct from the 'transcendental positivity', of ecstasy: the physical and psychological characteristics which accompany the withdrawal of the mind from the external world.

Von Hügel and Tyrrell accepted the experience of the mind's absorption in the highest form of contemplation, with its essential note
of passivity, properly understood. But since they laid great stress on the intensity of energising action in contemplation, the link between spirit and sense, the apprehension of the Divine by the whole person, external senses as well as the 'interior senses', they remained critical of any excessive turning away from the external world of sense or an over-evaluation of ecstasy understood as suspension of the senses. There must be no rejection of the bodiliness of prayer which an excessive stress on ecstasy would sanction. Contemplative prayer finds its place within human activity in its bodily-spiritual totality as an act of the incarnate spirit. This rootedness of prayer in human nature points to the need for asceticism, a right attitude to the body, and a need for self-discipline and spiritual training. We must now look at the ascetical principles von Hügel and Tyrrell considered vital to mysticism.
CHAPTER SEVEN

ASCETICISM AND MYSTICISM

THE THEOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES OF CHRISTIAN ASCETICISM

The formal articulation of a division between ascetical and mystical theology is usually ascribed to the Italian Jesuit Scaramelli in the middle of the seventeenth century. The division reflects to some extent the more ancient distinction between the active life and the contemplative life. The idea of the 'two ways' thus became a clear and rigid separation between what should be complementary dimensions of the spiritual life. Though modern authors have used the terms in a variety of ways, since Arintero and Garrigou-Lagrange there has been greater willingness to accept the complementary nature of these two dimensions of the Christian life. So, even though such a distinction may have a basis at the existential level, a unified view of the spiritual life embraces both aspects, since 'mysticism cannot be understood — much less experienced — without a concomitant asceticism, and any authentic Christian asceticism contains within itself the seeds of the mystical experience.'[1]

In the writings of von Hügel and Tyrrell there are not only scattered references to such questions but a systematic attention to the problem of asceticism and its place in the Christian life. It becomes clear that the concepts of asceticism, spiritual discipline, purification, mortification and suffering evoke themes central to their understanding of mysticism. Though neither adopted the schemes developed by some
theologians of mysticism, they did accept that just as prayer was essential to attain mystical union, so too was asceticism.[2]

Examining their critique of neo-Platonism, we noted that von Hügel and Tyrrell believed an alien, distorting element had been at work at various points within the Christian spiritual tradition. This was especially true on the question of asceticism and the attitude to the human body. Consequently their treatment of ascēsis and its relation to mysticism is presented as an attempt to redress a balance at the heart of Christian theology. Kirk maintained that ‘the whole dualist, ascetic school of thought had been frightened of the body and its passions, and had tried to make men “live like angels”’. [3] He felt St Thomas above all had restored a more Christian view by asserting the value of the human body, not as the tomb of the soul, but as a God-given endowment by which the individual expresses himself. But the problem of a true estimation of the body has recurred time and again in Christian history up to the present day, particularly with regard to the theology of the spiritual life.[4] Von Hügel acknowledged the attraction of a ‘strongly anti-body idea’ which he explained by reference to ‘Neo-Platonist literary influence’.[5] Both he and Tyrrell were aware that a truly Christian asceticism demanded a correct understanding of the body, not as the prison house of the soul, but the means by which the individual experiences himself as belonging not only to the physical, material world but the world of spirit.

As usual in von Hügel’s thought, vital distinctions and clarifications are indicated by the choice of adjectives. Accepting that 'a noble asceticism' is essential to the spiritual life, it must be a 'large and deep asceticism' with a 'mild amount of austerities' which are
integral to any 'virile religion.'[6] Even if one's attract does not require 'large bodily mortifications', prayer will greatly benefit from such 'virile asceticism' or 'much renunciation of facile pleasures'. That there is something difficult, painful, and demanding in the Christian way was taken by the Baron as a matter of fact and experience. He stressed repeatedly the centrality of the cross, renunciation and suffering as vital experiences in the Christian life. But such renunciation was always seen as a source of great joy, since it sprang from a sense that Christ himself had shown it as his way.

One of von Hügel's deepest convictions was that 'Christianity is a heroism', in no sense a 'wishy-washy sentimental affair.'[7] Thus, Christ teaches a great austerity. He teaches renunciation: the life of the Cross. He was not comfy. He had nowhere to lay his head. He was no rigorist, yet he tells us to die to ourselves, to take up the Cross, to follow him...Christianity is coming back to renunciation, and to right asceticism and austerity. That is what Our Lord teaches. If you don't see that in the Gospels, I don't see what you see.[8]

But he was also concerned to express the correct motive behind fruitful suffering and was critical of those who had 'concentrated only on the Cross: Christianity is the whole life of Christ.' There was not only mortification, suffering and sacrifice culminating in the cross, but also a great life of 'touching humility and love.' Thus, 'I like a balanced Christianity: Christianity is so balanced.' On one occasion he characterised the balance he was seeking as 'Mabillonism', which rested on a 'more adequate psychology and a deeper, truer asceticism (exercise and purification) of the whole man'.[9] Within this balance he accepted wholeheartedly the 'splendidly irreplaceable fruitfulness of the ascetical, self-renunciatory movement, and of its essential place in primitive, indeed all authentic, Christianity.'[10]
Von Hügel wrote numerous letters of counsel on the meaning and value of human suffering. These reveal not only his awareness of theological and ascetical principles but personal suffering and trial in the Christian life, the particular difficulties of the spiritual journey with its dryness, darkness and desert stretches, the basic human experiences of illness, bereavement, and the anxieties of family life in which the struggle of prayer was an integral part.[11] His daughter Hildegard wrote of his attitude: 'He has been too wonderful, speaking of what a splendid school suffering is and how it teaches one more than any amount of learning.'[12] The experience of the death of another young daughter had greatly affected his thinking on the Christian attitude to suffering. To a friend in his last illness, von Hügel wrote of Gertrud's acceptance and active utilisation of suffering, the discovery of its 'place, meaning and unique fruitfulness'. Her initial Stoic attitude grew more Christian as the cross became not merely a fact but a 'source and channel of help, of purification, and of humble power, - of permanent deepening, widening, sweetening of the soul.'

He was also sure that the apparent sterility of suffering was itself the final element of trial in one's pain. It is not the sheer fact of suffering that is good or achieves good, rather that its humble, prayerful acceptance and utilisation is an opportunity for growth and grace. In this sense 'suffering can be the noblest of all actions.'[13] His clearest statement of this was to Gladstone's daughter on the death of her father where he describes suffering nobly borne as a test of faith and a proof of love: 'I have always loved to think of devoted suffering as the highest, purest, perhaps the only quite pure form of action.'[14] The truly Christian appreciation of suffering transcended the Stoic's 'hopeless little game' of denying its objective reality. He
felt that only Christianity had 'taught us the true peace and function of suffering.' He had enough experience not to claim that suffering 'automatically deepens and widens man into a true spiritual personality', knowing that it often produces bitterness and destruction.[15] However he did maintain that full growth and deepening of the individual invariably involved trial and suffering, utilised and transfigured.

Although von Hügel deals with the relationship between mysticism and the problem of evil, there is no fully worked out theodicy. He acknowledged the temptation to treat God's sympathy for our suffering as a kind of suffering, though he recoiled from the suggestion that there was in any literal sense suffering in God, criticising particularly Harnack's enthusiasm for patripassianism. Though God is overflowing Joy and Love, the Baron also wanted to acknowledge God's deep concern for human suffering, a real 'Sympathy in God and Suffering in Christ' which draws him close to all our suffering.[16] There is here a profound paradox. Theology fails to explain how, with an 'All-knowing, All-powerful, and All-loving God, there can be evil at all', except by reference to some law or 'mysterious capacity for purification and development of man's spiritual character, on occasion and with the help of trouble, pain, and death itself.'[17]

He offers a general critique of the theory of evil as having 'no substance', the privation of good, but his emphasis falls decisively on an appeal to personal faith in Christ which gives meaning to suffering at the level of experience: 'Christ came, and He did not really explain it; He did far more, He met it, willed it, transformed it, and He taught us how to do all this, or rather He Himself does it with us, if we do not hinder the all-healing hands.'[18] The overriding conviction, which...
thus a matter of faith, was that 'in suffering, we are very near to God.' And it is the interior desire, the presence of love, which makes suffering fruitful: 'it is only suffering meekly accepted, willed, transfigured by love of God, of Christ - it is only such that will purify or cure anything.'[19]

The challenge to theology is even more pronounced in the case of large-scale human tragedy, though the Christian response remains the same. Commenting on the great loss of life in the recent Messina earthquake, which also prompted Tyrrell's article on 'Divine Fecundity', von Hügel observed that 'we have no notion what it means, and how it fits in with Theism.'[20] This pained 'agnosticism', which may be judged a vital element in the Christian response to such natural disasters and the loss of innocent life, anchors faith in the harsh reality of a broken and suffering world, but is also transformed by the knowledge that 'our great Christian faith, bringing us the additional mystery of Calvary, somehow eases that other one.' The Baron held that this truth was more readily accepted by the ascetical and outward-going element in religion than by the exclusively mystical which had a natural tendency to abstraction from such realities.

Von Hügel's belief in the importance of asceticism was rooted not only in personal experience, but in an acceptance of the wisdom of the mystical tradition. He was particularly influenced by Catherine's doctrine of purgatory which asserted the necessity of purification of the soul by God in preparation for mystical union. The path to pure love requires interior purification, and purgatory itself is the conforming of the human will to the divine will. Asceticism freely embraces the desire for such purgation and accepts its practical consequences in the
Christian life. In the Baron’s considered discussion of asceticism, the Christian witness is reinforced against Schopenhauer whose asceticism (particularly with regard to marriage) is judged by the Baron to be Gnostic rather than Christian. Von Hügel firmly resisted what he called all ‘dangerous parodies of Asceticism.’[21]

For the Baron, it is Christ who exemplifies true asceticism. The perfection preached by Jesus is inseparable from the desolation of the cross which represents the negative movement of detachment and renunciation, though this itself is linked intimately to a pure and fruitful attachment. This asceticism is characterised as ‘wise and noble’, warm because impelled by love. It is the instrument and not the end of a deep and rich life. Thus, the world-fleeing movement which the Baron found exemplified in A Kempis, though it must be balanced by a love of the world within and around us, remains ‘essential to Christianity, to all spirituality, to all deeper and the deepest human life.’ So this movement of detachment, essential to Christianity, needs completion by the ‘world-seeking, the world-penetrating, element.’[22] Such a tension is a ‘true paradox’ which is of the ‘very essence of our training, our testing and our trial.’ This acceptance and renunciation produce a ‘tension and fruitfulness’ which both issue from and lead to the ‘vivid apprehension and awed acceptance’ of a ‘holy Love and all-wise Will.’ Asceticism thus has its goal in the union with God’s will which is the heart of the Christian life:

the cross and self-renunciation are of the very essence of all religion, in proportion as it reaches to its own depth: it is the deliberate turning away from that which is morbid, and Christianity's proclamation of them, makes it the great discovered, and the final classical type and measure of all spiritual life or union with God.[23]
In the *Mystical Element* von Hügel turned directly to the connection between asceticism and mysticism which he considered under three headings. First he noted that what he called the 'generally severe' asceticism, which is usually linked with the early phase of every mystic's life, does not differ essentially from that 'direct training in self-conquest' which all earnest Christians consider an obligation.[24] He welcomed what he felt to be the growing understanding of and respect for the principle of asceticism among some who had little natural sympathy for the tradition of medieval Christianity with which it had come to be largely associated. He cites again from Schopenhauer who seemed to grasp the centrality of renunciation, self-denial, chastity and general mortification for Christianity, though the Baron felt he was not always aware of its true motive. He noted that William James appreciated the 'spiritual meaning' of asceticism in terms of the folly of the cross against merely 'naturalistic optimism.'[25] Von Hügel seems to posit a clear distinction between asceticism and mysticism; the mystic practises asceticism as a means towards or to safeguard contemplation; the analytical, polemical and painful thus serving the synthetic, peaceful and delightful. On the other hand, 'non-Mystical souls' practise asceticism to be free from sin and to be strengthened for the duties of the Christian life. Though the terms 'ordinary Asceticism' and the 'mystical form of Asceticism' seem to imply a sharp distinction, it is essentially a question of motive, orientation and emphasis. For the mystic, the practice of asceticism is more varied and inclusive since it does not constitute the whole of his inner life, but is part of a more expansive movement which itself purifies, humbles and deepens the heart and soul.

Secondly, the Baron identified the transcendence of God as another source of suffering in certain degrees of mysticism and some *attraits* of
the spiritual life. This was explored with reference to John of the Cross whose 'negative way', which the Baron felt to be a threat to the institutional dimension of religion and the role of the senses in apprehending God, had its roots within a tradition reaching back to the Areopagite. The denial of any essential likeness or communion with God leads to a repudiation of images and a disciplining of the senses which can become too absorbed in such representations. Kierkegaard is described as having pushed this 'peculiar kind of suffering and asceticism' to its ultimate with a consequent over-emphasis on ethics which had no place for contemplation or mysticism. And whatever the excessive language of John of the Cross or St Catherine, these true mystics redeem Kierkegaard's extremism by their actual practice which remained contemplative and synthetic. Von Hügel felt that the resolution of this problem was Catherine's own 'culminating intuition' that purgatory is joyful relief from a pain that would otherwise last forever. The suffering experienced through realising the distance between God and the individual is mitigated by the sense of God's felt presence which culminates in union with God. Though asceticism in this sense is rooted in the painful experience of God's transcendence, it is also felt to be part of the essential purging of the individual for mystical union.

Thirdly, von Hügel discusses an asceticism which falls between these two. This is the discipline and sacrifice undertaken to build up what he calls the abstractive habit of 'fleeing and of facing the Multiple and Contingent'. Under this heading he discusses at considerable length the Christian attitude to social reality, the family, society and the state, and to science, in the sense of material things, physical reality and the laws which govern them. These realities, he maintains, 'usually leave the Mystic indifferent or irritate or distract him; but
they can become for him great opportunities of rest, and occasions for self discipline.' In this context he seeks to clarify the terms and point to the connection between what he calls the 'larger Asceticism', which he claims is a wider and deeper means towards perfection than even 'genuine Mysticism' since such asceticism will include both this mysticism and the counter movement within the one single purified life of the soul. His desire is to balance 'attachment of the higher feelings to things good' and 'detachment of the will from evil', engagement and renunciation, respecting both needs of the personality. The danger of abuse and imbalance is greater in the case of mystical and contemplative detachment than ordinary asceticism which accepts the demands of 'Social Christianity'. The mystical habit thus needs the 'outgoing, social, co-operative action and spirit' which is the norm in the ordinary Christian life. He agreed with Troeltsch's view that the Christian ethos raises the soul 'above the world without denying it, believing this was the 'deepest insight of all Christian asceticism', which rendered superfluous all attempts to establish social utopias.[28]

The scientific habit, or contact and engagement with material reality, can also be a form of asceticism. Such contact with the various forces at work in the world will be costing yet fruitful, a positive purification of the religious imagination, heart, mind and will, leading to growth of the personality. The contrasting but complementary relationship between asceticism and mysticism is described in terms of the ascetic's 'self-thwarting' and the mystic's 'self-oblivion and seeking after Pure Love'.[29] Both express the same motive and necessity in the religious soul. The Baron indicates that the purification of the personal by the impersonal is a basic requirement of the Christian life and makes the point with reference to the example of 'any poor laundry-girl' who
accepts the demands of her practical work and alternates this with recollection, increasingly affective prayer, and rudimentary contemplation, seeking union with God. This movement between the visible and contingent, and the spiritual and infinite is further exemplified by the 'lowly farm-labourer or blacksmith or miner' who reconciles external mechanical work with 'deeply internal requirements and spiritual growth and consolidation.' Von Hügel is convinced of the absolute necessity of such involvement in the practical demands of life: 'let us note how much such discipline and asceticism is required by the whole Christian temper and tradition.' Thus 'Religion, in its deepest orientation and need, requires Asceticism, in some form or other.'[30]

Turning to Tyrrell, he felt he was waging a battle against what he called a virus threatening Gospel asceticism, 'whose hour is now come.'[31] Like the Baron he was concerned that Christian asceticism should reflect a correct and positive view of the human body which was endangered by a 'neo-platonic or puritanical abhorrence of the sense-world as radically and irredeemably evil and hostile to the spiritual life.'[32] What he called a 'sane, rational asceticism' distinguished the Gospel from pessimism, false 'mysticality', and a radical antagonism between spirit and flesh.[33] Christian asceticism rather 'unifies and co-ordinates body and soul with all their powers and faculties', building up the personality through self-determination and the gradual mastery of spirit over nature. Though 'this is not accomplished without pain and daily mortification', this is not a sanction for 'the wildest austerities bearable', but requires the use of good sense and reason, since it is easier to deaden and destroy psychic nature than to 'train and perfect it; much easier to tyrannize over it than to govern it.' The keynote, as in von Hügel's account, is balance and moderation. This is the reason why,
for example, the sanctity and austerity of St Jerome, whose 'violent methods' most likely created mental strain and nervous exhaustion, would arouse awe rather than the desire for imitation.[34] The quest for a balanced asceticism was a thread running through many of Tyrrell's essays, though shifts of emphasis are apparent at times.

Tyrrell believed that, despite the extremes and aberrations found in its ascetical tradition, Christianity truly recognised 'the unity of human nature as bodily and spiritual' against the false dualism of Plato's classical exposition on which 'innumerable ascetic fallacies' had been based, such as the body as the soul's prison.[35] Tyrrell observes that the body 'belongs to the integrity of human nature'; we do not have a body, we are bodily, and this body shares not only in our suffering but also our glory. He believed it was distinctive of Christ and Catholic Christianity to recognise body and soul as created by God, each in His image and likeness; to view the flesh as the sacrament and expression of the spirit, as the veil through which the spirit is to be approached, informed, elevated, sanctified.[36]

On this conception of the relation of body and soul rests the 'Christian view of temperance and purity, midway between those excesses of encratism on this side and antinomian licence on that.'[37] Tyrrell had made this point earlier in his brief treatise on the virtue of purity where mysticism and asceticism were seen to be intimately linked. He referred to St Paul's teaching on the body as the 'temple of the Holy Spirit', a truth at the root of the doctrine of grace. The central ascetical principle of discipline and self-denial is itself rooted in the essential truth of mysticism about the divine indwelling. Thus, the doctrine of grace, which posits a 'real mystical indwelling of the Holy Spirit in the soul, and thereby in the body of the unfallen Christian,
makes every defilement of that temple in some sense sacriligious.'[38] Consequently, 'the tumult of unruly passions, even where blameless, is unfitting in the sanctuary of a far closer indwelling, in the soul which is a consort of the Divine Nature; which lives and breathes with a divine life.'[39] Hence the need for ascetic endeavour. It was a wise and realistic view of Christian spirituality which acknowledged that the pursuit and love of Goodness requires 'a certain deliberate self-watchfulness and self-discipline.'[40]

It was Tyrrell's strong conviction that the theological principles underlying asceticism had often been forgotten or ignored in Christian history. Such false asceticism is described with a variety of adjectives of which 'dualist' and 'neo-Platonic' are the most common. This is the 'lower mysticism that is content to wrest the soul from the tyranny of the external by ascetical self-isolation, by forgetting the world and the historical process, in which the Divine will reveals itself.'[41] Ten years earlier, he had noted that the root of true asceticism is not Manichean disdain but that love of God and his kingdom which is at the heart of Christ's preaching. Asceticism is directed against self-will rather than an assault on the body as such. Thus 'Christian mortification and asceticism aims at the suppression of self-assertion, both bodily and spiritual', not merely in times of conflict, but at all times, 'in order to secure the habitual disposition and the ready obedience of the flesh to the spirit, i.e. of blind nature to reason and to God.'[42] This is not the wilful destruction or maiming of human nature but a 'strengthening and building up' of that nature into something divine.[43]

In stating that the 'destruction of the flesh' is alien to the teaching of the Word made flesh, Tyrrell is clearly articulating an
important Christian truth. What is often sometimes overlooked in the use of such terminology is the precise anthropological sense in which, for example, St Paul uses the word *flesh*. Paul's severe language is directed precisely to sinful, fallen nature (bodily and spiritual) which is overcome by being clothed in Christ. The antipathy of flesh (*sarx*) and spirit is not translatable into a body-soul dualism, though this fact has eluded many in the mystical tradition. Thus, Christian ascetical endeavour is not centred exclusively on the body; an 'asceticism and mortification of the intellect' is also required in preparation for contemplation. This is ordered to an enrichment and expansion of the mind through a purification which must embrace heart and affections, increasing our love for God and our awareness of his love for us. This reveals the essentially *interior* orientation of Christian asceticism.

Tyrrell suggests that in its pagan forms asceticism concerns primarily external acts of abstinence or effort, the oriental ascetic seeking mortification for its own sake. But his main point is that for the Christian, such acts are 'manifestations of an inward spiritual power of self-determination and mastery. Thus, it is not the act, but the power, of abstaining that matters.' The conclusion is succinct: 'in this we touch upon that inwardness which essentially distinguishes Christian from non-Christian asceticism.' Inevitably, Tyrrell speaks of such mortification in terms of the cross, the central Christian symbol of fruitful, redemptive suffering. The mortification which is 'the essential condition of all strenuous mental and moral development', and the subjection of the psychic will to the spiritual and divine, has its exemplification in the cross of Christ who was obedient to death in conformity to the divine will. This was 'Death for Life's sake, not Death
for Death's sake.' Again, like von Hügel, motive and interior disposition are all-important.

We have noticed in a previous chapter the tendency in both von Hügel and Tyrrell to ascribe imbalance in early Christian theology rather too readily to the influence of neo-Platonism. This is particularly apparent in relation to asceticism. But Tyrrell found another distorting influence in the renewed interest in eschatology with its belief in the delay of the parousia. He claimed that the mistaken expectation of the kingdom accounted for some of the asceticism and indifference to natural interests and duties on the part of the early Christians. Certainly, some of St Paul's exhortations are rooted in such an eschatological perception. Tyrrell held that these strands of the New Testament tradition came to be misunderstood and then utilised 'in the interests of an utterly unchristian, dualistic asceticism of oriental importation' which denied the solidarity of temporal and eternal, body and soul, which is at the heart of the gospel.[47] He repeated his conviction that the gospel knew nothing of the 'asceticism of the Dervish or Fakir.' But he still sought a legitimate asceticism, believing that self-denial and self-sacrifice were fundamental to the gospel. There can be no personal growth or social development without 'discipline or self-restraint', and 'no man can follow Christ without self-denial.' There must also be a positive assertion of the value of life and nature. In this light, pain and suffering can be accepted not as good in themselves, but for their 'expiatory value' and their 'disciplinary effects' for the good of humanity. Tyrrell wanted to avoid two extremes: a one-sided 'other-worldliness' was as dangerous as 'this-worldliness'. His criticism of socialism as immature was couched in these terms; it had overlooked the other-worldly and was contemptuous of mysticism.
These remarks are striking for their balance and perception, though at times Tyrrell's simplistic reading of Christian history leads him to ignore the tradition of the 'holy fool' among the Desert Fathers and others whose extremes can be too easily dismissed as unbalanced if one loses sight of the motive, a loving imitation of the Lord.[48] Some of the apparent extremes of asceticism, even if one chooses not to approve of them, may at least be understood as 'the folly of love, the folly of the cross.'[49] Further, there is the fact that desire for suffering and ultimately martyrdom, so prevalent in the early Church, had its roots in that desire which is at the heart of mysticism itself, union with Christ crucified and risen. On other occasions Tyrrell in fact recognised this, writing in moving terms of the 'martyr-spirit' as the 'triumph of early Christianity', the expression of self-sacrifice to the will of God of which 'Christ is the realized ideal.' Such a 'readiness to die for the Gospel', which was expected of all the disciples, required also a 'readiness to expose oneself to the perils and occasions of death, to sacrifice health and comfort and convenience for the Gospel's sake.'[50] This was an element in the traditional rationale of asceticism.

Finally, as Bouyer and many others have pointed out, with reference to the growth of monasticism and its intense asceticism, there was a reaction within the early Church to the danger of settling too readily for a compromise with society. Some of these truths were better appreciated in Tyrrell's more reflective essays and meditations which reveal a more rigorous and thoughtful research into Christian antiquity than certain more polemical writings which reflect the heat of controversy rather than the light of spiritual insight.

Tyrrell's most balanced discussion of this question of asceticism was his preface to Francis Thompson's fascinating booklet "Health and
Holiness: A Study of the Relations between Brother Ass, the Body, and his Rider, the Soul. Thompson himself was seeking to expound ascetical principles in terms of a proper love for, rather than hatred of the body.[51] Tyrrell approved of the main emphases of this study though not accepting all its conclusions. It is acknowledged that the subject of this discussion is not specifically those austerities motivated by the mystical desire for atonement or expiation, but asceticism as the method for perfecting our whole nature, the subordination of the psychic to the spiritual. Asceticism relates to the passions and desires as athletics relates to the limbs and muscles. Though the 'ascetical tendency' in the saints is frequently complicated with the 'sacrificial and self-destructive tendency', it is directed to building and not destroying. So, 'the crippling of Brother Ass is eventually as fatal to the mystical as to the moral life, both of which require the free use of unimpaired faculties.' For this reason the mystic is not absolved from the dictates of moral reason which must underly a sound asceticism and which rest on the belief that Christ is the great physician of soul and body alike, and imply a rejection of the two extremes of 'exaggerated pessimistic spiritualism' and 'naive animalism'. Tyrrell observes that 'Christian asceticism has ever been in principle and in aim a synthesis, a tempering of contraries.'

Tyrrell's final point finds him in complete agreement with Thompson on the need for science to assist theology: 'modern science and advanced physiology must needs be felt even in the science of spirituality.'[52] Even though the principles of asceticism may be imperishable and unchanging through the ages, there has been a 'growing understanding of the functions of soul and body, and of the precise degree and nature of their interdependence.' This was one aspect of the
synthesis of sanctity and science, contributing to a development of spirituality, that both von Hügel and Tyrrell sought. What this means in practice is that rigid adherence to ascetical principles of the past with their 'old-world applications' would be to ignore the 'bewildering changes that have since swept over the face of society, and to deny all value to the light which has been given us from the Giver of all light through the progress of Physiology and Psychology.' The consequences of ignoring such knowledge, which should temper the zeal for asceticism, could be the development of 'those very same mental and nervous disorders' which result from ascetical indulgence, and which are rooted in the violation of the 'due balance of sense and spirit.' But this learning and reshaping of understanding is not to be thought of as a one-way process since Christian spirituality and asceticism have a clear didactic role in contemporary society. Thus, the laws of perfect hygiene must not be directed simply to bodily perfection; the culture of the corpus sanum is not for its own sake, but for the health of the body as a 'pliant, durable instrument of the soul'. Such growth demands a 'degree of persevering self-restraint and self-resistance as constitutes an ascesis, a mortification, no less severe than that enjoined by the most rigorous masters of the spiritual life.'

Like von Hügel, Tyrrell wrote many letters of counsel and guidance, some of which inevitably touched on the problem of suffering. In 1900 he offered his 'wretched prayers' for Henry Sidgwick, whom he had never met but whose books he had read. His regret was that the crucifix meant less for him than it did for Tyrrell himself. He noted too that pain and sorrow in Sidgwick's philosophy were 'less evidently a pledge of divine love' than they were in his own.[53] Tyrrell believed that the experience of illness, pain and suffering is rendered intelligible only from the
perspective of faith. The mystery of innocent human suffering is bound up with the limitations of the finite and is also part of the ultimate mystery of God and his hidden purposes. He rejects what might be called a 'cheap eschatology' which denies the 'dark mystery' and the 'sad mortality' which mark all human undertakings. Thus, 'evil and suffering are in some way inseparable from the finite'. And for the finite mind, as the sense of chaos grows, wickedness seems to triumph over good, and 'the impenetrable mystery of evil gets darker and darker and more overwhelming' until the soul cries from its cross 'My God, my God, why has Thou forsaken me? Carest Thou not that we perish?' In terms of mysticism and the spiritual life there is a positive awareness of the value of suffering as a purgation and a token of love embraced. Tyrrell wrote that 'to love is necessarily to suffer; to love better and more widely, is to suffer more and more', not with a crippling resigned pessimism, but in the hope that death will be swallowed up in victory and God will wipe away every tear from our eyes.

This was a theme Tyrrell had treated in 1896 in a sermon on St Teresa of Avila's words 'Let me either suffer or die.' As an element in the mystical tradition such an attitude to suffering reflects one of the deepest, though perhaps most misunderstood, motives for asceticism. What Tyrrell is speaking about is not simply the passive, patient endurance of the many crosses which God used to purify and chasten her affections to prepare her soul 'for an eternal union with Himself.' It is rather Teresa's 'strange passion' which impelled her, in obedience to a perceived inspiration of divine love, 'to go out of her way in search of further sufferings', whether in the form of pain, or sorrow, or humiliation. In the course of his presentation Tyrrell enters upon a criticism of shallow philanthropy and any philosophy which
takes it as a first principle that all suffering without exception is evil and to be eradicated. Even though the generous philanthropist may accept the necessity of suffering in terms of evolution and growth, the mystical understanding is more radical. If the humanitarian seeks to lessen pain in the world, a mystic like St Teresa seeks not only to value it, but to love it. Pain is only terrible, he maintains, to those who view it as the ultimate evil. He dismisses rather hastily the problem of theodicy which he states clearly enough in terms of a personal almighty and all-loving God who could prevent misery, but does not.

Like von Hügel, Tyrrell was consistent with the Christian tradition in maintaining the key to the problem of suffering is found in the 'one who could have descended from the Cross, yet did not.' But he also observes that even those guided purely by the light of reason can accept that suffering is essential to the formation of every virtue, that 'life without suffering is impossible.' In these terms, asceticism is a combat motivated by the desire to prepare for the storms which inevitably afflict every soul. Thus we are all obliged to strengthen ourselves in time of peace by frequent exercise, or asceticism as it is called, by the practice not merely of restraint but of mortification, by cutting off not only all that is excessive or unlawful, but also much that is lawful and permissible. To be victorious in this battle with self 'we must chastise the body and bring it into subjection.' Though again the suggestion here is that asceticism is chiefly directed to the body, Tyrrell accepted that it was also a question of subjecting every 'affection, passion, or instinct, however natural, or useful, or admirable in due season and measure', to the 'higher rule of reason.'
Tyrrell also claimed that it was above all the mystics who witnessed to the truth *aut pati, aut mori* - we must either suffer or die. There follows a passage where Tyrrell's extravagant language yet again endangers a truth he seems at other times anxious to proclaim, that asceticism is not an assault on the body, but its elevation. But however stark the language about purifying the body by suffering, fast and vigil, subduing, tranquillizing, and putting the body to sleep before it can become a fitting instrument of the Holy Spirit, there is a truth here which mystical theology recognises. It is the truth expressed more poetically and attractively by John of the Cross in the words of *The Dark Night*, that the mystical ascent requires mastery of the body: 'My house now being all still.'[57] The language of hostility to the 'corruptible body' recurs with Tyrrell's remark that by suffering the soul can shake herself free from the embrace of this body of death' to fly to the 'embrace of Truth, her Spouse, her Life.'[58] It is likely that a growing dissatisfaction with this very terminology and the unbalanced, negative, or dualist interpretations to which it gave rise made Tyrrell so responsive to Thompson's balanced and positive attitude to the body some years later.

Finally, the chief contribution of the mystics goes even deeper than the acceptance of the mystery that sin is in some sense balanced and set right by suffering. The secret of St Teresa's passion for suffering is 'no other than the secret of the lover.'[59] Suffering is the life and energy of love. The truth is again couched in extreme terms: 'love seizes upon the heart and gnaws at it night and day, and wears and wastes the frail body, and consumes its strength with labours and sorrows.' It is this 'tyranny of love' which motivates the passion and death of Christ which itself reveals the 'all-devouring passion of God's
love for the soul.' Again one must appeal to faith which transcends all 'chill philosophy' which can never explain why 'love thirsts for suffering, why it is straitened till its baptism of blood be accomplished.' This truth can only be felt, never fully articulated. All this is revealed in the Man of Sorrows in whom God no longer remains at a distance, but reaches into the experience of human suffering as the ultimate expression of love. It is in this truth accepted and embraced, that St Teresa and every other mystic who seeks to love, finds the motive for suffering and grows in the conviction that without suffering love is not proved. The essence of asceticism for the mystic is the belief that love is matured and made perfect by suffering.

ASCETICISM AND HUMAN LOVE: MARRIAGE AND CELIBACY

Neither von Hügel nor Tyrrell explored at any length the variety of ascetical practices found in the Christian spiritual tradition. There is no discussion of fasting, almsgiving, or penitential disciplines, beyond brief references in connection with the lives of the saints. But there is an important and interesting application of ascetical principles to the perennial question of the relationship between love of God and love of creatures. Tyrrell raised the matter in a review of Coventry Patmore by Basil Champneys in 1900 and the exchange with von Hügel in this connection is illuminating. Tyrrell saw Patmore as a poet and thinker whose instinct and sensibility led him to criticise that 'pseudo-mysticism' which Tyrrell himself exposed and criticised as a distortion wrought by neo-Platonism. But Patmore was found wanting for subscribing to a 'certain school of ascetic thought' which was judged equally faulty and in danger of fostering fallacies 'every whit as uncatholic.' [60]
Tyrrell sought to resolve the problem in a series of reflections on the link between love of God and natural affection, especially married love.

Patmore not only idealised married love as a particular reflection of divine love, but came to believe that such love, in its highest form, was not merely the richest symbol, but the 'most efficacious sacrament of the mystical union between God and the soul.'[61] Conscious of the teaching of St Bernard and other Catholic mystics, Patmore's whole attitude and philosophy was determined and dominated by the symbolism of nuptial love. Although Tyrrell duly acknowledged the use of such imagery among some of the greatest mystics in their description of mystical union, he commented that 'the persistent and not always sufficiently restrained use of this category...made much of his writing just a trifle shocking to sensitive minds.' Noting that this did not involve any diminishing by Patmore of the 'Catholic instinct which prefers virginity to marriage', it is significant that Tyrrell remarked in parentheses that such a way of expressing the matter is 'not a strictly accurate statement'. The chief criticism of Patmore is that he is too much in love with his chosen metaphor for Divine love for the soul, and that pressed too far, it becomes not a source of illumination, but a distortion. But the over-strenuous use of this metaphor, with the natural limitation common to all analogy, was only one criticism. The belief that the marriage union was the most effectual instrument of that divine love was considered a more serious error. Patmore believed that his assertion that marital affection was not simply compatible with sanctity, but its main instrument, was consistent with some of the utterances of the saints and Fathers. For Tyrrell this was 'prima facie opposed to the common tradition of Catholic asceticism' and the raison d'être of monasticism. However, one senses that Tyrrell himself
is uneasy not only with Patmore's solution, but also with other traditional ways of formulating the point.

Tyrrell proceeds to set out the two 'distinct conceptions' which have struggled to emerge as the means of reconciling the 'claims of intense human affection with those of intense sanctity.'[62] Saints and ascetics could be quoted in support of either view, both of which miss the truth in seeking to express the nature of a relationship which is sui generis. One way of putting the question is to ask: in what sense can God be described as a 'jealous God', demanding to be loved alone? The first possibility, found in the 'commoner language of saints and ascetics', is the idea that God is a rival to human love. This is the 'God of popular asceticism' who is placed alongside creatures, so that love of them is necessarily a weakening of love for him.[63] The consequence is that those who would be perfect must mortify every natural affection for father, mother, family and friends, and above all must exclude the absorbing affection of spouse for spouse if they would be His alone. The implication is clear that even well-ordered natural affection is incompatible with the highest sanctity. Tyrrell rejects this firmly with the claim that even the Church's preference for virginity, and its commendation of celibacy for its clergy, and the 'teaching of the great masters of Christian mysticism' cannot be taken to explain divine jealousy as God competing with other creatures for human love. The authoritative refutation of this is the example and precept of Christ himself, especially as developed in Johannine theology.

The second attempt at a resolution, found in Saints Bernard, Francis and Teresa, places God not alongside creatures but behind them, such that any light or love shining through them is due to 'His inbiding presence,
the love which they excite in us passes on to Him, through them.'[64] Here God is the 'primary Agent and Mover in all our action and movement, the primary Lover in all our pure and well-ordered love.' So whatever we love rightly and divinely, it is He who is ultimately loved. Thus God is loved not apart from creatures, but in and through them. Tyrrell maintains that this view may be reconcilable with some parts of the Gospel and may seem to be implied in some of the Catholic saints, though 'to square it with the general ascetic traditions of the faithful at large is exceedingly difficult.'

Tyrrell accepted the element of truth contained in these different emphases whilst criticising Patmore's preference for the second view which better suited his own presuppositions. There is an irony in his attack on Patmore's critique of the *Imitation* for the 'hot-house, egotistical air about much of its piety', since Tyrrell himself became more critical and selective in his reading of Christian tradition.[65] Tyrrell rehearsed his conclusion in a letter to von Hügel in which he suggested we 'must find a place for both modes of knowing God'; the first one is concrete and experimental, accessible to the simplest and necessary for all.[66] The second, which requires a certain amount of culture, is the aim of contemplation which begets a distinct kind of love, not necessary for all, and justifying 'contemplative retirement & alienation from natural affections.' He offers two rather uninspiring analogies to illustrate this difference; the difference between salt tasted in solution and in its crystallised state, or a composer known in his compositions and known in himself. With respect to these different modalities in apprehending and loving God, he notes that Catholic tradition has regarded the second as a vocation apart, the contemplative life. But he concludes that it would be a serious mistake to suggest
that intelligence, culture or contemplative capacity were necessary conditions for a nearer approach to Christ. There is a more normal and commoner path to him than that of the cloister. He had on another occasion hinted at a sounder resolution of the tension between impulse and restraint, the relationship between human affection and divine love: 'human love is divine in the measure that it is elevated, strengthened and purified by self-denial.'[67]

It was as though the very incompleteness of Tyrrell's treatment presented an irresistible invitation to von Hügel who responded with a suggested solution which had clearly grown out of the lived experience of married life and, what appears a deeper, more considered reflection on the relationship between love of God and human affection. Tyrrell's attempted reconciliation of these two conceptions, which as an argument almost petered out in his essay, was found unsatisfactory by von Hügel who wrote at some length with his own proposals for a deeper synthesis. Though he felt Tyrrell's paper was 'beautifully suggestive' on the main problem, he also felt that the earlier paper on the 'Divine Precept' had been a better attempt to conceive the ultimate relation between the 'love of God through and in creatures, and the love of God in Himself and outside of creatures.'[68]

Von Hügel admitted that he could not be satisfied with any simple contrasting of the two or even any suggestion that the truth must lie between Tyrrell's two solutions. Rather the truth is only found by striving after both methods, a truth expressed in Bonhoeffer's distinction between the *cantus firmus*, and the autonomous contrapuntal theme.[69] The Baron was convinced that every soul has, and is bound to have, both not simply as an imperfection, but 'legitimately and in
conformity to its ideal and perfection.' He notes that although it might well be difficult to prove that in the life of every saint there was such a growth of affective love, the theory had to be admitted. Indeed, even a rigorously detached ascetic and contemplative of the stature of John of the Cross was clear on this point. The Baron quotes from the Ascent of Mount Carmel where John states that love of others for their goodness is pleasing to God, and if there be attachment in it, there is greater attachment to God. Furthermore, the more such love grows, the more our love for God grows, and the deeper our love for him, the more we shall love our neighbour 'for the principle of both is the same.' The Baron's comment on this passage is that such 'love of and detachment from creatures' is 'the ebb and flow, the movement in the waters of the soul' which would keep them fresh and stout.

Purification, restraint and detachment are then 'a universally necessary ingredient and condition in all the making and continuous renovation of all true love, of every kind and degree.' Because of the precious nature of this purity of affection and the difficulty of constant purification, von Hügel admits that some are called specifically to exploit this purification and restraint. In this sense the Carthusian is practicing with and for others the maximum of that 'restraint and constant spiritualisation of those affections' which all are called to preserve in some measure. If this is true, there is a sharp conflict between Patmore and 'our ordinary ascetical teaching'. This is because, according to von Hügel, Patmore writes as if there were such a thing as natural affective feelings for others which of themselves automatically ennable and spiritualise us. This notion, especially if expressed in the form that marriage is a 'sacrament of mystical love', must be rejected, along with the idea of automatically working sacraments in general. This
was a 'superstition' to which Patmore seemed to succumb. However, in wanting to stress the indispensability of discipline even in our natural affections, the Baron was in danger of denying the intrinsic goodness of creation and the nobility of natural virtue.

Von Hügel made it clear that he did not want to deny that such 'natural affections and social relations' could indeed be the occasion of spiritual apprehension, but only if they were 'both exercised and mortified, sought and fled, transcended and ever returned to.' If such 'automatism', as he called it, is rejected, one finds immediately the rationale for 'monachism, properly understood'. He spoke from personal experience of the wise counsel and example of the priest whose combination of natural affection and 'nobly costing; richly fruitful self-renunciation' in the form of celibacy, greatly influenced him and helped him escape any 'attempt to keep the cross out of any part of my life.' Nonetheless the Baron felt the inadequacy and unacceptability of some of the current ascetical literature and especially the practical working and official spirit of some orders. He looked for a renewal of the fundamental spirit which produced monasticism, creating 'more appropriate conceptions and forms', more 'directly and universally helpful', more enlarging, as were the orders in their best days. Though the plea was heartfelt, he offered no detailed practical suggestions as to the forms such renewed monasticism might take.

Patmore's belief that affection must be constantly cultivated was perfectly acceptable to the Baron, though he was sure that it required greater purification and discipline than Patmore himself seemed willing to admit. What von Hügel refers to, rather misleadingly, as 'constant spiritualisation and denaturalising' of affection, demands 'seeking and
fleeing, that going forth and coming home of the heart'. In this, some will be called to a maximum of fleeing to help and supplement those called to a maximum of seeking. But none will be absolved from the basic ascetical discipline which roots our salvation in the cross of Christ. The issue which clearly crystallised the criticism of Patmore was, predictably, his 'excessive and indeed impoverishing insistence upon sex', a point which Tyrrell had 'tactfully indicated' in his own paper. The strength of the Baron's conviction here is striking: 'I really think there are fewer shorter cuts to an utter impoverishment of life than to practically represent all affection as but various dilutions and modifications of that one relation, and that relation itself again narrowed to its most purely technical and exclusive side.' At a time when Freudian theory was beginning to circulate and appeal to many, von Hügel sounded a critical note, insisting that there were other quite different and more valuable relationships, that men and women do have other feelings towards one another and, even in marriage itself, if it is at all rich and stimulating, 'that side of things is surely but one among many, and there also never the highest or self-sufficing one.'

Von Hügel saw in Patmore an excessive reaction against Manichaeism in favour of a view of the world which he characterised as that of Miss Frisby in *Pendennis* for whom everything in life was but an element in a huge love-making. Though Manichaeism is 'no doubt the worse' extreme, the Baron found the balance in St Thomas whose doctrine that, although affected by sin, there is nothing essentially wrong about marriage, is the 'fully sensible and Christian one'. But the idea that without the Fall marriage and its use would not have been the same could be pressed to a faulty conclusion. Thus, just as he found Patmore's 'ordinary tone and teaching too little ascetic', so he found this doctrine too much so,
and sought the solution in a heightening of the one and a lowering of the other to a position 'comfortably compatible with Catholic teaching.'

It was in the course of a critique of dualism that the Baron stressed that the Church's exaltation of the monastic ideal must not be taken as a diminution of marriage. The Church preached the sanctity of marriage and its duty for mankind at large. But since the cross is the 'very salt of all virile and fruitful spirituality', it must be present in the marriage relationship as part of the growth to greater unification and spiritualisation.[71] According to his niece, he saw the Church's moral teaching on birth regulation precisely in these terms; the requirement of abstinence in the expression of sexual love was seen to be a particular application of the principle that heroism must mark every form of Christian discipleship. Though the traditional position that virginity was superior to marriage is also asserted, there is a clear acknowledgement that married love must be seen as part of a 'truly human spirituality' in which the self is developed in relationship with another through a union of the whole person.

In the 'Divine Precept', to which von Hügel referred in his response, Tyrrell took Christ as the exemplar of the ideal position for which he was striving. The command to love God and neighbour is central and 'the second great precept is not different from the first, but only another expression of it.'[72] In a more irate mood he put it more directly, stating 'that God wants to be loved in his creatures and not apart from them.' Whatever the importance of contemplation, it is not obligatory, whereas 'the love of creatures is obligatory.'[73] And the love we have for creatures will necessarily be different from the love we have for God. His point is made rather succinctly: 'Had God wanted us to love
Him as we love our human friends He would have given us eyes to see right into Heaven.'

Tyrrell responded to the 'heavy artillery' of von Hügel's argument regarding Patmore with a ready admission that they were in 'perfect agreement in principle' and that the Baron had drawn out what he himself had wanted to say.[74] There is a slight sense of relief in this reply, indicating that Tyrrell was happy not to pursue the matter. Moreover, despite his often depressing pessimism about human love and affection, he clearly held a thoroughly positive view of marriage. Thus he chided Maude Petre's Augustinian attitude, and expressed a high estimation of conjugal love.[75] It is also clear from his brief exposition of marriage and the true emancipation of women in 'A Great Mystery', which, though it may not satisfy the sensibilities of some present-day authors, was a thoughtful and positive treatment of the theological basis for the equality of the sexes.[76]

Tyrrell also took up a critical attitude to the idea that 'the intention of Nature' in every single use of matrimony should be the only criterion in estimating its meaning. He felt nature's prodigality was itself a contradiction of such a view. The expression of love between husband and wife is the purpose and intention of the conjugal act, whatever nature may bring forth in terms of progeny.[77] Tyrrell was raising an issue and bringing forward criticisms which were uncommon in theological circles at the time. But his considerations are rather pragmatic, the fruit of commonsense observation rather than theological insights. Whether he would have been willing to accept the separation of the various meanings of sexual love which became a feature of later generations is an open question. There are hints which could be
interpreted in different ways. If nature has given us feelings of hunger and thirst which need to be satisfied, and the truest way of satisfying them is to obey nature, then by analogy the sexual appetite must be dealt with in the same way. He was less insistent than von Hügel on the need for an asceticism to guide and govern the expression of the sexual instinct. Though it would be caricaturing their views to speak of Tyrrell's laxism and von Hügel's rigorism, a distinct difference of emphasis is apparent.

In the same letter Tyrrell expressed his impatience with what he considered a false division of the marriage relationship into a purely spiritual, non-sexual friendship which is higher than the second 'purely animal affection', as though strengthening the soul of the relationship by starving and killing its body or embodiment were virtuous. Again he detects the peril of 'oriental asceticism' and a wrong understanding of the interdependence of the body and the soul. He felt it vital to repudiate this in the matter of marriage since the expression of sexual love is not the manifestation of 'animal' affection, but personal love. He stated that the nature of the sexual act depended precisely on the nature of the agent and on the love of which it is the expression. It is the act of human persons called to love within the bond of a bodily and spiritual relationship. And this love will be marked by desire and affection, the former craving to possess the other, the latter subjecting itself to the desire of the other. The marriage act will be 'instinctively regulated' by mutual love which will issue more and more in unselfish love which consists of both 'real reverential love' and 'real desire' on both sides. In such experience the creature's love reflects the Creator's love and the human touches the divine.
On the question of clerical celibacy, there was a distinct difference between von Hügel and Tyrrell. Again Tyrrell's remarks appear to have been affected by his growing disillusionment with the prevailing ethos of the institutional side of religion and his intemperate criticism of whatever reflected accepted discipline or practice. At one stage, he did agree with the Baron, one feels rather reluctantly, that modernist priests who had renounced celibacy had forfeited the right to be heard in the movement of reform within the Church.[78] However, this was rather a question of pragmatic ecclesiastical politics than profound regard for the discipline of clerical celibacy as such. Even before his formal break with the Jesuits and the Church he was critical of the emphasis on celibacy as a form of Christian heroism. His typical view was expressed in a letter in 1904 where he claimed that there was far more heroism, unselfishness and virtue in the married life than the 'self-centred life of the cloister, with its artificial protection and its negative sanctity.'[79] He could appreciate that celibacy was 'practically desirable', valuable for apostolic work with large numbers, and even as an education of the affections, in the same way that marriage was, but concluded: 'with the mere ascetical, self-regarding celibacy, I confess I have lost all patience, through observing its detrimental effects on the character.' His hostility was apparent on several occasions and he believed that many priests remained celibate simply under constraint.[80] Though the Baron was prepared to accept that the 'laws concerning celibacy may want reforming from top to bottom', he possessed a strong conviction of the value of celibacy and felt that as an institutionalised ascetical ideal it proclaimed the vital importance of renunciation necessary to every religion.[81]
The Baron's clearest statement of the relationship between celibacy and married life as forms of Christian commitment also reveals the positive role of asceticism. He was convinced of the 'naturalness' of God's call to serve Him in life-long celibacy and recorded his joy and consolation at his own daughter's call to the Carmelite life.[82] The example of Christ himself and the greatest apostle would remain persuasive in Christian tradition. Allowing that this 'choice gift' is a special help to many souls, the Baron still sought to combat what he called 'the fairly common feeling, or more or less deliberate opinion, that marriage is at bottom, something nasty or impure', or that a celibate man or woman is purer than a married one, or even that there were any such thing as simply bodily purity. Not only devout wives and distinguished nuns had believed this, but a 'whole catena of passages from St Augustine and other Fathers etc. could easily be got together' to support such a view, either directly or by implication. He dismissed such an 'unwholesome, manichaean' error as based largely on 'misconceptions as to the essential functionings of mankind.' He asserted rather the 'essential goodness of the body' and the need of humanity at large to practice the 'sanctification of the sex-life' by its wise and devotedly religious use. Celibacy is therefore the abandonment of something essentially good, an 'heroic exemplification of that self-restraint which, married and single, we all so greatly require', a means to and form of devotedness to a greater number of souls. There is then a complementarity about these two distinct vocations both of which require a positive view of the human body, affection and sexuality, and an acceptance of asceticism in the form of discipline and renunciation of self-seeking. In both vocations God and neighbour are loved and served.
In the ascetical teaching of von Hügel and Tyrrell one finds a critical appropriation of the wisdom of the Christian spiritual tradition. There is a desire to root out elements which do not serve true mysticism, such as a negative attitude to the body and a distorted and diminished view of human affection and sexuality as inevitable obstacles to following Christ. In this task von Hügel showed himself to be more balanced and less prone to denunciation than Tyrrell. He knew that the adoption of an alternative extreme was equally unhelpful. Hence his positive acceptance of asceticism as vital both to celibacy and the married life. Their writings reflect a healthy desire for a re-orientation in the unfolding history of mystical theology which demanded a rejection of the 'distorting traces of Manicheism' which rejected matter, the body, and its feelings and instincts as of no account or even as sinful in themselves.[83] In relating the love of God and love of neighbour in fidelity to the teaching of Jesus, von Hügel was perhaps more successful than Tyrrell, though the latter also revealed real insight despite being marred by a self-confessed personal coldness and a hostility to current ecclesiastical discipline. But broadly speaking, in seeking the wisdom of the ages they were able to grasp and articulate the importance of what has been called that 'genuine ascetic discipline, which runs like a thread of gold from Jesus to today.'
It has become clear that the treatment of mysticism by von Hügel and Tyrrell was characterised by a desire for balance. This was apparent in Tyrrell's essay on 'Spiritual Equilibrium' where he was seeking a balance between the 'faculties of perception and emotion', but also between religion and the other 'departments of life.' However, he conceded that 'an all-round even development of all our capacities is never possible.' He felt the balance he sought was exemplified in the 'ancient Carthusian conception of the Christian life as constituted by a three-fold labour - of heart, mind, and hand - a conception based upon the study of the Gospel.' This 'resolving of life into three main divisions - affection, thought, and action, is practically satisfactory.'

Tyrrell considered religion the 'central preoccupation of the heart' though it gains in strength and health only if balanced by some keen discipline of the mind and outward work. Without such balance various destructive consequences are apt to follow. Those who find themselves so busy with their hands may find their 'minds crippled and their souls stifled.' Similarly, intellect divorced from religion and action degenerates into intellectualism. Furthermore, there is a kind of religion which is neither intelligent nor practical, being out of sympathy with intellect and labour. Thus, however all pervasive religion is, it remains 'but a factor and not the whole of life, and for its health depends on the health and harmony of all its co-factors.' Von Hügel agreed with this emphasis:
the soul cannot attain to its fullest possible spiritual development, without the vigorous specific action and differentiation of forces and functions of a not directly religious character, which will have to energize, each according to its own intrinsic nature, within the ever ampler, and ever more closely-knit, organization of the complete life of the soul.[3]

This is true even though the religious life is 'ever the deepest, the central life' of every soul.

THE THREE ELEMENTS OF RELIGION

This quest for balance reached its sharpest delineation in the concept of the three elements of religion, which was not simply the theme of von Hügel's opus magnum, but a constant principle in his thought on mysticism. Generally seen as his most characteristic contribution to religious thought, it is easily overlooked that Tyrrell was in fundamental agreement on the point. To articulate the balance between the three elements of religion is to reject exclusive mysticism for an inclusive mysticism which finds its locus only in relation to the intellectual and institutional elements of religion.

Von Hügel concluded The Mystical Element with the triumphant claim that the 'three great forces of the soul' which he had analysed at the outset were found to be 'necessary to religion', but only if held in balance with each other.[4] This triadic pattern, or 'trinity of tendency', was applied to history, to the nature of the individual and to religion. (It was also applied to the variety of religious orders in the Catholic Church.) The chief forces of Western civilisation are Hellenism, Christianity and science. The three 'modes of apprehension' in the individual are sense and memory, question and argument, intuition and feeling. The three elements of religion are the 'Historical-Institutional',
the 'Critical-Speculative' and the 'Mystical-Operative'. Despite the formal
texture and apparent rigidity of this scheme, it offered a framework for
situating mysticism in Christian experience. This pattern was derived
from the Trinity itself, the ultimate expression of multiplicity in unity
and source of the idea of three powers in the individual personality. He
notes that this line of thought was found in the patristic period, but no
reference is made to Augustine who was chiefly responsible for
articulating this psychological model. And though the Baron claimed to
have found his way to this threefold pattern through Newman and William
James, its application was very much his own.[5] Indeed, this scheme
was used precisely to challenge the Jamesian account of mysticism.

Much of the work concerned the mystical-volitional element with
particular reference to St Catherine, though numerous general and
specific questions relating to mysticism were also raised. The desire
throughout is to reject exclusive mysticism and to find the correct
relationship between the mystical element and the institutional and
intellectual elements. Such a balance guarantees the fruitfulness of the
mystical element which, if it stands alone, may 'cripple, or all but
exclude, the other forces and elements, and their vigorous and normal
action and influence.'[6] But the synthesis is actually unattainable, as
Tyrrell recognised:

In his *Mystical Element of Religion* Baron F. von Hügel has shown
that, if the ideal synthesis of the institutional, rational and
mystical elements be unattainable, owing to a sort of natural
antipathy between them, yet the perpetual struggle after that ideal
is essential: that the health of a religion consists in the balancing
and holding together of principles that tend to fly asunder and
become independent and exclusive.[7]

Though any exclusive emphasis on the mystical element is eschewed,
this does not preclude granting it a certain priority. As one of the
'three modalities, three modes of apprehension and forms of appeal and outlook', it is the last to come to fruition.[8] It is this 'Mystical and directly Operative element of Religion' that meets the action of the soul which seeks a dim but direct, potent, sense or feeling of the Infinite and Abiding Spirit.[9] Here the 'Experimental and Mystical' element of religion meets the emotional and volitional, ethical and spiritual powers which are in full motion. At this stage 'religion is rather felt than seen or reasoned about, is loved and lived rather than analyzed, is action and power, rather than either external fact or intellectual verification.'[10] Faith will be 'at its richest and deepest and strongest' when these three motives are most operative. In isolation the mystical element can be destructive, a point which the Baron illustrates with reference to various forms of pure mysticism in history: the Münster Anabaptists, some of the the Desert Fathers, the Quietists, the Dutch-Westphalian Apocalyptic Intuitionists and the Society of Friends. 'Pure Mysticism' fails to grasp the finite as the occasion for experiencing the Infinite. It also floats free of the institutional and intellectual elements, which in Christian terms are represented by the Church and theology. It is important to note that von Hügel does not envisage a mere chronological progression in which the mystical element supplants the other elements; this would be to destroy exactly the balance he seeks to achieve. Daly remarks that 'the three stages must be seen not as successive but as cumulative.'[11]

This scheme of the three elements, which received such thorough treatment by the Baron, was also presented succinctly by Tyrrell in one of his reviews of The Mystical Element. There was no major criticism of the Baron's position which he himself had explored in his own terms, not in a single work, but throughout his writing. Accepting
the three elements, Tyrrell noted that a 'unifying effort was required to 'keep each and all in their proper place.'[12] Corresponding roughly to 'three stages of religious development', they reflect the progressive realisation of the spiritual life. He did not articulate as clearly as the Baron the value of friction or tension in this attempt at harmonisation, though he accepted that each of these elements had 'something antipathetic to the other two', whilst rejecting any 'insoluble conflict between head and heart.'[13]

What von Hügel called the institutional element of religion represents the stage at which religion is 'a Fact and Thing.'[14] It is identified with the earliest experience of religion. The external religious symbol, place, picture, statue or book is usually the child's first encounter with religion, meeting a need that remains part of the adult's practice of religion, though it has to be tempered and deepened by the other elements. Here the appeal to the senses, the memory and imagination is linked to the exercise of authority which itself takes institutional form. At this stage the 'External, Authoritative, Historical, Traditional, Institutional side and function of Religion are everywhere evident.' The abstract terms can obscure the fact that this element is concretised in the visible, community of believers where the intellectual and mystical elements find their proper place. Though its specific realisation is in the Church, the institutional also takes the general shape of society and wider social and educational influences through which the 'communised religious experience' and reflection of the past is brought to bear upon us to stimulate and guide the religious sense.[15]

Von Hügel's complex attitude to the institutional element was indicated by Gwendolen Greene's remark that 'he often spoke of
Institutional Christianity as his hair-shirt - his Church his deepest pain.\[16\] Nonetheless, he constantly affirmed the need for some Church appurtenance, a word which recurs in his writings and which she defined as 'some sort or kind of Church faith and practice.' His special affection and regard was for the Roman Catholic Church, 'that great supernatural home and communion of souls.' He did not seek converts directly, which has led to criticism of his attitude to Catholicism, though he did remark that he could not rest until he had brought a non-practicing Catholic back to some observance of the Roman faith. For him the Church represented depth and breadth as well as tension, heroism, and other-worldliness, and the sacramental life in particular was 'God's unique gift to the Church.' He criticised Streeter's view that someone entirely outside the Church could be 'as deep and delicate, as valuable a mystic, as are the mystics belonging to the Church.' He held the 'spiritual instincts, ideals, and helps to be found in the R.C. Church to be, at their best, the deepest and finest to be found anywhere', though he admitted real counter-tendencies were to be found there.\[17\]

The affirmation of institutional Christianity and Catholicism in particular became a distinct feature of the Baron's writings.\[18\] He welcomed in Evelyn Underhill a progression from her 'excessively mystical works...lacking the institutional sense' to more recent works where she was 'bravely insistent on history and institutionalism.'\[19\] The Church remained for him the instrument of true mysticism, its purpose being 'the awakening, the training, the bringing into full life and fruitfulness of the Supernatural Life.'\[20\] And the Church finds its most tangible expression in eucharistic worship: 'the doctrine of, and devotion to, Jesus Christ, truly present, God and Man, Body and Soul, in the Holy Eucharist...forms most characteristically, the very heart of the Catholic
worship.' True incarnational spirituality holds that Holy Communion should be the 'very centre of a Christian's devotional life.'[21]

Von Hügel perceived a direct connection between incarnationalism, institutionalism, sacramentalism and mysticism, rooted in the fact that spirit is communicated through sense, so that symbols, though inevitably limited and inadequate, are always necessary. The childlike attachment to the 'thing element' is never to be despised since Christ always and everywhere makes use of the sensible: he let people touch him, used clay on the eyes of the blind, and also used bread and wine. Thus 'man needs the sensible so long as he is man and not spirit alone.'[22] So, the institutional element of religion is sanctioned by Jesus who used 'certain sensible symbols, vehicles, acts and likewise commanded his Church to use such 'sensible-spiritual acts.'

For his part, Tyrrell felt the 'modern Church' was 'starving to death', though he retained a belief in its necessity for the Christian life to be lived fully.[23] Even if the Church becomes a 'rock of offence' crushing individuality, a position which he came to espouse with bitter conviction, its true purpose was to communicate the spiritual through the material.[24] Relating external and internal religion, he sought to apply the 'incarnational principle' to religious experience and personal faith. Thus, religion must have a body and soul: 'all puritanical attempts at a merely philosophical, spiritual religion, discarding outward and imaginative expression, are violently unnatural and foredoomed to failure.' Like the Baron, he accepted that 'hierarchy, symbols, formulas are as essential to religious as to any other form of society.'[25] Practically, this means that Christ's visible Church is the 'indispensable
condition of that fulness of interior religion to which Christians alone are enabled to aspire.'

Tyrrell's strong conviction that institutional religion had become not merely intellectually burdensome but an obstacle to personal spiritual growth, 'a ruthless mechanism, a determinism, an almost organised opposition to the spirit', does at least help to indicate the true purpose of the institutional element. It exists to stimulate and guide the 'natural process of spiritual growth', the formation of a living independent personality. Moreover, there is a real interdependence between individual and community since institutional religion is formed, sustained, and furthered by individual souls. This is vital for the growth of mysticism since institutional religion is 'rooted in the mystical life of its several members - in that life which it fertilises, to be fertilised by it in return.' The 'direct converse between God and the soul', the heart of the mystical life, must not be suppressed but 'intensified and rendered more articulate by institutional religion.'

Tyrrell agreed with von Hugel that it was simple historical fact that 'the most notable and typical mystics have belonged to or sprung from the Churches.' Even accepting that the mystical life is in some real sense a 'personal affair between the soul and God alone', this is no justification for private, individualistic religion since mysticism necessarily involves a relationship with the Church and the world. To the true mystic 'the idea of a Church, a Catholicism, a communion of souls, whether saints or sinners, is altogether congenial.' Tyrrell took it as a simple truth of Catholic piety that the 'whole end and aim to which the Church, her dogma, her ordinances, are ostensibly and theoretically directed is divine love and mystic converse between God and
the soul.'[27] Not even his belief that the 'intellectual formulation of Catholicism' had collapsed altered the fact that the Catholic Church was the 'highest visible embodiment and instrument' of God's cause on earth.[28] The mystics above all had grasped this: 'All Christian mystics have felt the need of some such invisible spiritual Church, some Communion of Saints, some mystical body of Christ' through which they are 'put in immediate communication with God.'[29] For Tyrrell this could not be separated from the visible reality of the Church which stood as a challenge to individualism or the denial of authority and corporate life.

In Tyrrell's understanding, the Church is primarily a 'school of Sanctity and Charity' since her sole raison d'être is to 'reproduce the pattern of Christ as exactly as possible in as many as possible...The Church is the art-school of Divine Charity'.[30] The chief means for this was the sacramental life offered through the Church. Neither von Hügel nor Tyrrell discussed liturgical forms or ritual symbolism beyond stating the centrality of the sacraments and the value of some traditional aids to devotion, though both criticised mere externalism and the unsound theology at the root of some popular piety. Tyrrell believed that in the 'ritual and symbolism' of the Catholic religion there is a 'fuller vehicle for expressing and communicating those mystical states, begotten by the soul's contact with eternal realities, than words alone could ever supply.' It was the Mass which established contact with the sacrifice of the mystical Christ, the Eucharist being the sacrament of communion and incorporation with that 'mystical "Christ-crucified".' In the sacramental life, symbols and outward form are the graced and covenanted sphere of religious experience. So, despite his eventual rejection of existing Catholicism as a corruption, a form of Czardom, he
claimed to accept the necessity of the institutional element not merely as a theoretical principle but as a practical reality:

Incarnation, embodied immortality, sacraments, external worship, a visible Church; all are founded on this correlativity of the spiritual and phenomenal; on the idea that the spiritual utters itself in, and is addressed through, the phenomenal; that they are as inseparable as subject and object; that pure spirit is a pure abstraction.\(^{[31]}\)

The complement to this institutional element of religion is the intellectual element: the activity of questioning, reasoning, and argumentation which corresponds to the abstractive side of human nature. For von Hugel it meets the need to apprehend facts and their relation to each other, and 'religion answers this demand by clear and systematic arguments and concatenations...Religion here becomes Thought, System, a Philosophy.'\(^{[32]}\) It is surprising that this idea is not developed into any positive appreciation of theology as such. More often the intellectual element refers to science and philosophy though it is likely, as we noted earlier, the term 'science' implies the concept Wissenschaft which has reference to all fields of human knowledge, historical, philosophical, natural scientific, as the effort to appropriate, shape and integrate the facts and experience of life.\(^{[33]}\) Since there is always a danger that the Baron's conceptions remain at the level of abstraction, it is interesting that a little later he offers historical examples of this truth which clarify his intention. With a series of exemplars from Clement, Origen, Cassian and other Fathers to Pascal, Rosmini and Newman, the specifically intellectual element is here seen to have a distinctly theological sense.\(^{[34]}\)

The Baron also claims the intellectual virtues to be instrumental in spiritual growth: candour, moral courage, intellectual honesty,
accuracy, fineness, docility to facts, collaboration, renunciation of easy popularity and honours, and 'love of bracing labour and strengthening solitude.'[35] This element is not confined merely to the educationally-gifted, but is 'one of the faculties of every living soul.' Its essence is attention to 'things and their mechanism, their necessary laws and requirements.' Characteristically the Baron sees this element not only among the Church's intellectuals such as Jerome or Anselm, but also in the Venerable Anna Maria Taigi 'attending to the requirements and rules of good washing and of darning of clothes', or St Jean Batiste de la Salle studying the psychology of school children to improve his school system. Though there is a danger that emptiness and depravity of heart can co-exist with this dimension, its place in balanced religion cannot be denied. The vital critical role of the intellect is also apparent from his remark that religion has need of philosophy to 'analyze, synthesize...the materials offered by the religious experience and history.'[36] In the present he felt that the Church which already possessed in full knowledge the aids to spirituality was less strong as regards 'the needs, rights and duties of the mental life.' Thus he sought to 'make the old Church as inhabitable intellectually' as he could.

With regard to the intellectual formulation of revealed truths or spiritual wisdom, von Hügel provides an interesting insight into the tendencies and tensions of modernism. His attitude to dogma seemed to shift over the years. Whereas Tyrrell experienced a chasm between received dogma and life, spiritual experience and theological formulation, and consequently sought a theory of development which became ever more pragmatic, signalled by his eventual rejection of Newman's theory, the Baron found unacceptable what he called the 'full pragmatizing of the
Dogmas' since he believed they stood 'in some objective relation...to the Realities conveyed to our minds and souls.'[37]

This mature position was achieved only after feeling the distinct attraction of a purely relative and fluctuating concept of dogma. Nédoncelle has shown this temptation was strongest at the time of his deepest involvement in the modernist movement and his friendship with Loisy.[38] Even so it does not seem that the Baron resolved the issue satisfactorily; he retained the hope that the imagery of the dogmatic statements of the Virgin Birth and the Resurrection might be reformulated and purified in the same way that the imagery of Christ's descent into hell and ascension into heaven had been. Agreeing with Dechamps, he maintained that dogmas were part of the divine response to human aspiration. Though 'Critical Realism' influenced his belief in the possibility of dogmatic truth one also feels that the threat of ecclesiastical censure in part accounts for his growing acceptance of the givenness and objective value of dogma. Further, his growing unease with excessively liberal purifications of dogma was expressed in his margin notes to Palmer's The Diary of a Modernist, where he claimed that dogmas 'are not as far from life' as Tyrrell and Palmer suggested.[39]

It was in discussing von Hügel's thought on the intellectual element that Tyrrell articulated lucidly his own view, balancing some of his more anti-intellectual sentiments which in part gave rise to his extreme relativist view of dogma. He stated that 'a religion without at least an implicit theology is like a man without a brain.'[41] Despite the danger of distorting reason in the direction of rationalism, which in turn produces its own reaction in the form of irrationalism, fideism, or illuminism, the 'effort to understand itself is as essentially a part of

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religion as it is of any other side of our free life.' Using the term science in its broad Hugelian sense, he maintains that scientific preoccupations are a sobering and bracing influence on religious character. But there is a tension. As the 'rational and theological element of religion is normally distrustful of the mystic's unreasoned divinations and intuitions', so too in the medieval mystical tradition there was at times a contempt for 'scientific and positive knowledge', since the desire to know was considered 'lust of the eye' which was as pernicious as 'lust of the flesh'.

The nature and role of dogma was a central question in the modernist controversy and Tyrrell moved towards a more radical position than the Baron. Laubacher referred to the four stages in Tyrrell's evolving thought on dogma: uncritical orthodoxy (1886-1900); a period of transition (1899-1902); a period of restatement of Catholicism (1902-1907); and a final period of further precision in this restatement (1907-1909). Kilfoyle labelled these periods orthodoxy, liberalism, modernism, and anti-Roman modernism.[41] Whichever phase one highlights, Tyrrell always stressed the religious value rather than the intellectual form of dogmatic statements, the spiritual value under the philosophical, historical or theological form. Yet in mystical experience the form has an importance which is partly determined by theology and dogma. This question had been treated in various essays where he had sought to distinguish dogmatic theology from revelation and to assert that the spiritual authority of the traditional creeds resided in their expression of the 'collective religious experience of the community.'[42] Thus theology had to be tested by primitive revelation.
Tyrrell claimed to be resisting the rationalist spirit which he felt tended to invade and distort spirituality. A 'comprehensive theology' accepts that 'God's way of putting the truth was, after all, the better and the wiser.'[43] He stressed that the prayer of the saints must be determinative in theology, so that theology that makes one pray less is bad theology. In a crucial sense, devotion and mysticism precedes theology, and so where theology begins to contradict the facts of the spiritual life it 'loses its reality and its authority' and needs to be corrected by the lex orandi. The subordination of rational argument to the mystical element was expressed in St Ambrose's dictum that it is not through disputation that God has chosen to save his people, to which Tyrrell adds: 'it is not through theologians nor by theological methods, though these have their due place, but by the Holy Spirit, by the Spirit of Holiness working in His saints and servants, that He has promised to lead His Church into all truth.'[44] This was his resolution of the tension between the intellectual and mystical elements of religion.

Much of the ambiguity in Tyrrell's attempt to formulate his position on dogma rests on a fundamental distinction between theology understood as the Roman intellectual system which he dismissed as scholastic rationalism, and a theology which sprang from the lived experience of the saints. This determined his 'revolutionary view of dogma' which distinguished sharply between revelation and theology, experience and formulation, emphasising faith in the 'whole Creed...and in the direction it gives to the spiritual life.'[45] In this process Tyrrell was certain that the true teachers and theologians in the Church were the saints. And since the Church must instinctively protect the spiritual life by the articulation of dogma, its criteria is 'purely opportunist.'
Both von Hügel and Tyrrell felt that history illustrated the difficulty of attaining the right balance of the three elements. Emphasising one element to the exclusion of the others produced either externalism, rationalism or emotionalism, depending on which was allowed to dominate. Von Hügel spoke of the alarming consequences of such imbalance as perilous crises, the tyranny of mood and fancy, fanaticism, subjectivism, delusion, sentimentality, superstition, indifference, the contracting and shrivelling up of religion. He believed that one could 'most fully observe the presence, characteristics, and interaction of these three modalities' in the fluctuating movements within historical Christianity. Even in the New Testament the three elements are reflected in what he calls the Petrine, Pauline and Johannine schools. He also discerned the pattern in the early Church. Further, 'those six or seven centuries of the Middle Ages are full of the contrasts and conflicts between varying forms of Institutionalism, Intellectualism, and Mysticism.' He felt this period richly illustrated the fruitfulness of the right relationship between the three elements when the scholastic and mystical currents were rooted in the institutional. He saw in the humanist renaissance two exemplars of his thesis. The first was Nicholas of Cusa, combining the fullest adhesion to 'External Institutional authority, with keenest Intellectual, Speculative life, and with the constant temper and practice of experimental and Mystical piety.' The second was 'Blessed Sir Thomas More who lays down his life in defence of Institutional Religion and of the authority of the visible Church and its earthly head; who is a devoted lover of the New Learning, both Critical and Philosophical; and who continuously cultivates the Interior Life.'

Von Hügel believed that just as all that was true in the mystical element survived the quietist controversy, mysticism itself would always
be upheld in the Church. The study of St Catherine was intended precisely to establish the necessity of the mystical element in religion. However, Tyrrell's clear statement that Catherine of Genoa could never bear the weight the Baron sought to place on her, wishing he had selected a 'richer and less monotonous' mystic, was implicitly acknowledged by the Baron himself. He admitted that it was 'in spite of not a little obscurity and uncertainty and vagueness in the historical evidences of her life and teaching' and 'not a few limitations of natural character and of opportunity, and of several peculiarities' which perplex or repel us now, that she stood as a saint and hero, an example of the 'necessity, the limits, dangers and helpfulness of the Mystical Element of Religion'. But he maintained that since her life was rooted in the Church and its sacraments she exemplified the truth that the mystic lives her vocation at the heart of the Church. Nonetheless, Tyrrell firmly believed that Julian of Norwich was a better exemplar of the balance of the three elements, a 'more truly Catholic type' of mystic.

It is significant that the Baron concluded his opening treatment of the three elements by insisting particularly on the importance of the intellectual element. The mystical revival emphasised many different dimensions of mystical experience, some stressed its irrational aspect rather than its cognitive value, others focused on external phenomena rather than interiority and personal growth. Von Hügel remained faithful to the fundamental Christian perception that mysticism finds its true place in relation to a revelation in which the God-given intellect appropriates divine truth and experiences God himself. Despite his unease with the notion of the intellect, Tyrrell displayed a similar concern. He saw the value of science in countering the sort of dogmatising imagination found in the early Gnostics and which produces a
'mysticism that scorns reason and fact.'[52] For him religion intensifies and directs the whole body of human interests to a supreme end such that 'if the head or any member suffer, the rest suffer with it.' Summarising von Hügel's position, he describes the balance of the three elements in less abstract language: 'religion is an affair of the whole man, social and individual, rational and emotional - not of the heart alone, or of the head alone, or of the individual alone.'

INCLUSIVE AND EXCLUSIVE MYSTICISM

Von Hügel's description of mysticism was articulated with a distinct awareness of the rather different account offered by William James.[53] Though both emphasised the immediacy of religious experience and the centrality of the mystical element, the Baron faulted James for the incompleteness of his view.[54] Although he admired much of James's *Varieties of Religious Experience*, which he had 'studied very carefully', he noted 'how sadly the book thins off towards the end...the importation of Spiritualism is a grievous aberration.' More serious was the 'methodological error' running through it, affecting unfavourably the choice and presentation of examples.

Accepting the validity of James's distinction between institutional and personal aspects of mysticism, the Baron found its application oversimplified through a failure to admit their interpenetration in the cases cited. He felt the traditional over-emphasis on the 'theological concepts and formulations accepted and transmitted' by mystics, which tended to overlook the individual, personal and directly experimental nature of mysticism, had been countered by James with its opposite extreme.[55] The criticism of James was largely an application of the inseparability
of the three elements. What James overlooked was that 'even in the most individual experience, there is always some intellectual framework or conception, some more or less traditional form, which had previously found lodgment in, and had been more or less accepted by, that soul.' So all such deep experience, even though it may be in some conflict with this form, will never be completely independent of it.

In his only letter to James, von Hügel duly recorded his debt, though he criticised James's narrow concept of mysticism, what he later called its 'systematic...abstraction from institutional religion.' In suggesting parts of The Mystical Element which James might read, the Baron drew particular attention to St Catherine's witness to the necessary balance of the three elements. So the first dissatisfaction is with James's 'taking of the religious experience as separable from its institutional-historical occasions and environment and from the analytic and speculative activity of the mind.' A further dissatisfaction concerned the prominence James gave to 'spiritualistic phenomena and experiences', which was linked to his failure to distinguish 'cases of genuine religion' from cases of 'intoxication and of spasms.' Von Hügel acknowledged the 'valuable facts and evidences collected by Psychical Research Societies concerning telepathy and communications to loved ones at the moment of death', though he also remarked that no subject or result of psychical research seemed of 'any spiritual, religious worth', believing much of the interest generated by it to be unwholesome and superstitious. But as Adams points out, James was merely recording claimed evidence for spirit-survival.

The third point of criticism centred on James's pragmatism which the Baron felt hindered a 'fully appropriate apprehension and presentation
of the specifically religious facts and experiences.' This approach ignored what for von Hügel was 'religion's primary conviction and unalterable insistence, viz. the predominance of its Object, God, the Spirit, the Infinite, over the Subject, the apprehending finite spirit.' He concluded that James was probably unaware of the non-intellectualist religious significance of scholastic objectivism (which the latter had criticised), a point which he had occasion to bring to Tyrrell's attention on the question of transcendence and immanence. James had failed to take religion in its 'concrete fullness, its multiplicity in unity', a fault von Hügel attributed to James's background: 'It is only J's Protestant, or rather, sectarian, and American individualist prejudices which prevent his seeing how violent a "simplifier" he is.'

What was at issue in the criticism of James was a full and balanced account over against what Lash calls a 'contracted' account of mysticism. What the Baron calls 'inclusive mysticism' accepts the need for the intellectual and institutional elements. He acknowledged the problem of finding adequate terminology to express the nature of true mysticism when he cited Rauwenhoff on the difference between the German terms 'Mystik' and 'Mystizismus' which aimed at distinguishing religion which has properly integrated feeling, from religion where feeling is not balanced by the other elements. Confessing his unwillingness to translate the word 'Mystizismus' as 'Mysticality', the Baron opted for the term 'Mysticism' which he then sought to differentiate by the use of three distinct adjectives. Thus he set 'Inclusive Mysticism' against 'Pseudo-' or 'Exclusive Mysticism' to denote respectively the legitimate, and the (quantitatively or qualitatively) mistaken, share of emotion in the religious life. The matter was important enough for him to struggle for the right terminology, as he
indicated to Tyrrell when revising the Mystical Element. After some thought he stated: 'I am now substituting "Inclusive" and "Exclusive" for 'Mixed' and 'Pure' Mysticism respectively, and hope this will do!' With this clarification, he then claimed that 'Exclusive Mysticism' (elsewhere called 'Sheer' or 'Exaggerated Mysticism') tended to oust the outgoing movement of the soul, whereas Inclusive Mysticism 'may be truly said to attain to the true Mystic's desires' respecting the 'interaction of both movements, and of all the powers of the soul.'

Like Butler, von Hügel was severe in his criticism of those theologians, particularly the Benedictine Schram in the late eighteenth century, who had discussed seriously 'Diabolic or Preternatural' phenomena and 'Pseudo-Mysticism'.[62] Even the treatment by Görres in his 'widely influential Mystik' gave undue attention to 'Diabolical Mysticism' and witchcraft, 'Nature Mysticism', divination, lycanthropy, and vampires, and a good deal of 'Divine Mysticism' was given to what he called 'directly miraculous phenomenalisms.' Abbé Ribet was also found wanting for his uncritical tolerance of such aberrations. Though unimpressed with Inge's tone towards the Catholic Church, he welcomed the Dean's dismissive attitude to the distortions of mysticism which had been apparent in recent history. In criticising other accounts of mysticism the Baron was seeking a 'way out of and beyond all false or sickly Mysticism, on to the wholesome and the true.' In this he was encouraged by Lejeune's Manuel de Théologie Mystique which separated 'quasi-miraculous phenomena' from the substance of contemplation and the mystical life. He also approved of Laberthonnière's spirituality which was as full of a 'delicate Mysticism' as it was free from any 'attachment to extraordinary phenomena.' His final two witnesses to this welcome development were Tyrrell, particularly in his Hard Sayings and
External Religion, and Saudreau whom, he felt, reflected solid tradition and discrimination on this question.

What von Hügel called 'exclusive mysticism', Tyrrell characterised as 'rational mysticism', 'pseudo-mysticism' or 'unbalanced mysticism'. Tyrrell rejected these distorted forms since they were built on the desire to find God experimentally 'independently of all historical and philosophical presuppositions'. Another error was the attempt to establish contact with the invisible 'by means of divination, sorcery, and other superstitious practices.' He saw Caroline Stephen's *Light Arising* as an example of rational mysticism cutting religion free of 'all entanglements with the contingent' and making it the creation and property of the individual soul. It was an apology for Quakerism which substituted the 'inner light' for the authority of the Church so that religion 'floats free of the contingent in any shape or form'. Tyrrell claims that the Society of Friends is 'the sort of Church in which the mystic is most comfortable; it is not the sort in which he is most safe.' In his account of mysticism the 'inward light' requires the 'abandonment of individualism and recognition of social authority'. The respective comments of von Hügel and James on George Fox's *Journal* highlight their differences and also the agreement between von Hügel and Tyrrell. For James, the *Journal* testified to the truth that 'first-hand individual experience' comes 'naked...into the world and lonely,' whereas for the Baron it exemplifies the 'sterilising and unjust practical consequences' of 'pure' spirituality.

Tyrrell agreed entirely with von Hügel's criticism of James's individualism and subjectivism. He remarked that 'one of the strangest misapprehensions is that which identifies "mysticism" with that
"subjectivism" in religion which is distinctive of the Protestant spirit.'[65] Inclusive mysticism rejects such an 'extremely subjective interpretation of religious truth', though he acknowledged that even some Christian mystics had displayed an inability to distinguish clearly between 'dreams and realities.' There is a delicate but vital balance to be struck between individual and communal experience. Although he accepted that religious light in the world derives from individuals, and that the common mind is built up from individuals, it remains true that we cannot 'vitally apprehend any external teaching that is not an expansion and complement of some truth already within us.' Again, his thought is exactly parallel to that of the Baron. Such prior understanding helps not only to control and share the results of experience and observation, it is also in a real sense determinative of experience. Received language and concepts are instrumental in such an apprehension and are crucial for the shaping and interpretation of experience. Even our simplest sensations are an 'insoluble blend of subjective and objective' since we receive truth or reality not merely passively but as the result of our 'subjective elaboration of what is thus given.' This is particularly important for grasping the nature of mystical experience. Tyrrell definitely rejects the notion that there might be such a thing as 'raw mystical experience', free from the 'distortion' of concepts. He took the Shewings of Mother Julian as illustration of this truth. Thus, 'God spoke to her soul in its own language and habitual forms of thoughts', imparting that which was harmonious with the previous content of her mind.'[66] Here, at least implicitly, was the balance to his suspicion of the mind and its role in apprehending the divine.
This raises an issue that has preoccupied many students of mysticism in recent years: the role of doctrinal structures, credal ramifications or the 'meaning-giving organizational patterns' which are components of mystical experience. If the immediacy of mystical experience is not called into question but simply contextualized, then interpretation is seen to be built into experience since it is part of the one who experiences. Thus Tyrrell states: 'The obscurest mystical experience implies concepts, and spontaneously tends to clothe itself in concepts and words; and its fruitfulness depends much on the success of that effort.' For von Hügel too our reception of all reality is complex, and this is especially true with respect to God. Citing James Ward he notes that such experience has never been 'mere receptivity, but has been a conative or selective activity.' Experience is constituted by these two factors: 'a real relation antecedent to, but never completely covered by, the reflective knowledge we come to attain concerning it.' In this way both von Hügel and Tyrrell illustrate what Lash calls the necessity of any account of religious or mystical experience being 'intrinsically, or constitutively, interpretative or "hermeneutical" in character.'

Tyrrell thus agreed with von Hügel in seeking an inclusive mysticism against the 'fanaticism of mystics and ascetics' the 'soullessness of theologians' and the 'superstitions of formalists', all of which corruptions spring from a 'false simplification obtained by exclusion instead of inclusion.' For Tyrrell, the proneness to exclusivism was inherent in the very nature of mysticism. James did not provide the context for Tyrrell's discussion in the way that he had for von Hügel; in fact he referred to James as having helped towards the valuable distinction between mystic and prophetic illumination. His
criticisms emerged from a wider perception of the distortions wrought by externalism, dualism and individualism or subjectivism, what he characterised at one point as banal Kant-inspired Protestantism which fostered 'sundry bizarre reactions in favour of ritualism, pseudo-mysticism, and other medieval fashions.'

So, in terms of individual thinkers, Tyrrell, like von Hügel, singled out Kant who, by not allowing the possibility of 'the converse with God at which the mystic aims', was responsible for an 'impoverishment of religion.' Such impoverishment also characterised the thought of Ritschl and Herrmann who defined mysticism as 'solely subjective and interior experience.' Again like von Hügel, Tyrrell welcomed the growing tendency among some to relegate psycho-physical and semi-hysterical phenomena which had so often discredited mysticism as morbid and illusive. He observed that the 'greater mystics' from St Paul onwards never regarded the miraculous, or visible signs and wonders as infallible indications of true mysticism. Overcoming dualism with a more balanced understanding of the interdependence of body and soul would determine the evaluation of the 'otherwise mysterious phenomena of mysticism'. He did not want to deny the possibility of extraordinary mystical phenomena, but sought to distinguish them from the merely 'abnormal and morbid', hysteria, dissociation, and illusion, which were marked by a 'moral and spiritual sterility.' Against such distortions, true mysticism is found through inclusion; 'the remedy for such evils is the proper balancing of the mystical by the institutional and the rational elements of religion.'
TOWARDS A DEFINITION OF MYSTICISM

The belief that the mystical element is inseparable from the intellectual and institutional elements of religion is intimately linked with the view that the apprehension of God takes place within human experience in its totality. Mysticism finds its locus within the whole Christian experience of belonging to a visible community itself rooted in this world. One important corollary is that there is no place for the idea of a single 'spiritual' or 'mystical faculty'. Von Hügel and Tyrrell agreed on this question and, in view of the recurrence of the notion in the Christian mystical tradition, the strength of their conviction is all the more striking. Inge probably exaggerated the prevalence of the belief that 'we have an organ or faculty for the discernment of spiritual truth, which, in its proper sphere, is as much to be trusted as the organs of sensation in theirs.' Nonetheless, belief in what Streng calls 'a separate and special organ or faculty of mystical knowledge' has been held by many mystics and theologians of mysticism in history and found proponents at the time von Hügel and Tyrrell were writing.

What is clear from a study of von Hügel and Tyrrell is their rejection of such a faculty. The Baron opposed the notion as a form of 'Atomism', the acceptance of any 'single faculty of the soul or of any number of them short of all' as being 'sufficient to apprehend and affirm any full reality, especially the supreme Reality, God.' The point is vital for understanding the nature of mystical experience and its relation to epistemology and human experience in general. This rejection was simply the negative application of a more positive principle which had been expressed in their early exchanges. Tyrrell had written that St Francis de Sales was a remarkable example of the
'identification of sanctity in its fulness with the harmonious development of the entire human soul.' The Baron approved of this belief that perfection must be sought in the 'proportional development of all the faculties of the soul.' He claimed that Eucken had completely drawn him away from 'any absolute preference for any one faculty above another', and Blondel had helped him to see grace as ever 'the joint work of God and man, of the working of all his faculties, successively and simultaneously'. He believed such a stress on the 'totality and cooperation' of all the faculties effectively repudiated both sentimentalism and rationalism. Behind these contemporary witnesses the Baron also found St Thomas Aquinas who had himself recovered the 'older, Patristic position', which was also the scriptural teaching, that God moves in love towards his creatures who are called to respond with their whole nature: mind, heart and body.

The Baron also raised this question of a separate faculty of mystical apprehension in *The Mystical Element* where he described it as an error of the 'Exclusive Mystics', from which proceeded all their other errors. The view that mysticism thus constitutes 'an entirely separate, completely self-supported kind of human experience' destroys the fundamental truth that it is experience of God in and through total human nature and this-worldly reality. Though definitively rejected by Munsterberg and 'transcended by St John of the Cross', this erroneous view was 'still hankered after, and treated as of spiritual worth, by present-day Spiritualism.' William James again provided the stimulus in clarifying the Baron's own mind: 'even Prof. James's in many respects valuable *Varieties of Religious Experience* is seriously damaged by a cognate tendency to treat Religion, or at least Mysticism, as an abnormal faculty for perceiving phenomena inexplicable by physical and psychical
science.' It was deemed to be an error rooted in what he called 'Phenomenalist Mysticism'.

Von Hügel believed the corrective to this view was provided by St Teresa's remarks that 'the soul sometimes leaps forth out of itself, like a fire which has become a flame; the flame ascends high above the fire, but it is still the same flame of the same fire.[76] Nédoncelle's comment is that 'the psychology of the mystic is thus in the direct line of ordinary psychology.' It also implies what might be called an epistemological continuum in which mystical experience and knowledge are fundamentally consistent and continuous with general human experience and the ordinary process of cognition though the idea of 'breakthrough' to deeper consciousness is not thereby precluded. If, according to another of the Baron's definitions, mysticism is the 'intuitive and emotional apprehension of the most specifically religious of all truths, viz. the already full, operative existence of eternal beauty, truth and goodness, of infinite Personality and Spirit independently of our action', this requires a theological understanding of human experience as the occasion and context for the sense of the Infinite which is the beginning of mysticism.[77] Neuner reminds us that 'Mystik charakterisierte von Hügel als die Erfahrung des Unendlichen.'[78] Or, as Sherry has put it, 'For von Hügel "mysticism" is simply experience of God.' It is experience which begins with the sense of the Infinite on the occasion of the finite, and which through the practice of prayer and the pursuit of selfless asceticism, develops into a conscious union not only of the human and divine will but the individual in his totality, a union of divine and human personality. Evelyn Underhill saw here a characteristic of von Hügel's thought: his consciousness of the 'close-knit texture of realities within which we live and move.'[79]
Though this emphasis on the 'normality' of mystical experience represented a line of thought which has become common among mystical theologians, it was an approach which earned von Hügel the criticism of de Grandmaison whom the Baron regarded as a writer 'distinguished on precisely this class of subjects.' The charge was that von Hügel seemed to assume that 'the mystical sense...was, if not universal, at least common amongst mankind.' He took de Grandmaison's view to be that such a mystical sense was a 'rare endowment, a very real exception, and not the rule at all.' The Baron also mentioned Alfred Caldecott who felt he could only admire the mystics from afar and yet who saw 'gleams of intermittent mysticism' shining from such as Carlyle, Mill or Charles Lamb. Von Hügel did not want to deny this 'diffuse' presence of mysticism, though neither did he want to relegate to the 'dim background of our lives' great massive figures such as Dante or Beethoven in preference for the slighter ones. He also wanted to assert that there was 'not a mere difference of degree but a difference of kind', so that mysticism is 'not simply a condition and experience (however dim, and however remotely caused by the actual presence of God within the world) of some kind of Reality not ourselves, but is an experience (more or less and vivid) of God as distinct, self-conscious, personal Spirit.' This raised a question which von Hügel felt was of the greatest importance for epistemology in general and mystical experience in particular. It was 'not so much the question as to any awareness or experience which could properly be called mystical' and which could be held to be universally prevalent, but the question 'as to the implications of all our knowledge - of all such certainty as we possess, however little we may ourselves draw forth these implications into the full light of our own minds'.
For the Baron, the crucial question was 'whether we do not all, as a matter of fact, act and think in ways fully explicable only as occasioned and determined, in some of their most striking features, by the actual influence of the actually present God.'[81] He sought to illustrate this with a rather odd and laboured analogy but one which nonetheless brings out the difference between reality and our limited recognition of it. He noted that although astronomers were unaware until two generations ago that Uranus was deflected by Neptune the deflection was real and was really produced by Neptune. However inadequate the analogy, he was convinced of the truth it helped to express. He made the point more clearly in response to Algar Thorold's criticism that he had held that all people at all times are 'possessed of a genuine sense of God as such.'[82] He answers that he had never proposed such a doctrine and then clarifies exactly what he did claim. Accepting the general principle that we are all influenced by realities of all kinds, however fleeting or finite, apart from our consciousness of them and our ability to articulate and interpret them, the same truth can be applied to our sense of God:

Although I do not think that all men are clearly aware of His Presence, and although still fewer are capable of articulating this dim consciousness directly, yet these same men are very well present to the observer, who is himself fully aware of that great ultimate fact, sufficiently clear traces of the influence of that reality in those other souls.[83]

The misunderstanding did not spring merely from an idiosyncratic interpretation of the Baron's works. Von Hügel had written to Thorold himself in 1921 that he felt 'not only all Science, but especially all knowledge begins with intuition - a certain mysticism if you like.'[84] This broad use of the term mysticism, taken as a form of intuition, characterised the Baron's entire treatment and raised criticism from a
variety of quarters. He had noted the beginnings of his attraction to this comprehensive idea of mysticism in 1903 in response to Tyrrell's preface to the *Imitation*: 'I am getting to finding it important to lay the stress rather upon the *constant* presence (of course in varying degrees of fullness) of God's Spirit in all our processes, than upon its *special* presence in and during the unconscious region and moments'.[85] He wanted to insist on the continuous interdependence of our conscious and sub-conscious regions and upon 'how God's action is so operative throughout.' This renders the question about when and where the acts with the greatest fullness and directness are to be found as of secondary religious importance, providing 'we give Him the chance, so to speak, of all the different kinds of instruments for such action, by striving faithfully to keep up both fully conscious action and prayer.' We have noticed how he struggled to clarify this relationship of conscious and subconscious, though the truth he wants to express here is not vitiated by this. It received a clearer articulation in *The Mystical Element* where he observed that every one of our acts and our physical existence at every moment and in every direction depend on the 'prevenient, accompanying and subsequent power and help of God.'[86] Still more is every religious, spiritual and supernatural act of the soul impossible 'without the constant action of God.' Thus 'God's grace acts in and through the medium of her [the soul's] acts.' He is simply expressing the harmony of divine and human action, with its dynamic concept of grace, which was evident in his notion of mystical union.

On this question of the 'mystical faculty' and the nature of mysticism, Tyrrell found himself in complete agreement with von Hügel. We noticed his rejection of any idea of ecstasy as an 'act of a distinct faculty of the mind' differentiated from reason or intuition, a
faculty latent in all, undeveloped in many, but fully operative in the mystic.[87] The fundamental flaw in this view is to 'mistake an action of a recognised type', varied according to the difference in individuals, for 'a new and supernatural kind of action.' Similarly, in Lex Orandi Tyrrell clearly distinguished what he called a 'religious sense' from any idea of a specific faculty: 'There can of course be no more question of a separate religious "faculty" in the old sense, than of a separate moral faculty.'[88] This would reduce the complexity of the individual's 'distinct apprehensions, loves, and interests of his spiritual nature' which are not to be isolated but rather 'harmoniously coordinated in one and the same life or movement.' In view of this clearly stated position, Tyrrell's use of the phrase 'religious faculty' in External Religion was no more than a lapse of thought or carelessness of expression since the context reveals clearly that he was intended 'religious sense' as he had used it elsewhere.[89] Similarly, on another occasion the phrase 'religious faculty' is used broadly for 'our capacity of will-union with God.'

Like the Baron, Tyrrell rejected both sentimentalism and rationalism since mysticism is neither a purely affective nor a purely intellectual matter: 'it is the highest life of the soul; and as such it is an affair of the whole soul - of head and heart - and must violate none of its essential exigencies.'[90] Tyrrell held this truth to the end of his life. In Christianity at the Crossroads he noted that 'inward experience' involved 'no violation of the usual process of thought, nor calls for any special faculty.' He was adamant on the point: 'the idea that mysticism implies a special sort of gnosis, the exercise of a faculty lacking or dormant in others, needs to be exploded.'
Tyrrell's articulation of this point also enabled him to offer a clear statement of the relationship between mysticism and 'ordinary' experience which became the foundation for a definition of mysticism: 'All that mysticism implies is an emphasis and more exclusive use of certain processes and operations common to all minds.'[91] Claiming that God is given to us 'as the light is to our eyes or the air to our lungs', Tyrrell's thought exactly parallels that of von Hügel:

if he [God] is not to be found in us as the necessary presupposition of our thought and action, we can safely dispense with him. What we have to do is to show men that they affirm God in every breath, to teach them the mystic's habit of attention to the constant that underlies the variable elements of their consciousness.[92]

This was already implied in the descriptive account of the sense of the Infinite. Tyrrell defends von Hügel's argument against Kant, insisting that the mystics' constructions cannot be dismissed on the grounds of their subjectivism since subjective considerations necessarily enter the very simplest forms of knowledge. The argument is supported by reference to Volkelt whom the Baron himself had utilised in his discussion of epistemology. If the 'God-idea of the mystic' is neither more nor less than a natural response to certain stimulations than those elementary judgments on which all our knowledge rests, then it is 'in its emphasis and its interest, not in its process, that mystical differs from ordinary thought.'[93]

This was another way of expressing the truth behind the doctrine of the spiritual senses. Johnston distinguishes mystical knowledge from 'ordinary' knowledge with the help of John of the Cross who speaks of deep, vast, loving, 'mystical wisdom' which engulfs the person unlike that usually attainable by any human creature. The Carmelite saint notes that some call this contemplation 'knowing by unknowing'.[94] Thus, 'mysticism does not mean that we learn new things but that we learn to
know in a new way."[95] In stressing the qualitative difference between mystical and other forms of knowledge, the differentiating element is love; it is a loving knowledge, a wisdom through affective engagement and relationship. It is a knowing close to the biblical concept of intimate involvement and sexual union. We have seen how von Hügel and Tyrrell sought to express this distinction by contrasting 'tactual intuition' and reflex knowledge in their description of the operation of the 'spiritual senses'. So, this is more than Hick's idea of mystical experience as cognition, whereby mysticism is defined in terms of 'seeing as', or merely one of the endless possible hermeneutical variations in handling basically similar experiences of the same phenomena.[96]

Von Hügel and Tyrrell were proposing a holistic Christian anthropology which respected the totality of human nature and the profound continuity within human experience. Mystical experience is the apprehension of the transcendent God by the whole person since there is no special channel or, to use Chapman's terms, 'preternatural trap-door' or 'mystical telegraph' between the soul and God. They rejected the concept of a 'mystical faculty', not only in the case of those not drawn to the contemplative life, but even for those who may be regarded as mystics by specific vocation and commitment. It is not that the mystic has developed a particular faculty latent in all. Rather the mystic is one who has become so receptive to the sense of the Infinite in the matrix of his or her ordinary experience, so open to the presence of God which is both fostered and assimilated through prayer and spiritual discipline, that the totality of human nature and experience, and all the faculties are operative in a union of human and divine. Mysticism is thus 'essentially an apprehension, admiration, and love of the infinite depths and riches of Reality - of this Reality no doubt present
everywhere, yet in indefinitely various forms and degrees."[97] This apprehension is not solely a matter of separate experiences, identifiable by outward manifestations or even inward sensations, but essentially a profound, abiding experience, a union and communion of life and love.

THE UNIVERSAL CALL TO MYSTICISM

A further question which interested theologians of the period was: who is called to the mystical life? In discussing the possibility of a 'universal call to mysticism', opinions differed, reflecting the different accounts of mysticism. Egan summarises the position which came to be accepted by most mystical theologians: "the fullness of faith, hope and love as well as the accompanying virtues, constitute Christian perfection", and "all Christians without exception are called to the full perfection of Christian life."[98] This raises the further question whether there is one mystical way to perfection or two ways.

Some theologians believed there was a strictly mystical path for the few, distinct from an ascetical or ethical path for the many, a view which they felt accorded with observation and experience. Though von Hügel and Tyrrell held asceticism to be essential to the mystical way, the necessary purification of self in the journey to union with the divine, they envisaged no absolutely clear divisions. De Guibert considered mystical prayer a normal way to sanctity, though there were also other 'normal' ways. The purification necessary for sanctity is attained not only through infused contemplation, though he believed even saints who did not follow the mystical path probably experienced occasional touches of infused prayer. The alternative view, that there is one unitive way, is associated with the name of Garrigou-Lagrange,
though he was largely popularising the thesis proposed by John Ariniero in *La Evolución mística*.[99] For Garrigou-Lagrange the fullness of perfect charity required mystical contemplation, because 'infused contemplation takes place with a high degree of love, and vice versa.'[100] On this view, mysticism, in the sense of infused contemplation, is the normal development of the Christian life begun at baptism, the inherent dynamism of baptismal grace appropriated and lived. This view is fundamentally faithful to St Thomas for whom there was only one way, that of an 'ever-growing charity leading to the truest wisdom' and this was the 'path of every Christian.'[101]

To accept the universal call to mysticism, therefore, is to hold to the theological truth that it is 'the ordinary development of the grace of baptism', a theory that is 'very traditional and has its roots in the Church fathers.'[102] In Christian theology it is a truth which turns on the theology of grace. Von Hügel and Tyrrell accepted that grace was operative at every point of the Christian life and in every form of prayer. They would have accepted Rahner's view that mysticism 'occurs within the framework of normal graces and within the experience of faith', and that 'mystical experience is not specifically different from the ordinary life of grace'.[103]

The Baron was clear that at every stage of the mystical journey it was 'the same supernatural grace acting in and upon the same human nature responsive in different degrees and ways.'[104] Though mysticism may manifest itself in a variety of ways according to different *attraits*, if 'mysticism is knowledge through love and if love is the great commandment, can we not say that mysticism is the core of authentic religious experience and that it is for everyone?'[105] Thus 'mystical
experience is a profound realisation of what we are and of the grace we already possess.' This view, though now echoed in many contemporary accounts of mysticism, was reclaimed only after a considerable struggle among theologians earlier in the century. Aumann summarises the widely accepted position: 'the final perfection possible in this life consists in the intimate union of the soul with God through charity which is usually described as the mystical marriage or transforming union.'[106] If the mystical state consists precisely in the actuation of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, of which the chief gift is love, then charity 'constitutes the very essence of Christian perfection.' Therefore, 'there is not and cannot be any perfection or sanctity that is purely ascetical' since 'the full perfection of the Christian life is attained in the mystical state.' Von Hügel's place in this recovery of tradition is described by Nedoncelle who maintains that the Baron's acceptance of the 'mystical invasion' placed him in the forefront of developments in mystical theology:

to be summoned to the supernatural life is enough to put the soul in virtual possession of mystical powers: every baptized person is a potential contemplative. We must not forget that this daring doctrine was put forward at a time when theology was very timid of even setting ajar the door which he threw so widely open.[107]

Another authority on the mystical tradition hints at the contribution of von Hügel to the revival of mysticism. David Knowles was impressed by the 'mature, old, mellow Baron' handing on the torch of the Christian spiritual and intellectual tradition. Knowles remarked that 'his judgments are almost unerringly sound... and he has, with St Augustine and so few others, both mind and heart.'[108] Knowles also formulated the truth that mysticism appears as the 'culmination of the spiritual life of grace which is in essence the achievement of a union of love between God and the human soul.'[109] Though he still wanted to
maintain that there was a difference in kind not merely degree, and that in its higher reaches the mystical life was 'very rare, as are supreme excellencies of any kind', this may owe more to what Williams calls his 'tormented purism' than a fully adequate theory of mysticism110 He is sounder when insisting that when the awareness and operation of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, offered at baptism, becomes 'pronounced and habitual' one speaks of mysticism, which is not to be confused simply with 'experiences', and when he concludes that the mystical life is a normal prolongation of the life of grace.

This same view is also expressed by Trethowan: 'union with God is not in itself, something extraordinary...but the ordinary goal which the Christian sets before him, the purpose for which the Christian life is ordered' which all the faithful enjoy 'at least in embryonic form.'111 But at the wellspring of this revival in mystical theology stood Garrigou-Lagrange who asserted the one way to perfection, and in doing so was simply making a 'solid and defensible point about the purpose of Christian life as union with God.'112 The Baron was thus part of the original recovery of a central tenet of the mystical tradition.

These truths were central to the account of mysticism presented by von Hügel and Tyrrell. Though they have been recognised as vital concerns for von Hügel, their place in Tyrrell's thought has not always been recognised. His condemnation meant that not only were his polemical writings rejected, but his impressively orthodox work on mysticism was viewed with suspicion and virtually ignored. Both von Hügel and Tyrrell regarded mystical union as the perfection of Christian discipleship, the intensification of the ordinary life of grace. Marechal conceded that it was 'not forbidden even to Catholics to reduce the
higher mystical states to a simple quantitative increase of normal psychological potentiality and ordinary supernatural grace...to a pure intensification of the infused virtues communicated at baptism."[113] Von Hügel and Tyrrell refused to admit that this was reductionism, rather what Tyrrell called a legitimate simplification of the concept of mysticism. It rested solidly on a perception of the reality and constancy of God’s grace operating throughout the whole created order, through the sacraments and the earliest stages of the ascetical life as well as the highest contemplation. They both accepted what Maréchal rejected, the belief that mysticism is an intensification of the Christian life under the impulse of grace. Thus, Tyrrell admitted that there was 'latent mysticism involved in the Christian "Way of Life" and organically inseparable from it.'[114]

The particular question about the place of asceticism in the universal call to mysticism is resolved by Pepler with an interesting nuance. He claimed that since asceticism is the 'necessary pre-requisite' to mysticism, it is in one sense more accurate and helpful to speak of a universal call to asceticism.[115] Lonergan reflects the subtlety of the relationship when he observes that the 'differentiated consciousness is approached by the ascetic and reached by the mystic.'[116] Refusal to admit a chasm between asceticism and mysticism, or the life of the ordinary Christian disciple and the mystic, is not to adopt a psychological or theological reductionism, capitulating to a superficial 'sociological craze' or 'utilitarian error' which would 'rob mysticism of its truth to make it useful to society'.[117] This is not to deny its immense value to society, though this always derives from the essential and radical truth of mysticism: the transforming power of the gifts of
faith, hope and charity which mark every stage of the Christian life, including the practice of asceticism.

In what appears at first sight a rather tautologous remark, Tyrrell describes the mystic as one in whom the mystical element tends to predominate. More precisely, he is one who is 'particularly, sensitively, absorbingly conscious of a divine attraction exerted on his own soul, and seeks to accommodate himself to it both actively and passively.'[118] Von Hügel offered a fuller definition in his description of religion:

religion, at least among the mystics (and I believe that, on this point at least, the mystics merely dive deeper into and bring out more explicitly the sap or the central core of the religious passion), consists centrally in the sense of Presence - the sense of an overflowing Existence distinct from our own and in the Adoration of the same.[119]

Thus the mystic is not set apart from the rest of humanity by virtue of his abnormal experience. This view places the mystic at the forefront of the human journey, being a pioneer of renewed and redeemed humanity. Sanctity is the concern of every Christian, the calling of all within the Church; as the Baron put it, 'to sanctify is the biggest thing out.'[120] And since the presence and grace of God are apprehended in the midst of life, the depth and pervasiveness of divine activity is expressed in the slow purification of the soul by the transforming power at work in individuals. Such transfiguration and spiritual growth in all its forms, whether suffering of soul or mind, or the external acts of religion, is the work of God in the individual. To be called to holiness, sanctity or perfection is effectively to be called to mysticism, the way of loving knowledge and union and active charity which constitutes the Christian life.
We have seen how Tyrrell found in the Saints the secret of our own humanity, since their mysticism was not 'a peculiar possession from which other Christians are excluded.' Mysticism is misunderstood if it is seen as 'something vague and unintelligible, something akin to illusions, visions, things which no healthy and practical mind would care to meddle with.' Like Tyrrell, the Baron welcomed Joly's rejection of the 'abnormalities' associated with mysticism, though he felt John of the Cross and others had also done the same long before. Joly had suggested the simple definition that 'mysticism is the love of God.' The corollary is that 'every Christian in the state of grace loves God, and is therefore more or less of a mystic.' Tyrrell agrees with Joly that the saint has simply allowed himself to be 'wrapped up and permeated with the love of God.' He draws out the vital conclusion: 'the Saint differs from the ordinary Christian, not in his mysticism; but in the degree of his mysticism.' The difference is between 'inceptive love and perfect love', between the seed and the flower. What he calls a 'real continuity and sameness of kind' makes the saint intelligible to us. Tyrrell knew this was a 'simplification of the notion of mysticism' which would be distrusted by those who believed mysticism to be beyond, if not against, reason. But he appeals to the analogy of human love where there is something mysterious and beyond reason, claiming that 'if all love is mysticism; still more the love of God.'

Tyrrell readily acknowledged that those who preferred to keep mysticism at arm's length would be unhappy with such a definition though he insisted that the mystic's belief in the intuitive penetration by which the mind is brought into contact with God is open to all. He concludes that the mysticism of the saints does not render them unknowable but 'reduces them at once to the category of the known.'
If the substance of mysticism is 'that love of God without which no soul can put forth the blossom of its highest perfection and salvation', then the answer to the question about who is called to mysticism is clear: 'if love be mysticism, then we have the key to all mysticism within ourselves.' The logical conclusion from this is that 'everyone is something of a mystic; no one is nothing but a mystic.'

In this view, all love is mystical in that it transcends exact analysis and reasoning. Its goal is union with God and 'this ineffable union is not the privilege of a few elect souls, but an obligation upon all.' So Tyrrell is not satisfied merely to proclaim a universal call to mysticism; he implies the urgency and seriousness of a distinct obligation. Again the agreement with von Hügel is striking. The Baron had written that he wanted to get rid of 'too hard and fast a line...between contemplative, mystical acts and states, and the acts of the ordinary spiritual and even mental life. Most of ours have dug as deep a trench as possible between the two.' In resisting this he claimed that Mysticism, indeed, anything and everything, becomes profoundly uninteresting, and indeed a pure and simple irritant, except it be conceived as existing, in some form and degree, in every mind. Only in its intensity and extension, in its quantity and quality will it then differ in various souls.

This meant that mystical states in their elementary forms, endless degrees and combinations are not 'strictly the affair of a small élite only.' The Baron was emphatic that 'the good, old, classical Catholic tradition knew no such doctrine, but very deliberately and quietly taught the precise reverse.' Butler saw the enduring contribution of the Mystical Element precisely in its assertion that mysticism is not intended for a leisured class: 'again we learn that mysticism, like religion itself, is within the reach of all'.
So von Hügel and Tyrrell broadened the concept of mysticism to embrace a whole range of human experience from the sense of the Infinite in its most inchoate form to the highest realms of mystical union, spiritual marriage or transforming union. In doing this they rightly claimed complete fidelity to the classical patristic position. If mysticism is union with God all are called to this fulness of life and love. They wholly accepted the view which Johnston sums up thus: the mystic is a believer who 'loves God so intensely that his charity takes on a highly experimental character, coming to possess his whole being' so that 'every convinced believer is a mystic in embryo.'[129]

Given these emphases, where is mysticism to be situated in the Christian vision? This question is raised by Williams in discussing *Western Mysticism* where he points out Butler's marked failure to 'earth' mysticism in the saving event of Christ. This failure to 'contextualise' mysticism, a feature of other discussions at the time, was itself linked with the dominant desire to utilise the apologetic value of mystical experience. Knowles observed how the growing conviction that experience was evidence for religious reality affected the study of mysticism. The argument could proceed by suggesting that since mystical experience was shrouded in mystery, offering no clear doctrinal concepts to the mind, it could hardly be assimilated to the dogmatic or ecclesiastical aspects of religion at all. Although there were times when Tyrrell was drawn to such a position, he and von Hügel struggled precisely to resist such an 'unpalatable conclusion' by relating the mystical element to the intellectual and institutional elements of religion and situating it within an overall Christian theological vision. Again, other contemporary accounts help to throw into relief the significant breakthrough in the treatment by von Hügel and Tyrrell.
What is at issue is the possibility of what Williams calls a 'unified approach to the Christian contemplative tradition', and the attempt to determine its 'overall location in theology.' This transcends both the mere anthologising of the mystics and the attempt to identify a cross-cultural single type of mystical experience. It requires something like Katz's view that 'mystical experience must be mediated by the kind of beings we are.' We have seen that von Hügel and Tyrrell fully accepted such a position. If its implications are also accepted, in terms of the role of language, context and interpretation in shaping experience, then mysticism becomes a 'purely formal concept' which reminds us that religion is 'not only outward performance but also, for some of its adherents at least, 'a never-ending quest after its own perfection, the perfection which is inherent in its specific structure, a perfection to be realized on the level of the spiritual, the interior dimension of man.' This is close to von Hügel's view revealed in the statement quoted earlier; 'the mystics merely dive deeper into and bring out more explicitly the sap or the central core of the religious passion'. It was the whole thrust of his and Tyrrell's belief in the rootedness of mysticism in the Christian life of discipleship, and their desire to anchor mystical experience in the ordinary experience of the finite and contingent.

Unfortunately, Williams adopts the ugly and infelicitous term 'reconditioned' for the human consciousness which has been reshaped under the impulse of divine activity and mystical apprehension. But the central feature of his account of mysticism is the experience of transformation wrought by the living out in depth and seriousness of a particular religious commitment and the attempt to perceive and describe this transformation. If this is accepted, then the specificity of
Christian mysticism derives from those central symbols and patterns of thought which have their roots in the life and teaching of Christ. Thus, it will be an overall vision of Christian faith and life which will provide the hermeneutical framework for assessing such claims to mystical experience or descriptions of mysticism.

In seeking a restoration of contemplative prayer and the mystical life to the whole Church, von Hügel and Tyrrell were consciously seeking to retrieve vital elements of the Church's inheritance, including the universal call to mysticism. This was again in conscious opposition to Herrmann, Ritschl and others who felt that what was truly Christian could not be mystical and who wrote in a 'thoroughly patronizing manner concerning Catholic Mysticism'.[136] Von Hügel was reassured that such a negative attitude was also resisted by 'richer and more balanced Protestant thinkers' such as Eucken, Troeltsch, Class, Siebeck on the continent and Pattison and Illingworth in England who displayed a 'strong sympathy with Mysticism'.

Unlike von Hügel and Tyrrell, none of the Catholic theologians who are noted for their treatment of these mystical questions earlier in the century were tarnished by association with modernism. Because of their involvement in the modernist movement, their contribution to these issues has been insufficiently recognised in the unfolding of the mystical tradition in the twentieth century. Bremond was perhaps the major continental figure who came nearest to them in belonging both to the revival of mysticism and the modernist controversy. His correspondence reveals an abiding friendship with von Hügel and Tyrrell from whom he clearly learned a good deal on mystical theology, and, significantly, he too emphasised its centrality. Like them, he criticised
the tendency to place the mystics at the fringes of Christian experience, expressing the belief that although the mystical experience may seem out of reach it 'attracts us like a promise.'[137] Moreover, he stated that 'instead of supposing the mystics superhuman, we are rather disposed to open the mystic career to all mankind.' Since the mystic vocation does not belong to the realm of the esoteric, 'it is not possible to ignore the mystics without disowning one's self.' Maude Petre expressed similar sentiments when, rejecting the idea of a privileged spiritual class: 'If contemplation be the highest life of man, then every man is called to some exercise of it.'[138] Thus, von Hügel and Tyrrell are again seen to be part of a more general recovery of an essential truth of the mystical tradition.

Williams's description of Butler's legacy to mystical theology could be applied equally to von Hügel and Tyrrell. Theirs was a 'bold attempt to demystify mysticism', to avoid some of the stark negativity of the Carmelite tradition, to resist a rigid schematic theory of contemplation, to relate the mystical to the ordinary ways of the Christian life.[139] They were powerful witnesses to the truth that there are no 'special hermetically-sealed spiritual classes in the Catholic Church' and that mysticism is an 'organic part of its life, neither a threat nor a marginal specialism'. What the mystic describes, as they insisted time and again, was the fundamental human experience of awareness of the Infinite, the growth, deepening and the possible loss of that experience, and the ascetical transformation through suffering and purgation central to the Christian vision of humanity. Mysticism thus names the idea 'which identifies and illuminates a set of deep and varied experiences, all of which look towards the Source or Centre of all vision and aspiration.'[140] It evokes particularly the 'intensity...
transforming power' of such experience of the Source. Though it may rightly be thought that the note of 'breakthrough to presence and receptivity' and the sense of crossing the threshold is essential to true mysticism, it was the conviction of von Hügel and Tyrrell that the idea of continuity, progression and intensification was in need of re-assertion to ensure that mystical experience is understood as the deepest and most truly human experience.

Von Hügel and Tyrrell related mysticism to the sacraments, which form a 'sound structure for mystical experience', anchoring it in the institutional reality of the Church, and relating it to theology and the whole Christian life. To integrate mysticism into the Christian vision is to recognise that all are called to the mystical life since that life consists in the full operation of the spiritual gifts, above all the love of God and neighbour. Using inherited and consecrated forms of discourse, images, language and structures which have made possible and preserved the wisdom of the ages, the Christian mystic bears witness to the necessity of contemplative discipline for humanity to flourish.

The mystics are not to be thought of as a 'gallery of neurotics and psychopaths', but those who embrace the meaning of human existence, as revealed in the historical Christ. The mystic has a mission, part of which is to protest against those who would 'shrink the range of human possibilities', or defend 'regressive models of human destiny' or otherwise contract the vast range of human potential for life and love. But for the Christian, mysticism converges on the person of Christ and is rooted in the historical reality of the Incarnation and the sacraments, with their implications for practical living. As Tyrrell put it, 'if we separate it from that living unity, we tear it from its root and source
of vitality."[143] In the words of a modern author, Christian mysticism is orientated to the 'mystery of Christ in a scriptural and sacramental context.'[144]

So, the mystics are those who embrace and live religion to the full, which is to say they live their humanity to the full. They exemplify a dual movement, through self-renunciation and suffering, to the 'true self, its abiding joy in union with the Source of Life, with God Who has left to us, human souls' the choice between 'the noble pangs of spiritual child-birth, of painful-joyous expansion and growth' and the 'shameful ache of spiritual death, of dreary contraction and decay.'[145] Without the sense developed by the mystic, 'all life, and life's centre, religion, are flat and dreary, vain and philistine.' Von Hügel claims that if the mystics are those who truly manifest the 'presence of the Infinite in Man', then they are the fullest personalities and 'amongst the great benefactors of our race.'[146] As Tyrrell put it: "A new creature...a Son of God - this is the full fruit of Christian Mysticism."[147] In a moving passage, which touches the heart of the mystical vocation, Tyrrell wrote of the mystic as possessing the fullest personality, becoming Christ-like and thus able to identify with the whole world. Thus, 'the mystical life of such a personality is an atonement of the whole world with God' not a narrowing or impoverishment of the individual.[148] The true mystic does not reject the world but affirms and bears witness to God's purpose for the world He has created. And so 'the true mystic is a prophet and redeemer, his heart in the world and the world in his heart.'
CONCLUSION

Although Aubert observed that 'Roman Catholic spirituality at the beginning of the twentieth century was lacking neither in seriousness nor in depth', its outward appearance was 'of a kind calculated to provoke unfavourable reactions in the younger generation', this hardly accounts for the mystical revival which marked the period. Von Hügel and Tyrrell observed a formalism and rigidity in much of the prevailing spirituality which they believed was the consequence of a profound retreat from mysticism which could only be overcome by the recovery and reintegration of the mystical element of religion.

The desire for mystical revival at the turn of the century expressed itself in various forms, including official authoritative statements such as Leo XIII's teaching on the Holy Spirit in *Divinum illud munus* and Pius X's encouragement of personal Eucharistic devotion. This impulse to the development of lay spirituality was accompanied by an increase in retreats and days of recollection, and a flowering of spiritual literature. The liturgical movement, the biblical movement and the growth in Marian devotion in later decades had their spiritual roots in this revival. The eventual institution of the Feasts of Christ the King and the Sacred Heart may seem simply the official containment or channeling of the desire for spirituality, but they were important expressions of a sense of the sacred touching the realities of life and the secular world.

Elmer O'Brien claimed that spiritual writers such as Marmion and Vonier witnessed to a vigorous mystical revival in England early in this century, though he lamented the 'falling away from a tradition of
theological spirituality so nobly and comprehensively established.'[3] But his picture is incomplete since there were others, including von Hügel and Tyrrell, who were central to what Dru called that generation which 'rediscovered the spiritual tradition'.[4] We have claimed that they are important not merely for their part in the modernist movement but because they belonged to that mystical revival. Though they explored historical criticism and religious philosophy, they turned quite consciously to the mystical tradition of the Church to rediscover the roots from which there could be a renewal of Christian life.

As Maude Petre spoke of the 'failure and the fruit' of modernism, we may ask about the failure and the fruit of the mystical revival which von Hügel and Tyrrell undertook. Johnston referred to that 'cluster of Catholic theologians', such as Poulain, Tanquerey, Garrigou-Lagrange and de Guibert who attempted to systematize mysticism, relying heavily on Thomas Aquinas and the Carmelite mystics.[5] But there was an over-systematic gradation of the mystical life, an interest in the phenomena of mysticism, and a concern with the essence of mysticism which left much unexplored. Von Hügel and Tyrrell showed little interest in such stages of mysticism, stressing rather the continuity between higher and lower forms of prayer and the relationship between contemplation and action. Further, visions, trances, locutions, ecstasy and other physical or psychical phenomena were judged secondary to the interior realities of the renovating sense of God's presence and union with his action, and the moral transformation of the individual under the impulse of grace. Moreover, they sought a definition of mysticism not in 'essentialist' terms but by a contextual description, relating it to the intellectual and institutional elements of religion.
Johnston's belief that a 'thorough updating' of mystical theology requires a greater awareness of modern psychology and comparative religion also helps us to assess the place of von Hügel and Tyrrell in the on-going mystical tradition. Though Blondel charged the modernists with putting 'the unknowable unconscious in place of the Heavenly Father', von Hügel and Tyrrell for their part resisted a mere 'psychologising' of mystical experience, proclaiming the transcendent, objective but personal nature of the Divine Reality encountered by the individual. Nonetheless, they clearly sought to appropriate some of the psychological insights of their day, as the references to James Ward, William James, Bergson, Münsterberg, Ribot and others indicate. Their use of the current psychology is a question which could well be explored to discover the possibilities and limits of applying empirical data and theory to the interpretation of mystical experience.

We have also seen how they were cautious and critical with regard to comparative religion, partly due to the lack of adequate sources and also their awareness of the danger of homogenising mystical experience. Yet their approach, implicitly if not explicitly, recognised the need for greater dialogue with non-Christian forms of mysticism. Indeed, their stress on the continuity between the inchoate sense of the Infinite and full union with God, and their belief in the universal call to mysticism, opened up far-reaching possibilities for a positive assessment of non-Christian mysticism which, however, remained largely unexplored. Again it is an issue deserving further consideration especially as it bears on the question of how one may hold to the uniqueness of Christian mystical experience and yet find meaning and value in mysticism which rejects implicitly or explicitly that experience.
Since von Hügel and Tyrrell acknowledged the determinative influence of religious institutions and beliefs in shaping experience, and held to the qualitative difference between a vague sense of awe and wonder, and direct experience of the God of Christian revelation, they would have rejected Stace's thesis that mystical experience is reducible to a common 'universal core'. But their emphasis on the continuity between mystical experience and 'ordinary' experience, the sense of the finite and contingent as the context for the emergence of the sense of the Infinite, entailed the view that every individual is a mystic in some degree. Though there is a danger of emptying the word mysticism of its substantive content with such a comprehensive definition, it proclaims the irreducible inner spiritual directedness of every human being and the truth that grace is operative in all our affective and cognitive experience. Nonetheless they held to the uniqueness of Christ as the Way, the Truth and the Life, and to the belief that for mysticism to be Christian it must be rooted in the Church and its theology.

One of the dominant characteristics of the thought of von Hügel and Tyrrell was the desire to achieve a balanced synthesis of the different strands found in the Christian mystical tradition, a balance which they felt had been lost at times. We have seen this concern in each of the foregoing chapters. Neo-Platonism and pantheism must be purged and re-shaped if they are to contribute to a truly Christian understanding of the divine-human encounter. Divine transcendence must be balanced by an immanence which accepts the nearness of God and his accessibility to human experience, allowing a legitimate panentheism. The idea of the spiritual senses explicitly evoked the specificity but also the depth and richness of mystical experience in its intellectual and affective dimensions. Mystical union is also to be understood as
engaging mind, heart and will in a dynamic mysticism of action which is at the same time the operation of grace. Contemplation is balanced by action, quietism and passivity being rejected in favour of contemplative prayer understood as intense, concentrated, fruitful action. True asceticism requires a healthy respect for both body and soul, a balance of attachment and detachment, and the right ordering of love of God and creatures. The idea of the three elements of religion is the clearest expression of the need for balance which is not merely a holding together of opposites but a realisation of the profound unity of the human person which underlies mystical experience and mystical theology.

In criticism one may suggest that although there was clearly an awareness of social and political questions, particularly manifest in their critical references to socialism and von Hügel's desire for the reform of the German state, their fundamental acceptance of the social and political status quo may appear a weakness. We noted that von Hügel seemed to accept without question the social stratification which later generations would regard as having reached its romantic ideal in Edwardian England. It seems from some of his letters that Tyrrell was easily assimilated to a comfortable, upper-class attached to the Farm Street parish. But this can so easily become criticism of individuals simply because they belonged to one period rather than another, a fact for which they can hardly be held responsible. The point is that such political awareness as one finds is not related to mysticism as such unless one sees their stress on the universal call to mysticism as an egalitarian spirituality having political consequences.

Although their lack of concern with this question may seem a flaw, their caution might challenge many in our own time who opt too readily
for a politicisation of religious thought and an easy assimilation to the prevailing political and ideological consensus whether of left or right. Even if the world more than ever needs a 'synthesis of the politician and the mystic', politics has its own potential for destroying whatever cannot easily be absorbed and assimilated.[9] The subversive and revolutionary nature of mysticism resides in its challenge to the deepest core of the human person. The mystical call which is addressed to all, touches the roots of our humanity, calling into question all our definitions of what 'being human' means. This is not to deny its relevance to politics or its radical challenge to the way in which individuals live in community and build society, but simply to accept that God's call is addressed to each individual in his or her inner being. The change to be wrought in the world that God created and is creating will be achieved precisely by those who remain obedient to the Creator and resist the temptation to usurp the power which belongs to the Lord and Giver of life. The transformation and glorification of the world can only become a reality through the creative instrumentality of men and women who are themselves transfigured through the mystical way which, in Christian terms, remains a way of the cross.

Mysticism has its roots in the belief that there is an inner life which needs to be fostered and fed, a core within where human beings encounter the Source of all being, and grow in union with that Source. Individuals will always seek depth and interiority, the fullness of life and meaning which can only be found in union with God and others. Every true expression of the Christian mystical tradition, whether originating in the deserts of Egypt and Syria in the early Church, medieval Northern Europe, fourteenth century England, sixteenth century Spain, or the questionings and searchings of a diffuse movement at the turn of the
present century, serves to 'keep before the eyes of the church' the 'potential of a deeper union with God' which is a possibility held out to all.[10] Von Hügel and Tyrrell sought a re-engagement with the Catholic mystical tradition to meet the spiritual needs of individuals in a period of cultural transition and intellectual ferment. They perceived that to be true to itself and its mission, the Church constantly needs not simply new structures but new saints and mystics. The mystical element of religion overcomes the tendency to desiccation and decay which afflicts religious institutions and their patterns of thought. Von Hügel's whole theological method, and Tyrrell's critique of 'theologism', remain a challenge to theologians to rediscover the saints and mystics as primary sources for Christian theology, demanding also that theological thought be nourished by mystical experience. A theology which emerges from a mind not in harmony with the heart will remain cerebral, brittle and uninspiring.[11] Both von Hügel and Tyrrell sought to overcome such a dissociation of sensibility by retrieving a mystical theology in which mind and heart lay hold of the reality of God as a mystery to be lived not a problem to be solved.

Another way of formulating the balance which they sought is in terms of a reconciliation of science and sanctity. This is more vital now than ever when spirituality is threatened by the technological domination of the material and physical world which offers the illusion of being God-like. Especially when knowledge is valued chiefly for the power it confers, mysticism continues to proclaim a loving knowledge which is a means to human growth, liberation, and fulfilment. Mysticism offers the way to a total, integrated vision of what we are called to be, as body and soul, matter and spirit, mind and heart. This denies neither spirituality nor materialism but proposes the transfiguration of
the material world through the spirit which requires not only a symbiosis, but an interpenetration of mysticism and materialism. If the Incarnation and human bodiliness are taken seriously, there must also be a world-affirming as well as a world-denying impulse in Christian life and spirituality. One of von Hügel's criticisms of theological liberalism was precisely its refusal of the truth that the spiritual is mediated through the senses and through historical events.[12]

A series of images of von Hügel and Tyrrell helps to capture something of their enduring appeal as guides to mysticism. One image is of von Hügel the scholar absorbed in the daily routine of his study and then holding forth enthusiastically at an academic gathering. This is complemented by Butler's description of exhilarating walks with the Baron discussing Fénelon, Bossuet, Grou, St Teresa and the mystical tradition, followed by a long visit to the Blessed Sacrament: 'there I would watch him sitting, the great deep eyes fixed on the Tabernacle, the whole being wrapt in an absorption of prayer, devotion, contemplation. Those who have not seen him so know only half the man.'[13] Typically, Tyrrell commented on this practice of the Baron before the tabernacle and remarked that he would never be found there. They were very different. Tyrrell's amusing self-description, 'the travails of an Irishman in search of a Religion', captures something of his pathos. For Tyrrell, we have a contrast of images: 'tired, wistful, determined...wandering restlessly' in the darkness of the small hours of the morning on Clapham Common, and Tyrrell immersed in the regular daily round of the Jesuit house at Richmond in the magnificent Yorkshire dales, a routine of study, the breviary rediscovered, and practical care for the retired priests. Tyrrell in personal anguish, and Tyrrell sensing a certain peace and stability: two threads of a complex
enigmatic tangle.[14] Thus, he entered fully into the restlessness, the doubt and the anguished spiritual searching of his generation.

We each chose our own heroes and exemplars, and our choosing is often merely self indulgent. We need to be challenged by the unfamiliar, and even by the idiosyncrasy of those who do not immediately conform to our ideal. Whatever our predisposition, and whatever their limitations, von Hügel and Tyrrell remain signposts for the mystical journey. Eliot described von Hügel as 'almost a saint...a minor master of the devotional life' though he felt his orthodoxy was as out of date as Tyrrell's modernism.[15] But sixty years later we can appreciate both the truth and the inadequacy of this judgment. The questions he and Tyrrell raised remain central and their struggle with them can still inspire. Indeed, it is possible to think of them in terms of Abbé de Tourville's observation that 'in every age God has scattered forerunners in the world. They are those who are ahead of their time and whose action is based on an inward knowledge of that which is yet to come'.[16]

Von Hügel and Tyrrell were at the fountainhead of a great revival of mysticism in a century which has also seen the apparent triumph of so many destructive counter-forces whose full measure has probably not yet been experienced. Herein lies their abiding significance for Christian theology. Their commitment to mysticism and their belief in the universal call to the mystical life is an enduring challenge to the Church and to individual believers never to forget the riches they are called to inherit. This truth was recovered by some of the 'best Catholic spirits at the beginning of the present century', among whom we may rank von Hügel and even Tyrrell.[17] If it remains a truth which has 'yet to achieve its proper position at the centre of Catholic spirituality,
theology and life', von Hugel and Tyrrell may yet have much to teach us. Maude Petre's judgment is a valuable corrective to all other interpretations: 'let there be no mistake as to the fundamental aim of both, which was the spiritual welfare of mankind through the instrumentality of the Catholic Church.'[18] However open to the reality of mysticism in every individual, and however critical of certain aspects of Church life, they maintained that the full realisation of the mystical life requires contact with the institutional and intellectual elements of religion through which we reach the God who shows us how to be human, and the man (Christ) who shows us how to be divine.
Abbreviations

CFA  Friedrich von Hügel, 'Caterina Fiesca Adorna, the Saint of Genoa, 1447-1510', The Hampstead Annual, (1898), pp.70-85


EL  Friedrich von Hügel, Eternal Life: A Study of Its Implications and Applications (Edinburgh, 1912).


LN  Letters from Baron Friedrich von Hügel to a Niece, ed. with an introduction by Gwendolen Greene (London, 1928).


AHM  George Tyrrell, A Handful of Myrrh: Devotional Conferences (London, 1902).


ER  George Tyrrell, External Religion: Its Use and Abuse (London, 1900).


OW  George Tyrrell, Oil and Wine (London, 1907).
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<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Title</th>
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<tr>
<td>CF</td>
<td>Hilaire Bourdon (George Tyrrell), The Church and the Future, Private</td>
<td>Hilaire Bourdon (George Tyrrell)</td>
<td>Private circulation, 1903.</td>
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<td>George Tyrrell, A Much-Abused Letter (London, 1906).</td>
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<td>SO</td>
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<td>The Soul's Orbit; or, Man's Journey to God, compiled with</td>
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<td></td>
<td>by M D Petre, (London, 1904).</td>
<td>additions by M D Petre</td>
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<td>LC</td>
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<td>SC</td>
<td>George Tyrrell, Through Scylla and Charybdis; or, The Old Theology</td>
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<td>RE</td>
<td>George Tyrrell, 'Revelation as Experience', Heythrop Journal, 12</td>
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<td>SF</td>
<td>M D Petre, Von Hügel and Tyrrell: The Story of a Friendship (London,</td>
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NOTES TO INTRODUCTION


10 Kent p.170.


14 Marlé cites von Hügel’s letter to Blondel, 11 December 1908, pp.341-42.


NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE

1 Merry del Val was communicating the 'Approbation of Pius X', dated April 1907, for the fifth edition of Augustin Poulain's Des Grâces D'Oraison. We have used the text from the English edition, translated by Leonora L Yorke Smith, with a preface by David Considine (London, 1928), p.ix. Next two quotations from Cardinal Steinhuber, Prefect of the Sacred Congregation of the Index, pp.x, ix.


4 E C Butler, 'Mystical Books and Books on Mysticism', Downside Review, 30 (1911), pp.2-3, and next quotation p.17. See also Butler's article in Hibbert Journal, (March 1906).

5 William Johnston, Silent Music: The Science of Meditation (London, 1977), p.46. Next quotation p.48. The criticism of Poulain's method was common among those who approached mysticism from the standpoint of scripture and dogma. Johnston describes him thus: 'Poulain was clearly a man in advance of his times. If I were asked to define his role, I would call him not a scientist but a mystical theologian open to dialogue with science and with the world of his day.' p.50.

6 Daniel Considine, Preface to English translation of Graces, p.xi.


13 Introduction, Readings from Friedrich von Hügel, selected and ed. by Algar Thorold (London, 1928), p.34. The introduction is a longer form of Thorold's review of The Mystical Element which appeared in the Edinburgh Review, April, 1922.


16 Inge, pp.vi, viii. Quotations in this paragraph: pp.viii, ix.


20 Gabriel Daly, *Transcendence and Immanence*, p.229.


23 Cuthbert Butler, *Western Mysticism*, (London, 1919) It carried the subtitle *The Teaching of SS Augustine, Gregory and Bernard on Contemplation and the Contemplative Life*, but also a further and most revealing subtitle *Neglected Chapters in the History of Religion*. In his 'Afterthoughts' which were added in 1926 to the second edition of 1922, Butler noted 'the movement of the past quarter of a century may be characterised as a great return to the ideas of antiquity and of the Middle Ages concerning contemplation and its place in the spiritual life.' p.xii.

24 Kirk, p.431.


26 Kirk, p.435, and next quotation.


31 Daly, p.32. Next two quotations: p.228.

32 Daly, p.229. Next quotation and discussion in this paragraph: pp.229-31.


35 Tyrrell to von Hügel 23 October 1907, BL Add MSS 44939.72.


37 *Life*, p.223.


40 Loome, *Liberal Catholicism*, p.131. Loome's argument at this point is directed particularly against Barmann and Heaney.


43 Loome, *Liberal Catholicism*, p.186. The first two quotations are from his letter to Underhill 22 May 1911, SL p.187.

44 Kent, *The Unacceptable Face*, p.168.


50 Trevor, Prophets and Guardians, pp.28-47.


53 Nicholas Sagovsky, Between Two Worlds: George Tyrrell's Relationship to the Thought of Matthew Arnold (Cambridge, 1983).


62 Von Hügel to Tyrrell, 27 June 1908, BL Add MSS 44931. Quotations in next sentence: Von Hügel to Tyrrell, 25 March 1908, BL Add MSS 44931.4b; von Hügel to Maude Petre 30 January 1913, BL Add MSS 45362.80b


64 Von Hügel to Maude Petre, 18 January 1913, BL Add MSS 45362.4b, and quotation. On another occasion he wrote to Maude Petre: 'The quarrel with the Vatican must not obscure the far more central point on which he speaks to us from his very depths', 18 February 1910, BL Add MSS 45362.121.

65 Von Hügel to Tyrrell, 7 December 1908, BL Add MSS 44931.71.


71 Loome, *Liberal Catholicism*, p.35.


77 Joseph Rickaby, *Scholasticism* (London, 1908). He concluded his brief presentation with these remarks: 'the reader has much misread these pages, if he takes Scholastic philosophy to be one and the same with the deposit of Catholic faith.' p.91. See also Wilfrid Ward, 'The Scholastic Movement and Catholic Philosophy', *Dublin Review*, 50 (1891), pp.255-71.

79 Daly, p.25.


81 Tyrrell to von Hügel, 17 November 1902, BL Add MSS 44928.43.

82 Tyrrell to von Hügel, 20 November 1904, BL Add MSS 44928.219; 10 March 1906, BL Add MSS 44929.95; 8 December 1906, BL Add MSS 44929.137.


84 Letter to Mrs U, 22 February 1908, GTL p.54.


88 Von Hügel to Tyrrell, 20 September 1896, BL Add MSS 44927.39, and following quotations in this paragraph.

89 Schultenover, *George Tyrrell: In Search of Catholicism*, p.80.

90 Tyrrell to von Hügel, 28 September 1898, BL Add MSS 44927.40.


92 Von Hügel to Ward, cited by Barmann, p.78.

93 Von Hügel to Tyrrell, 30 September 1900, BL Add MSS 44927.135.


95 Neuner, p.52.


97 Von Hügel to Maude Petre, 13 March 1918, SL p.248.

98 *Mémoires* II, p.72.


100 *Life*, p.298.

101 Von Hügel to Tyrrell, 18 June 1899, BL Add MSS 44927.80, and next quotation.

102 Von Hügel to Tyrrell, 18-20 December 1901, BL Add MSS 44927.175, and quotations in next sentence.

103 Von Hügel to Tyrrell, 4 December 1899, BL Add MSS 44927.95, and quotation in next sentence.


106 Preface to ME p.xxxiii, and next three quotations. Next three quotations: von Hügel to Tyrrell, 8 October 1899, BL Add MSS 44927.84; Preface to ME p.xxxiii; *Letters from Baron von Hügel to a Niece*, ed. with an introduction by Gwendolen Greene (London, 1928), p.72.


111 SC p.155.

112 ER p.120.


114 Tyrrell to von Hügel, 10 February 1910, BL Add MSS 44930.6.
115 Tyrrell to von Hügel, 23 April 1909, BL Add MSS 44931.

116 Tyrrell to Maude Petre, 8 July 1898, BL Add MSS 52367.1.

117 Tyrrell to von Hügel, 26 June 1905, BL Add MSS 44929.36b, and next quotation.

118 Tyrrell to Bremond, 27 July 1904, BN FB NAF. For the next point see for example AL I pp.52, 57

119 GTL p.xvi.

120 HS p.25. Following quotations in this paragraph: GTL pp.39f, 40.

121 CF p.151 Next two quotations: pp.176, 177.

122 CCR p.213. Next quotation Tyrrell to von Hügel, 17 June 1901, BL Add MSS 44927.164.

123 OW p.xi.

124 OW p.xiii. Following quotations in this paragraph: Medievalism, p.77; Tyrrell to von Hügel, 28 March 1909, BL Add MSS 44931; GTL p.109.

125 FM I p.284.

126 Tyrrell became even more convinced of this whilst staying at Richmond. He wrote to Bremond of his priest companions: 'these spoilt lives. Against the charge that our training tends to destroy individuality some point to the collection of oddities we turn out. But surely oddity is not individuality; or eccentricity the same as originality...Nothing more surely produces grotesque deformities than the endeavour to produce an impossible uniformity.' He clearly felt deeply, for himself as much perhaps as for others, the pain of 'the underlying strangled humanity', 4 August 1901, BN FB NAF. Informative background to this question of the role of seminaries in preserving the dominant spirituality is offered by Peter Doyle, 'The Education and Training of Roman Catholic Priests in Nineteenth-Century England', *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, 35 (1984), pp.208-19; J Derek Holmes, 'English Ultramontanism and Clerical Education', *Clergy Review*, (July, 1977), pp.266-78.

127 FM I p.v.

128 OW p.viii.

129 FM I pp.285f.

130 FM I pp.285f

131 Tyrrell to Thurston, October 1900, Thurston Papers, 0023, Archives of the Society of Jesus, Farm Street.


135 Von Hügel to Tyrrell, 8 August 1898, BL Add MSS 44927.37.


137 Tyrrell to Bremond, 29 October 1898, BN FB NAF, and quotations in next two sentences. See GTL pp.50, 51.

138 AL I pp.222-4.

139 Tyrrell to Bremond, 29 October 1898, BN FB NAF, and quotations in next two sentences. GTL p.50.

140 Tyrrell to Bremond, 11 January 1899, BN FB NAF.

141 Tyrrell to A R Waller, 28 October 1898, BL Add MSS 43680.3. Next quotation: Tyrrell to Waller, 10 April 1901, BL Add MSS 43680.35b.

142 MAL p.10, and next quotation.


NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO


2. We shall notice the omissions of significant letters in SF and how this selectivity affected the picture she presented. Looe has described the state of the letters in the Petre collection, pointing out that the von Hügel-Tyrrell letters constitute 'without question the most important primary source for the development of the modernist controversy in Great Britain.' Liberal Catholicism, p.344

3. Tyrrell to Petre, 1 April 1908, BL Add MSS 52367.175b

4. Von Hügel to Tyrrell, 17 November 1899, BL Add MSS 44927.88.

5. Von Hügel to Tyrrell, 26 May 1901, BL Add MSS 44927. 'Tracts for the Millions' appeared in The Month, 96 (November, 1900), pp.449-60.

6. See von Hügel, 'Fr Tyrrell: Some Memorials of the Last Twelve Years of his Life', Hibbert Journal, 8 (1910), p.233. The Baron also spoke of Tyrrell's 'immensely quick and varying Celtic temperament' in contrast to his own 'slow, teutonic one'. Tyrrell's 'countless moods' were expressed in his 'incisive letters' which also revealed his 'sincere and sensitive mind', p.233. Quotations in next sentence: AL II p.2; 'Some Memorials', p.234.


8. 'Some Memorials', p.235. After comparing Bremond and Tyrrell, he wrote to Maude of the latter 'he is a soul with which I feel more and more in closest touch.' 14 June 1900, BL Add MSS 45361.4. He wrote to Tyrrell himself of his likeness to Bremond, though noting the latter's 'mind and character are so much less religious or mystical than yours.' 30 June 1900, BL Add MSS 44928.202b.

9. Von Hügel to Tyrrell, 16 October 1905. BL Add MSS 44927.53b. Von Hügel to Petre, 3 July 1906, BL Add MSS 45361.40b.


11. Tyrrell to von Hügel, 20 February 1901, BL Add MSS 44927.155. Quotations in rest of this paragraph: Tyrrell to von Hügel, 31 January 1902, BL Add MSS 44928.4b. Tyrrell wrongly dates his letter 1901.


13. Tyrrell to von Hügel, 6 October 1897, BL Add MSS 44927.7. The question of Gertrud's health was discussed in at least twelve letters over the next four years. Next quotation: von Hügel to Petre, 18 May 1901, BL Add MSS 45361.13.

15 Root p.48; see for example Tyrrell to von Hügel, 10 May 1899, BL Add MSS 44927.76.

16 Though Ellen Leonard states of Tyrrell that 'in 1904 he joined the new London Society for the Study of Religion', *George Tyrrell and the Catholic Tradition*, p.19, Barmann rightly asserts that 'Tyrrell was never a member, but he attended the meeting on 4 June as a guest.' *Baron Friedrich von Hügel and the Modernist Crisis in England*, p.188, note 3. Nonetheless, von Hügel's Diaries and the correspondence with Tyrrell reveal that Tyrrell was usually aware of the papers the Baron had given or was preparing for the meetings of the LSSR and that he attended some of them. See for example Tyrrell to Petre, 28 April 1906, BL Add MSS 52367.160: 'On Tuesday evening I go to LSSR meeting with the Baron.'

17 *MWF* p.256.

18 Tyrrell to von Hügel, 28 March 1908, BL Add MSS 44931.87, and next quotation.

19 Tyrrell to von Hügel, 24 May 1909, BL Add MSS 44931.103. This is the last letter in the collection of the von Hügel-Tyrrell correspondence to which Maude Petre attached the note: 'G.T. died July 15.' Next quotation also from this letter

20 See for example Tyrrell to Petre, 24 February 1904 on the Baron's view of the present position of Mignot and Lagrange in the modernist crisis; 10, 16 March 1905, BL Add MSS 52367.120, 121.

21 *SF* p.56; Tyrrell to Waller, 7 April 1905, BL Add MSS 43680.227.

22 *SF* p.74.

23 Tyrrell to von Hügel, 28 September 1898, BL Add MSS 44927. Next quotation: Tyrrell to von Hügel, 11 January 1903, BL Add MSS 44928.63.


25 Von Hügel to Tyrrell, 8 October 1899, BL Add MSS 44927.84.

26 Tyrrell to von Hügel, 1 November 1899, BL Add MSS 44927.87; von Hügel to Tyrrell, 17 November 1899, BL Add MSS 44927.88.

27 Von Hügel to Tyrrell, 8 October 1899.

28 The background to this remark was the growing tension between Tyrrell and the Society of Jesus to which Maude Petre refers thus:
'Certain restrictions now made themselves felt, not only in his liberty as a writer, but in other work also.' AL I p.130. A note following the title page in the volume on *Saint Nicholas* (London, 1901) by Jules Roy in the Joly series announced: 'The Publishers regret that circumstances have made it necessary for the Rev. Father Tyrrell SJ to discontinue for the present the editing of this series'.

29 Von Hügel to Tyrrell, 31 October 1902, BL Add MSS 44928.40.

30 Von Hügel to Tyrrell, 4 March 1900, BL Add MSS 44927.101.


32 Von Hügel to Tyrrell, 27 May 1900, BL Add MSS 44927.114.


34 ME II p.64. Quotations in next two sentences: von Hügel to Tyrrell, 4 March 1900, BL Add MSS 44927.105.


36 Tyrrell to von Hügel, 26 October 1902, BL Add MSS 44928.39; von Hügel to Tyrrell 31 October 1902, BL Add MSS 44928.40.


38 SF p.55. Next two quotations: Tyrrell to von Hügel, 31 December 1897, BL Add MSS 44927.12; Tyrrell to von Hügel, 12 November 1900, BL Add MSS 44927.142.

39 Von Hügel to Tyrrell, 4 March 1900, BL Add MSS 44927.105. The reference is to Jérôme-Édouard Récejac: *Essais sur les fondements de la connaissance mystique* (Paris, 1896). Next quotation: Schultenover *George Tyrrell: In Search of Catholicism*, p.398, note 22. Schultenover's guess at the reason for this surprising omission ('von Hügel usually noted everything he read'), is probably correct. He wrote to Tyrrell that he disliked the idea of the book since the 'poor fellow is an Abbé who has left the Church.' 4 March 1900. In view of his sensitivity on the matter of ex-priests, it would have seemed appropriate to von Hügel to exclude reference to Récejac.

40 Tyrrell to von Hügel, 10 March 1900, BL Add MSS 44927.106.

41 Von Hügel to Tyrrell, 4 December 1902, BL Add MSS 44928.48. Von Hügel also used Münsterberg's *Psychology and Life and Grundzüge der
Psychologie, in his critique of Pseudo-Mysticism in the chapter on mysticism and the question of evil, ME II p.303.

42 Von Hügel to Tyrrell, 4 June 1902, BL Add MSS 44928.14.

43 Von Hügel to Tyrrell, 30 December 1905, BL Add MSS 44929.79. De Tourville's Piete Confiantes have become something of a classic, reflecting a breadth and openness to the modern world. However, the Baron had reservations since the Abbé seemed to view modern philosophy, and particularly historical criticism, with suspicion. These were essential in von Hügel's religious philosophy and his understanding of mysticism. But the Baron concluded in the same letter: 'but for all that, a fine, a very fine man.'


46 George Tyrrell and the Catholic Tradition, p.145.

47 Von Hügel to Tyrrell, 26 September 1898, BL Add MSS 44927.40. Diary 16 September 1898, SAUL.

48 Von Hügel to Tyrrell, 27 October 1898, BL Add MSS 44929.56. De la Bedoyère remarked that the 'obscurity and address of the home for this effort did not for him provide any excuse for a superficial or hasty effort.' Life p.108. The article appeared in The Hampstead Annual (London, 1898), pp.70-85.

49 Barmann, Von Hügel and the Modernist Crisis, p.143. Next quotation von Hügel to Tyrrell, 3 October 1898, BL Add MSS 44927.48.

50 Preface to the Second Edition, 1923, pp.xxii-xxiii. In the same year von Hügel wrote of the attraction of St Catherine, her shrine and his personal devotion. Speaking of the Altar at St Catherine's Shrine he wrote: 'I repeatedly communicated at those altar-rails, and my eldest daughter, who to-day would have been forty-six, was married before that Shrine in the year 1907.' He had earlier sent a photograph of Catherine's portrait to Wilfrid Ward with the words 'Is'nt it a winning countenance? I am writing a little paper on her.' 30 May 1898, WFP.

51 LN p.77.

52 Preface to First Edition of ME, p.xxiii.

53 Tyrrell to von Hügel, 31 December 1897, BL Add MSS 44927.12.
54 SF p.29.


56 Life p.109. Also SF p.185. Next quotation Barmann, p.144. However, Barmann's suggestion that the Baron wrote 'as much for the clarification of his own ideas as for seeking Tyrrell's advice and observations' seems rather questionable, p.143.

57 Von Hügel to Tyrrell, 1 October 1899, BL Add. MSS 44927.47, and quotations in next two sentences. Von Hügel was prepared to risk describing her condition as 'hysteria or hysterious, or epileptoid and interpret it with modifications along the lines of Baring-Gould's life'. The reference was to Rev Baring-Gould's 'hasty and slipshod account' in the Lives of the Saints, vol. X, (1898 edition) which he cited in ME I p.92.

58 Tyrrell to von Hügel, 5 October 1898, BL Add MSS 44927.52.

59 Von Hügel to Tyrrell, 6 October 1898, BL Add MSS 44927.54. Quotations in rest of this paragraph: this letter and Tyrrell to von Hügel, 7 October 1898, BL Add MSS 44927.55; von Hügel to Tyrrell, 27 October 1898, BL Add MSS 4492757.

60 Von Hügel to Tyrrell, 27 October 1898. Next quotation: Tyrrell to von Hügel, 23 July 1899, BL Add MSS 44927.82.

61 Von Hügel to Tyrrell, 19 August 1900, BL Add MSS 44927.126.

62 Von Hügel to Tyrrell, 30 September 1900, BL Add MSS 44927.35, and quotations in rest of this paragraph.

63 Tyrrell to von Hügel, 20 February 1901, BL Add, MSS 44927.155. Next two quotations in this paragraph: von Hügel to Tyrrell, 28 May 1901, BL Add MSS 44927.157.

64 Tyrrell to von Hügel, 17 June 1901, BL Add MSS 44927.164, and next two quotations.

65 Von Hügel to Tyrrell, 6 August 1901, BL Add MSS 44927.169, and following quotations in this paragraph.

66 Tyrrell to von Hügel, 14 August 1901, BL Add MSS 44927.170.

67 ME I pp.253f. The Baron expressed the truth thus: Now it is a well-known principle of Catholic theology, expounded with clearness and finality by Pope Benedict XIV, in his standard work On the Beatification and Canonization of the servants of God, that such an approbation of their sayings or writings binds neither the Church not her individual members to more than the two points, which are alone necessary with respect to the possibility and advisability of the future Beatification and Canonization of the author of the sayings or writings in question. The Church and her individual members are thus bound only to hold the perfect orthodoxy and Catholic piety of such a saintly writer's intentions, and again the (at least interpretative) orthodoxy of these his writings, and their spiritual usefulness for some class or classes of souls. But every
kind and degree of respectful but deliberate criticism and of dissent is allowed, if only based upon solid reasons and combined with a full acceptance of those two points. Points in next sentence: Tyrrell cited the Latin text of the *Summa*: Ia. q. 105, art 5, and P.I, q.cv. art 5; *Opusculum* III, C.131.

68 See ME II p.337

69 Tyrrell to von Hügel, 22 September 1901, BL Add MSS 44927.174. Next quotation: von Hügel to Tyrrell, 18 December 1901, BL Add MSS 44927.175.

70 Tyrrell to von Hügel, 31 January 1902 which is wrongly dated 1901, BL Add MSS 44928.4.

71 Tyrrell to von Hügel, 10 July 1902, BL Add MSS 44928.19.

72 Tyrrell to von Hügel, 16 or 18 September 1902, BL Add MSS 44928.28.

73 Tyrrell to von Hügel, 16 or 18 September 1902, BL Add MSS 44928.28, 29, and next quotation.

74 Tyrrell to von Hügel, 14 October 1902, BL Add MSS 44928.38b. Next quotation: Tyrrell to von Hügel, 4 December 1902, BL Add MSS 44928.51b.

75 Tyrrell to von Hügel, 11 January 1903, BL Add MSS 44928.63. Next two quotations: von Hügel to Tyrrell, 27 June 1903, BL Add MSS 44928.104b; Tyrrell to von Hügel, 11 August 1903, BL Add MSS 44928.117.

76 Tyrrell to von Hügel, 11 January 1904, BL Add MSS 44928.146b. Maude Petre had noted the loss of von Hügel's letter at the end of the manuscript of Tyrrell's letter to the Baron, 10 January 1904, BL Add MSS 44928.143.

77 Tyrrell to von Hügel, 19 December 1905, BL Add MSS 44929.74b, and next quotation.

78 Von Hügel to Tyrrell, 30 December 1905, BL Add MSS 44929.76, and following quotations in this paragraph.

79 Von Hügel to Tyrrell, 5 January 1906, BL Add MSS 44929.80.

80 Tyrrell to von Hügel, 10 March 1906, BL Add MSS 44929.95. Next quotation: Tyrrell to von Hügel, undated postcard from early April 1906, BL Add MSS 44929.97. Another reason for the move was the fact of Bremond 'prancing about Provence (in search of materials for a book on Provençal mystiques) after May for some months. I think of a quiet stay in London till he settles down.' With this in mind he asks the Baron to try to find him some cheap accommodation near Vicarage Gate.

81 Von Hügel to Tyrrell, 20 April 1906, BL Add MSS 44929.98b. Next quotation: von Hügel to Tyrrell, 24 April 1906, BL Add MSS 44929.100.

82 Tyrrell to von Hügel, 18 June 1906, BL Add MSS 44929.110, and next quotation.
83 Tyrrell to von Hügel, 28 June 1906, BL Add MSS 44929.111.

84 Von Hügel to Maude Petre, 19 October 1906, BL Add MSS 43680.42.


86 Von Hügel to Maude Petre, 3 July 1906, BL Add. MSS 45361.39, and previous two quotations.

87 Tyrrell to Maude Petre, 17 August 1906, BL Add MSS 52367.162. The strange nature of this letter from Maude Petre doubtless increased Tyrrell's suspicion. She had included a note intended for Henri Bremond with the letter addressed to Tyrrell who had read the note by mistake. On first reading it Tyrrell thought the reference was to a cooling of friendship between Bremond and von Hügel rather than himself and von Hügel. Whether or not Maude Petre really did intend Tyrrell to see the note seems open to conjecture.

88 Tyrrell to Maude Petre, 17 August 1906, BL Add MSS 52367.162b.

89 Von Hügel to Tyrrell, 13 August 1906, BL Add MSS 44929.191.

90 Von Hügel to Maude Petre, 3 July 1906, BL Add MSS 43681.40b, and following points in this paragraph.

91 Von Hügel to Maude Petre, 3 July 1906, BL Add MSS 43681.40b. Next quotation Tyrrell to von Hügel, 6 August 1906, BL Add MSS 44929.116.

92 Von Hügel to Tyrrell, 17 August 1906, BL Add MSS 44929.118.

93 Von Hügel to Tyrrell, 17 August 1906. The Baron was clearly worried about the length of the book: 'As to the length of my Book, and of some of its chapters, eg ch. XI and XII, I have had my fears and doubts. But I find that Taylor's "Problem of Conduct" has got chapters of 50 and 60 close-printed large No. pp. each, and which are far less broken up than mine.' Final quotation in this paragraph: Tyrrell to von Hügel, 3 September 1906, BL Add MSS 44929.121.

94 Tyrrell to von Hügel, 20 September 1906, BL Add MSS 44929.124.

95 Von Hügel to Tyrrell, 1 October 1906, BL Add MSS 44929.127.

96 Tyrrell to von Hügel, 3 October 1906, BL Add MSS 44929.128.

97 Von Hügel to Tyrrell, 12 October 1906, BL Add MSS 44929.129b.

98 Von Hügel to Tyrrell, 17 October 1906, BL Add MSS 44929.130. In this letter the Baron states his intention to retain the previous structure: 'All except the transposition of the doctrine to after the other biographies, for I meant these to illustrate and even show the influence of that doctrine: and how can I do so, if I were to put the partial cause after the effect?'

99 Von Hügel to Maude Petre, 19 October 1906, BL Add MSS 43681.48, and next quotation. The Baron was quoting from Tyrrell himself.

100 Tyrrell to von Hügel, 8 December 1906, BL Add MSS 44929.137.
101 Von Hügel to Tyrrell, 18 December 1906, BL Add MSS 44929.139.


103 Von Hügel to Tyrrell, 25 March 1908, BL Add MSS 44931.7f, and quotations in this paragraph. In this letter the Baron detailed the conditions: 'He [Dent] takes all cost and risk - but pays nothing if book does not sell well - to cover print etc. royalty - 12%. When these costs are covered a royalty of 12½% on all copies will be paid to vH in England. 10% in America'. He went on: 'The book to be bought in 2 vols. of, say, 400pp each, at 21/- net the 2 vols. I to take 200 copies; the total ed. for sale to be, say, 800 copies.'

104 Von Hügel to Tyrrell, 25 March 1908, BL Add MSS 44931.7f.

105 Tyrrell to von Hügel, 28 March 1908, BL Add MSS 44931.9.

106 Tyrrell to Maude Petre, 1 April 1908, BL Add MSS 52367.175, and next quotation. Previous quotation Tyrrell to Bremond, 15 March 1905, BN FB NAF.

107 Tyrrell to von Hügel, 6 April 1908, BL Add MSS 44931.10, and next two quotations.

108 Von Hügel to Tyrrell, 16 April 1908, BL Add MSS 44931.12, and next three quotations.

109 Tyrrell to von Hügel, 4 December 1908, BL Add MSS 44931.67b. Next two quotations: von Hügel to Tyrrell, 7 December 1908, BL Add MSS 44931.68b, Von Hügel to Tyrrell, 22 December 1908, BL Add MSS 44931.74b.

110 Von Hügel to Tyrrell, 22 December 1908.

111 'The Mystical Element of Religion', Quarterly Review, 211 (July 1909), p.126. Next three quotations: this review; and Tyrrell to Bremond, 2 August 1905, BN FB NAF; this review p.126.


113 Barmann, Von Hügel and the Modernist Crisis, p.144.

114 Tyrrell to von Hügel, 23 July 1908, BL Add MSS 44931.33b. Quotations in rest of this paragraph: Tyrrell to Maude Petre, 16 November 1900, BL Add MSS 52367.16; 16 July 1902, BL Add MSS 52367.85.

115 Loome, Liberal Catholicism, p.178.


117 Schultenover, p.344.

118 Neuner, p.88.
NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE

1 CFA p.80. Tyrrell's articles in the American Ecclesiastical Review, 21 (October 1899), 389-403; 21 (November 1899), 472-89; 21 (December 1899), 607-17, were reprinted in FM I, pp.273-344.

2 Tyrrell to Charles Devas, 8 January 1908, in Letters from a Modernist, p.159. For the following references: EL p.10. The references are to Oldenberg, Buddha, third edition (1897) and Edvin Lehmann, in Chantepie de la Saussaye's Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte, third edition (1905). References to these sources occur elsewhere, including The Mystical Element of Religion. See also ET where von Hügel confesses his lack of first hand knowledge of Buddhism.

3 Tyrrell to von Hügel, 26th June 1903, BL Add MSS 44928.66.

4 CFA p.84.

5 EA II p.67, and next quotation.

6 EA II p.89 and next quotation. The Baron believed that Buddhism in its original form consisted neither in the Wheel of Reincarnation alone nor in Nirvana alone, but a combination of the two.

7 EA II p.158.

8 EA II p.158.

9 EL p.165, note 1.

10 RG p.214.

11 EL p.9.

12 Von Hügel to Mrs Lillie, 29th November 1922, SL p.364.


14 Von Hügel to GG (Gwendolen Greene), 18th August 1919, SL p.286.

15 ME I p.60.

16 ME II p.184.

17 ME II p.392.

18 FM I p.308, and next two quotations.


20 FM I p.343.

21 FM I p.343. He had also stated that 'the superficial resemblance between the detachment advocated by Oriental pessimism and that which is approved by Christian mysticism covers an immeasurable antagonism of principle and spirit', p.340.
22 LC p.64.
23 Tyrrell to von Hügel, 29th May 1903, BL Add MSS 44928.98.
24 LO p.94, and next quotation.
25 CF p.75
27 EFI (1904-6) p.52.
28 EFI p.ix.
29 Tyrrell to Waller, 18th March 1903, BL Add MSS 43680.138.
30 Tyrrell to Waller, 19th April 1903, BL Add MSS 43680.147b.
31 CW p.258.
32 SO pp.159f.
33 Tyrrell to Maude Petre, 3rd May 1902, BL Add MSS 52367.78-79.
34 AL II p.415.
35 AL II pp.415-16.
36 FM I p.319
37 FM I p.320.
38 Tyrrell to von Hügel, 11th January 1903, BL Add MSS 44928.63.
39 CCR p.90, and next three quotations.
40 CCR p.90.
42 ME I p.25. This quotation is repeated in vol.II, p.326 and given its source as Caird, The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers, vol II, (Glasgow, 1904), pp.210, 211.
43 ME II p.91.
44 ME II p.293.
45 Von Hügel to Maude Petre, 5 December 1899, SL p.82. In one of his frequent letters including recommended reading, he advised Tyrrell to re-read Plotinus and Berkeley, 27 June 1908, SL p.153.

46 ME II p.23.

47 29 June 1922, SL p.358.

48 See for example letter to Gwendolen Greene, 9 December 1921, SL p.347: 'As to Plato, I am delighted you are taking him so strongly. I hope you will end by being steeped in him; by having read all the Dialogues we have fixed upon at least four times each; and that you will come to be able to compare Dialogue with Dialogue, and to use the Plato generally for comparison and criticism in your own non-Platonic reading. I am trying to follow you in these your Plato to reading: have so done the Protagoras and half of the Gorgias. So glad you are at the Phaedrus and soon at the Symposium. And mind to admire the Meno - I love it!'

49 FM I p.279. This was a question treated at some length in the correspondence in 1898 to which we have already referred, SL pp.71-74.


51 LC p.33, and next two quotations.

52 FM I p.312.

53 LC p.33.

54 LC p.37.

55 Tyrrell to A R Waller, 18 March 1903, BL Add MSS 43680.138.

56 See von Hügel's remarks to Martin D'Arcy: 'The Eternal Light we adore had, surely, not a little to do with Plotinus at his best.' 7th November 1921, 'Friedrich von Hügel's Letters to Martin D'Arcy', ed. by Joseph P Whelan, Month, 4 (1969), p.34. The Baron in effect accepted the judgment of Inge who had claimed that 'every treatise on religious thought in the early centuries of our era must take account of the parallel developments of religious philosophy in the old and the new religions, which illustrate and explain each other.' Inge, Christian Mysticism, p.91, footnote.

57 EL p.81

58 ME I p.23 and EL p.82. Inge's judgment on the place of Plotinus is of interest in that it confirms that of the Baron. Thus, 'in the history of Mysticism he holds a more undisputed place than Plato; for some of the most characteristic doctrines of Mysticism, which in Plato are only thrown out tentatively, are in Plotinus welded into a compact whole.' Christian Mysticism, p.91.

59 A discussion of this question and a survey of some recent literature is presented by G Madec, "Platonisme" Des Pères, Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique ed. by A Vacant, E Mangenot, and E Amann (1903-50), 491-507. The points of similarity and divergence
between neo-Platonic philosophy and a Christian theology which is rooted in the Scriptures and the celebration of the sacraments are noted in such a way that the debt to Platonic concepts and vocabulary is honestly acknowledged. A more extreme view is offered by Festugière who claims that 'when the Fathers "think" their mysticism, they platonize'. Contemplation et vie contemplative selon Plato (Paris, 1967), p.5. His firm conclusion is that 'there is nothing original in the edifice' (of patristic mysticism). Thus, patristic mysticism is pure Platonism. For a critique of Festugière's narrow and inadequate concept of Christian mysticism and indeed the whole Christian religion, which rests on a 'preference' for what is claimed to be the spirituality of the evangelists, apostles, Ignatius, Irenaeus, the monastic founders etc. as against a 'philosophical spirituality', see Andrew Louth, The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition pp.190f. Characteristically, Lossky felt the Christian content in the Fathers was predominant: 'All that can be said in regard to the platonism of the Fathers, and especially in regard to the dependence of the author of the *Areopagitica* on the neo-platonist philosophers, is limited to outward resemblances which do not go to the root of their teaching, and relate only to a vocabulary which was common to the age.' The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church (Cambridge and London, 1973), p.32.

60 March 1921, SL p.321.

61 SL p.321. In conclusion he defended the integrity of his position: 'I believe that this is the only truly tenable, circumspect position which we have to take.' In his 1921 letter the Baron expressed his appreciation of Heiler's 'rarely rich book' Das Gebet, and sympathised with the general view regarding the dependence of some Christian thinkers on neo-Platonism though he dissented from the claim that Augustine and St Francis had been dominated by such influences as Proclus. He suggested that this error of judgment was the consequence of Heiler's flawed method of analysis.

62 LC p.35.

63 ME II p.212.

64 SL p.321.

65 ME II p.213. Confessions, XII, n.32.

66 ME II p.248. Confessions, XI, xxvii, 3, xx, xi. The concept of evil as privation, absence of good, which has enjoyed such a long history in Christian theology through its greatest teacher, is again felt to have originated in neo-Platonism, especially Plotinian mysticism. Confessions, VII, 12; VI, 15; VII, 5, 11, ME II p.293. Further, in a brief reference to Mother Julian's words on this problem the Baron's judgment is summary: "I saw not Sin for I believe it hath no manner of substance, nor no part of being": Neo-Platonist theory.' Similarly Eckhart's conception of evil as 'nothing but privation, or falling away from Being; not an effect, but a defect', was felt to have its roots in neo-Platonic philosophy. ME II p.294.

67 ME II p.61.
Cuthbert Butler spoke of 'Dionysius' as 'the Father of scientific Mystical Theology', Western Mysticism, p.6. William James stated that 'The fountain-head of Christian mysticism is Dionysius the Areopagite.' Varieties of Religious Experience (London, 1902), p.401. When Richstätter spoke of Dionysius as 'Vater der christlichen Mystik', he did so with disdain, deploring his influence, as von Balthasar pointed out in The Glory of the Lord, vol. II, (Edinburgh, 1984), p.147, note 12. See also Louis Bouyer, 'Mysticism: An Essay on the History of the Word', in Understanding Mysticism. More recently, Louth has discussed the 'immensely influential' Mystical Theology and the Dionysian influence in general in, for example, fourteenth-century English mysticism. On this view, Dionysius represents 'the end of the development of Patristic mystical theology'. Louth, ibid, p.159. Rowan Williams offered a slightly more nuanced observation: 'It was left to a succession of commentators in East and West to give a reading of Dionysius which smoothed away some of [the] more ambivalent features and developed more clearly and more theologically his central insight.' The Wound of Knowledge: Christian Spirituality from the New Testament to St John of the Cross (London, 1979), p.118.

Von Balthasar brings his own massive scholarship to bear on this question, noting the indivisibility of the Dionysian system, and concluding: 'From the first it follows that it is this indivisibility that has made the theology of Denys...into an original whole of such character and impact that none of the great theological thinkers of the following ages could avoid him, could escape a fascination to which the supposed august authorship may have contributed something, but which could scarcely have had less influence, had there been no claim to apostolic authority.' p.147.

Von Hügel acknowledges his reliance on Hugo Koch's seminal work Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita in seinen Beziehungen zum Neuplatonismus und Mysterienwesen, (Mainz, 1900). Next quotation: ME II p.96.

This is a view which has been corroborated by the work of David Knowles who spoke of Dionysius deriving 'much of [his] system and outlook from Neo-Platonism' and 'particular features' being 'derived from the teaching of Proclus' whilst, at the same time, there is also a dependence on earlier Christian spiritual teaching, 'The Influence of Pseudo-Dionysus on Western Mysticism', in Christian Spirituality: Essays in Honour of Gordon Rupp, ed. by Peter Brooks, p.86.

Bouyer has rightly challenged the simplistic view that the mysticism of Pseudo-Dionysius was derived almost entirely from neo-Platonism and owed little to early Christian sources, 'Mysticism: An Essay on the History of the Word', p.43. With von Balthasar, he stresses particularly the context of the eucharistic liturgy for the mystical theology of union with God, p.52.

ME II p.313-4.

Furthermore, the Baron's general view was sound enough, that when
neo-Platonic theory met solid, lived Christian experience it was invariably refined and reformed and more properly integrated into Christian theology, but when the latter was hesitant or unclear the distorting influence of the former became more evident.


79 ME II p.99.

80 ME II p.104.

81 ME II p.105.


83 ME II p.323.

84 ME II p.317, and next quotation pp.323-4.

85 Von Hügel to Tyrrell, 6 August 1901, BL Add MSS 44927.169.

86 Von Hügel, 26 September 1898, SL p.77.

87 ME II p.249.

88 ME II p.312.

89 Von Hügel to Tyrrell 26 September 1898, SL p.72, and next quotation.

90 Von Hügel to Tyrrell, 26 September 1898, SL p.73

91 ME II p.101.

92 SL p.74.

93 FM I p.308, and next quotation.

94 FM I p.344.

95 GTL p.46, and next three quotations.

96 FM I p.316.

97 GTL pp.46f.


99 ME II p.145.

100 ME II p.146, and next two quotations.

101 ME II p.252, and next two quotations.
102 ME I p.24.
103 ME I p.25.
104 ME II p.353.
105 CCR p.208.
106 CCR p.208.
107 SO pp.156f.
108 CCR pp. 206-209.
109 FM I p.312. Tyrrell was quoting Sabatier from Life of St Francis, chapter viii.
110 ME II pp.121f, and next quotation.
111 ME II p.123.
113 LC p.33.
114 Tyrrell to Maude Petre, 19 April 1899, BL Add MSS 52367.4b.
115 FM I p.310.
116 FM I p.310.
117 FM I p.314.
119 Ursula King, Towards a New Mysticism: Teilhard de Chardin and Eastern Religions (London, 1980), p.123. Inge offered the following definition: 'True Pantheism must mean the identification of God with the totality of existence, the doctrine that the universe is the complete and only expression of the nature and he life of God, who on this theory is only immanent and not transcendent.' Christian Mysticism, p.117.
120 Pius IX, in his comprehensive Syllabus Errorum, in 1864 headed the list of 'the principal errors' of the time with the belief that 'there exists no Supreme, all-wise, all-provident Divine Being distinct from the universe, and God is identical with nature of things, and is, therefore, subject to change. In effect, God is produced in man and in the world, and all things are God and have the very substance of God, and God is one and the samething with the world, and, therefore, spirit with matter, necessity with liberty, good with evil, justice with injustice.' Over eighty years later Pius XII asserted that the increasingly popular appeal of evolutionary theory among theologians was giving rein to 'monistic or pantheistic speculations.' Humani Generis, AAS, (1950).
121 Pius X, Pascendi Dominici Gregis, AAS, 40 (1907), pp. 593-650.


124 Inge had written in 1899 that 'Pantheism, as I understand the word, is a pitfall for Mysticism to avoid, not an error involved in its first principles.' Christian Mysticism, pp.121f. He acknowledged that there were elements in Christian mysticism which drew it close to some of the speculations of pantheists, one of which was the belief in divine immanence. In the opinion of William James the tendency to pantheism in Christian history was stronger at the times when a more pronounced intellectual speculation held sway: 'philosophic theism has always shown a tendency to become pantheistic and monistic.' Varieties, pp.141f. Indeed, unlike Inge, James believed this pantheistic inclination to be inherent in all mysticism per se, as 'one of the general traits of the mystical range of consciousness.' Varieties, p.409. In her classical study Evelyn Underhill expressed the threat pantheism represents and also the remedy: 'Unless safeguarded by limiting dogmas, the theory of Immanence, taken alone, is notoriously apt to degenerate into pantheism'. Mysticism, p.99.


126 EA II p.39.


128 RG p.100, and next quotation.

129 EA II p.119, and next two quotations.

130 EA II p.121.

131 EA I p.132.

132 ME II p.310.

133 ME II p.317. For the next sentence see EA II p.218

134 ME II p.316. It was Duns Scotus who translated Dionysius from Greek to Latin about the year 850.


136 ME II p.318.

137 ME II p.328.
The background to these remarks is found in A S Pringle-Pattison's article 'Martineau's Philosophy', *Hibbert Journal*, I (1920), pp.458, 457.

According to de Lubac it was not pantheism as such which he rejected but all the versions of it which he described with a variety of qualifying adjectives: 'ancient pantheism', 'common pantheism', 'the Hindu type of pantheism', 'humanitarianist neo-pantheisms'. De Lubac was citing Teilhard from *Non Univers* (Paris, 1918) in *The Religion of Teilhard de Chardin* (London, 1967), p.155.


E A II p.135f, EA I, pp.119f, von Hügel to Kemp-Smith, 30 July 1920, Barmann, p.91.

RG p.246, EA I, p.132.

Tyrrell to A R Waller, 2 April 1902, BL Add MSS 43680.55.

Oil and Wine in 1900 he had become aware of its ignorances, errors, and inconsistencies.' p.viii.'


Tyrrell, 'Idealism in Straits', FM I p.356, and next four quotations.

E F I p.98.

NV p.127.

FM II p.356, and following quotation.

NV p.83

E F I p.99.
158 Tyrrell to Maude Petre, 18th August 1901, BL Add MSS 52367.52, and following quotation. In this remark about the 'general soul', and other comments, there is more than a hint of Tyrrell's likely sympathy with some aspects the Jungian 'collective consciousness'. Chapman alludes to this in 'The Thought of George Tyrrell', p.145.

159 LO p.146.

160 EFI p.98.

161 King, p.113.

162 King, p.116.

163 King, p.118.
NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR

1 ME II p.336; OW Preface 1907, p.ix.

2 A Hazard Dakin, Von Hügel and the Supernatural, p.158.

3 See discussion in Daly Transcendence and Immanence, chs 6 and 7; and Sagovsky, Between Two Worlds, pp.127-139.

4 Daly suggests that the terms were used as a conscious attempt to confront the 'Kantian critique of metaphysics' and also to combat scholastic rigidity, pp.2, 7-25.

5 Daly, p.119. The question was raised in contemporary studies of mysticism such as Inge's Christian Mysticism. Sharpe also discusses the issue in chapter seven of his work, concluding with the remarks that 'it is not to be wondered at that a fancied distinction between God's immanent and transcendent actions should have led to such strange results.' Mysticism: Its True Nature and Value, p.145. Benson raised the matter at the height of the modernist controversy and stated that either of these two truths, if taken separately, leads to error.' Mysticism, p.23.

6 See Loisy, Mémoires, III, p.24, where von Hügel's insistence on transcendence is described as 'un cauchemar angoissant.' Loisy also felt that the Baron's God was the 'Grand Individu'. Maude Petre supported Loisy by suggesting that the 'phantom dread' of reducing God's transcendence haunted von Hügel and deeply affected his relationships with other modernists, Alfred Loisy, pp.35f. She felt his judgment on the excessive immanentism of Loisy, Tyrrell, Minocchi, Buonaiuti, Blondel and Laberthonnière was both 'prejudiced and unjust'. Loisy, writing to Maude Petre, after the Baron's death saw his insistence on transcendence as part of his turn to 'dogmatic intransigence' which he thought was in many ways out of character. Since von Hügel was so deep and sincere a mystic' Loisy could only explain this rigid orthodoxy in terms of sickness.

7 Nédoncelle, 'A Recently Discovered Study of von Hügel on God', International Philosophical Quarterly, 2 (1962), p.6. See also von Hügel's letter to Maude Petre where he was seeking to ensure that his Italian periodical Cultura Contemporanea would promote an 'ever-deepening and widening, a wisely Transcendental, Ontological, ie. religious conviction.' 17 November 1910, SL p.184.

8 Von Hügel to Bishop Talbot, 2 April 1910, SL p.177. But the Baron's judgment had not always been negative. In The Mystical Element he had paid tribute to Loisy's balance: 'the Abbé Loisy has also dwelt, with rare impressiveness upon the intensely Other-Worldly character of the first Christian teaching.' ME II p.360 note 1.

9 See Maurice Blondel, The Letter on Apologetics and History and Dogma, especially for an interesting brief discussion of von Hügel's enthusiasm for L'Action and Dru's suggestion that the Baron did not understand Blondel, pp.56-57. In the case of Blondel the roots of immanentism are to be found within the French philosophical tradition which represented a fundamentally orthodox approach to religion. Blondel had written: 'my original intention was to
establish a philosophy which was autonomous, but which nevertheless, from the rational standpoint conformed to the most minute and rigorous demands of Catholicism', see 'Lettre-préface pour une réédition de L'Action', in Études Blondéillennes, I (1951), pp.16f. The chief Catholic exponent of the method of immanence had been Leon Oïlé-Laprune, Blondel's teacher. For a discussion of Blondel in historical context see B M G Reardon, Liberalism and Tradition: Aspects of Catholic Thought in Nineteenth Century France, chapter 2. See also F C Copleston, A History of Philosophy, vol. 9, part 2, (London, 1975), chapter 2, where crucial distinctions are made between the method of immanence, 'the approach to being through critical reflection on the subject' and a doctrine of immanence, 'asserting that nothing exists outside human consciousness or that the statement that anything so exists is devoid of meaning', p.20. Though Blondel has been accused of Modernism in this regard, and suffered suspicion as a consequence, it does appear that 'though he was obviously aware of the fact that God cannot be conceived except through consciousness, he had no intention of suggesting that God is identifiable with man's idea of him.' p.20. See also J J Heaney, The Modernist Crisis: von Hügel, p.192; J J Kelly, 'The Modernist Controversy: von Hügel and Blondel', Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses, LV, (December 1979), pp.297-330. From SL p.334 it seems clear that the Baron's debt to Blondel remained to the end. In this respect Daly's criticism of Robert Aufieri's view that the Baron rejected the "méthode d'immanence of Blondel and others is sound.

Aufieri, 'Baron Friedrich von Hügel: A Doctrine of God', Dunwoodie Review, 14 (1974), p.7. Transcendence and Immanence, p.139 note 80. Von Hügel clearly felt that Blondel remained pivotal in the whole debate. His response to Blondel showed his approval of 'the Philosophy of Immanence...in all its legitimate degrees and kinds. Blondel's views make a helpful counterweight and check to a method and conclusions which, even if Blondel's views could be suppressed completely, would still have to be faced and, in good part, at least, allowed for.' Von Hügel to Tyrrell, 14 March 1904, BL Add MSS 44928.181. Tyrrell's position is reflected in The Programme of Modernism, introduced by A L Lilley (London, 1908), pp.117-18 which Tyrrell had translated from the Italian. Both von Hügel and Tyrrell were committed to the method of immanence whereby God is sought within the structure of human experience and in this regard the influence of Blondel, whose presence we noticed in the correspondence in chapter two, is manifest.

12 Von Hügel to Maude Petre, 18 February 1910, BL Add MSS 45361.120.
13 Tyrrell to von Hügel, 31 July 1907, BL Add MSS 44930.48.
14 NV pp.235-36.
15 HS pp.1-2.
16 Von Hügel to Tyrrell, 31 December 1898, BL Add MSS 44929.64.
17 FM II p.356.
Loisy was chief among those. Despite the rather 'apologetic' tone de la Bedoyère's remarks on the significance of Loisy in the Baron's shifting thought on immanentism are worth citing: 'just as Loisy played a critical part in guiding von Hügel towards excessive historico-critical positions so hard to reconcile with his own great Catholic faith, so Loisy himself, in revealing the spiritual consequences in his outlook and character of the implicit denial of the basis of religion, became the occasion of von Hügel's increasing mistrust of the whole immanentist trend of Modernism - a mistrust which he never appears to have formally applied to his whole Catholic thought by revising point by point his earlier beliefs', Life, p.247.

Il Rinnovamento, (April 1907), pp.393-414. Reprinted in translation in SC pp. 360-86 under the title 'From Angels or from men?'

See Tyrrell's letters to Houtin, BN FH NAF.

Tyrrell to von Hügel, 19 November 1905, EL Add MSS 44929.68b. In the light of this one may well question Sagovsky's rather too decisive conclusion that Tyrrell was 'deeply committed to the transcendence of God.' Between Two Worlds, p.131. One might say, more accurately, 'at times yes, at other times perhaps not.' Reference to Tyrrell's letters often obliges one to question judgments made too readily on the basis of his essays alone, and vice versa.

Von Hügel to Tyrrell, 14 May 1907, SL pp.137f.

SL p.139.

Daly remarks that Tyrrell could legitimately feel exasperated at von Hügel's criticisms. But his suggestion, in defence of Tyrrell, that he was a fervent exponent of the 'theology of unfulfilled aspiration' is questionable. Daly acknowledged that Tyrrell's clearest expression of that was in Christianity at the Crossroads which, of course, had not yet appeared. Transcendence and Immanence, p.152. In fact what von Hügel failed to do was to read Tyrrell's remarks here against the
background of Tyrrell's earlier works. With reference to these essays Tyrrell would claim quite rightly in self-defence that he had in fact retained the balance. Apart from any other point a distinct difference of temperament and approach between the two men is evident here. The Baron sought to express the balance in any adopted position almost every time it was stated. Tyrrell was quite happy to state one side of a position at one time and its complementary truth on an entirely separate occasion, thus giving rise the charge of imbalance and one-sidedness.

35 SL p.139.
36 Tyrrell to von Hügel, 20 June 1907, BL Add MSS 44930.33.
37 Tyrrell to von Hügel, 21 May 1907, and letter to Longman, the publisher, 27th May 1907, AL II p.317.
38 R J Campbell, The New Theology (London, 1907). Loome noted that it was 'the only case in which both men reviewed the same work. A comparison of the two reviews is instructive, shedding light on the similarities and the differences in the positions taken by Tyrrell and von Hügel at the very height of the modernist controversy.' Loome, Liberal Catholicism, p.222. In the event Tyrrell read von Hügel's review in June, wrote his own review for The Hibbert Journal which appeared in July, two months before the Baron's. See von Hügel to Tyrrell, 18 June 1907, BL Add MSS 44930.36; Tyrrell to von Hügel, 20 June 1907, BL Add MSS 44930.39 where Tyrrell remarked that Campbell ought to be 'thankful for being beaten with such a costly stick.'
39 Tyrrell to von Hügel, 20 June 1907, BL Add MSS 44930.39.
40 LC p.95.
41 LC p.99.
44 EL pp.197-98.
45 LC p.110.
47 Daly, p.153 rightly criticises the assumption of a 'drift to immanentism'. The flaw in this assumption can be appreciated in the light of these references to Lex Credendi which was published in 1906. Oil and Wine was written in 1900.
Daly's comments are again of interest: 'Monistic in language certainly; but these words were written as a mystical meditation not as theological analysis. They could be paralleled with quotations from many of the classical mystics. In 1907 Tyrrell the theological critic could express reservations about Tyrrell the mystical writer.' p.154.

50 GS p.207.
51 ME I p.276.
52 Von Hügel to Tyrrell, 12 July 1905, SL p.131.
53 EA I p.56.
54 EA II p.121.
55 Von Hügel to René Guisan, 11 July 1921, SL p.334.
56 GS p.110.
58 Hibbert, pp.918-19.
59 Hibbert, p.919.
60 The reference is to Campbell's The New Theology, p.23. Albany p.657.
61 Albany, pp.659f, and remaining quotations in this paragraph.
62 Albany, pp.659f, and remaining quotations in this paragraph.
63 Von Hügel to Maude Petre, 18 February 1910 where the Baron accused the Italian modernists of trying to 'capture' Tyrrell and 'dress him up in their clothes and colours.' BL Add MSS 45361.121.
64 CCR p.87. Next four quotations: pp.99, 204, 205, 110.
65 CCR p.110.
66 Tyrrell to von Hügel, 9 April 1909, BL Add MSS 44931.91
67 Tyrrell to von Hügel, 9 April 1909, BL Add MSS 44931.91
68 ME I p.39. By way of comparison, see A B Sharpe, Mysticism: Its True Nature and Value (London, 1910), where the problem of transcendence and immanence is resolved without reference to the doctrine of the Incarnation, pp.136-45. Benson's treatment is much sounder in this regard. He states: 'Christianity, on the other hand, holds both these truths, and finds their reconciling in the Incarnation of the Son of God.' Mysticism, p.28. Trine's comments are simple and
a <e>, ed with little argument: 'God is immanent as well as trans...nt' in Tune with th Infinite (London, 1899), p.38.

Vo Hügel to René Guisan, 11 July 1921, SL p.335.

S. e von Hügel, later letters to Norman K mp-Smith, in Barmann, ed, The Letters of Baron Friedrich von Hügel to Norman K mp-Smith.


S. ho nl, The Int 11 tual Crisis in English Catholicism, p.158.

A. mann, Sp'ral Theology, p.122.

Ja... wrote: 'The handiest of the marks by which I classify a state of mind as mysti-al is negative. The subject of it immediately says that it ...| | | | | | |

From the point of inquiry and analysis, Peter Moore has noted that 'a number of philosophers have arg ed that the mystics' accounts of their experiences do not render the latter accessible to rational inquiry. For them the limit of rational inquiry is the discovery that, at least so far as the non-my tic is concerned, the mystical experience is ineffable.' He goes on to make some extremely perceptive and discriminating remarks about the significance of the mystics' talk about ineffability; for instance what St John of the Cross calls an ineffable experience if the substantial touch and the 'delicacy of delight thus felt is 'impossible of description' is not thereby empty or meaningless to non-mystics but simply classifies the experience as within the class of 'delights impossible of description.' He further notes that although 'mystics make no secret of their difficulties with language' which must not be underestimated, there is little support for the claim that mystical experience is inaccessible to a substantial degree of comprehension and critical analysis by non-mystics. However not all would agree with the statement that mystics observe the same rules and logic that apply in non-mystical writing or that the apparent obscurity of mystical writing is explicable in terms of the enquirers' ignorance of the related doctrines, practices and institutions which form the wider frame of reference. Many of the mystic would want to claim much more than this, especially that the nature of the Object experienced is the main reason for the inability to communicate with great clarity or precision. Peter Moore, 'My tical Experience, Mysti al Doctrine, Mystical Technique', in My ti m and Philosophical Analysis, ed. by Steven T Katz, pp 101, 105, 107.

G3 p 115.


ER p 1c9.
Elsewhere the Baron made the point that 'incarnational doctrine' requires the belief that 'Reality, especially spirit, and supremely God, manifest their true natures to us, precisely in and through and on occasion of Sense'. EL p.166. The criticism of St John of the Cross was that sense was negated in the mystical journey to union with God which was understood in purely spiritual terms. Thus the Baron criticises the view that 'God is a pure Spirit...and only what is purely spiritual can consequently be the adequate means of union with Him.' RG p.141.

The appeal to experience represented for Tyrrell the first stage of an "affective" apologetic which appealed to the 'beauties and utilities of religion, on the contentment and happiness that accompany a life of faith and love.' LO p.viii. He went on to say that unless such utility was also based on the truth it remained merely a seduction. However, it as an approach which drew considerable opposition as is clear from Tyrrell's reply to Lebreton's criticism of his use of 'le sens de Dieu': 'If I have dwelt (as against scholastic intellectualism and rationalism) more frequently on the affective and voluntary elements of the act of faith, I have both explicitly and implicitly always recognised its cognitive character as involving a presentment of divine realities. My psychology forbids me to conceive any spiritual act whose real and divisible simplicity may not be logically analysed into knowledge, feeling, and will, or which does not imply an apprehended truth as well as a desired end and practical determination. Most cordially, then, do I endorse the statement that faith is "l'adhesion de notre esprit à une vérité".' SC pp.313f. Much has been written on von Hügel's epistemology. Nédoncelle remains the most perceptive commentator on the Baron's 'critical realism' and its place in his understanding of mysticism. Thus: 'Realism to the Baron is not just an act of simple faith in the validity of sensible perception. Not is matter the most rich or the most objective reality which we are capable of knowing. To him critical realism is, above all, spiritual'. p.74. The soul needs the body since here on earth knowledge is dependent on the body, history, duration and effort. The soul thus needs the senses especially for its purification. The religious and mystical consequences of this are important. 'When we ascend from the senses to the soul, and from the soul to God, the stimuli become more and more objective and fruitful.' p.76. The conclusion is that the mystical life implies 'a higher realism' (p.78, note 3) since the Baron proposes 'a realism of living and spiritual beings, rather than one of categories and ideas.' pp.78f. Kelly has also discussed the Hügelian philosophy and epistemology at some strength and stressed the shift in the Baron's thinking, especially traceable between the two presentations of 'Experience and Transcendence' in 1903 and 1906 respectively. The move to a 'wider, more radically empirical notion of experience' is asserted with reference to von Hügel's own comments but the case seems less than convincing, p.176. Beattie takes little account of such a claimed movement of thought. 'Von Hügel's "Sense of the Infinite", Heythrop Journal, 16 (1975), pp.149-73. Sherry has also raised some critical questions about the limitations of von Hügel's epistemology, noting that he does not attempt a 'deductive proof of God's existence from an experience.' Von Hügel: Philosophy and Spirituality', p.8.
Nédoncelle's remarks are of interest here: 'Intuition of an immediate presence is the type of perfect knowledge, and even in this world we are not wholly without this experience. The realism of intuition is at once the starting point and the goal of all philosophic experience. Beyond the sense and beyond the reasoning mind, even though through them and in agreement with them, we establish contact with an absolute. Let us add that intuition has an affective character: it respects and loves its object.' p.77 Beatie writes that 'with regard to the various faculties which act in the cognitive process von Hügel placed great importance upon the non-discursive elements at work: on such elements as sensation, feeling, volition, and especially intuition. Intuition is given special emphasis, for he saw in it the vehicle for providing human consciousness with its deepest, widest, and most intimate mode of apprehension, involving the whole personality and reaching the deepest realities which face us.' Von Hügel's "Sense of the Infinite", p.158.

ME II p.287, and next two quotations.

EA I p.55. See also EL pp.183-187 where Schleiermacher is cited with approval: 'The Essence of Religion is neither Thought nor Action, but Intuition and Feeling'.

ME II p.390. Beatie observed: 'It was the non-processive aspect of intuition as well as its depth and intimacy of grasp which seems to have caught his attention.' Von Hügel's "Sense of the Infinite", p.159.

Beatie, p.151. The paper 'Experience and Transcendence' which appeared in Dublin Review, 136 (April 1906), pp.357-379 was the reworking of an earlier paper which the Baron had delivered to the Synthetic Society, 28 May 1903. See Papers read before the Synthetic Society 1898-1908, and written comments thereon circulated among the members of the Society. Presented by the Rt Hon. Arthur James Balfour (London, 1909), pp.425-43. Referred to as ET I and ET II by Kelly. In the following, reference to ET is to the revised version in the Dublin Review.

ET p.357, and next two quotations.


ET p.361, and ME II p.282 where he wrote of the 'vivid sense of how immensely the Spirit...transcends, and yet also is required by and is immanent in...the keen sense of the Finitude and Contingency present throughout the world of sense-perception and of clear intellectual formulation.'
90 ET p.362. A further reference to Kant's place in the discovery of 'the soul's sense of the Infinite and Abiding' is to be found in EL p.167

91 RG p.208.


93 ME II p.283.

94 'A Letter from Baron Von Hügel', p.5.

95 ET p.364, and quotations in next two sentences.

96 ET p.364.

97 The Baron's list is a varied array of philosophers and theologians: Plato, Plotinus, Clement of Alexandria, Augustine, St Bernard, Cardinal Nicolas of Cusa and Leibniz in the past. In the present Cardinal Newman, Professors Maurice Blondel, Henri Bergson, Siegwart, Eucken, Troeltsch, Tiele, Igino Petrone and Edward Caird. Characteristically, he then claims the 'explicit assent of practically all the great Mystics of all ages and countries'. ME II p.282.

98 ME II p.283. Also EA I p.52.

99 EA I p.57.

100 Kelly, 'Experience and Transcendence: An Introduction to the Religious Philosophy of Baron Von Hügel', pp.176f.


104 Beatie, p.162.

105 ET p.366.

106 Beatie, p.163. A comparison with W R Trine is interesting since he moves freely between impersonal and personal terms for the Infinite. In Tune With the Infinite, pp.11-15. See also Neuner's comments on the different sense of the term Infinite, Religion zwischen Kirche und Mystik, pp.49-50.

107 ET p.361. Following quotations in this paragraph: ET pp.358, 359, 360, 363, ME II p.290, ET p.364. Gwendolen Greene felt that these terms dimness and clearness were most characteristic of the Baron's thought. 'Thoughts from von Hügel', Dublin Review, 189 (1931), p.255.


111 LO pp.xxiv, xxv.

112 LO p.ix. Following quotations from *Lex Orandi*, pp.xii, xiii; xiv, xxiii.

113 Tyrrell to von Hügel, 29 May 1903, BL Add MSS 44928.97-98. Tyrrell also remarked that much of the discussion had baffled him. Next two quotations: LO pp.xvii,xix where the words are drawn from Augustine.

114 LO pp.xvii, xv.


118 FM I p.331.

119 FM I p.311, CF p.78.

120 CF p.81.

121 RE p.144.

122 LC pp.70f. Quotations in next sentence: p.71.

123 EFI p.32. Next quotation: EFI p.95.


125 Eg MAL p.71.

126 RE p.144.

127 Tyrrell to Bremond, 20 July 1899, BN FB NAF.


129 LO p.xxxii.

130 RE p.144, and next quotation. Following quotations in this paragraph: RE p.143.
131 LO p.xxxi, my emphasis. Following two quotations: pp.xxv, xv.


134 FM I p.302-3.

135 SC p.189.

136 EFI p.271. One might notice here a parallel with Gabriel Marcel's distinction between problems and mysteries. For Tyrrell, as for Marcel, mysteries are to be embraced and lived not problems to be solved.

137 ER p.119. Following quotation: p.113.

138 RG p.28.

139 LO p.xxv.


141 Tyrrell to Bremond, 18 September 1902, SF p.117.

142 NV pp.185, 240.

143 Another Handful of Myrrh: Devotional Conference (London, 1905), p.3.

NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE

1 In 1932 Karl Rahner discussed at some length the 'doctrine of the spiritual senses', tracing the use of 'sense imagery' in Origen for whom, he concluded, 'the spiritual senses can be the organs of mystical knowledge.' In the same article he also discussed the influence of the doctrine in the later Fathers, Revue d'Ascétique et de Mystique (RAM), 13 (1932), pp.113-145. The following year he turned to the doctrine in the Middle Ages, particularly Bonaventure, and the later mystical tradition, concluding with reference to Poulain and modern authors. RAM, 14 (1933), pp.263-299. Both articles appear abridged in Theological Investigations, vol.16, (London, 1979): 'The "Spiritual Senses" According to Origen', pp.81-103; 'The Doctrine of the "Spiritual Senses" in the Middle Ages', pp.104-134. Daniéloú also took up the question in his study Origène (Paris 1948), where he reiterated his disagreement with Stolz and his interpretation of the 'spiritual senses'. For Daniéloú the imagery was no more than a set of metaphors denoting spiritual experience.


6 Albany Review, p.664.

7 ME II p.282, and next quotation.

8 EL p.187.

9 ME II p.290.

10 ME II p.395.

11 Rowan Williams, 'Butler's Western Mysticism: Towards An Assessment', p.204. See also Living Flame of Love', Stanza 2, 16, The Collected Works of St John of the Cross, translated by Kieran Kavanagh and Otilio Rodriguez (Washington, 1979), pp.600f. Dupré remarked that John of the Cross 'seems to use the term "touches" to denote an experience unrelated to sensation but analogous to it by its directly intuitive character. The sense of touch was probably selected because of its greater immediacy and lesser distinctness', 'The Mystical Experience of the Self and its Philosophical Significance', in Understanding Mysticism, p.457. Aumann also discusses the 'varying degrees of intensity' of the mystical touches in Spiritual Theology, p.343. A contemporary of the Baron, Arthur Devine, remarked that Scaramelli understood the divine touches largely in terms of the higher state of mystical union. Devine regarded John of the Cross as the guide on this question as on all matters of the mystical union. A Manual of Mystical Theology, pp.439f. Following quotation from Williams, p.205.

13 *Confessions*, IX, 10, 2, 3. *EL* pp.89-90.


16 ME II p.97. Next two quotations: ME II pp.97f; ME I p.23.


18 ET p.364.

19 ET p.366. Von Hügel's quotation from John of the Cross at the end of this paragraph is from the 1889 translation by David Lewis, *Spiritual Canticle*, p.207. The other reference is in ME II p.257.


21 ME II p.304.

22 ME I p.177. Following quotations in this paragraph: ME I pp.178, 179.

23 ME I p.179.


25 ME II p.49.

26 ME II p.49. Following quotations in this paragraph: ME II pp.49-50.

27 ME II p.50 where von Hügel was citing from St Teresa's *Life*, ed. by David Lewis (London, 1888), pp.40, 41; 408; 206. Following quotations in this paragraph: ME II pp.50, 51.

28 LC pp.244, 245. Next quotation: pp.244f.


30 LO p.160.

31 FM I p.265, and following three quotations.

33 Tyrrell was replying to von Hugel's query concerning the 'possibility of acts of states of and in the soul (here below) produced by God alone, without any kind of cooperation on the part of the soul.' 6 August 1901, BL Add MSS 44927.169. He felt Ignatius was in error in his description of the consolation without previous cause since it seemed to propose that God acted ex abrupto without human cooperation. A modern interpretation would want to link this consolation without previous cause to earlier mystical experience in the individual: 'The consolation without previous cause emerges out of the consolations with previous cause. It is a consolation beyond anything expected from the second prelude... For Ignatius, only God can so enter a person, totally integrate him around his love, and then leave.' Harvey D Egan, Christian Mysticism: The Future of a Tradition (New York, 1984), p.52.

34 FM I p.266.


36 This necessary distinction, and the confusion surrounding the word intellect, is discussed by Illytyd Trethowan who claims that the distinction between intellect (mind) and discursive reason was lost after the Middle Ages. The Romantics appealed to 'imagination' and 'feeling' in seeking to recover the balance. One consequence was that mysticism came to be associated with anti-intellectualism which tended to deny that there could be any direct contact of the mind with God. Mysticism and Theology: An Essay in Christian Metaphysics (London, 1975), pp.88f.

37 FM I p.268, and following four quotations. See also HS p.39 for the use of the scriptural image.

38 OW p.209, and following quotation.

39 Von Hugel to Tyrrell, 22 June 1903, BL Add MSS 44927.102, and quotations in next two sentences.

40 Having noticed earlier the interest in Lejeune's La Vie Mystique it is also significant that there was in this work a heavy emphasis on feeling in his description of mystical experience and reference to a number of witnesses, including Surin, Lallemand and Poulain, to the truth that God is felt by the individual. The theological issues raised by this question are presented in Daly's illuminating discussion of the scholastic attitude to Pascal, the fait intérieur, l'esprit de finesse and the logic of the heart. Transcendence and Immanence, pp.21-25.

41 LC pp.15f.

42 OW p.211. Quotations in next two sentences: OW p.212.

43 Schultenover has some interesting remarks on feeling in relation Tyrrell's philosophy of religion: 'To say that religion is a matter feeling is to say only that religion controls the mainspring of life.
It is not the whole of life. It is a kind of life and a kind of feeling or group of feelings that have their perceptual antecedents and resultant actions. The same is true of the virtues commonly associated with religion: faith, hope, love, reverence, penitence. Each is a kind of feeling arising from a certain perception and finding release in a certain action. Thus it is just as or even more correct to speak of religion as a sentiment or affection than to speak of it as consisting in beliefs or good works. For it seems that the locus of religion is the internal will-attitude rather than the perception that precedes or the action that follows it.' George Tyrrell: In Search of Catholicism, pp.218f.

44 LC p.16.
47 EFI p.140. Following quotation: p.31.
48 Hugo Rahner, p.197.
49 Riehle, p.110.
50 Riehle, p.109, and following quotation.
51 FM I p.327.
52 HS p.58.
54 See Spiritual Exercises, n.2 where Ignatius contrasts 'knowing much' with 'to understand and savour ... interiorly that fills and satisfies the soul.' Devine refers to Cardinal Bona's Via Compendii ad Deum, and speaks of an 'untaught wisdom which is superior to all human wisdom, by which the mind without discussion acknowledges its God, and, as it were, touches Him, and without reasonings tastes Him.' A Manual of Mystical Theology, p.6.
55 Poulain, Graces, p.90, and following quotation.
57 ER pp.154f, and following quotation.
58 LO p.67.
59 CF pp.81, 82.
60 CF p.79. See also FM I p.310.


66 Recéjac noted the importance of 'sensible symbols' in the 'tendency to draw near to the Absolute'. *Fondements de la Connaissance Mystique* (Paris, 1897), p.66. William James remarked that 'sensorial images...whether literal or symbolic, play an enormous part in mysticism'. *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p.392. Much of the contemporary literature on mysticism supports these judgements. Lejeune, as we have noted, cited Surin, Lallemand and others in whom not only is the analogy of touch to be found but at times the more extensive sense imagery. Devine cited the Venerable Louis de Ponte (from his *Introduction to Mental Prayer*) who used Bonaventure to 'explain the spiritual senses and how the soul may be said to see, hear, smell, taste, and touch God spiritually', *A Manual of Mystical Prayer*, pp.441f. In contrast, an English contemporary, Sharpe, claimed that 'mysticism can make no use of the terms of sense-experience to describe what is supersensible', that is, 'direct contact with a transcendent reality'. His conclusion that 'the consciousness of the actual divine presence admits of no description; only the bare fact can be stated, apart from its effect on the person who experiences' would deny the value of much of the literature of the mystical tradition. *Mysticism: Its True Nature and Value* (London, 1910), pp.74-5. Similarly Benson displayed an unwillingness to use sense imagery, probably due to his predominantly scholastic outlook.

67 Such was the novelty of Poulain's presentation at the time that E Lambelle even suggested that he had invented the whole idea of the spiritual senses, see Karl Rahner, p.132. For Poulain the stress on the 'spiritual senses' served to elucidate the belief in the direct perception of God which he took to be an essential element in mystical states. Saudreau opposed this view and maintained that such realistic language suggesting that God was known by direct perception rather than by his effects was simply figurative and metaphorical. *L'Etat Mystique* (Paris, 1921). Farges, however, defended Poulain's view that a real immediate apprehension of God was both philosophically and theologically sound from the point of view of the mystical tradition. Garrigou-Lagrange endorsed the position of Saudreau and cited the authoritative opinion of Cardinal Billot who also believed that the idea of the immediate perception of God was an invention of Poulain. Butler, *Western Mysticism*, p.lxiv. Butler also places the controversy in the context of Thomist theology, noting that Joret passed over the matter in silence, and Gardell, Noel and Maréchal who reflected a more sympathetic attitude to Poulain's position. Following quotation: Poulain, *Graces*, ET, p.88.

68 With regard to the expressions 'felt' and 'tasted' in John of the Cross, Ruth Burrows is rather unhelpful when she suggests that we must be careful not to interpret these 'in terms of our sense experience' since 'they are used in analogy.' *Ascent to Love: The Spiritual Teaching of St John of the Cross* (London, 1987), p.91. Since it is precisely and only in terms of such sense experience that the terms can be understood at all the real question is what is the
exact meaning of analogy when used in this context. In answering this Riehle goes much further, claiming that this language takes us beyond 'mere metaphor' or even the idea of five powers residing in the soul 'by analogy with the physical senses.' They are nothing less than 'temporary spiritual acts, ultimately effected by divine grace though, as Rahner asserts, they are in no sense dependent on five separate faculties, a notion which would go far beyond the data of the mystical tradition. Rahner also maintained that 'a difference of metaphor can clarify a difference of mystical experience.' Riehle p.104. Karl Rahner pp.133, 134.

69 Karl Rahner, p.133. Scaramelli speaks of these direct perceptions as 'sensations', *Direttorio mistico* (Rome, 1900), Treatise 3, n.32. Also Louis du Ponte who speaks explicitly of 'five interior acts' corresponding to the exterior senses which we call seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and touching spiritually.' Foulain p.101.

70 See Parrinder, *Mysticism in the World's Religions* (London, 1976), especially chapter 2 on 'Mystery and Union'.


73 Devine begins Part III of his *Manual* with the statement that the degrees of contemplation cannot be 'classified with great exactness and distinctness, as the spirit of God is not confined to any one method in the operation of His grace' but then proceeds to discuss 'the first degree of contemplation' and concludes over eighty pages later with a chapter on the 'Tenth degree: Perfect Union or Spiritual Marriage', pp.375, 380, 464.

74 *Study*, p.169.


76 ME II p.320. Following quotations in this paragraph: ME II pp.321, 322, 323.

77 ME II p.323.


82 ME II p.325. The reference was to J B Schwab, *Johannes Gerson* (Wurtzburg, 1858). Next quotation ME II p.325. The Baron's scrupulosity in presenting the Catholic position is evident in a footnote where he stated that he had found only one secondary Ecclesiastical Censor of this doctrine of 'God's substantial presence in the soul', the Sorbonne censure of Peter Lombard. It is safely dismissed with the remark that 'the same Sorbonne repeatedly censured St Thomas on other points.' ME II p.325, note 3.

83 ET p.368. The reference was to *De Beatitudine*, c.III, 3 princ. He also used this passage in ME II pp.151f.

84 His references were to *Oeuvres Complètes de S. E. le Cardinal Dechamps*, vol. II, pp.373–75. The Baron explained the idea of a *pierre d'attente* as 'what English builders call "toothing", a block of stone projecting from the wall of one house, with a view to incorporation into the wall of another, future, adjoining house', ET p.369.

85 ET p.378.

86 ME I p.229, and following quotation.

87 One need only mention the Spanish Carmelite mystics of the sixteenth century. The questions raised by this imagery are briefly touched upon by Parrinder, *Sex in the World's Religions* (London, 1980), pp.217f, and also Zaehner, *Mysticism Sacred and Profane*, p.152. Johnston deals with the concept of *mystical marriage* and claims, pace Freud, that despite the similarity between the sexual urge and the urge to mystical union, one is not simply a sublimation of the other. He maintains that according to the Christian tradition the deepest desire of the human heart is for God. *The Mysticism of the Cloud of Unknowing*, p.246.

88 ME I p.220. Twenty pages later he raises the same question and answers more fully with the additional suggestion that she needed to quench a 'feverish immediacy in her clamorous, claimful false self', ME I p.246.

89 ME I p.293. He was quoting from her *Vita*. Following four quotations: ME I p.293.


94 'A Letter from Baron von Hügel', p.6, and next quotation.

95 ME I p.293, and next three quotations.

96 ME I p.369, and next three quotations.

97 ME I p.233, and next quotation.

98 CFA p.79.


100 ME I p.234, and next quotation.

101 ME I p.239. Following three quotations in this paragraph: ME I pp.238f, 244, 281.

102 ME II p.94. Quotations in rest of this paragraph: ME II pp.98, 100.

103 Albany Review, pp.663f. Following quotations in this paragraph p.664.

104 ME I p.370. ME I p.136.

105 ME I p.370, and next quotation. Following quotation: von Hügel to Tyrrell, 6 August 1901, BL Add MSS 44927.169

106 CFA p.84. See Parrinder who speaks of theistic mystical experience as a distinctly 'I-Thou' relationship, 'a union with God in a relation of love.' Mysticism in the World's Religions, p.193.

107 LN p.96, EA II p.239.

108 EA II pp.198, 151f.


110 HS p.1, and following quotations in this paragraph.

111 Devine, p.467.

112 HS p.4, and next quotation. Quotations in this and next paragraph: HS pp.39, 15, 16, and next quotation.

113 HS p.6. Following quotation: p.17.


116 EFI p.63.


120 HS p.65. Next quotation: p.66.


122 OW p.207. Following three quotations: pp.208, 208, 209.


125 LO p.xxiii. Following quotations: p.15, 32.


128 LO p.xxviii. Next quotation: p.xxix. See also Tyrrell to von Hügel, 4 August 1901, BL Add MSS 44927.170. See Aumann, *Spiritual Theology*, p.74 on the centrality of grace in the mystical union.

129 CCR P.125. Quotations in next two sentences: SO p.50.


132 FM II p.356 Quotations in this paragraph: pp.356, 365

133 NV p.78. Following three quotations: pp.78, 79, 83.

134 ER p.79.


137 EFI p.273.
138 CCR p.124.

NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX

1 LN p.96.
2 LO p.19.
3 Von Hügel to Maude Petre 5 September 1908; 17 April 1906, BL Add MSS 45362.31,34
4 Tyrrell to von Hügel 26 June 1905. Maude Petre wrongly redates this letter in AL II p.203. BL Add MSS 44929.36b. At the height of the modernist crisis Tyrrell wrote to von Hügel: 'I have sought quietus in getting on ahead with my Pater Noster work, which I call "The Spirit of Christ."' 12 September 1905, BL Add MSS 44929.39b.
5 The two addresses 'The Facts and Truths Concerning God Which Are of Special Importance in the Life of Prayer' and 'The Facts and Truths Concerning the Soul Which Are of Most Importance in the Life of Prayer', were given at Beaconsfield on 26 October and 27 October 1921, and were published in the Second Series of Essays and Addresses in 1926. Here all references are to The Life of Prayer, Second Impression (London, 1928). Quotations in this paragraph: LP pp.7-8, 29.
6 Quotations in this paragraph: LP pp.8-9, ME II p.266.
11 LP p.15.
12 LP p.12.
13 LP pp.21-22, and quotations in next two sentences.
14 LN p.14. See also pp.xvii, xxxiv.
15 RG p.71.
16 EA I p.90.
17 ME II p.340.
19 LP p.24.
20 LP p.32. Next two quotations: p.33.
22 LN pp.85, 16f.
23 LP p.39.


25 EL p.370.


30 LP p.43. Next quotation: p.44.


33 LP p.47. Next two quotations: pp.47, 52.

34 LP p.52, and next quotation.

35 LP p.63.


37 ME II p.266.

38 ET p.377.


40 LC pp.80-81. The 'catechism definition' has its origins in the classic definition of John Damascene, and was latinized by St Thomas Aquinas as *ascensus mentis in Deum*, Knowles, *What Is Mysticism?*, p.78, note 1. Quotations in this paragraph from LC pp.80-81, 83, 84.


42 LC pp.90, 92. Next three quotations: pp.93, 96, 94.

43 GTL pp.50, 150, LC p.94.

44 LC pp.88-89.


47 GTL p.152.


51 LC p.112.


53 LO p.151.

54 Tyrrell to Maude Petre, 17 February 1908, BL Add MSS 52367.172.

55 LC p.115, and next two quotations.

56 GTL p.147.


58 LO p.111.


60 GTL p.147.


62 OW p.250.

63 GTL p.145. Quotations in rest of this paragraph: pp.146, 149.

64 LO p.121.

65 OW p.249.

66 LO p.122.

67 OW pp.248-49.


70 LO p.158. Next four quotations: pp.159-60, 161, 162, 162.


ME II p.129, and next quotation.

ME II p.131, and next quotation.


ME II p.133, and next three quotations.


ME II p.135.

ME II p.141.

ME II p.136.


ME II p.143.

ME II p.137.

EA II pp.228-29, EA II p.82. Next quotation: p.82.

91 LN p.4, and next two quotations.
92 LN p.140, and next quotation.
93 LN p.43.
94 Goodier, p.21.
96 LN p.44.
97 See Aumann, *Spiritual Theology*, pp.337f.
99 Von Hügel to Tyrrell, 10 November 1903, BL Add MSS 44928.127.
102 LN p.44 and next two quotations.
103 The case of Margarethe Peters in Wildenspuch in 1823 had been recorded in Heinrich Héppe, *Geschichte der Quietistischen Mystik* (Berlin, 1875) to which the Baron refers in a footnote. Von Hügel valued the documentation of this study though he deplored the 'obviously strong partisan bias of the author against Rome.' ME II p.139. Next two quotations: p.139.
105 ME II p.147. Quotations in this paragraph: pp.149, 151, 152.
108 ME II p.173, from Fénelon, and next quotation.
109 ME II pp.357, 343.
110 ME II p.174.
111 The quotation with which the Baron concludes is directly from Fénelon, ME II p.181. Next quotation: ME II p.301.
113 Though Tyrrell does not cite the work, the reference is to T Ribot, *Psychologie de l'Attention* (Paris, 1889), which Underhill also used in her discussion of ecstasy, *Mysticism*, p.363.
114 Quarterly Review, p.117, and quotations in this paragraph pp.117–18.
115 EFI p.35. Quotations in this paragraph: EFI pp.38, 38, 38, 39, 39.
116 Tyrrell to Bremond, 16 September 1901, BN FB NAF, and next quotation.
117 FM I p.273.
122 OW p.259. Following quotations in this paragraph: OW pp.258-60, FM I p.298.
123 FM I p.278.
124 FM I p.278.
126 FM I p.336.
130 HS p.291.
133 Andrew Louth, *The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition*, pp.68-69. Next two quotations: FM I pp.298, 299. Louth remarks that 'this idea of the soul as a mirror which, when pure, can reflect the image of God seems to be original to Athanasius', though he admits there are 'faint hints' in Theophilus and Plotinus. p.79.
137 FM I p.322.

139 FM I p.328.


141 FM I p.298, and next quotation.

142 FM I p.296, and next three quotations.

143 FM I p.306.

144 GTL p.46.


147 ME II p.42. Next two quotations: pp.46, 42.


149 ME II p.47.

150 ME II p.59.

151 ME II p.49 See also Farges p.444. Herman gave a more positive assessment of the role of psycho-physical concomitants of ecstasy and criticised von Hügel's readiness to conclude that such psychic phenomena 'do not in any sense belong to the essence of Mysticism' but rather 'constitute the abnormal element in Mysticism' *The Meaning and Value of Mysticism*, p.53.

152 Evelyn Underhill, *Mysticism* Preface to twelfth edition (1939). p.4.1 See also chapter VII, where she distinguishes the different elements in ecstatic experience, physical, psychological and mystical, emphasising its essential mono-ideism its entrancement and the agreement of mystics in seeing it as 'an exceptionally favored state' pp.363-358. At the same time she admitted that the outward form of ecstasy depended on the body rather than the soul of the mystic p.373.


154 J.-e. h de G. Ther's position was that ecstasy was 'neither an essential part of the human organism which can...bear the influence of the divine a 'sin without being in a state of performing the lower psychological actions' *The Theory of the Spiritual Life* New York. 1933 p.354

156 Farges believed that to accept ecstasy as a natural phenomenon was a capitulation to rationalists, pp.509, 446.

157 Egan, p.306. Kirk expressed the same point, noting that in ecstasy the mind is 'wholly concentrated upon Him who is present to it and thereby relegates all thoughts of self into the background.' The Vision of God, p.197. He also spoke of 'ecstatic conditions' which are 'irrelevant concomitants of this experience of God.' p.198. For Maréchal, ecstasy was a synthesis of 'an empirical negativity and a transcendental positivity', Studies in the Psychology of the Mystics, pp.190-94. For Aumann, mystical prayer of union has as its 'essential element' the 'absorption of the soul in God' and the ecstasy is a 'secondary but concomitant element.' Spiritual Theology, p.346. Knowles was even more dismissive in his assertion that 'Ecstasies, raptures and the like have in themselves no spiritual value.' What Is Mysticism?, p.55.

158 Underhill, Mysticism, p.371.

159 Egan, p.306.

NOTES TO CHAPTER SEVEN

1 Aumann, *Spiritual Theology*, p.16. 'Early in the 1750's Scaramelli introduced the distinction between ascetical and mystical theology', though the Polish Franciscan Dobrosielski had already introduced the term 'ascetical' into the Latin usage of Western theology in 1655, pp.14-15.

2 On these divisions see for example A Devine, *A Manual of Ascetical Theology*. Marechal described asceticism as 'a prerequisite condition for the states of union.' *Studies in the Psychology of the Mystics*, p.201.


5 ME II p.298.


7 LN p.xix. EA II p.94.


9 Von Hügel to Tyrrell, 30 September 1900, BL Add MSS 44927.135.

10 EL p.253.

11 LN pp.85f.

12 SL pp.255f, and next two quotations.

13 SL p.227.

14 SL p.70. Next two quotations: p.228.

15 ME II p.292.

16 EA II, p.205. LN p.132.

17 ME II p.292.

18 SL p.228, and next quotation.

19 LN p.155.

20 Von Hügel to Maude Petre, 4 January 1909, BL Add MSS 45361.61, and next quotation.


23 Von Hügel to Tyrrell, 4 June 1902, BL Add MSS 44928.17.

24 ME II p.341. In this he included 'practically all pre-Protestant and most of old Protestants.'


28 EA I p.192. In this regard it is likely that criticism of von Hügel's lack of deep interest in any of the social-moral and politico-moral problems which since the war have so grievously tortured our generation and affected the whole Christian outlook will continue to be offered. Kelly, Von Hügel's Philosophy of Religion, p.211. Lash takes this up in his recent examination of von Hügel, Easter in Ordinary, pp.165-66. The fact is that The German Soul stands as an attempt to deal with some of these issues. It still remains true that von Hügel seems to fit rather comfortably into the socially stratified culture of Edwardian society.


30 EA II p.124.

31 Tyrrell to Maude Petre, 19 April 1899, BL Add MSS 52367.4b.

32 LO p.160.


36 FM I p.310.

37 LO p.185.

38 Notes on the Catholic Doctrine of Purity (Roehampton, 1897), Preface dated 20 April 1897, p.4.

39 Notes on the Catholic Doctrine of Purity, p.5.


41 CCR p.261.

42 NV pp.405-6.

43 LC p.190.

45 FM I p.338.


50 LC p.194. For the next point see Bouyer, 'Asceticism in the Patristic Period', *Christian Asceticism and Modern Man*, pp.15-19.

51 Quotations in this paragraph from preface to Francis Thompson, *Health and Holiness: A Study of the Relations between Brother Ass, the Body, and his Rider, the Soul* (London, 1905), pp.viii-ix.

52 Thompson, p.15. Remaining quotations in this paragraph: pp.ix, x.

53 Tyrrell to Henry Sidgwick, 13 July 1900. Henry Sidgwick Papers, Trinity College Library, Cambridge. See also Tyrrell's letter to Frederick Myers, January 1901 on the death of Sidgwick, Frederick Myers Papers.


56 HS p.131. Quotations in this and next paragraph: pp.131, 131, 143, 144, 145-6, 144, 141.


58 HS p.147.

59 HS p.148. Quotations in rest of this paragraph: pp.148, 149.

60 FM II pp.42, 43.

61 FM II p.44. Next three quotations: pp.44, 45, 49.

62 FM II p.49.


64 FM II p.52. Next two quotations: pp.52, 53.

65 FM II p.54.

66 Tyrrell to von Hügel, 12 November 1900, BL Add MSS 44927.142, and next quotation.
67 OW p.242.

68 Von Hügel to Tyrrell, 26 December 1900, BL Add MSS 44927.148, 150, and next two quotations in this and next two paragraphs. Von Hügel was quoting John of the Cross from the translation by David Lewis.


70 Von Hügel to Maude Petre, 18 May 1901, BL Add MSS 45361.13b, and quotations in this and next two paragraphs.

71 ME II p.128 and next quotation. For the next point see Gwendolen Greene, 'Thoughts from Baron von Hügel', 189 (1931), pp.245-260.

72 HS p.311.

73 Tyrrell to Bremond, 16 October 1901, and next quotation.

74 Tyrrell to von Hügel, 20 February 1901, BL Add MSS 44927.155.

75 Tyrrell to Maude Petre, 18 August 1901, BL Add MSS 52367.51b.

76 HS pp.220-260.

77 GTL p.209. Quotations in next paragraph: pp.209, 211.

78 Von Hügel to Maude Petre, 30 May 1912, BL Add MSS 45362.52.


80 Tyrrell to Bremond, 28 March 1903.

81 Von Hügel to Maude Petre, 30 May 1912, EA II p.95. See EA II pp.285f.

82 Von Hügel to Maude Petre, 15/16 May 1910, BL Add MSS 45362.24, 25 and quotations in this paragraph.

NOTES TO CHAPTER EIGHT


3. ME II p.393, and next quotation.


5. ME I pp.53, 54. See also John Couison, who perhaps overstates von Hügel's dependence on Newman in this respect, *Newman and the Common Tradition*, pp.174-78.

6. ME II p.387.

7. CCR p.278.

8. ME I pp.51, 52.

9. ME II p.390.


12. Quarterly p.107, and next two quotations.

13. RG p.31.

14. ME I p.51, and next quotation.


17. SL p.162.


19. ME I p.xiv.


23. Tyrrell to von Hügel 16 June 1900, BL Add MSS 44927.119.


27 FM I p.281.

28 MAL p.63.

29 EFI p.213. For the next point see MAL p.19.

30 CF pp.73, 74. Next three quotations: CF pp.135, 135, MAL p.85.

31 CCR p.208.

32 ME I p.52.

33 See Neuner, Religion zwischen Kirche und Mystik, p.52.

34 ME I p.78.

35 ME I p.79. Next three quotations: pp.78, 78, 79.


37 Von Hügel to Thorold, 15 August 1921, quoted in Life p.338.

38 Study, pp.184-192 where it is argued that the earlier and later view were out of harmony. Eventually von Hügel was much nearer to Blondel than Loisy. For following reference to Dechamps: ET p.369.


41 Ellen Leonard, George Tyrrell and the Catholic Tradition, pp.79-87.

42 SC p.241.


44 LO p.208.

45 Tyrrell to von Hügel 10 February 1907, BL Add MSS 44930, and next quotation.

46 ME I pp.54-55. Next four quotations: pp.58, 61, 61, 62.

47 ME I p.62.

48 ME II pp.142-3.

49 Quarterly, p.126.

50 ME II p.396.

51 Tyrrell made this clear in his shorter review in Hibbert Journal, 7 (April, 1909), p.688.

53 James Luther Adams has indicated their significance by comparing reactions to their works. Temple described von Hügel's study as arguably 'the most important theological work in the English language during the last half-century.' *Life* p.223. B H Streeter said James's *Varieties of Religious Experience* was the most important book on religion during the same period. 'Letter from Friedrich von Hügel to William James', *Downside Review*, 98 (1980), p.215


55 ME II p.309, and next quotation.

56 Von Hügel to Kemp-Smith, Barmann p.63.

57 Adams, p.230.


59 Barmann, p.64.


61 ME II p.291, and following points on this terminology. The reference was to Rauwenhoff’s *Religions-philosophie*, (Berlin, 1894), p.116. On the shift of terms from the 'Experience and Transcendence' paper to ME see also von Hügel to Tyrrell 15 March 1907, BL Add MSS 44930.14. Quotations in rest of this paragraph: this letter and LN p.147.

62 Quotations in this paragraph from ME II pp.305-7. It seems more than likely that the Baron had shared thoughts on the matter with Abbot Butler who also spoke strongly against the 'filthy and disgusting' nature of that 'systematised demonology' taken seriously by Schram, Göres and Ribet which had 'gone far to reduce Catholic mysticism in popular estimation.' 'Mystical Books and Books on Mysticism', p.3.

63 *Quarterly*, pp.101-102, and following quotations in this paragraph.

64 *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p.269, EA II pp.61, 75, 77.


66 FM II p.39.

67 *Quarterly*, p.110. For previous two quotations and a brief discussion of this question see Richard Woods who also speaks of interpretation being 'built into experience' and there being 'no experience which is meaningful without such interpretation'. *Understanding Mysticism*, p.4. See also John E Smith, 'William James's Account of Mysticism: A Critical Appraisal', in *Mysticism and Religious Traditions*, p.248,

68 ET p.379. The reference was to 'Present Problems of General Psychology', (American) *Philosophical Review*, 1904, pp.606, 607, and following quotation.

69 Lash, *Easter in Ordinary* p.158.


71 Inge cited Proclus as representing one of the earliest examples of this doctrine. Commenting on the statement that 'the soul (as well as the body) can see and perceive', he sums up the Proclian position thus: 'We have an organ or faculty for the discernment of spiritual truth, which, in its proper sphere, is as much to be trusted as the organs of sensation in theirs.' *Christian Mysticism*, p.6

72 Streng, 'Language and Mystical Awareness', in *Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis*, pp.141-69. Although Inge and Bennett criticised the notion, *A Philosophical Study of Mysticism: An Essay* (New Haven, 1923), p.102, Margaret Smith in her influential study in 1931 seemed to assert belief in a specific 'spiritual sense' and based this on an interpretation of Augustine and a contemporary student of mysticism, R W Trine, *In Tune with the Infinite*, p.40. She wrote that 'Mysticism...denies that knowledge can be attained only by means of the senses, or the intellect, or the normal processes of consciousness, and claims that the highest knowledge can be attained, and can only be attained, by this spiritual sense of intuition.' *Introduction to Mysticism* (London, 1977), p.4. Now it is not absolutely clear that a separate, distinct faculty is being proposed here by Smith; it is in fact possible to understand this as referring to a synthetic concept which gathers up various elements of consciousness or awareness operating in harmony. This is at least suggested by the reference to he physical senses in her quotation from Trine. More certain are Sharpe's references to 'the doctrine that the soul has a faculty by means of which it can, when God so pleases, contemplate Him directly and even become united to Him.' *Mysticism: Its True Nature and Value*, p.81. Also, 'it must be noticed that however closely what may be called the lower kind of mystical experience may approach the ordinary experience of the senses in character, it must always be considered as entirely distinct from naturally caused sensations or ideas.' p.103. In a similar vein John Chapman, in his *Spiritual Letters*, speaks of a 'mystical faculty' (pp.274, 276), 'a connection has been established with Him, a wire along which God can speak to the soul'.(p.309), a 'faculty' which has been obscured through disuse (pp.303-4), and even a 'preternatural trap-door'.(p.276).

73 ET p.376.

74 Preface to *Amédée's Saint Francis de Sales* (London, 1900), p.x. Following quotations in this paragraph: von Hügel to Tyrrell, 4 March 1900, BL Add MSS 44927.101; von Hügel to Tyrrell, 4 June 1902, BL Add MSS 44927.16.
ME II p.283: 'Is there, then, strictly speaking, such a thing as a specifically distinct, self-sufficing, purely Mystical mode of apprehending Reality? I take it, distinctly not; and that all the errors of the exclusive Mystics proceed precisely from the contention that Mysticism does constitute such an entirely separate, completely self-supported kind of human experience.' Following references to John of the Cross and James: ME II p.308. Earlier and more recent commentators have recognised this conviction as a distinctive mark of the Baron's thought. Sherry observed 'He denied that there is a purely mystical mode of apprehension', 'Von Hügel: Philosophy and Spirituality', p.4.

ME II pp.324, 336. For the following comment from Nédoncelle see Study, p.167.


The Letters of Evelyn Underhill, p.20.

ME I p.xi. Following quotations in this paragraph: pp.xi-xii.

ME I p.xii.

SL p.363.


Von Hügel to Thorold, 15 September 1921, Life, p.337.

Von Hügel to Tyrrell, 10 November 1903, BL Add MSS 44928.126, 127, and next two quotations in this paragraph.

ME I p.79. Next two quotations: pp.79-80.

FM I pp.306-7, and next two quotations.


Quarterly, p.122, and next quotation.

Quarterly, p.122.

Quarterly, p.123.


Johnston, The Inner Eye of Love, p.33.

97 ME II p.319.


99 See Aumann, Spiritual Theology, pp.127f, Christian Spirituality in the Catholic Tradition, p.274.


101 Johnston, The Still Point, p.139.

102 Johnston, The Inner Eye of Love, p.31.


104 ME II p.174.


106 Aumann, Spiritual Theology, p.104. Quotations in this paragraph: pp.105, 110.

107 Study, p.165.


109 David Knowles, What is Mysticism?, p.133, and next quotation.


111 Illtyd Trethowan, Mysticism and Theology, p.79.

112 Williams, 'Butler's Western Mysticism', p.209.

113 Maréchal, Psychology of the Mystics, p.200. See also Johnston who writes 'many theologians hold that Christian mysticism is no more than an intensification of the ordinary Christian life. Reacting against the view that mysticism is an esoteric phenomenon, surrounded by an aura of the occult, they insist that it is just a deepening of that faith that every true Christian possesses.' Still Point, p.28.

114 LC p.37.


117 Pepler, p.199.
118 Quarterly, p.117.
119 RG p.71.
121 FM I p.260, and next quotation.
122 SL p.84.
123 FM I p.261, and next five quotations.
124 FM I p.262, and next quotation.
125 FM I p.271, and next quotation.
126 Quarterly, p.122.
129 Johnston, Still Point, p.28.
131 Williams, 'Butler's Western Mysticism', p.208.
133 Katz, p.40.
134 RG p.71.
135 Williams, 'Butler's Western Mysticism', p.209.
136 ME II p.332, and quotations in next sentence.
138 MWF p.113.
139 Williams, 'Butler's Western Mysticism', p.212, and next two quotations.
141 Pepler, p.170.
142 Pepler is quoting an unnamed 'recent writer on the subject', p.201. Quotations in next sentence from Williams, 'Butler's Western Mysticism', p.213.

143 LC p.37.


145 ME II p.395, and next quotation.

146 ME II p.340.

147 CCR p.262.

148 Quarterly, p.109, and next quotation.
NOTES TO CONCLUSION


2 Latourette, Christianity in a Revolutionary Age, pp.96-104, 365-370. See also Aubert pp.34-66.

3 Elmer O'Brien, 'English Culture and Spirituality', p.72.

4 Dru, Maurice Blondel, p.24.

5 Johnston, Inner Eye of Love, pp.29f.

6 Maurice Blondel, History and Dogma, p.260.

7 Sherry, 'Von Hügel's Retrospective View of Modernism', p.184.


9 Matthew Fox, 'Meister Eckhart and Karl Marx: The Mystic as Political Theologian', in Understanding Mysticism, p.536.


12 EA II pp.91-131.


18 SF p.2.
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