(Mega-) metaphor in the text-worlds of economic crisis: towards a situated view of metaphor in discourse

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Abstract

Building on Werth’s (1994) notion of ‘megametaphor’, in this thesis I examine the discourse-level conceptual effects of metaphor in five op-ed articles about the 2008 British financial crisis. I use these analyses to offer three contributions to debates in metaphor studies. Firstly, I attempt to offer a more detailed specification of megametaphor. I argue that whilst megametaphor is a useful concept to start an investigation of discourse-level metaphoric conceptual effects, Werth (1994) does not sufficiently differentiate it from the notion of ‘conceptual metaphor’ (see Lakoff, 1993; Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). I define megametaphors as text-driven discourse-level conceptual structures comprised of multiple metaphors. Secondly, I argue that megametaphors are situated within the broader cognitive environments generated in the minds of discourse participants as they take part in a discourse. Analysts therefore have to account for the relationship between megametaphors and the conceptual contexts in which they appear. I argue that Text World Theory (see Gavins, 2007; Werth, 1999) provides the best account of this conceptual context, and suggest that the text-world structures created in the minds of readers scaffolds the integration of individual clause-level metaphors into megametaphors. Finally, drawing on Werth’s (1977, 1994) notion of ‘double-vision’, Steen’s (2008, 2011a, 2011b) notion of ‘deliberate metaphor’ and Stockwell’s (2009) attention-resonance model, I propose a framework for describing the ways in which megametaphors ‘texture’ (Stockwell, 2009) the text-worlds in which they are situated.
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1. Thesis context and aims

They talked of hedges against inflation, as if mathematics could contain actual air and some row of hawthorn could stop an army of numbers from marching over it. They spoke of the mood of the stock-market, the health of the economy as if these were living creatures with moods and blood. And thus they personalised and demonologised the abstractions of their lives, believing them to be fundamentally real, indeed changeless. But it did not occur to one of those spirited and in various ways intelligent people around Berto’s table that a complete mutation of our means of nourishment had already come into being where the concept of money and property were concerned, a complete mutation not merely to be defined as a collapse of the capitalist system, or a global recession, but such a sea change in the nature of reality as could not have been envisaged by Karl Marx or Sigmund Freud (Spark, 1976: 126).

In her (1976) novel, *The Takeover*, Muriel Spark draws the reader’s attention to the figurative ways in which her characters talk about the economy: how they speak of ‘hedges’ and ‘inflation’ and how different aspects of the institutions of the economy (the stock-market and the economy as a whole), are personified. On the one hand, Spark seems to mock the figurative reification of abstract concepts: she writes that Berto’s guests believe ‘the abstractions of their lives… to be fundamentally real’, her use of the verb, ‘believe’, suggesting she does not. On the other, she herself
uses a series of metaphors to describe changes in the economy. *The Takeover* is set against the background of the 1973 oil crisis and the rise of the Arab states as a major economic power. It is this movement in the balance of global economic power to which Spark refers with the terms ‘sea change’, ‘mutation’ and ‘collapse’.

All three terms are themselves also figurative: ‘mutation’ is a biological metaphor, ‘collapse’ a structural one, and the phrase ‘sea change’ recasts the shifting economic context as a change in nautical environment. Despite Spark’s seemingly scornful view of this type of figurative reification, on the scale of world events and in the description of complex global economic processes, it seems that even she finds metaphor hard to avoid. As Turner (2006) argues, metaphor makes our understanding of these infinitely complicated situations ‘human scale’. It is for this reason that McCloskey (1983, 1995) points to metaphor as an indispensable heuristic for economists seeking to describe world economic events.

This thesis examines the ways that people use figurative language to understand such world events; the role metaphor plays in representations of the kinds of ‘mutation’ or ‘collapse’ to which Spark refers. My primary interest is to investigate the metaphoric situations that journalists describe in discourses about economic crises. More specifically, the thesis focuses on the discourse of op-ed articles (opinion articles that are positioned ‘opposite the editorials’ in British broadsheet newspapers) about the British financial crisis of 2008. In Section 1.1 of this chapter, I give a brief explanation of the events of that crisis and a fuller explanation of what op-ed articles are. In Section 1.2, I then outline the methodology by which the articles analysed in this thesis were chosen.
Rather than examining metaphor in large swathes of economics or business discourses (in the manner undertaken by, for example, Charteris-Black, 2000, 2001, 2004; Drury and Rae, 1993; Fukuda, 2009; Henderson, 2000; Koller, 2003, 2004, 2005; and White, 2003), my goal is to augment understanding of the role played by metaphor in the mental representations created by readers in response to the op-ed articles they read. This means taking both a cognitive and a situated view of metaphor: seeing metaphor as not only a kind of linguistic device, but also something that structures our understanding, or our conception, of the economy and other abstract concepts (for outlines of this conceptual view of metaphor, see Gibbs, 1994; Lakoff, 1993; Lakoff and Johnson, 1980); and viewing this conceptual structure as an integrated part of the other conceptual structures generated by language users as they take part in discourse. The aim of this thesis is to make an original contribution to existing work in metaphor studies by beginning to elaborate a consistent and coherent theoretical perspective (and in so doing evaluate existing approaches) which can be used to analyse these discourse-level metaphoric structures and the conceptual effects they produce.

To analyse the discourse-level conceptual effects engendered by metaphor requires a wide-ranging, holistic approach to the text. It is not possible to capture the complexities of the conceptual effects generated across a discourse by using only one framework, and it is for this reason that throughout the thesis I synthesise and expand upon multiple theoretical approaches. I outline the advantages of this eclecticism, which is a defining aspect of the discipline of stylistics (see Carter and Stockwell 2008, Jeffries 2000), in Section 1.3. In Section 1.2 of this introductory
chapter, I give an outline of stylistics (for seminal examples, see Leech and Short 2007; Weber 1995) and its sub-discipline, cognitive stylistics (for what has become a widely known introduction to the field, see Stockwell, 2002b; for expert applications, see Brône and Vandaele, 2009; Gavins and Steen, 2003; and Semino and Culpeper, 2002), and suggest that the work presented in this thesis constitutes an example of the latter area of research. Finally, in Section 1.4, I give an overview of the thesis and the arguments and claims that are developed throughout it.

1.1 ‘Op-ed’ articles and the 2008 financial crisis

Since 2007, the US and European economies have suffered a financial crisis that some economists have compared in severity to the Wall Street crash of 1929 and the subsequent Great Depression of the 1930s (for examples, see Bootle, 2012; Pettifor, 2008; Webb, 2008). The 2007/2008 global crash began with the US sub-prime mortgage crisis and led to the failure of two large banks, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. This failure of the banking sector compelled the American government to authorise a bank bailout package costing $700 billion. Soon, however, the crisis spread to Europe and in September 2007 it led to a run on the British bank, Northern Rock. The collapse of the bank led to a UK government bailout, and the bank’s later nationalisation in February 2008. In Iceland, banking failure precipitated the dramatic collapse of the Icelandic economy, and across Europe the financial turmoil led to recession and increasing government debts. Britain was no exception and, in October 2008, its economy officially went into recession. Now, five years since the crash, the British economy has experienced its first two
consecutive quarters of growth and there are signs of a very slow and tentative recovery.

The main response of European governments to these events was to slash public spending, ostensibly to stave off the accumulation of large public debts and debt repayments. These austerity measures have provoked strikes and huge demonstrations across Europe, most dramatically in Greece and Spain, and also the emergence of new social movements like the global ‘Occupy’ movement. In Britain, there has been a renewal of strike activity alongside multiple marches and demonstrations against austerity by tens and even hundreds of thousands of people. On one demonstration the London offices of Barclays bank were stormed and, on another occasion, the headquarters of the British Conservative Party were occupied and vandalised after students marched against education cuts and increased student fees. Organisations such as ‘UK Uncut’ and ‘Occupy London’ have organised direct action against the government and the large businesses that have benefitted from tax cuts whilst public services are reduced and welfare provision cut.

In this thesis, I examine some of the debate and discussion about the crisis in British ‘op-ed’ articles of the time. Op-eds are articles that usually appear opposite the newspaper editorial in British broadsheet newspapers. Van Dijk (1989: 230) notes that ‘editorials are intended and structured to express and convey the opinion of the newspaper about recent news events’. Like editorials, op-eds are used for ‘conveying personal and subjective opinions on current events or relevant issues’, however they differ insofar as they ‘are written by individuals who are not
affiliated with or working for the newspaper but are typically experts, professionals or prominent figures in certain fields’ (Chen, 2011: 694). Much of the literature on op-eds and editorials also emphasises their persuasive or argumentative function (Chen, 2011; van Dijk, 1989, 1992; Wang, 2008: 375; Yağcioğlu and Cem-Değer, 2001). Indeed, as I suggest in Chapters 4 and 5, the deployment of discourse-level metaphors within the op-eds, and the ‘texture’ (Stockwell, 2009) of those metaphors, plays a role in advancing this argumentative function.

1.2 Methodology

The op-eds chosen for analysis in the thesis were taken from the ‘News Bank’ online database of UK newspapers. Articles related to the economic crisis were found by searching for the key word ‘economy’ and refined with a date search. All articles discussed over the course of the coming chapters were published in October 2008, the month the British recession broke. Through the rigorous examination of journalistic responses to this major international event, my central aim in this thesis is to outline a theoretical framework for describing the ways in which metaphors develop across discourse. In particular, the thesis focuses on the discourse-level conceptual effects generated by multiple uses of metaphor in single op-eds. From the large number of texts returned by the initial search, it was therefore necessary to choose a selection of texts that could be individually analysed (I have provided this selection of texts in appendices 1-5 of the thesis). The texts which form the basis of my extended analyses in the forthcoming chapters were chosen according to the variety of metaphors for the economic crisis they contain (since, obviously, one cannot attempt to give an account of the conceptual effects of multiple
The selection of texts was therefore initially theory-driven; a means of exemplifying a particular theoretical argument about the nature and status of discourse-level metaphor, or what I term, following Werth (1994), ‘megametaphor’.

In my concluding chapter (Chapter 6), I point to the obvious limitations of this approach in making generalisations about the op-ed genre and discourses of economic crises more broadly. However, this methodology nevertheless permits a critique of extant approaches to metaphor in discourse alongside a more stringent elaboration of Werth’s (1994) theoretical work on megametaphor. It is this critique and elaboration which, it is hoped, will form the main contribution of this thesis to debates and discussion in metaphor studies.

The goal of this thesis, then, is to examine the specific discourse-level conceptual effects generated by a reader’s engagement with a single discourse within a specific context; to ask what role metaphor plays in the conceptual structures generated by a reader as they read; and to offer the beginnings of a theoretical framework to address this question. In the field of linguistics, cognitive stylistics has been at the forefront of addressing such issues. For this reason, I now turn to an outline of this discipline and its parent discipline, stylistics.

1.3 Stylistics

Although the object of analysis in this thesis is op-ed articles, the main concern of stylistics has historically been the study of literature, specifically an examination of the relationship between linguistic structures and literary effects. Stylistics has its roots in the Anglo-American ‘New Criticism’ (for example, Leavis, 1932; Ransom,
1941; Richards, 1936) and in the Russian formalist and European Structuralist movements (for example, Barthes, 1964, 1977; Jackobson, 2001; Todorov, 1971) of the early to mid-twentieth century. Both formalist and ‘New’ criticisms were primarily concerned with close textual analysis; with analysis of the language of literary texts and how this related to their aesthetic value, or ‘poetics’:

Poetics deals with problems of verbal structure, just as the analysis of painting is concerned with pictorial structure. Since linguistics is the global science of verbal structure, poetics may be regarded as an integral part of linguistics (Jackobson, 2001: 1258).

The work of the formalists was to define ‘the empirical linguistic criterion of the poetic function’ (Jackobson, 2001: 1265). Attridge (1996) points to the significance of Jackobson’s (2001) paper to the field of stylistics, writing that the ‘collection [in which Jackobson’s paper appeared] turned out to be one of the founding documents in English of what we call “literary linguistics”, and one of the most memorable papers in it was Jackobson’s’ (Attridge, 1996: 36). He further suggests that the concentration on the formal properties of style and literariness acted as ‘a call to arms for the stripling discipline of stylistics’ (Attridge, 1996: 37). The military metaphor is fitting. The early formalist focus on clearly describing the linguistic basis of literature attracted criticism from traditional literary criticism. The conflict found first (and at times, vitriolic) expression in the debate between the literary critic, F.W. Bateson (1971a, 1971b), and the stylistician, Roger Fowler (1971a, 1971b). In what has come to be known as the Fowler-Bateson controversy (Simpson, 2004: 148), Bateson (1971) argued that
descriptive linguistics is always at least headed towards total description – a detached, objective, universally available discipline (whatever the user’s age, sex, nationality, or culture). Literature, on the other hand, has its ineradicable subjective core, which tends to define the range and effectiveness of its uses (Bateson, 1971a: 57).

The implication that linguistics is ‘a universally available’ discipline, whereas the study of literature (which, according to Bateson (1971a, 1971b), is the opposite of linguistics) is not, is a worrying assertion for anyone committed to the idea that intellectual endeavour should be fundamentally democratic. Bateson (1971a) makes no concomitant argument that all ‘subjective’ criticism should therefore be deemed equally valid. Indeed, he suggests quite the opposite: his disdain for literary linguistics hinges on the notion that it is not useful precisely because it does not make such judgements. If literary criticism is subjective and therefore not ‘universally available’, but one critic’s view can be better than another, then the scholarly appreciation of literature is logically excluded from the field of rational academic enquiry. It therefore seems to me that Bateson’s (1971a) argument belies an implicit elitism.

Bateson (1971a) goes on to suggest that the analysis of the literary critic travels in the opposite direction to that of the grammarian. For Bateson (1971a: 57), the role of the grammarian, or linguist, is to sub-divide the sentence, whereas the role of the literary critic is to synthesise these constituent parts of the literary text into a unified whole, or interpretation. Problematically, Bateson (1971a, 1971b) narrows the discussion of language to that of only grammar. As Fowler
(1971b: 67) rightly points out, however, there seems little need to disqualify the study of above-the-sentence forms from linguistic analysis. In fact, a formal description of the linguistic units operating above the level of the sentence comprised the central concern of Harris’s (1954) contemporaneous, pioneering work on discourse analysis. At the heart of Bateson’s (1971a, 1971b) objection to literary linguistics is the flawed notion that a literary reading is entirely subjective (i.e. somehow divorced from the verbal artefact – the literary text – to which it was a response) and therefore beyond the purview of linguistic analysis. Moreover, Bateson (1971a, 1971b) takes an arbitrarily narrow view of linguistic description, meaning that, ‘style’, which he defines as an above-the-sentence phenomenon (Bateson, 1971a: 57), is excluded, by definition, from linguistic study.

Given these faults, Fowler (1971a, 1971b) is right to insist on the importance of connecting linguistic analysis to literary critical interpretation. However, the formalist division between *langue* and *parole* (Saussure, 2001), was not helpful to Fowler’s (1971a, 1971b) argument. Bateson (1971b) writes that:

The student of literature cannot be content with a description of the external mechanics of *langue*. As he [sic] reads a work of literature he will have to almost identify himself with the author he is reading or with his various *dramatis personae*. Now the critical controls to be applied to prevent any misreading of this or that particular passage or work are the *inter-subjective phenomena of style* (Bateson, 1971b: 79, emphasis in original).
In one sense, Bateson (1971b) is right. Within generative linguistics it is *langue*, or competence, that is the privileged term. As Chomsky (1965: 4) writes, *performance*, or *parole*, ‘surely cannot constitute the actual subject matter of linguistics’. The uncritical acceptance of the *langue*/parole or competence/performance distinction at worst excludes literature from linguistic analysis or, at best, makes the linguistic properties of literature of trivial importance. From within this formal, generative paradigm, I would therefore agree that literary scholars ‘cannot be content with an external description of *langue*’ (Bateson, 1971b) because it has no regard for readers, authors or the cultural, political and social contexts in which works of literature are produced and consumed. Ironically, however, it was not stylistics, but developments in literary criticism, notably Barthe’s (1977) essay famously hailing *The Death of the Author*, that led to the neglect of readerly experience and its relationship to authorial intention. Conversely, literary linguists registered impatience with the old formalist schools of linguistic thought. Indeed, Attridge (1996: 38) makes explicit criticism of the formalist neglect of writer and reader.

Similarly, this disregard for readerly interpretation leads Weber (1996: 2) to argue that formalist stylistic analyses ‘strike one as mechanical, lifeless, sterile exercises, and largely irrelevant to the interpretation of the literary work that they are describing’.

This critical introspection within stylistics led to the adoption of new functionalist linguistic paradigms and an exploration of their application to literature. Weber (1996: 2) summarises the importance of these paradigms to stylistics: ‘the functionalist introduces a new criterion of stylistic significance:
namely, obviously enough, direct functional relevance to the interpretation of the literary text’. One of the more famous examples of this functionalist stylistics is Hallidays’ (1996) essay on William Golding’s novel, The Inheritors. The novel charts the relationship between a group of Neanderthals and more advanced prehistoric humans. Using categories from functional grammar, Halliday (1996) describes the way in which the text construes the world through the eyes of the Neanderthal narrator, Lok (for a recent description of the functionalist grammatical framework, see Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004). Elements of linguistic style are here given a functional significance insofar as they generate this literary effect. The explicit pairing of linguistic patterning with literary interpretation marked an advance for stylistics (although, it should be noted that this pairing was not a feature of all work in this area. As Gavins (2012: 347) argues, Halliday’s (1966) ostensibly functionalist criticism of Auden’s Leda and the Swan offers no interpretation of the linguistic facts it identifies). However, it was also attacked, notably in a seminal article by Fish (1996 [1981]):

The stylisticians proceed as if there were observable facts that could first be described and then interpreted. What I am suggesting is that an interpreting entity, endowed with purposes and concerns, is, by virtue of its very operation, determining what counts as facts to be observed, and, moreover, that since this determining is not a neutral marking out of a valueless area, but the extension of an already existing field of interests, it is an interpretation (Fish, 1996 [1981]: 72, emphasis in original).
For Fish, there are no formal facts of the text that can be ‘neutrally marked out’ by the analyst. To mark these facts as important, he argues, is already to have interpreted what the text means (see also Fish, 1979). Fish (1979, 1996 [1981]) instead suggests that analysts should focus on how a particular interpretive community makes available interpretative procedures to the individual reader of a literary text. Under this model, it is ‘interpretive acts [that] are... being described’ (Fish, 1981: 72, emphasis in original). Rather than see aesthetic value as an intrinsic part of the literary text (like the formalists), or assume a necessary interpretative relevance for linguistic forms (like the functionalists), Fish (1979, 1996 [1981]) is arguing for a contextualised view of literary interpretation.

Stockwell (2000: 16-17) suggests that Fish’s (1979, 1996 [1981]) criticism of stylistics relies on a selective representation of the discipline, and that literary linguists were already well aware of the effect of context on literary interpretation. To adequately address this question would require a comprehensive survey of the contemporaneous literature, which is beyond the scope of this overview. However, it is certainly correct to argue, as Toolan (1996) does, that Fish’s (1979, 1996 [1981]) way of accounting for context, the notion of an ‘interpretative community’, is itself too vague to be of any use, prompting more questions than it addresses:

The term ‘community’ is an attractive one, connoting a cohesive, caring fraternity of equals. But is it an accurate description of the sort of group which confirms or sustains any critical reading? More specifically, do all communities merit approval (presumably not) and how do they change or become changed? Or would the theory claim that communities do not
change, rather that new communities come into existence (Toolan, 1996: 130)?

Since Fish’s (1979, 1996 [1981]) criticisms, stylistics has embraced its own dynamic models of the interaction between reader, text and context (for a representative collection of work that puts context at the heart of stylistics, see Bex et al, 2000; Verdonk’s, 1993, contextualised stylistic analysis of Seamus Heaney’s poem *Punishment* is also an excellent example of contextualised stylistics). As Carter and Stockwell (2008: 298) write, the state of the art in modern literary linguistics is such that ‘stylistics necessarily involves the simultaneous practice of linguistic awareness and awareness of the interpretive and social dimensions… formal description without ideological understanding is partial or pointless’. In this respect, contemporary stylistics can be seen as a ‘social science’ of literature (Carter and Stockwell, 2008: 298).

At the heart of modern stylistics is a recognition that ‘the primary interpretative procedures used in the reading of a literary text are linguistic procedures’ (Carter 1982: 4), and that these procedures are situated within a co-text and a social, political and cultural context. Since its early beginnings, then, stylistics has moved from an attempt to formally define literary language to sophisticated analyses of the interrelation between linguistic forms, the functions they serve, the communicative contexts in which they are used and the resultant literary effects experienced by readers of the text. In this regard, stylistics has taken on a more a reconstructive project, with linguistic analysis and intuitive interpretation working together as part of a ‘philological circle’ (Leech and Short,
Indeed, in recent times, this has also extended into an explanation of the responses of others (for examples, see Allington, 2011; Allington and Swann, 2009; Peplow, 2011; and Whiteley 2011a, 2011b). The attempt to reconstruct and contextualise the linguistic prompts that led to an interpretation, or reading, of the text is seen as a concomitant to making the readings as ‘rigorous’, ‘retrievable’ and ‘replicable’ as possible (Simpson, 2004: 4). This has led some stylisticians to verify their own intuitions and assumptions about the literary effects of linguistic structure by empirically testing them against the readings and reading behaviour of larger groups of readers (for examples, see Andringa, 1996; van Peer, 1986; van Peer and Andringa, 1990; van Peer et al, 2007; van Peer et al, 2012; Zyniger et al, 2012). In this respect, the discipline of stylistics can itself be interpreted as an attempt to ‘open up’ criticism; to make the processes of criticism more transparent, less impressionistic and, in doing so, to move beyond unjustifiably eccentric readings (Short et al, 1998).

Whilst the research overviewed here has focussed on literary stylistics (a decision warranted by the discipline’s early focus on literature) stylistics has also featured examinations of the rhetorical and ideological effects of non-literary texts. The turn towards functionalist paradigms provoked an interest in the social impact of style and the important relationship between language and power. In the late 1970s, the work of the Critical Linguists (Fowler et al, 1979; Kress and Hodge, 1979) drew connections between the patterning of grammatical forms such as nominalisation and passive sentence constructions and the ideological representations they entail. Later, Fairclough’s (1985) landmark paper, Critical and
Descriptive Goals in Discourse Analysis, examined the patterns of language use across a series of single texts, the institutional contexts in which they were used and their consequent ideological effects. Similarly, in his seminal (2002 [1989]) monograph, Language and Power, Fairclough highlighted a number of linguistic structures that he suggested possess, in given social and institutional contexts, ideological properties (pp. 91-116). Although this research did not explicitly identify itself as such, the concern for linguistic form, ideological effects, and all importantly for this branch of (Critical) Discourse Analysis (CDA), social and political context, mean that these works can be read as examples of a contextualised, functionalist, non-literary stylistics (for a representative collection of research in modern CDA, see Wodak and Meyer, 2009). Whilst these early connections between studies of ideology and language on the one hand, and stylistics on the other, are implied, stylistics soon became overtly concerned with the mechanics of power. Mills’ (1995) work on ‘feminist stylistics’ adopts a critical approach to ideological uses of language at the same time as it explicitly identifies this approach with stylistics. In this respect, it acts as a forerunner to Jeffries (2009), who sets out a ‘critical stylistics’ in her eponymously titled monograph. Both Mills (1995) and Jeffries (2009) make connection between their own critical work in stylistics and the work in CDA that came before it. The exploration of the relationship between style and society has also branched away from explicit ideological critique towards a concern for language and identity. For example, Coupland (2007) argues that style is socially meaningful and therefore has a function, or use, in social interaction. Style does something:
We need to understand how people use or enact or perform social styles for a range of symbolic purposes. Social styles... are a resource for people to make many different sorts of personal and interpersonal meaning (Coupland, 2007: 3).

Coupland (2007) re-expresses the earlier functionalist concern for the socially meaningful nature of style but in a new sociolinguistic context. This productive synthesis is also continued in papers by Kirkham (2011) and Moore (2012).

Whilst these non-literary examples of stylistics have focussed on the ideological, rhetorical and identify forming effects of linguistic structures, as opposed to their aesthetic or literary effects, it seems to me that the identification of linguistic patterns within a text, their context of use and the effects they produce – literary or otherwise – are at the heart of stylistic analysis (for contemporary examples of this non-literary stylistics, see Goddard, 2011; Hidalgo-Downing and Kraljevic Mujic, 2011; Kirkham, 2011; Moore, 2012; Nikiforidou, 2010; and O’Hara, 2012). It is for this reason that whilst the analyses presented in this thesis are not literary, they constitute examples of stylistics because their main concern is with describing metaphoric conceptual effects as they develop across a discourse and anchoring this description in a description of the text.

1.3 Cognitive Stylistics

From the previous overview, contemporary stylistics can be understood as the use of linguistic frameworks to enrich our understanding of literary and rhetorical effects that are produced in a particular context. Within the same vein, the most
recent development of cognitive stylistics can be understood as the analysis of these effects using insights from cognitive linguistics and the cognitive sciences in general. Gavins and Steen (2003: 1) write that ‘cognitive poetics relat[es] the structures of the work of art, including the literary text, to their presumed or observed psychological effects on the recipient, including the reader’. It should be noted that Gavins and Steen (2003) focus on literary reading. I use the term cognitive stylistics, rather than cognitive poetics, because of my non-literary focus.

In the last ten years, work in cognitive stylistics has rapidly expanded and has become a well-established area of literary-linguistic research. Important collections representing key work in the field include Brône and Vandaele (2009), Gavins and Steen (2003), and Semino and Culpeper (2002), whilst Stockwell (2002b) provides a seminal introduction to this approach to literary-linguistic study.

Gavins and Steen (2003) note the development of two kinds of cognitive stylistics; ‘one that is more tightly related to the rise of cognitive linguistics’ whilst ‘the other kind... is more generally oriented towards work in cognitive science’ (Gavins and Steen, 2003: 3). Whilst I engage in this thesis with wider work in cognitive science (most extensively, Barsalou, 1999, 2003, 2008a, 2008b, 2012; Barsalou et al 1999; and, to a degree, Zwaan, 2003), the majority of the frameworks that form the basis of my analyses are taken from cognitive linguistics (for examples, see Brandt and Brandt, 2002; Evans, 2006; Fauconnier and Turner, 2002; Langacker, 1987, 1991, 2008; Zwaan, 2003) and the research of cognitive stylisticians who work in the cognitive linguistic vein (for examples, see Gavins, 2000, 2003, 2005, 2007; Hidalgo-Downing, 2000, 2002, 2003; Stockwell, 2009;
Werth, 1994, 1999). As such, the work presented in this thesis corresponds with the trend in cognitive stylistics ‘that is more tightly related to the rise of cognitive linguistics’ (Gavins and Steen, 2003: 3). It is therefore important to provide here a fuller introduction to this branch of linguistics.

All linguistics might be said to be ‘cognitive’ insofar as the structures, ‘rules and semantic features which generate language are stored in our memory’ (Ungerer and Schmid, 1996: x). Although Geeraerts (2006: 2) suggests that cognitive linguistics ‘has not yet stabilized into a uniform theory’, it can, however, be differentiated from other forms of linguistics by its embodied and experiential view of language. The ‘first wave’ of cognitive linguists, as Geeraerts (2006: 24) calls it, emerged in the late seventies and early eighties, breaking with the well-established Generativist school of linguistic theory founded by Noam Chomsky (see Chomsky, 1957, 1965). Generative linguistics privileges the study of linguistic competence; the innate understanding of linguistic rules provided by a separate language module in the brain. In contrast, cognitive linguistics sees language ‘as an integral part of cognition, not a separate “module” (hence cognitive linguistics)’ (Langacker, 2009: 628). Language is not a closed-off, innate faculty of the mind, but ‘involves knowledge of the world that is integrated with our other cognitive capacities’ (Geeraerts, 2006: 5). In this respect one can differentiate between two forms of linguistic experientialism. On the one hand, as an ‘integral part of cognition’ (Langacker, 2009: 628), linked to our perceptual faculties via our nervous system, our linguistic faculties are fundamentally embodied. That is, our ways of representing a state of affairs in language draw on our experiences of being living,
breathing creatures that move about in an objectively existing material world (Ryan, 1998; Stockwell, 2002b). This observation collapses the Cartesian distinction between mind and body. Rather than being separate, the mind is a thing in, and of, the body (Johnson, 1987; Lakoff and Johnson, 1999). On the other hand, because our knowledge of the language system is constructed by our experience of, and exposure to, language in use (see, for example, Tomassello, 2000; Zeschel, 2008; Langacker, 2009), ‘the pivotal factor [in Cognitive linguistics] is meaning, rather than abstract form’ (Langacker, 2009: 628). That is, our knowledge of the language system is based on our worldly experience of meaningful utterances or sentences. As such, linguistic meaning is also co-determined by our individual or culturally and socially shared experiential knowledge of the world. In this respect, meaning is ‘encyclopaedic’ (Geeraerts, 2006, 2009).

Throughout the thesis I utilise a diverse set of ideas and concepts from cognitive linguistics (for example, ‘prototypes’, ‘image-schemas’, ‘frames’, and ‘conceptual integration networks’). In Chapters 2, 3 and 4, through the prism of their application to metaphor, I provide an outline of this set of cognitive linguistic ideas and concepts. In some ways this metaphor-oriented outline is consonant with the development of cognitive linguistics itself. Alongside innovations in cognitive semantics (for example, Fillmore, 1982) and cognitive grammar (for examples, see Langacker, 1987, 1990; Talmy, 1988), the renewed interest in metaphor as a conceptual and cognitive phenomenon (starting with Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, and Ortony, 1979) gave significant impetus to the first cognitive linguistic ‘wave’. My
explanation and application of these various cognitive frameworks parallels this development.

In addition to drawing on cognitive linguistic ideas and concepts, the approach in the thesis is also influenced by the rigour, holism and interdisciplinarity characterising linguistic analysis in stylistics. In their manifesto for stylistics, Carter and Stockwell (2008: 300) argue that it ‘should be eclectic as a matter of principle’. Certainly, it is useful to draw on ideas and concepts from multiple theoretical perspectives in describing the development of metaphoric conceptual effects across a single discourse (provided those perspective do not irreconcilably clash). A combination of approaches allows the analyst to describe and explain conceptual effects only partially captured by using only one. The use of a diverse range of theoretical perspectives also provides a way of testing the concepts and ideas made available by a single framework or theory. Additionally, if multiple frameworks furnish a vocabulary for talking about the same or a similar phenomenon, analysts can probably have a greater confidence that the phenomenon actually exists, rather than it being theorised into existence by the framework itself. The value attributed to eclecticism in stylistics is reflected in the wide range of concepts and frameworks that are used in this thesis. Whilst they are wide-ranging, however, they are all underpinned by a commitment to principles that are central to cognitive linguistics and the cognitive sciences. These principles are succinctly summarised by Lakoff (1990):

For me, cognitive linguistics is defined by two primary commitments... The generalisation commitment is a commitment to characterizing the general
principles governing all aspects of human language... The cognitive commitment is a commitment to make one’s account of human language accord with what is generally known about the mind and brain, from other disciplines as well as our own (Lakoff 1990: 40).

1.4 Thesis overview

In Chapter 2, I thoroughly outline the cognitive view of metaphor alongside the other important cognitive linguistic concepts and key theoretical themes of the thesis. The perspectives outlined here go on to inform the analyses presented in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. In the first half of the chapter, I give a detailed overview of the state-of-the-art of cognitive linguistic research on metaphor. I concentrate on cognitive approaches because of their significance in contemporary metaphor studies and outline three cognitive theories of metaphor: ‘structure mapping’ (see Gentner, 1983; Gentner and Markman, 1997; Lakoff, 1993), ‘class-inclusion’ (see Glucksberg and Keysar, 1990: Glucksberg et al, 1997; Glucksberg, 2003; Glucksberg and Haught, 2006), and the ‘career of metaphor theory’ (see Bowdle and Gentner, 2005; Gentner and Bowdle, 2001). After evaluating all three approaches, I argue for a perspective that situates metaphor within its environment of use: within the conceptual architectures created by language users as they engage in discourse. This form of analysis would account for the relationship of metaphoric conceptual structures to the wider cognitive environments generated by discourse participants in response to the text.
To embark on such an analysis requires not only a cognitive theory of metaphor, but one of discourse as well. In the second half of Chapter 2, I argue that Text World Theory (henceforth TWT, see Gavins, 2007; Werth, 1999) provides the best model of the text-driven discourse-level conceptual structures generated in the minds of discourse participants (see Section 2.2.1). It is therefore the most suitable tool for modelling the cognitive environments in which the conceptual structures prompted by metaphor appear. However, whilst TWT has sophisticated ways of accounting for discourse-level conceptual structures, I argue that its theory of metaphor requires further elaboration, particularly Werth’s (1994) notion of ‘megametaphor’ (see Section 2.2.2). Throughout the final sections of this chapter, I argue that this concept provides a promising start to studying the text-driven dynamics of metaphoric conceptual structures in individual texts, but needs clearer differentiation from another category in the cognitive linguistic literature, ‘conceptual metaphor’ (see Lakoff, 1993; Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). I provide a clearer definition of megametaphor and delineate it from this other type of conceptual structure. In the concluding sections of Chapter 2 (2.2.3 and 2.2.4), I contrast the TWT view of discourse and the perspective on metaphor it engenders, with other socio-cognitive approaches to the subject.

The aim of Chapter 3 is to outline more thoroughly what megametaphor is and the ways in which it differs from other discourse-level conceptual structures, specifically extended and mixed metaphor. I use a discussion of the frameworks that have been applied to these phenomena as a way of exploring their potential application in the analysis of megametaphor (see Section 3.1). I identify two
approaches, or paradigms, that have been used to examine these figurative structures: the linguistic paradigm (which I exemplify with the following work: Crisp et al, 2002; Dorst, 2011; Krenmayr, 2011; Pragglejazz, 2007; Steen, 1999a, 1999b, 2009; Steen et al, 2011) and the conceptual paradigm, which I exemplify by reference to Conceptual Integration Theory (henceforth CIT, see Coulson and Oakley, 2001; Fauconnier and Turner, 2002). I then apply ideas from each approach to two op-eds in an attempt to illustrate their relative strengths and weaknesses.

From these analyses, I conclude that the linguistic approaches are systematic and relatively transparent but are less adept at dealing with discourse-level conceptual structures. Moreover, the rigidity imposed by the use of propositional analysis (e.g. Steen, 1999a, 1999b 2009) make it harder to focus on metaphor at the discourse-level. Conversely, the conceptual approach is able to account more readily for discourse-level metaphoric structures. Indeed, in the extant literature, CIT’s ‘blended space’ (Fauconnier and Turner, 2002) probably best approximates to my understanding of megametaphor. I argue, however, that whereas the linguistic paradigm offered a clear procedure for getting from the linguistic ‘surface structure’ (Steen, 1999a, 2009) of the text to the conceptual structures it prompts, CIT’s ‘optimality principles’ (Grady et al, 1999) – principles that govern the production of complex blends – are not sufficiently anchored in the text. In the final section of the chapter, I restate the importance of seeing megametaphor as a text-driven, situated conceptual structure.

In Chapter 4, I offer a situated view of megametaphor. To outline such a situated view requires a deeper exploration of the text-driven relationship between
text and cognition. To explore this relationship, I examine research in Cognitive Psychology (for example, Barsalou, 1999, 2003, 2008a, 2008b, 2012; Barsalou et al, 1999) and Cognitive Linguistics (for example, Brandt and Brandt, 2002; Evans, 2006; Langacker, 1987, 1991, 2008; Stanfield and Zwaan, 2001; Zwaan, 2003). In Section 4.1, I integrate the discourse oriented concept of a ‘discourse world’ (Gavins, 2007; Werth, 1999), taken from TWT, with Barsalou et al’s (1999) psychologically oriented notion of a ‘world model’ to account for what I describe as the conceptual system. I use this discussion to present a new perspective on the nature of ‘target’ and ‘source domains’ in cognitive theories of metaphor; specifically target domains that are abstract and what I call phenomenologically ‘distant’ (examples of such concepts include FEMINISM, DEMOCRACY, FASCISM and importantly for this thesis, ECONOMY). This perspective sees these abstract concepts as situations with complex component concepts that are related to each other through metaphor.

After describing the conceptual system, in Section 4.2 of the chapter I examine the interrelation of the conceptual system with the language system using research in Cognitive Linguistics and Cognitive Grammar (Evans, 2006; Langacker, 1987, 1991, 2008; Stanfield and Zwaan, 2001; Zwaan, 2003). Then, in Section 4.3 of the chapter, I apply the ideas presented in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 to two texts. I use these analyses to demonstrate the effect of the text-world context of the various metaphors present in each op-ed article on how those metaphors are integrated into discourse-level mega-metaphoric conceptual structures. The principle purpose
of these analyses is to show that the text-world context scaffolds the integration of individual metaphors into different discourse-level megametaphors.

Having examined the bounds of megametaphor in Chapter 4 – where megametaphors begin and end, and the factors governing their integration into larger conceptual structures – in Chapter 5 I outline a framework for examining the ‘texture’ (Stockwell, 2009) of the discourses in which megametaphors appear. I provide a survey of TWT’s concept of ‘double vision’ (Gavins, 2007; Werth, 1977, 1994, 1999) and examine this notion with regard to the issues raised in contemporary debates around ‘deliberate’ metaphor (Gibbs, 2011a, 2011b; Müller, 2011; Steen, 2008, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c). I then propose a framework to account for the ways in which megametaphors are foregrounded, or pushed to the background of a discourse, drawing influence from Stockwell’s (2009) attention-resonance model. In outlining this framework, I identify six metaphor foregrounding features and use these as a means of examining the ways in which metaphor acts as a kind of ‘mood’ or ‘spotlighting’ in two op-ed articles about the 2008 economic crisis.

Finally, in Chapter 6, I give a summary of the arguments and claims made in the thesis along with an outline of the thesis limitations. I then use these limitations to suggest some areas of further research which might give further impetus to the study of megametaphor.
2. Metaphor in Discourse

This chapter has two main aims: to review the existing literature on metaphor and to provide theoretical preliminaries to the rest of the thesis. The literature reviewed in this chapter comes mainly from within the cognitive paradigm of metaphor research insofar as it focuses on the mental processes and conceptual mappings prompted by metaphor in the minds of language users. I have focussed on cognitive approaches to metaphor because, as I argue in Section 2.1, they have risen to dominate contemporary metaphor research. However, it should not be forgotten that the emphasis on conceptual structures in contemporary metaphor studies has led some researchers to call for a rebalancing in favour of the language and textuality of metaphor (for example, Pragglejaz, 2007; Steen, 2011b; and, with particular respect to cognitive poetics, Browse, in press). Accordingly, I engage with linguistically oriented criticisms of contemporary metaphor research in Chapter 3.

In one respect, then, the aim of this chapter is to outline the dominant cognitive framework that forms the stimulus for Pragglejaz (2007) and Steen’s (2011b) recent contributions to metaphor research.

The chapter is divided into two halves. In the first section, I give an overview of the prevailing cognitive paradigm in metaphor studies and outline three contemporary approaches to metaphor from within this paradigm, namely the ‘structure mapping’ (see Section 2.1.1 to 2.1.3), ‘class-inclusion’ (see Section 2.1.4) and ‘career of metaphor’ (see Section 2.1.4) theories. I conclude this first half of the
chapter by arguing that we need a contextualised view of metaphor that situates it within the cognitive environments generated by cognisors as they participate in discourse (Section 2.1.5).

In the second half of the chapter, I examine the conceptual and linguistic context in which metaphors are used and understood: discourse. In Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, I outline the perspective on discourse taken in TWT (see Gavins, 2007; Werth, 1999) and the approach to metaphor that has emerged out of it (particularly Werth, 1994). I suggest that TWT is an ideal framework for describing the conceptual contexts in which metaphors appear. Then, in Section 2.2.3 and 2.2.4, I outline alternative approaches to discourse and cognition and contrast these to those taken in TWT. I conclude the chapter by arguing for the importance of the TWT notion of ‘megametaphor’ (Werth, 1994) to contemporary metaphor studies.

2.1 Metaphor

Metaphors are dynamic. They are cognitive processes that involve mapping some familiar domain of knowledge onto another, unfamiliar domain. To create or understand a metaphor is therefore to do something; to perform a cognitive operation. Examining metaphor in this dynamic way is characteristic of the perspective adopted in Cognitive Linguistics. What some scholars have called the ‘cognitive turn’ in metaphor studies (for example, Steen, 2011b) began in the late 1970s with Ortony’s (1979) important collection of essays, Metaphor and Thought. The then novel, unifying theme of the collection was (as the title suggests) to emphasise the link between figurative language and the workings of the mind. The central tenant of the cognitive perspective it subsequently initiated is that
metaphor is not simply a linguistic ornament, but integral to the way we think; it is both a figure of speech and a figure of thought and constitutive of the way in which we understand abstract phenomena (for detailed accounts of this perspective, see Fauconnier and Turner, 2002; Gibbs, 1994; Grady, 1997, 2004; Lakoff, 1993; Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, 1999; Ortony, 1979). A year after the publication of *Metaphor and Thought*, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) published their seminal monograph, *Metaphors We Live By*. The work outlined the first and most influential framework for analysis within the cognitive paradigm in metaphor studies: Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT, see Lakoff, 1993; Lakoff and Johnson, 1980).

According to CMT, much of the metaphorical language we use to talk about the world reflects deeper conceptual correlations in our embodied experience (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 244-5, 1999). In common with other work in Cognitive Linguistics (for example, Fillmore, 1982; Lakoff, 1987; Langacker, 1987, 1991, 2008; Talmy, 2000a, 2000b), language is not seen as an autonomous formal system, modularly divorced from other cognitive capacities (for example, Chomsky, 1965), but rather a faculty which reflects and is determined by our interaction with our cognitive environment. Metaphor is the process by which cognisors recruit concretely experienced aspects of this cognitive environment (for example, SPACE, HEAT, ORIENTATION, PRESSURE) to conceptualise other more ineffable subjective experiences (for example, TIME, LOVE, HATE, ANXIETY, our sense of SELF) or more phenomenologically removed abstract concepts (for example, DEMOCRACY, FEMINISM, ECONOMY) (see Grady 1997, 2004; Lakoff and Johnson 1999). For example, if someone felt that they enjoyed a friendly or special relationship with another
person, they might describe that relationship as a ‘close’ one. If, over time, one of
the people in that relationship became less friendly, one might say that they
became ‘distant’. In CMT, these systematically linked linguistic metaphors of
closeness and distance are seen as evidence for an underlying conceptual model
which structures personal relationships in terms of spatial relationships. Lakoff and
Johnson (1980) provide a range of linguistic evidence for a variety of conceptual
metaphors that structure the way English speakers conceive of abstract or
intangible concepts (for example, MORE IS UP, LIFE IS A JOURNEY, IDEAS ARE OBJECTS,
UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING). This linguistic evidence is also corroborated by a growing
body of experimental work in Psycholinguistics and Cognitive Psychology that
suggests that metaphor is a ubiquitous aspect of human thought (for example, Boot
and Pecher 2010, 2011; Casasanto and Dijkstra 2010; Schubert 2005; Zanolie et al.
2012). This body of research includes the finding that there is no statistically
significant time difference between the way that people process equivalent
conventional metaphorical and literal statements (Gibbs 2002). This is an important
finding because, if figurative language requires decoding into a more primary literal
meaning, one would expect metaphors to take longer to process than their literal
counterparts. Gibbs (2002) argues that the fact that they do not suggests that the
language reflects pre-existing conceptual relationships between different aspects of
our embodied experience.

In CMT, the different aspects of our experience that are brought together by
metaphor, like RELATIONSHIPS and SPACE, are called domains. CMT re-designates what
have been called the ‘tenor’ and ‘vehicle’ in traditional studies of metaphor
(Richards, 1936) as the target and source domain. The source domain is the more concrete area of human experience that is mapped onto the less familiar target domain. By ‘concrete’, it is meant that source domains are areas of human experience that have a more embodied basis, aspects of our experience like, for examples, HEIGHT, TEMPERATURE, SPACE, PRESSURE, as opposed to more abstract conceptual domains. Stockwell (2002: 106) notes that the terminological difference represents CMT’s concern for the conceptual level of analysis. Indeed, domains are written in small capitals to signify the fact that they refer to conceptual structures. I give a more detailed explanation of what kinds of conceptual structures constitute domains in Section 2.1.2, below.

As Steen (2011b) argues, despite claims by Lakoff (1993) that CMT is ‘the contemporary theory of metaphor’ (my emphasis), there has been much debate within the field of Cognitive Linguistics about precisely how people bring these two conceptual domains into interaction with each other; that is, over what cognitive processes are actually performed by language users to create and understand metaphors. CMT defines metaphor as ‘a cross-domain mapping in the conceptual system’ (Lakoff, 1993: 203). This ‘structure mapping’ perspective (Gentner, 1983; Gentner and Markman, 1997; Lakoff, 1993) itself emerged out of the ‘salience imbalance’ theories advanced by Ortony (1979), Ortony et al (1985) and Tversky (1977). It is for this reason that I group these perspectives under the umbrella term ‘comparison’ theories of metaphor. I provide a critical evaluation of these two theories in Section 2.1.1, followed by a more detailed exposition of what domains are and how conceptual structures between domains are mapped in Section 2.1.2. I
then summarise the ‘comparison’ theory, which has become the standard view in CMT, in Section 2.1.3.

Since the early 1990s, Sam Glucksberg and colleagues have advocated a ‘class-inclusion’ theory of metaphor in opposition to the standard theory in CMT (Glucksberg and Keysar, 1990: Glucksberg et al, 1997; Glucksberg, 2003; Glucksberg and Haught, 2006). Whilst not as influential as CMT’s ‘structure mapping’ theory, the ‘class-inclusion’ approach has challenged many of CMT’s claims about metaphor. More recently, both theories have been reconciled in ‘the career of metaphor’ theory by Gentner and Bowdle (2001) and Bowdle and Gentner (2005). I outline both the ‘class-inclusion’ and the ‘career of metaphor’ theories in Section 2.1.4. Finally, to conclude Section 2.1, in Section 2.1.5 I summarise the arguments given across the section and argue that the existing literature on metaphor calls for a situated, contextualised view of metaphor that is sensitive to the broader discourse-level conceptual structures generated in the minds of discourse participants as they take part in discourse.

2.1.1 Salience imbalance versus structure mapping

Tversky (1977), an advocate of the salience imbalance position, suggests:

There is a close tie between the assessment of similarity and the interpretation of metaphors. In judgements of similarity one assumes a particular feature space, or a frame of reference, and assesses the quality of the match between the subject and the referent. In the interpretation of similes, one assumes a resemblance between the subject and the referent.
and searches for an interpretation of the space that would maximize the quality of the match. The same pair of objects, therefore, can be viewed as similar or different depending on the choice of a frame of reference (Tversky, 1977: 349).

This ‘close tie’ between the interpretation of similes – ‘X is like Y’ – and metaphors – ‘X is Y’ – is characteristic of the metaphor-as-comparison position. While Ortony (1979) does not hold, as Tversky (1977) appears to, that simile and metaphor undergo the same processes of understanding, he does argue for two types of simile – literal and metaphorical (or rather, these constitute two poles on a cline) – the latter of which underpin our basic understanding of metaphor. An important notion in Ortony’s (1979) literal/metaphorical cline is attribute ‘salience’. This notion is taken from Tversky’s (1977) earlier paper. ‘Saliency’ is determined by two factors: ‘intensity’ and ‘diagnosticity’. Intensity relates to attributes such as loudness or brightness, whereas ‘diagnosticity’ relates to how easily a particular attribute might be discriminated from others. For example, loud noises are intense, and have a high diagnosticity when they are preceded and followed by silence. However, a loud noise amongst other loud noises has a lower diagnosticity because in this noisier environment, it is harder to discriminate. Loud noises therefore have a higher salience when preceded and followed by silence than when they appear amongst other loud noises. On Ortony’s (1979) literal/metaphoric cline, literal similes are similes in which the ‘salience’ of target domain attributes – properties and relations the target domain possesses – is as high as the salience of the source attributes, for example, ‘billboards are like placards’. In this example, the source
and target domains both share salient features: they are both flat and advertise a product or point of view. Conversely, in metaphorical similes, the source domain possesses attributes that are more salient than those in the target. So, for example, someone who wanted to suggest that billboards were an eye-sore might say ‘billboards are like warts’ (this example is Ortony’s, 1979). Ugliness is a salient feature of warts, but not always a salient feature of billboards. This would therefore be a non-literal comparison, or simile (see Ortony et al, 1985, for experimental results that confirm this distinction). For Ortony (1979) and Ortony et al (1985) salience imbalance is the key determiner of metaphorical simile, and therefore metaphor.

Lakoff and Johnson (2003 [1980]) take issue with this view of metaphor as salience imbalance. In the afterword of the second edition of *Metaphors We Live By*, they reject the notion that metaphor is a question of similarity:

Metaphor is, in general, not based on similarity, as we argued throughout *Metaphors We Live By*. Instead, it is typically based on cross-domain correlations in our experience, which give rise to the perceived similarities between the two domains within the metaphor. For example, the persistent use of a metaphor may create perceived similarities, as when a love relationship, conceived of metaphorically as a partnership, goes awry when responsibilities and benefits are not shared equally (Lakoff and Johnson, 2003: 244-5).

This view of metaphor is correlative. It pertains to what Grady (1997, 2004) calls ‘primary metaphors’. These are metaphors that are grounded in experiential
correlations: correlations between concrete neurobiological processes and subjective experiences or ‘feelings’, for example, HEAT with AFFECTION, VERTICALITY with VALUE, SPACE with TIME etc (see Grady, 1997; 2004, and Lakoff and Johnson, 1999). For example, the primary metaphor, WARMTH IS AFFECTION, is grounded in the concrete experience of WARMTH when being hugged by our parents at a young age. The bodily experience of WARMTH and the subjective experience of AFFECTION are experientially, and therefore neurologically, linked in the ‘conflation phase’ of a child’s linguistic development (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999).

Whilst this theory may hold for some experientially primitive metaphors, it is not a sustainable position to hold for all metaphors. What stands out in this correlative theory of primary metaphor motivation is that it only explains the mapping of source domains on to target domains that are directly experienced by human beings. For example, AFFECTION, whilst being abstract in the sense that it cannot be explained in its own terms, is a felt experience; a phenomenological fact. Not all target domains are so directly experienced by cognisors. Although they are abstract concepts, one cannot subjectively experience DEMOCRACY, FASCISM and, all importantly in this thesis, ECONOMY, and yet this abstractness and phenomenological distance means that they are all potentially open to very rich metaphorisation. Lakoff and Johnson (2003 [1980]: 245) are far closer to the mark in the second half of the quotation, above, when they use the term ‘creation of perceived similarities’. As Chilton (1996) summarises:

[Metaphor] presupposes that the two domains are already structured similarly. Yet there are no arguments for this similarity, except the
metaphorical move... the analogy itself. Metaphor works by projecting one relatively well understood set of ideas onto a domain that is problematic, rather than by simply expressing a pre-existing and objective similarity’ (1996: 106).

Under this view, metaphor creates similarity. In the case of the class of metaphors that fall outside primary metaphors, mapping structure from one domain onto another is an agentive process. In this respect, Ortony’s (1979) theory of salience imbalance in metaphor is problematic because it falls short of recognising the ability of metaphor source domains to construct a target domain in a certain light. It is this ability that has prompted some to argue that metaphor is constitutive of ideologies (for example, Goatly, 2007). The shortcoming is reflected in Ortony’s (1979) examples, which often compare one concrete object to another, for example, ‘encyclopaedias are like goldmines’, ‘billboards are like warts’, ‘blood vessels are like aqueducts’. The inherent attributes of more nebulous, abstract target domains (like ECONOMY) are less obvious.

In contrast to Ortony’s (1979) view of metaphor as attribute salience imbalance, Lakoff (1993: 203) has argued that metaphor and simile are both ‘cross-domain mapping[s] in the conceptual system’. It is structures, not simply attributes, which are mapped from one domain onto another. Structure mapping is explained by way of reference to what Lakoff (1993) calls the ‘invariance principle’:

Metaphorical mappings preserve the cognitive topology (that is, the image-schema structure) of the source domain, in a way consistent with the inherent structure of the target domain. What the Invariance Principle does
is guarantee that, for container schemas, interiors will be mapped onto interiors, exteriors onto exteriors, and boundaries onto boundaries; for path-schemas, sources will be mapped onto sources, goals onto goals, trajectories onto trajectories; and so on. To understand the Invariance Principle properly, it is important not to think of mappings as algorithmic processes that start with source domain structure and wind up with target domain structure... One should instead think of the Invariance Principle in terms of constraints on fixed correspondences: If one looks at the existing correspondences, one will see that the Invariance Principle holds: source domain interiors correspond to target domain interiors; source domain exteriors correspond to target domain exteriors; etc (Lakoff, 1993: 215).

Thus, structural, schematic relations from the source domain are analogously mapped onto structural, schematic relations in the target domain. Mapping structures is not only a question of mapping shared attributes, but of shared structural relations.

Gentner and Markman (1997: 48) put these two types of metaphor – structure and attribute matching – on a cline of different types of metaphor. At the attribute-matching end of the cline are what Lakoff (1993) and Lakoff and Turner (1989) might call ‘image-metaphors’, whilst at the structure-matching end are metaphors that engender analogical similarities. Gentner and Markman (1997: 51) further suggest that structure mapping provides a means of creative reasoning: ‘when there is a match between a base and target domain, facts about the base domain that are connected to the matching information may be proposed as
candidate inferences’. Indeed, Gibbs (2006) provides empirical evidence for such extended metaphorical reasoning in the case of the conceptual metaphor ROMANTIC RELATIONSHIPS ARE JOURNEYS. Similarly, Thibodeau and Boroditsky (2011) demonstrate that when people use different metaphors for crime, the kinds of solutions they propose for reducing criminal activity change, thus providing further evidence of the extended nature of metaphorical reasoning. In this respect, structure mapping theories of metaphor can be seen as superior to salience imbalance theories insofar as they account for metaphorical reasoning and the conceptual construction of phenomenologically distant target domains.

My discussion of metaphor processing has so far revolved around ‘comparison’ theories of metaphor. This discussion has particularly focussed on structure mapping theory given its superiority over salience imbalance theory. The structure mapping position is favoured by CMT. Within it, simile and metaphor are commonly regarded as entailing similar, if not the same, processes of comparison. Metaphors may be motivated by universal correlations in human experience or they may be motivated by a desire to explain – by making concrete – abstract, inaccessible concepts or phenomena, like DEMOCRACY, FASCISM and ECONOMY. In both cases, the source domain topography structures the target domain topography, which is to say that structural, schematic relations from the source domain are analogously mapped onto structural, schematic relations in the target domain. Mapping structures is not only a question of mapping shared attributes, but of shared structural relations. The shared structural relationship projected onto
unfamiliar target domains allows for creative inferences to be made about the
target domain by importing structure from the source domain.

The process described thus far coheres with the dynamic view of metaphor
propounded above. Structure mapping is a process; ‘to map’ is a verb. This mapping
process may be used to explain an abstract but familiar domain of human
knowledge, or the process might be extended to make creative inferences about
unfamiliar, abstract concepts. In this respect, metaphor is a dynamic process in two
senses. On the one hand, metaphors can be extended and unfolded across a
communicative situation by language users; on the other hand, this process is
constructive. It constitutes domains of unfamiliar knowledge. In the following
section, I turn to a more detailed discussion of how metaphors can be extended,
how they cluster around a particular source domain and how the logic of these
source domains structures the target domain. More specifically, my focus in the
next section is on the ways in which structures are mapped.

2.1.2 Mapping structures: from simple image-schematic metaphor, to complex
metaphoric clustering

In Cognitive Linguistics, an array of terminology exists to taxonomise the ways in
which human beings structure domains of knowledge. At the most basic level of
human cognition, the most prevalent term is image-schemata (see Lakoff, 1987;
Langacker, 2006). These conceptual units are the lowest level in a hierarchy of
semantic categories (Langacker, 2006: 32), or concepts (Barsalou, 1993; Barsalou et
al, 1993). To understand a concept like ‘elbow’, for example, one also has to
understand the concept, ‘arm’, and then the even broader concept of ‘body’
(Langacker, 2006: 32). In this hierarchy, ‘body’ is the highest concept, whereas ‘elbow’ is the lowest, most basic. It is a ‘cognitively irreducible representational space or field of conceptual potential’ (Langacker, 2006: 32). Accordingly, image-schemas are simple conceptual structures, or gestalts, each possessing an inherent ‘basic logic’ (Lakoff, 1987: 272) defined by the interaction of their structural elements. So, for example, a PATH image-schema has a PATH, a TRAJECTOR, which is an object that moves along the PATH (like a ball, or a person), and a LANDMARK. The PATH dictates the movements of the TRAJECTOR and the LANDMARK situates these movements in relation to some stationary point (like, say, a human observer). This image-schema has its basis in the common experience of watching objects move across our field of vision. It is a simple conceptual unit abstracted from these day-to-day experiences. As such, it functions as an accessible source domain which is easily co-opted to structure a conceptual model of much more abstract, intangible areas of human knowledge or experience. For example, thinking about a phenomenon like TIME requires that we reify it as a concrete, physical object. Time is often structured by PATH image schemas. Events can move along the PATH towards people – as in the holidays have come – or people can move towards an event – as in we’re coming up to the holidays (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 41; see also Evans, 2004). Different grammatical representations often involve a different mapping of image-schema elements onto the target domain. In the first example, TIME is mapped onto the PATH, PEOPLE are mapped onto the LANDMARK and the TRAJECTOR is the HOLIDAYS. Conversely, in the second example, TIME is a PATH, PEOPLE are TRAJECTORS and the LANDMARKS are HOLIDAYS. There are two variable conceptual metaphors structured around the central metaphor, TIME IS A PATH. Importantly,
these alternative mappings further serve to illustrate that metaphor is something we do. Metaphor is not just a mechanistic application of one area of knowledge onto another, but a creative process which engenders both conscious and unconscious choices over not only which source domains are mapped onto which target domains, but also which components of the source domain are mapped onto different nodes in the target domain. Even simple metaphors structured around image-schemata, like TIME IS A PATH, engender multiple possible mappings.

Such a schematic metaphor might also be elaborated, taking on richer forms, like TIME IS A RIVER, or even LIFE IS A JOURNEY. These are far more complex arrays of knowledge. In Cognitive Linguistics, they are called ‘scripts’, ‘frames’, or ‘Idealised Cognitive Models’ (ICMs) (respectively, Fillmore, 2006; Minsky, 1975; Schank and Abelson, 1977; Lakoff, 1987). ICMs and frames can model single complex objects and ideas (Lakoff (1987: 70-1) gives the example of an ICM and a frame for BACHELOR), or – like scripts – they can refer to ‘a data-structure for representing a stereotyped situation, like being in a certain kind of living room, or going to a child's birthday party’ (Minsky, 1975: 221). These ‘data-structures’ include knowledge about setting, time place, activities and expected behaviours.

For example, Schank and Abelson (1977) famously outline a restaurant script, which has an expected order of activities – such as being seated, ordering, eating, paying the bill etc. – and expected patterns of behaviour. As more culturally embedded, complex domains of experience, scripts are less fundamental than image-schemata. These knowledge types are experiential but importantly they vary across cultures.
Experiences of going to a restaurant may change depending on the cultural context of the cognisor.

More complex source domains give rise to more complex mappings. For example, Lakoff (1993) describes the conceptual metaphor LOVE IS A JOURNEY. In this metaphor, LOVE is a subjectively felt, abstract feeling; an ideal target domain. In contrast, our knowledge of JOURNEYS is complex but relatively concrete, entailing vehicles, locations, destinations, travellers and many other areas of experiential knowledge. Lakoff (1993) writes the following:

Imagine a love relationship described as follows: *Our relationship has hit a dead-end street*. Here love is being conceptualized as a journey, with the implication that the relationship is stalled, that the lovers cannot keep going the way they've been going, that they must turn back, or abandon the relationship altogether.

The LOVE IS A JOURNEY metaphor indicates a set of correspondences such as these:

- The lovers correspond to travellers.
- The relationship corresponds to the vehicle.
- The lovers' common goals correspond to their common destinations on the journey.
- Difficulties in the relationship correspond to impediments to travel.

The complexity of the source domain creates a set of conceptual metaphors that all cluster around the central metaphor, LOVE IS A JOURNEY. The single source domain of
JOurneYS allows for the inferential creation of a matrix of metaphors relating to other aspects of a relationship.

2.1.3 Summary of Conceptual Metaphor Theory

I have argued, in agreement with those who advocate structure mapping theories, that metaphor is a dynamic, creative process which structures our understanding of unfamiliar domains of knowledge. I have also described the ways in which simple conceptual structures, such as image-schemata, and more complex conceptual structures, such as frames, generate metaphors of varying degrees of complexity. The approach to metaphor outlined above is the standard view held in Conceptual Metaphor Theory. It is a view that allows for and explains, to a degree, the creative extension of metaphors across a discourse. In Section 2.2, I will come to elaborate more fully what is meant by ‘discourse’. In the next Section, 2.1.4, I outline one of the main criticisms of structure mapping (and by extension, CMT) from Psycholinguistics. This view, known as the ‘class-inclusion’ theory of metaphor, challenges the assumption that metaphor is a process by which shared attributes or structures are mapped between source and target domains. In doing so, it undermines the view that metaphor is quite as dynamic a process as I have argued it to be. It is for this reason that it is important that the class-inclusion theory be addressed.

2.1.4 Categories, Structures and Careers

The class-inclusion theory of metaphor, represented by Glucksberg and Keysar (1990), Glucksberg et al (1997), Glucksberg (2003) and Glucksberg and Haught
(2006), opposes CMT’s fundamental definition of metaphor; that metaphor is ‘a cross-domain mapping in the conceptual system’ (Lakoff, 1993: 203). Glucksberg and his colleagues argue that metaphors are not instances of ‘implicit simile’ (Glucksberg and Keysar, 1990), but assertions of inclusion in a category. To explain this position it is helpful to outline work in Cognitive Psychology on categories and category formation. After describing this research, called ‘prototype theory’ (see Rosch et al, 1975; Rosch, 1978; Rosch and Mervis, 1981), I then provide an outline and discussion of the class-inclusion theory of metaphor.

Rosch (1978: 189) argues ‘that human cognition should not be considered the arbitrary product of historical accident or of whim but rather the result of psychological principles of categorisation’. Categories of human thinking are determined by human psychology or, more specifically, have a basis in our embodied experience of our surroundings. Prototype theory posits three categorical layers: super-ordinate categories, basic-level categories and subordinate categories (Rosch, 1978). Each layer represents a level of abstractness, such that subordinate level categories are the most concrete and detailed categories, while super-ordinate are the most abstract (Rosch et al, 1975). For example, in the taxonomy, ‘bar stool’, ‘chair’ and ‘furniture’, ‘bar stool’ is the subordinate category, ‘chair’ the basic level category and ‘furniture’ the super-ordinate category. Of these, prototype theory sees the basic-level category, chair, as ‘more fundamental’ (Rosch and Mervis, 1981) than the others: ‘basic objects are the most inclusive categories for which highly similar sequences of motor movements are made to objects of the class’ (Rosch et al, 1975: 393). That is, ‘chairs’ all share the same
concen\textit{trated cluster of attributes; their relative size, shape and way in which human bodies interact with them} \cite{Rosch1978} (namely, we sit on them). This is in distinction to ‘furniture’ (chairs have less attributes in common with tables, say, than they do each other) and ‘bar stools’ (bar stools are not a sufficiently abstract enough category to include other types of chair).

Whereas the ‘classical theory’ \cite{Lakoff1987} of categorisation, which \cite{UngererSchmid1996} argue goes back to Aristotle, sees category membership as being a matter of necessary and sufficient conditions – \( x \) is a member of superordinate category \( y \) if it satisfies attributes \( a, b \) and \( c \) – categories in prototype theory are far more nebulous and ‘fuzzy’ \cite{RoschMervis1981,UngererSchmid1996}. Rather than the binary system of being either a member of a category or not, categories are more accurately described as sets of ‘family resemblances’ \cite{Wittgenstein1958}. However, there are ‘good’ and ‘bad’ examples of a category or, rather, more prototypical or less prototypical examples \cite{Roschetal1975,Rosch1978,RoschMervis1981}. Prototypical categories tend to share the most attributes with other examples of the same category \cite{RoschMervis1981}; prototypes ‘are abstract concepts constructed from typical attributes of the main concrete exemplars for that concept’ \cite[28]{Gibbs2003}. More ‘chairy’ chairs will have the most attributes in common with other chairs (my idea of a prototypical chair, for example, would be a wooden chair with a back and four legs). In this respect, they are most statistically differentiated from prototypes of other categories \cite{RoschMervis1981}. The most ‘chairy’ chair will be
differentiated from the most ‘tably’ table because it shares more attributes with chairs, than with tables.

Prototype theory has since been given a more context dependant orientation (Rosch and Mervis, 1981). That is, the prototypicality of a category member will vary across cultures. For example, a prototypical bird in China may differ from a prototypical bird in Britain. Moreover, category prototypes are adaptive to contexts and goal directed actions, for example, ‘things to pack in a suitcase’ (Barsalou, 1991, 2003; Gibbs, 2003). Barsalou (1993) sees the notion of ‘concept’ as ‘a cognitive representation of a category on a particular occasion’ (for a full discussion of concepts, see Chapter 4, Sections 4.1.1 to 4.1.2). Concepts, as a ‘representation of a category’, are prototypical. They are the most typical example of a category within a given context. Adapting this notion of a prototype – a concept fitted to a context – involves a different set of processing assumptions to that of Rosch (1978). Rather than seeing prototypes as statistically significant clusters of attributes in semantic memory, Barsalou (1993) argues that contexts serve to delimit our encyclopaedic knowledge of the attributes of, say, ‘chairs’, so that we produce a cognitive representation of a chair that is fitted to the context of the particular text we are interpreting. This seems like a more realistic way of defining prototypicality because it accounts for the way in which our view of linguistically vague basic levels categories, like ‘bird’ (this is vague insofar as the type of bird is not specified) might change depending on the co-text; consider ‘the bird in my garden’ compared to the ‘the bird in the zoo’.
Whereas the structure mapping theory of metaphor argued for the analogical mapping of source to target domain topography, the class-inclusion theory sees metaphor as a process of re-categorisation. Glucksberg and Keysar (1990) give the example of ‘jail’, suggesting that the metaphorical statement ‘my job is a jail’ creates the new, ad hoc super-ordinate category of jail* (the fact that it is a super-ordinate category is signalled by the use of an *); a category in which both ‘jail’ and ‘job’ are a part (see Figure 2.1). In this respect, the class-inclusion theory draws on Barsalou’s (1991, 1993) notion of prototype categories being established in an ad hoc fashion as fitted to a particular super-ordinate context.

Literal or metaphorical class inclusion is designated by the proto-typicality of the target in its relation to the super-ordinate category. The most prototypical member of the ad hoc category is used as the name of the category itself. Glucksberg and Keysar (1990) provide an example of this from real discourse:

John Demjanjuk... was accused of being ‘Ivan the Terrible,’ a sadistic guard at the Treblinka death camp in Poland. ‘The name Demjanjuk has become a noun in Israel, a word to identify an ordinary person capable of committing unspeakable acts’ (Shinoff, 1987, italics added). This category of people was
presumably created in the context of many such tribunals, and has now been given a name. That the category name and the person's name are quite distinct is revealed in the following interchange between an American newspaper reporter and an Israeli spectator attending the trial:

Israeli: ‘If he is a Demjanjuk, then he should be condemned to death:’

Reporter: ‘But he is Demjanjuk, his name is John Demjanjuk.’

Israeli: ‘I know his name is Demjanjuk, but I don't know if he is a Demjanjuk’ (Shinoff, 1987, quoted in Glucksberg and Keysar, 1990: 8, emphasis in original).

The general category, Demjanjuk*, has been abstracted from the particular, literal John Demjanjuk to encompass all people who commit monstrous acts (an * is used to demonstrate that this is the general category). Glucksberg and Keysar (1990) imply that conventionalising the source domain as a general category takes place over some time. They write ‘this category of people was presumably created in the context of many such tribunals’ (Glucksberg and Keysar, 1990: 8). However, they also argue that the basis for all metaphor (conventional and novel) is one of category inclusion.

It is important to note here that category-inclusion models of metaphor are problematic from the perspective of examining metaphor as a discourse phenomenon. As Gentner and Bowdle (2001: 242) point out, this view of metaphor is inherently ‘localist’ because ‘there is no global mapping across the entire base [source] domain – only a series of separate category statements’. From the
perspective of this thesis, if all metaphor is a question of ad hoc category creation, it is hard to see the ways in which this model might deal with metaphorical inferences in the case of extended metaphor. Similarly, the model does not explain the systematic nature of conventional metaphors. In this respect, structure-mapping models outperform their category-inclusion rivals. However, in challenging the assumption that when source domain lexis ‘are used in their metaphorical sense they always reflect the presence and use of metaphorical conceptual systems in on-going metaphorical cognition’ (Steen, 2011b), Glucksberg and his colleagues raise a legitimate point. It is certainly just as ‘localist’ a claim to suggest that every time we see the same metaphor we construct the same mapping between source and target domains; that after repeated exposure to a conventional metaphor there is no cognitive ‘short-cut’ to our understanding. The very fact that metaphor can be viewed as a dynamic mapping process – as a mental activity – suggests that when people repeat the same mapping – the same mental activity – they are likely to get better at doing it.

In their ‘career of metaphor’ theory, Gentner and Bowdle (2001) and Bowdle and Gentner (2005) combine structure-mapping and category-inclusion models of metaphor to overcome some of the problems described above. Their main claim is that over time, as metaphors become more conventionalised, the type of conceptual mapping entailed by a metaphor shifts from structure-mapping to class-inclusion. That is, metaphors start as implicit simile comparisons and then become class-inclusion statements. At the start of a metaphor’s career, when it is novel, relational structure in the source domain is mapped onto the target domain
in the same manner as Gentner (1983), Gentner and Markman (1997) and Lakoff (1993) propound. Provided these relations are systematic, they may be ‘abstracted’ to form the categories for which Glucksberg and Keysar (1990) argue. However, far from being ad hoc, to become conventional these categories must also become relatively stable. Bowdle and Gentner (2005: 198) suggest that metaphors like ‘the sun is a tangerine’ are less likely to become conventionalised metaphors because the two attributes that make the comparison – roundness and colour – are not systematically related to one another. ‘Things that are orange and round’ is therefore less likely to become a stable conventional abstract metaphorical category. One further constraint on the shift from novel, structure-mapping to conventional, class-inclusion is the degree to which the abstract category is already lexicalised. Bowdle and Gentner (2005: 198) give the example ‘this encyclopaedia is a silver mine’ where the abstract category ‘source of something valuable’ is already lexicalised as ‘gold mine’.

Bowdle and Gentner (2005) stress that the shift from one type of processing to the other is not a discrete movement, but that there is an overlap in a metaphor’s career in which it may be understood in both ways. Even more interesting from the perspective of a discourse theory of metaphor is the idea that our way of processing novel metaphors may shift, in a limited sense, from one to the other over the course of a single text. Over two test phases, Bowdle and Gentner (2005) found that if a source domain has been primed as a simile, it will later often be more easily understood as a metaphor. In the first phase, subjects were presented with two novel metaphoric similes with the same source domain
(for example, ‘an acrobat is like a butterfly’, ‘a dancer is like a butterfly’). They were then asked to give a third, appropriate target domain to the source domain (‘a ___________ is like a butterfly’). In the second test phase, subjects were given novel and conventional source/target comparisons in both simile (X is like a Y) and metaphor form (X is a Y). They were then asked to rate their strength of preference for one form against the other. Some of the novel source/target mappings were the same novel metaphoric pairings as appeared in the first phase of the experiment. Bowdle and Gentner’s (2005) results suggest that there was a greater preference for the metaphor form (for example, ‘a dancer is a butterfly’) in source/target pairings that had been primed as similes in the first phase of the experiment. This suggests that where subjects are forced to make repeated novel mappings between domains, they do in fact create abstract stable and – for the duration of the test, at least – conventional metaphor categories.

2.1.5 Conclusions: putting metaphor in context

Bowdle and Gentner’s (2005) findings demonstrate that the way in which cognisors process a single metaphor across a given discourse is liable to change. The process is situated within a broader discursive context. In criticising class inclusion for its localism, Gentner and Bowdle (2001) imply its opposite; a global approach to the study of metaphor which takes this discursive context into account. Such a global approach would not only look at individual metaphors in sentential isolation, but examine the ways in which metaphors interrelate across stretches of human communication – across stretches of discourse – to form bigger, sustained conceptual structures. CMT describes the clustering of metaphors about a single
conceptual key, going some distance in explaining the ways in which these bigger conceptual structures are formed. However, discourses often use multiple metaphors from disparate conceptual keys. If metaphor is a matter of human thought and an integral part of the conceptual structures discourse participants create as the discourse proceeds, it is necessary to understand the ways in which they integrate these disparate conceptual keys into one coherent conceptual structure. Such a process of integration may even lead to the demotion of conventional or dead metaphors from the lofty heights of class-inclusion, to start again at the level of their junior, structure-mapping counterparts, causing them to be re-mapped or elaborated in novel ways.

Viewing metaphor as a dynamic process – as a cognitive activity – demands that it be considered in its relation to other conceptual structures created by discourse participants as the discourse runs its course. To do this requires a model of discourse that is capable of not only explaining metaphor, but of describing the ways in which discourses prompt the creation and management of a more general conceptual architecture in the minds of discourse participants. In this section, I have examined metaphor as an activity; in the next section, then, I pay closer attention to the discourse situation in which this activity takes place.

2.2 Discourse

I concluded Section 2.1 by emphasising the importance of situating metaphor within a context. A fully contextualised account of metaphor involves understanding how the conceptual structures engendered by different metaphors in the same discourse interact with one another. It also involves understanding how
those combinations of metaphors relate to the larger cognitive environments
generated by discourse participants in response to the discourse. Such a situated
view of metaphor therefore requires a cognitive account of discourse; a way of
describing not only the clause- and sentence-level conceptual arrays created by
discourse participants, but the ways in which texts prompt discourse participants to
build complex mental representations that span whole discourses.

In Section 2.2.1, I argue that TWT (see Gavins, 2007; Werth, 1999) is the
best starting point for modelling such a conceptual environment and in Section
2.2.2 I outline the ways in TWT has approached metaphor to date. In this outline, I
pay particular attention to Werth’s (1994) notion of megametaphor and make a
crucial distinction between this notion and conceptual metaphor. Megametaphor
and its relationship to the text-worlds generated by discourse participants are the
subjects of Chapters 3 and 4.

Fairclough (2001: 23) has suggested that the term ‘discourse’ has what he
calls a ‘felicitous ambiguity’. He writes that discourse can be viewed as ‘either what
people are doing on a particular occasion, or what people habitually do given a
certain sort of occasion’ (Fairclough, 2001: 23). The TWT conception of discourse
that I adopt in this thesis broadly takes the first perspective; ‘what people are doing
on a particular occasion’. However, it is clear that not all work in metaphor studies
takes this perspective. In Section 2.2.3, I describe an alternative view of discourse
which coheres more with Fairclough’s (2001: 23) second definition; ‘what people
habitually do given a certain sort of occasion’. I track this view of discourse back to
the work of Michel Foucault (1971) and trace a line from this conception of
discourse, which has become particularly widespread in CDA (for representative outlines and examples of CDA, see Fairclough, 2001; Van Dijk, 1993a, 1993b; Wodak and Meyer, 2009), to socio-cognitive approaches to discourse and cognition (for example, Koller, 2004, 2005; Van Dijk, 1993c, 2009; Van Leeuwen, 2008). In Section 2.2.4, I argue that this focus on the socio-cognitive aspects of discourse has affected the types of methodologies that metaphor analysts researching within the CMT and CDA paradigm have used. Corpus studies have proliferated (for examples, see Burns 2011; Charteris-Black, 2004, 2006; Chiang and Duan, 2007; Cienki, 2005; Drury and Rae, 1993; Fukuda, 2009; Henderson, 2000; Holmgreen, 2008; Koller, 2003, 2004, 2005; Koller and Davidson, 2008; Lu and Ahrens, 2008; and White, 2003) whereas, with some exceptions (for example, Chilton, 2004: 145-9; Crisp, 2008, 2012; Steen, 1999b; Werth, 1994), fine-grained analyses of the conceptual structures engendered by multiple metaphors used across a single discourse have been neglected. To end the chapter, I suggest that an analysis of megametaphor acts as a valuable alternative to this trend.

2.2.2 Discourse and Cognition: Text World Theory

In Section 2.1.5 I argued for an approach that attends to the conceptual contexts in which metaphor appears. As a ‘cognitive discourse grammar’ (Werth, 1994: 90), TWT is ideally placed to describe such a cognitive environment. This framework focuses on explaining the generation of complex, rich, discourse-level mental representations, or ‘text-worlds’. TWT has been used most extensively in cognitive poetics (for example, Gavins, 2000, 2003, 2005, 2007a, 2007b, 2012; Gavins and Stockwell, 2012; Giovanelli, 2013; Hidalgo-Downing, 2000, 2002, 2003; Lahey, 2006;
Lahey and Cruickshank, 2010; Werth, 1994, 1995, 1999; Whiteley, 2011a), but also non-literary cognitive stylistics (for example, Gavins, 2007; Hidalgo-Downing and Kraljevic Mujic, 2011), and CDA (for example, Hart, 2008; Chilton, 2004).

TWT posits two ontological layers; the ‘discourse world’ and the ‘text-world’. The discourse world is the fundamental world in which the discourse takes place:

The discourse world contains not only those sentient beings participating in the discourse and the objects and entities which surround them, but all the personal and cultural knowledge they bring with them to the language situation (Gavins, 2007: 9-10).

The discourse world, then, is the physical space in which communication takes place, along with all the ‘personal and cultural knowledge’ the discourse participants have available to them. As this communication proceeds, participants create mental representations of the discourse in their minds. These mental representations are ‘text-worlds’. Text-worlds are ‘rich’ mental representations, meaning that they ‘consist of fully defined characters… and objects’ (Werth, 1999: 81). As well as objects and characters, or ‘enactors’ as Gavins (2007) calls them, other important text-world building blocks are the location and time in which the action of the text-world takes place. These four richly defined, ‘fleshed out’ factors – time, location, enactors and objects – constitute the ‘world-building elements’ of the text-world. They create a deictic space in which the action of the text-world unfolds. In contrast to world-building elements, ‘function advancing propositions’, as their name suggests, advance the function of the text. They are the elements of
the text that advance the communicative purpose of the writer/speaker as it is perceived by the other discourse participants (Gavins, 2007: 59-64).

Although a very simple sentence or utterance may lead to the creation of only one text-world, most texts involve the creation of multiple worlds. For this reason, TWT posits the idea of ‘world-switches’. World switching occurs whenever there is a change in deictic centre. This might be a change in location, a change in time or even a change in narrative perspective. In addition to world switches caused by a change in time, place or perspective, Gavins (2005, 2007) suggests that world switching, and the creation of new text-worlds this necessarily entails, can occur as a result of a change in modality. Following Simpson (1993), she argues for three different types of modality: epistemic (modals relating to knowledge, for example, ‘she thinks’), deontic (modals relating to obligation, for example, ‘she should’) and boulomaic (modals relating to wishes and desires, for example, ‘she wanted’). Use of these modals creates further text-worlds in which enactors’ knowledge, wishes, desires and obligations are hypothetically enacted. Similarly, Hidalgo-Dowling (2000, 2002, 2003) suggests that text-worlds are created when a certain state of affairs is negated. For example, if I write ‘there is not a pink elephant in the middle of the room’ to comprehend the sentence, readers must create a conceptual space – a text-world – in which there is a pink elephant in the middle of the room (see also Lakoff, 2004).

It should be stressed that world-switches and the creation of new text-worlds are ‘text-driven’ (Gavins, 2007: 29, Werth, 1999):
From the vast store of knowledge and experience available to the participants, it is the \textit{text} produced in the discourse world that determines which areas are needed in order to process and understand the discourse at hand (Gavins, 2007: 29).

This principle of ‘text-drivenness’, then, is that it is the text which prompts the discourse participants to access different areas of their knowledge and thereby build different text-worlds.

TWT offers a framework for describing the text-driven creation and management of conceptual space across discourse. In this framework, discourse is viewed as a process of interaction between text and discourse participant knowledge. This interaction takes places in the discourse-world; the world in which the discourse participants communicate. The text cues discourse participants to access their knowledge of the discourse-world to create mental representations – text-worlds – of the state of affairs depicted in the text. In the course of a single discourse, discourse participants often manage multiple text-worlds which are the product of text-driven world-switches.

As I argued in section 2.1.5, understanding the conceptual processes involved in metaphor requires that analysts connect their accounts to the broader conceptual contexts created by discourse participants. TWT provides the best framework to describe the discourse-level conceptual structures created in the minds of readers as they read. It is therefore able to provide an invaluable account of the cognitive environments in which metaphor operates. In this thesis I offer an account of how metaphor relates to this broader conceptual context. An approach
such as this requires that metaphors be properly situated within the text-worlds in
which they appear; an examination of the role that metaphor plays in constructing
those text-worlds; and an account of how the metaphors used in those worlds
relate to one another. To an extent, TWT has already approached these issues. In
the next section (2.2.3), I give an account of these approaches.

2.2.3 Text World Theory and Metaphor

To date, two TWT models of metaphor have been offered. The first and earliest is
the approach defined in a single paper by Werth (1994), which was later expanded
upon in Werth (1999). The second model proposed by Gavins (2007), builds on
Werth’s (1994, 1999) account, bringing elements of Werth’s (1994, 1999) original
framework into dialogue with another Cognitive Linguistic framework, Conceptual
Integration Theory (henceforth, CIT; see Fauconnier and Turner, 2002). I give a
critical account of CIT in Chapter 3, and outline the differences between Werth’s
(1994, 1999) and Gavins’ (2007) approaches to metaphor in Chapter 5. In this

As I argued in Section 2.1 of this chapter, a central concern of CMT has been
to find linguistic evidence for metaphor in the conceptual system. This has often led
researchers to focus on clusters of metaphors that instantiate the same underlying
conceptual metaphor. Werth’s (1994, 1999) framework is a response to this focus
on metaphor clustering. He writes:

It is not enough to say... [that] metaphors simply cluster - they do cluster,
and this gives us valuable insights into our frames of reference and our
The efficient use of linguistic resources. However, the fact that metaphors can also be sustained, as a kind of ‘undercurrent’, over an extended text allows extremely subtle conceptual effects to be achieved (Werth, 1994: 89, emphasis in original).

Note the idea of the ‘sustained undercurrent’ in this extract. Here, the emphasis is not on the ways in which clause-level metaphors provide evidence for metaphor in cognition in general, but on how these metaphors contribute towards the ‘subtle conceptual effects’ that are produced on a specific occasion, over a single text.

According to Werth (1994), metaphor is a discourse – as well as a cognitive – phenomenon and its ‘conceptual effects’ have to be judged accordingly; not only on the sentence-level, but by the way in which they contribute to the global meaning of a text, or the metaphorical ‘gist’ (Werth, 1994: 101). Werth (1994) is therefore most interested in how multiple micro-metaphors are combined throughout a single discourse to create a mega-metaphorical meaning; with connecting individual instances of metaphor to more global conceptual structures created by discourse participants as they take part in a discourse.

The delineation in Werth’s (1994) work between conceptual metaphor and megametaphor is refreshingly novel. However, at times he himself seems to blur the distinction between the two. In Werth’s (1994) footnote fifteen, he writes:

[Selection from a list of sub-metaphors or micro-metaphors] is... similar to the central principle of Universal Grammar, that specific language grammars make a selection out of the whole list of possibilities which Universal Grammar tells us are legitimate (Werth, 1994: 103).
In this formulation, megametaphors set the parameters for the use of individual micro-metaphors, just as Universal Grammar sets the parameters for specific language grammars. The emphasis is on getting from a general megametaphor to its specific manifestation as a micro-metaphor. Problematically, in framing the relationship in this way, Werth (1994) makes megametaphor indistinguishable from Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) ‘conceptual metaphor’. This confusion is further compounded, although less explicitly, in the main text of Werth’s (1994) article. He writes that ‘we need a clear procedure of reasoning in order to get from these ‘megametaphors’ to the metaphors actually occurring in the text’ (1994: 100). He further suggests ‘that... ‘megametaphors’... may in fact lead to a whole series of specific metaphors, of which the actually occurring set is but a selection’ (Werth, 1994: 99). Again, the focus in all these examples is on moving from the megametaphor (which is here indistinguishable from conceptual metaphor), to its instantiation in a text.

Nevertheless, what makes megametaphor valuable as a concept is its focus on the specific ways in which individual texts prompt the creation of novel discourse level mega-metaphorical structures with their own ‘subtle conceptual effects’. This understanding of megametaphor is also more consistent with TWT’s text-driven approach to discourse. Recall that the TWT view is that discourse is an interaction between the discourse participants’ knowledge and the text. The discourse participants’ mental representations of the text are driven by this dynamic interaction. Applying this principle consistently to an analysis of metaphor in discourse means that it is the text that is the control-valve determining which
megametaphors are relevant to its interpretation. In any discourse it is therefore instances of micro-metaphor that drive the construction, by the reader, of megametaphorical ‘gist’. In this respect, individual cases of metaphor accumulate to create the ‘subtle conceptual effects’ Werth (1994: 89) is attempting to describe.

In order to arrive at a megametaphor, readers will have had to construct it by integrating the micro-metaphors they encounter throughout the text into an overarching conceptual model; a megametaphorical structure. This is the opposite of the top down process described by Werth (1994: 99, 100). As a reader, one cannot have a complete conceptual model of the text before acquiring the conceptual material to construct such a model. A reader cannot understand the metaphorical ‘gist’ of a text without first reading it.

For a writer, on the other hand, the process may well be the opposite way around. As in Werth (1994: footnote 15), it may be the case that writers select from a subset of conceptual metaphors that are all related to a single conceptual metaphor. However, processes of writing and reading should not be conflated. In the case of the former, a conceptual metaphor used by the writer is manifested in the text as a series of micro-metaphors. In the case of reading, these micro-metaphors are then used to construct a global, megametaphor in the reader’s mind. It is for this reason that in this thesis I will make a terminological distinction between conceptual metaphors and megametaphors. I define a conceptual metaphor in the conventional sense as ‘a cross-domain mapping in the conceptual system’ (Lakoff, 1993: 203). In contrast, I view a megametaphor as a readerly phenomenon. It is a global conceptual structure stretching across the discourse,
created by the gradual accumulation and combination of micro-metaphors by the reader, as they read. Micro-metaphors are the individual ‘cross-domain mappings in the conceptual system’ that are prompted by the text. The principal difference between megametaphors and conceptual metaphors is that the latter describe a general cognitive operation – the mapping of one domain onto another – whereas the former situates this mapping within the context of an actually occurring discourse.

As Werth (1994: 97) admits, his explanation of how micro-metaphors constitute and contribute towards megametaphorical structures is underdeveloped. In Chapters 3 and 4, I examine, by example, the creation of megametaphors in discourse. Using insights from Conceptual Integration Theory (see Fauconnier and Turner, 2002), I look at the ways in which localised instances of micro-metaphor contribute to the creation of these global discourse-level structures. Finally, after establishing what megametaphor is and how it interacts with the text-world topography of the discourse, I give a detailed treatment of a further important concept in TWT approaches to metaphor, text-world ‘layering’ (see Gavins, 2007; Werth, 1994, 1999), in Chapter 5.

Studying megametaphor requires that analysts examine the ways in which multiple metaphors within a single discourse are combined in the text-world representations of discourse participants to create discourse-level conceptual effects. As an object of study, megametaphor entails a certain view of discourse. According to this view, discourse is seen as a single communicative event between one or more discourse participants. As I have already mentioned, Fairclough (2001:
very schematically summarises such a view as ‘what people are doing on a particular occasion’ (Fairclough, 2001: 23). However, he also proposes another common use of the word discourse, namely ‘what people habitually do given a certain sort of occasion’ (Fairclough, 2001: 23). In the next sections (2.2.3 and 2.2.4), I give a more detailed outline of this perspective and explore the ways in which adopting it has shifted the kinds of phenomena that metaphor analysts examine. I then compare this approach to the view of discourse presupposed by an analysis of megametaphor.

2.2.3 Discourse and Social Cognition: from Michel Foucault to Critical Discourse Analysis

One of the originators of the view that discourse is also ‘what people habitually do given a certain sort of occasion’ (Fairclough, 2001: 23)’ is Michel Foucault (1972). Indeed, that Wodak and Meyer (2009: 16) describe him as the theoretical ‘godfather’ of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and several seminal figures explicitly trace a line from Foucault to their own research (for example, Fairclough, 1985, 1989; Van Dijk, 1993b; Van Leeuwen, 2008, 2009) is indicative of his influence on CDA. The notion of discourse is central to Foucault’s work, particularly in The Archaeology of Knowledge (Foucault, 1972; see also Foucault, 1966, 1971). In his later research (for example, Foucault, 1975, 1976) it is a hugely important category in his description of the mechanics of power in Western societies. In this section, I outline Foucault’s (1971) conception of discourse and connect this conception to the socio-cognitive theories of discourse used in CDA (for example, Koller, 2004, 2005; Van Dijk, 1993b, 2009; Van Leeuwen, 2008). Then, in Section 2.2.4, I outline
the theoretical and methodological consequences of such a socio-cognitive view of discourse for metaphor studies.

Foucault’s (1972) conception of discourse is complex. He begins by highlighting the problem of identifying what a discourse is, insisting that to do so, analysts must look beyond a linguistic description of the language to the principles that govern why a particular statement was made and not another:

Before approaching, with any degree of certainty, a science, or novels, or political speeches, or the oeuvre of an author, or even a single book, the material with which one is dealing is, in its raw, neutral state, a population of events in the space of discourse in general. One is led therefore to the project of a pure description of discursive events as the horizon for the search for the unities that form within it. This description is easily distinguishable from an analysis of the language... The question posed by language analysis of some discursive fact or other is always: according to what rules has a particular statement been made, and consequently according to what rules could other similar statements be made? The description of the events of discourse poses a quite different question: how is it that one particular statement appeared rather than another (Foucault, 1972: 28)?

Foucault’s (1972) differentiation between a purely linguistic study of discourse and a description of what he calls ‘the events of discourse’ is similar (though not identical) to the division between what Schiffrin (1994) has termed ‘formalist’ and ‘functionalist’ approaches. Within this schema, formalists have emphasised a
description of, as Foucault puts it (1972: 28), the ‘finite body of rules that
authorizes an infinite number of performances’ (see, for example, Harris, 1952).

Conversely, functionalists place at the heart of their analysis a concern for not only
the linguistic forms that are used by discourse participants, but also the reasons for
or the social function of that particular use of language. Schiffrin (1994: 32) writes:
‘discourse is viewed as a system (a socially and culturally organised way of
speaking) through which particular functions are realised’. Brown and Yule (1983:
1) put it even more succinctly: ‘the discourse analyst is committed to an
investigation of what that language is used for’.

Whilst Foucault (1972) and the functionalists both reject a purely formal
linguistic description of discourse, and whilst both share a concern for the reasons
behind a certain statement appearing in place of another, Foucault (1972) differs in
important ways from the approach exemplified by Schiffrin (1994) and Brown and
Yule (1983). A description of ‘what the language is used for’ necessarily requires a
recovery of a discourse participant’s intentions in a given moment. In fact, Foucault
(1972: 28) energetically argues against any attempt to ‘rediscover the silent
murmuring’ (thought) that – according to the historians of thought – ‘animates’ the
statement. Instead, he wishes ‘to grasp the statement in the exact specificity of its
occurrence; determine its conditions of existence, fix at least its limits, establish its
correlations with other statements that may be connected with it, and show what
other forms of statement it excludes’ (Foucault, 1972: 29). The focus is not on
recovering what it was a person ‘was really thinking’ when they produced a given
statement, but on connecting the production of this statement with the whole field
of discourse in general. Indeed, the differences between these two emphases at least in part explains the seminal debates between Fairclough (1996) and Widdowson (1995, 1996) and the criticisms of politicised research agendas made by Schegloff (1997). At their heart, these debates consist in whether analysts should use the terms in which discourse participants talk about their own interactions, or whether analysts should ‘deploy the terms that preoccupy them in describing, explaining or critiquing, etc. the events and texts to which they turn their attention’ (Schegloff, 1997: 167, emphasis in original). For both Foucault (for example, 1976) and Fairclough (2001), the emphasis is not on the individual reasons discourse participants have for their behaviours (or, in the case of Fairclough, 2001, their linguistic behaviour), but on how that behaviour comes to expresses wider regularities within the whole ‘field of discursive events’ (Foucault, 1972: 28) and thereby exercises or manifests a certain power relationship between the individuals involved.

For Foucault (1972) the examination of discourse consists in the discovery of correlations in different statements and their relationships to one another. It is this that leads Foucault (1972) to delineate three different definitions of discourse. In his work, discourse may refer to ‘the general domain of all statements, sometimes as an individualizable group of statements, and sometimes as a regulated practice that accounts for a number of statements’ (Foucault, 1972: 80). In Foucaultian analysis, then, a discourse can be the totality of all things that are said or written; a set of statements – that is, a group of texts – that share some ideational content (for example, a racist discourse); or discourse can be defined with respect to the
things that are said about and in the course of some repeated social practice (for example, teaching, or classroom discourse). Mills (2003) has glossed this final definition as

the unwritten rules and structures which produce different utterances or statements... this set of structures and rules would constitute a discourse, and it is these rules in which Foucault is most interested, rather than the utterances and the text produced (Mills, 2003: 53-4).

Rather than trying to understand the function or utility of a particular linguistic form to the language user, this form of analysis has as its focus the ways in which a particular text might instantiate the set of ‘structures and rules’ that constitute a broader discourse. As Van Leeuwen (2008: 6) puts it, ‘it is possible to reconstruct discourses from the texts that draw on them’. Discourses are projected into the communicative situation from outside; ‘we must conceive of discourse as a violence that we do to things, or, at all events, as a practice we impose upon them; it is in this practice that the events of discourse find the principle of their regularity’ (Foucault, 1971: 22).

![Figure 2.2 Fairclough’s (2001: 24) orders of discourse](image)

**Figure 2.2** Fairclough’s (2001: 24) orders of discourse
In terms of the ambiguity Fairclough (2001) outlines, the greater emphasis in Foucault’s (1972) work is on ‘what people habitually do given a certain sort of occasion’ (Fairclough, 2001: 23). Clearly, this understanding of discourse clashes with the cognitive conception adopted in TWT. As my outline suggests, TWT is more concerned with ‘what people are doing on a particular occasion’ (see Fairclough, 2001: 23). Fairclough (2001) synthesises both these conceptions of discourse into what he calls, following Foucault (1971, 1972), ‘orders of discourse’. He matches these orders of discourse to types of social practice (see Figure 2.2). ‘Actual discourse’ in this schema is the object of study of the TWT approach – the interaction of reader knowledge and a single text – whereas ‘types of discourse’ is meant in the sense of the more Foucaultian conception. Actual discourses appear in the context of actual practices. For example, actual medical interviews appear in the context of actual medical examinations. However, the interview will itself draw upon the expected conventions and topics of medical discourses which are themselves situated within the institutions of the medical profession. That is, actual discourse draws upon discourse types. Moreover, the discourse types associated with certain types of practice may ‘colonise’ (Fairclough, 1995) the actual discourses of others. So for example, Fairclough (1995: 130-66) argues that the actual discourses of modern universities have been colonised by business discourse types.

Fairclough (2001) adds that changes to the discursive regime of an institution are not simply top down. Individual, actual instances of discourse exist in a dialectical relationship with the types of discourse they draw upon:
As far as the social world is concerned, social structures not only determine social practice, they are also a product of social practice. And more particularly, social structures not only determine discourse, they are also a product of discourse (Fairclough, 2001: 31).

Fairclough (Fairclough, 2001: 26) goes on to argue that, discourse should not be viewed as the mechanical instantiation of discourse types, but rather ‘the creative extension-through-combination of existing resources, with conventional cases of a discourse drawing on single discourse types... being thought of as limiting cases rather than the norm’.

As it has been described thus far, Fairclough’s (2001) view of discourse and society is not antagonistic to the TWT account of discourse. The relationship between ‘actual discourses’ and the more Foucaultian ‘types of discourse’ is easily reframed as the relationship between the text and the reader’s knowledge of the expected conventions and topics associated with the genre. Fairclough (2001) even gives a CDA version of the text-driven principle:

[F]rom the point of view of the interpreter of the text, formal features of the text are ‘cues’ which activate elements of the interpreter’s MR [members resources], and that interpretations are generated through the dialectical interplay of cues and MR (Fairclough, 2001: 118).

The main point of departure between TWT, Fairclough and – more generally – existing work in CDA, is the way in which these members’ resources are theorised. Fairclough’s (2001) criticism of the cognitive conception of background knowledge
is that it has ‘given little attention to the social origins or significance of MR’ (Fairclough, 2001: 9) and that the term ‘knowledge’ is misleading because background knowledge – or ‘common sense’ – is often ideological (Fairclough, 2001: 118). It is for this reason that Critical Discourse Analysts who have focussed on cognition have emphasised its social aspects (for example, Hart, 2008; Koller, 2004, 2005; Koller and Davidson, 2008; Van Dijk, 1993c, 2009). In this area of research, ‘social cognition’ is an important concept (Augostinos and Walker, 1995; Potter and Wetherall, 1987; Van Dijk, 1993a, 1993b, 2009). Social cognition is defined as ‘the socially shared representations of societal arrangements, groups and relations, as well as mental operations such as interpretation, thinking and arguing, inferencing and learning’ (Van Dijk, 1993b: 257). From this socio-cognitive perspective, background knowledge is re-theorised as socially situated shared cognitions that form an ‘interpretative repertoire’ (Potter and Wetherall, 1987) for a given language community (although it should be noted that ‘social cognition’ has often had far more individualist connotations in psychology, see Augostinos and Walker, 1995; Condor and Antaki, 1997). Interestingly, Van Leeuwen (2008) explicitly links this conception of social cognition to the Foucaultian conception of discourse described above:

[I use] ‘discourse’... here in Foucault’s sense (for example, 1977), that is, not in the sense of ‘an extended stretch of connected speech or writing,’ a ‘text,’ but in the sense of social cognition, of ‘a socially constructed knowledge of some social practice,’ developed in specific social contexts, and in ways appropriate to these contexts, whether these contexts are
large, for instance multinational corporations, or small, for instance particular families, and whether they are strongly institutionalized, for instance the press, or less so, for instance dinner table conversations (Van Leeuwen, 2008: 6).

In Van Leeuwen’s (2008) formulation, what Fairclough (2001) calls a ‘type of discourse’ is reframed as social cognition. In CDA work on cognition, then, there is a sense in which ‘types of discourse’, or as Mills (2003: 53) might say, the extra-linguistic ‘rules or structures which produce different utterances or statements’, are reconceived as mental phenomena. Whilst being socially constructed and shared, these ‘rules or structures’ reside in the minds of individual language users, mediating between the micro- and macro-structures of society; between the face-to-face interactions of individuals, and the wider social context in which these interactions take place (Van Dijk, 1993c).

This new cognitive orientation in CDA addresses issues within Foucaultian discourse analysis. As Donnelly (1986: 29) suggests, the notion that the language used in an individual text re-expresses a particular discourse raises the question of who or what creates and co-ordinates the propagation of discourses that permeate Western cultures. Proposing a cognitive interface between the behaviours of the individual and the practices enshrined in social institutions certainly begins to explain the ways in which discourses, in the Foucaultian sense of the term, are expressed in individual texts. Without attending to these processes, Foucaultian conceptions of discourse run the risk of seeming overly metaphysical; as if discourses express themselves in texts of their own volition. Indeed, whilst he
champions a Foucaultian socio-cognitive perspective, it is notable that van Leeuwen (2008: 6) also writes that it is ‘texts that draw on [discourse]’, and not language users that use discourses as a cognitive resource to produce and interpret texts (a similar point is made by Billig, 2008). The notion of social cognition materialises, so to speak, the relationship between the abstract rules and structures that comprise a discourse and their concrete manifestation in a given text. I say ‘materialises’ insofar as these rules and structures are stored in the memory, which is itself materially anchored in the mind.

However, it is precisely in this sense that one can also criticise socio-cognitive approaches to discourse. Whilst cognitions may be shared, cognition is embodied and therefore individually situated. Brains exist in individual – not social – bodies. Although the term social cognition is useful insofar as it allows analysts to make interesting observations about the cognitive and conceptual processes that generally underpin the production and reception of texts, it only tells a fraction of the story in relation to the ways in which discourse participants – not abstract social minds – manage the conceptual models cued by what Fairclough (2001) terms ‘actual’ instances of discourse. Of course, the substance of Fairclough’s (2001) criticisms of cognitive approaches is that the conceptual content of these individual minds is socially determined. However, one need not jettison this truism to acknowledge the fact that cognition is, ultimately, an individually situated activity. An embodied, experientialist approach to discourse is necessarily a sociological approach because knowledge is the product of our individual experiences. This includes our experiences of social institutions. As such, ‘social’ background
knowledge is not drawn from the memory of an abstract social cognisor, but already exists in the raw in the memories of discourse participants. Clearly it is absurd to suggest that studies of the types of cognitions people are generally inclined to have are of no importance. Social cognition is an important category in such analyses. Equally, analyses of the conceptual structures prompted in the course of engaging in a specific discourse are also worthy of researchers’ attention. However, the emphasis on the socially determined aspects of cognition – especially in CDA – has led to a relative neglect of this kind of study. I now illustrate this point with respect to metaphor.

2.2.4 Social Cognition and Metaphor

Koller (2005) argues that much of the work on metaphor in Cognitive Linguistics does not take into account the social aspects of cognition and overemphasises its embodied aspects. She cites in particular Grady’s (1997) important work on ‘primary metaphor’, Grady et al (1999) and Lakoff and Johnson (1999). Rather than treat metaphor as the natural product of near universal experiential correlations, Charteris-Black (2004) and Koller (2004, 2005) both suggest that metaphors are often profoundly ideological. For example, far from reflecting language users’ naturally occurring experiential correlations, the metaphors used in business discourses often propagate sexist ideologies (Koller, 2004, 2005). Koller (2005) rightly rejects any universalistic or ‘natural’ experiential basis for these sexist metaphors but maintains, following Lakoff (1993), that metaphor is ‘a cross-domain mapping in the conceptual system’. Whilst metaphor is socially, culturally and politically motivated, it is still a cognitive phenomenon that structures the way
language users think – as well as talk – about a given target domain and therefore forms a cognitive resource for language users in constructing (ideological) theories about the world (Charteris-Black, 2004; see also Thibodeau and Boroditsky, 2011). Indeed, some have argued that metaphor has a fundamental role in structuring shared ideologies (Goatly, 2007; Lakoff, 2002). As such, Conceptual Metaphor is a type of social cognition.

The turn towards examining metaphor as a form of social cognition also has methodological implications. If metaphors perpetuate ideologies, or even constitute them, then identifying the metaphors used in texts that are produced in a particular social institution means at least partially recovering the discourses these texts draw upon (see Van Leeuwen, 2008). Rather than examining the development of mega-metaphorical structures across single texts, the emphasis is on examining general patterns of metaphor use across a corpus to find evidence for the exogenous influence of a discourse – in the Foucaultian sense – or an ideological perspective. For examples in CDA, see: Burns (2011), Charteris-Black (2004, 2006), Chiang and Duan (2007), Cienki (2005), Holmgreen (2008), Koller (2003, 2004, 2005), Koller and Davidson (2008) and Lu and Ahrens (2008). Although a desire for robust and rigorous data sample sizes is in no doubt a positive thing, it has meant a drift away from more detailed analyses of individual texts, or, in the vocabulary of TWT, discourses. As one side of the dialectic that Fairclough (2001) identifies in his own distinction between ‘types of’, ‘orders of’ and ‘actual instances of’ discourse, such an analysis is important. Without it, analyses of metaphor are at risk of becoming mechanistic. Conceptual metaphors are seen abstractly as static
figures waiting to be discovered in large collections of texts, as opposed to dynamic conceptual mappings that are the product of the on-going cognitive processes of discourse participants.

The notion of megametaphor adopted in this thesis emphasises that metaphor is a dynamic cognitive process acting in concert with other conceptual processes that are prompted by the text as the discourse proceeds. Studying megametaphor means examining metaphors within the context of the actual discourse in which they appear. This means studying the relationship of metaphor to the broader conceptual architectures cued in the course of the discourse: the text-worlds discourse participants produce; the prototypes, image-schemata, frames and ICMs these text-worlds draw upon; and the other conceptual metaphors prompted by the text. From this perspective, I argue that the metaphors used in a discourse should be studied in an integrated fashion, as one of many interacting cognitive processes which set the parameters of a discourse participant’s conceptual model of the text.

As I have already suggested, a TWT conception of discourse can provide the starting point for such a dynamic, integrated study. However, it is important to note that the advantages afforded to the study of metaphor as a discourse phenomenon by TWT do not travel in one direction. Although two models have been offered (Gavins, 2007; Werth, 1994), TWT has yet to develop a comprehensive account of how micro-metaphors are combined into mega-metaphorical structures. Moreover, work in TWT has yet to fully engage with the debates in Cognitive Linguistics around metaphor as a ‘structure mapping’ or ‘class-inclusion’ process. These gaps are
important missing components of the framework. One cannot claim to provide a
cognitive discourse grammar without fully addressing one of the most ubiquitous
figures of speech and thought. TWT, then, would benefit from further developing
this aspect of the framework. In addition, insights from TWT can also provide the
basis for a valuable critical intervention into the field of metaphor studies.

This thesis is intended as an example of such a bilateral engagement of both
areas of research. In the next chapter I give a more detailed examination of TWT’s
notion of megametaphor and the frameworks within contemporary metaphor
research and – more broadly – cognitive linguistics, that can help define the
workings of megametaphor more comprehensively.
3. Megametaphor

In Chapter 2, following TWT, I defined discourse as an actual instance of communication between two or more participants involving the text-driven activation of participant knowledge (Gavins, 2007: 29). From this discourse oriented perspective, it follows that individual clause-level metaphors are not isolated conceptual structures, but are an integrated part of the conceptual topology discourse participants create as they take part in a discourse. This is to say that they are often part of broader conceptual structures that in the last chapter I termed, following Werth (1994), megametaphors.

In Chapter 2, I presented an initial definition of megametaphor as a readerly phenomenon; a conceptual structure that stretches across a single discourse involving the combination of multiple smaller figurative conceptual structures. My aim in this chapter is to subject Werth’s (1994) initial sketch of megametaphor, which I argued was at times contradictory (see Chapter 2), to more rigorous criticism. To do this, I draw out the differences between megametaphor and other figurative discourse-level conceptual structures and use this delineation to describe in detail the precise conceptual configuration of megametaphor. Any discussion of discourse-level megametaphors must concern itself with the relation of individual clause-level metaphors to one another. An examination of the relationship between clause-level metaphors is also fundamental to any discussion of mixed or extended metaphor. Accordingly, I begin this chapter with a discussion of the existing
literature on these two figurative structures (see Booth, 1978; Crisp, 2008; Crisp et al, 2002; Fludernik et al, 1999; Kimmel, 2010; Perrine, 1971; Piller, 1999; Werth, 1994; Tirrell, 1989). I use this discussion as a starting point for describing two potential approaches to examining megametaphor; what I term the ‘linguistic’ and the ‘conceptual’ paradigms (see Sections 3.2 and 3.3). After describing both paradigms, I argue that whilst the linguistic paradigm (see Crisp et al, 2002; Dorst, 2011; Krenmayr, 2011; Pragglejaz, 2007; Steen 1999a, 1999b, 2009; Steen et al, 2011) admirably devises a rigorous and transparent set of processes for finding linguistic metaphor and then moving from linguistic to conceptual analysis, it ultimately does not have the technical vocabulary to describe how metaphors from a variety of different source domains might be integrated into an overarching mental representation of the entire discourse. Conversely, the conceptual paradigm, exemplified later in the chapter by Conceptual Integration Theory (CIT see Coulson and Oakley, 2001; Fauconnier and Turner, 2002), more fruitfully addresses this question, but fails adequately to anchor its account of conceptual integration in the linguistic structures of the text. To conclude the chapter, in Section 3.4, I suggest that Text World Theory offers a more text-driven approach to the study of mega-metaphoric conceptual structures (Gavins, 2007: 29; Werth, 1999). In Chapter 4, I outline the ways in which TWT might address some of the issues identified in this chapter and in Chapter 2.

3.1 What megametaphor is not...

Like megametaphor, mixed and extended metaphors are both discourse-level figurative structures insofar as they concern the conceptual relationships between
individual clause-level metaphors. I start this chapter by giving an overview of how these figurative tropes have been treated in the existing literature. I take this approach on the basis that a study of the techniques, methods and theoretical perspectives used in the analyses of these discourse-level structures will act as a stimulus for my own discussion of megametaphor. From this overview, in the following sections I delineate two approaches to the study of discourse-level conceptual structures: the linguistic approach adopted by Crisp et al (2002) and Steen (1999a, 1999b, 2009), which itself builds on work by Dorst (2011), Krenmayr (2011), Pragglejaz (2007) and Steen et al (2011); and the conceptual approach exemplified by Kimmel (2010), Perrine (1971) and – I shall argue in Section 3.3.1 – by work in Conceptual Integration Theory (see Coulson and Oakley, 2001; Fauconnier and Turner, 2002). I begin with a discussion of extended metaphor.

3.1.1 Extended Metaphor

Since the ‘cognitive turn’ in metaphor studies (Steen, 2011b), extended metaphor has implicitly been at the heart of research in this area. As I argued in Chapter 2 (Section 2.1), One of the main reasons Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) core argument about the cognitive status of metaphor was so compelling and influential is because of the systematicity with which concepts from the same source domain are repeatedly mapped onto concepts from the same target domain. CMT has often used examples of extended metaphor to demonstrate the systematic nature of conceptual mappings. For example, Lakoff’s (1993) discussion of the LOVE IS A JOURNEY metaphor includes the extended metaphor ‘we’re driving in the fast lane on the freeway of love’ (albeit the metaphor is only extended across one sentence).
A primary concern of CMT has been the way in which metaphorical reasoning extends across discourse in this way. Analysts have been interested in the way metaphors relate to one another, and the discovery of systematic interrelations between some metaphors has driven the cognitive turn in metaphor scholarship.

Strikingly, defining extended metaphor has been a task taken for granted in much of the literature. To my knowledge, there are only two papers that explicitly theorise, define and interrogate the notion of extended metaphor. The first and earliest is Werth (1994) and the second is Crisp et al (2002). Werth (1994) sees extended metaphor as consciously sustained and more literary than other types of metaphor. Piller (1999) uses Werth’s (1994) definition to analyse extended metaphor in automobile discourses, but he acknowledges that Werth’s (1994) claim that extended metaphor is more literary than other types is problematic. I would agree with Piller (1999) that extended metaphor is not an exclusively literary device (Fludernik et al (1999: 384) and Tirrell (1989) also make the same point in passing).

As Werth (1994) himself concedes, extended metaphor can be seen in advertising discourses and the examples in this thesis should prove that extended figurative structures are also a feature of economics discourses (see Sections 3.3.2, 4.3, 5.3 and 5.4). Moreover, whether or not the metaphor is consciously sustained or not begs the further question of consciously sustained by whom? As Gibbs (2011a, 2011b) points out, even in the case of extended metaphor, it is still hard to make claims about how conscious writers and speakers might be of the linguistic choices they make. Conversely, from the perspective of readers or listeners, it may be that some extended metaphors feel more ‘deliberate’ (Steen, 2008, 2011a) than singular
uses of metaphor. This could have an effect on how they construct a mental representation of the state of affairs the writer or speaker wishes to communicate.

I discuss the issue of readers, writers and metaphor ‘deliberateness’ in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5.

For the moment, it is the ‘sustained’ part of Werth’s (1994) account of extended metaphor which has the most traction. This aspect of the phenomenon is common to most implicit and explicit definitions of extended metaphor. Outside of the cognitive paradigm, Tirrell (1989) is primarily concerned with ‘extensions’ of a ‘metaphorical antecedent’ in a single discourse. For Tirrell (1989), extensions of a metaphor are anaphoric: they refer back to a previously established metaphor for their meaning and it is in this respect that the original meaning of the metaphor is extended.

In their definition, Crisp et al (2002) also adopt the idea that extended metaphor is sustained across a discourse. Similarly, in a later paper, Crisp (2008) defines extended metaphor ‘as a linguistic metaphor extending over more than one clause whose language relates directly to both the metaphorical source and target’. The introduction of a grammatical criterion makes the definition of extended metaphor more linguistically rigorous. Beginning the search for extended metaphor on the linguistic level also ensures that the analysis is textually grounded. However, Crisp et al (2002) note that to identify extended metaphor it is also necessary to extend beyond the linguistic realm, into the conceptual. For example, this is an extract from Dan Roberts’s (2008) article, *Prudence is going to be punished, and recklessness rewarded*: 

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In industry, it goes with the territory: companies exposed to big swings in investment are known as cyclicals and should at least have their seat belts on. The rest of us need to start strapping in (Roberts, 2008, see Appendix 1).

There are numerous examples of metaphor here. In the first sentence, ‘big swings’ is a metaphor that maps space onto changes in the amount of money invested into a company. Combined with the adjective, ‘big’, it suggests a violent, pendulous backward and forward motion. This spatial metaphor is further elaborated by the metaphor ‘should at least have their seat belts on’. In this vehicular metaphor, ‘seat belts’ are mapped onto the precautions companies can make against a rapid decline in investment. The metaphorical implication here is that a cyclical company is like a vehicle and the rapid changes in the amount of investment the company receives causes the vehicle to move quickly and erratically. Precautions to regulate the flow of investment are therefore like a seat belt because they protect the occupants of the vehicle in the event of a crash (which is made more likely by the vehicle’s fast, erratic movements). Notably, in this first sentence, the language shifts between source and target domain. ‘Industry’, ‘companies’ and ‘investment’ are all target domain words, whereas ‘big swings’, ‘cyclical’ and ‘seat belts on’ are all associated with vehicular travel and the closely relate domain of spatial movement. This switching between source and target domains changes in the final sentence of the extract: ‘the rest of us need to start strapping in’. Here, the only target domain concept is ‘the rest of us’, which is an indirect reference to other companies (which is to say, companies that are not cyclicals). Conversely ‘need to start strapping in’ is source domain language which extends the mapping made
between ‘seat belts’ and financial precautions in the first sentence to the second. As a result of this indirect reference to non-cyclicals and the subsequent use of only source domain language, if the second sentence were read out of context there would be no reason for readers to assume that it is metaphorical. It is only when the second sentence is preceded by the first and the target domain of business is established as the conceptual context that it can be interpreted metaphorically. As Crisp et al (2002) suggest, extended metaphor requires that due attention be given to the conceptual contexts in which extended metaphors appear. In Section 3.2.2, I outline the ways in which Crisp et al (2002) use propositional analysis to account for this conceptual context and how they provide a formal description of a wide variety of metaphor types based on the interrelation between the linguistic forms and the propositional contents of metaphors in discourse.

3.1.2 Mixed Metaphor

In contrast to extended metaphor, which has been viewed as a typifying feature of ‘literary’ language (Werth, 1994), part of the problem in identifying mixed metaphor is that, as Booth (1978) points out, it has historically been treated as a deficient use of language. As a descriptive term, then, ‘mixed metaphor’ is laden with negative connotations. Perrine (1971) argues that mixed metaphors are simply complex metaphors – metaphors in which literal meaning is expressed through a variety of disparate ‘figurative terms’ – that do not ‘harmonize’:

A ‘mixed metaphor’ is simply an unsuccessful complex metaphor, one in which the figurative terms clash rather than harmonize. I do not know of a logical test by which successful and unsuccessful complex metaphors may
be separated. The only test is the imagination of a sensitive reader (Perrine, 1971: 130).

Under this definition, mixed metaphor is not a matter of whether metaphors are actually mixed, but whether they are mixed comprehensibly. This is a judgement based on whether speakers or writers have communicated the point they wish to make effectively. However, readers are often able to identify what are regarded as mixed metaphors without finding them incomprehensible. Take, for example, Hamlet’s famous soliloquy:

\[
\text{Whether ’tis nobler in the mind to suffer} \\
\text{The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune,} \\
\text{Or to take arms against a sea of troubles,} \\
\text{And by opposing end them? (Shakespeare, 2002: Act 3, Scene 1)}
\]

‘To take arms against a sea of troubles’ is often identified as a famous example of a mixed metaphor, but the line is perfectly comprehensible, meaning something like ‘is it better to endure problems, or attempt to solve them and by doing so end them’. Accordingly, comprehensibility cannot be the criteria by which mixed metaphor is judged.

Recently, most attempts to fix a definition of mixed metaphor have revolved around two factors: 1) the proximity in the discourse of the constituent metaphors comprising the mixed metaphor to one another; and 2) the relationship of the source domains in these metaphors to one another. Kimmel (2010: 98) gives two basic conditions for mixed metaphor:
The first condition relates to the proximity of the metaphors that comprise the mixed metaphor to one another, whereas the second relates to the nature and relation of the metaphor source domains. In terms of proximity, Kimmel (2010) bases his work on the notion of a metaphoric cluster. This notion has its origins in the work of Corts and Pollio (1999; see also Corts and Meyers, 2002) and has later been used and developed by Cameron (2007a, 2007b; see also Cameron and Low 2004; Cameron and Stelma, 2004; Cameron and Deignan 2006). A cluster is a statistically significant spike in metaphor use within an actual instance of discourse and can be defined as follows:

> Metaphor clusters can be found in transcribed talk or text by drawing a graph of the cumulative frequency of linguistic metaphors. As each linguistic metaphor is spoken, so the cumulative total rises by one, giving the ‘cumulative frequency’ at that particular point in time. A graph is drawn with the horizontal or x-axis showing time and the cumulative frequency on the y-axis... Along the x-axis, time is operationalized by dividing the transcribed talk into subsequent ‘blocks’ of talk... When a cluster of metaphors is produced, the graph shows a sudden change upwards in slope (Cameron, 2007b: 47).

Although Cameron (2007b) divides her text into ‘blocks’ of ten words to approximate to the units used in Corts and Pollio’s (1999) study, there seems little
need to define rigidly the number of words which constitute these blocks. The purpose of the exercise is to present any changes in the density of metaphor use within the discourse. Accordingly, the size of the units used will depend on the size of the text being studied and the type of questions the researcher wants to answer.

The second aspect of Kimmel’s (2010: 98) two conditions for mixed metaphor, that the metaphors ‘do not (for the most part) share any imagistic ontology or any direct inferential entailments between them’, relates to the type of conceptual mappings that are identified by the analysts, and whether or not these conceptual mappings cohere and can be thought of as belonging to the same source domain. The notion that the metaphors ‘do not... share any imagistic ontology’ is particularly important in Kimmel’s (2010) empirical, corpus based analysis of mixed metaphor in discourse. His method for identifying mixed metaphor is double layered:

To count mixed clusters, the most important thing to exclude is that no source-domain similarity obtains between metaphors. Such similarity can be of an image-schematic kind or relate to rich domain knowledge, i.e. the first and second metaphor in every pair can share similarities at either or even at both levels (Kimmel, 2010: 101).

Further:

Put succinctly, metaphor sources typically involve both an imagistic core that ‘carries’ the event ontology (cf. Invariance principle; Lakoff, 1990) and an exemplar that adds richer knowledge to it. For example, the expression
‘the EU constitution gets the axe’ evokes an image-schematic scenario in which an entity gets destroyed through a decisive and swift force motion, thus specifying the event ontology (quick manner and finality). Knowledge about axes and the execution scenario adds a second cognitive layer (executions concern animate beings, are cruel and put an end to their life). Hence, the metaphor may be legitimately grouped with all further metaphors in which swift and strong forces occur or with all further punishment-related metaphors, quite independently of forces (e.g. ‘jailed’) (Kimmel, 2010: 100).

Kimmel (2010) takes an image-schematic view of conceptual structure. This enables him to determine not only if source domains are identical, but whether they are similar, or could belong to the same ‘fuzzy category’, such as ‘motions that are decisive and swift’ (see Rosch, 1978; Rosch and Mervis, 1981). It also results in a rather conservative definition of mixed metaphor. Not only must source domains be distinct, they should share no image-schematic commonalities either: the ‘imagistic core’ in each case must be different.

On the one hand, in using the unit of the cluster, Kimmel (2010) defines mixed metaphor functionally: that is, a ‘cluster’ is a unit of analysis that arises from a statistical analysis of where metaphor is being used in the text. However, the notion of a cluster has no regard for the formal, grammatical features of that text. It is unclear as to whether mixed metaphor appears on the clausal or inter-clausal level of analysis, or even whether mixed metaphors can belong to entirely different sentences. In this respect his measure of what I have called the proximity of one
metaphor to another is very ‘open’. On the other hand, his appraisal of the conceptual similarity between source domains is very strict; source and target must undergo a double-test to ensure that both source domains are suitably dissimilar.

Crisp et al (2002) have the opposite emphasis. Their concern is primarily with defining the formal grammatical and conceptual context within which a metaphor is used. They define a taxonomy of different types of metaphor – including single, multiple, restricted, extended, simple, complex, and pure – of which mixed metaphor and extended metaphor are only two examples. Rather than examining or comparing the clustering or image-schematic properties of source domains (Kimmel, 2010), this taxonomy is based on grammatical and propositional analysis of clauses (a process I explain in more detail below, in Section 3.2.2).

3.1.3 Two different approaches to discourse-level metaphorical structures

Out of this overview of work on mixed and extended metaphor emerge two paradigms for categorising metaphorical language: one that concerns itself with formalising a set of rules for identifying and taxonomising different types of metaphor in discourse (Crisp, 2008; Crisp et al, 2002); and another that is more focuses on how metaphoric clusters are deployed in a particular discourse context and whether it is conceptually possible to integrate these metaphors into an overarching conceptual structure (Kimmel, 2010; Werth, 1994). I term the former approach a linguistic paradigm because of its focus on creating formal linguistic rules for defining different metaphor types, and the latter a conceptual paradigm because of its focus on conceptual relations between metaphors: that is, its focus
on comparing the conceptual structure or ‘imagistic core’ of individual metaphors irrespective of their formal grammatical relation to other metaphors in the sentence/discourse. In the conclusion of this chapter, I argue that my notion of megametaphor, developed from Werth’s (1994) paper, sits somewhere between these two paradigms. However, before proceeding to a more concrete description of megametaphor, in the following sections I elaborate further on the two paradigms and their approaches to discourse-level metaphoric structures. I begin with the linguistic approach.

3.2 Linguistic approaches to metaphor in discourse

Crisp et al’s work (2002) on developing linguistic and propositional rules that define a set of different types of metaphor is part of a much broader project involving many researchers and research groups (Crisp et al, 2002; Dorst, 2011; Krenmayr, 2011; Pragglejazz, 2007; Steen, 1999a, 1999b, 2009; Steen et al, 2011). This research can be subdivided into two different areas. The first area of work is dedicated to devising rigorous, transparent processes by which analysts can find instances of metaphor in discourse. The most important research in this area is that of the Pragglejaz Group (2007), and a cluster of researchers at Vrije University, Amsterdam (Steen 1999a, 2009; Steen et al, 2011; Dorst, 2011; Krenmayr, 2011). The second area of work relates to 1) devising processes by which analyst can rigorously and transparently describe the mappings that are made as part of a metaphor and 2) categorising these mappings. The main work in this area is Steen (1999a, 2009), in which he defines a five-step procedure for getting from the linguistic to the conceptual pole of metaphor. Steen’s (1999a, 2009) procedure
incorporates the work by the Pragglejaz Group (2007) and the researchers at Vrije University. It is for this reason that I outline the work from Pragglejaz (2007) and the Vrije University group first.

3.2.1 Finding Metaphor in Discourse

Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) linguistic evidence for the systematic nature of metaphor in the conceptual system redefined metaphor as a cognitive phenomenon. However, the examples given in the text were often the product of introspection, rather than taken from real discourses. The claims cognitive linguists have made about the ubiquity of metaphor in language require empirical testing; the analysis of language in use, ‘in the wild’ (Pragglejaz, 2007: 1). As necessary as the expedition for metaphor ‘in the wild’ is, it is not without its methodological and theoretical problems. The Pragglejaz group (2007) write:

Researchers often differ in their intuitions about what constitutes a metaphoric word or phrase. Metaphor scholars often do not provide criteria in their empirical investigations for specifying what is, and what is not, metaphorical... Variability in intuitions, and lack of precision about what counts as a metaphor, make it quite difficult to compare different empirical analysis. More important, the lack of agreed criteria for metaphor identification complicates any evaluation of theoretical claims about the frequency of metaphor, its organisation in discourse, and possible relations between metaphoric language and metaphoric thought (Pragglejaz, 2007: 1-2).
To remedy this vagueness and lack of precision, the Pragglejaz group (2007) propose a procedure for identifying metaphor in discourse, called MIP (standing simply for Metaphor Identification Procedure). This procedure was later modified by researchers at Vrije University, Amsterdam, and renamed MIP–VU (Dorst, 2011; Krenmayr, 2011; Steen et al 2011). I describe both the procedure and its modified form below.

The first step in any inductive, text-driven approach to identifying conceptual metaphor is necessarily concerned with how metaphor is linguistically signalled; with what in the text causes readers to create mappings between domains. Accordingly, MIP and MIP-VU are not concerned with cognition per se. The procedure makes no claim as to the types of cognitive processes that may be happening in discourse participants’ minds (Krennmayr, 2011: 104; Pragglejaz, 2007: 31). MIP is concerned with how the text might be inducing a cross-domain mapping: that is, with whether the words on the page provide the potential for a mapping between two domains of experiential knowledge. MIP therefore identifies linguistic metaphor, not conceptual metaphor. It is concerned with how language signals and encodes metaphor, not the cognitive processes the language engenders. The basic procedure is as follows:

1. Read the entire text-discourse to establish a general understanding of the meaning.
2. Determine the lexical units in the text-discourse.
3. 
a. For each lexical unit in the text, establish its meaning in context, that is, how it applies to an entity, relation or attribute in the situation evoked by the text (contextual meaning). Take into account what comes before and after the lexical unit.

b. For each lexical unit, determine if it has a more basic contemporary meaning in other contexts than the one in the given context. For our purposes, basic meanings tend to be
   i. More concrete (what they evoke is easier to imagine, see, hear, feel, smell and taste);
   ii. Related to bodily action;
   iii. More precise (as opposed to vague);
   iv. Historically older;

Basic meanings are not necessarily the most frequent meanings of the lexical unit.

c. If the lexical unit has a more basic current-contemporary meaning in other context than the given context, decide whether the contextual meaning contrasts with the basic meaning but can be understood in comparison with it.

4. If yes, mark the lexical unit as metaphorical (Pragglejaz, 2007: 3).

MIP involves the comparison of the ‘basic’ and ‘contextual’ meanings of lexical units in the text. Lexical units are usually words (Krennmayr, 2011: 104), but they can also be phrasal verbs (for example, ‘get up’) and polywords (for example, ‘all right’,
which can also be written as ‘alright’) (Pragglejaz, 2007: 26). In general, the guiding principle as to whether or not a phrase or word might be a lexical unit is whether it is semantically decomposable; whether it can be broken down into independently meaningful sense units. The ‘contextual meaning’ of a lexical unit is what it means in the context of the text. Conversely, the ‘basic meaning’ of a lexical unit is defined as its most concrete, physical, or embodied sense. Whilst the contextual meaning of a lexical unit is identified with respect to the text being analysed, basic meanings are found in the dictionary. In the case of the Pragglejaz group (2007), the dictionary used is the Macmillan Online Dictionary. If the basic and contextual meanings of the lexical unit under analysis are the same, there is no metaphor. However, if the two meanings ‘can be understood in comparison’, the lexical unit is being used metaphorically. It is important to note that metaphor is not necessarily present if the basic and contextual meanings are simply different. The provision for comparing basic and contextual meanings, instead of simply noting a difference, allows for the exclusion of non-metaphorical but equally figurative conceptual devices such as metonymy (Pragglejaz, 2007: 31).

MIP-VU (Dorst, 2011; Steen et al, 2011; Krennmayr, 2011) makes a number of additions to MIP. Rather than simply looking for metaphor, MIP-VU is concerned with identifying ‘metaphor-related words’:

It should be noted that the term ‘metaphor-related words’ is used to reflect the fact that MIP-VU aims to identify all lexical units in the discourse that can be related to cross-domain mappings in conceptual structure rather
than only metaphorically used words, as is the case in MIP (Krennmayr, 2011: 102).

In this respect, MIP-VU makes a distinction between implicit, direct and indirect metaphor (Steen et al, 2010) and provides instructions on how to find these phenomena (see Dorst, 2011; Krennmayr, 2011; Steen et al, 2011). Direct metaphors are non-literal comparisons which are somehow flagged by the text itself. This might involve a predicate nominative assertion (for example, ‘Juliette is the sun’) or using a prepositional phrase, for example ‘like’, to explicitly signal a comparison between two concepts (for example, ‘Juliette is like the sun’) (Steen et al, 2010: 786). Indirect metaphor occurs when a source domain concept substitutes for a target domain concept (for example, ‘my mobile phone has died’) (Steen et al, 2010: 785). Finally, implicit metaphor is similar to indirect metaphor except that source domain lexical units may be replaced by anaphor (for example, ‘my mobile phone has died, although I don’t know why it has’) (Steen et al, 2010: 788). The central difference between MIP and MIP-VU is that the flags used by the latter to code for metaphor are more sensitive to the exigencies of identifying metaphor in actual stretches of discourse. As such, the two approaches complement one another.

Having outlined MIP/MIP-VU I now provide an example of the procedure in practice. The following sentence is a further example from Roberts’ (2008)

*Prudence is going to be punished, and recklessness rewarded:*

Even after 18 months of fretting, the speed with which Britain's economy is now hurtling into reverse comes as a shock (Roberts, 2008, see Appendix 1).
The first step of the procedure is to divide the text into lexical units. There are no phrasal verbs or polywords in the sentence (‘into’ is a single lexical unit because it is written as a single word), so the lexical units correspond with the words in the sentence. The next step is to compare the contextual meaning of each word with the basic meaning for that word in the Macmillan dictionary. In Figure 3.1, I provide the basic and contextual meanings for each lexical unit, followed by a note on whether the two meanings are the same, or if there is a difference or comparison between them. I then note whether the word is used metaphorically or not.

Of the twenty-one lexical units in the sentence, I have marked six as definitely metaphor related words (MRWs). A complication is introduced by the second lexical unit, ‘after’, which one could interpret as having two basic meanings. These are 1) ‘at a later time’ or 2) ‘further along a road, railway etc’. Both seem equally ‘concrete’, insofar as both relate to different elements of our embodied experience. On the one hand, human experience is structured by our temporality. We do not experience our lives all at once, but as a stream of sequentially structured events. On the other hand, the second basic meaning of ‘after’, ‘further along a road, railway, etc’, relates to another fundamental dimension of human experience; space. The dilemma in deciding over which meaning is the basic meaning consists in the question: which of these dimensions of human experience – space or time – is primary, or more fundamental? The answer matters because if we take the first meaning as the basic meaning, there is no metaphor, whereas taking the second would suggest that there is.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lexical unit</th>
<th>Contextual Meaning</th>
<th>Basic Meaning</th>
<th>Type of contrast</th>
<th>Metaphor related word?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Even</td>
<td>used for showing that you are saying something that is surprising</td>
<td>used for showing that you are saying something that is surprising</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>after</td>
<td>considering what happened in the past; used for saying that someone is influenced by past events</td>
<td>1. 'at a later time', OR 2. 'further along a road, railway etc'</td>
<td>1. Different, but no comparison OR 2. Comparison</td>
<td>1. No OR 2. Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>eighteen</td>
<td>the number 18</td>
<td>the number 18</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>months</td>
<td>one of the 12 periods that a year is divided into, such as January, February etc</td>
<td>one of the 12 periods that a year is divided into, such as January, February etc</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of</td>
<td>used for saying what type of thing is in a particular quantity or group</td>
<td>used for saying who or what has a particular feature, aspect, or quality</td>
<td>No comparison</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fretting</td>
<td>to worry about something continuously</td>
<td>to worry about something continuously</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the</td>
<td>The is used as the definite article before a noun; used before a noun that refers to an action, especially when it is followed by ‘of’</td>
<td>The is used as the definite article before a noun; used before a noun that refers to an action, especially when it is followed by ‘of’</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>speed</td>
<td>[uncountable and countable] the rate at which something happens or is done (Longman)</td>
<td>[uncountable and countable] the rate at which something moves or travels (Longman)</td>
<td>Comparison</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with</td>
<td>in a particular way; used for saying what sound or</td>
<td>if one person or thing is with another or does</td>
<td>Comparison</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>expression someone or something makes when they do something</td>
<td>something with them, they are together or they do it together</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>which used for introducing information that shows what specific thing or type of thing you are talking about. You can also use ‘that’ to introduce this type of relative clause, and this is more usual</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain’s economy</td>
<td>England, Scotland, and Wales</td>
<td>England, Scotland, and Wales</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[countable] the system by which a country’s trade, industry, and money are organized</td>
<td>[countable] the system by which a country’s trade, industry, and money are organized</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>is</td>
<td>[linking verb] used for giving information about someone or something, by giving their name, job, position etc, describing them, or saying where they are</td>
<td>[linking verb] used for giving information about someone or something, by giving their name, job, position etc, describing them, or saying where they are</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>now</td>
<td>at the present time</td>
<td>at the present time</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hurtling</td>
<td>To change state very quickly (novel usage - my gloss)</td>
<td>to move very quickly, especially in an uncontrolled way</td>
<td>Comparison</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>into</td>
<td>used for stating the result of a change</td>
<td>entering a place, building, or vehicle</td>
<td>Comparison</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| reverse | recession (novel usage - my gloss) | 1. to start to happen or to make something happen in the opposite way OR 2. the position of the gears in a vehicle that makes it go backwards (Longman) | 1. Comparison
Or 2. Comparison | Yes |
| comes | [intransitive] to happen | [intransitive] to move or travel to the place where you are | Comparison | Yes |
| as | used to say what job, duty, use, or appearance someone or something has (Longman) | used to say what job, duty, use, or appearance someone or something has (Longman) | Same | No |
| a | used before a noun that expresses your feelings about a situation | ? | / | No |
| shock | [countable] [usually singular] something that happens unexpectedly and makes you feel very surprised and upset | [countable] [usually singular] something that happens unexpectedly and makes you feel very surprised and upset | Same | No |

**Figure 3.1 The metaphor identification process**

Metaphor scholars have pointed to the ways in which time is often spatially conceived (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Evans, 2006) which would suggest that in the established literature, space is seen as a more fundamental, embodied dimension of human experience. From this it follows that we take 2 – ‘further along a road, railway etc’ – as the basic meaning, from which it then follows that ‘after’ is a
metaphor. However, there is also a compelling argument to say placing spatial and
temporal experience into a hierarchy when both forms of experiences are
unmediated is unwarranted. If, as cognitive linguists say, meaning is grounded in
the body (Johnson, 1987; Lakoff and Johnson, 1999), and both dimensions of
experience – time and space – are grounded in the physical interaction of our
bodies with the world, there is no reason to privilege one over the other. It is more
accurate to say that our embodied experiences of time and movement are
inextricably interlinked. We can think of time as motion or of motion as a series of
events that sequentially transpire. It is for this reason that I have provided both
temporal and spatial definitions of ‘after’ as basic meanings in my analysis.

Whereas ‘after’ produced more than one basic meaning, other lexical units
in the text yielded none. The co-ordinating conjunction, ‘which’, and the indefinite
article, ‘a’, both have dictionary definitions that defy any concrete definition. As
such, I have marked each as being non-metaphorical (which seems intuitively
correct). The other notable case in the analysis was the lexical unit, ‘of’. Although
the basic and contextual meanings of the word did not match, there was not
sufficient comparison between the two for it to be deemed metaphorical.

The main difficulty in this example consisted in identifying basic meanings.
Insofar as the type of analysis I am concerned with is a close, text-driven, discourse-
oriented account of metaphor, this is not really a problem. Any ambiguities can be
accommodated by simply factoring both basic meanings into the analysis. There is
no need to choose between basic meanings in the way one might have to if one
were performing an analysis of a large corpus of texts. In this latter type of study,
clear decisions are needed so that the frequency of metaphors in the text can be counted and statistical analyses carried out. To make such clear decisions, Pragglejaz (2007) suggests working in a team of analysts. Any ambiguities over basic meanings can be talked over so that a single decision is reached. The strength of MIP and MIP-VU is that they set the framework for a structured debate over what constitutes a metaphorically used word. The procedure makes explicit – ‘exhibits an openness’ (Freeman, 1993: 132) – the assumptions made by metaphor scholars as they identify metaphors in their chosen texts so that these assumptions may be judged, or even challenged, by critics of the work. Despite this openness of the procedure, I hesitate to say that this renders research more ‘scientific’ (Steen et al, 2011: 2) because it rests on a fundamentally inter-subjective assessment of what constitutes metaphorical language. Whereas scientists use objective units of measurement (for example, there is no debate that a metre is a unit based on the distance travelled by a quantum of light in a given amount of time) the criteria that determine whether or not linguistic metaphor is present in the text are socially negotiated: teams of analysts debate whether, according to the MIP and MIP-VU criteria, a particular word is used metaphorically. Whilst this may produce uniform results in one community of analysts, there is no reason to suppose it might do in another. Rather than argue that the method is scientific or suppose that, because it is, it is more valuable (see Cameron, 2011), the Pragglejaz group (2007) rightly make a virtue of the discursive aspect of the procedure. It is this aspect that makes the procedure valuable because, in the best tradition of stylistics, it aims to make the analyst’s assertions amenable to criticism. In this respect, rather than say that MIP and MIP-VU are scientific, I prefer to call the procedure ‘democratic’.
3.2.2 Finding metaphor in the conceptual system

To emphasise, MIP and its extension, MIP-VU, identify linguistic metaphor. They are not concerned with the conceptual content of those metaphors or the cognitive processes engendered by them in a reader’s mind. As such, MIP-VU is only the first step in attempting to fully account for metaphor. Building on this work, Steen (1999a, 2009) proposes a five step framework for moving beyond the linguistic level of analysis, to the conceptual. Having identified metaphor in the language, or the ‘surface text’ (Van Dijk and Kintsch, 1983), Steen (1999a, 2009) proposes four more steps which are designed to explicitly trace out the conceptual mappings present. He claims this procedure provides a way of systematically explicating the metaphoric mappings that are present in the discourse.

After identifying the metaphor related words in the text, Steen’s (1999a, 2009) second step is to turn the text into a set of propositions to create, following Van Dijk and Kintsch (1983), a ‘text-base’. To do this, the text is first separated into ‘discourse units’. Discourse units are usually based (grammatically) around independent clauses in the text. The example sentence from Prudence is going to be punished, and recklessness rewarded by Dan Roberts is a complex sentence with one embedded independent clause. It therefore functions as a single discourse unit. The discourse unit is then broken down into propositions:

DU: The speed with which Britain’s economy is now hurtling into reverse comes as a shock.

P1: SPEED COMES
P2: AS P1 SHOCK

P3: WITH SPEED P4

P4: ECONOMY HURTLE

P5: INTO P4 REVERSE

P6: POSSESS BRITAIN ECONOMY

I have underlined the metaphoric language in the discourse unit and the accompanying metaphoric concepts they encode in the propositions. The purpose of this step is to turn the language into a set of concepts or ‘text base’ (van Dijk and Kintsch, 1983) that breaks down the conceptual content of the discourse unit into manageable chunks of information (it is for this reason that some determiners have been left out of the propositional representation of the text). Like metaphor mnemonics, propositions are written in capitals to signify that they are conceptual entities. Crisp (2002) argues that for the purposes of the analysis, it does not matter whether propositions are viewed as psychologically real cognitions because the aim is to describe the semiotic content of the text; to represent the potential activation of the important conceptual content the text contains in a simple ‘rough and ready’ fashion which can easily be analysed (Crisp, 2002: 12). Contrary to Crisp (2002), in Section 3.2.3, below, I argue that this methodology does have theoretical implications for the way in which we view metaphor source and target domains. These implications have consequences relating to the types of figurative phenomena that the procedure identifies. Before outlining these criticisms, however, in providing an initial outline of the framework as a whole, it is enough to
say that a welcome advantage of formalising the conceptual ‘gist’ of the text in this manner is that it makes the identification of source domain language more amenable to scrutiny, clearly spelling out the concepts which readers access as they are prompted to do so by the text.

Step one of Steen’s (1999a, 2009) procedure used MIP-VU to identify linguistic metaphor and step two created a ‘text-base’ by matching the grammatical lexical units in the text to concepts. The metaphoric mapping of concepts is the subject of step three. After the text-base of propositions has been established and the metaphoric source domains identified, an open, formal comparison between the source domain and some yet to be posited target domain is established. We can see from the propositional analysis in step two of the procedure that the conceptual relations between metaphoric words in the example sentence are incredibly dense. Frequently, propositions are embedded within other propositions. It is for this reason that I want to tackle P4 and P5 together. These were:

P4: ECONOMY HURTLE

P5: INTO P4 REVERSE

One could write the comparison that is established as:

The economy is doing some action, a, such that it is undergoing a change of state, b, and acting differently, c. It may be asserted that there is some similarity between this and some object or entity, G, hurtling into reverse.

This may be formally expressed as:
\[(\exists F, a, b, c) (\exists G x, y, z) \{ \text{SIM} \ [\text{ECONOMY} (a, b, c), G (\text{HURTLE, INTO, REVERSE})] \} \]

The formalism summarises the analogical comparison between the two domains. The first two brackets, \((\exists F, a, b, c) (\exists G x, y, z)\), show that there is some analogy between the set of concepts \((a, b, c)\) belonging to the target domain \((F)\) and the set of concepts \((x, y, z)\) belonging to the source domain \((G)\). The next set of brackets, 
\{ \text{SIM} \ [\text{ECONOMY} (a, b, c), G (\text{HURTLE, INTO, REVERSE})] \}, express this analogical comparison, or similarity. The target concept, \text{ECONOMY} matches up to the as yet unidentified source domain concept, \(G\). The set of unidentified target domain concepts, \(a, b, c\), respectively match up to the source domain concepts \text{HURTLE, INTO, and REVERSE}. The role of this open comparison is to spell out the set of correspondences between source and target domains inhering in the metaphor.

Conversely, the role of step four is to identify the analogical structure between source and target domains. This means substituting concepts for the unknown values in the formal expression, turning it into a closed comparison:

\{ \text{SIM} \ [\text{ECONOMY} (\text{QUICKLY CHANGE, BECOME, RECESSION}), \text{OBJECT or VEHICLE} (\text{HURTLE, INTO, REVERSE})] \}

For the target domain concept, \(G\), I have substituted two potential concepts, \text{OBJECT} or \text{VEHICLE}. This is because, in the initial identification of MRWs ‘reverse’ was given two basic meanings: ‘to start to happen or to make something happen in the opposite way’ and ‘the position of the gears in a vehicle that makes it go backwards’. For the target domain concepts, \(a, b,\) and \(c\), I have substituted, respectively, the concepts \text{QUICKLY CHANGE, BECOME} and \text{RECESSION}. These are the
concepts that I infer are missing from the metaphor. Again, the advantage of this process is that it makes the analyst’s inferences more easily susceptible to scrutiny and criticism and paves the way for the fifth step. This step is different depending on which version of the method one uses. In Steen’s (1999a) earlier version, the role of the step is to spell out the metaphoric mappings in the proposition and to relate these to an over-arching conceptual metaphor of the type identified by Lakoff and Johnson (1980), for example GOOD IS UP, ARGUMENT IS WAR, AFFECTION IS HEAT etc. This is done by pairing up the corresponding source-target domain concepts which were identified in step four. In this example, they are:

THE ECONOMY IS AN OBJECT or THE ECONOMY IS A VEHICLE

HURTLING IS QUICKLY CHANGING

ENTERING IS BECOMING?

REVERSE IS RECESSION

I have put a question mark next to the mnemonic ENTERING IS BECOMING because it has changed the grammatical form of the preposition, ‘into’, into a gerund, ‘entering’. The constraints of expressing metaphor in a symmetrical, like-for-like mnemonic form – that is, in a ‘NOUN is a NOUN’ form, or a ‘GERUND is a GERUND’ form – necessitates expressing the conceptual content of the preposition verbally. To conceive of the preposition requires the gestalt understanding of a CONTAINER image-schema. ‘Into’ is simply not meaningful without this conceptual base (Langacker, 1987, 2008). Indeed, in English, ‘into’ usually collocates with a verb (see the Macmillan Online Dictionary). As such, ENTERING seemed the most fitting verbal
substitution; its most basic sense in the Macmillan Online Dictionary is ‘to go or come into a place’.

With the exception of the ENTERING IS BECOMING metaphor, and with the caveat that we take the ECONOMY to be analogically compared with a VEHICLE instead of an OBJECT, the metaphors in this example can be said to relate to the more general conception, THE ECONOMY IS A VEHICLE. In their corpus work, Charteris-Black (2004) and White (1997) both identify a similar metaphor which is used repeatedly in discourse, THE ECONOMY IS A MACHINE. One could say that the metaphors in this particular example are an instantiation of this conceptual metaphor. It is in this respect that, in its earlier incarnation (Steen, 1999a), step five is socio-cognitive insofar as it seeks to relate the metaphors that are found in the text to ‘socially shared’ conceptual metaphors. Or, to put it in a more precise, concrete and embodied fashion, step five asks whether a particular metaphor coheres with the way readers are repeatedly prompted by a set of texts (a corpus) to map a particular source domain onto a particular target domain.

The earlier (1999a) version of Steen’s five-step approach matches the inductive, bottom-up analysis of conceptual mappings to socially shared conceptual metaphors (shared for innate, biological reasons, for example, Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, 1999; Grady, 1997, or for more sinister, ideologically motivated reasons, for example, Charteris-Black, 2004; Koller, 2004, 2005; Goatly, 2007). However, in its later incarnation (Steen, 2009) the final step consists in identifying the communicative function of the metaphor in the discourse. In terms of the issues the step addresses, rather than orienting to metaphor as a socio-cognitive
Phenomenon, it can instead be thought of as concerned with the pragmatics of metaphor in use. It asks what the point of the metaphor is, or what is the writer of the metaphor trying to tell the reader by using it? In the example sentence from Roberts’ (2008) article, *Prudence is going to be punished*, one could summarise the communicative function of the metaphor as follows:

The writer is trying to tell me that the economy is slowing down at an alarming rate.

This summary represents what van Dijk and Kintsch (1983) would call the ‘context model’ readers produce as they participate in the discourse. Interestingly, the vehicular metaphor has permeated into my summary of the point I perceive Roberts is trying to make. After all, the economy is not literally ‘slowing down’. The alarm at the speed of the economic decline, however, is not metaphorically expressed in this summary although the feeling may well be intensified by the gerund, ‘hurtling’, which appears in the original sentence. In this instance, then, metaphor is having both a salient effect on how I construe the situation – it is structuring my understanding of what is happening to the economy (‘slowing down’) – and a ‘shading’ effect, insofar as it is intensifying the feeling of alarm which the word ‘shock’ in the example sentence indicates. The issue of metaphor salience, or foregrounding, and metaphor ‘shading’ is one I take up and explore further in Chapter 5.

Crisp et al (2002) use the formal propositional analysis developed by Steen (1999a) to create a taxonomy of the variety of different types of metaphor that can be found in discourse. As I listed in Section 3.1.2, the different types of metaphor...
they identify are single versus multiple, simple versus complex, pure versus mixed and restricted versus extended. The different types of metaphor identified by Crisp et al (2002) are defined by two factors. The first is the conceptual congruence of the conceptual domains, established by using propositional analysis, utilised in each type of metaphor (so, are the source domains the same or different?). The second factor concerns how the different metaphorically used words and their accompanying concepts are embedded in and relate to different propositions. So, for example, the metaphor discussed above stretched across two propositions, with one being embedded in the other:

P4: ECONOMY HURTLE

P5: INTO P4 REVERSE

In the first proposition (P4), the economy ‘hurtles’, which is then embedded in the next proposition (P5), where the hurtling goes into ‘reverse’. Crisp et al (2002: 61) would call this metaphor a ‘complex’ metaphor because of this embedding across multiple propositions. Crisp et al (2002) elaborate similar sets of rules for describing the remaining categories of their taxonomy. ‘Simple’ metaphors are those that are restricted to only one metaphorical proposition in the T-unit (which is Crisp et al’s (2002) term for what Steen (1999a) calls the ‘discourse unit’). ‘Multiple’ metaphors are those that have multiple metaphorical propositions, but the propositions are not embedded in one another (Crisp et al, 2002: 61). ‘Mixed’ metaphors are multiple or complex metaphors that use different source domains, whereas ‘pure’ metaphors are those that have congruent source domains (Crisp et al, 2002: 62).
Extended metaphors are those that are continued across multiple discourse units, whereas restricted metaphors are those that are not (Crisp et al, 2002: 64).

3.2.3 Strengths and weaknesses of the linguistic approach

MIP and MIP-VU provide rigorous procedures that can be used to find and code linguistic metaphor. Similarly, Steen’s (1999a, 2009) five-step procedure offers a transparent method for delineating the conceptual mappings potentially prompted by a linguistic metaphor (transparent, in any case, once one becomes familiar with the particular formal, almost algebraic, conventions that are used). The distinction this approach draws between conceptual and linguistic metaphor is also important. Text-driven approaches to metaphor must start with an account of the text. In beginning with the linguistic ‘surface text’ and working up, so to speak, Steen’s (1999a, 2009) approach to identifying conceptual mappings is perfectly consonant with this text-driven approach to meaning construction.

Whilst MIP-VU strays into discourse level territory with its discussion of anaphoric indirect metaphors, and whilst propositional approaches to metaphor have been used to make taxonomies of inter-clausal metaphor (see Crisp et al, 2002; Steen, 1999b), the analysis remains largely on the level of the clause. The approach provides rigorous description of the mappings prompted by clause-level metaphor and even inter-clausal metaphor, but does not have the analytical vocabulary to express how they are integrated into a discourse-level conceptual structure. Indeed, the adoption of propositional analyses in Crisp (2002), Crisp et al (2002) and Steen (1999a, 1999b, 2009) compounds this problem. Recall that in Crisp (2002) there is an important distinction made between conception, i.e. the
conceptual content or ‘gist’ of a linguistic form, and the actual cognitive processes that the linguistic form prompts: that is, it is not claimed that cognisors ‘think in propositions’. By adopting this approach, both Steen (1999a, 2009) and Crisp (2002) claim to take no position on contemporary debates in Cognitive Psychology about the nature of thought and conceptualisation (although I do discuss these issues in further detail in Chapter 4). However, using such a methodology does have theoretical implications. Crisp et al (2002) and Steen (1999b) use this method to develop a typology of different metaphors, including mixed and extended metaphor, based on the interaction of grammatical and propositional criteria. Carving-up the text into propositional chunks and then labelling these concepts as belonging to this or that source domain without regard to their embodied, image-schematic conceptual structure has the effect of creating potentially artificial conceptual divisions between domains. As Lakoff (1987) and, even earlier, Rosch (1978) and Rosch and Mervis (1981), point out, categories do not have fixed, discrete boundaries, but are instead constituted by more or less prototypical examples. Although analysts can make a formal distinction between source domains to judge whether they are mixed or not, this does not preclude the integration of these conceptual domains into a larger conceptual structure. Indeed, in Kimmel’s (2010) procedure for identifying mixed metaphor, he notes that the same image-schematic event structure often underpins multiple metaphors that might, at first glance, seem to be irreconcilably different. Making a rigid formal distinction between different source domains and therefore different types of metaphor is problematic if, in practice, discourse participants are capable of integrating seemingly disparate metaphors into an overarching megametaphor. In
Section 3.3.2, I examine the conceptual integration of just such a set of metaphors: MARKET DEPRECIATION IS DOWNWARD MOVEMENT, VALUE FLUCTUATION IS GYRATION and ECONOMIC CRISSES ARE NATURAL DISASTERS. If texts can prompt the creation by discourse participants of coherent extended conceptual structures comprised of metaphors from disparate source domains, then the value of the distinction made between mixed and extended metaphor needs to be re-assessed. The propositional approach is a useful method for transparently spelling out the concepts involved in a particular discourse unit. However, insofar as it relates to the study of discourse-level conceptual structures it limits the analysis to clusters of metaphors which are easily identified as belonging to the same source domain (rather than metaphors that belong to disparate source domains that might otherwise be integrated into a megametaphor).

To analyse megametaphor more is required than to note formal similarities and differences between the different domains involved in the various metaphors in a discourse. Whilst the linguistic paradigm offers a starting point for the analysis of megametaphor, the absence of any account of how metaphors might be integrated into an overarching mental representation rules out any prospect of it offering a comprehensive explanation of megametaphor. In the next section, therefore, I turn to a discussion of the conceptual paradigm exemplified earlier in Kimmel’s (2010) work.
3.3 Conceptual approaches to metaphor in discourse

In Section 3.1.2, I quoted Perrin (1971). The final sentence in this quote perhaps best summarises the theoretical impetus behind what I have termed conceptual approaches to metaphor. Here is the quote again:

A ‘mixed metaphor’ is simply an unsuccessful complex metaphor, one in which the figurative terms clash rather than harmonize. I do not know of a logical test by which successful and unsuccessful complex metaphors may be separated. The only test is the imagination of a sensitive reader (Perrine, 1971: 130).

From this perspective, the labels we apply to metaphor in discourse are not the product of formalising a grammatical rule or type of propositional analogy. The starting point is instead ‘the imagination of a sensitive reader’, which is to say the conceptual processes at play that make a particular constellation of metaphors meaningful (or not). It is this starting point which prompts Kimmel’s (2011) notion of an ‘imagistic core’. Kimmel (2011) defines mixed metaphors as instances of multiple metaphor in which the source domains of the metaphors involved have irreconcilable image-schematic structure. Although Kimmel’s (2011) general emphasis in the paper is not on discourse-level conceptual structures, the issue at stake in his double-layered method for identifying mixed metaphor is precisely how it may or may not be possible to integrate the metaphor in question into such an overarching mental model (indeed, Kimmel’s (2011) definition of extended metaphor might well be a series of metaphors whose ‘imagistic core’ is similar enough for them to be integrated into such an overarching conceptual structure).
The question of integrating metaphors into such a structure is most exhaustively covered by research in the field of Conceptual Integration Theory (Coulson and Oakley, 2001; Fauconnier and Turner, 2002). It is for this reason that in what follows I give a review of this framework. I then suggest that whereas work from the linguistic paradigm of metaphor research perhaps focussed too exclusively on the linguistic aspects of metaphor at the expense of its discourse-level conceptual characteristics, CIT does not sufficiently moor its account of conceptual integration in the language of the text. I conclude the chapter by bringing together some of these observations to characterise megametaphor and the type of framework analysts need to examine these conceptual structures.

### 3.3.1 Integrating Metaphors

From the perspective of Werth’s (1994) TWT schema, Steen’s (1999a, 1999b, 2009) procedure identifies micro-metaphor: that is, individual, clause-level uses of metaphor. CIT (see Coulson and Oakley, 2001; Fauconnier and Turner, 2002), or Blending Theory as it is also known, offers a terminology and conceptual apparatus for talking about the ways in which these micro-metaphoric structures might be integrated into a broader, discourse-level, macro-metaphoric structure. Importantly, CIT sees itself as not only a theory of metaphor, but a theory of thinking in general. The title of Fauconnier and Turner’s (2002) important volume, *The Way we Think*, is certainly superficially indicative of this widened scope. As a cognitive process, CIT theorists argue that conceptual integration helps us to solve problems (Fauconnier and Turner, 2002: 39-57), explains aspects of grammar
(Fauconnier and Turner, 1996) and syntax (Barlow, 2000; Mandelblit, 1997) and aids us in understanding narratives (Oakley, 1998).

3.3.2 What makes a blend?

Rather than positing two domains, as in CMT, CIT posits at least four ‘mental spaces’ feeding into the construction of metaphor. What defines a mental space is unclear, Fauconnier and Turner (2006: 307) write only that mental spaces are ‘very partial assemblies containing elements, and structured by frames and cognitive models’. I return to a discussion of what exactly constitutes a mental space below. For the current purposes of explanation of the model as a whole, it suffices to say for now that the totality of these spaces is called a conceptual integration network. Contained within the conceptual integration network are three kinds of mental space. In all conceptual integration networks there are at least two input spaces. Objects and entities in one of these input spaces will map onto equivalent relations in the others, in a similar fashion (though not identical, see Section 3.3.3) to source and target domains. In addition to the input spaces (of which there may be more than just two), there are two further spaces; a ‘generic space’ and a ‘blended space’. The ‘generic’ space, Fauconnier and Turner (2006: 308) say, ‘contains what those two [or more] inputs have in common at any moment in the development of the conceptual integration network’. The generic space captures structural analogies in each input space. Insofar as it relates to the research covered thus far, the generic space best matches what Kimmel (2011) calls the ‘imagistic core’ of a metaphor. It captures the abstract image-schematic structure that different inputs in the conceptual integration network have in common (I further interrogate the
Figure. 3.2 Components of a conceptual integration network

notion of a generic space in Chapter 4). Finally, the fourth ‘blended space’ is the space in which elements from the input spaces are merged in accordance with the structural similarities and analogies established in the generic space, hence the word ‘blend’. The blend itself is the product of three cognitive processes: the composition of elements in the input spaces; the completion of the blend by applying another cognitive resource, for example, a frame, which structures the contents of the blended space; and, finally, the elaboration of the blend (see Grady (2000) for a discussion of the psychological foundation of these processes). This final process is the point at which the blend is ‘run’; when the blend is dynamically represented in the mind of the discourse participant. It is at this point that the
blend may take on ‘emergent structure’ (Fauconnier and Turner, 2006: 315).

Emergent structure is the aspect (or aspects) of the blend which would not have been logically possible without the combination of structure from the input spaces. It is the conceptual content of the blend that exceeds the sum of its parts. Figure 3.2 outlines the configuration of mental spaces that comprise the conceptual integration network with respect to the metaphor ‘the market plummeted’. This clause is taken from an article by Benjamin Barber (2008, see Appendix 2) called *Decades of eroded trust and democracy did the damage*. I analyse a longer extract from this article in more detail, below.

In this conceptual integration network, the first input contains conceptual structure relating to the depreciation of market value, whereas the second input contains conceptual structure relating to the verb ‘plummet’. The generic space contains the structure that is mapped between the two inputs into the blended space. In this example, the generic structure is the vertical PATH image-schema that structures the metaphorical downward motion of market devaluation. Finally, the blended space is the space in which this metaphorical movement of market value is simulated. The emergent structure in this blend is such that changes in numerical value are conceived as changes in height. In this respect, one can say that this is another way of representing the conceptual metaphor \textit{VALUE IS VERTICAL HEIGHT}.

Although this was a very simple illustration, the conceptual architecture involved in CIT is more complex than that of CMT and therefore potentially more flexible. Multiple input spaces allow for several areas of a discourse participant’s knowledge to be integrated to create complex ‘multi-scope’ blends over longer
stretches of discourse. For example, take this longer extract from Decades of eroded trust and democracy did the damage, by Benjamin Barber (2008). It appeared on the website of the left-leaning British broadsheet, The Guardian, on 20th October 2008.

On that black Monday when the US Congress refused to pass the $700bn bail-out, the market plummeted 477 points. A few days later, after Congress reversed itself and passed the $700bn bail-out, the market dropped nearly 800 points. Since then it has gyrated wildly, drawing markets in Britain, continental Europe and Asia into the maelstrom (Barber, 2008, see Appendix 2).

In this extract, there is a conceptual development from the vertical movement of the market, to gyration-like movement, and then finally to the whirlpool-like movement of the maelstrom (for the sake of illustrative simplicity, I ignore the other metaphors in this extract). From the perspective of CIT, one can view this conceptual progression as the sequential addition, over the course of the discourse, of further inputs to the blend. The first input is the initial PATH schema of the plummeting and dropping market. The second input is the subsequent gyration of the market. Instead of being structured around a vertical PATH image-schema, I would define ‘gyration’ as circular movement about a fixed point (I also get a strong sense of centrifugal force associated with this verb). This input feeds into the generic space via its structural continuities with the previous, vertical PATH image-schema: that is, its ‘imagistic core’ (Kimmel, 2010) has structural continuities with
Figure 3.3 Getting from verticality to gyration

Figure 3.4 Getting from verticality to gyration to the maelstrom
The commonality between a vertical PATH image-schema and a circular PATH image-schema is their fixed point. Vertical movement has to be defined in relation to a landmark, just as circular movement is defined by its relation to a centre. In the generic space, then, there is a structural progression from movement defined in relation to its verticality, to movement defined by its relation to a fixed central point. I have represented this in Figure 3.3. The final additional input space is the more elaborate ‘maelstrom’. The whirlpool-like movement associated with the maelstrom certainly coheres with the circular gyrations of the market. The gyration input acts as a stepping-stone between the image-schema associated with verbs ‘plummet’ and ‘drop’ (PATH), and that associated with maelstrom (I have represented this ‘stepping stone’ process in Figure 3.4). As such, there is a synthesis of what on the surface seem like quite disparate metaphors, MARKET DEPRECIATION IS DOWNWARD MOVEMENT, VALUE FLUCTUATION IS GYRATION and ECONOMIC CRISES ARE NATURAL DISASTERS. In this example, very minimally defined schematic arrays of knowledge were combined to create a larger, discourse-level conceptual structure. With respect to looking at metaphor as a discourse phenomenon – that is, in its rootedness and interconnectedness with other linguistic, conceptual and pragmatic features of the discourse – the main advantage of CIT is its flexibility, especially when compared to the linguistic approaches in Section 3.2. The fact that CIT is able to account for multiple inputs in the blend means that it provides a potential terminology for describing megametaphor. However, the framework also raises a number of issues which I outline in the following section.
3.3.3 Blending: questions and answers

To re-quote Fauconnier and Turner (2006: 307), mental spaces are ‘very partial assemblies containing elements, and structured by frames and cognitive models’.

Similar definitions are introduced by Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 40) (mental spaces are ‘small conceptual packets’ and they ‘contain elements and are typically structured by frames’) and Grady et al (1999: 102) (‘a mental space is a short-term construct informed by the more general and more stable knowledge structures associated with a particular domain’). Dancygier (2006: 5) also emphasises the short term aspects of mental spaces when she parenthetically defines them as ‘temporary cognitive structures prompted by the use of linguistics forms’.

Somewhat more formally, Fauconnier (1985: 16) suggests that mental spaces are ‘constructs distinct from linguistic structures but built up in any discourse according to guidelines provided by the linguistic expressions’, and that they are structured incrementable sets – that is, sets with elements \((a, b, c, \ldots)\) and relations holding between them \((R_{1ab}, R_{2ab}, R_{3cbf}, \ldots)\) such that new elements can be added to them and new relations established between their elements (Fauconnier, 1985: 16).

In all these definitions, emphasis is placed on the provisional, temporary nature of mental spaces. Fauconnier (1985: 16) and Dancygier (2006: 5) both point to the fact that they are ‘mental objects’ (Fauconnier, 1985: 16) created ‘online’, as it were, in the moment of discourse. However, this emphasis on the ad hoc nature of mental spaces is problematic insofar as it is unclear how a ‘conceptual packet’ might be ‘partial’. Indeed, the most basic forms of conceptual organisation, image schemas,
and even more complex conceptual structures like ICMs, are gestalt structures (Lakoff, 1987: 489-91). This is to say that they are ‘psychologically simpler than [their] parts’ (Lakoff (1987: 489-90). A ‘partial’ gestalt is therefore a contradiction in terms. Mental space frameworks would benefit from a clearer elaboration of the relationship between ‘partial’ mental spaces and the basic experiential gestalts that comprise imageschemas and other conceptual structures. This relationship is hinted at by Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 40), who introduce the notion of a frame to their definition, and Grady et al (1999), who similarly relate mental spaces to domains. However, these relationships require further explanation.

By contrast, the notion of a domain used in CMT is relatively well defined in Cognitive Linguistics (see Lakoff, 1987: 68-76; Langacker, 2008: 44-54). Langacker (2008) uses the expression ‘domain’ to refer to more or less basic areas of experiential knowledge. Basic domains are cognitively irreducible, for example TIME, SPACE, COLOUR, PITCH and our sense of TEMPERATURE, whereas non-basic domains are comprised of complex configurations of basic experience (Langacker, 2008: 45). Langacker (2008: 47) likens these more complex configurations to what Lakoff (1987) describes as Idealised Cognitive Models (see Chapter 2, Section 1.2). Mnemonics, like LOVE IS A JOURNEY, refer to sets of correspondences between these more or less basic conceptual configurations (Lakoff, 1993). Although it is unclear, in using the term ‘partial assemblies’, Fauconnier and Turner (2006: 307) imply that mental spaces have a relationship to larger knowledge structures, like frames or ICMs. In this respect, one could infer that the differences between ‘spaces’ and ‘domains’ are analogous to the differences between a ‘profile’ and a ‘base’ in

Outlining the differences and similarities between domains and mental spaces also raises the question of the relationship between conceptual metaphor and conceptual integration networks. In their exploration of this issue, Grady et al (1999) make a similar distinction between the local, ad hoc structure of spaces, and their more global, stable counterparts in CMT. Rather than viewing CIT and CMT as antagonistic frameworks, they view both perspectives as mutually compatible. Within the bounds of the Conceptual Integration framework, conceptual metaphors are viewed as stable, unidirectional counterpart connections between elements in the input spaces: by ‘unidirectional’, it is meant that the relationship between the elements accords with Lakoff’s (1993) ‘invariance principle’ (see Chapter 2, Section 2.1); by ‘stable’, it is meant regularly occurring in discourse. Whilst attempts to clarify the similarities and differences between different technical vocabularies and concepts are welcome, the way in which Grady et al (1999) formulate the relationship between CMT and CIT is problematic. Superficially, it bears a resemblance to Bowdle and Gentner’s (2005) career of metaphor theory. In this account (see Chapter 2), as the metaphor’s ‘career’ progresses, there is a movement from ‘metaphor-as-structure-mapping’ to ‘metaphor-as-class-inclusion’. Similarly, in Grady et al (1999), we see a movement from blend, to stable mapping.
The difference in Bowdle and Gentner (2005) is a clear processing difference; discourse participants either analogically map some conceptual domain onto some other domain or instead simply understand some concepts as peripheral examples of a prototype category. However, because all blends depend upon the creation of counterpart connections between inputs, the difference between a stable connection (conceptual metaphor) and a novel connection (blend) in Grady et al (1999) is less apparent. They fail to adequately explain what CMT offers to CIT beyond introducing the concept of ‘invariance’.

I prefer to view CMT and CIT as fundamentally talking about the same thing. Both are concerned with how conceptual structure is mapped, be it from one domain onto another or many spaces to one. This raises its own problems. Just as the focus on conceptual metaphor, as opposed to the megametaphorical structures I have in mind, has led to a focus on examining cognition torn from its conceptual context, the tendency to think of CIT as a theory of everything, from thought, to grammar, to syntax, to narrative, to ritual etc., has meant that its account of metaphor has torn the phenomena from its proper discursive context. CIT leaves important questions unaddressed. These questions fundamentally relate to how cognisors participate in discourse and thereby manage inputs into the blend. For example, what is mapped between the inputs and why? Which inputs are included in the blend and why? CIT proposes a set of ‘optimality principles’ which attempt to address these issues (Fauconnier and Turner, 2006: 340-1), though the principles are themselves in need of greater specification. They are:
1. **Integration:** The scenario in the blended space should be a well-integrated scene.

2. **Web:** Tight connections between the blend and the inputs should be maintained, so that an event in one of the input spaces, for instance, is construed as implying a corresponding event in the blend.

3. **Unpacking:** It should be easy to reconstruct the inputs and the network of connections, given the blend.

4. **Topology:** Elements in the blend should participate in the same sorts of relations as their counterparts in the inputs.

5. **Good Reason:** If an element appears in the blend, it should have meaning.

6. An additional principle, leading to some of the fanciful imagery encountered in blends, is referred to as Metonymic Tightening: Relationships between elements from the same input should become as close as possible within the blend. For instance, Western images of personified Death often depict the figure as a skeleton, thus closely associating the event of death with an object that, in our more literal understandings, is indirectly but saliently associated with it (from Grady et al, 1999).

The optimality principles provide a set of maxims that multi-scope blends tend to orient towards. They partially address some questions relating to extended metaphoric structures: individual, sentence-level metaphors are included (by readers?) into extended blends when they contribute towards a ‘well integrated
scene’ (principle one) which includes an extended analogical network of topological relations (principle four). This might also include the creation of ‘candidate inferences’ by readers (Gentner and Markman, 1997) because events in one input imply corresponding events in another (principle two). However, the principles also present problems from the perspective of the discourse-oriented framework adopted in this thesis. If discourse is defined as text-driven communication between discourse participants, the optimality principles are too abstract to apply meaningfully to an analysis because they relate to cognition in the absence of discourse. If texts drive the activation of discourse participant knowledge, and if in doing so, they prompt readers to create a metaphorical mapping between two or more spaces to create a blend, it makes no difference whether the blend conforms to any of the optimality principles or not: discourse participants are being prompted to make the mapping regardless. This is not to say that the optimality principles are not useful for describing ‘good’ blends – blends in which discourse participants integrate multiple inputs into a coherent conceptual model – but they fail to tell us how discourse participants ‘make do’, so to speak, in actual instances of communication. Similarly, given that metaphor takes place in a particular communicative context involving two or more people, the optimality principles also fail to say anything about how or why a discourse participant might produce a ‘bad’ blend. CIT’s concern with the big themes of human thinking and creativity has led to a neglect of an adequate theory of discourse production and reception, which is accompanied by an inadequate rooting of the theory in the fabric of the text. This raises the following questions:
• How do discourse participants manage cluster of metaphors that do not adhere to these optimality principles? What happens to ‘tricky’ metaphors? Are they written off as meaningless?

• In cases where individual metaphors do adhere to these optimality principles, are they always integrated into the blend by discourse participants?

• Can discourse participants manage multiple blended spaces already made up of multiple input spaces; are all inputs integrated into the same blended space; if not, why not?

I address these questions in Chapter 4. Before doing so, however, I now provide a final summary of the linguistic and conceptual paradigms examined in this chapter along with how these paradigms might relate to the study of megametaphor.

3.4 Megametaphor

I began this chapter with a discussion of extended and mixed metaphor because both figurative phenomena relate to the question of how, if at all, disparate smaller conceptual structures ‘link up’ to create larger discourse-level structures. Out of that discussion emerged two ways of approaching these discourse-level structures. The first, which I called the linguistic paradigm, concerns itself with devising processes to identify metaphor in the language and rules for formally analysing metaphorical propositions. One advantage of this approach is that conceptual analysis proceeds from a linguistic analysis of the text. Insofar as it relates to the examination of megametaphor, this is an advantage because, as I argued in Chapter
2, megametaphors are text-driven conceptual structures. Another advantage is that the procedures for finding and describing linguistic and conceptual metaphor are rigorous and transparent. Work in this paradigm had been used to create taxonomies of different formally and grammatically defined types of discourse-level metaphor (Steen 1999b; Crisp et al, 2002). Problematically, though, whilst the approach facilitates the creation of these metaphor categories, it lacks the theoretical vocabulary to describe the ways in which multiple clause-level metaphors might be integrated into an overarching conceptual structure. Moreover, if in practice discourse participants integrate metaphors into an overarching conceptual structure even when source domains are ‘mixed’, there seems little use in making a formal distinction between mixed or extended metaphor (short of making a normative judgement over whether a mixed metaphor might be a bad use of language).

The second approach, which I called the conceptual paradigm, was exemplified by CIT. It concerns itself with the question of how metaphors are integrated into such an overarching structure. The main advantage of this paradigm is its flexibility. Multiple input spaces allow for the description and analysis of complex discourse-level conceptual blends. Indeed, of the frameworks discussed in this chapter, the notion of a discourse-level blend probably best approximates what I have in mind in my use of the term megametaphor. As I demonstrated in my analysis of Barber’s (2008) article, *Decades of eroded trust and democracy did the damage*, the notion of a blend is a powerful tool in explaining how multiple metaphors from disparate ‘mixed’ source domains can be integrated into a single
mental representation of the discourse. However, there are also important

differences between CIT’s notion of a blended space and my own use of the term
megametaphor. As I noted at the beginning of this chapter and the end of the last,
megametaphors are readerly structures. They are the metaphoric conceptual
structures created by readers as they take part in a discourse. Megametaphors
differ from blended spaces insofar as they are not created according to a set of
abstract ‘optimality principles’, but are the product of a reader’s engagement with a
text. As such, they are text-driven and therefore created ‘online’ in actual instances
of discourse. In this respect they also differ from conceptual metaphors, which are
relatively stable conceptual mappings that structure human thinking irrespective of
the text. Megametaphors may well re-instantiate and thereby reinforce these
stable mappings, but they are ultimately prompted by the text. The difference is
rather like the difference between the prototype of a given category and an actual
instantiation of that category, or, to anticipate a distinction I draw in the next
chapter, the difference between a frame and a text-world.

Megametaphors, then, are discourse-level conceptual structures comprised
of multiple metaphors (that may come from disparate source domains) that are
created by readers in response to linguistic prompts from the text. In the next
chapter, I outline in further detail the ways in which megametaphors are text-
driven. This requires a deeper examination of the interrelation between language
and conceptual systems. As I will argue, the concept of a text-world is integral to
understanding this interrelation.
This thesis is an attempt to describe and argue for a cognitive approach to metaphor which situates the phenomenon within actually occurring instances of discourse about the economy. In Chapter 2, I described the dynamic view of metaphor such a discourse-oriented approach would take, and in Chapter 3 I described the metaphoric phenomena it would be most interested in examining: megametaphor. In this chapter, I flesh out the discussion of discourse given in Chapter 2 and use this to re-evaluate the linguistic and conceptual aspects of metaphor described in Chapters 2 and 3. To do so I draw on multiple frameworks, chiefly Text World Theory (Gavins, 2007; Werth, 1994, 1999), but also work in Cognitive Psychology (Barsalou, 2003; Barsalou et al, 1993) and Cognitive Linguistics (Brandt and Brand, 2002; Evans, 2006; Langacker, 1987, 1991, 2008; Zwaan, 2003). I then apply these frameworks in the analysis of two op-ed pieces about the economic crisis. In this respect, one of the key aims of this chapter is to provide practical examples of megametaphor analyses from the discourse-oriented perspective I am advocating.

In this chapter, my original contributions to metaphor studies are twofold: firstly, I argue that abstract, complex source domains like ECONOMY are better thought of as ‘situations’ which are internally structured by metaphor (as opposed to thinking of them as ‘literal’ domains of human experience awaiting a mapping); and secondly, I suggest that the conceptual structures prompted by metaphor cannot be fully accounted for unless analysts also factor in the discourse-level
conceptual and linguistic contexts in which clause-level micro-metaphors (see Werth, 1994) are produced. TWT provides a way of modelling this conceptual and linguistic context (see Gavins, 2007; Werth, 1999). This theoretical perspective sees discourse as an interaction between the text and the cognitive processes comprising discourse participants’ 'knowledge'. In fact, later in Section 4.1.3, I substitute the term ‘knowledge’ for what can more precisely be called the ‘conceptual system’, on the basis that the former term is mired in philosophical controversies relating to the nature and status of truth and belief (for cognitivist critiques of traditional objectivist views of knowledge, see Lakoff 1987; and Lakoff and Johnson, 1999) whereas the latter term refers more neutrally to the mental entities (and the relationships between these entities) that populate cognisors’ long and short term memories. My intention in this chapter is to examine the relationship between the conceptual system and metaphoric language in order to offer a theoretical account of how discourse participants generate discourse-level megametaphors.

Just as work in TWT (and, more broadly, Cognitive Poetics) such as Gavins (2007), Gavins and Stockwell (2012) and Werth (1999) anchor cognitive poetic analyses in a linguistic description of the text, both Steen (1999a, 1999b 2009) and Crisp (2002) anchor their conceptual – or propositional – analyses in a description of the linguistic metaphors they find using the Pragglejaz (2007) and MIP-VU techniques (Dorst, 2011; Krenmayr, 2011; Steen et al, 2011). In both TWT and in what I termed the linguistic paradigm in metaphor research (see Chapter 3) there is a distinction between the language system and the conceptual system. I maintain
this distinction in my own work. In this chapter, I move from an outline of what comprises the conceptual system (Section 4.1), to an outline of the language system (Section 4.2). I explore the text-driven interrelation of these two systems in the production of economic metaphors by returning to Benjamin Barber’s (2008) article on the economic crisis, entitled *Decades of eroded trust and democracy did the damage* (Section 4.3). I go on to argue that it is the interaction of these two systems that leads to the creation of a series of text-worlds which themselves provide the conceptual context for mega-metaphorical structures; structures that are contingent upon this conceptual backdrop. In Section 4.3.5, I demonstrate the ways in which negated text-worlds (see Hidalgo Downing, 2000, 2002, 2003) organise and structure the boundaries of megametaphor with respect to Boris Johnson’s (2008) article *Eat, spend and be merry – this is not the end of the world*.

### 4.1 The conceptual system

In this section I outline what I mean by the term ‘conceptual system’. To do so, in Section 4.1.1 and 4.1.2, I describe two experiential theories of how this conceptual level of discourse is structured; Barsalou et al’s (1993) ‘world model’ and Werth’s (1999) ‘discourse world’. In Section 4.1.3, I then compare the relative merits of each position and argue that whilst Barsalou et al (1993) provide a convincing account of how the conceptual system is grounded in our capacity for selective attention and short and long term memory, their framework overlooks some important ways in which abstract concepts, like ECONOMY, are first encountered textually, in the moment of discourse (as opposed to as a direct, perceptual encounter). I turn to Werth’s (1999) account of frame formation and argue that his account better
describes the formation of abstract concepts. However, I also note that it rests on making a problematic distinction between ‘functional’ and ‘propositional’ knowledge types. To address this, I synthesise Werth (1999) and Barsalou et al’s (1993) approach by recasting the distinction between functional and propositional knowledge types as a distinction between conceptualisation and language: the language system and the conceptual system. It is through discourse that cognisors create a conceptual frame for the economy consisting of a complex ‘situation’ (see Barsalou et al, 1993; Werth 1999) which relates the often abstract constituent concepts of the economy – markets, banks, governments etc. – to one another. I suggest that metaphor plays a crucial role in the creation of this situation, acting as the conceptual ‘glue’ which gives it coherence. My approach differs from traditional CMT approaches because it sees the ECONOMY not as a phenomenologically autonomous domain of human experience, but rather a concept which is already constituted by the metaphors structuring the relationships between constituent parts of the concept frame.

The structure of this section reflects the overall movement in this chapter from conception to language. I therefore start with Barsalou et al’s (1993) ‘world model’ approach, which has as its central concern the human conceptual system, and then move onto Werth’s (1999) more discourse-oriented account. This latter focus on the interrelation between discourse and cognition naturally leads me from a discussion of the conceptual system in this section, to a discussion, in Section 4.2, of the linguistic level of the discourse model I set out at the beginning of the chapter.
4.1.1 World Models

It is important from the outset to say that Barsalou et al (1993) do not frame the importance of their ‘world model’ approach with respect to how knowledge is employed in discourse. Indeed, this particular paper gives only a passing reference to the interrelation of the conceptual system and language (Barsalou et al, 1993: 6). Rather than concern itself with ‘knowledge’, Barsalou et al’s (1993) discussion is concerned with ‘concepts’. Their goal in the paper is to sketch the structure of the human conceptual system and to explain the ways in which it is a product of our human experiences. To do this, they eschew propositional approaches to modelling concepts in favour of an approach which sees concepts as situated, modal simulations (Barsalou, 2003: 521). Barsalou et al’s (1993) model of the conceptual system is the ‘world model’. World models are cognisors’ beliefs about the current state of the world… The core of a world model is a hierarchical system of spatial frames... This spatial core represents locations in the world hierarchically... Within the spatial core of a world model, we propose that people represent the current positions and states of familiar individuals (Barsalou et al, 1993: 9).

At the lowest point in this hierarchy of spatial frames is what Barsalou et al (1993) call ‘perceptual symbols’. Perceptual symbols are modal components of perceptual experience. Selective attention extracts perceptual symbols from our experience, which are then stored in long term memory. For example, I have on my desk a blue book. Looking at the book from the front I can define at least two aspects from my perception; the book’s shape, ‘rectangle’, and its colour, ‘blue’. Selectively focusing
my attention on these aspects might cause me to derive perceptual symbols for them which I then identify in other entities in the world. Perceptual symbols are therefore generalised aspects of our experience that are derived from selective attention to our cognitive environment (Barsalou et al, 1993: 5). They are also compositional (Barsalou, 1993) because they can be combined to create larger cognitive structures (‘blue’ plus ‘rectangle’ equals a ‘blue rectangle’). These larger constellations of perceptual symbols are mental representations of ‘individuals’. As Barsalou explains, ‘in the scheme of a world model, individuals, both animate or inanimate, are central ontological entities’ (Barsalou et al, 1993: 10). This is to say that individuals are mental representations of entities (that is, objects and people) that cognisors have experienced by either perception or, as is the case with fictional characters, introspection. For example, a mental representation of the individual, ‘my house’, is comprised of a series of multi-modal perceptual symbols, such as the overall shape of the house, the shape of its doors and windows, the geometrical relation they have to one another, the colour and texture of the bricks, the doors, the walls, the smell of the kitchen etc. Importantly, upon occasion, some of the perceptual symbols constituting ‘my house’ change. For example, my front door has not always been green. To cope with multiple ‘specialisations’ of an ‘individual’, Barsalou et al (1993) posit the notion of a frame:

A frame is a data structure that serves to capture stable information about the individual over time, as well as variability... [F]rames are large collections of perceptual symbols integrated to form a unified representation of an entity, in this case, an individual (Barsalou et al, 1993: 10).
In the context of Barsalou et al’s (1993) model, frames are the sum of experiential information cognisors possess in relation to a particular entity. Indeed, Barsalou et al (1993) posit a rule; the ‘one entity one frame’ principle, which says that ‘only one frame represents one individual’ (Barsalou et al, 1993: 11). This is designed to reflect the ontological assumption that an individual represents a single entity in the world and that this entity exists continuously over time.

Related to individuals is the notion of ‘models’. Models are types of individual. ‘Unlike individuals, models do not have corresponding physical entities in the world… Certainly, different individuals in the world may instantiate a model, but no direct physical counterpart to the model exists’ (Barsalou et al, 1993: 11). Moreover, ‘the frame for a model is a data structure that integrates perceptual symbols across multiple individuals, capturing constancies and organizing variability’ (Barsalou et al, 1993: 12). Whereas I have a frame for my house, I have also produced a model for houses in general which will include perceptual symbols for common features of houses (I know there must be a door and that it will be at the ground level, for example). Prototypes (Rosch, 1978; Rosch and Mervis, 1981) approximate the idea of a model, but differ in important ways. Whereas prototypes are based on a concept possessing the most statistically significant features within a given category, models are comprised of perceptual symbols. This means that models are updated locally with respect to the specialisation of one or more perceptual symbols in the model frame, whereas prototypes are revised across the whole network of concepts contained within a category. Importantly, then, models are specialised with respect to a particular situation, or context. Conversely,
prototypes have features that are most likely to appear across a range of contexts, hence their status as central examples of a category. Put differently, prototypes are the concept most likely to fit most contexts, or a range of situations. In defining models, Barsalou et al (1993) start from the opposite position; model frames are only meaningful insofar as they relate to an actual real-world situation (Barsalou, 1991). Models are therefore context-sensitive, or ‘situated’ (Barsalou, 2003).

The notion of a ‘situation’ is therefore of central importance in Barsalou et al’s (1993) work. For Barsalou et al (1993), situations are comprised of ‘images’ which are themselves comprised of sets of perceptual symbols that represent individuals and/or models arranged in a static spatial configuration and perceived (or ‘construed’ see Langacker, 2008; Zwaan, 2003) from a particular perspective. A series of images combines to make a situation, depicting a relatively constant set of individuals/models that change in some way over time in a relatively constant region of space. Barsalou et al (1993) differentiate between two types of situation; episodic and generic. The difference is similar to the difference between individual and model frames. Episodic situations are cognitive representations of an actual situation, whereas generic situations ‘like models... do not have direct counterparts in the physical world but have the ontological status of mental types’ (Barsalou et al, 1993: 20). Model and individual frames are always derived from actual situations (which can themselves be the product of perception or introspection). This means that ‘a specialized frame develops and becomes associated with [a] generic situation’ (Barsalou et al, 1993: 23-4). Rather than concepts being stable mental entities which are plucked from reader cognition, concepts are conditioned by the
cognitive environments – the situations – in which they are evoked. As I will argue below, this has quite radical consequences for the notions of ‘domain’ and ‘mental space’ in CMT and blending theory.

At the heart of Barsalou et al’s (1993) paper and Barsalou’s broader research (for example, Barsalou, 1999, 2003, 2008a, 2008b, 2012) is an attempt to ground the human conceptual system in the brain’s modal systems and thereby provide an embodied account of conception that is based on situated, modal simulations. By ‘simulation’, it is meant that the concepts we have stored in our memory actually re-enact the physical or introspective states that feature in our real-world experiences of those concepts. As Barsalou (2008: 618) explains, ‘[s]imulation is the re-enactment of perceptual, motor, and introspective states acquired during experience with the world, body, and mind’. Using the example of a chair, Barsalou (2008) goes on to outline how simulations are stored in the memory, becoming concepts:

As an experience occurs (e.g., easing into a chair), the brain captures states across the modalities and integrates them with a multimodal representation stored in memory (e.g., how a chair looks and feels, the action of sitting, introspections of comfort and relaxation). Later, when knowledge is needed to represent a category (e.g., chair), multimodal representations captured during experiences with its instances are reactivated to simulate how the brain represented perception, action, and introspection associated with it (Barsalou, 2008: 618).
The conceptual system reproduces the states captured in our day-to-day experiences and is therefore grounded in all the modalities this experience involves; our sense of sight, smell, taste, touch, hearing, temperature; our proprioceptive and motor systems; and our sense of pain. Over time and through multiple exposures to similar patterns of multi-modal experience, all these modal experiences and perceptual symbols are integrated into frames and models (for a comprehensive example of this simulative process with respect to the concept, ‘car’, see Barsalou, 1999). This theory of concepts is what Barsalou (2008) calls ‘grounded’ cognition. I would argue that Barsalou’s (1999, 2003, 2008) theory of grounded cognition seems intuitively more likely than other, ‘propositional’ approaches to the conceptual system. These approaches suggest that cognisors conceptualise in an amodal language of thought (for example, Fodor, 1975; with respect to stylistics, see also Louwerse and van Peer, 2009). Barsalou (1993, 2003) and Barsalou et al (2003) reject such an amodal theory for four reasons: there is no account of how such an amodal language might arise in the cognitive system; they say that there is no evidence to suggest such a mental language exists; there is no account of how these abstract amodal symbols are linked to their referents in the world; and, finally, propositions are linguistically vague (see below for a more detailed description of linguistic vagueness). They continue:

In general, the manner in which theorists construct propositional representations seems neither illuminating nor explanatory. Consider the propositional representation of "The lamp is above the table," namely, ABOVE (lamp, table). Essentially, this proposition is the result of dropping the
closed class words of the sentence and retaining the content words in a way that captures the conceptual relation between them, using parentheses and a comma. Because a longer string of words has simply been reduced to a shorter string, we haven't actually re-represented the original sentence in a true language of thought – we have simply dropped words that carry information about surface structure and retained words that capture gist. This gist doesn't convey anything conceptual, because it is just words. Again, we have the symbol grounding problem: Reference is not truly established to the world, but is necessarily mediated by the theorist or programmer who constructed the propositional representation (Barsalou et al, 1993: 4).

Propositional approaches to concepts are rejected because although they capture ‘gist’, they fail to escape or represent anything beyond language. Barsalou et al’s (1993) ‘model frames’ and ‘individual frames’ seem a far more plausible description of concepts on the basis that they are grounded in actual human experience, in all its sensory complexity.

Although their model convincingly grounds the conceptual system in our capacity for selective attention and the identification of perceptual symbols which can be composed into larger, more complex frames, Barsalou et al (1993) acknowledge that it cannot fully explain one type of concept; abstract concepts. Abstract concepts are notable because they are not tangible, directly experienced phenomena, like ‘individuals’, which can be directly represented with perceptual symbols. Neither can they be ‘models’ in the sense that Barsalou et al (1993) use the term. It is with this shortcoming, or gap, in the account in mind that I now turn
to another approach to the mental entities existing in cognisor’s heads; Werth’s (1999) notion of a ‘discourse world’.

4.1.2 Discourse Worlds

Whereas Barsalou et al (1993) are interested in the mental entities populating cognisors’ world models, Werth’s (1999) focus is on how these entities interact with the text in the course of a discourse. Werth (1999) defines a discourse world as follows:

The discourse world is the situational context surrounding the speech event itself. It includes all of those elements... which are perceived by (‘manifest to’) the discourse participants. The discourse world minimally contains the participants and what they can see, hear, etc. However, it must also contain what the participants can work out from their perceptions. This is an important point since the discourse world cannot simply be a matter of sense input (Werth, 1999: 83, emphasis in original).

The discourse-world is not only a physical, but a cognitive space. As Werth (1999: 86) points out, ‘[s]peakers are not only equipped with their physical senses, they also carry a store of memories and knowledge, and are capable of imagining situations they have never experienced’. The discourse-world includes both the immediate situation in which the communicative interaction takes place, and the discourse participants’ knowledge of the world. The cognitive aspect of the discourse-world – which is to say discourse participants’ memories, attitudes and beliefs about the world and also their knowledge of the entities populating it – is a
necessary requirement even when ‘a discourse is exclusively about the discourse-world. This is because, even in these cases, speakers need their memories and imagination to recognise all the entities present in the environment’ (Werth, 1999: 86). The discourse-world, then, is not an objective, encyclopaedic account of the real world. It is, rather, individuated, experiential knowledge possessed by discourse participants. Werth (1999: 103-113) later suggests that this discourse world knowledge is organised into frames (Minsky, 1975; Fillmore, 2006) and likens frames to Lakoff’s (1987) conception of an ICM, holding to the notion that frames/ICMs are

experiential models of (part of) human life which direct and influence human understanding of aspects of the world, as mediated through human perceptions and cultural knowledge (Werth, 1999: 107).

Werth’s (1999) notion of a frame differs from Barsalou et al’s (1993). For Barsalou et al (1993), frames are agglomerations of perceptual symbols which represent concepts (individuals and models). They are purely perceptual. For Werth (1999), frames are the marriage of both perceptual information and cultural knowledge. To avoid confusion, instead of referring to Barsalou et al’s (1993) individual and models as frames, I will call these notions ‘individual and model concepts’ because they relate to purely conceptual entities. However, I will retain Werth’s (1999) terminology because what Werth (1999) calls a frame has more in common with the classic literature on frame semantics (see Fillmore, 2006) and the mental entities referred to by Shank and Abelson (1977). Werth (1999) builds on this work
and the work done by Lakoff (1987) by suggesting that the concept of a frame is fundamentally related to the notion of a situation. He writes:

The very notion, ‘situation’... is the consequence of human conceptualisation - it has been framed by human cognitive processes into a complex category of human experience (Werth, 1999: 110).

Cognisors produce a mental model of a situation. These mental models are then grouped according to ‘situation-type’, based on similarity; ‘they must be sufficiently similar to count as recurrences of something previously experienced’ (Werth, 1999: 111). If frames have their origins in the experience of a range of similar, repeatedly encountered situations, ‘we would still need to know why a particular frame consisted of that particular set of situation types’ (Werth, 1999: 112). That is, cognisors need a principle by which to group situation-types together; ‘a mechanism that will also match situation-types with relevant areas of cultural (and other) knowledge’ (Werth, 1999: 112). In Werth’s formulation, a frame is perceptual information plus cultural knowledge. He raises the question of how cognisors get from having an understanding of a simple, experiential situation-type to the complex, cultural/experiential fusion of knowledge that a frame entails. The answer he gives hinges on a distinction between the ways in which discourse world knowledge can be expressed. On the one hand, knowledge can be represented propositionally as a set of ‘facts’ (for example, 'cars have steering wheels'). On the other, knowledge is also functional insofar as it relates to the performance of a set of acts (for example, 'driving') (Werth, 1999: 101-3). Propositional expressions of knowledge often make expert systems of functional knowledge explicit,
instantiating functional knowledge in language. Werth (1999: 111) claims that although situation-types are often purely experiential, or non-linguistic, ‘many – perhaps most – of the situation types we recognise involve language in a fundamental way’. That is, ‘most experienced phenomena... can be reported on propositionally’ (Werth, 1999: 111). Situations, then, are often recounted in discourse.

Discourse consists of the conjunction of the propositions actually expressed (together with their inferences) and the knowledge evoked by those propositions. When a situation is expressed in propositions, each one is also accompanied by relevant information from the participant’s knowledge store. We can therefore see that when this happens often enough to set up a pattern, we get a frame. But each individual time it happens, we get a text world, or the representation of a specific context for a particular discourse (Werth, 1999: 112).

Discourse is the site of convergence between repeated experience and cultural knowledge. It brings together linguistic expressions depicting a situation – propositions – with the experiential and cultural knowledge of the discourse participants to create a text-world and it is this collection of similar text-worlds which become a frame. ‘A frame, then, is a distillation from a pattern of text worlds, representing complexes of situation-types and background knowledge’ (Werth, 1999: 112). Text-worlds are not simply produced by the interplay of linguistic forms, their propositional content and participants’ discourse world knowledge; they are also constitutive of this discourse world knowledge. The
relationship of discourse world to text-world is dialectical; text-worlds re-express frames that are themselves generalised from cognisors repeated construction of similar text-worlds.

4.1.3 Discussion: situations, frames and abstract concepts

If discourse-world knowledge, organised as frames, is the marriage of propositional knowledge and functional knowledge (or, put differently, 'language plus cultural know-how'), and if a discourse is defined as the interaction between text and discourse world knowledge, our participation in one particular discourse depends upon our knowledge of another. In this respect, Werth’s (1999) notion of discourse participant knowledge is fundamentally inter-discursive because the knowledge activated by discourse participants is itself the product of discourse. Discourse produces knowledge at the same time as it relies upon it. As such, the argument also runs the risk of being circular. There needs to be some way of grounding participant knowledge outside of discourse. In anchoring frames in situations, Werth (1999) provides fertile ground for doing this, but fails to offer an adequate account of what exactly a situation is.

are grounded in our perception of the world and the human capacity to direct
selective attention onto different aspects of our experience. Barsalou et al (1993)
outline a series of cognitive mechanisms by which we conceptually carve up our
continuous experience into contiguous episodes; events, situations and images.

Whilst there are certainly continuities in the way these researchers
definition of a frame. For Werth (1999), frames consist in experiential, ‘functional’
knowledge plus propositional knowledge. Problematically, Barsalou et al (1993) and
Barsalou (2003) are opposed to the amodal, ‘language of thought’ implied by the
latter kind of knowledge. I use the term ‘implied’ advisedly insofar as it is not clear
whether Werth (1999) is, after all, using the term ‘propositional’ in the sense that

The relationship between functional and propositional knowledge (or image-
schemas and propositional frames) is nothing more or less then the
relationship between cognition and language. By language, I really mean the
mental representation of language, and by cognition, I am referring to non-
linguistic conception (Werth 1999: 111, emphasis in original).

If cognition consists of ‘functional knowledge’, ‘image schemas’ and ‘non-linguistic
conception’, then it is unclear whether ‘propositional knowledge’, ‘propositional
frames’ and ‘the mental representation of language’ are in fact linguistic
conception. This idea of linguistic conception – or an ‘amodal language of thought’
(Barsalou, 2003) – is clearly at odds with a modal, situated and experiential view of
concepts and the conceptual system (a view of concepts that harmonises more with

There is a sense, however, in which a ‘mental representation of language’ need not engender a propositional view of conception. It is quite possible for cognisors to introspectively use language without recourse to verbalisation. However, this introspective use of language does not constitute conceptualisation. Introspective language has a conceptual referent in the same way that verbalised words do. Those referents are the experiential, situated simulations Barsalou (2003) describes. Whether or not the language used in this internal monologue or even in the external language use of written or spoken discourse can be said to be knowledge (and not simply express it) is a different, more profoundly philosophical question than I have time to answer in this thesis. As such, I want to avoid using the term ‘knowledge’ altogether. I want, rather, to explore the relationship between, on the one hand, concepts and their relationship to one another (mental representations of ‘situations’, in the sense that both Werth (1999) and Barsalou et al (1993) use the term) and, on the other hand, the text. On the surface, this seems rather similar to Werth’s (1999) focus. However, it dispenses with what is fundamentally quite a problematic category (‘knowledge’ and all its associated philosophical baggage) and replaces it instead with ‘conceptualisation’. In this formulation, the principle concern is with the way in which language expresses an underlying conception; a system of interrelated concepts. Here, ‘propositional knowledge’ is recast as the language system and ‘functional knowledge’ as the ‘conceptual system’. The language system is the means by which human beings turn the interrelated array of concepts constituting their thoughts into reflexive objects of study and examination in an act of public or introspective
communication. The passing of thought into language is the transformation of individual subjective conceptualisation into a textual artefact – an object – amenable to interpretation by an individual, group or whole community of discourse participants.

It is in this passing from subjective conception to object of interpretation and back again that Werth’s (1999) conception of a frame is useful in the understanding of abstract concepts. Whilst being abstract and intangible (and therefore ideally suited target domains), concepts like LOVE are phenomenologically more immediate than abstract concepts like ECONOMY. Human beings feel LOVE for someone or something. They do not ‘feel’ the ECONOMY. There is a sense, then, in which concepts like ECONOMY are at a phenomenological remove; we do not have direct access to the ECONOMY in the same way that we do to our own experiences of LOVE. The economy is not an object we encounter wandering the brute reality beyond the walls of our bodies. Neither is it an internal, emotional response to stimulation from this outside environment. Our first encounters with the economy are textual. We read or hear of the state of the economy, of economic crises and the exigencies of the global economic system. While aspects of the ECONOMY concept may be physically experienced and perceived – for example, the exchange of money for goods, depositing money in the bank, the unfortunate personal consequences of unemployment – a significant proportion of it is also constituted in the processes of text and talk. The frame for the ECONOMY is therefore properly established as the aggregation of multiple text-worlds; text-worlds which all depict the economy with respect to a certain situation. Situations themselves consist of
multiple constituent entities; most basically perceptual symbols, but also individual
and model concepts. These constituent concepts are themselves often incredibly
complex. So, economies have markets, bond markets, banks, consumers,
businesses, governments etc. I analyse one such complex constituent concept, THE
MARKET, in Section 4.3.2, below. Our understanding of the term ‘economy’ consists
in our understanding of how these often complex constituent concepts interrelate;
that is, in our understanding of a situation in the sense that both Werth (1999) and

The type of situation expressed by ‘economy’ is not a literal representation
of economic events. As I argued, the concepts comprising ‘economy’ are also often
quite abstract and very complex. Because there is an uneven level of abstractness
in the concepts constituting the economic system, it becomes necessary to
metaphorise their relations; to make their interaction ‘human scale’ (Turner, 2006).
In this respect, metaphor plays a constitutive role in the creation of the economy
situation. Importantly, this view differs from the view that there is some literal
conceptual ‘domain’ of ECONOMY, onto which concepts from other domains are
figuratively mapped. It argues instead that ECONOMY is a complex concept that relies
on metaphor from the outset, because our understanding of it is always with
respect to a situation. This is to say that the concept represents a situation which is
itself constituted by metaphorical relations between objects and entities like, for
example, markets, banks and governments. Metaphor and metonymy are the
conceptual glue holding that situation together.
Of course, CMT has long argued that abstract concepts are represented concretely by metaphor. A criticism levelled at neurobiological approaches to metaphor motivation prevalent in CMT (see Grady, 1997, 2004; Lakoff and Johnson, 1999) has been its inadequate account of the ways in which target domains which have no basis in our everyday experiences, like ECONOMY, come to be thought of in relatively stable conceptual metaphors (Koller, 2005). As Chilton (1996: 106) and Koller (2005) point out, metaphors are not necessarily pre-existing similarities between things (like, for example, Tversky, 1977), or correlating neurobiological and psychological phenomena (see Grady, 1997; Lakoff and Johnson, 1999). They are similarities that are (ideologically) asserted. This assertion of similarity takes place within discourse. Concepts that have no direct phenomenological basis, but which are associated with relatively conventional metaphors, must rely on this process of asserting similarity in language for their propagation. Werth’s (1999) view of frame formation provides a means of describing this process. According to Werth’s (1999) perspective, frames for the economy are developed by cognisors in the process of participating in discourse: that is, it is in discourse that these situations – or, more accurately, text-worlds – representing the economy are created and it is in discourse that the metaphors that glue these representations together are established. As such, Werth’s (1999) discourse oriented account of frame formation is a more powerful tool for understanding the conceptual formation of abstract concepts in cognition. This is because it implicitly recognises that some conceptual structures have their origins in linguistic, not perceptual or introspective activity.
To summarise the argument thus far:

1. Abstract, phenomenologically inaccessible concepts, like ECONOMY, are best described as complex situations comprised of constituent concepts and their relations.

2. The relations between these constituent concepts of ECONOMY are often metaphorical.

3. These metaphors are not pre-linguistically established as neuronal connections but are often a product of a figurative assertion taking place in discourse.

4. This view differs from the conventional CMT view because it does not argue that metaphors for abstract concepts emanate from some mapping of a figurative source domain onto a literal target domain. Rather, the ECONOMY frame is the product of metaphor from its inception. That is, the ECONOMY is a complex situation involving figurative relations between what are often already richly metaphorised constituent concepts. As such, the ECONOMY frame consists of metaphorical relations. It is not a pre-packaged literal conceptual domain, awaiting a metaphoric mnemonic of the form THE ECONOMY IS A ...

For both Werth (1999) and Barsalou et al (1993), situations are purely experiential. They are perceptual input. However, points one and two, above, stress the significant discursive aspect of the ECONOMY frame. The metaphorical relations inhering between constituent concepts cannot be directly perceived as concrete phenomena. They are described in discourse, or, in Werth’s (1999) terminology,
they are expressed propositionally in language. As such, ECONOMY situations are more than just situations. They are text-worlds insofar as they consist of language, plus a conceptualisation. They are generated in the interaction between language and the conceptual system. Having discussed in some detail the structural content of this conceptual system, I now turn to a discussion of the next part of the discourse model: the language system.

4.2 The Language System

In this section, I first outline briefly what the language system and the relation of the language system to concepts is (Section 4.2.1) and then describe the problems this cognitive view of language poses for metaphor studies (Section 4.2.2). I then argue that the solution to these problems lies in TWT’s view of text-driven meaning construction.

4.2.1 Language and cognition

Like the fundaments of the conceptual system, our linguistic know-how arises from our experience of our cognitive environments (Goldberg, 1995; Tomasello, 1998, 2000; Langacker, 2009). Whilst the language system is not modularly divorced from other parts of the cognitive system, as a system it warrants special consideration. Werth (1999: 98) argues that the language system is different from other cognitive systems because it is used for both the input and output of information. Or, in the terms I have employed thus far, language is special because it is the cognitive system by which we render our private, subjective conceptions into public, objective prompts to conceptualise. It is at once expressive and affective of a
cognitive state. In the context of this thesis, it is the affective function of the language system which is important because I am interested in the cognitive processes by which readers are prompted to create mental representations by the text.

In terms of this cognitively affective, rather than expressive, function of language, Stanfield and Zwaan (2001) and Zwaan et al (2002) argue that language references perceptual symbols. Rather than a lexical item triggering a propositional representation of a concept, they argue, following Barsalou (1993, 1999), that upon hearing or seeing a lexical item, cognisors are caused to create a modal simulation, consisting of one or more perceptual symbols, of its referent. In keeping with Barsalou et al (1993), they further suggest that this modal simulation is situated: that is, the type of simulation engendered by the lexical item depends on the conceptual context in which it appears. For example eagles in nests are conceptualised differently from eagles in flight (Zwaan et al, 2002) and red fire-trucks are a different colour to red squirrels (Zwaan, 2003).

It is in this respect that Evans (2006) draws a distinction between what he calls ‘lexical concepts’ on the one hand, and ‘cognitive models’ on the other. Taking influence from Langacker (1987), Evans (2006: 501) writes that ‘lexical concepts constitute the semantic pole of symbolic assemblies of form and meaning’. As their name would imply, ‘lexical concepts’ are in this regard conceptual. At the same time, cognitive models are large scale coherent bodies of non-linguistic knowledge which lexical concepts provide access sites to. The range of cognitive models which are
accessed, either directly or indirectly by a lexical concept, I refer to as a cognitive model profile. Individual cognitive models consist of facets (attributes) and relations (structural invariants) which hold between facets (Evans, 2006: 501).

Somewhat confusingly, ‘lexical concepts’ are not conceptual in the sense that they have any definite semantic content. Rather, they act as access points for conceptual material; for a specific ‘facet’ of an equally specific ‘cognitive model’ grouped within the ‘cognitive model profile’ of the word. For example, the word ‘red’ has a cognitive model profile which includes both the cognitive model for the red of the fire-truck, and a cognitive model for the red of the squirrel. In Barsalou et al’s (1993) terminology, one would say that the cognitive model profile consists of various perceptual symbols which are all lexicalised as ‘red’. Evans (2006: 503) suggests that lexical concepts have a ‘lexical profile’. This is a series of semantic, collocational and grammatical selectional tendencies which cause one particular conceptualisation to be accessed over another. Although there is clearly merit in saying that the semantic, collocational and grammatical context in which a word appears goes some distance in defining the kind of concept activated, Evans’ (2006) account seems confused. On the one hand, lexical concepts provide access to a range of cognitive models, whilst on the other it is said that the selectional tendencies of lexical concepts define the specific cognitive model accessed. Thus, it is unclear whether the term, ‘lexical concept’, refers to an array of semantic potentials or to a singular conceptualisation. Indeed, the fact that the term includes reference to a concept of some kind further confuses the issue; a lexical item
cannot simultaneously activate a single concept and a range of concepts in reader cognition.

All this is not to say that the problematic relationship Evans (2006) sets up between linguistic forms and the variegated concepts they potentially activate in reader cognition is without value. It is, rather, to suggest that the terminology is in need of refinement. Zwaan (2003: 39) offers a terminologically more economical account when he argues that ‘incoming words activate functional webs [patterns of neurological activity] that are also activated when the referent is experienced’. He continues:

Thus, assuming there is no prior semantic context (although this is rarely the case outside the cognition lab and a game of Scrabble) and our word is the first content word of the sentence being processed, this word will diffusely activate overlapping functional webs. This web comprises the totality of our experiences with a certain entity or event. The degree of diffuseness of the representation depends on the frequency distributions, primacy, and recency of our experiences with its referent. If a certain category of experiences, for instance a specific visual perspective, is relatively frequent for that entity compared to other experiences with the same entity (for example, we most often see hot air balloons from below, rather than from above and we most often see eagles from afar rather than from up close) then the most frequent experiential trace will be the most highly activated (see Palmer, Rosch, & Chase, 1981, on canonical viewpoints). When there are experiential categories with roughly similar frequencies, the initially
activated functional web will not be strongly biased toward a specific representation. The activated representation will provide the context for the pattern of activation for the next functional web. This provides a constraint on the activation of the new web. The more specific, or “articulated,” the initial representation, the stronger the constraint it exerts on the subsequent activation. The constraint–satisfaction mechanism by which a previously diffusely activated functional web is constrained to fit the mental simulation is called articulation, and it occurs during construal (Zwaan, 2003: 39-40).

Like Evans (2006), this neurological approach views the concepts activated by words as delimited by semantic, grammatical, collocational and pragmatic factors: that is, a series of ‘selectional tendencies’ (see Evans, 2006). The range of conceptualisations potentially triggered by the word is always already constrained by this context. As well as forward constraints on the activation of concepts, the temporal movement from word to word, clause to clause, sentence to sentence etc. engenders backward constraints on the kinds of concepts already activated. That is, the implication in Zwaan (2003) is that the concepts activated by language undergo a process of updating as a discourse proceeds.
4.2.2 Challenges for a cognitively oriented, discourse theory of metaphor, or:
what a text-driven account of meaning construction can do for metaphor theory

All of the above raises issues for metaphor theory. Evans (2006) and Zwaan (2003) reasonably claim that the concepts indexed by lexical items are variegated and disambiguated with respect to the text-worlds in which they appear. However, novel metaphoric language is striking because it is language used outside of its normal context. This raises the question of which concept, out of the array of conceptual potentials inhering in a single lexical item, cognisors access when they read or hear the metaphorically used word and which construal of that frame might be accessed. Given the uncertainty of the conceptual referent, it also poses problems for what is mapped from the source conceptual frame onto the target conceptual frame. From the perspective of Zwaan’s (2003) model, a solution to the problem might be that the metaphoric word activates overlapping functional webs ‘comprising the totality of our experience’ of the concepts associated with it (Zwaan, 2003: 39), in the same manner as any first content word of a new discourse might. However, if one takes CMT’s fundamental claim seriously – that metaphor maps some conceptual material onto another – the problem with this apparent solution is that it cannot account for which parts of ‘the totality of our experience’ of the source concept frame is actually mapped onto the target concept frame. Uncertain conceptual referents mean indefinite mappings. To pose the problem slightly differently, then, the issue does not consist of identifying which construal of the source concept frame is evoked by the metaphorically used word. More
fundamentally, it relates to a procedural problem, which is the issue of how readers know which aspects of the source conceptual frame to map onto the target frame.

Brandt and Brandt (2002) tackle this issue from the perspective of Conceptual Integration Theory. They write:

The structure that the inputs have in common (the “generic” structure in Fauconnier and Turner’s terms), is specified by what is situationally relevant. It is thus not cognitively realistic that this structure exists in the mind as a definite list of entities and relations, independent of a goal, a purpose, motivating the conceptualizer to evoke these similarities. As with other categories, the category “shared structure between the inputs” is context sensitive. Though it may be analytically possible to construct such an exhaustive list for every blend, it is not phenomenologically plausible that such a list is evoked in the mind of the conceptualizer in order to construe the meaning of the blend (Brandt and Brandt, 2002: 232).

Just as conceptual frames are situated (Barsalou, 2003) and developed by discourse participants to serve communicative or conceptual goals (Barsalou, 1993), so – for Brandt and Brandt (2002) – is the category ‘shared structure between the inputs’. As a conceptual figure situated within a specific context of use, metaphor is being used for some conceptual or communicative end. For Brandt and Brandt (2002), the context of utterance delimits the mapping.

Brandt and Brandt’s (2002) article is dedicated to explaining more fully the metaphoric utterance ‘this surgeon is a butcher’. They argue that context is crucial
to understanding the metaphor, arguing that it ‘does not have an intrinsic meaning outside the context of use’ (Brandt and Brandt, 2002: 219). To explain the mechanism by which the situational context in which the metaphor is uttered delimits the mapping, they advance the notion of a ‘semiotic space’, which they describe as follows:

A semiotic (base) space is a mental space in which the cogniser represents the present situation of cognising. It is either a shared scene of communication, involving the persons participating in shared meaning construction through the semantic network considered, or a scene of reflection involving the reflecting subject and the situation in which the reflection takes place, as represented by the subject. It is thus assumed to be the case, phenomenologically, that when people communicate, they represent the situation of communication, and this shared representation is a pre-requisite for meaning construction (Brandt and Brandt, 2002: 225).

In their example, the semiotic space – the discourse participants’ mental representation of the situation in which the discourse is taking place – determines whether the utterance is interpreted metaphorically. The crucial factor in determining the meaning of ‘this surgeon is a butcher’ is that the scar of the patient is the focus of attention in the semiotic space. The ugly scar is the thing that prompts discourse participants to view the utterance as a metaphor and not a comment, say, on the surgeon’s culinary hobbies.

This semiotic space is also responsible for delimiting the mapping; for defining what the generic structure in each input is. For Brandt and Brandt (2002),
the generic space fails to define what the relevant shared structure is to the communication taking place. Brandt and Brandt (2002) argue that discourse participants compile generic structure between the inputs, SURGEON and BUTCHER, on the basis that the metaphor, ‘this surgeon is a butcher’, is trying to tell them something about the scar which is the focus of the discourse in the semiotic space. The mapping is unidirectional because it is the surgeon that is deictically singled out by the demonstrative, ‘this’. The BUTCHER input is therefore telling us something about this particular surgeon (and not vice-versa). Because it is the surgeon that has caused the ugly disfigurement, the schematic, generic structure in the blend is 'some actor acting upon something' to cause the scar. Discourse participants then run a simulation in which a butcher acts on the body of the patient. The communicative outcome of this simulation, i.e. what is meant by the metaphor, is to pass some sort of ethical judgement on the surgical practices of the surgeon. The surgeon is guilty of treating the patient’s body with the same level of (dis)respect as a butcher would treat that of an animal.

The main strength in Brandt and Brandt’s (2002) paper is their claim that what is considered generic to the inputs is provided by the context of the interaction. In the case of writers or speakers, something in the context of the interaction has a perceived similarity to something else, which stimulates the production of a metaphor with respect to some communicative goal, be it instantiated in a spoken utterance or words on the page. In the case of discourse participants that are acting as addressees, or readers, context, i.e. the deictic markers used in the ‘semiotic space’, delimits the process of deriving shared
structure from the inputs. In many ways, Brandt and Brandt’s (2002) semiotic space resembles the TWT notion of the discourse world. Both concepts are meant to account for the ways in which the immediate discourse situation and the values and beliefs of discourse participants impacts upon the discourse. In Brandt and Brandt’s (2002) example, it is the direct relationship between discourse world and text-world that delimits the shared structure imported into the blend. World-building utterances, ‘this butcher’, act in concert with physical objects in the immediate discourse world, the scar, to determine what the relevant shared structure is.

However, written discourse is characterised by the reader’s deictic projection into a situation: a text-world. Interestingly, to explain their interpretation of the metaphor, Brandt and Brandt (2002) have to describe the situation in which the discourse took place: that is, they have to create a text-world in which the woman with the scar is talking to her friend. The original discourse world context is collapsed into a text-world representation because the discourse world in which the original discourse took place is reconstructed for the reader by Brandt and Brandt (2002) as a text-world. The thing gestured towards in Brandt and Brandt’s (2002) ‘semiotic space’ is therefore not objectively given, as in their example of the patient with a scar, but is the product of the text. Brandt and Brandt (2002) draw our attention to the scar as they narrate the context of the utterance ‘this surgeon is a butcher’. Ontologically speaking, then, the semiotic base space of the metaphor may be at one remove (or maybe more) from the discourse world. That is, conceptual integration networks are just as likely to be anchored in text-worlds, as they are in the discourse world. Indeed, in written discourse, this may well be the norm.
In the context of an analysis of written discourse, TWT has the advantage over Brandt and Brandt’s (2002) approach because of the distinction it draws between discourse world and text-world. Moreover, one of TWT’s main concerns is with the way in which the text prompts readers to create deictic spaces – text-worlds – and mental models of the places, people and objects populating them. Reframing Brandt and Brandt’s (2002) basic argument in the terminology of TWT leads to the conclusion that what is mapped from the structure of one concept frame to another is determined by a deictic reference to an object, entity or place within the text-world. Linguistic cues prompt cognisors to simulate the perceptual symbols, individual and model concepts populating and comprising a given text-world and, as the discourse proceeds, direct reader attention across this mental landscape by profiling and occluding, in the grammar, its different aspects and elements. Readers make sense of metaphor with respect to a text-world which is constructed and ‘construed’ (Langacker, 1987, 2009) through the medium of language. From this perspective, then, to map conceptual structure is a text-driven process. It is the mechanisms of this text-driven process which now need to be examined. This can only be done with reference to concrete examples.

4.3 The Text(s)

In this section I employ some of the ideas in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 in the analysis of two texts. In the first analysis, I return to Benjamin Barber’s (2008, again, see Appendix 2) *Decades of Eroded Trust and Democracy did the Damage*. I examine metaphor on the level of the word (‘market’), then the clause, then on the discourse-level. My concerns in this analysis are three-fold: 1) to examine the
bottom-up creation of two discourse-level metaphoric structures across the text-world structures prompted by the text; 2) to re-examine the notion of metaphor convention with respect to these text-worlds; 3) to describe the text-driven processes by which ‘shared structure’ is mapped (or, as I shall argue, sometimes is not) on the clause- and discourse-levels. The overall emphasis in this analysis is on the rootedness and bounded-ness of discourse-level metaphor in text-world structures and their linguistic prompts.

In the second analysis, my concern is to emphasise this rootedness in its most extreme form: negated metaphor. I discuss this concept of negated metaphor with respect to an article by Boris Johnson, which appeared in The Telegraph.

4.3.1 Analysis: Back to Barber

Here is the extract from Barber’s (2008) *Decades of Eroded Trust and Democracy*

Did the Damage again:

On that black Monday when the US Congress refused to pass the $700bn bail-out, the market plummeted 477 points. A few days later, after Congress reversed itself and passed the $700bn bail-out, the market dropped nearly 800 points. Since then it has gyrated wildly, drawing markets in Britain, continental Europe and Asia into the maelstrom (Barber, 2008, see Appendix 2).

In what follows, I describe the complex layering of metaphor and metonymy in the noun phrase ‘the market’ and the relationship of this layering process to work on conventional metaphor and the ‘career of metaphor’ theory (Bowdle and Gentner,
2005) and also work on situated cognition in cognitive linguistics (Zwaan, 2003; Evans, 2006). In the following sections, I describe how these issues of conventionality feed into a discourse-level, text-world representation of the economy which is structured by a series of spatial and hydrodynamic metaphors. Although this is a short extract, it should be noted that in Section 4.3.5 I situate this stretch of text within a larger section of its co-text. As part of this broadened analysis, I examine the ways in which the hydrodynamic metaphors in this extract relate to other megametaphorical structures that appear later in the text.

4.3.2 What exactly is ‘the market’?

The career of metaphor theory argues that conventional metaphors do not involve a mapping between source and target domains, but are rather ‘class-inclusion’ statements (Bowdle and Gentner, 2005). This means that words that have a conventional metaphorical use are disambiguated in a similar manner to other polysemous words and no mapping is required. ‘The market’ has a multitude of potential complex referents. In economics discourse, it is conventionally used to refer to the stock exchange. Clearly the ‘basic meaning’ (Pragglejaz, 2007) of the market – ‘a public building or place where people sell goods on tables called stalls’ (Macmillan Online Dictionary) – does not match this use of the term, a use which is conventional within the context of economics discourses. If we are to take the notion of situated cognition seriously, what ‘market’ might refer to in this context can only be discussed with respect to the text-world in which it appears. According to Evans (2006) and Zwaan (2003), words exhibit different ‘selectional tendencies’ or grammatical, contextual and co-textual markers which induce a
particular ‘functional web’ (Zwaan, 2003) or pattern of neuronal activity in reader cognition. This neuronal activity represents the situated simulations of a configuration of perceptual symbols that together constitute a concept (Barsalou, 2003). In this schema, concepts accommodate towards established contexts, not the other way round (Barsalou, 1993, 2003). As such, different meanings for market (‘basic’ and more abstract) are codified in the text by different selectional tendencies, or different grammatical or con/co-textual factors. This is to say that a word’s meaning will be disambiguated with respect to its use in a repeated pattern of language use. Put differently, repeated exposure to text-worlds in which a mapping between the stock exchange and ‘a public building or place where people sell goods on tables called stalls’ is made is likely to result in the creation of an economy concept frame in which readers expect ‘market’ to mean ‘stock exchange’, not a more ‘basic’ meaning. The ‘selectional tendencies’ which single-out a particular concept from a range of semantic potentials made available by a lexical item, then, are nothing short of a description of the language normally used in the production of text-worlds depicting a series of similar situations. Conceptual mappings are only conventional or novel insofar as they relate to a situation. In the context of economics discourse – that is, in the context of an economy text-world – ‘market’ is not a conceptual metaphor.

In this particular text, the grammatical and con/co-textual factors that trigger this more abstract meaning of the word ‘market’, instead of its ‘basic meaning’ (Pragglejaz, 2007) and the metaphoric mapping it would engender are twofold. The first relates to three co-textual features of the text which create a
context in which ‘market’ is probably disambiguated as ‘stock exchange’. The first sentence of the extract contains the noun phrase ‘US Congress’, which, to my mind, makes it more likely that ‘market’ refers to the economic institution and not the more parochial ‘basic’ meaning that the Pragglejaz (2007) procedure identifies. Indeed, the fact that it is the US Congress, and not, say, the French Congress, also suggests that the institution being referred to is not just any stock exchange, but specifically the New York Stock Exchange. The term ‘black Monday’ also suggests an economics frame. The noun phrase structure, ‘black+ day of the week’, is often used to refer to days which have been economically tumultuous (for example, the noun phrase ‘Black Wednesday’ is used to describe the catastrophic economic events of the 16th September, 1992. The British Conservative government was forced to withdraw from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism, a move which cost the treasury £3.3 billion). Finally, the term ‘bail-out’ would also suggest that ‘market’ refers to the economic institution. ‘Bail-out’ is itself potentially metaphorical, but it is a metaphor that is often used in economics discourses to mean something like a loan used to bail an institution out of economic difficulty (rather than to bail out a boat which is taking on water). Interestingly, in this text ‘bail-out’ acts as a noun-phrase (‘the $700bn bail-out’) rather than a verb (‘to bail-out’). This change in the grammatical form of the lexical item suggests that this is a bail-out of the financial kind (one is more likely to turn the verb into a gerund and say ‘the bailing out of the boat’, as opposed to ‘the bail-out of the boat’). In readers who are familiar with economics discourses, then, one can say that its grammatical selectional tendencies suggest that ‘bail-out’ is probably not processed metaphorically as a mapping, but disambiguated (see Glucksberg and Keysar, 1990).
The overall effect of these three lexical items is to establish a context in which readers who are relatively well versed in economics discourses will take ‘the market’ to mean ‘stock exchange’. However, there is also a second factor which complicates this interpretation of what exactly market means in this context. This second factor is the collocation of the noun phrase, ‘the market’, with the verb phrase, ‘plummeted 400 points’. This is also potentially metaphoric; a stock exchange cannot literally plummet. It is also hard to see what the literal meaning of a violently subsiding New York Stock Exchange might be. In this respect, I would argue that ‘the market’ is, in this context, referring metonymically to the value of the New York Stock Exchange. ‘400 points’ here refers to a way of measuring stock market value. Charteris-Black (2004) has found evidence to suggest that a mapping between the value of a market and physical movement is conventional in economics discourse. He glosses the conceptual metaphor underlying such collocations as MARKET CHANGES ARE PHYSICAL MOVEMENTS. Indeed, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) have also argued that VALUE and VERTICALITY are conventionally mapped onto one another. In this text, ‘the market’ may not be a metaphor, but it is a metonym – an internal mapping between part and whole – which stands for market value. ‘The market plummeted’ signifies a layering of, first, conventional metaphor which may not be processed metaphorically, and then metonymy. In the second – metonymic – stage of the metaphor’s career, ‘value’ is conceived conventionally in terms of verticality. To my knowledge, there is no research on the metonymic mapping between markets-as-stock-exchanges and market value. It is therefore hard to say whether this metonymic mapping is conventional. Certainly the mapping of value onto verticality or physical movement is. As such, whether ‘the market plummeted’
might be disambiguated in a ‘class-inclusion’-like manner (see Glucksberg and Keysar, 1990) or whether a mapping of value on to verticality is actually made (see Gentner and Markman, 1997) is a difficult question to answer. Whatever this answer might be, the question is only posed if one concerns oneself with an examination of the text-driven processes of lexical disambiguation and the figurative mappings that disambiguation may (or may not) prompt. Notably, this is something that Charteris-Black (2004) ignores in his study; ‘the market’ appears unproblematically in the target slot of the mnemonic MARKET CHANGES ARE PHYSICAL MOVEMENTS, when in fact it has an incredibly complex conceptual structure.

From this discussion of its grammatical and con/co-textual context, I concluded that the noun phrase, ‘the market’, is functioning metonymically and stands for market value. Importantly, this conclusion was based upon a particular understanding of conventionality. Within the context of an economic situation represented in writing – that is, within the context of an economy text-world – the grammatical and co-textual cues I highlighted conventionally prompt readers to conceive of ‘the market’ as a ‘the value of the stock exchange’, or, more specifically, the New York Stock Exchange. Before moving on to a discussion of the metaphorical relations in which this complex metonymic conceptual structure engages, it is worth reflecting upon the understanding of conventionality I have adopted. Importantly, it relies upon reader familiarity. I argued that conceptual mappings are only conventional or novel insofar as they relate to a text-world. Similarly, however, this text-world has to be repeatedly experienced by readers for it to become a frame – in the TWT sense of the term – which then loops back to scaffold our local
understanding of specific text-worlds. Convention requires iteration and iterations are performed by individual readers. For the novice reader who does not have the requisite concept frame for the economy – for whom the mapping of ‘market’ onto the stock exchange is still novel and has yet to be repeated in a variety of text-worlds about the economy – the text is likely to be more difficult to understand. In these conditions, the phrase ‘the market plummeted’ is likely to be relatively unintelligible or conceived of in a more dramatic way than readers familiar with the text-worlds of political economy. So, imaginative readers of a more cataclysmic disposition might imagine markets subsiding into the ground, ‘plummeting’ into voids created by titanic geological forces. In any case, it is worth pointing out that a convention is not a disembodied rule that asserts itself, but rather something that a reader does or does not know. Conventions are a type of discourse world know-how. In this respect, I would argue that Brandt and Brandt (2002) are wrong when they write the following:

The utterer, the ‘sense maker’, intends to share some content of thought with an addressee in a semiotic exchange. This semantic content, which is inherently intersubjective, borne of the speaker’s intention to have the addressee recognise his utterance as an attempt to engage in a semiotic event of shared attention, as well as its pragmatic intentions (its status as a communicative act), constitute the meaning of the metaphor. It is, in effect, inconsequential for the analysis whether it is conducted from the perspective of the speaker or the addressee, as the mental content is shared
Presumably, writers are aware of the communicative purpose of the metaphors they use: that is, they intend what they say to mean something. The same cannot be said of readers, who construct meanings from the textual prompts produced by writers. The perspective from which the analysis is made is therefore not ‘inconsequential’. If there is an asymmetry in the degree to which reader and writer are familiar with the conventions which select for the meaning of a word within a given context, it is likely that the text will make little sense (or a radically different sense) for the reader. Both the production and reception of metaphor in discourse relies on an understanding of the context in which it takes place. To write off a lapse in ‘shared mental content’ as simply ‘miscommunication’ is therefore to arbitrarily privilege the writer’s construal of the discourse context over the reader’s. In short, the perspective from which metaphor is approached – production or reception – matters.

4.3.3 Plummeting and gyrating: mixed metaphor and meaning

In the first three examples of market movement the market ‘plummets’, ‘drops’ and ‘gyrates’. The mapping established in the first two verbs, ‘plummeted’ and
‘dropped’, is the same. In both cases VERTICALITY is mapped on to VALUE. As I suggested above, this mapping is relatively conventional (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Charteris-Black, 2004), occurring across a multitude of situations. Given this conventionality, it may be that all that is going on here is a ‘class inclusion’-like lexical disambiguation. However, Steen (2008, 2011a) has argued that repeated use of source domain language may well cause cognisors to actually perform the mapping between source and target domains. It is possible that both uses of source domain language, ‘plummet’ and ‘drop’, make the source domain more salient and in that regard reinvigorate the conventional metaphor, making it more likely that a mapping is made. As Langacker (2008) points out, reading is a linear process that unfolds temporally as the reader scans the words on the page. Under Steen’s (2008, 2011a) argument, it is therefore likely that the initial verb of vertical movement, ‘plummeted’, might not be processed as a mapping. ‘Plummeted’ does suggest a more violent, vigorous movement, though, and in that respect it seems more novel. As a consequence, it is possible that it will cause readers to make the mapping between an aggressive downward movement and a rapid depreciation of value and therefore act to make the next verb of vertical movement, ‘dropped’, more saliently metaphorical. Rather than make any general prediction, I would argue that the type of process involved mostly depends on how habituated readers are to the text-worlds of political economy. In the case of a novice conceptualisation of market, it is more likely that ‘plummet’ will be conceived metaphorically and not simply disambiguated. This is on the basis that making the metonymic link between ‘the market’ and ‘market value’ is a greater conceptual feat if one is simultaneously mapping the ‘basic meaning’ of market onto the more abstract meaning, ‘stock
exchange’. The conventional metaphor, \textit{VALUE IS VERTICALITY}, is therefore less likely to be available to novice readers because it can only be made once the metonymic link between ‘the market’ and ‘market value’ has been made. The literal meaning of ‘plummet’ (‘to fall quickly’, not ‘to devalue’) is therefore the one most likely to be selected by novice readers because the conceptual context in which the word is disambiguated is different than for expert readers. The value/verticality mapping is only conventional – and therefore available to disambiguation – in the context of a market value/market metonym, which is only a possible metonym in the context of readers being familiar with the conventional stock exchange/market metaphor.

If all three verbs are treated as metaphorical mappings and not lexical disambiguations, the conceptual mapping in each case is between some change in market value and physical (initially downward) movement. In this respect all three verbs can be said to evoke a situation. I say ‘situation’, and not simply ‘concept’, because each verb assumes some gestalt image-schematic structure (Lakoff, 1987; Langacker, 2006). As such, the back-grounded conception of each verb (‘plummeted’, ‘dropped’ and ‘gyrated’) is of some trajector moving in relation to some landmark: that is, the image-schema consists of multiple concepts (in this case, very basic perceptual symbols) arranged schematically in relation to one another. This is a ‘situation’ in the sense that Barsalou et al (1993) use the term; an array of images (verbs of movement imply a continuous succession of images) comprised of multiple perceptual symbols in some schematic relation to one another. This back-grounded conceptual structure is the same type of structure that Langacker (1987) describes in his use of the word ‘domain’. Here, I use the term
‘situation’ instead of ‘domain’ for the sake of continuity. I also do so to highlight the fact that the use of the verb establishes a set of conceptual relations whose main elements – the trajector and the landmark – constitute, however schematically, the world-building elements of a text-world (the place and object elements). In each case, in addition to evoking each ‘situation’ the verb profiles a certain aspect of it (Langacker, 2006); namely the trajectory of the object (and not, say, the object itself or the landmark). The profiled aspect of the situation is the conceptual structure being mapped onto the devaluation of the markets. In this respect, it is the text which drives the creation of the contingent category ‘mapped structure’ because the verbs profile the relevant aspect of conceptual structure – the trajectory – which should be mapped. The mapping is text-driven, prompted by the grammar of the text.

On the clause-level, the three verbs, ‘plummeted’, ‘dropped’ and ‘gyrated’, cause readers to profile the same aspect of a situation conceptual structure; a trajectory. The first two verbs, ‘plummeted’ and ‘dropped’, map value along one dimension, verticality. In contrast, as a circular movement, ‘gyration’ is two dimensional. Moreover, my canonical construal (Palmer et al, 1981) of this circular schema is of a side-to-side motion. That is, gyration does not occur along a vertical axis, but across perpendicular horizontal axes (see figure two). In the plummet/drop metaphor, a lower physical position corresponded to ‘lower’ values and vice versa. However, the gyration schema profiles a type of horizontal, circular trajectory which does not map onto the high/low, valuable/valueless scales established by these previous metaphors. Grammatically, in previous examples of
market movement, ‘the market’ was the grammatical subject (‘the market plummeted’ and ‘the market dropped’). In the case of ‘gyrated’ the market is anaphorically referred to by the pronoun ‘it’ (‘the market dropped nearly 800 points. Since then it has gyrated wildly’). The entity that ‘dropped’ is therefore the same entity that has since ‘gyrated’. Moreover, the temporal deictic marker, ‘since then’, combines with the past perfect, ‘since then it has gyrated’, to suggest that there is a continuous (and not contiguous) relationship between these movements, which is to say that the market drops and gyrates in the same conceptual space.

The point, here, is that not only are the entities that drop and gyrate the same, but that both movements are performed in one continuous motion. This presents a coherence problem. The movement of ‘the market’ is at first intelligible – relating to value – and then, with the addition of horizontal movement, the mapping breaks down, becoming unintelligible.

![Figure 4.1 Dropping and gyrating](image)

**Figure 4.1 Dropping and gyrating**
Although the trajectories of the vertical and gyration image-schema are different, the overall mapping of value fluctuation onto physical movement is continuous. However, in the context of the previous metaphors, the exact meaning of this metaphorical gyration defies literal translation. The disintegration of the mapping has a communicative force. The absence of a literal meaning suggests that what the markets are doing is unknown. Werth (1994) and Gavins (2007) have described metaphor as a ‘double-visioning’; a layering of a metaphorical text-world onto a literal text-world (I discuss these issues in greater detail in Chapter 5). In this case, under the terms established by the metaphors ‘plummeted’ and ‘dropped’, there is no conceptual correlate in the market’s gyrations between the metaphoric and the literal. The meaning of the metaphor is found in the fact that it fails to meaningfully represent any change in market value. This meaning, then, might be represented as follows ‘the value of the New York Stock Exchange dropped on Monday, after one course of action was taken, and then dropped again, after the opposite course of action was taken. We now have no idea what it is doing’. This is a pragmatic inference, but it is an inference prompted by the text; by the grammatical profiling of mutually exclusive image-schematic structure.

This new circular image-schematic structure coheres with that of the maelstrom; a whirlpool which draws objects (namely, other markets) into its centre. The maelstrom elaborates this basic, circular structure. Moreover, it brings the value of the New York Stock Exchange into conceptual relations with other stock exchanges thus making the economic text-world more complex: markets in Britain, continental Europe and Asia are drawn into the maelstrom. Given the unknown
literal referent of the market’s gyrations and the pragmatic meaning readers infer from this – that the markets movements are unknowable and chaotic – the centre of this maelstrom is emblematic of this chaos and confusion. When markets across the world are drawn into it, they too become subject to the chaos. The hydrodynamic logic of the maelstrom is mapped against the spread of market turmoil. Markets are metaphorically sucked into an unpredictable chaos. Here, metaphor structures the internal relations of the economy text-world.

4.3.4 The discourse-level picture

Here is the extract again:

On that black Monday when the US Congress refused to pass the $700bn bail-out, the market plummeted 477 points. A few days later, after Congress reversed itself and passed the $700bn bail-out, the market dropped nearly 800 points. Since then it has gyrated wildly, drawing markets in Britain, continental Europe and Asia into the maelstrom.

In the previous sections, I described how this stretch of text prompted the creation of a metaphorical situation, or megametaphor, depicting the state of the economy and the dynamic, text-driven progression of this situation from the horizontal movements of the MARKET to the MAELSTROM. I argued that the image-schematic structure of the three verbs in the extract, ‘plummeted’, ‘dropped’ and ‘gyrated’ constituted a skeletal, rudimentary text-world structure. In terms of the world builders in this text-world structure, ‘the market’ is acting as an animate object. Widening the scope of the analysis, the US Congress also metonymically stands for
the Congressional representatives, which adds further enactors to the text-world. The place and time are initially specified as ‘the US’ and ‘Monday’. There’s then a world switch in the following sentence, when the temporal deixis switches to ‘a few days later’. Finally, in the third sentence, the use of the temporal deictic marker, ‘since then’, and the use of present perfect tense (‘it has gyrated’) signal the unfolding of the action in this new text-world. The creation of text-worlds which have a temporal relation to one another corresponds with the development of vertical market movement into the world-wide chaos of the ‘maelstrom’.

**Figure 4.2 The discourse-level development of the maelstrom**
The conceptual development of the discourse-level, extended metaphor is partially constitutive of, and therefore grounded in, these two worlds and advanced in them by the multiple uses of clause-level metaphor which I identified in the previous section. I have represented this conceptual progression in Figure 4.2. Within the second text-world of ‘a few days later’, the ‘scope’ (Langacker, 2008) of the location world builder changes, shifting and widening. This change in scope corresponds to a change in specificity. Readers ‘zoom-out’ from the specifics of the US markets, to a view of the whole world economy – ‘markets in Britain, continental Europe and Asia’ – and the hazards caused to it by the erratic revaluations of the US Stock Exchange. The accumulated movements of the US markets come to stand for the economic crisis in the form of a maelstrom.

4.3.5 Worlds apart: multiple metaphors on the discourse-level

In the previous section, I first described the word-level, lexical disambiguation of ‘the market’ in the extract from Decades of Eroded Trust and Democracy Did the Damage. I then described how market devaluation was metaphorised as movement on the clause-level; how these metaphors, along with other deictic markers, provided fundamental ‘world-building’ blocks for the text-worlds in which they appear; and how these individual clause-level metaphors accumulated and combined to create the ‘maelstrom’ on the discourse-level. This movement combined with a progressive shift in scope and specificity; from a fine-grained representation of the movement of the US market, to a courser grained construal of the economy, and the economic crisis, as a whole. These processes of metaphor combination and shifting construal, culminating in the discourse-level
megametaphor of the maelstrom, unfolded over two temporally linked text-worlds, the world of ‘that Black Monday’ and the subsequent ‘few days after’.

Clearly, however, the maelstrom metaphor is not the only discourse-level metaphoric structure at play in the text. The text goes on:

Since then it has gyrated wildly, drawing markets in Britain, continental Europe and Asia into the maelstrom. What’s going on – a crisis in economic capital or in fiscal confidence?

Neither exactly. As the global hysteria makes evident, trust is at stake, but not purely fiscal or economic trust. De-leveraging banks, insuring deposit accounts, penalising CEOs and socialising risk can’t do the trick because trust is ultimately political - more specifically, democratic. Trust is a crucial form of social capital, a recognition of the common ground on which we stand as citizens. It is the glue that holds rival producers and consumers together and lets them do the business that would otherwise do them in (Barber, 2008, see Appendix 2).

The first important textual feature to note is the rhetorical question ‘what’s going on – a crisis in economic capital or in fiscal confidence?’ The question, the answer given in the following paragraph, and the deictic repositioning the interrogative and its reply entail, begin the creation of a complex web of new text-worlds which re-orient the reader. I have represented this matrix of text-worlds in Figure 4.3. The question prompts a further world switch, although this time it is not based on a change in temporal deixis, but rather relational deixis. It triggers a movement from
the third person narration of the previous text-worlds, to an implied second person address to the reader; questions, after all, are asked to elicit answers. It shifts us, then, to a conceptual space in which the narrator – a textual enactor of Benjamin Barber – is asking a direct question of the reader. This implied second person narration simulates a ‘face-to-face discourse world relationship in what is actually a split discourse-world situation’ (Gavins, 2007: 75). The new text-world, then, is a simulation of the discourse world. Its location and time world-building elements are accordingly characterised as ‘here’ and ‘now’, and its enactors are ‘Barber’ and, implicitly, ‘the reader’. Within this new text-world, two further worlds are created. Two possible answers to Barber’s rhetorical question are given. The fiscal crisis is the product of either a ‘crisis in economic capital’ or a ‘crisis in fiscal confidence’. In TWT, epistemic modal expressions are treated as engendering new text-worlds (Gavins, 2005, 2007: 109-125). The possible answers to the question express, relative to their text-world of origin, two hypothetical possibilities; a world in which it is ‘a crisis in economic capital’ which is the source of the current problem, and a world in which it is ‘a crisis of fiscal confidence’. As Figure 4.3 suggests, following the question there is a further world switch, signalled by the narrator’s answer to his own question; ‘neither exactly’. Here, both the previous hypothetical worlds of fiscal confidence and economic crisis are discounted. Once more, the deictic shift is relational. The narrator shifts conversational role, moving from the perspective of the person asking the question, to the person answering it. The reader finds themselves in a text-world in which the ‘global hysteria makes evident’. Here begins
Figure 4.3 *Deictic repositioning in* Decades of eroded trust and democracy did the damage
a new cluster of metaphors which all structure a discourse-level, text-world representation of the economy and—importantly for Barber’s article— the political process.

The key metaphorical concept in this text-world is ‘trust’. Grammatically speaking, trust is used as a noun, as opposed to a verb. Langacker (1987, 2008) argues that schematically, all nouns take on a ‘thing’ or object-like status. There is a sense, then, in which the grammar of the text means that ‘trust’ is already metaphorised as a concrete object before it enters into any more complex metaphoric relations in the extract. In this respect, the various mappings between ‘trust’ and other source domains can be viewed as elaborations of this very basic ‘object’-like schema. The more complex potential source domains in the extract are ‘a stake’, ‘capital’, and ‘glue’. The dropping and gyrating of the markets in the previous sections possessed clashing image-schematic structure. Whilst these metaphors for trust may be different, there is no conceptual dissonance between them. They combine, with other spatial metaphors in the text, to create a new, discourse-level structure.

The first of these potential metaphors, ‘trust is at stake’, is linguistically complex. A ‘stake’ contributes towards the jackpot in a gambling game, and the verb ‘to stake’ means to wager. The phrase ‘at stake’ means that something is ‘likely to be lost or damaged if something fails’ (Macmillan Online Dictionary), which is related to the gambling senses of ‘stake’ in both its noun and verb forms. However, whilst cohering with the gambling meanings of these forms, the phrase, ‘at stake’, also goes beyond them and could mean anything that is at risk of being
lost or damaged. In fact, a search through the British National Corpus reveals 518 examples of the phrase ‘at stake’, none of which refer directly to gambling. Many refer to money, although there are also many references to abstract nouns such as ‘morality’, ‘reputations’, ‘the issue’, ‘pride’ etc. In this respect, ‘at stake’ is probably a dead metaphor, or a metaphor very close to the end of its career, which once referred only to gambling, but has since broadened its meaning. The degree to which gambling senses of the term play a role in the text-worlds generated by the reader is therefore questionable.

The second of these potential metaphors is also complex: ‘Trust is a crucial form of social capital’. The metaphor takes a predicate nominative form (X is a Y), which would usually signal an explicit or ‘deliberate’ (Steen, 2008, 2011a) metaphor. Rather than use the term ‘deliberate’, I prefer to use the term explicit because it suggests that the language is making the metaphor more salient to the reader without making a claim about the motives of the writer (see Chapter 5 for a deeper exploration of these issues). However, this explicitness is rendered problematic by the modification of the second noun phrase, ‘capital’. ‘Trust is a form of social capital’ (my emphasis). ‘Social capital’ is a technical term from sociology which highlights the value of social relationships and the resources they generate for individuals and groups. After a discussion of the main sociological theorists of ‘social capital’, Burt (2000) writes:

The cited perspectives on social capital are diverse in origin and style of accompanying evidence, but they agree on a social capital metaphor in which social structure is a kind of capital that can create for certain
individuals or groups a competitive advantage in pursuing their ends. Better connected people enjoy higher returns (Burt, 2000: 32).

Social capital is here referred to overtly as a metaphor. Like capital, social capital can be invested to yield ‘higher returns’. Trust, then, literally is a kind of social capital, but social capital itself is metaphorical. This metaphor gives social relationships the same characteristics as economic relations; they have a value which can be invested. In the article, trust characterises a type of social relationship which is held to be valuable, on metaphorical grounds, as ‘a recognition of the common ground on which we stand as citizens’. In this second metaphorical conception, ‘the common ground on which we stand’ suggests that favourable relations between individuals are conceived in terms of proximity, which paves the way for the next metaphorical conceptualisation of trust as a kind of glue.

This next metaphor is expressed as a further predicate nominative assertion (‘trust is the glue’), which suggests that it is salient to readers (it is not conventional) and actually functioning as a mapping in reader cognition. The fact that the following subordinate clause repeats the same spatial metaphor, mapping proximity onto favourable social relations (‘that holds rival producers and consumers together’), further indicates that this matrix of metaphors is a mapping in reader cognition. This is to say that whilst some metaphors are very conventional (the spatial mapping of proximity onto intimacy, for example), these are often repeated and co-occur with novel mappings (for example, ‘trust is the glue’).

All of these metaphors constitute a discourse-level metaphor structure which can be summarised as follows: ‘trust is a kind of capital which is valuable
because it acts like glue, bringing producers and consumers together thus improving their social relations'. This discourse-level structure may also cause readers to re-evaluate the metaphoricity of the phrase ‘trust is at stake’. It seems to me that there is a clear cohesion between conceiving of trust as a type of capital and conceiving of it as a stake in a gambling game. However, it is difficult to say with any certainty whether or not this potential gambling metaphor is integrated into a reader’s text-world representation or not. I suspect it depends on the level of attention readers direct towards the text and the degree to which the gambling sense of ‘at stake’ was initially activated in reader cognition. Whether or not this potential metaphor plays a role in the discourse-level, text-world representation, it is clear that there are two complex discourse-level metaphoric structures in the extract from Barber’s (2008) article. The first depicts the economy as a maelstrom, whereas the second depicts the economy as a series of economic actors, all held in the same place – a ‘common ground’ – by trust. These two discourse-level conceptions are incongruous insofar as the first represents the economy as a dynamic, chaotic place governed by dangerous tides, whereas the second is static in its conception and the economic actors are notably land-bound.

However, it is also clear that both conceptions feature in quite distinct conceptual spaces from one another. The first megametaphor unravelled over two text-worlds. The narrator then interjected with a rhetorical question causing a series of world switches. A new metaphorical conception then began in a new text-world. The two metaphors are separated by quite some conceptual space; they are text-worlds apart. Moreover, insofar as they are situated within a series of deictic
shifts which are relational, or, in the terminology of Systemic Functional Linguistics, relate to the interpersonal function of language (Halliday and Matthiesen, 2004), the change in metaphorical conceptions represents a change in the communicative, or argumentative function of the metaphor. That is, Barber creates an economy text-world which represents market turmoil as an intractable problem. Whatever the response by government, the markets are drawn into the maelstrom. The rhetorical question and the false hypothetical answers given attempt to address this maelstrom conception. However, the actual answer, ‘neither exactly’, repositions Barber’s narrator, allowing him to redefine the metaphorical paradigm under which the economic problem is formulated. The shift between text-worlds serves to differentiate the two conceptions of the economy from one another. Readers need not attempt to integrate each discourse-level metaphor according to a set of ‘optimality principles’ (Fauconnier and Turner, 2002), which, in any case, would prove to be quite hard given their quite different character, because each is situated within a text-world in which the narrator is playing a very different role. It is only by focussing on the textuality of metaphor, by focussing on the way it is situated within, as well as constitutive of, discourse-level structures, that the limits and boundedness of these megametaphors become apparent.

4.3.6 The end of the world, or: 'Those aren’t zombies!'

The issue of the conceptual bounds, or limits, of metaphor is most apparent in the case of negated metaphor. It is well known in Cognitive Linguistics that counterfactuals or negations often evoke the concept or array of concepts that are (not) being referred to. In TWT, negation leads to the creation by discourse
participants of negated worlds (Hidalgo-Downing, 2000, 2002, 2003). The following extract is from an article by Boris Johnson (2008), the Conservative Mayor of London. It appeared in the British broadsheet newspaper, The Telegraph, in October 2008. Notably, Johnson repeatedly tells readers what the economic crisis is not. Holding to the Cognitive Linguistic assumption that when readers are presented with a negation they think of the set of concepts being negated, the article includes many metaphors that are active in reader cognition by virtue of their negation. Here is the extract:

After reading the BBC's special market crisis website, complete with its jagged red arrow pointing at the floor, and after hearing the pornographic glee with which we are told that another small country has gone up the spout, and after Mr Bean, the Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, has informed us that this could be the worst financial crisis in history, I am afraid I want to thrash my FT on the table and shout, Whoa! Come off it, folks! This isn't the Black Death. Pinch yourself. Are you still there? Got a pulse? Thought so. Look out of the window. Those aren't zombies. They are men and women engaged in the normal business of getting and spending.

This isn't some disaster movie about a virus from Mars. It's a recession, a downturn, a correction of a kind that is indispensable to any kind of human activity, and it does not require that we all go around under a special kind of credit-crunch pall. It does not mean we have to cancel all parties and talk in hushed credit-crunch tones. It doesn't mean we have to line our rooms with
newspaper, get in the foetal position and live on tins: in fact, it means the opposite (Johnson, 2008, see Appendix 3).

I will focus on the section of text beginning with ‘this isn’t the Black Death’. Throughout this extract, readers create a series of negated text-worlds in which the economic crisis is (not) likened to a zombie apocalypse. I have a diagrammed this process of repeated negation in Figure 4.4. The negated worlds are created in the context of a world in which Johnson thrashes his FT (Financial Times) on the table. It should be noted that Johnson ‘want[s] to thrash [his] FT on the table’. I therefore start my analysis from a boulomaic world; an ontologically non-actual world which expresses the desires of discourse participants. In this world, Johnson shouts, ‘this is not the Black Death’. ‘This’ is an anaphoric reference to the financial crisis. Here is an explicit metaphor by negation taking the form of a negated predicate nominative assertion. As Figure 4.4 shows, the negated metaphor creates a metaphorical text-world in which the financial crisis is the Black Death. This is then followed by an imperative, ‘look out of the window’ and another negation ‘those are not zombies’. This sets up another negated world in which there are zombies at the window. In the following sentence, Johnson then details what the previously non-specified things at the window are: ‘they are men and women engaged in the normal business of getting and spending’. The metaphor here is acting at the inter-clausal level. ‘Those’ is a vague demonstrative whose referent (‘men and women’) is only clarified in the next sentence. The final straight-forwardly negated world is created by a (non-) comparison between the financial crisis and a ‘disaster movie
Time: Now  
Place: Unspecified, living room? Office?  
Enactors: Boris Johnson, men and women  
Objects: FT

Thrash  
\[ \downarrow \]  
FT → on table

And shout  
This not → **Black Death**

Look out of the window  
Those not → **zombies**

They → men and women  
\[ \downarrow \]  
Engaged → in the normal business...

This not → **disaster movie about a virus from Mars**  
It → recession → downturn → correction...

Not → **require → that we...**

Not → **mean...**

Means → opposite

---

**Figure 4.4** The negated megametaphor of the zombie apocalypse

**Negated world**  
Financial crisis → Black Death

**Negated world**  
Those → **Zombies**

**Negated world**  
Financial crisis → disaster movie about a virus from Mars

**Negated world**  
Financial crisis → requires

**Negated world**  
Financial crisis → means

**Deontic world**

We all go around under a special kind of credit-crunch pall

**Deontic world**

We cancel all parties and talk in hushed credit-crunch tones.

**Deontic world**

We line our rooms with newspaper, get in the foetal position and live on tins.
about a virus from Mars’. Again, the effect is to create a negated world in which the crisis is conceived as a sci-fi disaster movie. Although my intention here is to outline the structuring role that text-worlds play in the creation of megametaphors, it is important to note that the conceptual consequences of this negation are to foreground the metaphor (Hidalgo Downing, 2000). In Chapter 5, I expand upon the idea of foregrounding metaphor and outline a number of strategies, including negation, that serve to make metaphor a more salient aspect of discourse participants’ mental representations of the discourse.

The next two negated worlds are slightly more complex than the first three. Instead of simply asserting that X is not the case, Johnson described behaviours that we should not be engaged in. So, the text sets up three further negated worlds: one in which the financial crisis ‘require[s] that we all go around under a special kind of credit-crunch pall’; a second in which it means ‘we have to cancel all parties and talk in hushed credit-crunch tones’; and a final negated world in which it ‘mean[s] we have to line our rooms with newspaper, get in the foetal position and live on tins’. In all three worlds, there is an embedded deontic world in each negation in which readers ‘have to’, are ‘meant’ or are ‘required’ to (not) behave in a certain way. The embedded deontic modal worlds create and add to an elaborate and richly negated discourse-level megametaphor which describes a novel science fiction metaphor. I have surrounded this series of negated worlds with a blue square on the diagram to indicate that they can be grouped together as a discourse-level structure and ‘blended’, in the sense that Fauconnier and Turner (2002) use the term.
It should be noted – and this was the observation which started this discussion of metaphor in negation – that the megametaphor has definite conceptual and ontological limits or bounds. By this, I mean that it is situated within a negated text-world which ontologically differentiates it from the actual state of affairs presupposed by Johnson. Obviously, this discourse-level structure is what the financial crisis is not. It is juxtaposed throughout the article with references to what Boris Johnson thinks the crisis is. Positive assertions of what the crisis is are often expressed metaphorically. So, for example, in this extract alone, the crisis is referred to as a ‘downturn’. Clearly the text-world in which the economy is going through a ‘downturn’ and the more elaborate negated worlds of Martian epidemics are very different (one is 'real' whereas the other is explicitly fantasy). The ontological and conceptual limits of these text-worlds scaffold our integration of metaphors into the varying discourse-level metaphoric structures we encounter as readers progressing through the text. By this, I mean that rather than integrate the metaphors that describe this negated situation with the metaphors that describe what Johnson perceives as the actual economic situation into a single discourse-level megametaphor, discourse participants are prompted to create two parallel megametaphors; one negated megametaphor, and one conceptual model that represents the actual state of economic affairs. Although this is an obvious point, it needs stating on the basis that it represents the most extreme case of what I have argued in the previous example: that metaphor is simultaneously anchored in and partially constitutive of the text-worlds created by readers as they read. It is situated; both subject to, and facilitator of, the twists and turns of narrative
perspective, temporal and spatial shifts, hypothecation, negation and modality readers encounter in the normal course of reading.

4.4 Conclusion

In this chapter I have argued for a situated view of metaphor, from the clause- to discourse-level of analysis. This view is situated in the sense that it sees metaphor as a linguistic and conceptual phenomenon that occurs in a discourse. I therefore started the chapter with a more detailed account of the different types of experientially defined cognitive systems that (in the course of interaction with the text) constitute discourse. I detailed the structure of the conceptual system with respect to research in cognitive psychology on situated simulation (Barsalou, 1991, 1993, 2003; Barsalou et al, 1993) and related this work to research in cognitive linguistics on lexical disambiguation (Zwaan, 2003; Evans, 2006). Throughout my discussion of both the conceptual system and language system, I introduced ideas from TWT (Werth, 1999; Gavins, 2007) to refine the ways in which these areas of research can be applied to metaphor. In the case of the conceptual system, I introduced the idea that complex abstract concepts like ECONOMY, which are not directly experienced by cognisors, are first encountered textually, as a situation represented in discourse. More specifically, I argued that concepts of this type are first encountered as text-worlds. In these text-worlds, metaphor plays a key role in structuring relations between the complex constituent concepts that make up the economy, such as markets, banks, governments and individual politicians and business leaders. I have argued that this account of the economy-as-situation differed from approaches which view the economy as a literal domain of
experience, awaiting a metaphoric mapping. This is because it sees this economy ‘domain’ as always already constituted by complex configurations of metaphor (which may even be mixed, as in the case of the gyrating markets in Barber’s (2008) *Decades of Eroded Trust and Democracy did the Damage*).

In the case of the second cognitive system in the model, the language system, I adapted Brandt and Brandt’s (2002) ideas to argue that the text drives the integration of shared structure in metaphors from the word all the way up to the discourse-level. On the level of the word, I suggested that the ‘selectional tendencies’ (Evans, 2006) that disambiguate words amounted to a linguistic description of the language conventionally used in text-worlds depicting the different situations in which that word may be used. I used ‘the market’ as an example of this lexical disambiguation. I also suggested that conventions are only conventional insofar as they are known by cognisors. As such, I argued that readers that are unaware of them would create radically different representations of the economic situation than those that are. In this respect, contra Brandt and Brandt (2002), it really does matter whether analysts approach metaphor from a readerly or writerly perspective.

On the level of the clause, I argued that the initial profiling (see Langacker, 1987, 2006, 2009) of trajectories with conventionalised metaphorical correlates (height and value, see Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Charteris-Black, 2004) followed by the profiling of a trajectory which departed from this conventional correlation led to the metaphoric mapping breaking down, which itself became meaningful. In this respect, ‘shared structure’ between each metaphor was conventional, in the case of
the first two metaphors, and determined with respect to these conventions in the case of the third on the basis that the entity ‘gyrating’ was the same that had (meaningfully) dropped. As such, ‘shared structure’ in the case of the gyration metaphor was a text-driven category.

On the level of the discourse, I suggested that metaphor partially constitutes the text-worlds created by readers. However, it is also bounded by those text-worlds. This was most obviously demonstrated in the case of negation and negated metaphor in Johnson’s article, *Eat spend and be merry – this is not the end of the world*. Equally, different discourse-level metaphors (the ‘maelstrom’ and ‘trust’ metaphors) were also shown to be organised around different text-worlds in *Decades of eroded trust and democracy did the damage*. The deictic shifts engendered by changes in narrative perspective (linguistically manifest in the ‘I’ and ‘you’ relationships engendered by interrogatives directed at the reader) conceptually segment the text in such a way that the two metaphors for political economy appeared in distinct text-worlds. In this respect, the contours of this text-world architecture scaffold the integration of clause-level metaphor into larger, discourse-level constructions. Individual instances of metaphor, or whole megametaphors can therefore be ‘worlds apart’ from one another, operating in different text-worlds and creating different conceptual effects in the service of the different communicative and rhetorical strategies used by a writer at different points in the discourse.

The conclusions of this chapter address some of the questions raised in chapter three. These were:
1. How do discourse participants manage cluster of metaphors that do not adhere to these optimality principles? What happens to “tricky” metaphors? Are they written off as meaningless?

2. In cases where individual metaphors do adhere to these optimality principles, are they always integrated into the blend by discourse participants?

3. Can discourse participants manage multiple blended spaces already made up of multiple input spaces; are all inputs integrated into the same blended space; If not, why not?

With respect to question one, I demonstrated in my discussion of ‘the market’ that asymmetries in the linguistic resources available to readers result in meaningless or hard to understand metaphors. If a writer is familiar with a conventional linguistic metaphor and a reader is not, it is likely that the metaphor remains only a linguistic metaphor for writers (and therefore not a mapping), whereas for readers it will be both a linguistic and conceptual metaphor. Accordingly, if both or one of the metaphors is “dead” for a writer, this does not necessarily mean it is so for the novice reader. To partially address question two, then, this is the source of metaphors that do not orient towards the optimality principles outlined by Fauconnier and Turner (2002). The ability to make a coherent mental representation out of metaphors that do not orient to these principles presupposes two things: either parity in the linguistic resources available to discourse participants (they both know the selectional tendencies that mark only for linguistic
metaphor) or the ability of the reader to make a pragmatic assumption about the break-down of a particular mapping.

In the case of questions two and three, I have argued that discourse-level metaphors (and, by extension, their clause-level constituents) are situated in and constitutive of text-worlds. It stands to reason, then, that it need not be the case that all metaphor that can be integrated into a discourse-level structure actually is. The integration of a metaphor into a megametaphor will depend upon the boundaries of the text-worlds in which that metaphor appears, be those boundaries defined by narrative perspective, modality, counterfactuality etc. In the case of *Decades of eroded trusts and democracy did the damage*, a change in the mega-metaphorical conception of the economic crisis was accompanied by changes in narrative perspective. This shifting text-world context scaffolded the integration of micro-metaphors into the different megametaphors prompted by the text. With particular regard to question three, clearly discourse participants can manage multiple megametaphors, whether they be in series, as in *Decades of eroded trusts and democracy did the damage*, or parallel, as in the negated megametaphor in *Eat, spend and be merry – this is not the end of the world*.

At the heart of this perspective is the view that an analysis of metaphor on any level, discourse or otherwise, requires a return to the textuality of metaphor; the fact of it being a part of – indeed, a structuring element of – discourse. It was this quality that was missing from the ‘optimality principles’ outlined by Fauonnier and Turner (2002). In Chapter 5, I further explore this notion of the textuality, or ‘texture’ (Stockwell, 2009), of metaphor. In the present chapter, I outlined the
relationship of discourse-level metaphors to the text-world architectures in which they appeared. In the next, I examine in more detail the “feeling” of these metaphors; their force and intensity; their rhetorical effect; the degree to which they constitute an argument about the state of the economy, or the “mood music” that accompanies such an argument.
The preceding chapter described the ways in which multiple clause-level metaphors fed into larger discourse-level metaphoric structures. The edges of these discourse-level metaphors were defined in relation to a backdrop of text-driven world-switches. If Chapter 4 concerned itself with metaphor ‘edge-work’, this chapter is concerned with the content of those edges. It is about the ‘texture’ (Stockwell, 2009) of those metaphors. For a preliminary example, consider, again, the extract from the Johnson (2008) article:

Look out of the window. Those aren't zombies. They are men and women engaged in the normal business of getting and spending.

This isn't some disaster movie about a virus from Mars. It's a recession, a downturn, a correction of a kind that is indispensable to any kind of human activity, and it does not require that we all go around under a special kind of credit-crunhch pall. It does not mean we have to cancel all parties and talk in hushed credit-crunhch tones. It doesn't mean we have to line our rooms with newspaper, get in the foetal position and live on tins: in fact, it means the opposite (Johnson, 2008, see Appendix 3).

Compare this to the following extract from a piece by George Osborne (2008), then the British Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer (now Chancellor of the Exchequer). It was published in The Telegraph:
Gordon Brown is not a man with a plan: he is a man with a huge overdraft. He is trying to spin a virtuous strategy out of extra borrowing, when in truth that extra borrowing is forced on him. And the only reason the borrowing is so large is because he made the catastrophic mistake as Chancellor of not setting aside any money for a rainy day. He left the cupboard bare (Osborne, 2008, see Appendix 4).

Both extracts make extensive use of metaphor. In Osborne’s article, ‘overdraft’, ‘spin’, ‘rainy day’ and ‘he left the cupboard bare’ are in some sense metaphorical. As I will argue below, ‘setting aside money for a rainy day’ is also a potentially metaphorical phrase insofar as it would usually be used in a domestic, not economic context. Indeed, I will argue below that a majority of the metaphors featured in the Osborne extract fit into a domestic frame which is used as the source for an extended metaphor that compares Brown to someone who is inept at handling their household finances. Whilst both extracts include discourse-level metaphoric structures, there are qualitative differences between their appearances in each text: The metaphors ‘feel’ different. Hidalgo Downing (2000, 2002, 2003) suggests that negation is a foregrounding device. Accordingly, in the first example, the repeated negated worlds foreground the metaphor of the Martian epidemic. Indeed, the frame is entirely constitutive of the negated world; this world is ‘the disaster movie about a virus from Mars’. Conversely, metaphor in the second extract is playing a less decisive role. The domestic framing of the economy is not made wholly explicit until the final line, ‘[h]e left the cupboard bare’. ‘To spin’ may not even be
interpreted as a metaphor, let alone related to what is quite an antiquated domestic situation (in this instance, ‘to spin’ means to ‘present information in a certain way’, but it can also mean ‘to spin wool’, an antiquated domestic chore).

This chapter is concerned with the qualitative differences between discourse-level metaphors, such as those noted in the Osborne and Johnson extracts (see Section 5.3, below, for a more thorough examination of the former). It focuses, in particular, on how these differences can be explained with reference to the text-world structure of the texts in which they appear. It is for this reason that, in the next section of the chapter, I examine in more detail the way in which TWT has approached metaphor (Werth, 1977, 1994; Gavins, 2007) and review this approach with respect to recent developments in metaphor scholarship: that is, Steen’s (2008, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c) work on ‘deliberate metaphor’ and the work discussed in the preceding chapter on the Career of Metaphor Theory (Bowdle and Gentner, 2005). I then apply these ideas to two texts at the end of the chapter.

5.1 Metaphor in Text World Theory: a brief history of seeing double

Werth’s (1977) earliest work on metaphor discusses the phenomenon alongside irony and ambiguity. He writes:

[L]iterary ambiguity, irony and metaphor all spring from the same kind of conceptual process, in which two (or more) semantic structures occur simultaneously and are amalgamated in accordance with a linguistic constraint (Werth, 1977: 24).
All three phenomena are here depicted as reliant upon the simultaneous occurrence of two or more ‘semantic structures’. Werth (1977, 1994, 1999) calls this simultaneously generated semantic structure ‘double-vision’ (see also Gavins, 2007: 146-64). In the conclusion of the article, Werth extends this visual metaphor and suggests that ‘making metaphors requires the speaker be fitted out with bi-focals’ (1977: 24). Crucially, one of these semantic structures offers a comment on the others:

All [of the examples] have two or three layers of meaning. One is generally superficial or obvious, while the others provide further comment or insight. It is this essential trait which I am referring to as ‘double-vision’, or if you want a more impressive term, *diplopia*: the reader, like the viewer of a Cubist painting, is allowed, and in fact encouraged, to glimpse two or more aspects of meaning simultaneously (Werth, 1977: 9).

Again, the emphasis here is on ‘glimps[ing] two or more aspects of meaning simultaneously’ and there being some sort of inference made about one of those aspects with reference to the other. Although Werth’s (1977) article appeared two years before the publication of Ortony’s (1979) seminal *Metaphor and Thought*, it is notable that, to a small extent, it anticipates some of the insights gained from this cognitive turn in the study of metaphor. For instance, he writes:

Metaphor should not be viewed as an adventitious deviation from ‘real’ language, in terms of the violations of some normal linguistic rules, but instead casts doubt on the normality of these linguistic rules (Werth, 1977: 14).
Werth (1977) prefigures the standard view in CMT that metaphor is a normal, or ‘ubiquitous’ (Lakoff, 1993; Gibbs, 1994), feature of human thought and language. Despite this apparent anticipation of later cognitive developments in metaphor study, Werth (1977) is still operating within the bounds of ‘a generative semantic framework’ (Werth, 1994: 80). This framework ‘assumes [that] semantics is to be represented in terms of logical form’ (Lakoff, 1993: 248), as opposed to embodied image-schematic gestalts (see Lakoff, 1987) or situated simulations (see Barsalou, 2002; Zwaan, 2004). As such, rather than place metaphor at the heart of human language cognition, Werth’s (1977) model of ‘double-vision’ maintains a link with the logical, truth-conditional semantic approaches operating within the generative tradition.

Later, Werth (1994) reframes the notion of ‘double-vision’, re-orienting it to then contemporaneous developments in cognitive linguistics, metaphor studies and his own developing theory of text-worlds (which was later consolidated in Werth, 1999). As I described, Werth (1977) considered that there were two or more semantic structures involved in metaphor and that one made some comment on the other. For example, in his discussion of the sentence ‘the chair scurried across the room’, Werth (1977: 14) writes: ‘the chair is both a chair and some animate creature such as a spider… we interpret both the subject and predicate while retaining their word meanings’. There are two distinct semantic structures – one relating to the spider (or scurrying animal), and one relating to the literal movements of the chair – which are both viewed simultaneously. Werth (1994) maintains this view, but reframes it with respect to Text World Theory:
The double-vision modality represents the machinery of metaphorical language. The theory of text-worlds, and especially the notion of participant accessible sub-worlds allows us to see how this machinery operates. The notion of layering, which I have argued is central to the conceptualisation of metaphors, is actually constitutive for text-worlds (Werth, 1994: 101).

Significantly, Werth (1994) writes that ‘layering... is constitutive for text-worlds’. Here, then, the suggestion is that the two or more simultaneously generated semantic structures constituting the ‘double-vision’ in Werth (1977) are recast as simultaneously experienced, distinct, layered text-worlds. Moreover, the metaphoric ‘sub-world’ is participant accessible. In text-world theory participant accessibility relates to the ontological status of the text-world in question. Werth (1994: 94) ‘call[s] sub-worlds in which participants can legitimately verify the probability of propositions participant accessible worlds’ (for more detailed accounts of participant accessibility, see also Werth, 1999; Gavins, 2007: 77).

Whilst there are certainly similarities between Werth’s earlier (1977) and later (1994) works, there is an also an extent to which Werth (1994) adds a further layer to the double-vision schema of the older paper. He writes:

So, my first contention is that metaphor (in common with irony and deliberate ambiguity) not only consists of two levels, the literal and the figurative or, to employ I.A. Richard’s terminology, the tenor and the vehicle, but that its special quality is that we see both simultaneously, or one through the other. Metaphor, that is to say, does not merely substitute one
area of experience for another; it combines the two kinds of experience into a third, new, way of seeing (Werth, 1994: 83, my emphasis).

This passage maintains the continuity with Werth (1977) until the last sentence, in which there is no longer a layering of two text-worlds which are both simultaneously experienced, but the combination of the two worlds and creation of ‘a third, new, way of seeing’ (Werth, 1994: 83). Sticking with the visual metaphor, it seems to me that peering through one text-world layer to view another is quite a different thing from the creation of an altogether new ‘way of seeing’. It poses the question of what exactly the conceptual status of this ‘new way of seeing’ is; text world? blended space? blended world, even? The notation Werth (1994) elaborates upon in the final sections of his article does little to address these issues.


Blended worlds are not separate discourses, only separate mental representations. They create an added layer to an existing conceptualisation; they do not replace that conceptualisation entirely. Crucially, the particular input world in which a given metaphor occurs, and from which the resultant blended world emerges, retains its prominence in the discourse process as a whole. To use the terminology of earlier cognitive-linguistic theories, the
originating text-world is still the target world in the discourse: the metaphor has been created in order to facilitate a better understanding of this target, which remains the central point of reference for the discourse world participants (Gavins, 2007: 149).

She continues, arguing that blended worlds are ‘steadily evolving, complex and autonomous mental representation[s]’, rather than simply a ‘mapping of one domain onto another’ (Gavins, 2007: 151). Importantly, as Gavins (2007: 149) points out, this blended world does not replace the target world, but, following Werth (1994), enriches the conceptual structure by adding another ‘layer’. Gavins (2007: 152) explains that ‘[w]henever a metaphor occurs in a discourse, our mental representation of the text in which the metaphor was generated continues and normally remains the prominent focus of our attention’, although discourse participants can ‘togg[e] between the worlds if necessary’ (Gavins, 2007: 152). I would argue that what Gavins (2007) describes is not so much a double-visioning, but a triple-visioning. Two input worlds combine to create a third, ‘autonomous’, blended world. Gavins (2007) is offering a much more complex, conceptually rich, account of double (or triple) vision than Werth (1977, 1994). Whereas Werth (1977, 1994) restricts metaphor to the parallel experience of two ‘semantic structures’, or domains and only later examines how they might be combined into a third ‘new way of seeing’, it seems to me that Gavins (2007) is instead concerned with how reader attention (see Gavins, 2007: 149, 151, 152) is directed to the various input worlds of the metaphor. That is, the notion of ‘toggling’ is closely related to how the different worlds comprising the metaphor are made salient, or ‘prominent’, by the
text. I argue that, from this perspective, the different worlds comprising the metaphor are subject to foregrounding or occlusion depending on the linguistic strategies used by the writer to create the metaphor. Thus, in the Johnson example, the text-world of the Martian epidemic – that is, what the economic crisis is not – is especially foregrounded by repeated negation. In each case of negation, the 'real' world depicting the economy is backgrounded, or occluded, by this negated world (notice, too, the indefinite forms, ‘it’ and ‘this’, used to reference the economic crisis. The negated world is richly defined, whereas the 'real' world of the economic crisis is indefinite and vaguely defined). This backgrounding and foregrounding of textual figures is one aspect of what Stockwell (2009) calls ‘texture’. Although he addresses his discussion of texture to literary critical reading and uses it to describe the cognitively affective aspects of literary ‘resonance’ (Stockwell, 2009: 17-55), I suggest that Stockwell’s (2009) ideas can be combined with insights from Text World Theory to describe the cognitively affective aspects of metaphor in economics op-ed articles. Clearly, the description here should not be directed at how discourse participants are engaging in some kind of ‘literary experience’ (see Miall, 2006). It should be noted, however, that ever since Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) early seminal work, it has been well known that metaphor explicates some difficult to explain form of human experience in terms of another, 'easier', more concrete domain of human activity. Metaphor is just as much a communicative activity as a conceptual one (Steen, 2004, 2008, 2011a). However, communication is more than just explanation: it also conveys norms, judgements and expectations. It would be a limiting perspective if analysts only saw metaphor from the perspective of explaining intangible or abstract concepts, and not from this communicative angle.
In this respect, metaphor not only provides the basis for logical arguments about the economy, but also provides the ‘mood lighting’ to which solutions to the economic crisis are developed. In the following section, I extend Gavins’ (2007) triple vision schema with respect to Stockwell’s (2009) notion of texture, and the recent developments in metaphor theory.

5.2 Toggling between worlds or refocusing attention?

In the last chapter, I argued that far from the economy being a literal domain of human experience awaiting a metaphorical mapping, the economy is in fact a concept that we first encounter textually, in discourse. Our first encounters with the economy relate to a situation relayed to us in language; a text-world. The world builders and enactors of this text-world consist of things like banks, governments, markets, money, capital, GDP, etc. Many of these constituent world-building concepts are themselves often complex and abstract. As a consequence, the relationships between them are often represented metaphorically. However, I also noted that the degree to which the linguistic metaphors encountered in these text-worlds of political economy form a part of the text-world – that is, the degree to which a mapping between source and target is made (Gentner and Markman, 1997), as opposed to a disambiguation of the word as an implicit class inclusion statement (Glucksberg and Keysar, 1991) – depends on a variety of linguistic co- and contextual factors. These linguistic co- and contextual factors, or selectional tendencies (Evans, 2006: 503-4), amount to a description of the language usually used in the production of economy text-worlds, which is to say they amount to a linguistic description of an ECONOMY frame, in the sense that Barsalou et al (1999)
use the term. The content of this frame depends on the familiarity of discourse participants with the text-worlds of political economy. Thus, whether or not a linguistic metaphor construes a salient conceptual metaphor depends upon the familiarity of discourse participants with the ECONOMY frame. The implicit assumption here is that metaphors that are processed as a mapping make it into our text-world representation of the situation, whereas linguistic metaphors that are simply disambiguated amount to a literal representation of events in the text-world.

Similarly, Steen (2008) writes that, paradoxically, the majority of linguistic metaphor is probably not processed metaphorically, as a mapping. He posits the notion of ‘deliberate’ metaphor. This is to be distinguished from other types of metaphor insofar as deliberate metaphors ‘involve mandatory attention to the fact that they are metaphorical’ (Steen, 2011a: 84), which is to say that they explicitly signal their own metaphoricity. For this reason, in Steen’s (2008, 2011a) framework both predicate nominative metaphors and similes can be considered ‘deliberate’ because their linguistic forms (‘X is a Y’ and ‘X is like a Y’) explicitly provoke a mapping in reader cognition. This mapping is represented in discourse participants’ mental representations of the discourse (Steen, 2011a: 84). The metaphor makes it into the reader’s situation and context models. Steen (2008) writes:

In reception, metaphors presumably would be experienced as deliberate when they are recognized as such a rhetorical device. It may be argued that this will happen when they ineluctably shift the perspective of the addressee
from the local topic of a message to another conceptual domain from which that local topic is to be re-viewed (Steen, 2008: 224).

The talk here is of ‘shifting’ between perspectives. Similarly deliberate metaphor is about drawing ‘attention’ to the fact of a metaphor’s existence. In many ways Steen’s (2008, 2011a) focus on shifting attention bears a resemblance to the textured understanding of discourse-level metaphor I advanced in the previous section. Indeed, Steen (2011a: 105) writes that ‘the crux [of deliberate metaphor] lies in the presence of the source-domain in attention, in the situation model’. This attention to the relationship between the linguistic form of a metaphor and its salience as a metaphor in reader cognition is certainly important. However, Steen’s (2008, 2011a) notion of deliberate metaphor has also faced criticism. Gibbs (2011a, 2011b) questions how deliberate the use of ‘deliberate’ metaphors might be. He argues that the production of an utterance takes place in the context of a series of unconscious psychological processes that precede the utterance itself, further arguing that

One implication of this line of psychological research is that people may believe that they have created a metaphor deliberately, with their very conscious thought processes being the initial, primary cause for the creation of the metaphor, yet be mistaken about the real reason they wrote or said what they did. Many other cognitive unconscious forces may shape the online production and understanding of metaphors, which are simply not accessible to our conscious intuitions, despite our strong beliefs to the contrary (Gibbs, 2011a: 41).
In this understanding, deliberate metaphor use is hard to gauge because the psychological processes that contribute towards the production of a metaphorical utterance or sentence cannot be consciously reflected upon. When cognisors do reflect upon the reasons behind their behaviours, linguistic or otherwise, they are often wrong about the causes. Cognisors cannot reflect upon cognitions at the same time as they have them; they cannot be conscious of the backstage cognitive processes that make that consciousness possible. As opposed to envisioning a model of metaphor production which has only two states of being – fully conscious and deliberative, versus unconscious and reflexive – Gibbs (2011a) instead prefers a model of metaphor production that sees a variety of conscious and unconscious factors interacting to shape the creation of metaphoric language. In this model, the production of utterances or sentences is conditioned by the total interaction of all these factors: evolutionary forces; long term conceptual knowledge and experiential history; present socio-cultural conditions; present bodily states and actions; present motivations and cognitions; present linguistic context; immediate linguistic production and understanding processes; and neural processes. All of these play a role in the creation of utterances or sentences (Gibbs, 2011a: 46). Linguistic behaviour emerges out of their interaction as opposed to being the terminus of a serialised, deliberative thought process.

Gibbs’s (2011a) description of the relationship between conscious and unconscious thought and human behaviour is fascinating and presents a variety of problems for Steen’s (2008, 2011a) notion of deliberate metaphor. Writing in response to Gibbs’ (2011a) article, Steen (2011c: 55) suggests that deliberate
metaphor does not equate to conscious metaphor, but ‘it does have the crucial function of affording conscious metaphorical cognition, which does not hold for non-deliberate metaphor’. However, this reformulation prompts the further question: ‘affording’ to whom; reader or writer; speaker or listener? In the previous chapter I argued that it was necessary to examine the production and reception of metaphors as different phenomenon, but in the debate between Gibbs (2011a, 2011b) and Steen (2011b) the issues surrounding metaphor production and reception are bundled together. In the main, Gibbs (2011a) levels his criticism of deliberateness at the production end of discourse. His discussion of conscious and unconscious human behaviour related to the creation of metaphors, not their interpretation. Steen’s (2008, 2011a) own use of the word ‘deliberate’ suggests an emphasis on the linguistic behaviour, conscious or not, of the writer, although he does also address the issue of deliberate metaphor ‘in reception’ (see Steen, 2008: 224, quotes above). The disagreement between Gibbs (2011a) and Steen (2011c) is, in the main, concentrated at the writerly end of discourse; at discourse production.

Despite the dubiousness of attributing deliberateness to metaphor production, Steen’s (2008, 2011a) notion of deliberate metaphor – or rather the phenomenon he identifies with the term – does have value in a reception-oriented analysis of the processes of metaphor interpretation. Whereas Gibbs (2011a, 2011b) rightly criticises as psychologically naïve the idea that analysts can provide formal criteria for the deliberateness of a writer’s linguistic behaviour, Steen (2008, 2011a) is absolutely correct to point out that the linguistic form of a metaphor shapes the creation of a text-world in reader cognition. Whilst the term ‘deliberate’
probably hides more than it reveals, it seems reasonable to say that the cognitive psychological effect on readers of what Steen (2008, 2011a, 2011b) terms ‘deliberate metaphor’ is qualitatively different to other, more indirect, forms of metaphor. In the context of Text World Theory’s emphasis on text-driven meaning construction, such an assertion is hardly controversial: different linguistic forms prompt the creation, by readers, of different conceptual structures. Rather than making any claim about the conscious intentions or otherwise of writers, then, it seems to me that the most important aspect of Steen’s (2008, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c) definition of ‘deliberate metaphor’ is that the source-domain of the metaphor makes it into a reader’s text world representation of the discourse. The particular linguistic form the metaphor takes is liable to make it a more or less salient part of this text-world representation. It is in this respect that Steen’s (2008, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c) work on deliberate metaphor is consonant with Gavins’ (2007) notion of ‘toggling’ between input worlds; linguistic cues prompt the foregrounding or backgrounding of source- and target-domains.

However, this toggling between input worlds need not be a binary process; a process of switching between either source or target world; a process of switching between deliberate or non-deliberate metaphor; or a process of switching between metaphors that are ‘on’ or ‘off’ in reader cognition. In a contribution to the debate between Gibbs (2011a, 2011b) and Steen (2011a, 2011c), Müller (2011) writes:

To me it seems clear that an approach to metaphor understanding and creating is in need of a dynamic concept of metaphor, which addresses metaphors as processes, not as categorisation puzzles in which metaphors
jump from non-conventional to conventional, or non-deliberate to deliberate. Rather what we find, when we study how people use metaphors, is that metaphors are activated dynamically: over the course of a discourse event and to varying degrees. Without the need to refer to notions like consciousness and deliberateness, we can as linguists, and as psychologists, describe processes of metaphor activation which range along a scale, from sleeping to waking (Müller, 2011: 62).

Müller (2011) is suggesting a cline of metaphor salience. Whilst not explicitly stated, the implication is that metaphors ‘activate’ something in the minds of discourse participants. That is, Müller (2011) seems to be gesturing towards a scalar view of metaphor salience or prominence in reader cognition. In such a scalar model, one should look at metaphor ‘layering’ (Werth, 1994) not as a toggling between text-world layers (see Gavins, 2007) but instead as a fading or growing of source and target world prominence. The process here is analogue, not binary. Such an analogue view of metaphor can be expressed (metaphorically) in the language of light and shade. Source-domains can operate in the background as the mood lighting for a literal representation of events, or they can become so bright they distract readers, themselves becoming the main event. Metaphors are not ‘on’ or ‘off’ in reader cognition. They have dimmers – not light-switches – that grow brighter or darker with the language used. The lexicon of such a perspective is one of brightness and fading. It is a similar lexicon to that advanced by Stockwell (2009) in his model of attention and literary resonance. He writes:
The felt causes of these [figures or attractors] in textual attention are focus, engagement, fading and extinction, which in turn represent a scale of figure and background. Figure/ground in cognitive linguistics and in cognitive poetics tended to be regarded as a polar category, whereas from the perspective of scaled readerly attention, it is a cline of prominence, ranging through degrees of foregrounding into vague, undifferentiated but rich background (Stockwell, 2009: 22).

Just as Müller (2011) describes a cline of metaphor prominence, Stockwell’s (2009) model of figure/ground is scalar. Attractors are foregrounded, then fade into the background or are occluded by other attractors. The texture of the text consists in this direction and redirection of readerly attention on to different textual attractors.

In a similar fashion – though by no means exactly the same, for reasons given below – I am arguing that source- and target-domain worlds are subject to the text-driven cognitive attention and neglect of readers, actively engaged in the process of reading. If metaphor source-domain worlds are conceived as textual figures that are more or less foregrounded by the linguistic forms taken by the metaphor, then double-vision can be thought of not as a toggling between two text-worlds, but as a refocusing of reader attention between the source- and target-domain text-worlds.

In such a model, metaphors in which the source-domain world is foregrounded might prompt the creation of vivid situated simulations of that world which are used to analogically reason about literal happenings in the target-domain world, whereas metaphors in which the source-domain world is backgrounded might have
subtle effects on the tone or mood of the text without ever pushing through into our text-world representation.

Whilst there are similarities between the language used by Stockwell (2009) and the augmented Text World Theory account of metaphor I have begun to formulate, it is also clear that what Stockwell (2009) means by an attractor differs in important ways from a source-domain world. Whereas Stockwell (2009) is describing the ways in which reader attention ranges across and is directed at different attractors in a single text-world, I maintain the view, held by Gavins (2007) and Werth (1977, 1994, 1999), that in the case of metaphor (and especially discourse-level metaphorical structures such as those described in the previous chapter) we experience two different text-worlds simultaneously. Rather than world-switching, or toggling, between the two, both are simultaneously experienced and fade in and out of focus, becoming foregrounded or backgrounded depending upon the language used in the text (in the following sections, I provide two examples of this process). Stockwell (2009: 25) gives a list of features that make good attractors. These are: newness, agency, topicality, empathetic recognisability, definiteness, activeness, brightness, fullness, largeness, height, noisiness, and aesthetic distance from the norm. This list suffices for his purpose of explaining the intra-world texture of individual text-worlds. However, to examine the inter-world texture of metaphor – that is, the backgrounding and foregrounding of simultaneously experienced input worlds – it is necessary to describe a separate set of linguistic and conceptual features that make source input worlds more or less
prominent to readers. As a starting point, Steen (2008) highlights a number of features that are likely to emphasise or foreground metaphor in reader cognition:

1. The presence of a similarity operator, or MFlag (see Steen et al, 2011). This might be the predicate nominative form, or it may be a word that signals a comparison, as in the case of simile (‘as’, ‘as if’, ‘like’ etc).

2. Extended metaphor.

3. A movement away from literal, target-domain language towards language associated exclusively with the source-domain (Steen (2008: 225) gives the example of the Neil Young song, *Like a Hurricane*, which features the lines ‘you are like a hurricane, there’s calm in your eyes/and I’m getting blown away’ in which the last line features only source-domain language).

On the basis of the analyses in the previous Chapter, I would add:

4. Novel metaphor (as in Chapter 4, I define novelty with respect to the language usually used with respect to the frame of which a particular text-world is an instantiation).

5. Negated metaphor (as in the Johnson article).

Finally, negated metaphor suggests a further type of metaphor foregrounding device:

6. Modal metaphor (as in metaphors which use a modal verb or phrase to further emphasise or draw attention the comparison, such as ‘seemed like’).
All six of these manifestations of metaphor draw reader attention to the metaphor as a metaphor, making the source-domain world more prominent in reader cognition. As such, they function as metaphor foregrounding devices, which is to say they push to the fore the source-domain world of the metaphor into our text-world representations of the text.

In the next section, I use these six features of foregrounded metaphor to describe the ways in which the source and target-domain worlds of discourse-level mega-metaphoric conceptual structures fade in and out of reader attention in the course of a discourse.

5.3 Discourse-level metaphor and texture: metaphor as mood lighting

In the previous section, I proposed six features that were likely to foreground metaphor. By ‘foreground’ I meant that aspects of the source-domain would be salient parts of the text-world representations of readers. Before moving on to an examination of foregrounded metaphor, however, I first give an example of metaphor that is not so prominent, or rather the prominence of the megametaphor fluctuates as the discourse proceeds. To do so, I return to the extract at the beginning of the chapter by George Osborne (2008), called *We can’t borrow our way out of trouble*. Here is the extract again:

Gordon Brown is not a man with a plan: he is a man with a huge overdraft. He is trying to spin a virtuous strategy out of extra borrowing, when in truth that extra borrowing is forced on him. And the only reason the borrowing is so large is because he made the catastrophic mistake as Chancellor of not

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setting aside any money for a rainy day. He left the cupboard bare (Osborne, 2008, see Appendix 4).

As I argued in the opening remarks of this chapter, there are a variety of metaphors used in this extract that all in some way relate to a domestic frame and therefore contribute to a discourse-level megametaphor in which government finances are compared to household finances. In this extract the megametaphor is mostly subdued, acting as the ‘mood lighting’ described in Sections 5.1 and 5.2. However, as the discourse proceeds, it becomes more prominent and plays a more central role in creating the kind of discourse-level meaning, or ‘gist’, to which Werth (1994) refers. In the following section, I perform an analysis of the foregrounding and backgrounding of the metaphor source- and target-domain worlds that constitute the domestic megametaphor of the extract. One can assume that the six metaphor foregrounding features work in concert with each other and other aspects of the text. As such, rather than going through the list of features and attempting to identify each in the text in turn, I analyse the text chronologically. Again, the aim is to describe the contour of reader attention as the discourse unravels; how source and target-domain worlds are foregrounded and backgrounded as the text proceeds. This necessarily calls for a sequential analysis of the text.

5.3.1 Analysis: why it is wrong to borrow

The extract begins with a negated world, ‘Gordon Brown is not a man with a plan’. As with all negation, this foregrounds the processes that are negated. This initial foregrounded world is then followed by a metaphor, ‘he is a man with a huge overdraft’. The source- and target-domain worlds created by this metaphor are
respectively a world in which Gordon Brown has a strategy to deal with the economic crisis and one in which he simply has an overdraft. The syntactic parallelism of both clauses (‘X is (not) a man with a Y’) suggests that there is an equivalence between the ‘plan’ and the ‘huge overdraft’. Thus, the foregrounded negated world in the first clause of the extract corresponds to the target-domain world created in the second. This initial foregrounded negation leads to what Stockwell (2009) describes as a ‘lacunae’, or ‘blob’ in the language of cognitive psychology. If Gordon Brown does not have a plan, there is a sense in which he must or should have something. The ‘huge overdraft’ fills the lacunae. As such, the source-domain world (‘overdraft’) comes to occlude the target-domain world (‘plan’) insofar as it fills this conceptual gap, but it does so only on the basis that the gap existed in the first place, which is to say that the ‘plan’ continues to resonate just behind the ‘huge overdraft’. ‘Plan’ is a series of tasks set for accomplishing a goal, the goal being to stop the financial crisis. Although ‘plan’ is a noun, my schematic frame knowledge is that it is a summary of the actions, or processes, required to do something. ‘Overdraft’ is also a noun, but the foregrounded equivalence set up between it and ‘a plan’ mean that the discourse-world conceptual frame associated with overdrafts – the actions required to take out an overdraft and the types of people who do so – are also peripherally activated in reader cognition. Just as plans entail actions and goals, overdrafts entail private individuals (and not nation states) becoming indebted. I have represented these backgrounded frames in Figure 5.1. I have chosen to call them backgrounded frames, as opposed to source- and target-domain worlds, because they are larger backgrounded conceptual structures which are presupposed by the source- and
target-domain worlds of the megametaphor, but do not contribute directly as world builders to these worlds: the target- and source domain worlds only partially instantiate these frames. I have in mind here a similar difference between Langacker’s (2008) concept of a ‘profile’ and ‘base’. The transparency of the source-domain world indicates that it does not quite occlude the negated target-domain world of the metaphor. The dotted lines between the aspects of each frame indicate mappings between the two.

**Figure 5.1 Backgrounded frames**
The most foregrounded world, then, is the source-domain world of the megametaphor in which Gordon Brown has an overdraft. The negated target-domain world of ‘the plan’ is partially occluded by this source-domain world. Then, finally, the implied mappings between the frames associated with plans and overdrafts constitute the rich background layer of this megametaphorical configuration of text-worlds.

This is the next sentence of the extract: ‘he is trying to spin a virtuous strategy out of extra borrowing, when in truth that extra borrowing is forced on him’. It contains two further linguistic metaphors, ‘he is trying to spin a virtuous strategy’ and ‘the borrowing is forced on him’. The first metaphor, ‘to spin’, is conventional within the text-worlds of politics/political economy, meaning something like ‘to create the appearance of’ (the verb has negative connotations). I therefore doubt that it is a particularly salient part of the text-world representation of readers (although, as I suggested at the beginning of the chapter, it does fit into the domestic frame of the megametaphor. Given that spinning is not a very prototypical example of contemporary domestic activity but a word that refers to an activity prototypically associated with a politics frame, there is little reason to believe the subtle extended metaphor revives its original use at all). The second metaphor, ‘is forced upon him’, is a relatively conventional metaphor. If something is forced on someone, they are coerced into doing it. In the metaphor, ‘the borrowing’ is reified as an object and, because the verb form is in the passive, it is pushed onto Brown by some unknown force. Financial borrowing is an incredibly abstract concept. As such, it is probably un-representable in reader cognition without it
being reified in some form. This schematic reification is consonant with the underlying, schematic force dynamics of the overdraft frame evoked in the first lines of the extract. Phenomena like debt aversion suggest that in some circles indebtedness is seen as a moral failing. From this perspective, to be indebted is therefore the product of coercion; the product of this force dynamic schema of an object, ‘debt’, being pushed onto an individual. Private individuals are often ‘forced’ to take on debts with all the moralistic baggage this entails. There is a sense in which this schematic metaphor therefore coheres with (ideological) views of household debt and the moral failures that some groups of people think it presupposes. That is, unplanned borrowing – borrowing that is forced upon the debtor – is a sign of bad household management. The fact that Osborne writes that Brown is trying ‘to spin a virtuous strategy’ suggests that, in trying to create the appearance of virtue, Brown is duplicitously covering up for what he knows to be a moral (non-virtuous) failure. Notably, this moral colouring of the metaphor is partially achieved through the ‘mood lighting’ provided by the backgrounded overdraft frame. This frame sets in place a moral judgement on the borrowing that is ‘forced upon’ the British economy ostensibly because of Brown (borrowing which is actually very different from a personal, household loan or overdraft). In this second sentence of the extract, the target-domain world comes back into focus, but an attitude towards borrowing inherited from the implicit frame knowledge of overdrafts looms in the background, giving added weight to the implication made by Osborne that Brown is involved in a duplicitous cover-up.
The overdraft frame is more closely incorporated into the source-domain text-world in the following sentence, in which the reason for the debt being so large is given (within the logic of the household budget, if unwanted personal debts are morally questionable, large unwanted debts are even more so). Here is the sentence: ‘And the only reason the borrowing is so large is because he made the catastrophic mistake as Chancellor of not setting aside any money for a rainy day’ (the metaphorical language is given in emphasis). A ‘rainy day’ is a meteorological metaphor for a difficult time. To me, it seems to have a parochial connotation and is accordingly more prototypically associated with my domestic, household frame; families have ‘rainy days’, not governments (indeed, a quick internet search reveals that a host of financial advice companies offer services to families ‘saving for a rainy day’, and in nearly all of the sample hits returned by a British National Corpus sampler (XML Version, 2007) search, the phrase ‘for a rainy day’ appears in the context of personal – not governmental – finance). Interestingly, from the perspective of looking at metaphor backgrounding and foregrounding, the phrase ‘for a rainy day’ is a way of speaking associated with a particular frame – the frame of household finance – but not altogether a way of speaking about household finance per se. Notably, whether or not it rains is out of an individual’s control, but how individuals or households plan for a rainy day is not. The rainy day metaphor provides a context to Brown’s plan. It is in this context that the moral judgement of the plan is encoded. In this frame, unwanted private debts – debts that have been ‘forced on’ an individual – are only incurred as a result of irresponsible spending in the past. There is no direct mapping, in the sense of an explicit correspondence (for example, plan/overdraft), being made between Brown and the leader of a
household. Such a mapping is implied and therefore backgrounded in the same
sense that aspects of the overdraft frame were, colouring our moral understanding
of Brown’s plan.

The domestic source world of the metaphor is finally brought explicitly into
focus in the final sentence of the extract which uses only source world language:
‘the cupboard was bare’. This is a line from a nursery rhyme called *Old Mother
Hubbard*, in which Old Mother Hubbard goes to the cupboard to fetch her dog a
bone, only to find the cupboard is empty. The line itself appears in the domestic
text-world context of the kitchen and is accordingly an instantiation of a more
general frame of domesticity. This domestic frame coheres with the ‘rainy day’
metaphor of the previous sentence. The frame of household finance which had
previously loomed in the background, shading the moral understanding of
government debt, is in this final foregrounded metaphor explicitly integrated into
the source world of the metaphor (as opposed to being merely background
intimation). Again, the bare cupboard is the product of Brown’s
government/household ‘living beyond its means’ (indeed, this is a phrase commonly
used in the right-wing economic commentary on the financial crisis).

5.3.2 Analysis Summary

This extract initially foregrounds what Gordon Brown is, according to Osborne,
literally lacking (‘a plan’) by negation. Then, in the following clause, it quickly
switches to a metaphor which views public debt through the source world concept
of an ‘overdraft’. The equivalence drawn by the syntactic parallelism between
Brown’s (lack of) a plan and an overdraft sets up a bi-focussing between source- and
target-domain worlds. This equivalence also primes a series of mappings between a ‘plan’ frame and an ‘overdraft’ frame (plans involve people embarking upon a series of actions and achieving a goal just as overdrafts involve private individuals taking out an overdraft at the bank and thereby becoming indebted). The following metaphor, ‘the borrowing is forced on him’, coheres with a personal debt frame; a frame which views unwanted personal debts as the consequence of bad personal finance management (with all the moral judgements this brings of ‘irresponsible’ spending). This is compounded in the next sentence by the meteorological metaphor, ‘for a rainy day’, which is usually used in the context of personal finance.

Notably, these mappings between frames are largely the product of inference. The initial equivalence established in this text between, on the one hand, Brown’s plan and, on the other, an overdraft, instantiates one specific part of a personal finance frame. The frame of personal finance to which the concept, ‘overdraft’, belongs is therefore relatively backgrounded throughout the extract. It is not until the final sentence, ‘he left the cupboard bare’, that the implicit conceptual structure required to understand the concept ‘overdraft’ – the frame of personal or household finance – is explicitly foregrounded (insofar as it uses ‘language associated exclusively with the source-domain’).

In this extract, then, the contour of reader attention between source- and target-domain worlds can be described as follows: an initial foregrounding of the target world, followed by a bi-focussing between source- and target-domain worlds, then a backgrounding of the source world, which colours our ethical understanding of government debt, then finally a refocusing on the source world with the final
sentence, ‘he left the cupboard bare’. The overall effect of this contour – this relative backgrounding of the source world – is that an increase in government debt is seen as ethically undesirable and indicative of bad financial management (rather than a necessary corollary of the most serious financial crisis since the Great Depression) without Osborne ever having to explain concretely why, in the context of borrowing to fund economic recovery, this is the case. The implied, backgrounded logic of household financial management is taken for granted.

5.4 Discourse-level metaphor and texture: metaphor as spotlight

In the previous section, I examined the ‘mood lighting’ effects of metaphor in casting an ethical judgement over the policies of the government for dealing with the financial crisis. In this section, I provide an analysis of a particular salient megametaphor in the opening paragraphs of an article called *Gordon Brown with siren suit and cigar* by Matthew D’Ancona (2008). The op-ed appeared in the right-wing British broadsheet newspaper, *The Telegraph*. D’Ancona is the editor of the British right-of-centre political magazine, *The Spectator*. Here is the extract:

> This is New Labour's first real war. There are no shots being fired, no shock and awe bombardment, no SAS units behind enemy lines. But - in its potential direct impact upon national life and public behaviour - this financial crisis much more closely resembles a traditional military conflict than the five wars which Tony Blair waged.

> In political terms, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and Iraq (twice) were all ‘faraway countries of which we know little.’ Now, in Mr Brown’s eyes, we
face a foe that (unlike, say, Slobodan Milosevic or Saddam Hussein) is a threat to each and every one of us: as pension savers, homeowners, insurance policy holders, taxpayers and users of public services. The enemy of potential austerity, indigence and bankruptcy lurks everywhere.

Often mocked by Cabinet colleagues for his military illiteracy and diffidence at times of conflict, the PM has relaunched himself as General Gordon, armed with his £500 billion rescue plan. The enemy is not an invading army or a global terrorist chieftain in Tora Bora but - as the Prime Minister describes it - an invading financial contagion, hatched in the United States and now rampaging across the global map like Hitler's arrows in the opening titles of Dad's Army.

With unambiguous symbolism, the new National Economic Council is openly described as a 'war cabinet' and meets in Cobra, the Cabinet Office room reserved for national security crises. By bringing his deadliest rival, Peter Mandelson, back into Government from exile in Brussels, Mr Brown has shown himself willing to recreate the spirit of national unity enshrined in the coalition cabinet of 1940 (D'Ancona 2008, see Appendix 5).

Throughout the extract a discourse-level metaphor of war is employed to talk about the financial crisis. D'Ancona goes so far as to claim that the financial crisis is more like a war than any of the other far-off conflicts in which Britain has recently been
involved. He makes this claim on the basis that it more closely resembles his own prototype of military conflict, namely the Second World War. Importantly for my purposes, metaphor in this article is used in a very salient way. It is foregrounded; used as ‘spotlight’, not ‘mood lighting’. In what follows, I use the list of foregrounding features identified in Section 5.2, above, to explain how this is achieved. As in the last analysis (Section 5.3), the aim is to offer an analysis of how the war source-domain of this discourse-level metaphor fades in and out of reader attention as the discourse proceeds.

5.4.1 Analysis: This is war

This is New Labour’s first real war. There are no shots being fired, no shock and awe bombardment, no SAS units behind enemy lines. But - in its potential direct impact upon national life and public behaviour - this financial crisis much more closely resembles a traditional military conflict than the five wars which Tony Blair waged.

The text begins with a deictic reference, ‘this’. Taking part in a written discourse implies a ‘split-discourse-world situation’ (Gavins, 2007: 75). The reader and writer are spatially and temporally separated and therefore inhabit different discourse-worlds. In the case of written texts, therefore, establishing reference for deictic words cannot be achieved by recourse to the immediate physical context in which the reader reads the words on the page. Rather, deictic markers receive their meaning with respect to an entity that is referred to in the text-world. It follows, then, that the demonstrative, ‘this’, used by D’Ancona to begin this op-ed piece is a cataphoric reference to some object or entity in the text-world that has yet to be
fully described. In this regard, ‘this’ is a world-builder, albeit a very schematic and poorly defined one. Given that the reader and D’Ancona do not share the same immediate discourse-world context, one could infer that the referent of ‘this’ is probably some on-going national event or spectacle, but beyond that it is hard to tell. In the third sentence of this paragraph, ‘this’ is more specifically defined as ‘this financial crisis’, but until this point readers are left guessing.

The grammatical complement of ‘this’ is ‘New Labour’s first real war’. By the time readers get to the third sentence of the paragraph, it is clear that this opening sentence is actually a metaphor. In the meantime, however, the poorly defined deictic referent of ‘this’ means that the metaphor is not immediately obvious. At this early stage, readers may guess that what is actually being described is the scale of the economic problems faced by the British Labour government (the financial crisis was, and continues to be, a particularly salient issue in the national news media), but there is also a sense in which this inference requires a particular effort on the reader’s behalf. In any case, such an inference – at this very early stage in the discourse – is hardly verifiable. In terms of source- and target-domain world foregrounding, the results of this initial deictic indeterminacy are to disguise the fact that this is even a metaphor. If readers make an early effortful guess that ‘this’ is a reference to the target-domain world in which the economic crisis unravels, they do so only on the basis that wars and economic crisis are both important national events. That is, it is only insofar as they see the economic crisis through the lens of war. In this initial sentence, it is therefore the source-domain world of the metaphor that is foregrounded. In terms of the six foregrounding features I set out
in section two, the metaphor is foregrounded because the text uses language ‘exclusively associated with the source-domain’ of war. In contrast, the target-domain language (‘this’) is vague and schematic.

This initial foregrounding of the WAR source-domain world is followed by a series of negations in the second sentence: ‘there are no shots being fired, no shock and awe bombardment, no SAS units behind enemy lines’. In the last chapter, following Werth (1999), I suggested that text-worlds act as specific instantiations of more general frames. In this instance, the negation tells readers what frame conception is not required in the creation of this particular source-domain text-world. The extract begins with a categorical assertion that ‘this is Labour’s first real war’. Indeed, the pre-modifier, ‘real’, suggests that the text-world D’Ancona is about to describe is a more prototypical example of the WAR frame. However, the usual features of a WAR frame, such as ‘shots’, ‘bombardments’ and reconnaissance missions ‘behind enemy lines’, are negated; they are not happening. As I argued, following Hidalgo Downing (2000, 2002, 2003) and Lakoff (2004), negation has the effect of foregrounding the things and processes that are negated. Readers create text-worlds in which these negated processes are represented as actually happening. Here, then, there is a ‘layering’ of text-worlds (see Werth, 1994). In the very background of reader attention is the poorly specified, schematic, target-domain world of ‘this’ (which, as the third sentence tells readers, refers to the ‘financial crisis’). In fact, as I argued, this demonstrative is so poorly specified readers may not even recognise the first sentence as a metaphor. As such, it may be the case that the whole sentence, ‘this is New Labour’s first real war’, contributes to
the creation of a single text-world which is interpreted as a literal description of whatever ‘this’ is. It is this text-world – the source-domain text-world of ‘New Labour’s first real war’ – which either occludes or incorporates the target-domain world of ‘this’. Finally, emanating from this source-domain text-world is the foregrounded negated world in which shots are fired, bombs are dropped and SAS units penetrate enemy lines. Figure 5.2 represents the configuration of backgrounded and foregrounded worlds in which ‘this’ is incorporated into the source-domain world of war and conflict. Figure 5.3 represents the configuration of backgrounded and foregrounded text-worlds in which ‘this’ is a schematic world-builder for the target-domain world.

Both figures represent the same section of text, but Figure 5.2 represents an initial reading, whereas Figure 5.3 represents a reading of the first two sentences of the article after ‘this’ has been assigned reference (either by guesswork, or by the reference assigned to it in the third sentence of the paragraph). Accordingly, Figure 5.2 is a literal interpretation of ‘this is New Labour’s first real war’. In this literal interpretation, ‘this’ is a yet-to-be-specified nominal appearing in the same wartime text-world as ‘New Labour’s first real war’. In this diagram, the foregrounded negated world is just that; a text-world in which the entities and processes negated in the home text-world are represented. Conversely, Figure 5.3 represents a metaphorical interpretation of ‘this is New Labour’s first real war’. ‘This’ (the economic crisis) and ‘New Labour’s first real war’ conventionally belong to two very different frames (an ECONOMY frame and a WAR frame, respectively). In Figure 5.3, two simultaneously experienced source and target worlds are created, cueing the
Figure 5.2 Foregrounding a negated world

Figure 5.3 Foregrounding a negated source-domain world
‘double-vision’ Werth (1977, 1994, 1999) and Gavins (2007) describe. In this instance, the source world is an instantiation of a more general WAR frame. The negated world foregrounds aspects of this WAR frame, such as shooting, bombing and SAS reconnaissance, but crucially these do not form a part of the source-domain world. This negation is functioning in a different way to the type of negated metaphor I described in Johnson’s article, 

*Eat spend and be merry – this is not the end of the world*. In Johnson’s op-ed piece, the negated metaphor took the form ‘those are not X, they are y’ (for example, ‘those aren’t zombies, they’re people’). When individual aspects of the zombie apocalypse frame were negated (‘zombies’), they were replaced with a corresponding object or entity in the target world (‘people’). The effect was to establish negated mappings between source- and target-domain worlds which combined across the text to make a negated megametaphor metaphor. However, in this example, rather than using the form ‘those aren’t SAS reconnaissance missions, they’re X’, which provides some negated metaphorical correspondences, D’Ancona provides a list of things associated with a WAR frame that cannot be mapped onto any aspect in the target-domain world. The result is to saturate the discourse with war-time imagery. This has the effect of making any source-domain world instantiation of the WAR frame – and therefore any mapping from this source-domain world onto the target-domain world – more salient to readers than it might otherwise be.

The actual metaphorical correspondence between source- and target-domain world is given in the third and final sentence of this first paragraph:
But - in its potential direct impact upon national life and public behaviour - this financial crisis much more closely resembles a traditional military conflict than the five wars which Tony Blair waged (D’Ancona, 2008, see Appendix 5).

Here, the basis for the megametaphor is given in the adverbial phrase, ‘in its potential direct impact upon national life and public behaviour’. The commonality between ‘traditional military conflict’ and the ‘financial crisis’ is that both will affect the British public in a way that other more recent wars have not. Note, however, that the expression of this commonality in an adverbial phrase allows D’Ancona to use the pronoun ‘it’ instead of the more specific noun phrase used in the next clause, ‘the financial crisis’. This further defers any resolution over what the actual topic of the discourse is – to what ‘this’ or ‘it’ refers – until this following clause.

Although both traditional wars and financial crises affect the citizens of the nation states involved, we are prompted to view this property of both source and target-domain through the lens of the source world because a specification of the target – the financial crisis – is deferred to the following clause. Again, then, the source-domain of war is foregrounded. When the target of the metaphor is finally revealed it prompts a ‘world-repair’ (Emmott, 1997; Gavins, 2007) in which the text-world array depicted in Figure 5.2 is reconfigured into that depicted in Figure 5.3. This world-repair is likely to cause a rebalancing of attention towards (but not completely away from) the target-domain world as readers finally perform a mapping from source- to target-domain world. The ‘similarity operator’ (Steen et al, 2011), ‘much more closely resembles’, then refocuses reader attention on the
source-domain world of ‘traditional military conflict’. This refocusing is consolidated by the comparison that follows it to ‘the five wars which Tony Blair waged’. There is an ambiguity here. On the one hand, ‘this financial crisis’ may have a closer resemblance to ‘traditional military conflicts’ than it does any of the wars that came before it; it is more like a traditional military conflict than it is like a modern war. On the other, ‘this financial crisis’ may be a better example of ‘traditional military conflict’ than any of those other wars; it is more war-like than ‘the five wars which Tony Blair waged’. In the first sense, the financial crisis is compared to both types of war. In the second sense, the financial crisis is more prototypical of war than modern warfare is. In either understanding, the three-way comparison between ‘this financial crisis’, ‘the five wars which Tony Blair waged’ and ‘traditional military conflict’ has the effect of excluding parts of a more general WAR frame from the mapping between source- and target-domain worlds in much the same way as the negation in the second sentence of the paragraph did. The ‘five wars which Tony Blair waged’ are not like this war/financial crisis. Like shooting, bombing and reconnaissance, they are surplus to the requirements of the metaphor. Again, the effect is to saturate the discourse with references to military conflict which foregrounds any later source-domain world instantiations of this WAR frame.

The next paragraph begins with a similar ‘saturation’ strategy:

In political terms, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and Iraq (twice) were all ‘faraway countries of which we know little.’ Now, in Mr Brown’s eyes, we face a foe that (unlike, say, Slobodan Milosevic or Saddam Hussein) is a threat to each and every one of us: as pension savers, homeowners,
insurance policy holders, taxpayers and users of public services. The enemy
of potential austerity, indigence and bankruptcy lurks everywhere.

The opening sentence lists a series of countries which have all been subject to
military intervention under the New Labour government. This is followed by a
temporal world-switch to ‘now’ which is then immediately epistemically modalised
by the adverbial phrase, ‘in Mr Brown’s eyes’. This is a relatively conventional non-
specialist metaphor used to refer to seeing something from someone else’s
perspective. I doubt, therefore, that it features as a particularly salient aspect of the
text world representation of discourse participants. It does, however, modalise the
salient metaphor that follows it; ‘we face a foe that... is a threat to each and every
one of us’. This is not the narrator’s metaphor, but epistemically modalised from the
perspective of Brown. Again, the language here belongs solely to the frame of
c o n f l i c t . A s i n t h e f i r s t p a r a g r a p h , t h e r e i s a n i n i t i a l f o r e g r o u n d i n g o f t h e k i n d o f w a r
the financial crisis is not like (‘Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and Iraq (twice)’).
These wars were all in ‘faraway countries’. There is then a refocusing of attention,
this time epistemically modalised from the perspective of Brown, on what kind of
war the financial crisis is actually like – a conflict in which ‘each and every one of us’
is threatened (unlike the conflicts in ‘faraway countries’) – that is expressed entirely
in the language associated with the source-domain world. As a consequence, the
initial foregrounded text-worlds of previous wars are occluded by this new source-
domain world (although there is a brief world-switch back to the wars in Kosovo and
Iraq prompted by the parenthetical ‘unlike, say, Slobodan Milosevic or Saddam
Hussein’). Again, the effect here is the same as in the preceding paragraph: an initial
foregrounding of the source-domain text-world of military operations and a
backgrounding of the literal target-domain world of economic activity and
government policy.

It is not until the list of those threatened by ‘the foe’ that the source-domain
world begins to resurface in reader attention. The list, ‘pension savers,
homeowners, insurance policy holders, taxpayers and users of public services’,
constitutes the ad hoc category ‘people affected by an economic crisis’ (for ad hoc
categories, see Barsalou, 1991). However, the central conceit of the metaphor – that
the economic crisis is more like any war New Labour has fought because the British
people are directly threatened by it – means that this group of people are equally
threatened by a military foe and therefore perfectly at home, so to speak, in the
figurative war-time text-world. What might, therefore, have resulted in a refocusing
of reader attention on the literal target-domain world – the listing of people who all
belong to the same category, ‘people affected by an economic crisis’ – is actually
somewhat hampered by the fact that this group of people is also at risk, although
less prototypically so, in the text-world of military conflict. It is not until the last
sentence of the paragraph that readerly attention is then rebalanced more strongly
in the direction of the target-domain world, with the triadic listing of the literal
threats to UK citizens (‘austerity, indigence and bankruptcy’). However, even in this
instance, the personification (‘lurks’) of these economic hazards means that
attention between both source- and target-domain worlds is probably balanced.

A similar process to the previous paragraph of foregrounding aspects of the
general WAR frame, followed by a more specific rendering of the WAR source-domain
world, then a refocusing of reader attention back in the direction of the target-domain world is operating within this paragraph. Indeed, like the previous paragraph, this paragraph defers a specification of the target-domain until the final sentence. Readers are unaware of the target-domain correspondence of the ‘foe’ until it is described as ‘the enemy of potential austerity, indigence and bankruptcy’ in this final line. One of the main ways in which the paragraph differs, however, is in the fact that the source-domain world is also modalised from the perspective of Brown. The overly solemn, almost Churchillian language (for example, the archaic use of the term ‘foe’, ‘each and every one of us’, ‘the enemy... lurks everywhere’) of this modalised source world give the impression that Brown is being subtly satirised. The ridicule, alongside a series of further elaborations of the war megametaphor, is continued in the next paragraph:

Often mocked by Cabinet colleagues for his military illiteracy and diffidence at times of conflict, the PM has relaunched himself as General Gordon, armed with his £500 billion rescue plan. The enemy is not an invading army or a global terrorist chieftain in Tora Bora but - as the Prime Minister describes it - an invading financial contagion, hatched in the United States and now rampaging across the global map like Hitler's arrows in the opening titles of Dad's Army (D'Ancona 2008, see Appendix 5).

Continuing the military metaphor, Brown is described as ‘General Gordon, armed with his £500 billion rescue plan’. There are two simple elaborations of the discourse-level military metaphor here; a mapping between weapons and government policy (the ‘£500 billion rescue plan’) and between a military general
and the Prime Minister, Gordon Brown. In the context of an article written by the editor of a magazine which is firmly on the right of the political spectrum, the use of Brown’s first name is mocking. Indeed, Brown’s competency as a general is called into question by D’Ancona’s assertion that he suffers from ‘diffidence’ and ‘military illiteracy’. The logic of the foregrounded discourse-level metaphor is such that Brown’s supposed literal failing as a military strategist translates into economic incompetence. Viewed from the perspective of a right-wing news pundit, this blurring of metaphoric reasoning and literal observation is a clever strategy.

Contemporaneous polling demonstrated that voters generally perceived Brown and the Labour government to be more competent economic managers than their Conservative opponents (for example, ICM, 2008; Ipsos MORI, 2008). Where this was not the case, ‘experience’ was judged by voters to be an important character trait of a political leader dealing with a financial crisis and, in the polls, Brown led on this character trait (for example, Populus, 2008). The metaphor of military conflict takes away this advantage from Brown and the government and reframes the debate in such a way that other qualities become more important. So, for example, in the Populus (2008) poll, Brown was said to lack ‘character’. This perception jars with the Churchillian tone of the source-domain language in the previous paragraph and with Brown’s figurative role of General, ‘armed’ with government policy, in this paragraph. Whereas the source world in the paragraph before was entirely foregrounded by the use of only (hyperbolic) source-domain language and modalised from the perspective of Brown with the adverbial, ‘in Brown’s eyes’, in this paragraph neither the source or the target-domain of the discourse-level military metaphor are modalised and both are – initially – relatively balanced, with
the language flitting quickly between both. This is ‘double-vision’ irony in the sense that Werth (1994) uses the term. It allows D’Ancona to cast an ex-Chancellor of the Exchequer with over a decade of experience in the British Treasury and a reputation for being serious, or even dour, as a comic character, out of his depth in a ‘traditional military conflict’.

The war-time metaphor is consolidated at the end of the paragraph in a final complex metaphor, which is foregrounded on account of its novelty. After a series of negations which return reader attention to the negated aspects of the source frame of military conflict (‘not an invading army or a global terrorist chieftain in Tora Bora’), ‘the enemy’, previously described as ‘austerity, indigence and bankruptcy’, is recast as a ‘financial contagion, hatched in the United States and rampaging across the global map like Hitler’s arrows in the opening titles of Dad’s Army’. This novel metaphor draws on several different conceptual frames which are all instantiated in a single source-domain text-world; the frames of disease, science fiction, the second world war and a British television sitcom, Dad’s Army, which aired from 1968-77. ‘Contagion’ is first metaphorised as an entity that can be ‘hatched’ (a lizard or an alien life form?). This contagion/hatched entity then ‘rampages across the global map’. The two frames, ‘disease’, a ‘hatched’ entity and the way in which they ‘rampage’, are image schematically similar if conceived from the perspective of their maximal scope (Langacker, 2008). That is, if they are viewed, as it were, from a perspective which sees the ‘rampaging’ of the ‘contagion’ or ‘hatched’ enemy spreading, en masse, across a surface (‘the global map’), as opposed to a construal which is more limited in scope that focuses on individual rampaging hatched
entities, or diseased people. Indeed, this broader construal is the more likely one given the figurative comparison, ‘like Hitler’s arrows in the opening titles of Dad’s Army’. Dad’s Army was a comic television show about a platoon of the British Home Guard in the Second World War (the Home Guard was comprised of volunteers who were ineligible for military service usually due to their age, hence the name of the show). The opening credits of the programme consisted of a map of Europe upon which was charted the movements of the Allied and German military forces. The construal of these military movements is similar to the maximal scope construal of the spreading, or rampaging ‘financial contagion’. Underlying the integration of all these frames, then, is this maximal scope construal of the situation in each frame. The hyperbolic metaphoric portrayal of this ‘hatched’ enemy together with the comic connotations of the Dad’s Army mapping and Browns’ supposed ‘military illiteracy’ combine in this source world to portray the then British Prime Minister as a ridiculous figure. Indeed, in the report D’Ancona makes it clear that it is Brown who refers to the crisis as a financial contagion just as it is ‘in Brown’s eyes’ that ‘we face a foe… that is a threat to each and every one of us’. There is a sense, then, that whilst D’Ancona seems to agree with Brown that the metaphor is apt (after all, he uses it himself at the beginning of the article) it does not cast the then Prime Minister in a particularly good light.

The Dad’s Army allusion to the Second World War is continued in the final paragraph of the extract:

With unambiguous symbolism, the new National Economic Council is openly described as a ‘war cabinet’ and meets in Cobra, the Cabinet Office room
reserved for national security crises. By bringing his deadliest rival, Peter Mandelson, back into Government from exile in Brussels, Mr Brown has shown himself willing to recreate the spirit of national unity enshrined in the coalition cabinet of 1940 (D’Ancona, 2008, see Appendix 5).

In a similar fashion to the last paragraph, this paragraph begins with a more balanced flitting between source and target-domains, with the concept ‘war cabinet’ being explicitly mapped onto the National Economic Council. Once more, the metaphor is not the narrator/D’Ancona’s, but is put into the mouth of someone else who ‘describes’ the National Economic Council as a war cabinet (although, due to the use of the passive, it is unclear who is doing the describing). The final war-time metaphor, and specific allusion to the Second World War, comes in the next sentence: ‘By bringing his deadliest rival, Peter Mandelson, back into Government from exile in Brussels, Mr Brown has shown himself willing to recreate the spirit of national unity enshrined in the coalition cabinet of 1940’. Before becoming Prime Minister, Brown had served as Chancellor of the Exchequer in the government of Tony Blair. In this time, he developed a political enemy in Peter Mandelson, who also served in various roles in the Blair cabinet. Continuing the war-time metaphor, Mandelson is described as Brown’s ‘deadliest enemy’. Indeed, the term ‘exile’ also seems to cohere with the military theme of the metaphor. Most significantly, however, Brown’s appointment of Mandelson shows that he is ‘willing to recreate the spirit of national unity enshrined in the coalition cabinet of 1940’. This is an explicit, novel comparison between the ‘spirit’ of the cabinet now and the cabinet of the Second World, in which the Labour, Liberal and Conservative parties formed a
war-time ministry led by Conservative Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain. The comparison further serves to push to the fore the war-time source-domain world that dominates the introductory paragraphs of D'Ancona’s piece.

**5.4.2 Summary of analysis and conclusion**

Throughout the opening paragraphs of this op-ed piece, text-world instantiations of a *WAR* frame (negated, source and modalised source worlds) are all repeatedly foregrounded. This repeated foregrounding has the effect of making individual source to target-domain mappings even more salient than they might otherwise be. In terms of the six features of foregrounded metaphor identified in Section 5.2, the first paragraph contained negated metaphor and metaphors expressed solely in the language of the source-domain. The second paragraph contained implied negation (this war/financial crisis is not like Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and Iraq) and modalised metaphor expressed solely in the language of the source-domain. In the third paragraph, D'Ancona used negated metaphor and complex, novel metaphor (which included a similarity operator). Finally, the fourth paragraph consisted of two explicit novel metaphorical comparisons (‘cabinet’/’war cabinet’ and the return of Mandelson with the coalition cabinet of 1940).

Tracing the contour of reader attention through the article, then, there is an initial foregrounding of the source world in the opening sentence of the first paragraph, then an attentional shift towards the negated worlds in the following sentence which serves to prime and intensify subsequent source- to target-domain world mappings. The following sentence is viewed entirely through the lens of the source-domain world due to this priming (despite the fact it highlights properties
associated with both war and the financial crisis). Finally the target-domain, ‘this financial crisis’, is given and the metaphor is revealed, only for the source-domain to fade back into focus in the comparison to a ‘traditional military conflict’. Readers are then steered toward a further negated aspect of the broader source frame of war – the current war/financial crisis is not much like the five previous wars of the New Labour government. The same pattern of negated world occluded by source world, which is then briefly balanced with the target world only to occlude it once more, is then repeated; the war/financial crisis is not like Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and Iraq, which foregrounds these negated conflicts; attention is then redirected to a modalised source world in which ‘we face a foe’; the target-domain is then partially, though not completely, foregrounded by the listing of ‘people affected by the economic crisis’, then is briefly balanced with the source world with the naming of the target (‘austerity, indigence and bankruptcy’) which is then occluded by the source-domain (‘lurks’). Throughout the rest of the article, source and target worlds are balanced in more or less ‘double-vision’ (see Werth, 1994; Gavins, 2007) with the exception of the ‘hatched contagion’/Dad’s Army novel metaphor in paragraph three, the novelty and complexity of which suggests that readerly attention is probably refocused in favour of the source-domain world for the duration of the metaphor.

The effect of this attentional contour was first to foreground text-worlds that all instantiated the source frame of military conflict. In the lighting metaphor I have employed throughout this chapter, this primed war as a ‘spotlight’; an overarching frame which all subsequent source-domain worlds would instantiate. In paragraph
two, the foregrounded source-domain world – epistemically modalised from Brown’s perspective – had two functions that followed from this initial framing. On the one hand, the archaic language (‘foe’, ‘each and every one of us’, and ‘lurks’) had the effect of satirising Brown’s view of the situation. Adopting such a sombre tone implied a pretension to a level of statesmanship perhaps not warranted by Brown’s polling figures. On the other, this satirical Churchillian language suggested that the narrator actually believed Brown not to be up to the serious job of waging this war. This foregrounded modalised source-domain world then became gradually occluded by a literal, target-domain world reference to Brown’s inadequate military abilities. The subtler satire of the previous paragraph was thrown into sharper relief by this more balanced, or ‘bi-focussed’, oscillation between source and target worlds, which is more reminiscent of the ironic double-vision described by Werth (1994). The irreverent use of Brown’s first name in ‘General Gordon’ was the chief example of this metaphoric ‘mood lighting’. Finally, the satirical hyperbole was continued in the foregrounding of the Dad’s Army metaphor and the bi-focussed comparison to a war-time coalition cabinet. I would argue, then, that the different types of metaphor foregrounding in the initial paragraphs of this op-ed piece all play a comedic role in satirising the inadequacies of Gordon Brown and the then Labour government in dealing with the financial crisis (or rather, the inadequacies perceived by D’Ancona).

Whereas recent research has focussed on a binary understanding of metaphor as either ‘on’ or ‘off’ in reader cognition (the central examples being Gibbs, 2011a, 2011b; Steen, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c), in this chapter I have offered a
framework which can account for how discourse-level metaphor becomes brighter and dimmer across a single discourse and the ways in which two different discourses use metaphor as either a backgrounded, mood lighting device (for example, *We can’t borrow our way out of trouble*) or as a foregrounded spotlight or form of ‘stage lighting’ (for example, *Gordon Brown with siren suite and cigar*). To perform these analyses, I advanced six features of foregrounded metaphor (Section 5.2) and used them to describe the contour of reader attention as it moves between source- and target-domain text-worlds. I used the six features to describe the ways in which source and target-domain worlds moved in and out of focus as the discourse proceeds. In offering a description of this contour of attention, or megametaphor prominence, I have hoped to provide a sense of the ‘texture’ of the megametaphors used in the texts (see Stockwell, 2009); a sense that metaphor is not simply a mapping between two different conceptual domains, or, in the text-world terminology I have used, source- and target-domain worlds, but that it is subject to qualitative nuances; to light and shade. Such an analysis of metaphor is only achievable from the perspective of seeing it as a discourse phenomenon which interacts with other metaphors and the broader text-world architecture of the text. Indeed, the analyses presented above have required a holistic discussion of the multiple linguistic and conceptual layers comprising the discourse. Given this eclecticism and the concern for the specificities of the conceptual effects of metaphor within a specific conceptual and textual context of use, one could say that the type of work for which I have argued throughout this thesis is fundamentally a *stylistic* analysis of metaphor. This chapter has not been about describing the mappings prompted by a set of metaphors. It has not been about describing A and
B correspondences between source and target worlds. Indeed, metaphor research is already gifted with innumerable studies of this type describing the novel and conventional conceptual correlates between different areas of human experience in large swathes of discourse (although, for the reasons discussed in Chapter 2, it has probably focused on the conventional at the expense of the novel). It has, rather, focused on how these mappings are *styled*. In fact, Stockwell’s (2009) work on texture can be read as a corrective to approaches that over-emphasise the general fact of a cognitive process at the expense of describing the finer points of this process as it happens on a specific occasion. In this regard, Gavins and Stockwell (2012) write:

> Within what is fast becoming a paradigm-shift towards a cognitive-science approach to literature, we have observed an eagerness amongst literary scholars and linguists to contribute to other fields in the social and natural sciences, and to adapt their insights in the field of literary scholarship. However, the centrality of textuality has not always been maintained in the rush for progress (Gavins and Stockwell, 2012: 34).

Rather than an emphasising conceptual structures at the expense of describing how these structures relate to the text, Gavins and Stockwell (2012: 34) instead suggest that ‘approaches within cognitive poetics are best developed with a stylistic analysis embedded within them, rather than ‘bolted on’ to a schematic, idealised, purely psychological or conceptual model’. Certainly this is how I have attempted to go about the analyses presented in this chapter. We know that metaphors entail
mappings. Developing the analytical and descriptive tools to describe the qualitative differences in those mappings should be next on the agenda.
6. Conclusions and Future Research

In this chapter, I offer an overview of the key issues covered in the thesis and a summary of the main contributions I hope to have made to debates in the field (Section 6.1). I follow this overview and summary with a discussion of the limitations of the thesis and pose three main weaknesses (Section 6.2). Finally, in Section 6.3, I outline four areas of potential future research that I believe would further enrich the arguments made in the thesis and might provide a more thorough empirical basis for the claims that are made.

6.1 Overview and summary

In this section, I give an overview of each chapter of the thesis and provide a summary of the main contributions I hope to have made to debates and discussion in Text World Theory and metaphor studies.

In Chapter 2, I introduced the key theoretical and methodological themes of the thesis. To do this, I split the chapter into two sections. In the first, I gave an overview of existing research in metaphor studies. In this overview, I concentrated the discussion on cognitive approaches to metaphor due to the centrality of the ‘cognitive turn’ (Steen, 2011b) to this area of study. After reviewing ‘structure mapping’ theory (see Gentner, 1983; Gentner and Markman, 1997; Lakoff, 1993), ‘class-inclusion’ theory (see Glucksberg and Keysar, 1990: Glucksberg et al, 1997; Glucksberg, 2003; Glucksberg and Haught, 2006), and the ‘career of metaphor theory’ (see Bowdle and Gentner, 2005; Gentner and Bowdle, 2001) theories, I
argued for a kind of metaphor analysis that not only examined the kinds of cognitive processes that metaphors engender, but also the ways in which metaphor interacts with the cognitive environments created by readers in response to the text; a form of analysis which accounts for the relationship between the conceptual structures prompted by metaphor, and the wider conceptual architectures created by discourse participants as they take part in a discourse.

It was for this reason that in Section 2.2 of Chapter 2 I turned to a discussion of discourse. I argued that Text World Theory, as a ‘cognitive discourse grammar’ (Werth, 1994: 90), provides a principled, text-driven account of the discourse-level conceptual structures created by discourse participants (Section 2.2.1). It therefore offers a suitable framework for modelling the cognitive environments in which metaphors are situated. In Section 2.2.2, I then gave a critical account of Werth’s (1994) TWT approach to metaphor and argued that whilst his notion of megametaphor provides a good starting point for a situated analysis of figurative linguistic and conceptual tropes, the term needed to be more clearly differentiated from conceptual metaphor. In contrast to conceptual metaphor, which is a stable conceptual mapping stored in long term memory, I defined a megametaphor as a readerly conceptual structure: a text-driven conceptual structure generated by discourse participants in a specific instance of discourse. The study of megametaphor therefore encompasses the ways in which multiple instances of metaphor combine across a discourse to create discourse-level conceptual effects; how these text-driven structures interact with the text-worlds created by discourse participants; and an account of how megametaphors ‘texture’ (Stockwell, 2009) the
text-worlds in which they appear. In the final sections of the chapter (2.3 and 2.4), I contrasted the TWT view of discourse and the methodologies engendered by an analysis of megametaphor with socio-cognitive approaches to metaphor and/in discourse. I argued that the analysis of megametaphor offers a valuable complement to this socio-cognitive approach.

The main aim of Chapter 3 was to compare megametaphor to other discourse-level figurative phenomena and to examine critically the appropriateness of deploying the frameworks used to describe these phenomena in the analysis of megametaphor. In Section 3.1 of the chapter, I gave an overview of research on mixed and extended metaphor. I chose to focus on these figurative tropes because, like megametaphor, they involve the analysis of metaphor on the discourse-level, which is to say that they are centrally concerned with the grammatical and conceptual relationship between clause-level metaphors. From this initial discussion of mixed and extended metaphor, I delineated two general approaches, or paradigms: the formal linguistic approach, and the conceptual approach. In Section 3.2 of Chapter 3, I gave an account of the linguistic paradigm (see Crisp et al, 2002; Dorst, 2011; Krenmayr, 2011; Pragglejazz, 2007; Steen, 1999a, 1999b, 2009; Steen et al, 2011) and exemplified the approach with an article by Dan Roberts (2008) called Prudence is going to be punished, and recklessness rewarded, which appeared in the British broadsheet newspaper, The Telegraph (see Appendix 1). In Section 3.3 of Chapter 3, I gave an overview of the conceptual paradigm, which I suggested was best represented by work in Conceptual Integration Theory (see Coulson and Oakley, 2001; Fauconnier and Turner, 2002). I then applied CIT to
an article appearing in the British broadsheet, *The Guardian*, entitled *Decades of eroded trust and democracy did the damage* by Benjamin Barber (2008, see Appendix 2). From my critical examination of each approach I concluded that neither was entirely suited to an analysis of megametaphor. Whilst the linguistic approach provided a systematic and relatively transparent procedure for finding linguistic and conceptual metaphor, its predominant focus on clause-level metaphor and its use of propositional analysis means that it lacks a theoretical vocabulary for dealing with the kinds of ad hoc, discourse-level structures captured by the term megametaphor. Conversely, I argued that the conceptual paradigm is able to account for the integration of multiple clause-level metaphors into an overarching discourse-level ‘blend’, but that the processes by which this is achieved are not sufficiently anchored to the text. In Section 3.4, I concluded the chapter by differentiating megametaphors from conceptual metaphors and blends by restating that megametaphor is both a text-driven and discourse-specific phenomenon.

The purpose of Chapter 4 was to offer a situated view of (mega-) metaphor that addressed the issues raised in Chapter 3. To do this, I drew together ideas and concepts from TWT and the linguistic and conceptual paradigms in metaphor research, and combined them with work in Cognitive Psychology (for example, Barsalou, 1999, 2003, 2008a, 2008b, 2012; Barsalou et al, 1999) and Cognitive Linguistics (for example, Evans, 2006; Langacker, 1987, 1991, 2008; Stanfield and Zwaan, 2001; Zwaan, 2003). In Section 4.1, I synthesised Barsalou et al’s (1993) notion of a ‘world model’, Barsalou’s (1999, 2003, 2008a, 2008b, 2012) research on situated, modal simulations and Werth’s (1999) concept of the ‘discourse world’ to
model what I termed the conceptual system. I used Werth’s (1999) account of frame formation to differentiate between two types of abstract concept: phenomenologically immediate concepts like LOVE, which have a basis in our subjective experience of the world, and phenomenologically distant concepts, like ECONOMY, which have no experiential basis (one can have first-hand experience of LOVE; one cannot have first-hand experience of the ECONOMY). I argued that, because of this kind of abstractness, this second type of concept is first encountered textually, in discourse: that is, as a text-world. The world-builders and function advancers in this text-world are often themselves complex concepts, like banks, governments, markets and businesses. Metaphor is thus a necessary conceptual device for making these text-world representations of the economy ‘human-scale’ (Turner, 2006). Rather than being an autonomous domain of human experience, complex ECONOMY text-worlds are comprised of metaphor at their inception. This means that the frames discourse participants abstract from multiple cognitive encounters also consist of conventional conceptual mappings.

Following this discussion of the conceptual system, in Section 4.2 of Chapter 4 I used frameworks from Cognitive Linguistics (Brandt and Brandt, 2002; Evans, 2006; Stanfield and Zwaan, 2001; Zwaan, 2003) to explain the relationship between the conceptual system and the language system and used this discussion to examine the relationship between metaphoric language and the conceptual structures prompted by this figurative language use. I argued, following Evans (2006) and Zwaan (2003), that lexical items have ‘selectional tendencies’ (Evans, 2006), or grammatical, contextual and co-textual markers, which induce different
‘functional webs’ (Zwaan, 2003), or patterns of neuronal activity. These patterns of neuronal activity represent concepts. Following Barsalou (2003), I defined a concept as a situated modal simulation. The concepts evoked by different lexical items are codified and prompted by the different grammatical and cognitive environments in which the lexical item appears. It is this context that determines the concept accessed by the lexical item. In the case of metaphorically used words, it is therefore the conceptual (i.e. text-world) and grammatical context that delimits the target domain referent of the word.

In Section 4.3, I illustrated these ideas by applying them to two texts. In the first analysis, I returned to Benjamin Barber’s *Decades of eroded trust and democracy did the damage* to demonstrate the effect of the text-world context on clause- and discourse-level metaphors. I argued that the word ‘market’ had a basic meaning (see Pragglejaz, 2007) of ‘a public building or place where people sell goods on tables called stalls’, but was used in the article more abstractly to mean ‘the New York Stock Exchange’. In the article, the grammatical and conceptual context of the word ‘market’ indicated that it was the stock exchange, and more specifically the value of the stock exchange, to which ‘market’ referred. The contextual cues for this referent were the conceptual context provided by the other world-builders in the text-world (‘the US Congress’, ‘Black Monday’ and ‘he bail-out’) and the grammatical context provided by the collocation of ‘market’ with the verb phrase, ‘plummeted 400 points’. This specific text-world context instantiated a more general ECONOMY frame in which the word ‘market’ conventionally referred to the stock exchange. I synthesised this TWT account of metaphor convention with
Bowdle and Gentner’s (2005) ‘Career of Metaphor Theory’ to argue that the metaphor, THE STOCK EXCHANGE IS A MARKET, would therefore have less salience to readers who have extensive experience of economy text-worlds (and therefore a richly developed ECONOMY frame) and more salience to those readers who have had less experience of these text-worlds.

On the discourse-level, I argued that the text-world structures generated by discourse participants formed the conceptual framework for megametaphors. This shifting text-world context scaffolds the integration of clause-level micro-metaphors into mega-metaphorical conceptual structures. In my analysis of the Barber article, I demonstrated the ways in which changes in relational deixis (i.e. the social repositioning implied in the ‘question and answer’ rhetorical strategy used by Barber) guide the integration of micro-metaphors into two sequential megametaphors (the ‘maelstrom’ metaphor and the ‘trust’ metaphor). I used my second analysis of Boris Johnson’s (2008) article, Eat spend and be merry – this is not the end of the world (see Appendix 3), to further illustrate the scaffolding effect of text-world structures. I suggested that the negated worlds in Eat spend and be merry prompted the simultaneous generation of two megametaphors that are ontologically separated by the text-worlds in which they appear. I also suggested, following work in TWT on negation and modality (Gavins, 2005, 2007; Hidalgo Downing, 2000, 2002, 2003) that the negation of the ‘zombie apocalypse’ megametaphor served as a foregrounding device.

In Chapter 5, I offered a framework for accounting for how megametaphors contribute to the ‘texture’ (Stockwell, 2009) of the text-worlds in which they
appear. In Section 5.1, I gave a summary of Gavins’ (2007) and Werth’s (1977, 1994) account of metaphoric ‘layering’ and ‘double vision’ and drew similarities between this work and the research and debates on ‘deliberate metaphor’ (Gibbs, 2011a, 2011b; Steen, 2008, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c). Following Müller (2011), I argued that toggling between source, target and blended worlds or between metaphors being ‘on’ or ‘off’ in reader cognition was too rigid and binary a framework for modelling the prominence of metaphor. In Section 5.2, I proposed an analogue framework that listed six metaphor foregrounding features for describing the ways in which megametaphors are foregrounded or back-grounded across a discourse. This framework was underpinned by Stockwell’s (2009) ‘attention-resonance’ model. In Sections 5.3 and 5.4, I then gave a detailed analysis of two articles, *Gordon Brown with siren suit and cigar* by Matthew D’Ancona (2008, see Appendix 4) and *We can’t borrow our way out of trouble* by George Osborne (2008, see Appendix 5), which demonstrated the ways in which megametaphor might be pushed to the fore of a discourse, acting as a ‘spotlight’ that brings the metaphor to centre-stage, so to speak, or the ways in which megametaphor can be back-grounded and used to colour our understanding of a text-world, acting as a kind of ‘mood lighting’.

To summarise, I have aimed to position three main contributions to debates in metaphor studies at the centre of this thesis:

- I have attempted to offer a more detailed specification of megametaphor that builds on Werth’s (1994) original TWT account.
- Drawing on work in Cognitive Psychology (Barsalou, 1999, 2003, 2008a, 2008b, 2012; Barsalou et al, 1993), TWT (Gavins, 2007; Hidalgo Downing,
2000, 2002, 2003; Werth, 1999) and Cognitive Linguistics (Brandt and
Brandt, 2002; Evans, 2006; Zwaan, 2003; Zwaan, et al 2002), I have argued
that megametaphors are situated within the cognitive environments
created by discourse participants and have suggested that TWT provides the
most suitable theoretical framework for describing this environment.

- I have synthesised work on ‘double vision’ (Gavins, 2007; Werth, 1977,
  1994), ‘deliberate metaphor’ (Müller, 2011; Steen, 2008, 2011a, 2011b,
  2011c) and attention (Stockwell, 2009) and presented a framework for
describing the ways in which megametaphors are linguistically foregrounded
or back-grounded across stretches of discourse.

In the elaboration of these three main contributions, I have used an eclectic mix of
cognitively oriented frameworks, ranging from Cognitive Linguistics (for example,
Brandt and Brandt, 2002; Evans, 2006; Fauconnier and Turner, 2002; Lakoff, 1987,
2008b, 2012; Barsalou et al, 1993). The advantage of using this variety of
frameworks and approaches is that it has facilitated a holistic analysis of the
conceptual effects generated by megametaphor across single op-ed discourses.
Such an analysis would not have been possible with recourse to only one
framework. The use of eclectic linguistic frameworks to explain and contextualise
formal linguistic patterns and features is a common approach in stylistic analyses
(as identified and defended by Carter and Stockwell, 2008; Jeffries, 2000). In this

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respect, the analyses presented in this thesis constitute examples of a cognitive stylistics of metaphor with a renewed emphasis on the conceptual effects created by unique configurations of figurative conceptual tropes within a single discourse.

6.2 Limitations

As I set out in Chapter 2, the analytical focus in the thesis has been on the megametaphors appearing in op-ed articles on the 2008 financial crash. I justified this focus by arguing that the study of the metaphoric conceptual structures created by discourse participants on a particular occasion of discourse has been relatively neglected to date. My attention to megametaphor, as opposed to conceptual metaphor, is intended to provide a counter-balance to this trend; a counter-balance that situates figurative conceptual structures within their immediate discursive contexts, and investigates the relationship of these structures to the conceptual landscape generated by discourse participants in response to the text.

Whilst this provides an interesting counterpoint to work in metaphor studies that has a more socio-cognitive orientation, my chosen emphasis also has its drawbacks. Over the course of the thesis, I have presented five texts and six analyses in total. Clearly, five texts do not amount to a representative sample of all the op-eds written in October 2008 about the financial crisis. For this reason, it is difficult to make claims about the megametaphors that generally appear in this discourse type. Consequently, I have declined from doing so. However, the analyses I have presented have allowed me to make claims (outlined in Section 6.1, above) that relate to existing theoretical work on metaphor. In this regard, the main aim in the
thesis is to begin to outline a theoretical vocabulary for talking about the mechanics of megametaphor construction and the ways in which megametaphors interact with other conceptual structures. I have set out to use the texts to say something new about the theory, with the intention of enriching perspectives on metaphor from both TWT and metaphor studies. Despite this central intention, I also hope to have said something new about the texts I have analysed. For example, from my analysis of Barber’s (2008) article (see Appendix 2) in Chapter 4, it is clear that the metaphors in the op-ed are being used alongside deictic world-switches to ideologically reposition Barber in relation to the reader. This use of megametaphor switching and deictic world-switching for persuasive effect in op-eds (and other argumentative texts) is certainly an area of research that should be taken up in later research (see Section 6.3, below). However, drawing immediate and definitive conclusions from these analyses about op-eds, or economics writing in general, was a secondary concern of the thesis.

In this thesis, then, I have used the economics op-eds to elaborate upon a theoretical category – megametaphor – rather than making any more general claims about metaphor in discourses of economics crises. In one sense, it is not clear if making generalisations across a discourse type is even desirable in the case of an examination of megametaphor. If megametaphors are text-driven readerly conceptual structures that form a part of text-worlds, and conceptual metaphors are mappings stored in long term memory that form a part of frames, then the study of the metaphors generally appearing in a discourse type is the study of conceptual metaphor, not megametaphor. Such a study would be interesting and
probably a valuable political and economic tool in addressing the challenges presented by the economic crisis (which, as I write, continues). However, an analysis of megametaphor, by its nature, demands an analysis of the specific configuration of figurative conceptual structures and their relationship to the text-world topographies prompted by an individual text; a sharpening, not a broadening of the analysis. Indeed, the elevation of the general over the specific – the focus on a description of the types of conceptual metaphors that generally appear in a discourse type, rather than the megametaphors in a collection of individual discourses – is exactly the type of emphasis that I have set out to avoid. As I argued in Chapter 2, this should not mean that megametaphor is an overly-specific and therefore useless concept. In any differentiation between the general and the specific, too much emphasis on either will lead to analyses that are either too broad or too specialised to say anything that might be considered useful. Following Fairclough (2001), I believe that analysts should see the interplay between the general cognitive resources modelled by conceptual metaphor and the specific conceptual configurations modelled by megametaphor as dialectical. Megametaphors are the conceptual metaphors of tomorrow, and conceptual metaphors are the ossified traces of megametaphor. Indeed, as I argue below (Section 6.3), combining an analysis of the conceptual metaphors and the megametaphors of the 2008 financial crisis to explore the interrelationships between these conceptual structures would be a fruitful and interesting area of future research. Such an approach would account for how conventional metaphors for the economy, and the ideologies that accompany them, are discursively refigured in times of crisis to describe new economic realities.
It is in this regard that another limitation to the thesis presents itself. From the perspective of choosing a representative sample, I have chosen a selection of texts that are particularly unrepresentative of this ideological landscape. Four out of five of the texts appeared in right-wing newspapers. This bias is of no consequence insofar as it relates to illustrating what a megametaphor is and the issues encountered in analysing megametaphor. Even so, it is perhaps striking that throughout the thesis I have only touched upon the ideological aspects of megametaphor in passing (my discussion of megametaphor foregrounding and irony in Chapter 5 is one such example, as is my discussion, in the same chapter, of how megametaphors can perform a kind of moral scene-setting). The debates surrounding the economic crisis are clearly not technical questions to be resolved by professional economists alone; they are profoundly political. As the strikes and demonstrations currently breaking out over Europe and America amply demonstrate, the economy is the topic of and arena for dramatic ideological struggles. One reason for my neglect of this obviously important area of study is that the theoretical work on megametaphor – what it is, how it should be analysed and the research questions such a category might produce – is underdeveloped. Given this underdevelopment, putting the concept to use in an ideological critique of the discourses surrounding the economic crisis is premature. As I argue below (Section 3), however, the ideological aspects of megametaphor should certainly feature more prominently in future research on the subject, which has a greater luxury of time and space in which to do so.
In the course of the thesis I have declined from making any generalisations about the types of megametaphor that appear in the op-ed articles of the 2008 financial crisis, and I have neglected any ideological critique of the megametaphors I have examined. The arguments and claims I have made constitute an attempt to delineate megametaphor from other types of figurative trope and to provide a sketch of the kinds of issues encompassed by the study of this type of discourse-level conceptual structure. Whilst I have referenced empirical work in the fields of psycholinguistics and cognitive psychology, my contribution to debates in metaphor studies and TWT has been largely theoretical. Clearly this places further restrictions on the conclusions that may be drawn from the thesis. As with any theoretical enquiry, the claims that are made are provisional pending empirical verification. This does not invalidate the need for a theoretical exegesis of megametaphor. Indeed, it only makes a detailed theoretical specification of the phenomenon that is to be empirically investigated more important. I believe that testing the psychological reality of the claims made in the thesis should therefore also feature in future work on megametaphor. My intention is that the thesis may act as a springboard to this practical work. Accordingly, in Section 3, below, I outline future areas of research which might add a further empirical foundation to the claims that have been made.

6.3 Further Research

In the following sub-sections I suggest four areas of further research. My intention is to give an indication of how future work on megametaphor might address the limitations outlined in the previous section. It also aims to outline where there
might be some overlap with other disciplines and how an exploration of this cross-over might further enrich the ideas set out in this thesis.

6.3.1 Megametaphor and Cognitive Grammar

Throughout the thesis, I have at various points touched upon key works in Cognitive Grammar (CG, namely Langacker, 1987, 1991, 2008). In the analyses in Chapter 4, I drew particular influence from the notion of domain profiling in my discussion of the text-driven nature of source to target domain mappings and the metaphorical meanings we generate from them. However, the CG notions of a ‘profile’ and a ‘base’ and the related notion of ‘focus’ and ‘construal’ (Langacker, 2008: 55-89) also have much to offer to the discussion of metaphor foregrounding in Chapter 5.

Construal is a central concept in CG. It relates to how lexico-grammar encodes a certain perspective of the situations depicted in a text; ‘as part of its conventional semantic value, every symbolic structure construes its content in a certain fashion’ (Langacker 2008: 55). A key aspect of construal is connected to how lexico-grammar focuses the attention of discourse participants on particular aspects of the state of affairs being depicted in a text. Langacker (2008: 57) writes: ‘focussing includes the selection of conceptual content into what can broadly be described (metaphorically) as foreground vs. background’. At the same time as language evokes a particular set of concepts, it also evokes a set of background knowledge necessary for understanding those concepts. For example, to understand a concept like KNEE, it is necessary to know that the knee is the joint in the middle of the leg, and that the leg is itself a limb of the body. CG would designate the joint in the middle of the leg and the area immediately around it the
‘immediate scope’ for the word ‘knee’, whereas the human body would be its back-grounded ‘maximal scope’ (see Langacker, 2008: 63-4). The word ‘knee’ foregrounds one particular aspect of this hierarchy of related conceptual structures.

Connected to the notions of maximal and immediate scope are the terms ‘profile’ and ‘base’. In CG, the profile is the aspect of the conceptual structure that is foregrounded by a linguistic expression. It provides the focus of the attention (Langacker, 2008: 66). The word ‘knee’ can therefore be said to profile the joint in the middle of the leg. Conversely, the leg functions as the conceptual ‘base’ of the word. It should be noted that the maximal scope of an expression need not equate to its conceptual base. In the case of ‘knee’ the maximal scope is the human body, whereas the conceptual base is the leg; the thigh, knee, shin/calve and foot. Of this conceptual base, the knee – the joint in the middle of the thigh and shin – is profiled. Similarly, the immediate scope of any expression is not necessarily identical to the profile. The immediate scope of ‘knee’ includes the lower part of the thigh and the upper part of the shin, whereas the joint between the two constitutes the profile.

CG provides a sophisticated, nuanced vocabulary for describing the different aspects of conceptual structure that are foregrounded and back-grounded in the lexico-grammar of a text. It is for this reason that it offers a good platform from which to continue research in the area of metaphor foregrounding. A discussion of the ways in which different aspects of source and target domain structure are profiled and the conceptual consequences of this profiling would be an interesting
complement to the figure-ground model of attention I have adopted in Chapter 5. Indeed, this is an area of research that has already begun (see Browse, in press).

5.3.2 Megametaphor and Ideology

As I highlighted in Section 2, one area of study I have neglected in this thesis is the relationship between ideology and megametaphor. Charteris-Black (2004), Goatly (2007), Koller (2005) and Lakoff (2002) all rightly point out that the conceptual metaphors that structure our understanding of abstract target domains also play a role in maintaining, or even constituting, ideologies. Koller’s (2005) work on business mergers and acquisitions discourses comes the closest to dealing with the phenomena I have termed megametaphor. She writes:

Frequent recombinations of cognitive resources obviously bring about an increasing degree of hybridity... At the level of semantics, hybridity could, for example, be indicated by metaphor clusters. An example would be the phrase ‘she did some serious housekeeping and bolstered the morale of the troops’ (‘Risky Business’, 2001: para. 7), which combines the diametrically opposed domains of WAR and HOUSEKEEPING within the comparatively small unit of the sentence. Such clustering indicates a fluctuating, dissenting discourse... In a critical cognitive perspective, increased heterogeneity thus signals struggle about conceptualizations. However, although clusters certainly indicate hybridity, not every co-occurrence of different metaphors necessarily signals conflicting discourses. Different metaphors can show complex coherence and thus reinforce a particular concept (Koller, 2005: 205).
The concern here is with ‘hybrid’ clusters of metaphor; groups of co-occurring metaphors from different source domains that combine to create what Koller (2005) later calls a ‘metaphoric scenario’ (see also Steen, 2003). Koller (2005: 205) suggests that metaphor hybridity, or metaphoric scenarios that contain a multitude of different source domains, might, on the one hand, signify dissent against hegemonic ways of thinking. On the other, she suggests that hybridity can also be used to ‘reproduce existing power relations’ (Koller, 2005: 205). The point here is that metaphorical scenarios are used in the service of some ideology or set of interests in a political struggle. New hybrid scenarios can be used to enlarge an interpretative repertoire (be it politically right- or left-wing), with ‘complex metaphors being recombined to enlarge the pool of cognitive resources’ (Koller, 2005: 205). These new cognitive resources form a new interpretive repertoire used to respond and understand new political and economic realities.

It seems to me that the conceptual structure identified by Koller (2005) in her use of term ‘metaphoric scenario’ is similar to the phenomena identified by the term megametaphor, albeit without the reference to the text-world structures prompted by the text. Her discussion of hybridity is thus easily synthesised with my own distinction between megametaphor and conceptual metaphor. Conceptual metaphors are the ‘cognitive resources’ to which Koller (2005) refers, whereas megametaphors can be viewed as the actual deployment of these cognitive resources in a text in the service of an ideological perspective. Following Koller (2005), these megametaphors can either dissent from or reinforce existing conventional, hegemonic conceptualisations, which is to say that they either re-
instantiate existing (metaphoric) frames for the economy, or recombine or recycle old conceptual material to create new conceptual structures.

This process of retrenchment versus novel reconfiguration becomes all the more interesting in the context of discourses related to economic crises. Habermas (1976) outlines the processes by which economic crises can lead to what he terms ‘legitimation crises’:

[T]he selective raising of taxes, the discernible pattern of priorities in their use and the administrative performance themselves must be so constituted that the need for legitimation can be satisfied as it arises... If [the state] fails in [this] task, a deficit in legitimation occurs.

Legitimation crises arise as a result of the inability of state administrators to legitimize their decisions; ‘the expansion of state activity produces the side effect of a disproportionate need for legitimation’ (Habermas, 1976: 71). In light of this observation, it is reasonable to expect that, as a function of expanded state activity (or even inactivity), there will be political struggles to legitimise that expansion; in capitalist societies, economic growth is achieved in accordance with private goals of profit maximisation (Habermas, 1976: 73), not the ‘generalizable interest of the population’ (Habermas, 1976: 73). The use of public money to fix an economy steered by private capital needs legitimizing. In a legitimation crisis, the private economy is necessarily politicized. In this respect, administrative planning ‘stirs up the cultural affairs that are taken for granted’:
Administrative planning produces unintended unsettling publicizing effects. These effects weaken the justification potential of traditions that have been flushed out of their nature-like course of development. Once their unquestionable character has been destroyed, the stabilization of validity claims can proceed only through discourse (Habermas, 1976:72).

The normative values, or ‘cultural affairs’, inherent to the economic order – for example, individualism, minimal state intervention, self-interest as a virtue – are no longer taken as a given, but require rationalisation in discourse. There is a necessary general ideological retrenchment. As champions of the previously dominant ideology clamour to justify their support for decisions that seemed to cause the crisis, and as those who opposed that ideology struggle to articulate alternatives, one would expect a reconfiguration of old conceptual metaphors in new complex megametaphors. In this respect, a Critical Cognitive Stylistic examination of the media discourses covering these economic events may shed light on the way conventional cognitive resources may be reconfigured to adapt to a new economic situation and used to either legitimate or challenge the perceived relations of power in that situation.

5.3.3 Megametaphor and Corpus Linguistics

As I have argued, megametaphor is a specific conceptual structure generated by a discourse participant on a particular occasion of discourse. It may seem odd, then, to propose that an analysis of a corpus or corpora has any bearing on the study of megametaphor. One might equally argue, however, that ‘the problem for text and corpus analysis is to reconcile analyses of the details of individual texts, their
context of production and reception, and intertextual patterns across large corpora’ (Stubbs, 1996: 236). It is this reconciliation between the general pattern of metaphor use in a corpus, and the specific conceptual dynamics of megametaphor that underpinned my suggestions for future work on the ideological dimensions of megametaphor. To talk of a reconfiguration of conventionally used cognitive resources – a reconfiguration of conventional metaphoric frames for the economy – requires an initial description of those conventional frames: that is, ‘when a reliable description of the regularities has been assembled, then the individual texts can be read against it’ (Sinclair, 1996: 25). Corpus studies of the conceptual metaphors present in the discourses of political economy are thus a pre-requisite to understanding the relationship between a conventionalised – i.e. widely held – ECONOMY frame and the mega-metaphoric conceptual structures featuring in a particular configuration of text worlds. Reading a single op-ed or series of op-eds against this broader context, represented by a corpus, should therefore be an important part of any future Critical Cognitive Stylistics methodology for approaching megametaphor.

The value of corpus methods to the study of megametaphor also extends beyond the realm of ideological critique. In Chapter 4, I made frequent reference to the notion of metaphor convention and the proto-typicality of certain phrases in different text-world contexts (for example, ‘for a rainy day’, ‘the bail-out’ and ‘market plummeted’). The research methods made available by corpus linguistic techniques constitute a powerful tool for modelling these notions of prototypicality and convention. For example, recent work on ‘keyness’ (for example, Bondi and

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Scott, 2010), collocation and reference corpora could be used to model the types of words usually associated with particular discourse types and thereby provide a way of modelling whether or not that type of language was conventional for a given text. Similarly, Sinclair’s (1996) work on phraseology would be a good starting point for examining the ways in which whole phrases (like ‘for a rainy day’) are connected with particular contexts (a ‘domestic’ context) and therefore engender metaphorical effects when they are re-contextualised in different text-world environments to the norm. All these techniques would add an important empirical foundation to the analyses of mega-metaphorical salience in discourse.

5.3.4 Megametaphor and Psycholinguistics

Metaphor foregrounding relates to whether mega-metaphorical structures are a particularly salient part of the text-world model of a particular discourse. In Chapter 5, I proposed six ways in which the language used by discourse participants boosts the salience of metaphor. Metaphor foregrounding, then, is fundamentally about the relationship between language use on the one hand, and psychological states on the other; between text and the salience of a conceptual structure. Work on deliberate metaphor (Steen, 2008, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c) has tended to focus on the former, linguistic aspects of metaphor. In a similar way to my own six metaphor foregrounding devices, it has centred on identifying the linguistic evidence for a ‘deliberate’ use of metaphor. Conversely, rather than examining the salience of metaphor to language users, psychological and psycholinguistic metaphor research in the cognitive paradigm has often emphasised the effect metaphor has on structuring and influencing thought (for example, Gibbs, 2006; Thibodeau and
Indeed, Thibodeau and Boroditsky (2011, 2013) have pointed to the covert effect metaphor has on reasoning about social issues. Their findings are immediately and obviously important to CDA work on metaphor. From its early foundations in Critical Linguistics (see Fowler et al, 1979; Kress and Hodge, 1979), to its modern cognitively oriented approaches, CDA has been interested in understanding how discourse covertly manages or manipulates the minds (van Dijk, 1993, 2006) of discourse participants. If metaphor is capable of covertly influencing thought, then it is clearly one such ‘mind managing’ device.

An interesting complement to the existing psycholinguistic work on covert metaphor and its ideological effects would be a new focus on overt, or foregrounded, metaphor. On the empirical, psycholinguistic level, research questions might relate to how convincing participants in experiments find foregrounded, as opposed to back-grounded megametaphors. On the ideological, critical level, research questions might relate to how foregrounded megametaphors ideologically position readers in relation to the narrator, and implied author, of the text. In such an analysis, situating megametaphor within the text-world structures prompted by the text would be of vital importance. As my analysis of Barber’s (2008) article, *Decades of eroded trust and democracy did the damage* demonstrates (Chapter 4), very different megametaphors appear in very different conceptual spaces of the text in which narrators assume very different identities. Factoring in overt and covert forms of megametaphor into this analysis would produce an interesting and complex account of the ways in which narrators adopt more or less obviously ideological positions as the discourse proceeds. Indeed,
given what might tentatively be described as the diegetic nature of economic crises op-eds – the texts are part of a wider discourse on how best to correctly diagnose and therefore offer solutions to the economic crisis – it would be interesting to examine how writers reproduce the arguments, and therefore the metaphors, of their political opponents in their own writing: are these metaphor overtly foregrounded, or are they covertly reproduced? What are the ideological effects of this foregrounding or back-grounding? Further psycholinguistic research on the salience of megametaphors would open the door to a host of productive research questions.

5.4 Conclusion

The suggestions for further research detailed in the previous sections do not constitute an exhaustive list of the next steps for a more detailed study of megametaphor. They represent a flavour of the kind of work engendered by a renewed emphasis on examining the cognitive dynamics of metaphor within a single discourse. The aim of this thesis has been to present metaphor as an integrated part of the conceptual structures generated by readers as they read; to situate metaphor within this cognitive environment and begin to account for the relationship it has to other features of this conceptual topography. Like other work in Cognitive Stylistics, such an analysis is necessarily holistic and therefore interdisciplinary. It is this holism, and the theoretical and methodological eclecticism that comes with it, that makes the study of megametaphor an exciting prospect for future research in Stylistics and metaphor studies.
Appendix 1

Prudence is going to be punished, and recklessness rewarded

Sunday 26th October, 2008

Dan Roberts

<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/columnists/danroberts/3563045/Prudence-is-going-to-be-punished-and-recklessness-rewarded.html>
Appendix 2

Decades of eroded trust and democracy did the damage

Monday 20th October, 2008

Benjamin Barber

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/oct/20/economics-globaleconomy-creditcrunch>
Appendix 3

Eat, spend and be merry - this is not the end of the world

Tuesday 28th October, 2008

Boris Johnson

Appendix 4

We can't borrow our way out of trouble. The policies that got us into this mess cannot be the ones to get us out of it, says George Osborne

Wednesday 29th October, 2008

George Osborne

<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/3563119/We-cant-borrow-our-way-out-of-trouble.html>
Appendix 5

Brown, at least, is having a good war. But for how long?

Sunday 12th October, 2008

Matthew d'Ancona


London: George Allen and Unwin.


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