The Western Order under Quasi-Multilateralism:
The Bosnian Conflict and the West, 1992-1995

By

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Abstract

This thesis presents an interpretation of the formation process of the post-Cold War international order with special reference to the Western debate regarding use of coercive power in the Bosnian conflict of 1992-1995. As the role of multilateralism and the authority of the UN were the most contentious issues of the debate, this thesis will provide a critical resource for comprehending the origin and the nature of ‘American unilateralism’, and its relationship with other Western allies. It will also be a useful tool in predicting future outcomes.

This research will apply the concept of ‘Quasi-multilateralism’ to analyse the relationship between the US and other Western states during the Bosnian conflict. It is held that the US justified its policies in the name of collective action without adhering to the outcomes of genuine multilateral consultation with its allies. However, this inevitably undermined the quality of justice that the West alleged to promote. More specifically, this work will analyse the fact that there was a clear tension between Western states who sought to legitimate their role in international order based on shared values, and thus it will argue that the content of ‘Western Value’ was a product of power politics. Accordingly, this research will conclude that America’s interpretation of justice was used as a means to project its own national interests under the logic of Quasi-multilateralism.

This thesis will challenge the Liberal view of the present world order that Western states have common interests in promoting democracy and market economies across the globe and implementation of those Western values will make the world safer and fairer.
Acknowledgement

Despite the fact that this thesis takes such a conventional form, (i.e. using empirical 'cases' to evaluate the coherence of theoretical hypothesis), in fact, attempts to evaluate political events in terms of historical significance and thus theory is an instrument to enrich such enquiry. This method was developed during my undergraduate study at Aichi University, Japan. Emeritus Professor Eijiro Yanagisawa’s seminar discussions of the current international events, which were firmly based on newspaper cuttings, provide an indispensable foundation for studying international relations.

The works of two supervisors of my postgraduate course at University of Nagoya, Japan, influenced the formation of my viewpoint regarding the empirical analysis I have presented here. My attention to the political use of moral values was inspired by Professor Yuta Sasaki’s archival records-based and thus solid historical studies that empirically reveal the fallacy of the role of ‘anti-communism’ perception in defining British foreign policy during the inter-war period (1920s-1930s). It also exposes the rhetorical use of the perception of ‘Cold War’ on the part of the British government in their attempt to obtain America’s support for its actions during the Suez War of 1956. With his natural enthusiasm for seeking fairness, and rich knowledge of politics and life across the Balkan Peninsula, Professor Mamoru Sadakata encouraged us to critically look at the reality and the ramifications of political actions in the name of promoting ‘justice’ from the perspective of the victims of the conflict and that of political-economic reforms.

This research is conducted under the supervision of Dr Jason Ralph and Dr Neil Winn. They provided valuable comments in various drafts. Dr Ralph suggested critical works that eventually guided the theoretical argument of this thesis. Dr Winn advised me on the importance of maintaining theoretical coherence. I also thank people who I interviewed for offering their accounts of unique experiences in
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Kota Yoshitome
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Abbreviations

AP  Associated Press
AFP  Agence France Presse
CJTF  Combined Joint Task Force
CFSC  Common Foreign Security Policy
CSCE  Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
EC  European Community
ESDI  European Security Defence Identity
EU  European Union
G-7  Group of Seven (of Advanced Industrialized States)
GDP  Gross Domestic Product
HMS  Her Majesty’s Ship
HVO  Hrvatska Vijeće Odbrane [Croatian Defence council]
ICFY  International Conference for Former Yugoslavia
IFOR  Implementation Force
IMF  International Monetary Fund
IPS  Inter Press Service
JCS  Joint Chiefs of Staffs (of the United States of America)
JNA  Jugoslavenska Narodna Armija [Yugoslav People’s Army]
NAC  North Atlantic Council
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSC  National Security Council (of the United States of America)
NYT  The New York Times
OHR  Office of High Representative
PDD  Presidential Directive Decision (of the United States of America)
PFP  Partnership for Peace
PRF  Rapid Reaction Force
RS  Republika Srpska
SFOR  Stabilization Force
Tanjug  Telepřafska agencija nove Jugoslavije
[Telegraphic Agency of New Yugoslavia]
UK  United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
UN  United Nations
UNHCR  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNPROFOR  United Nations Protection Force
UNSC  United Nations Security Council
UNSCR  United Nations Security Council Resolution
UPI  United Press International
US  United State of America
VOPP  Vance-Owen Peace Plan
WEU  Western European Union
WP  The Washington Post
Chapter 1 The Western Order and Multilateralism

This thesis discusses international diplomacy in relation to the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina (hereafter the ‘Bosnian conflict’) from 1992 to 1995. The Bosnian conflict was one of the defining events in European security after the Cold War because NATO, for the first time in its history, used serious military power in a conflict situation outside the territories of its own member states. The episode was also a watershed in the history of international security because the international community intervened in this conflict under the premises of the doctrine of ‘humanitarian intervention’.

This research represents a work that analyses a serious gap between Western rationales of intervention and their outcomes. This argument is based on a presumption that there are usually strategic interests that define the use of force, even if those decisions have been justified by evoking ideational (ideological) interests. In other words, a combination of particular values often promotes someone’s preferred strategic interests over those of others. Moreover, sometimes Western states’ initial commitment to a particular value succumbs to their strategic interests. Before we define the term West, we look at the main tasks of this thesis and how they will give substance to the above-discussed presumption. The work thus discusses the nexus between strategic interests and the moral values behind the West’s—especially America’s—approach to the Bosnian conflict, in combination with an analysis of differing transatlantic visions of post-Cold War European security. In order to analyse this causal relationship, this thesis will focus on discussions of three points and will make three contributions to the literature accordingly.

Firstly, it will chronologically analyse diplomatic interactions between the US and its European allies during the Bosnian conflict of 1992-1995. Western policy-makers debated their approaches to the former Yugoslavia against a background of differing transatlantic visions of post-Cold War European security (see Chapter 2). This research will find that there was an intimate relationship between America’s strategic interests in post Cold War European security and its preferred approach to the Bosnian conflict as opposed to that of its European allies. One of the significant
contributions that this research will make to the literature is that it will elucidates the above-discussed causal relationship based on primary empirical resources such as the author’s interviews with the policy-makers of the period from both side of the Atlantic.

Secondly, however, some liberal authors over play the relationship between America’s strategic interests in Europe and its approach to the Bosnian conflict. On the contrary, moral values were the defining guide to the US approach to the Bosnian conflict. As this research will explain in detail, many liberal works point out that there is a stable intra-Western relationship even after the Cold War thanks to the democratic nature of the Western regimes and their particular mode of international interaction, namely the principle of multilateralism. Therefore, it is essential for us to look at their theoretical arguments in order to compare the validity between the interpretation of this research and that of these liberals.

Thirdly, the research will also provide an alternative approach to the liberal interpretation. It will highlight America’s hegemonic leadership, the exclusionary nature of the post Cold War international order and the interventionist nature of America and its allies towards the former Communist regimes and other developing states. It will also establish a hypothetical interpretation as to how America’s transformed role in Europe resulted in the Western approach to the Bosnian conflict; and how it defined the formation of the European security order. The empirical material of this research will thus provide a touchstone with which of the two interpretations (i.e. that of liberal writers or my own) is more coherent.

In order to discuss the above-mentioned points in empirical cases, this chapter now looks at the necessary literature and explains the research issues. Firstly, it will define the terms *West* and *Western Order*. Secondly, it will look at the literature concerning the Bosnian conflict. It will also focus on the relationship between the US and its European allies relating to the Bosnian conflict in view of their differing interests regarding the institutional arrangements of the post Cold War European security order. Thirdly, it will discuss the liberal interpretation of the formation of the post Cold War order. It
will pay particular attention to the how this school of thought explains the stability of the intra-Western relationship and how it interprets the role of values and powers in determining Western actions. Fourthly, it will articulate a critical interpretation in opposition to the liberal account: elaborating an alternative theoretical argument by building on Ian Clark’s works; from this an alternative rationale will be put in place. Lastly, it will outline key research questions and the organization of this thesis.

The Contentious Images of the West and the Western Order

The West and the Western Order (also known as ‘Liberal Order’) is commonly used terminology in academic as well as journalistic works. However, there are various ways of defining the term ‘West’. Generally speaking, geo-strategic, economic and ideological factors are often used to specify the identity of the West. Neo-Realists adopt a geo-strategic interpretation. They use the term ‘West’ as a synonym for the states that formed security alliances against the Soviet Union, and they presumed that the Western alliance would collapse as a result of the disappearance of its common enemy (see Image of the West I: Cold War Model). However, Western military alliances such as NATO and the US-Japan security treaty, and Western economic institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF, the GATT (since 1995 the WTO) and the OECD have survived and prospered since the demise of the Soviet Union.

Liberals suggests that there is a gap between the Neo-Realists’ assumptions and the reality of the persistence of Western solidarity. In opposition to Neo-Realists’ structural explanation of international affairs and the relative gain approach for accounting for the actions of states, Liberals look

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at shared economic interests and common ideologies for defining the West and the stability of the Western relationship. Some liberals—particularly known as liberal institutionalists—pay attention to the absolute gain and argue that stability emanates from the liberal economy based on its institutional arrangements. Other liberals pay attention to 'ideational' (i.e. moral and legitimising) factors that maintain the stable relationship among the Western states. These liberals point out that a commonality of the domestic political identity of each state is the foundation of Western actions in international affairs (see Image of the West II: Liberal Model). Added to that, James Gow argues that the values (i.e. culture of openness and adaptability) and legitimacy of its actions, rather than geography and power, define the sphere and identity of the West. He considers the West as a 'social construction' and accordingly claims that 'defending the West defines the West' (see Image of the West III: Post-Cold War Strategic Model). Indeed, US policy-makers and their allies often remark that shared common values are important bridge which consolidates Western identity.

We need to clarify, however: what kinds of values define the West? For example the US and China share not only economic goals (for instance, promoting international commerce) but also certain geo-strategic and military interests particularly with regard to international terrorism after 11th of September 2001. Yet they have divergent views on the fundamental economic values (i.e. American capitalism as against China's so-called 'market socialism') and the principles of domestic politics (American democracy as against the Chinese Communist Party's monopoly of power). There are many instances of this kind, such as the US relationships with Russia, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan. Thus, having common strategic interests with the US—which can be justified by an ideological rationale

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3 The details of their arguments will be discussed in the third section of this chapter.
5 Gow, *Defending the West*. 17.
such as anti-terrorism—does not alone constitute a state's membership of the West.

To consider the above-discussed images of the West, the idea of 'liberal democracy' can be regarded as the pivotal criteria to identify a Western state. This ideology is based on the principle that the formal political decisions are made by the democratically elected representatives (as opposed to the direct democracy); the system is regulated by the rule of law; and is supposed to respect basic human rights as well as the interests of the market economy (in the form of protecting the rights of free-enterprise and the private ownership of commodities). However, at the same time, the interpretation of ‘liberal democracy’ and implementation of this idea in practice can vary from actor to actor. There is a tension between the US and its prosperous allies (that is, to mention the other members of G7: Japan, Germany, UK, France, Italy and Canada) regarding what is the legitimate identity of the ‘West’. In other words, there is a danger that ‘liberal democracy’ and its related values can be merely used as rhetoric to justify America’s hegemonic position in the name of multilateral cooperation (see, Image of the West IV: Quasi-Multilateral Model).

Provisionally, as a common denominator of the term among the above-discussed literatures, the term Western state is used in this research in such a way as to satisfy the following three criteria. Firstly, it has at least either a bilateral/collective self-defence arrangement with the US or membership of security or economic institutions that were established during the Cold War in line with the strong strategic interests of the US (such as NATO, ANZUS, GATT/WTO, and the OECD). Secondly, it shares ‘liberal democratic’ values. And thirdly, it has a developed market economy and advocates the continued liberalization of the global economy. Besides the members of G7, other important states

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10 See page 33-43 of this thesis for more detailed discussion of this point.

11 According to the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 'Japan in Asia, Canada and the United States in northern America, Australia and New Zealand in Oceania and Europe' are categorized as developed states or regions. UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs. "Definition of: Developed, Developing Countries [code 491]", Standard Country or Area Codes for Statistical Use. Series M, no. 49, Rev. 4: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cdb/cdb_dict_xrxx.asp?def_code=491. [Accessed on 1 March 2005].
that meet these criteria include Australia, New Zealand, Sweden, Austria and Spain. Accordingly, the Western Order is formed by the Western States according to above-definition, which at least nominally espouse the principle of ‘liberal democracy’ (the combination of the market economy and domestic political pluralism) and project these to the international sphere.

With regard to the Bosnian conflict, this thesis discusses the relationship between: the US, UK, France, Germany, other member states of the European Union, other NATO member states, Russia and the newly independent states of the former Yugoslavia (i.e. Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and the rump Yugoslavia of Serbia and Montenegro). Russia and the former Yugoslavia states are not categorized as Western states according to the above-discussed definition. It is important, however, for us to look at these countries relationship with the Western states, as it illustrates the extent to which Western policies can accommodate the interests of the non-Western world. This will test the validity of the liberals’ claim that the Western Order stabilizes the international relationship not only amongst the Western states but also of the wider international community (see the third section of this chapter in detail).

Before we discuss the details of the Western approach to the Bosnian conflict, it is essential to look at the literature on this subject. In particular we should understand how the causal relationship between the Western approach to the Bosnian conflict and the international order is explained.

12 Therefore, Switzerland (formally declared as ‘neutral’ power) is not considered as a Western state. South Korea and some ASEAN members have potential to become Western state. However, they are still not regarded as a Western state.

Chart 1: Four Images of the Western Order and International (World) Order

**Image of the West I:** Cold War Model
- US & its allies
- West
- USSR & its allies
- EAST

**Image of the West II:** Post-Cold War Strategic Model
- Constructivist/Realist viewpoints
- Security threats to the West
- Ad hoc members of the West

**Image of the West III:** Liberal Multilateral Model *
- Traditional West
  - (extensive and inclusive nature of the West)
- New West
  - (no clear border between the West and the West)
- International (world) Order

**Image of the West IV:** Quasi-Multilateral Model
- US
- Its allies
- West
- Potential western states
- Hegemonic relationship
- Non-Western World

* A state is Western insofar as it shares democratic values and satisfies economic criteria. If the nature of World Order is based on liberal democracy, there is a not clear boundary between the West and others.
The Bosnian Conflict, the Transformation of the Western Relationship, and the Post-Cold War Security Order

There have been several major developments which impacted upon the European security order since the late 1980s, such as: the re-unification of Germany; the collapse of the Soviet Union; the break-up of the former Yugoslavia and the subsequent conflict in Slovenia, Croatian and Bosnia-Herzegovina; the enlargement of NATO; and the Kosovo crisis. It is well-documented that there was an intimate causality between the German re-unification process, America's revised security commitment in Europe, and the re-formation process of NATO in the post Cold War European security order. In the same way, it is argued that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the political instability of Russia, America's decision to renew its commitment to European security, and the NATO expansion were not isolated events.

The common feature in these cases is that the transformation of the European security architecture is strongly influenced by security issues in Europe and America's approach to these issues. The Bosnian conflict was one such case. It was the first time that NATO and Western states used military power in a conflict situation in Europe. NATO's use of militarily power was against Bosnian Serb forces—domestic actors in the former Yugoslavia. Hence, this was the so-called 'out-of area' mission; outside NATO's territories as well as outside the scope of its original mission (protecting its member states from the external aggression, particularly, by the Soviet Union). This happened against...

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17 James Gow suggests that there were various actors that were engaged in military actions on the part of Bosnian Serbs. In order to simplify, the present thesis uses the term 'Bosnian Serb forces' to indicate actors who undertook military activities in order to enhance Serbian interests in Bosnia during the conflict. The use of the term 'Bosnian Croat forces' denotes the same for Croatian interests. Gow, James. The Serbian Project and Its Adversaries: a Strategy of War Crimes. London: Hurst & Company, 2003. 79-89.
18 For detailed information about the transformation of the NATO's functions, see the fifth section of this chapter, and Chapter 2.
the backdrop of the transformation process of NATO in 1990s, America's changing role in Europe, and an unsettled intra-Western relationship (see Chapter 2 in detail). It is necessary to understand how the Bosnian conflict and Western approaches to it provided a context for the transformation of the European security order.

There is a vast amount of literature on the collapse of former Yugoslavia and the Bosnian conflict. This thesis will focus on academic and informative journalistic works on the issue of Western approaches to the Bosnian conflict, and will attempt to find out general trends among them. As far as the subject of studies in regard to the Bosnian conflict is concerned, this research adopts the following three categories: 1) the origin of the collapse of the former Yugoslavia and the nature of the Bosnian conflict; 2) Western approaches to the conflict; 3) NATO’s policy towards the former Yugoslavia. The review aims simply to provide an overview of the literature on the subject.

One of the most fundamental and prominent subjects here relates to a debate about the origin and nature of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, and particularly to the Bosnian conflict. With regard to the cause of the collapse of the former Yugoslavia, there are two dominant positions. Some of the literature criticizes Slovenian and Croatian nationalism, and the German government's 'premature' recognition of their statehood, for exacerbating the situation that led to the collapse of the former Yugoslavia. Others emphasise the policies of Serbian leader, Slobodan

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Milošević²⁴, and also Bosnian Serb leaders such as Radovan Karadžić.²⁵ In addition, one of commonly discussed points is the federal government’s ineffective governance and its indifference to the interests of each its federated members’ as well as its citizens.²⁶

The analysis of the origin of the collapse of the former Yugoslavia links to two interpretations of the nature of the Bosnian conflict. The first position tends to regard it as a civil war, whereas the second claims it as a war of aggression or international conflict.²⁷ The civil war perspective regards ethnic tensions within the former Yugoslavia as the critical factor in the conflict and thus it tends not to distinguish between the aggressors and the victims. In terms of the international reaction to the situation, this viewpoint provides a rationale for recommending the West assume a neutral position in the conflict.²⁸ A contrasting view claims that the conflict was an international war of aggression brought about by Slobodan Milosevic’s attempt to promote the ‘Greater Serbia’, and thus Serbia was considered guilty for militarily intervening in other states’ politics. This is part of an interpretation that places Serbia (and Bosnian Serb forces) as the primary aggressor and regards Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims as its victims. The policy-makers who held this view supported international military intervention against the Serbian nationalism.²⁹

To sum up, the above-discussed studies regarding the nature and the origin of the conflict provide important background to the Western use (or non-use) of coercive power. They show how, if

the Western states were to adopt the view of international aggression or pay attention to protecting the territorial integrity of Bosnia then it would promote a policy of international intervention. Then the subsequent forms of the European security order have two possibilities. One possible option is an order based on a kind of alliance of democracy that would promote international intervention in order to either punish or exclude the aggressors. The other option is to reinforce an order among the sovereign states that would act regardless of the characteristics of those domestic regimes (that is, according to the collective security measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter). Chapter 2 of this thesis will look at the details of the Western debates on this issue. It is essential to look at the international context of this debate in order to understand the implications for European security order.

Secondly, in conjunction with the above-discussed issue, there are number of works that have studied individual Western states’ (or organizations’) approaches to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. One type is topical current analysis of a state’s approach to the Bosnian conflict that may include analysis of the state’s domestic political situation as well. These studies are quite informative in order to understand the factual details concerning the Western decision-making process. However, due to their narrow focus on the development of the actual policies of some states (or organizations) and their performance, it is difficult to learn wider lessons regarding the Bosnian situation and the reformation process of the European security order from these studies. In contrast to this approach, others criticize the contradiction between the Western action of recognizing Croatia and Bosnia as states and their subsequent neglect of the situations that undermined their territorial integrity. This position synthesizes its analysis of a Western approach with the above-discussed debate on the nature


31 As an exception, Wayne Bert provides an informative analysis of the America’s policy-making process in relation to the Bosnian conflict. Bert, The Reluctant Superpower.

32 For instance: Simms, Brendan, Unfinest Hour.
of the Bosnian conflict. However, the majority of these studies of the policy-making process in individual states (or organizations) do not provide detailed accounts of diplomatic interactions between the Western states, and their implications for the situation in Bosnia. Thus they cannot constitute the foundations of this research.

Some studies focus more on intra-Western or superpower diplomacy. These studies analyse international approaches to the Bosnian conflict with reference to the interactions between the Western states. These literatures inform us of important aspects of the conflict resolution process such as: what the key tensions between the US and its European allies were; how these issues were settled; and what the implications of those were for the situation in Bosnia. However, the majority of these works were either written before the memoirs of the then policy-makers and other important informative works were published or do not attempt comprehensive analysis. Therefore, in order to provide a detailed account we should supplement the conclusions of the above-mentioned literature with the contents of memoirs and interviews of policy-makers. Memoirs and journalists' accounts provide us insights into the decision-making processes of some states and organizations regarding the Bosnian conflict. However, in order to understand the implications that the Bosnian conflict has had for the Western Order, particularly its security arrangements, it is indispensable to look at NATO's transformation process after the Cold War.

The literature, which focuses on NATO's transformation process, pays attention to the

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33 Bose, Bosnia after Dayton, 19.
34 For instance, Brug, Steven L. War or Peace? Nationalism, Democracy, and American Foreign Policy in Post-Communist Europe. New York: New York University Press, 1996; Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will.
37 We are unable to see classified official documents at the present. Thus the contents of this work are subject
institutional adaptation process in the post Cold War security environment.  However, not much of the literature seriously discusses how the Western approaches to the Bosnian conflict related to the future of NATO and America’s role in the European security order.

The above-discussed literature review suggests that individual elements of European security—namely the changing European security environment, America’s relationship with its allies, the ideology that regulates the transatlantic relationship, and the corresponding institutional frameworks—are well studied in relation to the Bosnian conflict. However, there is a lack of work that discusses the causal relationship between each aspect of the European security order in a comprehensive manner. The present research represents an attempt to analyse this by paying attention to Western debates relating to the justification of the use of coercive power outside Western territories in the post Cold War period, and its applications to the Bosnian conflict. For this reason, we will look at the liberal literature on the Western Order that may provide a standard interpretation of the West’s use of coercive power to the Bosnian conflict and the transformation of the European security order. It may also help us to understand the relationship between national (vital) interests and the collective moral interests of the West.

Multilateralism and the Liberal Interpretation of America’s Relationship to European Security

This section looks at the works of Ruggie, Risse-Kappen, Ikenberry and their co-authors as examples of a liberal interpretation of how America relates to the West. It provides an interpretation of

to challenge by serious researches in future.


how the West and the US in particular responded to the challenge posed by the Bosnian conflict. As we will discuss later, these authors do not consider that the Bosnian conflict and the Western approach was the critical case that transformed the nature of the Western Order and America’s relationship with its allies. In order to provide an overview of their arguments, we at first look at the theoretical foundations of their analysis. The section afterwards will elucidate their analysis of the West and Western approaches to the Bosnian conflict.

These authors share the point of view that normative regulation (i.e. multilateralism) between the Western states is the fundamental source of the strength of the Western Order. This is because they believe that the continuity of the Western institutions, such as NATO after the Cold War, urge us to look at the foundation of the West beyond the structural causality of Neo-realism. Neo-realists ask the reason why states form and maintain alliances despite the anarchic nature of international relations. Following this question, some (Neo-) liberal literature has analysed America’s (or other states’) domestic policy-making process. In this way (Neo-) liberals have challenged the (Neo-) realists that treat the states as unitary rational actors. Their claim is that it is domestic background rather than international distribution of power that determines the relationship between allies.

In contrast to the above-discussed alliance studies, those who pay attention to role of normative values claim that the Western identity plays a significant role in determining Western actions. They argue that the strength of the West does not come from the structure of its international relationship vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, but from its shared value of ‘liberal democracy’ and the collective decision making process among the Western states. Thus, they presume that neither international strategic circumstances nor a state’s domestic policy-making process alone, can fully

explain the relationship between Western states. In essence, a logic derived from ‘Liberalism’ is applied and the role of ‘Multilateralism’ is emphasized in order to explain the intra-Western relationship. This research refers to this position as Liberal Multilateralism. Concerning the key issue of this research—the intra-Western relationship—the Liberal Multilateralists’ studies provide a comprehensive theoretical perspective. The following sections will elucidate Liberal Multilateralists’ account of the notion of multilateralism, the nature of the intra-Western relationship and America’s role within it, and how the Western Order contributes to stabilizing the world order.

**Multilateralism**

There are two ways of defining the term multilateralism: one is a quantitative definition that Neo-liberal literatures adopt and the other is Liberal Multilateralism’s qualitative (normative) interpretation. According to Robert Keohane’s quantitative definition, multilateralism is a form of international policy-making process that involves more than three states (or international actors). Unilateralism and bilateralism are antonyms with multilateralism. In this way, the number of participants in international cooperation is regarded as the index of multilateralism. There are more than three states participating in the ‘Western’ policy-making process and thus it is literally a multilateral process.

In contrast, the Liberal Multilateralists’ definition of multilateralism is based on its normative...
value (qualitative) rather than quantitative indicators. James Caporaso makes this clear:

'Multilateralism' [...] is a belief that activities ought to be organised on a universal basis at least for a 'relevant' group (for example, democracies). 46

Indeed, the Liberal Multilateralists argue that a genuine definition of multilateralism must contain an explanation as to 'how that order is achieved.' 47 It is not the balance of power or utilitarian motives, as Realists might suggest, but a normative values—namely multilateralism—that organizes the order. 48 James Morgan clarifies this point: 'multilateralism is the legitimacy of an order that is organised by more than three nations'. 49 This 'multilateralism' regulates intra-Western relationships and thus the power asymmetry between the Western states (i.e. the US and others) can be controlled. 50

In short, Liberal Multilateralists believe that it is not the international structure (i.e. polarity), or balance of power, or coercion of a hegemonic state, but rather the legitimacy of multilateralism—which is maintained by Western democracies—that has preserved Western institutions such as NATO and the Liberal Order. In this way, Ruggie and Risse-Kappen define the transatlantic alliance (by referring to Karl Deutsch's work) as a 'pluralistic security community'. 51

Democracy

Emanuel Adler and Michel Barnett modify Deutsch's 'pluralistic security community' concept by following the Liberal Multilaterists' arguments. 52 They describe the foundation of security community in the following way:

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47 Ruggie, Multilateralism Matters, 12.
48 Ruggie, Multilateralism Matters, 7.
50 Ruggie, Multilateralism Matters, 7.
A security community's governance structure will depend both on the state's external identity and associated behaviour and its domestic characteristics and practices.\(^{53}\)

In this way, Liberal Multilateralists focus not only on the process of decision-making between states but also on the common domestic system of the Western states, namely democracy. From this, Liberal Multilateralists endorse the 'democratic peace' theory.\(^{54}\) The pluralistic democracies are more likely to engage in peaceful conflict resolution through a multilateral decision-making process because they are used to such process domestically.\(^{55}\) To elucidate this process: at the domestic level a pluralistic democratic policy-making process undermines the notion of the state as a unitary rational actor, and thus paves the way to a consideration of a variety of actors and dimensions—such as bureaucratic politics and non-governmental actors—that are involved in deciding the outcomes of policy. At the international level, pluralistic democracy encourages inter-state interactions of bureaucratic politics and the formation of transnational networks.\(^{56}\)

In addition to this, Ikenberry and his co-authors have postulated another function that maintains stable interaction among the Western states, which is referred to as the 'socialization of norms.'\(^{57}\) This 'socialization of norms' is the processes by which leaders of secondary states accept hegemonic states' liberal-democratic norms. Even if they had not shared the same domestic values at the beginning of interaction, the Liberal Order 'socializes' leaders of each state, and eventually common values (i.e. 'liberal democracy' and multilateralism) spread from one place to another.\(^{58}\) In

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\(^{56}\) According to James Rosenau, transnational network (or transnationalism) is defined as 'the process whereby international relations conducted by governments have been supplemented by relations among private individuals, groups, and societies that can and do have important consequences for the course of events.' Rosenau, James. The Study of Global Interdependence: Essays on the Transnationalization of World Affairs. New York: Nichols, 1980. 1.


\(^{58}\) Ikenberry argues that this 'socialization of norms' is more or less a product of hegemony. In contrast,
essence the Liberal Multilateralists claim that the more the domestic characters of the Western states converge, the more the multilateral arrangements become secure. Risse-Kappen expressed the essence of this point in one phrase; ‘democratic allies form democratic alliances’.

Ruggie and Risse-Kappen also point out that multilateralism has transformed the security concepts of America and its Western allies. They understand that America has changed its national security interests from a ‘geostrategic logic’ (i.e. power politics) to one that is ‘more inclusive and more extensively institutionalized—even before the Soviet threat.’ According to these authors, the US follows the logic of multilateralism rather than a ‘geostrategic logic’ for promoting its foreign policy. Thus Ruggie claims that the creation as well as operations of the UN and NATO should be understood as an expression of the logic of multilateralism. In this way, Ruggie argues, the liberal institutions will eventually be able to address some agendas by themselves. Multilateralism played a fundamental role in promoting both the transformation of America’s perception of its national security, and Western states communication with each other.

As the result of such integration of common values (i.e. the pluralist nature of domestic policy-making processes) and convergence of interests, the Liberal Multilateralists suggest that there is a high probability of so-called ‘diffuse reciprocity’ among Western states. This means that given the condition that both X and Y are members of the same international cooperation (e.g. regime, institution and alliance), when X acts by following a regulation of that cooperation, X expects its ally Y’s similar behaviour. To sum up, Liberal Multilateralists stress that intra-Western cooperation is principally

Risse-Kappen claims that socialization of norms also occurs in the other way round (i.e. from secondary states to hegemonic state) as well. Ikenberry and Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power"; Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies, 6, 16, 24-27.

Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity, 14; Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies, 6, 16, 24-27.

Italic in the original text. Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity, 14.

Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity, 14.

Ruggie, Multilateralism Matters, 34.

Ruggie, Multilateralism Matters, 7.

Ruggie, Multilateralism Matters, 32-33; Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies, 6-7; Adler and Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities," 32.

Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity, 24.
maintained by the Western identity of ‘liberal democracy’ and its policy-coordination process based on
the principle of multilateralism. In other words, they argue that it is *power of values* (i.e. ‘liberal
democracy’ and multilateralism) not *balance of power* that regulates the relationship among the
Western states. This point distinguishes the Liberal Multilateralists’ worldview from those who
primarily focuses on the distribution of power (Realism and Neo-Realism) or on rational calculation of
actors to maximise one’s interests through cooperation (Neo-Liberalism). 67

*America’s ‘Benevolent’ Leadership*

The Liberal Multilateralism literature highlights the point that the pluralistic democracy of
the US (i.e. America’s alleged open and competitive policy-making process) provides sufficient ‘voice
opportunities’ for its Western allies to reflect their opinions on America’s foreign policy-making
process. 68 This means that America’s Western allies are able to participate in the US policy-making
process and thus they are able to exercise their influence on the outcomes of American policy. 69 Risse-
Kappen produced a well-regarded study on this subject in relation to European members of NATO and
their relationship with the UN from 1950s to 1980s. 70

In *Cooperation among Democracies*, he spells out the methodology and criteria to assess the
European influence on American policy in the following way. There would be ‘disagreement over
policies’ between the Western states prior to their interaction. 71 Through intra-Western interaction they
may dissolve such differences, and the outcomes of the US policy ‘either come close to the initial

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67 Keohane argues for continuity of the Western alliance even if American power declines, because the
international interdependence has institutionalised Western relations. Risse-Kappen and Ruggie criticize this
position (neo-liberal institutionalism). Keohane, Robert. *After Hegemony*; Risse-Kappen, "Ideas Do Not
Float Freely"; Ruggie, *Constructing the World Polity*, 63-64, 105.

68 Risse-Kappen, Thomas, and Peter J Katzenstein. "Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: the
Case of NATO," in *The Culture of National Identity: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, edited by Peter J
Katzenstein, 357-399. New York: Colombia University Press, 1996; Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation among
Democracies*, 95; Ikenberry, *After Victory*, 51-53, 203-204; Also, Ruggie implies this point by arguing that


70 Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation among Democracies*.

European demands or represent intra-alliance compromise. The central stage on which to assess Europe's influence is the American foreign policy-making process, where Western values would guide the interactions among actors. According to Risse-Kappen:

European demands are represented in the American foreign policy process, either directly through interallied consultations or indirectly through domestic and/or bureaucratic U.S. actors referring to allied concerns in the initial deliberations.

According to this methodology, the influence of America's allies can be found in either the intra-Western policy coordination mechanism, or in the US policy-making process. Risse-Kappen then looks at alternative forces within the US policy-process—such as 'the power structure of the international system', '[America's] domestic politics', and 'leadership beliefs'—that possibly define the outcomes of America's decisions. If these alternative factors are insignificant for determining the outcomes, then he concludes that 'European influence on American foreign policy' exists.

Risse-Kappen also suggests that three factors may prevent the US administration from following the outcomes of multilateralism. The first case is the situation that involves America's vital strategic interests. Secondly, he points out European policy-makers' indifference to Western values (of multilateralism and of 'liberal democracy') by promoting self-serving interests (such as imperialism). The last case is that America's domestic actors (e.g. Congress, bureaucratic politics and others) overwhelm its intentions regardless of the outcomes of the intra-Western multilateralism. Despite the concerns raised by Risse-Kappen, Liberal Multilateralists (even Risse-Kappen himself) continue to argue that there is a successful operation of intra-Western multilateralism—and America's allies' 'voice

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72 Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies, 14.
73 Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies, 13-14, 33-34.
74 Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies, 14.
75 Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies, 13.
76 Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies, 13-14.
77 Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies, 13-14.
78 See Risse-Kappen's interpretation of the failure of the intra-western multilateralism during the Suez War. Cooperation among Democracies, Chap. 4.
79 Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies, 13-14.
opportunities'—in the post Cold War world.  

In addition to these 'voice opportunities', Ikenberry argues that America's 'strategic restraint' and a willingness not to impose its particular interests on other Western states provides a stable intra-Western relationship. He combines this point with his analysis of the interaction between the US and other Western states after WWII. In this way, Ikenberry understands that the structure of this American liberal hegemony to be a result of the settlement of the Second World War, and that this provides a stable intra-Western relationship. He refers to this relationship between the 'liberal hegemony' of the US (i.e. not coercive leadership) and its Western allies as the 'constitutional order' that creates an orderly relationship among the Western states as similar to the constitutionally regulated Western domestic politics.

Ruggie also supports this connection between America's benevolent leadership of its allies (i.e. restrain to America's self-serving interests for the sake of common Western interests) and the formation of the Liberal Order among the Western states: 'American hegemony that was decisive after World War II, not merely American hegemony.' To paraphrase this point, it is not America's hegemonic leadership towards its allies but America's role as a leader of 'liberal democracy' and of Western multilateralism (i.e. its self-restraint in advocating its interests and its open and penetrated policy-making process) that was the key factor for the West's construction and maintenance of a stable order.

To sum up, the Liberal Multilateralists suggest that as a result of the above-discussed

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83 Ikenberry, After Victory, 29-34. 210-214.
84 Italic in the original text. Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity, 14.
combination of multilateralism, pluralistic democracy of the Western regimes, and American leadership, the Western states are able to overcome the Realist-presumed balance of power politics in the context of anarchy (in the sense that there is no central authority to regulate inter-state affairs). These mechanisms that maintain the intra-Western relationship distinguish the Western Order from other historical orders such as the balance of power-based order of *pax-Britannica* and any form of hegemonic order.\(^{85}\)

**Liberal Interpretations of the Western Actions in Relation to the Bosnian Conflict**

As we have discussed, the Liberal Multilateralists believe that the Western Order forms a 'pluralistic security community'\(^{86}\) or a 'constitutional order'.\(^{87}\) To elucidate the implication of such features, the Liberal Multilateralists consider that the end of the Cold War shifted the security environment, and wiped out the main external threat in the form of the Soviet Union. As discussed above, they posit that the Western states are now able to overcome traditional power politics when it deals with security threats. However, every order is accompanied by the potential to project coercive power. The Western Order is no exception. As previously discussed, by referring to the ideas of 'democratic peace' and 'pluralistic security community', they contend that the Western actions have been making a positive contribution to the stability of Europe. Accordingly, they suggest that the West collectively has been using its coercive power after the Cold War and that this promotes Western *values* of 'liberal democracy' and multilateralism, not in order to accomplish its geo-strategic objects and *vital interests*.

It is important to note, however, that we have been witnessing the fragile nature of the relationship between the US and its allies regarding their use of coercive power towards non-Western states in the post Cold War period (such as the Iraq War of 2003, the Western militarily action in

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\(^{87}\) Ikenberry, *After Victory*, 29-34, 210-214.
Afghanistan of 2001, and NATO’s intervention in the Kosovo War of 1999). Even some of the Liberal Multilateralists raised concern about this trend of the abuse of America’s supremacy. Among these cases, the Western approach to the Bosnian conflict represents a critical test case to evaluate the validity of the above-discussed interpretation of Liberal Multilateralism. As empirical study of this thesis will demonstrate, Western states failed to provide a coherent approach and a timely resolution to the Bosnian conflict. This case can also be seen as a precedent for Western actions based on self-serving interests, indicating the failure of Western multilateralism.

Some Liberal Multilateralists, in fact, accept that Bosnia represented a case where multilateralism failed. As previously discussed, the Liberal Multilateralists spell out the conditions under which the US is unable to follow the outcomes of multilateralism. They are: powerful domestic opposition in America; European indifference to Western values; and cases where America’s vital interests are at stake. Following these criteria, some Liberal Multilateralists view the West’s response to the Bosnian conflict as a failure of multilateralism due to: US congressional pressure not to comply with European opinions; bureaucratic opposition to the foreign entanglement; or European policymakers’ lack of respect for the ‘ideational’ (moral) interests of the West (i.e. protecting the territorial integrity of Bosnia and empowering the victims of the conflict in the form of Bosnian Muslims). However, they do not regard America’s action as based on its vital interests and thus the Bosnian conflict did not alter the nature of the Western Order.

In short, Liberal Multilateralists believe that the Bosnian conflict did not undermine the logic of the ‘pluralistic security community’ in Europe. Accordingly, Liberal Multilateralists claim that four consequences have emerged from the Western experiences during the Bosnian conflict as follows:

89 Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies, 13-14, 37.
90 Ruggie, Winning the Peace, 172.
92 To be precise, Risse-Kappen himself does not see that the Bosnian case damaged the coherence of NATO. See: Risse-Kappen, "Collective Identity in a Democratic Community," 394;
1) Multilateralism is the only existing legitimate logic to regulate the intra-Western relationship. Therefore, there is no disagreement among Western states regarding the contents of multilateralism. Multilateralism, in practice, implies the principles of enhancing America's democratic allies' 'voice opportunities' and embracing international norms such as the authority of the UN Security Council.

2) America's supremacy within West and its democratic allies' 'voice opportunities' are compatible.

3) NATO kept its coherence and hybrid character, and thus NATO worked in harmony with other security institutions. Also, it did not exclude non-Western states from its decision making process.

4) As a result of those factors, the Bosnian conflict posed a challenge to the values of the West (i.e. 'liberal democracy' and multilateralism), but it did not pose a threat to the geo-strategic and vital interests of each Western state.

**Ian Clark's Critique of the Western Order under Quasi-Multilateralism**

The literature on Liberal Multilateralism discussed above provides a standard and comprehensive but fallible narrative of the formation of the European security order, especially America's relation to other Western states. It identifies that Western values of promoting liberal democracy and multilateralism, not geo-strategic goals or vital interests, are the reason for the Western use of coercive power. The essence of this interpretation is that what is good for the West is always good for the rest of the world. Ian Clark criticizes such Liberal Multilateralist interpretations of the causal relationship. He pays attention to the potential gap between Western moral values and the West's practical application of them, by analysing the negative impacts of Western actions on the non-Western world.

Clark at first elaborates on Ikenberry's perception (previously discussed) of the order which Ikenberry claims to have been formed after the major wars. Ikenberry argues that an order consists of a particular pattern of re-distribution of power, including use of coercive power on the part of a

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94 Clark, The Post Cold War Order; Clark, "The Great Transformation after the Cold War?"
hegemonic state, and a re-definition of the legitimacy that would persuade secondary states to voluntarily take positions required by the order. Clark terms the former element as ‘distributive peace’ and the latter as ‘regulative peace.’ Liberal Multilateralists understand that the Western Order is stable because it has relied on what Clark called ‘regulative peace’ rather than the use of coercive powers to maintain it. Multilateralism is regarded as the essence of the ‘regulative peace’ of the Western Order. Clark questioned how this multilateralism works in practice.

Clark notes that Russia and its allies have been poorly treated by the Western states since the end of the Cold War. His interpretation is that as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union, it is natural to consider the Western states as the ‘victors’ of the Cold War and define the terms of the Cold War’s conclusion in the form of the West’s receiving of the ‘spoils’ of war from Russia as the loser. Clark suggests that the re-unification of Germany, NATO’s eastwards enlargement, IMF’s structural adjustment and loss of Russian influence as a global power in general are regarded as the ‘spoils’. The West is able to obtain these ‘spoils’ because it has undeniable asymmetric power over the non-Western world. Clark concludes that the West justifies imposing its policies on the non-Western world in the name of promoting multilateralism; however, in reality, such Western use of multilateralism does not give substantial ‘voice opportunities’ to the non-Western states regarding how the West treats them. Therefore, the Western Order and its multilateralism amounted to a ‘harsh’ settlement against the losers of the Cold War, namely Russia. Here Clark sees a tension between formal logic of multilateralism among the Western states and its application towards the non-Western states. His verdict on practices of multilateralism is negative. Clark sums up his analysis saying that the West does

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96 Ikenberry, *After Victory*, 57-58, 259.
97 Clark, *The Post Cold War Order*, 64.
98 Deudeny and Ikenberry, "The Nature and Sources of Liberal International Order."
99 Clark, *The Post Cold War Order*, 78.
100 Clark, *The Post Cold War Order*, 60-61.
102 Clark, *The Post Cold War Order*, 175, 182-183.
not promote 'constitutional order' as Liberal Multilateralists claim,\textsuperscript{104} but a 'quasi-constitutional order' that imposes a settlement on the 'losers' of the Cold War in the name of multilateralism.\textsuperscript{105} Accordingly, Clark predicted that such practices on the part of the West would make the contemporary order unsustainable.\textsuperscript{106}

This research adopts Clark's interpretation regarding the Western use of power to the non-Western world and its negative outcomes (i.e., in Clark's term, 'harsh' reality) with the following qualifications. The difference between the genuine 'constitutional order' and a 'quasi-constitutional order' is based on the content of the 'regulative peace' within the Western Order. The former requires a genuine kind of multilateralism (i.e. the Liberal vision of multilateralism) but the in the latter the US follows a logic that can be called \textit{Quasi-multilateralism}. A genuine multilateralism demands \textit{procedural} legitimacy when the West uses its coercive power towards the non-Western world. This means that the West should act based on consent among the Western states and through the framework of a multilateral international organization, especially the UN. Hence the non-Western states also have some 'voice opportunities' to define the outcomes of the Western action. However, Quasi-multilateralism is accompanied with an \textit{ideological} interpretation of the moral values of the West that does not necessary demand a \textit{procedural} interpretation of multilateralism. It rather compels the West to consider the 'quality' of the result. Therefore, the non-Western states do not have a chance to participate in policy-making process of the West.

As previously discussed, Liberal Multilateralists claim that legally speaking, NATO takes a form of collective self-defence, however, in practice, it operates according to a genuine logic of multilateralism and can cooperate with collective security organizations such as the UN and other regional organizations. In this way, they suggest that NATO can accommodate the interests of the non-Western states. However, what happens if the West or the US uses NATO to maintain its strategic
interest on the basis of its ideological moral values of ‘liberal democracy’ instead of procedural normative value of multilateralism? The above interpretation, derived from Ian Clark’s works, encourages us to make four counter claims vis-à-vis Liberal Multilateralists as follows;

1) Liberal Multilateralists are indifferent to a potential conflict between the ideological Western moral values of promoting a justice based on the principles of ‘liberal democracy’ and respecting the procedural normative value of multilateralism.

2) There can be a potential friction between America’s strategic interests for maintaining Western Order under its hegemonic leadership and the procedural normative value (i.e. multilateralism) that legitimises America’s allies’ ‘voice opportunities. In other words, America may abuse ideological values of Western multilateralism in order to constrain its allies ‘voice opportunities’.

3) A Western security institution, such as NATO cannot dissolve this tension between procedural values and ideological values in the form of a hybrid organization of collective self-defence and collective security.

4) In such a situation, it is highly likely that NATO and the US do not follow genuine multilateralism but Quasi-multilateralism in order to promote Western interests and that would not work in favour of non-Western states.

The next section elucidates this point by studying definitions and implications of collective security and collective self-defence in conjunction with the differing principles of multilateralism and Quasi-multilateralism.

NATO is Not a Hybrid Organization: a Tension between Western Moral Values and America’s Strategic Interests

There are three factors that distinguish the concept of collective security from that of collective self-defence: 1) the use of logic of balance of power, particularly the existence of any hegemonic leader within a security arrangement; 2) the obligations of the collectivity to its member
states; and 3) the way the collectivity treats non-member states.

Firstly, there are differing ideas as to what role power asymmetries play among the members of security arrangements. As Charles Kupchan and Clifford Kupchan summarize it, an ideal type of collective security has highly convergent security interests among the members. "[B]alancing behaviour [among the members] occurs only in response to aggression." Multilateralism in the form of 'voice opportunities' serves to shape common security interests among the members of a collective security arrangement. An ideal type of collective security is almost identical to the Liberal Multilateralists' interpretation of the Western Order and its 'pluralistic security community'.

In contrast, collective self-defence is usually organized in line with the international balance of power and thus keeps the logic of power asymmetry between participants. For instance, it would be impossible to explain the establishment of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO without considering the rivalry between the Soviet Union and the US. Hence, Quasi-multilateralism (in the form of giving priority to a hegemonic leader's strategic interests over its allies' 'voice opportunities') is highly likely to regulate the relationship among the members of a collective self-defence. With regard to this point, even some Liberal Multilateralists accept that NATO was a product of American hegemony. However, as previously discussed, they distinguish between different aspects of NATO. They consider that NATO has hybrid characteristics. It protects the original strategic or material interests of its members through a collective self-defence function in order to deter the threats posed by outsiders (i.e. the Soviet Union). At the same time, it pursues internal ideational interests to promote Western values (i.e. 'liberal democracy' and multilateralism) across the globe by facilitating collective security functions to support non-member states/regions. As a result, they assume that NATO simultaneously maintains two functions; a genuine multilateralism among its members, and collective

108 As previously discussed, despite this fact, Liberal Multilateralists argue that the nature of America's benign hegemony and NATO's inclusiveness have created a 'security community', and have established its collective security measures. Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity, 14; Ruggie, Winning the Peace, 44-45, 80-88; Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies, 32. Ikenberry. After Victory: 233-239.
security actions regarding NATO's 'out of area' missions. By extending its collective security function (promoting its values of 'liberal democracy'), Liberal Multilateralists believe that NATO can act in harmony with other security organizations. In other words, they presume that shared ideational interests and multilateralism makes NATO able to accommodate America's hegemonic interests, its allies' 'voice opportunities', and the interests of other security organizations without serious frictions among them.

Secondly, with regard to the obligation to protect other member states, collective security imposes greater responsibilities on its members. A prime responsibility is the 'all against one' principle that guarantees universal commitment (or total solidarity) amongst participant states against aggressors.\(^{109}\) Thus, all members of the arrangement share the same levels of responsibility. In other words, when it faces a security threat, the normative regulation imposed on each member of the collective security arrangement should be in accordance with the genuine definition of multilateralism.

In contrast, collective self-defence restricts the conditions and geographical scope of its responsibility. There are various cases in NATO's history that the strategic interests of the US took precedence over ideational interests of promoting 'liberal democracy' and multilateralism. For instance, NATO defined the scope of its defence obligations and its membership not purely by ideological criteria but by geographic locations. Forming a defence organization against the potential invasion by the Warsaw Treaty Organization was the principal rationale of NATO's existence. Accordingly, NATO accepted Portugal (a founding member), Turkey and Greece as member states despite the fact that they did not have democratic regimes.\(^{110}\) Neither the moral interests of facilitating intra-Western multilateralism nor promoting 'liberal democracy' defined NATO's geographical orientation, but America's strategic interests vis-à-vis the Soviet Union ultimately determined its membership. In

\(^{110}\) In addition, as Lawrence Kaplan suggested, America's geographical interests in Spitzbergen (Norway), Greenland (Denmark), Azores (Portugal) may explain why the US included these states in NATO. In practice, NATO did not prevent the conflict between Turkey and Greece on the issue of Cyprus. Kaplan, Lawrence S. The United States and NATO : the Formative Years. Lexington, Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 1984. 83, 107-110. For Risse-Kappen's acknowledgement of this point, see: Risse-Kappen,
addition, as Risse-Kappen accepts, multilateralism in the form of America’s allies’ ‘voice opportunities’ could be restricted when America’s strategic interests were at stake.\textsuperscript{111} The well-known examples of this were: America’s reluctance to support the British and the French actions in the Suez War of 1956; De Gaulle’s demands to reform NATO’s decision-making system in 1959; and the so-called Skybolt crisis between the US and the UK in 1962.\textsuperscript{112} This means that so far as the US placed priority on its own strategic interest over a common norm of multilateralism, the collective self-defence organization of NATO could not overcome a potential tension between the hegemonic position of the US and its allies ‘voice opportunities’ or the interests of non-Western states.

Lastly, there is a difference between collective security and collective self-defence regarding their definitions of threat and response. The former does not have a clear image of threat at the beginning and thus the corresponding measures will be negotiated among the member states on a case-by-case basis, whereas the latter defines the enemy at its inception and tends to have a fixed means to counter the threat. This would suggest that collective self-defence arrangements are exclusive in nature and potentially unfriendly to outsiders.

To elucidate this point: under a collective security arrangement, threat is perceived in accordance with Claude’s well-known phrase:

\begin{quote}
[t]he world is conceived not as we-group [sic] and they-group [sic] of nations, engaged in competitive power relations, but as an integral we-group in which danger may be posed by “one of us” and must be met by “all the rest of us.”\textsuperscript{113}
\end{quote}

This suggests that collective security does not pay substantial attention to the political orientation (i.e. type of domestic regime) or the strategic interests of its members. Chapter VII of the UN Charter stipulates that the UN Security Council ‘shall determine the existence of any threat to the
peace' and if necessary it will 'decide what measures shall be taken.' 1114 In relation to this point, Article 51 of the UN Charter also recognizes that '[n]othing in the present [UN] Charter shall impair the inherent rights of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.' 1115 In this way, Article 52 provides the legal foundation for establishing regional (collective security and self-defence) arrangements. However, in practice, institutionalization of this particular self-defence arrangement (namely NATO) effectively created quite a different approach to security from UN-based collective security when it comes to perceptions of 'threat.' There is a consensus in the literature on security that collective security accommodates potential enemies within the group, whereas collective self-defence—based on the mechanism of alliance—defines the enemy according to its own values and seeks to exclude potential enemies at the outset. 1116 Collective self-defence, in other words, would take coercive action for the sake of its own values and against its fixed conceptualisation of the enemy. In this respect, the notion of 'democratic peace' may define the salient Western value and may become a rationale of using coercive power against non-democratic regimes (see Chapter 4, below). 1117

To sum up the three elements discussed above, it is logical to say that the concept of a collective security arrangement fits with the Liberal Multilateralists' view of multilateralism, and it would accommodate the interests both Western and non-Western states. In contrast, a collective self-defence arrangement tends to promote Quasi-multilateralism and thus it would restrict the input of both

1114 Article 39, Chapter VII, Charter of the United Nations.
1117 This point is well-discussed by one of the proponents of democratic peace, Michael Doyle. He warns of the war-prone tendency of West. In contrast, there are some authors who support the use of coercive power in order to promote 'democratic peace'. Doyle, Michael W. "Liberalism in World Politics," American Political Science Review 80, no. 4 (1986): 1151-1169. Also see, Cooper, Robert. "Why We Still Need Empires," The Observer, 7 April 2002, 27.
Western and non-Western states on America’s policy. Contrary to the Liberal Multilateralists’ prediction, however, NATO still maintains its collective self-defence identity by keeping de facto independence from the authority of the UN for its military operations (see Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 for details). Thus, it is logical to consider that the maintenance of NATO’s collective self-defence identity and its quasi-multilateral characteristic is in the critical strategic interests of the US or the Western states. Accordingly there is a tension between such strategic interests and the ideational interests of the US and the West in the form of promoting multilateralism in security (i.e. collective security).

The above study of security concepts suggests one critical point. It is now clear that the relationship between the West and the non-western world is constructed not only based on power politics between the two but on a logic of Western Order (i.e. genuine multilateralism that emphasises procedural values or Quasi-multilateralism that inclines to ideological values) and its institutional approaches to security (i.e. collective security or collective self-defence). Therefore, the politics that determines the logic of Western Order—namely the intra-Western relationship—is the critical part of understanding the nature of the World Order since the end of the Cold War.

Two Visions of the Western Order: Working Hypothesis and Methodologies

Four Research Questions and Two Hypothetical Interpretations

According to previously reviewed literatures, it is possible to consider that the intra-Western debate on the Bosnian policy was a critical moment for the West to determine the organizing principle of its order, and its approach to the rest of the world. This section categorises two concepts of the intra-Western relationship and how it moulded the role of the West in international (world) affairs and its relationship with non-Western states during the Bosnian conflict. They are namely Liberal Multilateralism and Quasi-multilateralism. (See Table 1 for overview).
Table 1: The organizing principles of international relations and policy implications

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intra-Western regulation</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Unilateralism</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Allies’ voice opportunities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Criteria to justify the use of coercive power</td>
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<tr>
<th>Relationship between the West and the Non-Western states</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Unilateralism</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-western actors</td>
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<td>Organizations</td>
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<td>Security arrangements</td>
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<tr>
<th>Implications for the Bosnian conflict</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Unilateralism</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Bosnian policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Implementation of the coercion</td>
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There are four analytical agendas that illustrate the difference between the two categories as follows:

1. Was there only one normative value that regulated the intra-Western relationship?
2. Why was the US not able to support the UN-EU sponsored peace plans?
3. To what extent did NATO cooperate with the UN and other international organizations?
4. Did the ideological values that originally adhered to the Western order force the US administration to adopt a policy of ignoring the UN-EU sponsored peace plans and advocate the ‘lift and strike’ policy in the name of promoting Western values (i.e. protecting the ‘victim’ of the conflict in the form of the Bosnian government under the leadership of Alija Izetbegović)?

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118 Unilateralism is indicated in order to provide an idea of the evolution process from Multilateralism to the alleged features of the current US foreign policy. Therefore, this thesis does not make any academic claim to define the term ‘unilateralism’.
The following section summarizes the interpretations of each concept of Western collective action.

**Liberal Multilateralism**

The international order based on Liberal (genuine) Multilateralism places emphasis on the procedural legitimacy of collective decision-making. Insofar as it corresponds with this, the practice of America's hegemony within the intra-western relationship is considered as quite restrained and its allies' 'voice opportunities' are guaranteed not only in theory but also in practice. The outcomes of the intra-Western negotiation are based on mutual understanding of the benefit of actions, not on balance of power between the US and its allies.

In addition, the boundaries between the 'West' and 'the international community' are less rigid than under Quasi-multilateralism. As the result of the end of the Cold War, it is considered that there is no substantial antagonism between the Western states and the non-Western states. The post-Cold War international order is managed on the basis of the voluntary acceptance of Western values by non-Western states. It is assumed that the virtue of the intra-Western relationship based on multilateralism (i.e. America's constrained behaviour towards its allies) will attract its former adversaries to transform their identities and interests. Thus the membership of the originally Western collective policy-making forum is open to non-Western states.

Accordingly, collective security and the UN as a symbol of this become key security principles and organizations of genuine multilateralism. Collective use of coercive power ideally takes the form of 'international' agreements rather than of bilateral agreements between the 'Western states'. NATO is considered as a hybrid organization between collective security and collective self-defence. The practices of its *de facto* independence from the UN Security Council are narrowed as a result of this.

As far as the Bosnian policy is concerned, a (genuine) multilateralist view would take it that the UN-EU sponsored peace plans reflected America's allies' opinions (because they were supported
by the majority of US allies and also used the UN as the core organization). This policy was in accordance with the resolutions of the Security Council and international agreements (see Chapter 2 for details). Therefore, as far as procedural aspects are concerned it did not exclude non-Western states from the decision-making process. It even provided opportunities for the majority of Bosnian warring parties to participate in the negotiation process. Nevertheless, some advocates of Liberal Multilateralism accept that America’s lack of cooperation with the UN-EU sponsored peace plans, and its so-called ‘lift and strike’ policy were a failure of this theory.

They regard it as an exception and blame the US domestic actors that forced the US administration to ignore its allies’ ‘voice opportunities.’ They understood that it was an irregular failure that did not change the nature of the US as a Liberal Multilateralist actor. Based on a more casual interpretation of multilateralism, some might argue that the Bosnian experience was a ‘success’ of Liberal Multilateralism. This was because the US did not implement the ‘lift and strike’ policy, as a result of European countries opposition to it. Added to that, the policy-makers of the US administration endorsed these perspectives and legitimised their policy of non-cooperation with the UN-EU sponsored peace plans on the basis of protecting the ‘victims’ of the Bosnian conflict. They understood that this was a moral obligation of the Western states under the values of Liberal Multilateralism. In all these scenarios, Liberal Multilateralists understand that the Bosnian conflict did not cause any threat to America’s vital interests and the US did not use its sheer asymmetric power over others to impose its preferred policies. Therefore, America under the Clinton presidency is still characterized as a Liberal Multilateral actor, and the nature of the Western order is intact according to their theories.

*Quasi-multilateralism*

An international order that adopts Quasi-multilateralism places emphasis on the identity of each actor (whether it accepts liberal democratic values and regimes or not) over procedural values for defining the membership of any collective policy-making forum. However, it tends to reflect America’s
hegemonic interests vis-à-vis its Western allies. America’s allies’ ‘voice opportunities’ are constrained. In practice, the balance of power between the US and its allies, rather than the multilateral negotiation process, determines the outcome of Western policies.

An image of the post-Cold War international order is of an extension of Western values to the non-Western world. However, the West’s emphasis on the identity of its domestic regimes rather than its international collective procedural fairness and openness, sometimes prevents non-Western states from taking part in collective decision-making processes. In other words, the boundaries between the West and the non-Western world are more rigid under Quasi-multilateralism than genuine multilateralism. ‘Western’ states could use collective coercive power based on their own values regardless of any ‘international’ consensus that may reflect the interests of non-Western actors. This kind of practice would arguably create a tension between the interests of the Western states and the non-Western states. Western action cannot be treated as a synonym for international action.

Accordingly, Western states still maintain bilateral and collective self-defence arrangements as the pivotal forums of collective security. Collective coercive use of power can be implemented on the basis of ‘Western’ consensus regardless of the existence of formal ‘international’ legitimacy such as consent from the UN Security Council. NATO is not a hybrid security organization between collective self-defence and collective security. In other words, NATO attempts to maintain its de facto independence from the UN Security Council as far as possible.

Where the Bosnian policy is concerned, the UN-EU sponsored peace plans and the US approaches to the conflict can be discussed not only based on their procedural legitimacy, but also on ideological values. The US administration criticized the UN-EU sponsored peace plans for appeasing Serbian and Croatian aggression and proposed to implement the so-called ‘lift and strike’ policy in the name of supporting the interests of the Bosnian government and of the civilians on the ground.

This research supports interpretations based on Quasi-multilateralism. Accordingly, this research posits the following working hypothesis in regard to post Cold War European security as
follows: Western policy towards Bosnia did not work to support the interests of the Bosnian government, and adversely affected its civilians, who suffered as a result of conflict being prolonged and of the West's failure to protect them in the early stages of international involvement. Western hypocrisy was exacerbated due to US manipulations of the interpretation of Western moral values in order to organize the Western Order under Quasi-multilateralism.

The empirical chapters of this thesis will examine the validity of this hypothesis regarding the four questions as above stated. If the answers to these questions turn out to be in favour of this research's arguments, it will suggest that America's policy was deliberately implemented to transform the regulative principles of the Western order from Liberal Multilateralism to Quasi-multilateralism for the sake of its own national interests. The following section will address methodological issues in relation to the contents of the empirical study.

**Definition of the Terms**

Here the interests of the Bosnian government is understood as maintaining its territorial integrity under the leadership of the Izetbegović government (hereafter the Bosnian government) and as protecting the civilians on its controlled territories in order to prevent imminent violence upon them, and to cease the conflict as soon and as peacefully as possible.\(^{119}\) The overall vital interests of the US are provisionally understood as maintaining its hegemony vis-à-vis its allies in the post Cold War order. In practice, with regard to the European security order, this was expressed in the form of consolidating NATO's coherence and functions regardless of the pressure to enhance collective security arrangements in Europe. In other words, it is the position that maintains NATO's *de facto* independence from the authority of the UN Security Council. As far as the Bosnian conflict is concerned, the US administration did not want to use its ground troops to implement the UN-EU sponsored peace plans

\(^{119}\) Of course, this is a simplified interpretation of their interests. Neither of the organizing principles of the Western order can guarantee the interests of the Bosnian government and its civilian on the ground. However, it is clear that the US policy emphasised the interests of the Bosnian government more than the UN-EU
for fear of undermining NATO’s role and America’s military flexibility.120

The term NATO’s de facto independence from the UN is defined in the following way. So far as NATO undertakes its collective self-defence missions (i.e. NATO’s Article 5 mission) it is considered that NATO maintains both de jure and de facto independence from the UN Security Council (UNSC) provided that the latter does not take relevant action regarding such an issue. However, according to the usual interpretation of international law, the UNSC becomes the supreme legal authority to establish NATO’s missions when it engages in missions beyond collective self-defence matters (e.g. peacekeeping operations and the so-called ‘non-Article 5’ missions). In other words, NATO does not have de jure independence from the UN for establishing a peacekeeping mission outside of the territories of its signatories. In the case of the Bosnian conflict, UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) No. 713 established the arms embargo over the former Yugoslavia.121 In addition, UNSCR 743 set up the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and it was deployed firstly in Croatia then in Bosnia.122 Accordingly, WEU and NATO provided support to the arms embargo scheme and NATO also provided infrastructure for the UNPROFOR missions. However, as far as the implementation of such missions is concerned, there is a political space for NATO and the UN Security Council to negotiate the extent to which NATO maintains its operational flexibility. Therefore, the term NATO’s de facto independence from the UN suggests a policy, which seeks greater operational flexibility from the UN Security Council regarding the use of air powers in Bosnia. This policy is a part of strategy that attempts to maintain NATO’s principal role in the European security order accompanied by America’s hegemonic leadership in Europe, as well as to support the supremacy of collective self-defence arrangements over collective security. This thesis will empirically demonstrate that the advocates of these two positions were almost identical; namely the US policy-peace plans. See Chapter 3, 4, 5 and 6 for detail.

120 In retrospect, it can be argued that not deploying US forces on the ground was a preference and maintaining NATO’s de facto independence from the UN one was the vital interests. However, the US administration did not clearly give priority to one over another until summer 1995; thus it treats two factors as vital interests. See Chapter 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 for details.

makers.

To look at this point in a wider context, the extent of NATO's operational flexibility in relation to the Bosnian conflict was the symbolic issue regarding the future of Western security arrangements.\textsuperscript{123} It was also the critical issue for defining the inclusiveness of the Western order.\textsuperscript{124}

With regard to the definition of a particular state's (or organisation's) policies, this research adopts the following general guideline that is often used in the studies of diplomatic history. \textit{British policy} is defined as a policy that was expressed by the then British government. It should be at least substantiated either by government official documents, parliamentary records, statements or memoirs of the policymaker(s), or the author's interview with the policymaker(s) in charge of foreign and defence policy.\textsuperscript{125} In other words, the narratives of empirical study are mostly based on the above-mentioned materials. The use of academic works (the secondary materials) that interpret individual states' policies or bilateral relations regarding the Bosnian conflict is kept at the most minimal level. The general guideline is that academic works are only referred to when they are the only resources that provide reliable background information or evaluation of a policy.\textsuperscript{126}

The same approach is taken for defining the policies of the United States and other states. \textit{European policy} is generally defined as a policy which is endorsed, declared or recommended either by the European Council (a meeting of the head of governments and the highest decision making institution of the EC/EU), or meetings of Foreign Ministers or Defence Ministers. Therefore, British policy and European policy are not always the same. However, when British policy is in harmony with

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item In other words, it asks whether NATO operates relies on multilateralism or Quasi-multilateralism; and whether it encourages to give substance to collective security arrangements in Europe or not.
\item Inclusiveness of the Western order depends on whether the West considers the interests of the former communist regimes in a relatively formal, substantial and favourable manner or demands that they accept Western opinions.
\item This research acknowledges common caution relating to the reliability of interview research in historical study. However, the use of interviews as a resource in this study is justified with regard to the limited availability of official documents (such as minuets of cabinet meetings, diplomatic telegrams, and the drafts of policies) during the Bosnian conflict.
\item Therefore, this research acknowledges the potential danger that it could sometime fail to provide comprehensive coverage of important academic works in relation to interpretation of the transatlantic relationship and US foreign policy during the Bosnian conflict. However, this is not the principle criteria to
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the EC/EU's policy this research does not consciously distinguish one from the other. This is for the purpose of simplification and thus this research does not dismiss the reality that a 'European policy' often contains divisions among members of the European Union.

The findings of this research in regard to European and British influence on US foreign policy relates also to wider questions, including: Is the US as well as the West multilateralist or quasi-multilateralist? And are the consequences of Western policies on the non-Western world harsh or benevolent? If we find evidence that intra-Western interactions produce the above-discussed features of collective security and do not produce harsh outcomes for the non-Western world, then the Liberal Multilateralists' view of intra-Western relationship should be regarded as a coherent interpretation. Conversely, if we find that America consistently acts to promote the three features of collective self-defence and that Western policies result in harsh outcomes for non-Western states, it would be appropriate to say that the US promotes Quasi-multilateralism.

**Methodologies**

In contrast to Liberal Multilateralism which pays attention to the process of intra-Western policy-making, this research adopts Susan Strange's notion of 'power over outcomes' as the criterion to evaluate one state or actor's influence on American policy. This means that one state or group's influence on American policy is evaluated not in terms of how they participated in the American policy-making process but how they managed to define the consequences of a US or Western policy. In other words, this research evaluates European influence on American policy not through analyzing the American policy-making process, but the outcomes of the Western policy. This is because European policy-makers would not be satisfied with only participating in the US policy-making process. As far as the domain of America's European allies' influence is concerned, the research assumes that the

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‘outcomes’ of Western interaction includes an overt policy itself and the way they legitimize it. This demonstrates the extent to which Western states shared common values prior to and after their interaction. Thus the Liberal Multilateralists’ assumption that Western states share a normative vision to deal with some particular situation prior to intra-Western interaction is contested. 128

The notion of ‘power over outcomes’ also defines how the actions of the West betrayed their values and the promises to the non-Western world and devastated conditions of civilians on the ground. Those Western hypocrisies will be discussed in the following three respects: a) an approach or a peace plan that would dismiss the Bosnian government’s desire to maintain a single and unified sovereign state; b) a method to impose a settlement that would impose further violence on Bosnian civilians (e.g. arming Croatians and launching excessive air strikes); c) a settlement that would deprive Bosnia’s rights of self-governance and self-determination.

In order to evaluate the role of moral interests and vital (or strategic) interests for defining Western (and the US) policy, this research follows Risse-Kappen’s previously-discussed methodologies. 129 In other words, we will look at an initial US policy and initial European policies (as well as those of non-Western states) in relation to the Bosnian conflict prior to and after (i.e. the consequences) intra-Western interactions. If the intra-Western interaction resulted in the advancement of European policy, this can be seen as European influence on US policy. Thus we may conclude that intra-Western interactions are explained by the Liberal Multilateralists’ interpretation. However, if an initial American policy is persistent throughout intra-Western interaction and that determines the West’s actions, this will mean that there was no substantial European influence and thus it will suggest a failure of multilateralism. In the case of the Bosnian conflict, Liberal Multilateralists claim that the failure was either due to European policy-makers ignoring the Western moral values or American domestic actors’

128 To be precise, some Liberals (e.g. Ikenberry) are more conscious of the coercive aspect of the establishment of shared Western norms. Thus they discuss the process of promoting ‘Western values’ (e.g. ‘socialization of norms’) in relation to American hegemony. Ikenberry and Kupchan, “Socialization and Hegemonic Power,” 283-315; Ikenberry, “Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Persistence of American Postwar Order,” 43-73.

opposition to the outcomes of multilateralism. Accordingly, they dismissed the interpretation that the failure of multilateralism was a result of the US government’s strategic calculation to promote its vital interests. In order to examine the critical factor that caused the US policy to oppose the outcome of multilateralism, we will look at America’s domestic actors’ positions and the characteristics of the European actors’ policies. We will also consider America’s vital interests when these two factors do not explain the US policies.

The Organization of the Thesis

Each chapter examines the working hypothesis in relation to the intra-Western relationship regarding the Bosnian conflict. As previously discussed, there are four theoretical points by which we will evaluate the coherence of the Liberal Multilateralism and the working hypothesis of this thesis. The organization of the thesis is as follows.

Chapter 2 presents background information of the collapse of the Yugoslavia, the Bosnian conflict and Western debates in relation to international conflict resolution mechanisms since the early 1990s. It will underscore the ad hoc nature of institutionalization of the Western approach to the crisis engulfing the former Yugoslavia, and will also underline the fact that European states needed to rely on their political and diplomatic skills rather than institutional multilateralism to establish a Western policy to address the situation in the former Yugoslavia. In this way, this chapter will look at whether the Western states promoted one vision of multilateralism or differing ideas of Western cooperation.

Chapter 3 will discuss the period from August 1992 to May 1993. It will demonstrate the fallacy behind the notion that America’s allies’ have ‘voice opportunities.’ It will also trace the fact that the US administration was determined to not to accept the EU-UN approach to the Bosnian conflict prior to intra-Western interaction and even before the US domestic actors (e.g. Congress, media and leaders of public opinions) demanded that the Clinton administration oppose the EU-UN approach. In this way, we will look at the relationship between America’s vital interests and its reactions to the
Bosnian conflict.

Chapter 4 will look at the period from June 1993 to September 1993. It will analyse America’s justification of its ideological interpretation of Western values instead of following the procedural value of multilateralism. For this purpose, it closely studies the texts of the series of speeches presented by the high-ranking officials of the Clinton administration in September 1993. It will illustrate how the US administration promoted the idea of Quasi-multilateralism by employing the ‘democratic peace’ theory in order to follow its vital interests of maintaining NATO’s de facto operational independence from the UN (i.e. collective self-defence) and consolidating America’s hegemonic role within the West.

Chapter 5 will cover the period from October 1993 to December 1994. This period illustrates America’s application of Quasi-multilateralism to the situation in Bosnia that was launched by the series of speeches in September 1993. This resulted in the transformation of the main institutional framework of international mediation from the EU-UN sponsored International Conference of the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) to the so-called Contact Group. Despite this transformation, the Western states were still unable to form a coherent position. This factor will challenge the fallacy of the Liberal Multilateralists’ claim that NATO can cooperate with other security organizations such as the UN by virtue of its alleged hybrid characteristic based on multilateralism. It also criticizes the Liberal Multilateralists’ interpretation that explains America’s failure to follow the outcomes of multilateralism as being due to its domestic political pressures. Instead, it argues that the critical factor for neglecting multilateralism was the Clinton administration’s policy of protecting its vital interests (i.e. keeping the US away from the ethnic conflict on the ground and maintaining NATO’s de facto independence from the UN).

Chapter 6 will discuss the final phase of the Bosnian conflict in 1995. The remarkable differences between this period and the previous ones were NATO’s and the US’ active involvement in the conflict not only politically but also militarily. However it was accompanied by the fact that the US
launched military actions while effectively sidelining its European allies and the UN from the
substantial decision-making process. Hence it is appropriate to discuss how America’s promotion of
Quasi-multilateralism affected the interests of the Bosnian government and the situation of the civilians
on the ground.

The conclusion of this thesis is in Chapter 7. This chapter spells out exactly how the working
hypothesis is consistent with the empirical cases compared with the empirical analysis. It assesses the
validity of the Liberal notion of multilateralism and of the Western Order. These theoretical comments
will be followed by some discussion regarding the implication of this research for the understanding of
the current Western Order.

This chapter chronologically traces the development of Western interactions concerning the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (hereafter ‘former Yugoslavia’) in 1991-1992, with particular reference to the outbreak of the Bosnian conflict. It sets the scene for the empirical studies that will follow in the subsequent chapters. This chapter will also look at the cases that are inconsistent with the assumptions of Liberal Multilateralism. Especially it challenges the interpretation that the Western states share a view that multilateralism regulates Western collective action.

The key feature regarding intra-Western relationships at the outbreak of the Bosnian conflict was the lack of a transatlantic Western institutional framework to deal with the situation. This was due to the fact that the US was relatively indifferent to the collapse of Yugoslavia, while the Europeans began to construct some form of international framework to promote peace. This raises the question: what happens when America’s allies want to address an issue that the US is simply not interested in?

For the Liberal Multilateralists this is an unusual situation. As previously discussed in Chapter 1, Liberal Multilateralists claim that multilateralism regulates the Western Order. In other words, they do not see the tension between the procedural normative value of multilateralism and the ideological moral value of promoting ‘liberal democracy’. The Liberal Multilateralists are, however, prepared to accept the possibility of the failure of multilateralism under the following circumstances. They are: America’s insistence on maintaining its vital national interests; interference from America’s domestic politics; and America’s European allies’ ignoring of Western values. Yet, as we have discussed in Chapter 1, none of them accept that Bosnia was the case that fundamentally challenged the validity of their understanding of the intra-Western relationship. This is because they believe that the US government did not insist on its vital interests (and strategic interests) vis-à-vis its allies’ opinions but paid lip service to multilateralism. In this way, they think that America’s failure to follow

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1 Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies, 13-14.
the outcome of multilateralism in Bosnia was just an irregular situation.

In order to challenge such an interpretation, this chapter will make the following three claims. First of all, the opportunities on the part of European states for exercising their influence on American foreign policy are not always naturally guaranteed. This will be discussed in relation to Western approaches to the process of the collapse of the former Yugoslavia. Secondly, the failure of intra-Western cooperation regarding the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia was due to the existence of competing visions (i.e. different ways of defining the ‘ideational’ interests) of Western collective action in the early 1990s. This point will be analysed with reference to the Western policies regarding Slovenian and Croatian independence. Thirdly, America’s vital national interests defined the contents of its global vision and its approaches to the Bosnian conflict. The vision aimed at maintaining its hegemonic political position in Europe and keeping NATO’s pivotal role in the European security order. In other words, America’s advocacy of ideological moral value is instrumental rather than a natural expression of belief. This claim will be examined in relation to the independence of Bosnia and the initial phase of the Bosnian conflict.

The content of each section of this chapter has five basic empirical themes. These are: 1) background information on the general political situation in the former Yugoslavia and the international relations involved; 2) initial European policies; 3) initial American policy; 4) the outcomes of intra-Western interaction; and 5) the assessment of one of the three claims of this chapter as aforementioned.

The Collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Search for a Common Western Approach

The former Yugoslavia began its process of dissolution when Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence in December 1991. Since the late 1970s, along with other East European communist regimes, Yugoslavia had been experiencing serious difficulties in maintaining its federal structure. Especially, its poor economic performance in the 1980s consistently undermined the
legitimacy of the federation. The process of dissolution was, however, unique in comparison with other East European states. It was not simply a matter of the transformation of governing powers and principles (i.e. from communism to liberal democracy). The case of Yugoslavia was a matter of survival of unity and integrity of the territorial state (federal structure) itself. Yugoslavia's ethnic diversity, which in the past proudly proclaimed the 'brotherhood' of its multi-ethnicity, was one of the main means employed to foment the turmoil. Moreover, there was a serious lack of international interests in the situation it faced. In essence, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union had worked against Yugoslavia. The West was no longer interested in supporting Yugoslavia as a strategic bastion against the Soviet Union. These factors had a negative impact on the Yugoslav economy which ended up undermining the legitimacy of the federal system.

Against this background, nationalist movements had since the 1980s become the major driving force in the transformation of the former Yugoslav regime. For instance, Susan Woodward argues that the local leaders had shifted the foundations of the re-distribution mechanisms from the old communist-party based system to the one based on ethnic identity that often ended up as increasing the unemployment rate among those ethnic Serbs who worked in manual labour sections in non-Serbian republics in the former Yugoslavia. She considers this as a root cause that inflamed nationalism across the former Yugoslavia. Sabrina Ramet provides detailed analysis of cultural and religious factors in order to comprehend the complexity of the dissolution process in the former Yugoslavia. Nonetheless, she points out that the critical factor that inflamed the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia was not these factors. It was ethnic Serbs' nationalism in the former Yugoslavia—especially those in non-Serbian

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7 Ramet, Sabrina P. Balkan Babel, Chapter 4, 5, 6 and 7, Espec. 79-80.
republics—that stimulated counter-nationalism, and that facilitated the fragmentation of the federal structure. Indeed, it is widely considered that the Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević and other ethnic leaders exploited this situation. Robert Hayden makes a counter-claim that the origin of the conflict was not so much ethnic or cultural confrontation as such. He believes that the formation process of the constitutions in the new republic—especially Slovenia—that refused to accept any central authority beyond nation sovereignty, that institutionalised the series of conflicts in the former Yugoslavia.

Despite these different interpretations regarding the origins of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia among the well-known works, it is possible to understand that ethnic identities became the central means to express political issues, such as territorial disputes, the direction of regime transformation, and constitutional rights. This ethnicity-driven politics was often accompanied by violence.

The end of the Cold War opened the question of the legitimacy of the Yugoslav state, after decades in which the overriding consideration had been independence vis-à-vis Nazi-Germany and the Soviet Union. The actions of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) exacerbated a situation that was fuelled by friction between a Serbian nationalism that attempted to maintain the federation structure in the former Yugoslavia under its hegemony, and other nationalist movements that aimed either at seceding from it or at altering the structure of the Federation. As a result, the JNA ended up being employed as an instrument in the forging of a “Greater Serbia.” This situation only intensified the violence in the former Yugoslavia.

The international community had been attempting to resolve the chaotic situation since the outbreak of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia in 1991. With regard to this situation the Conference

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13 For instance see: Gow. The Serbian Project and its Adversaries. 57-65.
on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) held a Foreign Ministerial meeting in Berlin on 19 and 20 June 1991. It expressed international concern regarding the situation in Yugoslavia and supported ‘territorial integrity’, ‘the rights of minorities’ and peace based on negotiation.\textsuperscript{14} This conference meeting formalized international support for the EC’s efforts to arbitrate the dispute in Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{15} It would be possible to argue that CSCE provided an institutional framework to coordinate Western policy during this period.\textsuperscript{16} However, in fact, the CSCE was not able to coordinate an international approach to the collapse of former Yugoslavia, and conflicts resulted from that because of the following disagreements among the major international actors.\textsuperscript{17}

There were four international lines of division regarding this issue: the relationship between the different EC member states, between the EC and the UN, between the US and the EC and between the US and the UN. At the time of the collapse of the federal structures of the former Yugoslavia, the most serious division was that between the members of the European Community.\textsuperscript{18} This disunity was conspicuous as a result of the lack of engagement of the US and the UN regarding the collapse of the Yugoslavia. The UN was not eager to engage in this conflict for fear that a drain on its limited resources would undermine its other efforts such as those in Africa, Asia and Latin America.\textsuperscript{19} Moreover the US was also not enthusiastic, as it perceived that it held no security or geographical interests in Yugoslavia. Thus there was a substantial gap between the American position and that of its European allies in regard to the collapse of the former Yugoslavia. As a result, during the early period of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia the central agenda was the formation of a common European policy.

\textsuperscript{16} Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War, 308-309.
\textsuperscript{18} For general overviews of this issue see: Freedman, Lawrence, ed. Military Intervention in European Conflicts. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1994; Ramet, Sabrina P. and Christine Ingebritsen, eds. Coming in from the Cold War.
American Policy: Identifying Its Vital Interests

At the beginning of the conflict, the US government had regarded the issues faced by Yugoslavia as less important than the situation in the former Soviet Union and the post-Gulf war Middle East. Generally speaking, the US had no geo-strategic interests in the former Yugoslavia itself at that time. However, the US administration preferred to maintain the territorial integrity of the former Yugoslavia for fear of the spill-over of ethnic conflicts across Europe. The then Secretary of State, James Baker, had been to Yugoslavia in June 1991 just before the outbreak of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. During this visit, he fomented an idea that despite America’s lack of geo-strategic interests there was an urgent need for military action against the nationalist movements in the former Yugoslavia. However, before they formally proposed to use international coercive power, the US policy-makers also paid attention to the grand strategic questions. The dissolution of the former Yugoslavia happened just at the moment when re-construction of the post Cold War security architecture in Europe was being undertaken.

Against this backdrop, the EC asked the US to let Europeans take an initiative on the former Yugoslav issues. The Bush administration accepted the EC’s requests with regard to the international initiatives because the US wanted to focus on other issues such as the situation in the Soviet Union. However, at the same time, the US was not comfortable with the idea of the revitalization of the

26 Interview with Thomas Niles on 21 May 2004.
European-led security organization called the Western European Union (WEU) for fear of losing NATO and American supremacy in Europe. Successful European political actions on the former Yugoslavia would certainly boost such European security initiatives. To interpret the ramification of this development, there was a potential danger for US policy-makers that their decision to intervene in the former Yugoslavia under the given transatlantic situation would allow the Europeans to claim the credibility of their political initiatives at the cost of the US troops. For these reasons, the US administration decided not to advocate international intervention.

To provide institutional context regarding America's strategic calculation, there was a serious transatlantic debate regarding the future of NATO in European security. At that time NATO's role in the post Cold War European security system was not assured and thus the US administration wanted to preserve NATO's pivotal position in it. From 1988 to 1991, NATO held five summit meetings attended by the heads of state. This fact indicates the changing security environment in Europe in view of the fact that NATO does not normally convene summit meetings even annually. The central part of Western debate during this period was regarding the extent to which NATO would support Europe's own security initiative of the so-called European Security Defence Identity (ESDI) in the form of revitalizing the WEU. Concerning the practical application of this initiative, NATO's support to the European states' peacekeeping missions outside of the territories of its member states (the so-called 'out of area' operation)—in other words a domain of collective security rather than

31 They were: on 2-3 March in Brussels; on 29-30 May 1989 in Brussels; on 4 December 1989 in Brussels; on 6 July 1990 in London; and on 7-8 November 1991 in Rome.
32 For instance, the last NATO summit meeting before May 1988 was held on 10 June 1982 in Bonn. The first summit meeting after 1992 was convened on 10-11 January 1994. After that the summits were held as follows: on 8-9 1997 in Madrid; on 23-25 April 1999 in Washington D.C.; on 21-22 November 2002 in Prague; on 28-29 June 2004 in Istanbul; and on 22 February 2005 in Brussels.
collective defence—became the heart of the debate.\textsuperscript{34}

As a result of a series of summit meetings in November 1991, NATO adopted the so-called

*New Strategic Concept*.\textsuperscript{35} It on the one hand endorsed the idea of NATO’s support to the European

initiative but on the other hand it emphasised NATO’s collective self-defence identity as follows:

The creation of a European identity in security and defence will underline the

preparedness of the Europeans to take a greater share of responsibility for their

security and will help to reinforce transatlantic solidarity. However […] NATO is

the essential forum for consultation among the Allies and the forum for agreement

on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of its members

under the Washington Treaty.\textsuperscript{36}

However, this compromise statement did not amount to a consensus between the US and its allies. The

US considered that the other Western states agreed that NATO maintain its position at the heart of

European security and its identity as a collective self-defence organization.\textsuperscript{37} In contrast, some

European states, especially France and Belgium, believed that this new concept would give substance

to their demands that NATO should provide support for European-led peacekeeping missions and thus

accept UN authority over its collective security actions (i.e. the so-called ‘out-of area’ peacekeeping

mission).\textsuperscript{38} These actions would give substance to the ESDI and would revitalize the European-led

collective self-defence security organisation of WEU. This was the key strategic context regarding the

Western debate on the issue of the former Yugoslavia.

Against this backdrop, in order to maintain NATO’s supremacy and its \textit{de facto}

independence from the UN, it was a prerequisite for the US to make Europeans recognize the

importance of NATO. Accordingly, James Baker drew up a ‘wait and see’ policy while taking the
actions of America’s European allies into account. The essence of this policy was that the US would just ‘see’ what Europeans did and then ‘wait’ until the moment that they finally realized the importance of America’s and NATO’s presence in Europe. This did not require any US military deployment in the former Yugoslavia. Given the situation in the Persian Gulf and the Soviet Union, the US did not want to sacrifice any troops. For the purpose of implementing the ‘wait and see’ policy, the US accepted a leading role for the EC regarding the former Yugoslavia.

In short, this ‘wait and see’ policy was one that aimed at promoting America’s vital national interests, not the alleged Western normative value of multilateralism, concerning European security order. American vital interests as perceived by the Bush administration were those of maintaining American hegemony in Europe via means of NATO’s de facto independence from the UN, and keeping the US away from military involvement in the former Yugoslavia.

European Reactions: a Nascent Challenge to American Hegemony

The EC, in contrast to the US, had paid serious attention to this issue and it intended to lead international efforts to settle the conflict. Reflecting the Euro-enthusiasm symbolized by the Treaty on European Union (also known as the ‘Maastricht Treaty’) in December 1991—which promoted further integration of European social and economic policies under the auspices of the European Union—both US and EC policy-makers regarded former Yugoslavia as a test case for European competence in international politics in comparison with that of the US. When the EC began to engage in mediating this conflict in June 1991, Jacques Poos, the Foreign Minister of Luxembourg that held the EC Presidency, said: ‘this is the hour of Europe. It is not the hour of the Americans.’ The EC designated a

41 Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War, 309-312.
Yet the EC suffered from serious division among its member states. There were four contentious problems. The first concerned the perception of the conflict in Yugoslavia, namely whether it was a civil war or an international conflict. The second related to the EC members' dispute over whether they should recognize the newly-declared independent republics of the former Yugoslavia, namely Slovenia and Croatia. Thirdly, it was not clear which international institutions would be used to take an initiative on arbitrating the conflict in Yugoslavia. Lastly, there was a dispute over the necessity for deployment of the EC or WEU (or even UN) peacekeeping troops. Britain, France and Germany—the three biggest powers in the EC—had different opinions relating to their own sets of interests.

The British perception of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia in general and that of Bosnia in particular was a civil war (or domestic ethnic conflict) rather than an international conflict (according to which scenario some specific aggressors caused the violence from outside). It was linked to the two British positions of supporting the territorial integrity of the former Yugoslavia and not being willing to intervene in the conflict militarily. The British government was not in favour of military intervention under conditions of no consent from the warring parties to have international troops deployed on the ground. The UK was uneasy about the idea of sending European-led peacekeeping

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44 The EC troika consists of the foreign minister of the past, incumbent and the next President of the European Council. At that time [as of June 1991] they were respectively Gianni de Michaelies (Italy), Jacque Poos (Luxembourg) and Hans van den Breuk (Holland) Gow, *Triumph of the Lack of Will*, 50-53.


46 This does not dismiss alternative conception of the nature of the conflict. The use of these two concepts is based on the discourse among the Western policy-makers. Alternative understanding of the nature of the war, see: Gow, *Triumph of the Lack of Will*, 4-5.


48 The UK was uneasy about the idea of sending European-led peacekeeping
troops (in the form of the WEU) to Yugoslavia. At the heart of this position was the fear on the part of the British that this would constitute the EC's formal support for establishing a European-led military organization (in the form of the WEU) that would be in competition with NATO and the US. The British government was also anxious about the lack of European capability to carry out such multilateral military action without American leadership. For these reasons, the British government put emphasis on the CSCE’s role in conflict resolution and it supported the introduction of economic sanctions, including an arms embargo over the former Yugoslavia and diplomatic isolation of Serbia (if necessary) instead of military action.

The French perception of the Yugoslav issue was not expressed clearly, as it aimed at obtaining two potentially contradictory objectives. On the one hand it argued that the territorial integrity of the Former Yugoslavia had to be maintained. There were various reasons why France took this position, such as: the fear of enhancing German influence which would result if the EC followed the German policy of recognizing Slovenia and Croatia (see the German approach to the former Yugoslavia in the following paragraphs); anxiety about the potential recognition of newly independent states that might possibly get out of European control and whose dissolution would demand a serious international military intervention; and its historical sympathy for Serbian nationalism. On the other hand, however, France was in favour of sending peacekeeping troops. It argued that deployment of WEU troops under the UN authorization was the best option. This was because, establishing a

51 Sharp, _Honest Broker or Perfidious Albion?_, 7-8.
European-led security organization with visible military competence reflected the French interests at the beginning of the 1990s. Sending WEU-led peacekeeping troops was expected to pave the way for fleshing out such a vision. Accordingly, France argued that the EC and WEU should take the lead on international diplomatic efforts to arbitrate the Yugoslav crisis, with the authority of the UN. These two elements, namely European political independence from the US and European-led peacekeeping forces, were closely linked in French policy calculations.

These policies fuelled political tension between the US and France. For instance, at the French-American summit in March 1991, the French President, François Mitterrand, argued for the necessity on the part of Europe to organize its own military competence. This claim was based on two factors; a traditional French vision that Europe needed to regain its political independence from American hegemony, and a widely held prediction that the US and NATO would reduce their military presences in Europe as a result of the end of the Cold War. The US President, George Bush senior, was furious with the French position. According to Robert Hutchings (the Director for European Affairs at the US National Security Council in 1998-1992), when the European leaders gathered at the NATO summit in Rome in November 1991 and some of them supported the above-discussed French advocacy, George Bush said to one European leader, ‘[i]f Western Europe intends to create a security organization outside the Alliance, tell me now!’ Then Bush emphasised his determination to a European leader that ‘he [Bush] would stake his presidency’ on guaranteeing the continued American presence in Europe through NATO.

The Bush administration clearly perceived a nascent form of challenge to American

57 Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War, 282.
59 Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War, 274-275.
61 Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War, 281.
62 Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War, 281-282.
hegemony—in other words America’s *vital interests*—on the part of European leaders. In short, intra-
Western interactions in relation to the former Yugoslavia became a stage that would define the future of
the European security order and the role of the US within it. This provided the context in which, as
previously discussed, James Baker decided to test European unity and its competence in the Yugoslavia
crisis. 63

European efforts, however, should have been accompanied by reliable political and military
resources. They needed to obtain international authority that would bring international support to
European-led peacekeeping operations. Moreover, there was neither agreement among the nationalist
movements in the former Yugoslavia as to the form to be taken by the future federation nor any consent
among them to deploy international peacekeeping troops on the ground. In such a situation, it was
essential to obtain authorization from the UN Security Council (UNSC) under the provision of its
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It stipulates that the UN Security Council has the authority to recognize
‘the existence of any threat to the peace’ (Article 39); and it may decide the necessary means to restore
the peace ranging from ‘measures not involving the use of armed forces’ (Article 41) to military
measures (Article 42). 64 Therefore, France was eager to put the Yugoslavia issue forward in the UNSC.
It created a clear tension between France on the one hand and the US and UK on the other.

For Germany the issue was more directly related to the situation on the ground; would the
international community support the self-determination of Slovenia and Croatia or not? The then
German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher explained the upshot of the German position. It
supported the right to self-determination for all nations and that opinion was based on the CSCE’s
Helsinki Final Act of 1975. Genscher interpreted this to mean that ‘without a guarantee of rights for
minorities, a change of borders could hardly be avoided.’ 65 However, Germany faced a dilemma. It

64 Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This was a shared view among the Western states regarding establishment
65 Genscher. Rebuilding a House Divided, 495, 497-498.
was not able to send troops outside of NATO under its constitution. Therefore, the activities of international organizations were an essential element for protecting these rights.\textsuperscript{66} The UN is the highest international authority. If the sovereign statehoods of Slovenia and Croatia were recognized, then the international community—essentially the UN—would have been in charge of their security situation. This paves the way for satisfying the conditions for imposing enforcement measures as well as establishing self-defence rights for these states under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.\textsuperscript{67} Hanns Maull summarized the German position as giving recognition to Slovenia and Croatia as a means to ensure the security of these two states under the umbrella of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.\textsuperscript{68} In order to accomplish this purpose, Genscher supported French efforts to include the UN in the peace promoting process.\textsuperscript{69} However, he also demanded that the EC should closely cooperate with CSCE in the diplomatic activities concerning the conflict in Yugoslavia. The rationale of doing such a thing was that the UN and CSCE would be able to reflect the opinions of the US, the Soviet Union and other European states.\textsuperscript{70} 

To sum up this section, regardless of the above-discussed differences among the member states, the EC took the leading role in the international arbitration of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. However, it was not able to obtain serious American support at the beginning. America’s unwillingness to support European initiatives was based originally on its lack of geo-strategic interests in the former Yugoslavia in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War.\textsuperscript{71} However, as a result of France’s and its supporters’ advocacy of organizing a European security institution independent of NATO and without the presence of the US, the Bush senior administration looked at this issue more strategically.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{66} The German debate on the use of force in the former Yugoslavia, see: Müller, Harald. "Military Intervention for European Security: The German Debate." In Military Intervention in European Conflicts, Espec. 128-131.
\item \textsuperscript{67} However, once the UNSC takes action the member state’s rights should be conceded to the UNSC. Gow, \textit{Triumph of the Lack of Will}, 90-91.
\item \textsuperscript{68} Maull, "Germany in the Yugoslav Crisis," 102.
\item \textsuperscript{69} Genscher, \textit{Rebuilding a House Divided}, 500-501, 504-505.
\item \textsuperscript{70} At that time Germany held the chairmanship of the CSCE. Genscher, \textit{Rebuilding a House Divided}, 498.
\item \textsuperscript{71} Baker, \textit{The Politics of Diplomacy}, 635-636; Hutchings, \textit{American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War}, 308-309; Interview with Thomas Niles on 21 May 2004.
\end{itemize}
In this way, the Bush administration also held a tight grip on the US policy-making process. The result of US policy was to examine the European competence via means of its ‘wait and see’ policy. In other words, the Bush administration deliberately sidelined America’s involvement in Western multilateral policy-coordination in order to maintain its vital interests.

Against this background, cooperation between the EC and the UN was also not smooth. America’s distance from the former Yugoslavia issue influenced the UN position. The UN was not eager to take an active role in the conflict in Yugoslavia at the beginning or even when it began to place troops on the ground. Because of these conflicting interests among the international actors, CSCE was not able to take the central role for mediating the conflict. During the early period of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia the central agenda was the formation of a common European policy. In short, because of America’s strategic decision to sideline it from the former Yugoslavia issue, Western multilateralism failed to mitigate transatlantic interaction at this stage. The next section traces the formation of ‘European policy’ and the EC’s attempt to organize a workable international approach to the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia.

The Independence of Slovenia and Croatia: Two Western Visions

Slovenian independence was the first test for the formation of a common European policy towards the former Yugoslavia. Unlike in subsequent conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav army and the army of the newly established sovereign government of Slovenia reached a cease-fire agreement soon after fighting broke out between the two. The so-called Brioni Agreement (the settlement pact of the Slovenian conflict) was adopted within a month of Slovenia’s declaration of independence on 8 July 1991 as a result of mediation efforts. The prompt settlement of the Slovenian

73 The then Under-Secretary-General of the UN Marrack Goulding recalled that the newly appointed UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali (1992-1996) wanted to retreat from this issue as soon as possible. Goulding, Marrack. Peacemonger. London: John Murray, 2002, 294.
74 Harden, Blaine. “Yugoslav Crisis Pact Sets EC Involvement In country’s Future,” The Washington Post, 9
situation was partly due to its demography and partly due to the nature of the war. The Serbs consisted of only about 10 percent the population in Slovenian areas. The Slovenian war was regarded as a conflict between Slovenia and the federal system.\textsuperscript{75}

In contrast, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia were regarded as nationalist conflicts between the Croats, the Muslims and the Serbs.\textsuperscript{76} Nationalist wars tend to be prolonged since, in order to satisfy nationalism, there is often no middle way. The aim is to conquer all of the contested space in question.\textsuperscript{77}

In Croatia, the war between the JNA and the Croatian forces became tense and prolonged in contrast to what had happened in Slovenia. In terms of demography, the Serbs make up 30 to 40 percent of the population in Croatia. In particular, the Serbian population was concentrated in the region of Krajina. Furthermore, the war was between various groups of nationalists. As Susan Woodward argues, there were little incentives among the political leaders to produce a compromise in this kind of war.\textsuperscript{78}

\textit{The Western States' Initial Approaches}

International efforts to restore peace in Croatia were not easy. As previously discussed, there was a lack of coordination among the major international actors on the shape of the UN and the EC. Moreover, as also previously discussed, the EC had serious divisions among its member states. However since it had managed to broker the Slovenia ceasefire agreement, the EC carried on working to promote an international framework to resolve conflicts in the case of Yugoslavia more generally and concerning Croatian independence in particular. The EC attempted to establish a framework of arbitration that would both be able to reconcile the competing nationalist factions in each Yugoslav


\textsuperscript{76} Ramet, \textit{Balkan Babel}, 165-167 and 202-203.

\textsuperscript{77} Woodward, \textit{Balkan Tragedy}, 222, 272.

\textsuperscript{78} Woodward, \textit{Balkan Tragedy}, 222, 272.
republic and also to engineer a peaceful re-formation of the Former Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{79} The US State Department supported this attempt.\textsuperscript{80}

In order to promote such a plan, the EC decided to take a conditional approach to recognition.\textsuperscript{81} The first priority was the promotion of a cease-fire agreement and the establishment of a constitutional framework for Yugoslavia in order to mollify Serbian and Croatian nationalism.\textsuperscript{82} Then secondly, if all parties had agreed on this procedure, the EC would have been willing to discuss the matter of recognition. In principle the EC was neither pro-recognition nor in favour of vigorous international peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{83} This simply followed the British perspective regarding the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. With regard to the cease-fire, the EC nominated the former British Foreign Minister Peter Carrington as the chairman of the EC-hosted peace conference that aimed at promoting the above-discussed peace plan.\textsuperscript{84} With regard to the recognition process, the EC set up an Arbitration Commission that would produce a juridical recommendation concerning the recognition of each of the republics of Slovenia and Croatia.\textsuperscript{85}

In order to promote this policy Carrington convened the EC-hosted peace talks in The Hague on 7 September 1991. This International Conference on Yugoslavia in effect consolidated the EC's leading position in the peace negotiations. Carrington tried to promote a comprehensive agreement among Yugoslavia's ethnic leaders, but one which was still based on the principle of the
mutual recognition of self-determination on the part of each ethnic group. Carrington suggested to the then UN Secretary-General that the former Yugoslavia was not able to control the situation. Therefore, agreement among the ethnic leaders was essential to establish a cease-fire as well as organizing the constitutional framework. As a result of negotiations at The Hague, the Croatian President, Franjo Tudjman, the Federal Yugoslav Defence Secretary, General Veljko Kadijević, and the Serbian leader, Slobodan Milošević, signed a cease-fire agreement. Following this agreement the situation on the ground did not change substantially. Then the EC brokered another ceasefire agreement after Carrington had obtained Milošević’s consent on maintaining the territorial integrity of Croatia. However, this was again ineffective in preventing fighting on the ground. There was no substantial willingness among the local leaders to maintain any ceasefire.

There were, however, three additional obstacles. Firstly there was the inconsistent European position. The then German Foreign Minister was quite adamant in his support for the independence of Croatia. Germany was set on recognizing Croatia as an independent state whereas France and the UK were less willing to accept that.

Secondly, there was also disagreement among the European leaders over the matter of what form peacekeeping troops should take. This was paralleled by disputes over the kind of institutions that should or should not be used and also how EU and the UN should coordinate each effort. On 17 September 1991 Germany and France agreed between themselves that the European-led (i.e. WEU) peacekeeping troops should be sent if the leaders of each republic of Yugoslavia agreed with the cease-fire. However, for fear of transatlantic tension and the potential military burden the UK government opposed this initiative. Therefore, the EC and also the WEU were not able to reach an agreement at

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86 Silber and Little, *The Death of Yugoslavia*, 190.
87 De Cuellar, *Pilgrimage for Peace*, 482.
90 De Cuellar, *Pilgrimage for Peace*, 482.
92 Howorth, "The Debate in France over Military Intervention in Europe," 123.
93 The British government was wary of the form the potential peacekeeping troops should take. At first,
their Foreign Ministerial meeting on 19 September on the form peacekeeping troops would take.\textsuperscript{94} France was keen on obtaining the authorization of the UNSC and institutional support from the UN. Germany supported this position. However while the UK government softened its opposition eventually, it was at first not eager to endorse this EC-UN collaboration.\textsuperscript{95} The British government was wary about authorizing WEU-led peacekeepers as well as about the potential demand on the UK in contributing to it.\textsuperscript{96} However, by 17 September 1991 the British Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, recognized that the UK should deploy some form of troops. Of course this would not be under the umbrella of the WEU, and it became one of the most essential reasons why the UK agreed to work with the UN instead.\textsuperscript{97}

The last problem was the lack of international support for the policy of sending peacekeeping troops, which was essential in order to compensate for the lack of administrative authority of in the former Yugoslavia. International cooperation between the EC and the UN, the EC and the US, and the EC and the Soviet Union proved defective. First of all, as discussed above, the EC did not have a consistent position concerning the authority of the UN on this issue. The UN was also reluctant to provide serious institutional support for these European-led initiatives as it wanted to obtain a cease-fire agreement before the deployment of any peacekeeping troops.\textsuperscript{98}

Moreover, the US assisted European efforts merely on the rhetorical level.\textsuperscript{99} In substance it was considering an American solution to the Yugoslavian situation that marked a departure form the initial ‘wait and see’ position vis-à-vis the potential European policies.\textsuperscript{100} Concerning the Croatian and

Luxemburg and France wanted to deploy WEU troops. But Britain was not prepared to get involved in war situations on the ground. Hurd, \textit{Memoirs}, 448; Genscher, \textit{Rebuilding a House Divided}, 500.
\textsuperscript{95} Sharp, \textit{Honest Broker or Perfidious Albion?}, 11-12.
\textsuperscript{96} Hurd, \textit{Memoirs}, 448.
\textsuperscript{97} Hurd, \textit{Memoirs}, 448.
\textsuperscript{98} Goulding, \textit{Peacemaker}, 294.
\textsuperscript{99} Richard Boucher (State Department Deputy Spokesman), "Call for a Cease-fire in Yugoslavia."
\textsuperscript{100} Baker, \textit{The Politics of Diplomacy}, 637-639.
Slovenian recognition the US administration began to form its own preference. The US administration did not recognize the independence of Croatia and Slovenia as a way to ease the tension but rather the reverse. With regard to this point, James Baker had given more attention to the policy memorandum that the Director of Policy Planning Staff of the State Department, Dennis Ross, produced on 5 June 1991. It recommended that the US needed to establish a comprehensive as well as practical framework for providing recognition to any new state in former communist regimes including those from the former Yugoslavia. In order to establish such a scheme, it argued that the US might employ 'carrots and sticks' in order to make new countries formerly under communist regimes follow a particular policy before deciding whether or not they should recognize a state. This implied that such a scheme would not act in tandem with the EC-held International Conference on Yugoslavia and also that it would create a situation where competition to win American recognition of a state would occur.

Furthermore, the Soviet Union provided negative inputs. It interrupted the diplomatic process after the Carrington-chaired conference in The Hague and thus it produced confusion over the locus of international authority. Moreover, there was an attempted coup d'état in the Soviet Union in August 1991. Despite the fact that it was suppressed, this coup d'état became a catalyst for the collapse of the Soviet Union. As a result, this averted US attention further away from the situation in Yugoslavia.

A Fragile International Compromise: UNSCR 713 (Arms Embargo) and the Vance Plan

Since the EC and the WEU were able to reach an agreement on the form that peacekeeping troops should take, Canada (at that time a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council) called a

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101 Interview with Thomas Niles on 21 May 2004.
105 For more on the Soviet Union's intervention on this issue, see: Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will, 56-57.
meeting of the Security Council in order to consider sending UN peacekeeping troops. The meeting was driven by a compromise between France and the UK. In essence, they agreed to accept the UN’s role in Yugoslavia and support the EC’s efforts (this was the French opinion) but the UN Security Council (UNSC) was not to authorize either European-led peacekeeping troops or large-scale international military action (which was the British position). The US also supported this compromise because it backed peace based on negotiation, and it wanted to prevent a spill-over of the conflict. Eventually on 25 September 1991 the UNSC held a ministerial-level meeting and unanimously adopted the Resolution (UNSCR) No. 713. UNSCR 713 established an arms embargo over the whole of Former Yugoslavia and it also became the backbone of the international approach to the Bosnian conflict. The resolution was intended as a means to restrain further violence on the ground. However, in reality this placed a block on the ability on the part of each republic in general—and Bosnia in particular—to defend itself militarily. Therefore, this UNSCR 713 created a tension between the Western states as well as domestic actors within the Western societies, as to how the Western collective policy to Bosnia should be put into practice.

The European approach to UNSCR 713 was based on the above-discussed compromise between the UK and the France. The Bush administration’s initial rationale for supporting UNSCR 713 was that this document provided a scheme to minimize further violence in the region and thus prevent Serbian aggression as well as to prevent Croatia from arming itself as a means towards self-determination. However, towards the end of 1992, as the Bosnian conflict intensified and the US

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111 Interview with Douglas Hurd on 7 April 2004; Interview with David Hannay (the British Ambassador to the UN, 1990-1995) on 6 October; A letter exchanged with Malcolm Rifkind (the British Defence Secretary, 1991-1995).
112 Interview with Thomas Niles on 21 May 2004.
administration realised that the Serbs had easy access to arms, it began to regard UNSCR 713 as a mistake. Accordingly, the Bush administration directly voiced its opposition to UNSCR 713 to the members of the EC at the end of 1992. In addition, both chambers of the US Congress reflected and amplified the apprehension on the part of the Bush administration. Some of the members of Congress demanded the lifting of the arms embargo once the Bosnian conflict intensified. Gradually this became the dominant position in the Congress. However, the Bush administration stood behind the arms embargo scheme throughout 1992. Therefore, it is clear that regardless of domestic obstacles the Bush administration held its grip on America's approach to the former Yugoslavia and the Bosnian conflict by the end of 1992. This point can be regarded as a success of European allies' 'voice opportunities'. However, the US administration still maintained its 'wait and see' position at that time. Thus America's vital interests regarding the former Yugoslavia issue at that time were to avoid taking a heavy burden and to keep a distance from substantial international political and military involvement on this issue. Supporting UNSCR 713 initially contributed to satisfying this position. Therefore, the greatest tension that was occurred was between the EC and the UN.

Regarding this aspect, UNSCR 713 demanded various points such as: a cease-fire in Yugoslavia; an expression of support for EC efforts; and a request to the UN Secretary-General to support international mediation and to negotiate with the Yugoslav leaders. Yet there was no consensus among the members of the UNSC concerning the form peacekeeping should take. The UN secretariat was still reluctant to get involved, as it was wary of the potential conflict between the UN and the EC. This was because there was lack of substantial American endorsement of the EC promoted peace process. Despite the UN Secretary-General's unease on this issue, the EC demanded

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113 Interview with Thomas Niles on 21 May 2004.
114 See: Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 86; Interview with Thomas Niles on 21 May 2004.
115 Interview with Robert Hand (Policy Staff of Steny Hoyer: the ranking member of the House of Representative Foreign Policy Affairs Committee and who opposed UNSCR 713) on 19 May 2004; Interview with Mark Sletzinger (Policy Staff of Lee Hamilton: the Chairman of the House of Representative Foreign Policy Affairs Committee and who supported UNSCR 713) on 17 May 2004.
117 De Cuèllar, Pilgrimage for Peace, 478.
that he nominate the peace envoy on 6 October. In order to satisfy the EC, the UN Secretary-General
appointed the former US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance as his special envoy. Nevertheless, cooperation between the UN and EC was not making a positive impact on the ground.

According to the then UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar, Carrington (the EC representative) and Vance (the UN Envoy) had a good personal relationship. However, as far as the direction of the peace process was concerned, they took different and almost opposite approaches to the Croatian issue. On the one hand, Vance still relied on the ability of the then-existing Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to control the situation. Therefore, he placed priority on the Croatian issue rather than promoting a settlement in Yugoslavia as a whole. Carrington, on the other hand, however, did not take administrative capability of the still nominally existing Federal Yugoslav government for granted. Thus he argued that the issue of Croatia should be handled as a part of the whole settlement. Furthermore, Carrington considered that Croatia was one of the countries to be blamed for the collapse of Former Yugoslavia.

In effect, Vance worked separately from the framework that was set by the EC, whereas Carrington attempted to promote a settlement in the former Yugoslavia as a whole. Vance focused on brokering a settlement in Croatia. In November 1992 the warring parties in Croatia, excluding the Krajina Serbs, made a cease-fire agreement and offered their support of the implementation of the so-called Vance Plan provided the deployment of a UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR).

The European Approach: Recognizing Slovenia and Croatia Based on the ‘Sovereign Peace’

In the meantime, the EC took its next step in leading the Croatian issue. On 16 December 1991, the Council of Ministers decided that the EC would consider giving recognition to Slovenia and

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118 De Cuéllar, Pilgrimage for Peace, 478.
119 De Cuéllar, Pilgrimage for Peace, 480-482.
120 De Cuéllar, Pilgrimage for Peace, 478.
121 De Cuéllar, Pilgrimage for Peace, 482.
122 “The Vance Plan,” in Ramcharan, Bertrand ed., The International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia:
Croatia on condition that the assessment of the EC Arbitration Commission’s (the so-called Badinter Commission) regarding the qualifications of each republic of former Yugoslavia was a positive one. This report was scheduled to be submitted by 15 January 1992. However, on 19 December 1991 the German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher declared that it would recognize Slovenia and Croatia provided the EC Arbitration Commission’s terms were satisfied. On 23 December 1991, Germany went further by suggesting its intention to set up embassies in Slovenia and Croatia by 15 January 1992 when the EC Arbitration Commission’s report was due. This German action meant to recognize de facto independence of these states but that impeded the de jure process in pursuant to the outcomes of the EC Arbitration Commission’s report. However, in effect, it had strong impact upon the direction of the EC policy. Eventually, on 11 January the EC Arbitration Commission came to the view that the independence of Croatia and Slovenia should be recognized. Accordingly on 15 January the other EC members followed this recommendation. The German Foreign Minister justified his position that it was in line with the decision taken by the EC Council of Ministers on 16 December 1991:

The Community and its Member States confirm their attachment to the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris, in particular the principle of self-determination.


124 Genscher, Rebuilding a House Divided, 515-516.

125 Genscher, Rebuilding a House Divided, 515-516.


In his interpretation, the EC placed the self-determination rights as the pivotal guideline of relations between states. However, the German policy was criticised that it acted regardless of the other countries’ concern regarding the effects of recognizing the international independent personalities of Croatia and Slovenia at that time and that undermined the coherence of the EC.

Despite the controversy over the EC’s coordination of the policy regarding Slovenian and Croatian independence, it set the precedent for the EC to respect the self-determination rights of residents in the former Yugoslavia. In this way, the EC demanded Bosnia to hold a referendum on its independence to confirm its’ peoples’ opinions. It did not recognize Macedonian independence despite the fact that the Badinter Commission confirmed that it had satisfied the conditions laid down by the EC Ministerial meeting on 16 December 1991. This was due to opposition on the part of the Greek government’s objection that it had a province called ‘Macedonia.’

Accordingly this emphasis on national self-determination defined the EC’s vision of organizing the post Cold War international order in general and the situation in the former Yugoslavia in particular. This vision interpreted the values within the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 in the following order of priority: national self-determination, equality of sovereignty, non-intervention, peaceful settlement of disputes and other democratic values. If there were any possibility that the EC would use coercive power it would be to protect the order based on sovereignty. Therefore, intervention in internal affairs was restricted. This can be called the ‘sovereign peace.’ All international security organizations such as the UN, CSCE and NATO are expected to protect this kind of order and the UN commands the highest legal and political authority. America was of course not an exception to this rule. Hence former

131 Maull, “Germany in the Yugoslav Crisis,” 104. For the German government’s perspective on this issue, see: Genscher, Rebuilding a House Divided, 513-516.
Yugoslavia is a critical case for examining the reality of America's allies' 'voice opportunities' with regard to their 'power over outcomes' in relation to US foreign policy.

America's Approach: Not Recognizing Slovenia and Croatia in the Name of 'Democratic Peace'

At this time, however, American action was not coordinated with that of the EC. The EC prioritized the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia on the basis of respecting their rights of self-determination. With regard to the procedure and the effects of Croatian recognition, the US administration was clearly discontented with the mechanisms that European states used to grant recognition to Croatia. In contrast to the European policy, the US argued that Bosnia and Macedonia deserved international recognition more than Slovenia and Croatia on the basis that the two former states did not rely on military means to achieve their goals. The US administration believed that the Croatian and Slovenian actions were not in accordance with the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, as they used military force to implement it. If the US had recognized the independence of such countries as Croatia and Slovenia where military force was used to secure independence, then surely, so America argued, it should recognize countries seeking to obtain independence via democratic means.

The US President, George Bush, and the Secretary of State, James Baker, decided not to follow the European policy of recognizing Slovenia and Croatia first. Instead, they decided to support Vance's efforts. Vance argued that on the one hand, recognizing Bosnia was a way to facilitate the settlement. On the other hand he argued that it was necessary to deploy peacekeeping troops before any recognition of Bosnia. The US did not recognize Croatia and Slovenia until such time as it did the same for Bosnia in April 1992.

America's vision was therefore different from that of the EC. The US put emphasis on the

134 Interview with Thomas Niles on 21 May 2004.
peaceful settlement of disputes and democratic values as the foundation of its approach. Therefore America’s rationale for using coercive power might have been based on the promotion of democracy. Restraint use of coercive power to one state’s internal affairs would thus be dismissed by this logic. This vision is namely the legal foundation of ‘democratic peace.’ International security organizations are expected to promote this democratic value, rather than the principle of non-interference and the value of sovereign state system. From the American perspective such an institutional arrangement would provide an opportunity to get legitimacy for a pre-conceived policy. This may promote democracy and Western values in other states, but it would not be carried out following the logic of genuine multilateralism but rather that of Quasi-multilateralism.

Indeed, the Bush administration changed its ‘wait and see’ approach vis-à-vis the EC policy regarding the situations in the former Yugoslavia. This created a serious difference between the EC’s ‘sovereign peace’ and America’s ‘democratic peace.’ It also suggested America’s shift of its international vision from the New World Order to that of ‘democratic peace’. Hence the Bosnian conflict became the critical case for defining the vision to organize the international order, namely the tension between multilateralism and Quasi-multilateralism.

*Was There Only One Vision of Western Values?*

It is now clear that there were at least two visions of international collaboration regarding the independence of Croatia and Slovenia. On the one hand the EC’s approach placed national self-determination at the top of its rationale and promoted the ‘sovereign peace’. The EC, armed with this approach, requested the US to recognize the independence of Croatia and Slovenia at the same time as the EC. This could have been the catalyst for the substantiation of Western multilateralism in regard to the former Yugoslavia. However, the US refused to accept the logic of ‘sovereign peace’ and did not recognize Croatia and Slovenia. Instead it demanded that the EC and other international actors

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recognize Bosnia and Macedonia on the basis of their peaceful and *democratic means* for pursuing independence. By insisting on this ‘democratic peace’ in opposition to its allies, the US administration gradually moved its policy from ‘wait and see’ to actively promoting America’s preferences. It is important to note that such American actions in the face of European-led multilateralism were accompanied by the manipulation of Western values.

As Risse-Kappen suggested, if *vital interests* had been at stake—provided there were neither substantial domestic obstacles, nor a violation of Western values by America’s allies forcing the US to act unilaterally—the US would have persistently refused to coordinate its policy with her European allies. So far we have discussed, there were neither serious domestic political forces nor any violation of the Western procedural value of multilateralism on the part of the America’s allies. Therefore, it would be plausible to say that America’s vital interests were the key motives for defining its actions regarding the former Yugoslavia.

**Bosnian Independence and America’s Vital Interests**

In this section we analyse to what extent the US agreed to give substance to the UN’s authority over Western military actions at the outbreak of the Bosnian conflict. At that time the only common Western policy was the arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia and the UN’s legal authority to impose it. However, it was not clear how they could implement it. Therefore this case is important to evaluate the validity of the Liberal Multilateralists’ interpretations regarding America’s approach to the multilateral policy-making process with its allies.

At the end of 1991, the giving by European states of international recognition to Croatia was regarded as just a matter of time. Peter Carrington, the EC Envoy, together with Jose Cutileiro (Ambassador from the then EC Presidency holder Portugal) went to six republics of the former Yugoslavia. The EC proposed that it would recognize them if they met criteria that the EC Arbitration

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140 Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation among Democracies*, 13-14, Chapter 4.
Committee's report was to stipulate. The Bosnian leader Alija Izetbegović decided to go for independence towards the end of 1991. The Bosnian Serbs insisted that Bosnia-Herzegovina should remain a part of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Accordingly, the Bosnian Serbs declared their provisional independence on 9 January 1992 provided Bosnia-Herzegovina was to be recognized as an internationally independent entity. This suggests that there was a serious division in the region regarding the form that the future of Bosnia should take.

As the Bosnian government had decided to seek independence, it followed the procedures as laid down by the EC Arbitration Committee. The Opinion No 4 of the EC Arbitration Commission report recommended Bosnia to hold an internationally monitored referendum on the issue of independence. Accordingly, the EC-assisted Bosnian referendum was held from 29 February to 1 March 1992. The result of the referendum was in favour of independence, although the Bosnian Serbs boycotted the vote. On 6 March the Bosnian President Alija Izetbegović declared independence. At the same time, the Bosnian Serb forces intensified its military actions. As a result, the conflict in Bosnia escalated. There developed an urgent need for the nationalist groups in Bosnia to reach a compromise on the framework of the independent state. In addition, the international community was under pressure to provide peacekeeping troops on the ground. In order to respond to these demands, the EC hosted peace talks between the three warring parties in Lisbon.

European Policy: Recognition of Bosnia and Neutrality in the Conflict

Since its failed attempt to form a united approach regarding of the recognition of Croatia, the

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141 Silber and Little, The Death of Yugoslavia, 216-217.
142 Silber and Little, The Death of Yugoslavia, 218.
EC had been trying to establish a common position among its members. Although it was not able to find a compromise on the issue of the recognition of Macedonia due to Greece’s stiff resolve to oppose it, at least regarding the issue of Bosnian independence it managed to form some kind of common position. This was facilitated by a change in style on the part of the German government. The German position became more cooperative on the issue of Bosnian independence. The first EC policy on the Bosnian independence issue was to demand that Bosnia hold a referendum in whose implementation the EC would assist. Secondly, it would recognize Bosnian independence, provided the three largest Bosnian ethnic groups reached an agreement on the form to be taken by an independent Bosnia. The Bosnian declaration of independence, as led by a Muslim-dominated government (i.e. the Bosnian government) that did not pay sufficient attention to minority rights (i.e. those of Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs), only exacerbated the armed fighting among the different ethnic areas. The EC came to regard the situation as a conflict between three ethnic groups (i.e. Muslims, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs) and so for the EC the future of Bosnia would consist of territorial divisions based on the ethnic groups rather than the concentration of administrative power in a multi-ethnic Bosnian government.

In order to be a credible international mediator, the EC should have been able to provide military backup for the implementation of any agreement. Yet, in reality, there was no serious readily deployable military capability available for the EC, to meet the burdens that such a peacekeeping mission would involve. Moreover there were some unresolved issues among the member states. One

145 Honig and Both, Srebenica, 72-73.
147 According to James Gow, it partly reflected German policymakers’ sensitivity to the international criticism that they received concerning its position on the issue of Croatian independence. It also partly came from the style of its new foreign minister, Klaus Kinkel, who was appointed the position in April 1992. Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will, 172.
150 This categorization is for the sake of simplicity. In particular the leaders of the Bosnian government consisted of various ethnic backgrounds.
151 "Statement of Principles of 18 March 1992 for New Constitutional Arrangement for Bosnia and
of the most urgent matters was that of peacekeeping itself. Vance and Carrington were wary of allowing a situation on the ground in which there were no international peacekeepers at the time of the recognition of Bosnia. On the one hand, Carrington demanded that the US work with the EC. On the other hand, however, he— as well as Vance— urged the EC to delay recognition until such time as the UN peacekeeping troops were already deployed on the ground. However, the EC was still not able to reach an agreement on whether the UN peacekeepers be deployed in Bosnia or not. As previously discussed, France and later Germany supported the idea of WEU-led peacekeeping troops.

In contrast, the UK, the UN and the US did not like this idea. Britain and the US had apprehensions that if a WEU-led peacekeeping force got off the ground, the solidarity of the transatlantic relationship would come to be undermined. The newly appointed UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, also did not want to take the responsibility of another mission. The other unresolved policy related to the question of economic sanctions against Serbia. The opinion of the French government was that the EC should maintain a political dialogue with Belgrade while it proposed economic sanctions through the UN. In contrast, the UK and Germany argued in favour of full-scale economic sanctions by the EC.

While the EC was stumbling over these differences, the tension in Bosnia grew considerably. Arbitrating the positions of the Bosnian ethnic groups became the only credible option for the EC. EC policy regarding to the issue of Bosnian independence can be summed up under the following four points:

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153 Howorth, "The Debate in France over Military Intervention in Europe," 123.
155 Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished, 37-38.
156 Wood, "France and the Post Cold War Order: the Case of Yugoslavia," 137. The debating points were the timing and scale of sanctions. There were two positions: one opinion was that the EC should take swift action but not wide in scale; the other was that the EC should seek UN sanctions. Those take time but the scale and authority of action would be stronger.
1) Holding the Bosnian referendum on independence was deemed a prerequisite for the recognition of Bosnia.

2) The future of the Bosnian state should consist of the three ethnic groups (or ‘components’) in the form of several different ethnic areas.

3) Peacekeeping troops would be needed but the EC could not decide what the form of this should be as well as how it should be sent.

4) Economic sanctions against Serbia were needed. But the EC did not manage to reach agreement as to the mode in which sanctions were to be imposed

American Policy: Recognition but with Priority Placed on the Bosnian Government

As discussed previously, since the later 1980s, the US did not have critical national interests in the former Yugoslavia and Bosnia. This was one of the reasons why the Bush administration adopted the ‘wait and see’ policy with regard to the dissolution the former Yugoslavia. However, as the situation came to demand international involvement, the US administration began to form its own preferences. The American preference at this time was to recognize Bosnia and Macedonia more than Slovenia and Croatia. On the one hand, the US decided to follow the EC regarding the Macedonia issue, due to Greece’s strong opposition to recognizing Macedonia. On the other hand, however, the US was determined to recognize Bosnia. Its rationale in recognizing Bosnia was on different basis from that of the EC. The American perception was that Bosnia had been pursuing independence through democratic means. Accordingly, the US insisted that Bosnian independence should be recognized and that the new Bosnia should be represented by a Bosnian central government, not by the ethnically defined ‘components’ as sketched out in the EC policy.

On 2 March 1992 Baker decided that the US would commit itself to the above-discussed

policy with the caveat that the US administration should review international reactions before implementation.\footnote{Baker, \textit{The Politics of Diplomacy}, 639-641.} During the process of reviewing, Baker decided to follow the EC's procedure and timetable regarding the recognition of Bosnia.\footnote{US/EC, "US/EC Declaration on the Recognition of the Yugoslav Republics," (92/080); Baker, \textit{The Politics of Diplomacy}, 641-643.} In addition, after Bosnia declared independence, the US pushed the EC to take action to isolate Serbia.\footnote{Baker, \textit{The Politics of Diplomacy}, 645-648.} This action on the part of American opinion stood in contrast to the European priority of maintaining negotiations with the warring parties including Serbia and of attempting to broker a cease-fire agreement.\footnote{Wood, "France and the Post Cold War Order: the case of Yugoslavia," 137.} However, US support was conditional. First of all, the Bush administration rejected any American military contribution to the peacekeeping mission.\footnote{Interview with Thomas Niles on 21 May 2004.} Moreover, on 5 March Baker told a congressional hearing that the US was willing to support the activities of UNPROFOR but not be responsible for all its costs. He, in effect, demanded that UNPROFOR minimize its costs.\footnote{Baker, James. III. "Hearing of the Commerce, Justice, State & Judiciary Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, Subject: FY '93 Budget, Chaired by Senator Ernest Hollings (D-SC), 5 March 1992, " \textit{Federal News Service}, 1992, Lexis-Nexis. For details of the US arguments on the issue of the const of UNPROFOR, see: Kim, Julie. "Congress and the Conflict in Yugoslavia in 1992," \textit{CRS Report for Congress}, Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1993, 10-11.} In this way, the US government not only rejected the idea that it might contribute international peacekeeping personnel in Bosnia but also it gave only conditional support to UN peacekeeping on the ground. American policy can be summarized as follows:

1) The US would recognize Bosnia in its own way but it would first consider the international reactions (including consulting with the EC) before making any recognition official.

2) Bosnian territorial integrity was to be maintained under the auspices of its central government.

3) The existence of the local cease-fire agreement was to be a prerequisite for sending UN peacekeeping troops but the UN was to reduce costs and no American troops would be sent.
4) Imposing economic sanctions on Serbia and isolating it were urgent matters to be attended to.

A Fragile Consensus Among the Western States Regarding the Recognition of Bosnia

After the Bosnian referendum and its declaration of independence, the Western leaders commenced diplomatic activities in order to set up an appropriate international approach regarding the process of Bosnian recognition. The EC Foreign Ministers held a meeting in Brussels on 10 March 1992. James Baker also took part in this meeting. There the EC members decided to recognize Bosnia on 6 April and the US agreed to follow this schedule. The EC and the US accepted a strategy that they should wait to recognize Bosnian independence until the Bosnian parties concerned had reached an agreement on the future of Bosnia. In order to accomplish this aim, the EC hosted negotiations between Bosnia’s warring parties in Lisbon. However, it is important to note that the EC and the US did not reach an agreement on the framework for Bosnia (i.e. the above-discussed policy summarized point 2 of European policy and American policy respectively).

The EC-brokered mediation in Lisbon produced an agreement. Bosnia’s three warring parties—namely the Bosnian Government, the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Croats—agreed a constitutional framework for Bosnia on 18 March. Internationally they confirmed the existing external borders of Bosnia. Domestically, this so-called Lisbon Agreement (also known as the Carrington-Cutitiero Plan) prescribed that the future of Bosnia would consist of three ethnic ‘components’ in the form of several different administrative districts of the so-called ‘cantons.’ This meant that the three ethnic components and corresponding ‘cantons’ would substantially replace the functions of the Bosnian government and thus, in effect, would restrict the sovereignty of Bosnia.

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169 Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will, 85-86.
The Lisbon Agreement was based on the perception that the Bosnian conflict was a civil war. Based on this perception, the EC was committed to international mediation via negotiations. This posture reflected the British position towards Bosnia.\(^{170}\) Therefore, although the members of the EC awoke to the necessity of deploying some form of peacekeeping troops, in practice they tended to focus on humanitarian aid, not full military operations on the ground.\(^{171}\) The framework of the Lisbon Agreement consisted of three main requirements:

1) Bosnia would consist of 'components' based on ethnic identity.

2) In order to prevent further violence, UNSCR 713 (the arms embargo) was to be maintained.

3) International military coercion was only to be used as a last resort.

In order to satisfy these requirements the EC needed to construct a good working relationship not only with the UN but also the US.

The official American position was to support the Lisbon Agreement and the EC's peace negotiations\(^{172}\). Despite the fact that the Lisbon Agreement was not implemented, the EC and the US recognized Bosnian independence on 6 and 7 April respectively following their agreement of 10 March.\(^{173}\) On the same day the UN Security Council (UNSC) recommended deploying UNPROFOR troops from Croatia to Bosnia.\(^{174}\) Sending peacekeeping troops and isolating Serbia now became the central issues of international diplomacy in the region. However, there were three latent tensions between the US and EC. The first was the content of the settlement. The US Secretary of State had insisted that the Bosnian government should remain sovereign not only in its nominal status but also in

\(^{170}\) Hurd, Memoirs, 452.

\(^{171}\) Hurd, Memoirs, 452.


substance and thus the ethnically defined components were not deemed suitable to replace it. The second contentious issue was the necessity of a peacekeeping mission on the ground and also the form that this should take. The third problem was Serbian isolation. The US government demanded of its European counterparts that the Western states should collectively isolate Serbia as a means for the promotion of peace. This disagreement between the US and the EC became clear when the European leaders began to take steps to negotiate a map of Bosnia based on constitutional principles of the Lisbon Agreement.

First of all, with regard to the Lisbon Agreement, regardless of its official position the US Ambassador to Yugoslavia encouraged the Bosnian government leader to reject it. Warren Zimmerman, the then US ambassador to Yugoslavia, 'encouraged' the Bosnian leader Izetbegović to 'stick by what he'd agreed to.' It was not difficult to predict that an inconsistent international approach would have the effect of intensifying the conflict. Furthermore, the relentless offensives of the Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat forces intensified the conflict even further. Hence there was an urgent need to maintain stability and security in Bosnia (i.e. by sending peacekeeping troops).

Secondly, as for the peacekeeping mission, there were several issues to be sorted out. On top of this issue, the UN office was not eager to collaborate with the EC. Boutros-Ghali emphasised that the UN's effort would be concentrated on promoting an agreement among the warring parties. In theory, the Lisbon Agreement could have paved the way to a formal settlement process. However, following Zimmerman's 'encouragement', the Bosnian government withdrew its support for the Lisbon Agreement. Instead, the Bosnian government demanded the Western leaders deploy UN peacekeeping troops in Bosnia and when this was not agreed to, it demanded that the UN lift the arms

177 Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe, 189-190. Zimmermann was instructed by Washington that he should support any form of the peace agreement if three parties agreed. However, as soon as Izetbegović withdrew his consent to the Lisbon Agreement, the US government openly criticized the plan as ethnically dividing Bosnia and thus effectively endorsed Zimmermann's 'encouragement.'
178 Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished, 36-41.
embargo on Bosnia.\textsuperscript{179} It was difficult for the UNSC as well as the EC members to ignore the Bosnian government’s call for a deployment of a peacekeeping mission given that they had already recognized its independence.

Legally speaking, collective security action under the provision of Chapter VII of the UN Charter was the only possible justification for dispatching peacekeeping troops where there was no consent among the warring parties to accept it. If the conditions of Charter VII of the UN Charter were applicable to this situation, the UNSC had two choices. One was to send a military intervention force and the other was to provide military protection for humanitarian aid. France preferred the former\textsuperscript{180} and the US and the UK supported the latter option.\textsuperscript{181} Furthermore, as a result of the collapse of the Lisbon Agreement, it was a UN mission that lacked the consent of the warring parties on the ground as well as sufficient international support. Towards the middle of May 1992, the EC and the UN could not supply additional missions in Sarajevo since the fighting in the area had escalated.\textsuperscript{182} As a result the UNSC could not take vigorous united action. The next move of the peacekeeping mission became a major concern for the Western policy-makers.

Thirdly, the US demanded that Serbia be isolated in the process paying more attention to this issue than other aspects. James Baker targeted Serbia as guilty of orchestrating a humanitarian crisis in Bosnia and thus demanded that international economic sanctions be brought against it.\textsuperscript{183} The US government attempted to exclude Serbia and Montenegro (which together formed the rump Yugoslavia) from international institutions such as the UN, the CSCE and so on. France was uneasy


\textsuperscript{180} Goulding, \textit{Peacekeeper}, 311-312.


with such a move and argued that the international community should maintain a dialogue with Serbia and prevent the EC from taking further sanctions against it. In contrast, the US challenged that the French were not doing enough to prevent the humanitarian crisis. In order to facilitate sanctions being imposed on Serbia, James Baker even suggested that the US could have supported the establishment of a multilateral force against Serbia under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Eventually, regardless of French reservations, Serbia was expelled from the CSCE on 12 May 1992. On 30 May 1992, UNSCR 757 was also authorized under provision of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This endorsed the economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, and demanded that the Sarajevo airport be open for free flowing of humanitarian aid.

To sum up, the US administration successfully managed to maintain its position of not sending American ground-troops while drawing international attention to the isolation of Serbia instead of seriously protecting the interests of the Bosnian government. However, James Baker’s diplomacy was implemented under the cover of the UN’s collective security function under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. From Baker’s perspective, accepting the UN’s role and the EC’s initiatives—in other words abiding by multilateralism—was a means to prevent America’s military involvement in Bosnia. However, if the situation had deteriorated, UN authority demanded the US to be accountable for any actions under the umbrella of the UN—namely taking coercive action on behalf of the UNSC. As we will discuss below, the Sarajevo crisis of June 1992 crystallised this dilemma for America.

The Sarajevo Crisis of June 1992: Multilateralism and UN Authority

Acting in accordance with the recommendation by the UNSC regarding the revitalization of the UN’s conflict resolution functions, on 18 June 1992 the UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-

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Ghali, produced a paper entitled, *An Agenda for Peace*. This document recommended the UN to conduct so-called peace enforcement missions even where there would be no agreement from the warring parties to do so. Bosnia as well as Somalia became the test case for this. On the same day, the WEU issued another important document in relation to peace enforcement measures: the Petersberg Declaration.

The Petersberg Declaration was significant in two respects. On the one hand, the UK-French dispute over the identity of the WEU was softened as a result of French acceptance of the identity of WEU as a 'European Pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.' On the other hand, however, the same document decided to conduct peacekeeping operations only 'in accordance with the UN Charter.' By basing itself on the UN Charter the WEU announced that it would take a UN-centred multilateralist approach to peacekeeping operations. As far as the UN's authority over its operations was concerned, WEU's position was a more positive one than that taken by the NATO and the US. In short, European states, France in particular, shared the same view as the US in seeing that the Bosnian conflict required some forms of the international intervention. However, Europeans, especially France, differed from the US on the issue over who would take that action.

It was under the above-mentioned international circumstances that the crisis in Sarajevo drew international attention. By the end of May 1992, Sarajevo was under siege and was surrounded by Bosnian Serb forces. International action was widely urged. Negotiations concerning the form that international peacekeeping should take, became the focus of the debate. On 8 June the UNSC authorized Resolution No. 758, which again demanded the re-opening of Sarajevo airport as well as

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190 WEU, "Petersberg Declaration".
191 WEU, "Petersberg Declaration".
recommending additional personnel for the UNPROFOR missions in Bosnia.\textsuperscript{193} On 18 June UNSCR 760 was also adopted, which repeated the urgency of humanitarian aid efforts in the former Yugoslavia but under the provision of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.\textsuperscript{194} Re-opening Sarajevo Airport was regarded as an essential part of ensuring the flow of sending ‘humanitarian assistance’ throughout Bosnia.

These resolutions indicate that preventing a humanitarian crisis became the central political objective at the UNSC. The UN offices finally went along with this. On 26 June 1992 Boutros-Ghali announced that the UN would take the ‘necessary means’ if Sarajevo Airport had not been opened within the next 48 hours.\textsuperscript{195} On the same day, both the US and the EC held the highest level decision-making meeting.

America’s reaction to the Sarajevo crisis underlined difficulties imposed on the Bush administration. There were not only international but also domestic pressures upon the US administration to do something about the situation in Sarajevo. On 9 June 1992 the UN envoy and the former US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance supported American participation in the UN peacekeeping mission in Bosnia in a congressional hearing.\textsuperscript{196} Following Vance’s suggestion, on 12 June 1992 the US Senate voted in favour of American participation in the multilateral enforcement operations (S. Res. 306).\textsuperscript{197}

In the meantime, the US Secretary of State James Baker proposed the use of coercive power at the UNSC in order to liberate Sarajevo from the Bosnian Serb’s siege of late June 1992.\textsuperscript{198} With regard to Boutros-Ghali’s ultimatum on 26 June, on the same day the US administration held a National Security Council (NSC) meeting.\textsuperscript{199} They discussed Baker’s proposal.\textsuperscript{200} However Baker was

\begin{footnotes}
\item[197] Kim, "Congress and the Conflict in Yugoslavia in 1992,\textquoteleft 13-14.
\end{footnotes}
unable to unite the US administration behind American participation in multilateral force. After that the National Security Adviser, Brent Scowcroft, gave a press conference. He hinted at what the conclusions of the NSC would be. He emphasized that the US would not dispatch its forces without the war-fighting parties’ consent even if these forces were only to be employed for the sake of humanitarian assistance. This meant that the US decided to draw a line separating it from the European policy-makers expectation to obtain American military involvement for the service of the UN resolutions. In other words, America’s vital interests were not to get involved in peacekeeping missions on the ground in Bosnia.

To look at the European side of the reaction to the Boutros-Ghali’s ultimatum, the EC summit was held on 26-27 June. It discussed the potential use of multilateral forces in relation to the humanitarian situation in Bosnia. In the statement after the summit, the EC approved the use of military means if necessary. However, it was a conditional support. On the one hand, it adopted the French position that demanded coercive action without the war-fighting parties’ consent. However, on the other hand, it did not say who (or which organization) would take such action. This was because the other EC leaders were concerned about the French option that emphasised the role of the WEU. There was still a gap among the European states regarding their differing perception of the nature of the Bosnian conflict.

As a result of the two international decisions above, even if the UNSC had decided to take coercive action, there would have been no international organization willing to implement it. The EC meeting on 26-27 June 1992 suggested that European leaders except the French would not dare to implement the EC’s decision until NATO or the US were willing to provide substantial military

Further embarrassment for the EC loomed. In order to maintain the EC’s lead international role, the Sarajevo Airport issue had to be sorted out by the European states. It was the French President, François Mitterrand, who was most determined to keep the EC’s firm grip on the diplomacy regarding the Bosnian conflict. Mitterrand went so far as to land at Sarajevo Airport on 28 June 1993. This action ‘proved’ the safety of Sarajevo Airport. The French air force and other air force carriers including those of the US began to send humanitarian aid via Sarajevo Airport from the following day.

As far as international relations among the major powers were concerned, Mitterrand’s visit to Sarajevo had three specific consequences. Firstly, it postponed the use of coercive power against the siege of Sarajevo. Secondly, it maintained the EC’s role as a leading international body in the mediation of the Bosnian conflict. This reinforced political pressure for the UN to fully cooperate with the EC. However, as the EC was reluctant to send sufficient numbers of troops, this put a severe burden on the UN’s capability on the ground and thus undermined any attempt to give teeth to UN resolutions and its ultimatum. Thirdly, however, it marked the failure of the French attempt to get the EC to support the WEU-led peacekeeping operations on the ground in Bosnia as humanitarian assistance was re-started without use of coercive power. As a result, as far as the Bosnian issue was concerned, the political leadership within the Europe gradually shifted from France to Britain. At this time Britain was about to become the holder of the EC Presidency for the second half of 1992.

To sum up this section, the Bush administration’s vital interest was to not get militarily involved on the ground. The US administration’s reaction to the Sarajevo crisis of June 1992 confirmed this point. However, as the Sarajevo crisis was ‘settled’ as a result of political negotiations, the US did

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Lexis-Nexis; Gow, *Triumph of the Lack of Will*, 94.
208 France was the biggest contributor of the UNPROFOR and Britain was the second biggest. See: Department of Public Information, United Nations. *Former Yugoslavia, UNPROFOR: Background*, http://64.233.179.104/search?q=cache:zHKZDete4a4J:www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unprof_b.htm+UNPROFOR+troops+contributing&hl=en [Accessed on 15 February 2005].
not have to show whether it would give substance to the UNSC resolutions or not. In other words, the US escaped a serious test as to whether it would act in accordance with multilateralism or not. However, because of this situation, it did not explicitly spell out how America's policy in Bosnia was linked to its vision of 'democratic peace' and the corresponding security order in Europe. Therefore, it can be argued that by that time, the US policy-makers regarded the Bosnian conflict as a regional issue that would not undermine America's interests in relation to the institutional framework of the European security order, i.e. maintaining NATO's de facto independence from the UN. Therefore, there was no urgency for the US policy-makers to link their vital national interests to the situation in Bosnia. More fundamentally, the EC had failed to put a pressure on the US to give substance to intra-Western multilateralism in the form of 'sovereign peace' and the collective security functions of the UN.

Conclusion

During this period (from the middle of 1991 to the summer of 1992), European policy-makers were unable to construct a consistent position in relation to the situation in the former Yugoslavia. Europe's inability to organize an internationally coordinated policy in Bosnia was essentially due to the escalating conflict situation on the ground. Nevertheless, regarding the Bosnian situation, the European leaders produced three important policies. These were: the Lisbon Agreement; the international humanitarian efforts concerning the situation in Sarajevo; and their support for the maintenance of UNSCR 713 (the arms embargo). However, these efforts did not produce sufficient results. Insufficient support from the US and the UN office were important causes of ongoing failure. However, the tension between France and Britain concerning the status of the WEU was the central factor in European incompetence at this stage.

Concerning this point, it seems clear that the British government had shared interests with the US administration over its objection to any international peacekeeping mission in Bosnia under the umbrella of WEU. However, the fact is that the US did not put any troops on the ground despite the
British expectation that if troops were to be sent the US was to bear the main responsibility for providing peacekeeping mission.\footnote{The US administration clearly dismissed this possibility. Interview with Thomas Niles on 21 May 2004; Major, \textit{The Autobiography}, 534-535; Sharp, \textit{Honest Broker or Perfidious Albion?} 8-9.} As we have analysed, the US administration maintained its grip on America’s policy-making process regarding its approach to the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. Given this fact, it is also clear that Europe’s lack of influence on American foreign policy during this period was not due to America’s domestic politics or Europe’s ignorance of Western values. It is safe to state that the influence of the Western European states on American foreign policy was not guaranteed either by maintaining an alliance with the US or sharing so-called democratic identities with them.

With regard to this point, this chapter has discussed three claims of why intra-Western multilateralism failed. The first claim is that intra-Western multilateralism and its corresponding institutional mechanisms were not given. As above discussed, this point has been endorsed by the empirical evidence. The second claim is that intra-Western cooperation is not naturally guaranteed because there is more than one vision of multilateralism. These different visions of multilateralism had taken shape in the form of the two approaches to the independence of Slovenia and Croatia. On the one hand the EC recognized their independence on the basis of the ‘sovereign peace.’ On the other hand the US insisted on placing itself on the side of ‘democratic peace.’

The third claim is that America’s reactions to European initiatives in the former Yugoslavia related to America’s vital interests. As discussed above there was a tension between America’s vital interests and some European states’ favoured vision of European security. However, Europe’s actions were incoherent and thus they could not pose \textit{the critical} threat to the vital interests perceived by the US administration. In other words, for any influence to be felt the European states would have had to be united. Moreover, they needed to politically construct an international institutional arrangement that
the US would find impossible to contravene. Chapter 3 will look at the process of how the US administration linked the situation in Bosnia and its vital interests in Europe.
Chapter 3 British and European Influence on American Foreign Policy: the London Conference and the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, from August 1992 to May 1993

This chapter examines the validity of the Liberal notion that America's allies have 'voice opportunities' in the US foreign policy-making process. It will also illustrate the formation process of conceptions of vital interests on the part of US policy-makers in relation to the European approach to the Bosnian conflict. In this way, it will analyse corresponding US policies to protect these vital interests.

Chronologically speaking, this chapter looks at British and European influence on the American foreign policy-making process in relation to the Bosnian conflict from August 1992 to June 1993. The establishment of the International Conference of the Former Yugoslavia (hereafter ICFY), the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, and its subsequent failure characterized this period. The key political forces that promoted multilateralism during this period were twofold: EC member states were at least relatively united behind the EC-UN peace-plan; the EC and UN consolidated their working relationship behind the promotion of the peace plan. At this time the British government was at the centre of most European initiatives. Obtaining a workable peace agreement from the warring parties was the pivotal task for the EC and the UN. In order to bring this about, they needed American political and military support. However, both the Bush and the newly elected Clinton administrations were reluctant to agree to European demands.

Theoretically speaking, these events will challenge the premise of Liberal Multilateralists that America’s supremacy is compatible with its own and its allies’ 'voice opportunities'. This chapter demonstrates, contra-Liberal Multilateralists, that there was an increasing sensitivity among US policy-makers regarding the prospect of the ICFY-promoted Bosnian peace plan and its potential impact upon America’s vital interests. In other words, US policy-makers perceived a trade-off between the success of the ICFY-led peace process and the demise of America’s vital interests in Europe. At first, vital
interests were to prevent the deployment of American ground troops in Bosnia. This took the form of challenges to the authority and legitimacy of the ICFY. This was because the activities of the ICFY were regarded as the incarnation of the EC’s challenge to America’s strategy to maintain de facto independence of NATO from the UN regarding NATO’s so-called ‘out-of area’ operations.

Discussion of vital interests will lead to us to evaluate the coherence of the working hypothesis of this research. In order to prove its validity—especially the claim of America’s intentional promotion of Quasi-multilateralism in relation to the Bosnian conflict and NATO’s role in Europe—we shall provide evidence showing that American policy makers were aware of a causal link between their vital interests and the development of international diplomacy regarding the Bosnian conflict. Therefore, this chapter will trace the relationships between the vital interests and the corresponding policies, by reading America’s reactions to the Bosnian conflict.

With regard to this causality, the tension between the EC-UN and the US in 1993 on the issue of the Bosnian conflict underscores the fact that there was a fundamental disagreement among Western states as to what kind of multilateralism they should support. This tension was between the European vision of multilateralism based on ‘sovereign peace’ and America’s vision of Quasi-multilateralism founded on the logic of ‘democratic peace.’ In the face of this tension, the US administration pursued two kinds of policy. One was to disagree with the EC-UN policy, and to impose its own preferred direction instead. This was the so-called ‘lift and the strike’ policy. The other was to challenge and attempt to alter the definition of multilateralism itself. The first policy will be discussed in this chapter and the second in Chapter 4.

With regard to the organization of the chapter, it first discusses the London Conference of August 1992. The claim in this section will be that Europe had only limited influence on the outcomes of US foreign policy even if both parties agreed on the set up of the multilateral framework. For example, the Bush Senior administration did not want to send any American ground troops to implement the ICFY-promoted Bosnia peace plan. This policy was formed regardless of domestic
opposition in America, and without acknowledging European states’ violation of Western values. In other words, according to the previously discussed Risse-Kappen’s methodology, not deploying its ground troops was the key vital interest of the US at that time.¹

Secondly, the discussion will look at intra-Western relationships regarding the Vance-Owen Peace Plan of January 1993 and the international reactions to it. The main theme here will be similar to the previous section, that is, the evaluation of British and European influence on American foreign policy-making processes. The argument will then suggest that America shifted its focus in the foreign policy from merely preventing the deployment of American troops on the ground to challenging the framework and logic of the ICFY. This transformation will be illustrated by the fact that the Clinton administration was determined to refuse the EU-UN’s approach prior to intra-Western interaction, and even before US domestic actors (e.g. Congress, media and leaders of public opinion) demanded the Clinton administration do so.

Thirdly, it will discuss the fate of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan. It analyses intra-Western interactions regarding the Bosnian warring parties’ meeting in Athens in May 1993 and the so-called ‘Joint Action Program’ of June 1993. This section will argue that the Clinton administration was aware of the causality between the ICFY’s activities and its challenge to America’s vital interests. This will be demonstrated by analysis of the international diplomatic context of the Clinton administration’s policies in Bosnia.

The London Conference of August 1992 and European Multilateralism

The Bosnian conflict was intensified while the international community struggled to find a way to coordinate its actions. By August 1992, the Bosnian Serb forces’ use of ‘concentration camps’ and their ‘ethnic cleansing’ of other Bosnian ethnic groups had been reported.² International opinion

² American journalist Roy Gutman won the Pulitzer Prize for his one of the earliest and also influential reports on this subject. See a revised version of the reports: A Witness to Genocide: the First Account of the
was outraged. Pressure on Western policy-makers to do something about this mounted. As a result, the UNSC adopted resolution no. 770 on 13 August 1992. It stated that the UN would take 'all necessary means' for providing humanitarian assistance in Bosnia. However, David Hannay, the British Ambassador to the UN, commented on the resolution, '[t]his resolution does not prescribe the use of force, it merely authorizes it as a last resort' and 'it is very important we try every means possible to get supply through without use of force.' The intention of comment was to make clear that there would not be any international military intervention. Accordingly, the humanitarian assistance was provided without heavy armaments. This was not sufficient to satisfy humanitarian needs on the ground. Some (including US presidential candidate Bill Clinton) began to argue in favour of lifting the arms embargo. Others supported limited military action such as air strikes (e.g. David Owen), or full-scale military intervention (e.g. Margaret Thatcher), against Bosnian Serb forces. On 25 August even the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution that supported the Bosnian government’s ‘just struggle’ for self-determination. Calls for urgent international action in Bosnia were mounting. In the meantime, in late July 1992 the EC announced their intention to convene with the UN a joint international conference on the former Yugoslavia in London from 26 August 1992.

British and European Policy: Promoting Multilateralism on the Basis of the 'Sovereign Peace'

Mobilising international action towards a negotiations-based settlement was the
principal aim of the London Conference. Politically, the EC and the British government wanted to formalize their relationship with the UN in relation to peace promotion. Before the London Conference, the relationship between the EC’s attempts at peace-promotion and those of the UN were not formally institutionalized. Combining UN and EC efforts was an important step in the EC’s organizing of a coherent international diplomacy vis-à-vis the Bosnian warring parties. As previously discussed, the UN office was not willing to work with the EC mission for fear of taking unbearable burdens on its shoulders. The EC did not want to use ‘military force against hostile opposition to achieve a military solution’. It argued that such a policy would place a heavy financial and military burden on the West. Hence it attempted to engage the warring parties in negotiations to reach a settlement. Moreover, there was an additional political calculation in the EC’s attempt to formalize the relationship with the UN. The idea was that the EC’s efforts along with that of the UN authority would persuade the US to support it. Indeed, they considered the fact that the US President had been promoting the so-called ‘New World Order’ based on the revitalized conflict resolution mechanisms of the UN.

American Policy: Multilateralism Without Following Its Outcomes

American policy in relation to the London Conference was not simple. Officially at least it supported the EC’s attempt to formalize the EC and the UN working together. There was a tension within the US administration’s policy direction however. On the one hand it aimed at promoting peace

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12 Interview with Douglas Hurd on 7 April 2004.
13 Interview with Douglas Hurd on 7 April 2004.
14 Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished, 43-46.
15 Interview with Douglas Hurd on 7 April 2004.
17 Interview with Thomas Niles on 21 May 2004.
through negotiations. On the other hand, it paid more attention to the humanitarian tragedies in Bosnia and demanded that the EC and the rest of the international community condemn Serbian actions in the former Yugoslavia.  

Yet, despite the fact that it supported UNSCR 770, the US administration was reluctant to fully endorse this resolution for fear that American troops would have to be deployed on the ground. In short, so far as the framework was concerned, the US administration accepted the EC’s moves provided that American military support was not required.

The London Conference and Institutionalization of European Multilateralism

The London International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) was held on 26-27 August 1992. It adopted principles that consisted of thirteen points. The essence of principles can be summarized as follows. Firstly, in order to conduct the peace process in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter, the London Conference confirmed that any peace plan that the EC and the UN were to promote must recognize the territorial integrity of Bosnia, and that it must not accept any transformation of Bosnian borders that was imposed by military means. Secondly, the London Conference delegated to the UN and EC representatives the task of mediating between warring parties in Bosnia. This Conference also established a permanent office in Geneva. Vance continued as the UN envoy. However, the EC nominated the former British Foreign Minister David Owen as the Special Representative to the former Yugoslavia, replacing Lord Carrington. Thirdly, the London Conference endorsed the idea that any peace plan be implemented in accordance with UN peacekeeping operations.

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21 Interview with Thomas Niles on 21 May 2004.

(i.e. sending a UN peacekeeping mission after the peace agreement). In this way, the ICFY fully adhered to UNSCR 713 (arms embargo on Bosnia).

Regarding the third decision, there was a contentious issue during the London Conference. This related to the issue of the interpretation of UNSCR 770 that suggested using 'all measures necessary' (i.e. including military means) under the provision of Chapter VII of the UN Charter to assist humanitarian aid. The Bosnian Serbs leaders were worried that the ICFY together with UNSCR 770 could work as a catalyst for international intervention. However, the military escorts accompanying humanitarian aid eventually became a part of the UNPROFOR mission under the provision of UNSCR 776. UNSCR 776 expressed the UNSC’s ‘full support’ for the decisions and principles of the London Conference. In addition, on 9 October UNSCR 781 was adopted regarding the so-called no-fly zone. This prohibited all military flights over Bosnia and Herzegovina and thus ‘aimed at ensuring the safety of the delivery of the humanitarian assistance.’ In this way, the military escorts accompanying humanitarian aid were distinguished from military intervention. In other words, the UNSC dismissed any coercive intervention to the conflict. These developments were in harmony with the then British policy. For instance, in the face of political pressure from Muslim world to intervene in the Bosnian conflict militarily, British Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, emphasized that the UN Security Council should control the use of military power and also be cautious about launching military intervention until ‘the case is absolutely proven’.

The London Conference formed the perception of the conflict as a civil war and thus attempted to develop a solution by promoting negotiations among the warring parties, instead of

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instituting international intervention. This viewpoint, in line with the British perspective, became the orthodox interpretation of the conflict among the EC member states and guided the relationship between the EC and the UN office. As a result of the London Conference, the British and European policy in Bosnia became more multilateralist. On the basis of the London Conference, there were now new institutional structures in place for Britain and the EC members to exercise influence on American foreign policy.

To sum up, the EC and UN established the institution of the ICFY. It can be regarded as an institutionalization of the European approach to international security, namely intra-Western multilateralism and its logic of 'sovereign peace.' European policy-makers demanded the US endorse this. By establishing the ICFY, the members of the EC wanted to obtain the following support from the US:

1) that it would continuously stand by UNSCR 713

2) that it would provide sufficient political support for the peace negotiations by placing diplomatic pressure on the warring parties

3) that, if possible, it would accept NATO’s participation regarding the implementation of any peace agreement.

Regarding the last point, at that time the ICFY did not request specific American troops as such but hoped to use NATO. However, the US administration was reluctant to offer any military support for the implementation of a settlement. Therefore this was one of the most controversial agendas regarding the Western approach to the Bosnian conflict.

The London Conference and the establishment of the ICFY gave substance to the EC’s

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28 Hurd, Douglas. Memoirs. London: Little, Brown, 2003. 452. The UN office was still not willing to follow the EC’s demands regarding financial constraints. It was also concerned about the efficiency of proposed peacekeeping plan. Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished, 46-49.

29 The US administration endorsed UNSCR 776 and also the acting Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger attended the Ministerial meetings of the ICFY Stealing Committee. Therefore, the ICFY and its supporters understood that the US fully participated in the policy-making process of ICFY activities. Interview with David Owen on 16 March 2004.

30 Interview with David Owen on 16 March 1993.
efforts with the authority of the UNSC. The ICFY became the sole legitimate international body to promote the peace-plan for a settlement of the Bosnian conflict. The United States was faced with pressures from the EC and the UN to support their missions. It was difficult for the US to dismiss the legitimacy of the EC and the UN claim, as it had praised the revitalization of the UN’s conflict resolution mechanisms in accordance with Present Bush’s concept of a ‘New World Order.’ Indeed, the US was caught in a dilemma. On the one hand it endorsed the EC’s efforts and the framework of the ICFY itself. However, on the other hand, it did not want to follow the outcomes of the ICFY negotiations that might result in American military contribution towards a UN peacekeeping mission in Bosnia for implementing a peace plan.33

Domestically, the presidential election put further political pressure on the US administration. The Democratic Party’s presidential candidate Bill Clinton criticized President Bush for not doing enough for the sake of the Bosnian people and promised vigorous American action against Bosnian Serb forces. He implied that he would support coercive action against the Bosnian Serbs.34 A congressional majority also agreed to take tougher action against the Serbs.35 In October 1992, Congress voted in favour of the so-called Biden Amendment on the FY 1993 budgets. This Amendment allocated $50 million worth of self-defence armaments to the Bosnian government if the US decided to lift the arms embargo.36 It was eventually authorized by President Bush on 6 October 1992.37 Furthermore, on 15 October, the Bosnian government demanded that the US President and the

31 Interview with Thomas Niles on 21 May 2004.
33 Interview with Thomas Niles on 21 May 2004.
35 Interview with Robert Hand (Policy Staff of a member of House of Representative, Steny Hoyer, (D-Md.) who was one of the influential opponents of the UN arms embargo on Bosnia) on 19 May 2004.
UN lift the arms embargo. The editorials of the well-known newspapers such as The New York Times and The Washington Post began to support this idea.

It seems that the US administration faced much domestic pressure to act against UNSCR 713 and thus it was not able to contribute anything to the ICFY. Nevertheless, having endorsed a controversial budget, the US administration made it clear that it would stand by the resolution 713 and the ICFY. George Bush defended his position:

"We're working through the international organizations. That's one thing I learned by forging that tremendous and greatly, highly successful coalition against Saddam Hussein, the dictator. Work internationally to do it. I'm very concerned about it."

George Bush even pledged American support for the implementation of the no-fly zone under UNSCR 781. In the meantime, the ICFY steering committees drafted a formal peace plan for Bosnia at the end of 1992. The ICFY Co-Chairmen as well as Bush administration officials were confident the US would support their plans if George Bush had been re-elected. However, Bill Clinton won the US presidential election of November 1992. The incoming administration began to formulate its policy from the end of 1992 and showed signs of a shift in the American position.

To sum up, it can be said that the Bush administration, on the rhetorical level, prioritised its international pledges to support the ICFY over American domestic pressures. From this it would appear that the Bush administration followed the logic of multilateralism that was promoted by its European allies. It was reported that George Bush intended to endorse the ICFY by announcing the possibility of deploying US ground troops if the violence began to spread to other republics of the

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40 In relation to this, the then Assistant Secretary of State for Canadian and European Affairs, Thomas Niles, recalled that the Bush administration did not consider the so-called lift and strike policy up until the end of its duty in the office. Interview with Thomas Niles on 21 May 2004.
42 Bush, "Presidential Debate in St. Louis."
43 Interview with David Owen on 16 March 2004; Interview with Thomas Niles on 21 May 2004.
44 Interview with Thomas Niles on 21 May 2004.
former Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{45} However, instead he decided to send American troops to Somalia. It is important to note that, as we have discussed, since the outbreak of the Bosnian conflict, the Bush administration had maintained its initial position that the US would not send any ground troops to Bosnia. In short, the Bush administration’s support for the ICFY was only political and excluded military deployment. This was the vital interest of the US regarding the Bosnian conflict at that time. The result of the US presidential election in 1992 cemented this resolve. Despite the fact that presidential candidate Bill Clinton had pledged to support a strengthening of the UN, the elected new administration began to formulate a policy in opposition to UNSCR 713 (i.e. lifting the arms embargo) as well as the ICFY’s peace plan.\textsuperscript{46}

The Vance-Owen Peace Plan and America’s Perception of Its Vital Interests

The EC and the UN proposed the Vance-Owen Peace Plan (VOPP) in January 1993.\textsuperscript{47} Establishing a plan on the principles of the London Conference, the VOPP envisaged a new Bosnia that would consist of 10 so-called ‘cantons.’ Each ‘canton’ would reflect a specific ethnic distribution. However, distribution was based on the 1991 census, not on the situation as a result of the conflict.\textsuperscript{48} In this way, at least in theory, the VOPP refused to recognize any territorial gains based on ethnic expansionism. This went to the heart of the principles which had been proclaimed at the London Conference.

In order to implement this plan, three agreements from the Bosnian parties were needed: the constitutional agreement that Vance and Owen obtained; a map demonstrating how the Bosnian parties

\textsuperscript{45} Kim, "Congress and the Conflict in Yugoslavia in 1992," 7.
intended to divide up the land; and a cease-fire in hostilities. Vance and Owen convened three plenary
meetings in Geneva in January 1993. At the end of these meetings on 30 January 1993, the three
warring Bosnian parties signed constitutional agreements that outlined the future of Bosnia under the
VOPP. In addition, the Bosnian Croats and Serbs signed a cease-fire. However, the leader of the
Bosnian government, Izetbegović, refused to sign the agreement because he wanted to keep heavy
arms around Sarajevo in order to provide a balance to the Bosnian Serb’s military presence. Owen later
criticized the new American administration’s approach to the Bosnian conflict that encouraged
Izetbegović to take an uncompromising stance.49

European Policy: The VOPP as a Symbol of European Multilateralism

It was important for Vance and Owen to obtain international, and especially American,
support for the VOPP in two respects. Firstly, they needed political support from the US administration
that would allow them to impose serious political pressure, not only on the Bosnian Serbs but on all the
warring parties to accept the VOPP.50 In particular, the possibility that America might move to lift the
arms embargo to Bosnia would certainly have fuelled tension on the ground.51 Secondly, Vance and
Owen planned to send a UN peacekeeping mission of around 25,000 troops to Bosnia in order to
implement the VOPP.52 For this purpose, Vance and Owen expected to have a contribution from
NATO.53

Organizing coherent diplomatic action to promote the VOPP became the heart of British and

49 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 111-112.
50 Interview with David Owen on 16 March 2004; Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 111-112; Hurd, Memoirs, 457-458.
51 Hurd, Memoirs, 457-458.
52 "Report of the Secretary-General on the New York round of the Peace Talks on Bosnia and Herzegovina,
(3-8 February 1993)," (UN Doc. S/25248). Reprinted in Ramcharan ed., The International Conference on the
53 At first, the ICFY did not specify the role of NATO for the implementation of the VOPP. The ICFY
decided to ask NATO’s contribution after the US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher’s speech on 10
EC's Bosnian policy.\textsuperscript{54} This was because Europeans considered that the possibility of ending the
Bosnian conflict at this stage depended on the extent to which international cooperation was
maintained between the EC-UN and the US.\textsuperscript{55} British and EC policy regarding interaction with the US
administration can be summarized as follows:

1) The VOPP was the only credible international peace plan at that time.

2) The framework of the peace plan was in accordance with the principles that were
endorsed at the London Conference.

3) In order to promote the VOPP, UNSCR 713 (the arms embargo) must be maintained.

4) American persuasion vis-à-vis \textit{all} the warring parties of Bosnia was essential in
promoting the VOPP.

\textbf{American Policy: Refusing the VOPP on Moral Grounds}

According to David Owen, the new US administration's reaction to the VOPP was not
initially coherent.\textsuperscript{56} On the one hand, it was reluctant to support the VOPP due to the complexity of its
implementation on the ground; on the other hand, however, it had accepted the framework of the
London Conference before it had formally taken over the White House.\textsuperscript{57} In order to justify its position,
the Clinton administration at first implied that it would keep its distance from the ICFY's activities. The
newly appointed Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, and the US Ambassador to the UN,
Madeleine Albright, hinted at attempts to distance their position from the ICFY and the VOPP in their
congressional confirmation hearing on 13-14 and 21 January respectively.\textsuperscript{58} For example, on 13

\textsuperscript{54} Hurd, \textit{Memoirs}, 457-458; EPC, "Statement on Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1 February 1993," \textit{European Foreign
\textsuperscript{55} Interview with David Owen on 16 March 2004; Interview with Douglas Hurd on 7 April 2004.
\textsuperscript{56} Owen, \textit{Balkan Odyssey}, 101.
\textsuperscript{57} Interview with Anthony Lake on 19 May 2004; Interview with Thomas Niles 21 May 2004.
\textsuperscript{58} "Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subject: Confirmation Hearing for Warren
Christopher as Secretary of State," 13 January 1993, \textit{Federal News Service}. Lexis-Nexis; "Hearing of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subject: Nomination of Madeleine Albright as Ambassador to the
January Christopher remarked:

I don't think we can make those negotiations [in Geneva] our sole reliance [...] I think we have to have an independent position with respect to Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia countries because the stakes are too large for us to rely solely on the negotiations taking place at Geneva, much as I hope they'll succeed [emphasis added].

Vance and Owen were concerned about the American position. They attempted to influence the US by explaining about the V OPP, in order to ensure that the ‘Clinton administration listened and shifted course when the facts became clearer’. Accordingly, they went to UN headquarters in New York to sell the V OPP in public, and obtained the EC’s formal backing to do so. On 1 February 1993 Vance and Owen met newly appointed US Secretary State, Warren Christopher. To their surprise, Christopher had little knowledge about the V OPP, despite the fact that the US administration had been criticizing its deficiencies. Vance and Owen explained the V OPP and Christopher agreed that he would at least not oppose it until the US administration defined its policy towards Bosnia. The ICFY Co-Chairmen decided they could use this opportunity to persuade the US to understand and support the V OPP. However, after the meeting Christopher spoke to the press and alluded to his misgivings about the plan. Vance and Owen were watching on television and realized they had been betrayed by the US Secretary of State. This episode suggests that US hostility towards the V OPP preceded any intra-Western interaction.

As the Bosnian leaders had planned to come to New York by the end of February 1993, diplomatic interaction intensified despite American unwillingness to support the V OPP. By that time, the Clinton administration’s formal approach to the Bosnian conflict had been more clearly developed.

59 “Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subject: Confirmation Hearing for Warren Christopher as Secretary of State,” 13 January 1993.
62 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 113-114; Messervy-Whiting, Peace Conference on Former Yugoslavia, 17.
63 Interview with David Owen on 16 March 2004.
64 Interview with David Owen on 16 March 2004.
65 Interview with David Owen on 16 March 2004.
In fact, during this process, Clinton decided not to support the VOPP.\(^6^6\) To express this policy, on 10 February Christopher outlined the America’s six points plan for promoting a settlement in Bosnia.\(^6^7\)

These six steps were as follows: America would provide political support for the VOPP as well as nomination of Reginald Bartholomew, the former US Ambassador to NATO, as peace envoy; the US would attempt to persuade different Bosnian ethnic groups to engage with the negotiations; it would increase economic and political pressures on the Republic of Serbia; it would tighten enforcement of the no-fly zone, intensify humanitarian efforts, and propose the establishment of an international war crimes tribunal; it would provide American military support for the implementation of the peace plan; and it would broaden the consultation with America’s allies and friends. On 12 February, the EC welcomed Christopher’s six steps.\(^6^8\)

American support for the VOPP, however, was conditional. Christopher emphasized that the peace plan should be ‘just and workable’ and that it must not be imposed on the Bosnian people from the outside.\(^6^9\) Thus the promise of an American contribution to the implementation was stated pursuant to their condition. Yet it was clear that the Bosnian government was not keen on accepting the VOPP. A specialist in military issues of the former Yugoslavia, James Gow, criticized Christopher’s announcement: ‘[i]n effect the US was sticking with its policy but pretending, for want of a better option, to lend its support to the work of ICFY.’\(^7^0\)

On 18 February, Bosnian Prime Minister, Haris Silajdžić appeared at a hearing of the US Senate. He emphasized the legitimacy of the Bosnian government (and thus the territorial integrity of Bosnia) and his right to defend the nation. He demanded that the arms embargo on Bosnia be lifted in

\(^{6^6}\) Clinton, My Life, 511.
\(^{6^9}\) Christopher, "New Steps toward Conflict Resolution in the Former Yugoslavia, Opening Statement at a News Conference, Washington, DC, February 10 1993."
\(^{7^0}\) Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will, 244.
order to accomplish this task. \textsuperscript{71} Vance and Owen, and probably the other EC policy-makers too, were confused by these developments. Owen was not sure 'where the US administration was heading' when the Bosnian president Izetbegović and the Bosnian Serb leader Karadžić came to New York at the end of February for negotiations. \textsuperscript{72} Under these circumstances, the first phase of negotiations between the Bosnian parties in New York did not produce much of substance.

Internationally, the leaders of the EC member states had begun their top-level diplomacy towards the US president in order to assist the VOPP negotiations in New York. John Major, François Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl attempted to put over the peace plan to President Bill Clinton on 24 February, \textsuperscript{73} 9 March \textsuperscript{74} and 26 March 1993 \textsuperscript{75} respectively. However, no substantial transatlantic agreements on Bosnia were announced, and when West European leaders visited Washington D.C., Clinton tended to avoid mentioning, 'the Vance-Owen Peace Plan'. When it was necessary to mention it, Clinton just gave conditional support to the VOPP at the joint press conferences with each West European leader in turn.

Behind the scenes the US administration hinted that the real intention of Christopher's six steps was to promote an alternative policy to the VOPP. In essence, America's position stressed the need for a form of Western military intervention with no US ground troops, rather than the EC-UN promoted peace process. Therefore, the difference between the EC-UN position and the US administration was clear. The European states were in favour of promoting the VOPP as well as negotiations. Then, following the announcement of the Christopher's six steps, the ICFY considered deploying UN-authorized NATO peacekeeping operations that would be accompanied by forces from


\textsuperscript{72} Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 128.


other states (e.g. Russia) on the ground. In contrast, the US argued for an entirely different strategy; the so-called ‘lift and strike’ policy. This advocated both lifting the arms embargo that had been placed on the Bosnian government as well as carrying out aerial attacks against Bosnian Serb forces.

With regard to this policy, on 23 February Boutros-Ghali met Clinton and his cabinet members in the White House. Boutros-Ghali asked Clinton to support the VOPP and to contribute troops to endorse the plan. According to Boutros-Ghali, Vice President Al Gore replied on behalf of Clinton. Gore emphasized the point that the VOPP would amount to an endorsement of Serbian gains. He called for the acceptance of a ‘lift and strike’ policy rather than supporting international efforts to enforce the VOPP. Clinton added that the US would try to support the VOPP, but it ‘did see a need for a modification of the envisaged borders’ in favour of the Bosnian government. This had the effect of undermining not only the progress of the VOPP negotiations but also their credibility. The US administration justified its unwillingness to support VOPP negotiations by using moral arguments. Owen was ‘shattered’ when he realised that his American friends ‘believed that Vance and I were somehow rewarding ethnic cleansing and aggression.’ In retrospect, Christopher’s six-step plan had set up the rationale for the US to draw a clear line between their ‘just and workable’ solution and that of the EC-UN.

In short, the US would not support the VOPP regardless of European efforts. The ICFY supporters, especially at the British offices in the US, were frustrated at the American administration’s ignoring of their opinion and realised that the Anglo-American alliance was not working in relation to the Bosnian issue. The American policy at the beginning of the transatlantic interaction regarding the VOPP can be summarized as follows:

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77 Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished, 72.
78 Anthony Lake commented that the US mainly criticized the VOPP’s practical difficulties but this aspect and the plan’s moral issue were ‘inseparable.’ Interview with Anthony Lake (the US National Security Adviser, 1993-1996) on 19 May 2004.
80 Christopher, "New Steps toward Conflict Resolution in the Former Yugoslavia."
81 Interview with Robin Renwick (the UK Ambassador to the US, 1991-1995) on 5 October 2004; Interview
1) The US administration reserved the right to hold its own views on Bosnian peace (i.e. the VOPP was not the only peace plan).

2) The warring parties were to be treated in accordance with their respect for human rights issues and thus it used the moral arguments as a means to criticize the VOPP, (i.e. in other words, the US could support one party of the conflict against others and thus this point demonstrated transatlantic disagreement regarding one of the principles of the London Conference that was to be neutral to the warring parties).

3) The US administration preferred lifting the arms embargo (scrapping UNSCR 713 in relation to Bosnia) as opposed to the deployment of NATO or US peacekeeping troops.

4) The US government was not willing to use political pressure to force the Bosnian government to accept any peace plan.

_The Realities of the Western Interaction: America’s Strategic Challenge to the VOPP_

During the spring of 1993, European leaders made efforts to persuade the US administration to endorse the VOPP while also trying to obtain consent from the warring parties for implementing it. However, the US position towards the VOPP had hardened. In this divided international context, the second phase of the talks between the Bosnian parties was held at New York from 16 to 25 March. At the end of this, the Bosnian government and the Bosnian Croatian leaders signed an interim arrangement and the provisional map. The Bosnian Serb leader did not sign them. Obtaining a signature from the Bosnian Serbs on the provisional map became the key target of the negotiations. As they could not rely on American political pressure on the three warring parties of Bosnia, Vance and

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82 Anthony Lake commented that the US recognized Bosnia under the leadership of Izetbegović. Thus the only legitimate government was that of Izetbegović. In this respect, he added that the US administration did not oppose the principles of the London Conference but it did oppose the practices of the ICFY. Interview with Anthony Lake on 19 May 2004.

83 Owen, _Balkan Odyssey_, 133.
Owen decided to use Milošević’s influence on the Bosnian Serbs.\textsuperscript{84} The French President, François Mitterrand, created an opportunity in Paris to discuss the VOPP with Milošević on 11 March 1993.\textsuperscript{85} He persuaded Milošević to put pressure on the Bosnian Serb leader Karadžić to accept the VOPP. Vance and Owen also attended part of the meeting, where they realized that Milošević’s bottom line was lifting economic sanctions against Serbia.\textsuperscript{86}

Since the second phase of the talks between the Bosnian parties in New York at the end of March 1992, and keeping Milošević’s demands in mind, Vance and Owen had begun to construct a strategy to obtain the consent of all parties to the implementation of the VOPP. This was the legitimate procedure of the ‘sovereign peace’, which gave shape to the conventional UN conflict resolution process and to the principles of the London Conference. This was also a natural choice for the ICFY Co-Chairmen, given the fact that they could not rely on coercive powers to impose the settlement. They wanted to obtain the UNSC’s clear support for the VOPP and also possible further sanctions on Serbia if it did not cooperate with Vance and Owen.\textsuperscript{87} Accordingly, Boutros-Ghali asked UNSC members to assist Vance and Owen, and the EC supported this idea.\textsuperscript{88} Following this request, the British and the French delegations at the UN began to draft a resolution to endorse support of the VOPP. However, on 30 March the US blocked this draft even before it was placed on the table of the UNSC.\textsuperscript{89} This was because towards the end of the warring parties’ meeting in New York the US administration had begun to promote a lift and strike policy.

America’s next move became clear when Clinton met German Chancellor Helmut Kohl in Washington on 26 March 1993. Izetbegović happened to be in Washington at the same time and thus met both leaders. At a joint press conference with Kohl, Clinton stated that the need to lift the arms

\textsuperscript{84} Interview with David Owen on 16 March 2004. Also, Owen, \textit{Balkan Odyssey}, 142.
\textsuperscript{85} Owen, \textit{Balkan Odyssey}, 142.
\textsuperscript{86} Owen, \textit{Balkan Odyssey}, 142.
\textsuperscript{87} Owen, \textit{Balkan Odyssey}, 142; Owen, “The Future of the Balkans: an Interview with David Owen,” 5.
\textsuperscript{88} Owen, \textit{Balkan Odyssey}, 142; EPC, “Statement on American Steps to Promote Peace and a Political Settlement in Former Yugoslavia,” (93/053).
\textsuperscript{89} Boutros-Ghali, \textit{Unvanquished}, 77-78.
embargo on Bosnia was their new approach to the Bosnian conflict. In the official statement Kohl disagreed with Clinton and instead emphasized the importance of promoting the VOPP. However, on 2 April Clinton repeated his argument in favour of lifting the arms embargo at the Vancouver G7 summit. Other Western leaders refused to support Clinton. Despite this international pressure on the US, it did not seek to form a compromise with the Europeans. On that day (2 April) Cyrus Vance decided to leave his position as UN Special Representative, a resignation that came into effect on 2 May 1993. Former Norwegian Foreign Minister, Thorvald Stoltenberg, was appointed as his successor. Although Vance had acted in the capacity of UN-appointed Co-Chairman of the ICFY, there had been anticipation among international actors that his career as a former US Secretary of State would facilitate America’s cooperation to the Bosnia peace process. However, his resignation clearly dismissed such potential.

These international divisions had the effect of softening the pressures on the Bosnian Serbs to endorse the peace plan. On 2 April, the day of the Vancouver G7 summit, the Bosnian Serb Assembly grasped this opportunity by rejecting the provisional map of the VOPP. In addition, the situation in Srebrenica—where Muslims comprised a majority—became tense as Bosnian Serb forces had been intensifying their attack on the city since March 1993. With regard to this situation, on 13 April NATO began its so-called Operation Deny Flight to give substance to UNSCR 816 (adopted 31 March 1993). UNSCR 816 strengthened the concept of ‘no-fly zones’ that prohibited all air flights

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According to Clinton, Kohl was in favour of the lift and strike policy. Clinton and Kohl promised to Izetbegović they would persuade the UK and the French to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia. Clinton, My Life, 512.
92 Drew, On the Edge, 148-149.
93 Drew, On the Edge, 148-149.
94 Interview with David Owen on 16 March 2004; Also, Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished, 73.
95 Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will, 245.
over Bosnia without permission from UNPROFOR. The UNSC also adopted resolution 819 and declared Srebrenica a ‘safe area’ on 16 April. However, the UNSC and other UN member states could not provide sufficient ground troops to enforce the concept of ‘safe area’. Therefore the adoption of UNSCR 819 did not deter the Bosnian Serb forces’ attack on the city. International political, as well as military collaboration was urgently needed.

On the same day (16 April), Clinton announced that with the exception of sending American troops, he would consider all options to restore peace including revising the VOPP. As one of these options, he again proposed lifting the arms embargo and also launching aerial strikes for restoring to restore peace in Bosnia. This suggested that the US administration had intensified its opposition to the VOPP. Clinton implied that the heart of the US-EC row on the issue of Bosnia related to the role of multilateralism. As he stated the matter:

I have operated from the beginning under the assumption that whatever is done must be done within the framework of a multilateral cooperation, that this was not something the United States could effectively do alone.

However, he added:

[…] those are the things that I have been able to do, taking a situation that was in quite bad shape when I found it and within the limits of multilateralism. I wouldn’t rule out other steps [emphasis added].

After making these announcements, on 19 and 20 April, Clinton telephoned Major and Mitten-and to discuss his plan. They shared the view that they should do something about the Bosnian situation since the UN ‘safe area’ of Srebrenica was about to fall into the Bosnian Serbs’ control. However,

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99 Interview with Douglas Hurd on 7 April 2004.
103 Clinton, "The President's New Conference with the Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa of Japan, April 16 1993," 441-442.
they disagreed what to do. On the one hand, the European leaders were in favour of the VOPP and thus wanted to continue with the peace negotiations. On the other hand, the US administration promoted a lift and strike policy with the threat that the US would do this unilaterally, if necessary. However, in this conversation with Clinton, Major got the impression that Clinton had not completely made up his mind what his position would be. Major also states that Mitterrand began to soften his opposition to the lift and strike policy.106

As a compromise, they agreed to tighten UN economic sanctions against Serbia, in pursuant to the latter’s support to the VOPP. Accordingly UNSCR 820 was adopted on 17 April.107 It contained an article stating that economic sanctions would be imposed against rump Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) nine days after the resolution was passed (i.e. 26 April) if the Bosnian Serbs refused to accept the VOPP. However, there was no substantial reaction from the Bosnian Serbs after the nine days in question. On 28 April, the UNSC adopted resolution 821, and it recommended expelling Yugoslavia from the UN Economic and Social Committee.108

As a result of these sanctions on the part of the UN, the ICFY obtained the UNSC’s formal support in their attempts to urge Milošević to persuade the Bosnian Serbs to accept the VOPP.109 This strategy worked well. On 25 April Milošević decided to support the VOPP and he was urged to persuade Karadžić to accept it.110 The next day Milošević and the other rump Yugoslav presidents sent a letter to the Bosnian Serb Assembly demanding that it accept the VOPP. On 26 April, the Bosnian Serb Assembly voted for the idea that the final position vis-à-vis the VOPP would be decided by the referendum.111 This was scheduled for 15 and 16 May.112 The result of the referendum could easily be predicted. However, the Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić suggested that there could be no

109 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 152-153.
110 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 154.
112 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 154.
formal decision until the referendum. This implied that they might reconsider their position depending on the outcomes of the result of the negotiations with the other warring parties.

By that time the Greek government had agreed to provide ICFY with an opportunity to hold a meeting of the three Bosnian parties in Athens. The three parties accepted a meeting for 1-2 May 1993. This was a critical moment if the VOPP was to be saved. United and sustained international pressure on the Bosnian Serb authority was clearly needed. The EC had been united behind the VOPP since early 1993. The UN and NATO also began to discuss the implementation of the VOPP. American support for the VOPP was eagerly anticipated. However, just before the meeting, the US administration indicated that America’s new policy would be put into action regardless of the outcomes of the Athens meeting. The US Department of State Spokesman, Richard Boucher remarked: ‘[I] won’t prejudge the outcome of the Athens meeting. But the President and the Secretary have made clear that we’ll continue on our course.’

To sum up, the Clinton administration had been actively promoting the so-called ‘lift and strike’ policy in opposition to the VOPP. It did not have any serious intention of accepting European influence on the Bosnian issue either prior to or after the intra-Western interaction. Moreover, the Clinton administration eventually challenged the logic of multilateralism itself. This is clear in Clinton’s speech on 2 April 1993 as well as the State Department Spokesman Boucher’s statements on 30 April. To qualify the political context, chronological evidence indicates that the Clinton administration had formed its opposition to the VOPP as soon as it took over the White House in January 1993. This suggests that the Clinton administration’s policy to defy the VOPP and its multilateralism had been decided before US domestic actors (e.g. Congress, media and public opinions) attempted to define the direction of America’s Bosnian policy. As we have shown, in January

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113 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 154.
114 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 156.
115 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 157.
1993 when Vance and Owen visited New York the Clinton administration reacted negatively to the VOPP without knowing the contents of it. This also implies that the US government’s criticism of the moralistic deficit of the VOPP was substantially prepared after they had decided to oppose the VOPP. Therefore, according to the previously-discussed Risse-Kappen’s criteria (see Chapter 1), there is a reasonable foundation to assume that the Clinton administration’s use of moral values in the form of undermining the credibility of the VOPP was related to its vital interests. Accordingly it can be said that such a manipulation of Western values was a well-calculated policy to prevent European ‘voice opportunities’.

The Clinton administration’s approach to the Bosnian conflict was clearly a departure from that of its predecessor. The Bush administration had decided to accept the principles of the London Conference and did not challenge the idea of multilateralism that was the guiding norm of the ICFY. It only refused to deploy the US troops on the ground. However, the Clinton administration’s approach to the Bosnian conflict transformed America’s perception of its vital interests from minimal opposition to the particular outcomes of multilateralism to the logic of multilateralism itself. This was because the ICFY, the EC and the UN created a situation in which the US could not avoid the outcomes—namely sending US ground troops as a part of the peace implementation mission—so long as it supported the logic of multilateralism that was incarnated in the principles of London Conference and the ICFY framework. Therefore, as a next step the US administration would challenge the political frameworks that sustained the legitimacy of the VOPP, the principles of the London Conference, the framework of the ICFY and the European vision of multilateralism.

The ‘Lift and Strike’ Policy and the Failure of Intra-Western Multilateralism

On 1-2 May 1993 in Athens Vance and Owen held a meeting with the Bosnian and

2005]. Also see: Owen, *Balkan Odyssey*, 157-158.
Yugoslav leaders to get the agreement to implement the VOPP. At the end of the meeting, Vance and Owen got a long awaited signature from the Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić on the provisional map and the interim arrangements. Karadžić signed up to both on 2 May 1993 on condition that they would only be valid if the Bosnian Serb Assembly ratified them. Despite Karadžić's stated condition, the ICFY supporters believed that the Bosnian conflict would soon cease. On 4 May the UN Secretary-General even presented a 'working paper' to the UNSC that considered possible reinforcement of the peacekeeping operation. In this paper he proposed to send 70,000 troops to Bosnia to secure the 'safe areas.' It envisaged NATO as having operational and tactical control with the UNSC holding political and strategic authority. The ICFY Co-Chairmen eagerly awaited American support for the success of the process to obtain the 'final' agreement to the VOPP from the Bosnian Serbs.

Despite this, the US administration's resolve to oppose the VOPP was strong. The Clinton administration in fact had no intention of executing political pressure for the three Bosnian parties to accept the VOPP. It also refused any American contribution to the implementation of the VOPP. On 27 April, Christopher hinted at the American rationale of this position in his congressional testimony. He explained four rules for the use of American military force that are known as the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine. These are as follows: there must be a clear goal; there must also be a high chance of success; a clear exit strategy is required; and American public support is necessary. Owen thought that: 'none of these conditions was likely to be met in the early stages of implementation.' By that time, Owen at last understood the motives behind Christopher's six points from 10 February. In short, America's

117 At the end of this meeting, Cyrus Vance formally stepped down as the UN co-chairman of the ICFY and was replaced by the former Norwegian Foreign Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg.
118 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 158-9.
120 Hurd, Memoirs, 458; Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 158-159.
121 Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished, 84.
122 Interview with David Owen on 16 March 2004.
124 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 155.
125 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 155-156.
advocacy regarding the Bosnian peace was used as a tool to legitimize its lack of interest in supporting the VOPP in both its negotiation aspect and the implementation process.\(^{126}\)

As previously discussed, the Clinton administration legitimized its position by appeal to a moral argument. The US kept its distance from the European approach by criticizing Europeans for not caring about the difference between the ‘victims’ (Bosnian Muslims and Croats) and the ‘aggressor’ (Serbs). Subsequently, on 1 May the Clinton administration formalized the so-called ‘lift and strike’ policy in order to deter the ‘aggression’ on the part of Serbs.\(^{127}\) This was a policy that lifted the UN arms embargo to former Yugoslavia—which UNSCR 713 had imposed on September 1991—in order to support the Bosnian government and the Bosnian Croats. In addition, it advocated aerial attacks against Bosnian Serb forces. In order to promote this policy, Christopher was dispatched to Europe on the day it was formalized.\(^{128}\) According to him, this action was needed not merely because humanitarian values were at stake: ‘[b]ut fundamentally our actions are also based upon the strategic interests of the United States.’\(^{129}\) The vital interests in this context were clearly to prevent the US troops getting involved in the peace implementation missions on the ground.

For the leaders of the EC and the ICFY, the ‘lift and strike’ policy was America’s unilateral move, and they strongly refused to accept it.\(^{130}\) Some authors argue that Christopher’s soft style of negotiation was the reason why he could not persuade European allies.\(^{131}\) However, the opposite was the case. The US administration did not provide any substantial opportunity for its allies to have their views reflected in any of the outcomes of the American policy, not only before it had formalized the

\(^{126}\) Owen, *Balkan Odyssey*, 157-158.


\(^{129}\) Christopher, "US Consultations With Allies On Bosnia-Herzegovina Secretary, Christopher Opening Statement at a News Conference, Washington, DC, May 1, 1993."

\(^{130}\) Interview with Douglas Hurd on 7 April 2004; Interview with David Owen on 16 March 2004.

'lift and strike' policy but also after it had decided the policy. Officially, the US administration claimed that carrying out ‘consultations with its allies’ were precisely the aim of Christopher’s mission to Europe.\(^{132}\) However, the then British Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, has negatively assessed the reality of the ‘consultation’.

He believed Christopher had made up his mind, and, effectively ignored all actual consultation and demanded the UK accept the policy of ‘lift and strike’. In response, Hurd defended the British position. Christopher did not listen but simply repeated his own views and the proposed US policy solution.\(^{133}\) Furthermore, the US administration refused British input prior to the formalization of the ‘lift and strike’ policy. Before Christopher’s mission, the British government had suggested to its US counterparts that it would not be able to support the ‘lift and strike’ policy.\(^{134}\) For instance, John Major had sent a message to Clinton prior to Christopher’s visit stating that air strikes for the service of diplomacy of the ICFY and an enforcement of the no-fly zone should be considered instead.\(^{135}\) Christopher did not even mention the British proposal when he came to promote the ‘lift and strike’ policy.\(^{136}\) However, the Clinton had realized the fact that the European allies were not willing to accept the ‘lift and strike’ policy prior to Christopher’s visit.\(^{137}\) This episode illustrates the reality of the intra-Western cooperation that was directed by the US not by multilateralism. From America’s perspective, ‘consultation’ with its allies meant compelling Europeans to accept US policy.

Christopher received cold reactions from his European counterparts.\(^{138}\) For the European leaders responded as such for the following three reasons. Firstly, they were concerned about the effect of the ‘lift and strike’ policy on the ground. David Owen, as well as John Major and Douglas Hurd

\(^{132}\) Christopher, "US Consultations With Allies On Bosnia-Herzegovina Secretary, Christopher Opening Statement at a News Conference, Washington, DC, May 1, 1993."
\(^{133}\) Interview with Douglas Hurd on 7 April 2004.
\(^{134}\) Hurd, Memoirs, 458-459.
\(^{135}\) Hurd, Memoirs, 458-459.
\(^{136}\) Hurd, Memoirs, 458-459.
\(^{137}\) Clinton, My Life, 512; Hurd, Memoirs, 457-458;
recognized the function of the air strikes in pushing the Bosnian Serbs to sign up to the VOPP.\footnote{139 Interview with Douglas Hurd on 7 April 2004; Interview with David Owen on 16 March 2004.}

However, they opposed the idea of lifting the arms embargo, as this would certainly result in the intensification of fighting on the ground.\footnote{140 Hurd, Memoirs, 457-458.} This in turn would increase the risks to the peace-keeping mission to which the EC member states had contributed the bulk of its personnel. Accordingly, lifting the arms embargo might force the delay of humanitarian aid.\footnote{141 Interview with Douglas Hurd on 7 April 2004; Interview with Robert Hunter on 17 May 2004.} The European message was clear. Douglas Hurd stated that diplomatic pressure for the settlement was the most important aspect of Western cooperation but ‘lift’ was not pressure for peace but a vote for war.\footnote{142 Hurd, Memoirs, 460.} Secondly, they also emphasized that it is indispensable to have America’s military participation on the ground for implementing the VOPP.\footnote{143 Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Commons, "Examination of Witness, Rt Hon Douglas Hurd, 5 May, 1993; The Third Report, The Expanding Role of the United Nations and Its Implications for United Kingdom Policy, Volume II, Minutes of Evidence and Appendices," Parliamentary Papers XXXVI (1992-1993): (HC 235-II), 231.} Lastly, indeed, the European leaders had expected a positive result from the ICFY’s meeting in Athens, and anticipated positive outcomes of the debate at the Bosnian Serb Assembly regarding the acceptance of the VOPP.

The Bosnian Serb Referendum and European Attempts to Save Multilateralism

The expectations among supporters of the ICFY regarding the success of the VOPP were unsustainable. American proposals regarding the ‘lift and strike’ policy, which had not yet been implemented, encouraged the Bosnian Serb Assembly to harden its position. As a result, it refused to endorse the VOPP and instead decided to hold a referendum on 6 May. Milošević was there to persuade representatives to vote in favour of the VOPP.\footnote{144 Silber and Little, The Death of Yugoslavia, 284-285.} In relation to the VOPP negotiations, the ICFY tried to use Milošević as a substitute for American political support. However, he failed to convince the Bosnian Serb Assembly. On 17 May 1993 the referendum turned out to be against the
VOPP. International pressure did not work either. The referendum among the Bosnian Serbs drove a final nail into the expectations that had been raised by the Athens meeting.

This was a clear failure of international diplomacy. Pressure on the Bosnian Serbs did not ensure support for the VOPP. Moreover, the US launched its alternative policy of ‘lift and strike’ when there seemed to exist a possibility for success in gaining consensus for the VOPP. In this respect, not only the contents, but also the timing of the American decision to promote the ‘lift and strike’ policy damaged the unity of international efforts behind the VOPP. The ‘blame game’ for such a failure in international diplomacy began when the US failed to obtain consent for the ‘lift and strike’ policy from its allies.

There were two European attempts to save the ICFY framework in general and the VOPP in particular. One of these was instituted by the French, who proposed to include Bosnian cities under the aegis of UN ‘safe areas.’ However, the US blocked discussion of this issue at the UNSC. The other attempt came from the Russians. Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev, indicated his agreement with Owen and Stoltenberg’s idea of the so-called ‘progressive implementation’ of the VOPP. This idea was to implement the VOPP in Muslim and Croatian areas regardless of whether the warring parties on the ground were to stop fighting or not. Such a plan would require an armed UN force of 25,000, which would likely involve a substantial contribution from NATO.

Owen and Stoltenberg discussed this plan with Tudjman and Izetbegović. The latter two agreed to this on 18 May. The following day the ICFY Chairmen discussed the plan with NATO’s Southern Commander, Admiral Boorda, and NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR), General Shalikashvili. Owen was impressed by the fact that these senior NATO staff had studied the VOPP and prepared military deployment plans in detail. Apart from their caution about the

145 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 178.
146 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 176.
147 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 176; Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will, 248-249.
148 Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will, 248-249.
149 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 177; Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will, 248-249.
difficulty regarding the Bosnian Serb-controlled area, these NATO officials did not oppose the provisional implementation of the VOPP.\textsuperscript{150}

On 19 May, Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev and his Bosnia envoy Churkin went to Rome to discuss this issue with European Foreign Ministers attending a meeting of WEU. According to Owen, the Russians were convinced that European Foreign Ministers would be in favour of the idea.\textsuperscript{151} At the same time, French and British Foreign Ministers were making preparations to re-vitalize the VOPP at the UNSC.\textsuperscript{152} The British Foreign Secretary was also suggesting the possibility of potential sanctions over Croatia regarding the Bosnian Croat forces' offensives in Mostar.\textsuperscript{153} These European reactions encouraged Kozyrev and he decided to refer the ‘provisional implementation’ plan of the VOPP to the UNSC with the aim of authorizing it. This was scheduled for 21 May 1993.\textsuperscript{154}

\textit{The Clinton Administration's Answer to European Multilateralism}

While the Europeans were promoting the VOPP and the UN’s role in Bosnia, the US administration strengthened its resolve to keep its distance from both. It reacted in three ways. Firstly, the US shifted attention away from the Bosnian conflict to the Balkan Peninsula in general. It is widely reported that Bill Clinton changed his mind from promoting a ‘lift and strike’ policy to the ‘containment’ of the Bosnian conflict at the same time Christopher sold the former policy to his European counterparts.\textsuperscript{155} It was reported that Clinton's shift in his approach resulted from his having read Robert Kaplan's book, \textit{Balkan Ghost}.\textsuperscript{156} This book emphasized persistent ethnic antagonism that permeated the history of the Balkan Peninsula. Accordingly, the US administration decided to dispatch a small number of peacekeeping troops to Macedonia in order to prevent the ‘spill-over’ from the

\textsuperscript{150} Owen, \textit{Balkan Odyssey}, 179.
\textsuperscript{151} Owen, \textit{Balkan Odyssey}, 179.
\textsuperscript{152} Hurd, \textit{Memoirs}, 462-463.
\textsuperscript{153} Hansard, 12 May 1993, Vol.224, 792.
\textsuperscript{154} Owen, \textit{Balkan Odyssey}, 177.
Bosnian conflict. However, this was merely a face-saving device on the part of Clinton. Despite the impression inside and outside of the US government that the ‘lift and strike’ policy had been abandoned, the Clinton administration in fact retained it. At the highest level, they continued to promote the ‘lift and strike’ policy to the allies throughout 1993.

Secondly, the US administration rationalized its disengagement from the VOPP negotiations. In his congressional testimony on 18 May Warren Christopher, tried to dissociate the US from responsibility in relation to the Bosnian problem. He said that Bosnia was a ‘problem from hell’. He also underlined, however, that ‘at heart, this is a European problem’. In this way, he justified the policy of trying to contain rather than to settle the Bosnian conflict. This implied that the Clinton administration’s concern regarding human rights was selective and hence politically motivated.

Thirdly, the US attempted to permanently scrap the VOPP. The Clinton administration persuaded the Russian Foreign Minister to launch a joint US-Russian initiative regarding the Bosnian peace process instead of holding a UNSC meeting on the ‘progressive implementation’ of the VOPP. The US requested the UK, France and Spain (the then chair-state of the UNSC) to support this initiative. As a result, they announced the so-called ‘Joint Action Program’ on 22 May. The Joint Action Program re-named the Vance-Owen Peace Plan as the Vance-Owen Peace ‘Process’. Even before the Joint Action Program, the US administration had used the term ‘process’ to refer to the VOPP. This indicated that they did not regard the VOPP as the only possible plan but rather one of a

158 Interview with Charles Redman on 5 February 2004; Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 19-20.
159 Interview with Anthony Lake on 19 May 2004.
161 Drew, On the Edge, 79; Silber and Little, The Death of Yugoslavia, 288.
162 Hurd, Memoirs, 462-463.
number of choices. In other words, keeping the ICFY away from the international policy-making process in relation to the Bosnian conflict was the American aim behind the Joint Action Program. Critically, given America’s morally charged opposition to the VOPP, the Joint Action Program did not even help the ‘victims’ in the form of the Bosnian Muslims. Therefore, on 23 May, immediately after the announcement of the Joint Action Program, Izetbegović rejected it.

In short, the essence of the Joint Action Program was to shelve the VOPP. The European leaders’ unified support collapsed. There were two reactions from the European policy-makers who participated in the launching of the Joint Action Program. On the one hand, Kozyrev only later realized what America’s concealed objective in announcing the Joint Action Program was and regretted what he had signed up to. On the other hand, however, Douglas Hurd was clearly aware of American intentions and the Joint Action Program’s implication regarding the fate of the VOPP. However, the US presented the Joint Action Program as one that transcended the issues of Bosnia. The US demanded its allies consider the transatlantic alliance between the US and Europe. This forced European leaders to ask themselves whether they should choose the Anglo-American alliance or implement multilateralism in the form of the VOPP. Under such circumstances Hurd and the French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé ’had to judge how far we could carry out reasonable disagreements with the Americans on Bosnia without endangering the wider partnership’. This shift in a locus of international policy from the European solidarity in the form of the VOPP to the Atlantic alliance undermined the unity within the EC. For instance, Germany was not invited to participate in the programme. The German Defence Minister, Volker Rühe, strongly condemned the Joint Action

164 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 183.
165 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 183-184.
167 Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will, 253.
168 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 1282-183.
169 Hurd, Memoirs, 462-463.
170 Interview with Douglas Hurd on 7 April 2004.
171 Hurd, Memoirs, 463.
Program as ‘morally catastrophic’.\textsuperscript{172} Indeed, multilateralism could not contain the abuse of America’s power asymmetry vis-à-vis the other Western states. The US did not allow its allies what the Liberal Multilateralists refer to as ‘voice opportunities’.

American actions to undermine the legitimacy of the ICFY’s role in the Bosnian issue went even further than this. The US administration challenged the very basis of intra-Western interaction at that time. The institutional framework and principles of the London Conference of August 1992 gave the ICFY the legitimacy of UN-centred multilateralism. On 18 May the US Ambassador to UN, Madeleine Albright, and the Peter Taromoff, the US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, demanded that the UN Secretary-General relinquish the framework of the London Conference. Boutros-Ghali recalled:

\begin{quote}
Albright proposed that “once and for all” we simply drop the approach set by the London Conference of August 1992. “I hate being involved in arguments over the Vance-Owen map,” she said. Instead, she proposed to move to “a Balkan conference.” Yes, Tarnoff added, we want “a Balkan perspective.” I [Boutros-Ghali] asked what this meant. “All the countries of the Danube,” Albright said. I could make little sense of this […] The London Conference was the agreed international framework for dealing with the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. The United States had fully participated in it; it could not simply drop it. I suggested instead that the London Conference hold a second session [emphasis added].\textsuperscript{173}
\end{quote}

This suggested the next target of American diplomacy regarding the Bosnian conflict. The US would challenge the framework of London Conference and the authority of UN-centred multilateralism.

To sum up, it is logical to consider that the timing of America’s launching of initiatives regarding the Bosnian conflict (such as the formalization of the ‘lift and strike’ policy and the ‘Joint Action Program’) were deliberately aimed at clashing with that of the ICFY’s critical efforts to promote the VOPP. By that time, America was not only opposing the outcome of multilateralism (i.e. deploying the US troops on the ground) but also challenging the very framework that legitimized such

\textsuperscript{172} Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 190.
\textsuperscript{173} Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished, 84.
demands (i.e. the London Conference and the ICFY). Given this context, it is clear that America's ultimate object of proposing the 'lift and strike' policy and launching the 'Joint Action Program' was to undermine the authorities of London Conference and the activities of ICFY—in other words the symbol of the European vision of multilateralism. Therefore, the challenge to multilateralism within the Western Order was intrinsic to America's Bosnia initiatives.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has analysed the interaction between Western states in their promotion of the VOPP. The main theoretical aspect of this process relates to the extent to which the US administration followed a multilateral path. In other words, it evaluates Western states—in particular British—, influence on the American foreign policy-making process. In terms of the 'process' as well as 'outcomes' of intra-Western interaction concerning the VOPP, there were few opportunities for British and European policymakers to have their views reflected in the American policy-making process. The Clinton administration did not support the peace plan promoted by the EC and the UN. From the time the VOPP was proposed up until its collapse in May 1993, the Clinton administration progressively strengthened its resolve to block the plan.

In the 'consultation' process with its allies following the formalization of the 'lift and strike' policy, the US administration repeatedly attempted to impose this policy. They conceded that they would not unilaterally implement a 'lift and strike' policy. Therefore, any European influence at that time was to prevent the US resorting to unilateral action to replace the internationally legitimate institutional framework of the ICFY. This concession was only possible because European states refused to accept the policy as it stood.\(^{174}\) However, European states were not able to change the 'lift and strike' policy itself. Even after the US faced serious opposition from the Europeans, the Clinton

administration did not abandon the potential of the ‘lift and strike’ policy. In fact, Anthony Lake recalled that he did actually promote the ‘lift and strike’ policy again when he visited various European capitals in July 1993.

Indeed, it was the United States government that refused to accept not only a collective policy-making process among the Western states but also the political consequences of multilateralism. The Liberal Multilateralists claim that multilateralism prevents any potential abuse of America’s asymmetric power over other Western states. However, the outcomes of intra-Western interaction in relation to the VOPP demonstrated such a claim is unsustainable. In essence, the US administration supported the multilateralism to the extent it agreed with the outcomes that it generated. This is the form of international cooperation that this research refers to as ‘Quasi-multilateralism.’

Douglas Hurd underscores this point and recalls the nature of intra-Western interaction at that time as follows:

[American leaders] admire and sometimes practise blunt speech, but it is almost always within a framework of accepted thought which they regard as correct.

Like Douglas Hurd himself, British policy-makers have undergone similar experiences in their attempt to influence American foreign policy through the supposedly established framework of multilateralism. The overwhelming irony was that the Clinton administration had constantly praised the idea of ‘multilateralism’. It can be concluded that there was no substantial British and European influence on the outcomes of American policy from January to May 1993 regarding the Bosnian conflict.

This American challenge to the European vision of multilateralism was accompanied by the transformation of its vital interests and the means to achieve them. The initial US position accepted the logic of multilateralism (i.e. the London Conference and the ICFY) but opposed its outcomes, as they did not accord with America’s vital interests (i.e. not sending America’s troops). However, the Clinton administration believed that in order to oppose the outcomes they also needed to re-define the form of

176 Interview with Anthony Lake on 19 May 2004.
177 Hurd, Memoirs, 463.
international cooperation in accordance with their preferences. Their *vital interests* were now not only preventing America's military involvement in Bosnia but also replacing the normative regulation of the West from multilateralism to Quasi-multilateralism. Quasi-multilateralism would allow the US to command international leadership without producing outcomes that imposed a heavy burden upon her. For legitimizing this transformation, the US advocated an alternative approach to Western values. In opposition to European *procedural* interpretation of Western value—multilateralism—the US advocated the *ideological* interpretation of Western value in the form of protecting the interests of the 'victims' of the conflict (i.e. the Bosnian government). Chapter 4 will demonstrate America's further manipulation of moral values. It will also suggest the ramifications of such a policy to the Bosnian conflict and to the re-formation of the Western Order.
Chapter 4 Legitimizing Quasi-Multilateralism in the Name of Promoting ‘Democratic Peace’, from June to September 1993

This chapter provides an empirical foundation for one of the main claims of this thesis. The claim is that the US will only give substance to the procedural value of the West (i.e. respecting the outcomes of multilateralism), if they are in accord with America’s geo-strategic and vital interests which the US has already decided before any Western multilateral interaction. When the consequences of multilateralism differ from the preferences of the US, the latter typically takes the following two steps. Firstly, the US refuses to follow the consequences of multilateralism and insists on the adoption of an alternative US-promoted policy. Secondly, the US attempts to distort a value of Western interaction, namely multilateralism. The first case has already been discussed in Chapter 3 with regard to the relationship between the VOPP and the ‘Joint Action Program’ as well as the ‘lift and strike’ policy. This chapter focuses on the second case.

From June to September 1993, instead of following the outcomes of multilateralism, the US attempted to alter the orthodox interpretation of Western value in order to justify its vital interests. A part of the working hypothesis of this research will be evaluated in relation to this case, namely that there is a link between the West European states’ loss of influence on America’s foreign policy-making process and the US administration’s manipulation of the definition of Western values in accord with its quasi-multilateral vision of international cooperation. This chapter will argue that America’s advocacy of an ideological interpretation of Western values, based on the idea of ‘democratic peace’, was a means to promote America’s vital interests, opposed to following the outcomes of the procedural normative value of multilateralism and its concept of ‘sovereign peace’. In the context of the Bosnian conflict, America’s vital interests were to maintain NATO’s de facto independence from the UN regarding the use of coercive power (i.e. keeping its collective self-defence identity) and to enable the US to desist from sending ground troops to Bosnia. The outcomes of multilateralism were America’s endorsement and support of the ICFY-promoted peace plans.
The first section of this chapter will look at the transatlantic debate on NATO air strikes during the summer of 1993. The study of this period will point out the implications of the European approach to the Bosnian conflict in respect of America’s vital interests. There was mounting pressure on NATO to abandon its *de facto* independence from the UN as regards its collective security operations outside of NATO’s jurisdiction (i.e. ‘out-of area’ peacekeeping missions). This was a critical issue because accepting the substantial authority of the UN over the NATO decision-making process has the potential to transform the identity of NATO from that of collective self-defence to forming a subordinate part of UN collective security mechanisms; meaning NATO would have to abide by UN Security Council decisions. Although such a transformation is in accord with the Liberal Multilateralists’ interpretation of the nature of NATO and the Western Order, the Clinton administration did not want to endorse it. The analyses of America and of NATO reaction to this transatlantic debate are thus essential to evaluate the coherence of the Liberal Multilateralists’ arguments on NATO’s hybrid characteristics.

The second section will follow the developments of the above-discussed tension and will discuss the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan of August 1993 and its failure to obtain America’s support. It will also elucidate the fact that America’s opposition to the ICFY’s initiatives was not based on the contents of the peace plans (i.e. *ideological moral values*) but on the implications of them for America’s *interests*, that is, in the way the UN might gain any authority over NATO’s use of coercive power. The key claim in this section is that America’s vital interests were not only to send ground troops to Bosnia but to be able to maintain NATO’s *de facto* independence from the UN.

The third and the fourth sections will analyse the relationship between the political context of Western debates on the Bosnian conflict and the contents of a series of high-ranking US policymakers’ speeches in September 1993. It will provide evidence for the previously-discussed claim that America’s attempt to re-define the moral missions of the West was simply *a means* to justify one of its vital interests, namely maintaining NATO’s collective self-defence identity.
The Western Debate on NATO Air Strikes in August 1993 and the Role of Multilateralism

The Bosnian Serb forces again surrounded the Bosnian capital Sarajevo in early June 1993. The situation called for international action. The Clinton administration had demanded its European allies accept the need for coercive power in the Western approach to Bosnia. This demand reflected the fact that the failure of the VOPP and the 'Joint Action Program' had gradually transformed the political landscape of the Bosnian peace process. America intensified its political pressure on its allies to accept the 'lift and strike' policy. America's demand was partly manifested in the form of UNSCR 836 of 4 June 1993. This UN resolution authorized UNPROFOR to implement 'safe-areas' under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the aim of which was to provide a safer environment for residents and refugees of the areas. It demanded the UN member states provide multilateral forces to protect 'safe areas'.

Following the adoption of UNSCR 836, on 10-11 June NATO held a meeting of its decision making body, the North Atlantic Council (NAC). France suggested it would only accept NATO's air strikes provided there was clear permission from the UNSC. This condition stipulated the so-called 'dual key' of air strike action; a requirement for both NATO and the UN to give permission. In effect, NATO's operation was placed under the authority of the UN. It was a difficult condition for the US administration to accept. As a compromise, the NATO ministerial communiqué suggested the possibility of air strikes in the following way:

[NATO will] offer our protective airpower in case of attack against UNPROFOR in the performance of its overall mandate, if it so requests.

NATO promised to protect the UNPROFOR missions but it was not a full commitment to give

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substance to ‘safe-areas’. This meant that NATO imposed a self-restriction on the interpretation of UNSCR 836. This point implied, however, that NATO’s cooperation with the UN in the Bosnian peace process became a serious political issue among Western states. A peace plan has two phases: its promotion, and its implementation. The VOPP was promoted by the EC-UN and was supposed to be implemented by NATO under the authority of the UN. It was a peace process based on negotiation. In contrast, the American preference was the use of coercive power in the service of diplomacy. For this purpose, the US attempted to maintain NATO’s *de facto* independence from the UN regarding potential implementation of enforcement measures.

*The EC Summit of June 1993: a New Attempt to Promote European Multilateralism*

In the meantime, the American drive to a policy of lifting the arms embargo in effect divided the EC members. The German government officially decided to accept the ‘lift and strike’ policy. American diplomacy towards Germany had intensified since the ‘Joint Action Program’. On the one hand it offered a ‘carrot’ to Germany. A few days after Kohl condemned the ‘Joint Action Program’, Clinton announced he would support Germany’s bid to become a permanent member of the UNSC together with Japan. On the other hand, however, there was a stick. Christopher had publicly criticized the German position towards the ‘Joint Action Program’. In an interview to *USA Today*, Christopher even suggested that the German policies at the end of 1991 that effectively promoted the EC’s decision to recognize the statehood of Croatia in January 1992 was one of the origins of the Bosnian conflict. The next day the German Chancellor dismissed such accusations and asked for the State Department’s clarification of Christopher’s comments.

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10 Neuman, J. "Christopher Raps German Role on Bosnia,” *USA Today*, 17 June 1993, A1.
This US-German tension worked to America's favour. Germany changed its initial position and now begun to support the 'lift and strike' policy. On 21 and 22 June 1993 the EC held its regular summit in Copenhagen and on that occasion Helmut Kohl proposed to lift the arms embargo to Bosnia and asked other member states of the EC to support the possibility of air strikes. Kohl demanded that EC members accept the 'lift and strike' policy in response to the Clinton administration. Mitterrand categorically refused to accept Clinton's idea via Kohl. Instead, he argued that the EC must put priority on strengthening UN peacekeeping operations rather than lifting the arms embargo. As a result, the EC summit's conclusion stated its support for the enforcement of the UN safe areas in Bosnia but not for the 'lift and strike' policy. Mitterrand was determined to defend the EC's support for peace negotiations in opposition to the 'lift and strike' policy. After the Summit, Mitterrand sent 1,300 additional French troops to reinforce UNPROFOR. Although it was not adopted, the German support for the 'lift and strike' policy and their emphasis on the Bosnian Muslims' interests created the first visible division between the EC members since the London Conference of August 1992.

Instead of supporting the 'lift and strike' policy, European leaders decided to back the revitalization the ICFY's peace negotiations. Owen suggested that the next peace plan would be based on the 'three-part confideration.' According to him, the Dutch Foreign Minister was not satisfied with the new peace plan as the EC Foreign Ministers had expressed their official support to the VOPP only

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12 In the meantime, Christopher nominated Richard Holbrooke as the next US Ambassador to Germany. In 1992 Holbrooke was a key foreign policy adviser to the then Presidential Candidate, Governor Clinton and recommended that Clinton adopt the so-called 'lift and strike' policy. Less than one year after the nomination of the German ambassador post, Holbrooke was appointed as the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs in order to revitalize US policies regarding Bosnia and NATO. The former US Bosnia Envoy (from the summer 1993 to the spring 1994), Charles Redman, took over the position of the US Ambassador to Germany. It provided a context for America's attention to Germany regarding the Bosnian conflict. Holbrooke, Richard. To End a War. New York: Random House, 1998. 40-43, 50-53, 55-56; Christopher, Warren. Chances of a Lifetime. New York: Scribner, 2001. 256.

13 Riding, "Kohl Urges Arming of Bosnian Muslims."


ten days earlier. As a result, the EC Summit’s conclusion avoided mention of the VOPP, as well as the new peace plan, but expressed its support for the new negotiations in the following way:

The European Council expresses its full confidence in the co-chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and encourages them to pursue their efforts to promote a fair and viable settlement acceptable to all three constituent peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The EC leaders supported ICFY’s new peace initiatives provided that they were not organized ‘at the expense of the Bosnian Muslims’ and reaffirmed their support to the principles of the London Conference of August 1992. The EC Foreign Ministers also agreed to facilitate negotiations for the new peace plan and decided that the EC Troika would discuss the plan with Izetbegović. Following the EC Summit, the ICFY Co-Chairmen facilitated the negotiation among the warring parties, who reached agreement on 30 July 1993 regarding the new provisional draft of the peace plan. From then on the new Peace Plan was discussed as the basis of this draft.

The Transatlantic Debate in the Summer of 1993: Was NATO Becoming More Multilateral?

Just a few days after the EC summit of June 1993, Clinton’s National Security Adviser, Anthony Lake, and Bosnian Envoy, Reginald Bartholomew, flew to Europe. They demanded British and French officials accept the ‘lift and strike’ policy, particularly aerial strikes in the service of diplomacy. In order to obtain their consent, Lake emphasized that NATO and the transatlantic alliance were at stake in this policy. British policy-makers agreed at least to the use of aerial strikes, but their

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19 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 206-207.
20 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 218-219. The constitutional plan can be found in: Owen, Balkan Odyssey, CD-Rom No.119.
22 Interview with Anthony Lake on 19 May 2004. Also see, Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 19-21.
French counterparts had reservations. As previously discussed, France demanded the UNSC’s authorization for such action. Despite this apprehension on the part of its Western allies, on 29 June 1993 the US supported a motion to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia at the UNSC. As predicted, it failed to obtain support from other Security Council members. As a result of this, the US facilitated the modification of its policy by focusing on launching air strikes.

In early July 1993, Clinton asked Lake and other policy-makers to look at the possibility of American military engagement, including sending troops. By late July 1993, the US was emphasising necessity of air strikes for protecting safe areas rather than sending US ground troops. The specific aim of the policy at that time was to remove Bosnian Serbs forces from Mount Igman near Sarajevo. However, a majority of European policy-makers as well as UNPROFOR commanders in Bosnia did not request air strikes at that time. The European objection to the policy was not surprising. The EC encouraged the ICFY’s promotion of the new peace plan. In August 1993, the ICFY intensified its negotiations with Bosnian warring parties and discussed delicate issues such as territorial divisions in regard to the new peace plan.

At the same time NATO held a NAC meeting in Brussels (on 2 August). The subject of the meeting was the issue over authorization of NATO air strikes. This was due to America’s strong pressure on the European states. For instance, a few days before the NAC meeting, the State Department Spokesman Mike McCurry had suggested that if NATO member states did not support the US position, it would take a unilateral decision. Although Clinton watered down McCurry’s rhetoric,

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27 Drew, On the Edge, 273-278; Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 19-21.
28 However it still did not exclude the option of lifting the arms embargo as well. Interview with Anthony Lake on 19 May 2004; Interview with Robert Hunter on 17 May 2004.
29 Drew, On the Edge, 273-278; Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 19-21.
30 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 222.
31 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 218-219.
32 Marcus, Ruth and Rick Atkinson. "NATO Envoys Agree to Back U.S. Air Strike Plan in Bosnia," The
he did not dismiss the essence of McCurry’s position. Faced with such a critical threat to the raison d’être of the transatlantic alliance, the European member states within NATO reluctantly agreed with the American plan of using an aerial strike in order to protect the UNPROFOR missions on the ground. On 2 August 1993, NATO decided to authorize air strikes at the end of its NAC meeting.

Immediately after this, David Owen denounced the timing of NATO’s decision, as it would undermine the credibility and the prospect of the ICFY-led peace negotiation at Geneva. European policy-makers had woken up to the fact that NATO’s decision would not help the ICFY’s activities. Indeed, following NATO’s decision, the Bosnian government begun to demand more territorial gains and were less willing to negotiate, whereas the Bosnian Serb leadership were increasingly sceptical about the motives of Western involvement. However, American pressure was hard to throw off. As a result, the NAC meeting deepened divisions within the EC. On the one hand, Britain and France were concerned with the potential implications of air strikes for the ICFY’s diplomatic activities and the safety of their peacekeeping troops on the ground. On the other hand, the German foreign ministry and EC Commissioner for external affairs Hans Van den Broek of Holland raised questions about the nature of the Geneva negotiations. They were concerned that the Geneva talks would force the Bosnian government to accept an unfair and unjust settlement.

Against this backdrop, Britain, France and UNPROFOR troop-contributing states, (such as

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37 Interview with Douglas Hurd on 7 April 2004.
40 Interview with David Owen on 16 March 2004; Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 225-228.
Canada) were united to prevent NATO air strikes.\textsuperscript{41} For them, promoting peace negotiations and not enforcing the air strike were synonymous.\textsuperscript{42} Promoting peace negotiations was the critical condition that they could use to prevent air strikes, without increasing the risks for their troops on the ground. They employed two instruments to prevent NATO air strikes. One was criticizing the practical consequences of the air strike as European policy-makers had done before, and the other was questioning the air strikes' legality.

With regard to legality, ICFY supporters, especially France and UK, and the UN Secretary-General, Boutros-Ghali, emphasized that according to Chapter VII of the UN Charter the UNSC should play a pivotal role in any military action.\textsuperscript{43} This interpretation was provided in opposition to the American view. US Vice President Al Gore told Boutros-Ghali that NATO would not seek any permission from the UN when it begun the aerial attack on 2 August.\textsuperscript{44} Legally speaking, the ICFY supporters’ position was a logical interpretation. By 6 August the Clinton administration had agreed that the authority to permit aerial strikes belonged to the UN Security Council.\textsuperscript{45} As a result, NATO held another NAC meeting to clarify the operational details of the air strike on 9 August 1993. The UK and France succeeded in inserting UN authority into the procedure for NATO’s potential air strike as follows:

[The NAC] agrees with the position of the UN Secretary-General that the first use of air power in the theatre shall be authorized by him.\textsuperscript{46}

As previously discussed, the NAC had already agreed in June 1993 that the air strike would

\textsuperscript{41} Socolovsky, "NATO Allies Back U.S. Call for Air Strikes in Bosnia, But May Not Act."

\textsuperscript{42} The ICFY Co-Chairman David Owen was not always in favour of this opinion. He supported, on a case-by-case basis, the air strikes in the service of the ICFY negotiation. The UK administration basically distinguished peace negotiations from air strikes and preferred the former to the latter. Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 13-20, 108-110; Interview with David Owen on 16 March 2004; Interview With Robert Hunter on 17 May 2004.


\textsuperscript{44} Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished, 88-89.

\textsuperscript{45} Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished, 91.

\textsuperscript{46} NATO, "Decisions Taken at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 9th August 1993," NATO Press Releases: (93) 52.
be carried out in order to protect UNPROFOR missions, not to protect the ‘safe-areas’ itself.\textsuperscript{17} This meant in practice that, as long as the UNPROFOR commanders did not ask the UN Secretary General to assist their operation with air strikes, it would not be implemented. That was the legal hurdle for NATO to launch air strikes. The US administration intensified its political pressure on UN commanders in Bosnia in general and the UN Secretary-General in particular.\textsuperscript{48} Since the middle of August, the US Ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright, began a public campaign to criticize UNPROFOR officers’ negative comments on air strikes.\textsuperscript{49} At that time, UNPROFOR commanders were reluctant to utilize air strikes in order to put pressure upon Bosnian Serb forces to remove most of its troops from the mountains around Sarajevo as they threatened the safety of its troops on the ground. However, Albright’s blunt criticism forced the UN officials to accept the necessity of air strikes with regards to the situation on the ground.\textsuperscript{50}

Concerning the British and the French resolve against the air strike, US ambassador to NATO, Robert Hunter, warned that if NATO failed to endorse it,

\begin{quote}
NATO’s future is on the line...This is deadly serious business, not only for Sarajevo, but for the future of the alliance.\textsuperscript{51}
\end{quote}

The US administration again linked this issue with the future of the Western alliance and the existence of NATO. As previously discussed (see Chapter 2), European policy-makers, (except some traditional French Gaullists), did not have the will to sacrifice NATO and the transatlantic alliance (i.e. collective self-defence) as a result of the Bosnian issue (in other words, a collective security agenda). There was a consensus among member states of NATO that it (NATO) played a pivotal role in European security. Thus America’s challenge to the existence of NATO was a critical threat for its European allies to

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\textsuperscript{48} Boutros-Ghali, \textit{Unvanquished}, 91.


'carry out reasonable disagreement' with the US regarding the Bosnian conflict.\textsuperscript{52}

As we have discussed, European policy-makers defended their position by securing a second NAC resolution that included the UN Secretary General's consent as a condition for commencing NATO air strikes. In addition, they attempted to prevent the implementation of NATO air strikes. The ICFY supporters, in particular the British government, warned the US that they would pull out UNPROFOR troops from Bosnia if NATO commenced the air strike.\textsuperscript{53} This logic put the Clinton administration's assertion regarding the necessity of air strikes on hold.\textsuperscript{54} Under this scenario, the US would most likely have had to send its own troops to take over the UN's operation. In effect it would have implied that the US forces participate in the war against the Bosnian Serbs on behalf of the Bosnian government.\textsuperscript{55} Thus, it could have forced the US to stake its national interests on the future of Bosnia. Both the Bush senior and Clinton administrations had dismissed such an intimate relationship prior to intra-Western interactions on the Bosnian issue.\textsuperscript{56} Not sending ground troops to Bosnia was a general consensus among the US policy-makers. Gradually, the Clinton administration softened its attitude towards the urgency of the air strikes.\textsuperscript{57} As a result, the only credible international approach to the Bosnian conflict at this time was the ICFY's peace negotiations.

It is important to note, however, that the US retreat was based on its reluctance to take responsibility for the consequences of the 'lift and strike' policy. America's determination to use NATO air power was not diminished in any way. It was not European influence as such but rather American interests (i.e. not to get militarily involved on the ground) that suspended the implementation of NATO air strikes. This means that, therefore, it was not the outcomes of multilateralism but rather American interests that defined the US action. This is the nature of the Western Order that Liberal Multilateralists

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\textsuperscript{52} Hurd, \textit{Memoirs}, 463.
\textsuperscript{53} Interview with Douglas Hurd on 7 April; Interview with Robert Hunter on 17 May 2004.
\textsuperscript{54} Interview with Robert Hunter on 17 May 2004; Interview with Charles Redman (the US Special Envoy to Bosnia, 1993-1994) on 5 February 2004.
\textsuperscript{55} Hurd, \textit{Memoirs}, 459-460; Owen, \textit{Balkan Odyssey}, 311-312.
\textsuperscript{56} Interview with Thomas Niles on 21 May 2004; Interview with Robert Hunter on 17 May 2004.
have failed to understand.

To sum up the transatlantic debate on the issue of NATO air strikes in August 1993, it is clear that the US policy-makers emphasized their determination to impose air strikes regardless of its allies' opinions by threatening the very existence of NATO. This forced European policy-makers to concede to America's position. However, European policy-makers were, able to prevent the implementation of the NAC's decision regarding air strikes on 2 August 1993. This resulted in NATO's second resolution on 9 August 1993 that inserted the UN Secretary General's consent as a condition to implement air strikes. The logic of multilateralism in the form of UN authority over NATO air strikes was used to prevent American policy this time around. However, the Clinton administration was not able to override the Europeans not because of the power of multilateralism but rather due to the strategic implications of air strikes that would have undermined the American desire to keep its ground troops away from Bosnia. To elucidate this point, if the US promoted air strikes regardless of its allies' objections it would have to take over UNPROFOR's role on the ground. If the US supported the European peace initiatives it would need to follow the consequences of the ICFY negotiations. Again this would demand that the US or NATO provide troops on the ground. The US thus faced a dilemma over the implementation of air strikes. As a result, the US administration on the one hand criticized the activities of UNPROFOR on the ground but on the other hand, the US softened the pressure on its European allies to support NATO air strikes.

The Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan and America's Ambigious Support for the Bosnian Government

Since the failure of the VOPP, leaders of former Yugoslavia initiated another move to re-frame the Bosnian peace process while Western leaders were trying to consolidate their new approach. By June 1993, Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević and Croatian president Franjo Tudjman agreed to

promote the so-called 'Union of Three Republics' of Bosnia. This plan envisaged that Bosnia would consist of three ethnically defined territories, namely: a Bosnian Serb area; a Bosnian Croat area; and Muslim territory.

This proposal pushed the Bosnian peace process into a new phase. In terms of territorial distribution, the plan clearly retreated from the principles of the London Conference of August 1992. The 'Union of Three Republics' was at odds with the principles of the London Conference which refused to recognize territorial gains by any military means and to accept an ethnic-based state formation in Bosnia. Germany and the Netherlands were critical of this departure from the principles of the London Conference. Nevertheless, the ICFY Co-Chairmen attempted to formalize this peace plan as they had obtained 'full confidence' in their personal competence from EC member states. The practical rationale for promoting the new peace plan was to settle the conflict through negotiation.

The 'Union of Three Republics' was clearly in breach of the principles of the London Conference. However, the institutional framework of the London Conference—namely the ICFY as well as the EC and the UN's commanding position in relation to the direction of the international mediation—was still intact.

The ICFY Co-Chairmen, Owen and Stoltenberg, spent the summer of 1993 in mediation between the three warring parties of Bosnia on the matter of the 'Union of Three Republics', also known as the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan. The Bosnian government was reluctant, as they believed the plan would undermine the sovereignty of Bosnia. However, because of the absence of any

59 Interview with David Owen on 16 March 2004; Interview with Douglas Hurd on 7 April 2004. See also: Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 223-224, 227-230, 239.
60 Interview with David Owen on 16 March 2004; Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 224-225, 227-230, 239.
alternative peace plan in the offer, the Bosnian government decided to take part in the negotiation of it. As a result, on 30 July 1993 the three warring parties of Bosnia reached an agreement on the constitutional arrangement.

Despite the row over NATO’s aerial strikes, the ICFY, the Bosnian warring parties, Milošević and Tudjman carried on to discussion of the map. As a result of the negotiations, on 20 August, Owen and Stoltenberg tabled a formal version of the ‘Union of Three Republics’ plan to the Geneva negotiations. Although it emphasised that the principles of the London Conference should be respected, EC member states reaffirmed their support to the ICFY negotiations and the implementation of the peace plan. As we will discuss later, from the NATO and American perspective, the success of the ICFY’s peace negotiation would increase pressure for them to provide substantial troops for implementation of the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan. In other words, the prospect of the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan would roll back America’s hitherto attempt to maintain NATO’s de facto independence from the UN in the form of promoting the ‘lift and strike’ policy.

By September the Bosnian parties signed an agreement for the cessation of hostilities. To formalize the provisional agreement of the peace plan, on 20 September the Co-Chairmen convened a meeting of the three warring parties of Bosnia on board the British Air carrier HMS Invincible in the Adriatic. The three Bosnian leaders, Milošević, Tudjman, Momir Bulatović (President of Montenegro), and the ICFY Co-Chairmen attended the meeting. In addition, the US Bosnia Envoy observed the discussion. David Owen recalled that this was another critical moment for settling the Bosnian

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63 For details of the negotiation see: Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 204-223.
65 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 218-219. The constitutional plan can be found in: Owen, Balkan Odyssey, CD-Rom No.119.
66 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 204-223.
69 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 232-233.
70 Interview with Charles Redman on 5 February 2004.
conflict. All participants except Bosnian government leader, Alija Izetbegović, agreed to formalize and implement the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan. Izetbegović, however, reserved his signature because he wanted to obtain consent from the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina (nominally it consisted of all three ethnic areas) and the Bosniac Assembly (consisting of Bosnian Muslims). Both Assemblies’ meetings were set for 27 September. There was a modest expectation for the success of the Peace Plan among those attending the HMS Invincible negotiations (including America’s then Bosnia Envoy, Charles Redman).

While Izetbegović was expected to secure the support of the Bosniac Assembly, the ICFY Co-Chairmen elaborated on a detailed implementation plan at NATO headquarters. Uniformed officers at NATO had been studying potential implementation plans since August 1993. It seemed that the issue at stake was the number of implementation forces. However, on 22 September the NATO Secretary-General turned down Owen and Stoltenberg’s request for NATO to contribute to the implementation of the Peace Plan on the basis that it lacked clear military goals. Furthermore, on 21 September, Izetbegović remarked that he was ‘not inclined to accept’ the peace plan. In the meeting of the Bosniac Assembly on 27 September, Izetbegovic took a ‘neutral’ position on the Plan.

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71 Interview with David Owen on 16 March 2004.
77 NATO Southern European Commander, Admiral Jeremy M. Boorda, estimated that NATO needs to send around 20,000 troops if Bosnian parties agreed to implement the Stoltenberg-Owen Peace Plan. Lancaster and Williams, "NATO Plans Deployment in Bosnia; U.S. Could Dispatch Thousands of Troops to Maintain Peace."
However, the majority of the Assembly followed his initial remarks and effectively tuned down the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan which then collapsed as a result. The key obstacle to the acceptance of the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan was the reluctance on the part of the Bosnian government and of the US administration.

American Policy: 'Neutral' Regarding the Bosnian Peace Negotiations

The ICFY was not able to convince the Bosnian government of the necessity and merits of the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan. The Bosnian government was unwilling to give up the territorial integrity of Bosnia. The ICFY did not have a well-constructed relationship with the US administration either. Yet America’s support was the critical element that the ICFY Co-Chairmen needed for the success of the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan. According to David Owen: ‘we were going to need the United States to pressurize Izetbegović to accept the map’ of the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan in the last stage of the negotiation. 81 However, the US did not provide the eagerly-awaited support for the ICFY.

Regardless of its European allies’ expectations, the Clinton administration insisted that the formalization of the peace plan should be accompanied by the willing consent of the Bosnian government. 82 Hence, it was ‘neutral’ to the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan. 83 Despite the official stance, it was not literally ‘neutral’ to the conflict, as the US administration insisted on enforcing the ‘lift and strike’ policy to support the Bosnian government. 84 This ‘neutrality’ was however not simply rhetoric to promote the interest of the Bosnian government in the form of American military support, but was used a means to protect the US intention not to deploy ground troops. Clinton suggested that the US would not do so for fear of the UN’s command and control authority over the US or NATO missions. 85

81 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 213.
82 Interview with Charles Redman on 5 February 2004; Interview with Anthony Lake on 19 May 2004.
83 Interview with Charles Redman on 5 February 2004; Interview with David Owen on 16 March 2004.
84 Interview with Robert Hunter on 17 May 2004; Interview with Anthony Lake on 19 May 2004.
85 Clinton, Bill. "Remarks and Exchanges with Reporters Prior to Discussions with President Alija
As a result, the US administration and the Bosnian government shared concerns vis-à-vis the necessity of air strike and the prospects of the ICFY’s peace negotiation. They hinted at this shared concern in the period from the agreement on the provisional draft of the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan in August, to the HMS Invincible meeting of September 1993. Regarding the air strike, the US and the Bosnian government were closer to each other than to EC member states. On the same day as Albright’s aforementioned critical remark regarding UNPROFOR (17 August), Bosnian Vice President Ejup Ganić supported her opinion by condemning UNPROFOR’s lack of concern about the situation in Sarajevo. Ganić pointed out that each country providing troops was more concerned about its national interests than the situation on the ground, and this, in effect, worked in favour of Serbian aggression.86

The other case was that concerning the nature and implementation of the peace plan. When the ICFY Co-Chairmen asked the Bosnian parties to state their final position by 31 August, on 22 August, Izetbegović recommended that the Bosnian Assembly reject the plan.87 At that time, Izetbegović was fighting a war for the self-determination and territorial integrity of Bosnia not only against Bosnian Serb forces but also in the face of Bosnian Croat forces. In fact, he requested that the US President endorse NATO air strikes against the Bosnian Serb forces and urged the UNSC to lift the arms embargo in order to deter the Bosnian Croat forces’ offensives.88

Izetbegović, in effect, demanded that the US clarify whether it was denouncing Croatian offensives as well as those by the Serbs in Bosnia or simply blaming Serbia and Bosnian Serb forces for the atrocities. Denouncing Bosnian Croat forces as well as Bosnian Serb forces would directly place the US administration in accordance with its ideological interpretation of Western value (i.e. to support the territorial integrity of Bosnia under the Izetbegović government as a foundation for a ‘just’ peace).

88 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 228.
88 Izetbegović, Inescapable Questions, 159-163.
However, denouncing the Bosnian Serbs alone would effectively place the Bosnian Croats in the position of 'victims' of Serbian 'aggression'. This latter option would allow the US administration not to give substance to its rhetorical advocacy to protect the Bosnian government by balancing America's commitment to both the Bosnian government and the Bosnian Croats. Effectively, this policy would protect one of America's *vital interests*; of keeping the US away from any military confrontation on the ground, yet without seriously undermining America's profile as a promoter of its self-designated moral role as protector of the 'victims' of the conflict. 89

Against the above-discussed background, Izetbegović flew to Washington to meet Clinton. In their meeting on 8 September, he asked Clinton to support the Bosnian government by launching air strikes and lifting the arms embargo. 90 Clinton refused to fulfil Izetbegović's requests. 91 However, before the meeting he hinted at American political support to the Bosnian government in the following way:

> I've been willing to do that [guarantee an American military contribution] since February [1993]. But in order to do it, we have to have a fair peace that is willingly entered into by the parties. It has to be able to be enforced or if you will, be guaranteed by a peacekeeping force from NATO, not the United Nations but NATO. And of course, for me to do it, the Congress would have to agree [emphasis added]. 92

Indeed, the instructions for the US Bosnian Envoy who attended the HMV Invincible meeting were that he should simply observe the negotiations and not impose any peace plan on the Bosnian government. 93 He acted accordingly. America's 'solution' to the above-discussed tension between

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89 In retrospect, it can be argued that this was 'preference' rather than 'vital interests'. However, until July 1995, the US administration was unable to decide whether it is necessary to deploy its troops in Bosnia in order to protect another vital interest; NATO's *de facto* independence from the UN. In other words, by the summer 1995 the US administration was not considering a hierarchical relationship between the two vital interests (i.e. not deploying ground troops on the ground and maintaining NATO's *de facto* independence). They rather considered that both interests were equally vital and compatible (see, Chapter 6 of this thesis in detail).

90 Interview with Charles Redman on 5 February 2004.

91 Interview with Charles Redman on 5 February 2004.


93 Interview with Charles Redman on 5 February 2004.
moral values and strategic interests was 'neutral' to the conflict. This not only marked a retreat from its initial moral commitment to protect the interests of the Bosnian government, but it also compromised the success of the ICFY peace negotiations. David Owen criticizes the US position because this 'neutrality' encouraged Izetbegović to demand more territorial gains, and eventually undermined the credibility of the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan. In fact, the US administration did not provide any substantial alternative and that effectively prolonged the conflict in Bosnia.

The US administration legitimized its 'neutrality' by setting increasingly tough conditions to support the ICFY. A week before Clinton's remarks as above-quoted (8 September), he had put forth a similar set of conditions. At that time he did not spell out the need for congressional consent. In fact, there was no imminent congressional move against the Bosnian peace plan at that time. This was because the majority of the congressional legislators were opposed to the ICFY promoted peace plan(s). Since late 1992 they had advocated lifting the arms embargo. Despite this fact, on 23 September, Clinton administration officials consulted with members of the US Congress in relation to the Bosnian policy. In the meeting, the members of Congress sensed that Clinton administration officials did not insist on the necessity of American participation in the implementation of the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan. Moreover, on 22 September the NATO Secretary-General had already rejected the idea of contributing to the implementation of the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan. It would be plausible to consider that the Clinton administration (and NATO) had formed its position prior to interaction with members of US Congress. Indeed, Madeleine Albright's remark on 23 September was clearly sympathetic to congressional concerns:

Young men and women should not be sent in harm's way without clear mission,

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94 Interview with David Owen on 16 March 2004.
95 Marcus, R. "Clinton Stresses Hill Support is Needed for U.S. Peace Keepers to Go to Bosnia," The Washington Post, 3 September 1993, A32.
96 Interview with Robert Hand on 19 May 2004.
97 Drew, On the Edge, 282.
99 Tett, "Woner cautious on Bosnia deployment."
commanders, sensible rules of engagement and the means to get the job done.  

To sum up, it is clear that America's application of its ideological interpretation of Western value in the form of protecting the interests of the Bosnian government was as opportunistic as its approach to the procedural value (i.e. multilateralism). The Clinton administration's policy of 'neutrality' towards the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan was not only indifferent to the success of the ICFY-led negotiations but also to America's initial commitment to protect the interests of the Bosnian government. It is essential to consider why the Clinton administration did not give substance either to both interpretations of Western values (i.e. multilateralism in the form of supporting the ICFY and ideological moral value in the form of protecting the Bosnian government) of the West.

According to Risse-Kappen and the Liberal Multilateralists' interpretation (see Chapter 1), America's failure to follow the outcomes of multilateralism or other moral values of the West was a result of one of the following factors: America's allies' ignoring the moral issues regarding the contents of their policy (i.e. it's allies' tendency to promote 'unjust' policies, such as imperialism or support to anti-democratic regimes); America's domestic opposition to follow it's allies' policies; and America's vital interests being at stake in regard to its allies' proposed policies.

The ICFY's clear departure from the principles of the London Conference (i.e. not dividing Bosnia in accordance with its ethnic distribution) can be argued to be an instance of such a violation of Western values. However, if the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan's departure from the principles of the London Conference involved the ignoring of one Western value (maintaining the territorial integrity of Bosnia), the US administration's overt criticism of the framework of the ICFY as well as the London Conference would also constitute a serious violation of another Western value (multilateralism). Moreover, if the ICFY's actions were regarded as detrimental to other Western values, such as protecting the 'victims' of the conflict, the Clinton administration's 'neutrality' towards the Bosnian conflict at this period can be seen as being indifferent to the plight of the Bosnian government.

100 Albrightý Madeleine. "Use of Force in a Post-Cold War World'. Address at the National War Collage, National Defense University, Fort MacNair, Washington DC, September 23, 1993," US Department of
Regarding America’s domestic politics: as we have previously noted, on 8 September 1993 Bill Clinton employed a Liberal Multilateralist interpretation of the factors that defined America’s policy of not endorsing the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan. These suggested factors were, one, congressional opposition and, two, Europe’s violation of Western values in not respecting the interests of the ‘democratically’ elected Bosnian government in regard to territorial integrity. However, in the same speech he also underlined the importance of maintaining NATO’s de facto independence from the UN. Moreover, as we have discussed, the US administration eventually dismissed Bosnian President Alija Izetbegović’s direct plea for the lifting of the arms embargo, despite US congressional support for such a lifting, as well as the Clinton administration’s initial advocacy of that policy. In short, America’s domestic politics alone cannot explain the Clinton administration’s actions.

Hence, it is rational to argue that the US administration’s policy of maintaining America’s vital interests was the critical factor in clinching its indifference to the outcome of Western multilateralism and also of its initial commitment to protecting the interests of the Bosnian government. This challenges the foundations of the Liberal Multilateralist interpretation that there was no link between America’s vital interests and its actions in regard to the Bosnian conflict, and that thus the nature of the Western Order under multilateralism was therefore maintained during this period (see Chapter 1). However, as this thesis has demonstrated, America’s policy was to re-organize the Western Order under Quasi-multilateralism for the sake of its vital interests. In order to implement this policy without undermining its vital interests, the US administration needed a rationale that was able to satisfy the contentious demands of, on the one hand, disguising its profile as a supporter of international justice, and on the other hand preventing the Europeans from being in a position to justify their Bosnian policy in the name of multilateralism. The next section will look at the Clinton administration’s answer to this question of legitimizing America’s advocacy of Quasi-multilateralism.
America’s Global Vision: Multilateralism as a Means to Promote Its Vital Interests

While it did not react positively to the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan, the US administration took a further step to prevent any input that would constrain its foreign policy. Clinton administration officials demonstrated this position in a series of speeches delivered in September 1993, clearly expressing their foreign policy. These speeches discussed the American challenges to multilateralism in the form of the UN authority over international use of coercive power (i.e. peacekeeping operations and multilateral forces under the provision of Chapter VII of the UN Charter).

Their critical concern was the relationship between the UN’s authority over American peacekeeping operations and NATO’s ‘out of area’ operations. The Clinton administration insisted that any American military action should not be under the command and control of the UN. The US provided a rationale drawing a line between the kinds of multilateral cooperation which the US was able and not able to participate in. American national interests would define this. In this way, the Clinton administration rejected the claim that the US would not always follow the logic of multilateralism. This series of speeches was the foundation of the Clinton administration’s official international strategy and formed their policy towards international peacekeeping operations.

This reformed strategy was later entitled as ‘A National Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement’ (hereafter ‘Engagement and Enlargement Strategy’). This identified American foreign policy as an instrument for expanding liberal democracy and reasoned that its foreign entanglements should be defined by these values. As for peacekeeping operations, the Clinton administration later

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101 They deliberately coordinated the contents of a series of speeches, which are listed here in chronological order: the Secretary of State Warren Christopher on 20 September, National Security Adviser Anthony Lake on 21 September, US Ambassador to UN Madeline Albright on 23 September and the President Clinton on 27 September. Also, Interview with Anthony Lake on 19 May 2004.
102 Clinton, Bill. "Remarks and an Exchanges with Reporters Prior to Discussions with President Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia, 8 September 1993".
103 Interview with Anthony Lake on 19 May 2004.
authorized a Presidential Directive Decision 25 (hereafter 'PDD25') in May 1994 by following logics that the Engagement and Enlargement strategy had advocated. PDD25 set tough criteria for America's participation in international peacekeeping operations. This effectively constrained the US role in UN-authorized peacekeeping missions. In other words, PDD25 stipulated that any American involvement in international peace operations should be decided on the basis of American national interests. This meant that the US should maintain command and control authority when it participated in peacekeeping operations.

Accordingly, the abovementioned documents implied that the merit of Western multilateralism should be qualified in terms of the Engagement and Enlargement Strategy. In addition, the US could not follow the decisions of the UN or any other international organization or regime, if they were not in accord with America's preferred outcomes. This was a clear departure from the logic of George Bush's vision of a 'New World Order' that advocated UN-based multilateral solutions for international conflict. This had provided legitimacy for the London Conference and the ICFY's peace initiatives. The Clinton administration's new vision suggested that US policy towards Bosnia would be defined in conjunction with America's re-orientation of its world vision regarding the role of 'multilateralism' and 'the UN' for the use of Western coercive power.

At the beginning of this series of landmark speeches, on 20 September 1993 Warren Christopher outlined the general principles of American foreign policy in the following way:

Let me be clear: Multilateralism is a means, not an end. It is one of the many foreign policy tools at our disposal. And it is warranted only when it serves the central purposes of American foreign policy: to protect American interests. This country will never subcontract its foreign policy to another power or another person [emphasis added].

The Clinton administration went further than this. Instead of following the logic of multilateralism that

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they believed could constrain the American national interests, 21 September 1993 Anthony Lake argued for the necessity of a new strategy of ‘engagement’.\(^\text{108}\) This new rationale re-focused the direction of American foreign policy. According to Lake, US policy should be discussed in the following manner:

Un fortunately, debates over both Bosnia and Somalia have been cast as doctrinal matters involving the role of multilateralism. This focus is misplaced. […] We should not let the particular define the doctrinal. […] I believe strongly that our foreign policies must marry principles and pragmatism. We should be principled about our purposes but pragmatic about our means. […] Only one overriding factor can determine whether the U.S. should act multilaterally or unilaterally, and that is America’s interests [emphasis added].\(^\text{109}\)

In essence, the US administration wanted to change the direction of the foreign policy debate for the sake of its vital interests. Before the enlargement strategy, the successes of US foreign entanglements were evaluated in terms of their compliance with multilateralism. In order to revise this criterion based on America’s preferences, the Clinton administration now argued that its ‘foreign policies must marry principles and pragmatism.’\(^\text{110}\) In order to make this happen, the US had to define its ideal values, which must correspond to its national interests. It was neither the UN nor ‘multilateralism’, but the US president that should define the normative criteria of international affairs and the priority of policies. Accordingly, Madeleine Albright supported this point in the following way:

In trying to explain why it was important to have partners in dealing with regional conflicts, I said, “U.S. leadership within collective bodies requires what I would term ‘assertive multilateralism.’” By this I meant that when America acted with others, we should lead in establishing goals and ensuring success. I did not in any way rule out the possibility that we would have to act on our own in self-defence or to protect other vital interests [emphasis added].\(^\text{111}\)

It was likely that the US administration would use its foreign policy tools to re-configure the rules and


\(^{109}\) Lake, "From Containment to Enlargement."

\(^{110}\) Lake, "From Containment to Enlargement."

systems of international relationships according to such a principle.

Anthony Lake explained what he wanted in order to make this transformation. First of all, he urged the US should continuously play a pivotal role in international relations. It was not because it facilitated multilateralism but for the following reason:

If we [American people] do not [engage], our government's reactions to foreign events can seem disconnected; [...] and America could be harmed by a rise in protectionism, unwise cuts to our military force structure or readiness, a loss of the resources necessary for our diplomacy—and thus the erosion of U.S. influence abroad [emphasis added]. 112

In the context of the Bosnian conflict, in order to prevent 'erosion of U.S. influence' abroad, the Clinton administration attempted to avoid military involvement on the ground in Bosnia and keep NATO's independence over its use of military force. However, US interests were defined not based on the Cold War style of geo-politics (such as 'containment strategy') but on the new unique environment in the post-Cold War world. In order to clarify this point, Lake addressed four salient facts that conditioned its behaviour.

Firstly, 'America’s core concepts—democracy and market economics—are more broadly accepted than ever.' 113 Secondly, the US is the dominant power; thirdly, there are explosions of ethnic conflicts; and lastly, developments of communications and transportation have closely linked world events. Lake added: '(in) such a world, our interests and ideals compel us not only to be engaged but to lead' in order to enlarge market-based economies and democracy. 114 According to Lake, this is because:

The expansion of market-based economics abroad helps expand our exports and create American jobs, while it also improves living conditions and fuels demands for political liberalization abroad. The addition of new democracies makes us more secure, because democracies tend not to wage war on each other or sponsor terrorism [emphasis added]. 115

To paraphrase the Lake's speech, a safer international situation would help the healthy operation of the

112 Lake, "From Containment to Enlargement."
113 Lake, "From Containment to Enlargement."
114 Lake, "From Containment to Enlargement."
115 Lake, "From Containment to Enlargement."
market, and the democratization of other countries’ domestic regimes would be one way of contributing to the stabilization of international relationships. Lake argues that in order to protect America’s influence abroad, the US should not look at the procedural legitimacy of multilateralism but rather at the degree of the existence of a market economy and formal democratic structures: in other words, the US should focus on ideological justification of its foreign policy orientation. This became America’s new interpretation of the value of West that would be used to organize the Western Order. The new ideological interpretation of the Western value (i.e. based on the ideas of ‘democratic peace’) was used as a means to promote America’s vital interests without losing its profile as an internationalist leader, and earnest about promoting Western values more than its material interests. However, Lake acknowledged that he chose ‘democratic peace’ theory not because of its theoretical implications but as a means to promote America’s national interests.116

‘Democratic peace’ theory provides a justification for the US to use coercive power against the non-Western world without paying serious attention to procedural legitimacy under a UN-centred multilateralism. According to Michael Doyle, this theory on the one hand envisages stability between democratic regimes. On the other hand, however, it does not dismiss the likelihood of the democratic regimes’ abusive intervention towards non-democratic states in the name of promoting peace.117 Yet this logic is detrimental to the US interests in that it would impose a moral responsibility on the US to protect ‘democratic’ regimes abroad. Foreign leaders can exploit this logic of responsibility which might potentially ‘entrap’ the US in conflicts in which it has no clear material interests.118 Indeed, America’s advocacy of protecting the interests of the Bosnian government in the name of ‘democratic peace’ had certainly this potential. Therefore, the US administration needed to clarify how they intended to apply the logic of ‘democratic peace’. In other words, the US emphasised that it was not

116 Interview with Anthony Lake on 19 May 2004.
multilateralism (i.e. a legal agreement at the UN), or democratization of the decision-making process of a regime but rather the promotion of ‘market democracy’ (i.e. liberal democracy) that should be the priority of US foreign policy as well as that of other Western states. Moreover, the futures of Bosnia and of humanitarian issues across the globe were also not on the main agenda of the US foreign policy. Lake stated this point in the following way:

A strategy of enlargement suggests our principal concerns should be strengthening our democratic core in North America, Europe and Japan; consolidating and enlarging democracy and markets in key places; and addressing backlash states such as Iran and Iraq. Our efforts in Somalia and Bosnia are important expressions of our overall engagement, but they do not by themselves define our broader strategy in the world" [emphasis added].

In retrospect, it was in September 1993 that the US re-defined the international norms that they would follow. They also outlined America’s policy priorities accordingly. As we will discuss below, the US administration generally followed these values and priorities for the next few years.

The re-vitalization of the ‘core’ parts of ‘market democracies’ was implemented in the form of a decision on NATO on enlargement and the reinforcement of the US-Japan Security Treaty. As for the coercive aspect, by June 1993 the US and the UK had already carried out air strikes against the Iraq regime. Clinton legitimized this attack with the charge that Saddam Hussein regime planned to assassinate the former President George Bush in April 1992. In terms of international law, this joint US-UK military action was highly controversial. This event symbolically set a precedent for the launching of air strikes without clear UN authority. In 1994, Anthony Lake argued that Iran must be


119 For instance, the US did not act to prevent humanitarian atrocities in Rwanda in 1994.
120 Lake, "From Containment to Enlargement."
'contained' together with Iraq for the sake of protecting America's national interests and democracy.\(^{125}\)

Furthermore, the US administration had been prepared to initiate 'pre-emptive' air strikes against North Korean nuclear facilities in June 1994.\(^{126}\) This was prevented as a result of former US President Carter's visit to Pyongyang, where he managed to reach a political settlement with the then North Korean leader Kim Il Son. The Clinton administration was the first to use the term 'rogue states' regarding the states that harbour terrorism and ignore human rights. Based on such criteria it criticized regimes such as Iran, Iraq, Syria, Cuba, Sudan, Lebanon and North Korea.\(^{127}\) In this context, Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs could be regarded as 'rogue states (or regimes)'.

Following the above-discussed link between America's values and its use of coercive actions, the US administration re-defined the importance of the Bosnian issue. This was not for the sake of multilateralism or purely humanitarian concerns as such, but for strictly American interests. Lake stated this point in the following way:

The conflict in Bosnia deserves American engagement: It is a vast humanitarian tragedy; it is driven by ethnic barbarism; it stemmed from aggression against an independent state; it lies alongside the established and emerging market democracies of Europe; and it can all too easily explode into a wider Balkan conflict [emphasis added].\(^{128}\)

This suggestion is that the US ought to be engaged with this issue not due to its obligation to the UN or to a principle of multilateralism. Rather, the reason was that the Bosnian tragedy clashed with American value of promoting 'market democracy' and its geo-politics. In this way, Lake defined the conflict as an international conflict not a civil war. He added the kind of policy he thought appropriate for responding to this.

June 1993, Lexis-Nexis.


\(^{126}\) This is according to the then US Secretary of Defence and his junior officer's memoir.


\(^{129}\) Lake, "From Containment to Enlargement."
This is why this Administration supported lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia [...] It is why we remain committed to helping implement an accessible and enforceable peace accord [...] But while we have clear reasons to engage and persist, they do not obliterate other American interests involving Europe and Russia, and they do not justify the extreme costs of taking unilateral responsibility for imposing a solution [emphasis added].

Lake dismissed ICFY-promoted peace plan(s) as neither ‘accessible’ nor ‘enforceable’. Moreover, he suggested that the US would not bear ‘unilateral responsibility for imposing a solution’. This cunningly implied that the US administration would support neither the ICFY-promoted peace plans nor any ethnic war on behalf of the Bosnian government. Lake’s remarks also indicated America’s perceptions of Bosnia, namely that Bosnia is not important for itself (i.e. in terms of humanitarian concerns or democratic values) but only in so far as it relates to America’s vital interests and its strategic goals (i.e. maintaining NATO’s de facto independence from the UN).

On 23 September the US ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright, reinforced Christopher and Lake’s previously discussed position. She stressed that multilateralism was but just one of many foreign policy tools.

[Some say we must make rigid choices between unilateral and multilateral, global and regional, force and diplomacy. But that is not true. We have the flexibility in this new era to steer a reasoned course between the counsel of those who would have us intervene everywhere and of those who see no American purpose anywhere [emphasis added].

To conclude this series of systematically collaborated statements, on 27 September 1993 President Clinton expressed his quasi-multilateralist position in relation to the American policy towards UN peacekeeping operations at the UN General Assembly meeting. According to him:

129 Lake, "From Containment to Enlargement."
130 Interview with Anthony Lake on 19 May 2004.
131 According to the then US Ambassador to NATO, Robert Hunter, the US made it clear that it would not come to fight on the ground on behalf of the Bosnian government. Interview with Robert Hunter on 17 May 2004.
132 This was a shared vision within the Clinton administration. Interview with Robert Hunter on 17 May 2004.
In recent weeks in the Security Council our nation has begun asking harder questions about proposals for new peacekeeping missions: Is there a real threat to international peace? Does the proposed mission have clear objectives? Can an end point be identified for those who will be asked to participate? How much will the mission cost? From now on, the United Nations should address these and other hard questions for every proposed mission before we vote and before the mission begins [emphasis added].\footnote{Clinton, Bill. "Confronting the Challenges of a Broader World: Address to the UN General Assembly, New York, September 27, 1993," \textit{US Department of State Dispatch}, 4, no 39: Article 1.}

Accordingly, Clinton advocated how the UN should act in the following manner:

\begin{quote}
The United Nations simply cannot become engaged in every one of the world’s conflicts. If the American people are to say yes to UN peacekeeping, the United Nations must know when to say no [emphasis added].\footnote{Clinton, "Confronting the Challenges of a Broader World: Address to the UN General Assembly, New York, September 27, 1993."}
\end{quote}

The logical consequence of the Engagement and Enlargement strategy was the restriction of the UN’s role in regulating the international use of coercive power. It was not the UN who should decide how its members states respond to the conflicts but the criteria laid out by the US should guide what the UN can do. In other words, multilateralism and the UN peacekeeping mission became less urgent political issues for the Clinton administration. The consequences of this were, the US administration pulled its troops out from Somalia. It did not become actively engaged in the Rwanda crisis of 1994, and did not send any ground troops to Bosnia acting in a combat capacity until the final settlement agreement was signed. In short the Engagement and Enlargement Strategy was America’s attempt to re-define Western values and its priorities in opposition to that of Europeans. This was accompanied with a shift away from ‘sovereign peace’ towards ‘democratic peace’; and away from European ideas of multilateralism towards Quasi-multilateralism. This transformation corresponded with the devaluation of UN-centred multilateralism as reflected in the ICFY and the rise of the Western alliance in international politics. However, it was carried out at the cost of undermining the legitimacy of multilateralism and restricting America’s allies’ ‘voice opportunities’. In this respect, Lake admitted
that the Engagement and Enlargement Strategy was not popular among European policy-makers.¹³⁶

The Political Context of the ‘Engagement and Enlargement Strategy’: Somalia and Bosnia

As we have discussed, this research presumes that there was a causal relationship between America’s vital interests—in the form of maintaining NATO’s de facto independence from the UN and not becoming militarily involved on the ground—and its negative reaction to the ICFY-promoted peace plans. Therefore, the claim being made is, contrary to the Liberal Multilateralist proposition, that it was neither America’s domestic politics nor its European allies’ violation of Western values, but the Clinton administration’s conscious calculation of its vital interests that led the US to promote its alternative vision of multilateralism. In other words, this reading suggests that Bosnia was the critical turning point in the nature of intra-Western relationships, as it transformed regulative principles of cooperation from multilateralism to Quasi-multilateralism. Accordingly, this transformation implied that ‘democratic peace’ (accompanied by a policy to maintain NATO’s de facto independence from the UN) was replaced by the idea of ‘sovereign peace’, a UN-centred conflict resolution mechanism, and the revitalization of a collective security system. To substantiate this reading, it is necessary to analyse the political context behind the Clinton administration’s launching of the Engagement and Enlargement strategy in September 1993. Therefore, we must consider the extent to which the Bosnia issue defined the Clinton administration’s policy-making process in comparison with other events at that time (such as the US involvement in Somalia).

With regard to the Somalia issue, if we consider the fact that Warren Christopher was demanding that the UN alter Somalia policies in mid September¹³⁷, and problems the UN peacekeeping operation faced in Somalia at that time, one might believe that September’s series of

¹³⁶ Interview with Anthony Lake on 19 May 2004.
speeches would have introduced a new US approach to Somalia. In other words, that the situation in Somalia forced the US administration to reject the logic of multilateralism. However, this interpretation is not appropriate. Instead, the series of speeches should be considered as highlighting the US reaction to the logic of multilateralism in general and the ICFY-promoted peace plans in particular. There are four reasons to support this as follows: the contents of the speech itself; the timing of the policy announcement; the reality of the relationship between the US and UN regarding the Somalia peacekeeping; and the American action following the sequence of speeches.

Firstly, as far as the texts of the speeches were concerned, Clinton regarded this as an opportunity to outline his prospective peacekeeping operations. To quote Clinton’s statement again:

> From now on, the United Nations should address these and other hard questions for every proposed mission before we vote and before the mission begins. [emphasis added].

The US administration had already committed itself to peacekeeping operation in Somalia at that time. The mission involved a controversial use of coercive military power.

Facing the difficulties of the mission in Somalia, the US administration on the one hand intended to transform the nature of the mission. In this way, the US administration demanded the UN Secretary-General adopt an exit strategy as soon as possible and on 22 September 1993 the UNSC approved the resolution No. 865. UNSCR 865 urging the UN to take political and economic actions along with the ongoing military measures in Somalia. This resolution seemed to indicate an American retreat from the military mission. On the other hand however, the Clinton administration was still committed to disarming General Aideed’s militia in Somalia. Clinton supported the continuity of the US mission in Somalia even after the incident on 3 October that killed eighteen American

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138 Clinton, "Confronting the Challenges of a Broader World: Address to the UN General Assembly, New York, September 27, 1993."
soldiers and was generally regarded as the fatal turning point of the mission.\footnote[142]{Clinton, Bill. My Life. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004. 552.} He acknowledged the fact that at that time ‘there was no support in Congress for a larger military role in Somalia’.\footnote[143]{Clinton, My Life, 552.} Nevertheless, he ‘did not mind taking congress on’ with regard to this issue.\footnote[144]{Clinton, My Life, 552.} Despite this tough rhetoric, in the end, on 6 October 1993, Clinton ordered the completion of American efforts against Aideed’s militia, and withdrew US troops.\footnote[145]{Hirsh and Oakley. Somalia and Operation Restore Hope. 128; Clinton, My Life, 551-552.} Clinton explained his rationale in the following way:

I had to consider the consequences of any action that could make it even harder to get congressional support for sending American troops to Bosnia and Haiti, where we had far greater interests at stake.\footnote[146]{Clinton, My Life, 552.}

It was not the Somalia issue that dictated US policy towards Bosnia. However, it was Bosnia that defined the US policy towards Somalia. As Clinton suggested, America ‘had far greater interests at stake’ regarding the situation in Bosnia.

Secondly, as far as the chronology is concerned, the critical event for the US presence in Somalia occurred on 3 October 1993. On that day 18 US soldiers were killed and more than 50 were injured. On 6 October the Clinton administration held an urgent NSC meeting to review policy towards Somalia.\footnote[147]{Hirsh and Oakley. Somalia and Operation Restore Hope. 128. Clinton, My Life, 551-552.} However, it was before October (specifically, from 20 to 27 September 1993), that the Clinton administration made a series of speeches that challenged logic of multilateralism. During this period, Bosnia was the one that had imminent and substantial potential to require the US or NATO troops on the ground. The HMS Invincible meeting was held on 20 September and the Bosnian Assembly convened on 27 September 1993.

Moreover, a day before the US president’s 27 September speech, an official of the Clinton administration suggested that the series of speeches would neither be a follow up of the Bush senior’s UN speech in 1992 nor Boutros-Ghali’s An Agenda for Peace that encouraged the UN’s active
involvement of peacekeeping mission but also implied American obligation for implementing it.\textsuperscript{148} In other words, it would not substantiate America's commitment to multilateralism. Instead, the official said, "this is more a response to the current environment and where we may be going or not going in Bosnia, as [the] case may be."\textsuperscript{149} To clarify this point, Anthony Lake has dismissed the idea that the US administration set the timing of the series of speeches to clash with the ICFY's meeting on the HMS Invincible.\textsuperscript{150} According to Lake, this was simply a coincidence, as he does not remember the contents of the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan [as at May 2004].\textsuperscript{151} However, he acknowledged the fact that the contents of September's series of speeches demonstrated America's preference as to how the Bosnian issue should be settled.\textsuperscript{152} In fact, regardless of Lake's reluctance to admit the causal relationship between the timing of September's series of speeches and the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan, the contents of the speeches worked in detriment to the ICFY peace plan, just as the US officials had intended. With regard to this point, one US official recalled that the series of speeches in September 1993 indicated the Clinton administration's answer to the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan.\textsuperscript{153} British foreign policy-makers also shared the same impression.\textsuperscript{154} In other words, Lake's denial of the relationship between the timing of the speeches and the development of the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan should be scrutinized in the future on the basis of hitherto unreleased official documents. However, chronologically speaking, it is still rational to take the view that the Clinton administration's series of speeches in September constituted American policy, which was to reject any American political or any military support for the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan.

Thirdly, there was a controversy about the UN's command and control authority over American peacekeeping troops. The Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan envisioned deploying NATO's

\textsuperscript{149} The White House, Office of Press Secretary, "Transcript of Clinton Administration Background Briefing on the President's U.N. Speech,"
\textsuperscript{150} Interview with Anthony Lake on 19 May 2004.
\textsuperscript{151} Interview with Anthony Lake on 19 May 2004.
\textsuperscript{152} Interview with Anthony Lake on 19 May 2004.
\textsuperscript{153} Interview with a State Department official on 21 May 2005.
peacekeeping troops on the ground under the authority of the UNSC. On 8 September the US president spelled out his conditions for this. On 22 September after the meeting with Owen and Stoltenberg, the NATO Secretary-General dismissed NATO's participation in implementation of the peace plan. It clearly reflected America's reluctance to endorse the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan. As Clinton had stated before the HMS Invincible meeting, the US administration's principal concern regarded the implementation of the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan, especially the issue of the UN's command and control authority over US or NATO troops. Indeed, at the news conference after the speech, one journalist asked him about the conditions the US would apply when sending troops on peacekeeping operations. Clinton replied:

For example, there is no question that the United Nations could not directly manage an operation the size of the Bosnian operation, [...] I would want a clear understanding of what the command and control was. I would want the NATO commander in charge of the operation, [...] And I would want a clear expression of support from the United States Congress [emphasis added].

In relation to this point, officials of the Clinton administration as well as members of the US Congress blamed the failure of the Somalia mission on their concession to the UN's command-control authority over the US troops. However, according to the UN Secretary-General's report on Somalia, the US deployed its troops separately from the UN peacekeepers. This meant that the US forces involved in the combatant activities were in fact not responsible to the UN command structure. Boutros-Ghali recalled that the fatal American military operation in Somalia on 3 October (that resulted

154 Interview with Douglas Hurd on 7 April 2004; Interview with David Hannay on 6 October 2004.
157 Clinton, Bill. "Remarks and Exchanges with Reporters Prior to Discussions with President Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia, 8 September 1993; Drew, On the Edge, 281-282.
159 Albright, Madam Secretary: 146.
in 18 deaths among US soldiers) was 'planned, decided and launched entirely without the knowledge of United Nations officials.'\textsuperscript{161} In contrast, the EC-UN promoted peace plans in Bosnia either asked the US to participate in the main body of the UN peacekeeping operations, or to accept UN control over the question of aerial strikes by NATO.

For these four reasons above, it is plausible to conclude that the series of speeches represented America's reaction to multilateralism and to the Bosnian policy promoted by Europe. The US experiences in Somalia and resulting domestic politics worked as a catalyst for the formation of the Clinton administration's guideline of the UN-led peacekeeping missions (i.e. PDD25) but it did not define the contents of the series of speeches.\textsuperscript{162}

In summing up in relation to the Clinton administration's series of speeches in September 1993 and its political content, it is possible to argue that the 'Engagement and Enlargement' Strategy was, at least regarding its implications, a systematic reaction to the logic (i.e. 'multilateralism', 'sovereign peace' and the UN-centred approach to the use of coercive power) that the ICFY relied upon. The US opposition to the ICFY-promoted peace plan was mainly based on its assumption that by accepting the substantial authority of the UN over NATO military actions it could alter the nature of the latter from that of a collective self-defence to a collective security organization. In other words, the US administration was reluctant to use its military power for the sake of multilateralism. Indeed, as Warren Christopher suggested, '[m]ultilateralism is a means, not an end.'\textsuperscript{163}

With regard to the concept of 'democratic peace', however, the US administration did not actively commit itself to promoting this value. For instance, on the one hand the Clinton administration made clear its principle that the US would not support a peace plan if the Bosnian government were

\textsuperscript{161} Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished, 103-104.

unwilling to accept it. On the other hand, however, the Americans failed the Bosnian government by their unwillingness to provide military support on the ground. The Clinton administration also refused to lift the arms embargo when the Bosnian government requested the US to do so. This was because the lifting of the arms embargo could have led to the withdrawal of the UNPROFOR troops and thus the US would have had to take over the vacuum this left on the ground.

In short, as Anthony Lake has made clear, the US administration used the concept of 'democratic peace' theory in order to promote America's policy. The essence of this American policy was to re-organize the Western Order under Quasi-multilateralism. This logic on the one hand prevents the UN from exercising any authority over NATO military actions and keeps the US away from fighting on the ground in Bosnia, while on the other hand the same logic maintains America's profile as an actor that cares more for common moral value ('liberal democracy') than any of its self-serving interests. The 'Engagement and Enlargement' strategy thus defined the common moral value that the US supported and the corresponding interpretation of when it was able to use its military power. The new definition of America's interests (i.e. promoting 'market democracy' not multilateralism) provided a rationale for the US administration to assume the mantle of the Western cooperation whilst in reality pursuing its own self-serving interpretation of the conditions for use of its military power.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has provided empirical documentation for the key claims of this thesis that the US only supports the outcomes of multilateralism if the consequences accord with American vital and geo-strategic interests that the US has decided before any multilateral interaction. In addition, the US manipulates the interpretation of the collective 'ideational' interests of the West in accordance with its vital interests. With regard to these claims, this chapter has shown the political motives behind the Clinton administration's promotion of 'democratic peace'. However, the Clinton administration's

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163 Christopher, "Building Peace in the Middle East."
application of this notion did not aim at promoting democracy per se. This moral rhetoric was, on the contrary, used to protect its vital interests—especially maintaining NATO’s de facto independence from the UN in relation to the use of coercive power—against the background of mounting pressure on the US to follow the outcomes of Western multilateralism in the form of the ICFY-led peace plan.

During the summer of 1993, the UK and other EC members promoted the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan through the UN-centred multilateral framework of the ICFY. The US administration was not only reluctant to support the framework of the ICFY but also unwilling to accept the implications of the ICFY-promoted peace plan(s) regarding the UN’s authority over the use of Western military power. The Clinton administration considered that the political implications of the ICFY-promoted peace would challenge America’s vital interests in maintaining NATO as a collective self-defence organization and of not accepting any international authority other than that of the US president to dictate the use of NATO military power. To put it conceptually, there was a tension between the notions of collective security on the one hand and collective self-defence on the other, regarding the mode of the West’s use of coercive power in implementing a peace plan in Bosnia.

Given the context discussed above, the series of speeches of high-ranking officials of the Clinton administration in September 1993 constituted a systematic attempt to alter the kind of multilateralism that produced the ICFY peace initiative in Bosnia. These speeches demonstrated that the Clinton administration wanted to promote its international vision of US actions not being evaluated on the basis of multilateralism and its relationship with the UN, but rather on its attachment to the pursuit of ‘market democracy’ across the globe. In this way, the Clinton administration demanded that its European allies abandon their vision of multilateralism and the corresponding institutional arrangements that would re-vitalize the authority of the UN over conflict resolution mechanisms. In short, the essence of this policy was to maintain America’s hold over NATO and to avoid any military involvement on the ground.

164 Interview with Anthony Lake on 19 May 2004.
This strategy of ‘Engagement and Enlargement’ on the one hand altered the US stance of presenting itself as a multilateralist in terms of its promotion of ‘market democracy’. However, on the other hand, it legitimized America’s reluctance to follow the outcomes of genuine multilateralism and also provided an excuse for the US not to do enough in Bosnia until there was a clear case for protecting ‘market democracy’. These findings are quite the contrary to the interpretation provided by the Liberal Multilateralists. Indeed, as the working hypothesis of this thesis has suggested, America’s new interpretation of moral value ('liberal democracy') corresponded to its vital interests.

Chapters 5 and 6 will analyse America’s application of the logic of Quasi-multilateralism and its consequences. The working hypothesis predicts that America’s use of Quasi-multilateralism—namely the maintenance of NATO’s collective self-defence identity and the European states’ loss of influence on the US policy-making process—would impose a negative impact upon the interests of the Bosnian government and upon the welfare of civilians on the ground.
Chapter 5 Quasi-Multilateralism in Action: the Contact Group and the US, from October 1993 to December 1994

This chapter covers the period from October 1993 to December 1994. One of the most significant developments in this period was America's active involvement in the situation in Bosnia and the wider international diplomatic sphere. Institutionally, this led to the transformation of the main institutional framework of international mediation, from the ICFY, to the so-called Contact Group. The Contact Group consists of US, UK, France, Russia, and Germany. It arguably represented a concert of major powers rather than genuine multilateralism. In contrast to the ICFY-promoted peace negotiations, the Contact Group's approach to the warring parties contained some elements of coercion. The Western approach to Bosnia gradually tilted towards America's position of using coercive power. However, the rationale for doing so had been transformed from America's initial rhetoric of protecting the interests of the Bosnian government, to one that advocated the use of coercive power, in order to impose a peace settlement.

Whilst subtle in appearance, this shift in style had critical implications for America's policy of coordinating its two vital interests (i.e. not using its ground troops and maintaining NATO's de facto independence from the UN) and two values of the West (i.e. respecting the outcomes of multilateralism and promoting 'liberal democracy'). As we noted in Chapter 4, America's choice was to project the rhetoric of 'democratic peace' and thus advocate an ideological interpretation of Western values, rather than promote a procedural normative value of multilateralism. The application of this normative standard was again the 'lift and strike' policy. However, this time, America's promotion of 'lift and strike' policy was based on a different motive. Initially, it used 'lift and strike' policy to deter the authority of the UN and multilateralism. This time, added to this original intention, the US

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1 To be precise, this 'coercive' means that the way international actors promote a peace plan. The ICFY did not substantially employ military means to impose its peace plans. Of course, several UN resolutions concerning the Bosnian conflict (e.g. UNSCR 713, 770, 836) were based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter and thus they contained some elements of 'coercion'. However, these resolutions were not aimed at promoting a particular peace plan.
administration attempted to keep a distance from the interests of the Bosnian government that would demand the deployment of US troops. Instead, the US began to cultivate a close relationship with the Croatian government. This was legitimized to re-establish geo-strategic stability (i.e. balance of power) in the region. Indeed, America’s favourable political system of ‘liberal democracy’ demands a stable international environment for the smooth operation of the market economy. This can be argued to be an application of the ideological interpretation of Western values, based not on advocating a ‘just’ peace that would protect ‘victims’ of the conflict in the form of the Bosnian government, but on promoting stability for the sake of ‘market democracy’ (see Chapter 4 in detail). Such manipulation of ideological interpretation of moral values did not work in favour of the interests of the Bosnian government.

Theoretically speaking, this chapter attempts to analyse why the Clinton administration failed to follow the logic of multilateralism in the form of supporting the EU-UN sponsored peace plans. It also addresses the fundamental reason for the Clinton administration’s failure to give substance to its initial moral argument for supporting the interests of the Bosnian government in the form of imposing the ‘lift and strike’ policy. These analyses will conclude a debate regarding the factors that prevent the work of an alleged harmonious multilateral cooperation between the US and its allies.

To reiterate the key interpretational differences, Liberal Multilateralists believe that America’s domestic politics forced the US administration not to support the EU-UN sponsored peace plans. In addition, they argue that European opposition to the ‘lift and strike’ policy prevented the Clinton administration from imposing it. In this way, they blame either European countries’ inability to look at moral issues or America’s domestic actors’ narrow-minded approaches to the Bosnian conflict for failing Bosnian civilians on the ground and intra-Western multilateralism. Hence, they still claim that the Clinton administration supported multilateralism. In opposition to such interpretation, this research focuses on the US government’s policy, its responsibility for the failure of Western multilateralism in Bosnia. The analysis of the strategic constraints for implementing the ‘lift and strike’ policy will illustrate the Clinton administration’s core interests on the Bosnian issue. It will also
demonstrate the fact that the Clinton administration’s initial commitment to the interests of the Bosnian government was a tactic to maintain NATO’s *de facto* independence from the UN.

The organization of this chapter is as follows. The first section will look at the interactions between the US and its European allies in relation to the EU Action Plan of November 1993, the Sarajevo Market incident of February 1994, and the formation of the so-called Muslim-Croat Federation in Bosnia of March 1994. The key issue between the US and its European allies was the use of air strikes and the authority of the UN. This first section will analyse the extent to which the US policy, regarding the Bosnian conflict, was linked to its interests to reform NATO’s direction. This section will also look at the gap between America’s rhetorical support to the interests of the Bosnian government (i.e. maintaining territorial integrity of Bosnia under the leadership of Izetbegović government) and the substance of its actions.

The second section will analyse the formation process of the Contact Group, and it will also analyses as to the reason why the Clinton administration’s reluctance to follow the outcomes of the conclusion of the Contact Group. This section will demonstrate the fact that, despite the establishment of the Contact Grope, the US administration attempted to maintain the maximum operational freedom of NATO’s actions, not only from the UN but also from the Contact Group. In relation to this point, it will look at the extent to which the outcomes of the intra-western interactions were defined by the America’s vital interests (of maintaining NATO’s de facto independence from NATO and keeping the US away from the sending its ground troops) in comparison with other possible factors (i.e. congressional opinion, European violation of Western values and bureaucratic politics). This will challenge Liberal Multilateralists’ interpretation of America’s reluctance to cooperate with its allies.

The third section will discuss America’s renovated promotion of its ‘lift and strike’ policy during the autumn and winter of 1994, and the difficulties faced by the US administration as a result of this. It will analyse the Clinton administration’s policy regarding the tension between America’s two vital interests (i.e. not deploying troops in order not to get militarily involved in the conflict on the
The Western Debate on the NATO Air Strike of Early 1994: Friction between America’s Vital Interests and Its Ideological Moral Values

Since the collapse of the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan, the Clinton administration attempted to discredit European policy-makers’ peace initiatives throughout October 1993. For this purpose, Clinton even explicitly condemned the UK and France, in the following way:

I had the feeling that the British and French felt it was far more important to avoid lifting the arms embargo than to save the country.2

As Clinton directly criticized the UK (and possibly as a result of two previous peace plans), it was unable to lead another initiative.3 This time it was France and Germany that produced the new peace plan on 7 November and eventually it was officially formalized as the ‘EU Action Plan.4

The EU’s strategy was to demand the cooperation both from Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian government. On the one hand, the ICFY Co-Chairmen assumed that territorial concession on the part of the Bosnian Serbs was an essential condition for obtaining the Bosnian government’s consent.5 As an incentive, the EU proposed easing the UN’s economic sanctions on Serbia in return for Milošević’s exerting influence on the Bosnian Serbs. Milošević was willing to accept this offer, as he was keen to end the crippling sanctions regime. On the other hand, this tactic implied that the EU would urge the

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2 Quoted in “It’s Self-Evident That We...Can’t Solve All the Problems.” [an excerpt of the interview with Bill Clinton] The Washington Post, 17 October 1993, A 28.
3 In addition, it can be argued that one of root causes of this tension was John Major’s support of Bush senior in the US presidential election in 1992. However, the policy-makers of both sides dismissed this interpretation. Interview with Douglas Hurd on 7 April 2004; Lord Robert Renwick on 5 October 2004; Interview with Robert Hunter on 17 May 2004.
Bosnian government to cooperate with the peace process. French Foreign Minister Allan Juppé and his German counterpart Klaus Kinkel outlined the EU Action Plan in the following way:

We must stress to the leadership in Sarajevo [the Bosnian government] that the military option leads nowhere and that they would thereby risk losing the support of the international community.6

However, the Bosnian government’s reluctance to cooperate was in many respects similar to its approach to the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan.7 Izetbegović had made clear that the critical interest of the Bosnian government was not obtaining ‘an unjust peace’ in the form of the EU Action Plan, but continuing ‘a just war of defence’.8

Encouraged by America’s unwillingness to support the EU’s peace initiative, the Bosnian government stiffened its resolve. Thus, on 10 November 1993 Izetbegović advocated, contra the EU Action Plan, that the Bosnian government take a more assertive direction:

We are thinking of switching from a defensive war to a war of liberation, and liberating the occupied territories.9

Indeed, towards the end of 1993, the Bosnian government opened various war fronts against the two enemies: the Bosnian Serb forces and the Bosnian Croat forces.10 This was partly in response to its enemies’ offensives and partly driven by the Bosnian government’s will to re-insert its administrative authority across Bosnia by all means.11

To elucidate the above-mentioned development, there were two choices for the Western states in conjunction with how they perceived the interests of the Bosnian government. One was to promote a settlement of the conflict, regardless of the Bosnian government’s reluctance. The other was to scrap the EU Action Plan and try to reconsider the means to protect the interests of the Bosnian


8 Izetbegović, Inescapable Questions, 165.


10 The Bosnian government’s actions during this period, see: Izetbegović, Inescapable Questions, 165-177.

11 Izetbegović, Inescapable Questions, 165-177.
government. However, given the Bosnian government’s willingness to continue its offensives, increasing the prospects for the Western states becoming further militarily involved the conflict. The EU made the choice to push for a settlement.

The US faced a dilemma. It was clear that the Clinton administration did not want to support the EU Action Plan, as it was basically a revised version of the Owen Stoltenberg Peace Plan. Instead, as we have discussed above, the US again advocated lifting the arms embargo. This policy satisfied America’s strategy to present itself as not pressuring the Bosnian government to give up its territorial integrity, while undermining the authority of multilateralism. However, as we have noted in Chapter 3, the ‘lift and strike’ policy would have led to the withdrawal of UNPROFOR troops and may have resulted in a serious demand for the US to send ground troops to give substance to its rhetoric about protecting the interests of the Bosnian government. Given Izetbegović’s aforementioned bellicose remarks, it could place the US in the position of supporting the Bosnian government militarily. This was the predicament of America’s use of quasi-multilateralism. As a result, the US administration could not present its own plan to settle the Bosnian conflict, notwithstanding its criticism of the EU Action Plan.

Against this background, in December 1994, Warren Christopher visited European capitals in order to finalize preparation for the NATO Brussels summit of January 1994. It was to be Clinton’s first visit to Europe since he had assumed the Presidency. The purpose was to consolidate America’s transatlantic alliance in accordance with its vision of NATO’s supremacy in European security without imposing any burdens or constraints on its military strategy, in the form of accepting the ‘lift and strike’ policy. However, Christopher faced serious opposition from the European allies.

It can be said that Christopher realised that the US was caught in the above-discussed predicament of quasi-multilateralism. In other words, if the US did choose to oppose the plan, and not successfully keep distance from its initial moral support to the Bosnian government, then it would have

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became involved in offering a military support to the Bosnian government. Therefore, Christopher decided to launch an alternative American initiative vis-à-vis the Europeans, when he returned to the US. US policy-makers began formulating a policy that would re-organize the situation on the ground without undermining America’s vital interests and without accepting the EU Action Plan. It eventually paved the way for the formation of the Federation between the Bosnian government and the Bosnian Croats. In other words, the US began to geo-strategically re-mould the situation on the ground in order to overcome its predicament. The NATO summit of January 1994 and the subsequent American diplomacy in Europe were the forum that the US administration outlined this.

The NATO Summit of January 1994: a Compromise between European Multilateralism and America’s Vital Interests

In the winter of 1993 and 1994, there were three important US policy objectives regarding European security. Firstly, it planned to construct a framework for preventing nuclear proliferation in Russia and other republics of the former Soviet Union. Secondly, it needed to reform NATO—represented by initiatives such as the Partnership for Peace (PiP) and the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF). Finally, it intended to launch a new initiative in relation to the Bosnian conflict. With regard to the first and second policies, NATO’s European member states did not raise serious objections. By the end of 1993, they agreed with each other on the contents to be decided at the NATO summit.

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13 Interview with Charles Redman on 5 February 2004.
14 Interview with Charles Redman on 5 February 2004.
15 Interview with Charles Redman on 5 February 2004.
16 PiP was an idea that was principally aimed at paving a way to enlarge NATO in the field of peacekeeping operations, while soothing the Russian hostility to NATO. This framework was formed as a result of the Polish general election of September 1993 (that resulted in a majority for the former Communist party) and the Russian Parliament election in December 1993 (that gave seats to the Liberal Democratic Party, the right-wing nationalists). See: Goldgeier, James M. Not Whether but When: the U. S. Decision to Enlarge NATO. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1999. 24-26. 54-58; Interview with Robert Hunter on 17 May 2004.
17 CJTF is aimed at providing a framework for NATO to work together with other regional organizations such as WEU (or EU) in regard to the so-called ‘non-article 5’ activities (i.e. peacekeeping/enforcing operations that would take place outside of NATO’s geographical jurisdiction). As for details of this, see: Barry, Charles. "NATO's Combined Joint Task Forces in Theory and Practice," Survival 38, no. 1 (1996): 81-97.
However, the proposed Bosnian policy, namely, ignoring the EU Action Plan, created a serious tension between the US and its European allies. This was the transatlantic political context which existed during the NATO Summit of January 1994.

The summit took place 10-11 January 1994, in Brussels, and resulted in the issuing of a mixed message. On the one hand, they agreed to express their support for the EU Action Plan in the following way:

> We are united in supporting the efforts of the United Nations and the European Union to secure a negotiated settlement of the conflict in Bosnia, agreeable to all parties, and we commend the European Union Action Plan of 22 November 1993 to secure such a negotiated settlement. We reaffirm our determination to contribute to the implementation of a viable settlement reached in good faith [emphasis added].

However, NATO did not spell out the means to promote ‘a negotiated settlement’ or how it would implement the peace plan, but suggested the other way of engaging the Bosnian conflict as follows:

> [w]e reaffirm our readiness, under the authority of the United Nations Security Council and in accordance with the Alliance decisions of 2 and 9 August 1993, to carry out air strikes in order to prevent the strangulation of Sarajevo, the safe areas and other threatened areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Yet, it was not clear whether the proposed air strikes were aimed at intervening in the conflict or rather they merely restrained form of involvement, in accordance with NATO’s decision on 9 August (see Chapter 4). In other words, it was not specified who would define the aim of the air strikes and who would authorise it.

This vagueness was partly a product of a compromise between the US and France. The US

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wanted to obtain NATO’s explicit support for air strikes. France and other European leaders were eager to get America’s endorsement for the EU Action Plan. In addition, they did not want to remove UN authority from air strikes for fear of escalating the conflict and the potential damage to the security of UN troops on the ground. As far as the NATO Communique is concerned, NATO reaffirmed its support for potential air strikes. France and America’s other European allies, in exchange, received at least nominal support for the EU Action Plan, and they also obtained the US concession to maintain partial UN authority over NATO’s potential air strikes in the dual key agreement.22

As a result of the NATO summit, the transatlantic relationship in the form of NATO was to determine not only the political framework but also tactical details of any international approach to the Bosnian conflict. This implies that, as a collective self-defence organization, NATO would take the key decisions of international action regarding the Bosnian conflict, instead of a collective security organization: the UN. One of the effects of this transformation was the marginalization of the role of the ICFY. After the NATO summit, the ICFY Co-Chairmen realized that they had been sidelined in the international mediation process of the Bosnian conflict.23 Nevertheless, so far as the process by which NATO reached this decision is concerned, there is some validity in Liberal Multilateralists’ theories (see Chapter 1). In particular, they seem correct in regard to the multilateral policy-making process within the intra-western relationship, as the NATO summit produced a compromised Communique that did not merely approve America’s position. However, the outcomes of this compromised agreement are another issue. In order to support the claims of Liberal Multilateralists in an absolute fashion, it is necessary to look at the consequences of the NATO summit. In other words, this is the issue of to what extent the US changed its policy after the NATO summit.

22 As a result of the NATO summit, the ICFY Co-Chairmen realized that they were sidelined in the international mediation process of the Bosnian conflict. In addition, the then WEU Security-General who attended the NATO summit witnessed this Franco-US cooperation behind the curtain. He understood that the WEU’s role as well as the British role in the Bosnian conflict was sidelined by NATO’s pre-summit meetings in November and December 1993 and by Franco-US cooperation in the NATO summit of January 1993. Van Fekelen, Debating European Security, 169-171.

23 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 269.
After the NATO summit, in order to obtain America's support for the EU Action Plan, the French Foreign Minister, the German Chancellor, and the British Foreign Secretary met their American counterparts in Paris (24 January) and in Washington D.C. (31 January and 1 February) respectively. However, the US responded by criticizing the European Action Plan. For example, US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, categorically dismissed sending American ground troops to implement the plan and urged France to support air strikes.

In contrast to the European approach of processing the formal peace negotiation, the US administration attempted to propose a more geo-strategic approach that would transform the situation on the ground. Following Christopher's visit to Europe in December 1993, on 4 February 1994, US foreign policy-makers referred the Muslim-Bosnian Croat Federation plan to President Clinton, in order to formalize their idea. The plan envisaged establishing a federation within Bosnia, consisting of the Bosnian government controlled territories and that of the Bosnian Croat. This would result in a united war effort against the Bosnian Serbs and, critically, end the fighting between the Bosnian government and the Bosnian Croats. In addition to this initiative, the US administration also advocated NATO air strikes in conjunction with the NATO Communiqué of January 1994 to end the siege of Sarajevo. Both policies would not require US troops on the ground but would bring initiatives of international diplomacy within America's hand and restore its credibility.

The Clinton administration's policy to maintain its international credibility took the indirect form of military intervention in Bosnia. In this respect, Liberal Multilateralists' claim of NATO's...
alleged function to form a united Western opinion and to work in collaboration with other security
organization such as the UN or the EU does not have substance. The US did not provide ‘voice
opportunities’ to its allies regarding the American and the Western approach to the Bosnian conflict.
The Sarajevo crisis of February 1994 provided an ideal opportunity for the US administration to
facilitate its policy.

The Sarajevo Market Place Incident on 5 February 1994: Can NATO Act Alone?

On 5 February 1994, the Sarajevo open-air market place was attacked by a mortar-shell and
that killed more than 50 people. 29 This incident happened in the context of the above-mentioned
international circumstances. Despite the fact that the culprit is still not clear [as of August 2005], the
majority of the international community concluded that it came from Serbian occupied territory. 30 By
blaming Bosnian Serb forces, France and the US demanded that NATO air strikes should take place. 31
In fact, the Communiqué of the NATO summit of January 1994 had supported air strikes as response to
the situation in Sarajevo. 32 However, supporting the US on such issue was unusual, on the part of
France. By proposing the European Action Plan, France considered that the threat of air strikes could
be useful for maintaining ‘safe areas’ and would facilitate NATO’s cooperation with the
implementation of the Peace Plan. 33

This issue of air strikes was, however, complicated as it was not only NATO’s solidarity and
credibility on the line, but also that of the European Action Plan. The ICFY Co-Chairmen had hosted

three-party meetings regarding the EU Action Plan on 18-19 January and also planned the next one for 10 February 1994. Furthermore, some members of the EU, especially the UK, were reluctant to endorse NATO’s air strikes because the British government wanted to leave open an opportunity to settle the conflict by negotiation and maintain the safety of its troops on the ground. Russia opposed launching any NATO air strikes against Serbs due to its frustration of NATO’s growing role in the post Cold War Europe.

On 9 February NATO convened an NAC meeting and decided to take coercive action if Bosnian Serb forces did not move its heavy weapons from Sarajevo by 20th of February 1994. According to Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, the British government did not veto the proposal due to consideration of ‘realism’, that it should maintain ‘the Atlantic Alliance, and that meant keeping our disagreement with the Americans within bounds.’ Indeed, according to The New York Times, Warren Christopher suggested in an interview that that: ‘[t]here was a strong sense that our interests and NATO’s credibility were at stake [regarding the NAC’s decision on 9 February].’ Christopher was satisfied with the conclusion of the NAC meeting, neither because NATO would take coercive measures, nor the US and NATO would (at least indirectly) support the Bosnian government’s fight for self-determination. His satisfaction was due to ‘[t]he fact that the United States is taking an active role is making a difference, because of our status in the world and our perceived ability.’

Following the NAC’s decision, the US and the European major powers intensified their diplomatic activities. The British government and UNPROFOR put their efforts into reviving hopes for a negotiation-based peace process. Thus, in effect, they attempted to prevent air strikes. This relied on

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33 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 260-261, 276-279.
34 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 267-270.
36 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 267-270.
38 Hurd, Memoirs, 467.
40 Warren Christopher quoted in Sciolino and Jehl, "From Indecision to Ultimatum," A1, 6.
two actions: firstly easing the tension on the ground and, secondly, the removal of the Bosnian Serb forces' heavy weapons from around Sarajevo by 20 February 1994. This policy was legitimized by the logic that a peace by negotiation is better than fighting a war that would further damage civilians' lives on the ground. Moreover, their critical interest—namely peacekeepers' safety—would be risked as a result of air strikes.\textsuperscript{41} To elucidate this point, the British government and the UN offices regarded the situation based on the distinction between the interests of the Bosnian government and that of civilians on the ground. The Bosnian government wanted to accomplish its political object of defeating the Bosnian Serb forces and restoring territorial integrity of Bosnia \textit{by all means}, whereas the civilians wanted to restore their ordinal life as soon as they can.\textsuperscript{42}

As for the issue of controlling tensions on the ground, on 6 February the newly nominated UN Secretary-General Special Representative for former Yugoslavia, Yasushi Akashi, proposed an immediate cease-fire around Sarajevo, ordering the UNPROFOR Bosnia Commander, General Michael Rose to obtain consent from the local Bosnian warring parties.\textsuperscript{43} On 10 February 1994, as soon as the NAC issued a threat of air strike, the local cease-fire was announced.\textsuperscript{44} On 12 February, the UN Security-General Boutros-Ghali delegated the UN side of the 'dual-key', of air strikes, to Akashi, who was generally cautious about using air power.\textsuperscript{45} Akashi told news reporters that air strikes should be carried out on whomever would violate the cease-fire. This statement implied that the UN's interpretation of the aims of air strikes was different from that of NATO, which only blamed Bosnian Serbs.\textsuperscript{46} In other words, by implying potential to punish not only Bosnian Serbs but also all warring

\textsuperscript{41} Interview with Douglas Hurd on 7 April 2004; Interview with David Hannay on 6 October 2004; Interview with Robin Renwick on 5 October; Interview with Robert Hunter 17 May 2004.
\textsuperscript{42} For instance, in February 1994 the Bosnian government refused to accept humanitarian aid in Sarajevo in order to bring international attention to the situation in eastern Bosnia where the Muslims were losing their fights against the Bosnian Serb forces. The UNPROFOR, the UNHCR (as well as European states) were highly critical about such political use of humanitarian. See, Ogata, Sadako. \textit{The Turbulent Decade: Confronting the Refugee Crisis of the 1990s}. New York: London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2005. 82; Rose, Michael. \textit{Fighting for Peace: Lessons from Bosnia}. London: Warner, 1999. 116-117.
\textsuperscript{43} Akashi, \textit{Ikiru Kotonimo Kokoroseki}, 143-145; Rose, Michael. \textit{Fighting for Peace}, 68-75.
\textsuperscript{44} Akashi, \textit{Ikiru Kotonimo Kokoroseki}, 143-145; Rose, \textit{Fighting for Peace}, 68-75.
\textsuperscript{45} Akashi, \textit{Ikiru Kotonimo Kokoroseki}, 146-147.
\textsuperscript{46} Akashi, \textit{Ikiru Kotonimo Kokoroseki}, 146-147.
parties, Akashi attempted to prevent the use of air strikes.

With regard to the issue of moving the Bosnian Serb forces' weapons, Russia became a key player. The British government and the UN asked Russia to persuade the Bosnian Serbs. This was because Russia had contributed to UN peacekeeping operations in Croatia and thus had substantial numbers of troops near the border of Bosnia. In addition, it was generally regarded as having a good relationship with Serbia as well as the Bosnian Serbs. For these reasons, the UK and the UN anticipated that Russia would be able to prevail on the Bosnian Serb forces to remove the heavy weapons while using its troops to monitor the progress. However, initial reaction on the part of Russia was negative. Against this background, the British Prime Minister and his Foreign Secretary flew to Moscow in order to hold a meeting with the President of Russia, Boris Yeltsin.

On 16 February John Major and Douglas Hurd had a meeting with Yeltsin. This had been planned before the incident in the Sarajevo market and thus the British leaders did not explicitly link issues regarding the UK-Russian relationship with the potential Russian contribution to the Bosnian conflict. However, the British leaders had a modest expectation of obtaining Russian support for their position with regard to the Sarajevo issue. This was because, before the Anglo-Russian summit, the Russian government had explicitly denounced NATO's ultimatum against the Bosnian Serbs and demanded adherence to the UN's conflict resolution mechanisms. Russia's Bosnian Envoy, Vitaly Churkin, suggested that its participation in the international decision making process in relation to the Bosnian conflict was the critical condition for dispatching its troops to Bosnia.

In the meeting with the Russian President, John Major promised that the UK would work

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47 The ICFY and the UNPROFOR regarded the Russian reaction to this situation as critical. For instance, when Boris Yeltsin criticized NATO's decision on the air strike, David Owen suggested his intention to step down to Douglas Hurd. However, Hurd requested Owen to stay. Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 285-286; Akashi, Ikiru Kotonimo Kokoroseki, 147-148.
48 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 285.
49 Interview with Douglas Hurd on 7 April 2004.
hard to make Russia become a member of the G7.\textsuperscript{52} This would provide an opportunity for Russia to participate in one of most influential decision-making bodies in world politics. Major also suggested that the Queen Elizabeth II would pay a formal state visit to Russia, making her first British Royal visit to the country since the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917.\textsuperscript{53} It can be argued that the implication of this Royal visit to Russia was to symbolize a \textit{de facto} recognition of the Yeltsin's regime, which had dissolved the Russian Parliament by military power in October 1993. Yeltsin decided to seize this opportunity. He implied that Russia would send its peacekeeping troops in order to monitor the Bosnian Serb forces' compliance to the NATO ultimatum demanding that they remove heavy weapons in and around Sarajevo.\textsuperscript{54} Bosnian Serbs announced that it would remove the heavy weapons on the following day.\textsuperscript{55} Jonathan Aitken, the British Minister for Defence Procurement, relayed the development to the members of the House of Commons, praising John Major 'on what has clearly been a successful diplomatic initiative' on his part.\textsuperscript{56}

On 21 February, the UN Special Representative, Akashi Yasushi, announced that he was satisfied that the Bosnian Serbs had complied, after he had received a NATO field official's call that affirmed this.\textsuperscript{57} The NATO secretariat also followed Akashi's estimate.\textsuperscript{58} The crisis had been avoided. This was regarded as a jubilant moment for British diplomacy and its promotion of the European vision of multilateralism, and effectively paved the way for Russia's participation in the international diplomacy regarding the Bosnian conflict. With the help of Russia, Europeans still maintained its grip on the international initiatives on the Bosnian conflict regarding its use of coercive power. However,

\textsuperscript{52} Landry, C. "Major Visits Key Reform City, Says Queen to Make Trip to Russia," \textit{Agence France Presse}, 16 February 1994, Lexis-Nexis.
\textsuperscript{53} Landry, "Major Visits Key Reform City, Says Queen to Make Trip to Russia."
\textsuperscript{54} Interview with Douglas Hurd on 7 April 2004; Daly, Emma, Andrew Marshall, Tony Barber, Patricia Wynn Davies, and Christop. "Sarajevo Air Strikes Forestalled by Russians; Serbs Pull Back Guns but Muslims fear Moscow's Troops Will Freeze Siege Lines," \textit{Independent}, 18 February 1994, 1.
\textsuperscript{55} Moutot, Michel. "Serbs Said to Withdraw from Sarajevo after Russian Pressure," \textit{Agence France Presse}, 17 February 1994, Lexis-Nexis.
\textsuperscript{56} Jonathan Aitkin, House of Commons Debate, 17 February 1994, Hansard, Vol. 237, 1155. Also quoted in Daly et al, "Sarajevo Air Strikes Forestalled by Russians."
\textsuperscript{58} NATO, "Statement by Secretary General to the Press Following Expiry of Deadline for Withdrawal of
the US administration prepared to transform the dynamics of the international diplomacy by remoulding the situation on the ground.

**The Muslim-Croat Federation: Creating an Entity in Order to Promote America’s Interests**

The Clinton administration decided to formalize the Muslim-Croat Federation in Bosnia as soon as the incident in the Sarajevo market occurred. In February 1994, Clinton dispatched his advisers to Europe to explain the Federation plan, while America’s European allies were attempting to prevent NATO’s air strike against the Bosnian Serb forces. Eventually, US Special Envoy to Bosnia, Charles Redman, managed to conclude an agreement. On 18 March, the US President hosted a ceremony establishing the federation attended by the signatories. This policy characterized the duality of the US cooperation with the EU and the UN. On the one hand, the US was officially working for the EU Action Plan; however, on the other hand, in reality, the US Envoy was trying to broker the Muslim-Croat Federation.

As previously discussed in relation to Warren Christopher’s visit to Europe in December 1993, the idea of Muslim-Croat Federation was promoted in order to overcome the tension between two vital interests of the US, as a result of promoting ‘lift and strike’ policy. In other words, preventing America’s direct involvement in the ground war was the essence of this policy. Hence, Charles Redman suggested that the rationale of forming the Federation was to settle the conflict between the Bosnian government and the Bosnian Croat forces and form an effective counter power against the...
Bosnian Serb forces. In this respect, the US Envoy claimed the initiative paved the way for the final
settlement of the Bosnian conflict.

America's approach, however, did not satisfy two parties, namely America's European allies
and the Bosnian government. European policy-makers did not like the idea of the Muslim-Croat
Federation because of the fact that the EU Peace Plan was still officially on the table and the new
international initiatives of the US undermined it. Thus, the policy-makers of its European allies were
kept away from the negotiation process and had little knowledge of America's negotiations.

The Bosnian government was, initially, also not eager to take part in the Muslim-Croat
Federation, as it would prevent the Bosnian government from winning the then ongoing offensives
against the Bosnian Croat forces and regaining its territorial integrity, under the leadership of
Izetbegović. They also distrusted the Croatian President, Franjo Tujman, due to his role in
orchestrating many of the military actions of the Bosnian Croat forces. However, the US pushed
forward the Federation idea regardless of the initial reluctance on the part of the leaders of the Bosnian
government. According to the US negotiator, Charles Redman, because of aforementioned factors, he
did not let the Croatian and the Bosnian leaders directly talk to each other at the negotiation table. He
discussed issues with each side separately, acting as a key interlocutor. Thus, the leaders of the
Bosnian government also sat at the negotiation table without clearly knowing what the Croatian
counterpart was up to and vice versa. Hence, the Bosnian President, Alija Izetbegović, believed that
the creation of the Federation was a result of Croatian acceptance of its political and military defeat
against the Bosnian government. However, in reality, it was a product of US policy to manipulate the

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63 Interview with Charles Redman on 5 February 2004.
64 Interview with Charles Redman on 5 February 2004.
65 Interview with Charles Redman on 5 February 2004; Interview with Douglas Hurd on 7 April 2004.
66 Interview with Douglas Hurd on 7 April 2004; Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 296.
68 Izetbegović, Inescapable Questions, 175-176
69 Interview with Charles Redman on 5 February 2004.
70 Interview with Charles Redman on 5 February 2004.
71 Interview with Charles Redman on 5 February 2004.
72 Izetbegović, Inescapable Questions, 177, 259-260.
geo-strategic situation on the ground (to form an implicit cooperation between the US and Croatia). Therefore, the outcomes were contrary to what Izetbegović believed. He stated that ‘[m]any of the institutions of the supposedly abolished para[-]state of Herzeg-Bosnia (Bosnian Croat’s occupied territory) have continued functioning today [as of 2001].’\textsuperscript{73} In short, the Bosnian government was not pleased with the Muslim-Croat Federation because it fundamentally constrained its rights of self-determination over the Bosnian Croats’ occupied territories.

The establishment of the Federation was, in retrospect, the beginning of the Clinton administration’s \textit{betrayal} of its own justification of the Bosnian policy and its alleged moral interests of the West that they should protect the right of Bosnia to self-determinate and to maintain its territorial integrity, under the Izetbegović government.\textsuperscript{74} These developments do not contravene what the working hypothesis of this thesis has assumed. European’s loss of ‘voice opportunities’ within the Western policy-making process does not necessarily work in favour of the Bosnian government. It was not only the Europeans but also the US that prevented the promotion of the interests of the Bosnian government. America’s key motive in its Bosnian policy was based on its \textit{vital interests} and geopolitical approach thus its initial moral advocacy of protecting the Bosnian government was used \textit{a means} to accomplish the \textit{end} of organizing the Western Order under quasi-multilateralism.

\textit{The Crisis at Goražde in April 1994: the NATO’s Defiance of Quasi-Multilateralism}

In the meantime, Bosnian Serb forces surrounded the US ‘safe area’ of Goražde. In early April 1994, the Bosnian government requested UNPROFOR to order a NATO air strike.\textsuperscript{75} However, General Rose, did not want to drag UNPROFOR into the Bosnian government’s war against the Bosnian Serb forces.\textsuperscript{76} In addition, there had been no dramatic incidents in Goražde, equivalent to the

\textsuperscript{73} Izetbegović, \textit{Inescapable Questions}, 177.
\textsuperscript{74} This justification is according to Anthony Lake’s comments. Interview with Anthony Lake on 19 May 2004.
\textsuperscript{75} Rose, \textit{Fighting for Peace}, 145-147.
\textsuperscript{76} Rose, \textit{Fighting for Peace}, 145-147.
bombing of the Sarajevo market, which could justify punitive air strikes.

Thus, UNPROFOR attempted to promote a local cease-fire in and around Gorazde, instead of using air strikes. On 9 April, General Rose urged Izetbegovic to endorse the idea of promoting a local cease-fire; however, Izetbegovic refused to accept it. As a result, the conflict between the Bosnian government forces and the Bosnian Serb forces intensified. Despite Izetbegovic’s determination, the Bosnian government forces nearly collapsed in areas around Gorazde. This situation forced the UN to take the option of air strikes.

On 10-11 April, NATO launched its first aerial strikes on the Bosnian Serb forces in support of the UNPROFOR mission in a “safe area.” However, as had been predicted before the air strike, Bosnian Serb forces took a number of UNPROFOR personnel hostages. According to General Rose, this was a critical moment of international diplomacy, as it had the potential to trigger the termination of the UNPROFOR mission. The key diplomats, such as the ICFY Co-Chairmen, the UN Secretary-General Special Representative, the US and the Russian Envoys came to Sarajevo. They negotiated in order to find a way out of the crisis for the UNPROFOR mission. However, the US Envoy, Charles Redman, argued that there should not be any peace negotiations until Bosnian Serb forces were punished and the status quo had been restored. Izetbegovic also claimed that the UN should give up its control of air strikes.

In order to find any opportunities for negotiation-based solution, the UN Special Representative, Yasushi Akashi, carried out shuttle diplomacy between Sarajevo and Pale. However, the prospects of his activities were not promising. Akashi even suggested, that in the worst case

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77 Rose, Fighting for Peace, 152-155.
78 Rose, Fighting for Peace, 155-159.
79 On 12 March Akashi agreed to launch air strikes as a reaction to the situation in Bihać. However, NATO failed to implement this due to bad weather. Akashi, Ikiru Kotonimo Kokoroseki, 158-159, 164-165.
80 Rose, Fighting for Peace, 162.
81 Rose, Fighting for Peace, 163.
82 Rose, Fighting for Peace, 166.
83 Akashi, Ikiru Kotonimo Kokoroseki, 165-173.
scenario, the UNPROFOR would have to withdraw from Bosnia. America’s uncompromising position, together with the Bosnian government’s stiff resolve to continue fighting, clearly prevented Akashi and Europeans from promoting a negotiation based settlement. Facing such a deadlock, David Owen suggested that the ICFY would accept the option that the US and the Russian Envoys were to take over its position of Co-Chairmen. It was in such a political context that Bosnian Serb held UN workers on the ground as hostages and threatened to shoot down NATO aircrafts, which resulted in the postponement of air strikes. The international actors involved in diplomacy concerning the Bosnian conflict began to pay attention to the next move.

On 15 April, the US administration suggested that it would hold proximity negotiations concerning territorial settlement in Bosnia, despite the fact that the ICFY was still the only legitimate international institution to do so. Furthermore, the new US Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Shaliakashivili, informed UNPROFOR that NATO would launch punitive air strikes against the Bosnian Serb forces. The Deputy Secretary-General of the UN, Kofi Annan and Akashi agreed that the UN should prevent NATO air strikes in relation to the situation in Goražde. However, on 22 April NATO held a NAC meeting and issued an ultimatum to the Bosnian Serb forces.

Against this backdrop, UNPROFOR was still promoting a cease-fire on the ground. On the same day as the NAC meeting (22 April), Akashi went to Belgrade. He held a series of meetings with Milošević and the leaders of the Bosnian Serb forces. Milošević summoned Radovan Karadžić and other leaders of the Bosnian Serb forces to attend this series of meetings. On 23 April Akashi and Karadžić agreed to stop fighting in Goražde. Akashi and General Rose, persuaded NATO to respect

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85 Owen, *Balkan Odyssey*, 296.
87 Owen, *Balkan Odyssey*, 296.
the local cease-fire.\textsuperscript{92} In addition to this, Akashi publicly demanded that the US respects the value of the local cease-fire.\textsuperscript{93} However, the NATO Secretary-General and NATO’s Allied Supreme Commander disagreed with the UNPROFOR.\textsuperscript{94} Moreover, the US Ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright, bluntly dismissed Akashi’s requests in the following ways:

International civil servants should remember where their salaries are paid — by member states. They should not even be thinking of criticizing the policies of member states. Frankly, I’m tired of it.\textsuperscript{95}

This underscored America’s perception that international organizations only exist in order to promote aims set by its member states, more precisely by the US. In contrast to Liberal Multilateralists’ viewpoint that the US is a ‘benevolent’ leader of the West, there was no space for such a perspective.

Added to Albright’s remarks, the Clinton administration appointed Richard Holbrooke to be Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs in order ‘to deal with the key issues of Bosnia and NATO’s future.’\textsuperscript{96} He was one of the original advocates of the ‘lift and strike’ policy among Clinton’s policy advisers and even a vocal supporter of America’s implicit violation of the arms embargo through a third party.\textsuperscript{97} This shuffle of officials in Washington implied that the US administration would become more hawkish in its reaction to the Bosnian conflict.

To return to the international diplomatic stage, as shown above, the UN officials and UN troop contributing states such as Britain and France vigorously opposed the launching of full scale air strikes for fear of the safety of their soldiers on the ground.\textsuperscript{98} Eventually their efforts prevented NATO from going ahead with additional air strikes in relation to the situation of Goražde. They succeeded in this because NATO lost its rationale to impose air strikes as the situation on the ground improved after

\textsuperscript{92} Akashi, \textit{Ikiru Kotonimo Kokoroseki}, 176; Rose, \textit{Fighting for Peace}, 180-182.
\textsuperscript{94} Akashi, \textit{Ikiru Kotonimo Kokoroseki}, 176; Rose, \textit{Fighting for Peace}, 180-182.
\textsuperscript{98} Akashi, \textit{Ikiru Kotonimo Kokoroseki}, 178-179.
Akashi’s local cease-fire agreement with Karadžić. In a sense, the UN officials, the British and the French government empowered the UN based-multilateralism in order to prevent NATO from implementing its decisions.

The Clinton administration was not pleased by the result. The then US Ambassador to NATO, Robert Hunter, said:

There were suspicions that the British officers serving with UNPROFOR were doing what they could do frustrate the decision of the Nato [sic] council. In fact, some of British officials were also frustrated at the action of the UN office as well as those of their own government’s policy in Bosnia. They shared a desire with their American counterparts for a more robust approach against Bosnian Serb forces. As far as this point is concerned, they had a potential to form an inter-governmental network with American officials. As we have discussed in Chapter 1, the Liberal Multilateralists argue that such a network may maintain Western solidarity regardless of their official policies.

The reality was, however, not in accord with the Liberal Multilateralist interpretation. First of all, the British officials who supported the robust action felt that they were not in the position to demand that their own government shift the policy. Moreover, their position and that of the US administration was fundamentally different. These British officials were quite critical of America’s indifference to the European promoted peace plan(s) and its lack of any alternative idea, to promote peace.

To sum up the above-discussed developments from the EU action Plan to the Goražde crisis, there are various points to be noted. First of all, the claims on the part of the Liberal Multilateralists that

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99 On 27 April the UN at last managed to send an additional 6,500 troops to reinforce the UNPROFOR mission in Bosnia instead of continuing NATO's air strikes. Rose, Fighting for Peace, 186.
101 For instance, the UK Ambassador to the USA, Robin Renwick, UK Ambassador to the UN, David Hannay, the Political Director at the Foreign Commonwealth Office, Pauline-Neville Jones were among such officials. Interview with Robin Renwick on 5 October 2004; Interview with David Hannay on 6 October 2004; Also see: Rose, Fighting for Peace, 249-250, 262-265; Simms, Unfinest Hour, 240-248.
102 Interview with Robin Renwick on 5 October 2004; Interview with David Hannay on 6 October 2004.
103 Interview with Robin Renwick on 5 October 2004; Interview with David Hannay on 6 October 2004.
the Western states share common ‘ideational’ interests for deciding their collective action cannot
explain the British and UN actions. The British government and the UN officials acted together to
prevent any possibility of launching air strikes for the sake of protecting the own peacekeeping troops
and maintaining a momentum for the negotiation based peace. However, this worked not in favour of
the ideological interpretation of Western values in this case such as protecting the interest of the
‘victims’ of international insecurity (i.e. the Bosnian government).

The same can be said of the decisions of the US administration. The US promoted the
Muslim-Croat Federation, regardless of the initial unwillingness of the Bosnian government. Moreover,
the US advocacy of air strikes did not give substance to Liberal Multilateralists’ claim that the US (and
the West) acts in accordance with its (ideological interpretation of) moral values of protecting the
Bosnian government. This was because there was a fundamental difference between the motives of the
US and that of the Bosnian government. The Bosnian government aimed to obtain a settlement that
ensured recognition of their territorial integrity or to provide all means to accomplish it by
themselves. However, the Clinton administration did not want to undermine its vital interests (i.e.
deploying ground troops). Added to that, with regard to the negotiation process of the EU Action Plan,
the US did not respect another procedural definition of Western values (i.e. multilateralism) in order to
maintain NATO’s de facto independence from the UN.

As a result of these Western actions, the two opportunities were missed. From a viewpoint of
respect for multilateralism, it was a chance to implement the EU Action Plan. From an ideological
interpretation of Western value, it was an opportunity to take robust action against Bosnian Serb forces.
Hence, the fundamental interests of civilians on the ground—saving their lives by all means, regardless
of the values it would promote—were not well represented in the Western approaches to the Bosnian
conflict. In short, the above-discussed facts contend with the Liberal Multilateralist’s assumptions. The
West did not act in accord with its alleged attachment to moral obligation to protect international peace
and justice. Also, NATO did not cooperate with the UN and its multilateral-decision making process
did not function as predicted by Liberal Multilateralists.

The Formation of the Contact Group: Was Multilateralism Restored?

European policy-makers realized the limit of their political impact on the direction of the international mediation concerning the Bosnian conflict, while they attempted to resolve the crisis in Goražde in spring 1994. In relation to this, David Owen proposed a new international policy coordination body that would directly involve the US and preferably Russia as well. In fact, before David Owen’s proposal, at the working-level, there were informal practices between the US and some of its European allies to share information regarding their diplomatic activities in relation to the Bosnian conflict. The US administration agreed to formalize these practices. However, the US Envoy to Bosnia, Charles Redman, was sceptical about the efficiency of such a forum. In particular, the US administration did not want to include twelve EU members in such a forum. David Owen shared these concerns regarding its efficiency.

The EU leaders were at first reluctant to defer to the Contact Group, as it was only a few months since the concept of the Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) had been formalized. However, its position was undermined by its failure to conclude a peace plan with the warring parties of the Bosnian conflict. Eventually, on 18-19 April 1994 the Foreign Ministers of the EU held their ministerial meeting and agreed with Owen and Redman’s proposal.

On the following day (19 April) the US, the UK, France, Germany and Russia effectively institutionalized a policy consultation framework among the great powers. The so-called ‘Contact Group’ replaced the ICFY’s leading international forum, with the aim of defining the direction of the

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104 Interview with David Owen on 16 March 2004.
105 Interview with Charles Redman on 5 February 2004.
106 Interview with Charles Redman on 5 February 2004; Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 295-296; Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 28.
107 Interview with David Owen on 16 March 2004.
108 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 296-299.
peace process, effectively undermining the EU and the UN’s role in the peace process.\footnote{Owen, *Balkan Odyssey*, 296-299.} A relatively open-ended multilateralism in the form of the UN and the ICFY was replaced by multilateralism among a limited group. The international interaction was getting one step closer to the idea of quasi-multilateralism that allows America’s exceptional position vis-à-vis the outcomes of policy coordination among more than three parties.

It can be argued that an inter-governmental policy network between the Co-Chairmen of the ICFY and the US Envoy to Bosnia helped the establishment of the Contact Group. Indeed, the idea of Contact Group did not come from their superiors. As far as this point is concerned, there is some validity in the assumptions of the Liberal Multilateralists. As previously discussed (Chapter 1), they argue that such formation of policy networks and transnational cooperation of bureaucratic offices are positive products of pluralistic Western democracies, which supplement governmental level communication and thus facilitate intra-western multilateralism.

It is important to note, however, the political development, which forced the Co-Chairmen of the ICFY to propose the establishment of the Contact Group; namely America’s explicit reluctance to cooperate with the EU, the UN, and the ICFY in promoting peace in Bosnia. Therefore, contra Liberal Multilateralists, it was not the democratic identities of the Western regimes, but diplomatic deadlock on the part of the ICFY, that was the critical factor in bringing about this transnational cooperation between the ICFY and the US Envoy to Bosnia. In essence, this was a product of power politics and America’s vital interests, not that of policy-network or the ideological moral value of the West. Hence, the formation of the Contact Group did not guarantee America’s support to promote peace on the terms of the ICFY.

\footnote{Owen, *Balkan Odyssey*, 296-299.}
The Contact Group Peace Plan: Imposing a Settlement

On 13 May 1994, the Contact Group held its first ministerial meeting and decided to direct a new peace process involving the three warring parties of Bosnia, and, in 1994, it held various meetings with their representatives throughout May and June. On 5 and 6 July 1994 the second ministerial was convened which led to the proposal of the Contact Group Peace Plan.

This plan presented a map that envisaged Bosnia as consisting of two components (the Muslim-Croat Federation and the territories controlled by the Bosnian Serbs), instead of the Stoltenberg-Owen Peace Plan’s three divisions. It gave 51% of the Federation territory to the remaining 49% of it to the Bosnian Serbs. With the exception of the numbers of the territorial divisions, the essence of the Contact Group Peace Plan was based on the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan. However, in contrast to previous peace plans, the Contact Group did not present clear constitutional arrangements. The details of these critical issues were to be addressed as soon as the warring parties consented to the territorial divisions. In addition, the plan was unique as it contained some elements of coercion as a means to achieve the settlement. This was called the ‘take it or leave it’ principle, which demanded the three parties accept the Plan by 20 July 1994, or face sanctions (including the possibility of NATO air strikes). However, the plan was promoted at the cost of ignoring the interests of the Bosnian government.

For instance, Izetbegović and other Bosnian leaders disliked the Contact Group Peace Plan as it posed a critical challenge to the interests of the Bosnian government. They saw it as a product of the Clinton administration’s shifting priority from its rhetorical support of the interests of the Bosnian government.

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112 For the details of the activities of the Contact Group during this period, see: Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 299-306; Rose, Fighting for Peace, 199-212.
114 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 28-30.
government, to actively pursuing America's interests as a world super power.\textsuperscript{118} In short, from the viewpoint of the Bosnian government, the Contact Group Peace Plan was an 'unjust' plan and was a symbol of America's betrayal of its initial promise to protect the territorial integrity of Bosnia.\textsuperscript{119}

Under intense international pressure (especially from the US), the Muslim-Croat Federation indicated its intention that they would accept the Contact Group Peace Plan (i.e. not the formal acceptance).\textsuperscript{120} The Bosnian Serb leader Karadžić attended the meeting of the Contact Group, where he raised concerns about the absence of concrete constitutional arrangements in the plan.\textsuperscript{121}

After the deadline, on 29-30 July, a third ministerial meeting (of the Contact Group) was held to discuss the situation. However, no clear constitutional arrangements were agreed on.\textsuperscript{122} Moreover, substantial international sanctions did not follow even when the Bosnian Serbs rejected the peace plan, due to internal divisions between the members of the Contact Group.\textsuperscript{123} The US demanded the launch of air strikes and lifting the arms embargo on the Muslim-Croatia Federation side. The European members of the Contact Group, in particular Britain and Russia, opposed this.\textsuperscript{124} British opposition was based on the logic that air strikes would lead to the withdrawal of the UNPROFOR troops on the ground or result in hostages. Russia contested NATO's military operation, because there was insufficient support from the UNSC.

Thus, by the end of the third ministerial meeting of the Contact Group in late July 1994, the

\textsuperscript{117} Izetbegovic, Inescapable Questions, 261.
\textsuperscript{118} Izetbegovic, Inescapable Questions, 261.
\textsuperscript{119} Izetbegovic, Inescapable Questions, 261.
\textsuperscript{120} According to Izetbegovic, the Muslim-Croat Federation did not give a formal approval to the plan until November 1994. Izetbegovic, Inescapable Questions, 261-262; Also see: Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 307.
\textsuperscript{121} Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 307-308.
\textsuperscript{124} Interview with Robert Hunter on 17 May 2004; Interview with Anthony Lake on 19 May 2004; Interview with Robin Renwick on 5 October; Interview with David Hannay on 6 October; Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 305-308.
US moderated its advocacy of a ‘lift and strike’ policy. This was not only a result of the pressure from other members of the Contact Group, but of America’s belated realization of the potential consequences of the ‘lift and strike’. The ‘lift and strike’ policy was rationalized by the America’s moral commitment to the interest of the Bosnian government. This was a means to oppose the ICFY promoted peace plans and thus a political tool to protect one of America’s vital interests of maintaining NATO’s de facto independence from the UN. However, imposing ‘lift and strike’ policy would have lead to the withdrawal of the UNPROFOR and the deployment of US ground troops—a scenario the US wanted to avoid. In reality, the ‘lift and strike’ policy only exacerbated this predicament for the US in the form of the tension between two vital interests maintaining NATO’s de facto independence from the UN and not deploying ground troops. As a result, US was not able to give substance to the Contact Group’s ‘take it or leave it ‘approach.

The Croatian Violation of the Arms Embargo: Impact of America’s Domestic Politics

Despite the above-discussed strategic context, it is widely believed not only by the Liberal Multilateralists, but also by some academics that domestic pressure, particularly from US Congress forced the Clinton administration to oppose the arms embargo on Bosnia. The Republican Party’s (which demanded the lifting of the arms embargo on Bosnian Muslims) control of majority in both chambers of the US Congress in November 1994, makes this causal relationship between the congressional pressure and America’s failure to comply with multilateralism (in the form of the arms embargo on Bosnia) seem plausible.

The US administration, however, formally adopted the ‘lift and strike’ policy in May 1993.

125 Interview with Robert Hunter on 17 May 2004; Interview with Anthony Lake on 19 May 2004.
This was nearly half year before the mid-term US congressional election. US policy-makers such as National Security Adviser, Anthony Lake, underscored this point. According to him, the US administration formed its Bosnian policy in relation to the European promoted peace plan(s)—in other words promoting 'lift and strike' policy—primarily based on the practicality of the plan(s), not based on congressional pressures to do so. In other words, America's domestic pressure was not the critical factor in determining the Clinton administration's policy in Bosnia and they had a grip on the direction of the policy based on rational calculation of America's vital interests. The following story is another case that may confirm this point.

On 29 April 1994, the US Ambassador to Croatia, Peter Galbraith, and the US Envoy to Bosnia, Charles Redman, met government officials of the Croatian Republic. The Croatian officials informed its US counterparts that they would supply arms to the Muslim-Croatia federation in Bosnia, via Iran. The US diplomats did not oppose it. According to Redman, he and Galbraith reacted to their Croatian counterpart by saying that: 'we would not put [on] the green light [for the arms smuggling] but the red light as well. We simply say [sic], “it’s your decision”.' The White House was informed of the meeting and did not oppose their actions. In other words, high-ranking US foreign-

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128 Interview with Anthony Lake on 19 May 2004.
129 Galbraith, Peter. "Prepared Statement of Peter W. Galbraith, U.S. Ambassador to Croatia, before the House International Relations Committee," Federal News Service, 30 May 1996, Lexis-Nexis. Redman, Charles. "Prepared Statement of Charles Redman, U.S. Ambassador to Germany, before the House International Relations Committee," Federal News Service, 30 May 1996, Lexis-Nexis. In addition, Izetbegovic implied that the Bosnian government had obtained arms from Iran, possibly in corroboration with Croatian authority. In order to encourage historians' researches in the future, this research provides a hypothesis on this issue that the US administration persuaded the Bosnian government to accept the establishment of the Muslim-Croat Federation by using this arms deal as a 'carrot'. So far Charles Redman has dismissed this. Interview with Charles Redman on 5 February 2004; Izetbegovic, Inescapable Questions, 223
130 Interview with Charles Redman on 5 February 2004; Interview with Anthony Lake on 19 May 2004; Galbraith, "Prepared Statement of Peter W. Galbraith, U.S. Ambassador to Croatia, before the House International Relations Committee", "Hearing of the House of International Relations Committee, Subject: Iranian Arms Transfers to Bosnia, Chaired by: Representative Benjamin Gilman (R-NY)," Federal News Service 30 May 1996, Lexis-Nexis.
131 Interview with Charles Redman on 5 February 2004.
132 Interview with Charles Redman on 5 February 2004; "Hearing of the House of International Relations Committee, Subject: Iranian Arms Transfers to Bosnia, Chaired by: Representative Benjamin Gilman (R-NY)."
policy makers had clear knowledge about this development and implicitly supported it. This was clearly a *de facto* endorsement of a violation of the arms embargo.

According to Galbraith and Redman, they also reported the contents of their conversation with the Croatian officials to all the members of the Contact Group. They recalled that other members of the Contact Group did not criticize America’s *de facto* implicit acceptance of the violation of the arms embargo on the part of Croatian authorities. Thus, Redman considered that it was either not a serious piece of information or they accepted the fact as it was. However, the then British Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, contested this claim, noting that he, as a member of the Contact Group, did not receive this critical information. He presumes that, had they been informed, it would certainly have provoked criticism from Britain against the US.

After the US administration implicitly endorsed the Croatian violation of the arms embargo, the US administration did not inform the US Congress. Without knowing what the administration was up to, the US Senate and the House of Representative voted in favour of America’s the unilateral lifting of the arms embargo on 12 May and 9 June 1994 respectively. The US administration did not officially endorse congressional resolutions, however, it had known the fact that the Croatian government had been ignored the arms embargo regime. It was unnecessary for the Clinton administration to provoke international criticism against them (and take responsibility for this in the form of sending ground troops) by explicitly violating the arms embargo. Thus, the Clinton

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133 Interview with Anthony Lake on 19 May 2004.
134 Interview with Charles Redman on 5 February 2004. "Hearing of the House of International Relations Committee, Subject: Iranian Arms Transfers to Bosnia, Chaired by: Representative Benjamin Gilman (R-NY)."
135 Interview with Charles Redman on 5 February 2004; "Hearing of the House of International Relations Committee, Subject: Iranian Arms Transfers to Bosnia, Chaired by: Representative Benjamin Gilman (R-NY)."
136 Interview with Douglas Hurd on 7 April 2004.
administration, on the one hand, refused to accept the congressional demand. Members of the Congress who supported lifting the arms embargo were frustrated at the Clinton administration's indecision.\textsuperscript{138}

By that time (spring 1994), it was too risky for the US administration to explicitly unilaterally undermine the authority of UN Security Council Resolution 713, which constituted the arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{139} As we discussed before, this was because the US had not deployed peace-keeping troops on the ground and, thus, lifting arms embargo would obviously provoke European allies to pull out their troops. It would eventually drag the US into a war against Bosnian Serb forces on behalf of the Bosnian government, or the Bosnian Croats.

On the other hand, since early 1993, the Clinton administration had ignored its own party's ranking members in the Congress, who supported the ICFY's efforts to settle the Bosnian conflict and urged the US to act with Europeans. For instance, the then Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the House of Representative, Lee Hamilton, said,

\[ \text{[i]f we lift this embargo, we are going to intensify the war, and by intensifying the war that is another way of saying we are going to be killing a lot more people.} \textsuperscript{140} \]

Thus, Hamilton and other Democratic members of the Congress who supported multilateral US policy in Bosnia were uncomfortable with the Clinton administration's approach.\textsuperscript{141}

Considering both opinions for and against the arms embargo, the US Congress did not have any power over the outcomes of the US endorsement of the Croatian violation of the arms embargo. The main reason for this was that the critical information (i.e. America's implicit endorsement of the violation of the arms embargo) was clearly concealed by the administration. In other words, the Clinton administration formulated the Bosnian policy by isolating congressional inputs. Indeed, contra-Liberal Multilateralism, US policy-making system was neither 'open', 'penetrative' nor 'competitive'. It is now plausible to conclude that America's implicit support for Croatia's violation of the arms

\textsuperscript{138} Interview with Robert Hand (Foreign Policy Staff of the Congressman Steny Hoyer, who supported the 'lift and strike' policy) on 19 May 2004.
\textsuperscript{139} UN Security Council Resolution 713. 25 September 1991 (S/Res/713).
\textsuperscript{140} Quoted in Doherty, "House Votes to Force Clinton to End Bosnia Arms Ban," 1535.
\textsuperscript{141} Interview with Martin Sletzinger (Foreign Policy Staff of the Congressman Lee Hamilton, who opposed
embargo—the symbol of intra-western multilateralism—was not based on its domestic politics but the Clinton administration’s rational calculation of US interests.

To sum up the developments from the formation of the Contact Group to the Croatian violation of arms embargo, we have discussed some important counter arguments against the assumptions on the part of Liberal Multilateralists. Firstly, the formation of the Contact Group can be interpreted as a work of intra-western multilateralism, assisted by the inter-governmental network, in the form of the cooperation between the ICFY and the US officials. However, as we have discussed, America’s persistent ignoring of the efforts of the ICFY prior to the establishment of the Contact Group, was a more fundamental factor in creating the Contact Group.

Secondly, even after the establishment of the Contact Group, the Western states were not able to form a united approach to the Bosnian conflict. In particular, they strongly disagreed with each other on the issue of the use of coercive power. The US did not want to endorse the UN’s command and control power over NATO’s military action. In contrast, the European members of the Contact Group insisted on maintaining the UN’s role in the use of coercive power and their efforts to promote peace due to concern over the implications for UNPROFOR troops on the ground. This episode suggests that NATO’s cooperation with other international organizations is defined by the political negotiations—in other words balance of power consideration—among the member states of NATO. NATO’s alleged hybrid characteristic, as Liberal Multilateralists assume, did not facilitate the cooperation between NATO and the UN.

Thirdly, the indecisive outcomes of the Western debate on the Bosnian conflict at that time were partly a result of intra-Western disagreement. However, given America’s asymmetric power over other Western states, this was more to do with America’s indecision related to the probable consequences of ‘lift and strike’ policy for the vital interests of the US that keeps American ground troops away from the conflict. This constituted a tension between America’s two vital interests (i.e. the ‘lift and strike’ policy) on 17 May 2004.
NATO’s *de facto* independence from the UN and not deploying ground troops). So long as the Bosnian government pursued a ‘just peace’ by all means, there was a danger that the US would become embroiled in fighting a war on behalf of the Bosnian government. Thus the Clinton administration faced the predicament of promoting quasi-multilateralism in relation to its advocacy of the ‘lift and strike policy’.

Fourthly, the administration’s implicit choice to overcome this predicament was a use of geo-strategic (i.e. balance of power) approach that encouraged a local force (i.e. Croatia) to promote its favoured policy, but without sacrificing America’s *vital interests* and without seriously undermining its profile as a supporter of the humanitarian situation in Bosnia and international collaboration. However, America’s commitment to such normative values would be compromised in order to promote its vital interests that demands ‘stability’ more than the contents of ‘justice’ on the ground. This was the implication of the America’s promotion of ‘market democracy’, based on the logic of ‘democratic peace’ instead of other forms of Western values (i.e. respecting multilateralism and protecting the interests of the Bosnian government). This was a way to organize the Western Order under the logic of quasi-multilateralism. Hence, in contrast to Liberal Multilateralists’ claim, the pressure from the US Congress did not force this policy. The formation of the Muslim-Croat Federation and the case of the Croatian violation of the arms embargo underlines America’s actions based on its vital interests.

Lastly, if the working hypothesis of this research is correct, this situation would lead to another step. The US would mount further international pressure for its allies to accept the logic that coercive action, and not negotiation, was the central means to accomplish a settlement in Bosnia. In this way, the West would impose a settlement that the Bosnian government did not want and it would devastate the conditions of civilians on the ground. The next section will demonstrate whether this interpretation is accountable and supported by events.
War or Negotiations? America's Vital Interests and Domestic Politics

From autumn to winter 1994, the situation in Muslim controlled areas such as Tuzla and Bihać had deteriorated. The Bosnian Federation demanded NATO air strikes in order to support their military operations. It also urged the international community to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia. The then UNPROFOR Commander in Bosnia, General Michel Rose, however, was critical about NATO's action under such a situation as one of intervening in the Bosnian conflict, and demanded that NATO comply with the UN's authority over its air strikes. This was based on the interpretation of the 'dual-key' of air strikes, which stated that NATO's actions were only permitted in order to protect either UNPROFOR personnel or to assure the flow of humanitarian assistance on the ground. Moreover, it also demands such actions should be authorized by the UN Secretary-General (via his special representative Akashi Yasushi or UNPROFOR Commander). The European members of the Contact Group, especially Britain, stood behind this interpretation.

Regarding this issue, together with UNPROFOR officers, the UK attempted to regain the political control over the international approaches concerning the Bosnian conflict. Their efforts consisted of four aspects. Firstly, the British government attempted to persuade the US to respect the 'dual-key' arrangement. However, this was not strong enough to convince the US administration.

Secondly, the ICFY Co-Chairmen, UK., France and Russia urged the US to accept the premise that maintaining political contact with the Bosnian Serbs leadership and Slobodan Milošević was critical in order to facilitate potential negotiations for a settlement. Thirdly, UNPROFOR demanded that the Bosnian government should not exploit NATO's actions in order to launch its own military offensives.

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143 Rose, Fighting for Peace, 262-264, 298-299.
145 Rose, Fighting for Peace, 262-264.
146 Interview with Robin Renwick on 5 October 2004; Interview with Douglas Hurd on 7 April 2004.
against the Bosnian Serb forces. Fourthly, they attempted to promote any form of local cease-fire(s) between the Bosnian Serb forces and the Bosnian government. The UN Special Representative, Yasushi Akashi, attempted to broker negotiations that aimed at bringing about cease-fire(s) between the warring parties of the Bosnian conflict. Lastly, the British government attempted to persuade the Bosnian government to postpone its demand to lift the arms embargo. The Bosnian government agreed to do so for six months.

In contrast, the US administration criticized the Europeans', especially the British and UNPROFOR's approaches as being too lenient on the Serbs in general and Bosnian Serb forces in particular. The US administration supported punitive use of NATO air strikes on Bosnian Serb forces. Furthermore, by the summer 1994, the Americans came up with the idea, supported by Germany, of closing all political communication, not only with the Bosnian Serbs, but also Serbia.

The gap between the US, on the one hand, and British, French and Russian policies on the other hand was too wide to bridge at that time. Then UK Ambassador to the USA, Robin Renwick, recalled that the differences between the US and UK, on the issue of the Bosnian conflict, resulted in serious criticism of the British foreign policy from Americans. There was a shared feeling among the American policy-makers that the British government, more than any other state, was the critical obstacle in Bosnia. This was the political reality of the 'special relationship' of the democratic regimes between the US and the UK at this time. This episode suggests that, in contrast to Liberal Multilateralists, America gives 'voice opportunities' for its allies, not based on their domestic identities but based on the affinities of strategic interests between the US and its partners.

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149 Rose, *Fighting for Peace*, 318.
152 Interview with Robin Renwick on 5 October 2004; Interview with Robert Hunter on 7 May 2004.
154 Interview with Robin Renwick on 5 October 2004.
155 Interview with Robin Renwick on 5 October 2004; Interview with Robert Hunter on 19 May 2004.
The Implications of the US Midterm Congressional Election of November 1994

The result of the US midterm election on 9 November 1994 did little to help to improve the situation in favour of the European members of the Contact Group. The Republican Party won the elections and obtained a majority in both houses of US Congress. They campaigned for a strong anti-UN position and demanded no 'US troops under UN Command.' On 10 November, President Clinton announced that the US would no longer take part in the international monitoring mission to prevent arms flowing into Bosnia. He went on to suggest that the administration would pursue strategic air strikes against Bosnian Serb forces in order to support the Bosnian government. This was a renewed avocation of the 'lift and strike' policy. America's policy at that time can be summarized as follows: a) supporting the interest of the Bosnian government at least rhetorically; b) withdrawing itself from the international monitoring missions of the arms embargo on Bosnia; c) launching NATO air strikes on Bosnian Serb forces regardless of UNPROFOR contributing countries' opposition; d) freezing any political contacts with the Serbs; and e) being unwilling to support any implementation of a peace plan.

This set of policies provoked outrage among the European members of the Contact Group. They denounced the approach, suggesting that it would merely intensify fighting on the ground rather than promote peace. Was the Clinton administration forced to take such actions because of US domestic pressure? Before the midterm congressional election of 1994, the US Congress had a consensus on lifting the arms embargo but it was not able to form a consensus on NATO air strikes against Bosnian Serb forces. The midterm election finally provided the opportunity for members of

157 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 31-32.
158 Interview with Douglas Hurd on 7 April 2004; Interview with Robert Hunter on 19 May 2004, Interview with Martin Sletzinger 17 May 2004; Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 31-32.
159 To clarify this point, before the mid-term US congressional election the leaders of both Democrats and Republicans had agreed on the necessity of NATO air strikes but their consensus was not strong enough to persuade other reluctant members of the Congress. See: Doherty, Carroll. J. "U.S. Policy in Use of Force Puzzles May Lawmakers," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 52, no. 15 (1994): 906; Doherty, "Authorization Bill Urges Clinton to Arms Bosnian Muslims," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 52, no. 16 (1994): 1011-1012; Doherty, "Senate Sends Mixed Signals on Bosnia," Congressional Quarterly
Congress to speak with a more united voice to lift the arms embargo. Therefore, as far as the *timing* of this announcement was concerned, it would be possible to suggest the existence of a link between this and congressional pressure. However, considering the *contents* of his announcement, this was not a dramatic departure from Clinton's previous position. As discussed, the Clinton administration had advocated the essence of the congressional demands before the midterm election. Thus, the midterm election only had limited impact upon the *contents* of the US government's policy.

For the reasons above, it is justifiable to reconsider the Liberal Multilateralists' interpretation that the Clinton administration was forced to take a unilateral position vis-à-vis its European allies. In fact, regardless of congressional pressures, the US administration was able to envision and to promote American interests in the form of 'lift and strike' policy that ignored other Western states' opposition. Hence, it is wrong to blame America's domestic actors' narrow-minded opinions as the key factor for dictating the US government's anti-multilateral actions. It would be accurate to suggest that the outcomes of the US midterm congressional election provided an opportunity for the Clinton administration to *revitalize* the 'lift and strike' that they had previously advocated.

Indeed, after Clinton's statement on 10 November 1994, the US administration attempted to deprive the UN of its authority over the so-called 'dual-key' of air strike by encouraging NATO to engaging air strikes. Towards the end of November 1994 Cazin, a Muslim enclave in the northern part of Bosnia, had been exposed to Bosnian Serb forces' attacks. In response, NATO carried out several air strikes on Serbian airfields and related facilities at the Serb-occupied town of Udbina in southern Croatia.\(^{160}\) This action alarmed the UNPROFOR Bosnia Commander, General Rose, as it went beyond the premise that NATO conduct air strikes in order support UNPROFOR's activities and not get

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160 Udbina was a Serbian forces controlled area of Croatia. The Serb forces' air fighters made sallies from there to Cazin. Cazin was a town near Bihać at a Muslim enclave in the northern Bosnia.
involved in military operations of any particular group.\textsuperscript{161}

In the meantime, the situation in and around one of the ‘safe areas’ of Bihać had also
deteriorated.\textsuperscript{162} In order to avoid the Bosnian government blame UNPROFOR for failing Bihać,
General Rose requested NATO’s air support against Bosnian Serb forces’ tanks and artillery.\textsuperscript{163} NATO
agreed to endorse the request on the part of the UNPROFOR. However, NATO’s new Supreme Allied
Commander, General Wesley Clark, told General Rose that the so-called ‘dual-key’ of air strike was
effectively out of the UNPROFOR Commander’s hand.\textsuperscript{164}

Furthermore, in New York, the US Ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright, demanded
that then UN Deputy Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, accept NATO’s strategic air strikes against
Bosnian Serb forces.\textsuperscript{165} In other words, NATO would attack targets beyond the hinted scope of those
posing an imminent threat to UNPROFOR’s activities. UN officials, the British, the French
governments all made efforts to prevent these strategic air strikes.\textsuperscript{166} As a part of this, on 30 November
Boutros-Ghali visited Sarajevo to discuss the situation with local leaders and UNPROFOR officers. He
warned that UNPROFOR personnel would be withdrawn if the Bosnian government (of Izetbegović)
did not stop fighting.\textsuperscript{167} On this occasion, Boutros-Ghali agreed with Rose that NATO should not
launch strategic air strikes.\textsuperscript{168} In addition, the British Foreign Secretary and his French counterpart
urged the US administration to lift its ban on contacting Serbian and Bosnian Serbs leaders in order to
facilitate a negotiation based settlement.\textsuperscript{169}

In this context, on 1 December NATO held a NAC meeting and decided to support the re-

\textsuperscript{161} The UNPROFOR Commander witnessed the fact that the Bosnian Prime Minister Harris Silajdžić had
visited Washington prior to the NATO’s air attack. The US government informed Silajdžić about this
\textsuperscript{162} Cazin is situated near Bihać
\textsuperscript{163} Rose, \textit{Fighting for Peace}, 307-308.
\textsuperscript{164} Rose, \textit{Fighting for Peace}, 308.
\textsuperscript{165} Rose, \textit{Fighting for Peace}, 305-309.
\textsuperscript{166} Rose, \textit{Fighting for Peace}, 305-309.
\textsuperscript{167} Rose, \textit{Fighting for Peace}, 305-309.
\textsuperscript{168} Rose, \textit{Fighting for Peace}, 313.
\textsuperscript{169} AFP, "Hurd, and Juppé Could Travel to Belgrade," \textit{Agence France Presse}, 1 December 1994, Lexis-
vitalization of the Contact Group Peace Plan. On 2 December, the Contact Group also convened its fourth ministerial meeting in Brussels. Ministers agreed to ease the degree of political isolation which had been imposed on Slobodan Milošević. After the meeting, the British Foreign Secretary and his French counterpart announced that, from 4 December 1994, they would make a joint tour of the Balkan Peninsula to discuss the prospects for peace negotiations with all main local leaders, including Slobodan Milošević.

It seems that European influence on US policy worked in practice. However, in fact, before the Europeans demanded recognizing political contacts with the Bosnian Serbs and Serbia at the NAC meeting (1 December), the US administration had faced a situation that forced them to modify its robust policy based on Clinton’s 10 November announcement. This situation was essentially America’s classic predicament of quasi-multilateralism in the form of the tension between its two vital interests. To elucidate this point, at that time, US policy-makers considered that the choice they could make was as follows: whether they continued to advocate air strikes and consequently send US troops on the ground in order to support UNPROFOR’s evacuation, or they betrayed its initial promise to protect the interest of the Bosnian government by halting air strikes in order to avoid sending its ground troops. The latter option was taken. In other words, America’s agreement to recommence the Contact Group’s negotiation with Milošević did not come about because of the power of multilateralism, but as a result of America’s realization of the negative impacts of its ‘lift and strike’ policy on its vital interests. In short, the US needed time to re-formulate its policy towards the Bosnian

173 According to Daalder, they realized it ‘by thanksgiving time’ (i.e. 24th of November, 1994). Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 33.
174 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 33.
175 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 33.
For this reason, the US did not react to the European demands positively. The US administration did not soften its hostile attitude towards Slobodan Milošević and thus did not spell out any incentives for him. In addition, Warren Christopher went back on his initial suggestion that he and Douglas Hurd might visit Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia. Christopher even kept his distance from Hurd and Juppé's initiative to negotiate with Serbian authority. There was a clear contradiction between an allegedly agreed Western diplomatic initiative and America's persistent advocacy of isolating Serbia. Furthermore, the US administration embarked on alternative initiatives that did not relate to the Contact Group's activities. On 1 December, the US administration had dispatched the then US Ambassador to Germany, Charles Redman, to Bosnia to meet the Bosnian Serb leaders.

According to David Owen, the ICFY and European leaders only discovered this on 2 December, just before the Contact Group ministerial meeting. They were 'amazed' by America's lack of coordination with other members of the Contact Group. The next section will add further elaborations about America's solution to the tension between its two vital interests that were created by its use of quasi-multilateralism.

The 'Containment' Policy: Overcoming the Predicament of Quasi-Multilateralism

As we have discussed above, after Clinton's announcement on 10 November, US policymakers faced a reality that its policy of 'lift and strike' would not provide any substantial breakthrough.
in bringing about a settlement and that this created a danger for its vital interests. Thus, it began to modify its policy towards Bosnia in order to prevent the scenario of deploying US forces on the ground. The essence of this revision was to keep distance from the Bosnian conflict in general and from the interests of the Bosnian government in particular.

The Clinton administration's new approach was aimed at 'containing' the domino effect of the Bosnian conflict that would gain time to avoid facing the consequence of the 'lift and strike' policy (i.e. withdrawal of UNPROFOR troops, which could trigger potential deployment of US ground forces). As a part of 'containment' policy, the Clinton administration suspended its option of launching strategic aerial strikes. In order to achieve this modified goal, the principal policy-makers discussed what tactics to follow and also how they should promote a peace, whilst keeping distance from the Bosnian conflict.

As a result of this discussion, in late 1994, the Clinton administration decided to promote a settlement based on the following three elements: 1) re-negotiating the Contact Group map; 2) accepting some formal political relationship between the Bosnian Serb and Serbia; 3) resuming political contact with the Bosnian Serbs. The principal policy-makers of the Clinton administration agreed that there needed to be a three to six month cease-fire in order to enhance the likelihood of success. In order to buy time, the US administration began to promote a provisional cease-fire.

As soon as the Clinton administration adopted this policy under the banner of 'containment', the US Ambassador to Germany (and the former US Bosnia Envoy), Charles Redman, visited Pale and the US ended the political isolation of the Serbs. In addition, on 8 December, Clinton made clear the conditions for sending American troops in his letter to the allies of the US and to the US congress. He told them that if the settlement was agreed, the US would provide 20,000-25,000 ground troops.

183 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 33-35.
184 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 33-35.
185 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 33-35.
186 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 33-35.
However, he emphasized that it must be under NATO command not as a part of the UN peacekeeping operation.\textsuperscript{188}

Formally acting in an individual capacity, but in reality endorsed by the Clinton administration, on 20 December, the former US President, Jimmy Carter, visited Bosnia.\textsuperscript{189} His purpose was to contact Bosnian Serb leadership and to seek a possibility of negotiation.\textsuperscript{190} He eventually brokered a provisional cease-fire agreement among the warring Bosnian parties from Christmas 1994 until 30 April 1995.\textsuperscript{191} The Carter mission consolidated the Clinton administration's 'containment policy' of the Bosnian conflict.\textsuperscript{192} Thus, it only eased the level of fighting, and did not guarantee a substantial cease-fire. Moreover, the US did not provide ground troops because it was a provisional \textit{cease-fire}, not the \textit{settlement}. This, of course, did not satisfy other parties, but only the US administration.\textsuperscript{193}

To sum up the developments from autumn to winter 1994, the US administration eagerly promoted its interests. The critical point for the US administration was that it did not want to deploy any troops on the ground, without having NATO's substantial control over such mission. One US policy-maker remarked that 'NATO is more important than Bosnia.'\textsuperscript{194} Indeed, the essence of America's approach was \textit{geo-strategy} in the form of manipulating the balance of power between the warring parties of Bosnia. Thus, it was based neither on \textit{procedural} normative value of respecting the outcomes of multilateralism, nor implementing the alleged \textit{ideological} moral value of the West in the form of protecting the interests of the Bosnian government. Nevertheless, America's initial advocacy of the 'lift and strike' policy was, rationalised by such \textit{ideological} interpretation of Western values.


\textsuperscript{189} Daalder, \textit{Getting to Dayton}, 35.

\textsuperscript{190} Daalder, \textit{Getting to Dayton}, 35.


\textsuperscript{192} Daalder, \textit{Getting to Dayton}, 35-36.

\textsuperscript{193} A Clinton administration official's evaluation of Carter mission, see: Daalder, \textit{Getting to Dayton}, 35-36.

Eventually, in order to implement its ‘containment’ policy, the US government retreated from its rhetorical commitment to protect the interests of the Bosnian government. It is now legitimate to say that one of the fundamental fallacies of the Liberal Multilateralists’ interpretation of the Western Order was their failure to look at this strategic use of ideological moral values.

Conclusion

The Contact Group replaced the ICFY’s—and thus effectively the EU and UN’s—initiatives to lead international mediation of the Bosnian conflict. It was formed as a result of the lack of American cooperation with the ICFY. Before its establishment, the US administration bypassed the EU Action Plan and promoted the Muslim-Croats Federation of in Bosnia. After the establishment of the Contact Group, the US attempted to impose a peace plan. However, America’s attempt failed, due to disagreement among its members. The US and Germany supported a wider air strike policy, but the UK, France, and Russia opposed this.

This limited form of policy-coordination among the great powers was expected to bridge a gap between the US and its European allies. However, the Europeans did not want to sideline the authority of the UN over NATO air strikes. Moreover, the US administration did not change its preference for the formal ‘lift and strike’ policy. In April (America’s implicit endorsement of the Croatian violation of the arms embargo) and November 1994 (Clinton’s announcement of withdrawal from the international monitor regime of the arms embargo scheme), the Clinton administration ignored the effect of an arms embargo on Bosnia, which was authorized by the UN Security Council Resolution No 713.

The US administration, however, faced two obstacles to any all-out implementation of the ‘lift and strike’ policy. One was an institutional obstacle—namely the so-called ‘dual-key’ arrangement. The other was a political one. America’s European allies’ threatened to withdraw UNPFOFOR troops on the ground if the ‘lift and strike’ policy were to be implemented. This would have led to US
participation of the war on the part of the Muslim-Croat Federation. The political risk of this policy was too high for the Clinton administration. Therefore, it was not the multilateral policy-coordination among the Contact Group as such, but the issue of the ‘dual-key’ and the risk for America’s vital interests that prevented the US from imposing the ‘lift and strike’ policy in a comprehensive manner. By the end of 1994, the Clinton administration had decided to buy time and promote a ‘containment’ policy for the Bosnian conflict.

The Clinton administration, however, still struggled with the predicament of quasi-multilateralism in the form of the tension between the two vital interests (i.e. maintaining NATO’s de facto independence from the UN and not deploying ground troops) throughout 1994. This anguish on the part of the US administration produced a policy to construct a working cooperation with local forces, without sacrificing its vital interests, as well as its profile as a supporter of Western values. This could shift America’s approach from international militarization to the intensification of the conflict at the local level. Formation of the Muslim-Croat Federation in March 1993, the Clinton administration’s implicit endorsement of the Croatian violation of the arms embargo in April 1994, and Bill Clinton’s announcement of unilateral withdrawal from the arms embargo-monitoring mission in November 1994 underscored this point.

America’s European allies were only able to prevent the full-scale Western military intervention in Bosnia in the form of ‘lift and strike’ policy. However, as the result of a failure on the part of the ICFY, they lost the political resources to promote substantial peace negotiations between the warring parties of Bosnia. Thus, the direction of the political interaction among the Western states was transformed from the Europeans’ demand for the US to cooperate with its UN based multilateralism to the American pressure for its European allies to accept the ‘lift and strike’ policy. In short, European voices were only heard in a passive way. Accordingly, the future of Bosnia was to be led by the Western states—essentially, by the US administration and its policy of indirect military intervention in the Bosnian conflict. If the working hypothesis of this research turns out to be true, the likely
consequences of such a policy would ‘betray’ America’s initial promise to protect the interests of the
Bosnian government and it would also ‘devastate’ civilians on the ground. The next chapter will
evaluate this causality.
Chapter 6 The Consequences of Quasi-Multilateralism: the End of the Bosnian Conflict, from January to December 1995

This final empirical chapter of this thesis discusses the Western approaches to the Bosnian conflict from January 1995, to the end of the conflict in November 1995. The key features of this period were as follows. Firstly, there was America’s continuing struggle with its predicament of quasi-multilateralism, in the form of the tension between its vital interests that was symbolized by the deadlock of the ‘lift and strike’ policy, as discussed in Chapter 5. Secondly, it was UNPROFOR’s lack of ability to stabilize the situation on the ground. Thirdly, it was America’s decision to intervene in the conflict in the form of NATO air strikes and by implicitly supporting the Croatian offensive. Finally, it was the Dayton peace negotiation that ended the conflict.

Theoretically, this chapter will evaluate the validity of the working hypothesis, especially, the causal relationship between the formation of the quasi-multilateralism (i.e. the loss of European ‘voice opportunities’ within the West as a result of America’s manipulation of the definition of the Western moral values) and the negative consequences it would cause the situation in Bosnia.

With regard to America’s manipulation of moral values, it is clear that other Western states were not able to prevent America’s opportunistic interpretation of Western moral values and its corresponding advocacy of use of coercive power (see, Chapters 3, 4 and 5). This is because the direction of the Western Order is not determined by multilateralism or other moral values as Liberal Multilateralists assume, but by an asymmetric power relationship between the US and other Western states (see Chapter 3). Moreover, America’s actions were essentially a product of the tension between its two vital interests (i.e. maintaining NATO’s de facto independence from the UN and keeping the US away from the conflict on the ground) and as a result of the opportunistic manipulation of the Western moral values (see Chapter 5). If the working hypothesis is correct, such a way of losing European ‘voice opportunities’ in the name of promoting ‘market democracies’ would not work in favour of the interests of the Bosnian government or that of the civilians on the ground.
As this research discussed in Chapter 1, such negative outcomes of the diminishing in the Western multilateralism in the Bosnian situation would take the form of: a) America’s betrayal of its promise to protect the interests of the Bosnian government, such as maintaining the territorial integrity of Bosnia under Izetbegović’s leadership; b) a means to promote a settlement that would impose further violence onto civilians (regardless of ethnic background) on the ground; c) a settlement that would deprive Bosnian people of their right to self-determination and self-governance. This chapter will particularly demonstrate the validity of the working hypothesis in relation to the above-discussed points a) and b) regarding NATO’s and America’s collaboration with the Croatian offensives toward the end of the conflict.

The first section will look at the crisis of the UNPROFOR mission in the early 1995 and America’s ambiguous action between its rhetorical advocacy of use of coercive power and its practical inaction. It will suggest, in contrast to the Liberal Multilateralists’ interpretation, that America’s continuous adaptation of such ‘wait and see’ approach to the Bosnian conflict was a product of the tension between the two vital interests of the US—keeping America away from military conflict on the ground, on the one hand, and consolidating NATO’s de facto independence from the UN regarding its so-called ‘out of area’ operations, on the other.

The second section will analyse Western reactions to the crisis of the UNPROFOR mission (i.e. the security situation regarding Goražde and the UNPROFOR’s failure to prevent the Srebrenica massacre) on the ground from the spring to the summer 1995. In the face of this situation, the European members of the Contact Group attempted to promote various initiatives, including the use of coercive power. They needed America’s military support to accomplish such an aim. However, the Clinton administration’s reaction was contrary to European expectations. By analysing the motives of the Clinton administration’s politics, this section re-confirms the claim of this thesis that America’s vital interests were the critical factor that caused the US to act outside of a multilateral framework. In relation to this point, this section will also discuss the growing gap between
America's original justification for the use of coercive power (i.e. protecting the interests of the Bosnian government) and the reality of its application in conjunction with the Clinton administration's deepening collaboration with the Croatian government. These facts will again challenge the Liberal Multilateralists' interpretation and suggest that America's actions in Bosnia were neither based on multilateralism, nor its genuine desire to promote democracy but based on its vital interests.

The third section will discuss one of outcomes of America's use of quasi-multilateralism in the form of NATO strategic air strikes, in conjunction with the local forces' (especially the Croatian Army's) offensives on the ground. In this process, the US sidelined the European members of the Contact Group from the Western decision to launch such intervention. Regarding the working hypothesis of this thesis, this section mainly looks at the implications of such intervention for the civilians on the ground.

The fourth section discusses the settlement of the Bosnian conflict. In particular, it will look at the negotiation process at the Dayton Air Base. As we will discuss in detail, in contrast to Liberal Multilateralists' interpretation, this process illustrates the old fashioned tension between America's hegemonic position and its European allies' 'voice opportunities.' Initially, the US legitimized its policy of advocating air strike, under the cover of promoting 'democratic peace' and urged other Western states to respect the interests of the Bosnian government. However, as suggested above, the final application of this logic did not protect the interests of the Bosnian government. This was because the US needed such settlement in order to avoid America's direct involvement in the conflict on the ground. Accordingly, the settlement was based on geo-political distribution of powers on the ground rather than on alleged moral values of the West (promoting the interests of 'victims' of the conflict in the form of supporting the multi-ethnic state under the leadership of the Bosnian government). This meant that the US, Croatian, and Serbian leaders defined the bulk of the settlement and the Bosnian government were placed under its pressure to agree to the proposed deal. This section will provide a conclusive analysis
on the working hypothesis of this thesis by discussing the implications of such promotion of quasi-multilateralism for the interests of the Bosnian government and the conditions of the civilians on the ground.

The Crisis of the UNPROFOR Mission: Distorting Western Moral Values

During the provisional cease-fire period (from January to March 1995), the international mediators prepared their next move. The Co-Chairmen of ICFY attempted to broker direct negotiations between the Bosnian government and Slobodan Milošević. In order to facilitate this, they argued for a lifting of economic sanctions, which four years previously had been implemented on the rump Yugoslavia (i.e. Serbia and Montenegro). The aim was to agree a policy to ease sanctions towards Serbia in exchange for Milošević's support for the peace negotiations, as well as his recognition of the borders of Bosnia and Croatia. The British, French, and 'independent' negotiator, led by Jimmy Carter, all supported this idea. However, the US, Germany, and the Bosnian government were cautious about negotiating with Milošević.

In the meantime, the Croatian authorities put increasing pressure on the UNPROFOR in Croatia to leave, in the light of its failure to bring security to Croatia. On 12 January 1995, the President of Croatia, Franjo Tudjman, claimed that Croatia would not accept the presence of UNPROFOR after March 1995. However, as a result of international pressure (including that of the US), on 12 March 1995, the Croatian President finally gave him consent to its presence. The US Vice President, Al Gore, led the American side of initiative on this issue remarking that:

I assured him [President Tudjman] of full U.S. support for restoring Croatian security.
sovereignty to all parts of Croatia. From the Croatian perspective, this remark implied that the US would not obstruct its forthcoming military operations to retake territory held by the Croatian Serbs.

Indeed, the US administration did not exclude the possibility of the use of coercive power to deter the Serbian offensives. According to Ivo Daalder’s account, who was at that time the Director for European Affairs at the NSC, the US administration looked at what kinds of possible action NATO could take if the UNPROFOR withdrew its personnel in the event of the ‘lift and strike’ policy being implemented. To look at this point from the context, the timing of US consideration implied that the Croatian government and its military forces—rather than the Bosnian government—would become America’s key local allies of the potential NATO’s military operations in and around Bosnia.

It is important to note, however, that America’s original rationale for advocating the use of international coercive power and criticizing ICFY-led peace negotiations was to support the territorial integrity of Bosnia neither under Serbs or Croats but under the leadership of Izetbegović (see Chapters 2 and 3). As we will discuss later, this indicates a double moral standard, employed by the US administration. On the one hand, it used the logic of ‘democratic peace’ and paid attention to the international responsibility to protect the interests of the Bosnian government in order to challenge the European vision of multilateralism. On the other hand, it implicitly encouraged military actions on the part of the Croatian government in order to avoid sending America’s ground troops to operate in an offensive capacity. In other words, the US administration began to distort the contents of the application of ‘democratic peace’ and Western moral values in order to protect its vital interests. Indeed, as Anthony Lake suggested, the Clinton administration’s adaptation of ‘democratic peace’ was a means to promote America’s interests of maintaining the Western Order under the leadership of the US, not the

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7 Quoted in Crossette, "Croatian Leader Agrees to Continuation of U.N. Force."
8 Slavonia had substantial numbers of ethnic Serb communities in some parts (i.e. Western Slavonia). It was on that basis the Serbian leaders claimed it as their territory.
10 Interview with Anthony Lake on 19 May 2004.
international organization of UN (see, Chapter 4).

As soon as the Carter cease-fire ended, the fighting intensified. On 1 May, regular Croatian Republic forces launched a military operation against the UN protected area of Western Slavonia. In the meantime the situation in Bosnia also deteriorated. Concerning the situation around Sarajevo, on 7 May the Bosnian government urged the UN either to launch air strikes or to lift the arms embargo. As it was a politically sensitive issue, the UN office asked for decisions of Boutros-Ghali and he rejected both options. The Co-Chairmen of the ICFY were also wary of any movements towards Western military intervention and supported the Boutros-Ghali’s decision. However, the US Ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright, criticized decision of Boutros-Ghali and demanded the UN release its hold over the ‘dual-key’.

_The Frasure Mission and America’s Persistent Promotion of Its Vital Interests_

Against this backdrop, the US administration took a new initiative and began to consider some kind of political resolution, along with the military measures they thought to be necessary. The US administration, as well as NATO officials, had undertaken an internal study in regard to what military means they should take. The UN Secretary-General requested in February 1995 that NATO should start making a plan to assist the possible evacuation of UNPROFOR in relation to the potential implementation of any Peace Plan. NATO’s answer to this request became OPLAN 40104. Along with studying OPLAN 40104, during May 1995, the foreign and security policy-makers of the Clinton administration discussed the ‘lift and strike’ policy again, but could not reach agreement concerning the

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11 Interview with Anthony Lake on 19 May 2004.
14 Owen, _Balkan Odyssey_, 346-347.
15 Owen, _Balkan Odyssey_, 336-339.
details of how to implement it.\textsuperscript{19}

As for the diplomatic aspect of above-discussed policy, the Clinton administration directly contacted Milo\v{S}evi\v{c}, although there was a disagreement among the US policy-makers as to whether this was advisable.\textsuperscript{20} On 18 May 1995, Robert Frasure, the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, met Milo\v{S}evi\v{c} in his presidential retreat. On this occasion, Frasure initially reached an agreement with him that the West would lift economic sanctions against Serbia in exchange for Milo\v{S}evi\v{c}'s recognition of Bosnia and Croatia.\textsuperscript{21} This was the policy that the Co-Chairmen of the ICFY had demanded the US support. Frasure asked the White House to endorse the so-called Frasure-Milo\v{S}evi\v{c} Agreement. However, as a result of the debate among the high-ranking officials in Washington, the Clinton administration decided against this.\textsuperscript{22} At that time such hawkish opinion was in the ascendant. The critical reason why the US administration ditched the Frasure-Milo\v{S}evi\v{c} Agreement was its ambiguity over the role of the UN Security Council in the implementation of the subsequent peace plan.\textsuperscript{23}

In order to legitimize the policy to scrap the political negotiation with Milo\v{S}evi\v{c}, Washington placed additional demands on Milo\v{S}evi\v{c} over and above the initial Frasure-Milo\v{S}evi\v{c} Agreement. For instance, Frasure's new conditions were that the West would suspend the sanctions for 200 days, if Serbia recognized Bosnia. However, it would keep punitive measures, such as the international ban on access to foreign credit, oil, and weapons.\textsuperscript{24} How could the Serbian economy

\textsuperscript{19} Daalder, \textit{Getting to Dayton}, 49-50, 89-90.
\textsuperscript{22} It is reported that Madeleine Albright and Vice-President Al Gore's National Security Adviser, Leon Fuerth, opposed the negotiation with Milo\v{S}evi\v{c} prior to the Frasure mission. They argued that sanctions or military pressure would be effective but negotiations with Milo\v{S}evi\v{c} would not. They were opposed to give any sanctions relief to Serbia. For details of this, see: Daalder, \textit{Getting to Dayton}, 39. Note 6; Albright, \textit{Madam Secretary}, 184-186; Sell, Louis, \textit{Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia}, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002. 227; Bildt, \textit{Peace Journey}, 20-21; Owen, \textit{Balkan Odyssey}, 348.
\textsuperscript{24} AFP, "Milosevic Refuses to Budge on Recognizing Bosnia: Diplomat," \textit{Agence France Presse}, 23 May 1995, Lexis-Nexis; Barber, T. "France Warns of Bosnia Retreat," \textit{The Independent}, 24 May 1995, 13. AFP; David Owen was disgusted at this US spin: '[..] which was a position Milosevic was never likely to accept. To cover their tracks the US publicly blamed Milosevic; this he took uncomplainingly, and did not in public
recover without oil or any foreign credit? Milošević refused to agree to these new conditions. Moreover, the US administration imposed a critical new condition that the US, not the UN Security Council, could impose economic sanctions on Serbia. This corresponded to the demands on the part of the Clinton administration that the US or NATO should take over the UN Security-General’s control over the ‘dual-key’, as well as any influence on the peace process.

Such demands contradicted the US official interpretation that Frauser carried out his mission on behalf of the Contact Group. Indeed, this American policy reflected its sensitivity over the UN’s function in the peace process. It was one of America’s vital interests, of maintaining NATO’s de facto independence from the UN that eventually blocked the Frauser-Milošević Agreement. However, the US placed responsibility on Milošević to accept new conditions. As a result of this American policy, the Contact Group lost another chance to move forward on the settlement of the Bosnian conflict.

The ‘Human Shields’ and America’s Evasion of Implementing NATO’s Decision

After the failure of these negotiations, the situation in Bosnia deteriorated further, in particular the so-called ‘safe areas’ of Bihać, Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Tuzla, and Žepa. On 22 May 1995, the offensives on the part of Bosnian Serb forces escalated around Sarajevo. On 25 and 26 May, NATO attacked areas around Pale, having gained authorization from the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative, Yasushi Akashi. Before the authorization, Akashi was in a dilemma about the

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reveal the details of the package. Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 348.
29 Akashi, Ikiri Kotonomo Kokoroskei, 193.
consequences of air strikes (i.e. Bosnian Serb forces actions should be punished, but such an action would certainly risk UNPROFOR personnel’s safety). As had been predicted, Bosnian Serb forces took members of UNPROFOR hostage in defiance of NATO air strikes. The UNPROFOR hostages were referred to as ‘human shields.’

Madeleine Albright had urged the UN to authorize air strikes prior to that. However, she kept silence at the UN Security Council after the catastrophic result of air strikes became clear. In fact, she ‘was shaken’ in the face of the debacle, following the air strikes and came to the belated realization that the US ‘need [a] better strategy [instead of air strikes].’ In addition, the air strikes led to the peace initiative by Robert Frasure being halted, after the recommended to the White House that his mission be abolished. Instead, he urged the Clinton administration to support European initiatives led by David Owen and Carl Bildt, who was to take over officially from Owen on 12 June. However, whilst the White House scrapped Frasure’s mission, they declined to support any initiatives by Bildt.

As a result of the implementation of air strikes, the US administration faced a classic dilemma, namely that the air strikes would force UNPROFOR to evacuate their personnel from Bosnia and such a situation would place demands on the US to give substance to its rhetoric, to support the interests of the Bosnian government, in the form of providing ground troops. To make the matter worse, as a result of the implementation of air strikes, the US now lost its options (not only ‘lift and strike’ policy but its peace initiatives) and that made the ICFY-promoted peace process was the only credible

30 At first Boutros-Ghali received a memo from General Janvier and General Smith on 22 May. Boutros-Ghali understood both Generals to believe that the ‘air strikes will work on an individual or selective basis - only sustained air strikes might make an impact, but they would produce many casualties if UNPROFOR remains deployed as it is.’ Boutros-Ghali decided that he should ‘redeploy and reduce the number of UN troops.’ General Janvier reported it to the UNSC on 24 May. However, Madeleine Albright adamantly criticized the UN position as being prepared to ‘dump the safe areas.’ On the one hand the US called air strikes. On the other hand, the US opposed the precondition to commence it (i.e. the withdrawal of UNPROFOR). Boutros-Ghali, *Unvanquished*, 234; Albright, *Madam Secretary*, 184-185; Akashi, *Ikiru Kotonimo Kokoroseki*, 191-192.

31 According to Akashi, the total number was 320 (170 were French troops). The US, NATO and staff in the UN Headquarters in New York pushed him to authorize air strikes but Akashi was quite sceptical whether they considered the consequences of air strikes. Akashi, *Ikiru Kotonimo Kokoroseki*, 191-192.

32 Boutros-Ghali, *Unvanquished*, 235

33 Albright, *Madam Secretary*, 185.

34 Daalder, *Getting to Dayton*, 40.
choice. Accordingly, the US administration had to pay attention to the intra-Western policy-debate in order to re-consider the choice they could make. Indeed, as Albright suggested, the formation of a ‘better strategy’ was needed.

During UNPROFOR’s crisis over its hostages in late May 1995, there were three major plans, coming from France, the UN and the US respectively. Firstly, on 27 May, the newly elected French President Jacques Chirac and the US President Bill Clinton discussed the Bosnian situation on the telephone. Chirac proposed to dispatch the so-called Rapid Reaction Force to Bosnia. This consisted of around 10,000 heavily armed French, British and Dutch soldiers. The mission was to assist the evacuation of UNPROFOR troops. The members of the Contact Group, of NATO, and of the UN Security Council all discussed the plan to send the Rapid Reaction Force and endorsed it in principle towards the middle of June 1995. As far as the political procedure to bring about a settlement was concerned, France, Britain and Russia supported the idea to re-vitalize the peace negotiations. For this purpose, they argued for the easing of some of the sanctions against Serbia in exchange for Serbian recognition of Croatia and Bosnia. However, on 29 May the US refused to endorse this at the Contact Group meeting.

Secondly, on 30 May, the UN Secretary-General presented four options to the members of the UN Security Council regarding the future of international involvement in the Bosnian conflict.

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36 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 44-46.
39 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 350.
40 The first option was to withdraw UNPROFOR, which he disliked because it would be perceived as a failure of the UN and also give the impression that the international community was abandoning the Bosnian people. The second option was to maintain the status quo. He thought this would be impossible. The third option was to change the mandate of UNPROFOR by allowing it to take military actions. He told the UNSC members that this would require that 'the UN forces be replaced with a multinational force under the command of the major country or countries contributing to it.' The fourth option was to scale down the UN mandate and to limit the mission to those only relating to humanitarian work. In addition, he wanted to address a fifth option but he did not. This was because Boutros-Ghali considered that it would be difficult to obtain support for this option from the members of the UNSC. This fifth plan was a plan to maintain the UN mission but to increase its military capability. Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished, 236.
One of his major suggestions was the choice, either of withdrawing UNPROFOR troops or of re-enforcing them. At the UN Security Council, Madeleine Albright dismissed both ideas. Instead, she demanded that the UN mission on the ground should concentrate on its humanitarian mission. She also argued that the UN should not put any obstacles in the way of air strikes. In essence, she demanded that air strikes be launched regardless of its impact on the UNPROFOR troops. In other words, the US administration was still undecided over whether, on the one hand, to impose the lift and strike policy or international intervention that would require American military involvement, on the other. Eventually, as a compromise, on 16 June, the UNSC endorsed the idea of the Rapid Reaction Force—to assist partial withdrawal of the UNPROFOR personnel, but without involving US ground troops.

Thirdly, the US administration considered how it should react to Chirac’s Rapid Reaction Force initiative. It decided not to object to it, as long as it would not require American ground troops. However, the Clinton administration was wary of any potential pressure for the US to support the evacuation of UNPROFOR. US policy-makers also looked at what they should do in accordance with the NATO’s contingency plan of OPLAN 40104, which envisaged NATO’s support for the withdrawal of UNPROFOR once it received a formal request from the UN to do so. On 31 May, the Clinton administration, initially, decided to support the OPLAN 40104 in principle. Clinton hinted at this position in his speech on 31 May and 3 June 1995.

On 14 June, Chirac came to Washington D.C. to discuss the situation in Bosnia. Given

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41 Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished, 241.
42 Albright, Madam Secretary, 185-186.
43 Albright, Madam Secretary, 185-186.
45 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 44-46.
46 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 44-46, 48-55.
48 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 48-55.
50 Clinton, Bill. "The President's Radio Address, June 3, 1995," Public Papers of the President of the United
Clinton's remarks, Chirac, as well as other UNPROFOR troop-contributing countries, anticipated that
the US would support the Rapid Reaction Force initiative, through OPLAN 40104. However, on 14
June, the Clinton administration decided not to support UNPROFOR’s withdrawal and, thus, also
OPLAN 40104, realizing it could potentially pave the way for 20,000 US ground troops to be sent and
also lead to the UN Secretary-General's asserting authority over NATO military operations. Two days
after the Chirac's visit to Washington D.C., Clinton remarked:

I have made it clear the circumstances under which we would help our NATO partners and our U.N. partners to withdraw or to help them if they were in a
terrible emergency. […]

But I do not believe the United States should send ground forces into the
U.N. mission as it is constituted, and I certainly don’t believe we should send our
ground forces into some sort of combat situation in Bosnia [emphasis added].

Accordingly, the US made it public that it would only support the Rapid Reaction Force initiative as
long as it did not require any American military involvement on the ground.

Keeping America's independence away from international pressure, while simultaneously
maintaining its profile as a supporter of international cooperation—namely, the use of quasi-
multilateralism—was a key aspect within the Clinton administration’s policy towards the Bosnian
conflict. In this way, on 16 June 1995, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution No. 998 that

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51 The then US Ambassador to NATO, Robert Hunter suggested that prior to Chirac's visit, the details of the
OPLAN 40104 was discussed among the members of the NATO and they, including the US, did not have
any objection to implement it. Interview with Robert Hunter 17 May 2004.

52 According to Richard Holbrooke and Ivo Daalder, an intra-administrative dispute occurred in the evening
of Chirac's visit to Washington. Clinton had a short conversation with his foreign policy-makers when he had
finished dinner with Chirac. It was Richard Holbrooke who raised doubts about Clinton's decision of 31
May by which the US would support OPLAN 40104. Holbrooke's point was that OPLAN 40104 meant
that around 20,000 US troops would be automatically sent if the UN asked NATO to support the withdrawal
of UNPROFOR. Christopher agreed with Holbrooke. Clinton was dumbstruck for a while when he heard
this. Following this, Clinton reneged on his decision of 31 May. The then US Ambassador to NATO Robert
Hunter and also Daalder criticized this interpretation of OPLAN 40104 as a misunderstanding. Hunter
claimed that the US administration as well as NATO officials were closely involved in the formation process
of OPLAN 40104 and thus there was no space for a re-interpretation of its deficits. Hunter and Daalder
understood that NATO that was to decide how the UN requests should be reacted to. Interview with Robert
Hunter on 17 May 2004; Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 57-61, 97-98; Holbrooke, To End a War, 66-68.

53 Clinton, Bill. "The President's News Conference in Halifax, June 16, 1995," Public Papers of the
provides legal status for the Rapid Reaction Force. However, the resolution defined the role of the Rapid Reaction Force as being to re-enforce the UNPROFOR (i.e. humanitarian assistance), not to directly engage Bosnian Serb forces. Without having America or NATO’s substantial involvement on the ground, it would be impossible for the European troops to take such an action. Moreover, the US administration was still unwilling to give substance to its rhetoric to support the self-determination of the Bosnian government.

To sum up UNPROFOR’s crisis and the Western reactions in the early summer 1995, once again the US administration did not live up to its allies’ expectations as well as its original promise to the Bosnian government. America’s decision to eventually ditch the Frasure-Milošević mission and especially its opposition to NATO’s OPLAN 40104 were strongly related to Clinton’s motivation to maintain NATO’s de facto independence from the UN concerning use of coercive action outside of its jurisdiction. This hypocrisy underlined the very essence of the US policy to organize the western Order under quasi-multilateralism.

The US relied on multilateralism as long as it worked in America’s favour. However, if the outcomes of multilateralism worked against the interests of the US, it employed ideologically charged moral arguments (i.e. the interest of the Bosnian government). Such ideologically defined moral arguments under the banner of ‘democratic peace’ were the means to promote America’s interests and, thus, the US did not give serious substance to such moral value in the form of assisting the Bosnian government’s military fighting on the ground. In order to disguise the reality of this opportunistic use of moral arguments, the US administration resorted to its common refrain, namely doing little to help the situation in Bosnia as well as blaming the Europeans and the UN. The fate of the UN mission was predictable without any American and NATO’s substantial political or military support for their operation.

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The Collapse of the UN Mission and America’s Final Decision

On 6 July 1995, Bosnian Serb forces began to attack the Muslim enclave of Srebrenica and the military offensive continued until they entered the town on 16 July. Although some NGOs contested the number of those killed and who was behind these events, it is widely believed that Bosnian Serb forces systematically killed about 7000 civilians during this period. Bosnian Serb forces outnumbered about four hundred and fifty Dutch UNPROFOR troops in Srebrenica, however, it was clear that UNPROFOR failed to save those lives. Furthermore, on 25 July, another ‘safe area’, Žepa, fell to the Bosnian Serbs. In the meantime, other ‘safe areas,’ especially Goražde, were still under attack and the latter was about to fall under Bosnian Serb control.

The failure of international actions on the ground generated widespread international criticism of the ‘dual key’ arrangement and also made a mockery of the concept of the ‘safe area.’ Those people who supported robust military intervention in Bosnia criticized the validity of the ‘dual key’ in relation to its practices. With regard to Srebrenica, the UN Special Representative, Akashi Yasushi, was criticized for blocking further NATO air strikes. As the then British Ambassador to the UN recalled:

 [...] the Americans and even to some extent the British and the French, became very frustrated. Because the evidence accumulated that whenever there was a bad incident, Akashi, Boutros-Ghali, and General Janvier always found some reason not to ask for NATO air support.

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55 For instance the former UN Civilian Affairs Coordinator in Bosnia, Phillip Crowin, estimated the figure of casualties lower than that was publicly believed. See: International Strategic Association. "Srebrenica Controversy Becomes Increasingly Politicized and Ethnically Divisive, Increasing Pressure on Peacekeepers," Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily XXI, no. 149 (2003): Lexis-Nexis.
57 For details of this event including chronological background, see: UN, "Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/35, The Fall of Srebrenica," 15 November 1999. (A/54/549).
58 Interview with Robin Renwick on 5 October 2004; Interview with David Hannay on 6 October 2004.
59 According to Akashi, it was the Dutch Defence Minister who phoned Akashi to have him stop the air strikes. This was because the former was wary about the possibility that the Dutch military personnel would be injured by the air strikes. Indeed, in April 2002 the then Dutch government collapsed when the official study of the Dutch troops’ role in the Srebrenica incident came to general notice. Akashi, Ikuo Kotonimo Kokorozeki, 202. The study Dutch government had commissioned on Srebrenica can be found at: http://www.srebrenica.nl/en/a_index.htm [Accessed on 21 March 2005].
60 Interview with David Hannay on 6 October 2004.
The ‘dual-key’ arrangement became a symbol of inefficiency of the UN peacekeeping mission in Bosnia.

Against this background, Western states expressed their outrage in the strongest manner. For instance, on 13 July, the French President Jacques Chirac proposed that in order to save Gorazde there should be international military intervention (i.e. Rapid Reaction Force) in the conflict. He emphasized that the international community should stand by the UN’s pledge on the issue of the ‘safe areas.’ For this purpose, he proposed to send 1,000 additional troops (i.e. Rapid Reaction Force) to Gorazde, with the assistance of airlifts by the US.

The West, however, still lacked consistency. On the day of Chirac’s proposal (13 July), the newly appointed British Foreign Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind, dismissed it. According to him, the British government was:

very sceptical of President Chirac’s Rapid Reaction Force proposal, as it seemed more of a symbolic political gesture than an initiative that had military substance.

The contents of this ‘scepticism’ were clear, given the international context, as we have discussed above. It is, namely, that the British government believed that in order to carry out robust action it was necessary to withdraw UNPROFOR troops on the ground to prevent them being used as ‘human shields’. However, the US refused to support this mission in the form of not endorsing NATO’s OPLAN 40104: furthermore, it did not provide any substantial plan for the settlement at that time. This implies that the British government and the Rapid Reaction Force would end up as fighting a war for self-determination on the side of the Bosnian government.

For these reasons above, instead of supporting Chirac’s proposal, on 14 July, the British government called for the convening of the second London Conference. As we have discussed in the previous section, the US administration was at that time also under the pressure to provide an

61 Silber and Little, The Death of Yugoslavia, 351.
62 Silber and Little, The Death of Yugoslavia, 351.
64 Silber and Little, The Death of Yugoslavia, 351.
alternative policy instead of merely criticizing European and UN efforts in Bosnia. Hence, holding an international conference was a convenient gesture, not only for the British government, but also the US administration for not sending its troops on the ground.

Following the British proposal to convene the Second London Conference and in the light of the situation in Srebrenica and Sarajevo, the new EU Special Representative for Bosnia and the ICFY Co-Chairmen, Carl Bildt, was putting all of his efforts into re-vitalizing the peace process. Eventually, on 19 July, Bildt reached an agreement with Milošević to promote the peace process. This was the so-called Bildt-Milošević Agreement. Milošević agreed that he would appear on Serbian television and criticize the Bosnian Serbs’ leadership in particular, Karadžić’s policy to continue fighting; and he pledged to recognize Bosnia and also agreed to the implementation of the Contact Group Peace Plan. In exchange, Bildt proposed that international sanctions against Serbia would be lifted within 9 months of the settlement after the approval of the UNSC or all five members of the Contact Group.

The contents of the Bildt-Milošević Agreement were, in fact, almost identical to that of the Frasure-Milošević Agreement. One of the differences was that the former suggested the sanctions be lifted after nine months, whereas Frasure put this back to twelve months. However, there was a most notable difference. Bildt intended to refer the result of his agreement with Milošević to a vote among the UN Security Council members. This implied that the members of the UN, including the US, would be bound by the UNSC’s decision over the implementation of such an agreement. In regard to the theoretical issue of this thesis, Bildt attempted to use the authority of the UN in order to establish a framework that would force the US to follow the consequences of multilateralism.

While the Europeans were not able to consolidate their interests, the principal policy-makers

65 For details of his diplomatic activities during this period see: Bildt, Peace Journey, 54-67.
66 Bildt, Peace Journey, 65.
67 Sell, Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia, 228-229.
68 Bildt, Peace Journey, 65; Sell, Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia, 228-229.
69 Bildt, Peace Journey, 65; Sell, Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia, 228-229.
70 Bildt, Peace Journey, 65; Sell, Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia, 228-229.
of the Clinton administration discussed their reaction to these international proposals. They agreed that the Chirac proposal would be a risky mission, in practice, but the US could not disagree with it in theory. However, the US administration still intended to seize an opportunity to launch strategic air strikes instead of sending ground troops. On 18 July, the Clinton administration insisted on the following two points for its allies: the US would not provide ground troops but air attacks alone and the ‘dual-key’ must be removed. In order to persuade Europeans, the US Chairman of Joint Chiefs of the Staff, General Shalikashvili, the US Secretary of Defense, William Perry, and the US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, flew to London in order to attend the Second London Conference (i.e. joint meeting of NATO and Contact Group).

It was predictable, however, that both British and French reactions would not be enthusiastic. As previously discussed, NATO had already defined the aim of air attacks as only ensuring the safety of UNPROFOR troops in the ‘safe areas’ and not to intervening in the conflict on behalf of any warring party. The Clinton administration’s policy to promote strategic air strikes by NATO would distort the original aims and procedures that had hitherto been laid down regarding the role of launching air strikes. The US now challenged UN authority over air strikes and thus, the foundation of Western multilateralism.

The Second London Conference: Consolidation of Quasi-Multilateralism

On 21 July, the Second London Conference discussed two major issues: firstly, how to promote peace based on the Bildt-Milošević Agreement and, thus, what kinds of action the Contact

71 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 69-70; Silber and Little, The Death of Yugoslavia, 351-352.
72 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 69-70.
73 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 69-70.
74 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 71-73.
76 However, the then British Ambassador to the UN, David Hannay, understood that UNSCR 836 (safe area) provided sufficient legal authority for taking robust action against Bosnian Serb forces. Interview with David Hannay on 5 October 2004. Also see: Gow, James. Triumph of the Lack of will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War. London: Hurst & Company, 1997. 135-136.
Group and NATO should take in accomplishing this; secondly, America’s proposed strategic air strikes
in relation to the debate on what kind of coercive measures the Contact Group should take to improve
the situation on the ground, especially the situation of Goražde.

Russia, the UK, France, Germany, and Spain supported the peace negotiations, based on the
Bildt-Milošević Agreement. However, the US rejected it and effectively killed the proposed
agreement. According to Carl Bildt’s adviser, Louis Sell, the critical reason why the US did not
support the Bildt-Milošević Agreement was the plan’s political strategy to refer to the UNSC.
If the agreement was referred to the UNSC, it would be difficult for the US administration to veto it and they
would thus be bound by it.

With regard to the situation in Goražde, Warren Christopher demanded that his European
allies support NATO air strikes on the strategic facilities and equipment of Bosnian Serb forces. Christopher also suggested that he did not intend to seek further UN authority and had no interest in
supporting ideas about the negotiation based peace process. The participants of the Second London
Conference appeared to have reached a consensus that there should be some form of coercive action
(i.e. air strikes) if the situation of Goražde deteriorated further. However, there was a debate regarding
the implications of air strikes. First of all, strategic air strikes would certainly force UNPROFOR
suspended its humanitarian missions in Bosnia and thus the Bosnian civilians would suffer from lack of
basic food and medications. In this respect, there was a long debate between the US and its allies

77 Bildt, Peace Journey, 67-68.
78 Bildt, Peace Journey, 68.
79 Christopher also confided to Bildt in private that ‘the upcoming Senate vote made it unfeasible, but that he
thought the whole thing would blow over in a week or two, and that we could then proceed with the
package.’ [Quoted in Bildt, Peace Journey, 68]. Soon after this conversation, on 26 July 1995 the US Senate
voted in favor of withdrawing US participation in the arms embargo scheme. However, the US
administration did not follow this congressional opinion. In other words, the congressional opinion was not
strong enough to push the US administration by that time. Therefore, with regard to ‘power over outcomes’,
it is plausible to consider that the critical factor that made Christopher oppose the Bildt-Milošević Agreement
was its potential to restrict NATO and US policies via UN authority. Sell, Slobodan Milošević and the
Destruction of Yugoslavia, 228-229; Bildt, Peace Journey, 68.
80 Christopher, Chances of a Lifetime, 254-256.
81 Christopher, Chances of a Lifetime, 254-256; Bildt, Peace Journey, 67-68.
82 Christopher, Chances of a Lifetime, 254-256; Bildt, Peace Journey, 67-68; Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished,
239-240.
regarding NATO’s obligation to support withdrawal of UNPROFOR, if it carried out strategic air strikes. Secondly, European and UN policy-makers demanded that a political strategy to settle the conflict should be accompanied by military action. Regarding the issue of UNPROFOR personnel’s safety, Boutros-Ghali understood that the participants of the Conference approved of the UN pulling out its staff if air strikes were to be implemented. In this way, he agreed to hand out his part of ‘dual-key’ of authorising air strikes to the UN commander in the field. However, from the military perspective, the UNPROFOR commander in Bosnia, Lieutenant General Rupert Smith, still voiced his concerns that air attacks alone would not help Gorazde. Carl Bildt also emphasised this point from a political point of view, regarding the necessity of peace negotiation along with air strikes. However, as the British government and other Europeans did not object to Christopher’s opinion, the representatives of the UN and the EU (i.e. Carl Bildt) were not able to influence Christopher’s opinion.

This high-handed American attitude, as well as the actual outcomes of the Second London Conference by no means satisfied the EU and the UN delegates. Carl Bildt expressed his frustration in the following way:

[The Second London Conference] had not managed to resolve the differences. I was convinced that we needed a more open dialogue with the Americans on a higher political level [emphasis added].

However, the European members of the Contact Group and the UN Security-General were not able to raise further objections to America’s above-discussed manipulation of the interpretation of moral values and the corresponding outcome of the UN’s loosening its grip on the use of coercive power in Bosnia. Warren Christopher recalled this point in his memoirs, noting that after the conference the UN Secretary-General’s authority was treated in the following way:

83 Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished, 240.
84 In practice this was implemented in the form of the shift from Boutros-Ghali’s civilian representative Yasushi Akashi to the commander of entire UNPROFOR mission, General Bernard Janvier. Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished, 240-241.
85 Bildt, Peace Journey, 67; Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished, 241.
86 Bildt, Peace Journey, 67.
87 Christopher, Chances of a Lifetime, 256; Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished, 240-241; Bildt, Peace Journey, 67-68, 71-72.
Within a few days of the [Second] London conference Boutros-Ghali tried to take back what he had given up in London. He insisted that he had intended all along to preserve a U.N. veto right over NATO air strikes. On Tuesday, July 25, I telephoned him to remind him that he had sat silent as we ratified the plan in [the second] London [Conference] and that backtracking now would send precisely the wrong message to the Bosnian Serbs. Boutros-Ghali responded frigidly, and I had to call him a second time before he finally stood down.\textsuperscript{89}

Indeed, there was no substantial mutual consultation in the formation of a common position, as Liberal Multilateralists' view of America's allies' 'voice opportunities' assumed. Despite the discontent of its European allies and the UN, the US administration believed that strategic air strikes and the removal of UN authority over the 'dual-key'—as well as its rationale of deterring Serbian offensives as \textit{the end} of Western action—were (in Christopher's evaluation) 'ratified' at the Second London Conference.\textsuperscript{90}

This collective 'ratification' of America's position gave a justification for the US to transform the rationale to use coercive power in Bosnia. Initially, the Clinton administration advocated taking robust action in Bosnia, based on the rationale that the West had moral responsibility to maintain the territorial integrity of Bosnia under the leadership of Izetbegović.\textsuperscript{91} Thus, it promoted a 'lift and strike' policy against the Serbian offensives as \textit{a means} to accomplish the end. Christopher now retreated from the initial rationale of the coercive action, as it would eventually force America to participate in the conflict on behalf of the Bosnian government, not only against Bosnian Serb forces but also against the Bosnian Croat forces. In order to avoid such a scenario, the US administration adopted a new interpretation of Western moral values that derived from 'democratic peace'. It emphasised restoring the stability of international affairs for the sake of the effective operation of 'market democracies' in Europe, rather than paying attention to the quality of 'justice' in Bosnia (see Chapter 4). America's new approach to the coercive action in Bosnia can be interpreted as deterring the Serbian offensives (i.e.

\textsuperscript{88} Bildt, \textit{Peace Journey}, 71-72.

\textsuperscript{89} Christopher, \textit{Chances of a Lifetime}, 256. Boutros-Ghali presented a different account regarding the same events, See, Boutros-Ghali, \textit{Unvanquished}, 240-241.


\textsuperscript{91} Interview with Anthony Lake, 19 May 2004.
restoring stability) as *an end, not a means, of Western policy to the conflict. In this way, Christopher dismissed the Bildt-Milošević Agreement that would give ‘too much to Serbs’. However, he did not spell out what was the appropriate balance between the three ethnic groups in Bosnia and what kind of peace plan the West should propose in conjunction with its coercive action. In this way, America’s initial advocacy of its alleged *moral value* of protecting the interests of the Bosnian government was distorted in order to promote America’s *vital interests* of maintaining NATO’s *de facto* independence from the UN and keeping the US away from the ethnic war on the ground. In other words, Christopher’s advocacy suggested that the official aim of the air strikes shifted from ensuring the safety of UNPROFOR mission (i.e. the UN and the EU’s position) or protecting the territorial integrity of Bosnia—namely the critical interests of the Bosnian government and America’s initial rationale to use coercive power—to deterring Bosnian Serb forces in order to facilitate the geo-strategic approach to the settlement of the Bosnian conflict, without sacrificing America’s vital interests.

In short, the Second London Conference marked the final turning point of the Western approach to the Bosnian conflict regarding the role of multilateralism in relation to the West’s use of collective coercive action to outside of its territory. Practically, the outcomes of the conference and America’s approach that defined it can be summarized as follows: firstly, it would prevent UN’s management of the use of coercive power in Bosnia. Secondly, NATO would launch strategic air strikes punishing Bosnian Serb forces but not promoting the critical interests of the Bosnian government (i.e. maintaining territorial integrity of Bosnia under the leadership of Izetbegović). Thirdly, these air strikes would be launched in conjunction with local forces—essentially the Croatian Army—fighting on the ground behalf of the US strategy. Lastly, the US would impose the settlement based on the newly created *military balance of power*. Thus, it would not be based on both interpretations of Western values (i.e. multilateralism or protecting the interests of the Bosnian government). The

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working hypothesis predicted that such promotion of America's interests under the banner of 'democratic peace' would not work in favour of the interests of the Bosnian government or the conditions of civilians on the ground (see Chapter 1). The next two sections will look at the coherence of this interpretation.

'Devastating' the Civilians on the Ground: Consequences of Quasi-Multilateralism (I)

The Second London Conference paved the way for Western military intervention in the Bosnian conflict. On 25 July, and again on 1 August, NATO endorsed a policy that substantiated the Second London Conference's decision on air strikes. However, given NATO's decision to carry out air strikes, UNPROFOR would have to be withdrawn in order to avoid a repeat of the hostage scenario. There was a problem, however, as the US administration did not fully endorse OPLAN 40104, which was precisely intended to deal with the issue of UNPROFOR's withdrawal. Given the Clinton administration's blocking of OPLAN 40104, there was now no concrete plan in the part of US and NATO as to how UNPROFOR personnel would be withdrawn. Therefore, NATO did not carry out its air strikes for a while. In other words, the Clinton administration bore responsibility for presenting a workable comprehensive plan to replace UNPROFOR's functions, as well as the EU-UN's political roles in Bosnia, when NATO began its strategic air strikes. The US decision on this issue was eagerly awaited.

In regard to this absence of America's political strategy to settle the conflict, Carl Bildt and David Owen visited Washington to discuss the peace plan, on 3 August. They attempted to obtain the support of American policy-makers for the Bildt-Milošević Agreement. Bildt impressed upon the US administration the need for the West to develop a political strategy for peace before undertaking any

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96 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 79-80; Bildt, Peace Journey, 58-59
military action. However, Richard Holbrooke, Al Gore, and others in the Clinton administration expressed their disagreement with Bildt on this matter. Al Gore even suggested that the US cannot accept any plan that is negotiated with Milošević. Hence, Bildt failed to persuade the Clinton administration.

After this meeting, on his way to the airport before returning to Europe, Bildt was informed by US intelligence services that the Croatian army was preparing to attack Kunin in the Krajina region, (Croatia) in early morning. Accordingly, at 5 am on 4 August the Croatian Army commenced its military offensive, known as Operation Storm. Given its expectation of military operations, within the near future, it was not surprising that the Clinton administration thought Bildt’s efforts were unhelpful. It would be natural to consider that, before any intra-Western interaction, the US position had already been decided and the EU had absolutely no impact on the outcomes of US policy.

Prior to this episode, on 22 July the Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and the Bosnian President Alija Izetbegović held a meeting regarding Operation Storm, which was attended by the US ambassador to Croatia, Peter Galbraith. At the meeting, Tudjman proposed that the joint military action in the Western Slavonia (that stride over the border between Croatia and Bosnia) against Serbian forces. In particular, Tudjman suggested that the Croatian forces would assist the Bosnian government’s actions in its Muslim enclave of Bihać, in Northern Bosnia. Izetbegović ‘immediately accepted the offer’, as he was desperate to obtain any military support. In other words, from the Bosnian government’s perspective, eagerly awaited military help came not from the US, which at least,

97 Bildt, Peace Journey, 71-72.
98 Bildt, Peace Journey, 71-72.
99 Bildt, Peace Journey, 71-72.
100 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 354.
101 Bildt, Peace Journey, 71-72.
rhetorically maintained its support of the interests of the Bosnian government on the international stage, but from an enemy. However, militarily speaking, this agreement consolidated the fact that the fate of the Bosnian government’s interests would be subordinated to the actions of the Croatian Army.

Publicly, the Clinton administration officials were reluctant to endorse this operation before it begun.\textsuperscript{106} However, US officials, in fact, supported the Operation Storm from the beginning. For instance, the US ambassador to Croatia, Peter Galbraith, attended the meeting between Tudjman and Izetbegović, on 22 July, in order to show a ‘US support for the Croatian-Bosnian alliance’.\textsuperscript{107} Indeed, as soon as the Croatian army commenced military operations the Clinton administration gave its support to the Croatian army’s actions.\textsuperscript{108}

Against this backdrop, the principal policy-makers of the Clinton administration held meetings on 7, 8 and 9 August.\textsuperscript{109} They, at last, discussed how they might form a comprehensive American policy to settle the Bosnian conflict, accompanied by both military and political measures. On 9 August, at the end of this series of meetings, Clinton made his final decision regarding the US policy.\textsuperscript{110} He decided to bring about the settlement on the basis of the Contact Group Peace Plan, but also by employing a ‘carrot’ and ‘stick’ policy. To be precise, this new approach did not aim to base itself simply on the Contact Group Peace Plan as it was. Clinton intended rather to re-negotiate parts of the Contact Group map with the warring parties.\textsuperscript{111} This was the ‘carrot.’ Then, as the ‘stick’, Clinton decided to use military power (i.e. strategic air strikes) if necessary.\textsuperscript{112} This had been proposed by advisers who were concerned about American credibility in the West, rather than the Bosnian situation itself.\textsuperscript{113} In other words, America’s vital interests would dictate the process to bring about settlement.

\textsuperscript{105} Izetbegovic, \textit{Inescapable Questions}, 222.
\textsuperscript{106} Holbrooke, \textit{To End a War}, 72-73.
\textsuperscript{107} Galbraith, \textit{The United States and Croatia}, XVIII.
\textsuperscript{108} Daalder, \textit{Getting to Dayton}, 122-123.
\textsuperscript{109} Holbrooke, \textit{To End a War}, 73-75; Daalder, \textit{Getting to Dayton}, 106-114.
\textsuperscript{110} Daalder, \textit{Getting to Dayton}, 106-110.
\textsuperscript{111} Daalder, \textit{Getting to Dayton}, 109.
\textsuperscript{112} Daalder, \textit{Getting to Dayton}, 109.
\textsuperscript{113} According to Daalder’s account, there were two agendas in the meetings. The first was what kind of settlement the US wanted. The second was the issue as to what extent the US would be prepared to use its military power. It was discussed in relation to the definition of American interests in intervening in the
This constituted the final form that the American policy would take in the Bosnian conflict.

Immediately after Clinton made these final decisions, he dispatched Anthony Lake and other members of the administration to Europe to explain them. On 12 August, the administration also announced that the Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Holbrooke, and the US Special Envoy to the former Yugoslavia, Robert Frasure, would go to Bosnia. 114 In principle, the European capitals welcomed what looked like a new American initiative. 115 The main reason for this openness on the part of the Europeans was that at least the US was making some kind of effort to settle the conflict. 116 However, the US and the other Contact Group members could not come to a common position in their discussion as to how to settle the conflict. For instance, after the announcement of this American initiative, Bildt and Holbrooke both carried out shuttle diplomacy across the Balkan Peninsula, albeit separately. On the one hand, Bildt continued to broker his peace plan that the US administration refused to accept in early August. 117 On the other hand, Holbrooke promoted American policy that involved military operations by Croatian army on the ground and NATO on the air.

On 16 August, Holbrooke and Bildt had a detailed conversation about each strategy. 118 They discussed tactical aspects of how the West should promote peace. However, they were not able to form a common strategy. This was because the differences between them arose from the fact that the US disliked being limited, even by the limited logic of multilateralism, in the form of the Contact Group. Holbrooke regarded the very framework and its practices of the Contact Group undermined the credibility of the Atlantic alliance and that of the US in Europe. Holbrooke claimed to his senior the US

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114 Shortly after that Holbrooke took over as the Special Envoy. It was due to the accident. On 20 August, Robert Frasure and his assistants lost their lives in a traffic accident on Mount Ingum near Sarajevo. 115 Bildt, Peace Journey, 82-83. 116 Bildt, Peace Journey, 82-83. 117 Bildt, Peace Journey, 82-83. 118 Bildt, Peace Journey, 88.
Secretary of State, Warren Christopher:

[The Contact Group presents us with a constant conundrum. We can’t live without it, we can’t live with it. If we don’t meet with them and tell them what we are doing, they complain publicly. If we tell them, they disagree and often leak—and worse.]

Such a position is, indeed, the central motive for the US administration to promote the logic of international order; what this research has referred to as quasi-multilateralism. The US only supports multilateralism as long as its outcomes correspond to America’s interests and, when the results of multilateralism do not accord with its interests, the US legitimizes its exceptional position, by advocating an ideological interpretation of the moral value of the West. However, other Western states would still consider themselves bound by the genuine rule of multilateralism, regardless of their like or dislike of its outcomes, as the US ultimately maintains the order by military power.

US policy-makers understood that the UN’s hold of the ‘dual-key’ over NATO air strikes institutionally protected the British and Russian position of not taking robust action in Bosnia. In other words, the UN authority in Bosnia (i.e. ‘dual-key’ arrangement) was regarded as a pivotal obstacle promoting America’s vision of international order. Therefore, with a determination to launch military intervention, sideling the authority of the UN was an essential part of America’s strategy to place a block on genuine multilateralism within the Contact Group.

**Operation Deliberate Force**

On 28 August 1995, a shift in perception on the Bosnian conflict occurred within the Contact Group. On that day, the indoor market in Sarajevo had been hit by mortar shell-fire which killed 37 people. This time the UN explicitly condemned the Bosnian Serbs as responsible for the

119 Holbrooke, *To End a War*, 84.
120 Interview with Anthony Lake on 19 May 2004; Interview with Robert Hunter on 17 May 2004; Interview with Robin Renwick on 5 October 2004.
killing. On 29 August, the Contact Group held a meeting in Paris.\footnote{Bildt, \textit{Peace Journey}, 94.} As a result of the previous day’s shelling, they did not oppose the NATO offensive—i.e. strategic air strikes to deter Serbian offensives—which was code-named \textit{Operation Deliberate Force}.\footnote{Bildt, \textit{Peace Journey}, 94. A detailed study of the operation is in Ripley, \textit{Operation Deliberate Force}.} On 30 August, NATO began operations, attacking the Bosnian Serbs’ key infrastructure from the air. The short-term aim of this military operation by NATO was to compel Bosnian Serb forces to remove its heavy artillery around Sarajevo and to release that city from its siege.\footnote{NATO, "Statement by the Secretary General of NATO, 30 August 1995," \textit{NATO Press Releases} (95) 73.} NATO continued the operation until 14 September 1995, when the Bosnian Serbs complied with its demands.\footnote{NATO, "Joint Statement by the Secretary General of the United Nations and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 14 September 1995," \textit{NATO Press Releases} (95)85.}

As soon as the operation commenced, the US Ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright wanted to make sure the ‘dual-key’ did not stop NATO air attacks. Because of Boutros-Ghali’s absence, she negotiated with his deputy Kofi Annan. As a result, the UN did not exercise the authority they possessed to prevent operations.\footnote{To be precise, Boutros-Ghali disagrees with Holbrooke’s reading in the following way: ‘On August 30, hardly a day after the bombing began, Ambassador Albright telephoned Under Secretary-General Annan to ask when the air strikes would end. In a note to me reporting on Albright’s call, Annan expressed astonishment that she should ask him such a question. Albright apparently did not understand that the decision-making process for the air operation had been delegated to the commanders in the field weeks ago. She was anxious that the bombing not go to the point where it would derail the peace process. Annan told her that we were in touch with our UN commanders in the field and suggested that she contact her own military authorities on the matter’ Quoted in Boutros-Ghali, \textit{Unvanquished}, 224-225.} US policy-makers understood that Annan indicated as much to the UN personnel.\footnote{Holbrooke, \textit{To End a War}, 99, 103.} Holbrooke made mention of this episode in his memoirs:

> Annan’s gutsy performance in those twenty-four hours [the first day of NATO air attacks] was to play a central role in Washington’s strong support for him a year later as the successor to Boutros-Ghali as Secretary-General of the United States. Indeed, in a sense Annan won the job on that day.”\footnote{Holbrooke, \textit{To End a War}, 103.}

Indeed, in 1996, the US prevented Boutros-Ghali from serving his second term and it instead supported Kofi Annan’s candidacy. Holbrooke’s recollections give us an insight into what the US administration’s critical concern was, in regard to the Bosnian conflict. This was the question of UN authority over
NATO operations—i.e. the very essence of the European vision of multilateralism and its ‘sovereign peace’.

In the meantime, the Croatian army moved its frontline from Krajina to within the Bosnian territory. In other words, the US compensated for the lack of any ground troops with the Croatian army’s offensives. However, these offensives became as those of Bosnian Serb forces. Holbrooke, was aware of this; he ‘told Tudjman that current Croatian behavior might be viewed as a milder form of ethnic cleansing. Tudjman reacted strongly, but he did not deny it’. Yet, after Operation Storm began, Holbrooke said: ‘Mr. President [Tudjman], I urge you to go as far as you can, but not to take Banja Luka [the Bosnian Serb’s main stronghold].’ The Croatian Army carried out its military action accordingly. However, as Holbrooke implies his initial acknowledgement of the fact, such military action was implemented at the cost of the civilians on the ground.

In 2001 the Croatian army officer in charge of Krajina offensives (i.e. Operation Storm) and its military activities in Bosnia (i.e. that in effect acted in conjunction with NATO’s Operation Deliberate Force), General Ante Gotovina, was indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. He has been charged with crimes against humanity and violations of the laws or customs of war in regard to Croatian offensives from summer to winter 1995. The initial version of his indictment says:

Between 4 August 1995 and 15 November 1995, large numbers of Krajina Serbs fled or were forced to flee to Bosnia Herzegovina and Serbia. [...] Ante GOTOVINA [sic] acting individually and/or in concert with others, including President Franjo Tudjman, planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of persecutions of the Krajina Serb population [emphasis added].

In this initial indictment, the Criminal Tribunal implied that the Croatian government, including its

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129 Holbrooke, To End a War, 160-161.
130 Holbrooke, To End a War, 160.
head of state, Franjo Tudjman, was behind such ethnic cleansing. As we have discussed, it was the US administration that effectively provided political context for the Croatian authorities’ actions.

This episode suggests that the quality of ideological moral value was easily compromised in accord with the vital interests of the US. The use of coercive power under the banner of punishing a non-democratic regime would devastate innocent civilians on the ground. These people who were devastated by such intervention would ask that; what was the use of ‘democratic peace’ for the quality of their life? Moreover, General Ante Gotovina, as well as Bosnian Serb leaders such as Radovan Karadžić and General Ratko Mladić, are still at large [as of August 2005].

To sum up, the actual outcomes of the Western actions underlined the fallacies of the claims on the part of the Liberal Multilateralists. As we discussed in Chapter 1, they argue that the Western collective action is guided by not America’s vital interest, but by the procedural normative value of multilateralism, due to America’s open and competitive domestic policy-making system, as well as its benevolent international leadership. The outcome of such Western policy is characterized by its another ideological moral value of liberal democracy—such as respecting law and order, free enterprise, democratic governance and human rights—and, thus, it would create stability, not only within the West, but also in the non-Western world. In other words, according to Liberal Multilateralists, there is a harmony between the procedural normative value and the ideological moral value of the West.

This section provides a catalogue of gaps between the Western promises to promote some justice and the outcomes that they created. America’s encouragement of the Croatian offensives was one negative consequences of its promotion of quasi-multilateralism. In order to maintain its vital interests, the US attempts to overcome the regulative power of multilateralism, under the cover of the

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133 The Criminal Tribunal later issued an amendment of the indictment. In the new indictment the same paragraph was re-worded as follows: ‘Between 4 August 1995 and 15 November 1995, the accused Ante GOTOVINA, acting individually and/or in concert with other members of the joint criminal enterprise, planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation, or execution of persecutions of the Krajina Serb population in the southern portion of the Krajina region’ [emphasis added]. President Tudjman was not mentioned in this revised indictment. This illustrated that the action of the Criminal Tribunal is politically vulnerable to diplomatic pressures. The Prosecutor of the Tribunal, "The Prosecutor of the Tribunal against Ante Gotovina: Amended Indictment," The International
Western collective action for an ideologically defined common cause, but without any serious constraint attached to America's actions. As a result, the process (i.e. use of coercive power) that is alleged to promote 'democratic peace' sometimes compromises the very essence of justice that the ideal democratic regime would be able to provide. Indeed, civilians on the ground were devastated by such hypocrisy.

'Betraying' the Bosnian Government: Consequences of Quasi-Multilateralism (II)

While NATO carried out its aerial strikes and coordinated the Western attacks on the ground against the Bosnian Serbs, the US Special Envoy, Richard Holbrooke, and the Serbian President, Slobodan Milošević, agreed with the basis for peace negotiations. On 30 August, Milošević and his Serbian military commanders met the Bosnian Serb leaders in Belgrade, with the Patriarch Pavle of the Serbian Orthodox Church in attendance. The Patriarch brokered an agreement to the effect that Milošević would represent all Serbs in international negotiations relating to the Bosnian peace process. This is referred to as the Patriarch Paper. Milošević became the key person in the matter of any settlement.

Immediately after this, Milošević met Holbrooke and informed him of what had been agreed. Holbrooke was delighted with the fact that the US could negotiate with Milošević. However, as previously discussed, this was the very point over which the US administration had repeatedly criticized and dismissed the EU-UN peace efforts as an appeasement of 'aggressors'. This gives a sense of American policy-makers' real concern about the Bosnian conflict. In short, the fact that they were willing to negotiate with Milošević demonstrates that America's initial advocacy of the moral issues in the form of negotiating with the Serbian leaders was not the critical issue for the US. In the context of the transatlantic relationship during the Bosnian conflict, as this thesis has discussed, it is plausible to

*Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 2001. CASE NO: IT-01-45-I.*


135 Holbrooke, *To End a War*, 105-106.
understand that America’s use of anti-Serbian rhetoric was a means to undermine the European vision of the Western Order under multilateralism and to prevent its involvement in the conflict on the ground.

The situation on the ground intensified international diplomatic activities. On 7 September, the Foreign Ministers in the Contact Group along with the EU Troika and the Canadian and Dutch Foreign Ministers assembled in Paris. On the same day in Geneva, the US Special Envoy, Richard Holbrooke, convened negotiations between the Bosnian warring parties. Once the US had decided who would attend, it excluded the UN chief diplomatic envoy for the former Yugoslavia, Thorvald Stoltenberg. Boutros-Ghali wrote a letter to Christopher that the US should accept Stoltenberg in the Geneva meeting as the UN representative from the ICFY. As a result, Stoltenberg was invited. However, he was only given very limited access to the meeting. Boutros-Ghali realised the fact that the US would not give any role for the UN regarding the settlement of the Bosnian conflict.

This episode suggested that the US finally succeeded in sidelining the UN not only militarily but also politically. As the working hypothesis of this thesis has suggested, America’s promotion of its supremacy within the Western Order under the cover of ‘democratic peace’ would not necessarily work in favour of the interests of non-Western world. Therefore, in order to assess the validity of this claim, it is essential to look at the negotiation process of the Bosnian warring parties after this phase of the chronology in the international involvement in Bosnia.

In Geneva, the warring parties and the Contact Group discussed various issues. The most important agreement was the acceptance of the Bosnian Serb entity, ‘Republika Srpska’ within the state of Bosnia. The US administration put a lot of pressure on the Bosnian government to accept this. On 8 September, in one meeting between Holbrooke and the Bosnian government’s delegate and its Permanent representative to the UN, Muhammed Sacirbey, Holbrooke threatened Sacirbey in the

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136 Canada and the Netherlands were contributing troops to the UNPROFOR. Owen, *Balkan Odyssey*, 358-359.
139 Boutros-Ghali, *Unvanquished*, 245.
following way:

I told Sacirbey that if he precipitated a failure in Geneva, the United States would hold him responsible, and only the Serbs would benefit. [...] In order to protect this process, I later asked Christopher to call Izetbegovic and Silajzic in Sarajevo to calm them down. He did so immediately [...].

As a result, the Bosnian government reluctantly accepted 'Republika Srpska' in principles. However, this means that Bosnia would be practically divided into two parts. This was a clear betrayal of America's initial arguments to use coercive power—namely, maintaining territorial integrity of Bosnia under the leadership of the Izetbegović government.142

In order to maintain the territorial integrity of Bosnia, the Bosnian government did not want to accept the idea of regional based election system for the position of presidency.143 However, as a result of the negotiation between Holbrooke and Milošević, the US demanded the Bosnian government to accept such a system.144 Finally, the Bosnian government had to accept the position America tabled in exchange for the Clinton's informal guarantee to oppose any future partition of Bosnia that did not have any legal force regarding the actions of the US.145 As a result of these arrangements, however, the future central government of Bosnia and its 'Bosnian Presidency' would not have a sufficiently substantial administrative authority to represent the whole of Bosnia. Indeed, under the Dayton Agreement, the position of President is split into three: namely one Muslim, a Bosnian Croat, and a Bosnian Serb.146 Having succeeded militarily to deter the Serbian offensives and also to place the Bosnian government's actions under the dependence of the Croatian Army, the US moved to the next stage of the negotiation.

141 Holbrooke, *To End a War*, 139.
142 American policy-makers defended that there is no perfect peace. Interview with Anthony Lake on 19 May 2004; Interview with Robert Hunter 17 May 2004. Also see: Holbrooke, *To End a War*, 361-364.
144 Holbrooke, *To End a War*, 179-184
The Foreign Ministerial meeting of the Contact Group in New York in late September 1995, the international actors involved in the diplomacy regarding the Bosnian conflict tried to bring about settlement. On 5 October, the US President announced a cease-fire that would take effect in five days time. However, on the same day that Clinton made this announcement, Holbrooke was in Zagreb in order to talk with Tudjman. Holbrooke recalled what he said to the Croatian President:

[I was] urging Tudjman to capture more territory before the cease-fire took effect. [...] “You have five days left that’s all,” I said, “What you don’t win on the battlefield will be hard to gain at the peace talks. Don’t waste these days”.

Holbrooke’s comments precisely reflected territorial-based and ethnically-divided prescription for the future of Bosnia. However, it is clear that militarily actions in accord with such logic would exacerbate the dire conditions of civilians on the ground. Indeed, American-designed peace was promoted at the cost of civilians’ lives on the ground. This undermines the claims of Liberal Multilateralists that the Western action is motivated by its ‘ideational interests’ (i.e. promoting ‘liberal democracy’ through the process of multilateralism) and that the West brings the outcomes in accordance with its values.

In October 1995, while the US administration was engaging military operation in Bosnia, the members of the Contact Group planned to convene intensive negotiations in order to bring about a settlement. These negotiations were due to take place at the Dayton Air Base, Ohio, in the US. Before the Dayton meeting could go ahead, the US had to resolve several international issues concerning the implementation phase of the peace process. There were three important issues: Russia’s role in the implementation phase of the peace agreement; NATO’s role in the post conflict Bosnia; and the international civilian administrator’s role.

As for the first issue, on 23 October, the Presidents of the US and Russia agreed that the latter will take part in the peacekeeping mission. Following this, on 27 October the US Secretary of...
Defense, William Perry, and his Russian counterpart Pavel Grachev reached an agreement to the effect that the Russian troops would be deployed separately from NATO but would be under NATO command.\textsuperscript{150}

With regard to the second issue of NATO’s role, the US government decided to provide ground troops, but it was determined to claim that the mission must be entirely under the command and control of NATO.\textsuperscript{151} America’s allies were ready to accept this point, but there was disagreement among the policy-makers of the US regarding the tasks and the duration of NATO’s operation in Bosnia.\textsuperscript{152} Eventually, by the end of October, the Clinton administration decided to send NATO troops with a minimal military role and with the additional condition that they were to pull out after one year of deployment. Following this decision, the NAC later authorized an implementation plan for the Dayton Agreement that was codenamed \textit{Operation Joint Endeavour} (also known as the OPLAN 40105).\textsuperscript{153} This operation plan was unlike its two predecessors.\textsuperscript{154} First of all, it was in fact implemented. Secondly, this plan reflected the above-discussed US administration’s intention to minimize NATO’s political and police role in Bosnia. Therefore, the US was reluctant to accept the potential that NATO would get involved in actions against persons indicted for war crimes, which was in contrast to Bildt’s requests.\textsuperscript{155}

\textsuperscript{151} Daalder, \textit{Getting to Dayton}, 139-149.
\textsuperscript{152} According to Holbrooke and Daalder there were two opinions within the administration. On the one hand Holbrooke and other members who were responsible for the Bosnian negotiations were in favour of giving an extended role to NATO and extending the length of its stay in Bosnia. They assumed that the Bosnian ethnic groups would have insufficient ability to administer the state. In order to bolster the settlement of the Bosnian state, they wanted to define NATO’s mission in Bosnia as ranging from policing to military monitoring. On the other hand, however, Lake and the Defense Department argued in favour of the opposite position. They were worried that if NATO stayed in Bosnia with a large role, it would allow the Bosnian parties to work less hard to implement the peace agreement. Thus, the role of NATO should instead be limited to monitoring the separation between the warring forces on the ground. Lake and the Defense Department’s views also set out from congressional suspicions about the sending of American ground troops. Holbrooke, \textit{To End a War}, 215-223; Daalder, \textit{Getting to Dayton}, 144-149.
\textsuperscript{153} Daalder, \textit{Getting to Dayton}, 147-148.
\textsuperscript{154} NATO had looked at two important operations plans in relation to the Bosnian conflict. They were namely: OPLAN 40103 that was aimed at implementing the Vance-Owen Peace Plan and OPLAN 40104 that supposed to assist to pull out UNPROFOR troops. See: Bildt, \textit{Peace Journey}, 114, 170.
\textsuperscript{155} Richard Holbrooke also defended NATO’s initial reluctance to assist the implementation of disarmament and as a tactics to seal settle the conflict. Holbrooke, \textit{To End a War}, 361; Bildt, \textit{Peace Journey}, 170.
The most controversial issue was the third issue, the role of the civilian administrator in Bosnia—the High Representative. At first, on 29 September 1995, the member states of NATO decided to set up this position in order to ‘monitor the total implementation of the peace agreement’. Initially, the US representative in charge of the future role of this post, Richard Gallucci, predicted that an American would take the role of High Representative. Therefore, he planned to vest strong administrative power in this position. However, as previously discussed, the US had decided that NATO would engage in only minimal civilian tasks in post conflict Bosnia. As a result the US changed its opinion about the High Representative and it was determined to prevent any interference to any NATO’s actions in Bosnia. Eventually, the US administration turned out to be refusing to give any real military power to the High Representative, particularly over NATO forces. This again underlines the fact that America’s concern was not based on its ideological moral value of West (i.e. looking after civilian and political re-constructions of Bosnia) but the national interests of the US, of not undermining NATO’s efficiency.

This tension between the US and the Europeans was prolonged up until the final phase of the negotiations at the Dayton Air Base. On one occasion, a French member even threatened to leave the talks. However, this did not change the fundamental nature of the negotiations that the US controlled the key initiatives. Finally, the Contact Group reached a compromise that the High Representative would only be able to exercise civilian and political aspect of administrative authority and would thus have no military power over NATO.

This division of labour between the NATO and the High Representative, however, came to be regarded as being to the detriment of effective governance in Bosnia, especially its quality of legal justice. Right up to the present day [as of August 2005] NATO and its successor (EU troops) have

156 Bildt, Peace Journey, 130.
157 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 156-158.
158 Bildt, Peace Journey, 130; Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 156-158.
159 Bildt, Peace Journey, 131-132.
160 Silber and Little, The Death of Yugoslavia, 372.
161 Bildt, Peace Journey, 131-132; Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 156-158.
failed to arrest two of the most senior persons indicted for war criminals including Mladić and Karadžić. The incumbent High Representative [as of August 2005], Paddy Ashdown, has in the past publicly criticized NATO's lack of cooperation on this issue. This can be argued to be one of the examples of the gap between the promise the West and the US made in the name of promoting 'democratic peace' in Bosnia and the reality of its practice, when it comes to a challenge to the strategic interests of the US.

To return to the Bosnian side of settlement, intensive negotiations between the three warring parties (i.e. the Bosnian government, the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Serbs) and the Contact Group were held in the Dayton Air Base in Ohio from 1 to 21 November. The Contact Group remained in Dayton throughout these negotiations. However, in reality, the US led the negotiations. The Bosnian government faced mounting pressure on them from the US to make unbearable concessions. One of such an issue was their territorial claim over Brčko. The Bosnian government was forced to accept putting the decision of the sovereignty of this area under future international arbitration.

On 21 November 1995, after intensive negotiations, the warring parties of the Bosnian conflict signed the Dayton Agreement. However, the Bosnian government could not be shy about their anger and frustration over the agreement. On his way back home from Dayton, Izetbegović could not contain his resentment at the outcomes of the negotiation: '[i]t is a world in which it is possible to lead an unjust war and impose an unjust peace'. Despite America's betrayal of its initial rhetoric

167 Izetbegović, Inescapable Questions, 328.
about protecting the interests of the Bosnian government, in December 1995 the Dayton Agreement was formalized at the Elysée in Paris with the attendance of the leaders of the Contact Group.

The international implementation process followed on from this. However, nearly a decade since the Dayton Agreement, Bosnia is still politically and militarily occupied by the Western powers. There is no clear date given as to when this occupation will come to end. Moreover, on the political plane, Bosnia is divided formally into two parts (i.e. the Muslim-Croat Federation and the ‘Republika Srpska’, albeit, in practice, these would be considered to be three divisions at the level of the political leadership (i.e. the Muslims, the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Serbs).

To sum up this section of the Dayton Agreement, America’s diplomacy accompanied by its military actions, finally settled the conflict. This gives credibility to America’s claim that the European efforts did not work, because it was unwilling to use coercive power and appeased Bosnian Serb forces. Originally, the US advocated the use of coercive power in order to protect the interests of the Bosnian government—the territorial integrity of Bosnia under the Izetbegović government.\(^{168}\) The US administration employed this logic in order to justify its ‘lift and strike’ policy and challenged the validity of European peace initiatives. However, the outcomes of America’s military intervention were far from aiming at fulfilling its initial rhetoric.

President Clinton justified the Dayton Agreement and the subsequent deployment of America’s troops on the ground for implementing it by asserting that it ‘served our [America’s] strategic interests and advanced our fundamental values’.\(^{169}\) He still shares the viewpoint with the Liberal Multilateralists that there was no serious tension between promoting America’s ‘strategic interests’ (i.e. to consolidate NATO’s supremacy in the form of maintaining its de facto independence from the UN) and its ‘fundamental values’ (such as promoting democracy and respecting human rights). However, as this section clearly demonstrated, America’s initial rhetorical commitment to

\(^{168}\) Interview with Anthony Lake on 21 May 2004; Izetbegović, *Inescapable Questions*, 290.

\(^{169}\) Clinton, *My Life*, 685.
maintain the territorial integrity of Bosnia was dismissed as a result of the Clinton administration's promotion of the strategic interests of maintaining NATO's *de facto* independence from the UN (and thus limiting the role of multilateralism) and not sending ground troops to fight on behalf of the Bosnian government. This betrayal was a symbol of the treatment that a non-Western received as a result of America's manipulation of moral values in order to organize the Western Order under quasi-multilateralism.

Conclusion

This chapter has analysed the impact of the intra-Western interaction for the Bosnian civilians and the Bosnian government concerning the settlement process of the Bosnian conflict. This thesis has four theoretical claims to be discussed in order to examine the validity of the working hypothesis vis-à-vis Liberal Multilateralists' views. They are as follows: firstly, it claims that there are tensions between the Western states regarding interpretation of legitimate actions; secondly, it suggests that America's supremacy within the West and its democratic allies' 'voice opportunities' are incompatible; thirdly, it argues that NATO is a collective self-defence organization that promotes the West's (or America's) chosen values; and lastly, it claims that America's promotion of quasi-multilateralism within the West does not necessarily promote the genuine contents of the Western values and, thus, it would not necessarily act in favour of non-Western world. The following paragraphs will look at what we have found out with regard to the first, second and the third point. Then it will discuss the empirical materials used in this chapter in relation to the last point.

As for the first issue regarding the debate on Western values, it is clear that the Clinton administration's vision to organize the Western Order—quasi-multilateralism—was not in accord with the European vision of multilateralism. America's vision advocated the multilateral decision-making process of a collective self-defence organization, not that of a collective security, and it opposed placing any substantial authority over America and NATO's military action, as the outcomes of intra-Western
interaction.

With regard to the second issue, of the nature of the intra-Western interaction, this was not found to accord with the Liberal Multilateralists' vision. Evidently, regardless of its allies' apprehensions, the US administration urged Western military intervention, albeit, without any direct involvement of American ground troops.

Concerning the third issue on NATO's identity, this was well illustrated by the US policy to remove the UN's hold of the 'dual key' of air strikes. The same logic—namely America’s dislike of multilateralism on security cooperation and the UN’s authority over the US and NATO’s use of coercive power—explains the dispute between the US and the Europeans such as OPLAN 40104, the Frasure-Milošević Agreement, the Bildt-Milošević Agreement, and the role of the High Representative. Indeed, the Clinton administration created a situation that allowed the US to use its military and circumvent UN authority. In contrast to the assumption on the part of the Liberal Multilateralists, NATO cannot effectively cooperate with other security organizations regardless of their identities (i.e. collective self-defence or collective security).

We turn now to look at the fourth claim that concerns the impact of such Western policy towards Bosnia. Liberal Multilateralists' pivotal claim is that the Western Order produces a policy in accord with Western value of 'liberal democracy', which is compatible with Western procedural normative value of multilateralism. This Western policy is expected to bring the benefit of 'liberal democracy' and multilateralism, not only within the West, but also to the non-Western world. However, the Bosnian case illustrates contra such perspectives. Western multilateralism was restricted as a result of America's advocacy of using a NATO strategic air strike.

The use of air strikes was initially rationalized as a means to protect the interests of the Bosnian government. However, in reality, the US did not want to send its ground troops to fight on behalf of the Bosnian government. As a result, the Clinton administration shifted its rationale to use military power from protecting the Bosnian government to deterring the Serbian offensives. However,
as we have discussed, the implication of this manipulation of the end of coercive power was quite devastating for the interests of the Bosnian government. This means that the military balance of power, not the moral integrity, determined the contents of the settlement.

First of all, the Croatian Army's offensives arguably exacerbated the conditions of civilians on the ground, especially the Croatian Serbs. Regardless of the brutality of the Croatian action, the US formed an implicit military cooperation with Croatia. The Bosnian government had no choice but to rely upon this collaboration. This implied that the Bosnian government could not impose its demands onto Bosnian Croat forces and their de facto occupation of the Bosnian territories. Moreover, at the final stage of the conflict, the bulk of the settlement was negotiated between Tudjman and Milošević, with the Bosnian government having to accept the outcomes of these negotiations. This demonstrates the fact that America's initial advocacy of protecting the interests of the Bosnian government was used as rhetoric to undermine the moral authority of the ICFY-promoted peace plans. Therefore, the US administration dismissed this rationale, when it realised that the ICFY no longer commanded moral authority to define the Western approach to the Bosnian conflict. Moreover, the US did not back up its rhetorical threat to protect the territorial integrity of Bosnian under the leadership of Izetbegović. Indeed, the Clinton administration did not act in accordance with its own moral advocacies because it gave priority to the vital interest of the US.

The above-discussed facts correspond to what the working hypothesis of this thesis has predicted. America's approach to the Bosnian conflict was driven by its policy to organize the Western Order under quasi-multilateralism in order to protect its vital interests. For this purpose, in opposition to procedural normative value of multilateralism, the US administration advocated the ideologically defined concept of protecting the interests of the Bosnian government as the moral value of the West. However this newly defined moral value was also used as a means to promote America's interests. In this way, the US eventually betrayed its initial promise to the Bosnian government and also devastated the lives civilians on the ground. In short, the interests of the Bosnian government were not only
neglected by the European approach to the conflict but also by the Clinton administration.
Chapter 7 Conclusion

As defined in Chapter 1, this thesis analyses the intra-Western interaction in relation to the Bosnian conflict, with a special reference to the friction among the Western states regarding interpretations of Western values that constituted the justification for the use of coercive power in the post-Cold War world. As a pivotal part of these analyses, this thesis traces the following developments: the formation process of the American vital interests as opposed to the impact of the European interpretation of the procedural normative value of multilateralism and its ICFY promoted peace negotiations; the corresponding US manipulation of Western moral values, based on an ideology of ‘liberal democracy’, in conjunction with the Clinton administration’s advocacy of the ‘lift and strike’ policy towards the Bosnian conflict and the implications of such a policy for the situation in Bosnia.

The interpretation of this causal relationship between America’s world vision and its implications for European security and Bosnia was already suggested in the form of the working hypothesis in Chapter 1. That was, namely, Western policy towards Bosnia did not work to support the interests of the Bosnian government, and adversely affected its civilians, who suffered as a result of conflict being prolonged and of the West’s failure to protect them in the early stages of international involvement. Western hypocrisy was exacerbated due to US manipulations of the interpretation of Western moral values in order to organize the Western Order under quasi-multilateralism.

This working hypothesis consists of four counter-arguments to the Liberal Multilateralists’ view of the Western Order. To repeat the four points of the debate, they are as follows. The first relates to the question of whether the Western states share the idea that moral legitimacy lies only in multilateralism, or that there is more than one concept of moral values. The second concern is as to whether the reality of America’s supremacy is compatible with its allies’ ‘voice opportunities’. Thirdly, it challenges the validity of the Liberal Multilateralists’ claim that regard NATO as having a hybrid identity of collective self-defence and collective security, which does not undermine the operation of the conflict resolution mechanism of the US. In opposition to that this research argues that NATO is a
collective self-defence organization that promotes the particular values that the West selects, and thus
NATO does not always act in collaboration with other international organizations (such as the UN).
Lastly, there is the question as to whether or not the Western Order acts in favour of the non-Western
world, especially the interests of the Bosnian government.

The successful evaluation of the four counter-arguments that correspond to the working
hypothesis of this thesis would provide an alternative theoretical, yet firmly empirically-based
interpretation of the nature and the implications of the Western Order. The rest of this Conclusion
evaluates the validity of the working hypothesis and its four counter-arguments in relation to empirical
cases we have discussed in this thesis.

Does Multilateralism Alone Constitute Western Values?

As the empirical chapters of this thesis (especially Chapters 2 and 4) have demonstrated,
there were clearly differing visions of the intra-Western collaboration. One vision was based on the
Liberal Multilateralists’ interpretation that predicts revitalizing the UN’s conflict resolution mechanism.
By implication, this order would be the embodiment of the ‘sovereign peace’ on the basis of the
procedural normative value of multilateralism. The member states of the European Union regarded the
ICFY-promoted peace plans as an embodiment of this vision. The other vision was promoted by the
US. The Clinton administration believed that the ICFY-promoted peace plans would pose serious
threats to the vital interests of the US. The interests were, firstly not sending America’s contribution of
ground troops for implementing the UN regulated peace plan and, secondly, maintaining NATO’s de
facto independence from the UN regarding NATO’s ‘out of area’ operations.

In order to protect its vital interests, the US promoted the ideological moral value of the
West under the banner of ‘democratic peace’ as the alternative to the procedural normative value of
multilateralism and its ‘sovereign peace’. America’s advocacy of the ‘lift and strike’ policy and the
justification for it—respecting the interests of the ‘democratically elected’ and ‘law-abiding’ regime of
the Bosnian government—gave substance to the ideological moral values under the banner of ‘democratic peace’ (see Chapters 3 and 4). Such American manipulation of the moral values of the West facilitated the re-organization of the Western Order in accordance with the logic that this research terms ‘quasi-multilateralism’. This logic allows the US to orchestrate Western collective military action with sufficient moral legitimacy but without following the outcomes of genuine multilateralism. This American policy of re-organizing the Western Order under quasi-multilateralism and the corresponding ‘lift and strike’ policy in Bosnia caused controversy, however.

As we have discussed in Chapter 5, this policy not only filled America’s allies with a sense of outrage, but it also created a tension between the dual interests of the US in relation to the Bosnian conflict. On the one hand, the Clinton administration advocated the ‘lift and strike’ policy and the ideological moral values (in the form of protecting the territorial integrity of Bosnia under the leadership of Izetbegović) in order to maintain its vital interest in NATO’s de facto independence from the UN. However, this policy of deterring the procedural normative value of multilateralism in the form of the ICFY peace plans effectively encouraged not only the Bosnian Serb forces and the Bosnian Croat forces’ offensives but also the Bosnian government’s military action to maintain its territorial integrity (see Chapter 5). Hence, the implementation of the ‘lift and strike’ policy would have triggered the evacuation of the UNPROFOR troops. This situation put mounting pressure on the US to sacrifice another of its vital interests — that of not sending ground troops — in order to give substance of the ideological moral value of protecting the territorial integrity of Bosnia under the leadership of the Izetbegović government. This situation is what this thesis calls the predicament of quasi-multilateralism.

It was this predicament, not the Western moral values or America’s allies’ voice opportunities, that led the US administration to increasingly ignore the concerns on the part of its allies as well as the interests of the Bosnian government. There was not a substantial consensus among the Western states, either, as to how they should settle the conflict over the issue of what kind of Bosnia
they should create. As demonstrated in Chapter 6, this drove the US to form an implicit alliance with the Croatian government in the Bosnian conflict. This was far from America's initial rhetoric of promoting a 'just' settlement under the banner of the ideological moral values of the West in the name of promoting 'democracy' in Bosnia and the policy of lift and strike. In fact, such interpretation of moral arguments was a means to promote America's vital interests in NATO's de facto independence from the UN and of not deploying ground troops. To elucidate this point, the form of 'democracy' the US eventually promoted was the 'market democracy' (i.e. liberal democracy) and the market demands a stable international environment (see Chapter 4). Thus, encouraging Croatian forces' offensives (which may have intensified the war at the cost of the civilians' lives on the ground) and not giving substance to the values of democracy itself in Bosnia can be legitimized as a means to create stability across the Balkan Peninsula. As Anthony Lake stated, the humanitarian tragedies in Bosnia itself do not 'define our broader strategy in the world.'\(^1\) Bosnia 'deserves American engagement' not only because of the humanitarian issues but also for the reason that 'it lies alongside the established and emerging market democracies of Europe.'\(^2\) In short, as long as the US maintained the impulse to legitimize its hegemonic position within the West, and other Western states did not simply accede to this logic (of a hegemonic vision of quasi-multilateralism), a single vision of legitimacy could never regulate the relationship among the states within the Western Order.

**Was America’s Supremacy within the West Compatible with its Allies’ ‘Voice Opportunities’?**

The empirical part of this research has demonstrated (especially in Chapter 3) that there is little evidence of a causal relationship between the Western demands made to the US and the actual outcomes of American foreign policy. As discussed in Chapter 1, Risse-Kappen spells out the

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2. Lake, "From Containment to Enlargement", Address at Johns Hopkins University, September 21 1993."
conditions under which the US is unable to follow the outcomes of intra-Western multilateralism.\(^3\)

According to this view, factors that prevent American compliance with genuine multilateralism are as follows: 1) overwhelming objection by domestic actors against US policy; 2) violation of Western values on the part of the European allies; and 3) America's vital interests where these are incompatible.

As we have also discussed in Chapter 1, some Liberal Multilateralists, such as John Ruggie and US policy-makers, have accepted that Bosnia constituted a failure of intra-Western multilateralism but that this was due either to America's domestic opposition or to European indifference to Western values.\(^4\)

Others, such as Risse-Kappen and Peter Katzenstaine, do not regard the Bosnian case as a failure of multilateralism among the member states of NATO.\(^5\) As a group, however, they dismiss the possibility that Bosnia constituted a threat to America's vital interests.

In contrast to such interpretations this thesis argues that America's two vital interests—namely not sending ground troops, and maintaining NATO's \textit{de facto} independence from the UN—were at stake in Bosnia and these interests dictated the US' disregard for its allies' opinions. As Chapter 2 of this thesis illustrated, the London Conference of August 1992 and the ICFY embodied the European vision of Western Order, which was regulated by the \textit{procedural} moral value of multilateralism and the idea of 'sovereign peace'. US policy-makers perceived that the European approach to the Bosnian conflict would undermine NATO and US supremacy in Europe and that it would also demand America's military contribution on the ground in order to give substance to the procedural norms of multilateralism.

Following this, Chapter 3 discussed the Clinton administration's reaction to the Vance Owen Peace Plan. The Clinton administration was quite determined to oppose the European approach to the


extent that it even rejected the Vance-Owen Peace Plan and proposed to adopt the so-called ‘lift and strike’ policy. This was legitimized by America’s use of the ideological value based on protecting the interests of the democratically established new state of Bosnia under the leadership of Izetbegović. Contrary to the claims of Liberal Multilateralists, this American policy was formed prior to any substantial domestic pressure on the White House to adopt it.

In Chapter 4, we have also studied America’s motives for launching the Engagement and Enlargement strategy. As Anthony Lake acknowledged, America’s use of the logic of ‘democratic peace’ was a means to promote its national interests. In this way, the Clinton administration advocated the alternative ideological moral values of the West as opposed to multilateralism. Again, the content and the ramifications of that strategy were neither based upon a serious dialogue between the European states and the US nor upon pressure by American domestic actors on the US administration. It was in fact the Clinton administration that consciously chose a suitable rhetoric—namely ‘democratic peace’ theory—to consolidate the de facto independence of NATO from the UN and its position at the heart of the post-Cold War European security order. However, as we have discussed, this in turn created the predicament of quasi-multilateralism with its associated dilemmas.

The findings of Chapter 5, and partly Chapter 6, delineate the Clinton administration’s strategy to overcome this predicament of quasi-multilateralism, (the predicament in the form of tension between the administration’s two vital interests of NATO’s de facto independence from the UN and of not deploying its troops on the ground in combat). Practically, this tension took the form of the contradiction between the US advocacy of the ideological moral values of protecting the interests of the Bosnian government and its cooperation with the Croatian forces. This thesis made it clear in Chapter 5 that it was this predicament of quasi-multilateralism (more specifically the consequences of the Clinton administration’s naïve manipulation of the interpretation of ideological moral values of the West for the sake of its vital interests)—and neither European allies’ ‘voice opportunities’ nor US domestic

6 Interview with Anthony Lake on 21 May 2004.
opposition to the Clinton administration—that was the critical factor in creating America's indecision with regard to the Bosnian conflict during 1994.

Indeed, as we documented in Chapter 5 and 6, the US government eventually attempted to keep distance from both the interests of the Bosnian government and its West European allies' demands on the US to follow the outcomes of multilateralism, in order to overcome the predicament of quasi-multilateralism. Consequently, the US, on the one hand, demanded that the Bosnian government give assent to the establishment of the Muslim-Croat Federation and also to accept the Contact Group Peace Plan, regardless of its initial reluctance to do so. On the other hand, the US ignored the outcomes of multilateralism by implicitly encouraging the Croatian government to violate the UN arms embargo. In addition, it urged the European members of the Contact Group to accept the use of strategic air strikes, irrespective of their opinion. America's advocacy of the use of air power was not directly aimed at protecting the interests of the Bosnian government. Instead, air strikes effectively assisted the Croatian offensives to conclude the conflict as soon as possible, because the US wanted to avoid using its ground troops. Finally, America's *vital interests* prevented the endorsement of its initial *ideological* interpretation of Western values (in the form of protecting the interests of the Bosnian government).

To sum up, the empirical analyses provided in this thesis have indicated, contra Liberal Multilateralists, that the tension between America's two vital interests (i.e. maintaining NATO's *de facto* independence from the UN and not being militarily involved on the ground) and America's strategy to overcome the tension were the critical factors for defining US actions in Bosnia. In other words, according to Risse-Kappen's criteria (see Chapter 1), the case of Bosnia was the one where the US acted in accordance with its *vital interests*, rather than with the *procedural* normative value of multilateralism or the *ideological* moral values of promoting 'liberal democracy'. Intra-Western multilateralism only functioned so long as outcomes worked in favour of America's interests. America's adoption of multilateralism was indeed conditional.

The major fallacy of the Liberal Multilateralists lies in the fact that they cannot adequately
account for an asymmetrical power relationship between the US and other Western states. From the Vance-Owen Peace Plan to the Dayton Agreement, America's 'power over outcomes' regarding the Western approach to the Bosnian conflict was paramount. The US even manipulated the contents of Western moral values in accordance with its vital interests. To conclude this section, there is more than sufficient evidence to argue that America's actions to consolidate its supremacy in relation to the Bosnian conflict undermined its allies' 'voice opportunities.'

**Did NATO Give Substance to its Alleged Hybrid Identity?**

NATO's actions during the Bosnian conflict eventually consolidated the identity of NATO in line with the perceptions of the US policy-makers and NATO officials. Before the settlement of the Bosnian conflict, the member states of NATO did not have a clear consensus as to how they should define the alliance. As we have discussed in Chapter 2, the differing interpretations of the implications of NATO's *New Strategic Concept* of 1991 induced disagreements among the heads of state regarding the future direction of NATO. Western experiences during the Gulf War of 1991 and the 'New World Order' encouraged the European leaders to demand that the US give substance to multilateralism regarding security issues such as extending NATO missions to support UN-led peace-keeping operations. The political motive of European leaders in establishing the ICFY, was to implement this framework.

In opposition to such demands, the US administration(s) and NATO officials defended the *de facto* independence of NATO from the UN. For instance, the then NATO Secretary General, Manfred Wörner, defined his organization's identity when he discussed the relationship between NATO and the UN as follows:

For instance, in the conflict in former Yugoslavia, NATO is supporting with its ships in the Adriatic, [sic] the UN in the enforcement of the embargo. [...] Do these recent developments mean that NATO is becoming a "peacekeeping-agency" of the United Nations? Certainly not. Collective defence remains the core of our Alliance. It is NATO's capability to provide for the security
of its member states that creates the political power enabling us to shape political change. NATO's role as a major political factor would vanish if we were unable to maintain strong, collective defence capabilities.

By the end of the Bosnian conflict, the European members of NATO realised that they were unable to grasp the opportunity to give substance to Western multilateralism by revitalizing the UN-led peacekeeping operation in the form of NATO's substantial cooperation on the ground.

At the NATO Madrid Summit of 1997—the first NATO summit after the Bosnian conflict—the heads of states issued a declaration that reflected the above-discussed concession in the following way:

NATO will remain the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of Allies under the Washington Treaty [emphasis added].

In order to legitimize their commitments to such a collective self-defence function in the post-Cold War Europe, the leaders of NATO spelled out the aim of the Western collective military action as follows:

The security of NATO's members is inseparably linked to that of the whole of Europe. [...] The consolidation of democratic and free societies on the entire continent, in accordance with OSCE principles, is therefore of direct and material concern to the Alliance [emphasis added].

They affirmed that the orthodox interpretation of the Western moral values have now shifted from the procedural normative values of multilateralism and its vision of 'sovereign peace' to the ideological moral values of promoting 'market democracy' and its vision of 'democratic peace'. Indeed, NATO's declarations formed a kind of collective endorsement of America's Engagement and Enlargement Strategy and its opportunistic use of the 'democratic peace' theory to serve America's national interests.

This compromise among the heads of state of NATO implies that the UN or other international

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organizations cannot exercise any substantial authority over NATO action under the cover of multilateralism, especially its so-called 'out-of-area' operation.

In order to clarify the arguments outlined above, this thesis has presented three criteria to distinguish the identity of collective self-defence (or bilateral alliance) from the ideal type of collective security (see, Chapter 1). These elements are as follows: the degree and the role of power asymmetry between participants within a group; obligations of every member state; and the treatment of non-member states. The following sub-sections evaluate the finding of this thesis in the light of the above-mentioned three criteria.

The Power Asymmetry between the US and Other Member States

This thesis has demonstrated that in terms of the 'power over outcomes' there was a clear power asymmetry between the US and the other member states of NATO in relation to the Western approach to the Bosnian conflict. The differing Western opinions were not fully discussed within NATO despite its alleged multilateralism. Instead the US policy bolstered by the country's dominant power vis-à-vis other Western states, defined the outcomes of NATO's action. In other words, because of NATO's nature of institutionalizing America's supremacy to other member states, the US tends to prefer the collective self-defence arrangement (or bilateral alliances) to the collective security mechanism of the UN in its use of coercive power in the non-Western world.

This was, in a sense, a return to normality in the intra-Western relationship and the original function of NATO as it was established during the Cold War. The hints that the US gave in the early 1990s, that it might promote a UN-centred multilateralism merely constituted an exceptional phase of American foreign policy. America's more conventional logic is that of quasi-multilateralism. In other words, with regard to the legitimacy of Western use of coercive power, there was a pattern that, on the one hand, the US wanted to be regarded as multilateralist but, on the other hand, it avoided being constrained by the outcomes of any genuine multilateral consultation process.
America's use of quasi-multilateralism accompanied by its manipulation of Western 'ideational' interests—namely, its dismissal of procedural normative value of multilateralism and advocacy of the ideological moral value of 'liberal democracy'—and its corresponding institutional arrangements (i.e. the collective self-defence organization of NATO or bilateral alliances, but not the collective security organization of the UN) for legitimizing the use of coercive power. This is seen to be the central continuity in the pattern of America's cooperation in international security. Indeed, the US has demonstrated its overwhelming supremacy vis-à-vis the other member states of NATO during the Bosnian conflict and this, moreover, was the critical factor in determining America's modus operandi in the use of coercive power.

Obligations of Member States

Concerning the justification of the Western use of coercive power, the Gulf War of 1991 and America's subsequent promotion of the so-called the 'New World Order' marked an exceptional phase in US foreign policy. This is because the promotion of the 'New World Order' implied America's involvement in the materialisation of the above-discussed European vision of multilateralism that facilitates 'sovereign peace.' According to the notion of 'sovereign peace' and its procedural normative values of multilateralism, the UN Security Council Resolution 660 provided a clear war aim for the multilateral forces during the Persian Gulf War, which was to restore the status quo ante between Iraq and Kuwait. Due to this, the multilateral force did not invade Iraqi territories and halted its offensives as soon as it restored the sovereignty of Kuwait. Following from this, the 'New World Order' revitalized the UN conflict resolution mechanisms—in other words, what this research refers to as 'sovereign peace'. The UN document entitled An Agenda for Peace reflected this American initiative of taking collective coercive action, based on discussions at the UN Security Council. 

The Somalia and the Bosnia peacekeeping operations were regarded as the major test cases for this vision. During the initial phases, the Somali mission did not provoke serious controversy between the US and its Western allies. The Bush Senior administration decided to dispatch American troops in order to support the UN mission on the ground. In October 1993, the Clinton administration faced the collapse of the Somali mission and decided to retreat from supporting the UN mission. As European states were not seriously involved in the Somalia operation, this decision did not provoke serious criticism from America’s Western allies. Hence, as far as the intra-Western relationship was concerned, the Bosnian conflict was the real test case for examining the durability of the vision of ‘New World Order’.

As a result of the tension between the US and its Western allies, the US neither dispatched any peacekeeping troops on the ground, nor supported the EC/EU- and UN-promoted peace plans. The Clinton administration advocated the so-called Engagement and Enlargement strategy that legitimatized interventionist policies in the name of promoting ‘democratic peace’ and its ideological moral values of ‘liberal democracy’. As Michael Doyle argues, the idea of ‘democratic peace’ has the potential to create a bypass for the justification of the use of coercive power beyond the UN-centred conventional notion of the sovereign state system (see Chapters 1 and 4). Indeed, this logic was employed to legitimize America’s actions such as the use of NATO air strikes, and also its neglect of the UN arms embargo on Bosnia (see Chapter 4). Ever since the Bosnian conflict, it seems that the US has deliberately used ideological moral values to justify its use of coercive power when its actions do not conform to the outcomes of negotiations at the UN Security Council.

In retrospect, the Bosnian conflict was the turning point that led to the failure of the New World Order and the implementation of An Agenda for Peace. Therefore, it is fair to say that America’s approach to the Bosnian conflict reversed the definition of Western values from the short-lived

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multilateralist vision to a more conventional one of quasi-multilateralism that is rationalized by America's chosen ideological moral values (such as 'liberal democracy' and 'anti-terrorism'). Subsequently, the US started ignoring outcomes of collective decision-making processes if they imposed too much a constraint to actions on the part of America. However, at the same time, the US manipulated the interpretation of Western values and pretended that American action was not based on self-serving interests but on universal justice. The US urged other states to assent to values that, in reality, are chosen to justify not the common interests of the West but America's own interests.

For this purpose, the US ostensibly promoted the Western collective actions in forums, like NATO, where they can control outcomes. As a result of the above-discussed transformation of the vision of international cooperation on the part of the US, NATO acted only in order to protect its chosen values (i.e. 'democratic peace' in the form of promoting 'market democracy'). The previously quoted communique of the NATO Madrid Summit of 1997 illustrated such outcomes. In other words, the US re-defined its image and its post-Cold War obligations to the member states of NATO.

According to this new definition, NATO may help the UN's peacekeeping missions outside the territories of its member states (the so-called 'non Article 5 activities' or 'out-of area' tasks). However, NATO would only carry out 'out of area' operations to the extent that the UN mission concurs with NATO's (and America's) chosen values. In other words, this newly-defined obligation to members of NATO can be regarded as the collective self-defence task plus alpha. The contents of this plus alpha would be defined by the West's—essentially America's—chosen ideological moral values such as 'liberal democracy' or 'anti-terrorism' and not by the outcomes of negotiations of other international organizations such as the UN that symbolize the highest authority of the procedural normative value of multilateralism. In this way, NATO made a clear distinction between its collective self-defence task plus alpha and collective security tasks under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This distinction defines the responsibility for its member states' respectively. Indeed, America's obligation to the NATO members is limited in accordance with its self-serving ideology of 'democratic peace'.

How Did NATO Treat Non-Member States?

As Ian Clark has suggested, the Western policy of re-organizing international order based on its 'quasi-constitutional' logic would impose a 'harsh' settlement of the Cold War on the 'losers' in the name of multilateralism. Clark has discussed the idea that Russia as a loser of the Cold War receives poor treatment from the West. Indeed, Western policy in general and the American approach in particular, promoted NATO as a central institution of European security. Russia is only given partner status in NATO, which neither gives her a veto nor guarantees active participation in the formation of the NATO policy. In essence, Russia is marginalized in the decision-making process of European security. Similar, or even harsher treatment, has been imposed upon Serbia, and other former communist regimes, and what Clinton termed 'rogue states' that have not followed the Western vision of democratization of politics and liberalization of economy.

As we have studied in this thesis (especially Chapters 1 and 4), the West's intentional distinction between the identity of the West and that of others (losers of the Cold War and the non-Western world) is a foundation of the Western approach to the non-Western world. This distinction combined with the promotion of collective self-defence arrangements based on its ideological moral value of promoting 'market democracies', in the name of consolidating the idea of 'democratic peace', instead of procedural normative value of multilateralism and its ideas of 'sovereign peace', provides a context for the West to take coercive action against non-Western regimes. This is because, without the image of an 'enemy', it would be hard to justify the West's collective coercive action against external actors and maintaining a security organization that aims at protecting the West from external threats. Hence, as we have noted in Chapter 1, a substantial number of works on security studies point out that consolidating an image of an 'enemy' often creates a situation whereby the security within a collective

14 Clark, The Post Cold War Order, Chap 4, 168-170, 186.
A self-defence arrangement is often maintained at the cost of the insecurity of those outside the arrangement and of the opportunity to form collective security arrangements.\textsuperscript{15}

In reality, it is not shared Western values but US interests that determine Western actions towards the non-Western world. America’s collaboration with the Croatian government, instead of seriously protecting the interests of the Bosnian government, symbolized the reality of the manipulation of Western moral values. This case also represented a typical pattern in America’s use of force in the post-Cold War period. In order to promote its interests, the US employs local forces (e.g. the Kosovo Liberation Army, the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, and the Kurdish forces in Iraq) irrespective of their lack of democratic identities and regardless of their potential to militarize the maintenance of order in their respective regions. These factors contradict America’s initial ideological justification of the use of coercive power (i.e. creating democratic, multi-ethnic and stable societies).

The policy-makers of America’s allies in the West have been taking into account the above-discussed point when they plan foreign policies in relation to the US. However, they have not given up the idea of influencing the outcomes of America’s foreign policy. As a consequence of this, they still attempt to share America’s interpretation of ideological moral values, rather than promoting procedural normative values of multilateralism. As a result, the more the US demands the use of coercive actions, the deeper America’s allies are involved in such military actions. In reality, however, such manipulation of moral values accompanied with a fixed image of ‘others’ or ‘enemies’ and simultaneously strengthened collective self-defence arrangements would raise the tension between the West and the non-Western world. This would work to the detriment of any Western attempt to vitalize collective security arrangements with others.

The US security policy in East Asia indicates such a trend on a global scale. Since the end of

the Cold War, some Japanese, as well as American political leaders, have been urging Japan to lift its constitutional and political self-restraint to participate in collective self-defence arrangements.\(^{16}\) The rationale for this is that the Japanese government should follow the British way of esteeming an allegedly 'special relationship' (in other words privileged 'voice opportunities') with the US.\(^{17}\) They claim that such cooperation between the US and Japan would promote stability in the region. However, a revitalized security alliance between Japan and the US aims at responding to the situation in the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait by military means. If Japan and the US spend too much political capital and attention on strengthening their military alliance, and if they begin to consolidate their vision of an 'enemy' or the 'others' in East Asia without contemplating the consequences, then they will undermine any potential to develop genuine multilateralism and a collective security arrangement that could include all Asian states. In such a scenario, Japan and the US would exacerbate the security situation in East Asia in general and embitter their relationship with China and North Korea in particular.

To sum up, the results of the empirical studies coincide with the hypothesis of this thesis. It is now justified to say that America's policy to consolidate its supremacy within the West promoted the NATO-led military approach to the Bosnian conflict. This American policy was beyond the conventional framework of collective security and the UN conflict resolution mechanisms that are based on the sovereign-state system. The Bosnian conflict and the outcomes of the Western approach indeed marked a turning point in the trend of the post-Cold War security order from collective security


\(^{17}\) For instance, Abe, "Miles to Go: My Vision for Japan's Future CNAPS Roundtable Luncheon on 2 May 2005."
based order to an America-centred collective self-defence and alliances based one.

How Did the US Treat the Interests of the Bosnian Government and Civilians on the Ground?

As this thesis has illustrated, especially in Chapter 6, the Western approach to the Bosnian conflict ‘betrayed’ its promise to protect the interests of the Bosnian government and the means to impose a settlement (i.e. America’s de facto encouragement of the Croatian offensives) and ‘devastated’ the conditions of the civilians on the ground. As previously outlined in Chapter 1, in order to substantiate the working hypothesis, this research looks at three consequences of the Western approach to the Bosnian conflict, as follows: a) a peace plan that dismisses the Bosnian government’s desire to maintain a single and unified sovereign state; b) a policy that imposes further violence onto civilians on the ground (regardless of their ethnic origin); c) a settlement that deprives the Bosnian people’s right of self-governance and self-determination.

Mediation of the Bosnian Conflict

The US administration initially advocated that the interests of the Bosnian government (i.e. territorial integrity of Bosnia under the leadership of Izetbegović) should be placed at the centre of any international approach, on account of the fact that in 1992 the West originally recognized the Izetbegović government.\(^{18}\) Thus, it challenged the practicability and morality of the European and the UN initiatives of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan and the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan. In opposition to the ICFY approach, the US administration proposed the so-called ‘lift and strike’ policy.

It is important, however, to address the fact that neither the European nor American approach to the Bosnian conflict could satisfy the Bosnian government. There were three major points that suggest this. First of all, the US did not send ground forces to Bosnia until the end of the conflict

\(^{18}\) Interview with Anthony Lake on 19 May 2004.
despite the requests of the Bosnian government to do so. Secondly, from the Vance-Owen Peace Plan to the Dayton Agreement, all Western proposals to settle the Bosnian conflict more or less constrained the interests of the Bosnian government (to restore its territorial integrity and to reininsert its administrative authorities all over Bosnia). Thirdly, the US eventually relied on the Croatian military forces to conclude the conflict, without sacrificing American ground troops despite its initial rhetorical advocacy of the 'lift and strike' policy, for the sake of the interests of the Bosnian government.

In these instances, as mentioned above, the US did not support the Bosnian government’s desire to regain full administrative authority over Bosnia by any means (including military actions). Indeed, the Clinton administration’s advocacy of ideological moral values of ‘marker (liberal) democracy’ in the form of protecting the interests of the Bosnian government only helped America’s interests in replacing the procedural norms of multilateralism and, thus, in organizing the Western Order under quasi-multilateralism. However, the administration has failed to deliver what the US initially promised to the Bosnian government. This hypocrisy is symbolized by the existence of the ‘Republika Srpska’. Such lack of legitimacy regarding the structure of ‘Bosnian state’ under the Dayton Agreement can be regarded as one of the reasons why the West still needs to sustain the post-conflict Bosnia through its military presence. 19

The Treatments of the Civilians on the Ground

With regard to the plight of civilians in Bosnia, the American approach to the Bosnian conflict was no less negative than the European one. There were roughly four major faults that the US can be criticized for regarding its attitude to the civilians on the ground. Firstly, the US did not provide any ground troops to prevent humanitarian crises during the conflict. Secondly, it refused to cooperate with the ICFY-led peace plans, based on its stated desire to respect the interests of the Bosnian

government (see, Chapters 3 and 4). That, in retrospect, only prolonged the conflict. Thirdly, in this way, the US advocated the ‘lift and strike’ policy, but, for fear of military involvement on the ground, the US administration effectively encouraged the Croatian government’s military actions, costing civilian lives, rather than defending the wishes of the Bosnian government or Bosnian Muslims (see Chapters 5 and 6). Lastly, despite claim to be concerned about humanitarian conditions on the ground, the US did not make serious efforts to bring about the settlement of the conflict until it made sure that NATO initiated international military action in the Bosnian conflict (see, Chapter 6).

To sum up, the US promoted its own interests over a prompt settlement, in the name of respecting the quality of ‘justice’. America’s promotion of the ideological moral values instead of procedural normative values of multilateralism justified the West’s use of coercive military power. The great irony of this approach, however, is that America’s means to conclude the conflict effectively encouraged the ethnic cleansing committed by Croatian side, which was far from its original rational a ‘just’ way to conclude the conflict. Added to that, the quality of ‘justice’, under the Dayton Agreement, that the US military power brought forward does not give substance to what the US initially advocated (i.e. territorial distribution, the central government’s administrative power over Bosnia). In this respect, there are reasonable foundations to say that the America’s approach to settle the Bosnian conflict devastated the conditions of the civilians on the ground.

*The Self-Determination of Bosnia*

In regard to the Bosnian people’s right of self-governance, America’s supremacy vis-à-vis other Western states also works unfavourably towards implementing a just and stable settlement in Bosnia. The following points indicate four errors in the Western occupation of Bosnia. First of all, the Dayton Agreement was imposed upon Bosnia principally by military means and, thus, the implementation process was accompanied by with Western military and civilian authorities on the ground. NATO in conjunction with Russia, deployed international forces called IFOR (Implementation
Force, 1995-1996) and then SFOR (Stabilization Force, 1995-2004) in order to 'help ensure compliance with the provisions of' the Dayton Agreement.\(^{20}\) Along with military power, the West imposed a civil authority upon Bosnian politics. This institution is the Office of High Representative (OHR). The power of this authority was enhanced beyond the original arrangements by the decisions of the so-called Peace Implementation Council (comprised of the states that sponsor the implementation of the Dayton Agreement) in November 1997.\(^{21}\) The OHR now possesses a supreme political power (the so-called 'Bonn Powers'), which range from sacking democratically elected local policy-makers to imposing administrative orders, regardless of local policy-makers' decisions.\(^{22}\) This administrative power of OHR causes controversy.

With regard to the administrative power of this authority, David Chandler criticizes the West for having so far prevented the Bosnian people from regaining their rights of self-governance.\(^{23}\) In contrast, Sumantra Bose acknowledges the fact that the West contributes to the integration of Bosnian society by means of practical actions, such as introducing a single currency and imposing common car licence-plates for all Bosnia.\(^{24}\) However, it can be said that there is a consensus among these researchers and well-known policy-makers that the existence of the OHR does not genuinely empower Bosnian people's self-governance.

For instance, on 12 April 2005 the International Commission on the Balkans, composed of

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\(^{23}\) Chandler, *Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton*.

\(^{24}\) Bose, *Bosnia after Dayton*, 111-112.
seventeen well-known former policy-makers led by former Italian Prime Minister, Guliano Amart, published a report on Bosnia that urged to restore the self-governance of Bosnia by its peoples, instead of the OHR, and its *de facto* 'neo-colonial rule'. Following this report, even the incumbent High Representative, Paddy Ashdown, has accepted that the OHR could not maintain present political power over Bosnia in the future.

Secondly, as we have discussed in Chapter 5 and 6, the territorial integrity of Bosnia under the Izetbegović (Bosnian) government is prevented by two arrangements. One is the Muslim-Croat Federation of Bosnia. The other is the existence of 'Republika Srpska' (a Serbian autonomous entity) within Bosnia. In fact, it was the US administration that compelled the Bosnian government to accept both arrangements. In this respect, the Bosnian government and Bosnian Muslims were prevented from regaining their rights of self-determination.

Thirdly, intra-Western tension undermined the quality of justice in post-conflict Bosnia. As a result of the American reluctance to concede any operational power from NATO to the High Representative, the West was not able to implement basic juridical justice in Bosnia. As we have seen in the empirical study (see Chapter 6), the present High Representative criticized NATO for its lack of cooperation with him in arresting war criminals. In December 2005, NATO ceased its major mission on the ground, without accomplishing its initial promise to bring justice and peace to Bosnia. America's commitments to establishing a safe and multiethnic Bosnia, in general, and solving war crime issues, in particular, have been fading. There is only limited enforcing power on the ground to bring justice to important war criminals. This situation jeopardises the quality of juridical justice, which

25 Notable members of this commission include: the former German President, Richard von Weizsäcker, the former President of Macedonia, Kiro Gligorov, the former High Representative of Bosnia, Carl Bildt, and the then British chief negotiator at the Dayton, Pauline Neville-Jones. International Commission on the Balkans, *The Balkans in Europe's Future*, 12 April 2005. 11, 24.
28 International policing operations were taken over by the EU. NATO still maintains Headquarters in Sarajevo but their presence is not accompanied by a substantial number of troops on the ground.
is subject to the political negotiations. For instance, the US demanded that the Serbian authority cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal to arrest the prime war criminals in exchange for America's policy of re-commencing financial aid. The EU has also demanded that the Croatian government cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal as a condition for advancing its negotiations for accession into the EU. In contrast to this, the EU decided to commence the negotiation of the so-called 'stabilisation and association' agreement with Serbia despite international criticism regarding its unsatisfactory cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal. As a result of such politicization of justice and lack of enforcement, even almost a decade after the conflict (as at May 2005) both leaders of the Bosnian Serb forces (i.e. General Ratko Mladić and Radovan Karadžić) and the Croatian leaders (i.e. General Ante Gotovina) are still at large.

In short, Bosnian people have been left to live in an unstable political environment. The Western states made many promises when it promoted the Dayton Agreement but have achieved little to fulfil their rhetoric. For the reasons discussed above, it is clear that the procedures and contents of peace that the West, essentially the US, brought about in Bosnia do not work in favour of the interests of the Bosnian government and civilians in Bosnia.

It is now rational to ask the question: was it necessary to wait for the Dayton Agreement instead of following one of the plans that preceded it? As far as the civilians' lives are concerned, the answer to the question is probably 'no.' Of course this does not ignore the fact that, as with the Dayton Agreement, the ICFY proposed peace plans (i.e. the Vance-Owen and the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan) would also not have had a clear advantage in terms of the quality of justice and of governance

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that they could have provided for the Bosnian people. However, the Dayton Agreement was absolutely ‘necessary’ for the US, to promote its vision of the Western Order in opposition to that of the European ideas of ‘sovereign peace’, which were based upon the procedural norms of multilateralism; and that practically meant enhancing the UN’s authority over the use of coercive power.

To conclude this thesis, Liberal Multilateralists and the Western politics that supposedly reflected such viewpoints have made two critical errors. One is their indifference to the conflict of interests between the US and other Western States. The conflict results in the friction between differing visions among the Western states (i.e. the ideological interpretation of ‘democratic peace’ that the US advocates, against the European definition of the procedural normative value of multilateralism accompanied with the idea of ‘sovereign peace’). The other is the Western use of moral values as a means to promote its interests at the cost of the quality of justice and stability in the non-Western world. It is justifiable to conclude that the working hypotheses of this research and its four counter claims to the Liberal Multilateralists’ view have received positive empirical evaluations.
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