Antonio Machado, The Institución Libre de Enseñanza and Spanish Krausism

by

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Abstract

Antonio Machado was a pupil at the Institución Libre de Enseñanza from 1883 to 1893. There he received both a modern education unique in the Spain of that time and exposure to the ideological influences of Krausism and institucionismo. After examining the biographical aspects of his contact with the school (chapter 1), I investigate the nature and extent of its influence in certain areas of thought: metaphysics (chapter 2), ethics (chapter 3), art and nature (chapter 4), pedagogy and culture (chapter 5) and politics (chapter 6).

My most important conclusions are as follows. Machado did not adopt the metaphysics of Krausism, though there are Krausist echoes in his treatment of Time and Death. What he did acquire from the Krausists was a view of Man and an ethics: an idealistic and moralistic Christian humanism which determined his beliefs and judgments on many questions. This humanism is defined by an optimistic faith in the perfectibility of the human spirit and an ideal of human fraternity. Machado's belief in education through activity, dialogue and "awakening" is both an expression of his view of Man and typical of the pedagogy of the Institución. His vision of the artist's ethical responsibilities towards his fellow men is typical of the humanist moralism of Krausists and institucionistas.

The influence of the Institución on Machado's art is also seen in his definition of art as a synthesis of the temporal and the essential, in certain images, in his cultivation of simplicity of expression, in thematic and stylistic elements of his treatment of Nature and in his preference for historicist literary criticism. In Machado's political thought the influence of the Institución is apparent above all in his affirmation of the primacy of spiritual and ethical considerations and in his evaluation of the importance of education and culture as forces for national regeneration.
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Introduction

Quizás no estará demasiado lejos de acertar quien soltara, así de pronto, la especie de que el libro de Juan de Mairena nos quedará como el único epitome donde se conserva lecciones de lo que ha sido el jrausismo español.

Eugenio d’Ors, 1949
Most critics of Antonio Machado make some mention of the influence on his life and works of his education at the Institución Libre de Enseñanza and there have even been a few articles totally dedicated to describing and assessing that influence. Nevertheless, no full-length, detailed study of that influence has yet been made. This thesis aspires to fill this gap in Machadian studies.

The Institución Libre de Enseñanza was a school founded in Madrid by a group of university and secondary school teachers, the majority of whom were Krausists. These Krausists had been disciples of the philosopher Julián Sanz del Río (1814-69), who had developed and propagated the ideas of the German philosopher Karl Christian Friedrich Krause (1781-1832) in Spain in the 1840s, 50s and 60s, having initially studied that philosopher's thought in Germany in 1843-45. Krausism was the philosophical basis of the Institución Libre: the school can be seen as an attempt to put into practice the ideal of national regeneration through spiritual improvement proposed by Sanz del Río in his adaptation of the ideas of Krause. Because of the special importance of Sanz del Río in the pre-history of the Institución, an examination of his philosophy is a necessary part of my study, even though he died before Machado was born. I shall also refer to other important Spanish Krausists: Fernando de Castro (1814-74), Federico de Castro (1834-1903), Nicolás Salmerón (1837-1908), Gumersindo de Azcárate (1840-1917), and above all to Francisco Giner de los Ríos (1839-1915), the Krausist who became the most influential shaper of institucionismo, that is to say the policies, objectives and ideals of the Institución Libre. The term "Krausist" is applied to Sanz del Río and his direct philosophical disciples; the term institucionista is reserved for those who created and those who absorbed the distinct ethos of
the school. I shall be defining the characteristics of Krausists and institucionistas in my study and also pointing out the elements of continuity: the persistence of Krausist ideas among later generations of institucionistas, even if they did not regard themselves as adherents of the Krausist philosophy. Among institucionistas I shall concentrate my attention on Machado's teachers, especially Giner (who was a Krausist) and Manuel Bartolomé Cossío (1858-1935).

In spite of the growth of interest in Krausism and the Institución in recent years, neither of these subjects has received as much attention from critics and historians as the life and works of Antonio Machado. Consequently I have felt it necessary to devote more space to describing basic aspects of the former than of the latter. I shall also quote more extensively from the Krausists and institucionistas than from Machado, both because they are less widely known and because the texts from which I am quoting are in many cases much less easily available than the works of Machado.

I have generally preferred to draw my evidence from Machado from his prose writings rather than from his poetry. His prose writings form by far the greater proportion of his works, although this is not the only reason for my preference. His discursive prose provides clearer and more explicit evidence for the study of ideas which constitutes the major part of my thesis.

In the first chapter I make a detailed examination of Machado's schooldays at the Institución, together with an examination of his family's and his own contacts with the school and related circles both before and after his education there. The remaining chapters investigate the influence of ideas from the Institución on Machado in a number of areas of thought: metaphysics (chapter two), ethics (chapter three), art and nature (chapter four), pedagogy and culture (chapter five) and politics (chapter six). My study is predominantly concerned with intellectual history rather than with literary art.
Notes


2 See Bibliography, infra pp.441-445
En mí no hay otro bagaje de cultura que el adquirido en mis años infantiles de los nueve a los diecinueve en que viví con esos santos varones de la Institución Libre de Enseñanza.

Antonio Machado, 1912.
In 1917 Antonio Machado wrote in a typically laconic autobiographical sketch: "me eduqué en la Institución Libre de Enseñanza. A sus maestros guardo vivo afecto y profunda gratitud." In this chapter I wish to concentrate on a detailed examination of this period of Machado’s life - his schooldays - so briefly alluded to by the poet himself, and, as yet, largely unexplored by his biographers. Subsequently I shall outline his contacts with the school, its leading personalities and institutional allies in later years.

There appears to be a consensus that Machado attended the Institución from 1883 to 1889, that is to say from the age of eight until he was fourteen. His registration for the 1883-84 academic year is confirmed by an entry in the Boletín de la Institución Libre de Enseñanza. However in subsequent years the Boletín rarely published lists of its pupils, and it provides no evidence of the date of Machado’s leaving. The convention of dating this event in 1889 arises from his registration in that year at the Instituto de San Isidro, from which it is deduced that he had by that time completed his studies at the Institución.

Recently discovered documents cast doubts on the accuracy of this conventional view. In a letter to Ortega of 1912 Machado writes of "mis años infantiles de los nueve a los diecinueve en que viví con esos santos varones de la Institución Libre de Enseñanza". The discrepancy of his first age (nine instead of eight) from the evidence of the Boletín is attributable to a slip of the memory, or to the fact that he entered the Institución in his ninth year. But the difference between the critics’ fourteen and Machado’s nineteen is too great to be ignored. In fact an examination of Machado’s official school records, discovered by José Luis Cano, shows that he registered at the Instituto.
de San Isidro and later at the Instituto de Cardenal Cisneros merely in order to sit his bachillerato examinations in these centres, and not because he had left the Institución. The records show that he sat the examen de ingreso al bachillerato at San Isidro in 1889, in the very same month (May) as his first proper examination there (Geography). A letter in his file dated August 1890 notifies the transfer of his registration to Cardenal Cisneros, only weeks prior to a September examination there. His registration in both cases was clearly as an examination candidate rather than as a pupil. Finally, the records show that he was an alumno libre: in a letter dated 29 September 1891 begging a second opportunity to take an examination missed through illness Machado refers to himself with these very words; similarly a chart of all his examination results brackets all those taken at Cardenal Cisneros with the word libre. The conclusion from this evidence must be that Machado did not attend classes at either Instituto but merely took his examinations there. Hence his registration at these schools should not be taken as proof of the termination of his studies at the Institución. As I shall explain later, all pupils from private schools had to sit bachillerato examinations in official state educational institutions.

Machado’s examination record also provides evidence which supports his own statement that he remained at the Institución up to his nineteenth year, if not until the age of nineteen. It shows that he studied for and sat bachillerato examinations with some regularity from 1889 to 1893. After the last of these dates there are long periods during which he took no examinations: in fact he completed his bachillerato by taking two subjects in 1897 and six in 1900. The year 1893 appears to mark Machado’s abandonment, albeit temporary, of the pursuit of the title of bachiller, and it seems likely that such a
move might well coincide with the end of his schooldays. At the same time it should be emphasised that the Institución saw its function as quite different from the preparation of pupils to sit State examinations and that there is not a necessary causal link between Machado's leaving of the school and his ceasing to sit examinations. The two events might reasonably be thought to have coincided since they both represent a change in Machado's view of himself and ambitions; 1893 is also important in that it saw him take his first steps in his literary career: in the summer of that year he began writing for La Caricatura. Earlier in the same year his father had died, perhaps prompting him to decide that the time had come to leave school and accept his responsibility to seek a career and hence help to support the family. Manuel Machado had left the Institución earlier and clearly expressed his own sense of responsibility towards his family even before his father's death in a letter to Giner:

Mi queridísimo maestro: V. sabe las tristísimas circunstancias en que nos encontramos y las terribles desgracias que afligen a toda nuestra familia.

Creyendo yo mi deber el trabajar sin descanso cuanto pueda para ayudar al sostenimiento de nuestra casa hoy que mi padre está imposibilitado para ello, acudí días pasados a Don Nicolás Salmerón rogándole que me diese un puesto de redactor en el periódico "La Justicia". 7

The available evidence suggests, in conclusion, that Antonio Machado was a pupil at the Institución from 1883 until 1893.

The best way to begin an examination of the type of education he must have received there is to study how and why the school had developed a specific educational style in the first years of its existence, before Machado began to attend it.
The Institución Libre de Enseñanza was founded in 1876 by a group of University and Instituto teachers who had been removed from their posts following their protests against the 1875 decrees restricting educational syllabuses according to religious and political criteria. These teachers felt they had to defend the principles of free thought and teachers' autonomy (libertad de cátedra). The Institución's founders were Laureano Figuerola, Segismundo Moret, Eugenio Montero Ríos, Nicolás Salmerón, Gumersindo de Azcárate, Francisco and Hermenegildo Giner de los Ríos, Augusto González de Linares, Eduardo Soler, Laureano and Salvador Calderón, Juan A. García Labiano, Jacinto Messía and Joaquín Costa. Following the vocation of these men, the Institución began life as a centre for university studies and a private secondary school. In this second capacity it was officially linked to the Instituto de San Isidro: the Institución's pupils were, in its early days, prepared for bachillerato examinations according to the official programmes, and sat their examinations at San Isidro, where members of the Institución's teaching staff sat on the examining tribunals. However, during the first few years of its existence, the Institución developed a radically different character, moving away from both its initial conception as an independent university and its dependence on official bachillerato programmes and becoming an integrated school for all ages and a pioneer of modern educational thought in Spain. This development took place in a number of stages which can be observed in the innovations introduced into the school's prospectuses over a number of years.

As early as its second year (1877-78), the Institución created a new class "de Ampliación de Instrucción Primaria" in response to what it saw as the inadequacies of the preparation of its pupils, in their prior education, for studying for the bachillerato. This class was entrusted to Germán Flórez, a young
disciple of the Krausists. In the following year this class was expanded to form a real primary school, and Flórez was joined by another young man, Manuel Bartolomé Cossío, who had until then been one of the Institución's older students. In 1879-80 both these men were sent to Europe to complete their own education and the primary school, which in this year acquired an infants section, was entrusted to Joaquín Sama, Ricardo Rubio and Rafael Torres Campos. The development of this primary section was prompted by the Institución's teachers' experience of secondary teaching, by the wishes of parents to have their youngest children educated at the Institución and by the teachers' growing interest in modern European pedagogical thought. Rafael Torres Campos had attended the Exposition Universelle in Paris in 1878 and brought back to the Institución many new educational ideas and materials. The changes the Institución had undergone by 1879 are abundantly clear in its Prospectus for the coming school year. Its former aspiration to be an independent university has been quietly pushed into the background and it declares its intention to "llevar su atención y actividad preferente a la primera y la segunda enseñanza, base indispensable de la educación nacional". It proclaims as its function not the preparation of students to sit examinations but "la cultura del espíritu patrio"; its desire is to create, through education, Spaniards of a new type, and to do so, it feels, it must endeavour to provide an appropriate education for its pupils from the beginning. The Institución had been dissatisfied with those pupils who had received their primary education elsewhere, and in its 1879-80 Prospectus it makes quite clear its divergence from traditional Spanish educational practice and its attraction towards foreign models:

Respetando sinceramente el modo como entre nosotros los españoles suelen concebirse estas dos esferas la primera y la segunda
enseñanza y realizarse consiguientemente sus funciones, la Institución, no sin maduro examen, estudiando ejemplos extranjeros y aprendiendo en su inmediata experiencia, ha adoptado en sus propósitos, organización y procedimientos un sistema distinto, pero en cuyos resultados se halla, en cambio, autorizada para confiar plenamente.

The Prospectus goes on to mention Froebel and to outline its plan to provide a primary education in accordance with that pedagogue's thinking "haciéndola por entero educadora (no meramente instructiva), grata, sencilla, familiar y completa". It mentions the use of the "intuitive" method of teaching and the value of "excursiones instructivas". Furthermore the primary curriculum will be expanded so as to provide a more complete preparation for later studies: the Prospectus lists the following additional activities: drawing, map-making, construction of geometric solids, observation and classification of objects and species from nature, use of scientific apparatus and building of geographical models. But the changes planned by the Institución are not limited to primary education: at the same time as the curriculum of secondary education is allowed to extend back into the primary school, the methodology thought suitable for primary education (following Froebel) is envisaged as equally applicable to secondary and even higher education. This idea determines the continuing evolution of the Institución in the next three years until the Prospectus takes on its definitive form and the school makes a complete break with the official scheme of bachillerato studies.

Again, the evolution was by stages. In 1879-80 all first year bachillerato students attended a wide variety of classes in the primary school as well as pursuing their studies for the two subjects in which they were to be examined, according to the official scheme, at the end of the year, namely Latin and Geography. In the following year this experiment was judged to have been a success and the expansion
of the curriculum for secondary school students beyond
the limited number of subjects demanded by the
bachillerato was extended to secondary school students
of all years. 20 In effect, from 1880-81 onwards all
students, primary and secondary, studied the same
subjects and there was no longer a great divide
between the two types of education. To remove this
divide was the Institución's aim; in 1881 it summarised
its moves in that direction:

Las reformas llevadas a cabo hasta el presente
tendían, en efecto, a fundir, hasta donde
fuese posible, la primera enseñanza y la
segunda bajo la idea capital de que la una
no es más que continuación y desarrollo de
la otra; y de que las dos juntas deben formar,
en consecuencia, un grado único y continuo de
educación - el de la educación general - del
cual son ambas momentos, tan sólo diferentes
en la amplitud que recibe en cada cual de
ellos esa obra, una misma en los dos casos,
como unos mismos son también los objetos de
estudio y los procedimientos educadores. 21

In the conventional Spanish system of the time
gradual, general education was thought to be limited
to the primary school. Pupils who went on to the
Instituto (which was seen as preparatory for university
studies) attended only part-time and limited their
attention in each year to the small number of subjects
to be examined at the end of that year according to the
official programme: typically Latin and Geography in
the first year, Spanish language, the history of Spain
and arithmetic in the second year, geometry, world
history and French in the third year, and so on.
From 1880 onwards, the Institución ceased to divide
its secondary pupils into subject-determined classes
in accordance with the bachillerato scheme. Instead
the whole school, primary and secondary, was divided
into a number of secciones (initially seven, in later
years five or six) to which pupils were allotted
according to their level of attainment, and each
sección received a wide-ranging, full-time education. After trying this new system for a year, the Institución came to the conclusion that it could not be completely successful whilst students continued to have to sit annual bachillerato examinations. The need to prepare particular subjects in particular years prevented pupils from committing their attention to a wide variety of other subjects and prevented their teachers from applying the desired system of a gradual education. The only way, they decided, to implement their own system properly was to make a complete break with the official system of annual examinations. The Institución's 1881-82 Prospectus notified this radical decision thus:

Para evitar este inconveniente, no hay más que un camino: sustituir la matrícula y examen anuales, que obligan a mantener la mencionada distribución de asignaturas, por la matrícula y el examen general al fin de todo el Bachillerato, que la ley establece para la segunda enseñanza privada, y que permite seguir en esta última un plan y un procedimiento enteramente libres. Tal es la reforma que pondremos en práctica para el comienzo de la segunda enseñanza en el curso próximo.

In spite of this important break with the official bachillerato scheme, most of the subjects on the Institución's curriculum coincided with those on the official lists: Spanish language and literature, history, psychology, physiology and hygiene, logic and ethics, arithmetic and geometry, geology, botany, zoology, geography, physics and chemistry. Where the Institución differed most from other schools was in teaching these subjects to all its pupils of all ages, and in its methodology: it did not use the official bachillerato textbooks. The Institución also included in its curriculum subjects not found in the bachillerato programme: astronomy, sociology, law, industry, the history and theory of art, singing, drawing and
gymnastics. From the fourth sección upwards (equivalent to the first year of secondary education) Latin and French were taught - both bachillerato subjects - and English was offered as an option for students who had reached a high level in French. In succeeding years this large curriculum acquired a few more additions: the 1885-86 Prospectus adds modelling, carpentry and "otros trabajos manuales" and gardening, and mentions a new preference for organised games over gymnastics. This last development, with the introduction of rounders, football and paper-chase to the Institución was due to the influence of S.H. Capper, a young Englishman who joined the school's staff in 1882.

Probably more important in determining the special character of the Institución's education than the choice of curriculum were the pedagogical principles which the teachers aspired to put into practice in their work. The 1885-86 Prospectus includes a list of these principles and their applications and gives a good indication of the atmosphere in which a pupil of the school at that time, such as Machado, would have lived and worked, as well as outlining some of the specific activities in which he would have been involved.

One of the key elements of the Institución's education was the need for a close relationship between teacher and pupil. To this end classes were as small as possible and the teachers endeavoured to get to know each pupil individually:

La enseñanza es puramente individual y familiar; el maestro está siempre en íntima relación con el alumno, el cual permanece cada día en la Institución el mayor tiempo posible, para que la acción educadora sea continua.

Teacher-pupil contact was not confined to the class room, and formal class room teaching was not seen as the sole educative process in the school. Between classes the teachers did not retire to a
private staff-room but joined their pupils in the playground. Pupils and teachers ate together. Any contact between them was seen as an opportunity for education in the fullest sense of the word. The institucionistas frequently differentiate between true educación and the more restricted concepts of instrucción or enseñanza:

La Institución no se propone tan sólo enseñar e instruir, sino a la vez, y muy principalmente, educar; su objetivo no se reduce a preparar a sus alumnos para ser en su día abogados, médicos, ingenieros, etc., sino, ante todo, hombres, capaces de dirigirse en la vida y de ocupar digna y útilesmente el puesto que les esté reservado. Para ello tiene que atender, tanto por lo menos como a la inteligencia de sus discípulos, a sus sentimientos, a su moralidad, hábitos, maneras y desarrollo físico. 29

Education is seen as a preparation of the whole man for life. The emphasis placed on such matters as physical fitness and cleanliness, good manners and high moral standards is characteristic of the school. The Institución does not disguise its rejection of many of the conventions of contemporary educational practice: examinations, punishments and rewards, text-books and homework. It wishes to instil discipline and incentive purely by means of "la intimidad personal en que el maestro vive con ellos y del influjo que este régimen permite para despertar en sus conciencias el sentimiento del deber y el respeto a sí mismos". 30 Text-books are rejected because they reduce learning to a feat of memory and restrict the pupil to a passive, purely receptive rôle. The place of the text-book is taken by the pupil's own notebook; in this way active, personal study is encouraged. 31 That the pupil learns best through his own direct observation of the world and an active involvement in learning is a principle adopted by the Institución from Froebel:
Los principios de Froebel, sobre que tan rápidamente se reorganiza en todas las naciones la educación de la primera infancia, cree la Institución, de acuerdo con las tendencias de aquel pedagogo, que deben y pueden extenderse a todos los grados, poniendo al discípulo en contacto con la realidad; dejándolo siempre que sea posible en medio de la naturaleza; haciéndole observar todas las cosas directamente (intuición, excursiones, etc. 32

In the classroom the student is encouraged (where appropriate) to learn through observation and experience rather than from books. But the "intuitive" method has greatest applicability outside the classroom, in educational excursions. Excursions have the added advantages of providing physical exercise and a wider "social" contact between teacher and pupil, and of removing the conventional barriers between school and everyday life. The Institución first used excursions as a teaching method in 1878, extended their range beyond Madrid in 1879, and organised its first month-long summer excursion in 1880. By 1885 it was able to claim to be unique in Europe in the widespread use it made of excursions:

Las excursiones escolares, que se llevan a cabo por la Institución "en mayor escala que en ninguna otra escuela de Europa y en condiciones maravillosamente económicas" (The Times de octubre de 1884) son principalmente arqueológicas, geográficas, geológicas, agrícolas, botánicas e industriales. Cursos completos hay, como los de historia de la pintura, escultura y artes decorativas, que se dan exclusivamente en los museos, cuyas colecciones se aprovechan también en los demás estudios. Muchos alumnos han visitado ya las principales regiones de España, y algunas de las excursiones de verano han llegado a Portugal y a Francia. 33

During normal school hours the pupils of the Institución visited the museums, factories and law-courts of Madrid; at weekends they might range further,
most frequently to El Pardo or to the Guadarrama. In the school holidays longer excursions could be undertaken "visitando y estudiando monumentos, minas, puertos, buques, cultivos, establecimientos industriales, sitios pintorescos y localidades, tomando baños de mar, herborizando, haciendo largos viajes a pie, redactando informes...". 34 The students were clearly expected to be busy and earnest on these excursions, although, following Froebel, the Institución wished to foster at the same time a sense of "alegría en el trabajo". 35 Recreation formed an important part of the timetable: between classes (which were forty-five minutes long) there was a quarter of an hour break for games or rest in the school’s garden; there was time allotted for organized games (with the teachers) after lunch, and one afternoon a week and Sunday mornings were set aside for games and long walks. The Institución nevertheless considered the idleness encouraged by traditional long school holidays pedagogically harmful, and endeavoured to keep the school open and provide useful activities for their pupils during the summer months. 36

The school had originally been established in apartments in Calle de Espartneros, 9, but had moved to larger premises (at Infantas, 42) during the Christmas holidays of 1880-81 as a result of the pressure of growing student numbers. This move was considered a temporary expedient whilst purpose-designed buildings were being constructed. However serious financial difficulties meant that the planned school was left uncompleted, and the Institución moved for the last time in August 1884 to a detached, two-storey house at Paseo del Obelisco, 8. The street was then on the edge of Madrid, facing open fields, and a special tram service for pupils and teachers was arranged. The site provided opportunities for sports and country walks nearby and the house itself enclosed a large garden where pupils could take fresh air and exercise between lessons. Extra classrooms, workshops and scientific laboratories were built around the
garden. The garden is one of the features of the Institución most often evoked by former pupils. Giner and Cossío and the latter's family lived in a section of the building. The school was full of life even outside normal school hours with visitors and lecture courses. The simplicity of the furniture and fittings of both the school and the living-quarters at Obelisco, 8, has also been evoked as characteristic of the style of the Institución. One detail of the decorations which was unusual in a middle-class Spanish home of the period was the use made by the institucionistas of popular Spanish handicrafted items, especially regional pottery and needlework.

Antonio Machado would have attended the Institución at Infantas, 42, for a year before the move to Paseo del Obelisco. The basic principles of the education he must have received there had, as we have seen, been arrived at before his entry. Machado received an education significantly different from that offered by any conventional Spanish school of the time: the school was deliberately unorthodox. Machado studied a wider range of subjects for a longer period of time than he would have had the opportunity to do elsewhere. He was involved in studies and activities unavailable at other Spanish schools: the study of art and sociology, physical and manual education, educational excursions. His teachers were proponents of the most modern pedagogical theories of the time.

The idealistic prospectuses of the Institución give us a clear notion of the school's aspirations. However it is quite justifiable to question how far the day-to-day running of the school could have matched up to its teachers' high ideals. Some of these ideals would be particularly difficult to put into practice. For example the Institución affirms as its base primordial "el principio de la reverencia máxima que al niño se debe" - Froebel's belief that education should be child-centred - and deduces from this
principle the need for ideological neutrality in teaching:

por ello precisamente no es la Institución, ni puede ser de ningún modo, una escuela de propaganda. Ajena, como se ha dicho, a todo particularismo religioso, filosófico y político, absténganse en absoluto de perturbar la niñez y la adolescencia, anticipando en ellas la hora de las divisiones humanas. 39

The Institución might avoid being a school of propaganda, and yet it is difficult to see how such subjects as sociology, ethics and the history of Spain could be taught there without a distinct ideological slant. We know, for example, that the institucionistas believed in teaching history as cultural history and the history of peoples rather than as political history and the history of heroes. 40 In ethics, to proclaim as the Institución did the virtues of tolerance and freedom of thought was to proclaim one's own position of religious heterodoxy in the Spain of the time. I shall be investigating the ideology of institucionismo and its possible influence on Machado in later chapters. For the moment I would like to concentrate on the very real practical problems which faced the Institución in its pursuit of the pedagogical ideals outlined in its prospectuses.

The institucionistas themselves admit, on different occasions, to four specific problems: the problem of financing the school, the problem of recruiting and keeping teaching staff, the problem of attracting the cooperation of parents, and the problem of bachillerato examinations. These four problems are very much inter-related and they have as their root cause the unorthodoxy of the school. They are also problems that are of relevance to a study of Machado's education at the Institución.

The Institución was not set up as a profit-making concern and in fact was almost always economically unviable. Its capital was raised in the form of shares
taken out by people sympathetic to the school's objectives. Its income from fees was insufficient to pay its running costs and the budget could only be balanced thanks to donations and legacies from well-wishers. Its teachers received very little pay or in some cases no pay at all; more often than not the names of the teachers appear in the lists of donors printed in the Boletín. Consequently its teachers had to have or to seek other sources of income. At the same time they had to be totally committed to their work at the Institución and to the school's objectives. In a note written in 1914 Giner describes the difficulty of finding staff who meet these conditions as one of the major problems of the Institución. Sometimes, he writes, members of staff had to leave Madrid to earn their living, and due to staff shortages some subjects were not taught, or were only taught sporadically.

The problem was exacerbated by the demands of a curriculum which aspired to be encyclopaedic at all levels of the school, as is implied by a parenthetic remark in the 1910 Programme:

> las diversas enseñanzas marchan todas paralelamente, de tal suerte, que el niño - cuando el régimen no se perturba por nuestra carencia de medios - debe aprender en el fondo y durante todo el tiempo de su educación, las mismas cosas en las primeras secciones que en las últimas.

In a report made to the Institución's shareholders in 1892 Germán Flórez alludes to the abrumadora tarea of the small group of permanent teachers and describes one of the ways in which their work-load was lessened:

> Quizá nunca como en este año ha recabado la escuela para su obra el auxilio eficaz de los que fueron sus alumnos, utilizando su concurso para la enseñanza especial en las secciones. Y el interés que en sí tiene esta cooperación, por permitir al antiguo profesorado algún mayor descanso en su abrumadora...
Giner too refers to the use of the Institución's older or former pupils as temporary teachers in its primary school, and, like Flórez, emphasises their ideological sympathy as a criterion of suitability. Although they are untrained, he says, they have the advantage of never having acquired the "traditional habits of the profession". The institucionistas clearly had a strong sense of their own uniqueness and unorthodoxy, and, as Gómez Molleda has suggested, this too may well have created problems in recruiting "outsiders" as teachers. In fact the Institución did recruit a large proportion of its new cadres of teachers from its former pupils or from families closely associated with the school; but this source does not appear to have provided sufficient numbers to meet its needs.

The length and depth of the Institución's curriculum, though based on the best of pedagogical principles, was as much a cause of difficulties for the families of its pupils as it was for its over-worked teaching staff. In the text referred to above, Germán Flórez acknowledges the existence of conflict between the pedagogical ideal and the real, material concerns of parents. On the one hand he notes "las exigencias de una educación general sólida, obra lenta de suyo y que pide continuidad durante bastantes más años de los que es uso en nuestro país dedicar a esa enseñanza, o sea a la 1ª y la 2ª enseñanza". On the other hand he sees "las necesidades materiales perentorias de las familias de la clase media menos acodadas, que son las que principalmente nos confían la educación de sus hijos. Middle-class families, he says, are willing to make sacrifices in order to keep their children at school or
university, but they will do so only up to a point, and expect their children to obtain jobs of a certain standing in return. Many pupils of the Institución, according to this report, left the school prematurely, their education incomplete in the eyes of their teachers, in order to seek elsewhere useful qualifications so as to be able to earn a living. 47

Two years later, Flórrez reported yet again the poverty of the Institución and its small number of pupils and squarely laid the blame on the adverse opinion held by many parents of the unorthodox (but fundamental) features of the school’s programme:

Flórrez’s answer is in the negative; the Institución believes wholeheartedly in the soundness of its reformed educational system and maintains that it is parents who are at fault for removing their children from the school before their education is completed. The results observable in pupils who have stayed the course, claims Flórrez, speak for themselves. On occasion the Institución even alludes to the formal academic
successes of such pupils as proof of the value of its system:

Los exámenes que verifican sus alumnos de la Institución ante los tribunales oficiales, de un lado, y de otro el influjo natural que sus procedimientos ejercen en otros establecimientos de enseñanza, indican bien claramente que cada día reconocen, aun los menos adictos al método de la Institución, el indiscutible valor y la real importancia de su obra...hemos de decirlo sin jactancia: los alumnos que han completado aquí su educación reciben, donde quiera que van a continuar sus estudios superiores, justificado aprecio. 49

In principle, the Institución does not believe in an examination-orientated system, but circumstances force it to admit the necessity of its pupils gaining official sanction through the bachillerato. There is even evidence that it made some allowance for the examination requirements of its older pupils: in 1887, for example, the Boletín reports that excursions for students of the fourth and fifth secciones have been suspended because they are preparing for examinations. 50 But the Institución wished its pupils to complete the full programme of courses before submitting to examination. Rather than taking annual examinations, they should wait until they are ready for "el examen general al fin de todo el Bachillerato, que la ley establece para la segunda enseñanza privada". 51 Flórez noted the problem of students leaving the Institución prematurely to seek qualifications elsewhere; parents were too impatient to await the outcome of a single, final examination. Another way in which students frequently deviated from the Institución’s plans was in endeavouring to study for and sit annual bachillerato examinations at the same time as following the school’s own, unorthodox curriculum. Giner recorded the disastrous consequences of this procedure in a prologue written in 1914-15:
Tan pronto como suprimimos la preparación para los exámenes anuales, sobrevino la crisis. (...) Este sistema no va a poder seguir; nos tiene menos perturbados que cuando teníamos que preparar anualmente a nuestros alumnos; pero en otro sentido, es casi peor; entonces, teníamos ambas riendas en una misma mano, la homogeneidad de ambas era mayor, y, sobre todo, no era posible que nuestros alumnos, ante la idea de que lo principal es el examen, pospongan frecuentemente nuestros trabajos a su preparación, hasta el punto de faltar a clase la última parte del curso.  

In 1881 Giner had stressed the importance of the confidence and cooperation of parents in ensuring the success of the Institución's system after the break with the annual bachillerato examinations, and the Boletín had optimistically reported the enthusiastic reaction of parents. However, looking back on the very real problems created by this break, Giner, like Flórez before him, puts the blame for these on the parents rather than on the Institución:

Ahora, el mal nace del sistema dualista que quieren las familias hacer que lleve el alumno, estudiando en la Institución, unas ciertas cosas y de un cierto modo, y otras cosas, o aún estas mismas, de un modo diferente durante varios años. Y como el dualismo, seriamente llevado, fatiga y desmoraliza en el desdén, y como el examen es lo principal para el título, esta preparación lleva la primacía.

Esta es una primera causa de la ignorancia de nuestros alumnos y de la indiferencia de muchos de ellos alimentada por la familia.  

The abandonment of the annual bachillerato scheme produced a number of problems, then, and whether we apportion the blame to the Institución or to the parents it was the children who suffered the worst consequences. Many of them were forced to change schools and had to study under two totally different systems, either successively or concurrently. The problem of poor
attendances at examination times is recorded again and
again in the Boletín. 55 The whole question of the
conflict between the Institución and the bachillerato
was only resolved by the creation of the Instituto-
Escuela in 1918, for the Institución's pupils could be
assessed there without examination.56 At the same time
the Instituto-Escuela, a state-run institution inspired
by institucionista principles, undoubtedly attracted
potential pupils away from the Institución. 57

Back in 1881, the crisis provoked by the examination
question had also manifested itself in a drop in enrol-
ment, and hence affected the school's financial position.
Angel do Rego, a pupil at that time and later a teacher
at the Institución, remembers the public hostility dem-
onstrated against the Institución in the 1882 Congreso
Nacional Pedagógico and manifested in street battles
between pupils of the Institución and other schools,
and claims that many parents reacted by removing their
children from the school. 58 Other former pupils have
recalled their own problems in tackling the bachillerato:
Jimena Menéndez Pidal remembers her distress on first
having to deal with an official bachillerato textbook; 59
Manuel Varela Uña describes his — typical — experience
of two conflicting educational systems as psychologically
confusing and pedagogically harmful:

era insólito que no se calificara ni se
enviaran calificaciones a los padres, que
no hubiera exámenes, que no se adaptasen las
enseñanzas ni los programas a las pautas
oficiales y que expresa y deliberadamente no
se nos preparase a los alumnos para los exámenes
del Bachillerato.

La divergencia entre la educación que allí
se daba y la instrucción que era preciso
adquirir fuera de la escuela para superar los
exámenes de los distintos cursos del Bachille-
rato dio origen a bastante confusión en
nuestras mentes, y a bastante desorden en
nuestros estudios, que redundara, sin duda,
en perjuicio de nuestro caudal de conocimientos
positivos y de nuestros hábitos de trabajo. 60
Antonio Machado's performance in the official bachillerato examinations can only be analysed correctly if one is aware of the complexities and problems involved in the Institución's attitudes to such examinations. His examination record can be summarised thus:

<table>
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<th>Subject</th>
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<tr>
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<td>May 1889</td>
<td>Aprobado</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geografía (S.I.)</td>
<td>May 1889</td>
<td>Aprobado</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latín y castellano 1 (S.I.)</td>
<td>Sept 1889</td>
<td>Aprobado</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Sept 1890</td>
<td>Suspens</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jan 1891</td>
<td>Bueno</td>
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<tr>
<td>Historia de España (S.I.)</td>
<td>Sept 1889</td>
<td>Suspens</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>June 1890</td>
<td>No Presentado</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>June 1891</td>
<td>Aprobado</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latín y castellano 2</td>
<td>June 1891</td>
<td>No presentado</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sept 1891</td>
<td>Aprobado</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retórica y poética</td>
<td>Sept 1891</td>
<td>Aprobado</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psicología, Lógica y ética</td>
<td>June 1892</td>
<td>Aprobado</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aritmética y Algebra</td>
<td>Sept 1892</td>
<td>Suspens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>June 1893</td>
<td>Aprobado</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geometría y trigonometría</td>
<td>Sept 1892</td>
<td>Suspens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sept 1897</td>
<td>Bueno</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historia Universal</td>
<td>Sept 1897</td>
<td>Notable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francés 1er. curso</td>
<td>June 1892</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>June 1893</td>
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<td>Francés 2º curso</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>June 1893</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historia natural y</td>
<td>June 1900</td>
<td>Bueno</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fisiología</td>
<td>June 1900</td>
<td>Bueno</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultura</td>
<td>June 1900</td>
<td>Suspens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Física y Química</td>
<td>Sept 1900</td>
<td>Notable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ejercicios del grado</td>
<td>Sept 1900</td>
<td>Aprobado</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>de bachiller</td>
<td></td>
<td>S.I. = At Instituto de San Isidro; remainder were at Instituto del Cardenal Cisneros.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first point that must be made is that Machado did not follow the Institución's preferred procedure of sitting a single general examination (unlike, for example, Julián Besteiro, a famous contemporary of Machado at the school, who took and passed the single examination at the age of seventeen). Machado began
taking examinations at the age of thirteen, and the
order in which he took them roughly corresponds to the
official programme. 63 In the period while he was at
the Institución (up to 1893) his marks were low and
included a number of failures. He appears to have
abandoned the bachillerato in 1893 only to resume
preparation for examinations in his twenties. He
finally completed the course requirements for the title
of bachiller at the age of twenty-five. It is a far
from brilliant examination record.

However, I think it is a mistake to deduce from
his record, as Cano has done, that Machado must have
been a lazy scholar or that his teachers at the
Institución lacked the necessary pedagogical rigour. 64
As we have seen, the school did not prepare its pupils
for annual bachillerato examinations and pupils who
tried to sit such examinations privately encountered
considerable difficulties - Machado was in no way a
unique case. The Institución aimed to educate more
gradually than orthodox schools and did not use the
official text-books. It rejected the memory-learning
apparently demanded by the oral bachillerato
examination system. If the Institución provided an
inadequate preparation for these examinations it was
because it consciously rejected the view of education
on which the bachillerato was based.

One criticism that has been made of the Institución's
system of education is that, after the 1881 breakaway,
the pupils lacked the discipline of a formal curriculum
and were allowed to choose the subjects they studied,
hence leaving gaps in their education. 65 I can find
no evidence of the existence of such a system of options;
on the contrary it is apparent that the school's pupils
had to study more subjects and for a longer period of
time than in conventional schools. However we have seen
that the Institución suffered from staff shortages and
occasionally was unable to teach certain subjects for
this reason. This may have been a factor in the poor
academic record of Machado. Another criticism that has been made of the Institución is applicable to "progressive" education generally: that without examinations it is difficult to motivate pupils to work, and without some memorisation knowledge tends to be rather too vague. Whether this is true or not, some of the force is taken out of the argument by the fact that the Institución's pupils were well aware of the pressures and demands of examinations because they (and their parents) knew that the bachillerato was an unavoidable hurdle. The school's major failure was surely in believing that it could unilaterally declare its independence from the rest of the Spanish education system.

We have two anecdotes from Machado's memories of his bachillerato examinations. José Machado records one of them:

Hagamos ahora referencia de uno de sus exámenes. Se trataba de una asignatura de la que estaba en general bien preparado. Sin embargo, de una lección de Historia Natural - que era el examen - en la que se hablaba de un animal, del que terminaba el autor diciendo: "porque la boca y el ano están en el mismo plano" no le quedaron en la memoria más que estas palabras del docto catedrático. Y mire usted por donde, al examinarse de esta asignatura, le tocó esta lección. Estaba patinando sobre la descripción de este animal, del que nada recordaba en aquel momento, cuando de repente el profesor para ayudarle a salir del atolladero le dijo: - Sí, hombre, sí, ese animal que se distingue porque la boca y el ano ... - Están en el mismo plano - contestó ya sin vacilar el Poeta -. Esta contestación fulminante dada con tanta seguridad, le agradó tanto al catedrático que no dudó tampoco en darle un sobresaliente como una casa... 67

Good luck in the draw for selection of questions and the ability to memorise chunks of the official text-books were the keys to examination success, and Machado had to submit to the absurdities of such a
system, even at the age of twenty-four! He himself recalls an occasion when his luck ran out:

Los bachilleres de mi tiempo estudiábamos una química a ojo de buen cubero, que se detenía en los umbrales de la química orgánica y en una lección, de funesta memoria para mí, que se titulaba "Brevisima idea de los hidrocarburos". Era la última y más extensa lección del libro y la única que no alcancé a estudiar. Por desdicha, me tocó en suerte a la hora del examen. "Los hidrocarburos" —dije yo, con voz entrecortada por el terror al suspenso inevitable— "son unas sustancias compuestas de hidrógeno y de carbono". Y como el catedrático me invitase a continuar, añadí humildemente: "Como dice: brevisima idea..." 68

His final ironic quotation implies ridicule of the text-book and of the whole academic system, as well as confessing his own ignorance. In Machado's later professional life as a teacher the characteristic institucionista scorn for examinations is clearly expressed. 69 Any resentment about his own difficulties in becoming a bachiller was directed against the examinations, not the teachers at the Institución who failed to prepare him to pass them. Whilst he remembers his teachers at the Institución with love and gratitude, he dismisses his contact with the official academic world thus: "Pasé por el Instituto y la Universidad, pero de estos centros no conservo más huella que una gran aversión a todo lo académico". 71 The autobiographical article from which this quotation is taken suggests it would be wrong to characterise the young Machado as a lazy or disinterested student; he writes "He asistido durante veinte años, casi diariamente, a la Biblioteca Nacional" (presumably the years 1886-1906) and adds "mis lecturas han sido especialmente de filosofía y de literatura, pero he tenido afición a todas las ciencias". 72 The same article contains a list of some of the teachers at the Institución he remembers:
Francisco Vega Díaz has expressed surprise that Machado’s list is so short and that it does not include the names of some of the more famous Krausist founders of the Institución. 74 The brevity of the list is explained in part by the staffing arrangements under the secciones system that had been adopted. Whereas in its early years the Institución had assigned particular teachers to particular bachillerato courses (the 1877-78 Prospectus lists fifteen teachers and twelve auxiliares in its secondary department), 75 from 1880 onwards the pupils were divided into secciones for full-time education with full-time teachers. In 1880-81 there were nine profesores de sección; in succeeding years the number varied between eight and ten (not including the teachers of the infants’ sección). In some years the Boletín lists specific teachers as belonging to specific secciones. In 1881 the Prospectus describes the system as one of "secciones lo más reducidas posibles, cada una de las cuales está a cargo de dos o más profesores, que, de mutuo acuerdo, proveerán a las diversas exigencias de su educación". 76 This seems clear enough, but other statements suggest that the distribution of teaching was more complex. We have seen reference to former pupils helping with "la enseñanza especial en las secciones", 77 and to the impossibility of teaching some subjects for "cursos enteros" because of staffing problems. 78 It seems most probable that specific teachers were appointed to direct the studies of particular secciones but would not be asked to teach all the subjects within the large curriculum to their particular group. The more specialised subjects would have been taught by those profesores de sección best qualified to do so, or by specialists drawn from
outside the group of eight to ten "form-masters": either young auxiliares or older profesores especiales. The latter are listed in the Institución's prospectuses as a group separate from the profesores de sección; in 1885, for example, there is a list of twenty-three profesores especiales. However only a small number of these played an active part in the school's teaching, giving classes in specialist subjects (such as drawing, languages, sciences, handicrafts) on a regular but part-time basis, or joining in as teacher-guides in the programme of excursions. The majority of profesores especiales remained on the lists as vestiges of the Institución's original pretension to be an independent university. The school did continue to maintain a sección (the sixth) for university-level studies, in which, in theory, pupils would receive specialised training from these profesores especiales, many of whom were eminent scientists or professors working outside the Institución. 79 However the sixth sección appears to have had very few students and for many of the profesores especiales the title they held was purely nominal and a demonstration of nothing more or less than their links of sympathy with the Institución and its aims. Other eminent men maintained a similar none-teaching link as members of the Junta directiva or Junta facultativa or by collaborating with the Boletín.

Machado, then, in his days at the Institución, would have known a number of profesores especiales through occasional classes or excursions, but the teachers with whom he would have had most prolonged contact would have been the profesores de sección. In the years when he attended the school the Boletín only provides lists of teachers on three occasions, but since the variations are slight we might assume that they are representative. In 1884-85 the profesores de sección for the primary/secondary school were: Sección II: Germán Flórez and Aniceto Sela; III: Joaquín Sama and Antonio García; IV: José de Caso and Ricardo Rubio;
V: Francisco Giner de los Ríos and Manuel Bartolomé Cossío. In 1887-88 these same eight men are listed as "estudios generales" teachers without being assigned to particular secciones and they are joined on this list by Edmundo Lozano and José Ontañón. 80

Apart from Francisco Giner, none of these men were at that time well-known outside the Institución, and Giner is the only one who had been among the school’s founders. In effect, the dissident catedráticos who had founded the Institución had drifted away from active involvement in the day to day running of the school. This was the consequence of two changes: the change in the nature of the Institución, which had come to concentrate on pre-university education and the change in the political climate after the fall of Cánovas’s government in 1881. The new Liberal government had restored many of the former dissidents to their cátedras, and others became actively involved in politics under the new regime. By 1882 the Calderón brothers, Moreto Montero Ríos, Figuerola, Soler, García Labiano and Messía had all gone and Hermenegildo Giner and Azcárate no longer taught at the school, though they maintained a connection as Secretary and Vice-Rector respectively. 81

Francisco Giner, elected Rector of the Institución in 1880, became the undisputed head of the school from then until his death. The small group of full-time teachers who accompanied him in this, the school’s "segunda época" were, with the exception of Joaquín Sama, young men of the generation after his, and in many cases his former pupils. 82 Luzuriaga has called them "los educadores" to distinguish them from "los fundadores" and has emphasised the importance of their contribution to institucionismo:

Aunque de menor nombradía que los profesores fundadores anteriores, el grupo que constituyen los que llamamos los "educadores" es el que en realidad ha llevado a cabo la obra
Machado's list of maestros comprises five of these educadores - Cossío, Caso, Sela, Sama and Rubio - and two fundadores: Giner and Costa. Of the latter he writes that he saw him for the last time at the age of nine. Costa had been one of Giner's students in the Law Faculty at Madrid University and subsequently one of the founders of the Institución. In the school's "primera época" he frequently features among the lists of teachers in the Boletín but, although Giner considered him as a possible candidate for the job of teacher in the primary section in 1879, he never appears as a teacher in either the primary or secondary parts of the school. Costa was editor of the Boletín from 1881 or 1882 to 1884 and was responsible for its expansion in size during these years. His main teaching contribution to the school seems to have been his involvement in excursions, and Machado may well have met him on these or through Costa's friendship with his father, Antonio Machado y Alvarez. Cacho Viu says that Costa led botanical excursions to Moncloa, and there are indeed references to such activities in the Boletín. He left the immediate circle of the Institución in 1884 - which corresponds to Machado's memories - but continued to be thought of as one of its allies and even as a public spokesman for institucionismo, especially on pedagogical matters. Machado may well have included him amongst his list of fondly-remembered teachers as much for his later interest in Costa as a figure of national importance as for any impression made on him by Costa in his first year as a pupil at the Institución.

Friends of Antonio Machado have remembered that he had a special affection for José de Caso, as well as for Giner and Cossío. Rubén Landa writes of conversations with Machado in Segovia:
Los dos nos habíamos educado en la Institución Libre de Enseñanza. Iba\nmos descubriendo coincidencias en nuestras admiraciones y afectos. Por ejemplo, un día don Antonio me dijo que de sus maestros de la Institución el que más estimaba, con don Francisco Giner y el señor Cossío era don José de Caso. 89

The same preferences on the part of Machadó are recorded by Joaquín Xirau. 90

The Boletín gives some details of Caso's career. José de Caso (1850-1928) was both a Krausist philosopher and a pedagogue. He studied under Sanz del Río and eventually took his doctorate in philosophy. He taught at the Institución from 1876 to 1889. Prior to 1876 he had taught at Salmerón's Colegio Internacional and as an auxiliar in both the University of Madrid and the Instituto de San Isidro. In the first years of the Institución he taught psychology and geography in the secondary school. He was also "Director de primera y segunda enseñanza" and as such was very much involved in the important reforms introduced into the school in the 1877-81 period. Subsequently he became a profesor de sección and was editor of the Boletín from Costa's departure until 1889. In 1884 he was appointed to the Chair of Philosophy at Madrid University endowed by Sanz del Río, but he managed to combine the duties of this post with his work at the Institución until 1889. 91

Another of Machado's teachers who later moved on to a university career was Aniceto Sela (1863-1935). He had first come into contact with the Krausists as a student of law, and in his early twenties he joined the Institución as a profesor de sección. He held this position until 1888 when he moved to Valencia, having been appointed to the Chair of International Law there. In 1891 he joined the group of Krausist professors at Oviedo University where he was very active in the University Extension school both as secretary and as a teacher of "Contemporary History and Problems". 92 Eventually he became Rector of the University. His
teaching career at the Institución was relatively brief, though probably busy, and happened to coincide with Antonio Machado's first years as a pupil there. Sela corresponded with Machado y Alvarez, and the latter's letters show that the young teacher had made an impression on his son Antonio: letters written in 1884 include such messages as "afectuosos recuerdos de Antoñito", "mi hijo Antonio que tiene algo de zahorí, le quiere a usted mucho y le envía conmigo cariñosos recuerdos", "... mi hijo Antonio que está siempre diciendo — Yo quiero mucho al señor Sela porque es muy bueno —". Sela was, with Germán Flórez, in charge of the Institución's second sección at that time, and it is most probable that Machado was in his class. His messages show that Sela succeeded in establishing the sort of close relationship with his pupils that the Institución's principles demanded.

The three other "educadores" in Machado's list were all men who, once having entered the Institución, remained dedicated to it for the rest of their lives. Both Cossío and Ricardo Rubio first attended the school as post-bachillerato students and were soon afterwards recruited to teach in the developing primary school. Manuel Bartolomé Cossío (1858-1935) is, after Giner, the best known institucionista, but unlike Giner, Cossío did not shun public life, holding a number of important posts outside the Institución, the most important of which was the directorship of the Museo Pedagógico Nacional. He also gained fame as an art historian and as the first "Citizen of Honour" of the Second Republic. In the Institución he was successively student, auxiliar, teacher, director de excursiones and Rector. His pedagogical thought was an important constituent of the character and style of the Institución and I shall return to it in later chapters. Machado wrote a tribute to Cossío on his death, though without naming his former teacher.

Ricardo Rubio (1856-1935) never gained public
attention outside the Institución, but he was one of its longest-serving teachers. He first taught there as an auxiliar on the bachillerato course of Logic and Ethics in 1877, although he himself was no more than a bachiller, at the time beginning his undergraduate studies in law. In the following two years he also taught geography and "Retórica y poética". In 1879 he was made one of the teachers responsible for the primary school when Cossío and Flórez went abroad to "ampliar estudios". Although he eventually graduated in law he had lost all interest in pursuing it as a career after he had found his true vocation as a teacher at primary and secondary levels. His dedication and versatility made him an ideal profesor de sección. Guided by some of the eminent natural scientists associated with the Institución he studied and later taught a wide range of subjects, including botany, and he wrote articles on physical education and hygiene. He ran the Institución's first long summer excursion in 1881. He was at different times the school's librarian and editor of the Boletín. Although he also worked alongside Cossío as Secretary of the Museo Pedagógico Nacional, his life was fundamentally one of total dedication to the Institución.

The last profesor de sección remembered with affection by Machado is Joaquín Sama (1840-95), a Krausist of Giner's generation. Sama had been one of Federico de Castro's most prominent disciples in the University of Seville and worked as a teacher of Psychology in the Instituto de Huelva. In 1875 he was one of those who protested against Orovio's decrees on education and this protest was without a doubt a factor that led to him being dismissed from his post, although the official explanation was that he had taken unjustified sick-leave. In 1879 Giner invited him to join the staff of the Institución and he began teaching there in October of that year. His dedication and willingness to adapt himself to the school's needs were akin to those of Rubio; Giner has described Sama thus:
Sama, que llegó a esta casa con una amplísima base filosófica, se entregó de lleno, por entero, sin preferencias, a la obra de la educación general, atendiendo a todas las solicitudes de su espíritu, ensayando procedimientos modernos en todo, siendo alumno en excursiones de arte o de geología, maestro después de las mismas enseñanzas, encantado siempre con el trabajo, haciendo de su vida entera, de todas sus actividades, órganos para la educación de su país. 97

A former pupil of Sama, José Ontañón (hijo), remembers particularly his friendliness and patience in the classroom, his scientific excursions, his interests in sports and handicrafts and his knowledge of Latin. 98

Giner remembers his belief in the importance of moral education and his typically institucionista view that education was the only solution to the problems of Spain. Sama had campaigned for election as a Republican deputy in the years prior to his entry into the Institución, and Giner recounts his unorthodox technique of electioneering:

Su propaganda electoral consistía siempre en hablar de la educación popular; y antes de acudir al meeting en el teatro, con los discursos y las aclamaciones, pasaba por la escuela, llevando en su compañía a las autoridades y a los ricos, y hacía una lección a los niños, de la que pudieran todos deducir el valor y la urgencia que para la nación entraña la enseñanza. Extraño modo de hacer propaganda política en un país tan despreocupado del porvenir. 99

Sama had founded schools and self-help associations for workers in Huelva and San Vicente de Alcántara (his birthplace), and in Madrid he was involved with the Asociación para la enseñanza de la Mujer. He wrote many articles on social and pedagogical questions.

As I have already stated, the Institución’s teachers were paid little or nothing for their labours, and Sama was only able to give so much of his time to his teaching there (Ontañón speaks of his "clases de la
Institución, numerosas y variadas") because he had money of his own. This ran out in 1893 and he cheerfully accepted the necessity of returning to paid work at an Instituto, taking up a post in Guadalajara. Characteristically, Sama found a way of remaining a teacher at the Institución: he continued to live in Madrid and commuted when necessary to Guadalajara. Furthermore he endeavoured to introduce institucionista practices - excursions, sports, close pupil/teacher relationships into the Instituto. Exhausted by overwork, he died in 1895.

Such were the men whom Machado remembered from his schooldays. Who were his other teachers, apart from Giner, Cossío, Caso, Sela, Rubio and Sama? From the lists of profesores de sección published in the Boletín we can definitely add four names: Germán Flórez, José Ontaño (padre), Antonio García and Edmundo Lozano. Both Flórez and Ontaño were long-serving teachers at the Institución. Flórez was a disciple of Fernando de Castro and Gumersindo de Azcárate who became a teacher in the Institución's primary school when this was first created and remained there for the rest of his life. Cossío describes him as a shy, humble man who never aspired to any other position. Ontaño was principally a teacher of Latin and music although sometimes he assumed the wider responsibilities of a profesor de sección. He introduced singing into the curriculum in 1880, playing a harmonium that had belonged to Fernando de Castro and introducing his own translations of Mozart and Schubert. Spanish folk-songs were added to the repertoire later. He is most remembered as a teacher of Latin and in this capacity he may well qualify for the unfortunate distinction of being the object of Machado's only pejorative remark about his schooling at the Institución: "Ando muy flojo de latín, porque me lo hizo aborrecer un mal maestro". Since Machado sat examinations in Latin as early as 1889 he must have been referring to a teacher at the Institución.
Edmundo Lozano was brought to the Institución by Germán Flórez and worked there as a teacher during two different periods, the first of which was 1879 to 1890. Unlike Flórez, he had not a sufficient private income to dedicate his whole life to underpaid or unpaid teaching and his departure for South Africa in 1890 was apparently motivated by the hope that he could accumulate enough capital to be able to do so. As a teacher he was remembered for his physics and chemistry courses and for the workshop he created where pupils could make their own scientific apparatus. A second string to his bow was his passion for art and architecture, and he led a great number of excursions to Spain’s "ciudades monumentales". 104

Of Antonio García I have been able to find out very little other than that he was a profesor de sección during the 1880s (at least) and organized excursions. 105 In the 1884-85 Prospectus he was assigned to the third sección alongside Joaquín Sama, being referred to as simply "D Antonio García; bachiller", whereas in 1885-86 he is credited with a degree in mathematics. 106 From this we may deduce that he was yet another young university student recruited by the Institución because of his ideological sympathies or his association with one or another of the school’s teachers. His name does not appear in the Boletín in later years. Since former teachers were normally given an obituary in the Boletín on their death, we can assume that he was still alive in 1936 when the review ceased publication. 107

Machado must have had some contact with other teachers apart from the ones he lists: as we have seen several of these left the Institución before he did and must have been replaced. But the Boletín only provides lists of teachers for three of the years he was there: after 1888 there was no new list for ten years. Although Costa introduced a greater quantity of learned articles into the review, the Boletín during and after his editorship contains much less information on the
day-to-day running of the school than the earlier volumes. Machado’s teachers may have included such men as Rafael Torres Campos and José Lledó, both of whom feature as active teachers in the 1870s and early 1880s but whose subsequent relationship with the Institución is somewhat uncertain. From the list of profesores especiales we can extract certain names of men who very probably gave him some classes in specialised subjects or guided him on educational excursions: the English teacher J. Jameson, the carpenter José Martín and the artists Luis Sainz and Aureliano Beruete (Cacho Viu says Beruete gave classes in landscape drawing "en el soto del puente de San Fernando") and a number of distinguished scientists: Blas Lázaro, botanist and author of a major work on Spanish flora, José MacPherson, a pioneer of geological research in Spain, and his pupil Francisco Quiroga, who gained fame as the first scientific explorer of the Spanish colony of Río de Oro, and the naturalist Ignacio Bolívar. In a chapter of Juan de Mairena Machado praises the value of educational excursions and evokes his memories of "hombres maduros y ancianos venerables, capaces de atravesar la sierra de Guadarrama...movidos por el afán científico de estudiar la estructura y composición de las piedras o de encontrar una nueva especie de lagartijas", mentioning Bolívar specifically.

The evocation is valid for many of his teachers from the Institución on such excursions.

The Institución repeatedly emphasises in its programmes and prospectuses the importance for the success of the school of a factor beyond the school’s direct control: the attitudes of the parents of its pupils. The 1910 Bases state:

La Institución, por último, considera indispen-
sable a la eficacia de su obra la activa cooperación de las familias...Nada más nocivo para la educación del niño como el
In one respect, the Machado family does appear to have deviated from the school's wishes: in having Antonio sit annual bachillerato examinations. However, as Giner's comments show, this deviation from the school's way of thinking by parents was all too common, and, as Flórez suggests, was a sign of their greater "realism." Whatever the Machado family's reasons were for deciding on this particular course of action, it continued to be regarded as one of the "familias estrechamente vinculadas a la Institución desde su origen", on a par with the Giner, Quiroga and Ontañón families. In effect the Machado family's connections with the Krausists predate the founding of the Institución.

The poet's grandfather, Antonio Machado y Núñez (1812-96) was a friend of the Krausist Federico de Castro in Seville and with him founded the Revista de Filosofía, Literatura y Ciencias, an important organ of Krausism. Antonio Jiménez-Landi regards Machado y Núñez, Spain's first Professor of Geology, as one of the founding-fathers of the dynasty of natural scientists associated with the Institución - he was MacPherson's teacher. He was one of the professors who protested against Orovio's decrees. His move to Madrid's Faculty of Natural Sciences in 1883 was instrumental in bringing his grandson to the Institución and also in removing Salvador Calderón from the school's staff, for Calderón took over Machado y Núñez's Chair in Seville. Giner refers to him in his writings as "el entusiasta y benemérito Machado...el inolvidable Machado.

Antonio Machado y Alvarez, son of Machado y Núñez and father of the poet, was also attached to the Krausist circle in Seville. He was a pupil of Federico de Castro, and even on occasion substituted
for him in his Chair of Metaphysics. His enthusiasm for Krausism is demonstrated by a detail in a letter of 1871 to Giner:

> Mi señora madre está haciendo por indicación mía un retrato al óleo de Dn. Julián Sanz del Río que destinaré para santo de cabeza: desearía que me escribiese Vd. lo más pronto posible el color de los ojos.

His letters to Giner reveal a friendly relationship based on a common enthusiasm for Krausism and shared interests in publishing. One letter implies that Machado y Álvarez was involved in the publishing of Giner’s translation of Krause’s *Compendio de Estética*—a volume which appeared in Seville in 1874. In another letter Machado y Álvarez reveals an arrangement in which Giner sent copies of the *Ideal de la Humanidad* to Seville where Machado would sell them.

Machado y Álvarez’s friendship with Giner seems to have been instrumental in his establishing contact with Joaquín Costa for literary collaborations. In a letter dated 9 August 1879 Giner wrote to Costa:

> Antonio Machado (hijo), dedicado al estudio de la literatura popular, y que parece tener a él vocación decidida, está encantado con sus Dialectos, que publica en la Enciclopedia de Sevilla, y desea ponerse en relación con V. para sus trabajos comunes, como ya lo está con algunos extranjeros. Está V. apercibido, por si se dirigiese a éste y yo no estuviera ya aquí.

In effect, Machado was writing to Costa on the very same day to apologise for printing Costa’s articles on dialects without seeking his prior permission. He did so, he claimed, believing that "el mucho respeto que profeso a los de la Institución ha de ampararme de cualquier indiscreción que para con ellos pudiera cometer".

Subsequent letters show the beginnings of a collaboration in work on folklore. Machado y Álvarez refers to Giner
as "nuestro amigo común" and in several letters forwards
gards to him and to other institucionistas: "Afectuosos
re cuer dos a los Sres Giner, Gonzalo Serrano, Linares y
el Sr. Castro...", "Carifios a Sama y Giner". 127 These
letters to Costa also reveal that Machado y Alvarez was
somewhat in awe of both Giner and Castro:

He does not resent these criticisms though "por lo mucho
que el Sr. Giner me quiere y la injusta benevolencia con
que mira todas mis cosas y esa que algunas, entre
parentesis, son atroces"; 129 he accepts his position
as pupil and junior to Giner.

Another of Machado y Alvarez's friends at the
Institución, and one of his son's teachers, Joaquín
Sama, wrote an article in tribute to him on his death
in 1893. He describes Machado y Alvarez as "nuestro
simpático colaborador" and "persona de las que más
simpatizaban con la obra de la Institución". 130
In the year of the school's opening Machado y Alvarez
had written to Giner asking for "50 o 100 prospectos
de la Enseñanza libre (sic) para hacer propaganda" and
affirmed "tanto mi padre como yo le garantizamos que
hacemos cuanto se nos ocurra en pro de esa Institución
de Enseñanza". 131 He tried to enlist people to take
out shares in the Institución (though apparently he was
unable to do so himself) and his father sent a parcel of
fifty books for the school library "como pequeña muestra
del cariño que profesa a Vás. y de simpatía por la
noble empresa que realizan". 132 Years later the
Boletín acknowledges receipt of the gift of an oil-
painting from Machado y Nuñez's wife Cipriana Alvarez
de Machado, and implies that this was by no means her
first donation. Machado y Alvarez dedicated his Cantes flamencos (1881) to the Institución Libre. Both Machado y Núñez and Machado y Alvarez contributed to the Boletín; the latter published twenty-one articles, reviews and translations there between 1882 and 1887, mostly on the theme of folklore. In 1885 the Institución honoured Machado y Alvarez by creating a special Chair of Folklore for him at the school, although he appears never to have given any classes; as I have explained, there were a number of purely nominal profesores especiales on the school’s staff lists.

J.G. Brotherston has examined Machado y Alvarez’s move away from Krausism and espousal of Positivism in the 1870s. In a letter of 1880 Machado y Alvarez ironically informed Costa of his change:

Dale un abrazo de media hora a mi querido amigo D. Francisco Giner a quien dirá V. que estoy hecho un renegado, un apóstata, pues he dicho en público, como podrá ver en el extracto de las sesiones del ateneo, publicadas en "La Enciclopedia", que me inclino más al utilitarista (sic) Herbert Spencer que a Krause.

The adoption of Positivist ideas did not mean rejection of or by his friends at the Institución; in fact, such ideas were adopted to a greater or lesser extent by many Krausists in the 1870s and 1880s, and critics have even identified a hybrid “Krauso-positivismo” in Spain. Machado y Alvarez’s Positivism is apparent in some of the articles published in the Boletín and does not appear to have caused any antagonism between him and the school. They gave him an honorary teaching post, published his articles in the Boletín and recognised him as an institucionista in the obituary granted him in the same review. He had many personal and professional friends amongst the school’s teachers and sympathisers, and chose to have his sons educated there.
There are two more distant links between the Machado family and the Institución: José Alvarez Guerra and María Machado. José Alvarez Guerra, father of Cipriana Alvarez de Machado and great-grandfather of Antonio Machado y Ruiz, wrote a philosophical work—Unidad Simbólica y Destino del Hombre en la Tierra o Filosofía de la razón por un amigo del hombre—that has been seen as evidence of philosophical tendencies in Spain akin to Krausism prior to Sanz del Río's famous trip to Germany. ¹⁴¹ Joaquín Sama mentions this book in his obituary of Machado y Alvarez, showing that it was known to institucionistas, and suggests that Machado y Alvarez's pseudonym—"Demófilo"—might derive from that used by Alvarez Guerra. ¹⁴²

María Machado was a cousin of Machado y Alvarez and was reputedly engaged to Francisco Giner for a time. ¹⁴³ This aspect of Giner's life remains unexplored; ninety-eight letters from María Machado to Giner await investigation in the Fondo Giner. She, and her branch of the Machado family apparently lived in Bilbao: in a letter of 1876 Machado y Núñez refers to Giner visiting his niece and other members of the family there. ¹⁴⁴

To conclude this chapter I wish to outline briefly the evidence of Antonio Machado's continuing contacts with the Institución, institucionistas, and Institución-inspired bodies after he had ceased to be a pupil at the school. The first piece of evidence concerns Giner's classes at the Universidad Central in Madrid. In 1881 Giner had been reappointed to his Chair at the University but his only class was that of a none-obligatory component of the course for the Doctorate in Law. The class was primarily attended by sympathisers and disciples of Giner, including people who had no official connection with the course and even with the University. Martín Navarro has recalled seeing Machado at the class, ¹⁴⁵ and Machado himself refers to Giner's teaching style in university as well as school classes...
in his prose tribute to don Francisco. The most probable time for this attendance is the late 1890's or early 1900's when, it seems, Machado attended other classes at the University, although not following any particular degree course. He refers on one occasion to his attendance at the classes of M. Sales y Ferré, a Krausist-turned-Positivist sociologist, an event also recalled by his brother José.

The memories of a pupil at the Institución during the same fin de siglo years confirms Machado's continuing contact with the school itself. Tuñón de Lara writes:

Su participación en las excursiones domingueras de los antiguos alumnos de la Institución (y con los que más jóvenes estudiaban aún) es un testimonio más de su estrecha vinculación con el medio institucional durante su vida madrileña de los siete primeros años del siglo. Ha sido evocado en varias ocasiones por don José María Giner Pantoja.

Machado was, then, an active member of the Corporación de Antiguos Alumnos de la Institución Libre de Enseñanza. This had been formed in 1892, following the model of English and American Old Boys' Clubs, to provide a means of keeping former pupils and sympathisers together and as a means of channelling their sympathies into such activities as excursions. It also encouraged its members to spread the ideas of the Institución wherever they lived and worked and suggested various social activities they could initiate to contribute to the Institución's plan of regenerating Spain through education: the setting up of lending libraries, lecture courses, and programmes of excursions for the working classes. This part of the Antiguos Alumnos' activities derives from the University Extension Movement begun in England and introduced into Spain by the Oviedo Krausists, to spread subsequently to a number of other universities and the creation of Universidades Populares. Although the Universidad
Popular de Segovia, with which Machado later collaborated, was not created by institucionistas, it did follow a model initiated in Spain by them and by Krausists.

Machado was not a founder of the U.P. in Segovia - he joined an already existing organisation. Initially he taught French, and later gave "lecturas literarias". He gave many books to the Popular University's library including, interestingly, an almost complete set of Giner's Obras Completas. This certainly indicates a continuing regard for his former teacher and desire to propagate his ideas.

There is no correspondence preserved between Antonio Machado and Francisco Giner and thus it is difficult to ascertain the nature of their personal relationship. It has been claimed that Giner was consulted by Machado before making important decisions, including his decision to become a teacher. That Giner took an interest in Antonio's personal and professional life is indicated by a letter he wrote to Manuel Machado in 1912. Manuel had written to Giner asking his help in finding Antonio a new job after he had left Soria, but Giner's ethics prevented him from pulling strings and he could only offer sympathy:

Querido amigo: su afectuosa me causa tanta pena, cuanto que nada puedo para remediar la angustiosa situación de nuestro pobre Antonio. He oído de tal modo lamentar el número de peticiones análogas (unas legítimas - aunque pocas, como la que usted formula - , otras menos razonables), precisamente a las personas llamadas a resolver o proponer sobre ellas, que me sería imposible mediar en el asunto. Tal vez por otro conducto sería a usted posible. ... Tengo a ustedes más cariño del que deja quizá parecer mi inutilidad para servirles. Supongo que recibieron ustedes mis dos líneas de pésame. Bien de dentro sale éste de su afectísimo amigo. F. Giner.

Recuerdos de Rubio y familia y más para su madre, señora y todos. 154
Manuel's original letter to Giner is not preserved. However the two letters from him to Giner that I have seen are precedents for that one: in both 1893 and 1907 he wrote to ask Giner to pull strings to help him obtain a position, apparently with a similar lack of success.\textsuperscript{155}

In 1915 Antonio published his two tributes to Giner in the \textit{Boletín}. \textsuperscript{156} They are his only contributions to the review. They are both important evidence of Machado's attitude to Giner and \textit{compenetración} with his way of thinking and I shall refer to them again in later chapters. The verse elegy is frequently referred to and quoted from in the \textit{Boletín} in 1915 and in subsequent years. \textsuperscript{157}

Another important indicator of Machado's close relationship to the \textit{Institución} is the homage accorded to him and Manuel by the school in 1926, following the success of their play \textit{Julianillo Valcárcel}. The event is recorded in the \textit{Boletín} thus:

\begin{quote}
La Corporación de Antiguos Alumnos de la Institución Libre de Enseñanza ofreció el domingo 21 de febrero a los poetas Antonio y Manuel Machado un homenaje íntimo, que se celebró en el jardín de la Institución. Los antiguos compañeros de los ilustres autores de \textit{Julianillo Valcárcel} quisieron, con ocasión de su triunfo reciente, testimoniarles una vez más su cariño y su admiración por toda su obra poética. El presidente de la Corporación, señor marqués de Palomares de Duero, dio lectura a varias cartas de adhesión de compañeros ausentes. Manuel Machado leyó una escena de \textit{Julianillo Valcárcel} y la elegía de su hermano Antonio a la muerte de don Francisco Giner. \textsuperscript{158}
\end{quote}

Finally, Cossío read a poetic speech of tribute to the poets in which he suggests that the ethical and aesthetic lessons they had received at the \textit{Institución} were now bearing fruit in their literary art. \textsuperscript{159} Cossío later remembered the occasion as one "llena de sencillez, de intimidad, de digna elegancia, de encanto" and reported that Antonio Machado was so moved that he was unable to speak for a long while. \textsuperscript{160} Cossío's speech was published
at the poets' request, but rather against its author's will. 161 Some months later Cossío wrote to the Machado brothers thanking them for the dedicated copy of the play they had sent him:

Muy queridos Manuel y Antonio: con la idea de escribirles en un día que Antonio estuviese en Madrid como supongo que estará mañana, para hacerlo a los dos juntos, he tardado en darles las gracias, - ahora lo hago con toda el alma, - por su ejemplar de "Desdichas de la fortuna", con tan cariñosa dedicatoria.

También mi agradecimiento es fervoroso por la generosísima acogida de mi pobrecito saludo en el espléndido palacio de vuestra poesía. Aunque cada día siento con más fuerza que aquellas palabras no eran para el público, sino para la intimidad; para el ángulo del jardín cerrado y oculto en que fueron leídas; para decírlas en voz baja, con un poco de castizo misticismo, como de amante a amada; porque sólo la amada, no siendo las palabras otra cosa que amor, había de penetrarlas plenamente y de gozarlas con entera pureza...

To the Institución, Antonio Machado appears inseparable from his brother Manuel: Cossío writes one letter to both even though he acknowledges receipt of a "preciosa carta" from Antonio in Segovia. 163 In 1929 Ricardo Rubio wrote on behalf of the Institución to both brothers congratulating them on the success of La Lola se va a los puertos; he demonstrates the same personal and corporate warmth towards them as Cossío:

Qdos. Manuel y Antonio: ¡Con qué alegría he leído vuestro triunfo de anoche! Ya os podréis figurar los comentarios que sobre ello se hacen en esta casa donde hay tantos amigos y tanto cariño por vosotros.

El más cariñoso y viejo amigo vuestro,
Ricardo Rubio 164

Like his father before him, Antonio Machado was accepted and celebrated as an institucionista by the school itself, as was Manuel. The other Machado brother who had studied at the Institución, José, was, at least
for a short time, a teacher of art at the school. 165

In an article of 1915, Luis de Zulueta distinguished
two entities which could be described by the words "la
Institución": a specific teaching establishment, and a
wider spiritual community. Of the second Zulueta wrote:

In this chapter I have concentrated on Machado's links
to the closest circle of institucionistas: its founders,
teachers and pupils. Machado also had certain links
with other institutions distinct from but spiritually
linked to the Institución Libre de Enseñanza: official
educational bodies inspired by the ideas of Giner and
Cossío and administered by their disciples, namely the
Junta para ampliación de estudios, the Residencia de
Estudiantes and the Misiones Pedagógicas.

The Junta para ampliación de estudios e inves-
gaciones científicas was created in 1907. Its function
was both to set up research institutes in Spain and to
administer a system of grants for research and study
abroad. It aimed to foster the cultural regeneration
of Spain, in particular by opening new channels of
communication with European thought and science. Its
most prominent personality was its secretary, José
Castillejo, a disciple of Giner's.

In May 1910 Machado applied to the Junta for a
grant to undertake studies in French philology and
language-teaching in France. 167 On 15 December 1910
it was officially announced that his application had
been accepted, and he was made a grant of 350 pesetas
a month plus fees and travel expenses for a year's stay in France beginning on 1 January 1911. For some reason, possibly illness, he did not arrive in Paris until 10 February. The sudden illness of his wife forced him to abandon his studies and return to Spain in September. He had to borrow the money needed for his return journey but was later reimbursed by the Junta.

In his letter of application for the grant, Machado made a plea for the special needs of a teacher living in the cultural isolation of a small and remote Spanish town:

Nunca se encarecerá bastante la importancia y utilidad de este pensionado muy especialmente para los profesores confinados en estos rincones de España aislados de todo movimiento intelectual y desprovistos casi en absoluto de elementos de cultura.

Machado knew that this argument would not be ignored, for Giner had emphasised essentially the same point before him:

establishar las más perfectas Escuelas Normales y enviar después a los maestros al desierto intelectual de una aldea... sin hacerles salir de su localidad, de tiempo en tiempo, a otras de dentro, y más todavía de fuera de su patria, para ensanchar su horizonte ... es bien absurdo sacrificio.

Applicants were permitted to propose their own area of study. Machado listed three subjects he planned to work on: the influence of dialects on the formation of the French language, the development of French up to the present day and the methodology of language teaching in France and its effectiveness. Not long after his arrival in Paris he wrote to inform the Junta of his progress and new plans: he had been studying at the Bibliotèque Nationale, had attended the classes on medieval language and literature given by Bédier at the
Collège de France and made efforts to catch up on the part of the course he had missed through arriving in mid-year. He also attended classes on comparative grammar given by A. Meillet and classes on modern French literature by A. Lefranc. He sent the Junta copies of work done in class and told them of his intention to compose an historical grammar of French, something at that time unavailable in Spain. He began writing a study entitled "Estado actual de los estudios filológicos en Francia" and sent two chapters to the Junta as well as an index of chapters to follow. He even suggested that the chapters he had sent might be worthy of publication in the Junta's review. His work was apparently abandoned after he gave up his grant and returned to Spain.

I think these details of his studies are of some importance because they counter the general impression given by Machado's biographers that he used the grant as finance for a long holiday in Paris with his wife, or that he was not really interested in French philology and preferred to go to the lectures of Henri Bergson.

A more important general criticism sometimes made against the Junta, and relevant to Machado's relationship with them, is that they favoured institucionistas and their friends. Many of the members of the Junta were sympathetic towards the Institución: Castillejo, Alvarez Buylla, Azcárate, Bolívar, Costa, Sorolla, and it is true that pupils and friends of the Institución such as Besteiro, Fernando de los Ríos, Azaña and Machado did receive grants. However against the charge of favouritism it can be argued that the Junta included many men unconnected to the Institución - in fact it was deliberately pluralist in composition - and, furthermore, the Junta was not fully autonomous: its decisions had to be confirmed by the Ministry of Education. It does not appear to have been easy to get a grant: in 1910 only seventy candidates were successful from 359 applicants, and only a limited
number were available for each area of study - in the same year, Machado's grant was one of only six given for philological and literary work. Until a detailed study is made of the Junta's history, however, the question of favouritism remains undecided.

The evidence contained in Machado's Junta file does not indicate any obvious enchufismo. His two letters from Paris are cordial but not intimate in tone and formal in content. Castillejo is addressed as "Distinguido amigo" and referred to in the other letter as "el amigo Castillejo" and Machado concludes with "salude a todos los señores de esa Junta". The only reference to any mutual acquaintance outside the Junta is a message to Sr. Acebal about La Lectura: Machado asks Castillejo to inform the editor that he is not receiving his copies of the review in Paris (La Lectura was a review with strong links to the Institución, and Machado published a number of poems in it during that period). Apart from these details, the letters are rather formal and entirely devoted to the studies Machado had been given a grant to pursue. He seems to be intent on proving that he is not wasting his time or their money, and fulfilling a commitment to keep the Junta informed. His formal obligations apparently included sending proof of his arrival and residence in Paris.

Machado's Junta file reveals that he applied to them some years later (in September 1918) to study at the Instituto-Escuela, in order to qualify as a teacher of Spanish language and literature. The Instituto-Escuela was an experimental school created by the Ministry of Education by Royal Decree of 10 May 1918 and opened in October of the same year. Its administration was entrusted to the Junta and its pedagogical inspiration was the Institución. It was an integrated school which taught pupils from kindergarten to bachillerato level and it also trained student-teachers. Machado's application to become a student-teacher of
Spanish there is only one of a number of efforts he made to try and obtain a transfer from Baeza. His studies for the degree of licenciado en filosofía y letras at the Universidad Central in 1915–18 are a symptom of the same desire to obtain qualifications to facilitate such a move: in 1919 he applied (unsuccessfully) to be included among the opositores for cátedras de lengua y literatura castellanas and de psicología, lógica y ética. His application to the Instituto-Escuela even before it had begun to function does suggest that Machado felt a special attraction to the school and had advance information about how it was to be run. As an institucionista he would have been well informed about the Instituto-Escuela's creation.

Another institution which formed part of the wider spiritual community of the Institución Libre de Enseñanza was the Residencia de Estudiantes, created in 1910 and, like the Instituto-Escuela, administered by the Junta. As well as a place where students lodged, the Residencia was a centre of social, cultural and scientific activity with a distinct ethos, strongly influenced by the personality and beliefs of its director Alberto Jiménez Fraud, another disciple of Giner and the husband of Cossío's daughter, Natalia. Antonio Machado was a frequent visitor to the Residencia and his connection to it was reinforced in 1917 when he allowed the Residencia's publishing section to edit his Poesías Completas. The event was important for both the poet and the publisher: it was the first ever edition of his complete works and the first book of verse published by the Residencia.

The body belonging to the "Institución difusa" with which Machado had the most active relationship was the Patronato de Misiones Pedagógicas, created in May 1931. The Misiones Pedagógicas were very much the realization of a dream of its president, Cossío, although Cossío himself emphasised that it was a dream he had shared with Giner. Both men had lamented the cultural
deprivation of rural Spain and campaigned for the best teachers to be sent to the "worst" schools. Giner, writing in 1902, anticipated the creation of both the Junta and the Misiones when he proposed special facilities for rural teachers:

viajes baratos de estudio a los grandes centros, buenas bibliotecas circulantes de libros y revistas, cursos ambulantes de perfeccionamiento, visitas e inspecciones de hombres competentes (verdaderas misiones pedagógicas)

Cossío certainly seems to have taken the name from Giner; in 1915 he quoted his master's expression "maestros rurales, es decir misioneros" and commented:

El maestro de alta cultura y de más alta formación moral, misionero por los campos y las aldeas de España, fue, a no dudarlo, la parábola favorita, el versículo preferente de su último evangelio pedagógico.

In 1922 Cossío proposed a scheme of

misiones ambulantes con los mejores maestros empezando por las localidades más necesitadas para llevar animación espiritual al pueblo, para fomentar y mantener la vocación y la cultura de los demás maestros.

The first moves towards the creation of such misiones were made during the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera, but the dream only became reality under a sympathetic Republican Government.

Cossío did intend the Misiones to help rural schoolteachers, and to work with them, but their activity was primarily extra-scholastic: the aim was not merely to improve primary education but to spread the pleasures and benefits of "culture" to all Spaniards, starting with the most needy. To this effect, groups of young teachers and students were sent, under the leadership of "misioneros jefes", to the most backward
regions of Spain. They distributed lending libraries, set up travelling art exhibitions, gave film shows, talks, literary readings, played recorded music, sang folksongs and choral works, performed plays on makeshift stages. Cossío wanted the _Misiones_ to be enjoyable as well as educational but the typical earnestness of the _institucionista_ is apparent in his insistence on the _misioneros_ setting a good moral example at all times. Cossío saw the _Misiones_ as an instrument of social justice on a spiritual plane: they were an attempt to achieve a more equitable distribution of cultural wealth. The view of human and social life implicit in this project is typically _institucionista_: a belief in the primacy of spiritual over material factors and in the revitalising power of art and culture. The _Misiones_ are both the expression of _institucionismo_ at its most generous and idealistic and an indicator of the limitations of their creed. The _misioneros_ themselves were often very conscious of the inadequacies of the gifts they bore to the poor villagers of Spain: in one _Memoria_ is recorded their shock at the poverty and disease of their potential audience and their realization that their music and plays were totally inappropriate in such circumstances. They did what they could to help and subsequent _Misiones_ included health workers, medicines and agriculturalists in order to provide practical help as well as spiritual succour for the deprived. In effect, the _Misiones_’ aim of bringing town and country into closer contact worked both ways: as well as taking "civilization" and "culture" to remote villages, they brought many young townsmen face to face with aspects of Spanish life about which they had previously known little. 193

Machado was, from the beginning, a member of the _Comisión Central del Patronato de Misiones Pedagógicas_. I shall discuss his ideological sympathies with the _Misiones_ in a later chapter. 194 We know little of the exact nature of his contribution to the running of
the scheme, but it was clearly more than nominal. Natalia Cossío remembers that the period in which she most frequently saw Machado at the Institución was "cuando colaboraba con mi padre en las Misiones Pedagógicas". 196 Luis Santullano, Secretary of the Patronato, remembers Machado’s regular attendance and useful ideas at meetings, and his special interest in the Teatro del Pueblo (which only began to function in 1933):

Apart from these decisions in which he was involved, Santullano unfortunately does not specify the "trabajos varios" Machado undertook in the Patronato. 198 In any case, his position appears to have been an executive one rather than a collaboration with misioneros on their travels.

In conclusion, Machado maintained contact with the Institución, its teachers and pupils, and the wider circle of its sympathisers throughout his life. However,
his active contribution to the running of the school was not great: he was involved in excursions but held neither administrative nor teaching posts at the school. He only contributed to the Boletín on Giner's death. His most active contribution to the work of the Institución was his involvement in the 1930's with the Institución-inspired Misiones Pedagógicas. The school itself regarded him as a distinguished former pupil and a friend. His schooldays, which I have investigated in some detail above, were undoubtedly the period of his most prolonged contact with institucionismo.

In this chapter I have limited myself to establishing the biographical background of the relationship between Machado and the Institución Libre de Enseñanza. The influence of Machado's education at the school (and of his subsequent and continuing sympathy towards it) is the subject of the remaining chapters.
Notes


3 "Lista de alumnos matriculados - curso de 1883-84 1ª y 2ª enseñanza por secciones", Boletín de la Institución Libre de Enseñanza (hereafter BILE) N°172, 15 April 1884, p. 112.


6 Cano (ibid.) fails to reach this conclusion; cf. Leopoldo de Luis, A.M., ejemplo y lección, M., S.G.E.L., 1975, p. 27.

7 Letter to F. Giner de los Ríos, n.d. [1892], Fondo Giner, Real Academia de la Historia, Madrid, Caja 6.


12 "Plan de estudios para el curso de 1879-80", BILE, N°63, 2 Oct 1879.

13 V. Cacho Viu, op.cit., pp. 466-467.
"Prospecto para el curso de 1879-80", BILE, N°61, 31 Aug 1879, p. 121.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid. pp. 121-122.

Ibid. p. 122.

Ibid.

"Prospecto para el curso de 1880-81", BILE, N°81, 4 July 1880, pp. 89-90.


"Prospecto para el curso de 1880-81", BILE, N°81, 4 July 1880, p. 90.

"Prospecto para el curso de 1881-82", (suplemento), p. 2; the break was not immediate for all secondary students - those who had already completed two years of bachillerato studies were allowed to continue taking them; the reform was phased into the higher secciones as students who had begun under the new system moved up.

Ibid. pp. 2-3; singing classes were introduced in 1880.


J. Menéndez Pidal, "La enseñanza en la Institución, vista por una alumna", En el centenario de la I.L.E., M., Tecnos, 1977, p. 76.

"Prospecto para el curso de 1885-86", BILE, N°207, 30 Sept 1885, p. 286.

Ibid.

Ibid.; cf. "La Institución aspira a que sus alumnos puedan servirse de los libros como fuente capital de cultura; pero no emplea los llamados "de texto", ni las "lecciones de memoria", por creer que todo ello contribuye a petrificar el espíritu y a mecanizar el trabajo de clase donde la función del maestro ha de consistir en
despertar y mantener vivo el interés del niño, excitando su pensamiento, sugiriendo cuestiones y nuevos puntos de vista, enseñando a razonar con rigor y a resumir con claridad y precisión los resultados. El alumno los redacta y consigna en notas breves tan luego como su edad se lo consiente, formando así, con su labor personal, única fructuosa, el solo texto posible, si ha de ser verdadero, esto es, original y suyo propio" ("Institución. Bases y programa", BILE, Nº606, 30 Sept 1910, pp.277-278.)


34 BILE, 1903, back cover; the Institución's account of these excursions varies slightly from year to year, eg.: "En los meses de verano se organizarán excursiones en mayor escala. En ellas, según se ha dicho recientemente en el prospecto de las de este curso, los alumnos hacen largas caminatas, toman baños de mar y de río; practican ascensiones, trazan croquis de terrenos con curvas de nivel; herborizan y recogen colecciones de minerales; visitan monumentos arquitectónicos y de obras de arte, minas, fábricas, puertos y faros; estudian sistemas de cultivo, extracción de minerales y elaboración de primeras materias; se ejercitan en el difícil arte de observar y en el trato de gentes de diversas clases sociales; apuntan al paso, y consignan después en un diario por extenso, sus impresiones y observaciones; se acostumbran a vivir en una relativa independencia, y desarrollan su individualidad." ("Prospecto para el curso de 1881-82", p.3.)


36 Ibid., pp.286-287; this policy was phased out in 1892.


38 J-J. Gil Cremades, Krausistas y liberales, M., Seminarios y ediciones, 1975, p.16; José Giner Pantoja, "La educación estética en la Institución", En el centenario de la I.L.E., cit., p.53.


"Notas que don Francisco Giner dejó inéditas y destinadas a componer un prólogo para el nuevo libro que preparaba de Ensayos sobre educación 1914-15", En el cincuentenario de la I.L.E., M., 1926, p.60.


"Nota leída en la Junta general de accionistas, celebrada el día 29 de mayo de 1892 por el secretario Prof.D. Germán Flórez, BILE, Nº367, 31 May 1892, pp157-158.

"Notas que don Francisco Giner dejó inéditas...", loc.cit., p.60.


"Nota leída... por el secretario Prof.D.Germán Flórez", loc.cit., p.158.

Ibid.

Germán Flórez, "Nota de secretaría leída en la Junta general de accionistas, celebrada el 26 de mayo de 1895", BILE, Nº423, 30 June 1895, p.191.

Hermenegildo Giner de los Ríos, "Nota leída en la Junta general de accionistas el día 26 de mayo de 1889", BILE 1889, pp.175-176.

"Excursiones durante las vacaciones de navidad de 1886 a 87", BILE, Nº238, 15 Jan 1887, p.16; here it is also recorded that holiday excursions had been poorly attended, reminding parents of the importance of these activities in the curriculum.

V.Supra p.13

"Notas que don Francisco Giner dejó inéditas...", loc.cit., p.58.

F.Giner de los Ríos, "Discurso inaugural para el curso de 1881-2", En el cincuentenario de la I.L.E., cit., p.34; "Prospecto para el curso de 1881-82", loc.cit. p.2.


eg. In the minutes of the 1919 Junta general de accionistas:"...El Sr. Cossío explicó a los Sres. Accionistas el plan elaborado por la Junta facultativa para dar alguna solución al problema nuevamente presentado en la Memoria última, como venía presentándose en las anteriores, referente al conflicto que algunas
familias piensan que existe por incompatibilidad entre la asistencia de sus hijos mayores a todas las clases de la Institución y su preparación para los exámenes de bachillerato" (BILE №723, 30 June 1920, p.186)

56 "La cuestión que todos los años en estas Memorias hemos presentado a la atención de los Sres. Accionistas, referente a la baja que en nuestra sección de mayores ocasiona la preocupación de prepararse para el bachillerato se ha reproducido en este curso. Sino que ahora con ventaja para los alumnos salientes que encuentran afortunadamente una institución con facultad de conferirles la sanción oficial del título de Bachiller, sin necesidad de someterse a la prueba antipedagógica de los exámenes. Esto nos confirma cada vez más en la idea de que nuestra Institución debiera ser sólo una verdadera escuela de amplios programas y de extensa duración." (BILE №711, 30 June 1919, p.190)

57 M. Varela Uña, "La última etapa de la Institución, vista por uno de sus alumnos", En el centenario de la I.L.E., cit., p.217; BILE 1922, p.189.

58 Angel do Rego, "La Institución de 1879 a 1887. Impresiones y recuerdos de un alumno de aquella época", BILE №919, 30 November 1936, pp.262-263. In spite of these difficulties, according to do Rego, the Institución stuck firmly to its principles.

59 "La enseñanza en la Institución, vista por una alumna", En el centenario de la I.L.E., cit., pp.77-78.

60 M. Varela Uña, "La última etapa de la Institución, vista por uno de sus alumnos", Ibid., pp.216-217; the author's conclusion that "en este concreto aspecto creo que la Institución de nuestra época pudo ser menos buena que la de los lustros anteriores" (ibid. p.217) is, as we have seen, untrue; since Varela Uña was a pupil at the I.L.E. in the 20's and 30's and yet continued to sit bachillerato examinations, it is clear that the Instituto-Escuela was an option, like the examen general before, not always taken up by pupils and their families, perhaps because of the precarious life of the Instituto-Escuela before the Republic.


63 In Machado's "Expediente académico..." there is a copy of the scheme in operation at the time of his later examinations: "la distribución académica normal de los Estudios Generales es la siguiente:"
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grupo</th>
<th>Disciplinas</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Primer grupo</strong></td>
<td>(Latín y castellano con ejercicios prácticos -1er. curso)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Geografía general y particular de España)</td>
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<td>(Religión)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Segundo grupo</strong></td>
<td>(Latín y castellano con ejercicios prácticos - 2º curso)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Historia de España)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(Aritmética y Algebra)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Tercer grupo</strong></td>
<td>(Geometría y Trigonometría)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(Historia Universal)</td>
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<td>(Francés 1er. curso)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Cuarto grupo</strong></td>
<td>(Retórica y Poética)</td>
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<td>(Física y Química)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(Francés 2º curso)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Quinto grupo</strong></td>
<td>(Psicología, Lógica y Ética)</td>
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<td>(Historia Natural con principios de)</td>
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<td>(Fisiología y Higiene)</td>
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<td>(Agricultura elemental)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gimnástica 1er. y 2º cursos - en dos de los tres primeros grupos, o en los dos últimos.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Machado was excused the requirement of "Gimnástica" because he had begun his bachillerato examinations under a scheme which did not include the subject (Real Orden de 17 Sept 1900, included in file). There is no documentation pertaining to his excusal from "Religión", but that subject is not included in the various course requirements for the years prior to 1896 (copies are in the file) and Machado was probably excused on the same grounds as for "Gimnástica".

64 J.L. Cano, "A.M., estudiante", loc. cit., pp.646-647, refers to the "demasiada bondad de sus profesores de la Institución" and adds "que Antonio era un niño más soñador e indolente que estudiante parece evidente."


66 Ibid.


69. V. infra p. 305
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid. p. 90.
75. "Plan de estudios para el curso de 1877-78", BILE No 13, 11 Oct 1877, p. 49.
77. V. supra p. 20; my italics.
78. "Notas que don Francisco Giner dejó inéditas", loc. cit., p. 60.
81. V. Cacho Viu, op. cit., pp. 532-533.
82. According to Giner in "Segismundo Moret", Ensayos y cartas, Mexico, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1965, p. 180 (originally published 28 Feb 1913, BILE)
84. Letter from Giner to Costa, 9 Aug 1879, Archivo Histórico Nacional, Diversos: Títulos y familias, Caja 114.
85. From 1881 according to Luzuriaga, op. cit., p. 94; from 1882 according to "Joaquín Costa", BILE No 512, 31 March 1911, pp. 65-70; Giner, however, reveals in a letter to Costa (9 Aug 1879) that there was considerable collaboration in the editing of the BILE and hence that any clear cut division into editorial periods by single editors is untrue; Giner, for example, was editor from 1877 to 1881 - officially - but as early as 1879 he was offering Costa a share of the work and the pay (loc. cit.)
86. Cacho Viu, op. cit., p. 505; also G.J.G. Cheyne, Joaquín Costa, el gran desconocido, B, Ariel, 1972, p. 103.


88 V.infra pp.315, 383

89 J. Xirau, Manuel B. Cossío y la educación en España, Mexico, Colegio de Mexico, 1945, p.59.

90 "José de Caso", BILE, 28 Nov 1928, pp.353-356.

91 "José de Caso", BILE, 28 Nov 1928, pp.353-356.

92 M.D. Gómez Molleda, Los reformadores, cit., pp.280, 317; following Sela's death in 1935 the BILE promised an obituary of the school's former teacher (BILE N° 913, 31 May 1936, p.97) but this was never published.


94 Juan Uña, "M.B.C.", BILE N°905, 30 Sept 1935.

95 OPP, p.464.


97 "Joaquín Sama", Ensayos y cartas, cit., p.145; originally published BILE 28 Feb 1895.


99 F.Giner, "Joaquín Sama", loc.cit., p.146.

100 Biographical information from the articles by Giner and Ontañón, cit. nn.97 and 98.


102 On José Ontañón (padre): "José Ontañón y Arias", BILE, N°845, 30 Sept 1930, pp.257-258, and José Giner Pantoja, "La educación estética en la Institución, En el centenario de la I.L.E., cit., p.52; Giner Pantoja's date for the introduction of singing into the I.L.E. -1882-
is at variance with the evidence of the Institución's Prospectuses: V. BILE Nº51, 4 July 1880, p.90.

103 "Proyecto de discurso en la Academia de la Lengua", OPP, p.843.


105 The name Antonio García first appears in the BILE in 1882 (Nº141, 31 Dec 1882, p.292); ref. to excursions under Sr. García (geographical, artistic and industrial excursions) in BILE Nº238, 15 Jan 1887, pp.14-16; mentioned as profesor de sección in 1884-85 and 1885-86 prospectuses and as teacher of "estudios generales" for 1887-88 in Minutes of Junta facultativa (BILE Nº256, 15 Oct 1887, p.304).

106 BILE 1884, p.190; BILE 1885, p.288.

107 I have rejected the following as possible candidates for the identity of "A. García": Juan A. García Labiano, who signed the Institución's bases in 1876, taught law in "estudios superiores" courses in the early years and left the school by 1881 (V. Cacho Viu, op.cit., pp.411, 424, 533); Antonio García del Real, a pupil in the Institución's sixth section from 1883 (when he obtained his bachillerato) to 1886 (at least) studying engineering (BILE Nº223, 31 May 1886 and F. Giner, O.C. XII, p.181) and listed in 1887 as profesor in charge of an excursion, on a list which includes a separate "Sr. García" (BILE Nº238, 15 Jan 1887, pp.14-16); Angelo García Peña, whose death is referred to in 1902 and 1903 and who was a maths teacher at the school (BILE Nº513, 31 Dec 1902, p.382; BILE Nº516, 31 May 1903, p.65).

108 V. necrologies of both in Giner, Ensayos y cartas, cit., pp.131-134, 163-164.

109 V. Cacho Viu, op.cit., p.505; all profesores especiales in 1884-85 and 1885-86 prospectuses.


111 OPP, p.393.

112 The only critic who has studied Machado's schooldays in any detail, J. L. Cano, lists the following as his teachers: "las enseñanzas las daban, entre otros profesores, don Francisco Giner, Manuel Bartolomé Cossío, Ricardo Rubio, Eduardo Lozano, José Lledó, Jacinto Messiá,
José Ontañón, que daba lengua castellana y latina, Joaquín Sama, a cuyo cargo estaban las lecciones de Ética y Filosofía, y Francisco Quiroga. El director de estudios, José de Caso, enseñaba Psicología y Geografía.

"A. M. estudiante", CH, N°22, June 1966, p.643) The list appears to be based on prospectuses for the years 1876-1881 - probably from Cacho Viu’s book on the Institución - Messía is certainly inappropriate as he left the I.L.E. in 1881. The subjects assigned to Sama and Caso take no account of the school’s move away from the official bachillerato system and the multiple duties of a profesor de sección. Cano’s analysis of Machado’s education and examination results is inadequate since it does not consider the originality and unorthodoxy of the Institución.

M. Terán's "Los años de aprendizaje de A.M. (Su relación con la I.L.E.)" (A.M. y Soria, M, C.S.I.C., 1976, pp. 131-147) is less detailed than Cano’s study but it does investigate the Institución’s attitudes to the bachillerato, concluding that, because the school did not prepare for exams, most students left it after their primary education; hence he believes A.M. left in 1889.

113 BILE Nº606, 30 Sept 1910, p.279.
114 V.Supra p.22.
115 M.Varela Uña, "La última etapa de la Institución, vista por uno de sus alumnos", En el centenario de la I.L.E., cit., p.212.
119 M.D. Gómez Molleda, Los reformadores, cit., p.292
120 "Salvador Calderón", Ensayos y cartas, cit., pp.174-175.
122 Letter A. Machado y Alvarez to F.Giner, 13 July 1871, "Fondo Giner", Real Academia de la Historia, Caja 1.

Letter F. Giner to J. Costa, 9 Aug 1879: dateable by ref. to Cossío and Flórez's stay in Italy in coming academic year, Archivo Histórico Nacional, Madrid, Diversos: Títulos y familias, Caja 114.


Letter A. Machado y Alvarez to J. Costa, 29 Aug 1879, ibid.

ibid.


Letter A. Machado y Alvarez to F. Giner, 4 Nov 1876, ibid.

"La exma. Sra. Doña Cipriana Alvarez de Machado se ha dignado favorecer nuevamente a la Institución con otra obra suya, el retrato de Fr. Luis de León, pintado al óleo." (BILE Nº 231, 30 Sept 1886; p. 288)


A. Machado y Alvarez:
"Algunas notas de los cuentos populares. Estudio primero. A. los animales contenidos en "Io Rondallaine" del Sr. Maspons." BILE Nûs 120, 122, 125, 130, 1882.
"Literatura popular. II. Un post-scriptum.", BILE Nº 155, 1883.
"Folk-Lore extremeño. - La palomita", BILE Nº 156, 1883.
"Algunas notas caracteristicas de los cuentos populares", BILE Nº 158, 1883.
"Biblioteca de Educación nacional. Publicada por F. Adolfo Coelho", BILE Nº 168, 1884.
"Folk-lore - Juegos infantiles españoles", BILE Nº 175, 1884.
"Folk-lore - La sexualidad en las coplas populares", BILE Nûs 184, 186, 1884.
(transl.) "Terminología del Folk-lore por Alfredo Nutt", BILE Nº 187, 1884.
(transl.) "Terminología del Folk-lore, por Sidney Hartland", BILE Nº 189, 1884.
(transl.) "Terminología del Folk-lore", BILE Nº 193, 1885.
"Bibliografía. Ensayo de juegos y canciones infantiles, de Antonio Giavanotea", BILE Nº 194, 1885.
(transl.) "Datos para el Folk-lore del mar por el rev. Walter Gregor", BILE Nº 197, 1885.
(transl.) "La ciencia del Folk-lore por Gamme", BILE Nº 204, 1885.
"Los Museos Cantonales y los Museos Folk-lóricos", BILE Nº 210, 1885.
"Las adivinanzas", BILE Nº 226, 227, 1886.
"Bibliografía - II Folk-Lore (Novelle popolari toscane illustrate, da Guiseppe Pitré. Firenze, 1885)", BILE Nº 228, 1886.
"Apuntes para el Folk-lore de Aravaca (provincia de Madrid)", BILE NºS 229, 231, 234, 1886.
"Bibliografía - II. Folk-Lore (Blaison Populaire de la France par H. Gaïdoz et Paul Sébillot, Paris, 1884)", BILE Nº 230, 1886.
"Sobre algunas aberraciones de la moda", BILE Nº 254, 1887.
"Terminología del Folk-lore", BILE Nºs 255, 256, 1887.
"Titin. (Estudio sobre el lenguaje de los niños)", BILE Nºs 255, 258, 1887.

J. Sama, in his BILE obituary, states that Machado y Alvarez published nearly thirty articles in the BILE; this is probably because some were published over a number of issues. The Indice de autores del Boletín 1877-1926 does not include Machado y Alvarez's translations published in BILE Nºs 193, 197 and 204.


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140 eg. statistical analysis used in "Folk-lore: de la sexualidad en las coplas populares", BILE N°s 184, 185, 1884.


142 "Antonio Machado y Alvarez", cit., p.126.

143 V. Cacho Viu, op.cit., p.290.

144 Letter A. Machado y Alvarez and A. Machado Núñez to F. Giner, 4 Nov 1876, "Fondo Giner", Real Academia de la Historia, Caja 2.

145 M. Navarro, Vida y obra de don Francisco Giner de los Ríos, Mexico City, Orion, 1945, p.15.


147 OPP, p.793; José Machado, Ultimas soledades, cit., p.72 - José also remembers attending an evening gathering at Sales y Ferré's house and that the Professor was a friend of their mother.

148 M. Tufiño de Lara, "A.M. y la I.L.E.", Cuadernos para el diálogo, Extra XLIX, Nov 1975, p.102; Tufiño is referring to José María Giner Pantoja's "Alocución en la Sorbona el 6 de marzo de 1959, reproducido en el libro A don Antonio Machado, al cumplirse los veinte años de su muerte, que editaron en México los antiguos alumnos de la Institución, del Instituto-Escuela y antiguos residentes (1961)" (Tufiño de Lara, ibid.) I have been unable to consult this book.

150 V. M.D. Gómez Molleda Los reformadores, cit., Ch. VIII.

151 For a full account of the U.P. de Segovia V. P.de A. Cobos, A.M. en Segovia, vida y obra, M, Insula, 1973, pp. 39-47.

152 All vols. of Giner's O.C. except vols XIV, XVIII, XX; instead of vol. XI is the shorter 1904 ed. Filosofía y sociología; Publ. dates of O.C. vols are 1916 to 1928— Machado clearly donated new vols. as they were published; 5 vols. have dedication by A.M.; these books and other gifts to U.P. from Machado are now in the Casa-Museo Antonio Machado in Segovia.

153 "Según me informó en conversación particular el doctor Álvarez Sierra, en la decisión de hacer oposiciones a cátedra, como en otras muchas que tomaron los Machado, quien influyó fue Giner." A. de Albornoz, La presencia de Miguel de Unamuno en A.M., M, Gredos, 1968, p. 29.

154 Letter F. Giner to Manuel Machado, 1 Sept 1912, cit., A. Armas Ayala, "Epistolario de Manuel Machado", Índice de artes y letras, No. 50, 15 April 1952, p. 4 cf. J. G. Brotherston (Manuel Machado, cit., p. 41, n.) who reveals that it was Rodríguez Marín who helped A.M. to obtain his post in Baeza, after a request from Manuel; P. de A. Cobos appears to have made an error in recalling Giner's letter about Antonio's transfer for he writes: "Giner de los Ríos dejó constancia epis- tolar de su disgusto en el intento de sacar a Machado de Baeza" (A.M. en Segovia, cit., p. 13)

155 Letters M. Machado to F. Giner, n.d. (1892?) and 23 Jan 1907, "Fondo Giner", Real Academia de la Historia, Cajas 6, 13; in the first Manuel asks help in his application to become a journalist on La Justicia, in the second he light-heartedly proposes himself for the post as auxiliar in the Museo Pedagógico Nacional.

156 "A don Francisco Giner, BILE No. 659, 666, 1915; "D. Francisco Giner de los Ríos", BILE No. 664, 1915; both contributions had previously been published elsewhere: the poem in España, I, Nº 5, 26 Feb 1915 and the prose tribute in Idea Nueva, Baeza, 23 Feb 1915.

157 Usually accompanying tributes to Giner and approving A.M.'s vision; it was also quoted on Cossío's death (BILE 1935, p. 306). The poem became, it seems, a part of institucionismo. However, on one occasion, the BILE allowed the following piece of none-literary criticism to be published: "El adjetivo resulta totalmente impropio. El Guadarrama no es "anocho", sino largo. En el centro de la cadena, hacia el puerto de su nombre, se reduce a una arista de 10km. de espesor que la línea férrea atraviesa rápidamente. Aun en su diámetro
trasversal máximo, entre Pedraza y Torrelodones, a uno y otro extremo de los depósitos diluviales, el Guadarrama no llega a los 60 km. de anchura. Perdóname el gran poeta esta rectificación fácil." (Constanino Bernaldo de Quirós, "La memoria de Don Francisco Giner", BILE Nº747, 30 June 1922, p.185, n.)

158 "Homenaje a los poetas Manuel y Antonio Machado", BILE Nº791, 28 Feb 1926, pp.63-64.

159 Ibid., also in M.B.Cossío, De su jornada (fragmentos), M, Aguilar, 1966, pp.53-55.

160 Letter from M.B.Cossío to unnamed correspondent, cit. Francisco Giner de los Ríos, "Los escritores y la Institución", En el centenario de la I.L.E., cit., p.110.

161 Ibid.

162 Letter M.B. Cossío to M. and A. Machado, 22 May 1926, Biblioteca Manuel Machado, Institución Fernán González, Burgos; the library also contains a letter (n.d.) from R. Menéndez Pidal apologising for his absence from the homage; there are also two letters from Cossío to Manuel alone which reflect Cossío's memories of the Machado family and of the poets' school-days at the I.L.E.: one, dated 17 July 1925, congratulates Manuel on his appointment as jefe de investigaciones históricas and includes the remark "En esta ocasión pienso sobre todo en su abuelo y en su buen padre"; the other congratulates him on Ars moriendi and concludes: "Siga Vd. cultivando su jardín, pues sin que me ciegue el emocionante recuerdo de haberle visto jugar ¡ay! en el de esta querida casa, y hasta donde yo alcanzo, que no es mucho, las frutas de su cercado siguen siendo dulces y sabrosas."


164 Letter R. Rubio to M. and A. Machado, 9 Nov 1929, ibid.

165 N.Cossío, "Mi mundo desde dentro", En el centenario de la I.L.E., cit., p.16; A.J. McVan, A.M., N.Y., 1959, p.51; the period in which he taught at the I.L.E. is imprecise - McVan refers to the years Antonio was in Baeza, the BILE records J. Machado and J. Ontañón as the teachers in charge of an excursion to Toledo in Easter 1916 (BILE Nº673, 30 April 1916, p.128)

166 L.Zulueta, "Lo que nos deja", BILE Nºs 659-660 Feb-March 1915, p.53; N.B. title based on A.M.'s elegy: the article has a first section entitled "Lo que se lleva" (ibid. pp.45-68) headed by the lines: "Lleva quien deja y vive quien ha vivido,/¡Yunques, sonad; enmudeced, campenas!"


169 Letter A. Machado to J. Castillejo; 7 March 1911; letter A.M. to unnamed member of J.A.E. /Sr. Sanheiro/ 24 March 1911 - refs. to illness prior to leaving Madrid.


170 Letter A.Machado to President of J.A.E., 2 Oct 1911, Archivo General del C.S.I.C., caja 188/2-33.


172 Letter of application to J.A.E., loc. cit.

173 F.Giner, "Un peligro de toda enseñanza" (1884), O.C. XII, p.105; the idea is repeated in O.C.XII, pp.91-92, 249-250 and 271-272.

174 J.A.E., Memoria correspondiente a los años 1910 y 1911, M, 1912, p.18.

175 Letter of application to J.A.E., loc.cit.

176 Letter to J.Castillejo, 7 March 1911 and letter to unnamed member of J.A.E. /Sr. Sanheiro/? ,24 March 1911, loc. cit.

177 J.A.E., Memoria correspondiente a los años 1910 y 1911, M, 1912, p.68.

178 Letter to unnamed member of J.A.E. /Sr. San- heiro/? loc.cit.
Ibid.; J.A.E, Memoria correspondiente a los años 1910 y 1911, M, 1912, p.68; Note, June 1911, in M.’s J.A.E. file recording receipt of first chapter; also, Ibid., manuscript plan:

"Estado actual de los estudios filológicos en Francia", A. Machado, París 1911. Indice
I La enseñanza del francés
II El francés en la Escuela Primaria
III El francés en los Liceos y Colegios
IV El francés en la Sorbona
V La gramática
VI La gramática histórica
VII Filología y literatura medio-eval
VIII Gastón París y sus discípulos
IX Los modernos fonetistas franceses
X Estudios de gramática comparada
XI Morfología general
XII Semántica

Letter A. Machado to unnamed member of J.A.E. (Sr. Sanheirg?, 24 March 1911; the chapters are not preserved in the C.S.I.C. file.


M.D. Gómez Molleda, Los reformadores, cit., pp.460-461.


J.A.E., Memoria correspondiente a los años 1910 y 1911, M, 1912, pp.19, 27.

Francisco Laporta, Virgilio Zapatero and others are preparing such a study.

Letters 7 March 1911 and 24 March 1911, loc.cit.

Letter A. Machado to President of the J.A.E., 17 Sept 1918, Archivo General del C.S.I.C., caja 188/2-33


A. Machado, letter to Unamuno 16 Jan 1915, OPP, p.919; J.Moreno Villa, Vida en claro, Colegio de México, 1944, pp.89-90; Luis de Valdeavellano, "Un educador humanista: Alberto Jiménez Fraud y la Residencia de Estudiantes", in A.Jiménez Fraud, La Residencia de estudiantes, B, Ariel, 1972, p.32, and A.Jiménez Fraud,


194 Patronato de Misiones Pedagógicas. Septiembre de 1931-Diciembre de 1933, M, 1934, pp.156-157; Machado is listed as "don Antonio Machado y Alvarez" (sic).


196 N. Cossío, "Mi mundo desde dentro", En el centenario de la I.L.E., cit., p.16.


Todo el movimiento filosófico moderno español, al margen de la escolástica, arranca de un pensador ilustre, hijo de la tierra soriana, de don Julián Sanz del Río, a quien deben su verticalidad – según frase del maestro Giner – la mitad, por lo menos, de los españoles que andan hoy de dos pies.

Antonio Machado, 1914
Pablo de A. Cobos is one of a number of critics who have endeavoured to understand aspects of Antonio Machado's life and work by examining the ideological influence of his teachers at the Institución Libre. Where Cobos most differs from other critics is in the emphasis he gives to the influence of the metaphysics of Krausism. In two books — *Humor y pensamiento de Antonio Machado en la metafísica poética* (1963) and *El pensamiento de António Machado en Juan de Mairena* (1972) — Cobos attempts, among other things, to trace fundamental metaphysical ideas, expressed by Machado through his apócrifos, back to Krause and Sanz del Río. Cobos labels all interpretations of Machado's metaphysical thought previous to his own as "deficient" precisely for having ignored the influence of Krausism. At the same time, the critic is well aware of the complexity of the metaphysical systems under discussion, and seems to be conscious of the lack of precision of some of his analogies. Nevertheless he never doubts the truth of his thesis that Krausism is indeed present in the thought of Machado's apocryphal philosophers:

Es oscura y enigmática la metafísica poética de Abel Martín; enigmática es asimismo la Wesenlehre, teoría del Wesen de Krause; siempre quedará dudas al establecer analogías y diferencias, pero ninguna en cuanto a la presencia de la segunda en la primera. El panteísmo de Machado, Dios incluido, se ha de estudiar con punto de partida en esta extraña, difícil y religiosa filosofía.

In this chapter I wish to concentrate on an examination and evaluation of the central points of Cobos's thesis. As a necessary preliminary I shall first outline my own understanding of the metaphysics of Krausism and of Machado's apócrifos, in particular of Abel Martín.
Karl Christian Friedrich Krause (1781-1832) saw his own philosophical system as a synthesis of all the achievements of human thought up to his time. He aspired to reconcile the contradictions of earlier philosophers into a harmonious whole, bringing together the elements of truth in their different systems. Krause held that previous thinkers had grasped partial aspects of the truth, yet he observed that the history of philosophy was characterised by the expression of a series of seemingly irreconcilable dichotomies: Idealism and Materialism, Deism and Pantheism, Subject and Object, Body and Spirit, Substance and Accident, Cause and Effect, Freedom and Necessity, Unity and Variety.

Krause attempted to reconcile these dichotomies in a new and all-inclusive metaphysical system. At the centre of this system is his view of the relation between God and the World, including Mankind: a harmonious synthesis, he believed, of the previous theories on this point, alluded to in the above quotation. Before I examine this central theory, however, I think it is relevant to set Krausism in the context of the philosophy of his time, for this...
sheds a great deal of light on Krause's principles, objectives and conclusions. Although he saw his own system as the culmination of all previous philosophy, and held that Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas and Leibniz were "prophets" of his own Racionalismo armónico; his most obvious sources of inspiration are his immediate predecessors in German philosophy: Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel.

An interesting reflection on Krausels, relationship to these thinkers is to be found in Sanz del Río's comparison of their worth in the introduction to his Metafísica analítica, where he is keen to pass judgement on Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel and hence justify his own preference for Krause. Sanz del Río acknowledges the important advances made in German philosophy prior to Krause and declares that these advances are included in Krause's new synthesis, which he claims is more "realistic" and of greater practical value than the other systems. To Kant Sanz credits: the discovery of the dualismo contradictorio in previous philosophy; a rigorous critique of traditional logic; and a fundamental shift in philosophical attention from the Subject to the Object. Yet Sanz, like Krause, found Kant's conclusions unsatisfactory. Kant believed that we can only really know the processes and categories of our own minds: the mind imposes forms on objective reality and in this way attains knowledge of phenomena, but it is unable to penetrate the "noumenum", the Thing-in-Itself. Hence, according to Sanz, the legitimacy and practical value of knowledge was left in doubt by Kant. As for Fichte and Schelling, Sanz criticises them as creators of unreal, purely hypothetical systems. Sanz is particularly critical in this respect of Schelling, whose system he believes is without any firm basis of observation of the real world. Nevertheless Sanz recognises the importance of Schelling's aspiration to overcome all dualities, for Krause shared this aspiration. Both Sanz and Krause firmly reject the
manner in which dualities are excluded from Schelling's System of Identity, for this exclusion is only achieved at the cost of denying such notions as human freedom and individuality, both fundamental concepts in Krausism.

To Hegel Sanz attributes the solution of the fundamental question posed by Kant as to the possibility of knowledge: Hegel saw that the same rational essence determines both "Being" and "Thought", that is to say, the Reason that reigns in the human mind also reigns in the objective world, and hence the "real" is intelligible because it is rational. Sanz also praises Hegel's discovery of the dialectical rhythm of thought.

At the same time he is critical of the way that Hegel applies a dialectical method. Firstly, Sanz says, he does not build his system on the evidence of finite reality; rather he proceeds by stages of pure abstract thought, ignoring the thinking subject as a real human being and the objective world as something real and substantial. Secondly, Sanz is unhappy with a dialectical system that resolves dualities by negating one term or the other. In his final synthesis, according to Sanz, Hegel obliterates such problems as human individuality, finite existence and real human, historical change, and, since Absolute Idealism is a purely abstract construct, can offer no practical, ethical guidance.

Sanz summarises the reasons for his preference for Krause rather than Hegel thus:

Para nosotros no era dudosa la elección entre los dos métodos indicados de la construcción filosófica; (...) No es el primer método y sistema [el de Krause] el puro opuesto del segundo [el de Hegel], sino que abraza en sí lo que éste tiene de verdadero; puesto que lo real absoluto puede, y aun debe ser, como real, intelectual e inteligible a la vez, sin borrar su realidad, antes bien determinándola, llenándola en esta su propiedad interior y en todas; pero el ideal puro, el puro pensante, y lo pensado, un puro abstracto sin motivo ni valor.
Implicit in Sanz del Río’s commentaries on Krause’s predecessors in German philosophy are not only the reasons for his preference for Krause but also an appreciation of the fundamental principles underlying Krausism together with an understanding of what influences determined these principles. First of all, we can say that Krause wished, like his predecessors, to construct a vast, all-inclusive metaphysical system capable of accounting for every aspect of the world and of human life and of absorbing all the major philosophical trends of the past. Secondly, Krause abhorred dualities and sought to overcome them. Thirdly, he was wary of Monism in certain guises because it could imply the negation of both the observable complexity of life and of such fundamental ethical principles as human freedom and individuality. Krause believed that he could achieve these aims by applying his own dialectic, the dialectic of Harmony, and by positing the concept, related to harmony, of Organic Unity. In the dialectics of Krause syntheses contain contradictions in a harmonious higher stage, without negating the reality of the contrary parts. Similarly, the concept of Organic Unity enables his system to be all-inclusive — everything is connected to everything else in a vast whole — while allowing for the real existence, differences and up to a point the free and independent functioning of the parts that make up the whole. Krause’s system allows for the existence, as we shall see, of both an Infinite Being who is the Unity of the whole of creation, and, at the same time, of finite, individual and free human beings.

Krausism is a rational philosophy but without limitation to abstract thought. Rather it claims to be based on the evidence of "objective reality". Furthermore, it claims that, since its epistemological basis is sound, it can provide knowledge of practical value. As I have pointed out, Krause adopted Hegel’s "idealist" solution to the problem of knowledge: the
notion that Reason governs the world as well as the human mind. However in Krausism this notion is presented as a conclusion drawn from real experience rather than as a starting point: Krause wishes to appear not to be making presuppositions. The Krausist process of knowledge begins, its adherents claim, without preconceptions, and is based on a particular means of overcoming the Kantian dichotomy of Subject and Object. Knowledge in Krausism begins with a primary intuition within the individual consciousness, where the consciousness reflects on itself and is hence both Subject and Object.

This primary intuition constitutes the starting point of that part of Krausist metaphysics known as the Analysis in which the ego begins by achieving knowledge of itself and eventually, after a series of stages, arrives at knowledge of God. The ego, it is claimed, is not merely an abstract term but represents the consciousness of a real individual human being living in the real world. The thinking individual’s first intuition is that he is indeed an individual and that he has a body and a spirit. He also realizes that he is a human being among other human beings. From these intuitions, according to Krause and his followers, the individual deduces three ideas: the idea of "Spirit", a totality comprising all human spirits; the idea of "Nature", the unity which describes the entire physical world; and the idea of "Humanity" - the totality of human beings. Krause calls these three unifying entities "Relative Infinities", and declares that, because they are perceived to be separate entities with definite limits, they prompt the ego to search for something greater which unites and hence explains them all. This explanation can only be the existence of an Infinite Being on which the Relative Infinities are founded and in which they are united and given meaning. In this way, within the individual consciousness, the Krausist analytic process acquires knowledge of God and of God’s relationship to mankind and to the world.
Both "Intuition" and "Reason" are said to play their part in this process of knowledge. Intuition provides the data of intimate experience and Reason translates this into conceptual terms. Neither faculty could function alone: intuition is incommunicable without rational language, and reason alone only provides empty concepts. The rationality used by Krause is given the name realismo racional or racionalismo armónico by the Spanish Krausists and aspires to provide a vision that is at one and the same time real, rational and harmonious, that is to say in accord with other means of perception as well as rationality.

P. Jobit, in his exposition of the Krausist "Analysis", emphasises the rôle played by intuition and the quasi-mystical nature of the revelation of God within the individual consciousness. However it seems to me that reason is the faculty dominant in the Krausist Analysis: the deduction of the existence of the Relative Infinities and particularly of the Infinite Being is clearly more a process of rational logic than an intuition. The individual searches for an explanation, a reason for the nature of the world of men, and arrives at concepts which, although following on from spontaneous "intuitions", ultimately depend on the rational presupposition that such an explanation must exist. Furthermore, Reason is seen by Krause as a Divine principle that orders the world, and human rationality is supposedly a part or reflection of this. Although Sanz del Río claims that racionalismo armónico does not exclude non-rational means of perception, he is critical of past thinkers who misused and limited the powers of reason by having recourse to notions such as "faith" and "feeling", which he clearly sees as inferior to reason:

en vez de dirigir el pensamiento histórico de los individuos y pueblos o siglos por las leyes de la razón eterna... por la recta y sana razón...tales doctrinas trastornan también el
órdan del espiritó, poniendo lo inferior sobre lo superior, lo menos perfecto sobre lo más perfecto, el corazón sobre la cabeza, el sentimiento creyente sobre el claro conocimiento. 16

A highly rationalistic urge to define and categorise according to logical principles informs the second part of the Krausist system — the "Synthesis". The Synthesis begins by examining the supreme notion of God arrived at in the Analysis and subsequently descends the same path that had been ascended in the Analysis, deducing from the one Absolute Being the nature and organization of the whole universe in its various parts: Spirit, Nature, Mankind and the human individual. The synthesis is hence complementary to the Analysis, but its scope is far greater: the description and categorization of all areas of knowledge within a hierarchy of interrelated sciences and disciplines. The concept of organic unity, of the interrelationship of the parts to each other and to the whole, allows Krause to attempt an all-embracing system which, while unified under the principle of the Absolute Being, includes and accounts for all the variety, dynamism and mutability of the real world of man, nature and history.

One of the most important disciplines derived by Krause in the Analysis, the Philosophy of History, clearly demonstrates how the principle of variety within organic unity can be applied to a particular area of human knowledge. According to Krause human history is a process of gradual perfection. Although mankind is free, its destiny is intimately connected to the Divine Essence of which it is a part, and can be described as the achievement of the Kingdom of God here on earth. The historian's task is seen to be the tracing of Man's slow but sure progress towards this ideal by charting his intellectual and spiritual evolution. For Krause true history is the history of ideas, the underlying history of the workings of the Divine Essence discernible
beneath the apparent chaos of "external" history. In Krause's own philosophy of history the errors of the past are attributed to inadequacies of knowledge, but he is often able to sift out elements of truth or partial truths in past thought, and hence build his own system as the latest stage in an unbroken historical development. Krause sees in history a unity of direction and is not dissuaded from his view by the apparently violent ideological conflicts of the past and present. Rather he explains these conflicts as part of a single dialectical process which he believes to be a rule of history. This dialectical process is explained by Krause in terms of a triad: Indifferentiation - Opposition - Harmony. Indifferentiation is a stage of unconsciousness, exemplified in history by the relationship of primitive man to the world he lives in: without conflict but without knowledge either. Conflict or opposition is a sign of the growth of consciousness, and is a necessary stage in the development of mankind towards the highest stage: conscious harmony. The third stage in the Krausist dialectic is one of reconciling conflicts - harmonization - rather than of the victory of one of the elements in conflict. After a detailed examination of history Krause concludes that humanity and human thought stand on the threshold of maturity, of the Age of Harmony when all the apparent conflicts of the past will begin to be resolved and mankind will come closer to God and the Truth. In fact Krause's philosophy is seen by his followers as the auger of the Age of Harmony.

In the application of the Krausist dialectic to human history we can observe how difference and conflict are integrated into a vision of a single, unified process.

The cornerstone of Krausism is its vision of the relationship between Man and God within time, that is to say both throughout the history of humanity and in relation to the individual human being's life. In his account of this relationship Krause aims, characteris-
tically, to reconcile differing theories on the subject into a harmonious synthesis; the main dichotomies as he sees them are Deism and Pantheism, Transcendence and Immanence and the Finite and the Infinite. Sanz del Río explains the position of God in racionalismo armónico thus:

El reconocimiento de Dios como el objeto de la suprema inducción racional del espíritu y el principio de todas las deducciones de una ciencia verdadera, no es el deísmo que concibe a Dios como un género y abstracción fuera del mundo, separado del mundo e incomprendible para el hombre; no es el panteísmo que confunde a Dios con el mundo, concibiendo un Dios-mundo o un mundo-Dios. El racionalismo armónico conoce a Dios como el absoluto, infinito y el ser supremo sobre el mundo; distinto como el ser supremo del mundo que es inferior bajo Dios, por Dios, mediante Dios. De consiguiente, Dios conoce el mundo, goberna el mundo, guía el mundo al bien con justicia, con sabiduría, con amor, con arte divino: In Deo sumus, vivimus et movemus. Ex ipso et per ipsum et in ipso sunt omnia. 17

The quotation from St. Paul was dear to the Krausists, as was Krause's own formula (in Sanz's translation) "El hombre en, según y mediante Dios". In this system, Man is not separated from God by an act of creation ex nihilo or by exclusion of the finite human world from the Kingdom of God; or by an impenetrable barrier of mystery: such dualities are alien to Krause's thinking. Neither is the Krausist cosmology purely pantheistic, for this would deny, according to Krause, the possibility of transcendence, and would obliterate human individuality and moral freedom. Nevertheless, Krausism was criticised in Spain as pantheistic by such writers as Balmes, Orti y Lara, Menéndez y Pelayo and Campoamor, even though Spanish Krausists such as Sanz del Río, Giner de los Ríos, Federico de Castro, Canalejas and González Serrano repeatedly attributed this criticism to misunderstanding, and were, in fact, critical of pantheism themselves. 19 They gave their own world-
-view the name Panenteismo (from Krause’s All-in-Gott-Lehre). In "Panentheism" the world and mankind exist within God, outside Whom there is nothing. The world and mankind are free and individual realities, yet God transcends and contains everything within and below Himself. In this way Dualism and Pantheism, Immanence and Transcendence are reconciled in a new, harmonious synthesis. Krause saw his own system as a rational Christianity, a Christianity brought into line with the philosophical advances of his time and with the idea of the perfectibility of Man.

In Panentheism God is defined as "eternal", "infinite" and "absolute" and Man as finite and limited in time and space. Yet this does not imply an unbridgeable gulf between the two: God, in Sanz del Río’s words, is not "algo puramente otro y extrahumano" but a Todo of which Man forms a part, and hence human beings have "algo de divino sobre su individualidad histórica". Human life, properly lived, transcends the individual’s limitations and is the realization of that individual’s Divine potential, the "algo de divino" within him:

El hombre y la humanidad, sólo viviendo en unidad consigo, y en libre armonía con todos los seres, puede hallar a Dios en su corazón y en su razón a la vez; la imagen divina aparece entonces a la humanidad en la imagen purificada de su propio espíritu.

This fulfilment of a divine potential must also be seen, according to Krause, in the context of human history, that is to say in so far as each individual’s life is a part and a contribution to mankind’s slow progress towards perfection. This feeling that the individual is part of something greater (God, and Humanity in history) enables Man to overcome his sense of limitation, and, more, to redefine and dignify his own particular limitation as essentially an indication of his own uniqueness and individuality. Human beings are all different because, although they are all manifestations
of the same essence, they are all limited in different ways. This means that every man has a particular and irrepeatable contribution to make to the progress of humanity. Sanz del Río expresses this notion thus:

Y reconociendo yo además mi infinita limitación en el mundo y aquí en esta tierra y vida e Historia... esta presente historia y vida... me llama a justa, viva, ordenada, útil relación con ella para no dejar vacío y baldío este tiempo entre mi tiempo todo en la continuidad infinita (en Dios y en el mundo todo como en éste) de mi racionalidad y racional vida y obra y obra de hombre. - Que por lo demás y al cabo de todo, el sentimiento de mi limitación al lado de mi realidad y real humana actividad... no me inquieta ni me impide obrar derecho y tan bien como cabe dentro de mi limitad (sic), sabiendo como sé que el sentimiento de mi límite no es absoluto, ni es el sentimiento de la nada y la muerte alrededor de mí y de lo presente, sino el sentimiento de mi particularidad cada vez y en cada eficacia mía y de mí con todas mis coordenadas relaciones, a saber, en totalidad gradual orgánica positivamente de particular: cada más comprensiva particularidad histórica, en presencia y virtud y mediante la totalidad absoluta presente en mi ser y en la razón de mi ser y en mi racional conocimiento. 22

The same idea is explained much more clearly by Sanz del Río's disciple Francisco Giner de los Ríos:

Cuanto llevamos dicho hasta aquí se aplica igualmente, en virtud de la identidad de naturaleza a todo ser racional. Mas si ninguno de éstos manifiesta propiedad alguna esencial que no se halle en todos, difieren también profundamente unos de otros en cuanto al modo propio y exclusivo como cada cual muestra esa naturaleza común, y que le constituye en un ser peculiar y distinto de todos los de su género: en este modo de ser característico, singular, único, consiste su individualidad; o en otros términos la completa limitación con que su esencia aparece concretada en todas las relaciones posibles, sin quedar indeterminada en ninguna. Por esta limitación, cada individuo, como tal individuo, es enteramente otro que los demás (...) Esta originalidad característica le atribuye propio valor,
I have quoted at some length here because it seems to me that this idea of limitation and the ideas derived from it is a good and an important example of the ability of the Krausist world-view to include and account for variety and difference within a basic framework of unity. It is a metaphysical idea that justifies a number of key Krausist ethical principles - freedom, the importance of the individual, life as fulfilment of oneself and of a mission for one's fellow-men. Metaphysics and ethics are inseparable, though the metaphysical impulse is, characteristically, more pronounced in Sanz del Río, and, also characteristically, the ethical principle is more eloquently and nobly stated by Francisco Giner.

The idea of life as an obra, a mission, the fulfilment of an individual destiny, is often linked in Krausist thought to the idea of time and temporality. Mankind, says Sanz del Río, fulfils itself in time, and he sometimes uses the phrase obra temporal as a synonym of vida. Francisco Giner, translating Krause, uses temporal as an alternative for viva. Of course, this emphasis on time derives naturally from the definition of human beings as limited both by mortality and by their historical circumstances, and because each human life is seen as a segment of the forward-moving history of humanity. Because human history is seen as intimately bound up with God, Sanz can refer to history as a proper place for worship of God.

Similarly, God's relationship to Man and the world is pictured by Sanz as a continuous process in time:
la primera operación divina, la creación de sus seres, dura eternamente; la segunda operación en que toda criatura que en su límite se hace semejante a Dios es elevada por Dios según su mérito, dura también eternamente, y ambas operaciones divinas forman juntas la relación viva y continua de Dios con el mundo, la Providencia. 27

In this account of creation, Sanz is obviously striving to avoid the duality involved in the idea of the Creation as a moment of separation of God and the world. In Krausist thought the term "eternal" as used here should not be understood as implying absence of time; "eternal" means "everlasting" - sometimes Sanz uses the term "eterna-temporalmente" to make his meaning clearer. 28

In the same sense he refers above to his life - "mi tiempo" - and its relation to "la continuidad infinita". 29

In effect the notion of Eternity as something outside time would involve another duality, always something shunned in Krausism. So, in the same way as the Absolute Being includes the sum total of finite and limited beings, the Eternal is a unity of all moments of time. Salmerón approvingly quotes Plato's description of time as "la imagen móvil de la eternidad", 30 and Sanz del Río is probably thinking of the same philosopher when he remarks "se dice bien la eternidad del tiempo". 31

"Eternity" is also used by the Krausists as an expression describing the unchanging element within man - his essence - which exists alongside the ephemeral and mutable part of his being:

Siempre que atiendo a mi interior, me hallo, ante todo, mudando, esto es, pasando de un estado determinado a otro y otro también determinados y así indefinidamente, y esto según la ley formal del antes y del después, o en forma de tiempo. Advierto, en seguida, que Yo el que mudo y tengo conciencia de mis mudanzas, soy y quedo el mismo en todas, y entonces, opuestamente a que mudo, veo al mismo tiempo que no mudo, que duro, que permanezco el mismo, y permanezco según la ley de ser Yo todo presente siempre a mí mismo, o en forma de eternidad. 32
Sanz described Man's relationship to God as comprising two processes taking place throughout "the eternity of time", namely Creation and Salvation. I would like to complete my account of Krausist metaphysics by examining its vision of salvation, immortality and death. The most extensive work by a Spanish Krausist on these themes is *Filosofía de la muerte*, a compilation left by Sanz del Río, edited, annotated and expanded by Manuel Sales y Ferré. Although lengthy and detailed, this work is often vague and enigmatic on important points and at times separate manuscripts which have been assembled into the various chapters and sections are not wholly consistent with one another. I shall try to summarise what seem to me the most fundamental ideas.

Sanz del Río clearly attempted to formulate a coherent theory of death by applying the same philosophical principles and methods he had developed in his analysis of human life, following Krause. He (and his co-author Sales y Ferré) aspires to base his conclusions on observable reality and personal experience and, in addition, to apply deductive reasoning to those truths he believed he had already established about life in order to arrive at valid conclusions on the nature of death and immortality. Certain key Krausist concepts consequently shape this work: the rejection of dualities and extreme and exclusive philosophical stances; the attempted synthesis of previous theories; the principle of organic unity which leaves room for mutability and differentiation; the dialectic of harmony rather than opposition; the concept of Man as a composite of Nature and Spirit, within the larger unities of Humanity and God; the concepts of temporality and individuality, as well as eternity and humanity.

Sanz rejects several visions of death and immortality commonly found in philosophy or theology as extreme and erroneous. The vision of man being swallowed up and lost after death within "Being", found in some
Eastern religions, and the idea that it is "Humanity" that is immortal (attributed by Sanz to un-named Greek and Roman thinkers and to some modern philosophers he refers to as "objective idealists") are both judged unsatisfactory because they deny the importance of the individual human being and of the ethical merit of his life. He also criticises what he calls "unbalanced" evaluations of the relative importance of mortal life and the afterlife, whether to the detriment of the latter or of the former, as in Christianity which, according to Sanz, sees this life as no more than a preliminary to the more important life after death. It is also erroneous, he holds, to believe as Christians do that only the spirit survives death, or to maintain the contrary Materialist idea that the body alone survives death in the form of indestructible matter. Finally, Sanz cannot accept the idea of death as a total negation of life, since this involves a duality—Being and Non-Being—inconceivable in the Krausist metaphysics, and, according to Sanz, a logical contradiction. Absolute Nothingness, he declares, is a monstrous, unreal and irrational figment of the human imagination.

According to Krausism death is a negation, but only a relative negation. Since Being is the one unifying principle of the Universe, death can only be the negation of a form of being, a moment of transition from one form of being, one form of life, to another. The human body loses its present form after death, but the matter it was made of returns to the Nature from which it came: physically death is a transformation, not an annihilation. In fact it is not really a return to Nature, since that matter never left Nature, the human body having an organic relationship with Nature, of which it forms a part, both during life and after human death. Thus the oneness and continuity of being in spite of human death is affirmed in Krausism.

Death and the afterlife have an intimate connection
with the particular life of each human individual. Man is limited, and death is the most dramatic indication of each individual’s temporal limitation. Death is not conceived by Sanz as an alien force, as something which impinges on life from the outside; rather each man’s death is his own death and its inevitability accompanies him in life. His death is an expression of his own individual and particular destiny and should constitute not a negation of that destiny but its positive conclusion, providing that he has lived his life to the full. Death is a conclusion, but it is only the conclusion of one form of life, one form of being. In effect there is an important element of continuity of being from life through death to the afterlife, namely the individual human being who has his own life, his own death and his own afterlife.

Sanz believes in a spiritual afterlife as a different form of being, distinct from life on earth but at the same time linked to that life within one process of being. What is the distinct form of the afterlife? According to Sanz, when we die it is certain that a part of us ceases to exist: that part of the human being and his life which is ephemeral and transitory. At the same time another part of him survives: the essence of his individual being. Fundamentally the human essence is something unchanging, unvarying and eternal, and this clearly cannot be destroyed when one man dies. The common essence he shares with his fellow-men lives on in them. However Sanz does not wish to conclude from this that the individual being is obliterated in death within the vastness of the unchanging oneness of Being or Humanity. He strives to preserve some individual dimension of immortality, and this emphasis on the individual is expressed in his terminology: the part that perishes in death is the "determinado individuo y sujeto temporal", the part that lives on is the "sujeto e individuo esencial"—both essential and individual. All men share a common human essence but each man is a
particular expression of that essence, and it is this particular expression of the essence—"lo esencial del yo"—which survives death, not merely the "general esencia humana". 37

We have seen how for Krausists life is fundamentally an obra (for this reason Sanz prefers the term difuntos to muertos with its etymology "los que han funcionado"); hence the essential part of a man's life lies in those of his acts and achievements that can be described as essential:

Precisely which aspects and acts of the individual's life are "essential" and which consequently survive death are, according to Sanz, made clear to the individual at the very moment of his death. Sanz describes this as a moment of total recall of one's past life and consciousness of its value, a moment of Final Judgement where the judge and the judged are both dimensions of the individual himself: there is no external divine arbiter:

en ese crítico momento, toda esta vida temporal con todas sus relaciones ha de serme presente de una vez en la claridad de mi vida racional, como la parte es presente al todo, y presente juntamente lo que resulte en bien o en mal de toda ella para mi destino ulterior. Pues bien, esta pura presencia en mí, en la unidad de mi vida racional, de toda esta vida, con la presencia a la vez de lo que resulte para mí en bien o en mal de todo lo hecho aquí, y según cuyo resultado habrá de determinarse mi vida ulterior, es lo que se llama juicio de la vida, juicio final; esto es, juicio que hacemos de
Every individual is able to achieve something "essential" in his life, something which transcends the limits of his finite being, and it is in the transcendental dimension of his achievement that he survives death: "en todo lo esencial que hago en esta vida...trasciendo a la siguiente". Frequently Sanz prefers other terms to express the notion of transcendence: "vida superior", "sobre-vida", "vida fundamental", "eternidad", terms he uses both when he is discussing transcendental acts carried out during finite life and when he is alluding to the transcendence that is life-after-death; the two are obviously interrelated aspects of "lo esencial".

In either case, each human being, because of his particular limitations (and hence his individuality), achieves transcendence differently, and therefore lives on after death in different forms. It is this differentiation of achievements which enables Sanz to give an individual dimension to one man's afterlife as part of the eternal survival of essential being in mankind. It is not a great degree of individuality; the just man, for example, lives on after his death as a part of Justice.

Another way in which the individual might survive as an individual within humanity is in the preservation of the memory of a person among his contemporaries and among future generations of men. While admitting that this is a form of immortality, Sanz regards it as an unsatisfactory or incomplete explanation of essential immortality, since it admits too much that is ephemeral and is liable to over-emphasise the value of a small number of "great men" and make us forget everyone else's immortality. This is made clear in Sanz's discussion of the traditional belief in a Communion of the Living and the Dead. When he defines life he frequently refers to obras; he also often describes life in terms of
relaciones, for in Krausism life is one organically linked whole, and a man's life is unavoidably one of relationships - to Nature, to the society he lives in, and to the rest of Humanity, past, present and future. Hence Sanz sees relationships between the living and the living and between the living and the dead, although the latter relationship is a somewhat different one from the former. The relationship of the living and the dead is a purer, more essential form of human relationship, a superior relationship with beings stripped of everything transitory and ephemeral. This relationship is the Communion of the Living and the Dead, which is for Sanz a term that expresses the recognition of a fundamental truth: that we all form part of a greater whole - Humanity in history - a whole in which we share a common essence, and by means of which we can transcend our limitations as finite individuals by fulfilling our part of one great life. Communion with the Dead is an aspect of one general Communion of Mankind. Within the unity of Humanity the living can be said to live among the dead - in the sense of the eternal human essence - and the spirit of the dead - this same essence - lives on in the finite lives of the living. So, concludes Sanz, we should pay our tribute to the dead in the way we live our lives, not by mourning or by solemn acts of homage. At the same time the dead can be said to guide and influence our lives from day to day, since they represent the "essential" dimension, the possibility of transcendence. If we are true to our essence, and live rationally and harmoniously with our fellow-men we can transcend this mortal life as we are living it and attain "eternity" here and now:

aquel que es bueno y puro de corazón vive ya aquí vida real, bienaventurada, lleva la eternidad, no en la relación del antes o del después, sino en el presente del bueno y justo obrar. 43
In fact, in fulfilling ourselves and our mission as human beings we can be in "Heaven", the Kingdom of God, here in our mortal lives; Sanz writes: "seamos hoy fieles cada uno en su puesto, cada uno presidiendo su destino; este es nuestro cielo presente." Then, after we have died we will also achieve the lasting transcendence that is survival in the spirits of the generations of men who succeed us:

Sanz del Río counsels a calm and well-balanced attitude to death; death is neither something to be longed for nor something to be feared. Death is only terrifying to a man who has no sense of the true meaning of life, a man who lives only in and for the present moment, "cuya vida es anticipadamente la muerte de su razón y de todo lo superior en nosotros"; whereas a man can be resolute and calm if he sees death in its true light as "muerte rodeada y penetrada de vida superior - de parte acá como hacia allá". In short, a rational attitude to death depends on an appreciation of the transcendental purpose of life, beyond the present moment:

Characteristically, metaphysics leads to ethics in Krausist philosophy.
The metaphysical thought of Antonio Machado can be summarised more briefly than that of the Krausists. Its central ideas are to be found in his short but difficult work *De un cancionero apócrifo. Abel Martín* (1926). Further explanations of these ideas are given in *Cancionero apócrifo. Juan de Mairena*. (1928) and *Juan de Mairena* (1936), and a number of poems — P.C. CLXIX–CLXCVI — shed further light on the metaphysics.

In spite of its brevity, *De un cancionero apócrifo. Abel Martín* presents the basis of a complete metaphysical system with a cosmology, an ontology and an epistemology. However, it is as much an aesthetics as a metaphysics: Machado's vision of human life and death, his view of the universe and his critique of rationality are ultimately the justification of a poetics. The way Machado presents his poetic and philosophical thought in *Abel Martín* is a curious one: it takes the form of a commentary on the philosophical ideas underlying the poetry of a fictional character, Abel Martín (who is said to have lived from 1840 to 1898) complete with quotations from his prose and verse and bibliographical references. The work can be seen as a metaphysical commentary on Machado's own poetry, in particular his early lyric verse: it is a retrospective analysis and justification of his poetry and poetics in terms of his growing interest in and knowledge of philosophy. The invention of the apocryphal poet and philosopher Abel Martín enables Machado to reflect on his own poetry and his own philosophising with ironic detachment.

Abel Martín's cosmology takes the form of a pantheistic monism. The universe is a single, all-inclusive Absolute Being made of a single substance. This single substance is constantly active, and its activity is what we call consciousness. Each individual human consciousness is a part of the vast universal consciousness or world-soul. However, although only a tiny fraction of the whole, the individual consciousness is capable of apprehending the whole of which it forms a part. The
The sum total of all consciousness comprises the universe's knowledge of itself, the self-awareness of the Absolute Being. Because of the universality of active consciousness and the oneness of Being, Abel Martín describes the Absolute Being metaphorically as "El gran ojo que todo lo ve al verse a sí mismo." 48

Abel Martín's idea that the individual consciousness has the potential to perceive the whole universe implies the possibility of a single human being achieving total knowledge of reality. But Martín is quick to point out the difficulties involved in achieving such knowledge. Being, as well as constantly active, is constantly changing in its manifestations: the universe is in a perpetual state of flux. Reason is totally incapable of accounting for the mutability of reality, since Reason can only function in a world of fixed identities and clear-cut spatial divisions. Rationality, says Martín, clearly following Henri Bergson, is a "homogenizing" process, whereas reality is essentially "heterogeneous". Martín also echoes Bergson when he affirms that only a form of "intuition" is capable of apprehending the ever-changing nature of reality. But in Martín's metaphysics an authentic intuition of reality is not something immediately available to the human mind. The mind must first be prepared to see the world as it is by means of a special dialectical process of knowledge. 49

A large section of the Cancionero apócrifo is dedicated to the description of this process of knowledge. According to the apocryphal poet and metaphysician, the experience of love is a key element in the process of attaining the self-awareness necessary before a real intuition of life can be achieved.

Abel Martín believes that love is a strong, subjective impulse to break out of the confines of the self. That it is fundamentally subjective is, he says, proven by the experience of the desire for love before any particular "beloved" is chosen. Even after one's love has been focused on a particular person the same subjectivity can
be seen to operate, since one’s image of the beloved is fundamentally a projection of one’s own desires. Martín’s picture of love implies solipsism. Through the impulse we call love we learn of our confinement and isolation within our own consciousness. This knowledge is only given to us after the failure of love, when we realise that we cannot break free of the subjective prison, and we become aware of the nature of the impulse that has made us try to do so. When love fails we learn through experience a fundamental truth about life, or in grander terms about Being: we understand what Martín calls "la esencial heterogeneidad del ser". This heterogeneity shows itself in several ways: in the existence of human beings quite separate from ourselves, each with his own particular limitations or boundaries; in the constant mutability of all things; in the deep-felt need of the human being to go beyond his limitations and reach the "Other". In this last sense, when man becomes conscious, through failure, of his own impulse to love, he is in fact becoming aware of a more general law about human life: he is glimpsing the truth that man is characterised by a "sed metafísica de lo esencialmente otro". 50 As I shall explain later, this thirst for "Otherness" is part of Machado’s account of the ethical impulse in man. 51

Abel Martín describes the process of knowledge via the experience of love as a metaphorical journey. The initial subjective impulse to love sends the self out along a path; when the self is thwarted in love it returns along the same path. The path is simply the corriente erótica the self projects outwards from itself, towards the Other. This journey from the self towards the Other and back to the self is an image of a dialectical learning process. Initially the self is active spontaneously and unconsciously and does no more than blindly follow the love impulse. In the second stage of the dialectic, the self is thwarted in love, and the anguish and sense of solitude it experiences is a sign of its
loss of innocence and of the birth of consciousness.
Returning to its own confines, in the third stage, the self is hence different from the self that set out on the journey: it can now look on itself with a new awareness and gain self-knowledge. Principally, as we have seen, the self acquires the concept of "la esencial heterogeneidad del ser" and the ideas related to this concept.

Martín wishes to give this process of acquisition of ideas an explanation in terms of an epistemological theory. His general epistemological theory is based on two related notions: objectivity and negation. The impulse to love creates a certain objectivity in that the movement outwards from the self establishes a distance which enables the self to contemplate itself from outside, as it were. The concept of negation comes into play when love fails. Martín tells of a crucial moment in the experience of love, the moment when the beloved fails to turn up at an appointment; this is a moment when solitude is most keenly felt. What happens is that absence throws into sharp relief the significance of presence. Such a negation functions like a shadow which sharply defines the image of an object. In the same way it is a negation experienced when love fails that enables the self to become conscious of its own limitations, the limitations that define it as a particular self. When the lover becomes aware that he is separated from the Other, and by extension from all other human beings, by the walls of his own subjective prison, it is in fact a negation (the non-self) that is making the precise boundaries of the self visible. In this way negation produces self-consciousness and ideas. Another image of negation used by Abel Martín is that of a blackboard on which white letters are clearly visible. It is the white letters that constitute reality, being; the blackboard on which they can be read is the opposite of what really exists, it is non-Being (El no-ser, la Nada). La Nada is a concept
inclusive of all possible negations: absence as the negation of presence, the non-self as the negation of the self, silence as the negation of sound, oblivion as the negation of remembrance, death as the negation of life, and so on. Negation is the producer of existential awareness in man; it is la Nada which raises man above the level of other creatures, giving him consciousness. Hence Martín speaks of non-Being as "la creación específicamente humana" or as the Divinity's special gift to man. Negation is the cornerstone of human thought; human rationality is the ability to perceive negations and hence define reality in terms of concepts.

This association of rationality with non-being is indicative of Abel Martín's ambivalent attitude towards Reason. On the one hand he affirms that it is Reason that elevates man above the level of blind animality; on the other hand, Reason is only able to perceive non-realities, it cannot deal with reality directly, only with shadow-realities (concepts defined by negation). Rationality and negation explain reality in terms of fixed categories, homogenous units, but reality, as Abel Martín sees it, is heterogeneous, constantly changing, without fixed boundaries. Consequently, reality is not intelligible in purely rational terms. Only a form of "intuition" can capture the real nature of life and the world. Martín claims that poetry offers just such a means of intuiting reality, and that a poem is a uniquely equipped instrument for communicating intuitions without distorting them into purely rational forms. An aspect of the heterogeneity of reality greatly stressed by Martín (and by Juan de Mairena) is temporality. Both apocryphal thinkers emphasise that the human experience of time is an experience of a fundamental reality, and discuss the way poetry can express this experience.

The poet, then, has special powers unavailable to the rationalist thinker. However, according to Martín,
the poet can only put into practice his intuitive powers after he has gone through the process of self-knowledge involving failed love; the discovery of "la esencial heterogeneidad del ser" and of non-being and rationality is a necessary stage in the acquisition of the poetic gift. Poetry is only possible in the third stage of the dialectical process, for the poet's task is to negate the negation involved in the second stage: to restore to reality, homogenised by Reason, its rich heterogeneity.

The Cancionero apócrifo. Abel Martín. does not provide us with any definitive statements on either the nature and purpose of human life or the nature of death in metaphysical terms, but we can assemble a composite picture of Martín's ideas on these themes from odd remarks and, in particular, from poems attributed to Martín and his disciple Mairena. Firstly, it seems clear that in Martín's world-view life is essentially a constant striving for transcendence of the individual's limitations, an impulse to reach lo otro. This striving for transcendence is expressed by the image of life as a journey towards distant goals; in the poem "Siesta (en memoria de Abel Martín)" the possibility of undertaking such a journey is attributed to the divine gift of Reason/Negation which raises man above mere animal concern with the material world and awakens an unending longing for transcendence:

Con la copa de sombra bien colmada, con este nunca lleno corazón, honremos al Señor que hizo la Nada y ha esculpido en la fe nuestra razón. 57

In "Ultimas lamentaciones de Abel Martín" the metaphorical traveller is given a companion on his journey: Time - "¡Oh Tiempo, oh Todavía/ preñado de
inminencias! / Tú me acompañas en la senda fría, / tejedor de esperanzas e impaciencias." Temporality is another defining feature of human life. In the same poem the aim of the journey - transcendence - is pictured as the conquest of distant, unassailable fortresses. The striving for lo otro is a quest for the impossible, but the quest continues throughout life nevertheless.

As well as Time man has another companion on his journey: Death. In "Muerte de Abel Martín" this lifelong companion is portrayed as a mysterious woman. The omnipresence of death in life is commented on in Juan de Mairena, where death is described not merely as a companion but as part of man's being, almost part of his anatomy, and certainly something personal. Death, says Mairena, is a dimension of "la autosuficiente e inalienable intimidad del hombre". Death, like Time, is a part of the individual human being's experience of existence, not a force outside him.

On the question of the nature of death and the destiny of the individual after death, Machado (through Martín and Mairena) is uncertain what to believe. In the poem "Mairena a Martín, muerto" Mairena contemplates his maestro lying peacefully on his deathbed, but is uncertain whether the dead man is at peace with "Ella" (La Nada) or with "El" (El gran ojo, the Absolute Being). These two possible views of death - oblivion or absorption into Absolute Being - derive from two views of God countenanced by Martín. Firstly there is God as the great world-soul revealed to him intuitively or by feeling; secondly there is God as creator of la Nada (of which death would be a part), the God envisaged by rational thought. When the idea of la Nada is predominant in Martín's mind he is apt to reflect that such a death makes life senseless and absurd. In the fourth section of "Muerte de Abel Martín", for example, the dying poet reflects that his life of striving for awareness and transcendence is pointless if he is obliterated by death just the same as men who have
striven for nothing, learned nothing and achieved nothing. At one point in the same poem he seems to long for the moment of oblivion to come and put an end to his painful and fruitless longings, his ultimately worthless consciousness:

Antes me llegue, si me llega, el Día, la luz que ve, increada, ahógame esta mala gritería [my thoughts] Señor, con las esencias de tu Nada. 64

The first two lines of this quotation are enigmatic; but fortunately Juan de Mairena has provided us with a gloss. The lines are meant to be an allusion to Martín's view of death as a reabsorption into the Absolute Being – Mairena paraphrases the sense of "la luz que ve, increada" as "la divinización de la conciencia humana tras de la muerte". 65 He also comments that this vision of death is "más inclinado, acaso, hacia el nirvana búdico que esperanzado en el paraíso de los justos". 66

On his deathbed, Abel Martín is shown suffering doubts and fears until his last moments. However he is finally granted a vision of his whole past life, and after this he calmly accepts death: he serenely raises a glass to his lips – "un vaso de pura sombra lleno" – a gesture that inevitably reminds one of the death of Socrates. 67 We suppose that Martín finally succumbs to the pantheistic nirvana in which he ultimately believed, an end he had evoked in his "Ultimas lamentaciones" in terms of release, serenity and reabsorption into Nature:

¡Oh, descansar en el azul del día como descansa el águila en el viento, sobre la sierra fría, segura de sus alas y su aliento! La augusta confianza a ti, naturaleza, y paz te pido, mi tregua de temor y de esperanza, un grano de alegría, un mar de olvido... 68
In death as in life Abel Martín’s metaphysics is pantheistic: Juan de Mairena describes his maestro’s system as "panteísta...en sumo grado". 69

Pablo de A. Cobos sees evidence of Krausist influence in the metaphysics of Abel Martín in a series of similarities, parallels and coincidences in the two systems. Firstly, he believes that the two cosmologies are very alike in the way they portray the nature of the Absolute Being and His relation to the world of men. Both philosophies deny the notion of a separation between God and the world and declare that the concept "God" includes the world and mankind. In both systems the world is a part of the Absolute Being, not something created ex nihilo and set apart from Himself by God. The Absolute Being is, in Martín’s cosmology, described metaphorically as "el gran ojo que todo lo ve al verse a sí mismo" and Cobos declares emphatically "se ha de poder afirmar que esta metáfora capital, intuición cumbre en la metafísica martiana, le viene a Machado del racionalismo armónico". 70 However, although Cobos explains the similarities in the pantheistic view of the Divinity in the two world-views he makes no clear distinction between panteísmo and panenteísmo - an important point to the Krausists. On one occasion, for example, he presents a quotation from Juan de Mairena as "una declaración expresa de panteísmo, o panenteísmo". 71 Furthermore, he presents no evidence to show that the gran ojo metaphor (rather than the ideas behind it) has its source in Krausist philosophy.

As well as in their cosmologies, Cobos sees similarities in the philosophical methods espoused by Krause and Abel Martín. In both philosophies, Cobos claims, the starting point is the yo contemplating itself. As an example of the Krausist method Cobos quotes from Federico de Castro’s Metafísica: "El punto de partida del "Sistema de la Ciencia" es el de la identidad que se encuentra en la intuición con que el Yo se está
presente en la conciencia, siendo y sabiéndose él mismo que conoce y es conocido". Cobos equates this primary intuition with Abel Martín's account of the knowledge available to the individual consciousness as part of the all-inclusive, all-seeing single monad or gran ojo which "puede ser pensada, por abstracción, en cualquiera de los infinitos puntos de la total esfera que constituye nuestra representación espacial del universo...pero en cada uno de ellos sería una autoconciencia integral del universo entero". Using this inward looking method, says Cobos, Martín comes to know God - El gran ojo - "En la línea vertical ascendente ha llegado Martín hasta Dios; se lo ha encontrado en la entraña del ser, dando sentido al cosmos"; although he does not refer to Krause at this point, Cobos clearly has in mind the Krausist process of discovery of God within one's own consciousness.

Cobos also suggests a methodological similarity in the process by which full knowledge is acquired in the two systems. In Krausism there are two stages: the ascent from the individual consciousness to God and the return path from God to the individual; in Martín there is a similar two-way journey from the self out towards the Other and back again. Cobos also notes a methodological similarity in the systematic use of triads in Krause and Martín. As one example from Krause he refers to the three stages of his philosophy of history: the period of mankind's unconscious and natural relationship to God; the period when, through misapplied consciousness, mankind moves away from God; and the third age when he truly knows God and hence discovers the law of universal harmony. Similarly in Abel Martín's Los complementarios there are said to be three parts, although we are only given the first part, the title of the second ("Canto de frontera, por soleares (cante hondo) a la muerte, al silencio y al olvido"), and the prologue to the third part, the poem "Al gran pleno o conciencia integral". In these particular examples of the use of triads quoted by
Both thinkers are clearly applying a dialectical method (hence the tripartite division), and the critic sees a further similarity in the use of the concept of harmony in the third stage of the dialectic by both. In fact the poem "Al gran pleno...", with its reference to Armonía, is regarded by Cobos as one of the clearest proofs of Krausist influence in the Cancionero apócrifo, and is mentioned again and again as confirmation of his thesis. Yet Cobos never gives a detailed interpretation of this poem, limiting himself to sweeping conclusive statements such as describing the poem as a declaración expresa of pantheism or panentheism (again Cobos does not attach importance to the distinction), or as a "cierre en el que patentiza la inspiración krausista de Abel Martín". Cobos only gives a few brief hints at how he interprets this difficult poem: he says it is a song to "la suprema armonía del krausismo" or to "El Ideal de la Humanidad alcanzado". This "harmony" or "ideal", he suggests, is primarily aesthetic in Abel Martín and ethical in Juan de Mairena:

Esta plenitud o Conciencia integral es El Ideal de la Humanidad alcanzado; es la integradora subjetivación que Martín encomienda a la poesía; es la fraternidad, obsesiva en Mairena. Síntesis conclusiva de la metafísica poética de Martín, Mairena y Machado, inspirado los tres en la filosofía poskantiana de Krause y de don Julián Sanz del Río.

Cobos also sees in "Al gran pleno..." a concept of temporality that he relates to Krausist ideas on time. For both Krause and Martín, he claims, time exists for both man and God. However Cobos's treatment of this theme is rather cursory: his discussion of time in Krausist philosophy is limited to a couple of brief quotations and comments. He does not investigate the question in any detail.

Cobos attaches some importance to the long and difficult poems attributed to the cancioneros apócrifos.
of Martín and Mairena, seeing them as illustrations of fundamental metaphysical ideas. He believes that the vision of death expressed in "Ultimas lamentaciones de Abel Martín" and "Muerte de Abel Martín" is akin to the Krausist view. Of the latter poem he writes: "el Día, "la luz que ve, increada", el Gran Ojo, nos invita a entender una posible integración metafísica en el Ser, a través de la Nada purificadora, empalmando con aquella también martiniana esperanza de la krausista Armonía". 82 In "Ultimas lamentaciones de Abel Martín" Cobos sees an affinity of philosophical attitudes to death in Martín and Krause rather than a similarity of metaphysical conceptions:

Y, frente al misterio, en el que a la vez están Dios y la muerte, las dos sintéticas posiciones del creyente y del increduló; en nuestra cultura, el cristiano y el humanista. La angustia del cristiano está en lo mucho que se juega al vivir; la angustia del racionalista está en el desamparo en que le sume el absurdo, la irracionalidad de la muerte, con el sinsentido de la vida.

Martín está en el segundo caso, mas no plenamente; subyace en él una concordancia entre la irracionalidad de la muerte y la del corazón, que le sitúa, acaso naturalmente, en la sustantividad religiosa del krausismo institucionista. 83

Some supplementary details concerning the chronology of Machado's "apocryphal" philosophical texts are used by Cobos as support for his thesis. He sees a parallel between the philosophical development of Krausism from Sanz del Río to Francisco Giner de los Ríos, and the changes observable between the thought of Abel Martín and that of his disciple Juan de Mairena. In both cases the disciple is more ethical, more Christian, less abstractly metaphysical than the master. Cobos also links this Sanz/Martín - Giner/Mairena parallel to the dates of birth and death given by Machado to his two fictitious nineteenth century philosopher-poets:
Tampoco le podía dar otra alma, u otro Dios, Abel Martín al universo suyo; porque Martín nació el año 40 del siglo decimonónico, cuando Sanz del Río demandaba a la Universidad de Madrid la creación de una cátedra de Filosofía del Derecho, para que le crearan la de la Historia de la Filosofía, previo el deber de estudiarla en Alemania. Cuatro años tenía don Abel cuando Don Julián meditaba en Illescas y 14 tenía el primero cuando el segundo comenzó a enseñar...De manera que Martín, español, aunque sevillano, luego que le diera por la filosofía, de ninguna manera pudo eludir su destino en el seno del panenteísmo, como el Dios que le dieron, entre los alemanes y los belgas, a los españoles de su época para su propio uso. (...)

Juan de Mairena al venir a las letras el año 1934, se encontró, pues, en el angosto sendero de seguir cristianizando el panenteísmo de Sanz del Río, en la compañía de don Francisco Giner, que había nacido en Ronda un año antes que Abel Martín. 84

Cobos seems to believe that Machado too could not have avoided being influenced by Krausism, given his education at the Institución and his family's close ties to the Spanish Krausists. 85 Cobos recognises that there is some truth in the assertion made by many historians that after Sanz's death interest in the purely metaphysical aspects of the philosophy declined, but he maintains that an "atmósfera krausista irremediable" survived right up to the 1930's even though other philosophical theories became much more popular. 86

On the whole, Cobos's treatment of the question of influences is rather unmethodical. He tends to make sweeping statements about the importance of the influence of Krausism without backing his ideas up with much detailed evidence or elucidation. Sometimes he implies that Krausism is the key to Martín's metaphysics, yet there are whole sections of his studies where Krausism is not even mentioned, and on one occasion he states that Bergson and Leibniz are the principal influences, against the whole tenor of his previous and subsequent polemical statements about the importance of Krausism. 87
At the same time it is only fair to point out that Cobos does honestly acknowledge the shortcomings of his thesis on certain points and recognises that there are counter-arguments that can be made to some of his propositions. He anticipates, for example, the objection that Machado never quotes Krause in his writings and only rarely mentions Sanz del Río; in fact he names Sanz only twice in his works, also mentioning el krausismo español on one occasion. Cobos attempts to play down the importance of this detail: he claims that the Spanish Krausists were generally wary of referring to Sanz and Krause for fear of causing escándalo in a society hostile to those thinkers. From my readings of Spanish Krausists I would say that Cobos greatly exaggerates their reticence. Furthermore, the absence of quotation from Sanz and Krause is not limited to Machado's published works: he does not quote them either in his letters or in his personal notebooks. This is particularly significant in the case of Los complementarios, where we can find many notes and rough drafts later to be incorporated into the philosophical writings attributed to Abel Martín and Juan de Mairena.

Cobos suggests several other counter-arguments to his thesis, and, as we shall see, often fails to answer them satisfactorily. In spite of this and the other shortcomings in his books, he does nevertheless provide a useful framework within which to examine in greater detail the whole question of similarities and differences between the metaphysical thought of the Spanish Krausists and that of Machado's apócrifos. Let us begin the examination by studying in detail the case for and against Cobos's thesis on the question of the cosmologies of the two systems.

Cobos is clearly right in seeing a similarity in the concept of the Absolute Being in Krausism and in the Cancionero apócrifo de Abel Martín. In both systems the Absolute Being is an all-inclusive totality and the world of men is a part of the Whole rather than something
set apart from the Divinity in a single act of creation. The Absolute Being pervades the whole universe, is immanent in all men and in all things. In conventional philosophical terminology such a view of God would be called pantheist. However, the Krausists deliberately reject the label "pantheist" and invent a new term "panentheist" to describe the system in which they believe. Juan de Mairena has no doubts about describing his maestro Abel Martín's metaphysics as "panteista... en sumo grado". Such an admission would be anathema to a true Krausist. In spite of the importance of the pantheist/panentheist distinction, Cobos uses the terms indiscriminately when discussing the nature of Abel Martín's world-view. For a Krausist the terminological distinction is important, and in fact Cobos even quotes a statement from López-Morillas's El krausismo español that emphasises the distinction and the reasons for it:

A la visión panteísta del mundo propuesta por Schelling le reprocha Krause la inevitable consideración del acontecer universal como un sencillo proceso natural, como una especie de determinismo divino en el que no podrían hallar cabida las nociones de libertad y responsabilidad humanas. Para sortear obstáculos, el panenteísmo (Krause) echa mano de la fórmula siguiente: "El mundo no está fuera de Dios..., ni tampoco es Dios mismo, sino que es en Dios y mediante Dios." 

According to the Krausists only the panentheist view is able to reconcile the idea of an immanent Deity with the notions of human individuality and freedom; furthermore only panentheism can account for a God who is transcendent and above man at the same time as being immanent. Krause does not want the term "God" to be understood merely as an expression for the sum total of the parts that make up the whole world whether in the realm of Reason or Consciousness or of Substance: the Absolute Being is on a different level to man. In Krausism man is separated from God in this sense, although he is not
separated from Him in other senses: humanity has not been set apart from God in an act of creation, and does form part of the Divine Essence.

In Abel Martín's metaphysics there is no sense of such a separation of the world and God onto different levels. For example when Mairena states "siendo el mundo real, y la realidad única y divina, hablar de una creación del mundo equivaldría a suponer que Dios se creaba a sí mismo", the World and God appear to be interchangeable terms. Cobos quotes this line as proof of "panteísmo o panenteísmo" in Martín and Mairena, but it is obviously the former rather than the latter on this evidence. In fact the preceding line of the Cancionero apócrifo - "El mundo es sólo un aspecto de la divinidad" - a line Cobos does not quote, would, taken in isolation, be a better pointer towards possible panentheism, for it does suggest some degree of separation according to levels. However, in context it is clear that no special importance is attached to the word aspecto, which a Krausist could well use as a loophole to introduce the notions of transcendence and human freedom into traditional pantheism. In fact the concept of freedom is not dealt with at all in metaphysical terms in the apócrifos; Machado does not seem to think it problematic within a pantheist system. When he describes the world as an aspect of God, he is emphasising unity rather than difference; the phrase is merely part of a denial of the idea of the Creation of the world by God: the line concludes "...de ningún modo una creación divina". In this rejection of the idea of Creation, Abel Martín does coincide with Krause in one respect: both thinkers dismiss the idea of a single act of creation ex nihilo. Yet whereas Krause envisages creation as taking another form, that of a continuous and everlasting process guided providentially by God, Martín seems to reject any idea of Creation, as when he writes:
En la teología de Abel Martín es Dios definido como el ser absoluto, y por ende, nada que sea puede ser su obra. Dios, como creador y conservador del mundo, le parece a Abel Martín una concepción judaica, tan sacrílega como absurda. 96

When Martín and Mairena distinguish between world and God, as between part and whole, they are ultimately distinguishing between world and universe, for God is described by them as "el universo mismo como actividad consciente, el gran ojo que todo lo ve al verse a sí mismo". 97 Their God is the universe's consciousness of itself, is the universe itself. That Mairena should accept the label "pantheist" while the Krausists were critics of pantheism points to a fundamental difference between the two philosophies. Sanz says that Krausism does not simply posit "un Dios-mundo o mundo-Dios" as some of Krause's German contemporaries did in their pantheistic systems. 98 When Sanz describes and criticizes Hegelianism, the system he condemns sounds rather similar in its conception of the Absolute Being to Abel Martín's vision of "el gran ojo que todo lo ve al verse a sí mismo" and "el universo mismo como actividad consciente":

Toda la realidad, la vida y el pensamiento es /In Hegel's Absolute Idealism/...Dios mismo, en un momento imperfecto (diferencial) de su consciencia, que anhela ser y es transformada sucesivamente en idea más concreta, hasta ser la totalidad concreta de todos sus momentos anteriores, esto es, hasta ser Dios consció de sí. 99

Cobos appears to imply in his books that Machado drew not only the conception of God for the metaphysics of his apócrifos from Krausism but also the metaphor "El gran ojo que todo lo ve al verse a sí mismo". He gives no evidence of the use of such a metaphor in Krausist texts, and I know of none. However it seems that Francisco Giner de los Ríos was fond of a very
similar image he had encountered in Schelling, which he quoted to his students approvingly, though pointing out that his own metaphysical conception was not quite the same (for the Krausists Schelling was too wholeheartedly pantheist):

Su amor fervoroso a la Naturaleza hacía evocar al maestro Francisco Giner en clase esta imagen bella del gran filósofo Schelling: 'El hombre es el ojo con que el espíritu de la Naturaleza se contempla a sí mismo', y luego de haber puesto una palabra que atenuase la expresión de Schelling, revolviase contra los que ven en lo natural la expresión de lo tosco, grosero e instintivo. 100

Whether or not Machado adopted as his own the metaphysics of those of his teachers at the Institución who were Krausists, he certainly does seem to have acquired and remembered some philosophical ideas from them, particularly from Giner. Another example of a favourite Ginerian image for a philosophical notion that appears in Machado's writings is the image of man walking upright, on two legs, as the expression of his differentiation from other animals because of his superior mental faculties. Machado recalls Giner's use of this idea in an article where he refers to the importance of Sanz del Río in the history of modern Spanish philosophy:

don Julián Sanz del Río, a quien deben su verticalidad - según frase del maestro Giner - la mitad por lo menos, de los españoles que andan hoy en dos pies. 101

and J. Xirau has recorded Giner's frequent use of a variation of this image in exactly the same context:

En la mayor intimidad y en libre conversación intranscendente solía decir Giner: "si el cincuenta por ciento de españoles no andan de cuatro patas se debe a la presencia de don Julián Sanz del Río." 102
Finally, the image finds its way into two metaphysical poems attributed to the apócrifos, alluding ironically to the power of rational thought (which Machado links to negation) as a defining feature of the human being:

Pensar: borrar primero y dibujar después, y quien borrar no sabe camina en cuatro pies.

Fiat uábra! Borót el pensar humano.

Toma el cero integral, la hueca esfera que has de mirar, si lo has de ver, erguido. Hoy es espalda el lomo de tu fiera. 103

A third image used by Machado in philosophical poems may also be an echo of words used by Giner: the formula "se hace camino al andar" and its variants, with its existential symbolism. A. de Albornoz has observed similar usage of this idea in both Machado and Unamuno and suggested a hypothesis to explain the similarity: Giner as a common source. Like the other two images I have discussed, this would appear to have been something that Giner often said rather than something he wrote. The evidence for Albornoz's hypothesis is a statement made by Unamuno in 1917:

¡Oh a cuantos no les enseñó [don Francisco] que, echando a andar por el desierto, derecho, hacia la estrella que tomamos por Dulcinea celeste, se hace con los pies, y según se anda el sendero del destino. 104

The best known example of the image in Machado is the poem that begins "Caminante, son tus huellas/ el camino, y nada más;/ caminante, no hay camino,/ se hace camino al andar". 105 Variations on the caminante idea occur in some of the apocryphal poems, such as "Muerte de Abel Martín" where the existentially aware individual is described as "quien trazó caminos", in contrast to "quien siguió caminos" - the man whose consciousness is less developed. In the same poem there are two other motifs that appeared in Giner's image according to
Unamuno: the vision of a distant guiding star — "¡Oh, distancia, distancia!, que la estrella que nadie toca, guía. ¿Quién navega sin ella?" — and life as a journey across an uncharted desert: in a moment of despair "pensaba Martín que Dios no le veía, y en su mudo desierto caminaba".

There is some evidence that Machado repeated some of Giner's favourite images in his philosophical poetry and prose. However, as we have seen, there are important differences between the cosmology of Machado's apócrifos and that of a true Krausist: the former is pantheist, the latter panentheist. Abel Martín fails to make the necessary distinctions in his concept of the Absolute Being to be properly panentheist. Cobos does not attach enough importance to this terminological distinction.

As I have said, Cobos occasionally anticipates objections to his thesis about close similarities between the Krausist cosmology and Abel Martín's. One important point he raises in this way is the question of monism in the two systems; he writes "El acento excepcional con que se afirma la unicidad de la sustancia parece alejar al gran ojo de la divinidad panenteísta" (here Cobos does choose to use the correct term — panenteísta).

In effect in Martín's metaphysics there is emphatically only one substance, whereas Krausism distinguishes between Nature and Spirit, although neither of them is called a "substance". Krause maintains the Nature/Spirit duality because he wishes to avoid the extreme positions of Idealism or Materialism. Yet at the same time he aspires to a principle of unity in his system. The problem is resolved by defining Spirit and Nature not as absolutes but as relative absolutes or finite essences which are unified within the single Absolute Being. Cobos attempts to fit Martín's monism into the Krausist scheme by suggesting that Martín's single substance could be seen as equivalent to Nature, and its activity, the autoconciencia integral del universo entero, is
equivalent to Spirit in Krausism. This analogy is not really tenable because in Martín the single substance is absolute, not "finite" or "relative" as in Krause, and is totally identified with consciousness, which is its activity and is also described as absolute. Martín's system could be described as an Idealist Monism; Krausism tries to preserve the idea of a Nature/Spirit distinction. Juan de Mairena rejects any such duality out of hand, referring to "La creencia más o menos ingenua en la dualidad de sustancias" and judging "la feliz creencia en la dualidad de sustancias" to be a "signo de senilidad". He is equally dismissive of the idea of "harmonizing" such opposed philosophies as Idealism and Materialism, a process that was fundamental in the formation of Krause's "harmonious", eclectic system:

Krausism, of course, was just such a "síntesis a la alemana".

As well as similarities in their cosmologies, Cobos also observed certain features of the philosophical methodologies of Krause and Machado's apócrifos that he believed to be similar and hence proof of an influence. In both philosophies, as Cobos says, the process of knowledge is likened to a journey upwards or outwards from the self (to God in Krause, towards the Other in Abel Martín), followed by a return along the same path. In Krause the two stages produce two complementary parts
of the metaphysical system: the Analysis and the Synthesis. In Martín the journey forms one single process of knowledge, since a key element of the outward journey is the failure to reach the objective. Really the only similarity in the two systems is in the use of the image of a two-way journey along a single path. Both the process of knowledge (two complementary parts in Krause, a dialectical process centred on negation in Martín) and the knowledge gained on the journey are very different. Abel Martín discovers, through the failure of love, la esencial heterogeneidad del ser; Krause succeeds in finding God and subsequently discovers the organic interrelatedness of the whole universe in and under Him.

In the description of the self's journey towards the Other and back to its own isolation Abel Martín is describing a dialectical process, with three parts. Although the division of the metaphysics into Analysis and Synthesis in Krausism is not an example of such a tri-partite process, the dialectical method and the division into threes is, as we have seen, characteristic of Krause. As Cobos says it is also characteristic of the metafísica poética, and this is undoubtedly a similarity in method in the two systems. However the use of triads and dialectics is by no means exclusive to Krausism; in fact it is generally considered a typically Hegelian feature, and one that Krause saw fit to adapt to his own system. In the absence of strong evidence of Krausist influence elsewhere in Machado's metaphysical thought, it would seem reasonable to propose that both thinkers have a common source in Hegel.

In Abel Martín's epistemology the self that is totally inward-looking can know nothing, not even itself; knowledge is the fruit of the dialectical process involved in moving outwards towards the Other. In the Cancionero apócrifo he states: "Para el hombre, lo inmediato consciente es siempre cazado en el camino de vuelta", and Machado denies the possibility of
immediate self knowledge more explicitly in Los Complementarios: "EL YO - Aquello de que no sé más que esto: que es una actividad-pura y nunca reflexiva. Lo que nunca es objeto de conocimiento. El ojo que ve y nunca se ve a sí mismo". In Krausism all knowledge stems from an immediate, initial knowledge of itself achieved by the yo. In Humor y pensamiento de Antonio Machado en la metafísica poética Cobos quotes just these statements from Machado and hints that he is aware of the difference in attitude from Krausism, but he glosses over the significance of the difference. In El pensamiento de Antonio Machado en Juan de Mairena, however, he takes a quite different line and attempts to show that the two systems under discussion are alike on this question of immediate self-knowledge, giving as evidence quotations from Federico de Castro and Abel Martín. Castro writes of the yo's initial consciousness of itself as the starting point of his metaphysical system. His point of view is typically Krausist: when the yo contemplates itself it is at one and the same time Subject and Object. According to the Krausists, this was the way to overcome from the outset the problem of the dichotomy of Subject and Object as posited by Kant, and to deny the Kantian conclusion that the Object as Thing-in-itself is unknowable. Cobos juxtaposes this statement of the Krausist starting point with Martín's declaration that an autoconciencia integral del universo entero is possible from any point within the great Monad, that is to say possible for any individual human consciousness. Cobos is overlooking a fundamental detail here: whereas Castro is talking of a starting point Abel Martín is not. The apocryphal philosopher makes it clear that the total vision he alludes to is far from easy to acquire and is only available in any case to the individual who has gone through the dialectical process of knowledge he describes. The autoconciencia integral is only possible at the third stage of the dialectic; it is never possible at the first. In fact, in denying the possibility of
immediate self-knowledge Abel Martín is implying a fundamental difference between his metaphysical system and Krause's.

Another of Cobos's statements about Abel Martín's philosophical methodology is also clearly erroneous: his declaration that Martín finds God within himself in an ascending process of knowledge beginning with the self, that is to say in the same way as the Krausists claim to discover God. In the Cancionero apócrifo de Abel Martín we are presented with a ready-made conception of the Absolute Being as El Gran Ojo, but at no point are we informed how the philosopher arrived at this conception. Later, in Juan de Mairena, we are given a resumen of Martín's ideas on the question of divine revelation. He is said to distinguish between rational revelation and revelation in the heart. The God we may conceive of rationally is not "real" but, like all rational conceptions, a negation of what is real. I have already shown the fundamentally rational nature of the Krausist discovery of God. Martín also says that God might be revealed to men in their hearts, as a "Tú de todos, objeto de comunión amorosa" or an "objeto de comunión cordial que hace posible la fraterna comunidad humana". God seen in this way is immanent within the human spirit and is the basis for an ethical impulse to love. I shall return to this point in my discussion of Machado's ethical thought. This God of Love is rather different from the strictly metaphysical conception we are given in the Cancionero apócrifo, and Mairena's discussion of revelation throws no light on how Martín arrived at the idea of the Absolute Being as a single Monad, as El Gran Ojo.

One of the most basic epistemological differences between the philosophical approaches of Abel Martín and Krause is in their respective evaluations of the power of Reason. According to Martín, Reason is incapable of apprehending the mutable nature of reality - "el ser y el pensar...no coinciden, ni por casualidad" only
poetic "intuition" can do so. Krausism is a rationalist system, it is *racionalismo armónico*. Cobos dismisses this difference very lightly:

> Que luego, en el orden práctico, el pensar alcance al ser [Krause] o se quede en pura hambre [Machado] es, muy probablemente, una circunstancia diferencial entre el espíritu germánico, capaz de comulgar con ruedas de molino cuando sea menester, y el espíritu andaluz, capaz de no comulgar con nada, y hasta por simple pereza. 122

This is a totally inadequate account of the reasons for the differences in the two systems. On the other hand, the difference is not simply that between two totally opposed, extreme positions: Pure Reason and complete Irrationalism. *Racionalismo armónico* aspired to take into account such non-rational human faculties as feeling and intuition; Sanz del Río wrote:

> En filosofía profesamos el racionalismo; no un racionalismo exclusivo que niega las demás facultades y fuentes de conocimiento en el espíritu, sino un racionalismo armónico, fundado en la justa estima y justas relaciones de todas las facultades cognoscitivas del espíritu. 123

However, Sanz concludes that all these other faculties fall "bajo la forma, carácter y regulador unitario y permanente de la razón". 124 While admitting certain irrational elements, Krausism is predominantly rationalist. Abel Martín, on the other hand, makes the discovery of Reason a key moment in the process of human awareness, but denies to Reason the power of truly knowing reality, a power he claims for irrational, poetic intuition. Both philosophers bring together rational and irrational elements - Gómez Molleda has seen a "talante racionalista-irracionalista" as something Machado had in common with his Krausist maestros. 125 Their divergence is in the relative importance attached to Reason (predominant in
Krausism) and the non-rational (predominant in Machado). Sanz del Río described over-estimation of the irrational as putting "lo inferior sobre lo superior...el corazón sobre la cabeza". Machado took the opposite view; he wrote: "El corazón y la cabeza no se avienen, pero nosotros hemos de tomar partido. Yo me quedo con el piso de abajo".

The theoretical Krausist position that Reason alone is insufficient to account for certain aspects of human experience is more developed in Francisco Giner de los Ríos than in Sanz del Río. Sometimes his remarks on the limitations of abstract rationality are similar to ideas expressed by Machado through his apócrifos. Mairena writes that "la razón humana milita toda ella contra la riqueza y variedad del mundo", and Martín explains why this is so:

Todas las formas de la objectividad...tienden a formas espaciales y temporales puras: figuras, números, conceptos. Su objetividad quiere decir, ante todo, homogeneidad, des-cualificación de lo esencialmente cualitativo. ...Pensar es ahora descualificar, homogeneizar. La materia pensada se resuelve en átomos; el cambio sustancial, en movimientos de partículas inmutables en el espacio.

Giner makes essentially the same point in "Espíritu y naturaleza" (1897):

la psiquis, aunque necesita para su expresión exterior el concurso de esa naturaleza, rompe la solidaria e indivisa cohesión de ésta y todo lo desarticula, representándose sus elementos, partes y propiedades aisladas como objetos que subsisten por sí, aun arrancadas de sus relaciones con el todo... el geómetra abstrae /las/ formas /de la naturaleza/ y las simplifica en promorfos, suprimiendo la infinita complicación de la realidad, que, infinita, e inagotable en su estudio, no se deja aprisionar en esquemas y fórmulas.
Reason, says Giner, with its power to break down reality into intelligible parts, is basic for human civilization, but at the same time it is guilty of simplifying and obscuring the marvellous richness, complexity and oneness of that reality. Martin and Mairena similarly criticize the limitations of conceptual formulae and the dis-integrating effect of rationality, contrasting the living flux to the simplifications of a purely rational apprehension. Machado, through his apócrifos, uses a terminology that clearly bears the stamp of Henri Bergson: Reason, he says, is a homogenising force, a "dequalifying" process. Also like Bergson, Machado says that Reason is a faculty incapable of accounting for time and the ever-changing nature of reality in time: "El pensamiento lógico...es una actividad destemporalizadora. Pensar lógicamente es abolir el tiempo, suponer que no existe, crear un movimiento ajeno al cambio, discurrir entre razones inmutables....nos permite anclar en el río de Heracles, de ningún modo aprisionar su onda fugitiva". Giner de los Ríos appears to anticipate this "Bergsonian" line of thought in his essay "Cómo empezamos a filosofar" (1887 - two years before the publication of Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience). Giner portrays the mind's endeavour to concretise perception into separate moments outside the flow of time as contrary to living reality:

La riqueza interior de nuestras representaciones, que son ya una visión finita del objeto, fluctúa constantemente, desvaneciéndose y deformando sus límites, para responder de algún modo, a fuerza de sustituir unas por otras, a la inabarcable riqueza de la realidad. Cada uno de sus momentos constituye una concreción efímera de ese hervor íntimo, concreción que a la par lo traduce y lo niega. Ninguno vale de por sí, arrancado y desarticulado de la serie creadora, que a todos los engendra, los condensa, los cuartea y los disuelve. Aislados son, como el mineral, el hueso o la hoja, una vez descuajados del planeta, del animal o de la planta: un producto ya inorgánico, muerto.
Machado, in poem CXXXVI-xxv of Campos de Castilla, makes a very similar contrast between a total, living, temporal reality and the "dead" product of an analytical examination of such a reality: there are, he says, "dos modos de conciencia"

...¿cual es mejor?
¿Conciencia de visionario \( \equiv \) intuition\( ^7 \)
que mira en el hondo acuario
peces vivos,
fugitivos,
que no se pueden pescar,
o esa maldita faena \( \equiv \) rationalismo\( ^7 \)
de ir arrojando a la arena,
muertos, los peces del mar? 134

Here the Bergsonian and Ginerian influences on Machado could be said to be perfectly compatible. Yet we should not be tempted to take this comparison between Machado's critique of Reason and Giner's acknowledgement of the limitations of rational thought too far. Here Machado is pleading the cause of "poetic thought" or "poetic logic" as a unique form of intuition; 135 Giner is criticising abstract reasoning from a quite different point of view. In "Cómo empezamos a filosofar", he is trying to demonstrate the possibility of fallibility in the thought of even the most respected thinkers and scientists, and pleading for students to learn from their own (albeit limited) perceptions of reality rather than accepting truths as established. 136 In "Espíritu y naturaleza", whilst pointing out the limitations of rational thought, he is not proposing any better, alternative means of perception. In fact he maintains that rationality is the backbone of human civilization. 137 Giner is fundamentally a rationalist, although not an out-and-out rationalist of the "Age of Reason" type. Kant has given him an awareness of the relativities of rational truth, and Romantic thought a certain recognition of the force of "feeling" and of the vitality of "Nature". 138 These are the influences within the eclectic philosophy of Krause which control the extent
of its commitment to Reason.

Cobos affirms that the view of death displayed in the long poems of the Cancioneros apócrifos is akin to that of the Krausists precisely because certain irrational, religious elements are present. Cobos does not draw a precise analogy, merely suggesting that both the Krausists and Abel Martín were, in their attitude to death, in a position somewhere between the orthodox Christian faith in eternal life and the atheist's despairing fear of senseless oblivion. The one metaphysical concept Cobos mentions is the idea of the reabsorption of the individual into "Being" after death, something he sees in both Martín and Krause's philosophies. Again, Cobos makes his claim only in vague terms, unsupported by detailed textual analysis and comparison. His point of view has, nevertheless, been supported by M. Tuñón de Lara who declares: "Le sobra razón a Cobos, al señalar la base krausista de estos poemas" and sees in Abel Martín "una actitud que hace evocar el Ideal de la humanidad para la vida". Tuñón goes no further in his analysis than Cobos, only agreeing to the general contention that there are underlying Krausist attitudes in the poems on death.

From my analyses of the two systems under discussion I would agree that there is a similarity of attitude in Sanz del Río and Abel Martín: what they have in common is a serene acceptance of death in spite of a lack of faith in the survival of the individual human being in some after-life akin to life on earth. Behind this acceptance is a conviction of the transcendental value of finite human existence. Martín, however, goes through moments of doubt and despair: his attitude is less certain than that of Sanz. At the same time there is a hint of a further affinity in the way in which Martín is shown to attain his final serenity. Immediately prior to this he has a vision of his whole past life. As we have seen, in Krausism just such a vision comprises the individual's "Final Judgement" of himself and consequently his knowl-
edge of his destiny. This Krausist idea would provide a coherent explanation of Martín's calm at the end: he has seen that his life has been worthwhile, he has fulfilled his rôle in the universe. 141

Another affinity between Sanz del Río and Machado's apócrifos on the theme of death is the idea that death is something intimately bound up with the individual's existence, something highly personal rather than alien. Sanz writes: "hailo mi muerte como una pertenencia e inherencia de mi ser, tan natural y propia en mí como soy y vivo", 142 and Mairena echoes Sanz thus: "la muerte va con nosotros, nos acompaña en vida; ella es, por de pronto, cosa de nuestro cuerpo". 143

There is also, as Cobos says, a similarity in Martín's and the Krausist's vision of the absorption of the individual into "Being" and Nature after death, although in the case of the Krausists there is some attempt to attenuate the pantheistic implications of such a vision by proposing an individual dimension of immortality. 144 As in the area of cosmology, Martín does not make the necessary distinctions to define his position as specifically panentheistic rather than pantheistic.

On the theme of death it is particularly difficult to draw firm conclusions about a possible Krausist influence on Machado. In Machado's apócrifos there is no sure and consistent line on the nature of death and life-after-death. In Machado's writings generally there is not even a consistent attitude to death: sometimes death prompts despair and a sense of the absurdity of finite life, at other times Machado is peacefully resigned to his fate. In the poems which reflect on the death of Leonor there are indications that Machado was tempted to embrace a more orthodox Christian view of immortality, alongside statements of complete despair. There is in Machado no clear statement of his beliefs about the nature of immortality that is comparable in terms of length and consistency with Sanz del Río's Filosofía de la muerte. Even the Krausist position is
uncertain in that none of Sanz's Spanish Krausist contemporaries or followers made any comparable theoretical statement on the question of immortality.

In Machado's prose and verse reflections on death the moment when he most clearly aligns himself with the Krausist attitude to death and vision of immortality (as expressed by Sanz del Río) is in his two elegies to Francisco Giner de los Ríos. In both the poem and the prose tribute he echoes a number of Sanz's ideas. In the poem both life and death are portrayed without reference to any confessional religion. In death Giner's body returns to nature. This nature is not only the soil of his native land but a nature where life goes on endlessly — symbolised by the wind, the trees and plants, the butterflies — in spite of the death of an individual man. The only "eternal life" envisaged in the poem is this integration in living nature and the living-on of Giner's spirit in the hearts of other men as an inspiration to their labours. Both the spirit and the flesh continue to be part of life. This view is, as we have seen, proposed by Sanz del Río in his Filosofía de la muerte. Also in line with Sanz is the serene acceptance of death and the rejection of mourning, proposing instead an active tribute to the dead man in the way those who survive him live their lives. Sanz writes: "Tal es el sentido de nuestra unión y comunión con los muertos, y de nuestro fiel sentimiento de ella, sentimiento, no triste, estéril y mudo; sino profundamente vital y vivificador". One of Sanz del Río's Krausist contemporaries, Fernando de Castro, expressed the same idea in his request in his will that his funeral should end with

algunas palabras no de dolor y sentimiento, sino de fortaleza y virilidad que, al mismo tiempo que realcen el acto alienten a los concurrentes a vivir con plenitud de vida y libertad de pensamiento.
Machado echoes these ideas in his poem:

\[\begin{align*}
&\text{¿Murió? ... Sólo sabemos} \\
&\text{que se nos fue por una senda clara} \\
&\text{diciéndonos: Hacedme} \\
&\text{un duelo de labores y esperanzas.} \\
&\text{... ... ... ... ... ...} \\
&\text{Vivid, la vida sigue,} \\
&\text{los muertos mueren y las sombras pasan;} \\
&\text{lleva quien deja y vive el que ha vivido.} \\
&\text{¡Yunques, sonad; enmudeced campanas!} \\
\end{align*}\]

Typically Krausist elements here are the rejection of mourning, the idea of an active tribute to the deceased, the insistence on the continuity of Life, the notion of spiritual immortality through one’s fellow-men. Another idea expressed here as in Sanz is the distinction between those who are immortal because they have truly lived their lives to the full and those who die for ever because, fundamentally, they have never really lived in the sense of achieving their potential for transcendence. Sanz writes of those "cuya vida es anticipadamente la muerte de su razón y de todo lo superior en nosotros!", and of those who "lleva[n] la eternidad... en el presente del bueno y justo obrar". The important thing according to Sanz in determining our immortality is "lo que dejemos hecho en razón de la vida, absoluta y eternamente". Machado's line "lleva quien deja y vive el que ha vivido" closely resembles Sanz del Río in both thought and expression: the verbs llevar and dejar are used in the same sense by both.

In his prose tribute to Giner, Machado explains more fully his distinction between the eternally dead and the eternally living:

\[\begin{align*}
&\text{Sólo pasan para siempre los muertos y las sombras, los que no vivían la propia vida.} \\
&\text{Yo creo que sólo mueren definitivamente - perdonadme esta fe un tanto herética - sin salvación posible, los malvados y los farsantes, esos hombres de presa que llamamos caciques, esos repugnantes cucañistas que se dicen políticos, los histriones de todos los escenarios,}
\end{align*}\]
Sanz too rejected the idea that public remembrance of a name was in itself an authentic form of immortality; only those whose essential spirit lived on, "influyentes a su modo esencial e íntimo en nuestra vida" were truly alive after death. Machado prophesies just such a survival of Giner's spirit: "Su alma vendrá a nosotros en el sol matinal que alumbrá los talleres, las moradas del pensamiento y del trabajo".

Another theme in which there are noteworthy similarities between Machado and the Krausists is the theme of time. Cobos briefly alludes to the question in El pensamiento de Antonio Machado en Juan de Mairena but does not give enough evidence to really show the importance of time in Krausist philosophy. Fernando Lázaro Carreter has pointed out this feature of Krausism much more convincingly than Cobos, and my own examination of time in Krausism is the result of following up remarks made by Lázaro. The most fundamental parallel between Machado and the Krausists on this theme is the definition of human life in terms of time: in Krausism life is an obra temporal, man's self-realization in time. For Machado time is "the ultimate reality", to live is to "devorar tiempo". The importance of temporality in Machado, and the influence of Henri Bergson in this area of his thought, is well known. Much less known is the fact that Machado's Krausist masters could well have instilled in him a sense of the importance of time before he knew of Bergson's philosophy. The Krausists could have predisposed Machado to accept certain aspects of the French philosopher's thought when he finally discovered him. In Krausism too the idea of the mutability of all things complements other possible influences on Machado on this point — Leibniz and Heraclitus as well as Bergson.
We have seen that according to Krausism the concept of eternity is not exclusive of time: time exists for the Absolute Being as it does for mankind. The same idea is expressed by Juan de Mairena; he sees the notion of "un Dios totalmente zambullido en el tiempo" as a logical consequence of Martín's conception of God as El gran ojo: "Imaginemos - decía mi maestro Martín - una teología sin Aristóteles, que conciba a Dios como una gran conciencia de la cual fuera parte la nuestra.... En esta teología nada encontraríamos más esencial que el tiempo". Cobos observes an affinity between Krausism and Abel Martín's metaphysics in this notion of God-in-Time, though not on the evidence I have quoted. Instead Cobos derives this concept in Abel Martín from an interpretation of the opening lines of the poem "Al gran pleno o conciencia integral":

Que en su estatua el alto Cero
- mármol frío,
- ceño austero
- y una mano en la mejilla -
- del gran remanso del río,
- medite, eterno, en la orilla, 
- y haya gloria eternamente.

In Cobos's reading of these lines "el alto Cero" is the Absolute Being in Martín's cosmology, a God who dwells in "Eternity" which is defined as a backwater off the river of Time. According to Cobos, this does not imply that "Eternity" is timeless, but rather that a distinctive "still" dimension of time, different from time as experienced by men, but nevertheless temporal. This is, I believe, a misinterpretation on Cobos's part: the God alluded to as "El alto Cero" is not Martín's Gran ojo but a parody of a rationally conceived God. El alto Cero implies negation and hence rationalism for Abel Martín; furthermore the Divinity's pose is that of Rodin's Le Penseur. This God of Reason is a God aloof from the world of men and outside time. Martín is here mocking both such a theology and the means of perception related
to it - rationality - which he sees as unreal and remote from real life, which cannot be properly conceived of without time. The rest of the poem concerns a different God - Martín's Gran ojo - and the means of perception related to Him - poetic intuition. The conciencia integral of the poem's title describes at the same time the Divinity and the vision of reality attained by poetic intuition: the connection stems from the fact that the individual human consciousness is a part of the Divine consciousness:

Y la lógica divina,
que imagina,
pero nunca imagen miente
- no hay espejo; todo es fuente -,
diga: sea
cuanto es, y que se vea
cuanto ve.
... ... ...
Armonía;
todo canta en pleno día.
Borra las formas del cero,
torna a ver,
brotando de su venero,
las vivas aguas del ser. 167

Cobo repeatedly affirms that this poem is one of the clearest proofs of the influence of Krausism in Abel Martín. 168 Yet he only gives vague hints as to why he thinks this is so. The basis of his conclusion seems to be one word that appears in the poem - armonía. This is certainly a key concept in Krausism, and an important one in Martín's metaphysics: Mairena describes his master's philosophy as "una total idea del mundo esencialmente armónica". 169 Yet in spite of this affinity the poem in question is so full of echoes of Leibniz that it is difficult not to conclude that Leibniz is the primary influence here, not Krause. Let us look now at these signs of the influence of Leibniz in the poem and at the same time analyze the meaning of this difficult concluding poem of Martín's Cancionero apócrifo.

The word pleno in the title of the poem is taken from Leibniz, who explains its meaning in Theorum 61 of
the Monadology: "The whole is a plenum, which means that the whole of matter is connected". In Martín's system this unity finds expression in the idea of a single substance or a single monad. The latter term is also from Leibniz, though Martín does not follow the philosopher's idea of a plurality of substances, a plurality of monads. According to Leibniz, every monad reflects the whole universe and God like a mirror.

Similarly, in Martín each individual consciousness, as a fragment of the Great Monad, is capable of apprehending the whole universe; but Martín rejects Leibniz's idea of consciousness as a mirroring process as too passive an image of consciousness. He also seems to imply that Leibniz's mirrors involve a sense of separation of the individual from the universe, when in fact the former is really an integral part of the latter. Martín's correction of what he sees as a flaw in the Monadology is expressed in the poem in the line "no hay espejo; todo es fuente". Each soul is part of the universe and hence when it reflects on itself it is in fact contemplating the universe and vice versa - there is only one form of consciousness, self-consciousness, "todo es fuente". Any consciousness is "una autoconciencia del universo entero".

Basically, Martín's disagreement with Leibniz here is terminological: he rejects the notion of mirrors. He certainly follows Leibniz in his idea that each particle of the interconnected universe is in itself a universe in miniature. Theorems 66 and 67 of the Monadology state:

> it is evident that there is a world of created beings - living things, animals, entelechies, and souls - in the least part of matter.

> Each portion of matter may be conceived as a garden full of plants and as a pond full of fish. But every branch of each plant, every member of each animal, and every drop of their liquid parts is itself likewise a similar garden or pond.

and Martín briefly echoes this notion in "Al gran pleno":
"todo el mar en cada gota,/ todo el pez en cada huevo". 175

Leibniz also maintains that matter is constantly changing:
"all bodies are in perpetual flux, like rivers, and parts are passing in and out of them continually", 176 yet at the same time he holds that matter is indestructible, that the total quantity of matter within the plenum always remains the same. These two ideas provide a coherent explanation of the line "Todo cambia y todo queda" in "Al gran pleno", and the image of a river to express the notion of flux appears in the same poem - "las vivas aguas del ser" - as it does throughout Machado's work. Of course, the image is by no means exclusive to Leibniz - Machado himself mentions Heraclitus, Santa Teresa, Manrique and Bergson as other users of the image - but Machado must have noted its use in Leibniz too.

Other key ideas and images from Leibniz that appear in the poem under discussion are the notion of harmony - in Leibniz, the harmony between all things is pre-established by God - and the image of the seed. For Leibniz a seed is an example of the possibility of the whole universe being contained in a single tiny particle of matter. 177 There are brief references to these ideas in the poem: "El gran pleno/ Tiene amor, rosa y ortiga,/ y la amapola y la espiga/ le brotan del mismo grano./ Armonía;/ todo canta en pleno día." 178

There are echoes of Leibniz in other poems of the Cancionero apócrifo too. For example the lines "¡Oh Tiempo, oh Todavía/ preñado de inminencias!" in "Ultimas lamentaciones de Abel Martín" repeats one of Leibniz's images used to describe the nature of time: "every state of a simple substance is a natural consequence of its preceding state, so that the present state of it is big with the future". 179 Leibniz must be added to the list of influences on Machado on the theme of time.

In the prose sections of the Cancionero apócrifo Abel Martín displays a rather ambivalent attitude to Leibniz. Leibniz is the punto de partida of Martín's
philosophy, but the concepts of a plurality of monads and "mirrors" are rejected. Leibniz is described at one point as filósofo del porvenir, but shortly afterwards his metaphysics is said to be only a marvellous example of logical thought, and as such totally out of touch with reality, like all rational ideas according to Martín. Yet on the whole Martín admires Leibniz and feels that, apart from the errors attributable to his rationalism, he was on the right track. "Al gran pleno o conciencia integral" is at the same time a tribute and a correction to Leibniz's philosophy, as well as being a celebration of Martín's view of the universe and of the power of poetry. If we look at the poem carefully and in its context all these threads become apparent.

In the section of the Cancionero apócrifo immediately prior to the poem, Martín discussed rationality, its connection with the concepts of negation and homogeneity, and hence its inability to apprehend reality directly. The opening lines of "Al gran pleno" mock rationality and a rationally conceived God who looks down on the world sub specie aeternitatis. In effect Leibniz saw God in this way, and denied to man any apprehension of reality as all-embracing as that of God, though he believed that man, because he had something of the divine in his rationality, could glimpse aspects of the truth in a limited way. In mocking rationality and the divine vision sub specie aeternitatis in the first seven lines of his poem, Martín is mocking philosophers like Leibniz. The rest of the poem concerns a different God and a different means of perception. In the first case there is a tribute to Leibniz in calling this God "El gran pleno" instead of Martín's usual name, "El gran ojo". In the second case Martín is proclaiming the power of poetic intuition to apprehend reality, yet the universe is described in this second part of the poem in terms so reminiscent of Leibniz that we can only conclude that Martín felt that behind Leibniz the rationalist there was a poetic visionary. Machado
himself wrote in a note in *Los complementarios* that Leibniz was an "autor de un poema de gran estilo" and that the truth in his metaphysics was poetic rather than philosophical.\(^{182}\) In the *Cancionero apócrifo* Martín makes the following important comment, (after describing Reason's attribute of "de-realizing" being):

¿Y cómo no intentar devolver a lo que es su propia intimidad? Esta empresa fue iniciada por Leibniz — filósofo del porvenir, añade Martín —; pero sólo puede ser consumada por la poesía, que define Martín como aspiración a conciencia integral.\(^{183}\)

Poetry is aspiración a conciencia integral; the Absolute Being in Martín's poem is conciencia integral as well as El gran pleno. What Martín is saying is that poetry alone can provide us with a total vision of the universe comparable to the vision of the Absolute Being, but through "intuition" rather than Reason. Poetry alone can aspire to be total like the vision sub specie aeternitatis; but unlike the latter it is a vision that includes the temporality and mutability of life as it really is.\(^{184}\) Leibniz, Martín implies, has intuited certain truths about the universe: the importance of time and change, the inter-connectedness of all things, the microcosm and the macrocosm. Hence he echoes ideas from the *Monadología* in the poem, and we can observe that these echoes are perfectly compatible with the cosmology of Abel Martín as described earlier in the *Cancionero apócrifo*. At the same time, however, Martín believes that Leibniz was mistaken in his view of God and in his commitment to rationality.

Why should Máchado have been attracted to Leibniz? One possible reason is the influence of his Krausist teachers: Krause had regarded Leibniz as one of the forerunners of his own racionalismo armónico, and it was Patricio de Azcárate (father of Gumersindo) who translated and edited Leibniz in the nineteenth century in Spain. A new edition of the *Monadología* was published
Another possible promoter of Machado's interest in Leibniz was Ortega y Gasset, who showed a particular interest in the philosopher in a series of articles of the early 1920's. Machado was an avid reader of Ortega. The hypothesis of an influence of Ortega on Machado is supported by a similarity in some of their comments and ideas about Leibniz. For example, like Martín in "Al gran pleno", Ortega rejects the notion of a vision sub specie aeternitatis as an unreal, intellectual abstraction; he proposes that "cada individuo es un punto de vista esencial", and suggests that "los hombres son los órganos visuales de la divinidad" — an image close to both Martín's Gran ojo and to Martín's possible source — Schelling via Giner. However, although Ortega and Machado may use similar ideas from Leibniz, it should not be forgotten that they are pursuing rather different lines of argument. Ortega is defending his own Perspectivism and Ratio-Vitalismo; Machado is presenting a case in favour of the unique powers of poetic intuition.

The closing poem of the Cancionero apócrifo, Abel Martín is both metaphysical and aesthetic. What the work as a whole proposes is above all a view of the poet as a unique visionary. In this, and in the themes of the poems included in the Cancionero — irrationalism, organic nature, solitude, frustrated love and aspirations, the universality of individual emotional experience — Machado is taking a line that is typically Romantic. He was quite conscious of this, as he demonstrated in a Poética published in 1931:

Me siento, pues, algo en desacuerdo con los poetas del día.... Muy de acuerdo, en cambio, con los poetas futuros de mi Antología, que daré a la estampa (= Abel Martín, Juan de Mairena and other planned apócrifos) cultivadores de una lírica otra vez inmersa en las "mesmas aguas de la vida".... Ellos devolverán su honor a los románticos, sin serlo ellos mismos; a los poetas del siglo lírico... que ponía en el tiempo, con el principio de Carnot, la ley más general de la naturaleza.
It was surely this sense of deliberate anachronism that prompted Machado to make Martín and Mairena nineteenth century figures, together with the desire to explain and justify retrospectively his own poetic works, which date back to the year of Martín's death — 1898. This seems to me a more likely explanation than Cobos's idea that they were made to live in the second half of the nineteenth century so as to fall naturally within the sphere of influence of the Spanish Krausists. Cobos's other theory on the question of dates — that there is a deliberate Sanz del Río/Abel Martín and Francisco Giner/ Juan de Mairena parallelism — falls down because Martín (1840-1898) is a contemporary of Giner (1839-1915) rather than Sanz (1814-1869). Cobos overlooks this simple fact when attempting at the same time to draw a parallel between metaphysicians (Sanz and Martín) and their more practical, ethically orientated disciples (Giner and Mairena). 190

Cobos's study of the influence of Krausism on Machado's apócrifos' metaphysical thought has serious inadequacies. There is a lack of detailed evidence and explanation, a lack of consistency and a lack of method. Although he claims to approach the apócrifos without bias, he had close links to the Institución, and often he appears to be manipulating the texts he quotes in order to make them fit in with an a priori theory. He often dismisses anticipated objections to his thesis with the most specious of arguments. At the same time he deals with many other themes in his books on Machado, often with insight, and it is only my particular bias, that is to say my emphasis on possible Krausist influences, that casts unfavourable light on what is in fact only one of a number of lines of approach he takes to Machado's works. 191

My own approach to the Cancionero apócrifo in this chapter could also be seen as involving a distortion of that work, for I have been extracting metaphysical ideas from a work which is primarily more concerned with poetry
than with metaphysics. In this, and in its brevity, the Cancionero apócrifo is not really comparable to Krausism, which is a much larger and more fully worked out philosophy. Whole areas of thought — such as the question of freedom, the nature of transcendence — are not touched on by Abel Martín, and hence no comparison can be made. On the other hand, one of the key themes of Abel Martín — the Other, and the related questions of Love and Solipsism — is not dealt with as a philosophical problem by the Krausists. 192

A final problem of my comparison of Krausist metaphysics and the metafísica poética is that both metaphysical systems are so obviously eclectic that it is impossible to say with any certainty whether certain ideas and features (for example, the notion of harmony and the use of triads) are the result of a direct influence of Krausism on Machado or a coincidence due to shared sources, in these cases Leibniz and Hegel.

The Cancionero apócrifo. Abel Martín shows evidence of a wide range of philosophical and literary influences and it would be a major task, beyond the range of this chapter, to unravel the multiplicity of threads. However the major influences are undoubtedly Leibniz and Bergson — the first I have looked at briefly, the second has already been studied in some detail by the critics. 193 Krausism is, if anything, a minor influence on Machado’s metaphysical thought. As we have seen there are a number of possible echoes of Krausism together with a number of fundamental differences from Krausism in this area.

Abel Martín is not a Krausist philosopher. In his cosmology, with its concept of an Absolute Being who is both immanent and all-inclusive and its picture of an organically unified universe, Martín is similar to the Krausists, but not identical. Whilst Martín is wholeheartedly a pantheist, the Krausists call themselves panentheists, a distinction which is of some importance. Abel Martín also differs from the Krausists in that he does not accept the Nature/Spirit duality. There are
important methodological differences between the two systems. The starting point of Krausist metaphysics is immediate self-knowledge, something deemed impossible by Abel Martín. A key moment in the Krausist process of knowledge is the discovery of God within the Self, something not dealt with by the apocryphal philosopher. Finally, perhaps the most fundamental epistemological difference between the two systems: Krausism is predominantly rationalist, Martín's system predominantly irrationalist. In fact one of the most important sections of the Cancionero apócrifo is a critique of Reason.

I have found a number of similarities between Krausism and Martín's philosophy, none of which are investigated in detail by Cobos, though he mentions some of them. Firstly, there is the importance attached in both philosophies to time: time is seen in both as one of the most important dimensions of life, for human beings and for the universe as a whole, including the Absolute Being. Connected with this is the vision of universal mutability and flux in both philosophies (because of this Giner acknowledges the limited powers of Reason, though he does not go as far as Martín). A second thematic area where there are close parallels is that of death. Ideas that recur in both philosophies on this theme are: the intimate and personal character of death; calm acceptance of death; physical immortality within Nature; spiritual survival in other men, though as an inspiration to live rather than merely as memory; the rejection of mourning, and the idea of keeping alive the essential spirit of the deceased as the most proper form of tribute; the belief that living life to the full is the guarantee of transcendence and immortality; the belief that the individual sees and judges his own past life shortly before death.

Both in the themes of time and death there are problems in assessing the importance of the Krausist influence. On the theme of time, Krausism is clearly only one of a number of complementary influences. On
the theme of death, Machado's beliefs appear to have varied at different times. The occasion when his affinity with the Krausists on this theme is most apparent is when he writes about Francisco Giner's death.

Thirdly, I have noted a number of images that may have been learned by Machado from the Krausists, particularly Giner: the image of El gran ojo, that of man walking upright, the "se hace camino al andar" formula, and the metaphor of an outward and return journey to describe a process of learning.

That the influence of Krausist metaphysics on Machado should be of limited importance is not really surprising. Historians of Spanish Krausism have often made the point that as early as the 1870's other philosophies began to eclipse that of Krause and that even former disciples of Sanz del Río began to adopt ideas from more contemporary and celebrated thinkers. These same historians claim that if Spanish Krausism had a lasting importance after the death of Sanz it was not because a fixed metaphysical doctrine continued to be propagated but because of the practical activities of the Krausists and their pupils, practical activities that derive more obviously from the ethics of Krause than from his cosmology. In 1911 Giner publicly acknowledged that Krausism had lost its popularity as a metaphysical system, but he maintained that Krause's basic tendencies in the spheres of Law, Social Sciences and Ethics continued to attract attention and be influential. Even Sanz del Río, the principal metaphysician among the Spanish Krausists, claimed that Krausism would be important to Spain because it was a system of great practical value rather than an abstract metaphysics.

Hence the fact that Machado does not adopt the metaphysics of Krausism in its entirety is neither surprising nor an indication that he could not have been influenced in other important respects by the Spanish Krausists.
Notes


2 Humor y pensamiento, cit., p.120

3 Ibid., p.58


7 Textos escogidos, cit., pp.124-129, 153-165.

8 Ibid. p.129

9 Ibid. p.124

10 Ibid. pp.126-127

11 Ibid. pp.127-129

12 Ibid. pp.153-165

13 Ibid. p.165

14 In this account of the "Analysis I am following Jobit, Educateurs, cit., Ch.IV "Le problème metaphysique".
15 Sanz admits this a priori assumption: Textos escogidos, cit., p. 152; cf. God as the "Necessary Being" in Leibniz.

16 Ibid., p. 141

17 Ibid. p. 36

18 Jobit, Educateurs, cit., pp. 198-201.

19 Ibid. p. 203

20 Sanz del Río, Ideal, cit., p. 272.

21 Ibid. p. 75

22 Sanz del Río, Diario, 25 Feb 1863, in Sanz del Río, ed. Pablo de Azcárate, cit., pp. 287-288

23 F. Giner de los Ríos, "Lecciones sumarias de psicología" (1874), O.C., IV, pp. 248-250.

24 Ideal, cit., pp. 190, 199.


26 Ideal, cit., p. 273.

27 Ibid., pp. 275-276.

28 Sanz del Río, Diario, 8 Sept 1862, in Sanz del Río, ed. Pablo de Azcárate, cit., p. 279.

29 V. Supra p. 89.

30 N. Salmerón, "Principios analíticos de la idea de tiempo" (1873), cit., Jobit, op. cit., p. 90 n.

31 Filosofía de la muerte, cit., p. 46

32 Ibid. pp44-45


36 Ibid. pp. 109, 114, 142, 149, 159, 199.

37 Ibid. pp. 157-175, 239-240.

38 Ibid. pp. 174-175; "difuntos"- p. 253 n.

39 Ibid. p. 169.

Ibid. pp. 168, 298.

Ibid. pp. 246-313.

J. Sanz del Río, *Ideal*, cit., p. 278.


*Ideal*, cit., p. 289.

Filosofía de la muerte, *cit.*, pp. 150, 196-197.

Ibid. p. 160 n.

*OPP* pp. 293-294, 322.

*OPP* pp. 301, 309.

*OPP* pp. 296-300.


*OPP* pp. 305-307.

*OPP* pp. 299, 309, 311.

*OPP* pp. 310, 311, 322.

*OPP* pp. 315, 373; *V.Infra* p. 131

*OPP* p. 309.

*OPP* p. 330.

*OPP* p. 329.

*OPP* p. 346.

*OPP* p. 425.

*OPP* p. 313.

*OPP* p. 459

*OPP* pp. 346-347

*OPP* p. 346

*OPP* p. 424

*OPP* p. 452

68 OPP p. 329
69 OPP p. 484
70 Cobos, Humor y pensamiento, cit., p. 57.
71 Cobos, El pensamiento de A. M., cit., p. 61.
72 Ibid. p. 234
74 Cobos, Humor y pensamiento, cit., p. 57.
75 Ibid. p. 88.
76 Ibid. p. 86.
77 Ibid. pp. 51, 87-88; Cobos, El pensamiento de A. M., cit., p. 237.
78 Cobos, Humor y pensamiento, cit., p. 110.
79 Ibid. pp. 87-88
80 Ibidem.
81 Cobos, El pensamiento de A. M., cit., pp 237-238.
82 Ibid. p. 151
83 Ibid. p. 129
84 Ibid. p. 97
85 Cobos, Humor y pensamiento, cit., p. 58.
86 Ibid. pp. 58-59, 93.
87 Ibid. p. 93
88 Ibid. p. 58, cit. supra p
89 OPP pp. 421, 795.
90 Cobos, Humor y pensamiento, cit., pp. 58-59.
91 OPP p. 484
92 J. López-Morillas, El krausismo español, cit., pp. 38-39, cit., Cobos, Humor y pensamiento, cit., p. 57; reprocha should read reprochaba; in Cobos "ni tampoco es Dios mismo" reads "ni tampoco en Dios mismo".
93 OPP p. 322
Cobos, El pensamiento de A.M., cit., p. 61.

OPP p. 322.

OPP p. 311.

OPP p. 294.

V. Supra p. 87.


OPP p. 795 (1914)

J. Xirau, Manuel B. Cossío y la educación en España, Colegio de México, 1944, p. 31.

OPP p. 746 (1915); OPP p. 311 (1926).

M. de Unamuno, O.C., V, M, Afrodisio Aguado, 1952, p. 322, cit. A. de Albornoz, La presencia de Miguel de Unamuno en Antonio Machado, M. Gredos, 1968, p. 345; I have found no example of this imagery in Giner's published works; cf. Juan de Mairena: "Los poetas...pueden aprender de los filósofos el arte de las grandes metáforas" (OPP p. 421).

OPP p. 203

OPP pp. 345-347; cf.: "las ideas trascendentales, inasequibles como las estrellas que nunca podremos alcanzar, las ideas nunca realizadas, orientan la mente humana, sirven también como las estrellas para navegar, nos guían en la ruta nunca terminada del conocer" (OPP p. 816, 1922).

Cobos, Humor y pensamiento, cit., p. 66.

Ibidem.

V. Supra pp. 99-100.

OPP pp. 445, 669.

OPP p. 545

OPP p. 307

OPP p. 698

V. Supra pp. 83-84.

Cobos, Humor y pensamiento, cit., pp. 83, 89.
116 V. Supra p. 108.
117 OPP p. 459
118 V. Supra p. 84.
119 OPP p. 459
120 V. Infra p. 180.
121 OPP p. 309.
122 Cobos, El pensamiento de A.M., cit., p. 235.
123 Sanz del Río, Textos escogidos, cit., pp. 84-85.
124 Ibidem.
125 Los reformadores, cit., p. 364.
126 Textos escogidos, cit., p. 141.
127 OPP p. 925 (1918)
128 OPP p. 449
129 OPP p. 309
130 O. C. XI, p. 61, my italics.
131 Ibid.
132 OPP p. 49 (1931)
133 O. C. XII, pp. 40-41
134 OPP p. 205
135 OPP pp. 309, 430.
137 O. C. XI, pp. 61-62.
138 See "Espíritu y naturaleza", cit., passim.
139 V. Supra p. 110
141 V. Supra pp. 95-96; again, Machado is inconsistent in his view of death - in "Recuerdos de sueño, fiebre y duermivela" (OPP pp. 332-339) memory of past life continues after death and is a source of anguish rather than comfort - in fact it is a form of Hell.
142 Filosofía de la muerte, cit., p. 109.
143 OPP p. 425
144 V. Supra pp. 94-96
145 Eg. CXX (OPP p. 176), cf. letter to Unamuno
147 V. Supra pp. 93, 97.
148 Filosofía de la muerte, cit., pp. 272-274.
150 OPP pp. 214-215
151 Filosofía de la muerte, cit., p. 197.
152 Ideal, cit., p. 278.
153 Filosofía de la muerte, cit., p. 160 n.
154 "Don Francisco Giner de los Ríos", BILE №664, July 1915, pp. 220-221.
155 Filosofía de la muerte, cit., pp. 295-299.
156 "Don Francisco Giner de los Ríos, cit., p. 221.
157 op. cit. pp. 237-238
158 F. Lázaro Carreter, "¿Claves de la poética de A.M.?", Nueva Estafeta, №3, Feb 1979, pp. 52-53.
159 V. Supra p. 90.
160 OPP p. 373.
162 V. Supra pp. 124-126, infra p. 135.
163 V. Supra p. 91.
164 OPP p.483
165 OPP p.312
166 Cobos, El pensamiento de A.M., cit., pp.237-238.
167 OPP p.312.
168 V.Supra p. 109.
169 OPP p.547
170 Leibniz, Philosophical Writings, ed.G.H.R.
Parkinson, transl. Mary Morris and G.H.R. Parkinson,
London, Dent, 1973, p.188.
171 OPP p.294
172 OPP p.312
173 OPP p.294
174 Philosophical Writings, cit., p.190.
175 OPP p.312
176 Philosophical Writings, cit., p.190.
177 Ibid. p.191 (theorem 74)
178 OPP p.312
179 Philosophical Writings, cit., p.182; OPP p.329.
180 OPP p.293
181 OPP p.309
182 OPP p.703
183 OPP p.307
184 Mairena is sceptical about the possibility of
Martín's "poetic logic" achieving what it aspires to:
See OPP pp.407, 430.
185 J. Ferrater Mora, Diccionario de la filosofía,
cit., voz - Leibniz; J. López-Morillas, El krasusismo
español, cit., p.173.
186 A fact mentioned by X. Tilliette, "A.M., poète
philosophe", RLC, Paris, Jan-Mar 1962, p.44; J. Ortega
y Gasset: "Ni vitalismo ni racionalismo" (RO, Oct 1924),
O.C. III, Revista de Occidente, 1947, pp.270-280, El tema
de nuestro tiempo, O.C.III, pp.145-203, "La resurrección
de la mónada" (El Sol, 12 Feb 1925), O.C. III, pp.431-434.


189 OPP pp.49-50.

190 V.Supra pp.110-111.


192 On the theme of love, Mairena rejects the idea of the male/female relationship as a "síntesis, armonía o coincidencia" of opposing elements, which recalls the characteristic Krausist dialectic. (OPP pp.485-486)

193 See Note 161, supra p.149.

194 F. Giner de los Ríos, "Salmerón", (1911), Ensayos y cartas, cit., p.170.

195 Letter J. Sanz del Río to José de la Revilla, 1844, cit. J. López-Morillas, El krausismo español, cit., p.60.
Acordaos de cuando eráis niños, de cuando vuestro padre, aquí amado de todos, os envió a esta casa - donde yo prediqué siempre el saber sobrio - para aprender dos cosas: a decir bellas palabras y a ejecutar nobles hechos.

M.B. Cossío, "Homenaje a los poetas Manuel y Antonio Machado", at the Institucion Libre de Enseñanza, 1926
The particular importance of the Ethics of Krausism in Spain has often been emphasised by critics and historians. Azorín, for example, dismissed the importance of Krausist metaphysical thought and maintained that Krausism was significant in Spain above all because of its ethics. It was, he said, fundamentally, a norma de vida:

Azorín’s comparison of Krausists to Erasmists is an apt one: the object of both movements was the spiritual reconstitution of man, based on what they saw as a reaffirmation of authentic Christian ethical principles, which they believed had been obscured by the formalism and doctrinal theologising of the Church of their respective times. The Spanish Krausists believed themselves to be deeply religious men, but their religious beliefs were labelled heterodox by those Ultramontane Catholics who were their principal enemies.

In order to examine the characteristic ethics of Krausism we must consequently bear in mind the Krausists’ attitudes to contemporary Catholicism. In effect, the Krausists frequently define their own beliefs in terms of contrast to the ideas and practices of orthodox Catholics of their time. The text that expresses most clearly both the ethics and the attitude to religion of the Spanish Krausists is Gumersindo de Azcárate’s
Minuta de un testamento (1876), and I shall base my exposition of these aspects of Krausism on that text. I shall also refer to Sanz del Río’s Ideal de la humanidad para la vida (1860) — important as the principal statement of ethical ideas of the founder of Spanish Krausism, and clearly echoed by Azcárate in his own, more orderly work — and to some comments on religion by Francisco Giner de los Ríos. Subsequently I shall examine Antonio Machado’s religious and ethical ideas, comparing them to those of the Krausists.

The most extensive section of Azcárate’s book, which takes the form of a fictitious will, is that in which the testator narrates his prolonged religious crisis, culminating in his confession of his beliefs to his Catholic wife. In this confession he affirms the importance of religion in human life and his own commitment to Christianity, which he declares to be "la manifestación más alta y más divina de la vida religiosa hasta hoy". He states his belief in God in these terms: "creo en un Dios personal y providente, al que me considero íntimamente unido para la obra de la vida". The expressions used in these statements — "vida religiosa", "la obra de la vida" — are representative of the testator’s attitude to religion throughout the book. His emphasis is above all on ethics, the religious way of life, rather than theology or eschatology. It is remarkable that in a last will and testament so little reference is made, and importance attached to, questions of life after death. At one point alone he refers to his belief in immortality:

creo en la vida futura, y por tanto en la inmortalidad de nuestro ser, de nuestro espíritu con un cuerpo, habiendo de conservar siempre el hombre su individualidad esencial, no la pasajera y temporal, debida a las circunstancias de la vida terrena; y habiendo de encontrar todos, más pronto o más tarde, según sus merecimientos, un momento en el infinito tiempo en que se regeneren y salven.
This is not a very clear statement of his beliefs: it is neither a repetition of the orthodox Catholic line nor a clear allignment with the ideas on life-after-death expressed by Sanz del Río - it is too vague for that. However certain of Sanz's ideas are echoed here: the immortality of body as well as spirit, "essential" as opposed to "temporal" individuality, the infinity of time, the denial of hell and damnation. The main point I wish to make here is that Azcárate's Christianity is unorthodox and ethics is much more important in his religion than eschatology.

According to the author of the Minuta de un testamento there is a "fondo esencial del Cristianismo, oculto para muchos bajo la pesada costra de errores y preocupaciones"; this fondo esencial is the Christian ethic of love and charity:

Por encima y aparte de las diferencias dogmáticas, litúrgicas y de organización hay una cosa que interesa por igual a todos, que es la restauración de la vida cristiana. Los principios de caridad, amor y humanidad, consignados en el Evangelio, los traemos siempre en los labios, pero raras veces determinan nuestra conducta.

The testator implies here a critical attitude to what he sees as two of the errors of contemporary Christianity: the division of the Christian world into opposing sects, and the restriction of commitment to the Christian ethic of love to lip-service instead of practicing it in everyday life - again the emphasis is on la vida cristiana. On the first point Azcárate, like other Krausists, appears to favour the re-unification of the Christian faith: sectarianism is a cause of hatred in a realm that should be dominated by love. At the same time he dislikes the idea that any religion other than the Christian is false, and the sectarianism that this produces. Rather he recognises and respects the fact that all religions have elements of truth in them:
creo que la providencia de Dios alcanza, con su amor, a todos los pueblos y a todas las épocas, que en toda la historia se muestra igualmente, y que preside por tanto a todas las revelaciones religiosas verificadas en la conciencia humana a través de los siglos, en las que, por lo tanto, hay siempre un elemento divino y eterno al lado del temporal y transitorio. 8

On the second point – the failure of many professed Christians to live up to the ethics of Christ – Azcárate is insistent. He sees it as a consequence of the over-emphasis on dogma, liturgy and the formalistic practicing of the rituals of conventional Catholic worship:

Yo no hubiera podido consentir sin profunda repugnancia, que mis hijos hubiesen continuado profesando su Religión, si ésta hubiera sido el catolicismo al uso, estrecho, frío, formulario, dogmático más que moral, despertador del odio y de la guerra, no del amor y de la paz, litúrgico y ritualista más que vivificador y práctico. 9

In his own confession of faith, the testator limits greatly the dogma and devotions he is willing to see as essential to Christianity. The essential "dogma", he says, is to be found in the Sermon on the Mount; prayer is the only essential act of worship. What Azcárate is saying is that religion should not be reduced to a mere timetable of weekly devotions: rather it should be a mode of conduct practiced in every minute of every day and in every area of human life. Human behaviour should follow the pure, unselfish ethic preached and practiced by Jesus. Love and charity should be the principles governing the life of a society. 10 Questions of dogma and liturgy are unimportant in comparison with this living of the Christian life. 11 Azcárate’s fictional testator expresses the hope that his testament might convince some readers of these truths and
convertir algunos católicos en cristianos, despertando en su espíritu energías que hoy están adormecidas o muertas y haciendo posible para ellos el vivir la doctrina de Jesús en vez de limitarse tan sólo a declararla y proclamarla. 12

In any code of ethics a crucial question is the determination of the authority which compels a man to behave in a certain way. For the author of the Minuta both God and Christ are important moral forces. It is, he declares, his "intimate union" with God that urges him to lead a pious life, 13 and it is Christ’s teaching and example which provide a model of human conduct. However no mention is made of the divinity of Christ; rather it is suggested that His life represents the fulfilment of the best qualities inherent in human nature: "nadie como Jesús ha realizado en la vida con tanta gloria y resplandor la naturaleza humana en su esencia y pureza". 14 Azcárate is, furthermore, unwilling to accept that the authority of the Scriptures or of men of the Church is sufficient in itself to determine and sustain a moral creed. He reflects at one point on the limitations of the enforced memorising of the Catechism in educating his own moral sense as a child, and states:

Hoy conozco que para que el hombre salve su integridad moral en medio de las agitaciones de la vida presente, la razón ha de venir en ayuda del sentimiento, y la convicción en auxilio de la autoridad. 15

External authority alone cannot sustain a true ethics, which should be internalized. Inner conviction, based on Reason is an essential part of the testator's religious beliefs. His belief in God derives from a rational line of argument common to all Krausists (we have seen the same argument in Sanz del Río’s metaphysics):
His God is the Absolute Being of Panentheism, immanent in and transcending all things including the individual human being. It is this immanence that explains the "intimacy" of his "union" with God and justifies his belief in the moral impulse as something internal rather than mere obedience to external authority. In effect Azcárate holds that it is the conscience of the individual that is the ultimate moral authority. The testator advises his son to listen respectfully to the guidance of his teachers, but always to base his final judgement on ethical questions only on the dictates of his own conscience.

Rationality is one of the cornerstones of Azcárate's religious thought. Reason leads him to his concept of and belief in God, and to his conviction that all religions "responden a un fin esencial y permanente de la vida que tiene su raíz y fundamento en la misma naturaleza humana". It is the spirit of rational enquiry developed through the testator's scientific studies which leads him to doubt the truth of the Biblical account of the Creation and of elements of the Catholic creed and liturgy. (On this last point, Sanz del Río is more specific than Azcárate, rejecting the Christian belief in "la proximidad de Dios, la divinidad de Cristo, el hecho histórico de la Revelación, la posibilidad del milagro, la virtud de la esperanza". If it is rationality that thus provokes the testator's religious crisis, it is also rationality which enables him to examine and confirm his own beliefs. Hence he proposes that when his children reach an appropriate age they should not be discouraged at all from a "free investigation" of religion in the same spirit.

As we have seen, Azcárate believes that fundamentally
all Christianity is united, in spite of doctrinal and sectarian differences, because of the existence of a common ground of ethics. This common ground exists, not merely because it is derived from the teachings of Christ, but because it is the product of the human conscience, which, although manifested in the individual, is a universal:

yo creo, como creo ahora, que los principios fundamentales del Cristianismo son los mismos para todas las sectas, los cuales, cuando tienen verdaderas raíces en la conciencia, determinan una vida igual... y que al lado de esto las diferencias dogmáticas y litúrgicas, debidas en gran parte a circunstancias históricas, tienen escasa importancia. 22

Azcárate affirms the existence of God and the importance of Christ's ministry, but his view of religion has as its basis not a theology or a Christology but an optimistic view of human nature. Rather than a revelation from above religion is seen as an expression of a fundamental tendency of human nature. God, he says, manifests Himself in all religions produced by the human conscience. Christ is seen as the embodiment of all that is best in man. Human Reason and Human Conscience are the powers that can reveal Truth and Goodness. The Minuta articulates a Theism that is strongly influenced by Rationalism and a Christianity heavily tinged with Humanism. Azcárate ascribes to Christianity the notions of "Humanity" and "Human Dignity":

La idea de humanidad es indudablemente una creación del Cristianismo... En todo individuo, por bajo que haya caído, reside siempre el fondo del hombre esencial, de aquí se deriva su permanente valor y dignidad, y en esto se funda el amor que debemos a todos, porque en todos debemos amar al hombre, o, como dijeran los cristianos,... debemos amar a todos los hombres a Cristo. 23

It is clear that this particular brand of Christianity
is fundamentally opposed to the idea of Original Sin. In fact, in the creed professed by the Krausists, sin is seen only as the product of insufficient development of the human faculties of Reason and Conscience. The Krausist version of religion is also fundamentally opposed to the idea of Man's Fall, for it is integrated into the Krausist Philosophy of History, which is, as we have seen, a vision of Man's gradual and relentless progress, through increasing knowledge and awareness, towards perfection. The utopian goal of this progress is most clearly expressed by Sanz del Río, who envisages a time when Mankind will achieve "la perfección que cabe en su naturaleza conforme al plan divino del mundo". One day, he believes, Man's full spiritual and ethical potential will be realized and the Kingdom of God will come to exist here on earth: "El que escucha la voz de Dios en su conciencia está cerca de reconocer la vocación divina de la humanidad a reunirse un día en una vida y sociedad religiosa sobre la tierra."

Although Azcárate does not profess a belief in this utopia in the Minuta, his belief in the progress of humanity throughout history is quite apparent. He dismisses, as we have seen, the doctrinal differences of contemporary religious thought as unimportant vestiges of a past that has now been superseded. While he admires the achievements of Christianity, he firmly places it in history: it is, he says, the highest manifestation of humanity's religious spirit hasta hoy - leaving open the possibility that it too may be superseded. In one of the curious footnotes to the text of the Minuta he proposes as an evaluation of the testator's profession of faith that "resulta un progreso evidente respecto de la época anterior". It is a progress because it avoids the restrictions imposed by religious dogmatism and hence enables religion to be reconciled with the progress achieved in other realms of human thought - science and rational philosophy. In this way, he claims, religion is made to accord with "las leyes generales que presiden
al desarrollo de la humanidad". Azcárate's whole attitude to religion is bound up with the Krausist philosophy of history and with the idea of the perfectibility of Man which is behind it.

In the same footnote, Azcárate labels the religious beliefs proposed in the Testamento as "Unitarian" or "Liberal-Christian", and explains that they are a blend of philosophy and positive religion, of Rational Theism and Protestant Christianity. A contemporary Positivist critic of the Minuta described its author's religion as "Cristianismo sin dogmas ni misterios, sin Cristo y sin Iglesia". Certainly it is a version of Christianity which elevates the importance of humanity, and attaches great importance to freedom of enquiry and freedom of conscience. It is a Christianity which concentrates above all on ethics and affirms that man is naturally good. That the Minuta can indeed be considered representative of the attitudes of Spanish Krausists generally is confirmed by Francisco Giner's description of the testator as "el hombre que ha llegado a ser como el ideal ético hecho carne para toda la España que aún respira".

The ethics of Krausism emphasises both the importance of human social relationships and the importance of the individual. On the one hand it is the Christian spirit of love for one's fellow-men that can bring harmony to the world and eventually bring about the longed-for brotherhood of man. On the other hand, the individual is seen as a unique manifestation of humanity who, because of his special qualities, has an individual special mission to perform in the progress of humanity as a whole. The individual is morally autonomous and free to pursue the truth through the exercise of his Reason. Only through the exercise of this moral and intellectual freedom can man fulfil his potential as a human being and thus contribute to the eventual fulfilment of humanity's potential.

According to Krausism neither freedom of conscience nor rationality nor the pursuit of knowledge is opposed
to religion or to God's will. On the contrary both rationality and conscience are manifestations of the "divine" in man, and all knowledge is knowledge of God, since everything is in God. Hence Sanz del Río can declare that if man lives according to his true self and in harmony with his fellow-men, he will find God in his mind and in his heart, and that "Dios se manifiesta con verdad en el espíritu que se asemeja a Dios en el ejercicio virtuoso de su libertad". Because of the nature of the relationship between Man and God in Panentheism, the free exercise of individual moral judgement, the pursuit of human perfection and the search for truth are not merely permissible – they are duties:

El hombre, imagen viva de Dios, y capaz de progresiva perfección, debe vivir en la religión unido con Dios, y subordinado a Dios; debe realizar en su lugar y esfera limitada la armonía de la vida universal, y mostrar esta armonía en bella forma exterior; debe conocer en la ciencia a Dios y el mundo; debe en el claro conocimiento de su destino educarse a sí mismo.

Sanz del Río's Ideal de la humanidad para la vida is particularly useful as a guide to Krausist ethics in that it provides many "commandments" of this type which briefly and forcefully summarise essential points. A section of the book is devoted to a list of what he calls "las leyes (Mandamientos) de la humanidad". The first three "Mandamientos generales" are:

1° Debes conocer y amar a Dios, orar a él y santificarlo.
2° Debes conocer, amar y santificar la naturaleza, el espíritu, la humanidad sobre todo individuo natural, espiritual y humano.
3° Debes conocerte, respetarte, amarte, santificarte como semejante a Dios, y como ser individual y social juntamente.

As well as the Absolute Being, the "Relative Infinites" of the Krausist metaphysic – Humanity, Spirit and Nature
- are seen as worthy of reverence. Also important here is the emphasis given to knowledge (Mandamiento 10 commands systematic pursuit of the truth) and to man defined as both individual and social. The respect for Nature in Krausism has several consequences for the philosophy's adherents. Firstly it gives rise to a pantheistic reverence for and enjoyment of the countryside. Secondly it is seen as a corrective to the anthropocentric implications of some types of Humanism and of Christianity, that is to say, to the belief that the earth is for man's exclusive benefit. Thirdly, since for the Krausists the human body is an aspect of nature, it leads to a respect for the physical as well as the spiritual dimension of man, a respect which goes against the Christian idea of a conflict in man between the spirit and the flesh. Giner, for example, writes:

lejos de ser el cuerpo un obstáculo, una cárcel, un castigo, la raíz de todas las tentaciones infernales, según soñara el misticismo de todos los tiempos, desde la India hasta nuestros días, constituye un órgano esencial y verdaderamente sagrado, que nos permite cumplir en nuestro límite una obra, semejante a la infinita de Dios. 37

Another much-repeated Krausist belief is that good should be done for its own sake and in obedience to the promptings of the conscience, not from any hope of reward or fear of punishment, either human or divine. Sanz expresses this attitude in his sixth and thirteenth Mandamientos:

6º Debes hacer el bien con pura, libre, entera voluntad y por los buenos medios.

13º Debes hacer el bien, no por la esperanza, ni por el temor, ni por el goce, sino por su propia bondad: entonces sentirás en ti la esperanza firme en Dios y vivirás sin temor ni egoísmo y con santo respeto hacia los decretos divinos. 38
Sanz also describes the character of an ideal Krausist via the twentieth Mandamiento:

20° No debes ser orgulloso, ni egoista, ni perezoso, ni falso, ni hipócrita, ni servil, ni envidioso, ni vengativo, ni colérico, ni atrevido; sino modesto, circunspecto, moderado, aplicado, verdadero, leal, y de llano corazón, benévolo, amable y pronto a perdonar. 39

The typically Krausist attitude to life is earnest, serious, even puritanical. Hypocrisy, insincerity and frivolity are major sins. It is a man’s duty not only to strive to live a morally pure life but also to think seriously and with a sense of responsibility about his everyday actions, to use his powers of reason and his conscience to question his own behaviour and that of others. The Krausist belief in tolerance is somewhat ambiguous. Sanz sees intolerance as one of the most censurable features of religious sectarianism and attributes it to imperfect knowledge of God. 40 He says man should be quick to pardon. Yet the Krausists often seem aggressively intolerant of what they see as inadmissible behaviour in others. Azcárate says that to turn a blind eye to the sins of others is not what is meant by tolerance, and suggests that ostracism is an appropriate means of censuring those members of his own society who are morally unworthy of his company. 41 Giner de los Ríos shows no tolerance at all for what he sees as the insincerity, shallowness and hypocrisy of many supposedly "religious" people in Spain; in his writings there are many caustically ironical evocations of what he sees as the religious norm in Spain:

El hombre de nuestra clase media, las más de las veces, casi siempre quizás, es católico de buena fe; pero al uso del día. Se casa ante el párroco, bautiza a la prole, oye Misa los más de los domingos, come de viernes en Cuaresma, se confiesa a última hora, por lo menos, y se deja enterrar en sagrado. Eso es todo.
Dando culto a las formas sociales respeta sinceramente a la Iglesia, como respeta a la familia, a la propiedad (sobre todo a la propiedad), al Ejército y demás elementos conservadores de la vida regular, media y ordenada; pero no siente la menor vocación para las cosas divinas. 42

In one of his obituaries Giner is even more caustic, describing Spain's "plebeian middle classes" as totally devoid of spirituality, regard for their fellow-men or true charity, and as being impelled only by fear to forsake the general frivolity of their existences and perform the rites of a purely external religion. 43 Antonio Machado attributes Giner's critical irony to a passion for honestly telling the truth, and claims that Giner aspired not to denigrate his fellow-Spaniards but to inspire them to improve themselves. 44 Yet it is likely that this and other examples of the Krausists' sense of their own moral superiority only served to further aggravate the reciprocal intolerance of the society from which they tended to set themselves apart.

The austerity, and in some respects puritanism, of the Krausist ethics was both mocked by its enemies and admitted by its adherents (one characteristic Krausist belief that is rather puritanic is the concept of work as both a duty in terms of social responsibility and a source of moral improvement - I shall return to this point later). 45 Giner reflected in 1894 on the beneficial influence of Sanz del Río in Spain and noted with pleasure that the term krausista had come to be habitually attached to "toda obra, tendencia, conducta, doctrina... con sólo que en ellas se revele una construcción sólida, una moral austera, la obediencia a principios, el culto del ideal". 46 This austerity of the Krausists was manifested in certain external details or traits of behaviour: strict "good manners", simple but tidy clothes and homes, the shunning of ostentation of material wealth and luxury and of the pleasures of the life of "elegant society", the use in everyday discourse of the language
of philosophy, and (at least in some Krausists) the attempt to avoid being excessively eloquent or rhetorical. Some of these details explain Menéndez Pelayo's famous description:

Los krausistas todos hablaban igual, todos vestían igual, todos se parecían en su aspecto exterior, aunque no se pareciesen antes, porque el krausismo es cosa que imprime carácter y modifica hasta las fisionomías, asimilándolas al perfil de D. Julián /Sanz del Río/ o de D. Nicolás /Salmerón/. Todos eran tétricos, cejijuntos, sombríos; todos respondían por fórmulas hasta en las insulsecas de la vida práctica y diaria; siempre en su papel; siempre sabios, siempre absortos en la vista real de lo absoluto. 47

Of course I am not suggesting that this portrait is anything but caricature. In any case there are significant differences between the early "founding fathers" of Spanish Krausism such as Sanz del Río and Salmerón and their disciples who became institucionistas. It is in the most important of these differences that we can discover the main reason for their lasting influence: the institucionistas went beyond the intense interest in philosophical theory characteristic of Sanz del Río and became involved in a practical (though undeniably idealistic) project to regenerate Spain. Alberto Jiménez. Fraud has described the emergence of a new institucionista type, under the leadership and example of Francisco Giner, somewhat different from the krausista as exemplified by Sanz del Río:

Había nacido un nuevo tipo: el del institucio-nista, sinónomo, como el del krausista, de hombre de principios y de vocación y también de un cierto puritanismo, aunque no tan utopista, pues atento a las realidades nacionales e infla-mado por la historia y el arte de España y hasta exaltándose en frenesí amoroso por la naturaleza y el suelo patrios. Predicaba desde las cátedras universitarias un tipo de reforma nacional a través de la enseñanza. 48
It is significant that Jiménez Fraud notes, alongside the new institucionista directions of thought and action the survival of the Krausist's characteristic puritanism and moral purpose—as did Giner in the quotation above. In effect the Krausist ethics, and the view of man from which it derives, is a very important determinant of institucionista attitudes to education and to the problem of Spain; Sanz, after all, did declare that increasing knowledge was the driving force of human progress and that one of man's fundamental obligations was "educarse a sí mismo". I shall return to the importance of Krausist ethical thought in the social and educational thought of the men of the Institución Libre in subsequent chapters. However, let us for the moment concentrate on the ethics themselves and turn our attention to Antonio Machado.

Many critics discern in the moral character of Machado features which they attribute to the influence of the Institución. Federico de Onís notes an "afán por la elevación moral", Blanco Garzón a "noble sentido estético", and Alice McVan "a certain austerity". S. Serrano Poncela sees as typically institucionista qualities in Machado "la austeridad de costumbres en la vida privada; la ausencia de ostentación; la intransigencia ante el peculado". M. Tuñón de Lara emphasises Machado's sense of tolerance, belief in work and critical spirit. Rubén Landa, himself an institucionista, also stresses the importance of austerity of life-style and morality:

Advierto en Machado dos influjos krausistas: uno: vida austera. Ningún krausista fue rico. Todos vivieron de su trabajo. Eran cultos. Por su vida en inglés se diría que eran "puritanos". Lo eran en la conducta, pero no en la doctrina, porque pensaban, como Rousseau, que los hombres son naturalmente buenos.

Landa dismisses as superficial criteria of institucionismo
details such as the tidiness and simplicity of dress and aversion to café-life of men of the school, for on the basis of such criteria Machado would not qualify as an institucionista, and Landa is convinced that Machado (whom he knew personally) was an institucionista "en lo más hondo". He invokes his own memories of Salmerón, Giner and Azcárate as well as the authority of statements made by Valera and Clarín to affirm that Spanish Krausism was essentially a "religion", and a religion in which "más importante que la doctrina es el sentimiento y la conducta". He believes that the austerity of Machado's life - not only his poverty but his lack of desire to be other than poor - is characteristic of institucionista attitudes. Furthermore, he says, it was characteristic of institucionistas to be religious without belonging to any particular Church.

Let us now turn from these general judgements and testimonies of Machado's character and life-style and examine in detail his attitudes to religion and to ethics as he expresses them in his writings. His ideas on these themes show a noteworthy consistency throughout his life although the amount of attention he devotes to particular aspects varies at different times. On the religious question we can, for the sake of convenience, distinguish four periods of his development. In the first period, up to 1912, he writes very little about either religion or ethics, although what he does say in such texts as the poem "Retrato" (XCVII) and his address in memory of Antonio Pérez de la Mata (1910) are consistent in terms of ethical ideas with later, longer declarations, as I shall show. In this first period the question of the nature and existence of God is rarely mentioned, even though in a poem of Soledades, Galerías. Otros poemas. (1907) he describes himself as "pobre hombre en sueños/ siempre buscando a Dios entre la niebla". Machado's metaphysical search as expressed in the poetry of that collection is for something to give meaning and purpose to life rather than any specific religious faith or
theology.

In the second period, which roughly corresponds to the time of his residence in Baeza (1912-1919), religion becomes an important theme of his poetry and prose. Three main circumstances of his life explain the growing importance of religious matters to Machado: the death of Leonor, the influence of Unamuno, and Machado's own contact with rural Spanish Catholicism. The first and second of these circumstances prompted the expression of certain religious ideas about the nature of God and the possibility of immortality that did not persist in Machado for very long. However they were influences that prompted him to examine and express his more deeply-rooted convictions. It was also during this period that Machado undertook a thorough study of philosophy, partly in order to obtain a degree, but also in line with a lifelong interest. In some of the poems of Campos de Castilla from this period are the first brief expressions of metaphysical and ethical ideas later to be dealt with in greater detail by his apócrifos. The shortcomings of Spanish Catholicism are also an important theme of that collection (particularly in its second, enlarged edition) and of contemporary prose writings, which include some of his most caustically anti-clerical remarks.

The third period in my division spans the years Machado spent in Segovia (1919-1931). It includes the Cancionero apócrifo, Abel Martín, Machado's most extensive metaphysical work, although notes and brief poems of the preceding period show that Martín's metaphysics was the result of a long period of reflection. It is in the metaphysical aspects of Machado's religious thought - such questions as the nature and existence of God and of life after death - that there is the greatest variety of ideas, the least consistency. Contemporary with the writing of Abel Martín are a number of important discussions of ethics and reflections on Christ and Christianity. As we shall see, Machado's Christian ethic is fundamentally an ethic of human brotherhood, and this
ethic is somewhat inconsistent with certain aspects of the metaphysical thought of Abel Martín, particularly Martín's solipsism. In Juan de Mairena Machado shows that he was well aware of this inconsistency, and that he preferred to maintain his ethical rather than his metaphysical principles:

Nosotros partimos, en efecto de una concepción metafísica de la cual pensamos que no puede eludir el solipsismo... Frente a nuestra fe cristiana — una "videncia" como otra cualquiera — en un Dios parental que nos ordena el amor a su prole, de la cual somos parte, sin privilegio alguno, milita la fe metafísica en el solus ipse.... La heterogeneidad de estas dos creencias ni excluye su contradicción ni tiene reducción posible a denominador común.... el "ama a tu prójimo como a ti mismo y aun más, si fuera preciso", que tal es el verdadero precepto cristiano, lleva implícita una fe altruista, una creencia en la realidad absoluta, en la existencia en sí del otro yo. 61

In the fourth period (1931-39) it is the altruistic ethical impulse that dominates Machado's religious deliberations; metaphysics, never really consistent in Machado, fades into the background. In Juan de Mairena his Christian and humanist ethical principles are expressed in more detail than anywhere else in his works. Let us now look in depth at the way Machado reveals his religious and moral thought in his writings in these various periods.

One of the most prominent features of Machado's writings on religion is his strong anti-clericalism. His very first signed political article was a satirical commentary on Spain's superficial religiosity. 62 In the "Retrato" of 1908 he confesses to the "gotas de sangre jacobina" within him: an allusion to the anti-clerical tradition of his family, particularly his father. 63 Where the poet's critical attitude to the Spanish Catholic Church is most vehemently expressed is in prose and verse of the Baeza period; in 1915, for example, he wrote quite openly and in the strongest of terms of the
Estimo oportuno combatir a la Iglesia católica y proclamar el derecho del pueblo a la conciencia y estoy convencido de que España morirá por asfixia espiritual si no se rompe ese lazo de hierro. Para ello no hay más obstáculos que la hipocresía y la timidez. Esta no es una cuestión de cultura — se puede ser muy culto y respetar lo ficticio y lo inmoral — sino de conciencia. La conciencia es anterior al alfabeto y al pan. 64

Note Machado's scale of priorities here: la conciencia is of more fundamental importance than economic justice or literacy. This does not mean that Machado denies the importance of these factors; in a letter to Unamuno of 1913 he laments the material sufferings of agricultural labourers and speaks of his own campaigns in Soria to encourage people to read. 65 In another letter to Unamuno, of 1915, he confirms that when he writes of the right to la conciencia he is referring to the need for religious freedom: "la cuestión central, la religiosa y de conciencia" he writes. 66 In the first of these two letters he explains the reasons for his combative attitude to the Church:

Empiezo a creer que la cuestión religiosa sólo preocupa en España a usted y a los pocos que sentimos con usted. Ya oiría al doctor Simarro, hombre de gran talento y de gran cultura, felicitarse de que el sentimiento religioso estuviera muerto en España. Si esto es verdad, meditad estemos, porque ¿cómo vamos a sacudir el lazo de hierro de la Iglesia católica que nos asfixia? Esta Iglesia, espiritualmente huera, pero de organización formidable sólo puede ceder al embate de un impulso realmente religioso. El clericalismo español sólo puede indignar seriamente al que tenga un fondo cristiano. 67

Machado's hostility to the Church arises from his own Christian convictions. He believes that Spanish Catholicism has become an institutionalized form of
spirtual repression. Rather than representing a true spirituality it has become a hypocritical defender of the fictitious and the immoral: Machado believes that Truth and Goodness lie in a totally different type of religion.

Some of his criticisms of Catholicism are expressed in *Campos de Castilla*. In his satirical elegy to "don Guido" he mocks the Andalusian gentleman's hypocritical and formalistic practice of "religion" which serves to mask an empty and dissolute life. Don Guido and his religiosity appear to be set up as a deliberate contrast to another Andalusian - don Francisco Giner - and his spiritual worth, as portrayed in Machado's verse elegy. There religion is reduced to the maestro's simple, non-confessional belief in the living out of the moral imperative:

\[
\text{(don Francisco se nos fue diciéndonos:)}
\]
\[
\text{Sed buenos y no más, sed lo que he sido entre vosotros: alma.}
\]
\[
\text{Vivid, la vida sigue; los muertos mueren y las sombras pasan;}
\]
\[
\text{lleva quien deja y vive el que ha vivido.}
\]
\[
\text{¡Yunques, sonad; enmudeced, campanas!}
\]

Don Guido, on the other hand, lived a dissolute youth and only in his later years became "hermano de una santa cofradía" and "gran rezador". Unlike Giner's, Don Guido's death was mourned by the Church who paid him the tribute of ringing its bells all day. Yet, Machado suggests, Giner is the one who survives death whereas Don Guido is one of those shadow beings who die for ever: "Buen don Guido, ya eres ido/ y para siempre jamás.../ Alguien dirá: ¿Qué dejaste?/ Yo pregunto: ¿Qué llevaste/ al mundo donde hoy estás". The answer to these questions is provided by the elegy to Giner with its repetition of the dejar/llevar wordplay: the conventional, superficial Catholic leaves nothing of spiritual worth, hence his oblivion is certain.

Another poem of *Campos de Castilla*, "El mañana
Machado sees as widespread religious frivolity and mindlessness, and links the Church with the decadence and stagnation of Spain:

"El Dios Ibero" looks at another aspect of Spanish religious life: peasant Catholicism. Machado portrays this as having as its basis the fear of a potentially vengeful Divinity who is not at all the Christian God of love.

Machado also sees Spanish peasant religiosity as greatly bound up with superstition: in 1913 he writes to Unamuno of the two distinct strands of Catholicism in Spain - the traditionalist acceptance of Papal dogma of the well-to-do and the superstitious faith in miracles of the pueblo. Neither of these approach his own vision of what Christianity should be: a living out of the ethics preached by Christ. He concludes in his letter that "El Evangelio no vive en el alma española".

Another aspect of traditional Spanish Catholicism that Machado rejects is what he sees as its obsession with death rather than life. An image in which he sees graphic expression of this obsession is the cult of Christ Crucified. In the poem "La Saeta" of Campos de Castilla he evokes the bloody images of Christ in agony of the Andalusian Semana Santa and then rejects the view of Christ (and Christianity) such images portray: "¡No puedo cantar, ni quiero/ a ese Jesús del madero,/ sino al que anduvo en el mar!" Here the sea is richly symbolic and evokes a number of meanings: it is the mystery of being, the unknown, life and death. Through
the repetition of key images over a series of poems
Machado sets off a multiplicity of implications in each
poem. Hence, although the sea may sometimes symbolise
death and oblivion, it is also an image of a place
where man must travel without the aid of pathways, thus
"Caminante, no hay camino,/ sino estelas en la mar" is
a symbol of man's simultaneous existential freedom and
sense of cosmic solitude. Another poem of the same
series proposes that "Todo el que camina anda,/ como
Jesús, sobre el mar." According to Sánchez Barbudo
el mar in "la Saeta" is principally a symbol of the world,
as a place without pathways, and consequently Machado's
Christ in the poem is Christ as man. This is certainly
one of the implications of the series of poems with this
camino/mar motif; another is that all men are like Christ.

The rejection of the image of Christ Crucified in
favour of other images of Christ -- Christ as a living
human being -- and another type of Christianity -- more
concerned with living than dying -- is something that
recurs and is discussed in more depth and with greater
clarity in Juan de Mairena. In 1938, for example,
Machado writes:

> después de San Pablo ha sido difícil que el
Cristo vuelva a asentar sus plantas sobre la
tierra, como quisiéramos los herejes, los
reacios al culto del Cristo Crucificado.

In effect by this time Machado has gone much further than
merely criticising what he saw earlier as an error of
Spanish (and particularly Andalusian) Catholicism. He
now declares that a false view of Christ was given by
Saint Paul and was taken up by the Scholastics; hence
the whole of orthodox Catholicism suffers from the same
error.

In other writings from the last period of Machado's
life further details of his own view of Christ are pro-
vided. Firstly, Christ is seen as a man rather than as
the Son of God; hence Machado writes through Mairena
"la humanidad produce muy de tarde en tarde hombres profundos... (Buda, Sócrates, Cristo)". Ironically rather than seriously Mairena proposes a heterodox view of the divinity of Christ: "fue... el hombre que se hace Dios para explicar en la Cruz los pecados más graves de la divinidad". Behind Mairena's irony there is a serious point: Christ's ministry was a rebellion against the ethics of Judaism, accepted in the name of their God as God's Law. Hence the ethics of Judaism are "God's sins". Mairena sees these ethical principles as patriarchal, authoritarian, vengeful. Christ rebelled against Judaism by proposing alternative, fraternal values based on a concept of love new to humanity. Love in the Old Testament, says Mairena, was no more than the name given to the carnal appetite that assured the survival of the Jewish race. Christ established a new form of love which could unite all men of all races in a common bond of brotherhood. Christianity represented, according to Machado, a step forward in the ethical development of humanity.

In his criticisms of Catholicism Machado rejects the idea of Christ as the Son of God and the Church's emphasis on death and suffering. He rejects the Church's preoccupation with the rituals of devotions. He proposes that religion should be concerned above all with the way human beings live their life on earth. His view of Christ as an exemplary man whose fundamental message was the need for brotherly love is in line with this view of the proper nature of religion.

What is Machado's authority for asserting the truth of his own view of Christ and Christianity? In the second and third periods I have distinguished he alludes to his own familiarity with the Bible as an authority on true Christianity, but by the last period even the Bible itself, like its Scholastic commentators, comes under suspicion. He believes that even the New Testament is tainted with pre-Christian, Judaic notions, and hence must be approached with great caution.
The essence of Christianity is to be found, he continues, in mankind rather than in books:

Machado's view of Christ, it would appear, is the product of a view of man and human history: Christianity represents an important step forward in the development of mankind, and manifests itself most clearly in the human conscience. Machado's views are here very close to the Krausist philosophy of history, conception of Christ and notion of the human conscience. The distinction between the Christ of the Bible and the "essential" Christ internalised in the human spirit is one also made by Sanz del Río: the Krausist philosopher distinguishes between a "Cristo histórico" and the "Cristo vivo y eterno". The first is of lesser importance and the testimonies we have of his life are, according to Sanz, incomplete and partial. Christ, says Sanz, is important not as an isolated individual but as an element in the history of mankind as a whole. The second, "essential" Christ is the one that lives on in the human spirit—"el Cristo vivo y
eterno', el Cristo encarnado vivamente en nuestro pensamiento y sentido entero humano, el Cristo íntimo que nos representamos y adoramos y que llevamos en nosotros". 

In Machado's statement above there is clearly a development of ideas from his declaration in 1913 that "El Evangelio no vive en el alma española". Firstly, Machado has acquired a more critical attitude to the Gospels, and secondly he has changed his opinion as to the spiritual merits of the Spanish people (I shall return to this second change in a later chapter). However, the idea that religious attitudes are essentially manifestations of the human spirit's natural tendencies is one frequently expressed. In "Sobre literatura rusa" (1922) Machado explains how the spirit of Christ demonstrates a notable advance on the concept of man held by the Greeks (as well as the Jews). Here, as later in Juan de Mairena, a philosophy of history in terms of a progressive development of human spirituality and self-knowledge is apparent. Greece had made its particular contribution to human history by discovering the power of Reason as a form of communion between men. Christ, says Machado, brought a new revelation: the power and universality of human feeling, in particular of the feeling of human fraternity and non-sexual love (he makes a contrast to love as portrayed in the Old Testament in this article of 1922, as later in Juan de Mairena). The impulse to love one's brother man, like other feelings, is not, says Machado, an abstract idea or ideal but something naturally present in the heart of every man:

El corazón del hombre, nos dice el Cristo, con su ansia de inmortalidad, con su anhelo de perfección moral, con su sed de amor nunca saciada, tiene ante sí también un camino infinito hacia la suprema perfección del Padre. Y esta ansia, esta sed que tú, hombre, descubres con sólo mirar a tu propio corazón, es la de todos los hombres. 

These three impulses are, declares Machado, the essence of Christianity and they are impulses natural to man.
However certain individuals and peoples manifest these universal human tendencies more clearly and powerfully than others: Christ, in his time, and Russia in the modern world, according to Machado. For Machado the most important of the three Christian impulses is that of love: "[La] fraternidad humana... fue la gran revelación de Cristo", he writes, 96 and "lo ruso, lo específicamente ruso, era la interpretación exacta del sentido fraternal del cristianismo, que es, a su vez, lo específicamente cristiano". 97 Machado's interpretation of lo ruso is based on his readings of the nineteenth century Russian classics, particularly Tolstoy whom he refers to as "la síntesis del alma rusa". 98 His belief in Tolstoyan brotherly love, which is the core of Machado’s own fondo cristiano, leads him to proclaim to Unamuno in 1918: "El tolstofismo salvará a Europa, si es que ésta tiene salvación". 99

We have already seen a number of aspects of Machado’s religious thought that are similar to ideas expressed by the Spanish Krausists: his critical attitude to Spanish Catholicism from a point of view that is defined as more truly Christian; specific criticisms of the Church of his time - its hypocrisy and shallowness, its ritualistic formalism, its lack of real spiritual and moral values, its repressive attitude to freedom of thought; Machado’s conviction that religion should concern everyday life, not theology or devotions or death; his belief that Christ was a man, not the Son of God; his placing of Christ within a progressive philosophy of human history; his affirmation that Christianity has an essence, which is ethical, and should be internalised; his conviction that religious impulses stem from human nature.

However we have not seen Machado acknowledge that his religious views stem from his education at the Institución or from readings of Krausist works. The only affirmation of an affinity of views with other thinkers (apart from Tolstoy) was his description of himself as one of the few people in Spain who shared
Unamuno's opinion of the profound importance of religion. 100 However, in spite of Machado's obvious high regard for Unamuno and acceptance of him as some sort of mentor, 101 it would be erroneous to say that Machado's religious views are identical to those of Unamuno. There are similarities between the two but there are also important differences. The major divergence is that, whereas for Unamuno matters eschatological are of paramount importance, for Machado it is ethics that are primary, particularly the ethics of brotherly love. After Unamuno's death Machado contrasted his own view of Christ with "sus plantas sobre la tierra" to Unamuno's "hincapie en la Crucifixión". 102 Earlier than this, in letters to Unamuno himself (where Machado is often most eager to acknowledge that he is a mere disciple) he expresses some dissatisfaction with the limitations of Unamuno's points of view. He confesses to being rather perplexed by Niebla, 103 and judges Abel Sánchez "pre-cristiano", that is to say rooted in Judaic rather than truly Christian ideas, even daring to suggest to Unamuno that the time has come for him to write an authentic Christian novel, concerning fraternal love. 104

The time when Machado comes closest to Unamuno's ideas is in the years 1913 and 1914 when he is most concerned about notions of life after death, following the death of Leonor. In Machado's work as a whole there is not that obsessive concern with immortality that we see in Unamuno or the obsessive and agonic striving to believe in God. In 1913 Machado does express such a striving in terms very reminiscent of Unamuno, in the poem "Desde mi rincón": "Crecer en una fé que nace/ cuando se busca a Dios y no se alcanza,/ y en el Dios que se lleva y que se hace." 105 Similarly, in "Profesión de fe" (1913?) he proposes that God is created by man through faith: "Yo he de hacerte, mi Dios, cual tú me hiciste/ y para darte el alma que me diste/ en mí te he de crear". 106 González de Cardenal sees these poems as of minor importance in assessing Machado's religious ideas since they
seem mere paraphrases of Unamuno rather than expressions of Machado's own deep-felt convictions. Certainly such ideas were not expressed by Machado either prior to or subsequent to these few years after Leonor's death. Even in certain ideas expressed in the "Profesión de fe" there is a difference in emphasis as to the nature of the God agonically sought. Whereas Unamuno seeks God as an assurance of human immortality, Machado proclaims that God is fundamentally a spirit of love in man: "en mí te he de crear. Que el puro río de caridad, que fluye eternamente, fluya en mi corazón. ¡Sévà, Dios mío, de una fe sin amor la turbia fuente!"

In fact at various points in his life Machado links belief in God with commitment to the ethic of brotherly love. In a letter to Unamuno of 1918 he states that the existence of God can be confirmed by a process of logic which begins with the recognition of human fraternity:

El amor fraternal nos saca de nuestra soledad y nos lleva a Dios. Cuando reconozco que hay otro yo, que no soy yo mismo ni es obra mía, caigo en la cuenta de que Dios existe y de que debo de creer en él como en un padre.

Here belief in God appears to be a secondary matter in Machado's religion: it is a by-product rather than a determinant of ethics. Later, in Juan de Mairena, he attempts to account for the existence of God emotionally rather than logically, but his starting point is again the spirit of brotherhood: "Dios aparece como objeto de comunión cordial que hace posible la fraterna comunidad humana". God, he says, is a sort of Absolute Other or a "Tú de todos" — a concept akin to Martin Buber's idea of God as the "Eternal Thou" to whom we relate through our relationships with finite, human "thous".

As I have said there is a problem in Juan de Mairena in reconciling an ethics of fraternity with a solipsistic metaphysics, something Machado confesses is in fact not really reconcilable. However he does link the need for a God with the individual human being's fundamental
desire for "otherness": God could be seen, Mairena suggests, as the infinite expression of "la esencial heterogeneidad del ser". 112 In any case Machado never seems to arrive at any final definition of God or confirmation of his belief in Him, and in the last period of Machado's religious thought theology in general is treated rather light-heartedly. By then belief in God is certainly not a cause of anguished doubt; in Machado's religious writings generally ethics are much more important than theology and this is particularly apparent in Juan de Mairena. What Machado is committed to is the Christian-Humanist ethic to which he gives expression in prose and verse.

We have seen that Machado believes that the primary impulses which for him constitute the essence of Christianity are rooted in human nature, especially in the human heart and the human conscience; Christianity, he says, is emotional rather than logical: "¿a qué vino Cristo al mundo? El nos reveló valores universales que no son de naturaleza lógica, los nuevos caminos de corazón a corazón". 113 In Juan de Mairena he repeatedly points out the limitations of abstract logic, carefully distinguishing beliefs from rational conclusions. However this does not mean that he is inclined to defend his own religious beliefs purely via faith: even in this area of belief, rationality is seen to have a function, and an important one. Beliefs, Mairena explains, can only be confirmed as true convictions if they are capable of surviving the test of a searching rational enquiry. Yet beliefs are not in themselves rational conclusions; they are "los residuos de los más profundos análisis de nuestra conciencia". 114 Beliefs are different in nature from rational conclusions, since they are living rather than abstract ideas. 115 However this does not mean that all beliefs are necessarily irrational; in fact Mairena holds that the opposite is usually the case:
Hence in his discussion of the nature of belief in general Machado strives to distinguish his own beliefs, including his religious beliefs, from a blind faith contrary to human reason or an unthinking acceptance of Scriptural authority. We have seen that Machado rejects Catholic dogma such as the divinity of Christ and censures both the unthinking acceptance of Church dogma and the superstition of different classes of Spanish Catholics. The individual, Machado holds, must base his own religious (and other) convictions only on the authority of his own mind, conscience and heart. Our ultimate beliefs, he declares, should not be confused with "los ídolos de nuestro pensamiento que procuramos poner a salvo de la crítica". Even worse is to uphold what we know to be untrue solely for utilitarian or emotional reasons.

In view of these judgements it is not surprising, indeed it is logical, that Juan de Mairena should actively encourage his pupils to submit their own beliefs to rational enquiry. The manner in which he does so recalls the stance taken by Azcárate's fictional testator and by the Institución Libre on the questions of free enquiry into religion and religious tolerance. Mairena writes of the principles of his projected Escuela Popular de Sabiduría Superior:

Las religiones históricas, que se dicen reveladas, nada tendrían que temer de nuestra Escuela de Sabiduría; porque nosotros no combatiríamos ninguna creencia, sino que nos limitaríamos a buscar las nuestras. Nosotros sólo combatimos y no siempre de un modo directo, las creencias falsas.

Like Azcárate's fictional testator, Mairena professes respect for all creeds but states that his own beliefs correspond only to the dictates of his own conscience.
and mind. The claim of both men not to be the enemy of established faiths is somewhat ironical, since in both cases this claim is accompanied by a declaration of "free-thinking" principles which they know are contrary to the principles of the institutionalized religion of their time and country. The statutes of the Institución Libre show this same ambiguity:

 Quiere la Institución Libre de Enseñanza sembrar el respeto más religioso para cuantas convicciones consagra la historia.
 La Institución Libre de Enseñanza proclama... el principio de la libertad e inviolabilidad de la ciencia y de la consiguiente independencia de su indagación y exposición respecto de cualquiera otra autoridad que la de la propia conciencia del profesor. 119

For Machado, as for his Krausist maestros, man should be free to seek the truth for himself. Machado shares with the Krausists an optimistic view of the capabilities of the human spirit both to find truth and to behave well. For Machado as for the Krausists, man's natural tendency is to strive to be good: the "anhelo de perfección moral", wrote Machado, asserts itself in the heart of every man. 120 Man needs no knowledge of religious dogma to be good - in "Retrato" Machado proudly declares "Más que un hombre al uso que sabe su doctrina,/ soy en el buen sentido de la palabra bueno". 121 In the same poem he implies that it is his own conscience which "teaches" him to love his fellow-men: "Converso con el hombre que siempre va con-migo/.../ mi soliloquio es plática con este buen amigo/ que me enseñó el secreto de la filantropía". 122

It is in Juan de Mairena that Machado expresses most emphatically the humanism behind his ethics. There he proclaims the dignity of man: "el hombre no lleva sobre sí valor más alto que el de ser hombre". 123 The Krausists linked this idea to the teachings of Christ; so does Machado who suggests that if Christ were to return he would preach not so much humility to the powerful as pride to the humble, pride in their funda-
mental worth simply because they are human beings. 124
As well as being proud of their humanity, says Machado, all men should be proud of their unique gift of an innate moral sense which guides their behaviour:

Machado's view of man as ultimately morally autonomous, that is to say prompted to virtue by his own conscience and in need of no external religious authority to live a good life, is the same as that of the Spanish Krausists. 126 So is his rejection of any utilitarian view of ethics. However these ideas are not uniquely attributable to a Krausist influence and it is not surprising that at one point Machado should mention Kant when writing of his own ethical convictions:

In effect Kant's theory of the moral imperative is the most obvious precedent for many of the fundamental principles of the ethical thought of both Machado and the Krausists. What is particularly interesting here is that Machado should refer to his own fondo de educación kantiana - surely alluding to his formative years at the Institución Libre de Enseñanza. This is as close as he gets to publicly declaring that his ethics are based on what he learned from his teachers at the Institución.

That Kant made an important contribution to that eclectic philosophy called Krausism has often been recognised. In fact Krause considered himself to be
the only true follower of Kant and the perfecter of his philosophical system. Menéndez Pelayo describes Krausist ethics as "Kantian". In the Minuta Azcárate does not refer to Kant, but he does acknowledge his influence in other writings. The similarities between the attitudes to religion and ethics of Azcárate and Kant are numerous: their respect for all religious creeds because of the value of their moral doctrines, which are seen to have much common ground; their judgement that Christianity can be divided into its ethics and a body of unimportant secondary doctrines; their rejection of external worship; their conviction that a religious (i.e. moral) life is possible without any church and that the inner voice of conscience is the ultimate moral arbiter; their belief that, because human rationality and conscience are the same for all men, there is one moral code natural to all men. It seems quite possible that Machado found in his readings of Kant support for the ethical principles - non-confessional and based on a vision of human nature - which he had acquired in his schooldays at the Institución Libre. The school had provided him with a fondo de educación kantiana on which to build his own ethical theories. 

In spite of his belief in the independent ethical imperative present in all men, Machado, like the Spanish Krausists and even Kant, by no means shuns the expression of moral "commandments" for other people. The commandments he chooses to propose show that his identification with Krausist views goes further than a general theory of ethics and involves adherence to certain specific values. In the final part of a speech read in Soria in 1910 in memory of Antonio Pérez de la Mata, he offers guidance to the schoolchildren in his audience, and some of the moral ideas he puts forward show a close affinity to ideas he attributes to Giner in the prose tribute five years later. There is even a similarity in his choice of words on the two occasions, suggesting that he is conscious in 1910 that he is repeating Giner's
teachings. In 1910 he advises "Desconfiad de todo lo aparatoso y solemne, que suele estar vacío",\textsuperscript{132} and in 1915 he writes:

Desdeñaba D. Francisco todo lo aparatoso, lo decorativo, lo solemne, lo ritual, el inerte y pintado caparazón que acompaña a las cosas del espíritu y que acaba siempre por ahogarlas.\textsuperscript{133}

In 1910 Machado stresses that it is important to think and enquire for oneself and that individual thought should be the backbone of individual integrity and authenticity:

Que vuestros sesos os sirvan para el uso a que están destinados... Conservaos íntegros para vuestra obra y vuestra voluntad, como cuerda de ballesta en máxima tensión.\textsuperscript{134}

The same teaching is again later attributed to Giner:

Lo que importa es aprender a pensar, a utilizar nuestros propios sesos para el uso a que están por naturaleza destinados y a calcar fielmente la línea sinuosa y siempre original de nuestro propio sentir, a ser nosotros mismos, para poner mañana el sello de nuestra alma en nuestra obra.\textsuperscript{135}

The vision of life as a personal obra, a process of individual self-fulfilment, is typically Krausist. Another of Machado's dicta in the 1910 speech concerns the correct behaviour towards one's moral inferiors:

No aceptéis jamás el reto de los vividores y de los intrigantes, porque si peleáis con ellos tendréis que emplear sus armas plebeyas y, aunque triunféis, seréis desgraciados en el orden del espíritu.\textsuperscript{136}

This spirit of aloofness and moral intransigence recalls that of Azcárate's testator, who suggests one should ostracise those of lesser moral principles than oneself;\textsuperscript{137}
both writers take a similar line on this question to Sanz del Río, who declares in the Mandamientos de la humanidad:

Renuncia de una vez al mal y a los malos medios aun para el buen fin; nunca disculpes ni excuses en ti ni en otros el mal a sabiendas. Al mal no opongas mal, sino bien, dejando a Dios el resultado. Así combatirás el error con la ciencia; la fealdad con la belleza; el pecado con la virtud; la injusticia con la justicia; el odio con el amor; el rencor con la benevolencia; la pereza con el trabajo; la vanidad con la modestia; el egoísmo con el sentido social y la moderación; la mentira con la verdad; la provocación con la firme serenidad y la igualdad de ánimo; la malignidad con la tolerancia; la ingratitud con la nobleza; la censura con la docilidad y la reforma; la venganza con el perdón. De este modo combatirás el mal con el bien, prohibiéndote todo otro medio. 138

In the final period of his life Machado has Juan de Mairena make a declaration of his principles — including ethical principles — to his pupils; again the values he proposes are ones characteristic of an institucionista: brotherly love, and tolerance for men's differences: "Yo os enseño — en fin — o pretendo enseñaros, el amor al prójimo y al semejante y al diferente"; 139 austerity of life-style: "Yo os enseño, o pretendo enseñaros, a renunciar a las tres cuartas partes de las cosas que se consideran necesarias"; 140 and work as an imperative:

Yo os enseño, o pretendo enseñaros, a trabajar sin hurtar el cuerpo a las faenas más duras, pero libres de la jactancia del trabajador y de la superstición del trabajo 141

Machado's qualification here needs some explanation, since his reservations about the value of work do appear to indicate a divergence from institucionista attitudes as represented by Francisco Giner. For Machado in his last period the work imperative is primarily a matter of social responsibility. For Giner it is this and more —
work is in itself a positive virtue, with few qualifications. Giner holds that work is "el medio ambiente y natural del hombre" and a source of human joy. It is also a measure of human worth; thus, when he praises the qualities of a former colleague he sees fit to put enthusiasm for work alongside moral sense:

Hombre, robusto y sano de cuerpo y de espíritu, educado en la escuela del deber y en el culto del trabajo, única fuente que eleva y dignifica al individuo, y en la convicción íntima de que lo principal en el mundo es ser bueno y obrar bien.

Consequently Giner is an admirer of the work-ethic he sees in English and German culture; Machado, in Juan de Mairena, is critical of what he calls the "culto perverso al trabajo" of the Anglo-Saxons. For Giner idleness is a parasitic and socially irresponsible condition from which men should be liberated for the benefit of their own dignity as well as for the benefit of their fellow-men: "La industria y el comercio...ennoblecen el trabajo, emancipan...a las clases ricas de la servidumbre de la ociosidad y del parasitismo". For Mairena, on the other hand, it is work that is more akin to slavery and "leisure activities" that are the realm of authentic human freedom and dignity:

es este trabajo necesario que, lejos de enaltecer al hombre, le humilla, y aun pudiera degradarle, el que debe repartirse por igual entre todos, para que todos pueden disponer del tiempo preciso y la energía necesaria que requieren las actividades libres, ni superfluas ni parasíticas, merced a las cuales el hombre se avanteja a los otros primates.

More realistically than Giner, Mairena sees that much necessary work is unlikely to coincide with anyone's "vocation" — one of Giner's provisos about work is that it should correspond to the individual's vocation. Mairena does agree with Giner in criticising those
parasitic elements who avoid doing their share of society's toil, characteristically, according to Mairena, the señorito class in Spain. Hence the conclusion that work should be equally divided between all men so that all men have an equal opportunity, not to be "idle", but to involve themselves to the full in activity of a different sort: cultural activity, spiritually fulfilling "leisure". The emphasis on the importance of "culture" as a mode of social justice is very much in the spirit of Giner and the institucionistas, as I shall show in a later chapter.

In Machado's pre-Mairena writings this sharp division between work and culture is not made. Often he refers to his own poetry or to culture generally as an area of work. With this in mind he is able to write paradoxically that "lo más fecundo del trabajo humano es lo que llamamos reposo, ociosidad", a statement which echoes one made by Cossío (a less puritanical institucionista than Giner): "en la capacidad para el ocio reside la más alta dignidad humana". Machado's enthusiasm for work in both senses (socially necessary labour and cultural activity) is highest in his earliest period. In "Retrato" he expresses pride in earning his own living. In his advice to the schoolchildren of Soria he recommends love of work without the qualifications later expressed through Mairena, and hints at work's moral benefits for children: "Amad el trabajo y conquistad por él la confianza en vosotros mismos". And in 1908 he follows Giner (who is constantly critical of Spaniards' proverbial lack of enthusiasm for work) in seeing work as a primary necessity for the regeneration of Spain: "Sabemos que la patria es algo que se hace constantemente y se conserva sólo por la cultura y el trabajo...Sabemos que no es patria el suelo que se pisa, sino el suelo que se labra." He goes on to contrast this view of la patria as a creative enterprise to the concept of national glory in terms of military power:
Sabemos que la patria no es una finca heredada de nuestros abuelos, buena no más para ser defendida a la hora de la invasión extranjera. ...No sois patriotas pensando que algún día sabréis defender esos pelados cascotes; lo seréis acudiendo con el árbol y con la semilla, con la reja del arado o con el pico del minero a esos parajes sombríos y desolados donde la patria está por hacer. 154

Giner makes this same contrast in visions of national glory: "esta miserable, pero querida España...será, no la España de Otumba y de Pavía ¡Dios nos libre de ello!, pero sí nación culta, animosa, enérgica, honrada". 155

In short, we can observe a greater affinity between Machado and Giner on the theme of work in the former's early writings than in Juan de Mairena, where he becomes critical of the work ethic, though continuing to uphold his belief in work as a social duty. In Juan de Mairena he places a higher value on free cultural activity than on work in the narrowest sense of the word, but he does not simply defend idleness as an ideal. On the other side of the comparison, Giner's enthusiasm for the work ethic is not a total opposition to the idea of leisure, and of course he too believes cultural activity is tremendously important. As a good Krausist Giner believes that men should seek to harmonise their different human needs and activities, to have a sense of proportion and balance rather than commit themselves totally to any one activity, such as work in the narrow sense. When he writes of the deficiencies of Spaniards such as lack of enthusiasm for work he proposes that what they need is to be more active in all areas of their lives, not simply in one:

El defecto característico de nuestra juventud actual...es la anemia, la falta de vigor, la apatía, y así, lo que más necesitan, aun los mejores de nuestros buenos estudiantes, es mayor intensidad de vida, mayor actividad para todo, en espíritu y cuerpo: trabajar más, sentir más, pensar más, querer más, jugar más, dormir más, lavarse más, divertirse más; poner un mayor peso en cada platillo de la balanza.
In conclusion, we can say that Machado aligns himself with the ethical thought of his Krausist maestros in choosing to emphasise certain moral values and principles: brotherly love, austerity and simplicity, tolerance for the beliefs of others, intolerance of insincerity and hypocrisy, the work imperative (with some reservations), and the dignity of man. Other ethical principles derived from these — human equality and respect for the individual, combined with a sense of social responsibility — will be discussed in later chapters in the contexts of educational and political thought.

There is also, as we have seen, a noteworthy similarity of ideas concerning religion between Machado and the Krausists. They share a critical attitude to contemporary Catholicism, a commitment to a lived Christianity as opposed to religious dogma and formalistic practice, a belief in the primacy of ethics in religion, an interpretation of Christ as an exemplary man rather than as the Son of God and of Christianity as a historical manifestation of the development of the human spirit rather than as the product of divine revelation. They believe that the moral imperative is an aspect of human nature, that the conscience is the ultimate moral arbiter and that rational enquiry is a precondition of belief. They can be described as religious free-thinkers and, in spite of their affirmations of the existence of God (more sporadic in Machado's case) as essentially humanists. Machado appears to acknowledge the importance of the ethical lessons he learned at the Institución Libre when he alludes to his "fondo de educación kantiana".
Notes


3 Ibid., p.116; obra in Krausism - V. supra p.90

4 Ibid., p.117

5 V. supra pp.91-98

6 Minuta, cit., p.136 n.69; cf. Sanz del Río: "Es una imperfección histórica de la religión el que las formas particulares del culto religioso presuman todas un mérito absoluto en oposición con los restantes... /La religión/ no es todavía la religión del amor en el espíritu de Jesucristo y de edificación humana bajo esta única ley." (Ideal, cit., p.239)


8 Minuta, cit., p.136 n.69; cf. F. Giner: "la religión, en este sentido, que se halla en el fondo ya no de todas las confesiones positivas, de todo teísmo, sea cualquiera su grado... es una manera de obrar, una forma de conducta." (O.C. VII, p.307); on primacy of ethics cf. Sanz del Río: "En la vida histórica de la humanidad, es la relación moral la subjectiva y la precedente a la religiosa" (Ideal, cit., p.276)

9 Minuta, cit., p.137; cf. Sanz del Río: "la vida religiosa no se cifra principalmente en las prácticas exteriores sino en el corazón y la obra viva" (Ideal, cit., p.279)

10 Minuta, cit., p.136

11 Ibid., pp.136-137

12 Ibid., p.247

13 Ibid., p.116

14 Ibid. p.118 n.46

15 Minuta, cit., pp.98-99; cf. Sanz del Río: "La religión y la sociedad religiosa salen de su esfera y dañan igualmente a la vida del todo y a la propia, cuando pretenden que el conocimiento de Dios y de las relaciones divinas con el hombre no pueden ser asunto de conocimiento
racional, sino un dogma que sólo se ha de contemplar con los ojos de la fe." (Ideal, cit., p.263)

17 Ibid., pp.190-191
18 Ibid. p.108
19 Ibid. p.107
21 Minuta, cit., pp.137-138
22 Ibid. pp.136-137
23 Ibid. p.118 n.46; cf. Sanz del Río: "Jesucristo ha despertado el sentimiento de la dignidad humana en todo hombre, bajo todo cielo, y en todos los estados sociales; ha encendido la celestial llama del amor entre los hombres: la Caridad. Esta pureza de motivo, esta disposición universal a amarse los hombres como hermanos en nombre de Dios padre no la conocieron los griegos, el pueblo más culto del mundo antiguo."(Ideal, cit., p.38)
24 J. López-Morillas, El krausismo español, cit., p. 38.
25 Ideal, cit., p.36.
26 Ibid. p.127-128.
27 Minuta, cit., pp.118-119 n.47; cf. Azcárate in "La religión y las religiones" (1909): "yo entiendo que la Religión es un fin permanente de la vida, pero sometido como los demás de la actividad humana, a la ley inevitable de la transformación, quedando siempre vivo lo esencial de ella" (Minuta, ed. cit., p.287); cf. Sanz del Río: "Este modo de concebir el Cristianismo...da al Cristianismo un sentido real religioso, aunque en su determinación sólo histórico, en la ley en que hoy se funda, eterno y absoluto; y prevee el fin histórico no del principio en que se funda el Cristianismo, como sola religión, sino del Particularismo cristiano, que será en su día a la vez compulsado y transformado y universalizado en la Religión universal de la Humanidad, que el Cristianismo no lo es aún" (Diario, 23 March 1863, in Sanz del Río, ed. Azcárate, cit., p.298)
28 Minuta, cit., p.118 n.47.
29 M. de la Revilla (1876), cit. V. Cacho Viu, La I.
L.E., cit., p.385
30 "Salmerón" (1911), Ensayos y cartas, cit., p.169
31 V.Supra pp. 88-90.
32 V.Supra p.160.
33 Ideal, cit., p.266
34 Ibid. p.33
35 Ibid. p.100
36 See e.g. F. Giner, "Espíritu y naturaleza", O.C. XI, p.57
37 "El arte y las artes", O.C. III, pp.16-17.
38 Ideal, cit., p.100
39 Ibid. p.101
40 Ibid. p.251
41 Minuta, cit., p.238.
42 O.C. XVII, p.73.
43 "Salmerón" (1909), Ensayos y cartas, cit., p.169.
44 "D. Francisco Giner de los Ríos", BILE Nº664, July 1915, p.220.
45 V.Infra pp.187-188
46 "Laureano Calderón" (1894), Ensayos y cartas; cit., p.135, my italics.
49 V.Supra p.165.
50 "Introducción", LT Nº45-46, 1964, p.15.
51 Gloria y pasión de A.M., B.A., Patronato Hispano-
Argentino de Cultura, 1942, pp.15-16.
52 A.M., N.Y., Hispanic Society of America, 1959,
pp.5-6.
53 A.M. su mundo y su obra, B.A., Losada, 1954, p.192
A.M. poeta del pueblo, B, Nova Terra, 1967, p.16

Letter to D.R. Wearing, 20 Feb 1974; the second influence Landa alludes to is in Machado’s attitude to nature which I shall consider later.

"Mis recuerdos de A.M. (continuación)", unpubl. typescript, p.5 (courtesy of R. Landa)


"Mis recuerdos de A.M." (Continuación), p.6.

LXXXVII, OPP, p.112

V. Supra p.128; on periods of M.'s religious thought see: Ulegario González de Cardenal, "Trayectoria e identidad religiosa de A.M.", Homenaje a M., Salamanca, Universidad de Salamanca, 1977, pp.93-118; I have combined González de Cardenal’s first and second periods into one.

OPP pp.479-480

"Trabajando para el porvenir" (1904), OPP pp.761-762.

OPP p.125; on his father’s views, V.infra pp.360-1


OPP p.914

OPP p.916 cf. OPP p.784

CXXXIII, OPP pp.192-194

CXXXIX, OPP pp.214-215

OPP pp.193-194

V. Supra p.130

CXXXV (1913), OPP pp.196-197; even stronger are the following lines in his poem dedicated to Azorín’s Castilla: "Malgrado de mi porte jacobino, / y mi asco de / las juntas apostólicas / y las damas católicas / creo en / la voluntad contra el destino. / A pesar de la turba / milagrosa / y sus mastines fieros, / y de esa clergalla / vocinglera / corazoncitos de Jesús tan hueros, / creo / en tu Dios y el mío." (cit. Azorín, Castilla, ed. J.M. Rozas, B, Labor, 1973, p.183)

OI, OPP pp.130-132
74 OPP p. 916, my italics.
75 CXXX, OPP p. 188
76 eg. XIII (OPP pp. 66-67), LVIII (OPP p. 101)
77 CXXXVI-xxix, OPP p. 203; V. Supra p. 117.
78 CXXXVI-ii, OPP p. 198
79 Los poemas de A. M., B. Lumen, 1967, pp. 291-292
80 OPP p. 587
81 Ibid.
82 OPP p. 581 (1938)
83 OPP p. 534 (1937)
84 OPP p. 399
85 Ibid.; cf. similar ideas in "Sobre literatura rusa" (1922), OPP p. 816.
86 OPP p. 534 (1937), cit. infra p. 176.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
89 Diario, 23 March 1863, in Sanz del Río, ed. P. de Azcárate, cit., pp. 296-297.
90 V. Supra p. 173.
91 V. Infra pp. 380-383.
92 OPP p. 815; N. B. discovered: "La razón humana será un don divino — yo no lo dudo —, pero tuvo que ser inventada, descubierta, por el hombre mismo" (Ibid.)
93 Ibid.
94 OPP p. 816
95 OPP p. 817
96 OPP p. 816
97 OPP p. 860 (1934)
98 OPP p. 818
99 OPP p. 924
See his letters to Unamuno, and "mi maestro es Unamuno" in autobiographical note (1913) in F. Vega Díaz, "A propósito...", cit., p. 71.

"Trayectoria e identidad...", cit., p. 113.

J. Macquarrie, Theological Resources. Existentialism, London, Hutchinson, 1972, p. 84.

"Cuanto subsiste, si algo subsiste, tras el análisis exhaustivo o que pretende serlo, de la razón, nos descubre esa zona de lo fatal a que el hombre de algún modo presta su asentimiento. Es la zona de la creencia."

Bases (1908) and Estatutos de la I.L.E. N°15
OPP pp. 500–501; according to Mairena, man’s will to live is not "un deseo de perseverar en su propio ser" (i.e. as Spinoza saw it – and much quoted by Unamuno) but "más bien [un deseo] de mejorararlo" (Ibid.)

In an otherwise uneven chapter on A.M.’s religious views, Emilio del Río writes "Por herencia legítima de la Institución Libre, Machado intenta siempre configurarse a un ideal de bondad no confesional" (La idea de Dios en la generación del 98, M, Studium, 1973, p. 52)


e.g. in "La religión y las religiones" (1909), in ed. cit. Minuta, passim.


Elsewhere described by A.M. as "uno de los vástagos más robustos del krasimismo español" (OPP p. 795, 1914) cf. infra p. 384.


BIBE N°664, 1915, p. 220

loc.cit. p. 29

loc.cit. p. 220

loc.cit. p. 29

Minuta, cit., p. 238

Mandamientos Nos. 21 and 22, Ideal, cit., pp. 101–2

OPP pp. 552–553 (1937)

OPP p. 551

Ibid.


"Manuel Pedregal" (1896), Ensayos y cartas, cit., p. 155.

OPP p. 468
"El espíritu de la educación en la I.L.E.",

OPP p. 527

Ibid.

Ibid.


Xirau, M. B. Cossío, cit., p. 121.

OPP p. 126

loc.cit. p. 30

OPP p. 769

Ibid.

O.C. XVII, p. 3; cf. also Costa: "El honor y la seguridad de la nación no se hallan hoy en manos de los soldados: están en manos de los que aran la tierra, de los que cavan la viña, de los que plantan el naranjo, de los que pastorean la cabaña, de los que arrancan el mineral, de los que forjan el hierro, de los que equipan la nave, de los que tejen el algodón, de los que construyen los puentes, de los que estampan los libros, de los que hacen los hombres y los ciudadanos educando a la niñez."

O.C. XII, p. 83 (1887)
Chapter Four

Art and Nature

Salimos de Cercedilla, pernoctamos en la casita de la Institución..."De la casita a la Granja a pie. De la Granja a Segovia en automóvil. De Segovia a Madrid en tren." Corazón e itinerario de Don Francisco Giner.

Antonio Machado, 3 August 1914
In this chapter I wish to investigate the possible influence on Antonio Machado of Krausist ideas on art. On this theme it must be recognised from the outset that there is an important difference between Machado and the Spanish Krausists in the nature and extent of their involvement with art. Whereas Machado was a practicing artist, an important poet and critic, the Krausists were above all else philosophers and teachers. Their dealings with art were as critics and aesthetic theorists rather than as artists. Although the importance of art is emphasised in Krausist thought, their works of literary criticism and artistic theory represent a relatively minor part of their activities. Because of this limited nature of Krausist involvement with art, most of my comments on affinities with Krausism in Machado's art will concern his ideas on art rather than his practice as an artist. An important exception will be my examination of his treatment of the theme of nature which has, I believe, a practical as well as a theoretical model in certain of the writings of Francisco Giner de los Ríos. In this area, and in other artistic questions, there is clearly also a close affinity between Machado and some of his artistic contemporaries (in particular Unamuno, Azorín and Baroja) and for this reason I shall be paying some attention in my examination of this theme to these contemporaries, rather than attempting to look at Machado as an isolated artist.

Many of the principal ideas on art characteristic of Krausism are alluded to in the following brief quotation from Sanz del Río's *Ideal de la humanidad para la vida*:

sentir en sí la belleza y expresarla con carácter individual ante los hombres para la común animación y edificación es una de las primeras excelencias de nuestra naturaleza. Las obras de arte traen, como Prometeo, a la tierra un rayo de la
belleza infinita; son una viva y progresiva revelación de la divinidad entre los hombres. Es bello lo que en su límite y género es semejante a Dios, y refleja en sí con carácter individual la construcción del mundo, en unidad, en oposición, en armonía.

Amando desinteresadamente las obras de arte, extasiándonos mudos de encanto ante ellos, sentimos verdaderamente la presencia de Dios en nuestro espíritu, contemplamos la encarnación de lo infinito en lo finito. 1

Firstly, we can note in the Krausists a high regard for art: Sanz declares that the creation and appreciation of art is one of the most valuable gifts of which mankind is capable. In his Mandamientos de la humanidad he commands "Debes conocer y cultivar en ti la belleza, como la semejanza a Dios en los seres limitados y en ti mismo". 2 Giner de los Ríos describes art as "un fin y obra real humana, al igual de la ciencia y tan esencial como la que más", totally rejecting the suggestion that art is an activity of secondary importance in human affairs. 3

Secondly, the importance given to art within Krausism is justified by linking the notion of Beauty to the concept of God proposed in its metaphysics: all expressions of Beauty are said to be an approximation to the perfection of the Absolute Being. Since the Absolute Being in the Krausist system is an all-inclusive Unity of Creation, of which men form a part, the creation and appreciation of Beauty in art is not merely a human approach to the unattainable perfection of a distant Divinity; rather it is the fulfilment of the Divine potential within man. Hence Sanz can say that through art we can feel the presence of God within us, or in other terms, be aware of the "incarnation of the infinite in the finite". Man is finite and limited, but he forms part of the Absolute, and as such can transcend his finiteness and limitation. Art is, then, for the Krausists, a means of transcendence, a way of approaching the Absolute.

Thirdly, art is bound up with the historical dimension of the Krausist metaphysics - the Philosophy of
History. Krausism envisages the possibility of individual human beings transcending their limitations, approaching the Absolute, in their individual finite lives. But the individual is also part of Humanity, which, according to the Krausists, gradually progresses throughout history towards the fulfilment of its potential, towards the perfection of the Absolute. As we have seen, it is through ever-increasing knowledge that mankind is said by Krause to progress: through growing knowledge of itself, of the world in which it lives and of God. The approach to the Absolute made by art is one means of increasing human awareness and, like other sources of knowledge, will inevitably come closer and closer to the truth during the process of human history. Consequently Sanz del Río describes works of art as "a progressive revelation of the Divinity among men". The integration of art into the Krausist philosophy of history explains the predominance of a particular type of literary criticism in the writings on art of Francisco Giner de los Ríos: the interpretation of literary texts as indicators of the spiritual development of peoples, or of humanity as a whole, either at some point in the past or in the present. I shall return to this type of literary criticism later.

Fourthly, art is believed by the Krausists to be something that contributes to the spiritual development of those who enjoy it. The artist gives expression to Beauty, says Sanz, "para la común animación y edificación". Giner refers to "su capital importancia [la del arte y la belleza], ya para la mera cultura e ilustración del hombre, ya para su desarrollo íntimo, como elemento sustancial, serio y varonil, por decirlo así, de toda educación verdaderamente racional y humana". Art, furthermore, is not only a powerful force for spiritual development because of the connection of the beautiful to the Absolute in its own right. The beautiful is also linked by the Krausists to another aspect of the Absolute: the Good. "Lo bello", writes Krause, "es
también bueno, esto es, algo esencial que debe realizarse en la vida, y, en consecuencia, como parte integrante del destino humano”. Not only is the beautiful good, according to the Krausists, the good is also beautiful. The concepts of art and beauty are introduced into the ethics of Krausism, and the frequent association of the ethical imperative with an aesthetic imperative is perhaps the clearest example of the non-rational side of Krausist religious thought. In the Ideal Sanz reminds us that as important as any specific "fine art" is "el arte total de la vida y del bello obrar". Giner expands on this aesthetic dimension of ethics in his writings on art and literature. In "El arte y las artes" (1871) he asks "¿cabe dudar que el arte forma una verdadera ley de conducta, cuyos principios no nos es lícito infringir?" He goes on to elaborate a view of ethics in which both a moral imperative and an innate artistic sense are involved. The aspiration to do good is, he says, inherent in all men, but good intentions alone are insufficient if a man is clumsy and artless in their execution. It is the artistic sense which enables man to realize his moral aspirations. Both Sanz and Giner are arguing that the concept of art is wide-ranging in its applications: it is not confined to the literary, plastic and musical arts. Rather artistic gifts similar to those applied by musicians and poets to their particular arts are used by every man in his everyday life:

La vida toda, en cuanto despliega orgánicamente y en armonioso ritmo la plenitud de los elementos con que elabora sus fines, transparenta... la divina inspiración que, por fortuna para la humanidad no alienta sólo al músico, al escultor o al poeta. Sea el hombre fiel a esta vocación de lo alto, en todas sus relaciones, consigo mismo, con todos los seres del mundo, con Dios, y la belleza florecerá en su vida y sus obras.

Art provides a "ley de conducta" in its principles of harmony and organic unity, beauty and proportion, which
guide man's conception and realization of his moral duties:

La vida toda nos aparece como una obra artística, desde que la concebimos y realizamos... como el régimen libre, discreto, bien medido, firme y flexible a la vez de nuestra conducta en todas las relaciones. 10

It is Giner's disciple Cossío who takes this linking of ethics to aesthetics and elevation of the importance of art and the arts to its logical extreme. Whereas for Giner the aesthetic sense is a faculty complementary to the moral imperative, Cossío believes that this sense is in effect the primary force in ethics. Jiménez Fraud explains Cossío's point of view thus:

Tenía, pues, un fundamento estético la misma moral de Cossío. Colocada en el más alto escalón de la jerarquía estética, lo ético es como lo más fundamentalmente humano, como la flor misma de la vida humana, como el final desarrollo simétrico y la interacción armónica de los impulsos egoístas y altruístas que mueven la vida del hombre... El buen gusto queda así erigido en la facultad fundamental estética y la raíz psicológica de lo ético queda trasplantada del campo del conocimiento intelectual al campo del sentimiento, y en la vecindad inmediata de la estética. Lo bello es la voluntad y la acción bellas, y esa voluntad y esa acción reciben, a semejanza de lo bello, la aprobación de lo más hondo de la naturaleza humana.

Suponía esta doctrina de Cossío una plena confianza en la naturaleza humana, la cual para aspirar a lo bello necesita directores que se ocupen de educarla, pero ya una vez el hombre cultivado, se dirige espontáneamente a aquello que estime más bello, encontrándose así en la dichosa imposibilidad de obrar mal. 11

For Cossío aesthetic education is of supreme importance since it is a guarantee of moral awareness. To educate the artistic sense is not merely to impose certain facts and judgements but to awaken a deep-rooted human tendency (Giner says that art is a "vocación perenne y esencial de la humana naturaleza") 12 which will subsequently
function autonomously in the area of ethics. One of Cossío's educational dicta was "¡la educación por la belleza y para la conducta en la vida!" When one is aware of Cossío's beliefs in this respect one can see the significance of his juxtaposition of ethics and aesthetics in his speech in homage to Antonio and Manuel Machado at the Institución in 1926:

Acordaos de cuando eráis niños, de cuando vuestro padre, aquí amado de todos, os envió a esta casa... para aprender dos cosas...: a decir bellas palabras y a ejecutar nobles hechos. 14

For all the Krausists art is an important dimension of human life and a source of spiritual improvement, including ethical improvement. Ethics and aesthetics are closely linked and so, in the same way as the Krausists introduce aesthetic concepts into their ethical thought, they tend to contemplate art within the context of their ethical convictions. Art is seen to have a specific function to perform in the life of man. This usefulness of art may be seen in terms of the rôle it may play in the development of the individual human being. Giner holds that "toda obra bella es juntamente útil, ya en cuanto satisface necesidades superiores del espíritu, ya en otras relaciones menos principales". The usefulness of art in a moral and spiritual sense may also be looked at in a broader context: the rôle it plays in the development of humanity as a whole through history towards perfection, alongside other essential human activities such as religious and philosophical thought and scientific research. Their viewing of art from the point of view of the Krausist ethics and philosophy of history logically shapes the Krausists' concepts of the proper function and distinctive qualities of true art. Let us now turn our attention to the artistic criteria characteristic of the Krausists.

The Krausists are opposed to the concept of the artist as an individual set apart from his fellow-men,
in the same way as they reject a narrow view of "the artistic": all men are capable of achieving beauty in their lives, and it is their duty to do so. The artist, Sanz del Río proclaims in the Ideal, should consider himself part of a "human family", within human history. He censures artists, even great artists, who, in their pursuit of beauty, forget their ethical duty to the rest of humanity:

A man exclusively dedicated to art is not a complete man because of his separation from other men and because he is not fulfilling all his potential as a human being. For Sanz an artist must be first of all a complete human being; only then can he be an authentic and valuable artist. As we have seen, Sanz sees the artist fulfilling a rôle for his fellow-men - "sentir en sí la belleza y expresarla con carácter individual ante los hombres para la común animación y edificación", bringing to others a glimpse of the beauty of the Absolute. However it is not "absolute" or "ideal" beauty that is the proper subject of the human artist according to the Krausists. Krause himself wrote:

su objeto del arte estético no es la belleza en general, sino el temporal o viva, cuya base es ciertamente la absoluta.

The artist should be concerned with the world and experience of man, with "living" beauty rather than pure, eternal beauty. Yet this "living" beauty is not part
of everyday human life: it is an aspect of the realm of transcendence available to man, an experience that enables man to go beyond his apparent everyday limitations. In art, as in the achievement of virtue, the infinite enters the world of the finite individual; through art, Sanz declares "contemplamos la encarnación de lo infinito en lo finito". The same paradoxical notion is expressed by Krause in the following definition of art:

Arte, en general, es la facultad elevada a habilidad de hacer efectivo algo esencial en el tiempo i.e. to realize something transcendental in human life/. esto es, de producir la aparición en sus límites de su esencia eterna.

Art, then, should be human, but what it should communicate to men is the highest possibilities of mankind. In this way art can help pave the way for the achievement of "el Ideal de la Humanidad". Sanz affirms the importance of the ethical dimension in art and declares that "puede...el arte humano y debe ser cultivado en forma social", but this does not mean that art should be morally or socially didactic in intention; the Krausists do not propose that art should be used to propagate the ideas of Krause, for example. Giner de los Ríos quite explicitly rejects such a distortion of the idea of the usefulness of art:

Digna de censura es...la tendencia a formar sobre lecciones morales las composiciones artísticas...olvidando que los grandes maestros siempre han cuidado de salvar la independencia del fin estético, aun en sus producciones más o menos didácticas.

Reviewing Galdós's La familia de León Roch (a novel clearly influenced by Krausist ideas) in 1878, Giner emphasises the point that proper aesthetic values should never be sacrificed for the sake of moralizing, and it is with toleration rather than enthusiasm that he speaks of modern tendenziöse Literatur. In any case, he adds, the
worth of art should always be judged according to its aesthetic merit and not in terms of the justness or otherwise of any moral content. 24

In his critical writings Giner reveals many of his own criteria of what is and what is not valid in art. At one extreme he is quite ready to accept that some works of art aspire to beauty and nothing more. 25 As we have seen he believes that if they succeed in this such works are spiritually "useful" for humanity. Yet Giner is mistrustful of artists who, in their contemplation of beauty, appear to be self-centred, artists who deliberately limit themselves, cutting themselves off from large areas of human life and from communication with their fellow-men:

Giner's imperative for the artist to "desplegar sus facultades en todas direcciones" has several meanings: artists can and should draw their inspiration from every aspect of human life; artists should live complete, natural human lives; artists should recognise the ethical duty they have towards their fellow-men and should strive to communicate with them and thus share their spiritual treasures. The same wide-reaching concept of the artist's possibilities and functions is implied by Giner in another dictum in the same article: "El arte abraza por completo la vida", a phrase which not only embraces all the meanings I have just glossed but also includes Giner's belief that "art" is something all men, not just a small, gifted caste, can apply in many areas of their lives. 27
Giner holds that literature, like art in general, should be concerned with real human life, with "reality". However he is careful to define his own concept of the type of "realism" that is fitting in human art. It should be a "realism" that elevates man. Consequently he is critical of the mundane and ignoble portrayal of "reality" offered by modern Naturalists. He supports a blend of "realism" and "idealism" in art, maintaining that the aspirations of humanity towards the ideal are also a part of "reality" and that art should reflect this ideal dimension by purifying its representation of life and searching for essential reality rather than the superficial appearances of reality: "es fin del arte la idealización de lo real por la representación de su esencia, purificada de los elementos accidentales que la desordenan". This idea of a blend of "realism" and "idealism" in art is very much the language of the literary debates of the time at which Giner was writing - the 1860's and '70's - but it can also be seen as another expression of the notion presented by Krause and Sanz del Río of the coming together of the finite and the infinite, the essential and the temporal, in human art. Giner writes in a similar way of the combination of elements that is needed to produce great poetry: "todas las grandes obras poéticas han de responder, necesariamente, a ambos elementos: el constante e inmóvil, y el transitorio, variable, diferente". The first is the essential element - what is unchanging and common to all men and hence the source of the universal significance of art - ; Giner calls it "el sentido universal humano", Sanz "lo permanente y fundamental humano". The second element, "el transitorio, variable, diferente", is that which makes art real, individual and vital. Both elements should be present in art, which consequently will be both "real" and "ideal". All the Krausists see art as an ability to synthesise disparate and apparently opposed elements: the real and the ideal, the finite and the infinite, the temporal and
the essential, the subjective and the universal. In the aesthetics of Krausism art is creative rather than mimetic: in art, declares Giner, "la fantasía, por su virtud sintética...efectúa como una segunda creación". The synthesising, creative power of art is also alluded to in the Krausist definition of beauty as "similarity to God". The Absolute Being in Krausist metaphysics is a Unity of all things who includes within Himself all the variety and mutability of the universe. Variety is preserved within this Unity because it is a unity through harmony and reconciliation, an organic unity. Through the principle of organic unity the artist, like God, can hold together in a harmonious synthesis the disparate elements that comprise reality. Thus Sanz del Río can claim: "Es bello lo que en su límite y género es semejante a Dios, y refleja en sí con carácter individual la construcción del mundo, en unidad, en oposición, en armonía".

Similarity to God as a criterion of beauty is not, then, in the aesthetics of Krausism, a vague allusion to the perfect and the sublime. It implies certain categories according to which works of art will be judged. Beauty is "organic unity", that is to say "Unidad que lleva en sí pluralidad y armonía". The concept of organic unity as a criterion of artistic value can be seen, for example, in Giner's rejection of the notion of a separation of form and content in art. It is, he writes, erroneous to confuse the true beauty of art with a procedure of adding formal trimmings to the subject matter of a work; rather content and form should be intimately and indivisibly united if a work is to possess merit and integrity. If they are separated, says Giner, they can produce artistic aberrations: at one extreme didacticism thinly disguised as art, at the other extreme artists with no sense of their moral responsibilities. Two examples of such aberrations given by Giner are empty mannerism and immoral, degrading naturalism.

Although "organic unity" is presented in the theor-
ethical writings of the Krausists as an important criterion of artistic worth, there is disappointingly little evidence of the application of this criterion to the criticism of literary texts. (It is disappointing because of the fruitfulness of the principle of organic unity as applied by Coleridge and those English critics who have followed his example; Coleridge, like Krause, drew inspiration for his organicism from Schelling). The predominant mode of literary criticism practised by the Spanish Krausists is geistesgeschichtlich in character - concerned with ideas and the philosophy of history rather than with evaluating works of art. Giner in particular shows in his criticism the imbalance between the ethical and the aesthetical that he censures in the artistic practice of others - "el imperativo moral suplanta... al imperativo técnico", we could say using Giner's words (though he was not, of course, speaking of himself). Giner frequently looks at literary texts not as autonomous expressions of beauty but as indicators of the spiritual state of a nation or of humanity as a whole. In a study of nineteenth century poetry his main concern is to demonstrate that the preference for subjective lyricism is symptomatic of the ideological disorientation of modern man, and he even proposes a theory of poetic genres adapted to the Krausist view of the dialectical process of history: the epic corresponds to an age of unity of beliefs, the lyric to an age of opposition and disorientation, and the dramatic to an age of harmony (unity of beliefs at a higher level, richer and more developed than the first stage). His essay "Consideraciones sobre el desarrollado de la literatura moderna" (1862) is primarily an investigation of the "spirit" of France as expressed in its literature and a plea for cultural nationalism in Spain. In this essay he justifies his own approach to literature thus:

No es otra cosa la literatura que el primero y más firme camino para entender la historia realizada; mentor universal, nos reproduce lo
pasado, nos explica lo presente, y nos ilustra y ailecciona para las oscuras elaboraciones de lo por venir.
En ninguna otra esfera puede estudiarse con más seguridad el carácter de los pueblos.
¿Dónde se conoce a los españoles del Renacimiento? En el teatro de Lope y Calderón. 45

Since for the Krausists history is fundamentally the history of ideas, what they look for in literature is the Weltanschauung of a people or an age.

To sum up, in Krausist aesthetics we can observe the integration of art into the wider framework of the metaphysics, ethics and philosophy of history of Krause. Krausist aesthetics is consequently humanist, ethical and historicist. Art is seen as an important, natural, human activity and as a means by which man transcends his individual limitations and develops towards perfection. Human art is also a record of human development. The rôle of art and of artists is derived from the humanist ethics of Krausism. The artist is considered to be firstly a man and secondly an artist, and as such he has a duty to speak to and for his fellow men, and to uplift their spirits. The proper subject of art is beauty, not as an abstract notion or an ideal but the wide variety of beauties in human experience, beauty in life and time. The work of art should be a synthesis which brings together the real and the ideal, the finite and the infinite, the temporal and the essential. Krausist aesthetics grants to art the liberty to range widely over human life, but is critical of certain types of art which transgress the principles it proposes: naturalism, mannerism, self-centred art, didacticism - in short, art where the necessary balance of the ethical and the aesthetical is not maintained.

Does the aesthetic thought of Antonio Machado show any noteworthy similarities with the ideas of his Krausist maestros? In attempting to answer this question we are faced with a large amount of material spanning
more than thirty years and reflecting his development as a poet and critic. Let us begin by considering an important article on art and the artist's rôle published by Machado in 1920: "¿Qué es el Arte?". Here he explicitly examines the question of the relationship between ethics and aesthetics. He begins by dismissing the idea that the artist must play a morally didactic rôle in society, suggesting that art "put to the service" of religion, morality or politics is not truly art. Instead he claims that "todos cuantos cultivan el Arte están de acuerdo en que la libertad es condición esencial para que éste se produzca". 46 However he feels that this "freedom" of art needs to be defined. One way artists have understood their freedom, he says, is as a freedom to separate art from all other human activities and practice it as a sort of beautiful but useless game. Machado's preference is for a different view of the artist's freedom, a vision of freedom which widens and elevates the scope of art rather than reducing it:

la libertad para el Arte es, en el fondo, lo contrario: un derecho a socavar todos los campos y a saltar por encima de todas las vallas. El Arte no será ya el producto de una actividad superflua, sino una actividad integral, de que son tributarias, en mayor o menor medida, todas las actividades del espíritu. El Arte necesitará entonces que sus raíces puedan ahondar y extenderse por todo el campo de la cultura humana. 47

For Machado art is an important human activity which can legitimately draw its inspiration from all human activities and the world in which men live. He includes the following as possible subjects for art: the human soul, physical nature, ethics, science, politics, and emphasises that none of these subjects is in itself more valid than any other. On the one hand, he writes, artists have no reason to scorn as a possible source of inspiration "los nuevos anhelos que agitan hoy el corazón del pueblo"; on the other hand there is no reason why they should not "cantar
The only thing that Machado explicitly rejects as a source of artistic creation is other art: art should be inspired by living reality not by a desire to imitate the artistic achievements of others. His inspiration should be "las otras ramas de la cultura, y, sobre todo... la naturaleza y la vida". He is also emphatic in rejecting the idea that art is a mere recording of data, a mimesis of observed reality. True art is a creative transformation of reality, something quite different from mimetic naturalism — "el ingenuo naturalismo, tan justamente desacreditado hoy". Unfortunately Machado does not give us more than a few brief and metaphorical hints about the nature of the creative process he alludes to, and how, for example, political ideas can be transformed into art. He only rejects the notion of ideology strait-jacketing the artist and suggests that the traditional distinction between useful and fine arts is a false one, and of no relevance to aesthetics as he sees it.

The concept of art proposed in "¿Qué es el Arte?" centres on the ideas of freedom, creativity and humanity. The liberty of art as defined by Machado is an implicit recognition of the necessary humanity of art. He is defining his own point of view against more limited concepts of art: naturalism, didactic art and, perhaps above all, art-for-art's sake. In rejecting the notion of the artist as a man separated from other men and from ordinary life he is accepting that the artist's ethical duty stems from his belonging to a human family. When Machado rejects an art removed from life he is in fact rejecting something that he himself had once believed in. The basis of his creed of art as something essentially human and concerned with the life of humanity was first expressed by Machado in 1903 and 1904 when he began to feel profoundly dissatisfied with the type of art he had been pursuing until then. The aesthetic crisis undergone by Machado in 1903-4, which is reflected in a number of
letters, poems and articles, has been seen as a turning point in his artistic career. As Geoffrey Ribbans has observed, there is a remarkable consistency between the principles adopted and articulated by Machado at that time and his statements on art in general and poetry in particular during the rest of his life – key ideas and even expressions recur again and again. 52 Machado alludes to writings of 1903-4 in "¿Qué es el Arte?": "Hace ya muchos años, en la revista Helios, creo haber escrito algo sobre este tema, mal comprendido entonces por los puros estetas de aquel tiempo, acaso mal expresado por mí", 53 and says that he will now restate his point of view. In effect in August 1903 Helios published an open letter from Unamuno to Machado which included statements from a letter written by the latter on his changing ideas on art. His most important declaration was a simple one: "Empiezo a creer...que el artista debe amar la vida y odiar el arte. Lo contrario de lo que he pensado hasta aquí". 54 More brief statements by Machado on the same subject were included in an article published by Unamuno in Nuestro Tiempo in May 1904; Machado stated: "No debemos crearnos un mundo aparte en que gozar fantástica y egoístamente de la contemplación de nosotros mismos; no debemos huir de la vida para forjarnos una vida mejor que sea estéril para los demás." 55 In another article of 1904 – a review of Juan Ramón Jiménez's Arias tristes – he repeats the same idea and goes into more details of his dissatisfaction with self-centred aestheticism:

De todos los cargos que se han hecho a la juventud soñadora, en cuyas filas aunque indigno milito, yo no recojo más que dos. Se nos ha llamado egoístas y soñolientas. Sobre esto he meditado mucho y siempre me he dicho: si tuvieran razón los que tal afirman, debiéramos confesarlo y corregirnos. Porque yo no puedo aceptar que el poeta sea un hombre estéril que huya de la vida para forjarse quiméricamente una vida mejor en que gozar de la contemplación de sí mismo. Y he añadido: ¿no seríamos capaces de soñar con los ojos abiertos en la vida activa,
en la vida militante? Acaso, entonces, echáramos de menos en nuestros sueños muchas imágenes, y tal vez entonces comprendiéramos que éstas eran los fantasmas de nuestro egoísmo, quizá de nuestros remordimientos. 56

As in "¿Qué es el Arte?" Machado rejects the idea of art as a realm apart from life and from other men. Art should not be pursued merely for the delight of the artist but should be directed to other men, for whom it should be fruitful. The subject of art should be active human experience, real life, not mere fantasy or imaginary beauty. Machado criticises Juan Ramón for his apartness from life - "Juan R. Jiménez se ha dedicado a soñar, apenas ha vivido vida activa, vida real" - and his poems for dealing with largely imaginary experiences, expressed in forms that he derives from other artists he admires. 57

Machado's change of heart is a change of priorities: life should come before art and not the other way round.

From the time of this crisis onward, Machado sought to achieve a poetry that might communicate to other men his insights into human life. In Juan de Mairena he speaks of such an art as a "fraternal" "objective" art, but these adjectives imply neither didacticism nor naturalism, as he explained in "¿Qué es el Arte?". Nor do they necessarily imply the abandonment of inner-looking lyricism - the intimismo characteristic of his earliest poetry. Rather Machado redefined his intimismo in terms of a search for universals of human feeling. In the review of Arias tristes he wrote "creo...que una poesía que aspire a conmover a todos ha de ser muy íntima. Lo más hondo es lo más universal". 58 Later, in 1917, referring back to the poetry of Soledades he claimed "pensaba que el hombre...puede también, mirando hacia dentro, vislumbrar las ideas cordiales, los universales del sentimiento." 59 Through his vision the poet can transcend personal experience and gain and express insights that are valid for all men. This desire to achieve universally relevant insights is sometimes expressed in terms of a redefinition of the idea of
poetic "dreaming". "Dreaming" can be a metaphor for the aesthete's escape from the concerns of real life and other men, or an expression of the vagueness and mystery of his poetry. The poet's aim, Machado wrote to Unamuno in 1904, should be "soñar despierto", that is, to direct his powers of vision into seeing through the mysteries of human existence. 60 "La belleza", he states, "no está en el misterio, sino en el deseo de penetrarlo". 61 Consequently, the poetry of Soledades. Galerías. Otros poemas, written after the 1903-4 crisis is characterised by the exploration of existential problems and a shunning of the vagueness and preciosity typical of many of the poems of the first edition of Soledades.

In subsequent collections - the two editions of Campos de Castilla, Nuevas Canciones and the Cancioneros apócrifos - Machado explored other modes of pursuing "fraternity", "objectivity" and "universality" in poetry: the regenerationist and patriotic poems of Campos de Castilla, the use of archetypes such as the Cain and Abel myth, the evocation of landscapes, the use of songs, ballads and other folkloric forms, the radical invention of the apócrifos. Many of these procedures are justified by Machado in terms of an escape from a self-centred aesthetics and a search for universality. In his 1917 prologue to Campos de Castilla, for example, he wrote: "pensé que la misión del poeta era inventar nuevos poemas de lo eterno humano, historias animadas que, siendo suyas, viviesen, no obstante, por sí mismos." 62 In 1928 he justified the device of the invention of apócrifos in terms of "objectivity": "esa nueva objectividad a que hoy se endereza el arte, y que yo persigo hace veinte años, no puede consistir en la lírica - ahora lo veo muy claro -, sino en la creación de nuevos poetas - no nuevas poesías -, que canten por sí mismos". 63 Yet these new poets are alluded to in 1931 in terms very reminiscent of Machado's writings of 1903-4 as "cultivadores de una lírica otra vez inmersa en las "mesmas vivas aguas de la vida" " and as neo-Romantic. 64 In his drafted speech
to the Academia de la Lengua of the same year, Machado defends the Romantics by claiming that their "individualism" was the opposite of an exclusion of universality:

El individualismo romántico no excluía la universalidad, antes por el contrario aspiraba siempre a ella. Se pensaba que lo más individual es lo más universal y que en el corazón de cada hombre canta la humanidad entera. 65

Again he echoes his statements of 1903-4: "lo más hondo es lo más universal". We could say that he had come full circle by the 1930's and returned to the principles of those early years. However it would be more accurate to say that he had been working within the same basic principles since 1904, experimenting with the wide range of possibilities open to him without changing his general concept of the nature of art. Although he continued to make new statements of aesthetic principle throughout his life, the 1920 article "¿Qué es el Arte?" is probably his most comprehensive explanation of his general theory. Other writings fill out some of the detail. Particularly interesting are some of his declarations on his sense as a poet of writing for and on behalf of his fellow men.

In 1925 he writes simply: "un poema es — como un cuadro, una estatua o una catedral — antes que nada, un objeto propuesto a la contemplación del prójimo". 66 In an earlier essay in Los complementarios he expands on the notion of the relationship between artist and fellow men as a relationship grounded in a shared humanity; it is much more than just a question of transmitting and receiving an artistic response:

El sentimiento no es una creación del sujeto individual, una elaboración cordial del yo con materiales del mundo externo. Hay siempre en él una colaboración del Tú, es decir, de otros sujetos. No se puede llegar a esta simple fórmula: mi corazón, enfrente del paisaje, produce un sentimiento. Una vez producido, por medio del lenguaje lo comunico a mi prójimo. Mi corazón, enfrente del paisaje, apenas sería capaz de sentir el terror cósmico, porque aun
Feeling is, then, accompanied by a sense of sharing something with the rest of humanity. The same sense of community, Machado says, also informs the act of expressing feelings via language, for this is something else that is communal rather than private and individual:

Para expresar mi sentir tengo el lenguaje. Pero el lenguaje es ya mucho menos MIO que mi sentimiento. Por de pronto, he tenido que adquirirlo, aprenderlo de los demás. Antes de ser NUESTRO — porque MIO exclusivamente no lo será nunca — era de ellos, de ese mundo que no es ni objetivo ni subjetivo, de ese tercer mundo en que todavía no ha reparado suficientemente la psicología, del mundo DE LOS OTROS YOS. 68

Let us return to Machado’s crisis of 1903-4 and consider its causes. As Ribbons has shown, Unamuno was an important influence in enabling Machado to re-orientate himself after the rejection of certain elements and features of his aesthetic beliefs up to that time. Machado himself confesses his indebtedness to Unamuno, writing "usted, con golpes de maza, ha roto, no cabe duda, la espesa costra de nuestra vanidad, de nuestra somnolencia. Yo, al menos, sería un ingrato si no reconociera que a usted debo el haber saltado la tapia de mi corral o de mi huerto." 69 Mi huerto could be seen as a symbol of the soul as a solipsistic prison, 70 or of a limited concept of art: in "¿Qué es el Arte?" Machado says that art is free to "socavar todos los campos y saltar por encima de todas las vallas". 71 Unamuno helped Machado by backing him up with further arguments against aestheticism and giving him moral support and some useful ideas to aid his reorientation. Yet the crisis seems to have come to Machado without any personal intervention from Unamuno,
and his fundamental affirmation "el artista debe amar la vida y odiar el arte. Lo contrario de lo que he pensado hasta aquí" is prior to any promptings from Unamuno. It is not simply a case of Machado being moved in a certain direction by the powerful influence of Unamuno.

Why then should Machado have entered such a crisis? Probably the public criticisms made of the "Modernist" poets by Unamuno and others were a factor. However I would like to suggest another possible factor in the crisis: the deep-rooted ethical principles imbued in Machado at the Institución Libre. The art-for-art's sake aestheticism he was attracted to in his earliest poetry was contrary to the teachings on human art of his maestro Giner de los Ríos, and Machado, after a brief involvement with what was most fashionable in contemporary Spanish poetry, reverted to more deeply held ethical and artistic principles — those of the Krausists. We can certainly observe a close affinity between the ideas on art of the Krausists — particularly Giner — and those of the mature Machado. They share a belief that the proper subject of art is human life and that it is the artist's duty to speak for and to his fellow men. They both affirm that art should enjoy a wide-ranging freedom to draw upon the wide range of those subjects that can be considered human and vital. They have in common a high estimation of the value of art as a human activity, though emphasizing that human life and human ethical principles take precedence over purely aesthetic considerations. Giner and Machado reject as false art naturalism, art that imitates other art, didactic art and self-centred art. In both Machado and Giner, the aesthetic principles are built on the foundation of their ethical convictions.

There are differences of emphasis between Machado and the Krausists on the theme of art. The Krausists give more theoretical importance to the link between aesthetics and metaphysics, proclaiming that Beauty is similarity to God, and that similarity to God takes the form of a creative synthesis in art which forms an
organic unity. In the Cancionero apócrifo, Abel Martín also the poet’s vision is said to be an intuition of both the heterogeneity and the oneness of creation; however the metaphysical view of creation presented there is significantly different from that of the Krausists, and Abel Martín, unlike the Krausists, rejects the idea of a rational perception of this same reality. Machado comes closest to the Krausist idea of the synthesising and transcendental power of art in some of his statements about the importance of time in life and art. In 1931, for example, he defines poetry as "la palabra esencial en el tiempo" as the bringing together of two artistic imperatives, esencialidad and temporalidad, which in a sense are contradictory. On the one hand, he proclaims that poetry should deal with life, which he defines as temporal per se; on the other hand, poetry cannot exist without visions of lo esencial—the timeless, the eternal, the universal dimension. In the idea of poetry as a combination of these apparently opposing elements Machado is close to the Krausist view of art as a synthesis of the finite and the infinite, the essential and the temporal. Indeed, Machado’s definition echoes closely Krause’s definition of art (as translated by Giner): "Arte...es la facultad elevada a habilidad de hacer efec-tivo algo esencial en el tiempo". Machado, in his discussions of art, gives far less attention than the Krausists to the concept of Beauty, and he certainly never attempts to define Beauty, as the Krausists do. In his drafted speech to the Academia de la lengua he comments on his lack of concern with beauty of form thus:

confesaros he que con excepción de algunos poetas, las bellas letras nunca me apasionaron. Quiero deciros más: soy poco sensible a los primores de forma, a la pulcritud y pulidez del lenguaje, y a todo cuanto en literatura no se recomienda por su contenido. Lo bien dicho me seduce sólo cuando dice algo interesante, y la palabra escrita me fatiga cuando no me recuerda la espontaneidad de la palabra
It should be understood that the term naturaleza is used here in the sense of "natural reality" or "living reality" as distinct from art, inclusive of "artificial" creations. Machado puts "nature" and "life" above art in his scale of values, and in art he is more interested in content, well expressed, than in any formal beauty pursued for its own sake. This lack of concern for the question of Beauty perhaps also accounts for Machado's failure to follow his Krausist maestros in linking ethics to aesthetics, in the sense of deriving moral principles from the principles of art (the extreme example of this was Cossío). On one occasion, in Juan de Mairena, he does link ethics and aesthetics in a way which could be interpreted in line with Krausism: in an aphorism - "A la ética por la estética, decía Juan de Mairena". However if we read the phrase in its context, which in any case is a humorous one, we can see that it is in fact an allusion to the possible use of art to point out moral lessons, which is a quite different matter from the aesthetic view of ethics proposed by the Krausists. In Machado's case, ethics impinges on aesthetics, but not vice versa.

A number of literary historians and critics have suggested that the Krausists and institucionistas were an important influence on the writers of the generation to which Machado belonged. One of Machado's contemporaries, Azorín, speaking on behalf of those writers whom he considers to comprise "the 1898 Generation" (he does not specify its membership here), stated categorically in 1915:
Later critics have attempted to define the nature and importance of this influence with more precision and detail, notably Jeschke, Granjel, Fernández de la Mora, López-Morillas, Gullón and Gómez Molleda. The last of these has made the most comprehensive study of the question, though she considers the writers above all as a group rather than studying the influence of the Institución Libre on individuals. She does, however, provide pointers to the main areas of similarity between the two groups — "institucionistas" and "noventíochistas", considered in each case to form a "movement" — and hence she indicates useful guidelines for anyone who wishes to study the influence on a specific, individual writer. Gómez Molleda's aim is to add the men of the Institución to the list of the "98 Generation"'s maestros already established by critics: she does not claim that the former are more important than the latter. She sees the common ground between institucionistas and "98 Generation" as predominantly ideological. In the broadest terms, they all share a sense of dissatisfaction with the ethos of Restoration Spain, and distance themselves from its established customs and ideologies, and see a need for a spiritual regeneration of Spain. In fact Rafael Urbano declared as early as 1904 that Francisco Giner was "maestro de toda la juventud presente" and uniquely exempt from the youth's rejection of the example of the older generation.

Gómez Molleda goes on to list a number of more specific similarities of attitude between institucionistas and noventíochistas. In matters of religion, she says, both groups adopt a hostile stance to the dogma and institutions of the Catholic Church, although their anti-clericalism is intellectualised rather than violent...
and simplistic. They share an essentially humanist view of life. In their philosophical thinking both Krausists and men of the "98 Generation" combine rationalist and irrationalist tendencies derived from European thought. I have already discussed in some detail the similarities between Machado and his maestros at the Institución in these areas of thought and noted that there are indeed significant affinities in his particular case.

Gómez Molleda also lists a number of similarities in the way the institucionistas and "98 Generation" writers approach the "problem of Spain". Both groups, she declares, are "Europeanizers" in so far as they believe that European ideas have important lessons to offer Spain for her regeneration, but at the same time they wish to affirm their love and interest for things Spanish. They express this love and interest in their explorations of the countryside, historic towns and villages of Spain, and in their enthusiasm for the beauty of its landscapes (points also mentioned by Azorín and Jiménez Fraud). Both groups seek to reveal essential Spanish qualities different from the values of the "official Spain" of their time and from those emphasised by traditional Spanish historiography, and they direct their researches towards what Gómez Molleda calls the "sub-historic", showing a special interest in using literature and folklore as a source of insight into the Spanish spirit and the spirit of past centuries. They all, finally, believe that education and culture have a primary role to play in the regeneration of Spain, a common characteristic referred to by the critic as pedagogismo. None of these areas of possible institucionista influence is strictly speaking an aesthetic one. They concern ideas or themes which Machado or any other contemporary writer might choose to express through the medium of art. For this reason I shall deal with most of them in the chapters on cultural and political thought. Two of them will be dealt with here: the
historicist approach to literary criticism, which clearly implies a general attitude to the value of art, and the theme of nature, since there is evidence that Giner de los Ríos anticipated Machado in his literary treatment of the theme. Before I turn to these themes I wish to mention briefly two other ways in which Giner may have exerted a stylistic influence on Machado's art. The first is the use of certain images, a point I dealt with in the chapter on metaphysics. The other is the cultivation of a deliberate simplicity and clarity of language. Gómez Molleda suggests a possible influence of the Institución on the "98 Generation" in this detail, and Tuñón de Lara has made the same point in the specific case of Machado, referring to "la palabra exacta, ceñida a la realidad...el estilo legado - y recreado con sello original por él [Machado] - por Giner y Cossío". We have seen that Machado himself remembers Giner's scorn for "todo lo aparatoso, lo decorativo" in his prose tribute, and that he advises a similar mistrust to his pupils in Soria. Machado rightly suggests that Giner's attitude to style has its roots in the ethical austerity of Krausism - again, ethics and aesthetics are connected:

Como todos los grandes andaluces, era don Francisco la viva antítesis del andaluz de pandereta, del andaluz mueblé, jactancioso, hiperbolizante y amigo de lo que brilló y de lo que truena...Era sencillo, austero hasta la santidad, amigo de las proporciones justas y de las medidas cabales. 89

Both Giner and Machado, as we have seen, express a mistrust of stylistic adornos masquerañg as art. Similarly, both of them define their own aspiration to stylistic simplicity against the overblown and ornamental model of traditional Spanish rhetoric. Machado writes in Juan de Mairena:
soy un profesor de Retórica, cuya misión no es formar oradores, sino, por el contrario, hombres que hablen bien siempre que tengan algo bueno que decir, de ningún modo he de enseñaros a decorar la vaciedad de vuestro pensamiento.

Criticism of the rhetorical tradition of Spanish public life is a recurring feature of Giner's writings; a typical example is his reference to "los concursos de retórica de la comedia parlamentaria" in an article of 1898. Like Mairena, he believes in speaking simply and truthfully, and connects precision and clarity of language with correctness and honesty of thought; one should not use language to disguise ignorance, but find one's truth before articulating it:

Hay una panacea: despertar en nuestros discípulos el espíritu de verdad, de realidad, de ingenuidad sincera; el interés por estudiar y conocer las cosas antes de ponerse a hablar de ellas.

Like Mairena, Giner holds that truth is more important than style. There is evidence that Giner made a conscious effort to achieve a quality of simplicity in his own speaking and writing; Leopoldo Palacios recalls:

Para reobrar contra la corriente oratoria retórica, superficial y "empaquetada", D. Francisco... evitaba cuanto podia desplegar las galas de su sugestivo verbo. Escritos sus artícuos, los sometía intencionadamente a una recia poda.

It is true that this search for simplicity of language is not characteristic of all institucionistas and Krausists: men like Salmerón, Castelar and Costa are very much within the tradition of nineteenth century Spanish oratory. However it was Giner, not these men, who shaped the educational policies of the Institución, and it seems possible that Machado may have been taught the values of simplicity and clarity of language by Giner and other teachers at the school. Evidence of the
school's teachings in this respect is provided by an anonymous article in the Boletín, published in 1888, which instructs pupils:

Escribir con mucha claridad y con el menor número posible de palabras, y no decir nunca inexactitudes ni exageraciones. 95

This is one of a number of "rules" given for pupils writing journals of their excursions. As I shall demonstrate later, Machado appears to have remembered these "rules" in later life. 96

Let us now turn our attention to the treatment of the theme of nature in Machado, in some of his literary contemporaries, and in Francisco Giner.

Giner's fervent love of nature has been referred to by many of his former pupils, including Jiménez Fraud, Fernando de los Ríos and Julián Besteiro. 97 This love had, of course, the philosophical backing of Krausism: the universe is comprised of the two "relative infinities" of Spirit and Nature, and man, in his physical being, is a part of Nature. Sanz del Río commanded a religious reverence for nature. Yet man is seen by Krausism to have a special mission in the universe, because of his unique gift of consciousness, a mission which effects his relationship to nature. Giner writes:

Man can bring greater harmony to nature by improving or increasing crops, by irrigating deserts. In line with his optimistic view of human nature, Giner sees in man's cultivation and use of nature not only the pursuit of selfish ends but a manifestation of the impulse to "do
Another way in which man fulfills a mission on behalf of nature is through science. He can strive to understand external nature and thus speak on its behalf:

Although he grants to mankind special powers and responsibilities, Giner is careful to avoid anthropocentrism: man is not put on earth merely to exploit nature for his own ends. He is a part of nature as well as its beneficiary. An ecologist ahead of his time, Giner emphasises man's duty to respect external nature and even introduces this duty into his juridical thought, writing of "la existencia de verdaderas relaciones jurídicas entre el hombre y los seres naturales" and "la existencia de un derecho de la Naturaleza y sus seres respecto del hombre". Nature, animate and inanimate, animal, vegetable or mineral, has legal rights which can be defined loosely as man's duty both to abstain from arbitrary disturbance of natural life and to perform actual "services" to Nature.

Furthermore, Giner points out the limitations of man's special powers with regard to nature: human "superiority" is only confined to certain aspects of man's being. Man is creative in his own way: he can create institutions, machines and culture; but he is unable to create even the simplest of living organisms. In what way, Giner asks rhetorically, can Darwin's achievements be judged "superior" to the life of a plant? We have already seen how Giner, while praising human rationality as the corner-stone of civilization, admits the inadequacy of Reason to capture the complexity and richness of "reality", including living nature. Giner wishes man to preserve a proper sense of his humility within the scheme of creation: nature has its rights and its powers just as man has.
Giner's love of nature is not confined to philosophical and legal theorising but felt as an emotional and physical impulse with a strong religious character. In one article he describes an occasion when he contemplated the sun setting over Castile, viewed from the Guadarrama, and concludes: "no recuerdo haber sentido nunca una impresión de recogimiento más pródima, más grande, más solemne, más verdaderamente religiosa". 104

Closeness to nature brings to man benefits both spiritual and physical, and Giner regards physical benefits as no less sacred than spiritual ones. In the same article he describes how, feeling "el roce vivificante de la Naturaleza maternal", we enjoy its closeness through all our senses:

A poco... que se reflexione sobre los diversos elementos en que cabe descomponer el goce que sentimos al hallarnos en medio del campo, al aire libre, verdaderamente libre (que no lo es nunca el de las ciudades), se advierte que este goce no es sólo de la vista, sino que toman parte en él todos nuestros sentidos. La temperatura del ambiente, la presión del aura primaveral sobre el rostro, el olor de las plantas y flores, los ruidos del agua, las hojas y los pájaros, el sentimiento y conciencia de la agilidad de nuestros músculos, el bienestar que equilibra las fuerzas todas de nuestro ser, y hasta el sabor de las frutas, por prosaico que parecer pudiera a la sensibilidad de una estética afectada y romántica. 105

An integral part of Giner's love and respect for nature is his attitude to physical nature in man – his body. I have already mentioned the Krausists' dismissal of the view that the body is the root of all sin. 106 For Giner it is a "religious" duty to cherish the body as something natural and therefore sacred:

Porque el cuerpo lleva como el espíritu el sello de su divino origen, es deber nuestro cultivarlo, conocerlo, amarlo, querer su bien, dirigir y desenvolver sus fuerzas, velar por su salud, manteniéndolo ágil en sí y como parte que es a una de la humanidad y la Naturaleza. 107
Consequently, physical education and hygiene were important components of the Institución's educational programme. Educational excursions were introduced into the school timetable. The teachers saw excursions into the country as a combination of healthy exercise, observation of nature and encouragement of the love of nature. The Institución was without a doubt an important influence in introducing the practice of excursionismo into Spain, and in particular in encouraging madrileños to explore and appreciate the landscapes of the nearby Guadarrama. Rubén Landa recalls:

Yo no nací en Castilla; la primera vez que fui allí no me gustó aquel paisaje, ahora me entusiasma. Se lo debo a la Institución. Lo mismo les ha sucedido a otros muchos alumnos de ella. 108

Pío Baroja, in his Memoirs, quotes Ramón y Cajal on the beauties of the region:

¡Los alrededores de Madrid! ¡Necesito tener sentido cromático de oruga para echar siempre de menos el verde mojado y uniforme de los países del Norte y menospreciar la poesía penetrante del gris, del amarillo, del pardo y del azul! 109

Baroja comments: "se ve que Ramón y Cajal, al hablar de los alrededores de Madrid, repetía un tópico del tiempo, muy de la Institución Libre de Enseñanza. 110

Giner's essay "Paisaje" concentrates on the landscapes of the mountains, valleys and plains around Madrid and tries to stimulate readers to discover their beauties for themselves. 111 He sees in the region "la grave y austera poesía de un paisaje, cuyo nervio llegaría hasta la fiereza si no lo templasen la dignidad y el reposo que por todas partes ofrece" and comments that this appreciation is less accessible to the vulgo than that of the softer and gentler landscapes of the North. Yet this does not mean Giner dislikes other landscapes.
he claims that Spain is fortunate to possess such a range of different landscapes. 112

Giner's love is for nature, but it is also a love for a specific suelo patrio. His enthusiasm for the Guadarrama is an expression of his patriotism; his desire to explore landscapes is a desire to know Spain. His vision of the landscape is often influenced by his awareness of the character of the people who inhabit it and by a sense of history. Looking on the woods of El Pardo he is reminded that they are but a remnant of "la espléndida selva que un tiempo rodeaba a Madrid y que el atraso, la preocupación y la ignorancia han ido talando y reduciendo hasta dejarla transformada en pobrisima tierra de pan llevar". 113 Looking at the landscape of the whole Madrid region he senses in it a character, which he defines in human terms; this character is the same character as that of its greatest artists:

Suaviza, sin embargo, este contraste entre montaña y llano una nota fundamental de toda la región, que lo mismo abraza al paisaje de la montaña que al del llano. En ambos se revela una fuerza interior tan robusta, una grandezza tan severa, aún en sus sitios más pintorescos y risueños, una nobleza, una dignidad, un señorío como los que se advierten en el Greco o Velázquez, los dos pintores que mejor representan este carácter y modo de ser práctico de la que llamarse pudiera espina dorsal de España. 114

In effect, Giner maintains that the relationship between the natural environment and the character of the people who inhabit it is extremely intimate:

Esta relación entre la constitución geológica, el relieve del suelo, el clima, el medio natural, en suma, y el hombre, relación que se imprime en la constitución de nuestro cuerpo como en la de nuestra misma fantasía, de donde trasciende a nuestros gustos, hábitos, artes, a la obra y modo entero de la vida, se advierte por extremo en la región que se despliega sobre la falda sur de este tramo central de los montes carpétanos. La raza, las ciudades,
Giner is pleased to see confirmed by the evidence before his eyes the Krausist theory of the organic interrelatedness of all things. However, although he sees a correspondence between the austere nobility of the landscape and the character of famous men from the past, he is not so pleased with the human evidence of the present. Near El Pardo he observes a few houses, "las más de ellas con ese aspecto triste, ese color seco y esa suciedad y mal cuidado que son característicos de los pobres pueblos de Castilla", and this sadness and decay is in total contrast to the beauty and vitality of the natural panorama nearby "como si la Naturaleza, piadosa con el hombre...se esforzase por compensar con su gallarda pompa y lozanía el miserable aspecto de las pobres casuchas, cuya proximidad y vasallaje sufre impertérrito el decaído alcázar". The historical symbolism of the scene is clear: the neglect of the houses is associated with Spain's past rulers - here Carlos V who built the El Pardo Palace - and also with the people themselves whose poverty stems from the deforestation of the landscape Giner noted shortly before. The decaído alcázar symbolises the poverty and indifference of the present day rulers as well as the ruled. The vitality of nature offers man a lesson: the need to respect nature and to imitate its creativity. The application of the term pompa to nature is ironical - pompa would normally be applied to things human.

No thorough examination has so far been attempted of the treatment of nature by Giner or by institucionistas generally. Carlos Blanco Aguinaga has noted in them a progress on the "conservative" view of the values of rural life of writers such as Pereda, Trueba and Fernán
Caballero; the men of the Institución, he observes, take a critical and forward-looking line, seeing in the harmony of Nature a symbol of a possible future social order. The critic also suggests some shortcomings of the institucionistas' paisajismo: they use contemplation of nature, he claims, as a realm of private aesthetic pleasure and a means of escape from the world of men. Blanco quotes an example from Cossío's writings in which San Vicente de la Barquera is described without reference to its inhabitants, and concludes that "la distancia elitista es notable". On the evidence of Giner's writings I would say that these criticisms are unjust: the term "élitist" has frequently been applied to institucionista attitudes, and I shall return to this charge later, but I think it is inappropriate in this instance. We can certainly see limitations in Giner's responses from a political point of view: for example, the poverty he notes in rural Spanish villages could be used as the starting point for a discussion of the need for changes in the social structure that produces palaces alongside hovels, but it is not.

It is not true that for Giner nature is a world distinct from that of men: rather man is, or should be, an organic part of the natural world. In fact Giner writes that human elements are a positive feature of the rural landscape, not something to be regretted:

al par de los elementos puramente espontáneos, contribuyen también y enriquecen al paisaje otros (casas, caminos, tierras cultivadas, etc) que son obra del arte humano, y hasta el hombre mismo, cuya presencia anima con una nueva nota de interés el cuadro entero de la Naturaleza.

The usual contrast in Giner's writings is not between an irretrievably imperfect human world and a harmonious natural one, but between the healthy environment of the country and the unnatural, unhealthy life of city-dwellers. After recounting his physical and emotional pleasures in the Guadarrama, Giner immediately thinks of
his fellow men in Madrid:

Y entonces, sobrecogidos de emoción, pensábamos todos en la masa enorme de nuestra gente urbana, condenada por la miseria, la cortedad y el exclusivismo de nuestra detestable educación nacional, a carecer de esta clase de goces. 123

Far from leading Giner merely to escape from social realities, contemplation of nature actually prompts him to reflect on the deficiencies of Spanish education. He does not wish to preserve his enjoyment of nature as a private pleasure but pleads in his article for others to follow his example and take to the Guadarrama. The life of Madrid is anaemic: its sickly inhabitants should take to the countryside "para compensar su desequilibrio y labrar en las honduras del espíritu caminos de regeneración y de progreso". He is not proposing for himself or for others an impossible dream of leaving the civilization of the towns behind and "returning to nature"; rather town-dwellers should correct the imbalance in their lives by periodic trips into the hills. The habit of putting themselves in contact with nature would contribute to the physical and spiritual regeneration of Spaniards. 124

Giner believes that nature, like art, has wide-reaching educational values, including the stimulation of "la expansión de la fantasía, el ennoblecimiento de las emociones, la dilatación del horizonte intelectual, la dignidad de nuestros gustos y el amor a las cosas morales que brota siempre al contacto purificador de la Naturaleza". 125 As in Art, Giner sees in Nature the important qualities of beauty, harmony and organic unity. He admires the expressions of love of nature and the descriptions of nature in the poetry of Ventura Ruiz Aguilera, 127 and states that landscape painting is the most "sintético, cabal y comprensivo de todos los géneros de la pintura". 128 However he seems to conclude that the artistic representation of nature is always inferior to nature itself and can only perform a secondary function;
this is another example of the limitations of human "superiority" over nature:

However, in line with his view of the independence and value of art, Giner is quick to remind us that this didactic function is in no way a denial of the existence of specifically aesthetic values and of a technical appreciation of art, totally separate from the usefulness of its content. In any case, Giner seems to have devoted his own love of nature towards encouraging others to enjoy it for themselves rather than towards a cultivation of his own literary skills for describing nature. He aspires to be a teacher rather than a literary artist.

Nevertheless, it is possible to distinguish certain features of Giner's technique of describing nature: use of sense impressions other than the visual, exclamations of emotion, humanization of the landscape (its dignidad, nobleza, nervio, señorío, etc), symbolically significant elements (eg. the houses near El Pardo), contrast between the human and the natural. His descriptions of nature are not an independent art form but constitute part of a narrative or argument, and features of the landscape tend to serve as introductions to moral and patriotic reflections. If we isolate his descriptions we can note the recurring use of certain techniques: his sentences are usually syntactically and linguistically simple and structured on the enumeration of numerous details,
especially the names of plants and trees, often accompanied by colour epithets. Here are two typical examples:

- En la montaña, severa hasta la majestad, todo es mate y adusto: los líquenes que tienen el veroso granito; el monte bajo, cuyo tono apenas templan, allá en la primavera, el morado cantueso, la amarilla flor de la retama, el rojo de tal cual amapola o de las opulentas peonías; el sombrio verdor de los pinos, que se alzan sobre ellos, ora esbeltos y erguidos, corpulentos y nudosos, o muertos con el gris de plata de sus ramas desnudas, retorcidas y secas. 131

... un admirable paisaje donde el sombrío verdor de las encinas, la esmeralda de los pinos, la plateada seda de las retamas, las zarzas, jaras, rosal espinos, sauces, fresnos, chopos y álamos blancos, cuyo pie alfombran con inagotable profusión el tomillo, el cantueso, el romero, la mejorana y otras olorosas labiadas 132

The accumulation of detail demonstrates Giner's perception that whilst Castilian landscapes have a certain uniformity of general appearance they are far from empty: in fact they are full of natural variety. His observation and naming of wild flowers and herbs, and the use of botanical terms such as labiadas also show the existence of a scientific eye, a naturalist's interest in species and classifications. This scientific attitude is also shown by Giner's discussions of geological details:

la lenta sedimentación de los aluviones cuaternarios depositados en el valle de Madrid, con proceder exclusivamente de la trituración de los materiales de la propia sierra, ha hecho imposible en él toda aspereza y toda forma abrupta: los grandes horizontes, cuyos últimos términos se funden dulcemente en el celaje; el inmenso radio de las ondulaciones del terreno 133

In the description of both the terrain and the vegetation, this "scientific eye" is not allowed to overwhelm Giner's painterly gift of portraying a landscape: he does give a general impression of the lines and scale of the mountains.
and plains as a background to the nearer details of colours and varieties of vegetation. It is not a technique that gives us a realist's picture of the disposition and characteristics of every detail of the landscape in an orderly fashion; it is more an impressionistic overview, a collection of names of objects, colours and shapes.

Giner looks upon nature as a naturalist and a painter; he also looks on it, as we have seen, as a patriot with a sense of history. Thematically, the landscape is linked by Giner to men who have lived there in the past (Velázquez and El Greco), to national character and culture, to Spain's decline and its causes (denuded forests and ostentatious palaces). The Guadarrama is described as "Spain's backbone", suggesting the importance of Castile in Spain's history. For Giner, to affirm the beauties of the Spanish landscape is to affirm the existence of a national potential for the future, if only Spain would look to nature for lessons. Nature offers to man an awareness of his place in the cosmos and of his need to interact "organically" with other men and with nature. It prompts him to be active and creative, to care for his own health and body. Its beauty and vitality is a force which can raise men spiritually. For Giner, nature is important metaphysically, ethically, aesthetically and pedagogically. Nature is a principal aspect of his vision of human life and of his vision of Spain's decline and possible regeneration. The future he looks forward to is a time "cUando el pueblo español esté a la altura de su paisaje". 134

In his treatment of the theme of nature, Giner, I believe, expresses a number of ideas and uses a number of techniques which were later more thoroughly exploited by the writers of the "98 Generation". I am well aware that the concept of the "98 Generation" is still a subject for literary polemics about the appropriateness of the name, the definition of its characteristics and the precise delineation of its membership. It is not my
intention to enter into the minutiae of these polemics here. For the purpose of examining Machado's treatment of the theme of nature (and later, other themes) I wish to look at similarities in his treatment to that of a few of his literary contemporaries—Azorín, Baroja and Unamuno—and suggest that all four writers also manifest similarities to Giner de los Ríos in the way they deal with this theme. The term "98 Generation" is used here as a convenient label to allude to what these four writers have in common; but my use of the label is not intended to imply the absence of differences between them, or to exclude other writers from possible membership of the group. The term is unavoidable if we are to consider what critics have already said about similarities between these writers, though each critic I refer to uses the term in a slightly different way. It is a term that has, for better or worse, been established in Spanish literary history, and though imprecisely defined, it does refer to a recognizable literary manner (some of the features of which I shall be describing). Thematically, the writers of the "98 Generation" are united by a similarity of approach to the "problem of Spain", although there are also significant similarities in their approaches to philosophy and to art. The manner I am referring to by the use of this term does not include fin de siglo Aestheticism.

Lafín Estralgo, in his important study of the "98 Generation", claims that one of the most characteristic literary innovations of the writers he considers to comprise the group was the technique of projecting a sense of history into landscape descriptions. As we have seen, this was a technique used before them by Giner de los Ríos. A few examples from Azorín, Baroja and Unamuno will suffice to show the similarities between these three writers, their similarities to Machado, and the similarities of all of them to Giner de los Ríos in the texts I have quoted.

In La voluntad Azorín sees in the plains of Yecla
the same austere spirit that he believes is characteristic of certain great statesmen and artists of Spain's past:

se siente en esta planada silenciosa el espíritu austero de la España clásica, de los capitanes tétricos — como Alba —; de los pintores tormentarios — como Theotocopuli. 136

In a similar way Giner believed he could observe in the landscapes of the Madrid region the "severe grandeur" of Velázquez and El Greco. 137 The national character is seen to be a reflection of the harsh environment of Castile. Azorín writes:

Paisaje de contrastes violentos, de bruscos cambios de luz y sombra, de colores llamativos y reverberaciones saltantes, de tonos cegadores y hórridos grises, conforma los espíritus en modalidades rígidas y los forja con aptitudes rectilíneas, austeras, inflexibles... la mentalidad, como el paisaje, es clara, rígida, uniforme, de un aspecto único, de un solo tono. Ver el adusto y duro panorama de los cigarrales de Toledo, es ver y comprender los retorcidos y angustiados personajes del Greco. 138

Giner too makes much of the colour contrasts of the Castilian landscape and its correspondence with the character and culture of its inhabitants. 139 So too does Baroja, who writes in Camino de perfección: "En aquella tierra gris los hombres no tenían color; eran su cara y sus vestidos parduscos, como el campo y las casas". 140 The landscape is formative of character and is closely associated with Spaniards of the past. Reflecting on the plains of "Marisparza" Baroja's character Fernando Ossorio thinks of Saint Ignatius Loyola. 141 We find the same technique in Unamuno. In En torno al casticismo he describes the Castilian plains and thinks of Calderón and Cervantes, and comments:

en este clima extremado y sin tibiezas dulces, de paisaje uniforme en sus contrastes, es el espíritu también cortante y seco. 142
Machado, in his poetry, expresses the notion of a correspondence between men and their environment in more concise ways. For example the transferred epithets of the phrase "llamuras bélicas y páramos de asceta" in "Por tierras de España" suggest a unity of the countryside and the character of the men of Castile, past and present. Similarly in "Las encinas" the holm-oak is seen as a tree that typifies some of the positive qualities of the men for whom it forms part of their natural world: "¡encinas, pardas encinas/ humildad y fortaleza!" In just the same way as Giner and his fellow writers quoted above, Machado expresses the close relationship between men and their environment by referring to the similar colours of the earth and men's clothing: in "Campos de Soria" he describes "las tierras labrantías/ como retazos de estameñas", echoing the "buenos aldeanos que visten parda estameña of "Las encinas". In "Orillas del Duero" he writes of the "¡campillo amarillento/ como fosco sayal de campesino".

In the writings of Azorín, Baroja, Unamuno and Machado there is, then, a tendency to derive from contemplation of the landscape lessons about the Spanish character, Spanish culture and Spanish history. Ramsden has concluded that the decisive influence in this feature of their sensibility was Taine, a theory supported by Unamuno's own declarations:

Sin duda lo que influyó más algunas páginas de esos ensayos /En torno al casticismo/ fue Taine. Toda aquella descripción de Castilla, paisaje, etc., responde a los de Taine de los Países Bajos. On the evidence of Giner's similarities to the writers of the "98 Generation" in this respect we could conclude that he too had been influenced by Taine or that he reached conclusions similar to those of Taine on his own, following the Krausist notion of the organic interrelatedness of all things. Whether or not Giner directly
influenced the "98 Generation" in this, he is certainly a forerunner of this aspect of their sensibility.

Lain Entralgo shares the belief of Ramsden that the positivist idea of the determining influence of environment on man is visible in the writings of the "98 Generation", but both critics, quite rightly deny that these writers describe landscape in a positivist-naturalist way. Aesthetically, they do not seek to portray precise detail, but rather aspire, through a literary impressionism, to convey the mood, the "spirit" of the landscape as they see it. In this they owe something to the Romantic-Symbolist idea of "paysage état d'âme". Even where Unamuno makes a quite deliberate effort to concentrate on landscape purely as environment, in Entorno al casticismo, he is unable to repress his tendency to pursue emotional and poetic effects, as, for example here:

Recórranse a las veces leguas y más leguas desiertas sin divisar apenas más que la llanura inacabable donde verdea el trigo o amarillea el rastrojo, alguna procesión monótona y grave de pardas encinas, de verde severo y perenne, que pasan lentamente espaciadas, o de tristes pinos que levantan sus cabezas uniformes. De cuando en cuando, a la orilla de algún pobre regato medio seco o de un río claro, unos pocos álamos, que en la soledad infinita adquieren vida intensa y profunda... ¡Ancha es Castilla! Y qué hermosa la tristeza reposada de ese mar petrificado y lleno de cielo!

Here Unamuno creates a mood by attributing to nature human physical and spiritual characteristics, by emotionally charged adjectives and by straightforward exclamations of his own emotions.

Ramsden argues that the "98 Generation" are not only important for their artistic skills in evoking moods through landscape descriptions; they are also important because they extended the types of landscape thought suitable for such lyrical evocations to include Castile. Previously, the critic declares, only the north of Spain
had prompted evocative descriptions of nature. He mentions the artistry of such pre-98 novelists as Pereda and Pardo Bazán and quotes Unamuno on the existence of Rousseau-influenced nature enthusiasts in the Basque country of his youth. Ramsden concludes "Perhaps there is similar contemporary evidence of love of nature in the 1880s from less verdant areas of Spain, but I myself know of none". As we have seen there is such evidence in the writings of Giner de los Ríos of the 1880s: he shows both an enthusiasm for nature generally and a sensitivity to the beauties and spiritual qualities of Castilian landscapes. In his perception of the Castilian landscape he is certainly a forerunner of the "98 Generation" in a way that cannot be attributed to the influence of Taine. The "98 Generation" are, of course, more skilled craftsmen in evoking the landscapes of Castile than Giner. However, within the limitations of Giner's literary abilities and pretensions, we do see certain similarities of technique. As we have seen, he too uses devices such as the humanization of landscape, colour impressionism, direct expressions of mood and simple accumulative syntax: all of which are important elements of Unamuno's description above and of the "98 Generation" manner generally.

Another thematic similarity between Giner and the "98 Generation" is the belief that closeness to Nature is spiritually regenerative, and the contrasting of such an experience to the miseries of urban life. In Baroja's Camino de perfección, Fernando Ossorio leaves behind him the depravities of life in Madrid and, after a long journey, finds peace of mind in an unnamed village in the Levant through acceptance of the vitalistic lessons of Nature; he writes:

así mi espíritu, que ha roto el dique que le aprisionaba, dique de tristeza y de atonía, corre y se desliza con éjubilo su canción de gloria, su canción de vida; nota humilde, pero armónica en el gran coro de la Naturaleza Madre. 153
It is not merely an escape from the human world: Fernando comes to understand that he too is part of Nature and he learns to love not only the earth but his fellow men and women. Similarly Unamuno's character Pachico in *Paz en la guerra* returns from a walk in the mountains with a sense of his own and other men's place in the natural scheme of things and a positive attitude to life:

> Cuando al descender de aquellas alturas vuelve a bordear los sembrados, plantíos y caseríos, y a saludar a algún labriego que braga con la tierra esquiva, piensa en cuán grande es esta obra del hombre, que humanizando a la Naturaleza, la sobrenaturaliza poco a poco. Hásele fundido, en la montaña, la eterna tristeza de las honduras de su alma con la temporal alegría de vivir, brotándole de esta fusión seriedad fecunda. 154

Later, in 1911, Unamuno asserts the physically and spiritually regenerative effect of trips into the mountains: "El cuerpo se limpia y restaura con el aire sutil de aquellas alturas... pero el alma también se limpia y restaura con el silencio de las cumbres." 155

Azorín evokes the health and peace of nature, in contrast to the moral corruption and disorder of urban life:

> Desde aquí, tendidos sobre la suave hierba, espaciamos la vista por el paisaje. ¡Dulces horas de grato descanso! Atrás la populosa y turbulenta urbe, quedan las concupiscencias, las pasiones, las mezquindades. Aquí está el aire sutil, limpio; el aroma no pasado por alquitranes; el silencio no turbado por máquinas ni gritos. ¡Dulce, dulce armonía! 156

Machado expresses the same rejection of the physical and spiritual unhealthiness of the town in "Un loco" (Campos de Castilla); his madman who is really sane flees the city:

> ¡Huye de la ciudad... Pobres maldades, misórrimas virtudes y quehaceres de chulos aburridos, y ruindades
de ociosos mercaderes.
Huye de la ciudad. ¡El tedio urbano!
- ¡carne triste y espíritu villano! - 157

In "Las encinas" the alternative spiritual values of the countryside are symbolised by the holm-oak:

¡...y tú, encinar madrileño
bajo Guadarrama frío,
tan hermoso, tan sombrío
con tu ajustez castellana
corrigiendo,
la vanidad y el atuendo
de la hetiquez cortesana!... 158

Machado's attitudes to nature are most explicitly expressed in his prose writings. In an autobiographical article of 1915 he clearly states his preference for the countryside rather than the town.—"me agrada más el campo que la ciudad" — 159 and in his 1917 prologue to Campos de Castilla he unequivocally proclaims his love of nature, declaring that the theme of some of his poems is "el simple amor a la Naturaleza, que en mí supera infinitamente al del Arte", recalling Giner's preference for Nature to its representation in art (in spite of the high value that he, like Machado, gives to art). 160

In Juan de Mairena there is a lesson concerning the pedagogical values of excursions and their physical, spiritual and intellectual benefits:

si lográsemos... despertar en el niño el amor a la naturaleza, que se deleita en contemplarla, o la curiosidad por ella, que se empeña en observarla y conocerla, tendríamos más tarde hombres maduros y ancianos venerables, capaces de atravesar la sierra de Guadarrama en los días más crudos del invierno, ya por deseo de recrearse en el espectáculo de los pinos y de los montes, ya movidos por el afán científico de estudiar la estructura y composición de las piedras o de encontrar una nueva especie de lagartijas. 161
This is clearly a reference to the excursionismo of the men of the Institución Libre. Machado had of course been on excursions both as a pupil of the school and as a member of the Corporación de Antiguos Alumnos, and he continued to explore the Spanish countryside for the rest of his life. We know of his walks to the Laguna Negra, to Ubeda from Baeza, to the source of the Guadalquivir, among other places. In Los complementarios he makes a note of an excursion through the Guadarrama and refers directly to Giner's excursions in the same place:


Machado stayed at the Institución's mountain cottage near Cercedilla, met Cossío, followed one of Giner's favourite itineraries (which the teacher describes, in part, in "Paisaje"), and was conscious of the spirit of Giner being with him! Even the inverted commas in the manuscript are significant; in the Institución's notes on how to keep a journal of an excursion is the advice:

1) Epígrafe de la excursión; por ejemplo: "De Madrid a las Navas del Marqués"; "De las Navas a Robledo," etc. (....)

Machado uses inverted commas because he is aware that, in making such notes, he is in a sense quoting Giner or repeating an action from his days at the Institución. There is evidence that Machado did keep a notebook record of his excursions: in Los complementarios there are cross references to another volume — "En el cuaderno 2º "Impresiones y apuntes de Pedraza, Sepúlveda, Duratón y
The Institución's notes on excursions are interesting because they show how pupils were encouraged to observe and take note of everything around them: there are rules "para el camino" and others "para la población". The former include:

Descripción del camino. Aspecto general del país que se recorre; panoramas y puntos de vistas pintorescos; montañas, llanuras, valles, puertos, gargantas, cascadas, grutas, fuentes, etc. Pueblos por que se pasa; iglesias, ermitas, y otros edificios notables. Naturaleza de la vegetación: bosques, sembrados, plantíos; sus clases; praderas, etc. (...). Fijarse también en la clase de terreno por que se pasa: v.gr., si es granito, arena, caliza. 167

As in Giner's own descriptions of nature a naturalist's observance of plants and terrain is here combined with an aesthetic sense. It is not unlikely that Machado's training at the Institución contributed to his own powers of observation of details of the natural scene. A repeated motif of his descriptions of landscapes is the observation and naming of plant species among the rocky terrain of Castile, as, for example, in "A José María Palacio":

¿Hay zarzas florecidas entre las grises peñas y blancas margaritas entre la fina hierba? 168

and "A orillas del Duero":

trepaba por los cerros que habitan las rapaces aves de altura, hollando las hierbas montaraces de fuerte olor - romero, tomillo, salvia, espliego -.

Similarly, Machado often uses this simple enumerative technique in lists of observed landscape features, accompanied by single colour epithets, as in "Campos de Soria":
Colinas plateadas,
grises alcóres, cárdenas roquedas
por donde traza el Duero
su curva de ballesta
en torno a Soria, oscuros encinares,
ariscos pedregales, calvas sierras, 170
caminos blancos y álamos del río...

This technique is very reminiscent of that used by Giner in descriptions like the following:

un admirable paisaje donde el sombrio verdeor
de las encinas, la esmeralda de los pinos, la
plateada seda de las retamas, las zarzanas, jaras,
rosales, espinos, sauces, fresnos, chopos y
álamos blancos, cuyo pie alfombran con inagotable
profusión el tomillo, el cantueso, el
romero, la mejorana y otras olorosas labiadas,
que huellen sin cesar gamos y conejos, forman
una vista grandiosa, coronada por la vecina
sierra con su cresta de nieve en el invierno,
sus radiantes celajes en el verano, y en todo
tiempo con su imponente masa y graves tintas.

Perhaps the practice of keeping notebook records of their excursions contributed something to the descriptive styles of both Machado and Giner. Machado's poem "A orillas del Duero" begins like an account of an institucionista's excursion: in the first fourteen lines of the poem we see a walker not only fully aware of the landscape, the flora and fauna around him, but of his own body as he struggles up the mountain slopes in the summer heat. The poem is probably the first example of such an account in verse in Spanish literature. However the poem progresses to a statement of its main theme: Spain, past and present, and in the light of this the narrative opening can be seen to have symbolic overtones. The mountain is a figurative viewpoint on the whole of Spanish history as well as a real mountain; the climber's weariness parallels the spiritual exhaustion of his nation subsequently evoked; the vulture he sees is an omen of the imminent mortality of Spain. The landscape, in the characteristic manner of the "98 Generation" provokes memories of and reflections on the people who live and
have lived there. Machado compares features of the landscape to scattered remnants of old armour, evoking Spain's past military glory and present decadence. His attitude to this past is strangely ambiguous, for while he is censorious of the bloodlust and predatory greed of the armies that created the Spanish Empire, he also seems, in this poem, nostalgic for the power and wealth that such military might brought. The poem's refrain - "Castilla miserable, ayer dominadora, envuelta en sus harapos desprecia cuanto ignora" - expresses, I think, more criticism than nostalgia for the Empire: the rhyming of dominadora and ignora suggests that there is causal link between the attitudes characteristic of a warrior people and the present poverty, intellectual and spiritual as well as material. The present state of Spain is described in terms of negatives and absences:

¡Oh tierra triste y noble, 
la de los altos llanos y yermos y roquedas, 
de campos sin arados, regatos ni arboledas; 
decrépitas ciudades, caminos sin mesones, 
y atónitos palurdos sin danzas ni canciones 
que aún van, abandonando el mortecino hogar, 
como tus largos ríos, Castilla, hacia la mar! 172

At the end of the poem there is a significant contrast between humanity and nature, emphasised by the rhyme scheme:

De la ciudad lejana
me llega un armonioso tañido de campana 
- ya irán a su rosario las enlutadas viejas -. 
De entre las peñas salen dos lindas comadrejas; 
me miran y se alejan, huyendo, y aparecen de nuevo, ¡tan curiosas! 173

The vitality of the animals contrasts with the mental picture we form of old women in mourning, whose devotions are a predictable ritual (he knows what the bells mean). Furthermore the animals are curiosas, whilst the human beings portrayed in the poem are characterised by a lack of interest in anything new to them - "desprecia cuanto
ignora". Machado implies that man should take note of Nature's example.

In the following poem of *Campos de Castilla* - "Por tierras de España" - Machado again brings the relationship between man and nature into a commentary on the decline of Spain, suggesting that one of the reasons for the present state of affairs is the Spaniards' lack of respect for nature. Like Giner, he chooses as evidence the thoughtless destruction of the forests of Castile and the subsequent impoverishment of the land. Machado links this action, and the continuing rape of the land in the present, with the warrior mentality he distinguished in "A orillas del Duero":

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El hombre de estos campos que incendia los pinares
y su despojo aguarda como botín de guerra,
antajo hubo rado los negros encinares
talado los robustos roble dos de la sierra.
Hoy ve a sus pobres huyendo de sus lares;
la tempestad llevarse los limos de la tierra.
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In spite of Machado's declared "love of nature" and suggestions of a possible harmonious relationship with it, he usually takes the viewpoint of a man who admires its beauties as an observer. There are few manifestations of authentic pantheism, of joyful union with nature: examples are Abel Martín's appeal to be swallowed up into nature after death, and a celebration of love among Abel Martín's sonnets in which the lovers are fused with the elements:

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Tejidos sois de primavera, amantes,
de tierra y agua y viento y sol tejidos,
la sierra en vuestros pechos jadeantes
en los ojos los campos florecidos.
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In an early poem of *Soledades* there is a moment of joy on contemplating a beautiful sunset in which the harmony of nature is acknowledged and felt to give meaning to life:
Yo iba haciendo mi camino,
absorto en el solitario crepúsculo campesino.

Y pensaba: "¡Hermosa tarde, nota de la lira
toda desíén y armonía;
hermosa tarde, tú curas la pobre melancolía
de este rincón vanidoso, oscuro rincón que
piensa!" 178

In Juan de Mairena Machado reflects at one point on the notion of "love of nature" in the Rousseauian manner, and his perceptive comments shed some light on his own treatment of the theme. He writes:

No debemos engañarnos. Nuestro amor al campo es una mera afición al paisaje, a la naturaleza como espectáculo. Nada menos campesino y, si me apuras, menos natural que un paisajista. Después de Juan Jacobo Rousseau, el ginebrino, espíritu ahito de ciudadanía, la emoción campesina, la esencialmente geógica, de tierra que se labra, la virgiliana y la de nuestro gran Lope de Vega, todavía, ha desaparecido. El campo para el arte moderno es una invención de la ciudad, una creación del tedio urbano y del terror creciente a las aglomeraciones humanas. 179

The town-dweller can never have the authentic experience of closeness to the land possible for peasants and farmers. There is a profound difference between this feeling for nature and the passive observation of landscape of the refugee from the city. Machado implies the same idea in "las encinas" when he contrasts the peasant who lives close to nature and feels it in his hands to those poets and painters who have temporarily left urban society to find material for their art. 180 Hence we can say that Machado was well aware of the limitations of his own knowledge of and closeness to nature. Yet at the same time he confesses in Juan de Mairena that such closeness to nature is preferable to the dehumanized life of the modern city: the Rousseauian wish persists in Machado. 181

Machado also expresses in the same place his
consciousness of the dangers of an "afición al paisaje" becoming a cover for a flight from one's fellow men, an escape into solitude that Machado finds ethically undesirable:

¿Amor a la naturaleza? Según se mire. El hombre moderno busca en el campo—la soledad, cosa muy poco natural. Alguien dirá que se busca a sí mismo. Pero lo natural en el hombre es buscarse en su vecino, en su prójimo. 182

In effect in Machado's earliest poetry nature is a place for solitude and for private aesthetic pleasure. In the poem from Soledades quoted above nature provides the solitary poet some relief from his personal existential anguish and material for exercises in colourful imagery, such as describing the setting sun as "entre nubes de fuego, una trompeta gigante/tras de los álamos verdes de las márgenes del río." 183 In Machado’s early verse landscapes are used predominantly for symbolic purposes. There are bare plains which symbolise the emptiness of the life of his symbolic pilgrim or traveller who treads them. There are exercises in "paysage état d'âme" where the landscape (or more often the urban scene of parks, gardens and fountains) evokes the moods of the poet contemplating it, as, for example, in "Horizonte":

En una tarde clara y amplia como el hastío,
cuando su lanza blande el tórrido verano,
copiaban el fantasma de un grave sueño mío
mil sombras en teoría, enhiestas sobre el llano. 184

The inner world of the poet's consciousness becomes inseparable from the outer world he contemplates in this technique; the "real" and the symbolic become confused. In the best poems of this type in Soledades the landscape has a convincing reality apart from its symbolism, as in the poem that begins "Yo voy soñando caminos/de la tarde." In this opening phrase there is a deliberate confusion as to whether the caminos are "dreams" or a real place where dreaming has occurred, but the briefly
evoked details of landscape of the following lines—
"¡Las colinas/ doradas, los verdes pinos,/ las polvo-
rientas encinas!"—are convincingly real, as is the
winding path which disappears from view in the failing
light at the end of the poem. Yet this path is at the
same time a symbol: in the central section of the poem
Machado reflects on the purposelessness of life without
feeling and the disappearance of the path is a metaphor
for this loss of purpose. 185

In *Campos de Castilla* Machado's ability to observe
and evoke real landscapes comes much more to the fore
and there are not the extravagant images of colour which
are a feature of some poems of *Soledades*. The landscape
becomes a national landscape, one peopled by present day
Spaniards and ghosts of Spaniards of the past. Often,
as we have seen, the description of landscapes is a
preliminary for reflections on Spanish history in the
98. Generation manner. Some of the skills put to use
in *Soledades* are turned to different ends: symbolism
is historical and patriotic rather than just personal
and moods evoked by landscape descriptions transcend
purely private problems (although these return to the
fore in the poems inspired in Leonor's illness and death).
The historical sense does not dominate all Machado's
descriptions of landscape from *Campos de Castilla*
onwards. There are also poems that do no more and no
less than evoke and celebrate the beauties of nature or
the changes of the seasons (such as the first five
sections of "Campos de Soria"). 186

Although it is true that there is a development,
a change, in the way Machado deals with landscape before
and after *Campos de Castilla* it is by no means a clear
cut division. Poems such as "Fantasía iconográfica" and
"Noche de verano" are very reminiscent of poems of
*Soledades*. *Galerías. Otros poemas,* 187 and poem IX of
the earlier collection is one of the best examples of
Machado's "98 Generation" manner. Here a landscape is
described with a simple enumeration of details:
Pasado los verdes pinos,
casi azules, primavera
se ve brotar en los finos
chopos de la carretera
y del río.

The river and the countryside are humanised:

El Duero corre, terso y mudo, mansamente.
El campo parece, más que joven, adolescente.

Wild flowers are observed:

Entre las hierbas alguna humilde flor ha nacido,
azul o blanca.

And, although there is no historical reflection as such,
the poem concludes with exclamations of the beauty of
nature in his homeland and a sense of optimism for the
future provoked by the vision of natural regeneration:

¡Belleza del campo apenas florido,
y mística primavera!
¡Chopos del camino blanco, álamos de la ribera,
estrema de la montaña
ante la azul lejanía,
sol del día, claro día!
¡Hermosa tierra de España!

The poem is very much in the manner of Campos de Castilla,
of the "98 Generation" and of Francisco Giner's writings
on nature.

According to Carlos Blanco Aguinaga, the writers of
the "98 Generation" (with the exception of Machado) show
a development from a critical and forward-looking vision
of Spanish reality towards a "paisajismo de evasión"
where the countryside becomes a place for solitary
withdrawal into personal concerns, and the human element
of rural life (peasants, small towns and villages) evoke
resignation and even nostalgia for the past. Machado's
evolution, claims Blanco, was in precisely the opposite
direction. There is some truth in this contention.
The comments from Juan de Mairena quoted above are interesting evidence of Machado's awareness of the danger of private aesthetic concerns overwhelming the ethical imperative in life and art as he saw it from his own humanist point of view. As I have attempted to show, Giner de los Ríos's *paisajismo* cannot be seen as escapist in Blanco's sense of the word either. Machado recognises this in the final lines of his verse elegy to Giner, where he recalls that in the beautiful countryside of the Guadarrama "el maestro un día/ soñaba un nuevo florecer de España." In this poem, as in Machado's poem IX, this hope for national regeneration parallels the vision of perpetual rebirth in nature.

Machado's treatment of the theme of nature in verse and prose cannot be attributed simply and deterministically to any one "influence". Rather there is a whole complex of factors involved. Albornoz has summarised the principle factors thus:

Para que el poeta descubriese y llevarse a su poesía el paisaje de Castilla, para que la poesía en que lo recoge y revive llegara a crearse, tuviera que darse juntas las tres siguientes condiciones: un amor a los paseos por el campo y a las excursiones, nacido, sin duda, en los tiempos de la Institución; el conocimiento de unos paisajes visto antes por los ojos de otros escritores, Unamuno, su gran admirado especialmente [also Azorín] y sobre todo, el contacto directo y diario con las tierras y las gentes de Soria.

I would add to this that the Institución Libre could have inspired not only the excursionista habit but a particular sensitivity to Castile, a sharpness of observation and a sense of respect for nature and awareness of man's relationship to it. It is also interesting to note that Machado's treatment of the theme of nature in modes similar to those of Giner follows an aesthetic crisis after which he reverted to a view of art akin to that of the Krausists.

At the same time, the influence of the writings of
Unamuno, Azorín and Baroja on the art of landscape
description in Machado is undeniable; Machado explicitly
declares his admiration for these writers. 193 It is
impossible to distinguish this influence totally from
the influence of Giner who, as we have seen, anticipates
the "98 Generation" in his approach to Nature in many
respects and may well have influenced their early
writings. What we cannot say is that these writers
presented to Machado a totally unprecedented vision of
Nature in general or of the Spanish landscape in particu-
lar. Neither can we say that the experience of Soria
was Machado's first and dramatic contact with the country-
side of Castile. Both the writings of the "98 Generation"
and Soria added to and expanded on previous experiences
and attitudes fostered by Giner at the Institución.

One objection that could be made to a close identi-
fication of Machado with institucionista attitudes to
Nature is that the special enthusiasm for the Guadarrama
of men of the school is not very apparent in his writings.
As Arthur Terry suggests, this fact could be explained by
Machado's very familiarity with the Guadarrama, 194 a
familiarity he confesses both in the excursion note
discussed above 195 and in the poem which begins "¿Eres
tú, Guadarrama, viejo amigo,/ la sierra gris y blanca,/la sierra de mis tardes madrileñas...?" 196 That Machado
associated the Guadarrama with the Institución is clear
enough in his verse elegy to Giner, as is Machado's
complete understanding of the ethical and religious
beliefs of his maestro. When the poet names Giner "el
viejo alegre de la vida santa" we recall Giner's combi-
nation of an ethic of moral intransigence with a quite
unpuritanical optimism about the possibilities of human
life. His reference to "talleres", "labores" and "yunques"
and the confirmation of Giner's death by the detail "van
tres días que...no trabaja" echo the maestro's commit-
ment to the work ethic. Naming him "brother of the sun"
suggests both his desire to seek out the truth and spread
enlightenment and his feeling of union with living Nature.
In death Giner’s body returns to nature, where life goes on – symbolised by the wind, the trees, the plants and the butterflies (Giner himself wrote "la muerte no es más que un momento del proceso universal orgánico y de su obra de renovación incesante.") Giner’s spirit lives on, according to Machado’s elegy, among his followers. The nature his body returns to is the soil of the native land for whose regeneration he had worked. It is also a specific part of that land: the Guadarrama he loved so much and walked in so frequently.

Rubén Landa has suggested that Machado’s choice of a last resting place for Giner in the poem is a precise spot near the Institución’s casita in the Guadarrama, identified by an isolated holm-oak tree:

Al escribir la poesía que dedicó a la muerte de Don Francisco, Antonio Machado recordaba sin duda aquel lugar de la sierra [la casita que la Institución tenía en la sierra de Guadarrama cerca del sitio llamado "el Ventorillo", entre Cercedilla y el puerto de Navacerrada]. La encina, y en singular, sólo a un observador muy bueno no se le hubiera escapado... Efectivamente, en aquel lugar no hay más que una encina pequeña delante de la casa, poco más abajo de ella y en sitio poco visible, al lado de una roca de granito. En aquella altura hay bosques de pinos, los de encinas están en laderas más bajas de la sierra.

Hence in Machado’s poem:

...Oh, sí, llevad, amigos, su cuerpo a la montaña, a los azules montes del ancho Guadarrama. Allí hay barrancos hondos de pinos verdes donde el viento canta. Su corazón repose bajo una encina casta, en tierra de tomillos, donde juegan mariposas doradas... Allí el maestro un día soñaba un nuevo florecer de España.

The detail of the solitary holm-oak shows both Machado’s powers of observation and his familiarity with the area.
It is a detail which is accessible only to fellow institucionistas, the amigos addressed in the poem, although readers of Campos de Castilla would recognise the encina as a symbol of the best qualities of Spain from the poem "Las encinas".  

Ramsden sees the love of nature of the "98 Generation" as essentially "Romantic", and draws interesting conclusions on the "Romanticism" of these writers. He holds that the central feature of Romanticism is a sense of fallen values and that the Romantic attraction to nature is fundamentally a search for a realm of harmony and self-discovery. It is also, he says, a response to the pressures of Europe's growing cities. Spain was behind the rest of Europe, the critic argues, both in suffering this crisis of beliefs and in urban development, and consequently it is not surprising that the Romantic Movement in Spain was late, short-lived, and limited in scope and intensity. The Spanish Romantics show a relative insensitivity to nature; the "98 Generation" are sensitive to it in the extreme. Hence Ramsden concludes that the "1898 Movement" (as he usually terms the group of writers) represents a second, more profound and more wide-ranging Romantic Movement in Spain, something he sees confirmed both by the writers' deep sense of ideological and spiritual crisis and by their attraction and sensitivity to the countryside.

This line of argument is most convincing. All I would add is that the Spanish Krausists were important forerunners of the "Romanticism" of the "98 Generation" in both these respects: the sense of ideological crisis and the attraction to nature. One reason for this is that the philosophy of Krause was much influenced by Schelling, who is often seen as an important philosophical expression of key aspects of "Romanticism"; Krausism includes, among other elements, many ideas from nineteenth century German "Romantic" thinkers. One such idea embraced by Krause is the notion of the volkgeist together with its historicist companion the zeitgeist. In the next
chapter I shall be considering the importance of these Romantic ideas in the formation of certain Krausist attitudes, and examining their affinity to certain attitudes of Antonio Machado and of some of his contemporaries in the "98 Generation". For the moment I would like to make brief mention of the application of these ideas to literary criticism. It is characteristic of the "98 Generation" to use literature as a source of insight into the essence of national character both past and present. Azorín's researches into the "spirit" embodied in major and minor works of Spanish literature are legion. Unamuno, in En torno al casticismo (to give but one example) approaches the classics of the Golden Age from the same historicist viewpoint. Examples of the same approach in Machado are less numerous but still significant. We have seen how he uses Tolstoy as a guide to the true "soul" of Russia, and shall return to this again later. 204 The poem "Desde mi rincón" is a tribute to the value of Azorín's literary historicism in Castilla. 205 Many of Machado's commentaries on Baroque literature in Spain show that he sees literature as a guide to the spiritual state of a nation. He declares, for example, that culteranismo and conceptismo are symptoms of "un creciente empobrecimiento del alma española". 206 In a critical article on Moreno Villa's Colección (1924) he is quite explicit about the value of literature as a key to understanding the zeitgeist:

In effect the review from which this is taken exemplifies Machado's application of such a belief to literary criticism. Machado affirms there that the subjective and irrational world-view characteristic of nineteenth century man no longer holds sway, and he looks to contemporary
literature for signs of the emergence of a new, more "human" ideology in Western civilization. Machado's rejection of nineteenth century subjectivism and his hopes for a new, more "objective", "fraternal" and "human" art, as the expression of a new humanist ethic, clearly correspond to his own idea of what art should be as formulated in comments on his own poetry from 1904 onwards. 208.

As Gómez Mollada points out, this type of historicist and ideological criticism was practiced in Spain, prior to the "98 Generation" by the Spanish Krausists, particularly Giner. 209 It is interesting that Giner, like Machado, pays particular attention to the nineteenth century, for him "contemporary" literature, and that he reaches conclusions similar to those of Machado. His most important article on the subject is "Del género de poesía más propio de nuestro siglo" (1865). Expanding on his conviction that "No es otra cosa la literatura que el primero y más firme camino para entender la historia realizada; mentor universal, nos reproduce lo pasado, nos explica lo presente", 210 Giner looks at the poetry of his own time to see what it can tell him about the spirit of the age. Observing the predominance of the lyric among literary forms, he concludes that the introspection characteristic of such poetry is symptomatic of the ideological crisis of the age. The poet turns for his inspiration to a private inner world because he can find no secure beliefs in the ideologically disorientated society in which he lives:

"La poesía" apartada la imaginación del mundo que halla a su alcance y en el cual no ve sino accidentes, luchas y discordias, se siente incapaz de una contemplación objetiva de las cosas, no menos imposible por su propia turbación que por la voluble inestabilidad de aquéllas, y se reconcentra en sí misma. 211

Giner believes that nineteenth century introspective lyric poetry symptomatises the spiritual state of mankind.
in an age of conflict. In a sense, Giner devalues such poetry by such a judgement: it can never be a completely satisfying art because of its restrictions. 212 Giner does not, however, deny the achievements of the major poets of his time, and does not deny that introspective lyric poetry can have a universal value:

But, whilst accepting the qualities of subjective lyricism, Giner clearly looks forward to the superseding of such art, when the ideological crisis which justifies it has itself been superseded. The lyric will continue to dominate literature, he says, "hasta que llegue la nueva unidad": until the age of unity of beliefs and social harmony envisaged in the Krausist philosophy of history arrives. 214

Machado makes similar statements about subjective lyricism, both with reference to the nineteenth century generally 215 and considering his own poetic principles. Referring to his earliest collection - Soledades - he writes: "la ideología dominante era esencialmente subjectivista; el arte se atomizaba, y el poeta...sólo pretendía cantar a sí mismo"; 216 he affirms like Giner that introspective poetry can communicate universal truths "yo... pensaba que el hombre...puede...mirando hacia dentro, vislumbrar las ideas cordiales, los universales del
but he concludes that he looks forward to the appearance of a different poetry, that of an age of greater communal spirit: "amo mucho más than the time, ideology and art of Soledades: la edad que se avecina y a los poetas que han de surgir, cuando una tarea común apasione las almas." 218

The similarity of ideas and approach in Giner and Machado is remarkable.

Mátyás Horányi, in one of the few critical works that link Machado's aesthetics to Krausism, comes to the surprising conclusion that it is Machado's earliest and most introspective poetry — that of Soledades — which comes closest to fulfilling Krausist ideas on poetry. 219 This error derives from a misreading of Giner's "Del género de poesía más propio de nuestro siglo": the critic reads Giner's analysis of the nature of contemporary poetry as if it were a desideratum rather than an explanation of the shortcomings of the poetry of the time in the light of the Krausist philosophy of history. Horányi appears to believe that for Giner inner-looking poetry corresponds to the highest stage of human development, the age of harmony, whereas he is linking it to the second stage of the dialectic of history, the age of "opposition". Horányi also links this poetic introspection to Krausist metaphysics, where the reflecting consciousness begins the "Analysis" by contemplating itself.

Juan Ramón Jiménez has made a similar connection between metaphysical and poetic introspection in support of his contention that elements of his aesthetics derive from Krausism. 220 Jiménez is a curious case in the whole question of possible Krausist influences on Spanish literature, since many of the aesthetic ideas he espoused, and, in his later life, explained in terms of Krausism, are in fact practically identical to those Machado rejected in 1903-4 in the name of a humanist, ethical aesthetics, which, as I have attempted to show, is close to that of Giner de los Ríos. For Machado (after 1903-4), as for Giner, life came before art: one should be firstly a complete man and secondly an artist. For Jiménez, art
was an exclusive dedication and a realm apart from everyday life and the majority of humanity. Jiménez distorts the Krausist imperative to cultivate Beauty by making it a private affair in an ideal realm, forgetting Krause's declaration that art should deal with "la belleza temporal y viva" rather than the absolute, and Giner's criticism of artists who unnaturally isolate themselves from their fellow men. Jiménez's attempt to justify his aestheticism and solitary search for the absolute in terms of Krausism is, I believe, a distortion of certain features of that philosophy and a neglect of other, equally important, Krausist principles for life and art.

Generally, critics who have looked at the question of Krausist influence on the literature of the turn of the century in Spain have found more evidence of such an influence on the regeneracionista mode of the "98 Generation" than on the type of aestheticism that has frequently been described by the term "Modernist".

In the case of Antonio Machado it has even been suggested that his early "Modernist" verse was totally against the aesthetical and ethical teachings of Krausism, whereas his poetry in Campos de Castilla was fully consistent with a Krausist influence. Both these judgements are debatable. The clear cut distinctions they imply between "Modernism" and "98 Generation", Soledades and Campos de Castilla, are oversimplifications, as are the definitions of "98 Generation" as solely regeneracionista and "Modernism" as nothing more than Aestheticism. This whole area of literary history is complex and controversial: some critics would have us believe that the "Modernists" and the "98 Generation" were two radically opposed groups of writers; others would like us to acknowledge the common ground shared by all the writers of the time by accepting a single title, be it one of the two already in circulation or some new creation. Machado is always a problematic figure for critics of the first type, yet those who believe in an all-inclusive label would still have to find a way of describing what the poet...
himself saw as an important aesthetic reorientation in 1903-4. A further problem is that this reorientation does not neatly cut a line between *Soledades* and *Campos de Castilla* but is first manifested in practice in a second edition of *Soledades* called *Soledades. Galerías. Otros poemas*, which includes pre- and post-crisis poems and revised poems, as well as significantly omitting some poems included in the first edition. If we manage to distinguish the post-crisis poems are we to call them "98 Generation" or "Modernist" or something else? Of course the simplest expedient is to avoid using labels at all, or to use them cautiously and with explicit qualifications.

This thesis is not concerned with settling terminological polemics about "Modernism" or "98 Generation" but with investigating the influence of Krausism and the Institución Libre de Enseñanza on Antonio Machado. I use these labels because they are unavoidable if we are to make reference to critical studies of the literature of the period under discussion. I believe that there is an affinity between Machado's post 1903-4 aesthetics and that of the Krausists; neither of these aesthetics can be described by labels such as *regeneracionista* or "Modernist" (in a narrow sense). The reason for this is that they are not the aesthetics of a literary school or a narrowly defined exclusive creed. They are broad statements of the humanity of true art, an ethical aesthetics whose details derive from an optimistic and progressive view of man and his place in the cosmos and the society of men.
Notes

1. Ideal, cit., p. 55
2. Ibid., p. 100
3. O.C. III, p. 135 (1866) and p. xxxvii (1876)
4. Introduction to Krause, Compendio de estética, traducido del alemán y anotado por Francisco Cifér, 2ª ed., M, Librería de V. Suárez, 1883, p.xii.
5. Ibid, pp. 39-40
6. Ideal, cit., p. 65
7. O.C. III, p. 12
8. Ibid. pp. 12-13
9. Ibid. pp. 29-30
10. Ibid. pp. 2-3
11. Ocaso y restauración, Colegio de México, 1948, p. 195; Cossío published little, hence the need to rely on many points on secondary sources.
16. Ideal, cit., pp. 181-182
17. Ibid. pp. 65-66
18. V. Supra p. 201
19. Compendio de estética, cit., p. 88; Gner's translation of Krause.
20. cit. supra p. 202
22. Ideal, cit., p. 176.
24 "Sobre 'La familia de León Roch'" (1878), O.C. XV, p.288.
26 Ibid. p.9
27 Ibid. p.8
28 "Consideraciones...", O.C. III p.192
29 Ibid. pp.208-209
30 "Un poeta: Don Ventura Ruiz Aguilera" (1862), O.C. III, p.260
31 "Poesía erudita y poesía vulgar" (1863), O.C. III, pp.94-95
32 "Del género de poesía más propio de nuestro siglo" (1865), O.C. III p.56
33 Ideal, cit., p.187
34 "Poesía erudita y poesía vulgar" (1863), O.C. III, pp.94-95.
35 "Del género de poesía...", O.C. III, p.47
36 Ideal, cit., p.55, cit. supra p.202; my italics.
37 Compendio de estética, cit., p.32
38 Giner, "El arte y las artes", O.C. III, pp.5-6.
39 Ibid. pp.5-6, 13-14.

41 See: M.H. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp, Oxford Univ. Press, 1953, ch.VIII part V; the idea of a coming together in art of the finite and the infinite derives from Schelling, who states: "beauty exists where the particular (the real) is so in accord with its idea that this idea itself, as infinite, enters into the finite and is intuited in concreto"(cit. F. Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Vol.I, part 1, N.Y., Image, 1965, p.152.)
43 "Del género de poesía..." (1865), O.C. III, pp.45-62
44 O.C. III, pp.159-236.
45 Ibid. p.164; cf. Sanz del Río: "En la historia de la cultura humana, la historia de las bellas artes guarda
con la total de cada pueblo secreta correspondencia."
(Ideal, cit., p. 141.)

46 In La Internacional, No 48, 17 Sept 1920; republ. M. Tuñón de Lara, "Un texto de Don A.M.", B.H., 71, 1969, p. 313; the review was a socialist one, and M's article one of a series on the role of art in society.

47 Ibid.
48 Ibid. p. 315
49 Ibid. p. 314
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid. p. 313

52 G. Ribbans, "Unamuno y A.M.", Niebla y soledad, M. Gredos, 1971, p. 307; this article is fundamental for an understanding of the 1903-4 crisis.

53 loc. cit. p. 314
54 cit. Ribbans, loc. cit. p. 289.
55 ibid. p. 301
56 OPP p. 763
57 OPP pp. 762-763
58 OPP p. 763
59 OPP p. 47
60 cit. Ribbans, loc. cit. p. 301
61 Ibid. p. 306
62 OPP p. 47
63 OPP p. 833
64 OPP pp. 49-50
65 OPP p. 848
66 OPP p. 823
67 OPP p. 714
68 Ibid.; cf. Abel Martín on language of poetry (OPP p. 308)
69 cit. Ribbans, op. cit., p. 302
70 ibid.
loc. cit. p. 313

On "Modernism"/Krausism V. Infra pp. 262-263.

V. Supra pp. 103-104.

OPP pp. 49-50

Compendio de estética, cit., p. 2; cf. supra p. 208; on time in Machado and the Krausists V. Supra pp. 131-132; Lázaro Carreter, who has pointed out the affinity between M. and Krause on the theme of time also suggests that Krause anticipates M.'s theory of the "función temporal" of rhyme (Compendio de estética, cit., pp. 143-145, OPP pp. 319-320; Lázaro Carreter, "¿Claves de la poética de A.M.?", cit., p. 53.); it seems to me that Krause's ritmo temporal is a definition of prosody and no more.

OPP p. 843; "literalmente" in the last line according to OPP is corrected to "literariamente" (See: M. Tuñón de Lara, A.M. poeta del pueblo, cit., p. 232 n.)

cf. definition in "¿Qué es el Arte?": "Llamemos Naturaleza... a todo lo que no es arte, e incluyamos en ella, no sólo el mundo exterior, sino también el corazón del hombre" (loc. cit. p. 314)

V. Supra pp. 204-206; the influence of Krausism was important in this respect on Juan Ramón Jiménez and his "ética-estética" - See R.A. Cardwell, Juan Ramón Jiménez: The Modernist Apprenticeship 1895-1900, Berlin, Colloquium Verlag, 1977, passim.

OPP p. 371


"Don Francisco Giner", BILE, 1915, p. 91; the emphatic "ha determinado" probably owes something to the time and place of publication.


V. Supra pp. 166, 223.

86 V. supra pp. 116-118.
87 A.M., poeta del pueblo, cit., p. 194.
88 V. supra p. 186.
89 "D. Francisco Giner de los Ríos", BILE N° 664, July 1915, p. 220.
90 V. supra pp. 211, 223.
91 OPP pp. 493-494
92 OC XI p. 281 (1898); another eg. O.C. II, pp. 180-181.
93 O.C. II, p. 183
94 "Nota preliminar", Giner, O.C. XII, p. 9.
98 "El arte y las artes", O.C. III, p. 16.
99 Ibid. p. 18
100 O.C. XIII, pp. 53-54, 118-119, 130.
101 O.C. XI, p. 62
102 O.C. XI, p. 59
103 V. Supra pp. 124-125.
104 "Paisaje" (1885), Ensayos y cartas, cit., pp. 44-45.
105 Ibid., pp. 45, 39-40.
106 V. Supra p. 163.
107 "El arte y las artes", O.C. III, p. 17; cf. Sanz del Río, "Mandamientos de la humanidad", 52: "Debes conocer, respetar, amar tu espíritu y tu cuerpo y ambos en unión, manteniendo cada uno y ambos puros, sanos, bellos, viviendo tú en ellos como un ser armónico" (Ideal, cit., p. 100)
108 Letter to D.R. Wearing, 20 Feb 1974
110 P. Baroja, *ibid.*
111 "Paisaje" (1885), *Ensayos y cartas*, cit., pp 39-46
114 "Paisaje", loc. cit., p. 41.
115 *Ibid.* p. 43
118 cf. Giner on Spain’s "trágico amor a la "gran-deza exterior", a expensas de la más íntima miseria en las cosas del alma como en las del cuerpo, que desde los Reyes Católicos nos viene hundiendo hasta el abismo de estupidez desalmada de Marruecos" (Letter to Azorín, 1912, in Giner, *Ensayos y cartas*, cit., pp. 122-123)
119 V. Cacho Viu has promised a study of institucio-nista attitudes to Nature and their anticipation of "98 Generation" attitudes in the second vol. of his history of the I.L.E. (*La I.L.E.*, I, cit., p. 505 n.)
125 *Ibid.;* Nature, like Art, has an ethical function.
126 Nature is not however, for Giner, an infallible model for all things; error, irrationality, incongruence, and disorder exist in the natural as well as the spiritual world ("Espíritu y naturaleza", *O.C.* XI, p. 63)
127 "Un poeta: don Ventura Ruiz Aguilera" (1862), *O.C.* III, pp. 251-279; Cossío’s foreword to the same vol, p. xxv.
128 "Paisaje", loc. cit., p. 39
129 "Espíritu y naturaleza", *O.C.* XI, p. 60.
131 "Paisaje", loc. cit., p. 41.
133 "Paisaje", loc. cit., p. 41.
135 P. Laín Entralgo, La generación del noventa y ocho, M, Diana, 1945, ch. 1, "Un paisaje y sus inventores", pp. 21-42; for Laín the Generation comprises: Unamuno, Baroja, Azorín, Antonio Machado and Valle-Inclán as its major figures, and Menéndez Pidal, Ganivet, Maeztu, Benavente, Manuel Machado, the Alvarez Quintero brothers, Manuel Bueno, Silverio Lanza, Zuloaga and Darío de Regoyos as lesser members.
137 V. Supra p. 232.
138 La voluntad, cit., p. 164.
139 V. Supra pp. 232-233.
140 Camino de perfección, M, Caro Raggio, 1974, p. 245.
141 Ibid.
142 En torno al casticismo, M, Austral, 1968, pp. 55, 63.
143 OPP XCIV, p. 129
144 OPP, CIII, p. 134.
145 OPP, CXIII-ii, p. 146 and CIII, p. 137.
146 OPP, CII, p. 132.
147 The 98 Movement in Spain, Manchester U.P., 1974.
149 Laín Entralgo, La generación..., cit., pp. 351-2.
150 Ramsden, op.cit., p. 178.
151 op.cit. pp. 53-54, my italics.
152 op.cit., p. 178.

O.C.I, p. 351 (1911), cit. Ramsden, op. cit., p. 179

O.C. IV, p. 394 (1923), cit. Ramsden, op. cit. p. 181

OPP, CVI, pp. 139-140 (1913)

OPP, CIII, pp. 136-137

F. Vega Díaz, "A propósito...", cit., p. 70.


OPP p. 393

V. Supra p. 40.

See OPP p. 51


anon. "Cuestionario de excursiones", BILE Nº 264, 15 Feb 1883, pp. 47-48; also refers to importance of the date, simplicity and accuracy of language (V. Supra p. 228), distances, times and price of journeys.

op. cit., p. 186V (See also p. 187R)

loc. cit.

OPP, CXXVI, p. 180

OPP, XC VIII, p. 126

OPP, CXIII-vii, p. 148.

"El Real Sitio de El Pardo", O.C. XX, p. 24 (1883)

OPP, XC VIII, pp. 126-128

ibid. p. 128

V. Supra p. 233

OPP, XCVI, p. 128

V. Supra p. 106.

OPP p. 298

OPP, XIII, p. 66

OPP p. 437

OPP, CIII, p. 137

V. Supra pp.233-235

OPP, CXXXIX, p.215

La Presencia de Miguel de Unamuno en A.M., cit., p.144; E. Lafuente Ferrari attributes more importance to the I.L.E.: "Las verdaderas fuentes del sentimiento del paisaje en Machado hay que buscarlas en su educación con esos varones que buscaron - Giner, sobre todo - , interesar a los niños en la naturaleza, en dos sentidos: la observación - piedras, plantas, animales - y la contemplación del paisaje puro o las obras de arte" ("A.M. y su mundo visual", A.M. y Soria, cit., p.96)

See, e.g., Letter to Ortega, 20 July 1912, in J.L.Cano, "Tres cartas inéditas de M. a Ortega", RO, 3ª época, Nos.5-6, March-April 1976, p.33


Los complementarios, cit., p.16R, cit. supra p.

OPP, CIV, p.137 (1911)

"El arte y las artes", O.C. III, p.17

OPP, CXXXIX, pp.214-215

R. Landa, "Mis recuerdos de A.M.- continuación" (typescript), p.6, cf. P.de A.Cobos, Sobre la muerte en A.M., M, Insula, 1972, p.45; Landa (ibid.) recalls staying at the I.L.E. casita in the summer of 1914 and returning from a walk to find a note from Antonio and José Machado to say they had passed through en route to La Granja; Landa concludes that M. noticed the holm-oak on this one brief stop at the casita; however we know that on another
occasion that summer Machado spent the night there. Clearly he knew the area well through repeated visits, and not from one chance glimpse of the tree as Landa suggests.

200 OPP, CXXXIX, p. 215
201 OPP, CIII, pp. 134-137
202 The 98 Movement in Spain, cit., pp. 174-177
204 V. Supra p. 178; V. Infra pp. 366-368.
205 OPP, CXLIII, pp. 218-220
206 OPP p. 318
207 OPP p. 825 and Los complementarios, cit., pp. 196v, 204v.
208 V. Supra pp. 214-220.
209 V. Supra p. 225.
210 cit. supra pp. 212-213.
211 "Del género de poesía más propio de nuestro siglo" (1865), O. C. III, p. 54.
212 V. Supra p. 209.
213 "Del género de poesía...", O. C. III, p. 56.
214 Ibid. p. 58.
215 See especially his drafted speech to the Academia de la Lengua, OPP pp. 842-858.
216 "Prólogo de la segunda edición de Soledades, Galerías y Otros poemas" (1919), OPP p. 48.
217 "Prólogo", Soledades (1917), OPP p. 47
218 "Prólogo de la segunda edición de Soledades, Galerías y Otros poemas" (1919), OPP, p. 48
219 M. Horányi, Las dos soledades de Antonio Machado, Budapest, Académia Kiadó, 1975, passim.
Richard A. Cardwell in J.R.J.: The Modernist Apprenticeship 1895-1900 (Colloquim Verlag, Berlin, 1977) attempts to expand on Jiménez's thesis of a Krausist basis for his aesthetics, but does not account for the distortions and omissions this thesis involves; Cardwell, like Horányi, sees Giner's "Del género de poesía..." as a prescriptive rather than an analytic statement on introspective poetry (Ibid. p.125).

222 e.g. M. Tuñón de Lara, Costa y Unamuno en la crisis de fin de siglo, M, Edicusa, 1974, p.143.

223 Guillermo de Torre, El fiel de la balanza, M, Taurus, 1961, pp.146, 150.

224 e.g. G. Díaz-Plaja, Modernismo frente a noventa y ocho, M, 1951.

225 e.g. R. Gullón, Direcciones del modernismo, M, Gredos, 1963.
Don Francisco no creía que la ciencia es el fruto del árbol paradisíaco, el fruto, colgado de una alta rama, maduro y dorado, en espera de una mano codiciosa, sino una semilla que ha de germinar y florecer y madurar en las almas. Porque pensaba así, hizo casi tantos maestros como discípulos tuvo.

Antonio Machado, 23 Feb. 1915
Pedagogical theory and practice is without any doubt the field of intellectual activity where the influence of the Spanish Krausists on national life manifests itself most clearly. The Institución Libre de Enseñanza and its allies were the principal forces for practical educational reform in Restoration Spain. In this chapter I wish to examine in detail the pedagogical thought of the institucionistas (particularly Giner), something I have already described in general terms in Chapter One. I would also like to attempt to show how the educational ideals adopted by the Institución fit into the Krausist view of man and the world, forming part of a consistent and integrated whole. I shall subsequently describe Antonio Machado's ideas about education and compare them to those of his maestros at the Institución. Finally I shall examine the similarities in the views of the nature and rôle of culture in the institucionistas, Machado and certain of his literary contemporaries.

For Francisco Giner, as for the institucionistas generally, education in the widest sense was the key to the regeneration of Spain. Disillusioned by the failures of the 1868 Revolution, Giner became convinced that the only way to achieve a firm and lasting reform of Spanish society was by social pedagogy. In a famous essay of 1870 he wrote:

una experiencia dolorosa comprueba cada día más el principio de que sólo la lenta y varonil educación interior de los pueblos puede dar seguro auxilio a la iniciativa de sus individualidades superiores y firme base a la regeneración positiva y real de sus instituciones sociales. 1

For Giner and his colleagues and followers at the Institución the problem of Spain is primarily a cultural and spiritual one. "Donde hay qué hacer las revoluciones es en las cabezas, es decir en los espíritus" proclaimed Giner, quoting Ibsen. 2 Whenever he lists the symptoms
of the decadence of Spain, spiritual and ethical shortcomings predominate:

La befa de los principios, hija y madre al par de la ignorancia; el bajo nivel intelectual de casi todos nuestros hombres políticos, el desenfreno moral de una gente desalmada que corre tras los goces más ínfimos y bastos, únicos que comprende y en que cifra su desapoderada ambición; las dos clases extremas, las "altas" y la plebe, aparte excepciones, embrutecidas y enviciadas; las "medias", secas, que no sé si es peor todavía... dan en su combinación por resultante la nota común de nuestra civilización. 3

According to Giner, the foremost and most profound instrument for the recivilization of the Spanish mentality is education. Consequently he proclaims as the function of the Institución the formation of men useful to Spain and to Humanity, not just the instruction of individuals for their own benefit. The school hoped to nurture in its pupils those spiritual and moral characteristics it felt were lacking in the Spanish character, such as respect for the law, a sense of social vocation, sincere patriotism, love of work, a spirit of truth, tolerance and justice. 4

Since education is seen by the institucionistas as such a powerful tool of reform, it is logical that they should attribute to miseducation the persistence of specific spiritual deficiencies, such as untruthfulness which Giner describes as "uno de nuestros cánceres sociales, cuidadosamente mantenido por una educación corruptora". 5 Indeed he lays the blame for Spain's continuing decadence in all spheres on the nation's universities, teacher-training establishments and schools; in a prologue of 1889 he declares that, given the material and intellectual poverty of these institutions:

La nación mal puede tener otra política, ni otra ciencia, ni otra magistratura, ni otro clero, ni otra milicia, ni otra agricultura, ni otra industria, ni otros alcaldes, ni otros
So Giner asserts the primacy of education as a force for good or evil in society. Education is slower but more effective than revolution, more profound than political and legislative change. Law reform is, he believes, something purely formal and external and of very limited value when compared to a transformation of basic attitudes, of a whole national mentality. Spain does not need new electoral laws, Giner says, it needs electors with a new spirit. Only education can bring about such a change.

In so far as turn of the century regeneracionismo reflects this same scale of values in methods of reform, it is welcomed by Giner. Thus he comments on some of Costa's campaigns in favour of education:

For Giner, the social role of the teacher is every bit as important as that of scientists, artists and administrators. The teacher's mission is the cultivation of the national spirit, the purification of its tastes and customs, its morality and its ideals. This mission is one that demands patience and dedication, not revolutionary battle-cries. Therefore Giner feels it necessary to censure the excesses of turn of the century regeneracionista zeal. In one of his most concise professions of faith, he demonstrates his affinities with the post-98 spirit of criticism, and also his differences:

En los días críticos en que se acentúan el tedio, la vergüenza, el remordimiento de esta vida actual de las "clases directoras", arran-
cada, hasta donde cabe, de su comunión universal, confinada en un zaquizámi, donde no llegan el sol ni el aire, sin ideal, seca, vulgar, y sin sustancia, es más cómodo para muchos pedir alborotadas a gritos "una revolución", "un gobierno", "un hombre", "cualquier cosa", que dar en voz baja el alma entera para contribuir a crear lo único que nos hace falta: un pueblo adulto. 10

Behind the Institución's valuation of the importance of education is the Krausist belief in the perfectibility of man and the Krausist conviction that it is through increasing knowledge that mankind progresses towards moral and spiritual perfection. In the Krausist view of man ethical shortcomings are attributed to ignorance rather than to Original Sin. Consequently Sanz del Río wrote that "debe [el hombre] en el claro conocimiento de su destino educarse a sí mismo". 11 Education is the key to the moral development of an individual, a nation, or of humanity as a whole.

Also central to the educational principles of the Institución is the Krausist idea of harmony, applied to its vision of the ideal man. For the Krausists the human being is an organic unity of faculties, physical, mental and spiritual; hence the ideal man is one in whom all these faculties are developed fully and in harmony with one another. An educated man is not for a Krausist merely a distinguished specialist or even just a sound thinker - education should develop the whole man, not just his specialist knowledge or his intelligence. A man who has concentrated on the development of one faculty, for example, his intelligence, will be an unbalanced human being, deficient, for example, in moral qualities, and hence an incomplete man in spite of his wisdom. The institucionistas therefore stress the importance of using education as a means of developing other faculties as well as the intelligence. The pupil should learn to keep healthy and fit, to use his hands, to appreciate beauty, to behave respectfully and with tolerance, to feel a sense of duty and purpose in life, as well as developing
his intelligence and increasing his knowledge.

The Institución frequently emphasises this point by distinguishing in its programmes and prospectuses between the complete educación it aspires to provide and mere instrucción or enseñanza. It does not aim merely to supply the necessary knowledge or qualifications for its pupils to have successful careers. In Giner's words the school aims to produce not doctors, engineers or lawyers but "ante todo, hombres, capaces de dirigirse en la vida". The Institución has a concept of an ideal, "harmonious" man; but it is well aware that all its pupils cannot, and indeed should not, be cast in one mould.

We have seen how Krausist philosophy elevates the importance of individuality: each human being is different and this means that every man has a unique contribution to make to the life of humanity. Part of the teacher's job is to foster individuality and originality and encourage his pupil to find his own individual form of integrity and plenitude. Education must always be education of the individual.

At the same time as it stresses the importance of the individual in education, the Institución emphasises the social dimension of education as of life. It aims to form "hombres útiles al servicio de la Humanidad y de la patria". Ideally, part of the function of the Institución-educated man is to promote, in Spain, by his example, habits and qualities considered by the institucionistas to be deficient in the Spanish mentality. He will also contribute to society by his work, by a profession chosen according to his own special aptitudes and vocation. Although the school should not merely prepare a man for a particular job, it should give him those qualities necessary to do any job well, including a sense of vocation, a feeling of social responsibility and a love of work. Essentially the Institución sees education as a preparation for a full, active life. Because of this the school wishes to remove what it sees as the traditional division between on the one hand
This desire to remove false divisions is a characteristic feature of Krausist thinking which is integrated into the pedagogical thought of the institucionistas. The school, in the first few years of its existence, became an opponent of the division of education into primary, secondary and tertiary levels, each with a distinct content and methodology. The Institución espoused the view that education should form a single, continuous process with the same aims and techniques throughout. It held that education should be encyclopaedic and varied and was opposed to premature or exclusive specialisation. Even a professional man should have a wide general culture and be able to relate his speciality to the totality of human endeavour. The Institución supported the use of active and "intuitive" methods of learning at all levels, following the ideas of Pestalozzi and Froebel on this point, and were critical of traditional passive and assimilative techniques: memory learning, text books, lectures. Examinations were criticised both as a way in which the true aims of education were distorted and as a force that encouraged the arbitrary division of knowledge into distinct, false units.

The teaching method proposed by the Institución is fundamentally child-centred. The child should learn through activity, through his own direct experience of reality under the teacher's guidance. The child is not merely an empty vessel to be crammed with knowledge but an individual human being, already equipped with all the human faculties. The teacher's rôle is to nurture the natural development of the child's latent potential. A child is naturally inquisitive and his curiosity must be encouraged. The teacher must welcome the child's questions, hence promoting his interest in knowledge, and help him to discover things for himself.

To be effective, the Institución's educational plan demands a special, close and individual relationship between teacher and pupil that is lacking in the traditional Spanish system. One traditional obstacle to such
a relationship is the system of incentive and discipline through rewards and punishments. Another is the excessive number of pupils in most classes, at any level, in Spain, together with all the formalities attached to being a catedrático. An intimate relationship is impossible when teacher and pupil are separated in large classrooms, where the lesson is delivered to massed gatherings of students from a special chair on a raised platform. The educational ideal is the opposite of this: small classes where the pupil is actively involved in the lesson through collaboration and dialogue. Giner writes:

Transformad esas antiguas aulas; suprimid el estrado y la cátedra del maestro, barrera de hielo que lo aisla y hace imposible toda intimidad con el discípulo; suprimid el banco, la grada, el anfiteatro, símbolos perdurables de la uniformidad y del tedio. Romped esas enormes masas de alumnos, por necesidad constreñidas a ofir pasivamente una lección o a alternar en un interrogatorio de memoria, cuando no a presentar desde distancias increíbles ejercicios y manipulaciones de que apenas logran darse cuenta. Sustituid en torno del profesor a todos esos elementos clásicos un círculo poco numeroso de escolares activos que piensan, que hablan, que discuten, que se mueven, que están vivos, en suma, y cuya fantasía se enmobece con la idea de una colaboración en la obra del maestro. Vedlos excitados por su propia espontánea iniciativa, por la conciencia de sí mismos, porque sienten ya que son algo en el mundo y que no es pecado tener individualidad y ser hombres. Hacedles medir, pesar, descomponer, crear y disipar la materia en el laboratorio; discutir, como en Grecia, los problemas fundamentales del ser y destino de las cosas; sondear el dolor en la clínica, la nebulosa en el espacio, la producción en el suelo de la tierra, la belleza y la Historia en el museo... Y entonces la cátedra es un taller y el maestro un guía en el trabajo; los discípulos, una familia; el vínculo exterior se convierte en ético e interno; la pequeña sociedad y la grande respiran un mismo ambiente; la vida circula por todas partes y la enseñanza gana en fecundidad, en solidez, en atractivo lo que pierde en pompa y en gallardas libreas.

Plato is for Giner the finest model of this style of teaching. He is the embodiment of an active, living
educational method stripped of formal regulations, examinations, textbooks and *oposiciones* and of all the paraphernalia of academic "borlas, mucetas y demás insignias solemnes". 16 An authentic educational system on the model outlined by Giner will, he claims, close for good the gulf between teacher and pupil, whom he describes ironically as "extraños hoy, uno a otro, péra lo más de su vida, salvo el efímero vínculo de la lección académica en que el profesor se siente inspirado de Real Orden todos los lunes, miércoles y viernes, de tres y media a cinco de la tarde." 17

Educational excursions were for the Institución an important means of enabling pupils to observe and experience reality, although this was not their only value. Excursions also provide healthy exercise, an opportunity to practice social skills, and a means of extending the learning experience outside the limits of the classroom and the school timetable, again, trying to overcome the division between school and real life. Excursions are also a way of strengthening the personal relationship between teacher and pupil through extra-curricular contact. 18

It is typical of the thinking of the institucionistas to see a plurality of benefits deriving from one teaching activity: again we can note the urge not to make false divisions into distinct school subjects, to make any instructive activity at the same time educative in a wider sense. Sport, much promoted by the Institución, following the English example, is similarly seen as an activity with various benefits. Partly it is a hygienic activity and an aspect of physical education: for the institucionistas something as important as education of the mind and spirit, following the Krausist respect for the body as "Nature" in man. But sport also has an ethical function, developing such qualities as "team spirit" and a sense of "fair play".

Two of the images most often used by the Institución to describe its view of the nature of the educative process
are the image of awakening something dormant and the image of nurturing a seed to fruition. Both these images reflect the view that a pupil’s development is, or should be, something quite natural and individual – not a pre-determined moulding imposed by a teacher. The stress placed on the naturalness of a child’s development is, like that placed on its unique individuality, consistent with the Krausist view of man. As we have seen, for the Krausists a number of faculties and impulses are inherent in human nature: Reason, conscience, love, the urge to do good, the desire for knowledge, the sense of beauty. They are not things that a teacher has to impose on a pupil: his rôle is merely to encourage their growth, to awaken a latent potential. Giner writes:

The view of education and of human nature proposed by the Institución is defined by contrast both with the most common educational practices of the time and with the vision of man these practices are founded on. In contrast to the optimistic humanism of the Krausists is the Catholic conviction of the need to combat the evil inherent in man by imposing strict adherence to the teachings of the Church. 20
education is primarily concerned with the development of the intelligence, to the detriment of the development of other human faculties. This does not mean, however, that the institucionistas underestimate the importance of promoting the ability to think and reason as an element of education. What they wish to do is to place rationality in what they consider to be its proper context. Firstly, it is only one of several human faculties, with which it must harmonise. Secondly, rationalism should not be something abstract but something rooted in reality and life. The faculty of rational thought, Giner writes, should be developed by active and intuitive methods of education, just like any other sphere of learning:

The pupil should learn through Socratic dialogue to think for himself. In this way he acquires the habit of questioning, arguing and doubting, of disciplining thoughts that are his own. Again Giner uses an organic image to describe the educational process: "spreading the wings of his spirit". Again learning is likened to an awakening, a coming to consciousness. Two other details of Giner's speech are worthy of comment. Firstly his final remarks on the responsibility derived from the rational faculty. Rationality is not an independent power but a
faculty which must work in harmony with the other human faculties, here the ethical imperative to act purposively and responsibly. Giner's rationalism is the "Racionalismo armónico" of Krause. Secondly, Giner mentions an "espíritu sectario". The Institución's attitude to the teaching of religion derives from its dislike of the sectarianism and dogmatism of the Catholic Church which it considers a divisive force in society and a barrier to freedom of thought. The Institución wanted to secularize education at the same time preserving a sense of respect and tolerance towards all religious beliefs. It wanted, it claimed, to preserve children from the divisions produced in the adult world by sectarianism. The school also claimed not to be sectarian itself in philosophical or political beliefs:

La Institución Libre de Enseñanza es completamente ajena a todo espíritu e interés de comunión religiosa, escuela filosófica o partido político; proclama tan sólo el principio de la libertad e inviolabilidad de la ciencia 23

Now it is quite clear that the Institución's teachers had their own philosophical views, but their claim is that they did not wish to impose these beliefs ready-made on their pupils. Rather they maintain that the pupil should learn to think for himself and eventually to produce original ideas. In considering the aims and techniques of teaching pupils to think for themselves Giner gives great emphasis to the fostering of the critical spirit. Learning to look critically at the thoughts of others is a vital stage in learning to think for oneself. Giner is careful to distinguish the true critical spirit from what he calls "the spirit of contradiction", that is to say a purely negative and subjective disposition to disagree or find error. The true critical spirit is creative; it is a genuine stimulus to constructive reflection and independent thought. One must acquire the habit of thinking through for oneself what has already been thought by others.
Giner wishes to discourage the lazy acceptance of ideas merely because of the reputation of their exponent; he sees the links of his own criticismo to that of Kant:

> pensando con aquella ignava ratio, en vano flagelada por Kant, que pues las cosas están ya sabidas y explicadas en reflexión, discurso y lengua, no hay para qué tomarse el trabajo de mirarlas con nuestros propios ojos... es uso imaginar todavía las doctrinas científicas como una especie de cristalizaciones, como construcciones definitivas, perpetuas e irreformables, en las cuales fuera sacrilegio poner mano. 25

Giner goes on to censure those who take ideas directly and without thought from currently respected thinkers—he names Kant, Spencer, Comte, Wundt, Krause and Tiberghien (a Belgian Krausist thinker). 26 He reserves a particular scorn for those who not only accept the ideas of others as definitive truths but try to preserve the very ways in which these ideas are expressed as something inalterable and sacred. The thoughts of others, Giner concludes, like any form of knowledge, are to be acquired only by living them oneself, not by blindly accepting them and even less by memorising them.

Behind Giner's affirmation of the importance of approaching ideas critically is his own conviction of the relative and historical nature of all truths expressed by human thinkers. There is no such thing as a doctrine that is absolutely and finally true. The best that can be said of a thinker such as Kant or Krause is that his thought represents an important step forward in human awareness, or the most advanced thinking of his time. But it is the duty of subsequent generations to continue this progressive development of thought towards further awareness. Hence Giner's attitude to rationalism and to teaching students to think rationally for themselves is in line both with the Krausist philosophy of history and with the Krausist faith in the ability of free and independent rational enquiry to lead mankind to the truth and to guide each individual man in his daily life. Men
have no need of external ideological or moral authority. Each man can and should function autonomously, using his own Reason and his own conscience. It is the teacher's rôle to awaken and develop these natural powers in each individual student under his guidance, not to impose ideas on him. One thing Giner is proud of in Spanish Krausism is its lack of a tradition of strict doctrinal orthodoxy, and the consequent vigour and variety of its development in different directions: he compares the Spanish Krausists to branches that have sprouted from a single trunk. 27 Sanz del Río, Giner explains, did not aspire to teach a philosophical doctrine but to teach how to philosophise. 28 Adopting this motto as his own, Giner summarises his own views on philosophical education thus:

In short, the principal aim of education of the intelligence is to teach the individual how to think for himself. The individual learns to think by active debate, and by approaching the thought of others critically, but the ultimate aim is for the individual to develop his own latent potential for original thought. The teacher should be like Socrates: a midwife who aids his pupil in giving birth to his own thoughts. Finally, the individual's capacity for rational thought should be dedicated to achieving his own full potential as a human being and to fulfilling his obra: his life within society and as a member of the human race. Education is for the institucionistas a process by means of which a man's full potentialities are awakened for life; it is not a mere acquisition of information or of qualifications.
In the light of this exposition of the pedagogy of Giner and the *Institución Libre* it is easy to see the accuracy of Machado's portrait of Giner of 1915:

Su modo de enseñar era el socrático: el diálogo sencillo y persuasivo. Estimulaba el alma de sus discípulos – de los hombres o de los niños – para que la ciencia fuese pensada, vivida por ellos mismos. Muchos profesores piensan haber dicho bastante contra la enseñanza rutinaria y dogmática, recomendando a sus alumnos que no aprendan las palabras, sino los conceptos de textos o conferencias. Ignoran que hay muy poca diferencia entre aprender palabras y recitar conceptos. Son dos operaciones igualmente mecánicas. Lo que importa es aprender a pensar, a utilizar nuestros propios sesos para el uso a que están por naturaleza destinados y a calcar fielmente la línea sinuosa y siempre original de nuestro propio sentir, a ser nosotros mismos, para poner el sello de nuestra alma en nuestra obra.

D. Francisco Giner no creía que la ciencia es el fruto del árbol paradisiaco, el fruto, colgado de una alta rama, maduro y dorado, en espera de una mano atrevida y codiciosa, sino una semilla que ha de germinar y florecer y madurar en las almas. 30

This is clearly more than a mere summary of another man’s points of view: it is a statement of shared beliefs. I have already shown how a speech made by Machado in Soria in 1910 anticipates several ideas and even expressions attributed to Giner in the 1915 tribute. The common ground shared by Machado and Giner is ethical as well as pedagogical. 31 Another very institucionista idea expressed in the 1910 speech is the importance of the education of children for the future progress of Spain – Machado tells the children in his audience:

vosotros representáis un porvenir incierto. Vuestro mañana acaso sea un retorno a un pasado muerto y corrompido. Para que vosotros representéis la aurora de un día claro y fecundo, preciso es que os aprestéis por el trabajo y la cultura a aportar al tesoro que os legaron las generaciones muertas, la obra viva de vuestras manos. 32
Another relatively early article by Machado that expresses ideas on education is "Granada: el doctor Berrueta". As the article's discoverer, M. Baamonde, says, it has a very clear institucionalista stamp. In praising the educational spirit and methods of Berrueta, Professor of Art at Granada University, Machado identifies his own beliefs with those of the Institución. Like Giner, Machado criticises the separation of student and teacher and the formality characteristic of traditional Spanish teaching, proposing instead that the teacher should be a friend and fellow-worker of his pupils. Giner describes the ideal class as a workshop ("la cátedra es un taller y el maestro un guía en el trabajo"); Machado speaks approvingly of Berrueta's methods in similar terms:

Propone un plan de estudios, temas concretos de investigación, y, reservándose una parte de obrero, asigna a cada uno de sus discípulos aquella labor más en armonía con sus gustos.

Like his teachers at the Institución, Machado prefers practical work and experience to abstract, memoristic learning. He describes enthusiastically the use made by Berrueta of educational excursions, a characteristic feature of the pedagogy of the Institución. Machado, like Giner, is critical of the examination system as a standard for the measurement of educational achievement, valuing instead the evidence of students' ability and enthusiasm to investigate and work for themselves:

la eficacia de un centro de enseñanza y la valía de sus profesores, no han de juzgarse por las listas de Matrículas de Honor ni por la cantidad de títulos expedidos, sino por la calidad de los trabajos, por la sazón de los frutos, por cuanta cultura asimilada se manifiesta en labor fecunda y libre del alumno. La formación de unos cuantos hombres capaces de pensar, de sentir y de trabajar, de unos cuantos valores humanos, es todo lo más y todo lo menos que puede pedirse a un maestro.
The last sentence could well have been written by Giner, with its emphasis on education as the development of a man's complete potential, moral and spiritual as well as intellectual. Compare what Giner wrote in the Institución's 1880 prospectus:

La Institución no se propone tan sólo enseñar e instruir sino a la vez, y muy principalmente, educar; su objeto no se reduce a preparar a sus alumnos para ser un día abogados, médicos, ingenieros etc. sino para ser ante todo hombres, capaces de dirigirse en la vida y de ocupar digna y útilmente el puesto que les está reservado. Para ello tiene que atender tanto por lo menos como a la inteligencia de sus alumnos a sus sentimientos y a sus acciones; tiene que cuidarse de los más mínimos pormenores de su conducta para enseñarles a vivir, no meramente a pensar y estudiari.

Although there is evidence of Machado's pedagogical ideas as early as 1910 it is in Juan de Mairena that these are most fully expressed. In 1910 Machado proclaimed to the schoolchildren of Soria the importance of individual thought. Juan de Mairena expands on this notion, explaining in more detail his methodology for teaching pupils to think for themselves. Mairena rejects the idea that his rôle as a teacher is merely to impart information; his function is to stimulate the critical faculties of his pupils:

Vosotros sabéis que yo no pretendo enseñar nada, y que sólo me aplico a sacudir la inercia de vuestras almas, a arar el barbecho empeder-nido de vuestro pensamiento, a sembrar inquietudes, como se ha dicho muy razonablemente, y yo diría mejor, a sembrar preocupaciones y prejuicios.

Dialogue is essential to Mairena's method. Like Giner, he does not distinguish between the techniques appropriate for education at different levels or ages; the curiosity thought characteristic of children should, he believes, be encouraged in pupils of all ages:
Preguntadlo todo, como hacen los niños. ¿Por qué esto? ¿Por qué lo otro? ¿Por qué lo de más allá? En España no se dialoga porque nadie pregunta. 39

The model for Mairena's teaching style is, like Giner's, Socrates. Like Giner, Mairena mocks the academic conventions which build barriers between teacher and pupil:

Es cierto que yo no distingo entre alumnos oficiales y libres matriculados; cierto es también que en esta clase, sin tarima para el profesor ni cátedra propiamente dicha - Mairena no solía sentarse o lo hacía sobre la mesa - , todos dialogamos a la manera socrática, que muchas veces charlamos como buenos amigos, y hasta alguna vez discutimos acaloradamente. 40

Giner repeatedly emphasises that development of the intellect must be directed to practical ends: rationality, he says, is not a prerogative to be shown off or misused but an instrument for responsible action. 41 Mairena echoes this point of view:

¿Intelectuales? ¿Por qué no? Pero nunca virtuosos de la inteligencia. La inteligencia ha de servir siempre para algo, aplicarse a algo, aprovechar a alguien. 42

Mairena's attitude to Christianity is a measured one. On the one hand he is critical of traditional "religious education" - "De la enseñanza religiosa decía mi maestro 'la verdad es que no la veo por ninguna parte'". 43 Machado himself describes Jesuit education as "profoundly unChristian". 44 Mairena is opposed to what he sees as the perversion of Christianity. He is by no means opposed to the authentic Christian tradition as he sees it - for him as for the Krausists Christianity is essentially an ethic of brotherly love. 45 As we have already seen, Mairena claims that his school is not an enemy of historical religions, but, like the Institución,
his claim is accompanied by a statement of free-thinking principles that he knows is in conflict with contemporary Catholicism. 46 Mairena also echoes the Institución's statutes when he denies the existence of any philosophical or religious sectarianism within his school:

De nuestra escuela no habría de salir tampoco una nueva escolástica, la cual supone una Iglesia o un Poder político más o menos acordes en defender y abrigar un dogma, con su tabú correspondiente, sino todo lo contrario. Nuestro hombre no tendría nada de sacerdote, ni de sacrificador, ni de catequista, como sus alumnos nada de sectarios, ni de feligreses, ni siquiera de catecúmenos. 47

Mairena says that the man or men needed to staff his Escuela Popular de Sabiduría Superior would be "en la línea tradicional protagonicosocraticoplatónico, y también convergentemente en la cristiana". 48 The Christian element would be ethical, and would be embodied in the teacher in his rôle as a spiritual and moral guide as well as an intellectual one.

Unlike the pedagogy of Giner, that of Juan de Mairena is not a systematically formulated whole; its fragmentary nature makes it difficult to compare the two. The closest Mairena comes to outlining an educational programme and pedagogical creed is in an article published by Machado in 1937. The main points can be extracted thus:

Repárad en mi enseñanza. Yo os enseño, o pretendo enseñaros a contemplar. ¿El qué? me diréis. El cielo y sus estrellas, y la mar y el campo, y las ideas mismas, y la conducta de los hombres (...) Yo os enseño, o pretendo enseñaros, a meditar sobre todas las cosas contempladas, y sobre vuestras mismas meditaciones (...) Yo os enseño, o pretendo enseñaros, a renunciar a las tres cuartas partes de las cosas que se consideran necesarias (...) Yo os enseño, o pretendo enseñaros, a trabajar sin hurtar el cuerpo a las faenas más duras, pero libres de la jactancia del trabajador y
de la superstición del trabajo (...) 
Yo os enseño, o pretendo enseñaros, oh amigos queridos, el amor a la filosofía de los antiguos griegos, hombres de agilidad mental ya desusada, y el respeto a la sabiduría oriental, mucho más honda que la nuestra y de mucho más largo radio metafísico (...)
Yo os enseño, o pretendo enseñaros, a que dudéis de todo (...)
Yo os enseño — en fin — o pretendo enseñaros, el amor al próximo y al distante y al semejante y al diferente.

Mairena’s declared aims are to stimulate rather than to instruct or inform; in every case "yo os enseño..." is followed by an activity to be practiced or an attitude to be adopted by his pupils. The activities are what he calls elsewhere "las actividades esencialmente humanas" or "las altas y libres actividades del espíritu" and which include "atención, reflexión, especulación, contemplación admirativa". Part of Mairena’s aim is the encouragement of mental habits: contemplation, meditation and doubt. However, like Giner, he also aspires to stimulate other human faculties as well as the intellect, especially the moral and aesthetic senses.

In the area of thought, Mairena advises his pupils to doubt everything, to question everything. He too sees the importance of developing the critical spirit as a means of teaching his pupils to think for themselves. They should learn, he declares, "a repensar lo pensado, a desaber lo sabido". If we consider Mairena’s radical scepticism purely in a pedagogical context then his affinities with Socrates and Giner are obvious. However, it would be inaccurate to think of Juan de Mairena as solely or even primarily a pedagogical work. It does contain sections that are predominantly pedagogical, and the characterisation of Juan de Mairena as a teacher gives much of what he has to say a pedagogical dimension. But a large proportion of the work is concerned with presenting Machado’s philosophical and poetic beliefs. Mairena’s scepticism is principally a key element in Machado’s critique of rationalism.
In the degree of his scepticism and his mistrust of rationalism Mairena goes much further than Giner. He does, however, leave open a possible escape route from "el lóbrego callejón del escepticismo": the doubting of one's own doubts, which he says, ironically, is the only way one can begin to believe in anything.

As well as aspiring to teach his pupils to think critically for themselves he aims to teach them to meditate and to contemplate. The distinction between contemplation and meditation is given some emphasis by the apocryphal teacher, as is the need for the former to precede the latter. The reason for this is explained in part by Mairena himself: the word contemplation suggests a distancing from objects, an unhurried and objective observation of reality. In this attitude Mairena seems to echo Giner's emphasis on the need to "estudiar y conocer las cosas antes de ponerse a hablar de ellas". Thought should always be grounded in reality. The term contemplation as used by Mairena also implies an aesthetic experience of reality - in defining essentially human activities he qualifies contemplation as "contemplación admirativa". Mairena wishes his pupils to observe and enjoy reality. He is also precise about the nature of the reality to be contemplated: "El cielo y sus estrellas, y la mar y el campo, y las ideas mismas, y la conducta de los hombres" - the Universe, Nature, human thought and human behaviour. In addition to the ideas of other men, he is advising his pupils to enjoy and reflect on physical reality and social life. Like Giner, Mairena does not wish the spiritual and intellectual life to be a life alienated from reality - the physical world and the world of men. Like Giner he wants to inspire in his pupils "el amor a lo bello y a las grandes cosas".

Mairena's teaching, according to the programme set out above, is directed to intellectual and aesthetic development. It is also directed to moral development. Mairena points out a number of values he would like to
instil in his pupils: the ethic of brotherly love, tolerance, renunciation and austerity. As I have already shown, in stressing these values Machado aligns himself with the ethics of Krausism. 56 I have also examined one point on which Machado differs from the Krausists (which Mairena alludes to): his attitude to the work ethic. 57

Another minor difference between Juan de Mairena's pedagogical thinking and that of the Institución Libre concerns physical education. In spite of being officially a teacher of gymnastics, Mairena does not believe in "physical education". "No hay que educar físicamente a nadie", he proclaims, adding that gymnastics and sports are mechanical and unnatural activities, something set apart from a man's normal physical and social life. 58 The Institución did believe in physical education as an essential part of the education of the whole man, although Giner looked less favourably on gymnastics, especially of a militaristic type, than on sports and excursions into the countryside. 59 In sport Giner saw both physical and spiritual benefits, as I have already mentioned, and he claimed to prefer to see children practicing sports and organised games rather than playing freely but aimlessly (what he calls with Krausist seriousness "el juego inorgánico"). 60 The Institución introduced English games such as rounders, football and paper-chase into Spain. Mairena's dislike of sports is partly a consequence of the temperament of his creator, but it also owes something to the time at which he was writing. Whereas when Giner campaigned for physical education in schools sports were little practiced in Spain, Machado lived to see the upsurge in interest in sport of the 1920s, which he saw as a manifestation of "una ola de fanatismo y de americanismo". 61

Mairena is opposed to physical education in the sense of gymnastics and sports, but he is in total sympathy with excursionismo as a part of education.
After criticising sports he goes on to praise the plurality of educational benefits to be had from trips into the countryside, benefits both spiritual and physical. The contemplation of nature, he writes, provokes an aesthetic and spiritual joy and gives children a direct contact with physical reality much more likely to awake their scientific curiosity than book-learning. Some of the terms Mairena uses in his comment on excursions are significant indicators of his general pedagogical approach. He writes of the need to "despertar en el niño el amor a la naturaleza...o la curiosidad por ella"; the child's natural curiosity is the best educational motivation; the teacher is above all a stimulator, an awakener, not an imparter of information. We have seen the same ideas and terms in Giner. In the same piece Mairena also reveals that he shares the Ginerian concept of education as a preparation for one's whole life; in praising excursions as a means of physical education he states his intention as "para crear hábitos saludables que nos acompañen toda la vida", implying, perhaps, that any benefits derived from sport and gymnastics are unlikely to continue beyond one's formal school life. 62

Another thing that Mairena's pedagogy has in common with that of the Institución is that it is child-centred. The Institución declares "como base primordial, ineludible, el principio de la reverencia máxima debida al niño" 63 and Machado echoes this, though with a slight amendment: "hemos adquirido un respeto al niño, loable, en verdad, si no alcanzase los linderos de la idolatría". However, although the aim of the pedagogy of both is to stimulate the natural development of the pupil, they are both very conscious of the enormous importance of the quality of the teacher who adopts such a rôle of stimulator. For Giner "El maestro no representa un elemento importante de ese orden, sino el primero, por no decir el todo. Dadme el maestro y os abandono la organización, el local, los medios materiales, cuantos
factores, en suma, contribuyen a auxiliar su función". 65 Mairena says he needs, to staff his school "un hombre extraordinario, o si queréis, varios hombres extraordinarios", though none of them would be "sabios especializados". 66 Like Giner, Mairena is opposed to excessive specialisation, and holds that every educated man should have a wide enough general culture to give him a vision of the totality of human knowledge. 67

Mairena believes in the importance of teachers and advises his pupils to mistrust autodidacticism since "es poco lo que se puede aprender sin auxilio ajeno". 68 Machado defines his concept of the true master/disciple relationship when commenting on Joaquín Xirau:

Es Joaquín Xirau... un discípulo de Ortega y Gasset, en el mejor sentido de la palabra, que ha encontrado en la cátedra de su maestro ayuda y estímulos para pensar. Quiero decir, que Ortega y Gasset no le ha apartado de su natural inclinación, sino, por el contrario, le ha confirmado y alentado en ella. Es sólo esta relación entre maestro y discípulo lo que pretendo hacer constar. 69

The maestro's rôle is to foster and stimulate his pupil's natural tendencies. A maestro is also for Mairena a spiritual guide, as well as an intellectual one; hence he writes: "Vosotros debéis amar y respetar a vuestros maestros, a cuantos de buena fe se interesan por vuestra formación espiritual". 70 The use of punishments and threats by the schoolteacher has no place in his concept of a true pupil/teacher relationship:

De ningún modo conviene que enturbiamos con amenazas el ambiente benevolo, fuera del cual no hay manera de aprender nada que valga la pena de ser sabido... Si acusamos a nuestro prójimo, quizá no demos en calumniadores, pero estableceremos con él una falsísima relación, terriblemente desorientadora y descaminante, de la cual todo maestro ha de huir como de la peste. Porque indirectamente nos proponemos como modelo, no siéndolo, con lo cual mentimos y le cerramos al mismo tiempo la única vía, o
la vía mejor, para que descubra en sí mismo lo que ya nosotros hemos descubierto. 71

The same criticism of traditional classroom discipline, and belief in the importance of a close and friendly pupil/teacher relationship, where the teacher can teach spiritual and moral lessons by example, can be observed in the pedagogical declarations of the Institución:

Respecto a disciplina, enseñanza moral y vigilancia, la Institución representa una protesta completa contra el sistema corruptor de exámenes, de premios y castigos, de espionaje y garantías exteriores. Espera el progreso y la corrección moral de sus alumnos de la intimidad personal en que el maestro vive con ellos y del influjo que este régimen permite para despertar en sus conciencias el sentimiento del deber y el respeto a sí mismos. 72

Here both Giner and Machado imply their vision of the moral impulse as something inherent in human beings; the teacher is not there to enforce a moral code but to help his pupils to discover an innate morality, to awaken their natural ethical sense.

In Chapter XXXIX of Juan de Mairena there appears a reflection on problems of the pupil/teacher relationship that may have been prompted by an article by Giner — "Un peligro de toda enseñanza". The Mairena chapter was published in El Sol in 1935; the article by Giner dates from 1884, though the second edition of Educación y enseñanza (O.C. XII) in which it appears was published in 1933. The problem is stated by Mairena in the following terms:

¿Cómo puede un maestro, o si queréis, un pedagogo, enseñar, educar, conducir al niño sin hacerse algo niño a su vez, y sin acabar profesando un saber infantilizado? 73

Giner begins similarly:
La comunicación del maestro con sus educandos, cualesquiera que sean la edad y cultura de éstos, no puede menos de estrechar el horizonte intelectual del primero, por la exigencia imprescindible de acomodar el grado de su pensamiento a otro menos desarrollado, aunque no sea más que en aquella esfera. Para tratar con niños es menester hacerse niño.

Both Mairena and Giner concur on the value of the teacher becoming "child-like" in some ways. For Mairena "siempre es niño el capaz de aprender, aunque tenga más años que un palmar"; for Giner the teacher should be "a la vez maestro y discípulo". A good teacher should continue to learn throughout his life. Both Mairena and Giner agree on the pedagogical value of the teacher adapting himself to the level of his pupils, and promoting an intimate relationship with them rather than "teaching down" to them. There are similarities in the starting points of these two articles. However they develop in different directions; Giner takes up the problem of the continuation of the education of teachers, especially isolated rural teachers, after their training, in order to keep their intellectual horizons open. Machado is concerned above all in his chapter of Juan de Mairena with the dangers of pedantry. He declares that if something cannot be taught in language children can understand, then it is probably the case that the teacher does not truly understand the subject he is trying to teach. Mairena's comments are a part of his criticism of traditional rhetoric and pleading for simplicity and clarity of language.

Giner saw the Platonic dialogues as the model for his own pedagogical style, and that he conformed to this model is confirmed by many former pupils including Leopoldo Palacios, Manuel Azaña and of course Machado in his prose tribute. Mairena also aspires to follow Plato, but it seems very possible that it may have been Giner who provided Machado with a living example of such a style. As I have said, Machado attended Giner's
famous class at the University of Madrid, officially part of a law course but in fact attended predominantly by people from outside the University who were disciples of Giner. Palacios’ description of Giner’s style as a teacher there is worth quoting at length:

En clase no hacía lecciones seguidas, ni explicaba un sistema, ni siquiera un asunto monográfico determinado. Confía a los alumnos trabajos especiales. Aquellos los producían en notas, sobre las que recaía el más minucioso estudio. El profesor suscitaba problemas, aportaba información, sugería dudas y reservas, provocaba nuevos estudios y confrontaciones, indicaba autores y libros y hablaba de su significación sobre los puntos más importantes. Uno de sus discípulos llevaba el "diario de la clase", que originaba nuevos comentarios. A veces, sin embargo, al crepúsculo de la tarde, en un ambiente de sombras, apenas alumbrada por un candelabro solemne y la llama despabilada y efímera de algún tizón encendido, D. Francisco se abandonaba a sí mismo ante los alumnos, embelesados, hacia las cimas de la más sustanciosa, precisa, difícil y ardorosa elocuencia. Pero cuando se daba cuenta se interrumpía de súbito y como avergonzado: - Ea, señores, se acabó; somos meridionales y sensibleros; ¡somos incorregibles! - 78

There are a number of features Juan de Mairena’s class has in common with Giner’s: it is voluntary and the teacher ignores the traditional, formal distinctions between matriculados and no matriculados, oficiales and libres oyentes; there is no set programme for the course; the norm is dialogue between teacher and pupil, with the teacher acting as a guide, raising questions and doubts, and encouraging debate and thought, as well as providing information. Even Giner’s involuntary flights of rhetoric have their equivalents in Juan de Mairena, and the use of a humorous and self-deprecating irony is common to both teachers. 79 Giner never gave examinations; Mairena does so, but very light-heartedly. Many of Mairena’s classes are described, according to Machado, following the notes of his students - like Giner’s
"diario de la clase". The classes of both Mairena and Giner are rich and varied experiences, and such unconventional classes take place within, and hence in deliberate contrast to, conventional Spanish educational institutions.

Mairena's dream of his class being suppressed by Royal Decree could be seen as a repetition of the prehistory of the Institución: his crime is said to have been the encouragement of free thought, and one is reminded of the dismissal (and imprisonment) of the Krausist textos vivos in 1868 and 1875. It is true that the event in Juan de Mairena contains a direct reference to Socrates - the teacher is accused of "corrupting youth", but his accusers are the Spanish Church and State, personified as "un extraño hombrecillo, con sotana eclesiástica y tricornio de Guardia Civil". 80

Several critics have suggested that features of Juan de Mairena might have been modelled on Giner. 81 Some importance has been attached to the fact that Mairena's official cátedra is that of Gymnastics, his unofficial one that of Rhetoric. For Segundo Serrano Poncela the combination of Rhetoric and Gymnastics is significant in that they are both, he claims, "symbols of institucionismo". 82 This is an unconvincing explanation in view of Mairena's opinion of gymnastics. Helen Grant offers another model for this detail: Adolfo Almazán, teacher of Gymnastics and Grammar at the Instituto in Baeza, as well as owner of the rebotica where Machado attended a tertulia. 83 Another possible explanation of the choice of Gymnastics is that it derives from some experience of Machado's, in the same way as many minor details and anecdotes in the book do. Machado was once amused when visiting the Ministry of Education in Madrid by being taken for a gym teacher. 84 Finally, it could be argued that Gymnastics is intended purely as a contrast to Rhetoric: physical versus mental acrobatics. Ultimately it is impossible and unimportant to attribute a detail such as this to one particular
source. More important are the ideas expressed in Juan de Mairena: ideas on many subjects and from many sources. Some of these ideas have no relation to Giner, Krausism, or the Institución, so it is impossible to conclude that the apocryphal teacher is a disguised portrait of Giner. The disparate elements that make up the character and ideology of Mairena are held together by the personality and beliefs of his creator: Machado himself states that Mairena is his yo filosófico. Yet some of these ideas clearly owe something to the influence of Giner and the Institución on Machado. In the area of pedagogical theory, as we have seen, there are noteworthy similarities between Machado and the institucionistas, and, insofar as Mairena, as portrayed in the classroom, puts these ideas into practice, we can say that the Institución and Giner provided Machado with a model for features of his ideal teacher.

As well as writing on pedagogical subjects, Machado was of course a practising teacher: as I have already pointed out, his choice of career may well have been influenced by Giner. However, the available evidence suggests that, as a teacher, Machado fell far short of his own ideals and the ideals of his teachers at the Institución; in fact his teaching corresponds more closely to the routine model satirized by Giner. A.J. McVan reports some details of his teaching manner given by former pupils and concludes that Machado lacked any real interest in teaching. He is said to have worked from the official textbooks which he would open at random, often repeating the same lesson. He smoked in class and sometimes fell asleep. An ex-pupil of his at the Instituto in Baeza claims that his classes were totally without discipline or order and that his pupils only attended when they had nothing better to do. Machado was sleepy and unconcerned and was often the butt of practical jokes and of some ridicule. Machado himself admitted that he felt no vocation for teaching and saw his work only as an obligation:
No tengo vocación de maestro y mucho menos de catecártico. Procuro, no obstante, cumplir con mi deber. 90

This lack of interest and drift into routine is confirmed by the testimony of two institucionistas who were with Machado in Segovia: P. de A. Cobos 91 and Rubén Landa. 92 Another colleague of his in Segovia, Quintanilla, remembers Machado's lack of class discipline and disrespect for the examination system, and tries to explain the motives behind these attitudes:

Era benévelo por su carácter bondadoso, pero él justificaba su actitud en el sistema de enseñanza, con excesivo lastre escolástico y memorístico, que lo convertía en una farsa, que había que desacreditar por completo... Aprobaba en la educación lo que era auténtico, pero satirizaba a los reformadores pedagógicos a quienes llamaba "jaleadores pedagógicos", porque su oficio era batir palmas mientras los demás trabajaban. 93

The implied criticism of the existing educational system is in the spirit of the Institución, but the purely negative and destructive tactic is most certainly not. Neither is the satire of pedagogical reformers consistent with an institucionista way of thinking. 94 Cobos's rationalizations of Machado's shortcomings as a teacher are even less satisfactory from an institucionista standpoint. He says that Machado had no confidence in the existing educational system and no faith that he could achieve anything worthwhile by his own teaching; on behalf of Machado, Cobos asks rhetorically:

¿De qué les habla de servir a los chicos de España, ni a la humanidad entera que él enseñara un poquito más de francés o de literatura? 95

a statement that totally contradicts the institucionista idea that teaching comprises 'a complete educación', not mere instruction in a given subject, and the gradualist...
faith in the slow and unspectacular education of generations of Spaniards as the only way to assure the regeneration of the nation. In theory Machado shared the faith in education of the Institución: we have seen how he saw in the schoolchildren of Soria a potential "aurora de un día claro y fecundo" for Spain, if they could learn to build, through work and knowledge, on the foundations of the culture of the past, and create the culture of the future. Machado's belief in the importance of spiritual and intellectual regeneration is most frequently expressed in terms of "culture" rather than education. The need to spread "culture" to the entire Spanish people is a recurring and important theme of his mature prose writings, particularly Juan de Mairena. The apocryphal teacher's Escuela Popular de Sabiduría Superior aims to awaken the spiritual potential of the people of Spain, not just to teach a handful of adolescents. Machado, as I shall attempt to show in this and the final chapter, shares the belief in cultural reformism of the Institución. Yet he seemed unable or unwilling to contribute to the cultural regeneration of Spain through his work as a schoolteacher.

A key question in the cultural reformism of both Machado and the Institución is the question of the relationship between the intellectual élite of the nation and the people. Critics have given considerable attention to the question of the "élitism" of the Institución; left-wing critics in particular have seen this as something to be censured in the school's ideology. Elías Díaz writes: "Resulta fácil descubrir un fondo elitista y de cierto aristocrático en ese moderado reformismo armónico del krausismo"; concluding that this élitism manifests itself in political attitudes that are inadequate from a democratic point of view. Tuñón de Lara also sees a cultural élitism implicit in the Institución's vision of its rôle in Spanish society as the creator of a new
intellectual élite which will be equipped to undertake the reform of Spain from positions of intellectual authority. Viewed thus, the Institución’s élitism has several facets: the restriction of its special education to a small number of privileged pupils; the importance attached to political and cultural leadership within society; and the view of culture as something created by the few, with the many as no more than passive recipients of culture from the élite, via education and art. I shall be examining this view of the Institución’s élitism shortly, suggesting that there is a need to distinguish between the school’s de facto élitism as a tiny, middle-class institution in Madrid, limited in size and resources, and the theoretical attitudes to culture, education and élites held by its teachers. Although Tuñón admits that the question of élitism is a complex one, with problems of theory and practice and differences of opinion amongst institucio- nistas, he sees fit to make a contrast between what he sees as the élitism of the Institución and the more "democratic" views of Antonio Machado in two books: Antonio Machado, poeta del pueblo and Medio siglo de cultura española (1885-1936). In the first of these works he writes, for example:

No cabe duda de que la trayectoria de Machado, si tiene siempre raíces en la ética de Giner, está muy lejos de compartir – es más, está en el polo opuesto – los propósitos de institucio- nistas de consagrarse a formar "minorías para la nación." 101

Tuñón’s judgements have been influential. José María Valverde, in his 1975 biography of Machado, echoes the above quotation when he affirms:

Precisamente en Juan de Mairena quedará del todo claro que las ideas machadianas sobre la pedagogía, con el tiempo, han dejado de identificarse con las de la Institución Libre de Enseñanza, consagrada principalmente a "formar minorías". 102
Yet, curiously, in the same year, Tuñón returned to this theme and expressed his judgement in terms of a correction of Valverde’s statement! Developing on some of the provisos he had make earlier about the complexities of the subject of the elitism of the Institución he now emphasises the importance of distinguishing the original thought of Giner de los Ríos from that of some of his disciples who succeeded him, and concludes that Machado’s ideas about culture coincidé, on the whole, with those of Giner.¹⁰³ I shall now attempt to examine the whole question of the nature of culture and the rôle of élites in the thought of Machado and of important institucionalistas.

Machado’s earliest article that deals with these themes in any detail is "Sobre pedagogía", published in 1913. The article was written, in part, in response to a lecture by Cossío on educational problems, of which Machado must have read an account in the press, since the text of the lecture was not published.¹⁰⁴ Machado feels the need to comment on Cossío’s proposal to send Spain’s best teachers to the most culturally deprived parts of the country, that is to rural schools. This is a much repeated institucionalista idea; Giner wrote in 1900: "Hay, pues, que enviar a las peores escuelas los mejores maestros".¹⁰⁵ Such an idea is in one sense deliberately anti-élitist: culture should be for all, and Spain needs more widespread and better education at all levels, not merely a better educated intellectual élite. When Giner writes of the educational needs of Spain he is careful to point out that the distinction between the educated and the uneducated is not a matter of social class:

además, hoy, esta educación – y reeducación en su caso – no sólo se aplica a las clases pobres, sino a las acomadadas, aristocráticas y directoras, no menos necesitadas que aquéllas ¹⁰⁶
In "Sobre pedagogía" Machado begins his commentary by approving of Cossío's proposal and its egalitarian implications. Yet he quickly moves on to another aspect of the plan which could be seen as elitist: the possible vision of "culture" as some gift that the few are able to distribute to the many like manna from heaven. Machado proposes that there should be a movement of information in the other direction too: from the people to the intellectuals. He declares that his view of pedagogy and culture is a "folkloric" one. Machado's frame of reference in this article is typically institucionista: he sees Spain's problem as a problem of culture and national psychology rather than a question of political and economic ills. It is indisputable, he writes, that ignorance is a major problem in Spain, and that Spain needs more "culture". However there are many types of "culture" and many types of cultural ignorance, and it is essential to diagnose correctly the nature of the latter before thinking of providing the former. Machado uses a medical analogy: cultural deficiency is an illness, culture is a state of good health; a doctor does not proceed by simply prescribing good health but must first study the nature of the illness in order to seek the appropriate cure. So those who wish to remedy Spain's cultural maladies must first discover their exact nature; only then can they decide which of the many types of "culture" is needed in Spain, and which will be able to be assimilated by the body of Spain. "Culture" is not a universal panacea: the right culture must be sought for a specific case of deprivation, taking into account the specific needs and the specific capabilities of the Spanish mentality. Furthermore, in spite of the existence of widespread ignorance in Spain, the Spanish mind is not a mere empty vessel, ready to be filled by the "culture" dispensed by its future educators. As well as defects there may be positive elements to provide a basis for national regeneration. Machado, in short, believes that
an essential part of any regenerative programme is a close study of the mentality of Spain, which he believes is predominantly rural. The flow of information between intellectuals and people should be a two-way process; he writes:

no basta enviar maestros; es preciso enviar también investigadores del alma campesina, hombres-que vayan no sólo a enseñar, sino a aprender. 107

Machado goes on to discuss the notion of "Europeanising" Spain, mentioning the campaigns of Costa and the work of the Junta de Ampliación de Estudios. He agrees that Spain needs to send its young people abroad to investigate European culture, but emphasises that this praiseworthy activity demands a complementary labour: the study of the "Spanish soul", a study to be undertaken not only in the history and literature of the past but in the present, in the Spanish people:

Tenemos jóvenes que van a estudiar a Francia, Alemania, Inglaterra. Muy bien. Por muchos que sean nunca serán bastantes. Tenemos quienes investigan en archivos y bibliotecas españoles, con el noble deseo de desempolvar y sacar al sol nuestra cultura y nuestra historia. Son pocos; hacen falta más. Pero, ¿quién son los investigadores del pasado, vivo en el presente de nuestra raza? 108

Machado is not proposing a single and exclusive scheme of action. The investigation of the "Spanish soul" should be an activity complementary to the other cultural projects he mentions. In the final paragraph of "Sobre pedagogía" he suggests that this investigation has already been initiated by his literary contemporaries - the "98 Generation". One of their outstanding achievements, he claims, has been an intense and direct observation of Spanish life. Working independently they have succeeded in revealing many previously unknown aspects of Spain. There is a clear implication that
Machado sees this aim and this achievement as his own too. It is through his literary work that he sees himself collaborating with and complementing his former teachers' plans to solve the cultural problems of Spain through education.

That Machado indeed saw this as his own rôle is confirmed by his declarations to Ortega y Gasset in a series of letters written less than a year before "Sobre pedagogía". These letters are alluded to in that article, and many ideas and phrases are repeated in both, as for example in this extract from one of the letters:

Cuando los intelectuales, los sabios, los doctores se dignen ser algo folkloristas y desciendan a estudiar la vida campesina, el llamado problema de nuestra regeneración comenzará a plantearse en términos precisos. Mientras la ciudad no invada al campo — no con productos de desasimilación, sino de nutrición, de cultura — el campo invadirá, gobernará... la vida española. 109

Again, he envisages a two-way process between intellectuals and people. Machado also outlines to Ortega a poetic credo which bears relation both to his account of the work of his literary contemporaries in "Sobre pedagogía" and his own poetic practice in Campos de Castilla:

2. [nuestra lírica] la hemos de sacar de nuestra tierra y de nuestra raza.

6. Que el poeta puede hacer hablar a las piedras, pero que debe también interrogar a los hombres.

7. Que no es el poeta un jaleador de su patria sino un revelador de ella. 110

I have referred to Machado's "folkloric" point of view as an amendment to Cossío's statement of pedagogical intent. Why should Machado emphasise this particular point, and, is his idea a sign of an important difference of opinion from the institucionistas? I shall now try
to determine the possible sources of this idea in Machado and answer these questions.

At the time he wrote "Sobre pedagogíá" Machado appears to identify his own point of view with that of Unamuno. In the same year he wrote to Unamuno:

Yo no me atrevo a decir en público ciertas cosas, por miedo a que se me crea defensor de la barbarie nacional, pero temo también que se forme en España cierta superstición de la cultura que puede ser funesta. Me parece muy bien que se mande a los grandes centros de cultura a la juventud estudiosa, pero me parece muchísimo mejor la labor de usted cuando nos aconseja sacar con nuestras propias uñas algo de nuestras mismas entrañas. Esto, que no excluye lo otro, me parece lo esencial.

This is indeed a much more radical declaration of belief in the cultural potential of Spain than the article, and a stronger criticism of a culturalist and elitist social pedagogy. Furthermore, in his letter Machado goes on to state that "cultura, sabiduría, ciencia" are words that are beginning to irritate him. Yet, unlike Unamuno, he does not take an exclusively nationalistic, anti-Europeanising line either. Both European culture and the national cultural potential are desirable. Rather than the Unamuno of 1913, Machado seems to me close to the Unamuno of 1895 and En torno al casticismo. There, like Machado in "Sobre pedagogíá", Unamuno expressed a faith in the joint and complementary influences of modern European High Culture and the Spanish spiritual potential dormant in "the people": "Tenemos que europeizarnos y chapuzarnos en pueblo", he wrote. He was as opposed to those Europeanisers who systematically scorn everything Spanish as to cut and out casticistas. A harmony of the two elements must be sought, and it must be built on the ordinary people of Spain and their intrahistoric tradition, as yet unrevealed according to Unamuno. The potential Spain embodied in the "spirit of the people", the Volksgeist, can and must be brought to
light by diligent research: "España está por descubrir, y sólo la descubrirán españoles europeizados". 114

The materials for such a study include the everyday life of the people and the geographical features that influence it, and popular literature and culture. 115

The authentic and "eternal" tradition of Spain is that which is alive in the present, not some fossilized relic of the past:

En este mundo de los silenciosos (Ordinary Spaniards unaffected by the changes of history) debajo de la historia, es donde vive la verdadera tradición, la eterna, en el presente, no en el pasado, muerto para siempre y enterado en cosas muertas. En el fondo del presente hay que buscar la tradición eterna. 116

Compare this to what Machado wrote in his poetic creed in 1912:

3. Que la tradición, tal como ha llegado a nosotros, no es un valor poético; con ello no se puede construir nada.

4. Que la poesía es siempre agua que corre, actual, de esa actualidad que tiene su raíz en lo eterno.

5. Que no se es castizo por vestir trajes o adoptar formas de lenguaje de otras épocas, sino ahondando en el hoy que contiene el ayer, mientras el ayer no podía contener al hoy. 117

and more briefly in "Sobre pedagogía": "¿Quiénes son los investigadores del pasado, vivo en el presente de nuestra raza?" 118

So Machado's "folkloric" point of view bears a close relation to the ideas of the early Unamuno. As well as pointing out that the authentic spirit of Spain itself is an essential element for its cultural regeneration, both suggest that this "eternal" spirit is to be found in the contemporary customs and folklore of rural Spain. Both also emphasise the need for a selection or adaptation of elements of foreign culture to the needs and
capabilities of the Spanish people. Machado writes of the need for educators to select the correct cure from several cultures; Unamuno praises those who have contributed to the spread of foreign ideas by serving them up "más o menos aderezados a la españaola". Machado and Unamuno were not alone in seeing this harmonious blending of traditions and cultures as the way to bring about change in Spain. In 1904 Baroja wrote in a similar vein:

In fact this idea is a much repeated one in turn of the century regeneracionista literature. In an article of 1898 Unamuno again appeals for an examination of the "spirit of the people" and mentions another writer who was perhaps the first to undertake this kind of investigation in Spain:

Costa's researches of this type and their influence on the thought of the "98 Generation" in general and Unamuno in particular have been pointed out by a number of critics. Costa tried to adapt his political ideas on the problem of Spain to the "spirit of the people" as revealed in popular literature and custom. Perhaps
his most practical contributions were those concerned
with Common Law, such as Derecho consuetudinario y
economía popular de España (1902), a work based on
first hand research and which includes a section on
Vizcaya contributed by Unamuno. However his researches
included the study of somewhat more fanciful sources,
such as popular Spanish proverbs in Introducción a un
tratado de política sacado textualmente de los refran-
eros, romanceros y gestas de la península (1881).
Costa notes that in Spain such materials have rarely
been studied systematically "para penetrar el pensa-
miento ético, religioso, jurídico y político que animó
al pueblo, y que el pueblo consignó en ese gran reperto-
torio de su sabiduría". Costa firmly believed that
Europeanising reform had to be harmonised with the
peculiarities of the Spanish situation and the Spanish
mentality. Laín Entralgo sums up Costa's beliefs on
this point thus:

Costa, seducido, sin saberlo, por el histori-
cismo casticista de la filosofía romántica
alemana, aplicó a los problemas de España la
doctrina del Volksgeist o "espíritu del pueblo"
y consideró que la decadencia española sería
el resultado de "la inadecuación entre la
espontaneidad de la masa y la reflexión de la
minoría gobernante". De ahí la índole de su
programa regenerador o reconstituyente:
"Vuelvase a la espontaneidad étnica, recons-
titúyase la unidad de las reacciones castizas,
y España volverá a la ruta que un destino
previo le ha asignado".

Laín correctly attributes the origin of the idea of the
"spirit of the people" to German Romantic thought, that
is to say to Herder and the German Historicists Savigny
and Puchta.

Whatever the immediate sources of Machado's self-
proclaimed "folkloric" point of view it is certainly a
continuation of an essentially Romantic attitude. He
confesses to an admiration for both Costa and Unamuno
in 1915: "Admiro a Costa, pero mi maestro es Unamuno".
Another possible influence on Machado in this area of thought is his own father, who studied Spanish folklore and enthused on the cultural potential that folklore revealed:

En España, al menos, si mi opinión es tenida en cuenta, debe cultivarse con no menos empeño que el estudio de la ignorancia popular y las creaciones imaginarias que origina el predomino de la fantasía y el sentimiento sobre la razón, el saber del pueblo (lore, lehre, enseñanza, doctrina, lección), lo que aquel ha aprendido de su razón y de su experiencia para incorporarlo al caudal científico, no, por desgracia, excesivo que poseemos, y para traer a reflexión todo el pensamiento de esta nación acaso más ignorante que otras de Europa, pero no dotada de peores prendas intelectuales que otras naciones afortunadas y que gozan en el día de mayor adelanto. 126

Compare this to the concept of folklore proposed by Juan de Mairena:

Pensaba Mairena que el folklore era cultura viva y creadora de un pueblo de quien había mucho que aprender, para poder luego enseñar bien a las clases adineradas. 127

I would now like to examine the compatibility of this belief in the importance of folklore, the Volksgeist, intrahistoria, with the attitudes of the Spanish Krausists, particularly Francisco Giner de los Ríos. It is generally recognised that both Costa and Machado y Alvarez were close in spirit to the Institución: the former was a founder and occasional teacher at the school and many of his ideas, especially educational ideas, are very institucionista, in spite of the independence of his character and thought; the latter was offered a Chair of Folklore by the school and recognised as a true institucionista by Sama in his obituary in the Boletín. However there is firmer evidence for the assertion that the folkloric ideas of Machado father and son, Unamuno and Costa, and the attitudes to cultural regeneration
derived from these ideas are indeed compatible with the attitude of Giner and his followers: the evidence of the writings of Giner and other institucionistas.

Krausism is, as we have seen, an eclectic philosophy which attempts to harmonise many earlier philosophies. The Krausist view of social pedagogy can be seen as a combination of Enlightenment and Romantic ideas. At first sight the Krausist view of the importance of culture and of the rôle of an élite as that of raising the spiritual and cultural level of the nation could be thought closest to that of the ilustrados. However, Giner repeatedly points out the differences between his own ideas and those characteristic of the Eighteenth Century. He sees its intellectualism and faith in abstract Reason as excessive, and is critical of its vision of society. This, he says, is a dualist conception, for it divides an active minority of rulers from a passive majority of subjects. Fundamental to Krausism is its dislike of dualism and the consequent desire to resolve divisions into harmony. For a Krausist society is, or should be, essentially a unity, hence it is natural that Giner should be critical of the division of society involved in the political and legal thought of the Enlightenment. He also extends his criticism to the radical elitism deriving from such thought in these and other areas:

De otra parte, en la educación, en el arte, en la religión, en la ciencia, en todo, el mismo fenómeno: la misma condensación, en grupos técnicos, de las funciones cuya inmanencia se olvidaba en el cuerpo social. La mayor parte se reducía a disfrutar, abajo, de los bienes que el poeta y el artista, el sabio, el educador, el sacerdote, le distribuía desde arriba. El "todo para el pueblo", "nada por el pueblo" de los fisiócratas, era la consigna. 129

Giner looks more favourably on Romantic thought, which recognises that the production of thought and art is not an activity totally monopolised by professional minorities
but is something in which every member of a society plays an active rôle, via the Volksgeist:

La reacción romántica del siglo pasado debía mirar las cosas de manera muy distinta. Con todas sus fantasías especulativas, todo su sentimentalismo, sus prejuicios históricos, políticos, nacionales, sociales, ella es la que ha elevado el servum pecus en la lengua y la poesía, en el arte, en la industria, hasta en la religión, la ciencia y la filosofía, a la dignidad, por lo menos, del colaborador en obras que ya no son miradas como asunto de un grupo social.... Todo se formaba en las intimidades del Volksgeist, del alma del pueblo.... Para Savigny, que trabajaba bajo la inspiración de Schelling, un pueblo era una cierta entidad mística, que no obraba sino en la continuidad de su historia, no pudiendo cada generación disponer a su arbitrio del patrimonio que se le había formado con la sangre y los esfuerzos de todos ellos. 130

Giner approves this development on Enlightenment thought in spite of some criticisms. He believes that the Romantic thinkers based their idea of the Volksgeist on poetic intuition rather than on rigorous analysis of reality, and welcomes serious studies of social unity and interrelatedness. 131 Furthermore, he does not believe that the Volksgeist can function without the cooperation of an intellectual minority, whose contribution is that of rationality and guidance. 132 The minority's function is to condense and interpret the tendencies of the society they live in, and by their powers of conscious thought and action, awaken the latent energies of that society. 133 Elite and people must collaborate harmoniously:

Acaso es así, en la cooperación de la espon
taneidad y de la reflexión, del conatus y de la acción voluntaria, de la presión general y de la reacción técnica como se desenlue
vlen todas las funciones sociales. 134

Hence Giner's desire to harmonise, in the Krausist
manner, previously antagonistic forces and ideas: the élite of Enlightenment social theory and the Volksgeist of the Romantics. In his exposition of the Romantic view, Giner attributed to Savigny an idea that is important to this discussion: the notion that a people can only go forward if it maintains its historical integrity and hence that successive generations of rulers must always make their ideas conform to a nation's historical heritage. Giner clearly subscribed to this view himself; in a letter to Azorín he exclaims:

¡Cuándo, en la evolución castiza, y sin romperla - vano empeño, además - vendrá de nuevo nuestra hora, la de hoy, no la de ayer! 135

Hence, like the writers of the "98 Generation", and before them, Giner held that no reform of Spain was possible or desirable if it conflicted with the genuine spirit of Spain. 136 He insists that Krause's foreign philosophy was adapted by Sanz del Río "a las condiciones de nuestro pueblo"; 137 he is opposed to any "espíritu de imitación servil extranjero" in reform projects. 138 There must be a harmony of foreign and indigenous ideas. Américo Castro insists that Giner in no way wished to "extranjerizar a España, cuya peculiaridad en lo que tenía de valiosa adoraba como nadie". 139 Another commentator who knew Giner personally, Leopoldo Palacios, also emphasises his deep love of Spain, of what he considered the best and most authentic values of Spain:

La cátedra de D. Francisco...segúfa los domingos en el campo, o en la sierra, o en los pueblos aldeanos, embebíóndonos en la Naturaleza; o en los museos y las viejas ciudades castizas, reviviendo el Arte y la Historia, y donde él nos descubría realmente a España, a la pasada y a la por venir - ¡la eterna! - ¡despertándonos en la verdadera adoración hacia ella! 140

There is a notable coincidence here with the "98 Generation" belief as to where the true Spain is to be found: land-
scapes, villages, old towns. Giner was also interested in popular arts and crafts; he is said to have been among the first to consider popular ceramics as worthy of a middle-class home. Américo Castro believes Giner's enthusiasm may have influenced others:

Iluminado por el romanticismo krausista, don Francisco Giner comenzó a interesarse teóricamente y estéticamente en las artesanías populares, y a estimular la curiosidad de otros. De ahí surgió el folklorismo de don Antonio Machado y Álvarez... Al mismo centro de círculo ha de referirse la obra de Joaquín Costa. 142

Castro also comments that "Ese gusto por lo popular era, desde luego, deleitosa contemplación de las raíces hispanas". Giner's interest in lo popular included an enjoyment of popular poetry, and like Costa and the "98 Generation" he saw this literature as a principal source of insight into the Volksgeist:

La poesía popular, riquísima elaboración del sentimiento de un pueblo en lo que tiene de más personal y característico... es, en efecto, la más alta manifestación que hacen de sí las naciones, y la comprobación más enérgica de su existencia propia. 144

I think that there is a clear similarity of all these interests and beliefs of Giner's to Unamuno's idea of intrahistoria and Machado's vision of the nature and importance of folklore. These three writers share a belief in an authentic national quality that is eternal, and a belief that this quality is incarnated in particular aspects of Spain: landscape, popular culture and customs, folklore and popular literature. Américo Castro comments perceptively on the reasons behind this tendency to seek an authentic Spanishness in these particular natural and cultural manifestations: Giner, like the writers of the "98 Generation" who succeeded him, felt dissatisfied with the values expressed in contemporary
political and cultural life and in the history of Spain since the Hapsburgs. Hence they needed to find a representation of a better Spain outside history and outside the centres of official power and official ideology. Otherwise they would have had to deny totally the possibility of their country ever developing towards the ideal future they envisaged without becoming completely "Europeanised" and losing its Spanishness. Faith in the Volksgeist is their way of expressing a patriotic nationalism. 145

I think it should be by now apparent that Machado's "folkloric" view of culture is in no way contrary to the theoretical writings of Giner. Both writers express a desire to harmonise Spanish and European cultural contributions. Both profess a faith in positive Spanish qualities embodied in the Volksgeist, and see this true and eternal spirit of Spain manifested in similar areas. Both believe there should be a two-way flow of "culture" between intellectuals and people: Machado believes men should go to rural Spain to teach and to learn; Giner summarises the Krausist view of the rôle of the masa social in cultural life as "De una parte, lo que aporta, el folklore inclusive; de otra, lo que recibe por la propagación y el contagio". 146

However there are differences between Machado and Giner. In Giner there is less mention of the contemporary Spanish peasantry, as distinct from their literature and artefacts. It is more difficult to find in Giner positive comments on the Spanish mentality of his time than in Machado (although Campos de Castilla too gives a predominantly negative picture of Spain). The main difference between Machado and Giner on this subject is that Giner's expressions of faith in the Volksgeist are not taken beyond a theoretical level, whereas Machado, like Unamuno and Costa, makes an attempt in his essays and poems to penetrate and interpret the "soul of Spain".

It seems improbable that Machado's criticism of cultural elitism was directed at the cultural attitudes
of the Institución Libre, as personified by Giner and Cossío. Machado’s comments on "superstición de cultura" and "aristocratismo" in "Sobre pedagogía" and contemporary letters are directed rather at the young intellectuals of Ortega’s generation. In 1915 he writes to Unamuno of the "mal disimulado aristocratismo" of "la juventud que hoy quiere intervenir en la política".

The principal source of contact of these younger intellectuals with the Institución was through its daughter institutions: the Junta de Ampliación de Estudios and the Residencia de Estudiantes. It has been argued that, although these institutions continued and expanded the influence of institucionismo, they gave it a more Europeanising and elitist character than before. In spite of their inspiration in the ideas of Giner, they tended to favour the formation of a distinct intellectual élite, since they began to function long before institucionismo was able to bring about a substantial and complementary development in mass education. The direction the Residencia took was clearly strongly influenced by the ideas of its director, Alberto Jiménez Fraud, who chose to diverge from Giner’s aim of slowly but surely building up Spanish culture from the roots. Instead, Jiménez Fraud saw as his first priority the rapid creation of an intellectual élite to take control of Spain’s cultural and political life; looking back on his work he writes:

En lo que sí me interesa detenerme es en lo referente a las minorías directrizes, y empiezo por afirmar rotundamente que el formarlas, y en el más breve plazo posible, era en efecto el objeto principal de nuestros colegios universitarios.

He goes on to acknowledge that such a statement of intent was bound to provoke criticism of elitism, but he nevertheless affirms that his scheme was more necessary and more realistic than Giner’s idealistic project of re-educating the whole nation, at all levels:
Más fácil, sin embargo, es propagar este ideal de educación liberal y afirmar que la función última de una Universidad es la de servir a la perfección moral del país, que hacer admitir la necesidad de una clase directora, la cual sólo significa para muchos la negación de una educación igualitaria, y también el peligro de que esa clase se constituya en minoría aristocrática cada día más aislada de la masa común, no pudiendo ya por tanto influir en ella, ni deseándolo tampoco.

Writing of his own thoughts back in 1914 he quite explicitly distances himself from the attitudes of los institucionistas and of the "1898 Generation":

El tono elegíaco de la llamada generación de 1898 empezaba a cansarnos; las mismas excitaciones que al sacudimiento de la mordorra española hacían los institucionistas parecían ya excesivas. Más que amonestaciones lo que el pueblo español deseaba era una clara estrella norte y limpios caminos de marcha. La angustiosamente apremiante era formar una clase directora consciente, leal e informada. Esta labor respondía plenamente a mi vocación, y me entregué por entero a ella.

On the question of the relationship between élite and people, Jiménez Fraud confesses to a similar theoretical ideal as Giner. In the following commentary on the Romantic reaction against the dualism of Eighteenth Century thought, he is clearly glossing Giner's exposition quoted above:

No logró concebir los términos aristocracia y democracia como contrapuestos ya que ha sido superada la concepción dualista en que se reservaba la función directora a una clase aristocrática... No en vano la escuela histórica ha dado valor casi infalible a las formas instintivas y espontáneas nacionales, al alma del pueblo; y no en vano el romanticismo del siglo XIX ha elevado a la masa pasiva a una dignidad superior. Historiústas y románticos han obligado a colaborar a pueblo y minorías: éstas con su acción reflexiva, aquél con su acción espontánea. El pueblo formando en su intimidad reglas de conducta y empujándolas
a la superficie para que las minorías ejerzan sobre ellas su acción reflexiva. No pueden concebirse hoy, pues, las minorías sino como el momento reflexivo del alma de la comunidad.

Yet he goes on to say that the circumstances of pre-war Spain demanded that an intellectual élite be formed as rapidly as possible; the organic collaboration between the intellectuals and the people was too slow and hence this link had to be broken and priorities altered:

Se dan circunstancias, sin embargo, en las distantes funciones sociales, que reclaman mayor velocidad y eficacia en el desarrollo de una función. Y el retraso y decadencia de la función universitaria reclamaba, para renacer con rapidez a vida más activa, la acción prestigiosa de minorías directoras, la formación de las cuales era el principal objeto de nuestros colegios universitarios. 153

This is an open confession of divergence from the plans of Giner, whose idea of the function of universities was quite different; Giner wrote:

La nueva universidad...dirige hacia un tipo de vida cada vez más completo, no el adiestramiento de una minoría presumida, estrecha y gobernante, sino una educación abierta a todos los horizontes del espíritu, que llegue a todas las clases e irradiie hacia todos lados su acción vital. 154

Giner also wrote of the folly of attempts to reform Spain purely through the actions of an élite desde arriba:

Cada día es más evidente lo ilusorio de toda tentativa de reforma social de arriba abajo, sólo prosperan las que, desatendidas del soberbio espejismo y aparente poder le las alturas, descienden humildes a la oscura raíz, de donde viene el primer impulso de la vida orgánica. 155

Giner's view of social and cultural life is an organic one; the élite needs the collaboration of the mass of
the people, and hence in order to raise the cultural level of Spain it is necessary to do so at all levels, from the roots upwards. In another article critical of aristocratism cultural, Machado expresses a similar organic view of culture, using the same image of roots as Giner:

Although both Machado and Giner stress the importance of the people as the roots of the nation, neither deny the existence of different levels of culture. Both see that intellectual élites are a fact and a necessity. Giner writes that "De hecho, la experiencia muestra que todo movimiento intelectual (v. gr.) se resume en una minoría" and Machado alludes to "la minoría pensadora que representa la honda conciencia de todos". At the same time, both aspire to the extension of culture to the masses; through culture alone the level of the masses will be raised towards that of the élite; Giner writes:

todos cuantos quisieramos remover la educación nacional somos una minoría aun, y lo seremos largo tiempo....Por otra parte las luchas de hoy día no son ya como las que hicieron tan heroicas la vida de nuestros mayores. Cada vez la cultura va limando las garras a la fiereza humana...Después de todo correrá el tiempo, y los ciegos verán, y andarán los tullidos, y la Historia consolidará de todas nuestras empresas lo que haya de incorporarse al fruto de las empresas pasadas, y barrerá lo inútil; las minorías se harán mayorías.

Machado said in 1934:
la clase proletaria reclama sus derechos a dirigir el mundo, sólo lo dirigen la cultura y la inteligencia y tanto una como la otra no pueden ser un privilegio de casta. Lo que hay en el fondo del movimiento de las masas trabajadores es la aspiración a la perfección por medio de la cultura. ¿Qué se logrará en cuanto la cultura deje de ser un privilegio de casta y las masas penetren en su zona de influencia? Pues lo que las masas buscan, no ser masas en el sentido que se da a este nombre y lo conseguirán.

Minorities will become majorities, the masses will no longer be mass-men -- these are the hopes of Machado and Giner. It is not desirable to perpetuate culture as the privilege of an isolated ruling élite. There will always be an élite in the vanguard of progress and it is an élite of culture and intelligence, not class. But this élite cannot function properly without the firm basis and support of an educated nation. Hence the highest levels of culture must be rooted firmly in the spirit of the whole country, and must be made available to everyone. Notice the predominance given to "Culture" in the scale of values of both writers. Giner sees it as the driving force behind change and progress; Machado interprets working-class politics as the expression of the aspiration to perfection through culture. The Misiones pedagógicas of the Second Republic, inspired by institucionalistas and supported by Machado, were based on this same interpretation of the needs and desires of the masses; Cossío wrote:

Aun las clases humildes, aparte el pan y el abrigo, piden y reclaman el goce de la contemplación y de la cultura, y mediante ello, la plena dignidad humana. Tal es el sentido profundo de lo que con el tiempo se ha convertido en el problema social.

In the 1930s Machado greatly expands on the ideas on pedagogy and culture that we have seen in "Sobre pedagogía" of 1913 and other early writings, though there
are important elements of continuity. In the 1910 speech in honour of Antonio Pérez de la Mata, for example, he made a distinction between outward signs of intellectual merit and true value: a doctor's cap, he said, may cover an idiot's brain, whilst poverty and obscurity do not preclude intelligence. The same anti-élitism is an essential feature of Juan de Mairena's theory of culture, apparent in the apocryphal teacher's very first maxim: "La verdad es la verdad, dígale Agamemnón o su porquero". On the same point, Machado made an interesting statement in 1938:

Debo advertir que, aunque nacido y educado entre universitarios, nada había en mi educación — digamoslo en loor de ella — que me inclinara a pensar que la palabra de un cajista había de ser necesariamente menos interesante que la autorizada por la sabiduría oficial.

Machado sees no incompatibility between his education at the Institución and his own democratic view of culture, although he does not go so far as to attribute the latter to the former.

In Juan de Mairena, Machado maintains his "folkloric" point of view: that complementary to the intellectuals attempts to teach the people there should be an attempt to learn from the people, to understand and exploit the cultural potential already present in the people. Mairena praises the value of Spanish folklore, which he defines as "cultura viva y creadora", and even claims that "es muy posible que, entre nosotros, el saber universitario no pueda competir con el folklore, con el saber popular". This superiority is, however, not a matter of a range of knowledge but a spiritual superiority, a superiority of attitude. Whereas in Mairena's experience the knowledge represented by his local university (in an unnamed "gran población andaluza") was all too frequently imperfect, and professed without enthusiasm the local craftsmen knew their speciality perfectly and put heart and soul into their work.
Their craft might be making guitars or fabricating bricks, but their attitude to work was that of an artist; they knew that "el hacer bien las cosas es, como para el artista, mucho más importante que el hacerlas".\(^{167}\) The anti-élitism implied here again seems to echo Giner who wrote: "De haber jerarquía, estará en la cualidad, en el modo, elevado o vulgar, ideal o plebeyo, como cada individuo ejerce su función; pero no en la función misma".\(^{168}\)

According to Mairena, it is spiritual reserves such as the attitudes of those craftsmen that give the Spanish people a great cultural potential. Other aspects he finds of value in the people are the metaphysical propensities of the Andalusian and the sense of human dignity of the Castilian peasant, for whom "nadie es más que nadie".\(^{169}\) The apocryphal teacher believes his projected Escuela Popular de Sabiduría Superior will prosper in Spain since the Spanish people are "maravillosamente dotado para la sabiduría, en el mejor sentido de la palabra".\(^{170}\) Cossío saw the same potential:

En España...sobre un fondo milenario de cultura exquisita, que se transmite por tradición familiar y popular, hay una tenue capa de barbarie depositada por unos pocos siglos de retraso. Sólo es preciso romper la costra superficial para hallar las aguas profundas de una antigüísima y refinada civilización. 171

For Cossío, one means of exploring the riches of popular wisdom was the study of the turns of speech, sayings and proverbs of the people. Xirau recalls:

En su proceder metódico es de notar la singular perspicacia con que ponía a contribución las conexiones lingüísticas al parecer más fortuitas, la derivación etimológica de las palabras y los usos espontáneos del lenguaje popular. Mediante ello y el sutil aprovechamiento de algunos proverbios españoles, ponía de relieve con insistencia y gracia, el íntimo contacto de la sabiduría popular con las más depuradas elaboraciones del conocimiento
científico y filosófico. La filosofía brota naturalmente de la sutil estilización de los más hondos sedimentos de la conciencia social. 172

Exactly the same method, based on the same convictions, is used by both Juan de Mairena and his creator. Machado, for example, glosses on a Castilian proverb thus:

Hay un breve aforismo castellano - yo lo oí en Soria por primera vez -, que dice así: "nadie es más que nadie"... nunca olvido al viejo pastor de cuyos labios oí ese magnífico proverbio donde, a mi juicio, se condensa toda el alma de Castilla, su gran orgullo y su gran humildad, su experiencia de siglos y el sentido imperial de su pobreza; esa magnífica frase que yo me complazco en traducir así: por mucho que valga un hombre, nunca tendrá valor más alto que el valor de ser hombre. Soria es una escuela admirable de humanismo, de democracia y de dignidad. 173

Machado is a great admirer of the popular and Spanish. Mairena advises his students to make every effort to improve themselves, but never to cease to be Spaniards. 174 Yet this admiration is not a barrier to his belief in high, universal culture; he also criticises "la barbarie casticista, que pretende hacer algo por la mera renuncia a la cultura universal". 175 He aspires, he declares, to write for the people, but this does not imply a lower form of literature: "Escribir para el pueblo es llamarse Cervantes, en España; Shakespeare en Inglaterra; Tolstoy en Rusia". 176 He defines and praisies folklore as saber popular but he also sees merit in the use of such instinctive materials by those of higher gifts: folklore is also defined as "todo trabajo consciente y reflexivo sobre estos elementos y su utilización más sabia y creadora" (although, ironically, if we think of his father and the Institución, he scorns the idea of Chairs of Folklore). 177 In short, although he admires the popular he does recognise the existence
of different levels of intellectual endeavour. Mairena aspires to teach the people as well as learn from them, but this involves no condescension on his part. After proclaiming his proposal to found the Escuela Popular de Sabiduría Superior he mocks the conventional kind of "people's school" that aims only to teach the illiterate to read or to do carpentry and condescendingly expects their gratitude for so little. Speaking for such a school he declares: "Nos empeñamos en que este pueblo aprenda a leer, sin decirle para qué... Y creemos inocentemente que se reiría [el pueblo] en nuestras barbas si le hablásemos de Platón. Grave error. De Platón no se ríen más que los señoritos, en el mal sentido – si alguno hay bueno – de la palabra". 178 Mairena believes that ordinary people have a right to be introduced to the most elevated aspects of universal culture, and have the capacity to respond to such teaching. This is another belief he shares with Cosío, who, writing on the aims of the Misiones Pedagógicas, declares:

El hombre del pueblo tiene derecho a gozar de los bienes espirituales de que disfrutan los privilegiados. Si sabe leer, no sabe distraerse con Sófocles y con los libros de caballería. ...[A los misioneros] puede corredorles la victoria de que nada interese al pueblo como los Diálogos platónicos. 179

Mairena opposes the Ortega view that mass access to culture would lead to a degradation of that culture. He distinguishes his own democratic faith in spreading culture from the señoritismo cultural of those who want to maintain culture as the privilege of a minority and hence an instrument of domination:

Para mí – continúa Mairena – sólo habría una razón de peso contra la difusión de la cultura – o tránsito desde un estrecho círculo de elegidos y de privilegiados a otros ámbitos más extensos— si averiguásemos que el principio de Carnot rige también para esa clase de energía espiritual que despierta al dormido...
Nuestra Escuela Popular de Sabiduría tendría muchos enemigos; todos aquellos para quienes la cultura es, no sólo un instrumento de poder sobre las cosas, sino también, y muy especialmente, de dominio sobre los hombres. 180

Giner was similarly critical of such misuse of culture:

el hombre de mayor inteligencia, superior cultura, mejor sentido moral, más medios de fortuna, de más poder, en suma, y facultades, nunca puede pretender supremacía, prerrogativas, privilegios en su favor, fundándose en aquellas circunstancias... su misma superioridad lo que hace es obligarle a ponerse al servicio y redención de la mediocridad, para sacudirla de esa vulgaridad en que se complace y embutece, y elevarla a la comunión del ideal, de que no es dado excluir a nadie; despertando en todos, según su límite y grado, un rayo de espíritu libre y "noble". 181

This idea of the duties of intellectual élites towards the rest of the population goes back to Sanz del Río:

¿No deberían las clases superiores sociales interesarse en ganar para la humanidad esta parte numerosa de sus hermanos, acercándose a los estados inferiores no menos dignos que todos de igual solicitud? ¿No deberían en ley de humanidad y con acción sistemática ocuparse en mejorar su educación liberal, en suavizar sus costumbres? ... También estas clases que viven bajo la servidumbre del trabajo corporal deben conocer y sentir la idea de la humanidad. 182

Both Mairena and Cossío mention the desirability of the people being introduced to certain authors (including Plato in the quotations above). However neither of them nor Giner see the aim of the education of the people (or indeed of any type of education) primarily in terms of imparting specifiable quantities of knowledge. Rather they believe that the aim of any kind of education should be to stimulate the intellectual and spiritual potential of the pupil. Mairena holds that a whole dimension of the people’s potential is under-developed; the masses —
Illos, 183 are deprived of the experience of certain human activities which he calls "las actividades esencialmente humanas". 184 Giner talks of the masses in the same terms of human deprivation: "las grandes masas desheredadas, no sólo de pan, sino de luz y de verdadera humanidad". 185 The activities Mairena considers "essentially human" include "atención, reflexión, especulación, contemplación admirativa"; 186 he also defines certain tendencies and faculties as specifically human: intelligence and rationality; a sense of uncertainty leading to doubts and enquiry; a desire to shape and improve one's own destiny; a moral imperative; an aspiration to transcendence; a sense of dignity. 187 The aim of the Escuela Popular de Sabiduría Superior is to stimulate these tendencies and faculties, to practice these activities, to awaken in people an awareness of their full potential as human beings:

In effect what Mairena aspires to do for the Spanish people is to extend to them all the type of education he gives his own pupils. There too, as we have seen, education is a matter of stimulation and awakening rather than a propagation of information. He defined culture above as "esa clase de energía espiritual que despierta al dormido"; 189 spreading culture is simply the awakening of more and more human beings:

Para nosotros, difundir y defender la cultura son una misma cosa: aumentar en el mundo el humano tesoro de conciencia vigilante, ¿Cómo? Despertando al dormido. 190
Culture is for Machado essentially a force that enables a man to fulfil himself as a complete and individual human being. By extension it is a force capable of bringing out the full potential of a nation or of humanity as a whole. Hence he is able to write of "universal" culture and of a national culture; a national culture is important because it is an expression of the authentic individuality of a people (nations too have an individuality and cannot be cast in one mould).

Both Giner and Sanz del Río see the spreading of culture as a humane and humanising activity before all else: Giner states that all men should be raised to commune in the ideal, Sanz that they should experience "la idea de la humanidad". 191 Cossío stated that the aim of the Misiones Pedagógicas was "poner a las gentes más retardadas en contacto directo con las actividades más altas de la vida espiritual" and that the first and foremost function of any type of education is "despertar la conciencia y el sentido del propio ideal". 192 Yet again we see the ideas of awakening, spirit, the human and the individual and the concept of education and culture as something that involves living activity, not mere passive receptivity.

In conclusión, Machado coincides with the men of the Institución Libre in his vision of the nature of culture and true education: they are stimuli that awaken an inherent human potential, ways of developing natural and individual human qualities, intellectual, spiritual, physical, aesthetic and ethical.

Like the institucionistas, Machado is an opponent of everything that restricts such development in traditional educational systems: formality, privilege, examinations, physical and spiritual separation of teacher and pupil. Instead, they propose a friendly collaboration between the two in the process of education, and that the pupil should learn through practice and activity rather than by passive assimilation of knowledge.
Both Machado and the Institución believe that a child-like curiosity is essential to the learner whatever his age.

Machado's methodology for developing the pupil's intellectual abilities is the same as that of the Institución: through Socratic dialogue and the practising of a critical attitude the pupil learns to think for himself. Also common to Machado and the Institución is the belief that thought should not be an activity remote from real life. Like the Institución Machado does not wish education to be used to impose sectarian beliefs.

For Machado the intellectual faculty is not the only one stimulated by true education; he also aspires to encourage aesthetic and especially moral qualities. This too is an aspiration he shares with the teachers of the Institución. Furthermore the moral qualities he favours include a typically Krausist version of the Christian ethic and stress on austerity, simplicity and tolerance. Machado differs from the Institución in his judgement of "physical education" in the traditional sense, but he concurs on the physical, spiritual and generally educative value of excursions.

Education and culture are seen by Machado and the Institución to have a vital importance in solving the problems of Spain. Pedagogy is seen as a tool for the necessary spiritual and cultural regeneration of the nation. Like the institucionistas, Machado aspires to extend education and culture to the whole of the country, and believes that a culture has a specifically national character, an individuality that must be respected. Hence Machado and the Institución both wish to avoid a purely Europeanising culturalism. Machado is critical of the elitism of some culturalists, but his criticism is not directed at mainstream institucionista attitudes as represented by Giner and Gossio. Rather he attacks the revision of Giner's thought carried out by men such as Jiménez Fraud. The recourse to the idea of the
Volksgeist as a check to élitism and pure Europeanisation is common to Machado, Giner and Cossío, as well as Costa and Unamuno. Giner and Machado articulate an organic theory of national cultural life and believe in the necessity of active co-operation between élites and people in cultural activity.

Although Machado collaborated to a limited extent in the social pedagogy of the Institución Libre via the Misiones Pedagógicas and the Universidad Popular de Segovia, he does not appear to have put into practice in his everyday work as a teacher the educational ideals characteristic of an institucionista that he expresses in his writings. In is above all in his prose writings (from as early as 1910 through to the more extensive coverage in Juan de Mairena) that he reveals his knowledge of and sympathy with these ideals. Finally, from Machado's own declarations, it could be said that he saw his activity as a literary explorer of the Spanish Volksgeist as complementary to the educational endeavours of the Institución in the regeneration of Spanish culture.
Notes


2. "Aspectos del anarquismo" (1899), O.C. XI, p.275; Giner goes on to reject political revolution: "... no, pues, en las barricadas, ni en los campos, donde está ya bien duramente probado − ¡y no digamos en España! − que las revoluciones sólo siembran dolores, desdichas, odio, salvaje atavismo".


4. "El espíritu de la educación en la I.L.E." (1880), O.C. VII, p.42; this article (Giner's inaugural speech of the 1880-1 course) is the basis of my exposition of the pedagogy of the I.L.E.

5. Ibid.


7. "Sobre el concepto de la ley en el derecho positivo" (1908), Ensayos y cartas, cit., p.25.


11. Ideal, cit., p.33, cit. supra p.162.


17. Ibid.

18. V. Supra p.16-17.

19. "Instrucción y educación", O.C. VII, p.4, italics; cf. Cossío: "Educar antes que instruir; hacer
del niño, en vez de un almacén, un campo cultivable, y de cada cosa una semilla y un instrumento para su cultivo." (cit. J. López-Morillas, "La Institución, Cossío, y el 'arte de ver'", Insula Nos. 344-345, July-Aug 1975, p.18.)


21 V.Supra pp.80-82


23 "Estatutos de la I.L.E.", artículo 15.

24 "Cómo empezamos a filosofar", O.C. XII, p.35, and passim.

25 Ibid. pp.38-39; cf. Locke: "The floating of other men's opinions in our brains makes us not one jot the more knowing, though they happen to be true. What in them was science, is in us but opinionately; whilst we give up our assent only to reverend names, and do not, as they did, employ our own reason to understand those truths which gave them reputation" (Essay Concerning Human Understanding, cit. N. Hampson, The Enlightenment, Penguin, 1976, p.40.)

26 Ibid.


28 Ibid.


31 V.Supra pp.185-186.


34 cit. supra p.283.

Ibid.

BIELE No. 81, 1880, p. 91.

OPP p. 484; cf. Giner: "Para todo esto nada mejor que estimular la producción del pensamiento en forma de reacción, esto es, merced a un diálogo hábilmente sos-
tenido, que obliga a sacudir el embobamiento del espíritu" ("Lo que necesitan nuestros aspirantes al profesorado", 1887, O. C. XII, p. 84, my italics)

OPP p. 493


V. Supra p. 286.

OPP p. 472

OPP p. 513

OPP p. 677

V. Supra Chapter 3 passim.

V. Supra pp. 182-183

OPP pp. 468-469

OPP p. 468; see also OPP pp. 587-588.

OPP pp. 551-553

OPP p. 468

OPP p. 469

OPP pp. 552, 469

OPP p. 551

V. Supra p. 227.

V. Supra p. 285

V. Supra p. 187.

V. Supra pp. 187-190.

OPP pp. 392-393

Giner, "Los problemas de la educación física", 1888, O. C. XII, pp. 71-76; on "military exercises" he says: "a causa del militarismo alemán y francés reinante, constituyen hoy un grupo aparte ... censurable cierta-
mente"; Juan de Mairena also links physical exercises to militarism (OPP pp. 582-583) and sport to war (OPP pp. 549, 532)
"El ayuntamiento de Madrid y el juego de los niños", 1887, O.C. XII, p.64; on the aesthetic value of sports and games see Giner's "Campos escolares" (1884), O.C. XII, pp.197-236.

61 OPP p.393
62 OPP pp.392-393; V.Supra p.245
63 "Bases", 1908.
64 OPP p.689 (1937)
66 OPP p.471
67 OPP pp. 471, 442-443
68 OPP p.502; also OPP p.366.
69 OPP p.585, my italics.
70 OPP p.370
71 OPP p.587
72 "Prospecto para el curso 1885-6", BILE Nº207, 30 Sept 1885, p.286.
73 OPP p.484
74 "Un peligro de toda enseñanza", O.C. XII, p.101
75 Another feature he shares with Giner - V.Supra pp.226-227.
77 V.Supra pp.45-46.
78 "Nota preliminar", Giner, O.C. XII, pp.9-10
79 Although both Mairena and Giner are ironists, the latter would doubtless have disapproved of the flippancy and bad taste of the former's joke "Sobre la Pedagogía decía Juan de Mairena en sus momentos de mal humor: 'Un pedagogo hubo; se llamaba Herodes'"(OPP p.504)
80 OPP pp.582-584

82 A.M., su mundo y su obra, cit., p. 192.


87 V. Supra p. 47.


91 *Antonio Machado en Segovia*, cit., p. 36.

92 "Mis recuerdos de A.M. - continuación", cit., p. 1.

93 "A.M. en mi recuerdo", *Insula* Nº 262, Sept. 1968, p. 3.

95 Antonio Machado en Segovia, cit., p.36.

96 V.Supra p.290.

97 OPP p.469; cit. infra p.332

98 E. Díaz, "Estudio preliminar", G.de Azcárate, Minuta de un testamento, cit., p.69.


100 Ibid. p.55 and Antonio Machado, poeta del pueblo, cit., pp.16-17.

101 op.cit. p.17


105 "El problema de la educación nacional", O.C. XII, p.271.


107 loc.cit. p.67

108 Ibid. pp.67-68

109 J.L. Cano, "Tres cartas inéditas de Machado a Ortega", RO, 3ª época, Nos.5-6, March-April 1976, p.31.

110 Ibid. p.32

111 OPP p.915; cf., however, his attitude only a year earlier as expressed in a letter to J.R. Jiménez: "Hay que defender a la España que surge, del mar muerto, de la España inerte y abrumadora que amenaza anegarlo todo. España no es el Ateneo, ni los pequeños círculos donde hay alguna juventud y alguna inquietud espiritual. Desde estos yermos se ve panorámicamente la barbarie española y aterra." (OPP p.904)
112 OPP p. 916
113 En torno al casticismo, M, Austral, 1968, p. 143.
114 Ibid., p. 141.
115 Ibid.
116 Ibid., p. 29
117 J. I. Cano, "Tres cartas inéditas de Machado a Ortega", RO, 3ª época, Nos. 5-6, March-April 1976, p. 32.
118 loc. cit. p. 68
119 En torno al casticismo, cit., pp. 15-16; cf. "El deber de los intelectuales y de las clases directoras estriba ahora, más que en el empeño de modelar al pueblo, bajo esto o el otro plan, casi siempre jacobino, en estudiarla por dentro, tratando de descubrir las raíces de su espíritu." (Unamuno, "De regeneración en lo justo", 1898, O.C., IV, M, Afrodísio Aguado, 1952, p. 1047)
120 P. Baroja, "Vieja España, patria nueva", El tablado de Arlequín, O.C. V, M, Biblioteca Nueva, 1948, p. 30
121 "Renovación" (1898), O.C. IV, pp. 1026, 1028.
123 cit. Pérez de la Dehesa, El pensamiento de Costa..., cit., p. 54.
124 P. Lain Entralgo, España como problema, M, Aguilar, 1962, p. 692.
127 OPP p. 387
128 V. Supra pp. 43-44.
129 F. Giner de los Ríos, "Acerca de la función de la ley" (1908), Ensayos y cartas, cit., pp. 26-27.
130 Ibid. pp.28, 29.
131 F. Giner, "La ciencia como función social", O.C. XI, p.3; this article is important for an understanding of Giner's ideas on the organic nature of society and national culture and on the functions of minorities.
132 Ibid. p.13.
133 Ensayos y cartas, cit., p.23.
134 Ibid. p.32; cf. use of espontaneidad and reflexión by Costa, cit. supra p.315.
135 Ibid. p.122
136 cf. Unamuno: "Ni a un hombre ni a un pueblo – que es en cierto modo un hombre también – se le puede exigir un cambio que rompa con la unidad y la continuidad de su persona" (Del sentimiento trágico de la vida, M, Austral, 1971, p.15); cf. Gómez Molleda, Los reformadores, cit., pp.102-103.
137 Ensayos y cartas, cit., p.64.
140 L. Palacios, "Nota preliminar", F. Giner, O.C. XII, p.10.
141 J. J. Gil Cremades, Krausistas y liberales, M, Seminarios y Ediciones, 1975, p.15.
143 Españoles al margen, cit., p.116.
144 F. Giner, "Poesía erudita y poesía vulgar" (1863), O.C. III, p.92.
146 "La ciencia como función social", O.C. XI, p.43; also: "esta reacción mutua entre el cuerpo social y sus órganos, que se verifica en esta esfera la ciencia como en todas las restantes de la vida (ni más ni menos) es el único camino que permite las transformaciones de la historia" (Ibid. p.25)

OPP p. 92.

A. Jiménez Fraud, Ocaso y restauración, Colegio de México, 1948, p. 265.

Ibid. p. 266

Ibid. p. 220


Ibid. p. 268


"La reforma de la enseñanza del Derecho" (1884), O.C. II, pp. 264–265.

OPP p. 717 (Los Complementarios); cf. Giner's criticism of Renan: "Renan, cuyo desde el vulgo, o más bien pueblo, de la masa, de las clases inferiores y menos cultas, lo lleva a la famosa teoría de que éstas sólo por representación gozan de las cosas nobles y elevadas de la vida, temiendo que los esfuerzos por elevar el nivel medio produzcan una 'medianía universal'. Así se comprende que de tal suerte sea para él ininteligible toda relación entre el nivel de la cultura de la masa y el de la ciencia, que la rompe y desarraiga de cuajo en frases como éstas: 'la grosería de muchos es lo que hace la educación de uno solo'; 'dejadnos la universidad, la academia, y os abandonaremos (a los demócratas) las escuelas rurales'. ¿No se puede afirmar con más reposo un error igual!' ("La ciencia como función social", O.C. XI, p. 34.)


Los complementarios, ed. Yndurain, cit., p. 201; cf. "la minoría de conciencias, que en todo momento representa lo actual" (OPP p. 826, 1925)

"Prólogo", O.C. XII, pp. 23, 25, my italics.


F. Giner: "Todo despertamiento se inicia siempre en una minoría; y tal vez a la hora en que estamos, en los pueblos más cultos, esa vida ideal es por doloroso extremo monopolio de una pequeña aristocracia, en medio de una inmensa demagogía del vientre; aristocracia y demagogía, en las cuales entran indistintamente, como
han entrado en todas épocas, ignorantes e ilustrados, ricos y pobres, poderosos y siervos" ("Problemas de la segunda enseñanza" (1892), O.C. XVII, p.150); Machado: "Es probable que la inteligencia haya dirigido siempre el mundo de los negocios humanos, más no parece tan claro que el intelectual, el hombre consagrado a actividades diagógicas, haya podido, a título de tal, jactarse alguna vez en formar en una casta dominadora ...No es fácil una inteligencia de clases." ("Intelectuales y obreros", 1920, OPP, p.802)

162 cit. J. Xirau, M.B. Cossío y la educación en España, cit., p.121; on the Misiones Pedagogicas: V. Supra pp.54-56.


164 OPP p.351

165 "Lo que recuerdo yo de Pablo Iglesias", OPP p.639

166 OPP p.387

167 Ibid.

168 "El problema de la educación nacional", O.C. XII, p.286.

169 OPP pp.462, 661,859.

170 OPP p.467

171 Xirau, M.B. Cossío..., cit., p.298; cf. A. Jiménez Fraud: "Véase a través de toda la obra escrita, hablada y practicada de Giner, Cossío y sus compañeros, la confianza ilimitada en las posibilidades, también al parecer para ellos infinitas, del pueblo español" (Ocaso y restauración, cit., p.217) and Antonio Sánchez Barbudo: "Cossío...era encantador, ingenuo, apasionado, entusiastmado como niño, con las virtudes y valores escondidos del 'pueblo'" (Letter to F. Caudet, 6 May 1973, cit. Caudet, Hora de España (Antología), M, Turner, 1975, p.475)

172 J. Xirau, M.B. Cossío..., cit., p.114; cf. Giner of whom Américo Castro writes: "Giner se deleitaba meditando sobre ciertos giros españoles sin correlación en otros idiomas, fenómeno lleno de alcance para quienes saben que hablar no es sólo poner gramática en el discurso, sino llevar a lo expresado la integridad del vivir" (Españoles al margen, cit., p.100)

173 "Soria" (1932), OPP p.859

174 OPP p.392

175 OPP p.383
176 OPP p. 528
177 OPP pp. 421-422
178 OPP p. 467
179 Xirau, M.B. Cossio..., cit., pp. 297, 301.
180 OPP p. 530
181 "Notas de sociología 1. La moral del superhombre", O.C. XI, pp. 277-278
182 Ideal, cit., pp. 64-65
183 OPP p. 404
184 OPP p. 468
185 "Acerca de la función de la ley" (1908), Ensayos y cartas, cit., p. 37.
186 OPP p. 468
187 OPP pp. 500-501
188 OPP p. 469
189 V. Supra p. 330
190 OPP p. 529
191 V. Supra p. 331.
192 Xirau, M.B. Cossio..., cit., pp. 291, 141.
Tal vez porque soy demasiado romántico, por el influjo, acaso, de una educación demasiado idealista, me falta simpatía por la idea central del marxismo: me resisto a creer que el factor económico sea el más esencial de la vida humana.

Antonio Machado, 1 May 1937
I have already mentioned Giner’s conviction as to the relative and historical nature of all truths expressed by human thought. Giner believed at the same time that there is a historical progression in human awareness, a forward-moving development of ideas; he wrote:

Cada civilización, al igual de cada hombre y aun de cada ser individual en el mundo, desde el sol a la más humilde hierba del campo, nace, crece hasta florecer en la plenitud de sus cualidades; decrece luego más o menos rápidamente y se extingue, cediendo al nuevo ideal que ha de desarrollar a su vez, hasta agotarse en fases análogas, la espléndida misión para que viene apercibida de lo alto. Así cumplen la ley de su destino las generaciones, corriendo de unas a otras un reguero de luz cada vez más encendida: quasi cursores vitae lampada tradunt.

Politics is probably one of the fields of thought where this progressive development was most rapid in Giner’s lifetime. Giner’s own ideology shows a clear development under the influence of new ideas and new circumstances; "cada día más radical, y con la camisa más limpia", he said of himself. He also observed the developments and variations in ideology of his Krausist contemporaries and disciples at the Institución, welcoming the independence of their thought but at the same time stressing their basic similarities:

se hallará en sus concepciones generales el mismo parentesco, a la vez que la misma irreducible divergencia en sus aplicaciones a la Sociología y al Derecho, a la Estética, a la Historia, la Ciencia Natural, la Economía, la Pedagogía, que distinguen a Azcárate y Costa, a Ruiz de Quevedo, y a Sales, a Federico de Castro y Leopoldo Alas, a Augusto Linares, a Alfredo y Laureano Calderón, a Posada, Buylla, Altamira, Cossío...y tantos otros. Todas son ramas de un mismo tronco, y ramas, a veces, cuya filiación sería...difícil de reconocer para Krause.
Hence it is impossible to examine the possible Krausist influence on Machado's political thought in terms of a doctrine. Furthermore, the difficulties of such an examination are increased because of the changed political circumstances under which Machado and, for example, Giner were writing. In Giner's early writings there is an awareness of the ideological crisis of nineteenth century liberalism; but by the time of his death this liberalism had suffered an even profounder crisis due to the rise of socialism, a rise that continued during the years that Machado was writing on politics. Giner defines his own beliefs as neo-liberal, but Julián Besteiro believes that by the latter years of his life Giner's strongest sympathy was for social democratic ideas. Besteiro is an interesting example of the independence of political ideology of institucionistas: a contemporary of Machado's at the Institución, he became a leading figure in the Partido Socialista Obrero Español. He confesses the enormous importance of Giner's influence on his own life:

Giner...era mi mayor afecto y él influyó decisivamente en los derroteros de mi vida. Don Francisco no veía con agrado que después de haber obtenido mi cátedra me decidiera a hacer política, porque él era un hombre que miraba la política con un indomable desdén; pero cuando vio el rumbo que yo tomaba y mis inclinaciones socialistas, creo que no le pareció tan reprovable mi camino.

Besteiro brings up an important point here: Giner's attitude to politics, in the sense of the science and art of government. For Giner politics is only one, and not the most important, of a number of activities concerned with social change. It is an exaggeration to say that he totally scorned politics though: what he is most scathingly critical of are the malpractices of contemporary Spanish political life. Giner was involved in politics, although he shunned direct and public involvement; he acted as adviser to progressive politicians of his time,
such as Salmerón, Azcárate, Moret and Canalejas. And of course he had a serious and professional interest in judicial matters, backed up by a profound knowledge of legal thought. This degree of involvement and knowledge must be borne in mind in a comparison with Machado, who was for most of his life only an observer of political life.

In view of the problems posed by the variety of political thought in the Spanish Krausists and their disciples, and because of the importance of changes in historical circumstances, it seems most sensible to concentrate above all in this chapter on the basic tendencies derived from Krausism, the kindred concepciones generales to which Giner refers above. That such an approach can be revealing is shown by critics of Besteiro, who have been able to perceive, in spite of that politician's Marxism, certain tendencies attributable to the influence of his teachers at the Institución: moralism, humanism and organicism. Other concepciones generales characteristic of Krausist political thought are liberal individualism, social reformism, and the importance attached to secularization, education and the notion of "harmony". Let us briefly consider the nature and implications of these tendencies in Krausist political thought.

In general terms this political thought can be described as progressive and "bourgeois". Krausist political ideology has been compared favourably with nineteenth century doctrinaire liberalism and with the political thought of such "98 Generation" writers as Unamuno for the coherence of its principles. According to Francisco Giner, politics falls within the realm of ethics: the Law, he says, is or should be "Un orden universal de piedad, de abnegación y altruismo". In part this moralistic attitude is a deliberate criticism of what he sees as the corruption and materialism of much of contemporary politics. But it is also derived from his Krausist vision of the nature of human life, in
which spiritual and moral values predominate. His is a humanist vision: the purpose of life is human self-development towards perfection. The Law, as ethics itself, is based on human nature, viewed optimistically; it should not be a system of restraints and controls on man's potential wickedness. Giner's belief in perfection and harmony is a denial of the Christian duality of the spirit and the flesh and of original sin. However he believes his ethics are totally in accord with those proposed by Christ:

Of course, Giner was well aware that mankind was far from achieving his ideal, utopian ethical harmony. In the realm of politics, according to the Krausists, the State will need to continue to exist as long as man remains morally imperfect. Yet for Giner it is ethical improvement that is the most important road towards social harmony. Political reforms, however well-intentioned, will fail to produce any essential change unless they find accord with the spiritual tendencies of the nation. Nineteenth century Liberalism failed, according to Giner, because it was exclusively concerned with external, abstract reforms instead of realising the primacy of inner, spiritual reform:

Because of the primacy of inner reform, an enormous
importance is attached to education in society. Education is the long-term solution for spiritual shortcomings, and the State's rôle in this is not to try to legislate change but to give to those institutions concerned with education the necessary freedom to develop their own inner resources:

This tendency to see all problems including political ones as essentially ethical is what critics have called the eticismo of Krausist thought. Other aspects of social reality are seen as subordinate to ethics; for example, economic life:

This typically Krausist scale of priorities has been criticised as inadequate and as a symptom of political impotence: Eloy Terrón believes that the Krausists were aspiring to "hacer en las conciencias la revolución que no eran capaces de llevar a cabo en la realidad social", a criticism answered by J. Santamaría who rightly affirms that for the Krausists consciousness was the true foundation of social reality. 17 Luis Araquistáin too regrets the Krausists lack of concentration on economic and agrarian reform (he does not include Costa in this). 18
Rather than impotence or short-sightedness, the Krausist view of society demonstrates an enormous idealism, admirable but verging on ingenuousness as Julio Caro Baroja says. 19

However, in spite of their fundamental humanist idealism, many Krausists and institucionistas were involved in political life as well as in education and did profess a more specific ideology than is suggested merely by eticismo. An important concept in the formation of this ideology is that of harmony. Krausist armonismo indicates a tendency to attempt to reconcile conceptual or other conflicts or dualities; we have already seen examples of its application to metaphysics and to education, where the intention is stated as being the balanced and harmonious development of all of a man's faculties - spiritual, intellectual and physical. I have already mentioned a political application of armonismo by Giner: his dislike of the sharp division of society into rulers and ruled. 20 In terms of politics armonismo also manifests itself in the dislike of extremism and in the ethic of tolerance for the beliefs of others. One of the principal conflicts that Giner sees in contemporary political thought is that between the desired freedom of the individual and the necessities of society as a whole; in ideological terms, the conflict between liberalism and socialism. Giner aspires to "harmonise" this conflict by establishing an ideology which combines and reconciles the best features of each. His basic political values are liberal: individual freedom of thought and action, the dignity of man; and he is critical of certain aspects of socialism: its materialism, its tendency towards State authoritarianism, its abstract egalitarianism and its tendency to suppress the development of the individual (writing on education he emphasises the importance of "el desarrollo de la personalidad individual, nunca más necesario que cuando ha llegado a su apogeo la idolatría de la nivelación y de las grandes masas"). 21 Yet at the same time he praises
the positive contributions socialist thinkers have made to human understanding, and he wishes to adopt from them the vision of human life as necessarily social and the desire to bring about a greater social justice (although through reform rather than by revolution). Giner is quite conscious of the failings in this respect of laissez-faire liberalism.

Giner's Krausist armonismo is, as Elias Díaz points out, philosophically opposed to Marxism: for Giner conflict is something to be reconciled peacefully, not the driving force of historical change. As well as being opposed to revolution as a means of changing society, Giner is critical of class-based politics:

As well as expressing Giner's disapproval of the use of politics for the furtherance of factional interests, this quotation alludes to other aspects of his ideology. Firstly, there is an implied mistrust of universal suffrage as a means of guaranteeing a democratic society. For Giner a true democracy would involve the harmonious co-operation of the whole of society; he is afraid that universal suffrage in the wrong circumstances can lead to a dictatorship of the majority. The extension of suffrage to the working classes may be premature since they (though not only they) are as yet unprepared for political responsibility; education must first prepare society for eventual democracy. For Giner it is not electoral legislation that produces true democracy but the spiritual maturity of the electorate. Furthermore he is suspicious of the tendency of democracy in the sense of universal suffrage to swamp the values of individualism.
has, he believes, a complexity and a variety that cannot be revealed merely by counting heads, it is much more than "la masa atomistica de los individuos en abstracto".26

As a liberal Giner believes in the importance of the individual, though his individualism is conceived as an integral part of his humanism:

Todo cultivo — y aun culto — de la individualidad es inseparable del cultivo de la Humanidad, de lo universal y absoluto en nosotros, o si se quiere de los fines divinos en el orden del mundo. 27

Within the same humanist and ethical beliefs is Giner's belief in the essential equality of all men: "cada individuo encierra en sí la naturaleza humana por entero, y en tal cualidad se funda la igualdad esencial de todos".28 All men are equally men, and all men have the right to develop and express their individuality.29 Yet Giner is critical of "la falsa y abstracta igualdad social, que condena toda distinción y toda jerarquía".30 His views on the functioning of élites and his belief in the organic nature of society go hand in hand. Let us now consider the meaning and implications of organicism in Krausist political thought. The notion of society as an "organism" is taken by Giner from Krause, Sanz del Río and Ahrens, but he also acknowledges the influence of socialist thought on his own beliefs in this area. Organicism aims to avoid the faults of both the liberal-individualist State, which he considers discredited, and the centralised and arbitrary State he fears is the logical product of socialism. For Giner liberalism has failed to take into account the importance of the social dimension of life. Its concept of political life, he says, divides the nation into, on the one hand, the individual, and on the other hand, the State. Giner wishes to bridge this gap by stressing the importance of a third element — society itself — in the life of a nation. "Society" is not the State, neither is it a mere aggregate of individuals; it is a complex area of
relationships that take place mid-way between the State and the individual, and hence, in Krausist terminology, is an area in which the opposition between the two might be "harmonised". Giner holds that society is an organism and he defines the characteristics of such an entity thus:

a) unidad de ser y vida, y, por tanto, de fin;  
b) pluralidad de funciones para realizar este fin;  
c) solidaridad, reacción mutua, interdependencia, condicionalidad recíproca entre todas ellas.

The consequences of such a theory are several. Firstly, the State is not or should not be the only corporate body within a society: society should contain a plurality of social bodies, associations, institutions and corporations which are organized to represent the many and varied interests within that society. Apart from the State, the only corporate body that has survived in the modern world is the Church; other interests should form social organizations: eg. municipalities and provinces, science and education, industry and commerce, agriculture and labour. These "organs" should be largely self-governing and should, by their harmonious interaction with one another, naturally and freely regulate much of the nation's life. The result of such a system would be a reduction of the importance and power of the State; for Giner, the State's function is principally to maintain the harmony between the various "organs" - really it is itself merely one organ with one main function: the administration of justice.

A second consequence of this organic view of social life is its inappropriateness for rapid and radical change. Society is a unity, a natural, living collectivity and any change would have to be not only the change of the whole society but a development, an evolution from what existed before. Giner's model corresponds to his own ideas about the best solutions
for Spain's problems: that Spain cannot be hurriedly adapted to fit some foreign blueprint, or changed by a stroke of the pen by legislators. Only gradual reforms that are in accord with the Volksgeist are feasible; real, lasting change depends on widespread ethical improvement.

A third consequence of Krausist organicism is the importance given to co-operation as the precondition of social change and the definition of the functioning of élites in terms of solidarity and collaboration with the people. I have already discussed Giner's ideas on this point. 34 He does not deny the existence or importance of élites but he does insist on the need for mutual collaboration of an organic nature between élites and people, for a general sense of communal unity. He also mentions the ethic appropriate to an élite which finds itself in a position of superiority from which it can spread enlightenment; it is an ethic of service 35 and brotherly love:

...no con la condescendencia gratuita del superior gubemental y benévelo para con el subdito, inferior y distante de él en conocimiento o en moralidad o en fortuna, sino con la conciencia del hermano para con el hermano, que, sin apeci6n de personas, reparte como el sol luz y calor a unos y otros, que obra en caridad, que a la vez es rigor de justicia y pone en ello su alma entera. 36

Again, social and political life is seen as ultimately a branch of ethics. The same eticismo and organicism pervades Giner's treatment of socio-economic problems. He is well aware of poverty and deprivation and of the responsibility of capitalism for these problems, and he sees that laissez-faire liberalism has failed to remedy them. He backs legislative reform as one means of alleviating the conditions of the masas pobres and supports working-class associations as a manifestation of social organicism. 37 However he believes that the fundamental force for social justice is not the Law, nor
class conflict nor collective ownership of property but the harmonising influence of ethics. Capitalism can be made into a juster system by an improvement in the ethical principles of capitalists; capitalism does not preclude altruism. 38

Giner's perspective on social problems can be shown by considering one of his articles: "Una observación sobre la condición de los criados" (1895). 39 The starting point of this article is the idea of the protection of workers' rights by legislation. Giner recognises the particular hardships endured by certain types of workers: servants, public employees and agricultural labourers; of the last he notes: "Tampoco será, ciertamente, en España donde los socialistas pondrán en duda, desde su criterio, la miseria del obrero rural". 40 Giner's own criterion of misery is not restricted to economic hardship: in a later article he refers to the "miseria económica, intelectual, moral, estética, de todos géneros de nuestras clases populares". 41 The importance given to questions of education and ethics is something I have already noted. Giner also refers here to aesthetic deprivation, which he describes as "un factor de incalculable importancia: su vida estética, sus diversiones y recreos". 42

The central concern of the article is the limitations of purely legislative reforms in remedying the hardships of one group of workers - domestic servants. Servants, Giner says, have been given "rights" and "freedoms" by liberal governments: they have the freedom to choose employment, the right to wages, the right to equality before the Law. The servant has thus become "en el sentido jurídico-exterior de la palabra, ante la ley, ante el Estado, una verdadera persona". 43 But Giner goes on to claim that this freedom and equality are purely formal; they exist only on paper. His theoretical freedom is in practice greatly limited by the restraints of necessity and his equality is valueless. A servant may have the right to receive a certain wage,
the more important reward of human kindness is not something that can be granted by legislation: it can only be an expression of the ethical qualities of the employer. All too often, Giner says, the servant's theoretical equality is negated in practice by treatment that constitutes a denial of his value as a human being. All liberal legislation has done is redefine the relationship between servant and employer in purely legal and economic terms.

In fact, Giner suggests, many servants were better off in human terms before this legislation, for then they were "part of the family" rather than mere employees. Before, many servants were bound to their family by ethical and "organic" bonds; now the two are totally separated into classes. It should not be thought, however, that Giner is defending the institution of domestic service, of which he is an opponent. What he is doing is outlining his own perspective on problems of social justice: he lacks faith in purely legislative reforms and affirms the primacy of ethics in social life, playing down the importance of purely economic considerations.

Let us begin our examination of the political thought of Antonio Machado by considering two of his declarations of political ideology from the latter years of his life. In 1937 he wrote:

Mi posición política es hoy la misma de siempre. Yo soy un viejo republicano para quien la voluntad del pueblo es sagrada. 45

And in 1938 he expanded on this:

Carezco de filiación de partido, no la he tenido nunca, aspiro a no tenerla jamás. Mi ideario político se ha limitado siempre a aceptar como legítimo solamente el gobierno que representa la voluntad libre del pueblo. 46

Estudié en la Institución Libre de Enseñanza
y tuve por maestros a Giner de los Ríos, Cossío y Salmerón, teniendo como condiscípulo a Besteiro. No es difícil, por tanto, deducir que mi formación había de ser liberal y republicana, que por otra parte había de coincidir con la historia política de mis antepasados ya que mi padre y mi abuelo eran republicanos fervorosos. 47

Machado sees himself as a democrat and a Republican, though without belonging to any particular political party. 48 He sees the roots of his ideology as being in the nineteenth century and confesses two formative influences: his family and the Institución. As we have seen, the politics of the Krausists were firmly liberal, and the majority of them were Republicans, although certain points about their Republicanism remain to be discussed when I consider Machado's attitude to the Partido Reformista.

In another writing of 1938 Machado refers with pride to the knowledge of nineteenth century political life he was able to obtain from conversations with his teachers at the school and with his father and grandfather. 49 His grandfather's involvement in politics extended to his acting as Governor of Seville after the September Revolution. 50 Machado y Alvarez is known, as well as for his work as a folklorist, for his anti-clerical articles. Their violence provoked the Bishop of Jaen to excommunicate readers of the newspaper El Linares. 51 Machado y Alvarez censures in his articles the temporal power of the Church, its opposition to Truth as revealed by modern science and its defence of superstition and of tyranny. He attacks the Church from his own standpoint as a "Rationalist Christian" who believes that institutionalized religion has perverted Christianity. He sees Christ as a "socialist" and defender of the poor, and believes the ideals of the French Revolution ("Igualdad, fraternidad, amor") are in accord with the spirit of early Christianity. Some of his notions show his affinities with Krausism: his profession of tolerance for all creeds, his enthusiasm for science and his pantheism:
I have already discussed the similarities between Antonio Machado's views on religion and on the Catholic Church and those of the Krausists. Machado y Alvarez's influence on his son in this respect is generally complementary to that of the Krausists though Antonio appears to draw more of his ethics from the latter, and perhaps more of the occasional virulence of his anti-clericalism from the former. The anti-clericalism of the Machados, father and son, and of the Krausists is in fact in line with one of the central ideas of nineteenth century Spanish liberalism: the belief that the Church is an opponent of freedom of thought and as such a principal cause of Spain's backwardness. Yet the anti-clericalism of the Krausists is more coherently argued than that of Republicans such as Machado y Alvarez. Giner, for example, justifies his campaigning in favour of the secularization of education by referring to his organic theory of society: the Church is, he says, only one of a number of corporate bodies within society, and like all other social "organs" it has its particular function. It has no right to interfere with the freedom of action of another "organ" - that section of society whose particular function is education. The Krausists' desire to secularize education is nevertheless a clear attack on the Catholic Church, which they know is totally opposed to the free-thinking and humanist principles they wish to introduce into Spain. However, unlike much nineteenth century anti-clericalism, that of the Krausists is intellectualized, and restrained by their ethic of tolerance and by their firm commitment to their own interpretation of Christian ethics.
If in his attitudes to the Church Antonio Machado owes something to both his family and his education at the Institución, in his attitude to political involvement he is closest to Giner. In 1913 he declares "me repugna la política donde veo el encanallamiento del campo por el influjo de la ciudad". In the early years of the Second Republic he states his belief that it is his duty as an intellectual and an artist not to become too involved in politics. By 1935, however, he appears to be changing his mind about the importance of politics: Mairena is made to advise his pupils "yo no os aconsejaré nunca el apoliticismo"; but, at the same time Machado suggests the reason for his former lifelong aversion "...sino en último término el desdén de la política malándose con trepadores y cucañistas, sin otro propósito que el de obtener ganancia y colocar parientes". It was the corruption of Spanish political life that repelled him. In a similar vein he writes in his prose tribute to Giner of "esos hombres de presa que llamamos caciques, esos repugnantes cucañistas que se dicen políticos". I have already quoted Besteiro's report on Giner's scorn for politics; Giner is also disgusted by the reigning political corruption, ironically describing politicians thus:

los diputados, senadores, ministros, etc., no están para eso resolver los problemas sociales sino para hacer discursos, dar y tomar destinos, mendigar plazas de alquileres en las grandes compañías industriales y no tratar de otra redención que la suya.

Both Machado and Giner, then, shunned political involvement because of contemporary political malpractices. Only with the emergence of a powerful threat to the survival of the Second Republic, and with the subsequent outbreak of the Civil War, does Machado admit to a complete change of opinion about politics:
Yo siento mucho no haber meditado bastante sobre política. Perteneco a una generación que se llamó a sí mismo apolítica, que cometió el grave error de no ver sino el aspecto negativo de la política, de ignorar que la política podía ser una actividad esencialísima, de vida o muerte para nuestra patria. 59

This is not to say that Machado showed no interest in politics before the 1930s. He had, as we have seen, Republican convictions, and he does occasionally pass judgement on Spanish and European politics, particularly in his letters and in Los complementarios (I shall consider some of these judgements later). And of course, like Giner and like some of his most famous literary contemporaries he shows a great concern for the "problem of Spain", though the problems of his country are most often seen as social, spiritual and cultural rather than solely political. Yet it is above all in his writings of the 1930s that he reveals the ideological bases of his own political points of view. Of particular relevance are his critical comments on Marxism. In 1937 he writes:

Desde un punto de vista teórico no soy marxista, no lo he sido nunca, es muy posible que no lo sea jamás. Mi pensamiento no ha seguido la ruta que desciende de Hegel a Carlos Marx. Tal vez porqué soy demasiado romántico, por el influjo, acaso de una educación demasiado idealista, me falta simpatía por la idea central del marxismo: me resisto a creer que el factor económico, cuya enorme importancia no desconozco, sea el más esencial de la vida humana y el gran motor de la historia. 60

In another article of the same year, he explains what he means by Idealism and Romanticism in this context:

Los idealistas, más o menos rezagados - el rezago no implica apartamiento de la verdad, sino de la moda -, creen en el espíritu como resorte decisivo, supremo imán o primer impulsor de la historia... La biblia de estos hombres - no siempre leída, como es destino
As a political "Romantic", educated by "idealists", Machado believes that it is the "spirit" that shapes the life and history of a society. He confesses that this is an unfashionable point of view whose roots are in post-Kantian, pre-Marxist thought. In terms of the history of philosophy in Spain, this almost certainly refers to Krausism rather than Hegelianism, although Machado suggests that to be an idealist in this tradition one need not have a personal knowledge of the metaphysical texts in which it is grounded. Above all, Machado defines his own ideology here as being diametrically opposed to Materialism and Realism, as represented by Marxism, and acknowledges the influence of the Institución on his own idealism.

Machado again defines his own beliefs against Marxism in a number of writings in which he discusses what he sees as the cynicism of the modern world. In these commentaries he clarifies what he understands by the term "spiritual values". Machado believes that the world is threatened by an enormous current of cynicism. By cynicism, he explains, he means a belief in "la animalidad humana", a belief that material and economic factors are the driving force of human life. The most representative strand of contemporary cynicism is, he says, Marx's Materialist Interpretation of History. Machado believes that this cynicism is the enemy of the values of "culture", "ethics" and "humanism", values with which he identifies
his own beliefs. It is the enemy of "los valores culturales" and of "lo que durante todo el siglo XIX hemos estado llamando ideales". Cynics are, he says, those who believe in "la perfecta inanidad de la ética". The cynicism of contemporary European thought "tiende a despojar al hombre de todos sus atributos divinos... ¡Perdón! Cuando digo divinos, quiero decir humanos, aquellos por los cuales el hombre excede o se diferencia de otros grupos zoológicos enteramente sometidos a sus fatalidades orgánicas". In these comments Machado reveals the basis of his own political ideology: he is an idealist and a Romantic, he believes in the primary importance of culture and ethics, he is a humanist. We have already seen the affinities of Machado's humanist ethics with that of the Krausists. His use of the terms "human" and "divine" recalls Giner, who writes of "el cultivo de la Humanidad, de lo universal y absoluto en nosotros, o si se quiere, de los fines divinos en el orden del mundo". He also follows Giner in opposing human idealism to animality; Giner says that "el culto del ideal...es lo que da a la humanidad su lugar preeminente en el mundo, a diferencia de la animalidad".

Machado's use of Marxism as an example against which to define his own ideology should not lead us to think that he is totally unsympathetic to socialism or that he aligns himself with the political opponents of Marxism. On the contrary, he sees the policies of the "so-called great democracies" in relation to the Spanish Civil War as another manifestation of contemporary cynicism, since, in defending by material means their own material interests they are as cynical as those Marxists whom they criticise. Such behaviour is cynical but is justified in the name of "realism". For Machado such "realism" is, like the materialism of Marxists, an implicit confession that "una política cimentada en principios éticos sería una política de ilusiones".
in political life against cynicism, be it of the Left, the Right or the Centre.

In spite of Machado’s philosophical disagreement with the principles of socialism he does recognize that it represents a step forward towards greater social justice and harmony: "Veo que el socialismo en cuanto supone una manera de convivencia humana...es una etapa inexcusable en el camino de la justicia." 68 As such he welcomes socialism, though he sees it as a stage in human progress rather than a final goal, and envisions mankind eventually achieving something superior to a socialist society:

Yo no soy un verdadero socialista... pero sin embargo el socialismo es la gran esperanza humana ineludible en nuestros días y toda superación del socialismo lleva implícita su previa realización. 69

Machado claims that it was Pablo Iglesias who opened his eyes to the existence of social injustice in around 1889. 70 In 1919 he writes of contemporary society in the language of socialism, describing Capitalism as "una economía social definitivamente rota". 71 Socialism is for Machado a stepping stone towards a better ordering of human affairs, but his ideal is based on spiritual and cultural values rather than on economic considerations. He believes that the underlying strength of socialism as a mass movement stems from ideals similar to his own, not from any apparent materialistic goals; thus he writes: "Lo que hay en el fondo del movimiento de las masas trabajadoras es la aspiración a la perfección por medio de la cultura". 72

The same eticismo and idealistic humanism that lead Machado to interpret left-wing politics in Spain in this way also shape his understanding of and reaction to the Russian Revolution. He discerns in Russian communism an aspiration he shares: to build a better world on the foundations of a spirit of human fraternity. 73 His interpretation of the Communist Revolution is strongly
influenced by his belief in the Volksgeist and tendency to see this national character expressed most clearly and authentically in literature. In effect Machado's view of Russia is rooted in his enthusiasm for the nineteenth century Russian classics, particularly Tolstoy. Tolstoyism, he claims, offers to a materialistic and utilitarian world a reaffirmation of the importance of the spiritual dimension in life. Russian literature is imbued with the Russian people's profound understanding of Christianity as a spirit of human fraternity, according to Machado. Machado attempts to explain the Russian Revolution in terms of this underlying spirit of fraternity; even as late as 1937 he claims to discern "el sentido generoso y fraterno, íntegramente humano, de todas las creaciones del alma rusa" as the driving force of the U.S.S.R. under Stalin.

The main problem Machado has to face in presenting this view of Russia is that of accounting for the professed Marxism of the Soviet State, for in Machado's use of the terms Marxism and Christianity are diametrically opposed world-views: materialism opposed to spirituality. Indeed, recalling Marx's Jewish ancestry, Machado represents Marxism as a reversion to the pre-Christian values of the Old Testament, where man is enslaved by essentially biological drives and the desire for worldly goods and where love is merely an expression of the human animal's desire to survive through procreation, or an aspect of clan loyalty. In contrast to this, Machado sees the Christian ethic of brotherly love as a liberation from submission to the appetites of the flesh and from the ties of the family and the nation. In view of the fundamental nature of these differences between Marxist materialism and Christianity, he is only able to maintain his own interpretation of Soviet Russia by emphasising the importance of the Volksgeist as a source of insight that goes beyond appearances, and suggesting that deep down the "Russian soul" has little sympathy for Marxism, which is a foreign import.
Machado's ingenuous attitude to Russian communism is, I think, demonstrative of several aspects of his political naivety. Firstly, he believes that ethical values are of paramount importance in politics, and, sympathising with the utopian beliefs of Tolstoy, wishes to see his own convictions confirmed by what is apparently the most progressive force in world politics. Secondly, he allows his Romantic belief in the Volksgeist to gloss over the complications of historical events. As I have already mentioned, this use of literary evidence to draw conclusions about national character is a feature Machado shares with literary contemporaries such as Unamuno and Azorín, and it is a tendency anticipated by the thought of the Spanish Krausists. Sometimes these writers contrast the type of understanding obtained by conventional historiography to the deeper insights provided into the Volksgeist and the Zeitgeist through the study of literature. Unamuno writes in En torno al casticismo: "cuanto mejor nos revelan un siglo sus obras de ficción que sus historias de la vanidad"; Giner states in an essay of 1863:

siendo la literatura poética espejo de lo qué una sociedad piensa, de lo que siente, de aquello a que aspira, en una palabra del ideal de su tiempo, que ella principalmente manifiesta y hace comprender, la historia puede tomar de su estudio un profundo conocimiento del carácter y modo de ser de las naciones, penetrando a la vez la misteriosa relación que entre las ideas de una época y sus acontecimientos existe, para explicar las causas internas de los grandes fenómenos sociales.

Machado is using literature in just this way, looking for underlying ideas and causes of events, in his analysis of Soviet communism via Tolstoy.

A third aspect of Machado's political naivety revealed by his conclusions on communism is his limited knowledge of Marxism, whose philosophical complexities he reduces to simplistic formulae such as "determinismo
Elías Díaz has noted the currency of this particular over-simplification in many writers, including Unamuno and Krausists such as Azcárate and Giner. Giner certainly has little sympathy for any materialist philosophy and he censures the "hedonism" and "psychological epiphenomenism" behind Historical Materialism. However, the article referred to by Díaz as evidence for his assertion that Giner sees Marxism merely as "economic determinism" is largely a summary of the opinions of other critics of Marxism rather than an expression of Giner's own views. Furthermore the summary itself (and other remarks by Giner elsewhere) shows that he was aware of some of the complexities of Marxist dialectics and sought to inform himself about them (even if only to criticise them) rather than accepting any simplistic formula as representative of the total content of Marxism. Perhaps surprisingly, Giner even alludes with approval, on occasion, to the ethical idealism apparent in certain Marxist ideas although at one point he suggests ironically that such idealism is at odds with Marx’s professed materialist world-view.

Rather than Giner, I think Machado’s formulaic definitions of Marxism recall some of Unamuno’s writings. Unamuno repeatedly claims that Marxism is simply the belief that hunger is the motive force of history; Mairena attributes to Marx the equation "un hombre= un hambre" and in 1937 Machado states that the central dogma of Marxism is "una creencia en el hambre como único y decisivo motor de la historia". Machado’s interpretation of the Russian Revolution as fundamentally spiritual in inspiration rather than Marxist may owe something to Unamuno, who wrote in 1921:

Bertrand Russell...no es ciertamente el más capacitado para comprender el íntimo sentido de una revolución religiosa como la del bolchevismo ruso....De lo que menos tiene la revolución rusa, por lo que sabemos, es de ser una realización del marxismo.
Machado writes in a similar vein in the 1930s (by which time Unamuno was much more critical of Bolshevism): "La Rusia actual es marxista, pero es mucho más que marxista" and "Yo no puedo imaginar una Rusia marxista, porque el ruso empieza donde el marxista acaba". 92

In short, Machado's judgements on the nature of Marxism and Communism reveal the political innocence of a rather idealistic man of letters. However at the same time they reveal the framework of his own deeply-held beliefs: he is an idealist who believes that politics should be an expression of man's finest spiritual possibilities: altruism, the moral imperative, the aspiration to human perfection. His are the values of a humanist (with Christian overtones). The same humanism, together with the same ingenuous Romanticism, is apparent in his writings on the subject of the common man, the pueblo.

Machado rejects on principle the use of the term masses to describe human beings, since

The term mass belongs to the language of materialism and hence its use in this context is a denial of man's true worth - his spirituality; it is, says Machado, a term that is both unChristian and inhuman. 94 The idea of human masses is according to Machado bourgeois and ecclesiastical in origin, and an expression of the attitudes of society's exploiters and non-democrats; consequently it should not be used by those who claim to be the defenders of the people. 95 It is logically impossible to speak of "saving" or "educating the masses" since these activities are spiritual rather than physical. 96 Juan de Mairena maintains this point of view when declaring the aims of his Escuela Popular de
Sabiduría Superior:

Nosotros no pretendemos nunca educar a las masas. A las masas que las parta un rayo. Nos dirigimos al hombre, que es lo único que nos interesa... El hombre masa no existe para nosotros. 97

Machado will not use the term masses because he considers it degrading, and he will not use it because it is a denial of man's individuality. It is only possible to educate the individual. Machado applies the same perspective to his audience as a writer; he aspires to communicate to each reader as an individual not to an abstract mass of people:

As well as the importance of the individual man, Machado again stresses here his vision that the fundamental force behind human endeavour is the aspiration to spiritual fulfilment ("hombria integral"). Machado believes in the individual, although this belief is not without qualifications, for he regards Individualism as a nineteenth century creed (embodied in that century's thought and literature as Idealism and Romanticism) now succeeded by the "social" tendencies of the twentieth. 99 Intellectually, he accepts the validity of these attempts to correct the excesses of Individualism, but emotionally he remains attached to many of its basic values. Hence when he writes of the movement to a new, objective, "social" art, his attitude is ambiguous: his acceptance of the necessity of a new "fraternity"
and "objectivity." \(100\) comes into conflict with his belief in the individual:

Contra el subjectivismo desmesurado del arte burgués en sus postrimerías militan el fascio y el soviet de la juventud, dispuestos a eliminar alegremente, con su mera actuación deportiva, los cuatro quintos del tesoro sentimental de sus mayores. Tal vez es esto lo que explica la poca simpatía de los viejos, y sobre todo los maduros, hacia la juventud actual. Pero esa juventud está —con más o menos consciencia de ello— en la gran corriente del arte moderno hacia un arte futuro —el que esto escribe aspira a morirse antes de verlo— pobre de intimidad, pero rico de acentos expresivos de lo común y genérico, un arte para multitudes urbanas, de ágora, de estadium, de cinema monumental, de plaza de toros. \(101\)

The same potential conflict between individual and communal values is apparent when he meditates on society:

No debe el hombre —decía Juan de Mairena— disponer de la vida del hombre; quiero decir que no debe utilizar a su prójimo y degradarlo hasta quitarle su dignidad de fin, para convertirlo en medio, supeditado a la vida ajena. Reconozco, sin embargo, que esto puede discutirse. Porque, si los hombres necesitan unos de otros para vivir y ello hasta el sacrificio, es claro que la suprema finalidad humana no está en el hombre —en el hombre individual—, sino más bien en el complejo social o agregado de individuos. \(102\)

Mairena, who, we are told, always remained a man of the nineteenth century, \(103\) is unwilling to reduce the individual’s life to a wholly social function, since each individual has a personal destiny to fulfil. At the same time he accepts that human life has an inevitable social dimension, and that a man’s ethical duties towards his fellow men are an integral part of his humanity. At one point he reflects ironically on the logical consequences of absolute individualism:
L'individualité enveloppe l'infini. El individuo es todo. ¿Y qué es, entonces, la sociedad? Una mera suma de individuos. (Pruebe lo superfluo de la suma y de la sociedad.) Por muchas vueltas que le doy - decía Mairena - no hallo manera de sumar individuos. 104

What is really put in question here is the definition of society as an aggregate of individuals, which is a mathematical rather than a human concept. Mairena's point and mode of expression here recall the criticism made by Giner of doctrinaire liberalism: he censured the "concepción de la sociedad... como un agregado atomístico de individuos sumados", proposing as an alternative concept that of society as "un todo real y sustantivo". 105

As I have explained, Giner attempts to account for both the individual diversity and the essential unity of social life within an organic vision of society. There is no systematic theorising of this kind in Machado's writings, though it is clear that he, like Giner, seeks to reconcile the individual and the social without negating either. Machado does suggest, albeit unsystematically, a vision of society as other than an aggregate of individuals by his frequent recourse to the notion of the pueblo. The term is used by Machado to designate the sense of national community that creates a spiritual unity among individuals:

El pueblo - en el pueblo entramos todos, sin distinción de clases, cuantos sentimos el destino común a los hombres de nuestra raza. 106

Giner, describing with sympathy Romantic legal thought, gives the word a similarly classless meaning:

...pueblo; esta palabra no expresaba ya más la clase "inferior", sino la nación entera, en la unidad de su vida jurídica... 107

However, more frequently Giner prefers the terms nación
and sociedad rather than the vagueness of the Romantic notion of el pueblo. Machado claims that for him the pueblo is not defined by social class but by a spirit of a shared national destiny, a sense of its own essential unity. He believes that the whole people should actively collaborate in national life; he writes: "Siempre creí que, sin la más directa intervención del pueblo, nada completo, nada fuerte, nada orgánico y vital podríamos realizar". Here the distinction implied is between pueblo and élites. As we have already seen in a different context both Machado and Giner emphasise the importance of active collaboration between the two in a nation's progress, and the organic terminology used by Machado here is very similar to that used by Giner. In a political article, Giner criticises the elitist legacy of the eighteenth century thus:

En adelante, la concepción dualista del Estado, con sus masas pasivas, desposeídas de energía, de poder, esperando de lo alto su principio de organización y de actividad, no sostendrá acaso mucho tiempo el lugar que aún conserva.

He also writes of the need to:

arrancar de cuajo en nuestra civilización, semiprehistórica todavía, el espectáculo de dos humanidades, separadas como dos periodos geológicos. Va siendo hora de que se dé al fin cuenta de sí mismo, y entre a colaborar y participar en la historia del espíritu conscicio aquella masa amorfa, inmensa, anónima, que sin saberlo, da siempre el fondo de esa historia y de sus creaciones: lengua, poesía, derecho, religión, moral, arte, industria.

The allusion at the end is of course to the Volksgeist as the essential foundation of national life; both Giner and Machado, as we have seen, assert the importance of this "spirit of the people" being understood and taken
There is, however, a difference between Machado and Giner in their attitudes to another means of expression of the "popular will" - universal suffrage. As we have seen, Giner is wary of universal suffrage because he sees the danger of the arbitrary imposition of the majority in such a system, and he believes there should be other organic means of representation of special interests to ensure harmonious cooperation rather than the dictatorship of majorities. Machado is much more clearly enthusiastic about democracy in terms of the ballot box. He claims to support the Republic because it represents "la voluntad del pueblo, libremente expresado" (here the adverb presumably alludes to the electoral corruption that prevented previous parliaments elected by universal suffrage from being truly representative). He also supports the Republic's modest plans to govern "en provecho de la mayoría de nuestros indígenas". At the same time, Machado's belief in the Volksgeist and in active collaboration of the whole people means that for him true democracy is not simply a matter of periodic voting. Neither does he support the Republic solely because it was elected by a majority of Spaniards: he supports it also because he himself is a life-long Republican and because he believes it is founded on ethical rather than materialistic (or cynical) principles. It should not be forgotten either, in comparing Machado and Giner on this point, that one of Giner's objections to democracy was the lack of political maturity of the electorate. Social pedagogy was the prerequisite of true democracy according to Giner. It could be argued that important progress had been made in this respect in the period between Giner's comment on premature extension of suffrage (made shortly after the 1868 Revolution) and the advent of the Second Republic. Some institucionistas certainly believed so and even went so far as to claim that the successful establishment of the Republic was the fruit of the complementary educational
endeavours of the **Institución** and the **P.S.O.E.**. In 1931 Cossío declared: "El magnífico espectáculo de la España actual es obra de Pablo Iglesias y de don Francisco". Lorenzo Luzuriaga expands on this idea:

sin los hombres que a la caída de la primera República empezaron a transformar las mentes y las conciencias de las generaciones jóvenes siguientes, desde la Institución Libre de Enseñanza, no habrían sido posibles hechos políticos en España tan ejemplares como los del 12 y 14 de abril, como tampoco lo habrían sido, por otra parte, sin la acción educativa paralela a ésta en el orden político: la actuación magnífica de Pablo Iglesias y de sus inmediatos discípulos.

Another of Giner’s fears with regard to democracy was that it would simply replace one social class for another in a position of power and privilege. He firmly rejects the idea of class-based politics. Machado implies the same rejection in his definition of the **pueblo** as something that transcends social class. Machado does not usually oppose to the concept of the pueblo those of the bourgeoisie and the aristocracy but that of the **señorito**, of whom he writes:

La verdad es que, como decía Juan de Mairena, no hay señoritos, sino más bien "señoritismo", una forma, entre varias, de hombria degradada, un estilo peculiar de no ser hombre, que puede observarse a veces en individuos de diversas clases sociales, y que nada tiene que ver con los cuellos planchados, la corbata y el lustre de las botas.

Entre nosotros, españoles, nada señoritos por naturaleza, el señoritismo es una enfermedad epidémica, cuyo origen puede encontrarse, acaso, en la educación jesuítica, profunda- mente anticristiana y - digámoslo con orgullo - perfectamente antiespañola. Porque el señoritismo lleva implícita una estimativa errónea y servil, que antepone los hechos sociales más de superficie - signos de clase, hábitos e indumentos - a los valores propiamente dichos, religiosos y humanos.
Given Machado’s definition of the pueblo in terms of a spirit of unity that overrides social class, this is a perfectly consistent definition of the señorito: the señorito is not defined by class either but by a spirit of division, in fact the very spirit of division which emphasises the importance of social classes. Señoritismo is seen as a deficient moral attitude rather than an injustice stemming from the social structure.

Señoritos are also defined as idlers and parasites: "hombres que eluden el trabajo con que se gana el pan". However this criticism is not made from the standpoint of a belief in the inherent dignity of labour (as in socialism) or in defence of the Protestant work ethic (as in Giner). Rather Machado condemns idlers because their leisure is the unjust privilege of a few bought at the expense of the greater work-load of the many. According to Machado, if work were distributed more evenly in society then all men would have the same opportunity to fulfil themselves through cultural and spiritual activities: "las altas y libres actividades del espíritu que son las específicamente humanas".

In this sense too señoritismo is condemned on humanist grounds: the señorito’s privilege denies other men their fulfilment as human beings in the same way as the señorito’s attitude to social class is counter to "los valores propiamente dichos, religiosos y humanos".

Since señoritismo is defined as a spirit of class privilege, then its opposite – the spirit of the pueblo – is seen to be a spirit of equality. Machado is careful to point out in exactly what sense he, with the pueblo, believes all men to be equal:

El señoritismo ignora, se complace en ignorar – juzgadamente – la insuperable dignidad del hombre. El pueblo, en cambio, la conoce y la afirma; en ella tiene su cimiento más firme la ética popular. "Nadie es más que nadie", reza un adagio de Castillá. ¡Expresión perfecta de modestia y orgullo! Sí, "nadie es más que nadie" porque a nadie le es dado aventajarse a todos, pues a todo hay quien gane, en
circunstancias de lugar y de tiempo. "Nadie es más que nadie, porque — y éste es el más hondo sentido de la frase —, por mucho que valga un hombre, nunca tendrá valor más alto que el valor de ser hombre. Así habla Castilla, un pueblo de señores, que siempre ha despreciado al señorito. 126

For Machado man's highest quality is his humanity, and since all men are equally human, all men are equal in this sense. His belief in equality is based on humanist values and his declaration of this belief recalls that of Giner: "cada individuo encierra en sí la naturaleza humana por entero, y en tal cualidad se funda la igualdad esencial de todos". 127 Machado does not, however, deny the existence of social classes or propose that they should cease to exist; what should cease to exist is all unjust privilege based on class, since this is an affront to his humanist ethic:

Hemos llegado ya a una plena conciencia de la dignidad esencial, de la suprema aristocracia del hombre; y de todo privilegio de clase pensamos que no podrá sostenerse en el futuro. Porque si el hombre, como nosotros creemos, no lleva en sí valor más alto que el de ser hombre, el aventajamiento de un grupo social sobre otro carece de fundamento moral. De la gran experiencia cristiana todavía en curso, es ésta una consecuencia ineludible. 128

Christianity enters the scheme of things, for Machado as for the Krausists, as a belief in the dignity of man as well as an ethic of brotherly love. 129 For Machado, as for the Krausists, ethical altruism is the basis of social and political life. For Machado, as for the Krausists, the crux of the problem of social inequalities is not the existence of a certain class structure but the lack of true moral values. Señoritismo is attacked as a deficient attitude to one's fellow men; class privilege is immoral. As we have seen, both Machado and the Krausists admit the existence of hierarchies in human life, of élites whose superiority is based on
moral and intellectual qualities (not on property or class). But both Machado and the Krausists deny the right of élites to special privileges; Giner writes:

el hombre de mayor inteligencia, superior cultura, mejor sentido moral, más medios de fortuna, de más poder, en suma y facultades, nunca puede pretender supremacía, prerrogativas, privilegios en su favor, fundándose en aquellas circunstancias.

Sanz del Río too wrote on the error of social differences being used as a justification of special privileges and on the moral sin of forgetting the equality of all men as human beings because of the existence of other inequalities:

Esta diferencia de estados despierta en el hombre vulgar la preocupación de que no pertenecen los hombres igualmente a una común humanidad y vida, sino a diferentes e inconciliables jerarquías sobrepuestas unas a otras y separadas en el todo... el que mira a los estados inferiores con orgullo, a los superiores con servilismo, el que en su criado y en su rey no ve lo primero el hombre, el consocio en la obra y destino común, presume en vano de alma y de sentido humano.

This is very much like Machado’s description and criticism of señoritismo. Sanz del Río also anticipates Machado’s assertion that all men have a right to the leisure time necessary for fulfilling themselves as human beings:

Las profesiones inferiores, cuyas funciones simples no dan alimento al espíritu y resfrían y embotan el corazón, debieran gozar algún desahogo para cultivar sus facultades superiores y despertar en la contemplación de la naturaleza y de las bellas obras humanas, ante los altares de la religión, en la solemnidad de la vida pública y en el respetuoso y libre comercio social, el sentido para lo elevado y lo bello, y el sentimiento de su libertad moral, y de su derecho humano.
Machado's later writings are full of comments praising the qualities of the Spanish pueblo. Although in theory the term is not for him descriptive of a particular social class, it is often quite apparent that it is the "common man" whom he is singling out for especial praise. Hence he writes of the pueblo and the value of "popular wisdom" as embodied in folklore:

Escribir para el pueblo... ¡qué más quisiera yo! Deseoso de escribir para el pueblo aprendí de él cuanto pude, mucho menos - claro está - de lo que sabe... Yo no he pasado de folklorista, aprendí, a mi modo, de saber popular. ...La aristocracia española está en el pueblo, escribiendo para el pueblo se escribe para los mejores. 134

The problem with Machado's eulogies of the pueblo is that so frequently his allusions to their supposed qualities are vague and unsubstantiated by any examples of these qualities. He refers, as we have seen, to the skill and application of rural craftsmen; 135 in a poem of 1920 he notes the compassionate and fraternal spirit of a working man and remarks "¡Oh santidad del pueblo! ¡Oh pueblo santo!". 136 But these instances are the exceptions rather than the rule. Most often he simply enthuses in a general way about "el saber popular", "el alma popular" or, in his reference to the proverb "nadie es más que nadie", to "el alma de Castilla". That he should extract so much significance from such a proverb - the humanism, dignity and democratic spirit of Castile - indicates the nature of his examination of the pueblo. 137 He is not so much concerned with individual Spaniards as with the Volksgeist: he is more concerned with searching for the underlying character of the nation than with observing social phenomena. This approach allows him the freedom to select his evidence and make distinctions between what is superficial and unimportant and what is fundamental. Hence he can
qualify señoritismo as "una enfermedad epidermica": it is not an important manifestation of a fundamental trait (in this case, a defect) of Spanish life. The evidence of a proverb is given much more credence as a key to the Volksgeist than the behaviour of landlords and peasants. When Machado praises the pueblo he is affirming his faith in the Volksgeist. He is also reaffirming his humanism, since he claims that "Entre españoles lo esencial humano se encuentra con la mayor pureza y el más acusado relieve en el alma popular".

The authentic pueblo is seen by Machado as a reserve of largely uncorrupted humanity, whose potential promises much for Spain's future. In 1936 he writes: "Existe un hombre del pueblo, que es, en España al menos, el hombre elemental y fundamental y el que está más cerca del hombre universal y eterno". Behind Machado's expressions of faith in the pueblo lies his conviction that man is naturally good.

We have seen that this evaluation of the importance of the Volksgeist is something Machado shared with the Krausists. Both Giner and Cossío enthused in a general way on the potential of the Spanish people and on popular art and literature. Giner is optimistic that one day "esta miserable, pero querida España" might become a "nación culta, animosa, energética, honrada...y hasta libre". Yet only occasionally does he give us a glimpse of the good qualities (spiritual and human qualities) which he assumes to lie dormant beneath the unattractive surface of contemporary Spanish life, as here:

poor pueblo, de largo — desde cuatro siglos — acostumbrado a no conmoverse demasiado hondo, no por demasiado tiempo; como lo está a engañar con cualquier apariencia, los espectáculos aparatosos, el agrandecimiento territorial, el matonismo, los toros,... su hambre y sed de energía, de fermentación ideal, de intimidad ética, de verdad, de belleza, de sinceridad religiosa, de comunión con la humanidad espiritual, que, aun envuelta todavía en egoísmo y barbarie, relampaguea ya en el mundo.
Although Giner acknowledges the importance of knowledge of the *Volksgeist* for educators, reformers and governors, he gives disappointingly little attention in his writings to analysing the specific qualities of the Spanish people. It is interesting to note that he, unlike Machado, was conscious of the vagueness, mysticism and lack of analytic objectivity of many Romantic interpretations of "the people" and its "spirit"; yet he made no attempt to rectify these faults in investigations of his own.

In fact, most of Giner's comments on Spanish life concern apparent faults rather than hidden virtues; generally he gives a very negative picture of the Spanish people of all classes, their ethical shortcomings, and their lack of response to the campaign of spiritual regeneration undertaken by the *Institución*: "la indiferencia de las petrificadas muchedumbres nuestros más vigurosos y bien calculados esfuerzos". Machado wrote in similar terms in 1912: "Hay que defender a la España que surge, del mar muerto, de la España inerte y abrumadora que amenaza anegarlo todo...Desde estos yermos se ve panóramicamente la barbarie española y aterra". A similarly black picture is given in some of the poems of *Campos de Castilla* where he sees in the peasantry "atónitos palurdos sin danzas ni canciones" and writes:

> Abunda el hombre malo del campo y de la aldea, capaz de insanos vicios y crímenes bestiales, que bajo el pardo sayo esconde un alma fea, esclava de los siete pecados capitales.  

However, by the 1930s, with the coming of the Republic, and especially in *Juan de Mairena*, the enthusiasm for folklore and interest in the *Volksgeist* apparent earlier has become the basis for repeated eulogies of the essential spiritual qualities of the *pueblo*. Only on a very small number of occasions in the 1930s does the existence of less ideal aspects of the Spanish *pueblo* in everyday life.
intrude. In 1935, in an interview, Machado includes in an enumeration of the threats to world peace "la incurable barbarie y el sadismo de las multitudes urbanas". In 1928 he makes a comment on the poet's audience which shows somewhat more realism than his declarations that he aspires to write for the pueblo: he confesses his awareness of the existence of "una masa desatenta, incomprensiva, ignorante, ruda", only to sidestep this reality with verbal sophistry. In 1937 he admits to receiving criticism that his comments on the pueblo are evasive or ingenuous. And, on a slightly different but related question, in 1938 he hints, for the only time during his Civil War writings, that he is conscious of the deep ideological divisions within the Republican camp.

But, in the 1920s and ’30s especially, it is Machado’s humanism, moralism, Romanticism and idealism that most frequently shape his public response to political life. The public figures who attract his sympathy are fellow idealists. As early as 1905 he responds to Unamuno:

En su hermoso libro Vida de Don Quijote y Sancho enaltece Unamuno la locura, el Impetu generoso. Sóbralle razón. ¿Necesita maestros de cordura esta tierra de vividores, de fríos y discretos bellacos? Locos necesitamos, que siembran para no cosechar. Cuerdos que talen el árbol para alcanzar el fruto, abundan por desdicha. ¿Dónde están los lunáticos, los idealistas, los renunciadores, los ascetas, los románticos, que apenas se ven por ninguna parte?

In 1912 he picks up the "madman" theme and mentions three such idealists:

Como vivimos en España, país beocio y sin respeto a todo valor espiritual, el nombre de Unamuno, como el de Costa, como el de Giner de los Ríos, trae...
In 1910 he praises the idealism and moral qualities of Antonio Pérez de la Mata:

Yo no dudo de que Mata fue bueno, en cuanto dio a su vida el sentido del ideal, la orientación generosa que todo hombre puede y debe dar a su actividad, cualquiera que sea la esfera en que ésta se desarrolle; yo no dudo que Mata fue humilde en cuanto consagró su vida a arrojar en los baldíos páramos espirituales de su tierra semillas que él no había de ver germinar. 156

Mata was a liberal Catholic closely associated with Sanz del Río and with Krausism. Hence we can see the appropriateness of Machado's vision of his life as a selfless mission (the Krausist's obra) committed to an ideal of spiritual regeneration, sowing seeds for the future of Spain – we have seen the importance of this image in the Krausists and in Machado. 157

Another idealist picked out by Machado is the Republican Manuel Hilario Ayuso, in a prologue of 1914. He gives another reason for his admiration of "madmen" like him in addition to the selflessness already evoked in the previous articles: such men also have a faculty of special insight derived from their nonconformity:

Note once again the primacy given to the human spirit in Machado's view of social life: it is only changes in the human spirit that can truly reshape the world of
men. In a much later article he concludes that a change in the spirit of humanity is the only power that can prevent war:

It is the spirit of the whole of humanity which must change, progress, if the world is to live in harmony. In spite of Machado's admiration for idealistic individuals he realises that they alone cannot alter the world; they must transmit their ideals to the rest of humanity, prompt a change in the human spirit, not just in human institutions. This idea is, of course, totally in accord with the Krausist view of human life and of the pathway to social and political change. Giner, in particular, inveighs against the futility of attempts to bring about change purely by legislation, emphasising the primacy of inner change. In fact, Machado's commentary above seems to echo Giner's "última cuartilla" which was on the same theme:

En general, la opinión liberal en España desearia caminar hacia una organización eficaz de las relaciones entre los pueblos, sea por medio de arbitraje, sea bien por verdadera organización política. Pero la mayor fuerza de esta posibilidad depende de la vida interior: de que los individuos y los pueblos no hallen su ideal en la extensión del poder, territorio, grandeza, supremacía respecto de nadie, en vez de ponerlo en una vida cada vez más pura espiritual y noble.
In the 1930s Machado is more cautious than before about singling out the qualities and importance of individual "idealists" in social and political life. Concerned to articulate his democratic convictions and wary of the élitism that could be read into such selectivity, he expresses above all enthusiasm for the Spanish pueblo as a whole. However it should not be thought that his praise of the pueblo implies an acceptance of their present condition - the pueblo is in no way for Machado a finished model of ideal humanity. Rather it is the human raw material that is Spain's hope for the future; it is an as yet unrealized potential. Machado describes the man of the pueblo as an hombre elemental, an hombre ingenuo, even as infantil. In 1920 Machado writes in a poem: "¡Ay, quién fuera pueblo/ una vez no más!" but his desire to be a man of the pueblo himself is recognised as "el sueño de una/ vida elemental". It is a longed for state of unconsciousness which might free the poet from his solitude as a man, and, implicitly, as a highly conscious intellectual. Machado is well aware that he cannot be a simple man of the pueblo and must accept his special responsibilities as a man set apart. In the 1930s he often speaks of the specific duties of fellow artists and intellectuals in the new circumstances created by the political ferment of the Republic, and, as we shall see, he sees his responsibility during the Civil War as the particular responsibility of an intellectual.

Machado does not deny, then, the existence of an intelligentsia or the limitations of the life of the pueblo. What he does repeatedly emphasise is the importance that should be given to the education of the pueblo; he writes: "El Estado debe sentirse revolucionario atendiendo a la educación del pueblo, de donde salen los sabios y los artistas". The élite of talent should be open to all. But his aspirations go much further than this: all men should be given the facilities to realize their own human potential, and hence raise
themselves from a position of *hombres elementales* towards their *hombriía integral*. Through "las altas y libres actividades del espíritu" they will swell the numbers of men "capaces de espiritualidad". Machado claimed to see in working-class political movements a fundamental aspiration to improvement through culture. The importance of cultural extension is one of the major themes of [Juan de Mairena](https://example.com), and Machado seems to regard it as more important than any social or political legislation the Republic might contemplate. We have already seen his affinities with the *institucionistas* (particularly with that branch of *institucionismo* represented by the *Misiones pedagógicas*) in this priority given to education and culture for all, and in the vision of the nature of such education and culture. For Machado true democracy is "una progresiva aristocratización de la masa" through culture; similarly for Cossío "La democracia es la aspiración de la más alta aristocracia para todos... un movimiento ascendente, un imperativo de nobleza integral".

I have said that Machado, like Giner, largely shunned active involvement in politics. I would now like to examine some aspects of his contacts with and relationship to certain political parties during the second decade of the century which shed further light on his political beliefs and attitudes. These parties are the *Liga de Educación Política* and the *Partido Reformista*.

José Luis Cano has confirmed Machado’s inscription in the *Liga* on its formation in 1913:

En el archivo de la familia Ortega se conserva una carta de Machado a don Manuel García Morente, colaborador de Ortega en la *Liga para la Educación política española* (sic), adheriéndose al manifiesto de la *Liga* escrito por su fundador, que no era otro que Ortega. En esa carta, fechada en Baeza el 21 de octubre de 1913, se declara Machado coincidente con los principios de la *Liga*, y ve en su manifiesto "el pensamiento de Ortega y Gasset, y aun rasgos de su estilo". Y en una carta al mismo Ortega, acusándole recibo de su ensayo *Vieja y nueva*
Tuñón de Lara has noted the inclusion of Machado's name in a list of inscritos in the Liga published in a 1914 folleto edition of Ortega's Vieja y nueva política, which was in effect the manifesto of the Liga. In this essay, Ortega divides Spain into two: the stagnant "establishment" and a potential "new" Spain:

Dos Españas que viven juntas y son perfectamente extrañas: una España oficial que se obstina en prolongar los gestos de una edad fénecida, y otra España aspirante, germinal, una España vital, tal vez no muy fuerte, pero vital, sincera, honrada, la cual, estorbada por la otra, no acierta a entrar de lleno en la historia... Toda una España - con sus gobernadores y sus gobernados - , con sus abusos y con sus usos, está acabando de morir.

Ortega's plan was to organise the young intellectuals of his generation into a minority who would transmit their own vitality and enthusiasm to the masses, educate the masses' political consciousness and bring about by this collaboration of masses and intellectuals the birth of the new España germinal.

This view of the problem of Spain and its solution seems to be echoed in a number of poems of Campos de Castilla: "El mañana efímero" (CXXXV), "Desde mi rincón" (CXLIII) and the significantly titled "Una España joven" (CXLIV), which was published in the first number of España (January 1915) - a review connected to Ortega and the Liga. Most succinctly, in a cantar Machado writes:

"Ya hay un español que quiere/ vivir y a vivir empieza/
entre una España que muere/ y otra España que bosteza".

In 1915 he writes to Unamuno that "La juventud que hoy quiere intervenir en la política dêbe, a mi entender, hablar al pueblo y proclamar el derecho del pueblo a la conciencia y el pan..."
givings about the new generation of young intellectuals:
"Gentes de buen talento hay entre ellos y de notable intención, pero me parecen todos tocados de un mal disimulado aristocratism que malogrará su obra". 178 He does not wish to associate himself too closely with what he sees as intellectual elitism: the tendency of Ortega and others of his generation to look down on the pueblo, to try and use mass support as a means to their own political ends and ambitions and aspiring to be the mentors and ultimately the leaders of the nation. I have already discussed Machado’s criticism of this form of elitism in a cultural context in examining his "folkloric" point of view in pedagogy. 179 Machado believes that the intellectual should try to understand and collaborate with the pueblo, not merely lead them or shape them according to their own - the intellectuals’ - preconceptions. The rhetoric of Ortega’s essay does suggest at times the type of relationship of fraternity and mutual understanding between the two groups favoured by Machado:

Vamos a incendiar con nuestra curiosidad y nuestro entusiasmo los últimos rincones de España; vamos a ver España y a sembrarlo de amor y de indignación. Vamos a recorrer los campos en apostólica algarada, a vivir en las aldeas, a escuchar las quejas desesperadas allí donde manan 180

but the nature of Ortega’s ultimate aspiration - to lead the pueblo from a position of authority - is also quite apparent, at least with the benefit of hindsight:

vamos a ser primero amigos de quienes luego
vamos a ser conductores. 181

Machado probably joined the Liga in good faith, and as more than a mere gesture of friendship towards Ortega (as Tuñón suggests). 182 But he also had, or soon acquired, private reservations about the attitudes of its members.
The Partido Reformista, led by Melquíades Alvarez, was very much connected to the Liga; many young intellectuals were members of both, and at least at the outset, the Liga acted as the propaganda branch of the P.R. Melquíades Alvarez was an Asturian lawyer, and, from 1898, a Republican diputado. He was friendly with the Krausist "Oviedo Group" and with Azcárate and Salmerón, and there were close ties between his party and the Institución Libre. In fact the nucleus of the party, on its formation in 1912, were institucionistas: Azcárate, José Pedregal, José and Luis Zulueta - plus Galdós and Melquíades Alvarez himself, both sympathisers of the Institución. The political programme of the Partido Reformista is generally considered to be highly representative of the political views of those institucionistas directly involved in politics (unlike Giner who did not join that or any other party). At the same time the party was formed by an amalgamation of existing Republican groups and was by no means solely the political instrument of the Institución. The party's programme was intended as an improvement on the policies of nineteenth century Republicanism and Liberalism, aspiring to be a coherent, detailed and "evolutionary" programme of reforms and to avoid the often vague and violent demagogy of earlier Republican parties. The party gave great importance to social as well as constitutional reform. In an important speech of 1914, Azcárate proclaimed on behalf of the reformistas:

Vamos a procurar hacer una revolución sin sangre. En España hay la problemática política y la problemática social. Tenemos que mejorar al proletariado en su integra condición.

In his concern for the "social" problem, Azcárate believed himself a "socialist"; however he was opposed to the ideas of class conflict, revolutionary violence and collectivism. Admiring Bernstein and the English Fabians rather than Marx, the reformistas believed that gradual reform could
produce a more equitable society. Other items given prominence in the Partido Reformista's programme were the need for a secularization of the State (by reforming Article 11 of the Constitution) and the urgency of large scale improvements and expansion in education.

What was most controversial about the Partido Reformista from the point of view of the progressive middle classes from whom it expected support was its attitude to the Monarchy. Originally calling itself the Partido Republicano Gubernamental o Reformista, in 1913 the party publicly proclaimed its willingness, under certain specified conditions, to govern under the Monarchy; in 1915 it added to this a statement of willingness to collaborate with the Monarchist parties. It made the first of these declarations, at a time of political crisis by claiming to support "la tesis de la accidentalidad de las formas del gobierno". This idea seems to have been proposed by Azcárate in accord with a common Krausist belief about politics: that less important than details of constitutional law are the spirit and behaviour of a particular government. The reformista line was that they could not and should not refuse their collaboration because of a secondary question such as the "form" of the government if such a collaboration meant progress for liberty and democracy. Azcárate apparently believed that certain events had shown that the presence of Alfonso XIII on the throne was not necessarily an obstacle to such progress.

As controversial as this statement of principles was its transformation into practice when a number of reformistas accepted an invitation to the Royal Palace for consultations with the King on 13 January 1913 (and on other occasions later). The reformistas were criticized by other Republicans for thus propping up the Monarchy and at the same time for weakening and fragmenting the unity of the Republican cause. (In fact historians like Saboró accept that the royal invitation was a tactical move with just this object in mind.) The
Partido Reformista's new line at the beginning of 1913 also led to splits within itself, with some members and sub-groups leaving the party and others declaring that they themselves would not collaborate in government under the Monarchy, although they would accept and support the party line. Azcárate himself said that in spite of his visit to the King he was a life-long Republican and therefore would not himself join any government under Alfonso XIII (in fact he was to die in 1917 before this possibility arose).

The reformistas nevertheless attracted the support of many men later to become prominent in the Second Republic, including Azaña and Fernando de los Ríos. They established themselves as a minor party in the Cortes, never holding more than twenty seats, and were periodically summoned to the Royal Presence at times of crisis. In 1922, collaborating in a "Gobierno de Concentración Liberal" they had a Minister: Pedregal in Hacienda, although he resigned after a short time when the main condition for his entry into the coalition government - the reform of Article 11 - failed to be implemented. However their collaboration with the Liberal-Monarchists during the years of continual political crisis that preceded Primo de Rivera's coup meant that they were included in many eyes as an integral part of the political decay then apparent. An editorial in El Sol of 30 September 1923 pinpointed the discredit the Partido Reformista's tactics had brought on it:

los reformistas, en vez de permanecer apartados higiénicamente de los restos descompuestos del viejo liberalismo prefieren librar las batallas ajenas y quedan con el escudo empañado y la lanza sin dar sus lanzadas.

Melquíades Alvarez absolutely refused, however, to collaborate with Primo de Rivera's régime, but with the end of that dictatorship and the subsequent failure of Berenguer, he again attempted to find a constitutional
solution by collaborating, not with the Republicans, but with the "old liberals". Hence his party was once more discredited. During the Republic the party was re-named Partido Republicano Liberal Democrata and became an unimportant centre party.

This is not intended as a complete account of the complexities of the politics of the reformistas but merely the minimum of background information necessary to understand the judgements Machado passed on the Partido Reformista in his private correspondence and notebooks.

In 1921 he wrote to Unamuno:

Yo tengo buenos amigos, personas dignas de aprecio por muchos conceptos entre los llamados reformistas. Credo, sin embargo, que como politicos han hecho una labor negativa, porque son los saboteurs mas o menos conscientes de una revolucion inexcusable. Comenzaron proclamando la accidentalidad de la forma del gobierno, muy a destiempo y en provecho inmediato de la supersticion monarquica y del servilismo palestino. Con ello han conseguido anular la unica noble, aunque de corta fecha, tradicion politica que teniamos, y la labor educadora de Pi y Margall y Salmeron, y otros dignos republicos, que emplearon cuarenta anos de su vida en convencer al pueblo de todo lo contrario... En vez de ahondar el foso donde se hundiese la abominable España de la Regencia y de este reyezuelo, afirmando al par al republicanismo y acrecentándolo, depurándolo, enriqueciéndolo de nueva savia, decidieron echar un puente levadizo hasta la antesala de las mercedes. Pecaron de inocentes y quizas de engreídos, porque pensaron, acaso, que ellos podrian, una vez dentro de la olla grande, dar un tono de salud al conjunto putrido del cual iban a formar parte ¡Gran error! 184

Machado's criticism of the reformistas is from the point of view of a committed Republican: he believes that their behaviour has weakened the Republican camp and strengthened the Monarchy. It is a criticism of their tactics rather than of their programme of reform; Machado has friends amongst them and believes that their policies
could have enriched and strengthened the Republican cause. I do not believe that when Machado refers to the reformistas as "saboteurs of a much-needed revolution" he is referring to a social revolution (in spite of the fact that the reformistas saw as their aim the realization "desde el Gobierno, de un modo pacífico y legal, de la obra revolucionaria que de otro modo realizaría el pueblo"). Rather Machado had in mind a primarily political revolution: the overthrow of the Monarchy and the corrupt political system of the Restoration. When in 1915 he wrote of the need for a revolution in Spain, he used the analogy of a new driver taking over the reins of a [illegible]-guided carriage. He believes that the reformistas have lessened the possibility of this political change occurring in Spain.

However it is also worth pointing out that Machado also expresses misgivings about the political qualities of the left wing parties (Republicans and Socialists) during this period and the possibility that they might "take the reins" from the despised Restoration politicians is not viewed by him with optimism. He writes in Los complementarios of the abyección y cobardía of "nuestros políticos de izquierda, sin excluir fracción alguna" as well as of the decrepitude and corruption of the dynastic parties. In effect he appears to hold a low opinion of Spanish politicians generally in the first and second decades of the century; what he speaks of most enthusiastically (in a letter to Unamuno in 1921) is the Republican fervour he witnessed in his childhood, suggesting that new men will need to be found if this spirit is to be rekindled.

Machado's reservations about the politicians of that time are mostly expressed in letters and private notes. In public we know that he took part in a demonstration in support of the leaders of the 1917 General Strike, and in 1919 he sent his adhesión to a banquet in honour of two reformistas (Zulueta and Alamor) and the Socialist Fernando de los Ríos.
Los complementarios includes a number of harsh comments on the reformistas. The earliest of these dates from 1915. Machado alludes to Melquiades Alvarez as a man of former promise who has become a nobody, describes Azcárate as an "anciano venerable, pero demasiado anciano" and hints at the dire consequences for their reputations of their interviews with the King: "El Palacio de Oriente es el Huerto del Francés del honor político". He foresees no future for the Partido Reformista: "¿Cuántas vueltas darán los pobres reformistas antes de caer en el saco de la basura?" and he concludes by quoting a saying of Giner's which is delightfully ironic in the context: "Tenemos favor y estamos perdidos". Machado is clearly conscious of the connection between reformismo and the Institución.

Later brief comments sarcastically describe the impotence of the Partido Reformista, or, more cruelly, portray Melquiades Alvarez as a man taking a begging bowl to the Royal Palace:

Ya hay cola de mendigos del poder a la puerta del palacio. El propio Don Melquiades prepara su escudilla pensando que, esta vez, le echarán algo... Sólo España, el país más estúpido del planeta, puede cerrar los ojos y dejarse llevar al derrumbro por gente tan menguada. A todo esto se puede seguir llamando revolución desde arriba.

As for others, for Machado the reformistas have become by association just one more degenerate Restoration party:

¡Era tan menguada, en verdad, la gente que barrió el golpe de estado [de Primo de Rivera] y su descrédito tan abrumador. Es triste pensar que no ha dejado ni siquiera un vacío. Quizás no sea generoso decirlo, pero - entre nosotros [Machado and Unamuno] - estaban destinados a caer en la espuerta de la basura.

Los reformistas cayeron también en el cesto de la basura, con su veinte actas debidas al favor ministerial.
Machado's comments on the Partido Reformista reveal several things. Firstly, we can observe once again his mistrust of politicians, political machinations and political ambitions. Secondly, he affirms the strength of his Republican feelings, although it is the Republicanism he knew in his youth that he defends rather than any contemporary trend. And even this nineteenth century Republicanism is not defined in terms of any policy apart from the overthrow of the Monarchy; rather it is for him an idealistic state of mind, a spirit.

He writes to Unamuno in 1922:

>Cuando yo era niño había una emoción republicana. Recuerdo haber llorado de entusiasmo en medio de un pueblo que cantaba la "Marsellesa" y vitoreaba a Salmerón que volvía de Barcelona. El pueblo hablaba de una idea republicana y esta idea era, por lo menos, una emoción, ¡y muy noble a fe mía! 195

He goes on to contrast to this spirit the pragmatism and lack of dignidad ideal of reformismo. 196 His comments on the reformistas reaffirm his idealism and Republicanism but they do not show any particular gift of insight into politics - they are the opinions of many Republicans of that time. A more personal and individual judgement is his evaluation of the political elitism of the men of the Liga. Yet he originally appears to have supported that group and his comments on his friends in the Partido Reformista and on the positive contribution they could have made to Republicanism imply that he may have looked on them favourably at the beginning (his first criticism of their tactics was in 1915). If he was in any way genuinely sympathetic to the party and to the associated Liga it is also characteristic of Machado that he chose to join the latter - a group of intellectuals - rather than a political party proper. Later he joined another of Ortega's intellectual pressure groups - the Agrupación al Servicio de la República, before it became a political party proper. The Agrupación was by definition for
"españoles de oficio intelectual". As a member of this group, Machado chaired one of its meetings attended by Ortega, Marañón and Pérez de Ayala in Segovia and was involved in the administration of that city for the first few days after the monarchy fell. Machado’s membership of the Agrupación probably went against his own views on the "masses" and on the rôle of élites, so different from those of Ortega, but he would, I feel, have subscribed to the philosopher’s statement that

el intelectual, al hacer política, tiene que hacerla como intelectual y no dejándose en casa las virtudes y los imperativos de su oficio y disciplina.

We shall see this same point of view expressed by Machado in some of his Civil War writings. Let us now turn our attention to the complexities of Machado’s political attitudes during that period.

Aurora de Albornoz has described Machado’s political evolution thus: "De un republicanismo burgués hereditario... llega Machado – caminando lentamente, primero; a ritmo acelerado, más tarde – a una posición socialista". We have just observed the strength of his emotional commitment to nineteenth century Republicanism. The most extreme expression of his apparent attraction towards socialist thought is to be found in certain writings of the Civil War period in which Machado, as never before, invokes the language of social revolution and class struggle. In 1938 Mairena is made to describe the First World War as a war in defense of Imperialism and Capitalism, defining the former as the expression of "las ambiciones desmedidas y forzosamente homicidas de las plutocracias" and the latter as "la forma de convivencia humana que sacrifica al individuo a la estadística". Mairena prophesies the end of such wars and their replacement by revolutionary struggles between classes, advising his pupils to take the side of the pueblo in such luchas de clases. He notes the prosperity of capitalist economies during periods of war and concludes
that such economies are in fact geared to war. With relation to the Civil War, he puts together the rulers of Germany, Italy, Britain and France as defenders of "el edificio burgués, minado en sus cimientos", as an international bourgeois-Fascist union defending the commercial interests of their own class against the interests and ideals of their respective peoples. 204

Machado has clearly been influenced to some extent by this time by aspects of Marxist thought; at one point he writes: "El marxismo tiene... un valor instrumental inapreciable. El marxismo contiene las visiones más profundas y certeras de los problemas que plantea la economía de todos los pueblos occidentales". 205

Can we then say that Machado radically altered his political stance during these critical years? I think it is impossible to arrive at such a clear-cut conclusion. For, during these same years, Machado was also writing (as we have seen) about his own Romanticism and Idealism, his "viejo republicanismo", his disagreements with the "cynical" Marxist view of man, his belief that the pueblo is not defined by class, his commitment to the Republic because of its democratic legitimacy (not because of its revolutionary values), his approval of the moderation of the Republican government. 206 Does this mean that the more "socialist" line taken at times by Machado is in fact not his own voice but a voice determined by the propaganda needs of a critical situation? I am not suggesting that Machado was obliged to take a particular line (note for example how he is able to be critical of Marxist philosophy in his speech to the J.S.U.); 207 rather he had available to him several registers of political rhetoric on which to draw. One of the strongest lines he takes in the more "circumstantial" pieces of his wartime writing (especially his articles for La Vanguardia) is a nationalistic one: he repeatedly reviles Franco for opening up Spain to a foreign invasion. He attacks the bourgeois-capitalist policies of the foreign powers involved with the Spanish conflict rather than
the class-politics of the Republic's Spanish foes. Some of his attacks on foreign nations are in a spirit quite contrary to the visions of class struggle referred to elsewhere, as when he points out that England's rulers are betraying national interests (including the British Empire) by allowing the Axis powers to gain a foothold in the Western Mediterranean. On one occasion his "nationalistic" angle on the War causes him to invoke that commonplace of Spanish national pride, the glorious victory at Lepanto!

Therefore, whilst Machado does show a greater awareness of and sympathy for socialist thought than hitherto during the Civil War, he never arrives at a coherent and consistent socialist position. He uses three (at least) ideological standpoints to defend the Republican cause: socialism, patriotism and the humanist idealism apparent in his previous writings.

Probably the most important change in Machado's politics during this period is not any change of ideology but a change in attitude to politics. I have already quoted his own declarations on his re-evaluation of the importance of politics after a lifetime of mistrust. This change was accompanied by a change in his own degree of involvement in politics; in October 1938 he wrote:

*Jamás he trabajado tanto como ahora. De ser espectador de la política, he pasado bruscamente a ser un actor apasionado.*

Perhaps this *bruscamente* explains some of the inconsistencies of his wartime writings. In any case he did indeed become involved in politics: in public mass meetings (rather against his character), in more or less propagandistic newspaper articles and poems, and as a distinguished figure whose presence in and support of the Republic was important both for his fellow-Republicans and for the image of the Republic abroad. (Many writers and intellectuals - "la tercera España" - chose to exile themselves for the duration.) On a number of occasions
Machado reflected on the importance of his own presence in the Republic and the nature of his contribution to the war effort. In his prologue to Azaña's *Los espagnoles en guerra* he wrote:

No es fácil juzgar un incendio por el mero análisis de las cenizas. Así, nosotros, hombres de España, contemporáneos de Manuel Azaña, los que vivimos dentro de este gran incendio que es la guerra española contra facciosos e invasores, somos en parte, testimonios irrecusables e insustituibles.

His presence in war-torn Spain is important, among other reasons, because he can bear witness to important historical events as a living reality. But it is also important, he says, because it is here and now that the Spain of the future is being created, politically, socially and culturally. Hence he censures the "frivolous and misguided" stance of those intellectuals who have chosen to leave Spain and believe that they can continue their labours on the sidelines of history. It is a misguided position, according to Machado, because it ignores the relationship between the life of the intellectual and the lives of his people. For Machado the behaviour of "la tercera España" implies a view of culture as an ivory tower activity. The true culture of the Spain of the future is in fact being created "en las entrañas sangrientas de la España actual". 213

In *Hora de España* Machado directs a special criticism at the elitism of Ortega y Gasset, when he writes "Es más difícil estar a la altura de las circunstancias que au dessus de la mêlée". 214 The French expression is one attached to Ortega by disenchanted left-wingers after his withdrawal from politics and return to what he considered as "intellectual life proper" in 1932. The first half of Machado's sentence is couched in deliberately Orteguian language. Machado believes that it is his own duty both to stand by his people and to oppose an enemy in whom he sees an opponent of intellectual
values:

Ante esta contienda el intelectual no puede inhibirse. Su mundo está en peligro. Ha de combatir, ser miliciano... Junto al pueblo ha de estar el intelectual: ha de ser un miliciano más con destino cultural. 215

The intellectual has his own specific area of combat: culture. How is he to realize this function of "un miliciano más con destino cultural"? In the article from which this is taken Machado points to one means of expression of commitment: the writing of poems inspired by the war. We could also add that he contributes by speaking to the troops or by publicly expressing his conviction of the rightness of the cause he supports. However Machado also suggests that the intellectual can contribute in other ways as well as by producing propaganda; indeed he says that the authentic role of the intellectual is to go beyond propaganda:

La guerra nos obliga a ahondar en nuestras razones, no sólo a pulirlas para convertirlas en proyectiles eficaces. De otro modo ¿qué razón habría para que los llamados intelectuales tuvieran una labor específicamente suya que realizar en tiempos de guerra? 216

That Machado did subscribe to the belief that a continuation of cultural activity and intellectual enquiry was at least as important as propaganda work is borne out by the nature, quality and quantity of his contributions to the review Hora de España. In the articles published there he continues to examine the same types of social, pedagogical, philosophical, cultural and literary questions as in the pre-war Juan de Mairena, with no change in tone and, if anything, an increase in quality. The Civil War does not appear here as a prompter of circumstantial commentary but, in Machado's words, as a stimulus to ahondar en nuestras razones. Many of these meditations have already been quoted:
thoughts on such themes as the pueblo, the masses, Marxism and humanism, work and culture. Machado's idealist, humanist and culturalist points of view on these questions are by no means exceptional in the review. Indeed, there appears to have been something of a common spirit in the "Grupo de Hora de España", attributable in part to the influence of Machado himself on the young writers closely connected to the review. One of these writers has suggested that Machado and Cossío were, among others, important influences on Hora de España: Rafael Dieste writes to Francisco Caudet (compiler of an anthology of the review):

La palabra pueblo tenía para nosotros un sentido especial, nada bullanguero ni tampoco "masivo". Hubiéramos suscrito con gusto el proyecto de Juan de Mairena: "Escuela Superior de Sabiduría Popular"... Todo esto influía en nuestro modo de ser influidos o de dejarnos influir (es decir: guiar, alentar). Tomando en cuenta el grupo como tal, acierta usted en la mención de Cossío y Machado.... La influencia de Cossío no fue precisamente —o eminentemente doctrinal: Y aún más que influencia se podría llamar acogida, amparo alentador, y éste personal, personalísimo... Se da la circunstancia de que todos o casi todos nosotros (los del G.H.E. /Grupo de Hora de España/) tuvimos parte, más o menos permanente en las Misiones Pedagógicas, a cuyo Patronato perteneció Machado. El presidente y principal inspirador, como usted sabe, era Cossío. Dejaré que usted ate cabos, en relación con el espíritu y origen de Hora de España. 217

A clear affinity is seen by Dieste between Machado, Cossío, the Misiones Pedagógicas and the G.H.E.: a sense of respect for the pueblo goes hand in hand with a belief in the importance of culture in these men and these groups. Like Machado, the men of Hora de España felt it their duty to "create culture" for the Spain of the future; like Machado they aspired to write "for the people", but without condescension; like Machado they believed that, although propaganda had its place in the war effort, the production of propaganda and nothing more was an inadequate
cultural aim; like Machado they wished to demonstrate their feeling of commitment to the cause of the pueblo, but saw their own cultural activity as the best expression of this commitment; and like Machado they saw their shared commitment in terms of shared spiritual values rather than in purely political terms. All these affinities between Machado and the "Grupo de Hora de España" can be seen in the group's "Ponencia colectiva" presented to the Congreso de escritores anti-fascistas in 1937. 218

This speech begins by reflecting on the options open to the writer at a time of Civil War. The two extreme choices - pure art and propaganda - are rejected; the first "por antihumano" and the second because it fails to satisfy "un anhelo profundo, aunque vago, inconcreto, de humanidad". Propaganda as usually practiced is insufficient both because of its limited artistic value and because of its implied attitude to its audience's intellectual incapabilities: "No negamos el arte de propaganda, pero nos parece por sí sólo insuficiente. En tanto que la propaganda vale para propagar algo que nos importa, nos importa la propaganda" but "lo demás, cuanto sea defender la propaganda como un valor absoluto de creación, nos parece demagógico y...falto de sentido". Furthermore propaganda too can be dehumanised and shallow, can involve party-political dogmatism and the use of simplistic symbols such as red flags and clenched fists. Because of this shallowness, propaganda is, according to the writers of Hora de España, not revolutionary in any deep sense: it expresses only surface images of revolution and fails to express the essence of that revolution. This essence is seen to be a sense of humanist values:

El problema era y debía ser de fondo; queríamos que todo el arte que se produjese en la Revolución, apasionadamente de acuerdo con la Revolución, respondiese ideológicamente al mismo contenido humano de esa Revolución.... Todo lo que no fuese creado con esa misma relación de valores, todo cuanto fuese "simbolofía revolucionaria", no podía expresar el fondo del
la Revolución no es solamente un símbolo, sino que representa un contenido vivíamente concreto, un sentido del hombre. Nosotros queremos un arte por y para el hombre. Efectivamente somos humanistas, pero del humanismo éste que se produce en España hoy. Del que recoge la herencia del humanismo burgués, menos lo que este último tiene de utopía, de idealismo en desuso y casi pueril ...Entendemos el humanismo como el intento de restituir al hombre la conciencia de su valor, de trabajar para limpiar la civilización moderna de la barbarie capitalista. 219

For the Hora de España writers, the essence of the Spanish Revolution is a concept of man, a set of values. These values are part of a long tradition of humanism but they are values now being realized, no longer just vague ideals. Their humanism takes up this tradition and adds a shot of the democratic spirit and a measure of anti-capitalism. However it is difficult to agree with their contention that this makes their point of view any less idealistic or utopian. Looking back on those years Juan Gil-Albert, another of the Hora de España group recalls their "tónica muy alta de ilusión". 220

In any case it is this humanist ethic that is seen as the link, the cause of commitment and shaper of their art, between these writers and the pueblo. Such a criterion of responsibility and commitment allows for considerable variety and vitality in art and thought. Although spiritually united, writers are free from any dogmatic controls and can therefore create and interpret independently and in accordance with their own consciences and abilities. Their ultimate intention would appear to be the creation of an authentic "Popular Front" culture which is neither bourgeois nor orthodox Marxist, neither elitist nor populist (in the pejorative sense), a culture which serves collective needs without supressing the autonomy of the creative individual. The Hora de España writers believed they had found a formula for commitment which reconciles social and artistic/intellectual demands, and central to this synthesis is their vision of social
revolution in terms of humanist values.

There is evidence that the Republican intelligentsia were respected by those sections of the pueblo who shared their belief in the importance of education and culture, a belief that was put into practice both in the educational expansion and the Misiones Pedagógicas of the 1931-36 period and in the front line schools, poetry readings and huge popular editions of Lorca and Machado of the war years. It seems to have been above all the anarchists who stood out against what they saw as a bourgeois and paternalist culturalism.

In a short piece published in the second number of Hora de España, Gil-Albert relates his experiences at the Teruel front in a way that exemplifies these writers' idea of themselves and their relationship to the pueblo. He tells of the feeling of solidarity prompted by shared experiences and the nobility he sees in the common soldiery. He also records the cultural aspirations of a militiaman who tells him: "Quisiera sobrevivir a la lucha porque tengo mucho que aprender. Si es así iré a buscarte para que hablemos de poesía". This recalls Machado's belief that at the heart of the mass movements of the left is "la aspiración a la perfección por medio de la cultura".

Perhaps the most questionable part of the Hora de España view of commitment is the idea that they were writing for the pueblo (the same is true of Machado's statements in the same vein). The writers themselves have to acknowledge the fact that the pueblo has more urgent necessities, both physical and spiritual, at a time of war. Recognising this, they were all involved to some extent in propaganda activities as well as what they saw as their more authentic creative activities. They also realise that an important part of their audience is abroad: part of the review's value, they say, is the image it gives of Republican Spain to the outside world. As for the Spanish pueblo, these writers can in all honesty only see them as a future audience; they stress their...
sense of unity in human values with the troops at the front and claim to be transforming these shared values into art and culture which will, when the war is over, become the cultural heritage of the pueblo:

Nos consideramos con el deber ineludible de interpretar, con nuestro pensamiento y sentimiento, el pensar y el sentir de esa juventud que se bate en las trincheras. De esa juventud tomamos alto ejemplo e inolvidable lección, y sólo estimaremos nuestro fin conseguido en la medida en que sepamos devolver a esa juventud, cuando ya no lo sea, en nuestra obra futura, en forma de creación artística y literaria, los mismos valores humanos que con su acción enaltecedora...nos afirman hoy. 224

To sum up, within the Hora de España group Machado found a democratic-culturalist and humanist-idealistic spirit in harmony with his own convictions. The review provided him with a vehicle for his finest writings of the Civil War period, and for some of his most important statements on social, political and cultural life. In its explanations of its aims, Hora de España provides us with a rationale to help our understanding of what Machado too was trying to achieve in those writings and in what sense he was endeavouring to be "un miliciano más con destino cultural", attempting to fulfil what he saw as his rôle as an intellectual: to "ahondar en nuestras razones". 225

We notice once again in Machado's Civil War writings (particularly in Hora de España) how he seeks to define his attitudes to politics specifically as an artist and an intellectual, and how culture is still for him a key area of endeavour for his country even in the most critical of political circumstances. During this period he again speaks of the aspirations of the pueblo as being human dignity and culture (as well as freedom and prosperity). 226 When he praises the Fifth (Communist) Regiment he chooses to give particular emphasis to their cultural policies: the educational progress that has been achieved by the Communists and their protection of
the Republican intelligentsia, including Machado himself:

We can observe here Machado’s estimation of the importance of his own (and others’) function as “men of culture” and his belief that the pueblo shares this respect for culture. In another writing of the war years, Machado goes so far as to predict that the men who will be remembered by history as most characteristic men of the Republic will be men of culture, whom circumstances have brought into political prominence:

It would not, I think, be excessive to see in this statement a reaffirmation of Machado’s belief in the inherent nobility and value of cultural activity, together with a suggestion of the limitations and frequent base-ness of political life. In spite of Machado’s greater interest in politics during the latter years of his life, it is always culture that he considers the more important activity, and it is to culture that he devotes his best energies.
I think that the first conclusion of this chapter should be the coincidence between Machado and Giner in their evaluation of the respective merit of these two spheres of public life. Machado most frequently sees his own social function as that of an artist and intellectual rather than as a political animal. Like Giner he believes that culture is of fundamental importance in Spain's problems; as we have seen, both men emphasise that spiritual and cultural deprivation is every bit as serious as material deprivation. Machado holds that culture should be made available to all, and not merely as a product but as a creative activity. His democratic culturalism is an integral part of his view of politics. In this he is very close in spirit to institucionistas such as Giner and Cossío and to the Institución-inspired Misiones Pedagógicas of the 1930s.

At the beginning of this chapter I attempted to define Krausist political thought in terms of a number of determining attitudes: humanism, moralism, organicism, individualism, reformism, and the importance attached to secularization, education and the notion of harmony. Machado's political writings show these same fundamental tendencies, although not all of them are fully developed, since his political ideology is not a systematic and complete theory in the way that, for example, Giner's is. The central beliefs behind Machado's political thought are quite clear though: his humanism and moralism, and the weight he gives to education and culture. He believes that spiritual and moral qualities are of predominant importance in human life and that human perfection in terms of these values is the aim of individual life and of history. Like Giner, Machado passes judgement on the errors and possibilities of political life from the viewpoint of an idealist, a humanist and a moralist. Like Giner he holds to the liberal creed of individual freedom, human equality and the dignity of man and justifies these beliefs on humanist grounds. At the same time, he shares Giner's dissatisfaction with the view
that society is a mere aggregate of free individuals and attempts to reconcile his individualism with an acceptance of the social dimension of life. Social responsibility is seen as ultimately dependent on an ethic of human fraternity and a sense of communal identity which he designates as the pueblo.

However, on this point, Giner goes much further than Machado. He develops a complex organic theory of society of a type not found in Machado. At the same time it is notable that some of the consequences of organic thought do appear in Machado’s ideas: the belief that the active collaboration and mutual interdependence between élites and people is a precondition of social and political life; the conviction that all social changes are evolutionary; the belief that society is characterised by a unity of purpose rather than by a complex of class tensions. And the term orgánico does on occasion occur in Machado’s writings in contexts which would support the argument that there is a vestigial Krausist content in his use of such language. 229

Another Krausist concept only occasionally articulated by Machado is the notion of "harmony" applied to political life and ideology, although his aspiration to such harmony is suggested by the use of such expressions as convivencia humana and by his espousal of the Tolstoyan ethic of brotherly love. However, on one particular occasion where he does speak of the need for an ethic of harmony the argument he is making (that spiritual improvement is much more important than written, legal guarantees) is so totally in accord with Krausist thought that again we can speak of a vestigial Krausism. 230

The belief in the importance of social reform through legislation, found more often in the less idealistic and more politically involved Krausists such as Azcárate than in Giner, does not appear in Machado’s writings. Although Machado expresses an awareness of material hardship he in fact writes much more about the cultural and spiritual needs of the Spanish people. He expresses
his opposition to immoral privilege and exploitation of one man by another but again his condemnation is of faulty attitudes (such as señoritismo) and of detraction from a person's dignity as a human being rather than of structural social and economic injustice. Such judgments are consistent with his moralism, and with the similar moralism of his Krausist teachers.

One point where Machado does differ from Giner is in his occasionally expressed enthusiasm for revolution, though, at least until his Civil War writings he sees revolution as a political rather than a social act: the replacement of the monarchy by a Republican form of government. The strength of his Republican convictions is not something he explains in terms of specific policies but as an attachment to the ideals of his father and grandfather. Also perhaps more characteristic of his family tradition than of the Krausists is the violence of his anti-clericalism.

Aurora de Albornoz has claimed that Machado's political ideology demonstrates a more modern outlook than Unamuno's: "Unamuno...no pasó de ser un liberal de corte decimonónico; Machado, por el contrario, entendió muy bien las nuevas ideologías que avanzaban con el siglo XX." I think the latter part of this claim is invalidated by a close reading of Machado's commentaries on Socialism and Marxism, and on the Russian Revolution. In fact Machado's ideology is, like Unamuno's, firmly rooted in the nineteenth century (anti-clerical, liberal, Republican) but with the specifically Krausist tendencies noted, especially the humanist, moralist and culturalist tendencies. It is surely significant that Machado should choose to express much of his socio-political thought during the 1930s through the mouth of Juan de Mairena, who is, in Machado's own words, a nineteenth century "free-thinker": "Juan de Mairena mira las cosas con su criterio de librepensador...un poco influido por su época, la de fines del siglo pasado, lo que no impide que ese juicio de hace veinte o treinta años pueda seguir siendo actual dentro de otros tantos años."
Notes

1 "La juventud y el movimiento social", O.C. VII, p. 111; also "yerran los que... elevan a la categoría de principios definitivos y absolutos las formas que revisten en cada tiempo las instituciones, en exacta correspondencia con el estado de conciencia pública y con el grado, siempre relativo, de la cultura general humana" ("La soberanía política", O.C. IX, p. 236).


3 Ensayos y cartas, cit., p. 171.

4 eg. "La política antigua y la política nueva", (1868-72), O.C.V, pp. 61-189.


6 J. Besteiro, "D. Francisco y el socialismo", BILE 1915, pp. 87-88

7 Interview in La Esfera, no date given, cit. A. Saborit, El pensamiento político de Julián Besteiro, M., Seminarios y Ediciones, 1974, p. 309.


9 E. Díaz, La filosofía social... cit., pp. 52, 244-145; E. Lamo de Espinosa, Filosofía y política en Julián Besteiro, M., Edicusa, 1973, pp. 348, 351; cf. Jobit: "Dans sa deuxième phase [after 1875], il faut l’avouer, le Krausisme n’est plus caractérisé par une doctrine une et stricte... C’est le moment où le Krausisme va se caractériser par autre chose que par les lignes rigides d’un système, par une certaine manière commune de sentir et de penser... Trois mots suffisent à la définir: esprit d’harmonisation; culte de la science; moralisme" (Les Educateurs, cit., pp. 237-238)

10 The following exposition is based above all on the writings of Giner and on E. Díaz’s summaries in La filosofía social, cit., pp. 48-67, 126-160.


12 "Un nuevo libro de Schäfflé", O.C. IX, p. 213.

13 Ibid. p. 218

14 "Problemas urgentes de nuestra educación nacional", O.C. XI, p. 169, my italics.
15 Ibid. p. 170, Giner's italics; cf. "La política antigua y la política nueva" (1868-72), O.C. V, p. 105.


17 cit. E. Díaz, La filosofía social, cit., p. 255 n.


19 J. Caro Baroja, "Prólogo", M.B. Cossío, De su jornada, cit., p. xxxii; cf. Pío Baroja, who sees in institucionalismo "el optimismo de los eunucos" (Juventud, egolatria, M. Taurus, 1977, p. 37.)

20 V. Supra p. 317.


22 La filosofía social, cit., p. 251.

23 V. Supra p. 336, n. 2.

24 "La política antigua y la política nueva", O.C. V, p. 87, Giner's italics.

25 "Por todas partes esto es lo que se reclama; no nuevos reglamentos electorales, sino electores de alma nueva" ("Sobre el concepto de la ley en el derecho positivo" (1908), Ensayos y cartas, cit., p. 25.)

26 V. Supra p. 354; also he praises in socialist thought "la concepción de la sociedad, no como un agregado atomístico de individuos sumados, sino como un todo real y sustantivo" and "su proclamación de la necesidad de modelar la organización social según principios éticos e interiores, fundados en el destino humano" ("La política antigua y la política nueva" (1868-72), O.C. V, p. 120)

27 "La acción moral de la juventud", O.C. XI, p. 147.

28 cit. E. Díaz, La filosofía social, cit., p. 153 (O.C. XIV, 173)

29 cf. Sanz del Río: "La sociedad hecha para el hombre, como forma y manifestación libre de toda naturaleza, debe organizarse bajo el plan de la naturaleza humana. Su fin es hacer posible y facilitar a todos sus miembros el cumplimiento de su destino individual y social como seres racionales; perfeccionándose en la originalidad y la armonía de todas sus aptitudes, fuerzas y tendencias." (Textos escogidos, cit., pp. 93-94, cit. E. Díaz, La filosofía social, cit., p. 63)
30 Resumen de Filosofía del Derecho, cit. E. Díaz, La filosofía social, cit., p.152.

31 "El individuo y el estado" (1879), O.C. IX, pp.17-18.

32 Ibid. p.36, n.

33 cf. J.J. Gil Crémades en J. Besteiro and Fernando de los Ríos: "para ellos 'organicistas', los sindicatos constituyen la conexión 'orgánica' del proletariado con el 'cuerpo social'" ("Krausistas, catalanistas y católicos", Cuadernos para el diálogo, Nº IV, Oct 1966, p.56, cit. E. Díaz, La filosofía social, cit., p.244); Díaz also quotes an example of organicism from Unamuno (ibid. p.245) cf. M.D. Gómez Molleda on Unamuno/Krausism in Los reformadores, cit., ch.XI

34 V. Supra pp.317-318, 324-325,331.

35 O.C. XI, p.278, cit. supra p.331

36 "La Universidad española" (1902), O.C. II, p.119, my italics; cf. Sanz del Río, cit. supra p.

37 "Un nuevo libro de Schäffle" (1894), O.C. IX, pp.132-133.

38 Ibid. p.146 and passim.

39 O.C. XI, pp.283-290; the same article also forms part of "Un nuevo libro de Schäffle", O.C. IX, pp.110-120.

40 O.C. XI, p.285

41 "Notas de sociología" (1898) O.C.XI, p.281.

42 O.C. XI, p.284; the subject is dealt with in more detail in "Sobre la educación artística de nuestro pueblo" (1887), O.C. XII, pp.57-61.

43 O.C. XI, p.289.


46 OPP p.687

47 La Voz de Madrid, París, Nº 13, 8 Oct 1938, in Antonio Machado, Antología de su prosa, ed. Albornoiz, cit., Vol.4, p.43.
48 cf. however R. Landa, who claims Machado belonged to Azaña's Acción Republicana (Typescript "Mis recuerdos de A.M. - continuación", cit., p.3); perhaps Landa is confusing Machado's signing of "el llamamiento de la Alianza Republicana" in 1926 with a commitment to a particular Republican party.

49 OPP p.686 (1938)

50 M.D. Gómez Molleda, Los reformadores, cit., p.290; some of Machado y Núñez's correspondence of that period is in the Institución Fernán González, Burgos.

51 This detail and Machado y Alvarez's anti-clerical views from "Demófilo", Artículos religiosos y morales publicados en los dominicales del libre pensamiento, M., 1883, passim.

52 "A mi hijo", ibid., pp.9-10, 12.

53 V. supra ch. 3

54 F. Vega Díaz, "A propósito de unos documentos autobiográficos inéditos de A.M.", PSA Nº 160, 1969, p.70; in his commentary, Vega Díaz suggests that Machado's aversion may have owed something to the hardships he saw his father suffer (PSA Nº161, 1969, p.208).


56 OPP p.401.

57 "D. Francisco Giner de los Ríos", BILE Nº664, p.220.

58 "La crisis de los partidos liberales" (1898), O.C. XI, p.282; the paragraph finishes characteristically: "...buena fuera, si entrase en ella la obra de redimirse por dentro".


60 "Discurso a las Juventudes Socialistas Unificadas", 1 May 1937, OPP p.690.

61 OPP pp.544-545; on the relationship between Romanticism and progresismo see OPP p.504.

62 OPP p.547 (1937)

64 OPP p.625 (1938).
65 "La acción moral de la juventud", O.C. XI, p.147.
67 OPP p.613; cf. Giner: "Aquellos políticos que, guiados por lo que llaman máximas prácticas de conducta, no siendo sino reglas para explotar en su provecho las miserias de la corrupción humana y lograr el poder, eterno objeto de sus desventurados afanes, abominan de los principios" ("La soberanía política", 1872, O.C. V, p.191.)
68 OPP pp.690-691 (1937)
69 Ahora, M, 3 Oct 1936, in Prosas y poesías olvidadas, cit., p.55
70 OPP pp.638-639 (1938)
71 OPP p.49
72 Interview with A. Prats, El Sol, 9 Nov 1934, in "Cartas y documentos de A.M.", L.T., 45-46, 1964, p.246; Here again he states: "Yo no soy marxista ni puedo creer con el dogma marxista que el elemento económico sea lo más importante de la vida" (Ibid.)
73 OPP p.861 (1934)
74 OPP pp.818-819 (1922); V.Supra p.178.
75 OPP p.365; V. Supra p.178.
76 OPP pp.666-667.
77 OPP pp.860, 365 (1934)
78 OPP p.365, V.Supra p.175.
79 OPP pp.668 (1937), 861 (1934).
80 V.Supra pp.259-260.
81 En torno al casticismo, cit., p.33
82 O.C. III, p.90
83 OPP p.815 (1922)
84 La filosofía social, cit., pp.122, 235-236.
"Los mismos que todavía blasonan de empedernidos materialistas tienen como a gala proclamar en todos los tonos (y con razón sin duda) que a nadie ceden en el culto del ideal, que es lo que da a la humanidad su lugar preeminente en el mundo, a diferencia de la animalidad; y se revuelven contra la acusación de grosería, de rusticidad, de sensualidad, de bajeza, de subalterno egoísmo, que les lanzan sus adversarios a menudo y bien gratuitamente; porque ellos serán materialistas en la metafísica, pero son espirituales en la ética" ("Espíritu y naturaleza", O.C. XI, p.55.)


OPP pp. 668 (1937), 365 (1934).

OPP p.531 (1937), 664 (1936)

OPP pp.530 (1937), 471 (1935)

OPP pp.530 (1937), 664 (1936)

OPP pp.530–531, (1937)

OPP p.471; the first two sentences have been completely misinterpreted by Carlos Rojas, who has, however, almost alone among the critics, shown the serious limitations of Machado’s political thought — his attempted demolition of the myth of "A.M. el Bueno" is, however, overdone (Diez figuras ante la guerra civil, B, Nauta, 1973, pp.273–319)

OPP p.664 (1936); cf. Mairena: "El que no habla a un hombre, no habla al hombre; el que no habla al hombre, no habla a nadie." (OPP p.518, 1936)


Ibid.; for the problem of the individual and the communal in Machado’s poetics V. Supra pp. 217–220.

OPP pp.834–835; cf. also the ironical "Diálogo entre Juan de Mairena y Jorge Meneses" (OPP pp.324–328).
417


103 OPP p. 401

104 OPP p. 353; cf. "L'individualité envelope l'infini había dicho Leibniz, y el siglo XIX repite en vario tono la vieja sentencia" (OPP p. 846).

105 "La política antigua y la política nueva" (1868-1872), O.C. V p. 120; also ibid. pp. 87, 198, 200, 208.


107 "Acerca de la función de la ley" (1908), Ensayos y cartas, cit., p. 28.

108 eg. "La ciencia como función social", O.C.XI, p. 3.

109 "La soberanía política" (1872), O.C. V, pp. 205-6.

110 "El Quinto Regimiento...", loc.cit., p. 104.

111 V. Supra pp. 324-325

112 "Acerca de la función de la ley", loc. cit. p. 29.


114 V. Supra pp. 309-331

115 V. Supra pp. 354-355.


117 OPP p. 609


120 "Don Manuel B. Cossío", Crisol, 3 Oct 1931, cit. G. Redondo, ibid., p. 353; Redondo quotes Posada on the same idea and says it became a commonplace of the time. (Ibid., pp. 340-341); Besteiro expressed the same idea in.
the Cortes in 1931 and in the Press (cit. A. Saborit, *El pensamiento político de Julián Besteiro*, cit., pp. 172, 194); see also Xirau, M.E. Cossío... , cit., p.105; cf. from the opposite side, the authors of the vitriolic Una poderosa fuerza secreta. La Institución Libre de Enseñanza (San Sebastián, Ed. Española, 1940): "A la revolución roja, el socialismo le ha dado las masas y la I.L.E. le ha dado los jefes" ("Prólogo")

121 *cit. supra* p.354.
122 *cit. supra* p.373.
123 OPP pp.660-661 (1936); an exception to Machado's practice of defining the pueblo only by opposition to the señorito class or mentality is found when Mairena is discussing rural craftsmen and distinguishes their attitudes from those of the middle classes and of university intellectuals (OPP p.467)
124 OPP p.527 (1937)
125 Ibid.; on the theme of work and leisure V. Supra pp.187-190.
126 OPP p.661 (1936)
127 *cit. supra* p.355.
128 OPP p.527 (1937)
129 V. Supra Chapter 2, passim.
130 V.Supra pp.325-326.
132 Ideal, *cit. pp.102, 107.*
133 Ibid. p.105; the expression profesiones inferiores does not imply a devaluation of their importance - Sanz states: "Todas las profesiones sociales... representan funciones efectivas, igualmente esenciales" (Ibid. p.103); cf. Giner, V.Supra p.331.
134 OPP pp. 528, 659,(both 1937), 662 (1936)
135 V.Supra pp.327-328.
136 "El Quinto detenido y las fuerzas vivas", OPP, pp.753-754.
137 OPP p.859; V.Supra pp.377-378.
138 *cit. supra* p.376.
139 OPP p. 662 (1936)
140 OPP p. 664 (1936)
141 V. Supra pp. 317-321.
142 "Las reformas del Sr. Pidal en la enseñanza de las maestras", 1885, O.C. XVII, p. 3.
143 "Segismundo Moret" (1913), Ensayos y cartas, cit., p. 178.
144 "La ciencia como función social", O.C. XI, p. 3; "Acerca de la función de la ley" (1908), Ensayos y cartas, cit., p. 29.
145 eg. V. Supra p. 278.
146 "Condiciones del espíritu científico" (1871), O.C. VI, p. 26; these muchedumbres are not defined by class: "Muchedumbres, por cierto, en que se apilan a la par con las clases menos educadas, y quizá con mayor inercia que ellas, las que de cultas blasonan y llevan en mal hora el gobierno de la sociedad" (Ibid.)
147 Letter to J. R. Jiménez, OPP p. 904; cf., letter to Unamuno (1913?) OPP pp. 914-915.
148 XCVIII, OPP p. 127 ("A Orillas del Duero")
149 XCIX, OPP p. 129 ("Por Tierras de España")
151 OPP p. 321.
152 OPP p. 659; M. admits receiving the criticism but does not answer it.
153 Prosas y poesías olvidadas, cit., p. 38.
154 OPP p. 766
158 OPP p. 794.
159 OPP pp. 546-547 (1937)
V. Supra p. 351; also: "Hasta ahora, ni en educación, ni en política, ni en otra esfera alguna, se ha alcanzado jamás a asegurar un fin cualquiera, cuyo cumplimiento dependa del interior, por medio de esos sistemas de garantías exteriores, con estar tan en boga, merced al espíritu mecánico, formalista y determinista de la sociedad contemporánea." ("Campos escolares", 1884, O.C. XII, p. 236)

"La última cuartilla", Ensayos y cartas, cit., p. 69.

He praises Unamuno once more in "Unamuno político" (OPP pp. 836-7, 1930); more "occasional" are his Civil War eulogies of Azaña, Giral, Miaja, Lister, etc., though he does pick out the importance of certain men of culture in the Republic; V. Infra p. 407.

OPP pp. 470, 664 and 728.
OPP p. 750
V. Infra p. 401
OPP p. 717 (1922)
OPP p. 664 (1936)
OPP pp. 469, 854; V. Supra pp. 332-333.
V. Supra p. 366
V. Supra pp. 326, 330, 332-333.
OPP p. 834; Cossío, cit. Xirau, M.B. Cossío..., cit., p. 297.
J. L. Cano, "Tres cartas inéditas de Machado a Ortega", R0, 3ª época, Nº5-6, March-April 1976, p. 27.
Older members of the Liga included Mæztu, Luis de Hoyos and Enrique de Mesa, as well as Machado.
OPP p. 209; see also CXL, dedicated to Ortega.
OPP p. 920
Ibid.

OPP p.926; with variations in Los complementarios, ed. cit., pp.51V-53R; cf. A. Saborit: "Los amigos de Melquíades Álvarez, creyendo cándidamente en la sinceridad de Alfonso XIII, que se entrevista con algunas personalidades de la intelectualidad izquierdista Cossío, Cajal, Castillejo, Azcárate, se apresuran a constituir el partido reformista, encabezado por Gumersindo de Azcárate y Benito Pérez Galdós, con cuyo error debilitaron considerablemente las huestes republicanas e inutilizaron a muchos hombres de buena fe" (in Joaquín Costa and el socialism, cit., p.14)

OPP p.721 and Los complementarios, ed. cit., p.17R

Los complementarios, ed. cit., p.54V.

OPP p.926

OPP p.640


Los complementarios, ed. cit., p.18R; Giner's saying is a justification of radical vanguardism: "Tenemos favor y estamos perdidos. Al favor no se llega sino: a) cuando hay consonancia, que puede ser - como aquí he is discussing the innovations and achievements of the Institución, a Dios gracias - por subir la opinión a tono - o por bajar más y más, hasta tropezar con ella -; v.gr. en el mercado de la economía o de los favores; b) cuando además esa fuerza, instituto, etc., no sigue representando, como antes, radicales novedades, etc. Porque si no, la discordancia, cerrada en a, sigue abierta en b para las cosas nuevas. Este favor, pues, nos pierde." ("Notas que don Francisco Giner dejó inéditas" En el cincuentenario de la I.L.E., cit., pp.52-53)
191 Los complementarios, ed.cit., pp.144R, 154R (1924)

192 Ibid., p.151V (1924); in his 16 Jan 1915 letter to Unamuno, Machado criticises the idea of a revolución desde arriba (OPP p.920) cf. an article of the Civil War (OPP p.528); cf. Giner’s criticism of "toda tentativa de reforma social de arriba abajo", cit. supra p.324.

193 Letter to Unamuno (1927), OPP p.928

194 Los complementarios, ed.cit., p.127V

195 OPP pp.926-927 (1922)

196 OPP p.926


199 O.C., XI p. 59

200 A.de Albornoz, "Notas preliminares", Antonio Machado, Antología de su prosa, M, Edicusa, 1972, Vol.IV, p.75; she continues: "Digo expresamente 'posición socialista'. No me refiero a partidos ya que Machado - lo dice en varias ocasiones - no perteneció a ninguno." (Ibid.)

201 OPP pp.628-30

202 OPP pp.630, 542, 648.

203 OPP p.542

204 OPP pp.608-13

205 OPP pp.668-669


207 OPP p.690

208 OPP p.616


210 V.supra p.362.

212 A. Sánchez Barbudo, Los poemas de Antonio Machado, cit., p. 453.


214 OPP p. 575 (April 1938); cf. OPP p. 541 (June 1937)


216 OPP p. 608, misrepresented by J. Machado, Últimas soledades, cit., p. 145.

217 Letter from R. Dieste to F. Caudet, in Hora de España. Antología, M. Turner, 1975, p. 466; Dieste, like Machado, also mentions the writer as testimonio (Ibid. p. 468); other influences on Hora de España mentioned by Dieste are Unamuno, and, perhaps surprisingly, Ortega (Ibid. p. 466)

218 Hora de España, No VIII, Aug 1937, pp. 81-95, and Hora de España. Antología, cit., pp. 352-357.

219 Ibid., my italics.


222 cit. supra p. 366

223 "... camaradas o simpatizantes esparcidos por el mundo,... hispanófilos, en fin, que recibirán inmensa alegría al ver que España prosigue su vida intelectual o de creación artística en medio del conflicto gigantesco que se debate" ("Propósito", Hora de España, No I, Jan 1937, pp. 5-6.)


225 cit. supra p. 401
424

226 "Juan Martín 'El Empecinado”, Nuestro Ejército, Valencia, Nº 1, April 1938, in Prosas y poesías olvidadas, cit., p. 87.


228 [Article in praise of Dr. J. Giral], Servicio de Información, Valencia, Aug 1937, in Prosas y poesías olvidadas, cit., pp. 72-73.

229 V. Supra p. 374.

230 V. Supra pp. 385.

231 La presencia de Miguel de Unamuno en Antonio Machado, cit., p. 14, n.

Debéis amar y respetar a vuestros maestros, a cuantos de buena fe se interesan por vuestra formación espiritual. Pero para juzgar si su labor fue más o menos acertada, debéis esperar mucho tiempo, acaso toda la vida, y dejar que el juicio lo formulen vuestros descendientes.

Antonio Machado, 1934.
Antonio Machado was a pupil at the Institución Libre de Enseñanza from 1883 to 1893: from the age of eight to eighteen. In those ten formative years he acquired an education unique in the Spain of that time for the range and depth of its curriculum, the modernity of its teaching methods, and the ideological background of its teachers who were strongly influenced by Krausism. The Institución's teachers aspired above all to instil a spirit of free enquiry and moral integrity, together with a specific sense of mission in life. The men who taught Machado at the Institución included only two of the school's founders: Francisco Giner de los Ríos, Krausist philosopher and undisputed head of the school, and Joaquín Costa, with whom the young Machado had relatively little contact. As well as Giner, Machado's teachers included other men with a profound knowledge of Krausism (José de Caso and Joaquín Sama) and a group of younger men who had studied under prominent Krausists and subsequently dedicated themselves (in many cases for life) to the aims and principles of the Institución (notably: Manuel Bartolomé Cossío, Aníceto Sela, Ricardo Rubio, Germán Flórez and José Ontañón). Other noteworthy though more occasional teachers at the school in Machado's time were the artist Aureliano Beruete and a number of eminent scientists. Particularly noteworthy features of the Institución's educational system were the attention given to art and the wide use of educational excursions.

The Institución was a deliberately unorthodox, experimental school set apart from the prevailing educational establishment. Its independence led to problems of a practical nature for its pupils, in particular the problem of taking the bachillerato. Machado had considerable difficulties in this respect, as did many other pupils. Although Machado's family were highly sympathetic towards the school, they went
against its wishes on the question of examinations. In spite of the formal academic failure Machado had to face as a consequence of his schooling at the Institución, he always looked back on his schooldays and teachers with gratitude and affection and continued to maintain contact with institucionista circles throughout his life. He made occasional brief comments confessing the important mark that his education at the school had made on him.

Machado expressed his recognition of the importance of Sanz del Río and Krausism in the intellectual life of Spain in the nineteenth century. He did not, however adopt the metaphysics of Krausism himself. His metaphysical thought is eclectic and constructed upon a foundation of ideas from Leibniz and Bergson, both more celebrated philosophers than Krause. The metaphysical aspects of Krausism had become unfashionable in Spain by the time Machado became a serious student of philosophy. At most we can see a few dim echoes of Krausism in some of his ideas such as his attraction to pantheism, to the notion of harmony and to a vision of an organically unified universe. Krausism may also have predisposed Machado towards accepting certain aspects of Bergson's account of Time; like Machado and like the French philosopher, Krausism sees Time and mutability as an essential feature of life. Another theme in which there are sometimes noteworthy similarities between Machado and Krausism is the theme of death. Machado shares the Krausist view of death as something intimate and personal and on occasion gives a vision of immortality like that of the Krausists: physical "survival" in undying Nature and spiritual life after death in the lives of other men. Convinced of the transcendental value of finite human existence, the Krausists advise a calm attitude to death, reject mourning and see the way those who survive the dead live their lives as the most meaningful tribute that can be paid them. Machado sometimes repeats these Krausist ideas and attitudes
— most clearly in his prose and verse elegies to Giner. However, at other times his treatment of the theme of death is quite different. In fact metaphysics is one of the fields of thought in which Machado is least consistent. Some of the basic tendencies of his metaphysical thought are fundamentally opposed to Krausism, especially his overriding irrationalism and monism.

What Machado did undoubtedly acquire from the Krausists was a view of man and an ethics: an idealistic humanism and morality which throughout his life determined the basic tenets of his thinking, shaping his beliefs and judgements on many subjects. Machado, like the Krausists, believed that man has an innate moral sense and is naturally good and has an inherent capacity to arrive at the truth. Consequently he shared the Krausists' conviction that each individual human being should be free to pursue the fulfilment of his particular destiny without the restraints of external moral and intellectual authority. At the same time, both Machado and the Krausists recognise that the destiny of the individual is intimately connected to the lives of his fellow men and the destiny of humanity as a whole: each human life is a part of the progress of humanity, throughout history, towards perfection, and the possibility of man depends on the ever-increasing fulfilment of the potentialities of the human spirit. Like the Krausists, Machado defines this humanist vision as authentically Christian, holding that the imperative to do good disinterestedly and the ethic of brotherly love constitute the essence of Christianity. This ethical, humanist Christianity is contrasted by Machado, as by the Krausists, to the dogmatism, formalism, shallowness and moral hypocrisy of the Catholicism of their time, claiming that the living out of the Christian ethics and faith in the human spirit represents a truer religious sense and spirituality than any preoccupation with liturgies and life after death. Machado follows the Krausists in seeing Christ as an exemplary man, an
embodiment of the capacity for perfection of the human spirit, rather than as the Son of God. The term "divine" is often applied by Machado and by the Krausists to the human conscience, human rationality and humanity's capability for self-transcendence within finite life. Given this view of Christ and Christianity and the elevation of humanity in the Krausists' religion, it is easy to see how Machado was able to hold on consistently to its principles without needing to adhere to the conception of God of Krausist metaphysics.

Machado also follows the Krausists in emphasising certain specific moral principles and values: brotherly love, the essential equality and dignity of man, austerity and simplicity of life style, freedom of thought and conscience, the importance of both individuality and social responsibility, the work ethic (with some reservations in Machado's case), tolerance for the beliefs of others, intolerance of shallowness, hypocrisy and moral turpitude. These ethical principles, in Machado as in the Krausists, are a combination of a somewhat puritanical earnestness and sense of moral superiority and a quite unpuritanical attitude to the possibilities of human nature, human life and human liberty.

Machado alludes to the "saintliness" of his teachers at the Institución Libre and to the ethical principles he acquired in his schooldays as his "fondo de educación kantiana". These principles are rarely expressed by Machado as an explicit creed; rather they are implicit in his pronouncements on certain subjects: religion, art, society and politics, education and culture. In these areas of thought he reveals not only these underlying ethical, humanist principles but also certain specific attitudes and approaches which are characteristic of institucionistas.

Machado's general statements on the nature of art and the rôle of the artist articulate an ethical aesthetics akin to that of the Krausists. The artist's
first obligation, they declare, is to humanity; his duty is to speak for and to his fellow men, not to seek in art a private and remote world apart from human life. However, while affirming the essential humanity of true art, Machado and the Krausists grant to the artist a freedom to range widely over the experience of man, rejecting only those extreme aesthetics that they believe are guilty of upsetting the necessary balance of ethical and aesthetic considerations (Naturalism, Mannerism, Art-for Art's sake, self-centred art, overt didacticism). This view of art is the natural product of their view of man. So is the approach to literary history of Machado and the Krausists: they see literature as an important indicator of the state of development of the human spirit in different times and places. Machado and Giner show a remarkable similarity in approach and conclusions in their analyses of nineteenth century subjective lyric poetry.

Although Machado's ethics impinges on his aesthetics the contrary is not the case as in the Krausists. Neither does he give a metaphysical account of Beauty in the way the Krausists do. He does, however, echo their definition of true art as a synthesis of the temporal and the eternal, the finite and the infinite.

In the area of social and political thought Machado admits to the influence of the "idealism" of his teachers at the Institución. He adopted their central belief that it is only changes in the human spirit, particularly moral changes, that can reshape human society; changes in the Law or in economic or social structures are of secondary importance. The utopian aim of the social vision of Machado and the Krausists is a harmonious world ordered by the ethic of human fraternity. Machado, like the Krausists, judges contemporary political life from a moral standpoint, rejecting pragmatism and mistrusting party politics. The strength of his Republicanism and
anti-clericalism owes something to his father and grandfather as well as to his teachers at the Institución. Machado, like the institucionistas, attaches far greater importance to the questions of spiritual reform and the spreading of culture than to politics proper. Behind the political struggle he sees the human aspiration towards spiritual perfection, in accord with the Krausist philosophy of history, and the emphasis he gives to the need for cultural extension as a key form of social justice and reform is one of the clearest manifestations of his institucionista way of thinking.

In fact Machado wholeheartedly supports the Institución's conviction that education and culture are the essential instruments for the regeneration of Spain. Machado's culturalism, like that of mainstream institucionistas such as Giner and Cossío, aspires to be democratic, stressing the rights of all men to have access to culture and education. Another means by which they seek to avoid elitism is by recognising the importance of the Volksgeist in the life of a national community and by defining the proper relationship between élites and people as an organic one built on collaboration, whether in cultural, social or political life.

In his prose tribute to Giner Machado shows his understanding of and sympathy for the institucionista idea of the nature of culture and true education, and he repeats the same idea in his own pronouncements on the question. For Machado and the institucionistas, culture and education are stimuli that can awaken a man's full human potential, can develop the inherent natural faculties of human nature: rationality, conscience, love, desire for knowledge and virtue, the sense of beauty. It is a vision of education that accords with their view of man; sometimes they refer to it as a humanising process. A favourite metaphor used to describe education (in addition to that of "awakening") is that of nurturing a seed. This image implies both the naturalness and the individuality of the learner's
development; education is not for them a cramming of information into empty heads or a moulding of people according to a preconceived pattern.

Machado echoes in his writings many of the pedagogical ideas of the Institución Libre: the importance of learning through activity and practice rather than by passive assimilation; the need for teachers to encourage curiosity, enquiry and the critical spirit in pupils; Socratic dialogue as a teaching method; the necessity in a complete education of developing other faculties - spiritual, ethical, aesthetic and physical - as well as the intelligence; the value of educational excursions; the need for close pupil/teacher relationships; the principle that education should not be remote from real life; the rejection of punishments and the examination system in schools.

The influence of the Institución Libre on Machado is primarily an influence of ideas and beliefs. Hence the main contribution of that influence to his literary works is thematic rather than formal. There are some traces of a formal influence of Giner de los Ríos: he may have given Machado some images - the "Gran Ojo", the "verticality" of man, the "se hace camino al andar" symbol. Giner encouraged pupils at the school to cultivate a deliberate simplicity and concision of language, and this is a feature of Machado's art. Giner's descriptions of landscapes show technical as well as thematic similarities with those of Machado. The excursions into the countryside Machado made as part of his education at the Institución undoubtedly developed his powers of observation and sensitivity to landscape, especially to the landscapes of Castile. Thematically, the Institución contributed to Machado's love of Nature and awareness of man's relationship to Nature: a belief in both the formative influence of environment on national character and in the potentially regenerative power of human closeness to Nature.

The influence of the Institución on Machado does
manifest itself in Machado's poetry; but the idealistic humanism that is the most profound indication of that influence finds its clearest and most powerful expression in his prose works, especially Juan de Mairena. If the Institución gave Machado his view of human life we can only evaluate its influence as one of fundamental importance. The very nature of that humanist vision meant that the influence of the Institución was in no way an ideological strait-jacket.

In Juan de Mairena Machado invites us to judge the success or failure of the education he received. I would assert that the Institución succeeded in transmitting to Machado an admirable and noble philosophy of life, whose expression in literary art is one of the major achievements of Spanish literature. However Machado's idealismo, although admirable, is open to some criticism. It sometimes manifests itself as ingenuousness (as in his interpretations of Communism) or as a vague evasiveness (as in his comments on the Spanish pueblo). Idealism, as well as an expression of man's highest aspirations, can also be a sign of an inability or unwillingness to face unpleasant realities. Sometimes too we can observe a contrast between the ideals Machado upholds and the reality of his own life and behaviour. For example, his optimistic view of the possibilities open to humanity contrasts with his frequent pessimism about the limitations of his own existence; the lofty pedagogical principles proposed in his writings are contradicted by his uninspired classes in the schools where he taught. However, he saw his true vocation as that of an artist and an intellectual; if he failed his maestros at the Institución as a teacher, he admirably succeeded in his aim of contributing with his poetry and thought to the cultural and spiritual regeneration of Spain to which the Institución's efforts were ultimately directed.
Notes

1 OPP p.370; cit supra p.425.

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Abbreviations

A.M. Antonio Machado y Ruiz
B Barcelona
B.A. Buenos Aires
BH Bulletin Hispanique
BHS Bulletin of Hispanic Studies
BILE Boletín de la Institución Libre de Enseñanza
CA Cuadernos Americanos
CH Cuadernos Hispanoamericanos
C.S.I.C. Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas
I.L.E. Institución Libre de Enseñanza
J.A.E. Junta para Ampliación de Estudios e Investigaciones Científicas
Leg.(s.) Legajo(s)
L.T. La Torre
M Madrid
N.Y. New York
O.C. Obras Completas
OPP Antonio Machado, Obras. Poesía y prosa, Buenos Aires, Losada, 1964
PSA Papeles de Son Armadans
RHM Revista Hispánica Moderna
RLC Revue de Littérature Comparée
RO Revista de Occidente
U.P. University Press
Univ. University
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