

PAKISTAN SINCE INDEPENDENCE:

The Political Role of the *‘Ulamā’*

(2 Volumes)

Volume 1

SAFIR AKHTAR

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Department of Politics

University of York

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To
the memory of my father
'Abdul Majid

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ABSTRACT

The '*ulamā*' (men of Islamic learning) occupy an important position in the Muslim society. Pakistan is no exception to this general phenomenon. Although they were always on the periphery of political decision-making throughout Muslim rule in South Asia (1206-1857), their influence on the masses was never in question. During the colonial period (1857-1947), however, the development of Islamic thought resulted in a division of Muslim society into two distinct sections: 'Islamic modernists', and orthodox Muslims who were under the influence of the '*ulamā*'. Secularist ideas could not gain ground amongst Muslims on account of their minority status in South Asia. Religion constituted the bedrock of their identity.

At the emergence of Pakistan, it was the 'Islamic modernist' section of Muslim society which held the reins of power, and successfully controlled the institutions of the power-structure. On the related issues of polity and society in Pakistan, it was not a matter of surprise that a conflict of orientation persisted between the 'Islamic modernists' and the orthodox Islam. The '*ulamā*' started from a weaker position and developed the political skills needed to assert their views. The failure of the dominant class to fulfil its promises enabled the '*ulamā*' to expose their true nature.

At the same time, the '*ulamā*' divided amongst themselves on the basis of sects and subsects, could not agree on an alternative political strategy. In actual fact, they were more effective in achieving negative ends (such as help to topple a government) than in capturing the reins of power. Even though their electoral

strength has always been low. Their undoubted skill in manipulating and using the modern paraphernalia of political mobilisation would appear to provide them with the apparatus, albeit in the long term, to consolidate a political alternative to the existing dominant class in control of state power. In the short and medium term, however, it is unlikely that the 'Islamic modernist' elements will be dislodged from power.

NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION SCHEME

All the Arabic, Persian and Urdu words and phrases occurring in the text have been transliterated in English according to the following scheme.

Consonants

ب	b	ص	ṣ
پ	p	ض	ẓ
ت	t	ط	ṭ
ٹ	ṭ̣	ظ	ẓ̣
ث	ṯ	ع	ʿ
ج	j	غ	gh
چ	ch	ف	f
ح	ḥ	ق	q
خ	kh	ک	k
د	d	گ	g
ڈ	ḍ	ل	l
ذ	ẓ	م	m
ر	r	ن	n
ڑ	rh	ڻ	ṇ
ز	z	و	w
ژ	zh	ہ	h
س	s	ی	y
ش	sh	ء	ʾ

Urdu sounds, being combinations of consonents and ہ are transliterated according to the above scheme, but differentiated from letters such as 'kh' and 'rh' by a line drawn underneath. For example کھ is kh and رھ is rh.

Vowels

Short	:	a, u, i	
Long	:	ā, ū, ī	(<i>alif maqṣūrah</i>) : à
Long with <i>tashdīd</i>	:	iyā, uwā	
Diphthongs	:	aw, ay, o and e	
Persian <i>Izafah</i>	:	-i-	
(<i>tā murbūṭah</i>)	:	ah, in	izāfah : at

This scheme is not apt for the transliteration of Sankrit words which are, therefore, retained in their accepted standard English form.

Plurals are formed in a number of ways in Urdu, depending upon the linguistic origin of the noun. In this work, generally 's' is added to the word in order to make it plural - e.g., *sūfīs*, *madrasahs*, etc., except in one case of the Arabic 'broken' plural of *‘ālim* (i.e., *‘ulamā*) is retained.

The words that have found their way into the English dictionary from Arabic and other languages of Muslim peoples are also transliterated. With regard to the names of places, the common English form is used; thus Allahabad and not Ilahabad; Oudh and not Awadh; the Punjab and not the Panjab. The only exception relates to Makkah, because the common English form 'Mecca' has been abandoned in Muslim countries in favour of the original Arabic form. When the names of the places become locative then these are correctly transliterated - as in Dihlawī (not Delhawī).

Uniformity is observed in the transliteration of the names of persons even though they themselves wrote differently in

English. Thus Moḥamed and Moḥammad are written as Muḥammad; similarly, Chaudhārī, Choudhury, Chowdhury, etc., are all discarded in favour of Chawdhārī, according to this transliteration scheme. Nevertheless, actual spellings of the names are retained in quotations, notes and in the bibliography.

The English words used in Urdu phrases have not been transliterated. The English spelling has been retained irrespective of the different ways in which they occur in Urdu script.

ABBREVIATIONS

ACII	Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology
AIKC	All India <i>Khilāfat</i> Committee
AIML	All India Muslim League
AISC	All India <i>Sunnī</i> Conference
AJKMC	All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference
AKK	<i>Anjuman-i-Khuddām-i-Kābah</i>
AMC	<i>Āzād</i> Muslim Conference
AML	<i>Āwāmī</i> Muslim League
APAL	All Pakistan <i>Āwāmī</i> League
APJAML	All Pakistan Jinnah <i>Āwāmī</i> Muslim League
APMAI	All Pakistan <i>Majlis-i-Ahrār-i-Islām</i>
APNC	All Pakistan National Conference
APP	<i>Āzād</i> Pakistan Party
APWA	All Pakistan Women's Association
BDS	Basic Democrats (Members of Basic Democracies)
BNA	Baluchistan National Alliance
BPC	Basic Principles Committee
BTI	Board of <i>Tālimāt-i-Islāmiyyah</i>
BUF	Baluchistan United Front
CAP	Constituent Assembly of Pakistan
CII	Council of Islamic Ideology
CIIR	Central Institute of Islamic Research
CMLA	Chief Martial Law Administrator
COP	Combined Opposition Parties
CPB	Central Parliamentary Board
CPI	Communist Party of India
CPP	Communist Party of Pakistan
CSP	Civil Service of Pakistan

DAC	Democratic Action Committee
EBDO	Elected Bodies (Disqualification) Order
EIC	East India Company
EPAML	East Pakistan <i>Áwāmī</i> Muslim League
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FC	Federal Council
FSC	Federal <i>Shari'át</i> Court
FSF	Federal Security Force
GD	<i>Ganātantrī Dal</i>
HAG	Harvard Advisory Group
HBFC	House Building Finance Corporation
ICS	Indian Civil Service
IGD	<i>Islāmī Ganātantrī Dal</i>
IJI	<i>Islāmī Jamhūrī Ittiḥād</i>
IJT	<i>Islāmī Jam'iyat-i-Ṭalabah</i>
INC	Indian National Congress
IRI	Islamic Research Institute
JGMD	<i>Jātyā Ganā Mukti Dal</i>
JIP	<i>Jamā'at-i-Islāmī Pakistān</i>
JUH	<i>Jam'iyat-ul-'Ulamā-i-Hind</i>
JUI	<i>Jam'iyat-ul-'Ulamā-i-Islām</i>
JUIP	<i>Jam'iyat-ul-'Ulamā-i-Islām Pakistān</i>
JUP	<i>Jam'iyat-ul-'Ulamā-i-Pakistān</i>
KMP	<i>Kisān Mazdūr Party</i>
KSP	<i>Krishak Sarāmik Party</i>
KT	<i>Khāksār Tahrik</i>
LFO	Legal Framework Order, 1970
MAI	<i>Majlis-i-Aḥrār-i-Islām</i>
MFLO	Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961
MIM	<i>Mutaḥiddah Islāmī Maḥaz</i>

MJAS	<i>Markazī Jamā'at-i-Ahl-i-Sunnat</i>
MJUI	<i>Markazī Jam'iyat-ul-'Ulamā-i-Islām</i>
MJUIMP	<i>Markazī Jam'iyat-ul-'Ulamā-i-Islām Maghribī Pakistān</i>
MNAs	Members of National Assembly
MPB	Muslim Parliamentary Board
MPJAH	<i>Maghribī Pakistān Jam'iyat-i-Ahl-i-Ḥadīṣ</i>
MQM	<i>Muhājir Qawmī</i> Movement
MRD	Movement for Restoration of Democracy
MSM	<i>Mutaḥiddah Shari'āt Maḥāz</i>
NAP	National 'Awāmī Party
NDF	National Democratic Front
NDP	National Democratic Party
NIP	<i>Nizām-i-Islām</i> Party
NU	<i>Nizām-ul-'Ulamā'</i>
NWFP	North West Frontier Province
PAI	<i>Pakistān 'Awāmī Ittiḥād</i>
PDM	Pakistan Democratic Movement
PDP	Pakistan Democratic Party
PML	Pakistan Muslim League
PNA	Pakistan National Alliance
PNC	Pakistan National Congress
PNL	Pakistan National League
PODO	Public Offices (Disqualification) Order
PPA	Political Parties Act
PPP	Pakistan People's Party
PSP	Pakistan Socialist Party
RP	Republican Party
RTC	Round Table Conference, 1969
SAM	<i>Sind 'Awāmī Maḥāz</i>

SCF	Scheduled Castes Federation
SKMPPMM	<i>Sind-Karachi Muhājir Punjabi Paṭhān Mutahiddah Maḥāz</i>
SPI	Socialist Party of India
TI	<i>Taḥrīk-i-Istiqlāl</i>
TJ	<i>Tablīghī Jamāāt</i>
TNFJ	<i>Taḥrīk-i-Nifāz-i-Fiqh-i-Jāfariyyah</i>
UDF	United Democratic Front
UF	United Front
UIPA	United Indian Patriotic Association

INTRODUCTION

The 'ulamā' (i.e. the men of Islamic learning) played a political role in varying degree throughout the history of the Muslim peoples. The 'ulamā' of South Asia were no exception. They participated in the struggle against colonial rule during the 19th and 20th centuries. Since the emergence of India and Pakistan as independent states, they have been taking an active part in politics in both countries. The minority status of the Muslims in India on the one hand, and India's constitutional commitment to secularism on the other, have contributed to limiting the 'ulamā's role. In Pakistan, however, the religious basis of politics and the objective proclaimed in its Constitution of enabling the people to live in accordance with the injunctions of the *Qurān* and the *Sunnah*, have given added scope to the political role of the 'ulamā'.

The role played by the 'ulamā' in the freedom struggle attracted the attention of scholars. A few studies in Urdu (e.g., the writings of Mawlānā Sayyid Muḥammad Miyaṅ of *Jamīyat-ul-'Ulamā-i-Hind*) were produced highlighting the 'ulamā's role. Dr. H.B. Khan's doctoral dissertation, also in Urdu, constitutes the latest attempt in this direction.

Dr. Ishtiyāq Ḥusayn Qurayshī's *Ulema in Politics* was the first detailed study in English, focusing on the role that the 'ulamā' generally played from the time Muslim power was consolidated in South Asia until the emergence of Pakistan. Ziyā-ul-Ḥasan Farūqī's study *The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan* devotes special attention to the role of the *Deobandī* 'ulamā' in the struggle for freedom and their orientation towards the Pakistan

question. Among recent studies Barbra Daly Metcalf's Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900 can be justifiably regarded as an important contribution to the history of Islamic religious movements of the 19th century, especially the Deoband movement.

Apart from such specific studies, writers dealing with intellectual and cultural developments in South Asia, and the history of the freedom movement have also touched on the role of the 'ulamā'.

It is a matter of surprise that no thorough study has yet been made of the political role of the 'ulamā' since the emergence of Pakistan. Their role has been touched upon in a peripheral manner by some authors in their writings on state and society in Pakistan. Leonard Binder is the only author who had attempted to study the political role of the 'ulamā', but, his study Religion and Politics in Pakistan covers only the first nine years of Pakistan's history. Binder did not have access to all the material pertinent to the political role of the 'ulamā'. Therefore historical discrepancies marred his otherwise pioneering work in the field. The need for fuller study in the political role of the 'ulamā' has remained unfulfilled. The present study is an attempt to fill this gap in the literature.

At the time this study was originally undertaken, its subject matter was to be the political role of the 'ulamā' during the first thirty years of Pakistan (i.e., 1947-1977). But at the time that the final stage of this study was reached, Muḥammad Ziyā-ul-Ḥaq's death occurred, and with it came the end of the most

recent phase of the *'ulamā's* political role in Pakistan. The author, therefore, decided to add a chapter dealing with Muḥammad Ziyā-ul-Ḥaq's regime in order to bring the work up to date.

This study is divided into two parts. Part One outlines the position of the *'ulamā'* in South Asian society, the divisions among them and their system of education, their contribution in the political arena from the downfall of Muslim rule to the emergence of Pakistan. Part Two focuses on the role of the *'ulamā'* in the socio-political milieu of Pakistan.

The approach adopted in this analysis of the role of the *'ulamā'* is mainly historical, the dynamics of social and political changes being best understood in an historical perspective. The periodisation of Pakistan's four decades into 1947-1958; the Ayūb Khān regime; the Muḥammad Yaḥyà Khān interregnum; the Bhutto regime; and the Ziyā-ul-Ḥaq regime, would appear to be logical from the perspective of the difference in general attitude of the *'ulamā'* towards each of these regimes. However, the fact remains that this periodisation can be questioned on other grounds - namely that the basic power structure was not radically altered even though there was changes of place among power holders united by certain homogeneous socio-economic and political characteristics.

The author would like to draw attention to a specific feature of this work. Whilst Chapters 1-6 were written with the advantage of a vast variety of material that could be consulted, the subsequent two chapters were written on the basis of a more restricted field of published scholarship.

It is natural to use the Islamic calendar in referring to the events of Islamic history. Dates according to the Islamic calendar carry an abbreviation of A.H. (i.e., after the *hijrah* of the Prophet Muḥammad from Makkah to Madīnah). All other dates in the text are in accordance with the Gregorian calendar.

PART ONE

CHAPTER 1

THE 'ULAMĀ' IN ISLAMIC SOCIETY

'Ulamā' is the plural form of the word 'ālim which is taken from the Arabic *maṣḍar* (infinitive) 'ILM ʾعلم. 'ILM means 'to know', 'knowledge' and therefore 'ulamā' are those who know (i.e., possess knowledge). The word 'ulamā' occurs twice in the text of the *Qurān*¹ and the expression is referred to at several places in the collections of *ḥadīṣ* (traditions of the Prophet).² With the passage of time the expression attained a technical meaning in the context of Islamic learning. Those who have acquired knowledge up to a 'generally accepted and prescribed standard'³ in all branches or any specific branch of Islamic learning e.g. *tafsīr* (Quranic exegesis), *ḥadīṣ*, *fiqh* (jurisprudence), *kalām* (scholastic theology) etc., are called the 'ulamā'. Some other titles and terms⁴ for the 'ulamā' such as *mullā*, *mawlawī* and *mawlānā* are also in common use.⁵

There were, of course, persons who had knowledge of Islam right from the beginning, but no section of the society was regarded as the 'ulamā'. The 'ulamā' as a distinct section of society made its first appearance only at the end of the first century of *Hijrah*.⁶ During the lifetime of the Prophet a group of his companions was named as *qurrā'* (the reciters of the *Qurān*).⁷ They were, perhaps, the predecessors of the 'ulamā'.

The emergence of the 'ulamā' as a distinct group can be traced as a feature of expansion of Muslim society through conquest followed by the conversion of non-Arab tribes. The codification of

Islamic laws became necessary for maintaining the Islamic structure of the society intact. The 'ulamā' emerged as the custodians of the structure. They gained power and influence during the Abbasid period (750-1258).

They flourished with the establishment of the *madrasahs*. The *madrasahs* seem to owe their beginning to the Ghaznavids (977-1187), but their greatest patrons were the Suljuqs. These were the institutions specifically created to teach *fiqh*. Other subjects were frequently taught, but 'there could be no *madrasa* without law as technically the major subject'.⁸ In the Ottoman Empire a modest hierarchy of offices, reserved for the 'ulamā' was created in (*circa.*) 1480, towards the end of Muhammad II's reign.⁹ This hierarchy was further organised by his successors with *Shaykh-ul-Islām* as its head.

Apart from the 'ulamā' there was, generally speaking, another kind of religious leaders - *viz.*, the *ṣūfīs*. They dedicated themselves to rigorous spiritual self-discipline, and were also known as *mashā'ikh*, *awliyā'*, and *pīrs*¹⁰ in South Asian Muslim society.

There was a thin line of demarcation between the two, sometimes overlapping, categories - the 'ulamā' and the *ṣūfīs*. The 'ulamā' were well versed in the scholarly traditions of the religion, and they were entrusted with the task of providing an authoritative interpretation of *Shari'ah*. The *ṣūfīs* were engaged in the moral and spiritual uplift of the people through meditation and intuition.

In order to propagate the faith among the people, the *ṣūfīs* adopted the mass contact technique and developed a code of doctrines based upon the esoteric interpretation of the *Qurān* and the traditions of the Prophet. The *ṣūfīs* were given a title of *Ahl al-Ṭarīqah* (people of the mystic path) in contrast with the 'ulamā', who were named as *Ahl al-Sharī'ah* (people of *Sharī'ah*). Similarly, if the 'ulamā' were 'ulamā-yi-ẓāhir' (externalists), then the *ṣūfīs* were 'ulamā-yi-bāṭin' (internalists).

From the overlapping categories of the 'ulamā' and *ṣūfīs*, any particular individual was acknowledged either as an 'ālim or *ṣūfī* depending on which of the two approaches to the propagation of faith that he emphasised in his practice. From the 18th century onwards, all the prominent 'ulamā' in South Asia were linked with the *ṣūfī* orders, and a fused category of 'ālim-ṣūfī or *ṣūfī-ālim* emerged which is still dominant in South Asia.

In this chapter we shall consider, in its historical context, the position of the 'ulamā' and the *ṣūfīs* in the Muslim state and society of South Asia, the theological and intellectual divisions among them which have continued to exist, and the system of *madrasah* education. It is the theological and intellectual differences among them which prove to be a divisive factor in their political stand on any given situation; at the same time, a commonly shared *madrasah* education and uniform religious observances have given them a cohesion and enabled them to forge together a joint front on various social and political issues.

1.1 The Position of the 'Ulamā' in Muslim society

The 'ulamā' enjoy a position of special importance in Muslim society due to the central importance attached by Islam to learning. God commanded the people to learn. 'Recite: In the name of thy Lord Who created'¹¹ were the first words of God's first revelation to the Prophet. The Prophet was instructed to pray 'O my Lord, increase me in knowledge'.¹² 'God will raise up in rank those of you who believe and have been given knowledge.'¹³ So the believers were informed.

The paramount importance of learning is further strengthened as tradition of the Prophet struck deeper roots.¹⁴ Therefore there is 'no higher distinction for a Muslim than to be credited with knowledge'.¹⁵

The 'ulamā' played multiple roles in the past which varied with time in accordance with political and social conditions. But, their primary role has always been as educators and purveyors of religion in general. How did they preserve religion?

Islam possesses neither a church nor a priesthood. No particular person, body, group or institution is vested with special powers of religious leadership. Any Muslim of decent character with enough knowledge can lead the congregational prayers and perform the rites connected with birth, marriage and death. No one has the right of mediation and intercession between man and his creator (God), therefore there is no need for a priesthood.

But Islam does recognise the need for guidance. Prophets were inspired by God to guide humanity and they were sent to the people from time to time. Muḥammad was the last such.¹⁶ The door of the Prophethood being closed, who would guide the Muslims after Muḥammad? The answer is simply: 'the persons having knowledge, e.g. the men of learning (*ʿulamāʾ*). They are the legatees of the Prophet's religion. The *ʿulamāʾ*, being the accepted guides and interpreters in matters of religion, occupy a higher status than laymen.

Without any fixed organisation in modern terms, the *ʿulamāʾ* do not form a formal class, especially in the *Sunnī* tradition. Even during the Ottoman period, with its elaborate hierarchy of religious offices, the *ʿulamāʾ* as a whole could not constitute itself into a coherent group. There were numbers of *ʿulamāʾ* who were averse to the idea of serving the state. They continued to impart instruction privately or turned to the *ṣūfī* circles. This is why the response of the *ʿulamāʾ* to any given situation was not always unanimous. It is often the case that the *ʿulamāʾ* are on different sides of the same issue. The *ʿulamāʾ* are not bound together by considerations of 'class' identity but rather by loyalty to a common teacher or school of thought. Nevertheless, a sort of 'class' characteristic did emerge among the *ʿulamāʾ* of the *Shīʿāh* tradition. They are distinguished by their dress, though this is not formally prescribed. With a large turban and a flowing robe, an *ʿālim* in Iran is easily differentiated in a crowd of laymen.

The *ʿulamāʾ* have been associated with the mosques which are an essential part of Muslim society. The mosque has always been revered as a place of ritual worship and the community centre for

believers. In early Islam, it was the place where state policy was declared, and therefore became a centre of political activity. Besides the daily five prayers, Friday prayer at noon is obligatory for every adult male Muslim, preferably to be offered in a single mosque in any locality before a large gathering. Following the tradition of the Prophet, a *khutbah* (address) is made at the gathering. *Khutbah* had been, and is a medium of social and political communication.¹⁷ A mosque generally has an *imām* who is entrusted with the duty of organising the prayers and leading them. The larger mosques may have *khaṭīb*s for delivering Friday *khutbah*.

Pertinent to the growing activism of the 'ulamā' is the revitalisation of the political role of the mosques. They want to revive the mosque as a centre where influence on state politics is exercised. Mosques are also convenient centres for *maktab* (elementary school) where children are taught to recite the *Qurān* and the method of performance of obligatory prayers. The education of Islamic fundamentals is also a part of the *maktab*'s curriculum. Through mosques and *maktabs* the 'ulamā' propagate the message of religion.

1.2 The 'Ulamā' under Muslim rule

Let us turn to a consideration of the 'ulamā's role in South Asia under Muslim rule.

According to a number of research monographs, tracing the history of Muslim expansion in South Asia, Islam entered this region through Arab traders who settled along the southern coast of India even before the Muslim conquest of Sind in 712 by Muḥammad

B. Qāsim.¹⁸ But it was not until the beginning of the 13th century that the Turks established a proper '*Sulṭanate*'. Through centuries from one reigning family to the other, the Muslims retained political power until 1857, though a sharp decline in their actual control had started with the death of the last great Mughal emperor Awrangzeb (1707).

Muslim political institutions had already developed to a considerable degree by the time the Turks consolidated power in South Asia. With the death of the fourth 'rightly-guided' *Khalīfah* (Caliph) 'Alī, the *Khilāfah* (Caliphate) lost its basic democratic characteristics and the Muslim government turned into a monarchy, while retaining the title of '*Khilāfah*'.¹⁹ The governments under the Umayyads and the Abbasids were essentially secular rather than religious in character. The Abbasids who relied on Muslim converts of non-Arab origin for overthrowing the Arab-dominated Umayyads' rule, adopted Persian etiquette and ceremonials at court. By the time the Abbasids came to power, the '*ulamā*' had already established themselves as the sole authoritative exponents of Islamic law. Religious and quasi-religious institutions remained in their hands, whilst the supreme power, the *Khalīfah*, shaped government policy with the assistance of his secular courtiers. The Turks of Central Asia were no different from their contemporary Abbasids, in their adoption of Persian customs. Demographic factors, among others, rather than the zeal to convert heathens, drove them to South Asia. They were not much concerned with Islamic ideals of peace and war. Their wars were no more religious in motivation than their political ideals were Islamic in character.

The anecdotes, recorded in chronicles, show the personal religiosity and piety of some of these rulers such as Sultan Iltutmish (1211-1236) and Nāṣir-ud-dīn Maḥmūd (1246-1266).²⁰ They did show deference to the 'ulamā' and ṣūfīs but did not practise the *Shari'ah* in a strict manner. It was the higher class of nobles that formulated the policies of the *Sulṭanate*. In the words of Niẓāmī:

The religious leaders played the part of a second fiddle. The political authorities tried to bind them to the state chariot in order to win public support through them, but they were not allowed to determine the course of political developments.²¹

Despite his personal religiosity and great regard for the religious divines, Iltutmish nominated his daughter Raḡyah as his successor. There was not a single 'ālim who could exert pressure in order to make him change the decision which ran contrary to *Shari'ah*.

Why did the 'ulamā' accept such a position? They did not challenge the absolute monarchy of the hereditary rulers. One of the factors contributing to their support of the monarchy was their fear of anarchy which is never far from the surface even in the Muslim world of today.²² An autocratic ruler, but religious in his personal life, would be tolerated by the 'ulamā'. Ziya-ul-Haq of Pakistan (1977-1988) was a perfect case in point.

The traditions of the Prophet forbade revolt against the rulers as long as they managed the performance of the obligatory prayers in society.²³ Thus, absolute rulers who enforced *Shari'ah* were tolerated. From this perspective, the 'ulamā' may, correctly,

be held responsible for bestowing the stamp of Islamic legitimacy on a variety of different political and economic structures.

In the last quarter of the 16th century, the 'ulamā' became actively opposed to the Mughal emperor Jalāl-ud-dīn Akbar (1542-1605) whose eclecticism led him to propagate a self-made religion, i.e. *Dīn-i-Ilāhī* (divine faith) in his capacity of the 'most just, most wise and most learned'.²⁴ The 'ulamā' felt bound to protest against the emperor's attempts to replace *Shari'ah* with a new *dīn*. Their power was undermined as Akbar introduced changes in religious institutions of the state. The two most outstanding 'ulamā' - Makhdūm-ul-mulk 'Abdullāh Sultānpurī (d.1583) and Shaykh 'Abd-un-Nabī (d.1584), connected with the state, were banished. Mullā Muḥammad Yazdī issued a *fatwā* (religious ruling) to the effect that Akbar was an apostate, and therefore it would be lawful to rebel against him.²⁵ Shaykh Jamāl-ud-dīn preferred to emigrate to Hijaz rather than give his approval to the *Dīn-i-Ilāhī*.

Dīn-i-Ilāhī was a hotch-potch of symbols and propositions picked up from various religions with which Akbar was superficially acquainted. It was confined to the ruling circles, but it provoked the 'ulamā'. Even Vincent Smith, known to be sympathetic towards Akbar, concluded that

the whole scheme was the outcome of ridiculous vanity, a monstrous growth of unrestrained autocracy... The Divine Faith was a monument of Akbar's folly, not of his wisdom.²⁶

The 'ulamā' and also those amongst the noblemen who were staunch Muslims, realising the danger that Akbar's policy contained, stepped up their activities to counter the effects of

Dīn-i-Ilāhī. Shaykh Aḥmad Sarhindī (1563-1624) wrote long letters to the noblemen, known for their religious sympathies. He discussed the problems confronting *Shari'ah* at length in a lucid style in his *maktūbat* (letters).²⁷ These letters had the desired effect and the Mughal emperor Jahāṅgīr (1605-1627) felt compelled to discard some of the practices of court, repugnant to *Shari'ah*. Shaykh Aḥmad, once imprisoned under the orders of Jahāṅgīr, distinguished himself as the most revered scholar of the time. The influence of the 'ulamā' was restored as Akbar's influence waned fast following his death.

The successors of Shaykh Aḥmad Sarhindī developed close personal links with the rulers.²⁸ Their role in the war of succession between the sons of Shāhjahān - Dārā Shikoh and Awrangzeb - is worth noting. They favoured the latter.²⁹ Awrangzeb's religious policy was formulated under the influence of the 'ulamā'.³⁰ The 'ulamā' under Awrangzeb more than regained the influence that they had lost under Akbar.

1.2.1 The 'Ulamā' in State-Service

The 'ulamā', under Muslim rule, either devoted themselves to preaching and to a peaceful and independent pursuit of knowledge, or joined the service of the state. They were usually employed in the religious institutions of the state. These were:³¹

1) Dīwān-i-Ṣadārat (Department of Religious Affairs)

It was controlled by an officer named *Ṣadr-us-ṣudūr* or *Shaykh-ul-Islām*³² who was chosen from amongst the outstanding

scholars of the time. The department used to control government grants and appoint judicial officers, religious functionaries and teachers.

*Khaṭīb*s and *imāms* were religious functionaries who led the daily prayers, and delivered the sermons on Friday and 'Īds. They performed rituals pertaining to marriage and funerals. Normally, only well-educated scholars were appointed to these offices (especially in big cities) because public opinion demanded that only men of acknowledged distinction should be *khaṭīb*s and *imāms*.

Guided by religious and political considerations, the rulers appointed some of the more eloquent 'ulamā' as *muzakkirs* (who remind the people of their religious duties towards the state) in their personal service. They delivered sermons before the rulers and the nobles, reminding them of their religious duties and obligations. Their liberty of speech was limited and dependent on the goodwill of the ruler.

*Khaṭīb*s or *mazakkirs* were often called upon to deliver sermons before the rebels in order to pacify them. Similarly, in moments of crisis, they were expected to inspire and encourage the masses.

Education also constituted an important function of *Dīwān-i-Ṣadārat*. The 'ulamā' were appointed as teachers in *madrasahs*, established and managed by the state.

2) Dīwān-i-Qazā (Judiciary)

The head of the judiciary was *Qāzī-ul-qzāt* (Chief *qazi*). *Qāzīs* were appointed for the provinces as well as for smaller jurisdiction. All the important cities, towns and even smaller settlements had their own *qāzīs*.

The *Qāzī-ul-qzāt* was appointed by the emperor. He was the highest judicial authority after the emperor. The *qāzīs* of smaller jurisdictions (e.g., provinces and cities) were appointed either on the recommendation of *Qāzī-ul-qzāt* or *Ṣadr-us-ṣudūr*. Being a 'technical' and professional job, only those '*ulamā*' were appointed as *qāzīs* who were well-versed in *fiqh*.

Writers such as Niẓāmī³³ count the *muftī* (the official posts held by '*ulamā*') as an integral part of the judicial system. Nevertheless, Saran, in his detailed study on Mughal provincial administration, concludes that the *muftī* was not a regular government official.³⁴ According to Khālid Masūd, scholars who claimed that the *muftī* was a government official, 'have not properly documented their conclusions... *muftī* was not a regular official'.³⁵

3) Dīwān-i-Ihtisāb

(Department for the Suppression of Disorderly Conduct)

The *Dīwān-i-Ihtisāb* was supervised by a Chief *muhtasib*. The need for the creation of this department originated with the *Quranic* injunction according to which a Muslim ruler is enjoined to

perform the prayer, [to] pay alms and [to] bid to honour and [to] forbid dishonour.³⁶

The Chief *muhtasib* was appointed by the Emperor himself. The *muhtasibs* of the various towns and cities were appointed by the state on the recommendation of the *Ṣadr-us-ṣudūr*. The department was charged with the supervision of moral standards, social behaviour and public security. The religious side of the department's functions consisted of enforcing the Islamic code of conduct, whilst the municipal side consisted of safeguarding the interests of the people and keeping an eye on the market.

1.3 The *Sūfīs* and the State

The efforts of the *sūfīs* in the propagation and preservation of the faith were equally important. The growth of the Muslim community in South Asia is generally attributed to the activities of the *sūfīs* involving a peaceful penetration of the country.³⁷ The creed of *sūfīs* (e.g., *taṣawwuf*) had been fully developed in Muslim societies where an institutionalised form of *sūfī* orders (*silsilahs*) had arisen well before the 12th century.³⁸

1.3.1 Popular *Sūfī* Orders in South Asia

Four *sūfī* orders, in particular, gained popularity in South Asia. The earliest of these four orders was the *Qādiriyyah*, founded by Shaykh 'Abdul Qādir Jīlānī of Baghdad (1077-1166), one of the most revered figures in the history of *taṣawwuf*. References to him are frequently found in the early *sūfī* literature of South Asia, but his works as well as the order that he led did not reach

the region until the 15th century. It was first introduced by Muḥammad Ghawṣ of Uch (d.1517), who set up a *khānqāh* (hospice) at Uch (Punjab) in 1482. This order rose to prominence in the 17th century when Shaykh ‘Abdul Ḥaq Dihlawī (1551-1642) introduced the writings of and on ‘Abdul Qādir Jīlānī. Muḥammad Mīr (1550-1635), popularly known as Miyaṇ Mīr Lāhorī, the preceptor of Dārā Shikoh (1615-1659), was the chief *qādirī ṣūfī* of that period. At present, *Qādirīyah* is the most widespread *ṣūfī* order in South Asia.

The other order is *Chishtīyah*. It was founded in Chisht (a small village near Herat, Afghanistan) by Khawājah Abu Ishāq (d.940), and brought into South Asia in the 12th century by Khawājah Muīn-ud-dīn-Sijzī (1143-1236), who set up a *khānqāh* at Ajmer. His successors propagated the order far and wide. A chain of *khānqāhs* came into being from Pakpattan (Punjab) to Lucknowti (Bengal).

Suhrawardīyah was another order which flourished, simultaneously with the *Chishtīyah*. It was founded by Shaykh Najīb-ud-dīn Suhrawardī (d.1169) in Iraq and was elaborated by Shaykh Shahāb-ud-dīn Suhrawardī (1145-1234). Bahā‘-ud-dīn Zakariyyā, one of the disciples of Shahāb-ud-dīn Suhrawardī, firmly established the order in Multan (Punjab) and Sind.

The fourth popular order in South Asia is *Naqshbandīyah*, named after Shaykh Bahā‘-ud-dīn Naqshband (1317-1389) who developed it. It was the last to reach South Asia (the late 16th century). Khawājah Bāqībillāh (1563-1603) was the *ṣūfī* who introduced it there, and his disciple Shaykh Aḥmad Sarhindī made it popular.

The *ṣūfī khānqāhs* were the nuclei for the propagation of the faith. Each *khānqāh* had a '*shaykh*' as its pivotal figure, around whom the whole system was built. The elaborate administration of the *khānqāh* evolved with the passage of time. These *khānqāhs* were visited from time to time by people seeking religious guidance. The visitors were provided with meals and lodging. Some of the *khānqāhs* had *maktabs* or *madrasahs*. The social and religious services rendered by the *khānqāhs* were financed from voluntary contributions. The rich, having regard for the *shaykhs*, made endowments of agricultural lands, buildings and handsome amounts to their *khānqāhs*. Nor did the state lag behind the rich in providing endowments to the *khānqāhs* as long as the *shaykhs* were prepared to accept them.

Among the various orders, *Chishtiyyah* adapted itself better to local conditions. It adopted many Hindu fashions such as the custom of bowing before a spiritual leader. Music, an integral part of the Hindu religious ceremonies, was adopted by the *Chishtīs*. The *qawwālī* (ecstatic singing with instruments) is a characteristic feature of *Chishtī khānqāhs*.

1.3.2 *Ṣūfīs'* Attitude towards Rulers

The attitude of the *ṣūfīs* towards temporal power varied from 'order' to 'order' and '*ṣūfī*' to '*ṣūfī*'. *Chishtīs* by and large made no contact with mundane authorities. Shaykh Farīd-ud-dīn (1175-1265) warned his adherents against developing contacts with kings and princes. He advised a certain *ṣūfī* who was leaving Ajodhan (Pakpattan nowadays) for Delhi in the following words:

I give thee a bit of advice, which it will be well for thee to observe. Have nothing to do with *maliks* and *amīrs*, and beware of their intimacy as dangerous; no *darwesh* ever kept up such an intimacy, but in the end found it disastrous³⁹

Shaykh Farīd-ud-dīn used to convey similar advice to others as well.⁴⁰ Nizām-ud-dīn Awliyā' (1238-1325) strictly adhered to the tradition.

Jalāl-ud-dīn Khaljī (1290-1296) sent some presents along with a message seeking his consent to endow the income of a village for the maintenance of the *khānqāh*. Nizām-ud-dīn Awliyā' declined the offer. The *Sultān* then asked for an interview which was also refused. When Nizām-ud-dīn Awliyā' came to know of the *Sultān's* visit, he avoided him by undertaking a journey to Ajodhan.⁴¹ The *Chishtīs* generally declined the *sultāns'* endowments. They thought the acceptance of such offers would curtail their freedom and make them subservient to the whims of the rulers. The *Chishtīs* also discouraged their adherents from seeking state service.⁴² Nizāmī observed that

almost all the notable saints of the *Chishtī* order in India scrupulously avoided the company of kings and nobles.⁴³

Unlike the *Chishtīs*, the members of the *Suhrawardiyyah* consorted with kings and princes. Shaykh Bahā'ud-dīn Zakariyyā mixed freely with the rulers, took part in political affairs and accepted court honours.⁴⁴ Unlike the *Chishtīs*, too, he amassed wealth. The practice of Nizām-ud-dīn's *khānqāh* was to give away everything in the store, every Friday evening, to the needy.⁴⁵ By contrast, nothing was disbursed from *Suhrawardī khānqāh* of Multan among the poor. Bahā'ud-dīn Zakariyyā was bitterly criticised for

his wealth as it was seen as a hindrance to spiritual progress. He left no stone unturned to convince his critics that it was not so much the wealth as its improper use that was detrimental to spiritual progress. But the critics went on to tell him: 'Two opposites - wealth and spiritual progress - cannot meet at one place.'⁴⁶

The profound religious influence which the *ṣūfīs* and their *khānqāhs* wielded over the masses stimulated the rulers, for spiritual as well as for political reasons, to develop contacts with *ṣūfīs*. The *ṣūfīs* were won over with endowments of large *jāgīrs* (estates), reservation of revenue of certain areas for the maintenance of public kitchens of the *khānqāhs*, and contributions to the building of shrines. State support to the *khānqāh* institutions was a way of ensuring the legitimacy of the ruler. It is also noteworthy that the disciples of the *ṣūfīs*, belonging to the nobility, constituted a link between the ruler and the *khānqāhs*. The system of endowments to the *khānqāhs* was first adopted by the *Sultāns* of Delhi, and the practice was followed by the Mughals. The Sikhs, during their rule over Punjab and North West Frontier Province (NWFP), continued the tradition. Their successor, the British colonial power, found it convenient not to deviate from it.

1.4 The 'Ulamā' and the Pīrs under British Colonial Rule

With the introduction of English education and the abolition of Muslim judicial administration, the 'ulamā' suffered a setback during the colonial period. They turned to establishing *madrasahs*, and continued to perform the religious functions as

usual. Economically, they were more or less deprived of earning their livelihood by seeking employment in government institutions. They had to depend on public contributions. These 'ulamā' were largely affiliated to the *ṣūfī* orders,⁴⁷ and contributed a great deal to explaining the importance of the practices of 'taṣawwuf' through their writings.

Apart from the *ṣūfīs*, 'ulamā' and *ṣūfī-ulamā'*, there were hereditary *pīrs* who controlled the *khānqāhs* of the great *ṣūfīs* of the past and the vast landed estates attached to them. It was normal practice for the hereditary *pīr* to pass on his authority to his nominated relative (usually his son) who became the *sajjādah-nashīn* (one who sits on the prayer rug). The role of these *sajjādah-nashīns* in society was determined not only on the basis of their religious influence but also on the strength of their landed interests. The colonial authorities treated them as though they were chiefs, controlling vast lands.⁴⁸ They, for their part, remained loyal to the temporal power irrespective of the policies of the rulers. On the whole, while the 'ulamā' played the role of activists, the hereditary *pīrs* persuaded the people to obey the temporal power.

1.5 Religious Divisions Among Muslims in Pakistan

We have so far discussed the 'ulamā' and *ṣūfīs* as a body of religious leaders in the Muslim society of South Asia. Though the 'ulamā' share common ground in essential matters of religion, they are divided among themselves along sectarian and sub-sectarian lines. We shall turn our attention to the sectarian structure of

the Pakistani Muslim society underlying the divisions among the 'ulamā'.

The total population of Pakistan is 83.78 million according to the 1981 census,⁴⁹ out of which 81 million are Muslims (96.68 per cent of the total population).⁵⁰ The Muslims are divided into two major sects and several sub-sects (divisions of a sect and then further division) (see figure 1.1).


Population figures by sect and sub-sect are not available. There has been no census on the basis of sects since 1921, as the Muslim leaders discouraged it in order to maintain a semblance of Muslim unity. In the absence of authentic figures, each and every sect and sub-sect (especially minority sects and sub-sects) is given to exaggerating its ratio in the whole population. The statements of different leaders even of the same sect are often contradictory on this matter.

The majority of the Muslim population is *Sunnī*. What is the ratio of *Shi'āhs* in the population? Opinions vary on this question. Freeland Abbot estimated them as 'perhaps ten per cent of the population'.⁵¹ In a recent study, they are presented as 'a substantial minority of 20 per cent' of the total population.⁵² The *Shi'āh* leaders themselves reckon that their community constitutes 30-40 per cent of the total population. But their claims are in fact exaggerated. They form no more than 3.13 per cent of the Muslim population.⁵³

The Muslim community became divided almost immediately after the death of the Prophet on the question of his successor.

Figure 1.1

Religious Divisions of Muslims in Pakistan



The majority of the companions of the Prophet took the view that the community as a whole was vested with the power to select the successor of the Prophet as the leader of the community, because the Prophet had issued no specific instruction to the community on who should wear the mantle of the head of state. So Abū Bakr was elected by a majority as the Prophet's immediate *khalīfah* (successor).

The other group, which proved to be a tiny minority, held the view that the Prophet had in fact designated a particular person as his successor, and that was his cousin and son-in-law 'Alī B. Abī Tālib. According to this group, the designation had been made public by the Prophet during a journey from his last *hajj* (pilgrimage to Makkah) at a place called the *ghadīr* (pool) of *Khumm*, on 18 *Zul-hijjah* 11 A.H./632. The Prophet's proclamation had, according to them, been reported in the following words:

'He for whom I was the master should hence have
Ali as his master'⁵⁴

This group came to be known as the *Shi'āh* (partisans) of 'Alī.

The majority group, democratic in orientation, succeeded in creating the institution of *Khilāfah/Khilāfat*. The *Khalīfahs* were elected by popular support, but the institution could not last long. Thirty years after the Prophet's death, the *Khilāfah* was turned into a kind of monarchy.⁵⁵ The *Shi'āhs*, rejecting the doctrine of the *Khilāfah* developed a theory of *Imāmah/Imāmat*, according to which the leadership of the Muslim society and state was vested in 'Alī and his Fatimid descendents.

This earliest division of the Muslim community has its origin in politics rather than in dogma. This is not to say that theological questions no longer form part of this division. However, the issues which contributed to the division were political to the extent that they were basically concerned with statecraft. 'Alī came to power after the assassination of the third *Khalīfah* 'Uṣmān, but his four year rule (658-661) which ended in his assassination was punctuated by civil strife. After his death, the Umayyads took power. The *Shī'āhs* revolted against the established power on several occasions, but in vain. The Abbasids who followed the Umayyads in 750 were descendants of the Prophet's uncle, Abbas. They came to power with the help of the *Shī'āhs*, but abandoned the *Shī'āhs* and reverted to the original political form of rule guided by *Sunnī* religious belief.

1.5.1 The Sub-sects of the *Shī'āhs*

The *Shī'āhs* are divided into several sub-sects. Shahrastānī, a 12th century writer, divided the *Shī'āhs* into five major sub-sects:⁵⁶ *Kaysāniyyah*; *Zaydiyyah*; *Imāmiyyah* (the *Iṣnā 'Asharīs*); *Ghulāt* (the extremists); and, *Ismā'īliyyah*. Each of these sub-sects was further divided into smaller groups. It is not necessary here to trace the long history of the splits among *Shī'āhs*. We are concerned only with those sub-sects of the *Shī'āhs* which are a part of Muslim population in Pakistan.

1. *Iṣnā 'Asharīs*

The main point of difference among *Shī'āh* sub-sects was the actual number and succession of the *Imāms*. Some count 'Alī as

the first *Imām*, while others (considering him as the *waṣi-yi-rasūl*) do not include him among the *Imāms*, and start counting the *Imāms* only from Ḥasan B. 'Alī onwards.⁵⁷ The next *Imām*, Ḥusayn B. 'Alī (the younger brother of Ḥasan B. 'Alī), along with his tiny band of companions, was killed in a skirmish with Umayyad's army (10 *Maḥarram* 61 A.H./680), when he was on his way to Kufah (Iraq) in order to raise military support.⁵⁸ 'Alī Zayn-ul-Ābidīn, the son of Ḥusayn, was declared as the next *Imām*.

After the death of Zayn-ul-Ābidīn, the *Shī'āhs* underwent a division. Before his death (in 712 or 713), he was said to have nominated Moḥammad Bāqir, his eldest son, as his successor. A section of the *Shī'āhs* gave their support to Muḥammad Baqir's younger half brother Zayd instead of the designated *Imām*. Zayd pursued an activist policy against the Umayyads and was killed with many of his followers in an unsuccessful revolt (740). The followers of Zayd (known as the *Zaydīs*) continued to pursue a line of action different to the mainstream of the *Shī'āhs* and developed a theological basis for their identity.⁵⁹

Muḥammad Bāqir was followed by Jāfar Ṣādiq. A new cleavage occurred on his death (765), when a group refused to accept his younger living son Mūsà Kāẓim as his legitimate successor. The dissident group claimed that Jāfar had already chosen Ismā'īl, his elder son, as his successor, and that prior to his (Ismā'īl's) own death, the latter in turn nominated his son Muḥammad.

The *Shī'āhs* who owed allegiance to Ismā'īl are known as *Ismā'īlīs*. They are sometimes known as 'Sevensers', since, according

to them, Muḥammad B. Ismā'īl ought to have been the seventh *Imām*.

The main body of the *Shi'āhs* accepted Mūsà Kāzīm as the *Imām* and the chain of hereditary *Imāms* continued down to Muḥammad al-Muntaẓar. He was the last of the *Imāms*, and in accordance with the counting of the mainstream of *Shi'āhs* (including 'Alī B. Abī Ṭālib as the first *Imām*), he became the 12th *Imām*. The last *Imām* was believed to have disappeared rather than died like any other mortal (940) and would reappear as the *Mahdī* before the Day of Judgement. The *Shi'āhs*, believing in the *Imāmah* of the 12 *Imāms* are known as *Imāmiyyah* or *Iṣnā 'Asharīs* (Twelvers).

Iṣnā 'Asharī, the largest branch of the *Shi'āhs* throughout the Muslim world remained a minority, lacking political power until the 16th century, when the *Shi'āh* Safvid dynasty (1501-1722) was established in Iran. In the contemporary world, the Islamic Republic of Iran is a country with *Iṣnā 'Asharsī* Shiahism as its state religion.

The *Iṣnā 'Asharīs'* beliefs are as follows:

1. There are twelve *Imāms*. The first *Imām* was 'Alī whom the Prophet himself designated. Every *Imām* deputed his own successor. The twelfth went into occultation, and will reappear before the Day of Judgement.
2. All the *Imāms* are infallible, and to obey them is to obey the Prophet himself.

3. During the period of occultation of the last *Imām*, the masses must follow *Shī'āh 'ulamā'*. These '*ulamā'* in *Shī'āh* terminology are *mujtahids* (literally, those who exert their mental faculties). Technically, *mujtahids* are jurists who are qualified to derive the legal norms from the basic sources of Islamic law. These '*ulamā'/mujtahids* are reliable by dint of their piety and learning. The most learned and the pious must be emulated. It is up to a person to take someone from the *mujtahids* as his source of emulation (*marja'-i-taqlīd*).

2. *Ismā'īlīs (Āghā Khānīs and Bohrahs)*

The *Ismā'īlī Imāms* propagated their message through a network of *dā'īs* (missionaries) and succeeded in establishing themselves as the real defenders of the faith among the masses in far-flung areas of the Abbasid *Khilāfah*. By 909, they were strong enough to establish a new state and dynasty in North Africa and Sicily. They were known as the Fatimids, in accordance with their descent from Fatimah, the daughter of the Prophet. The Fatimid state, at its peak, included Egypt, Syria, North Africa, Sicily, the Red Sea coast of Africa, the Yemen and the Hijaz in Arabia⁶⁰ with the holy cities of Makkah and Madinah. With the death of Fatimid *Khalīfah* and 18th *dā'ī-i-muṭlaq* (the supreme missionary in the theological terminology of the group) al-Mustansir in 1094, a new split occurred which divided the sect vertically from top to bottom.

On the one hand, there was Nizār, the eldest son and the designated successor of al-Mustansir; on the other, there was his

younger brother al-Mustālī. The latter became the ruler with the assistance of the army chief, and Nizār was killed in the revolt.

The *Ismāīlīs* in Persia refused to recognise al-Mustālī as the rightful *Imām*. They adhered to Nizār and were therefore known as *Nizārīs*. The millionaire potentates - the *Āghā Khāns* - have been the living and *ḥaẓīr* (present) *Imāms* of the sub-sect, therefore the *Nizārīs* are commonly known as the *Āghā Khānīs*. In Pakistan, they are also known as *Khojahs*. The word *Khojah* is derived from *khawājah* which carries a connotation of business. An overwhelming majority of the community is in business.

The *Āghā Khānīs* consider the word of God to be incarnate in the living *Imām*. The word has the status of the holy *farmān* of the *Imām*. It is the one and only obligatory word for the followers. The *Imām* instructs the followers through *farmāns*. *Farmāns* contradicting each other could be issued over a period of time. Nothing is regarded as permanent. 'The concept of the *Imāmat* and belief in the *Imām* alone are unchangeable.'⁶¹

The *Āghā Khānīs* do not maintain mosques. They assemble in their *jamā'āt-khānahs* (social clubs) and pray three times a day. Their prayer neither resembles the *Sunnī* prayer nor the *Iṣnā 'Asharīs'*. In form as well as in spirit, it is a homage to the living *Imām*. At the same time, *Āghā Khānīs* do not hesitate to join the 'Īd prayers with *Sunnīs* or mainstream *Shi'āhs*. They may join the congregational prayers of *Sunnīs* as well as of *Shi'āhs*, at which they are prone to imitating their physical movements, without reading the prescribed texts of the prayers.

The *Āghā Khānī* population of Pakistan is estimated at .06 per cent of the total. It is concentrated in big cities, and in the northern areas of Pakistan (especially Hunza and Chitral). The *Āghā Khānīs* are on the whole a close-knit and prosperous community, well looked after by the *Imām's* administration.

By virtue of the role that he played during the formative phase of Muslim League politics, *Āghā Khān III* is regarded by his followers and official historians of Pakistan as a leader of the Pakistan movement; his son Prince 'Alī Khān was, until his death, the head of Pakistan's delegation to the United Nations. Prince Karīm, *Āghā Khān IV*, who was installed in October 1957, is received during his visits to Pakistan with the formalities due to a very important personality.

The followers of al-Mustā'ī are known as *Bohrah*s in South Asia. The name *Bohrah* is derived from the Gujarati word '*vohorou*' (literally, 'trade'). Trading is in fact the main occupation of the community. The term does not reflect any religious or sectarian position, but rather shows the social and occupational standing of those belonging to the *Bohrah* community. There is a minority of *Sunnī Bohrah*s, who use the term *ja'farī* as a part of their names in order to distinguish themselves from the *Shī'āh Bohrah*s.

The *Shī'ah Bohrah*s are divided into three distinct groups, namely *Dawūdīs*, *Sulaymānīs* and 'Alīās. The first split occurred among the *Bohrah*s over the succession of the 27th *dā'ī-maṭlaq* in the 16th century. The majority in South Asia followed Dawūd B. Quṭb Shāh and were called *Dawūdīs*. The followers of Shaykh Sulaymān,

known as the 27th *dā'ī-i-maṭlaq*, remained in a small minority and were referred to as the *Sulaymānīs*. The majority group of the *Bohrahs* (i.e. *Dawūdīs*) further split in 1627 or 1628, on the occasion of the succession of the 29th *dā'ī-i-maṭlaq*. A splinter group departed from the main body, under the leadership of 'Alī. They were referred to as 'Alī *Bohrahs* or 'Alīās.

In all these three groups, *Dawūdīs* are in a majority. Sayyidnā Burhān-ud-dīn is the present *dā'ī* of *Dawūdīs*; he presides over a closely-knit hierarchy, the members of which are chosen personally by him. According to one source, there are 30,000 *Dawūdīs* in Pakistan;⁶² 25,000 of these live in Karachi. An overwhelming majority of them is engaged in middle-scale business; a few families such as the *Walikas* are running big industries and trading corporations.

The other two groups of the *Bohrahs* are mainly concentrated in Vadodara (India); they have a nominal following in Pakistan.

All the three groups of *Bohrahs* derive their theological and esoteric interpretation of the faith from the *Ismā'īlī* literature. They follow the *Iṣnā 'Asharīs* in certain rituals (e.g., the celebration of the *'Īd-ul-ghadīr*, commemorating the designation of 'Alī to the *Imāmah* according to the *Shī'ah* narration).

The original schism among the *Bohrahs* took place on the question of succession and not on any theological ground. The beliefs and rituals of all the three sub-sects are more or less identical, except for the lineage of the *dā'īs*.

1.5.2 The Relative Importance of the Sub-sects of *Shi'áhs* in Pakistan

Numerically the *Iṣṇā Āsharīs* are important. They are mainly in the Punjab and Sind. There are a few pockets of influence of the *Iṣṇā Āsharīs* where sectarian feelings play a part in the political game. The importance of the *Āghā Khānīs* and *Bohrahs* in Pakistan's commerce and industry is far in excess of the minuscule proportion of the total population that they represent. The *Āghā Khānīs* who constitute only .06 per cent of the total population of Pakistan control 5 per cent of its total industrial wealth.⁶³ *Bohrahs* control another 5 per cent of Pakistan's industry with an even smaller population (.02 per cent).⁶⁴ The industrial houses of Walika and Fanci belong respectively to the *Bohrah* and *Āghā Khānī* sub-sects.

1.5.3 The Sub-sects of the *Sunnīs*

The majority of the *ummah* which accepted the theory of *Khilāfah* became known as the *Ahl-us-Sunnah* or *Sunnīs*, the followers of the *Sunnah* of the Prophet. The *Sunnīs* take the first four *Khalīfahs* - namely, Abū Bakr, 'Umar, 'Uṣmān and 'Alī - as the *Khualāfa-ar-Rāshidūn* (rightly guided caliphs) and idealise this period (stretching over 30 years or so) as the best time subsequent to the death of the Prophet. The basic stand of the *Sunnīs* is to follow the *Qurān* and the *Sunnah* of the Prophet. The schism among the *Sunnīs* arose out of differences of interpretation and adaptation of the *Sunnah*.

After the death of the Prophet, the *waḥī* (the Quranic revelation) which used to be the guiding principle in any given situation during his lifetime, ceased to exist. At the same time, the Prophet's own intuitive intellect was no longer available. The companions of the Prophet, including the *Khalīfah*, took the advice of the prophet to Mu'āz [the governor of Yemen] as a fundamental principle. If the *Qurān* had explicit instructions on a specific matter, that was final. If not, the *Sunnah* was followed. If neither the *Qurān* nor the *Sunnah* contained any direct instruction, then a course was to be adopted such that the injunctions of neither the *Qurān* nor the *Sunnah* would be violated.⁶⁵ With the passage of time a number of new legal problems did crop up, mainly due to the extension of Muslim rule beyond the Arab peninsula and the accompanying proselytisation on an extensive scale of non-Arab peoples. In this context, Muslim scholars in the great centres of the conquered lands devoted themselves to the collection, scrutiny and compilation of the sayings and practices of the Prophet (*ḥadīṣ*), and study of *ḥadīṣ* became a subject in its own right with specific principles and a vast literature. In order to resolve the problems that arose due to changes in space and time, jurisprudential interpretations accumulated and developed into a Muslim legal system. A number of juristic schools of thought appeared, but only a few of these crystallised into definite systems.

Four juristic schools of thought stand out prominently in Muslim history. These are the schools of Abū Ḥanīfah (d.767), Mālik B. Anas (d.795), Shāfī (d.820) and Aḥmad B. Ḥanbal (d.855). These schools of thought as well as their followers are known after the names of the founders.

The vast majority of the Muslims in Pakistan are the followers of Abū Ḥanīfah (i.e., the Ḥanafīs). The first conquerors of north-west India (now a part of Pakistan) were the Ghaznavids, who were *Sunnīs* of the *Shāfī* school of thought. But the Ḥanafī school of thought had started to gain ground and to replace *Shāfī* influence in the court of Ghazni, under the *Sulṭān* Masūd(1030-1040). The *Shāfī* school of thought remained strong in north-west India until the establishment of the *Sulṭanate* of Delhi (1206).

The *Sulṭāns* of Delhi and the political élite of the *Sulṭanate* adhered to the Ḥanafī school. The *Sulṭans'* code of administration was strongly Ḥanafī in character, and the judicial system was based entirely on Ḥanafī jurisprudence. It is said that Muḥammad B. Tughlaq had a thorough knowledge of *Hidāyah*, the Ḥanafī juristic manual. The 'ulamā', during the *Sulṭanate* period, placed greater emphasis on *fiqh* than on any other branches of Islamic learning. Subsequently, several books of *fiqh* (that is, on Ḥanafī *fiqh*, of course), were compiled according to need.⁶⁶

The Mughals were staunch Ḥanafī Turks from Central Asia. Under them, the Ḥanafī school of thought continued to flourish. *Fatāwā Bāburī*, a Ḥanafī manual compiled in 1519, was a token of Babur's attachment to the Ḥanafī juristic school of thought.⁶⁷ Akbar's eclecticism did not penetrate the legal and judicial practices, in spite of the changes that he introduced in his administration. During Awrangzeb's reign (1658-1707) one of the largest Ḥanafī manuals, *Fatāwā Ālamgīrī* (known in the Arab world as *Fatāwā Hindīyyah*), was compiled under his direction by a group of leading jurists in the years 1664-1672.

Hanafism was the only religious law that applied to the *Sunnīs* who constituted a majority of the Muslims during the latter part of the Mughal period. But a trend, setting aside jurist's opinion in favour of the *ḥadīṣ*, began to develop because of the emphasis given to the *ḥadīṣ* studies by Shāh Waliullah (1703-1762).

From the very beginning of Muslim rule in South Asia, *fiqh* constituted a main focus of the *ʿulamā*'s pursuits; and it seems to have over-ruled the *ḥadīṣ* at certain times, as experienced by the eminent *ṣūfī* Nizām-ud-dīn Awliyā'.⁶⁸ The *ḥadīṣ* texts were not readily available to the scholars and students of the *Shariāh*. Shaykh ʿAbdul Ḥaq Dihlawī (1551-1642) introduced *ḥadīṣ* studies by making compendia and writing commentaries on *Mishkāt-ul-Maṣābīh*, the *ḥadīṣ* classic. But the efforts of Shaykh ʿAbdul Ḥaq did not result in a movement to advance *ḥadīṣ* studies.

Shāh Waliullah's writings on a variety of subjects initiated a movement to reform the Muslim society in South Asia, which had religious as well as political dimensions. We shall discuss the political aspect of the movement in Chapter 2, but in order to trace the schism among the *Sunnīs* we consider here the reformatory aspect of the *Jihād* (holy war) movement under Sayyid Aḥmad Barelwī's leadership. One of its main objectives was to eliminate those practices prevalent among Muslims that were believed to be contrary to the injunctions contained in the *Qurān* and the *Sunnah*. Shāh Ismāʿīl (1781-1831), the grandson of Shāh Waliullah and a spokesman of the *Jihād* movement, was a scholar of Islamics.⁶⁹ A number of books in Arabic, Persian and Urdu, criticising the beliefs and practices of the masses not in conformity with the Islamic tenets, were written by him. His

books, and especially the most circulated one i.e. Taqwiyat-ul-Īmān, became a source of heated debate. Refutations and counter-refutations based on it still continue to be added to the polemical literature. Shah Ismā'īl and other writers of his viewpoint criticised the excessive veneration of pious persons, devotion to shrines, attribution to his messengers and others of the qualities wholly characteristic of God. Strict *tawhīd* (oneness of God) was the message carried by the movement, and anything which was not practised by the Prophet or his companions was absolutely *bid'āh* (innovation), no matter who introduced it and for how long it had continued in practice.

The advocates of Islam popular in South Asia accused Shāh Ismā'īl and his associates of being unduly influenced by the *Wahhābī* movement of Arabia. There was a strong bias against the *Wahhābīs* in South Asia as they had turned against the Ottomans. The beliefs and practices attributed to Muḥammad B. 'Abdul Wahhāb (1703-1787), the founder of the movement, by the official Ottoman 'ulamā', depicted him as one who destroyed Islam. With the circulation of such views, when the reformers - Shāh Ismā'īl and his associates - were dubbed '*Wahhābīs*', the masses became reluctant to listen to them. On the other hand, neither the writings of Muḥammad B. 'Abdul Wahhāb, nor any impartial study of his movement was available in South Asia at the time. The opposition to these reformers was so great that they were unable to influence the masses. They were wrongly referred to as *Wahhābīs*,⁷⁰ but the label so firmly stuck to them that such British colonial policy makers as W.W. Hunter⁷¹ and others used it unquestioningly.

As a result of the controversy over the writings of Shāh Ismā'īl and his followers, the *Sunnīs* of South Asia became divided into the reformers and the propagators of the popular Islam. Both these schools of thought developed in the South Asian environment.

1. *Deobandīs*

A larger group of the reformers (who had retained their affiliation to Hanafism, and *taṣawwuf* as well), founded a *madrasah* (later known as *Dār-ul-ʿulūm*) on 15 *Muḥarram* 1283 A.H./1866 at Deoband.⁷² Among the founders of the *Dār-ul-ʿulūm* were Ḥāfiẓ ʿĀbid Husayn (d.1913), Mawlānā Mahtab ʿAlī and Shaykh Nihāl Aḥmad. But, the men who shaped the policy of the *Dār-ul-ʿulūm* were two old friends - Rashīd Aḥmad Gangohī (1828-1905) and Muḥammad Qāsim Nānawtawī (1832-1880).

The *Dār-ul-ʿulūm* had its modest beginnings in the old *Chhattah Masjid* under a spreading pomegranate tree. By coincidence, the first teacher and the first pupil were both named 'Maḥmūd'. Mullā Maḥmūd was the teacher, and Maḥmūd Ḥasan was the pupil. The latter subsequently became the *madrasah's* most famous teacher and was commonly known as *Shaykh-ul-Hind*.

Within half a century, the *Dār-ul-ʿulūm* became a central religious institution for the Muslims of the whole of South Asia. The ʿulamā' of Deoband established a system of branch *madrasahs* in the North Western Provinces, with the common goal of the propagation of the faith for which the ʿulamā' were to be trained. By 1880, there were 15 *madrasahs* in the North Western Provinces, affiliated to Deoband.⁷³ The largest and most successful of these was the *Mazāhar-i-ʿulūm* (Saharanpur). In size and reputation, it

was to be second only to Deoband itself in the whole of South Asia.⁷⁴ It was founded only six months after the *madrasah* at Deoband (1866). The *Mazāhar-i-‘ulūm* was modelled on Deoband. Mawlānā Aḥmad ‘Alī Sahāranpurī, a well-known scholar of *ḥadīṣ* and publisher, who had taught many *Deobandī ‘ulamā’*, was the first 'sarparast' (rector) of the *madrasah*. Upon his death, Rashīd Aḥmad Gangohī became the *sarparast*. He had already held a similar position at Deoband.

The ‘ulamā’ of Deoband, not necessarily taught at Deoband, but sharing their views, were strict adherents of *Ḥanafī fiqh*, and were inducted into one or the other of the *ṣūfī* orders. They propagated *ḥadīṣ* studies with special emphasis on *Ḥanafī fiqh*. Even in writing the commentaries on *ḥadīṣ* classics, they tried their best to authenticate the practices of Hanafism. At the same time, they struggled to purify popular Islam from the un-Islamic practices which had crept into it.

2. Ahl-i-Ḥadīṣ

A smaller group of reformers believed that they should not give strict adherence to any particular juristic school of thought. Shāh Waliullah had accepted some of the rulings of Mālik B. Anas contrary to Abū Ḥanīfah in respect of the offering of obligatory prayers. Shāh Waliullah was interested in the propagation of the *ḥadīṣ* text *Muwattā* (compiled by Imām Mālik). He contributed two commentaries - *Musawwā* and *Muṣṣafā* (the former in Arabic and the latter in Persian) - on it. He accepted the practice of raising hands (*raf‘-ul-yadayn*) before and after every *rakū‘* (position of bowing down) in daily prayer. Shāh Ismā‘īl, the

grandson of Shāh Waliullah, wrote a booklet which emphasised this practice. A large section of the 'ulamā' involved in the *Jihād* movement of Sayyid Aḥmad, began to practise it. Nawāb Siddiq Ḥasan Khān (1833-1889) and Nazīr Husayn of Delhi (1810-1902) gave this group an intellectual basis. Its distinctive view was not to adhere strictly to any juristic school of thought, and it was therefore known as *ghayr-muqallid* (non-adherents). Nevertheless the group chose for itself the title of *Ahl-i-Ḥadīṣ* (i.e., the followers of *ḥadīṣ*).

Until the turn of the 19th century, this group did not constitute itself into a separate sub-sect with its own mosques. It was considered a part of a larger reform movement, although with its own viewpoint regarding Hanafism. In the early part of the 20th century, two 'ulamā' from the Punjab - Muḥammad Ḥusayn Batālawī (1840-1920) and Ṣanāullah Amritsarī (1870-1948) - gave the group a specific character and identity through their organising skills and scholarship.

3. *Ahl-i-Qurān*

At the beginning of the 20th century, *Ahl-i-Qurān* emerged as a group. *Ahl-i-Ḥadīṣ* claimed to follow the *ḥadīṣ* and not be bound by the juristic deductions of the established schools. The new group went a step further and rejected the vast literature of *ḥadīṣ*. According to them, the only authority to be obeyed was the *Qurān*. A number of 'ulamā' accepted the idea and tried to guide society, but they were unable to agree among themselves on the question of why one is bound to a certain interpretation of the *Qurān* put forward by an 'ālim when he is not at all bound to follow

the interpretation of the Prophet himself? Their attempts to find rational proof for the fundamentals of Islam (*shahādah*, *ṣalāt*, *zakāh*, *ṣawm* and *hajj*) in all their minute detail from the *Qurān* (as practised by the *ummah*) were derided by those who had a basic knowledge of the Arabic language. The novel interpretations of the *Qurān* aroused some interest in the modern educated sections of society, but carried no conviction to those who had already accepted the idea. The *Ahl-i-Qurān*, under different names, worked especially in the Punjab but could never command a strong following.

The place of *ḥadīṣ* in Islam had been a subject of controversy. Scholars who wished to interpret Islam liberally, always negated the importance of *ḥadīṣ*, as the *ḥadīṣ* literature leaves no room for unorthodox interpretations. In the recent past, Ghulām Aḥmad Parwez was an outstanding spokesman of this school which does not take *ḥadīṣ* as a source of Islamic law. Though Parwez did not support the interpretations of *Ahl-i-Qurān*, he in effect thoroughly propagated the spirit behind their ideology. *Ahl-i-Qurān* received no support from any section of the 'ulamā' in contemporary Pakistan.

4. Barelwīs

Another section of the *Sunnīs* is known as *Barelwīs*. The name is derived from an 'ālim Mawlānā Aḥmad Raḥā Khān (1856-1921) of Bans Bareilly (Barabanki district, Uttar Pradesh, India) who gave it coherence intellectually and socially as a distinct group. He was brought up in an atmosphere of bitter opposition to the reformers, i.e. *Ahl-i-Ḥadīṣ* and *Deobandīs*. His father, Naqī 'Alī

Khān (d.1880), was an opponent of the reformers. Among his writings there exists a refutation of *Taqwiyat-ul-Imān* of Shāh Ismā'īl. He attacked the views of Shāh Ismā'īl on the issue of *imkān-i-nazīr* (possibility of the existence of an equivalent to Muḥammad) in another treatise (published in 1876).⁷⁵

Aḥmad Razā Khān was a prolific writer. A large number of books and tracts on jurisprudence, theology, ethics and other Islamic sciences are to his credit, but his real interest was in strictly adhering to the *Ḥanafī* school of thought and in staunchly opposing the reformers. He did not like to co-operate with the fellow '*ulamā*' of other schools of thought, even in matters which were outside the realm of theological controversy. He was among the '*ulamā*' who gathered at the platform of *Nadwat-ul-'ulamā*⁷⁶ (April 1894) but soon launched an attack against the movement. The presence of modern educated people in the ranks of the movement provided him with an easy opportunity to discredit it as a political gimmick of the followers of Sayyid Aḥmad Khān. At the same time, he felt uneasy working with the '*ulamā*' who were not giving any importance to the differences between the *Ahl-i-ḥadīṣ* and the *Ḥanafīs*.⁷⁷ He issued *fatwās* against the reformers, wrote letters, engaged in debates and sent his associates and students to debate as well. He left no stone unturned to discredit the reformers in front of the masses. By the turn of the 19th century, he had gathered a group of adherents around him who made his writings a touchstone for judging whether or not a particular belief or practice was in conformity with the doctrines of Sunnism. The followers of Aḥmad Razā Khān claimed to be so true to Sunnism that they identified themselves as the *Ahl-us-Sunnah-w-Jamā'āh*

In 1902, Mawlānā Aḥmad Razā Khān declared four leading Deobandi 'ulamā'- Rashīd Aḥmad Gangohī, Muḥammad Qāsim Nānawtawī, Khalīl Aḥmad Ambethawī and Ashraf 'Alī Thānwī - as *kāfirs* (infidels), assigning some un-Islamic beliefs to them.⁷⁸ Three years later, during a *hajj* visit, he obtained counter-signatures of 35 scholars in Makkah and Madinah to his *fatwā* as proof of his right judgement concerning the *Deobandīs*. A new version of his earlier *fatwā*, along with comments from these scholars, was published under the title of *Hisām-ul-Karamayn* (1907). This was complemented by another collection of similar *fatwās*⁷⁹ with a view to discrediting the *Deobandī 'ulamā'*. Out of the four *Deobandī 'ulamā'* who became targets of Aḥmad Razā Khān's wrath, two were still alive. The *Deobandīs* approached the scholars of Makkah and Madinah to clarify their position.⁸⁰ They raised the question as to why the 'ulamā' of Makkah and Madinah did not hesitate to countersign the *fatwā* of Aḥmad Razā Khān, when they were unable to check the references of the Urdu writings of the accused 'ulamā' in question? Perhaps it was sufficient for them to know that the accused were alleged to be *Wahhābīs* - the followers of Muḥammad B. 'Abdul Wahhāb (who were the political opponents of their masters, the Ottomans). The estrangement, produced by the *fatwā* between the *Deobandīs* and the *Barelwīs* continued and their bitter animosity appeared in the political sphere as well.

On taking a close look at the policies of Mawlānā Aḥmad Razā Khān, it would appear that he wanted to preserve Islam unchanged; not Islam as it was idealised in the *Qurān* and the *Sunnah*, but Islam that had evolved through centuries in the South Asian context. The following beliefs and practices of the *Barelwīs* distinguish them from the reformers - *Deobandīs* and *Ahl-i-Ḥadīg*:

1. The Prophet was created from light; therefore, he threw no shadow. He was human, but his humanity was not like that of others. He was and continues to be omni-present and all-observant, even after his worldly life.
2. The Prophet had the knowledge of *mā kāna w mā yakūn* (each and every thing which had been and which would be).
3. The celebration of the Prophet's birthday - *mīlād*, with the rituals evolved in South Asian context.
4. The saints after their death can hear and their powers of *taṣarruf* (control over world) and *karāmat* (miracle) continue as they had in their lifetime. They are alive in body even after death, they are just out of sight. They could be approached for help, by visiting their tombs and from any other place as well.

On account of the reverence that the great *ṣūfīs* and pious persons command, emphasis is placed on visiting their shrines which are centres of ardent devotion. The 'urs (annual death ceremony) is observed for a *ṣūfī*. The grave is usually covered with cloth and flowers are offered. The tombs are illuminated.

5. Making of *nazar* (votive offering) in the name of *ṣūfīs* and pious people is lawful.

The *Barelwīs* enjoy support largely among the rural and poorly educated masses, who practise popular Islam.

1.5.4 Comparison of the *Sunnīs'* Sub-sects

Among the three sub-sects of the *Sunnīs*, the *Barelwīs* constitute the overwhelming majority, the second largest group being the *Deobandīs*. *Ahl-i-Ḥadīṣ* constitute the smallest *Sunnī* sub-sect. Though all the three sub-sects are running their own religious institutions (mosques, *madrasahs*, etc.), the most active among these are the *Deobandīs*. The *Deobandī 'ulamā'* have several organisations in the specific field of religious activity. The *'ulamā'*, with their own special predilections, join these. A few such organisations are briefly described below:

1) *Tablīghī Jamā'āt* (Party for Preaching of Islam)(TJ)

Mawlānā Muḥammad Ilyās (1885-1944), a *ṣūfī-ālim* of *Deobandī*-orientation, founded the *Tablīghī Jamā'āt* (TJ) organisation in 1926 for the propagation of the faith in Mewat. The organisation's mission was to give a call to the Muslims to pursue the knowledge and practice of the fundamentals of Islam. With the passage of time TJ propagated its message beyond the confines of South Asia. According to the policy of TJ, preaching is not linked to a deep study of Islamic learning. It is a duty of a Muslim to convey the message of Islam however little he knew of it. People

in groups, duly controlled by a *Tablīghī* centre, would go from door to door, inviting fellow Muslims to perform the basic religious fundamental practices and to join the mission.

TJ's workers have no interest in the theological differences among Muslims. There are no political discussions among the preaching groups. It is basically an apolitical movement which is open to all Muslims. As in India and Bangladesh, it is also quite successful in its appeal in Pakistan.⁸⁰

2) *Majlis-i-Tahaffuz-i-Khatm-i-Nabuwwat* (Society for the Protection of Finality of the Prophethood [of Muhammad])

This organisation (founded in Multan, 13 December 1954) follows the sole aim of making people aware of the dangers of *Aḥmadiyyah* (Ahmadism). Through speeches, pamphlets, posters and dialogues with *Aḥmadīs*, its full-time workers/*ulamā'* campaign against the *Aḥmadiyyah*.

3) *Tanzim Ahl-i-Sunnat* (Organisation of *Sunnīs*)

This organisation (founded on 12 December 1943) is especially influential in those areas in which the *Shī'āh* community is seen as posing a threat to the influence of the *Sunnīs*. Its preachers, well-versed in *Shī'āh* theology, usually lecture on issues that differentiate the *Sunnīs* from the *Shī'āhs*.

4) Jamīyat-i-Ishā'at-ut-Tawhīd-was-Sunnah (Association for the Propagation of One-ness of Allah and the Sunnah)

The sole purpose of this organisation is to revive the *Sunnah* and to implore Muslims not to follow anything which has no proof from the *Qurān* and the *Sunnah*. In short, it upholds the teachings of Shāh Ismā'īl and his followers in a 20th century context.

The relative dynamism of the religious sects and sub-sects can also be gauged by the number of *madrasahs* controlled by each of them. Table 1.1 shows the number of *madrasahs* against each sect and sub-sect in the years 1959-60 and 1971.

Table 1.1 shows that the *Deobandīs* were running almost 50 per cent of the *madrasahs* (233 out of 472, 49.35 per cent) in 1959-60. During the interval of 11 years, the *Shi'āhs* and the *Ahl-i-Ḥadīṣ* lost eight and three *madrasahs* respectively. *Deobandīs* added 58 more to their strength and their share of the total number of the *madrasahs* increased further (291 out of 563; 51.58 per cent). Even in 1971 the *Deobandīs* were in control of a greater number of *madrasahs* than the *Barelwīs*, the largest group of the *Sunnīs*.

Not only are the *Deobandī* religious periodicals more numerous, but the subject matter that they cover and their presentation are better than the periodicals published by other sects/sub-sects.

Table 1.1

Sect-wise number of *madrasahs* in 1959-60 and 1971

Sect/ sub-sect	Number of <i>Madrasahs</i> 1959-60	Number of <i>Madrasahs</i> 1971	Increase or Decrease in Number over a period of 11 years
<i>Barelwīs</i>	98	124	26 (26.5%)
<i>Deobandīs</i>	233	291	58 (24.9%)
<i>Ahl-i-Ḥadīs</i>	55	47	-8 (-14.5%)
<i>Shi'āhs</i>	18	15	-3 (-16.7%)
without specific affiliation	68	86	18 (26.5%)
TOTAL	472	563	91 (19.2%)

[Source: Aḥmad, Hāfiẓ Naẓar, *Jā'izah-i-Madāris-i-'Arabiyyah Islāmiyyah Maqhrībī Pakistan* (Lyallpur: Jami' Chishtiyyah Trust, 1960), pp.796-811; Aḥmad, Hāfiẓ Naẓar, *Jā'izah Madāras-i-'Arabiyyah Maqhrībī Pakistan (2)* (Lahore: Muslim Academy, 1972), p.688]

Deobandīs are more active than others in the spheres of organisation and communication. Though individual voters are not unduly influenced by religious/sectarian affiliation, *Deobandīs* and *Ahl-i-Ḥadīṣ* are better placed than the *Barelwīs* to persuade their followers to vote according to their sub-sects because of their superior organisation.

1.6 The Madrasah Education Curriculum

The 'ulamā' go through a process of study and examination, originally formulated during the medieval period. The curriculum followed in the *madrasahs* of Pakistan, India and Bangladesh (including the *Dār-ul-'ulūm* at Deoband) is known as *Dars-i-Nizāmī*. It was drawn up by Mullā Nizām-ud-dīn Sihālwi⁸² (d.1748), a leading 'ālim during the reign of of Awrangzeb; and was consistent with the curriculum developed in South Asia over a long period of time.⁸³ Originally, *Dars-i-Nizāmī* consisted of 11 subjects with texts prescribed for each, as shown in column 2 of Table 1.2. With the passage of time, some other subjects were also included, whilst texts prescribed earlier were deleted and new ones were added. The curriculum nowadays consists of 16 subjects with the text books shown in column 3 of Table 1.2.

The *Shī'ah madrasahs* follow different texts for *fiqh*, *usūl-i-fiqh*, *ḥadīṣ*, *usūl-i-ḥadīṣ* and *tafsīr* since the *Dars-i-Nizāmī* is basically designed for the *madrasahs* of the *Sunnīs*. The *Shī'ahs* interpret their beliefs and practices according to their own standard texts.

Table 1.2

The Curriculum of *Madrasahs*, as prescribed by Nizām-ud-dīn Sihālwi and the present curriculum

Subjects	Books prescribed by Nizām-ud-dīn	Books included in the present day curriculum
1	2	3
Şarf (Conjugation and Declension)	<i>Mizān, Munsha'ib Şarf-i-Mir, Panj Ganj, Zubdah, Fusūl-i-Akbarī</i>	<i>Mizān, Munsha'ib Şarf-i-Mir, Panj Ganj, Zubdah, Fusūl-i-Akbarī, Dastūr-ul-Mubtadī, 'Ilm-us-Şighah Shāfiāh</i>
<i>Naḥw</i> (Grammar and Syntax)	<i>Naḥw-i-Mir, Sharaḥ Mi'atah 'Amil, Hidayat-ur-Naḥw, Kāfiāh, Sharaḥ-i-Jāmi</i>	<i>Naḥw-i-Mir, Sharaḥ Mi'atah 'Amil, Hidayat-ur-Naḥw, Kāfiāh, Sharaḥ-i-Jāmi</i>
<i>Mantiq</i> (Logic)	<i>Şughrā, Kubrā, İsāghawjī, Tahzīb-ul-Mantiq, Sharaḥ Tahzīb, Qutbī, Mir Qutbī, Sullam-ul-'ulūm</i>	<i>Şughrā, Kubrā, İsāghawjī, Mizān-ul-Mantiq, Tahzīb-ul-Mantiq, Sharaḥ-i-Tahzīb, Qutbī, Mir Qutbī, Mullā Hasan, Ḥamdullah, Qāzī Mubārak, Risalah Mir Zāhid, Mullā Jalāl</i>
<i>Hikmat</i> (Philosophy)	<i>Mebzī, Şadrā, Shams-i-Bāzighah</i>	<i>Mebzī, Şadrā, Shams-i-Bāzighah</i>
<i>Riyāzi-w-Hayat</i> (Mathematics)	<i>Khulāşat-ul-Hisāb, Tahzīb Uqlaydās, Risālah-i-Qawshajiyah, Sharaḥ-i-Chaghminī (Bāb Awwal)</i>	<i>Khulāşat-ul-Hisāb, Tahzīb Uqlaydās (Maqālah-i-ūlā), Tashriḥ-ul-Aflāk, Taşriḥ, Sharaḥ-i-Chaghminī</i>
<i>Balāghat</i> (Rhetoric)	<i>Mukhtaşar-al-Ma'ānī, Muṭawwal (up to mā anā qultu)</i>	<i>Mukhtaşar-al-Ma'ānī, Muṭawwal</i>
<i>Fiqh</i> (Jurisprudence)	<i>Sharaḥ-i-Waqāyah, Hidāyah</i>	<i>Khulāşah-i-Kaydānī, Nūr-ul-İzah, Munyat-ul-Muşsalī, Qudūrī, Kanz-ud-daqa'iq, Sharaḥ-i-Waqāyah, Hidāyah</i>

Table 1.2 (contd)

The Curriculum of *Madrasahs*, as prescribed by Nizam-ud-din Sihali and the present curriculum

Subjects 1	Books prescribed by Nizam-ud-din 2	Books included in the present day curriculum 3
<i>Usūl-i-Fiqh</i> (Principles of Jurisprudence)	<i>Nūr-ul-Anwār, Tawzīh Talwīh, Mussallam-us-Ṣabūt</i>	<i>Usūl-ush-shāshī, Nūr-ul-Anwār, Husāmī, Tawzīh Talwīh, Mussallam-us-Ṣabūt</i>
<i>Kalām</i> (Scholastic Theology)	<i>Sharah-i-'Aqā'id-i-Nasafī, Sharah-i-'Aqā'id-i-Jalālī, Mir Zāhid, Sharah-i-Mawāqif</i>	<i>Sharah-i-'Aqā'id-i-Nasafī, Khayālī, Mir Zāhid</i>
<i>Tafsīr</i> (Exegesis of <i>Quran</i>)	<i>Jalālayn, Bayḏāwī</i>	<i>Jalālayn, Bayḏāwī</i>
<i>Hadīṣ</i> (Traditions of the Prophet)	<i>Mishkāt-ul-Maṣābīh</i>	<i>al-Ṣaḥīḥ-ul-Bukhārī, al-Ṣaḥīḥ-ul-Muslim, Jamī' Tarmazī, Sunan Abī Dāwūd, Sunan Nisā'ī, Sunan Ibn-i-Mājah, Muwattā (Imām Mālik)</i>
<i>Farāz</i> (Distribution of inheritance)	-	<i>Sirājī</i>
<i>Munāzarah</i> (Science of debate)	-	<i>Rashīdiyyah</i>
<i>Usūl-i-Ḥadīṣ</i> (Principles of the Traditions)	-	<i>Sharah-i-Nukhbat-ul-Fikr</i>
<i>Usūl-i-Tafsīr</i>	-	<i>al-Fawz-ul-Kabīr</i>
<i>Adab</i> (Literature)	-	<i>Nafkhat-ul-Yaman, Mu'allaqāt-us-sabāh, Diwān-ul-Mutanabbī, Maqāmāt (Ḥarīrī), Ḥamasah</i>

[Source: Rāhī, Akhtar, *Tazkirah-i-Muṣaniffīn-i-Dars-i-Nizāmī* (Lahore: *Maktabah-i-Raḥmāniyyah*, 1978), pp.7-15]

The following shortcomings of the curriculum of the *madrasahs* are striking.

1. Arabic is the language of the *Qurān* and the *Sunnah*. A number of books on Arabic grammar, conjugation and declension are included in the curriculum but the students remain unable even to write a few sentences correctly. So far as the texts on literature are concerned, it seems that the texts are selected to increase the vocabulary of the students rather than to develop their literary quality. It is equally significant that no text from modern literature is included.

2. The texts on philosophy and logic, produced during the medieval period are out of date.

3. The texts on *fiqh* are selected solely from the *Ḥanafī* literature. The contribution of other schools of thought is not touched upon. The result is a strict adherence to the Hanafism.

4. The social sciences (economics, political science, sociology, history, etc.) are not studied at all. There is not even an introduction to the pure sciences, i.e. chemistry, physics, biology, etc.

5. The comparative study of religions is not a part of the curriculum.

6. English or any other European language is not taught on the premises of *madrasahs*.

To make the curriculum appropriate, according to the needs of the day, efforts have been made from the last quarter of the 19th century. *Nadwat-ul-'ulamā'* adopted a revised form of the *Dars-i-Nizāmī*, but it could not persuade the majority of the '*ulamā'* to give up the traditional curriculum. With the passage of time, even *Nadwat-ul-'ulamā'* had to water down its initial scheme of reform. *Dār-ul-'ulūm Nadwat-ul-'ulamā'*'s only contribution was to develop a taste for Arabic language and literature, and some of the well-established *madrasahs* are following the pattern set by it in this direction.

Several attempts, on an academic level as well as on the official level, have been made to improve the syllabus of the *madrasahs*, but nothing has been achieved due to the attitude of the '*ulamā'*. A *Shaykh-ul-Ḥadīṣ* (the teacher of *ḥadīṣ*) in a *Deobandī madrasah* rejected the idea of including new subjects in the curriculum. He wrote:

There is a type of *madrasah* which combines the religious and worldly Arabic/English education ... The founders of these *madrasahs* aimed to make use of the worldly education along with the religious one. So *Nadwat-ul-'ulamā'* at Lucknow was established for this very reason. The texts of the religious subjects were greater in number than the texts of the worldly subjects in the syllabus, so that the *dīn* (religion) might be dominant, and the *dunyā* (worldly subjects) subordinate. But the net result of these *madrasahs* is neither the achievement of *dīn* nor of mundane affairs. The money of Muslims earned through hard labour was wasted in supporting such *madrasahs*.⁸⁴

The most recent attempt to modernise the curriculum of the *madrasahs* is embodied in the Report of a Committee consisting of the 'ulamā' and scholars with modern education.⁸⁵ But, it was rejected by the 'ulamā'⁸⁶ and this exercise proved to be as futile as the previous ones. While the 'ulamā''s approach to curriculum has been static, they have shown vigour in setting up *madrasahs*, establishing central control over them, and in mobilising an effective system of funding for the buildings as well as for teaching and equipping the libraries. Before the emergence of Pakistan, there were 137 *madrasahs* in the area covered by it. The 'ulamā' migrated to Pakistan from the Muslim minority provinces of India and established many *madrasahs* in Pakistan. Within a period of three years (1947-50), the number of *madrasahs* in Pakistan rose to 210. After a decade (in 1961), the total number of *madrasahs* was 401. In 1971 a total figure of 563 was reached.⁸⁷

The *madrasahs* are generally affiliated to the federations of the schools of thought that they represent. The *Shī'āhs*, *Deobandīs*, *Barelwīs* and *Ahl-i-Ḥadīṣ* have their separate federations of the *madrasahs* which are responsible for suggesting syllabi and for unifying the examination system.

All these *madrasahs* are run through the voluntary contributions of the public and the obligatory *tiths-zakāt*, *fiṭrah* and *'ushr* under the injunction of the *Qurān* and the *Sunnah*.

1.7 Conclusion

The 'ulamā' occupy a unique position in Muslim society due to their Islamic learning, piety and the religious services

rendered by them. They have always enjoyed respect among the Muslim masses. On account of their influence over the people, their importance was recognised by the Muslim rulers of South Asia. The 'ulamā', as guardians of *Shari'ah*, had been affiliated to the organs of state power; but, their role remained peripheral in political affairs. Whenever a ruler openly defied established religious practices and followed a policy of suppressing the 'ulamā', he had to face stiff resistance. And, on certain occasions, the 'ulamā' proved to be so strong that the state had to change its policy in order to placate them. Under colonial rule in South Asia, the 'ulamā' were no longer affiliated to state organs. Their role became confined to the preservation of the Muslim faith and culture on the one hand, and to resistance to the colonial rulers on the other.

In the context of South Asian Muslim history, the 'ulamā' had never been hierarchically organised. They are bound together on the basis of common sectarian beliefs or of student-teacher relationships. In the absence of a hierarchy, the *Sunnī* 'ulamā' often find themselves in disagreement on several issues; and, different stands on the issue are justified by different groups. In spite of such diversity of approach, the 'ulamā' are united in their determination to uphold *Shari'ah*. In this sense, they share a common attitude on the problems facing society. By orientation and conviction, they would like to seek solution of economic, social and political problems in *Shari'ah*, as interpreted by classical jurists, strictly in accordance with the traditions of the Prophet. During the second half of the 19th century, Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khān's theological approach under the rubric of 'Islamic Modernism' was opposed by the 'ulamā' of all shades of opinion. Similarly, Mirzā

Ghulām Aḥmad Qādiyānī, the founder of *Aḥmadiyyah*, was uniformly opposed by the 'ulamā'.

In Pakistan, the *Sunnī* 'ulamā' played a more significant role than their *Shī'ah* counterparts. And, among the *Sunnīs*, the *Deobandi* 'ulamā' have been more vocal than the *Barelwī* and *Ahl-i-Ḥadīṣ* 'ulamā'. The 'ulamā' control a large network of mosques and *madrasahs* throughout the country. This network is, by and large, beyond the reach of the state. Therefore the 'ulamā' are more or less free to express their views.

The 'ulamā' exercise considerable influence on the Muslim masses, and especially on the lower and middle classes of the society. The upper stratum of society is generally modern educated and less responsive to religious appeals. With the passage of time, the 'ulamā', especially since independence (1947), have been able to penetrate the modern educated middle classes to a certain degree, thus diluting the legacy of Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān. The conflict between the 'ulamā' and the Islamic modernists is still alive, with the middle classes playing a major role on both sides. The 'ulamā' are regarded as experts in matters of *Sharī'ah*, but their credentials are challenged on issues of a political nature such as the economy, banking and commerce, and foreign relations. The curriculum of *madrasah* education does not include these subjects which would provide an understanding of the contemporary world.

NOTES

1. The expression 'ulamā' occurs in the following verses:
al-Shūrā: 197 ادلم يكن لهم ان يعلمه علماء بني اسرائيل [Was it not a sign for them, that is known to the learned (*ulamā*) of the Children of Israel. Arberry, Arthur J., The Koran Interpreted (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), p.380].
al-Fāṭir: 28 انما يخشى الله من عباده العلماء [Even so only those of His servants fear God who have knowledge. *Ibid.*, p.447].
2. For instance, a well-known *ḥadīṣ* is narrated in these words ان العلماء هم ورثة الانبياء ورتوا العلم [The religious scholars are the inheritors of the Prophets, i.e., they inherit knowledge. al-Bukhari, Muhammad B. Ismail, Sahih Al-Bukhari, Dr. Muhammad Muhsin Khān (trans.), (Chicago: Kazi Publications, 1979), Vol. I, p.59. Kulaynī, Abū Jāfar Muhammad B. Yaqūb, al-Usūl min al-Kāfī, Kitāb Faḥṣ ul-'Ilm (Tehran: 1343 Hijrī Shamsī), Vol. 1., p.32].
3. Nizāmī, Khaliq Ahmad, Some Aspects of Religion and Politics in India during the 13th Century (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1961), p.151.
4. For a detailed study of the titles of the 'ulamā', see Mubārakpurī, Qāzī Athar, '*Ulamā-yi-Islām Ke Alqāb kī Tarīkh*, *Ma'arif* 89 (January 1962): 1, pp.43-60; p.89 (February 1962): 2, pp.104-120.
5. *Mullā* is the same as the Turkish word *mevlā* and the Arabic word *mawlā* (lit. lord, master, patron, and also slave, anyone standing in a sort of fixed relationship to another). It was first used in Turkey before it attained general currency in the rest of the Muslim world. See *Ibid.*, p.109; Popper, W., '*Mullā*' in Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics (New York: n.d.), Vol. VIII, pp.909-910.

The term gradually fell out of favour amongst the South Asian *ulamā* in the early 20th century, and was replaced by the terms *mawlawī* and *mawlānā*, the latter being more in the nature of an honorific. In some of the recently published *tazkirahs* [biographical dictionaries] of the 'ulamā', the compilers use the title '*mawlānā*' for the 'ulamā' of the sect to which they themselves belong; and *mawlawī* for the 'ulamā' of the other sects. In contemporary South Asia, the expression *mullā* does not signify any superior status but rather reflects a derogatory impression of the 'ulamā'.

In the above context, an 'ālim is *mawlānā* for his admirers, *mawlawī* for those people who do not belong to his sect/school of thought, and *mullā* to his adversaries.

6. Khaldun, Ibn, The Muqaddimah, Franz Rosenthal (trans.), (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958), Vol. III, p.4.
7. The term *qurrā'* is used for those 40 (according to another narration, 70) companions of the Prophet who were massacred at *Bīr Māūnah* in the fourth year of *hijrah*. They had been sent by the Prophet to a tribe as emissaries in order to make the tribesmen better acquainted with Islam. After a sudden ambush all except two were killed. The *muḥaddiṣīn* (traditionists) and the historians generally took *qurrā'* as the reciters of the *Qurān*. Nonetheless, a new interpretation of the term *qurrā'* is given by M.A. Shaban [Islamic History: A New Interpretation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p.23 and p.51] and supplemented by G.H.A. Juynboll ['The *Qurrā'* in Early Islamic History' in Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 16 (1973): 2-3, pp.113-129]. They consider the term as a derivation not of the root *qarā* (قرأ) but of the root *qarya* (قري), and interpret it accordingly as 'the villagers'. But it remains a fact that the persons devoted to the propagation of the *Qurān* were referred to as *qurrā'* and the term is still in use with the same connotation.
8. Leiser, Gary, 'Notes on the *Madrasa* in Medieval Islamic Society', The Muslim World 76 (1986): 1, p.16.
9. Repp, R.C., 'The Altered Nature and Role of the 'Ulamā' in Thomas Nuff and Roger Owen (eds.), Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1977), p.280.
10. *Pīr* (a Persian word), literally means 'old man' or 'respected elder'. See Patten, W.M., 'Pīr' in Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, *op.cit.*, Vol. X, pp.40-43.
11. *al-Ālaq*: 1, Arberry, *op.cit.*, p.651.
12. *Ṭahā*: 114, *ibid.*, p.319.
13. *al-Mujādalah*: 11, *ibid.*, p.571.
14. 'An 'ālim is superior to the layman who prays, as the full moon is superior to all the stars.' Dāwūd, Abū, al-Sunan (Lahore: *Islāmī Academy*, 1983), Vol. III, p.115. Another saying attributed to the Prophet is 'Seek ye knowledge even if it be in China.' Though this particular sentence does not exist in authentic collections of the traditions of the Prophet, it reflects the general orientation of the Muslims.
15. Michon, Jean-Louis, 'Religious Institutions' in R.B. Serjeant (ed.), The Islamic City (Paris: UNESCO, 1980), p.35.
16. *al-Ahzab*: 40, Arberry, A.J., *op.cit.*, p.432.

17. See Fathi, Asghar, 'The Islamic Pulpit as a Medium of Political Communication', Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 20 (1981):2, pp.163-172.
18. Nadwī, Sayyid Sulaymān, 'Arab-w-Hind Ke Ta'aluqāt (Karachi: Karim and Sons, 1976); Mubārakpurī, Qāzī Athar, 'Arab-w-Hind: 'Ad-i-Rasālat Men (Karachi: H.M. Sa'id, 1975).
19. One tradition quotes the Prophet as saying: 'The Caliphate after me will endure for thirty years; then will come the rule of a king'. Arnold, T.W., The Caliphate (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965), p.107.
20. Nizāmī, Khaliq Ahmad, Salātīn-i-Dihlī ke Mazhabī Rujhānāt (Delhi: Maktabah-i-Burhān, 1958).
21. Nizami, Khaliq Ahmad, Some Aspects of Religion and Politics in India during the thirteenth century, *op.cit.*, p.90.
22. Habib, M., Introduction to Some Aspects of Religion and Politics in India during the thirteenth century (Khaliq Ahmad Nizami), *op.cit.*, p.viii.
23. Muslim B. Hujjaj, al-Jāmi'-us-sahīh, 'Abdul Hamīd Siddiqui (trans.) (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1978) Vol. III, pp.1032-1033.
24. The *mahẓar* (document drawn by a group) of 1579, drafted by Shaykh Mubārak, attributed these qualities to Akbar. The *mahẓar* was signed by the 'ulamā'. A contemporary historian, 'Abdul Qādir Badāyūnī, wrote that all except Shaykh Mubārak subscribed to the *mahẓar* against their will. Rafat Bilgrami, 'Akbar's *Mahdar* of 1579', Islamic Culture 47 (1973): 3, pp.239-240.
25. Qureshi, Ishtiaq Husain, Ulema in Politics (Karachi: Ma'āref Limited, 1974) pp.68-69.
26. Smith, Vincent A., Akbar, The Great Mughal (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1919), p.222.
27. 'About five hundred and thirty in all [compiled in three volumes]. They form a great classic of Indo-Muslim religious literature.' de Bary, Wm. Theodore (ed.), Sources of Indian Tradition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960) p.449.
28. The descendents of Shaykh Ahmad commanded respect at Awrangzeb's court. See Khān, Muḥammad Bakhtāwar, Mi'rat-ul-Ālam, Sajidah Alawi (ed.) (Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, University of the Punjab, 1979), Vol. II, p.413; Pasrūrī, Muḥammad Aslam, Farhat-un-Nāzirīn (text relating to the biographical sketches of renowned persons) in Ahmad Rabbānī (ed.), Maqālāt-i-Mawlawī Muḥammad Shafī' (Lahore: Majlis-i-Tarraqi-yi-Adab, 1972) Vol. IV, pp.155-156. The grandsons of Shaykh Ahmad -

Sayf-ud-dīn and Muḥammad Naqashband - used to write letters to Awrangzeb. These letters are in Sayf-ud-dīn, Maktūbāt-i-Sayfiyyah, Dr. Ghulām Mustafā Khān (ed.) (Hyderabad-Sind, 1963); Muḥammad Naqshband, Wasīlat-ul-Qabūl ilallah-war-rasūl, Dr. Ghulām Mustafā Khān (ed.) (Hyderabad-Sind, 1963).

29. Aslam, Muḥammad, Tarīkhī Maqālāt (Lahore: Nadwat-ul-Muḥaniffīn, 1970), p.238.
30. Haq, S. Moinul, 'Influence of Orthodoxy at the Mughal Court', Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society, 25 (1977): 3, p.168.
31. Several detailed studies of the administrative structure of the Muslim state in South Asia are available. These studies, dealing with either specific periods or particular institutions, discuss the religious institutions largely run by the 'ulamā'. A few examples are given below:

Ahmad, M.B., The Administration of Justice in Medieval India (Aligarh: The Aligarh Historical Research Institute, 1941); Bilgrmi, Rafat M., Religious and Quazi-Religious Departments of the Mughal Period, 1556-1707 (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 1984); Hasan, Ibn, The Central Structure of the Mughal Empire (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1967); Qureshi, I.H., The Administration of the Sultanate of Delhi (Karachi: Pakistan Historical Society, 1958); Qureshi, I.H., Administration of the Mughal Empire (Karachi: University of Karachi, 1966); Saran, P., The Provincial Government of the Mughals, 1526-1658 (Lahore: Faran Limited, 1976).
32. The term *Shaykh-ul-Islām* was used for an official designation as well as to refer to an honorific title. Shaykh Bahā'ud-dīn Zakariyyā of Multan (1182-1262) had the title conferred on him, but he had no specific functions to perform. As the title became popular, people started to use it loosely for the distinguished *sūfīs* even if it was not officially bestowed on them by the emperor.
33. Nizami, Khaliq Ahmad, Some Aspects of, *op.cit.*, pp.158-159.
34. Saran, P., *op.cit.*, pp.345-346.
35. Masud, M. Khalid, 'Adab al-Mufti: The Muslim Understanding of Values, Characteristics and Role of a Mufti', in Barbra Daly Metcalf (ed.), Moral Conduct and Authority - the Place of Adab in South Asian Islam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p.141.
36. *al-Hajj*: 41, Arberry, A.J., *op.cit.*, p.338.
37. Arnold, T.W., The Preaching of Islam (London: Constable and Company Ltd., 1913), pp.254-293.

38. A spate of literature on *ṣūfī* orders is available in Persian and Urdu. Among innumerable hagiographies, covering all the well-established orders, Shaykh 'Abdul Haq's '*Akhhār-ul-Akhyār*' (Delhi: *Maṭba'ī-Mujtabā'ī*, 1891) is an outstanding work on the earlier *ṣūfīs*. In the recent past, Muftī Ghulām Sarwar Lāhorī compiled a fairly comprehensive six volume hagiography entitled - *Khazīnt-ul-Aṣfiyā'* (Lucknow: *Maṭba' Nawelkishor*, n.d.); at the same time, his one volume hagiography *Hadīqat-ul-Awliyā'* [Muḥammad Iqbāl Mujaddidī (ed.) (Lahore: Islamic Book Foundation, 1974)] is a short account of the *ṣūfī* orders in South Asia.
39. Barnī, Ziyā-ud-dīn, '*Tarīkh-i-Feroz Shāhī*', abridged translation in Elliott, H.M. and Dowson, John (eds.), *History of India as told by its own historians* (London: Trubner and Co., 1871), Vol.III, p.144.
40. Kirmānī, Sayyid Muḥammad B. Mubārak, *Siyar-ul-Awliyā'* (Islamabad: Iran Pakistan Institute of Persian Studies, 1978), p.85.
41. *Ibid.*, pp.124-125, p.145.
42. Amīr Khusrow (1253-1325) was a glaring exception. He remained attached to the courts of three consecutive ruling houses - the Slaves, the Khaljis and the Tughlaqs. At the same time, he was one of the prominent disciples of Niẓām-ud-dīn Awliyā'. For information on his life and literary contribution, see Mirza, Dr. Wahid, *The Life and Works of Amir Khusrau* (Lahore: Punjab University Press, 1962).
43. Nizamī, Khaliq Ahmad, *Some Aspects of Religion*, *op.cit.*, p.242.
44. Jamālī, Hāmid B. Fazlullah, *Siyar-ul-Ārifīn*, Muḥammad Ayūb Qādirī (trans.) (Lahore: *Markazī Urdu Board*, 1976); Zaydī, Shamīm, *Ahwāl-w-Āsār Bahā'ud-dīn-Zakariyyā* (Rawalpindi: Iran Pakistan Institute of Persian Studies, 1974), pp.21-52.
45. Kirmānī, *op.cit.*, p.141.
46. *Ibid.*, p.168.
47. Nadwī, S. Abul Ḥasan, *Muslims in India*, Muhammad Asif Qidwai (trans.) (Lucknow: Academy of Islamic Research and Publications, 1960), pp.84-85.
48. Griffin, Sir Lapel H., *The Punjab Chiefs: Historical and Biographical Notes* (Lahore: Chronicle Press, 1865). This official account gives the nature of the colonial government's relations with the 'chiefs', including the hereditary *pīrs*.
49. Government of Pakistan, Federal Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Pocket Book of Pakistan, 1985*, (Karachi: Federal Bureau of Statistics, 1985), p.1.

50. Paxton, John (ed.), The Statesman's Year Book, 1988-89 (London: Macmillan, 1988), p.964.
51. Abbot, Freeland, Islam and Pakistan (New York: Cornell University Press, 1968), p.42.
52. Farmer, B.H., An Introduction to South Asia (London: Methuen and Co., 1983), p.105.
53. According to the 1921 census, the total Muslim population of India was 71 million of which the *Shi'ahs* were .073 million. They were only 1.02 per cent of the Muslim population. At the time of partition (1947), an influx of Muslims to Pakistan took place. If it is assumed that the whole of the *Shi'ah* population migrated to Pakistan and its growth rate has since remained equal to the overall growth rate, the following figures would represent the different total figures for the Muslim population in South Asia:
- | | |
|----------------------------------|----------------------|
| Muslim Population in India: | 61.40 million (1971) |
| Muslim Population in Pakistan: | 63.28 million (1972) |
| Muslim Population in Bangladesh: | 69.70 million (1981) |
- [Source: The Statesman's Year Book, 1985-86 (London: Macmillan, 1985)]
- | | |
|-----------------------------|---|
| Total Muslim Population: | 194.38 million |
| Shi'ah Population, being @ | |
| 1.02 per cent of the total: | 1.98 million (i.e.,
3.13% of the Muslim
population of Pakistan) |
54. Enayat, Hamid, Modern Islamic Political Thought (London: Macmillan, 1982), p.4.
55. See note 19 above.
56. Shahrastani, Muhammad B. Abdul Karim, Muslim Sects and Divisions: The section on Muslim sects in Kitab al-Milal wal Nihal, A.K. Kazi and J.G. Flynn (trans.) (London: Kegan Paul International, 1984), p.125.
57. Engineer, Asghar Ali, The Bohras (Ghaziabad: Vikas Publishing House, 1980), p.8.
58. The day of Husayn's martyrdom, 10 *Muharram*, is observed as a day of mourning among the *Shi'ahs*.
59. *Zaydiyyah* is the most moderate sub-sect of the *Shi'ahs* and nearest to the *Sunnīs* in its approach of *Imamah*. Zayd, the founder of the sub-sect is credited with the view that even though 'Alī was *afzal* (the most worthy) to succeed the Prophet, the *mafzūl* (outworthied) Abū Bakr, who in fact succeeded the Prophet, should be accepted as such because the allegiance of the public made the succession valid. So the *Zaydiyyah* in general regard the first two *Khalīfahs* as legitimate rulers, and take a

quite moderate view of the *Kilāfah* of 'Usmān. With such a theological approach, the *Zaydīs* hardly differ from the *Sunnīs*' creed, showing reverence to the first four *Khalīfahs*. They are thus sharply marked off from other sub-sects of *Shīāhs*.

Zaydīs today are concentrated in North and South Yemen. They offer their congregational prayers with co-habitant *Shāfīs*, in the same mosques, under a common *imām*. There seems to be virtually no conflict between the jurisprudence of the *Zaydīs* and of the *Shāfīs*. Serjeant, R.B., 'The *Zaydīs*' in A.J. Arberry (ed.), Religion in the Middle East (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), Vol. II, pp.285-301.

60. Lewis, Bernard, The Assassins: A Radical Sect in Islam (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967), p.31.
61. Clarke, Peter B., 'The *Ismaili* Sect in London: Religious Institutions and Social Change', Religion 8 (1978): 1, p.72.
62. Engineer, Asghar Ali, *op.cit.*, p.145.
63. Papanek, G.F., Pakistan's Development: Social Goals and Private Incentives (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1970), p.42.
64. *Ibid.*, p.42.
65. Quoted in Sābiq, Sayyid, Fiqh-us-Sunnah (Beirut: *Dār-ul-Fikr*, 1983), Vol. III, p.317.
66. For a detailed study of some of the outstanding texts on jurisprudence produced in South Asia, see Bhattī, Muhammad Ishāq, Barr-i-Saghīr Pak-w-Hind Men 'Ilm-i-Fiqh (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1973).
67. Burhānpurī, Shaykh Farīd, 'Fatāwā Bāburī', Ma'ārif 66 (July 1950): 1, pp.49-57.
68. Kirmānī, *op.cit.*, pp.541-542.
69. For his life and contribution, see Shāhjahānpurī, Piyām, Hayāt-i-Shāh Ismā'īl Shahīd (Lahore: *Idārah-i-Tarīgh-w-Taḥqīq*, 1973).
70. There are, undoubtedly, similarities between the *Jihād* movement (of India) and the *Wahhābī* movement, since both were based on the *Qurān* and the *Sunnah* of the Prophet. But, historically, there was no link between the leaders of the two movements. The leaders of the *Jihād* movement visited Makkah to perform *hajj* in 1822, when the city was completely under the sway of the Ottomans. There was no chance that the leaders of the *Jihād* movement could have established contact with the *Wahhābī* elders.

There is a glaring ideological difference between the two movements. The *Wahhābīs* completely eliminated the

taṣawwuf and philosophy from the intellectual life of their adherents. The leaders of the *Jihād* movement, by contrast, held the *taṣawwuf* in high esteem. Shāh Ismā'īl wrote on the subject, whilst Sayyid Aḥmad was himself the originator of a new *ṣūfī* order, the *Muḥammadiyyah*.

On the question of adherence to a juristic school of thought also, the two movements differed. The *Wahhābīs* of Arabia were and are the followers of *Ḥanbalī* school of thought; whilst reformers such as Shāh Ismā'īl did not attach themselves to any specific juristic school of thought.

It is interesting that Shāh Ismā'īl had access to Muḥammad B. 'Abdul Wahhāb's best known work, *Kitāb-ut-Tawhīd*. There are several paragraphs in Shāh Ismā'īl's *Taqwiyat-ul-Īmān* which are mere Urdu renderings of the Arabic text of *Kitāb-ut-Tawhīd*.

71. Hunter, W.W., *The Indian Musalmans* (London: Trübner and Company, 1871).
72. For the history and contribution of the *Dār-ul-'ulūm* Deoband, see: Raẓwī, Sayyid Maḥbūb, '*Tārīkh-i-Dār-ul-'ulūm Deoband*', *al-Rashīd*, 8 (March-April 1980): 4-5, pp.1-320; Faruqi, Ziya-ul-Hasan, *The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan* (Lahore: Progressive Books, n.d.); Metcalf, Barbra Daly, *Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband 1860-1900* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982).
73. Metcalf, *op.cit.*, p.126.
74. See Zakariyyā, Muḥammad, *Tārīkh-i-Mazāhar* (Saharanpur: *Kutub-khanah-i-Ishā'at-ul-'ulūm*, 1972).
75. 'Alī, Raḥmān, *Tazkirah-i-'ulamā-yi-Hind*, Muḥammad Ayūb Qādirī (trans.) (Karachi: Pakistan Historical Society, 1961), pp.530-32.
76. An organisation of the 'ulamā', committed to reform the existing curriculum of the *madrasah* education. For a brief discussion of this, see pp.87-88 of this work.
77. al-Ḥasanī, Sayyid Muḥammad, *Sīrat-i-Sayyid Muḥammad 'Alī Mongīrī* (Lucknow: *Idārah-i-Nashriyāt-i-Islām*, 1964), p.173.
78. Khān, Aḥmad Raẓā, '*al-Mustand-ul-Mu'tamad*' [being an appendix to the *al-Mu'taqid-ul-Muntaqid* written by Faẓl-i-Rasūl Badāyūnī] (Istanbul: *Maktabah-i-Aeshayq*, 1975).
79. Qādirī, Ḥashmat 'Alī, *Sawārim-ul-Hindiyyah* (Sahiwal: *Maktabah-i-Farīdiyyah*, n.d.), first published in 1917.
80. Sahāranpurī, Khalīl Aḥmad, *al-Muḥannad 'al-al-Mufannad* (Lahore: *Idārah-i-Islamiyāt*, 1984).

81. See Nadwī, Sayyid Abul Hasan 'Alī, Hazrat Mawlānā Muḥammad Ilyās Awr Un Kī Dīnī Da'wat (Delhi: Idārah-i-Ishāat-i-Diniyāt, n.d.); Haq, M.M. Anwarul, The Faith Movement of Mawlana Muhammad Ilyas (London: Allen and Unwin, 1972).
82. See Farangi Mahalli, Muhammad Raza, Bānī-yi-Dars-i-Nizāmī (Lucknow: Nāmī Press, 1973).
83. Abul Ḥasanat Nadwī traced a gradual development of the curriculum in South Asia, taking the Dars-i-Nizāmī as the culminating point. Nadwi, Abul Hasanat, Hinostān Kī Qadīm Islāmī Darsgāheṅ, (Lahore: Maktabah-i-Khāwar, 1979). pp.70-91.
84. Author's translation. Kandhlawī, Muḥammad Idrīs, Mas'lah-i-Ta'līm (Lahore: Maktabah-i-Uṣmāniyyah, n.d.), p.26.
85. Government of Pakistan, Report Qawmī Committee barā-yi-Dīnī Madāris-i-Pakistan (Islamabad: Ministry of Religious Affairs, 1979).
86. Ludhiyānwī, Muḥammad Yūsuf, Qawmī Committee Kī Report par Tabṣirah, Bayyēnāt, 47 (May 1985):1, pp.8-34.
87. Ahmad, Hāfiz Nāzar, Jā'izah Madāris-i-Ārabiyyah Maḡribī Pakistan (2) (Lahore: Muslim Academy, 1972), p.689.

CHAPTER 2

THE INDIAN STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM: 1803-1947

In order to understand the political role of the 'ulamā' in Pakistan, it is essential to study the nature and characteristics of their participation in politics during the period of struggle for freedom. The 'ulamā's role during that period continues to be a source of inspiration to succeeding generations. At the same time, the roots of the divisions among the 'ulamā' stretch back to the 19th century.

2.1 The 'Ulamā's Response to East India Company Rule

With the death of Awrangzeb (d.1707), the Mughal Empire rapidly disintegrated into petty autonomous regions. Political forces emerging on the periphery of the Mughal Kingdom (e.g., the militant *Marathas*, *Jāts* and *Sikhs*) turned into serious threats to the decadent Mughal rule. Apart from these politicised groups, the East India Company (EIC), already increasingly implicated in Bengal's affairs and exercising control over the administration, matured into a political power. It is worth noting that Muslim intellectuals did not grasp the situation and took no notice of the Company's increasing involvement during the early stages of its penetration. A leading intellectual of the time, Shāh Waliullāh considered the *Marathas* as the strongest threat to Muslim rule. In view of that he invited Ahmad Shāh Durrānī (1747-1773), the ruler of Afghanistan, to invade India in order to crush the emerging power of the *Marathas*.¹ Durrānī attacked India and defeated *Marathas* (the Third Battle of Panipat: 1761). But the Mughal

rulers had by then become too enfeebled to consolidate their position after Durrānī's success. The resulting political vacuum was filled by EIC.

By the end of the 18th century, the collapse of the Mughal rule was almost complete. All the Hindu Rājās had become independent and Shāh Ālam II (d.1806), the Mughal ruler, was a pensioner of the *Marathas*. The Sikhs were the rulers of the Punjab. EIC, with the consolidation of its power in Bengal, moved to expand its territories, and the *Marāthas* were successfully driven out from Delhi (1803). EIC let the name and shadow of Shāh Ālam, the Mughal ruler, continue in existence, but assumed *de facto* control of the Mughal state from 1803 onwards.

Control of EIC over political power made Shāh Ābdul Azīz² (1746-1824) issue a *fatwā*, declaring India *dār-ul-ḥarb*, a territory of war.³ Most of the followers of Shāh Ābdul Azīz sought in the *fatwā* a source of legitimacy for *jihād*⁴ against the usurpers with a view to re-establishing Muslim rule, albeit Shāh Ābdul Azīz himself gave no call to military action, or to emigration from the territories under EIC's occupation. He wanted the Muslims to recognise that the political power of the state was no longer in the hands of the Muslim rulers. He did not suggest abandoning the congregational prayers on Friday and *Īds* which were, under the classical juristic interpretation, not obligatory in *dār-ul-ḥarb*. He allowed his co-religionists to learn the English language and to take employment under EIC so long as they did not, thereby, commit '*ma'siyat-i-kubrā*' (grave disobedience), by fighting against their Muslim brethren.

The subsequent religious-political movements, initiated by Hājī Shari'atullāh (1781-1840) and Sayyid Aḥmad Barelwī (1782-1831) upheld the view that India was *dār-ul-harb*. The movement of Hājī Shari'atullāh, started in (*circa.*) 1820, is popularly known as the *Farā'izī* movement,⁵ because of its emphasis on the observance of the obligatory religious functions - *farā'iz* (plural of *fariḏah*). The *Farā'izī* leaders instructed their followers not to observe public prayers on Fridays and 'īds since these prayers ceased to be obligatory due to the disappearance of Muslim rule. In spite of this clear stand, the *Farā'izīs* did not resort to armed struggle and were busy reviving the pristine purity of Islam among the Muslims of Bengal. Haji Shari'atullāh was succeeded by his son Muḥsin-ud-dīn Aḥmad alias Dūdū Miyaṅ (1819-1862), who organised his followers into a well-knit and powerful organisation. From 1838 onwards, the *Farā'izī* leaders came into conflict with the Hindu *zamīndārs* and European indigo planters in an attempt to uphold the rights of the *Farā'izī* peasants.

The movement started by Sayyid Aḥmad in the early 1820s, known as the *Jihād* movement, explicitly regarded India as *dār-ul-ḥarb*.⁶ His armed struggle was initially directed against the Sikhs in the Punjab which he intended to extend to EIC. With the death of Sayyid Aḥmad Barelwī in 1831 while fighting against the Sikh forces, the first phase of the movement was brought to a close. It subsequently went underground in territories under EIC control. The remnants of the movement continued guerrilla warfare on the north west frontier for a long time afterwards.⁷ Mīr Niṣār 'Alī alias Tītū Mīr (1782-1831), a disciple of Sayyid Aḥmad, devoted himself to the *Jihād* movement in Bengal.

The 1857 Insurrection⁸ was the last military effort to get rid of the EIC's rule. It was not solely based on a religious call but, undoubtedly, religion was a strong factor which aggravated the situation. The 'ulamā' adopted the stance that opposition to EIC's rule was a matter of religious duty to be performed without regard to any other interest. Mawlānā Aḥmadullāh Shāh Madrāsī (1817-1858), 'the *maulvie* of Fyzabad'⁹ was the leading figure in the Insurrection, who 'fought manfully, honestly, [and] stubbornly in the field against the strangers'¹⁰ who had forcibly taken possession of his country. The 'ulamā' provided a political basis and a philosophy for the Insurrection by issuing *fatwās* which were then in circulation.¹¹ The *Shiāhs*, led by Ḥaẓrat Maḥal joined the *Sunnī* 'ulamā' in a declaration of *jihād*¹² against EIC's rule. Ḥājī Imdādullāh (1817-1899) organised *jihād* in the district headquarters of Shamli. The *mujāhid* forces were commanded by Ḥāfiẓ Zamin 'Alī who had the support of Mawlānā Muḥammad Qāsīm Nānawtawī and Mawlānā Rashīd Aḥmad Gangohī.¹³ Similarly, other centres of the Insurrection also received support from the 'ulamā': Raḥmatullāh (Kairanah), Mawlānā 'Abdul Jalīl (Aligarh), Mawlānā Liyāqat 'Alī (Allahabad), Muftī 'Ināyat 'Alī (Kakori), Kifāyat 'Alī Kāfī (Moradabad) and many others in Delhi gave active support to the leaders of the Insurrection.¹⁴

The 1857 Insurrection failed. The last nominal Mughal emperor was dethroned, and that was the end of even nominal political control of India by Muslims. The Muslim community was accused for its role in the Insurrection in an exaggerated manner. It was characterised as having been 'more aggressive and militant, possessing memories of recent rule in India and therefore more dangerous'.¹⁵

The effects of the Insurrection and its suppression were registered in a strong manner in the ruling circles in Britain. British policy-makers decided to place India directly under the Crown in November 1858. Thenceforward, a Viceroy with an Executive Council was entrusted with the task of administering the country.

2.2 The Introduction of English Education

The most effective instrument shaping politics after 1857 was the system of education introduced by the colonial power. The attitude of the Hindu and Muslim communities (and different sections within each) towards English education differed. The diversity of their attitudes and the inequalities between them of their ability to benefit from English education led to sharp conflicts.

During the period when EIC consolidated its power, the Christian missionaries played a major role in introducing English education. They thought that it would provide an effective means of evangelisation. The Danish Lutheran missionaries established two schools in Madras as early as 1717. The activities of William Carey (1761-1834) of the Baptist Missionary Society have been the subject of a number of academic studies.¹⁶ But, in spite of the encouragement given them by the administration, the success of the missionaries was never very great, as the local population was not eager to acquire English education at the expense of its own religion. The Muslims, especially, were apprehensive and the activities of these missionaries were widely believed to be among the causes of the 1857 Insurrection.¹⁷

Unlike the missionaries, EIC had been engaged in fostering education in the classical languages of Oriental learning, i.e. Arabic, Persian and Sanskrit. From 1823 onwards, the grant for the enhancement of learning was administered by a Committee of Public Instruction, and the issue concerning the appropriate system of education for India was brought under examination. In the beginning, the supporters of classical learning had their way. The situation changed when the advocates of English education gained ascendancy. They held that English education 'would make the Indian people gladly accept the British rule'.¹⁸ Thomas Babington Macaulay (1800-1859) was an ardent protagonist of English education and had pleaded in the House of Commons before he came to India as Law member in 1834. He was responsible for shaping the education policy in his capacity as President of the Committee of Public Instruction in 1835.

We must at present do our best to form a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern; a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals and in intellect.¹⁹

Subsequently, British educational policy was directed towards promoting western literature and values among the natives of India. This decision was prompted by political, administrative and economic compulsions. The educational institutions in India produced clerks and subordinate officials who cost much less than their English counterparts.

In addition to the efforts of Christian Missions and EIC, the Hindu reformers were also eager to promote English education. The *Vidyāla* or Hindu College of Calcutta (established in 1816) and

Elphinstone College, Bombay (established in 1827) were among the institutions founded by Hindu reformers.

While the Hindu upper class wholeheartedly devoted itself to English education, the Muslims, on the whole, did not avail themselves of the opportunity, because of their historical memory as rulers of India.

Table 2.1 shows the number of students in 1845 in educational institutions maintained at public cost.

Muslim students constituted only 23.2 per cent of the total in North Western Provinces and Oudh, whilst the Muslim population was over 30 per cent. In Bengal and Bihar, they constituted only 12.9 per cent, far below their ratio of the total population. In Bombay, Muslim students constituted only 2.7 per cent of the total strength.

2.3 Hindu Response to Western Liberalism

Hindu intellectuals responded to English education and western liberal ideas broadly along three different lines.

The first response of a section of the Hindu élite consisted of an outright rejection of those rites and customs of Hindu society, which did not conform to Western doctrines. The outstanding figure representing such an attitude was Rājā Rām Mohan Roy (1774-1833). He was born in a High *Brahman* (*Kulin*) family and started his career in the service of EIC where he attained the status of *sarrishtahdār* to the Collector of Rangpur (Bengal). He

Table 2.1

The Number of Students in Educational Institutions by Religion
Maintained at Public Cost in 1845

Presidency	Number of Students by Religious Affiliation				
	Christian	Hindu	Muslim	Others	Total
North-Western Provinces & Oudh	82	1,597	507	-	2,186
Lower Provinces (Bengal & Bihar)	154	4,186	907	1,789	7,036
Bombay	-	7,916	222	-	8,138
	236	13,699	1,636	1,789	17,360

[Source: B.B. Misra, The Indian Middle Classes (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1978), p.409]

retired when he was still young (1814) and settled down in Calcutta. In the same year he started an association known as '*Ātmiyā Sabhā*' which was critical of popular Hinduism, and stressed the necessity of discarding customs contrary to the teachings contained in the *Upanishads*.

In 1828, this organisation was re-christened '*Brahmo Sabhā*', and adopted a congregational form of worship with hymns, prayers and scripture readings. The *Brahmo Sabhā* observed none of the practices of popular Hinduism (e.g., idol worship, *Brahman* priesthood, the caste system and the widow burning or *satī*). Roy was foremost among the protagonists of English education. With Dwara Kanath Tagore (1794-1846), his principal associate, Rām Mohan Roy played a major part in launching the Hindu College at Calcutta. The medium of instruction in the College was English and several members of the Tagore family were among the original pupils of the College. Rām Mohan Roy believed English education to be the main instrument for reform.

The *Brahmo Sabhā* continued to function after the death of its founder. In 1843, Debendranath Tagore (1818-1905) renamed it as *Brahmo Samāj*. His leadership was, however, challenged by Keshab Chunder Sen (1838-1884), a more westernised Bengali *Brahman*. A split in the *Samaj* in 1878 was followed by its decline.

The *Brahmo Samāj*, reformist in character, was never a popular movement. It embraced middle-class Bengali families. *Brahmo* Samajists were keen on English Education.

...almost all the pioneers of the next generation, whether in besieging the British

stronghold of the Covenanted Service, or in political agitation, journalism, or the law were, if not Christians, *Brahmo Samajists*.²⁰

A similar movement known as the *Prarthanā Samaj* (society for prayer), took root in Bombay, under the guidance of Dr. Atmaram Pandurang (1823-1898), its founder, and M.G. Ranade (1842-1901). The movement was so close to *Brahmo Samāj* in its programme of religious and social reforms that there was a move to name it the *Bombay Brahmo Samāj*.²¹

The second general response to English education consisted, not of trimming popular Hinduism in accordance with Western ideas, but rather to transform it from a passive way of life into an assertive and aggressive missionary religion. A revivalist movement was thus given practical shape by Dayananda Saraswatī (1824-1883), a Gujarātī *Brahman*. He founded the *Āryā Samāj* (society of the Aryans) in 1875 in Bombay. Its main aim was to revive Hinduism as embodied in the four *Vedas*. In *Satyārth Prakāsh*,²² his major work, Saraswatī vehemently attacked Islam and Christianity on the one hand, and Hindu orthodoxy on the other.

Āryā Samāj branches were established in different parts of the country, but its main stronghold was the Punjab where the Hindu community had been less caste-ridden and more open-minded due to its co-existence with a number of other socio-religious groups.

The *Āryā Samāj* creed included many of the tenets of *Brahmo Samāj*. Like the latter, it condemned idol worship and *Brahman* priesthood. The re-marriage of widows was commended and people of other religions were admitted into the fold of the *Samāj*.

The *Āryā Samāj*, in its devotion to English education, 'rivalled the Christian missionaries in the number of [its] schools'.²³

A third response to English education opposed both the reformers and revivalists and favoured the *status quo*. *Dharmā Sabhā* was founded (1830) in Bengal with such an aim of countering the activities of *Brahmo Sabhā*. *Hindū Dharmā Vyayasthapakā Mandalī* emerged in the 1860s in Bombay and the *Sanātanā Dharmā Sabhā* was organised in the Punjab with the aim of opposing the doctrines of the *Āryā Samāj*. The Theosophical Society, founded in Madras, pleaded for the preservation and fostering of Hinduism in its many varieties and forms.

In addition to the aforementioned three positions of *Brahmo Samāj*, *Āryā Samāj* and the Orthodox/Conservatives, Sri Ramakrishna (1836-1886) was a particularly notable personality. He was a mystic. Like Dayānandā Sarswatī he personified the rebirth of the Vedic age in the midst of increasing Westernisation; but, in contrast to *Āryā Samāj's* aggressive stand, he preached a faith of selfless devotion to God and ultimate absorption in Him. His thoughts were propagated with greater clarity and in the English language by Narendrānath Dattā (1863-1902) (known as Swāmī Vivekānandā), 'an intellectual of very high calibre'.²⁴ Apart from the exposition of *Vedantā*, he inspired his co-religionists to be proud of their indigenous culture and way of life. He wanted to protect the Hindu community from the materialist influences of Western civilisation and believed that 'the Hindu race with [its] spirituality',²⁵ could conquer the whole world morally.

These socio-religious movements, along with some other smaller organisations, successfully aroused a feeling, especially among the middle classes, of belonging to a large Hindu community with a pride in its rich past. Despite their diversities, all these movements laid stress on English education, and produced three different sets of political leadership - moderates, extremists and the conservatives respectively.

2.4 Muslim Response to Western Liberalism

The initial response of the Muslims to Western doctrines, as indeed of the British domination which preceded them, was one of total rejection. Their resistance to British domination was reflected in the movements initiated by Sayyid Ahmad Barelwī and Ḥājī Shāriatullāh. They believed that the only way open to the Muslims to stem the tide of deterioration was to revive the Islamic faith in its pristine form. The leaders of Muslim revivalist movements were, by and large, the 'ulamā', who deeply resented British domination. The 'ulamā' had to suffer a great deal during and after the failure of the 1857 Insurrection. A large number of them were killed during the suppression of the Insurrection. A large number of them were arrested and deported to the Andaman islands. A few of them (e.g., Ḥājī Imdādullāh and Raḥmatullāh Kerānwī), emigrated to Makkah. Those who were fortunate enough not to be arrested carried on their activities in the educational field. The 'ulamā's attitude, just after the suppression of the 1857 Insurrection may be summed up as follows:

1. The 'new' rulers were too strong to be physically defeated by any insurrection.

2. The Christian missionaries were preaching Christianity as a world religion, with the aim of proselytising Indians.
3. The new rulers were propagating Western doctrines through education and the press.
4. Islam and its cultural traditions were in danger.

The Muslim community must therefore be protected from the Western doctrines and culture.

This analysis of the situation culminated in the movement of *Dār-ul-ʿulūm Deoband*. It was started with the foundation of a *madrasah* (later known as the *Dār-ul-ʿulūm*) at Deoband.²⁶

Dār-ul-ʿulūm adopted the *Dars-i-Nizāmī*, a medieval system of education. Its main aim was to provide religious guidance and leadership to the Muslim community. *Dār-ul-ʿulūm* propagated the faith without coming under the influence of Western doctrines. It attracted students from far and near, and its *fāzils* (graduates) functioned as teachers, *imāms* and *khaṭībs* throughout the country. The Deoband movement also made use of the powerful media of the press. Its periodicals and the publications of the *ulama* affiliated to the movement reached a farflung readership. The credibility of the movement can be gauged from the number and range of enquiries received by *Dār-ul-ʿulūm* from different parts of the country, looking for the *ʿulamā's* guidance on various matters of a socio-religious nature.

In 1310 A.H./1892-93, when the burden of dealing with such questions had increased by leaps and bounds, a separate *dār-ul-iftā'* was established. For nearly two decades from its founding, *dār-ul-iftā'* kept no record of the *fatwās* that were issued. During the period 1912-1974, a total of 4,15,857 *fatwās* were issued,²⁷ (amounting to a daily average of 18 responses to queries). At one point *al-Muftī*, a monthly journal, was published with the aim of giving a wider circulation to the *fatwās*. The *muftīs* of the *Dār-ul-ʿulūm* were strict adherents to the *Ḥanafī* school of thought. They rejected any deviation from the classics of the *Ḥanafī fiqh*.

Dār-ul-ʿulūm set an example of humble living and devotion to the learning of Islamics. Muhammad Qāsim Nānawtawī, the first *sarparast* of *Dār-ul-ʿulūm*, believed that the progress of *Dār-ul-ʿulūm* should be measured in terms of its poverty. He laid stress on financial deprivation while drafting the basic principles on which the institution was to run.

So long as the *Madrasah* does not have any regular and definite source of income, it will continue to exist - *InshāʿAllāh* provided there is an honest reliance on and faith in His mercy and compassion; and when it comes to possess a definite source of income, e.g., some substantial property in the form of land or factory or a promise of permanent donation from some rich person of honest intentions, then it appears the *Madrasah* will be divested of the feelings of fear and hope - a perennial source of submission to the will of *Allāh* - and, with this, will be deprived of the 'hidden' source of unfailing assistance; and its workers will start quarrelling amongst themselves. Therefore, in matters of income and constructions there should always remain a certain lack of certainty of means.

The participation of government and rich persons is also harmful.

The donations of persons who want to remain unknown, I believe, is a source of *barakah*. Their sincerity seems a more permanent means of income.²⁸

This axiomatic declaration prevented *Deobandī* elders from establishing contacts with neither the vested interests nor the government administration. A network of public donors, who had no expectation of achieving personal fame by making munificent contributions, thus came into existence. According to the annual report of 1289 A.H./1872, the largest monthly donation promised was to a value of 'eight rupees and five annas' by an anonymous giver.²⁹

The colonial government did not recognise the certificate of the *Dār-ul-ʿulūm*; no-one with this certificate could hope to enter government service; even though the *Dār-ul-ʿulūm* curriculum was far more advanced than the syllabus prescribed for such examinations in oriental languages as *Munshī Fāzil* and *Mawlawī Fāzil*. It was much easier for the *fāzils* of Deoband to pass examinations in the oriental languages in order to secure teaching posts in government schools. The *Dār-ul-ʿulūm* teachers discouraged such an instrumental attitude on the part of students. They likened their craze for teaching jobs in government schools after receiving a good religious education to using their precious shawls to clean shoes.³⁰

The Muslim middle classes, stripped of their privileges, were ready to co-operate with the British rulers, and to welcome English education. In this respect, the *Deobandī ʿulamāʾ*, who were essentially contra-colonialist, were radically different. A large section of the Muslim middle classes secured employment under EIC

before to the 1857 Insurrection. Realising that the decadent Mughal monarchy was a sinking ship, they looked to their future under EIC. During the Insurrection, they remained loyal to EIC. Sayyid Aḥmad Khān (1817-1898) was the most outstanding representative of this section of the Muslim intelligentsia.

Sayyid Aḥmad Khān was born in an aristocratic family which had long been linked to the Mughal court. He was brought up by Farīd-ud-dīn, his maternal grandfather who was a minister under the Mughal emperor. Sayyid Aḥmad Khān joined EIC's service as a minor officer in a court of *ṣadr-i-amīn* from which he rapidly rose to the position of a judge. His loyalty never wavered during the 1857 Insurrection. He saved many British lives despite threats from Muslim freedom fighters. He persuaded some of the local chieftains to give up their support for the Insurrection. As a mark of recognition of his services, he was awarded, among other honours, a Knighthood.

Not only did Sayyid Aḥmad Khān give his wholehearted co-operation to the 'new' rulers, he also accepted their ideas in the religious sphere. He initiated a movement whose aim was to interpret Islamic teachings in the light of Western ideas. He developed the basic notion that between the word of God (the *Qurān*) and the work of God (nature) there can be no contradiction. He advocated that the *Qurān* should be so interpreted as to be in conformity with the rules of nature. He thus neglected the *ḥadīṡ* literature which did not permit the liberal interpretation of the *Qurān*. He doubted the concept of revelation through *Jibrīl*. He did not believe the accounts of the miracles of the Prophets contained in the *Qurān* and *ḥadīṡ* literature on the grounds that they were in

contradiction with the laws of nature. The concept of *jihād* was totally transformed by Sayyid Aḥmad Khān into a defensive war. The existence of *malā'ikah* (angels) as distinct creatures, endowed with sense perception, was dismissed. Sayyid Aḥmad Khān developed a school of thought commonly known as 'Islamic modernism'.³¹

His ideas were bitterly criticised by the 'ulamā' and his followers were referred to as '*necharīs*' because they gave importance to the role of 'nature' in their interpretation of the *Qurān*.

2.5 Sayyid Aḥmad Khān and Aligarh College

In the aftermath of the 1857 Insurrection, British hostility towards the Muslim community was so intense that even the loyalty of Sayyid Aḥmad Khān and his followers could not staunch it. It was further strengthened upon the disclosure of the existence of a network of conspiracies against the government. A series of trials against the so-called *Wahhābīs* was started, commencing with the Ambala Trial (1864) and leading to the Patna Trial (1865), the Malda Trial (September 1870), the Rajmahal Trial (October 1870), and yet another trial (1871).³²

In addition to his official engagements, Sayyid Aḥmad Khān devoted his energies to the spread of English education among the Muslim community. He retired in 1876 and permanently settled down in Aligarh. He was subsequently appointed as a member of the Governor-General's Legislative Council (1878-1883). His career after retirement was aimed at fulfilling two broad purposes:

- 1) the development of cordial relations between the Muslim community and the British government;
- 2) the spread of English education among the Muslim community.

In order to achieve the first end he worked on two fronts. He used the power of his pen [in his writings such as The Loyal Mohammadans of India (1860) and A Rejoinder to W. W. Hunter's 'The Indian Musalmans' (1871)] to defend the Muslims against charges of disloyalty to the colonial government.

He deployed his theological skill and logic in the task of persuading Muslims that it was in their interest to cultivate good relations with the British rulers. Citing Quranic injunctions in Risālah-Ahkām-i-Ta'ām-i-Ahl-i-Kitāb' (1868), he argued that there was no religious reason why Muslims should not dine with the Christian British, provided that there was no food on the table forbidden under Islamic rules. He also argued that meals prepared by Christians were permissible for Muslims to eat, irrespective of the method adopted for the slaughter of the meat-giving animal.

He planned to write a commentary on the Bible with a view to demonstrating that there was no disagreement between the teachings of the *Qurān* and the Bible. He did not complete this project. Only a part of the work, Tabyīn-ul-Kalām, was published.

The Mohammadan Anglo-Oriental High School (established in 1875) was upgraded to the status of a College in 1877. Its foundation stone was laid by Rt. Hon. Lord Lytton, the Viceroy. All members of staff were British. The Muslim youth were expected

to make the best use of their presence and to learn their etiquette, manners and mode of thought.

2.6 The 'Ulamā' on the Learning of the English Language

There is a widely held belief that the 'ulamā' were opposed to Sayyid Aḥmad Khān's policy of introducing English language education at Aligarh College. In fact, however, the 'ulamā' had ruled that there was no harm in learning any language. Shāh 'Abdul Azīz made such a ruling during the early 19th century. 'Adbur Raḥīm Dahri³³ (1785-1850), one of his students, emphasised the need for the acquisition of Western learning. He spent the last days of his life teaching English at Fort William College Calcutta. He strongly advocated English in a booklet entitled 'Arzdāsht Dar bārah-i-Zarūrat-i-Tarwīj-i-Zubān-i-Angrezī-u-'Ulūm-i-Farang (An appeal for the study and dissemination of English language and the Western Learning).

Nawāb 'Abdul Latīf (1828-1893) founded the Muhammadan Literary Society in Calcutta (April 1863). Its aim was to disseminate English language and the Western learning.³⁴ Mawlawī Karāmat 'Alī Jawnpurī (d.1873), affiliated with the 'Society' throughout the greater part of his life, implored the Muslims to acquire a knowledge of the English language as well as modern science. Mawlānā 'Abdul Hay Frangī Maḥallī³⁵ (1848-1886) and Rashīd Aḥmad Gangshī,³⁶ the 'ulamā' among Sayyid Aḥmad Khān's contemporaries, held a similar view. The 'ulamā's objection was not to the Muslims learning the English language, but to the cultural impact of Britain on the Muslim people. The wording of the fatwās is explicit on this essential distinction which the 'ulamā' made

between learning the English language and learning the Western ways.

Those 'ulamā' who condemned Sayyid Aḥmad Khān's educational ventures were under the impression that he was using them to propagate his own views which were contrary to their understanding of the *Qurān* and the *Sunnah*. Sayyid Aḥmad Khān tried to placate the 'ulamā' by, for example, appointing Mawlānā 'Abdullāh Anṣārī, the son-in-law of Mawlānā Muḥammad Qāsīm Nānawtī (the rector of *Dār-ul-'ulūm* of Deoband) as head of the department of theology at Aligarh.

2.7 The Early Phase of Development of Indian Nationalism

With the adoption of English education 'a new integrated all-India class' came into existence. Its background was varied but it was linked together by nature of its 'knowledge, ideas and values'.³⁷ The language that this class shared was English. Members were inspired by the reformist movements and the problems that they reflected. They established organisations for the protection of their class interests. The 'Zamīndārī Association' (1837), Bengal British India society (1843) and the British Indian Association (1851)³⁸ represented the interests of Bengali landed aristocracy and the newly-emerging middle class in composition as in outlook.

The 'India League' (1875) and the Indian Association (1876) were organised with a view to reflecting the aspirations of middle-class Bengalis. The latter had branches in all major cities of northern India. It voiced the demand of the middle class for a

greater share of higher offices for Indians, and for handsome representation in public bodies. All the government posts with a salary of more than £800 per annum were reserved for the civil servants appointed in Britain. Although Indians were allowed to compete for these jobs, the upper age limit of 19 rendered it almost impossible for them to compete, especially because the examination was conducted in Britain.

The Indian Association campaigned for raising the age limit and for holding the examinations simultaneously in Britain and India.

The Indian Association,³⁹ was eventually overshadowed when the Indian National Congress was brought into existence.

2.8 The Indian National Congress (INC)

The Indian National Congress (INC) was founded on 27 December 1885 in a meeting held at Bombay. The meeting was convened on the initiative of a retired Scotsman, Allan Octavian Hume (1829-1912) with the full blessing of Lord Dufferin, the Governor-General.⁴⁰ Among the 72 delegates of the first meeting, presided over by a pioneer Christian Bengali barrister, W.C. Bonnerjee (1844-1906), more than half were principally from English-educated élites. The language adopted by INC was English.

Hume conceived INC as a 'safety valve for the escape of great and growing forces',⁴¹ resulting from English education and the general dissatisfaction of the educated classes with the

conditions prevailing in India. He defined the three main objectives of the organisation as follows:

1. the fusion into one national whole of all the different and till recently discordant elements that constitute the population of India;
2. the gradual regeneration along all lines, mental, moral, social and political, of the nation thus involved; and
3. the consolidation of the union between England and India, by securing the modification of such of its conditions as may be unjust and injurious to the latter country.⁴²

Like the Indian Association, its predecessor, INC too demanded that the competitive examination 'be held simultaneously, one in England and one in India', and 'the maximum age limit....be raised to not less than 23 years'. Among the main demands of INC were: 'expansion of the legislative councils by admission of a considerable proportion of elected members'; 'a complete separation of judicial and executive functions', 'reduction of army expenditure and commission for the Indians'.⁴³

INC in its early phase was dominated by *zamīndārs* and members of the legal profession.⁴⁴ It was committed to achieve its objects through resolutions, deputations and petitions to the Government of India and to the Parliament of Britain.

2.9 The Muslims and INC (1885-1888)

With the emergence of INC, the division on a theological basis between the two groups of the Muslim community - the '*ulamā'*

and the 'modernists' - came to be reflected in the political arena as well.

2.9.1 Sayyid Ahmad Khān versus INC

Sayyid Ahmad Khān believed that the Muslim community could advance only by remaining on good terms with the British and not by joining INC. In December 1886, the Aligarh Institute Gazette warned the Muslims not to take part in INC activities. Two important Muslim organisations of the time - the Central Mohammedan Association⁴⁵ and Mohammedan Literary Society - refused to send delegates to the second session of INC. Sayyid Ahmad publicly attacked INC in his speeches at Lucknow [28 December 1886] and Meerut [14 March 1888].⁴⁶ He made three main points: (a) that the Hindus and the Muslims were 'two nations'; (b) representative institutions were unsuited to Indian conditions as this system would end in the subjugation of the Muslims by the Hindus who enjoyed numerical superiority; and (c) the Muslims must depend on the British for the safeguarding of their interests.

In order to keep the Muslims away from 'the Bengalis in their mischievous political proposals' (referring to INC), Sayyid Ahmad founded the Mohammedan Educational Congress (December 1886, changed to Conference in 1890), and 'United Indian Patriotic Association' (UIPA) (August 1888) with the express aim of countering INC activities.

In view of the fact that Sayyid Ahmad Khān mounted a vigorous opposition to INC, special care was taken by INC leaders to stress its non-communal character. Badr-ud-dīn Tyabjī was

elected as President in 1887. The following year (1888), it was decided that no subject should be discussed by the subjects committee or by the President at any session, to which either the Hindu or the Muslim delegates objected unanimously or near unanimously. If after the discussion of any subject, either the Muslim or the Hindu delegates objected to a resolution on it in large enough numbers, it would be dropped.

The number of Muslim delegates in INC sessions during three decades from its inception to 1905 would suggest that the Muslims as a community were not very interested in it.⁴⁷ The majority of the Muslim delegates were usually from the city where the session was held. From all over the country, Muslim delegates who attended INC sessions fell into two major groups. The first was composed of the editors of newspapers and lawyers, who through professional ties or because of their interest in politics, joined INC. The second group belonged to the '*ulamā*' who were implacably opposed to Sayyid Aḥmad Khān's religious views.⁴⁸ Several booklets, pamphlets and posters were published by middle-class Muslims with the aim of keeping their co-religionists away from INC.⁴⁹ The virtual aloofness of the Muslims from INC was 'largely due to the influence of Sir Sayyid Aḥmad'.⁵⁰

2.9.2 The '*Ulamā*', INC and Sayyid Aḥmad Khān

The '*ulamā*' did not like Sayyid Aḥmad Khān's opposition to INC and pro-British stance. Mawlānā Muḥammad and his brothers issued a *fatwā* recommending that Muslims should join INC and refrain from taking part in Sayyid Aḥmad's UIPA. This *fatwā* was signed by about one hundred '*ulamā*' including leading *Deobandīs*. It

was published under the title of 'Nusrat-ul-Abrār' (Assistance of the Pious) in 1306 A.H./1888.

The 'ulamā, instrumental in issuing the *fatwā*, had a long history of anti-British orientation.⁵¹ Mawlānā Muḥammad's father, 'Abdul Qādir had supported the *Jihād* movement of Sayyid Aḥmad Barelwī; he had also participated in the 1857 Insurrection along with his sons who were the signatories of the *fatwā*. After the suppression of the Insurrection, Sayf-ur-Raḥmān, Mawlānā 'Abdul Qādir's eldest son, migrated to Kabul. The other members of his family settled down in Ludhiana (Punjab) after experiencing many difficulties. They maintained the family tradition of anti-British feelings.

The 'ulamā' advocated Muslim co-operation with INC on the basis of its potentially anti-British stance. They also stipulated that co-operation with INC should be conditional on its not resulting in any defiance of *Shari'ah* or in any compromise affecting the Muslim community. The choice was between the two organisations - UIPA and INC - in which membership was equally open to both Hindus and Muslims. The 'ulamā' felt closer to INC than UIPA. They did not pay much attention to the growing tension between the Hindu and Muslim communities on the basis of the Urdu-Hindi controversy, and the revivalism of the *Āryā Samāj*. The main weakness in the thinking of the 'ulamā' lay in their 'serious lack of realism',⁵² especially in respect of the aspiration of the Muslim middle classes.

2.10 Nadwat-ul-ʿUlamāʾ (Council of the ʿUlamāʾ)

In course of time the ʿulamāʾ realised that whilst Aligarh graduates were at home in modern learning and proved to be good subordinate officials in government offices, they were without Islamic learning. By contrast, the *fāzils* of Deoband and of other *madrasahs* were very well versed in medieval sciences but they had closed their eyes from the modern world. The educated class among the Muslims was thus divided between the *madrasah*-educated and the modernists. Mawlānā Muhammad ʿAlī Mongīrī (1846-1927), who had earned his reputation by writing refutations against Christian missionaries and defending Islam against their onslaught,⁵³ put forward the idea that the traditional and the English educational systems should be brought together. It was well received amongst the ʿulamāʾ of different theological persuasions. *Nadwat-ul-ʿulamāʾ* (Council of the ʿUlamāʾ) was formed (Kanpur, 1893), with the object of revising the *madrasah* curriculum. Subsequently, a curriculum was drafted with a view to training graduates, both in mundane and religious sciences. A *dār-ul-ʿulūm* was established in Lucknow (1898) to put the newly-drafted curriculum into practice.

In 1905, Mawlānā Shiblī Nuʿamānī (1857-1914), an acknowledged *ʿālim*, who had parted company with Sayyid Aḥmad Khān, was appointed as Education Secretary. As a consequence, *Nadwat-ul-ʿulamāʾ* became suffused with an atmosphere favourable to the dissemination of modern knowledge. Mawlānā Shiblī's proposals for radical changes in the *madrasah* system were, however, resisted by the other affiliates of *Nadwat-ul-ʿulamāʾ*. Shiblī had to resign from the post and retired to Azamgarh, his native town, where he established *Dār-ul-Muṣaniffīn* (1914),⁵⁴ a research institute.

Dār-ul-‘ulūm Nadwat-ul-‘ulamā’ was conceived as a meeting point between *madrāsah* education and English learning. In the event, however, the experiment was not successful. The graduates of *Nadwat-ul-‘ulamā’*, undoubtedly, acquired a better command of Arabic language and literature than the *fāzils* of Deoband; they also knew English, but they could not absorb the spirit of English education. *Nadwat-ul-‘ulamā’* developed more or less the same attitude as that which the *Deobandīs* projected.

The emergence of *Nadwat-ul-‘ulamā’* was a significant development. It provided for the first time a platform for the interaction between the ‘*ulamā’* and the English-educated élite. Munshī Athar ‘Alī, a leading lawyer of United Provinces (UP), played a leading role in organising the purchase of a building for the *Dār-ul-‘ulūm Nadwat-ul-‘ulamā’*. The seventh annual session of *Nadwat-ul-‘ulamā’* was held at Azimabad, Patna [5-6 November 1900]. It was attended by members of the university-educated élite, as well as the ‘*ulamā’*. Mawlānā Shibli criticised the concept of dividing Muslim society into 'old' and 'new' sections. The University-educated delegates expressed confidence in the leadership of the ‘*ulamā’*. The ‘*ulamā’*, for their part, were much moved by the emotive speeches of the university-educated speakers. The Azimabad session was regarded as an occasion for building bridges between the ‘*ulamā’* and English-educated élites.⁵⁵ The contacts established there further strengthened the interest that the ‘*ulamā’* had already begun to take in involving university-educated Muslims in their religious aims.

2.11 Militant Hindu Nationalism: Bāl Gangādhār Tilak
(1856-1920)

The 'Cow Protection Movement' constituted an important aspect of Hindu revivalism. In 1882, Dayānandā Saraswatī formed the first *Gaurakshinī Sabhā* (Cow Protection Society)⁵⁶ and wrote a book on the subject. As a sacred symbol, the cow had an appeal that was equally strong in all sections of Hindu society - conservative, revivalist and reformist. The cow protection movement was particularly successful in northern India. In order to prevent cow sacrifice at *Īd-ul-azhā*, one of the two Muslim festivals of rejoicing, the Cow Protection Society organised boycotts of Muslims who were forced by large crowds to sign agreements, promising not to sacrifice cows.⁵⁷ The activities of the cow protection movement gave rise to Hindu-Muslim riots (e.g., the Azamgarh riot of June 1893).⁵⁸ INC members took part in the cow protection movement.⁵⁹

In 1885, the year in which INC was founded, the Muḥarram festival of the Muslim community (an occasion for public mourning) coincided with the Hindu festival of *Dasahrā* (an occasion for rejoicing). This coincidence between the two festivals was repeated during four consecutive years (1885-1888), the dates of Hindu and Muslim festivals being calculated from two different calendars. Violent street rioting between the rival processions of Muslims and Hindus took place at Lahore and Karnal in 1885, at Delhi in 1886 and at Dera Ghazi Khan in 1889. Hindu-Muslim tension continued in large parts of UP; in the city of Bombay 80 were killed in 1893.⁶⁰

In spite of such Hindu-Muslim antagonism, revivalists in INC such as Aurbindo Ghose (1872-1950) insisted 'that it was through the religion of Mother that the masses could be effectively reached.'⁶¹ Bāl Gangadhar Tilak played a leading role in placing religious emphasis on politics. He was a successful leader of the Hindu masses. Kesari (lit. the lion), a Marathi-language weekly under his editorship, became the mouthpiece of militant Hindu revivalism. He strongly opposed The Age of Consent Bill (1891) and The Compulsory Vaccination Bill (1891), both of which were supported by Hindu reformists.

He was, however, not against social change, but objected to the colonial government's interference in the affairs of the Hindu society. Under his leadership, *Ganesh Chaturthi*⁶² came to be celebrated publicly, thus contributing to the political mobilisation of the mass of the Hindu people. Tilak also inaugurated a movement in honour of Shivājī (1627-1680), the well-known *Maratha* hero.⁶³ Money was raised for the purpose of repairing Shivājī's tomb in Raigarh. Shivājī's birth anniversary was publicly celebrated. Tilak's followers drew inspiration from Shivaji's life and achievements.

Tilak's bold anti-British stand brought him into the forefront of Congress politics;

'no single individual played a more important role in the history of Congress during the period [1892-1905] than Bal Gangadhar Tilak'.⁶⁴

Sayyid Ahmad Khān's advice to the Muslims, the Hindu-Muslim rioting between 1885 and 1893, and Tilak's 'emphasis on Hinduism bear a share of responsibility for the alienation of

wide sections of Muslim opinion from the national movement' (INC).⁶⁵

2.12 Hindu-Muslim Tension and the Emergence of the All-India Muslim League (AIML)

At the turn of the 19th century, the tension between the Muslims and the Hindus increased even further, with the introduction of Hindi in UP in *Devānāgarī* script as the court language (1900). Under the influence of the thought of Sayyid Ahmad Khān, Muslims naturally resented this as they viewed this change as undermining the Urdu language. But Sir Antony MacDonnel, the Lieutenant Governor of UP, ignored them.⁶⁶

In addition to the Urdu-Hindi controversy, the partition of Bengal and the agitation of the *bhadrālok* or upper-class Hindu Bengalis for its re-unification widened the gulf between the two communities.

2.12.1 Partition of Bengal

On 16 October 1905, the largest province of British India was partitioned. Lord Curzon, the Viceroy, justified partition on the ground of administrative necessity. Bengal, in his view, was far too unwieldy to be administered effectively by one Lieutenant Governor.⁶⁷ The argument did not appeal to the Bengali *bhadrālok*, who launched an agitation for the revocation of the partition. The reaction of the Muslim aristocracy, which had assumed the role of representing the interests of the Muslims, was in sharp contrast to that of the Hindu *bhadrālok*.

From the battle of Plassey (1757) to the 1870s, the British administration had depended upon the collaboration of the *bhadrālok* class which was the chief beneficiary of English education. Its members not only staffed government offices in Bengal, but also penetrated other parts of India as British colonial power spread, securing jobs in offices, teaching in schools and working as lawyers (and magistrates) in courts. On the other hand, the traditional Muslim aristocracy was simply pushed beyond the pale of any preferment with the extinction of Muslim state power. Its members were reluctant to acquire English education, whilst the Muslim masses, under the influence of the *‘ulamā*, joined such resistance movements as the *Jihād* and *Farā‘izī* movements.

Moreover, the changes, introduced into the revenue system of Bengal under the Permanent Settlement (1793) conferred considerable advantages upon well-off Hindus in rural Bengal. Tax collectors were given proprietorship over large land holdings. In 1905, out of 2237 large land holders, only 358 were Muslim.⁶⁸

The high social status enjoyed by the *bhadrāloks* and the dominant position that they occupied in government service in Bengal caused a feeling of restlessness among the other groups even as early as the 1870s. At that stage, W.W. Hunter (1840-1900), a civil administrator, pleaded in his book, The Indian Musalmans that Muslims should be given greater opportunities for government service. But no concrete steps in this sphere were taken before the emergence of INC. In 1889, the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal decreed that recruitment to the Subordinate Executive Service would no longer be through competitive examination. Two-thirds of the

vacancies would henceforward be filled by nomination with the aim of enabling the less educationally-advanced groups (i.e., Biharis, Oriya and the Muslims) to derive some benefit.⁶⁹

The main aim of the government in partitioning Bengal was to encourage the less educationally advanced groups. But partition was also aimed at providing a stimulus to the development of North East India.⁷⁰ For nearly a decade, government officials debated 'not whether but where it [the partition line] should be drawn.'⁷¹

Upon partition, the newly-formed province of 'East Bengal and Assam' had a Muslim majority of 58 per cent (cf. its minority status in united Bengal at 31.3 per cent). The Muslims of East Bengal quickly perceived the advantages of access to higher education and an increased share in the services and administration in the new province. At the same time, the vested interests of the privileged classes of Calcutta were threatened. The new province would come under a separate judiciary beyond the jurisdiction of Calcutta High Court. This meant that Calcutta-based lawyers could no longer hope to monopolise the legal profession in the region. Businessmen based in Calcutta were opposed to the idea of developing a rival port in Chittagong, not far away from Calcutta. Above all, the *bhadrālok* politicians were aware that they would be adversely affected in the legislative council of the new province in which seven out of eight villages had a Muslim majority and the administration had already been encouraging the development of a Muslim counterweight for over two decades.

The Indian Association, a *bhadrālok* dominated organisation, provided the platform for the agitation against the

partition. INC also joined the agitation. The *Swādeshi* (boycott of British-made goods) movement was launched, in the expectation that it would so 'injure British trade as to force the attention of the authorities at home togrievances and thus ensure the redress.'⁷² Soon the movement assumed a communal colouration. Hindu audiences in villages were told that imported sugar was polluted with the bones of cows in the manufacturing process. Vows were taken in front of the temples against the use of British-made goods. Priests refused to perform religious ceremonies involving the use of British-made goods. The boycott made manufactured goods, especially cloth, scarce and expensive. The agitators insisted that ordinary persons should buy indigenous even though they were more costly than machine-made goods. The Muslim population, by and large, did not sympathise with this stand. Hindu-Muslim riots broke out in different parts of Bengal.

2.12.2 The Simla Deputation (1906)

The *Swādeshi* movement in Bengal coincided with attempts on the part of the government to introduce reform in representative institutions. The Muslims, disillusioned by INC's participation in agitation against the partition of Bengal, followed Sayyid Aḥmad Khān's general line of safeguarding the interest of the community. Nawāb Muhsin-ul-Mulk (1837-1907), who had succeeded Sayyid Aḥmad Khān as Secretary of Aligarh College, organised a deputation to see Lord Minto (1845-1914), the Viceroy. 35 'nobles, *jagīrdārs*, *talukdārs*, lawyers, *zamīndars*, merchants and others',⁷³ under the leadership of His Highness Sultān Muḥammad Shāh Āghā Khān III (1877-1957) called on Minto [Simla: 1 October 1906]. They said that their purpose was to present 'our claim to a fair share' of

representation in all elections, whether for the legislative councils or for the local bodies. They asserted that the Muslim members to the representative bodies must be separately elected wholly by Muslim electors and the representation of the Muslim community must be

commensurate not merely with their numerical strength, but also with their political importance and the value of the contribution which they make to the defence of the Empire, and to the position which they occupied in India a little more than a hundred years ago, and of which the traditions have naturally not faded from their minds....⁷⁴

Minto assured the deputation that 'the political rights and interests of the Muslim community would be safeguarded.'⁷⁵

2.12.3 The Formation of AIML

After calling on the Viceroy, the Āghā Khān III and Nawāb Muḥsin-ul-Mulk conceived the idea of setting up a Muslim political organisation for achieving the objectives of the Simla Deputation.⁷⁶ But, before taking any concrete steps, they requested the government's approval.⁷⁷ In a few months' time, All-India Muslim League (AIML) was formed on the occasion of the annual meeting of the 'Mohammadan Educational Conference' (Dacca: 29-30 December 1906), with the Āghā Khān as its President. AIML's objectives were:

- 1) to promote, among the Musalmans of India, feelings of loyalty to the British Government, and to remove any misconception that may arise as to the intention of the government with regard to any of its measures;
- 2) to protect and advance the political rights and interests of the Musalmans of India, to

respectfully represent their needs and aspirations to the Government;

- 3) to prevent the rise, among the Musalmans of India, of any feeling of hostility towards other communities, without prejudice to the other aforementioned objects of the League.⁷⁸

2.13 The Early Phase of AIML (1906-1912)

AIML came into being as an organisation loyal to the British Government. The upper strata of Muslim society joined it. The 'ulamā' and the masses remained aloof from it. AIML's pro-British stance was sufficient to keep the 'ulamā' (especially of Deoband) away. Nor did the Āghā Khān, the living *Imām* of the *Ismā'īlīs* and close friend of the British, carry any appeal for them.

The agitation against the partition of Bengal took a new turn with the rise of terrorism through the activities of secret societies. The agitators successfully undermined the colonial power by seeking the support of the political opposition in Britain, and especially of the Labour Party. J. Keir Hardie, a Labour M.P., observed during his visit to Bengal (1907):

Lord Curzon's autocratic method of forcing his undigested and ill-advised scheme of partition had been a great blunder, and that there could be no peace until it had been rectified in one form or another.⁷⁹

The rectification was to await King George V's visit to India (December 1911). In a new administrative arrangement East Bengal and West Bengal were reunited with the exclusion of Bihar and Orissa.

A big segment of AIML realised that agitation and terrorism rather than pronouncements of loyalty to the government had yielded results. The government effectively silenced Nawāb Salīmullāh Khān and the Āghā Khān by bribing them with titles (G.C.I.E. and G.C.S.I. respectively). It was Nawāb Wiqār-ul-Mulk (1841-1917), successor of Muḥsin-ul-Mulk as Secretary to Aligarh College, who commented as follows:

Gone are the days of reliance [on the government]. What we should depend now upon, after the mercy of God, is the strength of our own arms, and for this the example of our worthy compatriots is before us.⁸⁰

The annulment of the partition of Bengal proved to be the turning point in Muslim politics. AIML underwent a radical change. The Āghā Khān resigned as President. The AIML headquarters was shifted from Aligarh to Lucknow. Within a few years, the Muslim 'nobles' in positions of power in AIML were replaced by members of the Muslim middle classes. AIML's aims also underwent a transformation in accordance with the aspirations of the middle classes.

2.14 Pan-Islamism and its Impact on Indian Muslims

The consolidation of Muslim power in South Asia was followed by the recognition, under the Delhi *Sulṭanate*, of the Abbasid *Khalīfahs* as *de jure* suzerains of the Muslim world. However, the Mughals believed that they needed no external source of legitimacy to sustain their suzerain power over India. From the early 16th century onwards, the political map of the Muslim world was dominated by three, almost equally great empires - the Ottoman, the Safavid and the Mughal.

The Ottomans considered themselves the successors of the Abbasid *Khalīfahs*, since they followed the *Sunnī* tradition, and occupied the central Muslim lands. The Mughals in India subscribed to the theory that every independent Muslim monarch was *Khalīfah* within his own territories.⁸¹ With the collapse of Muslim power, the feeling of being a part of the Muslim *ummah* began to develop in India. In 1785, Tipu Sultan of Mysore (1750-1799) reaffirmed his subservience to the Ottomans.

These feelings were augmented during the latter half of the 19th century by the ideas of Pan-Islamism, to which Jamāl-ud-dīn Afghānī (1838-1897) and his associates gave voice. Afghānī had reached the conclusion that none of the Muslim countries by itself could resist European colonialism. Therefore the *ummah*, despite the fact that it was split into definite entities and states, would have to forge a common bond, internal cohesion and unite itself in order to repel external aggressions.

Afghānī visited India on four different occasions during the period 1854-1882. Pan-Islamic ideas met with an encouraging response from a large section of Muslim intelligentsia and from the *ʿulamāʾ*: Sympathetic feelings for the Turkish Muslim brethren were aroused, since they were subjected to severe threats from the European powers. But Afghānī had to face the opposition of Sayyid Aḥmed Khān, who was bent upon securing the goodwill of the British.

The plight of the Ottoman Empire at the turn of the century merits some attention.

Its decline had already started at the turn of the 17th century but its survival for nearly two centuries was rendered possible because of the rivalries between European powers and the martial qualities of Turkish soldiery

The Ottoman Empire consisted of a conglomeration of different ethnic and religious groups. The Ottomans made no attempt to integrate them culturally. They had no policy of proselytising the non-Muslims of the Balkans and Anatolia to Islam. In the long run, the minorities identified themselves as different nationalities. Each of them found a patron from among the European states. These states often interfered in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire under the pretext of securing justice for the minorities. Russia's claim to the right to protect the interests of the Greek Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire was one of the direct causes of the Crimean War (1853). Tsar Nicholas told the British Ambassador that the Ottoman Empire was 'sick' and that Britain and Russia must reach an agreement on its reconstitution when its end came.

By 1856 Greece gained independence from the Ottoman Empire. In the same year, the European powers agreed among themselves (Paris Conference) to observe the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire. But, with the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War (1877-78) the principle of non-interference was reduced to a dead letter.

The boundaries of the Ottoman Empire were steadily shrinking. The Muslims in India came to believe that this sad situation was due to the conspiratorial role that the European

powers were playing against the Ottomans. Mawlānā Muḥammad Qāsim Nānawtawī and the *Deobandī* 'ulamā' raised a fund to help their co-religionists. An amount in excess of Rs. 2,00,000 was sent to Turkey.⁸² In 1897, during the Graeco-Turkish war, Indian Muslims once again held meetings, and raised funds to demonstrate their moral support for the Ottomans.

The role played by Mawlānā Shiblī Nu'mānī in the propagation of Pan-Islamic ideas is worthy of note. He not only went through the writings of Afghānī but also met Shaykh Muḥammad 'Abduh (1849-1905), Afghānī's most trusted disciple, in Egypt. He came under the influence of Pan-Islamic ideas during his visit to Turkey and Egypt (1892). Though Shiblī Nu'mānī served as a staff member of M.A.O. College in Aligarh for a long time (1882-1898), he never adhered to the political and religious stand associated with Sayyid Aḥmad Khān.

Shiblī Nu'mānī exercised a profound influence on the Aligarh students. Mawlānā Muḥammad 'Alī⁸³ (1878-1931) and Mawlānā Zafar 'Alī Khān⁸⁴ (1873-1956) were among his students. Shiblī Nu'mānī did not join any political organisation. He devoted his energies to literary activity and to religious education. His Pan-Islamic ideas were expressed in vivid terms in the journals under the editorship of Zafar 'Alī Khān (*Zamīndār* - Lahore), Muḥammad 'Alī (*Comrade* and *Hamdard*, first from Calcutta and then from Delhi), and Mawlānā Abul Kalām Āzād (*al-Hilāl* and *al-Balāgh* - both from Calcutta), all of which were started during the period 1910-15. Not only political activists but also literary figures such as Muḥammad Iqbāl (1877-1938) were deeply influenced by Afghānī. In fact, Iqbāl regarded Afghānī as the greatest renewer

of Islamic faith of the whole century.⁸⁵ Later Iqbāl made Afghānī his mouthpiece for expression of his own ideas on Muslim state.⁸⁶

Against such a background a veritable spate of Pan-Islamic literature came out during the period of the Balkan wars (1912). They appealed to the religious sentiments of the Indian Muslims and aroused their sympathy for the Ottoman cause.

2.15 Inter-connection between the 'Ulamā' and the English-educated Muslims

The annual conferences of *Nadwat-ul-'ulamā'* provided a platform for the '*ulamā'* and the English-educated Muslims to communicate with one another. The gap between these two groups narrowed down by the beginning of the 20th century. Pan-Islamic ideas contributed to bringing them closer together. The '*ulamā'* could not afford to neglect the English-educated Muslims, and it would seem that they were keen to enlist their support. Our attention should now be focused on the organisations which undertook the task of reconciling the interests of the '*ulamā'* with those of the English-educated Muslims.

2.15.1 *Jam'iyat-ul-Anṣār* (Association of Friends) (1910-1913)

The Deoband-based *Jam'iyat-ul-Anṣār* was one of the earliest organisations of the '*ulamā'* to be interested in seeking the support of English-educated Muslims. It was basically an association of the old boys of *Dār-ul-ūlūm* Deoband. It was founded by Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan (1851-1920) in a '*jalasah-i-dastārbandī'* (convocation ceremony) at Deoband on 27 Ramāzān 1337 A.H./12

October 1910. Mawlānā 'Ubaydullāh Sindhī (1872-1944) was deputed as the organising secretary of the *Jam'iyat*. The *jalasah-i-dastārbandī* was attended by a delegation from Aligarh led by Āftāb Aḥmad Khān (1867-1930), who subsequently became the Vice-Chancellor of the Muslim University of Aligarh. This development represented the culmination of the process set in motion by Sayyid Aḥmad Khān's political heirs of establishing links with the anti-British Pan-Islamist 'ulamā'. Muḥsin-ul-Mulk, himself an author of a number of religious works, had agreed to start a department of Arabic at Aligarh.⁸⁷ Wiqār-ul-Mulk, his successor, increased the religious content of the college syllabus. A paper on 'Islamic Religion' was made compulsory for all students. Āftāb Aḥmad Khān suggested in *jalasah-i-dastārbandī* the exchange of students between Deoband and Aligarh, in the expectation that students belonging to both would benefit from 'worldly' as well as religious education. This suggestion was accepted.⁸⁸

The *Jam'iyat-ul-Anṣār* was a religious and cultural body which denied having any political motives. Its activities were focused on promoting Arabic language, the publication of cheap editions of religious tracts, the arrangements of well-trained 'ulamā' for mosques, and on imparting Quranic instructions to English-educated Muslims.

The founders of the *Jam'iyat* solicited donations for the purpose of setting up branches in different parts of the country. It was not difficult for them to find a handful of *Deobandī* 'ulamā' in most cities and towns. The activities of the *Jam'iyat* were ostensibly religious and educational. It wanted to review and to reform the curriculum of the *Dār-ul-ʿulūm* Deoband. At the same

time, it also suggested some changes in the administration of the *Dār-ul-‘ulūm*.

Mawlānā Muḥammad Aḥmad, the *muhtamim* (administrator) of *Dār-ul-‘ulūm*, regarded the *Jam‘iyat* as a rival organisation which sought to curtail his power. The *Deobandī* 'official' historians [viz., Manāẓar Aḥsan Gīlānī, Qārī Muḥammad Ṭayyab and Maḥbūb Raẓwī] were averse to undertaking the task of de-mystifying the personality of Mawlānā Muḥammad Aḥmad. He accepted the title of *Shams-ul-‘ulamā*' conferred on him by the British government. It would appear that he was keen to prevent anti-British ideas penetrating the *Dār-ul-‘ulūm*'s academic staff and students.⁸⁹ Mawlānā Sindhī was already looked upon with suspicion by the teachers of *Dār-ul-‘ulūm* - Anwar Shāh Kāshmirī (1875-1933) and Shabbīr Aḥmad ‘Uṣmānī (1885-1949) - due to certain of his ideas which were not in conformity with the *Dār-ul-‘ulūm*'s general orientation.⁹⁰ Against such a background, Mawlānā Sindhī felt compelled to move from Deoband to Delhi (May 1913).

2.15.2 *Nizārat-ul-Ma‘ārif-il-Qurāniyyah* (Academy of Quranic Learning)

Mawlānā ‘Ubaydullāh Sindhī organised another institution in Delhi, *Nizārat-ul-Ma‘ārif-il-Qurāniyyah*, with Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan, Ḥakīm Ajmal Khān (1863-1928) and Wiqār-ul-Mulk as its patrons.⁹¹ Its basic purpose was to promote Quranic studies among English-educated Muslims. He was able to attract a group of persons which undertook the task of interpreting the *Qurān* in political idiom, with special reference to the struggle for independence.⁹² Mawlānā Sindhī lectured in Delhi for about two

years, but his main contribution lay in mobilising a strong following for Quranic Studies which has flourished to this day.

2.15.3 Anjuman-i-Khuddām-i-Ka‘bah (Association of the Servants of Ka‘bah) (AKK)

Anjuman-i-Khuddām-i-Ka‘bah (AKK) was another important organisation in which the ‘ulamā’ and the university-educated people worked together. Mawlānā ‘Abdul Bārī of Farangī Maḥal (1878-1926) founded this society (6 May 1913). He was already directing the *Majlis Mu‘īd-ul-Islām* (founded in 1912) which pursued the objective of propagating the knowledge of *Sharīah* in the Muslim community.⁹³

AKK's establishment was in major part inspired by the events surrounding the Balkan wars, and in particular the serious threat that was believed to be posed to the holy city of Makkah as a consequence of the hostilities between the European powers and the Ottoman Empire. The basic objective of AKK was to maintain the honour of *Ka‘bah* by defending it from occupation by non-Muslims, and by serving it in every possible manner. It was spelled out as follows:

- (a) to prepare such a group of Muslims which could be ready to sacrifice life and wealth for venerated House (of *Allāh*) with pleasure;
- (b) to carry on the preaching of Islam, which is really a service of *Ka‘bah*, and to send the missionaries of Islam wherever in the world they are needed;
- (c) to establish *madrasahs* for basic Islamic teachings, and orphanages; and
- (d) to strengthen the affiliation of Muslims to *Ka‘bah*, and to develop the means of transportation for *Ka‘bah*.⁹⁴

At the time of AKK's inception, six members,⁹⁵ including Mawlānā ʿAbdul Bārī, the President, were given the responsibility for its organisation throughout the country. Four out of these six members had been university-educated, but AKK had the blessings of the renowned ʿulamāʾ Shiblī Nuʿmānī helped draft its constitution,⁹⁶ to which ʿUbaydullāh Sindhī, Shāh Sulaymān P̄hulwārwi and leading *Shīʿah mujtahids* of Lahore and Lucknow gave their support.

AKK also had a mass appeal. Its membership rose to 9,000 within a short period.⁹⁷ The opposition of Mawlānā Aḥmad Razā Khān and some others proved to be futile amidst the strong feelings aroused by the Balkan wars and the publicity that AKK received in Pan-Islamist journals.⁹⁸

AKK was able to collect a large amount of money from its members and sympathisers. The question of how the money should be used became a subject of internal controversy. It is not clear how the money was actually spent, 'although a part of it went to establish Shawkat ʿAlī in business as a pilgrimage broker in Bombay'.⁹⁹ AKK lost its reputation as a consequence of such a misuse of public money. From 1916 onwards, only three years after its inception, it degenerated into a mere paper organisation.

Within such a short period, AKK achieved little for a variety of reasons including internment of Muḥammad ʿAlī and Shawkat ʿAlī (May 1915), its leaders; lack of organisational skill among its leaders; the fact that Z̄afar-ul-Ḥasan ʿĀlawī (Office Secretary of AKK) proved to be a secret agent of the colonial government; and the propaganda against it of the pro-British lobby. AKK,

nevertheless, did make a stir in the public arena and attracted the attention of the British government.

2.16 The Kanpur Mosque Incident

The sad incident of the demolition of the Kanpur Mosque brought the 'ulamā' face to face with the government. On 1 July 1913, the Kanpur municipal authorities demolished the washing place of a mosque (located in Maḥhlī Bazar) in order to widen the road. The local Muslims condemned the administration for desecrating their place of worship. The municipal authorities tried to pacify them by offering payment for the land and compensation for the damage caused. But, it was not lawful according to the *fatwā* of the 'ulamā' to sell the mosque as every part of the premises was integral to the mosque and no part could be detached from it. The Muslims demanded that the demolished portion should be restored to its original condition.

Mawlānā 'Abdul Qādir Subḥānī (1873-1957), a local 'ālim and the founder of *Madrasah-i-Ilāhiyāt* (Kanpur), addressed a public meeting at which he appealed to the Muslims to show the genuineness of their emotions by being ready to sacrifice their lives for the cause of the faith. Instead of dispersing after the meeting, the crowd proceeded to the damaged portion of the mosque to rebuild the damaged walls. The armed police opened fire and several persons were killed.

The Pan-Islamic press vehemently attacked the government for its unwarranted interference in religious matters and for its brutality. As a result of the publicity thus given to the incident

in the press and from pulpits, the Kanpur Mosque incident was raised to the level of a major issue involving a direct confrontation between the government and the Muslim community. Lord Harding, the Viceroy, who was of the opinion that the municipal authorities had acted unwisely, paid a visit to Kanpur. A settlement was reached; the damaged portion of the mosque was restored and those detained were set free.¹⁰⁰ The Muslim community, especially the 'ulamā', were jubilant.

2.17 The 'Ulamā' during World War I

On the eve of World War I (1914-1918) a strong current of anti-British feeling spread among the Muslims as a result of domestic and international developments. Turkey joined the war on the side of Germany. It was obvious that Britain and its allies would use military force as well as diplomacy against Turkey as an enemy and that Turkey would suffer as a consequence. Muḥammad 'Alī expressed the feelings of the Muslims, in a leading article in the 'Comrade' (Delhi) under the title of The Choice of the Turks,¹⁰¹ He stressed that British diplomacy had left no option for Turkey but to join Germany. Outstanding Pan-Islamists such as Mawlānā Abul Kalām Āzād (1889-1958) and Muḥammad 'Alī were interned.

British diplomacy helped the Arabs to fight against the Ottoman Empire. In the early 1916, a treaty was signed between the British authorities and Ḥusayn, Sharīf of Makkah. At the instigation of British agents, Husayn led a revolt against the Ottoman authorities (June 1916). This served as a pretext for the occupation of Palestine and Syria by British armed forces. The Muslims in India regarded Ḥusayn's treaty with Britain as an act of

disloyalty towards the sacred institution of *Khilāfat*. In a telegram addressed to the Indian Viceroy, Mawlānā ‘Abdul Bārī, President of AKK, expressed his anger and grief.¹⁰²

Through a pamphlet entitled *Tahqiq-i-Khilāfat* (July 1919) (compiled by Fayz-ul-Karīm and attested by a number of *pīrs* and pro-British ‘*ulamā*’ of Sind), the British authorities tried to justify Husayn's revolt. But this pamphlet proved to be a futile exercise in view of the *Aḥmadī* origin of its author. It was rejected by the ‘*ulamā*’. Mawlānā Muḥammad Ibrāhīm, a leading ‘*ālim*’ of Sind, exposed Fayz-ul-Karīm, and declared him as *kāfir* on account of his beliefs.¹⁰³ A refutation of the pamphlet was produced under the signatures of the mainstream ‘*ulamā*’ of Sind.¹⁰⁴

2.17.1 Silk Letter Conspiracy

During the war, the ‘*ulamā*’ of Deoband had conceived a plan to get rid of the British government. Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan, commonly known as *Shaykh-ul-Hind* believed that the British government was so fully entangled in the war that a popular uprising in India, orchestrated with an attack by Afghan forces and tribes belonging to the NWFP border, would result in the collapse of the colonial administration. To implement such a programme he mobilised the ‘*ulamā*’ in the NWFP tribal belt through his *Deobandī* disciples and associates. He also dispatched Mawlānā ‘Ubaydullāh Sindhī to Afghanistan (July 1915) to establish contacts with the Afghan government of Amīr Ḥabībullah Khān.

Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan himself had left for Makkah in 1914 ostensibly on *ḥajj*. He met Ghālīb Pāshā, the Ottoman governor of

Makkah. The 'ulamā' were organised in the tribal belt of NWFP.¹⁰⁵ When the 'ulamā' were engaged in executing their plan, a new development took place. A political mission of the Indian National Committee¹⁰⁶ reached Kabul.

Without loss of time, Mawlānā Sindhī met the representatives of Indian National Committee. However, their plans differed to such an extent that no close co-operation between them could be achieved in the beginning.

Mawlānā Sindhī and the representatives of Indian National Committee approached the Afghan authorities. The latter, however, transmitted a *verbatim* record of their discussions with the 'Indian fellows' to the Viceroy in Delhi. Superficially, however, the Afghan government appeared to be willing to co-operate with the Indians in Kabul, by allowing them to form a 'provisional government' in exile.

Mawlānā Sindhī sent a report of his activities in Kabul (9-10 July 1916) to Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan in Makkah. The report was written on a piece of silk cloth, meant to be handed over to Maḥmūd Hasan personally. The silk cloth letter was however intercepted [15 August 1916]. Mawlānā Maḥmūd Hasan and his associates - Mawlānā Ḥusayn Aḥmad Madanī (1879-1958), Mawlānā 'Uzayr Gul, Wahīd Aḥmad and Ḥakīm Nusrat Ḥusayn were arrested in Makkah and imprisoned in Malta. A number of *Deobandī* 'ulamā' and collaborators, involved in the conspiracy, were arrested or put under police surveillance in India. In subsequent years, this abortive scheme of the 'ulamā' was given the name of 'silk letter conspiracy'.¹⁰⁷

Throughout the war years, the British government tried to subdue Pan-Islamism through the support of the landed Muslim aristocracy and hereditary *pīrs*. In spite of threats from the government and resistance from within their ranks, the '*ulamā*' gradually came to the forefront of the political arena.

2.18 Rapprochement between INC and AIML

Political developments in India and abroad made the Pan-Islamists dominant in Muslim politics. They were equally active in INC. Āghā Khān found the policies of the Pan-Islamists unacceptable, and subsequently left AIML. AIML, under a different type of leadership, included in its demands a 'suitable government' for India in 1913. Muhammad 'Alī Jinnāh (1876-1948), ambassador of the Hindu-Muslim unity at that time, joined AIML in October 1913, after making it absolutely clear that his loyalty to AIML would in no way undermine his association with INC.¹⁰⁹ Due to the connection of Muslim leaders with both parties, AIML and INC drew closer together. Both parties managed to hold their annual sessions in the same city on consecutive dates and discussed the same issues. The AIML leaders used to attend INC sessions and *vice versa*.¹¹⁰

The close links between AIML and INC were also reflected in a jointly formulated constitutional scheme, popularly known as the Lucknow Pact (1916).¹¹¹ Under its provisions Muslims would be

- 1) represented through special [separate] electorates on the Provincial Legislative Councils;
- 2) given weightage in Muslim minority provinces (i.e.

U.P., Bihar, Orissa, Central Provinces, Madras and Bombay) whilst Muslim representation in the Punjab and Bengal would be less than their ratio of the whole population.

Furthermore,

- 3) 1/3rd of the Indian elected members in the Imperial legislative Council would be Muslims, elected by a separate electorate.
- 4) No Bill, nor any clause thereof, nor a resolution would be passed in opposition to the wishes of 3/4ths of the members of either community.

The Muslim community was thus accepted by INC as a separate political entity, on the basis of religion; and AIML was accepted as its representative.

The main features of the 'Lucknow Pact' were subsequently incorporated into the Montagu-Chelmsford Reform (1919). The close co-operation between INC and AIML was further strengthened during the agitation against the Rowlatt Bill (1919), aimed at extending control on political activities after the war. The Jallianwala Bagh massacre (Amritsar: 13 April 1919), where 379 people were killed and a large number of others were wounded in the course of firing by soldiers to disperse a political gathering, drew the parties, as well as the Hindu and Muslim communities in general, closer to each other.

During the war, the sympathies of the Indian Muslims were with their co-religionist Ottomans. They desired to see the Ottoman territories remain intact. They made no attempt to conceal their feelings, and, for its part, the British government gave assurances to the effect that their sentiments would not be ignored as a token of its appreciation of the steady support given to the war aims of the Allies by the Muslim community in India. In actual fact, however, as early as in 1915, secret treaties had been concluded between Britain, France, Russia and Italy. Under these, the signatories undertook that in the event of their emerging victorious in the war, they would partition the Ottoman territories into four spheres of influence, instead of directly annexing them jointly.¹¹² During much of the wartime, the existence of these secret treaties was not publicly known, and the (British) Indian government was therefore able to secure Muslim co-operation.

With the Bolshevik Revolution (October 1917) in Russia and the conclusion of a separate peace treaty between Germany and Russia, a big change occurred in the international scene affecting the war. The Bolsheviks not only made the secret treaties of its allies public, but also disrupted all the wartime arrangements by signing a separate treaty with Germany.

Upon learning of the secret treaties, the Indian Muslims were deeply shocked. Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister, proclaimed on 5 July 1918 that the Ottoman Empire would not be challenged in the lands of the Turkish race. President Wilson's 'Fourteen Points' also included much the same promise. The

Jazīrat-ul-Ārab,¹¹³ with the holy places of the Muslims, did not fall within the land of the Turkish race. Ḥusayn, Sharif of Makkah, was in control of a part of the *Jazīrat-ul-Ārab* with the full support of the British diplomacy. The 'ulamā' saw in the situation a message from a *ḥadīṣ* which commanded:

Expel the non-Muslim from *Jazīrat-ul-Ārab*.¹¹⁴

They were anxious to free *Jazīrat-ul-Ārab* from any non-Muslim influence. It was the desire of the faithful to achieve this aim as a *fait accompli*, in fulfilment of the dying behest of the Prophet. How would political developments actually take shape? was the question which occupied the attention of the Indian Muslims. The 'ulamā remained doubtful that the Ottoman *Khilāfat* would be treated honourably by the victorious powers.

In November 1918, the war ended with the victory of Britain and its allies. The fate of the Ottoman *Khilāfat* was no longer in doubt. Hungary-Austria, the other defeated state, had been divided and the Ottoman *Khilāfat* seemed destined for a similar fate.

The zealous Indian Muslims regarded it as their religious duty to join the struggle for the honourable treatment of the defeated Ottomans, at the hands of the Allied Powers. They were anxious that the institution of *Khilāfat* should be kept intact, with *Jazīrat-ul-Ārab* under its control. But, they had no idea of the extent to which nationalist secularist trends had taken a grip of the Ottoman *Khilāfat*. Arabs were averse to being ruled by the Ottomans. Arab nationalism had gained a considerable footing in several parts of the Ottoman Empire.¹¹⁵ The ideology of Turkish

nationalism had also developed. Its aim was to build a nation of Turks on the basis of secular ideas. The young generation of Turkish-speaking people had no interest in preserving the decadent institution of the *Khilāfat*.¹¹⁶

The religious character of the *Khilāfat* issue brought the 'ulamā' to the forefront of the political stage. They manifested greater vigour than before and their authority increased. The annual session of AIML (Delhi: December 1918) was attended by a number of the 'ulamā'.¹¹⁷ It was the first session of AIML in 12 years to attract such a number of 'ulamā'. They were warmly welcomed and given a prominent place on the platform.

Within a month of the Delhi session of AIML, Mawlānā 'Abdul Bārī drafted a reply to an *istiftā'* (questionnaire), designed to test the opinion of the 'ulamā' on the issue of *Khilāfat*. He emphasised the importance of the *Khilāfat* institution in the religious and political life of the Muslims. His reply was countersigned by the 'ulamā', largely of the *Farangī Maḥal* group.¹¹⁸

2.19.1 Intimate Co-operation between the 'Ulamā' and the English-educated Politicians

The 'ulamā's pronouncements about the importance of the *Khilāfat* in the religio-political life of the Muslims stirred Pan-Islamic sentiments; and public meetings with special reference to this issue were held. One such meeting, presided over by Ya'qūb Ḥasan, was held in Madras (17 January 1919); another, under the presidentship of Mawlānā 'Abdul Bārī, was convened in Lucknow (26 January 1919). An organisation '*Khilāfat* Committee' came into

being in Bombay (March 1919) with M.M. Chhotānī, one of Mawlānā 'Abdul Bārī's disciples, as its President.

There was no organisational link between the activities of various individuals involved in the *Khilāfat* agitation. They acted on their individual heads of steam in different parts of the country. The AIML leadership convened an 'All-India Muslim Conference' (Lucknow: 22 September 1919) to integrate the activities of the various individual leaders of the *Khilāfat*.¹¹⁹ This Conference called upon the people to observe 17 October as the *Khilāfat* Day, a day of fasting and prayer. Gāndhī (1869-1948) advised his co-religionists (the Hindus) to join with Muslims to show solidarity with their countrymen as 'the best and the easiest method of promoting unity between Hindus and Muslims'.¹²⁰

The Conference appreciated the work done by the Bombay-based '*Khilāfat* Committee' and resolved to transform it into an all-India organisation. M.M. Chhotānī remained the President with the headquarters of the organisation at Bombay. Hājī Siddīq Khatri (1873-1938) was appointed as the Secretary of the *Khilāfat* organisation. The main task to which the new organisation *Jamīyat-i-Khilāfat-i-Hind* (All India *Khilāfat* Committee, AIKC) addressed itself was the mobilisation of the masses with the aim of pressing the British government to refrain from doing anything that was likely to cause damage to the interests of the *ummah*. 17 October 1919 was widely observed as the *Khilāfat* Day and marked the beginning of the *Khilāfat* Movement. The first All-India *Khilāfat* Conference was called in Delhi on 22-23 November 1919. It was attended by Muslim leaders and Hindu politicians alike.¹²¹

2.20 Jam'iyat-ul-'Ulamā-i-Hind (Association of the Indian
'Ulamā') (JUH)

The 'ulamā'¹²² attending the first All-India *Khilāfat* Conference held a separate meeting amongst themselves (24 November 1919). Mawlānā 'Abdul Bārī had been stressing the importance of the organisation of the 'ulamā' since the end of the War, laying stress on the distinctive role of the 'ulamā' in the religio-political sphere. He chaired the meeting of the 'ulamā'. The role of the 'ulamā' in the religio-political life of the *ummah* and a number of aspects of their organisation were discussed in detail. The meeting ended with the decision to organise the 'ulamā' under their own organization, namely *Jam'iyat-ul-'Ulamā-i-Hind* (JUH). Mawlānā Kifāyatullāh (1875-1952) and Mawlānā Aḥmad Sa'īd (d.1960) were elected provisional President and Secretary respectively. A committee consisting of Muftī Kifāyatullāh and Mawlānā Muḥammad Akram Khān was constituted to draft the constitution of JUH. It was decided that JUH would meet again in December 1919 at Amritsar to discuss the draft constitution. A large number of the 'ulamā' was expected to be present at the proposed second All-India *Khilāfat* Conference.

The objectives of JUH, as passed and declared at the proposed session (28 December 1919-1 January 1920) were 'to guide the Muslim community in the following political as well as non-political affairs from a religious point of view:

- 1) To defend Islam, Centre of Islam [*Jazīrat-ul-'Arab* and the place of *Khilāfat*], customs of Islam and Islamic nationality, against the shortcomings that are meant to harm them, in accordance with the injunctions of *Shari'ah*;

- 2) To safeguard the religious rights; and to struggle for common religious and national interests;
- 3) To bring the 'ulamā' to one platform;
- 4) To organise the Muslim community; and to work for its moral and social reform;
- 5) To maintain unity with and sympathy for non-Muslim countrymen in accordance with Islamic *Shari'ah*;
- 6) To struggle for national independence;
- 7) To establish *Shari'ah* courts, according to the needs of *Shari'ah*;
- 8) To propagate Islamic faith within the country and abroad;
- 9) To maintain and to strengthen relations based on Islamic brotherhood, and unity with Muslims outside India.¹²³

Even though JUH was meant to represent the viewpoint of the 'ulamā, its membership was not limited to the 'ulamā'. Ordinary Muslims could join it, but, constitutionally speaking, the decision-making powers were vested almost wholly in the 'ulamā'. The President, Vice-President and Secretary were to be elected only from the 'ulamā. Similarly, of the working committee of JUH which consisted of 132 members, 88 were from the 'ulamā.¹²⁴

The emergence of JUH indicated that the 'ulamā' were consciously asserting their own identity; and were not willing to be camp-followers of AIML, INC or AIKC.

2.21 Hindu-Muslim Unity during the *Khilāfat* Movement

In 1919 the three All-India organisations - namely INC, AIML and AIKC - held their annual sessions at Amritsar, one after another. The similarity of tone and content of the speeches at

these sessions were indicative of the fact that in India at that time there was a coherence in the political demands of different sections of the population. AIML resolved to protect the 'religious' interests of the Muslim community in addition to its political and cultural interests.¹²⁵

The Muslims were in need of the collaboration of the Hindus in order to increase the strength of their agitation. The Hindu leadership from the INC platform gave strong support to the Muslim cause; and the Hindu masses accepted the lead given by Gāndhī in order to ensure that the Hindus felt 'bound to stand by the Musalmans in their demand for the redress of the *Khilāfat* wrong.'¹²⁶ The Hindus were equally in need of Muslim participation in the national struggle in order to make it an all-embracing movement. The aims of both the communities coincided within the ambit of the prevailing spirit of co-operation. Hindu-Muslim unity reached its crescendo within a short time. Gāndhī played a crucial role in forging Hindu-Muslim unity.

Gāndhī returned from South Africa in 1915, after a 21-year stay. During that period he had a fruitful association with the Muslims. He had been on the payroll of a Memon firm.¹²⁷ He worked so closely with the Muslim-dominated 'Natal Indian congress'¹²⁸ that it provoked opposition from Hindus.¹²⁹ Working with the Muslims, Gāndhī asserted (as early as in September 1909) that his life was devoted to the task of evolving co-operation between Hindus and Muslims in India as an 'indispensable condition of the salvation of India'.¹³⁰

Gāndhī's attitude to the West was an important factor in his acceptance by the Muslims, and especially the 'ulamā'. He referred to himself as 'an uncompromising enemy of the present-day civilisation of Europe'¹³¹ and he had abandoned the Western style of life. His simple living and dislike of Western civilisation were threads that were common to his and the 'ulamā's thinking.

Tilak's death in August 1920 removed Gāndhī's strongest rival in INC and the Hindu community. He was thus able to assume the leadership of the Hindus and Muslims during the early '20s without any great difficulty.

The first *Khilāfat* Conference (Delhi: November 1919) passed a resolution calling for a cessation of co-operation with the government in the event that unfavourable terms of post-war settlement affecting the Ottomans were to be concluded. It was during the *Khilāfat* movement that the seeds of the 'Non-co-operation movement' of subsequent years were sown.

Deputations to the Viceroy (19 January 1920) and to Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister (3 March 1920), proved futile. The Viceroy was in no position to accede to the demands because he had no authority to settle issues relating to the War. The Prime Minister, as well as British public opinion, had no sympathy for the Ottoman *Khilāfat*. Furthermore, the acceptance of the Treaty of Sevres (July 1920) by the Ottomans virtually guaranteed the extinction of the Ottoman Empire.

2.21.1 The 'Ulamā' on the Non-co-operation Movement

The idea of non-co-operation developed gradually. It was first suggested at the first All-India *Khilāfat* Conference (Delhi: November 1919). AIKC endorsed the idea in May 1920. Gāndhī assured AIKC of the support of INC in the matter of non-violent non-co-operation. Consequently, AIKC issued a scheme calling upon the masses to 'withdraw co-operation from the government and continue to do so until justice is done'. It further added that in case non-co-operation failed, the Muslims reserved the right to

take such other and further steps as may be enjoined upon them by their religion for the purpose of securing a satisfactory solution to the *Khilafat* question .¹³²

A memorandum, signed by 82 leading public figures, was addressed to the Viceroy (22 June 1920), which gave expression to the bitter feelings of the Indian Muslims over the harsh terms imposed on Turkey in the peace settlement; and urged the Viceroy to secure the revision of such terms from the British government; and implored him to make common cause with the people of India in case he failed to persuade the British Government. If the Viceroy was unwilling to adopt the suggestion contained in the petition, the signatories of the memorandum would

be obliged as from the first August next to withdraw co-operation from the Government and ask [their] co-religionists and Hindu brethren to do likewise .¹³³

The Non-co-operation movement was launched on 1 August 1920 with observance of a one-day general strike. INC decided to take part in the movement at its special session (Calcutta: September 1920). Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan gave non-co-operation a religious basis first in a *fatwā*,¹³⁴ and then in his presidential

address at the 1920 JUH session (Delhi: 19-21 November). Referring to the statement of Lloyd George in which he had equated the war against the Ottomans to a crusade, to the injustices done to the Ottomans, and to the Muslim population's forced migration from Smyrna [Izmir], he described *mawālāt* (friendship) with non-Muslims *ḥarām* (unlawful) who were at war with Muslims, were responsible for rendering the Muslims homeless and for collaborating with others in such actions.¹³⁵ He based his opinion on the following Quranic verse.

God only forbids you as to those who have fought you in religion's cause, and expelled you from your habitation, and have supported in your expulsion, that you should take them for friends. And whosoever takes them for friends, those - they are the evil-doers.¹³⁶

A resolution supporting the Non-co-operation movement was passed; and the refusal of *Dār-ul-ʿulūm Nadwat-ul-ʿulamā'* to accept government grant-in-aid, was appreciated.¹³⁷ A *mutafaqqah* (unanimous) *fatwā*, signed by 474 *ʿulamā'*, was issued by JUH.¹³⁸ It declared any form of co-operation with the enemy of Islam, the (British) Indian Government, *ḥarām*. It appealed to the Muslim people

- i) to resign from the membership of the Legislative Councils;
- ii) to withdraw their dependents from government schools or institutions getting grant-in-aid from the government;
- iii) not to practice law in courts;
- iv) not to serve in the police and army;
- v) not to pay taxes;
- vi) not to use the enemy's manufactured goods; and
- vii) not to retain titles conferred by the government.

On the matter concerning co-operation with Hindu countrymen, the *fatwā* proclaimed that whilst Muslims could obtain advice from friendly Hindus, they could not accept non-Muslim leadership.

During the *Khilāfat* and Non-co-operation movements, the 'ulamā' - affiliated to JUH and generally of *Deobandī* and *Ahl-i-Ḥadīṣ* affiliations - took active part in politics. The participation of *Shi'āh* 'ulamā' was, however, sporadic, because the *Khilāfat* issue was of relevance only to *Sunnī* schools of thought. Mosques were convenient meeting places and Friday sermons constituted the best medium for rallying support for the cause. The 'ulamā were mainly responsible for the victory.

They tried to put the movement in a radical direction... They originated the idea of non-co-operation and put constant pressure on the Central [All-India] *Khilāfat* Committee to adopt it and put it into practice .¹³⁹

The majority of the 'ulamā was in line with JUH. Mawlānā Ashraf 'Alī Thānwī¹⁴⁰ (1864-1943), Mawlānā Aḥmad Razā Khān Barelwī¹⁴¹ and Muftī Muḥammad Maḥzarullāh Dihlawī,¹⁴² however, were discordant voices. The disciples of these figures contributed to theological discussions refuting the JUH *fatwā*.¹⁴³ The Quranic verse, upon which JUH's *fatwā* was based, was differently interpreted by the opponents. According to them, the verse prohibits the *mawālāt*, not the *ma'āmalāt*. *Mawālāt* means affection and friendship; *ma'āmalāt* refers to exchange dealings; though friendship with all non-Muslims was prohibited, ordinary day-to-day dealings and transactions affecting social life were allowed. It was also pointed out that if *mawālāt* was wrong for the British, the same should be applied to the Hindus.

The pro-*Khilāfat* forces were so strong that anti-JUH 'ulamā' could not influence the masses. Mawlawī Hākim 'Alī (1869-1925), a follower of Mawlānā Aḥmad Raḡā Khān, who lectured at Islamia College (Lahore), sided with the lobby which insisted on retaining grant-in-aid from the government against students' wishes. Hākim 'Alī was eventually forced to resign his post in the College.¹⁴⁴

AIKC passed a resolution (Karachi: July 1921) advising Muslims not to serve in the British army which would amount to killing their co-religionists in the event of their fighting in the Middle East under the orders of the British. The 'ulamā' and AIKC leaders who were behind the passing of this resolution were arrested. The 'ulamā' were becoming more and more radical in their anti-British stance. By the end of 1921, they were not content with mere non-co-operation; they visualised complete independence as their goal.¹⁴⁵

The 'ulamā' and modern educated leaders of the *Khilāfat* and Non-co-operation movements were interned one after the other. The leadership of the movement fell into the hands of Gāndhī who called it off in February 1922 as a consequence of the Chauri Chaura (District Gorakhpur) incident in which an enraged mob set a police station on fire and 21 policemen were burnt to death. Gāndhī was severely criticised by the leaders of the movement, especially the 'ulamā; to them it seemed that Gāndhī had dashed their hopes.

While all this was happening in India, the new political leadership in Turkey was successful in its efforts to get the post-war treaty affecting the political future of the country

revised. The Treaty of Lausanne (July 1923) was accordingly signed. Turkey was declared a Republic (29 October 1923). The dignity of the institution of the *Khilāfat* had no other importance for the new rulers of Turkey than that of 'an historical memory',¹⁴⁶ and the institution of the *Khilāfat* simply disappeared (3 March 1924).

It was the supreme irony of the *Khilāfat* movement that Indian Muslims struggled to preserve an institution over the existence of which they had no direct influence.

2.21.2 Hijrat (Emigration) Episode

The Non-co-operation movement was in full swing when the idea of the emigration of Indian Muslims to Afghanistan, the nearest *dār-ul-Islām* (land of peace), was mooted.¹⁴⁷ This idea was given a religious basis by Mawlānā ʿAbdul Bārī and Mawlānā Abul Kalām Āzād through their *fatwās*.¹⁴⁸ Amīr Amānullāh Khān (1892-1960), the ruler of Afghanistan, stirred up the feelings of Indian Muslims by issuing welcoming statements. The Afghanistan Government's pronouncements were meant more to scare the British than to show goodwill to Indian Muslims.

Thousands of Muslims from the NWFP, the Punjab and Sind sold their moveable property. Some of them even divorced their wives who were unwilling to emigrate, arranged their dependents' weddings on the roadside, and headed for the Afghanistan border in the scorching heat of July (1920). The number of emigrants soon reached 30,000. It was beyond the financial resources of the Afghanistan Government to absorb such a huge influx; therefore,

restrictions were imposed on the emigrants. That was the end of the *Hijrat*. Hundreds died *en route* and several thousands returned penniless and disillusioned. The movement, not tempered by sober thinking, was the cause of the ruin of hundreds of Muslim families.¹⁴⁹

2.22 The Aftermath of the *Khilāfat* and Non-co-operation Movements

The Mappilla Rebellion (1921)¹⁵⁰ came as a blow to the Hindu-Muslim unity, even when the *Khilāfat* and Non-co-operation movements were at their peak. The trouble stemmed from agrarian unrest of the Mappilla tenants and landless labourers against their Hindu landlords and money lenders; but it soon assumed the form of *jihād*, resulting in forcible conversion to Islam and large-scale massacre, under the prevailing ideology of the *Khilāfat* movement. Whilst not supporting the so-called conversion of Hindus by the Mappilla,¹⁵¹ JUH nevertheless exploited the general sympathy of Muslim masses for the Mappilla as another avenue for the ventilation of anti-British feeling when government forces ruthlessly suppressed the rebellion.

The sufferings of the Hindu victims and forcible conversions, widely publicised, gave rise to Hindu-Muslim tension. In this tense situation, the *Shuddhī* (Conversion to Hinduism) and *Sangathan* (Unification or Consolidation) movements were launched by the militant Hindu nationalists.

Whilst some 'ulamā' accused JUH of sacrificing Islamic tenets in order to please Hindus, the conservative as well as some

other sections within INC criticised Gāndhī for ignoring Hindu interests for the sake of promoting co-operation between the two communities. They believed that such compromises could only result in larger Muslim demands.¹⁵² The Mappilla Rebellion made the ground fertile for militant Hindu nationalists. V.D. Savarkar, in his treatise *Hindūtvā* (1923), systematically formulated for the first time the creed of the Hindu nation. *Hindūtvā* (Hinduness) was defined as that which embraced 'all the departments of thought and the activity of the whole of our Hindu race'.¹⁵³

The Hindu *Mahāsabhā* held its first important session in 1923 (Belgaum) after almost 16 years of its formation (1907). It specifically dealt with social, cultural and religious questions which had been outside INC's area of concern. The *Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh* (National Volunteer Corps) was formed with the aim of organising the indoctrinated and physically fit among the Hindu youth (Nagpur: 1925).

2.22.1 *Shuddhī* and *Sangathan* Movements

There is no explicit provision in Hindu orthodoxy for the conversion of an individual or a group of individuals into the Hindu fold. The *Āryā Samāj*, however, introduced the element of proselytisation into Hinduism. The *Āryā Samajists* of the Punjab were the first to respond to the alarm raised by Hindus against alleged conversion during the Mappilla Rebellion. Funds were raised and scholars were sent to Malabar for the reclamation of Hindus alleged to have been forcibly converted into Islam. After his release from jail, Swāmī Shradhānandā (1856-1926) devoted his

life to the *Shuddhī* movement. He made UP his centre of activities.¹⁵⁴

Hindu society, fragmented by sect and caste cleavages, was considered to be vulnerable. The militant Hindu nationalists focused attention on the creation and consolidation of an organisation with a clear political consciousness. This scheme was known as the *Sanghathan*. The *Sanghathan* movement popularised war-like exercises with the ostensible aim of making Hindus capable of defending themselves against the Muslims.

2.22.2 Tablīgh and Tanzīm Movements

The 'ulamā', despite their accommodative role during the *Khilāfat* and Non-Co-operation movements (in an inter-communal sense), responded to these Hindu initiatives by establishing counter-organisations. The *Deobandīs*, *Barelwīs* and the moderates, not willing to be associated with a definite sect, set up separate organisations for the single purpose of *tablīgh* (the preaching of Islam). *Anjuman Raḡā-yi-Muṣṭafā*, *Jamīyat-i-Da'wat-w-Tablīgh*, *Anjuman Tablīgh-ul-Islām*, *Tablighī Jamāāt* and several other similar organisations worked independently to check the proselytising activities of the *Āryā Samāj*. Dr. Sayf-ud-dīn Kichlew (1884-1963) formed *Jamīyat-i-Tanzīm* with the aim of counteracting the activities of the Hindu *Sanghathan*.

Throughout the period when proselytising movements were at the peak of their activities, street fights and riots were reported from most of the principal cities. Hundreds were killed and thousands were injured. Within five years (1923-1927), 88

riots had taken place in UP alone, resulting in 81 deaths and 2,301 injured.¹⁵⁵ The situation was even worse in the Punjab. During the period 1922-1927, 474 riots were recorded.¹⁵⁶

The explanation for Hindu-Muslim antagonism during the '20s is generally sought by Indian nationalist writers in terms of the dubious character of Swāmī Sharddhānandā and the evil designs of the (British) Indian government which was bent upon shattering the Hindu-Muslim unity built during the Non-co-operation movement.¹⁵⁷ British writers generally interpreted the antagonism between the two communities as stemming from the Government of India Act, 1919.¹⁵⁸ Under this Act, franchise was considerably enlarged. The Hindus in the Punjab were politically conscious of the power of numbers and the role of the majority. The 1921 census caused alarm among the Hindus because their population had decreased during the inter-censal period leading up to it.¹⁵⁹ The Mappilla outbreak simply added fuel to the already smouldering fire of inter-communal tension. Without doubt there were many sincere religious men on both sides (i.e. adherents of *Shuddhī* and *Tablīgh*) who were active only in a purely religious sense (without any political motivation), but behind them were the politicians engaged in planning election strategies.

The Hindu-Muslim antagonism in the Punjab after 1923 can be traced to the enactment of the Municipal Amendment Act, 1923, which was designed to benefit the Muslims. The balance of power in several municipalities was tilted in favour of the Muslims due to the provision of extra Muslim seats. The resentment felt by the urban Hindus on account of this led to an intensification of antagonism between the two communities.¹⁶⁰

2.23 From 'Non-co-operation' to 'Co-operation'

After the Non-co-operation movement was called off, INC split into factions. A faction led by C.R. Dās (1870-1925) and Motilal Nehrū (1861-1931) advocated that Indians should join the legislatures, ostensibly with a view to bringing them to a standstill. Since INC was committed to a creed of non-co-operation, they formed the *Swarāj* (self-rule) Party (January 1923). Those Muslim politicians, who had been critical of Non-co-operation movement, were pleased with this new development. Sir Muḥammad Shafī' (1869-1932) noted in his diary:

I am glad non-co-operation is now dead and the future struggle has re-entered the constitutional arena.¹⁶¹

AIML, overshadowed by AIKC, decided to show its political strength by taking part in the 1923 election.

Non-co-operation for INC was a strategic move which could be suspended or even changed in favour of co-operation. But the 'ulamā' of JUH made non-co-operation a creed of religion. They were not in line with the *Swarāj* Party. Ḥakīm Ajmal Khān, close to JUH, failed to persuade the 'ulamā' to amend their *fatwā*, issued in 1920.¹⁶² Some 'ulamā' were in favour of reconsidering the *fatwā*. For example, Mawlānā Ḥabībūr Raḥmān (d.1929) put forward a case for doing so in his presidential speech at the annual session of JUH (Gaya: 24-26 December 1922).¹⁶³ The 'ulamā', by and large, did not pay any heed to Ḥabībūr Raḥmān and preferred to uphold the *fatwā* in its original form.¹⁶⁴

In the 1923 election, the *Swarāj* Party could win 41 out of 101 elected seats in the Central Legislative Assembly. It was absolutely clear that the *Swarāj* Party with such strength would not be able to bring the Assembly to a standstill. The election results forced the *Swarāj* Party to work with the Assembly rather than make it ineffective. The other solid group inside the Assembly consisted of 17 Independents, led by Muḥammad 'Alī Jinnāḥ. Neither the *Swarāj* Party nor the Independents were grouped along religious lines. Out of 41 affiliates of the *Swarāj* Party, eight were Muslims. The Independents, 14 of whom were non-Muslims, were led by Jinnah who was a Muslim. After the death of Ghulām Muḥammad Bhurgarī (1881-1924), Muḥammad 'Alī Jinnāḥ and Muḥammad Yáqūb (1879-1942) were the only two Muslims among the Independents. In spite of their different view points, the *Swarāj* Party and the Independents co-operated with each other on certain points. Together the two groups were referred to as the Nationalist Party.¹⁶⁵

Under the mounting Hindu-Muslim antagonism of the '20s, the *Swarāj* Party and the Independents faced a truly difficult task. Their chief aim was to maintain harmony between Hindu and Muslim communities, even though this went against the popular mood. In the 1926 election, they suffered heavy losses. Motilal Nehrū wrote to his son in disgust as follows:

The Malaviya-Lālā gang aided by Birla's money are making frantic efforts to capture the Congress. They will probably succeed as no counter effort is possible from our side. I shall probably make a public declaration after the Congress [session at Gauhati: December 1926] and with it resign my seat in the Assembly though I am still acclaimed as the leader of the strongest party in the country. We can do no possible good in the Assembly or

the Councils with our present members and the kind of men we have. I fear there will soon be defections from our ranks but apart from this it is impossible to achieve anything.¹⁶⁶

Muhammad 'Alī Jinnāh fared even worse than the *Swarāj* Party candidates. In the outgoing Assembly the Independents held the balance between the government and the *Swarāj* Party; but in the new Assembly he was a leader with scarcely any following.

Entry into the Legislative Assembly and the Provincial Councils in 1923 became a prelude to élitist politics involving the design of constitutional schemes. At AIML's annual session (Lahore: 24-25 May 1924) a committee was appointed to draft a constitution in consultation with other organisations.¹⁶⁷ The Reforms Enquiry Committee (1924) (commonly known as the Muddiman Committee), represented a step towards constitutional debate. But the most spectacular step towards constitutional debate took the form of the proposals put forward at the Muslim Legislators' Conference (Delhi: 20 March 1927). Muhammad 'Alī Jinnāh was the moving spirit behind the Conference of Muslim Legislators. The Conference suggested giving up separate electorate for Muslims if four proposals were accepted. These 'Delhi Proposals' were as follows:

- 1) Sind should be separated from the Bombay province and constituted into a separate province.
- 2) Reform should be introduced in NWFP and in Baluchistan too on the same footing as in other Provinces in India.

3) In the Punjab and Bengal the proportion of communal representation should be in accordance with the numbers of Hindus and Muslims in the population.

4) In the Central Legislature, Mohammedan representation should be no less than a third.¹⁶⁸

INC accepted the proposals with two amendments. It made reforms in NWFP conditional on the provision of a suitable judiciary, and the separation of Sind conditional on the separation of Andhra.

2.24 The Nehrū Report

In such a prevailing *milieu* of Indian political development, the Conservative Government in Britain appointed the Statutory Commission under the Chairmanship of Sir John Simon with a remit to review the working of the Government of India Act, 1919. The exclusively British composition of the Simon Commission evoked protests from INC and a faction of AIML (led by Muḥammad Ālī Jinnāḥ). The Simon Commission visited India. Despite some co-operation extended to it by a faction of AIML led by Sir Muḥammad Shafī', it was more or less completely boycotted. Lord Birkenhead, the Secretary of State for India, explained in the House of Lords why no Indian was included in the Commission. In his view no unanimous report could be expected from a Commission which included Indian representatives!

The All Parties Conference (Delhi: 11 February 1928), which constituted an 11 member committee (under the chairmanship of Motilal Nehru)¹⁶⁹ gave its response to Lord Birkenhead's statement. The All Parties Conference included representatives of AIKC and (the faction led by Jinnāh of) AIML but not of JUH. The exclusion of representatives of the 'ulamā' from the Conference had been due to the following reasons:

- i) The 'ulamā' did not possess the necessary training in respect of the techniques of constitution-drafting; and
- ii) The 'ulamā's stand on issues tended to be based on religious creed which they could not change.

The Committee, under Motilal Nehrū's Chairmanship, produced a *Swarāj* Constitution for India which subsequently came to be known as the Nehrū Report (August 1928).

The Nehrū Report rejected the principle of separate electorate for Muslims, presenting the constitutional image of a secular India as the only political remedy for inter-religious antagonism. It suggested the reservation of seats for Muslims both in the Central and in the Provincial Legislatures strictly in proportion to their population, with the right to contest additional seats for a fixed period of 10 years.

The Nehrū Report gave rise to strong resentment in different Muslim circles. A faction of AIML, led by Sir Muhammad Shafī', JUH and AIKC were among those opposed to the Nehrū Report. They contended that the principle of separate electorate had been

conceded under the Government of India Act, 1909 and duly accepted by INC in the Lucknow Pact (1916).

INC accepted the Nehrū Report *in toto* (3 November 1928) and a meeting of the All Parties Convention was called (Calcutta: December 1928) to achieve a broader consensus of the political parties. Muḥammad Ālī Jinnāḥ as the leader of one of the factions of AIML submitted a few amendments to the Report which were rejected in their entirety by the Convention. Muḥammad Ālī Jinnāḥ's disappointment with the Convention led to a *rapprochement* between him and Muḥammad Shafī'.

The Nehrū Report was also presented in the Central Legislative Assembly (12 March 1929). The effect of this was to bring Muslim members of the Legislative Assembly together as one bloc to the forefront of Muslim politics irrespective of their political affiliations. All of them, with the singular exception of Taṣadduq Aḥmad Khān Sharwānī, opposed the Nehrū Report.

JUH strongly criticised the Nehrū Report,¹⁷⁰ lamenting that it was biased against Muslims whom the Report held responsible for inter-communal disharmony in India. JUH made the point that independence could not be achieved and no successful government could be formed as long as the minorities remained dissatisfied.

JUH, however, expressed a commitment on its part not to 'demand unfair and unjust concessions for Muslims'. Muslims must be given their due share, legally and rationally justified. With respect to the religious rights of Muslims, JUH stressed the importance of religious liberty, preservation of Muslim

institutions and practice of Muslim law. Its suggestions were as follows:

- 1) Such a system of franchise should be adopted that every community might have a number of voters according to its proportion of the total population.
- 2) A Muslim majority be preserved in the Punjab and Bengal.
- 3) Reform be introduced in the NWFP and Baluchistan without stipulating any conditions.
- 4) Sind be unconditionally separated from Bombay province.
- 5) The Muslim representation in Central Legislature and the Central Executive Cabinet should be no less than one third.
- 6) No bill, resolution or amendment or any part thereof should be passed in any legislature, if 3/4ths of the members of any community in that legislature opposed such a bill, resolution or amendment or part thereof.
- 7) The concessions enjoyed by the Muslim minorities in Hindu majority provinces would be similarly extended to the Hindu minorities in the Punjab, Bengal and the NWFP.

- 8) The reservation of seats for minorities should not be for only 10 years, but for a period to be determined according to the wishes of the minorities themselves.
- 9) Every community be given a share in the services of the state in proportion to its population.
- 10) Every community be given grants-in-aid to propagate its culture and education in proportion to its population; and the responsibility for education should be left in every community's own hands.
- 11) The delineation of constituencies for election be performed in such a way that the majority community in a province was not adversely affected.
- 12) The national language should be Hindustani with both Urdu and Hindi scripts.
- 13) Representation, for all Legislatures, Central and Provincial, would be in accordance with the communal proportion of the population.
- 14) Muslims would not be willing to abandon the principle of separate electorate until and unless the above safeguards were accepted.

2.25 The All India Muslim Conference (1928) (AIMC)

The Muslim members of the legislatures were ready to make use of the political opportunities against the background of widespread Muslim dissatisfaction to which the Nehru Report gave rise. They organised an All India Muslim Conference (AIMC) with the aim of 'bringing together on one platform all political organisations in the country and representative active Muslims'¹⁷¹ in order to formulate a considered Muslim viewpoint with special reference to constitutional issues. The Conference was held in Delhi (31 December 1928 - 1 January 1929). His Highness the Āghā Khān, the leader of the Simla Deputation (1906), a former President of AIML and, above all, a 'valuable line of communication with the British Government',¹⁷² was invited to preside over the AIMC meeting. The Āghā Khān was asked to preside for the main reason that he had excellent personal relations with the colonial power.¹⁷³ It also helped that he was in a position to provide financial support for the conduct of the Conference.

AIMC was organised on a permanent basis, but it was not a political party in the strict sense of the term. It was more of a confederation of parties and individuals, than a disciplined party. Three parties (i.e. AIKC, JUH and AIML Shafi' group) constituted the main components of AIMC.

His Highness the Āghā Khān's address was a reminder that Muslim politics had taken a U-turn and reached back to the early phase of AIML (1906-1911). His address began with a homage to His Majesty the King Emperor, ending with the prayer 'May His Majesty

live long to continue to shower the blessings of his beneficent rule on his subjects'.¹⁷⁴

AIMC enumerated the demands on behalf of the Muslims, which were similar to JUH's proposals in response to the Nehrū Report.¹⁷⁵ JUH's participation was also reflected in the resolution to establish 'night schools for secular and religious education and instruction of Muslim adults'. The 'revival of Islamic spirit' was emphasised by 'utilising mosques as centres for social, moral and economic activities'. It was made an aim of this Conference to save Muslims from 'following un-Islamic customs and habits'.¹⁷⁶

JUH, committed as it was to complete independence and radical in its general political approach, thus became a part of AIMC, perhaps due to its fear of total eclipse in the event of its keeping aloof from such a platform. The 'ulamā's position had been considerably weakened since the end of the Non-co-operation movement.

2.26 Dr. Muhammad Iqbal on the Hindu-Muslim Question

Despite the opposition of all Muslim parties, INC was committed to a policy of putting the Nehrū Report into practice. It warned the (British) Indian Government that INC would start a civil disobedience movement if the Report was not accepted by December 1929. And eventually it did start such a movement. At the same time, INC scrapped the Nehrū Report in favour of a much more radical approach while launching civil disobedience (April

1930). The bone of contention no longer existed. JUH came out in support of INC's civil disobedience movement.

The Report of the Statutory Commission was published in May 1930 when INC was busy with its civil disobedience movement. In continuation of the Statutory Commission, a series of Round Table Conferences were organised. The first Round Table Conference was in session (December 1930) while AIML's annual session was taking place (Allahabad: 29-30 December 1930). Dr. Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938),¹⁷⁷ the Muslim poet-philosopher, was the President of the Allahabad session of AIML. Against a perspective of the Nehrū Report and its denunciation by the Muslims, Iqbāl spoke as follows:

...And as far as I have been able to read the Muslim mind, I have no hesitation in declaring that, if the principle that the Indian Muslim is entitled to full and free development on the lines of his own culture and tradition in his own Indian homelands, is recognised as the basis of a permanent communal settlement, he will be ready to stake his all for the freedom of India. The principle that each group is entitled to free development on its own lines is not inspired by any feeling of narrow communalism. There are communalism and communities. A community which is inspired by a feeling of ill will towards other communities is low and ignoble. I entertain the highest respect for the customs, laws, religious and social institutions of other communities. Nay, it is my duty, according to the teaching of the *Quran*, even to defend their places of worship, if need be. Yet I love the communal group which is the source of my life and behaviour; and which has formed me what I am by giving me its religion, its literature, its thought, its culture, and thereby recreating its whole past, as a living operative factor, in my present consciousness...India is a continent of human groups belonging to different races, speaking different languages, and professing different religions. Their behaviour is not at all determined by a common race-consciousness. Even the Hindus do not form a homogeneous group. The principle of European democracy cannot be applied to India without recognising the fact of communal groups. The Muslim demand

for the creation of a Muslim India within India is, therefore, perfectly justified...

I would like to see the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind, and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self-government within the British Empire, or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North-West India. The proposal was put forward before the Nehru Committee.¹⁷⁸ They rejected it on the ground that, if carried into effect, it would give a very unwieldy State. This is true in so far as the area is concerned; in point of population the State contemplated by the proposal would be much less than some of the present Indian provinces. The exclusion of Ambala Division and perhaps of some districts [of the Punjab] where non-Muslims predominate, will make it less extensive and more Muslim in population so that the exclusion suggested will enable this consolidated State to give a more effective protection to non-Muslim minorities within its area.¹⁷⁹

2.27 The Majlis-i-Ahrār-i-Islām (Society of the Free People of Islam) (MAI)

Since the days of the Non-co-operation Movement, INC, JUH and AIKC had worked together so closely that leading Muslim figures seemed to occupy the centre of the stage in all three parties. Among such figures were Mawlānā Abul Kalām Azād, Muḥammad 'Alī, Ḥakīm Ajmal Khān, Ḥasrat Mohānī, Dr. M.A. Anṣārī and many others. For instance, Mawlānā Abul Kalām Azād, a founder member of JUH, presided over JUH session (1921), INC special session (1923), and the *Khilāfat* Conference (1925). Mawlānā Muḥammad 'Alī led a *Khilāfat* delegation to London (1920), presided over an INC session (Coconada: 1923), and served on JUH's appointed committees (1925).

The publication of the Nehrū Report was a turning point in Muslim politics. AIML emerged as a force again. Muslim supporters of the Nehrū Report defected from JUH and AIKC. They either wholeheartedly joined INC or formed new groups/parties. The major defection from AIKC occurred in the Punjab.

The Punjab branch of AIKC was largely dominated by *Ahl-i-Ḥadīṡ* and the *Deobandī 'ulamā'*. They had greater respect for an *'ālim* (e.g., Mawlānā Abul Kalām Azād) than for a modern educated leader (e.g., Mawlānā Muhammad 'Alī). Discontented with the policies of AIKC under Muḥammad 'Alī, the Punjab branch supported the Nehrū Report. The Punjab branch was finally dissolved by the top leadership of AIKC.

After a short spell in the wilderness, the erstwhile members of AIKC Punjab branch organised themselves under the name of *Majlis-i-Aḥrār-i-Islām* (MAI) (29 December 1929). The declared objectives of the newly-founded party included (a) securing 'independence for the country'; (b) fostering 'better relations with other communities'; (c) establishing 'an Islamic system'; and working 'for the uplift of the masses, especially the Muslim masses'.¹⁸⁰

The leadership was still so intoxicated with the enthusiasm of the Non-co-operation movement that it took MAI into INC's movement of civil disobedience. Its radical religious interpretation of Islam provided MAI with a comparatively substantial base at the level of the masses. It perceived social change in the early history of Islam as consisting of the overthrow

of exploitative classes, the restoration of the honour of the depressed and the poor, and the practice of human equality.¹⁸¹

MAI attracted a considerable section of Punjabi poor and lower middle-class Muslims to its rank and file. It came into prominence during the Kashmir Agitation of 1931¹⁸² when a determined band of 100 volunteers, led by Mawlānā Mazhar Ālī Azhar, marched towards Jammu from Sialkot (Punjab). This bold step of interfering with policies of a princely state brought MAI its political reputation.

MAI had an explicitly religious appeal. The leaders, a number of them 'ulamā', frequently referred to the *Qurān* and the golden age of Islamic history which was free from oppressive and exploitative classes.

With its strong hatred towards imperialism, MAI developed a feeling of enmity towards the *Aḥmadīs*. Mirzā Ghulām Aḥmad Qādiyānī (1839-1908), the founder of *Aḥmadiyyah*, was a supporter of the British and was proud that his father had helped the British against his countrymen in the 1857 Insurrection. He always prayed for the imperialism of the British. When he claimed to be a prophet, the 'ulamā' issued a *fatwā* declaring him *kāfir*. The grandfather of MAI leader Mawlānā Ḥabībūr Raḥmān Ludhīyanawī, was the first to mobilise the 'ulamā' against the activities of Mirzā Ghulām Aḥmad. Following the religious legacy of the 'ulamā' and its own anti-imperialist stand, MAI stood against the *Aḥmadīs*. The role of *Aḥmadīs* during the Kashmir Agitation of 1931 increased MAI's bitterness towards them. MAI made one of its policy priorities to counter the missionary activities of the *Aḥmaddiyyah*

movement. In 1933, it opened an office in Qadian, the headquarters of the *Ahmadiyyah* movement.

2.28 The Government of India Act, 1935

The Government of India Act, 1935¹⁸³ was the product of a number of deliberations that had taken place during the preceding decade: the Report of the Indian Statutory Commission; the reports of the three round-table conferences (December 1930 - December 1932); a White Paper on The Communal Award; constitution of a Joint Select Committee of both Houses of British Parliament including 27 co-opted Indians.

The Government of India Act, 1935 envisaged a federation of 11 provinces of British India and 560 princely states. At the federal level, a bicameral legislature was to be introduced. Members representing the provinces of British India were to be elected and those representing the interests of princely states were to be nominated by their *Mahārajahs* or *Nawābs*. Matters pertaining to defence and external affairs were to be placed under the control of the Governor-General who would be responsible to the Secretary of State for India and the British Government. The Governor-General would be empowered with special responsibilities, among other subjects, for the preservation of peace, safeguarding the legitimate interests of minorities, and looking after the financial stability of the Indian Government.

At the provincial level, responsible government was to be introduced. Governors of the provinces were to be appointed on behalf of His Majesty by a commission. The provincial

legislatures, bicameral for six provinces (i.e. Madras, Bombay, Bengal, the United Provinces, Bihar and Assam) and unicameral for the others (i.e. the Punjab, the Central Provinces and Berar, the North-West Frontier Province, Orissa and Sind) were to be elected for five years. The governors would be vested with special powers in the provinces similar to those given to the Governor-General at the federal level. The franchise was extended from seven million [in 1919] to about thirty six million voters [in 1935], representing 30 per cent of the adult population.¹⁸⁴

INC expressed its dissatisfaction with the Government of India Act, 1935 with the comment that it represented a 'new charter of slavery to strengthen the bonds of imperialist domination and to intensify the exploitation of our masses'.¹⁸⁵ AIML rejected its federal part on the grounds that it was 'most reactionary, retrograde, injurious and fatal ... totally unacceptable' but notwithstanding the provincial part was seen to be utilised 'for what it was worth'.¹⁸⁶

Despite the dissatisfaction expressed by the two main established parties in varying degrees, the (British) Indian Government was determined to bring the Government of India Act, 1935 into effect. Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy, urged the Indians to 'give these reforms [The Act, 1935] a fair and reasonable trial ... and work the constitution in a spirit of tolerance and co-operation, for the honour and good of their motherland'.¹⁸⁷ INC, AIML and other political parties were persuaded to derive whatever benefit they could by taking advantage of the provision of the Government of India Act, 1935 relating to responsible government. The federal part of the Act was held in abeyance

pending the agreement of 50 per cent of the princely states to join the federation; but the provincial part, relating to the provinces of (British) India was to come into force with effect from 1 April 1937.

2.29 The Central Parliamentary Board (CPB)

AIML authorised Muḥammad 'Alī Jinnāh to form a Central Parliamentary Board (CPB) to take charge of the provincial elections. In 1936, AIML, an urban-based Muslim political party, with little contact with or concern for the masses, was an 'All India' organisation only in name. It had no proper primary organisation. The provincial organisation, however, did exist; but it was inactive. AIML had surrendered whatever influence it had to AIMC. AIML's annual sessions had in the past few years failed to attract the masses. During the session of AIML in 1930, a quorum of an average of less than 100 was maintained with the utmost effort; and the position was similar in the 1931 session.¹⁸⁸ No annual sessions were held during 1934 and 1935. Party discipline was so poor that Nawābzādah Liyāqat 'Alī Khān (1895-1951), the then Honorary General Secretary, aligned himself with the National Agriculturist Party of the United Provinces, for the purpose of contesting the election.

AIMC continued to be inactive and ineffective in 1936. Its affiliates, in their individual position, were more interested in contesting election from their parties of choice than from the platform of AIMC. Its executive board under the chairmanship of 'Abdullāh Hārūn (1873-1942), after having a few sittings in the

early months of 1936, decided not to use the AIMC platform for election.

JUH, one of the components of AIMC, was also in disarray. It had become almost a party of the *Deobandī ūlamā'*, and *Deobandīs* were divided over the issue of whether or not they should support INC. Mawlānā Ashraf 'Alī Thānwī resigned from the Rectorship of *Dār-ul-ūlūm* Deoband (1935) under the pretext that the pro-INC element was preaching its political creed in *Dār-ul-ūlūm*.¹⁸⁹ The Pan-Islamist modern educated group was equally unhappy with JUH's support of INC's civil disobedience movement (1930), and it tried to set up a parallel body to JUH at Kanpur (1932). Mawlānā Abul Maḥasin Muḥammad Sajjād, the JUH leader in Bihar, organised a new party called the Independent Muslim Party. Its aim was to adopt a policy dictated by provincial needs rather than in line with JUH's overall policy.

There were other provincial parties which were led either entirely or largely by Muslims. At the same time, the Justice Party of Madras, the Unionist Party of the Punjab, the National Agriculturist Party of the United Provinces and the Sind United Party were formed to serve the interests of *zamīndārs* in rural areas irrespective of religion. The *Khudāī Khidmatgār* Party of the NWFP, the *Azād* Party and the Muslim Political Party of Sind, and the *Krishak Projā* Party of Bengal were parties which were led entirely by Muslims. These parties of provincial importance were reluctant to undermine their position by joining CPB. The *Khudāī Khidmatgār* Party opted to make an alliance with INC instead of AIML.

As a consequence of the hostile attitude of the provincial parties with a Muslim following and due to AIML's inherent weakness, CPB could not even constitute provincial parliamentary boards in four of the provinces (NWFP, Sind, Bihar and Orissa), and candidates could not be found for all the Muslim-reserved seats.

AIML failed to bring together the parties of the Muslim majority provinces on to a common platform. CPB 'remained little more than a paper scheme'.¹⁹⁰

MAI, one of the two parties backed by the *ulamā'* in 1936, agreed to join CPB on condition that no *Aḥmadī* would be given a ticket, and that AIML should declare its objective as complete freedom rather than dominion status.¹⁹¹ But soon, MAI parted company with the leadership of AIML. According to MAI sources, the bone of contention was the fee of Rs. 750/- imposed on each candidate. MAI's meagre finances made the acceptance of such a condition impossible.¹⁹²

JUH had co-operated closely with AIML. It was proclaimed in CPB's manifesto that in 'all matters of purely religious character, due weight shall be given to opinions of *Jamiat-ulama-i-Hind* and *Mujtahids*'.¹⁹³ Mawlānā Aḥmad Sa'īd, the Secretary General of JUH, was extremely active in the election campaign.¹⁹⁴ He was in constant touch with Jinnāḥ to take appropriate steps for furthering AIML's campaign, and was the first to use the title of '*Qā'id-i-Aẓam*' (the great leader) to refer to Muḥammad Ālī Jinnāḥ [Moradabad: 7 December 1936].¹⁹⁵

2.30 The 1937 Election

The election for provincial legislatures was held in April-May 1937. INC emerged as the majority party in six provinces (Madras, Bombay, UP, Central Provinces and Berar, Bihar, and Orissa) and was the largest single party in three others (Bengal, Assam, and the NWFP). It captured 711 out of 808 general seats in legislative assemblies. It also won 18 seats out of 38 reserved for 'labour', four seats out of 37 allotted to landholders, and three out of 56 reserved for 'commerce'.

The party position in the Muslim constituencies of Legislative Assemblies and of the Legislative Councils is respectively shown in Tables 2.2 and 2.3.

INC could find only 58 Muslim candidates for 493 seats in the Legislative Assemblies; it won 26 of these, mainly in the NWFP (15 seats) where it had the solid support of the *Khudā'ī Khidmatgār* Party led by Khān 'Abdul Ghaffār Khān. The remaining 11 seats won by INC were in Madras, United Provinces, the Punjab and Bihar. It could secure no Muslim seat in six out of a total of 11 provinces (Bombay, Bengal, CP and Berar, Assam, Orissa and Sind).

So far as Muslim seats in the Legislative Councils were concerned, INC could not win even a single seat.

AIML won 108 seats out of 493 Muslim seats in the Legislative Assemblies. In Bengal, out of 121 seats AIML won 39. In the Punjab, the situation was extremely poor. Only one AIML candidate won in the Punjab Legislative Assembly election. In the

Table 2.2

The Result of the 1937 Election for Reserved Muslim Seats
in the Provincial Legislative Assemblies

Province	Assembly Total Seats	Reserved Muslim Seats			AIML	INC	Indepen- dents	Other Parties
		General	Women, others	Total				
Madras	215	28	-	28	9	4	6	9 [Justice Party 8, Muslim Progressive 1]
Bombay	175	29	1	30	18	-	12	-
Bengal	250	117	4	121	39	-	41	41 [Krishak Projā Party 36, Tippra Krishak Samity 5]
United Provinces	228	64	2	66	26	1	30	9 [National Agriculturist Party 9]
Punjab	175	84	2	86	1	2	5	78 [Unionist Party 74, Majlis-i-Ahrar-i-Islām 2, Ittihad-i-Millat 2]
Bihar	152	39	1	40	-	4	16	20 [Majlis-i-Ahrar-i-Islām 3, United Party 6, No Party 11]
CP and Berar	112	14	-	14	5	-	1	8 [Muslim Parliamentary Group (Rauf Shah Group) 8]
Assam	108	34	-	34	10	-	-	24 [Muslim Party 24]
NWFP	50	36	-	36	-	15	2	19 [No Party 19]
Orissa	60	4	-	4	-	-	3	1 [National Party 1]
Sind	60	33	1	34	-	-	-	34 [Muslim Political Party 15, United Party 17, Azad Party 1, Doubtful 1]
TOTAL	1585	482	11	493	108	26	116	243

[Source: Return Showing the Results of Elections in India: 1937 [Cmd. 5589] (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1937)]

Note The result, reported in newspapers differed from the official 'return', but the official figures are preferred to the mutually contradicting unofficial figures. Official figures are ambiguous for each province, a number of members are shown as 'Independants' but along with them some are labelled 'No Party', and in the case of Sind one independant member is shown as 'Doubtful' For unofficial figures, based upon newspaper reports, see Zaidi, I H, 'Aspects of the Development of Muslim League Policy, 1937-47' in C.H. Philips and Wainwright, Mary Doreen (eds), The Partition of India (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1970, pp 245-275

Table 2.3

The Result of the 1937 Election for Reserved Muslim Seats in the Legislative Councils

Province	Total Seats	Muslim Seats	AIML	INC	Independents	Others
Madras	46	7	3	-	2	2 (Justice Party)
Bombay	26	5	2	-	3	-
Bengal	30	17	7	-	9	1 (Krishak Proja Party)
United Provinces	52	17	-	-	16	1 (National Agriculturist Party)
Bihar	14	4	-	-	1	3 (United Party 2, No Party 1)
Assam	18	6	-	-	-	6 (Muslim Party 6)
Total	186	56	12	-	31	13

[Source: Return Showing the Results of Elections in India: 1937 (Cmd 5589), (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1937), pp.26-27, 53-54, 70-71, p.91, p.106]

other two provinces with Muslim majorities - NWFP and Sind - AIML could not win even a single seat. Nevertheless AIML scored substantial success in the Muslim minority provinces (Madras, Bombay, United Provinces, CP and Berar, Assam).

Of the Muslim constituencies for the Legislative Councils, AIML could get 12 seats out of 56, and all these were from three provinces (Madras, Bombay and Bengal).

An analysis of the results would indicate that neither INC nor AIML was very popular with Muslim voters. 243 Muslim seats in the Legislative Assemblies (nearly 50 per cent of the total) were won by the provincial parties; of the remaining 50 per cent, Independent candidates took their share of 23.5 per cent.

Out of a total of 56 seats in the Legislative Councils' 31 (i.e. more than 55 per cent) were won by the Independent candidates; 13 seats were shared among the different provincial parties. Muslim voters cast their lot with provincial parties - the Unionists in the Punjab, the *Khudā'ī Khidmatgār* Party in the NWFP, the United Party and the Muslim Political Party in Sind, and the *Krishak Projā* Party in Bengal.

2.31 The Struggle between INC and AIML

During the interval between the passage of the Government of India Act, 1935 to the commencement of the 1937 election, INC and AIML had fairly friendly relations. Muḥammad Ālī Jinnāḥ returned to India from London (24 October 1934) and was still an 'ambassador of unity'. He told party workers (March 1936) that

[t]he Hindus and Muslims must be organised separately, and once they are organised they will understand each other better, and then we will not have to wait for years for understanding ... I am helping eighty million [Muslim] people and if they are more organised they will be all the more useful for the [Indian] national struggle.¹⁹⁶

The manifestos of INC and AIML were drafted according to their differing orientations. AIML especially highlighted cultural issues. It pledged to 'protect and promote the Urdu language and script', 'to protect religious rights of Musalmans' and 'to make every effort to secure the repeal of repressive laws'.¹⁹⁷ It also spoke of the economic development of the country in general.

INC, for its part, highlighted economic issues and pledged land reform and a policy of welfare of labourers and peasants. The cultural theme was kept at a low key.

In spite of minor differences, the leaders of INC and AIML and impartial observers alike reached, by and large, similar conclusions about the manifestos which they regarded as more or less identical with regard to political issues.¹⁹⁸

Close co-operation existed between Rafi Ahmad Qidwai of INC and Chawdhari Khaliquzzaman of AIML in UP. The latter, who was an erstwhile Congressman, had joined AIML 'as a vote-catching device lest otherwise he should be disturbed by his fellow Muslims'.¹⁹⁹ INC and AIML co-operated in a few constituencies where both viewed the National Agriculturist Party as the opponent. Rafi Ahmad Qidwai, the only Congress Muslim candidate, managed to get elected with the help of Chawdhari Khaliquzzaman.

After the election, provincial ministries were to be formed. INC leaders indulged in controversy as to whether or not the Governors of the Provinces should exercise the special powers vested in them under the Government of India Act, 1935. In four non-INC provinces (i.e. Bengal, Sind, Assam and the Punjab), there was no difficulty in forming ministries. In Bengal A.K. Fazl-ul-Ḥaq formed a coalition government under the leadership of the *Krishak Projā* Party, along with AIML, Independent members and the representatives of the scheduled castes. Fazl-ul-Ḥaq also enjoyed the support of 25 European members of the Legislature. In the Punjab, the Unionist Party, under the guidance of Sir Sikandar Ḥayāt (1892-1942), formed a government. Similarly, Allah Bakhsh and Sir Muhammad Sa'adullāh formed coalition governments respectively in Sind and Assam.

Upon the assurance of Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy, to the effect that Governors would not unduly interfere with the affairs of the provincial governments, INC decided (7 July 1937) to form ministries in seven provinces. From the party position in the provinces of Bihar, Orissa, CP and Berar, Bombay, Madras and the NWFP, the question of any INC co-operating with other parties was a non-issue in view of its overwhelming majority. In UP, however, INC had the support of only one Muslim member of the Legislative Assembly.

Negotiations for coalition took place on the basis of an 'unwritten agreement' between AIML on the one hand and on the other the INC Muslim leaders of UP. At the same time, regard had to be paid to the strategic importance of UP which contained some 15 per cent of Muslim population, and had been a citadel of Muslim

politics. Mawlānā Abul Kalām Azād, the INC negotiator, offered AIML a coalition on condition that it agreed to cease to function as a separate party in the Legislative Assembly, to dissolve the Muslim League Parliamentary Board in UP, and to refrain from putting up its candidates in any future by-elections.²⁰⁰ The AIML leadership characterised these terms as the 'death warrant' of the party and refused to accept the offer.

Mawlānā Abul Kalām Azād, in his account of these events, blamed Jawaharlal Nehrū on the grounds that the negotiations broke down due to the latter's insistence on giving only one seat to AIML instead of the two demanded by its leaders. In Mawlānā Azād's view, Nehrū made a serious mistake which resulted in strengthening AIML position which 'ultimately led to Pakistan'.²⁰¹

INC, politically in need of Muslim support in the Legislative Assembly, offered a place in the Cabinet to Hāfīz Muhammad Ibrāhīm, elected on an AIML ticket. He accepted the offer and crossed the floor. AIML interpreted this as a calculated attack against it. The rift between AIML and INC grew wider and wider from this point onwards.

2.32 The Pe-vitalisation of AIML

The controversy between INC and the (British Indian Government on the question of the Executive powers at the disposal of the Governors, had the effect of intensifying the anxiety of the minorities, safeguards for whose interests had been vested in the Governors. Many Muslims came to believe that their rights would be trampled upon by INC ministries in the Province.

The outcome of the 1937 election made it clear to Muslim intellectuals (e.g., Dr. Muḥammad Iqbāl) that 'a political organisation' which gave 'no promise of improving the lot of the average Muslim' was incapable of attracting 'our [Muslim] masses'.²⁰² At the same time, INC's landslide victory in several provinces made the leaders of the Muslim majority provinces realise that INC would definitely be stronger than any other party if it decided to give effect to the federal part of the Government of India Act, 1935. And, what was to prevent INC from creating a strong federal government?²⁰³

In the light of such a general perspective, the annual session of AIML after the election (Lucknow: 15-18 October 1937), proved to be a landmark in its political career. For the first time since its formation (1906), it opened its membership to every adult Muslim and spoke of raising the living conditions of labourers and increasing their wages. It was resolved 'to frame and put into effect an economic, social and educational programme'. The ultimate aim of AIML was changed from 'full responsible government' to 'full independence'.²⁰⁴

The leaders of the ruling parties in Bengal, the Punjab and Assam (Sir Sikandar Ḥayāt of the Unionist Party, A.K. Fazl-ul-Ḥaq of the *Krishak Projā* Party and Sir Muḥammad Sa'adullāh of the Muslim Party) were present at the Lucknow session with large numbers of their followers. AIML's most important achievement on this occasion consisted of winning the Unionist Party's support. According to the Sikandar-Jinnāh Pact,²⁰⁵ Muslim members of the Unionist Party were taken into the fold of AIML; and AIML secured

the support of the Unionists on national issues concerning the Muslim community.

In UP, the defeat of the National Agriculturist Party (which won 22 seats out of a total of 228 in the Legislative Assembly), followed by the enactment of the United Provinces Tenancy Act, alarmed the big *zamīndārs*. In their desperation, they turned to political parties opposed to the ruling INC. Thus it was that the Muslim *zamīndārs* of the National Agriculturist Party turned to AIML and the Hindu *zamīndārs* to the Hindu *Mahāsabhā*.

From the election results, INC realised its meagre following among the Muslims and started a campaign of 'Muslim mass contact' with a view to propagating its message among the Muslims. AIML resented the campaign which it countered by publicising the ill-treatment being meted out to the Muslim community in provinces in which INC was in power.²⁰⁶ Through its propaganda machinery, AIML persuaded the average Muslim to believe that INC would never attach any importance to the preservation of Muslim culture. The adoption of *Vande Mātaram*²⁰⁷ as a national anthem, the educational schemes of *Vidyā Mandir* and *Wārdhā*, the encouragement of *Devanāgrī* script, and the on-going Hindu-Muslim riots, seemed to prove the point. When INC called for the resignation *en bloc* of its ministries (22 October 1939), on the plea that India had been dragged into World War II without the consent of the Indian leaders, Muḥammad 'Alī Jinnāḥ called upon Muslims to observe on 22 December 1939 as Deliverance Day. The resolution that was passed in various gatherings on that day embodied the view that

[t]he Congress Ministry [*sic.*] both in the discharge of their duties of the administration

and in the legislatures have done their best to flout the Muslim opinion, to destroy Muslim culture, and have interfered with their religious and social life, and trampled upon their economic and political rights...²⁰⁸

According to R. Coupland, a constitutional historian of (British) India,

Indian observers agreed with British officials that Hindu-Muslim relations had never in their experience been so bad [as in 1939].²⁰⁹

2.33 The Lahore Resolution (23 March 1940)

This background of fear of INC domination (equated to Hindu domination) in an independent India made AIML think in terms of partition. Several writers and politicians had proposed partition as a solution to the Hindu-Muslim riots and tensions.²¹⁰ Muhammad Iqbal was the first to echo publicly the idea of a Muslim state either within India or without (Annual Session of AIML, Allahabad, December 1930).

Chawdhari Rahmat Ali (1897-1951), a Cambridge student, denounced the constitutional schemes of the Indian Federation and urged the creation of a Federation of Pakistan as separate from the Indian Federation. He suggested the name 'Pakistan' in January 1933.²¹¹ In October 1938, the Sind Muslim League Provincial Conference canvassed the idea of 'Federation of Indian Muslims' with a separate constitution to assure 'political self-determination of the two nations, known as Hindus and Muslims'.²¹²

AIML held its annual session (Lahore: 22-24 March 1940) in which a resolution for a separate Muslim homeland was passed. Echoing Sayyid Ahmad Khān, Muḥammad Ālī Jinnāḥ spelled out in his presidential address that Hindus and Muslims were two nations. He said:

It is extremely difficult to appreciate why our Hindu friends fail to understand the real nature of Islam and Hinduism. They are not religions in the strict sense of the word, but are, in fact, different and distinct social orders. It is a dream that the Hindus and Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality... The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs and literatures. They neither intermarry, nor interdine together; and indeed they belong to two different civilisations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions. Their aspects on life and of life are different. It is quite clear that Hindus and Musalmans derive their inspiration from different sources of history. They have different epics, their heroes are different and they have different episodes. Very often the hero of one is a foe of the other, and likewise, their victories and defeats overlap. To yoke together two such nations under a single State, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority, must lead to growing discontent and final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for the government of such a State.²¹³

The resolution demanding the partition of India, ran as follows:

No constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principles, viz., that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the North Western and Eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute Independent States in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign.²¹⁴

This resolution was incorporated as an 'aim and object' of AIML's constitution at its next annual session (Madras: April 1941).

2.34 The Growth of AIML (1937-1947)

Under the able guidance of Muḥammad 'Alī Jinnāh, a shrewd politician and strategist *par excellence*, AIML grew from strength to strength during the decade of 1937-47. He clearly perceived that the constitutional struggle for India's independence would finally be resolved through the initiative of the colonial power. He strongly believed that AIML should be raised to the status of the sole recognised representative organ of the Indian Muslims. Soon after the outbreak of World War II, AIML offered its support to the (British) Indian authorities in return for creating 'a sense of security and satisfaction amongst the Musalmans', and recognising AIML as '[t]he only organisation that [could] speak on behalf of Muslim India.'²¹⁵ The Punjab and Bengal ministries, which were closely linked to AIML, gave unconditional support to the war efforts of the Indian government. Punjab supplied a continuous stream of recruits to the army during the war.

In contrast to AIML, INC, which was proud of its representative character, opted for a policy of confrontation. It withdrew from provincial ministries. This situation added to the relative importance of AIML.

British defeats on the Eastern Front compelled the British Government to seek INC support in the war effort. Sir Stafford Cripps visited India (March-April 1942) with the mission

of seeking the co-operation of INC and AIML by promising a constitutional scheme. AIML's demand for a separate Muslim homeland was validated in the scheme, by means of a provision to the effect that any province that did not wish to accede to the Indian federation could secede from it.²¹⁶ INC, sensing Britain's weakness in its defeat at the hands of Japan in Malaya and Burma, rejected Cripps' offer as a 'postdated cheque on a crashing bank'.²¹⁷

INC took the policy of confrontation to a high pitch with the 'Quit India' resolution (14 July 1942), fully endorsed by the All India Congress Committee (8 August 1942). It demanded the immediate 'withdrawal of the British power from India'; otherwise, 'a mass struggle on non-violent lines on the widest possible scale'²¹⁸ under the leadership of Gandhi would be launched.

The 'Quit India' movement was crushed, though disturbances were 'serious enough in any circumstances'.²¹⁹ INC was outlawed; its most important leaders were put behind bars. The political vacuum created as a result of the failure of the 'Quit India' movement, proved highly beneficial to the growth of AIML. It had called upon the Muslims to have nothing to do with INC; and offered the (British) Indian government its support if only the government would give an undertaking to create an independent State of Pakistan.

Lord Wavell succeeded Lord Linlithgow as Viceroy (October 1943) when the War was still going on. He came out with a proposal to form a 'new Executive Council'. The three main tasks of the proposed Executive Council would be to

- 1) prosecute the War against Japan;
- 2) carry on the governmental responsibilities until a new constitution was framed; and,
- 3) consider how an agreed-upon constitution could be framed.

As a means of forming the proposed Executive Council, a conference was called of the leaders of AIML, INC, the Premiers of the four non-Congress ruled provinces (Punjab, NWFP, Sind, Assam), the former Premier of Bengal, former Premiers of the provinces where no ministry could be formed after the resignation of INC ministries (Bombay, UP, Orissa, Madras, Central Provinces, Bihar), leaders of political parties in the Central Assembly, representatives of the Sikhs and the Scheduled Castes (Simla: 25-29 June 1944).

The gulf between INC and AIML could not be bridged at this meeting. INC claimed that it was a national and not a communal organisation, and it therefore had the right to nominate not only Hindus but also members of other communities. AIML, for its part, emphatically asserted that it was the only body which represented Indian Muslims; and that it had the exclusive right to nominate the Muslim members of the Council.²²⁰

While being deeply involved in winning recognition from the (British) Indian government for AIML as the only representative Muslim organisation, Jinnāh was equally concerned to rally the Muslims under the AIML banner. Muslims were categorically told that Hinduism and Islam stood in sharp contrast - from doctrine and ritual worship to the elaborate social systems. There is nothing

common - from birth to death - between the two communities. The AIML leadership made use of the religious cleavage. The cry of 'Islam in danger' played a part in mobilising the Muslim population especially where it was in a minority and even in the province of the Punjab where the margin between the Muslim majority and the non-Muslim minorities was sufficiently narrow to cause political concern among the former.

From the early '40s onwards, the pronouncements made by Jinnāh and other leaders of AIML became increasingly Islamically-oriented. For instance, Jinnāh told the AIML session (Karachi: December 1943)

[i]t is the Great Book, [the *Qurān*], that is the sheet-anchor of Muslim India.²²¹

He reiterated his views in an address to the Punjab Muslim Students' Federation (March 1944) in which he asserted that our bedrock and sheet-anchor is Islam... Islam is our guide and complete code for our life'.²²² He pleaded for separate nationhood of Indian Muslims on the basis of religion: 'Islam is not merely a religious doctrine but a realistic and practical code of conduct'.²²³ He told the NWFP Muslim League Provincial Conference November 1945 that

the Muslims demand Pakistan, where they could rule according to their own code of life and according to their own cultural growth traditions and Islamic laws.²²⁴

The desire for an Islamic way of life and fear of Hindu domination in an independent India were the major ingredients of AIML's national movement.

Jinnāh had an open course before him, to win over the Muslim voters through mass contact. But, he refrained from adopting such a course because of his temperament,²²⁵ and the formidable resistance that he anticipated from provincial parties and influential individuals. These influentials, either involved in party politics or playing their game individually, were largely *zamīndārs* and the elders of *barādarīs* (groups based on kinship). Jinnāh was able to enrol these people in AIML and automatically captured their boroughs in favour of AIML.

Since 1937 the Unionist Party of the Punjab and *Krishak Projā* Party of Bengal had been supporting AIML's policies at the national level. The link between AIML and *Krishak Projā* Party, however, broke when Faḡl-ul-Ḥaq, the leader of the latter and Chief Minister of Bengal, joined the Defence council (1941) in defiance of the former's high command. Even though he was expelled from AIML he was able to carry on as Chief Minister for some time before the Bengal government was replaced by an AIML government under Khawājah Naḡim-ud-dīn. The Unionist-AIML alliance ended after seven years in May 1944, when Khīzar Ḥayāt Tiwāna, the Chief Minister, was expelled from AIML. The members of both these provincial parties continued to move into AIML during the run up to the 1945-46 election.

The Muslim members of the Sind Legislative Assembly had been returned on the tickets of different parties or as Independents. Before the Karachi Session of AIML (December 1943) all of them, with the exception of Mawlā Bakhsh, joined AIML. Similarly, the Independents in NWFP co-operated with AIML. Sardār

Awrangzeb Khān led the AIML ministry for some time (May 1943 - March 1945).

AIML, though not organised on a broad mass basis, especially in Muslim majority provinces, showed a capacity for winning election. Until July 1945, AIML had lost only one of 70 by-elections which it had fought since 1937.²²⁶

AIML was equipped with all the paraphernalia of a political party. A student wing of AIML was organised under 'All-India Muslim Students' Federation'.²²⁷ A country-wide corps of 'Muslim National Guards' was raised (May 1944), consisting of more than a million persons.²²⁸ A 'Committee of Writers' was formed (1944) which started 'Pakistan Literature Series'²²⁹ 'to dispel misconceptions and help all fair-minded people to make a dispassionate study of the peculiar conditions of India and appreciate the position and viewpoint of the Muslim nation in India'.²³⁰

AIML rapidly secured a strong voice in the press, either by founding its own newspapers or by winning over established ones and persuading them to publicise AIML's policies.²³¹ AIML's press was duly aided by the Orient Press, a Muslim news agency, founded in 1942.

The idea of Muslim separatism with potential territorial bases in the northwestern (the Punjab, NWFP, Sind and Baluchistan) and the northeastern (which now constitutes Bangladesh) zones gained the support of all the influential classes of Muslims within AIML. The overall success of AIML in by-elections and the sharp

difference between the religions of the Muslims and the Hindus convinced intellectuals, even outside the purview of AIML's influence of the need for some form of separatism. K.M. Panikkar (1895-1963), a scholarly caste-Hindu, advocated that the separation of 'Pakistan' would be 'obviously the one way'²³² in which the Hindu-Muslim problem could be solved.

C. Rajagopalachari (1879-1972), a moderate INC leader and ex-Premier of Madras, favoured the creation of Pakistan, consisting of the Muslim majority areas, subject to a referendum of all their inhabitants. He suggested a formula to that effect at a meeting of the All India Congress Committee. Although it was rejected at the time (May 1942), it later became the basis of the Gāndhī-Jinnāh Talks (May 1944).²³³

The communist leaders decided to support 'what is just and right' in the Pakistan demand. G. Adhikarī, the leading theoretician, writing on the framework of the doctrine of nationality, stated as follows:

... where ever people of the Muslim faith living together in a territorial unit form a nationality ... they certainly have the right to autonomous state existence just like other nationalities in India.²³⁴

2.35 Split in JUH

During the period when INC was in power in the provinces (1937-1939), dissension occurred within the rank and file of JUH as Indian Muslims became more and more conscious of their separate identity. JUH, being a Muslim party under the leadership of the

'ulamā', was fully aware of the need to keep up the cultural and religious identity of the Muslims; it was therefore, not behind AIML in its denunciation of the *Wārdhā* and *Vidyā Mandir* educational schemes,²³⁵ which the INC ministries adopted. JUH believed that they would undermine the Muslim culture and religion.

In spite of Mawlānā Aḥmad Saīd's efforts to rally Muslim support for AIML in the 1937 election, there was no consensus on the question among the rank and file in JUH. Some of the 'ulamā' of JUH (e.g. Mawlānā Ḥifẓur Raḥmān) were active in INC politics. Mawlānā Ḥifẓur Raḥmān had been a member of the working committee of the UP Congress party. He had played a crucial role in winning over Ḥāfiẓ Muḥammad Ibrāhīm (a relative and member of the UP Legislative Assembly), to INC.²³⁶

INC's ideology of 'Indian nationalism' was a matter of controversy among Muslim intellectuals. On a theological basis, Islam is opposed to nationalism. In the traditional view, all the Muslims in the world are supposed to belong to one *ummah* on the basis of belief, irrespective of their land, language and colour. All the non-Muslims, whatever the differences between them, constituted one community, *vis-à-vis* the Muslim. Contrary to established traditional views, Mawlānā Ḥusayn Aḥmad Madanī (1879-1958) propounded a theory of nationalism based on geographical identity, irrespective of the religion professed by the people. He advocated this viewpoint in 1938 in a treatise *Mutahiddah Qawmiyat Awr Islām*²³⁷ (Composite Nationalism and Islam). This treatise provoked instant reaction from the 'ulamā' as well as the modern educated Muslim intellectuals. Mawlānā Sayyid Abul Ālā Mawdūdī (1903-1979) contributed an authoritative rebuttal to it.²³⁸

Muḥammad Iqbāl, the poet-philosopher, carried on a long controversy with Mawlānā Ḥusayn Ahmad Madanī.²³⁹ The latter, in spite of his scholarship, could not hold his position firm on the issue that Hindus and Muslims in India formed 'one nation'.

Mawlānā Ashraf Ālī Thānwī had resigned from the post of Rector of *Dār-ul-ʿulūm* Deoband. In 1938, he began to side with AIML openly. He advised his adherents to join AIML; and a branch of AIML was organised in Thanah Bhawan; the town where he lived, with his blessing (April 1938).²⁴⁰ A delegation of his close associates attended the Patna Session of AIML (26-29 December 1938). His message to the leaders of AIML included advice to the effect that they should take part in obligatory worship in their daily life, and a council of 'ulamā' be attached to AIML. The council of 'ulamā' was meant to advise AIML in matters of a purely religious nature; and the close co-operation with the 'ulamā' would increase AIML's strength because the masses, under the influence of the 'ulamā', would be automatically attracted to it.²⁴¹

Mawlānā Ashraf Ālī Thānwī looked on INC as an irreligious party, committed to communism, under the pretext of the socialist utterances of Jawāharlāl Nehrū. He feared the elimination of religion if INC were to come to power.²⁴² Therefore, he automatically disliked any party sympathetic to the cause of INC. He turned down the invitation of fellow *Deobandī* 'ulamā' to attend the annual session of JUH (Delhi: 3-5 March 1939).

Mawlānā Ḥusayn Ahmad Madanī reached the helm of JUH's affairs in 1940. He replaced Muftī Kifāyatullāh as President; and

relations between classes &
state or potential state
should be clearly drawn
out & noted down

presided over JUH for three consecutive sessions (i.e. June 1940, March 1942, and May 1945). In January 1940, JUH's Working Committee endorsed the INC stand on World War II and resolved to support its campaign. The glaring difference of opinion between Mawlānā Ḥusayn Aḥmad Madanī (himself a teacher in *Dār-ul-ʿulūm* Deoband) and some teachers with Thānwī connections (e.g., Mawlānā Shabbīr Aḥmad ʿUṣmānī, Muḥammad Ibrāhīm Balyāwī, Muftī Muḥammad Shafīʿ, Mawlānā Zāhūr Aḥmad and Khalīfah Muḥammad ʿĀqil), on the issue of co-operation with INC came to a head; and, the weaker party with the Thānwī connection was forced to resign.

2.36 The 'Demand for Pakistan' and the 'Ulamā'

With the passage of the Lahore Resolution (1940) of AIML, the 'ulamā' became divided. JUH, under the leadership of Mawlānā Madanī, opposed the resolution. The 'ulamā', outside JUH, generally upheld the resolution on the basis of the two-nation theory. They were unanimous in opposing Indian nationalism based on the argument of geographical homogeneity, but could not agree that Indian Muslims were a nation, detached from the remaining body of Muslim *ummah*. The 'ulamā', who were fully in accord with AIML, later formed their organisation *Jamīyat-ul-ʿUlamā-i-Islām* (JUI) and worked for the cause of AIML. There was a tiny group of 'ulamā' which neither supported 'Indian Nationalism' nor 'Indian Muslim Nationalism'. The chief ideologue of this group was Mawlānā Abul Ālā Mawdūdī. The group was, however, politically weak at the time; but, its approach was so logical and consistent that it did attract some attention.

It is appropriate to consider the stand of JUH and Mawlānā Mawdūdī on the demand for Pakistan with AIML as its principal exponent.

2.36.1 The Position of JUH

JUH's response to the Lahore Resolution of AIML was hostile. It was the moving spirit behind 'Āzād Muslim Conference' (AMC) (Delhi: 27-30 April 1940) which was attended by splinter groups of nationalist Muslims, namely All India Muslim *Majlis*, MAI, All India *Momin* Conference, *Khudā'ī Khidmatgār* Party, *Anjuman-i-Waṭan* (Baluchistan) and the All India *Shī'ah* Political Conference. AMC expressed strong opposition to the Lahore Resolution and to the division of India. It urged agreement on a constitutional scheme with appropriate safeguards for the Muslim culture and religion. AMC appointed a Board to make recommendations for securing a lasting settlement of the Hindu-Muslim question. It, however, never met to chalk out a programme. Nevertheless, JUH put forward a formula of its own in 1942. The constitutional scheme proposed by JUH envisaged a federal government with a weak centre, incorporating safeguards which the religious majority could not transgress.²⁴³

JUH opposed the demand for Pakistan on the following grounds:²⁴⁴

- 1) The British Raj was the main enemy of freedom-loving Indians. Muslims, according to their religion, were bound to struggle for freedom. But, they were in no position to drive out the

British without the co-operation of the Hindu majority in a joint struggle.

Pakistan was no more than an aspect of the British policy of 'divide and rule'.

- 2) The realisation of the Pakistan demand and the partition of India would split and weaken the Muslim community. The Muslims left outside Pakistan in Hindu majority provinces would be reduced to the status of an ineffective minority.
- 3) The partition of India would hinder the missionary activities of the 'ulamā' (one of the central objectives of JUH being to propagate and spread the message of Islam through peaceful missionary work).
- 4) An Islamic state on the pattern of the Rightly Guided Caliphs was a chimera. A strange irony that the very people who neither had an outwardly Islamic appearance nor the character that accorded with Islam should want to build an Islamic state; and to conduct it on the basis of religion. It was quite unbelievable that such people would revive Islam. Their relation to Islam was that of darkness to light or of water to fire.

The leaders of AIML spoke of the Islamic law when they had to address the Muslim audience in order to win popular support. But, in legislatures, they did not care for it. For example, Jinnāh's stand

1

on the Shari'at Bill (1935) moved by Ḥāfiẓ 'Abdullāh of Lyallpur was deeply shocking to sensibilities of the 'ulamā'.

The AIML leadership was, however, strong in its viewpoint of asserting the separate nationhood of the Muslim. Even so, it was vulnerable because it was lukewarm in the observance of the fundamentals of Islam in public life. In order to cover their weak position, AIML's leaders depicted the 'ulamā' of JUH as the paid agents of INC, bent upon making their own fortunes.²⁴⁵ The piety and simple-living of the JUH 'ulamā' was enough to convince their adherents that the AIML propaganda against them was baseless. Nevertheless, the 'ulamā' publicly refuted the allegation with all the vigour at their command. They used to swear: 'God may not be pleased with them if they had ever got any financial help from INC'.²⁴⁶

2.36.2 Jam'iyat-ul-'Ulamā-i-Islām (Association of the 'Ulamā' of Islam) (JUI)

The activities of JUH were 'a thorn in the flesh of [All India] Muslim League'²⁴⁷ and the latter was desperately in need of the support of some or the other among the 'ulamā'.

Mawlānā Shabbīr Aḥmad 'Uṣmānī (1885-1949), among the dissidents within JUH, was, in his own right, a figure as learned and respected as Mawlānā Ḥusayn Aḥmad Madanī. He was the leader most suited to fulfil the role of opposing the activities of JUH.

Mawlānā Rāghib Aḥsan from Calcutta had been a staunch AIML worker for a long time. He called a convention of the 'ulamā' from all over India (Calcutta: 26-29 October 1945). He had AIML's support. More than five hundred 'ulamā' attended. Mawlānā Muḥammad Ibrāhīm Siyālkotī, a pro-AIML 'ālim from the Punjab, highlighted in his address the religious and cultural differences between the Hindu and Muslim communities. He persuaded the 'ulamā' to accept Jinnāḥ's leadership, irrespective of his and his colleagues' life style. He made a reference to Abū Ayūb Anṣārī, a companion of the Prophet, who joined the military campaign against Constantinople under the command of Yazīd B. Mu'āwiyah. The 'ulamā' were in no way better than or equal to Abū Ayūb Anṣārī and Jinnāḥ had not been worse than Yazīd.²⁴⁸

At this convention, the *Jamīyat-ul-ʿUlamā-i-Islām* (JUI) was launched with the sole purpose of supporting AIML in its struggle to achieve Pakistan. Mawlānā Shabbīr Aḥmad 'Uṣmānī was elected as President *in absentia*.

The core of JUI, like that of JUH, consisted of *Deobandīs* who had parted company with JUH. Mawlānā Shabbīr Aḥmad who had worked side by side with INC during the *Khilāfat* movement, was now in the opposite camp. He justified his stance on the grounds that co-operation with non-Muslims was lawful when Muslims held a dominant position and non-Muslims played a secondary role. In the *Khilāfat* movement, Indian Muslims were holding the banner of struggle and the Hindus joined them. But, after the collapse of the *Khilāfat* movement, INC, under Hindu leadership, became a menace to Muslim culture in India. The struggle of INC would not result

in raising the Islamic Order; it was therefore unlawful for Muslims to join INC during the '40s.²⁴⁹

2.36.3 The All India *Sunnī* Conference (AISC)

With the emergence of JUI, led by Mawlānā Shabbīr Aḥmad ‘Uṣmānī, a *Deobandī ‘ālim*, the hard-core *Barelwī ‘ulamā’* preferred to revive their own organisation, the All India *Sunnī* Conference (AISC) rather than join JUI. AISC was founded at a convention of the *Barelwī ‘ulamā’* [Moradabad: 16-19 March 1925] when Hindu-Muslim antagonism was in full swing and the *Deobandī ‘ulamā’* of JUI were blamed for their part in the manifestation of Hindu-Muslim unity during the *Khilāfat* and Non-Co-operation movements. Mawlānā Nā‘īm-ud-dīn Murādābādī and Mawlānā Ḥāmid Raḥā Khān were the outstanding figures to organise AISC. The former was an ardent disciple and the latter a son of Mawlānā Aḥmad Raḥā Khān. AISC soon became inactive. Its lofty objectives such as the economic uplift of Muslims and giving proper guidance to them in religious matters, proved to be mere paper promises.

AISC was revived during the 1945-46 election. Mawlānā ‘Abdul Ḥāmid Badāyūnī, a *Barelwī ‘ālim*, was associated with AIML for a long time. As the propaganda secretary of AISC, he managed to get pro-AIML messages from his fellow *Barelwī ‘ulamā’*. After the election, AISC held a large gathering [Banaras: 27-30 April 1946] under the presidentship of Pīr Jamā‘at ‘Alī Shāh ‘Alīpurī. It resolved to support AIML in its demand for Pakistan.

The *Ahl-i-Sunnat ‘ulamā’* and *mashā‘ikh* are prepared to render every possible sacrifice in making the movement for an Islamic State a success. They bind themselves to struggle for a

state, based on the juristic principles in the light of the *Qurān* and the traditions of the Prophet.²⁵⁰

AISC constituted a committee of 13 leading *Barelwī 'ulamā'* and *pīrs* to chalk out a framework for the Islamic State.

2.36.4 The Position of Mawlānā Mawdūdī and his Party

A section of the *Deobandīs* under JUI and *Barelwīs* under AISC accepted AIML's stand towards JUH as their own. The stand made by Mawlānā Mawdūdī was different from both the pro- and anti-AIML '*ulamā'*

Before embarking on the delineation of Mawdūdī's position with regard to the demand for Pakistan, it would be appropriate to discuss his career; for, his role during the crucial period of the freedom movement continues to be a matter of controversy even in contemporary Pakistan.

Mawlānā Abul Alā Mawdūdī,²⁵¹ of an old Delhi family, was born in Aurangabad (Andra Pradesh) on 25 September 1903. His father, Mawlawī Ahmad Ḥasan, was among the early students of Aligarh College and adopted the Aligarh Westernised way of living. By profession, he was a lawyer and practised at Meerut (UP) before he moved to the Nizām's dominions. At a late stage in his life he turned to religion to such an extent that he gave up his legal practice fearing that he might have inadvertently saved culprits from legal punishment or pleaded for penalty against innocent persons. He developed a dislike of Western education and nostalgia for the Muslim culture of upper urban classes. Therefore, he did

not send Abul Ālā, his youngest son, to school when he was a child lest his language and manners should be spoiled through contact with other children. Arrangements were made for his private schooling. However, his father reluctantly allowed Abul Ālā to go to school when he reached the age of 11 to complete his matriculation. He joined *Dār-ul-ʿulūm* (Hyderabad) but his father's sudden illness and death compelled him to leave *Dār-ul-ʿulūm* before he could complete the course.

He started his career as a journalist at the remarkably early age of 15 years. Along with Abul Khayr Mawdūdī, his elder brother, he joined the staff of the religious-political weekly *Madīnah* of Bijnore (UP). In 1919, he went to Jabalpur (Central Provinces) to edit the *Tāj*, a journal started by Tāj-ud-dīn, a Pan-Islamist. It was the time of the *Khilāfat* movement and the young editor of *Tāj* took an active part in the *Khilāfat* activities at the local level.²⁵² He had translated two pamphlets from English with the aim of mobilising mass moral support for the Ottomans.²⁵³ Later on (from 26 July 1922), he became the editor of the *Muslim* (Delhi), the first organ of JUH. The *Muslim* ceased publication on 8 April 1923 and Mawdūdī returned to Hyderabad where Abul Khayr Mawdūdī, his elder brother, was associated with *Dār-ut-tarjamah* (Usmaniyyah University). He remained busy in scholarly pursuits and translated the second and third sections of 17th century Iranian philosopher Mullā Ṣadrā's famous classic *al-Asfār-ul-Arbāh*. In 1925, JUH started another newspaper *al-Jamīyat*, and Sayyid Mawdūdī was invited to be its editor, a responsibility which he discharged for three years (i.e., until 15 May 1928).²⁵³

In 1926, Sawāmī Sharaddhānandā, a leading figure of the *Shuddhī* movement, was murdered by a Muslim. The concept of *jihād* in Islam became a point of discussion. The aggressive critics of Islam and the British rulers always looked upon the Muslims as militants. The modernists (e.g., Sayyid Aḥmad Khān and his associates) denied the concept of militancy in Islam, interpreting *jihād* as defensive war. Mirzā Ghulām Ahmad, the founder of *Aḥmadiyyah*, declared *jihād* to be illegal. On account of the various contradictory interpretations that prevailed, the concept of *jihād* was subject to much confusion. The need for an objective study, free from the apologetics of the modernists, was keenly felt.

Mawdūdī started a series of editorials with the aim of clarifying concept of *jihād*, but the columns of a daily were not appropriate for such a lengthy study. He completed the study *al-Jihād fil Islām* (Islamic Law of War and Peace). It was published by *Dār-ul-Muṣaniffīn Azamgarh* (1929). He analysed the teachings of the five major religions - namely Hinduism, Judaism, Christianity, Buddhism and Islam - relating to war. He opined that Hinduism and Judaism allowed war for safeguarding the 'selves' (i.e., the interests), of the followers. Neither religion makes a distinction between right and wrong. Contrary to such a stand, Christianity and Buddhism absolutely forbade the killing of human beings by one another whatever the motivation. Such a concept could not be upheld in the real world. In practice, Christians neglected the teachings of their religion and waged crusades against other nations. As the concept of war in Christianity and Buddhism went against the grain of human nature, it was bound to be repudiated. Islam advocated war in order to depose *kufr*

(infidelity) from the seat of authority. Fighting against oppression and in defence of truth is *jihād*.

al-Jihād fil Islām was a serious work. It brought Mawdūdī into the limelight. After leaving *al-Jamīyat*, he settled down in Hyderabad where he was invited to write an Islamic primer for senior students preparing for matriculation. His widely read book *Dīniyāt* (Towards Understanding Islam) thus took shape; this book 'became one of the required texts for Muslim senior matriculation students throughout India'.²⁵⁵ In 1932, he took over the monthly *Tarjumān-ul-Qurān* (Interpreter of the Qurān).²⁵⁶ Within five years of its publication, Mawdūdī's powerful pen attracted the admiration of a number of intellectuals. He was regarded as 'a thoughtful and well-informed writer on Islamic subjects'.²⁵⁷ Chawdhari Niyāz 'Alī Khān,²⁵⁸ a Muslim devotee, and poet-philosopher Muḥammad Iqbāl persuaded him to move from Hyderabad to Jamalpur, a small village about four miles from Pathankot (Punjab), where he was asked to take up the task of organising and directing *Dār-ul-Islām*, an educational research institution. He gathered a few of his companions and set to work in his own way. After a year and a half, the trustees of the educational research institution started to interfere in his activities. He moved to Lahore where he carried on editing *Tarjumān-ul-Qurān*. At the same time, he served for a year as Dean of the Faculty of Theology in Islamia College, Lahore. In Lahore, he founded *Jamā'at-i-Islāmī* (The Party of Islam) on 26 August 1941, amongst a select gathering of a few hundred persons. 75 of them, from all over the sub-continent, became its founding members.

The trustees of *Dār-ul-Islām* (Jamālpur) were unable to find a person of Mawdūdī's stature to advance the activities which he had initiated at *Dār-ul-Islām*. They again contacted him and assured him that he would be able to work, without any interference, according to his own plans. In June 1942 Mawdūdī returned to *Dār-ul-Islām* which remained the headquarters of *Jamā'at-i-Islāmī* until August 1947.

Mawdūdī took a clear-cut stand with respect to INC and AIML first as an individual, and then as the leader of *Jamā'at-i-Islāmī*. According to him, both INC and AIML were champions of nationalism. INC's nationalism was based on the geographical identity of India, whereas AIML attempted to orchestrate a separate identity for all Muslims in India on the basis of religion. The Muslims in India constituted a nation but the Muslims outside its geographical jurisdiction were not a part of the Muslim nation so conceived.²⁵⁹ In Mawdūdī's perception of Islamic faith, there is no room for 'nationalism'. His view was best reflected in a booklet entitled *Mas'alah-i-Qawmiyat*²⁶⁰ (The Question of Nationalism), first published in 1939.

The philosophy of nationalism, in his understanding, 'has made the life of man miserable' and

in their spirit and in their aims Islam and nationalism are diametrically opposed to each other ... the ultimate goal of Islam is a world-state in which the chains of racial and national prejudices would be dismantled and all mankind incorporated in a cultural and political system, with equal rights and equal opportunities for all, and in which hostile competition would give way to a friendly co-operation between peoples so that they might mutually assist and contribute to the material and moral good of one another ... To be a

Muslim and to adopt a non-Islamic viewpoint is only meaningless. Muslim Nationalist and Muslim Communist are as contrary terms as Communist Fascist and Socialist Capitalist, Chaste Prostitute .²⁶¹

Mawdūdī's three-volume analysis of the Indian political situation during the latter half of the '30s is also important. In the first two volumes of this work, Musalmān Awr Mawjūdah Siyāsī Kashmakash²⁶² (The Muslims and the Present Political Crisis), Mawdūdī criticised and even vehemently condemned the theory of Indian Nationalism as espoused by INC. He believed that if the Muslims were to join INC, the Muslim minority would be assimilated into the Hindu majority, if not annihilated altogether. In the third volume, Mawdūdī criticised Muslim nationalists and AIML. As a conclusion to the whole analysis, Mawdūdī proposed a new and purely Islamic Party which he founded in the name of *Jamā'at-i-Islāmī*.

Mawdūdī's criticism of INC and pro-INC Muslim parties was welcomed by AIML workers who made full use of the theological arguments against 'Indian nationalism', as advanced by Mawdūdī.²⁶³ Mawdūdī's exposition of Islam as 'the way of life, encompassing each and every aspect of human society', won the attention of 'religiously-minded Muslims in the universities of India'.²⁶⁴

Jamā'at-i-Islāmī was meant

to base and organise the entire human life in all its varied aspects - faith and ideology, religion and ethics, morality and conduct, education and training, social system and culture, economic order and political structure, law and judiciary, war and peace, internal and international affairs - on the principles of submission and obedience to God

Almighty and the guidance and instructions of His Apostles.²⁶⁵

Mawdūdī addressed the task of organising a strict ideological party in order to achieve these objectives. For him, the bulk of the Muslim masses lacked the capacity to create and to maintain an Islamic state and society, because they were unaware of the requisites of Islamic faith; whilst their nationalist leaders lacked an Islamic orientation in their work and lives. Against such a perception of the Muslim masses, *Jamā'at-i-Islāmī* was strict in its policy of enrolment of members. Those seeking membership must satisfy the local organisation of the *Jamā'at* that they had fully grasped the aims and objectives of the party policy and programme, and that they not only accepted them, but were also practitioners of the basic teachings of Islam including prayer five times a day, fasting during the month of *Ramāzān*, refraining from drawing their livelihood from sources condemned by Islam (usury, bribery, selling of liquor, gambling, and all the illegal sources).

Due to such a high standard of enrolment, along with strict discipline, *Jamā'at* was, until 1947, a tiny party of 625 members.

Jamā'at-i-Islāmī developed and advocated the idea that to serve the government, not established on the principles of the *Qurān*, in any capacity - in its army or civil service, the judiciary or its legislative assemblies - was *ḥarām*.²⁶⁶ It, therefore, did not enrol those who were attached to the (British) Indian government; and, by the same token, it was not interested in taking part in elections for legislative assemblies.

The reasoning that led Mawdūdī to pursue a line different from the 'ulamā' in league with either INC or AIML, was clear and consistent. In his view, Muslims had an ideology. They were divinely bound to struggle for its implementation, and not to leave an area where they could propagate their ideology. The demand of the Indian Muslims for Pakistan would be quite genuine if they were considered merely as a nation without any mission.²⁶⁷ Mawdūdī wished to see Indian Muslims' struggle for a state based on Islamic principles. In a speech before the students and teachers of Muslim University, Aligarh, Mawdūdī declared with all his logical vigour that the movement 'under the leadership of the Muslim League did not represent a step towards the creation of an Islamic state, but rather a step in opposite direction'. On another occasion he said:

The basis of this movement is a spirit of nationalism, and nationalism is incompatible with Islam ... what is selfishness in individual life is nationalism in social life.²⁶⁸

2.37 The 1945-46 Election

The utter failure of the Simla Conference, followed by Japan's surrender (15 August 1945) paved the way for election, which the (British) Indian government had ruled out as impracticable during the War period. Elections were, in fact, long overdue. The Central Assembly had been last elected in 1934 and the Provincial Legislatures in 1937. There was no disagreement that they had long since ceased to represent the electorate.

Contrary to the principle of adult suffrage, only about ten per cent of the population of British India was eligible to

vote in the Provincial elections, under The Government of India Act, 1935. But the election for the Central Assembly was to be held under the Act, 1919, since the federal part of the Act, 1935 could not be put into practice due to the unwillingness of the rulers of the princely states. The voters for the Central Assembly seats constituted less than one per cent of the population.²⁶⁹

The two main election issues posed by AIML were: Pakistan; and, AIML's position as the only representative organisation of the Indian Muslims. By contrast, INC sought to prove its claim as a national organisation, i.e., representing Muslims, along with other communities. Its success, in and of itself, was to constitute the irrefutable proof of the negation of the demand for Pakistan.

These elections were crucially important for AIML's future. If it failed to secure the majority of Muslim seats, its demand for Pakistan would go by the board. The election for the Central Assembly took place (December 1945). 31 seats were reserved for Muslims. AIML contested and won all these seats, securing 86.7 per cent of the total Muslim votes. INC could hardly secure 1.3 per cent; nationalist Muslims favoured by the '*ulamā*' 8.9 per cent; and independent candidates 3.1 per cent.²⁷⁰

AIML's position in the elections to the Provincial Legislatures is reflected in Table 2.4.

AIML took nearly 89 per cent of the Muslim seats. It secured 74.7 per cent of Muslim votes cast in the elections to the Provincial Legislatures.²⁷¹

Table 2.4

The Number of Muslim Seats Won by AIML in
the 1946 Election for Provincial Assemblies

Province	Total number of Muslim seats	Number of Seats won by AIML
Madras	29	29
Bombay	30	30
Bengal	119	113
UP	66	55
Punjab	86	79
Bihar	40	34
CP and Berar	14	13
NWFP	38	17
Assam	34	31
Orissa	4	4
Sind	35	35
	495	440

[Source: Return Showing the Results of Elections to the Central Legislative Assembly and the Provincial Legislatures in 1945-46 (New Delhi: Manager of Government Publications, 1948)]

The overwhelming success at polls was a concrete proof of AIML's claims. And this remarkable success was partly due to the participation of the 'ulamā' in AIML's favour.

2.38 The Role of the 'Ulamā' in the 1945-46 Election

The 'ulamā' had been sharply divided on the issue of Pakistan. They fully participated in the election campaign, highlighting their differing viewpoints.

JUH in collaboration with MAI, All India *Momin* Conference and All India Muslim *Majlis*, formed the Muslim Parliamentary Board (MPB) under the presidentship of Mawlānā Ḥusayn Aḥmad Madanī. It is appropriate at this point to consider the political characteristics of the collaborators of JUH in MPB.

The 'ulamā' participating in the activities of MAI were largely drawn from the *Ahl-i-Ḥadīṣ* and the *Deobandī* 'ulamā' in the Punjab, though it also included a few *Barelwīs* (e.g. Fayz-ul-Ḥasan Alūmaharwī). It was the most popular party among the religiously inspired lower-middle classes during the early '30s. Its downfall started with the agitation over Shahidganj.²⁷² In 1937 it could hardly secure a seat in the Punjab. In 1940 when AIML passed the Lahore Resolution, the opposition from MAI was too feeble to pose a threat to AIML. Nevertheless, MAI voiced its opposition to the demand for Pakistan. The 'ulamā' in the rank and file of MAI had no faith in the Islamic pronouncements of AIML leaders. Their doubts resembled those of JUH. The dream of an Islamic state, free from exploitation of the poor by the rich, was a cherished ideal of MAI.

Its working committee accepted a resolution visualising the *Ḥakūmat-i-Ilāhiyyah* (Kingdom of God) (Saharanpur: 26 April 1943).

MAI does not consider it a religious or ultimate obligation of a Muslim to establish certain geographical, ethnic or linguistic barriers or to maintain them. On the contrary the divine measure is to follow the instructions of *Allāh* and His Prophet, to live with piety, to support virtue and to make it prevail. MAI seeks to establish *Ḥakūmat-i-Ilāhiyyah* wherever its feasibility exists. So that it can be propagated how the worldly troubles are remedied through practising the golden principles of Islam; and how salvation can be achieved in worldly life and the life hereafter.

In this respect MAI considers it appropriate to clarify that grasp of power by the Muslim majority or by some Muslim individuals in certain areas, is not synonymous of *Ḥakūmat-i-Ilāhiyyah*. Such personal or communal states, formed for the realisation of personal gains, proved to be a stigma on Islam; and the people disliked it. MAI cannot be satisfied to repeat past experience by handing over the reins of power to a party or group which knows nothing about Islam.²⁷³

After this resolution was passed, MAI made overtures to AIML with a view to making a deal; but AIML, with rapidly increasing popularity, insisted on unconditional support. As these talks broke down, MAI became, perhaps, AIML's bitterest opponent. Jinnāh was known as the *Qā'id-i-Aẓam* (The Great Leader), Mawlānā Mazhar 'Alī Aẓhar of MAI branded him *Kāfir-i-Aẓam* (The Great Infidel).

The All India *Momin* Conference was led by the middle-class *Anṣārs* (Muslim weavers). The basic idea behind the organisation was to raise the community of *Anṣārs*, 'economically and culturally, and to protect it'.²⁷⁴ The base of the party was so small that it could not attract much of a following from the

Muslim masses, in spite of its claims to represent the working classes of the Muslim community.

The All India Muslim *Majlis* (organised in May 1944) was a joint front of all the Indian Nationalist Muslims who had gathered together in opposition to the AIML Lahore Resolution (March 1940).

MPB filed its candidates in the election. INC gave support to MPB's candidates. The winds were so changed in favour of AIML's demand for Pakistan that MPB was an electoral failure. It hardly secured 6.4 per cent of the total Muslim votes cast in the elections to the Provincial Legislatures.

JUH's influence was largely neutralised by the pro-AIML appeal of JUI and by the direct participation of the '*ulamā*' in AIML politics. For instance, Mawlānā Jamāl Miyaṅ Farangī Mahallī, the son of Mawlānā 'Abdul Bārī, was very active in AIML's struggle for Pakistan.²⁷⁵

The JUI '*ulamā*' condemned INC's policies. They issued a *fatwā* forbidding Muslims to join INC.²⁷⁶ During the elections they toured extensively in order to mobilise Muslim support for AIML candidates.

UP was considered to be the stronghold of JUH. It made Saharanpar (UP) the venue of its 1945 session, a few months after which an election was held. In an important contest, AIML's Liyāqat 'Alī Khān stood against JUH-supported Muḥammad Aḥmad Kāzīmī for the constituency of Saharanpar and Muzaffarnaqar districts. The latter was defeated. Liyāqat 'Alī Khān acknowledged the

effective role played by Mawlānā Zafar Aḥmad 'Uṣmānī as a factor contributing to his electoral success.²⁷⁷

Along with JUI, the *Barelwī 'ulamā'* and *pīrs*, either in their individual capacity or under the loose organisation of AISC, gave support to AIML. Mawlānā Mawdūdī and his *Jamā'at-i-Islāmī* kept aloof from the election activities. Mawdūdī clarified his stand as follows:

Whatever the importance of the coming election or elections in the future, and howsoever they may affect our nation or the country, it would be impossible for us, as a party of principles, to tolerate the liquidation of the very principles in which we believe, for reason of expediency. Our whole struggle against the existing system is based on the principle of people's sovereignty as the basis of the system; and this principle gives absolute right of legislation to the Assembly, elected by the people, and there is no greater authority. Our belief in the Oneness of God demands that there must be sovereignty of God, not people's sovereignty. God's revealed Book should be taken as the final authority; and, the legislation must be in accordance with the Book ... With such belief in the Oneness of God, how can we take part in elections? Can it be lawful for us that on the one hand we resolve the legislation, not bound by the authority of the Book, *shirk* (polytheism); and on the other hand, we try to elect with our votes persons who want to enter the Assembly in order to usurp the prerogatives of God. If we are true in professing our belief, the only way forward for us is to employ all our strength to get the principle accepted according to which sovereignty belongs to God only; legislation must be based on the authority of the Book. As long as this principle is not accepted, we do not consider any election or voting lawful.²⁷⁸

Punjab was recognised as the province of greatest strategic importance in the struggle for Pakistan. It was the Muslim majority province which had disappointed AIML in the 1937 election. Electoral victory in the Punjab would act as a

deterrent against the spread of the influence of the *Khudā'ī Khidmatgār* Party of the NWFP which refused to concede the idea of Pakistan. Pakistan could not be contemplated without NWFP as a part of it.

In the election, AIML had solid support of the '*ulamā*' and hereditary *pīrs* of the Punjab. The leading *pīr* families which had staunchly supported the Unionist Party since its inception switched their loyalties to AIML. The response was enthusiastic even from *pīrs* who had previously been politically inactive.²⁷⁹

JUI held its All India conference (Lahore: January 1946) which was attended by the '*ulamā*' from all over the country. Some of them proceeded to tour the Punjab for propaganda work on behalf of AIML. The '*ulamā*' depicted all the anti-AIML Muslim organisations as traitors to Islam who were bent upon destroying the very interests of the Muslim *ummah*. The AIML propaganda gave the widest possible circulation to the religious appeals made by the '*ulamā*' and *pīrs* in its support. It is interesting that the Unionist Party, which had no religious basis, tried to imitate AIML's Islamic orientation to no avail.

It is often said that the 'majority of them [the '*ulamā*'] were at the outset against the establishment of Pakistan'.²⁸⁰ But this statement is not valid if we look deeply. The anti-AIML '*ulamā*' were grouped mainly in JUH, and, to a lesser extent in MAI. JUH, as we have already noted, had become almost exclusively an organisation of the *Deobandī* '*ulamā*', which was weakened by the defection of Ashraf 'Alī *Thānwī* group. In spite of its missionary zeal and intellectual contribution, the *Deobandī* school of thought

remained the creed of a minority among Muslim masses. The majority of the Muslim masses had been under the spell of popular Islam of the *Barelwī* 'ulamā' and of the hereditary *pīrs*. It was, therefore, no surprise that JUH, after its bifurcation, failed to get the support in the name of Islam.

The failure of the JUH 'ulamā' in the 1946 election was partly due to the appeal that they had had during the *Khilāfat* and Non-Co-operation movements. Out of religious obligation, Muslims were supposed to boycott foreign goods, to give up government services, not to send their dependents to government schools. Millions of Muslims suffered economically by accepting the religious call of the 'ulamā'. Thousands of them migrated to Afghanistan for religious reasons. Muslims were repeatedly told that they would get their reward in the life hereafter for every material sacrifice which they made on this earth in the cause of the faith. In 1946, JUH was opposed to the demand for Pakistan because it feared that the Muslims left behind in India as a consequence of partition would suffer. In contrast to JUH, the other 'ulamā' and especially the JUI 'ulamā', continued to uphold the underlying religious approach of the *Khilāfat* and Non-co-operation movements. To them, the formation of a new state, (i.e., Pakistan), represented a step towards the realisation of Islamic ideals.

2.39 Transfer of Power

In the aftermath of World War II colonialism had no future. The colonial powers could no longer command the resources that would be needed for the economic reconstruction of the

metropolitan countries and for the control of the colonies. Britain shared the problems of fellow colonial powers. Its coercive state apparatus in India in the form of the civil bureaucracy was understaffed and overburdened. The British soldiers stationed in India were eager to join their families at home. The indigenous garrison, which provided a focus for nationalist infiltration, was no longer as servile as it was before the War. A hunger strike by some ratings of the Royal Indian Navy in Bombay, followed by an open revolt in Bombay and Karachi (18-23 February 1946) was indicative of the prevailing mood. The Indian soldiers, recruited for the needs of the War were to be relieved and would almost certainly take part in political agitation during the post-War period.

Britain was the first among the colonial powers to appreciate the expediency of the post-War period and Attlee, the British Prime Minister, despatched a three-member 'Cabinet Mission' 'with the intention of using their utmost endeavours to help her [India] to attain her freedom as speedily and fully as possible'.²⁸¹

2.39.1 The Cabinet Mission Plan

After its arrival in India (23 March 1946), the Cabinet Mission had prolonged deliberations with politicians of all shades of opinion including the 'ulamā' of JUH. But the two parties which actually mattered were INC and AIML. Their views were poles apart. The Mission recorded its inability to secure agreement between them.

The Mission put forward its own plan to 'ensure a speedy setting up of the new constitution'. The plan had, of course, 'the full approval of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom'. It envisaged an Interim Government to 'carry on the administration of India until such time as a new Constitution be brought into being'. It made the following recommendations:

1. The future Constitution would be based on a three-tiered system, i.e., Provinces, Groups or sub-federations of Provinces, and a Union.
2. Three Groups or sub-federations of Provinces would be formed. Group 'A' would include the Hindu majority provinces (Madras, Bombay, UP, Bihar, Central Provinces, and Orissa). Groups 'B' and 'C' would consist of Muslim majority provinces in North-West India (Punjab, NWFP, Sind) and North-East India (Bengal and Assam).
3. The Union would control three subjects, namely, Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Communications.
4. The Union would have an Executive and a Legislature constituted from the elected representatives of the Provinces of British India and representatives of the princely states. It would have powers necessary to raise the finances required for running the government.

5. A Constituent Assembly would be indirectly elected, through Provincial Legislative Assemblies.

6. The Constitution of the Union and of the Groups would contain a provision whereby any province could call for a reconsideration of the terms of the Constitution after a lapse of ten years.

The Plan was an exercise towards a compromise between AIML's 'separate and fully independent State of Pakistan' and INC's cherished ideal of 'strong and organic centre'. From the day of the announcement of the Cabinet Mission Plan up to its rejection by INC and AIML, a series of statements, counter-statements and clarifications were issued. These sometimes aroused hopes that INC and AIML might after all agree to give it a try. In fact, however, neither was willing to withdraw its fundamental claims.²⁸²

2.39.2 The Direct Action Day

The Council of AIML rejected the Cabinet Mission Plan without even a single dissension (28 July 1946). Jinnāh accused the British of having 'played into the hands of the [Indian National] Congress'. He announced that 16 August would be observed as 'Direct Action' day and called upon AIML members to renounce all titles awarded by the British government. Jinnāh declared a big shift in the policy of AIML.

What we have done today is the most historic act in our history. Never have we in the whole history of the League done anything, except by constitutional methods and by constitutionalism. But now we are obliged and forced into

this position. This day we bid goodbye to constitutional methods.²⁸³

Nearly all the meetings under the AIML banner took place in and around the mosques after the obligatory Friday prayer. The 'ulamā' spoke on the grievances of the Muslims and in support of AIML's cause. The 'Direct Action' day passed off smoothly everywhere except in Calcutta where fierce riots took place. In two days nearly 5000 people were killed and some 15,000 were injured. The rioting spread from Calcutta to Noakhali (East Bengal), as well as to Bihar and UP.

2.39.3 The Interim Government (2 September 1946-14 August 1947)

Lord Wavell, the Viceroy, had been trying for some time to form an Interim Government exclusively consisting of Indians. Negotiations with Jinnāh had broken down on the issue of whether AIML should have the sole right to nominate all Muslim Ministers. In line with Wavell's thinking, INC was willing to form a government provided that it was given the right to nominate ministers not only from among the Hindus but also from amongst the Muslims and Scheduled Castes. The composition of the 14-member Interim Government was as follows:

Caste Hindu	5
Scheduled Castes	1
Muslim	5
Sikh	1
Indian Christian	1
Parsee	1

Jawāharlāl Nehrū formed the government which included five Caste Hindus (Sardār Vallabhhaī Patēl, Sarat Chandrā Bose, C. Rājagopālachārī, Dr. Rājendrā Prasād, and Nehrū himself), one scheduled caste Hindu (Jagjīwan Rām), three Muslims (Āsif Ālī, Shafāāt Aḥmad Khān, Sayyid Ālī Zāhīr), one Sikh (Sardār Baldev Singh), one Parsee (C.H. Bhabhā) and one Indian Christian (John Matthai).

The Interim Government could not be considered representative, neglecting AIML which had demonstrated its popularity among the Muslims - first in the 1945-46 election, and subsequently, in the election to the Constituent Assembly (July 1946) in which it won all the Muslim seats but five. AIML was again invited to join the Interim Government, and it accepted the invitation on the grounds that it would be folly 'to leave the entire field of administration of the central government in the hands of the Congress'.²⁸⁴ AIML continued to insist that it alone had the right to nominate all the Muslim members, but INC was not ready to surrender its status as a national organisation representing all Indians including the Muslims. AIML was given the opportunity to nominate five representatives. INC wanted to retain a Muslim, Āsif Ālī, as its representative, therefore three members, including one Hindu (Shafāāt Aḥmad Khān, Sayyid Ālī Zāhīr and Sarat Chandrā Bose) had to resign in order to accommodate new ministers nominated by AIML. Even though AIML could have nominated five Muslim nominees, it in fact chose to include Jogendrā Nāth Mondal, a Scheduled Caste representative, among them. Mondal had previously been a member of the AIML's ministry in Bengal. AIML's nomination of Mondal was in retaliation of INC's retention of Āsif Ālī in the Interim Government. The other four nominees of AIML

were Nawābzāda Liyāqat 'Alī Khān, Rājā Ghazanfar 'Alī Khān, Ismā'īl Ibrāhīm Chundrīgar and Sardār 'Abdur Rab Nishtar.

The Interim Government which now consisted of representatives of INC and AIML, proved unable to prevent the collapse of law and order and the distrust between the Hindus and the Muslims which was already paving the way for a civil war. His Majesty's Government, for its part, announced its intention 'to effect the transference of power to responsible Indian hands' not later than June 1948. It sent Lord Mountbatten to India, with 'plenipotentiary powers',²⁸⁵ to take over from Lord Wavell as Viceroy (March 1947).

2.39.4 The Final Round

From the 1945-46 election onwards up to the arrival of Lord Mountbatten, the key members of INC who had earlier been adamant in their resistance to AIML's 'two nation theory' gradually came to accept it. After the collapse of the Cabinet Mission Plan (June-July 1946), Sardār Vallabhā'ī Patel was thoroughly convinced that 'Muslims and Hindus could not be united into one nation. There was no alternative except to recognise this fact'.²⁸⁶ His experience of the Interim Government gave further corroboration to the feeling that collaboration with AIML in administering India would be impossible. The Interim Government remained sharply divided into two mutually hostile (INC and AIML) blocs. The AIML's nominees did not attend the 'daily meetings' of the ministers. They only attended Cabinet meetings called by the Viceroy.²⁸⁷ The AIML nominees opposed INC members as a matter of course, thus practically rendering the INC members ineffective, and paralyzing

the Government. The budget presented by Liyāqat 'Alī Khān, imposed swingeing taxes on the wealthy and on businessmen and industrialists, from whom INC derived substantial financial support.

After the (British) government's announcement of its withdrawal from India not later than June 1948, AIML was induced to intensify its struggle in Muslim majority provinces. In Bengal and Sind AIML was in the saddle. In the Punjab, a coalition of Akali Sikhs, the Unionists and INC held office. AIML was the largest single party in the Assembly, holding 74 out of a total of 175 seats. But it did not enjoy absolute majority. The leaders of AIML in the Punjab had claimed the support of 88 MLAs, but the Governor favoured inviting Malik Khizār Ḥayāt Khān Tiwānā to form a coalition government (8 March 1946). AIML registered its protest by calling a province-wide *hartāl* (closing of shops) on the following day. AIML started a civil disobedience movement against the Punjab coalition government, and forced Khizār Ḥayāt Khān to resign through its exercise of street power. The Governor took charge of the administration and the Punjab government was dissolved. During this civil disobedience (24 January - 2 March 1947), several 'ulamā' and *pīrs* were arrested.²⁸⁸ Mawlānā Dāwūd Ghaznawī assumed the leadership of the whole movement when all the Punjab Muslim League members went to jail.

The Lahore Resolution of AIML demanded 'the whole of the Punjab' for Pakistan. INC feared the inclusion of two divisions, Ambala and Jalandhar, in would-be Pakistan. In neither division was there a single district which had a Muslim majority. In Amritsar district, the Hindu-Sikh population, combined together,

outnumbered the Muslim population. The INC working committee demanded a partition of the Punjab.

The demand for the partition of the Punjab made MAI furious. Its working committee resolved to resist such partition, with the assistance of other Muslim organisations and parties (Lahore: 23 March 1947). MAI severed its connections with INC, and made overtures of a co-operative nature to AIML.²⁸⁹ It was the last of MAI's efforts to seek the attention of the Muslim masses by suddenly espousing the cause of Pakistan.

INC also suggested the partition of Bengal; and, by suggesting the division of the Punjab and Bengal into Hindu and Muslim majority areas, it actually pleaded for the partition of India on a religious basis. The support for India's partition had gained momentum even before Lord Mountbatten arrived (Delhi: 22 March 1947).

Mountbatten's assignment was to wind up the British Raj in India, along lines preferably agreed upon by INC and AIML. After holding interviews with both sides, he made up his mind in favour of partition as the only possible solution. At the same time he realised the necessity for transferring power even before the British Government's deadline of June 1948.

A plan for 'immediate transfer of power' was announced on 3 June 1947.²⁹⁰ According to it, the wishes of the Muslim majority districts of the Punjab and Bengal, the Provinces of Sind and Baluchistan should be ascertained as to whether their Constitution was to be framed by the sitting Constituent Assembly or by a new

and separate Assembly consisting of their representatives. If the Punjab decided in favour of a separate Assembly, then a referendum in NWFP 'in view of its geographical situation and other considerations' would be held. The referendum would be on the question of whether NWFP would like to join the existing Assembly or elect a new one. Similarly, Bengal's decision in favour of a separate Assembly would pave the way for a referendum in the predominantly Muslim district of Sylhet (Assam) on whether it would wish to join Muslim East Bengal or continue to remain in India's Assam.

AIML and INC accepted the Mountbatten plan on 9 and 15 June respectively; the verdict of the Muslim majority areas was secured speedily, within less than a month during a four week interval (20 June - 17 July).

NWFP was the stronghold of the *Khudāī Khidmatgār* Party, a staunch ally of INC; and Sylhet was considered to be under the influence of JUH. Mawlānā Ḥusayn Aḥmad Madanī, the President of JUH used to stay during the month of *Ramaḏān* in Sylhet. AIML depended heavily on the services of the 'ulamā'. The 'ulamā' of JUI extensively toured the areas and turned the voters in favour of AIML. In NWFP, Khān 'Abdul Ghaffār Khān, the *Khudāī Khidmatgār* Party leader, asked his party members to boycott the referendum but his appeal went unheeded. AIML secured a victory in the referenda held in NWFP and in the district of Sylhet.

After this exercise, the Indian Independence Act,²⁹¹ intended to transfer power to the two new dominions on 15 August, was duly passed (18 July 1947). It came into effect in due course.

2.40 Conclusion

The role of the 'ulamā' during the struggle for freedom, stretching back to the beginning of the 19th century, underwent a number of changes. In the period of the consolidation of colonial rule, they were at the forefront of the resistance movement. They remained at the centre of *Jihād* and *Farā'izī* movements, and played a significant role in the Insurrection of 1857. But, towards the end of colonial rule, their political role was at best peripheral.

With the failure of the armed struggle in 1857, the collapse of Muslim rule in South Asia was complete. The failure of 'ulamā'-led movements resulted in changes in their thinking. By and large, they accepted the harsh reality of colonial rule, and concerned themselves with the task of preserving Muslim identity through religious activities. *Madrasahs* were established. The newly-introduced press power was fully utilised for the propagation of Islamic beliefs and norms of Muslim culture. Until the beginning of the second decade of the present century, the 'ulamā' were more or less indifferent to colonial rule.

While the 'ulamā' were engaged in tasks relating to religious education, the effects of modern English education began to be felt. By the last quarter of the 19th century, a new class of English-educated Indians had come into existence. This aspiring English-educated class, comprised mostly of Hindus, demanded a better share of government jobs and of membership of representative institutions. The Muslim upper class, which in the past had been affiliated to the Mughal state, felt threatened by the emergence of a new class of English-educated Hindus.

Under the leadership of Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān, the Muslim upper class devoted itself to the promotion of English education in the Muslim community, and to the task of establishing close links with the colonial rulers. Sayyid Aḥmad Khān's policy of drawing close to the colonial government was not to the liking of the 'ulamā'. Not content with confining their activities to the promotion of English education, Sayyid Aḥmad Khān and his intellectual associates introduced a new interpretation of Islamic beliefs and teachings, which bore the appellation of 'Islamic Modernism'. It contrasted sharply with the theological approach that the 'ulamā' had established in South Asia. Muslim intellectuals in South Asia were thus divided into two main groups - one which adhered to the theological approach of the 'ulamā', and the other, to 'Islamic Modernism'. The mass of the Muslim people remained under the influence of the 'ulamā', whilst a tiny but very effective section of the Muslim community propagated 'Islamic Modernism'.

The 'ulamā's indifference to colonial rule, and the vocal representation of the Muslim cause by Sayyid Aḥmad Khān resulted in the effective removal of the 'ulamā' from the political arena. Muslim politics was dominated by Sayyid Aḥmad Khān and his followers. The 'ulamā' proved irrelevant in the politics of petitions, memoranda and conferences that constituted the bulk of indigenous political life in India after the 1857 Insurrection.

This situation changed when Pan-Islamic ideas penetrated South Asia. The 'ulamā' now had a chance to bridge the gap between them and the modern educated Muslims. Religious-cultural organisations were established, and the 'ulamā' once again entered the arena of the modern educated Muslims. The outbreak of World

War I, and subsequent developments gave rise to the *Khilāfat* and Non-co-operation movements. The purely religious nature of the *Khilāfat* issue projected the *‘ulamā’* as a vital political force. This phase was, however, short-lived. The *Khilāfat* was dissolved in Turkey (1924). Its reverberations in India were immediate and to the detriment of Gāndhī's Non-co-operation Campaign.

The *‘ulamā’* entered Muslim politics when agitation against colonial rule and confrontation had assumed a central position in Indian nationalist politics. They were a strong force in the mobilisation of Muslim masses. But the change in the course taken by politics from confrontation to negotiation, shifted the struggle from the streets and *pandāls* to the assembly halls. Although the *‘ulamā’* were marginalised once again in the delicate constitutional discussions that ensued, they tried to keep their political identity through their own organisations which continued to maintain an agitational posture. During the Pakistan movement (1940-1947), however, the *‘ulamā’*'s role assumed new significance, but they were followers of one or other of the two main camps. JUH opposed partition from its position as a supporter of INC. On the other hand, JUI and AISC supported AIML's movement in favour of partition.

During the Pakistan Movement, AIML emphasised the distinctive character of Islam. It claimed that Pakistan would be a laboratory of Islam. And, without partition, the dream of applying Islamic injunctions through state power could not be realised. The *‘ulamā’*, however, were not clear on the issue of whether AIML should be supported. Their attitude was based on how different sections perceived AIML's leadership. JUH and Mawlānā

Mawdūdī (of *Jamā'at-i-Islāmī*) were totally dissatisfied with the standard of 'Islamicity' of AIML's leadership. As far as they were concerned, AIML was unfit to hold office in an Islamic state that might result from partition. JUI and AISC, on the other hand, were willing to trust AIML's leadership.

The internecine divisions among the 'ulamā' during the Pakistan Movement should not be seen as stemming from any differences on the question of establishing an Islamic state. Quite the contrary, all sections of the 'ulamā' highlighted the characteristics of the Islamic state; but, whilst some believed that the political fortunes of an Islamic state could under no circumstances be entrusted to AIML's care, others believed that an Islamic state as a *fait accompli* could be expected to bring out the best in AIML.

Among the three groups of the *Sunnī 'ulamā'*, *Deobandīs* were the most vocal and articulate, in spite of their thinner theological following. On the other hand, the *Barelwīs*, who enjoyed a much larger following, were no match for the *Deobandī 'ulamā'* in the spheres of organisation and propaganda. The third group (*Ahl-i-Hadīṣ*) co-operated with the *Deobandī* organisations, and did not establish an overt political identity of its own.

Although the 'ulamā' were on the periphery of the nationalist political scene, it was expected at partition that they would play an important political role in Pakistan because of its religious character.

NOTES

1. Nizāmi, Khaliq Ahmad, Shāh Waliullāh Ke Siyāsī Maktūbāt (Lahore: Idārah-i-Islāmiyāt 1978), pp.6-17.
2. The eldest son and successor of Shāh Waliullāh; a leading 'ālim of the time. A great majority of the Sunnī 'ulamā' of South Asia even today traces its academic geneology to him.
3. Dihlawī, Shāh 'Abdul 'Azīz, Fatāwā 'Azīzī (Delhi: Maṭba' Muḥtabāī, 1893), Vol. I, pp.17-18. For an English translation of the relevant part of the fatwā in question, see Mujeeb, M., The Indian Muslims (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1967), pp.390-391.
4. Faruqi, Ziya-ul-Hasan, The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan (Lahore: Progressive Books, n.d.), p. 2.

A gloss different from the widely-held understanding of the fatwā was given by Mushir-ul-Haq in his M.A. Thesis Indian Muslims' Attitude to the British in the Early Nineteenth Century: A Case Study of Shah Abdul Aziz (Montreal: Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, 1964). Haq's article in Urdu entitled Unīswīn Sadi Ke Hinustān Kī Ha'yat-i-Shar'ī [Burhān, 63 (October 1969): 4, pp.221-243], based on the Thesis, shows that Shāh 'Abdul 'Azīz's fatwā was actually directed to the British and reflected an attitude of ambivalence rather than outright opposition. But there is in fact no doubt that the Jihād movement did take the initiative from this fatwā. Haq's interpretation is accepted by subsequent writers. For example, Ahmad, Aziz, Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan: 1857-1964 (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p.20; 'Activism of the Ulama in Pakistan' in Nikki R. Keddie (ed.), Scholars, Saints and Sufis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), p.258; Metcalf, B.D., Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband 1860-1900 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp.50-52; Rizvi, S.A.A., Shah Abdul Aziz: Puritanism, Sectarian Polemics and Jihad (Canberra: Dar-ul-Maarif, 1982), pp.225-244.
5. See Khan, Muin-ud-din, History of the Faraidi Movement in Bengal: 1818-1906 (Karachi: Pakistan Historical Society, 1965).
6. Sayyid Ahmad to Yār Muḥammad Khān, Makātīb-i-Sayyid Ahmad Shahīd (Lahore: Maktabah-i-Rashīdiyyah, 1975), p.25, p.25a. Shāh Ismā'īl, the spokesman of the Jihād movement, wrote a book entitled Mansab-i-Imāmat which provides an ideological basis to the movement. He equated the Christian rule in India to the rule of infidels, and hence jihād against the Christian rulers was inevitable. Mansab-i-Imāmat, Muḥammad Ḥusayn 'Alawī (trans.) (Lahore: Ā'inah-i-Adab, 1969).

7. The *Jihād* movement has attracted the attention of a number of historians. Among several studies, the following, due to their depth and insight, are worth mentioning: Ahmad, Qeyam-ud-din, Wahabi Movement in India (Islamabad: National Book Foundation, n.d.); Mihr, Ghulam Rasūl, Sīrat-i-Sayyid Ahmad Shahīd Vols.I and II (Lahore: *Kitāb Manzil*, 1954); Jamā'at-i-Mujāhidīn (Lahore: *Kitāb Manzil*, 1955); Sarguzasht-i-Mujāhidīn (Lahore: *Kitāb Manzil*, 1969); Nadwī, Sayyid Abul Hasan Ali, Sayyid Ahmad Shahīd, Vols.I and II (Karachi: H.M. Saīd and Co., n.d.); Nadwi, Masūd 'Ālam, Hinustan Kī Pehlī Islāmī Tahrik (Rawalpindi: *Maktabah-i-Milliyyah*, 1948).
8. The 1857 Insurrection constituted a landmark in the history of South Asia. Its failure resulted in the final obliteration of Muslim rule which had only nominally existed since 1803. There is a vast literature on the 1857 Insurrection. For an annotated bibliography of the relevant material in the English language, see Ladendorf, Janice M., The Revolt in India, 1857-58 (Zug Switzerland: Inter Documentation Company A.G., 1966).
9. Thompson, Edward and Garrat, G.T., Rise and Fulfilment of British Rule in India (London: Macmillan, 1934), p.441.
10. *Ibid.*, p.457.
11. A *fatwā* from the 'ulamā' of Delhi was issued in July 1857. For the text of the *fatwā* with the signatures of all those who signed it, see Razwī, Khurshīd Muṣṭafā, Jang-i-Āzādī Atharah saw Satāwan (Delhi: *Maktabah-i-Burhān*, 1959), pp.568-569; Qādiri, Muḥammad Ayūb, Jang-i-Āzādī 1857: Waqi'āt-w-Shakhsiyāt (Karachi: Pak Academy, 1976), pp.404-406.
- Apart from this *fatwā*, reportedly similar rulings were made public by the 'ulamā'.
12. Haq, Muinul, The Great Revolution of 1857 (Karachi: Pakistan Historical Society, 1968), p.76, pp.81-82.
13. Gīlānī, Manāzar Aḥsan, Sawānih-i-Qāsīmī (Lahore: *Maktabah-i-Rahmāniyyah*, n.d.), Vol. II, pp.125-137; Merathī, Muḥammad 'Ashiq Ilāhī, Tazkirat-ur-Rashīd (Lahore: *Idārah-i-Islāmiyāt*, 1986), pp.73-87.
14. Mihr, Ghulām Rasūl, 1857 Ke Mujāhid (Lahore: *Kitāb Manzil*, 1957), pp.163-168 and *passim*.
- For a brief account of the 'ulamā's role in the 1857 Insurrection, see also, Qureshi, I.H., Ulema in Politics (Karachi: *Ma'āref Limited*, 1974), pp.182-213.
15. Nehru, Jawaharlal, An Autobiography (London: Bodley Head, 1949), p.460.

For an account of the British authorities' attitude towards the Muslim community, see Hardy, P., The Muslims of British India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), pp.61-91.

16. Potts, E. Daniel, British Baptist Missionaries in India, 1793-1837: The History of Serampore and its Missions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), pp.114-136; Gupta, K.P. Sen, The Christian Missionaries in Bengal: 1793-1833 (Calcutta: R.L. Mukhopadhyay, 1971).
17. Khayrābādī, Faẓl-i-Haq, al-Sawrat-ul-Hindiyyah [translated into Urdu by 'Abdu-sh-shāhid Khān Sharwānī, under the title of Bāghī Hinustan] (Lahore: Maktabah-i-Qādiriyyah, 1974), pp.254-256; Khan, Sayyid Ahmad, Asbāb-i-Baqhāwat-i-Hind (Karachi: Urdu Academy Sind, 1957), pp.119-124.
18. Mountstuart Elphinstone quoted in Desai, A.R., Social Background of Indian Nationalism (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1976), p.141.
19. de Bary, Wm. Theodore, Sources of Indian Tradition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), p.601.
20. Tinker, Hugh, South Asia: A Short History (London: Pall Mall Press, 1966), p.175.
21. Farquhar, J.N., Modern Religious Movements in India (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1919), pp.76-77.
22. This basic work on Āryā Samāj was translated into English by Dr. Bharadwaja and was widely and frequently published.
23. Jordens, J.F.T., 'Hindu Religious and Social Reforms in British India' in A.L. Basham (ed.), A Cultural History of India (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), p.376.
24. Desai, A.R., *op.cit.*, p.293.
25. de Bary, Wm. Theodore, *op.cit.*, p.652.
26. See Chapter 1 of this work, pp.34-35.
27. Salīm, Muḥammad 'Abdullāh, 'Dār-ul-Iftā' Dār-ul-ūlūm Deoband', al-Rashīd 4 (February-March 1976): 2-3, p.203.

A selection of the *fatwās*, issued from Deoband's *dār-ul-iftā'*, is being compiled in several volumes. Eight of them have been issued at the time of this writing.
28. Faruqi, Ziya-ul-Hasan, *op.cit.*, p.26. The original document and its print has been published several times. See for example, Ahmad, Hāfiẓ Nazar, Jā'izah-i-Madāris-i-Ārabiyyah Islāmiyyah Maqhrībī Pakistān (Lyallpur: Jāmi'ah Chishtiyyah Trust, 1960).

29. Even this donation was only promised, not actually given. Khān, Sayyid Aḥmad, Maqālāt-i-Sir Sayyid, Shaykh Muhammad Ismā'īl Panīpatī (ed.) (Lahore: Majlis-i-Taraqqi-yi-Adab, 1962), Vol.VII, pp.278-279.
30. Raẓwī, Sayyid Maḥbūb, Dār-ul-'ulum Kī Ta'limī Khusūsiyāt (Delhi: Union Printing Press, n.d.), p.19.
31. Sayyid Ahmad Khan's religious thoughts are discussed, for example, in Baljon, J.M.S., The Reforms and Religious Ideas of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1949); Dar, Bashir Ahmad, Religious Thought of Sayyid Ahmad Khan (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1957); and Hālī, Alṭaf Ḥusayn, Ḥayāt-i-Jawīd (Kanpur: Nami Press, 1901).
32. Nadwi, Masūd 'Ālam, *op.cit.*, pp.127-170; Ahmad, Qeyam-ud-din, *op.cit.*, pp.232-272.
33. On 'Abdur Raḥīm's life and activities, see Malīhābādī, 'Abdur Razzāq, Azād Kī Kahānī Azād Kī Zubānī (Delhi: Hali Publishing House, 1958), p.389; Iṣlāhī, 'Abdur Raḥmān Parwāz, 'Abdur Raḥīm Dahri Kī Khud Nawisht Swānih 'Umri,' Jāmi'ah 72 (April 1975): 3, pp.186-188; Shāhjahānpūrī, Abū Salmān, 'Shāh 'Abdul Azīz Ke Ek Shāgird', ar-Raḥīm 1 (August 1963): 3, pp.37-44.
34. For details of the activities of the 'Muhammadan Literary Society', see Haque, Enamul, Nawab Bahadur Abdul Latif; His Writings and Related Documents (Dacca: Samundra Prokashani, 1968); Abbasi, Muhammad Yusuf, Muslim Politics and Leadership in South Asia, 1876-1892 (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1981), pp.15-18.
35. 'Hay, 'Abdul, Majmū'ah-i-Fatāwā (Lahore: Malik Siraj-ud-din and Sons, 1956), Vol. III, pp.20-21.
36. Gangohī, Rashīd Aḥmad, Fatāwā Rashīdiyyah (Moradabad: Barlas Press, 1323 A.H.), Vol.I, pp.90-91.
37. Spear, Percival, The Oxford History of Modern India (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p.291.
38. The membership of the British Indian Association could never have been more than 300. At the end of the 1880s, it was hardly 100. Seal, Anil, The Emergence of Indian Nationalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p.364.
39. For an account of the activities of the Indian Association, see Bagal, J.C., History of the Indian Association: 1876-1951 (Calcutta: The Indian Association, 1953); Seal, Anil, *op.cit.*, pp.214-226.
40. According to W.C. Bonnerjee, the first President of INC,

It will probably be news to many that the
Indian National Congress, as it was

originally started and as it has since been carried on, is in reality the work of the Marquis of Dufferin and Awa when that nobleman was the Governor General of India....Lord Dufferin had made it a condition with Mr. Hume that his name in connection with the scheme of the Congress should not be divulged so long as he remained in the country....

Philips, C.H., The Evolution of India and Pakistan: 1858 to 1947, Select Documents (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp.138-139.

41. Wedderburn, W., Allan Octavian Hume (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1913), p.77.
42. Philips, C.H., *op.cit.*, p.141
43. Seal, Anil, *op.cit.*, p.373; Pandey, B.N., The Break-up of British India (London: Macmillan, 1969), p.43.
44. Ghosh, P.C., The Development of the Indian National Congress: 1892-1909 (Calcutta: Firma K.L. Mukhopadhyay, 1960), p.11.
45. Sayyid Amir Ali (1849-1928) founded the National Muhammadan Association in 1877 (since 1883, re-named Central). Its objectives were 'to promote good feeling between the Indian races and creeds, ...to protect and safeguard Muhammadan interests and help their political thinking'. Aziz, K.K., Amir Ali: Life and Works (Lahore: Publishers United, 1968); Abbasi, Muhammad Yusuf, *op.cit.*, pp.119-145.
46. Philips, C.H., *op.cit.*, pp.187-189.
47. For Muslim representation at INC annual sessions, see Wasti, Syed Razi, Lord Minto and the Indian Nationalist Movement, 1905-1910 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), Appendix I, p.221; The Political Triangle in India, 1858-1924 (Lahore: People's Publishing House, 1976), pp.46-47.
48. Barrier, N.G., 'Muslim Politics in the Punjab: 1870-1890', The Punjab: Past and Present 5 (1971): 1, pp.101-102.
49. For an English translation of two such Urdu tracts, see *ibid.*, pp.104-127.
50. Lovett, Sir Verney, A History of the Indian National Movement (London: John Murray, 1921), p.39.
51. For the family's role in the anti-colonial movement, see Rabbāni, Muḥammad Khalilullah, Jund-i-Hurriyat (Khairpur: Madrasat-ul-Islām, 1978), pp.55-104.
52. Qureshi, I.H., *op.cit.*, p.228.

53. al-Hasanī, Sayyid Muhammad, Sīrat-i-Sayyid Muhammad 'Alī Mongīrī (Lucknow: Idārah-i-Nashriyāt-i-Islām, 1964).
54. For the life and works of Mawlānā Shiblī Nu'mānī, see Nadwī, Sayyid Sulaymān, Hayāt-i-Shiblī (Azamgarh: Dār-ul-Muṣaniffīn, 1943); Ikrām, Shaykh Muḥammad, Shiblī-nāmāh (Bombay: Taj Book Office, n.d.).
55. Nadvi, Syed Habib ul Haq, 'The Role of Resurgent Ulama and *Sufi-Shaikhs* in the Reconstruction of Islamic Education: Foundation of Deoband (1867); and Nadva (1893), Muslim Education Quarterly 3 (1985): 2, p.49.
56. Farquhar, *op.cit.*, p.111.
57. Freitag, Sandria B., 'Sacred Symbol as Mobilizing Ideology: The North Indian Search for a Hindu Community', Comparative Studies of Society and History, 22 (1980): 4, p.610.
58. Ghosh, P.C., *op.cit.*, p.68.
59. *Ibid.*, pp.69-70.
60. Coupland, R., The Indian Problem: 1833-1935 (London: Oxford University Press, 1943), p.29.
61. Jordens, J.F.T., *op.cit.*, p.378.
62. Festival in honour of *Ganesh*, the elephant-headed god of success and wisdom in Hindu mythology.
63. More than two centuries before, Shivaji had successfully revolted against Muslim domination.
64. Ghosh, P.C., *op.cit.*, p.2.
65. Dutt, R.P., India Today: 1940 quoted in Desai, A.R., *op.cit.*, p.332.
66. For a detailed study, see Fatihpurī, Farmān, Hindī-Urdu Tanāzāh (Islamabad: National Book Foundation, 1977), pp.154-235.
67. Aziz, K.K., The Making of Pakistan (London: Chatto and Windus, 1967), p.24.
68. Lambert, Richard D., 'Religion, Economics and Violence in Bengal', The Middle East Journal 4 (July 1950): 3, p.330.
According to the 1911 census, one third of the landholders in East Bengal were *Brahmans* and *Kāyasthās*. Johnson, Gordon, 'Partition, Agitation and Congress: Bengal 1904-1908', Modern Asian Studies 7 (1973): 3, p.356.
69. In Bengal, the Muslim community 'formed 31.3 per cent of the total population but held only 8.5 per cent of the

posts in the judicial and executive services in 1886'.
 Misra, B.B., The Indian Middle Classes, their Growth in Modern Times (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1961), p.388. As in 1887, Bengali Muslims occupied only five per cent of the posts carrying a salary of Rs. 75/- per month or more. Seal, Anil, *op.cit.*, pp.362.

70. Johnson, Gordon, *op.cit.*, pp.543-544.
71. *Ibid*, p.544.
72. Hardie, J.K., India: Impressions and Suggestions (London: Independent Labour Party, 1909), pp.25-26.
73. Philips, C.H., *op.cit.*, p.190 (from the 'Address to Lord Minto).
74. *Ibid.*, p.191.
75. Wasti, Syed Razi, The Political Triangle, *op.cit.*, p.60.
76. Khan, Aga, The Memoirs of Aga Khan (London: Cassell and Company Limited, 1954), p.95.
77. Agha Khan to Dunlop Smith (Private Secretary to the Viceroy), dated 29 October 1906, in Gilbert, Martin, Servant of India (London: Longmans, 1966), p.57.
78. Pirzada, Sharifuddin, Foundations of Pakistan: All India Muslim League Documents, 1906-1947 (Karachi: National Publishing House, 1969), Vol.I, p.(d).
79. Hardie, J.K., *op.cit.*, pp.10-11.
80. Paysah Akhbar, 12 January 1912 quoted in S. Razi Wasti, 'Nawab Viqar-ul-Mulk - A Great Political Fighter', Journal of Pakistan Studies 2 (1980): 1, p.97.
81. Qureshi, Ishtiaq Husain, The Administration of the Mughal Empire (Karachi: The University of Karachi, 1966), pp.28-29; Ulema in Politics, *op.cit.*, pp.253-254.
82. al-Qāsim, November 1912, pp.19-20.
83. Mawlānā Muḥammad 'Alī paid the following tribute to Shibli Nu'mānī, his teacher, after lamenting the poor state of religious education at Aligarh.

Aligarh itself presented one bright spot in all this cimmerian darkness and I must not omit to mention it. This was no other than a college Professor of rare charms and of an entirely new literary outlook whom Sir Syed Ahmad Khan had been able to attract to Aligarh. He was Shibli Nu'mani, Professor of Arabic and Persian, an ardent lover of poetry and Islamic history.

- Ali, Mohamed, My Life: A Fragment, Afzal Iqbal (ed.) (Lahore: Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1966), p.23.
84. Mawlānā Zafar 'Alī Khān was a student and admirer of Shiblī. He translated Shiblī's al-Fārūq [the life of the second *Khalīfah*] into English.
85. Iqbāl, Muhammad, Iqbāl-nāmāh, Shaykh 'Ataullāh (ed.) (Lahore: Shaykh Muhammad Ashraf, 1945), vol.II, p.231.
86. Iqbāl, Muḥammad, Jawīd-nāmāh (Lahore: Shaykh Ghulam Ali and Sons, 1954), pp.63-70.
87. Bhatnagar, S.K., History of the MAO College Aligarh (Lahore: Book Traders, n.d), pp.178-180; Khan, Habibullāh, Ḥayāt-i-Āftāb (Aligarh: Old Boys Association, n.d.), pp.171-172.
88. The exchange of students scheme was soon abandoned after it was discovered that the first two visitors from Aligarh to Deoband were secret service agents of the colonial government.
89. Gīlānī, Manāẓar Aḥsan, *op.cit.*, p.226.
90. For instance, Mawlānā Sindhī was not a critic of Mirzā Ghulām Aḥmad of Qadian (1838-1908); he indeed had contacts with Mirzā's followers. Perhaps this was not acceptable to Mawlānā Anwar Shāh Kāshmirī, who refuted the claims of Mirzā Ghulām Aḥmad whom he declared *kāfir* and apostate. Anwar Shāh Kāshmirī inspired the publication of a considerable amount of anti-*Aḥmadiyyah* literature, through his students.
- The *Deobandī* writers do not indicate in clear terms the religious points on which Mawlānā Sindhī's opinion differed from those of the senior teachers. The *Aḥmadiyyah* issue was perhaps one of them. For a discussion of Mawlānā Sindhī's views, see Aslam, Muḥammad (ed.), Mawlānā Sindhī Ke Siyāsī Maktūbāt (Lahore: *Nadwat-ul-Muṣaniffīn*, 1980), *passim*.
91. Sindhī, 'Ubaydullāh, Khutbāt-w-Maqālāt, Muḥammad Sarwar (ed.) (Lahore: Sind Sagar Academy, 1970), p.73.
92. Even though Mawlānā Sindhī himself could not write any commentary on the *Qurān*, the writings of his students (based on class notes) amply reflected the theme of *jihād* and struggle for liberty. Mawlānā Aḥmad 'Alī Lāhorī, Khawājah 'Abdul 'Hay Fārūqī and Mawlānā Bashīr Aḥmad Ludhiyānwī wrote the commentaries on the whole of the *Qurān* or on selected parts of it. The spirit of political struggle is evident in these commentaries.
93. Robinson, Francis, Separatism among Indian Muslims: The Politics of the United Provinces' Muslims, 1860-1923 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), pp.276-277.

94. Author's translation.
'Dastūr-ul-Āmal Anjuman-i-Khuddām-i-Ka'bah', in Tahrīkat-i-Millī, Dr. Abū Salman Shāhjahānpurī, Dr. Anṣār Zāhid and Faṣīh-ud-dīn Siddiqī (eds) (Karachi: Government National College, 1983), p.115.
95. Mawlānā 'Abdul Bārī Farangī Mahallī (President) Ḥakīm 'Abdul Wālī Lakhnawī, Dr. Naẓīr-ud-dīn Ḥasan Lakhnawī, Muḥammad 'Alī, Shawkat 'Alī, and Mushīr Ḥasan Qidwā'ī.
96. Khuddām-ul-Ka'bah, 1 (December 1914): 7, p.34.
97. Qureshi, I.H., Ulema in Politics, *op.cit.*, p.237.
98. In addition to the Pan-Islamic press already in existence, Anjuman started a monthly named Khuddām-ul-Ka'bah (Delhi: June 1914).
99. Minault, Gail, 'Islam and Mass Politics: the Indian Ulama and the Khilafat Movement' in D.E. Smith (ed.), Religion and Political Modernisation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), p.17.
100. Ja'farī, Sayyid Ra'īs Aḥmad (ed.), 'Alī Brādrān (Lahore: Muhammad Ali Academy, 1963), pp.328-412.
101. Jafri, S.R.A. (ed.), Selections from Mawlana Mohammed Ali's Comrade (Lahore: Mohammed Ali Academy, 1965), pp.498-524.
102. Iqbal, Afzal, The Life and Times of Mohamed Ali (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1974), p.168.
103. Sindhī, Dr. Mayman 'Abdul Majīd, Sindh Men Tahrīk-i-Khilāfat, Barg-i-Gul (Karachi: Government Urdu College, 1979), p.120.
104. Farrukhābādī, Raḥmat, Tahrīk-i-Khilāfat Men Musalmānān-i-Sindh Kā Kirdār, Barg-i-Gul, *op.cit.*, p.129.
105. Shāhjahānpurī, Abū Sulmān, *op.cit.*, pp.181-182.
106. In March 1913, a group of Indians living in America formed an organisation known as the 'Hindi Association'. Its sole objective was to work for the liberation of India, if necessary by armed struggle. San Francisco was chosen as the headquarters of the Association. In November 1913, the Association brought out its organ, Ghadr (Mutiny) in four languages - Punjabi, Hindi, Urdu and Marathi. The Association subsequently assumed the name of Ghadr Party. A large section of the Party's membership was drawn from the Sikhs. But, from the outset, 'it maintained a secular character and at no time did it seek emotional inspiration from Sikh religion' [Singh, Khushwant, The Sikhs (London: Allen and Unwin, 1953), p.118].

The *Ghadr* Party advocated the formation of secret societies for the purpose of launching a revolutionary movement within India, removing British colonialism by any means. Hardayāl Virendrānāth Chattopadhyaya, the editor of *Ghadr*, was arrested at the instance of the British government (25 March 1914), but his comrades were able to obtain his release on bail. He left for Germany.

At the outbreak of World War I, the Indian revolutionaries decided to throw their whole weight on the side of Germany. The German government, anxious to exploit anti-British feelings in any quarter, gave them support. Hardayāl and Raja Mahendrā Pratāp formed the 'Indian National Committee'.

In 1915, the *Ghadr* Party was active in India, especially in the Punjab. The British government requested the U.S. government to impose a curb on the activities of the *Ghadr* movement. Subsequently, *Ghadr* activists were arrested and convicted. See Brown, Giles Tyler, 'The Hindu Conspiracy: 1914-1917', Pacific Historical Review 17 (1948): 3, pp.299-310; Deol, Gurdev Singh, The Role of the *Ghadr* Party in the National Movement (Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1969); Juergensmeyer, Mark, 'Ghadr Sources: Research on Punjabi Revolutionaries in America', in Harbans Singh and N. Gerald Barrier (eds.), Punjab Past and Present, Essays in Honour of Dr. Ganda Singh (Patiala: Punjabi University, 1976), pp.302-321. This article contains a select bibliography on and of *Ghadr* Party's literature.

107. For detailed study of the Silk Letter Conspiracy, see Arab Bureau (Cairo), The Arab Bulletin 1916-1919, (London: Archives Editions, 1986), Vol. I, pp.427-431; Aybak, Zafar Ḥaṣan, Āp Bīṭī Vols. I and II (Lahore: Mansur Book House, n.d.); 'Ubayd-Allah Sindhi in Afghanistan', Journal of the Regional Cultural Institute 4 (1973): 3-4, pp.129-136; Madani, Husayn Ahmad, Naqsh-i-Ḥayāt (Deoband: Maktabah-i-Diniyyah, 1954); Miyan, Muhammad, Tahrīk-i-Shaykh-ul-Hind (Lahore: Maktabah-i-Rashīdiyyah, 1975); Sindhī, Ubaydullāh, Kābul Men Sāt Sāl (Lahore: Sindh Sagar Academy, 1955).
108. Muḥammad 'Alī, Dr. Mukhtār Aḥmad Anṣarī (1860-1936), Ḥakīm Ajmal Khān (1836-1928), Ḥasrat Mohānī (1877-1951), Maḥzar-ul-Ḥaq (1866-1929) and Mawlānā Abul Kalām Azād were the prominent Pan-Islamists.
109. Bolitho, Hector, Jinnah: Creator of Pakistan (London: John Murray, 1954), p.58.
110. The sessions in 1915 were held in Bombay and the phenomenon continued until 1919's sessions in Amritsar.
111. For the text of the 'Lucknow Pact', see Allana, G., Pakistan Movement: Historic Documents (Lahore: Islamic Book Service, 1977), pp.25-33; Philips, C.H., *op.cit.*, pp.171-173.

112. Hurewitz, J.C. (ed.), Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1956), Vol. II, pp.11-12, 18-22.
113. *Jazīrat-ul-Ārab* included Mesopotamia, Arabia, Syria and Palestine.
114. *اخرجوا المشركين من جزيرة العرب*
 The other narration of the *ḥadīṣ* is as follows:
اخرجوا اليهود والنصارى من جزيرة العرب
 (Expel the Jew and the Christian from *Jazīrat-ul-Ārab*)
115. For the development of Arab nationalism, see Hourani, A.H., Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age: 1789-1939 (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp.260-323; Landen, Robert G., The Emergence of the Modern Middle East: Selected Writings (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 1970), pp.192-196, 227-230; Tibi, Bassam, Arab Nationalism: A Critical Enquiry (London: Macmillan, 1981), pp.47-96.
116. Landen, Robert G., *op.cit.*, pp.94-98, pp.119-125, pp.219-222; Lewis, Bernard, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp.346-352.
117. Prominent among them were Muḥammad Ibrāhīm Mīr Siyālkotī, Ṣanauḷlāh Amritsari, Muftī Kifayatullāh, ʿAbdul Bārī Lukhnawī, Ṣalāmatullāh, Āzād Subhānī and Aḥmad Ṣāīd.
118. Robinson, Francis, *op.cit.*, p.293.
119. Chawdhari Khalīquzzamān named this meeting the 'First *Khilāfat* Conference'. He claimed to be the originator of the idea of this meeting, and according to his claims the 'All India *Khilāfat* Committee' was formed there and he was the person to draft its constitution. Pathway to Pakistan (London: Longmans, 1961), pp.47-49; Mawḍūdiyyat: Aek Āzāb (Karachi: International Press, n.d.), pp.28-29.
- The claims made by Khalīquzzamān do not seem to be correct. His name is neither mentioned among the conveners of the Conference nor among its delegates. The Conference was known as the 'All India Muslim Conference'. Manglorī, Sayyid Tufayl Aḥmad, Musal mānon Kā Roshan Mustaqbil (Delhi: Kutub-khānah Āzīziyyah, 1945), p.509.
120. Gandhi, M.K., The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi (Delhi: The Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1965), Vol. XVI, p.227.
121. According to one narration, Mawlawī Faḥl-ul-Ḥaq (1873-1962) presided over the Conference (Manglorī, *op.cit.*, p.509). Some others say that Gandhī was the President of the Conference. Krishna, Gopal, 'The *Khilāfat* Movement in India: The First Phase, September 1919-August 1920', Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, (1968): 1-2, pp.37-53.

- 122 The 25 'ulamā', present at the meeting were: 'Abdul Bārī F rangī Mahallī, Muḥammad Anīs, Pīr Muḥammad Imām Sindhī, Muḥammad Ibrāhīm Mir Siyālkotī, Qādir Bakhsh Badāyūnī, Khudā Bakhsh Muḥaffarpurī, Muḥammad Akram Khān, Sayyid M ḥammad Dāwūd, Salamātullāh, Asadullah Sindhī, Ghulām Nizāmuddīn Badāyūnī, Hāfiẓ Aḥmad Sa'īd, Tāj Muḥammad, M ilā Bakh h Amritsarī, Muniruzzaman, Sayyid Ismā'īl, Āzād Subḥānī, Abul Wafā Sanāullāh, Muḥammad Fākhir Ilahabādī, Kif'yatullah, Sayyid Kamāluddīn, Muḥammad Ibrāhīm of Darbhanga, 'Abdul Hakim Gayāwī, Muḥammad Sādiq and M ḥammad 'Abdullāh.
123. Author's translation.
Miyaṅ, Sayyid Muḥammad, Jamīyat-ul-'Ulamā' Kiyā Hay? (Delhi Jamīyat-ul-'Ulamā' Publication Division, 1946), pp.10-11. [The wording of the objects was slightly changed in 1939 but without any real difference.]
- 124 Sa'īd, Aḥmad, Asāsī Usul-w-Aghrāz-w-Maqāsid-w-Zawābit Jamīyat-ul-'Ulamā'-i-Hind Kā Zer-i-Tajwīz Musawwadah (Delhi: n.d.), p.3.
- 125 Pirzada, Sharifuddin, *op.cit.*, Vol. I, p.539.
126. Gandhi, M.K., An Autobiography (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1969), p.363.
127. *Ibid.*, p.74.
128. The Natal Indian Congress was founded on 22 August 1894, chiefly through the efforts of Abdullah Haji Adam who was Gandhi's employer. From its inception to 1913, it was continuously presided over by Muslim merchants. It also relied heavily on the financial backing of the Muslim community. *Ibid.*, pp.111-114, p.117, p.147.
129. Brown, Judith M., Gandhi's Rise to Power, Indian Politics: 1915-1922 (Cambridge: The University Press, 1972), pp.9-11.
130. *Ibid.*, p.9.
131. *Ibid.*, p.12.
132. Krishna, Gopal, *op.cit.*, p.50.
133. Aziz, K.K., The Indian Khilafat Movement: 1915-1933 (Karachi: Pak Publishers Ltd., 1972)p. 134.
134. Majlis-i-Khilāfat Punjab, Tahrīk-i-'Adm-i-Ta'āwun Awr Ahkām-i-Dīn-i-Mubīn (Lahore: Majlis-i-Khilāfat Punjab, 1920), pp.1-8.
135. Rozinah, Parwin, Jamīyat-ul-'Ulamā'-i-Hind: Dastāwizāt Markazī Ijlāsha-ye-'Ām, 1919-1945 (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1980), Vol.I, pp.67-68.

136. انما ينهاكم عن الذين اتاكم في الدين واخرجوكم من دياركم ولما هروا على اخرجكم ان تولوهم ومن يتولهم فاولئك هم الظالمون
Arberry, A.J., *op.cit.*, p.578.
- The ideologues of non-co-operation further elaborated their policy in several speeches and statements. See Āzād, Abul Kalām, *Mas'alah-i-Khilāfat-w-Jazīrat-ul-'Arab* (Calcutta: *al-Balāgh* Press, 1920), pp.138-143; Āzād, Abul Kalām, *Khutbāt-i-Āzād*, Mālik Rām (ed.) (Delhi: Sahitah Academy, 1974), p.49.
137. Rozīnah Parwīn, *op.cit.*, pp.76-78.
138. For the text of *fatwā*, see Ja'fari, Ra'īs Ahmad (ed.), *Awraq-i-Gumgashtah* (Lahore: Muhammad Ali Academy, 1968), pp.208-224; Shahjahanpuri, Abū Salmān (ed.), *Tahrīkāt-i-Millī*, *op.cit.*, pp.445-455.
- The first signature on the *fatwā* is of Mawlānā Abul Maḥasin Muḥammad Sajjād (d.1940), perhaps he drafted the *fatwā*.
139. Robinson, Francis, *op.cit.*, p.324.
140. For the views of Mawlānā Ashraf 'Alī Thānwī, see Jāfari, Ra'īs Ahmad (ed.), *op.cit.*, pp.326-331.
141. Khān, Ahmad Razā, *al-Muḥjat-ul-Mu'taminah fi Āyat-il-Mumtāhinah* (Bareilly: *Matba' Hasanī*, 1920); Jāfari. Ra'īs Ahmad (ed.), *op.cit.*, pp.225-305. Also see Ahmad, Muḥammad Masūd, *Fāzil Barelwī Awr Tark-i-Mawālāt* (Lahore: *Markazī Majlis-i-Razā*, 1976), pp.27-72.
142. Mazharullāh, Muḥammad, *Fatāwā Mazahri* (Karachi: Madinah Publishing Company, 1970), p.321 and p.329; Jafri, Ra'is Ahmad, *op.cit.*, p.326.
143. Muḥādābādī, Na'im-ud-dīn, 'Mawālāt' in Na'imī, Ghulām Mu'in-ud-dīn (ed.), *Hayāt-i-Ṣadr-ul-Afāzal* (Lahore: *Maktabah-i-Ṣadr-ul-Afāzal*, n.d.), pp.118-153.
144. Siddīq, Muḥammad, *Professor Mawlawī Hākīm Ālī* (Lahore: *Maktabah-i-Razawiyyah*, 1983), pp.97-113.
145. Resolution of JUH in its annual session (Lahore: 18-20 November 1921), Rozīnah, Parwīn, *op.cit.*, pp.130-131.
146. A telegram from Mustafā Kamāl to 'Iṣmat Pāshā (January 1924) in Landen, Robert G., *op.cit.*, p.232.
147. Ghulām Muḥammad 'Azīz Hindī, an ardent worker for the *Khilāfat* movement, was responsible for floating this idea. He obtained the necessary *fatwā* from Mawlānā 'Abdul Bārī and publicised it. See his narration: 'Tahrīk-i- Hijrat Kī Tārīkh' in Ra'īs Ahmad Ja'fari, (ed.), *op.cit.*, pp.755-934.

148. For the view point of Mawlānā 'Abdul Bāri, see 'Alī, Shaykh Shāhid, Majmū'ah-i-Risālah-i-Hijrat-w-Risālah-i-Qurbānī-yi-Gāw (Lucknow: *Shams-ul-Matabi*, 1920).
- For Mawlānā Abul Kalām Āzād's *fatwā*, see Mihr, Ghulām Rasūl (ed.), Tabarrukāt-i-Āzād (Lahore: *Kitāb Manzil*, 1959), pp.203-206; Malik, Hafeez, Muslim Nationalism in India and Pakistan (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1963), pp.343-344.
149. See Qureshi, M. Naeem, 'The Ulama of British India and the Hijrat of 1920', Modern Asian Studies, 13 (1979): 1, pp.41-59.
150. The Muslims of mixed-Arab descent in Kerala (along the Malabar coast) are known as *Mappillas* (often transliterated as *Moplah*). During the 19th and early 20th centuries, the *Mappillas* (generally agricultural labourers and sharply differentiated economically and socially) had been active in insurrectionary protests against their landlords' repressive policies of eviction. The Rebellion (1921) represented the culmination of 32 recorded outbreaks during the period between 1836 and 1919. See Dale, Stephen Frederic, Islamic Society on the South Asian Frontier: The Mappilas of Malabar, 1498-1922 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980); Miller, Ronald E., Mappila Muslims of Kerala: A Study in Islamic Trends (Bombay: Orient Longman, 1976); Wood, Conrad, 'Peasant Revolt: An Interpretation of *Moplah* Violence in the 19th and 20th Centuries' in Clive Dewey and A.G. Hopkins (eds.), The Imperial Impact (London: Athlone Press, 1978), pp.132-151.
151. Presidential Address of Mawlānā Abul Kalām Āzād at the Third Annual Session of JUH (Lahore: 18-20 November, 1921) and the resolution passed thereat. Rozinah, Parwin, *op.cit.*, Vol. I, pp.121-126, and p.132.
152. On the general approach of the conservative sections of Hindu society towards INC's policy, see Lalchand, R.B., Self Abnegation in Politics (Lahore: The Central Hindu Yuvak Sabhā, 1938).
153. Keer, Dhananjay, Veer Savarkar (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1966), p.263.
154. For the activities of Swami Shradhdhānandā, see Jordens, J.T.F., Swami Shradhdhananda: His Life and Causes (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1981).
155. Hardy, Peter, The Muslims of British India, *op.cit.*, p.204.
156. Uprety, Prem Raman, Religion and Politics in Punjab in the 1920s (Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1980), p.2.
157. Faruqi, Ziya-ul-Hasan, *op.cit.*, p.72; Kahaliquzzaman, Choudhry, Pathway to Pakistan, *op.cit.*, p.70.

158. Lawrence, Sir Walter Roper, The India We Served (London: Cassell and Co., 1928), pp.293-294.
159. The Hindu population was 36.28 per cent in 1911, and it reduced to 25.66 per cent in 1921. Uprety, Prem Raman, *op.cit.*, p.71.
160. Page, David, Prelude to Partition: The Indian Muslims and the Imperial System of Control 1920-1932 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp.86-88.
161. Shahnawaz, Begum. Father and Daughter: A Political Autobiography (Lahore: *Nigarshat*, 1971), p.73.
162. Page, David, *op.cit.*, p.99.
163. Rozinah, Parwin, *op.cit.*, Vol. I, pp.181-184.
164. *Ibid.*, p.189.
165. Page, David, *op.cit.*, p.109.
166. Nehru, Jawaharlal (ed.), A Bunch of Old Letters (London: Asia Publishing House, 1960), p.52.
167. Pirzada, Syed Sharifuddin, *op.cit.*, Vol. I, p.580.
168. Mujahid, Sharif al, Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah: Studies in Interpretation (Karachi: *Quaid-i-Azam Academy*, 1981), pp. 466-467.
169. The 11 members of the committee were as follows:
Pandit Motilāl Nehrū (Chairman), Sir Tej Bahādur Sapru, Sir 'Alī Imām, G.R. Pradhān, Sha'ayb Qurayshī, Subhas Chandrā Bose, M.S. Aney, M.R. Jayakār, N.M. Joshī, Sardār Mangal Singh and Jawaharlāl Nehrū (Secretary).
170. Rozīnah, Parwīn, *op.cit.*, Vol. I, pp.484-500.
171. Aziz, K.K., The All India Muslim Conference (1928-1935): A Documentary Record (Karachi: National Publishing House, 1972), p.24.
172. *Ibid.*, p.11.
173. Page, David, *op.cit.*, p.195.
174. Aziz, K.K., The All India Muslim...., *op.cit.*, pp.56-57.
175. *Ibid.*, pp.53-55.
176. *Ibid.*, pp.56-67.
177. For life and works of Dr. Muhammad Iqbal, see Beg, Abdulla Anwar, The Poet of the East (Lahore: *Quamī Kutub-khānah*, 1938); Khan, Zulfiqar Ali, A Voice from the East (Lahore: The Mercantile Electric Press, 1922); Wahid, S.A., Iqbal: His Art and Thought (Lahore: Shaikh

Mohammad Ashraf, 1944); Vahid, S.A., Introduction to Iqbal (Karachi: Pakistan Publications, n.d.).

178. The Nehrū Report made a reference to Dr. Iqbal's proposal, rejecting it in the following words:

A ... proposal was made to us namely that the Punjab, the North-West Frontier Province, Baluchistan and Sind should all be amalgamated together and that there should be no reservation of seats, unless the minority desires in that area. We are unable to entertain this proposal. It would mean the creation of an unwieldy Province sprawling all over the North and North-West.

[Report of the Committee appointed by All Parties Conference 1928, (Allahabad: All India Congress Committee, 1928), pp.37-38].

179. Pirzada, Sharifuddin, Foundations of Pakistan..., *op.cit.*, Vol. II, pp.158-159; Shamloo (ed.), Speeches and Statements of Iqbal (Lahore: *al-Manār* Academy, 1944), pp.11-13.
180. Afzal, M. Rafique, Political Parties in Pakistan: 1947-1958 (Islamabad: National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, 1976), p.26.
181. Ch wdharī Afzal Haq was the brain behind MAI. His writings had a radical tinge. See, for example, Haq, Afzal, Din-i-Islām (Lahore: *Qawmī Kutub-khānah*, n.d.).

His pronouncements were refuted by some of the 'ulamā' outside the pale of MAI. They labelled him a socialist. For instance, see Qasimi, Baha-ul-Haq, Ishtarākiyat Awr Islām (Lahore: The Author, n.d.).

182. The Kashmir Agitation was MAI's spontaneous response in order to demonstrate its unity with the Muslims in the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. The Muslim majority in the princely state started a movement of protest and demonstration against the oppressive rule of the autocratic Maharaja. In some parts of the Jammu province, the administration had completely broken down and British troops had been called in. The strong counter measures taken by the government of the princely state resulted in the displacement and emigration of Kashmiri Muslims into the neighbouring Punjab. MAI took the issue of Kashmiri Muslims and launched a massive campaign in support of their rights. The ruler of the state was approached in vain to sort out Muslim grievances. In order to put pressure on the ruler of the state, MAI started sending batches of volunteers to the state to help the Muslim demonstrators. MAI volunteers were unable to cross the border of the state, and were arrested. But within three months of MAI's appeal, over 40,000 people were reported to have courted arrest. The

MAI-led agitation only subsided with the arrest of MAI leaders in the Punjab and of Kashmiri agitators in the state.

Apart from the MAI campaign, an All-India Kashmir Committee was formed to help Kashmiri Muslims, especially by providing them with legal aid. The President of the All-India Kashmir committee was Mirzā Bashīr-ud-dīn Maḥmūd Ahmad (1889-1965). He was the son of Mirzā Ghulām Ahmad Qādiyānī and the religious head of the larger section of the *Aḥmadī* community. It was reported that the *Aḥmadīs* tried to convert the poor Kashmiri Muslims to their creed in the guise of offering them brotherly help. MAI took it as an affront to the Muslim creed, and with the passage of time, MAI developed a hard attitude towards *Aḥmadīs*. See Ansari, Taj-ud-din, *Jab Ahrār Ne Tahrīk-i-Kashmīr Kā Āghāz Kiyā* (Multan: *Majlis-i-Ahrar-i-Islam*, 1968); Lavan, Spencer, *The Ahmadiyah Movement. A History and Perspective* (Delhi: Manohar Book Service, 1974), pp.145-163.

183. H.M.S.O., Government of India Act, 1935 (London: H.M.S.O., 1935).
184. Singh, Anita Inder, The Origins of the Partition of India: 1936-1947 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1987), p 2.
185. Phillips, C.H., The Evolution of India and Pakistan, 1858 to 1947 Select Documents (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p.248.
186. Parda, Sharifuddin, *op.cit.*, Vol. II, p.261.
187. Rizvi, Gowher, Linlithgow and India: A Study of British Policy and the Political Impasse in India, 1936-1943 (London: Royal Historical Society, 1978), p.17.
188. Pzada, Sharifuddin, *op.cit.*, Vol. II, pp.171-172.
189. Sa'id, Ahmad, Mawlānā Ashraf 'Alī Thānwī Awr Tahrīk-i-Āzadī (Lhr: *Majlis Sayānt-ul-Muslimīn*, 1984).
190. Phillips, C.H., The Partition of India, *op.cit.*, p.11.
191. Batalawi, Ashiq Husayn, 'Iqbāl Awr Tahrīk-i-Pakistān', Journal of Research (Humanities), 2 (1967): 2, p.31.
192. Qurayshī, Nūr-ul-Haq, Swānih Hayāt Qāzī Iḥsān Ahmad Shuj'ād-dī (Multan: *Maktabah-i-Iḥsan*, n.d.), pp.267-268.
193. Mujhid Sharifal, *op.cit.*, p.487.
194. Mawlānā Ahmad Sa'id assured Muhammad 'Alī Jinnāh as follows

I have already written to the members of the *Jamiat-ul-Ulemā-i-Hind* to make effective speeches in support of the Muslim League in public meetings and

appeal to the Moslem voters to reserve their votes for the candidates of the League only.

Zaidi, Z.H., 'Aspects of the Development of Muslim League Policy, 1937-47' in C.H. Philips and Mary Doreen Wainwright (eds.), The Partition of India: Policies and Perspectives, 1933-1947 (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1970), p.247.

195. Mujahid, Sharifal, *op.cit.*, pp.419-436.
196. Bolitho, Hector, *op.cit.*, p.112.
197. 'League Parliamentary Board Manifesto, 1936' reproduced in Mujahid, Sharifal, *op.cit.*, pp.482-487.
198. Azad, Abul Kalam, India wins Freedom (Calcutta: Orient Longmans, 1959), pp.160-161; Ali, Chaudhri Muhammad, The Emergence of Pakistan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), p.27; Coupland, R., Indian Politics: 1936-1942 (London: Oxford University Press, 1943), p.14; Khaliquzzaman, Choudhry, Pathway to Pakistan, *op.cit.*, pp.156-157; and Sayeed, K.B., The Political System of Pakistan (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1967), p.34.
199. Sharma, M.S.M., Peeps into Pakistan (Patna: *Pustak Bhandar*, 1954), p.3.
200. Khaliquzzaman, Choudhry, *op.cit.*, p.161.
201. Azad, Abul Kalam, *op.cit.*, p.161.
- Rajendrā Prasād, though incorrectly labelled Ḥāfiẓ Muḥammad Ibrāhīm as an Independent but his inclusion in the INC ministry made the 'other Muslims' disgruntled. Prasād commented: 'Possibly, if the proposed agreement between the Independent Muslims [?] and the Congress had materialised, the communal animosity which the Muslim League whipped up later might never have been brought about'. [Prasad, Rajendra, Autobiography (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1957), p.446.]
- There is another view that in fact negotiations broke down not on the number of seats but on personalities. AIML desired to see Nawāb Muḥammad Ismāīl Khān (1886-1958) as its representative which was not acceptable to INC leaders. [Mehrotra, S.R., 'The Congress and the Partition of India' in C.H. Philips and Mary Doreen Wainwright (eds.), *op.cit.*, pp.195-196.]
202. Iqbal, Muhammad, Letters of Iqbal to Jinnah (Lahore: Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1943), p.15.
203. Philips, C.H., The Partition of India, *op.cit.*, pp.14-15.
204. Pirzada, Sharifuddin, *op.cit.*, Vol. II, p.280 and p.274.

205. For the text of Sikandar-Jinnah Pact, see Malik, Iftikhar Haider, Sikandar Hayat Khan: A Political Biography (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1985), p.162.
206. The following reports were produced and published by AIML. Report of the Enquiry Committee Appointed by the Council of All India Muslim League to Enquire into Muslim Grievances in Congress Provinces (Delhi: 1938) [Reprinted in Jafri, Ra'is Ahmad, Rare Documents (Lahore: Mohammed Ali Academy, 1967), pp.151-226]; Report of the Enquiry Committee Appointed by the Working Committee of the Bihar Provincial Muslim League to Enquire into Some Grievances of Muslims in Bihar (Patna: Bihar Provincial Muslim League, n.d.).
207. *Vande Mātaram*, composed by Bankim Chandra Chatterjee (1838-1894) occurs in his novel, Ānand Math, first published in 1882. Chatterjee was among the prominent Hindu writers of the late 19th century who laid great stress on the heroic episodes of Hindus against Muslim rule in order to arouse nationalist sentiment. The historical background surrounding the plot of the novel is unfriendly and hostile to Muslim feelings. In 1896, it was sung for the first time at the annual session of INC. During the *Swadeshī* movement in Bengal, its first two words i.e. *Vande Mātaram*, gradually became a slogan of nationalism. Muslims considered the song to be sectarian in character and not national. Sayyid Ālī Imām (1869-1933) recorded the dislike of this song on the part of the Muslims in his presidential address to the session of AIML Amritsar: 30 December 1908). After expressing de pair and disappointment on the 'sectarian cry' of *Vande Mātaram*, he prayed to INC leaders to 'put before the country such a programme of political advancement as does not demand the sacrifice of the feelings of the Hind or the Mohammedan, the Parsee or the Christian'. No heed was paid to the request of Sayyid Ālī Imām at that time or afterwards.

During the heated controversy on *Vande Mātaram* in 1937, INC urged the Muslims to accept the song in its own right and consider it 'apart from the book' (i.e. Ānand Math). It could not abandon the song altogether and discarded the stanzas referring to Muslim rule. It was left to the discretion of the organisers of any particular gathering to sing *Vande Mātaram* or any other song of an unobjectionable character in addition to *Vande Mātaram* or in its place.

After independence, Fabindranath Tagore's *Janā Ganā Manā* was adopted as the national anthem of India and *Vande Mātaram* was given 'equal status with it'. The objection to *Vande Mātaram* was not confined only to INC's opponents. The Muslims within the fold of INC were not also entirely satisfied with this song. The view of the late Humāyūn Kabir, the well known Muslim intellectual affiliated to INC, was recorded by Kuldip Nayar in his Distant Neighbours as 'very unfair of a secular India to

have adopted *Vande Mātaram*'. Muslim protest against the singing of *Vande Mātaram* can be heard even today. See, for example, Clark, T.W., 'The Role of Bankim Candra in the Development of Nationalism' in C.H. Philips (ed.), Historians of India, Pakistan and Ceylon (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp.429-455; Nayar, Kuldeep, Distant Neighbours: A Tale of the Sub-Continent (Delhi, Vikas Publications, 1972), p.13; Noorani, A.G., 'Vande Mātaram: A Historical Lesson' Economic and Political Weekly 8 (9 June 1973): 23, pp.1039-1043; Pirzada, Sharifuddin, Foundations of Pakistan, *op.cit.*, Vol.I, pp.51-52.

208. Ahmad, Jamiluddin (ed.), Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah (Lahore: Muhammad Ashraf, 1952), Vol. I, pp.110-111.
209. Coupland, R., *op.cit.*, p.132.
210. For details of such proposals see Pirzada, Syed Sharifuddin, Evolution of Pakistan (Lahore: the All Pakistan Legal Decisions, 1963), pp.35-260.
211. Chawdhari Rahmat Ālī invented the name Pakistan for the 'combined Indian and Asian homelands' of Muslims. In 1933, he explained the composition of the word Pakistan in the following words:

It is composed of letters taken from the names of all our homelands - 'Indian' and 'Asian'. That is Punjab, Afghania (North-West Frontier Province), Kashmir, Iran, Sind (including Kachch and Kathiawar), Tukharistan [*sic.*], Afghanistan and Baluchistan. It means the land of the Paks - the spiritually pure and clean.

He propounded this idea in a pamphlet Now or Never issued from his private address in Cambridge (28 January 1933). His idea was so novel that it took him 'more than a month to find three young men [Khān Muḥammad Aslam Khān Khaṭṭak, Ṣāhibzādah Shaykh Muḥammad Sādiq and Khān Inayatullah Khān] in London' to sign it with him jointly. After his first pamphlet, he formed a 'Pakistan National Movement' (1933) to propagate his ideas.

In 1937 Chawdhari Rahmat Ālī suggested two other independent regions for Muslims, *Bāng-i-Islām* (Bengal and Assam) and *Oṣmanistan* (Hyderabad-Daccan); and, began to interpret Pakistan as the combination of 'The five north western strongholds' [Punjab, Afghania (NWFP), Kashmir, Sindh and Baluchistan]. See Ali, Choudhari Rahmat, Pakistan: The Fatherland of the Pak Nation (Cambridge: The Pakistan National Movement, 1947), pp.224-227 and pp.252-254.

Chawdhari Rahmat Ālī's scheme made a stir in press and political circles, but it had no appeal for the AIML

leaders who rejected it as 'only a student's scheme, chimerical and unpractical' [*ibid.*, p.231]. In 1934, when Edward Thompson called Muhammad Iqbal as a protagonist of the 'Pakistan scheme', the latter was prompt to tell Edward Thompson that

Pakistan is not my scheme. The one that I suggested in my address is the creation of a Muslim Province - i.e. a province having an overwhelming population of Muslims - in the North West of India. This new province will be, according to my scheme, a part of the proposed Indian Federation. Pakistan scheme proposes a separate federation of Muslim Provinces directly related to England as a separate dominion. This scheme originated in Cambridge. The authors of this scheme believe that we Muslim Round Tablers have sacrificed the Muslim nation on the altar of Hindu or the so-called Indian nationalism.

[Muhammad Iqbal to E. Thompson, 4 March 1934, in Ahmad, S. Has n, Iqbal: His Political Ideas at Crossroads (Aligarh: Printwell Publications, 1979), p.80].

Ch wdhari Rahmat Ali was hailed by the sympathisers of 'Pakistan National Movement' as 'The Founder of P k i t n'. Ahmad, Khan A., The Founder of Pakistan: Through Trial to Triumph (Cambridge: W. Heffer and Sons, 1942).

212. Pirzada, Sharifuddin, Evolution of Pakistan, *op.cit.*, p 149.
213. Pirzada, Sharifuddin, Foundations of Pakistan, *op.cit.*, Vol. II, pp.337-338.
214. *Ibid* , p.341.
215. Resolution of the Council of AIML (adopted on 27-28 August 1939) Allana, *op.cit.*, p.220.
- 216 For the constitutional scheme underlying the Cripps' Mission, see Philips, C.H., The Evolution of India and Pakistan, *op.cit.*, pp.371-372.
- 217 Choudhary, G.W., 'The Cripps Mission' in Mahmud Husain (ed.), A History of the Freedom Movement (Karachi: Pakistan Historical Society, 1970), Vol.IV, p.135.
218. Philips, C.H., The Evolution of India and Pakistan, *op.cit.*, p.342.
219. Lumby, E.W.R., The Transfer of Power in India: 1945-7 (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1954), p.33.

220. See Moon, Penderel, Wavell: The Viceroy's Journal (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp.137-158.
221. Ahmad, Jamiluddin (ed.), *op.cit.*, Vol.I, p.575.
222. Ahmad, Jamiluddin (ed.), Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah (Lahore: Muhammad Ashraf, 1947), Vol.II, p.89.
223. Nichols, Beverley, Verdict on India (London: Jonathan Cape, 1944), p.190.
224. Ahmad, Jamiluddin, *op.cit.*, Vol. II, p.437.
225. Muhammad Ali Jinnah parted company with INC in December 1920, during the popular *Khilāfat* and Non-Co-operation movements in spite of his concern over the *Khilāfat* issue. The reason behind the parting of the ways can be traced in his letter to Gandhī. He wrote as follows:
- Your extreme programme has for the moment struck imagination mostly of the inexperienced youth and the ignorant and the illiterate...
- [Bolitho, Hector, *op.cit.*, p.84.]
226. Lacey, Patrick, Fascist India (London: Nicholson and Watson, 1946), p.33.
227. For the role of Muslim students in AIML's politics, see Zaman, Makhtar, Students' Role in the Pakistan Movement (Karachi: *Quaid-i-Azam* Academy, 1978).
228. Khān, Siddīq 'Alī, Beteq̄h Sipāhī (Karachi: Allies Book corporation, 1971), p.235.
229. 13 pamphlets were produced (1945-47) in this series. Each of them contained a statement to the effect that the views expressed in it did not 'necessarily represent the official views of the All India Muslim League'. The 13 pamphlets are compiled in a single volume. See Afzal, Rafique (ed.), The Case for Pakistan (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1979).
- On the same lines, a series of pamphlets in Urdu were published by *Idārah-i-Ṭulū'ī-Islām* Delhi.
230. Ahmad, Jamiluddin (ed.), Preface to 'Pakistan Literature Series No. 1' in Afzal, Rafique (ed.), The Case for Pakistan, *op.cit.*, p.iv.
231. For the role of the press in Pakistan movement, see Niazi, Zamir, Press in Chains (Karachi: Karachi Press Club Publications, 1986), pp.23-24, and the chapter entitled 'Jinnah and the Press', pp.26-40.
232. Lacey, Patrick, *op.cit.*, p.136.

233. Pirzada, Sharifuddin, Evolution of Pakistan, *op.cit.*, pp.217-220.
234. Adhikari, G., Pakistan and National Unity (Bombay: People's Publishing House, 1944), p.29.
235. Rozinah, Parwin, *op.cit.*, Vol.II, pp.632-645.
236. Qureshi, I.H., *op.cit.*, pp.349-350.
237. Madanī, Husayn Ahmad, Mutahiddah Qawmiyat Awr Islām (Delhi: Kutub-khānah Āziziyyah, n.d.).
238. Mawdūdī, Sayyid Abul Ālā, Masalah-i-Qawmiyat (Lahore: Maktabah-i-Jamā'at-i-Islāmī, 1939).
239. Dār, Bashīr Ahmad (ed.), Anwār-i-Iqbāl (Karachi: Iqbal Academy Pakistan, 1967), pp.166-170; Shamloo, *op.cit.*, pp.223-239.
240. Saīd, Ahmad, *op.cit.*, p.89.
241. *Ibid.*, pp.144-145.
242. *Ibid.*, p.89.
243. Faruqī, Ziya-ul-Hasan, *op.cit.*, pp.96-100.
244. Madanī, Husayn Ahmad, 'Presidential Addresses in JUH Sessions' in Parwīn Rozinah, *op.cit.*, Vol.II, p.8; Madanī, Husayn Ahmad, Muslim League Kiyā Hay? (Delhi: Jamīyat-ul-Ūlamā; 1945); Shari'at Bil A wr League (Delhi: Jamīyat-ul-Ūlamā Hind, n.d.).
245. Ispahanī, M.A. Hasan, Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah As I Knew Him (Karachi: Forward Publications Trust, 1976), pp.24-25.
246. Madanī, Husayn Ahmad, 'Presidential Address in JUH Session (1945)' in Parwin Rozinah, *op.cit.*, Vol II, p.792.
247. Smith, W.C. Modern Islam in India, *op.cit.*, p.297.
248. Sīyālkotī, Muhammad Ibrāhīm Kīr, Paygham-i-Hidāyat Dar Tā'id-i-Pākistan-w-Muslim League (Amritsar: Sarai Press, 1946), pp.70-71.
249. Shafī, Muftī Muhammad, Congress Awr Muslim League Ke Muta'alīq Shar'ī Faylah Deoband. Dār-ul-Isha'at, 1946, pp.24-25.
250. Author's translation of the resolution passed at the Conference.
Qādiri Muhammad Jalāl-ud-dīn, Khutbat All India Sunnī Conference 1925-1947 Gujrat. Maktabah i Razwiyyah, 1978, p 283.
251. There is scarcity of authentic information on Sayyid Abul Ālā Mawdūdī s formative years. He himself did not write in detail on his life experience in spite of consistent

requests from his adherents and critics alike. He always turned down any suggestion, saying:

Biography always remains incomplete before death, and there are many more important projects to be undertaken.

He imparted only scanty information about his early career either in press interviews, or in private letters, or in autobiographical notes. He relied heavily on his memory; therefore, such information as is available from his writings cannot be accepted without thorough scrutiny.

Leonard Binder wrote a life sketch of Sayyid Abul Alā Mawdūdī [Religion and Politics in Pakistan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961), pp.78-83] which has since been utilised by writers interested in Sayyid Mawdūdī's life and thought. See Āfāq, Abul, Sayyid Abul Alā Mawdūdī, Sawānih, Afkār, Tahrik (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1971); and Bahadur, Kalim, The Jamāāt-i-Islāmī of Pakistan (Lahore: Progressive Books, 1978).

Binder's information needs to be corrected in certain respects. For instance

... family that claims descent from Maudud, a relater of traditions of the Prophet, who is said to have come to India with Muhammad bin Qasim (p.78).

Mawdud Chishti was a *ṣūfī* of 12th century. He was neither the relater of the traditions of the Prophet nor did he come to India with Muhammad B. Qāsim.

His [Mawdūdī's] father was ... a companion of Sir Saiyid Ahmad Khan (p.79).

Mawlāwī Aḥmad Ḥasan should not be considered a companion of Sayyid Aḥmad Khān on the basis of the former having been a student of Aligarh College for some time.

In 1920 he [Mawdūdī] went to Delhi where he worked as sub-editor of *al-Jamiat*, organ of the *Jamiat-ul-ulama-i-Hind*. He remained at this work until 1927 (p.79).

al-Jamiyat was started on 2 February 1925, and Sayyid Mawdūdī's name appeared on it as its editor starting from the issue of 14 June 1925. He remained the editor until 15 May 1928.

During the *Khilāfat* movement

he is said to have translated from English to Urdu What happened to Samarquand?; The Condition of Christians

in Turkey; and Greek Atrocities in Smyrna
(p.81).

No such translation of 'What happened to Samarquand?' by Sayyid Mawdūdī exists.

A book was written by one Dayanand Saraswati, a prominent member of the *Arya Samaj* and a follower of Swami Shardanand, in which an insulting reference was made to Muhammad the Prophet. Dayanand was murdered by a Muslim called Abdul Rashid, and a sensational trial followed (p.82).

Not being satisfied with what he wrote, Binder added a footnote:

It is evident that the names and the incident referred to were garbled by my informant ... (p.82).

Dayānandā was the founder of *Āryā Samāj* and Swāmī Sharaddhanandā was his follower. Sharaddhanandā was murdered, not because of writing any book but because he was the foremost leader of the *Shuddhī* movement.

As a result of this work [Towards Understanding Islam] Maududi sprang into prominence as one of the leading theologians in India (p.82).

The book, written in an attractive style for senior matriculation students, highlighting the importance of Islamic faith and its fundamental teachings, had nothing to do with the theological questions in depth. No doubt this work is the most popular one among his writings, and has been translated into 14 languages; but, Sayyid Mawdudi's prominence among the theologians rests on such works as *al-Jihād fil Islām*, *Tafhīmat* and *Pardah*, etc., and not on Towards Understanding Islam.

252. Mawdūdī's letter to Mawlānā 'Abdul Bārī, *Nuqūsh* April-May 1968, no. 109, part II, p.238.
253. The two pamphlets were: *Waqī'āt-i-Samarnā Ke Mutā'āliq Ittihādī Commission Kī Report* (Delhi: *Dār-ul-Ishāāt-i-Siyāsiyāt-i-Mashriqiyyah*, 1921); and *Turky Meñ 'Isā'iyyon Kī Hālat* (Delhi: *Dār-ul-Ishāāt-i-Siyāsiyāt-i-Mashriqiyyah*, 1922).
254. H.B. Khan has provided the exact dates of Mawdūdī's joining and leaving JUH's papers, after physically checking the files of the *Muslim* and *al-Jamīyat*. See *Barr-i-Saghīr Pāk-w-Hind Kī Siyāsāt Meñ 'Ulamā' Kā Kirdār: Biswīn Šadī Meñ 1940 Tak* (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1985), pp.238-243.
255. Sayeed, K.B., 'The *Jamaat-i-Islami* Movement in Pakistan', *Pacific Affairs* 30 (1951): 1, p.61.

256. Some writers have stated that Mawdūdī was the founder of the Tarjumān-ul-Qurān; see Abbot, Freeland, Islam and Pakistan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968), p.172; Abbot, Freeland, 'The Jamaat-i-Islami of Pakistan', The Middle East Journal 11 (1957): 1, p.38; Sayeed, Khalid B., *op.cit.*, p.61; and Khan, H.B., *op.cit.*, p.246.

In actual fact, however, Tarjumān-ul-Qurān was started by Mawlawī Abū Muḥammad Muṣliḥ, an 'ālim of Bihar, who was under the spell of Mawlānā Abul Kalām Āzād's Tarjumān-ul-Qurān, a commentary on the Qurān. Muṣliḥ edited the first six issues of the monthly. From the seventh issue onwards Mawdūdī took charge of the organ, and changed it entirely both in appearance and in respect of its contents.

257. Qureshi, I.H., Ulema in Politics, *op.cit.*, p.333.
258. For the correspondence on this subject and on Mawdūdī's thinking at the time, see Gilani, Asād, Iqbāl, Dār-ul-Islām Awr Mawdūdī (Lahore: Islami Academy, 1978), pp.99-207; Yusuf, Muhammad, 'Maudoodi: A Formative Phase', Islamic Order, 1 (1979): 3, pp.33-43.
259. Chawdhari Rahmat 'Alī objected to this position of AIML:

It is foolish in the name of logic, because, at one and the same time, how can they [the Muslims] be 'half-Indian' and 'half non-Indian'? That is, 'territorially' Indian but 'nationally' non-Indian; again, 'internationally' Indian, but internally non-Indian ...

(Pakistan: The Fatherland of the Pak Nation, *op.cit.*, p.244).

260. A part of it was translated into English as Nationalism and India (Dār-ul-Islām Pathankot: Maktabah-e-Jamā'at-e-Islāmī, 1947).
261. Maudoodi, Sayyed Abul Ala, Nationalism and India, *op.cit.*, p.5, pp.9-11.
262. For a revised edition of Musalmān Awr Mawjūdah Siyāsī Kashmakash, including some of his other related writings, see Mawdūdī, Sayyid Abul Ālā, Tahrīk-i-Āzādi-yi-Hind Awr Musalmān, 2 vols. (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1964).
263. Manzūr-ul-Ḥaq Ṣiddiqī, an AIML worker, has testified to this in his recollections. See Ṣiddiqī, Manzūr-ul-Ḥaq, Ma'āsar-ul-Ajdād (Lahore: al-Maktabat-us-Salfiyyah, 1964), p.400.

Miṣbah-ul-Islām Farūqī, an Aligarh old-boy, narrated as follows:

I remember how in Aligarh, the University students kept volumes of the above-cited book [Musalman Awr Mawjudah Siyasi Kashmakash] pressed to their bosom together with many other works of him and the copies of the Tarjuman-ul-Quran during the election campaign before partition [of India]. They used to recite pages after pages of this literature in public meetings to refute the stand of the Congress and its Hindu and Muslim leadership and upheld how a free and independent Islamic state was the part of their very faith in Islam and its ideology.

Faruqi, Misbah-ul-Islam, Introducing Maududi (Karachi: Students Publication Bureau, 1968), p.31.

264. Smith, W.C. - Modern Islam in India, *op.cit.*, p.149. In October 1939, Mawdūdī wrote a paper on the political theory of Islam. It was published in English translation in January 1940 in The Awakening, (All India Muslim Students Federation's organ). This organ was pro-AIML in orientation.
265. Faruqi, Misbah-ul-Islam, Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan (Lahore: The Author, 1957), pp.7-8.
266. Mawdūdī, Sayyid Abul Ālā, Aek Nihāyat Aham Istiftā' (Dār-ul-Islām Pathankot: Daftar Tarjumān-ul-Qurān, n.d.), pp.5-11.
267. Tarjumān-ul-Qurān, 25 (July-October 1944): 1-4, p.104.
268. Mawdoodī, Sayyid Abul Ala, Process of Islamic Revolution (Dar-ul-Islam Pathankot: Maktabah-e-Jamaat-e-Islami, 1947), pp.22-23.
269. Lumby, E.W.R., *op.cit.*, p.59.
270. Return Showing the Results of Elections to the Central Legislative Assembly and the Provincial Legislatures in 1945-46 (Delhi: Manager of Government Publications, 1948), p.8.
271. *Ibid.*, p.55.
272. A locality in Lahore where Sikhs owned some property including a dilapidated and disused mosque. The Sikhs decided to demolish the mosque in 1935, not long before an election was due to be called. Even though MAI was known for its religious zeal it was faced with a dilemma because of the approaching election. If it started a serious campaign for the recovery of the mosque, its whole leadership would be put behind bars, and it would effectively be prevented from taking part in the election; at the same time, if it did not take notice of the situation, it would be vulnerable to criticism that

it failed to agitate against the demolition of the mosque in Lahore, the heart of the Punjab. In an effort to overcome the dilemma, the MAI leadership adopted a low key approach. This resulted in the defection of a group under Mawlānā Zafar Ālī Khān. This group formed a new party known as the *Ittihād-i-Millat* (Unity of the Community). A bitter struggle took place between MAI and the new party. Zafar Ālī Khān became the champion of the movement for the recovery of the mosque. Appeals were filed in the courts, but the law of property favoured the occupants.

Its half-hearted participation in the Shahidganj incident damaged the image of MAI. It fared badly in the 1937 election.

273. Author's translation.
Bukhārī, Sayyid Abū Muāwiyah Abū Zar,
Rūdād-i-Ijtimā'-i-Sahāranpur (Lahore: Maktabah-i-
Majlis-i-Ahrār Islām Pakistan, 1978), p.8.
274. Smith, W.C., *op.cit.*, p.228.
275. He was joint secretary of AIML from 1937 to 1947.
276. Shafī', Muftī Muḥammad, *op.cit.*, pp.1-32.
277. 'Usmānī, Zafar Ahmad, Anwār-un-Nazar Fī Āsar-iz-Zafar
(Lahore: Markazī Majlis-i-Ṣayānat-ul-Muslimīn, 1978),
pp.60-61.
278. Author's translation.
Tarjumān-ul-Qurān, 27 (1945): 3-4, p.189.
279. For the role played by the *ūlamā'* and *pīrs* in the Punjab election, see Gilmartin, David, 'Religious Leadership and the Pakistan Movement in the Punjab', Modern Asian Studies, 13 (1979): 3, pp.485-517; Sayeed, Khalīd B., Politics in Pakistan: the Nature and Direction of Change (New York: Praeger, 1980), pp.13-16; and Talbot, I.A., 'The 1946 Punjab Elections', Modern Asian Studies, 14 (1980): 1, pp.65-91.
280. Ahmad, Azīz, 'Activism of the *Ulama* in Pakistan' in Nikki R. Keddie (ed.), Scholars, Saints and Sufis: Muslim Religious Institutions in the Middle East Since 1950 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), p.257.
281. Statement by the Cabinet Delegation and His Excellency the Viceroy (16 May 1946). Philips, C.H., The Evolution of India and Pakistan, *op.cit.*, p.378; Moon, Penderel, *op.cit.*, p.471.
282. Several studies deal with the Cabinet Mission Plan and the events that followed. See, for example, Campbell-Johnson, A., Mission with Mountbatten (London: Robert Hale, 1951); Hodson, H.V., The Great Divide (London: Hutchinson and Co., 1969), pp.133-398; Lumby, E.W.R., *op.cit.*, pp.71-201; Menon, V.P., The Transfer of

Power in India (Bombay: Orient Longman, 1957); Moon, Penderel, *op.cit.*, pp.226-464; and Pandey, B.N., *op.cit.*, pp.175-211.

283. Ahmad, Jamiluddin (ed.), Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah (Lahore: Muhammad Ashraf, 1947), Vol.II, p.419.

284. *Ibid.*, p.467.

285. Hodson, H.V., *op.cit.*, p.201.

A few days after Lord Mountbatten's arrival in India, Pandit Nehru asked him: 'Have you by some miracle got plenipotentiary powers?' 'Why do you ask?' said the Viceroy. Nehru replied: 'You behave quite differently from any former Viceroy. You speak with an air of authority as though you were certain that what you said would never be reversed by HMG in London.' 'Suppose I have plenipotentiary powers. What difference would it make?' Nehru's answer was prophetic: 'Why then you will succeed, where all others have failed.'

286. Azad, Abul Kalam, India Wins Freedom, *op.cit.*, p.217.

287. Prasad, Dr. Rajendra, *op.cit.*, p.597.

288. T lbot, *op.cit.*, p.82.

289. D w , 27 April 1947

290. F r the te t see Philips, C H., *op.cit.*, pp.397-402.

291. *Ibid.*, pp 407-411.