Access to Electronic Thesis

Author: Liberty Mupakati
Thesis title: ‘Reparation and Inequality Through Different Diasporas’: The Case of the Zimbabwean Diaspora in Leeds, UK and Limpopo Province, South Africa
Qualification: PhD

This electronic thesis is protected by the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. No reproduction is permitted without consent of the author. It is also protected by the Creative Commons Licence allowing Attributions-Non-commercial-No derivatives.

If this electronic thesis has been edited by the author it will be indicated as such on the title page and in the text.
‘REPARATION AND INEQUALITY THROUGH DIFFERENT DIASPORAS’: THE CASE OF THE ZIMBABWEAN DIASPORA IN LEEDS, UNITED KINGDOM AND LIMPOPO, SOUTH AFRICA’

Liberty Mupakati

Thesis submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Geography
The University of Sheffield
September 2012

The Candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others. This copy has been supplied on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement.
‘Reparation and Inequality through different Diasporas: A case study of the Zimbabwean diaspora in Leeds, United Kingdom and Limpopo Province, South Africa’

Liberty Mupakati

ABSTRACT

This thesis focuses on the unprecedented exodus of Zimbabweans from the country of their birth to South Africa and the UK and their subsequent experiences of life in the diaspora. Since the late 1990’s, Zimbabwe has lost a significant percentage of her population. This loss accelerated towards the dawn of and into the new millennium in a series of migration episodes that were spawned by both economic and political catastrophes.

These migration episodes to South Africa and the UK comprised of mixed flows i.e. both skilled and unskilled migrants; economic and political refugees etc. Leeds and Limpopo were chosen as the main loci of this study because of the contrasting stock of migrants found there. Given that this thesis explores the differences in human and social capital and migration strategies between the two countries, these two areas were selected because of their contrasting population of migrants. These differences are evident in terms of educational and professional qualifications, levels of financial capital and histories of transnational circulation.

This thesis uses a mixed method approach consisting of both quantitative and qualitative methods. This was informed by the dearth of credible statistical data on the Zimbabwean diaspora resident in Leeds and Limpopo. The thesis therefore, draws on a questionnaire survey, semi structured interviews and ethnographic data that was gathered in Leeds and Limpopo with members of the Zimbabwean diaspora.

Data gathered from the survey enabled a detailed profile of migrants to be constructed which disentangled the different constituents of this nascent diaspora. Migrants’ transnational activities were investigated given the public interest currently surrounding diasporic activities such as remittances. Migrants’ diasporic experiences are shaped by complex and intertwined factors e.g. immigration status. These factors have a bearing on migrants’ ability to meet their transnational obligations. Furthermore, migrants’ transnational linkages and transactions have an impact on their return intentions.

Key words: Transnationalism; migration; diaspora; remittances; social capital; human capital; ambivalent diaspora; clandestine diaspora; enthusiastic diaspora; fearful diaspora; reluctant diaspora; ephemeral diaspora
Acknowledgements

I am indebted to a number of people whose sacrifices, guidance and help made this work possible. My many thanks and acknowledgements go to all of them.

Firstly, I would like to thank my supervisors, Dr Deborah Sporton, Dr Daniel Hammett and Dr Chasca Twyman for being sources of scholarly inspiration. I have tapped into their reservoirs of knowledge and benefited tremendously from their wit, judicious and critical comments. I would like to place my thanks and appreciation to all of them for being exemplary scholars who pushed me to realise my goal. My sincere thanks go to the University of Sheffield for offering me a scholarship without which this study would have remained an unfulfilled dream. I would also like to extend my thanks to my fellow post graduate students in the Department of Geography whom I shared similar experiences of thesis writing, the thrills and agony that accompanied it. Your support was much appreciated.

In South Africa, I am thankful to Inos and Heatherwell Dhau-Mawere, Simbarashe and Rudo Munetsi for sheltering me during my fieldwork. Sadly, Simbarashe died in a road traffic accident before this work was completed. This is for you young man, May your Departed Soul Rest in Peace.

I am thankful to all the people who took part in this study for, without your participation, this project would not have been realised. In particular, I acknowledge the invaluable help that I received from the following institutions and officers: Department for Home Affairs represented by Ms M Kgasi, the Acting Chief Director, Asylum Seeker Management and all her staff at the Musina Refugee Reception Centre, officials at the International Organization for Migration, Musina Office, in particular Belinda Fourie for arranging transport to the farms, Tonderai Mazanhi of Medicins San Frontiers, Musina, Pastor Simon Sithole of the I Believe in Jesus Church, Musina, the Catholic sisters at the women’s shelter in Musina. Similarly, my heartfelt gratitude goes to the various Zimbabwean communities, political and religious groups in Leeds which played pivotal roles in the provision of information required for this study.

Finally, I would to thank my wife, Maonei Portia, son, Jeremiah Tinodaish Nomutsa and daughters, Livinia Anesu and Karryn Tafadzwa for their unremitting love and the forbearance they exhibited during this study. I would also like to thank my parents for instilling in me the desire to learn, this is for you. Thanks are also due to my brothers and sisters for their support.
DEDICATION

To

Maonei Portia, my wonderful wife for the fortitude you have displayed in the race thus far. Your determination is inspiring and has touched many;

My children – Livinia Anesu, Jeremiah Tinodaish Nomutsa and Karryn Tafadzwa – I thank God for His blessings, you bring bundles of joy, happiness and focus to my life;

My parents, Jeremiah and Anna – I will forever be indebted to you for all the encouragement and sacrifices that you made in educating me, thank you baba naamai, ndinotenda (thank you father and mother, I am grateful).
Chapter One: Introduction

1.1 Introduction 1
1.2 Research aims and objectives 3
1.3 Research Design 4
1.4 The study area: Leeds (UK) and Limpopo (South Africa) 5
1.5 Major contributions 7
1.6 Thesis structure 8

Chapter Two: Zimbabwe: Independence and its nascent diaspora

2.1 Introduction 11
2.2 Contemporary emigration from Zimbabwe 1975-2010 15
  2.2.1 The First Episode: Turmoil and tenacity 18
  2.2.2 The Second Episode: Gukurahundi and the involuntary emigration of the Ndebele people 20
  2.2.3 The Third Episode: ESAP and the flight of skilled professionals 22
  2.2.4 The Fourth Episode: Health and social care: New opportunities, New frontiers 24
  2.2.5 The Fifth Episode: Land reform and the demise of agriculture 26
  2.2.6 The Sixth Episode: Operation Murambatsvina 28
  2.2.7 The Seventh Episode: The Great Trek 29
  2.2.8 The Eighth Episode: Asylum seeking and permanency of migration 32
2.3 Origins of the Zimbabwean diaspora in South Africa and the UK 35
2.4 Majoni-joni/Injiva: An exemplar of transnational circulation? 37
2.5 Conclusion 40

Chapter Three: Theorizing Transnational Migration

3.1 Introduction 42
3.2 Conceptualising transnationalism as a framework for International Migration 43
3.3 Transnationalism and Transnational Practices 44
  3.3.1 Embedding Social Capital in Transnational Migration 52
  3.3.2 Remittances: The new panacea to developmental problems? 58
  3.3.3 Return migration 61
  3.3.4 The notion of Diaspora and diasporic communities 66
3.4 Conclusion 69
# Chapter Four: Research Methodology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>Study Areas</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2.1</td>
<td>Leeds</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2.2</td>
<td>Limpopo</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>Why mixed method approaches to data collection?</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3.1</td>
<td>Questionnaire Survey</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3.2</td>
<td>Sampling and the problems of reliable statistical data</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3.3</td>
<td>Analysis of survey data</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3.4</td>
<td>Semi-structured interviews</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3.5</td>
<td>Ethnography and research diary</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3.6</td>
<td>Key informant interviews</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>Qualitative data analysis</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>Positionality: My biography and research philosophy</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5.1</td>
<td>Access and gate keepers</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5.2</td>
<td>Using translators</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>Ethical considerations</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

# Chapter Five: A profile of the Zimbabwean diaspora: The causes of the exodus migration pathways into the UK and South Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>Demographic profile of the study participants</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>Period of arrival in South Africa and the UK</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>Causes of migration from Zimbabwe</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4.1</td>
<td>Economic decline as the driver of emigration</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4.2</td>
<td>Loss of livelihoods</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4.3</td>
<td>Growing political intolerance, violence and repression</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4.4</td>
<td>Family Reunion</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4.5</td>
<td>The pursuit of Higher Education in South Africa and the UK</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4.6</td>
<td>Social networks and the lure of others’ success</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>A perilous, informalised irregular migration to South Africa and the UK</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5.1</td>
<td>A perilous migration to South Africa</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5.2</td>
<td>Irregular migration to the UK</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

# Chapter Six: A taxonomy of the diaspora

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>Typology and interpretation of the Diaspora</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2.1</td>
<td>An Enthusiastic Diaspora</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2.2</td>
<td>A Reluctant Diaspora</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2.3</td>
<td>An Ambivalent Diaspora</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2.4</td>
<td>A Clandestine Diaspora</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2.5</td>
<td>A Fearful Diaspora</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2.6</td>
<td>An Ephemeral Diaspora</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter Seven: The evolving transnational transactions of the Zimbabwean diaspora

7.1 Introduction 183
7.2 Remittances to Zimbabwe: An overview 184
  7.2.1 Remitting motivations in Limpopo 189
  7.2.2 Motivations for remitting in Leeds 193
  7.2.3 Reverse remittances in the UK 201
  7.2.4 Remitting Channels in Limpopo 202
  7.2.4 Continuity and change in remitting channels in the UK 207
7.3 Opportunistic politicians and the shifting relationship with home government 210
7.4 The evolving transnational mediums of contact with home
  7.4.1 Food as re-enactment of and contact with home 227
7.5 Conclusion 233

Chapter Eight: The (im)possibility of return? An exploration of the return intentions of Zimbabwean migrants in the UK and South Africa

8.1 Introduction 234
8.2 Attitudes towards return 235
8.3 Intentions to return: Under what conditions, why, when and how?
  8.3.1 Familial obligations as both an inducement and constraint To Return 238
  8.3.2 Citizenship and deferred returns 241
8.4 The economic renaissance in Zimbabwe and the global economic Recession
  8.4.1 Human Capital: Return as retracing the 1980 precedent 247
  8.4.2 Brain gain and Brain circulation: The professionalization of return 249
  8.4.3 Curtailed opportunities: Recession induced returns 253
8.5 Holiday visits: the circularisation of return 257
8.6 Political reform as key to unlocking return: The adoption of a wait and see approach to return 261
8.7 No desire to return 263
8.8 Conclusion 265

Chapter Nine: Conclusions

9.1 Introduction 267
9.2 Summary of findings 267
9.3 Academic Contribution 274
9.4 Methodological contribution 280
9.5 Policy Implications 281
9.6 Limitations of the study 282
9.7 Areas for Future Research 283

REFERENCES 284
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Appendix</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 1</td>
<td>Supervisor's introductory letter</td>
<td>356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 2</td>
<td>Self introductory letter</td>
<td>357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 3</td>
<td>The questionnaire</td>
<td>359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 4</td>
<td>Request for volunteers advert</td>
<td>371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 5</td>
<td>Profile of interview participants</td>
<td>372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 6</td>
<td>Interview guide</td>
<td>375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 7</td>
<td>Interview codes</td>
<td>377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 8</td>
<td>Consent form</td>
<td>381</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Acronyms

AIDS  Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
AIT   Asylum and Immigration Tribunal
AWOL  Absent without official leave
CDE   Centre for Development and Enterprise
CFU   Commercial Farmers’ Union
CIO   Central Intelligence Organisation
CORMSA Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa
DHA   Department for Home Affairs
DRC   Democratic Republic of the Congo
ESAP  Economic Structural Adjustment Programme
EU    European Union
FMSP  Forced Migration Studies Programme [University of the Witwatersrand]
FTLRP Fast-Track Land Resettlement Programme
HIV   Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HRW   Human Rights Watch
ICT   Information Communication Technologies
ILR   Indefinite Leave to Remain
IMF   International Monetary Fund
IOM   International Organisation for Migration
LRRP  Land Reform and Resettlement Programme
MDC-T Movement for Democratic Change - Tsvangirai
NMC   Nursing and Midwifery Council
OM    Operation Murambatsvina
PF ZAPU Patriotic Front - Zimbabwe African People’s Union
RBZ   Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RoHR</td>
<td>Restoration of Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAPS</td>
<td>South African Police Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIRDC</td>
<td>Scientific and Industrial Research and Development Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPT</td>
<td>Solidarity Peace Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKBA</td>
<td>United Kingdom Border Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VARRP</td>
<td>Voluntary Assisted Return and Reintegration Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WENELA</td>
<td>Witwatersrand Native Labour Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZANLA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZANU (PF)</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZIMRA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Revenue Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZIPRA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZNA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe National Army</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of tables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table Number</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table 2.1</td>
<td>Timeline of major events in Zimbabwe 1960-2010</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2.2</td>
<td>Migration episodes from Zimbabwe to South Africa and the UK 1975-2010</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2.3</td>
<td>Number of Zimbabwean nurses registered with the Nursing and Midwifery Council</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2.4</td>
<td>Asylum applications in the UK 1999-2010</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3.1</td>
<td>Three types of transnational social spaces</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3.2</td>
<td>Causes and effects of return migration</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4.1</td>
<td>Top 10 Local Authority Locations of Dispersed Asylum Seekers, December 2006</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4.2</td>
<td>Survey response rate by country of residence %</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4.3</td>
<td>Recruitment selection criteria matrix</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4.4</td>
<td>List of key informant agencies</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5.1</td>
<td>Geographical areas of origin of respondents in SA and UK</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 6.1</td>
<td>Country of residence and last job held in Zimbabwe %</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 6.2</td>
<td>Country of residence and current job %</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 6.3</td>
<td>Reasons for detention by country of residence %</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 7.1</td>
<td>Consequences of remitting on self by country of residence</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 8.1</td>
<td>Reasons to return and settle in Zimbabwe by country of Residence</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of figures

Figure 2.1  Map of Zimbabwe  19
Figure 4.1  Neighbourhood map of Leeds  73
Figure 4.2  Map of Limpopo Province  74
Figure 4.3  Musina Refugee Reception Centre  75
Figure 4.4  Manning a market stall in Polokwane  87
Figure 5.1  Respondents’ gender by country of residence (%)  99
Figure 5.2  Respondents’ age groups by country of residence (%)  101
Figure 5.3  Period of arrival in South Africa and UK (%)  102
Figure 5.4  Causes of migration to South Africa/UK (%)  105
Figure 5.5  Respondents’ marital statuses by country of residence (%)  117
Figure 5.6  Respondents’ educational qualifications on departure from Zimbabwe by country of residence (%)  120
Figure 5.7  Did you receive help while still in Zimbabwe (%)  122
Figure 5.8  Type of help received from prior migrants while still in Zimbabwe by country of residence (%)  124
Figure 5.9  Financiers of travel to South Africa/UK (%)  125
Figure 5.10  Type of help provided to newly arrived migrants (%)  127
Figure 5.11  Who you stayed with on arrival (%)  129
Figure 5.12  Type of visa held on entry by country of residence (%)  130
Figure 5.13  Dangers faced by informal migrants on journey to South Africa (%)  132
Figure 5.14  A gunshot victim in Musina  133
Figure 5.15  An advert for Medicins San Frontiers advert in Musina  136
Figure 5.16  Travelled directly to South Africa/UK? (%)  137
Figure 5.17  Third countries on way to the UK (%)  138
Figure 6.1  A six fold classification of the Zimbabwean diaspora  144
Figure 6.2 Has there been changes to your life by being in the diaspora by country of residence (%) 145
Figure 6.3 Improvements engendered by being in the diaspora (%) 146
Figure 6.4 Chengeto and her husband, Polokwane 148
Figure 6.5 Areas in which migrants' lives have not improved (%) 152
Figure 6.6 Quality of neighbourhoods in SA/UK (%) 157
Figure 6.7 Current immigration statuses by country of residence (%) 164
Figure 6.8 Tapiwa and his two wives doing piece work, Thohoyandou 169
Figure 6.9 Have you ever been detained by immigration authorities by country of residence (%) 172
Figure 6.10 Deportation by country of residence (%) 176
Figure 6.11 Migrants queuing for their evening meal, Limpopo 180
Figure 6.12 Inside a mukhukhu, Tzaneen 181
Figure 7.1 Have you remitted to Zimbabwe (%) 184
Figure 7.2 Frequency of remitting by country of residence (%) 185
Figure 7.3 Amounts remitted to Zimbabwe by country of residence (£) 187
Figure 7.4 Reasons for remitting by country of residence (%) 188
Figure 7.5 Recipients of migrants' remittances in Zimbabwe (%) 197
Figure 7.6 Chitoro.com website 202
Figure 7.7 Remitting methods by country of residence (%) 203
Figure 7.8 An amalaitsha truck carrying goods for delivery to Zimbabwe 205
Figure 7.9 Text message from an informal courier 208
Figure 7.10 Packed drums ready for shipping to Zimbabwe 209
Figure 7.11 Participation in Zimbabwean oriented activities (%) 211
Figure 7.12 Types of Zimbabwean oriented activities (%) 212
Figure 7.13 MDC membership card 213
Figure 7.14  A standard MDC support letter for asylum seekers 214
Figure 7.15  An MDC membership subscription schedule 216
Figure 7.16  Contact with home (%) 219
Figure 7.17  Mediums of communication by country of residence (%) 221
Figure 7.18  An advert of Econet mobile in the UK 224
Figure 7.19  Frequency of contact by country of residence (%) 227
Figure 7.20  KwaMereki Butchery, Leeds 229
Figure 7.21  South African manufactured Iwisa maize meal on sale, Leeds 230
Figure 7.22  Zimbabwean manufactured Pearlenta and Roller Meal on sale, Leeds 230
Figure 7.23  Zimbabwean women selling groundnuts, Polokwane 232
Figure 8.1  Migrants’ return intentions by country of residence (%) 236
Figure 8.2  An IOM advert targeting asylum seekers and refused asylum seekers in the UK to return home 246
Figure 8.3  Zimbabwe Human Capital Website 250
Figure 8.4  Migrants who have been to Zimbabwe in the last 12 months by country of residence (%) 258
Figure 8.5  Main purpose of last visit to Zimbabwe by country of residence (%) 259
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

Unprecedented emigration from Zimbabwe has been witnessed since the end of the 1990s. This outflow continued unabated until the formation of the inclusive\(^1\) government between President Robert Mugabe and his erstwhile opponent, Morgan Tsvangirai who became Prime Minister in February 2009. This emigration consisted of several migration episodes whose causes are complex and intertwined. These migration waves comprised of mixed flows i.e. skilled and unskilled, economic and political migrants moving alongside each other. South Africa and the United Kingdom (UK) attracted a sizeable number of Zimbabwean migrants and are thought to have the largest concentrations of Zimbabweans living outside the country. At the height of the crisis, these migrants are said to have become the lifeblood of the Zimbabwean economy through their transnational transactions such as remittances.

This study compares the formation and experiences of the Zimbabwean diaspora\(^2\) in the Limpopo Province, South Africa and in Leeds, UK by interrogating their migration and transnational experiences. In so doing, it investigates the role of social networks in channelling, fuelling and sustaining migration flows to these two destinations. The third and final aspect of this research conveys the experiences of Zimbabwean migrant workers in South Africa and the UK in the labour markets of these countries, and it thus situates the study against the backdrop of current debates on transnational migration and transnational practices. Such a study is necessary because of the extraordinary and complex migration flows to these two resident countries beginning in the late 1990s.

The different migration episodes comprised of migrants with different human capital endowments. Differences in migrants’ human capital can be ascribed in significant part to the policies pursued by the minority colonial government of the previous Prime Minister Ian Smith and those of President Mugabe soon after independence. Furthermore, these flows were mixed which merits an investigation to tease the differences within these flows and migration episodes. A detailed profile of the migrants in the two countries was generated, outlining the participants’ age, gender, class, immigration status, profession, education and social networks etc. This was done in order to distinguish the constituent parts of the Zimbabwean diaspora in South Africa and the UK. The study profiles migrants in both countries to enable a

---

\(^1\) The inclusive government is also referred to as the coalition government in some quarters while others erroneously call it the unity government. It was brokered by the then South African President, Thabo Mbeki who was the African Union (AU) and Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) appointed mediator.

\(^2\) The Zimbabwean diaspora is a very recent one compared to other established African Diasporas e.g. Ghanaian, Nigerian or Ethiopian. Until 2000, there was no diaspora to talk about as Zimbabweans preferred to live and work at home while those who would have left the country for further studies or to work seasonally abroad usually returned. This however, appears to be changing as more Zimbabweans who fled the country and are taking steps to regularise their stay in the countries that they are domiciled.
comparative picture to be built of the different migration flows as well as to capture the different human capital flows in the two different study areas.

The study uses transnationalism as the theoretical framework for this study. The concept of transnationalism has emerged as a useful concept for explaining international migration (Portes, 2000; Vertovec, 1999; Portes et al., 1998; Glick-Schiller, 1992). The use of transnationalism as a theoretical framework is predicated on the need to obtain a holistic understanding of the migrants’ decisions to leave Zimbabwe and form a new life in South Africa and the UK - it also links together these decisions and their consequences with the intimate ties which these migrants have maintained with those left behind. Transnationalism was also favoured as the theoretical framework because of the realisation that no one theory can fully explain the complexity of migration. Furthermore, transnationalism helps to illuminate the migrants’ intentions to return, where they occur.

Remittances and diasporic politics have been identified as exemplary features of transnationalism. Recent studies have concluded that remittances from the Zimbabwean diaspora have become the life blood of the country and have played a critical role in avoiding the total economic implosion of the country between 2000 and 2010 when the economic crisis was at its utter worst (Branning and Sachikonye, 2002; Crush and Tevera, 2010). Remittances demonstrate the complex connections that migrants have with the lives of those left at home. While the remitting practices of the migrants have often been praised, what has escaped scholarly attention is the cost these practices incur on the migrants. This thesis delves deeper into the remitting practices of Zimbabwean migrants.

A mixed methods approach was used in order to satisfy the research objectives by obtaining complementary data sets. This comprised of a questionnaire survey, interviews and multi-sited ethnography in both Leeds and Limpopo (McKendrick, 1998; Marcus, 1995). The use of the questionnaire survey helped the study to recruit and gather biographical data which enabled the construction of the crucial migrant profiles. Semi-structured interviews, ethnographic methods and key informant interviews made up the key qualitative methods that I employed to gather data. In addition to these primary data sources, secondary data was derived from a number of sources including the British Home Office data on asylum applications, similar documentation stored by South Africa’s Department for Home Affairs (DoH), relevant scholarly texts and key journals and internet articles.

The title of the thesis suggests a link between reparation and inequality. This is pertinent because of the different circumstances which occasioned departure from Zimbabwe and the class differences of migrants when they were in Zimbabwe and how these shaped the destination of migration. These class differences were later redefined by being in the diaspora given the opportunities that this presented. In this study, the term reparation is used to describe the role which the transnational
practices of Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa and the UK are playing in the development and reconstruction of the country as it slowly returns to normalcy having been ravaged by a debilitating socio-economic and political crisis. Linking repair to diaspora acknowledges the growing body of evidence which contends that diaspora is a resource for development which takes effect via remittances and return migration processes (Black and King, 2004; Lowell, 2001).

This link also affirms how social, economic, and cultural commitments can perpetuate inequality, personal and group vulnerability, power discrepancies and social entrapment (Bloch, 2006; Ghosh, 2006). By leveraging their financial and non-monetary remittances, many migrants have played an integral role in avoiding the country’s total economic implosion over the past decade. Some migrants have used their time in exile to develop their human capital and skills bases which can in turn be deployed positively in the reconstruction of a country which has frozen and depleted its human capital and skills base over the past ten years. Reparation is thus not used in this thesis to refer the ‘entire spectrum of attempts to rectify historical injustices’, such as the slave trade or colonialism (Barkan, 2001: xix).

For the sake of consistency with the participants’ lexicon, London is used interchangeably with the UK, Britain and England. The same applies to Johannesburg in terms of it being used to refer to South Africa writ large. The study uses the term diaspora to refer to any Zimbabweans living away from home in South Africa, the UK or other countries with a high concentration of Zimbabwean migrants.

1.2 Research aims and objectives

The principal aim of this study is to compare the formation and experiences of the Zimbabwean diaspora in Limpopo Province, South Africa and Leeds, UK. This is achieved by ascertaining the human and social capital differentials between migrants in these two areas and how these different capital levels have helped channel migrants to specific destinations. In so doing, the thesis seeks to unveil the complexities that are embedded in the transnational linkages between Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa, the UK and those at home.

The study profiled a sample of the Zimbabwean diaspora, discerning its heterogeneity; it is constituted of disparate groups who have moved because of radically different factors. It is important to point out here that there is a dearth of statistics about the number of Zimbabweans resident in these two countries (IOM, 2006) which informed the decision to use a questionnaire survey as an initial data collection tool. To this extent, four research objectives were used to realise this aim:

**Objective 1** To investigate and compare the profiles of the Zimbabwean diaspora in Limpopo, South Africa and Leeds, UK (Who; When; How)
Objective 2 To examine the role of social networks in producing and maintaining diaspora links and the complex connections with those left behind (Why; When; Transnational Transactions; Transnational social fields)

Objective 3 To explore the evolving transnational strategies employed by migrants in their relationship with home (Communication mediums; Why; How; When; Who)

Objective 4 To investigate the return intentions of Zimbabwean migrants in Leeds and Limpopo (Transnational Identity and Citizenship; When; Why; Who; How)

The first objective entailed the collation of biographical data regarding the sample migrants in South Africa and the UK in order to build a holistic picture of the people residing there, including reference to their educational qualifications and their professions. The second objective aimed to examine the role of social capital in producing and maintaining intra- and inter-links between the migrants themselves and those left behind. In so doing, it spans the various social arenas in which the diaspora exact their transnational practices. Objective three aimed to explore the migrants’ transnational transactions specifically with those at home. These interactions have been shaped by a range of factors, especially technological changes. The final objective sought to investigate migrants’ return intentions and their attitudes regarding possible return. It thus aimed to discern the factors which encourage and impede migrants’ return aspirations.

1.3 Research design

The study deployed a mixed methods approach which involved a questionnaire survey being initially used to generate codified data. A questionnaire survey was used because of the absence of reliable data on the Zimbabwean diaspora (IOM, 2006). There is no credible data available on the number of Zimbabwean migrants in either Leeds or Limpopo. Only national estimates are available, and these vary wildly (Magunha et al., 2009; Makina, 2007; Muzondidya, 2008; Pasura, 2008). The statistics provided by government departments in both countries are not entirely reliable given that they are only for migrants who have had some liaisons with these departments and the nature of migration means many others are unknown to the system.

A multi-method approach was thus deployed within specific areas in Leeds and Limpopo which migrants use because of the presence of relevant religious, civic, community, political or professional organisations. Further help was sought from charitable and employment organisations so as to recruit a sufficient number of participants. This extensive questionnaire survey was designed to establish a demographic backdrop for the subsequent semi-structured interviews which gave prominence to migrants’ voices.
Semi-structured interviews and multi-sited ethnography formed the second part of the data collection process. This qualitative facet of the study provided a means through which data could be gathered regarding the migrants and their migratory patterns, the reasons why they had left Zimbabwe and their experiences in the host country. Through the use of these qualitative methods, the transnational activities of the migrants were investigated. The use of ethnographic methods also helped to reveal the ways in which migrants utilise public spaces, how they navigate the treacherous border between Zimbabwe and South Africa, engage in paid work etc.

While the initial interview agenda focused on the exodus from the homeland, the study gradually turned its attention to other areas associated with migration. These areas of focus include the dangers that migrants have faced in their travels, and their experiences with immigration departments and in the labour market. These are salient features of this study because for the majority of the migrants, the decision to emigrate was premised on the need for social mobility which migration engendered. This section of the study involves an exploration of how migrants use their social capital and networks in their politically relevant interactions (also including with those at home). This analysis is concluded by developing a framework of the migrants' experience in diaspora and by exploring the shifting identities created by competing interests in favour of return and against.

1.4 The study area: Leeds (UK) and Limpopo (South Africa)

South Africa and the UK were chosen as representative case studies because they appeared to attract different kinds of migrants. The two areas were chosen as the main loci of this study because of the differences in human and social capital endowments as well as the migration strategies that migrants used to travel to these countries. In short, the two areas were selected because of their contrastive populace of migrants. These differences are evident in terms of educational and professional qualifications, levels of financial capital and histories of transnational circulation. Historically, Zimbabweans have ‘circulated’ between their home and South Africa, where they worked on the farms and in mines. Limpopo’s close proximity to Zimbabwe and the porous border between the two countries together promote circulation. In a similar vein, Roberts et al (1999) have argued that the extensive and hard to manage border between Mexico and the USA encourages circulation because the two countries are at different stages of economic development.

Previous works have suggested that migration to South Africa is dominated by low skilled migrants drawn from the border areas such as the Chiredzi, Beitbridge, Filabusi and Mwenezi districts etc (Kanyenze, 2004; Zinyama, 1990, 2002). However, recent changes have been noted in terms of migrants’ age, gender, academic history, and in terms of the movement of whole families rather than
breadwinners alone. These changes demonstrate the novelty and extraordinariness of the migration waves witnessed from the mid-1990s to 2010, which have differed from previous ones because of their intensity, scale and diversity.

Leeds, on the other hand, has attracted a quite different type of migrant, one who can afford the expensive airfares. This suggests that these migrants have higher levels of social, financial and educational capital than those found in Limpopo. However, such an interpretation is both misleading and an inaccurate reflection of the migration dynamics of the past 15 years, wherein Zimbabwe has damaged its human capital and therein sequestered it to foreign countries. Weaker social traditional bonds have been identified as fuelling the emigration of skilled professionals (Granovetter, 1973). The recruitment of Zimbabwean health and social care professionals by the National Health Service (NHS) and British local authorities (beginning in 1998) has further promoted the exploitation of these weak ties and thus increased levels of emigration.

Previously migration to South Africa and the UK was largely temporary and was dominated by males who engaged in ‘circular’ migration (Rutherford, 2011). Zimbabwean migration to South Africa and the UK is steeped in international history. Different historical antecedents have helped shape these migration waves, such as the Mfecane and WENELA labour movements, the 1970s liberation war, the Gukurahundi of the early 1980s, the movement of professionals escaping from the after-effects of the World Bank instigated Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in the mid-1990s, and the exodus which accompanied Zimbabwean economic collapse in the new millennium. However, current migration patterns depict a shift from temporary to permanent migration between Zimbabwe, South Africa and the UK, thereby signifying a new pattern of migration giving rise to Zimbabwe’s transnational migrant communities (Kearney, 1995; Goldring, 1998; Guarnizo and Smith, 1998). The growing permanence of migration and increased transnational practices in the Zimbabwean context, are under-researched phenomena, a genuine knowledge gap which this study seeks to fill.

3 Mfecane is associated with the rise of the Zulu Kingdom under Tshaka which led to the movement of other ethnic groups like the Ndebele, Shangaan, Tonga, Lozi etc northwards into what is now modern day Zimbabwe and Zambia

4 WENELA – the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association was a recruitment agency that was created in South Africa in 1897 and had exclusive rights to labour recruitment in the entire Southern African region where it offices in every country e.g. Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi etc.

5 The concept of Gukurahundi originates from the Shona peasant population which translates into ‘the rain that washes away the chaff’ and is generally used to refer to the deaths of over 20,000 people in the Matebeleland and Midlands Provinces during the political disturbances of 1982 to 1987. These disturbances followed an insurrection that started at Enthumbane Army Barracks in Bulawayo in February 1982 when some members of the former Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) rebelled against the army leadership. President Mugabe who was then the country’s Prime Minister, responded by sending the North Korean trained 5th Brigade to quell the rebellion. It is widely reported that the 5th Brigade indiscriminately killed civilians with the death toll alleged to be over 20,000 which President Mugabe and his ZANU (PF) party disputes.
1.5 Major contributions

The study makes a significant empirical contribution to literature about hard to reach Zimbabwean groups living in South Africa and the UK. By focusing on the lived experiences of a cross section (legal, illegal and undocumented migrants) of the Zimbabwean populace in Limpopo and Leeds, the study sheds light into mechanics of emigration from Zimbabwe to these two countries. These special insights into migrants’ experiences have been elicited by privileging their voices and perspectives in order to draw conclusions about their transnational lifestyles. The study thus contributes to current debates regarding international skilled and non-professional migration by providing context to the migration patterns which proceeded from the Zimbabwean crisis. Zimbabwe is an interesting case of emigration because the migratory patterns have been both economic and political; this resonates with scholarly opinion as to the difficulties inherent in pigeon-holing migrants as either economic migrants or political refugees (Bloch, 2006; UNCHR, 2004).

Secondly, despite the existence of a significant number of Zimbabweans in South Africa and the UK, very few comparative studies have been undertaken to explore similarities and differences between Zimbabwe’s key diaspora communities (Bloch, 2006). The comparative nature of the study between two contrasting and interrelated migration flows from Zimbabwe to South Africa and the UK makes it novel. By comparing migrants in these two countries which are at different levels of socio-economic and political development, a richer picture of migrants’ lives emerges which shape their interactions with those at home. This study includes both skilled and non-skilled workers, in order to obtain a broader and more holistic insight into the Zimbabwean diaspora groups in South Africa and the UK. This study addresses a critical gap in the literature by examining the views of both skilled and unskilled migrants in South Africa and the UK.

Thirdly, the study deepens our understanding of the diaspora through the development of the six pronged taxonomy i.e. enthusiastic, reluctant, ambivalent, clandestine, fearful and ephemeral diaspora. This typology captures the categories of migrants in South Africa and the UK engendered by a range of factors such as immigration status, gender, education, class etc. The fluidity of these categories further contributes to our understanding of the diaspora as experienced by migrants. The taxonomy, coupled with migrants’ transnational diasporic politics adds to existing literature on the nexus between diaspora and homeland politics.

Fourthly, the study contributes to academic and policy debates on return migration, circulation and re-integration of migrants in their home countries. This is critical as there has been no in-depth study of the return intentions of Zimbabweans domiciled in South Africa and the UK since the dawn of the new millennium. Previous studies have investigated the return intentions of Pakistani migrants living in the British city of Bradford (Anwar, 1979); Caribbean (Duval, 2004; Potter et al., 2005), Salvadorans
and Guatemalans in the USA (Moran-Taylor and Menjivar, 2005) and Mexicans in the USA (Borjas and Bratsberg, 1996; Constant and Massey, 2003). Such a study is pertinent given the extent to which Zimbabwe haemorrhaged her human capital during the crisis and the economic and political developments which are unfolding in the country.

1.6 Thesis structure

Migration is a highly contentious topic which has been explained from both economic and social perspectives (Massey et al., 1993; Borjas, 1990). The causes of migration are steeped in both contemporary and historical factors. It is against this temporally fused background that Chapter 2 begins with a brief overview of Zimbabwe, concentrating on the periods just before and just after the attainment of independence. The period before independence was characterised by high outflows due to the liberation war. Emigration prior to independence was largely multi-racial, with both black and white people exiting the country to escape from the intensifying war, while after independence white people continued to leave due to uncertainty over the policies which the socialist government of Prime Minister Robert Mugabe was intending to pursue. The Chapter considers these factors and conveys events which climaxed in the mass exodus of Zimbabweans between 2000 and 2008. It chronicles the eight migration episodes which dominated the migration process during this period. These episodes arose from a combination of socio-economic and political decisions which had a devastating effect on the economic and political landscape of the country.

Chapter 3 looks into the emerging transnationalism discourse in migration research and draws on this to inform the research as a theoretical framework to explain the international migration. The chapter examines the utility of these concepts in explaining international migration. This chapter is also concerned about general theories of migration and it relates to them in their broadest sense as an attempt to explain the emigration of Zimbabweans. Other areas of concern in this chapter are the concepts of diaspora, social capital, remittance and development and return migration.

Chapter 4 sets out the mixed methods approach in this research in an endeavour to reach as many and as diverse migrant groups as possible. The questionnaire survey was used to generate a sample of participants and was then followed by semi-structured interviews which sought to honour the participants’ own voices. The chapter argues the case for this methodology against the backdrop of the difficulties inherent in researching ‘hard to reach’ groups such as undocumented migrants and asylum seekers.

Chapter 5 explores the reasons behind the decisions taken by many to exit Zimbabwe. It analyses the migrants’ choices of destinations. The Chapter is
concerned about the deterioration in the country’s socio-economic, political and environmental fabric which has hastened departure from Zimbabwe. It presents testimonies of migrants about their journeys from Zimbabwe and sojourns in other countries and how they have drifted in and out of different statuses as they have continued to mediate their lives away from home.

Chapter 6 critically examines the experiences of Zimbabweans in Leeds and Limpopo. It is about their experiences of life in their host countries and what they perceive as being constraints on their agency. It focussed on how the diaspora has enabled, impeded or promoted the status quo in so far as social mobility is concerned. The chapter draws on the migrants’ narratives of their experiences in Leeds and Limpopo to gain an insight of life in the diaspora and whether it matches what they envisaged. A typology of the Zimbabwean diaspora is discussed which allows for a comprehensive analysis of the Zimbabwean communities in Leeds and Limpopo.

Chapter 7 considers the transnational linkages and activities that migrants are engaged in. The advent and proliferation of ICTs has opened new avenues through which news is disseminated and shared. It has opened a new front through which Zimbabweans in the diaspora can become more involved in events in Zimbabwe. The transnational activities of migrants are manifold and complex and they are undertaken for a variety of reasons. This chapter captures the various transnational practices of the sampled migrants and the various mediums through which these take place. It delineates the complex and highly sensitive nexus between asylum and homeland-immigrant politics.

Return migration is considered by some scholars as the final ‘chapter’ of the migration process. The subject of return migration is pertinent to Zimbabwe because of the human capital that Zimbabwe sequestered during the crisis, which has the potential to help in rebuilding the country given the relative stability now prevailing there. Chapter 8 discusses the factors that promote or hinder migrants’ return intentions. The formation of the inclusive government in February 2009 was considered to be a highly significant event. It is not only seen as having halted the economic and political problems that were plaguing the country, but also as initiating a wave of return migration. Indeed, the xenophobic attacks which gripped South Africa in 2009 resulted in significant flows back to Zimbabwe. However, evidence on the ground suggests that far from witnessing a stampede back to Zimbabwe, the country continues to sequester its human capital. This chapter will explore the migrants’ own understandings and interpretations of return mobility as well as unravelling the inclusive government’s policies regarding its citizens abroad.

Finally, Chapter 9 concludes the thesis by offering a summary of the findings and how they relate to the study’s original aims and objectives. It pulls together the different facets of the research and considers the academic and methodological
contributions and wider implications of the research, together with any gaps that merit further scholarly research.
Chapter 2  Zimbabwe: Independence and the emergence of a nascent diaspora

2.1  Introduction

This chapter discusses and highlights the major developments in Zimbabwe before and after its independence in order to contextualise the different migration practices of its citizens (Table 2.1). This is important because one of the central thrusts of this study is to explore the differences in human and social capital between migrants in the two study areas, and the implications of these on their intentions to return. These differences are connected to the policies and events immediately prior to and after independence. This approach is critical in understanding the country’s calamitous socio-economic collapse, which led to the emigration of a quarter of its population to countries within the region and beyond in a series of migration episodes (Crush and Tevera, 2010; McGregor, 2008; Pasura, 2008). The chapter charts the country’s emergence as an independent and sovereign nation before mapping its progress as it lurched from one crisis to another. These crises contributed towards the formation of the country’s nascent diaspora as some of the migrants who left did not return home while others engaged in circulation.

A series of crises have led to outflows of Zimbabweans to South Africa, the UK and other countries. These include the violence of the early 1980s in Matebeleland and the Midlands provinces; the unsustainable debt crisis which pre-empted the introduction of ESAP, the deleterious effects of ESAP (such as high costs of leaving, job losses and unemployment) the payment of gratuities to liberation war veterans in November 1997, the military adventure in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the rejection of the draft constitution in February 2000 resulting in an upsurge of political violence, and the invasion of commercial farms and concomitant destruction of agriculture. These historic moments have all combined to provoke different migration waves to South Africa and the UK.

The proceeding section justifies the chosen location of the research project in the light of other studies involving Zimbabwean migrants undertaken in South Africa and the UK. Migration episodes (Table 2.2) experienced since independence help shed more light on the emergence of diasporic communities in South Africa and the UK. This chapter, therefore, provides deeper insights into the migrant groups who are the focus of this study. The lives of this diasporic community have, as will be seen in Chapters 5 to 8, been shaped by events that occurred in the period shortly before and after independence. Indeed, the majority of the study participants in Limpopo are ‘born frees’, that is, they were born after the country attained its independence from

---

6 I use the term nascent to describe the Zimbabwean diaspora because in comparison with other diasporas, it is a relatively young one having started in earnest in the late 1990s when the country started experiencing socio-economic and political problems. Prior to that Zimbabweans tended to return home after spending brief periods working or studying away from home.
minority white rule in 1980, and a large segment of those in Leeds benefited from the new government’s education drive (see Figure 5.6). The independent government of the then Prime Minister Robert Mugabe embarked on expansionary education policies partly to redress skewed colonial educational policies and partly to fulfil its socialist policies. The networks that the current crop of migrants relied on to make the UK and South Africa home were sown during the tumultuous period of the pre and post independence era. This chapter explores the roots of the crisis, how these crises manifested, thus providing the background for rest of the study.
Table 2.1  Timeline of major events in Zimbabwe 1960-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Milestone Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>• ZANU formed and constituted into a guerrilla movement advocating for an armed struggle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>• Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) by the Rhodesian Front led by Ian Douglas Smith</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>• Liberation war intensifies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>• Geneva Convention peace talks between the nationalists and Rhodesian Front fails</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1978           | • Bishop Abel Muzorewa elected Prime Minister of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. Elections boycotted by ZANU (PF) and PF - ZAPU.  
                • New government not internationally recognized. |
| 1979           | • Lancaster House Conference – ceasefire signed between the warring parties  
                • Land reform framework adopted  
                • War ends |
| 1980           | • Independence,  
                • Robert Mugabe becomes Prime Minister and pronounces a reconciliation policy.  
                • PF – ZAPU and Rhodesian Front members co-opted into new independent government |
| 1982           | • Political violence and banditry activities break out,  
                • Joshua Nkomo and other ministers from PF - ZAPU dismissed from cabinet.  
                • Government deploys the North Korean trained 5th Brigade to Matebeleland and Midlands provinces  
                • Approximately 20,000 Ndebele speaking people killed |
| 1987           | • Unity Accord signed, Mugabe becomes Executive President,  
                • Joshua Nkomo and Simon Muzenda become Deputy Presidents |
| 1990           | • Inception of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme  
                • International framework for funding land reform re-defined |
<p>| 1997           | • Zimbabwean dollar crashes after the government awards unbudgeted for gratuities to the over 50,000 veterans of the liberation war |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1998 | - Svosve people in Marondera district, Mashonaland East Province invade Igava Farm  
- President Mugabe deploys the Zimbabwean National Army in the Democratic Republic of Congo  
- International Land Donors Conference held in Harare |
| 1999 | - A 395 member Constitutional Commission appointed by President Mugabe  
- Outreach programme to gather people’s views undertaken  
- MDC formed with Morgan Tsvangirai, a trade unionist at the helm |
| 2000 | - Government sponsored draft constitution defeated;  
- MDC and its partners campaign against the draft constitution  
- Land invasions intensify; government launches the ‘Fast Track Land Reform Programme’ in June 2000;  
- ZANU (PF) narrowly defeats MDC in the parliamentary elections |
| 2002 | - President Mugabe re-elected after defeating Morgan Tsvangirai; |
| 2005 | - Operation Murambatsvina,  
- Over 2,1 million people lose their livelihoods  
- Parliamentary, senatorial and presidential elections held, President Mugabe and ZANU (PF) win  
- MDC splits into two factions, led by Morgan Tsvangirai and Welshman Ncube |
| 2006-2008 | - Hyperinflation |
| 2008 | - Harmonised presidential and parliamentary elections,  
- Morgan Tsvangirai defeats President Mugabe but fails to win an outright majority  
- Presidential run-off characterised by violence,  
- Tsvangirai withdraws,  
- Mugabe conducts a one man poll and declares himself the winner |
| 2009 | - Formation of coalition government with Robert Mugabe as President and  
- Morgan Tsvangirai as Prime Minister |

**Source:** Raftopoulos and Mlambo (2009); Martin and Johnson (1981)
2.2 Contemporary emigration from Zimbabwe – 1975-2010

This study argues that there have been eight episodes of emigration from Zimbabwe between 1975 and 2010 (Table 2.2). This differs from findings of previous studies (Pasura, 2008; Zinyama, 2002). The differences could be ascribed to several factors including the devastating socio-economic and political catastrophes which befell Zimbabwe since 2000. The mixed flows that characterised the post 2000 exodus also helps to account for these differences as migration ceased to be associated with low skilled migrants who tended to circulate between Zimbabwe and South Africa but included professionals and skilled migrants. Permanency was a characteristic feature of this 'new' migration which differentiates it from previous migration which was largely circular. These waves were driven by different factors and comprised of mixed flows. This explains the existence of skilled alongside unskilled migrants, asylum seekers and students in South Africa and the UK. These differences also denote the human, economic and social endowments of the migrants.

For the sake of consistency with the participants' lexicon, London is used interchangeably with the UK, Britain and England. London is described as having a levelling effect by migrants due to the existence of opportunities that some migrants tapped to achieve social mobility. London is seen by migrants as offering hope for the future and a break with the past that stifled migrants' upward mobility due to structural constraints which existed at home. The same applies to Johannesburg in terms of it being used to refer to South Africa writ large. The study uses the term diaspora to refer to any Zimbabweans living away from home in South Africa, the UK or other countries with a high concentration of Zimbabwean migrants.
Table 2.2  Migration episodes from Zimbabwe to South Africa and the UK 1975-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Migration Wave</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>South Africa</th>
<th>UK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975-1982</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>• Intensifying liberation war</td>
<td>• Labour migration dominated by people from</td>
<td>• White Rhodesians</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• WENELA programme</td>
<td>bordering areas e.g. Chiredzi</td>
<td>• Higher education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Higher education</td>
<td>• Refugees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982-1987</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>• Gukurahundi</td>
<td>• Gukurahundi victims</td>
<td>• Scholarships</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Labour migration</td>
<td>• Gukurahundi victims</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-1997</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>• ESAP</td>
<td>• Professionals</td>
<td>• Doctors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Rising unemployment</td>
<td>• Unskilled migration</td>
<td>• Skilled professionals</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Rising prices of goods and services</td>
<td>• Expelled university students</td>
<td>• Expelled students</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Public sector strikes</td>
<td>• Dismissed professors</td>
<td>• Dispossessed farmers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Strikes by university and lecturers students</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997-2000</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>• Constitutional Commission Referendum</td>
<td>• Skilled</td>
<td>• Nurse education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Formation of MDC</td>
<td>• Unskilled</td>
<td>• Target savers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Invasion of commercial farms</td>
<td>• Cross border traders</td>
<td>• Dispossessed farmers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Deployment of soldiers to Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period</td>
<td>Events</td>
<td>Skilled</td>
<td>Unskilled</td>
<td>Dispossessed Farmers</td>
<td>Higher Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-2002</td>
<td>• Crash of the Zimbabwean dollar</td>
<td>• Skilled</td>
<td>• Unskilled</td>
<td>• Dispossessed</td>
<td>• Higher education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Black market and falling value of the Zimbabwean dollar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>farmers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Intensification of land invasions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Political violence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Parliamentary elections</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Presidential elections</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003-2007</td>
<td>• Economic decline Operation Murambatsvina</td>
<td>• Skilled</td>
<td>• Unskilled</td>
<td>• Dispossessed</td>
<td>• Higher education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Loss of livelihoods</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>farmers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Bank and bureau de change closures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Presidential and parliamentary elections</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-2010</td>
<td>• Hyper inflation</td>
<td>• Zimbabweans</td>
<td>• High profile</td>
<td>• Zimbabweans</td>
<td>• Visa over-stayers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Collapse of public services e.g. health</td>
<td>from all walks of</td>
<td>politicians and</td>
<td>from all walks of</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Cholera outbreak</td>
<td>life</td>
<td>business people</td>
<td>life</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Political violence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Harmonised presidential, parliamentary and local government elections</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-2010</td>
<td>• Economic collapse</td>
<td>• Zimbabweans</td>
<td>• Visa over-stayers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Political violence</td>
<td>from all walks of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>life</td>
<td>Visitors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.2.1 The First Episode of Emigration: turmoil and tenacity

The intense fighting that accompanied the liberation war in the 1970s saw a significant outflow of white Rhodesians as they attempted to escape the ravages of the war. Black people also moved out to seek refuge in neighbouring countries, and for higher education in countries such as the UK, thereby laying the roots of the contemporary Zimbabwean diaspora as some of them did not return following the cessation of hostilities in 1980. The attainment of independence from colonial rule in April 1980 did not stop the outflow of white people. Despite the incoming government of Prime Minister Robert Mugabe pursuing a reconciliation policy, this did not abate white emigration. I consider both the inflows and outflows prior to and shortly after independence to constitute the first migration episode (Table 2.2). This is differentiated from the rest of the migration waves by its multi-racial nature that moved to different destinations (Zinyama, 2002). It is estimated that about 100 000 whites emigrated from Zimbabwe during the first few years of independence, the majority of whom are settled in South Africa (Uusihakala, 2008), while Australia, the UK, Canada and New Zealand attracted a sizeable number (Chikanda, 2010).

Some scholars (Kanyenze, 2004; Mlambo, 2010; Zinyama, 2002) have sought to attribute the pre-independence migration of black Zimbabweans to South Africa to the contract labour system which was used to recruit labour to South Africa in order to ameliorate the acute shortages that were being experienced in the gold mines and farms. Migration to South Africa from Zimbabwe has long been associated with unskilled people who were needed to provide cheap labour in the mines and farms (Crush, 2005). The WENELA scheme helped forge and strengthen the historic ties between Zimbabwe and South Africa which have been of enduring significance. The enduring nature of this phenomenon is exemplified by the continued flow of Zimbabwean migrants to South Africa where they provide low waged labour on the farms, construction sites etc (Muzondidya, 20008; Rutherford, 2011). Economically, South Africa is Zimbabwe’s largest trading partner with Zimbabwean exports totalling 2.9 billion Rands while imports stood at 14.5 billion Rands in 2011 (Mashonganyika and Latham, 2012).

Historical and colonial ties opened up channels of communication between the centre and the periphery, provided knowledge and awareness of untapped opportunities available in the UK and South Africa (Robinson, 1986), and transformed the aspirations of many Zimbabweans. The majority of black people who partook in this migration episode were from the dry agro-ecological regions of Matebeleland and Masvingo Provinces which lay on the border (see Figure 2.1).

---

7 This thesis describes Rhodesians as white people who elected to leave Zimbabwe prior to and shortly after independence because of their opposition to an independent black led government. Some emigrated because they were unsure of the policies that the government of the then Prime Minister Robert Mugabe was going to pursue given the socialist rhetoric it was espousing.
The events that were to unfold were to fundamentally alter this migration trend; this will be demonstrated in the analysis chapters (Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8). Thus, while white Rhodesians exited the country due to the security fears and uncertainties engendered by the prospect of a socialist government, black Zimbabweans moved to South Africa in search of employment, refuge and educational purposes. Zimbabweans living in areas bordering South Africa continued with their circulatory practices after the dawn of independence. It can be argued that for these people, independence did not have a bearing on their perception of migration as a livelihood strategy.
The pursuit of higher education also accounted for emigration during this period. Students expelled from the then University of Rhodesia for their political activism in the 1970s won scholarships to pursue higher education in South Africa and the UK (Mlambo, 1995). For example, a significant number of senior government officials, including ministers, obtained their degrees at South African and British universities. The independent government actively promoted emigration for higher education purposes. Students were sent to study in South Africa, the UK and former Eastern bloc countries like East Germany and USSR, to replenish the depleted human resource base (Chung and Ngara, 1985). This loss is demonstrated by 19,300 white skilled and professional workers emigrating to Australia, the UK, Canada and South Africa between 1980 and 1983 (Mlambo, 2009). Temporary emigration for higher education purposes was encouraged by the independence government in order to address the skills gap caused by the emigration of white Rhodesians who held civil service positions prior to independence.

The relative peace between 1980 and 1982 led Raftopoulos (2004:4) to characterise the period as ‘years of restoration and hope.’ The outbreak of political disturbances in 1982 was to change the complexity and intensity of emigration from Matebeleland and Midlands’ provinces (see Figure 2.1). Whereas, these provinces had provided the bulk of migrants to South Africa by virtue of proximity and sharing similar cultural traits including the Ndebele language with the Nguni people of South Africa, the outbreak of political violence fundamentally altered the gender and age of migrants who moved.

2.2.2 The Second Episode: Gukurahundi and the involuntary emigration of the Ndebele people

For Masunungure (2006), Zimbabwe’s politics, like its society, is polarised and fractured along ethnic lines, between the majority Shona-oriented groups who are mostly found in the north, east and southern parts of the country and the minority Ndebele-oriented groups that inhabit in the western, south west and north western parts of the country. Masunungure argues that ethnic tensions had stalked the country since its colonisation in September 1890, causing a societal bifurcation. However, this idea of two nations can be challenged by the heterogeneity exemplified by the cosmopolitan nature of Zimbabwean population i.e. comprised of white minority settlers and the black majority. The tranquillity brought by independence, and any pretences of a newly homogenised nation, were shattered in 1982 when hostilities broke between the different military wings that had been integrated into the Zimbabwe National Army\(^8\) (ZNA) culminating in a period of political instability characterised by violence against the minority Ndebele people by the North Korean trained 5th Brigade that was deployed to Matebeleland provinces to

\(^8\) ZNA was created in 1980 as a unified army comprising of the ZANLA and ZIPRA guerrillas and Rhodesian Front soldiers who had fought on opposite sides during the liberation war. This attempt failed resulting in the outbreak of violent clashes pitting ZANLA and ZIPRA members soon after independence.
quell the insurrection. This mutiny in the armed forces pitted members of the former Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA\(^9\)) against those of Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA\(^{10}\)) and resulted in the state acting violently toward civilians (most of them Ndebele) in the Midlands and Matebeleland provinces accused of harbouring dissidents. This violence became a significant driver of the emergence of the Zimbabwean diaspora in both South Africa and the UK.

This protracted violence was only halted by the signing of the Unity Accord in December 1987 during which Joshua Nkomo effectively dissolved ZAPU to join ZANU (PF) (Tendi, 2011). The violence is estimated to have led to the death of 20,000 people in the Matebeleland and Midlands provinces (Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP), 2007; Solidarity Peace Trust (SPT), 2004). The violence resulted in increased emigration from Matebeleland and Midlands provinces, which bore the brunt of the disturbances. South Africa attracted a large contingent of fleeing Ndebele people due to their close cultural ties with the Nguni people of South Africa (Gatsheni-Ndhlovu, 2009).

Scholars such as Maphosa (2007) have highlighted the long history of migration between the two countries. This is evidenced by the work of Crush (2003) who found out that 23% of the Zimbabwean adult population have migrated to South Africa and 24% had parents who had been to South Africa, and a further 23% had grandparents who had been to South Africa. As Kanyenze (2004) argues, the discontinuation of the WENELA system at independence in 1980 did not stop Zimbabweans from trekking southwards in search of employment. Whilst the regional countries were popular with the majority of the Ndebele people, others with higher capital (social, educational and financial) endowments looked to more distant countries such as the UK. As will be demonstrated in Chapters 5-8, some migrants interviewed in Leeds were victims of this war who arrived in the mid 1980s. Such migrants played key roles for the later group of migrants as they provided the much needed bonding and bridging capital.

There were different flows within this migration wave: those with superior human and financial capital moved to distant countries like the UK and USA, and those with limited skills trekked to Botswana and South Africa where they had social networks (Maphosa, 2007). This episode of migration to South Africa was male dominated (Muzondidya and Gatsheni-Ndhlovu, 2007; Maphosa, 2011; Pasura, 2008). The dominance of young male adults is accounted for by the persecution that they were suffering at the hands of the notorious 5\textsuperscript{th} Brigade, the North Korean trained soldiers who were deployed to the Matebeleland and Midlands provinces to quell the

\(^9\) ZANLA was the Zimbabwe African National Union’s (ZANU) military wing which was initially led by Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole who was later replaced by Robert Mugabe in the 1970s. The majority of its supporters were Shona.

\(^{10}\) ZIPRA was the military wing of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) led by Joshua Nkomo. The majority of its supporters were Ndebele.
rebellion. Young adults were targeted because of suspicions that they supported the dissidents.

The gender dynamic of migration changed over time due to the worsening brutality of the soldiers who progressively were indiscriminately killing civilians, including women and children (CCJP, 2007; Research and Advocacy Unit (RAU), 2000; SPT, 2004), prompting the emigration of women and children. As Masunungure (2006) claims, despite the cessation of the hostilities, violence remains a potent weapon in President Mugabe’s armoury, there to deal with perceived and real enemies of ZANU (PF). His claim appears to have been vindicated by the violence that President Mugabe has used to crush dissent as witnessed by the unprecedented violence that he unleashed on perceived opposition supporters during the 2008 presidential run-off election.

The cessation of hostilities after the signing of the Unity Accord between President Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo in December 1987 brought much needed peace but not development, especially for Matebeleland and other provinces outside the Mashonaland (Alexander, 2006; Maphosa, 2007). While the peace brought by the unity accord was welcome, the euphoria which greeted it was to be extinguished by the news that the economy was struggling. It had started showing signs of distress by the mid 1980s despite being bankrolled by international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and multi-lateral agencies. This was to culminate in the adoption of Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) which, as will be seen in the next section, led to another migration episode.

2.2.3 Third Episode: ESAP and the flight of skilled professionals

Economic and political upheavals are known to cause migration (Castles, 2000). The government introduced ESAP in 1990 to inject life in an ailing and faltering economy at the instigation of the World Bank (Mlambo, 1997). ESAP was accompanied by swingeing cuts to the public sector resulting in massive redundancies and the introduction of cost recovery mechanisms such as user fees in schools and hospitals. The economic hardships that followed the introduction of ESAP in 1990 were a key driver of emigration to countries like South Africa and Botswana. ESAP had a disproportionate impact on the poor, which exacerbated inequalities with society. Squeezed out of the job market, a significant number of Zimbabweans left the country. Some scholars have cited ESAP as the turning point in Zimbabwe’s political and economic fortunes (Gaidzanwa, 1999; Mlambo, 2010).

It is likely that the migration of skilled professionals was more visible because their departure was more noticeable than that of unskilled people. What ESAP brought to light was that skilled professionals were not immune to the economic difficulties of the nation. The by-products of ESAP were a dramatic fall and erosion of disposable incomes of the middle class, such as nurses, teachers, and doctors, which prompted
Gaidzanwa (1999) to assert that it hastened their departure to regional countries like Botswana and South Africa and more distant countries like the UK. The introduction of ESAP marked the beginning of relentless strikes by public and private sector personnel (Gaidzanwa, 1999; Kanyenze, 2004). The strikes can be considered responses to ESAP’s failure/negative effects.

While unemployment was already unsustainably high prior to the introduction of ESAP, its inception had a debilitating effect on the socio-economic fabric of society (Bond and Manyanya, 2003). People were suddenly exposed to the harsh economic difficulties brought about by ESAP’s introduction. For example, the cost of living increased dramatically due to rising inflation and soaring interest rates. Real wages, according to the government’s own Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare (1995) declined in real terms. Furthermore, the anticipated growth in the private sector which was expected to absorb the surplus labour shed from the public sector did not materialise, this added pressure on the safety nets that had been created to cushion the impact of ESAP (Kanyenze, 2004).

There is a corpus of scholarly literature which documents the negative repercussions of ESAP on vulnerable people such as pensioners and children (Mutisi and Bourdillon, 2000). In order to provide for their families, both skilled and non-skilled Zimbabweans considered emigration thereby triggering the third migration episode in which professionals featured prominently as they moved to regional countries. The health sector bore the brunt of this emigration as evidenced by a high vacancy rate in the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare, which had soared to 30% by 1997 (Chikanda, 2010). The departures witnessed in the 1990s were a precursor to the mass exodus which began at beginning of the new millennium, when an estimated 2-3 million Zimbabweans emigrated (Makina, 2007; SIRDC, 2003). As will be demonstrated in Chapter 5, some migrants who left Zimbabwe during this period used South Africa and other regional countries as springboards for further migration to the UK.

While the introduction of ESAP had a negative impact on the Zimbabwean economy, its decline was exacerbated by the events which began in November 1997. On the 14th of November 1997, President Mugabe capitulated to demands for compensation by 50,000 war veterans for their participation in the 1970s liberation war. Each war veteran received a one off payment of Z$50,000 and a Z$2,000 monthly pension. This decision sent the economy into a tailspin from which it has never recovered (Bloch, 2006; McGregor, 20079), and further encouraged emigration.
2.2.4 The Fourth Episode: Health and social care: new opportunities, new frontiers

Faced with a growing shortage of health and social care staff to care for an ageing population, the incoming UK Labour government of Prime Minister Tony Blair embarked on a two-pronged approach: to train its own staff, and to launch an aggressive recruitment campaign in developing countries (Dyson, 2003). This opened up nursing education to people from the Commonwealth and provided free bursaries until 2002 in order to attract people to the profession. The provision of free bursaries to study nursing was a welcome development for Zimbabweans who could not qualify to enrol in the local universities. Young people and adults who had failed to enter local universities and tertiary colleges due to the competitive nature of education in Zimbabwe jumped at the chance of studying in the UK (Ranger, 2005).

This migration wave was dominated by young school leavers who had completed their ‘O’ and ‘A’ Levels. As news of the existence of scholarships filtered through the country, gainfully employed adults were attracted and took the opportunity to switch careers. The chance to study in the UK presented jobless young people and adults a ‘once-in-a-lifetime’ opportunity (Dyson, 2003). However, the exorbitant airfares needed to travel to the UK deterred people from poor backgrounds. Conversely, people from middle and upper classes and those with social networks already in the UK, who helped finance their travel, were attracted to the opportunities.

The fourth migration episode appeared to have been gender neutral and challenged the prevailing feminisation of care in Zimbabwe. Nursing has historically been considered a female profession due to the gendered division of labour. Like in the UK where in 1997 almost 91% of nurses were female (UK Central Council, 1998), nursing in Zimbabwe is highly feminised (Chikanda, 2006; Gaidzanwa, 1999). However, the prospect of studying in the UK appears to have induced males to consider joining the profession. This should be considered against the backdrop of rising unemployment in the country, although this alone cannot account for the sudden interest that studying in the UK created. It is likely that the scholarships offered a way out of the worsening economic conditions in the country. It also offered the opportunity of further education for young people and adults with low grades (Ranger, 2005).

Zimbabwe was a fertile ground for both strategies given its respected educational policy. Parallel to the emigration of nursing students was the emergence of the UK as a possible destination for medical professionals who had previously settled in Botswana and South Africa (Chikanda, 2010; Gaidzanwa, 1999) due to their close proximity to home and the existence of social networks. However, this trend changed in 1998 when the UK became the preferred choice for medical professionals due to rising demand for qualified health professionals, and better working conditions and remuneration (Pasura, 2008; Tinarwo, 2011). This coincided with a policy of the
British Labour government in 1998 to recruit skilled overseas workers to augment critical shortages that were being experienced in sectors such as health and social care (Modood and Salt, 2011). These professionals relied on weak ties as a mode of entry in to the UK (Poros, 2008; Granovetter, 1973).

Scholars such as Bach (2003) and Muula and Maseko (2006) argue that migration of skilled health personnel is primarily a response to globally uneven development manifested in low wages, few incentives, poor working conditions, poor promotion possibilities, inadequate management support, heavy workloads, limited access to good technology and medicines. The chance to earn decent wages in the UK was an inducement that the pauperised Zimbabwean health and social care personnel could not turn down. Recruitment agencies launched forays into Zimbabwe to help alleviate the critical shortage at home. The recruitment agencies, local authorities and the NHS had a significant role in attracting Zimbabwean professionals; in one recent study, 41% of all migrant nurses in the UK had come primarily because they had been recruited (Winkelmann-Gleed, 2006: 44). Thus, the fourth migration episode was not only driven by passive awareness but by active recruitment thereby differentiating it from the previous migration waves discussed earlier. As Poros (2008) explains, employers lower their transaction costs once they recruit labour from overseas by relying on the recruited migrants to informally recruit family, friends and community members to live and work with them.

As the economic performance worsened, ordinary Zimbabweans were compelled to consider emigrating. Information gleaned from the Nursing and Midwifery Council (UK) show a steady increase in the registration of Zimbabwean nurses beginning in 1997, peaking in 2002/2003 before falling when general nursing was removed from the Skills Shortage Occupational listing in 2006 by the Home Office (Table 2.3). The available statistics vary; some authors estimate that in 2002, there were 18,000 Zimbabwean nurses working abroad (Mangwende, cited in Pang et al., 2002).

Table 2.3 Number of Zimbabwean nurses registered with NMC per year – 1998-2008.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yr</th>
<th>98/99</th>
<th>99/00</th>
<th>00/01</th>
<th>01/02</th>
<th>02/03</th>
<th>03/04</th>
<th>04/05</th>
<th>05/06</th>
<th>06/07</th>
<th>07/08</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Nursing and Midwifery Council (2009)

The outflow of skilled professionals from Zimbabwe and other developing countries inevitably led to growing choruses of ‘brain drain’ (Faini, 2007) while others consider it as ‘brain gain’ and ‘brain circulation’ (Robertson, 2006). This emigration of health and social care professionals was anchored by cultural capital which Castells (2002) describe as knowledge of other societies and the opportunities they offer, as well as information about how to actually go about moving and seeking work elsewhere.
Some medical professionals had experience of migration having initially moved to South Africa and Botswana during the early 1990s before relocating to countries such as the UK. Such migrants provided the much needed cultural capital for others still at home who were contemplating leaving.

The migration of skilled professionals, similar to that of non-professionals, was aided and sustained by the existence of social networks (Maphosa, 2007). Gaidzanwa’s (1999:47) study of the emigration of health professionals to Botswana and South Africa in the 1990s shows the importance of these networks by revealing,

‘a very active grapevine about job possibilities in South Africa which saw doctors arranging references for their colleagues and keeping them informed about job opportunities in specific institutions as they arose.’

It can be argued that this migration wave also coincided with signs of a growing shortage of nurses in the UK which attracted some professionals to move there. However, the majority of the professionals still preferred to work in the region as they hoped for stability at home.

Like the migration waves which preceded it, this wave was dominated by earners while the spouses remained in the country. Migration was seen as temporary, as a means of cushioning the family from the economic shocks induced by ESAP. The spouses therefore remained in Zimbabwe, caring for their families (Gaidzanwa, 1999). This differed from the other waves of migration which followed, such as that of nursing students to the UK detailed in the next section.

These problems arose in an environment which was largely peaceful and where property rights were respected. However, as Section 2.2.5 demonstrates, this was soon to change following the government sponsored draft constitution in February 2000. The defeat saw the government supporting the violent invasion of commercial farms which resulted in the destruction of commercial agriculture which was the backbone of the economy. The violence that accompanied the farm invasions caused significant emigration.

2.2.5 The Fifth Episode: Land reform and the demise of agriculture

The Zimbabwean economy prospered because of commercial farming (Dashwood, 2000) which was the country’s biggest employer with over 2.5 million workers (Commercial Farmers’ Union (CFU), 2000; Moyo et al., 1995). The successes of Zimbabwean agriculture saw the country being labelled as the ‘bread basket’ of Africa. However, land ownership was owned mainly by white people due to land alienation during the colonial period. As Tendi (2011) notes, land dispossession was a popular grievance throughout Zimbabwe’s independence struggle. Unfortunately, the nationalists failed to have their demand fulfilled at the Lancaster House
Conference to address the imbalance in land ownership, thereby compelling the new government to acquire land on a ‘willing seller, willing buyer’ basis instead of compulsory acquisition for the first 10 years of independence (1980-1990) (Moyo et al., 1995). Upon expiration of this clause, parliament passed the Land Acquisition Act in 1992 (subsequently amended in 2000) which provided for the compulsory acquisition of white owned land.

In March 1999, President Mugabe appointed a Constitutional Commission to draft a new constitution to replace the Lancaster House constitution, which had been adopted at independence. The Commission undertook extensive consultations throughout the country which culminated in a draft constitution which was then put to a referendum. The draft constitution was rejected in a referendum in February 2000 (Raftopoulos, 2006) with the government subsequently blaming the white commercial farmers for this defeat (Magaramombe, 2010; Mlambo, 2008).

Shortly after the referendum, the war veterans, with the support of the government, intensified the jambanja\(^\text{11}\) which began in June 1998 when the Svosve people invaded Eirene and Igava farms in Marondera district, Mashonaland East Province. Similar invasions were re-enacted throughout the country. The farm invasions marked what was later to be called the ‘fast track land reform programme’ which many critics consider to have been reprisals against the farmers for having sponsored the opposition to the draft constitution (CFU, 2000; Scoones et al., 2010). Although provided for in the legal statutes, the government did not compulsorily acquire commercial farms until after the defeat of the government sponsored constitutional referendum in February 2000.

The seizure of white owned farms is considered to have precipitated the collapse of the economy (Chan, 2003; McGregor, 2006). The collapse of the agricultural sector released over 2.5 million former farm workers onto the job market which worsened the unemployment situation (Sachikonye, 2003). Commercial farm workers found themselves stateless when the Zimbabwean government revoked citizenship rights to people born in Zimbabwe to parents of foreign origin. The Citizenship Act (2003) has been criticised for disenfranchising millions of commercial farm workers, ‘coloureds’ and white people principally to punish them for their perceived support of the opposition MDC (Muzondidya, 2007). The majority of the farm workers were second or third generation Zimbabweans of Malawian, Zambian and Mozambican descent who had worked on the farms all their lives (Magaramombe, 2010). With the new farmers uninterested in inheriting these farm workers, they were left with little choice but to retrace their parents’ footsteps back to their countries of origin or move to South Africa and Botswana (Mlambo, 2010). The downstream industries which

\(^{11}\) Jambanja is a term used to describe the violent takeover of white owned commercial farms by supporters of President Robert Mugabe’s ZANU (PF) party. The farm invasions were led by war veterans, security services personnel and the youth militia (Green Bombers).
relied on agriculture were also forced to lose staff, who then promptly joined the migration phenomenon (Pilossof, 2012).

Some scholars have claimed that President Mugabe’s government ordered the invasion of white owned farms to ward off the threat posed by the MDC who had spearheaded the campaign against the draft constitution (Mlambo, 2005, 2010). The emergence of the MDC as a multi-racial party appealing to all segments of the population was to have far reaching repercussions in the way ZANU (PF) and the state interacted with the Zimbabwean citizenry. The defeat of the government-sponsored constitutional referendum in February 2000 and the near loss of its parliamentary majority in the June 2000 parliamentary elections resulted in the adoption of an ultra-nationalistic stance and populist policies which it used to court a restive population (Primorac and Chan, 2007). However, this worsened the economic crisis and set in motion a political crisis which increased the exodus.

The political atmosphere became polarized between two protagonists, President Robert Mugabe and Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai. This polarization was greatest during the March 2008 harmonised elections (presidential, parliamentary and local government) which President Mugabe and his party lost for the first time since independence, but refused to cede power on the basis that the MDC leader did not achieve 51 percent of the votes as required by the constitution. This prompted a violent run-off from which Tsvangirai withdrew, and President Mugabe was declared the victor. Migration to South Africa peaked during this period (Table 2.3).

In 2005, the government launched a blitz against informal traders in an exercise code named ‘Operation Murambatsvina’12 (Drive-out Trash). This action resulted in an outcry which prompted the UN Secretary General to dispatch a special envoy to investigate. The action of the government spawned another migration episode, detailed below.

2.2.6 The Sixth Episode: Operation Murambatsvina and collapsing livelihoods

The invasion of farms entrenched economic regression. With job scarcity becoming the norm, enterprising Zimbabweans turned to the informal economy for salvation and sustenance (Bond and Manyanya, 2003). As noted by Bratton and Masunungure (2006) the phenomenal shrinkage of the economy resulted in the unemployment rate increasing to over 70 percent, thereby forcing many Zimbabweans to turn to the informal sector as a source of livelihood and survival.

---

12 The government claims that Operation Murambatsvina (Drive-out Trash) was aimed at enforcing planning laws and bye-laws in Harare and other urban areas. According to the government, Operation Murambatsvina was necessary in order to rid cities and towns of illegally erected houses and buildings as well as to ensure compliance with trading standards and laws. However, the civic society and opposition MDC alleged that it was a government ploy to curb its urban support base as ZANU (PF) had lost in urban areas in both the 2000 and 2005 elections.
Raftopoulos and Mlambo (2009) claim that as many as 80% of the population work in the informal sector.

The government in a bid to rein in uncontrolled growth and to bring stability to the informal economy launched ‘Operation Murambatsvina’ in May to July 2005 which resulted in the involuntary movement and displacement of approximately 700,000 people in Harare (UN Habitat, 2005). Bratton and Masunungure (2006) claim that the operation was security led and was justified as a strategy to eradicate illegal dwellings and eliminate informal trade. Thousands of houses and business premises were destroyed in the process and wares of informal traders confiscated. Some scholars (Potts, 2006; Mlambo, 2008) have claimed that Operation Murambatsvina was an act of retribution by President Mugabe and his ZANU (PF) party against the urban electorate for having overwhelmingly rejected it in the 2000 and 2005 elections. Such scholarship regards the operation as an attempt to reduce the support base of the opposition MDC party. According to this school of thought, by destroying houses and informal businesses, ZANU (PF) was strengthening its hand whilst weakening the opposition’s (Potts, 2006). This view resonates with the conclusion of the UN Secretary General’s special envoy, Anna Tibajuka who concluded that the operation could have been a pre-emptive strategy designed to prevent popular uprising in light of increasing food insecurity and other economic hardships (UN Habitat, 2005).

For the victims of Operation Murambatsvina, who had seen the destruction of their livelihoods, emigration became a possibility which promised a fresh start (Chapter 5). South Africa was an attractive destination given its proximity to Zimbabwe. Operation Murambatsvina marked Zimbabwe’s descent into hyper-inflation which caused an unprecedented migration episode, which I call the ‘Great Trek.’

2.2.7 The Seventh Episode: The Great Trek

The deterioration of Zimbabwe’s social services sector has attracted scholarly attention (McGregor, 2008; Pruyl, 2009). The decline stemmed from years of underinvestment owing to the worsening economic situation. Raftopoulos and Mlambo (2010) sum this up succinctly when they suggest that by 2008, the economy had undergone a veritable meltdown, with all indicators signifying a country in severe distress. The cholera outbreak began in Chitungwiza in August 2008 before rapidly spreading throughout the country (WHO, 2009b) triggering an exodus whose consequences are still being felt today. Children and old age pensioners joined the exodus (Muzondidya, 2008). The country did not have foreign currency to buy chemicals required for water treatment. What initially appeared to be a simple disease outbreak served to demonstrate the perilous state of both the economy and the health delivery system. WHO (2009b) reported that there were a total of 98,522 cases with 4,282 deaths between August 2008 and 8 June 2009. The government initially spurned offers of help by NGOs and UN agencies, before eventually
capitulating once the death rate mounted. The cholera outbreak triggered the largest exodus from Zimbabwe to South Africa. But by then, the damage had already been inflicted, as evidenced by the over 4,000 deaths (Nyazema, 2010).

The precipitous decline of the health sector is demonstrated by the spectacular fall in the life expectancy rate from 63 years in 1990 to 34 and 37 years for women and men respectively in 2004 (WHO, 2006). Similar increases were also noted in the child mortality rates from 76 to 132 deaths per 1000 between 1990 and 2005 (Raftopoulos and Mlambo, 2010). Chikanda (2010) bemoans the fact that the crisis occurred at a critical juncture when health services were badly needed to address the growing threat of HIV/AIDS infections which was causing about 3,200 deaths per week in 2007, making Zimbabwe the fourth highest HIV/AIDS prevalent country in the world. The availability of life saving drugs in South Africa appealed to medically neglected Zimbabweans.

Cholera was not the only problem that the battered Zimbabwean populace had to contend with. Hyper-inflation was severe and made life difficult for citizens. Unable to migrate to western countries such as the UK, due to their increasingly restrictive immigration policies of these countries, South Africa became the gateway to a new life. It attracted every Zimbabwean with the desire to leave. It is therefore not surprising that this migration episode was generated by the cataclysmic collapse of the Zimbabwean nationhood project (Bratton and Masunungure, 2006). This wave consisted of the healthy and unhealthy, the educated and uneducated, married and the unmarried, and a myriad others who were moving in search of a new life and money. The South African government set up an emergency clinic in Musina (the nearest town from the border) dedicated to attending to the cholera and other health needs of the newly arrived Zimbabwean migrants (Human Rights Watch (HRW), 2009).

The great trek stands out from the other migration waves in that it was caused by the collapse of the state, evidenced by its failure to tackle the cholera outbreak. The cholera outbreak was the event which exposed the government’s bankruptcy. It caused cross border migration and movement, including travelling to South Africa or Botswana to purchase foodstuffs which were in short supply at home. This period saw migrants in western countries such as the UK remitting money by Money Transfer Organisations (MTOs) to neighbouring countries where their relatives travelled to buy groceries which were in short supply at home (see Chapter 7). The great trek was characterised by short-term movements, as migrants moved to South Africa for short periods of time and often shuttled between Zimbabwe and Limpopo in search of foodstuffs. Businesses were also involved in the great trek as they hedged their losses by moving to South Africa as the Zimbabwean currency weakened under hyper-inflation. It was therefore not uncommon to find Zimbabwean businesses opening branches in South Africa and the UK to serve the interests of a burgeoning Zimbabwean population. For example, entrepreneurs operated medical
companies and brokerage services which sourced medicines and groceries that the
migrants could purchase on behalf of those at home which solidified networks
between and within the exiled Zimbabweans with those at home.

Skilled people abandoned their jobs in droves due to the ravages of hyper-inflation.
According to Tevera (2010) 15,200 teachers deserted their jobs between 2007-2008
for careers in South Africa, Botswana, Namibia and Swaziland which compelled
some schools to close due to shortage of teachers. Teachers had been labelled by
President Mugabe and ZANU (PF) as opposition supporters. Before the year 2000,
teachers had played a central role in organising and running elections, which were
suspended after the near defeat of ZANU (PF) in June 2000; teachers have since
been increasingly alienated and underpaid (Tevera, 2010). The desperate situation
that the education sector finds itself in is demonstrated by the government’s decision
to ask approximately 10,000 teachers whom it had previously dismissed or
suspended to reapply with the view of having their jobs back (Mpofu, 2009).

Raftopoulos and Mlambo (2010) note that the economic crisis caused a massive
collapse of the country’s once-celebrated social services sector, with health and
education provision declining precipitously in the face of chronic and severe
underfunding and a debilitating brain drain as most professionals voted with their feet
in search of better prospects abroad. School-going children and beggars also joined
the great trek. Reports abound of Zimbabwean beggars begging in the streets and
other public spaces (Mail and Guardian, 2010). Vulnerable people such as the
visually impaired saw their grants from the government wiped out by hyper-inflation
and chose to join others in search of redemption in South Africa.

The political repression that accompanied the presidential run-off of June 2008
exacerbated emigration. The harmonized elections in March 2008 were praised for
their peaceful and tranquil nature. Petrified at the prospect of losing power to the
MDC, ZANU (PF) mobilized its war veterans, youth militia and state security services
that went on an orgy of violence against perceived opposition supporters. The MDC
claims that over 500 of its supporters were killed between March and June 2009
(MDC, 2009). South Africa and the UK offered refuge from the escalating violence.
However, the UK was out of reach for many because of the stringent visa
requirements and the cost involved.

The migration episodes delineated and discussed above contributed towards the
formation of the Zimbabwean diaspora. It is relatively young compared to other
African diasporas like the Ghanaian or Nigerian diasporas (Pasura, 2008). It is even
younger if compared against the established and classical diasporas such as the
Jewish diaspora (Cohen, 1997). The next section discusses the notion of seeking
asylum in South Africa and the UK as a migration episode which consisted of
migrants from the waves discussed above. This is informed by the unprecedented
numbers of Zimbabweans who have sought asylum in South Africa and the UK as a
strategy of both extending their stay in exile and making their stay permanent. Between 2000 and 2010, Zimbabwe was one of the top asylum generating countries in South Africa and the UK (UNHCR, 2011).

2.2.8 The Eighth Episode: Post-migration - asylum seeking and permanency of migration

The eight migration episode can also be called the post migration wave given that this relates to the actions that migrants took once in destination country. For example, some migrants entered the UK as visitors as part of the waves identified earlier and overstayed their visas before claiming asylum to regularise their immigration status. The deteriorating socio-economic and political situation at home meant that migrants that had entered South Africa and the UK as visitors and intended to stay for short periods postponed their intention to return. Migrants had left Zimbabwe with the intention of target saving for specific purposes e.g. buying a house (see Chapter 7). Pasura (2008) discussed how migrants flirted between immigration statuses in order to prolong their stay in the UK. In his study of Zimbabwean migrants in the British cities of Birmingham, Coventry, London and Wigan, he demonstrated how asylum seeking had gained currency with migrants as a strategy of extending their stay in the UK. Home Office (2012) figures show that asylum seeking peaked in 2009 when 7611 Zimbabweans claimed asylum with the bulk of these claims (7541) made in-country, and only 24 being made at the port of entry (Table 2.4).

Table 2.4 Asylum applications in the UK 1999-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of asylum claims</th>
<th>Granted asylum</th>
<th>Granted ELR; DL and/or HP</th>
<th>Asylum claims refused</th>
<th>Claims made at port</th>
<th>Claims made in-country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>105</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1,010</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>525</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2,140</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>1,970</td>
<td>1512</td>
<td>627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>8,695</td>
<td>2,644</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>4,351</td>
<td>5812</td>
<td>2,644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>4,018</td>
<td>1,070</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>3,931</td>
<td>809</td>
<td>3,209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2,522</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>2,874</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>2,067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1,392</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1,203</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>1,193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2,147</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>1,983</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>1,953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2,402</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1,542</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>2,083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>4,475</td>
<td>796</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>2,817</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>4,125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>7,611</td>
<td>2,386</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>5,457</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>7,541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1,955</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>1,931</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1,755</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Home Office (2011)
It is not an exaggeration to say that the majority of the applications came from people who entered the UK prior to the inception of the visa regime in November 2002 (Figure 5.3, p.100). Many of these migrants overstayed their visas while they worked illegally in the burgeoning social care and manufacturing sectors before claiming asylum in most cases several years after the expiration of their visas as will be demonstrated in Chapter 7.

Records from South Africa’s DHA\textsuperscript{13} indicate that 44,423 Zimbabweans claimed asylum between 2005 and 2007, before jumping to 111,968 in 2008. In addition, 19,564 corporate work permits were issued to farmers in Limpopo in relation to their Zimbabwean farm workers (DHA, 2010). The UNHCR (2009) data indicates that between 2004 and 2006, 241 Zimbabweans were recognised as refugees. Other statistics show that there has been a phenomenal rise in year on year deportations from South Africa to Zimbabwe, which surged to 74,765 in 2004 from a paltry 17,000 in 2001, before reaching 97,433 in 2005 and peaking at a staggering 102,423 between January and June 2007 (HRW, 2008).

While the British government condemned the developments in Zimbabwe, the South African government under President Mbeki maintained its policy of ‘silent diplomacy’ through which it sought to persuade the government of President Mugabe to be tolerant of its political opponents (Raftopoulos and Mlambo, 2009). It refused to recognise that there was a political problem in Zimbabwe which was capable of generating refugees. President Mbeki’s exasperation with the continued inflows of Zimbabwean migrants into South Africa was captured in a speech that he made in Parliament on 17 May 2007 when he said,

‘As to this…. inflow of illegal people, I personally think that it’s something that we have to live with… it’s difficult; you can’t put a Great Wall of China between South Africa and Zimbabwe to stop people walking across\textsuperscript{14}.’

The refusal to admit that there was a political crisis in Zimbabwe which was spawning refugees was reflected in the miniscule number of people granted refugee status in South Africa and its continued deportation policy which was only halted when President Jacob Zuma assumed power in 2009.

Thus, until April 2009, there were parallels between how the British and South African treated Zimbabwean asylum seekers. There was an over reliance on deporting refused asylum seekers in the UK while in South Africa, illegal immigrants suffered the same fate given that the government did not recognise Zimbabweans as asylum seekers but economic migrants. In both countries, the issue of what to do

\textsuperscript{13} Personal communication from the Acting Chief Director for Asylum Seeker Management dated 22/04/2010.

with Zimbabwean asylum seekers provoked intense debate and attracted considerable attention (Bloch, 2006; Ranger, 2005; Refugee Council, 2008). A number of permutations were floated in the two countries regarding Zimbabwean asylum seekers. These alternatives included granting all asylum seekers temporary residence status, giving them temporary work permits and a blanket amnesty (HRW, 2008; Refugee Council, 2006, 2008). The British government has been castigated for condemning President Mugabe’s human rights abuses but not tending to his victims (Ashton and May, 2008).

Although the British government cannot forcibly return refused asylum seekers, they are not allowed to work to sustain themselves and their families. This has left such migrants living in ‘limbo’ (Ashton and May, 2008) and ‘trapped’ (IPPR, 2006) because they can neither work nor be returned home. They are generally unentitled to the most basic ‘hard cases’ support of hostel housing and vouchers for basic necessities which are provided to refused asylum seekers who cannot go home (Institute of Race Relations, 2009). As a result of the cutting off of NASS support, many refused asylum seekers have resorted to working illegally where they face severe exploitation and the constant risk of arrest and imprisonment. The Institute of Race Relations (2008) claims that Zimbabweans make up a large proportion of those arrested in immigration raids and sentenced to up to nine months in prison for using false documents to obtain work (New Zimbabwe, 2010).

In South Africa on the other hand, refugee charities working with Zimbabwean asylum seekers, like their counterparts in the UK, called on the government to introduce a range of policies to ameliorate the growing vulnerability of Zimbabweans, such as granting blanket refugee status (Forced Migration Studies Programme (FMSP), 2007). These measures were suggested in order to end the endless cycle of informal border crossing, arrests, deportation, and curb informal border crossings, as well as freeing up security resources for more important jobs (HRW, 2008). The new government of President Jacob Zuma halted the deportation of all Zimbabweans when it came to power, and in April 2009 directed that all undocumented Zimbabwean migrants apply for renewable 6 months asylum permits. These permits entitle the holder to work, and access to basic social services such as health care.

Like the British asylum system, the South African asylum application and determination process is severely strained. The DHA aims to process applications within 3 months, but in 2008, the backlog of applications dated back to 1998

15 Hard cases refer to asylum seekers who have exhausted their appeals process resulting in their support being stopped.

16 The South African government announced on 23rd September that the asylum permits system will expire by 31st December 2010. A new dispensation for Zimbabweans was to be introduced in which migrants would transition to four year temporary residency permits, including work and study permits. The DHA was to issue these permits upon presentation of a valid passport and other relevant documentation, such as ‘proof of study, work, self-employment and business’ (DHA, 2010a)
Similarly, in the UK, the then Home Secretary, Dr John Reid told Parliament in 2007 that the Immigration and Nationality Directorate (IND) which was then responsible for processing asylum applications was not fit for purpose. Both countries’ asylum determination processes have been criticised for the inordinate delays in processing asylum applications. There are cases in which applicants waited up to 10 years to get the outcome of their applications (Muzondidya, 2008; Lewis et al., 2008).

The preceding paragraphs have shed some light on the asylum episode in South Africa and the UK which is closely linked to the other episodes already discussed. Migrants who sought asylum arrived in South Africa and the UK as part of the earlier episodes and sought asylum to prolong their stay in the host country as a strategy to make their stay permanent. The two countries have different asylum processes that Zimbabwean immigrants have to navigate in order to get documented status.

2.3 Origins of the Zimbabwean diaspora in South Africa and the UK

This section develops the above discussions of migration episodes and demonstrates how these waves contributed to the formation of Zimbabwean diasporic communities in South Africa and the UK. There are multiple differences in these communities owing to the nature of the migrants’ departure, their social and human capital, immigration status, ethnicity and gender which has relevance to the communities subsequently established. The section demonstrates how migrants utilised their agency to negotiate the difficulties of immigration. The earlier migration waves built, fuelled and sustained further migration due their social networking role (Massey et al., 1993). One of the objectives of this study relates to the role of social networks in the development of the Zimbabwean diaspora. It also seeks to understand the transnational links that migrants have with those at home. As noted earlier, initial migration episodes were circulatory as migrants moved between South Africa and the UK on one hand and Zimbabwe, on the other. However, as demonstrated in the last wave, migrants moved with their families or have been joined by their families thereby diminishing the prospects of immediate return. Against this background, asylum seeking by migrants with superfluous skills not required in UK and South Africa should be seen as a strategy of incrementally extending their stay.

Available evidence shows Zimbabwe being amongst the top 5 asylum generating countries to the UK between 2002 and 2008 and in the top 2 in South Africa during the same period (DHA, 2010b; Home Office, 2010). The imposition of the visa in November 2002 on Zimbabwean nationals wanting to travel to the UK only produced the desired drop in asylum figures but did not halt the inflow of Zimbabweans into the UK (Ranger, 2005). According to the Home Office (2002), visas against Zimbabwean nationals were introduced to curb the fraudulent use of the Zimbabwean passport. However, the strained and poisoned political relationship between London and
Harare cannot be discounted as the real reason for the introduction of visas. Zimbabwe had just pulled out of the Commonwealth and was persisting with its controversial land reform programme despite the international outrage that it was attracting. Ranger (2005) suggests that the visa requirement did not completely abate the movement of Zimbabweans to the UK as migrants used circuitous routes and travelled on false Malawian and South African passports which were then visa exempt.

Social networks and channelling played a critical role in the choice of destination (cf. Poros, 2001). The role of recruitment agencies in channelling nurses to Leeds cannot be underestimated as they acted as weak ties for skilled professionals (Granovetter, 1973; Poros, 2001). Nursing homes in Leeds recruited heavily in Zimbabwe, and a large segment of nurses in Leeds now working for the NHS did their adaptation courses in nursing homes in the Leeds and surrounding areas. The organizational ties of the migrant nurses helped other nurses to follow them, including other professionals and students. The importance of organisational ties is demonstrated by Waldinger (1999 cited in Poros, 2008: 1618) who asserts that, ‘organizational ties play a critical role in controlling the process of selectivity for recruits, especially for professionals, who depend more heavily on organizational ties than do most other recruits because of requirements such as educational degrees, certification, and licensing.’

Channelling of Zimbabwean migrants to South Africa and the UK was not only a consequence of structural and historical ties, but, as argued by Koser and Pinkerton (2006), of social networks which influenced the destination taken by migrants. Similarly, Boyd (1989) posits that in international migration, social networks typically comprise family and friends, community organisations, and associations and intermediaries such as labour recruiters and travel agents. As already highlighted in Section 2.2.2 for example, the movement of the Ndebele people to South Africa was driven to a large extent by the existence of social networks, as was that health and social care workers to the UK. Massey et al (1993) claim that migrants tap into the existing networks to considerably reduce the costs and risks associated with migration.

Drawing on Massey et al’s (1993) seminal work on the role of networks in migration, Koser and Pinkerton (2006) differentiated ‘personal’ networks from those based on more distant relations such as co-ethnics or co-nationals who are not necessarily personally acquainted with potential migrants whilst the former include family and friends. Personal networks were instrumental in the migration waves discussed above. These networks were developed at school, work and home, and as Gurak

---

17 Interview with Eliza, Leeds, 16 November 2009. Zimbabwean trained nurses had to do a 6 month adaptation course with registered institutions e.g. a Care Home before being registered with the Nursing and Midwifery Council (NMC) and work as nurses.
and Caces (1992) contend, provided momentum for further migration. Kritz and Zlotnik’s (1992) geographical definition of social networks situates social networks as one of a series of processes that link origin and destination countries in international migration. They add that in origin countries potential migrants are embedded in a set of relations with family and friends, whilst in destination countries they may have both personal and impersonal contacts. These explanations resonate with the circumstances that surround the migration of Zimbabweans to South Africa and the UK as the greater majority had an acquaintance that provided accommodation and access to labour markets on arrival. In the UK for example, personal networks assisted with information needed for immigration purposes such as invitation letters, job vacancies and asylum claims.

The migration and settlement patterns of Zimbabweans in both Leeds and Limpopo vindicates Ritchey’s (1976) facilitating and information hypotheses which asserts that flows were propelled by social networks. The networks facilitated migration by paying transportation costs (Chapter 5). Migrants also relied on their networks to ease the integration process and to find jobs. A large segment of the migrants in both Leeds and Limpopo are settled in areas where pioneer immigrants are concentrated. The UK’s National Asylum Support Service’s\(^\text{18}\) (NASS) clustering and dispersal system seeks to disperse asylum seekers from areas of high concentration (London and the South East) to other areas such as Yorkshire and Humberside. Dispersed asylum seekers and refugees are clustered according to language and ethnicity (Lewis \textit{et al.}, 2008). This policy has added a sizeable Zimbabwean community to the Yorkshire and Humberside region, adding to an already burgeoning Zimbabwean community which had formed around the health and social care professionals working in the region.

The granting of documented status to asylum seekers in both countries promoted formal travel to Zimbabwe to visit family and friends. However, those without documented status in South Africa also made holiday visits using informal channels (see Chapter 8). Some scholars refer to these frequent visits as ‘circulation’ (Glick Schiller, 2004; Tollefsen and Lindgren, 2006).

**2.4 Majoni-joni/Injiva: An exemplar of transnational circulation?**

Implicit in the transnational discourse, is the notion of ‘circulation’ which Levitt and Glick Schiller (2004) describe as the circular, situated and at times continuous sway between migrants’ sustained, occasional or non manifestation of transnational engagement. While highly skilled migrants have long been associated with transnational migration due to demand for skilled personnel in developed countries

\(^{18}\) NASS is a Home Office agency which provides accommodation to asylum seekers. It commissions public and private sector organisations to provide accommodation to asylum seekers. The clustering and dispersal policies were started in 2000 to ease the shortage of accommodation in London and the South East by dispersing asylum seekers to cities in the North of England using a range of factors such as language and country of origin.
Iredale, 2001), recent scholarship has started to highlight the informal ‘circulation’ of
less skilled people which often involves large-scale migrations of less privileged
groups (Tollefsen and Lindgren, 2006). This resonates with the work of Sassen
(2003) which associates ‘circulation’ with low-skilled, low-paid migrant workers, often
women, moving in different ‘survival circuits’ between poorer and richer countries.
Scholars such as Saurez-Orozco (2003:55) refer to labour migrants as
‘sojourners…who move for well-defined periods of time, often following a seasonal
cycle, and eventually return home.’

The circulation of majoni-joni and injiva\(^1\) between Zimbabwe and South Africa is
an example of this. These poor and often uneducated ‘circulators’ have been
described by Rouse (1992), as a ‘transnational semi-proletariat’ trapped in migratory
circuits. The migrants’ circulation between Zimbabwe and South Africa is
encouraged by a number of factors including their close proximity, historical and
economic ties and the demand for cheap labour in the latter. The migration episodes
discussed earlier confirms this as migrants moved to South Africa and the UK for
social mobility. As the movement of health and social care workers revealed,
migrants moved due to demand for skilled professionals.

The livelihoods of the circulators and that of their families are structured by
continuous mobility between places (Portes, 1996). The families of majoni-joni/injiva
that are left behind are reliant on the remittances from South Africa in order to
augment food supplies which they would have harvested from subsistence farming.
Families use remittances for a range of purposes like buying maize seed for the next
agricultural season and buying cattle which are used as draught power for
agricultural purposes. Thus, the continuous movement between the two countries is
pivotal to the lives of those left behind and has influenced permanent migration.

Scholars such as Portes (1996) and Rouse (1992) ascribe circulation to blocked
income opportunities and labour-market marginalisation in both sending and
receiving countries. In a similar vein, Parreñas (2001b) attributes this phenomenon
to a thwarted allegiance of circular migrants emanating from ‘partial citizenship’ while
Hoang (2011) claims that circulation is caused by exclusionary measures which label
migrant contract workers as indentured and unfree workers. As demonstrated earlier,
some migration waves were fuelled by high unemployment, however, most migrants,
due to immigration restrictions and shrinking employment opportunities, find
themselves engaging in temporary and seasonal work (Rutherford and Addison,
2007), which promotes a cycle of circulation. As argued by Castles and Davidson

\(^{19}\) Majoni-joni is a term used by those left at home to describe Zimbabwean migrant workers in South Africa.
Those left at home perceive all migrants working in South Africa as living and working in Johannesburg (Joni). Majoni-joni usually come home once a year during the Christmas holidays and can easily be identified by, for example, their hairstyles which mirror that of South Africans whom they will be trying to imitate.

‘Differential exclusion’ entails failure to integrate in the host country thereby compelling migrants to circulate between home and host country. Maphosa (2011) attributes the circulation of Zimbabwean migrants to a failure of integration in South Africa. He cites the May 2008 xenophobic attacks as a poignant demonstration of how migrants are despised in the host country. This resonates with Portes (1996) who argues that the challenge of transnational migrant communities is that of the weak who seek to use transnational space to counter marginality in both country of origin and country of destination.

Similarly, Roberts et al (1999) posit that the rural origins of most Mexican immigrants and their low position in the USA labour market make them marginal members of both nations. Likewise Maphosa (2011) claims that for Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa, it is the feelings and experiences of being unwanted that oblige them to preserve links with people at home. However, this does not explain the sustenance of ties by migrants in the UK who are more privileged than their equivalents in South Africa. Here, some migrants in Leeds and Limpopo find themselves in the unenviable position of suffering from a double exclusion, as they experience exclusion both in the host and home countries due to circumstances attendant to their immigration status and the political policies of the home government.

Circulation or oscillation for South African based migrants entail migrants staying in Zimbabwe for a few days or months per year mostly during the Christmas break when industries are closed in South Africa. For most migrants working on the farms in Limpopo, circulation is largely determined by the citrus picking season which runs from April to September (Rutherford, 2011). Many return home during the off season with the intention of returning during the next picking season, while others remain in South Africa looking for work opportunities at other farms (Rutherford and Addison, 2007). Likewise, documented British based migrants also engage in circulation, mostly during the Christmas period and summer holidays, while those with business interests at home ‘circulate’ several times a year. In Mexico, Arias (1998) and Escobar et al (1987) observed the circulation of male earners in the USA, where they work temporarily to supplement an informal income from their wives. The circulation of Zimbabwean migrants also mirrors that of Polish migrants observed by Krzystek (2008), who Iglikca (2001) calls ‘shuttle migrants.’ These Ukraine based Polish migrants were seen to remain in Poland for several months in a year which makes them ‘permanently circular’ (Slany and Malek 2005: 116). The same can also be said of Zimbabwean migrants working in South Africa some of whom come from households that have been involved in inter-generational circulation.

The loose border that separates Zimbabwe and South Africa encourages circulation more than UK. Furthermore, good transport links bode well for documented migrants
who can travel between the two countries with ease. This resonates with the work of Roberts et al (1999) which claims that the circulation between the USA and Mexico is underpinned by several factors, including ease of communication, a porous border, good roads, rail and air connections, and cheap telecommunication links.

Informality of migration to South Africa is typified by circularity (Weyl, 1991) or oscillation (Wilson, 1972) which entails migrants occasionally returning to their homes and families. Muzondidya (2008) has argued that migration from the dry agro-ecological regions of Masvingo and Matebeleland provinces to South Africa has always been circulatory. Such an explanation suggests that the migrants are therefore predominantly low skilled given their backgrounds, which are largely in subsistence agriculture and the informal economy. However, evidence adduced from this study shows increasing diversity in migrants’ origins, age, gender, and family composition. Previously, migration to South Africa was male dominated and comprised mostly of single young males. However, as Crush et al., (2012) demonstrated, increasingly whole families are moving rather than heads of households alone. Further, in recent migration episodes, a significant number of the migrants were highly-skilled, white-collar workers and are of urban origin which contradicts the findings of earlier studies (Muzondidya, 2008; Rutherford, 2011).

This section has argued that circulation of South African based migrants is driven by a number of factors, including historical ties, a porous border which encourages informal migration, and a lack of economic and employment opportunities at home. For those in the UK, documented status is a key driver as it enables migrants to travel without hindrance. It can be argued that the majority of UK based migrants are precluded from circulating (physically) due to their immigration status, for example asylum seekers cannot return home until their cases have been concluded, and those granted refugee status can travel to all other countries except Zimbabwe.

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter demonstrated the significance of different migration episodes to the sustenance of present day migration and to the characteristics of communities, which is the focus of this study. Earlier migration waves provided the impetus for the episodes which have occurred since the year 2000. The migration episodes were driven by a combination of factors including human and financial capital. These types of capital determined a migrant’s destination as evidenced by the migration of professionals such as health and social care workers to the UK since 1998, while the unskilled moved to South Africa as they lacked the financial wherewithal needed for airfares.

The notion of circulation has been explored and shown to predominate between South Africa and Zimbabwe. Circulation has also been linked to subsequent migration due to connections and relationships built during the sojourn in the host
country. This has been ascribed to the close proximity of the two countries. Migrants with documented status have also been shown to circulate in the UK more than their undocumented counterparts who are immobilised by their immigration status. Emigration from Zimbabwe, although initially temporary, has started to assume some degree of permanency, as witnessed by the increase in the number of migrants seeking to formalise their status in both South Africa and the UK. The majority of migrants in both countries have sought to formalise their status by applying for asylum, which appears to be easier in South Africa due to its more liberal policies. The next chapter builds on the literature about Zimbabwe to understand the concepts of diaspora, transnationalism and social capital upon which this research is premised.
Chapter Three    Theorizing Transnational Migration

3.1 Introduction

This thesis aims to understand the formation and experiences of the Zimbabwean diaspora in South Africa and the UK. Chapter 2 explained that emigration from Zimbabwe occurred in a series of episodes from Zimbabwe from the period 1975 to 2010, acts which contributed immensely to the formation of distinct diasporic communities in South Africa and the UK. This chapter focuses on the theoretical approaches to conceptualising migration and the interconnections between these ‘geographically dispersed communities.’ One of the major and original contributions of this thesis is to explore the relationship between transnationalism and return migration in tandem with the formation of the Zimbabwean community in South Africa and the UK.

A transnational approach captures the morphology of migration between South Africa, the UK and Zimbabwe which consists of seasonal/temporary, permanent and short-term episodes of mobility/circular migration which were discussed in Chapter 2. Moreover, a transnational approach to migration aids an exploration of migrants’ intentions to return. The use of transnationalism as a theoretical framework in this research is predicated on establishing the nature of relationships which the migrants have in both the home and host country (Bailey, 2001) which was highlighted in Chapter 2 through the circulation of migrants. Such an inquisition helps to explore migrants’ potential to return which forms one of the original contributions of this study.

This chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section, Section 3.2 discusses the use of transnationalism as a theoretical framework for this study while Section 3.3 has four subdivisions. The first section focuses on the utility of transnationalism as an analytical framework. Section 3.3.1 discusses the notion of social capital within the broad realm of transnationalism, and explores its role in migration flows and maintenance of ties with those left behind. This provides a platform for exploring how these migration flows take place, their motivations and how migrants interpret them. The second subsection (3.3.2) focuses on remittances which have been described as an exemplar of transnational linkages. Remittances have assumed a greater profile in the development discourse, with the World Bank describing them as ‘the new development mantras’ (World Bank, 2006). Section 3.3.3 explores the concept of return migration within international migration literature and lays the groundwork for Chapter 8. Section 3.3.4 explains the links between diaspora and transnationalism given the ‘myth of return’ occasioned by the permanency of migration as some migrants do not return home. The chapter concludes by pulling together the salient themes that would have been raised therein.
3.2 Conceptualising transnationalism as a framework for international migration

A key purpose of this study is to investigate the role of transnationalism in the formation of the Zimbabwean diaspora. This is achieved through the use of transnational theory which according to Piper (2009:94) recognises ‘the role of migrants is based on the loyalties and engagement many of them show towards their countries and localities of origin.’ The use of a transnationalism framework enables the study to have a binary focus i.e. how the actions of the migrants affect the livelihoods of those left at home and their role in encouraging further emigration (Toyota et al., 2007).

The concept of transnationalism privileges the notions of diaspora, social capital remittances and circulation as its key components. There is a gradual acceptance in migration scholarship that diasporas emerge from the acts of transnational communities in both the sending and receiving countries (King and Chrshitou, 2011). Transnationalism promotes the presence of networks through which information flows. These networks comprise migrants and other people in the receiving country as well as those left at home whose effects are felt in both locations.

My aim in appropriating transnationalism as the conceptual framework for this study is the realisation that current theoretical conceptualisations study migrants' social networks in isolation from other networks that significantly shape, alter and structure their lives and that of people left behind. Such an approach recognises the multi-sitedness of migrants' lives; that is, their actions are shaped by multiple factors and from places other than South Africa and the UK.

Thus, the adoption of a transnational framework allows this thesis to better comprehend the complexities, fragmentations and contestations that pervade the transnational social fields that mediate migrants' daily lives. These transnational social spaces are avenues through which intra and inter migrants interactions are performed as demonstrated, for example, remittances, visits, phone calls, e-mails, memories and ideas about home and belonging (Bailey, 2001; Vertovec, 2001; King and Christiou, 2010).

A growing number of migration scholars have questioned the polarised models of migration by highlighting the existence of sustained mobility and links between the sending and destination countries. This scholarship recognises the differences embedded in the mutually constitutive nature of all fields of economic, political, personal and cultural life so much that, rather than focusing on exclusive categories, it is pertinent to realise that all of these spheres contain overlapping and interdependent sets of actions, institutional processes and norms (Fraser, 1995:72).
Like Fraser (1995), Pries (1999: 26) identifies the four spheres of ‘transnational social spaces’ as: political and legal framework of the migration process, the material infrastructure, the social institutions and the ‘identities and life projects’ of transmigrants. This taxonomy mirrors that of Faist’s (1999: 44) which is built on the duality of spatial extension and temporal stability. Faist’s four transnational classifications are:

- dispersion and assimilation (weak simultaneous embeddedness in sending and receiving countries and short lived transnational social ties);
- transnational exchanges and reciprocity (strong simultaneous embeddedness but rather short-lived social ties);
- transnational networks (weakly embedded and long lived); and
- transnational communities (strongly embedded in at least two countries and long lived).

Therefore, in adopting a transnationalism approach, this study recognises that transnationality is a complex space which is multidimensional and multiply inhabited by participants drawn from multiple ethnic groups (Crang et al., 2003; Jackson et al., 2008). The Zimbabwean diaspora is multiply fractured along race, ethnicity, gender, class and education (Pasura, 2008a). Hence, it is pertinent to deploy a transnational framework given that the focus of this study is investigating the constituent parts of the Zimbabwean diaspora and their transnational practices. Such approach observes transnationalism from ‘above’ and from ‘below’, given the migrants’ heterogeneity (Smith and Guarnizo, 1998).

### 3.3 Transnationalism and Transnational Practices

As intimated in the preceding section, the field of migration is a highly contested terrain. Notwithstanding these contestations, there has been a gradual shift in migration scholarship from the dominance of particular paradigms e.g. Neoclassical Economics Approach (Todaro, 1969) to a greater plurality of approaches. One such approach is the transnational perspective which is used as the theoretical framework underpinning this study.

According to Glick-Schiller et al (1992:1), transnationalism is ‘the process by which immigrants build social fields that link together their country of origin and their country of settlement.’ In other words, it refers to the ‘web of cultural, social, economic, and political relationships, practices, and identities built by migrants across national borders (Guarnizo, 1997:288). For Patterson (2006:1891), transnationalism focuses on people who ‘…manage to construct and nurture social fields that intimately link their respective homelands and their new diasporic locations’ (Patterson, 2006: 1891).
In accord with critics of the traditional migration perspective (see for example, Portes, 1997; Skeldon, 1990, 1997), this thesis takes the view that the complexity that surrounds modern day international migration does not lend itself to explanation by a single theory. Such a view is informed by scholars such as Joly (2004) who claim that theories of migration do not adequately explain contemporary patterns of international movements.

This observation is critical in light of the revelations of Chapter 2 which showed that the migration episodes consisted of mixed flows with different types of migration outcomes. Furthermore, it was argued in Chapter 2 that the stimuli for the episodic migration differed between the two countries in that it was circular in South Africa and more permanent in the UK. Joly’s (2004) postulation is consistent with Arango (2000:283) who criticises migration theories for ‘their partiality, limited scope and limited applicability to certain types of migration…migration is too diverse and multifaceted to be explained by a single theory.’ Similarly, Portes (1997:208) asserts that ‘the limitation of migration theories is their fascination with either macro or micro structural issues…most of the so-called theories are not theories but concepts, theoretical frameworks and approaches or typologies.’

Against this background of scholarly disenchantment with traditional migration approaches to migration, this thesis deploys the concept of transnationalism as a framework to explore the transnational migration of Zimbabweans to South Africa and the UK (see Chapters 5, 7 and 8). Transnationalism in international migration has emerged as a way of dealing with the inadequacies of migration theories in explaining migration and circulation in an increasingly globalised world (Levitt and Glick Schiller, 2004; Portes, 1996).

The transnational framework is used in this study to examine the different flows and different connections that migrants have and maintain with those at home. Most scholarship on Zimbabwe documents the political problems that have plagued it since the late 1990s (cf. Blair, 2002; Chan, 2003; Holland, 2010; Raftopoulos and Mlambo, 2009) with little attention paid to the role that migrants play in the development of the country and sustenance of the livelihoods of those left behind through their remittances (Bracking and Sachikonye, 2006, 2008; Maphosa, 2007).

The role of globalisation in shaping modern migration cannot be underestimated. Transnationalism is driven, amplified and fuelled by globalisation, which has enabled its different forms to flourish or flounder. For example, the phenomenal developments in the telecommunications sector have drastically changed intra-migrant communication as well as how they communicate with those left behind (see Chapter 7).

Scholars have identified several forms of transnationalism including transnational social fields, transnational social formations and transnational social spaces (Faist,
2000b; Levitt and Glick-Schiller, 2004; Portes, 1997, 1999). These have been described as the ‘spaces’ of interaction generated through migrants’ (and non-migrants’) engagements in transnationalism (Faist 2000a, 2000b; Levitt and Glick Schiller, 2004). For Itzigsohn et al (1999: 317), transnational social spaces denote ‘a field of social interactions and exchanges that transcend political and geographical boundaries of one nation.’ For Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa and the UK, the transnational social fields are mediums through which potential migrants partake in the migration process and/or maintain intra and inter-country contact with those at home as well as how goods (Zimbabwean foodstuffs and merchandise), services and information are exchanged (see Chapter 7).

Faist (2000b) on the other hand, uses the term transnational social space both theoretically and as a description of the material and symbolic spaces that occur as a result of transnationalism. In this thesis, such an interpretation helps to identify the migrants’ understandings of their current circumstances relative to home, and their return intentions (Chapter 8). Faist's taxonomy of transnational social spaces (2000b) outlines the three categories as transnational kinship groups, transnational circuits and transnational communities (Table 3.1) which are dynamic and sometimes overlapping indicating the fluidity in migrants’ everyday lives and transnational relationships with home and those left behind (Chapters 6 and 7).

As Faist (2000b: 189) argues, whether we talk of transnational social spaces, transnational social fields, transnationalism or transnational social formations in international migration systems, we usually refer to sustained ties of persons, networks and organisations across borders, across multiple nation-states, ranging from poorly to highly institutionalised forms (see Chapters 7 and 8). An important distinction that emerges from the above is the difference between personal and organisational ties which are exploited by migrants with varying degrees of success depending on the strength of the ties and their embeddedness (Granovetter, 1973). Organisational ties that migrants can tap into include political parties, home town associations (HTA) and consular services. Some governments like India and Philippines have designated offices for their diaspora citizens (Agunias, 2009). Unfortunately, Zimbabwe does not have a diaspora office and does not recognise dual citizenship. However, migrants have access to embassy officials in both South Africa and the UK, who provide them with an array of services including visa and consular affairs.

Migrants utilise their ties to enhance not only their transnational capabilities in both the host and home country, but also of those left behind. As Levitt (2001a) claims, transnational lives in themselves may have become a strategy of survival and betterment. The transnational lives that Faist (2000b) refers to, include circulation between nation states as demonstrated by the practices of majoni-joni/injiva in South Africa who ‘circulate’ between the two countries several times a year as outlined in Chapter 2.
Table 3.1  Three types of transnational social spaces arising from international migration and flight

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of transnational social space</th>
<th>Primary resources in ties</th>
<th>Main characteristic</th>
<th>Typical examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transnational kinship groups</td>
<td><em>Reciprocity</em>: What one party receives from the other requires some return</td>
<td>Upholding the <em>social norm</em> of equivalence</td>
<td><em>Remittances</em> of household or family members from country of immigration to country of emigration e.g. contract workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transnational circuits</td>
<td><em>Exchange</em>: mutual obligations and expectations of the actors; outcome of instrumental activity (e.g. the tit-for-tat-principle)</td>
<td>Exploitation of <em>insider advantages</em> language; strong and weak social ties in peer networks</td>
<td><em>Trading networks</em> e.g. Chinese, Lebanese and Indian business persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transnational communities</td>
<td><em>Solidarity</em>: shared ideas, beliefs, evaluations and symbols; expressed in some sort of collective identity</td>
<td>Mobilisation of <em>Collective representations</em> within (abstract) symbolic ties; religion, nationality, ethnicity</td>
<td><em>Diasporas</em>: e.g., Jewish, Armenians, Kurds, Palestinians; <em>frontier regions</em>: e.g., Mexico-US, Mediterranean</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Faist (2000b: 195)

Similarly, documented migrants in the UK lead ‘astronaut lifestyles’ (Aye and Guerin, 2001:8) by travelling frequently between the UK, Zimbabwe and elsewhere (see Chapter 8). These ‘astronaut migrants’ travel to Zimbabwe at least twice a year although the majority of the migrants’ ability to ‘circulate’ is impeded by a lack of financial resources needed to travel, leaving them to pursue transnational lifestyles by other means, such as virtual contact. Ansari (1992: 139) has noted how the internet and email have fundamentally transformed the way in which ethnic minorities communicate.

Transnational social spaces have enabled migrants to engage in political, social and cultural activities (Magunha et al., 2009; Pasura, 2008). Consistent with such
explanations, Al-Ali et al (2001:581) argue that transnational activities can be classified in a variety of ways and may include activities that are political (e.g. lobbying), economic (e.g. remittances and investment), social (such as, promotion of human and other rights of the transnational group within different societies) and cultural (e.g. articles in newspapers). They further posit that transnational activities may take place at the individual level (through family networks) or through institutional channels (such as, through community or international organizations). Landolt (2008) in a study of migrants from El-Salvador residents in the United States of America, found evidence of economic transnationalism embedded in transnational ties between El-Salvador and the USA.

Previous studies of migration suggested that migrants' transnational links were denuded by the length of time that they would have spent away from home (Borjas et al., 1991). However, this school of thought has been dismissed by some scholars who point to the maintenance of ties by migrants whose families remained behind (see Chapter 7). Scholars such as Gardner and Grillo (2002: 179) refer to this as ‘the transnational domestic sphere.’ Thus, as Baldassar (2007) observes, while national borders may separate migrants from their families, this has not precluded them from maintaining mutual care-giving relationship. This transnational domestic sphere in countries such as Zimbabwe obligates children to look after their parents in old age. It is partly because of this cultural expectation that migrants engage in circulation in order to fulfil their culturally constructed ideals about appropriate family responsibilities (Baldassar, 2007). This cultural expectation and societal obligation plays a big part in the migrants’ decision to maintain transnational ties including circulation.

Politically, migrants in the UK have lobbied the British government to expand the targeted sanctions that are in place against some members of President Robert Mugabe’s government in order to force it to democratise the political space in Zimbabwe (see Chapter 6). These demands are part of wider efforts to emasculate President Mugabe’s rule and ultimately his removal from power. Their actions can be said to fall under ‘narrow’ and ‘broad’ transnational practices (Itzigsohn et al., 1999; Mahler, 1998). ‘Narrow’ transnational practices, according to Itzigsohn et al (1999:323), refers ‘to those people involved in economic, political, social, or cultural practices that involve a regular movement within the geographic transnational field, a high level of institutionalization, or constant personal involvement’ while ‘broad’ transnationality refers 'to a series of material and symbolic practices in which people engage that involve only sporadic physical movement between the two countries, a low level of institutionalization, or just occasional personal involvement, but nevertheless includes both countries as reference points.'

Transnational organising by political parties is not a recent phenomenon as historically parties have always relied on exiled members for financial support (Levitt, 2001). The recruitment and mobilisation of members in the diaspora by political
parties is premised on the idea that migrants are able to influence the voting patterns of the people left behind through their social remittances and other transnational linkages (see Chapter 7). For example, during the liberation war in Zimbabwe, both ZANU (PF) and PF-ZAPU mobilised for financial and material resources from exiled Zimbabweans and former communist countries like Bulgaria. It should be noted however, that there were different dynamics involved in the involvement of the diaspora and the eastern bloc countries providing support and assistance to the two parties.

In South Africa, groups such as the Zimbabwe Exiles Forum have been at the forefront of campaigning for Zimbabwean migrants’ rights as well as documenting the human rights abuses of President Mugabe’s ZANU (PF) party and members of the security forces. This is consistent with Levitt’s (2001) assertions that some political and immigrant groups articulate a dual agenda of advocating political integration in the host country while simultaneously encouraging migrants to stay active in homeland politics (see Chapter 6). The activities undertaken by migrants are consistent with Dunn’s (2005) views about political transnationalism of expatriates who militate against political regimes ‘at home’, as well as bilateral agreements between nations and the emerging influence of international NGOs. Similarly, Guarnizo’s (1997b) work on the political activities and influence of Dominican activists in the USA further attests to the growing power of migrants’ political transnationalism. Likewise, Levitt (2001b) highlights the importance of the formation of branches of major political parties from India, Mexico and Brazil in areas that have high concentrations of diaspora communities from these countries.

At the heart of the transnationalism discourse is the ability of migrants to sustain relationships in different nation states (Pasura, 2008). For example, some migrants in the UK have ties with their children in South Africa and Australia where they attend universities, and parents in Zimbabwe. For Glick Schiller et al (1992: 1-2) transmigrants are migrants ‘whose daily lives depend on multiple (familial, social, economic, political, organisational, and religious) and constant interconnections across international borders and whose public identities are configured in relationship to more than one state.’ In Caglar’s (2001: 607) analysis, current scholarship on transnationalism provides a new analysis of the increasing intensity and scope of circular flows of persons, goods, information and symbols triggered by international labour migration. It therefore follows from Caglar’s analysis that transnationalism is not just about migration but also circulation; this is important because it makes more visible low skilled migrants who have been neglected by traditional migration scholarship which, for example, focused on the migration of skilled professionals (Chikanda, 2007; Iredale, 2001). Some scholars argue that such an interpretation allows for a critical analysis of how migrants assemble and reconstitute their lives which are concurrently embedded in more than one society (Pasura, 2008; Tinarwo, 2011).
The concept of transnationalism has challenged scholars not to view migration in the binary focus of ‘emigration-immigration’ (Levitt and Glick Schiller, 2004). This view agrees with the work of Nyberg-Sorensen et al (2002) who posit that transnational approaches suggest that migration should be understood as social processes linking together countries of origin and destination. Likewise Magunha et al (2009) debunks the myth of migrants severing ties with their homeland when they settle in a new country. Portes et al (1999: 219) elevate this idea by suggesting that ‘transnational’ migration involves a significant number of people engaging in ‘sustained social contacts over time’, with more than just occasional trips and activities across national borders (see Section 2.4). The transnational practices of Zimbabwean migrants corroborate these claims as exemplified by the maintenance of ties with those at home as well as in other countries. As will be demonstrated in Chapters 7 and 8, migrants maintain regular contact with those at home whilst other migrants engage in dual living.

As Levitt and Schiller (2004) suggest, the emergence of the concept of transnationalism has been an attempt to explore migrants’ simultaneous embeddedness in more than one society. There is scholarly consensus that many contemporary migrants and their predecessors maintain various kinds of ties to their homelands concurrently with incorporation into host countries (Basch et al., 1994; Levitt and Jaworsky, 2007: 129); the transnational practices of Zimbabweans in the UK (Mbiba, 2005, 2012; McGregor, 2008, 2010; Pasura, 2008) and South Africa (Maphosa, 2007; Muzondidya, 2008) support this notion. Some Zimbabwean migrants have assumed transnational identities as evidenced by the fact that, despite becoming naturalised British and South Africans, they still describe themselves as Zimbabweans and visit Zimbabwe regularly (cf. Levitt, 2001). The act of assuming a new citizenship does not spell the end of migrants’ association with their home country and the people left behind. McGregor and Pasura (2010) demonstrated that some migrants in the UK of Zimbabwe attend themed events and activities such as national days, religious festivals and musical shows.

Emergent migration theories describe ways in which contemporary migrants live in ‘transnational communities’ (Pasura, 2008). Such types of migrant community, according to Portes (1997: 812), ‘comprise of dense networks across political borders created by immigrants in their quest for economic advancement and social recognition.’ Portes asserts that it is through these networks that an increasing number of people are able to live dual lives, that participants are often bilingual, move easily between different cultures, and frequently maintain homes in two countries as they pursue economic, political and cultural interests that require their presence in both. This explains the economic transnational activities of Zimbabwean entrepreneurs who have managed to set up businesses in Zimbabwe and travel frequently between Zimbabwe and South Africa and the UK. For migrants in South Africa in particular, and the UK to a lesser extent, the ability to converse in a local language is crucial to integration (Maphosa, 2004). Majoni-joni and Injiva (Section
2.4) for example, speak more than four South African languages to aid their ‘integration.’ Likewise, Magunha et al (2009) demonstrate how the ability to speak English encouraged Zimbabwean migrants to the UK as employers preferred migrants who could converse in English.

Some scholars have claimed that transnationalism has been deployed too broadly, with too little attention paid to place-specific variations in the form of cross-border activities and sensibilities (Foner, 1997a; Waldinger and Fitzgerald, 2004). This criticism highlights that some of the activities that are described as transnational are in fact translocal, taking place between a village in one place and a suburb in another, rather than in a transnational context (Waldinger and Fitzgerald, 2004:1182). However, this has been rebutted by some scholars because it fails to recognise that, even though the exchanges take place within villages or suburbs, they still retain a transnational identity as they involve people residing in different countries (Dunn, 2005).

Likewise, Fabricant (1998:26) opines that transnational theories ‘must address the yawning gulf separating those privileged groups apparently able to flit around the world at will from the much larger group of migrants threatened with incarceration.’ However, this criticism is unreliable; the majority of migrants are irregular (Chapter 5). Another criticism raised by Foner (1997a) and Smith (2001) pertains to the growing tendency to label some of migrants’ practices as transnational and therefore new, when in fact they have been in operation for a long time, many for centuries. The fact that they have been practised for a long time does not in itself deny their transnational nature. Foner (1997a:355) further claims that ‘transnationalism is not new, even though it often seems as if it were invented yesterday.’

Nonetheless, transnationalism, despite these criticisms, remains a valuable conceptual tool with which to investigate the complexity and multifacetedness of migration. The criticisms help to remind scholars to be rigorous when using this framework (Binaisa, 2009). Portes (2003) draws our attention to the idea that transnationalism is not a new occurrence but rather a novel perspective which enables the researcher to maintain attentiveness to the dynamic nature of the processes emanating from both migrants' home and host contexts. Similarly, Brettell (2000:104) reminds us that ‘as a theoretical construct about immigrant life and identity, transnationalism aptly suits the study of population movements in a world where improved modes of transportation as well as the images that are transmitted by means of modern telecommunications have shortened the social distance between sending and receiving countries.’

In the next four sections, I will discuss four salient aspects of transnationalism: social capital, transnational practices, return migration and the notion of the diaspora. By focusing on social capital within the debate on transnationalism, a greater understanding of the differences between the various migration episodes and flows
to South Africa and the UK can be constructed and situated. Such an approach will also deepen our understanding of how migrants’ transnational practices are informed by social capital, given the centrality of the latter in the transnationalism literature.

### 3.3.1 Embedding Social Capital in transnational migration

The role of social networks in fuelling and sustaining transnational migration by opening access to social support has received scholarly attention (Faist, 2004; Portes, 1996; Ryan et al., 2008). This thesis uses the notion of transnationalism to explore the ways in which the existence of personal and organisational ties facilitated the migration of Zimbabwean migrants to South Africa and the UK (Chapter 5) (cf. Granovetter, 1973; Poros, 2001). This approach agrees with Granovetter’s (1973) observation of the salience of ‘weak ties’ in opening and extending social contacts beyond dense friendship groups. Likewise, Tilly (1990: 84, cited in Vertovec, 2002) posits that,

> ‘Networks migrate...the effective units of migration were (and are) neither individuals nor households but sets of people linked by acquaintance, kinship, and work experience.’

It is important to highlight that social networks are instrumental in establishing transnational migration networks (Faist, 1997; Pries 2004). The migration of health and social care workers (Section 2.2.4) demonstrated the importance of personal and organisational ties.

Central to the transnationalism discourse, is the notion of social capital which has gained currency with scholars as a framework to understand international migration (Portes et al., 2007; Pieterse, 2003). Garip (2008) observes that migrants’ social capital is frequently conceptualised as a resource of information or assistance obtained through social ties to pioneer migrants (see Chapters 5, 6 and 7). This facilitatory role is similar to Böcker’s (1994) ‘bridgeheads’ function which binds migrants and non-migrants’ relationships spatially and reduces the risks and costs of migration for later migrants. The ‘bridgeheads’ facilitate migration by financing migration and meeting other pre and post migration related essential needs like accommodation, jobs, information and emotional support (Boyd, 1989: 651) (see Chapter 5).

Resources provided by pioneer migrants have been touted as critical to reducing the migration costs and ameliorating the risks of migration (Böcker, 1994; Massey et al., 2003). Crucially, migration networks, as the IOM (2003: 14) claims, facilitate the crossing of borders by migrants, legally or otherwise. The role of coyotes in Mexico and *maguma-guma*\(^{21}\) in Zimbabwe in facilitating informal migration into the USA and

---

\(^{21}\) Maguma-guma is a Shona term for gangs of crooks who patronise the Beitbridge border post engaging in criminal activities ranging from petty theft to facilitating the illegal crossing of goods and people through the
South Africa respectively demonstrate this (see Chapters 5). The coyotes and *maguma-guma* are not necessarily pioneer migrants but are agents who have become embedded in transnational networks.

There is a corpus of literature on Mexican migration to the USA which has demonstrated the importance of social capital in sustaining migration flows between the two countries (Curran *et al*., 2005; Espinosa and Massey, 1998; Massey and García-España, 1987; Winters, *et al*., 2001). Similarly, as this thesis will show, the emigration witnessed from Zimbabwe has been fuelled, sustained and maintained by the existence of social networks (see Chapter 2). Likewise, migrants’ return intentions have been shown to be rooted in the transnational linkages that they have with ‘home’ (Moran-Taylor and Menjivar, 2005) (see Chapters 7 and 8).

In his seminal work on social capital, Bourdieu (1986) defined it as the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to the possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition. He identified three forms of capital: cultural, economic, and social. Cultural capital has been described as ‘an ‘interpersonal identifier’ of social ranking which is only recognised as such by those who possess the legitimate culture (Lamont and Lareau, 1988: 158). Cultural capital can be taken to mean the symbolic capabilities that a person possesses and are usually embodied in language and behaviour (Ryan *et al*., 2008). Waters (2006) posits that cultural capital also manifests in educational qualifications.

Due to the existence of better opportunities to pursue further education in the UK, it is expected that migrants in the UK would have enhanced their educational and professional qualifications than their counterparts in South Africa. As shown in chapter 2, there is a widely held perception that South African and British education is superior to Zimbabwean education. Economic capital on the other hand, denotes the financial and material resources and assets that are available to potential migrants. Lastly, social capital can be provided by family, friends and acquaintances who may find resources to help a potential migrant or provide them with accommodation once they have arrived. Thus, as Bourdieu (1986) observed, social capital derives from the size and type of social networks a migrant can access and draw upon.

Putnam (1993) advances a wider definition of social capital to include features of social organisation such as networks, norms and social trust, which facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit. He also distinguishes the types of capital as bonding; bridging and linking social capital (see Chapter 6). Putnam (2007: 143) defines bonding social ties as that which bind people from the ‘same

---

border post and also through informal channels. Some of the maguma-guma are said to lie in wait for people trying to ‘border jump’ by traversing the river banks on both sides of the Limpopo river or in known paths used by migrants once they are on the South African side of the border.
background in some important way', while bridging social capital are ‘ties to people who are unlike me in some important way.’ For example, an asylum seeking migrant may identify fellow asylum seekers as ‘people who are like me’, as well as those from the same ethnic group or clan. In similar vein, Pieterse (2003) considers social capital to be the capacity of individuals to gain access to scarce resources by virtue of their membership of social networks or institutions (see Chapter 6 and Chapter 7). This observation is important for this research because some migrants depended on their membership of a social group for the resources that were needed to move. Once these migrants moved, they then helped others in their social group.

The social capital theory holds that the existence of social networks of information and assistance (social capital), significantly increases the likelihood of continued international migration between places of origin and destination (Chapter 5) (Massey, 2003). Eventually, argues Massey (2003:15), labour recruitment becomes superfluous, as, once begun, immigration displays a strong tendency to increase the growth and elaboration of migrant networks. Thus, according to this view, the existence of a community of immigrants in particular destination areas create a ‘family and friends’ (Massey, 2003) effect that channels immigrants to the same places, and facilitates their arrival and incorporation. The emigration of Zimbabwean social workers to the UK as demonstrated by Tinarwo (2011) was driven largely by the existence of social networks. Likewise, Chikanda (2010) and Gaidzanwa (1999) showed how Zimbabwean medical staff in South Africa relied on their social networks to find jobs once they had decided to leave Zimbabwe (section 2.5). Building on earlier work on social capital, Portes (1998:6) identified three strands of social capital as: the recipients (those making claims), the sources (those agreeing to those demands), and the resources themselves.

Drawing on Portes’ conceptualisation, Lin (2000:786) summarises the dimensions of social capital as: quantity and/or quality of resources an actor can access or use its location in a social network. Coleman (1998) reiterates the significance of resources that migrants can access from prior migrants and places these at the heart of social capital. Previous studies have highlighted the importance of transnational practices of established migrants in fuelling and sustaining migration (Massey et al., 1993). They achieve this by transmitting information to potential migrants about, for example, the availability of jobs and invitation letters that were needed to facilitate entry. The notion of the value of the resources being contingent on the strength of the relationship between sources and recipients resonates with a number of scholars (Porters, 2001; Garip, 2008). The availability of resources for newly arrived migrants or those contemplating migrating are important in initiating and sustaining migration. Scholars such as Garip (2008) and Massey et al (1993) argue that the resources pertaining to migration are shared with and utilised by potential migrants through social networks, which are a set of interpersonal ties based on kinship, friendship, or shared origin community which connect migrants and non-migrants (see Chapters 5
and 7). Similarly, Poros (2001) claims that subsisting interpersonal and/or organisational ties encourage migration in multiple ways and locations.

For the purpose of this study, I will use Garip’s (2008) interpretation of Portes’ terminology where migrant social capital is redefined as a resource (information flows or assistance with migrating) that recipients (potential migrants) access through their social ties to sources (prior migrants). In a departure from other definitions (see for example, Coleman, 1990; Putnam, 2000), this definition highlights the three dimensions of migrant social capital, which is important because each dimension affects migration propensities in different ways (Garip, 2008). According to Hugo (1981: 202), the information dissemination role of pioneer migrants is exemplified through the provision of information on opportunities, and support in the areas of travel, transportation, accommodation and work. For example, some migrants who claimed asylum at the port of entry in the UK had more resources than others as a result of their social ties (prior migrants) who had already gone through the immigration process, whilst others were helped with transportation costs. By using their networks, Zimbabwean migrants have been able to easily access information about immigration requirements, availability of work, education and training, thereby contradicting Aguilera’s (2005) observation that migrants need to stay in an area for considerably long periods of time in order to access information about labour markets. This is particularly true of migrants who constituted the eighth migration episode discussed in Chapter 2 who overstayed their visas during which period they acquired knowledge about the labour market and immigration process.

Three types of social capital have been identified: bonding, bridging and linking social capital (Putnam, 2000). These are relevant to this study as they not only help the migrants to travel but also to settle in new host communities. According to Putnam (2000), bonding social capital pervades relationships amongst members of a network who are similar in some form. For Woolcock (2003), bonding social capital essentialises the provision of social, physical and emotional support. Identity and status preservation are also thought to be central elements of bonding social capital (Szreter and Woolcock, 2004; Woolcock, 2003). He further claims that it exists between people with similar demographic characteristics like family members, neighbours, church members, close friends and work colleagues. Some commentators see bonding social capital forming in homogeneous communities (Putnam, 1993, 2003; Leigh and Putnam, 2002) which does not appear to hold for Zimbabwean migrants in Leeds and Limpopo; communities that are far from being homogenous but exhibit high levels of bonding social capital.

The strength of migrants’ bonding and bridging capital is demonstrated during times of crisis such as deaths (Mbiba, 2010) (see Chapters 6). Such displays of bonding social capital are consistent with Hawkins and Maurer (2010) who posit that migrants and societies give help to their immediate or proximal networks. For example, in Leeds, it is common for migrants to meet and discuss their ‘stories’ prior to going to
‘claim’ asylum at the Home Office. Zimbabwean entrepreneurs also utilise bonding social capital. For example, in both countries, entrepreneurial migrants who run businesses rely on information provided by other Zimbabweans already running a business about how to navigate regulatory barriers. There is evidence of overlap; it is possible for migrants to exploit all three types of social capital simultaneously.

Migrants are also reliant on bridging social capital. Bridging social capital, according to Szreter and Woolcock (2004) refers to relationships amongst people who are unrelated in a demonstrable fashion, such as age, socio-economic status, race/ethnicity and education. It is important to highlight that these forms of social capital are relied upon both in the receiving and sending country. Thus, bridging social capital links people who do not share any commonalities (Agger, 1998). Common interest and voluntarism join people from heterogeneous backgrounds. Bridging social capital is considered to be valuable for social cohesion as it encourages migrants to associate with people from backgrounds other than their own (Uslander and Conley, 2003). Majoni-joni/injiva in South Africa demonstrate migrants’ ability to mobilise and utilise bridging and cultural capital to enhance their chances of ‘blending in.’ Similarly, the migration of skilled professionals, such as health and social care workers, to South Africa and the UK reveals the importance of cultural capital (language, skills and educational qualifications) (Chikanda, 2010; Tinarwo, 2011).

Linking social capital on the other hand, refers to migrants’ ties to influential people through whom migrants can access services and resources which they can use for their own social mobility (Garip, 2008; Woolcock, 2003). Portes (2007) emphasises the ties linking individuals or groups which they belong to, to people or groups in positions of political or financial power. Several Zimbabwean and non-Zimbabwean groups provide linking social capital to migrants in South Africa, the UK and at home in transnational social fields (see Section 3.2). For example, asylum seekers in both Leeds and Limpopo receive legal help from charities and institutions. The I Believe in Jesus Church in Musina provides newly arrived male migrants with accommodation whilst they await the conclusion of their asylum cases, while in Leeds; groups such as Immigration Advisory Services provide legal aid. Membership of a political party such as MDC can also be considered a form of linking social capital which helps migrants in Leeds to acquire documented status, which further builds their linking, bonding and social capital. Linking social capital is characterised by exposure to and development of new ideas, values and perspectives (Woolcock, 2001; Szreter and Woolcock, 2004) which migrants are able to use in their host country as well as passing them on to those left behind, for example information about the availability of scholarships in South Africa, UK and other parts of the world. However, as Granovetter (1973) points out, there are attendant dangers to migrants being embedded in organisations or institutions such as churches and political organisations as they have weak organisational ties.
An interesting dimension of linking capital pertains to vertical relations that help individuals gain access to resources from formal institutions for social and economic development (Woolcock, 1998; Woolcock and Narayan, 2000). There are several reasons why migrants engage in vertical relations with organisations like the Home Office (UK) or Department of Home Affairs (South Africa). Engagement with these agencies strengthens migrants’ transnational practices; achieving documented status as will be demonstrated in Chapter 6, promotes circulation as migrants are then able to travel home frequently and legally (Chapter 8). Additionally, transnationalism would be promoted as the migrants would be able to bring their families to their residences for short visits. As Woolcock (2003) notes, linking social capital with regards to immigrants implies the need for government intervention to implement policies to grant new immigrants citizenship and help them access formal resources. The formal resources so granted are not only consumed ‘in-situ’ but are also utilised for the benefit of those left at home.

Some scholars have questioned the utility of social capital as a framework of explaining migration (Hawkins and Maurer, 2010). Critics have pointed out that not all migration assistance translates into migration as some established migrants act as ‘gatekeepers’ (Epstein, 2008) who may be unwilling to help potential migrants as much as ‘bridgeheads’ (Böcker 1994). Consequently, Portes (1998: 2) dismisses the concept of social capital as a fad and criticises it for being something of a cure-all for the maladies affecting society both in the sending and receiving country. Similarly, Pawar (2006:2) laments the inconsistencies in the manner in which it is applied, interpreted and used across a number of disciplines. Pawar’s criticisms echo those of other commentators such as Harris and De Renzio (1997) and Fine (1999, 2001) who dislike the way the concept is being applied in so many different contexts and ways, leading to confusion.

Similarly, Portes (1998) observes discriminatory and exclusionary overtones in the way social capital is used in some migrant communities. For example, some migrants in both South Africa and the UK were isolated from participating in marounds22 (roscas) on the basis of religion, employment status and area of origin in Zimbabwe (Chapter 6) (Portes and Landolt, 1996). Yet other irregular migrants appeared trapped in their own community which can lead to exploitation by documented migrants (Kim, 1988). Prior research has highlighted the isolation of Polish migrants in the UK (Janta, 2009), which has implications for Zimbabwean migrants due to their reliance on networks. As highlighted by Das (2004), migrants’ capabilities to build up their social capital are impeded by time constraints as they regularly work long hours due to the need to meet their societal obligations at home. This has resonance with the work of Pasura (2008) which noted how male Zimbabwean migrants in Britain did not have time to socialise with people outside.

---

22 Marounds – savings’ club that usually comprise of 5-10 people who make monthly financial contributions which are given to each member on a rotational basis.
their networks because they worked double shifts. As noted by Garip (2008), the social practices of people have to be analysed in all their complexity, given that these are shaped by several factors. For example, in this study, some migrants' social practices are shaped and influenced by their transnational practices.

The next section reviews literature on remittances which is integral to the concept of transnationalism and explores how this fits in this study.

### 3.3.2 Remittances: The new panacea to developmental problems?

Transnational linkages that migrants have with people left behind or living elsewhere are fundamental to this thesis. This is because remittances are an exemplary form of migrant transnationalism by which migrants maintain transnational links with their home country (Vertovec, 2004). Some scholars posit that migrants’ remitting behaviour have a bearing on their return intentions; this mirrors the final objective of this study (Chapter 8). It is pertinent to point out here that remittances are a form of transnationalism through which material, emotional and symbolic ties are maintained between migrants and those left behind or elsewhere (Basch et al., 1994; Vertovec, 1999; Portes, 2001). This section reviews literature on remittances and assesses claims of their developmental role.

The phenomenal growth in the volume of remittances over the last decade has increased the interest of researchers and International Financial Institutions, such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in further examining the potential role that remittances can play in poverty eradication in receiving countries. Such is their growth in stature and prominence in the migration-development discourse that they are now being lauded as the ‘new development mantras’ (Datta et al., 2007; De Haas, 2005; Kapur, 2004). Whilst the exact amount remitted to the developing countries may never be known due to the existence and proliferation of multiple informal remittance transfer channels, there is a growing consensus that vast sums of money have been remitted during the past decade (Maimbo and Ratha, 2005). The latest figures from the World Bank indicate that US$351 billion was remitted to developing countries in 2011, an 8 percent jump from US$323 billion remitted in 2010 (Mohapatra et al., 2011) of which US$40 billion went to Africa. Datta et al., (2007), estimate that about £1.5 billion was remitted from the UK alone in 2005 to more than 50 developing countries.

Scholars such as Datta et al. (2007) and Crush (2005) concur that informal remittance transfers schemes are particularly apparent in countries where there are stringent controls on foreign exchange, differential exchange rates that inhibit the use of formal systems, for example in Zimbabwe prior to dollarization where the official exchange rates were far below those of the parallel black market, political instability and low levels of financial development (see Chapters 5 and 7). The notion of dual exchange rates as impediments to formal transfers is corroborated by
Bracking and Sachikonye (2008) who observed a high degree of economic informality in their study of remitting behaviour in Zimbabwean households. Drawing on the work of Freud and Spatafora (2005) they concluded that informal remittances to Sub-Saharan Africa are encouraged by a dual exchange rate. Informal transfer schemes are also thought, according to Kapur (2004), to reflect the use of high levels of social capital and trust, and are typified by low transaction costs as well as quick delivery to often remote rural households in recipient countries (see Chapter 7).

The growth of the informal transfer schemes resulted in a recent review concluding that the economies of countries such as Fiji, Somalia and Surinam are in a much better state than official figures imply due to highly developed informal remittance systems (Pieke et al., 2005). Recognising the scale and magnitude of the informal channels, The World Bank (2005) acknowledged that remittances transferred through agents such as informal operators or travellers may be nearly as large as remittances through official channels (see Chapter 7). The remitting practices of Zimbabwean migrants have been recognised for their important role of averting the total economic collapse of the country which astounded economists and scholars alike, who had predicted the imminent collapse as far back as 2000 (Bratton and Masunungure, 2011). In fact, it can be argued that in the case of Zimbabwe, remittances have played a far more decisive role in the people’s livelihoods and survival than they are credited for.

Extant literature on remittances suggests that they are used for consumption (Stark, 1991). Such ‘unproductive’ uses include basic consumption needs, buying medicines, building houses, and spending on conspicuous consumption (Black, 2003b). Remittances from Zimbabweans in the diaspora have been used to augment incomes of impoverished Zimbabweans for rent, food, basic utility and medical bills. Zimbabweans remit money to pay school fees for their children, siblings and relatives as well as paying for ancillary education based costs such as uniforms and stationary (see Chapter 7) (Bloch, 2008; Mbiba, 2005). There are also cases of some Zimbabweans paying for university education of their siblings and children who are studying at South African, Australian, Canadian and New Zealand universities due to the collapse of state owned universities in Zimbabwe.

Prior to the formation of the coalition government in February 2009, entrepreneurs ran medical service companies which enabled diaspora Zimbabweans to buy medicines such as Anti-retroviral (ARV) medicines for their families and relatives who were affected by HIV/AIDS at home. Datta et al (2007) argued that, while paying for educational expenses is mainly altruistic, it is also a form of risk-spreading in that it helps in the development of cultural capital which may translate in better employment chances. There is an expectation that those who would have been helped in their studies would reciprocate the help they receive later in life. The
reasons for remitting therefore debunk Black’s (2003b) ‘unproductive’ consumption tag.

It is widely acknowledged that foreign currency transfers carried out by Zimbabweans in the diaspora surpasses earnings from all the other economic sectors, although it is not possible to quantify the volume of remittances due to the diversity of transfer practices, as well as the channels of transfer hidden due to the dualistic nature of the Zimbabwean economy (Tevera and Chikanda, 2009). This research argues that in a country such as Zimbabwe which is currently grappling with economic, political and humanitarian crises, remittances have become integral to people’s livelihoods. The importance of migrant remittances to the lives of those left behind is demonstrated by the findings of a C-Safe (2003) study. The study found out that 28.5 per cent of households regarded remittances as one of their income strands. Bloch (2005) posits that remittances can help to reduce poverty within particular households and have a wider impact due to improved education, health, and housing, and therefore better human development.

Some literature on transnationalism has noted the growing involvement of state institutions in harnessing migrants’ resources for development (Guarnizo and Smith, 1998). Countries like India and Mexico have been at the forefront of soliciting the support of their non-resident citizens to play bigger economic and political roles in their home countries (De Haas, 2006; Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003). During the crisis in Zimbabwe, the government, through the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) conceived a foreign currency harvesting initiative called the Homelink/Kumusha/Ekhaya scheme. The scheme was launched by the Governor of RBZ, Dr Gideon Gono in May 2004 and aimed to encourage the Zimbabwean diaspora to remit using formal channels rather than the informal channels which they were favouring (Gono, 2008).

The actions of the Reserve Bank lend credence to observations of political elites actively trying to tap into the resources of the migrant communities abroad (Al-Ali et al., 2001; Itzigsohn, 2000). Observers saw this as an admission by the government that it had failed to curb the thriving parallel market which offered higher rates than the government (Mbibu, 2005). As part of the initiative, the RBZ Governor toured top foreign currency generating countries such as South Africa, the UK, USA and Botswana, seeking to portray his latest venture as a noble and patriotic cause that diaspora Zimbabweans should embrace with open arms (Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2005b). Unquestionably, the scheme has not been successful. As Maphosa (2007) posits, only a paltry US$23.6 million had been remitted through the Homelink facility by July 2004 and the recent dollarization of the Zimbabwean economy confirms the failure of the RBZ and the government to arrest its economic decline.
Previous studies have revealed that remittances are usually sent to close relatives, and small amounts and transfers are likely to be most frequent from temporary migrants whose links with their countries of origin are still close which may indicate their return intentions (see for instance, Bloch, 2006; Crush, 2007; De Haan, 2006; Ratha, 2003). It has also been established that remittances decline over time for migrants with settled status, although a substantial proportion of long-term migrants still send money back to their relatives. This agrees with evidence of Zimbabweans in both countries who appear to be focused on consolidating their lives in the new host country rather than sending money home.

A study by Mbiba (2010) about Zimbabweans’ remitting behaviour, found out that those with insecure legal and economic status in the UK send proportionately more money back home than for example, professionals with documented status. This may be accounted by the fact that the UK and South African governments’ deportation policies target undocumented migrants thereby making them susceptible to exploitation, so they will endeavour to build their financial reserves in a short time and invest it back home as a strategy against their potential capture and eventual deportation.

3.3.3 Return Migration

The preceding sections have demonstrated how transnationalism has shifted arguments about migration from being a one way process to one where it is recognised as a ‘continuous regime of migration, return, and re-migration’ (King and Christou, 2011:455). This is consistent with the postulation of Ammassari and Black (2001: 12) that return does not suggest the ‘closure of the migration cycle… [but is] one of the multiple steps of a continued movement.’ As Ghosh (2000, cited in Olesen, 2002:135) cryptically suggests ‘return migration is the great unwritten chapter in the history of migration.’ Some migration scholars have projected return migration as ‘a mirage than a reality’ (Guarnizo, 1997:286), ‘myth of return’ (Anwar 1979), ‘ideology of return’ (Brettell 1979), and ‘return illusion’ (Hoffmann-Nowotny 1978).

The subject of return migration has elicited various permutations regarding the multiple possible meanings of ‘home’ (Brah, 1997), ‘homeland’ (Koser and Black, 1999) and ‘homecoming’ (Warner, 1994; Stefansson, 2004). For scholars such as Koser and Black (1999:7), home ‘can represent a return to the refugee’s country of origin; but more generally, it is seen as more specific than that, involving the place of origin, perhaps the refugee’s own house or land that was abandoned at the time of flight and may be imbued with social, cultural, spiritual, or economic values.’ An increasing number of scholars concur that return does not need necessarily connote ‘going home’ (Hammond, 2004:3) as some ‘returned migrants have settled in areas other than their areas of origin’ (Black, 2002: 131). For scholars such as Black and King (2004:80), the transnational discourse can be argued to be a form of return
which agrees with the work of Ley and Kobayashi (2005: 113) which asserts that for some migrants ‘return migration is less a final adjustment than another stage in a continuing itinerary.’

Reasons for return are both multiple and complex and include migrants’ experiences in the host country as well as those in the home country. Scholars such as Moran-Taylor and Menjivar (2005: 95) posit that migrants’ return intentions are shaped by their perceptions of place, attachment to place and sense of belonging while other commentators argue that motivation to return is sometimes influenced by a mixture of negative and positive quality of life factors (Gmelch, 1983; Michalos, 1997; Boyle et al., 1999). This agrees with the sentiments of Guarnizo (1997:287) which proffers that ‘the effects of migration, particularly of return migration, vary widely and are indeterminate because they depend on the contexts that migrants encounter abroad and upon return, and on the particular connections and obligations they have with their kin and communities.’

Migration literature suggests that migrants are motivated to return by a combination of factors which include economic, social, political and geographic factors (Cerase, 1974; King, 2000; Moran-Taylor and Menjivar, 2005; Agunias, 2006; Haour-Knipe and Davies, 2008). Studies which have investigated the return intentions of Caribbean communities have highlighted the importance of racism and discrimination in instigating return (cf. Leavy et al., 2004; Phillips and Potter, 2005; Potter and Phillips, 2005). These studies contend that racism and discrimination curtail the migrants’ economic and social opportunities (Modood et al., 1997). King (2000) developed a four pronged typology which captures the four main reasons that have been advanced by scholars to explain migrants’ return intentions (Table 3.2). The four main factors that King (2000) identified are:

- Economic
- Social
- Family/ life cycle
- Political

King's taxonomy captures the complexity and connectedness of the factors which influence return migration in both the host and home country. The importance of economic factors in hastening migrants’ return intentions cannot be overemphasised. The current global economic downturn has hit developed countries hard thereby hastening some migrants’ return home (Ratha et al., 2011). On the other hand, improving economic conditions in the country of origin may lure migrants back home which have resonance with Todaro’s (1969) neoclassical migration theory where return is considered as a consequence of a failed migration experience in terms of anticipated earnings and employment.
Table 3.2  Causes and Effects of Return Migration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cause Factors</th>
<th>Effect Factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• More jobs/better wages at home</td>
<td>• Employment changes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Unemployment/end of contract</td>
<td>• Effect on wages Use of savings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Desire to invest savings</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Racial hostility/difficulty in integration</td>
<td>• Change in status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Homesickness Desire for enhanced status</td>
<td>• Change in social structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family/Life Cycle</td>
<td>Geographical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Retirement Parental ties</td>
<td>• Destination of return and subsequent moves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Marriage Children’s education</td>
<td>• Landscape effects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Government policy at sending and receiving ends</td>
<td>• Local politics Voting patterns</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Haour-Knipe and Davies (2008), King (2000:14)

On the other hand, the New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) theory considers return migration as a consequence of a ‘calculated strategy’ (Cassarino, 2004) conceptualised at the household level and resulting from the attainment of the target that would have initialled emigration. Proponents of NELM theory such as Stark (1991: 26) assert that it

‘...shifts the focus of migration theory from individual independence … to mutual interdependence by viewing it as part of a household decision rather than an individual decision.’

According to Cassarino (2004), the NELM approach views return as the closure of the migration cycle by migrants who would have successfully achieved their targets by working in abroad.
However, some scholars have berated both the neoclassical economics and NELM approaches to return migration for privileging economic and financial factors at the expense of other equally important factors such as familial relationships (Lynn-Ee Ho, 2008; Tiemoko, 2004). The second criticism pertains to excessive focus on the migrants alone and their motivations for return (Cassarino, 2004). This, as alluded to earlier, hinges on the isolation of other non-economic factors e.g. social and political environment from migrants’ decisions and strategies to return.

King’s (2000) analysis gives more prominence to non-economic than economic factors in shaping migrants’ return plans. Haour-Knipe and Davies (2008) concur, arguing that economic arguments are contextual rather than paramount: migrants may return when economic conditions in the country of origin improve but cite family ties, and the desire to rejoin family and old friends as their motivations for return. In her study of Jamaican migrants returning home, Thomas-Hope (1999) observed two salient factors: the personal and domestic circumstances of the individual and his or her family (factors such as age and stage in career and household life cycle) as well as perceived conditions in the country of origin (including ‘comfort level’, environment, cost of living, level of crime, opportunities for investment, political stability and attitudes towards returning migrants) (Thomas-Hope, 1999 cited in Haour-Knipe and Davies, 2008).

Such studies claim that migrants’ life cycle is particularly important as the potential to return for migrants who have been away from home for long periods are denuded rendering them unlikely to return than those who have been there for a few years. However, scholars such as Wessendorf (2010: 375) refute this arguing that ‘roots migrants are in search of a place that provides them with a sense of belonging’ while King and Christou (2010: 109) claim that ‘the search for ‘belonging’ and ‘home’ is often an extremely powerful, emotional and even life-changing experience: an enactment of family heritage across time and space’.

Likewise, Iredale et al (2003) posit that skilled migrants’ decision to return are a result of careful consideration of personal factors, career-related prospects and the economic/political/ environmental climate in the home country. Such scholarship resonate with the work of Tiemoko (2004) which gives prominence to social and family factors in migrants’ return intentions as highlighted in Chapter 2. Some scholarship finds a causal association between return and gender in which women showed an inclination to return due to being family oriented than men (Guarnizo, 1997).

As Iredale et al (2003) posit, return intentions predicated on family reasons are likely to be cited by migrants who would not have successfully integrated in the host country than their peers who would have successfully transitioned to life in the destination country.
As Castles (1999) claims, we inhabit an age of migration characterised by affordable transportation and communication which have radically altered migration. Advancements in information communication technologies, air transportation have enhanced communication between migrants and those at home as well as facilitating the maintenance of physical ties. Frequent visits through holidaying in the home country helps migrants to assess progress of the projects that they are undertaking at home as well as, according to Haour-Knipe and Davies (2008), maintain ‘social visibility.’

Some studies have found that migrants maintain links with those left behind by engaging in regular visits home and as demonstrated in the preceding section, investing in property in preparation for eventual return (Cassarino, 2004; Thomas-Hope 1999). Scholars such as Saxenian (2006) for example, claim that the sustenance of these links is meant to aid the migrants on their future return while Meyer (2001) pointed out to the maintenance of professional registrations by South African migrants in the global North as pointers of these skilled migrants’ return intentions. Others, such as Oxfeld and Long (2004) observe that holiday visits have been used by migrants as strategy to assuage and overcome initial fears and hesitations about return. However, Conway et al (2009) claim that whilst repetitive return visits are useful for ‘keeping in touch’, the link to return migration was often tenuous as they do not automatically result in return.

Return is increasingly being seen as one stage of the migration cycle and not as the end of it as previously thought (Cassarino, 2004) as it may be a forerunner of further episodes of spatial mobility (Haour-Knipe and Davies, 2008), embedded in a cyclical process of repeat migrations increasingly referred to as ‘circular migration’ (Elkan, 1967; Hugo, 1977) and ‘astronaut migration’ (Ho et al., 1997). Extant literature suggests that return is no longer permanent, but according to Ammassari and Black (2001 cited in Agunias, 2006: 14) ‘temporary and even cyclical…a stage along a process of increasingly fluid movements between countries.’ In Chapter 2, it was discussed how Zimbabwean migrants working in South Africa return home only to return again once the farming season starts which Redfoot and Houser (2005) refer to as living ‘between’ or ‘across’ two countries, economies and cultures. These increased mobilities have been enhanced by unprecedented transformations that have occurred in the transport and communications sector which have made it ‘possible for transnational connections – including visits home – to be sustained at a greater density and multiplicity than in the past’ (Portes et al., 1999 cited in King and Christou, 2011: 455).

Disenchanted with the neoclassical and NELM perspectives to return migration, some scholars have explored it within structural approaches which privileges social and institutional factors in both the sending and destination countries (Cerase, 1974; Cassarino, 2004). Cerase (1974) identifies four types of return migrants; return of failure, return of conservatism, return of retirement and return of innovation. Return
of failure relates to migrants who choose to return because of failure to integrate in the host country owing to prejudices and stereotypes. The return of conservatism refers to the return of migrants who would have satisfied their set targets e.g. property acquisition. The third category is what Cerase identified as the return of retirement which is associated with migrants’ life course. This is consistent with some studies which have found out that some migrants tend to return home on retirement (Ley and Kobayashi, 2005).

The return of innovation refers to the return of migrants with superior human capital acquired in the destination country which is then deployed for social mobility in the country of origin (Cerase, 1974: 251). Migrants predicate their return on the newly acquired skills and savings made during stay in exile which they hope to invest thereby cementing their role as ‘innovators’ and ‘carriers of change’ (Cerase, 1974). For migrants in this category, the perceived opportunities that exist in the country of origin are considered against the experiences currently being experienced in the host country. However, returning migrants’ intentions are often dashed because of the resilience and strong power relations and vested interests of traditional power structures (Cassarino, 2004). Similarly, King and Christou (2010) have shed light on the ‘return of social realism’ whereby the initial ‘calling home’ notion differs significantly with what obtains on the ground which may be characterised by confrontations, frustrations, and general annoyances with the social and cultural institutions in the place and its wider behavioural norms and practices.

The transnational approach to return migration has gained currency with scholars as it differs from the structural, neoclassical and NELM approaches. Instead, it posits that return migration is not the end of the migration cycle but as an essential part of circular socio-economic relationships and exchanges linking migrants and those at home (Chapman and Prothero, 1983). These transnational links as explained earlier take place in transnational social fields where knowledge, information and remittances are exchanged and flow. While some migrants choose to return home, it is equally true that others elect to remain in the host country having successfully integrated. Migrants who remain form the pioneering diasporic communities and provide resources that potential migrants can benefit from in future migration cycles.

3.3.4 The notion of Diaspora and diasporic communities

Notwithstanding the growing importance of transnationalism in migration discourse, it would be remiss of me not to briefly discuss the notion of diaspora given the role it has played in informing contemporary migration scholarship. Indeed this view is shared by a number of migration scholars such as Berking (2004:103) who claims that ‘Diasporas are everywhere.’ Modern diasporas, according to Shuval (2000), now encompasses an array of groups such as political refugees, illegal immigrants, guest workers, immigrants, expellees, ethnic and racial minorities, and overseas communities. This is relevant to this study because the Zimbabwean diaspora
consists of disparate groups, as identified by Shuval. Common in the academic
definition of a diaspora, as propounded and propagated by classical diaspora
theorists (Cohen 1997; Safran 1991; Sheffer 2003), is that it is rooted in the
triumvirate of history of dispersal, connections with the homeland (in term of myths,
memories, desire for eventual return), and a collective identity or boundary
maintenance (Brubaker, 2005, Pasura, 2008a, 2008b).

There is a scholarly consensus that a diaspora embodies a notion of a centre, a
locus, a ‘home’ from where the diaspora occurs and that at the heart of the notion of
diaspora is the image of a journey (Brah, 1996). Zimbabwean migrants domiciled in
South Africa and the UK self identify and are identified by those at home as being in
the diaspora and harbour thoughts of eventually returning home (see Chapters 7 and
8). Others, as highlighted in Chapter 2, despite ‘circulating’ between home and host
country, still self identify and are identified as members of the diaspora. Thus,
transnational practices do not completely remove diasporic feelings and tags. Only
permanent return is capable of expunging these labels and identities (see Chapter
8).

The notion of a ‘home’ that Brah (1996) raises is picked up and expanded by Shuval
(2000) who argues that the diaspora discourse reflects a sense of being part of an
ongoing transnational network that includes dispersed people who retain a sense of
their uniqueness and an interest in their homeland. As McGregor and Pasura (2011)
demonstrate, Zimbabwean migrants keenly follow political, social and economic
developments in their homeland. This is evidenced by their attendance at
Zimbabwean themed functions like Independence Day celebrations, musical shows
and political gatherings (Pasura, 2008a). Another useful way of judging such interest
is by scrutinising articles which are written by migrants, or comments on diaspora
stories that appear regularly in Zimbabwe based newspapers. Here, migrants
engage in passionate debate with editors and reporters about governance and
economic issues and the potential role that they can play in the country’s
development.

Diasporas have been described as ‘the exemplary communities of the transnational
moment’, further, that the diaspora discourse reflects a sense of being part of an
ongoing transnational network that includes a homeland (Shuval, 2000). Shuval
further says that transnationalism is characterised by a sense of living in one place
while simultaneously remembering and/or desiring and yearning for another place.
Even though migrants may be living and working in South Africa and the UK, they
still harbour feelings of returning home. Further, Brah (1996) contends that at any
given moment in time, the sense of connection to a homeland must be strong
enough to resist forgetting, assimilating or distancing (see Chapter 8). For some
Zimbabwean migrants, integration has been used as a vehicle through which they
can secure themselves in the host country, although this has not been at the
expense of severing ties with the homeland which contradicts Brah’s assertion. The
case of *majoni-joni/injiva* in South Africa exemplifies how migrants are able to use their cultural capital for integration purposes as outlined in Chapter 2. Connection with home persists for most migrants because of the people left at home; for example, parents and other family members.

According to Safran (1991), a group can only be called a diaspora if circumstances dictating their move involved a destroyed homeland, expulsion from homeland, and experiences of trauma. This is important in this study because of the factors which compelled Zimbabweans the country of their birth which were highlighted in Chapter 2. It was argued in Chapter 2 that the second migration episode was spawned by the violence which took place in Matebeleland and Midlands provinces which suggests that the victims of this violence conform to Safran’s classification of what constitute a diaspora. Safran identified the basic characteristics of a diaspora to include:

- dispersal from an original ‘centre’ to two or more foreign regions, e.g. South Africa and the UK;
- retentions of a collective memory, vision or myth about their original homeland including its location, history and achievements e.g. free health and education at independence;
- the belief that they are not – and perhaps never can be – fully accepted in their host societies and so remain partly separate e.g. *makwere-kwere*, asylum seeker, immigrants;
- the idealisation of the putative ancestral home and the thought of returning when conditions are more favourable e.g. MDC in power, removal of President Mugabe from power;
- the belief that all members should be committed to the maintenance or restoration of the original homeland and to its safety and prosperity e.g. governance reforms to curb and eradicate corruption, return of the rule of law; and
- a strong ethnic group consciousness sustained over a long time and based on a sense of distinctiveness, a common history, and the belief in a common fate e.g. Ndebele people (Safran, 1991: 83-84).

The preceding discussion about the diaspora was meant to compare how the Zimbabwean diaspora highlighted in Chapter 2 compares with established diaspora such as the Jewish diaspora. It may be that Zimbabwean migrants do not fit into the archetypal diasporas as they may consider themselves to be in exile until the political and economic situation at home normalises. Having discussed the concept of diaspora and its history, the next section explores how the various themes can be consolidated into a conceptual framework for this study. Such a framework recognises the growing role and influence of transnationalism in migration literature.
3.4 Conclusion

This chapter reviewed the available literature on transnationalism, which helps to provide a framework for understanding migration. The transnational perspective of migration can help us understand why Zimbabweans moved at the time that they did. Migration is a complex phenomenon which cannot comprehensively be explained by one theory. The symbiotic and strong structural and economic relationships that were built between Harare, London and Pretoria during the colonial era played a crucial role in the decisions of migrants about where to move to (Mabogunje, 1970), as was the existence of social networks (Massey, 2003). The notion of transnationalism has been invoked to help explain why migrants continue to maintain ties with their homeland. The available reviewed literature suggests that contact with home is crucial to the lives of those in the diaspora (McGregor, 2008; Mbiba, 2010).

This chapter has disclosed that ties with the homeland are maintained through a range of activities including remittances and political activism. The stock of remittances has been shown to be rising due to dwindling foreign aid from the North to the South. Remittances themselves are a sign of migrants’ return intentions which are predicated on socio-economic, political and life cycle factors. The literature has demonstrated that leaving home is one aspect of the migration process. The chapter also explored literature on return migration which is central to this study given the recent political developments in Zimbabwe. Migrants’ return intentions were shown to be a consequence of multiple and interconnected factors including economic, social, political and geographical factors. However, as shown in Chapter 2, obtaining documented status through asylum seeking is a complex process which has left many migrants are languishing in the asylum process in both South Africa and the UK. The next chapter will discuss the research aims and questions used to generate and gather data in this study.
Chapter Four Research Design and Methodology

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents and discusses the methodological framework and the processes of research design that were used to generate data to fulfil the demands of the research aim and question. To reiterate, the aim of this research is to unveil the complexities embedded in the transnational linkages between migrants in South Africa, the UK and Zimbabwe. The research used a mixed methods approach to capitalise on the strengths of both qualitative and quantitative methods (McKendrick, 1999; Sporton, 1999). A questionnaire survey was used to collect initial data due to the dearth of credible statistics of Zimbabweans in both South Africa and the UK. The questionnaire survey was complemented by qualitative methods which included semi-structured interviews with selected migrants and key informants as well as multi-sited ethnography. The semi-structured interviews privileged migrants’ voices to reveal their perspectives on migration experiences and transnational lifestyles, as well as their potential to return. Such an approach was considered to be appropriate not only to ensure breadth and diversity of the data but also the validity of the findings. The mixed methods approach ensured that results can be checked for rigour through triangulation. In short, this was preferred due to the complexity of the study, and to ensure rigour.

This chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.2 explains why Leeds and Limpopo were chosen as the case studies for this study. This will be followed by an exploration of the research strategy, specifically how the fieldwork was conducted in South Africa and the UK and the multiple methods that were used in data gathering. Other sections consider the issue of researcher’s positionality and reflexivity, access and ethical considerations.

4.2 Study areas

Fieldwork was conducted in Leeds, UK and Limpopo Province, South Africa. This was informed by the distinctiveness and differences of the migration channels outlined in Chapter 2 and characteristics of Zimbabweans in these two countries which have implications for their transnational lifestyles (see Chapters 3 and 7), connections and return (see Chapter 8). Furthermore, the choice of the two areas was predicated on maximising diversity and differences given the two countries’ different stages of economic, technological and political development; i.e. South Africa; a country with a fairly developed economy but blighted by multiple inequalities and the UK - a developed country. A significant number of Zimbabweans in Leeds are highly skilled, have undertaken complex, and often costly, migrations

---

23 South Africa is not considered to be a developing country by the World Bank which classes it as a newly industrialising country and therefore classifies it in the same mould as Brazil, Russia, India and China forming the so-called BRICS countries.
and have different human, social and economic capital endowments than their Limpopo based counterparts. On the other hand as demonstrated in Chapter 2, Limpopo province is home to a large number of unskilled Zimbabweans who practice seasonal and circular migration. This Zimbabwean population as outlined in Chapter 2 consists largely of informal migrants who maintain strong connections with their families at home. The migrants who constituted the episodes discussed in Chapter 2 differed in terms of their skills base, education, ethnicity, gender and class.

### 4.2.1 Leeds

Leeds was selected as the focus in the UK because it is the third largest city with a population of approximately 750,000 people (Leeds City Council, 2011). It is home to a sizeable Zimbabwean community which Magunha et al (2009) estimate to be about 10,000 while other commentators have suggested that there are 50,000 Zimbabweans resident in the city and its precincts. The Zimbabwean population in Leeds, and indeed the entire Yorkshire region, owes its origins largely to channelling of Zimbabwean health and social care workers by recruitment agencies to work in the NHS trusts and local authorities in the region (Magunha et al., 2009).

Chapter 2 showed that health institutions and local authorities in the UK launched aggressive recruitment forays into Zimbabwe for health and social care staff (McGregor, 2008; Pasura, 2008). The role of social networks in the dramatic increase of migrants in Leeds and the surrounding towns cannot be underestimated (see Chapters 3 and 5). Health and social care professionals and other migrants already settled in the region provided important information to prospective migrants in Zimbabwe, and others already in the country, about job opportunities (Granovetter, 1973).

Adding to this significant population is the central government’s clustering policy of dispersing asylum seekers by language and ethnicity, through the National Asylum Support Service (NASS) (Hynes, 2011; Valentine et al., 2007). NASS is responsible for providing accommodation and support services to asylum seekers and a major aspect of its work has been to decongest London and the South East by dispersing asylum seekers to areas outside London (Valentine et al., 2007; Lewis et al., 2008). As Stewart (2012) notes, Leeds with slightly over 2,000 asylum seekers, had the highest number of dispersed asylum seekers in the Yorkshire and Humber region in 2006 which significantly boosted the clustered population (Table 4.1). According to the Yorkshire Migration Partnership, approximately 5547 Zimbabwean asylum seekers were in NASS accommodation in the Yorkshire and Humber region between 2006 and 2010 (personal communication, 2010).

---

24 Personal communication with Solomon, chairman of Zimbabwe Leeds Community Organisation, 14 October 2009.
Table 4.1  Top 10 Local Authority Locations of Dispersed Asylum Seekers, December 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local Authority</th>
<th>Total Asylum Seekers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Glasgow City</td>
<td>5,010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leeds</td>
<td>2,035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birmingham</td>
<td>1,935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchester</td>
<td>1,355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newcastle upon Tyne</td>
<td>1,245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cardiff</td>
<td>1,175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nottingham</td>
<td>1,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheffield</td>
<td>1,060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salford</td>
<td>945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swansea</td>
<td>865</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bennett et al., 2007 (cited in Stewart, 2012)

Leeds was thus, an attractive study area because of a significant population of Zimbabwean migrants. In addition to the factors mentioned above, there are several institutions of higher education within commutable distance of the city. Another incentive to choose Leeds was widespread reports about the difficulties that some members of the community faced including health and wellbeing issues and destitution (Brown, 2008; Khan and Byfield, 2007). Furthermore, having lived in Leeds since 2003 meant that I had built significant social networks that could be tapped for recruitment and information.

Figure 4.1 shows the areas from which study participants were drawn from. These included East Leeds areas of Chapeltown, Gipton, Harehills, Moortown and Roundhay which is home to St James’ and Chapeltown Hospitals where a significant number of Zimbabwean nurses and other health and social care professionals work. The rest of the participants were drawn from the other parts of Leeds notably South, South East and North East. Most study participants live in inner city areas which tend to be deprived. NASS has increasingly been resettling asylum seekers in these inner city and deprived areas through its housing contractors such as Angel Housing Group. The East, South, South East and North East areas of Leeds in particular, are home to migrants from diverse backgrounds, ranging from asylum seekers and refugees, professionals and students.
Chapter 2 highlighted how some of migrants left for the UK to work in health and social care which suggests that they had better human and social capital endowments. Despite their sizeable numbers and the contribution that they are making in their home country, no empirical studies have been undertaken to document their experiences, both in their host country and country of origin, a lacuna which this study seeks to fill.

4.2.2 Limpopo Province

Limpopo Province, with a population of slightly over 5 million (Statistics SA, 2008) is located in the north-east part of South Africa and shares a border with Zimbabwe. Limpopo province consists of five districts; Vhembe, Mopani, Capricorn, Waterberg and Greater Sekhukhune (Figure 4.2). It is a predominantly rural province with large swathes of commercial farms which McNab (2004), attributed to the skewed racial land ownership caused by apartheid. The commercial farms and farming towns such as Polokwane (formerly Pietersburg), Makhadho (Louis Trichardt) are the foci of this study. The farms and the towns have historically attracted migrants from Zimbabwe and beyond who provided labour on farms shunned by the locals as outlined in Chapter 2 (Rutherford, 2011; Rutherford and Addison, 2007). Musina town is located in Vhembe district and lies only 15 km from the Zimbabwe – South Africa border. The Beitbridge border post is the sole border post linking the two countries.
Both documented and undocumented migrants enter South Africa through the Beitbridge border post although a significant number of migrants also enter through other undesignated entry points e.g. Dete, Chikombedzi etc. Since May 2009, most migrants who enter informally formalise their status by applying for asylum permits at the Musina Refugee Reception Centre (Figure 4.3) in the town.

The decision to choose Limpopo as a case study was informed by the fact that I had contacts in the province and also because Limpopo is considered a reception centre and launchpad where migrants work to raise money before travelling further into the South African hinterland (Rutherford, 2011). Another factor for me was that I come from Zaka district, in Masvingo Province, Zimbabwe (Figure 2.1). Zaka is one of the poorest districts in Zimbabwe and as outlined in Chapter 2; its close proximity to
South Africa meant that migration has always been a livelihood strategy. As a boy growing up, I saw other boys moving to Tzaneen and Makhadho in Limpopo to work. I knew some relatives and former classmates who lived in Limpopo that could be relied on to recruit study participants.

Figure 4.3 Musina Refugee Reception Centre which processes migrants’ asylum permits

During piloting, it however, became apparent in Limpopo that I would struggle to obtain a diverse research sample if the study was to be conducted only in Musina as originally planned. This was because Musina was a transit point for onward migration into the South African interior and not a place where all the migrants desired to stay permanently. This meant that, had I stuck to the original research plan, my sample would mostly have consisted of asylum seekers, market traders and street hawkers, at the expense of other groups who are known to live and work in South Africa. I then decided to widen my study area to cover the whole of Limpopo province rather than just Musina.

4.3 Why mixed method approaches to data collection?

The adoption of the mixed methods approach was informed by the research questions of the study. Mixed methods research is, generally speaking, an approach to knowledge (theory and practice) that attempts to consider multiple viewpoints, perspectives, positions, and standpoints (including the standpoints of qualitative and quantitative research) (Greene, 2006). Burke Johnson et al (2007: 124) define mixed methods research as,

‘The type of research in which a researcher or team of researchers combines elements of qualitative and quantitative research approaches (e.g., use of qualitative and quantitative viewpoints, data collection, analysis, inference
techniques) for the broad purposes of breadth and depth of understanding and corroboration.'

Some scholars such as Findlay and Li (1999) argue that mixed methods approaches help to uncover the multiple meanings of events such as migration. Similarly, other authors (Bryman, 2006; Graham, 1999) argue that mixed methods approaches including questionnaire surveys and interviews have emerged as a dominant technique in contemporary migration research. Likewise Creswell and Plano Clark (2010) opine that the increased use of hybrid approaches harnesses the synergies of both qualitative and quantitative research. White (2002: 513) advocates the use of hybrid approaches because,

‘using the approaches together yields more than the sum of the two approaches used independently.’

My use of mixed methods was also in accord with Phillip’s (1998) suggestion that they are crucial in addressing a research question at the same stage in the research process, in the same place, and with the same research subjects.

Mixed methods approaches, as will be demonstrated later (see analysis chapters 5-8), typically involve the dual use of extensive and intensive methods such as surveys and interviews to gain a fuller understanding of both the structural forces driving migration and the individual forces influencing migration decisions (Campbell, 2007; Findlay, 2005; Findlay and Li, 1999). Chikanda (2010) used the mixed methods approach to study the emigration of medical doctors from Zimbabwe, whilst Tinarwo (2011) used the approach to study the migration of Zimbabwean social workers to the UK with varying degrees of success.

The use of the mixed method approach was prompted by the desire to obtain background information about Zimbabweans in the two areas given the unavailability of reliable statistical data. A questionnaire survey (Appendix 3) was administered to 810 participants in both areas (200 in Leeds and 519 in Limpopo). Data from the questionnaire survey was used to inform the qualitative research stage. From the 200 participants that participated in the survey in Leeds from which 27 were selected for qualitative interviews while in Limpopo 36 participants were selected for semi-structured interviews from the 519 survey participants (Appendix 5). In addition, 3 key informants were interviewed in Leeds and 4 in Limpopo. The semi-structured interviews enabled the study to explore the experiences of Zimbabwean migrants in Leeds and Limpopo. As will be shown in the following sections, the use of the mixed methods approach strengthened the research design and improved the quality of the research findings (Chikanda, 2010).

Using mixed methods in the study allowed for triangulation to check the rigour and validity of the results (Greene et al., 1989). Denzin (1978: 291) defined triangulation
as, ‘the combination of methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon’ and proceeded to outline four types of triangulation as data triangulation, investigator triangulation, theory triangulation and methodological triangulation. Triangulation has been advanced as the panacea to rid data collection methods of their perceived deficiencies. Bromley (1986) and Berg (1998) have staunchly advocated ‘triangulation’ in order to consolidate internal validity and claim that by combining several lines of sight (triangulation), researchers obtain a better, more substantive picture of reality; a richer, more complete array of symbols and theoretical concepts; and a means of verifying many of these elements. Similarly, Jick (1979) summarised the advantages of triangulation as: enabling researchers to have confidence in their results; encourages researchers to be proactive and creative in the way they generate and collect data; leading to thick and rich data; enables researchers to synthesise and integrate theories; it helps to uncover contradictions and that due to its completeness, it may serve as the litmus test for competing theories.

4.3.1 Questionnaire survey

A questionnaire survey was used to gather biographical data and factors precipitating departure from Zimbabwe, employment situation, transnational activities (Research questions 1, 2 and 3), standard of living in the host country, and return intentions (Research question 4). This agrees with the work of Parfitt (2005: 78) that suggests that the questionnaire survey method is an indispensable tool when primary data is required on people, their behaviour, attitudes, opinions, and awareness of specific issues. The survey was followed by the deployment of qualitative methods including interviews and ethnography which privileged the migrants’ voices.

A combined total of 808 participants were approached to take part in the survey in both Leeds and Limpopo (Table 4.2). The table shows that 237 people were approached to take part in the study in Leeds. Of these, 200 agreed to participate while 37 refused giving an approval rate of 84%. Similarly, in Limpopo, the approval rate was 91% after 571 people were approached, with 519 consenting while 52 refused. The combined approval rate for both Leeds and Limpopo was 89%. Given the transient and hidden nature of the population being studied, the response rate is consistent with other scholarly studies (Scott, 2003; Joly, 1987). It is acknowledged that questions may be raised about the different sample sizes for Leeds and Limpopo. Three factors account for these differences. Firstly, Limpopo province is much larger than Leeds with a population of approximately 5.5 million people (Statistics SA, 2010) than Leeds which has a population of just 850 000 people (ONS, 2012). This means that the population in Limpopo is sparsely spread as compared to Leeds where many migrants live in different wards which are close to each other. To ensure diversity, I had to recruit participants from different parts of the province e.g. on farms, towns and rural areas (Figure 4.2) whereas Leeds is largely urban (Figure 4.1).
Table 4.2 Survey response rate by country of residence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of residence</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>% within Country of residence</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>84.0%</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>91.0%</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>719</td>
<td>89.0%</td>
<td>719</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>808</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on survey results 2009-2010

The questionnaire was piloted in both Leeds and Limpopo (Sporton, 1999). Piloting entails pre-testing or ‘trying out’ of a particular research instrument (Baker 1994: 182-3). Bryman (2006) lists the major advantages of pre-testing as that it gives advance warning about potential problems which may result in failure or where protocols about the research may not be followed, or whether proposed methods or instruments are inappropriate or too complicated. In Limpopo, piloting resulted in the decision to extend the study area to the whole of Limpopo province instead of Musina as initially envisaged in order to attain diversity of the study participants.

The intention of the survey was to establish common positions amongst the Zimbabwean diaspora as well as to identify their points of departure. As Chikanda (2010) in his study of the migration of medical doctors from Zimbabwe argues, the purpose of surveys is to examine the combined or group experiences of the subjects being studied. He further posits that surveys are some of the best tools to use to obtain a snapshot of certain migrant practices, such as common forms of transnational links between migrants and those at home (Chikanda, 2010). The representativeness of the two samples can be questioned due to purposive sampling of recruits for the study, but this was unavoidable due to the hidden nature of the study participants. This was compounded by the lack of reliable data about the Zimbabwean population in both countries. As noted by Valentine (2001), purposive sampling is useful in researching hard to reach groups.

The survey was a useful instrument of data gathering; it afforded me the opportunity to statistically analyse differing responses and produce measurements of people’s thoughts and behaviours across a number of variables such as age, gender,
education, immigration and marital status. The information produced was used to make wider generalisations about Zimbabwean migration.

4.3.2 Sampling and problems of reliable statistical data

As already described in Chapter 3, there is a dearth of reliable statistical data on the number of Zimbabweans resident in both South Africa and the UK (Makina, 2007; Pasura, 2008). To arrive at a heterogeneous sample comprising of the different constituents of the Zimbabwean diaspora, I relied on my experience of having lived in Leeds for six of my eight years in the UK, knowledge that Leeds is a cluster area of Zimbabwean asylum seekers and refugees (Magunha, et al., 2009; Home Office Asylum Statistics, 2008, 2012), and my contacts in South Africa. In Limpopo, the heterogeneity of the sample was also reflected in the fact that both urban and rural areas were sampled.

In Leeds, questionnaires and an introductory letter were sent by email to contacts in different religious organisations and Zimbabwean community organisations who articulate the concerns of Zimbabweans in the Leeds area. I then followed these with personal visits. The decision to target these organisations was informed by evidence that refugees, and asylum seekers in particular, rely on churches for social support more than their documented counterparts (Pasura, 2010). I was then able to snowball the recruitment by tapping into an extensive reservoir of contacts provided by community leaders and other study participants.

Participants were recruited at political gatherings, rallies and religious gatherings such as Big Sundays (Pasura, 2008; 2010). The Zimbabwean owned grocery shops were also important recruitment sites as they are patronised by members of the Zimbabwean community. Leaflets were displayed (Appendix 4) at these shops and pubs soliciting for volunteers, following which, snowball sampling was used to reach more study participants. In Limpopo, leaflets were displayed at prominent and popular places such as service centres, bottle stores and long distance bus shelters. The bus shelters are important spaces for migrants and are used for an array of activities such as remittances, catching up on gossip, and employment opportunities.

Two sampling methods were used to identify participants for the questionnaire survey: purposive and snowball sampling. According to Tashakkori and Teddlie (2003: 713), purposive sampling techniques (also called non-probability sampling) involve selecting certain units ‘based on a specific purpose rather than randomly.’ Purposive sampling was favoured in this study in an attempt to be as representative as possible to ensure comparability of the Zimbabwean diaspora in South Africa and the UK. There is scholarly consensus that purposive sampling is used when a researcher aims to select a purposive sample that is as representative of a broader group of cases as possible, as well as setting up comparisons among different types of cases (Teddlie and Yun, 2007). As Maxwell (1997: 87) notes, purposive sampling
is useful in studies where specific information is required that cannot be obtained elsewhere. Thus, the use of purposive sampling, as will be demonstrated in Chapters 5 and 6, was intended to gather information from diverse groups within the Zimbabwean diaspora, including asylum seekers, refugees, documented and undocumented migrants and students, skilled and unskilled migrants (Bryman, 2001). Purposive sampling also enabled the research to capture the migrants’ biographical data, migration experiences, and transnational transactions and return intentions (see Chapters 5-8).

Purposive sampling was complemented by snowballing techniques in the recruitment of the study participants. Valentine (1997) defined snowballing as people in a group of interest informing the researcher about other individuals in that population who could also fit the criteria for inclusion in the study. I was able through snowballing to reach some participants that I would not ordinarily have reached because of the difficulties inherent in studying people’s immigration statuses, such as people not wanting to cooperate because of fear of the authorities as this may result in deportation (Corbetta, 2003). There is a body of scholarship which highlights the difficulties associated with researching forced migrants, principally their distrust of authorities which emanates from pre-migratory experiences (Silove et al., 1998) and fears that participation in research could impact negatively on asylum claims (Silove, Steel, McGorry and Drobny, 1999). Lee (1993: 60) echoes this viewpoint by claiming that sampling becomes more difficult the more the sensitive the topic under investigation, since potential informants will have a greater incentive to conceal their activities.

Therefore, the decision to use snowball sampling was driven by its utility in situations where those being investigated tend to hide their identity for moral, legal, ideological or political reasons, or are difficult to reach groups (Arber, 2001; Corbetta, 2003). Scholars such as Valentine (1997: 116) argue that snowball sampling helps researchers overcome one of the main obstacles to recruiting survey participants - gaining their trust. Furthermore, snowball sampling allows the researcher to more easily find interviewees with particular experiences or backgrounds (Lee, 1993). Moreover, it has been suggested that where there is no accessible sampling frame within the sample population, and where creating a frame would be difficult, snowball sampling is the only feasible alternative (Bryman, 2001; 2004). This rings true for the situation in both countries; there is a dearth of credible statistics regarding the exact number of Zimbabweans living in Leeds and Limpopo.

To ensure that only Zimbabwean nationals in the UK responded, adverts calling for willing participants were placed on major Zimbabwean internet news sites like South West Radio Africa (www.swradioafrica.com), The Zimbabwe Times (www.thezimbabwetimes.com) and ZW News (www.zwnews.com). This approach meant that only Zimbabwean nationals in the UK responded. In South Africa, I visited the Musina Refugee Reception Centre, the Musina Legal Centre, and the shelters
where newly arrived asylum seekers stay whilst their asylum permits are being processed. Other study participants were accessed through churches, the commercial farmers’ union and shops that are popular with Zimbabweans in the province. I also sent E-mails inviting Zimbabweans in both countries to participate, through professionals groups such as the Zimbabwe Institution of Engineers in the UK, through student unions at universities in Yorkshire. The same procedure was replicated in South Africa where there is a large contingent of Engineers. Despite the significant concentration of engineers in Limpopo, none of the respondents chose to complete the questionnaires online, preferring instead a face to face meeting during which discussions tended to veer towards how they could obtain visas to work in the UK.

The recruitment of study participants which meet certain criteria was quite difficult in Leeds. Table 4.3, shows the criteria used to select the participants.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituent</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Employment</th>
<th>Marital status</th>
<th>Political</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asylum seekers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Reunion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ancestry visa holders</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work permit holders</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business visa holders</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undocumented/Illegal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Author from fieldwork data
Some difficulties were encountered in recruiting participants without documented status in Leeds due to people’s reluctance to come forward because of doubts about the true intentions of the study. As will be outlined in Chapter 6, there are fears within the Zimbabwean community, in the UK in particular, about studies of people’s immigration status; some migrants suspect the studies will be forwarded to the Home Office and the Zimbabwean government, leading to their deportation and subsequent persecution at home given President Mugabe’s rhetoric about migrants as sell-outs. Others fear that the information will lead to their family and relatives being harmed in Zimbabwe if it is given to the Zimbabwean government.

4.3.3. Analysis of Survey Data

The survey data was amended to remove mistakes made during the data collection process. The questionnaires were edited for accuracy and consistency. Common mistakes included ticking two boxes instead of one, and providing multiple dates.

Once the data was amended, the questions were then imported on to an SPSS spreadsheet according to the preset codes that had been developed and coded to enable the statistical analysis of the survey results. Coding was done at two stages: prior to and after the survey, with the former done at questionnaire preparation stage while the latter was done after the completion of the data collection process.

The use of SPSS and statistical tests was informed by the objectives of the research (Kitchen and Tate, 2000). According to Punch (2005), SPSS is one of the most commonly used data analysis tools in social science research. The data from the SPSS spreadsheet enabled me to produce descriptive statistics, bar graphs, tables and charts of demographics, migration and transnational practices of Zimbabwean migrants in Leeds and Limpopo. Furthermore, Chi-square tests using this categorical data were undertaken. Sarantakos (2005) defines a Chi-square test as a nominal level test of significance. With the results, I was able to use cross tables to compare the frequency of, for example, remittances to Zimbabwe and elsewhere against variables such as age, education, immigration status, occupation and class.

4.3.4 Semi-structured interviews

The second phase of the study, consisting of semi-structured interviews, sought to build on the information that had emerged from the questionnaire survey. The interviews were used to elicit information on a range of issues such as migration history, aspirations, and perceptions about life in the diaspora and at home. The semi-structured interviews were used to address the objectives of research questions 2 and 3. The questionnaire survey enabled the detailed profiling of survey respondents following which 27 and 36 participants were selected in Leeds and Limpopo respectively for participation in the qualitative interviews. The interviews
enabled the participants to tell their own stories regarding their migratory experiences, which the questionnaire survey could not obtain.

An interview guide was followed (Appendix 6) which covered a number of points that were important to the research question:

- Departure from Zimbabwe
- Experiences in the host country
- Social networks
- Transnational linkages
- Intentions of return.

The flexible nature of the interviewing method provided for the alteration of the interview schedule where it was merited and required. However, to allow for comparability, such alterations did not compromise the core questions. A series of open ended questions were asked which allowed the participants to express themselves. The open ended nature of interviewing made it possible for the participants to generate, challenge, clarify, elaborate, or recontextualise the nature of their transnational relationships with those at home, and how this shaped not only their transnational practices, but also their way of living in their host country and the relationships that they had with fellow Zimbabwean migrants. This allowed me to unpack and interpret the different and multiple individual and collective meanings of being Zimbabwean in Leeds and Limpopo across a number of variables such as age, education, gender, immigration status, religion and social networks.

Semi-structured interviews allowed me to document the migrants’ salient life experiences and to attach meanings to their interpretations of life in the diaspora (Pasura, 2010). There is a body of scholarship which shows semi-structured interviews to be particularly important in the study of undocumented migrants and asylum seekers (Pasura, 2008; Valentine et al., 2007) as it allows for exploration, discovery, and interpretation of complex social events and processes (Burgess, 1991). Similarly, Bryman and Burgess (1999) posit that semi-structured interviews can be used as a streamlined means of obtaining rich, detailed data typically generated through field research without committing the investigator to prolonged involvement in the lives and activities of the researched community.

The interviews were undertaken in Leeds between September 2009 and January 2010, and from February to May 2010 in Limpopo. On average each interview lasted between 55-70 minutes although some interviews lasted over 2 hours. The length of the interviews largely depended on the interviewees. For interviewees in Leeds who do ‘shift work’ the interviews were relatively shorter compared to those who work between 9 am and 5 pm. In a few instances, the interviews had to be cut short after the interviewee had been called by an employment agency offering them a shift. In Leeds, most of the interviews were preceded by telephone conversations which were
largely not possible in Limpopo due to some participants not having access to telephones. In Limpopo, it was not always possible to do one-one interviews as some of the participants did not speak English which necessitated the involvement of a translator in cases where the respondent spoke Ndebele, Venda or Tonga.

Wherever possible, the interviews in both areas were recorded on a digital voice recorder and the interviewees were debriefed at the end of each interview to ensure their wellbeing. The recording of interviews precluded interruptions from note taking. Apart from the convenience that tape recording provided, Pile (1990: 217) suggests that a verbatim transcript ensures a full qualitative analysis. However, it was not always possible to record all the interviews as six participants in Leeds refused to have their interviews recorded due to safety and security reasons already discussed above. This is consistent with Corbin and Morse (2003) who claim that some respondents are reluctant to have their interviews recorded due to concerns about what the interviews may be use for. I sought permission to record each interview beforehand.

The recorded interviews were transcribed soon after the interviews took place, thereby conforming to Valentine’s (1997) observation that recorded interviews should be transcribed soon after the occurrence to enable easy recollection of proceedings. Each transcript was read, and comments appended regarding the interviewees’ spoken words in three steps in line with Smith et al’s (2009) advice. Drawing on the three steps of Smith et al (2009), I made descriptive comments about the accounts of the participants, which I followed up by noting any information concerning language used by the participants.

The interviews were held in environments in which the participants were comfortable, like cafes in Leeds and shopping centres in Limpopo (Longhurst, 2003). A few interviews were held in the participants’ homes as they indicated that they felt more comfortable there than in neutral venues. Some participants in Leeds were reluctant to be interviewed, asking why I had decided to interview them further, and why the information that they had provided via the survey did not suffice. Others thought this was a trap to get them deported, and I had to explain that I had chosen to interview them on the basis of the information that they had provided in the questionnaire. One participant who was undocumented took a long time before finally agreeing to be interviewed, which also coincided with the day she was granted indefinite leave to remain in the country. The interview took a completely different direction from what I had envisaged as I had chosen to interview her on the basis of her undocumented status. This case demonstrates the fluidity which accompanies migrants’ immigration status (see Chapter 6).

Valentine (1997: 111) observes that interviews can be conversational, fluid in form, each interview varying according to interests, experiences and views of the interviewees. She proceeds to say that that semi-structured interviews are sensitive
and people-oriented because they allow the interviewees to construct their own accounts of their experiences by describing and explaining their lives in their own words (Valentine, 1997:112). This observation was significant for my study because most Zimbabweans have not had the chance to candidly express their own opinions due to the repression that exists in their country. Participants were able to use the space of being in the diaspora to criticise the government of President Mugabe freely without fear of reprisals (see Chapter 6). Some participants remarked that they may as well as have a go at the government given that they had never been asked to tell their story in their own words, without fearing what may happen to them. I was able to revisit some areas where I needed clarity which is consistent with Bryman’s (1988) contention that interviewees can explain the complexities and contradictions of their experiences and can describe the mundane details of their everyday lives.

4.3.5 Ethnography and research diary

Ethnography was one of the integral data gathering methods employed in this study. Willis and Trondman (2000:1) define ethnography as a ‘family of methods involving direct and sustained social contact with agents.’ Previous migration studies have used multi-sited ethnography to fully understand the migration experience and its impacts, especially where people’s lives are conducted across borders (Burawoy, 2000; Fitzgerald, 2006; Marcus, 1995). Some ethnographic studies have researched migration from both sending and receiving countries (Maphosa, 2004). However, scholars such as Ostergaard-Nielsen (2003, cited in Fitzgerald, 2006) have argued that multinational fieldwork need not include the country of origin to yield analytic leverage from the multi-sited method.

I attended church services in Leeds and Musina and other community gatherings such as funeral wakes, weddings, birthdays and graduation parties. Political meetings and rallies were also important theatres for this study. By participating in these events, I was exposed to a variety of ways in which the migrants interacted. In Limpopo, I spent twenty days living at The I Believe in Jesus Church men’s shelter in Musina and ten days at the drop in centre in Makhadho. I travelled extensively throughout Limpopo province spending several days at a time in migrants’ homes. On some of the days, I went to work with migrants at their stalls on the streets of Polokwane, Makhadho and Thohoyandou (Figure 4.4), and fields where permission was granted by the farm owners. Fieldwork entailed spending long periods of time with migrants who were applying for asylum at the Musina Refugee Reception Centre as well as at the clinic run by the Medicins San Frontiers (MSF) in Musina. Living with the study participants enabled me to gain access to social networks with nodes in different sites (Fitzgerald, 2006).
Foner (2003) highlights the importance of living with and interacting intensively with the participants. By embedding myself in the lives of the migrants, I was able to capture in minute detail their lived experiences, beliefs and identities (Foner, 2003). Such an approach resonates with recent scholarship (James, 2001 cited in Francis-Chizororo, 2008) which contends that ethnographic approaches, by dint of their level of engagement with the participants inherently help researchers to recognise participants as competent contributors to and interpreters of the social world, and steers researchers towards doing work ‘with’ rather than ‘on’ migrants. Thus, ethnography privileges the voices of the migrants over that of officials.

In order to gauge the scale of illegal migration into South Africa, I joined members of the South African Defence Forces (SANDF) on border patrols along the Zimbabwe-South Africa border. I saw first-hand the dangers that migrants face in their endeavour to start a new life across the river. On one trip, ten people were intercepted by the soldiers and were taken to Musina Refugee Reception Centre (Figure 4.3) where they applied for asylum permits. Others escaped by retreating back to the Zimbabwean side of the border. By spending time with the soldiers I was able to understand their perspectives about the Zimbabwean migration.

Despite its extensive use, ethnography has been criticised for its lack of ethics; essentially its failure to uphold the rights of the study participants (Murphy and Dingwall, 2001). Clifford (1988) has highlighted legitimation and representation issues which are critical for this study. Despite privileging the participants’ voice, the concerns about their well-being and safety remained a cause for concern throughout
this study. Other scholars (Hannerz, 2003; Marcus, 1995) have noted the issues of language barriers, due to fieldwork being undertaken in multiple sites. My own experiences in Limpopo substantiated this, as I have only a cursory understanding of the Ndebele language that some participants preferred to converse in.

In both countries a research diary was kept throughout the fieldwork process as a method of data collection. The diary chronicled the duration of the interviews, observations during interviews, and critical reflections. This was a continuous process throughout the research process in Leeds and Limpopo. My research diary was a simple hard cover notebook in which I wrote after every interview. The research diary served a dual purpose: to document the direction of the research and to question my epistemological positioning (Nadin and Cassell, 2006). The diary was completed daily, and consisted of my reflections of the day’s occurrences. It was an attempt to make sense of the fieldwork. I chronicled my feelings in the diary. Sometimes I vented my fury and frustration in the diary while on other occasions I wrote of my feelings of disappointment tempered by joy, surprise and disillusionment (Tedlock, 2000). The entries contained the biographical details of the interviewees and salient points that were discussed.

I used the diary to reflect. These reflections were wide ranging, from fretting about practical issues, to my feelings about how the interview progressed. I used the diary to reflect on how the interviews had gone and how I could improve my next interview, to examine emerging themes, and to reflect on whether there were any contradictions which needed further research. By using the research diary, my research practice was challenged; that is I became self-critical about areas in the research methodology which needed strengthening.

4.3.6 Key Informant Interviews

Key informant interviews were held with 3 participants from three institutions in the UK and 4 in South Africa. Interviews were held with professionals, public officials, and other stakeholders and power players from organisations that work with migrants. Table 4.4 documents agencies from which key informants were drawn.

Key informants were asked for their perspectives about Zimbabwean migration and communities in South Africa and the UK. Thus key informant interviews were used to delineate the various organisations and networks that comprise the Zimbabwean diaspora as well as to obtain data about their strategies and internal dynamics (Vulliamy et al., 1995), and map out the relationships between the constituencies of immigrant politics (Eyles and Smith, 1988). All three participants in the UK had dual roles; that of participants as migrants and also as key informants. This is consistent with a body of scholarship that advocates and emphasises the need to seek out people who possess knowledge about specialised interests and concerns in the
social setting, people whom the researcher feels are integral to the scenes and situations being investigated (Vulliamy et al., 1995; Hitchcock and Hughes, 1989).

### Table 4.4 List of key informant agencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Movement for Democratic Change (United Kingdom and Ireland)</td>
<td>Leeds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe Leeds Refugee Community Organisation</td>
<td>Leeds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe Institute of Engineers United Kingdom</td>
<td>Leeds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Organisation for Migration</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I Believe in Jesus Church</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicins San Frontiers</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department for Home Affairs</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Based on survey results 2009-2010

As discussed in Chapter 2 and will be reiterated in Chapter 6, a significant number of migrants in the UK have claimed membership of the MDC as part of a broader strategy to gain documented status; this necessitated the inclusion of an MDC official in the UK amongst the key informants. On the other hand, in South Africa, the inception of asylum permits in April 2009, which are issued at the Musina Refugee Reception Centre (Figure 4.3) to newly arrived migrants, has led to the involvement of the third sector, such as churches, in the provision of basic services such as food and shelter. Unlike in the UK, the government does not provide asylum seekers with any support, a gap that is being filled by churches such as The I Believe in Jesus. The IOM is also actively involved in the provision of support to migrants in South Africa, as are medical charities which complement the government’s efforts.

### 4.4 Qualitative data analysis

I was always aware of the process of data analysis when I was in the field, and began analysis soon after the data collection process was underway, thereby echoing Bryman’s (2001) assertion that one ought to be conscious of emerging themes that may require closer attention in future interviews. I had a data analysis plan which had been developed prior to embarking on the fieldwork (Burgess, 1991; Cook and Crang, 1995), but the developments in the field were such that gathering and analysis sometimes occurred simultaneously depending on the type of data. Such an approach is informed by the realisation that research is an ongoing, iterative and dynamic process (Bryman, 2001). Data analysis, according to Braun and Clarke...
(2006), starts with the researcher becoming familiar with the data during transcribing and reading of the entire data. Transcription of the interviews was done in the UK. The collected data was grouped according to themes in line with Strauss and Corbin (1990) who suggest that the grounded theory method entails discovering phenomena, developing it and provisionally verifying it by subjecting it to systematic data collection and data analysis. Likewise, Brannen (1992) recommend the use of thematic analysis where data has been collected using qualitative methods such as interviews. Similarly, Bryman (2004) argues that by using theoretical sampling and coding, grounded theory aims to develop concepts, categories, hypotheses and substantive theories. The breaking down of the data through process coding is also meant to make it more manageable (Corbin and Strauss, 1990; Finnegan, 1992). Coding entails labelling data and then archiving it according to codes in line with Howard’s (2002) description of codes being tags or labels attached to chunks of data, words, sentences, and phrases. The coding process in this study evolved during the process of transcription and analysis aided in no small measure by the NVivo package which made it easy for me to develop, link, erase, and redevelop the codes.

The coded data was then grouped into themes, a process Braun and Clarke (2006) describe as a thematic approach. Thematic analysis according to Braun and Clarke (2006:79) is a method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data. Thematic analysis entails undertaking detailed searches for themes across a data set with a view of finding repeated patterns of meaning from the data set and is often characterised by a constant moving back and forth across the entire set of data. Emerging themes from the interviews were assessed and mapped to the theoretical debates outlined in Chapter 3 as well as in line with the aims and objectives of the study. Examples of themes which emerged from coding were ‘IMMIGRATION STATUS’ which emerged from codes such as ‘refugee’, ‘undocumented’, ‘work permit’, whilst ‘TRANSNATIONAL LINKS’ emerged from codes such as ‘contact with home’ ‘emails’ ‘remittances’ and ‘travelling home’, and the theme of ‘SOCIAL MOBILITY’ emerged from the synthesis of the following codes, ‘studying’, ‘not working’, ‘employed’ and ‘property ownership’, amongst others (see Chapters 5-8) (Appendix 7).

Coding has been criticised by Allan (2003) for fragmenting data, causing it to lose its context and narrative flow. Other scholars such as St John and Johnson (2000) caution researchers against getting carried away and developing too many codes as this negates their efficient use.

4.5 Positionality: My biography and research philosophy

In this section, I consider how my position (in terms of ethnicity, nationality, age, gender, social and economic status etc) and personal feelings influenced the research process (Madge, 1993). When I set out to undertake this study, I neither set
out to pretend nor intended to offer an objective nor even an agreed perspective on
the understanding of the Zimbabwean diaspora and the migration-development
nexus. I drew on the observations, lived experiences and perspectives of the people
who are intimately involved with the Zimbabwean diaspora who include
Zimbabweans themselves in Leeds and Limpopo, charities that work closely with
Zimbabweans in the two countries, government officials in both countries and
international organisations that work with Zimbabwean migrants such as IOM. There
is a body of scholarship which discusses difficulties that an inside researcher
researching his/her own community grapples with, and these encompass treating as
alien the triangular issues of bias, impartiality, whilst the outside researcher
endeavours to make the strange environment, culture and language familiar (Collins,

My experience of the immigration system in the UK entailed dispossession of my
agency to provide not only for myself but for my wider family who relied on me for
their sustenance. I found the idleness that accompanies the process of obtaining
documented status to be very difficult given that I had worked all my adult life. NASS
accommodated me in a neighbourhood which I can characterise as dangerous and
deprived. This experience left me feeling disempowered and dejected leading me to
regret trying to regularise my status in the first place. I asked myself whether I had
made the right decision to leave Zimbabwe and come to the UK to sit at home doing
practically nothing for seven years whilst I waited for the determination of my case.
My liaisons with the Home Office included a one month sojourn at the Oakington
Reception Centre in Cambridge, an experience which I found humiliating and
depressing.

Drawing on my experiences as both a civil servant in Zimbabwe and my experience
of the British immigration system, I empathically navigated my way through the
research project. The process of acquiring documented status in the UK helped me
to reach out to some participants who were still struggling to legalise their status;
some looked to me for advice, asking me about how I acquired legal status. On the
other hand, the fact that I had worked for the government in Zimbabwe scared some
people away from participating as they are distrustful of people who worked for the
government in Zimbabwe, viewing them as spies of President Mugabe’s government
and his ZANU (PF) party (see Chapter 6).

There is a belief within the Zimbabwean community that there are government spies
in both South Africa and the UK who gather incriminating evidence about politically
active migrants, which they use against their families left in Zimbabwe (Milmo and
Sengupta, 2008). Some participants queried whether I was doing the study at the
behest of both the British and Zimbabwean governments as a way of getting
undocumented migrants deported. I was able to dispel these erroneous views by
highlighting my own difficulties which I had experienced in both Zimbabwe and the
UK. This seemed to quell their fears.
My gender precluded some women from agreeing to an interview with me; they had suffered at the hands of male members of President Mugabe’s government. Some study participants associated me with the heinous assaults that they or their relatives had been subjected to. This was put into perspective by one interviewee who for example, asked me whether I had abused women when I worked in the public service as she had been sexually abused by soldiers during the 2002 elections. Similarly, some male interviewees also expressed the same fears, as they were also victims of President Mugabe’s government’s violence.

During the fieldwork, I became acutely aware of my relatively privileged position of having documented status whilst the cases of the majority of my compatriots had been refused or were still pending with the UK Border Agency, and further, of my education which makes me simultaneously an insider, outsider, both and neither (Gilbert, 1994; Mullings, 1999). As a Zimbabwean social activist living in the UK who has an active interest with Zimbabwean issues that confront the community in the UK, locally and globally, my strength as an inside researcher lay in the critical perspective that the situation afforded me. My role as an observing participant operating in my own locale made things easier than had I been an outsider. All social activities are value laden, that is, they are not completely value-free (Guba and Lincoln, 1994), and therefore there is no objectively privileged position. This is consistent with claims by Quicke and Winter (1994) and McDowell (1992) that a value-free, ‘true’ account of experience is deemed impossible thus giving credence to Chambers’ (1994) viewpoint about the existence of multiple rationalities co-existing.

Being an inside researcher meant I was familiar with the various meanings attached to words, symbols and deeds of the Zimbabwean community that are examined here. For example in Leeds, people use a variety of terms such as mupotere25, kundopotera26 and chidhoma27 when talking about one’s immigration status. This is mostly used in the presence of other nationalities in order not to let them in on the status of a member of the community’s status or in the presence of children. The familiarity that I had with the contemporary Zimbabwean diaspora situation, including its problems, hopes and fears, especially in the Yorkshire-Humberside region enabled me to be more sensitive to the research participants’ perspectives.

My experiences in the two countries made me an insider, outsider, and both (Pickering, 2001). In Leeds, I was an insider in that I resided in the city and was associating with my peers. Yet, on the other hand, I was an outsider to some participants, for example those without documented status who regarded me as

25 The term is used to describe someone who has sought asylum.
26 This describes the act of going to seek asylum from the Home Office.
27 In Zimbabwean mythology, this is associated with witchcraft and it is invisible to the naked eye. In the context of Zimbabwean migrants, this is used to describe people who do not have documented status and are thus invisible to the immigration system.
‘different’ from them. The fact that I was also studying for a PhD degree also made me an outsider to those without university education.

My ‘outsiderness’ was more pronounced in South Africa because of the language differences. I felt out of place because I could not understand the ‘street language’ that the younger participants were conversing in and I constantly kept asking the participants to explain again in a language that I could understand. The fact that I was living in the UK also made me the centre of attention as the participants appeared to be more interested in finding out how they could obtain visas to travel to the UK than in focussing on the subject at hand. This appeared to turn the tables and made me the researched.

Furthermore, the fact that I had not been to Zimbabwe since 2000 furthered my feelings of being an outsider, and the examples that I gave of the difficult circumstances which existed in Zimbabwe when I left were relatively insignificant compared to the conditions that existed when the participants left. For example, when I left Zimbabwe, a loaf of bread was selling at Z$5.00 which was a lot of money then but seemed reasonable to the participants - it cost millions of dollars when they left.

4.5.1 Access and gatekeepers

The issue of negotiating access to the study participants for both the questionnaire survey and subsequent qualitative interviews was of critical importance. Compared to Limpopo, access in Leeds was significantly more difficult. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, people’s frenetic working schedules meant that interviews were cancelled, rescheduled and postponed. Secondly, as will be outlined in Chapter 6, there is a pervasive fear of being deported. These fears about immigration status meant that it took longer than anticipated to complete the interviews, as some interviews had to be rescheduled a number of times due to last minute changes by participants. A significant number of Zimbabwean migrants living in Leeds are undocumented, which predisposes them to be suspicions of strangers, even fellow Zimbabweans enquiring about their immigration status.

There was a tendency to view inquisitive people as ‘secret investigators’, ‘Home Office’, ‘Central Intelligence Officers (CIO)’ which makes people guarded about the information that they divulge (see Chapter 6). This resonates with the work of Hynes (2003) who argues that multiple insecurities shape the formation of social relationships among refugees whose social worlds are likely to be marked by layers of mistrust. Participation, for most people approached, was decided by their immigration status. People who had initially agreed to participate later reneged once discussions regarding their status began; they feared that such disclosure would, despite assurances of anonymity, lead to their deportation by the Home Office (see Section 4.6). Conversely, immigration was not a decisive factor in South Africa, as
Zimbabwean migrants were not being deported regardless of their status at the time of the fieldwork. Hence immigration status was not cited as a factor in not wanting to partake in the study.

Exploratory visits were undertaken to homes of participants in Leeds to forge a trusting working relationship prior to beginning data collection. I also carried an original and photocopied introductory letter (Appendix 1) that I had obtained from my supervisor which had a section on ethics (see Section 4.6) and another letter which I had written which gave a background of the study (Appendix 2). I gave each participant, gatekeeper and key informant a copy of both letters which was significant in gaining trust. In Leeds, I approached community and religious leaders who made announcements of the study during their community events and church services. I was given a platform to explain the purpose of my study.

I had anticipated facing difficulties in South Africa due to the fact that I was an outsider as I had never lived or worked there. My fears were unnecessary to a large extent, as the migrants in South Africa wanted to know more about my research and were keen on knowing my lifestyle and experiences in the UK. In some respects, this threatened to derail my study because instead of talking about the experiences of the migrants, the discussion deviated towards me, with participants wanting more information about how to move to the UK and how I could help them to get visas to come and live in the UK.

4.5.2 Using translators

Recent scholarship has highlighted the salience of translation in cross-cultural research (Smith, 2003; Twyman et al., 1999). While the emphasis of the study was to privilege the migrants’ voice, the issue of representation and unequal power relations was unavoidable especially when interviewing non-English and Shona speakers which lead to ‘nuances’ of language being ‘lost in translation’ (Smith, 1996: 161). Issues of translation surfaced in South Africa where some participants did not speak English or Shona which I am conversant in, but spoke Ndebele, Venda or Tonga.

The recruitment of three research assistants/translators who were familiar with the geography and language eased any potential problems. The assistants were trained over two days in all aspects of the research process including conceptualization and dissemination to enable the research assistants to have a full grasp of the various components of the study. Some of the areas that were covered in the training centred on recruitment, interviewing, ethics, and data handling and management e.g. tape recorded data and confidentiality. The training was made easier because the research assistants were experienced people who had undertaken researches for some agencies in the same area and where thus, knowledgeable about the geography and research process. The research assistant played an interpreting role
providing oral translation services during face to face interviews with respondents that did not speak the same language as me (Hole, 2007; Larson, 1998).

The use of translators has resonance with contemporary scholarship which argues that researchers who fail to systematically address the methodological issues translators present in a cross-language qualitative research design can decrease the trustworthiness of the data and the overall rigour of the study (Mill and Ogilvie, 2003). In this study, the research assistants/translators covered and bridged any divides that may have existed between the participants and me. The familiarity of the research assistants with the study area was of paramount importance and resonates with contemporary debates about research being a collaborative and collective process (Burgess, 1984). The research assistants were paid for their work which is consistent with research ethics of paying research assistants for their work, commitment and collaborative effort (Scott et al., 2006).

4.6. Ethical considerations

I obtained clearance from the university’s ethical committee. Indeed, ethical considerations took prominence role in this study due to the sensitivity of the subject that was being researched. As Chapter 5 will show, the study involved human subjects some of whom had fled political persecution and could be in danger of harm, depending on how the research was conducted and how the resultant information was handled. Such an approach resonates with Robinson and Segrott’s (2002) claim that access to, and building trust with, vulnerable respondents such as refugees and asylum seekers can be a major problem. I therefore, sought all the necessary clearances from institutions like the Department for Home Affairs in South Africa. Bryman (2001: 475) notes that we cannot ignore ethical issues in research since such issues ‘relate directly to the integrity of a piece of research and of the disciplines that are involved.’

This research conformed to the following ethical considerations:
- the do no harm principle
- the principle of respect for autonomy
- respect for privacy and veracity

To this end, I strove to prevent any harm befalling the participants or to expose them to unnecessary risks due to their participation in the study. To achieve this, I took due care in handling confidential information such as recorded interviews. These were destroyed as soon as I finished transcribing. In addition, I ensured that all records and identities of participants remained confidential and participants were informed that any information that would have been obtained during the course of study was not going to be disclosed without their express permission. The use of
pseudonyms was another strategy that I employed in order to safeguard the safety of the participants who wanted their anonymity and privacy respected.

The principle of respect for autonomy compelled me to respect research participants’ wishes, perspectives, desires, and wants regarding the research. This was achieved by informing the participants in writing (which was reiterated orally) prior to an interview of the nature of the study and their freedom to withdraw their consent and discontinue their participation at any time without prejudice. By so doing, the principle of informed consent was achieved (Appendix 8). The notion of consent entails participants agreeing to take part in a research project, knowing what they are agreeing to, and authorising the researcher to collect information from them without any form of coercion and/or manipulation (Bryman, 1988; Flowerdew and Martin, 2005). In this study, the interview participants signed a consent form which was kept on file. Consent in this study was needed to protect the important ethical principle of autonomy, the right to exercise self-determination.

Appropriate authority and permissions were sought in advance throughout this study (Collins, 1990). This was achieved by using a reference letter from my supervisors and an introductory letter which I had written. Furthermore, the study respected the participants’ rights and immigration status. All interviews were preceded by an introduction of myself, my background, and the reasons for wanting to do the interviews (Burgess, 1984). I explained the purpose of the study to the participants, the benefits and the possible risks that were inherent in participating in the study. I also emphasised the lack of material benefits to the participants.

The participants in Limpopo were recompensed for their time and effort in line with best practices which calls for participants to be compensated for their time, effort and cooperation (Mullins, 1999; Winchester, 1996). I could not compensate those based in Leeds because of financial constraints, whilst in South Africa this was made possible by the favourable exchange rate. However, some participants in Limpopo regarded the R20 token of appreciation as too little and demanded larger sums as a precondition to participation. Such people were under the erroneous impression that I had a lot of money given that I live in the UK, and yet others stated that there were precedents of being handsomely paid for participating in surveys which echoes prior scholarship which highlighted concern about payments being made to research participants to maximise response rates and reduce the risk that non-respondents will differ significantly from respondents (Heberlein and Baumgartner, 1978).

Throughout the research processes, I was open with the participants and maintained clear lines of communication in case they changed their minds. Echoing Burgess (1984), I adopted a non-judgemental approach which saw participants freely expressing their views, which I respected. I also respected my promises to the key informants by feeding back the preliminary findings of the research. I kept the key
informants abreast of all the developments regarding the completion of my thesis and when detailed findings will be availed to them.

4.7. Conclusion

This chapter discussed my reasons for using mixed methods to address the research objectives. The use of the questionnaire survey was used in conjunction with and supplemented by qualitative methods such as semi-structured interviews and multi-sited ethnography in pursuit of achieving the study’s aims and objectives. The deployment of a mixed methodology was informed by the theoretical framework approach discussed in Chapter 3. However, the lack of a reliable data sample had a bearing on the results of the fieldwork, and possibly the results of the study, but these were negligible to the extent that they did not compromise the integrity of this research. The difficulties confronting inside researchers were explored as well as the complexity of researching ‘hard to reach or hidden groups’ who would otherwise prefer to live below the radar of officialdom. The remainder of this thesis discusses the results and findings of the data generated from the use of this mixed methods approach. Chapter 5 focuses on the causes of migration from Zimbabwe and how this contributed to the formation of diasporic communities in the areas of study.
Chapter Five  
A profile of the Zimbabwean Diaspora: The causes of the exodus and the migration pathways into South Africa and the UK

5.1 Introduction

This chapter begins with a synopsis of the demographics of the study participants in order to gain a deeper understanding of Zimbabwean emigrants given the eight migration episodes discussed in Chapter 2. The chapter is important because it sets the scene and provides a background to the formation of the Zimbabwean diasporic communities in the two countries. It sets the context in which migrants left Zimbabwe and the reasons that drove them into exile. Profiling migrants will help to understand the differences in migration flows to South Africa and the UK. It sheds light on the timing of migration episodes that were discussed in Chapter 2 and delineates the gender, educational and the skills base, of the two migrant communities. Such an approach helps to ease the contestations which surround debates about migration, for example voluntary and involuntary migration, skilled and non-skilled migration (Castles, 2000). Extant literature on migration concur that migration is a consequence of multiple and interrelated factors in both the sending and receiving country (Massey et al., 1998).

As such, the reasons for migrating are numerous, complex and intertwined (Chant and Radcliffe, 1992). Chapter 3 demonstrated the utility of transnationalism as a theoretical framework for explaining migration because it provides for participation of prior migrants settled in South Africa and the UK in perpetuating the migration process once begun. Furthermore, a transnational perspective to international migration, as highlighted in Chapter 3, is underpinned by the notions of social capital (Coleman, 1990; Putnam, 1993, 1995), remittances (De Haas, 2007), and diaspora (Brah, 1996; Shuval, 2000), which play integral roles in initiating, fuelling and sustaining migration waves and flows. The structural links that exist between Zimbabwe, South Africa and the UK due to factors such as colonialism, trade, and cultural ties cannot be underestimated (see Chapter 2) (Castles, 2000).

The chapter delves deeper into the invisible machinations of this migration process, some of the migration waves were driven in part by the socio-economic implosion of the country and other complex factors. Finally, it examines the means and ways that migrants used to travel and enter South Africa and the UK and the reasoning behind them. Such an approach dispels simplistic interpretation of migration having a start and end point (Black, 2006) by demonstrating the multiplicity of stages and circularity that are inherent in the migration of Zimbabweans (see Chapter 2). The chapter is divided into five sections with Section 5.2 devoted to the demographics of the migrants, followed by Section 5.3 which tackles the period migrants entered South Africa/the UK. Section 5.4 examines the factors on which emigration was premised on while section 5.5 is devoted to an exploration of the perilous, informalised, and
irregular migration to South Africa and the UK. Section 5.6 concludes the chapter by highlighting the salient factors that would have been revealed and discussed. The chapter builds on the results from the survey and the in-depth interviews and explores in detail the reasons the migrants cited as necessitating their exit.

5.2 Demographic profile of the study participants

Contemporary migration literature questions the historical dominance of the male gender in migration literature (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005; Gutmann, 2003). As noted by De Laet (1999:13),

‘The invisibility of women in international migration scholarship does not correspond to the reality of international migration as women migrate across international boundaries at approximately the same rate as men.’

The results from survey (Figure 5.1) supports De Laet’s claim with a near equal split in both countries (51% female ($n=102$) to 49% male ($n=98$) in Leeds; and 44% female ($n=229$) to 56% male ($n=290$) in Limpopo).

**Figure 5.1 Respondents’ gender by country of residence (%)**

![Bar chart showing gender distribution by country of residence](image-url)

**Source:** Based on survey results 2009-2010
Furthermore, the near equal split confirms other scholarly literature which notes an increase in the number of women engaging in migration independently (Curan et al., 2006; Kanaiaupuni, 2000) due to changing global labour markets which incentivises both men and women to migrate in large numbers (Piper, 2008).

However, the domination of men in Limpopo is in accord with findings of other studies about Zimbabweans in South Africa (Block, 2006; Muzondidya, 2008). Zimbabwean migration to South Africa has long been associated with males (Ansell, 2001) due to socio-cultural constraints which have historically affected female migration. These norms obligated women to stay at home in the rural areas whilst men moved to urban centres in search of employment (Zinyama, 1990, 2002). Movement to towns during the colonial era was restricted with preference given to men who were able to obtain the passes\(^{28}\) that were needed to travel, settle and access paid work in towns and cities. Thus, mobility for women has historically been constricted, which makes these findings important in that they highlight how women are exercising their agency to improve their livelihoods (Boyle, 2002).

Figure 5.2 shows that the age distribution for respondents in Limpopo is different from that of Leeds (Chi square= 135.446, df=4 and p <0.001). The population in Limpopo appears to be relatively young compared to that in Leeds. The majority of the respondents 286 out of 519 (55%) in Limpopo lie in the 18-27 age cohorts while in Leeds the majority, 89 out of 200 (44%) are in the 38-47 age group. In both Leeds and Limpopo, the economically active and reproductive 18-49 age groups appear to predominate. The largest difference is in the 18-27 years age group where about 55% are in Limpopo compared to 12% in Leeds and the difference is statistically significant (z = -10.69, p<0.001). Most respondents in the 18-27 years category migrated to South Africa and most of those in the 38-47 years migrated to the UK.

The age differences suggest the existence of an economically active population in the two countries which can be regarded as an affirmation of the devastating socio-economic and political problems that Zimbabwe has been experiencing in the past decade (Barclay, 2010; Phimister, 2009). These age groups appear to have been disproportionately impacted by the demise of the country’s once vibrant economy because as earners they were supposed to provide for their families. The inability to find jobs to enable them to fulfil and maintain their earner status compelled them to leave for South Africa and the UK to seek better opportunities, as outlined in Chapter 2.

The Zimbabwean population in the UK is older compared to that in South Africa. This can be explained by three factors. The majority of the survey participants in Leeds

\(^{28}\) The colonial regime required that people moving into towns have passes in their possession which they got from white Native Commissioners in their districts of origin prior to visiting towns. This was used to control the rural-urban migration.
arrived between 2000 and 2002 as part of the fourth and fifth migration episodes, which implies that they were younger when they arrived.

Figure 5.2  Respondents’ age groups by country of residence %

![Bar chart showing age groups and country of residence](chart)

**Source**: Based on survey results 2009-2010

In Chapter 2, it was outlined how professionals left Zimbabwe initially for regional countries before moving to the UK due to worsening economic conditions. The old age of the UK based respondents may also be explained by the fact that these professionals had spent longer periods of time pursuing higher education than their Limpopo based counterparts many of whom left home as part of the seventh episode which comprised mostly of young people seeking for a fresh start elsewhere due to limited employment opportunities. Finally, Zimbabwean professionals who are based in South Africa prefer to work in Johannesburg and other major cities like Cape Town, which are perceived to have more opportunities than are available in towns in Limpopo province. Consequently, the sample population in Limpopo may have distorted the findings as the majority of the respondents were predominantly young, with little or no professional qualifications. Tellingly, those with professional
qualifications in South Africa who participated in the study tended to be of the same age as their UK based counterparts.29

5.3 Period of arrival in South Africa and the UK

As discussed in Chapter 2, the migration episodes peaked at different intervals (Figure 5.3). Survey data shows that migration to the UK peaked during the fourth migration episode between 2000 and 2002 (70%, n=140) while that to South Africa reached its zenith in the sixth migration episode (43%, n=221).

Figure 5.3 Period of entry into South Africa/ UK (%)

There is a significant difference between proportions of migrants who entered South Africa and the UK, pre 1999, 2000-2002 and 2006-2008. A higher proportion of migrants entered the UK between 2000 and 2002 (70%, n=140) compared to only 12% (n=62) in South Africa during the same period (z =15.50, p<0.001). Between 2006 and 2008, a higher proportion of migrants entered South Africa, 43% (n=221)

Source: Based on survey results 2009-2010

29 The majority of interview participants with professional qualifications such as engineering working in South Africa fell within the 37-48 age range which is dominant in the UK.
compared to 15% (n=30) in UK (z=7.04, P<0.001). Thirty nine percent (n=196) entered South Africa after 2009 compared to none in the UK during the same period. The pre 1999 proportion of migrants was higher for the UK, 12% (n=23) compared to South Africa, 2% (n=10) (z =5.21, p<0.001).

Several factors account for these differences. Firstly, the peak in the UK coincided with the non-visa requirement for Zimbabwean nationals, and implementation of a visa requirement prompted a sharp decline in new arrivals (Pasura, 2008; Ranger, 2005), and a gradual increase in the number of arrivals in South Africa. Secondly, the ascent in number of arrivals in South Africa can be attributed to the effects of Operation Murambatsvina (Hammar, 2008; Mawadza, 2008), the hyperinflation and catastrophic collapse of the Zimbabwean economy (Hanke and Kwok, 2009), the cholera outbreak (Koenig, 2009; Pruyt, 2009), and the political violence that characterised the 2008 presidential elections (Barclay, 2010; Raftopoulos, 2010).

The absence of a visa regime between Harare and London until November 2002 drew the fourth and fifth migration waves mostly to the UK, making it the preferred destination for many Zimbabweans (see Chapter 2). According to some interviewees, it was more difficult to go to South Africa than to the UK due to visa requirements. Excerpts from an interview with Owen, 33, a former teacher in Zimbabwe whose asylum claim is still to be determined in Leeds, aptly captures this,

‘Although I had friends in SA who could help me to get a job, I was put off by visa requirements. At that time, around February 2002, you needed a visa to go to South Africa but you didn’t need one to come here. I didn’t see the point [of getting a South African visa] when I could come to London without a visa. Besides, earning pounds was a better option than earning Rands as pounds fetched more on the black market.’ (Interview in Leeds, 17 October 2009)

As a civil servant and a qualified teacher, Owen had a relatively good standard of living in Zimbabwe. He was able to draw on his cultural and financial capital to finance his trip to the UK having been influenced by, as will be demonstrated in Chapter 7, the transnational practices of prior migrants (Fussell and Massey, 2004). For Owen, as for many others, being a qualified teacher meant that he could mobilise the financial resources needed to travel to the UK.

The imposition of the visa regime by London in November 2002 not only drastically reduced the options for Zimbabweans wanting to leave Zimbabwe, but also shrunk the number of new arrivals except for those who came on work permits; their dependants and family reunifiers (see Figure 5.3). This was confirmed in interviews with migrants in Limpopo. Pepukai, a 46 year old accountant who works for a

---

30 Prior to the lifting of the visa regime between Harare and Pretoria, Zimbabweans intending to travel to South Africa had to provide an invitation letter and evidence of a South African host’s address; certified copy of the South African identity or permit; a security deposit; a valid passport; 2 passport-sized photographs; proof of funds in the form of traveller’s cheques amounting to R2000.00; bank statements for 3 months (DHA, 2010b)
financial institution who describes himself as one of those who reluctantly moved to South Africa after his planned trip to London floundered due to visa problems and lack of social capital that could have helped him to navigate the visa problems as demonstrated in Chapter 3.

‘I only came here because of visa requirements to go to London. I already had my ticket and was due to fly on 18th December 2002 when visas were imposed which meant that this was the only place that I could come. I am still hoping though that one day I will be able to join you in the diaspora.’
(Interview in Polokwane, 5 March 2010)

Despite living away from home, Pepukai does not regard himself as a member of the ‘diaspora.’ This view is shared by other migrants in South Africa who associate being in the diaspora with being away from the African continent. Secondly, as shown in Chapter 2, the circulatory nature of migration has led some migrants to regard South Africa as ‘just another place of work’ from which they can regularly travel home to be with their families. Interviewed migrants considered South Africa as a stepping stone to destinations further afield, which affirms one of the assumptions of this study: that migrants regard South Africa not as the final destination but as a launch pad for further migration (see Chapters 7 and 8). This is similar to what Collyer (2007: 668) calls the ‘fragmented journey’ which,

‘For many migrants on these routes their destination is not determined when they leave home, it may change many times during the course of the journey and, whatever it is, they may never get there.’

Similarly, Roberts et al (1999) noted that Mexican migrants’ journey to the US entailed numerous stops during which the migrants build their social capital. The visa restrictions had the unintended consequence of channelling migrants who intended to travel to the UK to travel instead to South Africa and other destinations such as Ireland and the Netherlands where they built their social capital with the aim of reaching their intended destination country (see Section 5.5).

5.4 The causes of migration from Zimbabwe

The reasons that migrants gave for exiting Zimbabwe are numerous, complex and multi-faceted. Notwithstanding this complexity, the reasons for migration fall within the broad realm of socio-economic and political factors. The questionnaire asked the respondents to select the main reason which prompted their departure from Zimbabwe. Figure 5.4 shows that the main reason for migrating to both South Africa and the UK was economic/poverty/unemployment with South Africa having a higher proportion, 91% (n=474) compared to the UK, 49% (n=99), z=-12.46, p<0.0001. The UK has a higher proportion of individuals who migrated because of political violence, 21%, (n=42) compared to South Africa, 3% (n=14) (z=8.36, p<0.001). Furthermore, the UK has more respondents who came to study, 10% (n=20) compared to South Africa, 3% (n=14) (z=4.13, p<0.001).
As demonstrated in Chapter 2, asylum seeking in the UK has gained currency with migrants as a strategy to gain documented status. This may explain why a significant number of respondents in the UK claim to be victims of political violence. In South Africa, the preponderance of economic reasons could be a consequence of economic factors taking precedence over political factors.

5.4.1 Economic decline as the driver of emigration

The neo-classical economic theory posits that migration is principally caused by individuals trying to maximise their income by moving from low wage areas to areas where their labour is sufficiently recompensed (Borjas, 1989). As outlined in Chapter 2, some scholars have attributed the increased emigration from Zimbabwe noticed in the 1990s to the hardships which accompanied the introduction of ESAP in 1990 which were felt by both professionals and non-professionals alike (Chikanda, 2010; Gaidzanwa, 1999; McGregor, 2008). This school of thought ascribes the suffering
that people were experiencing to the after effects of ESAP, which compelled professionals and less skilled people to leave (McGregor, 2008; Mlambo, 1997, 2008). The survey results supports this viewpoint as evidenced by 50% (n=99) in Leeds and 91% (n=474) in Limpopo participants stating that they left Zimbabwe due to economic hardships.

Section 2.2 demonstrated the migration episodes that were spawned by a complex set of socio-economic factors. For example, section 2.2.3 demonstrated links between ESAP and the third migration episode which was comprised mostly of professionals, including medical personnel migrating to regional destinations like Botswana and South Africa where pay and working conditions were perceived to be better (Chikanda, 2010; Gaidzanwa, 1998). This is consistent with Stark’s (1991) New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) theory which states that apart from income differentials, migration can also be explained by factors such as the availability of employment. The case of Dr Chokuda, 48 who left Zimbabwe in 1995 for South Africa when discontent with the government’s macro-economic policies first emerged helps to explicate this. He now runs a medical practice in Thohoyandou,

‘I left early, way back in the mid 90s when I realised that the country was lurching from one crisis to the next. Remember ESAP which Chidzero (Dr Bernard Chidzero was independent Zimbabwe’s first Minister of Finance minister) described as the panacea for our economic problems and the damage that it caused? I was a doctor but I could not afford a car on my salary.’ (Interview in Thohoyandou, 24 March 2010)

As argued by Adepoju (2000: 385), migration may be a rational endeavour to mitigate the dramatic impacts of the World Bank inspired austerity programmes which make emigration a ‘coping mechanism of last resort.’ This is clear from Dr Chokuda’s account which demonstrates the predicaments faced by many professionals at that time. Medical professionals expect to exhibit a higher standard of living befitting their status and society’s expectations (Hammett, 2008). Faced with the prospect of out of control inflation which was slowly denuding the value of the local currency, many Zimbabweans, professionals and non-professionals alike started exploring ways to leave (see Chapter 2). Until this juncture, migration was largely rural-urban and intra-urban but now took on a more regional dimension.

Increasing inflation and worsening economic conditions encouraged more people from geographic areas (Table 5.1) with little or no known history of regional migration to migrate, thus creating the sixth and seventh migration episodes anchored on weak ties as outlined in Chapter 2 (see Figure 2.1, p. 17). The dominance of respondents from Harare in the UK could be attributed to superior information flows given that it is the capital city which hosted recruitment agencies on their recruitment drives in Zimbabwe.
Table 5.1  Geographical areas of origin by country of residence %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In which province were you born?</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>% within Country of residence</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>South Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulawayo</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harare</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manicaland</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland Central</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland East</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland West</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masvingo</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matebeleland North</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matebeleland South</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlands</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Interviews with Anthony, a 42 year old former temporary teacher\textsuperscript{31} who arrived in South Africa as part of the seventh migration episode and now lives in Phalaborwa and Christopher, a 31 year old former municipal artisan now living in Thohoyandou attest to this stereotyping,

‘I grew up in Murewa (Mashonaland East province) and, as a child growing up, I never knew of people from our area coming here to work. It was always associated with people from Masvingo and Matebeleland provinces. But 2008 changed all that.’ (Interview with Anthony, Phalaborwa, 3 March 2010)

‘I am from Chinhoyi (Mashonaland West province), but now I have to survive by hawking. Working here has not been for people from my area but from Beitbridge and other border areas, but now I have joined them.’ (Interview with Christopher, Thohoyandou, 15 March 2010)

These narratives concur with scholarly literature which was discussed in Chapter 3 which claims that people from communities without a rich history of migration are less likely to migrate than those who come from communities where migration is prevalent (Massey and Garcia-Espafia, 1987; Massey and Espinosa, 1997). However, the searing poverty that was experienced in Zimbabwe compelled Anthony and Christopher to break with tradition and move to South Africa thereby opening up new frontiers of migration for their families, friends and relatives. Anthony and Christopher’s cases demonstrate that migration in South Africa, far from being the preserve of people in border areas, is now arguably a countrywide phenomenon. Notwithstanding this expansion, people from the provinces that border South Africa still predominate, though this is reducing.

As explained in Chapter 2, health and social care professionals left their jobs in droves after being enticed by the prospects of higher pay and better working conditions in the UK and other western countries in the late 1990s (Borjas, 1999). There had been well documented strikes in the Zimbabwean public service due to low pay and poor working conditions since 1989 (Chikanda, 2010; Gaidzanwa, 1999). Moreover, their decision to migrate to the UK was aided in no small measure by the structural links that existed between the two countries which converted potential migration into actuality (Sassen, 1988). This is supported by interviewees who arrived in Leeds in 1998 who spoke of being offered ‘astronomical sums of money’ which they could not decline. As Eliza, 47, a former matron at a national referral hospital in Harare who now works at Leeds NHS Trust says,

‘I was a matron at a Harare hospital earning a modest salary which I was comfortable with. Then these people from London came and offered me a job on a salary yearly of £26,000. I quickly did the maths; £26,000.00 was Zim$2,600,000.00 on the black market. With this sum, I could buy a house in the northern suburbs and kiss goodbye to Mabelreign (a medium to low

\textsuperscript{31}Temporary teachers are hired to alleviate the chronic shortage of qualified teachers. Temporary teachers are paid less than their qualified counterparts.
density suburb in Harare). I didn’t need to think twice about it, I just got on the next plane for London.’ (Interview in Leeds, 12 November 2009)

The ability to afford airfares differentiates Eliza from other migrants who decided to go to South Africa because of the exorbitant cost of travelling. This is one of the arguments of this thesis: that class played a critical role in channelling migrants to different destinations. As Banerjee and Duflo (2008:12) posit,

‘migration decisions of the middle class differ substantially from those of the extremely poor; unlike the poor...migration takes the middle class further as they have the means to move.’

Consistent with Banerjee and Duflo’s argument, it can be inferred that Eliza, like others of her ilk, was able to actualise her migration intentions because she was able to raise the airfare. Social mobility was paramount in Eliza’s decision to accept the job offer to work in the UK as evidenced by her reference of buying a house in the luxurious northern suburbs where the upper class live. Investing in property as outlined in Chapter 3 is also an indication of migrants’ return intentions.

The chronic foreign currency shortages in Zimbabwe provided the means through which Eliza’s hopes of social mobility could be realised. These shortages gave rise to illicit foreign currency trading on the black market (Mawowa and Matongo, 2010). The government still maintained a firm grip on the foreign currency exchange market and set exchange rates which did not reflect the perilous state of the Zimbabwean dollar (Bloch, 2006). Consequently, the few people with access to forex shunned the formal banking system in favour of the more profitable parallel market. It became an aspiration for many to work away from home where they would be paid in forex which could then be used for property acquisition. Hence, it is not surprising that Eliza accepted the job she had been offered; she was thinking of how much it equated to in Zimbabwean dollar terms. Her motivations for migrating therefore fall within the realm of NELM theory in which individuals migrate to maximise their income by moving from low to high wage economies (Borjas, 1989; Stark, 1991).

Chapter 3 discussed how people migrate in order to save enough money for a specific target e.g. buying or building a house. The collapse of the economy meant a shortage of jobs which had a bearing on people’s ability to get mortgages. Exiting Zimbabwe provided the only realistic hope for Zimbabweans who could not access mortgages to own property. Against this backdrop, it is therefore not surprising that the desire to own a property was mentioned by an overwhelming majority of participants in both the survey and interviews, and it transcended social classes. While some professionals may have owned houses in towns, the majority were not property owners prior to leaving Zimbabwe. Owning a house in Zimbabwe is highly regarded and signifies social mobility. Interviews with migrants in Leeds and Limpopo attest to this, as exemplified by Shadreck, a 39 year old Leeds resident and
asylum seeker who left home in 2002 and claimed asylum in 2008 (see Chapters 2 and 6).

‘I left Zim (Zimbabwe) because I wanted to make money and buy/build my own house. I was staying in one room with my wife and three children in Mabvuku. I heard that people were coming to London, working for 6 months and then buying a house. Although I had a fairly good job, I didn’t make enough money to buy a stand (residential stand on which to build a house), let alone a house. So I came here hoping to make enough money to buy my own house or build one. I managed to do that within 6 months. I am now a proud owner of four houses in the low density suburbs but this came at a cost as I could not go back home and eventually couldn’t work due to employers becoming strict about papers so had to go and claim about a year ago.’
(Interview in Leeds, 28 October 2009)

As Chapter 6 will demonstrate, asylum seeking is used by many migrants to legalise their immigration status. Shadreck’s case confirms this. He is one of the target savers who after achieving their targets decided not to return home and claimed asylum to legalise his immigration status. Shadreck’s narrative demonstrates the changes that accompany migrants’ immigration statuses. His status changed from being an economic migrant who entered the UK as a visitor, to claiming asylum to prolong his stay (Table 2.3, p. 23). In his study of Zimbabwean migrants in Britain, Pasura (2008a) shows how they switch between different immigration statuses in order to incrementally extend their stay in Britain. It has been shown in Chapter 2 how most asylum claims in the UK were made inside the country, a significant number of them several years of the expiry of the original visa. Shadreck’s case is emblematic of many other migrants in the UK.

The surge in inflation resulted in the capitulation of ‘staunch patriots’ i.e. migrants who self described in interviews as supporters of President Mugabe’s government and had fought with him during the 1970s liberation war. As argued in Chapter 2, President Mugabe caused the descent of the economy by awarding war veterans gratuities for their participation in the liberation war and eliciting their support to invade white owned commercial farms (Sachikonye, 2003). According to Raftopoulos (2009), the hyperinflationary condition prevailing in the country reduced the local currency to virtual worthlessness. Similarly, the World Bank (2008) claimed that Zimbabwe had the world’s fastest shrinking economy for a country not at war. Against this cataclysmic collapse, it is therefore not surprising to hear the ‘patriots’ who benefited from patronage talking of having had enough of the suffering they were experiencing despite their relatively privileged position. These ‘patriots’ told me that they left home in 2008 for South Africa and the UK reluctantly, after realising that the socio-economic situation was not improving (see Chapter 2). The following excerpts from staunch ‘patriots’ like Nelson, a 55 year old war veteran who

32 Mabvuku is a high density suburb in Harare. It is not uncommon to find several families living in one house due to the acute shortage of housing in high density suburbs in Harare and indeed other towns and cities in Zimbabwe.
abandoned the farm which he invaded at the height of the land reform programme, to join his wife, Eliza (p. 108) in the UK and Matongo, 58, a former colonel in the Zimbabwe National Army now domiciled in Limpopo shed light on this metamorphosis,

‘I am a war veteran; I fought against the (colonial) system and never thought that I would leave my own country for another, worst of all the UK. It is any irony of the highest order that I fought against the British and drove them away from Zim (Zimbabwe) yet I am now here eking a living as a security guard. I didn’t want to come here, I could have come way back in ‘99 when my wife first came but I didn’t because things were still ok at home. I was a chef (boss), in charge of policing an entire province. I got a very big farm during the jambanja (violent take-over of white owned farms) but unfortunately things didn’t work out well...things were unbearably tough in Zimbabwe and when you see die hard Mugabe people like me leaving; then you know how bad things were. Inflation was in trillions. You guys who came here early didn’t see anything; you were talking of inflation in 1999/2000; that was nothing.’

(Interview with Nelson in Leeds, 31 October 2009)

‘To see a man like me leave the country that I fought to liberate should tell you something. I don’t give up easily; I joined the struggle at 17 and was a colonel when I went AWOL (absent without official leave). Things were hard in Zimbabwe in 2008, despite the preferential treatment that people of my rank were getting in accessing forex, foodstuffs, farms etc; it was still hard. I think we were just getting the crumbs while those higher up were the ones enjoying it all, but you hear people saying soldiers were eating but it’s not true, we were also struggling. In the end, when this opportunity came, I could not resist the temptation of taking this job as a security manager of this mine.’

(Interview with Matongo, Musina, 7 May 2010)

These two accounts capture the metamorphosis in the thinking and experiences of people who are closely associated with the regime of President Mugabe, people who are largely responsible for and materially benefited from the demise of the once prosperous country. It is through the actions of ZANU (PF) and its war veterans like Nelson and Matongo that the country has gone from a bread basket to a basket case (Barclay, 2010; Chan, 2003). Nelson compares and differentiates the levels of inflation at the turn of the century and in 2008 to highlight the devastating effect that it had on ordinary people’s lives. Implicit in these narratives is the fact that ordinary people felt the ravages of economic decline more than the politically connected people such as Nelson33, who benefited from the transnational activities of his wife (Asis et al., 2004) (see Chapter 7).

While Nelson and Matongo’s cases may represent isolated examples of privileged migrants who left during the height of the economic problems (see Section 2.2.7),

33 Politically connected people also happened to be economically connected due to the inextricable link between politics and economic issues in Zimbabwe under the leadership of President Mugabe. The complex relationship between politics and economics can be argued to be part of the patronage that President Mugabe uses masterfully to prolong his reign in power.
most migrants in South Africa felt the full wrath of the precipitous economic decline because they left at the height of the economic crisis. Hyperinflation eroded the purchasing power of the local currency. As noted by Hanke and Kwok (2009), hyperinflation in November 2008 reached 89,700,000,000,000,000,000,000% compared to 65% in 2000 when most migrants in the UK, like Eliza (p. 108), left (Chitekwe and Mitlin, 2001). Furthermore in 2008, job losses were widespread. The economic crisis appears to have affected all people regardless of ethnicity or gender as will be shown by the cases below. Both male and female migrants irrespective of class appear to have been equally affected by the deteriorating economic conditions in Zimbabwe. There is a strong correlation between the economic factors and the year of departure as the case of Seshего resident, Davidson, a 37 year old engineer demonstrates,

‘You couldn’t stay there because it was uninhabitable; it was like living in a desert. I don’t know how to describe it for you to understand, because words can’t describe the suffering that we went through, the hardships that we saw and felt. If you were there in 2008, you would understand what I am trying to say. It was tough; the money was worthless for most of us who didn’t have access to forex.’ (Interview in Polokwane, 8 April 2010)

Davidson lays bare the problems and economic difficulties faced by formally employed people in Zimbabwe in 2008. He equates living in Zimbabwe to living in a desert due to the prevailing hardships that confronted people. It further illustrates the helplessness that people felt as they watched the currency collapse under the strain of hyperinflation. The majority of both the survey and interview participants ascribed the economic hardships to President Mugabe and his government (see for instance, Barclay, 2010; Mlambo, 2009; Phimister, 2009; Raftopoulos, 2009).

Some scholars have argued that migration is a livelihood strategy for the poor (De Haan, 2006; Rogaly et al., 2002) while others claim that it is the preserve of the middle class (Scott, 2006). Evidence from the Zimbabwean exodus does not conform to these common stereotypes due to its complexity. For example, it comprised of mixed flows of skilled professionals and non-skilled people, refugees and economic migrants. Some of the migrants do not conform to the archetypical definition of poor people as they were from relatively privileged backgrounds but were still compelled to leave because of the difficult economic circumstances prevailing in Zimbabwe. The following section discusses the nexus between migration and loss of livelihood.

5.4.2 Loss of livelihoods

Attendant to the economic problems highlighted in the preceding section, was the loss of livelihoods for some survey (8%, n=13 in Leeds; and 1%, n=8% in Limpopo) and interview participants who owned businesses on which they depended for their sustenance which spawned migration episodes 5, 6 and 7 discussed in Chapter 2.
Amongst this group were commercial farmers who lost their farms to the violent takeover beginning in June 2000, bankers and bureau de change owners following the closure and hounding of bankers by the new Central Bank Governor, Gideon Gono, and informal traders whose operations were disrupted by operation Murambatsvina in 2005. Dan, a 52 year old former white commercial farmer in Banket, Mashonaland West province who is now leasing a farm in Limpopo is in this category,

‘I lost everything that my father and grandfathers had worked hard for, to the extent that I feel like my whole life was taken from me, just like that, in a flash. I can’t describe the feeling…I was born on the farm, my parents are buried there, so are my grandparents. I guess I am lucky, I have managed to start something down here…others were not so fortunate.’ (Interview in Musina, 26 March 2010)

This quote highlights the anguish that white commercial farmers felt when they lost their farms and livelihoods. For Dan, the loss of the farm not only entailed financial ruin but also symbolised a ‘disconnect’ with his past given that his parents and grandparents were buried on the farm. Such losses were not only inflicted on white Zimbabweans, but were also felt by the people who worked on the farms, as in the case of Darios, a 25 year old former farm labourer in Chiredzi, Masvingo Province now residing in Giyani.

‘I came here because baas (white commercial farmer) lost the farm, it was invaded and we were told to go home. The new people didn’t need workers; it was taken by people from maruzevha\textsuperscript{34} (reserves) in Zaka. I didn’t have anywhere to go; I was born on the farm to a Mozambican father and a Zimbabwean mother. I had to come here as others who had homes in the villages went back to their villages and some like me, had to think of somewhere else to go.’ (Interview in Giyani, 15 March 2010)

Darios’ case is illustrative of thousands other people who were ejected from their places of work during the violent land reform programme (see for instance, Alexander, 2006; Sachikonye, 2003). Rendered stateless, disenfranchised and ineligible for resettlement under the fast track land reform as highlighted in Chapter 2, a number of people such as Darios chose to leave for South Africa where they hoped to find jobs in the agricultural sector.

Black elites were not spared either, as the case of George, a 47 year old former owner of a financial services institution who now runs a financial services company in Leeds, epitomises,

‘I left in 2004 when Gono (Gideon Gono, Reserve Bank Governor) was persecuting bankers left, right and centre, soon after he took over the reins at

\textsuperscript{34} The colonial regime used the term reserve to describe the communal areas where black people lived in villages.
the apex bank. Remember when he came in, he labelled us (bankers) as economic saboteurs, accusing us of externalising foreign currency.’ (Interview in Leeds, 28 November 2009)

The loss of livelihoods transcended social class (Scoones and Woolmer, 2003). George’s experiences are typical of the fate suffered by emerging black elites who were persecuted and scapegoated by President Mugabe’s government for the economic malaise in which the country was wallowing (Mawere, 2009). A number of well known business people were hounded out of the country for illegally externalising foreign currency. The state tried, through the arrests, to deflect attention from its own failings, and sought to blame the economic problems that were being experienced on malfeasance by business people.

It was not only successful black elites who suffered the wrath of President Mugabe’s government as the crackdown was extended to the informal sector. As explained in Chapter 2, the infamous Operation Murambatsvina (Drive out the Trash) resulted in hundreds of thousands of people being dispossessed of their livelihoods, some of whom emigrated to South Africa and the UK as part of the sixth migration wave. With their livelihoods destroyed, some migrants such as Fadzai; a 29 year old single mother moved to Musina,

‘I lost all my wares at the flea market in Harare. My property was also destroyed in the two room cottage that I was renting in Highfield. I didn’t have any alternative except to go either go to my rural home (Mutoko) or to come here. I decided to come here after leaving my daughter with my mother at our rural home.’ (Interview in Musina, 29 February 2010)

Fadzai’s case is not isolated; Murambatsvina was indiscriminate. The high density areas which are inhabited by the poor felt the impact more than their middle and upper class counterparts who resided in the low density northern suburbs. The reasons for this are three fold. Firstly, because there had been a population explosion in the high density areas which resulted in house owners erecting unapproved structures on their properties which they were sub-letting to homeless people working in both the formal and informal sectors. Secondly, there had been a mushrooming of housing cooperatives which had sprung up since the late 1980s, offering stands to their members in zoned land, thereby violating planning laws. Finally, the informal economy was heavily concentrated in the high density suburbs, because that is where the poor live. This bolsters my argument about the role of class in channelling migrants to different destinations. Fadzai, unlike George, was compelled to settle in South Africa because she did not have the same resources as George, who after losing his business moved to the UK where he now operates another business.

The use of violence on perceived opponents of the government increased dramatically after 2000 when ordinary people began being persecuted for freedom of
expression. Having watched the destruction of their livelihoods, some Zimbabweans felt obligated to follow their countrymen who had exited earlier.

5.4.3 Growing political intolerance, violence and repression

Despite the widely reported incidences of political violence against opposition MDC supporters by President Mugabe and his ZANU (PF) party supporters (HRW, 2008; McGregor, 2008; SPT, 2008), the results of this study do not support this widely held perception. The attacks against opposition supporters are reported to have peaked during the presidential run-off in June 2008 (SPT, 2010). It is therefore surprising that, despite leaving at the height of political problems, only 3% (n=13) of survey participants in Limpopo compared to 21% (n=42) in Leeds ascribed their departure to political persecution, violence, and safety and security issues (Figure 5.4, p. 102). Three factors could account for this. Firstly, the politically active migrants may have moved to metropolitan areas such as Johannesburg and Cape Town where there are vibrant MDC structures while others moved to the UK after a sojourn in South Africa. Secondly, it could be that the period of extreme political violence coincided with the height of the economic problems to the extent that those interviewed considered their economic problems took precedence over political ones. Thirdly, it may be that the migrants surveyed in Limpopo were not politically active, and resided in areas which were not affected by violence. This may suggest that the media coverage of political violence were exaggerated.

Interview insights suggest that migrants based in South Africa experienced and witnessed worse levels of political violence than their UK counterparts the majority of who left between 2000 and 2002 when it was not too pronounced. It seems, from the interview and secondary data, as though ZANU (PF) resorted to brute force to beat the electorate into submission, leading to the death of over 500 MDC supporters during the run-off period in June 2008 (HRW, 2009; MDC, 2009) compared to less than 12 deaths in the 2002 presidential elections (Zimbabwe Human Rights Forum, 2003). The experiences of Ntokwazi, a 26 year old MDC activist in Gokwe, Midlands province, now living in Ellisras in Limpopo encapsulates the pain and suffering that people who were perceived by ZANU (PF) to be MDC supporters endured,

‘I had to leave home because the CIO (central intelligence organisation), soldiers and green bombers wanted me dead. They killed my comrades, two of them in broad daylight, and, had I not escaped, I could also be dead. The party (MDC) gave me some money which I used to come here. I will, however, return home; Zimbabwe is my home.’ (Interview in Ellisras, 17 March 2010)

Scholars such as Brah (1996) argue that diasporas embody notions of a home from which migrants were expelled and to which they aspire to eventually return, as will be outlined in Chapter 8. Ntokwazi’s narrative is consistent with this thinking as he
regards Zimbabwe as his home to which he will one day return. He considers his existence in South Africa as enforced and temporary.

A sizeable percentage of the survey respondents (21%, \( n=42 \)) in Leeds attributed their departure from home to political persecution and safety and security issues which were backed by interviews. This is surprising given that when most of them left (2000-2002), violence was not as extreme as it was during the 2008 elections. It may be that their claim of political persecution is imagined, exaggerated or both. Thus, claims of political activism in the UK, as will be argued in Chapter 7, could be a strategy to get documented status. An interview with UK domiciled key informant confirms the use of political activism as a strategy to get documented status by most migrants. Zenzo, a 44 year old MDC UK and Ireland executive committee member, who has refugee status explains,

‘To be honest, I don’t think many of us who claim to have escaped violence and political persecution in Zimbabwe really mean it. We are just economic migrants who play the system. Have you noticed how people make claims every time the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (AIT) rules in favour of Zimbabweans in test cases? We saw it recently when the papers reported that the number of asylum applications rose 96% from January to March 2009. People just claim to have been MDC supporters when they were nowhere near the MDC. I write supporting letters to the Home Office for some asylum seekers who know absolutely nothing about the party, don’t even support the party; I am only doing so because they are fellow Zimbabweans who need to work to support their families at home.’ (Interview in Leeds, 22 October 2009)

Zenzo’s narrative is revealing because some commentators have expressed reservations about the authenticity of some asylum claims (Hart, 2005). His assertions about the number of asylum claims rising exponentially every time the AIT rules in favour of migrants’ applications against deportation helps to explain the number of asylum claims made in country. Moreover, it sheds light on the increases in the number of new asylum claims and fresh claims that migrants make (Table 2.4, p. 32).

5.4.4 Family Reunion

Castles (2002) has highlighted the importance of family reunion in propelling and perpetuating migration cycles leading to the formation of migration chains. Data from the survey (Figure 5.5) shows that cohabitation is a growing trend in both Leeds (30%, \( n=60 \)) and Limpopo (27%, \( n=141 \)) with the former having more respondents in cohabitation relationships than the latter. However, the difference is not statistically significant (\( z=0.80, p=0.421 \)). The number of respondents who reported being married are evenly spread in the two areas (Leeds, 26%, \( n=51 \); and 26%, \( n=133 \) in Limpopo).
Documented migrants are able to bring their immediate family members in both countries. In the survey, family reunion was at 13% (n=26) of the respondents, a more significant reason for moving to the UK than to South Africa (2%, n=10). This can be accounted for by two factors. Migrants in Leeds left their families behind when they first emigrated as outlined in Chapter 2. As will be demonstrated in Chapter 7, most migrants, especially in the UK, initially intended to stay for six months or less, during which they worked and saved for their targets. However, as conditions at home deteriorated, migrants deferred their return intentions while others sought to formalise their status by claiming asylum or switching to student visas or other immigration statuses (see Chapter 6). Once they became documented, migrants took steps to be reunited with their families.

In South Africa, family reunion has different impetuses due to the context of migration practices. Here, the circulatory nature of migration, which sees migrants shuttling back and forth more frequently than those in the UK (see Section 2.4 and Chapter 8), diminishes the need for family reunion. Moreover, immigration status is not a significant constraint to movement in South Africa; in the UK the reunification of

**Source:** Based on survey results 2009-2010
families only occurs after obtaining documented status. The case of Darios whose case we have encountered earlier (p.113), exemplifies this,

‘My wife is at home of course, why would she need to be here? She stays at home with the kids and she has been here once or twice but it’s difficult to come here with a baby on her back. If she had a passport maybe, but because she has to walk like the other border jumpers, it makes it difficult. I go home frequently so she doesn’t really need to come. It has always been that way, remember our fathers used to work away and we stayed at home with our mothers? Its tradition, wives stay at home and men work away and visit home whenever they can.’ (Interview in Giyani, 15 March 2010)

This excerpt demonstrates how circulation as outlined in Chapter 2, curtails family reunification (see Chapters 6 and 8). Other factors include the dangers associated with informal migration and socio-cultural norms which require wives to stay at home doing reproductive roles like caring for the children and community (Ansell, 2001; Dodson, 1998) which Collins (1994) terms community ‘motherwork’.

In Leeds, insights gained from interviews suggest that the females (15%, n=15) came to join their husbands who had obtained documented status such as refugee status; while men such as Nelson (p. 110) (11%, n=11) came to join their wives who had emigrated earlier on work permits. The majority of men with refugee status had left their wives at home when they first came. This resonates with Martin’s (2005) observation that the main reason for migration is an indicator of social roles of women and men. Male migrants moved to the UK in their role as earners (Thébaud, 2010). This is encapsulated by the case of Shamiso, 42 who recently joined her husband in Leeds together with her children having remained in Zimbabwe when he came to the UK in 1999.

‘I am still new here; I arrived in June last year (2008). I stayed at home when baba vaTonde35 (Tonde’s father) came in 1999. I was beginning to doubt whether we will be together ever again and I thought he didn’t want me to come. I didn’t believe what he was telling me that he didn’t have papers for me to come especially when other wives were coming here to join their husbands and other husbands were coming home yet he was saying he couldn’t come. I was beginning to believe that he had remarried here.’ (Interview with Shamiso, Leeds, 22 November 2009)

Shamiso’s narrative typifies that of many transnationalised Zimbabwean families who negotiate the economic opportunity structures of two nation-states to sustain themselves economically (Schmalzbauer, 2001). Darios and Shamiso’s cases demonstrate that transnational families are not a new phenomenon (Foner, 2000; Glick Schiller, 1999a). Shamiso’s statement brings to the fore the tensions that

35 In Zimbabwe, married people are referred to by the names of their children, usually the first born child. Shamiso calls her husband not by his first name but by his son’s (Tonde) name. Shamiso is also called Mai Tonde (mother of Tonde). This is done as a sign of respect as it is considered to be disrespectful to call an adult with a child by their first name. However, this practice is gradually reducing due to westernisation.
transnational living engenders in families, as evidenced by Shamiso’s doubts about her relationship.

5.4.5 The pursuit of higher education in South Africa and the UK

The human capital theory of Sjaastad (1962) emphasises the importance of personal assets like skills, education, and physical abilities. As De Haas (2010b) elucidates, the human capital theory helps us to theoretically explain the selectivity of migration beyond explanations focusing only on costs. In Chapter 2, I demonstrated the esteem in which the British education system to a greater extent, and South African education system to a lesser extent, is held in Zimbabwe due to structural links built during the colonial era. This esteem has proved to be enduring if judged by the number of Zimbabweans who continue to move to South Africa and the UK to study (Figure 5.4, p. 105). In accord with Bian’s (2002) argument, higher education in Zimbabwe has until recently been critical in ushering social mobility. It was and continues to be regarded in some circles as a safe path to social mobility and economic prosperity (Ranger, 2005).

The evidence from the survey shows that 10% (n=20) and 3% (n=14) of the respondents moved to the UK and South Africa for study purposes respectively. Moreover, evidence from both the survey and interviews indicate relatively high levels of educational endowments in both countries, if judged by the qualifications that the survey respondents held on arrival in South Africa and the UK. These findings are consistent with other studies of Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa and the UK which concludes that Zimbabwean migrants appear to be better educated than most migrants (Bloch, 2008; Makina, 2007).

Figure 5.6 shows that a higher proportion of respondents in the UK were holding college diplomas 43% (n=85) compared to their South Africa based counterparts, 22% (n=115), a difference which is statistically significant (z=5.63, p<0.001) which supports one of the aims of this thesis that migrants in Leeds have higher educational capital than their Limpopo based counterparts. The same trend was observed for undergraduate degrees, where 12% (n=23) of the UK based respondents held undergraduate degrees compared to 5% (n=25) of their South Africa based counterparts, a difference which is statistically significant (z=3.308, p=0.0009). There are more respondents in South Africa with primary and secondary level education than in the UK. The high percentage of respondents with secondary school level of education again appears to affirm this argument as they did not continue with their education to acquire professional qualifications as those in Leeds.
The study revealed that some of the people who moved to the UK to pursue nursing studies did not have sufficient ‘A’ level points needed to gain entry into the local universities. This scenario is exemplified by Irvine, 36, who lives in Leeds and came to the UK in the late 90s to study nursing at one of the universities in London,

‘I finished my As (Advanced level) in 1995. I couldn’t go UZ (University of Zimbabwe) as I only got 6\(^{36}\) points. I think to get into university then you needed a minimum of 9 or 10 depending on the programme you wanted to do.’ (Interview in Leeds, 14 December 2010)

The above case highlights the competitive nature of the Zimbabwean higher education system where entry is on the basis of advanced level passes as it is in the UK (Ranger, 2005). However, it could be that at the time of migrants’ arrival in the

---

\(^{36}\) Admission to universities in Zimbabwe is largely based on academic attainment. Under the points system, A=5 points; B=4 points; C=3 points; D=2 points and E=1 point. Students study a minimum of 3 subjects at A Level.
late 1990s, nursing was not popular with British people which enabled overseas students such as Irvine to enrol despite their seemingly poor Advanced level passes.

While some migrants arrived in the UK with little education, a number of these migrants have furthered their education or had enrolled in institutions of higher learning. This can be ascribed to the accessibility of higher education in the UK. Interestingly, more women than men have attained undergraduate degrees in the UK which suggests that being in the diaspora has opened opportunities for migrants (see Chapter 6). Interviews suggested that many migrants with documented status had either completed their university education or were enrolled in either full-time or part-time studies in further education colleges. For example, some migrants did not have any ‘O’ levels on arrival in the UK but have been accepted on university courses due to their experience in lieu of formal academic qualifications. The case of Lynne, a 35 year old woman resident in Leeds who arrived as part of the fourth migration episode, encapsulates this,

‘I came here having stayed in South Africa for three years. I entered as a visitor but once I got my papers, I applied to go to university. I am now a cardiac nurse. I only had four Cs at ‘O’ Level and I would not have dreamt of going to university if I were at home. Now I have a degree from a Russell group university, something that people at home can only dream of.’

(Interview in Leeds, 12 October 2009)

As discussed in Chapter 2, the increase in the number of migrants moving to the UK for higher education coincided with the availability of bursaries for nursing students under Project 2000. Information about the existence of nursing bursaries flowed within knowledge fields echoing Lee’s (1966:55) observation about migration taking place within well-defined ‘streams’, from specific places at the origin to specific places at the destination. This, according to De Haas (2010b), stems from the highly localised nature of opportunities and the flow of knowledge back to the country of origin from destination countries, which facilitates the passage for later migrants.

5.4.6 Social networks and the lure of others’ accomplishments

The integral role of social capital in initiating and maintaining migration was discussed in Chapter 3 (Castles, 2003; Massey et al., 1993, 1999; Portes, 1999). Consequently, the role played by social networks in Zimbabwean migration should not be underestimated. Data from the questionnaire survey reveals that 28% \((n=146)\) and 70% \((n=139)\) of survey respondents in South Africa and the UK respectively received help from pioneer immigrants while they were still in Zimbabwe (Figure 5.7).
Figure 5.7 Whether migrants received any help from prior migrants already settled in South Africa/UK while you were still in Zimbabwe?

Source: Based on survey results 2009-2010

This appears to support one of the hypotheses of this study: that UK based migrants had links to richer streams of social capital, which aided their migration by helping with the airfares, than their South African counterparts. It was demonstrated in Section 2.2.7 how the seventh migration episode to South Africa comprised of people from all parts of the country, some of whom did not have any known history of migration. These ‘new’ migrants e.g. Anthony (p. 108) did not have social networks in South Africa from which to tap; this is reflected by only 28% having received any help from migrants prior to departure (Figure 5.7). As shown in Chapter 2, circulation which is practised by a significant number of migrants in South Africa negates the need for social networks as opposed to the UK.

Decisions about destinations were made with the consultation and acquiescence of other actors such as prior migrants in the destination country (Massey, 2003; Stark, 1991). The transnational activities of pioneer migrants were critical in decisions to emigrate. For example, migrants who moved to South Africa as part of the seventh episode compared their fortunes and achievements with those who had moved.
during the fourth migration wave who appeared to be better off thereby strengthening their resolve to leave. The case of Dickson, 33, illustrates this point. Prior to moving to South Africa and settling in Tzaneen in 2007, he worked as an electrician in Zimbabwe. Most people of his generation in his village dropped out of school and went to South Africa where they worked. They would normally meet during Christmas holidays when the South African based migrants returned home (see Chapter 2).

As highlighted in Chapter 2, majoni-joni neither have educational nor professional qualifications but appear to be better off than their counterparts at home. The majoni-joni who lead transnational lives had told Dickson about their success in South Africa and how he too could be successful if he joined them.

‘I came here because of Joseph, a former classmate who lives in my village. He dropped out of primary school in grade 6 and crossed the river. He came home every Christmas with a new car full of goodies for his mother and family. I have ‘A’ levels but nothing to show of it. Joseph has built a big house... a 4 bedroomed house ...I couldn’t buy anything for my family at Christmas. He told me there were opportunities for skilled people like me. I came with him and stayed with him briefly when I got here.’ (Interview in Tzaneen, 26 April 2010)

According to Crisp (1999), social networks enable other migrants to follow peers, utilising the provision of information about job opportunities, money for transportation, and accommodation.

A total of 139 out of 200 (70%) and 145 out of 519 (28%) respondents in Leeds and Limpopo respectively stated that they had received some help from migrants who were already in the UK and South Africa while they were still at home. It can be argued that information channelled in this way enables the perpetuation of certain forms of migration, in this case, informal migration. This is because the networks in which Dickson is embedded consist of informal migrants and would therefore tend to attract likeminded individuals. Winkels, (2004) in his study of Vietnamese migration, discovered that a major motivational factor for migration was the presence of relatives or friends in places of destination. Dickson’s narrative exemplifies this. It illuminates how migrants obtained information about the existence of job opportunities. Dickson, like many of his counterparts, was able to convert his migration-related social capital into financial capital (Coleman, 1988).
Once a decision had been made to exit Zimbabwe, migrants relied on a range of sources to sponsor their journey (Figure 5.9). The results appear to show that a significant percentage of the survey respondents self sponsored their journeys. South Africa had a higher proportion of self funders 57% ($n=294$) compared to the UK, 48% ($n=96$). Significantly, the UK based migrants, had at 22% ($n=44$), a higher proportion of respondents whose transport costs were borne by their spouses compared to compared to 6% ($n=33$) in Limpopo ($z= 6.05, p<0.001$).
The results appear to suggest that migrants in Leeds had higher financial capital given the cost of airfares than those in Limpopo. The low percentage of survey respondents that were assisted financially by prior migrants in Limpopo may be ascribed to the relatively low wages that migrants in Limpopo earn. Secondly, the lower cost of travelling to South Africa may be responsible. Thirdly, the informality of migration reduces reliance on prior migrants.

The role of agents appears to have been minimal in both countries as were those of friends and combinations of friends and family. On the other hand, there is a near equal split between the two areas for migrants whose trip were sponsored by family which is in accord with the new economics of labour migration scholarship which as discussed in Chapter 3, claims that migration decisions are made by families or households-in which people act collectively both to maximize expected income and to diminish risks associated with a variety of market failures (Massey et al., 1993; Stark, 991). A small minority of migrants in UK had their airfares paid for by their employers who were mostly Zimbabwean professionals in need of nannies as
exemplified by the case of Thandeka, a 32 year old woman who was brought by her employer to look after her three children,

‘I have been working for them since 1995. When she came here in 1999, I stayed behind with her husband and their son. She then brought us here in 2001 where she gave birth to two more children whom I looked after. I was with them till I left last year (2008).’ (Interview, 23 January 2010)

While Figure 5.7 (p. 122) shows that some migrants did not receive help from migrants already settled in South Africa and the UK, this appears to have changed once they arrived in these two countries as shown in Figure 5.10 (p. 127). In Leeds, all respondents (n=200) reported receiving help from prior migrants on arrival compared to those in Figure 5.7 (n=139) who received help when they were still in Zimbabwe. On the other hand, the number of respondents who received help once they arrived in Limpopo jumped to 285 (Figure 5.10) from an initial 146 (28%) reported in Figure 5.7 when they were in Zimbabwe.

The survey results suggest that newly arrived migrants were provided with several forms of help by prior migrants already settled in Leeds and Limpopo. Help took several forms including provision of accommodation (35%, n=69 in the UK compared to 57%, n=161 in Limpopo), finding employment (37%, n=73 in the UK compared to 36%, n=133 in Limpopo), applying for asylum (5%, n=11 in Leeds compared to 6%, n=15 in Limpopo) and help with childcare (6%, n=12 in Leeds compared to none in Limpopo) which can be attributed to prevalent practices of South Africa based migrants of leaving children with their spouses/grandparents in Zimbabwe while they parents moved alone (Parreñas, 2001b). Interestingly, 12% (n=23) of the Leeds based respondents stated that they had been helped with opening bank accounts on arrival which did not appear to figure prominently with migrants in Limpopo. This could be attributed to the importance that employers in the UK attach to employees having personal bank accounts in which their wages could be deposited into that appears to be unimportant in South Africa as migrants reported being paid in cash at the end of the month by their employers.
As demonstrated in Chapter 2, for professionals and non-professionals alike, in South Africa and the UK, bonding social capital played a crucial role in anchoring the sixth and seventh migration waves given the strict visa requirements of the UK (Massey, 2003). The case of social workers and allied health staff, such as radiographers and physiotherapists, in the UK demonstrates this as they received help from their colleagues who had arrived earlier (Figure 5.10). This is consistent with Bourdieu’s (1986) claim that graduating from certain universities endows people with social capital in the same way as working for certain companies builds social capital, which can be leveraged for the benefit of other community members. The movement of health and social care workers to the UK attests to the existence of strong ties in this professional group of urban workers, which counteracts Fussell and Massey’s (2004:153) postulation that the social networks forged in urban areas comprise more of weak ties to acquaintances and workmates than of strong ties to kin and lifelong friends (which is typical of those formed in rural areas) which, according to Granovetter (1973), gives them access to more information, which transforms intention to migrate into actuality.
This study concurs with the work of scholars such as Clark (1999) and Hanson (2005) who advocate broadening the unit of research to include urban actors, because social capital ties that develop in urban areas are as strong as those forged in rural areas. The case of Paul, a 40 year old Leeds resident and senior social work manager demonstrates this.

‘I was recruited to work as a childcare social worker by a council in South Yorkshire in 2000. When I came, the manager asked me if I knew of other Zimbabweans who wanted work. I sent messages to three guys who were in my class and by the end of 2001 there were 30 of us working for this council. Social workers continued coming even when the government tightened the work permit system, we were helping people to come. They didn’t even have interviews; they were just offered the jobs on my recommendation. When they first arrived, they stayed with me or the other guys. I bought the air tickets for the first three guys, they repaid upon being paid their salaries, and they also did the same for others. The same also happened to the guys who studied physiotherapy who bought each other tickets until their whole class came here. Even now as we speak, social workers are still coming, we help them, I do that sort of work with my company in Zimbabwe, helping them sort out their work permits, General Social Care Council (GSCC) registration etc.’

(Interview in Leeds, 10 December 2009)

Paul’s case resonates with Tilly’s (1990:84) observations that,

‘by and large, the effective units of migration were (and are) neither individuals nor households but sets of people linked by acquaintance, kinship, and work experience.’

Paul’s narrative brings to the fore several issues which facilitate and impede migration. Firstly, finance as a both a barrier and an enabler to migration. The constraining effect in this case was removed by Paul and his friends’ ability to buy air tickets which were then repaid at a later date. Zimbabwean migrants in both Leeds and Limpopo use inter-ethnic ties to access diverse resources beyond their homogeneous networks. Secondly, it highlights the salience of embedded organisational ties (see Granovetter, 1973), which Paul epitomises in his role as an employee of a local authority in the UK which he exploited to inform former classmates of employment opportunities.

As shown in Figure 5.11, newly arrived migrants relied on their social networks for accommodation. In the UK, migrants depended on their social networks while a significant percentage of the survey participants in South Africa (46%, n=238) relied on hostel accommodation compared to only 1% (n=2) in the UK.
As will be demonstrated in section 5.5, this could be accounted for by the fact that most survey participants arrived as part of the eighth migration episode which was dominated by asylum seekers who were accommodated at church shelters in Musina. The majority of UK based migrants were accommodated by relatives (32%, \(n=64\)) compared to 25%, \(n=128\) for South Africa domiciled migrants. Similarly, the percentage of respondents who were accommodated by their spouses is significantly higher in the UK (25%, \(n=50\)) than in South Africa (4%, \(n=22\)) which could be accounted for by the skilled nature of migration as highlighted by the case of Nelson (p. 110) who followed his wife, Eliza who left during the fourth migration episode to work in the health and social care sector (see Chapter 2). The overall picture that emerges from these results suggests that professionals in both Leeds and Limpopo demonstrated higher levels of bonding social capital than their non-skilled opposites.
5.5 A perilous, informalised and irregular migration to South Africa and the UK

Zimbabwean migration to South Africa and the UK comprises of ‘mixed flows’, that is, of those looking for employment opportunities and others fleeing from persecution (Castles and Van Hear, 2005). It is characterised by both illegal and legal migration (Figure 5.12). The results show a high prevalence of informal migration between Zimbabwe and South Africa as demonstrated by 56% \((n=288)\) of the respondents having entered South Africa without a visa compared to none for the UK. The main visa type for UK was Visitors/tourist visa, 71% \((n=141)\) compared to 32\% \((n=167)\) for South Africa. The difference is statistically significant \((z=9.23, p<0.0001)\).

Figure 5.12 Type of visa held on entry by country of residence \%

![Bar chart showing the type of visa held on entry by country of residence.]

Source: Based on survey results 2009-2010

The preponderance of informal migration between Zimbabwe and South Africa, as has been demonstrated in Chapter 2, is a consequence of numerous factors including a loose border, proximity, a history of migration between the two countries etc. These informal movements are fraught with dangers to the migrants which range from the natural to the human. Migrants’ stories attest to this.
On the other hand, it is pertinent to point out that migration to the UK although largely formal, is tempered by migrants’ descent into irregularity, for example, after the expiry of valid visitors’ visa that they may have held on entry (see Section 2.2.8). Moreover, in Chapter 2, I demonstrated how illegality to South Africa is accentuated by the informality of migration. Several factors account for this informality. Informality is primarily driven by the prohibitive cost of the Zimbabwean passport which is beyond the reach of many (Lefko-Everett, 2010). Prior to the removal of the visa requirement in May 2009, migrants with passports also informally crossed into South Africa due to the high cost of the visa (Ncube and Hougaard, 2010). Information gained from both the survey and the interviews show that these requirements acted as a barrier to formal migration.

The dominance of informal migration to South Africa suggests that the lifting of the visa regime by the South African government has not significantly reduced informal migration. This can be attributed, as outlined in Chapter 2, to migrants’ prior experiences of border jumping which has been intergenerational (Muzondidya, 2008). The results show a high degree of informalisation of migration to South Africa which mirrors that of Honduran migrants to USA which Puerta (2005), attributed to high undocumented migration.

5.5.1 A perilous migration to South Africa

During fieldwork, I saw firsthand the dangers and treacherous routes that migrants have to navigate. For some, the journey to South Africa has left indelible physical (Figure 5.13), emotional and psychological scars, inflicted by wild animals, the Limpopo River and human smugglers who have taken over the space between Limpopo and Musina for themselves.
A total of 238 out of 519 respondents (46%) who crossed informally into South Africa reported facing some dangers in their travel. The biggest danger cited by these respondents was posed by maguma-guma\textsuperscript{37} (30%, \( n = 71 \)). The large human smuggling industry between Zimbabwe and South Africa has been taken over by criminals, commonly referred to as maguma-guma, who extort money, goods, mobile phones, and other valuables from desperate migrants. According to the information provided by the interviewees, migrants are typically approached by members of the gangs or ‘runners’\textsuperscript{38} at the Beitbridge border post with the promise of a safe passage to Musina. They were also usually promised protection from maguma-guma. The fee is usually agreed in advance and often negotiable. The fees vary from as little as 50 Rands to as high as 2000 Rands. The maguma-guma can be equated to the coyotes which Mexicans and other Latin American migrants use to facilitate their entry into USA (Mahler, 1995). Like the coyotes, maguma-guma accept payment in kind, that is, mobile phones, watches, jewellery and designer clothes and shoes (Muzondidya, 2008).

\textsuperscript{37} This is a Shona term which translates to people who seek to make a living through dubious means. The maguma-guma operate on both sides of the border (Zimbabwean and South African) and facilitate informal migrants’ entry into South Africa. Some informal migrants have complained of having been sexually assaulted and losing their belongings to maguma-guma.

\textsuperscript{38} Runners recruit and channel migrants to the guides (maguma-guma)
According to Graycar (1999), human smuggling is concerned with the way in which a migrant enters a country, and whether this has been achieved with the assistance of third parties. As Salt (2000:32) observes, quite often irregular migrants using third parties to enter a country are exposed, ‘both to unscrupulous service providers and to the immigration and policing authorities, thereby generating a dependence on the safeguards provided by the trafficking networks.’ Some migrants reported being subjected to vicious attacks by maguma-guma in order to coerce them to pay more than agreed fees. One such victim of attacks is Tarisai, a 24 year old man from Bikita
who suffered gunshot wounds following a disagreement with a group of maguma-guma over fees for facilitating his entry to South Africa (Figure 5.14).

He explains how he met his fate,

‘I was shot because I didn’t have more money to pay. I had already paid them R150 we had agreed. I told them I didn’t have any more money and he shot me on the leg. I was saved by the police. Now I am crippled, I left home perfectly normal but now I am an invalid.’ (Interview in Musina, 22 March 2010)

An interesting variant of informal migration is what the migrants referred to as ‘pay forward’ whereby a migrant would be smuggled into South Africa by an amalaitsha to destinations further than Musina on the understanding that the smuggled migrant’s relative (guarantor) would pay the ‘delivery’ fee once they have safely arrived. Under this arrangement, the smuggler transports a client without being paid the full fare which a relative of the client would have promised to settle in full once the client is safely delivered. However, because of the extortionate fares, some guarantors fail or refuse to pay resulting in the client being made to repay the debt by other means, by, for example, being forced in to sexual relationships with the transporter and his colleagues. While the accounts of the interviewees may not conform to archetypal trafficking for sexual exploitation which involves some aspect of forced labour and/or migration for the purpose of exchange of sexual services (Kelly and Regan, 2000), it is nevertheless important to note that female migrants are being subjected to sexual exploitation.

A part from the dangers of the maguma-guma, migrants also have to contend with other dangers like wildlife (8%, n=19). Others reported having to contend with the Limpopo River which forms a formidable barrier between Zimbabwe and South Africa (9%, n=21). This has, however, not proved to be a sufficient enough deterrent for desperate Zimbabweans trying to seek a new life in South Africa. Migrants do not only have to outfox the raging tide of the river but also evade crocodiles. This is demonstrated by two accounts of migrants who arrived as part of the sixth and seventh migration episodes. These narratives make claims of having witnessed other migrants being swept away by the swollen river and being pulled under the river by crocodiles, never to be seen again. The following quotes are illustrative.

‘We had to hold on to each other in a straight line with the guide in front, another in the middle, and one at the end. Suddenly there was a piecing scream and because it was dark I could not see who it was, we were told by the guides that two people had been swept away when we had crossed.’ (Interview with Gift, 23 in Giyani, 19 March 2010)

‘I am not doing it again...never ever. The current was too strong and it swept me and the person I was holding on to and the one who was behind me,
holding on to me. I was thinking that I was going to die and how I am still alive, only God knows.’ (Interview with Noah, 21 in Seshego, 8 April 2010)

As if the danger posed by the river was not enough, migrants also reported having to be constantly on the lookout for marauding animals, especially lions in the Gonarezhou and Kruger national parks. One interviewee told of the attacks by a pride of lions in which six of his colleagues perished.

There are examples in migration literature of informal migrants being exposed to multiple dangers during their travels, including rape (Koser, 2010; Singh, 2007). Rape was cited by 4% (n=10) of female respondents and some interviewees spoke of knowing other women who were raped but had not come forward to the nurses in Musina due to fear of being labelled. Yet others reported being gang raped in front of their husbands and threats of rape being used to extort payment. The interviewees who suffered the misfortune of being raped on both sides of the border, talked about ‘double trouble.’ The experiences of female migrants echo those of Honduran migrants attempting to reach USA who get raped on the dangerous journey through Mexico (Sladkova, 2007). Allegations of rape were echoed by Tonde, a sexual health specialist, who works for a medical charity that provides sexual health services in Musina,

‘We believe that there are many women who are sexually assaulted and raped in the forests by the maguma-guma but only a few come forward to report it. What is known is the tip of the iceberg as many more are reluctant to come forward due to the stigma associated with rape, you know how our culture is regarding someone who has been raped.’ (Interview in Musina, 22 March 2010)

The charity runs weekly outreach sessions at shelters where migrants stay on arrival in Musina. Flyers advertising their services are displayed at prominent places such as the Refugee Reception Centre (Figure 4.3, p. 75), The I Believe in Jesus Church’s kitchen area (Figure 5.15) and the Catholic Church women’s shelter in Musina. As part of the fieldwork, I attended several sessions in the shelters and farms where sexual health experts talked about the need to disclose any sexual abuse that they may have suffered and also to get tested for sexually transmitted diseases including HIV/AIDS given the reluctance by Zimbabweans to know their HIV/AIDS status (Feldman and Maposhere, 2003). The importance of accessing quick treatment for sexual assault victims as well as for those living with HIV/AIDS was stressed.

---

39 Interview with Tapiwa, Thohoyandou, 3 March 2010
40 Interview with Mavis, Waterberg, 21 May 2010
In order to develop a clear understanding of the dangers that informal migrants face when crossing into South Africa, I embedded with South African border officials on border patrols on five occasions between February and May 2010. This gave me first-hand experience of the dangers and treacherous conditions that migrants contend with on their journey. Being embedded in the border officials presented ethical issues. For example, it felt awkward to take photographs of women with children on their backs crawling through the border fence or of migrants running away without their permission. However, in order to capture the gravity of informal migration and the dangers that this presented, I felt that this was a risk worth taking if only to sensitize the policy makers about the dangers that informal migrants face in their quest to escape from the hardships being experienced in Zimbabwe. It was a bold decision which I felt superseded ethical considerations because it provided evidence of the dangers that vulnerable people experienced which I hoped would prompt policy makers in both South Africa and Zimbabwe to act.

One may ask why I embedded with non-migrants given that this thesis is about Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa and the UK. Embedding with non-migrants provided me with the opportunity to appreciate the difficulties that migrants endure on their travels. It also gave me the opportunity to appreciate the scope, scale and extent of informal migration between Zimbabwe and South Africa. It provided me with the chance to hear the perspectives of border officials about emigration from Zimbabwe.
5.5.2 Irregular migration to the UK

While migration to South Africa was largely informal, that to the UK was predominantly formal. The absence of the visa regime between London and Harare up to November 2002 accounts for this. The imposition of the visa regime on Zimbabwean nationals resulted in an increase in the use of passports of other countries by Zimbabweans entering the UK. This is consistent with findings from other studies which note the growing use of agents in procuring fraudulent documents and facilitating travel (Koser, 2000; Salt and Stein, 1997). The use of fraudulent documents is a recent phenomenon in the short history of Zimbabwean international migration.

Both survey and interview data show that most migrants in Leeds entered the UK on flights directly from Zimbabwe (Figure 5.16).

**Figure 5.16 Travelled directly to South Africa/ UK? %**

![Bar graph showing travel to South Africa and the UK](image)

**Country of residence**
- United Kingdom
- South Africa

**Percent**
- 100.0%
- 80.0%
- 60.0%
- 40.0%
- 20.0%
- 0.0%

**Did you travel directly to SA/UK from Zimbabwe?**

**Source:** Based on survey results 2009-2010

However, a small number of the survey respondents passed through some Nordic countries, notably Sweden, 23% (n=8), the Netherlands and Norway with 17% (n=6)
each including countries such as Ireland, 20% \((n=7)\), Finland, 14% \((n=5)\) and Germany, 9% \((n=3)\) prior to arriving in the UK (Figure 5.17).

**Figure 5.17 Countries which migrants passed through on way to the UK %**

![Bar chart showing countries and their percentage](image)

**Source:** Based on survey results 2009-2010

Such migrants constituted the fifth, sixth and seventh migration episodes whose inflows were significantly curtailed by the introduction of the visa regime (Section 5.3). Having been denied visas by the British embassy in Harare, some migrants switched their attention to these European countries which were considered to have liberal immigration policies. Once granted the EU wide Schengen visa, migrants proceeded to the UK as previously intended after a temporary sojourn in an EU third country. Interestingly, Sweden, Norway and the Netherlands were popular transit countries for migrants who had either studied or claimed asylum there after having failed to obtain visas to come directly to the UK.

Some commentators claim that the Netherlands is popular with smugglers (Skeldon, 1994; IOM, 1995) although the results of this study do not lend themselves to this claim. The case of Chamu, a 39 year old man who lives in Leeds with his wife and four children highlights this practice,‘I was denied a visa to come here in 2005. I then got a Schengen visa to go to the Netherlands. Once there, I worked briefly before coming here as I originally planned. I didn't intend to live in Holland, it was only a strategy to come here, sometimes you have to do whatever it takes to realise your
dreams. Together with friends, I managed to get my wife here who claimed asylum as I was told that if I claimed, it will certainly be rejected as I had lived in Holland and would probably be sent back there. My wife’s claim was successful and I was a dependent on her claim.’ (Interview, Leeds, 15 January 2010)

Chamu’s case shows how migrants used their studies in countries like the Netherlands as a long-term strategy to enter the UK, due to the perception among the interview participants that the Schengen visa opened channels to eventually get into the UK. It also highlights the salience of migrants’ transnational links in accessing information about regularising immigration status that was discussed in Chapter 3.

The asylum seeking migration episode that was discussed in Chapter 2 was used not only by migrants already in the UK and South Africa, but in other countries such as Ireland. This is exemplified by a small fraction of respondents who claimed asylum in Ireland prior to moving to the UK to join family and friends. Such migrants used knowledge gained through transnational links about countries with ‘easy’ immigration systems. This is consistent with Valentine et al’s (2007) findings in their study of Somali migrants in Denmark and the UK which observes that migrants granted asylum in Denmark later settled in the UK in order to be with family and friends. Such migrants believed the Irish border officials to be more accommodating to Zimbabwean migrants than their British counterparts. As Betty, a 54 year old mother of six who came through Ireland explains,

‘I was deported at Gatwick on two occasions in 2001 and 2002. A friend then told me to go through Ireland as they were not too strict. Once there, I claimed asylum but left to come here before the finalisation of my case as I had always wanted to come here because my friends, relatives are here. My people are here so I can have some support. I had always wanted to be here, Ireland was just a means to get here.’ (Interview, Leeds, 19 October 2009)

Chamu and Betty’s narratives highlight the multi-stage movements that were attendant in migrants’ journey to the UK. For both Chamu and Betty, it entailed a stopover in a third country prior to entering the UK.

5.6 Conclusion

This chapter has explored the factors that caused people to flee from their motherland to seek refuge in other countries, notably South Africa and the UK. It demonstrated that some of the causes of migration are steeped in historical antecedents, for example the emigration of whites which preceded the country’s independence as well as after it, and the labour migration which sustained mining and agriculture in both Zimbabwe and South Africa.
The questionnaire survey and interviews demonstrated the causes of emigration to be the economic collapse in Zimbabwe which began in November 1997, and which was exacerbated by the violent seizure of commercial farms which, historically, fuelled the economy. The collapse of the economy has had ripple effects and impacted on the delivery of social services such as health and education. These sectors were struggling under the strain of massive underinvestment which resulted in staff leaving for South Africa and the UK. The growing political intolerance and repression of President Robert Mugabe’s government has exacerbated the outflow. The wide scale outflow has also been proved to be socially driven, as demonstrated by migrants in the survey’s use of social networks in South Africa and the UK.

The chapter also focused on the process by which migrants exited Zimbabwe by highlighting the salience of informal migration between Zimbabwe and South Africa. It demonstrated how factors such social networks and social capital was critical in channelling migrants to different destinations. Social networks were shown to have played a crucial role in fuelling further migration as it provided potential migrants with the resources that were needed to travel and adapt in the destination country. The chapter also considered the role of financial capital in driving emigration and argued that migrants with higher social and financial capital moved to the UK while those with lower endowments settled in South Africa.

Drawing on the lived experiences of the migrants in Leeds and Limpopo, Chapter 6 presents a taxonomy of the Zimbabwean diaspora to elucidate the changes engendered to the migrants' lives by being in the diaspora given that some migrants moved in pursuit of social mobility. The taxonomy dissects and discusses the inequalities within the Zimbabwean diasporic communities which are driven in part by immigration status, social class, and education.
Chapter Six  A taxonomy of the Zimbabwean diaspora

6.1 Introduction

The previous chapter discussed the reasons which caused Zimbabweans to exit the country of their birth. It also drew the differences between flows in the different migration episodes that were discussed in Chapter 2. These flows consisted of skilled professionals and non-professionals with different demographic profiles. This chapter builds on some of the information discussed in Chapter 5, and others, gleaned from interviews to present a taxonomy of the Zimbabwean diaspora. In so doing, the chapter offers insights about the importance of transnational social fields through which connect migrants’ lives with those remaining in Zimbabwe. The social fields which were discussed in Chapter 3 shape migrants’ lives, and they are instrumental in connecting migrants with those still in Zimbabwe. By focusing on the transnational social fields, the chapter helps elucidate that migrants’ lives are lived in, and ‘float in and out’, of the transnational social fields which transcend the borders of South Africa, the UK and Zimbabwe (see Chapter 3). This will explicate similarities and differences in migrants’ lives in the two countries. The chapter fulfills Objectives 1 and 2.

This chapter builds on the motivations for departure and explores whether the diaspora has matched the migrants’ expectations. It achieves this by firstly building a six pronged typology of the Zimbabwean diaspora (section 6.2). By conceiving this as a social field through which migrants ‘float in’ and ‘float out’ of the different categories, the section represents different migration waves (see Chapter 2) as migrant experiences in the diaspora and at home. Migrants’ abilities to meet their obligations to those left behind are to a large extent affected by multiple factors like immigration status, recognition, and transferability of prior experience garnered in Zimbabwe etc. The effects of these factors on migrants are the subject of Sections 6.2.1 to 6.2.6. The Chapter closes with a summary of discussion of the impact that being in the diaspora has on migrants’ lives.

6.2 Typology and interpretation of the diaspora

Chapter 5 demonstrated the heterogeneity of the Zimbabwean communities in South Africa and the UK. The chapter delineated the constituent parts as skilled and unskilled, illegal, and documented migrants etc. It will be argued in this chapter that migrants’ backgrounds help shape their adaptation, integration, and experiences in South Africa and the UK. Consequently, this shapes their interpretation of life in the diaspora and prospects for return which was outlined in Chapter 3. The typology presented in this section derives from migrants’ accounts of their socio-economic and political experiences in their host country, which have a bearing on their transnational interactions (see Chapter 7) and return (see Chapter 8). These interactions may be imagined, physical and/or virtual (Escandell and Tapias, 2010).
The analysis of evidence from the study resulted in a six pronged classification of the Zimbabwean diaspora: reluctant, hesitant, clandestine, fearful, ephemeral, and ambivalent diaspora.

Drawing on the participant interviews and building on the work of Pasura (2008), six classes of the Zimbabwean diaspora were delineated as shown above. These classes were identified based on the migrants’ diasporic experiences and how these have impacted on their lives. This is a crucial and important area of this study as nothing of this sort has been done previously. The typology provides a detailed picture of how the migrants perceive their life in the diaspora. The typology builds on ongoing work examining vulnerabilities and precarities within migrant communities, their access to labour markets, citizenship and identities (Papadopoulos et al., 2008; Waite, 2009; Anderson, 2007). Migrants’ precarity is demonstrated by the type of work they are compelled to do due to constraints such as immigration status, unrecognised qualifications and experience accumulated in the country of origin which is ignored by employers in the destination country. Lack of immigration status accentuates clandestinity as migrants are compelled to go underground for fear of coming to the attention of authorities, which may lead to deportation (Ahmad, 2008; De Genova, 2002; Waite, 2009).

The enthusiastic diaspora refers to those migrants whose lives have been positively altered by being in South Africa or the UK, for example, migrants who had limited opportunities at home who are now able to exercise their agency. I use the term reluctant diaspora to describe those migrants whose stay in South Africa or the UK is restricted by a number of factors such as spouses, fear of where to start if they were to return home etc. An ambivalent diaspora describes those migrants who are unsure about the effect that the diaspora has had on their lives, while a clandestine diaspora describes undocumented migrants who are in South Africa or the UK illegally. A fearful diaspora describes those migrants whose lives are pervaded by anxieties and uncertainties brought by tenuous racial issues in the host country, for example, xenophobia, racism etc. Fearfulness is also induced by lack of documented immigration status which means that a migrant is vulnerable to detention, deportation or both which has repercussions not only on the migrant but also on the livelihoods of those left behind. The final category, an ephemeral diaspora describes the fluidity that characterise migrants’ lives in the diaspora and their relationship with those at home. Such a classification is important because it sheds light on the feelings of the migrants based on their overall political, economic, social and educational experiences. It is an all encompassing model which presents a holistic assessment rather than being based on one facet of their experiences.

Pasura (2008) in his study of Zimbabweans in the UK came up with a four-fold classification of the Zimbabwean diaspora based on their participation in diaspora politics. He referred to the four classes as: visible, epistemic, dormant and silent. Visible members of the Zimbabwean diaspora, according to Pasura, are those that
participate in political events and demonstrations, whilst the epistemic members engaged in debate on Zimbabwean issues on the internet and other forums. Members of the dormant diaspora although committed to the Zimbabwean cause, are constricted from participating in Zimbabwean oriented activities by both internal and external factors. He classifies the final group as silent, which comprises of migrants who have chosen to distance themselves from the politics of the homeland, and sometimes identified themselves not as Zimbabweans but as Rhodesians, British, South Africans or Malawians.

The taxonomy advanced in this study recognises that migrants’ experiences of being in the diaspora are in a perpetual state of flux. This fluidity means that there will be overlaps in the classification at any one given time as a migrant may belong to more than one category. This mutability not only impacts on the lives of the migrants but also of their families and relatives in Zimbabwe and elsewhere (see Chapter 7). For example, the confirmation of documented status may switch a migrant from a state of reluctance to one of enthusiasm. Similarly, a breakdown in a relationship may result in a shift from enthusiasm to a state of hesitancy. Likewise in the UK, dispersal of a migrant who is an asylum seeker from the South East to Leeds may quickly transform a migrant from a state of enthusiasm to one of reluctance. The spectre of xenophobia in South Africa left some migrants in a perpetual state of fear, which has become the default mode for a significant number of migrants. This state of change is accentuated by other external pressures given that migrants do not live in a vacuum but, as Waldinger and Fitzgerald (2004) posit, states and state politics shape the options for migrant and ethnic trans-state social action.

This six pronged classification (Figure 6.1) has been constructed based on the migrants’ engagement in and interaction with the social, economic and political transnational fields both in the host and home countries (see Chapter 3). Their group categorisation is determined largely by the extent to which they have adapted to their immigration status, socio-economic and political situation (Anderson et al., 2011; Waite, 2009). Membership of the group and its subgroups is driven partly by the perceived benefits they may accrue and often there are conflicting motivations. It is important to point out that some categories are more pronounced in one area than the other. For example, migrants in Limpopo were fearful of their safety due to xenophobia while those in Leeds feared deportation.
Figure 6.1 A six fold classification of the Zimbabwean diaspora
6.2.1 An enthusiastic diaspora

Enthusiasm for the diaspora is bred by a combination of socio-economic and political factors. Social factors such as gains in gender transformation and ability to further one’s education and economic factors e.g. ability to work and provide for family at home has resulted in some migrants being enthusiastic about the emancipatory role of the diaspora. For migrants whose opportunities were curtailed by a combination of factors at home like unemployment, economic hardships, and poor educational attainment; the ability to freely express their opinions and guaranteed freedoms such as freedom of assembly and association, the empowerment brought about by settling in the host country has been transformational. I refer to this group of migrants as the enthusiastic diaspora.

Figure 6.2 demonstrates that a higher proportion of the respondents in the UK (77%, n=154) have noticed significant benefits in their lives since they left Zimbabwe compared to when they were in Zimbabwe than their counterparts based in South Africa (56%, n=288), (z=9.23, p<0.0001).

**Figure 6.2** Have there been changes to your life by being in the diaspora? %

Source: Based on survey results 2009-2010
As explained in Chapter 5, one of the main drivers of emigration was the search for economic opportunities to become socially mobile. Social mobility was cited by an overwhelming majority of both the survey and interviewees as one of the significant outcomes of the migration process.

Figure 6.3 shows the benefits that migrants have accrued by being in the diaspora. These gains breed enthusiasm for being in the diaspora. Their enthusiasm derives from the economic, social and political benefits they have gained as a consequence of being in the diaspora.

**Figure 6.3 Improvements engendered by being in the diaspora %**

![Graph showing improvements engaged by being in the diaspora]

**Source:** Based on survey results 2009-2010

UK based migrants managed to advance their education than their South African based counterparts. The enthusiasts regard the diaspora as an enabler of human agency and attribute their success to it. In this group are migrants who were unemployed at home as the case of Chengeto who is now resident in South Africa will exemplify, those who eked a living in the informal economy as exemplified by the case of Sam in Leeds, those in low income employment e.g. Christopher (p. 108) in Limpopo, those who failed to gain access to institutions of higher learning e.g. Irvine
in Leeds (p. 120), those who were persecuted for their political beliefs e.g. Ntokwazi in Limpopo (p. 115) and others who had been disenfranchised by the government of President Mugabe’s warped Citizenship Act e.g. Darios in Limpopo (p. 113).

Furthermore, the enthusiasts comprise of women who for traditional and cultural reasons were disadvantaged in marriage relationships, as the case of Shamiso (p. 118) in Leeds attests to (9%, n=14). Enthusiasm for being in the diaspora was more pronounced in Leeds than in Limpopo probably because of the existence of better opportunities for social mobility in the former. It could also be ascribed to the differences in human capital which resulted in Leeds based migrants being able to secure better paying jobs than their counterparts in Limpopo, even if these jobs are routine and semi-professional occupations (Table 6.2).

Female migrants welcome the re-shifting of gender roles brought about by being in the diaspora. For feminists, diaspora signifies emancipation from patriarchy engendered by cultural values that consigned them to second class status at home (Gelfand, 1973). Marriage in Zimbabwe is seen as perpetuating male supremacy which is being eroded by being in the diaspora, especially in the UK. Migrant narratives indicate that there are seismic changes taking place within the home, where renegotiating of gender roles and identities is noticeable (Pasura, 2008). Some of these changes were caused by the non-transferability of men’s skills and qualifications. Consequently, men reported performing feminine household chores like childcare, cooking and washing which they did not partake in Zimbabwe (McGregor, 2008). Women point out that this is something that men would not countenance in Zimbabwe. Esther, a 42 year old married woman and a mother of three came to the UK as part of the fifth migration episode where she now works as a staff nurse (see Chapter 2). Her husband, who joined her together with their two children, initially refused to come citing his senior job as a manager of a private company. Her husband currently works as a bus driver,

‘being here has been good; at least my husband is seeing me as a person now, something that he never did when we were home. Now he cooks, he changes our youngest son’s diapers, something he never did for our two kids who were born at home. It has been a huge cultural shift. I have my own account, when we were home my pay would go into his account and he would give me what he thought I needed. He would even buy the groceries as though he was the one who cooked. I don’t know whether he would do the same if we were to go back home, especially when his people, his relatives are there.’ (Interview in Leeds, 16 October 2010)

Esther’s enthusiasm for the diaspora is predicated on the effects of UK residency on her husband. She contrasts his behaviour in the UK with his behaviour in Zimbabwe and wonders whether he is doing this because his relatives are not in the country to see him performing domestic chores. Enthusiasm for being in the diaspora has implications for migrants’ return intentions as will be demonstrated in Chapter 8. For
example, for Esther, returning home would be regressive as it would erode the gains she has acquired since moving to the UK. Esther’s account highlights the oppressive nature of some Zimbabwean culture and traditions which some scholars have associated with the ‘lobola/roora’ system (Ansell, 2001; Gelfand, 1973). Roora has been interpreted in some circles as conferring men with rights over their wives (Kuper, 1982). For example, in Esther’s case, her husband had control over her salary which was paid directly into his bank account.

Similarly, female migrants in Limpopo expressed enthusiasm (5%, \( n=13 \)) for being in the diaspora because of what they perceived to be significant changes to their lives since their relocation. Some migrants who arrived in South Africa as part of the seventh migration episode had never worked in their lives (see Chapter 2). The case of Chengeto, a 28 year old married mother of four currently living in Polokwane with her husband demonstrates this. She embraces the diaspora for giving her an opportunity to work. The mere fact that she earns an income has increased her self esteem. Studies on immigrant self esteem emphasise the importance of individual accomplishments and achievements (Nesdale and Mak, 2003). She derives great pleasure in knowing that her husband swallowed his pride and joined her at a market stall that she started (Figure 6.4).

**Figure 6.4  Chengeto and her husband at her market stall, Polokwane**

Despite his initial reluctance to work on a market stall which he considered to be beneath his qualifications, he now joins her everyday and respects her business acumen. Before his desertion, Chengeto’s husband was a former commissioned officer in the Zimbabwe National Army. She explains,
‘I started here on my own. He didn’t want to come as he thought it was a lowly thing to sell tomatoes here. He later started coming and now we work together here. I decide what to order and he respects that, he respects my judgement because he was ordering things that were not selling. It’s good to be seen as a person for once, when we were home, he would do as he pleased, and it was his home, his money, his children, his everything. Now he consults me, he knows I am valuable, that I have a brain despite not going to school like him.’ (Interview in Polokwane, 21 May 2010)

What is interesting from Chengeto’s narrative is the initial refusal by her husband to work on the market stall, a job that he considered to be incommensurate with his education. It reveals the anguish of playing a subservient role given the fact that her husband appropriated everything from money to children when they were at home. Memories of home are portrayed negatively because of the perceived injustices and oppression that she endured there. Denied a chance to exercise her agency, home is synonymous with oppression whilst moving to South Africa is tantamount to liberation.

As chapter 7 will reveal, Chengeto’s enthusiasm for the diaspora is premised on the equality and financial freedom it has engendered, and which enables her to remit to her family members at home. Her ability to bring an income to the family has altered the power dynamics in her relationship with her husband. Some commentators have claimed that being and working in the diaspora has enabled women to negotiate ‘patriarchal bargains’ (Hondagneu-Sotelo and Messner, 1994; Kandiyoti, 1988). For Chengeto and other female migrants, this equality manifests itself in the respect they are now shown by their husbands. Previously, her husband would not seek her counsel in issues that had a bearing on her life. She attributes the metamorphosis in her husband’s behaviour to being in South Africa. It is the feelings of increased self worth that make Chengeto an enthusiast.

Economic empowerment wrought by an ability to engage in paid work was identified as inducing enthusiasm for being in the diaspora by 49% \((n=76)\) in Leeds and 56% \((n=160)\) in Limpopo. In both countries, enthusiasm is engendered by the ability to work, get an education, buy a house, help those at home, and own a car. The case of Sam, a 45 year old health and social care professional living in Leeds helps to explicate this, being in the UK has given him the chance to do something with his life that, had he remained in Zimbabwe, would have remained a pipe dream.

‘I don’t have any ‘O’ levels, let alone ‘A’ levels but look at me, I am a nurse. I was brought here by my nephews from Gweru where I was as a hwindi\(^{41}\). I worked hard and bought three houses in Gweru for my parents and myself when I eventually go back. I provide for my family. My cousins encouraged me to go to school and after doing the access course, I trained to be a nurse. I tell people at home that I am a nurse and they don’t believe me because I

\(^{41}\) Hwindi is a derogatory term used to refer to mini bus/ bus terminal marshal
struggled at school. I don't care about that because I have achieved a lot. I thank God and my cousins who brought me here and helped me to get asylum and into college. Because they are nurses, they also helped me with my schoolwork. London has been good to me; it gave me a second chance that I was denied at home. Now, I am able to provide for my parents and wider family, something that I wasn't able to do when I was home.’ (Interview in Leeds, 28 November 2009)

Sam came to the UK as part of the fifth migration episode and is enthusiastic because of the second chance that being in the diaspora engenders (see Chapter 2). For a person without GCSE Ordinary level passes to be a qualified nurse would have been unheard of in Zimbabwe. The availability of further education opportunities for mature people has led to a sharp increase in the number of mature Zimbabwean students in the UK. That Sam, who was a hwindi at home, has managed to become a professional is a monumental feat which explains why people at home cannot believe it when he tells them about his academic and professional qualifications.

As explained in Chapter 3, emergent research on transnationalism highlight the importance to transmigrants of being able to maintain familial, social, economic and political ties with their country of origin despite emigration and incorporation in the host country (Goldring, 1996a, 1996b; Guarnizo, 1997a; Guarnizo and Smith, 1998). Sam is ecstatic about his acquisition of properties for himself and his parents, which demonstrate his transnational linkages (Portes, 1999) (see Chapter 7). Had he been at home, he would have been condemned to a life as a lodger as it is impossible for a hwindi to buy a house. For Sam, being in the diaspora has unlocked economic opportunities that would otherwise been closed had he remained at home (Massey and Akresh, 2006; Stark, 1991). As Chapter 7 will demonstrate, Sam’s enthusiasm is buttressed by being able to engage in transnational acts such as remitting which have a bearing on his return intentions. His acquisition of property at home is an indicator of his eventual return home (see Chapter 8).

If migrants such as Sam come across as enthusiastic about being in the diaspora, a significant segment of the survey were reluctantly soldiering on despite their misgivings. The next section focuses on this group who are staying on due to factors such as wanting to be with family.

6.2. 2 A reluctant diaspora

Research on migrant adaptation to the host country has highlighted a plethora of challenges that new immigrants face (Cheong et al., 2007). As will be seen later, for some migrants life in the diaspora has not matched their expectations, which have implications on their transnational linkages (see Chapter 7) and return intentions (see Chapter 8). These migrants, for example, include asylum seekers whose cases have taken very long to be determined, and professionals who cannot secure jobs that match their academic credentials and end up deskilled due to partaking in jobs
that are below their skills and academic profiles (Table 6.2). I call these migrants the reluctant diaspora. As the name implies, it comprises of migrants who are staying in the host country reluctantly, for example at the behest of a spouse who would in most circumstances have been instrumental in emigration. This is typical of the male spouses of health and social care professionals such as Nelson (p. 110) who moved to the UK at the behest of his wife, Eliza (p. 108).

The reluctantees are nostalgic about the power and influence that they used to wield at home. They are affronted by the loss of this which has relegated them to the periphery as highlighted in Chapter 5. This is accentuated by an inability to reclaim this power and influence due to the non-transferability of skills, experience and education to South Africa and the UK. Similar results have been noted in studies of Mexican male migrants in the USA who abhor the relative loss of status in the process of migration (Goldring 1996a; Hondagneu-Sotelo, 1994). These studies have found that Mexican immigrant men, like their Zimbabwean counterparts in Leeds and Limpopo, tend to be in positions subordinate to their positions prior to emigration.

These reluctantees begrudge their inability to recreate and re-incarnate their role and status in the diaspora. In both Leeds and Limpopo, reluctance is premised on the inability to secure documented statuses like work permits in order to work in their field (Figure 6.5). For example, in Limpopo, teachers cannot secure work permits because of an SADC-wide agreement which debars governments from poaching teachers from each other, leading to trained teachers working in private schools, mostly in remote parts of the country for low pay in order to avoid detection by the authorities (Adepoju, 2003).
The ‘reasons why respondents’ lives have not improved are different in the two countries studied (Chi-square result =29.740, df=3 and p value <0.001). Forty two percent (n=96) of the respondents in South Africa, cannot find a job matching their qualifications and experience compared to 9% (n=4) in the UK. This is surprising given that many of the respondents have little or no education (Figure 5.6, p. 120). It is likely to be a consequence of unfulfilled expectations as migrants may have expected to find employment on arrival as promised by their peers (see Chapter 5). The results also show that 43% (n=97) of respondents in South Africa indicated that their social and economic standing had gone down compared to 39% (n=18) in the UK.

Some migrants in both Leeds and Limpopo detest being in the diaspora in the first place. Such migrants protest that their departure from Zimbabwe was forced by circumstances like the economic deterioration which was discussed in Chapters 2 and 5. The prolonged stay in South Africa and the UK has come at massive professional costs for migrants due to working in fields that do not match their professional and academic skills (Table 6.1).

**Figure 6.5** Areas in which migrants’ lives have not improved %

Source: Based on survey results 2009-2010

[Diagram showing percentage of respondents in South Africa and the United Kingdom for various reasons their lives have not improved, including:
- Cannot find a job matching qualifications and experience
- My social and economic standing has gone down
- My living standards have depreciated
- My role as head of family has been downgraded]
Table 6.1  Country of residence and last job held in Zimbabwe %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of residence</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>South Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What was your last job in Zimbabwe before leaving for SA/UK?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher managerial, administrative and professional occupations</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Country of residence</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower managerial, administrative and professional occupations</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Country of residence</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate occupations</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Country of residence</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small employers and own account workers</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Country of residence</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower supervisory and technical occupations</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Country of residence</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-routine occupations</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Country of residence</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine occupations</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Country of residence</td>
<td>21.0%</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never worked and long term unemployed</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Country of residence</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
<td>51.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Country of residence</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on survey results 2009-2010

There is a significant association between ‘country of residence’ and ‘last job in Zimbabwe before leaving for South Africa/UK’ (Chi-square results=195.059, df=7 and p value <0.001). The results show that migrants in South Africa held semi-routine jobs in Zimbabwe while most of them had never worked in Zimbabwe prior to their emigration. On the other hand, a significant number of the UK based migrants were small employers and own account workers before leaving Zimbabwe.
As will be argued in Chapter 7, this group of migrants’ continued stay in South Africa and the UK is because of expediency, and a pressure to provide for those left behind. This agrees with Grove and Zwi’s (2006) contention that forced migrants are compelled into leaving their homes in an effort to ensure their own and their families’ survival. As Castles and Loughna (2003) remind us, conditions of conflict, political unrest, and with economic difficulties sometimes occur simultaneously and interact to contribute to the difficult decision to flee. In Limpopo, as the case of Davidson (p. 112), an engineer, demonstrates, companies recognise Zimbabwean qualifications in fields as law, banking and engineering, which has resulted in employment continuity for holders of these qualifications. Secondary evidence suggests that South African based migrants find it much easier to acquire work permits in these areas of skill shortage (Daniels, 2007).

The depth of the downward mobility for migrants is revealed by Table 6.2 which shows the current jobs that migrants are currently engaged in compared to the jobs that they held prior to their emigration (Table 6.1, p. 153). The downward social mobility spiral is more pronounced in the UK where there were no respondents who hold any higher managerial, administrative and professional occupations compared to 3% (n=6) when they left Zimbabwe (Table 6.1). There has been a slight decrease in the number of Leeds based migrants holding lower managerial, administrative and professional occupations from 9% (n=18) (Table 6.1) when they left to the current 5% (n=11) (Table 6.2).

Table 6.2 shows that the majority of respondents who settled in both South Africa (75%, n=387) and UK (55%, n=110) hold routine occupations which makes the difference between the two countries statistically significant (z=-5.22, p<0.001). None of the UK based respondents hold higher managerial occupations compared to 3% (n=13) in South Africa which alludes to transferability of qualifications unlike in the former. The high incidence of unemployment in the UK is, as has been discussed in Chapter 2, due to their immigration status which precludes them from working among other reasons.
Table 6.2  Cross tabulation of country of residence and current job %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What is your current job now?</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>% within Country of residence</th>
<th>Country of residence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Higher managerial, administrative and professional occupation</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>% within Country of residence</td>
<td>Country of residence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>U.K.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>U.K.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate occupations</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>% within Country of residence</td>
<td>Country of residence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>U.K.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>U.K.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small employers and own account workers</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>% within Country of residence</td>
<td>Country of residence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>U.K.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>U.K.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine occupations</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>% within Country of residence</td>
<td>Country of residence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>55.0%</td>
<td>U.K.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>U.K.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>% within Country of residence</td>
<td>Country of residence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>U.K.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on survey results 2009-2010

The high incidence of unemployment in the UK can be, as has been discussed in Chapter 2, attributed to migrants’ immigration status which precludes them from working among other reasons. While Davidson’s (p. 112) case showed that skilled professionals in South Africa can easily secure jobs matching their professional profiles, the same cannot be said of the migrants in the UK. Here, recognition of prior skills in fields such as law, banking, education, engineering, and public
administration has proved to be difficult, resulting in deskilling and downward mobility as demonstrated by the case of Esther’s (p. 147) husband who is now working as a bus driver. The case of Nkosinathi, a 48 year old man who arrived in the UK as part of the sixth migration episode to join his wife who came during the fourth migration wave to take up a nursing position in Leeds helps to explain this (see Chapter 2). Prior to moving to the UK, Nkosinathi worked as a director of a power utility company. He holds an engineering degree and a post graduate MBA degree from the University of Cape Town. He explains his reasons for resenting the diaspora:

'I had a large house, 10 bedrooms, now I live in a tiny terraced house without any space. I park on the street when I used to have a 4 port lockable garage at home. I cook, wash and bath the children when I used to have two nannies, two gardeners and two cooks at home. It’s outrageous really how things have turned out. I wish I had never come, I was a Director of a power utility company but I can’t find a job as an engineer and I now have to do rese- rese\textsuperscript{42} (all sorts of available work). To make matters worse, my wife has changed, like all other nurses who came here, she looks down on me now. It doesn’t help that I am a dependent on her visa, she treats me like a garden boy not her husband. She wears the trousers now. If it wasn’t for the children, I would have gone back a long time ago.’ (Interview in Leeds, 23 October 2009).

Nkosinathi’s antipathy to his situation is driven by the fact that he is doing chores that are associated with women. For Nkosinathi as for other male migrants, their reluctance is linked to gendered emasculation which echoes Ferree et al’s (1999) claim that the household is often the primary place where gender is produced and reproduced because housework is symbolically ‘women’s work.’ Nkosinathi’s narrative contradicts Thébaud’s (2010) claim that men in counter normative situations, such as earning less than their wives, reinforce their masculinity by not engaging in feminine activities, such as housework. He becomes more despondent when he compares his current job (Table 6.2, p. 155) and living arrangements to the ones that he had at home. He regrets coming over to the UK to join his wife as he believes that this caused the change in his fortunes. His aversion towards his new life is further compounded by the perceived lack of respect from his wife (Pasura, 2008).

For Nkosinathi as for other migrants, the diaspora has resulted in significant changes in power dynamics (McGregor, 2008; Pasura, 2008) leading to the diaspora being characterised as a leveller. He says that his wife now wears trousers which have traditionally been worn by men in Zimbabwe and are regarded as a sign of authority and domination. In other words, Nkosinathi feels emasculated by his wife due to

\textsuperscript{42} Rese-rese is a Shona term used by migrants to refer to migrants having to do all sorts of work going which is not related to their skills set. This means that a migrant may work in a care setting in the morning and in a manufacturing company in the afternoon etc. It is a euphemism for shift work where migrants can be called to work by employment agencies that they are registered with at short notice.
being dependent on her visa, which has implications for his return (see Chapter 8). His stay in the UK is contingent on the caprices and whims of his wife. Nkosinathi’s case agrees with prior studies which found that the structural marginalisation that men face in the work place in the host country is accompanied by both the dilution and erosion of patriarchal privilege within the family (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 1994).

Bitterness and reluctance is exacerbated by the fact that the reluctantees have to work and live in the same neighbourhoods with people who, were they in Zimbabwe, would be beneath them; another example of the levelling effect of the diaspora (Figure 6.6).

**Figure 6.6 Quality of neighbourhood rating by country of residence %**

![Quality_of_neighbourhood_rating](image)

**Overall, how would you rate your neighbourhood as a place to live in? Would you say it?**

**Country of residence**
- United Kingdom
- South Africa

**Source:** Based on survey results 2009-2010

Whereas at home Nkosinathi used to live in a plush neighbourhood with a coterie of domestic servants, the neighbourhood and house that he now lives in are far removed from what he was accustomed to at home, further accentuating his resentment of life in the diaspora. Nkosinathi was, until the economic implosion leading a privileged lifestyle, which contrasts with the lives of other migrants like Sam (p. 149). However, Nkosinathi’s views about the poor quality of neighbourhoods is in
the minority as the majority of the UK based migrants rated them as excellent, 47% \((n=93)\) compared to 4% \((n=9)\) making the difference statistically significant \((z=14.18, \ p<0.0001)\). The results further show that migrants in South Africa rate their accommodation poorly as opposed to their UK based counterparts.

Nkosinathi continues,

'I had everything at home; I am not like most Zimbabweans here who started driving here. I am saddened by the fact that I have lost my class, the people that I socialise with and work with wouldn’t have been anywhere near the people that I associated with at home. Being here has lowered my standards and you hear them saying we are all the same. I am not the same with them; I didn’t buy a house in Borrowdale because of the black market.' (Interview in Leeds, 23 October 2009)

Some commentators have noted that although a significant proportion of people migrate for social mobility and for safety and security reasons, very few realise their goals and the rest find growing ghettoization, deskilling, isolation and cultural antipathies in their new settings (Cheong, 2006). Nkosinathi’s experiences corroborate this viewpoint. He detests the fact that he has lost his standing; socialising with people that he would not have met or associated with was he at home. Nkosinathi’s reluctance is rooted in his powerlessness to change his situation; he does paid work that does not fully utilise his skills which has resulted in deskilling (Table 6.2, p.155). Furthermore, he refutes the common assertions by Leeds domiciled migrants that all migrants are the same regardless of the power and influence that they used to wield at home. That power has been eroded by being in the diaspora as evidenced by performing manual labour and earning a meagre wage.

The reluctantees perceive their loss of standing as a consequence of being in the diaspora. Some of them, despite coming by their own accord to South Africa and the UK after the worsening economic conditions at home, blame their spouses for forcing them to come. In Chapter 5 we encountered Nelson (p. 110) who packed his bags on his own volition eight years after his wife first left Zimbabwe, but still attribute his being in the diaspora to her. Other reluctantees like Herbert, 37, a lawyer who lives in Polokwane, have previously returned home after reportedly failing to settle but still came back after realising that they cannot cope in Zimbabwe as the situation there had changed drastically since they first left. He explains,

‘After failing to get a job in a proper firm here, I opened my own practice but then you don’t do real law here apart from the odd criminal case here and there, the majority are immigration cases. I went back after the elections but things have changed, the language, the way of doing things, you will need an induction about how to do business there...so I decided to come back despite
not wanting to stay here. It’s a catch 22 situation.’ (Interview in Polokwane, 13 May 2010)

Unlike other migrants such as those in Leeds who cannot travel back to Zimbabwe due to immobilisation wrought by immigration constraints, Herbert’s case demonstrates the circulation of Zimbabwean migrants between South Africa and Zimbabwe which was described in Chapter 2. He went back home after failing to settle in Limpopo but still came back, ostensibly because Zimbabwe has moved on during the period that he was in self-imposed exile (see Chapter 8). Herein lies the double pronged problem for the reluctantees: in as much as they despise being in the diaspora, Zimbabwe as a country has moved on to the extent that they consider themselves to be outsiders in their own country.

Loneliness breeds reluctance. In both Leeds and Limpopo, migrants reported being separated from their spouses. Darios’ (p. 113) case alluded to gendered division of labour which meant that women remained in the village doing productive work such as child rearing and agriculture while men worked in towns (Ansell, 2001). This practice of leaving women at home living with the in-laws has been noted by Zontini (2004) who found that Moroccan migrants leave their wives behind when they first move to Spain. The reluctant migrants in Limpopo spoke of an inability to bring their spouses over to join them due to constraints placed on them by these traditional norms. Rugare, a 28 year old married man, arrived in South Africa as part of the seventh wave. He now lives in Lebowakgomo, alone, while his wife remains at home in Zvishavane with his parents.

‘I feel like packing up my bags and going back home. It’s hard living on my own, I miss my wife but then my father won’t allow her to come and live here. He is one of those traditional parents, who say that the wife stays at home and works in the fields and bears children. It doesn’t help that I am the first born and he paid pfuma (lobola/bride price) for my wife, it’s like I owe him. Until my young brother marries, I can’t see a way out of this; it’s our culture. Being a son and the eldest, I can’t argue with him, I just go along for fear of disappointing him. He is my father after all.’ (Interview in Lebowakgomo, 19 March 2010)

Rugare feels constrained from challenging his father’s directives because of traditional customs which dictate that children cannot question their elders’ decisions. As much as he despises living apart from his wife, he feels powerless given that his father ‘invested’ in his wife by paying the bride price. He cannot see a way out of his predicament because of the tradition which obligates his wife to stay at his parents’ homestead until his younger brothers get married, which would then ‘free’ her to start her own homestead. Additionally, as the first born, he is expected to lead by example; removing his wife from his parents’ care would be interpreted as being disrespectful to his parents. To maintain transnational intimacy, Rugare engages in frequent visits (see Chapters 2 and 8) as well as regular telephone
contact with his family Parreñas (2008) (see Chapter 7). The frequent visits that Rugare engages in are an example of the circulation that was discussed in Chapter 2 which seems to be dominant amongst Zimbabweans living in South Africa. Similarly, in Leeds, reluctance is also driven by separation from family. Migrants without legal status cannot bring their families over to join them. This is explicated by the case of Gordon, a 55 year old asylum seeker living in Leeds and a former secondary school headmaster, who came to the UK in 2003 as part of the fifth migration wave leaving his wife and five children behind,

'It pains me to be here alone but then, what can I do? I miss my family and would go home tomorrow if I had the chance. But, I can't just go back because of the commitments that I have. If I go back, how will I pay my children's fees? How will I clothe them, feed them? Basically, I have nothing to go back home for. My wife tells me to stay here and soldier on and I am doing exactly that.' (Interview in Leeds, 16 January 2010)

Gordon is a realist who despite reluctantly remaining in Leeds is aware of his financial obligations to his family at home (see Chapter 7). It can be argued that some reluctant migrants are compelled to stay because of familial obligations which supersede the loneliness that being in the diaspora engenders.

6.2.3 An ambivalent diaspora

The third group comprises migrants caught in two minds about the efficacy of being in the diaspora. For these migrants, the diaspora has neither matched their expectations nor materially altered their lifestyles. This has to be viewed in the context of the opportunities that migrants had hoped for not existing. In Chapter 5, I argued that for many migrants the decision to leave was premised on the success of pioneer migrants which they hoped to emulate and replicate. Unfortunately for some migrants their dream of instant success proved to be a mirage. Socio-economic and political developments in Zimbabwe, including the formation of the inclusive government, have contrived to wreck migrants' plans (see Chapter 2). For example, the dollarization of the economy has eroded migrants’ earnings thereby diminishing their ability to meaningfully invest at home.

The ambivalence felt by the migrants is encapsulated by the case of Solomon, 38, a former middle ranking public service officer in Zimbabwe now working as a local government official in the UK. His ambivalence is premised on feelings of stagnation in his life which he feels is not significantly different from what it was like in Zimbabwe. Consequently, Solomon feels that he cannot glorify the years that he has spent in the diaspora. For him, what stands out is the ‘disconnect’ that he has had with home and his family. The distance has affected his relationship with his family despite being in telephonic contact with them (see Chapter 7). However, he feels
that this is counterbalanced by the strides that he has made education wise and the exposure that he has gained by being and working in the diaspora. As he explains,

‘I am caught in between on the issue of being in the diaspora. On one hand, I am grateful for the exposure and education that I have acquired by being in the diaspora rather than outside it like those at home who are experiencing it via me...through the remittances that I sent. On the other hand, I regret the opportunities that I have missed by being here such as being without my wider family, that my children haven’t seen my parents or their maternal grandparents and uncles and aunts for ten years. I wonder at times, how far I would have risen in my profession had I stayed at home. I would also have certainly benefited from the land reform; I would be a farm owner. So, it’s these thoughts that make you think whether you are better off being here or at home. I had a comfortable life at home which I think I have fairly maintained here. There hasn’t been a big change in my life to make me say I like the diaspora better than home.’ (Interview in Leeds, 14 November 2009)

Solomon’s ambivalence derives from a number of factors. Firstly, his current employment is not dissimilar to the one that he had at home (Table 6.1, p. 153). He therefore, does not feel like there have been changes in his professional life since he moved to the UK. In Chapter 3, it was argued that migrants gain cultural capital by studying and working away from home. Solomon’s case attests to this as he is grateful for the exposure that he has gained and the international education that he has received (19%, n=29) (Figure 6.3, p. 146). However, the qualifications that he has gained have not translated into recognition at work although he is hopeful that they will be useful at home (see Chapter 8). This is consistent with scholarly literature about migrants failing to find jobs that match their academic profiles (Holgate, 2004). The restrictions placed on him and his family due to his immigration status makes him question the decision to leave home in the first place.

The feelings of ambivalence are induced by the anxieties of home and belonging in the present which was outlined in Chapter 3. The ambivalent diaspora’s feelings of wanting to be at home are cancelled out by those of wanting to remain in the new host land. As Chapter 8 will reveal, family considerations are paramount in ambivalents’ minds, as great value is placed on children’s well-being, and fears of uprooting them from their settled life in the current host country prevail. The case of Dr Chokuda in Thohoyandou (p. 106) helps to underscore this point. His children are well settled in their school in Polokwane and the thought of uprooting them to Zimbabwe keeps him in his present location despite his opposition to staying,

‘My son is at University of Cape Town (UCT) while the youngest is in high school at a private boarding school here. I can’t just cut ties with this place to return home as it’s not all about me; it’s all these things that are at the back of my mind. I can’t just uproot them. As much as I yearn to be home after almost 15 years here, I can’t just pack and go back, that would be irresponsible. Because of my profession, I can always have somewhere to start and if things
don’t work, I can always come back. But going back doesn’t faze me, its home after all, you can’t run away forever.’ (Interview in Polokwane, 24 March, 2010)

Ambivalence is rooted in the perceived ability of the migrant to pick up from where they left, while, for some, it is about picking up the pieces and starting afresh should they return home. Migrants like Solomon who have enhanced their cultural capital by studying are optimistic about their chances of starting afresh should they return home (see Chapter 8). Tellingly, Dr Chokuda equates leaving home to running away, which gives insight into the depth of the problems in his country of birth. His characterisation of being in the diaspora as running away is in accord with transnationalism literature which, as emphasised in Chapter 3, argues that the circumstances surrounding people’s departure shape their association and idealisation of home (Brah, 1996). However, it is a belief shared by most migrants who feel that they ran away from the problems that were plaguing their country.

Notwithstanding the narratives of migrants such as Solomon seen in the preceding paragraphs, it is important not to lose sight of the fluidity of these categories as they pervade the disparate groups that make up the Zimbabwean diaspora, e.g. asylum seekers, economic migrants. The plight of ambivalent migrants like Nelson (p. 110) and Solomon appears to be better than that of other migrants whose lives are lived at subliminal levels because of fears of the state (Ahmad, 2008) as will be shown in the next section.

6.2.4 Clandestine diaspora

The fourth group consists of what I call clandestine diaspora. This group consists of undocumented migrants, illegal migrants, irregular migrants, refused asylum seekers and visa over-stayers who would be deported if they were to come to the attention of the authorities. Clandestinity lies beyond illegality in that the migrants use a range of instruments in order to exercise their agency and to evade the authorities (Waite, 2009). Literature on clandestinity argues that it exacerbates precarity (Ahmad, 2008; Anderson, 2010; Papadopoulos et al., 2008) by compelling migrants to partake in unstable and insecure work with limited tenure, protections, and benefits (Kalleberg, 2009).

Waite (2009:416) has explored precarity amongst migrants and noted that it ‘conjures life worlds that are inflected with uncertainty and instability.’ She highlights the contestations that are inherent in its use, meaning and conception, with other scholars viewing it as both a condition and a possible point of mobilisation among those experiencing precarity. In this study, in accord with Waite (2009), I regard precarity as a condition experienced by migrants whose lives are lived beyond the ‘normal’ realms of the labour market, where exploitation is rife because migrants
willingly and knowingly partake in exploitative labour practices due to their transnational remitting obligations (see Chapter 7).

Comparatively, it would appear as though clandestinity is more pronounced in Leeds than in Limpopo due to the progress that the South African government has made to reduce clandestinity by granting blanket asylum to all Zimbabwean migrants as outlined in Chapter 2. However, such a simplistic interpretation of the South African government’s immigration policy risks ignoring a large segment of Zimbabwean migrants who led and continue to lead clandestine lifestyles by virtue of their undocumented status (see Chapter 5) and the general attitude of employers and locals towards Zimbabweans in particular and foreigners in general (see Chapter 2). Moreover, beginning in September 2010, the South African government launched the Zimbabwe Documentation Process (ZDP) which seeks to regularise the immigration status of Zimbabweans. Furthermore, Chapter 2 demonstrated how informality of migration between Zimbabwe and South Africa promotes clandestinity. Thus, it can be argued that clandestinity in South Africa is rooted in the informality of migration.

The policy changes made by the government of President Zuma have not completely obliterated clandestinity as the interviews revealed. A significant number of the migrants have not taken advantage of this policy change to regularise their status, preferring instead to continue with the status quo. This could be ascribed to the migrants not noticing any positive outcome of having asylum permits given that the holders of the asylum permits still lead clandestine lifestyles (Ncube and Hougaard, 2011), which may indicate limited human capital. One of the central arguments of this thesis pertains to the differences in human capital endowments between migrants in South Africa and the UK. The low uptake of the asylum offer appear to suggest that migrants have limited human capital and consequently lack the skills that are needed to work professionally. On the other hand, it could be that the migrants are blind to the advantages of having documented status, given that informality of migration is deeply ingrained in their lives (see Chapter 2).

In South Africa, migrants use fake documents sourced from corrupt Department of Home Affairs (DHA) officials (Muzondidya, 2008). Clandestine migrants switch in and out of different statuses depending on the perceived gains that they can derive from their use at particular times (Ranger, 2005). This entails, for example, being an asylum seeker, a student, using false names, or all of these. Chapter 2 highlighted the language and other cultural practices of majoni-joni/injiva that live and work in South Africa. Clandestinity is therefore aided in no small measure by being able to

---

43 The ZDP was carried out between 20th September and 31st December 2011. During this time, Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa were required to present at DHA offices in Pretoria to apply for regularisation of their status. The ZDP superseded the special dispensation (asylum permits) which was in effect from 1st April 2009 to 30th April 2010 which saw Zimbabwean migrants given 3 month renewable asylum permits. By 31st December when the ZDP expired, 275 762 applications had been received by the DHA.
speak several local languages. Being fluent in local languages not only aids integration but is also critical in evading immigration officials and accessing work, which is crucial to perpetuating clandestinity. The case of Darios (p. 113) exemplifies this,

‘I speak seven South African languages, namely, Sipedi, Xichangani, Xivenda, Sotho, Tswana, Ndebele and Zulu. If I include Afrikaans, that will be eight although I am not yet fluent. In addition I speak Shona. If you want to stay here you need to speak their language, walk and behave like them and perm your hair. This way, the police think you are local and if they stop you, talk to them in their local language, the last time I was questioned in five languages by [the] police and each time I answered them back and they let me go. Funnily enough, local Shangaan people here in Giyani can’t speak as many languages as I and other Zimbabweans do.’ (Interview in Giyani, 15 March 2010).

Clandestine lifestyles, in Leeds, are led by migrants who have been unsuccessful in their efforts to obtain documented immigration status such as refugee status (Figure 6.7).

![Figure 6.7 Current immigration statuses by country of residence %](image)

**Source:** Based of survey results 2009-2010
Once informed of the outcome of their cases, migrants choose to sever all communication with the Home Office and other arms of the government. Evidence gathered suggests that once someone has descended into clandestinity they adopt a range of strategies to avoid the authorities (De Genova, 2002; Waite, 2009). Some of these measures include moving to a different city to start afresh, adoption of multiple identities, change of telephone numbers, and cutting off association with social networks leading to self imposed isolation (Ahmad, 2008).

The following case helps to underscore this point. Dudu is a 39 year old clandestine migrant who lives in Leeds. She came to the UK in 2000 as part of the fourth migration episode where she subsequently sought asylum. She left London, where she was staying after her asylum claim was refused six years ago. Dudu holds a mechanical engineering degree from the University of Zimbabwe.

‘Once they refused my claim, I changed my number, address, name and appearance. In fact, I changed everything that the Home Office could use to trace me with. I changed my friends and moved here where I rent a room in my new name. I have a new fake National Insurance number which I got from a Nigerian who I was introduced to by a Zimbabwean acquaintance; you can say everything about me is fake as no one knows my real name. I am Linda to many people and I am from South Africa, it helps that I am from Bulawayo so my accent is not too different from that of South Africans. I only went back to the Home Office when everyone started getting papers to make a fresh claim.’ (Interview in Leeds, 18 December 2009)

The above excerpt helps to demonstrate how clandestinity is aided and abetted by the availability of fraudulent Home Office and EU documents, drivers' licences and National Insurance numbers from the underworld that migrants can use to secure employment. Dudu’s narrative appears to suggest that migrants use their social networks to obtain fraudulent documents.

There is a significant association between country of residence and current immigration status (Chi-square test results=63.364, df=5 and p<0.001). Figure 6.7 shows that the major differences pertain to the dominance of migrants with refugee status/indefinite leave to remain in Leeds (15%, n=30) compared to 4% (n=18) in Limpopo and the preponderance of undocumented migrants in Limpopo (34%, n=177) compared to 13% (n=26) in Leeds.

Clandestine working practices are further fuelled by ‘hiring’ or ‘renting’ genuine documents of other migrants for a fee. Hiring and renting entails the genuine holder of the documents registering with numerous employment agencies and then sending their ‘proxy’ to do the actual work in return for a fee. By so doing, migrants ensure that limited resources are kept within the immigrant community by precluding others

---

44 This entails an undocumented migrant using a documented migrant’s documents to get a job for a fee, usually a 60-40 split of the wages with the owner of the documents getting the lion’s share.
from accessing them (Waldinger and Lichter, 2003). This practice demonstrates the interconnectedness of migrants’ lives within the diaspora, and how this interconnectedness transcends national boundaries (Objective 3). The case of Donald, a 38 year old undocumented migrant living in Leeds, typifies this practice,

‘My claim was refused long ago in 2006. I work as someone, I use his papers. Before, I got this fulltime position I used to work with an agency that he had registered with. I pay him for using his papers. He went back home last year. I wire his money via Western Union.’ (Interview in Leeds, 21 December 2009)

Despite seemingly being an expensive exercise, hiring and renting appeals to clandestine migrants like Donald because it enables them to earn money to meet their remitting obligations and to avoid destitution (see Chapter 7), while also augmenting the owner of the papers’ income for use during their stay in Zimbabwe (see Chapter 8). Reports abound of clandestine migrants being committed to prison for using fraudulent papers in the UK (New Zimbabwe.com, 2009, 2010; The Zimbabwe Mail, 2009). This is corroborated by the Institute for Race Relations (2008) which observed that there were 280 Zimbabweans serving jail terms for working illegally with fraudulent documents in the UK in 2008.

In Chapter 3, I demonstrated how scholarship on transnationalism foregrounds the importance of embedded networks which migrants utilise in their quest to exercise their agency (Levitt, 2003b; Glick-Schiller, 2006; Portes, 1998). Findings from this study are in accord with this literature as clandestine migrants have been able to exercise their agency by working through recruitment agencies. Some Zimbabwean owned employment agencies regard clandestine migrants as sources of cheap labour. These recruitment agencies appear to be taking a calculated risk because if they were to be caught by the UK Border Agency they would be liable to a fine of £10,000 per worker (UKBA, 2012). It can be argued that recruitment agencies believe that these workers can tolerate the ill-treatment, low pay, and exploitation rather than report them to the authorities, given their desperation. This has some resonance with scholarly studies which suggest that some employers prefer to employ clandestine migrants because of their tolerance of low wages and need to avoid conflict (Piore, 1986; Sassen-Koob, 1981).

The case of Charity, a clandestine migrant living in Leeds typifies this. Her asylum claim was refused several years ago when she lived in London. The 36 year old mother of four, whose husband and children are back in Zimbabwe, is reliant on the low wage that she gets from an agency, which is owned by a fellow Zimbabwean, to feed, clothe, house, and educate her children, as well as meet her essential needs. For Charity, as for many other migrants, the need to meet their remitting obligations supersedes concerns of exploitation, as will be highlighted in Chapter 7. Charity tolerates the delayed payments and ill-treatment of her employer as she considers this to be part of the suffering that comes with clandestinity. She says,
‘The owner of the agency is a Zimbabwean woman and she knows that I, together with others who work for her, don’t have papers. Most of us, workers are illegals. I get paid £3 per hour to work in care homes. Payment of wages is erratic and she tells us to go and report where we want...she knows that we can’t because we aren’t allowed to work in the first place. Without papers, you are nobody and you work for nothing, employers take advantage of you.’
(Interview in Leeds, 12 January 2010)

Scholars such as McClenaghan (2000) have observed that social ties can be both a blessing and impairment. As highlighted in Chapter 3, Charity used her bonding social capital to find a job incidentally with an employment agency owned by a Zimbabwean. She, like other clandestine migrants, is vulnerable to exploitation as demonstrated by delayed payments and working for an hourly wage which is way below the minimum wage. Phillimore and Goodson (2006) found similar results in a study of irregular migrants who work in the informal economy in the UK. Although Charity works in the formal economy her experiences are akin to those who work in the informal economy as exemplified by the withheld wages and the provision of transport to go to and from work places due to inaccessibility. She recognises that she is being exploited but is afraid to report her employer to the authorities because she fears reprisals and jeopardising the livelihoods of her peers (Gomberg-Muñoz, 2010; Menjívar and Bejarano, 2004). Her experiences echo De Genova’s (2002) claim that clandestine migrants who, afraid of ‘deportability’, accept mundane jobs which they would not have accepted were they documented.

Confronted by the spectre of destitution and unemployment, the clandestine diaspora often become trapped. Migrants have, according to Markova and Black (2008), been trapped in low paying ‘3 D jobs’ (dangerous, dirty and difficult) that are characterised by poor working conditions. I refer to these jobs as ‘4 D jobs’ (dangerous, dirty, difficult and demeaning) which are common for undocumented migrants. I have added a fourth dimension to this original interpretation – demeaning- because, in the eyes of the clandestine migrants that participated in this study, they would not have done these jobs at home. Male migrants spoke of being demeaned by performing personal care duties for old women in the care homes, which they perceived as un-African. As Gordon (p. 160), whom we have already met explains,

‘I found the whole care experience demeaning; it affronted my dignity as a man. How could I bath and take an old woman to the toilet, a woman old enough to be my mother or grandmother? It’s unheard of in our culture but there I was doing that. You know us men; we never even cleaned our children, which was always a woman’s job at home. I found the experience totally demeaning, it opened up fissures in both my home as my wife started challenging me as to why I couldn’t do the same duties at home and in the
Gordon feels that doing such a job resulted in the loss of his dignity not only at work but also at home and in the community as word would eventually reach those at home through migrants’ transnational linkages (see Chapters 7 and 8). Clandestinity for Gordon, as for many others in the UK, entails working in both the formal and informal sectors.

Similarly, clandestine migrants in South Africa work in both the formal and informal economies (Table 6.2, p. 155). As argued earlier, clandestinity entails a lack of social and legal protection from the state. The clandestine migrants work as cleaners, farm labourers, construction, and domestic workers. In Chapter 2, it was argued that locals shun this type of work due to the low pay and poor conditions of service. Clandestinity means that work is highly gendered with women partaking in domestic work while men tend to dominate in the construction sectors. The employment of domestic female workers in Limpopo echoes Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila’s (1997: 550) argument that considers the transnational movements of female domestics not only as,

‘...physical circuits of migration but as the circuits of affection, caring and financial support [for their families] that transcend national borders, provides an opportunity to gender views of transnationalism and immigration.’

Interestingly, some male respondents reported engaging in domestic work in Limpopo together with their wives as a means of earning money to meet their transnational obligations (Figure 6.8). Such migrants reported that domestic work was one of the quickest ways to get an income as they flirted in between jobs.

---

45 Dot.com- is a term used by Zimbabweans in the UK to refer to people who work in care homes. It derives from the belief that people who work in care homes principally wipe old people’s bottoms.
This is exemplified by the case of Tapiwa, a 28 year old polygamous man who moved to South Africa with his two wives as part of the seventh migration episode. He lives in Thohoyandou in a mukhukhu with his wives,

‘I arrived a month ago with my two wives. I have five children who remained at home. I need money to send to home for the children’s upkeep. We go round offering our services, washing dishes and clothes to people. We can make anything between R60 to R250 per day which is quite good. In between, if I get a job as a builder, my wives work with me as my dhaka boys [building assistants]’ (Interview in Thohoyandou, 3 March 2010).

Tapiwa’s narrative demonstrates the blurring of boundaries between what has historically been men and women’s work. Men have historically performed physical and masculine tasks such as working in the construction sector while women undertook feminine chores such as domestic work. However, as exemplified by the above case, Tapiwa’s wives works with him as building assistants in his work as a builder while simultaneously, he works with his wives as a domestic worker.

Both men and women work on the farms where there is a space for both genders to exercise their agency. Clandestinity promotes intra-farm and inter-country circulation. This is due to the need to escape detection. For example, migrants move from one farm to another as and when news of raids filters through. As Shumirai, a 23 year old farm worker in Naboomspruit explains,
‘Sometimes the South African Police Services (SAPS) raid the farms to arrest illegal workers. Because of mobile phones we now get to hear of these raids before they arrive and we run away. You just move to the next farm, and keep on doing that. That is how it is here, sometimes, the employer is the one who sells you to SAPS when it is end of the month and that way they don’t have to pay you. I have been a victim of that twice.’ (Interview in Naboomspruit, 26 April 2010)

Other studies have highlighted the collusion of the SAPS with employers which deprive the workers of their earnings by conducting raids at the end of the month which is what Shumirai is alluding to when she talks about being ‘sold by the employers’ (Neocosmos, 2008). Similar abrupt movements also occur in Leeds where clandestine migrants ‘disappear’ instantaneously (De Genova, 2002). Gordon’s (p. 160) case is an exemplar of these disappearance acts.

‘Working illegally means that you have to be on constant lookout for raids. Now the Home Office is very strict, the raids in the factories and care homes are frequent, it’s not like it was before. Just a month ago, the factory where I was working was raided and I got a call from a friend who works there to tell me not to come to work. I had to instantly move house as they took my home address from the company.’ (Interview in Leeds, 16 January 2010)

Gordon’s narrative highlights the salience of living ‘lightly’ to facilitate ‘melting’ into the crowds. Living lightly entails not having many belongings and living out of a ‘travelling bag’ and having tenancy agreements in false names. Living lightly means frequently sending both cash and non-financial remittances home to avert it being confiscated by government officials in the event of being arrested and ultimate deportation.

Mirroring the labour practices on the farms in South Africa, there is a blurring of gendered work in Leeds where both women and men increasingly work as order pickers, cleaners, and carers. This appears to be the only work that is available for both documented and undocumented migrants due to the tightening of immigration laws and the effects of the recession, which was highlighted in Chapter 2. Migrants reported being exploited by other Zimbabwean migrants and cleaning contracting companies which take advantage of their desperation. Their desperation is such that migrants end up performing domestic work for other Zimbabweans in return for accommodation and food. This is explicated by the case of Musa, a 39 year old widow and mother of five living in Leeds with a Zimbabwean couple.

‘I do everything here, washing, cooking, and taking the children to and from school, in fact everything that a house girl does. You know what our maids, the house girls used to do at home, that is what I am doing for this couple. I am lucky if I get £50 per month because I am expected to be grateful for having a roof over my head. I am fortunate because if it wasn’t for this couple, I would be destitute. I find it strange that I look after other people’s children
Musa questions herself for caring for other people’s children while her own are on their own in Zimbabwe which is akin to what Hochschild (2002) calls ‘global care chains’ which she used to demonstrate how Filipino domestic workers cared for the children of other mothers abroad while their children remained at home. Musa’s experiences highlight the prevalence of intra-Zimbabwean exploitation in which documented Zimbabweans take advantage of their country folk under the guise of benevolence. Some commentators such as McGregor (2006a, 2006b) have drawn attention to the difficulties that some Zimbabwean professionals in the UK experience with childcare. There is a growing market for childcare within the Zimbabwean community which is increasingly being filled by undocumented migrants such as Musa who would otherwise be destitute due to their immigration status which precludes them from accessing state support (see Chapter 2). On the other hand, the cost of formal childcare services is beyond reach of the majority of those with documented status and those who work illegally. Consequently, the documented migrants resort to offering the undocumented migrants a place to stay in return for performing both childcare and domestic duties.

Cases abound of clandestine migrants who have used their agency to circumvent the constraints and burdens of clandestinity. Consider the case of 28 year old Lebowakgomo resident Evelyn, an undocumented single mother of five. She is an exemplar of clandestine migrants who are utilising their agency by living off earnings from plaiting people’s hair and undertaking domestic chores such as washing and ironing, a practice commonly known as ‘piece work’. She is one of the numerous migrants who now eke a living through skills that she would not have otherwise utilised had it not been for her clandestinity. She reflects on how she ended up being a hairdresser.

‘I came in 2008 and could not find a job so ended doing this (gesturing). I earn enough to live on and to send children to school, it’s hard but then what option do I have? I now have a loyal customer base but competition is fierce, there are a number of us doing this so we undercut each other.’ (Interview in Lebowakgomo, 14 April 2010)

For Evelyn, hair plaiting came as an afterthought following her inability to find a job. Had she secured a job, it is unlikely that she would be earning a living doing ‘piece work’ like plaiting people’s hair and other domestic chores such as laundry and ironing.

### 6.2.5 A fearful diaspora

Fear pervades a significant segment of the migrant population. This fear is caused by a multiplicity of factors. Fear in Limpopo could be ascribed to lack of safety and
security, such as the xenophobic attacks that were perpetrated against foreigners in South Africa in 2008. The threat of deportation provokes palpable fear within migrants in both countries. Migrants are afraid of detention and deportation as this curtails their ability to meet their transnational commitments (Figure 6.9) (see Chapter 7). In Leeds, 23% \((n=45)\) of the respondents stated that they had been detained by the UK Border Agency compared to 39% \((n=201)\) in Limpopo. As discussed in Chapter 2, Zimbabweans without documented status in both countries are at risk of detention and deportation.

**Figure 6.9** Have you ever been detained by immigration authorities in South Africa/ UK %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of residence</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>South Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannot remember</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

% 0.00% 20.00% 40.00% 60.00% 80.00%

**Source:** Based on survey results 2009-2010

In the UK, detention by the Home Office may be for several months in one of its holding centres in Bedfordshire, Cambridgeshire, and other areas. Release from the detention may mean dispersal to a new area, accompanied by stringent reporting conditions which curtail the migrants' agency (Gomberg-Muñoz, 2010; Hynes, 2009). Detention may also lead to deportation from the UK. The case of Owen, a fifth wave migrant we met in Chapter 5 (p. 103), who was detained at Oakington Reception Centre in Cambridge after being arrested for illegally working at a manufacturing
company in Leeds helps to explicate this. He spent fifteen months in detention before being released. His bail conditions obligated him to ‘sign in’ at Waterside Court Immigration Centre in Leeds every Tuesday at 10 am and to be in his house between 6 pm and 6 am every day.

‘I am always in fear of being deported. When they held me at Oakington, they took me to Heathrow on three occasions wanting to deport me via Kenya Airways. The first attempt was aborted because I cut my wrists and the crew refused to take me in. On the second occasion, I was too weak to go on the plane as I had been on hunger strike for 24 days. The third and final attempt was aborted because my solicitor got a court injunction which stopped the Home Office from deporting me. This was served a few minutes before takeoff, in fact I was already seated on the plane thinking this is it, I am finally going home. On being released, I had to sign every Tuesday at Waterside and had someone from a private security company working on behalf of the Home Office and the police, Group 4 Security (G4S) and Angel coming to check on me daily and twice a week respectively.’ (Interview in Leeds, 17 October 2009).

As with many other Zimbabwean migrants in the UK, Owen’s account of detention demonstrates the depths that migrants go in order to stop their deportation. His account is corroborated by scholarly literature which has identified high rates of suicide and self harm among asylum seekers in Immigration Removal Centres in the UK (Cohen, 2008). Table 6.3 shows that the main reasons that South African based migrants were arrested for illegal entry into the country and working illegally which is consistent with arguments proffered in Chapter 2 about the high prevalence of informal migration between Zimbabwe and South Africa. This is demonstrated by seventy eight percent of respondents (n=158) in South Africa reporting that they were detained for illegal working compared to 37% (n=16) in the UK (z=-5.37, p<0.0001). Conversely, the detentions in the UK are attributable to visa over staying (47%, n=20), drinking and driving offences (1%, n=2), neglecting children (1%, n=2) and the use of fraudulent documents to access work/university education (1%, n=2). Parents that have been arrested for child neglect ascribe this to cultural differences as what constitutes child neglect in the UK is not considered as such back home.

46 The Angel Group is one of the private companies contracted by NASS to provide accommodation to asylum seekers in Leeds.
### 6.3 Reasons for detention by country of residence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>South Africa</th>
<th>% within Country of residence</th>
<th>% within Country of residence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Illegally entering the country</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
<td>11.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overstaying visa</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>47.0%</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working illegally</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>37.0%</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>78.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drink driving and other motoring offences</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaving children home on their own (home alone)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of fraudulent documents to access work/university education</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>43</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source**: Based on survey results 2009-2010

Like their counterparts in the UK, migrants in Limpopo who had been detained by SAPS and deported to Zimbabwe spoke of the hardships that they experienced in the Musina detention centre which they would not want to relive (HRW, 2006). Deportation for Limpopo domiciled migrants’ means being left alone on the Zimbabwean side of the border without any money to travel home. Migrants who had been deported spoke of sneaking back to South Africa once they had been freed by the Zimbabwean police, a phenomenon that Waller (2006) refers to as the ‘revolving door syndrome.’ The case of Hlanganani, a 36 year old undocumented migrant living in Potgietersrus highlights this,

‘I don’t know how many times I have been deported, definitely over ten times. They will drop me off in Beitbridge and once the police release us, I go back, mostly on the goods train, which is easy to sneak into. Lots of people do that,
it’s dangerous but then there is nothing for mahala (for free).’ (Interview in Potgiersrus, 30 April 2010)

Besides the threats of detention and deportation, migrants in Limpopo have to live with the threat of xenophobia. This coupled with constant threats and ill-treatment from locals induces fear in the Limpopo based migrants. The May 2008 xenophobic attacks on foreigners including Zimbabweans resulted in the deaths of 68 people (Muzondidya, 2008). Literature on xenophobic attacks has drawn attention to the role played by elites in inciting anti-immigrant feelings among locals (Neocosmos, 2005, 2008). Adepoju (2003) claims that the actions of the elites are meant to deflect attention from their failures and to protect their interests and wealth by apportioning blame on immigrants.

South Africans blame foreigners for taking away jobs from the locals despite the fact that foreigners take those jobs that the locals eschew (CDE, 2008). The influx of Zimbabweans is perceived to have exacerbated tensions between communities, which resonate with Dovido and Esses’ (2001) observation about the influx of foreigners heightening tensions in North America. They noted that the migration of large groups of people across borders can result in the host community’s reaction of feeling threatened by the new-comers either because of perceptions of economic strain or as a result of cultural dissimilarity. It is in this context that migrants such as Job, a 39 year old banking executive in Polokwane spoke of fear pervading and constraining his and his family’s life.

‘You are always afraid of the locals. You look at what they did in 2008 and you wonder whether you are safe. But, what choice do I have? I have a good job here which pays me well. I wouldn’t find anything which pays me like this back home, so as much as I don’t like to live here, I have to. You think, I can’t take this anymore but then again you look at options and you realise you don’t have any apart from staying and fighting for another day. There are many people like me. I am a mukwere-kwere as they call us, I may be a king in Zimbabwe but here I am nobody and can be killed any time and the police won’t investigate once they know it’s a foreigner who is dead. You get robbed and the police instead of arresting the robber, they arrest you because you are a foreigner.’ (Interview in Polokwane, 28 February 2010)

Fearfulness, like reluctance, is conceptualised in different ways by many migrants. For migrants in Limpopo, despite the dangers attendant to living in South Africa and the employment practices which discriminate against them, migrants, as will be demonstrated in Chapter 8, still maintain their residence due to the tenuous economic and political situation at home. Job, despite fearing for his safety decided to stay because of the remuneration that he is getting and the difficulties at home. His narrative, like that of many others is laden with self regret yet a gradual acceptance of the helplessness of his situation. It emerges from the realisation that the conditions in Zimbabwe are far worse than the dangers and frustrations endured.
in South Africa. In Limpopo, documented status does not protect a migrant from fear. Fear permeates and supersedes documentation. It affects all migrants regardless of immigration status (see Chapter 7). It unites all migrants regardless of gender, immigration status and class. The experiences of Job and other migrants in his situation dovetail with transnationalism migration scholarship outlined in Chapters 2 and 3 which posits that migrants are compelled to forge transnational links with home to offset racially stigmatising conditions in the host society (Basch et al., 1994; Portes, 1996). Fear, as Job’s case demonstrates, heightens the migrants' yearning for home although this may not translate to actual return (see Chapter 8).

Fear, for migrants domiciled in Leeds, is not for their safety but rather of being deported back home (Figure 6.10).

Figure 6.10 Deportation by country of residence %

Source: Based on survey results 2009-2010

Deportation is intimidating for some migrants who have not made arrangements for such an eventuality. As will be explained in Chapter 7, these arrangements include remitting for property acquisition. The survey results show that only 2% ($n=3$) of the respondents in Leeds were deported back to Zimbabwe before finding their way
back into the country compared to a significant 39% \((n=203)\) in Limpopo. This result suggests that once deported to Zimbabwe from the UK, migrants found it extremely difficult if not impossible to return given the restrictive immigration policies compared to those in South Africa where the porous border does not portend doom for deported migrants as they can always re-renter informally.

Migrants who have been refused asylum are at risk of deportation given the recent lifting of the suspension of deportation of Zimbabweans which had been in force since 2008. For migrants like Gordon (p. 160), deportation would certainly be a death sentence as he considers himself to be a political activist who came to the UK to escape political persecution, as highlighted in Chapter 2. His fears of deportation are also enmeshed in the economic uncertainty which would confront him at home if he was to be deported. They are also consistent with the argument advanced by Ahmad (2008) that the fear of deportation can lead to a pressure to maximise the ‘now’, whatever the current opportunities might be. As will be demonstrated in Chapter 8, lack of documented status does not necessarily disbar migrants from working and fulfilling their remitting obligations. As Gordon told me,

‘my fears are twofold, one I am a member of the MDC and I participate in lots of activities which has brought me to the attention of the CIO and ZANU (PF). Despite my illegality, I am still able to work to support my family at home. If I get deported then, I don’t know. Every day that I read about deportations my stomach turns. That is why I don’t drive or go to parties because I don’t want to give the Home Office the opportunity of arresting me and then send me home. I keep to myself because if you associate with Zimbos (Zimbabweans), unotengeswa\(^47\)’. (Interview in Leeds, 16 January 2010)

The case shows how some migrants have developed coping mechanisms to reduce the chances of being caught by officials. As Gordon’s case reveals, fear of deportation breeds mistrust of fellow country people who are suspected of selling people out. It can be argued that fear of deportation gives rise to isolation as migrants cut off communication and interaction with their countrymen. While Shumirai’s (p. 169) case in Limpopo suggested that employers informed immigration authorities on their presence in a bid not to pay their wages, Gordon’s narrative showed that the UK Border Agency has informants that are embedded within Zimbabwean migrants.

Working illegally also induces fear in the Leeds based migrants. This can be explained by four factors. Firstly, the migrants dread being caught by the authorities which may result in deportation. Some undocumented migrants such as visa overstayers have never had any form of contact with the authorities since they arrived,

\(^{47}\) This Shona word translates to being sold. In this context, undocumented migrants believe that fellow migrants who may be aware of one’s immigration status informs the Home Office about them, often giving the Home Office officials the illegal migrant’s home and work addresses which leads to their apprehension. There is a widely held belief that the Home Office pays such informants £500.00 for each successful arrest.
which serves them well. Coming to the attention of the authorities reveals their immigration status. Secondly, it is likely to result in criminal proceedings for working illegally as outlined in Chapter 2. Thirdly, the migrant will be prosecuted for working with forged documents and obtaining a pecuniary advantage by deception. Fourthly, it leads to loss of employment which has disastrous financial consequences for those at home (see Chapter 7). The experiences of the fearful diaspora have resonance with Gibney’s (2000) analysis that migrants opt to keep their presence hidden from the authorities due to fear of repatriation, distrust of asylum procedures, and unwillingness to be detained.

6.2.6 An ephemeral diaspora

The final category is what I call the *ephemeral* diaspora which derives from the temporality which is attached to each category and the notion of diaspora by migrants. A significant number of migrants regard their stay in South Africa and the UK as temporary which will cease once there is normality in Zimbabwe. Ephemeralism is driven by a complex set of socio-economic and political factors including immigration status, the availability of employment and educational opportunities etc.

The ephemeral diaspora is characterised by being constantly on the move both within and without South Africa, the UK and Zimbabwe as they search to maximise the benefits of being in the diaspora. This is explicated by the case of Blessing, a 32 year old mechanical engineer who decamped to Zimbabwe after a 6 year sojourn in the UK. He cites the failure to secure a job as a mechanical engineer as the primary driver of his decision to return to Zimbabwe initially before moving to South Africa (Table 6.2, p. 155). Here, he reflects on his ephemeral experiences:

‘I moved constantly when I was in London. I lived in London, Leeds, Luton, Birmingham, Milton Keynes and Coventry all in a space of 6 years. Circumstances force you to move. If you don’t move, the Home Office will catch you, especially when you don’t have papers. When things became tough, I returned to Zimbabwe where it was like jumping from the frying pan into the fire. Before long, I came here and luckily, I got the job of my dreams. I did everything in London, from being a student, working as a cleaner, a factory operative, courier and teacher. You have to, otherwise you won’t eat.”

(Interview in Polokwane, 31st March 2010)

Migrants descend into ephemeralism because of their transnational obligations (see Chapter 2) and restrictive immigration policies. Blessing demonstrates his ephemeralism by having stayed in 6 cities in the UK prior to returning to Zimbabwe where he stayed briefly. Thus, constant movement in the UK is both a strategy to evade the immigration authorities and gain paid work away from London where employers are considered to be more strict about immigration status (see Dudu’s case, p. 165).
Ephemeralism is also caused by marital breakdowns. Family break breakdowns can transform a migrant from membership of enthusiastic diaspora to ephemeralism. Similarly, a loss of employment has had the same effect on some migrants. The case of Malvern a 44 year old Leeds resident, who recently lost his job as well as divorced from his wife,

‘The past six months have been the worst of my life. I lost both my job and wife. The divorce has long been coming. You know our wives, the nurses, when they came here they became the husbands because they brought us here. As for the job, it was something from out of the blue; they just said I was one of the many to be made redundant. This has affected me, I used to be happily married and had a relatively good job, good car, good family, and good house but now I have nothing, I live in a hostel. I have lost everything.’ (Interview with Malvern, Leeds, 22nd December 2009)

For Malvern like many of his male counterparts, ephemeralism is partly a result of the gender linked emasculation that they are experiencing in the diaspora brought by the skilled migration flows. The loss of employment also results in ephemeralism as exemplified by Malvern’s case. When he was employed, Malvern could be said to have been part of the enthusiastic diaspora given his assertions that ‘he had everything, a good house, a good car, good family.’ Redundancy meant that he lost the good job and car while the family breakdown sealed his ‘demise’ as evidenced by living in a hostel.

Ephemeralism is closely tied to vulnerability which eliminates migrants’ abilities to make a choice. The ephemeral diaspora in South Africa, especially those who claim asylum in Musina is confronted by serious housing problems which ephemeralists appear to tolerate because of the problems at home. In South Africa, the task of providing accommodation has been arrogated by religious bodies which are overwhelmed by the large numbers of asylum seekers. This is echoed by Garcia and Duplat (2007) who point out that there has been an increase in church-based shelter provisions in some parts of South Africa in response to migrants’ accommodation needs. At night, men sleep in a tent which also acts as a church hall during the Wednesday, Friday and Sunday prayers. It was revealed during interviews that the mats were lice infested. Darios (p. 113) stayed at the shelter for one and half months while waiting for the processing of his asylum permit and when he was working to raise enough transport fare to travel further inland.

‘It is better than the show grounds where people used to sleep in the open. At least, there is security. It’s just the hunger, but otherwise it’s manageable. We didn’t stay in suburbs at home so you can’t complain.’ (Interview in Giyani, 15 March 2010)
For this ephemeral diaspora, food is at a premium especially for the men who live at *The I Believe in Jesus Church* men’s shelter in Musina where they have one meal a day in the evening which is provided by *El-Shaddai International Christian Church*, another faith organisation which is also based in Musina (Figure 6.11).

Figure 6.11 Migrants queuing for their evening meal, Limpopo

Photograph taken by Liberty Mupakati (2010)

Male migrants living at one of the shelters in Limpopo described their eating patterns as ‘0-0-1.’ The shelter provides one evening meal in the evening which is eaten on the church ground or in the tent where they also sleep. The meal consists of rice with soup. For some members of the ephemeral diaspora, these hardships were worth enduring as they hoped for better fortunes once in the South African hinterland.

However, for some migrants, the housing problems do not improve on leaving the shelter. Instead, due to the low wages that they earn, they cannot afford to rent suitable accommodation, and find themselves staying in dilapidated and ramshackle structures known as *mukhukhu* (Figure 6.12). Ephemeral migrants claim that they are forced to stay in poor neighbourhoods because they cannot afford the rent. It was not uncommon to hear of up to 10 people staying in one shack, which is a strategy of saving money. Other studies have found that Zimbabwean migrants are exploited by their landlords due to their vulnerability (Bloch, 2007; Muzondidya, 2008). Chengeto, whom we have already met (p. 146) and lives in the *mukhukhu* pictured, explains why this is popular with migrants:

---

48 Interview with Tarisai, Musina, 22 March 2010.
'It’s cheap; this is what we can afford. I can’t waste money renting a good house when our stay here is temporary and the money is needed to cover a lot of things at home. We work for ourselves and those at home so spending money on a good house is foolish.' (Interview in Polokwane, 21 May 2010)

Figure 7.12 Inside a migrant's mukhukhu, Tzaneen

Photograph taken by Liberty Mupakati (2010)

Chengeto attributes her choice for staying in a mukhukhu to the temporary nature of migrants' stay in South Africa as well as her transnational obligations (see Chapter 3). Given the competing financial needs, migrants see it prudent to sacrifice their own comfort for those at home.

6.3 Conclusion

The chapter explored the impact of being in the diaspora on the migrants. This has been achieved through a six fold classification of the Zimbabwean diaspora which fills an important gap in the literature. The six categories that have been discussed in this chapter are important; there are many factors to each category which affect how migrants interpret their situation. Migrants' enthusiasm is caused by the equal opportunities they have in the host country. Migration wipes the slate clean for most migrants, especially in the UK.

Migrants, despite their backgrounds, can start afresh and have access to social mobility tools, such as qualifications, which did not exist at home. Existence in the diaspora weakens cultural practices that stifled women’s rights. This new found freedom is cherished by female enthusiasts while eliciting reluctance in some men.
Reluctance has been demonstrated to be a product of failure to acclimatise and reproduce the lifestyle that a migrant had when they were in Zimbabwe. It is also associated with the erosion of masculinity. Reluctance does not portend return. Instead, reluctant migrants soldier on despite these perceived injustices.

Ambivalence is a product of unrealised goals and aspirations. It is seen as a continuation of the status quo; being in the diaspora has not materially changed the quality of life of the migrants. Measures taken to enhance social mobility such as further education would not have resulted in recognition at work. Thus, the benefits of being in the diaspora are not different from being at home.

Clandestinity is bred by undocumented status. It entails evading the authorities. Clandestinity is a demonstration of the migrants’ desire to exercise their agency despite the structural constraints imposed by their lack of documentation. It is the triumph of migrants’ inventiveness over officialdom. Clandestinity breeds isolation as migrants shun associating with their peers for fear of being turned in to the authorities. The fear of being caught pervades clandestine migrants. Migrants are afraid of what coming in contact with the authorities may initiate.

The fear of detention and deportation looms large in the undocumented migrants’ lives. Migrants live in fear of racial tensions coming open conflict, as was the case with the xenophobic attacks in South Africa in May 2008. High crime rates worry migrants and add to their fear of being in the diaspora. Some migrants in the different categories discussed in the preceding paragraphs persist with life in exile because of their transnational obligations to those who remained behind and elsewhere. As discussed in Chapter 3, transnationalism entails maintaining living and having ties with those left behind. Remittances are central to the maintenance of ties between the diaspora and those at home. Remittances can be both monetary and non-monetary. The next chapter examines migrants’ transnational transactions in the face of socio-economic difficulties that were experienced in Zimbabwe during the past decade.
Chapter Seven  
The transnational transactions of Zimbabwean migrants

7.1 Introduction

The preceding chapter presented a typology of the Zimbabwean diaspora which demonstrated how the lives of the diaspora groups are shaped by factors such as immigration status, gender linked emasculation etc. This chapter explores the factors that motivate migrants in the identified diaspora categories to engage in transnational linkages with those at home. Migrants’ abilities to meet transnational obligations such as providing for those left behind and to participate in political and economic activities are determined to a large extent by the diasporic group which they belong to. For example, a clandestine migrant may remit more regularly than an enthusiastic migrant due to their tenuous migration status.

The contention of this chapter is that migrants maintain links with those at home for multiple reasons including the need to ‘maintain a presence’ which therefore reduces their exposure to risk. By so doing, the chapter addresses the demands of objective 2, specifically the maintenance of links with those left at home and the complexities that surround this practice. Furthermore, focussing on migrants’ transnational linkages addresses the third objective of this study which seeks to explore the evolving transnational strategies employed by Zimbabwean migrants in their relationship with home. In doing so, the chapter extends debate about how transnationalism manifests in diasporic groups and communities, as discussed in Chapter 3. A number of scholars, as seen in Chapter 2, have turned to transnationalism to explain the migration phenomenon (Castles, 2003; Glick-Schiller, 2000).

Building on the taxonomy of the Zimbabwean diaspora which was discussed in Chapter 6, Section 7.3 presents and discusses the political activities and factors that promote or constrain the migrants’ transnational political activism. Because of the dire economic situation in Zimbabwe during the past decade, scholarly attention has focused on financial remittances at the expense of social remittances. Migrants’ social remittances have had far reaching consequences on the Zimbabwean political landscape; they have been crucial to the opposition MDC thereby allowing it to challenge ZANU (PF) hegemony. Focusing on social remittances also recognises that economic remittances seldom flow on their own but rather flow simultaneously with other forms of remittances. Section 7.4 focuses on the maintenance of contact by migrants and a range of mediums through which this is affected in both Leeds and Limpopo before proceeding to discuss how food is increasingly being seen as a medium of contact and re-enactment of home. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the importance, meanings attached to, form and nature of transnational transactions.
7.2 Remittances to Zimbabwe: An overview

As demonstrated in Chapter 2, Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa and the UK maintain links with their families and relatives at home (Figure 7.1). Remittances are one of the transnational linkages that bind migrants to those at home (Fussell and Massey, 2004). The results show that an overwhelming majority of the survey in both countries (98% (n=507) in South Africa and 100% (n=200) in the UK) have remitted to Zimbabwe.

Figure 7.1 Remittances to Zimbabwe by country of residence %

The survey respondents attributed their remitting motivations to multiple factors including altruism (Stark, 1991), co-insurance plans (Ahlburg and Brown, 1998; Glytsos, 1997), target saving (Ahlburg and Brown, 1998), smoothing family consumption (Rosenzweig and Stark, 198) and starting a business/investment (Connell and Brown, 199; Stark, 1991). The political problems that resulted in the international isolation of the country coupled with intermittent climatic shocks impelled migrants to remit. The volume of remittances to Zimbabwe during the past decade has led policy makers and academics crediting the diaspora with averting

Source: Based on survey results 2009-2010

The survey respondents attributed their remitting motivations to multiple factors including altruism (Stark, 1991), co-insurance plans (Ahlburg and Brown, 1998; Glytsos, 1997), target saving (Ahlburg and Brown, 1998), smoothing family consumption (Rosenzweig and Stark, 198) and starting a business/investment (Connell and Brown, 199; Stark, 1991). The political problems that resulted in the international isolation of the country coupled with intermittent climatic shocks impelled migrants to remit. The volume of remittances to Zimbabwe during the past decade has led policy makers and academics crediting the diaspora with averting
economic implosion during hyperinflation (Pilossof, 2009). This has to be understood in the context of the flight of capital and dwindling foreign direct investment (FDI) due to the toxic economic and political policies of President Mugabe’s government which were discussed in Chapter 2.

The results show that the frequency of remitting varies between the two countries (Figure 7.2). The reasons for these variations will be explored in Section 7.3. The frequency of remittances to Zimbabwe is closely related to the country of residency (Chi square= 116.25, df=4, p<0.001). The results suggest that UK based migrants are more likely to engage in remittances on an ‘as and when required’ basis (35%, n=69) while the majority of those in South Africa remit a few times a year (65%, n=327) probably because of the low wages which was discussed in Chapter 5. This means that accumulating sufficient amounts to remit may take longer than their counterparts in the UK.

**Figure 7.2  Frequency of remittances to Zimbabwe by country of residence %**

![Chart showing frequency of remittances to Zimbabwe by country of residence](image)

**Source:** Based on survey results 2009-2010

This may also explain why only 3% (n=13) of the Limpopo based migrants remit monthly compared to 17% (n=34) in Leeds. These remitting practices suggest that
migrants in the UK may have been joined by their families which negate regular remitting. Secondly, as argued in Chapter 2, migrants in the UK come from relatively well off backgrounds which imply that they do not need to send money home as their families are self sufficient.

Interestingly, there is almost an equal split between the UK and South Africa on ‘remitting yearly.’ It was pointed out in interviews that these yearly remittances occurred during the Christmas period when migrants in South Africa return home for the Christmas break. The case of Leanne, a 26 year old woman who arrived in South Africa as part of the sixth migration wave in 2006 helps to bring this into perspective,

‘I bring my mother money and groceries when I go home at Christmas. In between, I have to work hard to save, I don’t earn much here so I can’t send anything in between. I always go and celebrate Christmas at home and I have to ensure that I buy many things so that people can see why I am here, otherwise people will say I am uncultured, I don’t look after my mother and children.’ (Interview in Musina, 17 May 2010).

The above excerpt appears to suggest that migrants save intensively during the year in order to meet their yearly remitting obligations which are also motivated by the need to conform to societal stereotyping. Her narrative also suggests that the low wages which migrants in South Africa get which means that it takes them considerably longer to accumulate sufficient savings to send home. South African based migrants’ ability to remit frequently has also been diminished by the dollarization of the Zimbabwean economy.

Mirroring the variations in the frequency of remitting, the amounts remitted fluctuate between the two countries (Figure 7.3). There are significant differences in the amounts remitted with 96% \((n=484)\) of the 509 survey respondents in South Africa who remit stating that they send home the equivalent of £0 - £1,000.00 per annum compared to 52% \((n=104)\) in the UK who remitted over £4,100.00 during the same period.
As already pointed out, this can be attributed to the low wages that South African based migrants earn compared to their counterparts in the UK. Even migrants that are formally employed earn low wages in South Africa, something that Leeds based migrants are protected from by minimum wage law. The low human capital endowments which Limpopo based migrants have can also account for the low amounts remitted. Overall, the data suggests that migrants in the UK remit higher amounts than their South Africa based equivalents which may be due to the reasons for remitting (Figure 7.4).

As discussed in Chapter 3, migrants remit for multiple reasons. The results of this study lend support to this observation. The overriding reasons for remitting in both Leeds (49%, n=98) and Limpopo 54%, n=272) appear to be for educational purposes which corroborate claims of catastrophic collapse of the education system in Zimbabwe which has given rise to the mushrooming of private schools and colleges (Pswarayi, 2010). Remittances for household maintenance were also shared by migrants in both countries i.e. South Africa (23%, n=116) and UK (35%, n=69).
Echoing other literature, the remitting practices of Zimbabwean migrants appear to lean towards household consumption rather than investments and savings (Pham and Harrod, 2008; Dias and Jayasundere, 2004). Notwithstanding this, the multiplier effects of remittances should not be underestimated as they are considerable (Bryant, 2005; Hugo, 2002) given that remittances are not deployed for daily needs of their families alone but are also used for productive and non-productive investments, savings, education and healthcare needs of those left behind (Parreñas, 2005b; Wahyuni, 2005; Zlotnik, 1995).

Sections 7.2.1 and 7.3 will examine in more detail the spatial and regional factors that drive the migrants’ remitting behaviours. It will investigate the reasons why migrants remit in the manner that they do, and the factors that shape their remitting patterns.
7.2.1 Remitting motivations in Limpopo

The amount a migrant remits is affected by factors such as immigration status and human capital which have a bearing on the amount and frequency of remittances. As outlined in Chapter 3, remittances are related to return intentions (Ahlburg and Brown, 1998). Although the motivations for remitting espoused by migrants were multiple (Figure 7.4, p. 188), interview data shows that migrants concur that remittances mitigate the suffering experienced at home, as the case of Gordon (p. 160) shows. Evidence adduced from the study points to changes in the remitting behaviour which reflect the socio-economic developments at home as well as the migrants’ own personal circumstances.

Remitting was seen as critical to household maintenance and sustenance by an overwhelming majority of the survey respondents regardless of socio-economic status (Figure 7.1, p. 184). This sheds light on the extent to which those at home depend on the migrants for their provisions and livelihoods. Migrants sent both financial and non-financial remittances e.g. clothes, foodstuffs etc depending on the gravity of the situation at home. For example, data from the survey shows that between 2007 and 2008, migrants sent mostly groceries as the shops were empty because the government had no forex needed to import essential foodstuffs. Furthermore, hyperinflation rendered futile recipients’ ability to buy goods at home. Migrants felt obligated to remit to meet their families’ daily needs.

In fact, as explained in Chapter 3, there is a body of scholarship which argues that migrants regard remitting as part of their daily life and feel that there is an expectation of them to remit (Portes, 1999), especially for those migrants whose families rely solely on subsistence agriculture for their sustenance. In Chapter 2, it was highlighted how erratic rainfall in some parts of the country exposes migrants’ families to climatic shocks like droughts (Maphosa, 2011; Muzondidya, 2008). Being in South Africa and the UK has enabled some migrants, who described their situation at home as having been dire, to help their families through sending remittances. As the cases of Charity (p. 166), Shumirai (p. 169), Gordon, and others demonstrated in Chapter 6, some migrants are reluctantly staying in South Africa and the UK to meet their remitting obligations and mitigate the suffering of their families. The case of Muchi, 37, who came to South Africa as part of the seventh migration episode after spending some time in his rural area following his retrenchment in Masvingo in 2008 where he worked as a factory manager, helps to bring this into perspective,

‘If I don’t sent money and food my family will die, it is simple as that. The rains were poor this year and my family didn’t harvest anything so they look up to me to provide them with food. I have to; otherwise they will starve to death, so I have to work hard in order not to fail my family.’ (Interview in Vaalwater, 23 March 2010)
Muchi can be described as a member of the reluctant diaspora which was described in Chapter 6. However, despite his reluctance at being in the diaspora, he is happy with the opportunities that are attendant to it as they enable him to help his family through his monetary and non-monetary remittances. It can be argued from Muchi’s case that the reason why he is maintaining residence in the diaspora despite his reluctance is predicated on the need to maintain his breadwinner status which is a central aspect of hegemonic masculinity (Novikova et al., 2005; Thébaud, 2010). His case demonstrates the societal norms and beliefs that drive this phenomenon. The role of men as breadwinners is not confined to African culture alone but rather appears to transcend continents. For example, Taga (2005 cited in Thébaud, 2010) notes that, in Japan, masculinity is associated with the ability to provide financially for one’s family. The above account brings to the fore the connection between agriculture and remitting. When the harvests are poor, there is an expectation for migrants to remit more to compensate for the shortfall.

Chapter 6 highlighted how being in the diaspora has changed gender roles with women having financial independence and a greater say in their marriages. Women who are enthusiastic about the diaspora have welcomed the decision making powers it has given them. These decisions making powers include who to remit to and the purpose of the remittances, without their husbands’ influence. This is explained by Chengeto whom we have already encountered in Chapter 6 (p. 146).

‘My husband’s parents live in Harare and he grew up in Harare but my parents live in the rural areas. They need fertiliser and other agricultural inputs which his parents don’t need. When we were home, he would ignore my parents’ needs completely while giving his parents whatever they needed, saying my parents were my brothers’ responsibility. But since I came here, I have been sending them money to buy inputs and looked after them properly as he looks after his own. What he doesn’t realise is that if they get the inputs that they desire, they tend to have better harvests.’ (Interview in Polokwane, 21 May 2010)

Chengeto’s case shows how being in the diaspora has given financial independence to some women who were previously dependent. Such women decide independently what, when and who to remit to, without the consent and interference of their husbands.

Although only 9% \((n=43)\) of the respondents ascribed their remitting motivations for agricultural purposes, it was a recurring theme in migrants’ narratives. Migrants stated that their remittances were used to purchase seeds, farming implements, and livestock (Figure 7.4, p. 188). Migrants, like the people at home, rely on a good harvest. Good harvests translate to reductions in the amount to be remitted for food purchases thereby allowing remittances to be channelled to other critical areas such as education. These findings resonate with the work of Amanor-Wilks and Moyo (1996) who in their study of migrant remittances in Matebeleland found out that some
drought prone areas have sustained their populations by migrant incomes derived from South Africa. Similarly, Hobane (1999) found out that 62% of the adult population in one community in Matebeleland South were employed outside the country, mainly in South Africa and Botswana. These findings are contrary to Lipton’s (1980) postulation that migrants’ remittances are spent on consumptive goods.

The importance attached to education by Zimbabweans, highlighted in Chapters 2 and 5, is reflected by 54% \( (n=272) \) of the 507 survey respondents who have remitted for educational purposes. The figure can be attributed to the respondents leaving their children at home as well as paying fees for the extended family given the relatively youthful age of the South African based respondents whose children may not be of school going age. The collapse of the state education system has resulted in the growth of private schools and colleges (Chivore, 2004). Cash remittances cater for school fees, uniforms, stationery, groceries and text books. The decimation of businesses prompted migrants to send uniforms, text books, and other ancillary materials needed for their children’s education. Muchi reminisces about the changes that have taken place in the education system since he was at school in the late 1980s and now:

‘I have to make sure that I send pencils, pens, exercise books, buy text books, everything as they are not provided by the school. I can’t help but think how good life was to people of my generation. We were given uniforms at school and we would get exercise books, pens, everything. At university we didn’t pay anything, we got pay-out\(^{49}\). Now, I have to pay school fees and then pay the teachers on top so that my children can get extra lessons, which never happened during my time. Besides my own children, I also have my two young brothers at university that I pay fees for.’(Interview in Vaalwater, 23 March 2010)

The role of remittances in reducing school dropout rate has been noted in countries such as El Salvador (Cox-Edwards and Ureta, 2003). The results of this study are consistent with these prior studies as remittances were used to forestall children dropping out of school. They were also used to pay for private lessons given the incessant strikes which pervaded Zimbabwean public sector at the height of the crisis (Masuku, 2009).

Remitting for property acquisition was cited by a small minority of the survey participants (2%, \( n=12 \)). Property acquisition has different meanings to South African based migrants compared to their UK counterparts. Here, migrants spoke of building houses in their villages unlike their UK based counterparts who showed an urban bias. The importance of buying a property in towns was not shared by some

\(^{49}\) Pay-out was a government grant given to university students. The students repaid the loans once they started working and were repayable over a five year period.
migrants because of a strong attachment to their rural villages as the case of Anthony (p. 108) demonstrates,

‘I have just finished building my four bedroomed house in my village, it’s beautiful. I only had a small one bedroomed house which I built when I was teaching in Zimbabwe 2 years ago...I could only build a house in my village, as I can’t afford to buy a stand in town. Even teachers in Zimbabwe don’t have houses in towns, it’s beyond their reach.’ (Interview in Phalaborwa, 3 March 2010).

Anthony’s decision to build a house in his village was partly driven by the low disposable income that he and others of his ilk earn in the agricultural and informal economy where the majority of the study participants work. It can also be attributed to the circulation that they engage in between South Africa and their villages. The low disposable incomes for these members of the clandestine and fearful diaspora compel them to focus on survival and putting food on the table, as highlighted in Chapter 6. As one clandestine migrant put it, they are ‘caught up in surviving for the day and not worrying about buying a house in a town.\(^5\)

Therein lies one of the key differences between the Leeds and Limpopo based migrants. Migrants in Leeds place an emphasis on owning a property in towns and cities while those in Limpopo want to do the same in their villages. This can be ascribed to class as the majority of the migrants in Leeds worked in urban areas prior to migration while those in Limpopo had limited experience of living and working in urban areas. Circulation which was highlighted in Chapter 2 could also be responsible for this occurrence. It can therefore be said that there is a strong case to link class with urbanity. On the other hand, interviewees with urban backgrounds spoke of wanting to buy or build houses in cities. However, due to dollarization, property acquisition has become a pipedream even for professionals like engineers and doctors as the prices have been pushed beyond their means as the case of Davidson (p. 112) shows,

‘I started building in 2008 before dollarization. But dollarization is killing me as it is too expensive to buy things at home now because the dollar is stronger than the Rand.’ (Interview in Polokwane, 8 April 2010)

Davidson’s narrative suggests that migrants’ plans to acquire property at home have been stymied by dollarization which has pushed the cost of building materials beyond their reach.

Thus, the remitting behaviours and patterns of South African based Zimbabweans are driven by the need to protect their families from the impact of both economic and climatic shocks. Their remitting practices are therefore, supportive of rural livelihoods which most migrants have strong attachment with. The study participants felt

\(^5\) Interview with Miriam, Polokwane, 23\(^{rd}\) April 2010
enormous pride and self-worth for helping their families during their time of greatest need. The following section will discuss the motivations for remission of Leeds-based migrants. This will enable us to get a clear picture of similarities and differences in the remitting motivations of migrants in two countries.

7.2.2 Motivations for remitting in Leeds

Similar to their Limpopo-based counterparts, education (cited by 49%, n=98 of the survey respondents) is one of the biggest motivations for remitting (Figure 7.4, p. 188). This should be considered in the context of separation which, as demonstrated in Chapter 6, saw some migrants moving alone while their families remained behind. Remittances are driven by separation from families due to factors such as an immigration status that debars family reunion. Consequently, the interviewees reported sending money to Zimbabwe and other countries where their children were attending universities. Remitting for educational purposes echoes scholarly observations about remittances generating money for education (Lopez-Cordova, 2005; Durand et al., 1996). A significant minority of the interviewees highlighted their own educational attainment as motivation for investing in their children’s and siblings’ human capital.

The survey revealed that some migrants appear to be investing in their children due to their own qualifications (Figure 5.6, p. 120). Against this background, the evidence seem to suggest that migrants’ lack of social mobility which was discussed in Chapter 6 is not deterring migrants from investing in their children’s education, in the hope that it will kick-start their children’s social mobility. The flight of teachers from Zimbabwe has resulted in a lack of trust in the public education system. This has led Leeds-based parents to send their children to private schools which are reputed for offering a better quality of education than government schools. Betty (p. 139), a member of the clandestine diaspora in Leeds, whose husband and children are in Zimbabwe, reflects on her remitting motivations,

‘I have two children back home who are in secondary school now. I want the best for them, having been unable to see them for 10 years, the best I can do for them is to give them a good education. They are at Peterhouse and I have to fork out 3K (three thousand dollars) every term plus other expenses. These hardships I am facing here are worth it, they are for my children’s benefit.’ (Interview in Leeds, 19 October 2009)

Betty’s mothering from afar is akin to what Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila (1997: 548) refer to as ‘transnational motherhood’ which is increasingly becoming a characteristic feature of geographically dispersed families. Transnational motherhood has been defined as ‘the organisational reconstitution and rearrangement of motherhood to

---

51 Peterhouse is a private school consisting of a Boys’ and Girls’ Preparatory and High School about 79 kilometres from Harare. It is considered to be expensive by Zimbabwean standards and caters for the upper class. It offers Cambridge International Examinations whilst state schools offer the discredited local examinations set by the Zimbabwe Schools Examinations Council.
accommodate the temporal and spatial separations forced by migration’
(Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila, 1997: 548). These transnational families, despite
having members of the nuclear family living in different countries, share strong bonds
of collective welfare and unity (Parreñas, 2001; Ho, 2002). Bryceson and Vuorela
(2002) attributed the increase in this phenomenon to the changing social, economic,
and political conditions of a globalising world.

Betty’s case demonstrates the lack of trust and confidence that migrants have in the
integrity of the Zimbabwe Schools Examinations Council (ZIMSEC), which manages
examinations. This lack of trust is manifested in parents sending their children to
private schools where they sit for internationally recognised examinations
administered by the University of Cambridge Local Examinations Syndicate. Thus,
despite being in a clandestine diaspora, Betty is enthusiastic about being able to
remit for her children’s education (see Chapter 6). She therefore, tolerates the
hardships that her clandestine lifestyle induces as long as she is able to finance her
children’s education and to meet their needs. Betty’s actions are consistent with
some transnational migration literature which argues that women migrate overseas
to improve not only their economic and social livelihoods, but also those of their
families and children left behind (Hugo and Ukwatta, 2008; Shaw 2008) and to
exercise their agency by participating in labour markets available in other countries
(Parreñas, 2001).

The demise of the educational system has also been acutely felt in the higher
education sector. The country’s flagship and oldest university, the University of
Zimbabwe is seriously understaffed, with a lecturer vacancy rate of over 80% in the
faculties of science and medicine (UNDP, 2010). It is therefore not surprising that
interviewees reported sending their children to universities in South Africa, Australia,
New Zealand and Canada. Gordon (p. 160) explains why he sent his daughters to
universities outside Zimbabwe,

‘My eldest daughter went to university in Melbourne. My second eldest is at
UCT [University of Cape Town] in South Africa. I therefore remit to meet these
obligations.’ (Interview in Leeds, 16 January 2010)

Despite the UN indicators showing that Zimbabwe has the highest literacy rate in
Africa in 2010 (UNDP, 2010), the interviewees expressed doubt over these claims
arguing that they are outdated. The quality of teaching and learning has deteriorated
under President Mugabe’s regime, thereby undoing the good work that was done
earlier. The decline in standards is demonstrated by the fact that children of senior
government officials including President Mugabe shun local universities preferring
foreign universities. This, according to migrants, attests to the lack of faith in the
standards of local universities.
Target saving was cited by a small minority of the respondents in Leeds (3%, n=5) as a reason for their remitting practices (Figure 7.4, p. 188). Evidence from interviews suggests that most migrants achieved their targets of acquiring property soon after arrival which explains why only a small minority remitted for target saving which is a signifier of return migration. Migration literature claims that target saving occurs when migrants leave their country of origin to accumulate financial capital and assets which are then invested in a specific project such as purchasing or building a house (Massey and Parrado, 1994; Piore, 1979). Members of the different diaspora groups (enthusiastic, reluctant, ambivalent, fearful, ephemeral and clandestine) identified in Chapter 6 have engaged in target saving since arriving in South Africa and the UK. These different diaspora group members have different motivations for remitting. For example, clandestine migrants are driven to remit by the fear of being caught by the authorities (Ahmad, 2008). They live frugally, saving most of their earnings in case they are intercepted by the authorities and deported. The same also applies to the fearful diaspora.

Some enthusiasts, on the other hand, engaged in target saving soon after arrival when they were not sure about their long term intentions before scaling down their remitting practices in order to concentrate on building their life in the host country. The case of Lynne, (p. 121) a member of the enthusiastic diaspora living in Leeds shows how migrants deploy transnational strategies to further their livelihoods (King et al., 2006). She initially left Zimbabwe for South Africa hoping to accumulate sufficient savings with which to start a transport business,

'I left home in 1999 hoping to work hard and save money to start my own transport business. It didn’t work out in South Africa because the money that I was earning wasn’t much so I moved here, London in 2001. Once here, I bought two kombis (mini-bus) and a gonyeti (lorry) hoping to get in the transport business on my return. After that, I focused on buying houses. Now, I have three houses. I think there comes a time when you give up on this accumulating business and just want to be happy, work normally like others instead of killing yourself doing the long shifts to buy things that you may not use in your life time. Most Zimbos [Zimbabweans] have houses in Zimbabwe; they bought them soon after arrival during the black market days. If you see anyone saying they are building a house now and they live in Leeds, maybe they have only arrived, or want a customised house or they were dead stupid not to have bought one when it was easy...now they are too expensive to buy and to build.' (Interview in Leeds, 12 October 2009)

Lynne’s case mirrors that of other migrants who travelled to the UK in the hope of working to achieve their targets of starting their own businesses or acquiring property before returning home. Her narrative helps to explain why only a minority are remitting for property acquisition as most migrants either bought or built houses during the heydays of the black market due to the superior exchange rate of the Sterling against the Zimbabwean dollar (Mbiba, 2010). Owning a house has both cultural and traditional significance which, as highlighted in Chapter 3, is a sign of
being successful in life while, according to Van der Geest (2002), owning a house establishes one’s legacy. Although, target savers are thought to likely be short-term migrants (Ahlburg and Brown 1998), the findings of this study contradicts this hypothesis; some enthusiastic migrants such as Lynne, who initially considered themselves target savers eventually decided to stay longer despite achieving their goals. On the other hand, some migrants in Limpopo such as Muchi (p. 189) conform to projection of target savers as short term migrants who are involved in circular migration as highlighted in Chapter 2.

Property acquisition was considered by most migrants to be a two-fold process; firstly as a form of insurance against old age (De Haas, 2006) and secondly as an investment (Berry, 2009). Buying houses is predicated on the idea of return (see Chapter 3) and is a ‘proxy’ presence in the country of origin (Dlakoglou, 2010) (see Chapter 8). As will be discussed in Chapter 8, some scholarship argues that house ownership should be viewed in the context of the myth of return which exists and is important for many migrants (Anwar, 1979; Sinatti, 2009). For some migrants, owning a property was an investment as the houses could be used for rental income (Berry, 2009). Previous work on remittances (Levitt, 1998; Vertovec, 2000) has noted that migrants receive non-monetary remittances from home. However, evidence from this study reveals that migrants from some of the six diaspora groups identified in Chapter 6 receive monetary remittances accruing from their property investment at home. These reverse remittances appear to be accidental as migrants state that when they bought the property in Zimbabwe, they did not anticipate that they will end up drawing rental income from the property (see Section 7.2.3).

A significant minority of 35% \((n=69)\) of the survey respondents reported remitting to meet the basic spending needs of those left behind (Figure 7.4). The diversity of migrants’ recipients of the remittances appears to demonstrate the deeply ingrained nature of circulation between South Africa and Zimbabwe which was discussed in Chapter 2. This is exemplified by Figure 7.5 which shows that 57% of the 507 respondents in Limpopo cited spouses as recipients of their remittances.

The beneficiaries of the remittances depend on country of residency \((\text{Chi square} = 116.25, \text{df}=4, p<0.001)\). A large proportion of migrants in Limpopo \((37\%, n=192)\) remit to their parents compared to 19% in Leeds. Furthermore, a majority of 57% \((n=282)\) of the respondents remitted to their spouses in Limpopo compared to 43% \((n=86)\) in Leeds. These results seem to suggest that a significant number of migrants in Leeds are separated from their spouses and children due to immigration constraints. On the other hand, the fact that only 7% \((n=33)\) of the respondents remit to children in Limpopo could be informed by the youthfulness of the respondents who may not yet have older children compared to their UK based counterparts who are much older. The dominance of parents as recipients of remittances \((40\%)\) in South Africa demonstrates the pervasive influence of Zimbabwean culture where the female spouse has to report to her in-laws (Muzondidya, 2008).
The welfare of family members at home preoccupied the study participants as demonstrated by the diversity of the recipients of the remittances. Despite coming from different social and economic backgrounds, interviewees in Leeds felt obligated to remit for basic household maintenance. Some remittance literature posits that documented status preclude migrants’ remitting obligations as they are intent on improving their lives in the destination country (Menjivar et al., 1998). Contrary to these studies, this study found that remitting was not directly related to immigration status. Documented interviewees still have families trapped in the lower socio-economic class who require aid. Furthermore, the economic turmoil in Zimbabwe wiped out the middle class which some migrants may have belonged to prior to emigrating (see Chapter 2). This moved middle class families to the lower class, hence the need for help from relatives abroad.

Against the backdrop of the cataclysmic collapse of the middleclass, it is predictable for migrants to prioritise sending money to meet the basic needs of their families as well as to catalyse upward social mobility. To understand this better, let us consider...
the case of Chido, a 41 year old clandestine migrant living in Leeds. Chido came to the UK in 2000 as part of family strategy to diversity income,

‘I had a relatively good upbringing and went to boarding schools. I came in 2002 hoping to sponsor my siblings to come over but then they introduced visas shortly after I came, before I had raised enough money to sponsor even one. In 2005 my father lost his job following the closure of the company he was working for. I have to send money home but it’s not enough given my status here. For me, despite my status, sending money is not an option as my family relies on it. I don’t have a social life as I work continental shifts 24/7 but it’s worth it as I am providing for my family.’ (Interview in Leeds, 4 December 2009)

Chido illustrates the decimation of the middle class by the economic crisis. Her father’s retrenchment means that she now carries the burden of maintaining her family, which is akin to what Osili (2007) refer to a family in an ‘ailin economic situation' which they find to accentuate the probability of remittances. She brings to the surface the problems that face many migrants as they juggle to meet their remitting obligations. Chido, like many of her peers, fulfils her remitting obligations at the expense of her social life (Table 7.1).

The study data show that the ‘consequence of remitting to your family at home’ depends on country residence (Chi square= 40.577, df=6 and p < 0.001). Most significant is that migrants in South Africa work long hours in order to meet their remitting obligations at the expense of having time for social activities while UK based migrants derive pride in their work by helping their families at home. The long hours that migrants work could be a consequence of low wages obtained in South Africa compared to their UK based counterparts.

---

52 Migrants who did these continental shifts explained that they often entail working 24 hours a day often at different places. Such migrants stated that their shift patterns may be as follows: 7am – 3pm and then starting 3.30 pm -10 pm followed by a night shift typically starting at 10pm-8am. Some explained that they may not go to their home for two to three days at any given time as they go to the next shift straight from their other job.
### Table 7.1 Consequences of remitting on self by country of residence

| Source: Based on survey results 2009-2010 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What in your opinion is the main consequence to you of remitting to your family at home?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pride in my work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeling good that I am helping my family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doing my duty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working long hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little or no social life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Like their counterparts in Limpopo, migrants in Leeds have also felt the impact of the collapse of the health service. This is affirmed by 8% \((n=16)\) of the survey respondents sending medical supplies to sick family/relatives at home (see Figure 7.4, p. 188). The phenomenal collapse of the public health system created fertile ground for the proliferation of privately owned medical practices which demanded payment in forex. It is in this context that the diaspora supported the medical system in Zimbabwe as they became both the suppliers and consumers of the medical services. They were suppliers in the sense that they supplied the medical industry with the medical supplies which were not readily available in the country. Similarly, they were consumers in that they footed the bills incurred by their relations given...
that, at the height of the crisis, patients were being asked to buy their own medication; a death warrant for those who did not have recourse to diaspora funds. This is explicated by the case of Shamiso whom we saw earlier (p.118),

‘I fell seriously ill in 2008 and despite having medical aid, the doctor wouldn’t examine me. In those days they were charging US$100 just for consultation yet we were being paid in Zimbabwean dollars. If it wasn’t for my husband who was in London, I certainly would have died as many others who died due to lack of money to see a doctor and also to buy the prescription that you would have been given. In the end, I was admitted at Parirenyatwa53 (hospital) but had to get my own drip, oxygen, pills etc. My husband sent some of the medicine by DHL and my son had to go to South (Africa) to buy some of the medicine that the doctors wanted. The wards were full of people dying due to lack of medicines. They would just admit you but then ask you to buy your own medicines. That was how bad the situation was in 2007/2008. Many people died.’ (Interview in Leeds, 22 November 2009)

Medical insurance was no longer being accepted by doctors. To compound matters, public hospitals did not have medical supplies in stock and were asking patients to bring their own medicines (Makumbe, 2009). Nyazema (2010) claims that some people resorted to using traditional medicine to treat patients due to the unavailability of medicines. Had it not been for her husband who was in the UK, Shamiso believes that she would have perished like others who did not have recourse to the forex needed to buy the medicines required for their care. Thus, for Shamiso, her enthusiasm for the diaspora predates her arrival in the UK given that being in the diaspora enabled her husband to source the medicines and forex that was needed for her care which echoes Ghosh’s (2009: 32) claim remittances ‘can raise families out of poverty and enable more expenditure in health care and education of the young in the household.’ The use of remittances for medical purposes, contribute to discrediting the myths about remittances being only used for consumptive purposes (Fadayomi et al, 1992; Oberai and Singh, 1980); in this case it was life saving. In light of the above cases, I find myself in accord with scholars such as Taylor (1999) and Vertovec (2004) who posit that this perspective is too simplistic and erroneous.

This section has explored the reasons that drive migrants to remit in Leeds. These reasons were predicated on the need to ameliorate the suffering wrought by the failing economic situation at home. Despite some migrants leading clandestine lifestyles, this does not appear to have impeded their ability to remit. In fact, in spite of being in the diaspora reluctantly and clandestinely, migrants treat their remitting obligations enthusiastically, which may stem from the complexity of their ties with those left behind (see Chapter 3). In the next section, I briefly discuss the emerging phenomenon of reverse remittances within the Zimbabwean community in Leeds and explore the factors that have given rise to it.

53 Parirenyatwa formerly Andrew Fleming prior to independence, is the largest referral hospital in Zimbabwe. Before independence, it was a hospital for white people only. Until the crisis started, it was a beacon of the country’s health delivery system but has been run down due to years of under-investment.
7.2.3 Reverse remittances in the UK

Recent scholarship has drawn attention to reverse remittances whereby migrants do not only send remittances, but also receive them from those at home (Mazzucato, 2009; Ratha et al., 2009). As Mazzucato (2009) argues, reverse remittances demonstrate the pooling of risks between migrants and their families at home as discussed in Chapter 3. Remittances in transnationalism literature privileges non-monetary goods and services send from the home country e.g. foodstuffs, DVDs etc at the expense of monetary remittances. Evidence gathered in this study suggests that migrants receive both monetary and non-monetary remittances from those at home which bucks the trend as financial remittances often flow from migrants to those at home.

What has prompted these reverse cash remittances is the current economic recession in the UK, increasingly restrictive immigration policies which are reducing undocumented migrants’ access to work, and the unemployment crisis facing documented migrants. Such practices resonate with the emerging literature on reverse remittances which attempts to determine remittances’ scale and reasons for their occurrence (Marsters et al., 2006). Unable to work due to his clandestinity, Donald whom we have already met (p. 164) explains his remitting motives as follows.

‘I don’t have papers and I was stopped from working after they realised that I don’t have papers. Luckily for me, I bought four houses during the black market days soon after arrival which I am now renting out. If I don’t get papers soon, I think I will have to go back home so that I don’t continue draining money from my family. I should be feeding them not them feeding me...my wife uses Chitoro.com to send me money. I know several others who are getting money from home, people who are surviving from rent because they can’t find jobs due to not having papers.’ (Interview in Leeds, 21 December 2009)

Some scholars have associated migrants’ remitting behaviour with their return intentions (Azam and Gubert, 2005) (see Chapter 8). Donald’s case supports this hypothesis as exemplified by his investment in property. Being a clandestine migrant, it can be argued that Donald’s investment in property was prompted by the uncertainties and risks associated with his immigration status. His narrative also demonstrates the acquisition of property for retirement purposes (see Chapter 8). Migrants of the different diasporic groups identified in Chapter 6 are not immune to the economic crisis facing the UK and other developed economies. These have prompted reverse monetary remittances which migrants receive from rental income. Although welcome, these rental incomes appear to be accidental. For Donald, as for some of his peers, reverse remittances are a consequence of his clandestinity which disbars him from accessing state benefits. For clandestine migrants, approaching authorities for help is not an option due to fears of being deported which therefore
leaves them with no option except to rely on reverse remittances from family and relatives at home Zimbabwean operated MTOs such as Chitoro.com and Mukuru.com headquartered in London (Figure 7.6).

Figure 7.6  Chitoro.com website – a medium through which migrants in Leeds are accessing reverse remittances from Zimbabwe

Source: www.chitoro.com

Once money has been deposited into the Chitoro.com bank account in Zimbabwe, the recipient contacts chitoro.com giving them the details of the deposit and his/her account number into which the money should be deposited into. Thus for clandestine migrants like Donald, savings and investments that were made initially are now being used to fund the migrants’ incremental stay in the host country in the face of restrictive immigration practices and dwindling employment opportunities (see Chapter 6).

7.2.4 Remitting channels in Limpopo

Migrants in Limpopo use both formal and informal remitting methods (Figure 7.7). Formal methods which migrants use include registered Money Transfer Organisations (MTOs) (e.g. Western Union) which were used by 7% \((n=35)\) of the survey respondents and banks which were cited by less than 1% \((n=2)\). The low use of formal methods may be attributed to the high transaction costs which are exacerbated by the small amounts migrants remit. Further impediments include the requirement for migrants to have proof of identity in order to access these services.
In Chapter 2, it was shown how the South African government dealt with the Zimbabwean asylum wave by issuing asylum permits to most migrants. However, this has not eliminated the need for migrants to have identity documents; banks and MTOs insist on them in order to access their services (Ncube and Hougaard, 2011). The use of MTOs is further diminished by their location as they are located mostly in urban areas thereby excluding large segments of the population that work on the farms.

Evidence adduced from interviews suggests that professionals predominated in the use of banks and MTOs because they have documented status. Furthermore, they have access to the formal remitting methods as these are mostly found in urban areas in both Limpopo and Zimbabwe as they tend to come from urban areas than their undocumented counterparts who as demonstrated by the case of Darios (p. 113) tend to come from rural areas which are underserved by financial services institutions such as Western Union. As Figure 7.7 shows, the survey evidence appears to suggest that migrants favoured informal channels to remit as they considered them to be more accessible to both the sender and the recipients at

**Source:** Based on survey results 2009-2010
home. A paucity of financial services in migrants’ villages compels the migrants to remit through informal channels (Maimbo and Ratha, 2005).

Slightly over half of the survey participants (52%, \(n=263\)) remit either personally or through friends and relatives. This, as highlighted in Chapter 3, suggests the existence of strong social networks amongst the migrants (Meagher, 2005). Muchi explains,

‘We help each other here. One month it’s me who will take the groceries and money home and the other month it’s someone else. We come from the same area and almost every month everyone is going home so you ask them to take your things with them. Because we know each other there is no risk of things going missing. I have never used the bank or any other method.’
(Interview in Vaalwater, 23 March 2010)

Informal systems are therefore seen as foolproof and guarantee that the proceeds will reach the intended beneficiary. They are, as discussed in Chapter 3, predicated on traditional norms and reciprocity as the person entrusted with the money and goods will also rely on the others to do the same in future (Putnam, 1993). However, there are noticeable differences in how this is practiced in Leeds where weight restrictions imposed by airlines mean that those travelling home are reluctant or refuse to carry goods for their friends because this impacts on their ability to take home gifts for friends and family. This should be considered against the backdrop of migrants’ infrequent home visits engendered by travel restrictions due to cost and immigration constraints which are not very pronounced in Limpopo. For South African based migrants, the use of personally delivered remittances or delivered through friends and relatives is fuelled by circulation which Muchi alludes to in his narrative.

Door to door delivery drivers (malaitshas – Figure 7.8) are a popular medium of sending money and goods home (27%, \(n=136\)). The information gleaned from the interviews suggests that the choice of whether to use friends and family or malaitshas can be attributed to factors such as trust, cost and area of origin (Levitt, 1998). Migrants from the western and southern parts of Zimbabwe dominated in the use of malaitshas whilst those from further afield use friends and family. The preponderance in the use of informal remitting channels in Limpopo appears to be linked to migrants’ rural backgrounds.
Felicity aged 27, lives in Thabazimbi with her husband. Both are undocumented. She was born in Chivi district in Masvingo province while her husband hails from Mutare. She sends monetary and non-monetary remittances to her family via her mother (Figure 7.5, p. 197) even though her father is still alive; this reflects changing gender relations engendered by being in the diaspora, as highlighted in Chapter 6. This practice is contrary to what King et al (2006) refer to as the ‘male remitting channel’ where remittances are channelled by sons to their fathers. Felicity explains here the reasoning behind using her use of malaitshas since her arrival in Limpopo in 2004 and why she remits to her parents,

‘I have been using the same malaitsha since I came here. He comes from our area, he is trustworthy. When I don't have money to pay him, he will still take my goods home and I pay him when I have money. It works well for me. Occasionally I go personally, but when I can't my brothers and sisters and in-laws are here so there is always someone going. It just depends, but, because my son is at home, I tend to go there every 3 months. Being here means, I now have a say in who I send my money to, whether my parents or my husband's. When I was home, I never had that freedom because I relied on what he gave me as I didn't work. I had to save the little money that he gave me to give to my parents which wasn’t easy.’ (Interview in, 26 March 2010)
As discussed in Chapter 6, Felicity’s case epitomises the seismic changes in gender roles which have occurred in the diaspora. In this regard, she can be regarded as a member of the enthusiastic diaspora despite her clandestinity. Her clandestinity does not appear to have subdued her enthusiasm for being in the diaspora. Prior to moving to South Africa, she was a housewife reliant on her husband’s benevolence to help her parents. However, since coming to South Africa, she now remits directly to her parents as well as remitting to her in-laws’ through her parents, something that would never have happened were she in Zimbabwe. Her husband appears to tolerate this because he recognises her contribution to household income.

The role of social capital in remittances has not been clearly explored. While its role has been celebrated in promoting migration by channelling information to potential migrants (Massey, 20003; Portes, 2001), the critical role it plays in determining how remittances are channelled back to the homeland has been under researched. Felicity is surrounded by her family, which she can tap into for help with remittances when needed. The practise by Felicity of remitting through the *malaitsha* is akin to the ‘*mula*’ system used by Cuban migrants in USA in which remittances occur predominantly in an informal context where they are imbedded agents (Orozco, 2002) and the ‘*viajerm*’ used by El Salvador migrants also in the USA (Landolt *et al.*, 1999). The *mulas* like the *malaitshas* carry both money and packages of goods to Cuba for a fee. And like the *malaitshas* they are known through word of mouth, relatives, friends and acquaintances. But that is as far as the similarities go, for whilst the *mulas* enter Cuba as tourists, the *malaitshas* are Zimbabweans who earn their living by ferrying the goods of Zimbabweans in South Africa. Trust and reciprocity lie at the heart of this system. The *malaitshas* carry messages between the migrants and their families and relatives at home and Limpopo, thus serving as repositories of information which travels back and forth (Mahler, 2001).

Informal channels were used by both sets of migrants, that is professional and non-professionals alike as the case of Panashe, a 31 year old banker in Polokwane demonstrates,

‘I use friends, relatives, buses and cross-border traders to send stuff home. Western Union is fast but expensive, occasionally I use it when it’s urgent but I tend to use the other methods.’ (Interview in Polokwane, 29 May 2010)

Panashe, despite being a banker, is, as already seen in Chapter 6, a member of the fearful diaspora group. Despite being his professional status, he remits predominantly via informal channels thereby contradicting the view that informal channels are the preserve of undocumented migrants (Ratha and Riedberg, 2005). Whilst conventional wisdom posits that documented migrants are risk averse and use formal channels to remit, evidence adduced from this study suggests that they use informal channels. The informal remitting channels are predicated on trust just as in the *Hawala* system in Somalia and other Asian countries (Maimbo, 2003; Qorchi *et al.*, 2003).
This section showed the remitting channels that are used by migrants and the reasons why they use them. The use of formal remittance channels is obviated by the informal nature of migration between Zimbabwe and South Africa. The existence of strong social networks perpetuates the continued use and dominance of informal channels to remit home. Section 7.2.5 explores continuity and change in remitting channels in Leeds.

7.2.5 Continuity and change in remitting channels in the UK

The remitting channels used by migrants vary and are affected by a number of factors. These factors include immigration status, legislative changes, trustworthiness, reliability, cost, and speed. The channels through which remittances are funnelled to and from Zimbabwe have evolved over the past decade mirroring the socio-economic, political and technological developments in both the host and country of origin. The dollarization of the economy in early 2009 has not stopped the use of informal remitting channels. Instead, informal channels are used concurrently with formal channels which signify the enduring nature of informal remitting channels which Zimbabwean authorities blamed for the collapse of the economy (Figure 7.7).

The decline in the use of informal MTOs is demonstrated by only 5\% \((n=10)\) of the survey respondents reporting using them. Prior to their decline, unregistered MTOs and individual money changers were extensively used by UK based migrants not only because they offered higher returns than formal channels but also because of their accessibility. Interview participants stated that they found the black market convenient because it was run by people who understood their language, culture and values. The use of individual money changers agrees with the findings of Alvarez and Collier's (1994) study of Mexican truckers whose businesses had flourished because of the use of their own transnational ethnically based ties.

A small minority of the respondents (2\%, \(n=3\)) reported relying on informal couriers to send non-cash remittances such as electrical gadgets. These are favoured because they allow the senders to avoid paying customs and excise duty which would otherwise attract duty if they were sent using formal channels. The informal couriers include diplomatic and Air Zimbabwe staff who use their privileged positions as embedded agents within the airline and Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (Zimra) system to evade paying cargo fees and customs and excise duty thereby prejudicing both the airline and national fiscus. The speed with which the goods reach home is an added incentive for using these informal couriers. Customers are recruited through a network of family, friends and relatives. Potential customers are notified by text messages which details the departure dates and address where the goods should be brought to (Figure 7.9).
An example of a text message sent to potential customers in the UK by informal couriers that work for Air Zimbabwe

From: +44 7930248591
Sent: Feb 21, 2009 00:00
Subject: Arrived this evening and the last...Arrived this evening and the last day of accepting goods for freighting is Tuesday the 2nd of march, address 24 Ashburnham Road Luton, LU1 1JP. You can get me on 07939880832 or on this number. David Macheka.

The use of formal channels such as banks and registered MTOs has undergone a renaissance as witnessed by their use by 86% (n=172) of the survey respondents. This renaissance has been prompted by dollarization and legislative changes in both the UK and Zimbabwe. Previously, formal methods were shunned because they were considered to be expensive. As Maimbo (2005) suggests, migrants’ use of formal channels has been stifled by the high transaction costs. Furthermore, he claims that the average cost of transferring remittances remains at about 13 per cent, and sometimes exceeds 20 per cent of the amount remitted, which is high considering low wages that migrants earn. Additionally, banks are eschewed because of the inordinate time they take to process the remittances. The informal market has endured largely due to the restrictions that clandestine migrants continue to face in accessing formal remitting channels.

Remittances that are delivered personally or through friends, relatives and family have also been on the rise in Leeds as demonstrated by 4% (n=7) of the respondents having used this method to send money or goods home (Figure 7.7). The surge in personally delivered remittances appears to indicate increased mobility due to the granting of documented status within the community. As highlighted in Chapter 6, asylum seeking immobilised migrants due to attendant conditions such as inability to travel until determination of their cases.

At the height of hyper-inflation migrants considered sending money to Zimbabwe to be inappropriate given the shortage of goods and services. Hence, migrants were compelled to send non-monetary remittances such as foodstuffs. Informed by the non-availability of goods in the stores, migrants sent monetary remittances to relatives in neighbouring countries like Botswana and South Africa which were used to buy food to send home. Eliza (p. 108) is one of the migrants who sent foods through couriers and money to relatives in neighbouring countries during the crisis.

‘When things were tight at home in 2007/2008, I was sending drums full of groceries home at least once every three months. It used to cost me £150 per drum which I would fill to the brim with all sorts of groceries, from cooking oil to sugar, and even salt as they were not available in the shops. I would also put clothes in the drums (Figure 7.10) for my mother, nieces and nephews. I sent money to my sister who lives in Botswana who then bought food to send...
home. Even now, I still send drums but not with food as this is now readily available, just clothes, electrical gadgets etc to separate them from those without children in the diaspora, you know. There are many ways of sending the drums, shipping companies, air Zimbabwe people or embassy people. You shop around before deciding who to send with.’ (Interview in Leeds, 12 November 2009)

This case suggests that migrants consider a number of factors before settling on the remitting method. The overriding factor appears to be the cost involved and the demands of those at home.

**Figure 7.10** Packed drums ready for shipping to Zimbabwe in Leeds

For example, at the height of the crisis, she sent foodstuffs as these were in short supply at home. As the economic situation improved and food became readily available, Eliza scaled back on these and now sends electrical gadgets and clothes through informal channels which helps to set her family ‘apart’ from those without
family and relatives in the diaspora. Her case shows that non-resident Zimbabweans became the lifeblood of those at home as they provided money and foodstuffs which were in short supply. Eliza demonstrates that just as migration may be a multi-step occurrence, so too can remittances as evidenced by remitting to Botswana before reaching the intended beneficiaries in Zimbabwe.

This section explored the continuities and changes of remitting strategies of migrants in the UK. The following section focuses on how members of the Zimbabwean diaspora in Leeds and Limpopo participate in Zimbabwean oriented activities such as political party membership and membership of community groups, as well as the factors which inform and motivate this participation.

7.3 Instrumental activism and the shifting relationship with home government

The preceding sections explored the financial and non-financial transactions of migrants based in Leeds and Limpopo. Chapter 6 introduced the six pronged typology which consists of ambivalent, clandestine, enthusiastic, ephemeral, fearful and reluctant diaspora. Building on the financial and non-financial transactions which were discussed in the preceding sections, this section discusses migrants’ participation in Zimbabwean oriented activities. Because of the salience of political policies of President Mugabe in spawning the migration waves outlined in Chapter 2, focus would be devoted to immigrant politics.

Life in the diaspora for some migrants entails participation in a number of Zimbabwean oriented activities in Leeds and Limpopo such as religious organisations, football, demonstrations etc (Figure 7.11). The survey results show that there are more people who participate in Zimbabwean related activities in the UK (79%, n=157) than in Limpopo (45%, n=234). Participation in these events is a signifier of social capital which was discussed in Chapter 3. As demonstrated in Chapter 5, social capital was instrumental in facilitating some migration episodes. The low level of participation in Zimbabwean related activities by South African based migrants could be indicative of social isolation which is probable because Limpopo is largely rural with sparse population. It may also be suggestive of general apathy towards Zimbabwean activities.

It can be argued that the Zimbabwean diaspora exists in its present form because of the political problems which spawned an economic crisis leading to the exodus (see Chapters 2 and 5). Furthermore, political activism is a form of transnationalism which was discussed in Chapter 3 and which forms objective 3 of this thesis.
Although Figure 7.12 shows that only 13% \((n=20)\) and 25% \((n=59)\) participate in political activities in Leeds and Limpopo respectively and while participation in religious activity is much higher (30%, \(n=47\) in Leeds and 53%, \(n=124\) in Limpopo), migrants’ instrumental political activism is important not only due to different meanings and values attached to it but to the potential ramifications that it may have on the Zimbabwean political landscape which, as will be seen in Chapter 8, have important implications for migrants’ return. The exploration of migrants’ political activism is crucial given that the Zimbabwean diaspora exist because of President Mugabe’s political and economic policies which spawned emigration.
A higher proportion of UK based migrants participate in weddings (40%, n=64) compared to their South African based counterparts who mostly take part in church activities (53%, n=124), political meetings (25%, n=59) etc. Migrants appear to use political activism as an instrument to gain documented status in Leeds (13%, n=20) in particular and Limpopo to a lesser extent. Given the centrality of return in this study, it will be argued this instrumentalism is a significant indicator of the migrants’ return intentions (see Chapter 8). In Leeds, for example, the decision to confer refugee status is firmly rooted in political participation, similar to what Itzigsohn et al (1999) referred to as ‘narrow’ and ‘broad’ transnational practices which was discussed in Chapter 3. Narrow transnationalism is exemplified by the lobbying practices of migrants in South Africa and the UK to ensure that the Zimbabwean question does not fall off the international radar. Furthermore, migrants’ narrow transnational practices ensure that world leaders are kept informed of alleged human rights abuses that the government of President Robert Mugabe perpetrates. As Kastoryano (2002) notes, transnational migrants aim at acting as pressure groups for
political recognition in both political spaces. As demonstrated in Chapter 2, Zimbabwe’s citizenship law prohibits both dual citizenship and external voting.

It was noted in Chapter 3, that political involvement manifests itself in a diverse range of ways such as membership of a political party, engaging in demonstrations, lobbying host governments, and mobilising resources for a party at home, amongst others (Portes, 2001a). In the UK, the MDC commands considerable support as evidenced by the 43 branches that it has in British cities, which are twinned with constituencies in Zimbabwe for material support (www.mdcukandireland.org.uk). Membership of the MDC in both countries is achieved by purchasing a party card (Figure 7.13) and maintained by monthly subscriptions. Twinning can be regarded a form of translocal politics in which migrants from a particular area seek to better the situation in local communities of origin which as Portes (1999) argues, may lead to wider political implications as the empowerment of local communities serves as a medium for wider political change. The importance of MDC supporters in the UK can be demonstrated by the fact in the run-up to the 2008 elections they remitted to the main party in Zimbabwe over £80,000 for use in the campaign process (Home Office, 2009).

**Figure 7.13** Old (left) and new (right) MDC membership cards

Source: Card provided by anonymous MDC member

Migrants like Gordon (p. 160) predicate their asylum claims on alleged persecution from President Mugabe’s government due to their membership of the MDC. As discussed in Chapter 2, some migration episodes were caused by the totalitarian policies of President Mugabe. Despite having left Zimbabwe prior to the worst violence in 2008, all survey respondents who sought asylum in the UK claimed to be members of the MDC, resulting in a direct correlation between political activism and
asylum seeking in the UK. As discussed in Chapter 6, for clandestine migrants, being a recognised member of the MDC improves the chances of being granted refugee status. Being politically active entails maintaining current subscription, attendance at MDC meetings and rallies. Politically active members with pending asylum cases are issued with a supporting letter (Figure 7.14) from the party attesting to the claimant’s membership and the risks that may befall them from President Mugabe’s ZANU (PF) party were they to be forcibly returned to Zimbabwe.

**Figure 7.14** A standard MDC letter written in support of asylum seekers’ asylum claims, UK

![MDC letter](image)

**Source:** MDC support letter

Dudu, whom we have met earlier (p. 165), is one of the migrants whose asylum claim is based on political activism. She explains that her participation in diaspora politics is predicated on increasing the chances of being granted refugee status,
given that her friends were granted refugee status in the same manner. She observes,

‘I support *musangano* (party) because I want papers. If you pay your subs (subscriptions) you get a supporting letter that you give to the Home Office. Personally, I don’t want change to happen in Zimbabwe at the moment, not until after my papers have come through because we are benefitting from the crisis.’ (Interview in Leeds, 18 December 2009)

Dudu’s participation and membership of the MDC is informed by the potential contribution that this may make to her asylum application. Interestingly, for asylum seekers such as Dudu, they want the rule of President Mugabe to continue in order to justify why they are in the UK in the first place.

For Dudu, like many other interviewees, the fact that her friends have been granted refugee status as a result of their membership of the MDC was a precedent set by the courts which should see her being granted refugee status. The role played by networks in asylum claims has been highlighted by Landolt (2008) who observes that casual encounters at immigration offices often serve as the point of departure for friendship and exchanges of information regarding claims made (see Chapter 3). What this obscures is the fact that, for some migrants, interest, membership, and participation in political activities wanes once they are granted legal status thereby transforming from an opportunist political activist into a reluctant diaspora. Excerpts of an interview with Nokhuthula, a 38 year old health and social care professional working in Leeds underscores this point:

‘I only joined MDC when I was planning *kundo seeker*\(^5^4\) (to go and seek asylum) because that was the only way that I could get papers. I was attending all the meetings, in Leicester, Portsmouth, South-end and other cities. I made sure I had photographs taken with the leaders every time that they came here. Once I got my papers, I stopped going to the meetings, I just retreated to my own world. You will find there are many people like me. We got what we wanted from the party and they got some money from us. £70 pounds is a lot of money to pay to be a member of the party.’ (Interview in Leeds, 15 January 2010)

Once Nokhuthula was granted her documented status her enthusiasm waned and changed from being opportunist to ephemeral in so far as political activism was concerned. On the other hand, the grant of documented status meant that she became enthusiastic about being in the diaspora because of the ability to work and access new opportunities such as education. This shows the fluidity of the diaspora categories that were identified and discussed in Chapter 6. She was prepared to pay a £70 annual membership fee in exchange for the party helping her to gain

\(^5^4\) *Kundo seeker/kundo claimer/kundo potera* are terms used by Zimbabweans to refer to the act of claiming asylum at the Home Office. The prefix *kundo* translates to going to, hence kundo seeker means going to seek asylum.
documentation which she discontinued once she was granted refugee status as demonstrated by her membership card’s subscription schedule (Figure 7.15).

**Figure 7.15  MDC membership subscription schedule**

![Subscription Schedule]

**Source:** Card provided by anonymous MDC member

This appears to be a purely contractual arrangement where, in exchange for token participation, Nokhuthula would get the ‘evidence’ that she needed to present to the immigration judge in order to support her asylum application. This questions migrants’ motivations for participating in diaspora politics. This needs to be noted as scholarship on migrant politics, as discussed in Chapter 3, suggests that migrants engage in politics because they are concerned about the events at home. The behaviour of some Zimbabwean migrants in the UK suggests that this is untrue; participation in politics is driven by the need to obtain documented status rather than political change in Zimbabwe, as the case of Dudu above reveals. The political crisis in Zimbabwe appears to have played into some migrants’ hands as they cannot be deported; this is what Dudu is alluding to by saying that she wants status quo to prevail in Zimbabwe until she has documented status.

On the other hand, in Limpopo, asylum permits which give the migrants entitlement to work are not contingent on political activism. Migrants who present themselves to the Department of Home Affairs’ designated refugee reception centres are automatically given renewable six month asylum permits. Tapiwa, who we have already met, (p. 169) explains thus:
‘The Home Affairs person asked me why I came here and I told him that I was running away from poverty. He asked me if I was a member of a political party and I told him no. He then gave me asylum and told me to come back after 6 months to renew. People here get asylum not because they are supporters of MDC but because things are bad at home. You don’t eat politics; we are here to find something to eat for ourselves and our families. What I pray for is real change to happen in Zimbabwe. I will therefore go back and vote when the date has been announced.’ (Interview in Giyani, 15 March 2010)

Tapiwa describes himself as having been a recipient of an asylum permit without being an asylum seeker per se. This highlights the dichotomy within the South African immigration policy with reference to Zimbabweans who appear to have been ‘handheld’ into being asylum seekers rather than the ‘heartfelt’ act of seeking asylum (Bakewell, 2007). Political activism, therefore, carries different meanings to migrants in Limpopo; different from those of their counterparts in Leeds. Activism in Leeds appears to be driven by the need for papers, in Limpopo it appears to be driven by a desire for genuine change in Zimbabwe. This is not to say that all activists in Leeds are motivated by a desire to gain documented status. However, it is arguably true that the majority of the activists want refugee status.

I refer to this clandestinity induced political activism as opportunism given its transient nature. Opportunism is a strategy used by migrants such as Dudu to extricate themselves from clandestine lifestyles (see Chapter 6). It is driven by the need to regularise their status in order to enjoy the economic benefits which come with having documented status. This form of the activism is driven by a specific need. Once that need has been met, the activist withdraws his/her support as there is no longer a motive for their continued participation. Not all fleeting politicians joined the party in their host country. Instead some joined it in Zimbabwe and only stopped participating due to the internecine fights that have come to characterise the MDC-UK and Ireland, which has seen several provincial executive committees being dissolved by the leadership in Harare (McGregor, 2009; Pasura, 2008). Having said this, opportunist politicians left Zimbabwe in different migration waves with the majority arriving prior to the inception of the visa regime against Zimbabwean nationals (see Chapters 2 and 5). The survey data show that most opportunists in the UK did not engage in political activism on arrival and waited several years before gaining membership of the party mostly to support their asylum claims as outlined in Chapter 2.

However, this study is not suggesting that all political activists are opportunists as there are some whose membership predates their arrival in South Africa and the UK. Such migrants undertake advocacy work assisting fellow Zimbabweans regardless of political affiliation. In Leeds, for example, the Zimbabwe Leeds Refugee Community Organisation (ZLRCO) works with Zimbabwe from diverse backgrounds and its operations is akin to those of Latinos in Toronto which organise regular meetings and social events such as football for its members (Landolt, 2008). Solomon (p.
160), for example, besides chairing the ZLRCO and Zimbabwe Business Link, is a former executive committee member of the MDC and an elder in a Zimbabwean church, some of whose members are clandestine migrants. Here he explains the multiple roles that he plays in these organizations,

‘I play multiple roles in the community, one moment I am a politician, the next a church elder and the next a businessman. I am all these things rolled into one. I was into politics but then here it is confused, so I have taken a back seat from politics and I am making a contribution to the community through my church, helping people with their statements, accessing benefits for those who would have been granted papers, help orphans and underprivileged people in Zimbabwe through the church. This is taking my time and I am happy with what I am doing. The church is providing destitute Zimbabweans without papers with food, with accommodation and some other help. ZLRCO also does the same. In the business link, it’s about exploring what we as the diaspora can do to get a foothold in Zimbabwe.’ (Interview in Leeds, 14 November 2009)

Solomon can be classified as a member of the enthusiastic diaspora given how enmeshed he is in the political and economic development of the homeland (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2009). We have already seen how some migrants enthusiastically attribute the transformation in their lives to the diaspora. For Solomon, the diaspora has given him the space that he needs to work towards political and economic change in Zimbabwe. His enthusiasm also stems from being able to help his countrymen to gain documented status and an economic foothold in the home country which signifies his return intentions (see Chapter 3). He therefore, represents enthusiastic migrants who retain a keen interest in the political events that are unfolding in their home country. Solomon uses social capital, which was discussed in Chapter 3, to help transient politicians to gain documented status which is important in shifting their diasporic identities from, for example, clandestine or fearful to enthusiastic migrants, that arises following the attainment of documented status.

Political instrumentalism is one of the numerous collective social remittances that migrants engage in (Chapter 3) (Goldring, 2000, 2004) courtesy of improved communication systems which link them to those at home. Individual migrants also engage in individual social remittances through sustained contact with those left behind and elsewhere (Levitt and Lamba-Nieves, 2011). The following section considers the evolving mediums through which social remittances are conducted in Leeds and Limpopo.

7.4 The evolving transnational mediums of contact with home

One of the objectives of this thesis pertains to the maintenance of ties between migrants and those left at home. As highlighted in Chapter 2, recent scholarship advocates for the deployment of a transnational optic lens to better understand how
social remittances are mediated between the migrants and those at home by scholars and policy makers alike (Khagram and Levitt, 2008). Social remittances between migrants and those at home are exchanged through a myriad of ways including telephone, email, internet, physical visits and letters (Levitt, 2001a). Similarly, Parreñas (2005b) asserts that migrants maintain contact with those left behind through transnational communication which entails the flow of ideas, information, goods, money, and emotions. This was affirmed in interviews in which migrants highlighted the importance of maintaining contact with those at home.

An overwhelming majority of the study participants reported maintaining contact with their families and relatives at home, 99% (n=199) in Leeds and 98% (n=509) in Limpopo (Figure 7.16).

**Table 7.16  Contact with home by country of residence %**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of residence</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>South Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Are you in contact with your family in Zimbabwe?**

**Source:** Based on survey results 2009-2010

The maintenance of contact should be considered against migrants’ return intentions which were discussed in Chapter 3. As some scholars have noted, contact is viewed as a way of keeping familial and friendship bonds alive (Asis et al., 2004; Levitt and
This is encapsulated by the cases of Betty (p. 139) who states that,

‘Contact is important for me to know how my family is doing. It is the only way that we keep alive our bonds given that we can’t visit each other because I don’t have papers.’ (Interview in Leeds, 19 October 2009).

Thus for Betty contact is essential because it allows her to maintain transnational intimacy with her family from whom she is separated because she does not have papers. As explained in Chapter 6, some migrants have been separated from their families for long periods because of the inordinate delays in determining their asylum claims. Similarly, in South Africa migrants reported maintaining regular contact as exemplified by Dzivaidzo, a 33 year old teacher who lives in Thohoyandou with her family,

‘Talking to people at home keeps me on top of things. I think people would laugh at you if you don’t maintain contact with your family at home. In fact you would be mad not to phone and visit home to see how people are doing and how you can help them.’ (Interview in Thohoyandou, 15 May 2010)

For Dzivaidzo, as for many of her peers, contact is premised on her transnational obligations to her family and relatives which were discussed earlier. There are also overtones of wanting to conform to societal expectations in her narrative which are couched in ‘being mad if you don’t phone or visit home.’

Available evidence suggests that migrants maintain contact through a range of mediums e.g. telephone/text messaging, email, letter etc (Figure 7.17). In both countries, the use telephones/text messaging predominates. This can be accounted for by the high mobile penetration rates in both the UK and South Africa. A significant proportion of UK based migrants use the internet (49%, \(n=100\)) compared to 10% (\(n=49\)) in South Africa as well as telephone and short messaging system (47%, \(n=94\)) against 27% (\(n=131\)) in South Africa to maintain contact with their families at home. Conversely, in Limpopo, the results suggest that contact is mostly maintained through ‘word of mouth’ (23%, \(n=115\)) and ‘physical visits’ (30%, \(n=151\)). Letters (12%, \(n=63\)) have proved to be of enduring significance as methods of communication in Limpopo. This can be attributed to the circulation which was discussed in Chapter 2 as migrants frequently travel home during which they act as couriers. Secondly, it suggests that some migrants have been priced out of using mobile phones thereby forcing them to stick to traditional methods. Thirdly, it could be a consequence of poor telephone services in Zimbabwe where coverage for mobile phones in rural areas where the majority of the migrants come from, is still patchy.

Migrants reported being compelled to send relay messages to their families through third parties. Typically a migrant would call and leave a message with a family
member or relative who has a phone which is then relayed to their family. Quite often, a mutually convenient time with the owner of the telephone is agreed during which the migrant would call to speak to their family or relative, echoing Parreñas' (2005b) findings in Philippines where migrants have designated days to communicate.

**Figure 7.17** Mediums of communication by country of residence %

![Bar chart showing mediums of communication by country of residence.](chart)

**Source:** Based on survey results 2009-2010

Miriam, a 27 year old hairdresser in Nylstroom typifies this practice,

‘I speak to my two daughters on a teacher’s phone. I call and then call again in about ten minutes during which he would have sent word to my mother who lives a stone’s throw away from the school. Sometimes the phone is out of service which is frustrating; I hope there will be mobile phone coverage soon in our area. I have already bought my mother a cell phone which is not working because of lack of coverage.’ (Interview in Nylstroom, 26 May 2010)

Evidence from the interviews suggests that text messaging has left an indelible imprint on the Zimbabwean psyche as a method of communication in both countries. It is perhaps rivalled by the phenomenon of ‘beeping’, ‘missed calling’ or ‘flashing’
(Donner, 2007). This is when a person in Zimbabwe or elsewhere calls long enough for the receiver to see the number that is calling them. The receiver then calls the caller back. Beeping is driven by economic imperatives. As Slater and Kwami (2005) claim, flashing is both an economic and symbolic practice. Similarly, Sey (2007) views flashing in the Ghanaian context as a cost-saving strategy developed by users.

The beeping system is so widespread that migrants in Leeds with relatives at home and other African countries complained of ‘double trouble’ due to being beeped by people at home and elsewhere. The above example forms part of the imaginary for migrating. This is premised on the belief that the migrants in Leeds are better off than those at home and in Limpopo. This assumption and belief originated from the high margins that migrants in the UK made on the black market due to the strength of the Sterling. As discussed in Chapter 6, it was on this basis that some migrants in Limpopo view their stay as temporary and look forward to moving to other countries such as the UK which they perceive as having more opportunities than obtaining in there. Elizabeth (p. 108) expresses her annoyance with the concept of beeping,

‘I don't mind my parents beeping you know, because they may not have money and want me to call them back. It does my head in when everyone does it; even my brother who by all accounts is sitting pretty also beeps and expects me to call him back. It all boils down to this erroneous belief with people in Africa that people in London have money. I get texts saying call me, I have important news, why can’t they tell me the important news in the text?’
(Interview in Leeds, 12 November 2009)

Text messaging and beeping sustain networks in Leeds and Limpopo. They allow communication to flow between and within migrants. It is not only people at home who beep as this happen even within migrants in the diaspora, for example a migrant in Leeds may beep a friend when they do not have sufficient credit in their phone to make a call. The same applies to migrants in Limpopo where there are some mobile phone companies such as MTN offer ‘please call’ services which allows a person to send a message asking to be called back, a service also exploited by Jamaican customers of Digicel (Horst and Miller, 2006). Consequently, a migrant can perform both the ‘beeping’ and ‘receiving’ functions depending on circumstances and location. Beeping is a result of financial constraints and these are disproportionately felt by people at home which why interviewees appear to tolerate them. Beeping is steeped in power dynamics. As Donner (2007) contends, beeping and call back messages serve as a vehicle for micro-negotiations or micro-affirmations between two actors about who has more money. According to this school of thought, those at home do not have enough credit to make a telephone call or to send a text message which compels beeping. The financial constraints are not only faced by those in Zimbabwe but also by some migrants. As Mirirai, a 28 year old mother of three who arrived in South Africa as part of the seventh migration episode reflects,
‘My children and others at home beep me and I call them back whenever I can. Sometimes I don’t have money to call them back. My job as a nanny doesn’t pay as much. On the other hand, I beep my brothers who live in the USA and Canada. In a sense it’s a chain, on paper I appear to be better off than those at home and then my brothers are better off than me. If I beep them, I expect them to call me back just like people at home expect me to call them back if they beep. Besides, my brothers have got good jobs there and earn more than me which enables them to call home frequently and for longer periods. In most cases, they actually call home and then pass the message to me despite the fact that I am physically closer to home than them.’ (Interview in Waterberg, 17 March 2010)

Mirirai’s ability to initiate and maintain contact with her family at home is impeded by financial constraints (Mahler, 1998). She therefore resorts to beeping which Zainudeen et al (2006) described as “telecom use on a shoestring”. Contrarily, her brothers who work in North America are better endowed financially than her to initiate and sustain contact with those at home. Her experiences have resonance with Sassen’s (2000: 217) observation that ‘initiating and maintaining contact with home is not self-generative, but needs to be produced, and such a feat of production requires capital fixity, vast concentrations of every material and not so mobile facilities and infrastructures.’ Mirirai’s case highlights how beeping is being used to maintain transnational ties and social capital between families (Coleman, 1988, 1990).

Information is shared between migrants about mobile tariffs, mobile phone sim cards, international calling cards, discount access numbers and the best offers from Internet Service Providers (ISPs) both at home and in the host country. The Zimbabwean diaspora has been targeted by Zimbabwe’s largest provider of mobile and internet services, Econet Wireless Zimbabwe which recently launched mobile phone service in the UK (Figure 7.18).
Evidence gleaned from interviews revealed that contact is increasingly being maintained through the internet and other information communication technologies. The use of the internet has gradually increased since the mid 2000s in both countries although its use in South Africa is blighted by a number of factors. Firstly internet access penetration is low although this is counterbalanced by the rapid mobile internet penetration. Until mobile internet becomes available to migrants other than the professionals, their participation will always be encumbered by financial constraints. For example, an hour of internet access costs R15 in Polokwane, R25 in Louis Trichardt, R30 in Thohoyandou and R35 in Musina. Access to internet facilities is further impeded by the location of internet facilities which are concentrated in towns. As demonstrated in the above example, the cost of accessing internet per hour rises the further you go away from the metropolitan centres. The fact that the majority of the survey participants work in deprived areas such as commercial farms compounds matters. The low wages further inhibits access as Vuyelwa, a 23 year old undocumented man living in Groblersdal exposes,

1 can’t afford to use the internet, it is expensive. Besides, even if I wanted to, I don’t know how to use a computer. I hear some of my friends talking about facebook which you get on your fone [phone] but it’s expensive, it’s not for

---

55 These are the prices that the author was paying at various internet cafes when he was undertaking his fieldwork in Limpopo Province from February to May 2010.
people like me. I only use my phone to phone and text home which I don’t do as often as I would like because I don’t have money. Some people go the internet cafes, but I haven’t been; besides I work during the day and when I go home, the shops are closed. When I am off on Sunday, all the shops are closed.’ (Interview in Giyani, 15 March 2010)

Vuyelwa’s narrative demonstrates that the use of internet as a communication tool is inhibited not only by the cost but also by an inability to use computers. This inability and lack of access dwindles the communication options of the migrants. This narrative confirms my argument that a substantial number of migrants in South Africa have limited human educational capital. As Figure 5.6 demonstrates, a significant number of the migrants based in Limpopo comprise of school dropouts who are poor and uneducated. Vuyelwa’s narrative highlights how the use of internet as a communication tool is inhibited not only by the cost but also by an inability to use computers. This is compounded by the high tariffs associated with using mobile internet. A number of studies have noted that immigrants with little or no education from countries where ICTs are not ubiquitous face unique and challenging situations in their early years (Gubbay and Cogill, 1988; Rhee and Kim, 2004).

Similarly, Castells (1999: 1994) has warned that migrants risk being left on the wrong side of the digital divide, living in ‘informational cities’ that ‘deepen existing patterns of socio-spatial segregation.’ It is these differences in access to internet and mobile services that led Quan-Haase et al (2008) to talk about the ‘double digital divide’ which describes the gap in internet access and use segregated by both geographic locations and individual socio-economic status. This inability and lack of access dwindles the communication options of the migrants. This narrative confirms my argument that a substantial number of migrants in South Africa have limited human educational capital. As already demonstrated, a significant number of the migrants based in Limpopo comprise of school dropouts who are poor and uneducated. However, as Chen and Wellman (2005) have demonstrated in their study of immigrants in New Zealand, physical access to a computer is not enough as basic computer and cognitive skills are needed if the internet is to be meaningfully and productively exploited to learn about job opportunities, build community networks, constructing social capital, and participating in political activities.

Alternatively, the availability of free computing and internet courses and free internet in libraries in the UK has ameliorated the difficulties associated with lack of prior computer use that confronts the migrants in South Africa. Thus, the gulf in internet and email use is a direct consequence of the digital divide between the two countries. Some UK domiciled interviewees had never used computers prior to arriving in the country but took advantage of the free learning opportunities that were available for immigrants. This has resulted in emails being their preferred method of communication with their relatives. The comments of Sam (p. 149), the enthusiastic migrant based in Leeds are typical,
'I hadn't used a computer before arriving here in 2001. Even then, it wasn’t until 2005 that I attended my first computer class that was run by the refugee council in Manchester. When I arrived, it was all work and work. I used to talk to my wife by phone. After learning the computer, I fell in love with it. Now, I talk to my parents via skype, facebook, yahoo messenger and other mediums. I have sent refurbished computers home to aid our communication.’ (Interview in Leeds, 28 November 2010)

Zimbabwe has seen an unprecedented rise in mobile phone subscriber base since the dollarization of the economy in February 2009 with the latest figures showing that the country’s three mobile phone companies have an estimated subscriber base of 8.5 million in a country with about 13 million people (Chimhangwa, 2012). Such developments concur with reports that there are ten times as many mobile phones as landlines in sub-Saharan Africa (ITU, 2009). Sam’s comments demonstrate that the rapid technological advances in the dissemination of information between families allows for the instantaneous transmission of messages thereby ameliorating the gulf imposed by geographical and spatial variations. Some scholars have argued that the increasing penetration of new media, most notably of mobile telephones, contributes to the expansion of networks of interaction and participation across temporal, spatial and infrastructural distances (Shirazi, 2008).

The frequency of contact appears to be a consequence of access to capital and other social factors such as circumstances at home (Sassen, 2000) (Figure 7.19). For example the frequency would increase in the event of an illness or bereavement in the family or if one is undertaking a project such as building a house. The frequency of contact tapers off once a crisis has diminished. Esther, an enthusiastic migrant (p. 147) expresses the sentiments of her peers when she says,

‘When my husband and kids were at home, I was calling almost daily but once they came over, I stopped. Now, I don’t call that often unless there is something serious that would have happened, for example last month, when my sister was involved in a serious car accident; I was calling everyday to check on her.’ (Interview in Leeds, 16 October 2009)

It is apparent from Esther’s case that once her children joined her, she reduced the regularity of her calls home and only increased this when there was a family emergency.
Technological and transport developments have fuelled transnational commodity culture (Crang et al., 2003). For Zimbabwean migrants, the commodity culture is exemplified by their consumption of Zimbabwean foodstuffs imported by entrepreneurial migrants. As Vallianatos and Raine (2008) have pointed out, food connects migrants across time and place and is an essential component of maintaining connections to home. This is more pronounced in Leeds where a number of Zimbabwean shops have sprouted up in different cities. The following section explores this theme of food as a form of reconnecting with and contact with home. This is consistent with current scholarly endeavours which recognize that social and cultural processes regularly exceed the boundaries of individual nation states, sketching ‘transnational’ cartographies of cultural circulation, identification and action (Crang et al., 2003; Kearney, 1995; Appadurai, 1998).

### 7.4.1 Food as a re-enactment of and contact with home

One of the objectives of this thesis is to investigate the interconnectedness of migrants’ lives with those at home and how this is reproduced in the diaspora. Despite the salience of contact through physical visits, telephone and virtual
communication, food plays an important role in connecting migrants with home given the important role that it plays in migrants’ lives. As Harbottle (2000:5-6) claims, cultural identities are shaped, established, expressed and enacted through food consumption and food production practices which has resonance with Edles’ (2004) claim that food is a cultural symbol.

There is a corpus of scholarly literature which investigates the role of food in ethnic communities which focuses on its role in constructions of identity, belonging and home (Crang et al., 2003; Jackson, 2002; Mankekar, 2005). Guarnizo (2003) has described ethnically owned businesses as a form of economic transnationalism as they meet the dietary needs of the migrants. This school of thought regards business investment decisions as being embedded in a web of social expectations and obligations tied to their place of origin (Portes and Stepick, 1993; Jackson, 2002). The business ventures of Zimbabwean migrants in this study mirror those of earlier migrants which are heavily skewed towards retailing in small grocery shops. This can be ascribed to little financial reserves which compels them to set up shop at the lower end of this opportunity structure (Sassen, 1991). It is therefore not a surprise that migrants that have started businesses in the UK have gravitated to the lower end of the market as evidenced by types of business that they run such as grocery shops and butcheries that cater for the migrants’ dietary, cultural and entertainment needs.

Scholars such as Crang et al (2003) claim that networks associated with food flow through complex networks rather than via vertical ‘commodity chains’. This rings true of Zimbabwean owned business trading in food. The imported foodstuffs travel through complex networks before finally arriving in the UK. Existential threats to food security have resulted in the Zimbabwean government banning the exportation of certain foodstuffs, which however, still find their way to shops in the UK and other countries. Prior to the ravages wrought by the global economic recession, there were no less than five grocery shops in Leeds, four butcheries, two clothing shops, a cafe, four hair and beauty salons as well as three parallel money transfer shops. A number of shops have since closed leaving only one shop that is operational in the inner city Leeds area of Harehills and butchery in the west Leeds area of Armley (Figure 7.20).
KwaMereki is a butchery which sells a wide variety of Zimbabwean foodstuffs popular with migrants. The name is derived from a popular entertainment spot in Harare where people do ‘braai’ in the open car park. During summer, migrants engage in ‘gochi-gochi’ at KwaMereki in an endeavour to replicate the lifestyle that they used to lead at home (Mbiba, 2010). It is an avenue through which Zimbabweans try to re-incarnate their lives at home.

Despite the shops being marginally expensive than other ethnic shops, they continue to attract and retain a large customer base as they sell some foodstuffs imported from Zimbabwe and South Africa. The most popular foodstuffs are the staple maize meal called ‘Iwisa’ (Figure 7.21) and ‘Pearlenta’ and ‘Roller Meal’ (Figure 7.22) which is imported from South Africa and Zimbabwe respectively. The mealie-meal is used to make sadza, the staple diet for Zimbabweans.
Figure 7.21 South African manufactured Iwisa maize meal on sale at KwaMerekhi Butchers, Leeds

Photograph taken by Liberty Mupakati (2009)

Figure 7.22 Two brands of Zimbabwean manufactured maize meal - Pearlenta and No. 1 Roller Meal

Photograph taken by Liberty Mupakati (2009)
What is clear from the migrant businesses in the UK is that they utilise resources from both the country of origin and in the country of settlement. As Faist (2008) observed, transnational ethnic ties can supply useful economic, social and human capital for immigrant entrepreneurs. Buying Zimbabwean made foodstuffs from Zimbabwean owned shops invokes emotional attachment of the migrants to the country of their birth. Preparing and cooking their own food was considered to be good for the migrants’ children as it kept them in touch with their ‘roots’ given the fact that some of them were very young when they left Zimbabwe. This echoes Fischler’s (1988) claim that food is also central to our sense of identity. Veronica, a 44 year old divorced mother of four who lives in Leeds shares her feelings regarding this.

“Despite the food being expensive, it is important that I buy hupfu (mealie meal) and cook sadza for my children so that they know where we came from. I tell them that this is what they used to eat before we came here and that it’s better than having rice and pasta. I also buy mutuswa (dried vegetables), dovi (peanut butter) and try as much as I can to cook traditional food at least twice a week. I was very embarrassed when I took my kids home in December last year (2008) because they refused to eat sadza and dried vegetables with peanut butter. From there, I made a conscious decision to make them eat the traditional food that I ate when I was growing up. Besides, it’s healthier than what they like to eat here.” (Interview in Leeds, 12 November 2009)

As Guarnizo (2006:667) asserts, ‘eating and drinking national foods and beverages, or listening and dancing to “authentic” national music becomes “the thing to do” among many immigrant populations, especially among those living in segregated residential, ethnic enclaves.’ For Veronica like other migrants, eating Zimbabwean food signifies a reconnect and recall of the family left behind which if continually repeated preserves these transnational relationships and enact their companionship with those back home (Vallianatos and Raine, 2008). Ethnic shops provide migrants like Veronica with an outlet to reconnect with their past and home. Veronica’s case illuminates the centrality of food to the social ties and imaginings of home and community. For parents with children who have intermittent physical contact with home, food is an avenue through which culture and traditional practices can be transmitted. Veronica speaks of being embarrassed when she went home because her children refused to eat traditional food that had been prepared for them. Refusing food is considered to be an affront in Zimbabwean culture. Gabacia (1998:54) observed that for many migrants, losing traditional cooking practices equates to ‘abandonment of community, family, and religion.’

For parents with children who have intermittent physical contact with home, consuming food from home is an avenue through which they can transmit their culture and practices to their children and young people who are susceptible to acculturation and possibly assimilation. Rissel (1997) defines acculturation as process through which migrants and their children acquire the values, behavioural norms and attitudes of the host society. Acculturation affects migrants’ beliefs surrounding food habits, including how food is shared within a household, and the
feeding patterns or cultural understanding of foodstuffs (Brown et al., 1981; Burns, 2004). The children’s refusal to eat food during a visit to Zimbabwe shows evidence of dietary acculturation (Jerome et al., 1980).

On the other hand, migrants in Limpopo have not faced significant disruptions in their dietary requirements due to similar diet. People in Limpopo share the same staple food with those from Zimbabwe. For others with secure tenancy, they are able to recreate their tastes by growing their own vegetables in small gardens on their yards as well as rearing broiler chicks for consumption and for sale to other Zimbabwean migrants. Iwisa maize meal is readily available as the locals also use it for their own food requirements. Others reported bringing food from home or arranging with their families to some send to them which is a form of reverse remittances discussed in section 7.2.3. Cross border traders also play an important role in meeting the dietary requirements of the migrants. At the Musina Refugee Reception Centre and in the streets of Polokwane, Louis Trichardt, Thohoyandou etc both male and female migrants sell an array of foodstuffs that are brought from Zimbabwe to both locals and Zimbabwean migrants (Figure 7.23).

**Figure 7.23  Zimbabwean women selling groundnuts, Polokwane**

Photograph taken by Liberty Mupakati (2010)
Zimbabwean market traders are active in several towns in Limpopo including Musina, Louis Trichardt, Thohoyandou, Giyani, Tzaneen etc where they sell a range of foodstuffs sourced from home. During interviews some migrants reported working for Zimbabwean cross border traders who leave them with their wares to sell.

7.4 Conclusion

The chapter has explored the activities that characterise the transnational transactions of Zimbabwean migrants in their host countries. It has demonstrated the factors that influence these transactions and how the coping strategies that the migrants use to maximise their remitting capabilities. The chapter demonstrated the remitting reasons, which are complex and to a large extent entangled in the return discourse. I have discussed the remitting channels that migrants use in both countries which are driven by a range of factors including structural factors which have for example, resulted in the dominance of registered MTOs in the UK and informal methods in Limpopo due to circulation and social networks.

The political activities of the migrants were explored and the motivations for engaging in these activities were exposed. It was argued that political activism in the UK is predicated on the need to get documented status as the Home Office appears to place significance on migrants’ political activism when determining asylum cases. It was argued that migrant politics in the UK appears to be opportunistic as it diminishes once documented status has been obtained.

This chapter has highlighted the importance attached by migrants towards the maintenance of contact with those left which was argued to be out of familial obligations, keeping track of projects at home, return strategy etc. Migrants with children at home were shown to maintain frequent contact compared to those with their families in South Africa and the UK. Contact was shown to be maintained through a range of mediums including mobile, text messaging, letters, word of mouth etc. Chapter 8 builds on the various transnational transactions discussed in this chapter to explore migrants’ return intentions.
Chapter 8  The (im)possibility of return? An exploration of the return intentions of Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa and the UK

8.1 Introduction

The previous chapter explored the key transnational linkages that migrants have with those who remained behind which were cast as suggestive of their return intentions. It also discussed migrants’ participation and engagement in Zimbabwean oriented activities in Leeds and Limpopo. This chapter explores the conditions in which the different diasporic groups identified in Chapter 6 would consider returning home, a process that Pessar (1997) and Guarnizo (1997) consider as a continuation of the migration process. The exploration of migrants’ potential return intentions instead of actual return distinguishes this study from previous studies (Gmelch, 1992; Guarnizo, 1997b). As Chapter 5 demonstrated, a set of complex and intertwined factors compelled migrants to exit Zimbabwe in a series of migration episodes which were outlined in Chapter 2. The drivers for emigration to South Africa differed from those to the UK. As demonstrated in Chapter 5, migration to the UK appeared to be more skilled than that to South Africa which has implications for return. Furthermore, the Zimbabwean government is making concerted efforts to attract its skilled people from the diaspora which as discussed in Chapter 5 amounts to political factors affecting return. Against this background, this chapter investigates the conditions which will induce migrants to return home.

This chapter addresses objective 4; to establish the migrants’ attitudes and aspirations to return in order help in the reconstruction of their beleaguered country. It seeks to contribute to the burgeoning literature on return migration (cf. Newbold, 2001; Newbold and Bell, 2001; Tsuda, 1999; Ahlburg and Brown, 1998; King, 2000; Gmelch, 1983). Migrants’ insights about their intentions of return are used to demonstrate the opportunities and constraints that impinge on their return intentions and differences within the diaspora.

Interview data suggests that the diasporic groups identified in Chapter 6 consider factors such as political, socio-economic, human capital development etc in formulating their return intentions. It was noted in Chapter 2 how emigration was prompted by the economic and political policies of President Mugabe. It is therefore, not an exaggeration to argue that, until there have been significant democratic changes culminating in his removal from power, return for some migrants who are politically active will remain a pipe dream (see Chapter 6). The Zimbabwean crisis is associated with the rule of President Mugabe; the demise of his rule will entice migrants to return and play a role in the reconstruction of their country.

Furthermore, an investigation into return perceptions is supported by the cyclical nature of migration between Zimbabwe and South Africa which was highlighted in
Chapters 2 and 5. Moreover, Chapter 6 revealed the different diasporic groups that migrants belong to, which implies that migrants in South Africa and the UK have different social, economic, political and cultural capital endowments. A growing volume of scholarly literature has highlighted the entanglements between return migration, identity and experiences in the host country (cf. Tanner, 2005; Thomas-Hope, 1999).

8.2 Attitudes towards return

The subject of return is central to this study as explicated by the previous chapter which explored migrants' transnational linkages given scholarship which consider them to be return indicators. The decision to focus on potential to return was informed by the realisation that Zimbabwe might change, and will require the mobilisation of human capital which was haemorrhaged during the past decade (see Chapter 2). As Figure 8.1 shows, an overwhelming majority of the survey respondents in both Leeds (82%, n=164) and Limpopo (86%, n=446) expressed a desire to eventually return home while 16% (n=31) in Leeds and 13% (n=69) in Limpopo stated that they did not intend to return with an even smaller percentage in both places (2%, n=5) in Leeds and (1%, n=4) in Limpopo stating that they did not know whether they intended to return or not.
Chapter 2 highlighted that the Zimbabwean diaspora comprises of different constituencies who left home for different reasons. Likewise, their intentions to return are argued in this study to reflect these differences as highlighted by the different reasons which were advanced (Table 8.1). Investigating these incongruent groups’ intentions to return contributes to a burgeoning literature which sheds light on the return motivations of labour migrants (Kubat, 1984; King, 1986), migrant-students (Glaser and Habers, 1974), highly skilled migrants (Lowell, 2001; McLaughan and Salt, 2002) and refugees and asylum seekers (Al-Ali et al., 2001; Ghosh, 2006).
## Table 8.1 Reasons to return and settle in Zimbabwe by country of residence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What is the main reason that would induce you to go back and settle in Zimbabwe?</th>
<th>Country of residence</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>% within Country of residence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dual citizenship</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved economic conditions including availability of jobs</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>49.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End of political violence/Change of government</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owning a house/finished building my house</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To be with family</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>32.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial incentives/tax breaks</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>21.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved social services i.e. health delivery and education systems</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Based on survey results 2009-2010

The data shows that reasons for returning to Zimbabwe depends on ‘country of residence’ (Chi square = 207.97, df = 6 and p< 0.001). South African based migrants’ tenuous economic situation is reflected by almost half (49%, n=222) of the 446 respondents predicating their return on ‘improved economic conditions’ including the ‘availability of jobs’ while 21% cited provision of ‘financial incentives.’ Fourteen percent of the respondents based in South Africa premised their return on a ‘change of government.’ On the other hand, the overriding concern for the 169 Leeds based respondents wanting to return appeared to be the desire ‘to be with family’ (32%, n=54) which can be ascribed to immigration inhibitions that preclude migrants from neither bringing their families over to join them nor travelling to Zimbabwe for holiday
visits. Apart from immigration constraints, the ability to visit family has also been impeded by the high cost of travel as evidenced by the airfares which range from £600 to over £1,200 per person depending on the season. This does not seem to be a problem for South African based migrants because of circulation which was highlighted in Chapter 2.

8.3 Intentions to return: Under what conditions, when, and how?

Chapter 3 provided a theoretical framework for return migration. It discussed the various perspectives that have been advanced by scholars to explain return migration, namely, neoclassical economics (Todaro, 1969), NELM (Stark, 1991), structural (Cerase, 1974) and transnational approaches (Massey et al., 1993). These approaches suggest that migrants predicate their return on economic, environmental, social and political factors (Haour-Knipe and Davis, 2009; King, 2000). In Chapter 6, it was outlined how members of the six diasporic groups (ambivalent, clandestine, enthusiastic, ephemeral, fearful and reluctant) were affected by the structural factors in host countries and how some were reluctantly staying because of their transnational obligations to those left behind. While an overwhelming majority of the survey participants expressed hope of returning home, the conditions under which their return intentions are premised differ significantly (Table 8.1).

8.3.1 Familial obligations as both an inducement and constraint to return

There is a body of scholarship which claims that return migration is fuelled by the need to be reunited with family left behind (St. Bernard, 2006; Tiemoko, 2004). Evidence from this study appears to support this hypothesis. Of the 164 respondents in Leeds who expressed willingness to return home, 32% (n=54) predicated it on the need to be reunited with their families. As noted in Chapter 5, the majority of the Leeds based migrants arrived in the UK between 2000 and 2002 (Figure 5.3, p. 102) and have not been back to Zimbabwe since due to immigration constraints (Figure 6.7, p. 164). This is demonstrated by the case of Nokhuthula (p. 215), an enthusiastic migrant resident in Leeds who arrived in the UK as part of the fourth migration episode which was discussed in Chapter 2. Nokhuthula’s desire to return hinges on the desire to be reunited with her children, whom she has been separated from for over ten years,

‘I got the papers last year and I will be going home next month. I will sneak home from South Africa as others with the same papers as me do. It has been a long time since I last saw my children; I left when the youngest one was 5 and now he is 15. I have missed seeing my children grow up. Not being there has been hard, but being here has enabled me to provide for them, they live privileged lifestyles which they would not have had I been at home.’ (Interview in Leeds, 15 January 2010).
This case highlights the anguish engendered by separation. Migrants and their families have endured prolonged separation due to immigration constraints as well as their transnational obligations such as remittances which were discussed in Chapter 7. The granting of refugee status although welcome, does not translate into automatic mobility for migrants such as Nokhuthula as it allows them to travel to other countries except Zimbabwe. Having not seen her children grow, she is not mindful of the ramifications that her actions of illegally returning to Zimbabwe may endanger to her immigration status in the UK were it to come to the attention of the authorities. It would seem from this interview that she is not alone in this phenomenon as other Zimbabwean migrants based in the UK also engage in this practice (New Zimbabwe, 2009). Nokhuthula’s case highlights the tensions that beset migrants’ lives in the diaspora. In as much as she misses her family at home, she also realises the financial importance of maintaining residence in Leeds which has enabled her children to lead privileged lifestyles compared to their counterparts who do not have recourse to diaspora remittances (see Chapter 7).

On the other hand, a small percentage (3%, n=13) of the Limpopo based respondents (n=450) premised their return intentions on familial grounds. This should be considered against the backdrop of circulation and informal migration which are a characteristic feature of migration between Zimbabwe and South Africa as outlined in Chapter 2. The meaning of return for South African based migrants differs from that of their peers in the UK as exemplified by the case of Rugare whom we saw earlier (p. 159),

‘I go home two to three times a year, so I don't really know what you mean by return. Return for me, is out of question because this is my place of work, maybe I will go back home permanently when I retire. Besides, home is just across the river.’ (Interview in Lebowakgomo, 19 March 2010)

For Rugare as for many of his peers, return is informed by a number of factors. Firstly, the geographical proximity of Zimbabwe to South Africa renders return inconsequential as home is just across the river [Limpopo] which implies accessibility. Working and living in South Africa therefore, becomes akin to working in any part of Zimbabwe and travelling to the rural village from time to time. This should be considered against the background of rural to urban migration in Zimbabwe where economically active people move to urban areas in search of employment while leaving their spouses behind in the village. Secondly, return occurs when he retires from work which is echoes scholarly literature discussed in Chapter 3.

Notwithstanding the accounts of migrants intending to return to be with their families, some migrants stated that they have deferred their return intentions because of the needs of their children at home. This is epitomised by the case of Donald, a member of the clandestine diaspora whose case was discussed earlier (p. 164). His wife and
three children are at home and he has decided to abort his plans to return for their welfare,

‘I would like to return one day. I am on my own here; bored to death by the life that I lead, always on the lookout for immigration and police. My wife and children are at home. I haven’t seen them in 9 years. I don’t have papers so can’t bring them over or go home to visit. My youngest has only started high school and two are at UZ. I have to pay almost US$5000 for their fees and upkeep every term and there is no way I could get that kind of money at home. I will soldier on here till they finish their education then I will return. I really want to go back for the sake of my marriage and family but then, I have to bear in mind that returning for the sake of it is useless. My children’s education comes first; I think any father or parent worth their salt will tell you that.’ (Interview in Leeds, 21 December 2009)

It is clear from the above case that regardless of where the children are domiciled, intentions to return are predicated on what is in their best interests. Donald has had to postpone his return because he needs to work to raise his children’s tuition fees. His experience is similar to cases of El Salvadoran and Guatemalan migrants in Arizona, USA whose return intentions are contingent on the financial and educational needs of their children (Moran-Taylor and Menjívar, 2005). Donald’s case and that of other parents who have had to defer and redraw their plans to return appears to contradict some literature which posits that migrants return home to be with their families (Lynn-Ee Ho, 2008; Tiemoko, 2004). It would appear from this narrative that the desire of wanting to be with family does not supplant other considerations e.g. financial obligations for returning home which were discussed in Chapter 7.

Quite to the contrary, migrants demonstrate some willingness to delay their returning decisions on the basis of wanting to meet the needs of their family members at home (see Chapter 7). It is when these needs have been satisfied that the decision to return is affected. For Donald, his transnational transactions are a form of return which echo Black and King’s (2004: 80) postulation that ‘transnationalism itself can arguably be conceptualised as a form of return.’ Donald’s case epitomises how as demonstrated in Chapter 6, clandestine migrants persevere despite the difficulties engendered by their lack of documented status. Returning home for undocumented migrants in the UK entails losing their ‘stay’ as they would not be able to come back. Consequently they are enmeshed in a web of unconscious immobility (Binaisa, 2008). His case, as that of many others in his predicament, corroborates the findings of a study by Massey et al (2002) which found that lack of legal immigration status curtails migrants’ ability to move back and forth between the U.S. and their countries of origin. It also contradicts McGregor’s (2008) claim that undocumented migrants were likely to return home once the economic situation started improving in Zimbabwe.
8.3.2 Citizenship and deferred returns

Return intentions are promoted and repressed by the attainment of citizenship in the host country. As Reyes (1997) observed, a migrant's immigration status in the host country goes a long way in determining their return intentions. Evidence adduced from the study shows that migrants in the UK in particular, are keen on attaining British citizenship (17%, \( n=29 \)) as this brings with it the freedom to travel to other countries, including Zimbabwe, without hindrance (Table 8.1). This concurs with other scholarship on dual citizenship which claims that it ‘is ‘crossborder’ institutional and legal right that many cherish because it facilitates their transnational practices, and legitimizes and widens their mobility options’ (Conway et al., 2008: 391).

Leaving the UK in particular without citizenship or some form of documented status curtails a migrant’s ability to return. On the other hand, the attainment of South African citizenship is not considered to be a critical factor in determining return as evidenced by only 1% (\( n=5 \)) of the survey respondents citing it as motivating factor for returning home. For some South African based migrants, the award of South African citizenship is the beginning of another journey as South Africa is seen as a stepping stone to other destinations such as the UK, USA and Australia as the case of Pepukai demonstrated (p. 103) (Guarnizo, 1997; Ley and Kobayashi, 2005). It is in this context that some migrants predicate their return on securing citizenship in both countries which would enable them to return should things not work out at home as anticipated (Şenyürekli and Menjívar, 2012).

The prolonged crisis in Zimbabwe, which was highlighted in the previous chapters, resulted in some migrants delaying their planned return and in many cases compelled them to explore getting residency and citizenship in the host county. Citizenship complicates migrants’ return intentions. Migrants with citizenship instead of returning home, opt to bring their families to join them. Although Zimbabwe does not recognise dual nationality, this has not dissuaded Zimbabwean nationals abroad from acquiring citizenship of the countries in which they are domiciled. The acquisition of new citizenship in host countries has led to people staying longer than originally anticipated (Levitt, 2001a). Like other migrants, Eliza (p. 108), a member of the enthusiastic diaspora, arrived in the UK with the intention of staying for one year during which she saved money for her target before returning home. However, this changed when the economic situation at home degenerated resulting in first, her children and then husband joining her,

‘My aim when I came here was to buy a house in Borrowdale. I didn’t intend to stay for more than a year but now it has been over 10 years since I came. I can’t see myself returning now as my youngest daughter is in Year 9. If at all I am going to return, it will be after she finishes university. I now have the red passport (British) so I can go and come back as I please. I am not only a Zimbabwean now, but a British-Zimbabwean which gives me options about where I want to live. I have worked here and I am entitled to my pension
which I don’t have in Zimbabwe. I may as well stay and draw my pension as I worked for it. For now, I am content with visiting home once a year so that the children don’t lose touch with their home country, our culture and traditions. Besides, it’s good for them to see their grandparents and other relatives and yes, despite the good living here, Zimbabwe will always be home, London is not our home.’ (Interview in Leeds, 12 November 2009)

Eliza’ case although personal and distinctive, nevertheless echoes and exemplifies the plight of her peers in the community. It brings to the fore several issues that migrants have to exhaustively debate regarding the timing of their return. Chapter 3 highlighted how migrants’ life courses affected their return intentions. The life course approach posits that an individual’s life comprises of a series of transitions or life events, which are embedded in trajectories or status passages that give them a distinct form and meaning (Elder, 1994: 5). Eliza’s narrative appears to confirm this postulation as she premises her return on retirement from her current job. It was also exposed in Chapters 2 and 5 how migrants left home hoping for brief stays during which they accumulated sufficient savings which they hoped to deploy at home in property acquisition and other business ventures but have had to continuously revise thereby derailing their original intentions.

Such continuous postponements are akin to Anwar's (1979) 'myth of return' in which Pakistani migrants in the UK harboured thoughts of returning home which they never fulfilled due to economic reasons and their children's futures. An interviewee’s life cycle also plays an important role in the decision to return (Rogers et al., 1992). Eliza’s life cycle dissuades her from returning permanently and has substituted this with yearly visits which still enable her to maintain ties with home. Eliza’s dilemma about retirement and pension mirrors that of her peers who find themselves in a quandary about whether to forgo their pension benefits in the host country. Prolonged stays in the host country obfuscates the whole notion of return as the above case shows. Migrants who like Eliza, have acquired citizenship of the host country have to decide about which country that they would prefer to live in, an option that those with only Zimbabwean citizenship do not have. Eliza’s documented status enables her to travel frequently between London and Harare. She calls both Leeds and Harare home which resonates with Brah’s (1996:194) contention that despite people in the diaspora referring to more than one location as home does not mean that such groups feel settled in their host country (see Chapter 3).

The importance of children’s education is a theme that pervades this study. Parents have had to redraw their return intentions to accommodate their children’s education (Anwar, 1979). The findings of this study resonate with Ong’s (1999) study of Chinese migrants in Canada who predicated their return on the acquisition of a Western education which Mitchell (1997) contends is deemed crucial in the constitution of a ‘cultural citizen’ (see Chapters 2 and 5). This is consistent with King’s (2000) observation that the reasons for migrants returning home are multiple and intertwined. The evolvement of migrants’ goals due to progression of their life
cycle continues to redefine both the concept and timing of return (Rogers et al., 1992). It is these constant shifts that explain why Eliza has delayed her return intentions. As with many Zimbabweans, Eliza’s perspective on return has changed significantly to the extent that she now talks of yearly visits to enable the children to have contact with their grandparents and to keep them grounded in Zimbabwean culture and tradition. Regular visits have thus supplanted permanent return.

Similarly, Pepukai, a reluctant migrant in Limpopo (p. 103) hopes to return eventually once he has South African citizenship. Pepukai stated that he hopes that the acquisition of the South African passport will enable him to embark on yet another migration excursion having failed to travel to the UK due to visa constraints.

‘Once I get my citizenship, I will return home and re-strategize. It’s not like I can’t go home, I go there every holiday, and it is only a stone’s throw away. Going back to work there is another matter, but with the insurance of a South African passport, it is doable, I will try it and see what happens but if things go haywire again, I will use my new passport to go to other countries e.g. Australia.’ (Interview in Polokwane, 5 March 2010)

The acquisition of citizenship appears to have the same meanings and undertones for skilled migrants in Leeds and Limpopo who consider it to be a form of insurance that they can bequeath to their children. For Pepukai as for many others, a South African passport ensures that were he to return to Zimbabwe and the economic and political situation deteriorated, he can use it to parachute himself out of the country. Pepukai, like Eliza, has found that his returning intentions are contingent on citizenship issues. The quest for British and South African citizenships should be understood in the context of their perceived benefits such as ease of international travel. This mirrors the findings of Ley and Kobayashi’s (2005) study of the return intentions of Hong Kong citizens resident in Canada which found that most migrants returned once they acquired Canadian citizenship which they considered to be useful for international travel. Interestingly, both British and South African citizenship are considered to be a form of insurance that parents confer on to their children.

Equally, migrants chose either to return or defer their return due to the welfare and educational needs of children (Constable, 1999). In Eliza’s case, she has put off her return ambitions due to wanting her children to receive British education which is perceived as superior to Zimbabwean education (see Chapter 2). Ley and Kobayashi (2005) also found that Canadians of Hong Kong descent delayed their return plans to enable their children to complete their studies at Canadian universities which they deemed superior to the ones in Hong Kong. Such migrants are afraid that their children would fail to adapt if they were to return to Zimbabwe given not only the differences in the educational system but also the quality of education between Zimbabwe and the UK in particular. Unlike in Zimbabwe, education in the UK state schools and some designated South African schools is free of charge. Furthermore, the South African Schools Act (1996) states that no child can be denied access to
education for non-payment of fees (Department of Basic Education, 2011). Parents are therefore, reluctant to return to a country where they will have to pay astronomical fees for an education system whose credibility is compromised (Nyazema, 2010).

Conversely, some migrants are planning to return home because they have failed to secure legal immigration status which has relegated their stay in the host country on the margins (see Figure 6.7, p. 164). The results of this study suggest that return is a response to the structural barriers that inhibit migrants’ agency rather than failure per se (Cerase, 1974; Todaro, 1969). These structural impediments, as outlined in Chapter 6, include lack of documented status, reluctance to recognise qualifications, and the lesser value of accredited to experience acquired in home countries by employers etc (Bloch, 2006). For migrants who have exhausted their appeals process to get documented status, life in the UK can be an uphill struggle characterised by clandestinity and caprice (Waite, 2009). It is an existence punctuated by being on the lookout for immigration officials, of solitude and exploitation (see Chapter 6). The same is equally true in South Africa where even those with legal status endure untold suffering similar to their documented counterparts. This stems from the widely held perception amongst locals of Zimbabweans as a source of cheap labour (Crush and Tevera, 2010). Undocumented migrants and those on asylum permits in Limpopo appear not to attach the same importance to citizenship as their documented and skilled counterparts.

Chapter 6 discussed the difficulties faced by migrants regardless of documented status. It is these hardships that compel migrants to give up their quest for a new life in the host country and contemplate returning home. Home, despite the imagined and real problems, is construed as offering better opportunities than are existent in the host country. These difficulties are acutely felt by migrants who were in the middle to upper classes at home but have failed to replicate their class status in the host country. By comparing their current situation against what it was when they were home, migrants are able to evaluate if life in exile has paid off. The desire to return home is accentuated by narratives of the success of their peers at home or in other countries. Dudu (p. 165), an engineer speaks of her peers when she talks of being pained by destitution induced her immigration status;

‘Life is unfair. I was doing well at home, had my own car, a company car and had bought a stand all at the age of 26. If I had stayed, maybe I would have been someone now. Somehow, I threw that away by coming here, I should

---

For holders of Zimbabwean special permits (asylum permits) to migrate to the new work permits which are going to be issued to Zimbabweans from October 2010, applicants for the new permits are required to have a valid Zimbabwean passport; proof continuous resident in South Africa dating back to 31st May 2010; a letter from their employer stating that they are employed by a registered company; documents proving employer is a registered company; an affidavit from the police stating that the person is employed at the previously mentioned company (DHA, 2010b)
have maybe gone to Joza (Johannesburg) as some of my friends did. But I was lured by the pound. Now, I have to rely on the generosity of others to make ends meet, I have to sleep on friends’ sofa. I am going home, I have registered with IOM to go back under that scheme where they give you £500 upfront and buy you a ticket. Hopefully when I get home, I will be able to pick up the pieces and rise again. I know someone who went back the same way and now they say they are doing well. People will laugh at me initially when I arrive with nothing, but I am determined to start afresh, to prove to people that not making it in London is not the end of the world.’ (Interview in Leeds, 15 January 2010)

The above quote suggests that Dudu erred by coming to the UK instead of going to South Africa where she would have been able to get documentation which would have enabled her to find work in her profession. This echoes Borjas and Bratsberg’s (1996) claim that migrants fail in the host country because of misinformation or high expectations, followed by disillusionment. Her narrative, like that of her peers, is tinged with regret and self blame. Many migrants in Dudu’s position wonder whether they made the right decision in moving to their host country. The perceived success of their peers as one of the causes of emigration from Zimbabwe was discussed in Chapter 5 and still agitates many migrants, leading them to regret at the choice of destination that they made.

In the UK, the Voluntary Assisted Return and Reintegration Programme (VARRP) is run by IOM on behalf of the British government to assist refused asylum seekers and other illegal immigrants to return home by providing a financial stipend of up to £500 cash to those choosing to return home (IOM, 2010) (Figure 8.2).
Adverts about how to access VARRP support are placed in Zimbabwean internet websites such as NewZimbabwe.com (www.newzimbabwe.com), Zimbabwe Diaspora (www.zimdiaspora.com), and The Zimbabwe Mail (www.thezimbawemail.com). Chapter 5 highlighted the salience of economic problems in driving emigration from Zimbabwe and it appears it is against this background that the IOM provides returned migrants with a financial grant to start a business on arrival at home. Like other migrants, Dudu has used her transnational networks to ascertain the efficacy of this scheme (see Chapters 3 and 7). Home is contextualised as prosperous and free of social problems that migrants face in their everyday lives (Razum et al., 2005). In this regard, Dudu hopes that her problems would be absolved once she gets home as her agency will not be constricted.

8.4 The economic renaissance in Zimbabwe and the global economic recession

The formation of the inclusive government in February 2009 appears to have stemmed the economic decline. In 2011, the Zimbabwean economy recorded a 9.3% growth rate, one of the highest in the world (van der Vaart, 2011). In Chapter 3, it was highlighted how migrants may predicate their return on improved economic conditions in the home country (King, 2000). The return to near normalcy has prompted international agencies such as IOM to help the country to entice back skilled professionals who left at the height of the economic and political malaise to
help resuscitate the collapsed public services e.g. health and higher education (IOM, 2010).

Likewise, the huge mineral deposits reputed to be in abundant in the country have stirred investors’ interest resulting in multi-billion dollar investments being made in the extractive industries (Matsika, 2010). These investments have also lead to a huge demand for skilled personnel most of whom had left the country during the era of economic and political crisis. Private companies have thus, embarked on recruitment drives in countries such as South Africa and the UK, thereby complementing the efforts of the government in attracting skilled personnel back (King, 2000). These efforts have coincided with unprecedented economic recession in western countries such as the UK which has resulted in swingeing cuts being made on the public sector as part of deficit reduction plans (Mead, 2011). The cuts have resulted in some migrants who work in the public sector being made redundant which has obliged them to consider returning home sooner than they had planned.

8.4.1 Human Capital: Return as retracing the 1980 precedent

Migrants have utilised their time in exile to pursue different interests and activities. As highlighted in Chapter 6, some migrants have furthered their education during their time in South Africa and the UK. Migrants who have enhanced their human capital frame their return intentions in historical terms. These migrants draw parallels of their own situation and that of prior exiles who returned soon after independence in 1980 having fled Zimbabwe during the liberation war (see Chapter 2). The analogy was invoked to mirror the political developments in the country that culminated in the formation of a coalition government between ZANU (PF) and the MDC parties in February 2009. This is symbolic in that, like in 1980, the developments in February 2009 potentially ushered a new era in the country following a decade of protracted political upheaval and socio-economic regression.

In the 1980s, returnees due to their superior human capital were parachuted into senior positions in both the public and private sectors. The current crop of migrants hopes to emulate this precedent. Returning migrants plan to leverage their academic and professional capital to land senior positions in both the public and private sectors which are still struggling after years of human capital depletion (Ammassari, 2004). This is encapsulated by the following two cases of Paul whom we met earlier (p. 128) and Muzinda, a 43 year old Limpopo academic who moved to South Africa as part of the second migration wave (see Chapter 2) initially to work as a teacher before studying for his MA and PhD degrees at a leading South African university. Paul came to the UK armed with a Social Work Diploma which he since upgraded to a BA (Hons) degree in Social Work as well as completing an MA degree in Development Studies.
'I have decided to go home and swim with the sharks, you know. I came here a long time ago and now have got a PhD plus other professional qualifications which will help me to get a job. My PhD is from a reputable university here, not the ones they are churning out in Zim [Zimbabwe]. Think of the guys who benefitted from jambanja (land reform), ngoda[^57] and then again in this coalition. I can’t continue to lose out that’s why I am going back to swim with the sharks. Think back to 1980 or in the late 1970s, the guys from the UK going to Mozambique when they knew that the war was ending and then being given senior positions. As a student of history, I am learning from it to advance my personal interests. I could have stayed here as an academic but there is more to be got by going home than from staying here.’ (Interview in Thohoyandou, 26 April 2010)

'I came here with only a Diploma in Social Work but now I have a Masters, so I can go back and do something there with my education. My degree is superior to those obtained in Zimbabwe. Besides, I have some business there which advise professionals like social workers and nurses who want to come and work here. It will work out; I am tired of being here. I will leave the wife and the kids for now while I go and test the waters. If it doesn’t work out, I can always come back as I have a British passport.’ (Interview in Leeds, 10 December 2009)

In Chapter 3, it was put forward how the NELM approach to return migration considers it as a ‘calculated strategy’ incepted at the household level as a consequence of successful achievement of set targets (Stark, 1991: 26). It can be argued that the acquisition of educational qualifications by both Paul and Muzinda symbolise the achievement of goals that Stark (1991) refers to. The excerpts show that both Muzinda and Paul are banking on their superior human capital to kick-start their careers back in Zimbabwe. While both Muzinda and Paul initially left Zimbabwe to work in South Africa and the UK respectively, they also utilised their time in exile to advance their academic and professional qualifications. Muzinda and Paul’s return intentions echo Jasso and Rosenzweig’s (1988) claim that skilled immigrants had a higher probability of return migration which was discussed in Chapter 3.

For Muzinda, history has clearly demonstrated the significance of opportunism which he is seizing by going home to ‘swim with the sharks.’ Reference to the sharks is significant because it demonstrates that he is self aware, conscious of the risks that he is taking and the dangers inherent in such actions. It is a risk that he is prepared to take in the hope that he will reap significant returns. Like other migrants, Muzinda is pinning his hopes on the new government turning to its non-resident citizens to fill the labour vacuum. These findings echo Ammassari’s (2004) findings in which

[^57]: Ngoda is a term used to refer to diamonds by Zimbabweans. Alluvial diamonds were discovered in the Chiadzwa area of Manicaland Province in 2005. The government did not control the diamond mining until 2008 and during this period, several people associated with ZANU (PF) are thought to have amassed significant wealth as they controlled the illegal mining. Today, the diamond trade is closely associated with ZANU (PF) and the state security sector who are accused of trading in blood diamonds by organisations such as the World Diamond Council.
recently returned Ghanaians and Ivoirian migrants were employed in key positions in the public and private sectors due to their superior human capital.

International agencies such as UNICEF and IOM have been instrumental in facilitating the return of skilled professionals back to their home countries, a move which has been hailed in some quarters as turning the ‘brain drain’ into ‘brain gain’ (Chikanda, 2010; Meyer, 2003). The cholera epidemic in 2007-2008 provided the spur for some Zimbabweans to return to help contain the devastating disease.

8.4.2 Brain gain and brain circulation: The professionalization of return

The concepts of ‘brain gain’ ‘brain circulation’ and ‘brain exchange’ in international migration have gained traction during the past few years, with scholars such as Bastia et al (2007) arguing that returning migrants possess higher human capital than those who stayed behind, which they then use to contribute to the development of the country. Migration literature is still dominated by the dangers of the so-called ‘brain drain’ in the developing countries, which is blamed on poor salaries and working conditions in the Global South (Docquier and Rapoport, 2001; Stark, 2003). Having depleted a significant amount of her human capital, Zimbabwe has recently started enticing her professionals back. This process has been gathering momentum since the outbreak of the cholera epidemic in 2007 which killed over 2000 people (WHO, 2010).

After failing to contain the cholera outbreak, the government of President Mugabe requested international assistance from international agencies such as UNICEF and WHO (Makumbe, 2009). These organisations in turn, set up an initiative targeting skilled Zimbabweans to temporarily return to work in the health sector to curb the crisis. Thus, the Zimbabwe Human Capital Initiative (ZHCI) was born which sought to encourage skilled migrants to return home to alleviate the critical skills shortage ravaging the health, engineering, and education sectors (Figure 8.3).

This approach is consistent with developments that are being deployed elsewhere to counter the global shortage of skilled staff such as health workers (Chikanda, 2010; Roberts, 2008) through innovative health worker policies (Crush and Pendleton, 2012). It can be argued that the Zimbabwe Human Capital Initiative (ZHCI) is an endeavour to overturn the ‘brain drain’ into ‘brain gain’ (Hunger, 2004; Kingma, 2006; Skeldon, 2005). Employers from both the private and public sectors ad\n
The temporary returns programme enables skilled workers to voluntarily return home for periods lasting up to three months to work in hospitals or higher education institutions such as universities (IOM, 2008). IOM provides the returnees with monthly stipends that equate to their salaries during the period that they are at home.
Lynne, whose case was previously discussed (p. 121), has been to Zimbabwe on two occasions in the last 3 years as part of the ZHCI and has enjoyed the experience to the extent that she wants to return home permanently. She currently works as a staff nurse at a Leeds hospital,

‘It’s so different from working here. At home, they appreciate what you are doing. It is challenging yes, but there isn’t this targets crap, you don’t have to work constantly looking over your shoulder to see if someone is watching you. Ehe, there are challenges like equipment but you get so much joy from working with people who appreciate you, you don’t have to do extra-ordinary things to prove yourself. Here, I am already disadvantaged before I do anything because of my colour, the patients, the managers, your fellow pros and the patients’ family doubt you; you have to show them that you know your stuff. At home, patients know I am a nurse and I can be a doctor too as the doctors give you freedom. They know I trained in London and that I have been working there for almost 10 years which makes them defer to me, they say, ‘she was working in London; she was treating white people so she should
know this and that’. I enjoyed that, it is one of the reasons why I am going home, to work in an environment that is tolerant, this is not to say all the people here are intolerant, but you know, this isn’t our country and despite smiling at you, it’s not as it looks.’ (Interview in Leeds, 12 October 2009)

Frustrations at work and harsh working environments have been cited as reasons for wanting to return home (Hardill and MacDonald, 2000; Kingma, 2001). In this case, Lynne rants about the target culture that pervades the NHS which she claims impedes her work. The poor treatment of overseas trained nurses in the NHS has received scholarly attention and Lynne’s case highlights the enduring nature of the problems which not only foreign-trained nurses but also UK trained nurses of foreign origin have to contend with in their working environments (Allan et al., 2004; Buchan, 2003; Larsen et al., 2005). Returning home for Lynne as for many others in her position, can be considered as an escape route which some migrants are intent on seizing.

The experience that migrants have gained by working in world class institutions such as the NHS is not only recognised, but is most sought after and appreciated at home. It is this experience that is responsible for the deference Lynne gets from her peers in Zimbabwe. By contrasting her working environment in the NHS with that in Zimbabwe, it is clear that Lynne has been swayed by the adulation and higher status which she is afforded in Zimbabwe. The high doctor to patient ratio in Zimbabwe (itself a product of massive flight of medical personnel) means that she is given added responsibility (Chikanda, 2006). Although this contradicts some of the drivers of emigration which were discussed in Chapter 5, this should be understood in the context of Lynne not having been a nurse when she left Zimbabwe. Returning as a nurse represents a ‘triumphant return’ for her. She relishes this added responsibility and the prestige that her history and experience of having worked in the UK begets her from peers and patients alike. Nursing in Zimbabwe is a high status job. It is these considerations that are enticing her home. This begs the question, why Lynne has not returned home if her aversion to the working conditions in the UK is so strong? This can be answered by the conflicts that return endangers within migrants. She explains why these enticements have not translated into the actual return,

‘I want to go back; everything is set on my going back except one major issue...pay. When I went IOM and UNICEF were paying me the equivalent of my salary here in US$ but when I told them that I wanted to come back permanently, they told me that I would have to go on the civil service salary which is ridiculous. So, until I get a job at a private hospital which can pay me a net salary of over US$2000 per month, I may have to extend my stay here indefinitely.’ (Interview in Leeds, 12 October 2009)

Lynne’s return intentions have been delayed by financial considerations as IOM and UNICEF do not pay salaries for permanent returnees but only for those they bring on temporary secondment. Permanent return would entail a massive pay cut for Lynne given that civil servants earn a paltry US$380 per month compared to her gross
monthly salary of over £3,000.00. Lynne’s case demonstrates the gulf that exists between wanting to return and the actual act of returning informed by the practical implications of cost of living in Zimbabwe.

The resuscitation of the extractive industry in Zimbabwe has resulted in demand for skilled personnel including artisans. Some migrants who abandoned their jobs at the height of the economic crisis and settled in South Africa are trekking back to Zimbabwe after being head hunted by mining companies. Many of these migrants, despite their qualifications, were underemployed (see Chapter 6). Monica, an instrumentation technician who left the then state owned Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company (ZISCO) for South Africa in 2008 as part of the seventh migration wave epitomises this type of clandestine migrants who are looking forward to returning home (see Chapters 2 and 6). The 29 year old mother of three currently lives in a mukhukhu in Phalaborwa where she ekes a living distributing promotional leaflets for a Nigerian ‘doctor’,

‘I have been offered a job by Mimosa [a leading platinum mining company] in Zvishavane. I can’t wait to go back home and kiss goodbye to this life of servitude. Imagine, I did my apprenticeship and had a good job, good house but lost all these when ZISCO collapsed which forced me to come here and do this. I am glad I am going back to use my skills instead of shouting about these flyers [waving the flyers that she hands out to potential customers]. I am leaving at the end of the month.’ (Interview in Phalaborwa, 26 May 2010).

For migrants like Monica, the enthusiasm to return home is prompted by the frustration of living in South Africa where she is underemployed. Her return intentions appear to have been informed by her precarious living conditions and clandestinity which debars her from accessing formal employment. The clandestine lifestyle that she is leading although better than the conditions that she fled from in Zimbabwe, appear to be no match to the potential benefits that she stands to get in Zimbabwe which include subsidised housing, company car, a decent salary etc.

While some scholarship argues that skilled professionals are more likely to return than their unskilled counterparts, evidence from this study does not appear to support this. Some migrants (n=222) in Limpopo and (n=28) in Leeds suggested that they would return home once the economic situation normalises and jobs are available. It was demonstrated in Chapter 5 how the majority of respondents in Limpopo were economic migrants with little education. This is evidenced by the case of Khanyesile, a 23 year old clandestine migrant who arrived in South Africa as part of the seventh migration episode whose two children are in Zimbabwe,

‘I want to return home provided that there are jobs. I can’t go back now with little prospects of getting a job. My family depends on me, if I go back go without a job, how will I feed my family? I hope things normalise at home
Khanyesile’s case highlights the salience of improved job prospects in luring migrants back home. This is not surprising given the prominence of economic factors in driving emigration as outlined in Chapters 2 and 5. The neoclassical economics approach to return migration discussed in Chapter 3 ascribed migrants’ return intentions to failure to achieve higher earnings in the destination country as originally anticipated (Todaro, 1969). This may be what Khanyesile is alluding to when she says ‘no-one wants to live here like this.’ This statement, apart from describing her precarious financial position, may also denote the harsh and intolerable conditions that migrants live in as described in Chapter 6.

8.4.3 Curtailed opportunities: Recession induced returns

The neo-classical economics approach to migration described in Chapter 3, posits that return migration is driven by failure to meet targets (Todaro, 1969). In Chapter 6, it was revealed how the diaspora has been a disappointment for some migrants as it had not fulfilled their expectations. The global economic recession has disproportionately affected western countries such as the UK resulting in widespread redundancies as part of deficit reduction initiatives. In Chapter 2, it was demonstrated how public sector organisations such as NHS trusts and local authorities launched recruitment forays into Zimbabwe to lure health and social care workers. The recession has resulted in some of these recruited workers being made redundant. Faced with receding job prospects, some of these migrants are considering returning home. Chapter 3 discussed Cerase’s (1974) typology of return which includes return of failure, innovation, conservatism and retirement. The findings of this study suggests that migrants whose return intentions have been shaped by the global recession, far from being failed returnees, can be categorised as innovators given the human capital that they have acquired in during their time in exile coupled with the experience of working in advanced economies such as the UK.

The global economic recession has caused an upsurge in migrants wanting to return home (Fix et al., 2009). Interviewees who work in the public sector in the UK have seen their employers hit hard by the cut backs which are part of the measures adopted by the British coalition government to reduce the budget deficit. Jervas, 39, was, until his retrenchment, a member of the enthusiastic diaspora given his middle level management position in a Yorkshire local authority. The economic recession has wreaked havoc in migrant communities and does not discriminate between the documented and undocumented. It would appear as though the unemployment that migrants fled from is being re-enacted in the host country. So widespread have been the redundancies that migrants now talk of ESAP having followed them to the UK (Chapter 2). As Jervas observes:
‘Do you still remember ESAP and the retrenchments back home in the early 1990s? The same ESAP that we ran away from has followed us, it is now here. Look at how they are retrenching, the councils, hospitals and other public owned agencies, just like what happened when Chidzero adopted ESAP. I was made redundant, in fact I was one of the first ones to be gotten rid of. Since my redundancy, I haven’t found anything; I have had to go back kumachembere and indanda where I started. You can say I have gone full circle so I may as well go home as that is where I started when I first arrived. There is nothing to stay here for, no jobs, nothing. I am taking the ultimate leap of faith by going home. Like others, I was afraid of coming out of the comfort zone, we are so used to the buy one get one free things that we think that is the end of the world. I will take the positives with me; at least I have the experience of working here which I think will help when I look for a job at home. Definitely not, I will succeed at home.’ (Interview, Leeds, 12 December 2009)

The current unemployment crisis in the UK has been described by commentators as the worst since the Thatcherite cuts of the 1980s (Milne, 2010). South Africa has also been struggling to contain rising unemployment (The Mail and Guardian, 2011). As with many other migrants, Jervas draws parallels between the current cutbacks being seen in British public services to the ones witnessed in Zimbabwe which were discussed in Chapter 2. In Zimbabwe then, as in the UK now, the panacea to the huge budget deficit that the country was saddled with was thought to lie in outsourcing public services to the private sector and to reduce the number of public workers.

Migrants like Jervas who were made redundant because of ESAP in Zimbabwe have spoken of having experienced ‘double jeopardy’ to highlight their misfortune of losing jobs due to fiscal measures that are meant to rein in public expenditure (Chapter 2). For Jervas as for others, he now has the unviable record of having twice been made redundant in two different countries due to deficit reduction initiatives. Redundancies are therefore, the cue for migrants to leave, in this case, returning home, just like they were for exiting Zimbabwe. Like many other migrants, Jervas eschews the thought of reverting back to work in old people’s homes (kumachembere) and manufacturing industry (indanda) which he considers a backward step. As he explains, working in care homes and doing manual labour in manufacturing industries is viewed as a regressive step which is associated with the newly arrived migrants.

Despite the difficulties that have punctuated his stay in the UK, Jervas refutes the claim that he has failed. This rebuttal should be understood in the context of his

---

58 Dr Bernard Chidzero was the Minister of Finance when the government introduced ESAP; hence it became associated with him.
59 Machembere refers to old people. Kumachembere therefore refers to working with old people in old people’s care homes doing care work. Care work was known as dot.com by migrants (during the early days of arrival in the UK)
achievements both in the UK and at home where he has furthered his education (see Chapter 6) and acquired property (see Chapter 7) (Borjas, 1994; Lindstrom, 1996; Massey et al., 1993). Thus, returning home for migrants with properties and those that have managed to further their education agrees with Todaro’s (1960) neo-classical economics approach which posits that migrants that successfully return would have achieved their targets such as property acquisition (see Chapter 3). Thus, despite the circumstances attendant to their returns, the nature of Jervas’ return like that of his counterparts, cannot be considered to have been one of failure as they have something to fall back on upon their return. Such narratives contradict the findings of Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) who in their study of return migration in USA found that migrants with higher than average educational qualifications and skills are more likely to stay than their less skilled counterparts. In Limpopo, it is the professionals who are actively considering returning home to take advantage of the arising opportunities, not the less skilled who have always aspired to work in South Africa.

The failure to find employment which matches a migrant’s professional and academic profile has seen some migrants contemplating making the journey home. Chapter 6 lends credence to cases in the literature of highly educated migrants having to settle for low paying jobs that have no bearing to their specialist training (Bauder, 2003; Kofman, 2004). Studies of Zimbabweans in South Africa and the UK mirror this trend (McGregor, 2008, Muzondidya, 2010). Blessing, a member of the ephemeral diaspora whom we have met earlier (p. 178) cites the failure to secure a job as a mechanical engineer as the primary driver of his decision to return (Table 6.2, p. 155). This is consistent with findings from other studies. For example, Borjas (1989) found out that return migration was higher in immigrants who did not perform well in the labour market in USA. Following this failure, he retrained as a maths teacher and taught mathematics in secondary schools in Birmingham and Luton before deciding to go back home. Apart from failing to work in his preferred area of expertise, Blessing identifies the difficult behaviour exhibited by his pupils as the final straw. Following his failure to adjust to the socio-economic difficulties that were prevailing at home, Blessing left for South Africa where he soon found a job as an engineer. Here, he reflects on his experiences,

‘I wouldn’t say I left London because I failed there, I was never given a chance to work in my field - engineering. In the end I became a teacher before deciding to return home as I was wasting my time. I just had had enough of living from hand to mouth because in London. You can’t save any money. So, I decided that I was better off at home so I went back. I stayed at home for about 6 months before coming here. It took me a month to get a job as an engineer and within a year and half I was appointed a director of the company. I have since helped other guys to move from England to here, where they have found good jobs. In fact, people are moving from London to here, it’s better, it offers better opportunities. Eish, instead of doing rubbish jobs in London, SA offers real chances for professionals. I think, many people
even though they won’t admit it, are failures there in London. London was good until they introduced the USA (US dollar) and now with the exception of a few people, many live from hand to mouth, they are failures because they don’t have anything to show for their stay there. Going back to this issue of being a failure, I would say I am not because I returned home voluntarily; I had a work permit which is still valid and can travel to London anytime I want. It’s difficult to say who is a failure although there are people in London who have failed e.g. guys who don’t work and spend their time drinking etc. So would you say such a person is not a failure because he is still in London than say someone like me who returned home because I didn’t like what I was doing and knew that I could strike gold here? It’s hard to determine, but all I can say is that some people are embarrassed to go back.’ (Interview in Polokwane, 31 March 2010)

For Blessing, return did not represent closure of the migration cycle, but lead to continuity of migration manifested in circulation (Ammassari and Black, 2001). Return in this case, as with many others, marked a ‘stage in a process of increasingly fluid movements between countries’ (Agunias, 2006:14). This case also highlights the growing phenomenon of migrants moving from the UK to other countries such as South Africa and others leaving South Africa for Australia and the UK. The reasons for moving to South Africa are threefold: firstly, its close proximity to home appeals to a large segment of migrants. Secondly, it offers migrants the chance to work in the field that they trained in. Thirdly, it enables migrants to trial their return before deciding to eventually go back to Zimbabwe. Blessing’s narrative uses metaphors to highlight weaknesses that are inherent in Cesare’s ‘return of failure’ typology.

His decision to return was not instigated by low wages given that teachers are modestly paid public servants in the UK. Thus, his case contradicts Todaro’s (1969:140) claim that migrants return home because they had not achieved their goal of increasing their earning potential. It is important to embrace Blessing’s insights regarding how one defines return of failure which (Herzog and Schottman, 1982) also refers to as the disappointment theory of migration. Implicit in the above narrative is a sense that some migrants may remain in the host country without necessarily achieving the objectives which they left home for. Blessing claims that it is apt to label such migrants as failures even though they are reluctant to return for fear of exposing their failure to those at home. On the other hand, he did not consider his return as a failure as he had accumulated human capital to enable him to start afresh at home and in his current host country. His case corroborates Ley and Kobayashi’s (2005:113) claim that return migration for some migrants is less a final adjustment than another stage in a continuing itinerary.

This thesis contends that, because migrants already own houses in towns and their villages as well as cattle, the issue of ‘return of failure’ does not adequately capture the conditions under which migrants choose to return. Migration scholars such as
Ammassari and Black (2001) have argued that migrants acquire skills that are seldom useful during their stay away from home. The evidence from this study, especially in South Africa appear to contradict this viewpoint as some migrants work in the agricultural sector doing the same mundane things that they grew up doing at home which they also do when they return home. Interviewees who work on the farms in Limpopo talked about helping their families in the fields when they return home during holidays, mirroring their line of work in South Africa. Thus, the skills that the migrants pick up can be successfully put to use at home.

8.5 Holiday visits and seasonal migration: the circularisation of return

Technological and transportation advances have had a significant effect on return migration. As Castles (1998) observes, these advancements have resulted in migrants maintaining physical ties, person-to-person communication and social networks with those left at home as shown in Chapter 3. The combined effects of immigration status and high airfares on migrants’ ability to engage in return visits is demonstrated in Figure 8.4 where only 27% (n=54) have been to Zimbabwe compared to an overwhelming majority of 98% (n=510) in South Africa in the last 12 months. Lack of documented status does not impede travel in South Africa unlike in the UK. Circulation in South Africa is promoted by factors such as proximity and the remaining behind of spouses which necessitates the ‘shuttling’ back and forth.

---

60 Interview with Tapiwa in Thohoyandou, 3 March 2010.
Figure 8.4  Migrants who have been to Zimbabwe in the last 12 months by country of residence %

Source: Based on survey results 2009-2010

Holiday visits are undertaken by migrants for diverse purposes (Figure 8.5). The findings of this study concur with Thomas – Hope’s (1999) observation that migrants returning regularly or periodically maintain family obligations (53%, \( n=29 \) in Leeds and 84%, \( n=427 \) in Limpopo) and investing in land and housing in preparation for the final move back. Likewise, scholars such as Cassarino (2004) and Oxfield and Long (2004) have posited that holiday visits are used to assuage and overcome migrants’ initially held fears and hesitations that surround the act of leaving the host country and allowing them to choose if they want to return permanently. Furthermore, evidence from other studies (Braakman and Schlenkhoff, 2007; Ramji, 2006) highlight the importance of maintaining ties with the home country through regular visits, which make migrants more aware of the reality of the country, rather than having memories of an idealised home country.
Similarly, Faist (2000b) posits that visits serve to link multiple ‘homes’, ‘spaces’ and ‘bridges’ multiple identities. Likewise, Duval (2004) argues that return visits constitute transnational exercise through which multiple social fields are linked. As Vertovec (1999:448) points out, return visits enable the maintenance and representation of the ‘multiple ties and interactions linking people or institutions across the borders of nation-states.’ Other literature claims that return visits symbolise conduits or mediums through which social practice can be channelled through between former homelands and new homelands (Duval, 2004). In accord with Boyd (1989: 650), this thesis argues that migrants settled in South Africa and the UK use visits as a tool of maintaining their personal networks. Some scholarship claims that return is preceded by visits and by remittances that may well include funds for the construction of a new family house (Duval 2004).

The interviewees who had spent considerable amount of time without physical contact with their families stated that they found holidays provided them with opportunities to visit and strengthen relationships with families, relatives and the wider social networks (Boyd, 1989). Yet again, for interviewees who had postponed
their return intentions due to the need for their children to complete their education in the host country, return visits provide opportunities to visit home (Byron, 1999). Solomon whom we met earlier (p. 160) shares his views on the importance of visiting home,

‘I had gone for six years without going home coz [because] of papers. Now that I have stay, I tend to go to see what it is like, just to reacquaint myself with home, really. Eventually I would like to return once there is (democratic) change and these visits are my way of trying to see if I can fit in. Besides, I need to take the children to see where I grew up and meet my people, the animals and everything that is there. It keeps them grounded, to know the limits rather than the rights that they are taught at school. It removes them from the bad influence of London, this country is very bad for children, no morals and they have more rights than I as a parent. They need to know who they are, where they came from. It is important culturally, look at the Asians, they go to Pakistan or India almost every year to make sure that they don’t lose touch with their roots. I want them to speak my Shona language and the time we spend at home is invaluable for that because when we come back, they will be speaking it quite well.’ (Interview in Leeds, 14 November 2009)

Solomon’s case exemplifies the problems facing migrants regarding the cultural clashes between western culture and their own. The interviewees view return as reinforcing cultural hybridism and strengthening transnational identities (Castles, 1999; Oxfeld and Long, 2004). The issue of children elicits conflicting emotions. Some migrants in the UK in particular, resent the system which they perceive as rendering them impotent in disciplining their children. Bloch (2006) has highlighted the difficulties that Zimbabwean professionals face in raising children in the UK. Migrants are worried about the negative influences that their children are picking up such as poor educational attainment, drug use and promiscuity (Guarnizo, 2003).

There is a grudging respect for the Asian culture within the community in the UK which ensures that the children learn and abide by their culture. Thus, the sending of children home during holidays is motivated by identity preservation (Binaisa, 2009, Bloch, 2008; McGregor, 2008, 2009) as parents strive to conserve the little of their culture that is left. Parents also encourage their children to attend activities where their language is spoken, for example Zimbabwean churches such as Johanne Masowe, Roman Catholic and United Methodist Church where the sermons are conducted in the local Shona and Ndebele languages. This is premised on forestalling the children from becoming misfits when they eventually return home (Oxfeld and Long, 2004).

And like other migrants, visits for Solomon enable him to catch up with developments at home. This is important as some migrants due to reasons elucidated above, had not been able to return home whilst their asylum claims were being determined. For this group of migrants, visits are an avenue to see the progress of their projects
(housing, agricultural, business investments) which they have been told about but had not seen.

8.6 Political reform as key to unlocking return: The adoption of a wait and see approach to return

While the formation of the inclusive government has reduced incidences of political violence, it has not abated them completely and the political landscape is still dominated by President Mugabe and his ZANU (PF) party. The dominance of President Mugabe in the inclusive government is exemplified by his party’s control of the security levers of the state such as ministries of defence, state security, justice and home affairs which he has used skilfully to stifle democratisation. Consequently, migrants expressed disappointment at the slow pace at which the political, security and safety issues are being addressed in Zimbabwe leading 14% (n=65) and 11% (n=19) of the respondents in Limpopo and Leeds respectively to adopt a wait and see attitude towards return (Table 8.1, p. 234).

For migrants who suffered trauma at the hands of ZANU (PF) and other elements of the state machinery, returning home in the absence of a complete change in government is impractical. Return, for such migrants, can only take place once there have been demonstrable changes in sectors of the state like police, intelligence and the army, which are known to have been used by President Mugabe and his party to persecute opponents (Makumbe, 2009, 2010; Masunungure, 2010, 2011) (see Chapters 2 and 5). The fact that there have not been any prosecutions for perpetrators who meted violence to opposition supporters during the 2008 elections and others going back to 2000 does not inspire confidence to this group of migrants.

President Mugabe has staunchly refused to cede control of the security sector, and the commanders of the army and police have pledged their unflinching support to ZANU (PF) and its president (The Zimbabwe Independent, 2011, 2012). In fact, recent developments have not done anything to persuade members of the diaspora groups to return home as people perceived to MDC supporters continue to be arrested whilst ZANU (PF) supporters behave with impunity (The Independent, 2011, 2012). It is therefore, not surprising that those migrants who suffered political persecution are not packing their bags yet. Solomon (p. 160), a staunch MDC supporter who lost two members of his family to political violence and still bears physical, psychological and emotional scars vows never to return home permanently until there is complete change (see Table 8.1, p. 237),

‘For some of us who fled genuine political persecution, who escaped death by a whisker, talk of imminent return is immature given lack of substantive change on the ground. The people who killed my family are still roaming free and boasting about it. I will only return when Chihuri (Commissioner-General of the Zimbabwe Republic Police) is gone and the soldiers are back in the barracks, when there is proper rule of law. The MDC may be part of the
government but they don’t have real power, just look at who controls the police, the army, and CIO and justice delivery system. It is Mugabe and his party so they can do whatever they like without batting an eyelid. Only economic migrants are the ones who are free to return not us political refugees. That is why when I go home I go clandestinely as I don’t want to get into trouble with both ZANU (PF) and the Home Office here as my refugee status bars me from travelling to Zimbabwe.’ (Interview in Leeds, 14 November 2009)

As with many political refugees, Solomon is sceptical about the political changes that have taken place so far in Zimbabwe. Like his peers, Solomon is fearful of the insecure political environment which to all intents and purposes is still heavily dominated by ZANU (PF) (Compagnon, 2011; Cheeseman and Tendi, 2010). These apprehensions are compounded by the fact that the perpetrators of heinous acts of violence during the 2008 elections, which were discussed in Chapter 2, are yet to be brought to account for their actions and seem to be protected by the police.

There are serious disagreements between MDC and ZANU (PF) about what to do with the perpetrators of political violence, with President Mugabe insisting on a blanket amnesty whilst Tsvangirai and his MDC want them tried (Amnesty International, 2009; The Financial Gazette, 2012). The fact that the perpetrators are still roaming the streets dissuades migrants like Solomon from returning formally and permanently. He speaks for many migrants when he talks about entering Zimbabwe clandestinely due to restrictions attendant to his immigration status. Clandestine entries occur when migrants enter Zimbabwe informally to avoid violating their immigration status as demonstrated by the case of Nokhuthula (p. 215)

Interestingly, Solomon differentiates political refugees from economic migrants and claims that the environment at home is not yet conducive for political refugees to return home although it is ripe for economic migrants to return (see Chapter 6). Solomon’s interpretation of the conditions which would induce him to return substantiates Krulfield and Macdonald’s (1998:125) claim that refugees ‘would return home if conditions changed.’

On the other hand, migrants who bore the brunt of political violence during the June 2008 run-off elections in Limpopo were adamant that they would not be returning unless there is substantive political change where individual rights are respected. Ntokwazi whom we have already come across (p. 115) represents this group of migrants,

‘I am not returning until Mugabe goes, he is the author of our problems and suffering. I escaped death by a whisker at the hands of Mugabe’s thugs. Even though I didn’t work when I was home, now being here has enabled me to work. It’s not ok for Zimbabweans to return home at the moment whether you are a refugee or an economic migrant because the economic problems
being experienced there can’t be separated from politics.’ (Interview in Ellisras, 17 March 2010).

While Solomon insists that economic migrants can return home, his views are inconsistent with migrants such as Ntokwazi who can be described as both an economic migrant and a victim of political violence. This is because migrants move in mixed flows (UNHCR, 2004). For Ntokwazi as for other migrants, the economic problems being experienced in Zimbabwe cannot be separated from President Mugabe’s long reign, political and economic policies which make it illogical for all migrants to return while he is still safely ensconced in his throne. Return for such migrants, is only feasible when President Mugabe is no longer in office which represents complete democratic change.

8.7 No desire to return

At the other extreme are migrants who are adamant about not ever returning to Zimbabwe, 16% \( (n=31) \) in Leeds and 13% \( (n=69) \) in Limpopo (Table 8.1). These migrants cite a number of reasons why they do not entertain thoughts about ever returning home. These findings echo findings from scholars like Moran-Taylor and Menjivar (2005) who in their study of the return intentions of Guatemalans and Salvadorans found some migrants did not intend to return home, a phenomenon which they termed ‘no desires’ to return home. Migrants who stated that they are not returning home cited factors like interracial marriage, destroyed livelihoods, death of family members in Zimbabwe, welfare of their children who are already settled in South Africa and the UK etc (Chavez, 1988).

The Gukurahundi violence that broke out shortly after independence prompted the second migration episode which was discussed in Chapter 2. Some of the migrants who arrived in the UK in the 1980s as part of this wave stated that they would never return home as there is nothing worth returning for. This is demonstrated by the case of Mduduzi, a 43 year father of three who arrived in the UK in 1986 after fleeing the political violence in Gwanda, Matebeleland South Province,

‘I lost my family during the Gukurahundi; they were butchered by the 5th Brigade. I came here as a teenager and as you can see my wife is white and my children are mixed race. This is my home now, maybe if my parents, sisters and brothers were alive, I would think about returning, but there is nothing to go back for except sad memories. Besides, my children will be misfits if I were to return home. I would also lose out professionally as I am a nuclear physicist and the Zimbabwean economy has nothing for people like me.’ (Interview, 10 June 2010, Leeds)

Mduduzi’s decision not to return home is informed by four factors. Firstly, the demise of his family during the political hostilities means that there are no familial incentives to return (Tiemoko, 2004). Returning to Zimbabwe would lead to reliving the horrors
of his youth which he wants to leave behind. Secondly, family reasons; that he has married a white woman. There is scholarly consensus that marriages of people from different countries have a bearing on migrants’ attitudes and perceptions of returning to their home country (Hirsch, 1999; Moran-Taylor and Menjivar, 2005). However, this should not be construed to mean that all migrants in interracial marriages have no desire to return. Mduduzi’s decision not to return was compounded by the loss of his family. Thirdly, he is concerned about opportunities for his children as well as the difficulties that they are likely to encounter if they were to be uprooted from the UK to Zimbabwe. Mduduzi’s decision not to return may have been affected by the length of time that he has been domiciled in the UK, which resonates with Hondagneu-Sotelo’s (1995) claim that the longer a migrant has been in a country the less likely they are to return to their home country. Fourthly, his decision not to return was predicated on professional grounds given his profession as a nuclear physicist. This suggests that economic considerations were instrumental in his decision not to return home.

Dan (p. 113), the commercial farmer in Limpopo whose farm in Zimbabwe was expropriated during the land reform exercise, typifies this group of migrants who do not want to return to Zimbabwe. For Dan as for many others, Zimbabwe is no longer home but just another place as there is nothing to return for. As he explains,

‘My home is here, there is nothing that binds me to Zimbabwe anymore. I used to think that I will return one day once there is change but now those thoughts have receded, I can’t go back there. I am a South African now and from here, maybe I will go to Australia but never Zimbabwe, it’s a closed chapter.’ (Interview in Musina, 26 March 2010)

Dan’s case is instructive in that it reveals the dissociation that some migrants have with home. Chapter 2 revealed the exodus of white people to South Africa and Australia prior to and shortly after independence due to fears over the socialist policies of President Mugabe. Dan’s narrative suggests that there has been a resurgence of white emigration engendered by the land reform programme (see Chapter 2).

For migrants like Caroline, 27 who arrived in South Africa as part of the seventh migration episode and Chamu (p. 138) in Leeds, the decision not to return home is informed by the lack of opportunities and life prolonging anti-retroviral medicines given her medical condition. Here they explain their reasons for not wanting to return to Zimbabwe,

‘I am not going back to Zimbabwe. When I came here, I was on the verge of death; I was a walking skeleton due to AIDS. I couldn’t get ARVs in Zimbabwe, you need to know someone in order to get them, but here they are readily available. I am fine now, if I hadn’t told you that I am HIV positive, would you have known? Besides, here I can work which I couldn’t do at home
as no one wanted to employ me.' (Interview with Caroline, Naboomspruit, 26 April 2010)

'I left Zimbabwe on the verge of death; I was thin, very thin, and ‘literally’ being blown by the wind as I had lost so much weight. There were no pills for people like me who don’t have connections with people in high places. Now, look at me, do I look sick? I am not returning back there permanently because I am not guaranteed my supplies of ARVs. Each time I visit home, I take with me my 6 months worth of supplies which I get here.' (Interview with Chamu, Leeds, 13 January 2010).

Caroline and Chamu’s cases are emblematic of many other migrants who are living with HIV/AIDS. Recent reports in Zimbabwe show that only about 450,000 people affected by HIV/AIDS are accessing life saving ARVs medicines in a country where over 3 million are HIV positive (Machingura, 2010; The Herald, 2012). Reports also corroborate their allegations that the distribution of ARVs is cloaked in corruption, leading to the unnecessary deaths of the poor and the politically unconnected. For Caroline and Chamu, as for many of their colleagues, the fact that ARVs are readily available in South Africa and the UK respectively as well as the fact that they have been able to secure employment, makes return an unlikely proposition.

8.8 Conclusion

The chapter has also explored the factors affecting the return intentions of migrants. The intentions to return are shaped, and amplified by several factors including citizenship and identity, desire to be reunited with family and accomplishment of targets which prompted the departure from home, amongst others. The chapter has further shown that the attitudes towards return are fluid and mirror developments in both the host and home country. The formation of the coalition government between MDC and ZANU (PF) has not, as was expected in some quarters, resulted in a stampede of migrants wanting to return home (Crush, 2012; Crush et al., 2012; Faber, 2011; IRIN, 2009; Magaisa, 2009). Instead, migrants have expressed caution in their return intentions and have adopted a wait and see attitude. However, the adoption of this wait and see attitude should not obscure the fact that many migrants have and continue to prepare for eventual return as evidenced by investment in property and remittances, as highlighted in Chapter 7.

The continued conflict in the homeland has been identified as one of the biggest impediments to return, as are the dwindling employment opportunities. Although some migrants have deferred their return, there is a substantial willingness to return as evidenced by some short-term return by skilled professionals to ameliorate the critical staff shortages in sectors like health and higher education. The chapter has also shown how some migrants, instead of planning to return home, are instead thinking of remigrating to other countries such as Australia, New Zealand and Canada, which are perceived as better than the current host country. Other migrants
are planning to leave the UK for South Africa instead of returning to Zimbabwe outright. South Africa is seen as offering better opportunities than Zimbabwe and its close proximity to Zimbabwe is seen as advantageous.

Return intentions of the migrants are cloaked in the need to provide for their families. For those who suffered trauma due to their political involvement, return remains a mirage due to lack of substantial changes in the governance of the country. Migrants appear to be aware of the serious problems that they will confront on their return, hence their requests for help to assuage the transition pains.
CHAPTER 9  

CONCLUSIONS

9.1  Introduction

The aim of this research has been to examine and investigate the formation of the nascent Zimbabwean diasporic communities in Limpopo, South Africa, and Leeds, UK. This stemmed from a realisation that these two countries attracted different types of migrants who possessed different economic, political, human and social capital. Research findings were presented and discussed in-depth in each chapter subsequent to Chapter 5. This chapter concludes the thesis by summarising and highlighting the salient findings on migration and transnational practices of the Zimbabwean migrants in Leeds and Limpopo.

The chapter further discusses the academic contribution of this thesis and presents pertinent issues that need to be addressed in order to safeguard the welfare of Zimbabwean migrants domiciled in South Africa and the UK. Moreover, the chapter identifies and reiterates areas for further research as well as identifying areas which have implications for the study’s broader academic and methodology. Section 9.2 outlines the research’s fundamental findings in line with the research objectives that guided the study. In section 9.3, I discuss the original academic contribution of the research project while section 9.4 examines the study’s methodological contribution. Section 9.5 focuses on the limitations of the study while the final section, 9.6, focuses on identifying areas for future research and critical inquiry.

9.2  Summary of findings

A critical question in this study sought to ascertain the human and social capital differentials between migrants in the Leeds and Limpopo. The study further explored how these different capital levels have helped channel migrants to specific destinations. The thesis thus, unveiled the complexities embedded in the transnational linkages between Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa, the UK and those at home. This was achieved by exploring emigration from Zimbabwe in order to better our understanding of mixed migration flows. Previous studies have focused on the migration of either skilled (Bloch, 2006; Tinarwo, 2011) or unskilled migrants (McGregor, 2008; Pasura, 2010; Muzondidya, 2008) from Zimbabwe to South Africa and the UK. Given the complexity of the Zimbabwean migration witnessed since the dawn of the new millennium, it made academic sense to undertake a study which examined these mixed migration flows.

Objective 1 was addressed by undertaking a questionnaire survey and in-depth interviews which enabled the thesis to build detailed profiles of the study participants. The survey captured migrants’ biographic data, educational attainment; reasons for migration etc (see Chapter 5). In accord with prior research, the profiling of migrants demonstrated the multiplicity and complexity of the reasons for emigration (Gordon
and Jones, 1989; Bloch, 2008). Profiling enabled the breakdown of the migrants into smaller components, which allowed a profile to be built of the different components that constitute the Zimbabwean diaspora in the two locations. The demographic profile of the study ranged from 18 to 58 years. The majority of the migrants in South Africa are under 30 years which is consistent with findings of similar studies (Bloch, 2006, Crush et al., 2012; Makina, 2007). Those in the UK are much older, which demonstrates the different migration flows between the two countries.

The differences in migrants’ age profiles in the two countries demonstrate the different migration flows that characterised emigration from Zimbabwe. Most migrants in Leeds held professional jobs prior to relocating in the late 1990s to early 2000s while those in South Africa appear to have less educational capital (see Chapter 5). Most migrants in South Africa are ‘born frees’, that is, they were born after independence in 1980. The older migrants benefitted tremendously from the investments in education that followed independence. This investment was not sustained; the quality and standard of education declined as lecturers and teachers joined the exodus to escape economic hardships. The deteriorating infrastructure meant that most migrants in South Africa had not had access to the same quality of social services, such as education, which their older counterparts in Leeds had enjoyed.

Traditional migration theories stress the importance of economic motives in propelling emigration, mostly from low wage developing countries to high wage developed countries (Todaro, 1969). However, modern migration is more complex, to the extent that it renders these traditional perspectives of migration obsolete. Migration cannot be ascribed to a single reason but is the result of a series of factors. One of the concepts that scholars have turned to in order to capture and explain the complexity of migration is transnationalism (Glick Schiller et al., 1992; Hannerz, 1996; Castells, 1996). This research sought to investigate the emigration from Zimbabwe from a transnational perspective. The transnational approach to migration is relevant to this study because it encompasses the notion of social capital which recognises the important role that prior migrants play in fuelling and sustaining migration flows between the sending and destination country. This theoretical framework was explained in greater detail in Chapter 3.

The migration episodes that were identified in the study showed the different contexts in which migrants exited Zimbabwe for South Africa and the UK which was critical in unveiling migrants’ experiences. This is because the year of departure from Zimbabwe and arrival in South Africa and the UK shed more light on the migration type and choice of destination. For example, the UK was a prime destination for health and social care workers beginning in the late 1990s to early 2000s while South Africa attracted a significant percentage of the Zimbabwean population in the late 2000s as migrants’ options became constrained due to restrictive immigration policies of most western governments. The study showed how the decision on which
country to migrate to was influenced by migration networks and economic or professional concerns.

While one or more migration theories may work for particular migrants, they fail to apply to all cases. Some commentators such as Pessar (1997) have argued that conditions that cause migration for a particular group may change with time, making migration theory that used to apply irrelevant at a later stage. In this ‘age of migration’ (Castles and Miller, 2009) and a globalising world, mainstream migration theories need to be revisited if they are to remain relevant. It is noted that migration theories remain good points of departure but cannot explain the complexities of modern international migration. This complexity was explicated by migrants’ interview insights (Chapter 5).

In accord with recent scholarship which highlights the increasing number of women migrating independently, this study observed similar trends. In Leeds, the demand of health and social care staff may explain the dominance of women in the sample. Nursing has historically been feminised owing to the gendered division of labour. This echoes findings of similar studies in the UK which found that women constituted the majority of overseas nurses in the NHS (Alexis et al., 2007). Men in Leeds play the archetypical ‘trailing spouses’ role as they followed their spouses who pioneered migration to work as health and social care professionals in the NHS and local authorities. On the other hand, the findings in South Africa confirm the historical and traditional trends where migration is dominated by males (Crush et al., 2012; Mlambo, 2010). There is evidence, however, that this is changing; women accounted for 44% of the survey (Figure 5.1, p. 96). The study echoes findings of prior studies which noted that migration from Zimbabwe increasingly consisted of whole families rather than just male earners (Muzondidya, 2008). There is, therefore, a correlation between the emancipation of women from the hardships experienced at home and elimination of traditional practices. This study, therefore, identified a causal link between socio-economic hardships and increased participation of women in migration.

Consistent with other studies, this research finds evidence of Zimbabwean migrants possessing comparatively higher levels of educational capital than other groups of migrants (Magunha et al., 2009; Bloch, 2006, 2008; Makina, 2007; McGregor, 2008). In Leeds, a significant number of the survey has taken advantage of the opportunities attendant to their documented status to further their education during their time in exile. This is one of the original contributions of this study as no other study has tracked the educational endeavours of Zimbabwean migrants in the diaspora. The possession of higher educational capital has not translated into professional progression as many migrants find themselves underemployed, which heightens fears of de-skilling (Chapter 6). Some studies have highlighted the corrosive effect of de-skilling in migrant communities (Phillimore and Goodson, 2006). The depth of de-skilling is exposed by the fact that both the survey and
interviews in Leeds and Limpopo engaging in mundane occupations. Similarly, there has been a significant reduction in the number of migrants holding managerial jobs in both Leeds and Limpopo which is in accord with previous studies that demonstrates that there is a continuing decline in migrants’ occupational trends (McGregor, 2008; Pasura, 2008; Phillimore and Goodson, 2006).

In accordance with other studies, this study found out that care and industrial work offers migrants an entry into the paid labour market in Leeds (Bloch, 2006; McGregor, 2008) while in Limpopo most migrants enter the job market through the informal economy in the Musina area before progressing to the farms and later to the metropolitan cities such as Johannesburg and Cape Town (Crush et al., 2012; Muzondidya, 2008; Rutherford, 2011). Professionals such as nurses and social workers and engineers were headhunted from Zimbabwe by nursing agencies and local authorities (UK) and engineering firms (South Africa). In accord with Bloch (2006), this study found that migrants in the UK are seeking to incrementally extend their stay by studying for courses such as nursing and social work which, until recently, guaranteed an assured route into employment. Thus, nursing and social work are the most popular degree courses with migrants.

Objective 2 sought to examine the role of social networks in producing and maintaining diaspora links and the complex connections with those left behind. This objective was addressed by the discussions in the analysis chapters (Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8). Chapter 5 revealed the salience of social networks through the cases of migrants who chose to travel either to South Africa or the UK at the behest of their family, friends and relatives. Ties built at school, college or university played a significant role in channelling some migrants to particular destinations. Prior migrants provided a range of information including job opportunities, college applications, invitation letters, accommodation etc. Social networks transcend boundaries; so does the help and support that were provided by pioneer migrants. Such an acknowledgement recognises the complexity of migration, and that no one theory of migration can adequately explain why people migrate.

Social capital is a manifestation of transnationalism. The existence of social networks within the Zimbabwean diaspora helps to dispel claims propagated by traditional migration scholarship which projected migration as a linear but inter-connected process (Pasura, 2010). I have demonstrated throughout this study how, far from being a linear process, migration encompasses a series of multi-step journeys which migrants undertake as they build their social capital until they reach their desired destinations. Social capital was critical to migrants’ ability to travel from Zimbabwe to either South Africa or the UK and was utilised to access a range of services such as employment and negotiating the immigration structures, especially in the UK. Newly arrived migrants settled in areas that already had high concentrations of Zimbabwean migrants e.g. Harehills in Leeds and Louis Trichardt in Limpopo.
The transnational linkages that migrants have with the people at home and elsewhere serves to highlight the interconnectedness of lives and how these linkages transcend boundaries. The notions of diaspora, transnationalism and social capital have emerged as credible approaches that can be deployed to explain the international migration phenomenon. These highlight the interconnectedness of the migrants’ lives with those that remain at home, and how these connections are used to perpetuate further migration and cushion those at home from shocks through transnational transactions such as remittances (Goldring, 1999; Itzigsohn et al., 1999; Portes, 1996). Migrants use their transnational practices and networks produced and reproduced in the diaspora to initiate, reproduce, and maintain contact with those left at home and in other countries. Migrants in the UK for example, used their networks in neighbouring countries such as Botswana and South Africa to buy foodstuffs, educational materials and medicines for their family and relatives in Zimbabwe during the height of the crisis in 2007-2008. The research endeavoured to map out the experiences of the migrants in transnational and social capital discourses to establish their utility.

Furthermore, migrants’ transnational transactions have changed in tandem with the evolving socio-economic needs of those at home as well as the attendant political regulatory frameworks that governments have been imposing following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in USA. These financial regulations resulted in the outlawing of unregistered MTOs which were popular with UK based migrants as they offered higher returns than registered MTOs. While the 9/11 attacks jeopardised the operations of unregistered MTOs, the dollarization policies pursued by the coalition government delivered the fatal blow to the few operational informal MTOs in the UK and Zimbabwe. Post dollarization, migrants reported using formal channels for monetary remittances although this was more pronounced in the UK than in South Africa. The circulatory nature of most South African based migrants impeded formal remittance channels, as did the existence of strong social networks. The high transaction costs also diminished the number of migrants in South Africa wanting to use formal remitting channels. Infrastructural constraints were also found by this study to encumber the use of formal channels in South Africa.

Transnational practices of migrants are not just confined to economics but extend to political transnationalism. Diasporic political activism was shown to be rooted in the ‘politics of papers’ whereby migrants participate in diasporic immigrant politics in order to bolster their pending asylum claims (McGregor, 2009; McGregor and Pasura, 2010). Notwithstanding the opportunism that is linked to politics for papers, there was evidence of some committed political activists whose participation was premised on realising political change in Zimbabwe. For this group of migrants, they have lobbied the host governments to maintain pressure on President Mugabe and his ZANU (PF) party in order to democratise the political space in Zimbabwe. In this context of transnationalism from above, therefore, migrants have acted as
‘representatives’ (ambassadors) of the MDC in both South Africa and the UK in its fight to unseat President Mugabe from power.

Others’ activism was predicated on having a profile high enough to secure them positions in a new government (McGregor, 2009). Participation in diasporic politics appears to be hampered by fragmentation of the Zimbabwean community which permeates political and civic organisations of the Zimbabwean diaspora in both South Africa and the UK. The extent of participation was shown to be dependent on a number of variables including gender, class and type of migration. Unlike other studies which have drawn links to participation by the middle and upper classes, results of this study do not lend themselves to this as migrants from these groups appear to shun diasporic politics probably due to the incessant squabbling within the MDC diasporic structures. The omnipresent fear of President Mugabe permeated to migrants in the diaspora, some of whom were reluctant to go public in their fight for change because of fear about their own security as well as that of their family members at home.

The fourth objective considered the return intentions of Zimbabwean migrants in Leeds and Limpopo. The study established that while migration could have been used for a number of factors such as social mobility, escaping political persecution etc, most migrants harbour thoughts of returning home. Exile, for an overwhelming majority of the survey and interview participants, was nothing but a temporary phase of the migration process. As revealed in the interviews, there was an expectation among migrants that life in the diaspora was a necessary phase that they had to endure in order to accumulate sufficient resources needed to kick-start social mobility before returning.

I have stressed the complexity of this migration which detaches it from previous emigrations from Zimbabwe. Notwithstanding this complexity, many migrants intended to stay for short durations prior to making triumphant returns to Zimbabwe. As noted in Chapter 2, circulation has been a way of life for people living in the border areas of Zimbabwe and South Africa while movement to South Africa and the UK to gain higher education has been perennial. What differentiated this migration phase from previous was its diversity, as women and children also became ‘birds of passage’ (Morokvasic, 1984). Thus, migration ceased to be associated with males, and saw the emancipation of women migrating on their own thereby mirroring trends elsewhere (Bonney and Love, 1991; Hochschild, 2002). Likewise, there was a noticeable movement of whole families rather than earners alone.

Another distinctive feature of the ‘new’ emigration from Zimbabwe was migrants’ settlement patterns. As noted in the preceding chapters, migration has always been circulatory, with migrants returning home after completing their education or accumulating enough resources to assuage the shocks that were being experienced at home. However, migrants’ settlement patterns have been undergoing a
metamorphosis, with permanency becoming an option for a significant number of migrants in both countries, particularly in the UK.

Permanency was shown to be a consequence of migrants endeavouring to incrementally extend their stay in the host country. Permanency is driven by the worsening conditions at home, the desire to bequeath ‘better’ citizenship to their children, which is considered to be superior to Zimbabwean citizenship. The survey and interviews revealed that migrants’ decided to return home because of their children and other familial connections (Tiemoko, 2004). Migrants who were separated from their families intended to return in order to be with their families. However, separation was not in all migrant groups a reason for return; some migrants delayed their plans because they needed to meet their families’ transnational obligations. Thus, while separation engendered strong feelings about return, these plans are tempered by individual circumstances.

Return intentions for some migrants have been affected by events in the destination country. The failure to secure employment, for example, which matches a migrant’s educational and professional profile sometimes made migrants want to return, though this effect was not universal. Thus, members of the different diasporic groups, identified in Chapter 6, were capable of exhibiting simultaneous feelings, that is: enthusiastic, reluctant, and ambivalent or no desires. For other migrants, the decision to return home was informed by events in Zimbabwe rather than in the host country. The improving socio-economic and political conditions in Zimbabwe acted as a draw for migrants who considered their lives to have stagnated in the diaspora. Other migrants were planning to return because they had always planned to return home after reaching their targets. It was demonstrated in Chapter 5 how target saving caused emigration. Likewise, the attainment of these targets for some migrants’ connoted return while for others created new targets and prolonged their stay.

As reiterated in Chapter 8, and frequently highlighted, return was a key theme of this study. Return assumes different meanings to migrants in South Africa and the UK. For the South Africa based migrants, return did not seem to be a prominent thought because South Africa was a place of work; migrants felt they had never been away from home. On the other hand, for UK domiciled migrants, return did not entail the end of the migration process as they were more likely to move to South Africa which was considered to be better than the UK because of its close proximity to Zimbabwe. South Africa, for these migrants, eased the return process as it allowed migrants to ‘acclimatise’ to life in Africa without necessarily being ‘immersed’ in the harsh Zimbabwean environment.

Chapter 6 identified six diasporic groups whose affinity to life in the diaspora varied from one group to the next. The enthusiastic diaspora was shown to be grateful to the life changing experiences of being in the diaspora. Returning home for some
members of the enthusiastic diaspora was seen as a regressive step as it would undo the gains realised in the diaspora. This was exemplified by some female migrants for whom the diaspora had had an emancipatory effect. Conversely, men who had seen their masculine hegemony diminished by being in the diaspora could not wait to return. The study also revealed that despite staying in the diaspora reluctantly some male migrants were not in a hurry to return home due to the uncertainties that such a bold move would entail. In addition, an overwhelming number of the surveyed and interviewees showed an inclination to return, but some migrants did not harbour any such desires. However, not all legal migrants wanted to return home, as argued in Chapter 8; some migrants adopted a ‘wait and see’ attitude because of uncertainties in the homeland (Moran-Taylor and Menjivar, 2005).

Return for documented migrants has been shown to be associated with enjoying the best of both worlds, that is, entrenching transnational living as migrants ‘float’ and ‘circulate’ between Zimbabwe and the host country. Unlike their undocumented counterparts who could not travel outside the UK, legal migrants were not constrained from travelling between Harare and London, thereby negating the need for permanent return. The frequent return visits were used to ease the transition of eventual return, a phenomenon which has been observed in other prior studies (Ahlburg and Brown, 1998; Duval, 2004).

9.3 Academic Contribution

The original contribution of this thesis is its place specificity. By focusing on specific areas, the research was able to delve deeper into migration practices of migrants who left Zimbabwean at different times for different reasons in different migration episodes. By privileging migrants’ voice and experience, the thesis enriched our understanding of the notions of transnationalism and transnational social fields from a specific context. This enabled a richer picture of emigration from Zimbabwe to be painted as well as the characteristics of migrants to be unveiled. Some of the distinctiveness of the migration streams that were identified by focusing on two specific areas included the effect of factors such as gender, class and education in shaping the exodus from Zimbabwe. It also enabled the study to find out the place-specific factors which shape migrants’ return intentions and understanding of life in the diaspora as experienced by both skilled and unskilled migrants. Previous studies focused either on skilled or unskilled migrants which produced a literature specific to those migrant groups. Such literature does not capture the complexity and broad characteristic of the ‘age of migration’ (Castles, 2000, 2007) in which mixed flows predominate (UNHCR, 2007).

The second contribution of this study is its comparativeness which has seen it tease out differences that characterised migration flows to South Africa and the UK. By comparing the eight migration episodes that were identified, the study was able to
delineate the factors underlying emigration from Zimbabwe and the experiences of migrants who left under the same factors in the destination country. For example, it was able to compare the migration outcomes of migrants who left during the fourth migration waves in South Africa and the UK. The comparative nature of the study provided for similarities and differences to be drawn out and the factors which underpinned these. By comparing the political activism of migrants in Leeds and Limpopo for example, it was possible to decipher the factors which drive and/or hinder political activism in both areas.

Thirdly, the study contributes to literature on labour mobility through its comparative focus which helped to bring out the differences between migration flows to South Africa and the UK (Vaugeois and Rollins 2007). Prior research has focused on the migration of Zimbabwean migrants to South Africa through the historical prism of WENELA schemes and cross border traders while that to the UK was mainly for higher education. This study does not support the archetypal characterisation of migration to South Africa being dominated by migrants with poor educational capital with that to the UK comprising sorely of highly educated migrants. Instead, it suggests that migration to both countries consists of both skilled and unskilled migrants who are moving in mixed flows. The comparative approach enables the research to use an empirically vigorous examination of transnationalism, using social capital and diaspora as frameworks for explaining the migration of Zimbabweans to South Africa and the UK. The study has demonstrated the centrality of the Zimbabwean diaspora to the lives of those in Zimbabwe. It has moved debate away from a fixation on movement from the South to the North by exploring movement from Zimbabwe to countries in both the South and the North.

Closely tied to the above contribution, empirically, the study has added to the already burgeoning literature on the Zimbabwean diaspora and its relationship with home - Zimbabwe. This was achieved by firstly, zeroing on the importance of migrants living away from home in the country’s economic and political fortunes. In contrast to existing studies which tend to consider migrants’ transnational practices from a North-South axis, this study examined transnationalism and migrants’ transnational identity in context of flows within both the North and South. The inclusion of migrants’ voices in South Africa and the UK helped the study to achieve this. What emerge from this study are the various meanings attached to ‘home’, ‘transnational linkages’, ‘diaspora’ and ‘return migration’. Some migrants in both countries do not consider themselves to be away from home; instead they consider South Africa and the UK home given advances in transport and communication. Furthermore, ‘home’ for some migrants was not seen as being ‘fixed’ in Zimbabwe per se, but rather as the current ‘place of abode.’ The study findings question some aspects of transnationalism e.g. circulation as some immobile migrants especially in the UK still considers their transnational linkages as transnationalism. The thesis therefore, contributes to our theoretical understanding of transnationalism by stretching its constituents to include the transnational activities of immobile migrants such as
asylum seekers in the UK who are proscribed from travelling home by virtue of their immigration status. Furthermore, extant transnationalism literature highlights the benefits which migrants and their home countries derive by living and working away from home while neglecting the contributions that they make to the economy of the host country. This study suggests that both South Africa and the UK appear to have benefited immensely from Zimbabwe’s skills flight (Tinarwo, 2011; Chikanda, 2010). By so doing, the study deviates from prior studies which have dwelled mostly on migrants’ origins.

The links that the migrants forge have been shown to extend to several countries within the southern African region, which shows that the benefits of migration have been felt not only in Zimbabwe but also in other countries. The study has shifted debate from the economic benefits of migration to other ‘subtle’ benefits which have been crucial in the repair of the country. These benefits are social, political and cultural, and are evidenced by the accumulation by migrants of human, social and cultural capital as a result of working in developed economies and world class facilities. The benefits engendered by migrants by being in the diaspora do not appear to have been occasioned by their immigration status. Migrants have been adept at using their agency to circumvent the hurdles wrought by their immigration status. The study highlighted that these acts encompass both legal and illegal acts e.g. the use of fraudulent documents and the sprouting of informal remitting channels which are popular with migrants because of their low fees in comparison to legal channels such as banks and registered MTOs.

The thesis argued that migrants’ transnational linkages are important arenas through which migrants depict and exhibit their ‘Zimbabweanness’ by re-enacting life through the prism of home. This is performed through buying and eating Zimbabwean food, attending and hosting Zimbabwean parties and other Zimbabwean themed events such as the National Independence Day and musical festivals. It is also at these events that stories are shared about being Zimbabwean in London or South Africa; how to access paid work without the requisite documentation etc. Whereas, Pasura (2008:276) asserted that ‘pubs and gochi-gochi are community spaces where sentimental bonds are etched, recycled’, this thesis demonstrated that these are shared and performed at both the private and public levels.

Fourthly, the theorised taxonomy of the Zimbabwean diaspora in UK and South Africa which was presented in Chapter 6 contributes to academic debate about the formation and experiences of modern day diasporas which comprise of both voluntary and involuntary departures. The taxonomy is unique because it is derived from migrants’ utterances which were captured in their narratives. Some scholars have argued against taxonomies by claiming that they categorise people (cf. Portes, 2003; Vertovec, 1999). The taxonomy advanced in this thesis is derived from migrants’ perceptions and reflections of their situation in the diaspora rather than the author fitting their narratives into already defined categories. In addition, far from
being rigid and static, the typology realises and captures the fluidity that pervades the lives of modern day migrants which are shaped, amplified and refracted by being ‘in the diaspora.’ Echoing Binaisa’s (2008:206) study of Ugandans in Britain, this study has demonstrated the futility of drawing boundaries ‘heuristically for the purposes of managing our research data between migrant, non-migrant, citizen, refugee, indigenous, non-indigenous’ because these categories are not etched in stone but should be reflective of migrants’ lived experiences. For some of these migrants in the diaspora, has had a transformative effect, e.g. for migrants who were shorn of opportunities at home, while those migrants with superfluous skills, the diaspora has had a devastating deskilling effect. The taxonomy presented in this study is fluid to reflect the complexity and mutability of the migration phenomenon.

The six categories presented in this study capture the lived realities of migrants in both countries where deportation, racism and xenophobia are everyday practices that migrants have to contend with. In both South Africa and the UK, deportation is seen as a way of managing immigration (Bloch and Schuster, 2005: 491). While South Africa under the leadership of President Zuma tried to deal with the ‘problem of Zimbabwean migrants’ humanely by relaxing its asylum policies which was followed by the grant of documented status to all Zimbabweans who presented at the Department of Home Affairs with valid passports, the same cannot be said of the UK government. The UK government has been vociferous in criticising the government of President Mugabe of human rights violations but has not matched this rhetoric in its treatment of Zimbabwean asylum seekers who have been continued to be used as pawns by both the Conservative and Labour parties in their battle for supremacy in domestic politics. The findings of this research therefore, build on the work of scholars such as Pasura (2008) to conceptually theorise the Zimbabwean diaspora. Some migrants in both South Africa and the UK left home both voluntarily and involuntarily. Furthermore, other migrants have since settled permanently in the UK and South Africa. Unlike other previous studies, this study noted that permanency was a growing phenomenon within Zimbabweans migrants as opposed to circulation. Having said this, it should be noted that permanency has not supplanted occasional home visits as this is one of the characteristic feature of the Zimbabwean diaspora in both countries.

The taxonomy advanced also demonstrated the importance of instrumentalism in the Zimbabwean migrants who have turned to political activism in order to satisfy their immigration status in the host country. Nowhere is this more explicit than in the UK where the grant of asylum is predicated on participation in oppositional politics of the Movement of Democratic Change. The findings of this study show that political activism for a significant number of migrants in the UK are shored up by the desire to acquire documented status as opposed to the attainment of democratic change at home. This is exemplified by Dudu (p. 165) who would rather have the status quo prevail for a while until she gets documented status. This is important because transnationalism has historically been framed as migrants participating in homeland
politics due to their desire to effect positive political change rather than for self interest in the host country (Faist, 2000; Vertovec, 1999). Migrants' political activism has prompted some scholars to characterise them as social actors who are socially aware of the circumstances in both the host and home country (Pasura, 2008). Such scholars further claim that participation in transnational diaspora politics is the preserve of ‘visible and epistemic’ members (Pasura, 2008) which is refuted by the findings of this study. The thesis has demonstrated that participation in diasporic politics is an open field which migrants ‘float in and out’ dictated by their socio-economic and political imperatives.

A notable contribution of this study to Zimbabwean migration literature pertains to the identification of the eight migration episodes between 1975 and 2010. These episodes were driven by a complex set of factors including the prosecution of the liberation war in the 1970s, the political violence of the early 1980s, the after effects of ESAP, the seizure of white owned commercial farms and political repression which all contributed to an economic meltdown that resulted in multiple migration flows to South Africa and the UK. These migration episodes comprised of migrants with different characteristics in terms of their age, education, financial and social capital endowments as well as the class structures that they hailed from which influenced their destination choices. Thus, the study finds the salience of social networks in the migration process as the information and support provided by prior migrants was invaluable in propelling and sustaining migration flows into both South Africa and the UK. Once a decision was made about exiting Zimbabwe, migrants left either formally or informally. The informality of migration was more prevalent amongst those migrants who moved to South Africa than to the UK due to close proximity, affordability and loose border patrols. Movement to the UK was curtailed by the exorbitant airfares which resulted in the predominance of migrants from middle to upper classes who could individually and collectively afford the airfares. The episodes identified had a bearing on migration outcomes e.g. the temporality or permanency of migration.

The study has furthered our understanding of the sacrifices that migrants make in order to gain a foothold in the labour markets of the host country. Some prior studies have focussed on the difficulties that ethnic minorities face in their endeavours to access labour markets (Iredale et al., 2003). This was confirmed in this study (Chapter 6) where it was demonstrated how migrants took jobs that were incommensurate with their professional and academic qualifications in order to gain a foothold in the employment ladder. These jobs typically involved care work and industrial work which were shown to have been the default entry route for migrants arriving in the UK while the agricultural sector in Limpopo is anchored by foreign nationals including Zimbabweans (Rutherford and Addison, 2007; Rutherford, 2011).

The study suggests that migrants appear to countenance ‘short term’ suffering in order to accumulate relevant experience and capital for use in the future. As Grillo
(2007:128) notes, ‘migrants find themselves occupying a liminal space, betwixt and between’ where according to Binaisa (2008:215) ‘they respond to the daily pressures of life as a migrant’ by partaking in jobs that are beneath their academic and professional qualifications thereby shattering any hopes of social mobility that they may have harboured at the inception of their migration journey. Working in low paying jobs in agricultural, care and manufacturing sectors can be argued to be ‘rites of passage’ which most migrants lacking the requisite skills needed in South Africa and the UK had to do prior to finding employment with better remuneration. The study, thus, contributes to literature on the problems that confront migrants in both regulated and unregulated work sectors in the two countries (Muzondidya, 2008; Pasura, 2008) which are dominated by underemployment, deskilling, exploitation and downward social mobility. In so doing the study adds to literature on nascent diasporas which have until now been under the shadow of established ones. It shifts focus from a preoccupation with the difficulties that dominant Diasporas such as the Pakistani (Anwar, 1979) to less established ones in the mould of the nascent Zimbabwean diaspora. The study therefore, contributes to the studies about inclusion and exclusion of ethnic minority members in the labour markets in both South Africa and the UK. In accord with other prior studies, the study observed the difficulties that migrants face in the host countries regardless of documentation, which could form the basis for further research. However, for some migrants, career progression remained elusive, leaving them stuck in low paying jobs which they initially thought were temporary inconveniences.

Notwithstanding the difficulties that migrants face in adapting and accessing the labour market, this study revealed opportunities of the diaspora which some migrants have exploited for upward social mobility. The UK has been shown to have more opportunities than South Africa once a migrant obtains documented status. The thesis showed how some migrants have utilised their time in exile to enhance their educational capital. This was more pronounced in the UK than in South Africa because of easier access to higher education institutions as well as the different flows of migrants. It would be recalled that the UK attracted a different breed of migrants who had superior educational qualifications than those who moved to South Africa. In this context therefore, the thesis makes a significant contribution to contemporary literature and debates ‘brain gain’ as opposed to ‘brain drain’ which scholars such as Ghosh (2006) and Chikanda (2011) have shed light on. The study does not suggest that all skilled migrants would return given the competing demands such as family and career prospects which question the applicability of some migration notions of return migration and brain circulation (Chikanda, 2011). The thesis does not support assertions by commentators such as Marcelli and Lowell (2005) who claim that that migrants’ transnational practices such as remittances are denuded by the amount of time that they would have spent in the host country. On the contrary, the thesis noted that migrants still maintain links with their families at home and elsewhere regardless of the time that they would have spent away from home. In this regard, the study contributes to literature by demonstrating that
migrants’ transnational transactions do not appear to be circumscribed by the length of time that they would have spent away from home (Marcelli and Lowell, 2005).

The sixth contribution of this study pertains to return migration of millions of Zimbabweans living outside their country. In accord with other studies, the study found that migrants hoped to return home after brief sojourns in South Africa and the UK (Chikanda, 2010; Pasura, 2008). Mirroring other studies, migrants had misconceptions about the UK and South Africa with a significant number of study participants stating that they thought they would work hard for six months before returning home triumphantly (Duval, 2004). These misconceptions have not been realised as the ‘gold that they wished the streets of London and Johannesburg were paved with has not materialised’ which has impacted on their return intentions. Consequently some migrants have found themselves getting married and raising children in the diaspora while others have had to start new relationships and families with new spouses after failing to be reunited with the families trapped at home due to immigration constraints. This comes at a time when Zimbabwe is reeling from serious human capital shortages following years of haemorrhaging skilled professionals. The study argues that return migration should be interrogated through a multi-disciplinary perspective rather than narrow models which privilege economic motivations at the expense of social and structural factors. This has policy implications for the government of Zimbabwe which is currently enmeshed in constitutional debate about how to handle the Zimbabwean diaspora issue.

9.4 Methodological contribution

Methodologically, the study contributes to scholarly literature on researching ‘double’ hidden groups who fear reprisals from both the host and home countries. Some Zimbabwean migrants expressed fear not only of their own security but also of those left behind should their identities be divulged and come to the attention of President Mugabe and his ZANU (PF) supporters because of their political activism at home and abroad. Similarly, others were reluctant to come forward because of their tenuous immigration status which could lead to deportation which has disastrous consequences for them and their families.

Researching documented migrants was equally beset with problems given the complexity of the Zimbabwean migration, pervaded by the politics of President Mugabe. The fear of President Mugabe’s intelligence operatives transcended boundaries and was feared by both sets of migrants alike. Accessing the right type of migrants was integral to the success of this research as it sought to be inclusive, capturing the views of the different constituents of the Zimbabwean diaspora. The study employed new and innovative research methods including the use of online questionnaires, which were a success in the UK where migrants had busy working schedules which precluded face to face meetings. The use of online methods simplified the process of gaining people’s insights on their lives in the diaspora. It
can be suggested that using the internet and online methods for data collection is ideally matched to the study of ‘transient’ communities, some of whom have an aversion for officialdom, given their tenuous immigration status.

Secondly, the study’s methodological contribution lies in its use of mixed methods to examine the reasons underlying the migrants’ decisions to leave Zimbabwe; their transnational transactions and return intentions. The dual use of questionnaire survey and qualitative methods e.g. interviews and ethnography was shown to be a suitable approach to researching hard to reach groups unlike contrary to traditional migration approaches which place too much emphasis on quantitative methods. The use of a hybrid approach gave deeper insights to migrants’ experiences and resulted in the collection of data which would otherwise not have been possible had the research only used quantitative methods. The different methodologies complemented each other to the benefit of the research given that it concerned some hard to reach groups thereby contributing to academic debates about undertaking fieldwork with both ‘hard to reach’ groups and documented migrants.

Thirdly, the methodology was both participatory and ethnographic as it entailed both living and staying with research participants as well as key protagonists in stemming illegal immigration. The time I spent with members of the SANDF on border patrol duties was revealing and enriched this study as I was able to observe and participate in their day to day operations. It also afforded me the opportunity to talk with migrants who would have been intercepted trying to ‘jump the border’ to understand their motivations, fears and anxieties and future plans. The multi-sited nature of the study meant that I was able to reach out to a diverse range of study participants in both Leeds and Limpopo. In Limpopo, I was able to reach out to participants in farming areas, in small towns such as Thohoyandou and bigger ones such as Polokwane, in villages and in shelters which enriched the study as it captured the multiple interpretations and meanings attached to what constitute being in the diaspora and return.

9.5 Policy Implications

It is proposed that the policy relevance of this research is rooted in its engagement with the world today – the nexus between migration and development through migrants’ transnational transactions like remittances. In a world of contracting FDI, the role that migrants are playing as sources of forex cannot be underestimated. Regardless of the critical role that the diaspora played in averting the total economic implosion of the Zimbabwean economy, the government of Zimbabwe does not seem to have a coherent diaspora policy.

The study suggests that for Zimbabwe to derive higher returns from her exiled people there is need to build safe remitting channels which have migrants’ trust and buy-in. The informal systems that are currently being used by some sections of the
migrant population in both South Africa and the UK have resulted in the leakage of foreign currency and losses by migrants. The engagement of financial institutions could therefore, focus on shrinking the transactions costs which are acting as a barrier to the majority of migrants who are on low wages. Extant literature points to the extensive use of informal remitting channels in Asia and Africa (Sander and Maimbo, 2006).

The host conditions in which migrants live in South Africa and the UK have been highlighted, so too the exploitation that they endure because of their immigration status and transnational remitting obligations. It has been suggested that there is need for greater intervention by the governments of destination countries to stem this exploitative practices. The research noted the involvement of non-state actors in the provision of welfare services in both South Africa and the UK. This research can be the foundation upon which the capacities of these institutions, especially those in South Africa, can be strengthened to further meet the needs of all migrants rather than Zimbabwean ones only.

While the government of Zimbabwe profess to recognise the important role that its citizens in the diaspora play in the national socio-economic development, it has not fleshed up its diaspora policy. Not much is known about how the government intends to harness the developmental potential of its citizens apart from the usual rhetoric although there is a desk in the Prime Minister’s office which is supposed to deal with diaspora issues. What the study brought to the fore is the need for the Zimbabwean government to be proactive in its interactions with her non-resident nationals in order to tap into the skills and expertise that the diaspora Zimbabweans evidently possess. Some countries such as Sri Lanka have created institutions to study, legislate, and administer the migration flows after realising the important role that their non-resident nationals play in economic development.

9.6 Limitations of the study

The major limitation of the study pertains to the lack of a sampling frame given the unavailability of reliable data sets about the actual number of Zimbabweans resident in South Africa and the UK in general and Limpopo and Leeds in particular. This coerced me to use purposive and snowball sampling which may have discriminated against other migrants who were socially isolated given the hidden nature of the participants under study. The informal nature of migration which was discussed in Chapters 2 and 5 further exacerbates the problem of reliable data. Informal and undocumented migrants are inclined to shy away from having contact with officials due to fear of deportation as demonstrated in Chapter 6. The problem of researching hidden migrants is not peculiar to Zimbabweans in South Africa and the UK alone, but can be applied to other studies that are concerned with researching informal and illegal migrants in other developed countries.
There is a pervasive fear not only of the immigration authorities in South Africa and the UK, but also with the alleged infiltration of President Mugabe’s intelligence operatives within the Zimbabwean communities in South Africa and the UK. As discussed in Chapter 4, this palpable fear may have impacted on the diversity of the sample as some potential participants may have been dissuaded from participating in the study. Migrants who declined to participate on the basis of fear of President Mugabe’s secret police claimed that they were afraid of possible security ramifications that participating may endanger to their families in Zimbabwe. Furthermore, some participants were reluctant to participate because of fears of deportation and had reservations about the purpose of the study. This was particularly the case in the UK were migrants feared that the study may have been a ploy by the Home Office to identify undocumented migrants for deportation which would have repercussions on their livelihoods as well as that of those left behind. It is therefore likely that some groups were under represented in the sample due to fears for their own security as well as that of their families still in Zimbabwe.

9.7 Areas for Future Research

The results of the study have important implications for the study of migration of both skilled and non-skilled migrants. By undertaking this comparative research which focused on mixed flows of migrants, avenues for further research have appeared. Future research could follow through the experiences of migrants identified in this research to better understand their transnational practices and investigate their effects on the recipients in Zimbabwe. For example, such a study may explore the use of remittances by those at home to ascertain their developmental role. Closely linked to the above is the need for a longitudinal study of Zimbabwean migrants currently in Leeds and Limpopo in about 10 years from now to investigate their progress and perspectives about their experience in the diaspora or at home if they would have returned. This may help to provide answers to the mixed messages that some migrants are sending about their return intentions given the tenuous political situation at home which induced some migrants to adopt a wait and see attitude.

Further comparative studies can be undertaken in other parts of South Africa and the UK or other countries with significant concentrations of Zimbabwean migrants in order to draw out similarities and differences with this study. Such endeavours would provide holism to the research as they would be able to compare their experiences with those documented in this thesis. Similarly, future research may focus on the progress that the returnees and their families would have made in Zimbabwe. This is pertinent given the emerging identity conflicts between migrants and their children raised in South Africa and the UK who do not have the same attachment to Zimbabwe as their parents.
There is scope to explore the experiences of the migrants who have moved to other countries, such as Australia, from South Africa and the UK, to find out their experiences. While this thesis documented the experiences of some migrants that had returned home and migrated again to South Africa after failing to settle at home, there is evidence of some migrants who have returned to Zimbabwe only to continue their migration to third countries such as Australia and New Zealand. Such studies can explore the differences between the migrants’ experiences in South Africa, the UK, Zimbabwe and the new host country to elicit similarities and differences.

Furthermore, future studies may want to investigate health and well-being issues within the Zimbabwean diaspora in South Africa and the UK. This is an under-researched area given the multiple health inequalities prevalent in this community. In the UK, it is known that people from ethnic minorities face multiple health inequalities. Lack of documentation is exacerbating these inequalities given the limited access to health services that refused asylum seekers have. Such an exploration may look at the gendered effect of these inequalities given the differential health needs.

The lifestyle transition from Zimbabwe to the host country also needs scholarly attention. Migrants were not prepared for life in South Africa and the UK, and the cultural clashes have resulted in family breakdowns, child protection issues, and poor educational attainment by children and young people. Some families have had their children removed by social services. There is need for further work which investigates how children have been affected by the transition from life in Zimbabwe to life in South Africa and the UK. Some parents have also returned home with their children; transitional, adaptation and integration issues of such returned children and their parents merit further attention.

A further area of research could be to track and document the experiences of skilled returnees who left Zimbabwe without any qualifications, in order to establish their experiences in the job market upon their return. Such an exploration would explicate the extent to which the newly acquired human capital skills gained in the UK are being deployed given the tensions that may exist between locally trained and foreign trained workers. Chapter 8 alluded to the existence of this tension between returnees and those who had stayed behind during the crisis. A study of this nature would also illuminate our understanding of the difficulties that returnees face in entering the job market in Zimbabwe, given the length of time that they have been away.
Bibliography


of pregnancy weight gain on the size of infants born to underweight women', *Obstet Gynecol*, 57: 13–17.


Lipton, L. (1980) ‘Migration from rural areas of poor countries: The impact on rural productivity and income distribution’, World Development, 8: 10-20


Mead, D. (2011) ‘Swingeing public sector cuts are likely to generate an autumn and winter of discontent. We need a new public debate on the role of the police and legitimate forms of political protest and direct action’. British Politics and Policy at LSE. [Available at http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/36728/] [Accessed on 12/01/2012]


Redfoot, D. L. and Houser, A. N. (2005) ‘*We Shall Travel On*: Quality of Care, Economic Development, and the International Migration of Long-Term Care Workers (AARP Public Policy Institute, Washington, DC.


Slany, K. and Malek, K. (2005) ‘Female emigration from Poland during the period of the systematic transformation (on the basis of the emigration from Poland to the USA and Italy’, In K. Slany (ed.) International Migration: a multidimensional analysis. Cracow, Poland: AGH University of Science and Technology Press, pp. 115–54.


The Independent (2012) Ballot mightier than the bullet. 8 June 2012 [Available at http://www.theindependent.co.zw/comment/35879-ballot-mightier-than-the-bullet_.html] [Accessed on 8 June 2012]


United Kingdom Central Council (1998) *Commission for Nursing and Midwifery Education. Fitness for Practice.* London: UKCC.


Head of Department
Professor Grant Bigg
Department of Geography
University of Sheffield
Winter Street
SHEFFIELD
S10 2TN
Telephone: 0114 2227953
Fax: 0114 2227012
Email: D.Sporton@sheffield.ac.uk

4th October 2000

MR LIBERTY MUPAKATI

This serves to confirm that the above named person is a PhD research student at the University of Sheffield’s School of Geography who is currently conducting his fieldwork in Leeds, UK and Limpopo, South Africa. The fieldwork is expected to run from October 2000 to June 2010. Liberty’s research project is about Zimbabweans who are currently living away from home in Limpopo, South Africa and Leeds, UK.

In order for him to delve deeper into the issues surrounding the Zimbabwean diaspora in both South Africa and the UK, Liberty would be grateful if you could spare him some of your time to enable him to have a short interview with you which will last no more than an hour and a half. If you are an organization, he may need access to some data that only your department may hold about the people that he is researching on and I would be grateful if you may help him have access to this data. All the information that he collects/accesses from you is only going to be used for research purposes and will be in line with the University of Sheffield’s research ethics. Liberty will observe your right to confidentiality and would treat any information that you may avail to him in the strictest of confidence.

I would be extremely grateful if you could render any form of assistance to Liberty in his research project.

Yours sincerely

Deborah Sporton, PhD
Supervisor
APPENDIX 2 – SELF INTRODUCTORY LETTER TO ALL PARTICIPANTS

Hello,

My name is Liberty Mupakati and I am a student at the University of Sheffield in Sheffield, UK. The title of this study is: Reparation and Inequality through different Diasporas: The case of the Zimbabwean diaspora in South Africa and the UK.

I am kindly asking you to participate in a study which is focusing on Zimbabwean adults who are living away from home/exile in Leeds (UK) and Limpopo Province (South Africa). I would like to ask you some questions about your experiences. I want to know how you came to the United Kingdom and South Africa and about your life here particularly as you interact with service providers. I am also interested in knowing the experiences of service providers who are implementing programmes targeting Zimbabweans migrants. There is no right or wrong answers to these questions; I just want to know what you think.

Often people make decisions for migrants and asylum seekers without asking them. I want to find out what you think so that I can tell the government and other people who make decisions about migrants and asylum seekers’ lives. The interview should take about one and half hours. There might be follow up interviews and every time I will seek your consent. Participation in the study may take you away from your normal daily activities. I will spend at least three months in Musina as I want to understand your lives or work in detail.

The interview will be conducted at a place you view as private and where you feel comfortable sharing the story of your experiences with me. I may ask you to allow me to attend some of the meetings and events that you hold, attend or places of interest that you visit within the town. In addition I may ask you to allow me to either observe or participate in some of the activities you will be doing. This will allow me to have hands on experience about what you go through in your lives.

I may also ask you some questions about your life or organization that you find difficult to answer or upsetting. I will provide you with a list of organizations which can provide you with professional support (show list).

There will not be direct benefit to you as an individual, friends, family or organization but the information that you will provide will be useful in the understanding the lives of migrants and asylum seekers and the work of service providers. This information might later assist service providers to better assist other migrants and forced migrants.

I will not write down your name or address so no one will know what you have said. I will write all the migrants’ answers in a report, but no one will know which answer is yours.
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary and you are free to decline to participate. If you decide not to participate in this study, your decision will not affect you or your organization's future relations with any organization. If you choose to participate, you will still have the right to withdraw from participating in the study at any time without negative consequences to you or your organization. You do not have to answer any question that you do not want to answer. If you have any questions related to this study you are free to ask, before or after you have agreed to participate in the study.

For any questions you may have regarding this study, you are advised to contact Liberty on the following telephone numbers +27 780 638 383 (SA) or +44 773 312 5796 (UK) or on this email: L.Mupakati@sheffield.ac.uk/ libertymup@gmail.com.

Should you wish to make a complaint regarding any aspect of this study or how it has been conducted, please contact the PhD study supervisors, Dr. Deborah Sporton on the following telephone number +44 114; Email: D.Sporton@sheffield.ac.uk or Dr Chasca Twyman on +44 114 222 7953; Email: C.Twyman@sheffield.ac.uk.
Appendix 3 – Questionnaire Survey

My name is Liberty Mupakati, a PhD research student in the School of Geography at the University of Sheffield, United Kingdom. I am currently undertaking a research project which seeks to profile the various constituencies of the Zimbabwean diaspora, their lived experiences and the inequalities inherent in this diasporic group in the United Kingdom and South Africa.

I appreciate that the study is very sensitive and may evoke sad memories of your flight from Zimbabwe. I have to point out that you do not have to participate in this study if you do not wish to and that you may withdraw your participation at any time without prejudice. All the information that would have been collected about you would be destroyed once you have decided to withdraw.

Great care and significance will be placed on ensuring your anonymity and confidentiality. Accordingly, no one will have access to this data and no names will be recorded if you do not wish. All field notes, tapes or transcripts from the study will be stored in a safe place and the information will only be used for the purpose of the research. You can ask any questions at any time and you will receive information about the research results. You will not be coerced into participating in this study and your inalienable right to choose whether or not to participate will be respected. This research will be guided by and will conform to the University of Sheffield’s research ethics.

PART A: BIRTH PLACE AND OTHER RELATED DATA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Options</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Having heard the purpose of the research do you want to participate in this survey?</td>
<td>1. Yes 2. No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. What is your country of residence?</td>
<td>1. United Kingdom 2. South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Other (please specify)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. South African 3. Dual (Zim &amp; British)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Dual, Zim &amp; S. African)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Other (please specify)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. In which province were you born?

<p>| | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Bulawayo</td>
<td>2. Harare</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Manicaland</td>
<td>4. Mashonaland Central</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Mashonaland East</td>
<td>6. Mashonaland West</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Masvingo</td>
<td>8. Matebeleland North</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Don’t know</td>
<td>10. Matebeleland South</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Midlands</td>
<td>12. Other (please specify)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. In which district were you born?

7. How would you describe your ethnicity as?

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Shona</td>
<td>2. Ndebele</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Manyika</td>
<td>4. Shangaan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Tonga</td>
<td>6. Venda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Muchikunda</td>
<td>8. White Zimbabwe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. What is the main language that you speak in your household?

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. English</td>
<td>2. Shona/Karanga</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Ndebele</td>
<td>4. Shangaan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Venda</td>
<td>6. Tonga</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Chikunda</td>
<td>8. Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. What is your marital status?

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Married</td>
<td>2. Single</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Cohabiting</td>
<td>4. Divorced/Separated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Widowed</td>
<td>6. Refused to disclose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10. Do you have children? If no, skip to Q13.

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Yes</td>
<td>2. No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11. Where do your children live?

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. With you in SA/UK</td>
<td>2. Elsewhere in SA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. In Zimbabwe</td>
<td>4. Elsewhere in the UK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. Other (please specify) 9. Don’t know  

12. If you have children who are in Zimbabwe, are you financially responsible for them?

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Yes</td>
<td>2. No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Sometimes</td>
<td>4. Other (please specify)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13. If your parents are still living in Zimbabwe, are you financially responsible for them?

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Yes</td>
<td>2. No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Sometimes</td>
<td>4. Other (please specify)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14. Are you financially responsible for any family members that still live in Zimbabwe?

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Yes</td>
<td>2. No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Sometimes</td>
<td>4. Other (please specify)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15. What is the highest educational qualification that you attained in Zimbabwe?

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0. None</td>
<td>1. Primary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Secondary</td>
<td>3. College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Undergraduate</td>
<td>5. Masters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Doctorate</td>
<td>7. Other (please specify)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

16. What is the highest educational qualification that you attained in UK?

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0. None</td>
<td>1. Primary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Secondary</td>
<td>3. College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Undergraduate</td>
<td>5. Masters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Doctorate</td>
<td>7. Other (please specify)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17. What is the highest educational qualification that you attained in SA?

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0. None</td>
<td>1. Primary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Secondary</td>
<td>3. College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Undergraduate</td>
<td>5. Masters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Doctorate</td>
<td>7. Other (please specify)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### PART B: MIGRATION HISTORY & TRAJECTORIES

18. **In which period did you come to SA/UK?**  
   1. Pre 1999  
   2. 2000-2002  
   3. 2003-2005  
   4. 2006-2008  
   5. 2009-2010  
   6. Other (please specify)  
   9. Don’t know  

19. **What was the main reason that caused you to leave Zimbabwe?**  
   1. Economic/poverty/unemployment  
   2. Political  
   3. Join family  
   4. Study  
   5. For career and professional development  
   9. Don’t know  

20. **Did you travel directly to SA/UK from Zimbabwe? If yes, skip to Q22.**  
   1. Yes  
   2. No  

21. **If you did not travel directly to South Africa/United Kingdom, which other countries did you pass through?**  

22. **How did you travel to SA/UK? If you crossed into SA other than by foot, skip to Q24.**  
   1. Bus  
   2. Car  
   3. Walked  
   4. Train/Goods train  
   5. Long distance cargo hauliers  
   6. Air  
   9. Don’t know  

23. **If you travelled by foot, how long did it take you to reach your destination?**  
   1. Under a week  
   2. Two weeks  
   3. Three weeks  
   4. Over four weeks  
   9. Don’t know  

24. **Which border post did you use to enter SA/UK?**  

25. **What problems did you face at the border?**  

26. **If you used informal crossing points to enter South Africa, what problems did you face during your journey?**  

27. **Have you ever been detained by the Immigration authorities i.e. South African Police Services/Department for Home Affairs or UK’s Border and**
**Immigration Agency (Home Office)? If you have not been detained, skip to Q30.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**28. If detained, how many times were you detained?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Once</th>
<th>Twice</th>
<th>Can’t remember</th>
<th>Don’t want to answer</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**29. If detained, why were you detained?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Illegal entry</th>
<th>Overstaying the visa</th>
<th>Drink driving</th>
<th>Leaving children home alone</th>
<th>Use of fraudulent documents</th>
<th>Domestic violence</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**30. Have you ever been deported by South Africa’s Department of Home Affairs or the UK’s Border and Immigration Agency (Home Office) back to Zimbabwe? If no, skip to Q33.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**31. If you have been deported, how many times have you been deported? (SHOW CARDS #1)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Once</th>
<th>Twice</th>
<th>Can’t remember</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**32. Why were you deported?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Overstaying the visa</th>
<th>Illegal entry</th>
<th>Illegal working</th>
<th>Criminal offences</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PART C LIVING ARRANGEMENTS AND HOUSING HISTORY**

**33. How would you describe your current housing arrangements?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very Poor</th>
<th>Poor</th>
<th>Fair</th>
<th>Good</th>
<th>Excellent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
34. Using a rating of 1-5, where 1 means “very poor”, and 5 “excellent”, how would you rate the quality of your current housing arrangements? (SHOW CARDS #2)

1. Very Poor  
2. Poor  
3. Fair  
4. Good  
5. Excellent  

35. Overall, how would you rate your neighbourhood as a place to live in? Would you say it is? (SHOW CARDS #3)

1. Very Poor  
2. Poor  
3. Fair  
4. Good  
5. Excellent  

36. Have you ever slept rough i.e. slept on the streets, bush, bus shelter, petrol station etc? If no, skip to Q39.

1. Yes  
2. No  
9. Don’t know  

37. If rough sleeping/slept rough, how long did you slept rough/have you been rough sleeping? (SHOW CARDS #4)

1. Less than 1 week  
2. 1-2 weeks  
3. 2-3 weeks  
4. 3-4 weeks  
5. Over 4 weeks  
9. Don’t know  

38. What are/were the reasons for rough sleeping?

1. Can’t find work  
2. Evicted due to non-payment of rent  
3. Can’t find work due to immigration status  
4. Family/relationship breakdown  
5. Can’t remember  
9. Don’t know  

39. What was the visa type you held when you first entered SA/UK?

0. None  
1. Visitor’s/Tourist  
2. Student  
3. Work Permit  
4. Transit  
5. Family reunion/Settlement  
6. Ancestry  
7. Entertainment/Business  
9. Don’t know  

40. What is your current immigration status? (SHOW CARDS #5)

1. Asylum Seeker Permit/Asylum seeker  
2. Work Permit  
3. Refugee/ILR/Residency  
4. Undocumented  
5. Citizen  
6. Student
### PART D: FAMILY AND SOCIAL NETWORKS

**41. Have you been back to Zimbabwe since you came to SA/UK? If no, skip to Q44.**

- 1. Yes
- 2. No

**42. If you have been to Zimbabwe, how many times have you been there in the last 12 months?**

- 1. Once
- 2. Twice
- 3. Thrice
- 4. Over 4 times
- 5. Can’t remember
- 9. Don’t know

**43. What was the main purpose of your visit to Zimbabwe in your most recent visit?**

- 1. Get married
- 2. Business
- 3. Political meeting
- 4. Attend a funeral
- 5. Illness in the family
- 6. Attend a job interview
- 7. Visiting family
- 9. Don’t know

**44. Thinking back to the time you left Zimbabwe for SA/UK, what made you choose to migrate to SA/UK?**

- 1. Family ties
- 2. Friends
- 3. Social networks
- 4. Family reunion
- 5. Safety and security
- 6. Accomplishments of others already settled there
- 7. Take up job offer
- 8. No particular reason
- 9. Don’t know

**45. Who paid for your travel?**

- 1. Self
- 2. Family
- 3. Spouse
- 4. Friends
- 5. Agent
- 6. Combination of family/friends/employer
- 9. Don’t know

**46. Who did you first stay with when you first arrived in SA/UK? (SHOW CARDS #6)**

- 1. Alone
- 2. Spouse
- 3. Friends
- 4. Relative
- 5. Hostel/Shelter
- 6. Employer
7. Church  9. Don’t know

47. Did you receive any help from other Zimbabweans who were already in SA/UK when you were still in Zimbabwe? If no, skip to Q49.

1. Yes  2. No  9. Don’t know

48. If you did, what sort of help was this?

1. Financial  2. Groceries/Foodstuffs
3. Payment of school fees  4. Invitation letter
5. College applications  9. Don’t know

49. Did you receive any help from other Zimbabweans who were already settled in SA/UK when you first arrived in the country? If no, skip to Q51.

1. Yes  2. No  9. Don’t know

50. If you did, what sort of help was this?

1. Accommodation  2. Help to open bank account
3. Getting a job  4. College applications
5. Childcare  6. Asylum claim
7. Remittances  8. Contacting home
9. Don’t know

51. Are you in contact with your family in Zimbabwe? If no, skip to Q54.

1. Yes  2. No

52. If so, how do you contact them? (SHOW CARDS #7)

1. Telephone/text/sms  2. Email
3. Letters  4. Word of mouth/intermediaries
5. Physical visits  9. Don’t know

53. How often do you contact your family? (SHOW CARDS #8)

1. Daily  2. Weekly
3. A few times a month  4. Monthly
5. Never  9. Don’t know

54. Do you participate in Zimbabwean oriented activities in SA/UK?

1. Yes  2. No
55. **What sort of Zimbabwean related activities do you participate in? If none, skip to Q57. (SHOW CARDS #9)**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Weddings</td>
<td>2. Parties and braais</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Church</td>
<td>4. Football tournaments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Political meetings/demonstrations</td>
<td>6. Independence day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

56. **How often do you take part in these activities?**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Weekly</td>
<td>2. Fortnightly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Yearly</td>
<td>6. As and when</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Can’t remember</td>
<td>9. Don’t know</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

57. **Since your arrival in SA/UK, have you remitted (sent money or goods) to Zimbabwe? If no, skip to Q59.**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Yes</td>
<td>2. No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

58. **If you remit to Zimbabwe, how often do you remit to Zimbabwe?**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3. Every two months</td>
<td>4. A few times a year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Yearly</td>
<td>6. As and when required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

59. **Who are the beneficiaries of your remittances?**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Spouse</td>
<td>2. Children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Parents</td>
<td>4. Relatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Friends</td>
<td>6. Orphans and vulnerable children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Political party</td>
<td>8. Religious organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

60. **Approximately how much money have you remitted to Zimbabwe in the last 12 months? (SHOW CARDS #10)**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. £0-£1000.00</td>
<td>2. £1,100-£2000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. £2,100-£3,000.00</td>
<td>4. £3,100-£4000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. £4,100.00+</td>
<td>9. Don’t know</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

61. **During the last 12 months, for which of the following reasons have you**
remitted money or goods to Zimbabwe or elsewhere?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1. Education</th>
<th>2. Household maintenance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Health and medical care</td>
<td>6. Agricultural purposes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Clothing</td>
<td>8. Business investment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

62. Which of the following remittance methods did you use in the last 12 months? (SHOW CARDS #11)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1. Registered MTOs</th>
<th>2. Informal MTOs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>High Street Bank</td>
<td>4. Friends/Relatives/Personally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Informal couriers</td>
<td>9. Don’t know</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

63. What was your main consideration(s) in settling for this method? (SHOW CARDS #12)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1. Costs</th>
<th>2. Speed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Ease of use</td>
<td>4. Trustworthy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Guarantee of remittance reaching recipient</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Only method I know</td>
<td>7. Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Recommended by colleagues</td>
<td>9. Don’t know</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

64. What in your opinion are the consequences to yourself of remitting? (SHOW CARDS #13)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1. Pride in my work</th>
<th>2. Feeling good that I am helping my family</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Doing my duty</td>
<td>4. Stress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Little or no social life</td>
<td>9. Don’t know</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

65. What is your annual household income? (SHOW CARDS #14)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0. None</th>
<th>2. Less than £10000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>£11,000-£20,000</td>
<td>4. £21,000-£30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Over £31,000</td>
<td>9. Don’t know</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

66. In your opinion, do you think there are inequalities within the Zimbabwean community in Limpopo/Leeds? If no, skip to Q69.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1. Yes</th>
<th>2. No</th>
<th>9. Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
67. What, in your opinion are the causes of these inequalities?

1. Education  
2. Immigration Status
3. Unemployment  
4. Gender
5. Area of origin in Zimbabwe  
6. Lack of social networks
9. Don’t know

68. Has being in SA/UK improved your life when compared to what it was when you were in Zimbabwe? If No, skip to Q71.

1. Yes  
2. No  
3. Don’t know

69. If you feel it has improved, please describe in what ways you think that it has?

70. If you answered No in Q69 above, please explain in what ways do you feel that your life has not improved by being in South Africa/United Kingdom?

71. What was your last job in Zimbabwe prior to emigrating to South A/UK?

72. What is your current job now?

73. Is this job:

1. Permanent?  
2. Temporary?  
9. Don’t know

74. Is it:

1. Full-time  
2. Part-time  
9. Don’t know

75. If you are not working, what is the reason for this?

76. Do you think you are using the skills that you acquired whilst you were still in Zimbabwe in your current job?

1. Yes  
2. No  
3. Partly
4. Never trained for any qualification  
9. Don’t know

77. Do you intend to return and settle in Zimbabwe?

1. Yes  
2. No  
9. Don’t know

78. What would induce you to return and settle in Zimbabwe? (SHOW CARDS #15)
1. Dual citizenship
2. Improved job prospects
3. End of political violence and harassment
4. Own a house
5. Accumulated sufficient savings
6. Financial incentives
7. Improved social services
8. Change in government
9. Don’t know

79. **How old are you? (SHOW CARDS #16)**

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 18-27</td>
<td>2. 28-37</td>
<td>3. 38-47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. 48-57</td>
<td>5. 58-67</td>
<td>6. 68+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Don’t know</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

80. **What is your gender?**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Male</td>
<td>2. Female</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 4 – Request for volunteers’ flyer and advert

Request for volunteers in the Leeds (UK) and Limpopo (South Africa) areas to participate in a questionnaire survey

I am appealing for 200 volunteers in Leeds and Limpopo areas to participate in a questionnaire survey about a study that I am currently doing regarding Zimbabweans who are currently living away from home/ in exile and are resident in the Leeds and Limpopo areas and their vicinity. The survey is part of my studies that I am undertaking at The University of Sheffield’s School of Geography.

Completing the questionnaire will take no more than 45 minutes and all the information provided will be treated in the strictest of confidence and will be according to the University of Sheffield’s Research Ethics. In conformity with the University of Sheffield's Research Ethics and Guidelines on Research, no names and other confidential information will be collected. Participants also have the option of choosing pseudo names where they do not want their names to be known.

Should you wish to participate in the questionnaire survey, please contact me on the following email address: L.Mupakati@Sheffield.ac.uk or Mobile: 07733125796.

[The advert was placed in the Zimbabwe Times (www.zimbabwetimes.com); SW Radio Africa (www.swradioafrica.com); ZW News (www.zwnews.com); Zimbabwe Situation (www.zimbabwesituation.com) and at public spaces patronised by Zimbabwean migrants in Leeds and Limpopo].
### APPENDIX 5 – Profile of interview participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Immigration Status</th>
<th>Employment status</th>
<th>Profession</th>
<th>Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Donald</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Undocumented</td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>Accountant</td>
<td>Leeds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musa</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Asylum seeker</td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>Leeds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eliza</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>British citizen</td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>Nurse</td>
<td>Leeds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nelson</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>British citizen</td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>Security Guard</td>
<td>Leeds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owen</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Asylum seeker</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Leeds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lynne</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>British citizen</td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>Nurse</td>
<td>Leeds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irvine</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>British citizen</td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>Biomedical scientist</td>
<td>Leeds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chamu</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Settlement</td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>Leeds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nkosinathi</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Settlement</td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>Leeds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veronica</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Citizen</td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>Leeds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chido</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Undocumented</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Leeds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nokhuthula</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Refugee</td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>Social Worker</td>
<td>Leeds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charity</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Undocumented</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Leeds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gordon</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Asylum seeker</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>Leeds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malvern</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Citizen</td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>General Hand</td>
<td>Leeds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mduduzi</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Citizen</td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>Nuclear Physicist</td>
<td>Leeds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Betty</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Asylum seeker</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>Lecturer</td>
<td>Leeds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sam</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Refugee</td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>Nurse</td>
<td>Leeds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shadreck</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Undocumented</td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>Civil servant</td>
<td>Leeds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dudu</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Undocumented</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>Leeds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Esther</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Indefinite Leave</td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>Nurse</td>
<td>Leeds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>British citizen</td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>Social work manager</td>
<td>Leeds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shamiso</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Settlement</td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>Learning assistant</td>
<td>Leeds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jervas</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>British citizen</td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>Management</td>
<td>Leeds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomon</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Refugee</td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>Local governance</td>
<td>Leeds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Business Visa</td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>Businessman</td>
<td>Leeds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zenzo</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>British Citizen</td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>Lawyer</td>
<td>Leeds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Status</td>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thandeka</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Asylum seeker</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>Domestic worker</td>
<td>Leeds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Chokuda</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Citizen</td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>Medical Doctor</td>
<td>Polokwane</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monica</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Undocumented</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>Technician</td>
<td>Phalaborwa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ntokwazi</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Asylum seeker</td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Ellisras</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dickson</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Work Permit</td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>Technician</td>
<td>Tzaneen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darios</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Asylum seeker</td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Giyani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Felicity</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Undocumented</td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Thabazimbi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mirirai</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Asylum seeker</td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
<td>Waterberg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davidson</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Permanent Resident</td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>Seshegho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blessing</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Work Permit</td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>Louis Trichard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Work Permit</td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>Banker</td>
<td>Ellisras</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muchi</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Work Permit</td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>Technician</td>
<td>Vaalwater</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khanyesile</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Undocumented</td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Vaalwater</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hlanganani</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Undocumented</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>Potgiersrus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caroline</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Asylum Seeker</td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>Shop Assistant</td>
<td>Roedtan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matongo</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Work Permit</td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Polokwane</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panashe</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Work Permit</td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>Technician</td>
<td>Polokwane</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evelyn</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Undocumented</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>Shop assistant</td>
<td>Lebowakgomo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fadzai</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Asylum seeker</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Musina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pepukai</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Citizen</td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>Accountant</td>
<td>Polokwane</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muzinda</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Permanent Resident</td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>Academic</td>
<td>Polokwane</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christopher</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Undocumented</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>Clerk</td>
<td>Thohoyandou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shumirai</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Asylum seeker</td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>Shop Assistant</td>
<td>Naboomspruit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miriam</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Asylum seeker</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>Hair dresser</td>
<td>Nylstroom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anthony</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Asylum seeker</td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>Phalaborwa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herbert</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Permanent resident</td>
<td>Self employed</td>
<td>Lawyer</td>
<td>Polokwane</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chengueto</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Undocumented</td>
<td>Self employed</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Polokwane</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rugare</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Work Permit</td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>Technician</td>
<td>Lebowakgomo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarisai</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Asylum Seeker</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Musina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dan</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Permanent Resident</td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>Commercial Farmer</td>
<td>Musina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dzivaidzo</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Refugee</td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>Thohoyandou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Status</td>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gift</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Undocumented</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Giyani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noah</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Undocumented</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Seshego</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tapiwa</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Undocumented</td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>Builder</td>
<td>Thohoyandou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mavis</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Undocumented</td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>Domestic Worker</td>
<td>Waterberg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leanne</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Undocumented</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>Domestic Worker</td>
<td>Musina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vuyelwa</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Undocumented</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Groblersdal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonde</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Work Permit</td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>Nurse</td>
<td>Musina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pastor Simon</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Citizen</td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>Miner</td>
<td>Musina</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 6 - Interview Guide

1. Biographical detail
   i. gender
   ii. Occupation - employment and employment history
   iii. Hours worked, job satisfaction etc
   iv. marital status
   v. education/ training

2. Migration pathways
   i. Reasons for leaving
   ii. Means
   iii. Date of arrival
   iv. Future plans
   v. Experiences

3. Immigration status
   i. Immigration history
   ii. Current status
   iii. Impact of immigration status on health, education, work etc
   iv. Support around immigration

4. Social networks
   i. Support networks – how accessed, utilised etc
   ii. Housing
   iii. Schooling
   iv. Job opportunities
   v. Contacts
   vi. Methods

5. Transnational transactions
   i. Social
   ii. Financial
   iii. Frequency
   iv. Methods
   v. Beneficiaries
   vi. Contact
   vii. Mode
   viii. Impact on self
6. Inequalities and vulnerabilities

i. View on inequalities within Zimbabweans living here
   Prompt - e.g. income, housing, educational attainment
   • Causes e.g. immigration status, job, social class

ii. How are these inequalities manifested?
   Prompt - e.g. underpayment, harassment by police, underemployment, prostitution, crime)

7. Return Intentions

I. Views towards return

II. Factors encouraging

III. Political?

IV. Economic?

V. Social?

VI. Family?

VII. Barriers to return

VIII. Children?

IX. Career and professional development?
APPENDIX 7 – INTERVIEW CODES

Interview Codes

1. Zimbabwe: Turmoil, implosion and departure. Conditions and factors that propelled people to leave their country

i. Economic implosion
   - Rampant inflation, high cost of goods and services
   - Job losses, retrenchments, company closures
   - Strength of the pound/Rand
   - Poor salaries
   - Deteriorating work conditions
   - Loss of livelihoods e.g. Operation Murambatsvina, farm seizures
   - Sponsored by employer

ii. Social
   - Poverty and hardships
   - Way of life where I come from
   - Success of others in the diaspora
   - Family reunion
   - Children’s future
   - Language considerations
   - Had friends and networks already here
   - Educational pursuit
   - Collapse of health delivery system
   - Health problems e.g. HIV/AIDS, cholera
   - Collapse of education system
   - Better life prospects in SAUK
   - Had studied or worked here before

iii. Political
   - Political persecution
   - Lack of safety and security
   - Violence and repression
   - Lack of democratic space
   - Farm seizures
   - Breakdown in law and order
   - Escape conscription into youth militias
   - Went AWOL from the army and other security agencies

iv. Professional and career development
   - Lack of clearly defined career paths
   - Frustration at work
2. Migration pathways – strategies, complexities and problems
   i. Leaving preparations
      - How decision to leave was arrived at
      - Who was consulted
      - What else was needed
   
   ii. Formal routes
      - Visitor’s
      - Student
      - Work permit
      - Family reunion
      - Entertainment
      - Business
      - Transit
   
   iii. Informal routes and reasoning
      - Border jumping – what everyone was doing
      - Smuggling
      - False passports
      - Strategies
      - Circuitous routes
      - Third country passage
      - Fraudulent visa
   
   v. Problems encountered and effects
      - Clearing immigration
      - Deportation
      - Extortionate and exorbitant fees
      - Criminals
      - Rape/ assaults
      - Hunger/ thirst/ starvation
      - Emotional, physical and psychological scars
   
   vi. Other countries lived in prior to leaving here
   
   vii. Why you left this ‘other’ country for here?
      - Had always wanted to come here
      - Raising money to come here
      - Strategy to get documents to enable me to come here

3. Diaspora as a melting pot: migrant experiences in South Africa/UK
   i. Profile of migrants
      - Education
• Social background
• Economic background
• Demography
• Gender
• Religion
• Marital status

ii. Social networks and help provided
• Accommodation
• Employment
• Financial
• Education
• Immigration
• Childcare and help with children’s schooling

iii. Immigration and access to services
• Immigration status
• Flirting in and out of statuses
• Negotiating the asylum process

iv. Diasporic experiences
• Employment and nature of work available
• Deskilling and upskilling
• Impact on self and family
• Gender renegotiations/realignment
• Comparisons with life at home
• Social mobility
• Property acquisition at home and in the diaspora
• Financial independence
• Health
• Work opportunities
• Remittances
• Better training opportunities

4. Transnational transactions
i. Form and nature of contact with those at home
• Circulation
• Zimbabwean events
• Communication
• Food

ii. Transnational transactions
• Monetary and non-monetary
• Channels and forms
• Reasons for remittances e.g. property
• Beneficiaries
• Problems of remittances on self and wider family
iii. Migrant and immigrant politics
   • Scope, breadth and reach
   • Benefits
   • Views on migrant politics and activism

5. **Return intentions**
   i. Return intentions and immigration status
   ii. Attitude towards return
   iii. Human capital
   iv. When, for what and for how long
   v. Factors encouraging return
   vi. Barriers
   vii. Steps taken to prepare for return
APPENDIX 8 – CONSENT FORM

ZIMBABWEANS LIVING IN LEEDS AND LIMPOPO RESEARCH

CONSENT FORM

I, ..................................................................................................................... hereby certify that I am 18 years and above. I further confirm that my participation in this study is entirely voluntary. I confirm that I have read and understood the above information and any areas that I had difficulty with were fully explained to me. It has been explained to me that I can retain a copy of this consent form should I wish to exercise this right.

Signature:........................................ Name:......................................................

Signature of Interviewer:.................... Name:......................................................

Date:.........................................................