

# U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East and the Bush War on Terror : elite opinion and the failure of U.S. strategy

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## CHAPTER FOUR

### PERCEPTIONS OF BUSH'S FOREIGN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

At the heart of critical thinking about Bush's foreign policy in the Middle East lies a series of issues. Included in the list are U.S. hegemony, unilateralism, American policy regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict, and America's conduct of the war on terrorism. Many Middle Eastern commentators and experts in American foreign policy believe that Bush represents a clear break with the past.

Al-Ghamdi (author's interview, 2004) described two kinds of U.S. presidents: passive and active. 'Passive' presidents have had little or no impact on U.S. strategy/foreign policy. 'Active' presidents have influenced and shaped U.S. foreign policy. Some have established precedents that contradicted long held characteristics of U.S. behavior, such as the Monroe Doctrine (which stated that American continents were no longer open to European interference or colonization). President Bush can be classified as an 'active' president. His administration, for example, validated the approach of 'preemptive actions' against terrorists or states sponsoring terrorism and against states that possess WMD and, arguably, pose a theoretical threat (Merdad, author's interview, 2004).

Bush's foreign policy has been the subject of debate between those who claim that Bush has created a 'revolution' in American foreign policy, like Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay in their book *America Unbound* (2003), and those who describe Bush as a typical Republican president. Daalder and Lindsay asserted that Bush's

revolution involved the pursuit of strategies (to achieve U.S. national goals) that were different from those of previous administrations. American foreign policy during the Bush Administration has relied on unilateralism rather than multilateralism and preemptive actions and wars instead of containment and deterrence. It cannot be denied that Bush's foreign policy was affected by the events of 9/11, without which it would have been more difficult to pursue the strategy of preemptive war. There were, however, indications before 9/11 that the Bush Administration was pursuing a radically different approach to foreign policy. One need only consider its vision of the American role in the Arab-Israeli conflict and its rejections of the 1972 Pact on small arms, the Kyoto Protocol, and the reject of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to note the Bush shift.

To the contrary, Bush's foreign policy has been described by some observers and by the administration itself as 'Neo-Reaganite.' The Bush foreign policy has also been described by some supporters as 'new realist' (Dunn, 2003). Keller highlighted similarities between Bush and Reagan, asserting that they 'each will be remembered as a risk taker' (Dunn, p. 282). While Bush's foreign policy agrees with President Reagan's policy in terms of the economy and national security, like all U.S. presidents, President Bush has sought to impress his own character and ideas into America's foreign policy (Crockatt, 2003). Regardless of his impact on American foreign policy, President Bush represents a nation with long-established institutions and policies, which serve a national interests and which cannot to be altered. Of course, we must recognize that it is in a matter of degrees that U.S. presidents have

differed in their strategies and their use of power, means, and influence for the purpose of pursuing U.S. interests (Al-Kuaileet, author's interview, 2005).

The Bush Administration claims that Clinton's foreign policy was weak in terms of pursuing U.S. national interests. Unlike the Clinton Administration, which believed in the priority of 'geo-economics,' the Bush Administration believes that 'geo-politics' is more important (Dunn, 2003). Even though the Clinton and the Bush Administrations agree on the objects and interests on which U.S. foreign policy is based, they differ in the means used to accomplish their objectives. The Bush Administration replaced the Clinton strategy of active diplomacy regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict with a 'hands-off' policy (Al-Hulwa, author's interview, 2004). Al-Rawaf (author's interview, 2004) recalled something he had heard President Clinton say at an international forum in the Middle East (date unknown). Clinton said in his speech that the difference between his foreign policy and Bush's foreign policy was that he wanted America to lead the world whereas Bush wanted America to dominate the world.

The Bush view of U.S. domination, using its power to change regimes and 'remake the world,' represents the view of American neo-conservatives in the administration led by former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz (currently President of World Bank). Neo-conservatives emerged in the 1970's and were influenced by Leo Strauss, political philosopher at the University of Chicago who died in 1973. In his classic work, *On Tyranny* (1948), Strauss argued that for the Western democracies to be safe, the world must be democratic. It is a widely held belief that neo-conservatives have had an impact on Bush's war on terror, at least during the wars

against Afghanistan and Iraq (Khazen, 2005). Democratic Senator Joseph Biden said in July 2003 that 'They seem to have captured the heart and mind of the president, and they're controlling the foreign policy agenda' (United States Senate, July 2003).

The main principles of American neo-conservatives have been adopted in the Bush approach to foreign policy: using unilateralism, pre-emptive wars, and regime change. This foreign policy approach has been described by some American intellectuals as 'arrogance without purpose' (Daalder & Lindsay, 2003, p. 72), reversing the statement made by Bush during his first presidential campaign that his foreign policy would demonstrate 'Purpose without arrogance' (p. 72). One of the reasons that might have made Bush subject to the influence of neo-conservatives was his lack of experience in world matters and politics. Before he became president, he was 'tutored' by a group of 'Republican experts known as 'Vulcans.' Most of them had served in the first Bush Administration— Condoleezza Rice, Dov Zakheim, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Armitage, Richard Perle (who was known as the 'Prince of Darkness' during his years with the Reagan Administration), Robert Blackwill, Robert Zoellick, and Stephen Hadley (Daalder & Lindsay, 2003).

Uni-polar circumstances in the world have encouraged President Bush to rely on unilateralism in the U.S. war against terrorism (Al-Ghamdi, author's interview, 2004). Neo-conservatives have succeeded in shifting the U.S. war against terrorism from a war against terrorists, who constitute an actual threat, to a war against so-called 'rogue states,' which represent a theoretical threat (Naim, 2004).

According to Heywood (2000), Hegemony is 'The ascendancy or domination of one element of the system over others. For example, a state which is predominant

within a league, confederation or region can be said to enjoy hegemony' (p. 205). The events of 9/11 have prompted the Bush Administration to consolidate and strengthen U.S. hegemony not only in the region of the Middle East, but in the entire world. After 9/11, fighting terrorism became one of the major facets of U.S. foreign policy, and, according to Al-Otaibi (author's interview, 2004), the Middle East has become 'the center of gravity' in the American war on terrorism. The Bush Administration began to view what it tends to call 'Islamic radicalism' in the Middle East as the ideological source of terrorism (Al-Fayez, author's interview, 2004). In the summer of 2006, Bush described what he called Islamic fascism as a threat to the world security. This speech was widely condemned in the Arab and Muslim worlds as some commentator rebuffed the association of the term fascism to Islam, saying that, in fact, fascism is a Western made.

According to Gallup Organization, after 9/11, Bush's approval rating jumped from 51% (before 9/11) to approximately 90% in the month following the attacks. This greatly enhanced the Bush Administration's influence on Congress. Bush was given an unprecedented guarantee of approval for any financial and legislative requests for the war on terror and a 'green light' for any action that needed to be taken. On the other hand, internationally, the first reaction to 9/11 was sympathy and solidarity with the United States worldwide.

The National Security Strategy approved by President Bush in September 2002 validated the approach of 'preemption,' abandoning the long-utilized strategies of containment and appeasement (The White House, September 2002). The Bush Administration believes that the strategies of containment and appeasement are

ineffective with regimes that sponsor terrorism and may possess WMD. So it has abandoned the 'dual containment strategy' with Iraq and Iran that was used by the Clinton Administration (Daalder & Lindsay, 2003). Thus, the strategy toward U.S. enemies is one of military force. In his address at West Point on June 1, 2002, President Bush revealed the rationale behind the new strategic framework.

Deterrence -- the promise of massive retaliation against nations -- means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to defend. Containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies (United States Department of State, July 2002).

The expansible definition of terrorism used by the Bush Administration provides the basis for the right to launch 'preemptive actions' against terrorists or states sponsoring terrorism (Merdad, author's interview, 2004). As Bush has declared on more than one occasion, the war on terrorism will be a long campaign. The U.S. wars against Afghanistan and Iraq may well be the first two stages of what has become known as the U.S. 'war on terror.' Hamad Al-Sayari, Governor of the Saudi Monetary Bank, said that the United States seeks to impose its own changeable definition of terrorism. By doing this, America has placed itself in a position of inconsistency and is subject to criticism and the objections of other nations.

Increasingly, U.S. foreign policy and the war against terrorism have fueled anger and anti-Americanism in the Arab and Muslim regions. U.S. policies have been perceived by the majority of people in the Arab world as anti-Arab and anti-Muslim, especially since the first two stages in the U.S. war on terrorism were launched against two Muslim countries, Afghanistan and Iraq. The U.S. anti-Arab and anti-Muslim position, Al-Tayeb argued (author's interview, 2004), has intensified since the

beginning of the U.S. war on terrorism as many Islamic parties and organizations have been placed on a U.S. list of terrorist organizations alongside Muslim states that are now considered by the United States to be rogue states and states sponsoring terrorism (such as Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, and Syria).

The Palestinian resistance, as part of the Arab-Israeli conflict, has been shifted to a position within the framework of the U.S. war on terrorism and not in the peace process. The Bush Administration has added Palestinian Hamas and the Islamic Jihad to the U.S. list of terrorist organizations, concentrating on the issue of Palestinian militants as a problem of terrorism instead of considering it as part of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Yet, those militant organizations operate within the Palestinian lands and only in opposition to the Israeli occupation (Al-Khathlan, author's interview, 2004). This is an example of an issue that has been subject to wide debate: the United States looks at world matters from its perspective without regard for the perspectives of others.

Ambassador Jameel Merdad (author's interview, 2004), from the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated that the United States considers itself to be the world's ideal model of a civilized society and democratic state. After the end of the Cold War and the beginning of uni-polarity, the United States began to tout the superiority of American culture and values of 'Americanization.' Scholars like Kolko (2002) argue that the United States has become less secure since the end of the Cold War. Instead of upholding U.S. security and global stability, the United States has been accruing more animosity and enemies.

Within the Middle Eastern section of the U.S. war on terror, so-called cultural conflict has been widely debated by many scholars (Al-Namlah, author's interview, 2004). Religion falls within this cultural conflict. Bush's self-proclaimed religiosity has been subject to comment. Bush seems to believe that, when he went to wars against Afghanistan and Iraq, he was acting on behalf of God (Khazen, 2005). As he said in his State of the Union speech in 2003, 'The liberty we prize is not America's gift to the world, it is God's gift to humanity' (The White House, January 2003). Of course, values, beliefs, and motivations may be perceived differently by different cultures. Mohammad Eid (author's interview, 2004), from the Prince Naif University for Security Science in Riyadh and former Deputy Minister of Interior in Egypt, asserted that the religious aspect of the Bush Administration has impacted foreign policy. However, many Middle Eastern scholars, such as Al-Fayez (author's interview, 2004) believe that this foreign policy has evolved because the President has been influenced by Christian fundamentalists and Zionist groups.

#### Bush, Israel, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Commitment to the security of Israel has been one of the most important pillars of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (2002) asserted that without U.S. political and military support, the existence of the state of Israel would be vulnerable. The historical context of American political and military support was dealt with in Chapter two. However, this section focuses on the Bush Administration's foreign policy in regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Bush's role in the Arab-Israeli conflict, as with all previous administrations, has been one of

commitment to the traditional role of maintaining Israel's security. The difference between the Bush Administration and the Clinton Administration has been in the conduct of policies in relation to the conflict. Al-Fayez (author's interview, 2004) argued that, even though Clinton took the side of the Israelis against the Palestinians, he was able to diplomatically and skillfully execute U.S. foreign policy. Since the 1940s, all successive U.S. administrations have maintained the same position regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict but have altered the means for conducting the policies. Unlike the Clinton Administration, which was deeply involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Bush Administration began its term with a 'hands-off' approach to the conflict. Bush chose not to replace Clinton's special envoy to the Middle East, Dennis Ross, creating a diplomatic void (Daalder & Lindsay, 2003). Former National Security Advisor Samuel Berger (2003) felt that the 'hands-off' policy toward the conflict created a negative image of the United States in the world.

There are some Middle Eastern scholars like Al-Ghamdi and Merdad (author's interviews, 2004) who have argued that the U.S. 'hands-off policy' is an active foreign policy that aims to pressure Arab states into denouncing Palestinian actions and praise the actions taken by the Israeli government against what it considers 'Palestinian terrorism.' That power play makes the United States a dishonest broker in the Arab-Israeli conflict. In some cases, the Bush Administration has been more inflexible than the Israelis or, as Al-Ghamdi described, 'more Israeli than the Israelis themselves.'

The most significant move that negatively impacted the peace process was when Bush condoned the actions of the Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, against what he called Palestinian terrorism. Bush described Sharon a co-leader in the war

against terrorism. This American position has been described by many Middle Eastern commentators as a turning point in the peace process and in Arab-Israeli relations. The escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has caused unprecedented tension in the Egyptian-Israeli relation that was established by the peace agreement in Camp David in 1979 (Al-Tayeb, author's interview, 2004).

The Egyptian government and the Palestinian Authority have sought to revive the Israeli-Palestinian section of the peace process, but the Bush Administration believes that the way the Clinton Administration pursued its policy regarding the Middle East conflict poorly represented the United States as a superpower. The inability to resolve final issues between the Israelis and Palestinians at Camp David in 2000 has been considered a devastating U.S. failure. The Bush Administration has recognized the complexities of the Arab-Israeli conflict (Al-Hulwa, author's interview, 2004) and, in the first term, dropped the issue from its list of priorities in U.S. foreign policy, stipulating a termination of the aggression between the Israelis and the Palestinians before any U.S. intervention would occur. Both sides must completely stop their operations and bombings before the U.S. would become involved. This approach is different from the Clinton policy, which urged intervention mostly during the escalation of violence between the Israelis and Palestinians (Shlaim, 2002).

The Bush Administration has occasionally intervened (like in April 2002) during the escalation of violence between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Until the death of the Palestinian leader Yaser Arafat in November 2004, President Bush was concentrating only on the Israeli demands to reform the Palestinian authority and leadership. The 'hands-off policy' did not restrain Bush from blaming the Palestinian

for its responsibility for the violence. However, the Bush Administration did not blame the Israelis for their attacks on Palestinian civilians, the construction of the separation wall (beginning in June 2003), or for their expansion of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories (Gormoly, author's interview, 2004).

Bush has tended to be influenced by Israeli policies, such as the attempts to depose the elected Palestinian leader, Yaser Arafat, before he died. Another pro-Israeli policy taken by the Bush Administration involved adding the Palestinian Hamas and Islamic Jihad to the U.S. list of terrorist organizations. Many Middle Eastern experts in U.S. foreign policy, such as Jameel Merdad (author's interview, 2004) from the Institute of Diplomatic Studies under the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, claim that the Bush Administration has chosen to pursue radically different Middle Eastern strategies from the Clinton Administration in the Middle East. For example, he abandoned direct communication with former PLO leader Yaser Arafat, prompting the Saudi Minister of Foreign affairs, Prince Saud Alfaisal, to criticize President Bush and claim, in exasperation, it 'makes a sane man go mad' (Habib, 2003, p. 162).

The Bush Administration's vision of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is vague and its statements are often contradictory. For example, in his speech on June 24, 2002, President Bush described the West Bank and Gaza strip as 'occupied territories,' calling on the Israeli government to end settlements in these territories. A month later, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said in a meeting at the Pentagon, 'Settlements in various parts of the so-called occupied areas . . . (were) the result of a war, which they (the Israelis) won' (Quoted in Slavin, 2002, p. 1).

Al-Shamlan (author's interview, 2004) described Bush's role in the Arab-Israeli conflict as the worst among all U.S. administrations. During the time that he refused to meet with Yaser Arafat, President Bush consolidated his relations with the Israeli government's right-wing Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon. Bush's relationship with the Israeli government has been warmer than the relationship between the Israelis and the Clinton Administration. Bush provocatively described Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon as 'a man of peace' (Lynch, 2003). The statement totally disregarded the fury in the Arab world toward Sharon, who is considered by many to be a war criminal responsible for the Dair Yassin massacre in 1948 and the Sbrah-Shatelah massacre in 1982. Sharon also displayed great disrespect by walking inside the square of the Abraham Mosque sanctuary in September 2000. This provoked the Second Palestinian Uprising (Al-Aqsa Intifada) and led to the Israeli reoccupation of Gaza and the West Bank in late September 2000.

Interestingly, President Bush was the first U.S. president to speak of a Palestinian state, even though no action was taken. The failure of 'Camp David' in 2000 generated the escalation of violence between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Because of the bloody conflict, the Bush Administration became more convinced of the need for two states, Israeli and Palestinian (Gormoly, author's interview, 2004).

Some Middle Eastern experts in U.S. foreign policy, such as Al-Fayez (author's interview, 2004), claim that Bush's declaration regarding two states was made only to court world opinion and make it appear that the United States was engaged in the peace process. More specifically, Al-Otaibi (author's interview, 2004) stated that Bush's declaration was nothing more than an 'accommodation' to U.S.

allies in the region like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the other Gulf states concerned about a Palestinian state. In actuality, many specialists in U.S. foreign Policy in the Middle East, like Saleh Al-Namlah (author's interview, 2004), Saudi Deputy Minister of Information for Foreign Affairs, believe that the United States is not serious about achieving an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict. They consider the United States to be utilizing and prolonging the peace process to achieve U.S. objectives. Other assessments of Bush's declaration by Al-Shamlan and Alkhatlan (author's interviews, 2004) consider the wording to be equivocal and vague as it does not state the nature and borders of the proposed Palestinian state. Since all previous negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians mediated by the United States aimed for the resolution of a Palestinian state, the Bush Administration has not added anything relevant to the peace process. What the Bush Administration has focused on has not been the peace process itself or the creation of a Palestinian state. Rather it has focused only on the Israeli demands for the reform of the Palestinian authority and its leadership.

Israeli policy toward the Palestinians became more repressive after the events of 9/11, taking advantage of the U.S. war on terrorism. In a press conference, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon announced that he would launch a war against 'the Palestinian terror,' adding that Yaser Arafat was 'his Osama Bin-Laden' (Sammon, 2002). This statement was an example of how the Israeli government compared the U.S. war against terrorism with its problems with the Palestinians, justifying its military actions against them.

Al-Rawaf (author's interview, 2004) stated that the Bush Administration's role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has gone through three stages. The first stage was at

the beginning of Bush's first term when he came to office with a negative attitude toward Arafat, blaming him for refusing to accept the Israeli offer at Camp David in 2000. The second stage was at the beginning of the U.S. war on terror when the Bush Administration sought to utilize that war to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The third stage involves the 'Road Map,' which is 'a statement of intent' and offers real involvement in the peace process.

In his 'State of the Union' speech in January 2002, President Bush mentioned that the Palestinian Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Lebanese Hezbollah are terrorist organizations (The White House, January 2002). Those organizations operate within the area of conflict in Palestine and Lebanon and only against the Israeli occupation. The United States has exerted intensive pressure on the Iranian and Syrian governments because it is believed that they support these militant organizations and the United States wants that stopped. Pressure has also been put on the Palestinian authority to arrest members of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, seize their weapons, and stop violence. The United States went beyond mere pressure when it added these groups to the U.S. list of terrorist organizations and praised Israel for its efforts to combat terrorism. Some U.S. allies, mainly Arab and Muslim states like Saudi Arabia, disagree with the U.S. decision to consider these groups terrorist organizations. To them, the militant organizations are 'freedom-fighters' resisting Israeli occupation (Cannistraro, 2003). The U.S. position against the Palestinian resistance is no surprise as the security of Israel is a central issue of internal U.S. politics and an influential factor in U.S. presidential elections, as believed by many scholars in the Arab world like Al-Namlah and Al-Fayez (author's interviews, 2004).

On March 29, 2002, a suicide bombing in Israel that resulted in 26 casualties prompted the IDF (Israeli Defense Army) to invade and re-occupy the West Bank. This was the largest such operation since the invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Helicopter gun-ships, armored bulldozers, and F-16s were used. The invasion was described by U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan as 'a conventional war' and called for a multinational force under the terms of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, authorizing the use of force to protect the Palestinians in the occupied territory. The Israeli government announced that the purpose of the operation was to pursue terrorists, but the heavy air attacks using F-16s and other sophisticated weapons revealed a different purpose. Bennis (2003) argued, 'The military strike was designed to punish the entire Palestinian population for the actions of a few unaccountable extremists' (p. 206).

In April 2002, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia (who was Crown Prince at that time) presented a peace initiative at the Arab League Summit in Beirut, Lebanon, offering recognition of the state of Israel with full normalization in return for complete Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders. President Bush praised the Saudi initiative, and the Israeli government showed general interest in the initiative. However, Israel rejected the 'right of return' for Palestinian refugees as stated by the U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194 and refused to withdraw to the 1967 borders according to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 242. While the U.S. media had provided extensive coverage of Arafat's rejection of Barak's offer at Camp David in 2000, it did not blame or discuss the reasons why the Israelis rejected one of the most generous initiatives ever presented by the Arab countries.

In the same month (April 2002), claiming to be in pursuit of Palestinian fighters, the Israeli Army devastated the Jenin refugee camp with bulldozers and tanks. Some houses in the camp were demolished with Palestinians inside. Over 50 dead bodies were pulled from the rubble. U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan dispatched U.N. special envoy Terje Roed-Larsen to the Jenin Camp, where he described the situation as ‘shocking and horrifying beyond belief. . . It looks as if an earthquake has hit the heart of the refugee camp here’ (Bennis, 2003, p. 209). Larsen called on the Israelis to allow relief and aid agencies to bring in food and water.

The Arab group in the Security Council submitted a draft of a Security Council resolution, calling on Annan to investigate ‘the full scope of the tragic events that have taken place in the Jenin refugee camp’ (Bennis, p. 210). The draft was opposed by the United States, which refused to accept any U.N. resolution containing ‘strong language’ or condemning the Israeli government. Ultimately, a weak resolution was passed, with U.S. approval, calling on the U.N. Secretary General to send a ‘fact-finding team’ instead of an ‘investigation team.’ Before the U.N. resolution was passed, Israel refused to allow the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, to investigate human rights conditions in the West Bank. The initial response of the Israeli government to the U.N. resolution for a ‘fact-finding team’ was made by Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, who told Annan that Israel would allow the team to come in because Israel ‘has nothing to hide,’ but when the team was ready to go, the Israeli government took back its approval, refusing to allow the U.N. team to visit the Jenin Camp.

The United States did not ask the Israeli government to comply with the U.N. resolution regarding the Jenin Camp as it did with Saddam's regime in Iraq. Instead, it prevented any further proposed U.N. resolutions against the Israeli invasion and devastation of the Jenin Camp. Despite the Israeli violations and non-compliance with U.N. resolutions, human rights principals, and the Geneva Convention, U.S. financial aid to Israel has continued to increase to approximately \$4 billion yearly (25% of the U.S. foreign policy budget) (Findley, 2002).

As a consequence of the attacks carried out by the Israeli Army in the Palestinian territories and camps, in September 2003, twenty-seven Israeli Army pilots refused to participate in further Israeli raids against civilians on the Palestinian territories. One of the 'on-strike' pilots said, 'We're opposed to carrying out illegal and immoral attacks of the sort Israel carries out in the territories' (CBC, 2003).

During the American international campaign to promote the war against Iraq in 2003, the Bush Administration decided to temporarily break its 'hands-off' policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The purpose of this was to stop the violence and energize the 'Road Map' negotiations. The change was prompted by Arab and Islamic outrage toward the Israelis for their actions to suppress the second Palestinian uprising (Al-Aqsa Intifada) and toward the United States for supporting Israeli's actions. However, U.S. efforts to revive the 'Road Map' failed (Bennis, 2003). Gabriel Kolko (2002) of York University in Canada is one of the commentators who noticed the negative impact of the Bush Administration's unlimited support of Israeli actions and policies, especially after 9/11. The impact of Bush's policy in regard to

the Israeli-Palestinian conflict affected U.S. relations with friendly regimes in the region, mainly Saudi Arabia. According to Kolko,

The Bush Administration acknowledged that strong U.S. support for Israel has alienated even its conservative friends in the area, above all the Saudis, and has surely made it far more difficult to gain support from Muslim countries for the coalition it alleged it wished to build to fight in Afghanistan and eradicate 'terrorism' globally (p. 43).

Merdad (author's interview, 2004) argued that Israel carries cultural, economic, and electoral (or) political weight in the area of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. Culturally, Israel is considered by many Americans in intellectual and influential circles and lobbies as an extension of Western civilization and the American culture, a culture with 'Judeo-Christian' values (Pinto, 1999). In his article, *Israel American and the Arab Delusion* (2001), Daniel Pipes said, 'As Muslims, these Middle Easterners fail to understand the emotional resonance of a common Bible and a host of Judeo-Christian features. As Middle Easterners, they cannot see beyond the clash of nationalism to comprehend shared interests between countries' (p. 28). Economically, Israel maintains a combat-ready role in protecting the oil fields of the Gulf region, though this role became less important after the beginning of the U.S. military presence in the region in 1991. Israel's political weight is linked to its influence on internal U.S. politics, which has made it the duty of the United States to maintain Israel's security.

The religious bases of U.S. support for Israel are multi-faceted. Pipes (2001) asserted that the Zionist lobby played an important role coordinating the effort of the Israeli-Jewish lobbies and the American Christian right-wing. Neo-conservatives, Christian fundamentalists, and other right-wing groups in the United States have allied

with pro-Israeli lobbies to support Israel. Though their ultimate goals diverge, they share mutual objectives based on religious claims. Whereas the interest of pro-Israeli lobbies is to sustain the state of Israel as a Jewish state, the interest of the Christian right-wing is based on religious belief in the 'ingathering' of all Jews in the land of Israel before the second coming of the Christ (peace be upon him) is possible (Khazen, 2005).

The alliance between pro-Israeli lobbies and the American right-wing has driven the Bush Administration to pursue more pro-Israeli policies as this alliance provided Bush with a majority of voters in the 2004 presidential election (Findley, 2005). Some Middle Eastern specialists in U.S. foreign policy believe that the Bush Administration's foreign policy in the Middle East is driven by religious motivations. In a personal interview with Sadaka Fadel (2004) at King Abdulaziz University in the West province of Saudi Arabia, Fadel accused the Bush Administration of being 'itself Zionist.'

The Bush Administration's role in the Arab-Israeli conflict suggests that the policies represent a strong pro-Israeli bias. It condoned the Israeli suppression of the Palestinian uprising, adopted the Israeli standard of considering Palestinian militants to be terrorists, it conducted a hands-off policy where it did not involve unless there was an American interest like before the war in Iraq to soothe outrages in the Arab and Muslim world, it refused to meet with the Palestinian leadership, accusing it of condoning terrorism, and was the first administration to announce its intention to recognize Jerusalem in wholly as the capital city of Israel. In sum, what made the Bush Administration's role so far very negative in regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict is

not only its 'hands-off policy,' but also its support and condone of Israeli actions against the Palestinians.

Now we have reviewed the American-Israeli relation which contributes to the understanding of the Bush's foreign policy in the Middle East and have major affect upon the perceptions of American foreign policy in the region. In the next section, we need to look at the American strategy in the war on terrorism and how it has played out in the Middle East.

### The U.S. War on Terror

Many of the Saudi specialists in U.S. foreign policy that were interviewed, such as Al-Tayeb, Al-Hulwa, and Merdad (author's interviews, 2004), believed that the Middle East is the central focus of the U.S. war on terrorism. They expect next stages in the U.S. war on terrorism to be within the Middle East region. Others like Al-Khathlan (author's interview, 2004) believed that the Middle East embodies the entire focus of that war, and any other areas of the world involved in this war, like the Philippines which is getting U.S. assistance in intelligence and training against Abu-Sayaf is linked to the Middle East because the group is accused by the United States of being tied to Al-Qaeda.

The war on terrorism has focused on that region, beginning with Iraq. American neo-conservatives William Kristol and Lawrence Kaplan provided a clear understanding of how neo-conservatives view the war in terrorism and the U.S. role after 9/11. They wrote:

The mission begins in Baghdad, but it does not end there . . . We stand at the cusp of a new historical era . . . This a decisive moment . . . it is so clearly

about more than Iraq. It is about more even than the future of the Middle East and the war on terror. It is about what sort of role the United States intends to play in the twenty-first century (Kiristol & Kaplan quoted in Zizek, 2004, p. 2).

Some members of the Bush Administration attribute current U.S. 'problems' in the Middle East with the failure of previous U.S. administrations to respond properly to the terrorist attacks that were launched against the United States in the 1980's and the 1990's. According to Lynch (2003), the Bush Administration was intent on acting against external threats even before 9/11. The Bush Administration considered the Middle East to be a region that needed reform. This was announced in the so-called 'The Greater Middle East Initiative,' which will be discussed later in this chapter. The administration's view of the Middle East was based on criticism of Clinton's policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict and the beliefs of the 'hawks' in the White House. The pro-military 'hawks' considered rogue states, most of them in the Middle East, as direct and serious threats to the security of the United States (Daalder & Lindsay, 2003).

The U.S. war on terror is arguably a reaction to 9/11 and Al-Qaeda. The discourse of Islamic parties, militants, and radicals is anti-American foreign policy, and sometimes anti-American in general. The U.S. war on terror focuses on what it calls Islamic fundamental groups as a major threat to U.S. security (Al-Rawaf, author's interview, 2004). It is important to note here that many scholars in the Arab world, like Al-Ghamdi (author's interview, 2004), disagree with the use of the term 'fundamentalism' to describe Islamic movements for its negative connotations.

In a personal interview with Mohammed Eid (author's interview, 2004), from the Prince Naif University for Security Science and former Deputy Minister of Interior

in Egypt, he said that the United States has used the extremism of some radical groups in the Middle East as a reason for its war against terrorism, accusing some regimes in the region of sponsoring these radical groups and then, gradually, blackmailing those regimes to fully cooperate or to become subject to U.S. military actions. Mohammad Al-Bishr (2005), from Imam Mohammad Bin-Saud University in Riyadh, looked at the utilization of the concept of terrorism as the main problem with America's current open-ended war on terror, describing this period as the most crucial since the Second World War.

The capriciousness in understanding the concept of terrorism has led to the downfall of many political regimes. Its application has brought destruction to peaceful nations and death to innocent people. Many countries, governments, peoples, civil institutions, and even cultures are suffering the consequences of the 'war on terror' (p. 8).

Al-Hulwa (author's interview, 2004) argued that Samuel Huntington's *Clash of Civilization* thesis has shaped the basis of the Bush Administration's foreign policy. Huntington (2002) mentioned the Islamic, Russian, and Sinic civilizations as potential threat to Western civilization. He described the clash between Western civilization and other civilizations in the world as a tribal clash but in a global form, adding that cultural differences are the focal issue in the conflicts between these civilizations. The main point in Huntington's thesis is that 'culture and cultural identities, which at the broadest level are civilization identities, are shaping the patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict in the post-Cold War world' (p.20). Huntington elaborated upon what he believes features of these civilizations which cause clashes: Western 'universalism,' Muslim 'militancy,' and Chinese 'assertion.' The Islamic civilization (of which Middle Eastern societies are part) is one of the civilizations that Huntington

believed will clash with Western civilization. He attributed the expected conflict between Islam and the West to five conditions. First is the growth of Muslim populations and increased unemployment rates. Second is the Islamic revival giving Muslims the faith of their values and civilization that makes them feel they are more valuable than those of the West. Third is Western efforts to globalize their values and culture and maintain their economic predominance which is rejected by Muslims. Fourth, after the Cold War and the end of Communism, which was considered an enemy by both Muslims and the West, the two civilizations started to consider each other a threat. Fifthly, as the members of the two civilizations increase their contacts with each other, they feel the differences between their cultures, giving Muslims a stronger sense of their Islamic identity (Huntington). Maria do Ceu Pinto, the author of *Political Islam and the United States* (1999), traced the Western apprehension of Islam to what he described as Islam's 'vitality as a religious and civilisational paradigm and hence of its potential as a major ideological challenge to the West' (p.8-9).

In his book, *America and Political Islam*, Gerges (1999) highlighted the role of American intellectuals in shaping the perceptions toward the rise of political Islam. He described two approaches adopted by intellectuals of how America should tackle this issue: Confrontationalists and Accommodationists. The Confrontationalists called for serious effort to 'contain' Islamists. For example, they recommended hampering Muslim nations from possessing WMD and taking drastic actions against the so-called 'state sponsored terrorism.' The Accommodationists, on the other hand, discredit the notion of 'anti-Western' or 'anti-democratic' Islamism as they differentiate between

the renitence of a 'legitimate' Islamic groups and the one of a few 'extremist minority.' On the other hand, they see they look at the rising of political Islam as a 'challenge,' not threat.

Ali Al-Jahni (author's interview, 2005), from the Prince Naif University for Security Science in Riyadh, asserted the American neo-conservatives made efforts to associate Islam with terrorism. Also, the American media portrayed the terrorists as representatives of Islam, the association of Islam with terrorism was definitely misleading. Al-Jahni wonders why when Timothy McVeigh, a member of the Christian right-wing, was arrested and accused of the Oklahoma bombing, he was not referred to by the American media as a Christian terrorist. The association of terrorism with Islam is a stereotype that has become routinely retrieved by the U.S. media, even though many Muslim states have been the subjects of terrorist attacks—Algeria, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia, where most of the victims were Muslim.

Al-Mejlad (author's interview, 2004), at King Saud University, argued that the Bush Administration has adopted and developed the notion of the clash of civilizations against Islamic nations as it is believed that Islam is a growing threat that must be overwhelmed by altering Islamic cultures, and dividing and weakening the Muslim states. In an interview on the Crosswalk website in December 2001, U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft said that Islam is a religion that tells a person to send his son to death; whereas Christianity is a religion in which God sent his son to death (Council on American Islamic Relations, 2002). This is a violation of the U.S. Constitution and individual state laws that prohibit the expression of prejudice, bias, or racism in the

administration of justice (Shusta et al., 2002). An insensitive and ignorant statement regarding Islam like this made by a person who represents justice may be considered offensive by all Muslims, some of whom are members of the American society, and inflame hatred toward America in the Muslim world. According to the National Crime Prevention Council (1994) in the United States, many American people rely on stereotypical concepts about people from other countries and tend to use them to make generalizations about people's behavior instead of learning about the people and their cultures. A portion of the problem contributing to a lack of cultural sensitivity and understanding on the part of many American people is that they take uninformed assessments made by some officials, like Ashcroft as the truth. It is wrong to assume any religion supports terrorist acts. Instead, people sometimes manipulate religion for their own self interest and justify terrorist acts to their followers based on religious claims (Training Institute, 1998).

In fact, Islam is the religion of one-fifth of the world population, over 1.3 billion people (American Central Agency, 2006). Islamic Law (Sharia) has many texts that forbid terrorism and provide many degrees of offense and punishment for acts of terrorism. While Islam emphasizes tolerance as a basic tenet, the laws and teachings of Islam boldly condemn terrorism. The Holy Koran states,

Because of that we ordained for the children of Israel that if anyone killed a person not in relation of murder, or (and) to spread mischief in the land-it would be as if he killed all mankind, and if anyone saved a life, it would be as if he saved the life of all mankind (The Holy Koran, 1984, Sura Al-Ma'idah, verse 32).

As stated, if anyone kills a person unjustly or causes terror, it is as if he has killed all of mankind; on the other hand, if anyone saves a person, it is as if he has

saved all of mankind. It can be inferred from these verses that Islam is a religion that condones violence and honors the lifesavers. Islamic law speaks of 'Heraba,' a term which means 'terrorism.' It is defined as 'random or planned killing, like all terrorist acts that either randomly or intentionally cause harm to individuals or create a coup d'etat' (Al-Tarifi, 1998). A problem arises when terrorist spiritual leaders understand that religion can be an effective way to attract followers and, thus, use religion unscrupulously. They attempt to justify unlawful actions by claiming religious purposes or reasons when, in fact, they are serving their own interests (Harmon, 2000). There are some malicious Muslim organizations that have secret goals and have manipulated Islam in ways that serve their interests. They explain Islamic issues in ways that justify their actions. Followers do what their leaders want, disregarding true Islamic teaching (Al-Khateeb, 2005).

According to the Report of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World (2003), only 12% of the people surveyed from nine Arab and Muslim states believe that 'Americans respect Arab/Islamic values.' In his speech on the National Security Strategy of the United States in 2002, President Bush denied that the war against terrorism is a clash of civilizations. Instead, he said 'It does, however, reveal the clash inside a civilization, a battle for the future of the Muslim world. This is a struggle of ideas and this is an area where America must excel' (Report of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, 2003, p. 15). In sum, terrorism has no religion. Rather, terrorists hijack religion in order to gain support.

Huntington's thesis in *Clash of Civilizations* is consistent with Bin-Laden's declaration of a clash between the Muslim nation and what he calls 'Western imperialism.' Of course, Bin-Laden's claim is widely rejected in the Muslim world and is considered the abuse of Islam (Crockatt, 2003). However, most Muslims desire a resurgence of Muslim nations to 'compete' with other civilizations as argued by Sheikh Bin-Hemaid (author's interview, 2004), the Chairman of Majlis Ash'shura (the Saudi Parliament). Muslims believe that Islam provides solutions for current problems that their nations confront; Islam has the ability to evolve and modernize itself. Sheikh Bin-Hemaid believes that relations between Western civilization and other civilizations, particularly Islamic civilization, are not so much facing a clash, as Huntington or Kissinger argued, but are involved in a rivalry. He also asserted that Huntington's notion of a clash of civilizations does not represent the majority of American intellectuals and people, but represents the beliefs of a minority who have anti-Islamic attitudes and prejudicial perceptions and who also look at the Middle East as a center of cultural conflict. In agreement with Sheikh Bin-Hemaid, former U.S. diplomat, John Habib (2003), disbelieve in clash of civilizations. He sees it nothing but a disparity between these civilizations.

At the Counter-Terrorism International Conference (February, 2005) in Riyadh (which was attended by the author), the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs addressed the issue of cultural clashes.

Unfortunately, groups with extremist thinking and ideologies create an atmosphere of intolerance and promote conflict and animosity among cultures. For example, extremists have thrived on such notions as 'clash of civilizations' and 'the end of history.' By depicting other cultures, for example Islamic or Confucian, as a threat to the West, such notions incite hatred and atrocities

against the culture in question. This is exploited by extremist groups, by waging cultural and intellectual attacks against the West aggressively (p. 7).

Some commentators may argue that the clash is actually between radical Muslims (Al-Qaeda) and American radicals from the Christian right-wing, like Franklin Graham, Jerry Falwell, and Pat Robertson (those who believe in an inevitable clash with Islamic civilization). The Iranian revolution is an example of what the 'clash of civilizations' advocates warn about because one of the most important principles in its doctrine is the exportation of revolution (Crockatt, 2003). Former U.S. Secretary of State, Henri Kissinger (2002), considers Iran as a "great" threat to the United States.

Opposite to Huntington, some intellectuals focus on the roots of the conflict between the United States and the Islamic/Arabic cultures. They seek to enlighten the American people about the nature and roots of anti-Americanism. Explaining the roots of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the role America has played regarding that issue provides understanding of anti-American sentiment among Arabs.

Hard line policies do little to promote tolerance and understanding. According to Ali (2004), in 1997, some members of the Republican Party signed the so-called 'Project for the New American Century.' Among the signers were Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Jeb Bush, and Zalmi Khalilzad (now U.S. Ambassador in Iraq). Other signers were intellectuals like Francis Fukuyama, Midge Decter, Lewis Libby, and Norman Podhoretz. The project declared the U.S. right to use force 'wherever and whenever necessary' to sustain U.S. hegemony. This project was included in the National Security Strategy of the United States that was signed by President Bush in September 2002.

The role of these intellectuals appears to be influential in shaping the public debate. While Huntington has proved to be perhaps one of the most influential thinkers on identity politics, there are others who cannot be ignored. Like Huntington, Francis Fukuyama is considered one of the prominent theorizers in U.S. foreign policy. In the article, *History and September 11* that was published in *Worlds in Collision* (2002), Fukuyama stated that religious beliefs, social habits, and traditions are 'the last area of convergence' (p. 29). These three areas are very difficult to change in most societies and depend on the strength of commitment that the people have. Fukuyama believes that it would be very 'naive' for Americans to think that their culture, values and beliefs can 'seductively' prevail in the world. However, at the end of his article, Fukuyama suggested that Islam should make major changes, creating a secular state and endorsing religious tolerance. In his assessment, Fukuyama portrayed the clash of civilizations as merely a conflict between Islam and the West, which is questionable for a number of reasons.

First, the problem is not simply one of Islam versus the West. Rather, it may be argued that the current problems of civilization, stem from the clash between U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East and what might be considered the more militant or radical face of the Muslim world.

Secondly, there seems to be a pervasive misunderstanding about the nature of Islam. The world of Islam has been a tolerant religion since its emergence over 14 centuries ago. Islam is described as a 'very liberal' religion by Al-Namlah (author's interview, 2004). During the era of Islamic dominance in Spain (Andalusia), which lasted for eight centuries, many religions existed together in an atmosphere of

tolerance. With the decline of the Islamic state and eventual elimination by Spain, all non-Catholics (Jews, Muslims, and followers of other Christian churches) were subject to scrutiny by the Inquisition Courts. Most of the Jews and Muslims left Spain and migrated to Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia where they were allowed the freedom to practice their religion. Tomas Arnold, Professor of Contemporary History at the University of Oxford, is one of the Western scholars who has highlighted the history of tolerance toward non-Muslims in Islamic states. In his book, '*Call to Islam*,' Thomas Arnold said, 'They – aliens – lived under the Islamic rule with peace and hope. The Muslim rulers went on with their traditions of tolerance and forgiveness towards believers of other religions' (Arnold quoted in Al-Jalahema, 2005, p. 275).

Misunderstanding the history and culture of Islam is not unique to Fukuyama. It does lead to another problem, though, as Fukuyama wants Muslims to reform their religion as if it consisted of statute laws and was not a religion that they all must believe in and abide by. It must be understood that the primary sources of Islamic law (Sharia) are The Holy Koran (The Holy Book of God) and Sunna (the sayings and deeds of the Prophet Mohammed {peace be upon him}). All Islamic laws and legislation have been derived from these two sources and are not subject to any human adjustment or intervention. In most cases, such as the punishments for adultery and thievery, legal definitions and actions are clearly stated and detailed in the Islamic law (Sharia). There are some laws in Sharia where judges are given some latitude with alternative punishments for a particular case. For example, in the case of terrorism, The Holy Koran states three degrees of punishment that a judge can match with a

terrorist act according to the type, damage, and consequences of the act. When Fukuyama suggested that Islamic states should change into secular states, he ignored the reality that such a change would constitute a lack of faith.

Fukuyama had an odd and inaccurate view of the form of government in the Muslim states. He has argued that the Muslim states are not secular, when, in fact, most Muslim states are, indeed, secular as Islamic law (Sharia) has not been completely applied with all its articulated laws and values. Most Muslim states in the world claim that Islam is one of the main sources of their constitutions (Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, and Syria). Other countries, like Pakistan and Sudan, consider Islamic law to be the basis of their governments. Saudi Arabia and Iran are the only two countries who state that Islamic law (Sharia) is their constitution (Farchild & Dammer, 2001). In essence, Fukuyama prejudges the Islamic state when, in fact, there is no one model of Islamic state.

Fukuyama (2002) asserted that even though British and American officials have said that the war on terrorism is not against any religion or nation, there are cultural issues that do affect the current conflict. He mentioned the American belief that 'their institutions and values— democracy, individual rights, the rule of law and prosperity based on economic freedom— represent universal aspirations that will ultimately be shared by people all over the world, if given the opportunity' (p. 28). This assessment by Fukuyama is a very logical statement and is echoed in the speeches of President G.W. Bush who talks about how American values should prevail internationally.

Four years after 9/11 and the U.S. war in terror, anti-Americanism 'has reached shocking levels' (Report of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World submitted to the U.S. Congress in June 2003, p. 15). This sentiment exceeds the level of anti-Americanism that had already existed in the Arab and Muslim world as a result of the historic conduct of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East since the Second World War. Many people in the Arab and Muslim world believe that the American war on terror is focused on Islam. The argument is not about whether this belief is true or not. Rather, it has to do with the apparent failure of the United States to understand the Middle East and its cultures. The Bush Administration has failed (through television channels (Alhura), radios (Sawa), and special programs sponsored by the U.S. State Department) to communicate with the people of the Middle East, because instead of using these means of communication to establish a dialogue, the administration used them to explain and justify its policies.

#### Bush and the War on Terror

As a consequence of 9/11, many countries have been subject to U.S. pressure to participate in the war against terrorism. The U.S. demands of participations were mostly in the areas that can be only accomplished by multilateralism. These are intelligence, the use of military bases, and general security cooperation. In the area of security, for example, Canada was pushed to align its immigration system with the American system, which sought 'the new homeland defense' (Byers, 2002).

On September 20, 2001, President Bush told the U.S. Congress that the United States will act against states that provide 'aid or a safe heaven' for terrorists. He said

that Al-Qaeda was not the only organization subject to the U.S. war on terror. All terrorist organizations around the world were deemed the enemy. 'Our war on terror begins with Al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated' (The White House, September 2001).

So far, there have been two stages of the U.S. war on terror. The first stage was against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, host to Osama Bin-Laden and his organization, Al-Qaeda, which is accused by the United States of sponsoring 9/11. This first stage was arguably justifiable as the Taliban regime refused to relinquish Bin-Laden and Al-Qaeda members to the United States.

The second stage of the war on terror shifted to a war against Iraq, transmitting from a war against terrorist organization (Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan) to a war against rogue states (Iraq). According to President Bush, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea form an 'axis of evil.' These states were not accused by President Bush of directly conducting terrorist activities, but they sponsor terrorism or possess chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons.

The 'Axis of Evil' speech on January, 29, 2002 was considered by many commentators to be a turning point in the U.S. war on terrorism. These countries that did not necessarily produce terrorism or have links with terrorist organization, as was the case with Al-Qaeda and Afghanistan, but were considered as rogue states that posed a threat to the United States (Daalder& Lindsay, 2003). Even though North Korea is one of the three 'axis of evil,' it has been argued by Middle Eastern experts that the United States has only focused on Iraq and Iran. Some commentators, like Al-

Otaibi (author's interview, 2004), believe that the United States has overlooked North Korea and concentrated on the Middle East as a matter of order and hierarchy. 'Of course the Middle East, is more important for the security of Israel and the continuation of oil supplies.' Gormoly (author's interview, 2004) believes that including North Korea in the Axis of Evil was meant to dispel the notion of the U.S. focusing on the Middle East and to contain the North Korean threat to U.S. security, especially after announcing its progress in nuclear weapons and later its threat to attack American soil. Gormoly added that the United States believes the Middle East is at the center of the war on terrorism. Since 9/11, U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East has been subject to reform and change more so than policies affecting other parts of the world.

Booth and Dunne (2002) have raised some frequently asked questions: 'How long will it take to suppress Al-Qaeda in 40 countries in which it is supposed to have sleepers? Will it ever be possible to have a victory parade in this particular war . . . ?' (p. 20). Vice President Dick Cheney said in October 2004 that the U.S. war on terrorism 'May never end. At least, not in our lifetime' (Kolko, 2002, p. 2). U.S. policymakers may continue the war on terrorism, taking advantage of the term's (terrorism) vagueness, as long as it serves the interests of the United States. Unlike most previous wars, the results of the war on terrorism may be very difficult to measure because the enemy is elusive and the 'victory' are subject to change. Also, this type of war is open-ended. On the other hand, it is easy to measure any terrorist activity as it is being visible and broadcasted. Since the beginning of the U.S. war on terrorism, there have been several terrorist attacks that were linked to or sponsored by

Al-Qaeda— the incidents in Casablanca (Morocco) May 2003, Bali (Indonesia) October 2002, and several attacks in Riyadh in May 2003. Thus, the terrorist organization remains an active threat

The Middle East is of course the fulcrum of the U.S. war on terror because this region, as Merdad (author's interview, 2004) described, is a place of multiculturalism and religions, and also a place of cultural conflicts and clash of civilizations. Many problems and conflicts in the world have been either culturally or religiously tied to the Middle East, such as the wars in Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Chechnya. Therefore, the United States wants to control the manner of interactions in the Middle East. Hence, it is very important to say, even though it is subject to argument, that a cultural conflict does exist between the United States and other cultures in the world, especially with the cultures of the Muslim and Arab states. More specifically, Merdad and Fadel (author's interviews, 2004) argue that the U.S. war on terror is mainly steered against Arabs and Muslims. Fadel says the war on terrorism is actually 'an American bluff to justify its aggression against Arabs and Muslims.' He added that all countries around the world except Britain and Israel are 'so critical of this American bluff' to take advantage of its war on terror (Fadel). The Report of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World (2003) have found that levels of anti-Americanism, especially in the Middle East, have actually increased after 9/11 and the beginning of the U.S. war on terror.

While many commentators and experts disagree in the goals of the U.S. war on terror, many of them agree that the goals go beyond preventing terrorism. Gormoly (author's interview, 2004) described two objectives of the U.S. war on terror: first, is

to prevent any country in the Middle East, except Israel, from possessing WMD; and second, to punish regimes that antagonize the United States. Al-Namalh (author's interview, 2004) believes that the U.S. war on terrorism has been designed as a move against foreign policy opponents. Western scholars like Bennis (2004) have argued that the U.S. war on terror is not meant to bring terrorists to justice as the Bush Administration claims, but to advance its agenda to dominate the world. He added, 'In fact, of course, the war was never about bringing anyone to justice; it was about conquest and the mushrooming of US global power, all in the name of righteous vengeance' (p. 163).

Al-Ghamdi (author's interview, 2004), at King Saud University in Saudi Arabia, claimed that the Middle Eastern aspect of the U.S. war on terrorism has two bases: religious and cultural. The religious base is related to Israel, as many of the pro-Israelis and Zionists in the United States believe in the Old Testament, which commands the creation of a Jewish state before the return of Christ 'peace be upon him.' Among those believers are the neo-conservatives who have had a major influence on the Bush Administration. In the case of Iraq, there was no evidence of a connection between the Iraqi regime and terrorist networks, but Iraq was considered by pro-Israelis and Zionists to be a threat to Israel. The issue of WMD was brought up to justify launching a war against Iraq. The weapons were never found and after the war had already start, it was determined that WMD claims were based on unreliable reports, as the Bush Administration later admitted.

The cultural bases are predicated on the concept of the clash of civilizations as Al-Ghamdi (author's interview, 2004) argued. Al-Ghamdi has concluded that the U.S.

war on terrorism has been abused and utilized by the Bush Administration and American right-wing Christians to diminish the spread of Islam (Al-Ghamdi).

Unlike the war in Afghanistan, the war in Iraq has caused more controversy inside and outside of the United States. The war against Iraq signaled a crucial shift in the American war on terror. The war transmuted from a war against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime that allowed the organization to operate in Afghanistan to a war against states that possess WMD and, arguably, pose a theoretical threat. The American war in Iraq has led to subsequent issues like the confrontation between the United States and Iran, disagreements between the United States and two major European allies (France and Germany), and signs of disputes between Arab states and Iran over influence in the southern Shiite areas of Iraq. The next section discusses the war in Iraq as a second stage of the U.S. war on terror and currently a major theme of American foreign policy in the Middle East.

#### The United States and War in Iraq

Strategically and geopolitically, Iraq is a very important state in the Middle East. Since the Second Gulf War in 1991 and until the U.S. war against Iraq in 2003, a containment strategy, known as the 'dual containment policy,' was employed with both Iran and Iraq (Kissinger, 2002). Unlike some claims by American experts and commentators that the containment strategy had failed with Iraq, it appears that during the period from 1991 to 2003, the strategy actually was a success. The Iraqi army had lost almost 66% of the military capability that it had before the Second Gulf War (1990). In contrast, the containment strategy had failed with countries like North

Korea. In 2003, that country announced the revitalization of its nuclear program (Dunn, 2003).

After the end of the Second Gulf War in 1992, Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under the first President Bush said,

There is this sort of romantic notion that if Saddam Hussein got hit by a bus tomorrow, some Jefferson Democrat is waiting in the wings to hold popular elections [laughter]. You're going to get - guess what - probably another Saddam Hussein. It will take a little while for them to paint the pictures all over the walls again - [laughter] - but there should be no illusions about the nature of this country and its society. And the American people and all the people who second-guessed us now would have been outraged if we had gone on to Baghdad and found ourselves in Baghdad with American soldiers patrolling the streets two years later still looking for Jefferson [laughter] (Ali, 2004, p. 155-156).

The U.S. war against Afghanistan in late 2001 can be justified as a reaction to the Taliban's support of Bin Laden, Al-Qaeda's leader and admitted sponsor of the 9/11 attacks (Reinares, 2002). Unlike the U.S. war on Afghanistan, where the United States claimed the right of self-defense against the Taliban regime, U.S. justifications for the war against Iraq were based on unproven and erroneous claims of a linkage between the Iraqi regime and terrorist organizations. Before the war, the Bush Administration concentrated on the issue of WMD, but failed to find the weapons after the war started (Abdul Maguid, 2005). Several weeks after the fall of Baghdad, U.S. Deputy Minister of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz said in an interview that 'for reasons that have a lot to do with the US government bureaucracy, we settled on the one issue that everyone could agree on: weapons of mass destruction' (Ali, 2004, p. 152). The U.S. justifications for invading and occupying Iraq became subject to increased debate inside and outside the United States between war advocates and those against war. Tariq Ali, the author of *Bush in Babylon: The Recolonisation of Iraq* (2004), is one

who opposed the war. He argued that the U.S. war against Iraq is nothing but ‘a crude attempt to impose U.S. hegemony on a strategically important region’ (p. 143).

Al-Rawaf (author’s interview, 2004) determined that there were four reasons why the United States invaded Iraq. First, the United States was concerned about suspected Iraqi chemical and biological weapons capability that could be used directly by the Iraqi regime against the United States and Israel or used to arm some terrorist organization, like Al-Qaeda, that would not hesitate to use them against the United States. Second, it was to consolidate the U.S. presence in the Middle East oil zone (south of Iraq, south of Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates). Third, it offered the potential to be independent from Saudi oil. Fourth, the ‘liberation’ of Iraq would make it as an ideal democratic model for other states in the region.

The war in Iraq has proved controversial. We still debate the causes. Like many Middle Eastern experts on U.S. foreign policy, Al-Hulwah (author’s interview, 2004) argued that the purpose for the war against Iraq was the security of Israel and oil supplies. The belief that oil was the main reason for the U.S. invasion of Iraq is not only a view found in the Middle East, but can be in Europe and even in the United States. According to the Pew Research Center, in opinion polls conducted in early 2003 (before the U.S. invasion of Iraq), 76% of Russians, 75% of French, 54% of Germans, and 44% of the British believed that America invaded Iraq to gain control of its oil supplies.

Most people in Europe were against the U.S. war in Iraq, and even more were opposed to any European participation in the war. Unlike America, where majority

people had said yes to the war against Iraq, most Europeans have said no as many polls have showed majority opposition within Europe to the war (Kagan, 2004). Former British Cabinet Minister Mo Mowlam agreed with this belief, wondering if the United States would have intervened if Iraq produced rice or orange instead of oil (Dunn, 2003). Some believe that Bush himself has become a threat to world security. According to a poll conducted by the Emnid Institute in Germany in early 2003, 53% of the Germans believed that G.W. Bush was more dangerous than Saddam Hussein (Dunn, 2003).

In the United States, debate about taking military action against Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq began before 9/11. During the second half of 2000, he reduced Iraq's oil production and invoiced oil exports in euros rather than dollars. This caused disturbances in world oil prices and had a negative impact on the dollars. Some U.S. foreign policy experts cautioned from such an action. Among these experts was former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who said, in his book *Does America Need a Foreign Policy* (2002), that this conduct by Iraq was a 'national security challenge' to the United States and not just a problem in the world oil market.

There was influence by pro-Israeli lobbies for a U.S. invasion of Iraq. According to Al-Khathlan (author's interview, 2004), in 1996 Israel's national security strategy recommended getting rid of Saddam Hussein. The notion of regime change in Iraq was evolving since that date (1996) and was brought to sight by pro-Israeli lobbies and influential circle in the United States. Israel encouraged the Bush Administration to invade Iraq. Former U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Paul O'Neill confirmed that Bush's decision to invade Iraq was made a few weeks after 9/11.

According to O'Neill the Bush Administration intended to change the Iraqi regime even before 9/11 happened. O'Neill mentioned that during a meeting of the National Security Council on February 1, 2001, Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld advocated for war against Iraq, explaining how it would serve U.S. interests in the region. 'I imagine what the region would look like without Saddam and with a regime that's aligned with US interests . . . It would change everything in the region and beyond it. It would demonstrate what US policy is all about' (Ali, p. 215).

An unnamed U.S. official was quoted in the British newspaper, *The Independent* saying, 'The first foreign policy gesture of a democratic Iraq would be to recognize Israel' (Quoted in Zizek, 2004, p. 3). According to Seymour Hersh, the investigative journalist, the Israeli Mossad became very active in Kurdistan (Northern Iraq) before the U.S. war in Iraq in 2003. Several months after the end of the war, an office believed to be run by the Israeli Mossad was bombed, killing several Israeli agents (Ali, 2004).

U.S. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice stated clearly in 2000 what the United States should do if the Iraqi regime obtained WMD. 'The first line of defense should be a clear and classical statement of deterrence--if they do acquire WMD, their weapons will be unusable because any attempt to use them will bring national obliteration' (Rice, 2000, p. 6). This statement contradicted with what Rice said during the U.S. campaign to rally support against Iraq in 2002-2003. At that time, she changed her position and said that Iraq was a threat to the United States and international security. Furthermore, in an interview with CNN on March 4, 2001, Cheney said, 'I don't believe [Saddam Hussein] is a significant military threat today . .

. We want to make sure he does not become one in the future' (Cheney quoted in Bennis, 2003, p. 6). The Bush Administration exaggerated Iraq's WMD capability and portrayed Iraq as a major threat to U.S. security and stability. President Bush concentrated on the WMD issue to justify the war, asserting on October, 7, 2002 that the Iraqi threat 'is already significant, and it only grows worse with time' (The White House, October 2002). President Bush confirmed in five different speeches made before the war that Iraq definitely possesses WMD. In his address to the nation on March 17, 2003, (two days before the war in Iraq was launched) he said, 'Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised' (Ali, 2004, p. 149). Bush's claim contradicted a report that was submitted to the Senate Intelligence Committee in Congress by CIA Director George Tenet on. The report stated that Saddam was 'unlikely' to attack any U.S. targets using WMD unless the United States 'provokes' him. According to Zizek (2004), more than 1,000 U.S. experts spent several months after the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime searching for WMD but found nothing.

The Bush Administration has also attempted to link the Iraqi regime with terrorists in an effort to justify the war against Iraq as part of the war against terrorism. The administration, failed to establish such a linkage, taking into account its earlier statements denying any Iraqi involvement in 9/11 or in any terrorist activities against the United States. In a U.S. Department of State report on Global Terrorism that was released in April 2001, it was clearly stated that Iraq 'has not attempted an anti-Western terrorist attack since its failed plot to assassinate former President Bush in

1993 in Kuwait' (U.S. Department of State, April 2001). In September, 2002, President Bush acknowledged that the United States 'had no evidence that Saddam Hussein was involved with September the 11<sup>th</sup>' (Zizek, 2004, p. 1). Both the CIA and FBI admitted that there was no evidence of any meeting between Mohammad Atta (one of the 19 hijackers involved in the 9/11 attacks) and any Iraqi intelligence official as had been previously claimed by the Bush Administration. In contradiction to statements made by the U.S. Department of State, FBI, and CIA, President Bush said in his State of the Union address in 2002 that 'Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror' (The White House, January 2002). However, President Bush did not give any evidence or examples of Iraq's support of terrorism. With no evidence to link the Iraqi regime and terrorism, WMD and their 'potential threat' became a bases for launching the war against Iraq.

Because the justification for war was weak, the pro-war advocates in the Bush Administration did not hesitate to use Hussein's actions in the 1980's and 1990's as grounds for a preemptive war against Iraq. For example, they brought up his use of chemical gas against the Kurds in 1989, even though, at that time the United States chose not to denounce the action. According to the Senate Banking Sub-committee Report in 1994, the United States continued to supply the Iraqi regime with biological germs until 1989, even after the accusation that Iraqi had used chemical weapons against its own people (the Kurds) and against Iranian troops (Bennis, 2003). While President G.W. Bush is not responsible for this, the Reagan and first Bush Administrations were. They supplied Saddam Hussein's regime with biological weapons, and the current U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, was Reagan's

special envoy to the Middle East. President G.W. Bush, who has repeatedly accused Iraq of possessing biological weapons, has never acknowledged the role America played in this matter.

As the United States prepared to wage war against Iraq, President Bush repeatedly attempted to justify the war against Iraq by claiming the regime constituted a threat to Iraq's neighbors. At the time though, Iraq's neighbours informed U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell that they were opposed to a war against Iraq. After the Second Gulf War in 1990 and as a result of the U.N. sanctions against Iraq, Saddam Hussein's regime was virtually incapable of imposing a threat to its neighbours. Some of Iraq's neighbouring governments actually told Powell that was not Saddam Hussein but Ariel Sharon, the Israeli Prime Minister, who posed a threat to them. There were reports and Israeli sources confirmed that Israel, a non-signer of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, possessed WMD, nuclear weapons in particular. The concerns of Iraq's neighbours did not alter the Bush's decision to invade Iraq (Habib, 2003). According to the Report of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World (2003), a poll conducted by the Pew Research Center in 2003, before the war began in Iraq, found that people on the neighboring states Jordan, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia 'by greater than a two-to-one margin ... said the United States was a more serious threat than Iraq' (p. 15).

When the United States failed to get a U.N. resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq, the Bush Administration claimed that the U.N. resolution regarding the inspections implicitly authorizes the use of force (Al-Tayeb, author's interview, 2004). After the invasion of Iraq, the Chief U.N. Arms Inspector, Hans Blix, said that

the U.S. invasion was based on 'very, very shaky evidence,' (Ali, 2004, p. 151) exhorting other states not to accept any U.N. team again.

Unlike the war in Afghanistan, the United States failed to convincingly promote the war in Iraq and faced stiff international opposition led by France, Germany, and Russia (Al-Fayez, author's interview, 2004). In spite of this international opposition within the United Nations and worldwide anti-war demonstrations, the Bush Administration was determined to invade Iraq and formed what it called a 'coalition of the willing.' The Bush Administration sought to promote for the war against terror as a 'moral struggle,' as argued by Crockatt (2003), and sought to create international coalition in order to make it a world's 'moral struggle' instead of American one. Demonstrations against the U.S.-led war in Iraq took place not only in Arab and Muslim states but also in Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom, countries whose government allied with the United States in the war effort. On February 15, 2003, three million people protested in Rome, two million in Spain, and a million and a half in London. After her resignation, Clare Short (a member of the Blair Cabinet) told a House of Commons Select Committee that 'Bush and Blair had agreed 'in secret' to make this war regardless of all else' (Ali, 2004, p. 143).

The war advocates justify the necessity of a 'preemptive war' against Iraq by describing Saddam's efforts to obtain WMD. They believe that he must be prevented from obtaining WMD by force. Of course, there was no sufficient evidence of such accusation. U.S. justification for the war rested on a weak foundation of unsubstantiated claims and accusations. Mearsheimer and Walt (2003), insisted that Saddam Hussein's history proved that he would be contained, as he had been when

subject to the UN sanctions that weakened his military capability. Mearsheimer and Walt substantiated the claim that Saddam's regime was 'detractable.' In the Second Gulf War, Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons, but did not use them against U.S. troops and other coalition forces because they knew that the American response would have been devastating. This was confirmed by Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz and the head of Iraqi intelligence, Wafiq al-Samarrai, in later television interviews.

In 1994, Saddam gathered Iraqi forces at the Kuwaiti border to put pressure on the United Nations to change the UN system of weapons inspection. The United Nations warned the Iraqi regime and the United States deployed its troops at the Iraq-Kuwait border. The Iraqis immediately pulled back their troops. In neither case did Iraq resort to chemical or biological warfare. This supports Mearsheimer and Walt (2003) argument. It should be noted that even during the worst moments of the latest war in Iraq, when Baghdad was falling, the Iraqi regime did not use chemical or biological weapons. There have been claims by some senior Iraqi commanders from the Iraqi Army and the Iraqi National Guard that the United States had used 'tactical nuclear bombs' in the combat at Baghdad airport. They claimed that they saw Iraqi tanks melt after they were struck by U.S. missiles.

Merdad (author's interview, 2004) argued that the United States did not really need to promote the war against Iraq. First, the Bush Administration believed that the countries opposed to the war in Iraq were not strong enough to prevent the United States from going to war. In fact, the United States realized that by applying pressure and using influence, those countries would change their position and probably join the

coalition forces. Second, the Bush Administration did not believe that the war would stir up anti-American sentiment. Unlike Al-Fayez and Al-Khathlan (author's interviews, 2004) who felt the United States failed to successfully promote the war against Iraq, Alnmalah (author's interview, 2004) differentiated between U.S. success in promoting the war against Iraq and U.S. failure to obtain a U.N. resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq. He believed that the United States had succeeded in promoting the war against Iraq and forming an international coalition but did so only through promise of financial aid, pressure, and intimidation. He did not think that the United States had failed to gain U.N. approval with an international consensus to launch a war against Iraq.

Because the United States failed to get U.N. approval, Turkey refused to allow U.S. troops to invade Iraq from across the Turkey border and refused to allow U.S. missiles to attack Iraq using Turkish airspace. Al-Ghamdi (author's interview, 2004) argued that the United States had succeeded in promoting the war against Iraq by pressure, influence, and the policy of accomplished fact. These three strategies were not always successful, though, and Turkey's resistance is an example of that.

U.S. successes in the liberation of Kuwait, the military actions in Bosnia and Kosovo, and the invasion of Afghanistan have given the Bush Administration confidence that it can dictate peace and maintain the world order by using military force. Michael Ledeen from the Enterprise Institute said, 'The best democracy program ever invented is the US Army' (Ledeen quoted in Palmer, 2003, p. 30). There are, however, serious questions about just how successful the United States has been, especially when considering the decline during the situation in 'post-war' Iraq.

The relative success of the United States in restoring peace in Afghanistan has been subject to debate as security issues arise (beginning from the second half of 2005, the operations carried out by the Taliban militants against U.S. troops in Afghanistan have witnessed sever increase) and drugs plantations flourish despite the toppling of the Taliban regime and the establishment of a pro-American regime. The United Nations previously acknowledged the Taliban's efforts to eliminate the drugs plantations.

On March 19, 2003, the United States and its allies launched the war against Iraq. It 'ended' on April 30, 2003. After the swift success in the war, and fall of Baghdad, the end of military operations was declared. The Bush Administration believed advisors, like Richard Perle, when they said that the Iraqi people would welcome the U.S. troops. Of course, this speculation turned out to be untrue (Daalder & Lindsay, 2003).

The U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq have 'inflicted havoc against the people of Iraq' (Fadel, author's interview, 2004). The U.S. casualties in the first four months after the end of the war were more than the casualties inflicted during the war itself. Total U.S. fatalities during the war was 139 soldiers; 149 soldiers were killed in the first four months after the end of the war (U.S. Department of Defense, 2006). Chaos, resistance, and depression have escalated since the invasion and occupation by United States and coalition forces began. Those launching the attack against Iraq have faced wide resistance by Al-Sadr militants (referring to the Shiite cleric Moqtada Al-Sadr and his militant Al-Mahdi Army) since April 2004 throughout Iraq but heaviest in the Sunni triangle and in Fallujah. The Iraqi militants have frequently seized cities in Iraq, like Al-Najaf in April 2004, Fallujah between April and November 2004, and

occasionally Samira, and sometimes parts of Baghdad. Iraqi anti-occupation militants have been gaining the support of the Iraqi people, who have been outraged by the U.S. occupation that has caused significant pain suffering and casualties for the Iraqi people. The Iraqi militants are willing to die defending their country; they seek to defeat and oust U.S. troops or die as 'martyrs' according to their beliefs. (The militants are not part of the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization which has sponsored violent operations against the Iraqi people). There have also been a series of kidnappings targeting foreigners. With the serial operations of foreigners kidnapping and bombings, many foreigner contractors have found it very difficult for them to continue their contracts especially that most of them could not move inside Iraq without armored cars and guarding (Ali, 2004).

The growing Iraqi resistance and the increasing number of casualties among U.S. troops have contributed to a drop in Bush's popularity to an approval rating of 40% and a disapproval rating of 56% — the lowest since he became president (The Gallup Organization, 2005). The Bush Administration was stunned by the Iraqi resistance and the ensuing quagmire of the post-war outcome which represents a totally different result than was predicted by the pro-war advocates in the White House (Al-Khathlan, author's interview, 2004). The Bush Administration deadlock in Iraq has diminished the American war on terror.

When the war was over, April 30, 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was established under Ambassador L. Paul Bremer. In July, 2003, the CPA formed the Iraqi Governing Council (GC), which included various representations from Iraq's political parties, religious sects, and ethnic groups, except for the Ba'ath

party which was the ruling party during Saddam Hussein's regime. The GC had only consultative duties (Diamond, 2004).

On August 19, 2003, a massive explosion occurred at the U.N. headquarters in Baghdad, causing the death of Sergio De Mello, the U.N. envoy in Iraq, and several U.N. personnel. The U.N. mission was limited to supervision of humanitarian aid. After the terrorist attack, the United Nations immediately withdrew the mission from Iraq (Diamond, 2004). Added to the problems of 'legitimacy,' the Bush Administration decided on November 15, 2003, to change its plan and move forward the plans to transfer authority and sovereignty to the Iraqis.

On June 28, 2004, the United States passed authority to an interim Iraqi government, choosing Ayad Allawi (ex-Ba'athist and CIA agent) to be prime minister (Ali, 2004). The appointees of the interim government represented all Iraqi ethnicities and religious sects, making the formation of the interim government very challenging because of debate among all the Iraqi parties about their relative portions in the interim government. The Iraqi interim government was set to function until the Iraqi election scheduled for January, 2005 (Diamond, 2004).

Attacks on U.S. troops have escalated steadily since shortly after the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Before he was captured, the United States attributed the resistant operations in Iraq to Saddam Hussein and his followers. After he was captured and his two sons Udai and Qusai were killed, the United States could no longer blame the operations on Saddam Hussein and his followers. Resistant operations increased because Iraqi militants were no longer restrained by being accused of working for Saddamists or Ba'athists (Al-Tayeb, author's interview, 2004). Also, the capture of

Saddam Hussein actually relieved Shiite fears of the chance of a return of former regime and, thus, increased resistance among Shiite militants (Al-Namlah, author's interview, 2004). With the growing violence of the resistance, insecurity, the high rate of unemployment, and fury among Iraqis toward the occupation and ensuing chaos, some of the Iraqi people have even yearned for the return of the former era, regardless of the dictatorial regime. As many Middle Eastern commentators pointed out, after his first show in the court, Saddam Hussein's popularity increased (Ali, 2004).

The attitudes of the Iraqi people toward the occupation have grown more negative as time has passed. According to surveys conducted in two different periods of times by the Iraqi Institute for Strategic Studies and Research, in October 2003, 67% described the U.S. and international coalition forces as 'occupiers' not liberators compared to 43% in the surveys that was conducted shortly after the defeat of Saddam Hussein in April 2003 (BBC, October 2003). Iraqi sentiment has never been considered by the Bush Administration in its decision to leave or stay in Iraq. U.S. interests in Iraq and the region are the driving force. It is Al-Tayeb's (author's interview, 2004) speculation that the United States will not repeat the Vietnam scenario and withdraw from Iraq because of the bloody resistance because the strategic goals of the United States in Iraq make it unacceptable for the Bush Administration to give up and leave. Al-Otaibi (author's interview, 2004) asserted that unexpected post-war conditions in Iraq will prompt the Bush Administration to pass authority and sovereignty to the Iraqis after guaranteeing America's influence on any future Iraqi government.

The Bush Administration refers to the Iraqi resistance as ‘insurgents’ and ‘terrorists.’ On August 3, 2005, President Bush said,

The violence in recent days in Iraq is a grim reminder of the enemies we face. These terrorists and insurgents will use brutal tactics because they're trying to shake the will of the United States of America. They want us to retreat (The White House, August 2005).

The Bush Administration has been confronted with organized resistance and guerrilla war. Iraqi militants have seized cities in Iraq. In the end of March 2004 Shiite cleric Mugtada Al-Sadr ordered his Al-Maahdi Army to resist and fight the coalition forces all over Iraq. When Fallujah was seized by Iraqi Sunni militants, U.S. troops and the Iraqi National Forces had to engage in a full-scale war to regain the city. U.S. operations against the Al-Mahdi Army and other Iraqi militants in Fallujah took a very heavy toll on both sides and devastated the infrastructure of the city (Diamond, 2004). According to the U.S. Department of Defense (2006), from the beginning of the war in Iraq through October 8, 2006, the number of deaths among U.S. forces reached 2,728 soldiers.

As of October 2006, the United States had failed to restore security for the Iraqi people. While the Iraqi people did not enjoy political democracy during Saddam Hussein’s reign, the post Hussein period has lacked both democracy and security. In an article published in *Foreign Affairs*, Larry Diamond (2004) described the situation in Iraq in the following manner:

Iraq today falls far short of what the Bush Administration promised. As a result of a long chain of U.S. miscalculations, the coalition occupation has left Iraq in far worse shape than it need have and has diminished the long-term prospects of democracy there. Iraqis, Americans, and other foreigners continue to be killed. What went wrong?’ (p.2).

Diamond asserted that the pro-war advocates in the Pentagon ignored the forewarnings of Middle Eastern experts in the U.S. Department who forecast the post-war problems that would occur. Their warnings were not heeded. After the end of the war in Iraq, the pro-war advocates began to realize their miscalculations of the post-war situation. Their assumption that the Iraqi people would 'welcome the liberators' was based on the advice of advisors like Richard Perle, who resigned after the war, and some Iraqis who had no insight into the Iraqi internal matters, like Ahmad Chalabi who left Iraq in 1956, when he was six years old, and never went back (Ahmad Chalabi was sentenced in absentia by a Jordanian court of frauds. He was also imputed after the war on Iraq of engaging in espionage for the interest of Iranian intelligence besides cases of corruption). Pro-occupation exiled Iraqis, like Chalabi, have been called Jackals by some Iraqis, according to Ali (2004). Ali was astonished that the American and British administrations were surprised to find that, after the invasion of Iraq, the majority people there were against the occupation. He wondered if the Americans hold 'a belief that Iraqis are a different or lower breed of people who might be happier under occupation?' (Ali, 2004, p. 2).

Iraqi hatred toward America can also be attributed to the accumulated suffering incurred by ten years of sanctions that caused the deaths of up to 1 million Iraqis. In addition, according to the *Lancet study* released in October 2004, the estimated number of deaths among Iraqi civilians is over 100,000 people. This is a very controversial figure, and the British government has promised to investigate (BBC, October, 2004). In addition to the human toll, there has been massive destruction of Iraq's infrastructure. The Iraqi people saw after the fall of Baghdad that the United

States was most concerned with protecting the oil fields. U.S. disregard for Iraq's treasures and museums, especially the Baghdad Museum that was looted and sabotaged, prompted many Iraqis to refer to the invading Americans as 'new Mongols' (Mongols invaded Baghdad in 1258, destroying almost everything, including the great library of Baghdad) (Ali, 2004).

The Bush Administration made two costly mistakes regarding post-war Iraq. First, it attempted to 'de-Ba'athify' Iraq. This was suggested by Saddam Hussein's opponents, with Ahmad Chalabi heading the 'de-Ba'athification' commission. The problem was that most Iraqi elites were members of the Ba'ath party. Many of them had left Iraq in exile, living in Syria, where some had begun to support and finance Iraqi militants.

The second mistake made in the post-war stage was the CPA decision to immediately dissolve the Iraqi Army, approximately one million soldiers. Many in the Iraqi military had been recruited by Iraq anti-occupation militants (Anthony, 2005). Most of the operations sponsored by Iraqi militants in the 'Sunni triangle' (Fallujah, Ba'aqobah, and Ramadi) are very technical operations, proving that the militants are not just foreigner fighters, but also sophisticated Iraqi ex-soldiers who can, for example, make booby traps and hunt helicopters (Diamond, 2004).

Some Middle Eastern commentators consider the U.S. war in Iraq not apart of the war on terrorism, but rather part of an American plan to reform the Middle East into the 'Greater Middle East,' the goal being regime change in other countries in the region like Iran and Syria. The alleged goal involves spreading democracy throughout the area.

### Democracy in the Middle East 'The Greater Middle East Initiative'

In his speech on the State of Union in January 2004, President Bush attributed terrorism to the existence of undemocratic regimes in the Middle East which provide a breeding ground for terrorists. This speech has implicitly added all undemocratic regimes to the U.S. lists of countries that support terrorism. Al-Fayez (author's interview, 2004) argued that this speech was an attempt to ethically justify U.S. intervention in the Middle East region.

The speech was written by Ambassador Mark Palmer, author of *Breaking the Real Axis of Evil: How to Oust the World's Last Dictators by 2025* (2003). The book has been considered one of the most important and controversial books published since 9/11. Palmer categorized countries in the world according to the annual analysis of Freedom House organization that divides countries into free, partially free, and not free. Palmer argued that of the 45 governments he identified as dictatorships, half of them (23) were in and around the Middle East. He suggested different strategies to support democracy, from using various types of sanctions to oust those identified as dictators, supporting internal opposition against regimes, and prosecuting dictators at The Hague Court. He also suggested creating a 'global democratic security structure or alliance' (p. 45). Al-Namlah (2004, author's interview) speculated that if the American model succeeds in Iraq, Palmer's book will be one of the most remarkable books of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

It should be noted that Ambassador Palmer was also a speechwriter for President Reagan. This may help explain Bush's ideological continuity with the Reagan Administration. President Reagan's speech at the British House of Parliament

in 1982 was about promoting democracy. Gormoly (author's interview, 2004) and Al-Kuaileet (author's interview, 2005) consider the 'Greater Middle East Initiative' to be a continuation of the policy of the Reagan Administration with new input by the neo-conservatives. Al-Kuaileet argued that the United States has two objectives in creating the 'Greater Middle East.' First, it would create a pro-American bloc to compete with Asia. Second it would melt the Arabic identity by creating a bloc of states with different cultural and religious backgrounds, including the Arab states, Israel, and Turkey.

From Palmer's (2003) point of view, democracy in the Middle East would guarantee Israel's security. Democratic Arab governments would be 'more tolerant' of Israel. Such an assessment is, arguably, too simplistic because it portrays the Arab-Israeli conflict as one between the Arab governments and Israel. However, the majority of people in the Arab world are less tolerant of Israel than their governments are.

In the early 2004, the Bush Administration announced its plan to reform and democratize the region in what has become known as 'the Greater Middle East Initiative.' Al-Kuaileet (author's interview, 2005) stated that the Bush Administration follows the 'Western' school of democracy, believing that democracy proceeds development. The 'Eastern' school holds that development comes before democracy, like in South Korea. Former Secretary of the Arab League Ismat Abdul Maguid (2005) argued that the United States wants to impose its vision of how to reform the Middle East without any appreciation for the legal and cultural framework of the region.

Abdulkarim Al-Dokhayel (author's interview, 2004), from King Saud University, argues that the United States has utilized the issue of democracy in the Arabian region, comparing it to the Europeans' utilization of the issue of freebooting in the 19<sup>th</sup> century to invade the Arabian region. However, there are many in the Middle East, like Al-Shamlan (author's interview, 2004), who argued that the United States will prevent the creation of democratic regimes in the Middle East if it contradicts with the interests of the United States. Others like Al-Jahni (author's interview, 2005) believe that the United States began to raise the issue of promoting democracy after its failure to find WMD in Iraq.

In *'The Clash of Civilizations,'* Samuel Huntington (2002) described the clash between Western civilization and other civilizations as a tribal clash in a global form, adding that cultural differences are the vital issue in these conflicts. In his book *'The Third Wave,'* Huntington discussed democratization as creating cultural convergence that would bridge the gap between Western civilization and other civilizations. The 'Greater Middle East' initiative seems like an attempt to apply Huntington recommendations of cultural convergence (Al-Hulwa, author's interview, 2004). Al-Rawaf (author's interview, 2004) believes that, part of its war on terror, the Bush Administration seeks to enforce political, social, and cultural reforms to observe extremism in the Middle Eastern societies. Some experts in U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East have argued that the Bush Administration actually seeks to reform Islam. Among those experts is Sadaka Fadel (author's interview, 2004) at King Abdulaziz University. It is his belief that the U.S. war on terrorism is designed to 'reshape Islam or modify it.'

Naim (2004) argued that with the U.S. occupation and operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq causing the deaths of thousands of people in both countries, any efforts by the United States to promote democratization will face public opposition. The people look with suspicion and hatred toward any action taken by the United States. Naim gave a logical analysis of how the U.S. initiative regarding democratization in the Middle East has been perceived.

Lurid news stories about warlordism in Afghanistan and bloody chaos in Iraq give a daily boost to misgivings about exporting democracy. Of course, U.S. leaders will continue to wax rhapsodic about America's historical commitment to democracy abroad and how entire peoples are waiting for the United States to help them gain political freedom. Yet the same leaders remain silent about what they will do in strong likelihood that rabidly anti-American fundamentalists could come to power in free and fair elections in Muslim countries (p. 2).

While the Bush Administration has claimed that the occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq has been necessary to protect democratization and freedom, others have a different view. Many Middle Eastern commentators and experts in U.S. foreign policy have discussed the economic factors of the American war on terrorism. Here idealism gives away to materialism.

### Economic Aspects of the U.S. War on Terror

In Afghanistan, which represented the first stage of the U.S. war on terrorism, economic factors were subject to wide debate as American oil companies established business during the first weeks of the war while they were also fighting terrorism. In his study, *The Red Template: US Policy in Soviet-Occupied Afghanistan (2002)*, Andrew Hartman claimed that 'US policy in Afghanistan, consistent with US policy elsewhere both during and after the Cold War, is geared to protect US private power

and thus US access to oil' (p.467). According to Brisard and Dasquie (2002), in July 2001, two months before the 9/11 attacks, an American delegation met with Pakistani officials, acting as representatives of the Taliban regime. The Americans wanted the Taliban to permit them to build a \$3 billion oil pipeline, starting from the Caspian Basin and crossing Afghani land to the sea. The Taliban refused. The U.S. Department of State has denied these claims. In a CNN interview in January 2002, Former U.N. Chief Inspector Richard Butler said, 'I don't think we're being told all of the facts. There are denials, claims that meeting didn't take place, when clearly they did' (CNN, January 2002). Before 9/11, the Taliban regime was given an ultimatum by the United States to hand over Osama Bin-Laden and 'agree to the pipeline' (Brissard & Dasquie, 2002, p. 1). Three weeks after the beginning of the war in Afghanistan, the United States began doing business with the new Afghani government, laying pipelines from energy sources in Central and West Asia through Afghani lands. Dumbrell (2002) believed that America's task in Afghanistan changed from a war to bring 'terrorists' to justice to a permanent presence to secure oil in Central Asia, 'The American establishment of apparently semi-permanent bases in Central Asia seemed to reflect more a desire to enhance the security of oil supplies than a move to bring to justice the perpetrators of the 11 September attacks' (p. 285). In 1998, before becoming vice-president and while CEO of Halliburton Energy Services, Dick Cheney said, 'I cannot think of a time when we have had a region emerge as suddenly to become as strategically important as the Caspian' (Booth, 2002, p. 15).

Since the beginning of the war in Iraq, the economic factor has been the subject of debate among commentators and experts on U.S. foreign policy. The stability of the Middle East, which contains approximately 76% of the world's oil reserves, affects the world oil market. U.S. concern over soaring oil prices has increased as has oil consumption in America. Since 9/11 and up until the time of writing (June, 2006), oil prices have greatly increased to over \$70 (the highest prices ever). High oil prices have caused problems in the American economy, which was already suffering from recession and the expense of the war against terrorism in both Afghanistan and Iraq (Fennell, 2002). The U.S. interest in Gulf oil is not only about keeping a smooth flow of oil at a reasonable price, but also about utilizing oil as a tool for pressuring any nation that poses a threat to U.S. hegemony (Gormoly, author's interview, 2004). Al-Namlah (author's interview, 2004) argued that Gulf oil is an influential factor in U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, even more important to the United States than its relationship with Israel because it is one of the factors absolutely necessary for the permanent maintenance of U.S. superiority and the best way to pressure countries like China. Aware of U.S. efforts to control the oil fields in Iraq, European governments began to help the Russian government develop the gas and oil fields in Russia, seeking independence from Middle East oil and freedom from future pressure by the United States if it completely controls the oil fields in the Middle East (Al-Dokhayel, author's interview, 2004). Thus, Middle Eastern intellectuals and commentators, like Al-Sayad (author's interview, 2004) from Naif University in Riyadh, believe that the U.S. war on terrorism is a pretext to achieving an economic object in the Middle East, mainly control of oil.

Former U.S. Department of Defense adviser, Charles V. Pe-a, believes that oil is a vital issue for U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. Latest numbers in the year 2002 indicates that the United States imports 25.7 % of its consumed oil from the Middle East. Therefore, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (2003) asserts that the Gulf region is, indeed, the most difficult region in the world for the United States to deal with. The Arabian Gulf (Persian Gulf) has approximately 67% of the world proven oil reserves (Fennell, 2002). Moreover, the costs of oil production in the Gulf oil fields are cheaper than costs of oil productions in all over the world. For example, the costs of oil production in the Gulf oil fields are between 10-20% of the one in Russia. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia (as one of the Gulf states) that produces around 15% of the world oil production is the only country that has the capacity to cover any deficient in the world oil supplies as it did during the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. Saudi Arabia produced two million barrels extra (besides the eight million barrels that it produce daily) to maintain the normal oil prices during the U.S. invasion of Iraq (Pollack, 2003).

It has been argued that the economic interests of the United States are one of the main reasons for the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq. This economic interest is not based on the U.S. looting Iraq's oil fields as many have argued. Instead it involves a network of joint interests among large U.S. industries that have great influence on U.S. foreign policy. This network includes the weapons and American oil industries and other U.S. corporations. With the current U.S. war on terror, the Bush Administration sees the U.S. huge military expenditures justifiable. The United States alone spends \$518.1 billion, approximately 50% of the world's military

expenditures (CIA, 2005). The attacks of 9/11 have strengthened Bush's proposal for NMD (National Missile Defense), which replaced Reagan's project 'Star Wars' (Crockatt, 2003).

The connections the Bush Administration has to the oil industry cannot go unnoticed. President Bush, Vice President Cheney, and Secretary of State Rice have all held executive positions in the industry. Bush once owned an oil company, Cheney ran one, and Rice is a former director of Chevron (Fennell, 2002). According to Bennis (2003), when Vice President, Dick Cheney, was the CEO of Halliburton Energy Services, he made contracts for multi-millions dollars with the Iraqi regime, and he was, also, against the U.S. sanctions on Iran. The American oil corporations look forward to the privatization of the Iraqi oil industry which, if it happened, would yield a large amount of money for American oil companies which have experienced a decrease in oil reserves (Zizek, 2004). According to Ali (2004), a 'secret plan' regarding the privatization of Iraqi oil was published in the *Financial Times* in February 2003. The article stated that the goal was to enable Western oil companies to buy shares of Iraqi oil.

To achieve its objective in disarming the Iraqi regime from WMD, the United States created an international coalition. However, the post-Iraq outcome revealed that the war was not about WMD (Merdad, author's interview, 2004). The U.S. failure to find WMD after the war in Iraq has made many Middle Eastern observers focused on exploring the U.S. motivation of invasion Iraq, which became subject to debate in the Middle East and increased people's anger toward the U.S. war and occupation of Iraq not only in the Middle East, but worldwide (Lynch, 2003).

There was, of course, evidence of economic motivation for the U.S. war on terror. Iraq has almost 11 % of the world's oil reserves. British Labour MP Alan Simpson believed that the U.S. invasion of Iraq was not for justice, but for oil (Fennell, 2002). A few weeks after the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, U.S. Deputy Minister of Defense Paul Wolfowitz was in Singapore, and he was asked why America invaded Iraq instead of North Korea, which surely possessed WMD. He said, 'Let's look at it simply. The most important difference between North Korea and Iraq is that economically, we just had no choice in Iraq. The country swims on a sea of oil' (Ali, 2004, p. 152).

Before the war, Iraq's oil production was around one million barrels per day. The Iraqi quota of oil produced compared to its actual reserves (the world's second largest oil reserves— 113, 8 billion barrels) was quite low (Saudi Arabia produces 10 billion barrel a day). If Iraq had the financial capability, it would probably be able to multiply its production to three times the current quota within a short period of time. The United States, according to Fennell (2002), would prefer to rely on Iraqi oil instead of Saudi Arabian oil, which now represents approximately 15.25 % of its oil supply. The United States wants Iraq to raise its oil production to between five and seven million barrels a day to increase supply and lower prices. Such an increase, from the American perspective, could enable the United States to either control OPEC or cause it to collapse (Fennell, 2002).

After the collapse of the Iraqi regime in April 2003, the United States announced that countries not on the list of the 'coalition of the willing' would not be allowed to participate in the reconstruction of Iraq and would not be given any

contract. When South Korea was given 100 contracts, its president remarked that if his government had not enrolled in the U.S.-led coalition in the war against Iraq, getting these contracts would have not been possible (Ali, 2004).

One of the American scandals arising after war in Iraq involved a company with very close ties to Vice President Cheney. Halliburton Energy Services was granted questionable contracts in Iraq without providing competitive bids. Part of that debate was over the price that Halliburton had charged the Pentagon for fuel in Iraq. It charged the Pentagon \$2.64 per gallon when, in fact, the actual market price was 71 cents per gallon (Ali, 2004).

Even though most of the Iraqi people are greatly relieved that Saddam Hussein's regime is gone, most of them are convinced that the United States did not come to Iraq to sacrifice 2,728 soldiers and spend monthly over \$3.9 billion to liberate Iraq (Ali, 2004), (Naim, 2004). They consider oil to be the main factor in the U.S. decision to invade Iraq. They actually look at the occupation of Iraq as an Anglo-American colonization of Iraq to profit from its wealth (Diamond, 2004). Many people in the Arab world wonder if America would really care to liberate the people of Cuba, Zimbabwe, or even North Korea, for example.

When the coalition forces invaded Iraq, the first thing they did was to secure the oil fields, but not care, for example, about the Iraqi museums, such as Baghdad Museum that contained antiquities over 3500 years old, which had been looted and sabotaged (Ali, 2004). The Bush Administration was not bothered about all that. Instead, after the fall of Baghdad (the capital city of Iraq), the United States signed contracts with some American companies for the rehabilitation of the Iraqi oil fields.

Halliburton was immediately offered contracts for the rehabilitation and re-operation of the Iraqi oil fields.

### The Bush Administration and Unilateralism in Foreign Policy

Middle Eastern experts on U.S. foreign policy have been divided over whether the United States is unilateral or multilateral. There are some commentators like Alrawf and Al-Hulwa (author's interviews, 2004) who believed that the United States is more multilateral than unilateral in its approach to the war against terrorism, noting the American-led coalition in the war in Afghanistan and Iraq and the sharing of intelligence and military bases between the United States and other countries. Al-Rawaf argued that the current active use of unilateralism in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy has been driven by political, economic, and cultural factors, with the Bush Administration having taken upon itself the right to unilaterally use force to maintain world order and security. Al-Shamlan (author's interview, 2004), on the other hand, asserted that the Bush Administration has used both multilateralism and unilateralism and depending on the circumstances confronted. When the United States failed to get approval for a U.N. resolution authorizing the multilateral use of force against Iraq, the Bush Administration chose to take a unilateral approach, created an 'international coalition' that did little than give the appearance of a multilateral action.

While the United States moved forward unilaterally in the war against Iraq, after the war ended, it made another move in the United Nations for multilateral peacekeeping, such as the case in Balkans. This U.S. approach changed as U.S. forces experienced increased resistance and attacks and the number of casualties climbed.

The United States asked for a multinational force to be sent to maintain security in Iraq, but the opposition at the United Nations, led by France, prevented the American proposal from being passed (Dunne, 2003).

The United States has become subject to intense international condemnation for its unilateral approach to the war on terrorism. The U.S. use of unilateralism has made it subject to both national and international pressures, mainly from Europe. Al-Otaibi (author's interview, 2004) attributed the excessive use of unilateralism by the Bush Administration since 9/11 to its effort to consolidate U.S. hegemony. He described the coalition formed by the United States in the war against Iraq as an attempt to give the appearance of legitimacy to the war. This is supported by U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's commitment before the war that the United States could go to war against Iraq without allies.

Naim (2003) attributed the surge of international opposition to the United States to the Bush Administration's failure to communicate with the international community and to honestly and effectively promote U.S. actions. The Bush Administration's announcement of the U.S. ability to unilaterally engage in unlawful military action against Iraq totally disregards the United Nations, international law, and the international community. Al-Tayeb (author's interview, 2004) has stated that the excessive use of unilateralism by the Bush Administration has inflamed and increased terrorism. In the summer of 2004, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan described the U.S. action as an 'illegal war.' Annan's remark was denounced by the Bush Administration without any consideration of his right to clarify the U.N. position regarding world matters and conflicts.

According to Byers (2002), after 9/11, the United States rejected the offer of a U.N. resolution authorizing the use of force against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations John Negroponte wrote to the President of the Security Council on October 7, 2001, 'We may find our self-defense requires further actions with respect to other organizations and other states' (p. 124). The statement made by the U.S. Ambassador implied that the United States had decided to launch an open-ended war against what it considered a threat to its security, claiming self-defense without regard for the United Nations and international law. Article 51 of the U.N. Charter states that any act of self-defense must be reported to the Security Council, but it does not explain the extent or the content of that right of self-defense. The United Nations does not have the means to enforce its rules and regulations, abiding by its framework is a matter of moral and decency. The United Nations is practically incapable of reinforcing international law unless the United States agrees and is also incapable of obligating the United States to work under the umbrella of the United Nations.

Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, the Bush Administration was prepared to expand its military presence all over the world, even without allied support. The day after the attacks, the members of NATO voted (for the first time in its history) to consider the attack of 9/11 as an attack on all members and apply the mutual defense language in Article Five of the Charter. The United States made a list of 'specific requests' for military assistance, access to ports, and the use of early-warning crafts and facilities of the NATO members but would not consult with the members on military decision-making issues. Secretary of State Colin Powell clearly stated that

the alliance with NATO would not restrain U.S. 'military decision making' (Bennis, 2003). President Bush also, according to (Dunn, 2003), told his advisors that 'US strategies were not open to debate' (p. 284).

There is concern in Europe regarding the excessive use of force by the United States in the war on terrorism and Bush's doctrine of 'preemptive war.' There is also French and German apprehension about American abuse of NATO, using the organization to carry out policies that serve U.S. interests. French President, Jacques Chirac was the first European leader to visit the United States after 9/11. He expressed solidarity with the United States, offering the participation of French troops in any military action against those who were behind the attacks. Chirac did wonder though, if 'war' was the correct word to be used. Germany had concerns similar to France against using the word 'war.' The Bush Administration did not ask those countries to participate in the ground combat in Afghanistan (Crockatt, 2003). The French, in particular, have sought to create a European identity independent of American influence by pursuing policies toward Iraq that represent a European vision.

Al-Dokhayel (author's interview, 2004) differentiated between the European attitude toward the U.S. war on terror during the first stage in Afghanistan and the attitude during the war against Iraq, when a European position of the U.S. war on terrorism emerged. When Iraq was invaded in March 2003, the Foreign Minister of Germany, Joschka Fischer, wondered 'What kind of world order do we want?' (Kagan, 2004, p. 1). The French Foreign Minister, Dominique de Villepin, argued that the disagreement between the United States and the countries who opposed the war is not just about Iraq but about 'two visions of the world,' unilateralism and

multilateralism (Albright, 2003, p. 4). According to Kagan (2004), most European governments consider the war in Iraq as a part of an American 'unilateral' vision of world order with which they disagree. Europeans, especially the French, want the United Nations to have a major role in world matters. The American-European disagreement regarding world order existed before 9/11, but the divergence between the two powers has grown deeper and wider since 9/11.

Al-Khathlan (author's interview, 2004), would argue that, despite the unilateralism of the Bush Administration, it did allow allies like Britain, Italy, and Spain to have some degree of involvement in the decision making. For example, on March 14, 2003, a week before the war against Iraq began, President Bush joined British Prime Minister Tony Blair and Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar at Azores air base (Portugal) in the eastern-Atlantic to discuss and decide on a final strategy (The White House, March 2003).

The United States did need other countries to assist in the war against terrorism, not necessarily with military forces but with intelligence and the use of military bases. To gain cooperation from other states, the United States had to convince its allies that the actions taken were necessary for world security. Public pressure in Europe was intense. In Spain, Prime Minister Aznar went against the will of the people (over 80% of the people in Spain opposed the war) and lost re-election in March 2004. The election was preceded by the massive terrorist bomb attacks on Madrid's trains. Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for the attacks as punishment for Spain's participation in U.S.-led war against Iraq. Immediately after assuming office,

the new Spanish Prime Minister, Jose Luis Zapatero, ordered Spanish troops to withdraw from Iraq in April 2004 (Schwarz, 2005).

Cox (2002) indicated that the Bush Administration doctrine is based on the use of force and the belief that world order can only be stabilized by the unilateral actions of a superpower state. This policy became more obvious and consolidated after 9/11. One of the leading 'hawks' in the administration is Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. He has said many times that the United States could act by itself (referring to the war in Iraq) and does not need partners. 'The United States does not need allies to win the war' (Smith, 2002, p. 57). Rumsfeld, arguably, placed the British Prime Minister Tony Blair in a weak position during the preparation for the war against Iraq. While Blair was trying to convince the British parliament to go to war, Rumsfeld was stating in a conference that the United States can go to war without Britain.

Rumsfeld, has also claimed that the United States has acted multilaterally, saying that 36 countries have been participating in the war on terrorism in different ways, such as with intelligence and diplomatic cooperation. These, of course, are beyond the scope of unilateralism and require participation by other countries. This type of 'American multilateralism' lacks the most important factor in any alliance— participation in the decision-making.

The 'hawk' philosophy stated that the interests of the United States supersede the interests of other countries. According to Cox (2002), one of the Rumsfeld team commented that the Secretary of Defense and his team are 'believers in unilateral American military power' (p. 160). Cox speculated that if this 'unilateral' policy succeeded in the short term, the future of U.S. foreign policy would change. However,

the Bush Administration tended to describe itself as 'multilateral.' Former Secretary of State Colin Powell said, 'Nobody's calling us unilateral anymore. That's kind of gone away for the time being; we're so multilateral it keeps me up 24 hours a day checking on everybody' (Dumbrell, 2002, p. 285).

There were two conflicting approaches to foreign policy inside the Bush Administration. The multilateral approach was favored by former Secretary of State Colin Powell, Paula Dobrianisky at the State Department, and Stephen Hadley, Deputy National Security Adviser at the White House. They believed that any U.S. domination would have to be supported by international consensus. In a published interview in September 10, 2001, Powell said, 'You can't be unilateralist. The world is too complicated' (Dumbrell, 2002, p. 284). The unilateral approach was championed by such 'hawks' as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz (current President of the World Bank), and John Bolton, former Undersecretary of State (current U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations). They believe in the unilateral use of the mighty U.S. power. They have been supported by American neo-conservatives and members of the political right-wing, who believe that unilateralism is the 'rational choice' (Khazen, 2005).

#### The Bush Administration's Problem with International Law

There are two types of interactions in world politics. The first type is 'reactive,' like the polarization policy. The second type is 'organizational,' a country interacts and accommodates to the rules and regulations of international organizations and seeks change by passing new laws or modifying regulations (Merdad, author's

interview, 2004). Merdad argued that the United States considers itself the sponsor of international legality and assumes the authority to use unilateral action in defense of it. He added that the United States relies on loopholes to legalize any action that serves its interests and contradicts international laws. In the case of Iraq, the United States insisted that the U.N. resolution authorizing the work of the weapons inspectors also authorized the use of force, if necessary. The U.S. perception contradicted the U.N. interpretation of the resolution, when U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan stated in the summer of 2004, that the United Nations considered the U.S. war and occupation of Iraq to be illegal. When the United States could not get the United Nations to sanction the use of force against Iraq, it employed pressure and influence to encourage many countries to participate in the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq (Al-Hulwa, author's interview, 2004). This was clearly pointed out by Al-Otaibi (author's interview, 2004).

The United States appears to believe that it has the right to interpret international law according to its vision, values, and interests. For instance, when the United States failed to gain support for a U.N. resolution authorizing war against Iraq, some U.S. officials said that a new U.N. resolution was unnecessary. There were, however, reasons for U.S. concern about a U.N. resolution. First, it would legalize the war in Iraq and quell the concerns of countries that were hesitant to engage in physical or financial participation in the war. Second, the Bush Administration knew it would be difficult to gain international recognition of any American-appointed Iraqi government after the war. Third and most important, as Al-Rawaf (author's interview, 2004) pointed out, the Bush Administration was facing internal opposition by legal

groups and organization in the United States for violating the U.S. constitution, human rights principles, and international law.

After Bush declared war on terror, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan spoke to the U.N. General Assembly on September 24, 2001, and clearly stated, 'This organization is the natural forum in which to build such a universal coalition. It alone can give global legitimacy to the long-term struggle against terrorism' (United Nations, September 2001). The U.S. response to Annan's speech was developed by a State Department official, who said,

The United States welcomes a more active UN role as long as it does not interfere with America's right to use military force . . . we don't think we need any further authorization for what we may have to do to get the people that murdered American citizens (p. 107).

While the United States was trying to legitimize the war against Iraq through the United Nations, the international community was asking many questions about the U.S. actions.

Where would it lead? Where would it end? Was Afghanistan the beginning of a permanent war? What were the war aims of the coalition? What were its policies in Afghanistan? Did the events of September 11 confirm, as some in the U.S. asked, the existence of fundamentalist international? Did they signify the 'clash of civilizations'? Or, on the contrary, did they represent the latest and most lethal confrontation between the global North and the disarrayed states of the South that was to be justified in the name of a new cold war? (Gendzier, 2002, p. 594).

There is much controversy about the international legality of U.S. actions after 9/11. Without U.N. authorization, the United States launched wars against Afghanistan and Iraq and threatened other countries (Syria and Iran), announcing that they might be subject to U.S. military action as part of the 'war on terrorism.' The United States has steadfastly claimed that the wars were conducted within the

framework of international legality. Between 9/11 and the beginning of the war in Afghanistan, the United Nations passed two resolutions, neither of which legalized the use of force against Afghanistan. Resolution 1368 passed September 12, 2001, condemned the attacks and decided 'to remain seized of the matter,' (means no actions taken) (United Nations, September 2001). Resolution 1373, passed September 28, 2001, emphasized the right of self-defense in its preamble but did not authorize the use of force under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. The United Nations did not authorize the use of force in Iraq, either.

Even though the United States has claimed that Iraq is a threat to the states of the Middle East and to the United States, North Korea poses a greater danger to the United States, having threatened to attack American soil. Many people and intellectuals within the United States believed that the Iraqi threat was less than that of North Korea. Al-Namlah (author's interview, 2004) speculated that North Korea would be more likely to export WMD technology to anti-American regimes, especially after Bush's Axis of Evil speech. However, the Middle East has proved to be the central focus of the Bush Administration, taking advantage of 9/11 as reasonable ground of self-defense to launch wars against other states, like Iran and Syria who have been threatened by the United States. Both countries have been accused by the United States of supporting terrorism. After the war in Iraq, the Iranian nuclear capability was brought to sight by the Bush Administration. In regard to Syria, the United States has taken several actions against Assad's regime like the 'Syria Accountability Act' that was passed by the U.S. Congress in October 2003 (U.S. Department of State, 2003).

The United States has claimed the right to launch a war, in 'self defense' against any country that is theoretically considered foe. Article 51 of the U.N. Charter stipulates that it is the responsibility of a country claiming self-defense to inform the Security Council of any response to 'an armed attack.' Thus, the U.N. Charter defines 'self-defense' as action in response to 'an armed attack.' The action of the United States against Iraq does not agree with the U.N. position (Bennis, 2003). Booth and Dunne (2002) declared that a U.S. victory over terror will not be possible without U.S. commitment to international law and human rights. The U.S. Department of State, for instance, releases every year its own list of countries that violate the human rights principles when, in fact, the United States itself has been in the Amnesty top list for human rights violations. The Amnesty report, for example, condemns the detention of 1,200 foreigners inside the United States since September 11, the abusing and torture of Iraqi prisoners such as Abu Gharib scandal (which was condemned by U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan in his address to the General Assembly on September 21, 2004), the inhumane condition of over 600 detainees in Guantanamo Bay, reports of police brutality in America, and the 'ill-treatments' in prisons (Amnesty Report, 2004).

Defining terrorism and human rights are two issues about which the United States has adopted a double standard. According to Alkathlan (author's interview, 2004), the United States has refused the international community's call for a definition of 'terrorism' since the events of 9/11 and before the beginning of the war on terrorism. The United States avoided a clear cut definition of the term in order to maintain the option to change and modify the meaning to suit its national interests

(Gormoly, author's interview, 2004). Mogaiad (author's interview, 2005) speculated that, in a uni-polar world, the United States would seek to keep 'terrorism' undefined, as it would better serve American interests. Human rights has long been a major issue in U.S. foreign policy, with vociferous and righteous condemnation of those governments that routinely violate human right. However, the contemporary history of U.S. foreign policy reveals a contradiction between 'presumed' and 'actual' U.S. foreign policy. For example, during the Soviet-Afghan war, when Pakistan was accused by human rights organizations of violations, the U.S. Secretary of State at that time, Alexander Haig, told the Pakistani government 'your internal situation is your problem' (Hartman, 2002, p. 478). Like the issues of human rights, the U.S. abuse of the term terrorism is well documented. For example, when the United States was rallying to form international coalition in the Second Gulf War (1991) against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the United States crossed out Syria from the U.S. list of state sponsored terrorism, but re-inserted it in the list when the war was over. That reveals how the term has been politicized and utilized by the U.S. administrations as a card of pressure regardless of terrorism itself as an issue.

U.S. abuse of the term 'terrorism' to justify its actions is subject to argument, especially in the Arab and Muslim worlds. In a personal interview with Sheikh Saleh Bin-Hemaid, the Chairman of Majlis Ash'shura (the Saudi Parliament) in January 2004, he described the term terrorism as a pretext to justify U.S. military action against other states, which the United States wants it to remain undefined. He also asserted that U.S. actions in the Middle East, mainly the invasion of Iraq, were not actually to prevent terrorism, but to serve U.S. interests. Al-Ghamdi and Al-Khathlan

(author's interviews, 2004) agreed that the international controversy over the definition of terrorism is advantageous to U.S. policymakers, as they can modify the definition to best suit U.S. needs.

Former U.S. diplomat, John Habib (2003), argued that Bush's definition of 'state-sponsored terrorism' applied to actions of the United States— U.S. financial and military aid to the Nicaraguan Contras and to the Cuban Americans during the invasion of Cuba. Assassination has been used as a strategy by successive U.S. administrations. Several assassination attempts against the Cuban President Fidel Castro and the air raid against Libyan President Moammar Ghadafi were sponsored by the CIA and the Pentagon. The United States has sponsored covert CIA operations to overthrow several governments— the Mossaddeq regime of Iran in 1953, Argentina in 1975, and a failed attempt against President Hugo Chavez in Venezuela in 2002 (Ali, 2004). The United States has also supported coups to overthrow governments, like its support of Pinochet in Chile (1973), Zia-ul-Huq in Pakistan (1977), and even Saddam Hussein in Iraq (1979). These U.S.-sponsored operations were never considered terrorism by the Americans, whereas, for example, the Iranian and Syrian support of Palestinian resistance groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad who operate within the area of conflict in Palestine have been always brought up by the U.S. administration as international terrorism. Kolko (2002) described U.S. sponsorship of terrorism as one of the reasons why America was attacked.

During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan between 1979 and 1989, the United States financed and trained the Islamic Mujahidin. Kolko (2002) wondered why the

United States has suddenly discovered that the Mujihadin, who were considered as freedom fighters in the past have just become terrorists.

Before the war in Iraq, the United States portrayed Iraq as a rogue nation in possession of WMD. The weapons allegation was based on a flimsy report by the CIA and turned out to be untrue. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell admitted on April 2, 2004, that the evidence about Iraqi efforts to develop biological weapons that he presented to the U.N. Security Council in February 2003 to justify war against Iraq was not based on solid bases (BBC, 2004).

Another justification for the war against Iraq was the Iraqi regime's poor record on human rights and the repression of its own people. Tucker (2004) argued, 'Bush accepted in principle the legitimacy of war against any government failing a democratic litmus test' (p. 3). This unprecedented doctrine proclaimed by the Bush Administration has been subject to wide debate as it threatens many regimes in the world. This American doctrine begs answers to several questions. Does the Bush Administration really care about democracy? Saddam Hussein had a positive relationship with the United States in the 1980's, at a time when his regime was most repressive. Why was Iraq the target and not the closest neighbor, Cuba? How much more can U.S. allies accommodate the Bush Administration? Most of the world now considers the United States in a much less positive light compared to times past when the nation was admired worldwide.

Dunn (2003) claimed that the explicit attempts by the Bush Administration to give priority to U.S. interests over 'international norms and institutions is well documented.' The United States sees itself as the idealistic international model of

democracy, freedom, and values which all countries should imitate (Dunn). However, the United States has its own interpretation of international law and its own level of commitment to international treaties. Thus, it seeks to enforce treaties, international laws, and U.N. resolutions only when they match its interests. When they do not serve the interests of the United States, it rejects them and refuses any kind of enforcement. For example the Bush Administration rejected international treaties, such as the 1972 Pact on small arms, the Kyoto Protocol, and the International Criminal Court (ICC) (Daalder & Lindsay, 2003). When the United States decided to reject the International Criminal Court treaty, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated that the ICC would 'necessarily complicate U.S. military cooperation' (United States Mission to the European Union, May 2006). Why would Rumsfeld expect that the treaty to 'complicate' U.S. military operations, unless he expected violations by U.S. forces?

The main reason for the U.S. invasion of Iraq, according to the United States, was Iraqi noncompliance with the U.N. resolution regarding disarmament. The U.S. pretense of going to war to enforce U.N. resolutions when a country does not comply does not apply in the case of Israel, which has refused to comply with U.N. resolutions 181, 194, 242, 338, and 425. It has only applied to countries like Libya, Iraq, and Sudan, for example. Will the United States which has been pressuring Iran to unveil its nuclear capabilities, force Israel to be inspected and disarmed from WMD? Certainly, the Arab nations consider an Israeli nuclear capability to be a threat to their existence. This exception of Israel is an example of the American double standard in foreign policy (Sterner, 1990).

The United States tends to disregard U.N. resolutions and reports by international institution/organizations when they do not agree with U.S. foreign policy. For example, when the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported in November 2003 that 'To date there is no evidence that (Iran's) previously undeclared nuclear material and activities referred to above were related to a nuclear weapons program,' Undersecretary of State John Bolton described the IAEA report as 'impossible to believe' (CNN, November 2003). It seems that the United States considered the United Nations an instrument of U.S. foreign policy, even before 9/11. John Bolton, the Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security (and one of the hawks in the Bush Administration) became the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations in summer of 2005. Before he became the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, he said,

There is no United Nations. There is an international community that occasionally can be led by the only real power left in the world, and that is the United States, when it suits our interest, and when we can get others to go along . . . When the United States leads, the United Nations will follow. When it suits our interest to do so, we will do so. When it does not suit our interests we will not (Bolton quoted in Bennis, 2003, p. 218).

It is a big mistake for us to grant any validity to international law even when it may seem in our short-term interest to do so— because, over the long term, the goal of those who think that international law really means anything are those who want to constrict the United States (Bolton quoted in Tucker, 2004, p. 3).

Such statements reveal how some U.S. officials look at the United Nations. They consider it an 'instrument' that can be used to legalize U.S. actions, as in the case with Iraq.

After 9/11, the United States paid off its debts to the United Nations which raised many questions in regard to America's motivations (Crockatt, 2003). With

increasing resistance in Iraq and increasing national and international pressure on the United States regarding the legitimacy of its actions, the Bush Administration began to court the United Nations, calling on them to play a greater role in Iraq. This movement by the Bush Administration could also be attributed to U.S. failure to control the situation in Iraq and maintain security. The problem as Diamond argued (2004), the United States lacks legitimacy in Iraq, which has crippled to establish control and security.

The problem of legitimacy moved the Bush Administration to decide on November 15, 2003, to change its plan and transfer authority and sovereignty to the Iraqis sooner than expected. According to Diamond, when U.S. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice (now Secretary of State) was empowered by President Bush to handle the Iraqi matter, she sought to convince the United Nations to send its mission back to Iraq and assume the role of mediator (the United Nations, as mentioned earlier, pulled out its mission from Iraq after the bombing of the U.N. headquarters in Baghdad that caused the death of Sergio De Mello [the U.N. envoy in Iraq] and several U.N. personnel). The United Nations agreed and sent its envoy, Lakhdar Brahimi in February, 2004. He was instrumental in the formation of the Iraqi interim government.

The problem of legitimacy that America has experienced in Iraq has actually worsened the situation there and damaged the U.S. reputation worldwide. The Abu-Gharib scandal (where people all over the world saw pictures of American soldiers committing sexual abusing and tortures against Iraqi prisoners) accelerated the erosion of U.S. legitimacy in Iraq. To prevent it from becoming tourist attraction in the future

showing American atrocities in Iraq (like the German concentration camps), the United States demolished Abu-Gharib prison (Ali, 2004). The United States seems unwilling to admit its violations of international law and its lack of legitimacy in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Rather, it has its own interpretation of international laws designed to legitimize its actions, prompting Tucker (2004) to argue that legitimacy is 'rooted in opinion.' Of course, that explains the U.S. opinionated position in interpreting international law according to its view and dismissing the interpretation of the United Nations, the war in Iraq is an example of that. The American own-interpretation of legitimacy had actually emerged in 1945 when the United States played major role in the creation of the United Nations and then made itself the guardian of this organization and its principles. Tucker speculates that the United States will not be able to restore legitimacy unless it 'abandons the doctrines and practices that brought it to this pass' (p. 2).

The United States has been accused of applying double standard in its foreign policy. This double standard affected U.S. relations with various regimes, leading to support for some dictators and the denunciation of others. Former U.S. diplomat, John Habib (2003) assessed the relationship between the United States and dictatorial regimes saying,

The United States and dictatorships cooperated to achieve their own narrow objectives. The United States ignored their oppression and their corruption because they could be manipulated and they could make arbitrary decisions, without consulting their people, something not possible with regimes that were accountable to their citizenry. In turn the dictatorships were rewarded with a degree of international legitimacy and respectability and were allowed to remain in power (p. 62-63).

U.S. administrations have been mute regarding U.S. violations of international law, and ultimately have sought to legalize its wrongdoings. During the war in Afghanistan, the United States bombed a castle where Afghan prisoners of war were detained. Most of them were killed. Those who survived, in violation of the Geneva Convention on prisoners of war, were shipped to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (an American territory) and held in outdoor cages. This treatment was condemned by the international community and human rights organizations. According to the U.S. Department of State (2002), President Bush decided to consider the Taliban fighters in Guantanamo Bay as prisoners of war. The Mujahdieen prisoners were classified 'unlawful combatants.'

During the U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, many international television networks, especially Al-Jazeera, presented disturbing pictures and video tapes of civilian casualties caused by B-52 carpet bombing. For example, people in the Arab world were outraged by pictures of approximately 100 civilians killed in a wedding in Afghanistan by U.S. air attacks. In a published study, *A Dossier on Civilian Victims of United States Aerial Bombing of Afghanistan*, Marc Harold, an American professor, estimated the number of civilian casualties in Afghanistan in the first nine weeks of the war was 3767 (Hartman, 2002).

In Iraq, the United States condemned the Iraqi regime for videotaping the American prisoners of war and demanded they follow the guidelines of the Geneva Convention. The United States, however, videotaped the capture of the Iraqis, including Saddam Hussein while he was inspected and shaved. These are examples of the double standard the United States applies in its interpretation of international laws.

U.S. foreign policies have contradicted with the values that Americans promote: freedom, democracy, and human rights. For example, the Bush Administration waived nuclear-related sanctions and rescheduling debts for Musharraf of Pakistan, after he overthrew a democratically elected government in 1999. The U.S. actions were payback for his support of the United States in the war in Afghanistan after 9/11. The rejection of the International Criminal Court treaty undermines international law and fairness among nations and people. The violation of human rights involving the detainees at Guantanamo Bay, and the violation of international law in the invasion of Iraq are further examples of the U.S. contradiction (Mahmoud, 2003).

The next chapter will discuss the roots of anti-Americanism in the Middle East that the United States has, arguably, failed to address as this thesis claims. Firstly, the chapter will discuss the Arab-Israeli conflict as a major section in U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East and the main reason of anti-Americanism as all Saudi elites, (as a case study representing the Middle East) who were interviewed by the researcher have agreed, and even confirmed by the Report of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim world that was dispatched by the U.S. government in 2003, which mentioned U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, and the policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict in particular as reason for anti-Americanism. Secondly, the next chapter will discuss the U.S. war on terrorism as a reason that has, indeed, inflamed anti-Americanism by the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq and what have been described by many Arabs and Muslims as anti-Islamic position taken

by the Bush Administration. Finally, the last section will try to diagnose in depth the real roots of anti-Americanism.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### ROOTS OF ANTI-AMERICANISM

This chapter explores the roots of anti-Americanism in the Middle East, something the Bush Administration has failed to address. We asked a question that asked by Sardar (2002), 'Why do people hate America?' (p. 6). The roots of anti-Americanism in the Middle East go far deeper than the U.S. war on terror, which has actually triggered an array of accumulated negative perceptions and attitudes held by the people of the Middle East based on a series of U.S. foreign policies and actions dating back to the end of the Second World War. Of course, the actions of the U.S. post 9/11 have significantly increased the level of anti-Americanism not only in the Arab and Muslim worlds, but in many regions, including 'old Europe.' According to Crockatt (2003), anti-Americanism was both 'a cause and a consequence' of 9/11 (p. 43).

Understanding the roots of anti-Americanism is important. The speeches of President Bush pretend as if the Administration is unaware of the nature and roots of anti-Americanism in the Arab and Muslim worlds. In a speech a month after 9/11, Bush wondered why there was a 'vitriolic hatred for America in some Islamic countries . . . Like most Americans, I just cannot believe it because I know how good we are' (Crockatt, 2003, p. 68). The day after Bush's speech, anti-American demonstrations took place in most Arab and Muslim countries, especially in the

largest Muslim countries (Indonesia, Pakistan, Nigeria, and Egypt— home to approximately 25% of the Arab population).

According to Naim (2003), American experts on foreign policy met in early 2003 to discuss increased anti-Americanism in the world. They summed up their recommendations in a message to President Bush. The cabinet member whom the letter was submitted to told them that the letter would not have an effect upon the decision making of the Bush Administration unless it specified the ‘concrete costs’ of anti-Americanism. Former U.S. Diplomat in the Middle East, John Habib (2003), asserted that all successive U.S. administrations ‘ignored the warnings’ of U.S. ambassadors and friendly Arab leaders regarding how U.S. foreign policy had actually created and inflamed anti-Americanism in the region. This was especially true regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict and America’s support for Israel against its Arab neighbors. Habib drew a picture of how America was being perceived by the people of the Middle East.

Today America is viewed in the region as a nation that has lost its reputation as a country that once promoted the principles of justice and fairness. It is now viewed as a country that advances Israel’s and its own parochial interests at the expense of legitimate Arab interests (p. 165).

Al-Jahni (author’s interview, 2005), from Prince Naif University in Riyadh, argued that anti-Americanism does not exist only in Arab and Muslim countries, but in the rest of the world where the United States is seen as an imperial colonialist. This has undermined the American reputation worldwide. Anti-Americanism has different levels and has been expressed in different ways around the world. In his article, *The Peril of Lite Anti-Americanism*, Moises Naim (2003) identified two different types of anti-Americanism.

There is murderous anti-Americanism, and then there is anti-Americanism lite. The first is the anti-Americanism of fanatical terrorists who hate the United States-its power, its values, and its policies-and are willing to kill and to hurt the United States and its citizens. The second is the anti-Americanism of those in the United States and abroad who take to the streets and the media to rant against the country but do not seek its destruction (p. 1).

Naim (2003) defined the first type, 'murderous anti-Americanism,' as the act of violent terrorism, which seeks to kill Americans and cause damage to U.S. targets and interests. The second type, which Naim tried to explain in greater depth, is 'lite anti-Americanism.' He claimed that lite anti-Americanism, which exists within the United States and throughout the world, is not a hatred of the United States or its people. Rather, lite anti-Americanism is a hatred of U.S. foreign policy — the excessive use of unilateralism, U.S. wrongdoings, and the double standard in its foreign policy which can sometimes be summed up as 'do as I say, not as I do.' Lite anti-Americanism has had a negative affect on the image of the United States in the world, especially among those who may have believed in America as an ideal state or a so-called 'the dreamland' where its values and culture are internationally admired.

The anti-war movement in Spain following the war in Iraq in early 2004 was an example of lite anti-Americanism. The Spanish Prime Minister (Aznar) was one of the major U.S. allies in the war against terrorism and the war in Iraq. He and his party had to bear the cost of opposing the will of the Spanish people and lost elections in March 2004. Immediately after coming to office, the new Spanish Prime Minister, Jose Luis Zapatero, started to withdraw Spanish troops from Iraq (April, 2004). Lite anti-Americanism actually succeeded in undermining the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq and led to public pressure being put on other U.S. allies, such as the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Nicaragua, and the Philippines to follow Spain and withdraw their troops

from Iraq. Mogaiad (author's interview, 2005) attributed this dismantling of the American-led coalition in Iraq to negative perceptions inside Iraq and around the world, where the invasion of Iraq has been seen as motivated by American economic interests with the coalition forces as mere instruments utilized by the United States to accomplish self-interested goals. The European anti-war movements were perceived positively in the Arab and Muslim worlds, revealing that U.S. foreign policy is subject to international condemnation, not only condemnation by the Middle East.

Unlike Naim, Richard Crockatt (2003), author of *America Embattled*, claimed that it is difficult to define 'anti-Americanism,' saying that the term can be defined in different ways.

It is necessary to put quotation marks around the term 'anti-Americanism' because, like all essentially political terms, it proves difficult to define once you start peeling back the layers of meaning. One can take it that it implies something more sweeping and absolute than simply criticism of American policies, yet anti-Americanism may often begin in this way, hardening to an *idée fixe* only when such policies become routine or when a pattern of perceived exploitation and dependence becomes a permanent condition, as is arguably the case in American relations with Latin America (p. 43).

This does seem to support Naim's categorization of the term 'anti-Americanism' as murderous anti-Americanism and lite anti-Americanism.

There is a common phrase, the truth of which, applies here: 'for every action, there is an equal but opposite reaction.' The 'heavy-handed policy' of the United States in the Middle East has provoked Arabs and Muslims as it lacks any appreciation of the religious and ethnic sensitivities in the region. Given the current U.S. foreign policy toward the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, the proposal by the U.S. National Security Strategy in September 2002 to resolve conflicts in the region would be unattainable. The National Security Strategy stated 'The United States can play a

crucial role, but ultimately, lasting peace can only come when Israelis and Palestinians resolve the issues and end the conflict between them' (The White House, September 2002). The contradiction within this statement is apparent between the vagueness of the American so-called 'crucial role' and the emphasis that peace can be attained only when 'Israelis and Palestinians resolve the Issues and end the conflict between them.' Unquestionably, if both parties resolve issues and ended the conflict then peace would be attained. The hard question is how to broker the resolution and have both sides come to an agreement on the major issues of the conflict. That is what the U.S. National Strategy failed to address.

When interviewed, some Saudi elites representing the Arab world were asked about the reasons and justifications for anti-Americanism. Even though the reasons varied slightly, all of them mentioned U.S. foreign policy.

Asaad Al-Shamlan (author's interview, 2004), an academic from the Institute of Diplomatic Studies under the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, described two reasons for anti-Americanism. The first and most powerful reason is the negative perception of the U.S. role in the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict. If the U.S. actions and attitudes were not pro Israelis, the clash between the United States and the Arabs and the resulting anti-Americanism would not exist in its current form. The second reason has to do with cultural conflict between the Western cultures (represented by the American culture) and Arabic culture. Those parties and groups concerned with this issue are not actually against importing Western technology but against what they believe to be an American plan to impose its values and culture on the Middle East. Al-Shamlan added that anti-Americanism, indeed, has been utilized

by some Middle Eastern regimes as a tool to mobilize their people against what they see as a U.S. threat. Those regimes distract their people from internal problems related to economic, political, and human rights matters. Thus, this complex issue has been used by some regimes as a smoke screen to protect their own interests.

Abdullah Al-Hulwa (author's interview, 2004) is a member of Majlis Ash'shura and the Chairman of Foreign Relations Committee (the Saudi Parliament). He stated that there are three reasons for anti-Americanism in the Arab and Muslim worlds. First is the negative position of U.S. foreign policy toward the region, especially as it relates to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Second is the 'cultural' reason wherein many Arabs and Muslims perceive the American position as anti-Islamism. This has been revealed by negative attitudes expressed by the U.S. media, U.S. influential circles and lobbies, and intellectuals in the United States. For example, on the CBS show, *60 Minutes*, the American Reverend Jerry Falwell said, 'I think Mohammed was a terrorist. I read enough of the history of his life, written by both Muslims and non-Muslims, that he was a violent man, a man of war.' Falwell added, 'Jesus set the example for love, as did Moses. And I think that Mohammed set an opposite example.' (CBS, June 2003) Another statement was made by Franklin Graham, son of the famous Christian Evangelist Billy Graham, on NBC *Nightly News*. He described Islam as an 'evil and wicked religion' (CNN, April 2003). Such statements provoke Muslims around the world and inflame anti-Americanism. Al-Hulwa's final reason for anti-Americanism was the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. These acts significantly increased the level of anti-

Americanism toward what many people consider U.S. hostility towards Arabs and Muslims.

Abdullah Al-Otaibi (author's interview, 2004), an academic from the King Saud University also attributed anti-Americanism in the Arab and Muslim region to three reasons. First was the excessive use of power by the unilateralism of Washington. Second was 'double standards' policies used by the United States, such as condoning and supporting Israel's nuclear capabilities while preventing other states in the region from possessing nuclear weapons. Third was American intervention in internal matters in Arab and Muslim states, like the frequent intervention by U.S. media and Congress members in the educational system of Saudi Arabia, accusing it of teaching intolerance. In an interview with Ali Al-Marshad (2005), former Principal (Minister) for Girls Education, he refuted the accusations, saying that the Saudi educational system has been subject to annual review by a committee of Saudi experts.

Othman Alrawaf (author's interview, 2004) is a former member in the Foreign Affairs Committee in Majlis Ash'shura (the Saudi Parliament). He gave three reasons for anti-Americanism in the Arabic and Islamic worlds. First was American support of Israel. A second reason was U.S. opposition to national Arab movements, like its actions against Nasser's regime in Egypt when he sought Arab unification. Third was the perception that the United States was trying to impose its culture on the region. It has come to the point that all political parties and most people in the Arab world have anti-American attitudes.

Sulaiman Al-Khrajji (author's interview, 2004) is a former member of Majlis Ash'shura (the Saudi Parliament). He attributed anti-Americanism to U.S. support of

Israel. Additionally, the American unilateral approach in world matters has been quite troublesome. Anti-Americanism is fueled by U.S. decision-making and the use of force when it has overstepped the United Nations (the war in Iraq).

Yosif Al-Kuaileet (author's interview, 2005), Assistant Editor-in-Chief of the Riyadh daily newspaper in Saudi Arabia, emphasized the difference between hatred toward U.S. foreign policy and hatred toward American society. From Al-Kuaileet's point of view, anti-Americanism in the Arab and Muslim worlds (with 20% of the world's population) has been aimed at a U.S. foreign policy that has collided with the people of these nations—ignoring their religion and cultural values and siding with the Israelis in their conflict against the Arabs. The latter is considered by all Arabs and Muslims to be the major and substantial issue. Also, the United States has accused many Arabs, Muslims and Islamic organizations of being linked to terrorism, has used abusive and arbitrary detentions (the cases of detainees in Guantanamo and prisoners at Abu-Gharib in Iraq), and has arbitrarily detained suspected Arabs and Muslims inside the United States. These actions have been denounced internationally, especially by human rights organizations. American foreign policy after 9/11 has provoked many people around the world, not only Arabs and Muslims.

As a result of anti-Americanism, and mainly after the second Palestinian uprising (Al-Aqsa Intifada) in 2000, many organizations and unions in the Arab and Muslim world began to boycott U.S. goods, offering people lists of other products that could replace American goods. These boycotts intensified after the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 (Lynch, 2003). Such boycotts would not have a significant negative affect on the U.S. economy but might hurt some American

companies. Some businesses have benefited from this anti-American trend by establishing business in products to compete with American brands that have dominated the market for decades. For example, after the Second Palestinian uprising (Al-Aqsa Intifada) in 2000, three different soft drinks companies established, like Mecca Cola (referring to the Holy City), Zamzam Cola (referring to a well in Mecca), and Qiblah Cola (referring to the direction where Muslims turn in prayer toward the Holy Mosque in Mecca). The names of the brands reveal how these companies take advantage of anti-Americanism in the Arab and Muslim worlds by utilizing and exploiting religious symbols to gain customers.

As we discuss anti-Americanism, it is important here to mention that whereas anti-globalization (which is considered one of the reasons of anti-Americanism) is one of the major sources of anti-Americanism in the 21<sup>st</sup> century that has existed in many parts of the world especially in Latin America, such an issue is almost unnoticed in the Middle East. In Latin America, there are many anti-globalization movements, especially from the left wing such as the Zapa-tista (Arasil, 2005). Gormoly (author's interview, 2004) attributes the weak and almost inexistence of anti-globalization in the Arabic world to the lack of organizations and legal institutions in the region.

#### Arab Israeli Conflict-the Predominant Factor?

In Mach 2006, John Mearsheimer from the University of Chicago and Stephen Walt, Academic Dean at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University published a study titled *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy*. It criticized America's unlimited support for Israel, saying that it harmed America's

national interests. This paper has prompted wide debate in the United States and has been condemned by pro-Israeli lobbies. The authors asserted that America's pro-Israeli foreign policy has generated negative outcomes for the United States.

The U.S. national interest should be the primary object of American foreign policy. For the past several decades, however, and especially since the Six Day War in 1967, the centerpiece of U.S. Middle East policy has been its relationship with Israel. The combination of unwavering U.S. support for Israel and the related effort to spread democracy throughout the region has inflamed Arab and Muslim opinion and jeopardized U.S. security (p. 1).

More importantly, saying that Israel and the United States are united by a shared terrorist threat has the causal relationship backwards: rather, the United States has a terrorism problem in good part because it is so closely allied with Israel, not the other way around (p. 5).

Many Middle Eastern commentators and specialists on U.S. foreign policy, like Al-Khathlan (author's interview, 2004), agree that U.S. 'total biased support of Israel' is the primary reason for anti-Americanism in the Arab and Muslim worlds.

The Arab-Israeli conflict has been the main reason for anti-Americanism in the Arab and Muslim worlds since the Second World War. As that time, the United States supported the creation of the state of Israel in Palestine and then backed Israel in its wars against the Arab states in 1948, 1967, and 1973. It went on to adopt a pro-Israeli policy in the Arab-Israeli conflict (Heikel, 1993). Also, American tanks, artillery, and aircraft have been used against civilians in Southern Lebanon in 1982 and the Gaza Strip, and West Bank since the beginning of the second uprising (Al-Aqsa Intifada) in 2000. These weapons were part of significant U.S. aid to Israel (Findley, 2002). According to former U.S. Diplomat John Habib (2003), U.S. aid to the state of Israel between 1973 and 2003 totaled approximately \$1.6 trillion.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been omitted from the U.N. agenda as the United States has vetoed any attempt to blame the Israelis. This adds greatly to the discord between the Arab/Muslim world and the United States. For example, in April 2002, claiming to pursue the Palestinian fighters, the Israeli Army devastated the Jenin refugee camp using bulldozers and tanks. In response to the report of his special envoy Terje Roed-Larsen, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan called for an international investigative team to go to the Jenin Camp. The Arab group in the Security Council submitted a draft Security Council resolution calling on Annan to investigate 'the full scope of the tragic events that have taken place in the Jenin refugee camp' (Bennis, p. 210). The draft was opposed by the United States, which has refused to endorse any U.N. resolution containing strong language condemning the Israeli government.

According to the BBC, up until March 2003, of the U.S. vetoes in the United Nations, 35 were against U.N. resolutions condemning Israel. With its long history of a pro-Israeli position, the United States has allied itself with Israel against its Arab neighbors. This American position in regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict has created and escalated anti-Americanism in the Arab and Muslim worlds, where people accuse the United States of conducting a biased foreign policy in favor of Israel.

According to Merdad (author's interview, 2004), many Arabs and Muslims consider the United States to be both foe and broker in the Arab-Israeli conflict. All U.S. administrations have been subject to pressure by Jewish and pro-Israeli lobbies, which have influence in U.S. elections. The leverage of these lobbies have made Arabs and Muslims suspicious of the ability of the United States to honestly broker

peace in the Middle East. Without its pro-Israeli position in the Arab-Israeli conflict, anti-Americanism would not exist. Instead, as Al-Hulwa (author's interview, 2004) argued, many prominent intellectuals and policymakers in the Arab world would be pro-Americans, as they have studied in American universities and appreciate the American culture and people. Al-Fayez (author's interview, 2004) believes that American support of Israel against the Palestinians, support that is political, economic, and military, have made people in the Arab and Muslim worlds consider the United States and Israel as one state (لا يميزون بين إسرائيل و أمريكا).

One of the major reasons for mainstream anti-Americanism in the Middle East after 9/11, besides the war in Iraq, is that America condones Israeli policies in Gaza and the West Bank, including the massacres of Palestinians, especially in the Palestinian refugee camp of Jenin in early April 2002. The action taken on Jenin refugee camp was a copy of the one that committed against the Palestinian in Deir Yassin fifty years ago, which led to the Arab-Israeli war in 1948. Gormoly (author's interview, 2004) has speculated that the Bush Administration's 'hands-off' policy in the Arab-Israeli conflict has rendered them unable to positively impact the peace process. However, the same policy has not restrained Bush from blaming the Palestinians for their role in the violence while condoning the Israeli attacks on Palestinian civilians, the construction of the separation wall in the Palestinian-occupied territories to prevent Palestinians from escaping into the Israeli territories, and the expansion of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories of the West Bank of Palestine. In the case of Israeli casualties, the United States has used strong words to denounce the Palestinians but remained much quieter about Palestinian casualties.

In his theory, '*Why Men Rebel*,' Ted Gurr stated that resentment generates frustration (quoted from Al-Ghamdi, author's interview, 2004). Al-Ghamdi argued that when frustration accumulates, it leads to a divergence between ambition and what is obtainable. The actions of the Bush Administration have generated frustration within the Palestinian leadership and outrage in the Arab and Muslim worlds. This sense of frustration and outrage 'يولد مناخاً ملائماً لاستغلاله من جماعات إرهابية' has been utilized by some terrorist organizations, like Al-Qaeda to justify their actions against U.S. targets (Gormoly, author's interview, 2004).

Some commentators have argued that these perceptions are inaccurate. In the article, *The Real Roots of Arab Anti-Americanism* that was published in the *Foreign Affairs Journal*, Barry Rubin (2002) claimed that U.S. support of Israel in its wars against the Arab states was done to prevent Israel from being eliminated. He argued that 'The United States has merely helped Israel survive efforts from Arab neighbors to remove it from the map' (p. 79). The actual facts contradict Rubin's assessment of why the United States supported Israel during the Six Days War in 1967. The United States did not just help Israel survive, as Rubin argued. Instead, it actually helped expand Israeli occupation to include the Gaza Strip and West Bank (Palestinian lands), Golan from Syria, Sinai from Egypt, and some lands from Jordan (Heikel, 1990).

Rubin (2002) also claimed that the United States has been an honest broker in the Arab-Israeli conflict, if not more pro-Arabs. He mentioned U.S. intervention in the Egyptian-Israeli war in 1973 as an effort to save Egypt from defeat. However, he did not mention the flow of U.S. materials to Israel and the diplomatic role that the United States played to prevent any cease-fire resolution by the United Nations before

Israel was able to retake some of the lands regained by the Egyptian army (Hickel, 1993). Even during post-war negotiations between the Egyptians and the Israelis, the United States was an uneven-handed broker. Ismail Fahmy, Egyptian Foreign Minister during the 1973 war, said that U.S. Foreign Minister Henry Kissinger 'was in fact always acting on behalf of Israel' (Pipes, p. 29).

The Al-Aqsa Intifada (uprising) in late 2000 and the Israeli reoccupation operations that followed increased the levels of anti-Americanism in the Arab and Muslim worlds. The American 'hands-off' policy toward the Israeli Army's suppression of the Palestinians using American tanks, jet fighters, and missiles caused further Arab infuriation (Crockatt, 2003).

Before 9/11, as tension escalated between the Israelis and the Palestinians, the Bush Administration adopted a "hands-off" policy, meaning that the United States would not be involved in settling the conflict until the aggression between Israelis and Palestinians stops. That was perceived by Middle Easterners as a "green light" for Israel to pursue its anti-Palestinian policies, especially after the failure of the Camp David negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians in 2000. This policy of inaction has outraged many people in the Middle East and inflamed anti-Americanism. During its campaign to promote the war against Iraq in 2003, the Bush Administration decided to temporarily break its "hands-off" policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This is one of the conditions of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East which have attempted to underwrite a peace process while at the same time pursuing international diplomacy that is antagonistic to peace. Note the wars that the United States has launched against both Afghanistan and Iraq.

The Governor of the Saudi Monetary Agency, Hamad Al-Sayari (author's interview, 2005) described U.S. foreign policy dealing with Israeli-Palestinian issues as the main cause of anti-American feelings and disappointment in the Middle East, even with its allies in the Arab and Muslim world. He added that unless the Palestinian issue is resolved, anti-Americanism will continue and U.S. interests in the region will be jeopardized. The resolution of the Palestinian issue would make other issue like Iraq far easier to handle.

### The U.S. War against Terrorism and the Upsurge in Anti-Americanism

Terrorism is not a modern-day phenomenon but a problem that has had a long history. However, the period between 1945 and 1990's was an incubation period for Middle Eastern terrorism, according to Arasli (2005). Political issues and actions are what most common results in inciting acts of terrorism or terrorist backlash. U.S. foreign policy has been cited by some Middle Eastern commentators as relatively, if not fully, responsible for the asymmetric response from Islamic militant groups or terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda. Anti-Americanism has been used by most of those groups to destabilize Arab and Muslim regimes and to justify the conduct of violence and terrorist activities (Gormoly, author's interview, 2004). Gormoly has added that U.S. foreign policies that have sponsored and supported undemocratic and suppressive regimes in the region and caused economic and political problems add to anti-American sentiment.

Al-Kuaileet (author's interview, 2005) argued that American officials, intellectuals, and theorizers consider the Arabic region to be the center of terrorism,

where so-called 'Islamic radicals' have emerged, beginning on Egypt and extending to Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia. However, Al-Kuaileet asserted, these experts have failed to address America's role in the emergence of these groups, either through direct support (the Mujahidin in the Soviet-Afghan War) or indirectly with provocative foreign policies in the Middle East (especially in regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict). Al-Kuaileet has argued that the Bush Administration has failed to appreciate and address the concerns of Arabs and Muslims in regard to U.S. foreign policy in the region.

Al-Khathlan (author's interview, 2004), like many Middle Eastern observers, asserted that the U.S. war against terrorism has stirred up anti-Americanism and will continue to inflame and increase terrorism instead of diminish it. Similarly, Al-Fayez (author's interview, 2004), indicated that many Arabs and Muslims have become convinced, especially since 9/11 and the Bush Administration's increasing support for Israel, that the United States has been engaging in a crusade—like war against Muslims. Al-Fayez argued that American foreign policies have fallen under the influence of a group of fundamentalists in the administration with a neo-conservative agenda 'بان أمريكا تخوض حرب صليبية ضد المسلمين يقوده التيار الأصولي في الإدارة.' He, also, added that the American neo-conservatives played a major role in promoting the U.S. invasion of Iraq after Afghanistan. Both actions have inflamed anti-Americanism.

In the Report of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World (2003), the polls indicated that in 2002, only 6% of Egyptian people had a favorable view of America. In Jordan, in the same year, the polls indicated that 25% of the people had a favorable view of America; however, this percentage dropped

in the summer of 2003, after the war against Iraq, to only 1%. The polls reveal a significant increase in anger in the Arab world toward the U.S. war on terrorism and an accompanying increase in anti-Americanism in the region.

Of course, the second stage of the American war in terror (the war in Iraq) has witnessed severe increase in the level of anti-Americanism, where many Arabs and Muslims became to believe that this American war in terrorism is actually steered against Islam. The U.S. war and occupation of Iraq is currently a crucial issue that increases anti-Americanism and, therefore, to be addressed in the following section.

### The U.S. War in Iraq

Before the war, the United States made the false assumption that the Iraqi people would welcome the U.S. troops. Any sense of welcome quickly dissolved as the invasion was followed by chaos, the looting of Iraqi museums, and U.S. interest in the Iraqi oil fields. During the U.S. invasion of Iraq, television networks played a major role in inflaming fury toward the United States with videotaped pictures of civilian victims under attacks by B 52 bombers, daisy-cutters, and cluster bombs. There was a videotape of Iraqis killed and wounded in the U.S. air bombing of a Baghdad market on March, 28, 2003, which caused fury in the Arab and Muslim world as they saw the pictures of the victims in television networks (Lynch, 2003). Mahmoud, (2003) described the Arabs' rage toward the U.S. invasion of Iraq as unprecedented. Because of the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq, the younger generations of Arabs and Muslims are vulnerable to 'radicalization,' as argued by Mahmoud.

U.S. claims of Iraqi possession of WMD proved to be false. There was no WMD evidence to be found. This intensified anti-Americanism in the Arab and Muslim worlds; indeed, the international community, in general, became convinced that the war against Iraq was unjustified. For example, in Spain, one of the U.S. allies in the invasion of Iraq, a poll conducted immediately after the war in Iraq showed only 3% of the people there had a very favorable view of the United States (Report of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, 2003).

In the most distant Arabic state from Iraq (Morocco), people there, according to the Report of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World (2003), defined Americans 'ruthless occupiers in Iraq and as bigots, intolerant to Muslims' in America (p. 16). The report concluded that 'hostility toward America has reached shocking levels' (p. 15). These conclusions resulted even before the Abu-Gharib Prison scandal and Al-Fallujah invasion, where the world witnessed an American soldier shooting an unarmed wounded militant fighter inside mosque. The cameraman admitted that he saw five wounded militant fighters shot the same way. There can be no wonder how severely these actions and incidents have worsened anti-Americanism and hostility toward American aggression. 'There are some principles of ethical behavior (naked aggression is commonly taken to be unacceptable)' (Crockatt, 2003, p.165).

At the International Counter-Terrorism Conference held in Riyadh in February 2005, (attended by the author), the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated three international factors as roots of terrorism: foreign occupation, double standards, and

ideological and cultural conflicts. In regard to foreign occupation, the Saudi paper stated the following:

Thus, direct foreign occupation represents an opportunity for some groups to incite terrorism, then to justify— though wrongly— some of their terrorist activities as resistance against occupation and its atrocities. They would argue that international conventions give them the right to use available means to resist foreign occupation. To them, the end justifies the means, hence terrorizing civilians and the innocents (p. 7).

Since the U.S. war against Iraq in 2003, anti-Americanism has increased among Arab liberals, who were known before as pro-American. Before the war against Iraq, some Arab liberals tended to justify the U.S. war in Afghanistan and its policies to counter terrorism. This position held by liberals has shifted to an anti-American position since the war in Iraq. Pro-American attitudes nowadays are described in the Arab world as ‘cheap opportunism’ and disloyalty (Lynch, 2003). The U.S. war in Iraq has apparently generated, as Zizek (2004) speculated, ‘a fundamental Muslim anti-American movement’ (p. 3) in the Arab and Muslim worlds.

The lack of legitimacy has weakened the U.S. position in Iraq. After the U.S. war in Iraq and the beginning of the occupation, U.S. troops became subject to attacks by Iraqi and Islamic militants (Al-Fayez, author’s interview, 2004). U.S. troops and the other coalition forces have suffered from a steady series of attacks by Iraqi militants demanding the immediate withdrawal of all international forces and an end to the American occupation. Iraqi resistance has caused more casualties among U.S. and coalition forces than the war itself. The total number of deaths among the U.S. troops during the war in Iraq (March 19, 2003 to April 30, 2003) was 139 soldiers. The number of deaths since the end of war through (October, 2006) was 2,728 soldiers (U.S. Department of Defense, 2006). Iraqi and Islamic militants have also conducted

a series of kidnappings of foreigners whose countries are participating as part of the coalition forces in Iraq. They succeeded in forcing the Philippines government to withdraw its troops from Iraq in exchange for one of its kidnapped citizens, causing some tension between the Philippines government and the Bush Administration.

The Bush Administration has admitted that the first year of occupation was an unexpectedly bloody year. To date (October, 2006), the administration has failed to restore security and stability in Iraq. It has persisted in not admitting its failure in Iraq and has refused to admit that its justifications for going to war in Iraq were based on specious reasoning. The way the Bush Administration has handled the situation in Iraq reveals that it will not admit to failure in Iraq, even as Iraq appears to be on the verge of civil war between the Sunni and Shiite sects. In April 2006, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak said in an interview with Al-Arabiya satellite television that 'Civil war has almost started among Shiites, Sunnis, Kurds and those who are coming from Asia. The situation is uneasy and I don't know how would Iraq be brought together' (CBS, April 2006). In Britain, where she was faced with demonstrations, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice admitted in a press conference with British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw that the United States had made 'tactical errors - thousands of them, I'm sure' (BBC, March 2006).

The Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World submitted their report to the U.S. Congress in June 2003. In it, they said,

Finally, we want to be clear: 'spin' and manipulative public relations and propaganda are not the answer. Foreign policy counts. In our trips to Egypt, Syria, Turkey, France, Morocco and Senegal, we were struck by the depth of opposition to many of our policies. Citizens in these countries are genuinely distressed at the plight of Palestinians and at the role they perceive the United

States to be playing, and they are genuinely distressed by the situation in Iraq (p. 18).

The Advisory Group's report has also addressed, in several sections of the report, the negative affects of U.S. foreign policy on anti-Americanism, but has stated repeatedly that it was mandated to focus only on public diplomacy. For example, the report stated the following:

Surveys show that specific American policies profoundly affect attitudes toward the United States. That stands to reasons. For example, large majorities in the Arab and Muslim world view U.S. foreign policy through the prism of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Arabs and Muslims overwhelmingly opposed the post-9/11 U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan, as well as the use of force against Iraq, and the U.S. war on terrorism in general. It is not, however, the mandate of the Advisory Group to advice on foreign policy itself (p. 22).

This statement by the Advisory Group illustrates the main causes of anti-Americanism: the U.S. support of Israel, the U.S. war against Afghanistan and Iraq, and the war on terrorism 'in general.' The next section seeks to focus on the roots of terrorism beyond the mentioned causes and discusses the Bush Administration's effort to address the roots of terrorism.

#### Focusing on the Roots of Anti-Americanism

It has been argued by many commentators, such as An Naim (2002), Brian (2002), and Findley (2002) that U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East has caused the growth of anti-American militants and terrorist groups, mainly Al-Qaeda. Crockatt (2003) argues that anti-Americanism was both "a cause and a consequence" of 9/11. Thus, knowing the roots of anti-Americanism is important. The United States has failed to address and focus on the real roots of anti-Americanism. The administration

and many elites in the United States are against the idea of focusing on the roots of terrorism (Gormoly, author's interview, 2004). The administration attributes anti-Americanism in the Middle East to a 'misunderstanding' of U.S. foreign policy. This consideration was jeered by Arabs as one Egyptian remarked, 'Americans think Arabs are animals, they think we don't think or know anything' (Lynch, 2003, p. 5).

Some American intellectuals have claimed that anti-Americanism is actually a hatred of American democracy, freedom, and modernity. Former U.S. Secretary of State, Henri Kissinger (2002) attributes the 9/11 attacks to what he called a hatred to the Western values. According to Sardar (2002), a poll sponsored by the *International Herald Tribune* found that 90% of Americans believed that their country was 'disliked' because of its 'wealth' and 'power.' Yosif Al-kuaileet (author's interview, 2005) disagreed with this claim. He pointed the Scandinavian countries that have higher levels of freedom, democracy, and standard of life than the United States, and wondered why people in the Arab and Muslim worlds do not hate these countries. Al-Kuaileet asserted that American officials and intellectuals are playing politics.

Another broad and crude claim raised by other American intellectuals and scholars attribute anti-Americanism to envy of the Western civilization. If this was a valid reason, why are not sentiments also anti-French, anti-German, or anti-Scandinavian as they have higher levels of liberalism, democracy, and modernity? Anti-Americanism is about policies. Note the anti-British sentiment in the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and the anti-French sentiment in the 1960s had to do with political policies and 'occupation' (colonization).

Al-Khathlan (author's interview, 2004), from King Saud University in Saudi Arabia, looked at terrorism as the result of a series of actions generated by U.S. foreign policy. It has become a very sensitive issue to discuss the roots or reasons for the 9/11 attacks in the United States. Some Americans who tried to discuss the roots of 9/11 have been labeled as 'unpatriotic.' An Naim (2002) asserted that discussing the roots of 9/11 is not meant to justify the actions. It is necessary to understand the phenomenon as it requires not only a military response, but an effort to analyze the roots of the problem.

Understanding the motivation of any terrorist is essential for a reasoned and sustainable response, and should not be seen as condoning the crime or blaming the victims. It is from this perspective that I insist that it is relevant, indeed necessary, to consider the relationship between the attacks of September 11 and US foreign policy (p.168).

Habib (2003) gave examples of questions that should have been addressed by the Bush Administration and the U.S. media.

Who are these people? Why would they do such an evil act to Americans? What motivated them? Why today and not yesterday? Where were they all these years? Why do they hate us? And more importantly, 'did we do something to provoke this act'? (p. 274).

In his article, *A Time to Learn*, Travis Durfee (2002) questioned if the United States has not realized the importance of discussing the roots of 9/11, 'Have we taken a critical look at the events that led up to Sept. 11 and begun piecing together an answer the question: Why?' (p. 1). Noam Chomsky (the prominent linguistic scholar) believes that the continuous denial of answering and discussing the question 'Why' increases the chance of such an act to re-occur. The Bush Administration seems unconcerned with answers to this question. Some U.S. media, U.S. influential circles,

and intellectuals have considered the discussion of such a question as unpatriotic and justification for terrorism.

If the Bush Administration had focused on the roots of 9/11, the response to the attacks would have been a revision of the U.S. foreign policy that has generated hatred and consequent incidents like the 9/11 attacks. The American right wing and the pro-Israeli lobbies realize that a rational answer to the question 'Why?' may require a major revision of what many Arabs and Muslims consider the biased role of the United States in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Therefore, these influential circles have attempted to abort efforts to discuss the roots of 9/11, distracting the American people with other questions like 'How do we react?' or 'What do we do?' Al-Namlah (author's interview, 2004) attributed the increase in anti-Americanism in the Middle East after 9/11 to internal frustrations within the Middle East with an arrogant U.S. foreign policy focused after 9/11 on how and where military operations should be taken.

Smith (2002) wondered if the United States understood the reasons why many Muslims around the world celebrated after the 9/11 attacks. He attributed the negative attitude in the Muslim world as a reaction to U.S. foreign policy that is both unilateral and isolationist. Smith pointed out that 'if the US sees September 11 as justifying a more unilateralist foreign policy, then the likelihood is more, not less, September 11s' (p. 58). Of course, such a statement made by Smith is not accepted by the hawks in the White House, who have persisted in concentrating on using military power to defeat terrorism.

After 9/11, the Bush Administration refused foreign and national suggestions to review its foreign policy, as it may relate to terrorist acts. When Saudi Prince Al-Waleed Bin-Talal, the largest foreign investor in the United States, offered a donation of \$10 million to the families of the victims of 9/11, he commented to the U.S. media that the United States needed to review its foreign policy. The Prince's comment was based on the belief of many Arabs and Muslims that U.S. foreign policy has prompted anti-Americanism and anti-American terrorist operations. The Prince spoke out of concern for the growing gap between Arabs and Muslims on one side and the United States on the other. Reacting to the Prince's statement, New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani rejected the donation and denounced the statement, saying that such a comment was 'Highly irresponsible and very, very dangerous' (CNN, October, 15, 2001). The Prince's comment represented Middle Eastern views as to the roots of 9/11, and views of some Western scholars. One of those scholars, Gabriel Kolko (2002), described U.S. foreign policy, especially regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict, as the main reason for 9/11.

All of its policies in the Middle East have been contradictory and counterproductive. The United States' support for Israel is the most important but scarcely the only cause of the September 11 trauma and the potentially fundamental political destabilization, ranging from the Persian Gulf to South Asia, that its intervention in Afghanistan has triggered . . . But radicalized, suicidal Islamists are, to a great extent, the outcome of a half century of America's interference in the Middle East and the Muslim world (pp. 143, 149).

Barry Rubin (2002) believed that U.S. support for Israel and for what may be termed 'suppressive Arab regimes' had 'supposedly' created anti-Americanism in the Middle East. However, he argued that, in reality, the foreign policy of the United States was not the real or central reason for anti-Americanism.

Arabs and Muslims hatred of the United States is not just, or even mainly, a response to actual U.S. policies, policies that, if anything, have been remarkably pro-Arab and pro-Muslim over the years. Rather, such animus is largely the product of self-interested manipulation by various groups within Arab society, groups that use anti-Americanism as a foil to distract public attention from other, far more serious problems within those societies (p. 73).

According to Daalder and Lindsay (2003), polls in the 1990's showed that 10%, and, in some cases, less than 5%, of American people were able to 'name' an issue of American foreign policy. However, after the 9/11 attacks, many Americans became convinced that the United States was very vulnerable to terrorist attacks. They became more concerned and involved in the debates over U.S. foreign policy (Habib, 2003). According to a poll conducted by Gallup in March 2002, 63% of Americans attributed the unfavorable view of the United States in the Muslim world to the America's 'too much' favor of Israel in the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, as they have been unaware of U.S. foreign policy, many Americans have no awareness of the roots and nature of the issues that caused anti-Americanism. Many Americans, according to Bennis (2003), lack understanding about the nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict. From the American perspective, that conflict has not been viewed as between 'occupiers and occupied.' Rather, it has been considered conflict between Arabs and Jews.

Many Americans believe, as has been portrayed by the U.S. media, that U.S. interventions in the world have been for U.S. security and the best interests of other nations. With a perception so different from the Arab/Muslim view, many Americans cannot understand why their country is hated instead of appreciated. For example, during the U.S. intervention with the multinational forces in Somalia in 1992, the American people were shocked by pictures that were broadcasted of U.S. soldiers

killed and dragged in the streets of Mogadishu (the capital city of Somalia). Like American people, U.S. soldiers also, who expected to be welcomed to help Somalis in restoring stability, were stunned and could not understand the reasons of anti-Americanism among Somalis.

Since 9/11, there has been some evidence that Americans do have an unawareness of the opposition to U.S. power and have tried to mitigate it. The United States launched an international campaign to change its negative image in the Arab and Muslim worlds. The Bush Administration has, to some degree, realized the magnitude of anti-Americanism in the Middle East. While the administration has taken some steps to bridge the gap between the United States and the people of the Middle East, it has done so, though, in questionable ways. The State Department financed and established an Arabic-language satellite TV network, Alhura, to promote U.S. policies. This followed the pop-radio station, Sawa that started beaming across the Middle East in 2001. Al-Hulwa (author's interview, 2004) believed that these means are insufficient because they focus on promoting U.S. foreign policy and values without addressing the roots of anti-Americanism. Rubin (2002) claimed that changing U.S. policies and public relations campaigns would not tackle the problem of anti-Americanism, especially if it was based on nationalism and not perceived American wrongdoings. Indeed, Rubin argued that if the United States tried to conciliate the Arabic world, the situation would worsen and the strategy of radical groups would succeed.

Rubin (2002) believed that the United States was pro-Muslim and pro-Arab during the Cold War.

The United States wooed Egypt, accepted Syria's hegemony over Lebanon, and did little to punish states that sponsored terrorism. The United States also became Islam's political patron in the region, since traditionalist Islam, then threatened by radical Arab nationalism was seen as a bulwark against avowedly secular communism' (p. 75).

Rubin believed that when the United States 'wooed' Egypt or approved Syrian's control over Lebanon, that was a sufficient evidence of a pro-Arab policy. However, do these examples really reflect a pro-Arab policy? Rubin has failed to present convincing and solid evidence of an American pro-Arab policy because the main issue for both Arabs and Muslims is the Arab-Israeli conflict, and on that issue, American foreign policy has revealed a pro-Israeli policy. Rubin also failed to present evidence of a pro-Islamic policy based on the United States being 'Islam's political patron.' A pro-Islamic policy was used only against the Soviets during the Cold War. The United States utilized the power of Islam against the 'infidels' Soviets and the expansion of communism. This American strategy succeeded in Afghanistan.

In his article, Rubin (2002) concluded that the United States failed to adequately react to terrorist acts against it which has encouraged anti-Americanism. He suggested that the United States should reject any idea of using public relations, apologies, or strategies of appeasement.

The most Washington can do is show the world that the United States is steadfast in support of its interests and allies. This approach should include both standing by Israel and maintaining good relations with moderate Arab states-- which should be urged to do more publicly to justify U.S. support. Steadfastness and bravery remain the best way to undermine the practical impact of Arab anti-Americanism (p. 85).

In a personal interview with Assad Al-Shamlan (2004) from the Institute of Diplomatic Studies under the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he disagreed with Barry Rubin's use of the term 'appeasement' as a U.S. strategy that has been used with

the Arab states of whom the Gulf states (U.S. traditional allies) is a part, because appeasement as he argues is a strategy to be used only with enemies, exemplifying the British appeasement to Hitler Before the Second World War.

An-Naim (2002) asserted that U.S. unilateral military power and its failure to embrace the international law have fueled radical militants. He sees no difference between the 'Jihad' of Islamic militants and, what he calls a 'Jihad' conducted by the United States: the U.S. war on terror that has been conducted unilaterally and without legal sanction but has been justified as an 'American exception;' the 'act of resistance' by Palestinian militants has been considered by the United States as terrorism. Former U.S. diplomat John Habib (2003) agreed with An-Naim when he indicated that many Americans believe that such a double standard policy 'fosters anti-American attitudes among Middle Easterners and encourages aggravated terrorist attacks against individual Americans and American interests' (p. 269). An-Naim (2002) concluded his article by directly linking 9/11 to the U.S. foreign policies in the Middle East that have generated anti-Americanism.

I insist that it is relevant, indeed necessary, to consider the relationship between the attack of September 11 and US foreign policy. This perspective applies to US foreign policy in relation to particular regions of the world– the Middle East in this case– and to its subversive impact on international legality' (p. 168).

Some Arabs and Muslims around the world who have been outraged by U.S. foreign policy sympathize with the radical militants and support their terrorist attacks against U.S. targets. They hold the U.S. government responsible of the deaths of thousands of Muslims in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Palestine. U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, especially since 9/11 and the beginning of the war on terror, has inflamed

anti-Americanism in the Arab and Muslim worlds. Many Arabs and Muslims on the political left and right sympathize in varying degrees with the anti-occupation operations in Iraq that have been launched against U.S. forces (but not the bombings carried out against Iraqi civilians) (Al-Tayeb, author's interview, 2004). Support of anti-American operations is also in reaction to the unilateral use of force by the United States, the U.S. disregard for international legality, and what many Muslims have perceived to be a cruel and biased U.S. foreign policy in regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Cannistraro (2003) asserted that the U.S. occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq and U.S. support for Israel, which has repressed the Palestinians for decades, enabled terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda to recruit people who are willing to strike U.S. targets and commit suicide bombings. A retired U.S. Naval officer speculated that the United States acquired more anti-American foes as the Israelis used American weapons to attack civilians in the Palestinian occupied territories. He added, 'When I see on television our planes and our tanks used to attack the Palestinians I can understand why people hate Americans' (Sardar, 2002, p. 6).

Pollack (2003) described the U.S. presence in the Gulf states as one of the main reasons for the rise of terrorism within those states, adding that it was in the interest of the United States to maintain stability in the region by either reducing or withdrawing its troops from the area. Expelling U.S. troops from the Arabian Peninsula, home of the two Holy Muslim Lands, Mecca and Medina, has been a major demand and goal in the discourse of Al-Qaeda. In February 1998, on his *Fatwa* of

Jihad against the United States, Al-Qaeda leader, Osama Bin-Laden condemned the presence of U.S. troops.

The Arabian peninsula has never--since God made it flat, created its desert, and encircled it with seas-- been stormed by any forces like the crusader armies now spreading in it like locusts, consuming its riches and destroying its plantations . . . The United States has been occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of places, the Arabian peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbors, and turning its bases in the peninsula into a spearhead through which to fight the neighboring Muslim peoples (Quoted in Sammon, 2002, p. 142-143).

Since the beginning of the U.S. presence in the region after the Second Gulf War in 1991, U.S. troops have been subject to several attacks by Islamic militants, mainly Al-Qaeda. In early 2003, before the war in Iraq, the United States moved its troops out of Saudi Arabia (at the request of the Saudi government). U.S. troops relocated to the American base in Qatar (Al-Odaid base) and other bases in Kuwait and Bahrain.

In an interview with Mohammed Eid (2004), from the Prince Naif University for Security Science in Riyadh and former Deputy Minister of Interior in Egypt, he stated that in any state with the power of law and society terrorism cannot prevail; it is just a matter of time until terrorism is eliminated. Eid argued that it is necessary to take sufficient and effective steps and actions to prevent terrorism. One of the first and most important steps needed would be to focus on the roots of terrorism.

Parekh (2002) is one of the scholars who has tried to focus on the roots of terrorism. He presented that dialogue would be the best strategy for bridging the gap between the Western and Muslim worlds. It was his suggestion that Western states deliver a message to cultures around the world, mainly Muslim, that many values, like justice, are shared by all of them. He added that terrorism is not caused by 'poverty

and global inequality' but by West's responsibility of 'propping up the domestic system of injustice or by inflicting additional injustices and humiliations on them' (p. 274). This assessment by Parekh is impractical and unrealistic for four reasons. First of all, he considered 'justice' to be a shared value by all cultures, but many Muslims, believe the United States has pursued unjust foreign policies in the Middle East, mainly in regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict. For example, from the point view of many Muslims the unjust U.S. foreign policies includes the American support of the creation of Israel, U.S. condone and in sometimes support of Israeli aggressiveness, ignorance and violations of U.N. resolutions, the U.S. vetoes against all the proposed U.N. resolutions that condemned Israel, and the tremendous support of Israel in all its wars against Arabs in 1948, 1967, and 1973.

Second, Parekh said that the real enemies of these cultures are within their states, but did not identify them or explain why they act the way they do. Third, he portrayed the hatred of these cultures as aimed at Western states, which contradicts the reality that demonstrators seen on television or in newspapers were burning American flags, not French, British, or German flags.

Finally, he mentioned 'poverty and global inequality' as main reasons for anti-Americanism in the Arab and Muslim worlds. These reasons may apply to anti-globalization groups in poor nations where the main issues are poverty and inequality. For people in the Arab and Muslim worlds, anti-Americanism in the rich Gulf states is the same as anti-Americanism in poor Muslim countries, like Bangladesh. In the Arab and Muslim worlds, the Arab-Israeli conflict has been the main issue for Arabs and Muslims since 1948 when the United States supported the creation of Israel. So, anti-

Americanism in the Arab and Muslim worlds is due to the negative American role in the Arab-Israeli conflict over many years for that long of time. In summary, the U.S. actions have antagonized many nations, mainly Arabs and Muslims for a variety of reasons which this research focuses on.

The Report of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World (2003) stated, 'Separating simple opposition to policies from generalized anti-American attitudes is not easy' (p. 22). The actual problem within U.S. foreign policy has to do with the policy itself and not public diplomacy as the mission was mandated to explore. The Report of the Advisory Group confirmed the thesis that U.S. foreign policy in the region is actually the main reason of anti-Americanism. It also revealed the Bush Administration's failure to address the real roots of anti-Americanism and blaming anti-Americanism on public diplomacy. Lynch (2003) suggested that the Advisory Group recommend 'a fundamentally different approach to the United States' interactions with the region— one that speaks with Arabs rather than at them and tries to engage rather than manipulate' (p. 5). It is important to note that the gap is definitely not between the United States and the governments of the Middle East. The gap exists between the United States and people of the Middle East. Therefore, it needs to explore the roots of anti-Americanism by approaching the people of the region. Crockatt (2003) believes that a failure to treat the issue of anti-Americanism properly may worsen the problem. He said, 'To some extent, therefore, the solutions to the problem of anti-Americanism lie in America's own hands. However, the danger of mismanagement, arising from misreading a situation, may make such a strategy risky' (p. 70).

The next (Chapter six), will present the findings of the interviews conducted, which will be statistically generated to examine the core questions of this thesis, and the results will be presented on tables followed by interpretations.

## CHAPTER SIX

### REFLECTIONS ON U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Middle Eastern commentators are divided over the possibility of the Bush Administration evaluating the outcome of its foreign policies and the war on terrorism and whether or not the political introspection will lead to the continuation of the same policies or the development of a new foreign policy approach. Al-Tayeb (author's interview, 2004) is among commentators who expect the United States to continue toppling regimes in the Middle East, not necessarily with military force, but by using different methods, like economic pressure. He also expects the United States to effectively serve its own interests in the region by using pressure, power, and temptation. Al-Jahni (author's interview, 2005) raised a concern held by some Middle Eastern commentators that what we have witnessed in Afghanistan and Iraq since 9/11 is a new age of colonization but in a 21<sup>st</sup> century fashion.

Al-Koraiji (author's interview, 2004) believes that America has not gained anything from its policies in the Middle East except the wrath and pain of anti-Americanism. Thus, he expects that the United States, probably during the next two administrations, to review its policies and much-needed adjustments.

Considering current U.S. strategy in the Middle East, Lynch (2003) has offered a warning 'Relying on 'shock and awe' to win respect will alienate far more than it

will persuade. Threats of force, no matter how useful in the short term, will entrench the impression of American hostility and ensure future conflict' (p. 6).

### Reflections on Bush's Role in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

In the Middle East, anti-Americanism has been attributed to U.S. support for Israel, its anti-Palestinian position, and using the war on terrorism to dominate the Arab world and condemn Palestinian resistance, while many people in the Middle East believe that Bush's foreign policy in the region is not radically different from that of the Clinton Administration. However, they believe Clinton's foreign policy relied more on diplomatic process, played positive role in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and worked to reduce hatred of the United States (Al-Rawaf, author's interview, 2004).

It is agreed upon by experts on U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East that unlimited U.S. support of Israel is the main reason for anti-American sentiment among Arabs and Muslims. All U.S. presidential administrations have been subject to pressure from Jewish and pro-Israeli lobbies, which have significant influence on U.S. elections. The leverage of these lobbies has made Arabs and Muslims suspicious of the ability of any U.S. administration to act as an honest broker in the Arab-Israeli peace process. Arabs and Muslims are outraged by what they believe to be an uneven role assumed by the United States in that conflict. Merdad (author's interview, 2004) believes that it is U.S. bias toward Israel that is the only major reason for anti-Americanism. If the U.S. position was balanced, anti-Americanism would probably not exist. Indeed, many prominent intellectuals and policymakers would be pro-

American as they have studied in American universities and appreciate the American culture, values, and people.

Unlike the Clinton Administration, the Bush Administration has been completely on the side of the Israeli government, supporting the actions taken by Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon against the Palestinians. The Bush Administration also had refused to participate in direct dialogue with elected Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat, contradicting the historical role of the U.S. role and its obligations as a broker in the Arab-Israeli conflict (Gormoly, author's interview, 2004). The double standard policies of the Bush Administration have been the subject of criticism by Arabs and U.S. allies in the region. In reaction to growing disapproval, after the election in 2004, President Bush sent former Secretary of State Colin Powell to the Middle East to revive the peace process. The effort provided to be of no significance.

Merdad (author's interview, 2004) speculated that, in his second term, President Bush would be free to play a significant role in the Arab-Israeli conflict without the restraints of president seeking reelection. However, Al-Khathlan (author's interview, 2004) and others believe that the United States is not serious about ending the Arab-Israeli conflict, preferring to prolong the peace process. Merdad claimed that in conflicts like the one between Israelis and Palestinians, escalation and economic pressures are being utilized as weapons. The peace process for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (as a part of the larger Arab-Israeli conflict), as Merdad suggested, requires (socio-economic) integration between the Israelis and the Palestinians prior to any major negotiation, as exemplified by the failure of the Oslo negotiation. Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (2002) believed that it would not be possible to

reach a settlement of the conflict unless both parties recognized the existence of each other because the conflict of the Middle East (the Arab-Israeli conflict) is based on ideology and religion, exemplified by the failure of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations in Camp David where both parties failed to agree on the final status of the holy sites for which there seems to be no compromise. Kissinger concluded that a final settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict could only be gained in 'stages,' asserting that any attempt to jump to a 'final' settlement would end in failure and escalate into violence like what happened after Camp David in 2000.

Al-Ghamdi (author's interview, 2004) speculated that there will not be any improvement in Arab-American relations during Bush's second term because of the American commitment to Israel. He also expects the U.S. war on terrorism to continue to serve Israeli interests in terms of its security and superiority in the region and to diminish attempts by Arab states to develop their power and compete with Israel.

#### Reflections on the Bush's War on Terror

Al-Fayez, Al-Hulwa, Al-Khathlan, Al-Namlah, Al-Rawaf, Gormoly, and Merdad (author's interviews, 2004) are among the Saudi elites who were interviewed and asked about the U.S. war on terrorism. They see partial success and failures in their assessments of the so-called U.S. war on terror but vary in their opinions regarding where the successes and failures have occurred. Al-Fayez believes that there has been relative success in the war against terrorism as the United States won the war in Afghanistan and virtually immobilized Al-Qaeda. However, Al-Fayez

also believes that the Bush Administration has failed to restore security, quash resistance, and stabilize interim regimes in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

Al-Hulwah (author's interview, 2004) asserted that the United States has achieved military and political victories most recently in Afghanistan and Iraq, but also in Iran, Syria, and Libya. He also believes that the United States has achieved relative success in fighting terrorism by stifling sources of financing for terrorist organizations. This does not mean, however, that the United States has succeeded in eliminating terrorist organizations. That is very difficult to do. What Al-Hulwa considered to be the major failure for the United States in the war against terrorism are its efforts in the cultural field, which, he feels, is the most difficult issue to resolve. To bridge this gap, the United States has tried to communicate with the people of the Middle East by financing television and radio programs to sell a favorable U.S. image in the region. The effort has failed, causing the first director of the program to resign in 2003. Al-Rawaf (author's interview, 2004) asserted that while the United States has had relative success in military actions and in diminishing the financial resources of terrorism, it faces obstacles as it seeks to reform the Middle East socially, culturally, and politically through democratization.

Yosif Al-Kuaileet (author's interview, 2005) Assistant Editor-in-Chief of the Riyadh daily newspaper in Saudi Arabia believes that the United States succeeded in the first stage after 9/11, rallying the whole world to fight terrorism, saying that the American war in terror includes beside military actions strict measures to dry out financial resources of terrorism. It has also been relatively successful in stemming the flow of financial resources to fund terrorism, as Al-Kuaileet argued.

Merdad (author's interview, 2004) differentiated between what he believes to be U.S. success in the war against terrorism and the failure to focus on the real problem, the roots of 9/11 and anti-Americanism. He attributed Bush's success in the war against terrorism to the following: (1) U.S. ability to mobilize countries in the war against Iraq; (2) U.S. creation of new rules and concepts in international relations and world politics, using the attacks of 9/11 to legitimate U.S. conduct; and (3) new ways of pressures applied by the United States on countries around the world and many international organizations, such as the Europe Union. For example, after 9/11 the banks in Switzerland were forced to cancel the service of secret code accounts.

In his assessment of U.S. success in the war on terrorism, Gormoly (author's interview, 2004) stated that the United States has succeeded in the military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq but has not diminished the terrorist networks that are still active in many parts of the world. Al-Otaibi (author's interview, 2004) believes that the United States should show genuine engagement in regard to terrorist networks instead of concentrating on state-sponsored terrorism. Even though there has not been another major terrorist attack against U.S. targets since 9/11, frequent alarms inside the United States prove vulnerability and insecurity, (Al-Khathlan, author's interview, 2004). Also, the United States failed to capture or kill Osama Bin-Laden, alleged mastermind of the 9/11 attacks and the prime reason for the war in Afghanistan and the war on terror, in general. Al-Namlah (author's interview, 2004) has limited U.S. success in the war on terrorism to the political aspect involving the vague concept of terrorism. On the other hand, Al-Namlah believes that the United States has failed to accomplish the main objective of the war against terrorism— terrorism prevention.

The Libyan decision to dismantle its nuclear and chemical capabilities is one of the U.S. successes in the war on terrorism. Many commentators, like Al-Khathlan (author's interview, 2004), believe that the Libyan regime was moved to comply with the U.S. demand by the Iraqi lesson.

Middle Eastern commentators like Alghmadi, Al-Tayeb, Al-Shamlan, and Fadel (author's interviews, 2004) believe, in different degrees, that the Bush Administration has not actually succeeded in the war on terrorism. This is so because the world has become, as they argue, less secure than it was before 9/11. Al-Tayeb considers the inability of the United States to restore security and stability in both Afghanistan and Iraq as a failure of the American model that the Bush Administration has sought to promote and impose.

Even though, the Bush Administration did not achieve any of the announced objectives of its war against terrorism, like capturing Osama Bin-Laden and creating democracies in both Afghanistan and Iraq, it has indeed achieved unannounced objectives, such as consolidating U.S. hegemony and power in the Middle East. Based on this argument, Fadel (author's interview, 2004) says, 'I do not think that one may talk about success in that matter.' Al-Shamlan (author's interview, 2004), has argued that the United States has gained nothing significant in its war against terrorism but has increased the level of anti-Americanism as a result of its heavy-handed policies.

It is worth to say here that 9/11 has, actually, preponderated the influence of the conservatives over the one of the Democratic Party. After the war in Afghanistan and, soon thereafter, preparations for war in Iraq, President Bush became the target of increasing criticism within America, especially by Democratic political leaders. In

February 2002, Democratic Senate majority leader Tom Daschle warned against shifting the war objectives, saying that 'the war lacked 'a clear direction' and that U.S. troops had to find Osama Bin-Laden and other Al-Qaeda leaders 'or we have failed'' (Daalder & Lindsay, 2003, p. 95). President Bush set new precedents in U.S. foreign policy by adopting unilateralism, aggression, and a policy of 'preemptive actions' (Al-Namlah, author's interview, 2004). These policies became subject to criticism by intellectuals who had been considered advocates of the war against Iraq. Francis Fukuyama (2002) wonder if the United States had allies, who would go all the way with it in the war on terrorism, and what kind of allies. In fact, the United States has had fewer allies in the war in Iraq than it had in Afghanistan. As the time passes and the war drags on there are fewer allies and more criticism of the United States.

Al-Rawaf (author's interview, 2004) asserted that President Bush has a certain lines to pursue in the war against terror, such as fighting Al-Qaeda. However, the Bush Administration, would not only continue fighting terrorism, it will also continue to promote social and economic development and democracy in the Middle East. The administration believes reform is the best way to fight terrorism. Reform will lead to the defeat of what the administration calls the culture of 'intolerant violence.' Al-Rawaf believes that these reforms cannot be imposed on the Middle East by the United States but must be accomplished with the willingness and cooperation of the people in the region.

Al-Jahni (author's interview, 2005) believes that a successful war against terrorism requires America to be genuine about international cooperation and

respectful of the values of other nations. Genuineness requires participation in operations and intelligence and, perhaps most importantly, in decision-making.

Of course, at this stage, the controversy over the definition of terrorism will be, in the long term, a disadvantage for the United States because it will inflame anti-Americanism in the world and will diminish the U.S. credibility among its allies, who will be hesitant to support any further U.S. action. For example, whereas many countries have joined and supported the United States in the war on Afghanistan, many other countries, such as Germany, France, and Belgium have actually refused to participate in the war against Iraq. Other countries who participated in the war against Iraq were subject to internal pressures until they decided to pull out their troops like Spain, the Philippines, and Honduras. However, the United States has overstepped the United Nations and international law in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Therefore, Al-Fayez (author's interview, 2004) argues that the debate over the definition is nothing but an academic controversy.

As a consequence of its conduct of the war against terrorism, the United States has lost its outstanding reputation, and it may take a long time for it to be restored. The younger generations of Arabs and Muslims have witnessed tyrannical posture of the United States, especially in Iraq and are subject to radicalization. Thus, the United States is expected to face increased levels of anti-Americanism in the future. In that regard, Tucker (2004) says:

The years when the United States appeared as the hope of the world now seem long distant. Washington is hobbled by a reputation for the reckless use of force, and it is going to take a long time to live that down. World public opinion now sees the United States increasingly as an outlier—invoking international law when convenient, and ignoring it when not; using

international institutions when they work to its advantage, and disdaining them when they pose obstacles to U.S. designs (p. 6).

### Reflections on the U.S. War against Iraq

Prior to going to war in Iraq, the Bush Administration had the goal of changing Saddam Hussein's regime. Ultimately, military force was used to oust him from power. Since the downfall of Saddam Hussein, the Bush Administration has, arguably, failed to deal effectively with the post-Saddam era in Iraq, especially in regard to escalating resistance and violence. Mogaiad (author's interview, 2005) asserted that while the Bush Administration was prepared with several plans for the war in Iraq, it failed to plan for the post-war period. The American dilemma in Iraq is not only about Iraqi resistance, but also about the gradual withdrawal of coalition forces, leaving the United States deadlocked in Iraq. The only way for the United States to get out of Iraq, according to Mogaiad, is to allow the Islamic Conference Organization and the Arab League to play a major role in Iraq.

Al-Shamlan (author's interview, 2004) speculated that the United States will not leave under pressure from the resistance and will continue at any cost because, for the Bush Administration, nothing would be worse than leaving Iraq without success. Al-Shamlan believes that the Bush Administration has 'staked all their credibility on Iraq, so if they lose, they will lose everywhere else in the world.' The situation in Iraq has been deteriorating, and the Bush Administration is under pressure from the U.S. media, the public, and political circles because of the high cost of the war — in dollars and human lives. The Bush Administration hoped that by passing authority to the Iraqis, the situation would improve and that the U.S. home front would be more

supportive. The fact that there was less resistance under the Coalition Provisional Authority than under the Iraqi interim government has not helped Bush.

Unfortunately, the Iraqi government labeled by the Iraqi resistance as a ‘puppet government.’

Before the war in Iraq, the Bush Administration expected the post-war period in Iraq would be like it was in Japan and the Philippines after the Second World War and even in Afghanistan. Their vision was ill-conceived and short-sighted. The Iraqi ethnic, religious, and cultural mosaic has made it very difficult to stabilize and integrate Iraq. The Bush Administration was misled by some of its advisors and the Iraqi opposition when they were assured that the Iraq people would welcome the U.S. forces. That ‘welcome’ never happened (Al-Namlah, author’s interview, 2004). The capture of Saddam Hussein emboldened those in the Iraqi resistance as many Iraqi groups and militants were hesitant to participate in the resistance which he and Ba’athist party chiefs at large. Those in the resistance did not want to be viewed as Ba’athist supporters (Al-Ghamdi, author’s interview, 2004). Even though the war was won (Saddam Hussein was deposed), in post-war Iraq, the United States has been struggling with intense resistance, chaos, and a growing number of U.S. troops and Iraqi civilian casualties. The early months of 2006 gave indications of impending civil war between Sunnis and Shiites in Iraq (Biddle, 2006).

Gormoly (author’s interview, 2004) indicated that the United States was stunned by the Iraqi resistance after the war. Thus, he expected the Bush Administration to pass authority, especially for security, to the newly-elected Iraqi government, who would then be responsible for dealing with the Iraqi militants. If

this happened, the United States would be saved from the highly and deadly cost of guerrilla warfare. However, Gormoly did expect U.S. troops to remain on bases all over Iraq to insure U.S. influence on the Iraqi government. A few months after the interview with Gormoly, the United States was building 14 military bases in Iraq (Anthony, 2005).

Al-Hulwa (author's interview, 2004) described the U.S. post-war situation in Iraq as very critical and very difficult while it is relatively easy to overthrow a regime, forming and stabilizing a new regime and restoring security is much more difficult. Demolition and destruction can be accomplished in a short time; rebuilding and reconstructing government institutions may take several years, especially while guerilla war is being waged between U.S. troops and the resistance, severely exhausting the Iraqi infrastructure. Al-Ghamdi (author's interview, 2004) argued that U.S. failure in post-war Iraq has pushed Bush to use 'the cowboy approach' to pressure the United Nations to legitimize the U.S. occupation in Iraq, giving the United Nations a minor role.

Unity in Iraq is challenged by different ethnicities, religious sects, and political ideologies. The ethnic groups consist of Arabs, Kurds, and Turkoman. Since the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the leaders of these ethnic groups and religious sects have sought to avoid engaging in cultural or religious conflicts, resorting to some verbal clashes between Arabs and Kurds. The Kurds have demanded confederation in Iraq and want to expel Arabs from the city of Kirkuk, claiming that Saddam Hussein's regime had transferred them from all over Iraq in order to 'Arabinize' the city. The Kurds also have clashed with the Turkoman in Kirkuk.

There are three major religion sects in Iraq. The Muslim population consists of Shiites and Sunnis. There has long been great hostility between the groups. A minority of Christians make up another religious group.

Iraq is also home to numerous political ideologies and parties, such as the Ba'ath Party and the Iraqi National Party. Former U.S. diplomat to the Middle East John Habib (2003) was among the experts who expected disunity after the war and difficulty establishing a post-war Iraqi government. He attributed the weak threads of unity that did exist between the Iraqis to 'the grievances, the differences, and end objectives of each Iraqi group' (p. 279). Habib also was among experts who expected a long, continuous guerrilla war against the U.S. and coalition forces.

Al-Rawaf (author's interview, 2004) speculated that the United States would not withdraw from Iraq without having achieved success in the 'Iraqi model' because failure in Iraq or the 'new-Vietnam' would undermine Bush's doctrine of 'preemptive war' and the basis for his foreign policy. The Bush Administration claims that a reformed and reconstructed Iraq will be an ideal model for the other states in the region. Al-Kuaileet (author's interview, 2005) has argued that U.S. efforts to create a democratic society in Iraq (like the ones in Japan and West Germany after the Second World War) will end in absolute failure because the Iraqi post war government was based on ethnical division of power, which inflamed confessional feuds.

As they consider a U.S. failure in Iraq, some Middle Eastern commentators, like Ali (2004), have argued that the U.S. post-war crisis in Iraq has made any American plans to extend the war to Iran or Syria 'impossible.' Al-Fayez (author's interview, 2004) expects that, as a consequence of the negative experience in Iraq, the

Bush Administration will change its strategy in the region. While the United States used its military power to successfully topple the regime in Iraq, it has not been able to restore security in that country.

Al-Jahni (author's interview, 2005) argued that by invading Iraq, the United States has entered what he called "the nest of hornets," which will be very difficult, as he expected, for the Americans to get out of it. The U.S. war in Iraq has made America insecure and subject to increasing hatred and threat. Al-Qaeda has been able to recruit people who are willing to attack U.S. targets and fight U.S. troops in Iraq in an exhausting guerrilla war (Tucker, 2004). Al-Jahni notes that the United States is the target of anti-Americanism, which has increased since the war in Iraq. Americans do not realize that Muslims, and Iraqis in particular, will never forget the humiliation and torture, like at Abu-Gharib Prison in Baghdad, or the devastation of Iraq's infrastructure, leaving the Iraqi people to suffer from a lack of water and electricity.

Iraq has also become a center for training camps for terrorists. Once trained, they can leave Iraq to cause trouble. In Saudi Arabia, most of those who participated in the attacks in the second half of 2003 and 2004 were actually trained in Iraq. Al-Jahni (author's interview, 2005) speculated that the U.S. war in Iraq would create problems in the future for the United States and the countries of the Middle East, because Iraq is currently an incubator of terrorism and will export terrorists like those of Afghanistan.

Ali (2004) has argued that the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq will 'mark this century.' If America succeeds in the post-war period in Iraq, it 'will establish a dangerous new precedent for the 21<sup>st</sup> century' (p. 143).

#### Reflections on Bush's Use of Unilateralism and policy Double Standards

Yosif Al-Kuaileet (author's interview, 2005) believed that the United States was more unilateral in the war against Iraq and ignored the United Nations, therefore, was subject to many failures and criticism by international community. Gormoly (author's interview, 2004) speculated that, in its second term, the Bush Administration would reduce the use of unilateralism and the excessive deployment of its forces-troops have been engaged in many trouble spots in the world, stretching military resources too thin and exhausting the U.S. taxpayers. He also speculated that the United States would continue the war on terrorism and efforts to reform the Middle East, but probably with more balanced policies. Al-Namlah (author's interview, 2004) believes that the Bush Administration's adoption of unilateralism and aggression has tarnished the American ideal. He looked at the first term of the Bush Administration as 'transitional' for U.S. foreign policy. The general outcome of the policy would decide if the Bush Administration had succeeded with its strategy, and, if so, the administration would be encouraged to pursue the same policies in the second term.

In regards to the double standard in U.S. foreign policy, Al-Rawaf (author's interview, 2004) asserted that in the short term, the United States might gain positive outcomes from the vagueness of its concept of terrorism, including some 'freedom fighter' groups like the Palestinian Hamas and Islamic Jihad on the U.S. list of

terrorist organization for the sake of Israel. In the long term, though, there may well be unexpected negative outcomes in regard to the security of the United States. The United States has been widely condemned for conducting double standard policies, especially regarding using the label of terrorism and on human rights issues. Sheikh Bin-Hemaid (author's interview, 2004), Chairman of Majlis Ash'shura (the Saudi Parliament), attributes anti-Americanism in the Middle East to dishonest, double standard policies of the United States, especially in regard to the Arabic-Israeli conflict.

#### Reflections on Anti-Americanism

The U.S. war on terrorism has stirred up strong anti-American sentiment and will consequently inflame and increase terrorism instead of diminishing it. The United States needs to genuinely address the roots of anti-Americanism by 'opening direct dialogue' with the people in the Arab world before pursuing any revision of U.S. foreign policy (Lynch, 2003). This dialogue must be accomplished through Arab media and all possible means that enable the U.S. administration to reach the people at all levels in the Arab world. The dialogue should not be conducted to explain or justify U.S. policies, but to listen to public opinion in the Arab world. Since 9/11, the Bush Administration has sought to reach the people in the Arab world not listen to them and know their opinions about U.S. foreign policies, but to explain and justify U.S. policies, which have generated negative outcome. In the past, the Bush Administration has sent its 'spokespersons' to Al-Jazeera (the most popular Arabic news channel) to explain its actions. On one occasion, while hosting a former

American official, there was a running vote in which viewers were asked the question, 'Is the United States acting as an imperialist power in Iraq?' (p. 4). The longer the former U.S. official justified and explained U.S. actions, the more voters said 'yes.' At the end of the program, 96% voted 'yes.' The United States must clearly outline its interests and the objectives of its policies before listening to opinions in the Arab world. Then the United States needs to genuinely listen to Arab opinions and concerns. With such a dialogue may not significantly affect the U.S. image in the Arab world, it will be an important step in bridging the gap with the Arab and Muslim world.

If the Bush Administration should choose to focus on the roots of anti-Americanism, the United States must do more than engage in a dialogue. Major changes in its policies regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict and the occupation of Iraq would have to be made. The United States should meet its obligation to be an honest broker in the Arab-Israeli conflict. That must not be affected by U.S. commitment to the security of Israel, which would be attained only by a final settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Also, the United States should relinquish control over Iraq to the United Nations. They would then form a multilateral force to handle security before establishing a timetable for elections. This combination of dialogue and the alteration of U.S. foreign policy in the region would best bridge the gap with the Arab world. The question remained as to whether or not the Bush Administration is serious about changing U.S. image in the region and stemming the tide of anti-Americanism.

## CONCLUSIONS

This study has attempted to explore the debates over American foreign policy in the Middle East from a regional (mainly Saudi) perspective. It has, hopefully, evaluated the broader contours of American foreign policy in the Middle East to determine exactly how American strategies were perceived in many different ways by the peoples of the Arab and Muslim worlds. The thesis adopted a broad historical canvas through which to explore the question of how such perceptions have evolved. Predominantly though we have concentrated upon the impacts of the events of 9/11 and the subsequent so-called war on terror on Middle Eastern politics. There are, of course, many books, articles, and websites dedicated to the study of the U.S. and its wars against its 'enemies' but I hope very much that this thesis adds some understanding of how American actions have alienated certain sectors of the Arab and Muslim worlds. Overall I conclude that while of course there can be no excuses made for terroristic activities, that the events of 9/11 and even 7/7 are the product of a certain historical context needs understanding. One of these contexts is the hatred of the United States amongst some people in the Arab and Muslim world. In their book, *Worlds in Collision*, Booth and Dunne (2002) assessed anti-Americanism as the following:

We do not believe that the 'United States' is hated . . . there is a well of respect for American life and people throughout the world . . . the 'United States' must be disaggregated. Then it becomes apparent that is the policies of successive US governments that are so hated (p. 2).

This statement by Booth and Dunne supports the claim of this study that anti-Americanism in the Arab and Muslim worlds is directed against U.S. foreign policy not American society. The American society with its values and people is actually admired by people worldwide including the people of the Middle East. Some Saudi elites, as I highlighted earlier in chapter three and five, like Al-Hulwa (author's interviews, 2004) look at the American society with admiration.

9/11 was not a beginning of a trend of anti-Americanism but it certainly increased the curve of anti-Americanism in certain regions. One important question I address throughout the thesis is how this escalation occurred? Because to be the object of hatred was never the intention of the United States or its many leaders and peoples.

I have, in this thesis, adopted a structure which, I hope, highlights the motivating factors behind the U.S. role in the Middle East and subsequent reactions. Chapter one provides a backdrop to the events of 9/11 and focuses on the series of terrorist attacks against the United States. This chapter addresses key questions such as, what led to the tragedy of 9/11? How did it actually occur? How did the Bush Administration receive and react to the worst event in American history since the Japanese assault on Pearl Harbour. 9/11, like Pearl Harbour, was a 'transformative event' in U.S. and world history (Nye, 2001). 9/11 was indeed a 'transformative event' as we now talk about U.S. foreign policy before and after 9/11. Probably the major difference between the two events was that unlike Pearl Harbour where Japan was identified as foe and mission was specified for U.S. army, 9/11 led to an open-

ended war that was not only launched against Al-Qaeda but expanded against number of states America identified as sponsoring terrorism.

Chapter one also discusses the many debates within the Bush Administration during the preparations for the war on terror. There were, as I highlighted, two conflicting approaches to foreign policy inside the Bush Administration. The advocates of the so-called multilateral approach were led by the former Secretary of State Colin Powell. The unilateral approach was championed by the 'hawks' in the administration led by the Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. There were other voices. During the war council meeting held at Camp David in September 15, 2001, there were debates in regard to the first stage of the war on terror. Deputy Defense (now the President of World Bank Secretary) Paul Wolfowitz argued that the United States should engage in war against both Afghanistan and Iraq. Former Secretary of State, Colin Powell, warned against launching a war in both Afghanistan and Iraq as it would cause the U.S.-led international coalition against Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan to collapse. Probably without Powell's pressures on the White House, the American war in Iraq would have started earlier.

Chapter two presented a background to the conduct of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. This background focused on several central themes of American foreign policy in the region in the years between 1945 and the horrors of 9/11. For example, the history of the American role in the Arab-Israeli conflict covered the period beginning with the creation of the state of Israel in 1948 to the years which even now see continued controversy over the remit of Israel in the occupied territories. Chapter two together with Chapter three (which looks at the issue of oil and the

American-Saudi relationship) attempts to evaluate the broader contours of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East through Saudi eyes. This hopefully provides a case study of how American actions contributed to the growth of terror in the style of 9/11. Evaluating the broader contours of American foreign policy in the Middle East provides a somewhat unique perspective of a hegemonic power perceived through Saudi eyes. Saudi Arabia was selected to represent the Arab states in the case study, as they have almost the same ethnic, cultural, and religious background. Saudi Arabia occupies an important position as a major partner for the United States in the Middle East. It possesses approximately 25% of the world oil reserves and plays a major and a positive role in the world oil market. Saudi Arabia is also considered one of the most influential states in the Arab and Muslim worlds. During the Cold War, Saudi Arabia played a major role against a Soviet presence in the Middle East, and was together with the United States major supporters of the Mujahidin in Afghanistan against the Soviet invasion. After 9/11, (15 of the hijackers were from Saudi Arabia) the American-Saudi relationship was able to survive not least because such a relationship was inevitable for the interests of both countries, more importantly for the interests of the United States.

Chapter three explores the issue of oil as a central issue of American Saudi relations and claims that oil must be seen as major pillar in the conduct of American foreign policy in the Middle East. The chapter also presented the perceptions of Saudi elites in respect to American foreign policy and their country in particular. If there is a claim to the originality of the subsequent of the thesis it probably rests here as few studies of American foreign policy rest on this type of original interview material.

Since the interviews were conducted with Saudi elites, it was not easy to schedule time for interviews, which in some cases had to be conducted in two sessions. To even reach the elites, it required a network of connections. It was a somewhat a daunting task to interview people who have direct knowledge of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East

Chapter four discussed American foreign policy in the Middle East during the George W. Bush Administration. The chapter focused on the war on terror, and attempted to tie together issues surrounding the emergence of the war on terror and the contours of American foreign policy in the Middle East.

Chapter five explored what may be considered the roots of anti-Americanism in the contemporary political climate. Scholars are however as I highlighted divided over the reasons why terrorism has emerged in the 9/11 context. The thesis claimed that in order to understand the roots of Osama Bin-Laden (the prime example of anti-Americanism), it is necessary to understand how U.S. actions taken before 9/11 were perceived in the Arab and Muslim worlds of the Middle East. The perceptions of Saudi elites on these themes perceived to be the reasons for such a strident anti-Americanism were presented in Chapter five.

Chapter six presented interpretations of the outcome of the interviews with the Saudi elites. All of the interviewees 100% agreed that the 'security of Israel' and 'oil' were the most important pillars of the Bush foreign policy in the Middle East. Also, all participants 100% agreed that the end of the Cold War did impact American foreign policy in the region. In regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict, only 6.7% of interviewees described Bush's role in the conflict as both positive and negative, with

the majority (93.3%) describing the role as 'negative.' The majority of interviewees (90.5%) attributed anti-American sentiment among Arabs and Muslims to American support of Israel. Also, the majority (90%) believe that U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East has provoked and contributed to an asymmetric response from what may be described as Islamic militant or terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda, 5% said that there is a 'relative' relationship; and 5% said that no such relationship exists.

Chapter seven, provided the reflections of Saudi elites on U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. The reflections include perspectives on Bush's role in the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Bush war on terror (including the war on Iraq), and anti-Americanism.

The U.S. war on terrorism and the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq have been major contributors to the growth of anti-Americanism, which has reached unprecedented levels in the Arab and Muslim worlds. As a result of 9/11, the Bush Administration became very active in the Middle East, focusing in its war on terrorism there. The region has become 'the center of gravity' (Al-Otaibi, author's interview, 2004). The U.S. war in Iraq, the post-war era, American confrontations with Iran and Syria, and occasional interventions in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have consumed the Bush Administration's attention. As this thesis has argued, the series of actions conducted by the Bush Administration since 9/11 have escalated the anti-American sentiment that already existed in the region before 9/11. So, the U.S. war on terror has intertwined with U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. Of course, we cannot ignore the impact that 9/11 has had on the conduct of U.S. foreign policy (mainly in the Middle East), and that the war on terror was 'declared' in response to the horror of

9/11. However, as claimed by many Saudi elites, the United States has used and abused the term 'terrorism' to wage wars against countries like Afghanistan and Iraq. It has also abused the term by blackmailing countries not willing to obey the United States. 'Soft to terrorism' was the accusatory phrase used to describe regimes refusing to obey.

The outcome of this study reveals that the majority of Saudi elites interviewed by the author (some 90%) believe that American foreign policy especially after the beginning of the so-called 'war on terror,' has indeed provoked anti-American sentiments and has, therefore, contributed to the growth of what may be described as radical groups within particular parts of the Middle East. This does not, as I hope to have shown, mean that this was ever the intention of Washington's foreign policy. Rather, the United States has failed to address the roots of entrenched problem. These were understood both by Saudi elites and were clearly stated in the Report of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World.

Most of the Saudi interviewees (90.5%) agreed that longstanding support for Israel is a primary reason for anti-Americanism. This support for Israel has not been limited to short periods of time or to a specific U.S. administration but has existed since the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. As my thesis has shown, this American support was developed in 1956, consolidated in 1967, and reached its peak in the 1973 War with the American military and political support. Anti-Americanism in the Arab and Muslim worlds escalated after the United States supported Israel in the Arab-Israeli War in 1967 and was further inflamed after the 1973 War. Actions by the United States in relation to Israel created therefore many negative perceptions among

Arabs and Muslims, some of whom see no difference between America and Israel. Indeed, Israel's suppressive policies against the Palestinians have been condoned by all American administrations, yet those who support the Palestinians have been condemned. This as again, I hope I have shown has not helped the cause of Washington in the region. Yet, this shortcoming has failed to be entirely recognized by the current Bush Administration. In fact, the Bush Administration has utilized the War on terror to classify 'anti-occupation' organizations, like Hamas and Islamic Jihad, as terrorist groups while condoning the state-sponsored terrorism conducted by the Israeli government. This contradictory nature of American foreign policy highlighted throughout this thesis has meant that Washington is never perceived as 'honest' in its attitude to an enduring peace settlement.

Since the downfall of Saddam Hussein, the Bush Administration has, arguably, failed to deal effectively with the post-Saddam era in Iraq, especially in regard to the escalating resistance and violence (Al-Ghamdi, author's interview, 2004). The American dilemma in Iraq is not only about Iraqi resistance, but also about the gradual withdrawal of coalition forces, leaving the United States deadlocked in Iraq (Mogaiad, author's interview, 2005). As was said earlier by Al-Shamlan, the Bush Administration has 'staked all their credibility on Iraq, so if they lose, they will lose everywhere else in the world' (author's interview, 2004). The situation in Iraq is deteriorating, and the Bush Administration is under pressure from the media, the public, and political circles because of the high cost of the war— both in human lives and dollars. According to the U.S. Department of Defense (2006), from the beginning of the war in Iraq through October 8, 2006, the number of deaths among U.S. forces

reached 2,728 soldiers. On the other hand, according to the Congressional Budget Office (July, 2006), since the U.S. invasion of Iraq and until July 2006, the war in Iraq has cost approximately \$290 billion.

Even though the war was won (Saddam Hussein was deposed), in post-war Iraq, the United States has struggled with intense resistance, chaos, and a growing number of U.S. troops and Iraqi civilian casualties. The early months of 2006 gave indications of impending civil war between Sunnis and Shiites in Iraq (Biddle, 2006).

Even though the United States has succeeded in building its infrastructure for checking and tracking possible threats against American soil, it has failed to gain sympathy and support in its war against Iraq, as a second stage in its war against terrorism, because of its unilateral aggressive policies. The Bush war on terror has had the effect of helping create a breeding ground of terrorism in Iraq, encouraging terrorist bombings around the world (Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Spain, and the United Kingdom), and soaring oil prices. The Bush Administration has fueled terrorism with a series of actions, like the handling of prisoners at Guantanamo, which has been condemned worldwide, and scandals like the documented torture and abuse at Abu Gharib Prison in Baghdad. The unseemly actions of the United States have had a negative impact on America's image abroad and have created a new growth of anti-Americanism. Indeed, the U.S. war in terror has made America insecure and subject to increasing hatred and threat. Iraq has become a center for training camps for terrorists. Once trained, they can leave Iraq to cause trouble. In Saudi Arabia, most of those who participated in the attacks in the second half of 2003 and 2004 were actually trained in Iraq. Also, the bombings of

Jordan in 2005 were conducted by terrorist who crossed the borders from Iraq. The anti-American atmosphere created by U.S. foreign policy has been utilized by terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda, to justify their actions against what they describe as anti-Arab and anti-Muslim policies.

As a consequence of its conduct of the war against terrorism, the United States has lost its outstanding reputation, as an ideal state or a so-called 'the dreamland' where its values and culture are internationally admired, and it may take a long time for it to be restored. The younger generations of Arabs and Muslims have witnessed tyrannical posture of the United States, especially in Iraq and are subject to radicalization as argued by Mahmoud (2003). Thus, the United States will face increased levels of anti-Americanism in the future.

The United States, as the outcomes of this study have suggested, has failed to understand the Middle East. If the Bush Administration was genuine about wanting to end anti-Americanism in the Arab and Muslim world, it needed to develop a better understanding of the religious, ethnic, sentimental, and cultural background of the Middle Eastern societies in order to avoid any misperception and to know the mentality of those societies. This is attainable, as mentioned earlier through a dialogue. The Bush Administration has been focusing on how to improve public diplomacy and promote its policies in the Arab and Muslim world when, in fact, the problem is with the U.S. foreign policy itself.

The findings of this thesis claim the following to be at the root of anti-American sentiment and hostility: the role in the Arab-Israelis conflict, the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq, and actions following 9/11 in which the Bush

Administration created the perception among many Arabs and Muslims that the U.S. war on terrorism has aimed at Islam. Of the Saudi elites interviewed in this study, 93.3% described the Bush Administration's role in the Arab-Israeli conflict as negative, and 90.5% of them described American support of Israel as a reason for anti-Americanism.

This study hopefully contributes to an understanding of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East by introducing a Saudi perspective as an example of how people in the Arabic and Muslim world perceive and react to U.S. foreign policy. These interviewees included elites from all the Saudi sections and spectrum. The literature and the polls, some of which were sponsored by the American government, support the findings of this study.

Since the end of the conduct of the interviews (between January 2004 and February 2005) the politics of the Middle East, U.S. foreign policy in particular, has witnessed development in various aspects. More than any other themes in American foreign policy, Iraq has been the scene of major developments in the past two years. I claim that if the interview of this study had been conducted now, the answers of the questions addressing the Iraqi case would have reflected different outcome to the 2004-2005 interviews. The United States has been struggling with intense resistance, chaos, and a growing number of U.S. troops and Iraqi civilian casualties. Yet, the early months of 2006 gave indications of impending civil war between Sunnis and Shiites in Iraq as warned by Egyptian President, Hosni Mubarak. It has become inevitable to the United States to admit its deadlock in Iraq as, for example, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice admitted in a press conference with British

Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, in March 2006, that the United States had made 'tactical errors - thousands of them.' On August 3, 2005, President Bush had no choice but to admit the bloody and chaotic situation. He said,

The violence in recent days in Iraq is a grim reminder of the enemies we face. These terrorists and insurgents will use brutal tactics because they're trying to shake the will of the United States of America. They want us to retreat (The White House, August 2005).

The growing Iraqi resistance and the increasing number of casualties among U.S. troops have contributed to a drop in Bush's popularity to an approval rating of 40% and a disapproval rating of 56% — the lowest since he became president (The Gallup Organization, 2005).

In regard to the situation in Afghanistan, the relative success of the United States in restoring peace in Afghanistan in the first three years has become hard to uphold as security issues arise (beginning from the second half of 2005, the operations carried out by the Taliban militants against U.S. troops in Afghanistan have witnessed sever increase).

The U.S. war in terror has shifted in 2006 to include what Bush called an Islamic fascism. This speech was widely condemned in the Arab and Muslim worlds as some commentator rebuffed the association of the term fascism to Islam, saying that, in fact, fascism is a Western made.

As a consequence of its conduct of the war against terrorism, the United States has lost its outstanding reputation, and it may take a long time for it to be restored. Also, the younger generations of Arabs and Muslims have witnessed tyrannical posture of the United States, especially in Iraq and are subject to radicalization. Thus,

the United States is expected to face increased levels of anti-Americanism in the future.

## APPENDICES

APPENDIX A  
MIDDLE EAST MAP

MIDDLE EAST



**APPENDIX B**  
**INTERVIEW QUESTIONS**

### Interview Questions

1. What are the pillars of the Bush foreign policy in the Middle East?
2. Did the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War have impacts on the strategy of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East? Please explain?
3. How do you assess the Bush Administration's role in the Arab Israeli conflict?
4. How do you look at the Middle Eastern section of the U.S. war on terrorism?
5. Is the vagueness over the definition of terrorism an advantage or disadvantage for U.S. foreign policy makers?
6. How do you assess the U.S. use of unilateralism in the war on terrorism?
7. After approximately three years of the September 11 and the beginning of the U.S. war on terrorism, has the Bush administration succeeded in its campaign so far?
8. Has the United States succeeded in promoting war on Iraq?
9. How do you assess the U.S. situation in Iraq after the war?
10. To what do you attribute anti-Americanism in the Arab and Muslim world?
11. Has the Bush Junior Administration pursued radically different strategies to the William Clinton administration in foreign policy in the Middle East thus exacerbating tension and anti-Americanism? Specifically, has U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East meant that U.S. foreign policy itself become a target of fundamentalist and terrorist groups?
12. Has U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, provoked and contributed to an asymmetric response from what may be described as Islamic militant or terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda?
13. Do you have anything to add about U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East?

APPENDIX C

LIST OF THE INTERVIEWEES' NAMES, POSTS, AND THE QUESTIONS THEY  
ADDRESSED

'ALL INTERVIEWS WERE CARRIED OUT BY THE AUTHOR'

### List of the Interviewees' Names, Posts, and the Questions they Addressed

- 1- Al-Dokhayel, Abdulkarim: The Chairman of the Politics Department in the King Saud University in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. He is expert in European affairs; therefore, he was asked about the European reaction to the U.S. war on terror. The outcome of this question was not utilized in the findings of chapter six. Rather, it was incorporated in other sections in the thesis. This interview was conducted in January 2004.
- 2- Al-Fayez, Abdulaziz: (At the time this interview was conducted, he was a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the Saudi Ash'shura Council {Parliament}). Now, he is the Saudi Ambassador in Kuwait. Al-Fayez is expert in U.S. foreign policy. Therefore, he was asked all the questions (see appendix A). This interview was conducted in February 2004.
- 3- Al-Ghamdi, Abdullah: Associate Professor in the Politics Department at the King Saud University in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Al-Ghamdi is expert in U.S. foreign policy. He was asked all the questions. This interview was conducted in January 2004.
- 4- Al-Hulwa, Mohammad: member of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the Saudi Ash'shura Council {Parliament}. Al-Hulwa is expert in U.S. foreign policy. He was asked all the questions. This interview was conducted in February 2004.
- 5- Al-Jahni, Ali: Associate Professor in the Prince Naif University in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Al-Jahni was asked all the questions. This interview was

conducted in February 2005 during the Counter-Terrorism International Conference in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

- 6- Al-Khathlan, Saleh: Associate Professor in the Politics Department at the King Saud University in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. He was asked all the questions. This interview was conducted in January 2004.
- 7- Al-Khraigi, Sulaiman: (At the time this interview was conducted, he was a member of the Ash'shura Council {Parliament} in Saudi Arabia). Al-Khraigi was asked questions 10, 12, and 13. This interview was conducted in February 2004.
- 8- Al-Kuaileet, Yosif: The Co-Editor in Chief of the Riyadh Daily Newspaper. He was asked questions 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13. This interview was conducted in February 2005.
- 9- Al-Marshad, Ali: Former Principal (Minister) for Girls Education in Saudi Arabia. He was asked questionThis interview was conducted in January 2005.
- 10- Al-Mejlad, Mohammad: Lecturer in the Politics Department at the King Saud University in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. He was asked about what he called the Bush Administration adopting of the notion of the clash of civilizations. The outcome of this question was not utilized in the findings of chapter six, but was incorporated in other sections of this thesis. This interview was conducted in January 2004.

- 11- Al-Namlah, Saleh: The Deputy Minister of Information for Foreign Information. He is expert in U.S. foreign policy. Al-Namlah was asked all the questions. This interview was conducted in February 2004.
- 12- Al-Otaibi, Abdullah: Associate Professor in the Politics Department at the King Saud University in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. He was asked all the questions. This interview was conducted in January 2004.
- 13- Al-Rawaf, Othman: (At the time this interview was conducted, he was member of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the Saudi Ash'shura Council {Parliament}). Al-Rawaf is expert in U.S. foreign policy. He was asked all the questions. This interview was conducted in February 2004.
- 14- Al-Sayad, Abdulati: Associate Professor in the Prince Naif University in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Al-Sayad was asked questions 4, 5, 10, and 12. This interview was conducted in February 2004.
- 15- Al-Sayari, Hamad: The Governor of the Saudi Monetary Bank. He was asked questions 5, 7, 8, 12, and 13. He was also asked about the Saudi efforts in drying out financial resources of terrorism and the Saudi-American cooperation in this matter. Of course, the outcome of this question was not utilized in the findings of chapter six, but was utilized in other sections of this thesis. This interview was conducted in February 2004.
- 16- Al-Shamlan, Asaad: Associate Professor in the Institute of Diplomatic Studies under the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was asked all the questions. This interview was conducted in February 2004.

17- Al-Tayeb, Mohammad: Ambassador in the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

He was asked all the questions. This interview was conducted in February 2004.

18- Bin-Hemaid, Saleh: The Chairman of Majlis Ash'shura (the Saudi

Parliament). He was asked questions 4, 5, 10, and 12. Sheikh Bin-Hemaid was asked a question about Samuel Huntington's notion of the clash of civilization, which was utilized in the section that addressed the debate over Huntington's controversial thesis. This interview was conducted in February 2004.

19- Bin-Odah, Mohammad: Former Principal (Minister) for Girls Education in Saudi Arabia. He was asked about the Islamic law's attitude toward terrorism, which was utilized in the thesis. This interview was conducted in 2002.

20- Eid, Mohammad: Associate Professor in the Prince Naif University in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Eid is a Former Deputy Minister of Interior in Egypt. He was asked questions 3, 4, 5, 10, and 12. This interview was conducted in February 2004.

21- Fadil, Sadaga: (At the time this interview was conducted, 2004, he was Associate Professor in the Politics Department at the King Abdulaziz University in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia). Now, Fadel is member of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the Saudi Ash'shura Council (Parliament). He was asked all the questions. However, in the first contact with him, Fadel apologized because there would not be time for me to interview him (due to a trip business), but he called me again and told me that he emailed me answers

to all the questions that I sent to him prior to our supposed meeting. Ten out of the thirteen questions that he answered were just one sentence answers.

22-Gormoly, Raed: He is an expert in American foreign policy from the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was asked all the questions. This interview was conducted in February 2004.

23-Merdad, Jameel: (At the time this interview was conducted, 2004, he was Associate Professor in the Institute of Diplomatic Studies under the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Now, Merdad is Ambassador in the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was asked all the questions. This was the longest interview. It was conducted in January 2004.

24-Mogaiad, Saqr: Associate Professor in the Prince Naif University in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Moqaiad was asked questions 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 12. This interview was conducted in February 2005 during the Counter-Terrorism International Conference in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

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