CONSTITUTING GAMES: AN ANALYSIS OF GAME RULES
AND GAME-PROCESSES

FRANCIS CHRISTOPHER KEW

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ABSTRACT

In social theory, games are frequently presented as archetypal examples of activities governed by formal rules. Drawing upon ethnomethodology and figurational sociology, this project provides an analysis of the constituting of games and identifies the inadequacies of this conventional formalist wisdom. Applying and elaborating upon Garfinkel's work, two case-studies are presented which are designed to display the other dimensions of rule-following through which players accomplish a viable game. Analysis also reveals that this collaborative work does not preclude differing interpretations of the rules of the game. Changes to the rules are invoked in an attempt to remove their fringe of incompleteness in governing game-conduct and in the interests of creating and sustaining a viable game. These case-studies and a typification of game-rules provides the basis for analysis of the constituting of institutionalised 'invasion' games such as basketball, rugby union, soccer, rugby league, and netball. Interview material and documentary evidence is provided to argue that rule-changes are principally the outcome of a dynamic between legislators and players. Players explore the insufficiency of rules in precisely determining conduct in the game, and legislators respond by modifying the rules, to consolidate the game and thereby preserve characteristic features of game-identity and game-viability. This is elaborated by applying Elias's figurational analysis: changes to game rules are conceived as an unintended and unanticipated consequence of power-balances and the different interests of the functionally interdependent groups who produce game-processes. By virtue of their separate functions in this process, each group seeks to mobilise their power and resources in pursuit of their interests in the game-process. Confirmation for the perspective upon game-constitution developed in this project is sought in an analysis of one contemporary initiative to establish an invasion game as constituted by a set of hybrid rules from Australian Rules and Gaelic Football.

This analysis of game-processes and game-rules is designed to both exemplify and inform social theory, and also to make a significant contribution to sociological analysis of the development of contemporary sport.
FOR JENNY
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PREFACE

One way to introduce this project would be to provide a 'Cook's tour' of my intellectual journey to the point of arrival at the research topic. This would include brief stop-overs at those points in three separate degree programmes (and intervening teaching, lecturing and research experience) which I might, in retrospect, identify as critical sources of influence.

Abstaining from this rather contrived approach, it is more appropriate - in keeping with this project's focus upon game constitution - to provide a retrospective account of my own involvement in the constituting of game-processes as unreflexive player and as coach. If this approach has any merit, it is to suggest that the projects analysis of game-rules and game-processes is grounded in the lay-person's mundane experience of these activities.

My playing career in rugby union football spanned twenty years - at school, Wasps, Loughborough, Bath, Exeter, and with decreasing commitment, at Bradford. At the higher points of this career, the beginning of each season was marked by an induction into the 'new' or modified laws with ensuing discussion about the consequences these changes might have for individual and team skills and strategies. As unreflexive practitioners, no-one could discern what was wrong with the existing laws. Moreover, I cannot recall any law changes (with the possible exception of the tackle law)
having a significant impact upon actual game-processes. This remained true whether I was playing for a club's 1st XV's in the National Knock-Out Cup Competition, or when I was playing the 'coarse' rugby as immortalised by Michael Green. One can safely assume that my bewilderment about law-changes extended to most players of the game. It was not for us to reason why, but rather to receive with stoic resignation and act accordingly. Yet, there must have been some reason for law-changes, which, one could surmise, probably emanated from the way the game was played at the higher representative levels.

As a coach of rugby union football (from school to English Colleges representative level), my understanding of the laws altered since, at least at the higher levels, the ordained task was to devise the most effective ways in which to win. This entailed exploring the devious ways in which the laws might be interpreted, to gain advantage over opponents. Furthermore, and to my shame, coaching extended to encouraging deviant and therefore 'illegal' forms of play which, through playing experience, and the advice of cogniscenti, I had found were likely to escape sanctions from the referee whilst advantaging one's own team. However mistakenly, I believed that the status of 'coach' was enhanced by this display of knowledgeable insider-dealing culled from years of playing experience. Indeed, there was
little in my socialisation into sports coaching through a teacher education degree programme which contravened this instrumental accent upon performance.

These experiences of rugby union football as player and coach, made me appreciate that the rules are subject to change, they give some latitude in the ways in which players might adopt skills and strategies, and that game processes are difficult to police. Given these characteristics, this project aims to demonstrate that games like rugby union (herein labelled 'invasion-games') provide significant sociological insights into the multifarious ways in which agents (in this case players and ancillary personnel such as coaches) negotiate with structures (in this case, the game-rules as envisaged by legislative personnel from the game's governing body). This power of agency and the ensuing consequences for the game-structure undermines the standard wisdom about games, sustained in much social theory, that such practices are archetypal exemplars of activities 'governed' by formal rules. The constitution of invasion-games therefore deserves far more attention by social theorists than has heretofore been afforded.

The project principally draws upon and elaborates perspectives on social processes provided by ethnomethodology and figurational sociology and applies these to invasion-games. The basis of the analysis, as provided in Part One, is to invite the reader to dispense with conventional
imagery of games and game rules, and to recognise that formulated rules gloss the complex procedures through which members of a game-process make a game accountable. In Part Two an account is provided of two case-studies which are designed in order to display these procedures in practice. Subsequent analysis of these case studies identifies different levels of rules and suggests that this can be applied to the constitutive procedures in institutionalised games. Part Three contains a detailed empirical analysis of legislative action in a range of major invasion-games and establishes that the restructuring of these games is an outcome of the dynamic between rule-makers (in governing bodies) and the procedures of rule-interpreters (players). This analysis is elaborated in Part Four by applying Elias's perspective upon figurational dynamics. Throughout the project, empirical data is derived using a variety of methods, and is both informed by and elaborates upon theory. The final chapter focusses upon a recent attempt to establish a new invasion-game, the aim being to confirm and corroborate the analysis of game-constitution developed in this project.
.... the basic figuration of a sport is designed to produce as well as to contain tensions. The techniques for maintaining within a set figuration of people an equilibrium of forces in tension for a while, with a high chance of catharsis, or release from tension, in the end, remain to be studied. (Norbert Elias, 1986 : 159)
PART ONE

THE RULES OF THE GAME
The conventional wisdom about invasion-games such as soccer, netball, basketball, and the different codes of rugby football is that they provide archetypal examples of activities which are governed by their formulated rules. These rules demarcate the spatio-temporal boundaries between game-processes and non-game social processes. This formalist conception of games presents a highly constrained image of agency and obscures the contribution which analysis of game processes might make for social theory. An ethnomethodological perspective upon constituting games indicates the limitations of formalist accounts, and displays a dimension of game-processes and game-rules which hitherto has remained hidden in sociological studies of sports.

Chapter One provides a brief review of the development of sociological studies of sport, discussing debates about theory and about method. This development has been hampered by the professional contexts of physical education and by the neglect, with one or two notable exceptions, of sport by mainstream social theorists. Together, this has perpetuated a restricted image of the ontological status of games.

Chapter Two provides a critique of images of games and
game rules in Game Theory, Experimental Games and in much social theory where games are used as an analytic device to understand non-game social processes. The formalist imagery implicit or explicit in these research traditions contrasts with Garfinkel's analysis of 'doing' games. Elaborating upon Garfinkel's analysis which is restricted to simple games of strategy, five dimensions of rule-following are identified. Together these suggest that game-processes are under-determined by the formal rules, and therefore that formalist accounts provide a species of process-reduction. This analysis provides the basis for case studies of invasion-game processes which will be developed in Part Two.
CHAPTER 1

THE STATE OF PLAY

1.1. INTRODUCTION

1.2. GROWING PAINS

1.3. PROBLEMS OF IDENTITY AND LEGITIMACY
   1.3.1. Fragmentation
   1.3.2. The Neglect of Sport

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1.1. Introduction

Twenty years ago, studies of sport in undergraduate degree programmes in Britain, were almost invariably under the aegis of physical education. One of the most prestigious institutions was Loughborough College. At that time, in their Certificate of Education/Bachelor of Education courses, 'physical education' and 'education' were structurally separate, and the former focussed almost exclusively upon performance-related analyses of sport. The practical elements (involving 12 hours per week in each of the first two years of the course) consisted of student's own personal skill acquisition, related analyses of the components of skilled performances in a range of sports, and with less emphasis, coaching and teaching strategies. The theoretical elements, building upon these practical studies were exclusively from the natural sciences viz. anatomy, exercise physiology, kinesiology, and biomechanics. The primary focus of analysis was therefore upon an understanding, appreciation, and achievement of high levels of specific sports performance and competition — training the body to meet the various inherent challenges provided by the formal structures of the various sports. Implicit in this natural science orientation is, as Sage (1979) argues, that sports are conceived as physical activities rather than social interaction, concerned primarily with exercise, fitness, and health.
The career structures of graduates from programmes such as these were consequently ordained in terms of sports coaching, teaching and administration, or in one or other of the increasingly specialised natural science sub-disciplines of, what Hargreaves (1982) calls the 'dominant sports science paradigm'. At that time only one collection of readings (edited by Dunning in 1971) had been published in Britain on the sociology of sport, notably by authors working outside the professional and institutional nexus of physical education. It is therefore unsurprising to note nearly twenty years later that the sociology of sport has yet to be acknowledged as a bona fide specialism within mainstream sociology. As Bramham and Henry (1990) argue, social theorists of sport are still exploring disciplinary perspectives from which to understand, publish and so locate their studies epistemologically and institutionally, on the map of serious academic research.

The title of this chapter - 'The State of Play' - has two connotations which I suggest are interrelated. The first connotation is an assessment of the development of sociological studies of sport in the last two decades. The second connotation is the ontological status of 'play', and its supposed derivatives 'games' and 'sports', within sports studies. The two connotations are inter-related insofar as conceptions of the latter are arguably a consequence of the development of the former. Sports
sociology has, with a few notable exceptions, been largely the creation of physical education whose vocationally-oriented concerns failed to attract the interest of sociologists working outside that professional area.

The outcome is that few sociologists have challenged conventional assumptions about sport and sports processes and, as I shall demonstrate in the next chapter, many sociologists perpetuate a minimalistic image of games, and games processes, confined to an account of their formal rules. This leads to a relative failure to acknowledge the potential which analysis of sports processes might have for making a contribution to sociological knowledge.

This chapter is divided into three parts. In the first part, note will be taken of the key critiques of developments in sport sociology from its provenance in physical education. Most of these critiques are levelled at the uncritical abstracted empiricism and the weak metatheoretical foundations of studies which fail to make linkages between theory and method. Also, arising from its relative neglect by mainstream sociology, sports sociology suffers from problems both of identity and of legitimacy except where there are direct social policy implications of the analysis. In the second part, three well-developed sociologies of sport in Britain will briefly be reviewed (viz. from cultural studies, from feminist studies, and from
figurational sociology) to provide an account of the state of play (connotation no. 1). This provides a context to introduce the present project which begins by applying ethnomethodological principles to the practices of games-playing – an interpretive perspective upon game-processes and rule-following which has not been explored adequately by any sociology of sport in Britain, or elsewhere.

1.2. Growing Pains

According to Clark (1973:5-9), early developments within specialised fields of enquiry are characterised by two approaches both of which carry attendant dangers. The first approach has the danger of 'an inbred tradition of work with increasing tunnel vision riveted on the trivial' whilst the second approach which he categorises as 'the wandering analytical gypsy' carries within it the 'danger of a game of vignettes' ie. analysis of specific topics in vacuo without being able to locate the analysis within a broader reasearch tradition. Clark is making a diagnosis of initial developments of a sociology of Higher Education, but the first approach identified by Clark is an apt characterisation of the incipient developments of sports sociology which began to emerge in the USA in the late 1960's.

Hargreaves (1982) rightly notes that 'ritual functionalist - bashing' has been a feature of much
sociological theorising for a long time, and consequently there is little need to rehearse these debates here except to note that, in the absence of many alternatives, the recent development of courses in the sociology of sport in Britain was heavily influenced by a number of anthologies by sports sociologists from the USA (e.g. Yiannakis et al. 1978, Leonard 1980, Talimini and Page 1973, Snyder and Spreitzer 1978, Marie Hart 1975) which are remarkable only in the ways in which they bear close resemblance to each other in terms of structure, content, and the implicit (and seldom explicit) meta-theoretical assumptions. In addition, all the substantive empirical material is drawn from US sources, Luschen (1980) observes that workers in the sociology of sport seemed to be minimally aware of the epistemological concerns of sociology in general, whilst Gruneau's (1983:18) criticism of the ethnocentrism, parochialism, and 'abstracted empiricism' (Mills:1959) (1) characteristic of US sports sociology leads him the describe developments thus:

(1) Other critiques of the unreflective, uncritical employment of empirical methods include Phillips (1977), Wohl (1975, 1982), Loy, McPherson and Kenyon (1978 and Schućke (1977). Most sociological research into sport does not make recourse to any general theory. The writers however differ in their conceptions of what constitutes a "proper" social scientific analysis of sport.
..hidebound by caricatured forms of typological thinking, and blinkered by its own special problems of research, far too much sociological writing on sport has degenerated into the banal application of set typologies, a nit-picking concern over problems of definition, pointless collections of 'social facts', or crude de-contextualised discussions of the 'meaning' of the sporting experience.

Gruneau argues for a different more critical kind of sociological enquiry, one which challenges dominant conceptions of sport and he invokes Gouldner's (1961) crisis scenario, that 'ideologically-neutered' structural functionalism simply allows much post-war sociology to become little more than the handmaiden of the status quo. Gruneau's critique is, of course, only one species of more general Marxian critiques in mainstream sociology and other specialisms. Hall (1982), for example, celebrates recent studies of the media which situate media production more adequately within the total social and historical context. He attests to 'a rediscovery of ideology', a reversal of perspectives whereby the media is viewed as producing and reproducing rather than simply reflecting consensus, as earlier functionalist-inspired analyses were apt to do. One of the most uncompromising criticisms of established sport sociology in the Gouldner mould is mounted by Rose (1981, 1982) who is directly critical of a cadre of writers (Loy, Kenyon, Ball, McPherson) for their claim to pursue an 'objective' and 'value-neutral' stance (the two descriptors being unproblematically interchanged) towards the study of
sports. Rose writes that the work of this 'self-styled non-normative centre' is redolent with implicit commitments to particular values insofar as they remain relatively uncritical of the ways in which sports are organised and promoted in society. The failure to challenge the politico-economic order plus the weak meta-theoretical foundations of their work leads Rose to conclude that the 'normative centre' has not produced any theory which develops an understanding of sport 'beyond that gleaned by the insightful fan'. The point is extended by Hollands (1984:73) who, like Gruneau and Rose, aims to rescue a critical perspective which the applied normative orientation of physical education-inspired sports sociology fails to do. He writes:

The very structure of sports study in North America ironically pairs the social critic with those very individuals in sports science whose professional ideology reinforces an ahistorical and functionalist approach to the subject.

The term 'cadre' that Rose employs to describe this 'normative centre' is, undoubtedly an apt description as Loy (1978) himself acknowledges in a study of scholarly productivity in US sports sociology. He indicates that only 100 individuals have two or more published contributions to the sociology of sports literature, and of these, 19 key authors account for almost 60% of all the published work
surveyed. Loy argues that the sociology of sport has a structural problem of 'a lack of critical mass' in terms of the number of sports sociologists and the dearth of productive researchers. Hence the cadre of productive scholars (including Kenyon, Ball, McPherson and Loy himself) were very influential in contouring the theoretical assumptions and methodological approaches pursued in sports sociology, of whom later writers have been so critical.

The text by Loy, McPherson and Kenyon (1978) is representative of this tradition of work, in which the authors admit to a neo-positivistic bias. This soon becomes evident in their assertion that the 'key construct in sociology is that of the social system' (1978:28). All sports situations can be conceived as social systems and sociological discovery entails a 'never-ending search' for relations between independent and dependent variables that can be stated as scientific generalisations. Later, and in contradiction to this bold statement about the aim of social science, they invoke Ritzer (1975) to stress that sociology is a multi-method and multi-paradigm science, and they claim that conflict, functionalist, modern system theory, social exchange, and symbolic interactionist perspectives are exemplified throughout the text 'since no particular theoretical perspective is endorsed'. This claim to theoretical eclecticism is, however, refuted a few pages later by their systemic analysis of the 'structure,
composition functioning, and change of social systems' (1978:30) which leads the authors to describe the components of social systems as including a normative sub-system (culture), a structural sub-system (social structure) and behavioural sub-system (persons). In this analysis, stipulative or normative definitions of terms such as 'culture', 'structure', and 'norms' masquerade as descriptive definitions. Moreover, there is no indication of how 'sub-system components' are interrelated, whilst the term 'component' suggests a 'bolt-on' type of analysis of mutually exclusive social processes.

In elaborating their analysis (1978:30-32), the authors invite the reader to consider a football team as (i) a normative sub-system organised around a specific set of values, norms and sanctions; (ii) a structural sub-system having a well defined social structure based on ordered, repetitive, and regulated interaction amongst team members; and (iii) a behavioural sub-system having players who are performers acting out specific roles according to a prepared script. This example of their analysis is selected since it provides a perspective upon invasion-games which is also the focus of the current research project. Indeed, my project contains an implicit critique of a systemic account of game-norms, game-structure, and game-roles. Loy, McPherson and Kenyon's depiction of players as role-actors in games
provides a constrained image of agency which, in Garfinkel's
terms, conceives the actors as 'judgemental dopes'. There
is no account of social processes, of the immanent dynamics
of the 'system', no account of development and change, and
no account of how such systems relate to the wider social
context in particular. The dramaturgical imagery through
which the functions of players are conceived (the
behavioural sub-system) singularly fails to capture the
complexity of interdependent actions within game-processes,
fails to access the various logics of deviance from the
'prepared script' (i.e. the rules), and, as I shall
demonstrate later, fails to acknowledge that the 'prepared
script' itself is subject to chronic change.

This brief critique of Loy et al's conception of 'a
football team' departs markedly from the tenor of Rose's and
Gruneau's critique of the 'normative centre'. These writers
elevate the critical programme for sociological studies of
sport but, in doing so, there is a concomitant neglect of
the multifarious ways in which agents make sense of their
circumstances - in this case, as players of football. The
current project, as will become evident, seeks to redress
this neglect, and provide an account of agency in games
which is, I argue, despite the forays by Whitson (1976,
1978) and Harris (1981), considerably under-theorised.

Linked to these theoretical critiques are debates about
1979, McPherson 1974, 1978, Gruneau 1978, Melnich 1975, Stolarev 1976, Krawczyk 1977, Kenyon 1969a, 1969b, and Schulke 1977). Wohl (1972), the editor of the International Review of Sports Sociology for fifteen years, provides a comprehensive critique of the unreflective and uncritical use of empirical research techniques which disregard the underpinning theoretical assumptions. In short, he argues that there is a lack of understanding in much social research about sport of how methodological procedures and instruments logically presuppose substantive theories. Both Phillips (1977) and Deutscher (1973) agree that much sports research might be technically sound but is theoretically weak. Such 'abstracted empiricism' provides answers without first asking questions, and does not invite says Phillips, 'the continual shuttle between macroscopic theoretical conceptions and detailed empirical expositions'. McPherson (1978) borrows a metaphor from Forscher (1963) to depict sports sociology as approaching 'chaos in the brickyard'. Social research into sport has led to a random production of 'bricks' (i.e. facts) generated without theoretical guidance, the result being the accumulation of a number of diffuse, unrelated social 'facts' which describe but do not provide cumulative explanatory knowledge. Whilst one might not agree with McPherson's prescriptions for avoiding chaos (1978:78), particularly his recomendation
that all social research must 'aim to develop laws', his
depiction of the present state of sports sociology (in the
mid-1970's) accords well with Clark's (1973) and Gruneau's
(1983) critiques cited earlier.

1.3. Problems of Identity and Legitimacy

In Britain, the sociology of sport has yet to achieve
the identity and status of an established area of
specialisation in sociology. Sports sociology has a
relatively low academic status, suffers from a neglect by
mainstream sociologists, has poorly developed national
networks, and lacks a clearly defined network of
institutions engaged in research. Gross's (1959:128)
observations about the state of educational sociology in the
USA can be paraphrased by substituting the term 'sport' for
'education' and 'British' for 'American' where appropriate.

Gross writes:

The sociological analysis of (sport) may be described
as a relatively underdeveloped and unfashionable
subfield of sociology. There are currently only a
handful of sociologists who make this field their
speciality. Relatively few students in graduate
training aspire to be known as (sport)
sociologists, and few courses or seminars at the
graduate level are offered in this area by (British)
Universities. One of the most pressing problems of
(Sport sociology) is its current 'unfashionability',
for the prospects of this or any other sub-field
depend in large part on the degree to which sociologists
will direct their theoretical and research skills to its
major substantive problems. (2)

(2) I am indebted to J. W. Loy (1980:100) for this apt
quote.
1.3.1. Fragmentation

These problems can be mapped out by considering the historical and institutional circumstances in which sociological studies of sport have developed in the UK. As noted earlier, with the exception of Elias, Dunning and colleagues at Leicester University, and Hargreaves at London University, early sociological analyses of sport were largely undertaken by physical educationalists. Perhaps an impetus for developing sociological (and other disciplinary) perspectives upon sport was provided by the newly acquired degree status (B.Ed) a pressure to 'go academic' which, as Tomlinson (1982:46) argues produced a crisis of confidence and identity amongst physical educationalists. Added impetus was provided by the cut-back in teacher-training in the mid-1970's which spanned the development of 'Human Movement Studies' degree programmes. (3) Whiting at Leeds University was at the forefront of this development, the aim of which was to seek an academic base which was not tied to the formulation of principles for the practice of sports and other physical education activities in schools. The term

(3) Conferences to establish the domain of H.M.S. for undergraduate degree programmes were held at Sutton Bonnington (1979) and Dunfermline (1976). 3 yr. Hnrs. Degree programmes in H.M.S. remain attractive to those students who want to delay vocational choice until a post-graduate diploma/certificate course.
'human movement', rather than the contextual connotations implicit in the term 'human action' seems to debar sociological enquiry, and it is significant that, with the exception of a few articles from philosophy, valued for their utility in conceptual ground-clearing, almost all of the work published in the *Journal of Human Movement Studies* (est. 1975) is from psychology and the natural sciences. (4)

For sociological studies of sports, a more critical development was the establishment of courses in Leisure and Recreation in the late 1970's - a more pragmatic curricular development with a discernible student market linked to the dramatic increase in the level of state funding for sport (5). The Leisure Studies Association was established in 1982 and this community of investigators provides, through its journal *Leisure Studies*, and its regional, national, and international conferences (1984 and 1988), a major network for sports sociology.

The point of this brief analysis is to endorse Bramham


(5) Key developments include the executive status of the Sports Council (1972), the reorganisation of local government (1974), and the establishment of local authority Leisure Services departments. The latter is the primary direct provider of public sector facilities in the UK. In 1970, Britain had only 50 public sector indoor sports centres. By 1980, 500 were in existence - a new profession of 'leisure management' had been established.
and Henry's (1990) observations that sports sociology in Britain has yet to establish a clearly defined research, publication, and institutional network. There is no British Sports Journal which has a specifically sociological focus with the result that articles are dispersed in British journals such as Leisure Studies, the Physical Education Review, the Bulletin of Physical Education, Sport and Leisure, Carnegie Research Papers, Momentum, Theory, Culture and Society, and international journals such as the Journal of the Sociology of Sport, Research Quarterly, Sportswissenschaft, International Journal of Physical Education, Theorie und Praxis, and the International Review for the Sociology of Sport. Moreover, much sports sociology occurs in a variety of degree programmes which cover Physical Education, Sports Sciences, Sports Studies, Human Movement Studies, Leisure and Recreation Studies, Cultural Studies, and Community Studies. This fragmentation has resulted in poorly developed national networks. It is only in October 1989 that the British Association of Sports Sciences has promoted the idea of a Sociology Interest Group in addition to groups in psychology and the natural sciences (physiology, biomechanics etc.), whilst the B.S.A./L.S.A. Study Group is convened only at sporadic intervals. The result is a comparative lack of established fora for the interchange of ideas and receipt of critical informed
commentary. This fragmentation is compounded however by the conspicuous neglect of sport by mainstream sociology.

1.3.2. The Neglect of Sport

Writers with vested interests have a habit of elevating the importance of their domain concerns and it is not my intention to do so here. Nevertheless, with the exception of Elias and Dunning (1971, 1986) in Britain, Bourdieu (1978, 1984) in France, and perhaps Stone (1955) in the USA, few 'mainstream' sociologists have undertaken systematic analyses of sport. (6) Loy (1980) notes that in the 1936-78 period, the American Sociological Review published only 4 articles on the sociology of sport. (7) The results of Seater and Jacobson's (1976) survey of the 'intradiscipline status hierarchy' of sociological specialisms in the United States revealed that 'leisure, sport and recreation, ranked 35th out of the 36 specialisms, between education (34th) and


(7) Luschen (1980:321) lists 19 articles on sport in A.S.R. in the same period, revealing an extended interpretation of what constitutes 'sociological'. In either case sport is a relatively marginal topic. Dunning (1971) notes that, of all the articles written on sport sociology before 1971, only 20-30 were written by specialist sociologists and published in mainstream sociology journals. See also Sage (1979) who makes similar points in a review of the American Journal of Sociology and the American Sociological Review.
Many reviewers of books on the sociology of sport take the opportunity to bemoan the low level of development of the field, and Dunning (1983) is no exception. There are, he argues, several inter-related reasons for this. Firstly, sports sociology until the 1980's was 'largely the creation of physical educationists', a professional grouping who lacked 'the degree of detachment' and 'an organic embeddedness in central sociological concerns' (1983:135).

Their occupational commitment is displayed in crudely empiricist studies of issues exclusive to sport and physical education which are unlikely to attract the attention of mainstream sociologists. This elaborates the observations by Loy (1978) and McPherson (1975) cited earlier about the poor quality of sociological research. Kenyon (1986) reports on a survey of 7500 contributions to sports sociology since 1965, over 75% of which 'suggested no discernible theoretical orientation'. In the UK, Bramham and Henry (1990) draw upon Eliasian terminology to endorse this point in their identification of an empirical and pragmatic research tradition. Researchers have (1990:15):

...been so closely embedded in sporting practice, sports management and policy that they have failed to 'detach' themselves from their involvement in sporting forms and so develop adequate sociological methods for understanding sport and society.

An index of these issues of involvement and detachment
is provided by a (pseudo) problem debated within sports sociology about 'basic' and 'applied' sociology by Luschen (1968), Melnich (1975), Ball and Loy (1975), Sage (1979), Snyder and Spreitzer (1981), Ulrich (1979), and, in Britain, Hendry (1973) and Saunders (1976). Both Saunders and Hendry engage in some spurious boundary-mapping to distinguish between 'sociologists of sport' and 'sport sociologists'. The former are card-carrying sociologists who use sport to test out, demonstrate, validate or elaborate upon general social theory. The latter are 'committed' physical educationists and other sports professionals, argues Hendry, who have been 'sensitised' to sociological constructs, theories and methods but whose domain interests focus upon more pragmatic occupational concerns. Greendorfer (1977) goes further to suggest that sociological studies of sport have become too abstract and unrelated to pragmatic concerns and therefore she suggests a reorientation to establish a closer relationship between what she calls the 'substance' of sport sociology and the practice of physical education.

However, according to this arbitrary distinction 'sports sociologists' become a sub-discipline within a sub-discipline which, argues Tomlinson (1982) results in over-specialisation and produces intellectual lag or fossilisation. The artificiality of the distinction is, moreover, clear insofar as any sociologist is interested in
social structures and relationships which raises sociological issues of general concern as well as increasing understanding of, in this case, sport. Moreover, the emasculation of an applied field of study perpetuates its low status, reinforces empiricism, and in the case of sport, fails to acknowledge its potential to generate theory as suggested by Hoyle (1971), Luschen (1980), Ashworth (1971), Dunning (1971, 1983), and Elias and Dunning (1986).

Dunning's second point about the low level of development of sport sociology, is to invite mainstream sociologists to dispense with heteronomous evaluations. He writes (1983:136):

"present-day sociologists reveal their value-orientations ....through the fact that the dominant paradigm they adhere to, restrict their visions to a comparatively narrow range of social activities ."

Sport is ignored because it is perceived as being unserious, inconsequential, and engaging the body rather than the mind. Turner (1984) concurs by arguing that most sociology is Cartesian is that it perpetuates a mind-body dualism. Similar points are made by Hargreaves (1982b) in his specific criticism of Raymond Williams for the conspicuous neglect of sport in his studies of popular culture. In much sociology therefore, homo ludens is marginalised in favour of home labore and home economicus because, argues Dunning, despite sports social significance:
it is perceived as falling on the negatively valued side of a complex of overlapping dichotomies such as those between work and leisure, mind and body, seriousness and pleasure, economic and non-economic phenomena.

Dunning's critical appraisal of the neglect of sport by mainstream sociology, and Hargreaves depiction of the dominant, performance-oriented, sports science paradigm are adroitly conjoined by Bowdieu by way of a telling analogy. He writes (1988:153):

In a recent discussion...I learned that the great black athletes who, in the United States, are often enrolled in such prestigious universities as Stamford, live in a sort of golden ghetto, because right-wing people do not talk very willingly with blacks while left-wing people do not talk very willingly with athletes. If one reflects on this and develops this paradigm, we might find in it the principle of the special difficulties that the sociology of sport encounters: scorned by sociologists, it is despised by sportspersons.

In summary it is clear that the problems of identity and of legitimation or recognition of sociological studies of sport arises from a complex of historical, institutional and ideological factors. As a province of physical education, its early development (by researchers with inadequate grounding in social theory and method) was truncated by specific occupational concerns. Since then, much sociological teaching and research about sport has been undertaken within a range of vocationally-oriented courses of study. A consequence of this has been a failure to establish national networks of studies in sport (unlike leisure, tourism, and physical education) and a failure to develop an identity as
a bona fide specialism outside those applied areas. This situation is sustained and reinforced by the continued neglect of sport by mainstream sociology, whilst sociological studies of sport only escape Bourdieu's 'golden ghetto' by way of policy-oriented research programmes.

1.4. **Ontology of Sport**

I have argued above that there has been a relative failure to recognise the contribution which studies of sports, might have for sociological knowledge. One of the key reasons for this 'state of play' is the perpetuation of a conception of sport as being separate from the rest of life. I shall argue in the following chapter that many social theorists reinforce this conventional image of games and sports by counterposing the 'fixed and formalised' rules of games with the 'rules' of everyday life. Borrowing from Coleman (1969), I label this conception of the ontological status of sports as 'time-outs'.

The 'time-out' conception of sports derived from characterisations of play by Huizinga (1938) and Caillois (1961) (8). According to these influential accounts, play is characterised by voluntarism, unseriousness, use-

lessness, fantasy, and make-believe which together provide a sphere of "unreality" counterposed to the 'real' world. This unreality argument is based upon a particular conception of the function of rules. The rules of play (and, by extension, the more formalised constructs of games) set the activity apart from everyday life in time and in space. Games therefore are depicted as cocooned spheres, with clearly delineated spatio-temporal boundaries and governed by what Goffman would call 'rules of irrelevance' ie. in which the normal rules of conduct are suspended. (9) There is therefore a world inside and outside games typified by Weiss's (1969) assertion that games are 'enclosed activities governed by rules' where individuals and teams competitively seek to attain distinctive ends. Huizinga depicts games as 'sacred realms' although under certain conditions they might degenerate into 'profane spectacles', whilst even Luschen and Sage (1981:6) write that sport is 'essentially non-serious, superfluous for human survival' and its activities are 'non-representative' even though some of the activities represent former war and combat techniques.

Now of course, this depiction contains at least an element of truth insofar as the rules provide a

(9) Debates about morality and sport eg. McIntosh (1980), Aspin (1975), Bailey (1975), articulate around this issue. See also Grayson on Sport and the Law (1988).
deliberately contrived challenge and without which the activities would not be constituted as such, and it would be impossible to distinguish games and sports from other social processes. However, this provides a remarkably over-simplified account of sports processes, and fails to consider the interdependence of sports with the environing conditions of their practice. Moreover, rules of irrelevance appertain to many other informal and formal 'encounters' including the work sphere.

A celebration of games and sports as 'time-outs' reaches its apotheosis in contemporary philosophical and phenomenological writings e.g. Novak (1976), Arnold (1978), Vanderwehen and Wertz (1985), Gerber (1978) and Allen and Fahey (1982) which purport to provide experiential analyses of the situation-as-it-is-lived in sport, or as Arnold (1978) has it, a 'phenomenology of embodied consciousness'.

The empirical data provided is primarily first-hand retrospective accounts by individuals of their own sports experience variously labelled as 'autotelic', 'flow', 'phenomonological', 'transcendental', or 'peak' experiences.

A variant of this approach is applications of Maslow's (1968, 1971) 'humanistic psychology', studies of peak experience' Ravizza (1982) and of intrinsic motivation Csikszentmihalyi (1975).

Kleinman (1978, 1968) etc. provides copious examples from rugby, rock-climbing, basketball. Arnold (1978), and Stone R. (1972) have examples from surfing and skiing.
Such experiences can be gained when sporting involvement is 'authentic' which, in this context, means total involvement or absorption, disinterestedness, non-instrumental, play-ful participation.

In all these phenomenological accounts, which draw upon the work of Heidegger, Husserl, and Merleau-Ponty, the separateness, the spatio-temporal boundaries, and the difference of sport from everyday life is elevated to the exclusion of any consideration of the wider social contexts in which such action takes place. We are asked to recognise sports distinctiveness; to celebrate the 'sacred', untrammelled by the mundane, ordinary social world, the basic unit of analysis being the individual and his/her experience within the special spheres of sport.

Dunning (1967) argues that the notion of 'unreality' cannot be regarded as the central defining characteristic of sport, as propounded by McIntosh (1963) and Caillois (1961). This conception of sport - as 'utterly use-less' (McIntosh), or as 'occasions of pure waste' (Caillois) is largely a consequence, says Dunning, of an 'incomplete emancipation from the pervasive value-scheme of Western industrial societies' in which work is elevated to a higher status than play/leisure. The function of rules is not to define its 'unreality' but rather to 'produce and maintain a group configuration capable of generating a level of tension-
excitement'. Moreover, neither McIntosh's nor Caillois's conceptions can explain why there are changes to the rules of games, and if so why such changes are not purely arbitrary. Recalling the earlier analysis of sports theory as being the creation of physical education, the depiction of sport as a separate realm of activity might also be seen as part of what Bourdieu (1985) calls 'the occupational ideology' of sports theorists. As noted earlier, this point also occupies Hargreaves, Gruneau and Holland in their separate critiques of the normative centre of sports sociology. Hence, the 'unreality' thesis about sport presents a static, de-contextualised and dislocated theory of human practice.

To redress this deficiency, some theorists however have developed Marxian perspectives which display opposite weaknesses to the 'time-out' idealist conceptions of sport. In, for example, Brohm's (1978) work, sports are reductively analysed as merely passive reflections of the material foundations of social life functioning to reproduce and legitimate the existing capitalist structure of social, political, and economic arrangements. The determinism of this 'vulgar' Marxism offers no perspective upon the relative autonomy of sport as a particular species of cultural practice and therefore loses any conception of the dialectic between sports processes and environing conditions.
within which those processes develop (12). Moreover, Brohm's theoreticism has no analytic purchase upon the different levels of sports practice, (from the more playful to the more serious' work-like), nor is any account taken of the heterogeneity of sports in terms of their disparate structural properties.

Hence, there are two diametrically opposed ways in which the ontological status of sport is misconceived. The first elevates the separateness of sports to the exclusion of the sociogenesis of its practice; the second elevates (an interpretation of) the social and historical conditions of sports practice whilst failing to consider the particularity of sporting structures and processes. Both provide reductionist accounts.

1.5. The State of Play 2 : U.K. Sport Sociology

Not all is gloom and doom despite the 'growing pains' of sociological studies of sport. Three perspectives upon sport have been developed in the UK each of which have established a research tradition, and each claiming to be both social theory and sports theory. These are from cultural studies, feminist studies, and figurational (12) Not all neo-Marxist perspectives of sport betray these weaknesses as will be revealed in the next section.
sociology each of which have been influential in contouring the development of sports sociology. In the present context, there is no need to attempt a comprehensive review of these perspectives but merely to note that developments in British sports sociology in the 1980's have "clustered" (13) around three sets of social theory. Moreover, reviews never please everyone and carry attendant dangers of caricature, mis-labelling and omission. Unlike figurational sociology, cultural studies cannot, of course, be located in terms of the work of one major social theorist or research tradition, whilst feminist studies is as much political practice as it is an academic discipline.

Cultural studies, as evidenced by the work of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies in Birmingham draws upon a range of discourses (Marxism, history, literary criticism, semiotics, structuralism, and political science), the dominant theme being to examine the relationships between cultural forms and the economic and political processes of capitalism.

(13) According to Mullins (1973), sociological specialisms go through four stages of development - (i) normal, (ii) network, (iii) cluster, (iv) speciality stages. Loy Mcpherson and Kenyon (1978 ) argue that sports sociology has reached the 'cluster stage' viz. the achievement of a degree of academic development as revealed in patterns of publication and patterns of social organisation. (see also Loy 1980 : 92-98). Neither of these (viz.publications/social organisation) are as well defined in Britain.
Jennifer Hargreaves (1982) in one of the first critical texts on sport, argues that what little British sports sociology exists implicitly validates the existing authorities and structures of sports and fails to trace connections between sport, power, domination, and political control.

The major institutionalised source of theory is biased, since physical education and leisure theorists have had a symbiotic relationship with practitioners, organisers, coaches, and administrators of sport in the production of sports theory and practice.

Much of the analysis of writers from the CCCS emphasises, contra Adorno's pessimistic scenario of demoralised mass leisure, that various popular culture forms including sports, are a site of struggle for freedom from capitalist work-relations. However, as in mainstream cultural studies, there are structuralist accounts eg. Brohm (1978), Beamish (1981, 1982), Rigauer (1981), Vinnai (1973), and Alt (1983) which provide scenarios of subjugated, commodified sports practices wholly determined by capitalist economic relations. These 'vulgar' Marxist perspective are criticised by neo-Marxists who claim to provide more sensitive analyses of cultural practice. Hargreaves (1982, 1986) employs a Gramscian version of Marxism to explain the 'relative autonomy' of sport, in tracing its development as the consolidation of bourgeois
hegemonic rule, (see also Parry 1984), although he acknowledges the 'paradox' of sport and suggests that analysis of its manipulative tendencies must be counterposed by its liberating potentialities. This theme is taken up by, amongst others, Gruneau (1980, 1983), Gruneau and Contelon (1982), Whitson (1978a, 1978b, 1986), Ingham and Hardy (1984), Morgan (1982, 1983) and Ingham (1976). Gruneau draws upon Williams (1978, 1981) and Giddens (1976) to identify 'spaces' within sport for relatively autonomous practice, whilst Ingham and Hardy identify five 'moments' of ludic structuration ranging from 'pure-play' (or private labour) to wholly subjugated sport (alienated labour). The ways in which social classes and class-fractions generate their own culture occupies Bourdieu (1982, 1984) whose analysis is recognised by Garnham and Williams (1982), as transcending sterile debates between 'structuralist' and 'culturalist' schools within cultural studies.

Bourdieu, apart from Elias, is the one 'major' social theorist who has made a significant contribution to sport and social theory. Most of his research focusses upon the tastes and preferences for art amongst classes and class-fractions, but this has a more general application to sport and other forms of cultural production and consumption including the media, holidays, home decor, cars, clothes, drinks, table manners, and other leisure-time activities.
Bourdieu's work is yet to have a profound impact upon sports studies but a few researchers (14) have begun to realise in sporadic sport-related projects the explanatory potential of a perspective upon social relations which Urry identifies as 'structurationalism' alongside Giddens.

Feminist studies locate the social and historical construction of gender as the central concern for research and for radical social change. For femin the site of struggle in sport is patriarchy - a critique of the institutionalised structures whereby men control women in general, and their sport and leisure in particular, (15) in diverse, complex and resilient ways. Haywood, Kew and Bramham (1989:306) identify three inter-related feminist perspectives: a liberal perspective which focusses upon inequalities of access to sport and other discriminatory practices; a radical perspective upon woman's oppression in both the private and public spheres, and a feminist Marxist perspective upon the exploitation of women in domestic labour. With respect to sport, the major emphasis is that sport has historically and socially been constructed as a male preserve, a celebration of masculinity which has lead


(15) See especially White and Brackenridge's (1985) analysis of gender bias in sports bureaucracies.
to the relative exclusion of women who have to contend with a range of both material and cultural constraints. (16) The political programme with respect to sport is to radically reconstruct public sector and commercial leisure policy and management alongside other social services such as healthcare, education, transport, and social security, in order to empower women and alleviate structural disadvantage. (17)

Unlike cultural and feminist studies, the third major sociology of sport developed in Britain is identified with one major theorist, and primarily with one institution. Norbert Elias and colleagues at Leicester University (notably Eric Dunning) have applied and elaborated the 'civilising process' theory to examine with substantial empirical detail how wider structural processes such as state formation, internal pacification and more complex chains of interdependence, find their expression in sport

(16) The Women's Sports Foundation (founded in 1985) as a pressure group with precisely these objectives. It is independent of both public sector (Sports Council) and commercial interests.

In their developmental perspective Elias and Dunning analyse the sociogenesis of the pressure towards 'achievement-striving' in sport and the increase in 'calculative' violence in terms of the social figuration or patterns of interdependence brought into being by industrialisation. The primary focus of the 'Leicester School' is invasion-type games such as rugby (Dunning and Sheard 1979), soccer (Elias and Dunning 1966), and basketball (Maguire 1988), although Brooke (1978) examines the development of cricket. Invasion-games are the focus of the current project and Elias's conception of 'figuration' (18) and of the dynamics between interdependent groups will be employed later to examine the tensions, power-balances, and conflicts of interest within invasion-game figurations in order to come to an understanding of the social processes through which game-rules change over time. Hence, there is no necessity to review Eliasian sociology here except to note the extensive analysis of soccer spectatorship and hooliganism by Dunning (1979b), Dunning, Murphy, and Williams (1988), and Williams, (18) According to Mennell (1988) and Dunning (1989), Elias prefers the terms 'process' rather than 'figuration' to label his perspective.
The work of the Leicester 'school' demonstrates not only how social theory can be applied to sport, but reciprocally how studies of sport can be used to amplify and elaborate on theory. As documented earlier, most debates about social theory and sport articulate around sectarian disputes over the relative explanatory power of competing perspectives. Few other sociologies have addressed the ways in which studies of sport might actually generate sociological knowledge and an understanding of social relations despite several programmatic discussions (e.g., Snyder and Spreitzer 1974) which suggest this potential. This project is designed to keep both these perspectives in focus; to apply social theory to a study of game-processes and game-rules, and thereby to demonstrate that games provide an accessible and fruitful practical exemplar of those theoretical principles. In short, analyses of games have much more

(19) This work has attracted funding from the Football Association via the Norman Chester Trust Fund via the Football Association.

(20) This can degenerate into caricatured representations of supposedly rival theory. See, for example, Curtis's (1986) and Jary and Horne's (1987) review of figurational sociology, compared with Rojek's (1985) more informed critique.
heuristic potential than many social theorists would acknowledge.

1.6. **Games Playing**

My purpose in this project is to provide an account of the constitution of games. An ethnomethodological perspective upon game-processes is employed to provide an account of the complex methodic procedures through which 'members' of that process make sense of, and accomplish games. Kenyon (1986) notes that, apart from the occasional programmatic piece, there has been no systematic attempt to apply phenomenological sociology to sports. Luschen (1980) argues that because of 'the unique structure of sport itself', sociological studies of sport require 'new methods' of analysis which as Whitson (1976, 1978) argues, should include ethnomethodological and other phenomenological approaches. However, to merely note the absence of a particular research tradition is not, of itself, a sufficient basis for pursuing a particular perspective upon games practice. Rather, the aim is to analyse a dimension of games-structure and games-process which hitherto has been neglected by sociological studies.

As will become evident in the ensuing case studies, one aspect of 'accomplishing' games includes the formulation of rules. Formal rules provide the boundary conditions,
framework, or the structure of the game processes. Hence in one, but only one sense, games processes are separated out from environing social processes. But rather than (as in the case with the 'time-out' conception), emphasising this particular ontological status, this property of games is neither peculiar to games, not is it their most sociologically interesting characteristic.

Of far more interest is that, collectively, the structuring of games, through rule-enactments both constrains or sets limits upon, and enables action. Games represent a deliberately contrived challenge which circumscribe actions but simultaneously allow for a variety of responses by players to this conditioned challenge in terms of the employment of skills and tactics. Moreover, players have to respond to the developing and fluctuating situation of the game-process as it unfolds. This yields a complex set of social dynamics which Elias and Dunning (1966) portray in terms of a series of interdependent tension-balances of game groups and the function of rules is to maintain these tension-balances.

Hence, a crucial property of the rules which structure a game is that they condition but do not determine game-processes. In other words, conduct in games is, as will be stressed later, under-determined by the formal rules - necessarily so since without this under-determination, games would be predictable, and hence boring for participants.
It will be argued therefore that game processes require collaboration between 'members' in making the activity accountable, but that this does not preclude conflict over the definition of the situation. At this juncture a figurational perspective will be employed to analyse the dynamics between those interest groups who 'produce' game processes. Analysis of these conflicts provides a perspective upon rule-change - a feature of games which has received, with the exception of Elias and Dunning, little attention by the sociologies of sport which have been developed. Yet, the constituting and successive re-constituting of game-processes through rule-enactments is a critical aspect of the development of these sporting activities over time. This point is recognised by Elias (1986:153) whom I quote at length:

The problem as to how and why rules or norms have become what they are at a given time is not often systematically explored. Yet without exploration of such processes, a whole dimension of social reality remains beyond one's reach. The sociological study of sports-games, apart from its intrinsic interest, also has the function of a pilot scheme. One encounters here, in a field which is relatively limited and accessible, problems of a type which are often encountered in other larger, more complex and less accessible areas. Studies in the development of sports provide experiences in many ways and sometimes lead to theoretical models which can be of help in the exploration of these other areas. The problem as to how and why rules develop is an example.

To initiate this analysis of game-processes and game rules, the following chapter considers the images of games
in social theory to suggest that these conceptions, restricted to an account of the formal rules, fails to acknowledge the complex procedures through which games (as identified by their formal rules) are accomplished.
CHAPTER 2

IMAGES OF GAMES AND GAME-RULES

2.1. INTRODUCTION

2.2. FORMALIST CONCEPTIONS OF GAMES
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CHAPTER 2

2.1. Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to provide a critique of the image of games, of game-rules, and of games-playing in much social theory. This provides the context for subsequent research. This image of games is constrained by an undue focus upon the codified or formulated rules which are conceived as 'governing' playing processes, thus distinguishing games from each other, and setting them apart from other non-game social processes. This conventional 'formalist' wisdom is a widely-held thesis which obscures the heuristic potential of analyses of games for social theory. Concomitantly, this leads to a neglect of potentially fruitful sociological perspectives on games and sports, which in part this current project seeks to redress.

The 'formalist' account, whereby game-derivative notions are defined solely in terms of the formal rules, is apparent in analyses of strategic interaction in Experimental Games, in games as Training Devices, and in assessments of games as models to explicate non-game social processes. Formalist conceptions of games represent the central plank in arguments proposed by writers such as Giddens (1979, 1985), Albrittan (1978), Brittan (1973) and Rawls (1955) against the utility of games for understanding the 'rules' and
procedures of other social processes. It is also sustained by many social scientists and philosophers of sports; e.g. Suits (1978), Delattre (1976), Ganz (1971).

Unlike the putative 'rules' of everyday social life, the rules of games are clearly stated in propositional terms. Moreover, it is a necessary condition of being a 'player' of games, that one understands the rules, and acknowledges their situational relevance. However, it is suggested here that the distinction made, by the writers above, between games and other social processes (thereby marginalising the utility of the former for understanding the latter) is based upon an over-emphasis upon game-structure as identified by formal rules, thereby leading to a neglect of agency in games playing. It will be argued here therefore, that formalism is limited to only one dimension of rules and rule-following in games. This fails to acknowledge the different, 'deviant' or unexpected ways in which agents negotiate with, interpret, and make sense of the rules in the process of playing games.

Drawing upon disparate sources, several interrelated perspectives upon agency in games-processes will be provided, each of which cannot be explained adequately in terms of the formal rules which are conventionally depicted as 'constituting' particular games. Together, these perspectives illustrate 'the essential insufficiency of rules in the determination of conduct' (Heritage 1984:120).
The first is that playing according to, or with respect to, the formal rules requires players to possess a range of culturally-furnished understandings and abilities about what it is to 'play games'. These are tacitly held practical knowledge or methodic procedures about 'how-to-go-on' in games which agents must draw upon to accomplish the game process. This undercurrent of mundane understandings is not covered by the formal rules but is a dimension of rule-following since the formal rules are implicitly predicated upon an assumption of its existence.

The second perspective is that the 'game-furnished conditions' of particular games differ from one another (Garfinkel 1963, Cicourel 1964). These conditions are provided by the collectivity of rules which enable and constrain action possibilities and present a deliberately contrived challenge to which players must respond. Games therefore differ in terms of information available about opponents resources, the ranges of options available to players at any time within the process, and the numbers of people, both in association and in conflict, who are involved. Hence distinguishing between games is critical especially since many social theorists limit their observations to games of strategy such as chess, hence failing to realise the potential of games of physical skills such as 'invasion-games'.
Three other dimensions of games-playing which cannot be reduced to the formulated rules - which are often conceived as 'governing' the process - are (iii) rules of preferred play, (iv) the unstated terms of contract and with specific reference to invasion-type games, (v) the ethos of games. Each of these extend the critique of formalism by emphasising the 'fringe of incompleteness of formulated rules in actual instances of games play'.

The final perspective on rules not considered by formalist accounts, is more complex and seeks to provide an account of rule-changes. Formal rules, providing specific game-furnished conditions, together with tacit understandings, present the medium of interaction. But this process does not merely constitute and reproduce the formal features. Most 'invasion' games are subject to frequent modifications to the formal rules. Hence the games are not static or fixed systems of activities, but are successively reconstituted over time. Hence, in Giddensian terminology (1985) the formal rules (viz. the game structure) are not only the medium, but also the outcome of the game-playing process. Rule changes cannot be explained within formalist accounts which are restricted to conceptions of games played according to the formal rules. If this were all there were to games, there would be stasis. This suggests that in games subject to chronic change, there is an immanent
dynamic between game-structure and actions with respect to that structure in the act of playing. Since players are not necessarily motivated to have the rules changed, the formal rules of a particular game at any time can be understood as the unintended outcome of playing processes.

Together, these perspectives on games-play show that the formal rules, whilst identifying the particularity of a game's structure and its specific challenge, cannot precisely determine an actor's orientation to those rules, (Figure 2.1.).

Fig. 2.1. The Underdetermination of Performance by Rules

This chapter is divided into two parts. The first considers the image of 'games' in a range of debates about their suitability as models for non-game social processes. This entails a critical review of experimental games, games as training devices, and games as analytic models in the
writings of Giddens, Brittan, Rawls. I will argue that all these theorists sustain an image of games and games-playing limited to their formal characteristics thereby failing to fully acknowledge their heuristic potential. The second part provides a more extensive analysis of culturally furnished abilities, of game-furnished conditions and the other dimensions of games-playing (according to the rules) employing insights from Cicourel (1964), Garfinkel (1963), Coulter (1983), Heritage (1984), D'Agostino (1981) and others. This provides the precursor to a more extensive application of ethnomethodological principles to the practice of games through two case-studies which are provided in the following chapter.

2.2 Formalist Conceptions of Games

According to formalist accounts, game rules determine the limits on the areas of achieving the deliberately contrived ends of games. Players enter a contract and must submit to authoritative decisions involving the rules, an authority embellished in games such as soccer and rugby where the rules are termed 'laws'. Hence game-derivative notions such as 'playing', 'winning', 'fouling', 'cheating', 'scoring' get their meaning from the rules. Arising from this, the rules set games apart from the rest of life, a cocooned sphere of irreality discontinous with other social processes. The meanings of actions are contextually bound
up with the rule-structure, since the same actions outside
the game-context are at best meaningless and at worst
criminal. Try, for example, rugby-tackling a pedestrian in
the local High Street!

Formalism is not a straw man and does clearly have
explanatory power with respect to some important features of
games. Suits (1978:24), for example, states:

The end in poker is not to gain money, nor in
golf simply to get a ball into a hole, but to
do these things in prescribed (or, perhaps more
accurately, not to do them in proscribed) ways:
that is to do them in accordance with the rules.
Rules in games thus seem to be in some sense
inseparable from ends for to break a game rule
is to render impossible the attainment of an end
.....Since one cannot (really) win the game unless
he plays it, and one cannot really play the game
unless he obeys the rule of the game.

Others agree. Rawls (1955:26) in distinguishing between
'summary' and 'practice' conceptions of rules writes that
'to engage in a (game) practice....means to follow the
appropriate rules'. Olshewsky (1976:270) argues that action
breaking a rule will be ineffectual or impossible within the
rule context, or it will be judged not in that context at
all'; whilst Ganz (1971:73) concurs thus: 'if an instance of
behaviour does not fulfil the rules of a game....we discount
the behaviour as an instance of playing the game'.

D'Agostino (1981:7-8) cites perspectives such as these
as examples of "formulaism". Yet it is important to note
the differences between 'following a rule', 'playing in accordance with the rules', 'obeying the rule', and 'fulfilling a rule' all of which appear above. Paddick (1987:5-6) argues rightly that "rule-following" implies a deliberate reasoning process. If questioned, the rule-user could formulate the rule as in...."it is not permitted to throw the ball forward in rugby union football". In contrast, acting "in accordance with a rule" suggests habitual practice whilst "fulfilling a rule" means that an action satisfies a rule but the agent does not know the rule in any discursive sense. These are important distinctions which will inform a more extensive analysis of games playing in the second section. However, in the following, it will be argued that formalist imagery about games is dominant in a number of research traditions.

2.2.1 Game Theory and Experimental Games

Game Theory and Experimental games are studies of strategic interaction. Hence only some games are relevant such as chess and poker, but not, employing a more extended sense of the term 'game', activities such as patience, space-invaders, or make-believe childrens games. However, political, military, economic, and other social conflicts are considered to be 'games' (of strategy) in a technical or stipulative sense. Game theory is concerned with the logic of interdependent decision-making in social situations in which the outcomes depend upon the decisions of two or more
'players' each of whom have only partial control over the outcomes. Shubrik (1964) and more recently Elster (1978) explain that in games such as 'Prisoners Dilemma', 'Assurance', and 'Chicken', which purport to recreate the structure of strategic interaction, the sum of the pay-offs depends on the strategies actually chosen by players. Each player has a finite number of strategies which she/he might individually adopt. For each combination of chosen strategies there is a particular 'pay-off' to each actor. In other words, the pay-off to each actor is determined by the collective choice of all. Choice of strategy is dependent upon the information actors have about their own pay-offs, other players pay-offs and other players information (1).

The image of the actor in Game Theory is one who knows that her/his environment is composed of other strategic actors and that she/he is part of their environment. Elster calls this the 'fully transparent rationality of collective freedom' which is part of the reason why critics are sceptical about the utility of games to elucidate non-game social processes. There are debates within game theory about its heuristic potential. According to Murningham and Vollrath (1984) games in game theory give insights into

(1) Colman A. M. (1982) distinguishes between games of 'complete' information and games of 'perfect' information. This relates to the discussion later (pp 26-30) about game furnished conditions.
'typical intra-organisational group situation structures' whilst Kim and Roush (1982) argue that political strategy and other conflicts can be better understood by employing an abstract theory of games. Likewise Hamilton (1980) argues that game theory gives insights into the logical structure behind political kidnapping. Some of the key elements of such situations viz. conflicts of interest, alternative choices, anticipations regarding the consequences of such choices, are common to the family of games of strategy. In contrast Colman argues against any straightforward comparison or correspondence between games in game theory and social reality. He writes (1982:74):

...social reality...bristles with complexity and can be grasped only vaguely; it is therefore replaced by an idealised and deliberately simplified formal structure which is amenable to purely logical analysis. The conclusions of such an analysis apply not to the social reality itself but to an abstraction based upon certain properties which it is thought to possess. (1982:5) Game theory...helps us discover how rational decision-makers ought to behave in order to attain certain clearly specified goals; but on how people actually behave it says nothing.

Claims for a greater correspondence with 'social reality' are much more forceful in experimental games, as the titles of journals 'Simulating Society' and 'Simulation and Games' would suggest. Formalist imagery of games is evident in arguments which stress the rule-governed nature of games, the opportunity thus afforded for tinkering with the 'constitutive' rules in order to bear closer resemblance
to actual non-experimental interaction.

Greenblat (1975), for example, lauds experimental games as models for simulating society precisely because the rules are malleable. She argues that games help to refine theoretical formulations in that, to make such a game work, a social scientist must determine the critical elements of his/her system, and thus develop an understanding of how the system works, make conditions and relationships concrete, and, if necessary, redesign the system on the basis of observations gained until (note) 'it generates outcomes that represent the real world'. It is this article of faith which underpins the burgeoning number of games as training devices e.g. war games, business games, educational games. Games are also used by health personnel as rehabilitative devices, and by psychiatrists for diagnostic procedures. Some of these will be briefly described.

War games are used for training, and analyses of tactics and strategies. They provide a framework in which all relevant fields are represented viz. logisticians, weapon designers, operational planners, political scientists. Each of these groups, argues Paxson (1971), are compelled to act within a context which might 'modify dogmatism and stimulate ingenuity'. Games such as 'Monte Carlo' or 'Simulation', purport to provide a model of military reality yielding results of the interaction of opponents with conflicting objectives, as these results are developed under more or
less definitive 'rules' enforced by a 'control' or 'umpire' group.

War games have been played for centuries. Business games for only a couple of decades. Like War games, business games are attractive because they offer the 'player' a conflict situation abstracted from the complex reality of marketing, finance, production, development, employee relations etc. and provide experience of decision-making which the player must 'live with' during the course of the game, but clearly the outcomes have no actual long-term consequences. This 'learning by doing', proponents claim, fosters respect for the unforeseen in dynamic and changing situations, and encourages the ability to make decisions under pressure.

Similar arguments are employed in many other contexts. Coleman (1971), for example, is a prime advocate of the educational value of games in formal educational settings. Such games give insights 'within a controlled situation rather than uncontrolled experiments with irreversible effects'. Games can be devised which 'simulate the complex activities of a society' such as political processes. (Mock elections in schools are a good example of this). They are propitious in terms of their attention-focussing qualities and, invoking formalist arguments, Coleman sees games as 'time-outs' from the rest of life in that the outcomes of
game processes do not matter.

This celebration of games as training devices to simulate non-game social processes does not go unchallenged. Kraft, for example, is directly critical of Coleman, arguing that such games distort and falsify the complexity of 'real' society. His most telling point is that by conceiving of such processes as, for example, 'the basic structure of U.S. Government' as a game, the agenda, i.e. the values and parameters, are set in advance. Setting the agenda in this way precludes critical thinking about what values are worth striving for, etc. Hence the 'players' are indoctrinated into naive misconceptions of the political process by this mechanising or, in Kraft's term, 'computerising' of reality.

Kraft concludes that the key point about games is not that they simulate social life but rather they comprise a reality of their own. Kraft is sceptical about game simulations precisely because games are discontinuous with the rest of life. This he regards as a crucial defect. But, likewise, Coleman shares the same belief about the ontological status of games, yet argues that this is what makes games so useful. Coleman sees games as functional as a training device because through their constitutive rules, they are separated out and are thus inconsequential. In short, Coleman and Kraft share the same premisses but reach different conclusions.

The kernel of the critique of experimental games is that
there is no guarantee that experiments purporting to investigate behaviour in a controlled environment can be generalised to non-experimental naturally occurring situations. Hamburger (1979:231) doubts the 'ecological validity' of such experiments.

A price must be paid in moving from complex situations in the world to simple games in the laboratory. When people are put in a simple artificial situation...they will behave in ways appropriate to a simple artificial situation, thereby revealing nothing about how they will behave in a complex real situation. (2)

This is, of course, a species of the standard general critique of all positivist social science. A more subtle critique is provided by Colman who indicates that in experimental games an assumption is made that the subjects preferences amongst the possible outcomes corresponds exactly to the various small monetary rewards, tokens, points, etc. assigned to them by the experimenter. Colman suggests that subjects preferences may well be influenced by other factors outside the explicit pay-off structures of the games. Appelbaum (1974:108) concurs:

...subjective values of different outcomes...are initially unknown. There is no reason to assume that they are fixed a priori.

(2) See also Tedeschi, Schlenher and Bonoma (1973:202) Conflict Power and Games. Chicago, Aldine who make similar points about criteria for the assessment of ecological validity.
The argument about the validity of game models as training devices is only one facet of a much more extensive debate about games as 'models' for social life. The justification for the inclusion of games in formal education curricula has traditionally included not only health and fitness benefits, but a plethora of other claims in terms of preparation for life. Games have been a central plank in what Roberts (1974) calls the 'character-training in industry' initiated in 19th British Public Schools. More recently, the Youth Service recognise the contribution of games to 'life and social skills' (Stead and Swain, 1988). There is no conclusive demonstration of such processes occurring, yet it remains an article of faith amongst those occupational groups using games in various education and training fields.

2.2.2. Models and Metaphors

The use of game models as training devices can be situated through Black's (1962) account of various senses of 'model' and of metaphor. This serves as a bridge between the above discussion of games as training devices and social theory's use of games as analytic devices which will be considered later. Black conceives models as sustained and systematic metaphor whereby a model of a subsidiary subject is deliberately constructed in order to gain insights into a principal subject. Both models and metaphors (1962:
236-7) have:

the power to bring two separate domains into cognitive and emotional relation by using language directly aproprate to the one as lens for seeing the other;...The extended meanings that result, the relations between initially disparate realms created, can neither be antecedently predicted nor subsequently paraphrased in prose.

This gives considerable insight into the point of constructing heuristic models, and the analytical work they are designed to achieve. Note that there is no implication in the use of a subsidiary subject (e.g. games), to understand better a principal subject, that the latter is a species of the former. This would be an illegitimate inference, or, as Reid (1968) has it 'the logical fallacy of the undistributed middle'. (3) Black invokes Richards' (1955) conception of models as 'speculative instruments', bringing about a wedding of disparate subjects. They are not, as sceptics might suppose, merely ornamental substitutes for plain thought smacking too much of:

...philosophical fable or literary allegory to be acceptable in a rational search for truth'. (1962:231)

Two principal types of model identified by Black are 'scale' models and 'analogue' models. The former is more simple than the latter, and I suggest is the use employed

(3) The subjects of Reid's analysis are sport and art in his dismissal of arguments which elevate sport to the aesthetic status of art forms.
in the game simulations considered above. Business games, for example, are purposely designed to imitate or mimic the principal subject. The function of such 'scale' models says Black is to reproduce selected features, or to 'read off' properties of the original. C. S. Pierce (1935:247) sees such models as icons literally embodying the features of interest in the original'.

However, Black introduces a caveat. A change of scale must introduce irrelevance and distortion so that inferences from scale models to the original are 'intrinsically precarious and in need of supplementary validation. It is, of course, this precariousness which underpins Kraft's criticism of Coleman's unproblematic and grandiose claims about the use of games in formal education, as a supposed re-presentation of non-game social processes.

This account of the potential explanatory power of models is substantiated in Black's earlier discussion of metaphor. Metaphors (as in their extended form as models) are not just comparisons or substitutions but have their own distinctive capacities, and, if successful, achievements. Hence, he favours an 'interaction' view of metaphor - the interaction between subsidiary and principal subject, (e.g. political strategy, to recall Hamilton's example, 1980), a system of 'associated implications' or 'associated commonplaces', characteristics of the subsidiary subject
(e.g. a game). Hence, 'politics is a game of strategy'. Such a metaphor emphasises and thus supresses, or more generally, organises features of political strategy by implying statements about such activity that normally applies to a game. This, as both Black notes with reference to his account of models, and as Midgley (1974) argues, involves shifts of meaning of the words by which a metaphor is sustained. Black observes:

This use of a subsidiary subject to foster insight into a principal subject demands simultaneous awareness of both subjects but is not reducible to any comparison between the two. (my emphases)

In other words, a simple comparison can be replaced by literal translation with no loss of cognitive content, whilst 'interaction' metaphors are not expendable in this way. Such metaphors require the reader to select and emphasise relations in a different field. Midgley (1974:249) puts this point well:

Metaphor is an epidiascope projecting enlarged images of a word's meaning; turn the word around and you get different meanings, but where we don't grasp an underlying unity, we get no metaphor at all, and where the meaning isn't what we hope, the metaphor will fail.

For present purposes, it is instructive to abstract some of the key observations about metaphors and models supplied by Black and Midgley, and apply these to the treatment of games in theorising non-game social processes. In all cases cited here, 'games' are the subsidiary subject
whereas later I will be arguing for insights which can be gained through an analysis of games as the principal subject. Secondly, note that metaphors and models do not support straightforward comparisons or substitutions. Many of the claims and counter-claims about games' utility for social theory seems to articulate around the belief that such simplistic substitution is implied. Thirdly, metaphors and models select, re-organise and emphasise particular features for heuristic purposes. This selection process inevitably gives a different picture of the subsidiary subject than would be the case if the subsidiary subject was the principal subject. Fourthly, what is selected according to Black are "associated commonplaces" characteristic of the subsidiary subject.

Now this fourth observation is crucial in the present context. I want to argue that the 'commonplaces' about games which are emphasised and selected in their use in both metaphor and as model, correspond to the conventional wisdom about games as represented by formalism. The features of games which are of interest are precisely those which set games apart from non-games practices viz. they are constituted by rules, action within the game only has meaning if it is in accord with those formulated rules, winning in games only has meaning with respect to those rules, i.e. games are of interest because they are overtly rule-governed in the regulative sense, and thus rule-
following and rule-breaking is accessible. So, for example, Berne (1964) in his account of 'Games People Play' is primarily interested in the strategies and counter-strategies adopted by agents in inter-person relations. He labels these as 'games' in a metaphoric sense - and the metaphor works since the reader understands what features of games is implied by this descriptor. Clearly, Berne is not primarily interested in games per se, and quite legitimately alludes to 'associated commonplaces' of his subsidiary subject. (4)

Likewise, Bourdieu (1985) depicts cultural preferences as 'an endless game of self-relativising tastes'. Here, the game analogy is clearly drawn. 'Players' are confronted with objectively instituted cultural practices, and through early socialisation experiences, exhibit tastes and adopt styles relative to others in that field of practice. Taste then has a "positional" significance relative to tastes of others occupying different positions in social space. The ultimate aim of this 'game' is to establish or retain particular tastes as legitimate or distinctive. Hence,

(4) See Ashworth's (1974) account of sport as "symbolic dialogue" for an instance of illegitimate inference between 'sport' and 'life'. An example of a metaphor which does not work and distorts an understanding of sport.
the title of the book, 'Distinction'. Here again, note how much work the game analogy does, and note the allusion to conventional mundane understandings of games. (5)

2.3 Images of Games in Social Theory

In the debates about games for military, business and educational purposes, much of these insights about models goes unrecognised. More crucially, I want to argue that the 'associated commonplaces' of games are retained in the treatment of games by various social theorists such as Giddens (1985), Albrittan (1978), Brittan (1973), and Rawls (1955).

Their arguments, in which the rules of games are contrasted with the putative 'rules' of social life, founder on the same rock. The rock is an invariable commitment to an image of games limited to a conception of their formal 'constitutive' rules, and to games of strategy, particularly chess - an agonistic two-person game of pure strategy with few chance elements.

Brittan (1973:131) conceives games as much less complex than 'social interactions', the later being more uncertain, not calculable like games, and where prediction is improbable. He argues:

(5) Another classic example of such use of games is Elias's (1978) construction of 'game models' to characterise different relationships of power and function between interdependent people (see chapter 7).
'...In normal interaction we cannot assume that the world will remain still - as we do in the context of games-playing - nor that other contaminating factors will not enter into the interaction...'

In formal game-playing the 'world remains still', says Brittan, meaning that the rules are not subject to alteration, negotiation or re-interpretation by the players. Not so in normal everyday action, where the 'rules' are open to revision provided they do not completely violate the logical structure of the situation. Hence, whilst there is some worth in game analogies to explicate strategy and concealment, Brittan drives a wedge between games and everyday social interaction on the basis of the fixed and formalised character of the rules in the former. This is precisely the account that Giddens (1985:18) gives of the rules of the games as "formalised prescriptions", governing conduct, counterposing these with 'the rules implicated in the reproduction of social systems'. Giddens argues:

...Even those which are codified as laws are characteristically subject to a far greater diversity of contestations than the rules of games...e.g. chess. (6)

Much of this seems uncontentious. Chess is a game played according to the rules. This means being able to state the rules, treating them as motives for action, and

(6) Giddens suggests that childrens games might be more perspicacious for demonstrating his thesis than codified games such as chess. It will become apparent in the following chapter that other games are similarly useful.
citing the rules as defences of 'moves' in the game or as challenges against moves. To conceive of a chess-player who always breaks the rules is nonsensical - he/she would not be playing the game and thereby constituting the activity.

Black (1962:124-5) agrees:

be hind the ways in which we define systems of activities...there is the factual consideration as to whether people do have a special interest in observing the rules as such (and not for the sake of any penalties that may be attached to non-compliance)...

So the existence and observance of formal rules, as constitutive of games, is based upon the obvious 'commonplace' point that the system of activities of various games would not be exemplified if there were no such rules. The rules of games are fixed, not chronically contested, they function to constitute the activity, they cocoon the activity from extraneous influences.

Because the rules of games are formulated in contradistinction to the 'rules' of social life, these activities are accessible for analysis and, as reviewed above, of utility as training devices for non-game social processes. However, in contrast to the relatively unproblematic use of games in experimental and training contexts, Giddens (1985) and Rawls (1955) explore the limitations of any crude analogy between games and everyday social interaction since the notion of rules in games is not co-terminous with the more subtle, more complex, and more
opaque conception of 'rules' as it appertains to everyday social conduct.

Giddens, utilising formalist criteria, counterposes rules in games with the 'rules' and procedures of everyday life, by giving an account of the latter which borrows heavily from Schutz's and Garfinkel's ideas of the 'constitutive expectancies' of agents in normal, mundane interaction. He identifies several different and legitimate uses of the term 'rule' before arguing that the idea of rules as 'formulae' is most perspicacious for social theory. Following Wittgenstein, he argues (1985:20-21) that understanding a formula is:

'...being able to apply (the formula) in the right context and way in order to continue the series. A formula is a generalizable procedure - generalizable because it applies over a range of contexts and occasions, a procedure because it allows for the methodical continuation of an established sequence...'

Generalizable procedures are about 'knowing how to go on' within social practices. In contradistinction, game rules are codified interpretations of rules rather than rules as such. So formulated rules - those that are given verbal expression like the rules of games - should not be taken as exemplifying rules in general. The sense of rule most significant for social theory then, are 'intensive' in nature by which Giddens (1985:22) means:

...formulae that are constantly invoked in the course of day-to-day activities, that enter
into the structuring of much of the texture of everyday life...

These intensive rules are contrasted to 'shallow' rules (e.g. codified laws, constitutive rules of games), which are less influential in the structuring of social activity. Giddens, therefore, dispenses with any crude analogy between games and social life on the basis of the character of their respective rules. Rules of chess are both discursively formulated and formally codified just as the laws of the land are. The putative 'rules' of everyday life are tacit, informal, intensive, methodical procedures contained in practical consciousness which enter into the structuring of everyday life.

Giddens' analysis of different 'senses' of rule accords well with Rawls' (1955) oft-quoted seminal discussion of two 'concept' of rule viz. a "summary" conception and a "practice" conception. In much of his discussion of the latter, codified game rules serves as a quintesential example. Like Giddens, Rawls contrasts games rules with generalised procedures, if in a different terminology.

In the summary conception, particular cases of conduct, writes Rawls, are logically prior to the rules. In such cases, the same decision will be made either by the same person at different times or by different persons at the same time. If a case occurs frequently enough, one supposes a 'rule' is in existence. Rawls (1955:23) writes:  

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...we are pictured as recognising particular cases prior to there being a rule which govern them, for it is only if we meet a number of cases of a certain sort that we formulate a rule...

In this sense then, rules are conceived as guides or aids to conduct, which, says Rawls, are built up and tested by the experience of generations; thus, terms like, 'as a general rule', 'rules of thumb', 'maxims', would seem to apply. Now, this account seems to accord fairly well with Giddens' accounts of 'rule-following' as generalizable procedures applied in the enactment of social practices.

In contrast to this summary conception, the practice conception has rules logically prior to particular cases of the practice. Unless there is the practice, the terms referring to actions specified by the practice lack any sense. Rawls writes (1955:24):

...It is the mark of a practice that being taught how to engage in it involves being instructed in the rules which define it, and that appeal is made to those rules to correct the behaviour of those engaged in it...

Thus, those engaged in the practice recognise the rules (e.g. invasion games-playing) as defining it - it is essential to the notion of a practice that the rules are publicly known, describable, and understood as definitive. It follows then, that any action falling under a rule would not be described as that action unless there was the practice.

...In the case of actions specified by practices, it is logically impossible to perform them outside
the stage-setting provided by those practices...

Rawls substantiates this with an example of action in a 'batting' game. He says one can throw a ball, run or swing a peculiarly shaped piece of wood, but only 'stealing a base', 'striking out', 'drawing a walk' are actions which happen in a game of baseball. Actions are defined by the practice. This practice view leads to a different conception of the authority with which each person has to decide upon whether to follow a rule or not. In the summary conception, each person is always entitled to reconsider the correctness of a rule, and to question whether or not it is proper to follow it in a particular case.

The power of agents, is, of course, in line with Giddens' remark that 'formulae' (or, in Rawls' term, 'maxims') are subject to chronic contestations concerning their appropriateness or applicability. Not so however, says Rawls, when engaged in a practice such as a game, since to engage in the practice means to follow the appropriate rules. There is no way to act except by following the rules which define that action as that action. Hence, any explanation of action lies in referring to that practice.

I have abstracted the key elements of Rawls' analysis since not only is this in line with Giddens' account of game rules, but it represents an influential and sophisticated example of formalist approaches to game rules. Playing football means to follow the formal rules of football.
These rules determine the limits of action which can be employed in playing the game. The rules are definitive of that practice and give meaning to outcomes such as winning and losing. Black (1962:124) concurs in florid style:

"...Games of skill are played for the sake of winning according to the rules (if all you wanted was a touch-down, why not shoot the opposing team?)"

It is easy to note that this position allows for only a constrained image of agency. But, it becomes problematic as soon as one considers rule violations instead of rule-following. The problem is that such action outside the constitutive rules (e.g. cheating) is meaningless, since it is not action in accord with those rules (D'Agostino 1981, Paddick 1986). Part of the reason for this being unrecognised is that games typically invoked in analyses such as Giddens's, are chess and bridge, i.e. games of strategy, where incidences of rule-violation are rare, and, indeed, do not make sense. This, of course, is not the case in those types of sporting games which are the major focus of this study. The formalist response to the problem of penalties or rule-violations is to retreat from the all-encompassing statement that rules define the game, and to propose that there are two types of rule, namely, constitutive and regulative. Constitutive rules are about a games identity, determining what counts as an instance of, for example, football. Regulative rules are penalty-
invoking rules when the former are broken. But, a moment's reflection reveals that this will not work. If only constitutive rules are definitive of games, then a regulative rule such as "handball" in football (which does not apply in rugby), does not constitute a distinguishing or identifying characteristic of football. (7) Clearly, the distinction is arbitrary and, indeed, Giddens argues against Searle's (1969) account of constitutive and regulative types of rules. He says that there are only two aspects or 'senses' of rules rather than two variant types of rule. Hence, to use his example, a rule such as 'the rule defining checkmate in chess' is certainly part of what constitutes the game of chess, yet it clearly has regulatory properties also. Similarly, the expression, 'it is a rule that workers must clock in at 9.00 am' is a regulation but also has constitutive aspects inasmuch as it enters into the definition of a concept like industrial bureaucracy. Hence, to separate out the constitution of meaning from sanctions regulating conduct just will not do.

I have argued that Giddens and Rawls, in counterposing games with non-game social processes, sustain a limited

(7) Paddick and D'Agostino both provide extensive arguments against formalism's treatment of rule violations.
formalist conception of game-rules. Both Giddens' and Rawls' interest in games ceases once these practices have been established as archetypal exemplars of rule-governed activities within which the rules are definitive of that practice. In the following section, it is argued that Rawls' summary conception of rules and Giddens' depiction of rules as 'methodic procedures' or 'formulae' are equally applicable to games-playing and the practical knowledge invoked in their practice. This goes beyond Paddick's (1986) and D'Agostino's (1981) critiques which focus primarily on the weaknesses of formalist accounts of games in accounting for rule-violations.

2.4 Beyond Formalism: The Essential Insufficiency of Rules in the Determination of Conduct in Games

The subtitle of this section is borrowed from Heritage's (1984:120) comprehensive analysis of Garfinkel's account of human action, in contradistinction to that provided by Parsons (1936, 1951). In this section, it is argued that formalist conceptions of game-rules and rule-following are implicitly predicated upon a Parsonian image of the actor, of rules and norms, and of social action. (8) An explanation of the

stable organisation of games-playing in this functionalist perspective suggests that actors, through various socialising influences, internalise norms of conduct as needs dispositions of the personality. These norms regulate and more strongly cause or determine conduct. Collectively, actors are cognitively equipped to recognise situations (of games-play) and apply commonly held norms to produce intelligible action. If actors have identified the situation in the same way and have, through effective socialisation, acquired the same rules of action, then actors can and do coordinate their actions. This explanation, whereby socialising influences provide actors with 'enduring dispositions' to act in particular ways under specific circumstances (e.g. games-playing) gives rise to the following premises. Firstly, the actor is treated as broadly unreflexive, what Garfinkel calls a 'cultural or 'judgemental dope'. As Heritage (110) puts it, actors cannot adopt a 'manipulative game-like stance' towards norms and are incapable of the reflection necessary to make choices between alternative courses of action. Further, any deviation from 'accepted' norms can only be explained as inadequate socialisation. Hence various 'logics of deviance', as rational and organised domains of conduct cannot be understood. For Parsons, not only do actors share norms of conduct, but also share common 'definitions of the
situation' (Cicourel, 1964) to which such norms might be appropriate. This makes the actor doubly a judgemental dope since there is a consensus in both circumstances of action and the appropriate course of action in such circumstances.

Note that Heritage's notion of 'game-like stance' of actors departs significantly from the rule-governed game behaviour of actors in formalist imagery. Heritage suggests that, from Parsons, one receives a regulative sense of norms or rules which determine conduct in pre-defined scenes of action e.g. as provided by the formal rules of games which await actors. This requires that rules (governing conduct in games) should be exhaustive and unambiguous. The determinism of this conception is abundantly clear as soon as one seeks to provide an account of changes to game rules. If players/actors are 'programmed' in terms of pre-established or pre-defined norms, then game-structures would be unproblematically reproduced in the "replication" sense of that term. (9) It is an empirically demonstrable fact that this is not the case, particularly in the case of invasion-games, the rule-structures of which are subject to chronic reformulation. Hence, the reproduction of games does not preclude their reformulation over time.

(9) See R. Williams (1981) for a useful distinction between "replication" and "reformation", as different instances of cultural reproduction.
The insufficiency of rules as an explanation, and as a directive, of conduct is exemplified by Wittgenstein's later philosophy, as it is by ethnomethodology. Garfinkel and Sacks (1970) interpret Wittgenstein's work as 'a sustained, extensive and penetrating corpus of observations of indexical phenomena'. Cavell (1962), in his assessment of the applicability of Wittgenstein's philosophy, argues that even in games where the formal rules identify and constitute the character of the game, these rules do not define what playing a game is. If this is true even in codified activities like games, then it is just as true in other social situations not overtly organised through formally applied rules. Similarly, Hart (1961) cites legal rules as 'typifications which gloss the particulars they typify'. Such rules, like game-rules cover an indefinite range of contingent concrete possibilities and must be applied to specific configuration of circumstances which may never be identical. Similarly, Garfinkel (1967:63) writes that no rule can:

...itself step forward to claim its own instance but always awaits contingent application for another first time.

Like Cavell, Coulter (1983) invokes Wittgenstein to argue against an image of actors as acting through a knowledge of rules. As Wittgenstein (1953: para. 81) argues, one must not think that when someone:
...utters a sentence and means and understands it, he is operating a calculus according to definite rules.

Ordinary language users do not advert to or follow rules as if they were rule-governed sentient automata; there is no cognitive machinery underlying rules governing language-use. Through this, Coulter asks us to beware of an oversimplified and mechanistic account of the mundane yet complex process of ordinary language use which renders invisible the 'artful practices of persons in coming to grips with a social order and its transmission'. This leads Coulter to argue that performance is under-determined by rules. Even highly codified practices like games which are constituted by rules are, as Wittgenstein has it, "not everywhere circumscribed by rules" (1953 Para.68). In other words, no grammar of rules can fully encompass the intelligibility of conduct. This point is also recognised by Rawls (1955:17), who argues that with any set of rules there is understood:

...a background of circumstances which it is expected to be applied and which need not - indeed, which cannot - be fully stated...

So, even in practices which are said to be constituted by rules (such as games), i.e. where the rules appear to be necessary to the conduct or realisation of the practice (game), in their formulation they do not specify or dictate how they are to be followed. For example, there is no rule in tennis which states how hard or how high one
is to hit the ball. There is no rule in football specifying how long a team/player can keep possession of the ball, or whether the ball must be kicked at all! Indeed, Paddick observes that there is nothing in the rules of invasion games which state that players must try to win. Coulter (1983:65) argues:

...the retrospective-prospective elaboration of sense of any rule, of its intended domain, of its applicability and constituency, is a property of the actual use, invocation and appeal to rules in everyday affairs... (10)

Earlier in his analysis, and in similar vein, Coulter is critical of Goffman's (1959) account of patients' behaviour in mental institutions. Goffman concludes that their behaviour is considerably determined by the institutional arrangements which severely prescribe the possible roles that patients (and doctors) can take. Such behaviour then, is an effect of role-arrangements.

Coulter argues that institutional arrangements set limits to what behaviour is allowed or possible, but suggests that this is not the same as saying those arrangements cause conduct in the way Goffman

(10) See also Wieder's study (1974) of the 'convict code' i.e. and institutional domain governed by rules yet, as Weider shows, this overlays the informal yet binding 'code' which structures action. See also Heritage (1984) Ch. 7 'Maintaining Institutional Realities'
concludes. (11) As Coulter (1983:19) obliquely puts it:

...Recognition, reasoning and judgement are not properties as intelligibly ascribable to the phenomena for which causal laws are formulated...

Coulter's thesis eventuates in a re-assertion of the integrity of the human agent vis-à-vis a determinist theoretical account of conduct as limited by rules. The insights this gives for games-playing are clear - such playing cannot be specified, without remainder, in terms of the formulated rules. These rules do not wholly determine action within the game or, to put this another way, action in games is not an 'effect' of the formulated rules, even though the rules do set limits on or 'frame' action, i.e. provide boundary conditions for action.

This analysis of the under-determination of action by rules recognises that formulating or codifying the rules of a game is based upon an assumption that the players possess 'common-sense' understandings of what is expected in games-playing generally. Garfinkel (1967) calls this the 'scenic practices' of games playing. Coulter refer to the same as the 'culturally furnished conditions of a practice'. Our

(11) This elaborates an earlier discussion by Coulter (1971:316) about rules, in which he suggests that the negotiation of rules 'is taken for granted by members of society, but interpretive problems arise as no rules exhaust all possible contingencies'. Garfinkel's analysis of coding are invoked for the specification of what falls under a rule's jurisdiction in problematic situations.
rule-ordered reasoning says Coulter, is:

'...dependent on assumptions and judgements which fall outside the rules we learn to apply...

Ethnomethodologists conception of 'reflexivity' is relevant here since the codification of rules is predicated upon on implicit assumption that rule-users (in this case game-players) are in possession of culturally-furnished understandings about what it is to play a game.

Coulter does not explore the 'assumptions' and 'judgements' which are not covered by rules, nor does he provide any empirical examples, nor has he much to say about, 'the retrospective-prospective elaboration of the sense of rules', as applied to games. Cicourel (1964) however, in his critique of Bierstedt's (1957) account of norms, does identify the characteristics of fulfilling rules which apply to games-playing. He argues that the notion of 'game' as described by Garfinkel (1963, 1967) generates a working model of norms which avoids the neglect of actors 'differential perceptions', interpretations and motivations to comply with norms over time'. (1964:202)

2.5 Garfinkel on Games

2.5.1. Basic Rules

As is well known, Garfinkel was interested to find out how social structures are ordinarily and routinely maintained. He took for granted the omnirelevance of
normative regulations peculiar to games (1963:198), and finds games useful because they are systems of activities which have 'stable features' in which each player is provided with some kind of scheme for knowing what she/he, and other players are intending and doing. He writes (1963:190):

A game is selected because the basic rules of play serve each player as a scheme for recognising and interpreting the other players' as well as his own behavioural displays as events of game conduct.

However, Garfinkel is critical of Game Theorists Von Neumann and Morgenstern's (1947) definition of a game which is confined to listing the 'basic' rules (i.e. a formalist position). He argues that games can only be defined by acknowledging that basic rules (which denote the situations and normal events of play) have 'expectancies' attached. These basic rules have three invariant properties which he terms 'constitutive expectancies'. The first of these is that the basic rules 'frame' a set of boundary conditions within which players must make a choice, and these choices are independent of the number of players, particular territory of play or action potentialities in specific games. The second and third properties refer to what Schutz would term the 'reciprocity of perspectives' which players assume in games play.

This thesis consists of two assumptions; the assumption
of the 'interchangeability of standpoints' and the assumption of 'the congruency of relevances'. By the former is meant that the person (in this case the player) assumes that if he were to exchange places with other players then each would recognise the 'scene' in a manner that was - for all practical purposes - more or less similar. (12) By the assumption of the congruence of relevances is meant that the player assumes, and that the other player assumes, that differences in perspective which originate in the other players particular biography are irrelevant for the purposes at hand, and that both players have selected and interpreted common objects and their features in an empirically identical manner. In short, players expect that the same set of required (by the basic rules) alternatives are binding upon other players as they are binding on him, and any player expects that the other player expects such a commitment of him. (Garfinkel 1963: 190, 212-4) (13)

Cicourel concurs thus:

There is a reciprocity of perspectives whereby my imputing typical elements to others, and my imputing to others some idea of the meaning of the project to me, provide the basis for a definition of the situation through the interlocking of perspectives of relevance by participants within the setting.

(12) This thesis of Schutz is, of course, opposed to Solipsist accounts of the social world (see e.g. Best 1979)

(13) See also Grathoff R. H. (1970)
The basic rules then, indicate the domain of 'game-possible actions' (1963:195) ie what will be considered 'normal' for those persons who, by virtue of being a player, seek to abide or act in compliance with the rules. As an example of 'basic' rules, Garfinkel cites the rules of tick-tack-toe (14) - an example which could easily be surplanted by the rules of any other game 'described in a book of games' (Garfinkel 1963:190). As such Garfinkel's identification of basic rules as prescribing action does not differ from the account of 'formal' rules earlier (insofar as they are formally codified or stated in propositional terms). However, Garfinkel's analysis stresses the complex 'scenic practices' and "accommodative work" whereby games-playing practices are ordinarily and routinely accomplished. Moreover, in a context of 'trust', players take the basic rules of a game for granted as a 'definition' both of the situation, and of their relationship to other players (1963:193-4).

Having discussed 'basic' rules as definitions of the constituent events' of a game, Garfinkel identifies other features which are necessary 'to describe the game as a normative order'. These are (i) a set of game-furnished conditions; (ii) a set of rules of preferred play;

(14) A game similar to Noughts-and-Crosses.
(iii) an et cetera provision. Two further features which describe the game as people actually play it are (i) the likelihood of motivated compliance with the normative order of the game; and (ii) the non-game conditions which determine the likelihood of motivated compliance.

2 5.2 Game-Furnished Conditions

To identify the game-furnished conditions of particular games is to acknowledge the heterogeneity of their characteristics. Any analysis of games insensitive to the distinctiveness of specific types of games will be invariably open to criticism for lack of object-adequacy. Cicourel (1964:204-5) argues that another 'type' (the descriptor 'facet' is probably more accurate) of rule of games, to be distinguished from 'basic' rules is the 'game furnished conditions'. (15) Grathoff (1970) calls this a game's 'typificatory scheme'. This denotes the general characteristics of particular games, invariant to any specific state of the game, yet enter into each decision. To explicate this, Garfinkel (1963:193) contrasts two games of strategy viz. chess and poker. The latter has far more elements of chance inherent in the structure of the activity, and therefore unlike chess, does not provide

(15) Garfinkel identifies 4 features of a 'games furnished conditions'; (see 1963:192).
situations of perfect information. Every decision contains varying amounts of uncertainty. This is, of course, well known in Game Theory. Colman (1982:8) for example, makes a basic distinction between games of "complete information" and those of "perfect information", the difference being in the state of knowledge of players. In the former, players not only know the rules (i.e. permissible moves and strategies) which prescribe choices and outcomes, but also the "preference scales" of other players. Again there is an assumption of a reciprocity of perspectives viz. that each player assumes that the other(s) have complete information. In the latter, players know rules etc. but not the preference scales of other players, an archetypal example cited by Colman being chess. Colman also distinguishes between types of games of strategy - coordination games, where interests coincide, competitive zero-sum games, and "mixed-motive" games. In mixed-motive games, as constructed by game theory and proponents of experimental games, players preferences amongst possible outcomes are neither identical, (as in pure coordination games such as those which emerge in children's make-believe play) not diametrically opposed, (as in zero-sum games such as "heads or tails") or citing more widespread practices, racquet games (singles) such as squash, fives, tennis, etc.). This yields complex strategic properties which motivate players partly to compete and
partly to cooperate with one another. (16)

Colman says that players therefore have to contend with an "intrapersonal psychological conflict" arising from this clash of motives in addition to the "interpersonal conflict" that also exists in the game (1982:93). As will become evident later in this project, invasion-games are always of this mixed-motive type since, as team games they demand that players collaborate in order to compete effectively. It happens to be the case that, as widespread international practices, there is an increasing emphasis upon outcomes as a measure of "successful" performance which necessitates more sophisticated and "taylorised" methods of collaboration in order to realise these goals. Luschen (1970) in similar vein, argues that invasion-games demand, as an inherent structural property of their practice, a commitment to 'cooperation', 'association' and 'conflict'. Cooperation refers to an inter-team contract to 'accomplish' the game whereas association denotes the necessary intra-team marshalling of resources which eventuates in any attempt to compete effectively.

(16) Grathoff misses this hybrid nature of some game-furnished conditions in his distinction between games whose 'typificatory scheme' is where the winning and losing is not central, and those games 'where a goal' of who won or lost is introduced by an agreement between participants. (see Cicourel 1973:128)
These observations suggest that the game-furnished conditions of mixed-motive games such as invasion-games provide a complex matrix of interactive processes which are not "given" in other types of games, thereby suggesting considerable interest for social theory. Yet this remains unrecognised in assessments of the utility of games as models for social theory, limited to a constrained image of games of strategy such as chess.

This is also true of Garfinkel. His analysis of games and game-rules focusses upon a simple game of strategy (viz. tick-tack-toe), and other games cited, or invoked to illustrate specific aspects of the constitutive order of games are similarly games of strategy e.g. chess, poker, contract bridge, kriegspiel, or derivatives from these games (e.g. chess with traitors, noughts and crosses) which are established by altering the constitutive 'accent' of the parent game (Garfinkel 1963:191). (17)

Embellishments of the heterogeneity of the game-furnished conditions in invasion-games are provided by various typologies of games or play forms, the most informative examples of which are Caillois (1961), Loy

(17) In a later discussion of game's 'unstated terms of contract' or 'the et cetera provision', Garfinkel (1963:199) contrasts basketball with the 'way the Harlem Globetrotters play basketball'. This is his only reference to invasion games.
(1968), Mauldon and Redfern (1969) and the model of the structural properties of sports developed by myself and Haywood (1984, 1989). This latter model distinguishes between sports on the basis of the nature of the inherent challenge, the conditions (in terms of equipment and rules) which are imposed on the challenge to make it gratuitously difficult, and the response (in terms of skills tactics, and strategies) which have been developed to meet the conditioned challenge. (see Appendix 1).

In each case, the game furnished conditions are distinguished through analysis of the particular matrix of basic challenges, and the deliberately contrived constraints which are imposed on the challenge in order to make it difficult and therefore of sustaining interest, to players. These represent the bounded conditions within which playing action is situated, and corroborate Garfinkel's and Cicourel's argument that the game-furnished conditions, as represented by the structural properties of different games, are critical features for the analysis of any game. To identify the necessary conditions of a specific game is not to lapse into formulism. Rather the point is to recognise the boundary conditions for the structure of social action (Cicourel 1964:203). Clearly an acknowledgement of the different game furnished conditions of games is implicit in Giddens (1985:18) argument that the
rules of children's games in contrast to chess, are more perspicacious for understanding rules, norms, procedures, moves etc. since they are subject to chronic disputes about legitimacy.

2.5.3 Rules of Preferred Play
Arising from the particularity of a game's furnished conditions both Garfinkel and Cicourel identify another "type" (more accurately 'facet' or 'dimension') of game rules to be distinguished from 'basic' rules. These are rules of preferred play which denote the possibilities that basic rules provide. Cicourel (1964:203) argues that these operate independently of basic rules and arise from the various kinds of traditional play, efficiency procedures, aesthetic preferences, which are open to players.

Basic rules furnish the criteria of what is considered to be 'legal' play, but these bounded conditions for action allow for alternatives which players can choose at their discretion. Garfinkel's illustrative example is, of course, from a game of strategy, but the same property of game rules is recognised by Elias and Dunning (1986) with specific reference to the start of play rules in the invasion-game of Association Football. Their conception of 'fixed' yet 'elastic' game rules is one of a series of interdependent polarities or 'tension-balances' inherent within the
configuration of an invasion-game. (18) For the present however, Garfinkel's identification of the discretion available to players acting in accordance with the basic rules sustain the argument presented earlier that the basic of formal rules do not and cannot precisely determine conduct in games.

This is true of games of strategy, games of chance, and games of physical skill or combinations of any of these ideal types. It will, however, be argued that invasion-games provide an accessible and perspicacious exemplar of this dimension of playing to the rules of the game, as they do for the final dimension of games-playing viz. the unstated terms of contract or the 'et cetera provision'.

2.5.4 The Unstated Terms of Contract

Almost as an after thought, Garfinkel posits a distinction between games on the basis of whether they are 'partially ordered' or 'well-ordered', and asks whether this makes any difference to the accomplishing process of particular games. Chess, he suggests, is a well-ordered game inasmuch as the rules seem to resist any possible manipulation by players without destroying the game. Yet, even in chess, Garfinkel has found that:

(18) Elias and Dunning's conception of the dynamics of sports groups provides a key element of analysis of rules and rule-changes in Chapters 6 and 7.
one can at one's move change pieces around on the board - so that, although the over-all positions are not changed, different pieces occupy the squares - and then move. (1963:199)

The reaction of opponents in Garfinkel's experiment, ranged from bewilderment, demands for explanation and charges of spoiling the game even though such a manoeuvre does not affect one's chances of winning, and (note) the rules do not prohibit such a move. (19) Garfinkel suggests that this provides an illustration of a game's 'unstated terms of contract' - a tacit agreement amongst or between players, since the rules do not wholly proscribe relevant action, to play in accordance with them - as Garfinkel has it 'a final finely printed acknowledgement, et cetera!'

One of Garfinkel's 'subjects' in the chess game described above, suggested that Garfinkel's manoeuvre reminded him of the way in which the Harlem Globetrotters play basketball and that this team do not play "real" basketball. Garfinkel mentions this as an aside, but as will become evident, this has important insights for the current project. As is well-known the Harlem Globetrotters, in the interests of entertainment, play a pastiche of the game. They have devised routinised

(19) A more extensive discussion of breaching the background expectancies, and the basic rules of a game, is provided in Chapter 3.
displays of the quintessential individual and team skills of basketball, with the motivated compliance of the 'opposition' and of the referees (who act as stooges or fall-guys in the 'theatre'). In their "displays" (Stone 1955), virtuoso stunts are performed which conform to the basic rules yet do not and could not take place within the normal, or taken-for-granted context where the rules of preferred play demand that all players play in the interests of efficiency, in order to try to win.

However, both these chess and basketball practices are, what one might call, bizarre or extra-ordinary features of games-playing practice. More crucially, for the present project, one can identify 'et cetera' or 'let it pass' clauses which are the accepted or normal part of playing the game. Garfinkel (1963:199-200) would concur with this. He writes:

I have been unable to find any game whose acknowledged rules are sufficient to cover all the problematical possibilities that may arise, or that one cannot with only slight exercise of wit make arise within the domain of play...Should it turn out that the boundaries of the set are essentially vague, that no matter how explicit the rules are, the set of them is essentially partially ordered, that every game contains its "unstated terms of contract"...then we have important grounds for optimism.

This research project aims to demonstrate that this optimism is well-founded viz. that invasion-games are
replete with unstated terms of contract as supplied by the formal rules and that this feature is critical for understanding how the formal rules of such games are subject to chronic change. However, a focus upon playing invasion-games yields one more dimension of how the game is made accountable-for-all-practical-purposes which is not apparent to Garfinkel because of, I suggest, his exclusive interest in games of strategy.

2 6. The Ethos of Games

This dimension is uncovered by D'Agostino's (1981) analysis of the "ethos" of basketball and by two separate discussions of the 'normative' rules in ice-hockey (Silva 1981, Vaz 1977). These writers collectively acknowledge that playing these particular invasion-games involve routine, taken-for-granted breaches of the formal rules. Moreover this is (i) a necessary occurrence for the sake of the viability of the game, (ii) is accepted by both perpetrator and recipient as part of the 'constitutive' or natural order of events, and (iii) is implicitly condoned by game officials who are empowered to supervise game conduct and adjudicate about rule-violations. In contrast, Garfinkel's identification of 'preferred' rules, game-furnished conditions, and the et cetera provision are all invoked to account for normative compliance, for the stable
features of action and as operating with the 'basic' rules and constitutive expectancies of that particular game. The following provides further evidence that analysis of the accounting practices of invasion-games yields important insights.

D'Agostino dismantles formalism by arguing that every game has an 'ethos' i.e. conventions determining how the formal rules are applied. For example, according to the formal rules of basketball, no bodily contact is allowed, yet, as D'Agostino has observed, basketball is replete with, or 'consists' of bodily contact. Formalist accounts would interpret this as not playing basketball at all, since the rules disallow such action. D'Agostino suggests that referees tacitly ignore violations of the contact rule in certain instances ("no harm, no foul") since to do otherwise would destroy the viability of the game i.e. as an activity of sustained appeal for both participants and spectators. Similar considerations apply to the 'advantage law' in many other invasion-games as attested by Hargreaves A. (1981). The ethos of a game is therefore, says D'Agostino (1981:17):

that set of unofficial implicit conventions which determine how the rules of that game are to be
applied in concrete circumstances'. (20)

Note that these conventions are tacitly understood by both players and by referees viz a reciprocity of perspectives upon what is considered 'acceptable' behaviour, if not 'permissible' in the strict formalist sense. Players know what referees will allow and devise 'kills and strategies accordingly. Referees reciprocally know that players have this knowledge and comply to the 'definition of the situation'.

Game officials sometimes deliberately ignore a foul move in the explicit interest of promoting some good. Such official action is, from the formalist point of view (generally) inexplicable'. (1981:16)

(20) Rail's (1988) phenomenological study of physical contact in basketball endorses and extends D'Agostino's work. Basketball is an 'incidental contact' sport and, without direct acknowledgement to Schutz, Rail discusses the 'natural attitude' of actors towards physical contact. This includes the expectation that players, coaches, referees will reach a shared understanding of the rules and how, 'in this particular time and space', they will be interpreted. Intersubjectivity, the author argues, seems to guarantee a mutually agreeable definition of 'good' (accidental or playful) and 'bad (violent) physical contacts. Physical contacts (hand-checking, 'screening', 'boxing-out' are 'essential to a basketball game' and are 'at all times expected from the players' in contrast to violent contacts which are interpreted as 'other-worldliness' viz. outside the specific taken-for-granted frame of reference of the game.
This provides an example of 'traditional' play cited by Garfinkel and Cicourel as an aspect of 'preferred' rules. Less satisfactory accounts are provided by Silva and Vaz. Both recognise that ice-hockey is rife with rule violations. Silva says that the inability of several sports to reduce such violations 'appears not to be in rule-enforcement but in the very structure of the rules' (1981:10), whilst Vaz (1977:6) notes that 'the formal control system is only minimally effective in regulating the course of the game', and an increasingly punitive approach to reduction of rule-violation would 'seriously jeopardise the course of the game'. Unlike D'Agostino however, these commentators perceive this as a problem of, and a threat to, social order rather than as an inherent characteristic of games playing. Their proposed solution in line with Parsonian conceptions of norms and rules is to re-socialise players into formal rule compliance. Silva says this can be achieved by 'modifying the reinforcement structure of sports rules which provide this loop-hole' whilst Vaz (1977:6) stridently argues:

Success according to game rules should be strongly emphasised, and is in accord with the values of the larger society. Players must be taught to want to obey the rules of the game. Thus, both success and rule-obedience must be rewarded in the socialisation of hockey players.

This signally fails to access various 'logics of deviance' in games and treats players as unreflexive.
dopes. Moreover, there is a failure to recognise that the

game furnished conditions of invasion-games necessarily

allow for conduct which cannot, in every case, be
determined by codified formal rules, as argued earlier.

This discussion of the particularity of game-furnished
conditions, the 'preferred' rules of play, and the
unstated terms of contract, extends the observations
earlier about the under-determination of performances by
rules An explanation of this is still called for, as it
was 25 years ago when Cicourel (1964:203) pointed out:

An empirical issue which sociology has barely
touched is how the actor manages the
discrepancies between the formally stated
or written rules, his expectations of what
is expected or appropriate, and the practical
and enforced character of both the stated and
unstated rules.

2.7 Summary: 5. Dimensions of Rules

The aim of this chapter has been to argue that the
conventional image of games, limited to analysis of their
formulated rules, constrains their heuristic potential for
social theory. Games are clearly attractive media for
experimental analysis of strategic conflict since their
rules can be experimentally controlled. Games are not
attractive media for other social theorists such as Giddens
precisely because they are conceived in terms of formulated
and fixed rules in contradistinction to the putative rules
of everyday social life.
This chapter has illustrated that games-playing processes are not solely constituted or fixed by their formal, codified rules. Whilst formal rules provide an adequate explanation of rule-following in games, there are other dimensions of games which are more accurately typified as fulfilling rules. It is possible, therefore, to identify five mutually interdependent dimensions of rules in games which together constitute games-playing processes.

1 Formulated Rules
These rules are discursively formulated and function to condition the arbitrary challenge of games, (e.g. scoring a goal), make this challenge gratuitously difficult. These rules also function to identify the game as a 'game', and as distinguishable from other games. But this identity and constitution of the game cannot be explained solely in terms of these formulated rules.

2 Constitutive Expectancies
These are culturally specific skills and understandings which any agent must possess in order to play particular games (as identified by the formulated rules). They denote largely tacit, taken-for-granted knowledge, assumed to be held in common with other 'players', about how-to-go-on in games. These 'expectancies' are variously labelled as scenic practices, practical knowledge, methodic procedures,
normal-forming and background expectancies. They are assumed in any formal typification of game-rules, yet are unacknowledged since such culturally-furnished abilities are invariably tacit stocks of knowledge.

Garfinkel (1963:190-1) includes both the formulated rules and constitutive expectancies in his conception of the 'basic' rules of games.

3 Game Furnished Conditions

The conditions of practice of specific games, as provided by the gratuitous contrived challenge, differ from one another. Differences include the amount of information possessed by players at any stage in the game (thereby distinguishing between games of strategy), and in terms of the necessity and possibility of association, collaboration, and conflict provided by the formulated rules. Hence distinctions can be made between games on the basis of (i) the relative numbers of actors involved and their deployment as individual players, partners, and in teams, and (ii) as collaboration, competitive zero-sum or mixed-motive games and with specific reference to sporting games, (iii) the nature of the challenge, the conditions imposed on that challenge by the rules, equipment, and playing areas, and the nature of the response to the challenge in terms of skills and strategies. Hence analyses of games which fail to acknowledge the heterogeneity of the game-furnished conditions will be inadequate.

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4 Rules of Preferred Play

Arising from the specific concatenation of basic rules and specific game furnished conditions, players, (acting with motivated compliance to the bounded nature of the game), have choices to make. These rules operate independently of the basic rules and makes the gratuitous conditioned challenge of (invasion)-games of sustained interest to players. Preferences displayed by players will be influenced by the non-game conditions of the practice, whatsoever they consist of.

5 The Unstated Terms of Contract

The formal or basic rules of games cannot wholly prescribe action. There is, in every game, a fringe of 'non pleteness to the stated contract to play, an 'et cetera' provision. This feature of games, together with the rules of prefered play, underscore the observation that performance in games is under-determined by formal rules. The et cetera provision is not only displayed by bizarre, deviant, or eccentric instances of games-play, but is institutionalised within dominant modes of playing at least some invasion-games. Related to this is that invasion-games have an 'ethos' which indicates commonly-held understandings, about how the formal rules are to be interpreted and acted upon. This includes actual rule violations which are implicitly condoned by the 'police' of
game-processes

The rules of some games (e.g. games of strategy such as chess) are not subject to chronic change. Other games (e.g. invasion-games) are restructured over time, a process which is neither gratuitous nor arbitrary. Arising from the constitutive expectancies and game-furnished conditions of specific games, 'official' definitions of the situation are supplemented by 'unofficial' interpretations and negotiation with the formulated rules. As numbers 4 and 5 above illustrate, invasion-games allow an elasticity of response to the conditioned challenge as provided by the formulated rules. This acts back upon official definitions, the outcome of which, is that game rules are reformulated in order to maintain in and retain the characteristics of the game-challenge as envisaged by those who are empowered to make rules.

These dimension of rules provide the framework for the ensuing analysis. The game-furnished conditions of invasion-games are acknowledged in chapter 3 which aims to display the constitutive expectancies assumed by agents in making such a game accountable. Chapter 3 therefore, applies ethnomethodological principles to the practice of games-playing.
CHAPTER 2

IMAGES OF GAMES AND GAME-RULES

2.1. INTRODUCTION

2.2. FORMALIST CONCEPTIONS OF GAMES
2.2.1. Game Theory and Experimental Games
2.2.2. Models and Metaphors

2.3. IMAGES OF GAMES IN SOCIAL THEORY

2.4. BEYOND FORMALISM: THE ESSENTIAL INSUFFICIENCY
OF RULES IN THE DETERMINATION OF CONDUCT

2.5. GARFINKEL ON GAMES
PART TWO
THE TACIT DIMENSION
THE TACIT DIMENSION

The different dimensions of rules and rule-following implicated in game procedures identified in Part One provides the basis for a more focussed analysis of invasion-type game processes in Part Two. Two case studies are described which elaborate on Garfinkel's analysis of games, and extend an ethnomethodological perspective from simple games of strategy to different and more complex types of games. Departing from Garfinkel's breaching experiments with games, the case studies illustrate an alternative strategy through which the tacit dimensions of accomplishing invasion-games are displayed, dimensions which are overlooked in an account of a game's formulated rules.

This strategy, which documents the chronology of a game's constitution, yields some critical insights into the social processes implicated in making a game accountable. In particular, these (necessarily) collaborative processes also involve conflicts over the 'definition of the situation' which arise from inequalities of power and resources that members invoke in accomplishing an invasion-game. The outcome of these conflicts (unanticipated by all members) is successive rule-enactments which are implicitly motivated by an interest in preserving the game's identity and viability in response to potentially despoiling influences. Therefore, contra Garfinkel, invasion-games are
found not to be archetypal examples of 'stable concerted actions'.

Further, Garfinkel's depiction of 'games' does not provide a basis upon which to understand rule-changes which are chronically implicated in the production and reproduction of invasion-games.

Building upon these insights a typology of invasion-game rules is presented in Chapter 4 which incorporated both the received wisdom of formalist accounts, and Garfinkel's identification of a necessarily tacit dimension to games procedures. Yet, elaborating on this, the typology also addresses the accommodation work of members to preserve both the identity and the viability of the game once it has been established (i.e. the basic rules which mark out the specific contrived and gratuitous challenge). The typology introduces a temporal dimension, insofar as it outlines 'establishment' and 'consolidation' phases in a game's constitution.

It is suggested that this 'consolidation' phase as identified in the case studies has a more general application. With illustrative examples from two invasion-games (viz. basketball and soccer), the rule-changes common to many major institutionalised invasion-games might similarly be understood as accommodative work by the games rule-committees in response to playing strategies which, in unanticipated ways, compromise their intentions to legislate.
for an 'ideal' social (i.e. game) process, however that might be conceived.

The depiction of enabling and preservative rules enacted during the consolidation phase of a game's constitution provides the basis for a more extensive and intensive analysis of the history of institutionalised invasion-games which is undertaken in Part 3.
CHAPTER 3

ACCOMPLISHING GAMES

3.1. INTRODUCTION
3.2 CHOOSING A STRATEGY
3.2.1. Some False Starts
3.2.2. Choice of Game-Type
3.3. ACCOMPLISHING AN INVASION-GAME:
CASE STUDY 1
3.3.1. The Strategy
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3.4. ANALYSIS OF MEMBERS PROCEDURES
3.4.1. The Documentary Method of Interpreting the
Game
3.4.2. Eureka! Breaching the Tacit Understandings of
Games-Playing
3.5. ESTABLISHMENT AND CONSOLIDATION: TWO PHASES
IN ACCOMPLISHING GAMES
3.6. A NOTE ON METHOD: MONITORING THE PROCESS
3.6.1. Technical Problems
3.6.2. The Research Context: Control Effects
3.7. POLISHING THE PROCESS
3.7.1. Design Issues
3.7.2. Members Procedures
3.8. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
3.9. A CRITICAL NOTE
3.9.1. The Minimalism of Ethnomethodology
3.9.2. Confronting the Critics

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3.1 Introduction

Garfinkel's analysis of rules and their constituent properties has been addressed in the previous chapter. This work is part of a sustained series of experiments or 'demonstrations' of the fundamental properties of practical reasoning and practical actions - the 'seen but unnoticed' knowledgeable ways in which social actors recognise, produce and reproduce social actions and social structures. Heritage (1984, 1987) locates Garfinkel's (1987:226) work as a 'profound and challenging reorientation of fundamental aspects of social theory' viz. theory of social action, the nature of intersubjectivity, and the social constitution of knowledge. Garfinkel was a student of Parsons and developed a critique of the key presuppositions of Parsons 'voluntaristic theory of action' (1937). Perhaps the key issue in Parsonian theory, from which Garfinkel departed, was the problem of social order. Parsons, as is well known, proposed that moral values, internalised through socialisation practices, exert a powerful influence on both the means and ends of action. To the extent that such values are institutionalised in society as a 'central value system', social regularities will emerge in shared goals, expectations, and therefore patterns of coordinated activity. As Parsons and Shils (1951:150) have it:
It is through internalisation of common patterns of value orientation that a system of social interaction can be stabilised.

Heritage argues that, despite snipings from critics such as Wrong (1961), Gouldner (1970) and Lockwood (1964), the motivational aspects of Parsonian action theory remained unchallenged until Garfinkel. Garfinkel's seminal contribution is therefore to point out that the exclusive emphasis on motivational issues neglects 'the understandings in terms of which actors coordinate their actions and guide them over their course' (Heritage 1987:228). Parsons therefore has only constructed a ramified theory of dispositions to act, rather than a theory of action per se. Garfinkel's substantive research projects therefore seem to demonstrate and conceptualise the knowledge which actors bring to bear, and invoke in their specific circumstances, an approach which has more recently been endorsed by Giddens (1979:253-4). Garfinkel's ethnomethodological programme (although nowhere is this systematically stated) is to study:

the body of common-sense knowledge and the range of procedures and considerations by means of which the ordinary members of society make sense of and find their way about in, and act on the circumstances in which they find themselves. (Heritage 1984:4)

The radical nature of this programme is singularly difficult to grasp - as is the dense prose of Garfinkel. Rather than delineating a clearly articulated field of investigation, it indicates virgin or alien fields - or as
Heritage has it 'a signpost to a domain of uncharted dimensions' (1985:5). The current project has just such a characteristic.

Garfinkel's elevation of 'common'-sense (i.e. assumed to be held by all members of a social situation) (1) knowledge as the principle domain of enquiry into social action draws extensively on Schutz who had stressed that the social world is interpreted in terms of common-sense constructs which are social in origin. Schutz stressed that these constructs are the vehicles through which any actor makes sense of his/her actions and the motivations of others, thereby, coordinating actions into an intelligible scheme. Garfinkel's programme is to treat these common-sense and hence mundane and routine understandings as a 'topic' for investigation rather than as a 'resource' because, as Schutz asserts (1964:8) an adequate understanding of social action must be based upon analysis of the content and properties of such knowledge. (2)

(1) Garfinkel uses the term 'members' to emphasise that he does not make distinctions between 'lay' and 'professional' accounts of the social world - a distinction which, he maintains, is implicit in such locutions as 'actor' or 'agent'.

(2) See Schutz (1964) for an outlines of the properties of common-sense knowledge viz. epoche of the natural attitude, the active, ongoing, and revisable constitution of social objects, stock of knowledge held in typified form, the reciprocity of perspectives. See Heritage (1987:230-1) and (1984 32-74) for a comprehensive review of Schutz.
Consequently Garfinkel is critical of conventional sociology's conception of actors as producing and reproducing stable features of social action by acting in compliance with pre-established and legitimate action-alternatives as provided by the common culture. This makes the actor out to be a 'judgemental dope' both culturally and psychologically, leading to a neglect of the skilful, active, ongoing accomplishing of social order.(3)

Similarly, I have provided a critique of conventional wisdom about rule-following in games. Formalist accounts, implicitly condoning a determinist theory of social action, depict players (to be bona fide 'players') as merely acting in compliance with pre-established formulated rules as given rather than recognising the skilful practical reasoning through which the social order of games is achieved. These accomplishing processes exercise, what Garfinkel would call 'an obstinate sovereignty' over formalist claims to give an adequate account of rules and rule-following in games.

Treating practical reasoning as a topic is evident also in Cicourel's (1968) study of delinquency. Cicourel was interested in displaying the 'accommodative work' through

(3) Variants of this critique of 'conventional' sociology with respect to both theory and method are postulated by Cicourel (1964, 1968), Mehan and Wood (1975), Benson and Hughes (1983), Sharrock and Anderson (1986).
which 'objective' standardised data about delinquency was produced. What are the procedures through which people get labelled 'delinquent'? His study focusses on the complex interpretive work done by police in making sense of their environment and constructing reasonable courses of action. In so doing, police make recourse to 'background expectancies' (tacitly-held knowledge and assumptions) which provide a set of 'rules' in advance of particular occasions with which they have to deal. Just as I have been arguing that formulated game-rules and game-procedures are not identical, so there is no direct correspondence between the sanitised official statistics on delinquency and the methodic procedures which lead to their formulation. (4)

Garfinkel stresses further that the features of common-sense knowledge cannot be compared with scientific knowledge since the former as Schutz (1962:3) has it, is 'only partly rational and rationality has many degrees'. Garfinkel developed this by insisting that the properties of commonsense reasoning in mundane situations of action must be analysed without recourse to scientific rationality as the central point of comparison. His recommendation is to suspend or 'bracket' out any commitment to a privileged or more

(4) See also Garfinkel's (1967) account of hospital administrative procedures - good organisational reasons for bad clinical records.
rational versions of the social structure in order to study how people make sense of, create and reproduce social structures. Hence his espousal of "ethnomethodological indifference" which, as Heritage points out, simply means studying accounting practices without evaluative commentary, as dispassionately as possible. Garfinkel 'brackets' all external judgements of the 'adequacy, value, importance, necessity, practicality, success, or consequentiality' of common-sense knowledge. (Garfinkel and Sacks 1970:345)

There is no need to provide an exhaustive description of the ethnomethodological tradition. Comprehensive secondary reviews are to be found in Turner (1974), Mehan and Wood (1975), Douglas (1971, 1980), Benson and Hughes (1983), Leiter (1989), Handel (1982) and in the excellent work of Heritage (1984, 1987) who draws out the key theoretical premises in Garfinkel's theory of social action, on intersubjectivity, and on the social constitution of knowledge, locating these with respect to Parsons and to Schutz. In addition, critical reviews include Mennell (1976), Cuff and Payne (1975), Craib (1984), Giddens (1979, 1981, 1985), Goldthorpe (1972). It is sufficient to establish that ethnomethodological principles can be applied to the 'scenic practices' through which player's know-how-to-go-on in games.

Members (viz. players), according to Garfinkel (1967:75);
...are concerned as a matter of course with...the
nature, production and recognition of reasonable,
realistic and analyzable actions...for the socially
managed production of...(games). (my emphasis).

I emphasise 'as a matter of course' to point out the
tacit or, as Filmer (1972) puts it the 'forgotten' nature of
much practical knowledge. Garfinkel uses the term 'seen
but unnoticed' to refer to orientation towards an object
without conscious awareness to aspects of social
organisation. Indeed, Garfinkel's 'breaching experiments' -
which are designed to multiply the disorganising features of
everyday social interaction - are predicated upon a
recognition that practical reasoning in the socially
organised occasions of everyday affairs is necessarily a
tacit and taken-for-granted accomplishment.

This stress on the tacit dimension is not peculiar to
Garfinkel but is also the key tenet of Michael Polanyi's
(1958) conception of 'personal knowledge'. Both stress that
in the course of acting, speaking, accomplishing...a game, a
conversation, a scientific experiment...members do not,
indeed cannot, attend to or consciously be aware of, the
feature or processes of the acting, speaking, accomplishing.

Such attention to the processes of practical reasoning
would inhibit action as part of an activity. Indeed
stuttering, stage-fright and other forms of self-
consciousness arise from attending to procedures rather than
the performance of the action resulting in malfunctioning. Frankl (1971) calls this 'hyper-reflection' whilst Polanyi, in discussing the nature of skills and performance distinguishes between the 'subsidiary' (tacit) and 'focal' (focus of action) poles of awareness. For Polanyi, these poles of awareness are necessarily mutually exclusive. So by attending to 'procedures' in Garfinkel's terms, a member cannot attend to the action and vice-versa.

Polanyi's work on 'personal knowledge' is predicated upon a similar concern to Garfinkel's. (5) Just as Garfinkel claims that members' procedures exercise an 'obstinate sovereignty' upon social scientists claims, so the guiding motive of all Polanyi's philosophising is, as Allen (1978) suggests, 'to break what he regards as the dangerous hold of "objectivism" upon the modern world'. Polanyi writes in 'The Study of Man' that the objectivist ideal is:

the establishment of a completely precise and strictly logical representation of knowledge and to look upon any personal participation in our scientific account of the universe as a residual flaw which should be completely eliminated in due course".

(5) Epistemology makes basic distinctions between propositional (or discursive) knowledge, practical knowledge, and 'acquaintance knowledge'. See debates in Philosophy of Education between Hirst (1975), Reid (1970), Renshaw (1975), Peters (1973).
The basis of Polanyi's approach is his theory of "tacit integration", which makes it clear that knowing is necessarily a personal act which involves personal judgement and commitment, in contrast to explicitness an impersonality.

In his discussion of 'skills', Polanyi (1958) writes:

the aim of skilful performance is achieved by the observance of a set of rules which are not known as such to the person following them...
I have come to the conclusion that the general principle by which the cyclist keeps his balance is not generally known' (p49)

It is this tacit dimension of skilful performance in Polanyi's account which is of interest for this study. For Polanyi, the structure of knowing embodies two kinds of 'awareness' - subsidiary and focal, and tacit integration is the phrase he uses to exemplify the process whereby we attend from one set of objects to another set. In other words, when focussing on the 'whole' (e.g. hitting the ball in tennis away from an opponents reach) we are necessarily subsidiarily aware of the 'skills' (e.g. transference of weight from one foot to another, forward swing of the racquet arm, the sequence of muscular responses in the body etc.) through the process of tacit integration.

Polanyi is stressing, therefore, that in the skilful performance of actions, there are general 'principles' or sets of 'rules' which are necessarily tacit and hence for
most of use, unspecifiable in propositional terms. But an inability to explicate the particulars of subsidiary awareness is not to say we are ignorant of them. This 'personal knowledge' is that inexplicit way of "knowing" which becomes the reliable tradition in all forms of connoisseurship (e.g. wine-tasting) and practical knowledge in painting, games-playing, music, which are passed on by people through their actions and by their example.

There are clear similarities in Polanyi's account of the necessarily tacit dimension of skilful action with Garfinkel's display of members procedures for making activities accountable. Polanyi also argues that the subsidiary and focal poles of awareness are necessarily mutually exclusive (i.e. the pianist cannot attend to the movements of his finger on the keyboard whilst playing Beethoven's sonata). Similarly members, as a matter of course, accomplish activities in Garfinkel's demonstrations until they are called upon to give an account of, or made aware of, that accomplishing when the activities are breached.

Nevertheless, the work of Polanyi and Garfinkel is not co-extensive since the former restricts his focus to tacit dimensions of individual action - of knowing how to perform a skill. His examples (e.g. glass-blowing, bike-riding, swimming, piano-playing) are actions by individuals. In contrast, ethnomethodologists focus upon skills or
'accommodative work' learnt in and through interactive accomplishing, wherein members assume a reciprocity of perspectives. However, this brief account of Polanyi's work illustrates that Garfinkel's critique of 'conventional sociology' accords well with Polanyi's critique of a philosophy of science which does not acknowledge active, intentional knowledgeable agency.

3.2. Choosing a Strategy

3.2.1 Some false starts

To display the complex accommodative work by players in games the most obvious strategy was to conduct a breaching experiment. Garfinkel started his substantive research projects with a game (of tick-tack-toe) because such an activity is 'a system with stable features' - an established context of interaction with 'fixed' rules. His approach was to:

...ask what can be done to make trouble. The operations that one would have to perform in order to produce and sustain anomic features of perceived environments and disorganised interaction should tell us something about how social structures are ordinarily and routinely maintained. (1963:187)

Garfinkel's strategy can easily be informally replicated by playing noughts-and-crosses, deliberately break the 'basic' rules (this can be done in a variety of ingenious ways), and note the reaction and the subsequent 'repair
work' or 'management of incongruity' by the subjects. (6) In other words, members attempt to interpret the sudden disorder by making it compatible with their own understanding of 'the natural facts of daily life' (in games-play) and hence re-impose order. Garfinkel noted that his breaching of the game rules 'immediately motivated attempts to normalise the discrepancy' (1963:206).

However, I anticipated that to translate Garfinkel's breaching of a game of strategy to an invasion-game would not further my understanding of the social constitution of games particularly as I have argued that such activities cannot be conceived purely in terms of the formal rules. Hence, to merely breach the formal rules would yield few insights. Indeed, Garfinkel's game experiment is perhaps less illuminating than his other breaching demonstrations (7) since everyone does know at a conscious, discursive level that games are played to rules, whereas in everyday social situations the 'rules' as uncovered by Garfinkel, are 'seen but unnoticed'.

(6) I have done this on several occasions. Reactions include (i) copying my breaching, (ii) tacitly ignoring the breach, (iii) annoyance and refusal to continue to 'contract'.

Dispensing with a reworking of the tick-tack-toe experiment, I began to conceive of other ways in which invasion games might be breached. Most other invasion-games can be substituted for the games identified in brackets in the following examples: always passing backwards (soccer); always dribbling towards one's own territory/goal (in hockey); always passing to the same player (in basketball); never kicking the ball (in soccer); always keeping possession of the ball 'too long' (in hockey); never passing the ball...or always kicking the ball (in rugby). In these examples of possible game action, one can substitute 'never' for 'always' and vice-versa where appropriate.

There are some crucial observations to be made here. Firstly, none of the above instances of possible game behaviour break the formal rules of the game. There is nothing, for example, in the rule book of hockey, which states which direction one must hit the ball (except for the start of play). Secondly, all the above cases of game behaviour are not bizarre examples of possible game behaviour, rather they are frequently tactically advantageous (viz. in the interests of one's team) depending upon the specific configuration of players at any instance - this even includes not kicking the ball in soccer. Thirdly, the response by other members to each of the above 'breaches' of the contract (to compete), is different from
the response to breaking the formal rules. In the latter case, repair work is relatively simple. If one were, for example, in a game of basketball, to suddenly run with the ball without the mandatory bounces then members have recourse to the formulated rules, and merely restate them. However, in the examples of 'breaching' provided earlier, members can only appeal for cooperation in 'playing the game'. In these cases, what is broken is the 'unstated terms of contract', the 'finely printed acknowledgement, et cetera'. I have broken the 'trust' which members have for one another. I have breached the assumption of the reciprocity of perspectives i.e. the constitutive expectancies. I have been a 'spoilsport'.

This point is elaborated by Coulter (1971) who suggests that constitutive rules or expectancies are not determinative of action but rather give sense to behavioural events since it is only by recourse to these 'rules' that members can tell 'what is going on' in the first place. Contravening background expectancies, says Coulter (1971:316) 'creates an anomic situation of utter senselessness' whilst to contravene the preferred rules (which in the case of games are bounded by formulated rules) is to risk sanctions.

The final observation therefore is that it is possible to fail to make a game accountable whilst abiding by the formulated rules since these rules have a 'fringe of
incompleteness' which cannot deal with every contingent circumstance. Hence, these instances of breaching the constitutive expectancies of games corroborates Giddens (1975:23) observation that:

Breaking or ignoring rules is not, of course, the only way in which the constitutive or sanctioning properties of intensively invoked rules can be studied.

Whilst the above ways of breaching games begins to unpack the complexity of the rules implicated in the constitution of games, I conceived a strategy which was designed to elaborate a major process which, argued Garfinkel, is implicated in many aspects of the interpretation of action. Borrowing from Mannheim (1952) (8), he called this process 'the documentary method of interpretation'.

My strategy was to provide for members a 'game situation' of (potentially) almost complete disorder and anticipated that this would provide an opportunity to monitor the ways in which players made sense of the situation, made the game accountable, and actively created order. This approach would enable me to identify, I hoped, those tacit, taken-for-granted understandings about 'playing games' implicated in the rule-enactments which would necessarily have to be formulated in order for the members

to make the game accountable. Before outlining this strategy in more detail, some comments on the game-furnished conditions of invasion-games are necessary.

3.2.2. Choice of Game-Type

Having discarded the breaching of a particular game, I had to devise a strategy which would be more perspicacious for displaying the complex methodic procedures of games and underscore the dimensions of rules as identified in Chapter 2. Initially, this necessitated deciding upon a particular type of game from the five types identified in Maulden and Redfern's (1969) classification viz. 'net' games, 'aiming' games, 'rebound' games, 'batting' games and 'invasion' games. I chose 'invasion' games because their structural properties allow for a higher level of complexity of interaction processes than in the other four game types. Firstly, invasion games are all team games, which makes them inherently both competitive and co-operative enterprises. In order to compete effectively, co-operation within and between teams is necessary. Teams co-operate with each other whilst competing in order to sustain the 'irreality' of the activity. Moreover, invasion games are inherently more complex in terms of the nature of the skilled response to the constantly fluid game situation. Unlike a 'net' game such as tennis, the territory is not divided so that players can and do move anywhere on the playing surface in an effort
to invade and momentarily colonise territory. (9) Such games also require a broad range of gross motor abilities. Unlike other games, in invasion games players are empowered to throw and strike, catch and collect, carry and propel. Compare this with, for example, net games like tennis, badminton, or volleyball, where players can only strike the ball/shuttlecock. In short, invasion-games allow for complex and fluid interaction (within the rules laid down which condition the basic challenge). Note also that almost all the ethical issues arising in games-playing are from invasion-games. For example, discussions about violence in sport which excites so much media commentary are invariably about violence in invasion-games. In many instances of these types of games, the rules are consistently broken with the corollary that the policing of these games by referees is more complex. (10) Invasion games tend to be less stylised, less 'euphemised' in Bourdieu's (1985) terms, than other game types, and at least in the case of various codes of football played throughout

(9) There are exceptions eg. netball's designation of three areas.

(10) The number of 'police' varies with different invasion games. See Rees and Miracle (1986) for a discussion of the consequences of this for players commitments to abide by the rules. The policing of many invasion-games has also become more intense eg. in rugby union, linespersons are now empowered to adjudicate about foul play.
the world (American, Gaelic, Australian, Rugby, Soccer), are little more than modified and sophisticated forms of fighting, since teams invade territory which is defended by opponents. Therefore, invasion-games seemed to be particularly appropriate vehicles for displaying the accounting practices implicated in their practice.

3.3 Accomplishing an Invasion-Game: Case Study 1

3.3.1 The Strategy

Breaching experiments are designed to show how the 'perceived normality' of events can be made seriously problematic by undermining basic presuppositions about knowing-how-to-go-on i.e. what 'anyone can see' (Garfinkel 1963:198). These, as Heritage (1987:232) points out were an elaboration of Schutz's proposal that social actors must assume 'a reciprocity of perspectives'.

However, discarding breaching experiments, my strategy was the obverse of this, and was designed to display the relevance of background' (i.e. inferred or presupposed) knowledge in interpreting the nature of events and actions. Garfinkel (1967) provided a number of demonstrations (e.g. the 'counselling' experiment, the Dana conversation, 'lodging' in one's own home, each of which were designed to display the role of tacit, taken-for-granted knowledge in the achievement of mundane understandings of actors and events. With respect to these demonstrations, Garfinkel
argues that a major process is implicated which he calls 'the documentary method of interpretation'. He writes (1967:78) that:

the method consists of treating an actual appearance as 'the document of' as 'pointing to', as 'standing on behalf of' a presupposed underlying pattern, derived from its individual documentary evidences, but the individual documentary evidences in their turn, are interpreted on the basis of 'what is known' about the underlying pattern. Each is used to elaborate the other.

Breaching experiments are, of course, designed to immobilise the documentary method of interpretation, and to note how it is repaired. Heritage (1984:86; 1987:237) notes that this documentary process is well known to students of perception in the form of 'Gestalt' figures, (e.g. the duck/rabbit) but Garfinkel extends this to the recognition of 'mailmen, friendly gestures, and promises'. I am suggesting that one can extend this to the recognition of (fellow) 'game-players', Garfinkel's demonstrations were designed to exaggerate this process of the documentary method of interpretation - "to catch the work of 'fact production' in flight" (Garfinkel 1967:79).

The Dana conversation for example demonstrates how the subjects impute a background of matters that are assumed to be known in common, and without which knowledge, the utterances are unintelligible.

Nevertheless, none of Garfinkel's experiments or
demonstrations have the same constituent features as my strategy, since his interest in games, (chosen because of the 'omnirelevance of normative regulation' (1963:198) ceases with his early breaching experiments. My strategy was designed to display the accommodative work in maintaining or accomplishing games-playing (for another first time) thereby identifying the cognitive resources through which settings of action are rendered intelligible and accountable. As Heritage (1984:95) has it, the studies demonstrate:

the staggering range of assumptions and contextual features which may be mobilised ad hoc to sustain a particular 'documentary version' of a sequence of events.

Coulter (1971:317) extends this account by describing the documentary method of interpretation as a process whereby an underlying pattern of sense is derived by members:

from the individual, ongoing 'evidence' or documents of that sense whilst these in turn are elaborated by 'what is presumed' about the underlying patterns. This enables actors to connect up past, present and future in a social metric.

A case study was therefore designed in order to elucidate these characteristics of playing invasion-games. Members (11) were provided with no more than the basic

(11) The 'members' in this case study were 10 students (ages between 19 and 35). They formed part of a pre-existing group in a cohort on a Degree programme. None of these people were known to me prior to the experiment.
challenge or over-arching aim of an 'invasion' gam (viz. to get an object into a prescribed area). Confronted with this situation, bordering on the anarchic, members would then have to collectively agree upon rules and procedures in order to make the activity 'accountable'. Members were, in essence, to be given only two items of information. Firstly, that it was a 'game' and not therefore something else such as a 'task', a 'puzzle', or a 'commission'. Secondly, that the basic challenge of this game is to get an object/s or ball/s into a prescribed area (the term goal was not used). Members would have to decide on composition of 'teams' (although I would say nothing about equal sides), size and shape of playing area, equipment to be used (there was a variety available), (12) size and design of 'prescribed area', and crucially the rules constraining and enabling action. Hence, I provided a situation in which members were required to 'play' an 'invasion-game', yet were challenged to make such a game accountable. This process, whereby members accomplished social order, would then be monitored and recorded using sound track and VTR (13) as well as the researchers' own observations.

(12) Equipment included a variety of shape, size and composition of balls and other projectiles (e.g. bean bags); striking implements (bats, racquets, sticks).

(13) The video tape accompanies this thesis.
There are, of course, several ways in which members might respond to this 'challenge'. I anticipated that any response would be variants of the following: a) incredulity and inaction, b) ask for clarification about the object of the exercise or about the rules, c) immediately start to try to play the game as outlined. If their response was a) or b) I would encourage group discussion to identify methods of arriving at some general initial procedures. If the response was c) I would do nothing. In any case, I anticipated that members' initial response to my description of the procedure would be crucial with respect to the relative success or failure of the enterprise. I trusted, therefore, that in providing this challenge, members would have to collectively decide upon a very general game-structure which would subsequently necessitate the establishing of procedures and rules constraining and enabling action. I hope that this would enable me to identify those taken-for-granted assumptions about games-playing which, since presumed to be held in common amongst members, would not necessitate precise delineation in terms of formulated rules. I further anticipated that the structuring of the game would encourage the incipient development of specific skilled responses and strategies to the emergent game challenge.

3.3.2 Playing the Game

(i) The actual response to the initial task was none of
the aforementioned. Members immediately went into a 3-4 minute discussion, then selected equipment (a rugby ball), set up a skittle at either end of the playing area (a badminton court) and began to play a version of crab football.

I then stopped the game and pointed out that they had gone well beyond the 'humble' brief I had given them.

(ii) The ensuing discussion (discussion 1) led to a handling game using two different shaped balls, larger goals, and one formulated rule - no running with the ball. From this time onwards, there were no more changes to the sides, playing area or goals. The tacit assumption arising from this one rule was that players could not bounce or 'dribble' the ball, although there was no rule-making which debarred these procedures for invading territory.

(iii) Over the next 40-45 minutes (with game action succeeding intermittent group discussions) the following changes were made.

Discussion 2 - Discussion about body contact but no rule enactment.

- Any player can be goalkeeper: rule enactment;

Discussion 3 - No charging/barging: rule enactment;

- Extended discussion about the precise meaning of bodily contact;
- Discussion about scoring and refereeing but no changes to procedures;
Discussion 4 - Ball must be held away from the body, not held close to chest/stomach: a rule enactment;

Discussion 5 - Two separate team discussions about tactics and strategies;

Discussion 6 - Responses to developments in game arising from Discussion 5 - generally negative in terms of the viability of the game;

Discussion 7 - Responses to the question "what makes a good game?"
These (in order) of response were:
Fun;
Lots of action;
Simple rules;
Only requires simple abilities;
Everyone abiding by rules; (note)
Everyone is involved;
Teamwork required.

3.4. Analysis of members procedures
3.4.1. The Documentary method of interpreting the game

(a) Members' interpretation of the process

Members did not take my initial instructions literally. A clear case of members understanding more than is said. The 'filling in' of my skeletal description of an 'invasion-game' (what Sacks calls 'normal-forming') was evident in both games. For 'players' members read 'equal teams', for 'area' members read 'target' or 'goal' (I did not use either the word 'team' or 'goal'). In both games, the initial concern was to impose some restriction on actions. Members also interpreted the task as devising a game significantly different from established games; as a 'problem' to be solved. Several suggestions about rule modifications were
discussed as bearing too close a resemblance to existing
games (e.g. "No that's just like...rugby...netball" etc.).

(b) The principle of equality

This was the initial concern and was quickly
established. Meticulous attention was paid to organising
teams equal in male/female terms, and in terms of height
(not weight nor previously known games-playing ability).
The tacit element displayed being that a viable game is one
in which sides are evenly matched with respect to perceived
relevant characteristics.

(c) Constraints upon action

This was both an initial and an ongoing concern.
Members imposed a gratuitous difficulty on the ways in which
the basic challenge of the game can be met. In turn, these
conditions represented the framework within which a skiful
response can develop e.g. "no running with the ball". The
tacit assumption here is that a good game must have some
considerable action constraints to make it of sustaining
interest.

(d) Bodily contact

Related to the constraints upon action were the related
discussions about body contact - i.e. constraints upon the
use of brute physical force. There are two ways of
interpreting this central concern. Firstly because both
males and females are participating, there is a need to
outlaw body contact in order to equalise action opportunities and minimise inherent sex-differences in terms of strength. Secondly, games are seen as skilful enterprises and are in Elias' term 'civilised'; they are not just modified fighting. Excessive bodily contact destroys those skills.

(e) Controlling the game

One member, who can be labelled "the Competitor", repeatedly stressed the need for keeping an account of the score which was coupled with the suggestion of having a referee. The assumption here being that there's no point in playing otherwise. "The Competitor" also complained about the lack of ability of the goalkeeper. These suggestions were quickly dismissed by other members as being inappropriate and irrelevant to the prime interest in the game. The collective value construct was ludic (fun, play, enjoyment) not instrumental, as evidenced also by their responses in Discussions 6 and 7. Nevertheless, the interventions by the "Competitor" displays a different interpretive frame about what is to be accomplished.

Taken together, these five concerns - about equality, bodily contact action constraints, a commitment to a ludic process, and the initial 'filling in' of the problem to be solved - represent some of the tacit understandings displayed by most
members in making the game accountable. (14) There were few overt rule enactments or decisions which precisely delineated action with respect to these understandings; rather they were generally assumed by members, and 'passed over in silence' (Sartre) in favour of rule-making to establish the particular identity of the game. These findings are of interest and give ample demonstration of generally accepted, taken-for-granted ways of 'doing' invasion-games. However, no fewer than four of the seven discussion periods included extensive and acrimonious debates about how the ball might be held by the players in possession and for how long.

3.4.2. Eureka! Breaching the tacit understandings of games-playing

The reason for these debates was that one player, who might be labelled the 'despoiler' repeatedly abused the tacitly-held 'canons' of conduct in the game which were understood and acknowledged by the other nine members. He was not breaking the rules of necessary action, since few rules had been enacted; but he was breaking the canons which, collectively, the other members deemed to be appropriate to these social circumstances. By doing so, he was holding up the course of the game and preventing the

14) I have subsequently repeated this case study in informal settings with other students and these 5 issues are consistently reaffirmed.
free flow of the ball between the players.

The despoiler's actions are crucial insofar as they actually bore a close resemblance to members' collective decisions about rules, but, he did not do the routine 'filling-in' as did other members. In precisely the meaning of the colloquial expression, the despoiler was not "playing the game", insofar as he deviated from, what Sacks calls, 'normal-forming'. (15) Without his presence, one can assume that the unformulated tacitly-held background expectancies would have been sufficient to make the game accountable for all practical purposes. The game would have been viable and hence interesting and enjoyable, with far fewer rule enactments. However, since the 'despoiler' did breach the canons of expected behaviour, members found it necessary (see discussions 3, 4, 6 and as a consequence 7) to translate canons into rules prescribing necessary behaviour. Most rule changes then, were designed to circumvent the 'spoilsport' actions of this member. Another member who, I subsequently labelled as the 'fair player' was particularly incensed by the despoiler's behaviour. Her imput to discussions was almost wholly confined to condemnations of his action.

(15) The despoiler's actions were 'deviant' or atypical thereby accentuating what is normally taken-for-granted. Abrams (1982) stresses that it is the unexpected or 'freakish' which often yields the most insights for social theory. Platt (1988) makes similar observations.
The 'fair player's reaction to the playing characteristics of the despoiler parallel those of subjects in breaching experiments. Garfinkel's subjects wanted explanations from the experimenter concerning the latter's actions and, when such explanations were not forthcoming, the subjects assumed positions of 'righteous hostility'. Heritage (1984:97) concludes that:

a socially organised and intersubjective world stands or falls with the maintenance of this interpretive trust

and this is what the 'despoiler' clearly failed to do, thus engendering a form of ontological insecurity as evidenced by the fair player's responses.

3.5. Establishment and Consolidation: Two Phases in Accomplishing Games

The translation of tacitly understood canons of acceptable conduct into overt rule formulations of necessary conduct occupied much more of the accomplishing process. However, as is evident from the topics addressed in the discussion periods, it is possible to discern two phases in the constitution of the game. Initially, consideration was given to the basic structure of the game (i.e. selecting equipment, goals/targets, basic skills allowed). This experimental or "establishment" phase or rule enactments was quickly superseded by a "consolidation" phase. In the latter phase attention was given exclusively to the rules.
and procedures which would enable the action opportunities established earlier to be demonstrated. Once game identity had been collectively agreed upon during this establishment phase, the task became a matter of preserving this identity - a task starkly displayed since successive rule enactments which replaced previously taken-for-granted canons of behaviour were made to counteract the undermining influences of the 'despoiler'.

A summary of game-constitution might therefore be presented thus:

(a) There are two 'moments' in members procedures for making an invasion-game accountable. An establishment phase whereby members agree upon and hence identify the basic format or structure of the game, and a consolidation phase during which members attempt to enhance and enable actions allowed by the game structure which are already subject to constraint when the game was established.

(b) During the consolidation phase, there is a tendency for canons of acceptable action to be translated into rules of necessary action but only when and if such enactments become situationally relevant.

(c) The reasons for rule enactments are to enable action opportunities (decided upon during the establishment phase) to be adequately realised, and to preserve these action opportunities from possible despoiling influences.
This account of game-constitution depicts the dynamic between game-structure and agents' orientation to, and interpretation of, that structure. In particular, the consolidation phase illustrates how players mobilise their collective resources and understandings about invasion-type games in order to make the game accountable, i.e. viable. In so doing, insights are provided about why and how the game is reformed or restructured over time.

3.6 A Note on Method: Monitoring the Process

Considerable insights have been gained into the ways in which members accomplish games. The influence of the 'despoiler' moreover provided insights unanticipated at the outset of the research. Nevertheless, it became apparent that the monitoring of members' procedures in this pilot research was deficient in a number of ways. Firstly, there are considerable technical problems in monitoring the procedures adequately for future analysis. Secondly, it was apparent that I, as observer-participant, had a control-effect upon the accomplishing process.

Hence, there is an obvious need to devise more sophisticated methods for monitoring and recording the process, together with a more sensitive management of my effect upon members' procedures.

3.6.1. Technical Problems

For this first case study, a research assistant was
engaged to operate the video camera with soundtrack. He was instructed to record as much of the action as the camera position allowed, and also to focus as clearly as possible on the faces of members to record their reactions to both the researcher's instructions and to fellow members' suggestions during the group discussions. The technical problems encountered limited the utility of the data considerably. Specifically, the problems were as follows:

(a) **Camera.** Using only one camera meant only a single incomplete view of the action. Fortunately the camera could be positioned on a raised stage which afforded a better view than could have been the case if the camera was at ground level. In this latter case, foreground action would have obliterated background action.

Clearly, however, there is a need for multiple camera positions allowing for firstly lateral 'side-on' as well as 'end-on' monitoring and secondly, close-up detail as well as panoramic shots. This in turn would have necessitated skilful editing, and camera selection facilities in the final presentation of the data. In short, it was only possible to get a uni-perspectival and partial recording of the process.

The same points generally apply to the recording of members during the discussion sessions. The results showed that I was unable to record in any detail the reactions of members to the various proposals.
(b) Sound Track. This was incorporated in the VTR and hence did not allow for careful microphone positioning to pick up members comments, suggestions etc. It is only rarely that all members quietly and attentively listened to one person speaking. Consequently, the results were a confused babbling for the most part. The most successful parts of the sound-recording were those organised and led by me when some artificiality was imposed on the interaction. But this, of course, led to the usual problems of 'control-effect' of researcher upon members.

There is then clearly a need for the development of sophisticated technical procedures in order to make an 'adequate' recording of such an accomplishing process. Even with such development, any collection of research data, however sophisticated, will only be partial. Clearly with respect to this first case-study about games-playing this 'fringe of incompleteness' is considerably widened.

3.6.2 The Research Context: Control Effects

Inevitably members came to the situation with background expectancies which inevitably impinged upon the context-free game structure. The members were college students, the research was carried out at the college, in place of the normal curriculum and consequently the games playing procedures were perceived and accomplished within that formal framework. In corroboration of this, I heard one
student say to another - "have we got another lecture this afternoon?" Although I do not have a lecture/student relationship with members, the above comment also indicates that this is how they perceived me - hence a relatively formal and artificial setting and a cluster of expectations.

Finally, despite efforts to the contrary, I had a "control-effect" on the proceedings of the research. The research was not only constructed by me but also, the VTR shows that it was often led by me. I initiated all discussions and then subsequently summarised the ensuing comments. The games would not have changed from the 'crab-football' to the handling game without my intervention. It was I who structured the temporal sequence deciding upon the length of time devoted to the game-action and to the discussions. I was also guilty of an over-extended explanatory introduction to the whole process. In short, I did not manage marginality effectively - a realisation which forcibly illustrates the relative ease of making criticisms about the inherent subjectivity of all interpretative methods, and the relative difficulty in responding effectively to them in practice.

Note that these two concerns viz. the technical issues about recording the process, and the control effect upon the process by the researcher relate to the two different research traditions within ethnomethodology. All ethnography has to confront researcher - effects whilst, as
both Hester (1981) and Dingwall (1981) indicate, conversation analysts distance themselves from ethnographic work since such an approach fails to give an account of its own production. Modern technological developments place discourse analysts in a privileged position on this issue.

They can record, repeatedly replay and transcribe not only words, phrases and sentences, but also the pauses, stutters, inflexions of speech, emphases etc. for later analysis. Hence conversation analysts like Atkinson and Drew (1979) claim to explicate the cultural resources which are used in the production of appearances of social order. Clearly the monitoring and recording of accomplishing an invasion-game presents technical problems additional to those in, for example, Atkinson and Drew's analysis of court proceedings.

The relative success of this initial research was due mainly to the 'fortunate' influence of the despoiler whose actions enabled members procedures in making an invasion-game accountable to be well demonstrated. One can assume that, without his presence many rules would not have been enacted since the situation would not have demanded such rule-making decisions. However, there is a clear need to develop more sophisticated methods for recording the game process, together with a more sensitive management of marginality on my behalf as researcher. I therefore decided
to devise another case study in order to address these problems as well as gaining more insight into the accomplishment of games.

3.7 Polishing the Process? : Case Study 2

3.7.1. Design Issues

The principal aim of this second case study was to monitor the procedures as effectively as possible yet make the situation as 'natural' as possible by minimising the experimental frame of the process. I also took this opportunity to work with younger people. Procedural knowledge implicated in games-playing is extended and revised through successive experiences. I anticipated, therefore, that younger members might respond to the challenge of accomplishing games differently. For this second case study, the members were 10 children aged 11-13 years from a school with a predominantly middle-class catchment area. The children were chosen by the teacher, my instructions being to choose children who are articulate, and who have a positive attitude towards games/physical education. I attempted to polish the research process by attending to the monitoring and recording issues.

(i) Technical Issues

(a) Detailed briefing of two technicians (one for sound and one for visual recording) about the aim of the research project.
(b) Use of improved monitoring devices. (Better lighting, use of directional microphone accurate to 20 feet).

(c) Positioning of camera in raised position away from the playing surface.

(ii) Control Effects

(a) Minimise initial instructions to barest outline of the nature of the game to be accomplished, the playing area, and equipment to be used. Impress upon members that this is not a 'test'. Generally put them at their ease.

(b) To make no impat after those initial instructions, and to retire to a position away from the play area. (This only minimises but clearly does not nullify researcher's control effect).

In attending to these procedural issues it became apparent that problems of control effect and problems of monitoring are in conflict. In order to monitor members' procedures as effectively as available technical resources allow, the games-playing process must be accomplished in a wholly artificial situation. Conversely, attempts to minimise the control effects of the experimental nature of the situation, result in considerable technical problems in monitoring effectively. One either maximises monitoring imperatives or one minimises control effect. Drawing upon my experience from the first case study, I decided that two factors are crucial. Firstly, an improved sound recording, and secondly minimising my own intervention in the process. On that basis, I proceeded with the research. (16)

(16) See accompanying video-tape recording.
3.7.2 *Members' Procedures*

This second case study differed from the first in several crucial respects.

(i) Misinterpreting the Task

Members developed a type of game contradictory to my initial instructions. This was, I surmise, due to two factors. Firstly, in an effort not to 'fill in' tacit understandings, I refrained from mentioning 'goals' in my description of the aim of the game. Instead, I used the term 'target area' which was clearly interpreted in ways not anticipated by me initially. Secondly, one dominant member (an older boy) made a crucial intervention during early discussions suggesting a particular type of 'net' game - this suggestion was taken up and consequently framed the rest of the procedure. In keeping with efforts to minimise control effect, I did not intervene at this crucial stage.

(ii) Power and Resources

The accomplishing process was influenced by three extraneous factors. Firstly, I repeated the formula of 5 males and 5 females. I failed to foresee that pubescent girls and boys interact minimally with one another. Hence throughout the process, discussions were conducted almost entirely within gendered groups. Indeed the only intra-sex interaction was initiated by boys frustrated by their inability to devise a viable game. The five girls had a
minimal impact upon decision-making during the process.

This estrangement was further exacerbated by the realisation that the children were drawn from two year groups. The 3rd year children had much less impact upon decisions than the 4th year children. This left two 4th year boys who, in effect, controlled the outcome of the whole process. Much can be learnt from this about group dynamics and power relationships (see Chapter 7). For my purposes, however, the process was compromised from the outset. Firstly, by members' interpretation of the task in ways not anticipated by me and secondly, the choice of members.

In passing, it is interesting to note that it is considerations such as these which form one of the criticisms of much ethnomethodological research, i.e. that members' procedures are not purely mutually collaborative accomplishments; rather extraneous influences in terms of differential power and resources invariably dictate the procedures and outcomes of social processes. Both Goldthorpe (1973) in his specific criticism of Benson (1973), and Giddens (1985) in his more general appraisal of Garfinkel and Sacks' work, address the key issue. This research exhibits fully how ascribed (if not achieved) power enters into and influences members' interaction processes. This was not apparent in the previous research with an adult group, the female members of whom, I subsequently learnt,
are very sensitive to gender issues, and where there was clearly a more equitable power-balance in terms of ascribed status.

(iii) Playing the Game

The 'net game' devised by members was of interest for several reasons. Firstly, it was an attempt to invent a game significantly different in structure from other games. Four nets were erected in the shape of a square, and skittles of different colours placed within the square. Points awarded were determined by the colour of skittle knocked over. Rule changes (enacted with minimum discussion) were as follows:

a) change number of attackers and defenders in favour of former to make scoring more probable;

b) changing allowable actions by attackers from striking to catching;

c) allowing attackers to pass ball between themselves;

d) enlarging target area of the group of skittles.

The effect of (b) and (c) was to provide more continuous action by lowering the necessary skill threshold. The effect of (a) and (d) was to allow scoring opportunities to be presented more frequently. Members therefore attempted to devise a game with continuous action, involvement by all players, acceptable number of scores, balance between attack and defence. Rules allowing these characteristics to be displayed were enacted when deemed to
be relevant i.e. when the game-structure was deemed to be inadequate for allowing a viable, enjoyable game to be played.

(iv) Game-Identity

This highlights other critical dimensions of accomplishing games. In the first case study, the fortunate and probable atypical intervention of one particular member led to an explanation of rule-making as a response to actions which compromised tacit understandings of games. The 'consolidation' phase might then be seen as a translation of tacitly-held canons to explicit rules. This subsequent research substantiated what must be accomplished through rule enactments for a game to be viable and hence an enjoyable activity. But to these concerns about game viability, identified in the original study, must be added other concerns about game-identity. In the second case study much more time was devoted (with mixed success) to establishing the game. Discussions about rules during this phase were clearly based upon a concern with accomplishing a game significantly different from other games.

3.8 Concluding Observations

In the first case study I identified two 'moments' of rule formulation. An 'establishment' phase was replete with tacitly taken-for-granted, collective understandings of what was involved in accomplishing a game, yet also included
overt rule-making decisions to prescribe actions, and make the basic challenge (of an invasion-game) gratuitously difficult, and therefore of sustaining interest. The 'consolidation' phase was characterised by formulating rules to overcome previously unforeseen difficulties, hence enabling the gratuitously difficult challenge to be sustained, and preserving the enterprise intact.

Drawing the analysis of the two case studies together I suggest that the two characteristic concerns of rule-making in invasion games are games-identity (ensuring the game has particularity) and game-viability (ensuring that the gratuitous challenge as conceived through the rules can sustain interest as an invasion-game). Hence the latter is a general concern which applies to all invasion-games whilst the former applies specifically to particular types of invasion-game. (See Figure 3.1.)

Figure 3.1. Accomplishing Games
It is suggestive to ask whether the insights into games-playing from the above research has general applicability to institutionalised invasion-games such as soccer, rugby, basketball, netball, hockey. Is the history of the rules of these games a matter of translating canons into rules? Each of these games change their rules frequently - so what social processes are at work which make such rule changes so chronic? More generally, do these case studies provide a basis for understanding game transformation or more accurately re-formation? Why are the rules of invasion-games modified so frequently, whilst the rules of games of strategy such as chess (the focus of so many formalist accounts) are relatively immutable? How might the dimensions of rules identified in Chapter 2 provide insights into the chronic restructuring of invasion-games over time?

These two case-studies were designed to elaborate Garfinkel's project and to display the collaborative work whereby members of an invasion-game situation, assuming a range of background understandings to be reciprocally held in common, make sense of, and tacitly accomplish the social order of the invasion-game. Preliminary analysis of these processes, made possible both by my own participant-observation and by the playback facility of a VTR, suggests that there are at least four characteristic properties of rule-enactments in accomplishing an invasion-game. These
are:

i) A temporal development from an establishment to a consolidation phase.

ii) A typical concern with 'game-identity' and with 'game-viability'.

iii) A concern with both 'enabling' and with 'preserving' certain features of (game) action.

iv) That rule-enactments - a necessarily 'collaborative' feature of members processes - also involve 'conflicts' over the definition of the situation.

Together, these can be seen as forming a basis upon which to generate insights into the chronic re-structuring of major institutionalised invasion-games.
3.9. A Critical Note:

3.9.1. The Minimalism of Ethnomethodology

Garfinkel's treatment of mundane accounting procedures as a topic rather than as a resource, his portrayal of skilful, ongoing tacit accomplishing of social order, and his subsequent critique of what he termed 'conventional sociology', made a considerable impact on social theory in the late 1960's and early 1970's. According to Heritage the strikingly original analysis of problems of the theory of action, seemed to 'speak directly to the mood of the moment'. He writes (1984:2):

The enduring enthomethodological emphasis on the local, moment-by-moment determination of meaning in social contexts appeared, in itself, an important prophylactic against the mystifying consequences of 'grand theorising' and 'abstracted empiricism'.

Nevertheless, many critics have bemoaned the partial and minimalistic account that ethnomethodology provides - a reductionist account that suggests that social practices are fully accounted for in terms of members' procedures. This, say many critics, ignores or downplays the significance of extra-situational factors which enter into and condition (if not determine) social processes. Garfinkel's conflation of procedures with activities is evident in his 'central recommendation' (1967:1) that:

'the activities whereby members produce and manage settings of organised everyday affairs are identical with members' procedures for making these settings
'account-able'. (my emphasis)

Bauman (1973) concludes that ethnomethodology espouses 'a minimalistic phenomenal, nominalistic, contingent, value-neutral model of social science' which depicts the social world as nothing other than ongoing practical accomplishments, and events as nothing other than what Zimmerman and Pollner (1970) describe as 'occasional corpuses'. Gellner (1975), emphasising the particular cultural and intellectual context of the perspective's progenitors, labels it as 'the re-enchantment industry' and 'the Californian way of subjectivity'. Elaborating on the theme of minimalism, Law and Lodge (1978) argue that ethnomethodology is 'wholly relativistic' and provides an account of structure as 'process', but not of structure as 'environment'. Critics have variously villified ethnomethodology as: 'reductionist and spurious radicalism' (Dreitzel 1970), 'de-centred psychologism' (Lemert 1979), 'irrationalist' (Outhwaite 1975) 'mystical' (Gidlow 1972), 'purely a theory of social cognition' (Craib 1984) 'inadmissibly restrictive' (Tudor 1976), 'a new Conservatism' (McNall and Johnston 1975), 'pretentious neologism' (Gleeson and Erben 1976) and most alarmingly as 'the sociology of nothing' (Brotz 1974)!

These largely dismissive criticisms, however, can be confronted merely by indicating that my case-studies, in uncovering an interesting dimension of games-
playing processes, provide an empirical demonstration of ethnomethodology's explanatory potential. Moreover, such critiques are usually directed at a totalising ethnomethodology which claims that the sociological enterprise is redundant for want of an adequate analysis of members' procedures for accomplishing social order.

These critical reviews are from different ideological positions, and focus upon different aspects of the ethnomethodological programme (e.g. ethnomethodological 'indifference', the reflexivity of accounts', indexicality of expressions, the critique of 'conventional sociology'), are directed towards particular research projects or the whole ethnomethodology enterprise, and differ in their acknowledgement of the insights which this perspective might provide. (17) What unites them all is that they espouse (variations of) the standard critique of all interpretive perspectives - that ethnomethodology provides only a partial (albeit interesting and hitherto neglected) account of 'social reality'. These critiques are

rehearsed by Carr and Kemmis (1986) and by Craib (1984) amongst others, whilst Taylor, Walton and Young (1973:206-7) argue:

Ethnomethodology recognises and studies only one plane of social reality, individual consciousness. In rejecting general statements and concepts until they are reducible to members' consciousness, they falsely reduce all meaning to the meanings held by individual actors. They seem to believe that nothing is really fixed in the world, that the social order is merely an ongoing practical achievement of its members. But it is and it is not. Men create society but not always in circumstances of their own choosing.

This paraphrase of Marx, and the stress upon the unacknowledged conditions of action within which members achieve social order is echoed by Habermas in his critical review of Schutz, Cicourel and Garfinkel. Habermas acknowledges the insights about the interpretations of members 'meanings' but it is also imperative, he argues, to understand the genesis of systems of meaning viz: the objective context within which these meanings are formed. His critical theory charges one to transcend the 'hermeneutic moment', and likewise Bourdieu (1985) is dismissive of all interpretive sociologies for their 'genesis amnesia'. Gleeson and Erben argue along similar lines in their assessment of Cicourel and Kituse's (1963) analysis of delinquency. The nature of educational contradictions such as truancy, deprivation, and failure as
indicators of 'structural alienation' need to be explored - rather than as "managed glosses" of socially constructed meanings or taken-for-granted realities. (See also Tudor, Craib, Outhwaite, and Dreitzel for similar critiques). The key issue is summarised by Gleeson and Erben (1976:478) thus:

the procedures in concentrating upon the production of meaning and communication have isolated themselves from causality - especially in terms of power and legitimation'.

These critiques derive from Garfinkel's abandonment of the notion of one standard of rationality i.e. having precise definition, generalizability, context-freedom. The ideals of science (precision, logical exhaustiveness, and clear lexical definition) are says Garfinkel irrelevant to pragmatically oriented stocks of knowledge. To understand everyday life, it is important to acknowledge that action is deemed to be 'rational' insofar as it is 'accountable'. Giddens (1981, 1985) is critical of this identification of 'rationality' with accountability, since it cuts off description of actions and communications from analysis of purposive or motivated conduct, viz. the striving of actors to realise definite interests. Further, the production of an accountable world cannot be fully understood as the collaborative work of peers each contributing equally and, whose only interest is in sustaining an appearance of 'ontological security' whereby meaningfulness is
constituted. Rather members bring unequal resources and hence (1985:113):

'the reflexive elaboration of frames of meaning is characteristically imbalanced in relation to the possession of power whether superior linguistic or dialectical skills of one person, possession of relevant technical knowledge, the mobilisation of authority or force...

Giddens account of the interests, unequal resources, and power-imbalances (which I have emphasised above) entering into any social interaction is the kernel of the critique of ethnomethodology. At the heart of struggles based upon divisions of interest lies the differential interpretation of social norms and 'rules'. The production of an accountable world is not mere collaborative work. What stands for 'social reality' stands in immediate relation to the distribution of power - from global cultures and ideologies to everyday interaction. Giddens (1985:114) argues that:

even a transient conversation is a relation of power to which participants bring unequal resources'.

A response to such critiques is provided by Benson (1972) who argues that it make no sense to enquire about extra-situational constraints imposing limitations upon members' activity except insofar as such elements are oriented to as 'facts-in-the-world'. In his debate with Goldthorpe (1972) Benson challenges the latter to demonstrate how "power" 'zooms down from the conceptual
There's no need for such justification so long as I am concerned not with explaining or interpreting action itself but rather...with the conditions of action including what happens to actors willy-nilly.

Thus the lines are drawn. In so doing, the familiar sociological antinomies are rehearsed (and perpetuated) once again. Ethnomethodology provides an insightful account of social situations but is silent about extra-situational contexts; it depicts a collaborative enterprise but neglects conflicts of interest and inequalities of power and resources; it provides an account of meaning as process but not meaning as praxis. The Scylla of idiographic description and the Charybdis of nomothetic explanation is therefore rebuilt.

3.9.2. Confronting the Critics

The easy response to critics of ethnomethodology is to simply state that every other sociology (including other 'interpretive' approaches) fail to consider key questions of the construction and recognition of social activities by members themselves, which Garfinkel argues are analytically primary to any theory of social action. My case-studies of the accomplishing of invasion-type games attempts to show how these processes are an excellent exemplar of ethnomethodological principles in practice. The case
studies seek to demonstrate how 'members' draw on stocks of knowledge which, since taken-for-granted are not, in every case covered by discursive rules. Consequently, dimensions of rule-following are displayed which otherwise are inaccessible to analysis.

Another simple response to critics is that Garfinkel's project focusses upon a relatively narrow range of problems in the theory of action, the nature of intersubjectivity, and the social constitution of knowledge. Garfinkel does not provide any systematic statement of a general theory, and nowhere does he claim to supplant the whole sociological enterprise. As Cicourel (1964:240) for example notes:

Garfinkel's formulation...does not explicitly allow for the possibility of sustained conflict over time because he is not actually addressing conflict per se, but the stable features....of (game) situations which must hold even if there is substantive conflict amongst participants.

Yet another related response is to note that much of the critical reception is based upon on interpretation of ethnomethodology as subverting the whole sociological enterprise viz. the 'militant tendency' within the school (e.g. Benson, Blum) who espouse what might be termed the 'strong' programme. Alternatively, one might adopt a 'weak programme' and acknowledge the interesting insights which ethnomethodology might offer yet refrain from competing for some sort of theoretical hegemony. This is certainly the stance adopted by Halfpenny (1979) in his analysis of what
counts as qualitative data in different research traditions. Also Bauman's (1979) depiction of the alternative strategies available to figurational sociologists applies equally well to ethnomethodologists, and of course to the school's more stringent critics.

One strategy is to berate other groups for the selectiveness they cannot avoid. As Bauman (1979:125) states, 'in the current state of the game, selectiveness, being unavoidable, is by the same token the obvious target for criticism'

The 'ecumenical' sweep of critique may result in the institutionalising of the 'charismatic movement into one more sect on the already sectarian sociological scene'. The alternative strategy which applies as much to ethnomethodology as to other perspectives, is to develop (in this case) Garfinkel's style and method by applying them to 'other vital themes of modern life'. Through this one can elicit whether such an application yields perspectives on social life not otherwise vouchsafed by other unavoidable 'selective traditions'.

One can endorse this strategy (ie. the 'weak' programme) which, as a consequence, deflects much of the more stringent criticism of ethnomethodology. However, the case-studies about accomplishing games do more than merely confirm the ethnomethodological credo. The application of ethnomethodological principles to the practice of games-
playing has displayed critical dimensions and levels of
game-rules and rule-making procedures. This provides the
basis for a more extensive analysis of invasion-game
processes which occupies the remainder of this project.

One unanticipated outcome of both case studies was to
discover that the accomplishing process was not simply a
collaborative affair whereby members reflexively and hence
routinely make the activity accountable. Rather, conflicts
arose around members' attempts to produce order out of
disorder. An index of this conflict in the first case study
was the clarification and institution of rules deemed to be
necessary by members in order to foreclose options, require
certain actions, and re-establish collaboration in order to
accomplish the game and make it viable. The outcome of this
rule-making was therefore related to the resources which
members were able to utilise in making the game accountable.
A similar issue concerning inequalities of power and
resources, in this case ascribed by virtue of age and
gender, was evident in the games-playing accomplished by the
children in the second case study.

In both these cases, support is provided for the
critiques of ethnomethodology provided earlier. The
production of this 'accountable' game is not merely
collaborative work in which members only interest is in
'sustaining ontological security' (Giddens 1975:23). The
formulation of the game and its subsequent re-formulation through rule changes is the outcome of conflicting interests, imbalances in resources and in power to affect or determine the process.

Part of the explanation of rule-changes to invasion-games is to be found in Garfinkel's identification of the fringe of incompleteness of the rules. But another element of an explanation is to acknowledge the extra-situational factors which influence the likelihood that members will comply with the 'basic rules'. The instrumentalisation, or in Dunning's term 'the other-directed achievement-striving' characteristic of contemporary sports practice give rise to a tension between collaborating to realise a valued process and conflicts over scarce external goals. Nevertheless, none of this detracts from the seminal contribution ethnomethodology makes to our understanding of social (games) practices, which should therefore be incorporated into a more comprehensive account of the production and reproduction of invasion-games.
CHAPTER 4
STRUCTURING AND RESTRUCTURING THE GAME

4.1. INTRODUCTION

4.2. ESTABLISHING THE GAME

4.3. CONSOLIDATING THE GAME

4.4. RULE-MAKING IN ESTABLISHED GAMES

4.4.1. Basketball: Two Levels of Rules

4.4.2. The Restructuring of Soccer

4.5. THE CONDITIONS OF A PRACTICE

4.6. JANUS-FACED GAMES
4.1 Introduction

In Chapter 2, a range of perspectives on games processes were invoked to argue against the view that invasion-games (and other types of game) are exhaustively defined by their formulated rules. In particular, Garfinkel's analysis of social action and practical reasoning with respect to the constitution of games undermines the 'received view' of formalism, and provides a basis for subsequent research. The case studies, designed to display the skilful tacit accounting procedures implicated in the practice of a game, endorsed Garfinkel's project yet introduced a temporal dimension to the establishment of an invasion-game inasmuch as the 'basic' rules (the formulation of which assumes a range of tacit, mundane understandings) were subject to revision. Revisions were deemed to be necessary because not all members of the game process did the routine 'filling-in' of the taken-for-granted understandings assumed, reciprocally, to be held-in-common. These revisions (to the rules) were identified as 'a consolidation phase' - a restructuring process to 'repair' the structure of the game as originally envisaged. (Figure 4.1)
The case-studies also displayed two additional facets of the accomplishing process. Firstly, members efforts in making the game accountable-for-all-practical-purposes displayed an interest in 'game-identity' and 'game-viability'. The first of these concerns is about the particularity of the practice as a 'species' of invasion-type games. The second identifies a range of considerations applicable to the 'genus' of invasion-games. These two concerns are not therefore to be conflated. Secondly, the case studies demonstrated that the accomplishing of an invasion-game is not purely a collaborative process whereby all members have a reciprocity of perspectives on the situation. Collaboration is clearly a necessary property of members accounting practices by virtue of being 'players' of the game, yet conflicts arose over the 'definition of the
situation' as evidenced by the 'despoilers' breaching of other members' background expectancies and the affronted response of the 'fair player'.

Drawing these insights together with Garfinkel's identification of basic rules, game-furnished conditions, rules of preferred play, and the et cetera provision (the fringe of incompleteness of basic rules), a characterisation of rule-depth is provided in this chapter which, rather than dispensing with the standard formalist account altogether, incorporates these key tenets into a more comprehensive analysis of game-rules. An issue which is not satisfactorily addressed by either formalist accounts nor by Garfinkel's analysis of the social constitution of games, is that the rules of invasion-games are subject to chronic change, a characteristic which I indicate is not confined to my case-studies.

In what follows, I suggest that rule changes are necessarily at a 'surface' level - to enable and preserve the gratuitous challenge of the game as established earlier. These changes are outcomes of the accommodative work through which members respond to actions which they deem to compromise game-identity. Further I suggest this accommodative work is chronic to institutionalised invasion-games and that this provides a basis upon which to analyse the successive restructuring of these practices. To support this, some illustrative examples of rule-changes to
basketball and soccer will be included.

Therefore it is pertinent to conceive the enabling and preservative rules of an invasion-game as a 'contested terrain'. The conflicts over rules arise as soon as one begins to consider the environing conditions within which contemporary invasion-games are played.

The aim of this chapter therefore, is to elaborate upon the case-study materials and provide a chronology of two phases of game-constituting viz. establishment and consolidation phases. Through this, a typology of game rules is provided which accounts for the chronology of a games’ constituency, and indicates the level at which rules are changed. Processes of restructuring, or reconstituting (through rule modifications and changes) are necessarily at the consolidation level to preserve the characteristics of the game- process and enable these to be displayed. I suggest that this analysis has a more general application to changes to the rules of institutionalised invasion-games, thereby signalling a further phase to this research project.

4.2 Establishing an Invasion-Game

In the case-studies, establishing an invasion-game involved a set of collective decisions about formulating particular rules. These rules both constrain action potentialities whilst simultaneously enabling others to be displayed. Hence, the basic challenge (to get a ball into a
prescribed area) is hedged about by certain conditions in terms of both rules and the equipment which can be used. This structuring of the event identifies it as a particular species of invasion-game practice. Together with establishing game-identity, members were also concerned to establish 'game-viability' which they characterised as everyone being involved, lots of action, only requiring simple abilities, simple rules. Members' characterisation of game-viability needs considerable elaboration but, for the moment, it is sufficient to note that two interlocking concerns - for identity and viability - are implicated in the establishment of an invasion-game.

Once established at this preliminary level, the basic rules remained inviolate since any change at this level eventuates in a different practice. Garfinkel (1963:191,193) provides examples of 'Chess' and 'Chess with Traitors', and of 'Tick-Tack-Toe' and 'Noughts-and-Crosses', where one or two of the basic rules are altered which in effect create a new set of challenges. Other examples of tinkering with basic rules are provided in the 'New Games Handbook' (Fleugelman, 1982) and by Leonard (1978). New Games, originated in California; and are in most examples provided by Fleugelman, modifications of already-established games in order to maintain or reaffirm a collaborative ludic construct. The primary rationale is to
provide playful games experiences as an antidote to the
calculative, instrumentalised games-playing of established
US games such as basketball, grid-iron, football, and ice-
hockey. Hence, for example, 'volleyball' becomes 'infinity
volleyball', 'tennis' becomes 'frah'. In both these
cases, there are small changes to the rules of identity
which have radical consequences for the game-dynamics and
the skills required. (1)

Implicated in the establishment of an invasion-game (on a
discursively formulated level) are a range of tacitly-
known practical understandings about games generally and
playing invasion-games particularly. In the case-study
these resources were routinely invoked and taken-for-granted
in making this game-occasion accountable, members assuming a
reciprocity of perspectives about the definition of the
situation - an assumption which was undermined in the breach
(case study 1). Hence, the accomplishing processes in the
case studies endorsed and elaborated on Garfinkel's project
to show how the mobilisation of these resources are critical
for the stability of 'concerted actions'. This undermines

(1) All these 'new' games challenge the notion of invasion
and other types of games as being competitive zero-sum
activities. Thereby redefining what counts as successful
outcomes to the practice. Infinity volleyball, for
example, recasts success in terms of the number of
consecutive hits of the ball, and maximising involvement of
all players.
the received wisdom of formalist accounts which provide an image of games-playing as being exhaustively defined by their discursive rules.

Hence, invoking Giddens' (1984:20-23) typification of 'rules', the basic rules enacted during the establishing of the invasion-games are to be understood as providing for both the constitution of meaning and the sanctioning of conduct i.e. as both constitutive and regulative. The rules contain both tacit and discursively formulated elements, are both intensive and shallow, and are both informal and formalised. Giddens fourth characteristic of 'rules' is that they might be weakly or strongly sanctioned. Whilst the formal rules, as one element of the basic rules of invasion-games are strongly sanctioned inasmuch as violations are penalised with varying degrees of severity, it would be, argues Giddens, 'a serious mistake to underestimate the strength of informally applied sanctions'. In the case studies the despoiler's actions were heavily sanctioned especially by the 'fair player' even though he was not breaking the formal rules. Consider also, from the illustrative examples provided in the preceding chapter, how strongly sanctioned are breaches to the constitutive expectancies of a game. Always kicking the wrong way, or refusing to kick the ball at all, might be subject to more condemnation by other members than a clear breach to the formulated rules (e.g. tripping up an opponent or a
deliberate handball) which are in some cases actually or implicitly condoned by other team-members if such action is deemed to be in the collective interests of the team.

The final characteristic of the basic rules invoked in the establishing phase of the game is that they provide boundary conditions within which members can make choices and devise strategies about how to play i.e. the fixed rules necessarily allow for an elastic response which is a critical property of games-viability and without which interest in the event would not be sustained. This characteristic, together with the fringe of incompleteness of any discursively formulated rule means that performance in invasion-games is under-determined by the rules.

Consequently, the meaning of 'formal' rules cannot be conflated with the 'basic' rules. Conceptions of game-playing according to the formal rules gloss the complex accommodative work whereby a game is established and made accountable according-to-the-rules. This accommodative work is part of the definition of basic rules. Moreover, breaching the 'basic' rules does not necessarily entail breaking the formal rules as the first case study shows. I will argue later that this observation is critical to understanding why 'repair' work to the fabric (i.e. the formal rules) of institutionalised invasion-games
is so chronic. For the moment however, any discussion of
breaching leads to the subsequent phase of the constituting
of a game - the consolidation phase.

4.3. Consolidating an Invasion-Game

Albrittan (1978:239) argues that the use of game
analogy in social theory is a species of bourgeois
ideology, and with specific reference to the rules of a game
of strategy he writes:

With the rules of bridge, it does not make sense
to ask why those rules - they simply are the rules
of bridge. The rules may be changed and the game
still called 'bridge', or it may be given a new name.
But the change in either case would appear to be
gratuitous and un-interesting. To understand bridge
we want to know what the rules are and how they work,
but it seems pointless to ask why those rules or whose
interests they serve .

One of the principal aims of this project is to
demonstrate that changes to the rules of invasion-games are
neither 'gratuitous' nor are they sociologically
uninteresting. The case-studies were designed principally
to display the taken-for-granted assumptions and background
expectancies which members routinely employ in making an
invasion-game accountable. However, another critical
finding was that this process entailed successive rule-
enactments in response to breaches (by the 'despoiler') of
these tacit methodic procedures. As with Garfinkel's own
experiments, the despoiler's breaching requires other
members to do the necessary 'repair' work. In this case,
the repair work entailed translating understandings assumed to be held in common into formulated rules. This was deemed to be necessary in order to re-establish and consolidate the identity and viability of the game. The term 'consolidation' denotes that such repair-work is necessarily at a 'surface' level - to enhance the gratuitous challenge as previously established.

Following Heritage (1984:210) the case studies demonstrate that there are two processes involved in 'the maintenance of institutional reality'. The first process is the mundane production of actions which can be viewed in terms of the appropriate interpretive framework - in this case the constitutive expectancies of games-playing. The second process is the 'maintenance of the interpretive framework itself' in the face of the 'wear and tear' arising from deviant or discrepant courses of action. As the first case study illustrates, the maintenance of the framework of an invasion-game necessitated rule-changes as responses to 'deviant' behaviour not covered by the formal rules. Heritage (1984:180) writes:

- In maintaining (or transforming) their circumstances by their actions, actors are also simultaneously reproducing, developing, or modifying the institutional realities which envelop those actions.

Hence the reproducing of an invasion-game is not incommensurate with modifications or reformations to the 'interpretive framework'. In the first case-study, there
were four rule-enactments once the basic rules had been formulated in the establishment phase. Several other suggestions were made but not adopted in terms of formal rules. It will be remembered that the accomplishing process took the form of group discussions about rules, tactics, etc. followed by a period of playing. Hence any particular instance of playing (there were seven in all) was within the context of all previous discussion/rule-making periods. The four rule-enactments in their consolidation phase were:

a) Any player can be goalkeeper (in discussion 2)
b) No charging or barging (in discussion 3)
c) Ball must be held away from the body, not held close to chest/stomach (in discussion 4)
d) A restriction on how long the ball can be held in the hands (in discussion 6)

Each of these represent efforts to consolidate the basic rules, and make the game accountable. Three of these rule-enactment (b, c, and d) plus other topics discussed (e.g. the precise meaning of body contact) were a direct response to the discrepant behaviour of the 'despoiler' who, by his actions interrupted the game-process and thereby destroyed game-viability. Hence there was a dynamic between the structuring of the game at any one discussion period and members' orientation, interpretation, and response to the structure as given in subsequent playing periods.
On this basis, one might map out the chronology of the game's constitution as follows. A game structure (S1) is established, with a number of rules which simultaneously enable and constrain playing action. This is designed by members to create a viable, enjoyable, interesting game. Subsequent playing action (A1) shows that S1 is deficient since not all members play the game in ways anticipated at the time of the original formulation i.e. members differ in their understanding of what is 'legitimate' behaviour. Consequently another rule is invoked to create S2, a rebuilding, reforming exercise to repair the perceived deficiencies of S1. Further playing action (this time A2) within the new bounded conditions of the game displays other problems unanticipated at S2. These problems might be apparent with respect to another element of play or indeed to the same element which motivated rule-enactments at S2. A2 compromises S2 which therefore necessitates a further restructuring process S3....and so on Figure 4.2. presents a diagrammatic representation of this process.

Figure 4.2. Structuring and Restructuring the Game

Key:
(S = Structuring, rule-enactments)
(A = Playing Action)
One might assume, that these processes would be chronically implicated in the practice over time if the games in the case-studies had been further 'consolidated'. Several characteristics of this structuring process can be identified. Firstly, at any one time in this chronological sequence, the game-structure (S) as furnished by the formal rules, is the outcome of all previous instances of S and A. Similarly, the development of playing action A at any point in the sequence is to be understood as an outcome of all earlier instances of S and A. Moreover, S at any one time is the medium for future A viz. S₄ is the outcome of S(1→3) and A(1→3) and the medium for A₄. Secondly, a further characteristic of S at any point in the series, is that it is the unintended outcome of earlier S's. For instance, S₃ is unanticipated and hence unintended at S₂ since one can assume that the structuring at S₂ is designed to be adequate for all practical purposes (i.e. A₂). Thirdly, although this was not vouchsafed in the relatively simple segment of structuring and re-structuring which took place in the case-studies, an instance of rule-making at S with respect to one element of play, might have a 'knock-on' or cumulative effect upon other elements of play which further compromises game-viability. Hence successive changes to the rule of one element of play (e.g. modes of retaining possession of the ball in the case-study) cannot be adequately understood in
isolation from changes to the rules of other elements of play. Clearly, any one rule which enables and constrains action with respect to one element of play is part of an interlocking matrix of rules which, collectively, are designed to preserve game-identity and game-viability. The point can be illustrated by considering the codified rules of already-established invasion-games. In Rugby Union, for example, the 'laws' governing admissible action in rucks and mauls cannot be understood without reference to the laws which govern the tackle, and any changes to the laws about the latter have a knock-on effect for the laws about the former. Similarly, Law 10 (Method of Scoring) in soccer is interrelated with Law 13 (Free Kicks) insofar as any change to the former might alter strategies which players adopt with respect to the latter thereby necessitating rule-changes. This interdependence of game-rules highlights further the tendency for any change at S to have unintended consequences at ensuing A. (2)

4.4. Rule Making in Established Games

Prior to further empirical research, a beginning assessment of the perspicacity, for already-established games, of the above account of structuring and restructuring

(2) Giddens (1985: 12-14) reviews three main research contexts in which the influence of unintended consequences of intentional action can be analysed. These will be considered later in the project.
games might be explored by providing two illustrative exemplars. The first is to simply map out some of the key rules of basketball within the framework of establishing and consolidating the game. The second is to provide some extracts from the history of law-making by the legislators of soccer. These extracts illustrate the problems confronting legislators in their attempts to formulate, in precise and unambiguous terminology, their intentions with respect to the governance of future playing action. The extract from the laws of soccer should be 'read' on the understanding that playing action intervenes between each new structuring process, the latter being responses to that action.

4.4.1. Basketball: Two Levels of Rules

The basic 'rules' of this game enacted during the establishing phase can be simply stated by firstly (following Haywood and Kew 1984, 1989) identifying the primary challenge, and secondly, how this challenge is made gratuitously difficult. The challenge is to get a large ball (of a standardised dimension, weight etc.) into a 'peach' basket suspended ten feet off the floor. This contrived, gratuitous challenge is to be achieved by five players who are confronted by five other players who defend their own territory and basket whilst responding to the challenge offered to their opponents. Rule 1, Article 1 of the rules as published by the International Basketball Federation.
(F.I.B.A.) in 1984 provides the 'definition' of the game as follows:

Basketball is played by two teams of five players each. The purpose of each team is to throw the ball into the opponents' basket and to prevent the other team from securing the ball or scoring. The ball may be passed, thrown, tapped, rolled or dribbled in any direction, subject to the restrictions laid down by the following rules.

The 'following rules' (in order) cover a) equipment, b) players substitutes and coaches, c) officials and their duties, d) playing regulations, e) timing regulations, f) players' regulations, g) infractions and penalties, and h) rules of conduct, the last including sub-sections on (i) relationships, (ii) personal contact, and (iii) general provisions. In all there are 93 articles to these nine elements of the rules.

Therefore, this basic challenge is made gratuitously difficult by imposing the following conditions, other than the problems posed by the opposing team viz. no running with the ball, no body contact, no kicking the ball, but all players are empowered to occupy any space on the playing area (as demarcated). Together, these rules identify the invasion-game 'basketball'.

However, since the inception or establishment of this game, a collection of rules have been enacted (some of which have been subject to modification and clarification) designed to enable and preserve these 'formal'
characteristics' Some examples include:

- the 'travelling' rule (what constitutes running with the ball);
- the 30 second rule (how long a team can retain possession without attempting a score);
- the 3 second rule (how long an attacker can remain in the defence zone);
- the 'blocking' and 'screening' rules (movements allowed to defenders with respect to attackers invasions of their territory);
- no playing the ball on its downward flight towards the basket (to eliminate unfair advantages of tall individuals);
- the 3-point rule (further encouragement of the primary challenge).

All of such rules, were invoked not in response to rule-violations but rather by the inadequacy of the formal rules (to ensure game-identity and viability) at any one time, as perceived by legislative personnel from the game's Governing Body. How general this 'consolidation' process is with respect to the history of other invasion-games will be examined in the next chapter.

The second example of rule-making is from the history of law-making in soccer. These extracts illustrate the complexity of legislative attempts to preserve and consolidate the game. The first extract is chosen to display the restructuring of one key element of play, whilst the second set of extracts contain some bizarre 'wrong turnings' made by rule-changes at S in their attempts to account for various instances of A.

4.4.2. The Restructuring of Soccer

The Laws of Association Football, an invasion-game
established, or formally constituted in 1863 - would seem to be relatively stable insofar as it is still governed by 17 'Laws' - a term which suggests more permanence and power than 'rules'. Yet each of these laws, as extensively documented by Moir (1972) has been subject to considerable modification. The following illustrative extracts from adjudications (i) the Football Association and (ii) the International Board demonstrate the difficulties faced by legislators in formally accounting for, and providing an unequivocal account of, permissible game-action. Changes at any one time are retrospective responses to action which were unanticipated in the rule's previous formulation. Clarifications, modifications etc. might be understood as an attempt to nullify the perceived 'fringe of incompleteness' of the rule, and to preserve or re-establish game-viability.

All of the Laws of Soccer have been subject to chronic change. Even an element of play as seemingly simple as 'The Start of Play' was modified 15 times between 1863 and 1938! Few Laws however have caused more controversy or been more difficult to finalise (for all practical purposes) than the off-side law, the restructuring of which is reproduced in full below:

a) Law 11 Off-Side

1863: Law 6 'When a player has kicked the ball any one of the same side who is nearer to the opponents' goal-line is out of play and may not touch the ball himself nor in any way prevent any other player from doing so until the ball has been played, but no
player is out of play when the ball is kicked from behind the goal-line.

1866: Strict off-side disappeared. After 'has been played' insert 'unless there are at least 3 of his opponents between him and their own goal'.

1873: Uxbridge - delete 'has kicked' insert 'kicks'. After 'same side who' insert 'at such moment of kicking'. Delete goal' insert 'goal-line'.

1878: After 'kicks the ball' insert 'or it is thrown out of touch'.

1882: After 'at such moment of kicking' add 'or throwing'. After 'unless there are' add 'at such moment of kicking or throwing'. Add to the end 'or when it has been last played by an opponent'.

1883: In last sentence, after 'play' insert 'in the case of a corner kick or'.

1895: F.A. delete 'kicks' add 'plays' in Line 1.

1897: F.A. delete 'throwing' add 'throwing-in'. Before 'opponents' delete 'the' insert 'his' Change 'other player' to 'opponent'.

1898: In sentence 1 delete 'one' add 'player' Delete 'prevent any' insert 'interfere with an' Delete 'from doing so'

1903: F.A. after 'opponent' insert 'or with the play'

1907: S.F.A. alter last sentence - 'A player is not out of play when the ball is kicked off from goal, when a corner kick is taken, when the ball has been last played by an opponent, or when he himself is within his own half of the field of play at the moment the ball is played or thrown-in from touch by any player of the same side'. An excellent addition.

1920: F.A. Add as footnote 'it is not a breach of this law for a player to be in an off-side position, but only when in that position he interferes with an opponent or with the play. If a player who is in an off-side position advances towards an opponent or the ball and in so doing causes the play to be affected, he should be penalised'.

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1925: S.F.A. After earlier attempts in 1894, 1902, 1913, 1914, 1922,-1924 the off-side law was changed as follows:
Delete 'three' insert 'two'. A simple but effective alteration. This decisions had a marked effect on the tactical development of football.

1938: Law rewritten in its present form save for Part (c) 'the ball was last played by an opponent'.

1939: Part (c) adopted as it stands today.

1971: The Board gave permission for matches in the Watney Mann Cup to be played on the understanding that no player could be off-side except within the penalty area.

(Post 1971 - other competitions with other off-side 'experiments')

(b) The following extracts, amusing in hindsight, are taken from the rule decisions made by the 'International Board and the Council of the Football Association' which from 1956 onwards, incorporated the Committee of F.I.F.A. By the 1972-3 season, the International Board had made 84 decisions on the Laws of the Game. The extracts illustrate the efforts to 'shore up the breaches' (which constantly appear through playing action) by formulating rules thereby, narrowing their fringe of incompleteness. I have chosen the more 'entertaining' examples to underscore the point.

Law 10 Method of Scoring

1956: If the cross-bar of the goal, by falling exactly at the moment the ball would have passed into goal, prevents the ball from passing over the goal-line, the referee should allow the goal, if in his opinion, the ball would have passed the goal-line under the bar, had it stayed in its normal position. (withdrawn 1958)
Law 3 Number of Players

1956: A player nearing an opponent close to the touch line, who plays the ball to one side of the opponent and then runs round the other side in order to get the ball again behind this opponent, does not infringe any law if he, perchance, should pass over the touch line. Similarly, if a player near the goal-line, should step over the line in order to get possession of the ball inside the playing area, and then goes on to score, the goal is valid because the ball was never out of play and the player had no intention of leaving the game, his momentary going outside the field of play being done as part of a playing movement. Players are expected, as a general rule, to remain within the playing area. (withdrawn 1961)

Law 4 Playing Equipment

1956: If a player obliged, following doctor's orders, to protect his elbow with a plaster bandage to prevent further injury the referee has sole power to decide if the bandage constitutes a danger to the other players. (withdrawn 1961)

Law 5 Referees

1956: If a referee be struck in the face by the ball and temporarily incapacitated and a goal be then immediately scored he, having obviously seen nothing of it, shall only allow the goal if, in the opinion of the linesman nearer to the incident the goal was properly scored. (withdrawn 1961)

Untypically for sports theorists, Alderson and Brackenridge (1982:11), in their attempt to classify the rules of sports make some observations, which acknowledge the fragility of game rules and the necessity for frequent amendment. They write:

...the essence of sport, as encapsulated in the rule structure may not equate with the potential of the sport in terms of how it is performed; i.e. how the performers solve the sports problem. Indeed, sports rules are frequently amended as a
result of performer innovation.

However, the structuring properties of established institutional invasion-games cannot be simply 'read-off' from the ethnomethodological case-studies without considering the influence of environing conditions within which contemporary invasion-games are played.

4.5 The Conditions of a Practice

Sceptics might argue that it is an illegitimate inference to suggest that changes to the rules of institutionalised invasion-games are impelled in the same manner as in the single occasioned case-studies. A plausible argument might be mounted that chronic rule-changes only occurs in a setting whereby members are asked, in effect, to invent a game. This setting is bound to be replete with multiple interpretations and misunderstandings about the nature of the task, which necessarily gives rise to a flurry of rule-making in order to establish acceptable conduct. In contrast, rule-changes in institutionalised invasion-games are enacted within a much broader social and historical context of playing practice at national and international levels. In short such rule changes cannot be directly inferred from the situated practice of two occasions of invasion-playing; viz. the gulf between idiographic description and nomothetic explanation - the problems of generalising from specific case-studies which
confronts all ethnographic research. However, Giddens (1985:328) writes:

'Research which is geared primarily to hermeneutic problems may be of generalised importance insofar as it serves to elucidate the nature of agents' knowledgeability and thereby their reasons for action, across a wide-range of action contexts. (3)

This issue is addressed in depth by Platt (1988) in her analysis of the principles of research design and questions of research strategy. She identifies the primary functions of case-studies as rhetorical (4) and logical, the latter ranging from 'comparatively tentative and exploratory functions' to 'those permitting relatively strong assertions'. At the 'stronger' level, case-studies can be classified along two dimensions: whether or not confined to the particular case studied, and whether the case demonstrates a point directly or provides a basis for inference to cases not studied (1988:9).

My case studies were primarily concerned to 'demonstrate a point directly' viz. that 'accomplishing' an invasion-game provides a powerful demonstration of ethnomethodological


(4) Rhetorical functions include ostensive definition, illustration, mnemonic, empathy, revelation, persuasion, and aesthetic appeal. The case studies in the current project have a stronger function and are centrally implicated in the further developments of this research project.
insights into the nature of social action and
intersubjectivity, and further that such social analysis of
rules and rule-following in 'everyday life' applies equally
to formally structured invasion-games. Platt (1988:20)
writes:

...Case studies, especially those which start
with the case in its own right rather than as
an instance, are more likely to uncover
unanticipated findings as the details are explored.
This openness to surprise....is a real strength.

Analysis of the research materials - the processes
through which rules were enacted also provides 'a basis for
inference to points not directly demonstrated and with
relevance to cases not studied' (1988:12) - in this case to
institutionalised invasion-games whose rules are subject to
considerable modification. Issues of generalisability and
representativeness raises, says Platt, 'the most serious
intellectual problems' and she provides a critique of a
wide-range of case studies where claims for
representativeness or typicality are, or are not, justified.

Consequently, the next phase of the present project is
to establish the generalised importance of the findings of
the case-studies - to see how the constitutive practices
followed in these specific instances of games-playing are
embedded in wider reaches of time and space i.e. to discover
their congruence or relationship to institutionalised
practices.

A way forward is provided by Garfinkel who, in turning
his attention from the properties of 'basic' rules to features of 'actual playing', identified two considerations. Firstly, the likelihood of motivated compliance with the basic rules, and secondly, the 'non-games conditions' which might influence members motivated compliance. Garfinkel does not elaborate on either of these considerations but this, I argue represents the cutting edge of analyses of an invasion-game as a 'social practice' and other analyses of these activities as a 'social institution'.

So far the analysis has bracketted out any consideration of games as institutionalised practices to focus on discursive and practical consciousness and on members' strategies of control within the bounded conditions of a games situation as a social practice. Through analysis of the characteristic properties of these bounded conditions (i.e. the rule-structure) a perspective on rule-change has been developed. However, in discussing institutionalised invasion-games, the environing conditions of their practice must be acknowledged, since these conditions will have a bearing on members' interests in making the game accountable, and whether formal rules will be breached or not.

MacIntyre (1984:187) defines a social practice as a joint project in which goods internal to that project are realised in the course of trying to achieve the standards of excellence which characterise it. These 'internal goods'
can only be achieved and experienced by engaging in the practice in question. Morgan (1987), elaborating on MacIntyre's analysis, writes that social practices 'require institutions for their literal survival'. In order to function as a widespread practice, hockey for example, requires clubs, associations, administrators (of the rules as well as other bureaucratic considerations). Morgan argues that, unlike social practices, in which goods internal to that project are valued and realised, institutions are necessarily concerned with the acquisition and distribution of external goods (e.g. power, money, social status). Moreover, not only do these rewards encourage the 'practitioner' to lose sight of intrinsic goods, but institutions at least implicitly underwrite and legitimise such extrinsic temptations. Lasch (1979:69) summarises the point thus:

Practices have to be sustained by institutions which in the very nature of things tend to corrupt the practices they sustain.

The sociological literature on sport (as well as the general media) is full of testimonies to the corruption of what Huizinga calls the 'sacred realm' of sport. For present purposes, there is no need to expand on this save to endorse Dunning's (1986) observation that there has been a general trend towards achievement - striving, and other-directed forms of sports participation. The key point to establish here is that the environing conditions within
which contemporary invasion-games are practised encourages
the acquisition of goods external to the game process, an
instrumentalisation which mitigates against the valuing of
internal goods for their own sake. No perjorative
commentary about these trends is necessary. These can be
found in a number of research traditions from idealist
formulations e.g. Huizinga (1938) and Novak (1986) to the
more critical neo-Marxist perspectives e.g. Brohm (1978),

It is also necessary to emphasise that not all instances
of invasion-games playing, nor each of the established
invasion-games, is subject to the same institutional
pressures towards ends-oriented, highly competitive
endeavour. Lacrosse, for example, is a relatively minor
practice in terms of the number of participants, is limited
to a few countries, does not enjoy much media coverage, and
has a relatively shallow competitive structure in comparison
with, for example, soccer in Britain. A similar distinction
might be made between American Football and Rugby Union in
the United States.

Nevertheless, in the present research context, the key
point to note is that the exigencies of contemporary
invasion-games practice compromises the likelihood of
motivated compliance with the formal rules. Moreover,
players, supported by technical personnel such as coaches
and trainers, are encouraged to explore the action-potentialities provided by the formal rules in an effort to secure strategic advantages over opponents; i.e. to maximise their own teams resources and minimise those of the opposition. Translating this into Garfinkel's terminology, the non-game conditions of an invasion-game's practice lead to an intense exploration of the 'fringe of incompleteness' of a game's basic rules, an exploration which is allowed since the 'fixed' rules (of any invasion-game) allows for an 'elastic' response i.e. multiple ways in which members might respond to the gratuitous challenge as identified by the formal rules.

The institutionalised, serious, ends-oriented practice of established invasion-games contrasts with the ludic value-construct held by members in the earlier case-studies. In these latter practices, members adopted a 'playful' attitude and assumed that other members did likewise, thus realising the qualities of a social practice as identified by MacIntyre. But even in these situations, where processes (i.e. the social practice itself) are deemed to be more important than end-results, rule enactments were deemed to be necessary to ensure and consolidate game-identity and viability. Hence, the institutional context of established invasion-games, which demonstrably undermines a ludic value-construct, is likely to be even more influential in encouraging strategic conduct compromising what is
euphemistically termed 'the spirit' if not the letter of the law, quite apart from actual formal rule-violations.

On this basis, I deemed it appropriate to devise a research strategy which, drawing on insights from the ethnomethodological case-studies, was designed to gain an understanding of the chronic restructuring processes of institutionalised invasion-games. This provides the focus of the ensuing chapter which will be informed by the earlier analyses of the restructuring processes during the consolidation phase of games, and by the typification of game-rules outlined below.

4.6.3 Janus-faced Games

In the above section, I have argued that an 'interpretive' perspective upon game processes might be generalised to institutionalised practices of games. This is intended as a 'bridge-building' exercise to undermine the conventional dualism of micro and macro perspectives. Most of the sociological literature on sport fails to confront this problem and is therefore castigated by critics as reductionist, one way or the other. Structuralist and/or functionalist - inspired perspectives fail to acknowledge the ways in which agents make sense of and provide accounts of the particular social and historical circumstances in which they act. Conversely, hermeneutic research fails to
provide any account of the social and historical circumstances within which agents act. Hence familiar antimonies are constructed which as Bauman (1978) notes:

are constantly reiterated by the profession with that dispassionate solemnity which befits ritual incantation.

Even the most theoretically sophisticated commentators (e.g. Gruneau, 1983) admit that sport represents a 'paradox' since their formal rules provide a recognisable bounded sphere of irreality, yet simultaneously this activity is subsumed under the paramount reality of the social world. I want to suggest that this 'paradox' is more apparent than real and is largely a consequence of posing a series of either/or questions which perpetuate dualistic thinking. (5) It is, of course, understandable that this so-called 'paradox' is constructed since games are archetypal examples of activity, which through their formal rules, are separated out in time and space, as an especial sphere where actions only have a situational relevance.

To transcend this species of dualistic thinking, it is necessary to conceive games (and other sports) as a duality, as 'Janus-faced'. I borrow this term from Koestler's (1978) critique of reductionism in the life-sciences, but it serves in the present context. Janus, the Greek God, had two

(5) This is most apparent in extensive philosophical debates about morality and games, e.g. McIntosh (1978), Bailey (1975), Aspin (1975), and debates conducted through the Journal of the Philosophy of Sport.
conjoined faces, however bizarre that might seem. Applying this imagery to games, one face or more accurately 'facet' comes into focus when considering the environing conditions or institutional context of its practice. This is the 'dependent' part i.e. a constituent of a more extensive social fabric as provided by the institution. The other face is turned 'inwards' towards the characteristic properties or constitutive features of the practice. This is the quasi-autonomous whole, the social practice as demarcated in time and space through the formal rules or boundary conditions. With specific reference to the anatomy of the human body, Koestler employs the term 'Holon' to depict an entity (e.g. a single cell, the liver, etc.) as having a separable identity yet depending for its existense upon a larger 'whole'. This imagery accords well with MacIntyre's conception of social practices and social institutions. Invasion-games cannot be understood fully by focussing upon one 'face' exclusively, but only by acknowledging the indissoluble link age between a quasi-autonomy and inevitable dependency. The quasi-autonomous facet of games-playing comes into focus through analyses of the procedures whereby members realise the gratuitous challenge of the game. However, as argued earlier, the ever more elaborate and detailed preserving and enabling rules reminds us that this gratuitous challenge is fragile and permeable to 'outside' potentially despoiling influences.
which arise from the institutional contexts within which games-processes are enacted.

To understand this further and to quickly dispense with biological analogies, it is useful to borrow terminology from some disparate sources, with the important caveat that these terms do not correspond in meaning exactly to their author's usage. The first is the conversation analyst; Harvey Sacks (1974) who distinguished between 'Context-free' and 'Context-sensitive' structures of talk. This distinction is made principally to separate out those aspects of talk which must be accomplished in order for 'talk' to be sustained, from those aspects where agents have power and resources to manipulate or affect the process of 'talk'. In the former case, Sacks was able to identify relatively immutable structures such as turn-taking, opening and closing exchanges etc. The second is Hester's (1981) discussion of the omnipresent tension between 'formal' and 'substantive' concerns which, he says, is exhibited in all ethnomethodological analysis. This is particularly apposite in the present context, since my own application of ethnomethodological principles has developed from analyses of accounting procedures and towards substantive issues about conflicts of interest. The third is from Raymond Williams (1980, 1981) cultural analysis, in which he make a key distinction between 'depth' and 'surface' features of
cultural practices. Depth features span historical epochs, surface features are characteristic of specific epochs. Hence, for example, the 'play' impulse transcends any particular socio-historical era, whilst surface features are the different ways in which the play impulse is produced, reproduced and conditioned within particular historical periods (e.g. C19th Britain). My use of these terms departs from this but they are useful descriptors for the levels of rules within culturally and historically specific games-playing.

Figure 4.3 provides a deceptively simple typification of game rules. This is designed to be more than a 'speculative instrument' (Richards 1955) since it is constructed on the basis of interpretation of the methodic procedures displayed by members in the case-studies. Such typifications are inherently problematic since they attempt to characterise in precise and unambiguous ways, a range of complex social processes. As Hart (1962) has it, typifications gloss the particulars they typify. Nevertheless the aim is to draw together the insights from the case-studies about the social constitution of games playing and the nature of the rules implicated in their practice, in order to establish a conceptual framework for analysing rules in institutionalised invasion-games.
The left-hand side of this characterisation denotes the establishment, through collectively agreed rule-enactments, of the gratuitous, contrived challenge of the invasion-game. This rule-making delineates it both from other invasion-games and from non-game social processes more generally. At this level, the rules provide the spatio-temporal boundaries of the practice, and its identifiable 'form'. The rule-making at this level contains assumptions about a range of tacit, routine culturally-furnished understandings displayed by players; and the basic rules, crucially, are 'incomplete' insofar as they do not, nor cannot wholly
prescribe game-conduct. This elasticity is critical for
game-viability. Moreover, once established, the rules at
this level are immutable since if altered, the practice
would be transformed (not just reformed) into another
practice.

The right-hand side, denotes the actions of those
empowered to legislate for the practice (in my case-studies,
the players themselves) in order to maintain, enhance, and
re-establish the 'depth' features. These actions are a
response not to deliberate rule-violations but to instances
of playing the game which exploit the insufficiency of the
rules in the determination of conduct. This exploitation
might be motivated in differing ways, but is likely to be
more prevalent in those contexts which place a premium on
achieving successful (i.e. winning) outcomes. All rule-
changes, modifications, rescissions, etc. to
institutionalised invasion-games must be at this
consolidating and preservative level. Rule-making at this
level is the outcome of conflicts of interest between
preserving the internal goods of the game and those
interests generated by the acquisition of external goods.
The rules at this level are the nexus/locale of analyses of
strategic conduct in the social practice, and of analyses of
the practice as a social institution. These, in short, are
Janus-faced games.

The following chapter applies this perspective upon
game-constitution to a selected number of institutionalised invasion-games viz. Rugby Union, Rugby League, Basketball, Soccer, Netball and Lacrosse, which with the exception of hockey, represent the most widely practised invasion-games in this country. 
PART THREE

LEGISLATORS AND INTERPRETERS
Analysis of the case-study material in Part Two emphasised that constituting games involves members collaborating to make the game process accountable but that this does not preclude conflicts over the definition of the situation which are manifested in changes to the formal rules. Rule-changes were depicted as attempts to enable and preserve the gratuitous challenge at the consolidation phase of the game's development. In Part Three further research materials are presented to suggest that this explanation of rule-changes has a more general application to a range of major institutionalised invasion-games (viz. soccer, rugby union, rugby league, netball, and basketball) which can be mapped out more clearly because of the division of functions between legislators and interpreters (ie. players).

The rules of these games have been subject to chronic change and key personnel from the respective rules-committees of International Governing Bodies were invited to provide explanations of this development. Analysis of this material in Chapter Five suggests that there is an on-going dynamic between legislators and players consequent upon the different position these two groups have in relation to the rules. The necessity for restructuring is depicted as attempts to 'shore up the breaches' in game-viability and game-identity occasioned by players' exploration and exploitation of the fringe of incompleteness of the rules.
On the basis of extensive empirical evidence, it is demonstrated that legislative action has consequences in terms of playing processes unanticipated at the time of the rule's original formulation.

In Chapter Six, it is suggested that Norbert Elias's figurational perspective provides an appropriate framework for analysing the social dynamics through which institutionalised invasion-games are restructured over time. As noted in Part One, Elias is one of the few social theorists who have made a major contribution to sociological studies of sport. The developmental perspective of the 'civilising process' theory has been applied and elaborated upon by Elias and others from the 'Leicester School' notably Eric Dunning, and Kenneth Sheard. The aim of Chapter Six is to provide a critical commentary about Elias, Dunning's and Sheard's account of the dynamics of sports groups together with their analysis of rule-changes to rugby union, rugby league, and soccer. On the basis of research materials presented earlier, it will be argued that a figurational analysis of the dynamics endogenous to sports groups has yet to be fully explored, and further that such an analysis does not require a commitment to the theory of the civilising process.
CHAPTER 5

Legislating for Games

5.1 INTRODUCTION

5.2 DEVISING A METHOD

5.3 GAME-VIABILITY AND GAME IDENTITY
5.3.1. Characteristics of Game-Viability
5.3.2. Game-Identity

5.4 SHORING UP THE BREACHES
5.4.1. Rugby League: Play-the-ball and Scrummaging rules
5.4.2. Rugby Union: The Tackle Law
5.4.3. Soccer: The Off-Side Law Goalkeeping Rules
5.4.4. Basketball: After 8 Team Fouls

5.5 GETTING IT RIGHT IN NETBALL - ONE STEP AT A TIME
5.5.1. The 1959 Footwork Rule
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5.6 TENSION AND RESISTANCE: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AMONGST RULE-MAKERS

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5.7 CAVEATS TO GENERAL THEORY - BUILDING

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5.7.2. Developmentally-Specific Games

5.8 THE GAME GOES ON... AND ON

5.8.1. Legislators Versus Players

5.8.2. The Unintended Consequences of Action
5.1. Introduction

This chapter extends the analysis of rules and of rule-changes in earlier chapters by focussing upon the structuring processes in a range of institutionalised invasion-games i.e. enduring widespread, standardised practices which are produced and reproduced over time. Following Williams (1981) the term reproduction does not preclude 'reformation' and is therefore not be be understood as mere 'replication'. The emphasis therefore is upon the restructuring of invasion-games as demonstrated by changes or modifications to their constituent rules.

In the earlier ethnomethodological analysis of reflexively monitored strategic conduct in games-playing, members were required or expected to fulfil both the functions of legislating and of playing. A characteristic of institutionalised games-practice is a division of these functions in producing game-processes, which involves a delegation of power to identifiable groups. Hence 'legislators' are empowered to monitor instances of games-playing, deliberate about and formulate rules, and advise 'police' (referees, umpires, linespersons) upon the meanings of those rules and how they might effectively be implemented.

The research materials presented here provide an account of this legislative function, and subsequent analysis of
this data focusses upon the ongoing dynamics between legislators rule-enactments and the interpretation of rules by players. Analysis of the information gained through a series of interviews with members of each game's Governing Body and a subsequent respondent validation exercise reveals that legislative action is informed by a number of criteria which together constitute the conditions for viable games. Moreover, it is apparent that these criteria of game-viability are interdependent. This means that rules appertaining to one element of a game are interrelated with rules enabling and constraining action to other elements. Hence, changes to any one element of play might have the unanticipated consequence of affecting the viability of other elements.

Legislators were also asked to identify 'problem areas' of play viz. those which are subject to frequent and perhaps persistent rule-modification. The information provided by respondents elaborates the analysis of structuring and restructuring games provided in the previous chapter, whilst also providing an additional perspective on these social processes, using an exemplar from the game of netball. This restructuring therefore demonstrates that the processes implicated in the accomplishing of games identified in the case-study research materials has a more general application to institutionalised games-practice.

Not surprisingly, contextual issues contaminate
legislative functions on a number of levels. Representatives on international governing bodies have vested interests to protect, arising from the position of the game in their national culture, which act back upon deliberations about rules. Moreover, as the research material suggests, not all games are subject, to the same extent, to media and other commercial interests. Consequently the pressures upon the formal structure of a game varies in intensity; and therefore object-adequate analyses of the specific dynamics which impel rule-changes necessitates an understanding of these environing conditions of the practice.

Nevertheless, these research materials provide the basis for a more intensive and extensive analysis of the complex social dynamics within and through which invasion-games are produced, reproduced and hence reformed over time.

5.2. Devising a Method

The original case-studies, designed to elaborate upon Garfinkel's ethnomethodological project, focus upon the games-playing displayed by 'ordinary' members who might be expected to display the culturally-furnished abilities necessary to accomplish an invasion-game. In contrast, to understand the history of rule-changes to institutionalised practices, I chose to interview representatives from the one
group of personnel empowered to make, alter, or modify the rules - the delegated group from a game's governing body who legislate for game practice. Interviewing was the only method possible since the alternative (an observer at rule-committee meetings) was not feasible. (1) Moreover, I was interested in the retrospective 'gloss' or interpretation of rule-making which key members might make on the basis of their experience as legislators.

I selected the six most widespread invasion-games played in this country (viz. soccer, rugby union, rugby league, Hockey, Netball, and Basketball) all of which are played on an international level, and approached the respective National Governing Bodies with an outline of my research proposal. The outcome of this was that the following personnel were approached each of whom agreed to be interviewed.

(i) Rugby Union - a member of the Rules Advisory Panel to the International Board and a Senior Referee.

(ii) Rugby League - a member of the sub-committee for the Laws, and an International referee.

(iii) Basketball - British representative on International Federation (FIFA) and an International Referee.

(1) Even if the 'gatekeepers' had granted access, these committees only meet infrequently e.g. annually (soccer) every 8 years (netball), and not always/usually in Britain.
(iv) Netball - International Umpire, former National Coach and Convenor of International Board.

(v) Soccer - National Training Officer for Referees and Senior Referee (2)

It is worth noting that, out of these interviewees, have a dual function in the production of the game-process viz. to legislate and to police. This is unsurprising since the latter function enriches the former and establishes credibility for the latter. Nevertheless, it is important to clarify these different tasks. As Rawls (1955) points out, law-makers and police stand in different relationship to the 'laws' - they "look in different directions". The function of police (i.e. referees, umpires) is to look backwards and retributive ("he/she broke the law"). They carry out legislators intentions insofar as they can be determined. In contrast, legislators 'look' forward (viz. how can the game-structure be improved upon in the light of previous playing action) to further enhance the viability of the game. One interviewee only had a professional

(2) The Hockey Association (and the W.H.A.) failed to correspond until after this phase of research. From informal discussion with hockey officials and players, I realise that this game is potentially most fruitful since a) the game is subject to many rule-changes, b) it is the only major invasion-game which, as an integral part of the basic challenge, necessitates equipment other than a ball, and c) the rules of mens and womens hockey, which bifurcated in the establishment phase of the game, are now the same.
commitment to the former retributive function, since the Football Association was unable to identify a member of FIFA whom I could feasibly approach. Nevertheless, with this exception, my questions were directed at these individuals in their function as legislators.

The stages of the research were as follows. Firstly, each person was provided, in writing, with a general outline of the issues to be discussed, and apprised of the form of the interview. It was hoped that the subjects would do some preparatory work and provide detailed information about rule-changes at interview. The imposition of a standardised formal interviewing procedure was deemed to be inappropriate since the issues appertaining to particular games are specific to those games. Hence the interview was semi-structured and relatively informal. This strategy demanded that I, as researcher had a sound basic knowledge of each of the games - of their rules, individual, unit and team skills.

At interview, subjects were asked initially to identify the key rule changes in their particular game. No stipulation was given about particular time-scale or chronology. Subjects were then asked to discuss why such rule changes were deemed to be necessary. If and when required, I encouraged interviewees to focus upon rule changes to particular facets of the game, to discuss what
the consequences were for the ensuing action of the game, and particularly whether further rule modifications were considered or invoked. Each interview lasted between 60 and 120 minutes, and all personnel agreed to have the interview audio-taped. Anonymity was assured.

Hence the general format of each interview was to address the following topics: a) what have been the key changes to the rules of your game? b) why do you think these have been necessary? c) can you identify elements of play which have been subject to chronic or successive change? d) if so, can you comment on why this has been necessary?

After analysis of the (taped) interviews, a third stage of this research, was to write to three interviewees with a series of questions about topics c) and d) above (see Appendix 1). This respondent validation exercise proved to be fruitful since subjects (since interview) understood better the information I was wanting to gather. The interviews together with the respondent validation exercise provided the basis for the following interpretation of rule-changes to invasion-games.

5.3. Legislating for Games 1: Games-Viability and Games Identity

Analysis of the interviewees' responses shows that there are two primary concerns occupying game-legislators. The first
is a concern to re-establish and re-emphasise the key characteristics of that specific game. The second is a generalizable concern about what must be preserved, enhanced or enabled in order to sustain the viability of the game as an invasion-type game.

5.3.1. Characteristics of Game-viability

Subjects responses to topic (a) above were invariably accompanied by answers to topic (b) viz. why are rule-changes deemed to be necessary? Discourses about the problems identified in, for example, rugby union were carried out in terms of the technicalities of that game. Yet it became apparent that specific concerns of legislators in particular games were manifestations of more general issues for all the invasion-games analysed. These issues might be interpreted as a concern to create, and if necessary, recreate an ideal social interaction process insofar as this is given by the 'basic' rules, and the game-furnished conditions of the social practice. This is the over-arching consideration upon which decisions about modifications, clarifications, rescissions, etc. to the rules are based. In order for this ideal game-interaction process to be 'realised, players must not only play according to the rules but must do so in a manner which does not compromise the intentions of legislators. Players' understanding of the rules must therefore conform to legislators' understandings.

The ideal interaction process (of an invasion-type game)
would exhibit six basic but mutually conditioning characteristics, which together make the game viable. These might be stated as in Table 5.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5.1. Characteristics of a viable invasion-game</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Invasion-games are about attacking, or invading territory quickly, employing a variety of methods to do so.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Action should be fluent with a minimum amount of stoppages to play.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Methods of attacking territory should consistently display all the individual and unit skills as prescribed by the basic rules of identity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. There should be a balance between attackers and defenders, between the side in possession and the side not in possession.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Possession of the ball should be contested with no side enjoying a monopoly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. There should be sufficient opportunities to realise the over riding aim of scoring.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To these 'enabling' considerations, respondents identified methods of sanctioning conduct. Either or both the players and team must be appropriately censured for failing to sustain the enterprise by breaching the rules of the game. Each of these six characteristics is necessary to realise the 'ideal' as envisaged by legislators, but none is sufficient in itself i.e. they are mutually conditioning and interdependent. For example, rule-measures to enhance characteristic no. 6 might detract from
characteristics 4 and 5. Likewise no. 3 is enhanced by and interdependent with nos. 4 and 5. Respondents were aware of this fragile inter-relationship (examples of which are provided in the following section) insofar as they acknowledge that rule-changes might have an unanticipated cumulative effect upon other elements of play. Hence for example, rugby union legislators want to retain both the 'fair catch' or ('mark') and the line-out as constituent identifying features of their game (characteristic 3) but the effect of this is to compromise characteristic no. 2. Similarly legislators for both codes of rugby have recognised that unless characteristic no. 2 is compromised (i.e. there are 'dead-ball' situations of scrummages and lineouts which congregate about half the players in a small area), then the attacking skills of 'backs' invading territory (characteristic 1) will not be consistently displayed. Hence, there are a series of tensions and compromises in rule-decisions - a balancing act to enable all six characteristics to be displayed as far as the basic rules of identity provide. Table 5.2 is a distillation of the key rule-changes discussed by my respondents in connection with enhancing one or more of the six characteristics of an ideal invasion-game process. The dotted lines between each denotes the interdependence of these concerns.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Player</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Stats</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>223</td>
<td>(a)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.3.2. Game-Identity

Whilst the above concerns are generalizable across invasion-games, in response to topic (b) above, legislators provided an explanation of some rule-changes in terms of the particularity of the skills and patterns of actions which ought to be displayed through playing this specific invasion-game. These concerns, examples of which are listed in Table 5.3, are clearly responses to the development of playing strategies which, without violating the existing rules, compromise what is deemed by legislators to be quintessential characteristics of the game. (3)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5.3 : Game Identity</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) Rugby Union is a game to be played on the feet. Therefore changes in the tackle law to prevent 'pile-ups'.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rugby Union is a handling game. Therefore changes in the kicking laws to restrict kicking the ball out of play.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Rugby League is a passing, handling, invading game. Therefore get rid of line-outs and minimise incidence of scrummaging as much as possible.</td>
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(3) The recent construction of 'mini' rugby, basketball etc. for introducing the game to children identifies only the basic characteristics of game-identity. Mini-basketball, for example, has no 3 point play and explicitly disallows zone-defence, whilst retaining a restricted area in front of the basket. Interestingly, there is no mention of passing in the rule book of mini-basketball.
c) Football is about displaying ball control skills and 'taking men on'. Therefore introduce an off-side law (1930s) to prevent 'football-tennis' and encourage the game to be played in all the playing area.

d) A variety of ball-handling skills should be displayed in basketball. Therefore changes in the rules to neutralise the advantages of the taller player.

Issues about game-identity are most marked in games which share basic characteristics such as the different codes of rugby, football, or the games of netball, handball and basketball. Radical rule-changes in the Northern Rugby Union between 1895 and 1907 established its distinctiveness. The retention of the 'mark' and 'the line-out' despite massive problems in policing this latter game-element was interpreted by my respondent as retaining a separate identity from Rugby League. Similarly, English suggestions for rule changes in netball at an International Board meeting in 1983 were resisted because 'that's too much like basketball' (especially the issue of substitution).

Concerns about game-identity inter relate with more general issues about game-viability. Together they provide criteria upon which legislators deliberate about rules. This is the limit of the power of legislators as they do not put their 'creation' into practice. Immediately this formal skeleton of procedures is put into practice by players, potentially contaminating factors intrude which undermines the ideal. At the simplest and least interesting level,
players might be incapable of realising characteristics 1, 2 and 3 of game-viability because they do not possess the requisite skills. Moreover, there may be an imbalance in the levels of skills of the contesting teams, hence undermining characteristic 4. However, of more interest for sociology, are other contaminating factors which intrude because of the processes of 'negotiation' about the constitutive rules arising from the characteristic properties of invasion-game rules (see Chapter 2). Moreover, the 'fringe of incompleteness' of the formal rules is displayed more starkly in established games because players, absolved of any responsibility or power to determine the rules, stand in a different relationship to the constitutive rules than rule-makers. These different perspectives on game-rules have, as will be addressed in the next section, some interesting consequences.

5.4 Legislating for Games 2: Shoring up the Breaches

Subjects were also asked at interview, and in subsequent correspondence, to identify 'problem' areas of legislation viz. elements of play which were subject to chronic restructuring because playing modes developed which consistently undermined one or more of the criteria of game-viability and game-identity outlined above. In response to this, the following were identified:
Rugby League - the 'play-the-ball' rule, and the scrummage rules

Rugby Union - the 'tackle law'

Basketball - the rules concerning 'intentional' and 'unintentional' fouls in the final 3 minutes of play or after eight team fouls

Soccer - the 'off-side' law; goalkeeping rules. (4)

These provide testimony to the processes of structuring and restructuring chronically implicated in the production and reproduction of invasion-games, as identified earlier with reference to the case-studies. They illustrate the persistent failure of invasion-game legislators both to account for, and to provide an account of, games-playing. Legislators are unable to appreciate fully the consequences which their legislative actions have for ensuing game-processes. Far from games being constituted by their codified rules, as formalist accounts suggest, the dynamics between those who make the rules and those who act with respect to the rules makes the constitutive rules a contested terrain.

These dynamics are exacerbated by the non-game conditions within which invasion-games are played. Hence, players and legislators, standing in a different position to

(4) The response of the Netball interviewee was to indicate a different aspect of player's 'negotiation' with the formal rules. See 5.5. below.

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the rules by virtue of their separate functions in producing games, impute different values into the enactment of the process. The imputation of different values is a direct consequence of the fact that games are not just played as 'games' but are instrumental in achieving external goods (see Chapter 4). Because of this, as is suggested in the previous chapter, there is an inherent tension between 'formal' and 'substantive' concerns (the interest of players). Hence, the structuring of games through legislating and ensuing playing action, is replete with consequences unintended by either of the interest groups involved.

5.4.1. Rugby League : Play-the-Ball and Scrummaging Rules

Two months after the Northern Union split from the English Rugby Union in 1895, changes were made to the laws. The distinguishing characteristics of the game were established in the decade following but rules concerning scrummaging and 'play-the-ball' (first introduced in 1907) have undergone considerable changes sometimes actually reinstating rules which were earlier abolished. The establishment phase (circa 1895 - 1907) was followed by a period of relative stasis before a plethora of rule changes were enacted from 1950s onwards.

Alterations to both the scrummaging and play-the-ball
rules have been so frequent because both features are perceived to undermine characteristics two, four and five, if not adequately governed i.e. the fluency of action is destroyed, teams monopolise possession, and attacking teams have an in-built advantage over defending teams. In general terms, the history of the rules about scrummaging has been to limit the situations when it occurs and, when there is no alternative, to ensure that characteristics one and three are quickly reinstated i.e. displaying attacking skills and invading territory at speed. The distinctive 'play-the-ball' feature of Rugby League developed out of attempts to reduce the number of scrummages per game which prior to its enactment, averaged over 100.

The primary response to the problem of scrummaging was to reduce the number of situations where they must be formed. Legislators thus reduced the average number of scrums per game to approximately 15 by the mid-1960s. But this relatively successful attempt to enhance characteristic two was undermined by attempts to enhance characteristic four. In an effort to inhibit a team monopolising possession, a "4-tackle" rule was introduced in 1966-67. This meant that after four tackles, the first of which resulted in a 'play-the-ball', a scrum was formed. The result was actually to double the average number of scrummages per game - a clear case of one rule-enactment compromising another characteristic of invasion-games. The chronology of this is
interesting. Play-the-balls were originally introduced in an incipient form in 1907-8 in order to minimise stoppages to fluent invading action. Subsequent changes to the play-the-ball rule in an effort to ensure 'clean' possession resulted in a team being able to monopolise possession of the ball thus leading to monotonous and boring patterns of play. (5) Appendix B contains extracts from Rugby League match programmes (in 1952 and 1966) which provide swingeing commentaries upon the state of the game with particular concern expressed about scrummaging and play-the-ball.

To continue this tendency, legislators concentrated their efforts on deciding how far teams should be kept apart at play-the-ball situations. Changes to this policy were enacted in 1939, 1945, 1946, 1951, 1952, 1953, 1956, 1961. Distances varied between one and five yards as well as a period when all players were allowed to stand in line with the acting half-backs (i.e. initial receivers of the play-the-ball). As one commentator has it - "the rule makers appeared to go round in circles". (6) Eventually (in 1966) a limited tackle rule was instituted. This meant, originally, that the attacking side were allowed only four play-the-balls, and on the fourth tackle a scrum would ensue. The immediate consequence of this attempt to break the

(5) See Appendix B (iii).
(6) See Appendix B (ii).
monopoly of possession (characteristic was to increase the incidence of scrummaging (from an average of 15 to an average of 30 per game), another undesirable feature of play since it undermines characteristic two. The response to this has been two-fold. Firstly the tackle rule was extended to tackles which minimised the incidence of scrums (1972). Secondly, in 1983 the International Board decided that after tackles the ball should be handed over to the opposition without a scrum being formed, thus further reducing the incidence of scrummaging. In response to this, players and coaches have developed new tactics, especially kicking the ball into space and hoping that the opposition commit a technical offence.

Problems with the scrummage continue despite repeated rule changes throughout the years. These include (i) many variations of who should have the 'loosehead advantage', (ii) whether attacking or defending side should put the ball into the scrummage, (iii) when the hooker can strike for the ball and with which foot, (iv) restrictions upon the movements of the opposing scrum-half, (v) restrictions on the loose forward's movement once the scrum has been formed, (vi) changes to the off-side laws. The latest changes (1983-4) ensures almost certain possession for the non-offending side who are awarded both 'head and ball' advantage. The interviewee explained that the motive
underlying all these changes is to counter the possibility of gaining an advantage (through the formation of a scrummage) by deliberately or unintentionally committing a technical offence; and also to use the scrummage primarily as a means to re-start attacking play (characteristic 1).

In explaining these and other successive rule changes and modifications the interviewee (a member of the rules sub-committee) said:

If you bring a new law in, the coaches are sure to get round it. I mean it's their job, isn't it?

The respondent validation exercise also proved to be fruitful in providing an excellent example of the ways in which constitutive rules are negotiated in interaction eventuating in chronic change. In response to my postal enquiry (appendix A), the subject augmented this account thus:

Previously to 1966 it was possible for a team to retain possession for a long period, resulting in dour forward battles.

1. To eliminate such possibilities the "four tackle rule" was introduced. A scrum to be formed after four successive tackles by a team.

2. Four tackles were considered insufficient possession to allow a team to build up an attacking position, so the number of successive tackles permitted was increased to six.

3. The scrum after the last tackle, although head and ball was given to other team, did not always ensure a change of possession, so the scrum was abolished and the "handover" was introduced.

4. To avoid the "handover", teams adopted the technique of the "high up-and-under" or "bomb" when in a strong attacking position with the last tackle imminent. The tactic being to put the defending full-back in a vulnerable position when catching the high ball.

5. To discourage this tactic and to reward the kicker for taking the ball under pressure in his own in-goal an experiment is now in operation - when a defender takes the ball on the full in his own in-goal area, the game is restarted with a place kick on the 22m line. The catchers' team retaining possession.

6. The introduction of the "handover" has also discouraged defenders from striking for the ball at the play-the-ball situations, as this entitles the team in possession to another six tackles.

I hope this sufficiently illustrates that one law change is invariably followed by others to counteract the new tactics created by such a change."

This extract provides an excellent example of the constituting and re-constituting of game-rules in order to repair or enhance the various characteristics of game-viability which are compromised by players' tactics.

5.4.2. Rugby Union: the Tackle Law

Rugby Union is a relatively barbarous activity which notwithstanding the complex skills involved, represents in certain elements of the process a modified or stylised form of fighting - a 'mock-battle' in Elias and Dunning's (1971) terms. The basic rules encourage considerable freedom of
interaction between the 30 players, and, in temporal terms, the game eventuates in successive concentration with relative stasis (in rucks, mauls, scrums, line-outs) and dispersal with relative mobility (for attacking and defending territory). The rules (laws) of this game have undergone considerable reformation particularly in the post-war period. In 1946, the 'Laws of the Game' occupied 1.75 pages; in the late 1980s, the Laws take over 20 pages to describe, denoting successive annual efforts to respond to despoiling influences which have exploited the fringe of incompleteness of the rules, and to thereby re-establish game viability. The Nirvana of this ideal has proved to be a chimera as amply demonstrated by some of the exhibitions of games-processes in recent international games. Part of the explanation of this successive reformation is to be found in the non-game conditions of the games practice (eg. dissemination of the game to different social groups, professionalisation, structures of leagues, and more intensive competitions etc.). (8) Nevertheless, the dynamics endogenous to the production of the game-process also has outcomes in terms of rule-changes.

The interviewee - a member of the Rules Advisory Panel which reports annually to the International Board - provided

(8) A more extended discussion of the trend towards achievement striving sports is provided in 5.7.2. and in ensuing chapters
several interesting examples of how legislation is compromised by and through the playing process. The convoluted interpretations and reinterpretations of the rules governing tackles shows the 'dialogue' between legislators and players in stark relief. The main segments of the dialogue are as follows:

Pre-1958 When tackled the ball had to be released and played with the foot by the tackled player before he could retake possession of the ball, even if the player was not on the ground (i.e. the 'stand-up' tackle). Players were penalised for not releasing the ball. Hence there was no ' Maul ', and there were frequent stoppages to fluent play.

1958 Stand-up tackle abolished. Either player (knee) or ball must touch ground. Ball no longer had to be played with the foot.

1970 To speed up play and prevent too many stoppages, definition of tackle changed. Players only have to release the ball in the tackle if the ball touches the ground.

1978 Rule changed again since the above, although invoked to reduce the number of stoppages, had the reverse effect - an increase in the number of 'unseemingly pile-ups' (interviewee's words). Redefinition of tackle : players must release the ball if at least one knee is on the ground.

1984 The above change (to eliminate pileups) resulted in slowing the game down (characteristic 1), stopped flowing movements (characteristic 2), and more technical infringements. Tackle defined in the same way, but player must either release the ball or play it immediately i.e. complete a pass he has already started. Referees instructed about this re-interpretation of the rule.

It is clear from this chronology about what the interviewee called "the vexed question of the tackle", that

the consequences of legislation in terms of the ensuing
action are not always apparent. Outcomes of rule-making are unanticipated and therefore unintended. For example, the amendment to prevent, 'unseemingly pile-ups' was to initiate another set of circumstances, but players and coaches devised ploys which resulted in stoppages to play for other reasons. As the interviewee eloquently put it:

The history of the laws is catching up to prevent something which has arisen from some constructive and innocent amendment made previously.

My respondent also discussed other changes as efforts by rule-makers to enhance the viability of the game. Changes in handling/catching laws, advantage laws, out of play or 'touch' laws have enhanced both characteristics 1 and 2. Restrictions on kicking into 'touch', on the use of the 'mark', changing the value of scoring methods and differential penalties have encouraged characteristic 3 i.e. displaying the main skills of the game, in this case running and passing the ball as the main method of invading territory. Changes in off-side laws at scrum and line-out and the increase from 3 to 5 for the minimum number in a scrum (viz. greater concentration of players) have similarly encouraged attacking skills of running and passing.

These actual law-changes mask a miasma of annual deliberations by the International Board. Gadney (1973), the RFU member on the Board in the 1960's, documents changes made in the 1948-72 period (see Appendix C). The complexity of
legislative procedures and the conflicts of interest between members of the International Board (South Africa, New Zealand, Australia, France and the Home Unions) is illustrated by the number of 'deferred proposals', 'clarifications', 'dispensations' and 'experiments' within this 24 year period. Dispensations and experiments were allowed in 1949, 1951, 1954, 1957, 1959, and 1960 to elements of play as diverse as the kicking laws, touch laws, off-side laws, line-out laws, scoring values of a try, substitutions. Proposals from individual members on the International Board which were either deferred or rejected include:

i. 1961, 1964 - reducing value of all kicks at goal to 2 points;

ii. 1952, 1967, 1968, 1971, 1972 - substitutions at various levels of the game;

iii. 1954, 1956, 1966 - off-side law changes);

iv. 1951-touch laws;

v. 1951, 1961-penalties; and the most contentious,

vi. the 'knock-on' rules and whether to allow a 'cricket catch' (i.e. adjustment); proposals to this element of play were deferred in 1950, 1956, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970 and 1971 until in 1972 the law was changed to allow 'adjustment'.

Some of the changes to the laws have had consequences unintended by legislators since players and coaches devise tactics to take account of the new rules. As with Rugby League 'a constructive and innocent amendment' to one facet
of the game-process might have the unanticipated effect of undermining other facets or characteristics of the ideal towards which legislators actions are focussed (viz. a cumulative effect). The frequency of changes to the rules also leads to conflicts between referees and coaches. On several occasions, the interviewee noted the resistance of coaches to rule-changes. Coaches having devised particular individual and group skills in response to particular conditions governing phases of play are aware that changes to these conditions makes some skills redundant or "illegal". Other tensions are manifest over changes in the rules, one frequently cited example being between interpretations of rules in different national contexts. The Rugby League interviewee gave several instances of disagreements between Australian and British rule interpretations. The Rugby Union interviewee made the following response to my respondent validation exercise:

The International Board have been anxious in recent years to reduce the number of pile-ups, hence the changes in the tackle and lying on or near the ball laws of which you are aware. They have stressed that the game is intended to be played by players who are on their feet. Because there was an increasing tendency for players to wrench themselves free of an opponent's grasp in a maul by going to ground and feeding the ball back, usually from a sitting position, in 1985 the IB * introduced as an experiment into the maul law the following provisions:

(a) Players in a maul to have head and shoulders no lower than hips.

* IB = International Board
(b) Wilfully to collapse a maul is illegal - penalty kick.

(c) Referee to whistle for a scrum if any player goes to ground (unintentionally) in a maul.

Clauses (a) and (b) generally had a beneficial effect but the result of (c) was to stop play on many occasions when the ball was about to emerge. Much frustration ensued and indeed Welsh referees failed to enforce the provison until instructed to do so by the IB when the home international referees had their customary meeting before the international season in the New Year. As you may know, spectators in Wales (who make a considerable financial contribution to the game) want above all an uninterrupted flow of the game (especially if their team is winning) and they are happy for the ball to be fed back by any means, legal or otherwise, e.g. by being handled from scrum or ruck or being ferreted from underneath a pile of prostrate bodies.

In England we rigidly enforced the new provisions and by the end of the season players in the maul were learning the lesson and staying on their feet. New techniques may have been developed to ensure a continuing flow of the ball from the maul but that was no bad thing. However, when the IB reviewed the experimental provisions at the end of the season - each Union submitted a report on their operation, they incorporated the provisions into substantive law for season 1986-87 but added to provision (c) the all important words "unless the ball is immediately available for continuation of play". As Clive Norling boasts, the IB have seen the error of their ways and have come round to his way of thinking.

It is far too early to say whether the lawmakers have now got it right but this season the referee does not have to blow his whistle as soon as a player in a maul goes to ground but can delay for that split second to see whether the ball is immediately available, e.g. to be fed out of the maul, for a player to break away with the ball, to pass it to another player to continue the maul or for a ruck to ensue once the ball is on the ground.

Time alone will tell,

These recent deliberations about the maul illustrate the
inherent difficulties in accounting for, and providing (through the rules) an account of elements of play. The respondent's reference to spectator interests in paragraph 3 above will be considered in more detail in the next chapter.

5.4.3. Association Football

Soccer has 17 laws and is, according to the interviewee (the National Training Officer for Referees) a simple game. In contrast to the Rugby codes playing the game does not eventuate in large concentrations of players in collision with one another. Hence the game is simpler to police and to legislate for. Soccer is certainly not subject to chronic disputes about the rules, and these have changed only slightly over the last 15 years. Indeed the Annual Laws Committee meeting is, says the interviewee, little more than an "annual facility". Also most modifications are merely clarifications for different National Associations since soccer is a much more extensive and widespread social practice than either of the codes of Rugby football. Hence there is an in-built resistance to rule changes by virtue of the massive consequences such changes have - all rule changes must apply to all instances of play at different levels and in different national contexts. Notwithstanding this, administrators are unsatisfied with the way the game is
played, and much of this dissatisfaction stems from the way in which coaches have developed defensive tactics in response to the off-side law (last modified in 1938).

a) The Off-Side Law

The change in the off-side law in 1938 was an occasion when 'laws' were altered to meet specific tactical developments in the game deemed to be detrimental in terms of the ideal characteristics of invasion-games generally. The off-side law was changed to prevent what the interviewee called "football-tennis" i.e. kicking the ball from one end of the field and back again. Underpinning this was an understanding that the key skills of soccer are dribbling with the ball, demonstrating ball control skills, 'taking men on', and not kick and rush. However, this change has lead to the subsequent development of other tactics - particularly rushing out of defence - which has led to more stoppages in play because of being caught off-side, fewer goalmouth incidents, fewer goals scored, more backward passing especially to the goalkeeper, and an imbalance between defence and attack in favour of the former. In short, an amendment designed to enhance characteristic 3 (demonstrating the skills of the game) has had the unintended consequence of tactical developments which have undermined characteristics one, two, five and six. In the respondent validation exercise, the subject discussed the off-side law as follows:

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Although I referred to the Offside Law from the 1930's, perhaps I should add that a form of offside was recognised (and punished) from as far back as the 1860's. In those (very) distant days, there was a requirement for three defenders to be between an attacker and the goal line to prevent an offside offence. Later, in 1907, offside was restricted to the opponent's half of the field of play.

The change to only two defenders was made in 1925 and this had a marked effect on the tactics of the game.

From 1936, emphasis has been made that being in an offside position (alone) should not be regarded as an offence. The offence of offside is not committed until the player interferes with play or with an opponent or seeks to gain an advantage from the position.

Those currently seeking further review of the Offside Law feel that whereas tactics generally were previously geared to attacking play, much emphasis now centres on how to prevent goals being scored.

It therefore seems that just as tactics were instrumental in changing the Law in 1925, present day thinking about patterns of play is causing a number of people to question the relevance of the Offside Law (as it is now written and applied) and they are, therefore, suggesting variations for consideration and again querying the whole case for any offside. The background to this is really the player/spectator frustration from the many halts in the game for offside offences and, additionally, the doubts expressed about the accuracy of implementation/interpretation by many match officials.

I hope that these further comments clarify the situation.

A Discussion Paper was published by the International Football Association Board in 1982. This presented several suggestions about changes to the off-side law. These included (i) no off-side except in the penalty area (experimented with in the Watney Cup); (ii) a 35 yard line
for off-side rather than in opponent's half of the field; (iii) no off-side if player is not intentionally seeking to gain an advantage or interfering with play; (iv) no off-side if ball is played from one's own half of the field; (v) no off-side from goalkeepers' kicks; (vi) no off-side from indirect or direct free kicks; (vii) no off-side at all.

Some of these suggestions are more radical than others. The consequence of (iv) and (v) would be to encourage even more backward passing to the goalkeeper and more 'football tennis'.

b) Goalkeeping Rules

Linked to this extensive debate about offside have been four changes in five years to the goalkeeping rules in an effort to speed the game up. Here again is another illustration of successive rule changes in order to counteract any possible action which might undermine the characteristics of invasion-games play. When asked to identify a problem area the interviewee responded in writing with the following example:

Problem Area - Timewasting by goalkeepers in possession of the ball.

Law XII (5a) was changed initially to attempt to speed things up.

The Law was changed to restrict the goalkeeper's steps more severely when in possession of the ball.

The amended Law produced various unforeseen time consuming tactics whereby the goalkeeper, aided by a
close-at-hand defender, kept the ball away from opponents but continued to delay the progress of play.

The Law was amended again to insist that the ball could not be 'tip-tapped' over 2 yards in the penalty area by requiring the defending colleague to play the ball outside of the penalty area before the goalkeeper again took it under his control by hands.

Problems still arise because time is wasted by goalkeepers who, careful not to exceed the allowed four step limit, now merely remain stationary with the ball for a prolonged period.

Punishment is possible under a different section i.e. Law XII (5b) but it is there a matter more of the referees' opinion.

5.4.4. Basketball: After Team Fouls

The rules of basketball were invoked earlier as an illustrative example of the establishment and consolidation phases of a game's constitution. One of the perennial problems of this game is the issue of 'body-contact' since the rules do not explicitly allow for such conduct yet as D'Agostino (1981) observes, the game as played 'consists of bodily contact'. In the last 20 years, various sanctions have been devised to discourage those collisions between players which compromise game-viability whilst retaining a 'no-harm, no-foul' policy. These have included the following:

a) Players will be suspended from the game and substituted if they commit personal/physical contact or technical fouls.

b) To stop tactical fouls near the end of the game, any foul will be considered intentional thus resulting in two free throws at the basket.
c) Teams can commit a maximum of 10 fouls after which all fouls will result in two free throws. This was later reduced to 7 fouls. A team therefore has a collective responsibility to minimum fouling.

The interviewee went on to describe his own involvement in the International Federation, and in particular the laws about fouling in the last 2 minutes. In February 1986 FIBA called an Emergency meeting to discuss and change the rules about fouling as a consequence of playing tactics exhibited at the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics. The action and reaction of legislators and coaches which led to this emergency meeting took the following form (as described by the interviewee who is the British representative on FIBA).

1. In 1984, after 10 team fouls, subsequent fouls incurred the following penalty: 1 shot at the basket which if successful enabled another shot to be taken (i.e. one shot). If the first shot was unsuccessful no further shot was taken. Before 1984, there had been two shots at basket irrespective of whether the first missed or not. Hence the penalty for exceeding 6 team fouls was reduced (from two to one).  

2. When a foul is committed in the last three minutes the clock is stopped. Coaches now began to instruct players (who had 'used' a minimum number of the five personal fouls) to immediately foul the player in possession of the ball. Result: four shots at basket BUT (a) only one or two seconds have elapsed and (b) possession of the ball is regained by the offending side after the shots on basket.

3. Tactics further refined. Coaches told players to guard the best opposing shooters so that they will not receive the ball, and foul the poorest shooter when he received the ball. Interviewee said that "as a spectacle, as a fair contest, this was useless...the last minute on the clock could last ten minutes".

4. New rule in 1986: Number of intentional fouls reduced from eight to seven after which the team offended against receive two free throws (not just one) plus possession
in mid-court. (9) If the foul was not intentional, then the penalty incurred remains at one and possession to the offending side. Interviewee said "There's still a weakness in the rules because it still relies on the referee's perception that it was an intentional foul". Referees are therefore instructed to be alert to the possibility of a foul being intentional.

5. Coaches new strategy is to instruct players to commit intentional fouls but to make them seem unintentional e.g. tripping up into opposing player etc. If unintentional, it's a side-throw ball rather than free-throws at the basket.

This is an extremely complex set of processes articulating around perceptions of intentional/unintentional conduct, and around the distinction between 'personal' and 'technical' fouls. Moreover, basketball games are fractured by the legitimate intervention of coaches calling for 'timeouts' and tactical substitutions. My respondent called basketball a 'coach dominated game' and that all rule-changes are attempts 'to outwit the coaches'. This restructuring of one element of basketball is similar to the rugby example insofar as it illustrates how skills and strategies are developed which compromise the intentions of legislators. However, in basketball the 'contest' is over the sanctions which are appropriate to instances of rule-violations which if inappropriate actually advantage the perpetrators, to the detriment of the game-chances of the offended team.

(9) A further proposal (in 1988) was for this to be reduced even further, from six to five teamfouls. This has not been adopted by FIBA.
Rule-changes are, of course not confined to determining appropriate penalties. In June 1984 the rules sub-committee submitted for adoption a number of changes to the rules at the World Congress of FIBA in Munich which my respondent interpreted broadly as attempts to 'clean up the rules'. The number of changes to the formulated rules submitted for adoption were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rule</th>
<th>Title of Rule</th>
<th>Number of Changes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The Game</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Equipment</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Players, substitutes and coaches</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Officials and their duties</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Playing regulations</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Timing regulations</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Players regulations</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Infractions and penalties</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Rule of conduct</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Approximately 90% of these were either alterations or additions to the wording, and 10% deletions. These changes are not to be interpreted as radical or fundamental changes to the nature of the conditioned challenge of the game (as encapsulated in rule 1). They include clarifications, minute modifications and caveats, a more precise characterisation of the duties of referees and 'table-officials' as well as actual changes. They bear testimony
to problems of interpretation of international rules amongst a multi-lingual fraternity, but also to the inherent insufficiency of discursively formulated rules in providing unequivocal instruction about playing conduct.

In a later interview (November 1989) my respondent described more recent developments. The rules committee have been instructed by FIBA to explore ways to reduce the advantage of players' height in addition to the institution of the three-point play (6.25 metres from the basket). Proposals considered have included extending the height of the ring, extending the 'freestand area', disallow players to touch the ball when it is in contact with the ring, and instituting two categories of player (below and above 6' 4''). The rules committee however will recommend, at the World Congress in Argentina in June 1990 that none of these proposals be adopted.

5.5. Legislating for Games 3: Getting it Right in Netball
- One Step at a Time

5.5.1. The 1959 Footwork Rule

The response to my enquiries from the representative of Netball yielded additional insights about the constitution of games not highlighted by the respondents from the different codes of football. This interviewee is the convenor of the International Board and has written
extensively about the rules of the game as well as being a key figure in their formulation. She suggested that legislative action in netball needs 'creative thinking' in order to 'keep the core the same whilst keeping the periphery fluid'. This endorses my earlier distinction between basic rules and enabling/preserving rules. The 'core' characteristics of netball are (i) rules about footwork and playing the ball; (ii) rules disallowing contact and dispossession; (iii) rules about methods of scoring and (iv) rules about the playing areas allotted to particular playing positions, together with the off-side rule. Together these are the necessary and sufficient rules to characterise the game as 'netball' and distinguish it from other invasion-games such as handball and basketball which are also hand-passing invasion-games.

In the documentary materials (10) placed at my disposal, the respondent included an extended commentary upon the development of individual catching, passing and shooting skills (as they relate to particular playing positions) consequent upon the invocation in 1959 of one seemingly minor alteration to the footwork rules. As the following extract illustrates, the writer has a detailed

(10) I acknowledge my indebtedness to this individual who provided me with extracts from back issues of Netball Magazine, the Netball Jubilee Handbook (1976), and an extract from her own coaching text.
understanding of how new 'structuring' has opened up a range of action possibilities enabling the development of new skills and tactics (viz. rule changes are not designed solely to be constraining). There has been no change to this 1959 enactment but, of considerable interest for this current project is the writer's depiction of the chronological 'stages' in the interpretation of the rule. In contrast to the earlier examples of players/coaches interpretations of rules undermining the characteristic of game-viability, in this case successive responses to the new challenge of 'ways of playing within the footwork rule' have consolidated the game and actually enhanced game viability. In short, legislators seem to have 'got it right' although unaware at the time of these possible interpretations to their legislative action i.e. more unanticipated consequences.

The article (1976) written by the respondent was entitled 'Foot-work Fashion and Skill'. The use of the term 'fashion' in this context denotes the taken-for-granted assumptions about how the (footwork) rule is to be interpreted, and a relative failure (at early stages of playing the game post-1959) to realise the potentialities of the rule for enabling a variety of skilled response. The different stages of interpretation illustrate another dimension to the successive restructuring of a game. The
basic rules allow for rules of 'preferred play' in Garfinkel's term, a variable response by players to the conditioned challenges as set up by legislators. Exploitation of this 'elasticity' of 'fixed' rules (Elias and Dunning 1971, 1986) sometimes enhances rather than detracts from game viability. In this case, the 'exploitation' arises from one small change to the constraints imposed on individual action when in possession of the ball.

5.5.2. Footwork - Fashion and Skill

Stage I

The footwork rule originally allowed a landing and one further step, with the emphasis being on the firmness of the original landing, because there could be no release of this landing foot. I recall a coaching course in 1949 where we spent a lot of time practising landing on both feet, which had to be fairly far apart to encourage balance. Indeed, I remember being taken to task, as an England player of the time, for failing to master this in preference to a one-footed landing. Footwork here was related only to balance and control, and in a negative sense, to not breaking the rule. In order to stay still after landing on two feet, one has to use less speed in the approach run, upward spring is emphasised, and all the versions of change-of-direction dodges are necessary in preference to sprinting dodges. The total game was less speedy and fluid, with more emphasis on stopping than on going.

Stage II

One small change in rule opened up new possibilities. The landing foot was allowed to be lifted before the ball was released, although it could not be grounded again. Of course, this is the essence of the current rule, but many changes of fashion and skill have occurred since this change. The first dramatic change in style occurred as players and coaches realised that the forward momentum of the running action need not be checked as the ball was caught. The following pattern of action dominated in the
game:

Catch
land on one
foot
Continue forward
onto the other foot.
Throw ball
Control
First foot lift.

Practices were given to time the release of the ball while still running, but before the first landing foot touched the ground again. Sprinting, and acceleration of speed were required in the dodge, and often, only shooters retained the ability to do a feint dodge. The run was often converted into two bounding steps that covered more ground and emphasised height. Coaching emphasised what one could do with the feet, rather than what one could not do.

The game for a short time became very fluent, generated more excitement, and was often very uncontrolled in passing, which meant more difficult catching, and 'out of court' decisions, while defences had a heyday intercepting the high loose passes. For many players, the fact that one could lift the landing foot was interpreted as one should and "standing like storks" was a familiar experience.

Stage III

There was no further change of rule from now on, but coaches looked at the game that was developing and realised that the concept of control had to be reinstated. However, the approach was more positive than earlier. Three things were noted. First that the placement of the second landing foot could help to control the direction of the pass; second, that a more balanced and stronger throwing position is possible if a right-handed player lands on the right foot and places the left foot forward in readiness for the throw. (The opposite for a left-handed player). Third, that a stronger throw is possible if the landing foot is kept on the ground to push against as the throw is made. The emphasis, though returning to control, was on the use of footwork to help good throwing, rather than on not breaking the rule. Much more use was made of the pivot, and players kept their first foot grounded, as the second one was used freely to step into the best direction for the throw. As the ability to throw high and hard increased, the game looked more airborne and graceful. Dodging became more varied, and accurately placed passes meant a difficult time for defences. Although the controlled appearance returned to the game, the ability to move into a run more immediately after a throw, meant that it was still much faster than the game in Stage I.
Stage IV

This stage was really an integration of Stages II and III. Players knew that they could continue to 'run on' into the throw without any check at all, and that they could check, adjust feet and direct the ball wisely. These two abilities meant a choice of action. Good players now began to read the game around them, and select the best use of footwork according to the situation. If they were looking forward as they caught the ball and saw the next player already free, they passed without checking. If the next player was not free, they kept the landing foot down, and waited for the dodge. Coaches devised situations for players to practice adjusting their footwork to a variety of situations. The more dominant example of this type of player will always be Annette Cairncross, Surrey and England shooter, who may be seen on the No. 2 netball film. She mastered a variety of shooting styles all stemming from the ability to select whether to stop, or to travel on. From her play we devised names for shooting actions: the running shot; the step-around shot; the static shot; the step-back shot; the forward-bound shot. In fact, good players on the court were doing the same thing, choosing what to do with the second foot while the first was preparing to land. Now the game still looked essentially graceful and airborne, but had moments of the extreme excitement that unbroken speed generates.

Stage V

Since this stage is closer to us, it is difficult to stand back and evaluate what is causing the change. Possibly, it is that we have begun to question whether it is always necessary to land on the right foot if one is a right-handed player. Unquestionably, this is the soundest mechanical use of the body. Nevertheless, where strength is not needed for a throw, and where control is already at a high level, why bother to work for this adjustment? Shooters have developed a very different style, for many have gone right back to Stage I, using the two-footed landing, but now, with an excessively wide base to help them stay as near the post as possible as they release one foot to take up their shooting stance. They have to master a pivot on either foot according to which side of the post they receive the ball. Centre court players may land with the feet quite close together after one very sudden, perfectly timed sideways dodge. They have a very upright stance while they stand watching their team mates moving to positions themselves, and then drive forward onto one foot as they throw, continuing to run to receive the pass back. It is easier to
move very quickly from a narrow base, and although this is less stable, it enhances fluency. Because throwing skill has developed out of recognition, we are seeing throws controlled solely by the hands and trunk, without the help of feet, hence feet do not have to use time to adjust to better positions before the pass is made. If a player is near a line on her left-hand side, she will land on the left foot in order to use the second foot to drive into the direction of play. During Stage III, she would have landed on the right, and pivoted to face the direction of play. We are becoming used to seeing narrow bases, wide bases, upper bodies twisted away from the direction of the feet; walking into a throw; racing into a catch and continuing into the throw; catching while on the ground as well as in the air; feet "holding" spaces. We are also seeing more faults within the footwork rule, even among our best players, whereas in Stages III and IV or top players never broke the rules.

So where are we going? I am no prophet, but can possibly evaluate what this small history has taught us...There is no one best way of playing within the footwork rule, and a backward glance may help us to retain all the good things of a particular fashion, while discarding those things that caused stereotyped or inefficient play. (11)

5.5.3. Success and Failure: A Comparison

Several insights into the structuring and restructuring of invasion-games can be gleaned from these various examples of rule-change and the consequences which flow from such change. This elaborates and confirms the account of rule-changes in the case-studies cited earlier. The first and most obvious point is that the change to the netball footwork rule has been successful insofar as subsequent

(11) Two years after this 1959 rule change, the Australian coach observed (Netball Magazine 1961) that 'tactics we had encouraged ceased to be effective. There are new challenges to be met'. The new rules means there is now a better balance between 'freedom and restriction in movement'.

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responses by players have enhanced game-viability making for a more dynamic, fluid game and encouraging the development by players of varied passing and shooting skills. In the other examples, from basketball and the codes of football, rule-changes have been singularly unsuccessful insofar as either they have failed to nullify the perceived deficiency in that there has been a 'knock-on effect' to other elements of play, thereby undermining other characteristics of game-viability.

The model of structuring and restructuring developed in relation to the case-studies might be applied to these examples of rule changes to institutionalised games. The 'problem' areas of play in football codes and in basketball clearly conform to this pattern viz. \( S_1 \rightarrow A_1 \rightarrow S_2 \rightarrow A_2 \rightarrow S_3 \rightarrow A_3 \rightarrow S_4 \rightarrow \ldots \rightarrow S_N \) (as in Figure 4.2). There is little indication, for example, that contemporary instances of A in terms of the chronically restructured laws about the tackle in rugby union will not necessitate future S — either to the tackle itself or to environing, related elements of play. In the case of the netball example, the sequence has simply been \( S_1 \rightarrow A_1 \rightarrow S_2 \rightarrow A_2 \), where \( S_2 \) is the 1959 Footwork Rule. Subsequent playing action (A2) has shown considerable development and consolidation over time. But in this case, the shifting balance between constraint and enablement has, in the perception of legislators, enhanced characteristics of game-viability whilst preserving the quintessential
elements of game-identity, i.e. S2 is manifestly better than S1.

From a wealth of experience as player, coach, umpire and convenor of the International Board, the writer details the developmental stages of 'playing the footwork rule'. Early stages were characterised by a lack of control in receiving and passing the ball thereby favouring defenders at the expenses of attackers. This was followed by a re-establishment of control, more accurate and effective passing skills, more varied 'dodging' skills away from one's 'marker', and consequently a shift in the attack/defence balance back towards the former. Later stages were also characterised by players' exploration of the action potentialities and skills which the new rule allowed (run-on or check, pivot from either foot, wide and narrow bases, left and right foot placements) together with the further development of shooting, passing and evading skills.

All of this has been a development from 'one small change' to one (albeit centrally important) rule of netball. The time-scale of these development is 17 years. One might suggest that these 'stages' took so long to develop because players (and coaches) have to disassociate themselves from previously taken-for-granted ways of playing internalised in the pre-1959 period. In this connection, the frequent misinterpretation of the new rule must have hindered
development, as illustrated above by Thomas's commentary about players 'standing like storks' before passing the ball.

An additional key observation is that in neither this netball nor in the other examples, is it possible to predict how a rule-change will be interpreted, and how playing skills and strategies will subsequently develop. It is legitimate, for example, to infer from the above account of playing-to-the footwork rule that legislators in 1959 could not anticipate the ensuing stages of development even though, as it turns out, the change has been successful in enhancing game-viability. The same applies to all the other examples, as the successive rule-changes imply. Another example of players' interpretations and the enhancing of game-viability is the development of the 'peel' from the back or the front of line-outs in rugby union. My respondent noted that 'the peel was not in the rules', but that its development was encouraged because it displayed attacking, handling and passing skills (characteristics 1 and 2).

From these observations about the unanticipated consequences of rule-changes, one can develop two interlocking perspectives upon the structuring sequence of $S_1 \rightarrow A_1 \rightarrow S_2 \rightarrow A_2 \rightarrow S_N$. The first is that $S$ at any stage in the sequence allows players to develop a variety of $A$ i.e. strategies of preferred play. In other words, there are a
number of possible consequences of S in terms of A. It therefore follows that S3, for example, is only one of the possible developments of S2 and similarly S2 is only one development of S1. This perspective requires one to 'look forward' as it were, to the future of S. Can one predict what restructuring will be necessary to the rules of basketball, rugby league, soccer etc. in the future? Have the stages of development of netball consequent upon the 1959 rule-change been exhausted?

The second perspective on the structuring sequence is, in contrast, retrospective allowing one to perceive that S2 for example is a necessary precondition of S3, and S1 for S2 etc. To elaborate on this. S3 can only be understood as the development of all previous S and all previous A, the features of S3 being therefore the cumulative outcome of S1, A1, S2, A2. Therefore, the prospective view upon the structuring sequence brings the unanticipated consequence of action into sharp focus, whilst the retrospective view allows one to understand how the present structure of a particular invasion-game has developed its characteristic features. These points are made succinctly by Elias (1978:161) to whose work I will return later in the project:

...a retrospective developmental investigation can often demonstrate ....that a figuration had to arise out of a certain earlier figuration or even out of a particular type of sequential series of figurations, but does not assert that the earlier figurations had necessarily to change into the later ones.
5.6. **Tensions and Resistance**

It would be a mistake to over-simplify the dynamic between legislators and players as an explanation of the chronic restructuring of games. Each of these games have developed from localised practices in terms of both their spatial distribution and in terms of the social composition of participants, to become widespread international practices. Both the netball and soccer respondents indicated that many rule-changes are principally clarifications impelled by straightforward misunderstandings of legislative intentions arising from poor translations from one language (invariably English) into another. Nevertheless, the internationalism of these game-practices has been accompanied by a shift in the balance of power away from English national associations in soccer, netball, rugby union, and rugby league. Consequently, legislators, as an integral part of a game's Governing Body, should not be conceived as a homogenous grouping since there are vested interests arising from a game's position in specific national cultures. The tensions which are generated within this figuration of the controlling body of a game require more analysis than is allowed by the data gathered in this project. Nevertheless, examples of tensions and resistance are provided by the basketball, netball, rugby union, and rugby league respondents.
In 1962, an executive meeting of the IBBA (the International Basketball Association) was held in the Phillipines. Western nations were under-represented, Pacific and Asian nations were well-represented. It was observed that the game at international level disadvantaged smaller players. Consequently, a resolution was passed that the game was to be played on two levels - for those 6' 2" and over and for those under 6' 2". This expression of vested interest, understandable at international level, was however unworkable at lower levels; eg. basketball in the Leeds area, for example, would not be sustainable if separated into two mutually exclusive divisions based on player's height. Hence, at the following IBBA meeting the resolution was overturned. Both this respondent and the soccer representative indicated that although most problems with rules are most manifest at the more 'visible' national representative level, there is an inherent resistance to rule change insofar as decisions must apply at all levels of the game.

Other resistance to rule-change comes from coaching interests who are often represented on advisory bodies to international rule-committees. Both the rugby league and rugby union respondents (the latter in connection with scrummaging laws) noted the conservatism of coaches since skills and tactics are devised in response to the 'structural' constraints provided by the rules, which if re-
structured makes those skills and tactics either/both redundant (i.e. ineffective) or 'illegal'. Here vested interests in producing winning teams (a product orientation) might conflict with legislative interests in game-viability (a process orientation). A classic case of this was provided by the basketball respondent. In the USA, the NCAA (National Collegiate Athletic Association) which 'governs' collegiate basketball is independent of the National Basketball Association. The rules committee of the NCAA is comprised solely of coaches. Unlike every other basketball association in the world, they refused to accept the 30-second rule, viz. a team must attempt a shot on basket within 30 seconds of obtaining possession. A "shot-clock" has been instituted to monitor this process. The outcome is that, whereas the average scores in NBA games is 80 - 100 points, in NCAA games the average is only 40 - 60 points. Coaches in NCAA have devised detailed strategies for their respective teams to monopolise possession if and when it is in their interests so to do - known as 'putting on a freeze' or 'a stall' which means merely retaining possession, not attempting to score. There are classic cases, notes the respondent, of teams monopolising possession for the final 18 - 20 minutes of a game in defence of a four-point lead. In this particular case, several 'ideal' characteristics of game-viability are undermined in the interests of achieving
a successful outcome. (12)

Other tensions arise from the relative status of a game in particular national contexts. At the meeting of the International Netball Federation in 1983, English representatives proposed three rule changes. There were (i) substitutes to be allowed who could be used at any time; (ii) the positions of goal shooter/goal attack (who, depending upon the team in possession, are also goal keeper/goal defence) to have the same territorial limitations, and (iii) centre-pass to re-start play after a goal, to be taken by the non-scoring team. Each of these proposals was defeated. The Convenor of the International Board's gloss on this was that, in Australia and New Zealand, (the main opponents to change) the game has a high status 'which does not motivate enquiring attitudes to change'. Also Australians were concerned to retain a wholly separate identity to basketball (particularly with reference to the substitution proposals). In contrast, the game in England, my respondent argued, attracts little publicity or media attention, Equal opportunity laws militate against women-only sports, and current school policies against competitive team-games are affecting participation rates.

(12) None of the other games under analysis have this fragmentation of rule-making bodies. Further research is necessary for invasion-games such as ice-hockey, American football and handball.
Hence, whilst English representatives on the International Federation are sensitive to the need to create a dynamic, intrinsically more appealing and 'marketable' game to remain viable, such pressures are not evident in Australasia where the game has an assured status. This resistance to change is compounded by the relative success of Australia and New Zealand in international competitions, which parallels the interests of NCAA rule-makers in basketball, and their conservatism when faced with proposals to change the structure of the game.

A similar power struggle between Australia and England was noted by the Rugby League respondent. It is only since 1982 that the laws have been the same in both countries; before which 'local' laws were allowed. (13) The respondent suggested that Australian legislators are far too interested to 'spectacularise' the game and are 'hell-bent' on keeping scrummaging down to an absolute minimum. He was therefore critical of Australian referees' interpretation of a forward pass - as intentional off-side rather than a technical infringement - resulting in a penalty rather than a scrum for the 'offence'. This means that there are fewer scrums in the game but, argued my respondent, is a wholly illegitimate penalty for a forward pass. Other examples of (13) There is still one local law viz. the number of substitutes allowed.
tensions include the rugby union's respondents' comment about Welsh resistance to penalise unintentional collapses of 'the maul'.

The more extensive a practice, the greater the consequence of any rule-change in terms of clarifications, implementations, etc. Hence there is more resistance to change in basketball and soccer which, unlike rugby codes and netball, are not confined to a relatively small number of countries. Nevertheless, from the above examples, it is evident that the meaning of 'game-viability', unproblematically depicted earlier in terms of six basic characteristics, has different connotations for game-legislators arising from the particular cultural contexts within which they function - another tension between formal and substantive concerns, that perceptions about game-structure cannot be understood without reference to the environing conditions within and from which such judgements are made. None of this however, detracts from the primary tension depicted earlier between those who make rules (about games) and those who put the formal skeleton of procedures into practice through playing.

5.7. Caveats to General Theory-Building

Notwithstanding the identification of 'problem-areas' in all the games under analysis in section 5.4. above, it is evident that not all invasion-games are subject to the same
incidence of restructuring. This suggests the necessity of far more extensive research to consider games such as hockey, lacrosse, handball, shinty, Gaelic football, Australian rules football, American football, ice-hockey etc. Nevertheless, on the basis of research to date two hypotheses might be formulated which distinguish between the games studied in this project whilst also providing a basis for future research.

Firstly, the incidence of rule-change is related to the specific game-furnished conditions as established by the basic rules. As is evident from Table 5.2, some games are more fragile (e.g. rugby union) insofar as it is patently difficult for all six characteristics of game viability to be consistently realised through legislation. Others (e.g. soccer) are more stable inasmuch as most changes to the rules tinker with peripheral issues and with creating a range of effective sanctions against 'foul' play. Secondly, and extending the temporal dimension of rule-making at establishment and consolidation phases as identified in the case-studies, rule-making is developmentally-specific and related to whether games have a cultural-centrality or conversely whether they are relatively 'marginal' practices. Both these points need amplification.
5.7.1. **Game-furnished Conditions**

Soccer administrators review the 'laws' each year (merely as an 'annual facility' according to my respondent) whilst in netball, rule-committees meet only every eight years. But the frequency of deliberations about the rule, is of itself, no indication of relative stability. Soccer has manifest problems with the off-side rule but despite this, modification to this critical element of play has been confined to 'experimental' situations in particular competitions. Prior to the 1930's the off-side rule was subject to considerable change yet has now been unchanged for half a century. The history of changes for all 17 laws illustrate that most critical revisions were enacted in the pre-war period and that the game structure is now relatively stable, if not immutable. My respondent began the interview by noting that the laws have changed little in the last 15 years.

In contrast, both codes of rugby football have been subject to frequent and radical rule-changes, the cumulative effect of which has been to alter action opportunities, individual and unit skills, and the tactics of the game eventuating in comprehensively restructured practices. In Rugby Union, for example, my respondent listed changes to handling laws, offside laws, line-outs, kicking laws, scrummaging (hookers, props, flankers),
'touch' laws, and advantage laws. Note also that netball has had far fewer rule-changes than rugby codes, whilst another invasion-game lacrosse is celebrated as a free-flowing game with a relatively loose rule structure.

Part of the explanation for the fragility of some games is to be found by acknowledging the differences in basic game structure - the game-furnished conditions established by the particular combination of basic rules. Rugby Union for example is a 'collision' game, (not just a 'contact' sport) allowing for modified forms of fighting amongst concentrations of players. The game has developed highly 'situation-specific skills' (eg. line-out jumping, scrummaging, mauling, tackling, rucking), and involving 30 players having distinct but not wholly differentiated functions. This skeleton of formal games-playing procedures is finely balanced since, as noted earlier, the effects of alterations to the rules governing one element of play might have a cumulative effect on other elements. Rugby Union is therefore a densely interdependent practice insofar as the separable elements of play are inter-twined in complex ways.

Legislators of rugby union seek a formula - a particular concatenation of enabling yet constraining rules which will realise both the critical elements of game-identity and the characteristic properties of game-viability. The infrequency of this eventuating makes displays approaching
the ideal such as the Barbarians v All Blacks 1973, and France v Scotland 1986 even more celebrated, as repeated media coverage of these games illustrates.

5.7.2. Developmentally-Specific Games

The above consideration of the inherent properties of the basic rules of games must be supplemented by acknowledging the non-game contextual circumstances within which game-processes are practised. The cultural centrality of so-called 'major' invasion-games involves high rates of participation, mass spectatorship, national media coverage, sponsorship, advertising; viz. the commodification of both the spectacle and the players. This, together with intensified competitive structures translates into increased pressure upon the playing process. Technical advisors (eg. coaches, managers etc.) to players are encouraged to exploit any insufficiency and indeterminancy in the rules which, over time, leads to the demise of 'canons' and their translation into 'formal' rules. Related to this is increasingly 'heavy' policing (14) as a response to increasing rule-violation. Typically, the instrumentalisation and 'Taylorising' or rationalising of games-process is conceived as a destruction of an 'amateur'

(14) For example changes in the functions of linespersons in Rugby Union. Rees and Miracle (1984) note the increase in the number of 'police' in a number of invasion-games.
ethos (amateur literally meaning 'lover' of the process for its own sake).

Goodger (1980) provides a partial explanation of this long-term 'transformation' in terms of the changing social composition of sports groups, whilst my soccer respondent articulated a concern that the professionalisation of the game and the concomitant influence of coaches has led to a decline in the display of individual ball skills (eg. Matthews, Finney, Mannion), too much accent on work-rate and on not losing thereby upsetting the balance between attacking and defending skills.

Another aspect of the demise of amateurism is that the post-war acceleration of rule-changes is the outcome of a de-routinisation of the 'routine filling in' the latter being characteristic of less instrumentalised games-

(15) With specific reference to the practice of Judo, Goodger argues that the penetration of sports groups by 'new social compositions' whose preference in terms of performances varies from those of existing membership, provided an impulse for change towards a more competitive orientation and a 'reinterpretation of its goals, meanings and practices'. Judo became demystified, acquired more individualised and specialised competitive orientations and training practices based on sports science rather than Zen. There were counterveiling social influences (resistance by the original culture of the practice. Nevertheless, the dissemination of a practice from relatively homogenous social groups (i.e. a popularisation) is one dimension of the instrumentalisation of sports processes.
practice.

Clearly however, some invasion-games are more 'marginal' practices along all the indices listed above which translates into less intense pressures to exploit the rules, Netball, despite having 40,000 registered players is an example; and enshrined in the rules of this game is an appeal to players to observe canons of acceptable behaviour. Section V (Discipline) of the Rules states:

'The breaking of rules and/or the employment of any action not covered by the wording of the rules, in a manner contrary to the spirit of the game, is not permitted.'

This not only endorses the argument presented in Chapter 2 (that legislative action cannot provide directives for action in every case) but in appealing for players motivated compliance with legislators wishes, the rule suggests that this community of shared interests should place those interests (in the game-process) above any other supra-game interest. Brackenridge (1982) makes a similar point about lacrosse - another marginal practice. Lacrosse is permeated, she writes, by 'fairly rigid but tacit rules of...behaviour' and therefore:

it is not deemed necessary not even desirable to state explicitly the detail of game behaviour.

Brackenridge (an ex-England coach) goes on to argue that the 'survival' (note) of lacrosse 'in the modern era' depends on a resolution of behavioural issues by translating what she calls 'rites' into rules. She berates
legislators for adopting 'an ostrich-like approach' failing to acknowledge 'the changing social climate of the game'. Challenging legislators' assumptions that the imposition of more rules would be detrimental to the ethos and the 'free-flowing nature' of the game, (16) Brackenridge stresses that rules are not to be seen as merely constraining, but are 'directives to action'. She conceives an expanded rule-framework as a protective measure - to enhance the skills and quality of the experience - rather than as a restrictive measure. Notwithstanding Brackenridge's assumption that the translation of tacit conventions into formalised rules can close all the 'loop-holes' (see Chapter 2), in the present context, her portrayal of lacrosse's governing body is of a marginal, amateur, and minor practice which has not been subject to pressures to reform. Her commentary, however, suggests that the intrusion of professionalised value-constructs into playing modes is creating problems, making

(16) From correspondence with administrators, I have found that other more marginal 'regional' practices such as shinty in Scotland and Gaelic handball and hurling are similarly relatively 'sacrosanct' practices with little pressure on the rule-structure. Brackenridge's commentary on lacrosse also bears testimony to the tensions and resistances within governing bodies as discussed in section 5.6.
the existing rule-structure anachronistic. (17)

Together, these perspectives upon the 'internal' and 'external' dimensions of Janus-faced games provide caveats to proposals that the structuring and restructuring of practices as outlined earlier might be unproblematically applied to all types of invasion-games. In short, although the characteristics of invasion-game rules allow for differing interpretations about how they might be applied in specific situations of games-playing, exploitation of their fringe of incompleteness is related to the non-game conditions of the practice, which affects the likelihood of motivated compliance with both the 'letter' and what is euphemistically termed the 'spirit' of the rules. Hence, an object-adequate account of contemporary deliberations about rules in any one game must be grounded in an understanding of the history, traditions, and ethos of that particular game.

(17) See Pearson (1979, 1986) for an insightful analysis of resistance to rule making and bureaucratisation in outdoor pursuits. The codification and 'athleticisation' of these practices is seen as 'inimical to the basic aspects of the sport itself...its playful and non-instrumental character'. Rules are perceived as being, in this case, manipulative rather than preserving/enabling.
5.8. The Game Goes On

It is apposite at this juncture to draw together the two sets of research material on the playing and rule-making in invasion-games viz. the application of ethnomethodological principles to the practices of game-playing, and the analysis of legislating for established invasion-game. From this, one can identify two cross-cutting dimensions of game-constitution which are separable only for purposes of analysis. The first is the constitutive characteristics of a viable invasion-game, the second is the dynamic between legislators and players.

The concatenation of characteristic properties of game viability and game-identity whilst seldom articulated as such, are nevertheless, implicated in any deliberations about rules. In the analysis of the case-studies, these were alluded to as aspects of members’ tacit understandings of what must be accomplished in order for the game to be made accountable. Moreover, I noted that members held a ludic or playful value-construct insofar as their interest was in the games-procedure itself. In the latter research material concerning the legislation of institutionalised invasion-games, elements of this normally tacit taken-for-granted understanding, become translated into explicit 'articles of practice' oriented to by legislators by virtue of their delegated functions. Whilst legislators articulate
the 'ideal', rule-enactments still assume a range of tacit understandings to be held by recipients of the rules. Nor is account taken of possible breaches such as those examples provided earlier. Furthermore like the members in the case-studies, legislators are interested in the process qua process, the formal skeleton of the practice. Legislators and the case study 'members' therefore share similar criteria for making the game accountable.

The ensuing analysis of both research topics illustrates that further parallels can be drawn between members' response to the 'despoiler's' influence, and legislators' accommodative work (S) in response to instances of playing action (A). Just as members (i.e. the 'fair players') attempted to circumvent the despoiler's breaching of tacit assumptions about common understandings by translating these canons of expected behaviour into explicit rules, so legislators attempt to circumvent playing practices which compromise the ideal. These efforts are, however, often confounded because of the specific characteristics of invasion-game rules as outlined in Chapter 2. Consequently, games are subject to successive restructuring insofar as S as established at any stage in the sequence, cannot precisely determine or anticipate the features of the ensuing A.

This brings into focus the second dimension of game-constitution viz. the dynamic between 'interest groups' identifiable as such by virtue of their function in
producing games. The second set of research materials examined this dynamic between legislators and players in order to understand how the set of rules, at the consolidation phase of a game's development, is the locus of 'negotiations' over their interpretation. Arising from the division of functions between legislat ing for, and playing the game, flows differing interests, and most crucially a balance of power in determining the ways in which a game will be played. This dynamic will be examined in more detail in Chapter 7.
CHAPTER SIX
GAME FIGURATIONS

6.1. INTRODUCTION

6.2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN SPORT

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6.5. SUMMARY
6.1. Introduction

Mennell (1989:3) suggests that 1939 was not 'the most propitious year for the publication of a large two-volume work in German, by a Jew, on of all things, 'civilisation'. Norbert Elias's work on 'The Civilising Process' was not published in English until 1978 (Vol. 1 A History of Manners) and 1982 (Vol. 2 State Formation and Civilisation); long after he had formally retired (in 1962) from his post at Leicester University. Since then however, Elias, and notably Eric Dunning, have applied and elaborated the theory of the civilising process to provide a developmental analysis of sport. Dunning (1989) notes that, at the time and with exception of Gregory Stone (1955), sport was neglected as an area of sociological enquiry.

Elias's lectures, writes Dunning (1986:ix), 'with their developmental, reality-orientated focus and their stress on the interdependence of theory and observation, sociology and psychology, fascinated me from the outset'. In the last three decades, the Leicester School have developed a substantial analysis of sport (Elias and Dunning 1966, 1986; Dunning 1971, 1979a, 1981; Dunning and Sheard 1979, and with specific reference to soccer spectatorship and hooliganism, Dunning, 1979b; Dunning, Murphy and Williams 1988; and Williams, Dunning and Murphy 1989). (1)

(1) Other Eliasian-inspired studies include Brooke (1978) and Maguire (1988).
An elaboration and defence of the civilising process theory represents the major thrust of these developmental analyses of contemporary sports all of which are informed by extensive documentary survey, or other research materials. This is not, however, my principal interest in the theory.

(2) Rather, attention will be focussed upon Elias's


(b) Figurational sociology is labelled variously as 'functionalist', a form of teleological determinism, latent evolutionism, empiricist. Wehowsky offers an alternative historiography of manners by focussing upon the influence of Puritanism during the Reformation upon the bourgeoisie in contrast to Elias's focus on the aristocracy. Buck-Morss (1978), Curtis (1986) and Weis (1984), the latter two with specific reference to sport, point to counter-trends in contemporary society. Bauman, Smith, and Jary and Horne (1986) argue that Elias is 'resignative', neglecting the potentially transformative power of cultural forms - a pessimistic abandonment of the possibility of alternative futures. Rojek (1984) argues that Elias is low on propositional content and on predictive value. Mennell (1989:227-250) organises critiques of Elias into four categories - arguments from 'cultural relativism; from 'stateless civilisations'; from the permissive society; from the 'barbarisation argument'.

(c) Dunning (1988), Dunning and Mennell (1989), Dunning (1989) offer replies to the various critical reviews (eg. Robinson 1988, Newman 1985, Jary and Horne 1986, Hargreaves 1986, Curtis 1986). Robinson, and Jary and Horne are castigated for caricaturing Elias's project, which in the latter case merely offers the opportunity for stating their own preferred theoretical position. The common element of all those reviews says Dunning (1989:38) is that Elias's theory is one of 'unilinear evolution' which represents a misreading of Elias's project.

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conception of 'figuration' and his programmatic discussion of the dynamics within networks of interdependent people. This will be employed to analyse the tensions, power-balances, and conflicts of interest within game-figurations to arrive at a better understanding of the social processes through which the rules of invasion-games change over time.

Dunning, and his co-researchers, provide a figurational account of the socio-genesis of pressure towards achievement-striving, other directed forms of sporting process; a transformation from player-centred amateur practice to spectator-orientated professionalised practice. Acknowledging the 'heteronomous evaluation' of their earlier conception of sport, Dunning adds two additional polarities of tension-balances to their original conception of the dynamics of sports groups. These are the balance between seriousness and playfulness, and the balance between the interests of spectators and the interests of players. Insofar as contemporary sports processes are characterised by success-striving, the balance of these two polarities is tipped in favour of seriousness and the interests of spectators.

Changes to the rules of invasion-games such as rugby union, rugby league, and soccer are explained principally in terms of the perceived need to 'spectacularise' the game, to increase its entertainment value for spectators and for
media audience. This development is located within the wider figurational dynamics of contemporary sports which include a growing financial dependency of governing bodies upon the media and sponsors, and the competition for spectators' patronage from other invasion-games.

Elaborating on earlier research materials, and applying the perspective on the structuring and restructuring of games, I argue that Elias and Dunning's account underplays the complex dynamics between players and legislators, which are ensured by the nature of invasion-game rules. Dunning suggests that one of the consequences of the developmental trend towards serious, other-directed, instrumentalised sports processes is increased rule-violations. I suggest that another consequence is a tendency for players, (assisted by 'advisors' eg. coaches, managers, trainers), to exploit the insufficiency of the 'elastic' rules in the determination of games-playing conduct. One outcome of this exploitative tendency is for the characteristics of game-viability and game-identity to be undermined - or in Elias and Dunnings' terms, the inherent tension-balance in games to be upset. Concomitant with this, of course, the game as a spectacle is likely to suffer also. I suggest therefore, that legislators, in their rule-making/modifying capacity are oriented not only towards the wider societal context of the game, but most crucially towards the 'direct' producers of game processes.
As initially presented, Elias and Dunning's account of game-group dynamics is designed as a theoretical model to illustrate the distinctive characteristics of a group-in-controlled-tension epitomised by sports. But to understand the processes through which this tension-equilibrium is successively upset and restored and why rules are changed, it is necessary to elaborate and modify this model to emphasise critical features of game-dynamics.

To achieve this, it is necessary firstly to identify briefly, the key elements of the Leicester School's account of the development of modern sport and their analysis of sports group dynamics. On this basis, a critical commentary will be developed about their depiction of the nature and function of game-rules, and their explanation of rule changes.

6.2. The Development of Modern Sport

Elias suggests that the characteristics of modern sport (and other leisure activity) are intimately connected with the type and power of the state system in which they are formed and practised. Since the Middle Ages, the gradual formation of larger nation states from a host of smaller warring fiefdoms has eventuated in increasing state-control over the legitimate use of violence, centralised in national armies and police forces. Correlative with this process,
chains of interdependence became larger and more complex, and individual lives were pacified. The outcome of this 'internal pacification' and lengthening chains of interdependence is that both the opportunity and necessity for violent and impulsive expressions of emotion have decreased. Individuals within these complex interdependencies have learnt to exercise self-control over instincts and passions. Emotions have become 'flattened out', instinctual desires sublimated, and passions channelled into socially acceptable, 'harmless' pursuits. Consequently, thresholds of repugnance, shame, guilt and embarrassment have been lowered leading to a lower level of tolerance to 'barbarous' pursuits. Hence, for example, the epitome of good dining manners in the Middle Ages, (as described in Erasmus's Book of Manners and documented by Elias), would be perceived as downright animalistic in the relaxed stylised setting of a restaurant in 'post-modern' Europe. So too, folk games would appear barbarous and repugnant today, just as many people find the more extreme forms of 'blood' sport (eg. the recent incidences of dog-fighting) abhorrent.

Transformations in the practice of sport and games are but one of the manifestations of this long-term process through which inter-personal relationships have become progressively less violent. Since sports are areas of
social life in which problems of violence are abundantly manifest, the development of modern sports, argues Critcher (1988:201), represents a 'potentially fruitful vehicle' for testing the theory that there has been a long term change in the pattern of violence control and a lowering of thresholds in the tolerance of violence.

Sport always relates ambiguously to society: a promoter of order and disorder, a source for integration and disintegration, functioning, negatively and positively for the social order'. (1988:201)

Dunning and Sheard provide an empirically informed historical analysis of this blind, unplanned process through which folk games were transformed into the modern game of rugby forms. (3) This process is uneven, containing clashes of group interest and ideology, and different perceptions of what is considered appropriate or 'manly' behaviour, (4) civilising spurts, and apparent reversals or 'decivilising trends'. However, the process is one of a

(3) See also Elias and Dunning (1971), Dunning (1979b), Elias (1986), Dunning (1986), Dunning (1979c). This development is framed within an account of transformations from 'segmental' bonding characteristic of pre-industrial society and 'functional' bonding characteristic of urban-industrial society.

(4) Conflicts over restrictions on 'hacking', and the prohibition of 'navvies' (iron-tipped boots) in 19th century are extensively documented by Dunning and Sheard. One of the first acts of Rugby Union (formed in 1871) was to outlaw hacking completely.
gradual development towards more restrained forms of mock or mimetic 'battle-excitement' and more stringent standards of violence-control in contrast to the unruly, unpolic ed, loosely organised game forms from which they developed. (5) The 'civilising process' thesis is confirmed by noting (Elias and Dunning 1986 : 230) the patterns of violence-control in contemporary games which include codified rules, intra-game sanctions, the institution of referees, and Governing Bodies to make and enforce rules. These developments demand that players exercise high levels of self-control, with conduct being hedged about by stringent constraints.

The transformation (6) from folk games to modern sport is explained by reference to the structure and dynamics of the overall social and societal context within which, at any stage of the developmental process, games and sports are played (Dunning and Sheard 1979 : 1). A low level of state centralisation and lack of effective national

(5) Early folk-games did have 'lords of misrule' or 'abbots of unreason' who had an adjudicating function, yet nothing approaching the sanctioning and policing powers of modern referees and umpires.

(6) The term 'transformation' suggests radical, fundamental change. I will argue that contemporary developments to established sports are more accurately described as 'reformative'.
unification meant that 'folk' games were played in regional isolation. Communication and transport networks were poor, no common rules, no inter-area competition, no potential rivals except between those groups proximate geographically, and therefore 'little structural pressure on groups...towards success-striving and achievement-orientation...towards other-directed forms of participation' (1986:217). The sociogenesis of the pressure towards achievement-oriented forms of sport is sought, by Elias and Dunning, in the social figuration brought into being in conjunction with industrialisation. Industrial society is characterised by longer and more differentiated chains of interdependence, greater functional specialisation or division of labour, and the integration of these functionally specialised groups into more extensive networks (1986:219). Elias and Dunning, (contra to Durkheim's (1964) concept of industrial society based on 'organic solidarity'), argue that competitive pressures are enhanced within an environment characterised by decreasing power differentials between groups, greater reciprocal dependency, and patterns of muti-polar control within and amongst groups. The key to the relationship between industrialisation and the increasing seriousness of sport is 'functional democratisation' which means:

the equalising change in the balance of power within
and between groups that occurs contingently upon the inter-related processes of state formation and lengthening of interdependency chains. (1986:218)

In consequence, there has been a transformation from player-centred amateur practice organised by voluntary associations and informal competitive frameworks within which game-rules were principally designed to secure enjoyment from the playing process for players rather than for spectators. (7) These amateur attitudes have inexorably been eroded and been replaced by spectator-oriented, serious, achievement-striving and in some cases professional sport governed by a bureaucracy of permanent and (often) paid officials. The transformation from localism to cosmopolitanism has encouraged high-rates of inter-regional, national and international competition, a hierarchical grading of performance, and more extensive bureaucracies. Hence it is argued that an 'amateur' ethos is inappropriate within this figuration since players are forced to be other-directed and serious in their sports participation (1986:220).

Translated, this means that players interest in game-processes as an end in themselves (an intrinsic concern) is compromised by a gradual instrumentalisation viz. extrinsic interests standing outside the mere realisation of game-processes.

(7) This analysis of game-rules is evaluated in Section 6.5.
Hence, fuelled by material and status rewards consequent upon successful performance, modern sport is characterised by 'long-term planning', 'strict self-control and renunciation of immediate gratification', and 'constant practice and training'. Nor is this confined to the higher echelons of sport since participants at this level become a media-promoted reference group who set standards which diffuse to lower levels. (8) Concomitant with these developments, sport has been transformed from a lowly-valued institution to one of 'quasi-religious significance' (1986:205), an institution of cultural centrality which has become a major source of identification, meaning, and gratification for both players and spectators.

Sport is a primary mimetic event performing de-routinising functions within a highly ordered and routinised society where people are constrained continuously to exercise a high level of affective constraint. (1986:222)

Correlative with the increasing cultural significance of sports, together with other-directed instrumentalised forms of practice, players are encouraged to employ any means to

(8) The diffusion of 'professional' values is not as straightforward as Elias and Dunning imply. Bishop and Hoggett's analysis of the structure and dynamics of sub-cultures includes commentary upon the processes of negotiation with the dominant culture (1986:52-58). Some sports clubs resist the tendency for values, techniques etc. to filter down from the top stratum and place much greater premium on sociability. The authors also indicate age and gender difference in members views about the values of competitiveness and sociability (1986:15-17).
achieve successful outcomes including a resort to violent conduct outside the rules of the 'mock-battle'. Elias and Dunning, however, mount a counter-argument to the widely accepted and, in their view, erroneous and over-simplistic belief that violence in, and in conjunction with sports is increasing. In a discussion of long-term transformations in the characteristics of social bonding, they provide a comprehensive typology of forms of violence (1986:226) and argue that modern sports illustrate a shift in the balance between some forms of violence and others, particularly from affective or 'expressive' violence (viz. emotionally satisfying as an end in itself) to rational or 'instrumental' violence (as a means of securing the achievement of particular goals). This shift is attributable to structural changes in forms of social bonding from 'segmental' to 'functional' (1975, 1979, 1986), involved in which is a decrease in the significance of ascriptive ties (eg. family) and a corresponding increase in achieved ties determined by the division of labour and the lengthening of chains of interdependence. (9) The link between the level of development of particular forms of sport and transformations in forms of social bonding is

(9) Dunning (1986:232-3) acknowledges that this depiction of structural transformations underplays social class and gender inequalities and, also assumes continued power of the state to monopolise the legitimate use of violence.
explained thus:

'...the structure of modern rugby, together with the relatively civilised personality pattern of the people who play it means that pleasure in playing is now derived far more from the expression of skill with the ball....and far less from the physical intimidation and infliction of pain than used to be the case in its folk antecedents... (1986:231)

Violence in games where it does occur is therefore more instrumentalised, more calculated and linked to growing competitive pressures which leads to 'the increasing covert use of rational violence' that is simultaneously 'conducive to overt violence'. (1986:23)

In this way Elias and Dunning explain, the apparent paradox that games have grown less violent in some respects but more violent in others. They argue that the civilising process is confirmed insofar as a long-term decline in "Angrifflust" (viz. the capacity for obtaining pleasure from attacking others), is compatible with a concomitant increase in the use of violence in a calculated manner as part of rational strategies for achieving instrumental goals. This counters the oft-cited critique eg. Weis (1984), Curtis (1986), Jary and Horne (1986), that contemporary problems of social order in sport undermines Elias's thesis. (10)

(10) Problems of spectator violence is the primary focus of the Leicester School's research into contemporary sport (eg. Dunning Murphy and Williams 1988). However, this topic which has attracted social policy initiatives is not germane to the current research.
A defence and elaboration of the civilising thesis represents the primary focus in all the writings about developments in contemporary sport by the Leicester School. Moreover, as will become evident later, the civilising thesis informs Elias and Dunning's explanation of rule-changes in invasion-games. Trends towards serious sport, the gradual erosion of (inappropriate) amateur attitudes, lower thresholds of tolerance towards unruliness, and shifts in types of player-violence, are explained with respect to the patterns of social bonding, characteristic of urban-industrial society, viz. more complex chains of interdependence, an increasing functional specialisation, and patterns of multi-polar control as social networks become more extensive and intensive.

I will argue later that this perspective on increasingly complex and densely interdependent sports figurations can be applied to a more focussed analysis of the development of sports-groups over time. Moreover, exploring the dynamics between the groups involved in sports processes provides a perspective upon rule-change. For the present, however, it is necessary to review Elias and Dunning's own depiction of the figurational dynamics of sports groups which represents their initial application of a figurational sociology to sports processes, and is designed as a theoretical model to depict the specific characteristics of groups-in-controlled-tension.
6.3. The Dynamics of Sports Groups

In several articles (1966, 1971, 1979c, 1986) Elias and Dunning outline the figurational dynamics of games in connection with a wider investigation of the long-term development of sports. The authors argue that such a study can serve as an introduction to 'a figurational approach to the study of tensions and conflicts' (1986:194) and as 'a useful point of departure for the construction of small group dynamics'. Traditional small group theory is of no help in exploring the patterns of interdependence of 'groups-in-controlled-tension', an example of which is a sport group. Consequently, Elias and Dunning argue against the reification of games processes in conventional descriptions of these as 'activities played by two teams', a conception which suggests that the 'game' is something apart from the people who play them.

Dispensing with concepts such as 'action' and 'interaction', Elias and Dunning conceive games as a single configuration in which the configuration on one side (team) and that of the other side are interdependent and inseparable. Echoing arguments elsewhere (Elias 1969, 1978) the authors stress that it is the fluctuating configuration (of players) itself upon which, at any given moment in the game process, individuals base their decisions and moves; whereas:
Concepts such as interaction... appear to suggest that individuals without configurations, form configurations with each other a posteriori (1971:75)

Games therefore are conceptualised as figurations or 'structures' which have a hierarchy of several 'I' and 'he' or 'we' and 'they' relationships (see Elias 1978:130-1) - a complex of interdependent polarities 'built into' the game-pattern which provides the raison d'être for game dynamics. Each of these polarities contribute to the maintenance of what Elias and Dunning call the 'tone' or the 'tension-balance' of the game. These are:

(i) between opposing teams; (ii) between attack and defence;
(iii) between co-operation and tension of the two teams;
(iv) co-operation and competition within each team; (v) external control of players (managers, captains, spectators, referees, linesmen) and flexible control self-imposed by players; (vi) identification with and hostile rivalry between opponents; (vii) enjoyment of aggression by individuals and constraints imposed of such enjoyment by the game pattern; (viii) between elasticity and fixity of rules.

These polarities are, of course, not mutually exclusive but form a matrix of cross-cutting tensions within the ongoing and fluctuating network of interdependencies in a games process, and upon which individual's decisions
depend. (11) Elias and Dunning (1966, 1971) are, however, sceptical of the heuristic potential of game figurations because, in contrast to the 'serious business of life', games have no purpose except perhaps that of providing enjoyment and are often pursued as end in themselves. The concatenation of purposeful actions results in a configurational dynamics - in a game - which is purposeless (1971:79).

This idealist position celebrated in the writings of Huizinga (1938) and Novak (1984) (12) places an emphasis

(11) See Weiss P. (1981:47-54) who, from a different theoretical perspective, arrives at a similar conception of sport processes. Weiss acknowledges that earlier analysis of games as 'enclosed activities governed by rules' (1969) was 'regrettably over simplified'. A game is 'crisscrossed by a multiplicity of relations of individuals to each other of each and all to a common unifying nature, of the resulting team to other teams, playing with one another in unpredictable ways in accord with rules and regulations, and that the members of a team can and do interplay with what they helped to constitute? (1981:53-54)

(12) A comprehensive review of the cultural conservative critique of modern degenerative or compromised forms of play, is provided by Hoberman (1984:42-49, 122-161). He distinguishes between eg. the 'radical disillusionment' of Mumford and Toynbee, the 'christian fatalism' of T. S. Eliot, and the 'aristocratic vitalism' of Ortega. Huizinga's (1938) work is described as 'an elegant apologia for the Victorian ideal of amateurism' (152) - play has spiritual significance and in 'the increasing systematisation and regimentation of sport, something of the pure play-quality is inevitably lost'. (1938:197-8) For an earlier populist version of a celebration of the amateur 'ideal' see .Marshall's (1931) article in The Listener.
upon the irreality (if not the unreality) and unseriousness of games. This is, according to Bourdieu (1984) an element of the 'occupational ideology' of sports practioners, physical educationists and many theorists. Dunning (1979, 1986) however acknowledges the limitations of this earlier depiction of game-figuration dynamics which, he argues, was mistakenly derived from an amateur conception of sports - a specific 'heteronomous evaluation' reflective of 'a dependency on amateur values' (1986:208).

Consequently he identifies two additional inter-related polarities manifest in game-figurations which together provide linkages between the specific dynamics of sports groups and the environing social conditions of their practice. These are: (i) the polarity between the interests of players and the interests of spectators, and (ii) the polarity between 'seriousness' and 'play'. The ramifying effects or outcomes of these tension-balances are two-fold. Firstly, the further the balance is tipped towards 'seriousness' the greater the likelihood that the game will be transformed from a mock-fight into a 'real' fight and hence the formal rules will be transgressed (1986:209). (13)

(13) Deliberate rule-violations, and more broadly, the sociogenesis of rational violence are explained in terms of the structure of societies (eg. industrial) characterised by functions bonding which generates competitive pressures (see Dunning 1986:236-239, 219-221)
Secondly, the more the balance is tipped in favour of the interests of spectators, the more likely it is that this group will act in ways intended to affect the outcome of the games-contest.

The addition of these two polarities to the original characterisation is clearly meant to account for the (publicised) increase in (i) overt rule-breaking and 'violence' in sport and (ii) disorder on the terraces including various manifestations of 'hooliganism' including pitch-invasions, throwing missiles, and on more minor level co-ordinated boos, whistles, and chants by 'fans'. These additional polarities rescue the earlier ontology of game dynamics from a depiction of a cocooned, 'separate' set of social processes untrammelled by extra-situational influences, and recognise supra-game figurational issues which excite so much critical media commentary about the 'state of modern sport'.

Polarity no. 10 (viz. a shift in the balance between players and spectator interests) is also an important part of the explanation of changes to the rules of invasion-games (Dunning and Sheard 1979:213-4, 248-50). Rule changes to Rugby League and Rugby Union are depicted as being impelled by attempts to increase the game's spectator appeal.

The original formulation of sports group dynamics was restricted to polarities 1-8. Without polarities 9 and 10 it would be difficult to understand how the specific
dynamics and tension-balances within sports groups articulate with long-term developmental processes viz. the instrumentalisation of sports processes, an increase in calculative violence, and in rule violations, the sociogenesis of which is explained in terms of the structure of industrial societies characterised by functional bonding. I will argue later that this linkage between the dynamics of sports groups and the wider pattern of interdependencies needs elaboration in order to account for the ways in which game-rules develop; i.e. how and why game processes are restructured over time. In particular, I will argue that the consequences of 'serious' sport for sports-group dynamics are more complex than merely acknowledging the increased tendency for rules to be broken. Moreover, an explanation of rule-changes cannot be solely couched in terms of tipping the balance towards spectator interests at the expenses of players interests.

6.4. Critical Commentary

The aim of this commentary is to assess the adequacy of Elias and Dunning's analysis of the development of modern sport in providing an account of the restructuring of games. Consequently, attention will be focussed initially upon Elias and Dunning's depiction of game-rules and their explanation of rule-change. I will argue that Elias and
Dunning provide an insightful account of the nature of game-rules, as being both fixed yet allowing for an 'elasticity' of response. Yet there is a need to recognise and subsequently to explore the consequences of this elasticity in terms of the power of players in negotiating with the conditioned challenge of the game process. This power of negotiation can be understood better by embellishing the conception of fixed/elastic rules with the distinctive insights provided by ethnomethodological analysis and the critiques of formalism provided in Chapter 2. I will argue that the power of players, guaranteed by the insufficiency of elastic rules in determining game conduct has ramifying effects on the other polarities in game-group dynamics identified by Elias and Dunning.

Arising from this conception of game-rules and players power, a critique will be mounted of Elias, Dunning and Sheard's explanation of rule-changes. Their explanation, with three examples from soccer, rugby league, and rugby union, is couched in terms of legislators perceiving the need to 'spectacularise' the game, arising from changing conditions of the game in the wider society as noted earlier (eg. rugby union's increased financial dependency on sponsorship and the media). However, I argue that there is a need to distinguish between rule-changes and other developments which eventuate from deficiencies perceived in the game-pattern itself (brought about by players
exploitation of elastic rules and legislators' subsequent response), and rule-changes as developments which come about from changing conditions of the game in society. Borrowing from Boudon (1982) and for purposes of clarity, the first might be termed 'endogenous' developments i.e. rule changes engendered through the dynamics in sports groups. The second are 'exogenous developments (14) i.e. pressures to reform game-processes arising from the complex ways in which sports groups articulate with wider figurations. (15)

To analyse endogenous developments, and as the earlier empirical evidences suggest, there is a need to extend the 'brackets' around 'the dynamics of sports groups' as depicted by Elias and Dunning. With respect to the external control of players it is important to recognise the critical influence of governing bodies who, whilst not immediately present in any particular instance of game-process, nevertheless have considerable power in making such processes accountable.

(14) My use of these terms departs from Boudon who is interested in social change at a macro societal level rather than at the level of specific cultural practice. Barrett et al (1979) and Williams (1980) are also critical of structuralist analyses for their economic determination and hence not allowing for change, development and reformation in the reproduction of 'relatively autonomous' cultural practice, even though this autonomy might be limited.

(15) The 'packaging' of sports events as media-promoted spectacles provide examples of exogenous influences on sports processes.
These critical observations provide the basis upon which an object-adequate account of game-group dynamics might be developed, an outcome of which is that the rules of game-processes change over time.

6.4.1. Rules

Elias and Dunning lay considerable emphasis upon the development of rules in leisure activities demanding bodily exertion - a long term process of 'sportisation' through which these activities assumed the structural characteristics of modern 'sport'. Over time rules became more precise, explicit, more differentiated and better placed to provide the particular tension-equilibrium of characteristics of modern sports processes.

The rules of 'civilised' or in Elias's term 'mature' games provide a complex set of interdependent polarities which, as a set, contribute to the 'tonus' or tension-balance of the game. This set can be undermined along a number of axes which illustrates the fragility of the deliberately contrived challenge that invasion-games offer.

Dunning is also sensitive to the duality of what was envisaged in Chapter 4 as 'Janus-faced' games. At one and the same time, game figurations by virtue of their elastic yet fixed rules are identified as quasi-autonomous networks of interdependent action, yet these networks can only be fully explained if it is recognised that they form an
interdependent part of a wider figuration.

Elias and Dunning's list of polarities includes the tension between the 'elasticity' and 'fixity' of rules. Dynamics are fixed in terms of the necessary adherence to a unified set of rules - necessary because otherwise the game would not be established as a specific figuration. But dynamics are also 'elastic' or variable because otherwise each instance of games playing would be identical, predictable and hence their specific character as 'games' would be lost. Elias and Dunning (1971:67) write:

'if the relations between those who play the games are too rigidly or too broadly bound by rules, the game will suffer'.

In support of this the authors cite a particular (fixed) rule in soccer (16) and outline the variety of manoeuvrings this rule allows the two team figurations. Strategies develop in accordance with rules and conventions, (17) players' experience of former games, plus expectations of the intended strategy of opponents. Elias and Dunning want to emphasise the complexity of possible patternings

(16) The kick-off rule. See 1986:192-3

(17) This reference to 'conventions' is the only recognition of that aspect of 'rule-following' identified in chapters 2 and 3; viz. there are taken-for-granted assumptions about what is and is not appropriate behaviour which only become evident in the breach.
within a figuration of 22 players (soccer) or 30 players (rugby union). (18) The variety of possible moves available to individuals in interdependence, within this one example of playing-in-accordance-with the rules 'governing' a game, underscores the argument presented in chapter 2 against conventional 'formalist' wisdom about games. Rules not only cannot prescribe action in every way, but also if they did, one of the central characteristics of game processes would be lost. The fixity of game rules might be reconceptualised as the necessary structure which simultaneously constrains yet enables interdependent action. The 'elastic' dimension of game-rules indicates the power of agency without which such processes would hold no sustaining interest for players, and would debar the formulation of collective strategic action.

This account of fixed yet elastic rules parallels, in important respects, Garfinkel's (1963) depiction of game-rules whereby he distinguishes between 'basic' rules providing the boundary conditions of action yet which allow for a variety of responses viz. rules of preferred play (see chapter 2). Although not discussed with specific reference to sports group dynamics, Elias and Dunning (1986, 101:103) mount a criticism of Parsons' conception of norms modelled

(18) See Elias's account of the possible relationship relative to the number of individuals in a web of relationships. (1978:100-103)
'highly internalised individual proscriptions'. Game rules are group-centred or 'figuration bound' referring not to the single acts of individuals but to:

the dynamics of interlacing individual acts...to the moves of players in a changing figuration of people.'  (1986:102)

The point might be illustrated by noting the fluid figuration of players in a game of rugby union with respect to the laws about off-side at scrums, at line-outs, at penalties, and in 'open' play during a passing movement, or when a half-back kicks the ball high to the opposing defenders. The off-side law is implicated in and constrains players' actions in all these typical phases of a game-process yet operates in different ways in each case depending upon the displacement of both one's own team-members and the opponents, relative to the position of the ball at any one moment.

Another characteristic of playing games (according to the rules) noted by Elias and Dunning is that, since rules are elastic and cannot wholly proscribe conduct, players/teams might develop styles or modes of playing 'embodying norms of their own' within the norms (ie. the rules) as laid down by the Governing Body. Although elsewhere (Elias 1982:152) talks of rules as 'determining the conduct of players when they play a game', most of Dunning and Elias's commentary about rules acknowledges the
power of players in 'negotiating' with the game-structure since fixed rules necessarily allow an elasticity of response by players.

This account corroborates, in important respects, Garfinkel's (1967) depiction of game-rules - in particular his distinction between 'basic' rules providing the boundary conditions of action yet which allow for a variety of (ie. 'elastic') responses which Garfinkel depicts as rules of 'preferred' play (see chapter 2). However, as noted earlier, Garfinkel is concerned to identify the constitutive expectancies which are tacitly implicated in the formulation of 'basic' rules of games, whereas Elias and Dunning extend their account by emphasising that game-rules are 'figuration-bound'. The above example of rugby union illustrates that the situational relevance of a rule is dependent upon the specific unfolding circumstances of the game-process - a 'flowing figuration of human beings whose actions and experiences continuously interlock'. (Elias 1986:53)

Both these account of game-rules similarly undermine formalist wisdom by acknowledging that rules cannot precisely determine game-conduct. Their differences, as well as highlighting the separate projects of Garfinkel and Elias, stem in part from the latter's analysis of invasion-games whereas Garfinkel's analysis, focussing primarily on games of strategy, is interested in games only insofar as
they display the conditions for stable concerted action.

The primary aim of this extended commentary upon Elias and Dunning's depiction of invasion-game rules (scattered as they are throughout their writings), is to argue that the authors do not fully explore the consequences which 'playing-to-elastic,figuration bound rules' might have for game-dynamics, viz. how tension-balances (eg. between attack and defence) might be upset, how either both game-identity and game-viability might be undermined, and most crucially, how the rules themselves might need reformulation.

In chapter 5, the empirical evidence of rule-changes to rugby league, rugby union, soccer and basketball demonstrated that this restructuring is the outcome of the dynamic between players of the game (those who realise the practice and who explore the elasticity which rules allow) and the legislators (those who fix the rules which necessarily allow for an elastic response in the interests of game-viability). In the following section, the Leicester 'Schools' analysis of the function of invasion-game rules, and of rule-changes will be consulted. Rule-changes are depicted as one manifestation of broader developmental processes as is evident by their specific commentary on changes to the rules of rugby league, rugby union, and soccer. Changes to each of these games are depicted as an outcome of pressures to make the game more accountable in
terms of the interests of spectators.

6.4.2. Rule-Changes and the Development of Games

Developing the civilising process thesis, rule-changes are interpreted as attempts to maintain the fragile balance in these 'mimetic' activities between preserving control over the level of violence to be tolerated with respect to prevailing standards of civilised behavior, whilst also allowing for a sufficiently high level of mock-fighting without which interest in the game would flag, ie. a controlled de-controlling of emotions. Applying the Odyssean analogy rules function to steer the ship between the Scylla of disorderliness and the Charybdis of boredom. Perceptions of disorderliness are historically relative and as thresholds of tolerance towards gratuitous violence become lower, then game rules change. (Elias and Dunning 1986:198, 41-42, 49, 51; Dunning and Sheard 1979:7-9)

Related to this are discussions about rules functioning to reduce violence. Elias (1986:19-20) writes:

Rules constraining the contestants are aimed at reducing the risk of physical injury...in some sports there are always grey areas where violence is practised. But in most sports contests, rules are designed to keep such practices under control.

Sports such as invasion-games have a 'de-routinising' function in an otherwise highly ordered, routinised, and civilised society. The key problem of the rules is how best to control the de-controlled excitement of game processes and how to reconcile:
the pleasurable de-controlling of human feelings, the full evocation of an enjoyable excitement on the one hand, and on the other the maintenance of a set of checks to keep the pleasantly de-controlled emotions under control. (1986:48)

These concerns - to avoid the two fatal dangers of dullness and disorder (1986:51) - are evident in polarities nos. 6 and 7 in Elias and Dunning's analysis of sport groups dynamics. Yet there are other polarities, other tension-balances to be maintained which cannot be reduced to concerns about violence, nor to the civilising process thesis about shifting thresholds of repugnance, tolerance etc. towards such conduct. The other polarities (nos. 1-4), recognised to be of a slightly different type by Elias and Dunning, refer to the specific characteristics of groups-in-controlled tension, and elsewhere Elias and Dunning couch explanations of rule-changes with respect to maintaining this tension-equilibrium.

One example they provide is the change in 1925 to the off-side law in soccer necessitated because playing strategies had developed which upset polarity no. 2 (between attack and defence) thus lowering the 'tonus' of the game. Changes to the rule were deemed to be necessary to re-establish the 'ship' on an even course. With respect to this one rule-change, Elias and Dunning write (1971:96, 1986:201)

The group dynamics which rules help to maintain may on their part, determine whether rules persist or change. The development of football regulations
shows very strikingly how changes of rules depend on the overall development of that which they rule.

Therefore we are presented with two separable perspectives on rules and rule-changes. The first is a concern with violence, defining the permitted limits of violence (Elias 1986:155) and methods of ensuring stricter observation of rules. This is linked to long-term shifts in perceptions about acceptable behaviour indicative of a particular stage of development in the civilising of game-processes (see also Dunning 1986:230 and Dunning and Sheard 1979:1-6). The second account of rule-change is as a response to the unfolding dynamics of game-processes - the development of playing modes which undermine or compromise the inherent tension-balances in an invasion-game. I shall argue that the differences between these accounts, and their respective explanatory power, depends on the specific stage of development of an invasion-game, and hence the two separable explanations cannot be conflated. Rule-changes in the second account arise from deficiencies perceived in the game-process itself whereas rule-changes in the first account are related to deficiencies perceived in the game arising from changing societal conditions.

The importance of this distinction for the current project, lies in establishing that insights into the development of invasion-games can be gained through an empirical examination of the specific dynamics of different
games, and changes to their rules. In what follows, three specific examples of rule-changes provided by Elias, Dunning and Sheard are discussed. The three examples are: changes to the rules of soccer (Elias and Dunning), rugby union and rugby league (Dunning and Sheard) - three of the games analysed in the previous chapter.

In each case the author's explanation is couched in terms of the need to meet the interests of spectators. (19) I will argue that this explanation underplays the complex dynamics of sports processes, the consequences (in terms of the development of playing skills and tactics) of the nature of 'elastic' game-rules, and the legislative action which is therefore deemed to be necessary. Moreover, the particular level or stage of development of a game is a critical factor to consider in accounting for rule-changes as one aspect of that development. On this basis, I will develop an argument that many rule-changes to invasion-games can only be understood as an unintended and also unanticipated outcome of the dynamic between rule-makers and players.

6.4.3. Three Accounts of Rule-Changes

(i) Rugby Union

Dunning and Sheard provide a detailed analysis of the development of rugby union football, and supported by

(19) A similar explanation of rule-changes is provided by Maguire's (1988) account of the development of basketball in Britain.
documentary evidence and survey data, illustrate how the game's 'pristine' amateur ethos has been undermined since the 1950's. Prior to this, the social homogeneity of the game's personnel, (reinforced by the split with rugby league) and the socialisation of players (in public and grammar schools) into amateur values ensured a high degree of consensus concerning the amateur ethos. Since the 1950's however, and despite claims to the contrary by the game's Governing Body, there has been a transformation from a 'player-centred' towards a 'spectator-centred' form of amateurism. Recalling Dunning's account of sports group dynamics,(polarity no. 10), there has been a shift in the balance towards the interests of spectators and away from a player-oriented ethos or, as they have it elsewhere, towards 'other-directed' forms of sport.

Key structural developments have included an incipient bureaucratisation, the stratification of clubs based on sports performance rather than social criteria, and a growing financial dependency of the RFU and 'gate-taking' clubs (organised into a pressure group in 1969) upon spectators (gate receipts) and audiences (media). Increasingly, a player's performance has become subject to an economic exchange. These developments have been accompanied by the introduction of centrally organised competitions including knock-out competitions, merit tables (1970's) and leagues (mid-1980's). Arising from these more intense
competitive pressures, more rationalised 'scientific' coaching and training methods have been developed and, argue Dunning and Sheard, the game has been subject to a number of rule-changes in order to enhance its appeal to spectators. As illustrated by their survey data, these developments are, of course, not without conflicts of group interest, primarily between those who want to retain a player-centred amateur game (however idealistic this might actually be) and those who are receptive to, and encourage developmental trends towards a greater spectator-oriented professionalism. Not surprisingly, RFU officials are most reactionary and at least ambivalent towards contemporary structural developments whilst players and officials of 'senior' clubs are most progressive, if by 'progress' one means the development of instrumentalised, competitive, rationalised sports processes which attract revenue for the club through sponsorship and gate-receipts.

Of particular interest for the current project, is the survey of rugby personnel's attitudes towards contemporary developments. One question in this survey asked respondents to comment upon 'the importance of spectator interest in determining the laws'. Quite apart from the difference in respondents' answers, implicit in the formulation of this question is an assumption about the ways in which changes to the rules of the game are enacted; i.e. the game has become
increasingly reliant upon commerce, there are many instances of rule-changes to the game, therefore rule-changes are impelled by a concern to enhance spectator interest. In contradistinction to this, my earlier analysis suggests that rule-changes are necessitated by the development of playing skills and tactics in ways unanticipated by rule-makers. Since these two accounts cannot be conflated, it is important to examine Dunning and Sheard's analysis of rule-changes to Rugby Union in more detail.

Dunning and Sheard list six rule-changes since the 1950's all of which are interpreted as attempts to increase the game's spectator appeal. These are changes to the tackle law, to the penalty kick, off-side laws, 'handling' laws (knock-ons), the value of the try, kicking to touch. Each of these, (and other law-changes to rugby union) have been identified in chapter 5. My respondent, an advisor to the International Board's Rules-Committee, argued that all these changes are responses to the development of playing strategies which compromise elements of what, on the basis of that research, I subsequently identified as 'game-viability', i.e. rule-changes are primary reformative work. At no time did my respondent allude to the interests of the spectator.

In itself, this observation does not undermine Dunning and Sheard's argument since my respondent might be discursively unaware of the changing conditions of the
game's practice i.e. the 'transformations' towards spectator-interests discussed earlier. Moreover, a moment's reflection reveals that the 'spectator appeal' of a game is not in conflict with the characteristics of game-viability identified by all my governing body personnel as depicted in chapter 13. Rule-changes are motivated by attempts to restore/enhance game-viability which, ipso facto, increases the game's spectator appeal - or vice versa.

Nevertheless, despite this common outcome of rule-changes, and however their consequences are interpreted, it is important to establish their causal nexus. A close analysis of Dunning and Sheard's list of rule-changes reveals important differences. Two rule-changes in their list are especially apt for their analysis. These are (i) changes to the penalty kick laws - allowing the 'short' penalty so that the non-offending side can retain possession; and (ii) the knock-on/adjustment laws. Both these rules, in their original formulation allowed little or, in the latter case, no room for manouevre in terms of the development of playing strategies which might compromise the game. Therefore, changes to these rules can accurately be described as attempts to increase spectator appeal. Changes to the penalty-kick rule altered the balance between offenders and the 'offended' by providing the non-offending team increased choices of action including retaining
possession of the ball. Changes to handling rules to allow 'adjustments' minimised stoppages to the invading territory and decreased the number of scrummages. In both cases, changes are not responses to players' exploration of rules, since the elasticity of possible interpretation is negligible. They are simply efforts by legislators to enhance characteristics of game-viability and therefore spectator appeal, as Dunning and Sheard argue.

However, the other rule-changes (viz. tackle law, off-side law, the differential value of scoring methods, and the kicking laws) are much more complex. The outcome of these changes may have been to increase spectator appeal (ie. game viability) but this does not explain why changes to these aspects of play were invoked. In each of these cases, the original formulation was adequate-for-all-practical-purposes until their relatively recent reformulation. Their inadequacy, in each case, only became manifest when players began to take advantage of the elasticity of the formal rules in pursuit of their interests. These interests, as Dunning and Sheard's analysis of structural developments forcibly demonstrates, have become increasingly instrumentalised or 'serious' thereby encouraging devious (as well as deviant) methods of attaining the desired end result. Hence game-viability (and spectator appeal) are consistently compromised. Legislation in these cases is deemed to be a necessary response to developments in playing

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modes encouraged or condoned by the increasing 'seriousness' of sport.

Furthermore, one of Dunning and Sheard's examples - the change in 1958 to the tackle law has been subject to subsequent modification in 1970, 1978, and 1984. Similarly laws about off-side at the line of scrummage, with respect to the different playing positions, have been successively modified. These re-developments or re-structurings can only be understood by focussing upon the interdependent processes of players actions with respect to game-rules, and legislators subsequent responses. An explanation of rule changes, as legislative action (by fiat) to make the game more spectacular cannot capture these dynamics. (20)

(ii) Rugby League

Dunning and Sheard (1979:213-22) also provide an explanation of changes to the rules of Rugby League (the Northern Rugby Union until 1922) confined to the period 1895-1906. The radical changes, which by 1906 established a

(20) It is likely that the off-side laws at the 'maul' will need modification or clarification soon, as a response to the development by New Zealand of the 'rolling maul'. This means that players are in effect off-side and obstructing the opposition. An effective rule-modification will increase spectator appeal, but the crucial point to note is how any rule-change will be a response to the development, by players, of strategies which undermine game-viability. See 'Having a ball in the maul' by Alan Watkins, Sunday Telegraph 30/10/89.
different game-pattern to the parent game of rugby union, are again explained in terms of spectator interests arising from the complete dependency of this newly professionalised game on gate-receipts in order to pay the player's wages. The Northern Union inherited 'a discontinuous relatively static game' and had to compete for spectator support with the more dynamic continuous game of soccer. (21) A failure to attract enough spectators meant that many of the 42 clubs were on the verge of bankruptcy by the turn of the century. This situation was compounded by the loss of both middle class and some working class spectator support at the time of the split from Rugby Union in 1893.

Dunning and Sheard provide evidence to show that rule developments were initiated by the middle-class legislators to increase the game's entertainment value and to function as a vehicle for social control. They write (1979:216) that the interests of middle class administrators could be protected by the promotion of mass forms of entertainment which would divert the attention of the 'lower order' from an exploitative socio-economic structure and which could serve simultaneously as a means of inculcating and reinforcing standards of 'hard work, 'sobriety', 'co-operativeness' and 'thrift . (22)

(21) This is well documented by T Delaney (1984) in the Roots of Rugby League see also Charles Nevin 'The Muck 'n' Brass Game' in The Sunday Correspondent magazine 5/11/89.

(22) Structuralist Marxist perspectives (eg. Brohm, 1978) emphasise this function of contemporary sport in reproducing capitalist production relations. See also Stedman-Jones (1983).
related to rule changes for spectator interest, was the perceived need to 'civilise' the game, to reduce violence and also the alarming incidence of serious injury to players (who are, of course, the game's financial assets). This argument is a variant on Elias and Dunning's analysis of rules as functioning to steer the ship between dullness and disorder viz. to reduce levels of violence and injury risk, yet sustain a sufficiently high level of mock-battle excitement without which spectator interest would be lost.

It is important to establish why this account of rule changes to Rugby League is more successful than the earlier account of Rugby Union Rules, especially since both explanations are couched in terms of enhancing the entertainment appeal of the game for spectators. The reason the accounts cannot be conflated is that the two games are at different stages of development. Recalling the earlier analysis of 'establishment' and 'consolidation' phases of development, rule-changes in the 1895-1906 period of Rugby League denotes the processes whereby the game administrators sought to distance this newly professionalised game from Rugby Union, and doing so within a business context which demanded continued spectator support against the rival attraction of soccer. The time-scale of these basic changes to the game-structure (eg. abolishing the line-out, play-the-ball rules) was very short, and clearly not impelled by
players developing playing strategies compromising legislators' intentions. The aim was, as Dunning and Sheard argue, to establish the game's separate identity, (23) to create a viable form of sporting entertainment (viable both in terms of the game-pattern and financially) and ensuring a socially acceptable level of violence and violence-control. In short, legislative action can be explained within the wider figuration of alternative spectator events.

In contrast, the developments in Rugby Union since the 1950's documented earlier were not to establish game-identity but rather were at the 'consolidation' phase of a game which had been established 70-80 years earlier. I argued earlier that many rule-changes need to be understood as legislative responses to developing modes of playing, to restore or re-establish game-viability, the outcome of which also is to enhance spectator appeal. It is significant that both Rugby Union and Rugby League had a period of relative stasis in the first half of this century. As documented in chapter 5, since the 1950's there have also been successive changes in Rugby League to the play-the-ball, off-side, and scrummaging rules which, parallelling the Rugby Union changes of this modern period, are attempt to consolidate both game-identity and game-viability within a context of

(23) See discussion of game-identity in connection with the establishment phase of development in chapter 3.
increasingly instrumentalised, and commodified sports processes, as each invasion-game competes in the market for an audience, and hence for financial endorsement.

I am arguing therefore that the processes through which game-rules are changed are related to the level of a game's development, and at the consolidation phase the dynamics between players and legislators must be emphasised rather than only highlighting the wider figurations which environ sports processes.

(iii) Soccer

A third example of game development - in this case soccer - is provided by Elias and Dunning (1986:202) in connection with their analysis of the polarity between cooperation and competition within each team in sports groups. They discuss the development of team play in soccer in the 1860's and 1870's (ie. inter-team passing) at the expense of individual 'dribbling' skills - a new and more effective way of invading territory which shifted the balance between cooperation and competition within a team (polarity no. 4). Dunning and Elias do not discuss rule-changes here, but rather their analysis of this development, like their discussion of rugby union and rugby league is couched in terms of the wider figuration of interdependencies in which the game of football was played viz. increased competitive pressures and the incipient
spectacularisation of the game. However, whilst these exogenous influences may have been important in devising more efficient means of invading territory, one of the principal reasons for this development must have been the change in the off-side law in 1866 which radically changed the conditioned challenge of the game.

In 1863, when the Football Association was constituted, the off-side law was established as follows:

Law 6. When a player has kicked the ball any one of the same side who is nearer to the opponent's goal-line is out-of-play and may not touch the ball himself nor in any way whatever prevent any other player from doing so until the ball has been played, but no player is out of play when the ball is kicked from behind the goal line.

In 1866, this, 'strict' off-side law was changed by the single yet, in its effects on the conditions of play, a radical amendment to the rule as follows:

1866. After 'has been played' insert 'unless there are at least three of his opponents between him and their own goal.'

This was further refined in 1873 by the change....after 'same side who' insert 'at such moment of kicking'. (24) It is not difficult to envisage how this had a marked effect on the tactical development of football. Rather than proceed up the field as a phalanx behind the man in possession of

(24) A more comprehensive coverage of these and other changes to the laws of soccer was given in 4.4.2. and 5.4.3. My interviewee from the F.A. restricted his discussion of the off-side law to the post-1930's period.
the ball, players could now occupy areas of the field of play in front of the ball thereby encouraging passing movements in the interests of invading territory more effectively.

The question still remains whether these changes, and subsequent exploration of the elastic rules, were followed by other rule changes deemed to be necessary by legislators since the developing skills and strategies after 1873 upset the tension-equilibrium of the game figuration. In this case, the off-side law was changed again (in 1925) as Elias and Dunning note, but not before earlier attempts in 1894, 1902, 1913, 1914, and 1923, plus significant amendments to the 1866 rule in 1907 and 1920. (25) My respondent from the Football Association (chapter 5) completed the chronology of the development of the off-side law, including the F.A. Discussion Document of 1982, and the competitions which have been played according to experimental changes to this law.

6.4.4. Observations

From this discussion of the development of soccer in the 1870's together with the earlier commentary upon rule-changes in Rugby Union and Rugby League, the following

(25) Amendments were that players were not 'off-side' or 'out of play' at goal-kicks, corner-kicks, when in own half of play, when ball was last played by an opponent (1907), and also not 'off-side' if the player does not seek to interfere with or affect play (1920). Each of these amendments translate into a subsequent development of playing strategies.
observations might be made. Firstly, a critical element of a game's development arises from the nature of formal rules. These allow for the development of individual/unit/team skills and strategies which may 'escape' the intentions of rule-makers and, in doing so, upset what I have labelled characteristics of 'game-identity' and 'game-viability'. These characteristics relate to polarities nos. 1 - 4 in Elias and Dunning's account of sports group dynamics.

Secondly, explanations of rule-changes cannot be reduced to the 'spectacularisation' of games. This is, in effect, a species of process-reduction which underplays the dynamic between rule-makers and the players who negotiate with the rules. This explanation conflates the outcome with the causal dynamic of rule-changes. (26) Thirdly, and more specifically, rule-changes need to be located in a developmental perspective i.e. the level of development of a particular invasion-game. Fourthly, and building upon earlier insights into the 'accomplishing' of games, explanations of changes to any element of a game should consider both earlier and subsequent developments of the rules. For example, the development of soccer in the 1870's arises from the change to the off-side rule in 1866. This

(26) For a classic example of explaining 'social change' and development in sport solely in terms of factors exogenous to sport, see Furst 1971.
in itself is part of a historical sequence of change and modification viz. 1863 - 1866 - 1907 - 1920 - 1925 - etc. Similarly, Dunning and Sheard identify changes to the tackle-law in Rugby Union which, as illustrated earlier is part of a sequence of changes: pre 1958 - 1958 - 1970 - 1978 - 1984. A similar sequence is evident for the off-side law, the scrumming laws, the play-the-ball laws in rugby league. Any moment in these game-structuring sequences might be interpreted as enhancing game-viability (and therefore spectator appeal) although, as Dunning and Sheard note, the balance between spectators' and players' interests might be both historically relative and related to the level of professionalisation of the game. Moreover, interpolated into these historical sequences are the actions of players who play the game according to the rules as set at any moment in this developmental process.

Fifthly, this perspective on rule-changes accords analytical primacy to two polarities in Elias and Dunning's depiction of sports-groups dynamics. These are polarity no. 8 - between the fixity and elasticity of rules, and polarity no. 5 - between the external control of players (which in the case of legislators is conducted primarily in terms of game-rules) and the flexible control which individual players exercise upon their actions.

The following chapter builds upon these observations to develop an account of game-group dynamics through which
rules change. However, three additional points need amplification. These are (i) explanations of rule-change are intimately connected with the level or stage of development of the game; (ii) the consequences of the development of 'serious' instrumentalised sport for game-processes goes beyond a tendency to violate the rules; and (iii) the inclusion of governing bodies/legislators in an account of game-groups radically extends the complexity of the figurational dynamics of that group.

6.4.5. Levels of Development

There is, of course, a danger in presenting a simplistic caricature of Elias and Dunning's position on rule-change. The distinction between endogenous and exogenous change might be deemed to be artificial since in their analysis, both accounts are situated within the overarching consideration of creating and sustaining a viable game i.e. not too violent/disordered, not too dull/boring. Dunning (1979c:28) argues that the analysis of sports group dynamics illustrates how the balance between the complex of interdependent polarities 'changes correlative with changes in the game, and in the structure of society at large.' Elsewhere (1979a:344, 1986:208) he states that the patterns of interdependencies in games are:

partly a consequence of the relatively autonomous dynamics of specific game figurations, and partly the manner in which such figurations are articulated into the wider structure of social interdependencies.
With respect to one aspect of game's development (rule-changes) I have argued that Elias and Dunning's account is couched in terms of the latter thus neglecting the former. However, as indicated in the comparative analysis of rule-changes to rugby union (in the 1950's) and to rugby league (in the 1895-1906 period), of especial interest is the stage of development of the game. This theme is taken up briefly by Elias in his discussion of the relative maturity of games (1986:150-60). It is unclear what Elias means by the 'mature' or, as he has it elsewhere, the 'final' or 'ultimate' form of a game. However, Elias writes that in the patterned sequence of changes in the organisation, the rules, and the actual figuration of a game, a 'specific stage of tension-equilibrium is reached' (1986:196). One index of maturity would seem to be when national associations are formed and become 'law' givers thus usurping the power of local groups to decide upon game structure. This is supported in Dunning and Sheard's (1979:2-3, 100-101) and Dunning's (1986:230) account of the 'civilising' of rugby (viz. instituted rules, intra-game sanctions, institution of referees, a national rule-making and rule-enforcing body). However, Elias also discusses trial-and-error periods which involve the tinkering with the figurational arrangements in order to attain the 'necessary tautness' or the right balance amongst the complex of
interdependencies. In this regard, Elias cites, (again) the 1925 off-side law change in soccer.

Nevertheless, what is clear is that Elias observes that when the final or mature stage is reached 'the whole structure of further development changes' (1986:156). By this, I interpret immature stages as being the long-term processes through which leisure activities requiring bodily exertions take on the structural characteristics of contemporary sports, whilst the mature stage of development denotes the tinkering or, as I have depicted it, the 'consolidation' (see chapter 3) of the already-established network of interdependencies to ensure and enhance the mock battle excitement implicated in the game-pattern. I want to suggest that, at this mature stage, the structure of further development changes inasmuch as any development deemed, for whatever purpose, to be necessary is primarily 'reformative' rather than 'transformative' ie. designed to reproduce and preserve the particular tension-equilibrium of the process and further that this reformation is a consequence of the relatively autonomous dynamics of game-group figurations.

This analysis of formative and mature stages is in accord with the characterisation of establishment and consolidation phases of a game's development provided in chapter 3. It was argued that rule-changes must, of necessity, be at the preservative/enabling level in order to consolidate that which has been established.
Elias's distinction between formative and mature stages of a game's development parallels, in important respects, the depiction of 'establishment' and 'consolidation' phases of rule-making in the earlier case-studies of game-accomplishing. It was suggested then that this accomplishing process might provide, in microcosm, a chronology which has wider application to institutionalised invasion-games. Rule-changes to already-established games are, of necessity, reformative - to preserve and enable characteristics of game-identity and viability, and thereby to consolidate that which has been established. Hence at this level, developments are impelled by deficiencies discerned in the game-pattern itself, arising from players exploration of elastic game-rules; or as Elias would have it 'tinkering' to ensure the necessary tautness or tension of the figuration. Applying this to the examples of rule-changes discussed above, rule-changes enacted by the Northern Rugby Union at the turn of the century are at the establishment or formative phase of development and are not the outcome of the legislators/players dynamic addressed earlier. In contrast, changes to Rugby Union in the 1950's and 1960's (and to Rugby League at the same approximate period) are at the consolidating, preserving, enabling level. It is, of course difficult to precisely demarcate establishment and consolidation phases except in terms of
the institution of external controls i.e. national governing bodies. As Dunning and Sheard extensively document, the establishment of the standardised practice of soccer, the formation of the F.A., and the bifurcation with what was eventually to become rugby union, was characterised by tensions, resistance, and clashes of group interest. The change to the off-side rule in soccer can therefore be described as an early attempt to consolidate, improve and develop that which had recently been established. (27)

In conclusion, support for this project's focus upon the consolidation phase of a game's development, is provided by Elias (1986:159) who writes:

The techniques for maintaining, within a set figuration of people an equilibrium of forces in tension for a while, with a high chance of catharsis, or release from tension, in the end, remain to be studied.

6.4.6. The Consequences of 'Serious' Sport

The consequences of 'serious' other-directed sport for the dynamics of sports groups are, according to Dunning, two-fold. On the basis of earlier research and commentary, I suggest that there is a third consequence which is underplayed by Dunning. The two

(27) Dunning and Sheard note that in the late 1870's, some rugby games were still being played with 20-a-side, and that 'ten minutes of glorious hacking' (made illegal by RFU) was allowed at the end of the game, i.e. rugby union as a standardised practice had not fully been established.
consequences are firstly, that the interests of spectators take precedence over player's interests which, as noted earlier, is their explanation of rule-change. The second is the shifting balance towards 'seriousness' and away from 'playfulness'. Players strive for extrinsic rewards rather than merely seeking enjoyment from the game-process itself. This can be a source of strain and conflict upsetting other interdependent polarities in the game, and to the extent that players participate seriously:

the game is likely to be transformed from a mock-fight in the direction of a 'real' one and players are liable to transgress the rules, to commit acts of foul play. (Dunning 1986:209)

In the present context, it is necessary to note that rule violations do not necessitate changes to the rules. Such actions are, in effect, a refusal of the game contract and, if detected, result in stoppages to play and the imposition of penalties (against either individual perpetrators or teams) of varying severity. (28) These range from merely losing possession of the ball to suspension from the game, and in extreme, but well

(28) Some rule-changes eg. penalty laws in rugby union, or free shots in basketball, are designed to ensure that no advantage accrues to the offending side from rule-violations.
documented cases, the institution of criminal proceedings.

(29)

From my earlier commentary on Elias, Dunning and Sheard's account of rule-change, I suggest that there is another consequence of serious sport for game-group dynamics which relates particularly to polarities nos. R We and In their account viz. the fixity and elasticity of rules, (no. e 1/4) and the external control/self control of players (no. ). A consequential development of the demise of an amateur ethos is the more assiduous, calculative exploitation of the fringe of incompleteness of game-rules. Even without overt rule-breaking, this undermines characteristics of game-viability. When the game was played according to an amateur value construct, the order of the game was ensured by the adherence of players to canons or precepts of appropriate and acceptable behaviour tacitly assumed to be held in common. This, with the much looser formal rule structure, was sufficient for all practical purposes particularly because of the relatively homogenous social composition of players. The increased instrumentalisation of game processes together with the widening constituency of players has necessitated the translation of canons of

(29) See E. Grayson Sport and the Law (1987) who charts the increased incursion of the legal system into sporting violence.
acceptable behaviour into formalised rules designed to prescribe necessary behaviour and thereby proscribe deviant behaviour. What this meant was that, in Garfinkel's terms, the 'background expectancies' of knowing-how-to-go-on in games were breached. Hence the meaning of deviance in terms of game-playing is widened beyond the "illegal" ie. the transgression of rules, to encompass the development of playing modes unanticipated by game-legislators. Moreover, since there is a fringe of incompleteness about invasion-game rules', deviant or innovative playing modes are an omnipresent possibility. This possibility however, is realised in practice when players are encouraged to achieve successful outcomes within a context which accords status and financial rewards to winners.

An index of the calculative exploitation of elastic rules in rugby union is the acceleration of rule-changes in the post-war period, at a time when, as Dunning and Sheard document, the game's 'pristine' amateur ethos was being undermined. Hence the need for legislators to preserve game-viability in response to potentially despoiling playing skills and strategies. It is significant therefore, that in contrast to the Rugby Union respondent (chapter 5), the official from soccer's governing body focussed more fully upon pre-1939 law changes. Soccer was professionalised and 'spectacularised' at an early stage of its consolidation
phase of development. A complex hierarchy and grading of performance consequent upon the development of league and cup competitions was quickly established. This game was clearly in the vanguard of social processes towards calculative, efficiency-seeking modes of play and a concomitant rapid decline in amateur values. (30)

Therefore, the consequences of serious sport in terms of rule-changes were manifested in soccer much earlier than rugby union. The earlier reference to the relatively marginal practice of lacrosse illustrates that the legislators of this game remain committed to a relatively loose rule-structure although pressures to reform, as Brackenridge (1982) argues, are arising from increasing competitive pressures, and a need to enhance game-viability.

An acceleration of rule-changes to an invasion-game is another manifestation of the growing-seriousness of these sports other than the incidence of actual rule-violations. This is an addition to Dunning's analysis of the consequences of 'serious' sport.

6.4.7. Game Dynamics

In their depiction of the dynamics of game-groups, Elias and Dunning 'bracket out' any consideration of the super-

(30) Compounded by the dwindling number of middle-class, amateur teams who could compete successfully with professional teams. Corinthians last won the F.A. cup in 1892.
ordinate body who legislate for, or who 'frame' game-processes prior to any particular game-occurrence. External control is depicted as including managers, captains, teammates, lines-persons, referees, and spectators but not governing bodies. From the argument developed above about the nature of game-rules and rule-change, it should be clear that the influence of rules-committees is critical particularly because this involves a radical extension of the network of interdependencies. Two key points need to be made.

The first is that Governing Bodies are the institutional forum formally delegated power to decide upon the particular concatenation of fixed yet elastic rules of game processes (polarity no. 8). Their 'decisions, moves and purposes' (Elias) in preserving and enabling particular patterns of interdependent game-action means that they formally deliberate upon the polarities between opposing teams (no. 1) between attack and defence (no. 2) and between the enjoyment of aggression and the curbs imposed upon such enjoyment (no. 7). The maintenance of these tension-balances cannot be fully understood without reference to this key interest group, who therefore should feature in an account of the external control of players, especially since this interest group is acknowledged in Elias and Dunning's account of the 'civilised' stage of development of Rugby

The second reason for considering the influence of legislators upon game dynamics is that, as Elias (1978) himself points out, the figuration becomes much more complex. Any particular occasion of a specific invasion-game process is a 'game played on one level'. In this case, the interdependencies in terms of power and of function are along two possible axes: viz. (i) within a team and (ii) between teams. But to consider game legislation (together with the policing of games by referees, umpires etc) is to acknowledge that the game-figuration has two levels or tiers. This second level adds two more links to the chains of interdependence, which brings about other tensions. These are (iii) between players at the first level and 'players' at the second level, players at the second level being groups who are delegated power as special functionaries to coordinate the game at the first level; and (iv) within groups at the second level. (31) Hence there is a radical extension of the network of interdependencies, and to consider the 'game played on the first level' without recourse to the valencies between the first and second level is bound to be limited.

(31) An acknowledgement of specific tensions, between interest groups at this level (eg. between National Governing Bodies) and their relative power and resources, was provided in 5.5.
The ramifying effects of these valencies will be considered in more detail later. For the present, and as the earlier research indicates, in order to understand better how games are restructured, the primary dynamic within the networks of interdependency is between the legislators at level two and the players at level one; a dynamic from, and through which, all other polarities flow.

6.5 Summary

This chapter provides a critical review of figurational perspectives upon rules and rule-changes to invasion-games which are one element of their contemporary development. The following summarises the key points.

a) This account endorses the Leicester School's analysis of long-term transformations in contemporary sport towards instrumentalised, other-directed forms of participation but suggests that, at the 'mature' or consolidation phase of development, there is chronic reformation to preserve and enhance the specific characteristics of the game, consequent upon game-group dynamics.

b) The nature of the rules of invasion-games allows players to develop a range of responses to the conditioned challenges of the game. Without this power of agency, the
appeal of the game-process for both participants and for spectators would be undermined.

c) A major consequence of this power of players is that there is an omnipresent possibility that the tension-equilibrium of game-dynamics will be upset along a number of polarities, characterised earlier in terms of game-identity and game-viability, thereby necessitating modifications, clarifications and changes to elements of the game-rules.

d) This power is most likely to be exercised within an environing context which demands that players strive for rewards extrinsic to game-processes. One of the important consequences of 'serious' sport is that players are encouraged to explore the elasticity of the formal rules and their fringe of incompleteness.

e) The exercise of this power is uneven across games depending on the intensity of competitive structures, the rewards which accrue from successful performance, and the dependency on spectator support.

f) In the Leicester School's analysis of game-development, rule-changes are primarily depicted as attempts by legislators to spectacularise the game i.e. respond to changing conditions of the game in society. This arises from their emphasis upon the other-directedness of contemporary sport. But, this account underplays the dynamics endogenous to game-groups, particularly between...
legislating for, and players of, game processes; dynamics which are ensured by the nature of game-rules.

g) However, Elias is aware that, after a game has been established, and national organisations became the law-givers, the whole structure of subsequent development changes. He writes (1986:158) about the legislator/player dynamic as follows:

The former legislated with an eye on the overall situation of the game and its relation to the general public; the latter often remote from the centre of power and in the interest of their own chances of winning games, used the elasticity of all verbal rules by looking for loop-holes and by dodging the intentions of the law-givers.

In the following chapter, Elias's (1978) programmatic discussion of figurational dynamics will be reviewed and applied to this topic. The aim is to establish that many changes to game-rules are an unintended consequence of the actions of governing bodies, players and others in game-groups each of whom have different functions and therefore particular power and interests in making the game accountable.
ENDOGENOUS DYNAMICS

In Part Three, an analysis of rule-changes to major institutionalised invasion-games was provided to suggest that these developments have not been fully explored by figurational perspectives upon sport. Part Four therefore provides an account of the relatively autonomous dynamics within and between the groups who 'accomplish' game-processes, and thereby offers an explanation of how game-processes are, through successive rule-changes, chronically restructured over time. In Chapter Seven, these groups are, called a 'game-world' which is formed by those interest groups who are designated as such by virtue of their function in accomplishing games. This brackets out the supra-game exogenous influences of the media/sponsorship/advertising axis.

Analytical purchase on these dynamics is achieved by applying Elias's programmatic discussion of figurational dynamics as contained in his 'game models'. These depict the relationships within and between functionally interdependent groups and how these relationships change correlatively with shifts in the relative distribution of power. This analysis, together with other characterisations of the dynamics inherent to game-processes, provides a basis to consider the interests, functions, power, and resources of groups within game
worlds. Game-worlds have developed from relatively simple communities of interest to more complex multi-polar figurations. The structurally-generated dynamics within game-worlds thereby illustrates how rule-changes are an unintended consequence of the conflicts between groups consequent upon their division of functions in accomplishing the game-process.

Chapter Eight draws together the perspectives upon game-rules and game-processes developed in this project to consider an interesting contemporaneous exemplar of establishing a new invasion-game viz. the establishment by the Gaelic Athletic Association and the National Football League of Australia, of a game played to composite rules and designed to retain the best features from both games. Notwithstanding the optimism displayed by the Gaelic and Australian Rules Football officials involved, I suggest that the experiment is compromised from the outset. Two separate game-world collectivities are artificially conglomerated to provide a doubly complex set of figurational dynamics (between legislators, players, referees, and coaches). The formal rules of the composite game are doubly insufficient in determining conduct since players necessarily retain background understandings and methodic procedures from their respective parent games. These problems are exacerbated because the composite game is an impermanent figuration formed solely to provide
international competition.

The aim of this final section is therefore to demonstrate the explanatory potential of this project's focus upon the endogenous dynamics implicated in the constituting of game-processes and game-rules.
CHAPTER 7

GAME-WORLDS

7.1.

INTRODUCTION

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SUMMARY AND OBSERVATIONS
7.1. Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to argue that one key aspect of the development of contemporary invasion-games is, to paraphrase Dunning, partly a consequence of the relatively autonomous dynamics of the figuration of sports-groups. This will be achieved by applying Elias's programmatic discussion for sociology as set out in 'What is Sociology?' (1978). Building upon earlier research material, rule-changes to invasion-games are analysed in terms of the functions and interests, and the relative power and resources of the interdependent groups involved in producing game-processes.

These groups are collectively depicted as a 'game-world'. A game-world comprises all those individuals and collectivities who are constituted as identifiable groups by virtue of their function in producing an invasion-game process. This includes not only the players but other external control groups including coaches, managers, referees, paramedics, and governing bodies. Hence, there is a complex set of valencies implicated in the production of any invasion-game process, not all of which however are relevant to rule-change. It will, however, be argued that the restructuring of invasion-games if and when it occurs, is the outcome of conflicts of interest within the network of functionally interdependent groups of a 'game-world',

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each of whom mobilises their respective power and resources in order to realise their specific interests in making the game accountable.

Consequent upon the division of functions, there is a balance of power amongst the interdependent groups in game-worlds. Therefore, successive changes to the rules and other developments are both unanticipated and unintended by any one group, since such chronic restructuring is not in any one group's interest. This situation is ensured because, as noted earlier, with reference to Coulter, Cicourel, and Garfinkel, performance and the development of skills and strategies is under-determined by the rules and these rules allow for an elastic and multiple response. Therefore, and as the earlier empirical evidence illustrates, it is not possible for those who legislate for games, to precisely determine or anticipate exactly how some rules will be interpreted and acted upon by players.

Elias and Dunning provide a detailed analysis of the fragile interdependencies through which invasion-game processes provide an enduring appeal for both players and spectators. They are right to argue that rule-changes are successive attempts to sustain in equilibrium the complex of interdependent polarities which characterise these games. But their account of how the deliberately contived sets of enabling and constraining rules are changed to maintain this appeal is couched primarily in terms of influences exogenous
to game-worlds. In contrast, the following explanation of rule-change is couched in terms of the dynamic between the different levels or 'tiers' in game-worlds i.e. between producers of game processes at level 1 and the special functionaries and delegates at level 2. (1) However, a caveat is provided that the commercialisation of modern invasion-games, the 'sponsorship, advertising, media axis' as Hargreaves (1986) has it, erodes the traditional functions and power of a game's governing body with respect to game-structure.

The approach in this chapter will be, firstly to provide a brief review of Elias's programmatic discussion with particular emphasis upon his 'game models'. These models, says Elias (1978:80) are 'simplifying intellectual experiments', each of which is designed to depict the character of relationships - whether affective, political or economic - between functionally interdependent groups, and to show how these relationships change correlative with shifts in the distribution of power. Power and

(1) I borrow the terms 'endogenous' and 'exogenous' from Boudon's (1986) theorising about social change, although his analysis is couched at the societal level. Endogenous change is when a change from t to t & k is seen as a function of the system at t - an unfolding, elaboration or differentiation. See also R. Ash Garner (1977) Researching Social Change, Rand, McNally College Pub. Co.
function are to be understood as structural characteristics, as concepts of relationship rather than of substance, and applicable to figurations of varying complexity from small groups to societies. (1978:131)

The key tenets of this model are then applied to the figuration of 'game-worlds', to show how they have developed from simple communities of interest to more densely interdependent and more complex multi-polar figurations with conflicts of interest. This development is one index of the trend towards other-directed achievement - striving in sport, and of the increased cultural centrality of sport as documented by Dunning (1986).

This forms the basis upon which to analyse the structurally generated tensions in game-worlds which eventuate in changes to the rules. These tensions are explored in terms of the relative power and resources of the two primary groups, and their different functions and different interests in game processes. There are two inter-related and irreducible sets of dynamics in game-processes between processes and outcomes, and between cooperation, association, and competition. This depiction attempts to 'capture' the inherent tensions in game-processes around which the separate functions and power of specific groups in game-worlds articulate and coalesce.

The aim therefore is to elaborate upon Elias and
Dunning's social ontology of sport group dynamics to explain how changes to the rules of games are an omnipresent possibility, and thereby to argue that the long-term trend towards 'serious' sport, only accelerates an inherent characteristic of invasion-game processes towards successive restructuring. It is however, acknowledged that invasion-games are subject to varying degrees of commodification and differ in the extent of their practice. Those games which are subject to intensive commercial interest provide some key examples of restructuring which are not the outcome of structurally generated tensions within game-worlds.

7.2. Figurations

Elias has developed his figurational sociology over a period of fifty years and he invites us to 'dissociate ourselves from the obvious taken-for-granted ways of organising our perceptions (1956, 1969, 1978). He argues that the characteristics of our inherited structures of speech and thought (grounded, as Dawe (1970) observes, in our common-sense experience of the social world) are inadequate for understanding and investigating the complexity of social processes. The dominant concept of man in contemporary industrial societies (and limited to a particular period of their development) is 'homo-clausus'—an individual centred perspective upon the human universe which is, he argues, the contemporary counterpart of the
former geocentric perspective upon the natural universe. Within these conceptions terms such as 'group' and 'society' are widely used as if they refer to some-thing which lies outside, surrounds, and 'environs' the single individual. Terms such as 'individual and 'society' are 'the common currency of discourse', terminological conventions which 'draw a veil over our eyes which make it appear that there are individuals outside society and conversely a society outside individuals. He therefore suggests (1969:130) that we must:

abandon old linguistic traditions burdened with a philosophical heritage that is beginning to become obsolete.

Elias is therefore critical of the basic problematics which concern philosophy, psychology, psychiatry as well as a sociology, (Elias 1969). The tendency to reduce the study of people to one or other of a series partly overlapping dichotomies (see Elias, 1956, 1978) has led to much sterile debates within sociology. Pernicious dualistic thinking about individual and society, agency and structure, actor and activity, voluntarism and determinism does not capture the complex processual inter-relationships between people. His primary critique of sociological categories is the tendency to reduce processes conceptually to states ie. a 'process-reduction'. Hence, he writes (1978:112):

Our languagestend to place at the forefront of our attention substantives,which have the character of
things in a state of rest. Furthermore, they tend to express 'all-change' by means of an attribute or verb...something additional rather than integral.

Dualistic thinking about single 'individuals' and about 'society' is a species of 'scientific atomism' viz. dissecting a social unit into composite parts and subsequently attempting to explain the characteristic distinguishing features of the composite whole in terms of its components. Actions of single individuals cannot be studied in isolation, nor is the term 'interaction' adequate for capturing the ongoing processual interweavings of individuals. In 'interactionism', the prototype of 'man' remains the isolated single individual (see 1978:94-5, 1971:75) 'whereas underlying all intended interactions of human beings is their unintended interdependence'. (1956:143) Therefore the conception of individuals in social science should be 'homines aperti', rather than 'homo clausus'.

Much of Elias's critique of sterile debates in sociology, argues Bauman (1979:119) are unexceptional and are constantly reiterated by the sociology profession. Nevertheless such reiteration is clearly necessary in the context of the present level of development of sociological analyses of sport despite disclaimers to the contrary (Curtis 1986). But it is crucial to acknowledge the radical nature of Elias's programme. He is critical of the naive egocentricity and naive anthropomorphism which permeate our
thought and speech about social processes, and these modes of expression are mixed with others which are modelled on the vocabulary used to explain compelling forces of nature (see 1978: 16-22). He writes:

Emancipation from heteronomous ideas, with their concomitant modes of speech and thought, is scarcely easier for the human sciences than it was for the natural sciences two or three centuries ago. Those espousing the cause of the natural sciences then had no choice but to start by combating institutionalised magico-mythical models of perception and thought; protagonists of the social sciences today must now also struggle against the heteronomous use of natural scientific, models which have become just as firmly institutionalised. (19-zo).

Therefore, for sociology to be a 'destroyer of myths' it is necessary to break through 'the brittle facade of reifying concepts' (1978:15). Actions of single individuals can only be explained by acknowledging 'networks of interdependencies' or 'configurations' within which all actions take place. Elias conceives figurations as 'structures of mutually oriented and mutually dependent people' and, with copious illustrations, demonstrates how personal identities are intimately connected with relationships and positions within interdependent groups of individuals. Individuals are always and in every case interconnected by a multiplicity of dynamic and polyvalent bonds - economic, political, and affective. This bonding is both enabling and constraining ie. making for particular types of action but simultaneously limiting its scope. This methodological suggestion - of analysing
actions of individuals and groups within networks of interdependencies (2) - forms the basis of my account of game-group dynamics. (3) This will be informed by Elias's 'game-models' within which the actions and responses of interdependent people are viewed as moves in a game. Elias uses these models as simplified analogies to real social processes but, as Mennell (1989:259) emphasises, because real games are social processes, the analogy is 'less dangerous than the physical and biological analogies so frequently encountered in sociology'. (4)

(2) Many critics (eg. Horne and Jary 1986) are critical of this catholic list of polyvalent bonds. Marxists, of course, accord primacy to economic bonding. Like Marx, Elias analyses the relationships between group conflict and the development of functional interdependencies but he places greater emphasis upon the relative autonomy of political spheres which become the preserve of the state. (see Smith, 1984)

(3) It is worth noting the explanatory potential of this perspective for other topical issues in contemporary sport eg. drug-taking, gratuitous player violence, conflicts between national governing bodies of sport etc.

7.2. **Game-Models**

To counter the false methodological and ontological priority given to individuals and as a heuristic device, to explicate how figurations are structured, Elias provides a series of models of 'games or contests'. These are, using Black's (1962) term, 'analogue' models which function not as 'mere ornament or epiphenomena of enquiry' but provide a distinctive mode of achieving insight. They attempt to reproduce the structure or web of inter-relationships which are compatible with a wide variety of content or media.

Hence, Mennell (1989:263) notes that from Elias's game-models the implicit allusions are not just to his studies of sports and games, but also to the oligarchic court society, to the interweaving of the 'blind' long-term civilising and state-formation processes.

7.2.1. **Power**

All Elias's models are based on two or more people measuring their 'strengths' against one another - inherent in all situations in which people enter into relationships with one another, (even though awareness of it is often suppressed or euphemised). Dispensing with 'offensive connotations' of "power", Elias suggests that power is integral to any figuration. He writes (1978:93) that power must be understood unequivocally as a structural characteristic of a relationship, all pervading and as a structural characteristic, neither good nor bad...We depend on others; others depend on us... A's relationship to B is
always B's relationship to A.
Elias's game models are constructed to demonstrate this relational character of power - to outline the possible permutations of power distributions within the figuration and the ramifying outcomes of such relative strengths. Who, within a figuration, is more or less dependent on the other? Who has to submit or adapt most to the other's demands? Who has the power for withholding what the other requires? Who can more or less realise his/her interests? No one person or group within a figuration is completely power-less, there is always a balance of power, however imbalanced that might be (as I can attest to personally in terms of my changing relationships with my three children as they mature).

Elias has nothing to say about Garfinkel's project, viz. the methodic procedures of practical knowledge which members of any figuration have in making any activity or occasion accountable. Conversely of course, Elias's analysis of power as a fundamental inherent property of figurations is, as noted earlier, the basis of many critiques of ethnomethodology's emphasis upon collaboration, or mutual accountability, and on how social processes are accomplished. Elias is more interested in outcomes as related to the power and resources which individuals bring to bear in interdependent action. This does not refer solely to the naked, overt exercise of power in inherently conflictual circumstances, as in Elias's example of the
'primal contest' (1978:76-80), nor the fact that any individual may or may not choose to employ stocks of knowledge and other resources at his/her disposal (as in the parents/children figuration alluded to briefly above). The key point is the realm of choice available to the relatively power-ful in determining outcomes - one choice being not to exercise such power and consequently not to determine outcomes. This is to be contrasted with the circumscribed choice available to the relatively power-less in any figuration.

It follows from this that the closer the balance of power and resources between individuals or 'interest' groups, the less likely it is that the outcome of the figuralional dynamics will be the expression of the intentions of any one individual or group. This emphasis upon the unintended consequences of social action is critical with respect to this current research project since rule-changes in invasion-games have been depicted as unplanned and unanticipated. The point is succintly expressed by Bendix (1978:12) who notes that Elias's programmatic discussion is inspired by his own socio-historical work which analyses changing patterns of interdependence relative to the power-relations amongst people in societies. Both Bendix and Mennell note that Elias's analysis of the civilising process places great
emphasis on the unintended consequences of intended actions, which rather than being a mere 'footnote' (Mennell), are centrally implicated in social action. Elias (1969:221) emphasises that out of:

the interweaving of innumerable individual interests and intentions - be they compatible or opposed or inimical - something eventually emerges that, as it turns out, has neither been planned nor intended by any single individual. And yet it has been brought about by the intentions and actions of many individuals. (see also Bendix 1978:12) (and Elias 1962:229-32)

Therefore any account of an individual's actions or intentions, which makes no reference to the networks of interdependencies within which such actions take place, is bound to be deficient. Elias develops this, with allusions to 'games', by noting that:

The sequence of moves on either side can only be understood and explained in terms of the immanent dynamics of their interdependence. If the sequence of actions of either side were studied in isolation, they would appear without rhyme or reason. (1978:80),

7.2.2. Functions

This account of interdependent action is further extended in Elias's treatment of the functions which individuals or groups have for each other. Like the concept of power, function is understood as a concept of inter-relationship. Elias is therefore critical of 'structural-functionalist' theories which 'contain an inappropriate value-judgement'. In such perspectives 'function' is used to denote tasks performed by a single component or section within a harmonious whole, and conversely 'dysfunction' to
denote tasks which undermine the integrity of the existing social system. This depiction of the quality of a single unit leaves out the reciprocity (the bi-polarity or multi-polarity) of all functions. Elias writes (1978:78):

It is impossible to understand the function A perform for B without taking into account the function B performs for A....men have a function for women and women for men, parents for children and children for parents.

To this one might add that individual players in a team reciprocally perform functions for one another, opposing teams mutually perform functions for the other, and the game legislators and game players are also functionally interdependent. This idea of functional interdependence together with its close connection with relationships of power is, as will be demonstrated later, critical for understanding how the rules of invasion-games change and how such changes are both unintended and unanticipated. Each interest group performs functions for others and neither can usurp the function of the other, which leads Elias to observe (1978:72):

... the more closely integrated are the components of this composite unit ... the higher the degree of functional interdependence, the less it is possible to explain the properties of the latter only in terms of the former.

As will be explained later, this has clear implications for the study of the 'decisions, moves, and purposes' of players, referees, coaches, legislators and others who have a function in producing sports processes, especially with
reference to their respective interests in the rules of the game.

7.2.3. Levels

Elias's models are differentiated in terms of both the relative power held by opposing individuals, and in terms of the relative complexity of the figuration. The models range from simple 2-person dyadic figurations to more complex multi-polar and multi-levelled figurations. For the 'player' in more complex networks the figuration becomes more 'opaque' in terms of both its direction and development, since there is a limit to the span of chains of interdependence within which an individual can orientate him/herself. Elias stresses that people's knowledge of the networks in which they act is usually incomplete and often inaccurate. Strategies of individual and collective action, based on inadequate knowledge is therefore bound to have unanticipated consequences.

Moreover, one outcome of the opacity of figurations might be a pressure for figurations to reorganise when, through an increase in the number of interdependent 'players', functioning deteriorates. This reorganisation might take several forms - making new figurations of interdependent people, or splintering into smaller groups, or remaining integrated but reforming into more complex two-tier figurations.

Although Elias does not explicitly discuss this, these
three options are not mutually exclusive alternatives. The history of the bureaucratic development of any of the invasion-games in this study provide examples of each of these reorganising strategies. It is possible to trace the growing complexity of game figurations, the tensions and conflicts of interest which make for disintegration and for more densely interdependent integration, and the consequences which flow from these reorganising strategies. As noted above, Elias examines figurational dynamics in terms of the numbers of people involved in the networks of interdependence, the relative power and functions of individuals and groups within these networks, and the degree of integration achieved within and between groups at different levels. Complex figurations are characterised by multi-polar control and, as they develop in complexity, an equalising change in the balance of power. This means that the outcome of figurational dynamics is less likely to be the expression of the intentions of any one individual or group.

Sports groups are two-tier figurations since, the second level consists of those who are delegated power, as bureaucratic functionaries to coordinate, administer, and legislate for game-processes. These delegates are ultimately dependent upon and accountable to the first tier of players but also articulate with a third tier of 'players'
outside the institutional nexus of the specific invasion-game - the axis of sponsorship, advertising, and media. The term 'axis' is an apposite term as it connotes the mutual interdependency of these interests. Hence there are three levels of analysing invasion-game figurations which can be represented as follows:

**Figure 7.1. Game Figurations**

**Level 1**  -  Game-Processes: as played with reference to the game-pattern provided by game-rules.

**Level 2**  -  Game-Worlds: the groups involved in producing game-processes.

**Level 3**  -  Game-Spectacles: the groups who have commercial interests in game-processes.

It was argued in Chapter 6 that Elias and Dunning explain the incidence of rule-changes to level 1 primarily in terms of the development of this third level, whilst a perspective is provided here in terms of the dynamics within level two, viz. game-worlds.

**7.3. Game Worlds**

Kenyon (1969:78) and Loy, Mcpherson and Kenyon (1976:18) provide a description of the 'social roles' associated with primary and secondary involvement in sport. Adapting from these two accounts, this involvement is depicted as follows:
This characterisation of social roles is presented by the authors merely as a social ontology. There is no analysis of the development of modes of sports involvement, nor of how social 'roles' have become more differentiated over time. The term 'role' implies a harmonious system of game-production within which specific groups are well-integrated. Consequently, this depiction underplays conflicts of interest and structurally generated tensions both within and between the different groups. In contradistinction to Loy, McPherson and Kenyon, my designation of game-worlds encompasses only 'primary sport involvement' and the 'direct producers' in secondary sports involvement. The term 'game-world' is appropriated from
Becker's (1984) analysis of the networks and circles of "art-worlds". This includes the direct producers (ie. the players) but also, invoking Bourdieu's phrase (1985) 'the producers of the producers' including those who govern and police such processes (governing bodies, referees, linesmen, umpires), 'technical' personnel (trainers, coaches, managers) and 'professional' groups such as sports psychologists, physiotherapists etc. Hence, 'game-worlds' are more extensive figurations than Elias and Dunning's 'sports-groups', but brackets out those interest groups (eg. media, sponsors) who are not formed by virtue of their function in 'producing game-processes' (ie the indirect producers of secondary sport involvement in Loy et.al.'s characterisation).

The history of the game-worlds of invasion-games has been one of growing complexity since their inception and has been characterised by an increasing division of specific functions, and hence longer chains of interdependence.

At the formative stages of their development, game-worlds were relatively simple figurations. The formation of Governing Bodies Association Football (1863), Rugby Union (1871), Hockey (1882) might usefully be characterised—using Bishop and Hoggett's (1986) analysis of voluntary associations in leisure as 'organising around
enthusiasms'. (5) Dunning and Sheard (1979:235) depict the amateur ethos, dominant during the formative period of 'game-worlds' as a 'variant of the middle-class ethic of voluntary association' involving non-renumerated labour in terms of playing, refereeing, administrative, and facility/ground maintenance. The power of the newly constituted governance extended little further than formulating the 'laws' of the game in order to standardise conditions of play. The institution of referees was resisted for a time in both soccer and rugby since it was assumed that any law-transgressions were unintended. As attested to by Elias and Dunning, these early 'game-worlds' celebrated an amateur ethos. Translated into games conduct, it means an interest in games as an end in themselves, an intrinsic focus upon the manner of playing rather than on outcomes in terms of winning. (6) This is adeptly encapsulated by Henry Newbolt's poem 'Vitae Lampada'.

(5) Bishop and Hoggett provide a detailed and fascinating account of the structure and dynamics of leisure groups. These together with sports, include such diverse enthusiasms as military modelling, lapidary, metal detecting, square dancing, deep water angling, allotments. Each of these provide communities or 'worlds' of shared interests.

(6) Dunning and Sheard (1979:153) identify three elements in a 'constellation of normative and behavioural attributes' associated with the amateur ethos; viz. pursuit of the activity as an end 'in itself'; self-restraint, the norm of 'fair play'.
- 'it's not for the sake of a ribboned coat....nor a season's fame....its how you play the game'. Early game worlds were therefore characterised by an undeveloped division of functions, a relatively loose policing of game processes and, arising from the homogeneity social composition of participants, a homology of interests between players and governing bodies. Hence there was little structural pressure to develop other-directed instrumentalised playing styles. These simple communities of interest have developed into more complex, densely interdependent networks characterised by an increasing division of functions, and patterns of multi-polar control. Applying Elias's analysis of 'game-models', the trend has been for the second 'tier' or 'level' of players viz. special functionaries with delegated powers, to become more differentiated. Technical and paramedical services to players (eg. exercise physiologists, psychologists, physiotherapists) have been designed with accredited qualifications and organised into professional bodies. Extensive training courses for referees/umpires have developed with a graded hierarchy of levels of competence. Similarly, 'coach education' courses confer certificates of competence (at different levels) on alumni. Each of these represent increasingly professionalised communities of interest who sell their skills in the market viz. to fulfil specific functions within game worlds.
7.3.1. The Game-world of Basketball

One example of the development of more complex game-worlds is provided by comparing the structure and organisation of the Amateur Basketball Association (A.B.B.A.) in the 1960's with the English Basketball Association (E.B.B.A.) in the 1980's. (7) Table 7.1 identifies the key developments during that period.

Of particular interest for the current project is to note the recent reorganisation of the game-world of basketball into specific interest groups consequent upon the increasing complexity of the figuration. The English Association of Basketball Officials (E.A.B.O.) and Basketball Coaches Association of England (B.C.A.E.) have, according to my respondents been formed to 'look after their own interests', to develop technical expertise, and in the case of E.A.B.O., to act as a pressure group to increase payments of referees and table officials and organise equipment deals. The E.A.B.O. and B.C.A.E. are represented on the Officiating and Coaching committees of the E.B.B.A. respectively.

(7) The A.B.B.A. was disbanded in 1970, and English, Scottish, Welsh and Irish Associations were formed in its place.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Table 7.1</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Structure and Organisation of British Basketball</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960's</td>
<td>1980's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Structure of ABBA</td>
<td>1. Structure of EBBA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) National Executive Committee</td>
<td>a) National Executive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10 members)</td>
<td>(15-17 members)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) No Full-Time Professional Officer</td>
<td>6 Full-Time Professional Officers (Sec., Senior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Technical, Competitions,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regional Development,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marketing &amp; Development.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(plus 8 Administrative staff)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Committee Structure</td>
<td>2. Committee Structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) International</td>
<td>a) Policy &amp; Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Finance and General Purposes</td>
<td>b) Coaching</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Coaching and Officiating</td>
<td>c) Competitions</td>
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<td></td>
<td>d) Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>e) Disciplinary, Appeals and Procedure</td>
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<td></td>
<td>f) International</td>
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<td>g) Officiating</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>h) League Liaison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Plus ad hoc sub-committees, eg. on the drug problem)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Technical Qualifications</td>
<td>3. Technical Qualifications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Coaching : Grades 1 and 2</td>
<td>a) Coaching : 5 Grades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Refereeing : Grades 1 and 2</td>
<td>(Senior/1/2/Prelim/Leader)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b) Refereeing : 5 Grades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1/2/3/Prelim/Junior)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c) Table Officials : Grades 1 and 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Regional Competitions (Men)</td>
<td>a. British Basketball League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) National Knock-Out Cup (Men)</td>
<td>Ltd (1986)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. National Basketball League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1972) Divisions 1 (men and women)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c. NBL Division 2 (Men)(1988)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NBL Division 2 (Women)(1988)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d. NBL Regionalised Div. 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Men)(1989)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NBL Regionalised Div. 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 5. **Specialist Organisations**  
| a) English Schools Basketball Association (1957) |
| 5. **Specialist Organisations**  
| a) E.S.B.A.  
| b) English Mini BB Association  
| c) GB Wheelchair BB Association  
| d) GB Wheelchair Officials Association  

| 6. **Sponsorship**  
| None  
| 6. **Sponsorship (in 1988-89)**  
| (i) Basketball League Ltd : Carlsberg UK Ltd., National Westminster Bank  
| (ii) Coca Cola (Great Britain) Ltd, Converse (UK) Ltd, Spalding Sports (UK) Ltd, Mitre Sports American Airlines |

*Information gained by interview with (i) the President and with the Competitions Officer of the EBBA, and (ii) from the EBBA Annual Report 1987-88, 1988-89.*
There have been recent moves to form a players association similar to the Rugby League Players Association but this has, to date, proved impractical because of the relatively small number of professional players in the game. However in 1986, the British Basketball league was formed as a Limited Company, from the previous season’s Division 1 of the National Basketball League, a move symptomatic of the professionalising of the British game which created tension with the EBBA. One of my respondents from the EBBA, said that the game was 'bedevilled by millionaires on ego-trips' whose ownership of clubs in the BBL was motivated solely by creating winning teams rather than a concern with the longer-term development of the game in Britain. (8) A recognition of the increasing dependency of EBBA upon sponsorship and endorsement agreements, is the recent appointment by EBBA of a professional officer for 'marketing and development'.

(8) Other examples of the disintegration of game-worlds through the professionalisation of sport include:
(i) The effect of entrepreneurs Kerry Packer and Bob Lord on cricket and rugby respectively.
(ii) The recent idea of a 'super league' in soccer outside the football league.
(iii) Professional tennis circuits.
(iv) The threat of breakaway from the F.A. by the British Football Association.
(v) The retreat of ex-public school amateur soccer players from the F.A. Cup to the F.A. Amateur Challenge Cup (893) and thence in 1902 to the Arthur Dunn Cup. Even a marginal regional sport such as fell-running has amateur and professional associations - the Fell Running Association (FRA) and the British Open Fell Running Association (BOFA).
Another development is the formation of the British and Irish Basketball Federation whose constituent bodies are the EBBA and the Welsh, Irish and Scottish Associations. This body is responsible for Olympic and other international representation, and according to the President of EBBA, there is now pressure from F.I.B.A. (the International Federation) to make the British Federation the sole representative of British basketball at international fora, a move which is resisted by national associations. (9)

Hence the recent history of basketball illustrates increasing complexity and subsequent reorganisation which generates tensions and lines of fracture within the game-world (interest groups of administrators, referees,

(9) The development of the structure and organisation of Rugby League in Britain closely resembles Basketball eg. (i) Professional officers for coaching, referees, publicity, finance, administration, marketing and students. (ii) Formation of British Rugby League referees Society, (delegates from Yorkshire, Lancashire and Cumbrian County Societies) to seek 'clarifications on the laws'. (iii) A players organisation (now disbanded). (iv) Rugby league National Coaching Scheme (1983). (v) The restructuring of the game's administration in 1974 with the formation of British Amateur Rugby League Association separate from the Rugby league (professional game).
coaches, and professional and amateur players (10) including actual fragmentation in the case of the BBL. Developmental strategies also necessitate valencies outside of the game-world eg. working closely with the Sports Council (at national and regional level), the Central Council of Physical Recreation, the Sports Aid Foundation, The National Coaching Foundation, the British Association of National Sports Administrators, the British Association of National Coaches, and the British Olympic Association.

Clearly not all the tensions and conflicts within increasingly complex invasion game-worlds have a direct bearing upon changes to the structure of game-processes. Conversely however game-processes, and their development over time, cannot be adequately understood without reference to the 'game-worlds' within which they are produced.

7.4. Game-World Dynamics and Rule Changes

Game-worlds environ game-processes and as the earlier research materials suggest, the primary tension (which

(10) This does not preclude the possibility that any individual might have dual or several functions eg. as coach, as player, as referee, as administrator. Many individuals' sports careers develop from players to one or more of 'external controlling' functions identified earlier. Many analyses of sports careers provide a gender or race critique eg. White and Brackenridge (1985), Lashley (1989) i.e. inequalities of opportunity to develop careers in sport on retirement as a player.
necessitates rule-change) is between legislators and players.

Other groups can be subsumed under these two groups. With respect to game-structure, the interests of referees, umpires, linespersons, table-officials etc. can be subsumed under those of game-legislators since their function is to carry out the intentions of legislators insofar as they interpret them. The interests of coaches, (11) managers, physiotherapists etc. can be subsumed under those if players since their function is to advise, manage, train, prepare players for competition. This polarity between players at level 1 and the legislators at level 2 of the game-world figuration represents a reformulation of Elias and Dunning's polarity no. 5 (external control/self-control of players).

A perspective upon the fixing and re-fixing of 'elastic' rules (Elias and Dunning's polarity no. 8) can be developed in terms of Elias's (1978a) analysis of the relative power and functions of groups within networks of interdependent people, consequent upon these divisions of functions, legislators and players have different interests and specific power in producing game-processes -

(11) The reference here is to coaches of actual teams rather than officers of national associations responsible for the development of coaching standards and the organising of accreditation courses.
power which cannot be usurped by the 'opposing' groups. Hence these two groups, at separate levels in the figuration, have a different relationship to the rules or structure of the game. Their interdependence is confirmed by noting as Elias (1978:86) does with reference to 'games' played on two levels:

both levels are dependent on each other and possess different reciprocal power chances corresponding to the degree of their dependence on each other.

Contrary to conventional wisdom that depicts legislators as being the only group with power to determine game-rules, I argue that the power differential between the 'players' on the first and second tiers is relatively small; ie. the power chances of players at level 1 are ensured by their specific function of putting the game-structure into practice, and by the characteristics of fixed but elastic rules.

The balance of power and conflicts of interest within game-worlds reflect, or perhaps more accurately refract the irreducible tension-balance within game-processes. Elias and Dunning (1971) provide one characterisation of these polarities. (12) The following is an attempt to describe, in terms of players functions, the necessary commitments

(12) Polarities nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 in Elias and Dunning's analysis of 'sports-groups' depict the internal dynamics of game-processes without direct reference to supra-game controls.
inherent in playing the game. These might be stated as:

(i) a commitment to process and to outcomes;

(ii) a commitment to cooperating, associating and competing.

Together these cross-cutting dimensions, which are inherent in game-processes, provide a framework for understanding the relative power, functions, and interests of groups in game-worlds.

7.4.1. Game-Processes

a) Processes and Outcomes

Invasion-games provide a deliberately contrived and gratuitous challenge. The challenge is to invade territory in order to achieve an end (scoring points, goals, trys etc.). But this challenge is hedged about by conditions which make such an achievement gratuitously difficult. The conditions are provided by the equipment (eg. an oval ball, a hockey stick) and most crucially by rules which are designed to simultaneously constrain yet enable actions in pursuit of the goal.

The conditioned challenge of invasion-games therefore presents an interdependent tension between realising an end result (without which processes have little meaning) and realising processes, the manner of achieving the desired result in ways condoned by 'police'. Each is dependent on the other for its meaning.
Hence the playing of any invasion-game necessitates a commitment to both a process, and to a striving to achieve ends which are a culmination of that process, without both these, the viability of the game qua game is undermined. This inherent duality of games can be upset or spoilt in two contradictory ways both of which undermine game identity and game viability, or what Elias and Dunning call the 'tone' of the game. One way is to subordinate process to end-results typified by the apocryphal quote attributed to Vince Lombardi, an American football coach, who is reputed to have said..."Winning isn't everything, it is the only thing". According to Elias and Dunning (and exemplified by Lombardi's playing strategies) such a subordination of process eventuates in an increase in deliberate rule-violations, but, as has also been argued, chronic rule-changes are another manifestation.

The other way is to celebrate the process to such an extent that winning becomes nothing other than an incidental by-product. The community-based 'New Games' movement promoted by Leonard (1978), Fleugelman (1978), are an example of this. Many commentators on modern sport (eg. Meggyssey (1975), Hoch (1972), Gardner (1971), Weiss (1969), Huizinga (1938), Kew (1978), Novak (1980), Guttmann (1978), chronicle the instrumentalisation and growing 'seriousness' of games processes at the expense of intrinsic playful qualities of sports. Yet these critiques of modern sports
do not 'capture' the irreducible tension between processes and outcomes implicated in game-processes. Moreover, this irreducible tension is often caricatured in depictions of the amateur ethos as being an intrinsic interest in game-processes ie. as 'an end in itself' whilst conversely professionalism is simplistically conceived as an interest in outcomes—in winning games. All game-players—to be 'consecrated' as players—must display a commitment to both process and outcome.

b) Collaborating and Competing

As reviewed in chapter 5, one of the key criticisms of ethnomethodological accounts is that Garfinkel depicts social processes as essentially being collaborative whereby members, as a matter of course, draw upon stocks of knowledge in tacitly accomplishing social order. Taylor, Walton and Young (1973), Giddens (1982), Goldthorpe (1973), Gleeson and Erben (1976) are all critical of the minimalism of this perspective since there is no acknowledgement of power-differentials which affect both the medium and outcome of the social process. Nevertheless, all players of invasion-games must collaborate in order to realise the game process as a game of ...basketball or hockey etc. whilst competing against the other team. Moreover, individuals within particular teams collaborate in order to deploy their resources and thereby compete effectively. Luschen (1970)
provides an insightful analysis of collaboration amongst members of sports teams through which he distinguishes between 'co-operation' and 'association', and also questions the conventional definition of games as competitive zero-sum activity. (13)

Both cooperation and association are forms of collaboration but 'cooperation' is a type of 'vergemeinschaftung' where rewards are shared whereas 'association' is not determined by reward-sharing but rather by:

an internally and externally controlled system, a configuration of opposing teams and players in relative equilibrium. (1970:31)

He suggests, on this basis, that sports may be more useful for Game Theory (as non-zero-sum games) than is recognised. Nevertheless, this distinction is useful to distinguish between intra-team collaboration (cooperation) which is not a property of the game per se and inter-team collaboration (association) which is an inherent property. This elaborates upon Elias and Dunning's idea of groups-in-controlled-tension, and particularly the polarity between

(13) Sutton-Smith (1973) for example stresses competition or conflict in games to the exclusion of forms of collaboration. Games are 'a process of abstracting and comprehending cultural crises by casting them in the form of ludic antitheses'. Games are defined (1973:71) as 'an opposition of forces for the purpose of an uncertain outcome..a simplification of conflicts which are seldom desirable in the normative course of society', Sutton-Smith's perspective provides no analytic purchase upon the complex social dynamics inherent in game processes.
identification with, and hostile rivalry against opponents. These dynamics operate amongst the first tier of players who are performing, in effect, functions for one another. Hence, collaboration and competition forms a duality in invasion-games rather than being polar opposites.

Taken together, the interdependencies between process and outcome, and between co-operating, associating and competing represent the key tensions in invasion-games both between the two teams and amongst the individual players within each team. Together these represent the necessary functions of game-players. (Figure 7.3)

Figure 7.3. Players Functions

The failures by players to make a game accountable might include either deliberate rule-violations or breaching the background constitutive expectancies of games-playing. Rule-breakers simply fail to acknowledge the circumscriptions, (ie. the 'preferred' rules) on the means through which ends might be achieved. It is a weakness of the formulated rules if the outcomes of such action does not sufficiently disadvantage the offending individual or team's chances of competing successfully. The 'despoiler' in the first case-
study described in Chapter 3 singularly failed to comply with taken-for-granted assumptions about both inter- and intra-team collaborating. This led members to further 'define' amend and clarify the means or processes through which the contrived ends of the game should be achieved.

This characterisation of the interdependent commitments and functions of players provides a framework for understanding their interests and power relative to those of game-legislators and game--police whose functions in making games accountable differ from those of players.

7.5. Functions, Interests, Power and Resources

Legislators and 'police' are interested primarily in processes not end results; in preserving game identity and viability and enabling this to be consistently displayed. They are, perforce, agnostic to the outcome of any particular instance of games-playing as long as there is a preponderence of winning/losing over tied or drawn games. In exercising their legislative function, rule-makers attempt to anticipate the consequences for the playing process of their rule-enactments in order to impose their intentions and realise their interests.

Their power stems from an exclusive responsibility for constructing the agenda of formal games-playing procedures. Supported by their lieutenants (game-officials) they police but do not play the game. They are the guardians of the
games structure - a structure which, to ensure its viability, must allow considerable power of agency in collaborating and competing. Their responses depend on a collective ability to anticipate the consequences of their modifications of the rules.

Players and their 'advisers' are necessarily interested in both processes and in end results, they must play in a manner which is condoned by legislators and game officials in order for outcomes to be 'consecrated'. But arising from the competitive frameworks and extra-situational imperatives in which games are played, they are motivated primarily by the realisation of a satisfactory outcome to the game process.

Players' power stems from putting the formal agenda of fixed yet elastic rules into practice. Since rules necessarily allow for a variety of intra-team collaboration (in terms of the spatial distribution of players, the skills developed, and strategies adopted), their power is ensured. With respect to playing in ways condoned-by-the-police, players seek substantive outcomes. Supported by technical personnel, (coaches, trainers etc.) they devise particular patterns of interweaving based upon an assessment of both their own and of the opposition's resources. One facet of this is to explore the potentialities for action within the structure of the rules as provided by legislators and
interpreted by players.

The dynamic between players and legislators/police consequent upon a division of their functions and their relative power is illustrated in the game-world of basketball by the publication by the EBBA of a 'case-book'. This provides commentaries and interpretations on the Official Rules of basketball as determined by FIBA and adopted by the EBBA. This substantial 84-page document describes actual instances of players' actions (in pursuit of their interests) before stating how the formal rules 'governing' those actions in different elements of the game ought to be interpreted. The case-book provides documentary evidence of how legislators and 'police' marshal their resources as an interest group, and how the former advise the latter on the meanings and applications of specific rules. Two representative extracts are given below.

Rule 1:

1. Definition

1.1 The prime object of the game is to throw the ball into the opponent's basket.

(a) If the ball goes into the team's own basket by mistake, the points are credited to the opponent's captain.

(b) Intentional own basket scoring constitutes a Technical Foul.

(c) Persistent own basket scoring, after the award of a Technical Foul, shall be penalised by forfeiting the game. (See articles 17 - Duties and Powers of Referee; and 76 Relationships - Definition).
1.2 It is the duty of the referee to see that the game takes place (except for forfeit see Article 33 - Game To Be Forfeited) with any disputes being considered by the appropriate authority afterwards.

1.3 Play - Player A4 intentionally scores into his own basket.

Ruling - Basket shall count to Team B. Technical Foul charged against A4 and the ball is brought into play from the end line by Team A.

Rule 39:

Dead Ball

39.1 If points are awarded for a violation of Article 30 interference with the ball in defence; the whistle should be blown to confirm the basket and because it is a violation it should be permissible for a substitution to take place (as under article 40 - Substitution) or for either team, to have a time-out (as under article 41 - Charged Time-out). Following such a violation, the end line Official must handle the ball.

For a violation of article 30 - interference with the Ball in Defence; during a free throw situation the same procedure for confirming the basket should be adopted, except that no substitution of charged time-outs is permissible following the violation. (See Article 4) - Charged Time-out - Exception; and Article 46 - Substitution.

39.2 Play - A4's* shot for goal bounces off the ring. A5 and D4 are attempting to rebound. D4 fouls A5 who taps the ball towards the basket. The foul is called and the ball:

(a) Continues through the basket.
(b) Misses the basket.

Ruling - Charge the foul against D4 and in the case of:

(a) Award Basket and one Free Throw to A5.
(b) Award A5 2 Free Throws or option.

* A = Attacking Player, D = Defending Player
39.3 Play - A4's shot for goal is in flight when time expires. The ball then rests on the rim of the basket and:
   (a) A5 jumps and taps the ball into the basket.
   (b) D4 jumps and taps the ball away.
   (c) A5 and D4 jump and touch the ball simultaneously.

Ruling - in the above cases if:
(a) No basket.
(b) The goal counts and two or three points awarded to A4.
(c) Whether the ball continues through the basket or not the basket is disallowed.
 Also interpretation 35.10.

39.4 Play - A4's shot for goal is in flight when time expires. While the ball is on its downward flight, and is above the level of the ring:
(a) A5 jumps and taps the ball into the basket.
(b) D4 jumps and taps the ball away from the basket.
(c) A5 and D4 jump and tap the ball simultaneously.

Ruling - in the above cases:
(a) No basket.
(b) The goal counts and either 2 or 3 points awarded to A4.
(c) No basket.
 Also interpretation 35.11.

39.5 The provisions in 39.3 and 39.4 refer only to a 'shot for goal' and do not refer to passes, deflections or throws through a team's own basket.
 Also interpretation 35.12.

39.6 Play - A4's shot is in flight when the ball is tipped on its upward flight by D6. Time for the period expires:
(a) After the ball has left the shooters hand and before the tip, or
(b) After the tip.
 In each case the shot scores.

Ruling - No basket in both instances.

39.7 Play - At a jump-ball at a free-throw line the ball is tapped towards the basket. While the ball is
travelling towards the basket from the tap, playing
time expires, but the ball goes into the basket
after the end of time.

Ruling - No basket can be scored. Players at a
jump-ball are not considered to be in the act of
shooting and the ball becomes dead when time
expires.

39.8 Play - A foul occurs on the shooter while the ball
is still in his hands. As part of a continuous
action he manages to shoot and scores (See
Interpretation 85.3).

Ruling - The basket counts, except if the foul was
simultaneous with the end of playing time. In this
case if the ball had not been released by the
shooter before time expired the basket would not
count, and free throws would be awarded.

39.9 Play - Referee blows his whistle for a 3 seconds
violation, or the 30 second equipment sounds, after
the ball has left the hand of the shooter.
The shot
(a) Scores
(b) Misses

Ruling - in the case of
(a) The Basket counts
(b) Jump Ball

39.10 Play - A4 shoots and, after the ball has left his
hand, is fouled by D4. The shot hits the ring and
is then played by:
(a) A5 who taps it into the basket.
(b) D5 who taps it away.
(c) A5 and D5 who play it simultaneously.

Ruling - in all cases, charge D4 with the foul and
in all cases no basket is allowed - restart from the
sideline opposite where the foul occurred - throw in
to Team A.

39.11 The concept of delaying the dead ball caused by D4's
foul above is in order to 'permit' the shot to enter
the basket and the touching of the ball subsequently
by other players terminates such provisions. If D4's
foul had been deemed intentional or was the team's
eighth, then in all cases A4 would be awarded two
free throws or One plus One, as appropriate.
39.12 Play - A4 shoots and the ball has clearly left his hand when time expires. A5 is fouled by D4. This foul would be Team D’s eighth foul in the half. The shot is not successful. The foul could occur -
(a) Before the signal sounds for the end of playing time.
(b) After the signal sounds for the end of playing time.

**Ruling** - in the case of:-
(a) The foul is charged and One plus One free throws are awarded to A5. The half end when the free throws have been taken.
(b) The half ends with the sounding of the signal and no foul shall be charged and no free throws awarded.

See Article 19 - Time and Place for Decisions; regarding action to be taken if unsportsmanlike behaviour occurs between the end of playing time and signing the Scoresheet. (See interpretations 19.11 and 22.3).

Many of the key elements of the present study’s analysis of game-rules are illustrated by this case-book. It provides testimony to (a) the inherent difficulties facing the legislators in pursuit of their interests in game-processes, (b) the balance of power between two functionally interdependent interest groups, and (c) the insufficiency of formulated rules in accounting for players’actions. As illustrated even Rule 1 which purports to define the game is not immune from possible mis-interpretations which undermine game-identity and game-viability.

The two extracts provided above are about interpretations of just two elements of two rules of basketball, and are wholly representative of comments and
interpretations about each of the 9 rules of the game. These 9 rules are subdivided by FIBA into 93 'articles' and, in this case-book, no fewer than 80 of these articles are deemed to need clarification or further interpretation. The complexity of this is demonstrated by noting the instances of play which need interpretation under article 88 (Fouls in special situations) and article 80 (personal fouls). Under article 88, the case-book lists no fewer than 43 instances of playing action which require interpretation whilst article 80 lists 27 instances. For the whole of Rule 9 (Rules of Conduct) there are no fewer than 184 separate comments and interpretations of 90 instances of playing situations. As if this is not sufficient, referees and table officials are asked to take note of two addenda to the 1985 text consequent upon developments in 1986. The first addendum provides 24 'new interpretations' which were omitted from the original text but now deemed to be necessary for further clarification. The second addendum lists 21 interpretations which arise from one rule-change (to the Free Throw Rule) in 1986.

Many of these represent the attempts of legislators to account for instances of eccentric, bizarre, or freakish behaviour in games. It is, in this context, pertinent to cite Abrams' (1982) observations about Elias. Comparing Elias with the project s developed by Bourdieu and Giddens, Abrams (1982:240) argues that accounting for 'figurational
freaks' (14) is the ultimate test for Eliasian perspectives:

'it is the explanation of the eccentric, unexpected, innovating or deviant identity or career that is the crucially important test for figurational sociology.

Three key points about game-world dynamics have been made to explain rule-changes as the outcome of figurational dynamics in 'game-worlds'. First, invasion-games inherently require a collaborative and competitive dynamic, and a commitment to both processes and end-results. Second, the interests, functions, power and resources of the two key groups differ with respect to these dynamics. Third, these conflicts of interest, function, power and resources are played out in terms of the rules and chronic changes to these rules is the outcome of these 'euphemised' contests.

Changes to the preservative and enabling rules can therefore be explained as the outcome of the interaction between different interest groups whose strategies differ according to their relationship to the rules. Because all parties have some power within this social nexus, no one party is able to impose its own definition on the games process. It follows that the outcome of the interaction between legislators, and players, - at the site of the preservative and enabling rules - is replete with unintended consequences.

(14) The despoiler's action in the first case study might usefully be interpreted as eccentric in Abram's sense; preservative/enabling rules - is replete with unintended and hence unanticipated consequences.
7.6. **Unintended Consequences**

In an earlier discussion of the structuring and restructuring of invasion-game processes (5.5.3.), it was argued that no instance of $S$ in the sequence $S_1 \rightarrow A_1 \rightarrow S_2 \rightarrow A_2 \rightarrow S_N$ allows one to predict ensuing $A$. The basketball case-book provides testimony to the variety of instances of $A$ which arise in response to a given $S$, and which necessitate supplementary commentary to decide on their 'legality'. Hence, 'looking forward' through the $S \rightarrow A \rightarrow S \rightarrow A$ sequence, it is clear that, any stage of $S$ has unanticipated and unintended consequences.

Giddens (1985:13-14) identifies three main research contexts in which the influence of the unintended consequences of intentional conduct might be analysed. (15) Two of these are pertinent for the current project. The first context is the cumulation of events arising from one initiating circumstance, an archetypal example of which is Gavrilo Princip shooting Archduke Ferdinand at Sarajevo, thereby setting in train a set of events leading to the

(15) Merton (1936) prefers the term 'unanticipated' rather than 'unintended', but a distinction needs to be made. Giddens (1985:37-38) argues that 'intending' implies knowledge of consequences of action and hence anticipation. The two cannot be conflated. Anticipating doesn't require intending something to happen, but 'one cannot' intend something to happen without anticipating it might happen. This is the case with game-legislators, hence the description 'unintended' is preferred.
outbreak of World War I. In the more mundane context of games-playing it has been shown that a change to the rule of one element of a game (to enhance one characteristic of characteristic of game-viability) has a 'knock-on' effect to other elements of the game thereby detracting from other characteristics of game-viability. The extended discussion of the play-the-ball and scrummaging rules in rugby league is an illustrative example, as is the tackle law as defined in 1958 and again in 1970, 1978, and 1984.

The second connotation arises in trying to explain a pattern of events as an unintended consequence of an aggregate of courses of intentional conduct. Boudon's (1982:43) discussion of ethnic segregation, and also of the effects of a democratisation of educational opportunities in the 1960's are both examples. Similarly the successive restructuring of invasion-games identified in 4.5 and 5.4 derives as an unintended consequence from the aggregate of earlier intentional action. Legislators intend that their rule-making will, apart from clarifications and issues about implementing or policing the rules, be sufficient for all practical purposes. Moreover, players in their interpretations of the rules and subsequent development of skills and strategies do not intend for the rule to be changed since rule change is not in their interests. Therefore S at any one time is an aggregated outcome of all prior instances of intended action at A and at S. Boudon
(1982:14) calls this 'perverse effects', a basic mechanism involved in social change,

    when two or more individuals in pursuing a given objective, generate an unintended state of affairs which may be undesirable from the point of view of both or one of them.

The difference in invasion-games from Boudon's account is that in the latter, the conditions of action are unacknowledged insofar as individuals are acting independently of one another. Invasion-games however represent a relatively closed system in which members 'orientate' their actions with respect to each other and the unintended outcomes of their intended actions feed back to provide the acknowledged conditions of successive action ie. the new rules. Both connotations of unintended consequences - as an accumulation of events, and as perverse effects - are implicated in the structuring of games over time.

7.7. **Summary and Observations**

The aim of this chapter has been to demonstrate the potential of a figurational perspective upon the progressive restructuring of games. Applying Elias's account of figurational dynamics one can explore the valencies of each group within 'game-worlds', the relational character of power and resources between each group and the interests of different groups arising from their assigned function within
the networks of interdependency.

One unintended consequence of these dynamics is the continual restructuring of games, a process which cannot be reduced to an account of increasing violence. This explanation is consistent with Elias's analysis of figurational dynamics brought into being through industrialisation viz. functional democratisation, reciprocal dependency, multi-polar control; and also with Dunning's analysis of the trend towards other-directed instrumentalised forms of sports participation. Correlative with the increasing social significance of sport, 'game-worlds' have become more complex, more densely interdependent thereby engendering structural tensions and clashes of group interests.

Changes to many of the rules of invasion games together with the need for constant clarifications, are the unanticipated and unintended consequences of conflicts of interest within the network of functionally interdependent groups in a game-world, each of whom mobilise their respective power and resources to realise their interests and in making the game accountable. Figure 7.4. summarises the key elements of this process.
The much publicised increase in (calculative) violence which necessarily involves breaking the rules of invasion-games, as testified by Elias and Dunning, is not the issue at stake. Such rule breaking actually interferes with the realisation of player's interests if punished sufficiently and results in the cessation of game-processes. The above explanation suggests that, even without manifest and/or deliberate rule violations, games would still be
restructured as an outcome of figurational dynamics in game worlds.

Game worlds have developed so that there is a functional differentiation or division of labour between deciding on rules and playing games with respect to those rules. In addition, game rules necessarily allow for multiple response in order for the game to sustain viability. Taken together, these suggest that there is a nisus towards rule changes whether rules are breached or not. The growing seriousness of sport is manifest in increasing rule-legislation little of which is impelled by growing violence and rule breaking. Increasingly serious sport only accelerates an inherent characteristic of the complex dynamics between interest groups who produce games, i.e. between the first and second levels of players as identified in Figure 7.1.

In the previous chapter it was noted that Elias, Dunning and Sheard provide an explanation in terms of the third level in game-figurations (or the 'indirect producers' in the terminology of Loy, McPherson and Kenyon). More specifically, rule changes are explained as legislators' efforts to 'spectacularise' the game thus shifting the balance away from players' interests. Dunning and Sheard suggest, with particular reference to changes to the kicking rules in rugby union, that invasion-games legislators continue to rationalise their rule-enactments in
terms of a player-centred amateur ethos although the growing
dependency upon commercial sponsorship of the game belies
the reasons behind such rule-enactments. The tension
between player and spectator interests and the need to
consider not only elite levels of play is clearly recognised
by Gagney the R.F.U. member of the International Board who
prefaces his account of changes to the laws of the game from
1949 to 1972 by stating (1973:i):

...the natural desire to make alterations in the law
purely for the sake of providing our necessary and
faithful supporters with 'a thrill a minute' has
always been second place to the determination
only to make sensible changes in the law that can
be played and administered at every level of our
amateur game.

Nevertheless, there is considerable evidence to
suggest, as documented by Hargreaves (1986), and Maguire
(1988) that many rule-changes do corroborate Dunning and
Sheard's explanation. Hargreaves for example argues that if
a sport wants to attract investment from sponsors and TV 'it
has to adapt itself to its specific requirements, and it is
in this way that the character of some existing sports has
already been altered'. (1986:129) With particular reference
to basketball, Maguire suggests that rule changes are made
to 'speed up the game', 'increase the speed of scoring', and
to create a better spectacle 'enhancing its appeal as
'something to be consumed'.

There are many classic examples of this as the
following list demonstrates:

(i) One-day cricket; 30 metre circle around the wicket to legislate against defensive field placings; (ii) tie-break in tennis and squash; (iii) the 15 point game in squash and points awarded for each rally; (iv) the preponderance of stroke-play competitions in golf at the expense of match-play (singles, four-balls, foursomes); (v) the competitive structure of indoor (televised) bowls compared with traditional outdoor competitions; (vi) the demise of billiards, the spectacular development of snooker, and the creation of TV competitions eg. Pot Black (16). Clearly, the more reliant a sport becomes upon sponsors, the greater the opportunity for the latter to enforce conditions thereby leading, as Maguire argues, to an erosion of the power of governing bodies.

Moreover, as acknowledged in the previous chapter, some of the rule changes to invasion-games discussed by Dunning and Sheard (eg. the knock-on/adjustment laws in Rugby Union) are not a response to playing developments, but rather, are motivated by an interest in increasing the game's appeal for both spectators and participants, and in

(16) The dates, times, and venues of sports are also influenced by the demands of TV programming. There are also 'sporting' events, which are nothing but the creation of the media eg. 'The World's Strongest Man', 'Superstars' and 'Survival of the Fittest', the latter being a test of outdoor pursuits skills, but parodying the demands for such practices.
enhancing various characteristics of game-viability (see 5.2.). Nevertheless, the manipulative influence of sponsors/TV, as the above examples illustrate, is more apparent in the development of 'striking' (e.g. cricket), 'net' (tennis, squash) and 'aiming' (golf) (17) games than it is in 'invasion'-games. Clearly, these types of games are more easily manipulated because of their particular game-furnished conditions which, as argued in Chapter 3, do not have the complex patterns of interdependency of invasion-type team games. This is, at least implicitly, recognised by Elias and Dunning since their account of sports groups refers primarily to invasion-games (see Critcher 1988). In this respect it is interesting to note that 7 - a - side rugby, and 5 or 6 - a - side soccer and hockey, as developments from the parent games, have not developed beyond relatively minor competitions confined to specific 'slots' in the annual programme of events, despite their enhanced spectator appeal viz. their celebration of some, if not all, of the characteristics of game-identity and viability discussed earlier. (18)

(17) These designations are from Maulden and Redfern's (1969) classification of games.

(18) Michael Green writing in the Sunday Correspondent (5/11/84) suggests that rule-changes to Rugby Union might accelerate since commercial ITV has outbid the BBC for coverage of the Rugby World Cup in 1991.
This extended critical commentary about changes to game-processes impelled by the influence of 'level 3' in game-figurations (see Figure 7.1.) is, I argue, necessary since these conventional accounts ignore the dynamics within 'game-worlds' (ie. level 2) - dynamics which are replete with unintended consequences, one of which is rule-changes. Rather than perpetuate pernicious dualistic thinking about micro and macro explanations, the aim is simply to demonstrate that analyses of game-development must account for, and provide an account of, the dynamics through which agents in game-worlds act in accomplishing game-processes.

The following chapter considers the recent attempt by the Gaelic Athletic Association and the National Football League of Australia to enact a hybrid Gaelic/Australian Rules Football game based upon a recognition of their common origin in 19th century Gaelic football. Both figurational and ethnomethodological perspectives will be employed to assess the problems which face the establishing of a 'new' invasion-game from two separate games-world figurations. The analysis of game-rules and game-processes developed in this project are corroborated by identifying the specific problems inherent in this attempt to establish a viable international game.
CHAPTER 8

ESTABLISHING A NEW GAME : PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS

8.1. INTRODUCTION

8.2. THE PARENT GAMES
  8.2.1. Establishment Phase
  8.2.2. Renewing Contacts

8.3. THE COMPOSITE GAME
  8.3.1. Collecting the Data
  8.3.2. Establishing the Composite Game

8.4. THE COMPOSITE GAME : A CONGLOMERATE

8.5. TWO INTO ONE WON'T GO
  8.5.1. The Retention of Formulae from Parent Games
  8.5.2. New Wine in Old Bottles
  8.5.3. A Transitory Figuration

8.6. SUMMARY

8.7. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
8.1. Introduction

In 1984, the National Football League of Australia (N.F.L.) and the Gaelic Athletic Association (G.A.A.) embarked upon a three-match series of games in Ireland played to composite rules. This was followed in 1986 with a similar series in Australia, again played with compromise rules although considerably modified from the 1984 series. This was the culmination of a series of exchange visits beginning in 1967 with a combined side from clubs in the Victoria Football League playing Gaelic Football against County Meath and County Mayo. These hybrid rules are designed to retain the best features of both parent games and, according to E. W. Biggs the General Manager of the NFL, 'to provide an international level of competition for Irish and Australian footballers' which had, until 1984, not been possible for either code.

The aim of my analysis of this composite code of football is to illustrate how the perspectives on game-processes and game-rules developed in this project are to be applied to this contemporary instance of an attempt to establish a 'new' game. Earlier analysis examined the dynamics of well-established game-world figurations; the case of this embryonic development of a hybrid game is doubly complex insofar as two previously separate game-worlds (of players, referees, coaches, legislators etc.) are conjoined. This has ramifications both for legislative and
playing action in the new game. The problems inherent in rule-making arise not just because of the nature of 'elastic' game-rules (as argued in earlier chapters), but also because of players' background experiences of 'playing the game' in two formerly separate collectivities. This makes the composite rules doubly insufficient in determining the playing processes in the compromise game.

The problems manifest in playing this new game stem from the retention, by players, of background expectancies and tacit understandings from the two parent games. Australian Rules and Gaelic Football have much in common, but the formal rules of the composite game overlay and do not account for the disparity between taken-for-granted understandings about how-to-go-on in the game, developed through players experience in separate game-processes. I will argue that the retention of this dimension of rule-following has ramifying effects of the composite game-process. Not surprisingly however, coaches, managers, and legislators who have vested interests in this embryonic development gloss these inherent problems and choose, in the interests of promoting international competition, to emphasise the success of the venture. These problems are intractable since players lapse into their respective parent codes of football in between international series.

This contemporary initiative by the N.F.L. and G.A.A.
provides a somewhat fortuitous yet ideal opportunity to corroborate the theory that invasion-games processes are under-determined by the formulated rules. Hence, the following analysis is not to be understood merely an example selected to illustrate theory. Rather, it must confirm the analysis of game-rules and game-processes provided in this project - given the complexity of the process whereby two well-established game-worlds attempt to effect a temporary re union by codifying a set of composite or hybrid rules.

In what follows, some necessary background information about the parent game figurations precedes analysis of the development of the composite Australian Rules/Gaelic game, and the inherent problems this 'experiment' faces.

8.2. The Parent Game

8.2.1. Establishment phases

Ireland's traditional rural football or 'Caid' was no more 'civilised' than Cornish hurling, Welsh knappen, Normandy's la soule, and the various forms of football games in England. The civilising of the game and the first attempt to establish a common set of rules gained impetus from the decline of native games relative to the increasing popularity of imported i.e. English sports. (1) Hence the Gaelic Athletic Association was founded as an intensely

(1) The Irish F.A. was formed in 1880 and the Combined Irish Rugby Union in 1881, the latter being an amalgamation of the already well-established Irish Football Union and the North of Ireland Rugby Union.
nationalistic organisation with Charles Parnell, Michael Davitt and Archbishop Croke of Cashel as patrons. A letter from Croke in 1866 to Michael Cusack (one of the founding fathers of the G.A.A.) epitomises this advocacy of native pastimes which were to be enshrined in the constitution of the Association:

One of the most painful, and at the same time one of the most frequently recurring reflections that, as an Irishman, I am compelled to make in connection with the present aspect of things in this country, is derived from the ugly and irritating fact that we are daily importing from England not only her manufactured goods, but, together with her fashions her accents, her vicious literature, her music, her dances, her manifold mannerisms, also her games and pastimes, to the utter discredit of our own grand national sports and to the sore humiliation of every genuine son and daughter of the old land.

Ball-playing, hurling, football-kicking according to the Irish rules, 'casting', leaping, wrestling in various ways and all such favourite amusements may now be said to be not only dead and buried, but, in several localities to be entirely forgotten and unknown. And what have we got in their stead? We have got such foreign and fantastic field sports as lawn tennis, polo, cricket and the like, very excellent, I believe, and health-giving exercises in their way, still, not racy of the soil but rather alien on the contrary to it as are indeed, for the most part, the men and women who first imported and still continue to patronise them. (2)

(2) The G.A.A. retained its insularity and purity from contamination from outside (English) influences by stating that no G.A.A. player was allowed to play, support, or watch 'foreign' games (or even attend social events, dances etc. organised by such sports associations). The G.A.A. banned all military personnel including police from being members. Irish materials had to be used for all contract work and playing equipment. The Irish language had to be used in all official documents, and team programmes must use the Gaelic forms of proper names. This ban was in place until July 1971 by which time it had become anachronistic and inoperable.
Nevertheless, the codification of Gaelic football (and other sports of the Gael such as hurling and handball) owed everything to laws tried and found effective by the players and legislators of 'foreign and fantastic field sports', insofar as the rules placed considerable constraints upon the levels of violence permitted, thereby civilising, unruly, indigenous folk pastimes. The same applied to the early development of Australian football first developed in the State of Victoria where there were many Irish immigrants attracted to the gold fields of Bendigo and Ballarat. The first attempt at 'definitive' rules were written in 1866 which as Mason (1973:88) notes were 'borrowed' not just from Gaelic football but influenced also by rugby and soccer. (3)

The early development of the rules of both these games were similar insofar as frequent changes to the rules crystallised the separate identity of the game and enhanced its viability. For Australian football, this consolidation period was 1866-97, for Gaelic football 1886-1910, by which time both games had assumed their key contemporary characteristics. In both cases the early history of the Associations was characterised by clashes of group interest within the respective game-worlds with, in Australia, the

(3) Before 1866 there was little restriction on playing space and few restrictions on the numbers involved. A report of an 'Australian football' game played in 1858 states that the goals were about a mile apart, with 40 players on each side.
Victoria Football League seceding from the Victoria Football Association, and in Ireland prolonged conflicts between militants and moderates eventuating in spectacular resignations over the issue of G.A.A. membership and other elements of 'the ban'.

However, of particular interest is the first antipodean tour by a British party of players, under the leadership of A. E. Stoddart in the early 1890's. During this tour, 35 matches (16 in Australia and 19 in New Zealand) were played under rugby rules but 25 games were played according to the rules of Australian football. The tourists had prepared for this, through the offices of Henry Harrison, the recognised 'father' of Australian football who had provided rule-books and Australian coaches. The games were, apparently, by no means one-sided which suggests, that at the early consolidation stage of these two invasion-games, the separate development of skills and tactics did not preclude recent initiates from providing a viable contest for the 'regulars'. As I will suggest later, such relatively unproblematic 'code-switching' became increasingly difficult once the playing to specific codes of football was consolidated over time.
8.2.2. Renewing Contacts

Despite the frequent 'exhibition' matches (4) by Gaelic and Australian Rules footballers principally for expatriot communities, both games have been confined to their respective countries. Awareness of the dangers of insularity impelled a series of exchange visits beginning in 1967 with a short tour of Ireland by Australian footballers to play County Meath (the All-Ireland champions) and Country Mayo. The games were played according to Gaelic Rules with one modification. (5) In 1968, Meath toured Australia, and played games with rules modified (dimensions of pitch and of the goal area, and with the Gaelic round ball) which clearly disadvantaged the Australians. The 'Kingdom' of Kerry toured Australia in 1970 and played the Victoria team in a bizarre match, one half of which was played with the Australian oval ball, and the other half with the Gaelic ball, an unimaginative effort at compromise which gives new meaning to the stock banal commentary in soccer that 'it was a game of two halves'!

(4) Gaelic footballers have played exhibition matches in England (from 1896) and in USA (from 1931), and Australians have tried to export their game to New Zealand, New Guinea, and most recently in 1960's to USA, Europe, Japan and Britain.

(5) Players could pick the ball up from the ground rather than flicking it up with the toe (the latter being the Australian rules).
None of these exchanges represents systematic efforts to establish a composite game. Both game-worlds have highly developed domestic competitive programmes, with mass spectator support and a large televisual audience. Exchanges in the 1960's and 1970's were invariably programmed as end-of-season tours by representatives from two separate game-worlds in recognition of their common progeny.

Writing in 1973, Mason argues that the possibility that Australians and the Irish might agree on a 'compromise game which both can play on equal terms is very remote' (1973:100). However, after an accelerated series of exchanges of clubs and junior level in the 1970's and early 1980's (6) the G.A.A. and the N.F.L. drew up a set of composite rules for an international series of matches to be played in Ireland in 1984. This was followed by a second series in Australia in 1986-7.

8.3. The Composite Game
8.3.1. Collecting the data

My data about the establishment of the hybrid game is derived from this 1984-1987 period during which 6 games were played according to composite rules in two separate series. My initial exposure to this game was afforded by the

televising, by Channel 4, of the opening game of the 1986-7 series. I realised subsequently that this provided the opportunity for a detailed analysis of the formative or establishment phase of an invasion-game whereas earlier analyses of game-processes and game-rules were necessarily focussed upon the consolidating of 'mature' games which had been established for a century or more. I surmised therefore, that a rare opportunity was provided for gaining insights into the social processes implicated in the establishment of any invasion-game, thereby elaborating upon the perspectives developed in both the initial case-studies and the analysis of institutionalised games. Pfatt (1988:20) writes:

...there are case studies whose prime rationale is happy accident: data is only available in one case. It would be a great waste not to exploit such material: serendipity is not to be sniffed at.

The research materials from which the following analysis of the composite Australian Rules/Gaelic football games was developed were difficult to collect from a base in the UK. The approach adopted was to try to gain access to the networks of key personnel by contacting initially the sports editor of Channel 4. The following stages of data collection ensued:

a) Initial exposure to the game through an edited version of the first match in the 1986-7 series shown on C4 in January 1987.
b) Contact with the Sport Editor of C4 who informed me that the game was filmed by Cheerleader Production Company.

c) Contact with Cheerleaders who supplied me with the unedited VTR which included the whole game and post-match interviews with coaches, and players. (Neither of the other games in the series was televised in the UK).

d) Contact made by telephone/letter with (i) commentator on the game (from Skychannel, London); (ii) the Sports Editor of Channel 7 Sports, Australia; (iii) The National Football League, Melbourne, Australia; (iv) the Gaelic Athletic Association, Croke Park, Dublin.

e) Correspondence with (i) the Public Relations officer of the G.A.A., and (ii) the 1984 and 1986 Tour Manager of the National Football League of Australia (N.F.L). Each of these sent a questionnaire (appendix 1) about the development of the composite game.

Through this the following research materials were collected: (i) the reports on the 1984 and 1986 series compiled by the Australian team manager; (ii) a summary of the results of a questionnaire about the 1984 tour of Ireland given to the 25 Australian players; (iii) press cuttings from Australian newspapers; (iv) G.A.A. match programmes from the 1984 series and the current G.A.A. Rules Book; (v) completed questionnaire given to NFL official; (vi) the unedited video-tape recording of one match in the 1986-7 series.
8.3.2. **Establishing the Composite Game**

The 1984 tour of Ireland included three 'test' matches in Cork and Dublin (won by the Australians 2:1) interspersed with several regional matches. The key compromises in terms of rules, were (i) playing with the Gaelic round ball rather than the Australian oval ball; (ii) no tackle allowed (as in the Gaelic game); (iii) amalgamating both Australian and Gaelic methods of scoring viz. scoring under the bar, (6 pts), scoring over the bar, (3 pts), and 'sides' (1 pt); (iv) the Gaelic field of play. (7)

The general tenor of the retrospective assessment of the tour by legislators and other officials was positive as evidenced by the Australian Manager's tour report which stated that the tour 'has established the viability of meaningful international competition for Australian footballers...' and '...the venture was an outstanding success....more closely contested than our highest expectations'. The tour attracted interest at the diplomatic level. In a letter to the Australian tour manager, his Excellency Mr. J Small, the Irish Ambassador in Australia wrote:

(7) The Australian oval field was used for the subsequent 1986 series in Australia.
It is amazing in many respects that the first set of rules, devised for the opening series, produced such finely balanced competition and such exciting games. You probably read in the 'Irish Independent' of 31st October 1984 (the issue that carried photographs of you wielding a hurley)! that a seasoned and highly respected commentator on sport, Mitchell Cogley, described the second international as the most exciting game he had ever seen in any football code.

Nevertheless, the bonhomie of international diplomacy masked some key concerns about the hybrid game. In particular Australian players were perceived to be severely disadvantaged by the no tackle rule and by the rule-constraints on running with the ball. Due also to 'considerable confusion about the interpretation of the 'tackle law', the first game was characterised by outbreaks of violence between the players. The Australian concerns about the rules are capsulated in a post-tour questionnaire given to players by N.F.L. officials. The questions concerning game-structure were:

1. **Tackle** - Do you feel that some form of tackle is essential?

2. As we must be prepared to compromise, would you agree that a standing tackle is acceptable?

3. **Solo Run/Bouncing the Ball** - We reached agreement in principle that the existing inequalities need to be removed. Which of the following would you favour? Retention of the solo run, but unlimited number of bounces. Retention of the one bounce rule, but banning of solo run.

4. **Free Kick** - Should the player awarded a free kick have the same privilege as a player taking a mark?
5. Scoring - Are you satisfied with the compromise scoring system and the net?

6. Football - Are you satisfied with the use of the Gaelic football? If not can you suggest a realistic alternative?

7. Spot or free kick - Were you at all confused by the rule relating to where a player must stand the mark for a free kick?

8. Player on ground - Are you satisfied with the rule restricting a player with the ball who has fallen or been knocked to the ground?

9. Do you place any importance upon removing the existing restrictions for shepherding?

10. Officials - Do you feel there are too many officials in the arena?

11. Interchange players - Are there too many interchange players?

Players' responses to these questions (8) showed 'general conformity of opinion' and, unsurprisingly, favoured rule-changes which more closely resembled Australian Rules. Indeed, it is difficult to envisage any other general response to the questions as posed, which are already couched in terms of the background knowledge of Australian football.

For the 1986 series, a limited or 'mini' tackle was

(8) Players unanimous response was that 'some form of tackle of right to restrain the players with the ball was essential,...and...retention of the solo run but with unlimited bouncing of the ball'. There was also strong report for 'the free kick to be taken at the spot of the infringement and for the player awarded a free kick to have similar privileges to a player taking a mark'.
allowed. Players could now 'restrain' opponents without pulling them to the ground. This re-definition of the tackle seemed to be open to differing interpretations and, as in the first game in 1984, the opening match of the 1986 series (which was broadcast on the UK Channel 4) was notable for extensive violence which resulted in 5 players being sent off. A four hour tribunal session was held between coaches and team executives which sought to clarify the tackle rule for both players and referees. The 1986 Series Report states that 'both teams have a responsibility to select players with the correct attitudes' - a disciplinary reaction which neglects to acknowledge the imprecision of the rules in prescribing game conduct.

Despite these problems, the Australian Series Manager in his report to the N.F.L. on the 1986 series, suggested that 'the rules are a genuine and effective compromise between two great games', and in a letter to me (17.3.87) he wrote:

I refer to your letter of 3 March which has been passed on to me as the Series was conducted by the NFL. I have been deeply involved in the project, being Tour Manager of the Australian Team in 1984 and Series Manager in 1986.

The composite Series aims to provide an International level competition for Irish and Australian footballers, and to provide what both the GAA and NFL believe is a necessary International Dimension.

It has been very strongly supported by the players, and for an embryonic game, also the public.
The hybrid game is not shackled by traditions and accordingly, rules have been adopted or amended as practicality demands. The result is a fast 'play on' game with few interruptions.

My own view, and I must stress that in Australia at least an isolated one, is that the composite code has a lot to offer both its parents. Interestingly, when I was in Dublin two weeks ago, the Irish Team's Coach Kevin Hefferman, expressed the opinion that "it is already a better game than Gaelic Football".

However, we face enormous problems. The VFL will this year stage several International Exhibition matches of Australian Football, each with large promotional budgets.

Although we have an agreement, for their players to be available for NF teams, it will be difficult competing for commercial support and the players' services. Additionally, because of the strong domestic following for Australian Football, only a few of us here appreciate the need to broaden horizons.

Despite this optimism, I want to propose an alternative perspective upon the establishment of this composite game which is unrecognised by those interest groups within Gaelic and Australian football game-worlds whose primary concern is to promote the 'experiment' and establish international competition as a permanent feature in the competitive programme. (9) Building upon earlier analysis of game-processes and game-rules, I will argue that, despite disclaimers to the contrary, legislators are faced with intractable problems which are compounded by the transitory

(9) It is significant that the 1986 Series Report forefronts finance ($20,000 profit), promotion and the media publicity for the event, before considering match results, the rules, and player discipline.
nature of the composite game i.e. players return to their parent game-processes and game-worlds in the intervening periods between the hybrid international matches. The problem stems from the rules of the hybrid game being doubly under-determined by performance.

In the critique of formalism mounted in chapter 2, five dimensions of rules were identified. This provided the basis to develop a perspective upon rule-changes in well-established invasion-games since legislators cannot, in their rule-making function, precisely anticipate the ways in which players will interpret and act according to those rules. However, in the present case, the situation is doubly complex since players from two previously separate game-world figurations, bring two different sets of constitutive expectancies to the composite game which I argue, undermines the (transitory) efforts to forge a viable game with its own separate identity.

8.4. The Composite Game: A Conglomerate of Two Sets of Procedures

The composite game was established by legislators from both game-worlds who contrived a set of rules designed to retain the best features from the parent games and provide a viable game which does not unduly disadvantage either Gaelic or Australian players. This faith in the power of rule-
formulation to determine game conduct is, however, compromised by players, who in the interests of winning international games, respond to the new challenge but using formulae or procedures developed in the parent games. Analysis of the unedited video-tape recording (supplied by Cheerleaders Production Company) revealed several ways in which playing to the composite rules is contaminated by the retention of methodic procedures developed by players in response to the challenges posed by the parent game. These are (i) methods of scoring; (ii) methods of invading territory; (iii) methods of contesting the ball. Together these illustrate that the two respective sets of players are not, in effect, playing the same game despite the (superimposed) rule-structure of the hybrid game. These examples provide therefore an in vivo laboratory demonstration of the ways in which game procedures are under-determined by the rules.

a) Methods of Scoring

There are three methods of scoring in the composite game, viz. scoring under the bar (six pts.), scoring over the bar (ten pts.) and a 'side' score (one pt.). The first method is a characteristic feature of the Gaelic game, and the second and third a feature of the Australian game. An analysis of the scoring methods in each of the six internationals to date reveals considerable dissimilarities (see Table 8.1).
Table 8.1. Scoring Methods in International Series: N.F.L./G.A.A.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th></th>
<th>Ireland</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>6 pts</td>
<td>3 pts</td>
<td>1 pt</td>
<td>6 pts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Game 1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Game 2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Game 3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Game 2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Game 3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These continued differences in scoring methods are reflective of the particular unit and individual skills employed in invading territory and overcoming defensive strategies which have been developed in the parent games. The "net" (scoring under the bar for six points) is not a feature of the Australian game and in three games, this method of scoring was realised only six times compared with 24 for the Irish. Conversely, 'sides' for one point are not a feature of the Irish game unlike the Australian game; note
the preponderance of Australian scores by this method (87) compared with the Gaelic players (58).

b) Methods of Invading Territory

Analysis of the VTR illustrated that the Gaelic Football players invade territory primarily through short, quick hand-passing between players, and only kick the ball as a second option. In contrast the Australian Rules players characteristically invade territory through longer foot-passes to the centre of the opposition's defence and employ hand passes primarily to create space for the foot-pass. This was confirmed by the NFL respondent to my questionnaire who stated that:

Gaelic football is a shorter passing game because of the round ball. Kicks of 60m are common in Australian football with the oval ball.

Many consequences flow from this difference in unit skills — these include different ways of interacting, different patterns of play, different set of perceptual-motor skills. (10) These have been developed in the parent games with respect to rules enabling and constraining action, particular equipment (the Australian game is played with an oval ball rather than a round ball), particular playing areas (the Australian pitch is an oval area of 110m x 155m), and particular scoring methods.

(10) Typical NFL players tend to be taller than the more 'stocky' Gaelic football player although I have no empirical data on the relevant physical characteristics of the two playing constituencies.
Therefore, both sets of players exhibit conditioned responses developed in the parent game and transplanted into the composite game. (11) This is, in part recognised by both players and officials. Terry Daniher, the Captain of the Australian team for the 1986 series, notes that the challenge presented by the composite game rules requires players with specific skills and that, in preparation for the series, handling and kicking skills had to be modified. In an article in the 'Western Australian' newspaper (11.10.86) he states:

I think we should go well in the series. A specific type of player has been chosen and we have spent a lot of time just handling the ball and mastering the disposal. If the ball isn't kicked correctly it sways around all over the place. If we are prepared to work hard, we will get results.

Likewise, Ed. Biggs, the 1984 Tour manager was critical of policies about team selection in his report to the N.F.L. He wrote:

(11) It was also apparent that the two referees (one Irish and one Australian) were policing the game differently, displaying different interpretations of acceptable means of dispossessing the man in possession of the ball. This problem also occurred in the 1984 series and was recognised in the the Tour Report: "The G.A.A. appointed different referees for each of the 3 international matches causing considerable difficulty in continuity of interpretation and application of the rules'.

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Our team was selected basically on the performances in the inter-state series - a natural reaction. In future, if the best team for the composite game is required, the inter-state series should be largely regarded as a separate exercise.

c) Methods of Contesting the Ball

The ability to dispossess an opponent of the ball is a key element in all invasion-games since it allows for a more equitable balance between invading and defending territory - a central characteristic of game-viability, since otherwise a team could monopolise possession. The Australian code allows for a similar degree of body contact in the tackle as the rugby code (12) whereas the Gaelic game relies more on interceptions. In the composite game, the tackle rule has been highlighted as a key problem, and has been subject to modifications and clarifications. The restructuring of this element of games-play (which has, in effect, brought the 'definition' closer to the Australian version) follows a similar pattern of restructuring identified with respect to rugby union rules in chapter 5. The 'brawls' in both series were an outcome of players' differing interpretations of what

(12) Michael Calvin's (Daily Telegraph, 20.10.89) image of Australian Rules is "a game for padded cells played in the open-air...a show-case for Australian man-hood, all hairy armpits, hyperactivity, and huge thirsts". The incidence of injury is high. In the 1988-89 season, only one of the Melbourne team's 50 member squad of players avoided injury in the 36 games played.
constitutes an acceptable or 'fair' method of dispossessing opponents. The chronology of legislative action with respect to the tackle also demonstrates legislative failure to anticipate the responses of players to the formulated rules. The chronology is as follows:

(i) **1984 Series**: no tackle allowed (ie. no restraining of the man in possession of the ball).

(ii) Post-tour analysis by Australian players and officials was that this rule disadvantaged NFL players since the tackle was an integral part of their game. Therefore, they developed a strategy during the 1984 tour of 'deliberately fouling and giving their opponents free kicks in order to stop them running unchecked'. This was deemed to be unacceptable by legislators since such strategy undermines several characteristics of game-viability.

(iii) Tour Manager states that 'a form of tackle is needed to attract Australian support. This is recognised by the G.A.A. and is only a matter of definition...patience and understanding of each others position will be necessary'.

(iv) **1986 Series**: Limited or 'mini' tackle introduced which allows players to 'physically restrain opponents without 'dumping' or 'slinging' them (to
the ground) - 'something with which the Irish team could not be expected to contend'. (1986 Series Report).

(v) 1st game in 1986 series - extensive and prolonged fighting between players during which 5 players were sent off! VTR shows coaches remonstrating with each other and at half-time, there were heated debates between coaches and referees to clarify rule-interpretations.

(vi) Post-match Tribunal (lasting 4.5 hours) and subsequent meetings between coaches and team managers. Team officials asked to select players with 'the correct attitude'. No more problems in the final two games of the series. Australian Series Report states:
'The excessive violence in the first Test was not repeated, due mainly to in-depth conferences and a genuine spirit of cooperation between the two bodies'.

(vii) 1987: Tackle further modified. A 'pull-down' is now permitted providing the ball is not 'pinned' to the player thereby allowing for release pass of the ball during the tackle. Ed. Biggs, the Australian Team Manager stated:
'Holding the man - holding the ball has been a
problem of application and interpretation throughout the history of the Australian game, and arguments in the composite game...should be seen in this context'.

(viii) Further rule modification to Penalty Laws in 1987: players ordered off the field are not permitted to resume play for 15 minutes. (1984-6 ruling is five minutes). Therefore more stringent penalties for offending team's violations of tackle ruling.

The above rule changes are successive attempts to sustain and re-establish game-viability in response to players' despoiling actions. The fringe of incompleteness of the rules is starkly evident eg. what constitutes 'dumping', 'slinging' 'a pull-down', and 'pinning' the ball to the player. Such issues are likely to necessitate future rule-modifications and clarification. Presumably, if asked, every player of the composite game could display the relevant discursive knowledge of the formulated rules but, as the problems encountered in the opening games of both series show, this is clearly insufficient in prescribing playing action. Legislators' response, as would be expected, is to try to improve player discipline (by selecting players with the 'correct attitude' and imposing greater sanctions on foul-play).

I suggest however, that a neglected issue is that the formal rules of the composite game are superimposed upon two
dissimilar sets of mundane, taken-for-granted understandings developed within the parent games. This poses intractable problems for game-viability.

To elaborate upon this, it is useful to recall Rail's analysis of nature of bodily-contact in basketball which might be experienced by participants as 'accidental', 'playful' or 'violent'. Whilst violent contacts are intentional breaches of the formal rules and perceived as unacceptable, the perception of contacts as playful is of particular interest. In basketball, these are actions such as 'screening', 'blocking' and 'boxing out' which are accepted by players as 'part of the game', to be interpreted, therefore, in a 'playful' frame on the basis of 'shared understandings'. Similarly, one might suggest that the understandings by Gaelic and Australian players of what is deemed to be 'playful' contact would be dissimilar since these understandings derive from separate experiences of invasion-game processes.

As long as the parent games retain a separate identity the composite game cannot be consolidated unless players cease to be 'borrowed' from other game-worlds.

This problematic issue was recognised by Jim Main (1986: 23-24) a journalist from the daily newspaper 'The Australian' in his retrospective assessment of the 1984 tour. Discussing the 'vicious brawl' in the 1st test, he
comments on:

the Australians' instinct to tackle any rival in possession of the ball...it was not easy for the Australians to throw years of habit aside.

With respect to rule changes for the 1986 series he adds;

The Australians knew only too well that their crowds would never accept a code without some form of tackling. The Australian code is virtually built around body-contact and it is fair to say that the Australian public would shun any non-contact code as a 'girls' game'.

Whatever this indicates in terms of Australian male chauvinism, the difference in scoring methods, the differences in the methods of invading territory, and the issues about the tackle indicate problems inherent in creating a viable hybrid game. It is now pertinent to demonstrate how this G.A.A./N.F.L. experiment corroborates the earlier analysis of game-rules and game-processes.

8.5. Two Into One Won't Go

The summary of the NFL Report on the 1986 Series states that:

There were no more difficulties in interpreting the rules than there are in our own game, other than the obvious problem of adaptation in such a short period.

In what follows however, I argue that the 'problems of adaptation' are inherently more difficult and by no means obvious and that the problems arise from an assumption that the conjoining of two separate game-world figurations can be achieved successfully merely by drawing up a set of formal
rules to 'govern' the new game process. To elaborate upon this, one needs to focus upon the bifurcation of the two codes and what this entails in terms of separate development of playing processes prior to the establishment of the hybrid Gaelic/Australian game.

8.5.1. Game-Process: the Retention of Formulae from Parent Games

The brief history of the establishment of the composite Australian/Irish football game has been characterised by rule-changes, and manifest problems about rule-interpretations, and subsequent attempts to clarify their meaning. This project has emphasised throughout that, because of the properties of rules, legislators cannot wholly anticipate nor prescribe playing procedures. This applies equally to the composite game but, in this latter case, further problems arise because players come from previously separate game-worlds.

From a common origin in Gaelic folk-culture, two species of football have developed separately (13) leading to

(13) There is, however, a G.A.A. of Australasia which was founded in 1963; matches are limited to the annual interstate carnivals. This organisation has no grounds of its own, is strictly amateur, and charges no admission. By 1975 junior Gaelic football was started, and this organisation hosted the visits by Meath and Kerry in 1968, 1970 and 1981. It's status is very much as a marginal folk pursuit of expatriots who want to celebrate their ancestry; (see G. Roe 'History of the G.A.A. in Australasia' pp14-15 in G.A.A. official commemorative brochure 1986)
different characteristic features in terms of rules, equipment, playing area dimensions, methods of scoring. Concomitantly, players of both codes of football have developed specific skills and strategies in response to the two distinct contrived challenges of the two games. Players therefore possess a cluster of both discursive and practical understandings about what is necessary in order 'to go on' in the game.

The new game, however, involves superimposing upon these background understandings, a set of formal rules which contain some but, crucially, not all of the features of either of the parent game-constructs. Figure 8.1. provides a representation of the inherent complexity of this new game-figuration consequent upon the modification of the conditioned challenge of the game-process, and the artificial conjoining of two different game-worlds. The complexity of these social processes can be illustrated by using imagery from language.
Both codes of football are, in effect, like two vernaculars of one language which, through successive restructuring processes, have developed their own distinctive characteristics. The 'language' is Irish, whilst the dialects retain common elements but, having been 'spoken' in isolation and changing over time, develop specific nuances and specific taken-for-granted elements of 'speech'. Then, in 1984, speakers of both vernaculars are
brought together and are required to sustain a meaningful
dialogue. This means that some elements of the vernacular
are inappropriate, redundant, or misinterpreted by the
partners in the new dialogue. Hence certain taken-for-
granted elements of speech are forefronted as being
problematic.

Following Schutz (1971) this point might be elaborated
by conceiving both sets of players from previously separate
figurations, as 'strangers' for each other in the new
figuration. Schutz provides many examples of 'strangers' to
social situations, the outstanding one of which is
immigrants, he writes (1971:499)

The cultural pattern peculiar to a social group
functions for its members as an unquestioned scheme of
reference. It determines the strata of relevance for
their 'thinking as usual' in standardised situations and
the degree of knowledge required for handling the tested
'recipes' involved. The approaching stranger however
does not share certain basic assumptions which alone
guarantee the functioning of these recipes. He has to
place in question what seems unquestionable to the in-
group...This entails a dislocation of the stranger's
habitual system of relevance.

8.5.2. New Wine in Old Bottles

The case-study of accomplishing games (chapter 3) was
designed to display the mundane understandings assumed to be
held in common by all members. These taken-for-granted
understandings were forefronted through the actions of a
'despoiler' who either refused or was unable to do the
required routine 'filling-in'. Similarly, the mundane
procedures of Australian and Gaelic footballers become problematic and therefore 'visible' in the newly-formed composite figuration, as both sets of players function as 'despoilers' or strangers for each other. Applying the perspective developed earlier on the restructuring of invasion-games, figure 8.2. illustrates the problems inherent in overlaying a set of common procedures/rules upon two separate sets of games-playing and rule-making developments.

Figure 8.2. New Rules for Old Practices

![Diagram showing the relationship between AUS1, A1, AUS2, A2, AUSn, GS1, A1, GS2, A2, GSn, and AUGS1.]

Key: AUS = Australian Rules Football  
GS = Gaelic Football Rules  
AUGS = Composite Game Rules

This structuring sequence, and the consequences for AUGS1, can be elaborated by recalling the analysis of the interests, functions, power and resources of players and legislators in game-worlds mapped out in the previous chapter. In already established invasion-games and at the consolidation phase of their development, the tensions were depicted as essentially dyadic. Legislators (and game-
police) through their delegated function, are primarily interested in enabling and preserving features of game-identity and game-viability, whilst players' interests are more complex involving a tension between processes and outcomes, between cooperating, associating and competing.

In the composite game figuration, the social processes are more complex. Legislators have the same interests as in already established games although there are clearly tensions between Irish and Australian rule-makers in terms of their interests in retaining certain elements from the respective indigenous practices. However, playing processes in the new game illustrates that, within the intensely competitive environment of international games - (i) ways of 'co-operating' (intra-team collaboration) are borrowed from the playing experiences in the parent game and that (ii) this makes 'associating' (inter-team collaboration) problematic. Hence, even supposing that legislators for the composite game have common interests, there is a triadic rather than dyadic dynamic which mitigates against the establishment of a viable game. This, as Simmel (1950) has shown, makes the figurational dynamics far more complex. Moreover, there is little likelihood of this triadic dynamic resolving into a dyadic dynamic since the composite game is only a transitory figuration.
8.5.3. **A Transitory figuration**

The new 'dialogue' of the composite game resists consolidation since 'speakers' do not abandon the vernacular but lapse back into these practices in the intervening periods ie. players are borrowed from parent games only for the test series and accompanying tour matches. A similar historical example would be two public schools in the early to mid-C19th agreeing on a set of rules solely for an inter-school match whilst on all other occasions sustaining their own separate practices. There is, at present, no longer-term interest in supplanting the indigenous Australian and Irish codes, the compromise game being established solely to provide an additional international tier to an otherwise emasculated domestic competitive framework.

Indeed, not only is the composite game transitory, there is some doubt about its permanence as a bi-annual event in the competitive framework. Despite the optimism of series officials who have a vested interest in promoting the international game, there are inevitably conflicts of interest both between Irish and Australian representatives, and between composite game-officials and the parent game-world figurations. Inevitably, those who want to promote the international series have to compete for resources, for players services, for sponsorship, for spectator support, and for space within domestic competitive programmes. These
tensions are typified by the 1986 Series Manager from N.F.L. who wrote to me stating:

...we face enormous problems. The Victoria Football League (14) will this year stage several international exhibition matches of Australian football, each with large promotional budgets. Although we have an agreement, for their players to be available for N.F.L. teams, it will be difficult competing for commercial support and the players services. Additionally, because of the strong domestic following for Australian Football only a few of us here appreciate the need to broaden horizons. There are also philosophical differences between Irish and Australian Football officials, and therefore negotiating arrangements for tours has its difficulties.

For the present however, the transitory nature of the Australian/Gaelic game process yields several interesting insights into the dynamics within the game-world, and the impact which the composite game might have on the parent games. Building upon the analysis of restructuring (rule-changes) depicted in Figure 8.2., Figure 8.3. extends this to consider rule changes in both the composite and the parent games.

(14) The State of Victoria is the stronghold of Australian Rules Football and provides most of the players for the International Series.
It is useful to analyse the dynamics of this figuration by applying and elaborating the earlier depiction of prospective and retrospective analysis of structuring and restructuring game-processes (5.5.3.). It has already been stressed that AUGS1, as the outcome of all prior instances of AUS and GS, is replete with problems because of the retention of playing practices (A) developed in these permanent parent figurations. But it is also interesting to note that AUS3 and GS3, are also an outcome not only of AUS1/AUS2 and GS1/GS2 respectively, but also of AUGS1. This is recognised by E. W. Biggs (1987) who in his personal letter to me wrote:

My own view, and I must stress that in Australia at least, an isolated one, is that the composite code has a lot to offer both its parents.

Likewise, the 1984 Tour Manager states that 'the Irish Code could benefit by adopting some aspects of Australian
football', i.e. subsequent developments and possible restructuring of the indigenous games might at least indirectly be influenced by players experience of the parallel transitory figuration. Therefore, not only is the composite game-process at AUGS1, doubly complex because players collective experiences of either AUS or GS are brought to bear, but reciprocally, the competitive experiences and the accommodation necessary to meet the new challenge at AUGS1 acts back upon subsequent playing developments in the parent games at AUS3 and GS3. Furthermore, a prospective analysis of the restructuring processes depicted in Figure 8.2. suggest that the rule-changes for the 1986 series (at AUGS2) are both unanticipated and unintended at AUGS1, and also that playing strategies (A2) in response to AUGS2 are influenced by both AUGS1, and either AUS3 or GS3.

In summary therefore, Figure 8.3. provides a representation of the processes of re-constituting both the indigenous and the composite games. Because players, coaches, referees, legislators and other interest groups 'step' into and out of the different codes, the restructuring of Gaelic Football, Australian Rules Football and the composite game is the outcome of much more complex figurational dynamics than the unilinear developments within
the invasion-games analysed earlier (e.g. soccer, rugby, basketball). (15)

8.6. Summary

The attempt to contrive a composite game from the separate game-processes and game-worlds of Gaelic and Australian Rules Football both confirms and extends the analysis of game-processes and game-rules provided in this research project. As in the other invasion-games studied, rule-changes to the composite game are an outcome of conflicts between interdependent groups who have different interests, and different power and resources in making the game accountable. However, in the composite Gaelic/Australian game, legislative interests (to establish game-identity and game-viability) are made more problematic because of the resources which players bring to the game. The processes, (the collaborative games and strategies), which are employed by the two teams in an effort to win these inter-national and inter-"game-world" matches, demonstrate that players retain methodic procedures from the parent game. Hence, this provides an accessible example of (15) My respondents from both Rugby league and Rugby Union however, discussed rule-enactments in their game with reference to the other code especially with reference to the scrum (league) and the line-out (union). In both cases legislative decisions were partly motivated to sustain a separate game-identity. Hence, 'unilinear' developments does not imply ignorance of developments in other invasion-games, nor the perceived need to sustain an exciting invasion-game spectacle vis-à-vis other invasion-games.
how the superimposition of a different or modified rule-structure is doubly insufficient in determining how the game will be played. Since players retain formulae from playing the parent game, it is even more difficult for legislators to anticipate the outcomes of their rule-making.

These difficulties are compounded because the developmental sequence is not simply, AuGS1 - A1 - AuGS2 - A2, as in previous examples from already established invasion-games. In this case, instances of playing to AUGS are interposed with instances of playing to AUS and GS respectively. Consequently, any restructuring of either of the parent games subsequent to the establishment of the composite game might be an outcome of collective experiences in AUGS as well as AUS or GS.

Therefore, I suggest that the problems of adaptation to the composite code are not as obvious as the series officials suggest. The above perspective, of course, differs from the optimistic tenor of G.A.A. and N.F.L. officials who clearly have a vested interest in promoting a viable international game. As has been emphasised throughout this project, prospective analyses of future restructuring of invasion-games is problematic since the outcome of the figurational dynamics of game-worlds is replete with unintended consequences. Gaelic and Australian Rules Football are atypical insofar as they are, despite
frequent exhibition matches and promotional tours, only well-established within their respective national boundaries. The appeal of such tours for host countries is possibly no more than novelty value for a TV audience satiated with other football codes and other media sport-spectacles. Yet there are clearly powerful financial and cultural factors which mitigate against a closer association of the two codes to provide an international game, in addition to the problems inherent in superimposing a set of 'composite' or more accurately 'conglomerate' rules upon two distinctive game procedures.

8.7. Concluding Observations

This analysis of game-constitution has emphasised that the rules of the hybrid game are doubly insufficient to account for game procedures. Not only do the rules, however formulated, allow for an elastic response by players (as in other games), but also, the game is a composite of two already-established games. Hence, the problems in the constitution of the Australian/Gaelic game stem from the 'background expectancies' and routine scenic practices which players of both codes have developed separately in making their respective games accountable. Again routinely, players bring these procedures to the new figuration.

Therefore, the perspective taken on this composite game is not intended to merely illustrate or verify the earlier
analysis of game-constitution by accumulating additional evidence to that provided in preceding chapters. Indicating the limitations of inductive methodology, Popper (1972) argues that there is frequently little difficulty in the selection and accumulation of confirming instances of a theory, but knowledge (which, by its nature, is 'forever provisional) only proceeds through the search for counter-instances and subsequent attempts to solve the problems which arise. He therefore suggests that scientists ought to proceed to look systematically for a refutation which might lead to a better, more refined theory. (16) The analysis of the composite game needs to be understood in this light. Given the double insufficiency of the rules in prescribing game-processes, this contemporary 'experiment' with game-constitution must confirm and corroborate the analysis of game-rules and game-processes provided in this project - otherwise the theory would need refinement.

The search for confirming instances is not exhausted by the analysis of this composite N.F.L./G.A.A. game. Clearly, similar research projects might focus upon other invasion-games such as field and ice-hockey, American Football and handball. In Chapter 5 caveats were provided to general

theory building by noting the varying degrees of penetration by commercial interests exogenous to game-worlds. Lacrosse, for example, has been able to sustain game-viability without constant re-structuring since there has been little pressure for players to explore the insufficiency of the formal rules. This exploration or interpretative work by players and coaches is clearly more assiduous and unremitting within an intensely competitive environment. It would be instructive therefore to analyse the game-world dynamics of American Football and ice-hockey which provide the apotheosis of rationalised game-processes.

Nevertheless, although the research might be developed further, this project invites sociologists to dispense with preconceived and simplistic images of games and game-rules, and to explore the complex and, with no perjorative connotation implied, the devious 'world' of game-constitution. Since the project provides an account of the structuring and the restructuring of a major element of contemporary sports practices the invitation is extended to sociologists with a specialist interest in sport.
APPENDICES

Appendix A  Structural Properties of Sports Forms

Appendix B  Extracts from Rugby League Match Programmes

Appendix C  Significant Changes to the Laws of Rugby Union, 1948-72

Appendix D  Letter to Interviewees from National Governing Bodies: Respondent Validation

Appendix E  Questionnaire to National Football League of Australia Officials

Appendix F  Correspondence for Data Collection about NFL/GAA Composite Game
Structural Properties of Sport Forms

Appendix A
Appendix B

The following are four extracts from Rugby League match programmes of 1952, 1953, 1965 and 1966. Each are critical commentaries about the dire state of playing processes, the necessity for law-changes, and the undermining of several characteristics of game-viability identified by respondents in section 5.2. Appendices B (i) and (ii) indicate problems in play-the-ball rules viz. monopolising possession, mitigating against attacking/invading/passing skills of backs, difficulties in policing. Appendices B (iii) and (iv) provide testimony to the way strategies of play had developed by the mid-1960s which consistently compromised characteristics nos. 4 and 5 of game-viability. This was just prior to the limited (4) tackle rule first introduced experimentally for BBC2 Floodlit Trophy matches in October, 1966 and extended to all games from December, 1966. I am indebted to Mr Trevor Delaney of Ingrow, Keighley, West Yorkshire whose extensive knowledge of the history of rugby league, and supply of illustrative materials has been invaluable.

(i) Play-the-Ball; Lancashire Cup-Final Programme November 29th 1952.
(iii) Wakefield Trinity Programme September 1966.
(iv) Rugby League Magazine August 1965.
(v)
As the result of a majority decision of the International Rugby League Board, the present law governing the playing of the ball following a tackle has to be discarded.

In its place a substitute has been found.

Why was the rule found unsuitable to such an extent that it had to be swept aside even before it had been given a season’s trial?

It is as well to recall why the old rule of the two and then three yards positions was changed. It was held that:

(1) Players had to take up meticulously defined positions and that Referees had to act as surveyors and mathematical calculators.

(2) That the ball could be held by the defence for almost interminable long periods.

(3) That the ball rarely changed hands after a tackle.

(4) That forwards, in consequence of their presence being only required in the scrum, took on the duties of backs and in fact, interfered with the normal tasks of the backs.

It was felt that if the distance questions was eliminated and the forwards collected in a bunch, the road would be open for the backs to show their paces. This seemed an ideal way of giving the backs the opportunity of "showing their paces". But what actually happened? In the views of Australia, France and New Zealand (and quite a considerable number in this country) the play-the-ball rule was used to bring about a lot of indiscriminate kicking, a subterfuge for a lot of damaging "rucking" and the opportunity of creeping-up to off-side positions.

Did the rule help the backs to open out play? A careful observer at the recent Test Match produced the following figures. There were 151 incidents of playing-the-ball after tackles. Of these in only 10 instances did the ball reach the backs for a concerted movement. In all the rest, there resulted further tackles or numerous infringements.

Referees themselves found the task of controlling these play-the-ball sessions most harassing. Some, in fact, admitted they could not see what was going on. In view of
the determined opposition to this law - it has been discarded.

To take its place it has been recommended that all players rather than the two engaged in playing-the-ball back into the game shall be WHOLLY BEHIND these two players. In other words, so long as the referee has a defined open space - which, in effect, will be about two yards - the ball may then be brought in play.

Whether the new rule will help to bring about the desired open play remains to be seen.

One thing is certain. Unless we get the whole-hearted co-operation of players, coaches and referees no rule can be effective.


These last few days have been quite busy ones for our Officials in the Rugby League. Not only have they the Cup Draw on their hands, but they have amended one of the most controversial rules of all time, in the "Play the Ball" rule, and we can only wait as to how and when it will benefit our game. By this amendment the 'new' rule will be the same as the 1927/28 Season, so perhaps to many of us, it will bring back memories of earlier games.

Whilst I personally am against any mid-season changing of rules, especially in view of the Cup-ties almost with us, the majority of Clubs apparently did not share my views, and therefore from today we witness yet another change in our rules, one of many during the past few years. Under this amendment accepted by the League, there must be a yard gap between the man playing the ball and the rest of his team.

It is often a source of wonder, to the casual observer of our game, as to why it is necessary to amend and add to our many perhaps complicated rules, yet it is to the credit of all concerned who are striving to achieve the ideal game, not only to watch but also to play.

Therefore, although we may have cause to grumble a little at yet another change in our rules, let us remember that changes are not, whatever we may think, done just to cause confusion, but to please or try to please the 'man on the terrace'. So before we condemn, let us give this a fair trial, in order it might prove its worth for the benefit of
the game. Those at the helm of our Clubs, on the whole, are confident that if played to rule, it will result in more open play and less spotting. It is up to our players now, and if they will do their part, I am sure the public will rally round, and help our game to attain the heights which I am sure we all want to see.


If, as we hope, you've been a regular attender at Rugby League matches, you've seen it, as we've seen it, more pronounced this season, probably more distasteful and boring than even before. We refer, of course, to this continued possession of the ball by one side and to its unhappy corollary, the condemnation of its opponents to the purely defensive role of tackling, tackling and again tackling. And we have seen that if, in sheer desperation, those without the ball should under such unwarranted and sustained pressure go ever so slightly beyond the limit in their effort to have a reasonable share in the game they find themselves still worse off in that the same ordeals have to be faced many yards nearer their last line of defence, this, of course, following the resulting penalty.

In an issue of this programme last season we pleaded for more sparkle in our R.L. games. That way, we believe, lies the solution of most of our troubles. Now, after the first few weeks of a new season, let us note what we have seen. We have, unhappily to stress the fact that this is no erudite excursion into possibilities but is a written record of what has happened. And again, from our observation, it is not the extraordinary and the unusual to which we draw attention but rather to something which, to judge by appearances, is being strongly adopted as a pattern of tactics.

Somewhere in the region of its own 25 Line Side A gains possession of the ball. It immediately beings and sustains a series of sorties made up of the one necessary pass from the base, a lunge by the forward receiving the pass, a resistant tackle, the ball played back, and the same process repeated without the slightest variation 24 times. By this time the try-line is but a yard or two away and at last the defence is breached. The goal is duly kicked, and the side which hasn't had the ball to play with is five points down.

But let us mark the sequel. Side A has had matters all its own way. Does Side B get a look-in now? Not a bit. Here it would be well to note the wording of the law. We quote the R.L. Official Guide, Section 7, Subsection 2a.
"The ball is placed on the ground at the mid point of the half-way line and is kicked off to start each half of the game or to restart the game after points have been scored".

Now let us read sub-section 2d.

"When the ball is being kicked off or dropped out it shall be illegal for the kicker to kick the ball less than ten yards forward or to kick it over the touch-line or deadball line on the full".

There it is, and that is what we have seen. Side B restarts play as required. The odds are great that Side A is put again in possession. The same dreary process can be resumed and has been resumed. Side B may be anxious to use and display its skills, football which the spectators have paid to see. But, once again, not a bit. The spectator may have spent some money in his travel to the ground, at the turnstile, in a programme and perhaps in other little ways, hopeful of entertainment.

We are justified in asking a few questions. Where, how, and when does the other side get a sporting chance? What sort of football is this? Is it not rank and detrimental exploitation of the rules? If so, is it not time that this situation be dealt with, and in such a manner that the sides willing to give spectators what they want to see, are given a chance to do so?

After years of complaining about the unfairness of this continued possession we now find the possibilities of one-sided monopoly not checked but, to judge from our experience, actually enhanced.

There is a ray of hope. We understand that shortly we are to have in floodlit football an experimental rule allowing only three play-the-balls, after which a scrum. For the sake of the continued existence of our game we hope for its complete success. We have only one reservation here. The writer, being somewhat of a root and branch man with regard to the play-the-ball rule, would be in favour of awarding the ball automatically to the other side rather than leaving them to scrum for it. If this proved not feasible there could then be reversion to the scrum. We are, however, in a mood to be thankful for small mercies.
If we contrast today's games with the many which spectators of so long ago were privileged to see, and if we attempt contrasts between the play of present day backs and those of fifty or more years ago it could be easy to do less than justice to present day players. We are now repeating a well worn cliche. Those were the days when forwards were forwards and backs were backs when the chief duty of the forwards was to see that clever backs had the means of exercising their skills.

In these days all too often the forwards mould the entire play, wings can play through a whole match without receiving a pass, or at least a decent chance to run. The backs just do not have the opportunities available to their forerunners of sixty years ago. The emphasis on possession at all costs has reduced the game to fewer moves and the game has lost something. The art of screw-kicking seems to have gone, almost any kind of kicking largely on the way out. The grubber, the cross-kick to the wing and other forms of attack by using the feet, the dribble for instance, all those seem almost to have disappeared.

The writer would not like to be thought that he would dispense with forwards. Forwards and intelligent forward-play are a necessary and fundamental part of rugby, forward play, within its own limits, an essential element. The trouble has been for some years, so it seems, that forward play has been allowed to extend itself to a point of considerable interference with back play, and this has not been to the game's advantage.

To sum up, we do not believe that the skilful players of today lose anything by comparison with those of the past, and that, given more opportunity to prove their worth they would stand at least level in the estimation of those old enough to remember and to judge. The modern style of play is at the root of the trouble.

This can be varied by attention to the laws of the game, and whether those who accuse other of "tinkering" like it or not, some very definite changes are more than desirable, in fact, desperately necessary.
Appendix B (v)  

Rugby League Magazine, August 1965.

Despite the many complaints about the play-the-ball rule last season, the clubs were unable to agree about making a change and the same rule will be in operation this season. Following the experimental play-the-ball in the "Bottom 14" Competition, half-a-dozen schemes were put forward and discussed but all were rejected at the Rugby League's Annual General Meeting.

Could it be that the recent Wembley Cup Final influenced the retention of the much-maligned rule. There were nearly two hundred play-the-balls at Wembley, but the Hunslet and Wigan players executed them so quickly and slickly that there was no wrestling or barging and play was kept moving, as the rule intends it to be.

If playing the ball can be such a pleasant feature of a Rugby League Cup Final there is no earthly reason why it should continue to be a blot on the game in so many League matches.

The increase of referees' fees from £7 to £8 still leaves them underpaid for the thankless job they do, while the substitute rule merely makes legal what was already happening!
Significant Changes in the Laws 1948-1972

1948 Dropped goal reduced in scoring value from 4 to 3 points

1950 Try may be awarded when the momentum of a player carries him into in-goal even though, whilst tackled, the ball has touched the ground in the field-of-play.

1957 New Law 35 covered "Repeated Infringements of the Laws".

1958 Kicker permitted to place the ball for a place kick at goal after a try.
Necessity to play the ball with the foot after a tackle removed.
Advantage extended to include "ball touching referee".

1960 Advantage extended to include "ball emerging from scrummage between the first and second feet of either front row".

1961 Penalty kick permitted to be kicked in any direction.
First experiment to keep two lines of forwards a yard apart at the line-out.

1963 Line-out defined.
Law 20 and Law 34 combined as Law 20 (Charging, Obstruction, Foul Play and Misconduct).
Kicker of a penalty kick permitted to play the ball again without restriction.
Guidance given on the suitable pressure for a new ball.
Advantage extended to include "throw-in not straight from touch".

1964 At Touch (Line-Out) only two lines of players (double banking) on each side permitted.

1965 At Touch (Line-Out) each team limited to a single parallel line of players.
Off-Side Law amended at line-out to keep all players not participating in the line-out 10 yards from the line of-touch.
Scrummage off-side line defined as "a line parallel to the goal lines through the hindmost foot of the players team in the scrummage".

1966 Standard numbering of players recommended.
1967 Maul defined.

1968 Trial of Australian dispensation kicking law (restriction on kicking full pitch to touch from within the 25 yards line) for one season. Replacements allowed in International matches under certain clearly defined conditions.

1969 First ever complete re-write of the existing Laws with a view to clarification, simplicity and consistency. Notes, Case Laws and Ruling on the Laws discontinued as such, and replaced by "Instructions to Referees" issued as an integral part of the Laws. The re-write included: Playing time lost in delay in taking a kick at goal to be made up. Stiff-arm tackle and repeated infringement included in "foul-play". Penalty provision for specific misconduct by players in relation to the referee inserted. Right of appeal against a referee's decision deleted. Scrum-half not putting in the ball may not stand on the opposite side of the scrummage in front of the off-side line. Advantage Law dealt with in a separate Law.

1970 Advantage extended to include "kicking-off and throwing-in from touch" from the wrong place. The experimental restriction upon kicking full pitch into touch from within the 25 yards lines became Law (see 1968).

1971 Try increased in scoring value from 3 to 4 points as an experiment.

1972 Cricket-catch adopted for a knock-on as an experiment. Replacements extended to International matches of all grades.

This skeletal presentation of actual changes to the Laws — often after a history of withdrawn or deferred proposals, experiments, and dispensations — illustrates the inherent conservatism of the game's governing body in resisting change until it is clearly apparent that the re-structuring will (i) protect game-identity, (ii) increase game-viability, and (iii) is workable insofar as it can be adequately policed.
9th September 1986

Dear

You will remember that I contacted you in January and we subsequently discussed the key rule changes in your sport plus the reasons underpinning such rule changes. The information you gave me has been most useful and has helped me to formulate a theory about how games evolve.

To substantiate this I would be most grateful if you could provide me with an outstanding key example of the following:-

Identify a 'problem area' in the game which has necessitated a change in the law/rule. This change has had unanticipated outcomes in terms of the subsequent action of the game which has necessitated a further rule/law change. (This process might be repeated).

i.e. a phase/element of the game which has been subjected to successive rule/law change.
(If you can give me the dates so much the better).

Finally, can you comment upon whether the administrators have now 'got it right'.

I trust you don't mind this further imposition on your time. In return, I can offer you papers which have been submitted for publication if you are interested.

I look forward to hearing from you,

Yours sincerely,

F. C. Kew

(Senior Lecturer)
GAELIC FOOTBALL AUSTRALIAN RULES FOOTBALL CHALLENGE SERIES

QUESTIONS

1. What were the principal modifications made in 1984 to Australian Rules Football for the hybrid game?

2. Since the 1984 series, have there been other rule modifications / changes / clarifications?

3. In the first game of the 1986/87 series (the only game shown on Channel 4 TV in Britain) three factors were immediately evident:
   a) The scoring methods of the 2 sides were different;
   b) The patterns of play and skills displayed by the 2 sides were different;
   c) The referees and players seemed to have different interpretations of the rules about bodily contact.

Would you please comment on:

(i) the above differences and other problems arising from that game;

(ii) whether any rule changes or clarifications were made by the "Interested Parties" prior to the 2nd game in the series;

(iii) if there were rule changes / clarifications, did this have any effect on scoring methods, patterns of play, incidences of violence, etc.?

(iv) If there was an effect, did it improve the game; if so, in what ways?

(v) Did items (ii), (iii), and (iv) happen between 2nd and 3rd games?

4. Finally, I would welcome your insights about:
   a) why the hybrid game has been developed?
   b) what is the reaction amongst A.R.F. personnel?
   c) whether the hybrid game has a promising future?
   d) anything else you might think is of interest in the game's development.
I would like to add that the development of this hybrid game (particularly the rule changes and the reasons for such rule changes) in a 'godsend' for my research. There are few examples of international sporting games which are moving from an 'establishment' through to a 'consolidation' phase of development. Your comments and insights about the above questions are eagerly awaited!

I look forward to hearing from you and thank you for your time in answering these questions. If you do not want to keep to the rigid format of the above structure of questions, please feel free to answer those questions about rules however you see fit. Finally, may I offer you a copy of my research (or the relevant sections) when they are published.

Yours sincerely,

F. C. Kew
Senior Lecturer in Leisure Studies
Department of Applied and Community Studies
Ilkley Campus.
Dear Pat,

Thank you for the 1986 Commemorative Brochure which I have read with interest. I look forward to receiving subsequent "installments". I now understand the prime motives for the hybrid game and note that the brochure includes the International Rules. My main problem is that, being a 'foreigner', I am not fully conversant with either the Laws of Gaelic Football or with those of Australian Rules. Therefore I don't know where the hybrid rules differ markedly from the original codes. I am sure I can get this information merely by getting copies of the rules of the original codes and comparing them with the International Code - and this I will do.

However, without taking up too much of your time, I would be grateful if you could identify one or two of the features of Gaelic football which were altered/modified in the hybrid game and which subsequently caused problems of interpretation by players/coaches/umpires. With respect to the features you identify, I am interested in the following chronology:-

a) Original rule
b) Modified rule
c) Playing according to new rule (1984 series)
d) Subsequent modification and reasons for the modification
e) Consequences of modification for 1986 series
f) Any further modification/clarification proposed?

(N.B. I understand that the tackle law, for example, has been problematic).

For your information I attach a letter and questionnaire which has been sent to Channel 7 Sports and to the Victoria Football League. You will gather from this questionnaire the sort of understanding I am trying to acquire about the development of the new game.

May I take this opportunity of thanking you for all your help and I look forward to hearing from you shortly.

Yours sincerely,

Frank Kov.
Senior Lecturer, Department of Applied and Community Studies

Please reply to: Ilkley Campus, Wells Road, Ilkley, West Yorkshire, LS29 9RD Telephone 0943 609010
Dear Mr. Davy,

I understand from Rupert Rumney of Cheerleaders that you commentated upon the hybrid Gaelic/Australian Rules Football Game, which was televised for Channel 4. I am doing some research through the Sociology Department of Leeds University about the rules of games. The incipient development of this international game is, therefore, of great interest. Attached to this letter is a copy of a questionnaire I have sent to both the Victoria Football League and Australian Channel 7. I would be most grateful if you could respond to any or all of these questions. If you feel unable to do this, perhaps you could identify one or two of the features of Australian Rules Football which were altered or modified in the hybrid game and which subsequently caused problems of interpretation for players/coaches/umpires. Hence, with respect to the features you have identified, I am interested in the following chronology:

a) Original rule
b) Modified rule
c) Play according to the new rule
d) Subsequent modification/clarification and reasons for the modification
e) Outcome for play of the modification/clarification.

I would welcome your comments about any or all of these matters plus your opinion about the future of the game and the consequences for the two indigenous games. Meanwhile, may I thank you for your time and trust this request is not too onerous.

Yours sincerely,

Frank Kew
Senior Lecturer, Department of Applied and Community Studies

Please reply to: Ilkley Campus, Wells Road, Ilkley, West Yorkshire, LS29 9RD Telephone 0943 609010
Mr. Mike McKay,
Channel 7 Sports,
Dorcas and Wells Street,
SOUTH MELBOURNE,
Australia.

Dear Mr. McKay,

It has been suggested by Cheerleader Production Company that I contact you with respect to the recent Irish / Australian series of the hybrid Gaelic Football / Australian Rules game. I am engaged in some research through the Sociology Department of Leeds University, U.K. The research is aimed at understanding how modern sporting games evolve and change. I am particularly interested in this hybrid version of football since this is one of the few examples of a game at an incipient stage of development. I have already approached the Gaelic Athletic Association who are sending me VTR's of the recent series in Australia, but I also consider it necessary to get a perspective from the Australian experience. Therefore I would be most grateful if this request can be directed to the attention of the relevant personnel who are in a position to answer the questions posed on the attached sheet. Thanking you for your consideration.

Yours sincerely,

F. C. Kew,
Senior Lecturer
Department of Applied and Community Studies.
Dear Sir / Madam,

It has been suggested by Cheerleader Production Company that I contact you with respect to the recent Irish / Australian series of the hybrid Gaelic Football / Australian Rules game. I am engaged in some research through the Sociology Department of Leeds University, U.K. The research is aimed at understanding how modern sporting games evolve and change. I am particularly interested in this hybrid version of football since this is one of the few examples of a game at an incipient stage of development. I have already approached the Gaelic Athletic Association who are sending me VTR's of the recent series in Australia, but I also consider it necessary to get a perspective from the Australian experience. Therefore I would be most grateful if this request can be directed to the attention of the relevant personnel who are in a position to answer the questions posed on the attached sheet. Thanking you for your consideration.

Yours sincerely,

F. C. Kew,
Senior Lecturer
Department of Applied and Community Studies.
FK/AJD

9th April 1987

Mr. E. Diggs
General Manager
National Football League
120 Jolimont Road
Jolimont
Victoria
Australia

Dear Ed

Thank you very much for the material you sent me and for answering my questions. It has all proved to be valuable. In return, I can offer a copy of my analysis when it is finalised (this particular interest in Gaelic/Australian Football being part of a much larger project). Please let me know if you would like a copy.

Meanwhile, I would be most grateful to receive a copy of the questionnaire sent to players after the 1984 series (mentioned in your 1984 Tour Report): even better, a collation of the responses to that questionnaire. This would give me some insights into the players' views. I look forward to hearing from you.

Yours sincerely

Frank Kew
Department of Applied & Community Studies
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