CHANGING FORMS AND STRATEGIES OF STATE INTERVENTION IN THE HOUSING OF THE POOR IN ISTANBUL

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines different ways the Turkish state has attempted to house the poor in Istanbul since 2000, including the rescaling of the state and different interventions of the state in different localities. The rescaling of the state involves the expansion of nation state’s planning power by the empowerment the Mass Housing Administration (MHA), but also empowerment of the Greater Istanbul Municipality (GIM). These changes sought to promote ‘urban regeneration’ as the principle state housing policy for the housing of the poor over the period since 2000. This process crucially involves evicting most of the residents and relocating them to the peripheries of Istanbul, where they are then required to pay for the new housing. These developments have been met with well-organised resistance of the dwellers. However, the interventions of the state to different neighbourhoods vary. I argue in this thesis that the restructuring of the state and its spatiality can be analysed by using an Open Marxist approach to the state, as a product of capitalist class relations and as a particular historical form of social relations. This thesis develops the concepts of ‘rescaling of the state’ and ‘different interventions of the state’ by adopting a dialectical Marxist methodology for embedding this research in Open Marxism.

In this thesis, these two interrelated issues of restructuring of the state are explored both in ‘vertical’ level relations, which are the relations between different scales of the state (rescaling of the state) and in ‘horizontal’ level practices, which are differentiated interventions of the state at different localities at the same time. Hence, the main argument is that the restructuring of the state in Istanbul is a spatial and a scalar process that varies by class struggle.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AGFE – Advisory Group on Forced Evictions
CBD – Central Business District
FDI – Foreign Direct Investment
GIM – Greater Istanbul Municipality
JDP – Justice and Development Party
EU – European Union
IMB – Istanbul Metropolitan Bureau
MHA – Mass Housing Administration
OECD – Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PHF – Public Housing Fund
RPP – Republican People’s Party
SRA – Strategic Relational Approach
UR – Urban Regeneration
USA – United States of America
YHK – Board of Higher Arbitration
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

‘There is nothing more beautiful than demolition in Istanbul. Istanbul is getting more beautiful as we demolish it!’
Former Head of the MHA (Bayraktar, 2010)

1.1. The Motivation of the Thesis

This study has been motivated by two concerns. First, the study seeks to make a contribution to the spatiality of state theory in terms of state rescaling and different interventions of the state at different localities. Second it seeks to provide a better understanding of recent ‘urban regeneration’ process, as a form of state intervention, in Istanbul, including a significant change in the scaling of the state powers.

The spatiality of the state is a very complex theoretical discussion, which is discussed by various approaches, including non-Marxist and Marxist ones. This thesis adopts an Open Marxist approach to state theory that views the state as a historical form of social relations, in particular capitalist class relations. The state is an essential aspect of the development of the class struggle and not an institutional entity that is above or outside this struggle. Hence, the interventions of the state are formed historically from the development of this struggle involving the contradictions and conflicts embedded in the state and in locally specific places. The state aims to respond the contradictions and conflicts through its interventions; however it cannot overcome them entirely. This is an ongoing process of state restructuring which is why the interventions of the state are unstable and vary between different localities. This research aims to develop a more adequate approach in understanding changing forms and strategies of state interventions in different localities by examining the relations between dwellers, the state and capital for a particular time period. Hence, the
interventions of the state will be analysed as different moments of the regeneration process in Istanbul where class relations develop.

Istanbul offers a fertile ground to explore issues around the restructuring of the state’s spatiality. As the largest and the leading city of Turkey, it is in the centre of several complex political-economic restructurings of Turkey since the establishment of the country, but particularly since 2000. Since then, Istanbul has been a key site of these transitions of the state, involving integration to a global capitalist economy and being the spatial target of the internationally and nationally rising construction sector of Turkey, entailing restructuring of the housing of the poor.

The Justice and Development Party (JDP) government which came to power in 2002 put ‘urban regeneration’ (UR) as a nation-wide planning policy as one of the priority strategies in their agenda. The UR policy targets gecekondu settlements, which involve squatting of state-owned land dating back to the 1950s, and dilapidated areas in the city centres, involving historical conservation areas and affordable housing areas. This is pursued by the empowerment of the Mass Housing Administration (MHA), which is the national state body of housing finance, by giving extra-ordinary planning powers in which it is able to make planning at all scales and run the UR projects at neighbourhood scale. In this process, the question of upward scaling of the state and the dominating role of a national-scale housing authority in neighbourhood regeneration was a striking one.

However, the most interesting part of the rescaling of the state towards national scale in affordable housing was the organised resistance against the UR projects in most of the neighbourhoods subject to urban regeneration. The neighbourhood level resistance against urban regeneration was not expected by
the state authorities. The resistance in neighbourhoods had a significant effect on the changing interventions of the state in each locality.

The other pressure on the state has come from the developers who want to invest in the UR projects. The developers sought to invest in large areas, that is the scale of a whole neighbourhood. While the upward rescaling of housing policy was a response coming from domestic and international big construction companies’ large-area demands, the MHA was not able to respond to the resistance which occurred at the neighbourhood level. This caused downward rescaling of the state by giving some of the planning powers in regeneration areas back to the city-scale local authorities. However, downward rescaling of state power was still very limited when it is compared to the powers of the MHA. Hence, the implementation of urban regeneration projects at neighbourhood scale varies in using different legislation and diverse partnerships at different scales of the state. This sheds lights on the question of how and why state interventions vary at different localities for the same purpose of ‘urban regeneration’ projects, which is one of the questions that is in the interest of this thesis.

Seeking to regenerate inner city dilapidated areas and gecekondus so as to establish ‘modern places’ for living, the UR policy of the national state involves housing demolition in Istanbul in the form of relocation or eviction of dwellers from their neighbourhoods to 40 km away from the city centre. Outside Istanbul, the UR policy has also been employed; however the main target is Istanbul:

‘The government should take urban regeneration as the first thing in their agenda. They should provide serious amount of their resources for regeneration. Let’s start from Istanbul and Marmara Region, and solve the problem. We need a lot of money for regeneration. We need to revitalize a half of 3,5 million housing in Istanbul. The central state should lead the
process; the private sector cannot achieve it alone. If we can get the support of local authorities as well, we will make a major regeneration’ (Bayraktar, 2010).

‘The MHA will be more active in localities and the resources of the state will be mobilised in those localities where municipality is ready or where the municipality convinced the dwellers in their areas’ (Bayraktar, 2013).

What Bayraktar touches on the strategies of the state for the UR policy, including the large role of the central state with creating partnerships at local level and regenerating Istanbul on a large scale is very central to the changing housing strategies of the state. So, why should Istanbul be the main target of the UR, in what ways partnerships created at different scales of the state, and how are these partnerships and their intervention differentiated in different localities? This research focuses on how capital accumulation is headed towards Istanbul as a part of the UR process, and what are the dynamics behind differentiation of state intervention spatially.

As the meaning of regeneration took a different strategical perspective since 2000 as a part of Turkey’s integration to global capitalist dynamics through the expansion of construction sector, this research focuses on the period after 2000. As it is asserted openly by the former head of the MHA:

‘Either native or foreigner, either belonging to a pagan religion or is a nigger, it does not matter. As long as they have the money and they are able to finish the work, they can give the down payment of the regeneration project and enter to tenders of the MHA’ (Bayraktar, 2008).

‘This is not only urban regeneration, it will also revitalise the construction sector and construction materials sector’ (Bayraktar, 2012).
'Real Estate Associations can develop ‘urban regeneration projects’ in state-owned lands, areas where there is high risk of earthquake, and in gecekondu areas. That is one of the important things we are expecting. By this way, urban regeneration projects can realised, and also, by the development of real estate investment companies, the profit gained from these projects will be shared with wider population. Hence, public-real estate company partnerships, including the MHA, are very important and inevitable’ (Bayraktar, 2004).

Most of the literature on the recent urban regeneration process of the housing of the poor in Istanbul discusses the restructuring either from the perspective of urban social movements, or from a supposedly ‘technical’ restructuring of the state institutions and legislation according to the needs. However, there is no research made on the restructuring of state’s spatiality as a form of social relations. Hence, the lack of interest to the struggle of the residents against urban regeneration as a part of state’s spatial restructuring in the literature is the starting point of this research. The research analyses the resistance at the neighbourhood scale, the conflicts between capital fractions, and the interventions of the state in these localities by using a dialectical approach, where these three are conceptualised as different moments of the same relation.

1.2. The Structure of the Thesis

Responding to the arguments outlined above, this thesis critically examines the rescaling of the state in Turkey and the changing forms and strategies of state interventions at different localities in relation to ‘urban regeneration’ policy. In particular, it addresses four questions:

1. How can political economy in Turkey and in Istanbul since the 1950s to today be related to housing strategies of the state spatially?
2. How did the scalar nature of the state change in Turkey and in the three case study neighbourhoods in relation to affordable housing for the poor? How do global and national scale projects for Istanbul have particular impacts on the housing of the poor and the rescaling of the state?

3. How does state intervention into the housing of the poor while have been subjected to urban regeneration projects differ in different neighbourhoods of Istanbul? What are the forms of state intervention in three case study neighbourhoods? How do the means and forms of intervention vary between the three neighbourhoods?

4. What is the role of political resistance of the neighbourhoods in the changing forms and strategies of state intervention? In the case of specific neighbourhoods, what is the role of the resistance of dwellers to the intervention of the state and developers in the current and prospective housing policy for the poor?

These questions are explained in more detail in Chapter 5. In essence, the research is based upon a qualitative research of different scales of the state planning authorities, from the national to district, and also resistance of dwellers at neighbourhood level who are fighting against the demolition of their houses as a result of ‘urban regeneration’ projects. Combining data from three case area settings, involving areas under threat of demolition, neighbourhood organisations and state authorities at different scales, the research presents a grounded account of rescaling and different intervention forms of the state in three districts of Istanbul: Sariyer, Maltepe and Gungoren.

Two of the case studies, Derbent in Sariyer and Basibuyuk in Maltepe, are gecekondu housing areas. They have been under threat of demolition since they were built, however, since 2000, both of the case studies are subject to police violence and direct forms of relocation and forced-eviction of the whole neighbourhood. The other case study, Tozkoparan in Gungoren, is an affordable
housing area, whose origins preceded the programme of rehabilitation of gecekondu housing in the 1970s. However, this neighbourhood also became one of the UR areas in Istanbul. All three case study areas were designated to be regenerated as the land and the planning authority of the area was transferred to the MHA. Hence, without any consultation in the neighbourhoods, it was decided to regenerate them.

The thesis is structured into four parts: Methodological and Theoretical Framework; Historical Background; Research Questions and Methods; and Analysis and Findings. Following on from this introduction, Section I reviews the methodological underpinnings of a dialectical Marxist abstraction method that is adopted in the whole research and theoretical discussions of non-Marxist and Marxist theories of the state and its spatiality. Specifically, Chapter 3 points out key concepts and issues in research on the state, involving rescaling of the state as changing class relations and difference of state interventions focusing on the moments of class struggle in particular localities. It considers how class struggle is embedded in the restructuring of the state’s rescaling and interventions. This thesis not only aims to investigate theoretical discussions on the state and its spatiality from a wide range of different approaches, but also aims to develop an Open Marxist approach to the spatiality of the state, which has not been discussed in the differentiation of state interventions geographically. This thesis is predominantly based on a theoretical discussion of state’s spatiality in which the case studies illustrate and advance a particular theory.

Having identified some gaps on the spatiality of state’s literature in Section I, in Section II, Chapter 4 considers the historical context and the political economy of state’s spatiality in Turkey and in Istanbul, examining urban and housing policy between 1950 and 2000.
In Section III, Chapter 5 introduces the research aims and questions and presents the use of qualitative methods adopted to conduct the research. This chapter also bridges the dialectical Marxist abstraction method with the use of qualitative research methods.

Section IV presents and analyses the empirical material collected over the course of fieldwork. This is based upon participant observations, documentary analysis and semi-structured interviews conducted over the course of eight months. In Chapter 6, the historical background and political economy of Turkey and Istanbul between 2000 and 2011 is presented, examining the rise of the construction sector and the dynamics of capital accumulation in the process of Turkey’s integration to global capitalist dynamics. This chapter also examines the rescaling of the state in Turkey with respect to ‘urban regeneration’ policy by investigating the empowerment of a nation-scale housing institution (the MHA), the changing role of planning institutions at city-region and city level, and ‘urban regeneration’ projects at the neighbourhood scale.

Chapter 7 analyses the fieldwork research in three case study neighbourhoods, examining changing forms and strategies of the state in these different localities of Istanbul. This chapter starts with ‘urban regeneration’ projects and resistance against them in Istanbul as a whole. This is followed by a comparative analysis of all three case study neighbourhoods in terms of their demographic background, location of the neighbourhoods, ownership of housing, relationship between housing and workplace, and the historical roots of political resistance. The urban regeneration and resistance against it is then analysed separately for each case study neighbourhood.

Finally, the Conclusion Chapter summarizes the results of the thesis concerning spatial state theory, involving the rescaling of the state, spatial differentiation of
state interventions in neighbourhoods in Istanbul. On this basis, it reconsiders the theorisation of a changing spatiality of the state.
SECTION I: METHODOLOGICAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

CHAPTER 2: EPISTEMOLOGICAL GROUNDS OF THE RESEARCH

2.1. Introduction

The discussion in this chapter is to provide an epistemological ground to the theoretical framework and the analytical research of the whole thesis. This chapter provides the abstract concepts to the concrete in order to clarify the abstraction levels of the research. The methodology adopted in this thesis will then explain how the regeneration of housing of the poor at neighbourhood scale is related to different scales of the state, including national scale and the city-scale, and also how the state’s intervention at the same scale differs at different localities.

This thesis focuses on the debates on the political economy of space, involving an accumulated body of theoretical arguments and case studies. The concern of this chapter is the methodological grounds of those debates. The enduring methodological problem in Marxian political economy is the relations between the abstract and the concrete. Relations between the abstract and the concrete may be either necessary or contingent. The problem, therefore, presents itself as a dilemma of the necessary and contingent relations at different levels of abstraction.

Abstraction is a method, used by different approaches, of breaking a process (i.e. capitalist relations) or a whole (i.e. capitalism) into pieces as manageable parts to research. The main question of abstraction is what we abstract from and how we relate different levels of abstraction to each other. An abstraction starts from the very abstract concepts and goes along to concrete ones;
however this includes other levels between the very abstract and the concrete. Necessity and contingency, or internal and external relations, define the relation between abstracted parts. As in the example of the relation between a tenant and a landlord is a necessary one. Without the tenant, who pays rent to a landlord, there has not been a material social relation and they cannot exist without the one or the other (A. Sayer, 1994; p. 88-9). However, in a contingent relation, as in the example of the relationship between Turkish governments and the OECD, both can exist without the other. This Chapter will discuss abstraction, necessity and contingency and show in detail how they are used by Marxist approaches.

The relation of the necessary and the contingent in the dialectical Marxist method is distinct from the dominant approaches presented in human geography, from mainstream to critical. The mainstream approaches can be classified into two main strands: positivist geography and humanist geography. Positivist geography grasps reality as atomistic units, which are visible and empirically explored, but denies the existence of invisible phenomena and relations. The positivist approach focuses on a particular subject of analysis without relating it to whole social relations, including history, economics and politics in a wider sense (e.g. Hempel and Oppenheim (1948) cited in (Peet, 2006; p. 25)), and in its search for descriptive, quantitative, linear and naturalist accounts (Roberts, 2001; p. 545-7). In response to these shortcomings, humanist geography developed a critique of the positivist approach by demonstrating its lack in fundamental geographic elements of the human experience, for example, lived experiences in places (Peet, 2006; p. 34-5). As in Ley’s (1977) work, place should be considered as an object and subject phenomenologically and it is also an image and an intent; places may have multiple realities that is changing through the intentions of different subjects. Both strands seemed to be at odds with one another, but the development of
critical realist approaches has suggested an alternative angle to social geography.

Critical realism has attracted significant interest within social geography in recent decades (Cox, 1991a, 1991b; Cox & Mair, 1989a; Lovering, 1989, 1990; A. Sayer, 1985, 1991, 1994). By questioning both positivist and humanist geography, critical realism explores different levels of abstraction and relations between spatial scales (Roberts, 2001; A. Sayer, 1985, 1994). This is developed through the central premise of critical realism that the world exists independently of our knowledge of it. According to critical realists our observations and knowledge are not limited to or only start from our experience. It is rather theory laden that is always developed through discourses and a set of conceptual framework. A second assumption integral to critical realism is causation - that there is necessity in the world. Objects have causal powers, that is, the power to act in certain ways. This does not necessarily mean the empirical regularities among events. This means that, unlike positivism, explanation of an analysis does not require repeated events or regularities. ‘A causal claim is not about a regularity between separate things or events but about what an object is like and what it can do’ (A. Sayer, 1994; p. 105). Critical realism focuses on necessity rather than regularity.

This offers a midway point between positivist and humanist geography and critiquing both by adopting the abstraction of intrinsic powers and underlying causal mechanisms of objects of analysis. For critical realist methodology, such powers and mechanisms might not be directly visible, but can be analysed regardless of contingent conditions (Roberts, 2001; p. 546). The methodology allows geographers to explore further levels of abstraction for comprehending how the powers and mechanisms change when they interrelate with other powers and mechanisms. The interaction between various powers and mechanisms are explored by analysing two properties of the object: firstly, the
**internal properties**, which are characteristics of an object that constitutes it, without which the object would not be the same; secondly, the **external properties**, which are not necessary for the object’s existence (A. Sayer, 1994; p. 86-92). However, critical realism leaves the former and the latter external to each, that is, non-dialectical. The relation between internal and external properties of the objects of analysis is developed as if they are separate from each other. This external relation leaves the complexity of visible and invisible phenomenon aside.

Positivist approaches see reality as empirical units free from invisible relations. Humanist approaches see reality developed through people’s experiences. Critical realist approaches use an abstraction method to analyse visible and invisible relations. In contrast, the dialectical Marxist approach explored in this chapter adopts the philosophy of internal relations in order to examine the complex web of visible and invisible social entities of a single object of analysis. The next three sections deal with the constituent parts of dialectical Marxism. The first reviews the philosophy of internal relations to put forward the epistemological premises; the second examines the method of abstraction, and the third investigates how space enters the abstraction process. This is followed by a consideration of how this approach relates to the case study, in the complex relations of state interventions to the housing of the poor in Istanbul. This provides the basis for the theoretical framework and the review of empirically investigated changes in state intervention.

### 2.2. Dialectical Marxist Theories of Knowledge

Dialectical Marxism adopts the philosophy of internal relations. This shares some concepts that are used by critical realism, such as abstraction, internal/external relations, and the necessary/contingent, which were explained briefly above (Cox & Mair, 1989a; Ollman, 1993; Roberts, 2001; D. Sayer, 1987). The main criticism of critical realism by the philosophy of internal relations has
been the rejection of its dualistic treatment of opposites, such as the abstract/concrete, the social and the spatial, the global and the local (Cox & Mair, 1989a; A. Sayer, 1985, 1991, 1994). The meaning of the abstract/concrete distinction is to put abstract ideas at one end and concrete ideas to the other without regard to the intermediate levels of abstraction. The intermediate levels can only be potentially found in a hierarchy of levels of abstraction that is a continuum from the most highly abstract ideas to the most concrete ones (Cox & Mair, 1989a). However, it could be argued their critical realism does not take intermediate levels in the abstraction process into account and only refers to the dualisms. The emphasis of critical realism on dualist concepts is rooted in epistemological premises about the distinction between the realms of thought and reality (A. Sayer, 1991; p 283-4), and this neglects the dialectical relationships between them.

Dialectical Marxism, in contrast, is focused on ways of analysing social phenomena by rejecting distinctions and dualities, and resolving the apparent impasse between them. Firstly, dialectics is used as the epistemological premise, which is explained in this section; and secondly, the Marxist abstraction method is adopted to open up the different levels of abstraction, which will be examined in the following section.

According to Ollman (1993), the way to move the debate forward is to establish accurately what ‘dialectics’ means. In particular, we need to suppress the idea that dialectics is a simple flow of thesis-antithesis-synthesis or contradictions in dualities. It is, rather, a way of thinking that enables us to fully consider the changes and interactions occurring in the world. Dialectics adopts the philosophy of internal relations, which is a part of the Marxist production of knowledge on how to organise a reality for the use of research and how to analyse the outcomes of the study (Ollman, 1993). Marx did not consider social reality as atomistic and separate interactions of entities. Rather, in his
understanding of social reality, it is composed of a combination of what we know about it; how it changes in relation to its interaction with other things as a complex network of internal relations; and how it matches the wider context of which it is a part (Ollman, 1993; D. Sayer, 1987).

The philosophy of internal relations uses two significant ways to reveal what is the particular and what is the whole, and how they are related. Firstly, the philosophy argues that the ‘particular’ of a given social phenomenon cannot be defined merely by itself. ‘The world, is a complex network of internal relations, within which any single element is what it is only by virtue of its relationship to others’ (D. Sayer, 1987; p. 19). The most apparent example of a dialectical determination of a phenomenon is the relation between labour and capital. Neither labour nor capital can be understood autonomously or as independent particulars interacting externally. The identification of capital and labour respectively are intrinsically related: it is not possible to examine capital without labour, nor labour without capital (D. Sayer, 1987; p. 19).

Secondly, the philosophy of internal relations grasps the whole (the past and the likely future development of anything) as a single process while at the same time abstracting some parts for a particular purpose. Marx uses this method to subdivide the reality and to get units of it as a part of his abstraction. The parts of the abstraction are temporarily stable focuses of a wider and ongoing process, called ‘moments’ (Ollman, 1993; p. 66-8). The philosophy of internal relations rejects dualities and distinctions in dualities (e.g. global and local), which grasps social reality as separate, atomistic interactions of entities. In contrast, social reality is examined in terms of how parts of reality change in relation to interaction with other things as a complex network of internal relations and how reality matches the wider context of which it is a part (Ollman, 1993; D. Sayer, 1987). This involves the abstraction of some parts, for a particular purpose, of the whole process of capitalism, and these are termed
‘moments’. Extension of moments, one of the aspects of Marxist abstraction, provides us the ability to grasp the complex web of relations in capitalism, including different strategies and forms of the state interventions at different times and in different spaces. Therefore, the unequal and different interventions of the state or interventions at different localities can be analysed as a moment of the spatialities of production and reproduction of labour power and people (class struggle). A second example of the Marxist approach is the abstract concept of capital, which can be seen in the form of money capital as a moment in the process of production, and in the form of commodity capital as a moment in exchange. This argues that money and commodity are different forms of capital. Therefore, moments are different but not separate forms of the same process.

In the following section, the method of breaking the complex web of relations into moments will be discussed by following the Marxist conception of abstraction. This will include the dialectical method of Marxism and different aspects of Marxist method of abstraction.

2.3. The Dialectical Marxist Method of Abstraction

The role Marx attributes to abstraction is to break a complex web of relations into manageable parts. Marx starts the abstraction process from the ‘real concrete’, which is the world itself, continues with ‘abstraction’ separating the presented world into parts, and returning to the ‘thought concrete’, which is the reconstituted world. The ‘thought concrete’ is reconstitution of ‘the real concrete’ processed by the theory. For example, Marx handles each political-economy concept as a component of society itself, linked to the other components to form a particular structure. The process of abstraction in a Marxist approach starts from the concrete and ends in the ‘theorised’ concrete, which is a different ‘concrete’ from the starting point in the ‘real’. The whole abstraction process, from the concrete to the theorised concrete, is dialectical,
which, by abstracting out particular moments enables grasping ‘the whole’ as a single process.

In this respect, Ollman (1993; p. 73-110) argues that Marxist abstraction has three aspects: (i) extension; (ii) level of generality; and (iii) vantage point. The first aspect of systematic abstraction is extension. By using extension, it is possible to abstract moments of a process spatially and temporarily. Extension allows us to grasp a complex web of relations in a wider context in which two different appearances of a phenomenon at different times and in different spaces. These differences are the moments of a process (Ollman, 1993; p. 66). Marx uses extension to produce a critique of other political economists’ narrow abstraction method. This narrow method does not consider wider relations in time and space, and only sees either identical or different aspects of the object of analysis in the abstractions. The abstraction of capital involves time and space extension for every single analysis of it. In the example of a particular analysis of capital accumulation in Turkey, we need to limit our examination by using time and space extension. This research particularly examines Turkey’s integration to global capitalist dynamics, which is the period after 2000. The spatial extension of capital accumulation in Turkey since 2000 is predominantly Istanbul in which this thesis focuses on.

While every abstraction aspect develops the extension of moments, it should also be focused on a particular level of generality (Ollman, 1993; p. 86-99) in order to consider not only the part that is abstracted but also the whole system to which it belongs. According to Marx, the ‘level of generality’ for each concept should be known, because every concept takes different forms in different levels of generality. To take the example of ‘production’: production in general is related to common grounds shared with any society, but production in a pre-capitalist society is related to the particular forms of a pre-capitalist society, while production in capitalism is related to the particular forms of capitalist
society. Some aspects of different levels of generality might be similar or unlike when they are abstracted, but the abstraction of levels of production in general cannot cover all distinct periods of production (Ollman, 1993; p. 86-90). (Gibson & Horvath, 1983) propose a hierarchy of levels of abstraction that allows an intermediate level of abstraction to include sub-modes of production. At each level of this abstraction it is possible to define necessary relationships. Cox and Mair (1989a) adopt levels of abstraction of production to develop spatial concepts at different levels. This allows us to link more abstract elements of Marxist theory to geographical and historical variation by developing concepts at intermediate levels of abstraction. This will be discussed at the next sub-section of this chapter.

The third procedure of abstraction is the ‘vantage point’. A vantage point provides different perspectives for the questions of where, how and in what ways to carry out a research project. It is what the researcher interested in. Each new perspective opens up different ordering of the parts, different moments of the whole process and different sense of what is important. In the context of extension and level of generality, the object of analysis is developed from a particular vantage point. For example, different vantage points can be selected for analysing gender relations, for instance, examining unpaid housework or unequal payment in the formal economy. Each unveils a different perspective or different moments of the same process (Ollman, 1993; p. 99-109).

The three aspects of Marxist abstraction method are adopted as the abstraction method of this thesis. The two aspects of abstraction - extension and level of generality – provide a point of analysis of both the spatial and periodical expanse of state provision of housing for the poor, and a moment of how this intervention occurs and develops. The level of generality, also, helps us to develop concepts at different levels of abstraction, which allows a dialectical
flow from the abstract to the concrete that will be discussed in the next section. The vantage point of abstraction provides the particular perspective of the thesis on the research subject. To reveal the understanding of the method of abstraction in the thesis, next section provides a more detailed explanation of how space enters in the abstraction process.

2.4. Conceptualising Space in the Abstraction Process

The radical studies in the 1970s on the relation of space to the capitalist economy saw space either as a pre-given, passive reflection of social relations, or as a container on which events developed through time. In contrast to these ideas, during the 1980s it was argued that space is integral to social relations and is an active constitutive part of them (Harvey, 1982, 1987; Massey, 1985; A. Sayer, 1985; N. Smith, , 2010). The latter perspective involves a dialectical approach to the relation between space and social processes and provides fertile ground for pursuing the conceptualisation of space at different levels of abstraction. This section presents the distinctive dialectical Marxist approach to levels of abstraction specifying how and at what level(s) space enters the abstraction process (Cox, 1991a, 1991b; Cox & Mair, 1989a; Gough, 1991; A. Sayer, 1985, 1991). Firstly, how and when space enters to which abstraction levels will be discussed and secondly what is the relation of space to socio-economic processes at a particular level of abstraction: (either contingent or necessary) will be examined.

First, as mentioned in the previous section, a dialectical Marxist abstraction method is adopted in order to follow different levels of abstraction of the insertion of space into analysis, as suggested by Cox and Mair (1989a; p. 122-5). They drew on the work of Gibson and Horvath (1983), which concerned different periods of capitalism and adapted it to conceptualise space at various levels of abstraction. Gibson and Horvath (1983; p. 122-6) proposed an ‘intermediate level of abstraction’ between the highly abstract (e.g. mode of
production) and the lower abstract categories (e.g. social formation). This allows them to formulate theoretical concepts at different levels, but particularly at an intermediate level. Fundamental to Cox and Mair’s (1989a) emphasis on the sub-levels is the possibility of relating the abstract levels of Marxist theory and accounts of geographical and historical variations. This, according to Gough (1991; p. 434), allows us to see the potential existence of space at all levels of abstraction, rather than at merely intermediate or lower levels. For example, when we consider the relation between capital and labour at a high level of abstraction, space is an intrinsic part of it because for example, the relation involves the work place and home, and the relations between them. This identifies the socio-spatiality of each them separately and also shows the socio-spatiality of their relationship (Gough, 1991; p. 434).

Secondly, the (necessary or contingent) relation between space and socio-economic processes is examined through dialectical Marxist understanding of dualisms. As it is presented in the previous sections, the dialectical Marxist methodology rejects dualisms and suggests a dialectical relation. Gough (1991; p. 434-6; 439-40) adopts a dialectical approach to manage the necessary and the contingent social-spatial relations by developing a distinction between ‘structure’ and ‘system’. By the notion of ‘structure’ Gough (1991) refers to necessary relations, whereas by the notion of ‘system’ he refers to contingently related and spatially and historically concrete elements. For example, at the highest level of abstraction, the structure of the capital—labour relation (CLR) arises from the relation between capital, which owns and controls the means of production, and labour which sells labour power (Gough, 1991). However, when the structure is considered at a concrete level, capital and labour are presented as individual capitals and workers, not capital and labour ‘in general’. This presents that CLR exists both at the level of economy as a whole and at the level of an individual firm. The different levels of abstraction—the economy as a whole and the individual firm - are constructed by a single structure, and are
congruent with each other. ‘This congruence between part and whole is a consequence of the necessity of the relation between capital and labour, which imposes itself at both the society and the individual level’ (Gough, 1991; p.435).

This shows that different spatial scales of the economy - local, national, international - are developed from the same structure and these levels are congruent with each other (Gough, 1991; p.435). In other words, all these spatial levels are the moments of the same process.

However, the structures do not operate in the same way within each locality, even if they are congruent. The development of levels of abstraction arises in a number of ways, but in general, the differentiation of abstract structures into concrete forms are diverse and results in spatial difference (Gough, 1991; p.437). Gough (1991) demonstrates the difference with an example of the labour process at a particular level of abstraction. In ‘clothing machining’, the labour process will appear in various forms in different localities: ‘(i) because of local circumstances which are external to the labour process, such as wage rates; and (ii) because of tensions within the labour process, for example, between volume-productivity and quality of production’ (Gough, 1991; p.437). The differences are not only a result of external contingencies; rather, they are composed of both necessary and contingent relations as a unity.

Cox and Mair’s (1989) conceptualisations of socio-spatial relations at different levels of abstraction and Gough’s (1991) distinction between structure and system provide a dialectical abstraction process for the research. In the next section the application of the dialectic Marxist methodology to the research will be presented.

2.5. Applying Dialectical Marxist Methodology to the Case Study

In the previous sections of the chapter a dialectical Marxist approach to socio-spatial relations is examined. This section adopts this understanding
to the concrete research. This will draw a methodological framework for
the theoretical debates and also a framework for the concrete research.
Hence, the aim of this section is to show how the analysis of the research is
structured from abstract to concrete and from commonality to difference.
This research examines the state interventions to the housing of the poor
during the recent years in Istanbul, which involves complex, rapid and often
contradictory processes. To make an adequate research on state
interventions, the thesis examines the state theory in the next chapter and
adopts a theory of the state in which state and society are
dialectically related. As shown in the previous sections, the core of the dialectical
Marxist methodology is in its abstraction process. For this ground, the
levels of abstraction will be presented.

The highest level of abstraction is the capitalist mode of production (CMP).
This research is concerned about the capitalist use of space and capitalist
state rather than other modes of production. Firstly, space is not an
abstraction; it is just a moment of social relations as explained in the
previous sections. It is possible to analyse space at different levels of
abstraction as a moment of social relations, but not an abstraction in itself.
Secondly, the state is also not in itself an abstraction, but it is developed as
a moment of the capitalist mode of production. Those moments of CMP
are different but not separate.

In this thesis, the state is not seen as a basic category, or as a neutral
institution standing above or outside class struggle. It is rather viewed as a
product of class struggle and as a particular historical form of social
relations (Clarke, 1991b; p. 183). The state is seen as a social form of social
relations, not a thing free from other relations and caged in itself
(Holloway, 1994; p. 26). This means that the state and society are
inseparable parts of a whole set of dialectical relations.
After the discussions on the state theory, the ideas about the spatiality of the state are developed. In line with the discussion on space above, space is not seen as a container. It is integral to social relations. As it should be seen that space enters at quite abstract levels of analysis of the state not just at the concrete-contingent level. So, the state’s spatiality is an inseparable part of its restructuring in which is scalar and variable at different localities. The restructuring of the state for a particular time is a spatial process that carries scalar relations between different scales of the state and different interventions of the state at different localities.

The spatiality of this research starts from Turkey as the national scale of political-economic relations but also a part of network of nation states. Secondly, the research focuses on Istanbul as the city-scale of social space, which is also a part of network of cities in and outside Turkey. Thirdly, the neighbourhood scale, where urban regeneration process is evident is investigated as a part of the social space of network of neighbourhoods in Istanbul. These all three levels of the state are an integral part of a scalar relation. For example, the urban regeneration process in the neighbourhood scale is not separable from the changing role of Istanbul to become a global city as a part of networks of cities in the world or the political economic changes is a constitutive part of neighbourhood regeneration, not a separable process and relation.

Turkish political economy since the establishment of Republic has been developed from the CMP as general to particular from a historical and spatial specificity. In this research, the focus on the Turkish state melds and develops Turkish political economy and the theory of the state. The spatial development of this particular CMP is Istanbul, but specifically the local scale. The local scale gains an importance for this research to analyse the diverse interventions of state to different localities and how it eventuates
in spatial difference. The differences in three case study localities are not only a result of external contingencies; they are a composition of both necessary and contingent relations as a unity.

It is also significant for Turkey’s political-economic process to examine a particular period of time in capitalist mode of production (CMP). That is the period after 2000 when two periods of CMP collide in Turkey. In this period, neoliberalisation of political-economic relations overlapped with the financialisation of global economy when Turkey accelerated its integration to global capitalist dynamics. This has a considerable effect on Istanbul as being the new financial centre of the Middle East. So, the neoliberal domination of economy-politics in the world and integration of Turkey into global capitalist dynamics predominantly through finance restructures Istanbul spatially (e.g. building of new CBDs and developing the existing one) and relations between different scales of the state.

The relation between space and time is interwoven and not separate, on the contrary they are dialectically related as parts of one process. The overlap of neoliberalism and financialisation after 2000 in Turkey is an interesting one that has specific features even within neoliberalism, but some of which do not fit in neoliberalism and contradict with general neoliberal ideology. For example, the strong state tradition of Turkey empowered in this period in the form of centralisation of planning powers. Hence, this period is in many ways specific to Turkey, to Istanbul and to the neighbourhoods.

This framework provides a theoretical basis to analysing the concrete case, which is ‘changing forms and strategies of state intervention in the housing of the poor in Istanbul’. The vantage point of the research on the state itself is how state operates rather than on social-neighbourhood
movements, or the condition of the houses in the regeneration process, but all of them came in the story of urban regeneration process in the last decade from 2000-2010.
CHAPTER 3: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE STATE AND ITS SPATIALITY

3.1. Introduction

This chapter outlines the theoretical background of the thesis: it examines state theory and theories of state spatiality at a high level of abstraction in order to explain how the capitalist state acts and intervenes and how it is possible to analyse this process at different spatial scales of the state. The debate about the theory of the state and its spatiality is a very complex one, and this chapter aims to clarify the debate by separating the discussions: first, review of non-Marxist and Marxist approaches to state theory; and second, a review of discussions of non-Marxist and Marxist approaches to the spatiality of the state. The separation between non-Marxist and Marxist approaches helps to frame and limit the complexity of the state theory debate to a manageable basis for this research.

The overall aim of this research is to explain the changing forms and strategies of recent state urban regeneration policies in Istanbul since 2000. In different forms (e.g. renovation of historical areas, forced-demolishment of gecekondu settlements), urban regeneration has become one of the main urban policies in Turkey during the recent decade. This process brings accelerated demolition in the housing areas of the poor; coercion by the police; changes in existing laws; enactment of new laws; empowerment of existing and newly created city-regional and national scale state institutions; and disempowerment of city and district level state authorities. This process includes: (i) spatial varieties of state intervention (e.g. different strategies for different localities) in the urban regeneration areas; and (ii) rescaling of the state. For the most part, rapid and numerous changes in urban policy and in different forms of the state in Turkey have been analysed from by non-Marxist perspectives, and even when critical, see these changes as technical responses to the need to transform dilapidated
areas. However, there appears to be little or no research that adopts a Marxist state theory approach to understanding the recent changes in the forms and strategies of state intervention in urban regeneration process in Istanbul or other parts of Turkey. This thesis adopts a particular Marxist state theory, namely Open Marxist, to understand and examine the changing forms of the state and its rescaling. An Open Marxist approach requires consideration of: (i) a definition of state, power in and over of the state, and how the state acts; and (ii) the spatiality of the state at different scales.

The central focus of this thesis is upon contemporary approaches to state theory in the social sciences, mainly within political science, political economy and geography. So, the approaches examined in this Chapter are the contemporary discussion around the aims stated above. In the first section of the chapter non-spatial state theories, including non-Marxist and Marxist approaches, are examined. In the second section of the chapter, non-Marxist and Marxist spatial theories of the state are discussed. Non-Marxist approaches to state theory are analysed in order to reveal the weaknesses of the discussions on urban regeneration, while Marxist approaches are outlined in order to develop existing concepts in an Open Marxist approach which will provide a more adequate basis for analysis of urban regeneration processes in Istanbul than either non-Marxist or other forms of Marxist analysis. The limited analysis on the governance of urban regeneration process in Istanbul uses non-Marxist elitist or pluralist approaches in the Turkish literature. In this literature there is no study on the relation between the state and the regeneration process in particular.

It could be argued that the gap of studies on the state reflects the focus on analysing governments or governance rather than the state per se. This kind of studies focus on concrete and contingent form of governance without discussing the state as an abstract concept. However, governments and the
state are not the same and have particular differences. The special character of
government or governance varies in different forms of capitalist state in a
variety of different ways and institutional forms. On the contrary, the state is an
explanation of wider relations beyond the political parties in power. The state is
a part of social relations and a constitutive element of it.

As a conclusion of the chapter, the concluding section shows how the Open
Marxist approach can be adopted to the more concrete historical-geographical
case studies of the research.

3.2. Non-Marxist Non-spatial Approaches to State Theory

In this section, non-spatial theories of the state will be examined through non-
Marxist and Marxist approaches. The debates on the state will be examined in
terms of two questions: power in and over the state, and how the state acts. In
this section of the chapter, main approaches in the non-Marxist theories of the
state are examined: pluralist; elitist; managerialist and functionalist.

3.2.1. Pluralist Approaches to State Theory

Pluralism is the belief that offers a multiplicity in beliefs, institutions and
societies. The starting point of pluralism was that reality cannot be explained by
one principle, so the political pluralism advocates the ‘existence of diversity in
social, institutional and ideological practices and values’ (Dunleavy & O'Leary,
1991; p. 13).

Pluralists see the state as acting neutrally in a liberal democracy equally open to
the influence of all social groups (e.g. employers, workers, students, various
organisations); explicitly through elections and implicitly through lobbying or
corporatist structures. All these groups lobby and struggle to influence the
state. They have different interests and have roughly equal access to resources
to influence politics and various policies. Those groups which have the most influence are the ones that manipulate policy making. However, according to the pluralists, it is not possible for one single group or class to dominate the state, because resources are distributed across a range of groups and elites. This means that none of the groups have systematic advantage over others. Pluralists, thus, see the state as a site of conflict that reflects the pressures of interest groups. They consider policies as reflecting the interests of all social groups (M. Smith, 1995; p. 213).

Pluralist approach is descriptive in its analysis that emphasises governments or governmental systems rather than the state or the state organisation (M. Smith, 1995). Pluralists often mention the state empirically as discrete organisations (e.g. different departments of state institutions; courts, civil services) (Dunleavy & O'Leary, 1991), which leads to an analysis of different forms of government asking questions such as 'who has power in a polyarchy?' rather than 'what is the state?' (Dunleavy & O'Leary, 1991; p. 42). It is because they often do not accept the concept of 'the state' as a part of their analysis and reject the abstract concept of 'what is state'.

There are three main weaknesses of the pluralist approach. Firstly, they start their analyses from a more concrete level of abstraction by not considering the state as an abstract category. Their approach directly investigates a more concrete abstraction level of the state, i.e. governments, which are a form of socio-economic relations of a particular time and geography. Hence, pluralism has a limitation on making generalisations of abstract theoretical discussions. Secondly, pluralists do not necessarily investigate the historical, ideological and structural context of how the state works. Their examination is limited to the resources of the pressure groups rather than class relations in general and pluralism does not consider the historical-ideological and structural relations embedded in the state. Secondly, the pluralist approach, coming from a
normative basis, understands policy makers to be acting within a consensus of values, which is seen as politically neutral and the result of plural (different) interests (M. Smith, 1995; p. 209). However, it can be argued that, even when consensus occurs, it carries the tensions and the contradictions of class struggle (Eisenschitz & Gough, 1998; p. 93). The lack of consideration of historical context and the wider social relations of capitalism mean that pluralism is an inadequate framework for a comprehensive analysis of the state at different scales.

Following the pluralist approach, elite approach also shares the discussion of power through examining ‘community power’ and analysing governments. However, while pluralist approaches see the power as dispersed, the elite theory, on the contrary, claims that the power is in the hands of a small number of people with like minded and sharing similar interests (Judge, Stoker, & Wolman, 1998; p. 5). Next section examines elite approaches of the state theory investigating different varieties of the approach.

### 3.2.2. Elite Approaches to State Theory

Elitism, coming from the past discussion in political philosophy, carries a belief that a small ruling group is in the power to govern (Dunleavy & O'Leary, 1991; p. 137). Elite approaches to state theory argues that the state is often captured by particular powerful groups, including sections of business, senior government figures, rich individuals, media (owners) or sections of the middle class, independent of any democratic election process. This involves three main varieties of elite theory.

(i) **The classical elite approach** is based on a hierarchical conception of society and focuses on the relations between the rulers and the ruled or the powerful and the powerless. The ruled need decision maker(s) (for example; leaders) for complex decision-making processes. This further evolves historically into the
ruled having high regard for the leaders and increasingly accepting the self-interest of the leaders as being in the interest of the ruled (Dunleavy & O'Leary, 1991; p. 138-141; Judge, et al., 1998).

(ii) The technocratic elite approach to state theory largely adopts Max Weber's understanding of state organisation as a bureaucracy. Power is in the control of those who have the commanding positions within society’s leading bureaucracies (Dunleavy & O'Leary, 1991; p. 141-3; Judge, et al., 1998).

(iii) The radical elite approach, which adopts many aspects of democratic elite approach, sees the state dominated by new managerial elite of sections of business and powerful committees in the state. This approach has a particular focus on the governing of cities, with a specific critique of the pluralist approach to governing. According to critical elitist the major decisions are made by only a handful of people, rather than in the interests of diverse groups or classes (Dunleavy & O'Leary, 1991; p. 143-5; Judge, et al., 1998).

The elite approach to state theory assumes that the group that captures the state has non-contradictory interests and pursues these interests without creating any conflict in the society. However, the nature of capitalist relations carries contradictions which encounter dilemmas and cannot be solved fully according to the interest of the dominant elite groups or classes. This approach, thus, remains insufficient to reveal the complex contradictions within different groups or classes in a society.

While elite and pluralist approaches to state theory are interested in the power relations in the state or governments, the managerialist approach, which is examined in the following section, focuses on the state and internal relationship, particularly the self-interest of state officers. The managerialist approach shares some similarities with the technocratic elite approach.
3.2.3. Managerialist Approaches to State Theory

Managerialist theory sees the state as a distinctly separate institution from society, aiming to reproduce its own power. This autonomy is not embedded in the demands and interests of classes or groups in civil society: rather, it is rooted in the self-interest of state officers. The approach’s emphasis on the power of state officers might be seen as similar to elite approach; however, the state is not seen as captured by any powerful group outside the state as is accepted in elite approach. The state elite has an autonomous power, embedded in their own self-interests (salary, prestige, etc.) which is different from other group or class in society (Mann, 1984; Skocpol, 1985).

Managerialist theory attributes an intrinsic, autonomous power to state. The sources of coercive power of the state can be found in the state institutions with their managerial personnel: these personnel carry distinct interests, preferences and capacities, which need to be examined separately from civil society. The main separation of the interests is between the political and the economic. Therefore, whoever controls political power achieves the control of the state and whoever gets the control of commodity and labour power controls the economic power. This indicates that economic class relations are separate from political relations within the state (Hay, Lister, & Marsh, 2006; Mann, 1984).

There are two main critiques of the managerialist theory of state. Firstly, that it gives great significance to state officers and the bureaucratic processes of the state. This assumption is based on the bureaucratic and undemocratic nature of the state, facilitating the appropriation of state power by officers. This is the weakness of the approach that excludes the class character of the state (R. J. Das, 1996). Secondly, this approach has tended to concentrate rather one-sidedly on political factors internal to the state, both negatively and positively
Managerialists tend to see societal factors, e.g. social movements, as beyond or outside the state (Hay, et al., 2006).

3.2.4. Functionalist Approaches to State Theory

Functionalism refers to an organic working system of the society like a physical body, in which each subsystem feeds the maintenance of the proper functioning of the whole system. The state is such a subsystem of the society. Functionalists argue that the functionality of subsystems of an organic working system can reach a stable equilibrium. This functional system serves the needs of the society as a whole, rather than individual interests. The main focus of functionalism is to identify and understand how a range of elements of society fits together as a whole (Calhoun et al., 2002). The idea of stable equilibrium of the society as a whole rests on a common set of values which are well integrated, and each of which has a function in the social order. This maintenance of stability consists of agreement on shared values and a normative consensus amongst members of the society on rules and norms (Dunleavy & O'Leary, 1991).

Functionalist analyses of society may take two perspectives on the state. In the first, the state is seen as politically and socially neutral, acting in the interests of the smooth overall functioning of society and efficiency of the economy. The differentiations within societies along with modernisation and development thus result in social order and stability. Alternatively, the state is viewed as a separate institution from civil society and acts successfully to control the conflicts in society. The first perspective of the functionalist approach to state is examined below and adopts a non-Marxist approach. However, the latter functionalist approach to state, seeing civil society as conflictual, involves different Marxist approaches. These are influenced by the functionalist basis that will be examined in the next section of this chapter.
This approach can be criticised for its premise of seeing society as harmonious in terms of shared values. It disregards the variety of interests of different groups and classes; rather, it considers that a homogeneous interest sustains harmony in the society. However, different interests point out conflicts in society which are not necessarily solved just by satisfying the functional needs: the state is not able to respond to all the needs of the society.

In contrast to pluralist approach which sees the state under the influence of equal power of different groups, the elite approach conceptualises the state as a thing captured by unequal power of the most influenced groups. Whereas managerialist approach explores the autonomy of the state rooted in the self-interest of state officers, the functionalist approach which sees the state as acting either to control the conflicts in the society or to provide continuity for the functions of society and efficacy of the economy. The Marxist approaches investigated in the next section of this chapter view the state as an abstraction of complex social relations with many aspects.

3.3. Marxist Non-Spatial Approaches to State Theory

The starting point of all Marxist state theories is the identification of the state as a separate institution from the economy in a capitalist society, unlike for example, the feudal state which was organisationally fused with the economy. In a feudal state, the control of the state takes its power from the feudal system, whereby economic relations, political relations and military powers are fused together in all respects as one source of power. In a capitalist society, however, the state and the economy are institutionally separated. This does not mean that they are different in all respects (for example the exploitation of one class by another is common to both; however, the form of the exploitation differs (Group, 1980)), but it does mean that they are distinct from each other.
All Marxist theories of the state have an agreement on this differentiation in a capitalist society, but there is a disagreement on how the state and the civil society relate or the relation between economy and politics, why there is a separation, and what the nature of this separation is. This is also a basic difference from the non-Marxist approaches to state theory, which do not discuss whether there is a separation or not. This section focuses on these questions through examining three main strands of Marxist state theory: instrumentalist, structuralist and class-struggle theories.

3.3.1. Instrumentalist Approaches to State Theory
The instrumentalist theory of the state focuses on the question of ‘who controls the state’. This theory views the state as an instrument or a tool in the hands of the ruling class (Hay, et al., 2006). The state has no autonomous capacity, but is directly controlled by capitalists in order to pursue their common interests and/or the special interests of specific groups of capitalists (R. J. Das, 2006). Instrumentalist approaches to state theory involve different strands of analyses of the control of the state, which are similar in many ways to the elite approach. These include:

(i) The relations between the state elite and the economically dominant class:
The personnel in higher positions in the state (the state elite) have tended to be a part of the economically dominant class. The state elite, then, shares both the ideological and political assumptions and economic interests of this class, providing direct control of the state by the bourgeoisie. This control can be seen in different ways: for instance, having legislative seats, having advisory positions in the government, or funding political parties (Milliband, 1977; p. 69).

(ii) The relations between the state and the monopoly capital: According to the theory of State Monopoly Capitalism, capitalist competition causes the concentration of capital, which leads to the development of monopoly capital.
Monopoly capital and the state are fused together, because the tendency for the rate of profit to fall needs be controlled and compensated by the state. Hence the state has no autonomy and it is merely under the command of the monopolies: that is, the state is open to the manipulation of monopolies and becomes an instrument of dominant monopolies (R. J. Das, 2006; Poulantzas, 1978; p. 18-9).

There are both conceptual and empirical critiques of the instrumentalist approach to the state. Firstly, arguing that the state is fully subjected to the interests of the dominant economic classes disregards the structure of the state (Poulantzas, 1978), and privileges agency (actions of individuals or social groups) as being more important than structure (Hay, 2006; p. 72). Secondly, if the state acts in the supposed general interest of capital, then it would inevitably have to act against the interests of particular capitalists at the same time, since not all capitalists share common interests. This would require the state to have more autonomy than the instrumentalist approach allows. Thirdly, and on more empirical grounds, state personnel are seen as always captured by and sharing capitalist interest without conflict of interests or structural constraints. This approach mainly focuses on state personnel and inter-personal alliances and networks of the state elite, but does not regard the structure, form and function of the state as a whole (Hay, 2006; p. 71). In addition, state personnel do differ and carry contradictory interests, and the dominant economic class do not necessarily occupy important positions in the state (R. J. Das, 2006).

The instrumentalist theory focuses on the class character of the state in terms of who controls the state; the structuralist approach, which is examined in the next section, also addresses the class character of the state; however ‘in terms of the state’s actions imposed by the capitalist class structure’ (R. J. Das, 1996; p. 31).
3.3.2. Structuralist Approaches to State Theory

Structuralist theory claims that the state has ‘relative autonomy’ that protects the interests of the dominant class or secures the unity of the society as a whole. This relativity is examined through the constraints on state actions imposed by the dominant class structure (R. J. Das, 2006; p. 66). So it is not the attitude of state elite but structural constraints on the state actions.

The structure of the state actions is analysed by either its economic or political functions, by making a distinction between the economic and the political, and by asserting a priority of either economic structures or agents. The economic structuralist approach views the actions of the state as influenced and imposed directly or indirectly by the requirements of capital. In the political structuralist approach, relative autonomy of the state is seen necessary for the state to carry out its political functions (R. J. Das, 1996; p. 34). The commonalities of both tendencies are their commitment to the relative autonomy of the state, either economic or political, and the separation between the economic and the political as discrete forms of social relations under capitalism (Holloway & Picciotto, 1977; p. 81).

The commonalities and the differences between structuralist theories are examined in terms of how the state itself is viewed and how the relative autonomy of the state is understood. These will be dealt with by identifying two main structuralist approaches to state theory: economic structuralism, which includes the ‘structural selectivity’ of the state and ‘state derivation’, and ‘political structural’ approach.

(i) Economic Structuralism: The ‘Structural Selectivity’ of the State

This approach views the state as ‘non-capitalist’ in itself, but as having a selectivity process, which involves certain filtering mechanisms to secure the capitalist accumulation that is necessary for the existence of the state. The
selective nature of the state reflects its class character without being inevitably capitalist. The state sets up a sorting process according to selective principles, which are derived from the internal structure of the state apparatus, ‘influenced by the nature of ruling-class interests and historically contingent specific functions enacted by the state’ (Jones, 1999; p. 51), and to secure policy legitimation. The selectivity of the state involves the inclusion and exclusion of certain social groups or class fractions.

This sort of selectivity can be examined in terms of four processes: (i) exclusion, (ii) maintenance, (iii) dependency, and (iv) legitimation (Barrow, 1993; Offe, 1974). (i) The processes of exclusion in a capitalist society work towards the separation of property ownership and political authority. That is, the state cannot command economic production; rather, it can enable capitalists to invest in certain areas by state subsidies or incentives. The main way of doing this is to exclude or include certain groups or fractions by using the state’s selective mechanisms (Barrow, 1993; p. 100), which involve the elimination of policies incompatible with capital accumulation. However, in addition to the selectivity mechanism of the state, (ii) the maintenance is also needed to ensure that the state has the mandate or the consent to secure the general interest of capital. This mandate provides a systematic production of required policies for the general interest of capital. The systematic selectivity of the state, therefore, takes its power from its ability to coordinate state personnel to recognise and select in parallel to the general interest of capital, and also from the repressive mechanisms of the state apparatus that complement the selectivity process by selecting out anti-capitalist interests (Barrow, 1993; p. 101; Offe, 1974; p. 37-8).

The processes of exclusion and the maintenance alone do not fully explain the selectivity of the state in terms of how and why the state acts in parallel to the general interest of capital; the two further principles of dependency and legitimation add to the analysis. The structural selectivity of the state is clarified
with (iii) dependency. According to dependency, the state is dependent upon
the sustainable continuity of capitalist accumulation. Therefore, the state
apparatus and state personnel use the selectivity of the state for the
maintenance of capital accumulation. (iv) The whole process of selectivity also
needs to be legitimate in a democratic country. The legitimation process of
selectivity is set up by concealment and ideological mechanisms. ‘Concealment
mechanisms, such as administrative secrecy facilitate the adoption and
implementation of maintenance policies outside the sphere of class struggle
and special interest competition’ (Barrow, 1993; p. 101). The ideological
mechanisms are also used to show that the continuity of the capitalist
accumulation is needed to secure the unity of society as a whole (Barrow, 1993;
p. 101-3). However, there are contradictions between the legitimation process
and the accumulation of capital. For example, the increasing involvement of the
state in the economy can foster economic crisis and the close identification of
the state with particular interest groups in its attempts to solve the crisis can
weaken its legitimacy (Clarke, 1991c; p. 8). The state tries to overcome such
contradictions by using its political power. The economic crisis therefore
appears as a political crisis due to the contradiction between accumulation of
capital and legitimation mechanisms of the state (Offe, 1974).

The structural selectivity of the state is found to be a useful conceptualisation
by economic structuralists that show how the state works in terms of class
interests. However, this conceptualisation has structural rigidities. The
structural foundations of the selectivity process are developed by separating
and externally relating state institutions and political processes (Clarke, 1991c;
p. 8). It is assumed that the state has the power to mandate a selectivity process
in favour of the general interest of capital. This is an idealised type of state
which collects plural interests, examines them through its sorting mechanisms,
carrying social-structural (historical premises), accidental (contingent factors)
and systematic (organisational structures and processes of political systems)
exclusion rules. Then the state selects and implements policies to secure the unity of the capitalist society (Offe, 1974; p. 37-8). Such a conceptualisation, firstly, views the general interest of capital as non-contradictory; and secondly, views the state apparatus and state personnel capable of producing a selection process without conflicts or contradictions.

Economic structuralists that address the structural selectivity of the state do not see the contradictions and conflicts within the state apparatus or between different capital fractions; however, economic structuralists views the relation between the state and society derived from contradictions embedded in mode of production. The second theoretical strand in economic structuralism is the state derivation debate, investigated in the next section.

(ii) Economic Structuralism: State Derivation
The starting point of the state derivation theory is how to analyse the relationship between state and society without constituting them as distinct spheres. This approach is based on the categories used by Marx in *Capital* in which the relationship between wage labour and capital is not only an economic, but also a social, relationship that inextricably merges economic, political and ideological dimensions. These dimensions are complementary forms of a single social relation that appears by means of the struggles over the reproduction of social relations (Clarke, 1991c; p. 8). The relations between state and society are derived from contradictions embedded in the capitalist mode of production (Barrow, 1993; p. 78; Clarke, 1991d; p. 188) and the examination of this relationship is established on the derivation of the state form (Holloway & Picciotto, 1978; p. 16). These contradictions needed to be solved for the reproduction of capital (Barrow, 1993; p. 78; Clarke; 1991d; p. 188; R. J. Das, 2006; p. 69).
There are two aspects in this debate for analysing the necessity of the state as a separate institution (Barrow, 1993; p.79; Clarke, 1991d; p. 188; R. J. Das, 2006; p. 69-71). The state is derived either (i) from the nature of the relations among capitalists (Altvater, 1978; p. 40-2; Muller & Neususs, 1978; p. 35); or, (ii) from the antagonism between wage labour and capital (Gerstenberger, 1978; Hirsch, 1978). In the former, the state is viewed as an ideal collective capitalist that acts to provide general conditions for the existence of capital accumulation and the existence of the state itself. These are achieved by (state) functions that cannot be maintained by the capital itself (e.g. police and military forces to regulate the conflict between capital and wage labour, or establishing and securing legal relations) (Altvater, 1978; p. 42). This approach gives the state a relatively autonomous power by attributing to it a specific necessity in a capitalist society.

In the second approach to the derivation theory, the state is not viewed as a necessity for the survival of the general interest of capital above the competition among capitals alone: the necessity of the state also appears in relation to the exploitation of labour. The state is not identified with the general interest of capital; the state has its own rationale coming from its form. This form depends on the separation between the economic and the political, because of that the derivation of the state is depended on the continuity of this separation and the reproduction of capitalist relations causing it (Hirsch, 1978). This analysis opens a way to ‘conceptualise both the “autonomy” of the state as a specific form of domination, and the limits to that autonomy, inherent in the need for the state to secure the expanded reproduction of capital as the basis of its own reproduction’(Clarke, 1991c; p. 13-4).

The forms of intervention and particular policies of the state are not only produced for the needs of capital accumulation, they are also mediated by class antagonism and the historically developed form of the state. When the political and economic strength of the working class increases, the state responds to this
process by undertaking functions of the welfare state. The ability of the state to carry out these functions relies on the consistent growth of production which finances the resources needed for the functions of the welfare state, but also increases the pressures on the state to intervene for the continuity of capital accumulation (Clarke, 1991c; p. 14-5). This reflects the contradiction between the accumulation and the legitimation functions of the state that was argued in the previous section (the structural selectivity of the state).

This approach, deriving the state from conflicts within capital and the exploitation of labour, proceeds beyond the structural selectivity approach of the state by postulating the institutional separation of the economic and the political from the functional needs of capital (explained in the first Section (i) on economic structuralism). However, this approach does not explain or show how class struggle takes place historically. It rather views the institutional separation of the economic and the political as a historical event that happens once and reproduces itself in the wage form through time. Once the autonomy of the state has been derived at a single historical juncture, then it is embedded in the sovereignty of the state as an autonomous power (Clarke, 1991c; p. 15-6).

In the economic structuralist approaches, examined above, the state has to create conditions for capital accumulation and production; however, in political structuralist approaches the role of the state is settled on the changing balance of class forces. Political structuralism, which is investigated in the next section, highlights the political importance of the class struggle for the state.

(iii) Political Structuralism

This approach examines the relation between class and state by primarily focusing on the functions of the state and how these functions are achieved in relation to class struggle. Political structuralism views the state as carrying out its maintenance function by ‘constituting the factor of cohesion between the
levels of a social formation’ (Poulantzas, 1973 (1968); p.44), which is divided into classes. Despite various modalities (technical-economic, ideological and political) of the functions of the state, the state’s role is to be a part of the ‘organisational principle’ or ‘order’ of the cohesion of different levels of social unity. The process of ordering involves the reproduction of the structure by class struggle (Clarke, 1991a).

The ordering of the cohesion of different levels of social unity is analysed on two levels. On the first level, the state, as the cohesive factor of the social formation’s unity, takes different forms in relation to the mode of production and social formation in the conjuncture. This form-shaping process depends on the relation of class to the state. The state plays a dual role in the way it functions for different classes (Clarke, 1991a; p. 86; R. J. Das, 2006; p. 67): for dominated classes, the state acts to prevent their political organisation by showing itself as securing the general interest (R. J. Das, 2006; p. 67; Poulantzas, 1973 (1968)); and for the dominant classes, the state takes over the political interest of the bourgeoisie and seeks to arrange different fractions into a power bloc comprising dominant class fractions and political elites (R. J. Das, 2006; Poulantzas, 1973 (1968)). On this level of analysis, the state is the explicit political power of the dominant class(es) and the economic power of capital is shaped by class (Clarke, 1991a; p. 87; Poulantzas, 1973 (1968); p. 274).

On the second level of the analysis, ‘the representation of classes through parties and other institutions at the level of the state, and their presence through at that level is simply an aspect of the management by the state’ (Clarke, 1991a; p. 86). The power and the interests of the class(es) at that level are limited by the constraints that are set by the given structure. The concept of conjuncture determines the limitations of the possibilities open to the various classes. The development of the structure is shaped by the political practice of the class(es) in a particular conjuncture within the limits of that structure. This
shows that the political practice is subordinated by the structure and the political practice reproduces the structure (Clarke, 1991a; p. 97; Poulantzas, 1973 (1968)).

From a political structural perspective, therefore, the relative autonomy of the state stems from the actions of the state in realising its dual functioning for different classes. On the first level of analysis, the function of the state is performed by giving short-term economic concessions to the dominated classes to put a halt to or to disorganise their political organisation or to encourage the organisation of the dominant classes. This might be in favour of the dominant classes in their long-term economic interests (Clarke, 1991a; p. 87; R. J. Das, 2006; p. 67). The concessions and sacrifices that are given as state interventions show the relative autonomy of the state in favour of the dominant classes to achieve their political interests. On the second level of analysis, the function of the state is to present itself as the representative of the interest of the whole. This is necessary for the dominant classes to identify and formulate economic concessions for the dominated classes for the survival of the dominant class(es)'s political interests. In this approach, the separation between the economic and the political is an inevitable part of capitalism in which the state can only respond to the political interests of the dominant class(es) in the long-term. However, these interests are also the limitations of what dominant class(es) can achieve in the precise conjuncture of the class struggle (e.g. the configuration of the power bloc) (R. J. Das, 2006; p. 68). In order to preserve the structure the state expresses the power of all classes in the conjuncture, rather than only the power of dominant class (Clarke, 1991a; p. 98).

This approach has been criticised for its structural and functionalist analysis of the state (R. J. Das, 2006). Firstly, the survival of capital, both for the unity of the social formation and for the interests of the dominant class(es), necessitates the maintenance of the functions enabled by the relative autonomy of the state.
Secondly, this approach overstresses the political role of the state and while underemphasising its economic functions, it assumes the economic and the political as distinct forms of capitalist social relations (R. J. Das, 2006; p. 68-9).

3.3.3. Strategic Relational Approaches to State Theory
This approach can be found in the late Regulationist approach to state theory; however, the Regulationist version is a misleading and incomplete understanding of the strategic relational approach. Strategic Relational Approach (SRA) is a later approach developed through regulationist approach by relating regulationist assumptions with political structuralism. However, there will not be a separate review of regulationist approach to state theory in this section, but instead there will be an examination of the SRA that collates the regulationist assumptions of state theory.

The strategic relational approach considers the Marxist state theories, examined above, as either capital theoretical, ‘which subsumes different patterns of accumulation under general economic “laws”’ (e.g. instrumentalist theory of the state; the structural selectivity debate; and the state derivation debate); or class theoretical, which reduces patterns of accumulation and the state forms ‘to specific “economic corporate” struggles among various fractions and classes’ (e.g. the political structuralist approaches) (Jessop, 1991; p. 142). According to a strategic relational perspective, approaches that are focused either on the abstract forms (capital theoretical) or on the concrete forms (class theoretical) of variation in accumulation patterns, because of that it is necessary to link capital and class theoretical approaches by introducing ‘strategic-relational’ middle range concepts (Jessop, 1991; p. 142) on their theoretical assumptions for a more adequate approach.

The strategic relational approach is based on the combination of two approaches: the structural selectivity of the state, and political structuralist
approaches to state theory, which are examined above. The structural selectivity of the state (Offe, 1974) (see Section (ii)), presents the sorting process of the state according to its selective principles. This selectivity is developed in terms of four main principles: first, the state excludes or includes certain groups or fractions by using its political power over the economic power of various capital interests; second, the state produces its own maintenance by guaranteeing its mandate for securing the general interest of capital; third, the state apparatus and state personnel act according to the maintenance of capital accumulation; and fourth, the whole process of selectivity needs to be legitimate for the unity of the society.

However, there are some limitations of the SRA in terms of its structural roots. The strategic relational approach compensates the lack of ‘structural tensions and internal political struggles’ (Jones, 1997; p. 845) in the structural selectivity theory by fusing political structuralist approach to the structural selectivity of the state theory. This extends the structural selectivity debate and reveals the complex relations within the state system and its forms of representation (Jones, 1999; p. 51).

The political strategic approach, which is a later work than the political structuralist approach, gives primacy to politics, power, strategy and representation by focusing on the relationship between state and class(es) (Poulantzas, 1978). This approach sees the state as complex and decentralised among different branches and sections, but also all these branches and sections show a unified apparatus designed by the central power of the state (Poulantzas, 1978; p. 136). This can be called the ‘dual’ character of the state, including its institutional and class unity. Firstly, the institutional unity of the state is described with regard to the ‘dominance of the branch or apparatus which represents the interests of the hegemonic fraction’ of capital (Jessop, 1985; p. 127-8). This unity can be achieved through dominating a state
apparatus that is already taken over by the hegemonic fraction and/or through changing an already dominant state apparatus into a privileged centre of the hegemonic fraction’s interests (Jessop, 1985; p. 128; Poulantzas, 1978; p. 137).

Secondly, the class unity of the state is based on the ‘political practices which are pursued by the dominant apparatus’ (Jessop, 1985; p. 128). Class unity relies on the capacity of the dominant apparatus to transform power without constitutional formalities (e.g. legal / juridical unity). It is then possible for the dominant apparatus to set up its own parallel power networks, to enable short-term decision making in any branch of the state (Jessop, 1985; p. 128).

The unity-making process is reflected in the complex, incoherent and chaotic nature of state policy formation, reflecting class struggle in internal divisions and contradictions in and between different apparatuses and branches of the state. However, the role of the state organisation is to secure the imposition of a general line over the micro-policies, including the strategies and tactics of various fractions and classes. This general line appears through the collision of the complex institutional matrix of the state and particular strategies and tactics of fractions and classes, and is shaped by the ‘structural selectivity’ of the state characterised by the state’s apparatuses and personnel, by the class conflicts and contradictions of fractions and classes, and by a more or less successful overall strategy. Structural selectivity is not reducible to any of them; rather it emerges from clashes between them (Jessop, 1985; p. 126-7; Poulantzas, 1978; p. 132-6): that is, selectivity emerges from a process of strategic calculation without a calculating subject. Offe’s notion of a structural selectivity that depends on structural causality is thus shifted to a strategic selectivity of the state, depending on strategic causality (Jessop, 1985; p. 341). The selectivity process is highly interwoven with the strategies pursued by various fractions and traverses the state in the policymaking processes. In this way, the concept of ‘strategy’ plays an important role identifying the nature of the state and its
interventions and generating middle-range concepts for closing the gap between capital- and class-theoretical approaches.

In a political strategic approach, the state is considered as ‘the material condensation of a relationship of forces and as a strategic field and process of intersecting power networks’ in conflict (micro-policies) (Poulantzas, 1978; p. 136). Therefore, the state is seen as the strategic site and centre of the exercise of power: an organisation of the dominant class in its relationship to the dominated classes (Poulantzas, 1978; p. 148). However, the state is not a subject that obtains power for itself, nor is it an instrument held by the dominant class(es); rather it is a social relation, which is the terrain, the source, the result and the crystallisation of political strategies (Jessop, 1985; Poulantzas, 1978). Although the state puts into play the necessary tactics and strategies for the reproduction of political power, appropriate strategies result from clashes between state structure, particular strategies and counter strategies. No group, class or individual can choose the final outcome of conflict-laden process of micro-power plays (Jessop, 1985; p. 129). It is the state, with its selective power relations where all these micro-powers meet up and produce an outcome of the process. Through state power the micro powers or the interests of class fractions have the capacity to be realised. The clash of micro powers may involve counter-strategies and tactics of fractions for each of their interests, and because of that the field of state power is highly relational. The ‘strategic selectivity’ of the state reflects not only the institutional matrix of the state, which is the political domination inscribed in the state’s institutional materiality (Jessop, 2008; p. 125), but also the strategies and tactics of the fractional classes. The former demonstrates the field of class struggles, and the latter shows the alternative logics of fractions settled on a strategic basis. These strategies should be analysed at a middle range of abstraction.
Middle range concepts provide an understanding of the alternative logics of capital ‘in terms of accumulation strategies or regimes of accumulation’, and of the field of class struggle ‘in terms of competing hegemonic projects and alliance strategies’ (Jessop, 1990; p. 259). An accumulation strategy identifies a specific economic ‘growth model’ and sets outs the general strategy appropriate to its realisation. In order to achieve its aim such a model needs to ‘unify the different moments in the circuit of capital (e.g. money, industrial capital) under the hegemony of one fraction’ (Jessop, 1991; p. 143) and its successful expansion leads to economic hegemony. Thus, an accumulation strategy deals with complex relations and contradictions among different fractions of capital, which pursues different strategies. There are various tactics within a given accumulation strategy and also there is a plurality of strategies at a given period or conjuncture. The plurality of a range of tactics on a trial and error basis is necessary for the flexible exercise of an accumulation strategy. This plurality creates a margin of manoeuvre for non-hegemonic fractions and dominated classes to follow their interests under a given accumulation strategy. Such tactics may create threats to the realisation of the hegemonic accumulation strategy, but they also open a field of negotiation for the counter-interests within the framework of the given hegemonic strategy (Jessop, 1991; p. 205).

Hegemony involves the organisation and examination of ‘different class-relevant forces under the ‘political, intellectual and moral leadership’ of a particular class or class fraction’ (Jessop, 1991; p. 207-8). Development of a specific hegemonic project may cause conflicts between the particular interests and the general interests. There is no way of explanation to solve the conflicts from an abstract level, because the particular interests are numerous: it is only possible to examine conflicts at a more concrete level of analysis by considering conflicts in the conjunctural framework of a particular context of a particular hegemonic project. This involves giving concessions to the interests of non-
hegemonic social forces and disregarding the short-term interests of the hegemonic class or fraction (Jessop, 1991; p. 207-8).

Competing hegemonic projects and alliance strategies are set into a ‘terrain on which struggles occur’ (Jessop, 1990; p. 259), and are related to conjunctural processes, including ‘the specific content of the projects and the capacities of the proponents to pursue them’ (Jessop, 1990; p. 259). Similarly, competing accumulation strategies or regimes of accumulation are set into a strategic terrain, involving ‘the basic forms of the capital relation’ (Jessop, 1990; p. 259), and are related to conjunctural processes, involving ‘the specific structural organisation these forms assume from time to time and to the modes of economic calculation and strategic capacities of relevant economic forces’ (Jessop, 1990; p. 259). According to this approach, the (strategic) selectivity of the state is embedded in a strategic terrain and emerges from a conjunctural process. This perspective on the strategic selectivity of the state depends on a complex set of institutional mechanisms and political practices that serve to support or restrain particular fractional and class interests. Such mechanisms can take the form of: selective filtering of information; systematic lack of action on certain issues; and the pursuit of ad hoc and uncoordinated policies concerned with specific conjunctural problems affecting particular branches or sections of the state system (Poulantzas, 1978; p. 132-4). The mechanisms depend on the complex, crosscutting, decentralised, non-hierarchical and antagonistic relations within the different branches of the state ensemble. Each state branch tends to favour a particular fraction or an alliance of fractions. The state has the role to organise the unity of the power bloc (comprising of dominant class fractions and political elites), and has to regulate contradictions among different fractions (Poulantzas, 1978; p. 132-4). The idea that the state is a field of modes of domination exercised to some extent consciously, is adopted from the political strategical approach in which the state is viewed as a
‘structurally determined battleground for various capital fractional strategies’ (Bonefeld, 1991b; p. 46).

The strategic relational approach can be criticised for its methodological and theoretical shortcomings (Bonefeld, 1991a, 1993a; Clarke, 1991c; Roberts, 2001), which I consider in turn. The methodological shortcomings of the strategic relational approach are: firstly, its dualistic understanding of social reality, which also seeks to link the dualities (e.g. structure and strategy; economic and political) in terms of a strategical dialectic approach, and the conjunctural analysis (Bonefeld, 1993c; p. 57). From a very similar account to its methodological shortcomings, the strategic relational approach sees the economic and the political as separate entities which are then linked via accumulation strategies. The approach is thus dualistic rather than dialectical and does not accord with the Marxist philosophy of internal relations which produce the contradictory constitution of social relations, adopted by dialectical Marxist methodology (see Chapter Two). It tends to reify structures by dismissing class struggle and results in a conceptualisation of the structural framework of struggle rather than the conceptualisation of class struggle itself (Bonefeld, 1993a; p. 57). The strategic relational approach produces a descriptive analysis which cannot provide a coherent understanding of social development (Bonefeld, 1993c; p. 57).

The second methodological shortcoming of the strategic relational approach rests on its conjunctural analysis in which ‘the structural selectivity of the structures impinges on social forces through a set of “conjunctural moments”’ (Bonefeld, 1993a; p. 39). To consider the selectivity of the state as the past and the present development of state’s interventions by restraining it into conjunctural analysis shows the weakness of the approach, because a conjunctural analysis does not take into account the historical process of capitalist relations as a whole.
The third methodological limitation of the strategic relational approach is its use of relational analysis, borrowed from Poulantzas (1978), locating the selectivity of the state within a complex dialectic of structures and strategies that remains within the state. This form of relational methodology links two or more things in a relation, but does not consider the wider context in which the relation takes place, and does not see the whole process of the selectivity of the state as an internal part of wider capitalist relations. Rather, it views the selectivity of the state in a strategic context in which the state apparatus and various fractions of capital are related externally to each other.

Such methodological analysis has significant implications for explaining how the state works through the separation between economy and politics or between hegemonic projects and accumulation strategies. The dualist understanding of the SRA involves a division between economics and politics, as if they are two separate entities, and it demonstrates a weakness in dialectical analysis because of its exclusion of the historical process. The failure to adopt a properly historical materialist analysis of political struggles is inherent in the methodological and theoretical weaknesses of the strategic relational approach that lead to the separation of the economic and the political as two ‘levels’ and the consequent inadequacy of incorporating them into a single analysis of the whole. The economic level is examined as the field where individual capitalists pursue their particular interests, and the political level is the sphere in which individual capitalists pursue to generate social groups of different interests of class fractions, thus becoming over-politicised (Clarke, 1978; p. 36-7). Thus, despite the strategic relational approach’s aim to relate structural and ‘class-theoretical’ approaches, the structural rigidities remain in limiting all the dynamics of class struggle in a deterministic, formalist and structuralist methodology.
Earlier in this Chapter (Section 3.3.2 (i)), it was suggested that, without its structural rigidities, the concept of ‘the structural selectivity of the state’, is useful for understanding changes of interventions by the state. The strategic relational approach uses the same concept but aims to link structural and class-theoretical approaches. Thus the concept of selectivity is shifted from ‘the structural selectivity of the state’ to ‘the strategic selectivity of the state’. The concept of the strategic selectivity of the state claims that the state has a certain selectivity mechanisms, which they share with structuralists who used ‘structural selectivity’. However, different from them, the SRA determines these mechanisms as a consequence of different ‘strategies’ of accumulation. However, the concept of strategic selectivity has theoretical shortcomings as similar to structural selectivity. It is claimed that the strategic selectivity of the state emerges from conjunctural processes and from the contradictions between fractions of capital. However, the definition of ‘fractions’ of capital in the work of Poulantzas (1978) is discussed at a very abstract level and it is not clear which social groups are relevant in the constitution of fractions and how they can be identified. Fractions of capital is seen as the outcome of the political organisation (e.g. a political party, a pressure group or a part of the state apparatus) of different individual capitals that share an interest or interests, and thus, existence of fractions of capital is only possible in the form of political representation (Clarke, 1978; p. 33-35). Consequently, strategic relational approach appears to view the main contradiction in capitalist society as the struggle between fractions of capital rather than directly to the struggle between capital and labour.

This section discussed the non-Marxist and Marxist approaches to state theory in order to develop an understanding of the state for this thesis. While non-Marxist approaches remain inadequate because they see the state as something which can be captured by powerful groups in or outside the state. This is not evident in pluralist approaches; however, they see power as dispersed among
different groups, without examining conflicts and contradictions between them.
The Marxist approaches, examined so far, views the state either from an
economic perspective or from a political perspective, dominating the structure
of the state. The SRA offers a bridge between economic and political
structuralism to overcome the limitations of other Marxist approaches;
however the relation remains external and overlooks class struggle. For a more
fruitful approach to state theory, I will adopt and develop Open Marxist
approach, examined in the following section, which views the state as an
abstraction of social relations.

3.3.4. An Open Marxist Approach to State Theory: The Approach Used in This
Thesis

The Open Marxist approach to state theory has a distinctive ontological basis
relying on dialectical Marxist methodology (see Chapter 2). According to this
approach, the state and society are viewed as internally related. The state is not
seen as a basic category, or as a neutral institution standing above or outside
class struggle, it is rather viewed as a product of capitalist class relations and as
a particular historical form of social relations (Clarke, 1991b; p. 183). This means
that the state is viewed ‘not as a thing in itself, but as a social form, a form of
social relations’ (Holloway, 1994; p. 26).

The state is a form of social relations peculiar to capitalist class societies
including ‘the problem of reconciling the class character of the state with its
institutional separation from the bourgeoisie’ (Clarke, 1991b; p. 185). The
institutional separation of economics and politics depends on the explanation of
the state both as a class state and as seeing it institutionally separated from,
and external to, the capitalist class. The Open Marxist approach accepts that
there is an institutional separation between economy and politics; however, at
an abstract level they are an internal part of the same relation. The problem in
this explanation comes from treating the two aspects: state and class at the
same level of abstraction. Because ‘the state does not constitute the social relations of production, it is essentially a regulative agency’ (Clarke, 1991b; p. 189). Such an analysis of the state presupposes the analysis of the social relations that it regulates: the state is not necessary for the constitution of capitalist social relations and neither is it necessary for the reproduction of capitalist social relations, and so, it is not possible to analyse state and class at the same levels of abstraction. This raises the question of how to define the concept of state at an abstract level: is it only contingent or an institutional ensemble that does not have any inner coherence? At this point, the concept of class struggle enables the transition from levels of abstraction of the concepts in the development of the state to the historical application of concepts to the real world. ‘The development of the state is an essential aspect of the development of the class struggle, and has to be seen as an essential form of that struggle’ (Clarke, 1991b; p. 190).

Viewing the state as a form of social relations means that the state can only be analysed ‘as a moment of the development of the totality of social relations: it is a part of the antagonistic and crisis-ridden development of the capitalist society’ (Holloway, 1994; p. 28). This understanding of the state depends on the philosophy of internal relations, which views the moments of social relations as an internal part of the whole of capitalist relations. The existence of the state, therefore, relies on the development of capitalist social relations as a whole. However, it is not the case that ‘neither everything that the state does will necessarily be in the best interests of capital, nor that the state can achieve what is necessary to secure the reproduction of capitalist society’ (Holloway, 1994; p. 28-9). The former views the state as a tool in the hands of capital, and the latter views the state as a separate entity which has the autonomy to regulate the needs of the capitalist society as if there were no conflicts and contradictions in and between the state apparatus, society and capital. However, the state is a rigidified (particular) form of social relations that it is
separated from but also united with society. The particular forms of the state is an ongoing and repetitious process all the time (Holloway, 1994; p. 29). Thus, the state is not a formal necessity of capital but is a ‘historical necessity, emerging from the development of the class struggle’ (Clarke, 1991b; p. 188): that is, the state has not emerged from the requirements of capital, but has developed historically from the class struggle. In an Open Marxist approach, ‘The class struggle is thus seen as a means of mediating between the abstract analysis of capitalist reproduction and the concept of the state’ (Bonefeld, 1993b; p. 116; Clarke, 1991b).

**Different interventions of the state as a moment of class struggle**

The notion of the selectivity of the state is a useful in understanding changes in the structure and strategies of state interventions. However, the concept has been typified by different structuralist analyses as, on the one hand, the ‘structuralist selectivity of the state’ and on the other, as the ‘strategic selectivity of the state’ (examined in Sections 3.3.2). The Open Marxist approach has been critical of these different uses of the concept (Bonefeld, 1991a), but has not developed the concept of state selectivity further in understanding the state. One of the aims of this thesis is to develop the concept of ‘the selectivity of the state’ by adopting a dialectical Open Marxist approach that views the selections of the state as both a process and a relation. However, I will not use the concept of ‘selectivity’ as it attributes the state as the hub that collects all the pressures coming from different capitalists and from labour. By seeing the state as an abstract concept to define the relation between capital and labour, I will use ‘state interventions’ rather than using ‘the selectivity of the state’. The concept of ‘intervention’ enables us to examine the acts of the state as a relation (between capital and labour), rather than a consequence of their interaction. It also refers to an ongoing process between capital and labour. Hence, the interventions of the state change temporarily and geographically.
Changes in the interventions of the state can only occur in and through a complex interaction between internally related elements of capitalist class relations. In the concept of structural selectivity, the state is considered as independent from wider relations it belongs to, and it tends to simplify analyses of state interventions by just examining structural changes in the state. However, when we consider state interventions as a process, it becomes necessary to expand the margins to include consideration of the historical background. The interventions of the state as a process reveal phases of a developing and interactive system, rather than purely conjunctural events that are isolated from their historical context.

In addition, the intervention of the state is not only a process, but also a complex relation involving the interaction between capitalists, state apparatuses, workers, dwellers, material means of production and the reproduction of people (including the activities of people’s lives other than goods and services, mainly housework, care work and welfare services). Viewing the abstraction of intervention of the state as a process and a relation, like in all other abstractions in Marxism, is a way of giving emphasis to either the historical or the systematic character of the selectivity for a particular purpose.

This research can only focus on a part of this process. The temporarily isolated part of a wider and ongoing process is called a moment and the spatially isolated aspect of intervention of the state as a relation is called a form (Ollman, 1993; p. 66-8) (see Chapter Two). Following the argument above, this research sees intervention of the state ‘as a moment of capitalist class relations’. For example, constructing hydroelectric power plants, as a form of state intervention, in different villages of Turkey, has started by the demands of capital from the state in energy sector to gain high profits. However, there has been strong resistance in most of the villages against the implementation of
power plants that led to put a halt on the process. So the intervention of the state in energy sector through the pressures of the capitalists has restructured by the pressures coming from the farmers in the villages. This particular intervention of the state in Turkey is a moment of capitalist class relations after 2000.

The intervention of the state is neither developed through the structural properties of the state, as argued by economic structuralists, nor it is developed through the strategic properties of the state, as argued by the strategic relational approach. It is, rather, developed through, and arises from, the contradictions embedded in civil society. The interventions of the state can be understood by unfolding the contradictions of civil society, which the state is embedded in and arises from. The form of intervention of the state can be analysed through the characteristic of state in capitalist society: its institutional separation from the economics. However, these abstract conceptualisations of the intervention of the state need to examine the concrete contradictions of civil society, the pressures these put on social actors, the conflicts they face through their engagement with or in the state, and the ability and inability of the state to respond these pressures. While capital confronts inevitable and constant dilemmas, state action also faces such dilemmas. State action may respond to those tensions by variable and unstable applications of its institutional forms and strategies.

This approach informs the discussion of the spatiality of the state, which is a crucial missing component that needs to be addressed in order to develop the theory and carry out this research’s analysis. As it is discussed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.4) the space should enter to the abstraction process at all levels. So, to develop the concept of intervention of the state, firstly, non-Marxist spatial theories of the local state, involving functionalist, pluralist, elite and managerialist approaches are examined; then, Marxist spatial theories of the
state are examined in terms of two main discussions in the field: spatial selectivity of the state; and rescaling of the state by investigating strategic relational and open Marxist approaches, in the next section. The sub-national state refers to regional, local and neighbourhood levels of the state. I will use the term ‘local’ to refer to sub-national state. The section concludes by developing the concept of spatial interventions of the state.

3.4. Non-Marxist Spatial Approaches to State Theory

3.4.1. Pluralist Approaches to the Spatiality of the State Theory: ‘Communicative Rationality’

Healey (1997) adapts Habermas’s conception of ‘communicative rationality’ to pluralist state theory. Healey’s approach based on phenomenological approach, which views our understanding of the material world is structured by our social perceptions, as are our moral reasoning and our emotive feelings. She argues that priorities and strategies for collective action are developed through interaction when all interest groups to come to a certain degree of collaboration and reciprocity. If the conversation is open to a diverse range of people in order to exchange of knowledge and understanding, then it is possible to reach shared values. Urban planning practice is thus seen as a process of interactive collective action, bringing together the values of the interest groups and also the reflective decision making process of the planner to reach a consensus. Healey (1997), adapting the normative side of pluralism to a pluralist spatial state theory, argues that the planners and the practice of planning bring power relations into play and planners also have the choice to transform them (Healey, 1997).

The second aspect of Healey’s approach has a web of relations (networks) among different governance processes, such as spatial planning efforts that reflect and carry the potential to shape and link such relations and discourses at
different levels of the state. This reflects how transparent dialogues can be
developed on particular topics in order to reach a collaborative planning system
that carries a potential dominance of discourse over material social processes
(Gough, 2008).

This approach has a weak theorisation of the spatiality of the state at different
scales due to its lack of a historical and structural material context of social
processes. Secondly, it also demonstrates weakness coming deriving from its
pluralist roots: that is, assuming that each group or class is able to pursue their
interests in the planning process. This approach disregards historical and
structurally embedded social relations and inequalities of power, and sees the
planning process as an arena of consensus where representation of every class
and group can reach their interests equally.

3.4.2. Elite Approaches to the Spatiality of the State Theory
A spatial approach to elite theory of the local state is characterised in ‘growth
machine’ (Jonas & Wilson, 1999; Logan & Molotch, 1987) and ‘urban regime’
(Stone, 1987) approaches to understanding power relations in the management
of cities. Following an elitist approach to the local state, each of these
approaches claims that the local state is captured by a coalition of powerful
social groups, especially business, aiming to foster local economic growth. The
growth machine approach will be examined first.

(i) Growth Machines: Growth machines are seen as a coalition of powerful
social groups which becomes an entrepreneur in a particular place, e.g. local
media, banks, universities, property investors. The continuous and relatively
permanent relationship between this coalition and public officials enables the
elite group to exercise systematic and long term power and influence on public
policy. The interests involved are thus dependent on the local scale to achieve
their aims, usually in order to secure economic growth. This approach sees the
level of the local state at city scale at which the interests of the powerful groups and coalitions can arise. For this reason, members of the coalition tend to be an active part of local government, for example as elected council members, to pursue their interests directly (Jonas & Wilson, 1999; Logan & Molotch, 1987; Savage & Warde, 1993; Stone, 1987).

(ii) Urban Regime Approach: The urban regime approach can therefore be classified under elitist approaches to local state theory, because it argues that elite groups can capture the local state. However, it is worth noting the approach’s pluralist aspects when applied to identifying the power relations in local governance. An urban regime is defined as the capacity of a group to access resources and to significantly influence urban policy and management. However, unlike growth machine theory which posits a single coalition acting together, urban regime approaches suggests that there are various groupings having different significant impacts on the local state. This variety arises from the complexity of social relations in the control and management of local growth (Stoker, 1998; Stone, 1987).

Both of the elitist approaches downplay the demands arising from societal needs and class struggle and see the local state as captured by an elite group. This way of seeing the decision making process at the local level tends to ignore conflicts and contradictions. But the contradictory nature of capitalist relations encounters impasses at all levels of space. Class and other social conflicts are sometimes covertly embedded at the local level (Cox & Mair, 1989b). Urban regime approach rightly claims that the influential coalition of groups is locally dependent: however, they have not related the local scale of the state to other scales. This creates limitations in their analysis, such as disregarding the conflicts between different scales of the state and how they reflect at the local level.
3.4.3. Functionalist Approaches to the Spatiality of the State Theory: ‘Dual State’ Theory

The ‘dual state’ debate was very widespread in the 70s and 80s Anglophone literature, drawing on Weber versus Marx and included among (Castells, 1977; Pickvance, 1976; Saunders, 1981). Saunders (1981) develops a dual theory of the local state that makes a distinction between functions of the state at different scales. According to Saunders, distinct political processes operate separately at the national and sub-national levels of the state. At the national level, it is considered that state intervention takes place mainly in relation to the production process, in which the national state is responsible for the economy. At the local level, state acts through processes of consumption, in which competitive political struggles for social rights and social needs have a role in the process of developing policies (Duncan & Goodwin, 1988). In this argument, the nation state is responsible for the economy and the local state is responsible for maintaining the continuity of social processes.

Saunders’ dual theory is important in emphasizing the specificity of the local state, because it brings in the spatially specific nature of the local (sub-national) state. However, it is weak in of two points. (i) Economic and social life cannot be regarded as distinct spheres, and thus they should not be seen as distinct aspects of state intervention. (ii) Dual state theory rests on a functionalist premise of ‘efficient’ spatial scale allocation of particular aspects of policy and neglects the construction of state scales through social power and conflict (Gough, 2004; p. 192).

3.4.4. Managerialist Approaches to the Spatiality of the State Theory

The managerialist approach to spatial state theory developed through the influence of Rex and Moore’s concept of ‘urban managerialism’ emphasises the role of key managers in bureaucratic state institutions. These actors, often called ‘gate keepers’, play a crucial role in the distribution of resources to
different groups within the city (Saunders, 1981; Savage & Warde, 1993). This approach to governing cities as developed by Saunders (1981) appears as a form of bureaucratic managerialism at the city level.

The main weakness of the approach is that it puts an emphasis on the role of the local state bureaucrats or the gate keepers without regarding the historical and structural context of the governing process (Savage & Warde, 1993). The urban managerialist approach claims that urban gate keepers have autonomy in the decision making process. However, the decision making process is not isolated from other groups and classes in the city or at the different spatialised levels, and is not freed from the other scales of the state.

Space is not seen in the abstract levels of analysis in non-Marxist state’s spatiality approaches. In these theorisations, the spatial scale is viewed as city-scale without regarding other scales of the state (national to lower scales). The relations between different scales of the state are also not considered. For an approach, where space enters to the abstraction process from an abstract level of state theory, and where spatiality of the state is viewed at different scales of the state is considered, the Marxist spatial approaches of state theory is investigated in the next section.

3.5. Marxist Spatial Approaches to State Theory
An early Marxist approach to the distinctiveness and spatiality of the state at the local level is provided by Cockburn (1977). Cockburn claims that the local scale is not merely a governmental activity of the national state, nor does it merely represent the state locally (Cockburn, 1977; p. 47). Rather, the approach developed the idea of the local state as carrying out differentiated functions as part of the nation state – a concept which can be adapted to an analysis of relations between different scales of the state. The local state is caught up in contradictions between capital and labour that are specific to the local scale.
(Cockburn, 1977; p. 55). However, this approach is weak in showing the contradictions and conflicts between different scales of the state, especially between the national and the local. Nevertheless, Cockburn’s (1977) argument began and developed a discussion on the ‘local state’ as a part of class relations at different scales (Gough, 2008).

The next section aims to examine Marxist theories of the state’s spatiality at different scales and the role of the local scale in this relationship by discussing two contentious debates in the literature: the spatial selectivity of the state / the spatial interventions of the state; and the rescaling of the state. The interventions or the spatial selectivity of the state examines the horizontal differences of spatiality of the state. The rescaling of the state investigates the vertical spatiality of the state.

3.5.1. Strategic Relational Approach to the Spatiality of the State: Spatial Selectivity
The notion of ‘spatial selectivity of the state’ has been developed from the ‘strategic selectivity of the state’ (Jessop, 1990) concept (see Section 3.3.3) by strategic relationalists to examine the spatiality of the state (Brenner, 2004; Jones, 1997, 1999), especially in relation to its geographical foundations. Jones (Jones, 1997, 1999) argues that the concept of spatial selectivity reveals the ‘spatial privileging and articulation’ of differentiated state policies for particular geographical zones and scales. At a more concrete level of the concept, the relationship between the state and the spatial dimensions of public policy can be found in different forms. Firstly, in implicit policy formation, the state has the capacity (and uses particular strategies) to orient seemingly aspatial policies to specific areas (e.g. regional policies or institutions). This may result in uneven geographical consequences in relation to their interaction with particular social groups or economic sectors. In the uneven effects of national policies for regions and localities: regional policies can have diverse geographical effects.
Secondly, on the concrete level of application, the interaction of policy with historical legacies and pre-existing uses of space can result in geographical differentiation (Jones, 1999; p. 237-8).

The notion of spatial selectivity of the state depends on the relation between the two-level classification in terms of the relationships between the state, policy and space and provides a theoretical basis to explain local state restructuring. The spatial effects of such policies may result in ‘specific policy goals, intended and unintended side effects of policy and reproducing uneven development’ (Jones, 1999; p. 238). Spatial selectivity, therefore is defined ‘as the situation in which the state privileges scales, places and spaces through accumulation strategies (economic policy) and hegemonic projects (ideology)’ (Jones, 1999; p. 237). Thus, geographical privileging can be analysed in both material and ideological forms, and occurs in crisis periods ‘to achieve political and ideological control, as class, social and interest groups must be mobilised to secure support for particular economic and ideological policies’ (Jones, 1999; p. 237). This may include giving concessions in various forms (e.g. tax cuts), to certain groups or fractions; or crisis displacements, when the state’s existing accumulation strategy is inadequate to overcome tensions between different fractions of capital. The displacement of crisis takes place in the political sphere rather than in the economic sphere and opens the capital accumulation to new accumulation strategies, new hegemonic projects and alternative state projects, including new forms of representation (Jones, 1999; p. 238-9). The displacement of crisis can be accomplished in the restructuring of local state apparatuses by setting up ‘new institutions that are politically in favour of a particular accumulation strategy’ (Jones, 1997; p. 851).

Building upon Jones’s (Jones, 1997, 1999) approach, Brenner (Brenner, 2004; p. 89) develops the concept of spatial selectivity of the state in a strategic relational framework which sees the selectivity as ‘never permanently fixed
but, like all other aspects of the state form, represents an emergent, strategically selective, and politically contested process’. This approach assumes that ‘the organisational coherence and functional unity of the state are never structurally pre-given’ (Brenner, 2004; p. 89) but are deployed through historically specific political strategies. The geographies of state institutions and policies can be seen as a clash of earlier and existing political strategies to reshape state spatial configurations. That is, the spatiality of state power is a site, generator, and product of political strategies (Macleod & Goodwin, 1999).

Brenner develops the concepts of a strategic relational approach (state form, state projects and state strategies) by fusing them with their spatiality (state spatial form, state spatial projects and state spatial strategies) (Brenner, 2004; p. 90-1) at three levels of analysis: structural, strategic and spatial. *State spatial form* refers to the institutional separation of the political sphere of the state from the circuit of capital with reference to the principle of territoriality which is constituted by ‘the geographical matrix within which state regulatory activities are articulated’ (Brenner, 2004; p. 92). The territoriality in which state actions occur needs to be coherent for the security of the political regulation and can only guaranteed through *state spatial projects*, which ‘differentiate state activities among different levels of territorial administration and coordinate state policies among diverse locations and scales’ (e.g. sub-national, provincial, regional, metropolitan and local territorial boundaries) (Brenner, 2004; p. 92). However, the establishment of a structured coherence for capitalist growth at different scales of economies can only occur through the successful mobilisation of *state spatial strategies*. There is a variety of state spatial strategies, involving industrial policies, spatial planning programmes and housing policies, and these strategies are materialised in the territorial differentiation of policy regimes at different scales. This may result in geographical variation and unevenness of state policies, which explicitly or implicitly promote divergent and contextually specific impacts upon diverse scales and locations (Brenner, 2004; p. 93). In this...
The methodological shortcoming of the strategic relational approach applies to the spatial strategic relational approach to the state in a similar way. The structural foundations of the approach are reflected in the development of the concept of spatial selectivity of the state. However, in addition to its methodological shortcomings, there are also three particular weaknesses of the development of the concept (Cox, 2009). This critique is needed to develop an adequate explanation of the concept as a moment in class relations.

Firstly, this approach is limited in its ability to consider the limits and contradictions of state (spatial) form and interventions of different state apparatuses, fractions of capital, and institutions of the state at different levels. Such limits and contradictions are coming from the conjunctural analysis of a particular period associated with an accumulation strategy and a hegemonic project in a way that lacks a wider and adequate analysis of capitalism and capitalistic relations as a whole. Rather, it explains a only part of the whole by isolating a particular period from the contradictions through which capital develops in all its expressions, including the spatial (Cox, 2009; p. 933). It follows from this, that secondly, the functionalist explanation of the approach lacks an explanation the process of selectivity in terms of class struggle (Cox, 2009; p. 933). Class struggle is often equated with state managers, gender groups or other interest groups, and almost appears like a pluralist approach to state.

Thirdly, Brenner’s analysis displays a structuralist and functionalist approach to the selectivity of the state, where the focus on the inherited patterns of state spatial organization and the emergent projects, leaves the analysis as
descriptive. This leads Brenner to define different periods of capitalism, each of which has unique strategies for a particular time and geography in order to pursue the hegemonic project successfully. Each period of capitalism achieves a stable accumulation strategy giving rise to different spatial and temporal forms. Defining stable periods reflects a search for institutional fixes, negotiation and collaboration of different actors that ignores inherent conflicts and contradictions, and results in the idea that a hegemonic strategy for each of these periods applies to all the spaces and spatial scales in the same form and content, and is unaffected by contradictions or conflicts in and between spaces and scales.

Fourthly, a spatial strategic relational approach to the selectivity of the state by reifying space and attributing causal powers to space per se: that is, space itself is ascribed as a social force carrying causal powers. This is derived from the critical realist methodological roots of the approach in analysing the relations between space and society. Critical realism (see Chapter 2) views the relations between state and society as contingent and in a dualistic relationship, thus views the development of the abstraction towards the concrete by using an implicit method of empirical abstraction (Gough, 2012; p. 7).

3.5.2. The Rescaling of the State
The idea of the rescaling of the state was first employed in a Marxist approach by Taylor in 1982 (1982) (Taylor 1982). He examines the relation between capital, state interventions and their rescaling in the framework of the world systems approach. The three main geographical scales (global, national, local) are redefined as world economy, nation and state, and the city. The scale of world economy is seen as the scale of reality; the nation and the state as the scale of ideology; and the city as the scale of experience. Smith (2010) adopts these three levels of scale developed by Taylor, but emphasises that the abstract separation between reality, ideology and experience is not necessary:
scale can be analysed as the geographic basis of the uneven development of capital (N. Smith, 2010; p. 180). The urban and global scales represent the contradictory tendencies toward differentiation and equalisation geographically (N. Smith, 2010; p. 189), and the nation scale is not directly a product of this contradiction, appears from the circulation of capital in the world market. However, an analysis of scale needs to involve wider social and political processes not only the capital accumulation process (N. Smith, 2010).

This wider social and political analysis in the scale literature raises the question of the social construction of scale, an approach which opened a debate between Marston (2000; Marston & Smith, 2001) analysing the household as a scale, and Brenner (2001) analysing the productive relations of capital. Marston criticises the analysis of, and arguments about scale for being limited to capitalist production which ignores the social construction of scale (Marston, 2000; p. 219). For an adequate understanding of scale, all aspects of capitalism (production, reproduction and consumption) need to be taken into account, including the articulation of capitalism with patriarchal gender relations. This leads Marston to develop the household as a scale of analysis for a closer examination of gender relations and scale production. However, Brenner (2001) claims that Marston’s attempt fails to account for the relationship between the household and other scales, producing an analysis of place, rather than of scale.

In response to Brenner’s critique, Marston and Smith (2001) argue that Brenner ignores the importance of household scale in terms of the relations between the household, social reproduction and patriarchy.

There are weaknesses and strengths in Marston’s and Brenner’s discussion about scale. First, considering the household as a scale is a necessary part of the analysis, but it should be related to other scales. Brenner (2001) sees mutually-articulated scales as ‘scalar structuration’, but the articulation of scales is not explicitly taken up in Marston’s paper (2000). Second, an analysis at a particular
scale, involving household scale, city, and neighbourhood scales, which should involve an interscalar relationship to produce an adequate analysis. Purcell’s (2003; p. 318) general critique of the scale question in his discussion on the ‘islands of practice’ of scholars has a similarity to the way the strategic relational approach focuses on the separation between economy and politics, rather than class relations as a whole, and viewing the shift of scale in terms of overcoming obstacles of accumulation in a territorial arrangement (Gough, 2004; p. 189).

3.5.3. An Open Marxist Approach to the Spatiality of the State: The Approach Used in This Thesis

A more dialectical approach is needed, in which abstractions, including necessary relations, are developed towards the concrete, both by combining heterogeneous processes (‘over-determination’) and by developing the varied potentials within the abstractions. The abstract structures and processes may be inherently contradictory, so that their development towards more concrete forms will find both variety (including spatial variety) and tensions which cause change through time. The spatiality of the state’s interventions can be seen as spatial moments/forms of capitalist class relations, which carry these varieties and tensions and therefore, spatial forms are consequences of the intervention of the state.

(i) Spatial interventions of the state as a moment of class struggle

The state’s spatiality of intervention does not reveal only the objective socio-economic difference between spaces or territories, but also involves social struggles and socio-economic relations between people and between spaces. As in the example of the fundamental relation between capital and labour, both their separation and the form of their interdependence imply the spatial separation of the workplace from the home: this separation is an internal part of contradictory relation between capital and labour, which causes systematic problems and disruptions in that relation. The formation of the value of a
commodity embodies abstraction from, and commensuration of, the particular spaces in which it is produced.

The crucial distinction between the spatial selectivity of the state and spatial interventions of the state lies in their understanding on how state intervenes spatially. As we have seen in Section 3.5.1, the state has spatial selectivity mechanisms to exercise its interventions. From an Open Marxist approach to the state and its spatiality, the state intervenes spatially; however these interventions differentiate in different localities. In similar localities, like neighbourhoods, at the same scale the state behaves differently by using different strategies and policies. These differentiations are formed through the class struggle, involving conflicts and contradictions between the capital and labour, between different capital fractions, in and between different scales of the state, the pressure of capital on the state, and the value of the land. The concept of ‘different spatial interventions of the state’ enables us to examine the varieties of state intervention across different geography as a ‘moment of class relations’.

Different spatial interventions of the state in different localities provide the horizontal varieties of state’s acts; however this is not separate from the different scales of the state and their relations. The next section provides an adequate approach to the rescaling of the state by showing the weaknesses and strengths of Marxist literature discussed in Section 3.5.2 to develop an Open Marxist approach to rescaling.

(ii) The Rescaling of the State
The rescaling of the state is changes of scale in political-economic processes. These changes are often linked to changes in class relations, ‘articulated by particular class projects, and developed through class struggle’ (Gough, 2004; p. 185). However, the relation between scale change and class relations are not
corresponding to each other one-to-one. The rescaling of the state can be analysed through a particular change in scale at a particular moment (Gough, 2004; p. 185). What needs to be included in any analysis of space and scale are class relations as a whole so that the shifts of scale can be examined in terms of the obstacles to accumulation in a territorial arrangement (Gough, 2004; p. 189). As argued by Gough (2004; p. 187), ‘the very scale of a territory may be an important constituent of some of its social relations’, which can be analysed through ‘“scalar social relations” at particular scales’ (Gough, 2004; p. 187). There is a dialectic relationship at every scale in three senses:

(i) Social relations at a particular scale are always partially structured, whether consciously or unconsciously, by processes and actors at other scales. (ii) The significance of a scalar relation often lies in its contrast with and even opposition to, other scales. (iii) Because of the different construction of a social relation at different scales, shifts or partial shifts between scales may be used by social actors to modify those relations. (Gough, 2004; p. 187-8).

Hence, interscalar relations have a particular importance in the rescaling of the state.

Gough’s approach emphasises the scaling of capital-labour relations in workplaces and in general political projects. He argues that classes have different capacities to direct territories and distances of different scales in terms of shifting scales: ‘shifts in scale can be a means of class struggle’ (Gough, 2004; p. 189). That is, class struggle is not exercised just within production: it is also exercised within the state and various forms of reproduction of labour power and is a moment of gender and ethnic struggles. In a competitive neoliberal context, the class struggle can be seen to favour capital, aiming to discipline and fragment labour by shifting scales of the state. However, capitals both compete against and cooperate with each other, therefore, an adequate analysis of rescaling needs to involve both sides of the capital-labour relations. These are
not stable positions or political strategies, but are ‘poles of contradictory unities, of contradictory class relations and interests’ (Gough, 2004; p. 191).

Previous sections of this thesis argued for the dialectical Marxist approach adopted for this research, in which changing interventions of state are conceptualised as ‘the selectivity of the state as a moment in class relations’; and similarly, the rescaling of the state is also conceptualised as a moment in class relations. The rescaling of the state is seen both as a complex relation in and between capitals, state apparatuses, dwellers, genders, and the reproduction of labour, and as a process, which involves historical and potential future shifts in scales of the state.

As discussed above, this research adopts an Open Marxist approach to state theory that views the state as a particular historical form of social relations, in particular capitalist class relations. The state is an essential aspect of the development of the class struggle and not an institutional entity that is above or outside this struggle. Therefore, the interventions of the state are not simply in the service of capital interests, and do not automatically assure social reproduction, but have emerged historically from the development of class struggle involving the contradictions embedded in the state in a capitalist society. The contradictory nature of class relations disrupts their reproduction, and while the state attempts to amend these disruptions through its interventions, it does not entirely overcome them. This is an ongoing a repetitious process which produces variety and instability of the institutional forms of the state and of its strategies in the process of responding historically and spatially developed contradictions.

3.6. Applying Spatial-State Theory to the Case Study
The debates in this chapter provide the theoretical background and conceptual framework for analysing the changing forms and strategies of state intervention
in respect to the housing of the poor in Istanbul. In this section, my approach to state theory and its spatialisation is demonstrated with respect to its application in the research.

The key structure for this analysis is the capital-labour relation, carrying the contradiction between the subordination of labour to capital and the active role of labour in this relationship. As the focus of this research is changing forms and strategies of state interventions for the housing of the poor, the contradictory relations between capital and labour will be key to understanding the relations between dwellers, the state and the capital.

Most of the studies analysing the interventions of the state in housing examine them from an economic perspective in which housing is defined as commodity (Clarke & Ginsburg, 1973). However, in viewing the interventions of the state as capitalist moments where class relations develop, this thesis sees housing not just as commodity produced for exchange in the market, but rather as an intrinsic part of the contractual relationship between state, financiers, landlords and dwellers. This is ‘an ongoing and antagonistic relationship in which the worker encounters capital not as worker but as consumer’ (Clarke & Ginsburg, 1973; p. 4). However, there is no simple equivalence between class struggle and housing struggle, but nevertheless, housing struggle is also a historical conflict under capitalism. It is mostly limited to the immediate locality, such as neighbourhood, that is to a particular extent different from industrial struggles (Corrigan & Ginsburg, 1973; p. 145). As it will be shown in the case of Istanbul, housing struggle involves various motives based on changing interventions of the state, which mostly have a direct effect on people’s housing situation, creating unstable, locally dependent tenant organisation and the struggle against interventions of the state often function defensively.
The historical process of state intervention for the housing of the poor in Istanbul during the last decade shows the conflictual and contradictory nature of urban redevelopment in its different moments and spatial forms. The period includes the largest number of changes in legislation since the development of the Republic, mainly affecting housing of the poor and major empowerment and disempowerment of institutional forms of the state, for example giving power to municipalities or empowering national scale housing agencies. These changes involve different strategies in different localities, create conflicts between different levels of the state (local to national) and unfold neighbourhood resistance in neighbourhoods subject to urban regeneration. These changing forms and strategies of state interventions are developed as a moment and spatial form of capitalist class relations, and through the rescaling of the state. The different interventions of the state are the response developed to overcome the contradiction between the subordination of labour to capital, which is an ongoing and repetitive process in different forms: it is a changing unstable process.

The interventions of the state in Istanbul differentiate in different localities. This can be analysed by investigating horizontal relations, which are interventions of the state, and vertical relations, which are changing scales of the state.

(A) **Different interventions of the state to different localities in Istanbul can be applied to:**

(i) **unstable forms of legislation:** During the last decade, as pressures by capital for the reconstruction of mostly state-owned lands and dilapidated areas in the city centre have increased, there has been a great number of changes in legislation related to regeneration, renovation and construction sector. Changes in legislation demonstrate the intervention of the state in its attempts to respond to the adversarial relations between neighbourhood dwellers, different scales of the state, construction firms, and financiers. However, neither the
interests of neighbourhood dwellers nor the interests of construction firms and financiers, nor the interests of the different levels of the state are without conflict.

(ii) the state’s role in policing of property and in property law: There is a two fold system in the policing of property in the recent urbanisation process in Turkey. First, the right to housing in a neighbourhood defined as an urban regeneration area differs according to its historical background. The complexity of property ownership by people who settled on state-owned land generally works to the disadvantage of dwellers. Individual occupation of land needs to be proved by evidence of tax payments, bill payments, registration records, land allotment or ownership documents. Property law is enforced individual by individual, reducing the right to housing to a problem of individuals (Clarke, 1991; Das, 1999). The elements of class struggle embedded in the right to housing are weakened by state use of economic concessions to individuals. While bureaucratic obstacles are reduced for capital investment, bureaucracy related to individual property rights is getting more complicated.

(iii) variable resistance of social actors: This includes the variety of resistance by social actors to urban regeneration, and the state’s strategies and tactics to attempt to produce different solutions to the contradictions in civil society. This may be seen in the form of changes in the laws, generally and for particular localities, attacks by police, counter-attacks of the dwellers.

(B) The rescaling of the state in Istanbul since 2000 can be analysed by:

(i) complex interdependencies of actors at different scales: Urban planning activity proceeds at various scales (local, national, international) and involves actors at various scales (e.g. state bureaucrats; elected politicians - members of district councils, the greater municipality and parliamentarians; investors; urban
wellers; activists). The complex relations between actors at different scales (from national to neighbourhood scale) will be analysed.

(ii) **rescaling of the state to the national and integration to global capitalist dynamics**: Shifting to the national scale involves complex relations of articulation of capital(s) at different scales from an individual to a global level. This shifting process can be analysed in the form of changing laws, empowerment of central planning authorities and disempowerment of local authorities, and direct foreign investment in the construction sector.

(iii) **rescaling of the state to the local**: Shifting to the local scale can be examined through three main dimensions: (i) resistance by the residents of gecekondu settlements, residents of affordable housing areas, and the residents of old historical centres; organised political groups; urban activists against urban regeneration projects: (ii) the central state’s incapacity to respond such pressures (e.g. politicisation of neighbourhood dwellers); and (iii) demands from small and medium capital at the local level for investment in construction sector (e.g. construction companies, private planning bureaux). It is going to be argued that these processes (state rescaling) are the dynamics of the (its) ‘depoliticisation of the process’.

3.7. Conclusion

This Chapter aimed to examine the literature on the theorisation of the state and its spatiality from non-Marxist and Marxist approaches, and also aimed to develop a theorisation of different spatial interventions of the state and its rescaling by adopting an Open Marxist approach. According to the approach used in this thesis, the state is a social relation developed through class struggle. The changes in political-economic process of a particular time and space show us a reified form of interventions of the state and changes of scale. The conceptual framework for changing interventions of the state and state
rescaling, discussed in Section 3.5.3, provides a fertile ground to understand the changing forms and strategies of housing of the spoor in Istanbul since 2000. As an inseparable part of the analysis following a historical materialist account, in the next Chapter, the political economic history of Istanbul between 1950 and 2000 is examined.
SECTION II: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

CHAPTER 4: THE POLITICAL ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ISTANBUL FROM 1950 TO 2000

4.1. Introduction
This chapter examines political-economic and spatial changes in Turkey, and particularly in Istanbul, from 1950 to 2000. This period shows changing policies concerning the housing of the poor and the restructuring of the state. This will provide a historical context to the changing forms and strategies of the state since 2000s by unveiling the political-economic changes and their spatiality in a wider context. The 1950s are chosen as the starting point for a historical background of the urbanisation process in Turkey and Istanbul, because until the 1950s there were no specific politics and policies about urbanisation and there was not any major production of gecekondu settlements. Since the 1950s gecekondu production has been a solution for the housing need of migrants and the poor, and commenced and characterised the urbanisation of major cities, in particular Istanbul. The periodisation is followed by major changes in the 1980s in which Turkey had related to capitalist production directly and gecekondu settlements were commodified.

The Chapter has two sections, the first covering the period from 1950 to 1980, and the second, from 1980 to 2000. Each section describes significant socio-economic changes, population growth and Istanbul’s shifting demographic characteristics, the socio-economic context and the main dynamics of the urbanisation process in each period.
4.2. The Period Between 1950 and 1980

4.2.1. Population Growth and the Demographic Characteristics of the Population in Turkey

There was a massive migratory flow from rural areas of Turkey to the big cities during the rapid industrialisation of the 1950s. Between 1950 and 1980, Turkey’s population increased from 20.9 million to 44.7 million (see Table 4.1). In the same period, the urban population increased from 3.9 million in 1950, to 7.2 million in 1960; and from 12.7 million in 1970 to 20.3 million in 1980 (Onçu, 1988; p. 40). This increase was due to migration and to the higher population growth rate among the new migrants coming from the rural areas to a few major cities in Turkey (Keyder, 2005; p. 125). Istanbul, with its social, economic and spatial potentials, was the main destination for capital and labour, but other cities such as Izmir, Ankara and Adana, also experienced high rates of migration and growth. Population in Istanbul increased fivefold between 1950 and 1980 (see Table 4.1).

Table 4.1: Total Population and the Change of Population over previous five years in Turkey and in Istanbul (1945-1980)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population of Turkey</th>
<th>Change of population over previous five years in Turkey (%)</th>
<th>Population of Istanbul</th>
<th>Change of population over previous five years in Istanbul (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>18 790 174</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 078 399</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>20 947 188</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>1 166 477</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>24 064 763</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>1 533 822</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>27 754 820</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>1 882 092</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>31 391 421</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>2 293 823</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>35 605 176</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>3 019 032</td>
<td>31.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>40 347 719</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>3 904 588</td>
<td>29.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>44 736 957</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>4 741 890</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It has been argued that the main reasons behind rural migration are related directly to the mechanisation of agriculture (Ahmad, 1993; p. 115-6), the lack of opportunities in agriculture and attractiveness of new industries in the cities (Zurcher, 2009; p. 224). However, a more comprehensive analysis of the origins of Turkish rural-urban migration in the period shows that while these were significant components of the process, neither of these reasons has shaped the process alone or played a directly determinant role, (Yildirmaz, 2009; p. 100; 2010; p. 415). In fact, the mechanisation of agriculture created new job opportunities rather than causing unemployment. For example, the amount of cultivated land increased due to mechanisation in agriculture, which was related to acceleration in agricultural investment, an increase in agricultural prices, improvements in transportation and increase in agricultural credit (Yildirmaz, 2009; p. 105; 2010; p. 420). Mechanisation caused differentiated outcomes, leaving a group of people unemployed, but created jobs for others. The creation of jobs by mechanisation of agriculture generated important mechanisms for rural migration that encouraged landless agricultural labourers or sharecroppers to stay in the countryside rather than migrate to cities. While some landless peasants did migrate to big cities, the majority of rural migration flow was from the Black Sea Region of Turkey, where the mechanisation of agriculture had not occurred. In this region geographical limitations, including the rocky mountains and narrow shoreline, meant that mechanisation was not an effective means of cultivation (Yildirmaz, 2009; p. 109-17; 2010; p. 424-30).

Increased investment in transportation was also an important component of rural migration at the time. The enhancement of transportation was a part of the Marshall Plan, which was the American aid programme in the form of a monetary fund to help rebuilding European economies after the World War II and aimed to increase agricultural production, and to provide cheap and efficient transport of products to market. In ten years between 1947 and 1957, the length of motorways increased by 228 times (Yildirmaz, 2010; p. 435-37)
4.2.2. The Socio-Economic Context of the Period

The mechanisation of agriculture was not the main origin of the massive migration: however it became an important factor when the mechanisation of agriculture and investment in industrial development accelerated. Investments in the industrial sector slowed down during the Second World War and the industrial sector was affected by subsequent economic decisions taken between 1950 and 1960 by the state. The migrants in the cities were mainly employed in marginal non-industrial and informal sectors, and especially in infrastructure construction (e.g. motorways) when they first arrived to the major cities (Yildirmaz, 2009; p. 129-30; 2010; p. 441-2).

After the Second World War, Turkey accelerated capitalist production, when its compared to 19th century, but without forms of major productive capital. This was the period when productive capital played an important role in the expansion of world capitalism. The dynamic behind the expansion of productive capital in the late capitalist countries was its internationalisation through production of industrial goods via foreign direct investments, that came later than in more ‘mature’ capitalist economies (e.g. UK, US), and later than trading goods inter-countries (Ozturk, 2011; p. 64). This means that industrial goods were produced in Turkey as in other late capitalist countries.

Starting from 1950 and in the following years, Turkey enacted legislation to attract foreign capital. However, the change in legislation was not effective in increasing foreign direct investment and it did not have any impact on the development of productive capital in Turkey. Rather than direct investment, international capital sold technology, know-how and equipment to Turkey and provided credit to holding companies through the World Bank. In 1975, the flow of foreign direct investment relative to GNP was only 1.4% in total (Ozturk, 2011; p. 65).
Since the 1950s, and most apparently in the 1960s, Turkish industrial capital invested in ‘import-substitution’ industries for the manufacture of consumer goods for the national market. The state mainly provided infrastructure investment for the private sector and also assigned its own production of consumer and investment goods to the private sector to foster the capitalist dynamics in the country (Ozturk, 2011; p. 66). This was done in two ways. First, the state-owned industries provided goods and services to the private sector at subsidised low prices. Secondly, public-private partnerships (Public Economic Enterprises, KİTs), with state guarantees and ready access to financial support, were established. In the decade following 1960, the state took responsibility for infrastructural investment, because such investments require large capital investment and wider organisational capacity, they are not profitable in the short term (Basbakanlik Devlet Planlama Teskilati Mustesarligi, 1963; p. 61).

Between 1950 and 1980, industrial capital started to develop relations with commercial capital by creating links and partnerships with financial institutions. In the 1970s, the dominance of finance capital and holding companies was more obvious than it used to be. The financial system of Turkey was managed and dominated by banks, which were under the control and regulation of the state (Oncu, 1988; p. 42; Ozturk, 2011; p. 117-9).

From the 1950s to the 1980s, in order to encourage industrialisation, the state set up ‘a highly complex system of preferential interest rates on loans to priority sectors’ (Oncu, 1988; p. 42). However, this did not involve concessionary credits to private housing production. Commercial banks were even prevented by law from providing long-term housing mortgages and it was only possible to get credit for housing from the state-owned real estate bank, the Real Estate Credit Bank (EKB). The EKB gave credit at a highly privileged rate, mostly to civil servants, but was backed with limited funds. In the whole banking system,
housing credit accounts were no more than 1.7% of outstanding loans in 1979 (Oncu, 1988: 42). The Workers Social Security Fund (SSK) was the other institutionalised housing finance source however, it was limited only to workers who had been covered by social security for at least five years and the amount of housing credit was very small. These two and only sources of housing finance, aiming to be a part of redistributive policy of the state, representing less than 10% of all housing produced in the formal housing market (Oncu, 1988: 42). Their limited activities contributed more to the construction of middle income and luxury housing than affordable housing for the lower income households. Ataköy and Levent housing complexes in Istanbul are the typical examples of luxury housing investments made by the EKB in 1950s. The housing units produced by SSK were also purchased by higher income groups at that time (Bugra, 1998; p. 308).

Due to the increasing investment in industrial capital and infrastructure in this period, the construction sector also gained in importance, especially in the building of motorways, airports, dams and NATO facilities leaving the housing sector as a very small portion. In the 1950s, holding companies developed through investing in the construction sector. It is possible to analyse construction companies as a separate category from other sectors for this period (Ozturk, 2011; p. 74). All of them were developed as engineering and as building contractor companies and the large companies dominated in public infrastructure production (Guloksuz, 2009; p. 160). In contrast, private housing production was left to the small and medium sized companies and capital owners. This was reinforced by the state’s weak credit mechanisms for holding companies and large corporations to produce mass housing (Basbakanlik Devlet Planlama Teskilati Mustesarligi, 1968; p. 273). The deficiency of credit and subsidies by the state for private housing created an obstacle for holding companies to invest in housing production, and in addition, in this period the state discouraged the production of luxury housing (Basbakanlik Devlet
Planlama Teskilati Mustesarligi, 1963; p. 433; 1968; p. 286), which offered investment return for large construction companies compared with affordable and mass housing production. Rather, the state aimed to support the improvement of existing gecekondu settlements, through the policy of ‘making your own house’; and with ‘social housing’, by giving low interest commercial loans and personal loans to small- and middle-scale builders (Basbakanlik Devlet Planlama Teskilati Mustesarligi, 1963; p. 433; 1968; p. 286). The term ‘social housing’ in Turkish housing literature is used to refer to ‘affordable housing’. It does not have the meaning of housing provided by the state to be rented by the people who cannot afford to buy. ‘Social housing’ rather means houses that are sold without capitalist profit. In the whole chapter and in the following ones, ‘affordable housing’ will be used to refer to ‘social housing’ in Turkish housing literature.

The build-and-sell system, which is a model of housing production by small and medium scale developers and builders, emerged in this period. The main dynamic behind this model was the demolishment of gecekondu settlements through households selling their houses to builders for them to build four or five storey apartment blocks and getting a flat in return. This model emerged because of the personal loans system (Basbakanlik Devlet Planlama Teskilati Mustesarligi, 1968; p. 281) and by the law of Condominium Ownership, enacted in 1965, which opened a way of transforming gecekondu settlements via the build-and-sell system (UN, 1996). Financial credit for housing was not given to individual dwellers or for the building of mass housing, but to small- and middle-scale contractors for supplying the demand for middle-income housing.

Gecekondus and apartments revealed not only a differentiation in the urban space, but also the differences among social classes and their cultures (Oncu, 2005; Uzun, 2001). The duality between two housing types was the main characteristic of socio-spatial patterns of Istanbul: “Living in an apartment in the
central parts of the city was emblematic of a middle class status, a modern and urban lifestyle, whereas living in a gecekondu was deemed as the symbol of a peasant life, backwardness and a lower-class disposition” (Ayata, 1988; Oncu, 2005).

Between 1950 and 1970, each holding company in Turkey specialised in one of the subsectors of infrastructure construction, such as building highways or dams, as a part of nationally oriented capital accumulation. However, during the decade starting from 1970, holding companies diversified their specialisations in the construction sector and became active in its various subsectors (Ozturk, 2011; p. 89). Construction companies were also the first firms in Turkey that started to invest in the international market, especially in the Middle East. However, because of the decrease in oil prices in the 1980s, companies reduced their investments in the international market and continued to invest in the domestic market (Ozturk, 2011; p. 89).

As nationally oriented capital accumulation and industrialisation increased and holding companies grew until 1980s, the working class was expanded and strengthened. There was a threefold increase in the number of workers in manufacturing between the 1960s and the 1980s. The 1970s witnessed a movement of working class struggle in Turkey, including widespread strikes, as in Western Europe. Working relations and conditions were restricted by new laws, including the right to strike, collective agreement and unionisation, which continued until the military coup in 1980 (Ozturk, 2011; p. 124, 126).

4.2.3. Changing Forms of Urban Policy: Squatting of State-Owned Lands

Between 1950 and 1980, the massive flow of rural migration to big cities had an important effect on urbanisation as a part of the integration of Turkey into capitalist production processes. Changes in capitalist relations and migration of workers created a restructuring of labour, capital and market relations. These
changes had significant consequences for built environment, as well as for production relations and labour processes. Changes in spatial relations appeared with the construction of ‘gecekondu’ settlements as solutions to the unmet housing needs of the migrants. Gecekondu settlements are the squatter houses built on mostly state-owned land by the in-migrants to the cities. Gecekondu settlements were a solution to the housing need of the migrants in the big cities and also supported the supply of labour to industry. The new migrants were a solution to the need for cheap labour in the growing industrial sector in cities, and low costs of housing through gecekondu production helped to keep wages of the workers low. While this encouraged people because of job opportunities with low costs, it was also a process of forming a reserve army of labour (Yildirmaz, 2009; p. 131-2; 2010; p. 443).

From the 1950s to the end of the 1960s increasing numbers of gecekondu settlements were being constructed across Istanbul. The majority was built on state-owned lands (and a minor portion on private land) close to industrial areas and factories. They were all built without planning permission, lacked infrastructure, and provided extremely poor living conditions. The distribution of gecekondu areas were made through ‘hemsehrilik’ among the migrants. Hemsehrilik is a concept used in gecekondu literature to define the bound between the same villagers or citizens. The term will be used as ‘village-tie’ in the rest of the thesis. Village-tie (hemsehrilik) relations were the main ties between the dwellers of
gecekondu settlements that unite them as a community. Migrants coming from the same city or village tended to live in the same neighbourhood, because of the presence of their village-tie in the same neighbourhood. Firstly, a male migrant from one of the villages of the rural areas came to Istanbul and settled with a fellow migrant from the same village who had previously arrived in Istanbul. Secondly, after he settled in Istanbul he would bring his family and encourage other residents in the village to come to Istanbul. This relationship was a trust-based relationship in which people help and support each other in the new city in which they settled.

There was more than one reason behind the construction of gecekondu settlements. One of the main reasons was the lack of housing at the time of major migration flow. Neither the state nor private sector met or provided a solution for the housing needs of migrants. It took sometime to recover from the slowdown in house construction and decline in industrial investment. There were also other reasons behind gecekondu housing production. For example, migrants were the cheap labour power, it was not only they were unskilled but also firm-owners did not have to pay for housing, which reduces the cost of workers. Gecekondu was cheap housing that was a good solution for the housing need of low-paid workers and workers were not able to demand for extra payment for housing need because of their lack in solidarity. Because of this, the number of gecekondu settlements in Turkey increased dramatically over a very short period (see Table 4.2). According to the research done by the Ministry of Public Works and Settlement, at the beginning of 1960s the proportion of gecekondu settlements in total housing of Ankara was 64%, of Adana was 48%, of Istanbul was 40% and of Izmir was 24%. The percentage of gecekondu dwellers of the total population of cities was 59 % in Ankara, 45% in Istanbul, 45 % in Adana and 33 % in Izmir. But despite this, there were no major government interventions into gecekondu settlements until the 1960s (Karpat, 2003; p. 33).
Table 4.2: The growth of gecekondus and gecekondu population in Turkey (1955-1980)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total urban population</th>
<th>Gecekondu population</th>
<th>Gecekondu population as percentage of total urban population</th>
<th>Total urban housing units</th>
<th>Number of gecekondu houses</th>
<th>Gecekondu houses as percentage of total urban housing units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>5 324 397</td>
<td>250 000</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>1 050 000</td>
<td>50 000</td>
<td>4.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>7 307 816</td>
<td>1 200 000</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>1 440 000</td>
<td>240 000</td>
<td>16.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>9 395 159</td>
<td>2 150 000</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>1 880 000</td>
<td>430 000</td>
<td>22.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>10 437 233</td>
<td>2 250 000</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>2 100 000</td>
<td>450 000</td>
<td>21.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>12 734 761</td>
<td>3 000 000</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>2 800 000</td>
<td>600 000</td>
<td>21.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>20 330 065</td>
<td>4 750 000</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>4 500 000</td>
<td>950 000</td>
<td>21.11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Inkaya, 1972; p. 55) cited in (Keles & Payne, 1984; p. 181)

The 1960s started with a military coup when a new Constitution was enforced by the military government. The question of housing the poor was included in the Constitution under Article 49, which emphasised the priority of this problem, and Article 16, which guaranteed security of ‘dwelling occupation’ without forced eviction. In the same years, the State Planning Organisation considered housing as a part of the economic development of the country, and developed principles for a national housing policy to be implemented in the five year development plans (see previous section). In the First Development Plan (1963-7), housing investments were seen as unproductive for the development of capitalist relations in the country, therefore the aim was to keep housing investment low. The state rather than investing in housing production (which was very limited), prioritised investment in infrastructure and basic services (Basbakanlik Devlet Planlama Teskilati Mustesarligi, 1968; p. 61). This approach included putting limitations on the construction of luxury housing; providing land and personal loan; the improvement of gecekondu settlements; and providing ‘affordable housing’ (Basbakanlik Devlet Planlama Teskilati Mustesarligi, 1968; p. 429-35). In the Second Five Year Plan (1968-72), the role of the state in the housing sector by following the premises in the First Plan,
was defined as ‘regulator’ rather than ‘investor’ or ‘builder’. The state’s role was to attract small scale capital for housing investment (Basbakanlik Devlet Planlama Teskilati Mustesarligi, 1968; p. 273) and therefore, it provided affordable housing finance models and assistance to self-help housing schemes (Keles, 1990; p. 149). In this plan, existing gecekondu settlements were not seen as illegal and therefore to be demolished, but were seen as in terms of providing new housing after demolition. A new Gecekondu Law (No. 775) was enacted in 1966 to legalise the existing gecekondu units and this law was the starting point of amnesty laws for gecekondu settlements. Amnesty laws are a series of laws that were enacted at different times since 1966 in order to legalise gecekondu settlements by giving various legal rights, including right to have the deed title or the right to buy the land. This law and the Law of Condominium Ownership placed gecekondu settlements in the formal housing market and thus also into capitalist relations.

In the Third Five Year Plan (1973-77), gecekondu settlements were still the major concern of the housing sector in Turkey. This plan aimed to provide infrastructure development in existing gecekondu settlements and also to provide housing in the case of demolition of gecekondu in unacceptable condition. This plan acknowledged the failures of the credit system to produce social, mass and low-income housing, but still focussed on providing credit to individuals by giving personal loans (Basbakanlik Devlet Planlama Teskilati Mustesarligi, 1973; p. 835).

Despite the non-interventionist strategy of the state in relation to gecekondu settlements, state attacks on them have occurred and several have been destroyed. These actions have been met either by resistance from gecekondu dwellers, or in the form of negotiation. However, with the rise of political mobilisation in the late 1970s, resistance to demolitions in gecekondu settlements shifted to more politically-based protests than village-tie relations.
In the late 1970s, labour unions were organised under a confederation, for the first time since the Republic, and acted to uphold the social and economic rights of their members, including housing (Keles, 1990; p. 141). The political mobilisation and the strong working class movement in this period had a positive impact on urban social movements and which also gained a political character. Some radical left groups had a particular interest in the housing problem because they saw the housing problem as part of the class struggle (Aslan, 2004; p. 81). These movements demanded the right to have local services in existing gecekondu settlements, including sanitation, transportation, communication and roads, in order for the settlements to become integrated into the city. They also demanded the right to construct new gecekondu settlements for people who did not have dwellings. The second demand directly targeted the housing problem of migrants who came from the rural areas to cities as cheap labour.

This leftist strategy to meet housing need was based on the free usage of state-owned lands. This solution was mainly supported by radical left groups. The involvement of radical groups and the highly politicised climate of the period politicised the housing problem and opened the involvement of non-homeowners as well as organised radical left groups (Aslan, 2004; p. 77-80). The gecekondu movements demanding state land for the construction of houses faced severe repression by the state. However, in some areas, with the involvement of migrants and left activists, newly ‘planned’ gecekondu settlements were constructed as a form of political and social practice (Aslan, 2004; p. 80). These settlements were named ‘rebel zones’ in the daily media and were targeted for demolition due to their political basis. These rebel zones, such as 1 Mayis, Gulsuyu and Nurtepe Neighbourhoods were attacked and destroyed by the state, and a great number of people lost their lives during these brutal assaults. However, those among the inhabitants who shared a common political stance with the socialist radical left groups reoccupied the
sites and rebuilt the houses. These rebuilt settlements differed from the former gecekondu settlements on the basis of decision making processes involving participation, and the construction of housing as cultural and political commons, rather than profit making (Aslan, 2004p. 85). These movements created a threat for the continuity of existing political authority by proposing alternative solutions for housing and for social relations. As a result, the state started to abandon the policy of no using of force and started to take precautions in the form of using police force or immediate demolishment of new gecekondu (Aslan, 2004; p. 78).

In brief, resistance in gecekondu neighbourhoods was based on the increased awareness of class struggle of this period, and was politicised in relation to left working class movements, which provided support and active involvement. The resistance to the state’s actions against some gecekondu settlements was not based on notions of property-ownership, but was well organised around ideas of collective commons and with the participation of the majority of the neighbourhoods.

The production of gecekondu settlements until the 1970s can be seen as collaboration between capital and labour. Large-scale capital invested in production, which was more profitable than housing investment and left the housing market to small and medium-scale capital. However, after the 1970s, the politicisation of housing need and the urge of capital to invest in private housing weakened and even swept away the collaboration between capital and labour.
4.3. The Period between 1980-2000

4.3.1. Population Growth and the Demographic Characteristics of the Population in Turkey

Between 1980 and 2000 Turkey’s population increased from 44.7 million to 67.8 million and the population of Istanbul doubled in this period to 10 million people (TurkSat census and ABPRS database, see Table 4.3).

Table 4.3: Total Population and the Change of Population over previous five years in Turkey and in Istanbul (1945-1980)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population of Turkey</th>
<th>Change of population over previous five years in Turkey (%)</th>
<th>Population of Istanbul</th>
<th>Change of population over previous five years in Istanbul (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>44 736 957</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4 741 890</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>50 664 458</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>5 842 985</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>56 473 035</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>7 309 190</td>
<td>25.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>67 803 927</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>10 018 735</td>
<td>37.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TurkSat, Population Censuses, 1965-2000; Address Based Population Registration System (ABPRS) database (accessed on: 05.08.2012)

Table 4.4 shows the highest net migration and emigration of twenty cities in Turkey. Net migration is the difference between in-migration and emigration of a place. If the in-migration is higher than emigration, then the migration is positive, if in-migration is lower than emigration, the migration is negative. The rate of net migration is the exact or net number of migrants for the possibility of every thousand migrant in a period between two censuses.

In-migration to Istanbul always exceeded out-migration to other cities over this period (see Table 4.4). In the period between 1975 and 1980 the highest positive migration rate was follows: Izmir, 73.7 %; Istanbul, 73.4 % and Bursa, 61 %. The in-migration of these three cities was much higher than the emigration from these cities. The positive rate of in-migration had decreased in 1980-85 period but had increased in Istanbul by the rate of 107.6 % in the following period. Positive migration rate in Istanbul was increased in 1995-2000 period.
The negative migration rate was highest in Kars (-113.1 %), followed by Agri (-80.5 %) and Sivas (-75.4%) (see Table 4.4). The rise in the net in-migration rate to Istanbul between 1985 and 1990 was mainly the result of forced migration by the state from the eastern regions of Turkey, the state clearing people to weaken the Kurdish Movement. The forced migration was carried out by the state without the consent or choice of destination, sending people to major cities, and especially to Istanbul, reinforcing Istanbul as the main destination of migration flows in Turkey in this period.

Table 4.4: The positive and negative migration rates of the largest twenty cities of Turkey according to their regions between 1975 and 2000.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions of Turkey (only the selected cities that had high migration and emigration rates)</th>
<th>1975-1980</th>
<th>Change in Net migration in five years period (%)</th>
<th>1980-1985</th>
<th>Change in Net migration in five years period (%)</th>
<th>1985-1990</th>
<th>Change in Net migration in five years period (%)</th>
<th>1995-2000</th>
<th>Change in Net migration in five years period (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marmara Region</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>288 653</td>
<td>73.4</td>
<td>297 598</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>656 677</td>
<td>107.6</td>
<td>407 448</td>
<td>46.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bursa</td>
<td>58 720</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>47 434</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>83 641</td>
<td>61.6</td>
<td>85 325</td>
<td>45.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tekirdağ</td>
<td>4 849</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>3 438</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>17 907</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>51 335</td>
<td>96.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Çanakkale</td>
<td>- 1 408</td>
<td>-4.0</td>
<td>- 1 834</td>
<td>-4.9</td>
<td>- 2 042</td>
<td>-5.2</td>
<td>11 491</td>
<td>27.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kırklareli</td>
<td>- 3 170</td>
<td>-13.4</td>
<td>- 2 252</td>
<td>-8.9</td>
<td>- 5 510</td>
<td>-20.7</td>
<td>5 270</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aegean and Mediterranean Region</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>İzmir</td>
<td>119 896</td>
<td>73.7</td>
<td>82 173</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>146 208</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>120 375</td>
<td>39.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antalya</td>
<td>17 142</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>25 339</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>82 737</td>
<td>89.7</td>
<td>90 457</td>
<td>64.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aydın</td>
<td>9 382</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>9 365</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>19 077</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>21 553</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muğla</td>
<td>1 659</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3 058</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>15 998</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>42 921</td>
<td>70.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isparta</td>
<td>- 2 792</td>
<td>-9.3</td>
<td>- 5 148</td>
<td>-15.4</td>
<td>- 6 495</td>
<td>-17.0</td>
<td>13 869</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denizli</td>
<td>- 3 040</td>
<td>-5.7</td>
<td>2 095</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>10 570</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>15 205</td>
<td>19.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Central Region</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ankara</td>
<td>49 499</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>36 631</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>69 511</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>90 884</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eskişehir</td>
<td>7 759</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>8 506</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>6 510</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>9 582</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilecik</td>
<td>- 394</td>
<td>-3.0</td>
<td>1 095</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>3 009</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>10 105</td>
<td>57.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Çorum</td>
<td>- 23 753</td>
<td>-46.3</td>
<td>- 17 712</td>
<td>-32.6</td>
<td>- 33 897</td>
<td>-58.5</td>
<td>- 33 022</td>
<td>-58.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sivas</td>
<td>- 50 302</td>
<td>-75.4</td>
<td>- 37 687</td>
<td>-54.6</td>
<td>- 76 451</td>
<td>-105.8</td>
<td>- 35 627</td>
<td>-51.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bayburt *</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>- 13 808</td>
<td>-133.2</td>
<td>- 5 360</td>
<td>-59.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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### 4.3.2. The Socio-Economic Context of the Period

The 1980s started with radical changes in economic and social life in Turkey. The beginning of the period witnessed another military coup that dramatically affected social life, especially the strong working class movement. This period began with new decisions - the ‘January 24 Decisions’ - which aimed to meet the demands of capital after the economic crisis between 1977 and 1979. The economic decisions were mainly framed to discipline the working class, involving a decrease in union rights; banning strikes; trial of the directors of Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey (DISK); and shifting the setting of wage rates from collective agreement to the Board of Higher Arbitration (YHK). This Board is composed of representatives of the High Court, the Cabinet, universities; the Director of Labour and Social Security; two members of workers’ confederations and two members of the confederation of employers. The involvement of YHK guaranteed a reduction in real wages (Boratav, 2003; p. 150). However, the ‘January 24 Decisions’ were not limited to disciplining the working class, but also involved restructuring relations among

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### Table: Population Changes (1980-2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<tr>
<td>Siirt</td>
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<td>-29.5</td>
<td>-18 232</td>
<td>-41.7</td>
<td>-31 311</td>
<td>-140.7</td>
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<td>-75.1</td>
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<td>Adıyaman</td>
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<td>-34.7</td>
<td>-13 614</td>
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<td>-37.5</td>
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<td>Muş</td>
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<td>-66.4</td>
<td>-14 346</td>
<td>-49.4</td>
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<td>-53.5</td>
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<td>-26 213</td>
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<td>Mardin</td>
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<td>-54.8</td>
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<td>-113.1</td>
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<td>-77.9</td>
<td>-105 025</td>
<td>-163.5</td>
<td>-18 331</td>
<td>-61.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Şırnak *</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5 165</td>
<td>-24.7</td>
<td>5 950</td>
<td>21.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ardahan *</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>13 526</td>
<td>-106.7</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Blacksea Region</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Zonguldak</td>
<td>8 679</td>
<td>10.8</td>
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<td>-20.0</td>
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<td>Sinop</td>
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<td>-51.1</td>
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<td>-98.6</td>
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<td>-63.6</td>
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<td>Bartın *</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>15 658</td>
<td>-86.8</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(*) These cities have only recently been officially designated as cities for statistical purposes. No earlier information is available.

capital: relations between domestic capitals, relations between state and capital, and relations with international capital (Ozturk, 2011; p. 134; Yaman-Ozturk & Ercan, 2009; p. 66).

This period saw the establishment of liberal economic policies in Turkey, both in terms of restructuring relations among capital, but also in terms of the relations between capital, labour, and the state and disciplining labour. Between 1980 and 1990, the beginnings of the expansion of Turkey’s international trade were set in place. An international accumulation strategy was one form of restructuring, and started with enactment of new regulations which aimed to promote integration into international markets. These policies were intended to put pressure on labour movements, and imposing restrictions on the gains made by the working class during the previous decade, but also promoted restructuring relations between capital fractions to advantage holding companies (Ozturk, 2011; p. 134).

These measures had the effect of suppressing real wages by as much as 32% in relation to consumer prices, and the wage share in the industrial sector was more than halved, from 37.2% to 15.4% between 1978-79 and 1988 (Turkun, et al., 2010; p. 21). Aiming to increase participation and improve competitiveness in global markets, the manufacturing of goods was based on cheap mass production without creativity or quality (Turkun, et al., 2010; p. 21).

After the 1980s, investments in manufacturing and the service sector decreased (Ozturk, 2011; p. 136). Despite this, during the period between 1978-9 and 1988, the share of investments in industry of total capital accumulation decreased from 29% to 16%, and the share of industrial investment in national income decreased from 6 % to 4 % (Saygili, Cihan, & Yurtoglu, 2005; p. 48). Over a similar period (1980 – 2000), however, the share of service sector investments increased from 50% to 67%. More than half of this was in the housing sector,
which increased its share from 29% to 37% (Saygili, et al., 2005; p. 48) and housing became the leading sector (Boratav, 2003; p. 162; Saygili, et al., 2005). From the start of this period, while public investment led infrastructural production, private investment led housing production.

The decline in productive capital investments was a result of increasing interest rates and negative conditions for productive capital. Because of increasing rates, credit terms were restrictive and these especially affected industrial enterprises that had weak financial structures. In relation to financial changes in the economy, while most of the enterprises had difficulties in the first half of the period, some holding companies became unprofitable and declined in size in the second half of the period (Ozturk, 2011; p. 136). While the instability of financial changes resulted in a high number of bankruptcies, and takeovers increased, it also created a positive effect and competitive advantage for the holding companies, including banks, which held money-capital sources. This also implied contradictions among capitals (Ercan, 2004; p. 22) because holding companies had the chance of accelerated expansion by taking over small enterprises, and this enabled them to become dominant in the financial sector. However, it was not only the industrial enterprises that were affected in this period: some financial institutions and brokers were also negatively affected. Bankruptcies and take-overs were experienced in the financial sector, and as in the industrial sector, this produced change towards a more centralised structure (Gultekin-Karakas, 2009; p. 95-9).

In this period, foreign trade increased and became an important part of capital accumulation, which was dominated by a limited number of holding companies and resulted in increasing centralisation of capital; this restructured in relations between fractions of capital, both in production and in foreign trade. Money-capital, especially banking, played an important role in these changes (Gultekin-Karakas, 2009; p. 95). In the banking sector, the ratio of GNP doubled from 1980
to 1993. The restructuring of capital fractions had a positive effect on this increase: the interactions between the banking sector in Turkey and international finance corporations increased, including the ability of international banks to open branches in Turkey, and lifting restrictions on foreign borrowing by Turkish banks and enterprises (Ozturk, 2011; p. 144). In brief, during the decade following 1980, the banking sector and foreign trade expanded greatly, while at the same time, investments in manufacturing decreased. As a result, the distribution of surplus value gained increased importance rather than its production, and finance and trade capital came into prominence (Ozturk, 2011; p. 145).

The 1990s can be seen as the period of the second phase of the expansion of Turkey’s international trade. The main characteristic of the period was the advanced level of integration of the accumulation process in Turkey with global money-capital flows. As a part of this integration, late capitalist countries, including Turkey, were open to frequent and extensive economic crises (Yaman-Ozturk & Ercan, 2009; p. 55-60). These crises periods are resulted in the centralisation of capital. The major crisis of 2001 produced the most profound restructuring of this period (Ozturk, 2011; p. 147).

In the 1990s the banking sector rapidly became integrated into global financial flows which produced an increase in the number of Turkish banks: 67 in 1994 and 81 in 1999. But with the 2001 economic crisis the number fell to 54 (Ergunes, 2008; p. 358). The banking sector expanded in a very short period and then rapidly centralised. Private holding company banks held two-thirds of the total assets, deposits and credits in private banking in 1993 ((Bal, 1994; p. 77) cited in (Ozturk, 2011; p. 149). With the restructuring of the banking sector between 1997-2003, Turkish banking became even more centralised, as a result of intensification of the sector in holding companies in the form of leasing and factoring (Gultekin-Karakas, 2009; p. 95-102). Banks owned by holding
companies had branches and also other financial institutions abroad, a tendency which increased rapidly in the 1990s (Ozturk, 2011; p. 150).

The capital market was also affected by restructuring of money-capital relations. Despite the enactment of the Capital Market Law in 1981, capital market has not become a source of money-capital to private firms. Almost all the sources created in the capital market were used by the public sector, which was 95% of the total, rather than private sector. After the 1990s, the private sector was able to use these sources. After the Capital Market Law, Istanbul Stock Exchange Market (ISEM) was restructured; in 1986 80 enterprises active in the Exchange Market with 13 billion dollars of trading, and it increased to 316 enterprises with 182 billion dollars in 2000. While the exchange market gained importance for the accumulation of money capital after 1980s, it was under the domination of holding companies as in the banking sector (Ozturk, 2011; p. 150-1).

This period was also the time when foreign trade came to be dominated by the holding companies. The expansion of foreign trade began in the 1990s. The activity areas of Turkish investment involved sale-distribution and service units, retailing centres and shopping malls spread across Europe and Asia. In parallel with the expansion of foreign trade, the number of shopping malls in Turkey also expanded hugely in 1980s from 3 to 154 in 2000 (Ozturk, 2011; p. 150-9).

Alongside trade and manufacturing, infrastructure investment like communications, construction and transportation was rapidly internationalised in the 1990s (Ozturk, 2011; p. 166). The accumulation of capital in the construction sector in Turkey had been growing since the 1950s, while the internationalisation of the construction sector has been intensifying since the 1970s (Guloksuz, 2009; p. 157). In the 1980s because of the decline of construction work in Middle East, big construction companies in Turkey, which
had been expanding into global markets, instead began to invest in infrastructure projects in Turkey. However, in the 1990s, with reduced public spending by the Turkish state, construction companies returned to investment in international markets. As of 1995, construction companies based in Turkey gained approximately 10% of the international construction and contracting sector with 21 billion dollars of trading (Ozturk, 2011; p. 166). The internationalisation of the infrastructure and service sector was not limited to construction companies: media, telecom, logistic and even research and development companies began to be internationalised in the 1990s (Ozturk, 2011; p. 167).

The internationalisation of capital in Turkey has resulted in a series of economic crises (in 1994, 1997 and 2000-2001) which were moments in the restructuring of capital accumulation and class relations (Yaman-Ozturk & Ercan, 2009; p. 56). These crises carried capital accumulation and also contradictions of accumulation to wider scales. Briefly, to overcome the contradictions appearing during crisis at wider spatial scales in this period, the working class was disciplined by coups and wage restraints, and state and capital relations were restructured by legal and institutional changes (Yaman-Ozturk & Ercan, 2009; p. 65).

Since the 1990s, as Istanbul became Turkey’s ‘global city’ international money flows intensified to the city, putting greater demands on its infrastructure and producing specific kinds of built environment such as skyscrapers, shopping malls and ports. International investment fuelled the rapid growth of Istanbul, attracted infrastructure construction (motorways, bridges), development of the CBD (see more detail in Chapter 7, Section 7.3.2), mass housing production, gated communities and luxury housing, shopping malls and entertainment parks. The intensification of investment in the built environment has also segregated spaces for housing, commerce, and work between social classes and
produced uneven socio-spatial development. The socially-segregated spatial development of Istanbul was a result of neoliberal strategies effective since the 1980s, including the ‘global city’ role based on production of urban rents.

The concept of ‘global city’ is mainly used for major cities of early capitalist countries. Using the concept for the future development strategies of Istanbul carries distinctive elements as being a part of a late capitalist country. Istanbul has a very large amount of unauthorised housing areas, composed of gecekondu settlements, highly polarised wage structure and an effective informal economic sector. The meaning of the concept for Istanbul was to show the strategies of the governments at national and local scales aiming to accelerate internationalisation of the economy and to increase financial sector.

Over the two decades since 1980, the built environment of Istanbul has remarkably developed according to being ‘a global city’ strategy with rising mass housing areas in near peripheries along the coastline, linked with new motorways to the city centre. This includes not only diversified but also separated spaces of international flows, rising numbers of gated communities, gentrified houses and neighbourhoods on previous squatter areas or derelict areas in inner city, where urban dwellers have lived through deepened economic inequalities, social stresses, political crisis as well as ethnic tensions stemming from particular forms of migration (e.g. forced migration of Kurdish people).

4.3.3. Changing Forms of Urban Policy: The Inclusion of Gecekondu Settlements in Capitalist Relations

The restructuring of the state in parallel with the political-economic changes over the period 1970-1980 was followed by a new set of urban policies reflecting the neoliberal austerity programme developed after the military coup of 1980. Such developments not only gave rise to a new period in Turkey’s urbanisation, but also caused Istanbul to become a distinctive city among
Turkey’s major cities. The city of Istanbul became a favoured place for built forms of investment. These investments were very selective, focussing on large-scale communication and transportation, mass housing and infrastructure projects (Sengül, 2003). Since the 1980s, capital has been prominently represented in urban space in previously unfamiliar discourses, such as ‘being a global city’ or ‘promoting sustainable living spaces’ and in ‘landmark’ projects such as international trade centres and skyscrapers. The effects of this restructuring of relations between state, dwellers and capital is visible in the commodification of gecekondu settlements, the establishment of mass housing production, and the global city role given to Istanbul.

The shift from small-scale private construction to large-scale mass housing production with substantial state involvement began in 1981 with the establishment, under the Mass Housing Law (No. 2487), of the Public Housing Fund (PHF), a central state institution to regulate and to provide finance for the production of mass housing for low- and middle-income households. The PHF was designed as a financial institution for housing production, rather than producing housing itself; and it operated without the input or involvement of local authorities. The principles of the new legislation and the institution were to provide cheap credit for the construction of housing for low and middle income households. Priority was given to mass produced affordable housing no larger than 100 m² per unit. Non-capitalist mass housing organisations, such as housing co-operatives, unions of co-operatives, and social security organisations were able to benefit from the PHF (Keles, 1990; p. 151-53).

In 1984 the Mass Housing Law (No. 2985) was changed and credits were made available to private individuals, builders, contractors, as well as housing credit for investment in infrastructure in tourist regions. Restrictions on the production of social housing were removed in order to provide credit for second homes, for residences in a resort area, and for house sizes of 150 m² per unit;
that is, luxury housing by Turkey’s standards (Keles, 1990; p. 153-55). This change was a substantial shift in the Fund from providing only cheap housing for the poor to provide personal loans and credit for the middle and upper income households.

The PHF gave rise to the creation of large numbers of housing cooperatives for middle-income people in the near-peripheral areas of large cities, comprising in all more than 200,000 residential units. The outcomes of such an influential housing strategy are reflected mainly in Istanbul. From the 1980s to the 2000s, the city has developed with mass housing areas in the near-peripheries along the coastline, linked with new motorways to the city centre.

The production of mass housing under this policy did not particularly affect the revitalisation of gecekondu settlements, rather the legalisation process of gecekondu settlements continued as a separate process from mass housing production. A new comprehensive amnesty law was enacted in 1985 and ‘improvement plans’ integrated gecekondu settlements into the land use planning process for the first time since they were established. The amnesty law aimed either to conserve and improve, or to demolish, existing illegal housing units. Those gecekondu settlements built before the enactment of the amnesty law were to be conserved. According to the law, individuals who owned a gecekondu needed to apply to the local authorities to legalise their houses by making a payment for the title deed. Title deeds (tapu tahsis in Turkish) grant an owner of gecekondu housing the right to use the land, either by negotiating to buy the land from the private owner, or by buying the land from the state. The title deed constituted the basis for ‘land title’ to be gained after improvement plans or cadastral plan. The ownership of the house is only possible when an official cadastral plan recognizes the houses that are built before the plan. The holder of a title deed may get their allotment or plot in the area where they used to live or in another gecekondu improvement or gecekondu prevention
zones, which are the areas close to existing gecekondu settlements and carry the risk of gecekondu construction in the future. Title deeds are not a guarantee of ‘land title’: rather, they are seen as the first phase of the process of getting the right to the housing unit and the land. Title deed holders were restricted by the amnesty law, from selling or transferring their title deeds for 20 years. Gecekondu settlements constructed after the amnesty law were supposed to have been demolished, however, the time period envisaged in the law was extended to the following years after 1985 to gain votes for local and central elections (Turkun, et al., 2010; p. 128-9).

A corollary of this was that not only were gecekondu settlements given legislative recognition, and the occupants granted title to private land and construction rights, but also in this way became included in capitalist property relations. There had been some previous attempts to legalise gecekondu settlements and include them in capitalist relations, but they were limited to sub-contractors or the build-and-sell system, that is, small and medium capital at the local scale. However after 1988, the 20 year restriction on the selling and transfer of gecekondu units was lifted and gecekondu settlements became a part of the real estate market. Commodification of gecekondu created a new form of capital accumulation in the real estate market and started to be sold to contractors meaning that gecekondu owners became a part of capitalist property relations (Turkun, et al., 2010; p. 112). Occupants with property rights in land or houses started to sell to contractors and speculative builders, rather than staying in gecekondu.

Alongside policies for the revitalisation of some gecekondu settlements, others, not covered by the amnesty law, were demolished. Demolition of gecekondu was met with resistance by individuals who were either against demolition or demanding rights to property ownership. From being a form of collective movement in the 1970s, resistance had shifted to reaction based on demands
for individual and property rights. The defeat of the working class in the 1980s and the inclusion of gecekondu settlements in capitalist commodity relations had a crucial effect on this particular shift. With the commodification of gecekondu settlements a new form of housing production developed, called ‘construct and sell’ model. This model was evident in the previous period but was accelerated after 1985 by the amnesty law. In this model, gecekondu owners sold their houses to a small- or medium-scale developer and in return were allocated one or more flats in the apartment block that was constructed on housing scale. The interventions of the state in legalising gecekondu settlements by amnesty laws and improvement plans not only turned gecekondu settlements into commodities, but also introduced contractual relationships between state, financiers, landlords and dwellers. In these relationships, workers encounter capital not as labour, but as consumer (see Chapter 3).

The changing role of the state in housing production sped up the conversion of land into housing lots and provided infrastructure for future investments for mass housing production. It was also effective at the local level because municipalities started the production of mass housing projects. The municipalities, which owned amounts of land large enough to produce at least 400 housing units, were able to apply for finance from the Public Housing Fund (PHF). When PHF conditions are met by the local state, then houses can built by the municipality’s own companies or via cooperatives. But local state involvement in housing production with PHF was not widespread and remained limited to 50 or 60 municipalities in the 1990s (Turel, 2009; p. 13). Municipalities were also restructured to become the key actors in planning decision-making process. Such a shift was enabled by two new legal arrangements: the decentralisation law for the administration of the Municipalities of Large Cities (Law Number 3030); and Development Legislation (number 3194), which strengthened the financial structure of the metropolitan
municipalities and gave more power to local governments (Tekeli, 1991a). In this way, ‘local governments became relatively independent, especially with respect to urban development’ (Uzun, 1991:84).

The Greater Municipality of Istanbul was given greater power over the district municipalities. Through such change, while the Greater Municipality was empowered to frame spatial development at the city scale, district municipalities lost their powers on the decision making process of the district scale. District municipalities were responsible preparing small scale plans according to the large scale plans produced by greater municipality. However district municipalities did not have the power to approve the produced plans. It was the greater municipality, which approves or rejects and make changes on district plans under its authority. This division of labour within urban administration has consolidated the distinction between social classes at different spatial scales in Istanbul: political influence at the level of the Greater Municipality was dominated by big construction companies, bank owners and new urban elites, while the district level was left to the small and medium contractors and urban poor (Tekeli, 1991). The distinction between different scales of the state in elected representation created conflicts between different scales.

4.4. Conclusion
This chapter examined the population growth and the demographic characteristics of the population in Turkey, the socio economic context and changing forms of urban policy in Turkey and in Istanbul for the periods between 1950-1980 and 1980-2000. Substantially, in the first period, the migratory flow from rural areas of Turkey to the big cities was massive and restructured the capital-labour relations and housing structure. The acceleration of capitalist production and the need for cheap labour for the development of industrialisation substantially changed the built environment of
Istanbul. The state and the firms were lack in housing need of the workers that created a new type of housing called gecekondu settlements, which is constructed by the migrants on state-owned lands. This type production of housing was an anti-capitalist form of dwelling until amnesty laws and improvement plans started in 1980s.

The second period was the start of commodification of gecekondu settlements, but also the establishment of liberal economic policies in Turkey, which carried restructuring of relations between capital, labour and the state and, restructuring of the built environment. The investments on built environment has risen and the investments were focused on luxury housing, motorway construction, landmark projects and skyscrapers to promote ‘being a global city’ role for Istanbul given by the national and local scale state.

The following chapter examined the research questions, which framed this research and research methods that are used to collect data. The chapter aimed to show the relation between the dialectic Marxist abstraction and research methods that were used. This is followed by research questions and the selection of case studies. The last section of the Chapter examined the structure of the fieldwork design, the methods used and how the analysis made.
CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODS: QUALITATIVE RESEARCH IN THREE URBAN REGENERATION AREAS

5.1. **Introduction**

The variety and unstable nature of state interventions in different localities, and the rescaling of the state, are not only a theoretical or conceptual issue; they are developed through the concrete capitalist social relations embedded in each locality. These relations are also an integral part of wider social relations. This research, therefore, examines how the state behaves differently in different localities during urban regeneration processes in different neighbourhoods and how the regeneration process plays a role in the rescaling of the state in Istanbul.

The thesis seeks to capture this dimension by exploring social relations embedded in the urban regeneration process in Istanbul. In particular, it aims to examine the differentiated and changing forms and strategies of state intervention. Based on these considerations, qualitative research methods were used and this chapter discusses the close relation between the research methods employed and the methodological basis of the research; the research questions formulated and the structure of the fieldwork design.

5.2. **Methodological Roots of the Research Methods**

The thesis adopts a dialectical Marxist methodology (see Chapter 2) developed through the philosophy of internal relations, employing Marxist abstraction method, in which the complex web of social relations is broken into manageable parts to enable analysis. Capitalist social relations are considered as a whole
single process composed of particular dialectically related ‘moments’, and the abstracted moments of capitalist social relations are in relation with each other both internally and dialectically (Ollman, 1993). Abstraction also shows that the spatiality of capitalist relations at different scales - local, national, international - is developed from the same structure and constitutes a whole set of relations: that is, all spatial levels are the moments of the same process.

According to the dialectical Marxist approach, knowledge of these relations does not exist independently of the wider knowledge of capitalist social relations. Even if the relations in a particular time and space may be seen as partial or incomplete, the task of the research is not only to examine these particular relations but also, the research examines a moment of relations in a wider context and explains these relations within a theoretical framework which investigates the underlying mechanisms of social relations. The aim of examining and explaining social relations does not simply reflect what the everyday relations in a particular locality are, but involves why and how these relations are constructed in a particular locality and how and why they are related to other scales of space. Following the methodological roots of the research, the state’s interventions in the urban regeneration process in Istanbul is examined by researching and analysing (i) the capitalist social relations at different scales of the state and how these scales are related with each other; (ii) the variety and instability of state interventions during the urban regeneration process within different neighbourhoods.

The previous discussion (see Chapter 4), argued that the approach to ‘urban regeneration’ (UR) in Turkish academic literature has not sufficiently examined the changing forms and strategies of state intervention and its spatiality. Research on the UR literature in the most part, has been dominated by quantitative analysis of urban regeneration policies, seeing regeneration either as a technical process of housing policy, or as carrying out ethnographic analysis
of neighbourhoods subjected to urban regeneration projects. It is suggested in the analysis chapters of the thesis (see Chapters 6 and 7) that an adequate understanding of changing state interventions in urban regeneration areas can only be analysed by using a dialectical Marxist methodology, viewing the particular urban regeneration projects in each neighbourhood as an abstraction of the whole process of the housing of the poor: that is, as a moment in the spatiality of state interventions. Unlike previous studies, this is not an analysis of urban social movements or a particular grassroots movement in a particular neighbourhood, or the changes in the state institutions and legislation related to urban regeneration. Some of these approaches have adopted functionalist, structuralist, elitist, managerialist and pluralist approaches to the state and its spatiality viewing the state either subordinated to the logic of capital or a simple instrument of class forces.

Instead, this research views the state as a social relation and views social forces as acting in and through the state power (see Chapters 2 and 3). This refers to the complex relations between the state, space and social relations: the neighbourhood organisations and their resistances; changes in state institutions and legislation; uneven forms of interventions into neighbourhoods as an integral part of the whole intervention to the housing of the poor.

In particular, the methods of research need to have the capacity to analyse different sources that are reveal the relations in question. For example, the analysis of a certain local scale in Istanbul, combines interviews, documentary analysis and observations of the state structure, relating to neighbourhood dwellers, political groups, capital owners, elected politicians and bureaucrats at different levels of the state. Following these premises, a predominantly qualitative methodology was found useful for this research.
5.3. **Research Aims and Questions**

**Research Aims**

In relation to the theoretical basis of this research (see Chapters 2 and 3), the aims pursued are: (i) to investigate the changing forms and strategies of state intervention into the housing of the poor in Istanbul since 2000; and (ii) to illustrate the differentiation of state intervention in different neighbourhoods of the poor that are subjected to urban regeneration projects.

Following these aims, the formulated research questions are:

**Research Questions**

1. How does political economy in Turkey and in Istanbul since the 1950s relate to housing strategies of the state spatially?

2. How did the scalar nature of the state change in Turkey and in the three case study neighbourhoods? How do global and national scale projects for Istanbul have impact on the housing of the poor and the rescaling of the state?

3. How does state intervention into the housing of the poor subjected to urban regeneration projects vary between different neighbourhoods of Istanbul? What are the forms of state intervention in three case study neighbourhoods? How do the means and forms of intervention vary between three neighbourhoods?

4. What is the role of political resistance of the neighbourhoods in the changing forms and strategies of state intervention? In the case neighbourhoods, what is the role of the resistance of dwellers to the intervention of the state in the current and prospective housing policy for the poor?

5.4. **The Selection Criteria of the Case Study Neighbourhoods**

The case study method allows researchers to view complex relations in a specific place or time, for example individual life cycles, small group behaviour,
organisational and managerial processes, neighbourhood change, school performance (Yin, 2009; p. 4), and provides an understanding of local relations in a particular place. This method constitutes an important part of this research, but is distinct from the wider analysis of urban regeneration process that also examined. The case study method is used to reveal the local relations embedded in a spatial moment and is also a holistic approach to understand the changing interventions of the state during the urban regeneration process. On this basis, this research uses a multiple case study method, examining three case study neighbourhoods, in order to reveal the variety and instability of the interventions of the state in different localities. The case study neighbourhoods reveal spatial moments of the urban regeneration process and are related dialectically with the wider capitalist social relations.

During the last decade, the city of Istanbul has witnessed diverse urban regeneration projects in most of the poor neighbourhoods including squatter settlements (gecekondu neighbourhoods), historical city centre districts and old housing cooperative areas. It is not possible to give an exact number of urban regeneration areas due to the constantly increasing number of them, but there are more than fifty neighbourhoods which were announced as urban regeneration areas up to 2011 in Istanbul (see Chapter 4). Due to the complexity of the changing roles of state institutions at different scales and the frequent changes of laws for decision-making processes about urban regeneration projects, the urban regeneration process is highly complex. Because of this complexity and the changing nature of state interventions, the criteria of selection of the case study neighbourhoods were type of housing, political resistance, tenure mix and location are used, which are expanded and justified below.

(i) **Type of Housing**

As mentioned above, there are three types of urban regeneration areas in Istanbul: gecekondu neighbourhoods, historical city centre neighbourhoods,
and cooperative or affordable housing areas. The historical city centre
neighbourhoods are subject to a specific law, including conservation of
historical buildings and ethnic segregation of inhabitants of Istanbul. However,
this research focuses on the housing of the poor and the state’s solutions to the
problem of housing the poor. In this respect, gecekondu settlements are the
main housing problem type in Turkey’s urban planning process. Affordable
housing areas, which are very limited in number in Turkey, were the only
response by the state to housing the poor who were displaced from gecekondu
neighbourhoods in the 1970s. For this small-scale research a limitation of
selecting two gecekondu settlements and one social housing area was used. The
main reason behind this decision was two-fold: Firstly, it aims to examine the
state’s response to the need for housing for the poor. This relation is apparent
in the original making of gecekondu settlements, and in the affordable housing
areas that were produced for the people evicted from gecekondu settlements in
the 1970s. Secondly, the historical city centre neighbourhoods have a peculiar
formation process, including ethnic divisions, which carry different dynamics of
state intervention and this kind of case study selection might weaken the focus
of the research on a historical analysis of the importance of gecekondu
settlements in the Turkish urbanisation process.

(ii) Political Resistance
The existence of considerable political resistance in the neighbourhoods was
the second criterion for the selection process. The political dynamics and the
limits of resistance to urban regeneration are important in revealing the
relations between the state, space and society. In selecting case study
neighbourhoods, the existence of political resistance was looked for.

(iii) Tenure mix
The third selection criterion was the mixture of ownership, including owners of
their own house, owners of the land, and tenants. The complexity of ownership
and differences between tenures reveal the relations between the state, space and the society and people’s resistance against urban regeneration and their solidarity. A mixture of tenure types gives an opportunity to reveal an aspect of the resistance of dwellers on the basis of ownership. The role of ownership in the resistance against ‘urban regeneration’ and the existence or absence of solidarity between different tenure types is a rich source to understand the forms of struggle.

(iv) Location

The last criterion was the location of the neighbourhoods. Neighbourhoods located in the centre of the city were selected rather than the ones at the periphery. The centrality of neighbourhoods has a crucial effect on state interventions and strategies in terms of the neighbourhood’s land value and the effects on the relation between work and housing. In most of the poor housing areas, dwellers tend to live close to their working places. The main locational decision was the proximity of their houses to their workplace.

Following these criteria set, three case study neighbourhoods were selected: Basibuyuk and Derbent, which are gecekondu neighbourhoods and Tozkoparan, which is an affordable housing neighbourhood (Map 5.1). Political resistance against urban regeneration is evident in all three neighbourhoods but take different forms of struggle. The tenure mix is also an important aspect of case study neighbourhoods where you can find dwellers with land titles, title deeds, no official documents and tenants. This provides a significant aspect in their struggle. All three neighbourhoods are centrally located and have good connections to wider parts of the city. The details of all three case study neighbourhoods and the justification of the selection criteria is examined in Chapter 7.
5.5. The Structure of the Fieldwork Design

Timetable of the fieldwork

This section covers the timetable of the all phases of the fieldwork study of the research in 2010 and 2011. The fieldwork for the research took eight months in total, from the middle of May 2010 and to the middle of January 2011, involving three separate visits to the research areas (Table (5.1)). There are two phases of the research: First phase, between 15 May 2010 and 30 July 2010, involved the selection of the case study neighbourhoods and preparation for the second phase of the fieldwork. The second phase, which is between the beginning of August 2010 and at the end of January 2011, includes the fieldwork research in the selected neighbourhoods.
Table 5.1: Phases of the Fieldwork

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<th>Phases</th>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Aims</th>
<th>Research Methods</th>
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| Phase I  | 15 May 2010 – 30 May 2010 | Choosing the case study neighbourhoods  
Gathering wider information about urban regeneration process in Istanbul | Document collection  
Interviews              |
|          | June 2010 – August 2010 | Initial analysis for selecting the case study neighbourhoods  
literature review on the historical background of the research  
preparing interview questions | Participant Observation |
| Phase II | September 2010 – January 2011 | Gathering information on three case study neighbourhoods | Document collection  
Interviews  
Participant Observation |

**First Phase**

In the first phase of the research the main aim was to review all urban regeneration neighbourhoods in Istanbul to gain a picture of the city-wide urban regeneration projects and to specify the case study neighbourhoods. The preliminary investigation also provided a feel for the material and to designate the research methods. For the selection process of three case study neighbourhoods, different research methods were conducted (see Table 5.1).

**Second Phase**

The second phase of the research involved data gathering about the three selected case study neighbourhoods using three research methods, explained in detail in the following section.
5.6. Qualitative Methods

A qualitative methods approach gives the opportunity to explore the process of socio-spatial change and how social relations are constructed, without making experimental or measured (quantity, frequency, amount) research (Denzin & Lincoln, 2003). In particular, it has the potential to comprehend the socially constructed nature of spatial relations embedded in state intervention, including complex relations and different levels of analysis.

In relation to the ontological and epistemological basis of the research (see Chapter 2), the qualitative approach, which enables analyses both of the documented data and of people’s own accounts (Mason, 2002; p. 24). The research design flows from the theoretical approach of this thesis. The categories and concepts used in the qualitative research process are derived from the theoretical approach of the thesis, not from the empirics. The strategies and design process of the research is framed by developing the theoretical approach of state theory and a priori design decisions made in the beginning of the research.

The theoretical stand and concepts shaped the investigation of how state transforms itself and operates in time and in particular territories. Both investigations needed qualitative information. The abstract concepts that are used to generate the research questions are mainly derived from the spatiality of the state, including the rescaling of the state and interventions of the state. ‘Rescaling of the state’ is used to reveal how the scales of Turkish planning system restructured during the ‘urban regeneration’ process in Turkey and Istanbul. The main dynamics behind upward rescaling and also the limitations of downward rescaling is examined (see Chapter 6). The ‘interventions of the state’ is used to examine the different interventions of the state at different localities in the ‘urban regeneration’ process in Istanbul (see Chapter 7).
The following sections cover the qualitative methods used during the first and second phase of the fieldwork study of the research (Table 5.2 and 5.3). The fieldwork period involves documentary collection and semi-structured interviews were carried out with various respondents, and participant observation. The details of qualitative methods used are shown in the following sections.

Table 5.2: Research methods used during the first phase of the research

| Istanbul-wide data: Background and selection of three case study neighbourhoods |
|-------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|
| **Documents**                                   | **Semi-structured Interviews**                  | **Participant Observations**                    |
| Official documents, policy documents, press clippings, academic studies, politician’s speeches | Bureaucrats, professional chambers, political groups | Representatives of gecekondu neighbourhoods | Closed and open meetings of local and central state, chambers, social and political groups |

Table 5.3: Research methods used during the second phase of the research

| Gathering data about three selected case study neighbourhoods |
|-------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------|
| **Documents**                                   | **Semi-structured Interviews**                  | **Participant Observations**                    |
| Official documents, policy documents, press clippings, academic studies, politician’s speeches | Bureaucrats, Local and central government actors, professional chambers | Representatives of gecekondu neighbourhoods | Closed and open meetings of selected neighbourhoods, chambers, social and political groups, demonstrations and press statements |

5.6.1. Method I: Documentary Collection

The technique of documentary collection provides data to enhance understanding of research areas, including wider information on the city-region
and information about each neighbourhood. It has ‘the ability to situate contemporary accounts within an historical context’ (May, 2004; p. 175).

Documentary collection had two roles in the analysis of the research. Firstly, the data was limited to the information written in the documents, but this provided a frame for semi-structured interviews to cover the interpretation of the written documents and to get information beyond the written document. Secondly, documents helped to make comparisons between interviews, participant observations of researcher and the information in the documents. This technique was suited to the study’s focus on the historical background of state interventions and also current forms and strategies of interventions.

Documentary collection for this research involves:

- **official and policy documents** (e.g. all macro-scale plans and reports on Istanbul, reports on district urban regeneration projects, legislative documents on urban regeneration, meeting reports of workshops about restructuring of local governments);
- **reports** produced by real estate companies (e.g. reports, seminars), by professional chambers of urban planners and architects (i.e. reports, press statements), by political groups and parties, by neighbourhood dwellers (i.e. leaflets, press statements), by newspapers, various reports produced at international level (e.g. OECD, AGFE),
- **politicians’ speeches**
- **academic studies**

The transcriptions of real estate company reports and seminars are accessed in two ways: online and through the documents they produced. I had to visit the office of the Real Estate Association to get their publications. The reports produced by professional chambers were available either online or during the interviews when respondents supplied the reports that had not been publicised. The leaflets and press statements produced by neighbourhood associations
were gathered during interview visits and during participant attendance to their meetings. Newspaper reports were collected from the respondents; by following all the newspapers during the fieldwork and by online search. The reports prepared by international organisations are online. Politician speeches were collected from newspapers, web pages and magazines. Collection of these documents continued through the whole fieldwork.

Academic studies of UR in Istanbul are mainly focused on particular neighbourhoods in the frame of social movements or a description of the neighbourhoods. Wider analyses of the UR process are limited to the research by specific institutions taking major roles, in the process and are usually from a pluralist or elitist approach or the global city literature. These studies do not uncover the contradictions of capitalism and the complex relations between dwellers (both workers and consumers) and developers. None of these studies examines the urban regeneration process from an analysis of how state works and intervenes.

The selection of these documents was made firstly, to get descriptive but also critical analysis of the political economic changes of the period after 1950 in general. Secondly, in order to understand the regeneration process and the struggles in the case study neighbourhoods the limited written data was collected from neighbourhood organisations or dwellers to grasp what has happened historically.

5.6.2. Method II: Semi-structured Interviews
The semi-structured interview method uses specified questions; however, the interviewer is free to probe the answers given by the respondent by developing new questions during the interview and allows the opportunity for having a conversation-like exchange. This method of interviews has a structure and design according to the concepts, derived from the theoretical basis of the research (see Chapter 3), followed during the interview, significant questions to
structure the interview (May, 2004; p. 123). Semi-structured interviews were used to reveal the unwritten information about the regeneration process after analysing the documents. This technique was suited to the study focus on how the forms and strategies of state intervention change. In particular, rescaling of the state and different interventions of the state at different localities are used as the most abstract concepts to structure the interview questions (see Appendix A and B). The interviews were carried out to deepen knowledge gained from the documents and to gather information, which is largely undocumented, on social and political aspects of the regeneration process in Istanbul and in the neighbourhoods.

The key respondents at professional chambers, municipalities and neighbourhoods were accessed through my existing relations, developed during my MA research and my position as the Secretary General of Chamber of Urban Planners. The key contacts provided the name and connection of other informants during their interviews that have a form of snowball method, in which the researcher asks to the respondents to identify another potential respondent (Jupp, 2006; p. 281). In general, contacting respondents was relatively unproblematic, however I was refused two times and was accepted to interview but then cancelled before we started the interview: (1) one of the officers in one of the neighbourhoods (the muhtar, the governmental elected officer at neighbourhood level); (2) the Head of Gecekondu Settlements at Istanbul Greater Municipality; and (3) the Head of the Urban Planning Department of Sariyer District Municipality. The construction companies, which are or were active in the case study neighbourhoods, are a group of interviewees that I targeted to contact, but after a series of efforts to access them, none of them was successful. Saying that technically, they did not refuse to be interviewed but produced various excuses, including they did not know anything about the urban regeneration process. In case study neighbourhoods I
was only able to read documents about the construction processes but could not interview the construction companies.

The respondents were divided into seven groups: state officials at different levels; elected members of municipality councils (both city and district level), professional chambers of architects and urban planners; political groups; academics; existing and former members of neighbourhood organisations against urban regeneration; and former and existing neighbourhood dwellers. Some of the respondents were positioned in more than one group. Therefore, the questions and topics covered in interviews were extended according to the position of each interviewee (see Appendix (5.2) for the aims of interviews with each group).

Over the period of the fieldwork, 36 semi-structured interviews were carried out. Each interview ended approximately in an hour, although some were longer than this. I have interviewed (see Appendix A):

- one academic/activist
- two activists (Imece and the Platform of Istanbul’s Neighbourhood Associations)
- three member of the board of professional chambers
- four nation and city scale officials (the MHA, Kiptas and Greater Istanbul Municipality)
- one consultant for shopping malls
- seven members of neighbourhood organisations (four members of Tozkoparan Neighbourhood Association; two members of Derbent Neighbourhood Association; one member of Basibuyuk Neighbourhood Association)
- two neighbourhood dwellers (an old dweller of Derbent Neighbourhood and a former dweller of MESA Houses in Derbent Neighbourhood)
• *nine district and neighbourhood level officials* (three bureaucrats of Gungoren (Tozkoparan) District Municipality; two bureaucrats of Sariyer (Derbent) District Municipality and Muhtar of Derbent Neighbourhood; three bureaucrats of Maltepe (Basibuyuk) District Municipality)

• *five district level council members* (including city level ones) (one Gungoren (Tozkoparan) District Municipality Council Members; one Sariyer (Derbent) District Municipality Council Member; three Maltepe (Basibuyuk) District Municipality Council Members)

• *two district level municipality advisors* (advisors of Maltepe and Tozkoparan District Municipality Mayor).

The council members of the District Municipalities were two from Justice and Development Party (JDP) and six from Republican People’s Party (RPP). All the members who were in responsible from urbanisation issues in the district municipalities were interviewed. In Maltepe and Sariyer District Municipalities RPP was in power, only in Gungoren District Municipality JDP was in power. This caused a disproportion of the number of interviewees from (two from) JDP and (six from) RPP.

The academic I interviewed was working on a research project that analyses the urban regeneration process in six neighbourhoods in Istanbul, including my three case study neighbourhoods. The interview provided preliminary information about ‘urban regeneration’ in Istanbul, but also the research findings helped me to decide on the case study neighbourhoods. The member of the political activist group, Imece, provided me a wider picture of ‘urban regeneration’ and big projects (for example the third Bridge) in Istanbul. Imece is an active political group, which does not have direct relations with any political party. It is mainly composed of urban planners, architects and voluntary activists on urban problems. Their accumulated data and information on Istanbul also helped me to choose the case study neighbourhoods and to gather
wider information on Istanbul. The second interviewee from a political group was from PINA, which is a platform for dwellers in urban regeneration neighbourhoods. The interview with one of the members of PINA provided a wider historical background to ‘urban regeneration’ in Istanbul and information about each neighbourhood that has been subjected to regeneration.

Board Members of professional chambers of architects and urban planners provided detailed information about urban regeneration projects in Istanbul, and, again, the information they shared helped me in the selection process of case studies. One of the members in Kartal District was also responsible from Maltepe (Basibuyuk) District and provided detailed information of the urban regeneration project in Basibuyuk from its beginnings.

An officer of the Association of Shopping Malls explained the process of location selection for existing shopping malls near the case study neighbourhoods and how the selection process was carried out and the negotiations were conducted with district municipalities, greater municipality, capital owners and big land owners. The respondent also shared information about future shopping mall location selections in Istanbul. It was not possible to gain this information from district municipalities or from any written official documents. Mostly this kind of information is not shared with public until the start of the construction.

This research aims to reveal the relations between different scales of the state from neighbourhood to regional level, so interviews were done with bureaucrats, in charge of the ‘urban regeneration’ process in the three case study neighbourhoods, and also bureaucrats at the city and regional level. The interviews with bureaucrats from the MHA, Istanbul Greater Municipality, Kiptas, muhtar of Derbent Neighbourhood and district municipalities provided a wider data of relations between different scales of the state. These interviews gave an opportunity to learn details about the whole regeneration process in
Istanbul, but also to learn about the regeneration process in the case study neighbourhoods. It was possible to hear about the same process from actors at different levels. The other side of the decision making process at Greater Istanbul and District Municipalities was the elected council members of the municipalities. They are the politicians who make the final decision about all planning and regeneration projects at different levels of the state according to the type of decisions (see Chapter 6). Interviews with elected members are very important for this research, because the information they shared during the interviews reveals the relations between different scales of the state and reveals the locally-embedded relations in the decision making process.

The last group of respondents were the members of neighbourhood associations and dwellers in the case study neighbourhoods. This group provided a wider historical background for each neighbourhood, including how it is established, and how the ‘urban regeneration’ proceeds. They gave detailed information about the decisions made during the urban regeneration process on two bases: inward relations in the neighbourhood and in the neighbourhood organisations and outward relations with wider stakeholders of the process. Inward relations include self-government of neighbourhood associations, the engagement of dwellers with the neighbourhood associations and the activities of the neighbourhood organisations. The outward relations involve attacks by police, meetings with officials and council members and relations with other neighbourhoods which are subjected to urban regeneration process.

I had one interview with a former dweller of MESA houses in Derbent neighbourhood. These houses are a part of a gated community and have a negative effect on the recent regeneration process in the neighbourhood. An important incident happened between the dwellers of MESA houses and dwellers of Derbent in one of the attacks by the police force. This interviewee shared inside information about MESA house dwellers (see Chapter 7).
incident is a much contested subject and it was a good opportunity to listen the other side of the story.

Except for five, all of the interviews were recorded. Two of unrecorded interviews were with officials at district municipalities; one with the head officer of ‘urban regeneration’ at Greater Istanbul Municipality; one was with a dweller in one of the neighbourhoods; and one was with a former-dweller in the gated community near one of the case study neighbourhoods. Officials explained their refusal to be recorded in relation to their positions as a part of the state and they claimed (incorrectly) that it is not legal to give a recorded speech to a researcher. The dwellers who refused to be recorded were giving information about the historical background of the neighbourhoods, and felt recording might be ‘dangerous’ for them in the future.

5.6.3. Method III: Participant Observation
The aims of the participant observation technique enable the researcher to observe day-to-day activities (May, 2004; p. 148). This method was not easy to apply during the fieldwork, because the researcher needs to spend a great deal of time to secure and maintain relationships with people. However, it is a very productive method where the researcher can observe the relations between different actors (May, 2004; p. 154).

This method was used in all the possible chances of attendance at different forms of activities during the fieldwork. I have attended (see Appendix C):

- a symposium
- a press statement made by neighbourhood dwellers living in urban regeneration areas
• preliminary meetings of the European Social Forum, sessions on urban issues in the European Social Forum and neighbourhood visits of the European Social Forum
• a meeting of district municipality and Tozkoparan neighbourhood dwellers
• ENHR Conference in Istanbul
• weekly meetings of Association of Social Rights (political activist group)
• workshop organised by Association of Social Rights
• several meetings of Right to Housing Platform; meeting in Chamber of Architects.

The importance of participant observation for my research is that it allows observation of the relations between different actors in discussions where they legitimise their discourses or demand their rights. Attending these events allowed me to see the relations between different actors and their interactions, to hear the discussions on highly political issues, to observe and experience some of the political processes and conflicts at first hand. In particular, it gave a good insight into the ideas and concepts used by these actors. In this way, it was possible to identify the underlying tensions and conflicts embedded in the process of ‘urban regeneration’. It would not have been possible to gather this information by merely using documentary collection and interview methods.

Participant observations have some limitations to the nature of the method. Being a participant observer means that you do not have the right to participate in the discussions and you are known as a present researcher or an outsider in that meeting, and this might put constraints on others presence. I faced with these difficulties in two kinds of meetings: the meeting with the district municipality and Tozkoparan neighbourhood dwellers; and in a meeting of neighbourhood dwellers. In the former, it was stated by the district municipality members and politicians that people who are not living in the neighbourhood do not have the right to ask questions. They defined me and political activists as
‘outsiders’. In their speeches they claimed that even under the pressure of the presence of ‘outsiders’, they were openly answering the questions of the dwellers. Our presence created a threat and an insecure environment for the members of the municipality. In the other meeting, with neighbourhood dwellers, the difficulty was gaining the trust of all the dwellers. It took time for them to trust someone who does research on their daily lives, involving very sensitive issues, about their houses, their conflictual relation with a part of the state, and their possible eviction. In every meeting I attended, my contacts in that neighbourhood introduced me to the other dwellers again and again to make sure I was not seen as a threat.

The other difficulty with participant observation was gaining entrance to the meetings. This difficulty was not a crucial obstacle for me as a researcher, because I had secured and maintained relations with dwellers, academics working in these areas, members of chambers and political activists. I have been involved in the movement against urban regeneration since it has started in Turkey and I have connections in different groups, which positively helped me during the fieldwork where I need to access information or involve in a meeting.

Table 5.4: The Relations between Research Questions and Data Collection Techniques

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research Questions</th>
<th>Data Collection Techniques</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Documentary Collection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. How does political economy in Turkey and in Istanbul since the 1950s relate to housing strategies of the state spatially?</td>
<td>Official documents, policy documents, academic studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. How did the scalar nature of the state change in Turkey and in the three case study neighbourhoods? How do global and national scale projects for</td>
<td>Official documents, policy documents, press clippings, politician’s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Istanbul have impact on the housing of the poor and the rescaling of the state?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>How does state intervention into the housing of the poor subjected to urban regeneration projects vary between different neighbourhoods of Istanbul? What are the forms of state intervention in the three case study neighbourhoods? How do the means and forms of intervention vary between three neighbourhoods?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>What is the role of political resistance of the neighbourhoods in the changing forms and strategies of state intervention? In the case neighbourhoods, what is the role of the resistance of dwellers to the intervention of the state in the current and prospective housing policy for the poor?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 5.7. Analysis

The analysis of the data used in this research involves a complex and multi-staged process of relating the three methods. Most parts of the interviews were transcribed or taken notes from the voice-recordings. Concepts and the theoretical framework (see Chapter 2 and 3) were used to structure the data from documentary analysis, interview transcriptions and notes, and notes taken during the participation to several actions. The analysis of the research proceeded at different spatial and temporal scales. Firstly, a wider analysis of political and economic changes in Turkey since 1950s were analysed through
two methods of analysis: documentary analysis of official and policy documents, academic studies and analysis of interviews with academics. Secondly, an analysis of the ‘urban regeneration’ process in Istanbul after 2000 was analysed in terms of changing state interventions across the city and how they vary. This was done by analysing documents, including official and policy documents, press clippings and politician’s speeches; analysing interviews made with academics, professional chamber members, political group members, neighbourhood dwellers, elected council members and state officers at different scales of the state; analysing participant observations in meetings of local state authorities with dwellers, meetings at chambers, meetings of social and political groups. Thirdly, an analysis of three case study neighbourhoods covered: documents, including official and policy documents, press clippings and politician’s speeches; analysing interviews made with academics, professional chamber members, political group members, neighbourhood dwellers, elected council members and state officers at different scales of the state; analysing participant observations in meetings of local state authorities with dwellers, meetings at chambers, meetings of social and political groups.

The conceptual framework was separated into two main groups, the rescaling of the state and the interventions of the state, coming from the discussion in the theory (see Sections 3.3.4 and 3.5.3). This was easier to do for official documents and other documentary analysis; however, analysing interviews was the challenging part. Because, in the interviews I covered both the changing scales of the state and the different interventions of the state with all the interviewees. For example, a neighbourhood dweller is interviewed not only the process in his/her neighbourhood, but also the changing relations between dwellers and different scales of the state historically. So, all the interviewees in each neighbourhood and district are questioned to describe what happened historically, involving at least after 2000, in their particular neighbourhood in terms of different and changing roles of state scales, and different interventions.
of these scales to the neighbourhood. As the interviews followed the themes coming from the two theoretical basis of the research, each question on the same theme are classified and analysed together. Rather than analysing different interviews separately. Hence, each interview was not analysed as a single text, but as different parts of themes. For example, usage of democratic rights as a form of resistance in the neighbourhoods is analysed through the interviews done with dwellers, political groups, local state members, leaflets, newspaper clippings.

This structure of the research questions guides the structure of the analysis of the research, examined in the next section, and conclusions of the thesis. Chapter 6 and 7 show the findings of the fieldwork by focusing on the ‘rescaling of the state’ and the ‘selectivity of the state’. Chapter 8 presents the conclusions reached from the theoretical discussions and the fieldwork.
SECTION IV: INTERVENTIONS OF THE STATE TO THE HOUSING OF THE POOR IN ISTANBUL SINCE 2000

Introduction: Chapters 6 and 7

This section of the thesis investigates how the interventions of the state into the housing of the poor in the urban regeneration process in Istanbul since 2000 has diversified and changed. As shown in the theoretical argument, interventions by the state into different localities are analysed through both vertical relations - relations between different scales of the state (rescaling of the state) - and in horizontal practices - differentiated interventions by the state in different localities at the same time (see Chapter 3).

The restructuring of state interventions involving changing forms and strategies, is carried out the fundamental spatial restructuring experienced in Istanbul since 2000, when the country accelerated its integration into global capitalist dynamics. Pressures for such restructuring came from the state and capital in the form of large-scale urban investments, gentrification and urban regeneration projects. The background to this restructuring process can be understood in five main dynamics: the role of Istanbul as a supra-national regional economic centre; new laws on urbanisation; the change of scale in the management of Istanbul from city- to region-scale; restructuring of city centre; and ‘regeneration’ projects in neighbourhood level.

The first dynamic is Istanbul’s role as a supra-national regional economic centre serving to accelerate the country’s integration into global capitalism. Led by the national government, Istanbul is undergoing a period of restructuring with the aim of becoming a ‘global city’, a centre of high-level finance and business services, linking Turkey more strongly into the international (especially EU)
economy (Keyder, 2005; p. 128). The ‘global city’ project has been developing since the 1980s, and the 2001 crisis and recession had an important influence on the orientation of dominant sections of domestic capital to integration with international capital, especially financial capital. This process has accelerated since the Justice and Development Party (JDP) came into government in 2002.

Secondly, as a part of the process of integration into global capitalism, the JDP has made serious attempts to recompose class relations by passing new laws on urban policy (Gundogdu & Gough, 2008; p. 18). The process of EU integration and the prevention of earthquake risk in Istanbul accelerated the constitution of legal arrangements. The new regulations mostly were to regulate housing sector to demolish and build houses by considering the risk of earthquake. Since 2005, a large number of urban-dominated laws have been enacted or proposed. These include organisational restructuring and new roles for state institutions; economic concessions to individuals and investors; empowerment and disempowerment of state institutions at different scales and new tools for urban planning (e.g. urban regeneration, transformation, rehabilitation). Rather than being a technical or neutral process, the restructuring of laws is an intrinsic part of capitalist social relations. Despite the changes in the laws were contingent, they were also the responses by the state to the demands of capital and different classes. The changes in urban policy in Turkey since 2000, investigated in the following parts of this chapter, show us the restructuring of relations between the state, capital and dwellers.

The third dynamic is the shift away from city-scale concerns and towards a city-regional scale for the management of the city. The restructuring of the built environment is being organised by a newly-created city-region authority (Istanbul Metropolitan Planning Bureau) and by the national housing agency, the Mass Housing Administration (MHA), each having been granted stronger powers. The institutional restructuring of the state is exercised as the upward
rescaling of the state since 2000s, which will be investigated in the following parts of this chapter.

The fourth dynamic is the restructuring of the city centre. This project has adopted two essential aims: the decentralisation of manufacturing industries to the outer edges of the built-up area; and the regeneration of the inner city for finance and business services and up-market consumption and residential spaces. Current developments seek to remove industry, traditional low level services and low-income housing from the centre- and inner-city areas to the periphery, and to use the freed space to build offices for international business, luxury housing and consumer services. The political party in power, the Justice and Development Party (JDP), has seen the clearance of gecekondu settlements and dilapidated areas as an essential part of their urban policy and, additionally as an important element of integration into the EU and the global economy.

Lastly, integral to this programme are ‘regeneration’ projects organised by the MHA to redevelop low-income, high-density housing built in the inner city. These involve eviction and relocation of most of the residents to the periphery; they are offered subsidised purchase of affordable housing there, but most cannot afford this. Since 2004, ‘urban regeneration’ (UR) has become the main urban policy of the central and local state. The redevelopment process in the inner city is examined in the next chapter (Chapter 7).

The two Chapters in this Section are structured according to the theoretical claims of the research for revealing vertical and horizontal changes in state intervention in urban regeneration in Istanbul since 2000. Firstly, the rescaling of the state in the process of urban regeneration is investigated by analysing national, city scale and district scale state bodies of housing and regeneration, using documentary analysis, including legal and institutional changes, and drawing on semi-structured interviews with state personnel and elected
politicians. Secondly, the diversified forms and strategies of the state in urban regeneration in different localities is examined by analysing three case study neighbourhoods in Istanbul, using documentary analysis of plans at city and district scales; reports on urban regeneration; and semi-structured interviews with state personnel, elected politicians, case study neighbourhood dwellers, political groups; and participant observations in different meetings on urban regeneration in Istanbul.
CHAPTER 6: RESCALING OF THE STATE AS CHANGING CLASS RELATIONS SINCE 2000

The process of integration into global capitalism involved the restructuring of relations between the state, space and society in the form of rescaling the state. Rescaling is a changing process, examined in the following sections of this Chapter by investigating changing demographic characteristics and the political background since 2000. Integration into global capitalism is examined by focusing on the internationalisation of the construction sector. In the following sections, rescaling of the state is examined with a focus on the empowerment of regional and national scale institutions and changes in urban regeneration policy formation, and also construction sector is discussed.

6.1. Demographic Background: Turkey and Istanbul

Between 2000 and 2011, Turkey’s population increased from 67.8 million to 74.7 million and Istanbul’s population increased from 10 million to 14 million (TUIK, 2012): the total population of Turkey increased by 10%, and Istanbul’s population by 36%. According to the 2011 Address-Based Population Registration System (ABPRS) database, 18% of the total population of Turkey lives in Istanbul, the highest population of Turkey’s cities. Istanbul has almost three times the population of the second biggest city, Ankara (14.5 million), and four times the population of the third biggest city, Izmir (4 million).

6.2. Socio-Economic and Political Background

The Justice and Development Party’s (JDP) came to power in 2002 and mainly representing provincial small and medium capital in manufacturing, construction and commerce, with a strong orientation towards European Union (EU) and globalisation processes within a project of moderate political Islam.
The JDP has made urban redevelopment an essential part of Turkey’s integration into the EU and the global economy and additionally sees it as a way of increasing the domestic construction sector (Gundogdu & Gough, 2008; p. 18).

In 2002, the JDP was a new party attempting to gain acceptance, both by global powers (e.g. EU and USA) and by fractions of domestic capital. This involved the implementation of neoliberal policies, privatisation, and disciplining the working class by creating conservative socio-economic relations and oppression. The JDP attempted to recompose class relations in accordance with global capitalism by making new laws which involved with an emphasis on urban restructuring. Istanbul has been apparently conceived by Turkish capital and state, as well as international capital (as reflected in OECD’s recent report on Istanbul (OECD, 2008)), as a supra-national regional economic centre, serving to accelerate its integration to global capitalism, becoming a financial hub of the Middle East, and linking Central Asia and the Middle East to Europe.

The period of integration to global capitalist dynamics commenced with an economic crisis and recession in 2001, leading to restructuring of relations among fractions of capital and relations between capital, state and society. Some of the big corporations closed down, and some of them contracted, but others were able to expand. From 1995 to the middle of 2000, the rapid international expansion of capital in trading, finance and production both weakened workers’ power in relation to capital and reinforced big capital at the expense of small capital.

The response to the 2001 crisis was an international expansion of Turkish productive capital that had never been experienced before. However, internationalisation of commodity and money capital also continued in this period. The amount of capital inflow and outflow rose sharply in the 2000s. The
Restructuring of legislation in Turkey and also changes to the Constitution since 1999 and the enactment of the International Arbitration Law in 2001 had an effect on the inflow of international capital, which doubled every year in 2000 and 2001, and also added the half of the total amount of last twenty years between 2000 and 2001 (Ozturk, 2011; p. 170). According to Undersecretariat of Treasury figures, foreign capital inflow between 1980 and 1989 was $1.8 billion, between 1990 and 1999 was $8.4 billion (Hazine, 2003; p. 45) and between 2000 and 2004 was $8.3 billion (Hazine, 2005; p. 10). In 2001, after the economic crisis, foreign direct investment (FDI) declined for a short period of time; however it rapidly increased again in the following years.

The legislative change, which was Foreign Direct Investment Law, passed in 2003 allowed firstly, foreign investment companies and of their branches to establish themselves Turkey; and secondly, enabled foreign nationals to purchase real estate in Turkey. Both of these changes were influential in the rapid growth of foreign direct investment (Ozturk, 2011; p. 170-1). Total foreign direct investment, including real estate investments, doubled in 2006 and continued in the following three years at the same pace, fell by more than half in 2009-2010 and almost doubled again in 2011 (see Table.6.1).

Table 6.1: Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Turkey between 1995 and 2011

Source: Foreign Direct Investment Report of Turkey (Hazine, 2012; p. 8).
At the end of 2011, the preliminary FDI stock value in Turkey was $140 billion and 29,283 companies with international capital partners. FDI inflow to the industrial sector was 49% and to the service sector was 51% of the total inflow in 2011. The finance sector accounted for 38% and the energy sector for 27% of total inflow in the primary sectors in 2011 (YASED, 2012; p. 2) (see Table 6.2). Foreign direct investment in the service and finance sectors increased during 2011 as an important part of integration to global capitalism.

Table 6.2: Sectoral Breakdown of FDI Inflows to Turkey (2007-2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sectors ($ Million)</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2007-2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>5116</td>
<td>5174</td>
<td>3780</td>
<td>2861</td>
<td>7771</td>
<td>24,702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity, Gas, Water Mining</td>
<td>568</td>
<td>1053</td>
<td>2076</td>
<td>1817</td>
<td>4259</td>
<td>9,773</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>4211</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>1615</td>
<td>905</td>
<td>3364</td>
<td>14,065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>14,012</td>
<td>9,532</td>
<td>2,423</td>
<td>3,295</td>
<td>8,085</td>
<td>37,347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>11,662</td>
<td>6,069</td>
<td>666</td>
<td>1,584</td>
<td>6,031</td>
<td>26,012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Estate Agency Services</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>641</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>578</td>
<td>2,751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale and Retail Trade</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>2,085</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>3,587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>1,456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation, Warehousing and Communication</td>
<td>1,117</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>2,129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Services</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>11,412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Inflows</td>
<td>19,137</td>
<td>14,747</td>
<td>6,252</td>
<td>6,238</td>
<td>15,887</td>
<td>62,261</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: FDI 2011 Year-End Evaluation Report, (YASED, 2012; p. 2)
It was not only FDI that experienced increased capital inflow - the total capital flow also increased to $55-56 billion in 2006 and 2007 from $40 billion in 2005, $23 billion in 2004 and $10 billion in 2003 and 2002. The total foreign debt also increased rapidly, doubling in the same period from $120 billion in 2000 to $240 billion in 2007. At the end of first six months of 2008, Turkey’s total foreign debt increased to $284 billion, of which two thirds of this amount was private sector debt (Ozturk, 2011; p. 171). In brief, both foreign debt and foreign investment, especially in the form of FDI, rapidly increased in this period. Between 2003 and 2008, real estate purchase increased to $13 billion, and privatisation rates to $14 billion (between 2000 and 2008), which made a significant contribution to the increase in foreign debt and investment (Ozturk, 2011; p. 171).

In addition to the boost in capital inflow, outward flow also increased after 2000, and especially after 2004. While in the period between 1979 and 2000, outward capital flow was amounted to $3.7 billion, it rose to three times this between 2001 and 2008 to $14.7 billion (Ozturk, 2011; p. 172).

In this period, FDI increased as it had never increased before, but also the total capital flows accelerated its increase at the same time. This period was the starting of accelerated integration to global capitalist dynamics, which had a significant effect on the construction sector and also on the pressures of capital on the state.

6.3. The Dynamics of the Capital Accumulation Process: Internationalisation of the Construction Sector

There are two main components of the period between 2000 and 2011: firstly, the housing sector was almost totally left to the private sector; and secondly, the internationalisation of the construction sector proceeded rapidly. In the 9th
Economic Development Plan of Turkey, covering 2007 to 2013, housing is not discussed as a separate section, as it is had been previously, but rather it is considered as a part of the Construction Sector and Contracting Services (Basbakanlik Devlet Planlama Teskilati Mustesarligi, 2007). This indicates the state’s changing understanding of housing as a subject of private sector profit, rather than a public sector duty. Even the national housing authorities, such as the MHA and municipality firms, now mainly produce housing via partnerships with private construction companies or by giving contracts directly to private companies.

The internationalisation of the Turkish construction sector began in the 1970s (see Chapter 4) in the Middle East and in the following years it expanded both geographically and in number. The Turkish-owned construction sector, which is active both in the EU and Turkish public tenders, and specifically in the construction of factories and energy facilities, is composed of different fractions of capital.

(i) Holding companies, investors or firms, gaining internationalised and large scale international works;

(ii) growing holding companies that are not powerful enough to compete with other companies at an international level. Because of that they get small scale international works or are involved in projects as subcontractors;

(iii) middle-scale capital, which survives via national scale bids,

(iv) small-scale local companies, which gain contracts through price cutting techniques in small-scale local bids (Guloksuz, 2009; p. 160).

By 2001, Turkish companies had completed more than 6000 contracts worth more than $200 billion in 90 different countries (Yilmaz, 2011; p. 25). The total amount of construction business abroad between 1972 and 2002 was $44
billion; between 2002 and 2010 it was $146 billion. That is, in the eight year period between 2002 and 2010, the value of foreign construction by Turkish companies increased by three times the amount of the previous 30 years. (Caglayan, 2011; p. 21). The interest of foreign companies in domestic construction companies were also striking in the rising level of activity from $1.7 billion in 2002 to $10 billion in 2005 and then to $20 billion in 2007 (Ozturk, 2011; p. 181), which almost doubled in three years. In the list of big construction companies in the world in 2010, Turkey has the second highest number of companies with 33 holding companies, after China (Ozturk, 2011; p. 166).

The increasing internationalisation of the infrastructure sector (e.g. construction, transportation, communication) continued rapidly after 2000. Between 2008 and 2011, the infrastructure sector saw a 95% increase in the establishment of construction firms: in 2008, 7035 firms were active and this number rose to 13,733 in 2011 (Kurtulus, Purkis, & Aladag, 2012; p. 178).

The number of international construction companies based in Turkey increased from 1991 in 2006 to 2778 in 2011, and international capital-based rental property and business operations have increased from 1684 to 4719 in the same period. Twenty-five per cent of all international businesses operating in Turkey are in the construction and real estate sectors, and 57% of international business companies are based in Istanbul (Kurtulus, et al., 2012; p. 179). Changes to the Constitution and the enactment of the International Arbitration Law have facilitated the integration of global capital in Turkey and also enabled the expansion of Turkish construction companies in Arab countries. The holding construction company leaders in Turkey declared their support for laws that opens cooperation with foreign companies (Ilhan, 25.05.2012). The Chair of the Executive Board of Varyap Varlibas Construction Company, Suleyman Varlibas, stated that they had offers to create partnerships for new and existing
construction projects, mainly from Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait. In a
daily newspaper piece, on the interest of foreign companies in Turkish construction
companies, Varlibas is quoted as saying that:

There were demands from investors abroad to invest in Turkey. There have such demands for a while but they increased after
the enactment of the new laws which allowed inward investment. Now our dialogues with those investors continue. Moreover, real estate companies across the world admire us. They want to realise construction projects in their own or other
countries with our collaboration (Ilhan, 25.05.2012).

Serdar Inan, Chair of Executive Board of the Inanlar Construction Group, also emphasised the increasing interest of foreign companies in Turkey since 2005, and the interest during 2012 (see below). According to him, the new law, with
its emphasis on urban regeneration, permission for foreigners to purchase real
estate (not previously possible), and permission to build on degraded forest
land, had a very positive effect on the increase in foreign investment (Ilhan, 25.05.2012). In the same newspaper article, Inan agrees with this assessment.

This rise in interest comes from the image created by the enactment of new laws, the development of Turkey, the ‘Arab
Spring’ and the economic crisis in the West. The mobilisation of
construction and real estate since 2005 in Turkey, had a peak
this year [2012]. I have at least one or two meetings in a week
with foreign companies and investors. Seventy per cent of them are from Dubai and Qatar and the rest of the Arab world. If I responded to all these requests for meetings, I would not be able to do any other work (Ilhan, 25.05.2012).

Mehmet Even, the Deputy Chairman of another of the biggest construction
companies in Turkey, the Zorlu Real Estate Company similarly endorsed the
significance of the internationalisation of the Turkish construction industry.

We have had invitations from 14 countries, including USA,
Russia, England, Germany, Spain, Portugal, Azerbaijan, the
Balkan, Middle East and North Africa countries, to develop projects together, to form partnerships and ownership agreements for operation of facilities, asset management and finance. In addition to that, there are many firms who are interested in the residential, hotel, shopping mall, art centres and office building operations of the Zorlu Company (Ilhan, 25.05.2012).

Also a member of Board of the Dumankaya Company, Ali Dumankaya in the same article said that:

The scale of partnerships with foreign companies has risen and we are also having meetings for international partnerships with different companies. We need to create foreign partnerships especially in urban regeneration, because it is going to be inevitable and also useful to get involved in urban regeneration projects in the future (Ilhan, 25.05.2012).

The expansion and increase of the construction sector internationally and domestically was a response to the economic crisis affecting the USA and Europe. Considered historically, it can be seen that both in the time of an economic crisis and also in the time of expansion after a crisis, excessive accumulation of capital is transferred to spatial investment flows via financial institutions giving credit to investors and individuals. Turkey, being a ‘late developing’ country becoming integrated into global capitalism, attracts investors because of its highly profitable returns on investment. Investment in Istanbul has the potential to produce more profit than other cities of the country because of expanding financial sector activities and investments, its valuable lands in the city centre and its role as ‘the global city’ of Middle East Region.

The rise in the construction sector and the interest of foreign companies in the Turkish construction market and the willingness of domestic construction companies to cooperate with them brought pressure on the state to make
changes in urban policy and housing finance and institutions. These are examined in the next section.

6.4. **Radical Changes in Urban Policy and State Housing Finance and Planning Institutions**

The interest of capital in urban space has been gradually growing in Turkey, and in Istanbul particularly over the last decade, with a special emphasis on ‘urban regeneration’. In different forms, ‘urban regeneration’ has dominated urban restructuring in Turkey since 2000. Regeneration is considered as an unavoidable transformation of urban space and is justified by the need to take precautions against earthquake risk in Istanbul. The numerous rapid changes in laws enabling redevelopment are, for the most part, attributed to a technical process and descriptive analysis of legal changes without analysing the changing relations between the state, capital and the residents. However, changing the law reveals the tensions, conflicts and congruencies among different developers, different classes, between the state, developers and dwellers.

This research examines the new laws, changes in the existing laws, and ‘sack laws’. ‘Sack laws’ are a technique, widely used during the last decade, to make changes in only some of the articles of existing laws, and to change and merge different articles of separate laws into a single new law. In a sack law, it is possible to find an article on changes in planning regulations and changes in education regulations. This type of law creates a complex clash of different interest groups in one law, which causes negotiations between conflicting groups and weakens the opposition of a law influentially.

The following section, investigates firstly, the empowerment of the MHA at the national level with newly-granted planning powers and the transfer of large amounts of land owned by different institutions of the state to the MHA. Secondly, the changing roles of institutions at the city scale are examined.
Lastly, the new function of ‘urban regeneration’ projects as a form of spatial intervention by the state at neighbourhood level is examined to clarify the process in the case study neighbourhoods to be analysed in the next Chapter.

### 6.4.1. The Changing Role of the MHA at the National Scale

The first institutional change in relation to the housing of the poor and the rise of construction sector was the restructuring of the MHA in 2003. The role given to the MHA was to consolidate the politicised process of urban regeneration projects. This role was given to a central state body, since the Greater and District Municipalities were limited financially, politically and administratively to be able to undertake the scale of spatial restructurings projected. The MHA was therefore reinvigorated as a powerful operator in urban regeneration process, solving the legal and bureaucratic ‘obstacles’ for investors, giving financial and technical support to the municipalities, and organising resident relocations resulting from regeneration projects, and weakening possible civil resistance by both subtle and brutal methods. Within this framework, in recent years the MHA has initiated various urban regeneration projects, most of which have been located in Istanbul.

According to law, ‘urban regeneration’ projects can be implemented in four different types of areas: gecekondu settlements; gecekondu prevention areas; historical and dilapidated areas; and any other areas designated. The new laws show that every part of any locality can be a part of urban regeneration process: however, the priority of urban regeneration projects is gecekondu settlements and historical areas. The regeneration projects target all gecekondu settlements in Turkey, but prioritise those in Istanbul. The former head of the MHA declared on different occasions (Bayraktar, 2010) that a more comprehensive attack on the gecekondu areas of Istanbul would start with the introduction of a specific law for urban regeneration, which would give extra-ordinary power to the
national state to initiate regeneration projects without the need for conformity to the city plans.

Until the 2000s, the MHA provided cheap credit for approximately one million housing units, of which 85% were cooperatives, and constructed nearly 45,000 units on its own land in the large cities of Turkey. However, the main aim of the MHA - providing housing for the low and middle income people - has not been met, due to spending the credit on the production of middle- and upper-class housing (AGFE, 2009), rather than supplying affordable and cheap housing for the poor.

Since 2003, urban regeneration has become the main urban policy and the MHA the central state institution of planning. In contrast with the former period of urbanisation between 1950 and 2000 in Turkey, the JDP government gave all the authority for regeneration and all other planning powers to the MHA by transferring power from, and overriding, the municipalities (Celik, 2011; p. 491-3). The power of the MHA has been expanded by many far-reaching legal and institutional reforms:

(i) Firstly, the MHA has been given powers to establish its own companies, undertaking partnerships with existing private companies in and outside the country; providing credit and land; and/or directly undertaking regeneration projects (Law Number 4966, 2003).

(ii) Secondly, the MHA has been granted power to carry out profit-oriented projects in partnership with private companies, mostly on state-owned lands on a revenue sharing model. The MHA produces luxury housing, the profits from which can cross-subsidise affordable housing projects (Law Number 4966, 2003).
(iii) Thirdly, all the duties and powers of the national Urban Land Office have been transferred to MHA, with its land stock, which expanded the land stock of the MHA from 16.5 million m² to 194 million m², at no cost to the MHA (Law Number 5273, 2004).

(iv) Fourthly, the MHA has gained urban planning powers for the first time since its establishment. It gained the power of making plans at all scales: urban regeneration projects in gecekondu settlements (Law Number 5162, 2004); in historical areas, and dilapidated inner city zones (Law Number 5366, 2005); planning of all state-owned lands (Law Number 5018, 2009); and has taken all the planning duties of Ministry of Public Works and Settlement (Law Number 5069, 2007).

The MHA has become the only central state institution with extraordinary powers to restructure the relationship between the state, space and urban policy through its housing policies (Celik, 2011). Its powers expanded in scope and content to include, as well as housing, the building of schools, hospitals, dormitories, sport centres, social and cultural facilities, police stations and military facilities. Therefore, the completed and on-going MHA projects constitute an important part of the recent urbanisation process in general, and urban regeneration projects in particular. Since 2002, the MHA has produced approximately 500,000 housing units, has started 248 urban regeneration projects, met 5-10% of urgent housing need, and is planning to produce 500 thousand more housing units. Of total housing production, 17% is luxury-housing units; the rest is affordable housing. 15% of affordable housing is for dwellers in urban regeneration areas, the rest of affordable housing units are for low- and middle-income people (MHA, 2010; p. 4).

The MHA projects are implemented via partnerships on a revenue-sharing model, whereby the MHA provides the land, infrastructure and planning rights,
and private contractors share a certain portion of the profit with the MHA. The MHA owns the potential high-rent and valuable state-owned lands in the city centre and outer city by giving unusual planning rights to them. The former head of the MHA clarifies the aims of the MHA in his declaration in 2004 that:

The real estate associations may be interested in urban regeneration projects to develop new projects on state-owned lands, areas with high risk of earthquake and in informal housing areas and one of the main issues. In this way, urban regeneration projects will be realised and with development by the association of real estate companies, a wider range of people (investors and construction companies) would benefit from the incomes coming from the projects. Because of that, real estate associations’ collaboration with local governments, with public sector and with the MHA is a vital importance and inevitable (Bayraktar, 2004).

This model is implemented in districts like Atasehir (My World), Bakirkoy (Novus Residence), Buyukcekmece (Kentplus), Halkali (Soyak-Olimpiakent, Avrupa Konutlari), Ikitelli (missistanbul), Bahcesehir (Manolya Evleri), Ayazma (My World Europe), in which all the development sites are given English names for marketing purposes, and so on (see Map 6.1), where real estate prices have been escalating in the recent years, ranging from £ 150,000 to £ 1 million (KentPlus, 2011; Novus, 2011). This method of luxury housing production by the MHA illustrates, firstly, a huge transfer of state-owned land to private developers, and secondly, the changes in the MHA’s role from a housing finance institution to a planning authority. The role of the MHA is unique in Turkey in this process in that it supplies the land, resolving the major difficulty capital has in acquiring such valuable lands, and eliminates bureaucratic obstacles, from the planning process to the provision of infrastructure, and also plays a financial guarantor role for the construction company until all the housing units are sold. Hence, the MHA plays a facilitator role for private investors for the investment of large-scale capital in urban land.
Nevertheless, large-scale construction companies and real estate investment trusts are not satisfied with the powers of the MHA, and are still demanding a reduction in the bureaucracy of planning, and for more power to be given to a centralised planning authority equipped with a guarantor role in the construction process. The guarantor role of the state in the urban regeneration process is seen as necessary to reduce risks for investors (Gyoder, 2007, 2008). The final declaration of Real Estate Summit (2008), organised by the association of Real Estate Companies in Turkey, states that:

The MHA should take a more active leader role in the making of sustainable and manageable real estate politics, incentives and strategies at central and local scales in Turkey. In order to meet the need for legal housing for lower and middle income households in our country, the MHA should be in a leading position in the sector, giving credit to developers and consumers, and concentrating on the finance of construction,
rather than taking an active role in construction of houses (Gyoder, 2008).

The centralisation of planning powers in one institution is also supported by the MHA itself. In an interview I conducted with a highly-placed representative of the Istanbul Branch of the MHA, said that

The reason the MHA wanted to take planning powers is that there is real [problem with] bureaucracy in Turkey. When you go to the Greater Municipalities for planning permission, the process gets longer and longer. You could have produced as many housing units in the time you have to wait for planning permission. And in fact, the MHA asked for planning powers in order to bypass these long bureaucratic processes. Of course, the MHA still submits its plans to the Greater Municipality but they do not need approval: the plans are just checked for consistency with other plans. In 2004, the MHA gained all the planning powers: planning powers of related Ministries, and became the only actor in power for gecekondu areas. This allowed different aspects of planning to be run under one institution. When you control all the planning powers from one institution, the process become faster and more effective than it used to be (Official from MHA, Interview, 03.11.2010).

The leading role of the MHA facilitates the primacy of large-scale real estate companies (Agaoglu, Varyap, Tasyapi, Intes, Soyak, etc.) in urban regeneration. This leads to the disappearance of small- and middle-scale construction firms to disappear unless they become subcontractors (Yasar, 22.02.2011). The changing role of the institutions at the city and district scale had a significant role in the inclusion of small- and middle-scale construction firms that is examined in the next section.

6.4.2. The Changing Role of Institutions at the City and District Scale
There have been institutional changes in the city-scale planning institutions since the MHA gained new planning powers. As the national scale planning
authority has gained extensive powers, the city-scale planning authorities in Istanbul - the Greater Istanbul Municipality (GIM), Istanbul Metropolitan Planning Bureau (IMP) and District Municipalities - have experienced alterations in their planning powers as urban regeneration projects became the main policy for redevelopment of dilapidated neighbourhoods and gecekondu settlements.

Before this, the institutional framework of city-scale planning in Istanbul was under the control of the GIM at the metropolitan level and under the control of district municipalities at the district level. The GIM and the district municipalities - 73 in total in Istanbul - are composed of locally-elected council members from different political parties and a mayor leading the council during every election period of five years. The planning powers of the GIM and the district level were assigned according to the scale of the municipalities. While the GIM was responsible from the macro-scale plans, district municipalities were responsible for making district level plans at a micro-scale under the principle of decisions of the Greater Municipality. District municipalities were able to offer their comments on the macro-scale planning processes and to cooperate with other district municipalities in the preparation of metropolitan plans. After the preparation of the plans at the district level, they were submitted to the Greater Municipality for approval. In this way, the planning process was centrally run at the city-level.

However in 2004, planning became more centralised, with the establishment of the Istanbul Metropolitan Planning Bureau. The IMP was founded as a firm of the GIM having the responsibility of making the large-scale city-region plan, creating the ‘spatial constitution’ of the Istanbul city-region. The aim of its foundation was to establish regional planning the whole region of Istanbul by gathering together all the stakeholders (universities, professional chambers, representatives of ministries and district municipalities, NGOs, construction companies and developers). The plan was prepared by different fifteen working
groups with more than 300 people. The IMP has strategic planning powers that
override the district municipalities, and is differentiated from traditional
municipal bureaucracy in relation to partnerships with investors aimed in order
to make ‘the spatial constitution’ of Istanbul at city-region level. The plan
prepared by the IMP defined the new role of the city in its region as being to
foster integration with global capitalist dynamics. This role was mainly reified
under the conceptual framework of ‘being a global city’: this includes furthering
the deindustrialisation of the city centre and dispersing manufacturing to the
outer peripheries of the city in its region, while enhancing the service sector in
the city centre.

A 1/100,000 scale macro-plan was produced in partnership with academics and
with the active involvement of international agents, big real estate companies,
business, industrial capital and some NGOs. It has adopted two essential aims:
the decentralisation of manufacturing industries towards outer edges of the
built-up area; and the transformation of the inner city for finance and business
services and up-market consumption and residential spaces. As these are
achieved, the IMP claims, Istanbul is to be adapted to the dynamics of global
system, to become a competitive city among other global cities, and to enhance
its cultural and spatial attractiveness for tourists (IMP, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c).
For this spatial restructuring, large-scale urban (re)development investments
like seaports, trade and business centres, and urban regeneration projects in
inner city areas are proposed as the main urban policies. One of the projects
was to turn Kartal District in the Anatolian side of Istanbul close to Maltepe
District, where one of the case study neighbourhoods (Basibuyuk) located, into
the new trade and business centre of Istanbul in order to reduce the intensity of
activity in the CBD on the European side of Istanbul (see Chapter 7, Section
7.3.2). This project involves a cruise port and a trade port to transfer goods and
services to wider city-region and abroad. This indicates significant changes both
in the policymaking process in favour of developers, and the spatial distribution
of social classes at the expense of urban poor. This whole process was to be realised through ‘urban regeneration projects’ as a form of planning policy. As the IMP implemented the plan, the duties of the institution were terminated. The IMP was wound up and disbanded once the plan was implemented. The decisions made at the city-region scale by the IMP were assigned to the GIM to prepare city-scale plans.

The role of the GIM was to prepare large-scale plans according to the macro-scale plan of the IMP by setting annual goals and investment programmes, district municipalities had to prepare micro-scale plans, but also had more locally dependent responsibilities, and regulatory procedures; collecting solid waste; inspecting for health hazards and public safety; building car parks and recreational areas; building and maintaining secondary and local urban roads; building and maintaining facilities for health, education and culture; protecting cultural, natural and historical assets; offering social and cultural services for the elderly, women, children and disable; providing burial services; and offering training for skills and trades.

While the responsibilities and duties of greater and district municipalities remained the same, their planning powers changed after 2004. The institutional and legislative alterations to the planning powers of local institutions were due to the national state’s approach to moving the whole planning system towards an ‘urban regeneration’ focus. This shifted power to national scale institutions and weakened the role of the local state and reduced the ability of dwellers to participate in the planning process. The main change towards upward scaling of planning powers was the empowerment of the national-state authority of housing and planning, the MHA, which was investigated in the previous section (see Section 6.4.1).
As a part of the GIM’s role in the redevelopment of the city, one of the other publicly-owned companies of the municipality, called Kiptas, was developed with the aim of creating partnerships with developers in construction sector. Kiptas was established in 1987 but it was inactive after 1995 until it was revived with a new role in 2000. The main role of Kiptas is to produce a solution for unplanned developments and prevention of gecekondu production in Istanbul. Kiptas opens bids for construction companies and provides land, finance and the control of the regeneration of run down areas and new development sites in the construction process. It has become an important actor in the construction sector since 2000 and has constructed 50,000 housing units in Istanbul. It also goes into partnerships with the MHA in urban regeneration, most recently in Karanfilkoy, Zeytinburnu and Suleymanie. Kiptas is a locally-embedded model of the MHA, but it does not have the planning powers of the MHA. The respondent from Kiptas explains their involvement in the urban regeneration process as an unavoidable method: ‘There is no more vacant land in Istanbul to produce housing. Compulsorily, we need to make urban regeneration’ (Official from Kiptas, Interview, 15.10.2010).

As the urban planning process has become centralised, greater and district municipalities did not have the power to produce responses to the demands coming from the politicised neighbourhoods subjected to urban regeneration projects and to the demands of locally embedded developers. But at the same time, the central housing authority, the MHA, was not able to produce locally responsive solutions. In 2010, planning powers in the ‘urban regeneration areas’ was also given to greater municipalities by a change in Article 73 in the Municipality Law (Law No. 5998, 2010), which will be examined in the next section. The ‘urban regeneration’ projects were evident in the neighbourhood scale and these will also be examined in the next section.
6.4.3. ‘Urban Regeneration’ Projects as a Form of Spatial Intervention by the State at the Neighbourhood Scale

The MHA has been able to undertake urban regeneration projects since 2004, and has the added power of ‘providing finance for development and rehabilitation of gecekondu lands’ through its role in financing housing. Following this aim, the MHA has started ‘re-planning’ gecekondu settlements by implementing ‘urban regeneration projects’. Urban regeneration is defined as a central state policy and includes the local state and various actors in the housing market. The process of urban regeneration starts with an offer from a district municipality to the MHA to rebuild one of the neighbourhoods in the territory of a district municipality, including in some districts, offering collaboration and support for the MHA’s projects. In some localities, district municipalities run urban regeneration projects without the involvement of the MHA, in some localities the MHA and the district municipality run the project jointly, and in some of them, the MHA, district and greater municipality work together. The protocols between the MHA, district and greater municipality do not have a stable character, but vary whenever a new law is enacted. If the MHA or greater municipality is involved in the regeneration of one locality, then two- (MHA, district municipality) or three-actor (including Greater Municipality) based protocols are drawn up: the district municipality then starts research in the area in collaboration with a private company. For example, in the case of the Tozkoparan Neighbourhood, an engineering and planning company carried out the analysis of the social and spatial structure of the area, and gathered information on ownership, earthquake risk, and the durability of housing (Official, Tozkoparan (05), Interview, 17.01.2011). The protocol defines the responsibilities of the district municipality for researching the area and collecting information about ownership conditions. The district is also responsible for all technical processes in preparing the land for the project and for supplying the infrastructure. Then the MHA and the district municipality decide the rate of compensation. The different types of collaboration models
followed by the MHA and different strategies used in different localities are analysed in the following Chapter (Chapter 7) by investigating three case study neighbourhoods in detail.

In the second part of the redevelopment process, district municipalities are obliged to find provisional alternative housing for people in a different place other than the neighbourhood, and all the land is assigned to the MHA at no cost. Lastly, the MHA puts out a tender for the construction of the project and undertakes to act as the guarantor of the construction process. The guarantor role of the MHA in terms of providing cheap credits, cheap land and the guaranteeing continuation of the construction, continues until the sale of the all houses finish. The MHA offers new houses in the peripheries of the city to the people considered to have the right to be rehoused. It is possible for them to buy a new house in the reconstructed areas where they used to live, but people living in such areas are low-income households, who cannot afford the high costs of new houses. The down-payments, which range approximately from £3000 to £5000, are a huge amount of money for low-income households, and since they do not have regular incomes, meeting instalment payments would also be beyond their means. It is because the initial target of urban regeneration projects is to rebuild gecekondu settlements, gecekondu prevention areas and dilapidated and historical areas. They are forced to move to the peripheries of the cities, either to the housing offered by the MHA or even further out to where they can find cheaper houses to rent or to buy. Approximately 2 million people in total are now subjected to relocation in Istanbul (Bayraktar, 2010).

These regeneration projects are different from earlier programmes for the improvement or demolition of gecekondu housing units. In previous periods, demolition or renovation was limited to individual houses, but recent urban regeneration projects provided for the demolitions of whole neighbourhoods in
order to acquire large sites of land for private developers. For example, in an interview a consultant from the Association of Shopping Malls said:

A shopping mall needs at least 5000 m², which means a large piece of land. The MHA and the municipality planned Tarlabasi as an area where shopping mall developers can invest, but the project stopped, because the retailing sector do not want to create public opposition to their investments (Consultant for Shopping Malls, Interview, 19.10.2010).

The need for large sites in the city centre has changed the strategies of the state in dealing with gecekondu settlements. It is not individual houses or households that are targeted anymore but whole neighbourhoods of gecekondu settlements or dilapidated housing areas. The intervention by the state into housing the poor has directly targeted whole areas without allowing the dwellers the right to remain in their neighbourhoods. The former head of the MHA declared that the future for gecekondu settlement areas was driven by the need to regenerate whole neighbourhoods for large-scale urban projects:

In MHA programmes, particular importance is placed on gecekondu regeneration projects. By regenerating gecekondu neighbourhoods, it is going to be possible to improve informal settlements, and also at the same time, by producing new and planned urban land, it is possible to develop the valuable lands in the city centre for private projects to increase the prestige of the city. This also provides improved and planned housing in other parts of the city for the previous dwellers of those areas (Bayraktar, 2004).

This comment clearly illustrates that the main aim of regeneration projects is the clearing (or ‘cleansing’) of large areas of valuable land in the city centre.

However, the comprehensive nature of regeneration in Istanbul was met by organised resistance by neighbourhood dwellers, professional chambers of planners and architects, political groups and parties, radical left groups and
activists, both local and international. This section examined the changing role of different scales of the state in terms of changing planning powers. In the next section, rescaling of the state in Istanbul since 2000 is theorised through complex interdependencies of actors at different scales, shifting scale to national, and shifting scale to local as moments of class struggle.

6.5. Rescaling as an Arena of Class Struggle: The Changing Role of Mass Housing Administration

The previous sections sought to give a preliminary explanation of state’s rescaling. In this section, the focus is on the relations of capital flows into the built environment and the relationship between capitals (corporation) and the state. These relations substantially abstract from the question of class struggle.

The increasing interest in investment in Istanbul led to a rescaling of the state in Turkey, shifting scale from local to the national and from national to the local levels, involving radical changes in urban policy and institutional organisation and functions since the 2000s. The interests of different investors, including conflicts of competition among them and congruence of collaboration between them, necessitates different scalar relations, both in the form of upward and downward scaling of political-economic processes. However, demands are not only shaped according to the interests of different investors, but it is also shaped via the contradictions of capitalist production and by pressures from different interests, including those affected and the working class. The changing role of the MHA was at the centre of the rescaling of the Turkish state as class politics over the spatial form of integration into the global capitalist economy.

Rescaling of political-economic processes is a constitutive element of class power, and not only an expression of it (Gough, 2004; p. 185). In this process, the state attempts to respond the demands from different capital groups and conflicts among capital groups, and also conflicts among different classes,
including the demands of the working class. One of the state’s responses is through the changing and continuous rescaling the state itself (see Chapter 3 and Chapter 7).

In the following sections of this chapter, the restructuring of the state in Turkey since 2000 is analysed in terms of changing scalar relations in the process of urban regeneration. The rise of the construction and real estate sectors and their internationalisation is a constitutive part of rescaling of these political-economic processes. Demands from foreign developers to invest in the real estate sector, especially in Istanbul, and to create partnerships with domestic construction firms in Turkey, have changed scalar relations of the state upwardly. However, the increasing demand by developers for land created by urban regeneration projects threatens existing users and dwellers in city centre neighbourhoods, creating local resistance against the projects inducing downward rescaling of the state. In the next sections, radical changes in urban policy and relevant institutions are theorised in the framework of the theoretical discussions in Chapter 3 in order to reveal changing scalar relations since 2000 in Istanbul.

6.5.1. Complex interdependencies of actors in urban space

Urban planning activity proceeds at various scales - local, national, international - and actors at various levels: state bureaucrats; elected member of municipalities at different scales; investors; and urban dwellers and activists. As Cox (1998; p. 2) puts it, it is necessary to identify the ‘networks of associations in understanding the politics of space’. The politics of scale is not limited to the jurisdictions of state agencies or in geographical terms, but rather involves how the connections between different political scales, such as ‘local politics within the territorial bounds of local governments’ (Cox, 1998; p. 2) or ‘national politics within those of the nation state’ (Cox, 1998; p. 2) engage with each other. Networks of association involve different scales of the state, urban dwellers,
political activists, political parties or labour unions (Cox, 1998; p. 3). In the case of the urban regeneration process in Istanbul as a spatial form of urban politics, the network of association is composed of the MHA; the Istanbul Greater Municipality (elected and non-elected members); district municipalities (elected and non-elected members); neighbourhood dwellers in urban regeneration areas; activists against urban regeneration; political parties; professional chambers; and developers.

The complex relations between different actors in urban regeneration projects in Istanbul and the dynamics behind the constitution of their networks can be analysed in two ways: congruence and competition between different fractions of capital and conflicts between different scales of state action.

(i) Congruence and competition between different fractions of capital

In the urban regeneration of Istanbul, different construction companies compete amongst themselves to influence changes to the legal frameworks for urban regeneration and in changing the forms of housing finance and planning institutions. This argument has two underpinnings: firstly, construction companies sharing the ideologies of the JDP, were granted tenders by the MHA. But the selection process for awarding these contracts exposes the companies’ relations with the JDP, and is questioned by other construction companies. The Head of the Association of Contractors, Erdal Eren, complains that:

From our own sources of information, we have learnt that a huge construction has started on the way to Ankara Airport. None of us had heard about it publicly. This job must have been put out to tender - I am sure they had had a tender process, but it was not open to everyone. They had produced narrowly selected particular companies to apply for the tenders. Or again, we hear there is a construction going on in the centre of Ankara on the scale of a dam construction. Our Greater Municipality is undertaking it, but we don’t know who is doing the construction
none of us know. We even don’t know whether there is a project or not. Those kinds of jobs are all carried out under the Law of Tender and taken out of the bidding process. Most probably, they are calling for bids from just particular firms by claiming ‘a matter of urgency’. Legally, it is not possible to award tenders without bidding, but it is not possible to carry this issue to the public (Eren, 27.12.2006).

Secondly, the integration of international capital into the Turkish national capital market created competition among construction companies according to their capital accumulation capacity and scale of the firm. The first group of construction capital groups are international capitals, which share common interests and act in the same direction consistently with each other. The representatives of this group in Turkey are a part of organised associations of capital groups at European and global scales. However, individual firms in this group compete with each other to gain better positions in the Turkish national construction market. The competition between firms can be defined as exclusion of ‘less equipped’ firms by those ‘more equipped’ (Guloksuz, 2009; p. 164). The role of the MHA in the competition between fractions of capital in Turkey was to ensure that internationalised construction companies’ demands were dealt with at national scale by a nationally governed state body. However, the MHA also consolidates the sub-contractual relations between less-developed and more developed construction companies by maintaining local interests in construction but containing them at the local level. Locally-embedded relations between construction companies and their influence on local municipalities are used to put pressure at the local scale of the state in a consistent way.

(ii) Conflicts between different scales of state action

Conflicts between different scales of state action are seen in two ways in the urban regeneration process in Istanbul: firstly, there are tensions and conflicts between different scales of state institutions; and secondly, between elected
members of the councils and state personnel. These tensions can be seen in the relations between the Greater Istanbul Municipality and district municipalities; between the Greater Istanbul Municipality and the MHA; and between district municipalities and the MHA. The main conflicts between different scales of the state proliferates between different state bodies. These interests do not only result from the historical traditions of each institution, but also from different scalar demands and expectations of each institution. In interview, the Head of the Macro-Scale Planning Department of Greater Istanbul Municipality (Interview, 27.10.2010), expresses the following criticisms.

There is a law for the MHA, which I criticise personally. The MHA can do anything if they want to. Greater Municipality can make comments, but in practice it cannot do anything. In the Council meetings of the Municipality, the MHA projects get passed without disagreement. This happened in 2005 for approving the macro-plan. In our role as the Macro Scale Planning Department we appealed against the plan, we said, this plan does not have an integrated planning system. None of the urban regeneration projects in Istanbul has reached success so far. ... The change in the Municipality Law’s Article 73, which gives planning powers to the greater municipality, is not enough.

If you look at the Urban Regeneration Department of the Municipality, they couldn’t solve the problems which happened during urban regeneration project in Basibuyuk Neighbourhood in Maltepe District. The Department aimed to carry out many positive regeneration projects, but they haven’t achieved anything so far.

As the Department of Macro-Scale Planning, we do not have a voice, in the making of protocols with the MHA and with district municipalities. We appealed against the 1/1000 scale plans for Maltepe District, because we have adopted a different approach in our 1/5000 scale plans; however, the MHA is a weird institution, no one can stop it. Its little sibling is Kiptas, which is the firm of the Greater Municipality. They do their projects without sticking to the plan we produced. They say we are
producing solutions to the need for housing, but you can solve housing problem in housing areas not in the green park area. Kiptas constructed mass houses in Basibuyuk neighbourhood’s regional green park. We gave our negative comment, but the Council of the Greater Municipality approved the plan.

As is very clear from this respondent’s comments, the interests of different state bodies at different scales - sometimes even between different departments in the same institution- do not necessarily coincide with each other. They may object to each other’s plans and decision making processes. These tensions occur between different state bodies, and also between elected council members of municipalities and state personnel.

(iii) Conflict between different class strategies

Having different political parties at different scales of the state is one of the other reasons behind the conflicts. The national government and also Greater Istanbul Municipality are controlled by JDP, which is an Islamist conservative party, while some district neighbourhoods are under the power of the Republican People’s Party (RPP), which is a nationalist-left party. The different traditions and political ideologies of the two parties that can create conflicts between different scales of state intervention. However, in the field work study for this research, the two case study neighbourhoods under power of RPP at district level are found to have certain coherences with Greater Municipality and the MHA, run by the JDP government. The basis of this congruence will be shown in the next chapter.

The complex relations between different actors at different scales of the state are seen as an important part of the rescaling of the state. In Istanbul since 2000, the upward and downward rescaling is realised as moments of class struggle. The changing scales of the state in Istanbul can be analysed in two
forms: shifting scale to national and shifting scale to the local. These two aspects of scaling are examined in the next two sections.

6.5.2. **Shifting Scale to National: The Integration Process to Global Capitalism**

Erdogan Bayraktar, former Head of the MHA, emphasised in most of his statements in the newspapers that expanding the role of Istanbul at global scale is necessary and urgent. Istanbul needs to enhance its competitive power at a global scale to become a centre for real estate investment. The Concluding Report of the 2008 Housing Summit of the Association of Real Estate Agencies (Gyoder, 2008) also argued that, ‘In Turkey, the complexity of planning processes puts a halter on the construction sector’s activities. The powers and limitations of the institutions effective in this process should be reconsidered to create clear and fast solutions in a long-run planning process’. The Association demands new legal regulations as part of the adjustment process for integration into the EU and for integration with global capitalist dynamics. These declarations are also related to the global city role of Istanbul to be a part of the ‘networks of cities’ at global level in order to attract foreign investment.

Although large-scale urban investors and real estate investment trusts are satisfied with the role of the MHA, they still demand reduction in the planning bureaucracy and for more power to be given to the MHA as the central planning authority equipped with guarantor role to reduce the risks of the investors (Gyoder, 2007, 2008).

The demands and concerns of internationalised construction companies find their correspondence in the changes to laws and the changes in the role of institutions. The first shift was in 2004 in the administrative practice of urban regeneration. Urban regeneration firstly entered as a new concept in the planning procedure under Law No. 5393 (2005) by giving authority for planning urban regeneration projects at local scale to district municipalities. In the same
year, the MHA, which had limited powers in relation to regeneration projects for gecekondu settlements (Law No. 5162, 2004), gained the administrative role of carrying out urban regeneration projects by eliminating the power of local governments. This new role was given by Law No. 5366 (2005) for the regeneration of historical areas and dilapidated inner city zones, and by Law No. 5018 (2009) for the planning of all the state-owned lands. Additionally, all planning duties of the Ministry for Public Works and Settlement (Law No. 5069, 2007) and all the duties and powers of the national Urban Land Office were transferred (Law No. 5273, 2004) to the MHA with its land stock. This transfer expanded the land stock of the MHA from 16.5 million m² to 194 million m² without cost.

As a result, the MHA has become the only central state institution with extraordinary planning powers (Celik, 2011). This was a response to the demands of internationalised construction companies and for the effective and expansive usage of state’s central financial resources for demolition of gecekondu settlements and dilapidated houses and to provide affordable housing for the people evicted from their living spaces, and also using the police force to crush the militant resistance of dwellers of poor neighbourhoods against urban regeneration.

The second change in scaling related to direct foreign investment in the construction sector, which is becoming a growing capital accumulation sector in Turkey. In 2006 the construction sector reached an 18.5 % growth rate (Yemar, 2009). In order to establish an integrated construction sector in real estate and for foreign investment, there have been changes in the laws. The increase in the construction sector was supported by the changes in the Public Procurement Law (No. 4734, 2002). The process of changes in the law points out a dynamic scaling process involving conflicts and negotiations between classes. “The scale was shaped by the unequal but mutual power relationships between global and
domestic capital groups” (Ercan & Oguz, 2006; p. 641). The law also involves the establishment of a separate central institution, called Public Procurement Institution (PPI), which has extraordinary powers derived from the related ministries. Like the laws related to urban regeneration, in the case of the MHA, PPI was aimed to avoid the possibility of small-and medium capital interests influencing national political actors in the process and to respond to the needs of global capital.

The third shift in scaling is the changes to the State Procurement Law (No. 2888; 2005) in order to enable municipalities to establish real estate partnerships with global capital owners willing to invest at the local scale. With such power, mayor of the municipality may sell state-owned land merely by a decision of the municipal council. This change in the law illustrates a very complex and dynamic process of scaling that operates in and between the global and the local.

6.5.3. Shifting Scale to the Local
The changes in the laws supporting shifting scale to the global have placed limitations on the powers of the local scale (district and greater municipalities). The altered laws opened up the construction sector to the global market and facilitated its integration into global capitalism. However, as Gough (2004; p. 193) suggests: “State intervention, while supporting accumulation, can potentially lead to politicisation of economic regulation”. That is: (i) resistance from the residents of gecekondu settlements and old historical centres; organised political groups; urban activists against urban regeneration; (ii) the central state’s (MHA) incapacity to respond such pressures; and (iii) the demands from small and medium capital (construction sector mainly) at the local level, lead to shifting the scale to the local. To overcome the proliferation of contradictions in the process, and the politicisation of the process, the Greater Municipalities are given new powers to carry out urban regeneration projects at the local level (Law no. 5998, 2010), providing ways of depoliticising
the contradictions among different capitals and residents. The rescaling process was not only shaped by the interest of global capitals in the construction sector, but was also shaped by domestic capital groups and by the resistance of residents.

6.6. Conclusion

According to my analysis of the changing role of the MHA and recent shifts in urban policies during the last decade, it is argued that the modifications to the legislation and institutional reorganisations are at the centre of the rescaling of the state. Such rescaling as a class relationship and takes a geographical or spatial form in the urban regeneration process in Istanbul at a particular moment of class relations. This moment is the integration of Turkey into global capitalist dynamics in the form of construction companies’ internationalisation since the 2000s. The upward and downward scaling of the state as part of instating policies of urban regeneration can be seen as three aspects of state’s response to: (i) pressures by capital on the state, (ii) the durability of built environment as a contestation arena between different scales of the state, and (iii) reducing the risks in large scale investments. These aspects are used to summarise the analysis of rescaling in Istanbul since 2000.

(i) Pressures by capital on the state

Under the pressures by capital on the state, the MHA and the IMP attempt to develop a two-sided urban policy: (a) decentralisation of manufacturing industries to the far-peripheries of the city; and (b) evicting people living on valuable urban lands, to transform city centre for finance and business services and for up-market consumption and residential spaces. These policies are essentially dependent on the investments and profits of large-scale capital, and partially also, on the interests of small- and middle capital in construction sector.
It is obvious from the documents and press statements of The Association of Real Estate Investment Companies, which works in cooperation with the MHA in certain areas, that the Association advocates that the MHA should be the only institution to regulate urban regeneration. The Association also clearly stipulates that state should provide areas for secure investment and should be the guarantor of the process (Gyoder, 2007, 2008).

(ii) The durability of the built environment as a contestation arena between different scales of the state

One of the dilemmas of capital is to confront the durability in built environment. It takes long periods of time to re-invest in an already-built area, such as city centres where there are limited amounts of vacant or available land. The increasing activity and internationalisation of the construction sector puts pressure on the state to ‘regenerate’ or ‘transform’ large areas of high-value land. The MHA plays the role of facilitator and mediator (with local governments) in solving the problem of eliminating built structures on valuable land in the city centre of Istanbul. The MHA positions local governments to ‘clean’ the areas and solve the tensions in the eviction process to get the lands ready for the investment of capital. This point will be discussed in the next chapter in more detail.

(iii) Reducing risks for large-scale investments

Capital always wants to reduce the risks of investment by getting subsidies, credit and a guarantee from the state. Large-scale capital continuously puts pressure on the state for its immediate and general interests. The contradictions between the necessity for the state to reduce the risks for large-scale capital interests, and the state’s need to finance its own interests, results in unstable interventions by the state at different scales.
This chapter analysed and theorised the rescaling of the state as changing class relations in Istanbul since 2000. The vertical changes (rescaling) in the restructuring of the state are one aspect of the rebuilding of Istanbul. The other aspect is the different interventions of the state in different localities across a horizontal level. This second aspect is analysed in the next Chapter by investigating three case study neighbourhoods in Istanbul.
CHAPTER 7: CHANGING FORMS AND STRATEGIES OF STATE INTERVENTION IN DIFFERENT LOCALITIES

7.1. Introduction
This chapter examines the overall regeneration process in Istanbul since 2004 and analyses the three case study, Derbent, Basibuyuk and Tozkoparan, chosen for this research. The three areas are analysed comparatively in relation to: the demographic background; the location of the neighbourhoods and the ownership of housing; a comparison of housing types and tenure; and the relationship between housing and workplaces. In the following section, the historical roots of recent political resistance in the neighbourhoods are examined for three case studies. Then each neighbourhood is analysed separately in terms of redevelopment process as a form of state intervention, and moments of resistance. This is followed by a theorisation of thesis processes in each neighbourhood. In the conclusion of the Chapter, the local differentiation of state intervention is theorised through the analysis of three case studies.

7.2. Urban Regeneration as a Form of State Intervention and Moments of Resistance in Istanbul since 2000
In 2004, the JDP – at the national level – made a decision to clear the poor from the city centre of Istanbul, using ‘urban regeneration’ (UR) as a form of state intervention. The housing of the poor included dilapidated historical city centre neighbourhoods, all gecekondu areas and some affordable housing areas. The regeneration of these areas was claimed as a preparatory action of transformation to prevent earthquake risk, but in reality opened up large areas of land for international investment, situating Istanbul in global city networks, and favouring Istanbul is as the main destination for foreign investment over
other large cities in Turkey. The urban regeneration projects planned to relocate two million people from the centre parts of the city to the peripheries.

Urban regeneration, understood as a form of spatial intervention by the state, usually includes urban rehabilitation, transformation of the built environment and urban renewal. However, in Turkey the concept of UR is now identified with a particular urban policy that aims at the relocation of the poor occupying high-value land in the city centre and inner city. This process is seen by critical researchers as ‘class-cleansing’ (Gundogdu & Gough, 2008) of the poor from the city centre by evicting them to the far peripheries of the city and turning the emptied areas to high-income usages, including housing, shopping malls and business districts.

As UR is established as a national level policy, the MHA has been empowered to run the whole process (see Chapter 6) from the beginning. As the projects began to be implemented in some neighbourhoods, the political power of district municipalities and political and economic power of greater municipalities of large cities was needed to respond to the demands of residents and developers at different scales. In this way, the form of the state’s UR intervention is modified in different locations and at different scales of the state according to collective resistance in certain neighbourhoods. However, the implementation of the UR projects also varies in different neighbourhoods in terms of the various forms of partnerships formed with assorted state authorities at different scales. This differentiation results from different patterns of ownership, pressures by developers on the state, the conflicts between different scales of the state, and the resistance to UR by residents.

More than fifty neighbourhoods have been designated as UR project areas in Istanbul since 2004. In some of the neighbourhoods the UR process was eventually depoliticised and has been completed, with the relocation of some
dwellers to MHA housing units of the MHA but with others being left homeless or living in tents. The provision of affordable housing to residents in the UR areas is financed by the state by long-term credit payments to the MHA or Kiptas. However, as the UR areas are mostly occupied by low-income households with irregular employment, most of them could not afford payments.

Almost half the neighbourhoods subjected to UR have resisted the project and this resistance is often met by police violence. The basis of resistance is diverse in relation to ownership patterns, the historical political background, the political strategy of the state at the local scale and the value of the land. The form of resistance is two-fold: actions to get the police out of the neighbourhood; and exercising democratic rights to resist, including the establishment of neighbourhood organisations, holding meetings, issuing press statements and initiating lawsuits.

The next section of the Chapter examines three case study areas - Basibuyuk, Derbent and Tozkoparan - in terms of their socio-spatial structure and the UR and resistance processes in the neighbourhoods, in order to reveal the changing forms and strategies of the state’s spatial interventions in different localities.

7.3. The Socio-Spatial Structure of the Case Study Neighbourhoods

Basibuyuk and Derbent are two gecekondu neighbourhoods established informally, but some of the dwellers have gained formal ownership status over time. Tozkoparan is an affordable housing area that was formally built to meet the need for housing due to relocations in Istanbul in the 1950s. All three are subjected to UR processes developing through different state interventions.
This section reviews these three case study neighbourhoods to reveal their general structure in terms of the demographic characteristics of the dwellers, working conditions, the relationship between housing and workplace and the structure of housing ownership. This section also shows how these three neighbourhoods correspond to the selection criteria of case studies (See Chapter 5, Section 5.3), including: housing areas of the poor; existence of considerable political resistance; mixture of tenure; and central location of neighbourhoods with proximity of housing and workplace. The similarities and differences of the three case study neighbourhoods are analysed in relation to selection criteria, while the historical background of neighbourhoods provides a link to an analysis of UR process as it is manifested in the different locations.

7.3.1. The Demographic Background of the Case Study Neighbourhoods

The demographic profile of the two gecekondu neighbourhoods - Basibuyuk and Derbent - is similar; however Tozkoparan is distinct in education levels and places of birth. These similarities and differences are mainly the result of the
varying historical backgrounds of the neighbourhoods. Most of the residents in Tozkoparan are former gecekondu dwellers, who migrated to Istanbul in the early 1950s: they moved to this affordable housing area with better conditions than gecekondu houses in the late 1950s. In contrast, both of the gecekondu neighbourhoods have remained gecekondu areas with poorer conditions than Tozkoparan.

The population of Basibuyuk - 18,384 in 2009 - represents 4% of the total population of the Maltepe District. The population of density is low in the neighbourhood because of large areas of green parks and a big sanatorium located in it (Turkun, et al., 2010, p.; p. 202). The population of Derbent neighbourhood was 6660 in 2009. The population of the neighbourhood fell when Darussafaka was separated as a neighbourhood from Derbent (Turkun, et al., 2010; p. 214). The population of Tozkoparan was 22,208 in 2009 - 7% of the total population of the district. Tozkoparan also has low population densities due to large amounts of green areas and public spaces in the neighbourhood.

The average household size is 4.5 in Basibuyuk and 4.3 in Derbent. Tozkoparan has the lowest average household size with 3.6 and the average age is 36, which is the highest among other neighbourhoods. The average age in Basibuyuk is 30 and in Derbent it is 31. The demographic profile of gecekondu neighbourhoods are similar, but in Tozkoparan the birth rate is low and most of the second generation migrants moved to other neighbourhoods to live (Turkun, et al., 2010; p. 310) separate from their families.

The education level of women is lower than men’s in all three neighbourhoods. In Basibuyuk, 16% of women are illiterate, and 9% in both Derbent and Tozkoparan while 3% of men in Basibuyuk, 2% in Derbent and 1% in Tozkoparan are illiterate. The majority of the population in the three neighbourhoods are primary school graduates: 34% in Basibuyuk, 35% in Derbent and 29% in
Tozkoparan. Tozkoparan has much higher levels of education compared with the two other neighbourhoods: 11% of the population have primary school qualifications, 20% are high school graduates, and the percentages of women and men in these figures are very close. University graduates make up 6% of the population, and 5% are currently undertaking university studies (Turkun, et al., 2010; p. 316-18). Education levels in all three neighbourhoods are relatively low when compared to a high-income housing area. This can be understood through the lack of access to resources as being gecekondu dwellers. Tozkoparan’s difference from the other two case study areas depends on its relatively better access to resources, because of being an affordable housing area rather than a gecekondu neighbourhood.

The two gecekondu areas are mainly occupied by migrants; however, as the migration period was almost 60 years ago and the second generation of migrants are now settled in the neighbourhoods, the rate of Istanbul-born are quite high. Basibuyuk dwellers have predominantly migrated from the Black Sea Region (29%) and eastern Turkey (16%). The rate of migrants coming from Samsun and Sinop near the Black Sea and from Erzurum and Kars in the East are higher than from the other cities (Turkun, et al., 2010; p. 300). In Derbent, migrants coming from interior regions of Turkey, the Black Sea and eastern Turkey are almost equal. In the population of Tozkoparan, the numbers of Black Sea region born are higher than the other region origin migrants. Tozkoparan has the highest Istanbul-born rate when compared to other two neighbourhoods (62%) (Turkun, et al., 2010; p. 300) (Table 7.1).

Table 7.1: Dwellers’ place of birth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of Birth (%)</th>
<th>Basibuyuk</th>
<th>Derbent</th>
<th>Tozkoparan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other than Istanbul</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Turkun, et al., 2010; p. 300-1
The migration statistics also reveals the social relations and ties between dwellers in the neighbourhoods. In both of the gecekondu neighbourhoods, there is a mix first and second-generation migrants. The parents of existing dwellers migrated in the 1960s as first generation of migration and the highest rate of migration and settlement in Derbent and Basibuyuk was in the 1970s. The first generation migrants are around 60 years old now and tend to live with their children in the neighbourhoods. Dwellers in Tozkoparan are a part of second generation migrants in the 1950s to Istanbul, and because of that Tozkoparan has older migrants who are still living in the neighbourhood than the two other neighbourhoods (Turkun, et al., 2010; p. 302). In gecekondu areas, collective village relations are strong, family forms are still important and family members prefer to live together or close to each other. The longer historical residency in Tozkoparan means that community ties in the area are weaker than the other two neighbourhoods.

7.3.2. The Location of the Neighbourhoods and the Ownership of Housing

Derbent and Tozkoparan neighbourhoods are located in the European side of Istanbul and Basibuyuk is located in Anatolian side of the city (see Map 7.1). All three neighbourhoods are located in an inner area of the city with good transportation connections. Derbent and Basibuyuk are surrounded by luxury housing units, which increases the value of the land where they are located.

**Derbent Neighbourhood**

Derbent is a poor working class neighbourhood, which is located in Sariyer District in the European side of Istanbul. Derbent neighbourhood was established in the 1950s as gecekondu settlement for the cheap labour power needed for factories around the neighbourhood. The Sariyer District is on the border of Maslak-Buyukdere main road, which is the central business district (CBD) of Istanbul constructed in 1980 (see Map 7.2, Map 7.3 and Photo 7.2). The neighbourhood is located next to a forest area and has a view of the
Bosphorus: and is surrounded by high-income housing areas: there are metro and highway connections to the CBD and the rest of Istanbul (see Map 7.4, Photo 7.1). There is one primary school, three mosques and two green parks in the neighbourhood, and also basic infrastructures, such as electricity, water and natural gas connections are as in other neighbourhoods.

Photo 7.1: Derbent Neighbourhood: It is possible to see the CBD at the back of the neighbourhood.

Derbent was used as cultivated area until the 1950s. With massive migration and fast industrialisation in that period (see Chapter 4), gecekondu construction accelerated in and around Derbent in new industrial areas that were developed on the route between Maslak and İstinye (see Map 7.3) and also around the dockland and stone pits in Sariyer District. Large pharmaceutical factories and other industries were located in the area between the CBD (Buyukdere Road) (see Map 7.3) and Maslak, in the 1950s.
In Sariyer, the cultivated land, which was occupied by the first generation migrants, sold to second generation migrants who began to create gecekondu settlements after the 1960s (Turkun, et al., 2010; p. 214). Derbent experienced a similar process; however, here the land was sold by a few families from the Black Sea region (e.g. the Akdaglar family) who had appropriated or bought the land in the 1930s, before the migrants’ arrival (Member of Derbent Neighbourhood Organisation (01), Interview, 29.05.2010). According to the interview respondents, Derbent was established in the 1930s by the settlement of these families and turned into a gecekondu neighbourhood in the 1970s (Member of Derbent Neighbourhood Organisation (01), 29.05.2010 and Official, Derbent (04), Interview, 02.11.2010). The establishment of the neighbourhood was helped by left political groups and residents of the politically left gecekondu neighbourhood of ‘1 May’ (Member of Derbent Neighbourhood Organisation
located in Umraniye District on the Anatolian side of Istanbul. Forty-seven per cent of the land was purchased and 43% of the houses were constructed in the 1970s; however, a further 20% of land purchases and 29% of house construction occurred in the 1980s (Turkun, et al., 2010; p. 216-7).

Photo 7.2: A view from Derbent: Derbent Neighbourhood on the left and MESA Houses on the right

The industrial land in the area was purchased by holding companies and financial capital (e.g. Sabanci, Yapi Kredi Bank, Is Bank) (see Chapter 6, Section 6.3). The construction of the first Istanbul Bridge to connect the European and Anatolian sides of the city accelerated the development around the route. The Master Plan approved in 1974 did not plan to stop the development in the area, even though development in this area threatened the forest and a drinking water basin. Instead, the plan designated the land around the route to the bridge as the secondary centre of the city (I. G. Municipality, 1974).
In the 1980s, the plan for the lands adjoining the bridge to be upgraded as the CBD of Istanbul, promoted by preferential rights and concessions to developers (See Chapter 4, Section 4.3). This period is the first time the skyscraper entered into the Turkish planning and urbanisation system, and as a result of this new urbanisation policy, the Buyukdere-Maslak route developed as the primary location of high-rise buildings in Istanbul, attracting international business investments. From 1980 to the 2000s, this area still kept its pivotal location as the international and national business district of Istanbul, but developers of luxury housing developers were also attracted to the area because of its proximity to the large forest and its good connections with the city centre. Eventually, Sariyer District in general and the area around the CBD in particular became covered with high-income household housing and gated communities (see Map 7.4 and Photo 7.3 and 7.4).
Map 7.4: Luxury Housing and Gated Communities around Derbent Neighbourhood

*Stars show the luxury housing areas. Their locations have been derived from interviews and from personal observation during my visits.

Photo 7.3: A view of MESA Houses from Derbent: It is possible to see the wall and wires around the houses.

Source: Ozlem Celik
Basibuyuk is a poor working class gecekondu neighbourhood, located on the Anatolian side of Istanbul, and is one of the neighbourhoods in Maltepe District. At the time it was established in 1928, this neighbourhood was on the periphery of Istanbul. It covers 18% of the district’s area and is the second biggest neighbourhood, located on a high hill close to a large sanatorium hospital (Map 7.6 and Photo 7.5). Since the 1950s, the district has been one of the most important industrial areas in Istanbul. The early migrants to the area were employed either in the hospital or in the nearby factories. Basibuyuk was a convenient place to settle for newcomers because of its vacant state-owned lands and its proximity to job opportunities.
The majority of the housing in Basibuyuk Neighbourhood is gecekondu homes (63%) and the rest is flats (29%) and houses (7%). Eighty per cent of the flat and house owners live in gecekondu homes (including houses and flats), while 68% of tenants rent flats (Turkun, et al., 2010; p. 259). The majority of the houses are single-storey (Table 7.2). Most of the houses (65%) in the neighbourhood are without authorised project, building or occupancy permits (Turkun, et al., 2010; p. 261).
Map 7.5: The location of Basibuyuk Neighbourhood in Maltepe District

Table 7.2: Number of floors in houses in Basibuyuk Neighbourhood

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of floors</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single-storey</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two-storey</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three-storey</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four-storey</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than four-storey</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Turkun, et al., 2010; p. 260
Having large gardens in front of the houses is an important criterion for the UR process in Basibuyuk Neighbourhood. Sixty-five per cent of houses (Turkun, et al., 2010; p. 266) have gardens and with gardens it is possible for developers to gain high-value land per plot.

Getting ownership of their plot has always been a problematic issue for the residents since the establishment of the neighbourhood. In 2002, the District Mayor attempted to provide residents with land title and brought the issue to court with this aim. According to the decision of the court, all the houses with title deed are accepted to get their land titles. Title deeds are given to the dwellers as a provisional document to get their land titles; however as the governments change, they also change their policy towards turning title deeds to a fulfilled land title. In this case, a similar process has experienced, all the land is assigned to the District Municipality to complete the process. However, this process could not be completed, because of political changes at the local level.

There are three important aspects of the location of Basibuyuk Neighbourhood which motivated the state to ‘regenerate’ it. Firstly, its central location and good public transport, including metro and bus, and highway connections are promising for development of the neighbourhood (Map 7.6). Secondly, the neighbourhood is located near the new CBD of Istanbul. The neighbouring districts of Maltepe District and Kartal District, were designated as the new CBD and trade centres of Istanbul on the Anatolian side in 2009 (I. G. Municipality, 2009) (see Chapter 6, Section 6.4.2). There is only one CBD, as mentioned above, in Istanbul, close to Derbent neighbourhood, on the European side and this is going to be the second one. One of the main aims of the Environment Plan is to reduce the heavy pressure on traffic, resources and infrastructure on the European side of Istanbul created by industrial and commercial business. It is hoped to relieve the pressure on the original CBD by creating a second
business and trade centre on the Anatolian side and by relocating industry to Gebze and İzmit, which are neighbour cities located on the Anatolian side of the city-region. The second centre will be in the Kartal and Maltepe Districts, where a new dockland and international port will be constructed to connect goods and services to the wider regions of Istanbul, Turkey and abroad. Both districts are the old industrial zones of Istanbul, having large vacant lands suitable for up-market residential projects, hotels and office buildings.

Map 7.6: Location and connections of Basibuyuk Neighbourhood

Thirdly, the proximity of the neighbourhood to a forest area, which has potential recreational value, and views of the Bosphorus are important aspects for regeneration. Lastly, the pressure created by the developments around the neighbourhood is also one of the reasons behind UR. Located very close to the neighbourhood are a private university (Map 7.6) and two newly-built high-income houses and residences constructed both by Kiptas (Narcity Residences) (Map 7.7) and by a private construction company (Nish Adalar Residences) (Map 7.8). Each these developments include swimming pools, sports facilities and a shopping mall, and houses sell for between £65,000 and £300,000. Local
politicians were very much in favour of these new housing developments, seeing them as very positive for the image and the economics of the area (Advisor, Basibuyuk (04), Interview, 12.01.2011).

The previous Mayor of the District evaluates how the construction of Narcity affects the construction process in the district in one of his interviews in a newspaper (Ataselim, 2008).

There is a real differentiated process in Maltepe’s development in the recent years. Especially the flats Kiptas built in the area, created a different image. In the first phase of sales 4000 people applied, they sold more than 800 flats and in the second phase they are expecting 5000 applications. Maltepe became a very attractive place.

There is a favourable support from the local politicians for new developments and this creates pressure for rebuilding the gecekondu.
In a similar way, the head of the JDP in the Maltepe District sees the construction of these two housing developments as a ‘positive’ example for investment and UR (JDP Head of Maltepe District (07)/Council Member, GIM (04), Interview, 21.01.2011).

The construction sector had a shortage of land when the sector started to grow. We have a large amount of ready land stock where the gecekondu homes are built, [so] let’s rehabilitate these areas. In this way we may both earn the revenue and give a real identity to those areas. Gecekondu homes and gecekondu dwellers can gain a modern view and a modern understanding of life.

Map 7.8. The location of Nish Adalar Residences in Maltepe District


**Tozkoparan Neighbourhood**

Tozkoparan Neighbourhood occupies 10% of the Gungoren Municipal Council Area, a district located in the European side of Istanbul. (Map 7.9). It is also located very near Ataturk International Airport, which is the biggest airport in
the city; and is next to a major state university campus. Because of this, the neighbourhood has good public transportation connections, including tram, bus and metro-bus; but also has highway connections to wider parts of the city (Map 7.10).

Map 7.9: The location of Tozkoparan Neighbourhood in Gungoren District

![Map of Tozkoparan Neighbourhood in Gungoren District](http://212.156.127.250:3913/kentrehberi/fullharita.aspx)


Tozkoparan Neighbourhood has a different housing structure from Derbent and Basibuyuk, because it is not a gecekondu settlement. On the contrary, it was developed as a ‘gecekondu prevention’ area, which is a form of affordable housing (see Photo 7.6) for relocated gecekondu dwellers. After the demolition of houses for bridge or highway construction and the demolition of gecekondu homes in Sarayburnu, Bakirkoy, Surici, Topkapi, Balat, Mevlanakapi, Edirnekapi and other neighbourhoods in Istanbul by the state in the 1950s, dwellers from these areas were relocated to Tozkoparan. Flats were allocated to people whose houses had been demolished or to low-income households with more than three or four children. Firstly, the houses were allocated to people in need due to demolition, and to low-paid civil servants, but then flats were sold to
residents living in gecekondu homes. The initial price of the flats was quite high, and the buyers needed to pay them off over 20 years; however, the payment instalments stayed at the same monthly amount and because of inflation, they had lost value as the years passed and this was a positive outcome for the dwellers. They paid less in the amount of the money as the years passed (Member of Tozkoparan Neighbourhood Organisation (01), 27.05.2010, Interview; Member of Tozkoparan Neighbourhood Organisation, Tozkoparan(04), 13.07.2010, Interview).

The first developments in Tozkoparan were six apartment blocks of 20 flats each, called Menderes blocks, taking its name from the Prime Minister of that time. After the 1960s, this project continued and under Gecekondu Law, Tozkoparan was designated a ‘Gecekondu Prevention Area’. The state built flats for residents relocated from gecekondu areas and started relocating them in
1967. There were 80 blocks of ten flats in each, called ‘1102 Blocks’; 20 blocks of 60-64 flats in each, called Block A (45 m²); 8 blocks with fifty flats in each, called Block B (50 and 60 m²); 9 blocks including twenty flats in each, called Block C (65 m²) and 114 houses, called Nuve Houses. In 1985, a second phase of housing for municipality workers (65-80 m²), called ‘800 Houses’ and in 1987 flats for relocation due to demolition of gecekondu homes in Aıyansaray, Balat, Fener and Eyup, called ‘400 Houses’ and flats for the demolition of houses in Bayrampasa because of tramway building, called 310 Houses were built (Photo 7.7). On the other hand, in the 1980s with the support given by the state for cooperatives, four cooperative housing sites were developed in the neighbourhood. Of all the residences developed between the 1960s and the 1980s, only 800 houses and cooperatives have survived the UR project in the neighbourhood today (Turkun, et al., 2010; p. 244).

Map 7.10: Location and connections of Tozkoparan

Source: https://maps.google.co.uk/
Table 7.3: Number of floors of houses in Tozkoparan Neighbourhood

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of floors</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single-storey</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two-storey</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four-storey</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than four-storey</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Turkun, et al., 2010; p. 260)

Photo 7.7: Houses from Tozkoparan Neighbourhood

Source: Ozlem Celik

Currently, the majority of residents are flat owners and 93% live in four or five storey ‘authorised’ flats (Turkun, et al., 2010; p. 259) (Table 7.3) having an authorised project, building and occupancy permit (93%) (Turkun, et al., 2010; p. 261). As in the case of Basibuyuk, having gardens in front of the houses is an important criterion for the UR process. Here, 85% of houses (Turkun, et al., 2010; p. 266) have gardens that attract developers.
7.3.3. Comparison of Housing Types and Tenure in The Three Case Study Neighbourhoods

The majority of the housing type is gecekondu in Derbent (92%) and Basibuyuk (63%) neighbourhoods (Table 7.4). Tozkoparan, as a gecekondu prevention area, mostly consists of apartment blocks (93%), but also has authorised houses and a very small amount of gecekondu houses (Turkun, et al., 2010; p. 259). Rates of home ownership of housing are higher than tenancy in all three neighbourhoods (Chart 7.1): that is, in all the neighbourhoods the ownership pattern is predominantly owner-occupied, from which can be assumed that residents have probably developed attachment to their neighbourhoods and have long-standing social ties.

Table 7.4: Types of Housing in Basibuyuk, Derbent and Tozkoparan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of housing (%)</th>
<th>Basibuyuk</th>
<th>Derbent</th>
<th>Tozkoparan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gecekondu (Squatter House)</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>92.0</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apartment Block with title deed</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>92.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House with garden</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Turkun, et al., 2010; p. 209; 218; 245)

Apartment blocks with title deeds are 29%, gecekondu ownership and houses with garden are 7% of all the housing in the neighbourhood. Eighty per cent of all house owners live in gecekondu houses, and 68% of tenants live in flats. In Derbent, gecekondu houses are the dominant housing type (92%) and which produces a high rate of house ownership (70%) and a 30% tenancy rate. In Basibuyuk and Tozkoparan neighbourhoods tenants mostly live in flats rather than gecekondu houses and the majority of the houses are squatters in both of the neighbourhoods. But there are a considerable number of apartment blocks in Basibuyuk with title deeds. The title deed gives residents a de facto use right and also providing some legality. The majority (63.2%) of the residents in
Basibuyuk live in squatter houses and 29.3% of them are de facto owners of their land. These include both tenants and owner-occupiers. Ninety-two per cent of residents in Derbent live in squatter houses, the legality of which varies according to whether they have a pre-title deed or have no title deed (Turkun, et al., 2010; p. 259).

**Chart 7.1: Ownership and tenancy rates in the three case study neighbourhoods**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighbourhood</th>
<th>Owner</th>
<th>Tenant</th>
<th>Owned by a relative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basibuyuk</td>
<td>69.4</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Derbent</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tozkoparan</td>
<td>76.2</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Turkun, et al., 2010; p. 285)

**Chart 7.2: The period of obtaining the plot in Basibuyuk and Derbent**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Basibuyuk</th>
<th>Derbent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Before 1950</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951-1960</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-1970</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-1980</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>39.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-1990</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>33.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-2000</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Turkun, et al., 2010; p. 207-8); (Turkun, et al., 2010; p. 216-7)
The ownership of the land and the method of acquiring a plot is quite complex in gecekondu neighbourhoods. In Basibuyuk, people started to occupy or buy housing plots in the 1970s (39%) and this continued in 1980s (34%) (Turkun, et al., 2010; p. 207-8). Derbent has been available for settlement since 1930; however, the most of the plots were obtained in the 1970s (47%) and the 1980s (20%) (Turkun, et al., 2010; p. 216-7) (Chart 7.2).

The way of obtaining the plot also gives important information about the development of gecekondu neighbourhoods. This helps to illustrate the recent relations between dwellers caught up in the UR process. In Basibuyuk, most of the dwellers who own a house gained the plot from someone else or through someone else. So, the occupation of state-owned land is not the initial way of obtaining the plot. Buying the plot from the owner or from a real estate agent (62%) is the common way of getting the plot in Basibuyuk (Chart 7.3), and most plots were bought from the owner (43%) in the 1980s. Direct occupation of state-owned land (28%) took place mainly in the 1970s (Turkun, et al., 2010; p. 207) (Chart 7.3). The construction of houses on the plot started in the 1970s and continued into the 2000s with a peak period in the 1980s. The majority of the houses were constructed by a builder (48%), but a significant number of houses have been constructed by the owner (35%) (Turkun, et al., 2010; p. 207-8).
In Derbent, the significant period for settlement was during the 1960s and 17% of residents gained their plots at this time. However, the majority acquired plots in the 1970s (47%) and the 1980s (20%) (Turkun, et al., 2010; p. 216-7) (Chart 7.3). Most plots are bought either from the owner (34%) or from someone who occupied the state-owned land before (37%). The direct occupation of state-owned land was mainly experienced in the 1970s (18%) (Turkun, et al., 2010; p. 216-7) (Chart 7.3). Most of the houses were built in the 1970s (43%) and the 1980s (29%), and 22% of the houses were constructed by the owner of the house (Turkun, et al., 2010; p. 217). Obtaining a housing plot in these neighbourhoods was highest between 1970 and 1980 and kept increasing between 1980 and 1990.

The average size of households is 4.5 in Basibuyuk, in a range from 1 and 16; 4.3 in Derbent, in a range from 1 to 13; and 3.6 in Tozkoparan, in a range from 1 to 9 (Turkun, et al., 2010; p. 273). The size of the houses in gecekondu neighbourhoods is 50m² to 150m², which actually provides better living conditions compared to Tozkoparan neighbourhood. In Tozkoparan, the average household number is low, and sizes of the houses are very small. The
size of less than 50m², constitutes Thirty-eight per cent of total housing in the
neighbourhood is less than 50m² and 29% of are four-people households; 10%
of these -people households; and 6% of the houses have more than six people
households (Turkun, et al., 2010; p. 270). Although the houses in Tozkoparan
were constructed for large families on low-incomes, the housing conditions are
inadequate.

The rental value in these three neighbourhoods is also a good indicator of the
poverty of these areas. When the rental value in Istanbul, which is higher than
other cities in Turkey, is compared with rentals in the three neighbourhoods, it
can be seen that these neighbourhoods have the lowest rentals in the city. In
Basibuyuk and Derbent, the majority of the rental houses are rented for
between £70 and £130 per month. However in Tozkoparan, it ranges from £70
to £200, because of the different structure of the neighbourhood and the size of
the flats, which are smaller than other neighbourhoods (Turkun, et al., 2010; p.
285-6).

7.3.4. The Relationship between Housing and Workplace
The location of the neighbourhoods and the workplaces of residents are directly
related in all three neighbourhoods; so any relocation due to UR will directly
affect the employment of residents.

In Basibuyuk in 56% of the households only one member of the family works; in
Derbent, 42% and in Tozkoparan, 50%. The proximity of Derbent to luxury
housing areas provides the possibility of finding jobs in the service sector in
upper-income houses around the neighbourhood, so that in Derbent, the total
percentage of employed people in a household is 84%. This also had an
important effect on the rate of women’s employment in Derbent, which at 28%
is the highest of the three neighbourhoods. The employed people in a
household is 86% in Basibuyuk and 73% in Tozkoparan. However, Tozkoparan is
an exception in the percentage of non-employed population - 27%, because of high number of retired dwellers in the neighbourhood (Turkun, et al., 2010; p. 324-25).

Of the forms of work, the highest rate of employment is ‘full-time waged worker’ in all three neighbourhoods (Table 7.5). The rate of full-time waged workers is the highest in Tozkoparan (76%). As shown in the previous section, the education level in Tozkoparan is higher than the other two neighbourhoods, and so employment in managerial level positions requiring training and experience (e.g. manager, chief, headman, specialist), is the highest (20%). The highest rate of employment is in Tozkoparan Neighbourhood (90%) and the rate of self-employment is quite high in all three neighbourhoods - 11% in Basibuyuk and in Derbent and 12% in Tozkoparan, for a working class neighbourhood (Turkun, et al., 2010; p. 328-30).

Table 7.5: Positions at work

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position at work %</th>
<th>Basibuyuk</th>
<th>Derbent</th>
<th>Tozkoparan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Full time waged worker</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>76.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part-time waged worker</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seasonal/causal worker</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unwaged family worker</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic house worker</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Answer</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Turkun, et al., 2010; p. 329-33

The proportion of employees working in the textile sector is quite high in the neighbourhoods, especially in Tozkoparan (10.4%) which is close to textile factories. Employment in the service sector is also important in Basibuyuk and
Tozkoparan as well as the high rated noted above for Derbent. The rate of skilled-worker’s employment (e.g. workers in private offices and public sector) is the highest in Tozkoparan (23%); in Derbent it is 10%; and in Basibuyuk it is 9%. The rate of unskilled-worker’s employment in the service sector, including workers in restaurants and cafes, is high in Basibuyuk (7%) and Derbent (10%). ‘Driver’, as a category of employment, is also a significant occupation in Tozkoparan and Derbent - both 9%. Lastly, the proportion of technical workers or repairpersons with training and qualifications, is high in all three of the neighbourhoods: in Derbent 15%; in Basibuyuk 13%; and in Tozkoparan 11% (Turkun, et al., 2010; p. 339).

The rate of employees working for less than the minimum wage, -£250 monthly in Turkey in 2009 - was 28% in Basibuyuk, 14% in Derbent and 13% in Tozkoparan. Almost the half of the employed residents are on a minimum wage, indicating that case study neighbourhoods are mainly composed of low-paid working class households (Turkun, et al., 2010, p.; p. 359): 33% of incomes in Basibuyuk, 27% in Tozkoparan and 18% in Derbent are under the minimum wage (Turkun, et al., 2010; p. 416-7).

The relation between workplace and housing is significant for all three neighbourhoods: most of the employed population works in the same district as their neighbourhood or at a location which is easy to reach by public transportation. In Basibuyuk, the majority of the workplaces is located in Kartal (46%), the closest district, and the second major location of employment is Kadikoy (15%), which is also close to Basibuyuk and easy to reach by public transportation (Map 7.11). In Derbent, the the main locations of employment are also close nearby districts - Sisli (30%) and Besiktas (11%) - as well as Sariyer where Derbent is located (31%) (Map 7.12). The majority of employees in Tozkoparan work in Gungoren District (26%), in which the neighbourhood
located, but also in districts which are easy to reach by public transportation (26%) (Turkun, et al., 2010, p. 343).

Map 7.11: Relation between Work place and place of residence in Basibuyuk Neighbourhood

Source: https://maps.google.co.uk/
7.4. The Historical Roots of Recent Political Resistance in the Neighbourhoods

In all three neighbourhoods there has been resistance to the UR process ever since they were designated as UR areas. The forms of organisations and the forms of resistance in each neighbourhood share similarities, but also have differences in relation to their political background, organisational capacity, and ownership patterns in the neighbourhood. The detail of recent political resistance in the neighbourhoods is analysed in the following sections of this chapter in detail by looking at different forms and moments of resistance in each neighbourhood.

Derbent Neighbourhood has the strongest left political background of the three neighbourhoods. It was established, with the support of a radical left
neighbourhood, called ‘1 May’, in the 1970s, and through its close ties with working class people in the area. The factories around the neighbourhood were politically active and workers had left political views. In particular, the Kavel Cable Factory where some of the dwellers were employed, had played a significant role in working class victories in Turkey. In 1963, the factory workers organised to demand overtime payments and a fair basis for their annual premium. This resistance took the shape of a 36-day strike which resulted in the passing of the Labour Act [1963] giving greater rights to all Turkish workers (Guney, 2007; Koparan, 1997). Derbent has always had connections with left political organisations and this historical political background had an important effect on the UR process, which will be analysed in detail in the next section.

Interestingly however, Basibuyuk, where the majority of the neighbourhood has right conservative, Islamist, and even radical Islamist political background, mounted one of the strongest resistances to the UR process. The neighbourhood’s left values and politics are very weak, but when threatened with relocation, the neighbourhood organised a political resistance, including a separate organisation of women.

Tozkoparan neighbourhood has a political background from the 1970s’ strong working class movement in Turkey (Member of Tozkoparan Neighbourhood Organisation (01), Interview, 27.05.2010). One of the members of the neighbourhood organisation emphasised the left political background of the neighbourhood (Member of Tozkoparan Neighbourhood Organisation, Tozkoparan (04), Interview), 13.07.2010:

Socialist and revolutionary struggle has occurred in this neighbourhood in the past and Tozkoparan had a left political reputation. There had been military operations in the neighbourhood against radical left groups after the 1980s coup in Turkey. That’s why they called the gecekondu homes, which used to be in the neighbourhood, ‘Cuba Neighbourhood’. It is
because there were a lot of people in that area who admired Che Guevara and Castro. That area was known as ‘Cuba’ since 1978.

As this comment indicates, there is a predominantly social democrat left political tradition in the neighbourhood; however in recent years the neighbourhood has lost its left political grounds compared to the radical 1970s (Member of Tozkoparan Neighbourhood Organisation, Tozkoparan (04), Interview, 13.07.2010).

In the districts where Basibuyuk (Maltepe Municipal District Area) and Derbent (Sariyer Municipal District Area) are located, other gecekondu neighbourhoods were announced as UR areas. In both districts, all the gecekondu neighbourhoods met monthly and took shared decisions about actions against the state. They also learned from their experience by sharing it, and supported each other during battles against police and in other democratic forms of resistance (e.g. press statements).

Resistance to UR in each neighbourhood is analysed in the following sections in detail. The main structure for analysing the forms of resistance in the neighbourhoods is two-fold: first, actions to remove the police from the neighbourhood are examined; and second, the exercise of democratic political rights are analysed as forms of resistance. These two forms are the only forms of resistance that are present in these neighbourhoods. These forms, where present, will be analysed at different moments of resistance in each neighbourhood. The UR process in each case study neighbourhood is examined in terms of the starting point of the UR project, which types of institutional partnerships were involved, and how the neighbourhood organisations were established. Different forms of resistance are analysed for each case study neighbourhood.
7.5. Derbent Neighbourhood

The first transformation process in Derbent started in the 1980s after a ‘cooperative’, which is a private investment company, bought more than half of the land where gecekondu homes were situated, and ended with the building a gated community in the area after demolishing the gecekondu on their land. The second transformation process started under the state UR policy. The gecekondu in the neighbourhood were to be demolished to build new flats in the area. This plan was prepared in relation to the macro-scale plan of Istanbul in 2003, according to which, the existing gecekondu would be demolished. Some of the dwellers will be offered to buy new houses. Though, in most cases this would be too expensive. For example in Derbent, new flats are going to be sold for around £500,000.

In the case of Derbent, the second option of dwellers in respect to redevelopment of the neighbourhood was the option of relocation to Kiptas-built flats, which were 40 km away from the city centre, owned by the GIM under the condition of purchase. The construction company of Ataturk cooperative offered this option. The first and second phases of redevelopment in the neighbourhood will be examined in this section in detail.

Before starting to examine the process, however, it is important to show the present distribution of land ownership in the neighbourhood. The majority of the neighbourhood’s land is owned by the cooperative (132,389 m² excluding MESA Houses). The second main owner of land is Greater Istanbul Municipality with 112,717 m². The national state owns 10,950 m²; and a private hospital corporation owns 5119 m² of the land. Around 200 dwellers have title deeds to their homes on Municipality land but there is no individual ownership of homes (Official, Derbent (05), Interview, 18.10.2010)(see Section 7.3.2).
7.5.1. **The First Regeneration Phase: The Construction of MESA Houses in Derbent**

The first transformation in Derbent was the purchase of land by the Atatürk Construction and Industry Cooperative, established by people who were not from the neighbourhood. In 1986, the cooperative started to buy state-owned vacant land from the neighbourhood. The cooperative system is used in two ways in Turkey. Firstly, cooperatives consist of any entity under the Cooperative Law, being a cooperative of citizens. On the other hand, in Turkey, cooperatives can also be used as a vehicle for joint investment by wealthy individuals, as in the case of the Atatürk Cooperative in Derbent.

From information given in interviews for this research, the people who bought land in gecekondu neighbourhoods had close relations with the right wing party in the government. The defeat of the working class movement in the 1980s after the coup and the weakening of support for left political groups in gecekondu neighbourhoods also facilitated the purchase of the land in the neighbourhood (Member of Derbent Neighbourhood Organisation (01), Interview, 29.05.2010, Interview; District Municipality RPP Council Member (06), Interview, 19.10.2010). The land bought by the cooperative was also shared with 72 lot owners who were gecekondu dwellers living in the neighbourhood. The cooperative company had to deal with these owners as well as with the municipality, and to do so, had to negotiate with them in some way. However, the cooperative company have not tried to negotiate. Because of that, on the grounds of disagreement between the cooperative and 72 lot owners for sharing the land, the cooperative filed a claim to eliminate joint ownership of the land with individual owners. The court decided to solve the case via sale by auction. In 1996, the 72 individual lots were purchased by the cooperative because of the dwellers’ lack of information about the process, they could not pursue the case.
Between 2001 and 2002, a big construction company, called MESA, built 336 flats for high-income households on 76.634 m² of this land. The construction of luxury housing in the neighbourhood created a spatial and social segregation between dwellers in the MESA houses and the dwellers in gecekondu settlement. MESA houses are protected by walls, fences, wires and, cctv cameras.

7.5.2. The Second Regeneration Phase: Urban regeneration as a Form of State Intervention, and Moments of Resistance in Derbent

In 2004, Derbent was announced as an UR area by the district municipality, which was then under the power of the JDP. The first reaction of the gecekondu dwellers to the UR project was to establish a committee, but this was not a very easy process in the neighbourhood where left politics were followed by the minority, and the majority of residents supported liberal and right politics. The committee was accused of being biased towards the left, but the members organised more than 100 meetings with dwellers to convince them to claim compensation from the state for their ‘work and labour’ on the establishment of the neighbourhood. The meetings started in 2004, but it was a very slow process trying to involve dwellers with differing political views: nevertheless, the committee continued to engage with dwellers and continued to inform them about the process. The first big meeting was held with the participation of 750 people from the neighbourhood. They decided to organise against the UR project and selected street representatives - 85 street representatives for 53 streets. Some of the streets have more than one representative because the streets are too large for a single representative to consult with all the dwellers on that street (Member of Derbent Neighbourhood Organisation (01), Interview, 29.05.2010).

After getting organised in the neighbourhood, the committee started to have separate meetings with the district municipality, the cooperative of Ataturk and
with the contractor company, Cemre Construction. Participants in the meetings were selected from residents with differing political views. On realising that the cooperative was very keen on starting the project and evicting the dwellers, the committee shared the attitudes of stakeholders with dwellers in the neighbourhood and this led to the establishment of a neighbourhood organisation in 2005 to run the responsibilities of the committee on legal basis and to achieve recognition from the state authorities (Member of Derbent Neighbourhood Organisation (01), Interview, 29.05.2010; Head of Derbent Neighbourhood Organisation (03), Interview, 02.11.2010). The previous experience of the MESA housing project and the eviction of the 72 dwellers had created lack of trust in the state and the developers. This negative experience brought the different groups in the neighbourhood together to make quick decisions to resist the UR project (Member of Derbent Neighbourhood Organisation (01), Interview, 29.05.2010).

In the UR process, neither the GIM nor the MHA was officially involved in the process officially. From the beginning, it is only the District Municipality that runs the process. However, officers from the GIM contacted some gecekondu neighbourhoods, including Derbent, and offered to move residents to the newly-built housing areas, 30 km away from the city centre. The houses offered were built by the construction company of the GIM, Kiptas, as earthquake-proof stock in Kagithane or Pendik (District Municipality RPP Council Member (06), Interview). The GIM proposed that one gecekondu house would count as down-payment on the flat they offered and the rest of the price of the flat could be paid off in instalments over 20 years (Member of Derbent Neighbourhood Organisation (01), Interview, 29.05.2010). The dwellers of Derbent refused the relocation process and the previous head of Derbent Neighbourhood Organisation clearly summarises the reasons behind their refusal (Member of Derbent Neighbourhood Organisation (01), Interview, 29.05.2010):
We said that we are not going to bargain for our houses, because when we first established this neighbourhood we never thought that our neighbourhood was going to increase in value and we still do not see it this way. This is our living area and we have a living culture here. Everyone is like a relative, and everyone knows everyone in the neighbourhood. We have very close relations with each other and our social solidarity is very strong. It was not easy to establish this, that’s why we do not want to lose it.

After the residents’ refusal to move, the contractor firm sent written notice to every dweller in the neighbourhood giving them 15 days to either clear their houses, or compromise with the company on their terms or leave the neighbourhood (Member of Derbent Neighbourhood Organisation (01), Interview, 29.05.2010). The company managed to meet 300 dwellers and was able to come to agreements with some of them. The number of dwellers involved in these agreements is not definite, but is said to be between 57 and 102 (District Municipality RPP Council Member (06), Interview, 31.01.2011). As previously, the contractor company offered GIM stock housing constructed by Kiptas, for the relocation of dwellers. However, the GIM has no official involvement in the UR project of Derbent and this raises questions about the relationship between the state body and a private company. In my interview with the RPP District Council Member, it was stated that (District Municipality RPP Council Member (06), Interview, 31.01.2011):

I gave a parliamentary question to the GIM council and asked how a private construction company can offer houses from publicly owned housing stock of the GIM to Derbent dwellers? What is the role of the GIM in this UR project? What are the reasons behind a private company offering GIM housing stock? If there is an agreement, who are the contracting parties? However, I have not got any response for four months. That is to say, they do not offer a democratic solution, which is open to all residents.
In the Derbent UR process, none of the stakeholders - neither the cooperative, the contractor company nor the state - have met dwellers all together and explained the project. The only method used by the contractor company was to meet dwellers individually (District Municipality RPP Council Member (06), Interview, 31.01.2011). So far, the only official state body that runs the UR project is the District Municipality, and after the local elections in 2009, the local state is under the power of the RPP, which is a nationalist social democrat party. One of the RPP District Council Members states the difference in approach (District Municipality RPP Council Member (06), Interview, 31.01.2011):

We do not let anything be approved that is against the dwellers of the neighbourhood. We will not prepare building licenses, nor approve the building project under these circumstances. When we do not approve, no one can build anything here. But how long we can do this? A new political structure sharing a common political ground at all scales of the state, with the police force and the district governorship, could have total control over the neighbourhood and evict the dwellers. But as long as we have the power, we will not let this happen.

At the time of writing, the district municipality was supporting the neighbourhood in their resistance to urban regeneration; however, the RPP does not have a particular policy on UR. Their understanding is a pluralist one, where they see the UR process as equally open to the influence of all stakeholders. Accordingly, the District Municipality has begun a new commission in 2010, involving universities, representatives of the neighbourhood, NGOs, lawyers, urban planners and officials of the district municipality. They encourage and support neighbourhoods in establishing their counter-cooperative movement against the contractor company (Head of Derbent Neighbourhood Organisation (03), Interview, 02.11.2010).
The involvement of the MHA in the UR project in Derbent is not written or declared, it was only mentioned in some of the speeches by the GIM Mayor, but the MHA itself has not mentioned anything about the project in Derbent so far. The involvement of the GIM is also under question and not yet clarified. The only authority officially dealing with UR is the District Municipality. In contrast with other UR areas, the MHA and the GIM did not take an official role in the process in the time of writing.

The resistance in Derbent can be analysed in two main forms: firstly, actions to remove the police from the neighbourhood; and secondly, using their democratic rights to show on what basis they are against the project. As responses to different strategies of the UR process since 2006, resistance has taken different forms. Derbent has been a main focus of police action, which has been reported in the local and national media at different times during the UR process in Istanbul.

There are three moments of action to remove the police from the neighbourhood in Derbent between 2006 and 2011. The first one occurred during the demolition of the Neighbourhood Organisation’s building in 2006. A year after the establishment of the neighbourhood organisation and active use of the organisation’s building, where dwellers started to meet every night after work, the Municipality sent a notification to demolish the building in order to construct a new community health centre. After the notification, dwellers appealed against the demolition and suggested eight alternative locations for the health centre; however, the municipality refused their appeals (Member of Derbent Neighbourhood Organisation (01), Interview, 29.05.2010). After their appeals failed, dwellers kept guard over the building every night for a week, and also asked surrounding neighbourhoods to inform them if they saw the police force coming to Derbent. On 23 March 2006, police forces arrived in the neighbourhood around 5 o’clock in the morning and attacked the organisation
building with tear gas. The neighbourhood guards were taken to hospital for treatment for exposure to the gas. The gas attack affected a 2 km-wide area and many cats and dogs died as a result. The day was described by two of the dwellers in the neighbourhood in a journal as follows (Yuruyus, 2006):

I have been living in here since I was 20: we had made everything in this neighbourhood ourselves. Riot police attacked our organisation building. People defended it but early in the morning our numbers were low. They struck us with truncheons and took us into custody. When we were in custody, other dwellers resisted to police attacks by putting barricades around the building.

They swear to their mothers, can people accept that? We resisted. We were right. If they come again, we will resist better! ... They threw tear gas and then beat us. This is terror. This state made us get organised.

The same day, in the following hours, police dropped tear gas on every street in the neighbourhood to stop dwellers leaving their houses. Approximately fifty people did manage to go out on the streets, but they were taken into custody immediately. The riot police, a specialised police force for dealing with meetings, demonstrations and movements in Turkey, encircled the organisation’s building and demolished it. The building was located near the MESA housing development, and after the demolition, dwellers attacked MESA houses, blaming them for being the reason for the UR process. One of the members of the organisation illustrated the tension between MESA and Derbent dwellers as follows (Member of Derbent Neighbourhood Organisation (01), Interview, 29.05.2010):

MESA houses are segregated from our neighbourhood. You can say that ours is hell and theirs is heaven. The rules in their site, luxury houses, and gated community surrounded by secured wires and city surveillance cameras, shows how scared they are from us. They are right to be scared of us. From now on, we say that they should be scared. Atatürk cooperative came and
invaded our neighbourhood; they disregarded people who had their title deeds.

After the demolition, dwellers in the neighbourhood put up barricades and engaged in combat with the police force. The dweller’s actions to get the police out of the neighbourhood achieved its target, and police forces were withdrawn from the neighbourhood at nine o’clock at night (Member of Derbent Neighbourhood Organisation (01), Interview, 29.05.2010; District Municipality RPP Council Member (06), Interview, 31.01.2011).

A second phase of resistance in the form of actions to remove the police from the neighbourhood, occurred during the demolition of three houses by the GIM on 25 November 2010. In this incident, 600 riot police and municipal police officers used force to clear dwellers from their houses. The other dwellers in the neighbourhood supported the residents of the houses and resisted the police. One of the residents whose house was demolished told a news portal that:

All of my furniture, my jewellery and even my identification card remained under the demolition. I could not keep them. Police closed my mouth not to shout and not to call my neighbours. They took my husband and threw him out of the house. I was left alone with police in the house. They demolished our house at night. I am still working and I am a working woman. I have made my house with my honour and dignity. I did not steal anything; I did it with my own labour (Sendika.org, 2010).

The last action to remove the police from the neighbourhood occurred on 8 February 2011. This was very similar to the first attack by the police on the neighbourhood in 2006. Riot police came to the neighbourhood in the early hours in the morning to demolish forty houses whose owners had a deal with contractor company. The demolition in the neighbourhood created anger among the other dwellers. Police was there to facilitate the demolition of houses, because the state was expecting resistance to demolish houses in the neighbourhood from the other dwellers. So, the police were helping the
demolition team and taking the people away who were resisting. Police used tear gas and physical force ward off counter-attacks by the dwellers. Dwellers were very angry with their neighbours who negotiated with the construction company. They blocked the main road to the CBD of Istanbul and police used tear gas and pressure water to break up the crowd. The attacks of the police and the attacks of the dwellers went on for the whole day (Erollu & Kose, 2011; Yildirim, 2011): 10-15 dwellers were injured and two of them had heart attacks. The left newspaper, Birgun, described the day as ‘urban regeneration demolition turned into police operation’ (Yildirim, 2011).

The second form of resistance in the neighbourhood involved organising press statements involving 2000 people, organising large numbers of dwellers to regularly attend district council meetings numbers (100-150 people), to put pressure on council members when decisions were taken. They were also planning to organise different kinds of actions such as blocking main roads, for future resistance acts. The dwellers were supported by professional chambers, academics, political groups and other neighbourhoods. However, 50 people are on trial after being taken into custody during their acts of resistance (Member of Derbent Neighbourhood Organisation (01), Interview, 29.05.2010).

7.5.3. The Redevelopment Process in Derbent

Urban regeneration in Derbent can be analysed in two forms: regeneration as a form of market driven gentrification, and/or regeneration as a form of state intervention. In the first form, the regeneration of part of the neighbourhood was carried out through joint investment by wealthy individuals (the cooperative). The neighbourhood, located close to a very high-income housing area, has experienced spatial and social segregation since 2001. The spatial segregation between the gecekondu settlement and the MESA housing is clearly visible in physical separators - high walls, barbed wire and camera systems, used by the MESA.
The second form of urban regeneration is state intervention in collaboration with market or individual landowner. However, the various pressures on the state from the cooperative, as the biggest land owner in the neighbourhood (see Section 7.5); from other developers who want to invest in the area because of its location (see Section 7.3.2); and the high value of the land are important aspects of the form of the state’s intervention. Urban regeneration started as a policy of the local municipality to rehabilitate the housing in the area, but due to pressures from developers and the changing policy of the state towards urban regeneration, the rehabilitation became instead part of the state UR projects. State UR involves not rehabilitation of existing areas, but the demolition of gecekondus and construction of new houses or flats in the neighbourhood, either high-end private housing or Kiptas flats owned by the GIM.

Militant resistance by the dwellers to state UR created two important breaking points in the strategies of the state: firstly, the resistance created a barrier to the accumulation of capital in the area, because the violence associated with the protests put the investors off; and secondly, as a result of this resistance, the nation state has avoided becoming involved in UR in this neighbourhood. The investors tried to find a solution in the neighbourhood to negotiate with the dwellers and the contractor offered houses built by Kiptas, which is the firm of GIM, to the dwellers for their relocation. So, it is possible to claim that the scale of the developer is respondent by city-scale level state authority, even if the GIM has not involved in the UR process in Derbent directly.

The only form of national state’s involvement is in the use of police force and pressure on the leaders of the movement by taking them into custody and pursuing prosecutions of individuals for their participation in the protests. The resistance in the neighbourhood created a change in the policy of the
Municipality, which gave support to the dwellers against the decision made at other scales of the state. Hence the local level state took more responsibility to control the social order in the neighbourhood. The national state hands over the political management to the local state. It is because; the District municipality can handle, contain and manage the resistance through being in the neighbourhood and dealing with it through day-to-day relations. District municipality is in direct contact with the dwellers both during the election process and after the election. Especially, council members are in contact with particular neighbourhoods of the district as they are potential voters. But, also council members know the historical and political background of the neighbourhood; it is because they often grew up in the district. To get elected at the local level, local ties carry importance.

7.6. Basibuyuk Neighbourhood
The UR process in Basibuyuk began in 2004 as a part of state’s urban regeneration policy for gecekondu areas through a partnership between the GIM, the MHA and the District Municipality. The aim was to demolish gecekondu in the neighbourhood and re-locate dwellers with ownership rights to MHA flats within the neighbourhood. Currently, six of these blocks are being built on a 3500 m² area which was previously green open space.

7.6.1. Urban regeneration as a Form of State Intervention, and Moments of Resistance in Basibuyuk
In the 1990s the dwellers of Basibuyuk put pressure on the district municipality for titles to their land. The Mayor of the District supported their claims, but land titles can only be granted by a local authority if the municipality owns the land. In order to grant the titles, in 1997 the District Mayor took the body responsible of the (national) state-owned lands in Basibuyuk to court to transfer all the built-up area in Basibuyuk to the Municipality. Upon transfer the municipality
would be able to give land titles to the residents living in those areas. The case was finalised in 2002 and the built-up areas were transferred to the Municipality on condition that titles would be granted to the residents. The court awarded ownership of the land to the Municipality; however, the titles had still not been granted to the residents at the time of writing.

In 2004, a new district mayor from the JDP was elected, who promised to finalise the process of transferring the titles. But instead, within three months of his election, the land was assigned to the MHA and the whole neighbourhood was designated as an UR area. At the same time, the GIM prepared large-scale plans for the UR of Basibyuk and adjacent gecekondu neighbourhoods, which were approved in 2005. This was followed by the preparation of a protocol in 2006 to conduct the UR process through a partnership between the MHA, the District Municipality and the GIM. According to the protocol, gecekondu homes would be demolished and new affordable houses constructed by the MHA in the neighbourhood, which would be transferred to residents with land titles, or sold to those residents without land title.

The first area subject to regeneration was less than half of the neighbourhood (400 thousand m²), and residents were designated to be removed to Keci Yatagi, five kilometres away (I. G. Municipality, 2004), where the MHA planned to build 1800 housing units for the households relocated from Basibuyuk. In the same year, professional chambers opened a law suit to cancel the UR project, because the plan had given permission to build in a water reserve and forest area. This appeal had an important effect on the housing decision-making process and the construction of new housing in Keci Yatagi was cancelled. However, this did not stop the UR process and the public green park area, which by law was not available for development, was given permission for construction of the MHA affordable housing units.
This also had implications for the protocol agreement between the MHA, District and the GiM. This protocol involves the land (400 thousand m²) that was transferred to the district municipality in 2006 by the court case. In 2010, six apartment blocks of 300 flats of 80m² each were built in that area. As a part of the MHA’s housing policy, the rightful owners of houses in the neighbourhood are given the choice to purchase a flat with the demolition value of their gecekondu homes as down payment and state-subsidised credit for repayment over 15 or 20 years. There was no option for the ‘non-owners’ of the gecekondu homes—those who were not able to produce official proof of purchase or a title deed, or 30% of the whole neighbourhood (see Section 7.3.2).

In the 2009 local elections, the head of the neighbourhood organisation was elected as a council member of the district municipality, and the RPP candidate was elected as the Mayor of the District influenced by election campaigns in the gecekondu areas of Maltepe District (Council Member, Basibuyuk (01) / Former Head of Basibuyuk Neighbourhood Association, Interview, 20.10.2010). The neighbourhood residents were not the main reason behind the election of the RPP mayoral candidate, but had an important effect in the election process. The gecekondu dwellers had high expectations from the new Mayor, who comes from a social democrat background, in order to stop or improve the UR project. However, the weak policies of the RPP in relation to UR and their lack of power at different scales of the state resulted in similar policies to those of the previous JDP local government. The advisor to the new district Mayor explains the weakness of RPP UR policies at the national level and the lack of political power at local scale as follows (Advisor, Basibuyuk (04), Interview, 12.01.2011):

> We organised a meeting with a commission from the district municipality and the neighbourhood dwellers; however, officials from the Municipality did not say a word in the meeting. Dwellers found it insincere and because of that, dwellers’ trust in the new local government is damaged. It is because they voted for them and trusted them and also the Mayor promised
to give them the title deeds to their land after the election. This means that the mayor is either being ignorant about UR process or underestimating it. After the election, the Mayor said it is not possible to grant the title deeds under the existing legislation. So he needs to face the consequences.

I think all local governments where RPP is in power face the same problem: they are all convinced that there is no option other than the MHA model in the UR process and this is accepted by all of them. In reality, there are options other than the MHA model. But to believe that it is possible, you need to have a separate political strategy and project, a political will. If you do not have those, then you are confined to the MHA model.

Another of the RPP council members explains how they were persuaded to cooperate with construction companies to regenerate Basibuyuk, without involvement of dwellers as a part of partnership model with the MHA (Council Member, Basibuyuk(05), Interview, 20.01.2011):

We explained to the neighbourhood that it is not possible to fulfil the promises of the Mayor in this neighbourhood. We said it is only possible with a developer who has new stock housing. The district municipality may allocate resources; however, it does not have any. Can get credits by using their real estates, but it does not have that much real estate. Cooperatives are another possibility, but under what conditions? We had different solutions at the end. Large big-name construction companies offered to invest in the neighbourhood. But you need to have your title deeds to negotiate with them. The dwellers own their gecekondu home without any legal title deeds. Maltepe Municipality owns the all the land, so the land is state-owned. So you cannot negotiate, as the dwellers, with construction companies. So, the dwellers were mistaken. The district Mayor started negotiations with the MHA and they agreed on the continuation of the UR project.
One of the high ranking officials in the District Municipality confirms that the Mayor had the authority from the municipal council to arrange a new protocol with the MHA (Official, Basibuyuk (02), Interview, 13.01.2011):

The council gave the authority to the Mayor to arrange a new protocol. But we do not know what kind of protocol they are planning to arrange. Like us, the dwellers also wait for the process of the preparation of the protocol. They established a new department in the district municipality to liaise with the MHA. I asked them, what is your job description? They said we are the contact bureau of the MHA in the District. Their role will be definite after they arrange the protocol.

The current process of the UR project in the neighbourhood is to prepare a new protocol with the MHA. So, as the interviews show, the election of the RPP did not make an appreciable change to the process.

7.6.2. The Resistance in Basibuyuk as a Moment in Class Struggle

Since the acceptance of the UR project, there has been a considerable resistance in the neighbourhood starting in 2009 when construction began in the green park area of the neighbourhood. As we have seen, the neighbourhood is a highly conservative neighbourhood, and resistance to urban regeneration was not expected: rather, the neighbourhood was seen as a secure haven for the UR project. As the respondent from the MHA mentioned, they were expecting a very positive process of regeneration in the neighbourhood (Official from MHA, Interview, 03.11.2010), because of the residents’ strong support for the ruling party (JDP), and because the dwellers had been expecting to get titles to their homes for a long time. The UR process offered a possibility that could their ownership of their homes.

Despite its conservative political background, a neighbourhood organisation with 350 members was established in 2007 to lead the resistance against the UR
The resistance to UR in the neighbourhood had two different forms, similar to those experienced in Derbent: actions to remove the police from the neighbourhood or resist the presence and siege of the police in the neighbourhood; and the use of democratic rights (see Photo 7.8) to stop the UR process. These two forms are experienced at different moments of resistance. The attacks on police presence and attacks by police on the neighbourhood started on 29 January 2007, when a group of dwellers went to visit the Turkish Parliament in Ankara to stop UR in their neighbourhood. Fifteen hundred riot police surrounded the neighbourhood to protect the construction area in the green park. As most of the men in the neighbourhood had left for the meeting in the Parliament, women and children took action to resist the police that day. This 24-hour resistance involved violent confrontations between police and residents. Two dwellers from the neighbourhood described the police attack on the neighbourhood to a newspaper as follows (Dogan, 2007):

We woke up in the morning because of screams. Our neighbours were screaming that ‘They are here to demolish our houses!’ To protect our houses, we tried to stop them to invade the neighbourhood. However, the police attacked us, including women and children, with their batons. They used a huge amount of teargas so that people who were in their house were affected as well. Lots of children couldn’t breathe and were coughing for a very long time afterwards.

This brutal attack by the police rapidly led to an increase in membership of the neighbourhood organisation: 1297 new members joined after the incident, meaning that the group now included 98% of the UR area dwellers in the neighbourhood (Council Member, Basibuyuk (01) / Former Head of Basibuyuk Neighbourhood Association, Interview, 20.10.2010). However, the police invasion of the neighbourhood continued, and on 23 September 2007, 3000 riot police arrived to protect the construction site of the MHA houses.
The police siege and attacks continued during the construction of the MHA flats when the dwellers responded with attacks on the police. The second police intervention took place on 27 February 2008, was when 3000 riot police guarded the workers who were delivering the construction material and equipment, and the dwellers resisted successfully and did not let the materials enter the construction site. The role of police in this process was not surprising because the MHA sold the houses to the riot police with a reduced cost to take their support. This can be seen as bribing the police force to support the accumulation process in the neighbourhood. The purchase of houses by the police is used as a strategy by the nation state (MHA).

Because of this resistance, the construction contractor withdrew from the construction due to the loss to the company in money and time (Council Member, Basibuyuk (01) / Former Head of Basibuyuk Neighbourhood
Association, Interview, 20.10.2010). The high number and level of brutal attacks and violence by the police reduced in the neighbourhood following negotiations with the district municipality, through a permanent police force remained in the neighbourhood.

Nevertheless, four more violent attacks by the police realised before construction could start (19 March 2008, 3 April 2008, 7 April 2008, 11 April 2008), and these were responded to by actions by the dwellers to remove the police from the neighbourhood. During the struggles between police and dwellers, 52 dwellers were taken into custody and 38 dwellers were injured, including two severe injuries (Council Member, Basibuyuk (01) / Former Head of Basibuyuk Neighbourhood Association, Interview, 20.10.2010).

An important form of opposition in the neighbourhood, apart from actions to remove the police, was establishing ‘resistance tents’ to protest against the MHA housing units and keep a 24 hour guard on the construction site to prevent the construction company from building. A significant aspect of resistance tents was that the majority of those keeping guard were women.

This led to the formation of a separate women's organisation in the neighbourhood. This organisation called on women dwellers to meet. As it is a highly conservative neighbourhood, the involvement of women dwellers in resistance was an unexpected situation. After meeting with the main neighbourhood organisation, the women dwellers selected twelve representatives for a women’s commission as a part of the main organisation and they mobilised all the women dwellers in the neighbourhood, gaining 1000 women members. They kept guarding in the tents and the tents turned into meeting places for them, where they cooked, knitted and met their children after school (Council Member, Basibuyuk (01) / Former Head of Basibuyuk Neighbourhood Association, Interview, 20.10.2010).
The second form of resistance in the neighbourhood in parallel with opposition to the police, was to claim democratic rights. This strategy was supported by professional chambers, academics, activists, other gecekondu neighbourhood dwellers (especially in Maltepe District) and political groups. The moments of resistance in the form of democratic rights involved applying to the High Administrative Court twice for a ‘stay of execution’ by the UR project and the construction of the MHA flats. The dwellers won the case on the grounds of the violation of public interest, principles of urban planning and rules of democratic governance (Kuyucu & Unsal, 2010; p. 1488). The Court also declined the appeal of the District Municipality against this the decision. Despite the Court’s decision on the case, the construction of flats continued. This is a typical process.
in Turkey, where the authoritarian pressures of the politicians are often stronger than the state structure.

The second form of mobilisation of democratic rights had meeting with a range of academics; attending and presenting at conferences; meeting with professional chambers (e.g. architects, urban planners) and academics to develop an alternative planning process; meeting with neighbourhoods subjected to urban regeneration to share their experiences and learn from each other; preparing press statements; and working against the JDP and on behalf of the RPP in the local election process.

However, these forms of action have not been able to stop the construction of the six blocks of flats (see Photo 7.9) on the green space, but, in the time when I was writing, they have managed to stop the MHA from continuing the rebuilding project. The similar UR strategy of the district municipality in Basibuyuk as in Derbent, including partnership with the MHA is on the agenda of Basibuyuk municipality. The lack of producing responses to the dwellers’ demands in Basibuyuk which was expected from the RPP municipality, weakened the organised resistance of the neighbourhood. This is because the dwellers believed that RPP was their last chance to rescue their neighbourhood. The establishment of four new neighbourhood organisations by the GIM, involving the support of the MHA as well, also weakened ties between dwellers. These community organisations, created top down by the municipality, have similarities to ‘company unions’ where a company effectively sets up and sponsors a union. (Council Member, Basibuyuk (01 / Former Head of Basibuyuk Neighbourhood Association), Interview, 20.10.2010). However, this was done when this research was just completed, because of that the insight information about these organisations were very limited.
7.6.3. The Redevelopment Process in Basibuyuk

Urban regeneration in Basibuyuk can be analysed in terms of four aspects of changing forms of state intervention. These are different partnerships organised by different scales of the state, the lack of adequate response from the local state, the depoliticisation strategies of the state, and dividing dwellers by individualising property policy. Firstly, different scales of the state established partnerships at different moments of UR process, involving congruent or conflictual relations. The interventions of the state are not stable, and are very complex: a decision made by a central authority can face conflict within different scales of the state, or resistance at the local scale. In the case of Basibuyuk, the UR project decision was made at a national scale by the MHA, but was not free from influence from other scales of the state or conflicts between different scales of the state. So, different scales of the state establish congruent or conflictual partnerships for a particular moment of a state intervention.

In the beginning of the UR process, national (the MHA), city (the GIM) and district (District Municipality) scales of the state adopted a congruent UR project strategy for the neighbourhood. However, resistance by the neighbourhood dwellers posed a barrier to the accumulation of capital at the neighbourhood scale by opposing the start of the MHA’s flats construction. This created breakdowns in the accumulation of capital with the withdrawal of the first contractor from the project, and led to the long-term presence of a great number of police in the neighbourhood.

During the local elections, resistance in Basibuyuk and in other neighbourhoods resulted in not only the loss of trust in the Mayor and the UR policy of the JDP, but also in the social democrat spatial political strategy of the RPP which had created hope for the residents. The RPP government at the district level did not
meet the demands and expectations of the residents for gaining land titles, or for public housing provision.

The second form of state intervention was inadequacy of the intervention at local scale in order to respond the demands of the neighbourhood dwellers, which can be examined on two bases. Firstly, the political strategy of the residents at the local level was not effective due to the lack of legal basis and inadequate political power to change the legislation. This inadequacy stems not only from the lack of pressure on the national state to change the UR policy but also from the pressures from international and national large-scale developers seeking to bring Istanbul into global city networks and integrate the city into global capitalist relations. These demands create an upward rescaling of the state in the form of the centralisation of planning powers (see Chapter 6). Secondly, as gecekondu areas have become a part of capitalist commodity relations, and as the land became individually owned and available for sale, there has been a significant expectation that the existing occupiers gained benefit from redevelopment of the area. In this way, some of them expect to get more than one flat in return to the land, which is more valuable than the one they are living now. The RPP authority at the district level has provided a more favourable alternative political strategy for the residents compared to the policies of the JDP. Hence, gecekondu areas are considered as a commodity in the housing market by the RPP and their political strategy is also based on producing rent in the UR process by increasing the density of housing. The difference between the former JDP authority and the following RPP authority in Maltepe District is their understanding of the redistribution of benefit. While RPP proposes to share the benefit of redevelopment with the residents and small- and middle-scale developers, the JDP proposes to share the benefit with big-scale developers and higher income groups that can move to the new housing.
The third form of intervention in the UR process, was started by the intervention of the national state in the neighbourhood, but the resistance of the residents created problems with the project that were left to the lower levels of the state to solve. This is a tactical use of lower levels of the state to control the resistance in the neighbourhood (See Chapter 6, Section 6.5.3). The interview respondent from the MHA stated that in Basibuyuk they had serious problems because of neighbourhood resistance and consequently they decided that it was not possible to intervene at the neighbourhood scale without the involvement of local authorities (Official from the MHA, Interview, 03.11.2010).

Fourthly, the state restricted its relations with the neighbourhood to the level of individual interactions. The first method was to avoid meetings with the whole neighbourhood to discuss the project. The second method was the development of individual-based solutions in the UR process focusing on individual ownership rights. The negotiations with residents over land titles and protests were carried out in individual meetings. The last method was to fragment neighbourhood solidarity by offering different rights to different ownership types. The recent consequence of this was the division between dwellers who allowed the local authority measure their land and house to get an offer for relocation and those who refused to cooperate.

7.7. Tozkoparan

The UR process in Tozkoparan is an example of the state’s UR policy in the gecekondu prevention areas. The aim of UR here is to demolish the existing flats and build new ones in the same area without relocating the residents. However, the new flats will be more expensive than the existing housing. So, the residents either need to be able to pay the difference or they can be offered relocation to the MHA housing areas, 40 km away from the city centre.
7.7.1. Urban regeneration as a Form of State Intervention, and Moments of Resistance in Tozkoparan

Tozkoparan is a different case in terms of the basis of the UR process from the other two neighbourhoods examined above. With the previous descriptions of the housing and ownership structure of the neighbourhoods (see Sections 7.3.2 and 7.3.3), Tozkoparan is an affordable housing area developed by the state under Gecekondu Law to provide housing to replace demolished gecekondu homes or formal housing which had been demolished for other reasons. Along with the transference of the powers and rights in relation to the Gecekondu Law to the MHA (see Chapter 6), the land where the neighbourhood’s located was also transferred to the MHA, with the exception of the buildings owned by the residents.

The neighbourhood has a relatively low density housing for Istanbul, and large areas of the land are green parks and sports facilities. These large areas of undeveloped land were seen as an opportunity for UR to increase the number of housing units in the area to gain further rent. The advisor to the District Municipality affirmed in the interview that (Advisor, Tozkoparan(09), Interview, 01.02.2011):

This area is very feasible according to us. The density of the buildings and population is very low in this neighbourhood. When we increase the density, we can easily regenerate the neighbourhood. We can find finance, as well; this enables us to keep the dwellers in the neighbourhood. ...We have 4000 housing units in the neighbourhood, we may build another 8000 or we may create different attraction centres. ... For example, instead of constructing 50 more flats, a developer may prefer building 15 shops, which is more attractive. The builder may say “Give me a planning permit to build a hotel rather than 250 flats”. This all needs demolition of the [existing] flats. So, we may transform the neighbourhood by providing different functions other than housing. The public wins from that.
All the political and official actors coming from different political perspectives agreed on the feasibility of developing the open spaces and vacant lands. The municipality has a JDP majority in power; but the RPP council member of the district claimed that the JDP had taken up RPP ideas. (Council, Tozkoparan (08)/Council Member, GIM (01), Interview, 26.01.2011):

We said ‘Let’s not relocate the neighbourhood, let’s solve it here’. But how? If we increase the density and build 12 thousand flats, we can give 4500 flats to the dwellers and 9000 to the builder, and we can keep the rest as reserve housing. Now our friends from JDP are working on that (see Section 7.4).

The similarity of the policies of the JDP and RPP is evident in the respondent’s use of ‘friends’ for the opposition party members.

The officials in the Urban Regeneration Department of the District Municipality also emphasised the advantage of having large green areas available to the UR project:

When you look at whole Gungoren District, Tozkoparan is the only neighbourhood that has large green areas and vacant lands. Of course, having that much vacant land in the neighbourhood creates encouragement for the UR project. ... The increase in the density is an inevitable condition for regeneration. But I don’t know how much we need to increase. We can estimate that after we count construction costs and the value of real estate property, 4500 flats will be demolished and 8000-8500 flats might be built (Official, Tozkoparan(06), Interview, 17.01.2011).

Increase in density is our weapon. The state does not have that much budget anyway. There is no state institution or developer who is going to finance this project. Of course, we do not know what the MHA and the GIM think about it. They might want to get some profit. It is possible to use that profit on behalf of public interest, but we do not know (Official, Tozkoparan(05), Interview, 17.01.2011).
The UR process started by a revision of existing master and small-scale plans by the Ministry of Development and Housing on 28 March 2007. At the same time, planning powers for gecekondu prevention areas were transferred to the MHA with the change in Gecekondu Law in 22 March 2007. On 8 August 2007, the GIM went to court to repeal the planning activities of the Ministry for Tozkoparan (Court File, 2007), the MHA became the defendant because of changing planning powers. The reason behind the GIM action was to get involved in the planning process, rather than being told by the Ministry a local scale decision. While the case was continuing, Tozkoparan District Municipality and the MHA prepared a protocol on 11 April 2008 to continue the UR project together. The District Municipality renounced the case against the MHA in return for being a part of the UR project and this was a condition to be fulfilled by the municipality (Tozkoparan Protocol, 2008). On 17 November 2009 the court decided to cancel the previous master and small-scaled plans for the neighbourhood (Court File, 2007). The GIM wanted to over-rule the planning powers of the Ministry so it could carry out UR without having to consult them. But in the meantime, the law had changed to give the planning powers to the MHA. So that in order to get the district level planning powers, the GIM had to take the MHA to court. Meanwhile, the MHA and the District did a deal to continue with UR, so the District gave up fighting the GIM, but instead sought to involve them in the process.

The Urban Regeneration Department of the GIM and the District Municipality decided in principle to announce Tozkoparan as an ‘UR Area’ due to earthquake risk and to start the regeneration process under the Municipality Law, Article 73, that gives the GIM the power carry out UR projects without the involvement of the MHA (see Section 6.3.3). When the first protocol was prepared between the MHA and the District Municipality, the moment of rescaling of the state was upward. The converging interests of the developers putting pressure on national scale of the state - in this case the MHA - and the political strategies of
the District Municipality turned the conflictual relation between different scales of the state to a congruent one. The advisor to the District Mayor clarifies its involvement in the UR process (Advisor, Tozkoparan (09), Interview, 01.02.2011):

We do not have the power to regenerate the neighbourhood. All the power was transferred to the MHA for planning. Once the MHA got the powers, the Ministry did not have planning powers anymore. So, the whole process is beyond our powers. But we said that if this neighbourhood is in our district and if they start an UR project here, then we should be involved. Why did we think so? In the end, the residents are a part of our region, so we should be a part of the project. We do not have planning powers, but we could at least intervene with our political power by meeting the MHA. Then we started our meetings and the MHA found our involvement positive. They said: ‘Tozkoparan’s land is transferred to us: the buildings are dilapidated and carry risk, and the location is very convenient. So we can regenerate the area and you can help us in the process. Because you are a part of the society living in the area, you are the closest state institution to the residents. You help us: let’s demonstrate what we are planning in the area to the residents’.

The involvement of the district municipality is to the advantage of MHA, which had lost credibility because of brutal interventions in different neighbourhoods, such as Basibuyuk. Because of this, the MHA no longer wanted to undertake a UR project without the involvement of the district municipality (Official from MHA, Interview, 03.11.2010):

We undertake UR projects in response to demands from district municipalities; we include greater municipalities later in the process. When the district municipality decides on regeneration, then it becomes successful. We cannot have the same effectiveness as the district authority. ... In other words, the district mayor should call for UR and should establish its own team, this is very important. This process needs hard work and
you need to convince residents one-to-one. That’s why the local authority should do it. Our role can be running the construction or controlling it. The local authority should be the one keeping close contact with residents.

However, the district claimed the GIM got involved to gain support at the local level, and when necessary against the decisions of the MHA. From the experience of other neighbourhoods, when the MHA leads a UR project, the district municipality gains no benefit, either politically or economically. The advisor to the district Mayor explains why they want to involve the GIM (Advisor, Tozkoparan (09), Interview, 01.02.2011):

There is a planning process and in this process the GIM has planning powers. That’s why we need to include them. The scale of [the District of] Gungoren and the scale of the MHA are very different from each other. We may be crushed if we intervene directly, and because of that we involved the GIM.

Why we want to involve the GIM is, because it is powerful in both resisting the MHA and also in the political arena. Also GIM has other projects with the MHA, not only Tozkoparan, because of that they can find a compromise.

We had a meeting with the head of the MHA last week. He said: ‘I will sign whatever you say but you shouldn’t forget that this area is under my authority. If you want to use UR politically, I will build the flats, and you can give the keys and deeds [to the residents] at a public meeting’. … He says: ‘Let’s make a protocol, we can discuss it, but you cannot say to me: ‘Leave the project, transfer everything to the district municipality and we will run the process.’ I am sorry, but it is not possible, because legally I have the right to do it’.

If the GIM gets involved, then the district municipality can use the resources of the greater municipality, including the police force, demolition teams and political support, and also can share the redistribution of rent gained from ‘increase of density’ model. In this model, it is possible to include in the UR
project not only national-scale construction firms, which are putting pressure on the MHA, but also locally-based builders, which are putting pressure on local authorities.

The UR process is very different in Tozkoparan from the other two case study neighbourhoods. There has been no police intervention, and therefore there have been no actions to remove the police from the neighbourhood. The only form of resistance against the UR is the use of democratic rights of residents through the establishment of neighbourhood organisation and its activities. The neighbourhood organisation against the UR project was set up in March 2009 and has almost 150 members. The main aim of the organisation is to oppose the ‘authoritarian structure of the UR’. As one of the members of the says, they have seen other examples of UR in Istanbul and do not trust the state (Member of Tozkoparan Neighbourhood Organisation (01), Interview, 27.05.2010):

No one can evict me from my house and no one should do it. Our duty as the neighbourhood organisation is to show that the objective of the state is not to deal with the earthquake risk. Their aim is to reduce the proportion of green areas, like in other parts of Istanbul, as they have done in Basibuyuk, and get the rent from the increase in density.

To show the background politics of the UR project the organisation uses different techniques to attract dwellers. They organise film screenings every Thursday and put up posters for the film which include a flyer or banner about the UR process. They also prepared leaflets to distribute in the neighbourhood to inform residents about the on-going process of the UR project. They organised meetings with dwellers who have experienced the UR process in other neighbourhoods, and with academics who are specialised in this field. However, the participation of the dwellers is quite low. One of the founders – now a former member - of the organisation regrets that they did not succeed in
mobilising dwellers as they had expected (Former Member of Tozkoparan Neighbourhood Organisation, Tozkoparan (02), Interview, 20.07.2010):

We first aimed to explain the concept of UR and always emphasised that there should be ‘no demolition’ in the neighbourhood. This was the first and main aim: to resist demolition. If they demolish, they will not give us a house so stopping the demolition was important. However, I do not think that we were persuasive. Everyone tends to agree on the UR project: they say, ‘If they give a house for my own house, then I am in’. We had a minor success in explaining their rights and [persuading them to] at least struggle for getting a house in exchange for their house without making any extra payments and without going somewhere else.

They also faced obstruction by the district municipality in different ways. Every time the neighbourhood organisation tried to arrange symposiums or meetings in a convenient place in the neighbourhood, they were refused by the municipality. So they never managed to organise a big meeting with residents, but they are aiming to reach residents by using different methods. They are planning to publish a journal, including views of dwellers from other neighbourhoods, academics, professional chambers and other supporters of movements against UR projects. They are also planning to organise traditional competitions of papers or caricatures about the UR to attract people having different interests, rather than involving in a neighbourhood organisation. They will keep pursuing the planning process with meetings in houses or cafes (Member of Tozkoparan Neighbourhood Organisation (01), Interview, 27.05.2010).

Neither the MHA nor the District Municipality arranged meetings with the neighbourhood organisation. The organisation invited the Mayor, but he did not accept their invitation. The only meeting with the state and the dwellers was organised by the District Municipality, where they had a questions and answers
session with the whole team for the UR project of the Municipality. In that meeting, only the Mayor talked and answered questions from the residents. The method of contact with dwellers in the process is meeting them individually, as outlined in the webpage of the District Municipality (G. Municipality, 2010).

7.7.2. The Redevelopment Process in Tozkoparan

Four aspects of urban regeneration and the changing forms and strategies of the state in Tozkoparan can be analysed. Firstly, developers are less interested in Tozkoparan, compared to the other two neighbourhoods, because it is not near to high-income neighbourhoods or to the CBD. So, the movement against urban regeneration is weaker in here. Residents are not under direct pressure from the developers - at least not yet.

Secondly, different scales of the state established partnerships at different moments of the UR, including congruent or conflictual relations. The changing forms of partnerships within the state demonstrates the conflictual and instable nature of state’s interventions. In the case of Tozkoparan, this instability is the result of the pressures of local resistance to the UR process, the demands of developers in those areas and the conflicts between different scales of the planning procedure.

The UR process in Tozkoparan has different partnerships within the state at different moments. It was started as a national scale UR project: however as the district municipality and the GIM became involved, the process became more complicated and conflictual. The involvement of different scales of planning authorities of the state carried their tensions and conflicts between different levels into the UR project. The protocols made between the MHA and District Municipality are now open to change because of the involvement of the GiM.
Thirdly, the Municipality divided the opposition by suppressing collective meetings by not giving permission to the neighbourhood association to meet other dwellers in the neighbourhood by using public spaces. This is a part of indirectly dividing dwellers to individuals by creating obstacles to their collective movement.

Lastly, the resistance of the dwellers to urban redevelopment in their neighbourhood put pressure on the local state - the District Municipality. The municipality aims to explain the project to the dwellers in order for it to be accepted. In Tozkoparan, the acceptance of the project by the residents is important because the rate of ownership of the dwellers is very high (76%) (see Section 7.3.2). The legal status of the flats is different from gecekondu homes, because these flats are built by the state on fully formal basis. This also has an important effect on the UR process.

7.8. Conclusion: Different Interventions by the State as a Moment in Class Relations

The empirical material on the variety of the UR policy implementation -a form of intervention of the state in a concrete situation - reflects and supports the more abstract ideas about the changing forms and strategies of the state in different localities discussed in the theoretical Chapter (see Chapter 3). In all three case studies, it is seen that interventions by the state vary according to locality and also alter through time: that is, interventions are differentiated temporarily and spatially. When we compare the three case studies, four moments of differentiation in state intervention can be identified.

Firstly, housing and property ownership varies in the neighbourhoods. The aim of the research was to select a mixture of tenure in each neighbourhood, which was achieved; the case studies have large differences from each other in this respect. Tozkoparan is the neighbourhood where dwellers own their houses on
fully legal basis; however the legality of ownership in gecekondu areas is open to discussion according to the state authorities. The differences of ownership are very significant. Especially the definition of being ‘legal’ or not in a neighbourhood by the state is mainly discussed by using the separation between gecekondu areas and other housing areas. That is why in Basibuyuk and Derbent state intervention was brutal and forcible; however in Tozkoparan the UR process is less brutal than the two others.

Secondly, the historical political traditions of the neighbourhoods are different. The strongest left political engagement is in Derbent Neighbourhood, where the resistance against the UR projects is also the strongest and longest standing. But the right conservative political background of Basibuyuk did not prevent this area from organising against urban regeneration; however, they could not take the opposition through the whole process and were defeated in the stage where they let the construction company build the flats in their neighbourhood.

Thirdly, the ability to cooperate within the district of each neighbourhood is a significant aspect. The political connections with other neighbourhoods and political groups provide solidarity among different neighbourhoods. Solidarity among UR neighbourhoods in Maltepe and in Sariyer was strong. In the Sariyer Municipality Council Area, where Derbent is located, all the neighbourhood dwellers acted together under an umbrella organisation against the UR. In the Maltepe Municipality Council Area, where Basibuyuk is located, UR neighbourhood dwellers decided to vote for the same party (the RPP) in the local elections. This was an important indicator for the movement against the UR process.

Fourthly, the pressure of capital on different scales of the state generates different state interventions. In all three case studies, when the value of the land is high and more beneficial for the developers, they put pressure on the
national scale to by-pass bureaucratic obstacles and to suppress political mobilisation in the neighbourhoods by using national police force.

These moments of different interventions by the state in different localities are not separate factors, as in a positivist understanding: on the contrary, they are dialectically related and construct each other. The struggle against urban regeneration is differentiated in two ways in different localities: the pressures from the residents, and the pressure from capital. For example, having different forms of home ownership of housing creates division in the residents’ opposition movements, so that some of the residents who negotiated their legal ownership with the developers left the movement and weakened the movement itself. But a lack of developer’s interest in a neighbourhood, as in Tozkoparan, also weakens the residents’ movement.

The process of the UR project of all case studies is powered by the conflicts between the capital and the residents mediated by different levels of the state. Hence, the state is not a ‘tool of capital’, rather it is a part of the class relations.
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION

8.1. **Introduction**

‘Urban regeneration’ as a form of spatial intervention of the state to the housing of the poor in Istanbul since the 2000s illustrates two issues relevant to the state theory. Firstly, the rescaling of the state has been experienced in the form of both downward and upward scaling of planning powers of the state, but dominated by rescaling towards the national scale. Secondly, the ‘urban regeneration projects’ in Istanbul revealed different interventions of the state to different localities at the same time. The whole argument of the thesis is intertwined with rescaling and divergent interventions of the state by examining the ‘urban regeneration’ (UR) process in Istanbul and in three case study neighbourhoods. In this thesis, these two interrelated issues of restructuring of the state are explored both in ‘vertical’ level relations, which are the relations between different scales of the state (rescaling of the state) and in ‘horizontal’ level practices, which are differentiated interventions of the state at different localities at the same time. My aim has been to critically examine (spatial) interventions of the state in order to develop an adequate theoretical approach to the rescaling and the restructuring of the state and to understand different interventions of the state in different localities, by focusing on contradictions between capital and labour, that is, class struggle.

I have sought to explore complex relations within different levels of the state, looking at the UR policy and the process of its implementation in different localities through a focus on the role of collective resistance against the UR projects. To make sense of this complex picture, the thesis was guided by a theorisation of the ‘rescaling of the state’ and ‘interventions of the state’, which were used as analytical categories to understand the relation between the state, space, capital and class struggle in the redevelopment process of the housing of the poor.
This chapter presents a conclusion to the thesis, returning to the theoretical and conceptual discussions in the first two chapters, and to the research findings presented in two analysis chapters. The questions guiding the research were articulated on the grounds of the theoretical framework presented in Chapters Two and Three, which are revisited in this Chapter. The theoretical discussions of the thesis were followed by two empirical chapters. Chapter Six examined rescaling of the state as changing class relations, by examining the empowerment of Mass Housing Administration (MHA) at the national scale, the changing role of city- and district-scale planning institutions and ‘urban regeneration’ projects as a form of spatial interventions of the state at the neighbourhood scale. Chapter Seven examined three case study neighbourhoods in Istanbul to analyse the changing forms and strategies of state intervention at different localities. Throughout the research, methods used were part of a qualitative research methods approach, based on a dialectical Marxist method of abstraction.

In the following sections of this chapter, firstly the approach to state theory developed in this thesis will be summarised in an abstract theoretical discussion. This is followed by the conclusions on the restructuring of Istanbul, and two major concepts, the rescaling of the state and different interventions of the state, that have driven the research. The rescaling of the state in Turkey since 2000 will be illustrated in the third and fourth section by summarising the analysis of the relations between different scales of the state, including the MHA, the GIM and the district municipalities. The fifth section shows how different interventions of the state in different localities took form in the ‘urban regeneration’ process in Istanbul since 2000. The sixth section, by referring back to the methodological roots of this research, which is dialectical Marxist, discusses the relation between the abstract and the concrete in the former sections of the analysis. Lastly, possible future directions of research are discussed.
8.2. The Abstract Theory of the State Developed in this Thesis

Theoretical and conceptual discussions in Chapters 2 and 3 are applied in the research and have proved to be very useful to understand the relation between the state, space, capital, and class struggle. Here, I briefly recap the particular Marxist approach developed in Chapters 2 and 3. Marxist approaches to the restructuring of the state, including rescaling and interventions of the state, have been extensively debated, but there remain important differences in approach.

In contrast to the Strategic Relational Approach, rescaling of the state and spatial interventions of the state defined as ‘scalar fixes’ (Brenner, 1998) or ‘spatial-temporal fixes’ (Jessop, 2000), the approach adopted in this thesis assumes some relatively general forms of spatial political-economic regulations. Those are contingent on class struggle at varied spatial scales. My approach to the state shares the Open Marxist approach, which views the state as a particular historical form of social relations. The state is an essential aspect of the development of class struggle, not an institutional entity that is above or outside this struggle. The interventions of the state do not serve the ‘necessities of capital interests’, and do not assure social reproduction, but they emerge from the development of the class struggle, and involve the contradictions embedded in the state. This contradictory nature of class relations disrupt their reproduction, therefore the state responds to these disruptions through its interventions, but does not overcome them entirely. This is a chronic ongoing process. This concludes in variety and instability of the institutional forms of the state, and of its strategies in responding to conflicts and contradictions developed historically and spatially.

This approach is developed from Open Marxist understanding of the restructuring of the state and its interventions. The Open Marxist approach to the state (Clarke, 1991d; Bonefeld, 1993c) has not systematically developed
spatial aspects of the state. In this thesis I have sought to develop the spatial aspect of state analysis in the Open Marxist framework. My contribution is located in the insertion of ‘space’ at all levels of analysis and this way allows to re-think the state and its spatial restructuring.

The state’s responses to the contradictions and conflicts between capital and labour can be analysed in two spatial forms of state restructuring: the rescaling of the state, and different interventions to different localities. The state at different scales can perform different roles for different classes, and in varied ways in different localities.

The rescaling of the state examines different levels of the state and their relations with each other; in particular it investigates how the state is restructured upwardly and/or downwardly to respond to the pressures coming from capital and from subordinate classes. Hence, the rescaling of the state is a moment of class struggle, which is not just exercised within production but also within the state and its restructuring. So, the vertical level relations between different scales of the state are not a structural feature of a period of urbanisation, but rather are open to class struggle.

The contradictions and conflicts between the state, capital and labour can be found also in the different interventions of the state to different localities. This shows us the ‘horizontal’ level practices of the state’s interventions. I share the interest in different interventions of the state at different localities with writers of the regulationist and strategic relational approach. What I accept in their account is that the state intervenes differently in different localities at the same time. But they see the formation of state strategies free from contradictions between capital and labour. According to their approach, the state absorbs strategies of stakeholders and turns it to a hegemonic strategy by filtering through its spatial selective mechanisms formed by geographies of state
institutions and spatial policies. They rightly analyse the economic-social nature of the territories, their economic potential, and the strategies of capital to develop them. However, the spatial interventions of the state are neither non-conflictual nor purely strategically-driven processes: they rather arise as a moment of class struggle. The spatiality of the state power is not a site nor simple product of political strategies. Rather, (the spatiality of) the state itself is embedded in spatial class struggle, as a component of it.

In the strategic relational approach to the spatiality of the state, the state’s interventions are seen as spatial selectivity, which is deployed through historical specific political strategies that are formed from earlier and existing political strategies (Brenner, 2004: 89; Macleod&Goodwin, 1999). The strategic pressure on the state is to promote capitalist development at particular places. According to these pressures the state selects spatially. In response to this, I have argued that the spatiality of the state intervention is woven into class struggle, which creates different and unstable political strategies in different territories.

The rescaling of the state and different interventions of the state to different localities respectively is dialectically related through class struggle. These two are vertical and horizontal moments of the same process of the restructuring of the state. This will be examined at more concrete levels of the research in the following sections. The empirical material on the UR policy implementation - that is a form of intervention of the state in a concrete situation- can be theorised using the abstract ideas about the rescaling of the state and state’s differentiated strategies. The analysis of the UR process is developed through the analytical categories of the approach.

8.3. Restructuring of Istanbul Since the 2000s

Before examining the two specific restructuring process, which are the rescaling of the state and the varieties of state intervention, during the last decade in
Istanbul, I will discuss some conclusions on the urban change in the city in terms of situating the analysis of state restructuring within a broader framework of economic and social change. Since the 2000s, Turkey’s integration to global capitalist dynamics has accelerated, which can be analysed in the rise of internationalisation of construction sector; deindustrialisation process; rescaling of the state and the different interventions of the state in different localities. In this section, the rise of construction sector and the deindustrialisation process in Istanbul will be examined, and the last two are subjects of following sections.

As it is discussed in Chapter 6 of the thesis, the rise in the internationalisation of construction sector, including housing and infrastructure investments in the last ten years was a response to the economic crisis in the USA and Europe. The accumulation of capital in the time of crisis and the expansion after the crisis was a transfer to spatial investment via financialisation that is in the form of giving credit to investors and individuals. The main investment target of construction companies was new spatial developments in Istanbul. It was because of large amount of state-owned land, coming from the Ottoman Empire period, and valuable land in the city centre. The state-owned lands were used either for gecekondu housing and old affordable and cooperative housing or for public usage, including green parks, public transport storage space, historical areas, or old factories. The demand of investors for large amount of land in the city centre was responded by the state through implementing ‘urban regeneration’ projects in the mentioned areas.

This thesis analysed the redevelopment of private use of former or current state-owned lands in the form of housing, including gecekondu, affordable and cooperative. Giving priority to the redevelopment of gecekondu areas carries important causes: (i) their central location; (ii) their good connections with other parts of the city; (iii) having freed, which are from the former industrial areas, large scale of land close to their location; (iv) high value of the land
because of their location; (v) loose ownership rights, because of unfinished legalisation of the land. The selection of gecekondu locations in the 1950s was because of the proximity of the factory and housing. The housing need of labour force was met by leaving the state-owned land to the migrants to make their own houses. The whole process of squatting the land and construction of housing was kept informal by the state intentionally to control the labour force through the control of property rights. The housing of migrant labours were formed as ‘labour’ in its relation with capital or ‘consumer’ in its relation with housing developers and ‘citizen’ in its relation to the state. Having different forms of relation with capital and the state dwellers of gecekondu areas had to struggle to get their rights and to overcome the possible contradictory relations of different forms.

The redevelopment of gecekondu housing, which includes relocation and eviction of dwellers from their neighbourhoods to peripheries of the city, since the 2000s, carried the contradictions between different forms of relations among dwellers, capital and the state. But, also the deindustrialisation process in Istanbul by relocating factories to the outer parts of the city and to the city-region of Istanbul and creating a new CBD in the Anatolian of the city had a major impact in the relations between dwellers, capital and the state. So, the redevelopment of the whole city at a higher scale includes a cleansing process of the poor from the valuable lands in the city centre to the invaluable lands in the peripheries of the city and the changes in the workplace of working class.

However, this relocation process carries the contradiction between the need of labour in service sector in the city centre and the limitation of the access of workers to the jobs due to their relocation. This is evident in the recent redevelopment projects in Istanbul. As the dwellers living and working in the city centre or close to where they live, became unemployed due to impossibility of commuting from their new housing areas to their existing jobs. It is because
of limited transportation between jobs and houses and also the length and cost of journey. As the dwellers relocated to newly build housing areas, they are also forced to buy the houses, which adds an additional cost to their lives. This illustrates the limits of the state to overcome the contradictions between capital, labour and the state. As it was discussed in the theoretical discussion of the thesis, the state is not only responding the demands of the capital or demands of particular groups in the society. It rather tries to respond the contradictions or conflicts that can appear through the relation between capital, labour and the state and cannot overcome them entirely. In the case of Istanbul, the limitations of the state to respond demands of capital and labour may cause a crisis of reproduction. It is aimed to relocate around two million working class people from the city centre to the peripheries which may end up a huge amount of unemployment and crisis of reproduction in the near future.

8.4. Theorising the Rescaling of the State in Turkey since 2000
The rescaling of the state in Turkey since 2000 is a particular moment of political-economic relations in the integration process to global capitalist dynamics. The ‘urban regeneration’ policy as a form of state intervention involves large spatial changes, including relocation and eviction, for the poor. Hence, rescaling of the state helps us to reveal the relations within different scales of the state and between these scales, working class, including dwellers, and capital.

The empowerment of MHA as a national state institution to run the UR projects facilitates the involvement of large-scale construction companies to be a part of the process. However, the residents in the neighbourhoods put pressure at the local scale of the state in all three case studies to struggle against the UR projects and the scale of the intervention of the state responded to this. There have been attempts to demolish gecekondu settlements in the previous decades in Turkey, after gecekondu settlements were commodified. These
policies were predominantly aiming to rehabilitate gecekondu areas and did not have major relocations or evictions expanded to the city-scale. The resistance against demolition and eviction of that time was individual resistance, rather than organised. However, the recent UR projects are not based on individual-houses, but rather involve the whole neighbourhood acting in an organised form of resistance. This is because of large developers’ demand for large areas for higher profit, and in relation to that the state aims to rebuild the whole area of a neighbourhood of the poor. Consequently, all the UR projects demand all or the majority of housing to be rebuilt within the neighbourhood. The large scope of redevelopment creates solidarity and cooperation between dwellers to resist against the UR project as a neighbourhood. This is more evident in the gecekondu case study neighbourhoods, where dwellers experienced the threat of demolition individually from time to time since they settled.

The demands coming from large construction companies and developers cannot be responded to by the local levels of the state, because of their lack of budgetary and planning powers and their lack of role in the decision making process for larger scales, such as city or region scale. So, the nation state responded to the demands by empowering an existing housing institution of the national state, that is the MHA (see Chapter 6). The planning powers for all scales, including regional, city and district scales, were transferred to the MHA and centralised, an upward rescaling of the state.

However, the class struggle at the local levels in the form of resistance against ‘urban regeneration’ projects in the neighbourhoods politicised the process of rebuilding. The state intervention for promoting capital accumulation led to politicisation. The class struggle was not limited to the resistance of neighbourhood dwellers, but included also the demands from small and medium developers at the local level. The incapacity of the MHA to respond such pressures led to downward rescaling of the state to local levels. The
capacity of local municipalities, involving the GIM and the district ones, to control the politicisation process is stronger than nation scale. This is because of locally dependent ties constructed between the dwellers, local businesses and the local level state authorities through their day-today interaction.

We have seen that the impact resistance on state rescaling and the UR process is evident in the case study neighbourhoods. This took the form variously of putting a halt on the project for an indefinite time, slowing down the process and the development of a more participatory model of planning at the local level.

Thus, the resistance in Basibuyuk stopped the construction of flats by a private company in the neighbourhood. The residents organised picket of the construction site and they did not let the equipment of construction enter to the area. On the occasion of strong resistance, the construction could not start and the first construction company withdrew from the UR project. The second one, like the first, complained about its losses, and obtained the support of the nation state to intervene the construction area. The negotiation made by the company and the state (MHA) was to provide cheap affordable housing to the riot police force in return for protecting of the construction site by riot police. By using a permanent police force in the area, construction of the flats has been completed. So, the construction company used the high levels of the nation state (in the form of the MHA and police) to defeat the resistance.

In Derbent, the militant resistance of residents slowed down the UR process and opened it to negotiation and participation of the dwellers in the planning process at the local level. The district municipality runs a pluralist approach that gathers different stake-holders of the UR process under the roof of the municipality to respond the demands of the dwellers. They developed a multi-actor based working group, including all stakeholders in the area, including the
dwellers, to produce a plan. The resistance of the dwellers has put a very strong pressure on to the district municipality which is a consequence has not participated in the redevelopment. Therefore, the higher levels of the state (the GIM and the MHA) have had to intervene directly to evict residents and to begin to carry out the redevelopment themselves. This is an illustration between the class struggle and the scale.

In Tozkoparan, on the other hand, the district municipality is actively involved, because it is not under pressure to not to do redevelopment not as the same as Derbent. But also the MHA and the GIM use the ability of the district municipality to intervene locally and to use its political ties with the neighbourhood. Unlike Derbent, the district municipality is participating because there is not a generalised opposition to redevelopment from the community. On the other hand, the district municipality is the best level of the state to organise the negotiations and managing any opposition as opposed to high levels of the state. Like in Basibuyuk, the district municipality manages the dividing the inhabitants.

The existing literature of radical and Marxist geography and urban studies is overwhelmingly focused on the downward scaling (as well as from the nation state to global institutions) of the state in the recent decades (Brenner, 2004). Many authors in geographical political economy assume that this downward scaling from the nation state is a universal feature of the neoliberal period. However, what I have found in this research is: the pattern in Istanbul is different from the existing literature, with both upward and downward rescaling of the state. This cautions against conflating patterns with fundamental processes. I return to this issue in Section 8.5.
8.5. Differentiation of State Interventions in Different Localities as a Moment of Class Struggle

There is an interrelation between the state form and class struggle, which has been emphasised in the class struggle approach to the state theory (see Chapter 3). The discussion of the UR process and resistance of residents in each of the case study neighbourhoods demonstrates this. In some neighbourhoods for example Sulukule and Ayazma which are out of this study’s scope evictions were realised. However, in the case study neighbourhoods the UR is still an unfinished process. In these areas we have seen the UR projects as a form of state intervention vary (see Chapter 7). The instability and variety of state interventions among three case study neighbourhoods can be analysed through a dialectic between: (i) pressures of capital on the state, (ii) divisions between neighbourhoods and between groups resulting from property law, (iii) divisions between individuals resulting from property law and (iv) the historical and current political organisation of the neighbourhoods.

(i) Pressure of capital on the state in Turkey since 2000

Different pressures of capital on the state are formed in relation to the value of the land, determined by the location of the neighbourhood, including its connections to wider parts of the city, the presence of already settled luxury housing around the neighbourhood, having informal ownership types, and having empty land freed from housing. The pressure put by developers on the state has appeared in the use of new legislations in the form of using the police force. When we examine the case study areas the use of the police force is seen in Derbent and Basibuyuk, and legislation changes are seen all the three neighbourhoods.

In the case of Derbent and Basibuyuk Neighbourhoods the pressure of construction companies on different scales of the state is stronger than Tozkoparan Neighbourhood. We may analyse the intensity of pressure in these
two neighbourhoods by looking at attacks of the police, which were brutal and long-term. However, in Tozkoparan there is no interference of the police force yet. Derbent and Basibuyuk are located on valuable lands, and the value of the land has risen due to luxury housing settlements around them (MESA and similar housing in Derbent, and Narcity and Nish Adalar in Basibuyuk).

In the case of Tozkoparan, the legislative problems that blocked the UR process are solved by changing the Municipality Law. This change is empowering Greater Municipalities to run the UR projects through negotiating with dwellers by sharing-profit model. In the neighbourhoods where self-ownership is high, as in Tozkoparan, the density of the neighbourhood is raised by the plan made at city-level and the profit produced from it is planned to be redistributed among developers and dwellers.

(ii) Divisions between neighbourhoods and between groups resulting from property law

Property and tenure forms differentiated the neighbourhoods. Basibuyuk and Derbent neighbourhoods are gecekondu settlements, including unauthorised housing units. On the other hand, Tozkoparan is an affordable housing area, built as a gecekondu prevention area. As all three case study neighbourhoods should be considered in the same law, that is Gecekondu Law, the ownership of the land plays an important role in this process. Basibuyuk and Tozkoparan were announced as UR areas due to this law, the former by the Greater Istanbul Municipality in cooperation with district municipality, and the latter by the MHA; on the other hand, Derbent was announced as the UR area by the district municipality without giving reference to the law. The whole land of Basibuyuk and half of the land in Derbent is owned by the district municipalities. The land of Tozkoparan is owned by the MHA. The locally dependent features of neighbourhoods, such as ownership and the spatial structure of neighbourhood, had an important role in the policing of property and the intervention of the
state. For example, in Tozkoparan the state intervention was less brutal than in Derbent and Basibuyuk; because in Tozkoparan the ownership is ‘legally defined’ from the first establishment of the neighbourhood. When the ownership is not ‘certain’ in the eyes of the state, then they treat the neighbourhood as evictable and dispensable. This creates a separation between neighbourhood resistances and weakens the struggle against the UR by dividing neighbourhoods within and between into different groups of regeneration.

(iii) Divisions between individuals resulting from property law

Property divides individuals within neighbourhoods. The state tends to separate economic struggles from political struggles; this separation guarantees that ‘struggle against economic exploitation will not be a struggle against the political basis for that exploitation’(R. Das, 1999; p. 2110). The economic grievances of residents are dealt with on an individual basis in all three case studies. The property law is enforced individual by individual, which reduces the right to housing to a problem of individuals. As a dweller in localities subjected to the UR, you have to prove your presence by tax payments, bill payments, registration records, land allotment or ownership documents, individually. This has happened in three ways. First, the residents have to appeal to the plans and go to court as individual citizens. According to the laws, the residents need to prove that the land they occupied is bought and taxes are paid.

Another form of individualisation was through property law and the courts. In all three case study neighbourhoods, most of the residents individually appealed against demolition/eviction on the basis of the district plan and in Basibuyuk they also opened a case against the UR individually. The capitalist state only acknowledges individual private property. In capitalist society, property law is conceived of in terms of individual ownership and therefore by its nature it is profoundly individualising.
Another way of managing economic grievances of residents individually is mediating their rights through the market (R. Das, 1999; p. 2111). The residents need to pay for ownership rights, involving limited options of housing without having an alternative. This applies to all three neighbourhoods, but varies according to individual ownership of each resident.

The last way in which the state deals with the economic grievances of residents individually is negotiation with residents for their relocation. The residents need to meet state authorities or the construction company working in the area individually to make an agreement. Neither the companies nor the state authorities meet the whole neighbourhood for an agreement or solution. The state divides residents in the case of obtaining ownership rights of new flats for example by paying compensation money according to their tenantry rights: (i) tenant who have title deeds, titles or no document; (ii) those who could get compensation, those who could not; (iii) those who could get a flat without payment, those who cannot. These divisions were the main factors behind the fragmentation of collective resistance in Basibuyuk Neighbourhood. The residents who sold their lots to the MHA for compensation to get flats in the neighbourhood and who had a negotiation with the company to calculate their payment amount through measurement of the house they own withdrew from the struggle against the UR. In Derbent Neighbourhood, the division between residents is also created as in Basibuyuk by having agreements with the construction company, though this is small in number. Consequently, the better-off tenants who could buy the ownership of rights withdrew from the struggle against the UR.

(iv) **The historical and current political organisation of the neighbourhoods**

A strong political tradition in a locality creates the basis for collective political organisation for future. This is evident in one of the case study neighbourhoods, that is Derbent, where left political organisation tradition was significant in the
1970s. In Derbent, the resistance against UR has started from the beginning of
the process and the resistance became militant. This militancy was met by
brutal police attacks and punishment of some residents. However, the
resistance in the neighbourhood still continues in the form of counter-attacks
and use of democratic rights. However, in Basibuyuk neighbourhood, there was
no political resistance experience in the past. This did not prevent residents
from acting together against regeneration and becoming militant in some
periods of the resistance, however the resistance weakened after the state and
the developers managed to divide the neighbourhood individually. The
relatively strong political background of Tozkoparan had an effect on the
development of neighbourhood organisation; however, the high percentage of
housing ownership weakens the resistance in the neighbourhood.

Having a political background in a neighbourhood strengthens the resistance
and reduces the possibility of decline in collective movement. It is an important
impulse for the continuity of resistance until rights are gained collectively rather
than individually.

These four attributes of neighbourhoods, then, can explain the differences
between the URs in the three neighbourhoods. We can analyse the difference
between the neighbourhoods in terms of the dialectic between these four
processes. They are not separate factors, but as we have seen, interact in many
ways. For example, the divisions (ii and iii) weakened the resistance as we have
seen in (iv).

We have seen, then, that the abstract theory can give us a plausible account of
empirical research. This does not ‘prove’ the theory, however it does suggest its
usefulness and richness.
8.6. How This Thesis Relates the Concrete and the Abstract

Spatial economy, society, scaling of the state and the dynamics of the class struggle are utterly different in different places and times. It is not surprising, then, that the rescaling of the state in Turkey is different from Europe or Britain. This shows us that we should not make a generalisation from an empirical pattern. Even in radical and left research, the pattern of the empirical is often taken as a generalisation point for future researches. This problem has roots in empiricism in a very large part of geographers and urbanists who look for these empirical generalisations, and they see them as adding depth to the knowledge, but yet they are simple empirical generalisations. For example, as in the case of downward rescaling. In reality, downward rescaling is an empirical generalisation, but has been treated as a deep truth. Whereas in fact the deep truth is there are processes of capital accumulation in space and there is class struggle in space, and those processes can have very different rescaling outcomes. They do not necessarily have downward rescaling as an outcome. So, the downward rescaling of the state from nation to local levels is a contingent phenomenon and it is quite different in other countries in other times.

As is shown in Chapter 3 and Section 8.2, the state and its spatiality has an abstract theorisation, which can be adapted to different times and different geographies. What we learned from the theoretical insights of the restructuring of the state and its spatiality is how to use medium and high level abstract processes. However, these abstract concepts, such as the rescaling of the state and different interventions of the state, take different forms temporarily and spatially in different socio-economic relations. These forms can be seen through concrete analysis of a particular place and time and the pattern of the concrete analysis cannot be used as a generalisation (of an abstract theoretical discussion). This is linked to the use of descriptive concepts such as governance or government, rather than true abstractions such as the state (see Section 3.2).
More generally this is related to the lack of abstract generalisation of spatial political economy.

We have seen that there were important forms of upward rescaling as well as downward rescaling in the Istanbul case. Despite the fact that these initiatives were at neighbourhood level, it was the national state’s empowerment to carry out these neighbourhood initiatives. I have interpreted this as the need to use a more legislatively and economically powerful level of the state to carry out these difficulties particularly against opposition. But also, the pressure put on the state by large construction companies was at the national scale, rather than lower levels of the state, especially the district municipalities. In other words, it was class pressures that explain why in Turkey there was considerable upscaling of the state.

I hope that this thesis will be read in this spirit: the analysis cannot be generalised to other places and times, but the reader can take the theoretical development and it can be applied to other geographies and times.

8.7. Future Directions

The theoretical approach developed in this thesis has not been used extensively either in Turkey or in English speaking countries. I hope others will use it in the future. On the basis of the above discussion, I suggest that future research priorities on the restructuring of the state should be developed from a class struggle based approach. It should also be a multi-scalar analysis of the state even if the case studies are at the local level. Relations between different scales of the state and their spatiality are interwoven, by the class struggle. In particular, there seems to be a very limited research on Turkey at the neighbourhood scale in terms of rescaling of the state, or adopting a class struggle-based approach to understand the UR process as a form of state
intervention: this thesis could be a starting point for future research on different state interventions in different localities.

Given the constraints of time and resources, a comparative analysis of historical areas or neighbourhoods without resistance against the UR was not included in this research, but this would open up another angle of the research to add a new dimension to future work. A further strand of future research on different interventions of the state might be investigating building of hydroelectric power plants in different rural villages of Turkey, including forced eviction of villagers and their collective resistance against it. This kind of research would provide a fertile study of class struggle at local scale and rescaling of the state. This might also offer different perspectives on the resistance of dwellers in rural areas in Turkey in a spatially and temporarily specific moment, and also might provide an interesting insight of rural and urban class struggle in contemporary Turkey.
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## APPENDIXES

### Appendix A: The List of Interviews

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<td>31</td>
<td>Advisor, Basibuyuk (04)</td>
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<td>32</td>
<td>Council Member, Basibuyuk (05)</td>
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<td>No.</td>
<td>Name/Role/Date</td>
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<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>JDP Head of Maltepe District (07) / Council Member, GIM (04)</td>
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<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Official, Basibuyuk (08)</td>
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<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Representative of Architects’ Chamber of Kartal District (09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Interviewee Groups</td>
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<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic</td>
<td>academic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Activists (imece, PINA)</td>
<td>political activist groups</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chambers</td>
<td>professional chambers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officials</td>
<td>state officials at different levels</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council</td>
<td>elected members of municipality councils (both city and district level)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Neighbourhood Organisations</td>
<td>existing and former members of neighbourhood organisations against urban regeneration</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
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</table>
Appendix B: The Aim of the Interviews

I briefly put ‘what I want to get’ from each interviewee. This led my questions and gave a chance to me to check myself while doing the interview and checked myself whether I covered everything or not.

The Case Study Neighbourhoods: Tozkoparan, Basibuyuk, Derbent

Interviewees

1. **Neighbourhood Level:**

   a. *Representatives of Neighbourhood Organisations*
      - The historical background of the neighbourhood
      - Urban regeneration process
      - Why did they establish neighbourhood organisation, on what basis
      - How do they react to various interventions of state
      - What results did they get and how do they get such results

   b. *Muhtar (governmental elected officer at neighbourhood level)*
      - The historical background of the neighbourhood
      - Urban regeneration process
      - The structural pattern of the neighbourhood
      - How does he/she define the role of ‘muhtar’ in this process
      - What has been done by muhtar
      - What kind of results did they get

   c. *Members of Municipality Council, District Municipality Officers who are responsible from urban planning and related issues and Political Groups and NGOs (active in the neighbourhoods)*
      - How do they assess urban regeneration process in the neighbourhood I am researching
      - How do they define their roles
      - What are their constraints and opportunities in this process (according to them)
2. **Istanbul**

   a. **Mass Housing Administration (MHA)**
      - The main approach of MHA to urban regeneration
      - How do they assess the changing role of MHA after 2000
      - The main aim of MHA
      - How do they define the role of MHA
      - What have they done in this process
      - What are their constraints and opportunities in this process (according to them)
      - How do they evaluate Istanbul Greater Municipality and District Municipality
      - How do they evaluate the role of NGOs and professional chambers in this process
      - How do they evaluate the reactions of the neighbourhood dwellers and the neighbourhood organisation
      - How do they define their relation between different levels of the state
      - The future aims of the MHA

   b. **Greater Istanbul Municipality (GIM)**
      - The main approach of GIM to urban regeneration
      - How do they assess the changing role of MHA after 2000
      - How do they define the role of MHA and their relation with MHA
      - What have they done in this process
      - What are their constraints and opportunities in this process (according to them)
      - How do they evaluate Istanbul District Municipalities
      - How do they evaluate the role of NGOs and professional chambers in this process
• How do they evaluate the reactions of the neighbourhood dwellers and the neighbourhood organisation
• How do they define their relation between different levels of the state
• The future aims of the GIM

c. Istanbul Housing Development Planning Company (Kiptas) (It is a Greater Municipality Company established in corporation with foreign investment partnership)
• What is the role of Kiptas
• What is the working system of Kiptas (whom they work with, on what basis)
• How do they evaluate urban regeneration projects, and process
• How do they evaluate the changing role of MHA
• The future projects of Kiptas

d. Professional Chambers (City Planners, Architects, Survey & Cadastre Engineers)
• The main approach of professional chambers to urban regeneration
• How do they assess the changing role of MHA after 2000
• How do they define the role of MHA
• What have they done in this process
• What are their constraints and opportunities in this process (according to them)
• How do they evaluate MHA, Istanbul Greater Municipality and District Municipality
• How do they define the role of NGOs and professional chambers in this process
• How do they evaluate the reactions of the neighbourhood dwellers and the neighbourhood organisation
• How do they define their relation with different levels of the state

e. Political Groups and NGOs (active in urban regeneration in general)
• The main approach of political groups/NGOs to urban regeneration
• How do they assess the changing role of MHA after 2000
• How do they define the role of MHA
• What have they done in this process
• What are their constraints and opportunities in this process (according to them)
• How do they evaluate MHA, Istanbul Greater Municipality and District Municipality
• How do they define the role of NGOs and professional chambers in this process
• How do they evaluate the reactions of the neighbourhood dwellers and the neighbourhood organisation
• How do they define their relation between different levels of the state
## Appendix C: List of Participant Observations

### First Phase of the Field Work: List of Participant Observations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>List</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Meeting/Conference</th>
<th>What about</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Symposium</td>
<td>22.05.2010</td>
<td>Istanbul Urban Symposium</td>
<td>All the neighbourhoods subjected to regeneration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td>25.05.2010</td>
<td>Preliminary meeting of European Social Forum (ESF)* in Istanbul 2010</td>
<td>This meeting is a serial meeting before the ESF on the urban issues. The components of the meeting is neighbourhood organisations and some political groups and related chambers. It is aimed to make a preliminary meeting on the 26-27 of June 2010 to discuss the future actions for urban regeneration in Istanbul and to define their actions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Press Statement</td>
<td>27.05.2010</td>
<td>Press statement</td>
<td>Different neighbourhood representatives, political organisations, chambers, activists, neighbourhood dwellers have attended to the press statement. It was about a neighbourhood, called Ayazma, which has problems with MHA and the district municipality in the process of eviction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbourhood Meeting</td>
<td>28.05.2010</td>
<td>Tozkoparan Meeting: District Municipality and the People of Tozkoparan</td>
<td>Tozkoparan Neighbourhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meeting</td>
<td>26-27.06.2010</td>
<td>Preliminary meeting of European Social Forum (ESF)* in Istanbul 2010</td>
<td><strong>First Day:</strong> The dynamics of urban regeneration process in all the neighbourhoods that have organised neighbourhood organisations is shared. <strong>Second Day:</strong> Preliminary principles in the action against urban regeneration process are discussed and decided for future actions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Second Phase of the Fieldwork : List of Participant Observations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>List</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Meeting/ Conference</th>
<th>What about</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Workshops and neighbourhood visits</td>
<td>1-4.07.2010</td>
<td>European Social Forum(ESF) in Istanbul 2010</td>
<td>Social movements and urban regeneration experiences and practices all over the world</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sessions on urbanisation, social movements and urban regeneration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conference</td>
<td>05-07.2010</td>
<td>ENHR Conference in Istanbul</td>
<td>I have attendant to sessions on urban regeneration and recent changes in Istanbul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Group meeting</td>
<td>08.07.2010</td>
<td>Weekly meeting of Association of Social Rights</td>
<td>Urban regeneration process and what can be done actively in this process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Group meeting</td>
<td>14.07.2010</td>
<td>Weekly meeting of Association of Social Rights</td>
<td>Urban regeneration process and what can be done actively in this process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workshop</td>
<td>16-18.07.2010</td>
<td>Three days workshop of Association of Social Rights</td>
<td>On the right to housing.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Meeting</td>
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<td>Meetings of Right to Housing Platform</td>
<td>Debates on the urban regeneration projects</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Discussions on urban social movements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meeting of a Chamber</td>
<td>30.12.2010</td>
<td>Chamber of Architects, Kartal Branch Meeting</td>
<td>Discussions on the urban regeneration process in Kartal and Maltepe Districts.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>