THE EUROPEANISATION OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE MIDDLE EAST

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is an exploration of the Europeanisation of Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Middle East. The mainstream conceptualisation of Europeanisation in the foreign policy domain is based on a frequently used tripartite framework of uploading, downloading and socialisation. This framework is based on uploading preferences or templates by member states to the `EU level,' downloading policies from the `EU level' and socialisation of national foreign policy actors at the `EU level.' When the research direction turns towards EU candidates, the conceptualisation of the `EU level' becomes problematic due to the candidates being unable to upload their preferences to the EU. I argue in this thesis that these are issues that can benefit from a closer reflection on the conceptualisation of the so-called 'EU level' and how it interacts with domestic agency. Therefore, this thesis starts by conceptualising 'EU candidacy' as an institutional context to address the shortcomings of the mainstream Europeanisation model in its application to candidate states. This conceptualisation is based on the strategic-relational approach and a critical realist methodology for embedding this research into a new institutionalist agenda. It is analysed in this thesis how the usages of Turkey's EU candidate role prescriptions by Turkish actors have shaped Turkey's foreign policy towards the Middle East between 1999 and 2010. In this vein, this thesis analyses how the institutionalisation of Turkey's EU candidate role has enabled Turkey's foreign policy towards the Middle East since the 1999 Helsinki decision of the EU to declare Turkey as a candidate country. The main argument is that the institutionalisation of EU candidate role regarding compliance with the Copenhagen criteria and the foreign policy acquis of the EU through the usages by domestic actors has had enabled Turkey's foreign policy towards the Middle East.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CEEC- Central and East European Countries
CFSP- Common Foreign and Security Policy
CUP- The Committee of Union and Progress
DLP- Democratic Left Party
DP- Democrat Party
ECSC- European Coal and Steel Community
EEC- European Economic Community
EC- European Community
ENP- European Neighbourhood Policy
EP- European Parliament
EPC- European Political Cooperation
EU- European Union
EUSG- European Union Secretariat General of Turkey
FTA- Foreign Trade Agreement
IMF- International Monetary Fund
JDP- Justice and Development Party
JP- Justice Party
MP- Motherland Party
MUSIAD- the Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen Association
NAP- Nationalist Action Party
NATO- North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NSC- National Security Council
OECEC- Organisation for European Economic Cooperation
OIC- Organisation of Islamic Conference
PKK- Kurdistan Workers Party
PLO- Palestinian Liberation Organisation
RPP- Republican People’s Party
SME- Small and Medium scale Enterprise
SRA- Strategic-Relational Approach
TOBB- the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey
TPP- True Path Party
TUSIAD- the Turkish Industry and Business Association
TUSKON- the Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists of Turkey
US- United States
WEU- Western European Union
WP- Welfare Party
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

This thesis is an exploration of the Europeanisation of Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Middle East. As the title reveals, this leads the thesis to straddle several literatures and concepts. This introductory chapter therefore aims to outline the motivation behind some background choices that have been made as well as to explain the main puzzle behind this work.

Turkey has traditionally been categorised as an ally of the west. Its foreign policy has been pegged to the west in varying extents over the history of the Republic of Turkey. This was mostly due to the state ideology that perceived westernisation as the solution to the problems the country had been facing. Since the late Ottoman period, the political elite in Turkey have tried to catch up with the European civilisation. Therefore the elite who have founded the Republican Turkey out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire were also eager to turn to the west for models, ideas and even cultural scripts. This intensive westernisation drive has also led to the shaping of Turkey’s relations with the Middle East as an extension of its alliance with the west. When the Middle East gained strategic importance in the eyes of Turkey’s western allies, as in the 1950s, Turkey has pursued policies that are in line with those of its western allies. When there were strategic openings in the Cold War context and perceived economic opportunities in the Middle Eastern regional context, Turkey has pursued more autonomous policies towards the Middle East, although still confined by the broader paradigm of westernisation.

With the end of the Cold War, Turkey was left with twin foreign policy goals: searching for ways to reinstate its strategic importance in the eyes of the west and addressing the intensified Kurdish separatism, the rise of political Islam and
terrorism. Turkey's relationship with its Middle Eastern neighbours was conflictual due to the Iraqi, Syrian and Iranian sponsorship of terrorist movements. The relationship with Israel was improving due to the shared threat perception from the Middle Eastern neighbours. The military had gradually become the most influential actor in Turkish politics throughout the 1990s. The military's influence has led to militaristic, hard line policies both in domestic politics and foreign policy towards the Arab Middle East and also a very close military alliance with Israel. There was a reversal in this trend after 1999, but especially after 2002 when the conservative Justice and Development Party (JDP) came to power. Turkey has started pursuing peaceful relations with the Arab Middle East at the expense of its relations with Israel. Mutual trade, business, tourism agreements were signed constantly alongside high-level diplomatic visits between Turkey and its Arab Middle Eastern neighbours. This was accompanied by the Turkish government's relentless efforts at regional peace-building such as mediation efforts and the creation of bilateral and multilateral diplomatic institutions.

The students of Turkish foreign policy have analysed this shift mainly from a foreign policy analysis angle. These studies explored how the changing Middle Eastern security context, the rise of the pro-Islamic JDP and Turkey's changing economic structure caused the change in Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East from the 1990s into the 2000s. Another potential route is to analyse the impact of EU integration of Turkey on its foreign policy towards the Middle East since 1999. In December 1999, the EU has granted Turkey candidacy and it is possible to study the direct and indirect impact of Turkey's EU candidacy on foreign policy. In this thesis, I

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take the Europeanisation route to analyse Turkey's foreign policy towards the Middle East.

The analysis of Turkey's foreign policy towards the Middle East has been under-researched from the Europeanisation perspective. There are several reasons for this neglect, which altogether turn Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East into a critical and empirically interesting case for the Europeanisation literature. First of all, as the Europeanisation of foreign policy literature has focussed mostly on the member states of the EU, studying the Europeanisation of a candidate country's foreign policy could offer potential conceptually and empirically. Secondly, Turkish foreign policy has a century-old history and foreign policy tradition. Indeed, Turkey is dubbed as an “awkward candidate” by some observers. Its ‘awkwardness’ is also evident in its century-old foreign policy tradition as opposed to the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) that are rather new members of the international community. Therefore due to the path-dependence of existing institutions, Turkey offers an interesting case for analysing the conflictual process of adaptation to European integration. Third, Turkey's relationship with the Middle East renders this a critical case. The 1990s witnessed the securitisation of the Middle East by the military due to the perceived Islamic and Kurdish terrorist threat emerging from the region. Therefore an EU impact, understood in the broadest sense, on Turkey's foreign policy towards the Middle East is not very likely. Fourth, Turkey's foreign policy towards the Middle East has never been part of the conditionality for EU membership. The European Commission has given an opinion on Turkey's relationship with the region in the annual Progress Reports, yet the improvement of relations with the Middle Eastern countries was never a direct condition for

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2 For critical cases, see Berth Danermark, et.al., Explaining Society (Park Square: Routledge, 2002), p.170-2.
3 Harun Arikan, Turkey and the EU: An Awkward Candidate for Membership? (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006).
membership. On the other hand, the resolution of border disputes with Cyprus for example, was made an explicit condition for accession. Moreover, around 2008, there emerged discussions over whether Turkey had shifted the axis of its foreign policy from a western-orientation to the east. These arguments have been grounded upon the lost momentum of the EU accession process as opposed to the continuous increase in Turkey’s foreign policy activism in the Middle East.

Due to these factors, the Europeanisation of Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Middle East has been a critical case and the students of the Europeanisation of Turkish foreign policy have rarely focussed on the foreign policy towards the Middle East, especially in a thesis-length study like this. I focus on the Europeanisation of foreign policy, a candidate country’s foreign policy and a least expected aspect of that foreign policy, thereby offering an empirical and a conceptual contribution to the Europeanisation literature by analysing a significantly critical case.

1.1 The Scope of the Middle East and the Time Frame

As Turkey’s relationship with the EU dates back to 1963, the timeframe of the research must be pinned down to cover a certain period. I choose to focus on the period that began with 1999 when the EU’s Helsinki decision declared Turkey as a candidate country through 2010 when fieldwork for the thesis was finished.

Also the geographical scope of the research needs to be limited. The Middle East is a very vague geographical scope that has been a discursive battlefield, especially since 9/11 terrorist attacks and the American foreign policy that followed.

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6 For an exception, see Mesut Ozcan, Harmonizing Foreign Policy: Turkey, the EU and the Middle East (Burlington: Ashgate, 2008).
Phrases such as ‘the greater Middle East’ were coined to broaden the scope of the region's coverage alongside the EU’s famous grouping for the region as ‘Mediterranean,’ which comprises of quite distinct regions and countries of the Middle East (Mashreq) and North Africa (Maghreb). I focus on the Eastern Mediterranean countries (Mashreq) of the Middle East, rather than the western Mediterranean (Maghreb). I also limit the research analytically to the Arab Middle East, which comprises of Muslim-majority Arab countries and excludes Iran and Israel. Although this limitation is itself also vague, it covers mainly Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine and Jordan. This limitation is due to Turkey having different tracks of relations with Mashreq and Maghreb, relations with Mashreq being more intensive. However, it must be acknowledged that this delimitation is for analytical purposes only and in reality regions are social constructs.7 Even Turkish diplomats do not draw clear boundaries between their areas of responsibility, thereby confirming the constructed nature of regions in practice.8 Therefore, the geographical focus of this thesis is based on why and how Turkish foreign policy actors have constructed and reconstructed the Middle East in the context of Turkey’s EU candidacy.

Another very fundamental concept that requires clarification is ‘foreign policy’. The following section explains how foreign policy is defined in this thesis along with an elaboration on why Europeanisation has been chosen as the academic literature for this study instead of the Foreign Policy Analysis literature.

1.2 Foreign Policy (Analysis) and Europeanisation

8 Interview with a Turkish diplomat, Ankara, Turkey, 27 May 2011.
Foreign policy is defined in many ways to refer to a very wide range of activities and actors. It is sometimes defined broadly as "the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations...with a view to promoting the concerns of a single community."\(^9\) Although a comprehensive and useful definition, it starts from the assumption of the state representing a single community, which covers up the struggle within the boundaries of the state over foreign policy. Hudson, on the other hand, has proffered a basic definition of foreign policy as the "approach chosen by the national government to achieve its goals in its relations with external entities."\(^10\) This is again a valuable contribution, especially due to the emphasis placed on foreign policy being a chosen strategy. Yet, the distinction between 'foreign policy' and 'objectives' is prone to excluding the most interesting element of foreign policy from the definition, which is the objectives of policy. A more suitable definition for the purposes of this study is proposed by Manners and Whitman as "attempts by governments to influence or manage events outside the state's boundaries."\(^11\) This is the definition adopted in this thesis since it includes both strategies and objectives of foreign policy.

Foreign policy is not just another public policy as it is also a boundary-creating activity. As Hill has suggested, "[f]oreign policy is at the hinge of domestic politics and international relations."\(^12\) Domestic politics and foreign policy are two sides of the same coin, and cannot exist separately.\(^13\) Therefore its analysis requires a consideration for both sides of the coin, as well as agency, which the mainstream

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Foreign Policy Analysis literature cannot provide.\textsuperscript{14} Foreign Policy Analysis approaches can be broadly classified as those proceeding from the inside to the outside and vice versa. The outside-in approaches prioritise the external environment in explaining foreign policy decisions of states. The major explanatory factor is located at the systemic level.\textsuperscript{15} Thus, the majority of International Relations theories fall under this category, such as neo-realism, neo-liberalism and some variants of constructivism. According to the inside-out approaches, domestic factors shape foreign policy of the state. Traditional foreign policy analysis literature with its comparative foreign policy and foreign policy decision-making clusters, and classical variants of realism and liberalism fall under this category.\textsuperscript{16}

All variants of realism and liberalism are characterised by rational choice assumptions and are therefore not well equipped to take into account any genuine kind of agency. They assume that any rational actor would behave the same way under the given circumstances, therefore allowing the context to determine behaviour.\textsuperscript{17} This basic realist assumption does not leave space for the national peculiarities of states or the characteristics of decision-makers: states are unitary actors that seek survival through power-maximisation in an international system characterised by anarchy.\textsuperscript{18} As Wohlforth puts it, the common question uniting all realists is “what any state would do in X’s position.”\textsuperscript{19} Therefore agents are interchangeable and their characteristics not important. In his societal approach to liberalism, Moravcsik argues that the state is a representative institution that reflects

\textsuperscript{14} Walter Carlsnaes and Steve Smith, eds., \textit{European Foreign Policy} (London: Sage, 1994), p.11.
\textsuperscript{16} Carlsnaes calls inside-out approaches “innenpolitik” and finds realism juxtaposed against it and calls realist strands of foreign policy “realpolitik.” Carlsnaes, ‘Foreign Policy,’ p.334.
interests of the dominant sub-national interest group. The main assumption is the primacy of individuals and societal actors who “are assumed to act rationally in pursuit of material and ideal welfare.”20 The national interest thus defined is then translated into the foreign policy agenda. Political actors then try to live up to this agenda on the basis of cost-benefit calculations, under the constraints imposed by the preferences of other states.21

On the other hand, there is Allison's 'governmental politics model,' which argues that foreign policy is made under conditions far from rationality. Rather, foreign policy is the outcome of departmental and ministerial struggles to pursue their versions of the national interest, or worse their parochial interests.22 Although, this approach makes a very valuable case against rational choice assumptions, it fails to offer an account of choice instead of rationality.23 The governmental politics approach is thus prone to either reproducing rational choice assumption or depicting decision-makers as programmed by their position in bureaucracy.24

More importantly for the purposes of this thesis, as Manners and Whitman have pointed out none of these mainstream approaches have attempted to understand “the European condition as currently experienced by EU citizens, the states they live in, and the scholars who study them.”25 Europeanisation literature therefore is a fertile starting point for understanding this 'European condition' and its effects on foreign policies. Europeanisation has been a buzzword within EU studies since the late 1990s. As a budding literature there are many debates surrounding the concept. The Europeanisation literature mainly studies the domestic impact of EU integration. The range of policies, actors, institutions that are studied by the students

of Europeanisation is very broad and it also includes foreign policy. One of the debates surrounding the concept has been on how researchers come to know that the cause of a domestic development is the EU integration process. This focus on establishing causality has recently paved the way for the students of Europeanisation from diverse theoretical backgrounds to share their understanding of causation and ways to know it.

Due to its focus on the ‘European condition’ as well as the domestic actor, policies, politics and polities that are related to this European condition, Europeanisation by definition offers a useful link between structure and agency; and inside-out and outside-in approaches that the mainstream Foreign Policy Analysis literature advocates. Therefore, this thesis takes as its main research question whether and how Turkey's foreign policy towards the Middle East has been Europeanised in the 2000s.

Yet, this research question requires to be fleshed out by sub-questions. How should Europeanisation be conceptualised? What is the relationship between the EU structure and Turkish agency? How should we define causation in the context of Europeanisation? In this thesis, I offer answers to these sub-questions and the main research question. The main conclusion and the answer to the research question is that the institutionalisation of Turkey's EU candidate role has significantly enabled Turkey's foreign policy towards the Middle East, which is conceptualised as the Europeanisation of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. To provide answers to the sub-questions identified above, the thesis also offers a reflection on how the so-called ‘European condition’ interacts with domestic agency in Turkey within a strategic-relational approach (SRA) and a broadly critical realist methodology.

27 See the contributions to Theofanis Exadaktylos and Claudio Radaelli, eds., Research Design in European Studies (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2012).
and understanding of causation. I argue in this thesis that the way we conceptualise how the EU and a candidate country are related and where we look for causation are important components of Europeanisation research. This thesis contributes to the literature a healthy dose of reflection on ontology, so that the scholars can ponder what about the EU interacts with what kind of agency, and a healthy dose of reflection on methodology, so that causation is defined realistically and not too narrowly.

1.3 Thesis outline

Chapter two reviews the mainstream conceptualisation of Europeanisation in the foreign policy domain, which is based on a frequently used framework centred on uploading, downloading and identity change. Uploading refers to member states projecting their preferences and ideas to EU institutions in order to magnify the influence of their foreign policies. Downloading refers to the institutional adaptation by the member states to the decisions and rules adopted by the EU. Finally, identity change refers to the gradual reconstruction of national identities in the context of EU institutions. Yet, this framework has shortcomings when applied to Turkey, as a candidate state. Not being members of the EU, candidate states lack the opportunity to formally ‘upload’ their preferences or policy templates to the EU. Therefore, as a candidate state Turkey seems to be left with the option of adapting itself to the EU’s foreign policy rules in a top-down manner and/or socialise to EU norms according to the logic of appropriateness without even becoming a member of the EU. Likewise the Europeanisation of candidate countries has been studied extensively from a materialist perspective, where candidates mostly adopt EU rules to achieve membership, which is almost a given in the literature on candidate countries. I argue in this thesis, these are issues that can greatly benefit from a closer reflection
on the ontology of Europeanisation, and the conceptualisation of the so-called ‘EU level’ and how it interacts with agency.

Therefore, chapter three conceptualises ‘EU candidacy’ as an institution to address the shortcomings of the mainstream Europeanisation model in its application to candidate states. By theorising candidacy as a separate institutional context, we are able to analyse the opportunities and constraints that the EU candidacy presents domestic actors differentially. EU candidacy is a set of rules and roles, which can be adopted for reasons other than membership of the EU. Indeed, bottom-up Europeanisation research fits well with such an understanding of candidate Europeanisation by taking the reasons and perceptions of domestic actors as the departure point for analysis. It will be analysed in this thesis how the institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU candidate role enabled and constrained Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Middle East between 1999 and 2010.

Chapter four offers a historical account of Turkish foreign policy between the west and the Middle East. It will be argued that westernisation has been the foreign policy paradigm of Turkey since the late Ottoman Empire. Since the late 19th century, the west, i.e. Europe, has been perceived as the standard of civilisation and modernity. Upon the proclamation of the Republic in 1923, the westernisation paradigm has been articulated with Kemalism, the coordinative discourse of the founding Republican elite of Turkey.28 Kemalist westernisation continued perceiving the west as the source of modernity and civilisation, although ‘the west’ as a category started referring to the US in especially the Cold War period. After the end of the Cold War, Turkish foreign policy has gone through a period of uncertainty, where the Turkish military became a very dominant actor in politics in the 1990s. This chapter

therefore offers the background for the analysis of Turkey's relations with the EU as 'the west' after Turkey's proclamation as an EU candidate in 1999.

Chapter five analyses the EU candidate role prescribed by the EU in line with the Copenhagen political and economic criteria and its institutionalisation in Turkish politics. It is argued that the relationship of actors and the nature of the policy paradigms they have advocated for foreign policy making have changed due to the institutionalisation of Turkey's EU candidate role in such a way that the resulting balance of actors and paradigms has enabled the materialisation of the foreign policy towards the Middle East in the 2000s. This chapter also serves as an introduction to the actors in Turkish foreign policy.

Chapter six looks at the implementation of the foreign policy that was enabled by the tipping of the balance of forces among Turkish foreign policy actors and discourses due to the institutionalisation of the EU candidate role prescription for Turkey. In this chapter, the roles Turkey plays in the Middle East and how Turkey's EU candidacy enabled some of these roles that Turkey has played will be analysed. It will be argued that the institutionalisation of Turkey's EU candidacy role enabled Turkish foreign policy actors to play certain roles in the Middle East by altering the Middle Eastern actors' expectations of Turkey as an EU candidate.

Chapter seven analyses the institutionalisation of Turkey's EU candidate role with regards to the rule of alignment with the EU foreign policy acquis. This chapter analyses the convergence and divergence between Turkey's foreign policy and the EU foreign policy acquis towards the Middle East. After identifying partial convergence/divergence it focuses on the discursive strategies used by the Turkish actors to change the EU's role prescription for Turkey in line with Turkey's strategic depth policy. It is argued in this chapter that candidate state agency can actually
change the role prescriptions of the EU by using the strategies that are favoured by the EU candidacy context.

Chapter eight concludes the thesis by restating the main findings and contributions of the research. The main finding is that the institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU candidate role has significantly enabled Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East in the 2000s.
CHAPTER TWO: EUROPEANISATION AND FOREIGN POLICY

This chapter offers a review of the Europeanisation literature with a focus on the Europeanisation of foreign policy. The main aim of this chapter is to offer a bird’s eye view of the gaps and strengths of the specialised literature on the Europeanisation of member/candidate state foreign policies. The literature reviewed is limited to published academic work in the politics discipline that explicitly tackles the concept of ‘Europeanisation’. First a brief review of the broader Europeanisation literature will be provided. Here, the main debates and findings of the Europeanisation literature will be explained. Secondly, the specific literature focussing on agency in the Europeanisation literature will be analysed in terms of their criticisms of the mainstream literature and their contributions. Third, the literature on Europeanisation of foreign policy will be reviewed with a focus on the main debates, theoretical positions and findings. As Europeanisation literature has emerged in relation to analysing the domestic transformation of EU member states, the fourth section will analyze broader approaches to the issue of Europeanisation of candidate countries and also a specific review of Europeanisation of candidate countries’ foreign policies will be provided. Studies on the Europeanisation of candidate countries’ foreign policies are very rare in the field yet there are numerous studies on the Europeanisation of Turkish foreign policy, which will be reviewed in detail in the last section of the chapter.

2.1 Europeanisation

Europeanisation has emerged as a vibrant sub-field of EU studies, which aims to broadly analyse and explain how member states are affected by being part of
the EU. The research agenda has produced a significant level of empirical research with regard to the mechanisms and outcomes of Europeanisation. To begin with, there is more or less consensus over what can be Europeanised. It is undisputed by the scholarship that any aspect of domestic politics, policies and polity is permeable to Europeanisation.29

One of the first definitions of Europeanisation came from Ladrech and significantly shaped the path of studies and definitions that followed. Ladrech defined Europeanisation as an “incremental process re-orienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making.”30 Radaelli has criticised Ladrech’s definition for relegating agency and omitting the possibility of the Europeanisation of identities and cognitive structures. Radaelli offered a revised version of Ladrech’s definition as follows:

Processes of (a) construction, (b) diffusion, and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’, and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU public policy and politics and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures, and public policies.31

Yet, as Featherstone has warned, the phrase ‘logic’ in this definition requires attention, since it might be incorrectly interpreted as giving less emphasis to agency in making possible the incorporation of EU policies, norms, ways of doing things into the domestic policy process in the first place.32

Misfit between the EU institutions, policies, norms, ways of doing things and those at the domestic level is identified by some scholars as a necessary but

32 Kevin Featherstone, ‘Introduction: In the Name of “Europe”,’ in The Politics, eds. Featherstone and Radaelli, p.18.
insufficient condition of Europeanisation, which is complemented by mediating domestic factors.\textsuperscript{33} The proposition that the incompatibility between the EU level policies or institutions and the domestic ones causes misfit, which in turn entails adaptational pressure, has been quite common in the literature.\textsuperscript{34} The analyses of Europeanisation, which first identify misfit and proceed with investigating its effects are labelled as "top-down" research.\textsuperscript{35} Top-down analyses assume that there is always an EU template to cause misfit.

However the critiques of misfit/adaptational pressure argument have aptly pointed out its limited explanatory power. For example Knill and Lehmkuhl have argued that misfit could be a necessary condition only in cases of positive integration where there is an EU policy prescription that is capable of exerting adaptational pressure on the member states.\textsuperscript{36} Knill and Lehmkuhl have identified two more modes of governance in the EU. One of them is negative integration, which stands for policy areas where the EU abolishes certain practices, thus altering the domestic opportunity structures. The other one is framing integration, which refers to those areas where the EU competence is limited to inculcating the idea of reform and legitimising pro-reform circles in the domestic debates.\textsuperscript{37} Knill and Lehmkuhl therefore have argued that misfit is not applicable to negative and framing integration. Another critique of misfit has come from more agency-based approaches, who have asserted how ‘misfit’ itself is a social construct that requires agency and how agency can actively construct misfit. Actors may also socialise with the EU ways of doing things or simply choose the EU


\textsuperscript{36}Christopher Knill and Dirk Lehmkuhl 'How Europe Matters,' European Integration Online Papers 3/7 (1999).

\textsuperscript{37}Knill and Lehmkuhl, 'How Europe.'
way of doing things without there being any misfit or adaptational pressure.\textsuperscript{38} Such proponents of starting from the agency at the domestic level and who trace causality backwards to the EU have coined “bottom-up research” in response to top-down models.\textsuperscript{39}

Top-downers argue that misfit is never sufficient in bringing about change; therefore they have been identifying mediating factors that transmit EU impact in domestic politics. Borzel and Risse have identified the number of veto points, formal institutions as mediating factors for Europeanisation through resource redistribution (rational choice institutionalism); whereas informal institutions and norm entrepreneurs are identified as mediating factors for socialisation and learning (sociological institutionalism).\textsuperscript{40} Therefore, the fewer the number of institutional veto points with a potential impact on policy change, the more facilitating the formal and informal institutions are, and the more influential the norm entrepreneurs are; the more likely domestic change is to occur. However as research progressed and empirical findings accumulated, scholars added more mediating factors. With every new mediating factor added to the literature the distinction between top-down and bottom-up research designs blurred further as more agency was integrated to the originally top-down research paradigm. For example Featherstone and Kazamias\textsuperscript{41}, as well as Sbragia\textsuperscript{42} have included the image of the EU in the eyes of the elites as mediating factors. The more the EU is seen as a source of modernisation by the elites and the society, the better the chances are for adopting what it prescribes. Last but not


\textsuperscript{39} Exadaktylos and Radaelli, ‘Research Design,’ p.510-1.

\textsuperscript{40} Tanja Borzel and Thomas Risse, ‘When Europe Hits Home,’ \textit{European Integration Online Papers} 4/15 (2000).

\textsuperscript{41} Kevin Featherstone and George Kazamias, \textit{Europeanization and the Southern Periphery} (London: Routledge, 2001).

\textsuperscript{42} Alberta Sbragia, ‘Italy Pays for Europe: Political Leadership, Political Choice and Institutional Adaptation,’ in \textit{Transforming Europe}, eds. Cowles, Caporaso and Risse.
least, Ladrech has identified partisan politics as a mediating factor, whereby interest
groups’ capability to seize the opportunities offered by the EU is partly conditioned by
their proximity to the ruling party.43

However, these 'mediating factors' are usually conceptualised as 'static
transmission belts' in top-down models, which is the main difference between top-
down and bottom-up designs. They are assumed to have an impact on whether or not
and the extent to which EU pressure results in change.44 Likewise, policy, polity and
politics aspects of Europeanisation are also usually kept separate analytically despite
the theoretical acknowledgment of the need to address the interactive dynamics
among the polity, policy and politics aspects of Europeanisation. For instance, Radaelli
has argued in 2004 that analysing the dynamic relationship between these three areas
in the context of Europeanisation could be a fertile ground for future research.45 For
example, Schmidt and Radaelli have added the discourse surrounding the policy area
as another mediating factor.46 In this line of argument all mediating factors become
functional and interpreted through discourse in bringing about change.47 Although
Schmidt and Radaelli have contributed to such analyses of the interaction among
policy, polity, politics, there is a dearth of studies analysing the interactive
relationship between the Europeanisation of policy, politics and polity within the
mainstream Europeanisation literature. This is partly due to the difficulties of
methodology. As argued by Lenschow, "[s]uch empirical interrelations between the
three domains will pose some difficulty (a) for measuring and comparing effects of

43 Robert Ladrech, 'Europeanization of Interest Groups and Political Parties,' in The Member States, eds.,
Bulmer and Lequesne.
44 Cornelia Woll and Sophie Jacquot, 'Using Europe: Strategic Action in Multi-Level Politics,' Comparative
45 Claudio Radaelli, 'Europeanization: Solution or Problem?' European Integration Online Papers 8/16
(2004).
46 Schmidt and Radaelli, 'Policy Change.'
47 Schmidt and Radaelli, 'Policy Change,' p.187.
Europeanisation and (b) for developing parsimonious explanatory models.” Therefore, this poses a methodological problem mainly for research traditions that aim to produce parsimonious models to explain law-like social regularities, based on empiricism rather than empirical study. For example, when discourse is given explanatory power, parsimony is lost.

There are many supporting references in the literature to how Europeanisation of one area cannot be neatly contained in separate boxes, as any transformation always reverberates in other aspects. For example, Bulmer and Burch posited that even though the British administrative machinery by and large retained its long-standing British traditions, the considerable pressure for change emanating from the EU strained the underlying constitutional and political framework. Bache and Jordan formulated two types of Europeanisation in response to this analytical challenge: direct and indirect Europeanisation. Direct Europeanisation refers to the intended consequences in a policy area as opposed to indirect Europeanisation, which refers to the unintended consequences of an EU initiative. Unintended consequences in the same or another policy area are the spill-over effect of direct Europeanisation. This differentiation between intended and unintended consequences supports the proposition that Europeanisation in a single policy might have deeper reverberations in other aspects of politics and polity, and vice versa.

Another relevant finding in the literature is that Europeanisation does not cause homogeneity. On the contrary, it engenders “domestic adaptation with national colors.” Borzel and Risse have identified three different forms of domestic change:

absorption, accommodation and transformation. Absorption means minimal institutional adjustment. The core processes and philosophy of policymaking remains the same. Accommodation is when the member state undergoes deeper changes in its policy processes, but still retains its core philosophy. Finally transformation refers to the wholesale change in the policies, processes and underlying understandings of politics. A slightly different categorisation has been suggested by Radaelli as absorption, transformation, inertia and retrenchment. Absorption refers to a rather superficial accommodation of EU requirements while retaining core philosophies. In this definition Radaelli therefore combined absorption and accommodation categories of Borzel and Risse. According to Radaelli, transformation refers to a change in the underlying core philosophies in response to EU requirements. The major innovation in Radaelli’s categories is that he also includes inertia and retrenchment as possible outcomes of Europeanization. Inertia refers to the absence of domestic change and retrenchment means political elite opting for going against EU level developments, let alone harmonising their practices accordingly. Thus, Radaelli first of all successfully has broken down the equation of Europeanisation with observable change and convergence on the empirical level. In doing so, he has drawn attention to the underlying mechanisms linking the EU structure with agency, which may or may not cause observable change.

The next section reviews studies in the Europeanisation literature that have been pointing to the need to incorporate more agency-based accounts in the analysis of Europeanisation. This literature therefore offers a critique of the mainstream Europeanisation literature and makes an important contribution.

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52 Borzel and Risse, ‘When Europe,’ p.10.
53 Radaelli, ‘Whither Europeanization,’ p. 15.
2.1.1 Agency in Europeanisation

There has emerged a recent body of scholarship that argues for a more agency-based approach within the Europeanisation literature. McCauley, for example, has focused on how French anti-genetically modified organism social movements have responded to EU opportunities. McCauley has identified different modes in which agents respond to the EU. Proaction refers to domestic actors choosing to be active in lobbying at the EU level, rejection/promotion refers to the emergence of anti- or pro-EU groups, and finally usage refers to the empowerment of domestic actors by the top-down EU pressures, either through direct material or ideational resources or indirect effects of the EU on the national policymaking modes. McCauley’s focus on agency has brought to the fore the conclusion that “opportunity, resources or ideological empowerment are useless if domestic actors are not willing to use them” and their predisposition to use the EU is shaped by their ideology, identity, framing of the EU, and leadership.

Woll and Jacquot have focused on a sub-set of the taxonomy McCauley outlined, namely “using Europe”. Woll and Jacquot have specifically placed their study as a critique of the misfit model, “where policy actors are reduced to ‘mediating’ factors.” Woll and Jacquot have argued that the misfit model and the institutional

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58 Woll and Jacquot, ‘Using Europe,’ p.112.
constraints that it is based on are blinding researchers to policy change that is deliberate and takes place in the absence of misfit. The authors have cautioned against institutional analyses that treat individual actors as simple transmission belts. Institutional contexts need to be interpreted and actors do not give automatic responses to political pressure: they can choose and learn and thus develop agency independent of structural conditions.

By utilising this framework, Woll and Jacquot have aimed at expanding the two traditional logics of action utilised by the Europeanisation literature, namely the logic of consequences and that of appropriateness. The logic of consequences is premised on the assumption that actors analyse the costs and benefits of a particular action with an eye on its potential of fulfilling their pre-designated preferences. The minds, personalities and perspectives of actors are not important since in every situation it is assumed that there are only a given number of rational courses of action for an actor. As Hay suggests, "actors are interchangeable" in the eyes of those who share this view. As actors are in the pursuit of given material interests rationally within the constraints and opportunities presented by the (mainly material) context, their behaviour can be inferred from the context. Therefore, in studies that utilise the logic of consequences, actors are interchangeable as the context determines what actors want and do.

On the other hand, those who see action as resulting from a logic of appropriateness assume that actor preferences are developed endogenously within the institutions and actors are driven by their identities and the rules pertaining to those institutions. March and Olsen point out that personalities of the actors are not as important as the historical experience and the established rules of particular

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59 Woll and Jacquot, 'Using Europe,' p.113.
60 Woll and Jacquot, 'Using Europe,' p. 116.
political institutions and political conflicts are usually conflicts on deciding which set of rules should prevail.\textsuperscript{64} Therefore, action requires evoking an identity and the obligations of that identity.\textsuperscript{65}

Against this background, Woll and Jacquot argued that what is incompatible between the logic of consequences and the logic of appropriateness is the materialism of the former. Put simply, as long as strategic action is premised on material interests by the proponents of the logic of consequences, it cannot be combined with the logic of appropriateness, which is premised on the assumption that interests are social constructs. To find a middle ground, Woll and Jacquot have introduced "strategic usage of Europe" as an alternative.\textsuperscript{66} Rather than assuming that domestic actors act appropriately in the way 'good Europeans' act or rationally to pursue their material interests within the resources and constraints posed by the EU, this framework assumes that actors interpret, appropriate, translate or ignore the dynamics of EU integration.\textsuperscript{67} While acknowledging that actors have goals and projects that they pursue, this framework puts into empirical question how these projects have come to being in the first place and how actors pursue them by making use of Europe. Although usages are strategic initially, in the long run they have repercussions on the projects of actors and the context.\textsuperscript{68} All in all, such elaboration on the usage of Europe diversifies the traditional logics of action and dilutes the structuralist tendencies in the so-called logics of consequences and appropriateness.

By shifting the analytical focus from the institutions to how domestic actors interpret, appropriate or reject the resources and constraints posed by these institutions, actor-based approaches to Europeanisation offer an alternative path of

\textsuperscript{64} March and Olsen, \textit{Rediscovering}, pp.37-8.
\textsuperscript{66} Woll and Jacquot, 'Using Europe,' p.117.
\textsuperscript{67} Woll and Jacquot, 'Using Europe,' p.116.
\textsuperscript{68} Woll and Jacquot, 'Using Europe,' p.116.
analysis. Yet, so far these approaches have remained spatially limited to using Europe to achieve objectives in domestic politics leading to a lacuna in its application to foreign policy. Recent work emphasising agency in this manner has explored how domestic actors used 'Europe' to achieve their goals in the domestic arena. An extension of this research agenda to foreign policy would introduce domestic actors’ usage of 'Europe' in the international arena. By the same token, Europeanisation of foreign policy literature can benefit from this research agenda, as explained below.

**2.2 Europeanisation of Foreign Policy**

The literature on Europeanisation of foreign policy usually touches upon the 'unique' nature of foreign policy, understood mainly as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), for the Europeanisation literature. Europeanisation is perceived by these scholars as a literature that has grown in response to the transfer of competences to the EU, which comprised of the policies that fell under the first pillar of the Maastricht Treaty. Under the Lisbon Treaty the pillar structure was abolished yet foreign policy decisions are still made by unanimity. Therefore the literature on the Europeanisation of foreign policy has usually underlined this difference between foreign policy and policies where the EU has joint or sole competence.

Yet there are many studies that focus on national foreign policy adaptation to EU foreign policy, usually to the CFSP in particular. Common themes can be observed in the assumptions of convergence as a result of the Europeanisation of

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foreign policy, the assumption of misfit, the three dimensions of Europeanisation, i.e., uploading, downloading, identity reconstruction/cross-loading.

**2.2.1 Convergence and the Europeanisation of foreign policy**

Despite the wide-spread arguments within the broader Europeanisation literature that convergence is not a necessary outcome of Europeanisation, there are numerous leading scholars studying the Europeanisation of foreign policy who have defined Europeanisation as convergence. Brigghi has also identified and criticised such “accounts of Europeanization as a progressive, inevitable and predetermined transformation of not only the objectives, but the identities of the actors involved.”

One of the most cited studies on the Europeanisation of foreign policy is that of Wong’s research on the Europeanisation of French foreign policy towards East Asia. Wong has defined the Europeanisation of foreign policy as:

a dependent variable contingent on the ideas and directives emanating from actors (such as EU institutions and statesmen) in Brussels, as well as policy ideas and actions from member state capitals (national statesmen). Europeanization is thus identifiable as a process of change manifested as policy convergence (both top-down and sideways) as well as national policies amplified as EU policy (bottom-up projection).

Wong has therefore identified Europeanisation as the dependent variable, having described it as a process; and identified the independent variables leading to this process as the ideas and directives of EU actors as well as policy ideas and actions of national actors. Wong has suggested that the outcome is policy convergence across EU members in the long run. Wong’s approach poses a few problems. First of all, it is not clear how independent are the independent variables in this formulation. It is difficult to argue that national actors are independent from Europeanisation defined as a process. Europeanisation does not fit well within the independent-dependent

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71 Elisabetta Brigghi, ‘Resisting Europe: The Case of Italy’s Foreign Policy,’ in National and European Foreign Policies, eds., Reuben Wong and Christopher Hill (Park Square: Routledge, 2011), p. 68.
72 Wong, ‘Foreign Policy,’ in Europeanization, eds., Vink and Graziano, p.322.
variable language due to the endogeneity of the process. In Bulmer and Burch's words, “the relationship between the EU and member state institutions is iterative and interactive...It is difficult to try to conceive of the relationship in conventional, positivist social science terms.”73 Secondly, Wong assumes a final destination for the process of Europeanisation as convergence, therefore offering a teleological account of Europeanisation. Wong has explained the reason for convergence as the rational action of Member States to coordinate their action and positions on a matter so as not to let third countries take advantage of the rifts among EU Member States.74 Wong and Hill have likewise pointed out the “pendulum effect” to say there is “negotiated convergence between ‘extreme’ positions within the EU involving both Community and national actors.”75 Wong and Hill also have taken into consideration discursive convergence among the member states in their increasing reference to the European Union for their foreign policies. Their definition of Europeanised foreign policy is illustrative of the general tendency in the field to label convergence with the EU as Europeanisation. According to Wong and Hill, a Europeanised foreign policy is one which: complies with EU common positions; at least takes EU values as expressed by the EU internationally and EU common positions as its primary reference point; and tends to pursue its national goals through the EU means.76

Although he does not refer explicitly to an assumption of convergence, Tonra's definition also implicitly suggests that the Europeanisation of foreign policy leads to ideational convergence.

a transformation in the way in which national foreign policies are constructed, in the ways in which professional roles are defined and

75 Reuben Wong and Christopher Hill, 'Introduction,' in National and European, eds., Wong and Hill, p.12.
76 Christopher Hill and Reuben Wong, 'Many Actors, One Path?' in National and European, eds., Wong and Hill, p.211
pursued and in the *consequent internalisation* of norms and expectations arising from a complex system of collective European policy making.77

According to this definition, domestic actors eventually internalise EU policy-making norms thereby demonstrating convergence across national settings in foreign policy norms.

Yet, as the broader literature on Europeanisation that has been reviewed earlier demonstrated, Europeanisation need not imply convergence. Although convergence might be observed in the ways member state officials perceive the pressure they face, this convergence does not automatically lead to convergence in the policies.78

2.2.2 Misfit and the Europeanisation of Foreign Policy

Another group of scholars placed emphasis on the degree of adaptational pressure on national foreign policies due to European integration. For example, Miskimmon and Torreblanca have defined Europeanisation of foreign policy as

the process of change at the domestic level (be it of policies, preferences or institutions) originated by the adaptation pressures generated by the European integration process; a process of change whose intensity and character depend on the ‘goodness of fit’ of domestic institutions and adaptation pressures…. I will define adaptation as a move by national actors towards a greater *consistency* with the EU foreign and security policy.79

As explained in the earlier review of the broader Europeanisation literature, these studies fall within the category of top-down Europeanisation. By taking misfit between the EU foreign and security policy and the national foreign policies as the starting point, they rule out by definition domestic actors’ potential for

creative usages of European integration. However, as Irondelle’s study has aptly showed, the Europeanisation of French military policy started even before the establishment of European defence policy. Irondelle has explained that when the French military reforms took place in 1996 there was no template in that policy field at the EU. Therefore, he has analysed the framing effects of the European Union on French policymakers. Irondelle has suggested that the French military reforms were enabled and constrained by the emergent peace community in the EU, budgetary pressures of the European Monetary Union, the empowerment of pro-reform actors in decision-making and socialisation to the EU norms.\textsuperscript{80} Irondelle’s study is refreshing in terms of his analysis that goes beyond the misfit model, which is very much applicable in the foreign policy domain. In this line, he has traced back the mechanisms of Europeanisation “to determine whether the pressures from European integration play a role and, if so, whether this role is significant.”\textsuperscript{81}

2.2.3 Downloading, Uploading and the Europeanisation of Foreign Policy

The literature on the Europeanisation of foreign policy is by and large built on the three dimensions of Europeanisation.\textsuperscript{82} The first one is the top-down process of national adaptation to the requirements of EU membership, which is also called downloading.\textsuperscript{83} As explained earlier Wong has defined this top-down process as a process leading to policy convergence among EU members. Miskimmon has borrowed Smith’s indicators of domestic adaptation in response to top-down pressure by the EU to trace the downloading in German foreign policy. These indicators are

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{81} Irondelle, ‘Europeanization,’ p.214.
  \item \textsuperscript{83} Major, ‘Europeanisation;’ Pomorska, ‘The Impact.’
\end{itemize}
elite socialisation, bureaucratic reorganisation, and the level of constitutional change and the extent of shifts in public opinion.\textsuperscript{84}

The second dimension is the bottom-up process, where member states upload their preferences, ideas and policy models to the EU.\textsuperscript{85} Miskimmon has identified formal and informal agenda-setting, acting as an example-setter and ideational export by member states as ways of uploading.\textsuperscript{86} Member states’ participation in the EU institutions gives them the opportunity to shape EU policies, institutions and ways of doing things. While for Pomorska uploading is limited to exporting national preferences to the EU, for Major it means the export of ideas to the EU level.\textsuperscript{87} In this process, states are agents of change rather than simply reacting to the requirements of the CFSP. Miskimmon has shown how Germany had always attempted to upload its foreign policy preferences and templates since its unification to shape the blueprint for the CFSP to match German preferences.\textsuperscript{88} Other examples of such uploading dynamics include Greece’s success in uploading its bilateral disputes with Turkey regarding Cyprus.\textsuperscript{89} Spain has also perceived EU membership as an opportunity considering the scarcity of its own foreign policy resources and uploaded its foreign policy agenda regarding Latin America and the Mediterranean even during the negotiations of its accession to the EC.\textsuperscript{90}

There has been a debate in the literature as to whether uploading and downloading are dimensions, concepts or mechanisms of Europeanisation. Moumoutzis for example has engaged with a similar kind of questioning and concluded by ruling out ‘uploading’ or ‘projection’ of member state preferences as a

\textsuperscript{85} Wong, \textit{The Europeanization}; Pomorska, ‘The Impact;’ Major, ‘Europeanisation.’
\textsuperscript{86} Miskimmon, \textit{Germany}, p.12.
\textsuperscript{87} Pomorska, ‘The Impact;’ Major, ‘Europeanisation.’
\textsuperscript{88} Miskimmon, \textit{Germany}, p.198.
\textsuperscript{89} Spyros Economides, ‘The Europeanisation of Greek Foreign Policy,’ \textit{West European Politics}, 28/2 (2005), p.472.
\textsuperscript{90} Torreblanca, ‘Ideas, Preferences.’
form of Europeanisation. He argued that “[i]f agency (EU Member States) and structure (the EU) are mutually constitutive and integration theory informs us of how agency is structuring, then Europeanization is best suited to direct our attention to how agency is being structured.” This statement basically suggests that only domestic change caused by the EU opportunities and constraints can be called Europeanisation. Moumoutzis’ account is a welcome contribution due to his ontological and conceptual reflection, yet it causes a limitation on the spatial boundaries of Europeanisation by excluding anything that happens within the EU institutions as outside the scope of the Europeanisation literature.

Gross has offered a conceptualisation of Europeanisation, which is implicitly a very plausible defence for categorising uploading as Europeanisation. Gross has argued that Europeanisation is “the impact of the EU institutions on national politics, both as a potential platform to export policy preferences and as a constraint that influences national foreign policy-making.” Therefore Gross’ definition of the Europeanisation of foreign policy encompasses both the top-down and the bottom-up processes as the enabling and constraining effects of the EU institutions.

As De Flers and Muller have also noted, existing literature is not clear whether uploading and downloading are dimensions, concepts or mechanisms. De Flers and Muller have suggested a clarification of the concepts such as mechanisms and dimensions of Europeanisation in foreign policy. Accordingly, they have conceptualised uploading and downloading as “dimensions”; socialisation and learning as “mechanisms”; and national projection and foreign policy adaptation as

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92 Moumoutzis, ‘Still Fashionable,’ p.612.
94 De Flers and Muller, ‘Dimensions and Mechanisms,’ p.22.
“outcomes” of Europeanisation. De Flers and Muller have proffered socialisation and learning as the dominant mechanisms of Europeanisation in foreign policy arguing that these mechanisms “can explain why European foreign policy cooperation worked in the absence of formal enforcement mechanisms and against initially diverging policy preferences of member states.” Indeed, socialisation and learning occupy a central place in the Europeanisation of foreign policy literature.

2.2.4 Identity Reconstruction, Socialisation and Cross-loading

Some authors include a third dimension of Europeanisation in their categorisation as "cross-loading" or “identity reconstruction/ socialisation.” for others they are the mechanisms of Europeanisation. Cross-loading broadly refers to exchange of policy ideas and ways of doing things among EU members within EU institutions. As Pomorska has pointed out cross-loading is Europeanisation within the EU rather than because of the EU. In Major’s words, it involves a “learning process about good policy practice for the elites, where the EU sets the scene, offering a forum for discussion.” Here, the word ‘discussion’ is imperative. Due to not being members, candidate countries do not participate in the discussions of CFSP decisions of the EU until they sign the Accession Treaty and become active observers in the CFSP. The signing of the Treaty brings to an end the episode of ‘being informed ex-post of the CFSP decisions’ and starts an active participation episode.101

Identity reconstruction refers to long-term identity change caused by being part of the EU and socialisation to EU norms over time. Wong argued that

95 De Flers and Muller, ‘Dimensions and Mechanisms,’ p.13.
97 Pomorska, ‘The Impact’ and Wong, Europeanization respectively.
98 De Flers and Muller, ‘Dimensions and Mechanisms.’
99 Pomorska, ‘The Impact’
100 Major, ‘Europeanisation,’ p. 186.
Socialisation to EU norms leads to identity change and therefore interest change. A long-term outcome of these two mechanisms is socialisation, in Wong’s words “a process of identity and interest convergence.” As a result of their interaction within the EU institutions, national elites become familiar with each other’s policy positions and some level of convergence and cooperation ensue. Some scholars refer to this identity change as internalisation of EU roles and norms.

However, there are mainly methodological problems with focusing on internalisation of foreign policy norms as the cause of foreign policy Europeanisation. One way of studying internalisation is treating the state as an individual. Yet, this would mean to anthropomorphise the state and giving the state a ‘mind’ to internalise norms. The other way is to focus on the socialisation of state elites as an indicator of the socialisation of the state. However, there is a need to analyse how these elites’ socialisation caused the Europeanisation of state policy. For example, Wang’s analysis of the socialisation of China into the norms of multilateralism has demonstrated that elite socialisation does not automatically entail institutionalisation of the norm, and change in policies as an extension. An analysis of internalisation of EU norms would require longitudinal qualitative analyses of the same actors and verification that these

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102 Wong, Europeanization.
103 Wong, ‘Foreign Policy,’ p.325.
actors’ input into the decision-making structures was an outcome of their socialisation to EU norms.\textsuperscript{109}

All in all, the Europeanisation of foreign policy literature is over-reliant on uploading-downloading-cross-loading/identity reconstruction dynamics. However, a theoretically under-elaborated replication of such a model may be hiding more than it reveals. Such over-reliance comes at the expense of fruitful but marginalized alternative frameworks such as the ‘using Europe’ and ‘role theory’ (see below).

The uploading-downloading and crossloading framework offers a very limited conceptualisation of agency within the Europeanisation of foreign policy literature. As the earlier review of the turn towards more agency-centric explanations in the broader Europeanisation literature has demonstrated, there is more to agency than uploading policy preferences and templates to the EU level. The creative ways that agency can use European institutions should be elaborated more in the literature on the Europeanisation of foreign policies. As also pointed out by Moumoutzis in a recent literature review, the Europeanisation of foreign policy literature is based on overrated socialisation arguments.\textsuperscript{110} He has also argued that the usage of EU norms, practices and processes by domestic policy actors need to be brought back into the analysis of the Europeanisation of foreign policy.

Another helpful alternative has been offered by Aggestam, who applied role theory to analyse the Europeanisation of foreign policies. A focus on the roles actors play, rather than their internalisation of the EU norms or identity changes over the long run has been a necessary corrective in the literature. The concept of role provides a useful link between structure and agency. Accordingly, actors conceptualise their roles based on their perceptions of the institutional contexts they


find themselves in. According to role theory, actors are guided both by rules and their motivations, therefore foreign policy roles are a combination of foreign policy objectives, perceived context, and path-dependence of the past roles and actions. Aggestam has applied role theory to the Europeanisation of foreign policy by borrowing the distinction between preference and position roles coined by Barnett. Position roles have more detailed guidelines for action and are generally associated with institutions whereas preference roles are less constraining and leave more room for interpretation to actors. According to Aggestam, Europeanisation entails the adoption of position roles in relation to the EU structure.

These frameworks can contribute greatly to the analysis of the Europeanisation of foreign policies by addressing the limitations of the uploading-downloading-crossloading framework in conceptualising agency and its relationship with the EU structure. Another limitation is in terms of alternative spaces of foreign policy action. As Bates and Smith have noted, there is a widespread neglect of the space in political analysis. Foreign policy by definition involves the ‘foreign’ as a spatial category in addition to ‘European’ and ‘domestic’ which are usual categories of Europeanisation research. Foreign policy is mainly outward oriented as opposed to other public policies that are oriented towards inside the national borders.

Analysing the interaction between EU institutions and agency in different spatial

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111 Lisbeth Aggestam, ‘Role Identity and Europeanisation of Foreign Policy,’ in Rethinking European Foreign Policy, eds., Ben Tonra and Thomas Christiansen (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), p.82.
112 Aggestam, ‘Role identity,’ pp. 86-7 and p.91.
116 Although mainly outward-oriented, foreign policy also has an identity construction function creating difference. See Bahar Rumeli, ‘Constructing identity and relating to difference: understanding the EU’s mode of differentiation,’ Review of International Studies, 30 (2004), pp.27-47.
contexts, i.e. outside the EU and nation-state boundaries can shed further light on how Europeanisation might be a constraint or a resource in different spatial contexts.\footnote{117}

Thirdly, in a significant number of studies in the literature there is an assumption that Europeanisation manifests itself as observable convergence with the EU templates or norms. Such accounts mainly tell a story of isomorphism, where structure and agency do not work at the same time so as to create diversity. Rather agency creates the structure (usually conceived as the CFSP structure) and the structure determines the agency afterwards, which leads to equating convergence with Europeanisation, and anything that falls shorter than convergence with non-Europeanisation. A more fruitful conceptualisation of structure and agency would be one where agency takes place in a structured environment, and structural opportunities and constraints are only interpreted by and realised through agency. In other words, ‘uploading’ takes place within a structured environment and ‘downloading’ is done by and through strategic agents, which is lacking in the literature on the Europeanisation of foreign policy so far.

Finally, as the next section will demonstrate, this conceptualisation based on the three dimensions of Europeanisation of foreign policy does not fit well with the Europeanisation of candidate states. Downloading and identity reconstruction seem to be the only options for candidate state agency. Since candidate states are outside the decision-making structures, they seem to be deprived of any meaningful agency in the Europeanisation of their foreign policies. The next section therefore elaborates how this issue is tackled by the specific literature on the Europeanisation of candidate countries.

\footnote{117 Wong does this to a limited extent in his exploration of how French foreign policy elite used their role as an EU member to reconnect with the former colonies of France. Yet, his exploration is not theoretically or conceptually linked with the tripartite model of uploading, downloading and socialisation. Wong, Europeanization.}
2.3 Europeanisation of Candidate Country Foreign Policies

Europeanisation of candidate countries as a literature has emerged with the 2003 Eastern enlargement and within the context of the CEECs’ accession to the EU. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier have defined Europeanisation "as a process in which states adopt EU rules."\(^{118}\) Likewise, Heather Grabbe’s focus is also on the conditions and mechanisms of rule transfer from the EU to candidate countries.\(^{119}\) The literature broadly focuses on membership conditionality and power asymmetry between the EU and candidate countries as a crucial ingredient of rule transfer from the EU to the candidate countries.\(^{120}\) Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier have concluded in their review of the literature that "[t]he main findings of the research on the Europeanisation of accession countries point to the paramount causal relevance of asymmetrical interdependence and credible accession conditionality for the quick and pervasive adoption of EU rules in the accession countries."\(^{121}\)

Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier have assessed the explanatory power of alternative mechanisms of rule adoption in the CEEC. They have mainly questioned the relative impact of the EU external incentives on rational CEEC actors, in comparison with social learning and lesson-drawing by these actors. The main proposition of the external incentives model is that the candidate country government adopts EU rules if the benefits exceed the domestic costs.\(^{122}\) The determinacy of EU


\(^{121}\) Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, ‘Candidate countries and conditionality,’ in *Europeanization*, eds., Graziano and Vink, p.94.

\(^{122}\) Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, ‘Introduction,’ p.12.
conditions, the size and speed of EU rewards, the credibility of conditionality, the number of domestic veto players and the size of adoption costs for the target government are all variables that determine the likelihood of rule adoption according to this model.\(^\text{123}\)

The alternative model identified by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier is the social learning model, which is based on the logic of appropriateness assumption whereby the CEEC actors adopt EU rules only if they are persuaded by the appropriateness of EU rules.\(^\text{124}\) The likelihood of rule adoption in this model depends on the legitimacy of EU rules in the eyes of domestic actors, actors’ self-perception as the EU’s in-group, resonance of EU rules with the domestic rules. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier have taken into account the importance of normative suasion of the CEEC actors by the EU as strengthening the likelihood for rule adoption in the social learning model.\(^\text{125}\) The previous two models identified by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier have focused upon the EU induced rule adoption, i.e. EU rewards and sanctions as in the external incentives model and EU persuasion of target governments of the appropriateness of the rules or empowerment of domestic non-governmental actors through external legitimacy as in the social learning model. The final model Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier have identified is the lesson-drawing model which is based on voluntary adoption of EU rules by candidate governments when formulating domestic policies without EU conditionality or involvement. The main logic of action in the lesson-drawing model is the assessment of domestic utility rather than an assessment of EU rewards and sanctions.\(^\text{126}\) Lesson drawing, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier have argued, is more likely to take place when there is a perceived policy failure and domestic dissatisfaction with the status quo, existence


\(^{124}\) Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, ‘Introduction,’ p.18.

\(^{125}\) Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, ‘Introduction,’ p.19.

\(^{126}\) Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, ‘Introduction,’ p.21.
of epistemic communities with a specialisation on EU rules, suitability of EU rules to transfer.

Building on these models, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier have distinguished between two different types of EU conditionality: democratic conditionality and *acquis* conditionality, where external incentives, the legitimacy and utility of EU rules vary. Authors have argued that in democratic conditionality, the domestic political structure, costs of adoption and party politics make the difference. Where the external incentives model explains *acquis* conditionality the best when there is clarity, consistency of an EU reward and salience of the issue in the EU's approach.

Grabbe also has argued that a certain tension between the possibility of accession and rejection and willing partners in the candidate countries is necessary for EU conditionality to work. Grabbe has confined her study on Europeanisation to the “influence of EU accession policy on public policy-making” and analysed how the “EU used its accession conditions to exercise influence.” Grabbe has analysed the impact of the Schengen *acquis* and the single market *acquis* in the regulation of the free movement of persons. Still, Grabbe has focussed on policy transfer from the EU to candidate countries thereby has taken polity and politics as rather fixed transmission belts for policy transfer. Therefore, she has not attempted to bridge the evolving policy, politics and polity aspects of Europeanisation. Finally, Grabbe has also pointed out the power asymmetry in the EU-Candidate relationship, which works in favour of the EU. The underlying power asymmetry assumption renders candidate countries the receivers of EU constraints without any opportunity to use them as a resource.

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127 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, ‘Candidate Countries,’ p.91.
128 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, ‘Candidate Countries,’ p.91.
129 Grabbe, The EU’s, p.53.
130 Grabbe, The EU’s, p.73 and p.1.
In Grabbe’s framework, the EU exerts influence through the provision of legislative and institutional models, money and technical assistance, benchmarking and monitoring, advice and twinning, and finally gate-keeping candidates’ access to negotiations and the later stages of accession.\(^{131}\) The effectiveness of these mechanisms is influenced by certain mediating factors such as the diffuseness of the EU’s influence, uncertainty surrounding the accession process; as well as the country’s institutional capacity, political salience of the issue and the country’s macro-strategy of adaptation.\(^{132}\) Diffuseness of influence could be caused by the EU’s lack of institutional templates, inconsistencies in the EU’s advice to applicants, and the multiplicity of EU institutions or the Member States involved in expressing the EU conditions.\(^{133}\) Uncertainty can be caused by a lack of linkage between certain duties and the rewards; information on the hierarchy of tasks, content of the policy agenda to be undertaken, whom to satisfy and what counts as meeting the demands.\(^{134}\) On the receiving end of the relationship, mediating factors include the peculiar political culture of the candidate state, i.e. legacy of communism, tendency to create dysfunctional institutions, the match between EU *acquis* and the candidate’s needs; the overall public opinion in the candidate country on EU membership and the particular policy area; and finally the broader framework strategy the candidate pursues in the accession process.\(^{135}\) Grabbe has also pointed out the path-dependence effects of the accession process on candidate countries, as turning away from the EU process becomes too costly for the candidate country governments as their investment in and commitment to EU accession deepens.\(^{136}\)

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\(^{131}\) Grabbe, *The EU’s*, p.76.
\(^{132}\) Grabbe, *The EU’s*, p.90.
\(^{133}\) Grabbe, *The EU’s*, pp.90-1.
\(^{134}\) Grabbe, *The EU’s*, pp.92-4.
\(^{135}\) Grabbe, *The EU’s*, pp.97-112.
\(^{136}\) Grabbe, *The EU’s*, p.203.
As with the literature on the Europeanisation of member state foreign policies, convergence and internalisation are equated with true Europeanisation. For example Grabbe has concluded that “[i]t is when people stop referring to ‘EU policies’ that they have become truly Europeanised.” 137 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier have pointed out that Europeanisation means compliance with EU conditionality. 138 The agency-based approach to Europeanisation in non-members is useful in diverting attention beyond rule transfer from the EU towards the usage of the EU in different ways. In other words, rather than adopting an 'objective' view of what the EU rules are and whether they are complied with, agency-based approaches to the Europeanisation of candidate states aim to understand what domestic actors make of the EU rules, why and how they comply with them if they do.

The literature on the Europeanisation of foreign policy has tended to overlook candidate countries. It can be argued that with strong assumptions of socialisation in EU institutions and processes, and the projection of national preferences to the EU level, the existing literature on the Europeanisation of foreign policy has by definition marginalised candidate countries. An exception to this exclusion came from Major, who has deliberately adopted a broad enough definition of Europeanisation as "domestic change occurring on account of an EU impact" thereby covering "also the consequences of fulfilling EU requirements and of voluntary orientation towards EU standards in candidate countries." 139

There are a few studies dealing with the Europeanisation of new member states such as Poland and Slovenia, however their main focus remains on post-

137 Grabbe, The EU’s, p.205.
membership Europeanisation.\textsuperscript{140} These studies provide brief overviews of the pre-candidacy period, which usually focus on the candidate countries’ alignment with the CFSP acquis politique. Pomorska noted that the pre-candidacy alignment of candidate countries’ foreign policies with the EU and the related political dialogue led to the broadening of territorial interest of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.\textsuperscript{141} Against the backdrop of such dearth of studies on the Europeanisation of candidate foreign policies, it is striking that there is a notable number of studies on the Europeanisation of Turkey’s foreign policy.

The findings of this literature on the Europeanisation of Turkish foreign policy mostly resonate with the broader literature on the Europeanisation of Member State foreign policies. Ustun has argued that due to the “one-sided character” of the EU-candidate state relationship, “[w]hile the member states get the opportunity to affect the decisions during the process, candidates are informed at the end of the process about the policies to which they need to adapt.”\textsuperscript{142} Similarly, Ozcan has bluntly argued “[u]sing Europeanization as a strategic tool for pursuing foreign policy interest is not applicable for Turkey. This issue is valid for the members and especially for Cyprus and Greece.”\textsuperscript{143} In line with these assumptions, there is not any study of the Europeanisation of candidate countries and their foreign policies delving into the possibility of uploading to the EU or to candidate countries using the EU structure as a resource. The focus on socialisation and learning as Europeanisation is also evident in the literature on the Europeanisation of Turkish Foreign Policy. For example, Ustun has argued, “in regards to foreign policy matters, the EU lacks supranational


\textsuperscript{141} Pomorska, ‘Poland,’ p. 172.

\textsuperscript{142} Cigdem Ustun, ‘Europeanisation of foreign policy: The Case of Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Black Sea Region,’ Journal of Southeast Europe and Black Sea Studies, 10/ 2 (2010), pp.227.

\textsuperscript{143} Mesut Ozcan, Harmonizing Foreign Policy: Turkey, the EU and the Middle East (Burlington: Ashgate, 2008), p.162.
characteristics; so, the logic of appropriateness... is a more suitable method for understanding the Europeanization process in the foreign policy domain.”

A similar norm-based definition comes from Terzi, who has argued that the Europeanisation of Turkish Foreign Policy “would imply an acquisition of ‘European identity’ signifying belonging in a new community with new values and norms.” However, as stated earlier, these accounts only refer to the adoption of EU norms and identity by the candidate state in a by and large automatic manner, without an analysis of how domestic actors edit, translate, reject or use the EU accession process and EU norms and policies in foreign policy.

On the other hand, there is another approach analysing the Europeanisation of Turkish Foreign Policy on a pure conditionality basis. Aydin and Acikmese for example have argued that in the case of candidate countries the only mechanism of Europeanisation is conditionality. They have identified three types of EU foreign policy conditionality toward Turkey. The first one is the condition of alignment with the CFSP *acquis politque* including joint actions, common positions, declarations, conclusions reached as part of the CFSP. Secondly, Aydin and Acikmese have enlisted democratic conditionality “which stands at the top of the membership conditions for any country wishing to join the EU.” Finally, they have identified the condition of peaceful settlement of disputes. Therefore, Aydin and Acikmese did not confine their analysis to EU foreign policy decisions or norms and their impact on national foreign policy; rather they have also covered democratic conditionality of the EU. Therefore, authors have undertaken a fruitful expansion of what constitutes the ‘independent variable’ to include more than CFSP conditionality. Yet they omit the

144 Ustun, ‘Europeanization,’ p. 227.
147 Aydin and Acikmese, ‘Europeanization,’ p. 268.
external dimension of the EU’s trade policy and the related rules in Turkey’s candidacy. Also, whether or not the alignment with the CFSP acquis is a ‘condition for membership’ is an empirical issue to be resolved. As explained earlier, for policy areas such as Turkish Foreign Policy towards Cyprus conditionality framework could be applicable, yet it is not directly applicable in the case of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East.

Muftuler Bac and Gursoy have defined Europeanisation as “an adaptation to EU [foreign policy] norms” and its outcome.\textsuperscript{148} They have identified the EU foreign policy norms that are relevant to the case of Turkey as the civilian control of the military and the use of diplomatic and economic means to solve disputes.\textsuperscript{149} Authors do not favour a more sociological or a rationalist explanation of this adaptation process explicitly and focus on the changes evident in Turkish Foreign Policy that fall in line with their definition of Europeanisation based on indicators such as the increased influence of the elected officials and civil society groups in foreign policymaking, and the use of economic and diplomatic tools in solving disputes.\textsuperscript{150} The value-added in this approach is the emphasis on both adaptation to the EU and the indirect consequences of this adaptation are included in the definition of Europeanisation. What lacks in this approach is any explanation of how Europeanisation occurs. By focussing on how Europeanised foreign policy looks like, the authors have skipped the analysis of the causal complex that brought about such a foreign policy.

An interesting twist to this literature has come from Oguzlu, who has utilised a definition which distinguishes between “apparent Europeanization” and

\textsuperscript{149} Muftuler Bac and Gursoy, ‘Is there,’ p.5.
\textsuperscript{150} Muftuler Bac and Gursoy, ‘Is there,’ p.6.
“true Europeanisation.” As Oguzlu has labelled as apparent Europeanisation those cases of observed convergence between Turkish Foreign Policy and EU foreign policy, which “would probably have occurred had Turkey not been pursuing membership in the EU.” True Europeanisation, on the other hand, has been defined as “Europeanisation as cause”:

Europeanisation as cause would appear mainly as a top-down process in the sense that the hierarchical relationship between the EU and candidate countries would not allow the latter to challenge the normative underpinnings of EU foreign policy. EU norms gradually become part of national identities and foreign policy practices throughout the accession process.

Oguzlu’s approach is useful in the sense that it points to the need to go beyond appearances and observable correlations, which is a main premise of this study too. However, Oguzlu’s definition of Europeanisation privileges the EU’s normative structure over Turkish agency and again offers a hardly researchable account of internalisation. Therefore it is not surprising that he does not offer empirical work to support his argument.

Another interesting approach has come from Onis and Yilmaz, who have taken into account the reasons actors have as part of the causal analysis. They have coined the terms “loose Europeanisation” to refer to:

a certain loss of enthusiasm and commitment on the part of the government to what was previously the focal point of Turkish foreign policy efforts, namely joining the EU as a full-member...foreign policy activism is pursued with respect to all neighbouring regions, but with no firm EU axis as was previously the case.

This approach extends the horizon of research to include more agency in the definition by the incorporation of reasons and motivations as part of causal analysis, even if this point is not theoretically elaborated by Onis and Yilmaz.

152 Oguzlu, ’Turkey and the Europeanization,’ p. 683.
153 Oguzlu, ’Turkey and the Europeanization,’ p.662.
154 Ziya Onis and Suhnaz Yilmaz, ’Between Europeanization and Euro-Asianism: Foreign Policy Activism in Turkey During the Akp Era,’ Turkish Studies, 10/1 (2009), p.6.
Finally, as already mentioned before, in the case of Turkey there is a strong emphasis on the EU’s democratic conditionality and its impact on Turkish foreign policy. This is partly due to the military’s traditionally central presence in Turkish politics and especially Turkish foreign policy. The role of the military has been presented by the EU in the candidacy process as a major roadblock.\textsuperscript{155} Therefore many studies have placed significant emphasis on the impact of the EU’s democratic conditionality on the configuration of foreign policy actors in Turkey.\textsuperscript{156} However, Ulusoy has linked this process directly to democratic peace theory.\textsuperscript{157} Ulusoy has pointed out that

It is the contention of this study that Turkey’s cooperative relationships with the EU would go in parallel to Turkey’s democratization. Democratic Turkey would in turn adopt a more compromising style, a more multi-dimensional process and more EU-oriented outcomes in its foreign policy. As the country gradually becomes more democratized, the participation of various societal groups in the foreign policy-making process would lead to the adoption of more cooperative attitudes towards other democracies.\textsuperscript{158}

This assumption is also in line with the main tendency in the literature on the Europeanisation of Turkish foreign policy that Europeanisation is a progressive force that pushes Turkish foreign policy to a benign and peaceful form and that democratisation and pro-EU foreign policy go together, which I contest in this study. I argue in the following empirical chapters that the retreat of the military in Turkish foreign policy led to more political space for other actors; however this process by no means automatically entails a pro-EU foreign policy or peaceful foreign policy. Instead how this process led to a shift in Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East is

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{156} For example, Mario Zucconi, 'The Impact of the EU Connection on Turkey's Domestic and Foreign Policy,' \textit{Turkish Studies}, 10/1 (2009); Aydin and Acikmese, 'Europeanization;' Muftuler Bac and Gursoy, 'Is there.'
  \item \textsuperscript{157} Democratic peace theory is a liberal theory of international relations. Its main contention is that democracies do not go to war with each other. See for example Sebastian Rosato, 'The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory,' \textit{American Political Science Review}, 97 (2003), pp.585-602.
  \item \textsuperscript{158} Kivanc Ulusoy, 'The Europeanization of Turkey and its impact on the Cyprus Problem,' \textit{Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans}, 10/3 (2008), p.313.
\end{itemize}
part of the empirical puzzle this thesis answers rather than assuming an automatic and benign process.

2.4 Conclusion

This thesis addresses some of the shortcomings that the preceding literature review has demonstrated. First of all, in line with the calls for adopting a complex interaction between the policy, politics and polity domains it adopts a dynamic and interactive view of Europeanisation. Accordingly, it is acknowledged that policy is located within a broader political context, which is also in flux in the Europeanisation process. Therefore, domestic politics will not be utilised as a fixed transmission belt, rather it is affected by the EU and it holds causal powers. The Europeanisation of politics also leads to Europeanisation of policy in an indirect fashion, alongside the direct impact of the EU policies.

Also, I argue that the analysis of foreign policy Europeanisation cannot be confined to the CFSP, as the political and economic aspects of foreign policy are intertwined. Therefore a limited focus on the CFSP and its rules overshadows the economic dynamics of foreign policy, such as trade and the progressive consolidation of neo-liberalism in candidate countries. In the case of Turkey for example, an important part of the rules of EU candidacy was the alignment of Turkey’s preferential trade policy with that of the EU’s, which factored into the puzzle of Turkey’s foreign policy toward the Middle East as will be shown in chapter five.

Moreover, none of the studies on the Europeanisation of candidate country foreign policies that have been reviewed so far has dealt with the Europeanisation of foreign policy from a role theory perspective. This is due to the focus on the ideal typical division between conditionality and norm internalisation,
namely rational choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism. This division has led to a lack of conceptualisation of the so-called ‘EU impact’. In the next chapter I engage with this issue and offer a conceptualisation of EU candidacy as an institutional context of relational roles.

As a contribution to the literature on candidate countries, this thesis analyses how Turkish actors used EU candidacy as a resource in their relationship with the Middle East. Such an emphasis on agency in the Europeanisation of candidate countries and a focus on alternative spaces of ‘using Europe’ also helps to question definitions of Europeanisation as convergence. This contribution requires the research to be clear about the theoretical riverbeds in the Europeanisation literature and ontological and methodological underpinnings of Europeanisation. The following chapters will address these issues in turn.
CHAPTER THREE: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Europeanisation has been called an “attention diverting device” by Olsen.159 On top of using Europeanisation as an attention-diverting device, the mainstream literature has also often followed a new institutionalist route in explaining the impact of EU institutions (broadly defined, see below) on domestic politics.160 Yet, new institutionalism is also an “organizing principle,” which does not qualify as a theory itself.161 In a way, the Europeanisation literature has shied away from explicit theory and theorising.

Theory can be defined in many ways. Sayer has categorised theory as a filing system to classify data, theory as hypothesis, and theory as conceptualisation.162 The first definition of theory as a filing system is based on an empiricist approach to social sciences. Behaviourism assumes that reality is directly accessible to observers and it is possible to collect theory-neutral data and classify them to reach generalisations of social life. The second definition is the most common in politics, which is based on positivism, views theory as a cycle of hypothesis-generation and hypothesis-testing with an aim to reach generalisable correlations between variables. In this thesis I adopt the third definition and usage of theorising as “to prescribe a particular way of conceptualising something.”163 Sayer has argued this approach to theorising is more common in contested disciplines that demonstrate fundamental divisions. Considering the dividedness of the Europeanisation literature itself, I believe this approach to theorizing is extremely useful in conceptualising the objects

160 Maarten Vink and Paolo Graziano, ‘Challenges of a New Research Agenda,’ in *Europeanization*, eds., Vink and Graziano, p.13.
163 Sayer, *Method*, p.50.
of analysis and their relationship rather than building generalisable hypotheses leading to parsimonious theories. This chapter firstly outlines the analytical strategy I follow in conceptualising the objects and relations of my analysis. This strategy is based on new institutionalism as a meso-level conceptual framework and a strategic-relational approach to structure and agency. Secondly, this framework will be applied to the EU candidacy of Turkey and its effects on Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Middle East. Finally, the methodology that assists this analytical and conceptual strategy will be explicated.

3.1 The Four New Institutionalisms

Although there is an inflationary trend in the emergence of new institutionalisms, in this section I will mainly limit my review to the new institutionalisms that have informed the majority of the institutionalist studies in the Europeanisation literature. The three new institutionalisms are rational choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism, which have grown in relatively discrete disciplinary trajectories based on differing shades of social ontologies.164 The disciplinary trajectories of these three institutionalisms have also significantly shaped their definitions and conceptualisations of institutions.165 Discursive institutionalism has emerged as a critique of these three new institutionalisms and has been welcomed by the Europeanisation literature.

3.1.1 Rational Choice Institutionalism

Rational choice institutionalism broadly conceptualises institutions as “arrangements of rules and incentives” that do not alter the preferences of the participants in the institution.\textsuperscript{166} Rational choice institutionalism sees institutions as created by rational actors to solve problems of exchange.\textsuperscript{167} Therefore, individual preferences are ontologically prior to institutions and remain untouched by institutional rules according to rational choice institutionalism. Rational choice institutionalism is premised on the assumption that, in its crudest sense, individuals are rational actors who calculate in order to maximise their gain. Individuals have fixed and given preferences to act upon.\textsuperscript{168} According to rational choice institutionalism, institutions are exogenously given rules of the game by which actors play the game.\textsuperscript{169} The actors and the institutions they are located within vary according to the level of analysis. In International Relations for instance, actors are usually seen as unitary states.\textsuperscript{170} According to rational choice institutionalism these states act rationally within the international institutions they are located. In sum, this variant analyses the “institutional constraints on individual behaviour.”\textsuperscript{171}

The rational choice assumption that individuals precede institutions makes rational choice institutionalism appear to be placing due emphasis on


\textsuperscript{171} Pollack, ‘Rational Choice,’ p.4.
agency. Indeed, many students of rational choice institutionalism converge on the idea that it has an individualist ontology, due to the emphasis placed on individual preferences and individual calculations that lead to political outcomes.

However, Hay and Wincott have identified a deeper structuralism at play in rational choice institutionalism. They argue that no matter how individualist rational choice theories look, in the final analysis they take away the ability to choose, which is the essence of individualism, and replace it with rational calculations. In their own words, “rational choice strips away all distinctive features of individuality, replacing political subjects with calculating automatons." Therefore, rational choice institutionalism is innately structuralist in the sense that any agent would eventually choose the rational way of pursuing their exogenously given interests, within the limits imposed by the institutional context.

In time rational choice institutionalism has evolved to incorporate ideas into its explanatory framework so as to account for institutional stability. In Blyth and Varghese's words, “for the rationalists, ideas became focal points in situations of multiple equilibria that could be used to signal convergence, and thus explain stability, or were more or less failures of information.” The second inroad of ideas into rational choice institutionalism was made when rationalist scholars softened their approach to rationality. An example of this is the assumption of bounded rationality, coined by Simon, which assumes that actors do not have perfect information, a perfectly calculating mind and a long time to search for alternative actions.

173 See for example, Knill, The Europeanisation, pp.20-5; Aspinwall and Schneider, 'Same menu,' p.7.
175 Blyth and Varghese, 'The State,' p.357. "Multiple equilibria" refers to the existence of more than one optimal course of action. See Hay, 'Theory, Stylized Heuristic,' p.52.
Therefore, there is no assumption of perfect knowledge of the context. As Hay has suggested,

it is now conventional for rational choice theorists to declare themselves agnostic about the specific utility function to be maximized in any given context, insisting that the term rationality refers only to the efficiency with which means are deployed in the service of given preferences.\textsuperscript{177}

In other words, contemporary rational choice theorists have laxer definitions of rationality, implying the possibility of their rational agents seeking non-material gains, as long as they engage in calculation. These revisions give rational choice institutionalism a more realistic approach to explaining political life, yet they are still embedded within an understanding of theory that aims to reach law-like generalisations through hypothesis-testing or formal modelling.

Rational choice institutionalists working within the Europeanisation literature focus on the opportunity structures that European integration create for domestic actors and the importance of veto players in adaptation to the EU.\textsuperscript{178} The "External Incentives Model" of Europeanisation is an example of rational choice institutionalism. According to this model, "the EU sets the adoption of its rules as conditions that the [candidates] have to fulfil in order to receive rewards from the EU."\textsuperscript{179} The underlying assumption is that domestic actors more or less automatically respond to new opportunity structures created by the EU regardless of their identities and their ideas.

\subsection*{3.1.2 Sociological Institutionalism}

In certain respects, sociological institutionalism is diametrically opposed to rational choice institutionalism. The first difference lies in the definition and function of institutions. According to sociological institutionalism, institutions range

\textsuperscript{177} Hay, 'Theory, Stylized Heuristic,' p.41.
\textsuperscript{178} Kevin Featherstone, 'Introduction,' in \textit{The Politics}, eds., Featherstone and Radaelli, p.9.
\textsuperscript{179} Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 'Introduction,' p.10.
from major containers of values to symbol systems, moral templates, and cognitive scripts. The function of institutions is also different from that in rational choice institutionalism. In sociological institutionalism, institutions shape actor preferences and identities rather than simply shaping the interaction among individual agents. According to sociological institutionalists, individuals and their preferences are constituted by institutions and individuals seek legitimacy in their actions instead of pursuing an exogenously given self-interest. In other words, “exogenous scripts are embraced through cognitive and mimetic processes” by agents. This is not to say that sociological institutionalists rule out utility-maximising behaviour. In fact, most sociological institutionalists acknowledge such behaviour within cultural contexts that prescribe and legitimate utility-maximising behaviour. In Finnemore’s words, “rationality is ‘myth’ and conformance with it is ‘ceremony’.” Thus sociological institutionalism embraces various reasons for action including rational choices of actors, so long as those reasons are culturally embedded in that society or community. Legitimacy is the key to action according to sociological institutionalism, which sometimes even leads to inefficient but culturally appropriate behaviour and organisation.

Sociological institutionalism is diametrically opposed to rational choice institutionalism in its treatment of ideas, as agency is constituted by cultural institutions in the sociological variant. Finnemore puts it nicely when she writes that “the individual as autonomous social actor is a product, not a producer, of society and culture.” Ideas and institutions are ontologically prior to individuals; they constitute individuals and give meaning to the physical surroundings. A good example of such an

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approach is the socialisation assumption in the Europeanisation of foreign policy literature. Much of this literature conceptualises socialisation of foreign policy actors in this fashion, as a process without much agency (see chapter two).

Sociological institutionalists’ emphasis on the ideational structure leads critics to argue that they treat the individual as “a largely dependent and rather unimportant variable.” 184 The structuralism in some variants of sociological institutionalism is so evident that Schmidt points out that this approach can be considered “culturally deterministic” due to its strength in explaining norm-following and weakness in explaining norm-breaking behaviour. 185 However, as with rational choice institutionalism, sociological institutionalism is also a broad church and it undergoes revisions. Some of these approaches bring agency back into the frame and reject the view of individuals as cultural dopes. Finnemore has supported this position by arguing that there is a so far neglected aspect of normative competition in the sociological variant of new institutionalism. 186 As culture is a broad category that consists of contradictory values under one umbrella, there is always room for interpretation and contestation of norms by agents. For instance, Woll and Jacquot have fore grounded agency by arguing that social institutions such as EU norms and practices can be used strategically by agents, as chapter two has reviewed. 187 Woll and Jacquot have identified three broad types of usage. The most common is strategic usage, which refers to using Europe to achieve a certain goal. This kind of usage could refer to the mobilisation of EU resources to achieve a better position in decision-making or increasing one’s action capacity. The transformation of an anti-EU interest group into a pro-EU group to achieve a more favourable position in the domestic bids

187 Woll and Jacquot, ‘Using Europe.’
for EU projects could be an example. Cognitive usage refers to the usage of Europe by an actor in understanding her situation and persuading others to understand a problem in a certain way. This kind of usage covers institutional learning and policy diffusion within the EU. The lessons and the policies to be learned from the EU need the interpretation of and persuasion by domestic actors. Therefore, the cases of interpretation of the EU ideas and usage of these ideas by domestic actors in policy deliberation fall under cognitive usage. Finally, legitimising usage covers cases where domestic actors refer to European constraints or a broader European interest to legitimise a policy decision to the general public. This kind of usage is more likely when the public opinion is more pro-EU, therefore references to Europe have stronger appeal than references to national identity or interest.188

Such sociological approaches indeed broaden the scope of institutions to include power relations embedded within institutions. Instead of offering a frictionless account of socialisation to social norms, these accounts of sociological institutionalism show how actors appropriate norms strategically, in relation to each other. In Jenson and Merand’s words, according to these sociological institutionalists, “[a]n institution can be a set of formal rules and informal norms that persists through time, but it is also always a pattern of social relations, which can be competitive, oppositional and characterized by unequal power relations.”189

189 Jane Jenson and Frédéric Mérand, ‘Sociology, institutionalism and the European Union,’ Comparative European Politics, 8 (2010), p.82.
3.1.3 Historical Institutionalism

Historical institutionalism at a basic level is interested in political struggle within its temporal context.\textsuperscript{190} Any formal and informal recurring pattern can be counted as an institution according to historical institutionalists. According to Peters, Pierre and King, institutions can be defined in historical institutionalism as deliberately created institutions charged with the implementation of public policy, and the formal rules structuring relations between the state and interest groups...formal administrative institutions within the state such as civil service departments or legislatures, as well as informal rules, agreements, and customs within the state and between the state and society.\textsuperscript{191}

As the title implies, history matters for historical institutionalists. History is the context in which events take place, which directly affects the decision or the outcome. Historical institutionalists are interested in historical context out of which institutions emerge.\textsuperscript{192} Unlike rational choice institutionalists who are interested in coordinating functions of institutions, historical institutionalists are interested in the temporal processes that lead to the emergence of institutions.\textsuperscript{193} Secondly, the order in which things happen affect how they happen and their outcomes.\textsuperscript{194} This is also reflected in the assumption of path-dependence in historical institutionalism. Accordingly, historical institutionalists traditionally conceptualise institutions as ‘sticky’ and institutional change as path-dependent. Such a focus on history leads historical institutionalists away from a view of causality based on the presumed independence of variables. For historical institutionalists, there is no ‘independent’

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{190} Elizabeth Sanders, ‘Historical Institutionalism,’ in \textit{The Oxford Handbook}, eds., Rhodes, Binder and Rockman, p.42.
\item\textsuperscript{192} Kathleen Thelen, ‘Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics,’ \textit{Annual Review of Political Science}, 2 (1999), p.384.
\item\textsuperscript{193} Thelen, ‘Historical Institutionalism,’ p.384.
\item\textsuperscript{194} Hay and Wincott, ‘Structure,’ p.955.
\end{itemize}
variable that is responsible for an event; rather there are causal complexes that comprise of historically interrelated factors. As Immergut has aptly put it,

they tend to see complex configurations of factors as being casually significant. These configurations become apparent through historical-comparative observation, and it may be extremely difficult, if not possible, to break such models down into casually [sic.] independent variables.195

Historical institutionalists straddle both logics of action, that of appropriateness and that of consequences. In historical institutionalism, the mechanisms that reinforce institutions can be both “rules of the game’, and even citizens’ basic ways of thinking about the political world.”196 Following this duality, historical institutionalism does not embrace a specific logic of action for actors: sometimes they are interest maximisers; sometimes they just conform to norms habitually.197 Historical institutionalism in this respect is a highly eclectic approach. When referring to the more cultural variants of historical institutionalism, Peters, Pierre and King assert that “historical institutionalism is even more structuralist than more traditional models of structure and agency because it conceives of institutions as sustained by—and representing—systems of values, norms, and practices in society.”198 Therefore, if it were to adopt a logic of action, it would be in Schmidt’s words, “a logic of path dependency”.199 Accordingly, actors are bounded by the evolving structure. Historical institutionalists working within the Europeanisation literature focus on the impact of timing and tempo of EU developments on national adaptation and the stickiness of national institutions in the adaptation process.200 Gross’s finding that there is more continuity than change in member states’ crisis

196 Paul Pierson and Theda Skocpol, ‘Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science,’ Working paper, Available at www.polisci.berkeley.edu/faculty/bio/permanent/Pierson,P/Discipline.pdf (Date N/A).
200 Simon Bulmer, ‘Theorizing Europeanization,’ in Europeanization, eds., Vink and Graziano, p.50.
response policies due to national actors' predisposition towards using the already tried methods of crisis response is a good example of this logic of path-dependence (see chapter two).

Historical institutionalism has been criticized mainly for its eclecticism, its structuralism including the lack of an account of endogenous institutional change and insufficient conceptualisation of the role of ideas and micro-foundations of institutional behaviour. First of all, historical institutionalism has been criticised for lacking an endogenous account of change. The first line of such criticism was that according to many historical institutionalist work institutions explained everything until they explained nothing. For example, Krasner's oft-cited "punctuated equilibrium" theory of institutional change attributes change to critical junctures while in the remaining time, stasis settles in hence the "equilibrium." Secondly within this line of criticism, historical institutionalists have been criticised for not being able to account for ideational factors in the dynamics of institutional continuity and change. Along this line, Bulmer has argued that the incorporation of learning into historical institutionalist analyses offers the potential of easing the structuralist and deterministic tendencies of this variant of new institutionalism. Likewise Peters, Pierre and King concluded that the role played by ideas and the conflict over them should be central to historical institutional analyses.

Hall's work on the role of changing policy paradigms in institutional change is a pioneer in historical institutionalism. According to Hall, policy paradigms are broad ideational frameworks held collectively by groups of actors,

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201 Thelen and Steinmo, ‘Historical Institutionalism.’
202 Thelen and Steinmo, ‘Historical Institutionalism,’ p.15.
204 Bulmer, Theorizing,’ p.54.
which define what problems and solutions are legitimate even to consider. Policy paradigms provide actors with a framework of institutional goals, hierarchy of these goals and appropriate ways of addressing problems. Hall’s argument is that there are policy instruments, settings and paradigms, which are all elements that make up a policy system. Minor changes in the settings in which policy instruments are used represent first order change, whereas changes in the policy instruments represent second order change. Finally, if a more dramatic change that takes place in the hierarchy of goals and standards, then it is called third order change, i.e. paradigmatic change.

Palier’s criticism of Hall’s framework is that not all paradigmatic institutional change is necessarily abrupt and explicit, but sometimes slow-moving and incremental. As Streeck and Thelen have identified, layering is a potential mode of incremental change where actors with a reform agenda work around the unchangeable aspects of an institution by adding new elements to the existing institution with the aim of revising, correcting and amending it. Thus the newly added elements do not explicitly threaten the unchangeable aspects of the institution, i.e. the basic goals of the institution, and the supporters of those unchangeable aspects. Layering is achieved by actors’ active promotion of revisions, amendments and corrections to the old system and when it leads to differential growth and replacement of the existing unchangeable elements of the institution it entails institutional change. As Palier has demonstrated, for layering to succeed, there has to be consensus among key actors on the failure of past practices and policies and an ambiguous agreement among key actors over the introduction of new elements to the

208 Hall, ‘Policy paradigms.’
system to fix the system. What renders this agreement ambiguous is that the parties to the agreement all have their own reasons for agreeing with the new measures. Therefore, ‘layering’ is a very helpful concept that explains how incremental change, which may or may not lead to paradigmatic change in the long run, is initiated.

Although layering is a quite useful analytical concept, it still emphasizes the process unleashed by the annexation of new instruments to an existing policy at the expense of the goals actors had for layering new instruments in the first place and their strategies of layering. In this respect, layering explains what happens to the institution in the long run rather than showing how actors actually managed to layer their ideas onto the existing institution. Likewise, while Hall has successfully examined the importance of policy paradigms in institutional change, his explanation of how ideas can be strategically used by actors remained underdeveloped. This point is taken up by discursive institutionalists, who place actors, their strategies, ideas and discourses at the heart of their analyses.

There is a fine line between historical institutionalist analyses that take ideas on board and discursive institutionalism that emerged as a critique mainly of the lack of sufficient handling of ideas by historical institutionalists. The students of historical institutionalism suggested that the approach is capable of renovating historical institutionalism to be able to take ideas and agency into account rather than creating new institutionalisms. Yet, discursive institutionalism emerged on the grounds that historical institutionalism is not capable of adapting itself to take ideas seriously.

Secondly, by straddling both logics of appropriateness and consequences when explaining agency, historical institutionalists have been criticized for combining

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insights from competing social ontologies. Thus, sympathetic critics have suggested that historical institutionalism should adopt its own social ontology. This line of criticism led to the emergence of a self-labelled constructivist institutionalism, which will be explained below.

3.1.4 Discursive Institutionalism

A consequence of the increasing recognition of the need for ideas in the new institutionalist research is the recent flourishing of what Schmidt has called “discursive institutionalism.” According to Schmidt, discursive institutionalists are those new institutionalist scholars who use ideas as a causal factor in decision-making processes. Discursive institutionalism, therefore, starts from the assumption that discourse and ideas matter in bringing about any political reality and aims to incorporate this perspective to the existing three institutionalisms. The institutionalism in this approach is that ideas and discourse matter in changing or maintaining institutions. This way, Schmidt has aimed to emphasise actors’ ideational and discursive capabilities to transform or maintain institutions. Schmidt has coined helpful analytical categories for the analysis of ideas. Communicative discourse “consists of the individuals and groups at the centre of political communication involved in the public presentation, deliberation, and legitimization of policy, programmatic, as well as philosophical ideas”; whereas coordinative discourse

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214 Hay and Wincott, ‘Structure, Agency.’
215 Hay and Wincott, ‘Structure, Agency.’
is the organizing discourse of policy construction and elaboration by policy actors in
the policy formulation stage.220 This approach qualifies discursive institutionalism as
institutionalist in the sense that it acknowledges that all discursive interactions take
place within institutions. Schmidt for instance argued that compound political systems
are more likely to have strong coordinative discourses whereas simple polities are
more likely to have strong communicative discourses.221

Contrary to Bell’s criticism that Schmidt offers an idealist account of
institutionalism, Schmidt does not actually deny the existence and significance of the
material context.222 What she has argued is that discursive institutionalists rather
deconstruct ‘material interests’ by separating material reality from interests that the
actors conceive in the context of material reality.223 Otherwise, Schmidt has argued
that discursive institutionalism speaks the language of incentive structures with
rational choice institutionalism, path-dependency with historical institutionalism and
culture with sociological institutionalism while infusing them with agency and
ideas.224 Yet, this theoretical pragmatism is not shared by all proponents of the role of
ideas in institutionalist analysis. Hay, therefore, has coined constructivist
institutionalism to be able to highlight his particular strategic-relational ontology.

3.1.5 Constructivist Institutionalism and the Strategic-Relational
Approach

Starting from the inability of the logic of consequences and the logic of
appropriateness to explain endogenous institutional change as well as the lack of
ideational analysis in institutionalism, Hay has put forward constructivist

220 Vivien Schmidt, ‘Putting The Political Back Into Political Economy By Bringing The State Back In Yet
Again,’ World Politics, 61 (2009), p.11.
221 Vivien A. Schmidt, ‘The Role of Public Discourse in European Democratic Social Reform Projects,’
European Integration Online Papers, 9/8 (2005).
222 Bell, ‘Do We Really.’
institutionalism. In tune with Hay's version of the strategic-relational approach, constructivist institutionalism explains institutional change as contingent upon strategic actors' interaction with the strategically selective context in which they are embedded and the intended and unintended consequences of this interaction. Yet, the context and action are intermediated by the actors' perceptions of the context. Change is both path-dependent and path-shaping. Constructivist institutionalism places due emphasis on strategic yet ideationally motivated actors' ability to change the path of institutional development, while acknowledging that institutional change is also partly dependent on the past succession of events and evolution.225 The most significant contribution to the mainstream institutionalist variants is constructivist institutionalism's emphasis on not only institutional but also ideational path-shaping and path-dependence. In Hay’s words,

> Institutions are built on ideational foundations that exert an independent path-dependent effect on their subsequent development…. Constructivist institutionalism thus seeks to identify, detail, and interrogate the extent to which—through processes of normalization and institutional embedding—established ideas become codified, serving as cognitive filters through which actors come to interpret environmental signals and, in so doing, to conceive of their own interests. Yet, crucially, they are also concerned with the conditions under which such established cognitive filters and paradigms are contested, challenged, and replaced.226

The institutional context, actors' ideas of that context and path-dependent ideational paradigms altogether shape actors' perceptions of feasible, desirable, legitimate action.227

Many students of new institutionalism have complained about the disciplinary boundaries and highlighted the need for more dialogue among the variants of new institutionalism.228 As Hay and Wincott have aptly pointed out this should not invite an eclectic approach without any attention paid to the underlying

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ontological and epistemological differences. This is what Hay has aimed to accomplish by embedding his constructivist institutionalism within a strategic-relational ontology. However, the title ‘constructivist institutionalism’ has been confused with either ‘sociological institutionalism’ or ‘discursive institutionalism’ by the literature, thereby diminishing the impact of constructivist institutionalism and its strategic-relational ontology.

The strategic-relational approach is an ontological framework for the relationship between structure and agency, which is rooted in critical realist metatheory. According to the SRA, agency and structure are always present simultaneously at any given situation. The SRA analogy of structure and agency is the metals in an alloy out of which a coin is forged to highlight the inseparability of structure from agency. Following from this analogy, it can be argued that both structure and agency have causal powers (just like the metals in the alloy) that cannot exist without each other in a causal complex (the alloy) that make a certain political reality possible (the resulting coin). The main premise is that every action is the outcome of the interaction between a strategically selective context and a strategic actor.

Structures are always selective towards “some actors, some identities, some strategies, some spatial and temporal horizons, some actions over others” therefore their effects can only be observed in relation to action. This is probably why Jessop does not proffer an elaborate definition of what a structure is. Likewise Hay has opted for defining structure as the "setting within which social, political and economic events occur and acquire meaning" in particular referring to “the ordered

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229 Hay and Wincott, ‘Structure, Agency.’
nature of social and political relations—to the fact that political institutions, practices, routines and conventions appear to exhibit some regularity or structure over time.”

One of the key assumptions of the SRA is therefore the assumption that reality is produced through an interaction between a strategically selective context and a strategic actor. This assumption sets it apart from raw dichotomies between structure and agency. Strategic selectivity of the context favours certain strategies, therefore enabling and constraining the actors on the basis of the strategies they adopt. In other words, “politics is the art of the possible” and actors are the artists.

Yet, this position does not imply voluntarism, which dispenses with any notion of structure. It implies a relational approach to both structure and agency, without discarding either side.

Strategic selectivities of the context are path-dependent in the sense that the selectivities that actors face now are the outcomes of past political struggles and strategies. However, strategic selectivities of the context are also shaped by the strategic action by contemporary actors. It is never possible to predict the future trajectory of structural change because “the reproduction of structures is only ever tendential, so too are their strategic selectivities.” Structures do not determine action and actors by imposing certain logics of action or certain goals; rather they only privilege some strategies, actors and spatio-temporal horizons of action. Consequently there is always room for transformation of structures. Likewise, actors are complex, having incomplete information about the context, never fully equipped for the strategic analysis of the context, and facing opposition from actors pursuing other strategies. This leads to failure as an ever-present possibility. Finally structures are

234 Hay, Political Analysis, p.94.
236 Jessop, State Theory, p.149.
237 Hay, Political Analysis, p.111.
never monolithic constructs; they embody strategic contradictions that can be strategically used by actors, which make the reproduction of structures a probability not a rule.

Actors are taken to be intentional and capable of monitoring strategic selectivities embedded in the context and of devising certain strategies based on their perceptions of the context to achieve their preferences. Hay defines strategy as:

intentional conduct oriented towards the environment in which it is to occur. It is the intention to realise certain outcomes and objectives, which motivates action. Yet for that action to have any chance of realizing such intentions, it must be informed by a strategic assessment of the relevant context in which strategy occurs and upon which it subsequently impinges.240

Strategic action can be both intuitive and explicit. Intuitively strategic action entails habitual or routine practices based on a certain perception of the context and the likely outcomes of specific actions. Such intuitive action usually remains unchallenged unless it is rendered explicit by a crisis or failure.241 On the other hand, explicitly strategic action is based on a certain perception of the context coupled with a strategic investigation and mapping of the context and its strategic selectivities.242 Both kinds of strategic action are fallible and likely to co-exist in a given case of action. Strategies are fallible because agents are not assumed to be fully knowledgeable of the context. Actors may be acting strategically but based upon incomplete and/or false information, or well-informed systematic assessments of the context.243 After strategic action takes place, agents monitor the direct and indirect consequences of their action,244 which leads to strategic learning and the maintenance of or change in the selectivities of the context. As a consequence of strategic learning,

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240 Hay, Political Analysis, p.129.
241 Hay, Political Analysis, p.132.
242 Hay, Political Analysis, p.133.
243 Hay and Wincott, 'Structure, Agency,' p.44; Hay, Political Analysis, p.132.
244 Hay, Political Analysis, p.132.
actors might enhance their knowledge of the strategic context and in turn revise their strategies to achieve their objectives, or they might transform their objectives.

Ideas, in the form of perceptions, discourses, and goals are at the heart of the SRA since actors’ perceptions of their context are crucial ingredients in strategic context analysis. Actors do not have unmediated knowledge of the context; they act within a discursively mediated context. Failure might be the result of an unrealistic discursive construction of the context, so upon perceived failure actors might also change their discourse regarding the context. Agents “come to orient their strategies and tactics in the light of their understanding of the current conjuncture and their ‘feel for the game’.” Such ‘understandings of the context’ and ‘feel for the game’ are conditioned by the dominant policy paradigms. According to Hay, actors’ perceptions of what is feasible, legitimate and efficient are filtered by the policy paradigms (or discursive selectivities) of the context. Hay has argued that policymaking takes place within an evolving policy paradigm and an evolving material context. This approach highlights the importance of perceptions and discursive framing of the context by actors in conducting strategic context analysis. When agents reorient their strategies, it may also affect their goals.

All in all, the SRA offers a realistic account of structure and agency. The SRA is capable of bringing together useful insights from different variants of institutionalism within a consistent ontological framework. Yet, the SRA aims to

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245 Hay and Wincott, 'Structure, Agency,' p.44.
246 Jessop, 'Institutional Re(turns),' p.1224.
248 Hay, 'The “Crisis”.
251 Jessop, 'Institutional Re(turns),' p.1224.
deconstruct, demystify and denaturalises institutions, which goes against the
tendency in some of the earlier variants of new institutionalism as explained earlier.

In Jessop and Nielsen’s words, “[d]urable institutions always require
micro-foundations and usually exist in specific macro-contexts.”252 While actors are
strategic, reflexive, in pursuit of complex and ever changing goals, the institutional
context privileges certain strategies. Institutions are analysed not as abstract entities
but in terms of their strategic and discursive selectivities. In Jessop’s words, “[t]he
material, discursive and spatio-temporal selectivities of an organization, institution or
institutional ensemble privilege some practices and strategies and make it harder to
realize others.”253 A significant contribution of the SRA is in offering a dynamic view of
institutionalization rather than offering a static definition of institutions.

3.2 Combining the New Institutionalisms and the SRA

The preceding review of the advances in the new institutionalisms and the
SRA as an ontological framework informs the analysis in this thesis. Strategic-
relational framework provides the most basic ontological assumptions, which glues
insights drawn from different institutionalisms together. The main value-added of the
SRA will be the relationality of structure and agency. Such ontological clarification is
important as the concepts drawn from different new institutionalisms will be
reworked within a strategic-relational framework during the analysis. For example,
‘strategic action’ will be used throughout the analysis not in a rational choice
conceptualisation but in a strategic-relational conceptualisation as explained above.
Likewise, path-dependence will not be used in a structuralist sense of the concept, but

253 Bob Jessop, “Institutional Theory and Political Economy,” in Debating Institutionalism, eds., Peters,
Stoker and Pierre (Manchester: Manchester University Press), p.216
it will refer to the intentional and unintentional reproduction of the path of institutional development by agency. Also, by using the concepts drawn from historical institutionalism, sociological institutionalism and discursive institutionalism, the path-dependent evolution of institutions will be complemented by path-shaping activities of agency. Therefore, not only path-dependence but also incremental change due to path-shaping activities of agency such as institutional change through layering will also be adopted in the analysis. While path-dependence and incremental change through layering will be used to explain institutional change, agency that brings about change and continuity in institutions will be explained through conceptual frameworks such as ‘using Europe’ and ‘communicative and coordinative discourses.’

There are significant parallels between the usages of Europe identified by Woll and Jacquot and the communicative and coordinative discourses identified by Schmidt when applied to a Europeanisation framework. The legitimating usage of Europe can be found in the communicative discourses that domestic actors adopt and the cognitive usage of Europe can be found in the coordinative discourses.

However, all agency is situated in line with the SRA. Paradigms are the structured programmatic ideas that underpin formal institutions and actors operate within the boundaries set by paradigms. This is not to say there is full consensus among actors within the same paradigm. There could be dissent within the same paradigm and alternative paradigms can exist. Operating within the ideational boundaries set by the programmatic ideas underpinning institutions, actors interact through their coordinative and communicative discourses in the policymaking and policy implementation stages. Within this conceptual framework, this thesis will

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mainly explore how 'Europe' is used by domestic actors to enable and give meaning to Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East in the 2000s.

Yet, it is not sufficient to analyse how ‘Europe’ is used by candidate state agency. As ‘using Europe’ is a framework that was initially devised for the member states of the EU, further elaboration is needed to appropriate it as a framework for candidate states. In the next section, I delve into this question of how to conceptualise ‘Europe’ that is being used by domestic agency by conceptualising EU candidacy as an institutional context.

3.3 EU Candidacy as an Institutional Context

Many students of EU-Turkey relations mark the importance of the EU's Helsinki decision to grant Turkey candidacy 'status' as a cornerstone in this relationship. In what follows I argue that EU candidacy is more than just a decision but an institutional context. As the review of recent trends in new institutionalism has demonstrated earlier, I argue there is already a call within the literature for the adoption of a dynamic view of institutions and their relationship with agency and context. Utilising insights from the SRA, within which I have located my understanding of institutionalism for the purposes of this thesis, I will now turn to briefly explain how and why EU candidacy can be conceptualised as an institution. Although such an understanding is non-existent within the Europeanisation literature, there have been similar attempts within other literatures.

As Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier have noted, conceptualising enlargement as institutionalisation is a significant contribution to the study of enlargement. Authors have defined the enlargement of an organisation as the horizontal institutionalisation of that organisation's rules and norms in non-member
countries.²⁵⁶ However, as Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier have pointed out, the Europeanisation of candidate countries have not been analysed from an institutionalisation perspective.²⁵⁷ A study from the broader literature on international organisations is Mower’s article on the evolution of the observer status within the UN. Mower has argued that “[o]bserver status is an institution which the United Nations has acquired through historical accident and usage rather than through planning.”²⁵⁸ Accordingly, observer status-as-institution is located somewhere between membership and non-membership. This middle position offers its participants, the UN and the observing state, certain roles and rules. Although there is no theoretical discussion on either institutionalism or the concept of institution in Mower’s article, important parallels can be drawn with the conceptualisation offered in this thesis. First of all is Mower’s reconceptualisation of ‘status’ as an institution. Secondly, the implication of his argument that observer status-as-institution is not an entity on its own but it is based on the relationship between the UN and the observing state. These similarities will become more salient once the account of EU candidacy-as-institutional context is clarified below.

### 3.3.1 Relational nature of EU candidacy

The study of institutions has recently moved away from static conceptions of institutions, as the review of new institutionalism earlier has demonstrated. This has meant a turn to agency but also away from the disregard for how institutions emerge in the first place and what they stand for. Historical institutionalist work especially has focused on how institutions emerge from, reproduce and transform power relations in the society. Katzenelson has suggested that:

²⁵⁶ Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, ‘Theorizing EU Enlargement,’ p.503.
²⁵⁷ Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, ‘Theorizing EU Enlargement,’ p.507.
this body of scholarship [new historical institutionalism] shifted away from the macrostructures of the state, the economy, and civil society to focus on institutions understood both as rules of transaction between these sites and as the actual array of formal organizations inside each macrostructure and astride their interactions. Institutions emerged as ligatures fastening sites, relationships, and large-scale processes to each other.\(^\text{259}\)

In line with these attempts and the SRA, this thesis also conceptualises EU candidacy as a relational institutional context. It is based on the asymmetrical political relation between the EU and the candidate state, in the same way as “[t]he relations of money and banking systems....in which one object in a relation can exist without the other, but not vice versa.”\(^\text{260}\) Without the EU, there would not be an EU candidate, yet without Turkey as a candidate the EU would continue to exist. As long as there are other candidates for EU membership, the EU would continue to exist in its present “widening organization” identity.\(^\text{261}\)

EU candidacy is temporally and spatially located between EU membership and non-membership. The dividing line between candidacy and association can be rightly questioned as some association agreements that the EU has signed contain a membership prospect, such as those with Turkey and Greece.\(^\text{262}\) As Sedelmeier has argued, after the association agreements signed with Turkey and Greece, the EU has been keen to put water between association and membership and used association agreements rather as an alternative to membership.\(^\text{263}\) Also, the pre-accession process runs together with association rather than replacing it, which blurs the boundaries of EU candidacy as an institution. The EU started declaring countries as candidates in


\(^{260}\) Sayer, \textit{Method}, p.90.


\(^{262}\) David Phinnemore, \textit{Association: Stepping Stone or Alternative to EU Membership?} (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999).

1999 with the decision on Turkey. Since then Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has been declared as candidate in 2005, Montenegro in 2010.\textsuperscript{264} It could be argued that EU candidacy has been institutionalising between Turkey and the EU since the Turkish candidacy decision in 1999.

More significantly, as an institution, EU candidacy is the institutionalisation of position roles and a paradigm. Institutional paradigms serve as a cognitive framework for the actors involved in the definition of problems, legitimate and appropriate solutions to problems and behaviour. The paradigm of EU candidacy is accession of the candidate country to the EU. Problems are identified and solutions are offered within the framework of ‘EU accession’.\textsuperscript{265} Neither the EU actors nor candidate country politicians can legitimately put forward problems and issues that are not relevant to the candidate's accession to the EU. Moreover, EU candidacy comprises of social positions out of which actors construct their roles in relation to each other and the institutional context.

Roles that are prescribed, made and chosen by actors in relation to each other within institutions should occupy a central place in the analysis of international institutions such as EU candidacy.\textsuperscript{266} However, definitions so far have mostly emphasised the constraining nature of roles within institutions so that these persistent roles shape expectations. For example, Keohane has defined institutions as a “persistent and connected set of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations.”\textsuperscript{267} Although establishing the link between institutions and roles is a helpful starting point for future analyses,\textsuperscript{264} Sedelmeier, ‘Enlargement,’ p.417-8. DG Enlargement website, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/montenegro/relati/index_en.htm, (25 May 2012).
\textsuperscript{265} Ulrich Sedelmeier, Constructing the path to Eastern enlargement: the uneven policy impact of EU identity (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005).
such an approach ignores agency and privileges institutional structure in the conception and performance of roles. This structuralist bias is also shared by Barnett in that he has also argued that roles constrain state action.268

Barnett has identified two types of roles that constrain its occupants to varying degrees. Position role refers to roles that are associated with formal institutions. According to Barnett, they leave less room for interpretation to the actors that occupy them. Preference role on the other hand, refers to role conceptions associated with informal institutions. Preference roles, therefore, are less constraining than position roles and they leave more room for interpretation according to Barnett.269

However, some informal institutions such as religion can be more constraining than certain position roles such as The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) membership. Therefore, the distinction is more about varying levels of institutionalisation rather than the type of institutions. As institutionalisation is about actors’ perceptions of and strategies towards institutional roles, it can offer a balance to the structuralist bias of institutionalist role theory.270 Therefore, reconceptualising role theory within a strategic-relational approach to institutions would establish the balance in favour of agency in role theory.

Role prescription refers to "roles that other actors or groups prescribe and expect the role-beholder to enact."271 Role prescription therefore is the role expected by others in the institution, individuals of the occupant of a certain social position.272 The EU is the main rule-maker in relation to the EU candidacy institution,

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268 Barnett, 'Institutions, Roles and Disorder,' p.272.
270 This is my categorisation of role theorists who locates roles within institutions, such as Barnett and Aggestam. There is also a more psychologistic role theory that is drawn from symbolic interactionism, which is beyond the scope of this thesis.
therefore role prescriptions of EU candidacy are those codified by the EU and its member states in the Accession Partnership Documents and annual Progress Reports. The literature on the Europeanisation of Turkey also confirms the rule-making role of the EU and the rule-taking role of Turkish political actors by usually depicting the relationship between the EU and the candidate state as asymmetrical "between a ‘wannabe’ or ‘demandeur’ and an exclusive club having strict rules for membership.”

The EU Commission and the European Council together prescribe certain rules to be followed by Turkey, therefore providing Turkish actors with a prescription of an EU candidate role. These rules and roles have been evolving on a case by case basis, in relation to the applicants. Since the enlargement towards the UK, the role prescription for EU candidates has been the complete adoption of the *acquis communautaire* prior to accession.

There are procedural rules that are institutionalised in EU candidacy as well. The European Council decides whether an application is appropriate or not; and whether an applicant is ‘European’ or not. If the first opinion of the Council is positive, then the Commission produces a report and a recommendation as to whether to start accession negotiations with or without delay. Once the pre-accession process starts, the candidate is given an Accession Partnership outlining the specific conditions and priorities to be observed by the candidate state while adopting the *acquis*. The Copenhagen criteria have initially emerged as a set of criteria for assessing the eligibility of applications; however they

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276 For example Morocco applied for EU membership in 1987 but received an unequivocal rejection. Bahar Rumeli, ‘Constructing identity and relating to difference: understanding the EU’s mode of differentiation,’ *Review of International Studies*, 30 (2004), pp.27-47.
277 Bache, George and Bulmer, *Politics*, p.535.
were later on adopted as criteria for opening the negotiations as well.\textsuperscript{279} The Copenhagen criteria require "stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; a functioning market economy, as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic, and monetary union."\textsuperscript{280} Two sets of position role prescriptions offered by the EU for Turkey as a candidate that will be analysed in this study are:

Role 1(Copenhagen criteria): The candidate should be in compliance with the Copenhagen political and economic criteria.

Role 2(foreign policy \textit{acquis}): The candidate's foreign policy should be aligned with the foreign policy \textit{acquis} of the EU.

In Maresceau's words, "[t]he publication of progress reports, or even the simple fact that such reports are anticipated, creates an atmosphere of permanent follow-up."\textsuperscript{281} The Accession Partnership also constitutes a single framework for enhanced financial support to the candidate countries to support them in their reform efforts to institutionalise the role prescriptions of the EU. A political dialogue mechanism is also established on both a bilateral and multilateral basis between the EU and the candidates as part of this institution for the EU to keep candidates informed of its foreign policy positions and other political issues.\textsuperscript{282} Therefore, the EU decides, supports, judges and knows the candidate states, which creates a power asymmetry between the EU and the candidate state.

\textsuperscript{279} Bache, George and Bulmer, \textit{Politics}, pp.535-6.
\textsuperscript{280} European Council, \textit{Conclusions of the Presidency}, 21-22 June 1993, Copenhagen, Denmark.
\textsuperscript{281} Maresceau, 'Pre-accession,' p.33.
What shapes the institutionalisation of the position role is, however, Turkish political actors’ strategies towards each other and the EU’s role prescriptions. National role conceptions refer to the sum of national political actors’ strategies as to how they should act on behalf of their state, based on their perceptions of the role prescriptions, the material and ideational context, and their goals.\textsuperscript{283} In strategic-relational terms, national role conceptions are domestic actors’ strategies towards the role prescriptions of the EU and their context. Normatively oriented strategic behaviour of domestic actors, their definitions of the situation and their ideas of appropriate ways of addressing that situation alters the way the EU candidate role is institutionalised in Turkish politics. Role performance is the output of the interaction between role prescriptions and Turkish actors’ strategies towards these prescriptions. As Holsti has observed, “[i]f ‘the position makes the man [sic],’ the re-verse of the coin is that man interprets and defines for himself the rights, duties, privileges and appropriate forms of behaviour associated with his positions and relationships in society.”\textsuperscript{284}

This power of agency gives national actors more leeway for interpreting and defining what it takes to occupy a position role than it is presumed by Barnett. Thus, the asymmetry between the EU and the candidate can be alleviated to a certain extent. The candidates can transform the position role through skilled agency.\textsuperscript{285} As all structures (\textit{a fortiori} institutions) contain contradictions and strategic openings, agency can effect changes if they adopt appropriate strategies. A good example is the Polish and Hungarian officials’ argument that the CEECs should be more involved in shaping the CFSP decisions during candidacy. They built upon previous arrangements that allowed CEECs to unilaterally align themselves with CFSP outputs and in tandem

\textsuperscript{283} Aggestam, ‘Role Conceptions.’
\textsuperscript{284} Holsti, ‘National Role Conceptions,’ p.239.
with the Commission and the British, German and Italian governments' support they secured an arrangement allowing their indirect input into the CFSP decision-making. The paradigm institutionalised within EU candidacy institution is the accession of the candidate state to the EU. Therefore role prescriptions can be redrawn by making appropriate references to the 'accession' paradigm in a skilful way.

EU candidate role prescriptions and the rules that are designed for each applicant reflect a different configuration. But also, as historical institutionalism and the SRA suggest, institutions are located within a broader spatio-temporal context, so is EU candidacy. The domestic, regional, international context can be used strategically by national actors to alter their country's role as an EU candidate. The international context for instance has contributed to a change in the rules of the game several times. The Southern enlargement towards Greece, Spain and Portugal was heavily shaped by geo-strategic factors and this also shaped the role prescriptions of EU candidacy for these countries. Likewise Phinnemore has demonstrated how Romania's candidacy was by and large impacted on by political developments in the broader European and international context.

The institutionalisation of Turkey's EU candidate role is contingent upon domestic actors' adaptation, usage, adoption of the EU's candidate role prescriptions for Turkey. A relational definition of institutions is closer to process ontology than it is to substance ontology. Institutions are not reified 'things' that remain constant, they are processes of relations. In this respect, EU candidacy can be referred to as

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286 For details see Sedelmeier, *Constructing*, pp.168-70.
288 Bache, George and Bulmer, *Politics*, p.535.
289 David Phinnemore, 'And We'd Like to Thank ... Romania's Integration into the European Union, 1989-2007,' *Journal of European Integration*, 32/3 (2010), pp.291-308.
institutionalisation rather than an institution. When actors adopt strategies that are selectively favoured by the institutional context, a pattern emerges in the institutionalisation of EU candidacy. Yet, institutions are “fragile accomplishments.”\textsuperscript{291} They are reproduced by agents within certain macro contexts, which render institutions open to de-institutionalisation and re-institutionalisation dynamics.

3.3.2 The Value-added of conceptualising EU candidacy from an institutionalist perspective

I have argued for conceptualising EU candidacy as an institutional context that is strategically selective and relational between the EU and the candidate state. This offers potential in certain ways. First of all, this conceptualisation brings together elements drawn from different institutionalisms within a single ontological framework. The strategic-relational framework allows institutions to be viewed as changing, relational, path-dependent yet shaped by agency; as embedded within broader spatio-temporal contexts and strategically selective. This ontology highlights the role of agency; actors’ perception of the situation and discourses to narrate it in transforming or maintaining a social reality. In this respect, the role prescriptions do not determine what actors do or think, they enable and constrain certain strategies and discourses.

I have opted for conceptualising EU candidacy as an institutional context rather than specific EU policy processes, such as the CFSP, or modes of interaction, such as conditionality. Such a conceptualisation also addressed the question “what about the EU is the context for the Europeanisation of Turkish foreign policy.” CFSP is an ‘EU policy’ and its institutional structure usually does not include candidates as its participants. Therefore, analysing the impact of the CFSP on Turkey as

\textsuperscript{291} Jessop, 'Institutional (Re)turns,' p.1220.
Europeanisation, would not have given Turkish actors much ability to change the rules.\textsuperscript{292} When this lack of formal decision-making powers is combined with the methodological separation between the so-called ‘EU level’ structure and the ‘domestic level’ agency in the literature, while member states are conceptualised as first uploading to the ‘EU level’ and then downloading from it, candidate states are supposed to be left only with downloading and socialisation options (see Chapter 1).\textsuperscript{293} This has translated to a literature assessing the extent to which Turkish actors downloaded the EU acquis and socialised to an EU identity. Rather than adopting such an approach depriving Turkish actors of meaningful agency, I opt for reconceptualising EU candidacy as an institution since institutions constrain but also enable actors. I have argued that the EU and Turkey are relationally positioned to each other within EU candidacy, which is the institution that enables and constrains domestic agency in turn. In sum, this conceptualisation also allows me to transcend the artificial distinction between the ‘EU level’ and ‘domestic level’.

Conceptualising EU candidacy as an institution rather than a ‘status,’ or ‘decision’ allowed me to look at the rules and roles associated with EU candidacy as an institution. This institution gives Turkey and the EU a certain social position and the institutionalisation of its EU candidate role is contingent upon the domestic actors’ strategic but also normative orientation towards the role prescriptions and each other. However, it is an open-ended question whether, how and why these rules are used and what role is constructed out of the EU candidacy position.

\textbf{3.4 Research Design}


\textsuperscript{293} This approach is more in line with the structuration theory and the morphogenetic approach in terms of its methodological bracketing. The strategic-relational approach argues structure and agency should be analysed in relation to each other simultaneously.
Having conceptualised EU candidacy as an institution, I define Europeanisation from an institutionalist perspective. At the most general level Europeanisation is conceptualised as the process through which EU candidacy enables and constrains Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Middle East. The SRA places perceptions, discourses of actors and their strategies at the heart of causal analysis. For the strategic-relational approach the reasons and motivations of actors are also causes (see below). Therefore an understanding of the perceptions of actors and the meaning systems are key components of causal analysis. Both perceptions and policy paradigms within which actors define ‘feasible’, ‘normal’, ‘legitimate’ have causal status in the SRA.

This makes structural constraints and opportunities matters of perspective, they are experienced differently by different actors. Therefore, in order to make enabling and constraining powers of EU candidacy researchable, I conceptualise Europeanisation as the institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU’s candidate role by domestic actors as a strategy to achieve their objectives based on their perception of the context. These objectives can range from EU membership to any other objective. In this respect, actors in Turkey (foreign policy actors in this research) are situated in a strategically selective context and they strategise to achieve their political objectives. I define Europeanisation as the intended and unintended consequences of the institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU candidate role. In short, the mechanism of Europeanisation that brings together agency and EU candidacy is a complex of strategy and discourse, strategic and discursive selectivities and perception. Actors are reflexive and they might change their goals or strategies over

294 Hay, Political Analysis, p.125. Yet, this is not to argue for idealism. This takes place within a strategically selective context.
295 See also Claudio M. Radaelli, ‘Europeanisation: Solution or Problem?” European Integration Online Papers, 8/16 (2004).
time due to perceived failure or learning. Therefore without understanding how actors perceived their context and their reasons for acting, it is not possible to understand how the institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU candidate role and how it enabled or constrained Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East.

Such a research agenda necessitates the adoption of an intensive research design as coined by critical realist researchers.\textsuperscript{297} Intensive research designs are more suitable for finding causal relations. Intensive research aims to answer in-depth explanatory questions such as how a process works in a small number of cases, what produced change and what did the agents do.\textsuperscript{298} On the contrary, extensive research design aims to identify regularities, patterns in large numbers of cases. Extensive research is based on a representative sample of formal relations and correlations rather than causality. At this point, it is imperative to briefly review the distinction between the Humean definition of causation and the critical realist definition adopted in this thesis.

Causality in critical realism is not based on observable regularities and correlations that are associated with the Humean notion of causality, which assumes temporal asymmetry between and independent existence of cause and effect.\textsuperscript{299} Accordingly, if A causes B, A must take place before B, they must exist independently from each other and \textit{whenever A happens B must follow}. This conception of causality boils down to correlation, without incorporating the causal powers of entities in order to answer the ‘why’ and ‘how’ questions. On the contrary, as critical realism grants causal powers to unobservable entities such as reasons and structures, tracing

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item Sayer, Method, pp.242-58.
\item Sayer, Method, p.243.
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causality means more than identifying correlations between As and Bs. There are multiple causal complexes at work in producing a certain event. Critical realism ascribes causal powers to a wide range of factors, thereby broadening the traditional conception of causality. As Kurki elaborates in detail, these are the material, formal, final and efficient causes. They all hold causal powers and they bring about social and political reality when combined.\textsuperscript{300}

As opposed to the more traditional understanding of causes as things or forces that push and pull thereby bringing about movement and change, Kurki has adopted an ontologically deep understanding of causes. According to Kurki, causes not only move things but they also condition and constitute objects. She has outlined four types of causes in line with an Aristotelian understanding of causation as material, formal, efficient and final causes. Material cause refers broadly to the potential of the matter, anything that yields itself to making something out of. For example money is the material cause of buying and a gun is the material cause of killing. As the examples show, material causes are not necessarily raw substances such as wood or iron, they can be processed into a certain form.\textsuperscript{301} Kurki has defined formal cause as the intelligibility of the object, ”according to which’ something is made or constructed.”\textsuperscript{302} Formal causes give meaning to objects and social relations, which make it possible for actors to create new meanings. Whereas material causes can be thought of as the geographical context of a country, its industrial production or EU funds, the formal cause can be thought of as its predominant policy paradigm and the discourses of sovereignty. Efficient cause is the notion of cause that is more similar to the traditional understanding of ‘movers’ and ‘makers’. Efficient causes are triggers that set into motion the potential. However, efficient cause is closely related to final causes,

\textsuperscript{300} Kurki, ‘Causes,’ pp. 202-8.  
\textsuperscript{301} Kurki, Causation, p.221.  
\textsuperscript{302} Kurki, Causation, p.221.
which are the actors’ reasons for acting in a certain way. Final causes are “the ends and purposes ‘for the sake of which a thing is.’” They reflect the intentionality of actors. Final causes are the objectives these actors have in doing the things they do. All in all these four types of causes are inter-related and represent the interactive nature of structure and agency in bringing about social reality. Material and formal causes are structural conditions and constitutions that enable, constrain agency and constitute meaning. Efficient and final causes are more agential causes that are related to the practices of actors, which reproduce or transform the context through their practices.

Such a critical realist understanding of causation also bears upon the oft-used concept of ‘causal mechanism’ and it provides an opportunity to mark how a critical realist understanding of causal mechanisms is different than more mechanistic understandings of the term. The concept of causal mechanisms is usually understood in terms of individual parts of an object pushing and pulling each other in a pattern. The Humean understanding of the concept is more about identifying ‘intervening variables’ that make the correlation between an independent and a dependent variable possible. The understanding of causal mechanisms as intervening variables is also very common in the literature of Europeanisation as chapter two has explored. The static transmission belts that have been identified, which mediate the EU impact to translate into domestic change, are all intervening variables. The critical realist definition of causal mechanism is simply causal complexes that bring about a certain social reality. A causal complex is the combination of causes that make a certain reality contingently possible. Causation understood as a combination of factors that contingently brings about a certain social reality is based on an assumption that

303 Kurki, Causation, p.222.
304 Kurki, Causation, p.229.
305 Kurki, Causation, p.233.
reality is complex. The assumption of complexity of reality does not lend itself to reaching parsimonious theories of reality since due to the reflexivity of the actors that we study and the openness of reality.\textsuperscript{307}

This kind of causation therefore can only be established by using an intensive research design. I therefore opt for an intensive research design aimed to find how the EU candidacy role prescriptions worked in causing change or continuity in Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. In doing so I also adopt a bottom-up research design that is commonly used in Europeanisation studies, which starts from the domestic agency that is at the receiving end of EU role prescriptions and that is exerted to effect change or maintain a social reality.\textsuperscript{308} All in all such a research design is sensitive towards actors' motivations, discourses and strategies. This leaves a significant stamp on how I utilise methods of data collection and interpret the data.

Methodologically I have utilised retroduction to interpret and verify my inferences. Retroduction broadly means reasoning in order to find the constitutive mechanisms underlying a particular event. In Danermark's words, "the core of retroduction is transcendental argumentation, as it is called in philosophy. By this argumentation one seeks to clarify the basic prerequisites or conditions for social relationships, people's actions, reasoning and knowledge." \textsuperscript{309} Counterfactual reasoning is a method of retroduction, which is extensively used in this thesis. It aims to analyse causal powers and interactions, i.e. causal complexes, which bring about a social reality.\textsuperscript{310} According to this strategy, the analyst should speculate on what would have happened had the EU candidate role of Turkey been absent from the picture. The aim in this thesis is to reason whether Turkey's foreign policy towards

\textsuperscript{310} Kurki, \textit{Causation}, p.232.
the Middle East would be the same had EU candidacy been absent. Counterfactual reasoning is quite commonly prescribed in the Europeanisation literature, although rarely practiced.\(^{311}\) I have conducted counterfactual reasoning on two levels: as the researcher, I have filtered my findings from the counterfactual question as to whether Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Middle East in the 2000s would be possible without the existence of the EU candidacy institution. I have also asked my interviewees if they believed Turkey would still be able to pursue the same foreign policy towards the Middle East had Turkey not been an EU candidate. This level of counterfactual reasoning has ensured that Turkish actors have at least behaved as if Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Middle East was not possible without Turkey’s role as an EU candidate, thereby institutionalising EU candidate role in Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East.

As the concept of causation adopted in this study is based on the interaction between structures and agency within a bottom-up research design, it is important to specify what historical methodology is adopted. The idea of historicity is present in critical realist methodology. As the past is only transformed and sustained by agents, the past is still present. As Archer has ably put,

> the stratified nature of reality introduces a necessary historicity (however short the time period involved) for instead of horizontal explanations relating one experience, observable or event to another, the fact that these themselves are conditional upon antecedents, requires vertical explanations in terms of the generative relationships indispensable for their realisation.”\(^{312}\)

An understanding of political time as ‘punctuated evolution’ rather than ‘punctuated equilibrium’ is adopted in this study. Hay has proffered the concept of ‘punctuated evolution’ as a response to the commonly adopted punctuated

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equilibrium model of Krasner.\(^{313}\) Hay has argued that defining the periods between critical junctures as ‘equilibrium’ could have a misleading effect. Indeed, the word equilibrium has been criticized in the literature for implying stasis.\(^{314}\) On the other hand, the concept of punctuated evolution emphasizes the moments of crisis, i.e. critical junctures, yet also drawing attention to the incremental change that takes place between critical junctures.\(^{315}\) While adopting this conceptualisation of time, it is also important to bear in mind that change and stability are also internally-related concepts, therefore there is always an element of stability in all change and vice versa.\(^{316}\)

Therefore, a focus on agency within an evolving context should be complemented with a historical methodology that is sensitive towards both short-term and long-term time horizons of causes and outcomes. As Pierson has explained in detail, not all causal processes operate in short time horizons, leading to quick outcomes. Both causes and outcomes can be slow-moving, therefore an abrupt cause can lead to a long-term consequence and a cumulative cause can lead to an abrupt outcome.\(^{317}\) Therefore, although I adopt a bottom-up research design in the thesis I complement it with such a historical methodology to be able to account for long-term cumulative effects of strategy and cumulative causes of the strategies adopted by actors.

3.4.1 Research Methods

This study in the Europeanisation of foreign policy employs qualitative methods such as semi-structured interviews, document analysis and discourse

\(^{315}\) Hay, *Political Analysis*, p.163.
\(^{316}\) Marsh, ‘Stability and Change,’ p.98.
analysis. Document analysis includes mainly the EU Commission’s Annual Reports, the Accession Partnership Documents for Turkey, the EU Negotiating Framework for Turkey, the legislation passed in Turkey’s reform packages. This analysis has yielded details of the EU candidacy role prescriptions for Turkey and also the reception of the foreign policy and other developments in Turkey by the EU Commission. By analysing the relevant legislation in Turkey I have learned what has been reformed by Turkey in this period. Therefore, documentary analysis has provided an entry point for the research, which was complemented by interviews and discourse analysis.

Interviews with policymakers shed light on the reasons behind Turkish foreign policymaking towards the Middle East. As explained earlier, adopting an intensive research design has certain repercussions on interviewee selection, interview questions and data interpretation. Intensive research comes at the expense of “representativeness”. As I aim to uncover motivations, perceptions, strategies of actors, I do not take a representative sample of interviewees and ‘code’ their answers to reach generalisable findings. On the contrary I formulated semi-structured interview questions and asked each interviewee the questions that are relevant to their position. I included very broad questions such as the overall impact of the EU accession process, and very specific questions such as whether Turkey signed free trade agreements with Middle Eastern countries to comply with EU candidacy role prescriptions. Also I allowed sufficient flexibility in interviews for times when the interviewee disputed even the relevance of my question. As Sayer explains, such an approach to interviewing opens up the possibility of meaningful social interaction between the interviewee and the interviewer, increases the flow of information by

318 Sayer, Method, p.249.
giving the interviewee the chance to dispute the questions and emphases placed by the interviewer in the questions.320

I have conducted a total number of 41 interviews in fieldwork in Brussels and Ankara. The interviewees in Turkey are from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Turkish Parliament, the European Union Secretariat General of Turkey, the Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade, think-tanks, and business associations such as the Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen Association (MUSIAD), the Turkish Industry and Business Association (TUSIAD) and the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB). Interviewees in Brussels were chosen from the EU Commission Enlargement Directorate-General, External Relations Directorate-General, Council enlargement Directorate-General, Member State diplomats Turkey’s permanent representation to the EU, and Turkish Business Associations’ Brussels offices.

Finally discourse analysis of foreign policy speeches is conducted. In Wooffitt’s words, the goal is “to describe the way that such texts [all forms of verbal and textual materials] are constructed, and to explore the functions served by specific constructions at both the interpersonal and societal level.”321 The concept ‘discourse’ raises important theoretical baggage due to its close connection with poststructuralist studies. The use of discourse analysis in this thesis is based on a critical realist metatheory. According to critical realism agents are situated within both material and discursive structures and they are capable of reflexive action, which can change or sustain these structures. Therefore, unlike some poststructuralist approaches that assume there is nothing meaningful outside discourse, including the self, critical realists start with the assumption that there is also a material reality that conditions

320 Sayer, Method, p.245-6.
the way meaning is constructed while agreeing that reality is mediated by discourse. In Sayer, Jessop and Fairclough’s words,

the objection to post-structuralist accounts of emergence is that they idealise semiosis [meaning-making]—they ignore reference and truth conditions and attribute properties to semiosis as such in a way that ignores the dialectical interpenetration of semiotic and non-semiotic facets of social events.\footnote{Norman Fairclough, Bob Jessop and Andrew Sayer, ‘Critical Realism and Semiosis,’ in \textit{Realism, Discourse and Deconstruction}, eds., Jonathan Joseph and John Michael Roberts (London: Routledge, 2004), p.16.}

The selection of particular discourses over others that are available is conditioned by discursive structures and meaning systems.\footnote{Fairclough et.al., ‘Critical Realism.’} An analysis of the discursive structures and the discourses adopted are useful to understand the reasons of actors to act in a certain way.\footnote{Fairclough et.al., ‘Critical Realism.’} Discourse can be defined as “positioned ways of representing—representing other social practices as well as the material world, and reflexively representing this social practice, from particular positions in social practices.”\footnote{Fairclough et.al., ‘Critical Realism.’} This ontological assumption reflects on this thesis as the discourse analysis applied here is about understanding how Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East has been coordinated and communicated through foreign policy discourse of actors. On the contrary, the main goal is to understand how discourse was used to explain and justify foreign policy, or to make it meaningful, to a certain audience.

To analyse how Turkey’s EU candidacy is represented in Turkish foreign policy actors’ discourse in Turkey’s role performance in the Middle East, foreign policy speeches will be analysed.\footnote{Holsti, ‘National Role Conceptions,’ pp.233-309.} As Holsti has acknowledged, due to this interactive nature of role theory, agents hold overlapping roles, and different roles become salient in different contexts. In this light, the audience of foreign policy discourse is important. In this line, an analysis of Turkish governments’ foreign policy discourse

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\item \footnote{Norman Fairclough, Bob Jessop and Andrew Sayer, ‘Critical Realism and Semiosis,’ in \textit{Realism, Discourse and Deconstruction}, eds., Jonathan Joseph and John Michael Roberts (London: Routledge, 2004), p.16.}
\item \footnote{Fairclough et.al., ‘Critical Realism.’}
\item \footnote{Fairclough et.al., ‘Critical Realism.’}
\item \footnote{Fairclough et.al., ‘Critical Realism.’}
\item \footnote{Holsti, ‘National Role Conceptions,’ pp.233-309.}
\end{itemize}
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addressing a European audience would be different from the one addressing a Middle Eastern audience. As this thesis analyses the impact of EU candidacy on Turkey’s Foreign Policy towards the Middle East, it is imperative to analyse the speeches made by Turkish foreign policymakers towards a Middle Eastern and a wider Islamic audience.\footnote{The problems related to the Middle East have been usually raised by Turkish foreign policymakers in Islamic forums such as the OIC meetings or Ramadan dinners given for the ambassadors of Islamic countries. Sampling includes fora that include a significant representation by the Middle Eastern and Islamic audience such as Alliance of Civilizations and EU-OIC.} If the said speech is given in an international forum addressing issues pertaining directly to the Arab Middle East and/or Islam and if there is potentially substantial participation by Arab diplomats in the audience, that speech is included in the sample. If the speech is given as part of a joint press conference with a representative from an Arab Middle Eastern country, then it is included too.

Turkey’s foreign policy discourse is narrated in this thesis with references to the speeches of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs since 1999 and the sample consists of speeches delivered by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the Presidents. Since 1999 there has been a coalition government between 1999-2002 and since 2002 the JDP has held office. Due to the recurrent economic crises and the prevalence of the EU candidacy agenda, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the coalition government, Ismail Cem and Sukru Sina Gurel, did not appear in the sample sufficiently. Among the former ministers of foreign affairs Ismail Cem (from Democratic Left Party (DLP)), Sukru Sina Gurel (DLP), Yasar Yakis (JDP), Abdullah Gul (JDP), Ali Babacan (JDP) and Ahmet Davutoglu (JDP), there is no speech from Yasar Yakis and Sukru Sina Gurel and only one from Ismail Cem. There are several reasons behind this dearth. Ismail Cem held the position during the most volatile years of 1999-2002. The year 1999 was dominated by the EU agenda in the run up to the Helsinki Council decision to grant Turkey candidacy. The years 2000 and 2001 were the years of the twin economic crises.
crises, which again overshadowed the Middle East agenda. Only in 2002, could Ismail Cem focus on the Middle East agenda when Turkey hosted the EU-OIC Joint Forum. Sukru Sina Gurel and Yasar Yakis only held the office for very short periods: both of them acted as the Minister of Foreign Affairs for four months. I included the President’s speeches in the analysis as the President is also part of the executive according to the Turkish constitution. Ahmet Necdet Sezer remained as the President from 2000 to 2007 covering both the coalition government and the JDP governments’ terms. In 2007, Sezer was replaced as President by Abdullah Gul, a founding member of the JDP and the former Minister of Foreign Affairs. Ahmet Necdet Sezer was not a politician before he was elected as President, however Abdullah Gul was from the JDP. Therefore, including the President’s speeches provided a qualitative opportunity to assess discourses of the whole executive rather than the government only. By including the President’s speeches, I have ensured that the discourses analysed are not only representative of the JDP, rather they represent the high-level political elite involved in foreign policy making and implementation.

To corroborate the data collected from different interviewees I used triangulation. Denzin has identified variants of triangulation such as data triangulation and methodological triangulation, both of which are used in this research. Methodological triangulation is the most widely used triangulation variant, which is based on the idea of verifying data obtained by one method by the data obtained by another. Where possible, I referred to different data sources produced through different methods to cross-validate a particular interviewee’s narration. Data triangulation refers to the use of more than one interviewee’s account as data. I also triangulated across interviewees in the sense that where possible I referred to

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328 Also Ozcan, *Harmonizing*, p.88
different interviewees from both European and Turkish interviewees to make sure that the information gathered in an interview is reliable and not overly biased.

### 3.5 Summary and a definition

This section pulls together insights drawn from chapters two and three together to summarise the definition of Europeanisation adopted in this thesis and the main tenets of the appropriate research design that is utilised. The definition of Europeanisation adopted for the purposes of this thesis can be made clear by moving from an abstract definition to a more concrete one as follows. The definition I adopt here is somewhat an amalgam of two strands of definitions. The first one is the explicitly institutionalist definition offered by Gross (see chapter two) who at the most abstract level has conceptualised Europeanisation as the EU institutions’ enabling and constraining effects on national foreign policy. To give more detail to Gross’ definition through combining it with role theory, I define Europeanisation of foreign policy in this thesis as the ‘institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU candidate role through domestic actors’ strategies, which significantly enable and/or constrain Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East.’

Non-Europeanization therefore refers to non-usage of the EU candidate role by domestic actors. If any political action is not significantly enabled by the usages of the EU candidate role by domestic actors, that is non-Europeanization. As Europeanisation refers to a process of institutionalisation, it is also reversible. In other words, domestic actors can use the EU candidate role for a sustained period, thereby institutionalising it. They can also stop using it when and if they perceive a change in the context. Likewise they can also come to believe that using the EU candidate role is not actually a successful strategy given their objectives and the perceptions of the
context. This process leads to non-usage, therefore de-institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU candidate role in domestic politics. Non-Europeanisation, Europeanisation, de-Europeanisation do not necessarily follow a linear evolution. Rather these processes are relational to each other and they can manifest themselves in cycles.

Specifically in this thesis, Europeanisation will be observed if Turkish political actors’ usage of the EU candidate role significantly enabled Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. Non-Europeanisation therefore refers to cases where either the EU was not used by domestic actors to achieve their foreign policy objectives or their usage of the EU did not significantly enable them to achieve their objectives. What is significant in enabling a policy outcome is assessed on the basis of counterfactual reasoning conducted both by the domestic actors at hand and the researcher.

Such a definition requires a bottom-up research design in the sense that it does not direct the researcher to look for the effects of EU causes, rather it leads the researcher to specify how the EU candidate role prescriptions are received, interpreted, appropriated and used by domestic actors, which leads to the institutionalisation of EU candidacy in a certain form in the long run. Institutions do not always function according to their design, the way institutionalised subjects interact with the institutional architects and the institutional context shapes its institutionalisation and whether it takes root or not within a social context. The emphasis on ‘enabling and/or constraining’ foreign policy is in line with the account of causation explained earlier and it incorporates the assumption of causal complexes, of which the EU candidate role of Turkey might be a part.

The rest of the thesis applies this conceptual framework to Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. The following chapter begins the empirical
analysis by an historical review of Turkey's foreign policy towards the Middle East and the European Union within the context of Turkey's predominant westernisation paradigm. It will be demonstrated that Turkey's long-standing westernisation paradigm has shaped its relationship with both the Middle East and the EU. Therefore, the next chapter demonstrates the historical continuity and change in Turkish politics and foreign policy up until Turkey's candidacy era before zooming into the consequences of the institutionalisation of EU candidacy in 1999 and its aftermath.
CHAPTER FOUR: HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF TURKEY’S FOREIGN POLICY--
BETWEEN EAST AND WEST

Westernisation has been the dominant paradigm of Turkish foreign policy since as early as the late Ottoman Empire. The governing elite of the Ottoman Empire pursued westernisation reforms in order to catch up with European public administration methods and military power since the early 19th century. This policy paradigm continued its domination after the proclamation of the Republic to replace the multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire, which ruled over large portions of European as well as Middle Eastern lands. Ottoman rule in the Middle East covered the territories that belong to Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine and Yemen today for hundreds of years. These lands were lost at the end of World War I.

The Kemalist elite, who had led the War of National Liberation from the occupation that followed the Ottoman defeat in World War I and founded the new Republic in 1923, have been keen to pursue the ideal of catching up with western civilisation, which has inevitably had repercussions on Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Middle East. The Middle East has traditionally been perceived by the Kemalist elite as a source of backwardness and conflict that the young Republic had to stay away from. This paradigm left its stamp on Turkey’s foreign policy choices almost throughout the whole Republican era since 1923. This is not to say there was no relationship between Turkey and Middle Eastern countries, yet the depth and the goals of the existing relationship has usually been an extension of Turkey’s westernisation paradigm.

This chapter explains the historical evolution of Turkey’s relationship with the EU and Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East within a broader framework of westernisation of Turkey. Periodisation is based on the critical
junctures such as World War I, the proclamation of the new Republic in 1923, the World War II, the direct military coups of 1960 and 1980, the end of the Cold War and the period stretching from 1999 to 2009, which is the period under analysis that is marked by Turkey's EU candidacy. The first section therefore begins by explaining the westernisation reforms in the late Ottoman period to demonstrate the emergence of the westernisation paradigm.

4.1 Westernisation Reforms in the late Ottoman Empire

Turkey's westernisation dates back to the 19th century Ottoman Empire. The Empire had been surpassed technologically, militarily and economically by the newly emerging nation states of Europe but also militarily defeated by Russia, where new west European technological developments travelled while bypassing the Ottoman Empire by and large. Therefore, Russia had emerged as the archenemy of the Ottoman Empire in the 18th century and technological inferiority towards Western technologies was seen as the main problem that needed to be addressed. In Muftuler-Bac’s words, "Europe became a mirror through which the Ottoman elite perceived its own weaknesses, differences and traits." In this period westernisation, modernisation and Europeanisation were synonymous. The seeds of the ideas of the elite who have founded the Republic of Turkey on what and how to westernise were sowed in the demise of the Ottoman Empire.

After its military defeats by Russia, the Ottoman leadership first decided to emulate European military technology to catch up with Europe. The first military reforms were undertaken by Sultan Selim III in 1792, which was called Nizam-i Cedid

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(The New Order). The programme aimed at strengthening the state organization through military reforms such as the creation of a new and technologically advanced army. European practices and technologies were deemed as a model to emulate and Sultan Selim III "was prepared to accept European practices (and European advisers) to achieve his goals and the way in which his reign opened up channels of communication between Europe and the Ottoman ruling elite," especially with the French.\(^\text{333}\)

Selim's reforms failed due to the strong opposition from the Muslim dignitaries, the military and the lack of financial resources and know-how. Yet similar attempts at westernisation of the Ottoman administration and military remained as a recurrent theme in the next hundred years. However, soon it was discovered that the adoption of only military technology was not sufficient, therefore the ideal of westernisation spilled over to other areas such as law, government and education.\(^\text{334}\)

As Hanioglu has argued, cultural westernisation in the Ottoman Empire was facilitated by the leadership of non-Muslim subjects of the Empire, the Ottoman statesmen's perception of the Ottoman Empire as geographically European, and the lack of effective counter-ideologies produced by the Muslim dignitaries.\(^\text{335}\)

The Gülhane edict of 1839 was very significant in this process of westernization as it ushered in a new era of reforms. Important changes were made in the judicial system, so much that “[t]he canon law of Islam, the seriat, was never abrogated, but its scope was limited almost completely to family law and it was codified along European lines in 1865-88.”\(^\text{336}\)

The Gülhane edict and the ensuing Tanzimat reforms were partly used to gain foreign support and prevent foreign intervention by granting equal rights to all subjects of the Empire thereby improving

\(^{333}\) Zurcher, \textit{Turkey}, p.22 and 24.


\(^{336}\) Zurcher, \textit{Turkey}, p. 61.
the position of the non-Muslim communities but at the same time they emerged out of a genuine belief in the need to adopt European-style reforms.\textsuperscript{337}

Throughout these reform attempts, there was always a struggle between different interpretations of westernisation within the pro-reform elite and also staunch traditionalists who opposed any kind of reform. Intellectual movements emerged from the former controversy, which left their stamp on the evolution of the Ottoman reform movement.\textsuperscript{338} Some intellectual movements were critical of the reformers for holding too much central state power and they argued that power needed to be checked and balanced.\textsuperscript{339} Increased centralisation of power in the hands of the Sultan intensified such calls for constitutionalisation. Coupled with the need to stave off European pressures on the Ottoman government to grant non-Muslims privileges, these pressures led to a short-lived constitution to be proclaimed in 1876 which only survived until 1878.\textsuperscript{340} Despite its short span of life and the lack of constitutional power over the Sultan, this first constitutional era “served as an important precedent for the second Constitutional Period (1908-18) and marks the starting point for the Turkish Republic’s elongated journey toward democracy.”\textsuperscript{341}

Another intellectual movement was the Young Turks that emerged in the late 19\textsuperscript{th} century as a reaction to the centralisation of power in the hands of the Sultan and they played an important role in the start of the Second Constitutional Period. The Young Turk movement comprised of a loose network of secret committees of dissidents who aimed to overthrow the Sultan.\textsuperscript{342} The most significant and the dominant one of these committees was the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), which had a membership predominantly of bureaucrats and military

\textsuperscript{337} Zurcher, \textit{Turkey}, p.57.

\textsuperscript{338} Zurcher, \textit{Turkey}, p.128.

\textsuperscript{339} Sukru Hanioglu, \textit{A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire} (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2008), p.112.

\textsuperscript{340} Hanioglu, \textit{The late Ottoman}, p.117.

\textsuperscript{341} Hanioglu, \textit{The late Ottoman}, p.121.

\textsuperscript{342} Hanioglu, \textit{The late Ottoman}, p.145.
officials. By galvanizing opposition, the CUP staged a revolution and overthrew the Sultan in 1908. The main goal of the CUP was not to liberalise the political system, rather they aimed at “conservation and survival,” therefore as Hanioglu has pointed out they did not aim to destroy and replace the regime but only to restore the 1876 Constitution that was suspended after two years of operation. The ultimate motivation of the CUP was to earn credibility and support of the Western European liberal states by reinstating the constitutional regime.

The CUP ensured a relatively liberal political environment between assuming power in 1908 and 1913; however around 1912 they began establishing a power monopoly to the dismay of liberals. The elections in 1912 are known as “election with the stick” due to the intimidation used by the CUP to ensure that it retained the majority in the parliament. This led a group of military officers called “Saviour Officers” to demand the resignation of the CUP-backed government. This intervention by the military marked an early example of the Turkish military’s dividedness across the liberals, who wanted the resignation of the authoritarian government and the conservatives, who supported it. In this period, in tandem with the spread of nationalism across the Empire’s minorities, the CUP also adopted Turkish nationalism. In Zurcher’s words, “[w]hile the Committee officially supported Ottomanism (and, indeed, how could it have done otherwise, without voluntarily shedding two-thirds or more of the empire’s territory), its interpretation of Ottomanism came close to Turkification of the non-Turkish elements.” Alongside its growing inclination to a Turkish nationalism, the CUP also made reforms in the administration, culture and law, which altogether entailed further secularisation and

343 Hanioglu, The late Ottoman, p.147.
344 Hanioglu, The late Ottoman, p.150.
345 Zurcher, Turkey, p. 103.
347 Zurcher, Turkey, p. 103
348 Zurcher, Turkey, p.103.
349 Zurcher, Turkey, p.129.
westernisation of the political system in the Ottoman Empire. These reforms included curbing powers of the Muslim dignitaries and religious schools, adopting a new inheritance law based on the German code which added to the ongoing secularisation of the system. Also, partly due to the war conditions, partly due to the reform policies of the CUP, women’s status improved in public life, including entry to the labour market. Therefore, the CUP’s reforms also represented the westernisation drive in the late Ottoman reformation and furthered the secularisation and westernisation of the political system.

This brief history of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century reveals the historical struggles over power that gave birth to the ruling Republican elite who founded the Republic of Turkey after the World War I. They emerged out of a dominant political ideology of westernisation to restore the lost power of the Empire, but also they embodied the political struggles between the conservative forces and reformists that cut across the institutions of the Empire including the military. This period has also witnessed the emergence of nationalism alongside the ongoing secularism and westernisation trends, which altogether were incorporated by Kemalism in the post-World War I period. The Ottoman Empire went into World War I alongside Germany in 1914 and lost it. The Ottoman Empire was mostly occupied at the end of the War. This occupation gave rise to an armed national liberation movement led by Mustafa Kemal and some other military officers. The leading elite of this movement became the founders of the new Republic. The following section gives an overview of the Republican Turkey’s historical relations with Europe and the Middle East. As much as they seem to be autonomous geographical categories, in the political imaginaries of the Turkish foreign policy elite there is always a close link between the two. The next section demonstrates this link.

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350 Zurcher, Turkey, pp.121-2
4.2 Republican Turkey between East and West: 1923-1945

Turkey was defeated and largely occupied at the end of the World War I. The Sèvres Treaty signed between the winners and the Ottoman government at the end of the war, on 10 August 1920, contained very harsh terms for the Ottoman Empire. The Empire was reduced to a small state in Anatolia and its former territory was shared mainly among Greece, France, Britain, and Italy.\(^{351}\)

CUP government members fled the country, those that remained organised an armed resistance movement in Anatolia. The resistance movement was to be led by Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk), whose legacy dominated the political scene in the Republic of Turkey, of which he was one of the founders. Mustafa Kemal was a member of the CUP, yet he was not part of the inner circle of government during the war. This gave him a clean political reputation as “he was not associated with wartime policies of” the CUP government.\(^{352}\) The resistance movement launched a national war of liberation and succeeded in repelling the occupying forces from Anatolia. This process led to victory in 1922 and then to the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. After the Republic was proclaimed, there was a dire need to focus on nation and state building. Peace, consolidation of the state and the nation, territorial integrity and westernisation were the main goals of this period.\(^{353}\)

The leader of republican Turkey, Ataturk, thought that the ills of the Ottoman Empire, which led to its demise, were caused by the Empire’s detachment from the west.\(^{354}\) Therefore the guiding ideology in this period was westernisation.

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\(^{351}\) Zurcher, *Turkey*, p.147.
\(^{352}\) Zurcher, *Turkey*, p.142.
same elite that fought the war believed that Turkey should aspire to become a member of the contemporary civilisations of the west. Westernisation involved reaching the level of the contemporary western civilisation, as was the case in previous westernisation efforts. The early years of the Republic also saw the emergence of a state ideology that was to dominate Turkish politics in the years to come, Kemalism, derived from Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s name. Kemalism comprises of six principles, which Ataturk believed would elevate the Turkish society to the level of contemporary civilisations, i.e. the West. These were republicanism, secularism, nationalism, populism, statism and reformism. Some of these principles had been taking shape since the CUP era, some of them were included later and they were altogether included in the constitution in 1937.

Secularism and nationalism were already the predominant ideologies of the CUP in the final years of the Ottoman Empire, they were maintained by the elite who had grown out of the CUP and founded Republican Turkey. The main political goal of these two principles was to consolidate an identity among the people based on citizenship rather than religion. Secularism meant the subordination of religion to the state rather than their separation, as religion was seen as an obstacle to progress. Republicanism meant granting sovereignty to the will of the nation instead of the will of the Sultan. Ataturk was aware that the past reforms remained only as cosmetic attempts and the Sultan had always been the supreme authority in the Ottoman Empire. Recognizing this as a central problem that led to the demise of

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the Ottoman Empire, he adopted Republicanism as a principle for the new state. Populism referred to national solidarity and putting the nation's interests before class interests. It was also based on the assumption that Turkish society did not comprise of classes in the European sense of the word. Reformism was meant to ensure the modernisation of the state and it rendered Kemalism itself open to adjustment to catch up with contemporary developments, if necessary. The incorporation of statism in economic policy into Kemalism later than the other principles was also an example of this flexibility. Initially after the proclamation of the new Republic, Ataturk's government placed its faith into a liberal economic programme, the private sector was being encouraged and banks were established to provide private entrepreneurs with necessary loans. Yet, two factors led to the failure of this policy: the lack of private entrepreneurship in Republican Turkey and the 1929 economic depression. Non-Muslim minorities were the main merchants in the Ottoman Empire, therefore after the dissolution of the Empire there were not enough people left who had the technical knowledge and capital to establish businesses. The 1929 economic depression also led Turkish policymakers to begin to seek alternative economic policies, thus statism as an economic policy was adopted.

All in all Kemalism originally was a pragmatic, flexible worldview that ultimately aimed for Turkey to catch up with the level of contemporary civilisations. Westernisation initially occupied a central place in this worldview. Kemalist reforms, echoing previous reforms in the late Ottoman Empire, aimed to secularise and modernise society. The main difference is that Kemalist reforms were more drastic than any reform period before. The religious shrines (turbe) and dervish convents (tekke) were abolished; the religious dress code that included turban and fez was

362 Zürcher, *Turkey*, 182.
replaced by Western style hats. The state, education system and law were completely secularised; the Western clock, calendar, numerals and Latin alphabet were adopted at the expense of the Arabic/Persian alphabet used by the Ottomans. These were all measures designed to "cut off Turkish society from its Ottoman and Middle Eastern Islamic traditions and to reorient it towards the West." These reforms and the centralisation of power in the hands of the new Kemalist elite led to dissent within the country as after the war of national liberation certain groups (i.e. the Kurdish rebellions, rivals of Ataturk) were released from the leashes of a fight for survival and started to question the new leadership and the new regime. While the Kemalist regime was trying to implement westernisation reforms, they were also suppressing opposition. The nascence of the new regime led to a foreign policy based on westernisation, the preservation of the status quo and peace. This required the normalisation of diplomatic relations between Turkey and the European powers against which they fought the war of national liberation. Indeed, the period's foreign policy is often illustrated by Ataturk's motto "peace at home peace abroad."

All these factors led to a cautious foreign policy, including towards the Middle East. One of the earliest demonstrations of Turkey's principle of legality and pragmatism in its policy toward the Middle East was the Mosul question. After the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, the issue of Mosul, a former province of the Empire, remained unresolved between Britain and Turkey. By 1924, negotiations between Turkey and Britain proved to be futile and the issue was referred to the League of Nations, of which Turkey was not a member. The commission assigned to

367 Zurcher, Turkey, 173.
368 Zurcher, Turkey, pp. 186-8.
369 Zurcher, Turkey, p.189.
370 Sander, Turkiye'nin, p.77.
371 Baskin Oran, 'TDP'nin Temel Ilkeleri,' in Turk Dis Politikasi, ed., Oran, pp.46-52.
372 Karpat, 'Introduction,' p.4.
the matter decided in favour of the British and Turkey signed the treaty with Britain and accepted ceding of Mosul to Iraq which was mandated by Britain.\textsuperscript{373}

Similarly, Alexandretta, a former district of the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East was another outstanding foreign policy issue in the early republican period. As part of the secret war treaty between Britain and France, Alexandretta was annexed to Syria, which was mandated by France. During the independence negotiations between Syria and France, the issue of Alexandretta was taken to the League of Nations, which then declared Alexandretta should be granted autonomy from Syria. The province declared its union with Turkey one year after it was granted autonomy and in 1939 it became a part of Turkey.\textsuperscript{374} Yet, Syria has never officially recognised Alexandretta as Turkish territory and this has become another source of conflict between Syria and Turkey until the 2000s.\textsuperscript{375} In both cases, Turkey did not pursue adventurist policies and respected the decisions of the League of Nations and managed to normalise its relations with France and Britain.

Turkey’s pro-status quo stance is best illustrated by the Sadabad Pact of 1937, which was signed by Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan. This pact was premised on non-aggression and non-interference in each other’s domestic affairs rather than active cooperation or alliance among the signatories.\textsuperscript{376} In Mango’s words, “[f]ar from breaching Turkey’s policy of non-involvement in the Middle East, the Sadabad Pact helped to codify it.”\textsuperscript{377} Therefore, it exemplifies Turkey’s aloofness from Middle Eastern affairs and bilateral disputes in the region.

\textsuperscript{374} Altunisik and Tur, \textit{Turkey}, p.97.
\textsuperscript{375} Carolyn C. James and Ozgur Ozdamar, ‘Modelling Foreign Policy and Ethnic Conflict: Turkey’s Policies towards Syria,’ \textit{Foreign Policy Analysis}, 5 (2009), fn. 10.
\textsuperscript{376} Bilge Criss and Pinar Bilgin, ‘Turkish Foreign Policy toward the Middle East,’ \textit{Middle East Review of International Affairs}, \url{http://meria.idc.ac.il/} (3 September 2007).
However, this status-quo and legalistic orientation was not without exceptions. When Turkey’s major projects were threatened, it did not hesitate from taking action. The issue of Kurdish rebellions and the border dispute the rebellions caused with Iran is quite illustrative of this principle in Turkish foreign policy toward the Middle East in the early republican years. Due to the porous border between Iran and Turkey, during the 1920s tribal movements on both sides of the borders undertook cross-border activities and issues arose when the governments suppressed them by force. The biggest border dispute happened when Turkish security forces crossed the Iranian border in pursuit of Kurdish rebels and finally invaded the Lesser Ararat region in Iran in order to be able to suppress the rebellion properly.\footnote{Altunisik and Tur, \textit{Turkey}, p.98.} The issue was settled in 1932, when Iran agreed to the secession of Lesser Ararat in return for a small Turkish territory, however, it is a perfect example of how Turkey could breach its principle of preservation of the status-quo, when its vital interests were at stake. In this case suppression of domestic opposition and Kurdish rebellions was of utmost importance and Turkey took whatever action necessary to achieve this goal.

With the outbreak of World War II, Turkish foreign policy became almost non-existent towards the Middle East. When World War II broke out, Turkey was still a war-torn country and the fresh memories of World War I led Turkey to pursue its survival through active neutrality throughout World War II. Active neutrality in fact meant continuing a normal relationship with both parties, including signing defence and non-aggression pacts with the belligerents but avoiding direct military confrontation. Active neutrality went so far that even the make-up of the cabinets and the representations of the war in media were affected by the daily outlook of the
Therefore, the Turkish government managed to avoid being drawn into the war at the expense of losing prestige especially in the eyes of Britain. This loss of prestige partly led to overstretch on the part of Turkish governments especially after 1950 when economic aid from the west was integral to the development of economy and newly started multiparty regime.

### 4.3 Republican Turkey between East and West: 1946-1960

In this period, the overriding goal of the successive Turkish governments was to regain the prestige and strategic importance they lost in the eyes of the west as a result of their hesitation to enter World War II against Germany. Yet, ‘the west’ was no longer simply Europe; it was an ideological category led by the United States against the Soviet Union in the emerging cold war environment.

Combined with the threat perceptions of Turkish policymakers from the Soviet Union, the bipolar structure was quite influential on the foreign policy of the period. The Soviet Union’s territorial demands from Turkey drove the Turkey closer to the US. This was partly the reason why when the US launched the Truman doctrine and the Marshall Plan in 1947, Turkey was one of the beneficiaries. The Truman doctrine was a commitment by the US to help defend “free nations” who were under threat from the Soviet Union. The Marshall Plan was a massive financial aid extended to Europe to strike two birds with one stone: to reconstruct Europe as an

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379 When the Germans seemed to be victorious, ultra nationalist politicians were favoured in the government and when they were about to be defeated, nationalists in Turkey were removed from their positions or arrested. Baskin Oran, ‘Donemin Bilancosu,’ in Turk Dis Politikasi, ed. Oran, pp.396-8.
380 Criss and Bilgin, ‘Turkish.’
381 These threat perceptions include the Soviet Union’s refusal to renew the Turkish-Soviet Treaty of Neutrality and non-Aggression of 1925, Soviet territorial demands from Turkey and Soviet proposal of joint administration of the Turkish Straits. Altunisik and Tur, Turkey, p.102.
382 Zurcher, Turkey, p.209.
export market for the US industries and to contain Soviet expansion.\textsuperscript{383} The Marshall Plan was conditional upon free trade and joint decision-making by European states in using the financial aid.\textsuperscript{384} Marshall Plan was based on collective usage of the financial aid by the European states; the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was created for this purpose in 1948.\textsuperscript{385} The NATO was established in 1949 as a collective defence organisation initially against the Soviet threat. Turkey also benefited from the Marshall Plan and became members of both OEEC and NATO. On the other hand, Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg furthered their integration and formed the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) to pool their coal and steel industries in 1952, which was transformed into the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1958.

This period is also characterised by the transition to multi-party politics in Turkey. Therefore, as mentioned earlier the allocation of resources came to dominate the policy agenda. With the introduction of the multi-party system in 1950, politics became a matter of promising economic welfare to the voters for both the Democrat Party (DP) government after the 1950 elections and the Republican Peoples' Party (RPP) opposition.\textsuperscript{386} As Deringil has suggested, "[t]he development of the country's economy, which had been frozen in the war years, was now moved to the top of the agenda."\textsuperscript{387} This could only be achieved by ensuring resources and a strong alliance with the US, which proved to be the largest source of financial aid in the post-World War II period.\textsuperscript{388} The Democrat Party was a champion of economic liberalism

\textsuperscript{383} Zurcher, \textit{Turkey}, p.209.
\textsuperscript{384} Bache, George and Bulmer, \textit{Politics}, p.87.
\textsuperscript{386} Sander, \textit{Turkiye'nin}, p.150
\textsuperscript{388} Sander, \textit{Turkiye'nin}, p.150.
and therefore their economic policies were more in tune with those of the US than the statism of the previous era.\textsuperscript{389}

All these factors led to hyper-westernisation during the Democrat Party rule that started in 1950 and ended with a military coup in 1960. As Karpat has put it, "[a]fter 1950, modernization came to be understood, much more in practice than in theory, almost as a total imitation of the West, and as a drive for achieving higher living standards or maximum material comfort" rather than its original usage as combining the civilisation of the West with national values, by the guiding ideology of Turkey.\textsuperscript{390} Therefore, in this period, Westernisation dominated Turkish foreign policy and the governments kept viewing regional matters through the lenses of western interests and strategies, at the expense of Turkey's relations with its Middle Eastern Arab neighbours as Turkey's extremely pro-western policies alienated its Middle Eastern neighbours. Turkey diplomatically recognised Israel in 1949 as an extension of its close relations with the US, which also strained Turkey's relations with the Arab countries.\textsuperscript{391}

After firmly becoming part of western organisations such as the Council of Europe in 1950 and NATO in 1952, Turkey proved its western allegiance to a certain extent. However, especially NATO membership came at a cost for Turkey: It was only admitted to NATO “after a promise made to the British that Turkey would assume responsibility for the establishment of a Middle East Defence Organization.”\textsuperscript{392} The upshot of this promise was the establishment of the Baghdad Pact in 1955. The Baghdad Pact was a multilateral regional security pact embracing Britain, Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan, created with the aim of repelling potential Soviet threats in the region. However, it was a failure from the start. It received harsh criticism from the

\textsuperscript{389} Zurcher, \textit{Turkey}, p.215.
\textsuperscript{390} Karpat, ‘Introduction,’ p.5
\textsuperscript{391} Zurcher, \textit{Turkey}, p. 235.
\textsuperscript{392} Criss and Bilgin, ‘Turkish,’ also Mango, ‘Turkish,’ p.59.
Egyptian president Nasser, drew Syria and Egypt closer together against Turkey, and made Israel suspicious of the nature of the pact.\textsuperscript{393} The pact simply gave the Arab countries the impression that Turkey was a puppet of the west in the region and drew them closer to each other and ironically to the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{394} In 1959, the only Arab signatory of the pact, Iraq, left the pact after a revolution and the pact was renamed the Central Treaty Organisation.

Turkey's pro-Western policies were crystal clear during the 1956 Suez crisis, which erupted when France, Britain and Israel attacked Egypt after Nasser of Egypt nationalised the Suez Canal.\textsuperscript{395} Turkey harshly criticised Nasser for provoking the French and British interventions.\textsuperscript{396} In 1957, Turkey voted in the UN General Assembly against Algerian independence, which was an issue dearest to the Arab neighbours of Turkey as well as the Turkish public opinion.\textsuperscript{397} Moreover, Turkey fully supported the American interventions in Lebanon and Jordan against the spread of Arab nationalism.\textsuperscript{398} Turkey declared its support for these interventions and went so far that the Democrat Party government offered the US the use of NATO bases in Turkey. This offer was declined by the US government, who indicated that there was no NATO operation.\textsuperscript{399}

Turkish policymakers underlined the cultural and religious affinities between Turkey and the Arab Middle East in an attempt to gain strategic importance in the eyes of the west regarding their Middle East policies. As Criss and Bilgin state, “[w]hile Turkish policymakers did not know the Middle East well--lacking experience of involvement in regional affairs--they argued that ‘only the Turks really understood

\textsuperscript{393} Kemal Karpat, ‘Turkish and Arab-Israeli Relations,’ in \textit{Turkey's Foreign Policy}, ed., Kemal Karpat, pp.118-9.
\textsuperscript{396} Firat and Kurkuoglu, ‘Ortadogu‘yla,’ p.632.
\textsuperscript{397} Criss and Bilgin, ‘Turkish;’ Firat and Kurkuoglu, ‘Ortadogu‘yla,’ p.634.
\textsuperscript{398} Firat and Kurkuoglu, ‘Ortadogu‘yla,’ p.634; Karpat, ‘Turkish,’ p.120.
\textsuperscript{399} Firat and Kurkuoglu, ‘Ortadogu‘yla,’ p.634.
the Arabs and therefore were in a position to approach the Arab states.’”400 However, as Turkey was only approaching the region through the lenses of the west and was not paying attention to the internal dynamics in the region at the time, neither this rhetoric nor Turkish efforts to unite the region around western organisations was successful.

In the meantime, Europe had continued its integration by creating the EEC in 1958. The EEC envisaged progressive reduction of tariffs among the signatories with the aim of creating a common market. Unlike the ECSC, the EEC gave the opportunity to non-member states to associate themselves with the EEC and soon after the EEC came into effect Spain, Greece and Turkey applied for associate membership to the EEC in 1959.401 Turkey received a positive response shortly after the application. The signing of the association agreement was to wait until after the military coup that toppled the DP government in 1960. Turkey’s first application for association and the Association agreement that followed mark the beginning of Turkey-EU relations.402

4.4 Republican Turkey between East and West: 1960-80

The military, which had assigned itself the role of the guardianship of Kemalism, had been increasingly troubled by the DP’s religious references in politics, growing authoritarianism and friction with the military, as well as the military’s deteriorating living standards which culminated in the military coup of 1960. The military wanted to restore parliamentary democracy as soon as possible after the coup; therefore they commissioned a group of law professors to draft a new

400 Criss and Bilgin, ‘Turkish.’
401 Eric Faucompret and Jozef Konings, Turkish Accession to the EU (Park Square: Routledge, 2008), p.23.
constitution. The new constitution was drafted to prevent a power monopoly such as that of the DP and ushered in a new era in Turkish politics. It allowed public scrutiny over foreign policy as well as public policy as it was a liberal constitution with regards to its provisions on civil rights, media, civil society, political parties. As a result of this period of politicisation, Turkish foreign policy became subjected to active criticism by both left-wing and right-wing public opinion. Nonetheless, the military never ceased to be an important actor in foreign policymaking as it was, in the final analysis, a period beginning with a military coup. The trials after the coup led to numerous DP members’ imprisonment and the hanging of the Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Finance Minister in 1961. The new constitution also established the National Security Council (NSC) that included the force commanders, the chief of General Staff and the relevant ministers to advise the government on security matters. This institution was to gradually ensure the military domination over Turkish politics in the coming decades. Also the military leaders of the coup believed that the economic problems of the 1950s were due to the lack of planning under DP rule. Therefore they included the State Planning Organisation in the constitution and it marked the beginning of the import substitution industrialisation in Turkey. Yet, the industry still depended on foreign reserves, therefore export revenues, to pay for the imported materials and parts for production. This was to cause major economic problems during the 1970s.

Turkey’s relationship with the west was not altered by the military coup, but was affected later by the deteriorating position of Turkey in the eyes of the US.

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403 Zurcher, *Turkey*, p.245.
406 Zurcher, *Turkey*, p.248
407 Zurcher, *Turkey*, p.245.
408 Zurcher, *Turkey*, p.265.
409 The US removed its Jupiter missiles from Turkey as part of a compromise for the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba. However, Turkey’s opinion was not consulted at all in the process and the US
and the isolation it experienced during the Cyprus crisis. After its disenchantment with the US, Turkey began to pursue a more multi-faceted and cautious foreign policy. As Criss and Bilgin have suggest,

Turkey's foreign policy orientation, although subject to criticism by radical rightist and leftist circles alike, remained unquestioned at the policymaking level. Turkey's national role conceptions did not change either, though the role of faithful ally came to be less emphasized.

In this context, the Association agreement between Turkey and the EEC, the Ankara agreement, was signed in 1963 and came into force in 1964. The Ankara agreement was signed by all six members of the EEC and it envisaged economic integration, free movement of workers, and the eventual membership of Turkey. It set out the establishment of a customs union between Turkey and the EEC in three stages. In the first five years, Turkey was going to receive financial aid and duty-free quotas from the Community on its four most important export products. During the second phase of twelve years, both sides were going to grant tariff concessions reciprocally. In the final phase a customs union was going to be created and economic policies to be harmonised. The Ankara agreement created the Association Council, which is responsible for implementing the agreement; the Association Committee and the Joint Parliamentary Assembly, which are mainly advisory bodies.

Turkey demanded the start of the transitional phase in 1969. The Justice Party (JP) government was seeking to gain political capital from intensification of

demonstrated that “Turkey no longer held the position of extreme importance in the Cold War it had occupied heretofore.” George Harris, ‘Turkey and the US,’ in Turkey’s Foreign Policy, ed., Kemal Karpat, p.58. This was largely the result of the détente period starting in the late 1960s and marked by a relaxation of US-Soviet relations.

Violence erupted in Cyprus between Turkish and Greek communities in the island in 1963, after the Greek Cypriot President Makarios attempted to curb the rights of the Turkish community through a change in the constitution. Turkey started giving signals that it might use force in order to protect the rights of the Turkish community, but warned by the US through the infamous Johnson letter, which stated that Turkey could not use US equipment in such an operation and that Turkey will not be protected by NATO in case of such an intervention to Cyprus. Altunisik and Tur, Turkey, p.107.

Criss and Bilgin, ‘Turkish.’


Faucompret and Konings, Turkish Accession, p.25.
relations with the European Community (EC) by initiating the transitional phase of the Ankara agreement.\textsuperscript{414} The negotiations sparked a series of anti-EC protests by leftists, nationalists and Islamists alike.\textsuperscript{415} The Islamist Nationalist Order Party was a significant member of this opposition, whose members founded pro-Islamic parties in the coming decades. The Additional Protocol that was signed in 1970 delineated the details of transition phase up to membership and envisaged gradual establishment of free movement of persons by 1986 as well as free movement of industrial goods and services.\textsuperscript{416} The EC retained restrictions on the trade of products sensitive for its economy, such as agriculture, textiles, steel and iron, which were important export goods for Turkey.\textsuperscript{417} On the other hand, Turkey was to reduce its tariffs towards the EC gradually and receive financial aid as compensation for this process of tariff reduction.\textsuperscript{418} According to the Protocol, all duties and other trade restrictions used by Turkey against the EC were to be removed by 1995. Although full membership was a distant possibility, the conclusion of the Ankara agreement and the Additional Protocol made the EC the biggest trading partner of Turkey, replacing the US.\textsuperscript{419}

By 1970, political violence and polarisation in Turkey had grown to an alarming level, which the government was not able to stop. The Parliament was deadlocked and there was serious violence on the streets and university campuses.\textsuperscript{420} The military gave a memorandum to the government in 1971, threatening with a military takeover of the government unless “a strong and credible government” capable to stop the violence on the streets and the deadlock of the political system.\textsuperscript{421}

\textsuperscript{415} Dosemeci, “Associating,” p.194.
\textsuperscript{416} Harun Arican, Turkey and the EU (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), p.65.
\textsuperscript{417} Arikan, Turkey, p.65.
\textsuperscript{418} Arikan, Turkey, p.65.
\textsuperscript{419} Zurcher, Turkey, p.276.
\textsuperscript{420} Zurcher, Turkey, p.258.
Through the memorandum, the military forced the government to resign and a series of technocratic governments to be formed by the Turkish Parliament. The military also secured the proclamation of a state of emergency a month after the memorandum and thousands of “anarchists” were arrested who were allegedly involved in the guerrilla warfare on the streets. This coup took place without the military directly assuming power, but it still led to the disruption of democracy between 1971 and 1973. As Dosemeci has argued, the military was, “concerned that the military coup would lead to a deterioration of relations with Europe,” therefore the military made it clear that they wanted a swift ratification of the Additional Protocol, thereby effectively silencing political opposition to the Protocol.422

The goal of pursuing a multifaceted foreign policy also led successive Turkish governments to seek closer ties with the Middle East in the 1960-80 period. Therefore this period was characterised by relative autonomy from the US policies in the Middle East.423 This discourse underlined the rupture from the perceived mistakes of the DP governments during the 1950s.424 Yet, the military still emphasised Turkey’s continued loyalty to the, due to their fear of being misinterpreted by the US.425 However, starting from 1965, this policy turned explicitly in favour of a more pro-Arab policy orientation. When the JP came to power in 1965, partly in order to please the party’s rather conservative constituency, the party programme declared that among other things the JP would seek closer ties with the Muslim and Arab “brothers” in the Middle East.426 The identity crisis of Turkey revealed itself clearly in this period. As Turkish foreign policy sought closer ties with the Muslim Middle East,

426 Firat and Kurkuoglu, ‘Ortadogu’yla,’ p.788. Kemal Karpat disputes this thesis by asserting that the Justice Party was also harshly criticised for its Western and NATO orientation as well as that Turkish foreign policymaking is the remit of a few foreign ministry bureaucrats. Karpat, ‘Turkish and Arab.’
criticism raised from especially the opposition party, RPP, which criticised the
government for risking Turkey’s “basic policy of neutrality towards the Israeli-Arab
conflict and the country’s secularist standing.”\textsuperscript{427} There were economic reasons
behind this shift too. Oil became a scarce resource with the 1973-74 oil crisis. As an
oil-importing country Turkey’s dependence increased.\textsuperscript{428} This led Turkey to be more
active in its trade with the Middle Eastern countries.

Turkey also intensified its diplomatic visits to the Middle Eastern
countries in an attempt to garner support for its Cyprus policy.\textsuperscript{429} These efforts were
welcomed by the Muslim Middle East and Iraq expressed its sympathy for the Turkish
Cypriot cause in 1966, a trade agreement was signed with Egypt in the same year and
further diplomatic visits to Tunisia, Saudi Arabia followed. In 1969 Turkey also
decided to participate in the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) meeting as an
observer.\textsuperscript{430}

In the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Turkey denied the US use of Turkish
military bases to support Israel.\textsuperscript{431} Turkey supported the Arab position when Israel
gained the upper hand in the war, by declaring its objection to possible future
territorial encroachments by use of force. Moreover, Turkey extended humanitarian
aid to the Arab countries that suffered intense casualties during the war.\textsuperscript{432} During the
1970 crisis in Jordan, which brought Jordan against Syria and the Palestinian
guerrillas, Turkey stayed aloof from the conflict whilst denying the use of its military
bases to the US due to its policy that any external intervention in the crisis would
aggravate the situation.\textsuperscript{433} Turkey repeated its guarantee to deny the use of its military
bases in any Middle Eastern conflict more strongly in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. On

\textsuperscript{427} Karpat, ‘Turkish and Arab,’ p.131.
\textsuperscript{428} Altunisik and Tur, \textit{Turkey}, p.109
\textsuperscript{429} Firat and Kurkuoglu, ‘Ortadogu’yla,’ p.789.
\textsuperscript{430} Sander, \textit{Turkiye’nin}, p.235.
\textsuperscript{431} Sander, \textit{Turkiye’nin}, p.235.
\textsuperscript{432} Firat and Kurkuoglu, ‘Ortadogu’yla,’ p.790.
\textsuperscript{433} Firat and Kurkuoglu, ‘Ortadogu’yla,’ p.790.
the other hand, Turkey allowed Soviet planes that carried aid to Arabs through its airspace. It recognised the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) as the only legal representative of the Palestinian people in 1974 and finally agreed to the opening of a PLO office in Ankara in 1979. However, despite establishment of closer ties with the Arab Middle East, Turkey never severed its ties with Israel and the west.

In the meantime, the deteriorating economy due to the balance of payments problems and the polarisation of domestic politics were aggravating political violence. By the end of the 1970s, extremist youth groups were killing each other and public figures, kidnapping, organising attacks to neighbourhoods. Also the Islamist groups were actively organising demonstrations and demanding the reinstatement of Islamic law as part of the political polarisation. All these factors were alarming for the military, which took over government in September 1980. The reasons for the military coup were stated in the communiqué issued on the day of the intervention as follows:

The aim of the operation is to safeguard the integrity of the country, to provide for national unity and fraternity, to prevent the existence and the possibility of civil war and internecine struggle, to re-establish the existence and the authority of the state, and to eliminate the factors that hinder the smooth working of the democratic order.

The 1980 military coup also drastically changed the domestic structure of Turkey and caused problems between the EC and Turkey. The makers of the 1980 military coup were of the opinion that the anarchy prevailing in Turkey throughout the 1960s and 1970s was a consequence of the liberal and pluralist nature of the 1961 constitution. Therefore, the first thing they did after assuming government of the

435 Sander, Turkiye’nin, p.238.
437 Zurcher, Turkey, pp. 263-4.
country was to curb freedom of association and civil rights as well as the autonomy of universities.\textsuperscript{439} Around 100,000 people were arrested by the military junta and torture was widespread in the prisons and 20 death sentences were executed out of 3600 that were pronounced.\textsuperscript{440} In the aftermath of the intervention, the military sought to concentrate power in the hands of the president and the military by drafting a restrictive constitution. The leader of the military coup was installed as the President and parliamentary politics could only be restored under the shadow of the military. The military representatives obtained seats in the Higher Education Board, Radio and Television Supreme Council and Turkish Radio and Television. To this end, the NSC was strengthened by the 1982 Constitution. The council of ministers had to consider with priority the decisions of this council and since its creation it served to expand the military's political influence. The military junta also clamped down on the leftist labour confederation and the universities, in order to prevent leftist tendencies spreading among workers and students.\textsuperscript{441}

Another overriding issue for the military junta was to fight Kurdish nationalism, which had gained pace in the late 1970s. Kurdish nationalism had been rising in the 1970s on the back of rising political extremism. The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) was founded in 1978, which was the armed Kurdish nationalist movement that has become an important problem for Turkish policymakers ever since.\textsuperscript{442} The military junta that orchestrated the 1980 military coup adopted hardliner policies to halt the Kurdish nationalist movement. After the coup, it was impossible even to utter the word 'Kurd' let alone using the Kurdish language. Indeed, Kurdish as a language was banned in 1983. In the wake of the 1980 military coup,

\textsuperscript{440} Zurcher, \textit{Turkey}, pp.280-1.
\textsuperscript{441} Tachau and Heper, ‘The State,’ p.30.
Kurdish nationalists were arrested or fled the country. The PKK sought refuge in Syria and succeeded in regrouping there.443

4.5 Turkey between East and West: 1983-1990

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian Islamic revolution signalled threatening regional developments and the intensification of the Cold War again in the 1980s.444 As a response, Turkey aligned itself closely with the US once again and “became a pillar of Washington's strategy to protect American interests in the Middle East.”445 The post-coup calm in domestic politics gave way to the resumption of the PKK’s violent opposition to the Turkish state in 1984. The PKK terrorism increasingly gained support from the Kurdish population since then due to the repressive policies of the Turkish state and economic backwardness of the south East Anatolia, where the majority of Kurds live. The increasing PKK terrorism led to the declaration of state of emergency in the south East of Turkey in 1987.446

Turgut Ozal’s centre-right Motherland Party (MP) won the first elections in 1983 after the military coup. Ozal immediately started to implement an economic stabilisation programme. This programme was largely inspired by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and it aimed to create an export-oriented free market, reduce inflation and improve the balance of payments.447 The suppression of trade unions and the political left by the military coup made possible the implementation of neoliberal reforms. Wages were frozen to improve competitiveness, the Turkish lira

444 Criss and Bilgin, ‘Turkish.’
445 Altunisik and Tur, Turkey, p.112.
446 Robins, ‘The Overlord,’ p.663.
447 Zurcher, Turkey, p.307.
was devalued to boost exports, anti-inflationary measures were taken and exports were subsidised in various ways.\textsuperscript{448}

The early 1980s witnessed the downgrading of relations with the EC. The EC was critical of human rights violations that took place during the military rule.\textsuperscript{449} The EC foreign ministers declared that the EC's relationship with Turkey was contingent upon Turkey's respect for human rights and the reestablishment of democratic institutions.\textsuperscript{450} The European Parliament (EP) was more critical and warned that the suspension of the Association agreement could be considered in case Turkey did not return to democratic politics soon. Yet, member states and the Commission were inclined towards maintaining at least the association ties with Turkey.\textsuperscript{451}

Yet, Turkey applied for full membership to the EC in 1987. There were several reasons behind this. First of all, the Association agreement was not to Turkey's satisfaction anymore due to the successive enlargements of the EC, extension of its preferential trade regime to an increasing number of third countries and most importantly the Turkish policymakers' interpretations of the EC political context. The EC was furthering its deepening, which was potentially going to make Turkish accession more difficult. Also Turkish policymakers expected a similar treatment to that afforded to Greece, Portugal and Spain.\textsuperscript{452} Having witnessed the EC's use of its enlargement policy as an instrument of post-coup democratisation in these countries, Turkish policymakers thought they could receive similar treatment.\textsuperscript{453} That was a miscalculation: the EC was not ready for another enlargement just after the

\textsuperscript{448} Zurcher, \textit{Turkey}, p.307.
\textsuperscript{449} Zurcher, \textit{Turkey}, p. 323.
\textsuperscript{450} Arikan, \textit{Turkey}, p.125.
\textsuperscript{451} Arikan, \textit{Turkey}, p.126.
\textsuperscript{452} Arikan, \textit{Turkey}, p.71.
\textsuperscript{453} Arikan, \textit{Turkey}, p.71.
Mediterranean enlargement that led to the accession of Greece, Spain and Portugal.\textsuperscript{454} It took two years for the Commission to give its opinion on Turkey’s application. The Commission also stated in its opinion on Turkey’s application that Turkey was not ready economically or politically to become a member, citing also Turkey’s strained relationship with Greece and Cyprus. The Commission thus delayed Turkey’s application for membership indefinitely, rather than rejecting it.\textsuperscript{455}

Due to the boom in world oil prices in the beginning of the 1980s, oil-producing countries made enormous profits and this provided an attractive market for Turkish exporters, who were now subsidised by the government.\textsuperscript{456} The relationship with the OIC was improved in the period. Turkey increased its level of diplomatic representation at the OIC to the presidency level in 1984.\textsuperscript{457} Turkey also continued strengthening its relations with the Arab countries of the Middle East at the expense of its relations with Israel. When Israel annexed Jerusalem in 1980, Turkey objected to this act and withdrew its ambassador to Israel and downgraded its representation in Israel.\textsuperscript{458} Likewise Turkey criticised Israeli attacks on Lebanon in 1981 and became one of the first countries to recognise the Palestinian state in 1988.\textsuperscript{459} In Mango’s words, in this period “[g]estures were made which cost Turkey nothing, but gave Arabs pleasure.”\textsuperscript{460}

1980 witnessed another important development in the region, namely the Iran-Iraq war. Turkey adopted active neutrality during the war, which lasted eight years. The war diverted Iraqi attention mainly to its southern borders and therefore left a power vacuum in the northern parts of Iraq, of which the Kurdish groups in the

\textsuperscript{454} Faucomret and Konings, \textit{Turkish Accession}, p.31.  
\textsuperscript{455} Arikan, \textit{Turkey}, p.72.  
\textsuperscript{456} Zürcher, \textit{Turkey}, p.310.  
\textsuperscript{457} Sander, \textit{Türkiye’nin}, p.235.  
\textsuperscript{458} Firat and Kurkuoğlu, ‘Arap,’ p.128.  
\textsuperscript{460} Mango, ‘Turkish,’ p.66.
region took advantage.\textsuperscript{461} These groups were supported both by Iraq’s opponent Iran and Syria, who wanted to acquire a leadership role in the region. As a response to this strengthening of the relationship among Syria, Iran and the Kurdish groups that were located at its southern borders, Turkey was pushed into closer cooperation with Iraq.\textsuperscript{462} Turkey remained the only outlet for the Iraqi oil through the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline and this was also another factor in the emergence of closer cooperation. Turkey and Iraq also reached a mutual agreement on border security and cooperation in 1983. This agreement gave both countries the right of hot pursuit against cross-border terrorism.\textsuperscript{463} Turkey used its legal rights of hot pursuit in Iraqi territory several times throughout the 1980s and 90s.

In this period, Turkey began using water as a foreign policy tool. Turkey’s Southeast Anatolian Project (known as GAP in Turkish acronyms) to utilise waters of the Euphrates and Tigris alarmed Syria and Iraq, who were also heavily reliant on the waters of these two rivers that originate in Turkey and pass through Iraqi and Syrian soil.\textsuperscript{464} In the 1980s, Turkey started utilising its power over the control of the waters of Euphrates and Tigris as a political tool against Syria due to Turkish concerns over Syrian support for PKK terrorism.\textsuperscript{465} Therefore, relations with Syria were deteriorating. Strained relations went so far that Turkey finally threatened Syria with use of force if they did not stop supporting the PKK.\textsuperscript{466} Syria agreed to expel PKK militants from its territories. However, problems persisted between Syria and Turkey as Syria kept resuming its support for the PKK and the Turkish officials kept feeling threatened by the Syrian support for the PKK. Finally, after several agreements signed

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{461} Firat and Kurkcuoglu, ‘Arap,’ p.130
\item \textsuperscript{462} Firat and Kurkcuoglu, ‘Arap,’ p.131
\item \textsuperscript{463} Hot pursuit refers to the right of a country’s security forces to continue tracing criminals in a neighbouring country’s territory under certain conditions as provided by the mutual agreement. Firat and Kurkcuoglu, ‘Arap,’ p.133.
\item \textsuperscript{464} Altunisik and Tur, Turkey, p. 112.
\item \textsuperscript{465} Firat and Kurkcuoglu, ‘Arap,’ p.140.
\item \textsuperscript{466} Firat and Kurkcuoglu, ‘Arap,’ p.133.
\end{itemize}
between Syria and Turkey, Turkey accused Syria of not honouring its promises to cut its support for the PKK in 1989 and warned that it could also breach their agreement regarding the amount of water to be released to Syria.\textsuperscript{467}

All in all, the 1980s witnessed Turkey’s economic liberalisation that led to a hunger for new export markets. This caused closer relations with the Middle East on the one hand and the replacement of the EC as Turkey’s biggest trade partner, with the oil-producing Arab countries in the early 1980s. Yet, towards the late 1980s the usual trade flow returned by making the EC the biggest export market for Turkey again.\textsuperscript{468} Relations with the EC returned to the top of the agenda in the late 1980s with the application for full membership, which was refused for the foreseeable future. Yet, to compensate this decision, the EC agreed in 1993 to proceed to the final stage of the Association Agreement, which is a customs union, by 1995. The customs union decision and its background will be explained in the next section.

### 4.6 Turkey between East and West: 1990-1999

The end of the Cold War threw Turkey into uncertainty as to its new role in the new post-Cold War world. This change in the international structure was coupled with Turkey’s domestic problems and together they “created new tensions. This was most clear in Turkey’s relations with the Middle East where the domestic challenges of political Islam and Kurdish nationalism intermingled with Turkey’s relations with this region.”\textsuperscript{469}

Turgut Ozal was President from 1989 until he died in 1993. The personal stamp of Ozal on foreign policymaking, i.e. bypassing other relevant institutions and

\textsuperscript{467} Firat and Kurkuoglu, ‘Arap,’ p.139.
\textsuperscript{468} Zircher, \textit{Turkey}, p.310.
\textsuperscript{469} Altunisik and Tur, \textit{Turkey}, p.114.
emphasising trade relations, remained intact during the early 1990s. He was fully attached to the western alliance of NATO and he upheld trade over militaristic security concerns. He demonstrated his vision of Turkey’s continued alliance with the West in the Gulf War of 1990, where Turkey sided with the US led alliance against Iraq and even shut down the Kirkük-Yumurtalik pipeline. Turkey’s support for the US-led alliance regarding the Gulf War cost the country a lot on many fronts including losing trade capacity with Iraq and the influx of Kurdish refugees to Turkey after the War, but it was an attempt at regaining Turkey’s lost strategic importance at the end of the Cold War.\footnote{Firat and Kurkcuoglu, ‘Arap,’ p.551; For Turkey’s goal of regaining its strategic importance after the Cold War, Sabri Sayari, ‘Turkish Foreign Policy in the post-Cold War Era: Challenges of Multi-regionalism,’ \textit{Journal of International Affairs}, 54/1 (Fall 2000), p.171.}

However, Ozal’s one-man rule did not last long. After his death, Suleyman Demirel became President and Tansu Ciller, the leader of True Path Party (TPP), became the Prime Minister. In the meantime the Islamist Welfare Party (WP) had become one of the major parties in the political scene by 1994. Such ascendance of political Islam gave Prime Minister Ciller the opportunity to speed up the customs union decision by arguing to the EU representatives that the customs union decision would keep fundamentalist Islamists at bay. The WP had been increasing their votes steadily over the past decade but they reached their peak in 1994 and 1995 when they won 19\% of votes in municipal elections and 21.4\% in the general elections respectively.\footnote{Haldun Gulalp, ‘Globalization And Political Islam: The Social Bases Of Turkey’s Welfare Party,’ \textit{International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies}, 33(2001), p.433.} Partly due to Ciller’s warnings and partly to keep Turkey within reach but outside the EU, the customs union decision was made by the EU-Turkey Association Council on 6 March 1995.\footnote{Arikan, \textit{Turkey}, p.141.} Despite the EP’s negative position on the matter, the member states including France, Germany and Britain were in favour of

\addcontentsline{toc}{section}{References}
the customs union with Turkey. However, the EP had to give its assent to the
decision and it made its approval conditional on Turkey’s alignment of its human
rights regime with that of the EU. As a result, the Turkish government passed
amendments on the constitution and the anti-terror law, which aimed to improve the
standards of democracy and human rights in Turkey. These amendments marked the
beginning of EU conditionality in Turkey, yet it was much smaller in scale than the
period that started with Turkey’s elevation to candidacy in 1999. Despite the reforms
that the Turkish government passed, the EP was still reluctant. At that point, lobbying
by some member states such as Germany and Britain as well as the Turkish insistence
that the customs union could successfully anchor Turkey to the west and prevent the
political success of Islamists in Turkey succeeded in convincing the EP.

Although the Ankara agreement had envisaged the customs union as a
stage of the EU-Turkey relationship, the terms of the customs union that took force in
1 January 1996 were a step backwards from the Ankara agreement. The customs
union did not include the free movement of workers, services or capital, whereas they
were envisaged by the Ankara agreement. The EU and Turkey agreed to eliminate
customs duties and quantitative restrictions between each other on industrial goods
and Turkey also pledged to adopt the Union’s commercial policy and preferential
trade agreements in five years. As a result of the customs union decision, Turkey’s
weighted rates of protection for imports declined from 5.9% to 0%; for goods from
third countries it fell from 10.8% to 6%. The customs union has caused Turkey some
loss of autonomy over trade policy as the Union could conclude preferential trade
agreements with third countries in the future, with which Turkey had to align itself.

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473 Arikan, Turkey, p.141.
474 Arikan, Turkey, p.142.
475 Zürcher, Turkey, p.324.
476 Faucompret and Konings, Turkish Accession, p.36.
478 Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs website. www.mfa.gov.tr (12 December 2011)
Otherwise, these third countries would be able to benefit from the preferential trade regime they have with the EU in their exports to Turkey due to the Turkey-EU customs union without having to reciprocate as their agreements only allowed goods originating from the EU to enter their markets with tariff reductions.479

Along with further trade liberalisation, the customs union decision also brought about the obligation for Turkey to adopt significantly similar policies to those of the EU on standardisation and competition.480 Turkey put in effect a competition policy that was mostly modelled on that of the EU’s and eliminated its performance-based export promotion schemes due to the customs union obligations.481 Yet, Turkey was expecting more than a customs union as the Turkish elite perceived the customs union as a strategy to facilitate membership, whereas the EU had only offered it as a temporary alternative to membership after Turkey’s 1987 application for membership.482

By mid-1996, the WP was in a coalition with Tansu Ciller’s TPP and this alarmed the Kemalist military so much that they started monitoring activities of the WP with the goal of protecting the secular regime. Political Islam was not the only internal threat perceived by the military, Kurdish nationalism was also ascendant. The rise of Islamism and Kurdish nationalism also started challenging the basic premises of Kemalist ideology, on which Turkish foreign policy firmly stands. As Altunisik and Tur assert,

in the 1990s the debate about Turkey’s national identity also intensified as the process of modernisation created its own discontents...For instance, when the Islamist Welfare Party came to power as the senior coalition

480 Ulgen and Zahariadis, ‘The Future.’
482 Faucompret and Konings, Turkish Accession, p.35.
partner in 1997 it used foreign policy, particularly Turkey’s relations with the Islamic countries, as one of the main pillars of its counter-ideology.483

Indeed, when he became Prime Minister in 1996, Erbakan’s first official visit was to Iran. Then he also went to Libya to intermediate in the collection of the Libyan debt to Turkish construction firms, where he sat by and listened to Muammar Gaddafi reprimand Turkey for its alliance with the NATO and the EU.484 He suggested an Islamic free trade area and an Islamic G-8 as alternatives to the Western alliance. Coupled with the raging PKK terrorism and Islamic terrorism these political manoeuvres boosted the threat perception of the military.

In response to such perceived threat from Kurdish nationalism and Islamism, the military strengthened its grip on politics and further dogmatised Kemalism by attenuating nationalism and secularism to extreme levels and downgrading reformism and civilisationalism among the principles of Kemalism.485 This led Kemalism to be articulated by the military elite as an ideology that requires the crackdown of any Kurdish nationalism and political Islam in order to maintain the unity of the Turkish state. The military elite and the nationalists perceived any intervention from the EU as an attempt to divide Turkey, just like ‘they’ tried at the end of the World War I. This led the military to increasingly interfere with policymaking.486

The increased role of the military culminated in the 28 February 1997 military intervention, which was to continue until the early 2000s.487 During the premiership of Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of the Islamist WP, the military intervened in politics through a memorandum where they warned against the

483 Altunisik and Tur, Turkey, p.91.
485 Defne Gunay and Ali Tekin, ‘Strategic Adaptation to the EU: The Case of Turkish Armed Forces,’ unpublished manuscript.
486 Altunisik and Tur, Turkey, p.92.
expansion of Islamist fundamentalism. This intervention led to the closure of WP by the Constitutional Court and also the military put Islamists under extreme scrutiny. In the process the MUSIAD, the pro-Islamic business association, got damaged immensely as their members were banned from state procurement processes. By the late 1990s the military had assumed de facto control over the state's employment procedures by doing background checks on candidate civil servants.

All these hard line, militaristic policies were leading to human rights violations and the EU, especially the EP, was growing more and more discontented with these violations. In December 1997, after the 28 February intervention, the EU declared the CEECs as candidates in the Luxembourg summit, but excluded Turkey. Also following a crisis between Turkey and Greece over the sovereignty of an islet in the Aegean Sea in 1996, Greece vetoed the release of the financial aid to Turkey that was allocated as part of the customs union decision. This caused significant frustration among the Turkish political elite. The Turkish Prime Minister declared that all political dialogue with the EU was to be cut off.

These factors resulted in a quite conflict-ridden foreign policy in the late 1990s. Foreign policy under the iron fist of the military in the second half of the 1990s was still anchored to the US. But the military was at the same time actively seeking to safeguard the country's territorial integrity against domestic and international threats mainly emerging from the south. While these activities weakened Turkey's human rights record, it also deteriorated the relationship with its Arab Middle Eastern neighbours. During most of the 1990s, Turkey's relationships with its Arab

488 Baskin Oran, ‘Donemin Bilancosu,’ in Türk Dis Politikasi, ed., Oran, p.221.
489 ‘Erdogan : 28 Subat MUSIAD’in Belini Kirmak Icin Yapilmistir,’ Posta (Turkish Daily), 6 September 2010.
491 Zürcher, Turkey, p.324.
493 Faucompret and Konings, Turkish Accession, p.37.
neighbours were strained, at best unstable. Turkey came to the brink of war with Syria during the 1990s due to several reasons. Syria’s support for the PKK members, the dispute over the amount of water to be released by Turkey, its agreement with Greece to let Greek war planes to use Syrian airspace in case of a disagreement with Turkey were among the reasons. In 1998 Turkey had a showdown with Syria over its support for the PKK and the harbouring of the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan. Eventually, with the help of the US intelligence, Turkey could capture Ocalan in early 1999.

The 1990s are characterized by Turkish military incursions into Northern Iraq in order to fight PKK terrorism as the central Iraqi government had limited control in the area after the creation of no fly zones that led to a power vacuum. Turkey’s relations with Iran were also problematic during the 1990s on the grounds that Iran harboured the PKK during the 1990s. Other concerns of Turkey emanated from Iran’s aims to export its brand of Islamic radicalism and its support towards some Islamist terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah. This tension escalated in 1997, when the Iranian ambassador to Turkey advocated the adoption of Islamic law in Turkey. This speech indeed was one of the triggers for the 28 February 1997 intervention.

In the face of deteriorating relations with its Arab Middle Eastern neighbours, Turkey strengthened its relationship with Israel that had already been in a process of normalisation in the 1990s as a result of the Arab-Israeli peace process. This rapprochement was partly the success of a group of policy entrepreneurs, led by

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496 Ozcan, Harmonizing, p.132.
499 Altunisik and Tur, Turkey, p.126.
the military, over the Islamist circles that were sceptical of Israel and advocating integration with the Islamic world.\textsuperscript{500}

While Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Middle East was going through these conflicts, due to Turkey’s exclusion from the enlargement policy in 1997 Luxembourg Summit, political relations with the EU were frozen too. The European Council asked the Commission to prepare Progress Reports for Turkey along with the candidate countries, although Turkey was not yet declared as a candidate.\textsuperscript{501} A year later, the 1999 Helsinki decision of the EU to declare Turkey as a candidate led to the restoration of Euro-enthusiasm in Turkey. Turkey was to benefit from the pre-accession strategy and be judged on the basis of its success in compliance with the Copenhagen political criteria for accession. The Presidency Conclusions read as follows:

Turkey is a candidate State destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States. Building on the existing European strategy, Turkey, like other candidate States, will benefit from a pre-accession strategy to stimulate and support its reforms. This will include enhanced political dialogue, with emphasis on progressing towards fulfilling the political criteria for accession with particular reference to the issue of human rights, as well as on the issues referred to in paragraphs 4 and 9(a).\textsuperscript{502}

The issues referred to in paragraph 4 are the EU’s call for a peaceful resolution of border disputes and any other outstanding issues, if necessary by bringing the issue to the International Court of Justice. The issue raised in paragraph 9(a) is a specific focus on the Cyprus dispute and an expression of the EU’s strong support for the UN Secretary-General Annan’s efforts to resolve it. These matters were

\textsuperscript{500} Cagri Erhan and Omer Kurkuoglu, ‘Israel’le İlişkiler,’ in \textit{Turk Dis Politikasi}, ed., Oran, p.574.
brought forward as conditions on Turkey’s candidacy due to the Greek threat of veto unless they are worded in the decision.\textsuperscript{503}

\textbf{4.7 Turkey between East and West: The 2000s and the puzzle}

The 2000s witnessed a significant transformation of Turkey’s domestic politics, its relationship with the EU and also its foreign policy towards the Middle East. The coalition government of the Nationalist Action Party (NAP), DLP and the MP faced very serious twin economic crises of November 2000 and February 2001, which led to bankruptcies and rising unemployment. The JDP was a newcomer as a splinter from the banned Islamist WP. At the same time the fact that EU candidacy came with membership conditionality and the need to make reforms was getting clearer in the eyes of the government.

The Accession Partnership Document detailing short and medium term priorities to comply with the Copenhagen criteria was adopted in March 2001, and was revised later in May 2003, January 2006 and finally February 2008.\textsuperscript{504} This was a sign that full accession was not going to happen as soon as the Turkish elite hoped it would. The preparation of Turkey’s National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis (henceforth National Programme) took a long time and the document adopted at the end was rather vague on many critical issues.\textsuperscript{505} Yet, Turkey started the reform process in 2001 and since then the reform process continued until the present day. These reform packages have passed laws to ease restrictions on human rights, political and social rights, the role of the military in politics, the legal system, and economic governance. Capital punishment was banned, restrictions on learning and

\textsuperscript{503} ‘Saat Saat Adaylik Pazarligi,’ \textit{Hurriyet} (Turkish Daily), 11 December 1999.
\textsuperscript{505} Faucompret and Konings, \textit{Turkish Accession}, p.41.
speaking Kurdish were removed, the number of civilians increased in the NSC among a plethora of other changes.

In November 2002 elections the JDP won a landslide victory by 34%. In December 2002, the EU declared that depending on the Commission's positive opinion on Turkey's compliance with the Copenhagen criteria, the EU would immediately start accession negotiations with Turkey. The view of the Commission on Turkey's progress towards compliance with the Copenhagen criteria in its 2004 Progress Report was positive. Consequently, the EU declared the accession negotiations would start on 3 October 2005. Turkey accepted to sign the Additional Protocol to extend the Ankara agreement to the new member states of the EU, including Cyprus and did so on 30 July 2005, a few months before the start of the negotiations.

The Negotiating Framework however was discouraging for the Turkish political elite. The Framework stated that the negotiations were open-ended and "[w]hile having full regard to all Copenhagen criteria, including the absorption capacity of the Union, if Turkey is not in a position to assume in full all the obligations of membership it must be ensured that Turkey is fully anchored in the European structures." Also the Framework stated that "[l]ong transitional periods, derogations, specific arrangement or permanent safeguard clauses may be considered," which alarmed Turkish policymakers so much that then Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gul refused to board the plane until he was reassured that the Negotiating Framework did not refer to any kind of "privileged partnership" shorter than full membership.

509 Negotiating Framework, Substance of the Negotiations, article 12.
510 Faucompre and Konings, Turkish Accession, p.46.
The coordinating institution for the accession negotiations in Turkey is the European Union Secretariat General (EUSG). EUSG was later transformed into the Ministry of EU Affairs in 2011. EUSG is headed by an ambassador and coordinates the work of relevant ministries in the negotiation process. The chief negotiator was initially the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Babacan who was responsible for both positions until 2009, when Egemen Bagis was appointed as the chief negotiator. The accession negotiations began with screening, through which differences and potential roadblocks in the way of implementing the acquis are discussed by EU Commission officials and Turkish civil servants, the screening process was completed on 13 October 2006.

Those in favour of Turkey's EU membership have always been significantly higher than those against it in Turkish public opinion since 1996. Although volatile, this support has been an important contextual factor shaping the reception of Turkey's EU candidacy. Although still much higher than opposition, the chart shows that in 2006, support for Turkey's EU membership was lower than before.
Table 4.1: Public Opinion in Turkey vis-à-vis EU membership

![Graph showing public opinion on Turkey's EU membership](image)


In December 2006, due to Turkey's failure to diplomatically recognise the Republic of Cyprus as the sovereign state representing the whole island and open its ports to Cyprus, eight chapters of the negotiations were suspended.511 Other chapters were gradually opened for negotiations over the following years. Moreover, the new German and French leaders that assumed office in 2005 and 2007 respectively declared their negative views on Turkey's membership by offering Turkey a 'special status' falling short of full membership.512 These developments have revitalized dormant Euro-scepticism in Turkey and convinced the Turkish public that there is no realistic prospect of EU membership in the near future.

511 IKV homepage, [www.ikv.org.tr](http://www.ikv.org.tr) (10 December 2010)
While Turkey was going through such ups and downs in its relationship with the EU, its relationship with the Arab Middle East had been improving remarkably since 1999. High-level visits took place between Syria and Turkey for the first time in a long period along with an increased volume of trade.\footnote{Mesut Ozcan, Harmonizing Foreign Policy (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), p.118.} Moreover, Syria and Turkey signed a significant number of bilateral agreements,\footnote{\textquote{Turkiye ve Suriye arasinda 50 anlasma,} BBC Turkish, 24 December 2009.} including a free-trade agreement in 2004,\footnote{Kemal Kirisci, \textquote{Turkish Foreign Policy in Turbulent Times,} Chaillot Paper, 92 (2006), pp.19-20.} an agreement for the joint management of waters of Asi and Tigris rivers,\footnote{Kirisci, \textquote{Turkish Foreign Policy in Turbulent,}p.20.} as well as a visa exemption agreement allowing each other’s citizens visa-free passage in 2009.\footnote{Radikal (Turkish Daily), 17 September 2009.} Moreover, the two countries also agreed on the construction of a natural gas pipeline, which would connect an Arab pipeline with a Turkish pipeline.\footnote{Meliha Benli Altunisik, \textquote{Turkey’s Changing Middle East Policy,} UNISCI Discussion Papers, 23 (May 2010), p.152.} Therefore, Turkey went beyond normalisation of its relationship with Syria and both parties built up mutual trust and institutionalised bilateral cooperation in areas ranging from trade to energy.

Turkey’s foreign policy toward Iraq was different too. When the US asked Turkey to authorize American troops’ use of Turkish bases in the operation against Iraq in 2003, the Turkish Parliament voted against the motion. The most striking aspect of this decision was the silence of the military, a long-term US ally, on the issue.\footnote{Kemal Kirisci, \textquote{Between Europe and the Middle East: Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy,} Middle East Review of International Affairs, 8/1 (2004).} Furthermore, Turkey kept consultations with the Iraqi officials with an agenda of preventing the war and making it clear to the Iraqi side the potential consequences of war.\footnote{Ozcan, Harmonizing, p.118.} After the initial stages of the Iraqi war, Turkey grew concerned over the increasing importance of the Kurdish groups in northern Iraq,\footnote{Ozlem Tur, \textquote{Turkiye ve Ortadogu: Gerilimden Isbirligine,} in AK Partili Yillar, ed., Zeynep Dagi (Istanbul: Orion, 2009), p.162.} which alarmed Turkey on the possible emergence of a Kurdish state. Turkish
politicians reiterated their concerns over a possible independent Kurdish state and growing PKK presence in the region to their American counterparts several times in different fora. Turkey’s concerns grew so overwhelming that Turkish armed forces orchestrated a military excursion to Northern Iraq in 2008 in order to eradicate PKK bases in that region. After the military operation, Turkey's policy toward Iraq has changed significantly. Turkey started dialogue with the Iraqi Kurdish groups, acknowledged the regional government in northern Iraq as the legitimate governing body in the region, which are novelties considering the level of threat Turkish decision-makers had perceived from northern Iraq and the possibility of an autonomous or an independent Kurdish state emerging in northern Iraq during the 1990s.

Furthermore, Turkey’s relations with Palestine improved at the expense of the relationship with Israel in this period. The JDP hosted a Hamas delegation in Ankara after Hamas won the 2006 elections in Gaza. This meeting was criticized harshly by Israeli officials, who likened the meeting to one between the leader of the PKK and the Israeli government. A more recent crisis took place at the Davos Economic Forum in January 2009, where Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan harangued Israeli President Shimon Peres for knowing how to kill people. Turkey also provided humanitarian and development aid and “has been involved in capacity and institution-building activities, such as supporting political reform processes and conducting the Young Palestinian Diplomats’ Training Program.” Relations with Israel continued deteriorating in 2010, when Israeli soldiers raided a Turkish humanitarian aid flotilla

523 Serhat Erkmen, ‘Cumhurbaskani Gül’un Irak Ziyareti İşığında Türkiye-Irak İlişkileri,’ Ortadoğu Analiz, 1/4 (2009), p.9
524 Cagaptay, ‘Hamas Visits.’
525 Zaman (Turkish Daily), 16 February 2006.
and killed civilians who were aiming to defy the Israeli blockade against Gaza since Hamas' election.\textsuperscript{527} These developments point to a deterioration of relations between Turkey and Israel, which is quite the opposite of what happened during the 1990s.

Apart from the improvements in bilateral relations with the Arab Middle East, Turkey also undertook initiatives to come together with countries in the region at different political fora in order to establish dialogue and cooperation. An early example of such initiatives was the EU-OIC joint forum first proposed by the then Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ismail Cem, in 2002. This forum was initiated as a venue to disprove the arguments that the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US could be an indicator of a clash between the western civilisation and Islam. The participants included representatives from the EU Commission, EU Council, Council of Europe, OIC secretariat and around 51 ministers from all over the world.\textsuperscript{528} When the Iraq war was looming, Turkey held the first meeting of the "Summit of Iraq's neighbours" with the participation of Egypt, Iran, Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia in January 2003 in order to discuss Turkey's position on the issue and reach a common understanding as to the concerns of the participants regarding the US showdown on Iraq.\textsuperscript{529} Turkey also participated in the 2004 meeting of the G-8 "Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative" as a democratic partner.\textsuperscript{530} Moreover, Turkey assumed co-sponsorship with Yemen and Italy of the "Democracy Assistance Dialogue" which brings together civil society groups and governments from the region, the G-8 to assist consolidation of democracy in the region.\textsuperscript{531} Turkey also took a joint initiative with the Spanish government of establishing the Alliance of Civilizations under the auspices of the UN

\textsuperscript{527} 'Deaths as Israeli Forces Storm Gaza Aid Flotilla,' \textit{BBCnews}, 31 May 2010.
\textsuperscript{528} \textit{Turkish Daily News}, 11 February 2002.
\textsuperscript{529} Ozcan, \textit{Harmonizing}, p.138.
\textsuperscript{530} Huseyin Bagci and Bayram Sinkaya, 'Buyuk Ortadogu Projesi ve Turkiye,' in \textit{AK Partili}, ed., \textit{Dagi}, pp. 100-3.
\textsuperscript{531} US Department of State website. \url{http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2004/June/20040609173104ESnamfuaK0.3460657.html} (4 April 2010).
in order “to explore the roots of polarization between societies and cultures today, and to recommend a practical programme of action to address this issue.”532

Furthermore, Turkey also embarked upon a mediation role in peace talks between Israel and Syria in 2008; 533 however Turkey lost its mediating role due to its strained relations with Israel later.534 Another example of Turkey’s initiatives for furthering political dialogue and mediation in the region is the meeting of Syrian and Iraqi foreign ministers with the secretary general of the Arab League in Istanbul. The goal of this meeting was to mediate the dispute between Syria and Iraq that was caused by the Iraqi government’s allegations that Syria supported terrorist activity in Iraq.

Besides assuming key roles in newly-established organizations and helping institutionalise multilateral cooperation in the region, Turkey also levelled up its profile and impact in other institutions, of which it had already been a member. A good example of this is Turkey’s newly-acquired high profile in the OIC. Even though Turkey has been criticized by the members of the organisation for having close ties with Israel and even if Turkey itself had hesitated to get involved in the OIC due to its ideological reservations in the past, Turkey became a high profile member of the organisation recently. By the efforts of the JDP, a Turkish citizen, Prof. Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, was elected as the secretary-general of the organisation in 2004.535 Turkish policymakers also actively used the OIC forum to convey their observation that the Islamic world needs to put its house in order through democratisation, observation of human rights and increased participation in politics.536 Therefore, Turkey has started

536 Similar points have been made by the former President Ahmet Necdet Sezer and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gul in 2003. See Sami Kohen, ‘Gul’den Anlamli Mesajlar,’ Milliyet (Turkish Daily), 21 October 2003.
using the OIC forum effectively to convey messages of the need for democratisation in the Islamic world and give the ‘Turkish experience’ as a model that combines modernisation and Islam.

### 4.8 Conclusion

All in all, westernisation has been the dominant policy paradigm in Turkish foreign policy since the proclamation of the Republic in 1923. Late Ottoman and Republican history is shaped by westernisation reforms undertaken by various governments, with the underlying objective of catching up with the west. This paradigm was strictly anchored to Kemalism, which has been the state ideology upheld by the military and bureaucratic elite and the RPP throughout the Republican history. Kemalist westernisation therefore has always defined the limits of legitimate or rational foreign policy throughout the Republican history. Within this policy paradigm, there have been times when the Turkish foreign policy elite have improved relations with the Middle East. These were still embedded within a commitment to the western alliance, either in the shape of closer ties with the US or the intensification of the relations with the EU. Those periods when Turkey established closer links with the Middle East are mainly due to economic reasons.

Therefore, in the grand scheme of historical developments it could be argued that there is more continuity than change in Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. However, from a more limited historical perspective, there is change from the 1990s to the 2000s. As explained in chapter three, I argue continuity and change co-exist in every political development. Therefore, in accordance with this conceptualisation of political time and the review of the historical evolution of Turkish foreign policy, the goal of analysis has to be explaining and understanding the change
and continuity. The change and continuity can be observed on a less abstract level, having zoomed in on the foreign policy content, actors and discourses towards the Middle East in this period. The aim of the following three chapters is to understand and explain how the institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU candidacy role played a causal role in bringing about change and continuity in Turkish Foreign policy towards the Middle East in the 2000s.
CHAPTER FIVE: EUROPEANISATION AND FOREIGN POLICY ACTORS

This chapter explores the EU candidate role prescribed by the EU in line with the Copenhagen political and economic criteria and its institutionalisation in Turkish politics. It is argued that the usage of the EU’s candidate role prescription by Turkish actors enabled certain strategies and constrained others, therefore altering the direction and the objective of Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Middle East. The EU candidate role was institutionalised among Turkish foreign policy actors in such a way that the resulting balance of actors and paradigms has enabled the materialisation of the foreign policy towards the Middle East in the 2000s. This chapter therefore scrutinizes how a certain articulation of Turkey's foreign policy paradigm, namely post-Islamist westernisation, has come to shape Turkish foreign policy-making and implementation in the first place due to the institutionalisation of Turkey's EU candidate role.

Past research on Europeanisation has pointed at how domestic opportunity structures ‘mediate’ the domestic impact of Europe. Yet this focus has been mostly from either the rational choice perspective or the sociological institutionalist one. Borzel and Risse’s oft-cited work on two different mechanisms of Europeanisation from rational choice and sociological perspectives has identified two separate pathways for Europeanisation to cause change at the domestic level. According to this model, the rational choice institutionalist path follows the change in the domestic opportunity structure due to the emergence of new resources at the EU level with the background assumption that actors are rational. According to Borzel

537 Christoph Knill and Dirk Lehmkuhl, ‘How Europe Matters? Different Mechanisms of Europeanization,’ European Integration Online Papers 3/7 (1999); Rainer Eising, ‘Interest Groups and Social Movements,’ in Europeanization, eds., Vink and Graziano, pp. 167-81; Radaelli, ‘The Europeanization,’ pp.27-56.
and Risse, from this perspective, “Europeanization is largely conceived as an emerging political opportunity structure which offers some actors additional resources to exert influence, while severely constraining the ability of others to pursue their goals.”

Borzel and Risse have also acknowledged that Europeanisation only causes redistribution of resources when there is misfit between the EU level and domestic level policies, minimal veto points in the decision-making system and favourable formal institutions. The strategies, discourses and willingness of these domestic actors to exploit the new resources created by the EU are not included in their framework.

In what follows I argue there are two important factors that cause the empowerment of actors: mainly their reasons for exploiting new resources, i.e. their ideas in the form of discourses and reasons. This interactive relationship between the EU’s role prescription and Turkish actors’ strategies, discourses and willingness towards this prescription shape the institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU candidate role of compliance with the Copenhagen political and economic criteria.

In this vein, the chapter first overviews the EU’s role prescription for Turkey, which is codified in line with the Copenhagen criteria. Secondly, how this role prescription was institutionalised among Turkish foreign policy actors will be explained within the context of relations between the actors in Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East in the 2000s. Turkish foreign policy actors have adapted their strategies towards the EU’s role prescription for achieving their various objectives ranging from the westernisation of Turkey to acquiring political legitimacy in domestic politics. The actors analysed in this chapter include the primary state actors such as the government, the Turkish Armed Forces, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as

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539 For example, McCauley, ‘Bottom-up.’
well as a secondary actor, the Parliament;\textsuperscript{540} and non-state actors such as the business associations that have been active in the Middle East.

5.1 The EU’s Role Prescription

The EU candidacy role prescribed by the EU has provided Turkish foreign policy actors with two broad sets of rules to comply with as part of the so-called Copenhagen criteria. These criteria for accession to the EU have been set out by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993. The Copenhagen criteria broadly consist of political and economic criteria. Accordingly, an eligible country must have stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and the protection of minorities; a functioning market economy, ability to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the EU.\textsuperscript{541} These two sets of rules aim at macroeconomic stability, economic competitiveness as well as democratisation and civilianisation. The EU’s role prescription laid out by the Copenhagen criteria can only be institutionalised through its interaction with domestic agency. The following section offers a brief overview of the EU’s role prescription for Turkey and the Copenhagen criteria that caused a shift in Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Middle East. Afterwards, an analysis will be offered of how Turkish political and economic actors adopted and institutionalised the EU’s role prescription due to their political projects and paradigms.

5.1.1 EU’s Role Prescription for Turkey: Economic and Political Rules

Turkey started its economic liberalisation in the 1980s, when it shifted from import-substitution industrialisation towards an export-oriented free market

\textsuperscript{540} Philip Robins, \textit{Suits and Uniforms} (London: C. Hurst & co., 2003), pp.53-91

economy as explained in chapter four. This shift also resulted in an export boom due to state intervention in the promotion of exports.\textsuperscript{542} The following decade, however, is dubbed as the “lost decade” due to the sinking growth rate and investment, rising unemployment, the economic crisis in 1994 as well as concurrent government crises due to instable coalition governments that characterised the 1990s.\textsuperscript{543} State borrowing was at very high levels and a group of domestic financial elite emerged, mainly the big holding companies’ banks, whose profits were more based on their lending to the government than their industrial activities.\textsuperscript{544} The coalition governments were still shaping the economic policy on extending favours to their particular electorates.

The financial crisis of 1994 was addressed by borrowing from the IMF and the accompanying stabilisation programme was drawn up by this institution. However, the economic conditions preceding the crisis remained the same, huge budget deficits, very high rates of inflation reaching up to 70% at times and dependency on short-term capital inflows remained intact in the rest of the decade.\textsuperscript{545} The EU factor in this decade was limited to the customs union between Turkey and the EU, which came into operation in 1996. While exposing groups of Turkish corporations to European competition, the customs union did not cause a significant political structural change as it did not institutionalise the goal of EU accession as much as EU candidacy did.\textsuperscript{546}

\textsuperscript{543} Atac and Grunewald, ‘Stabilization,’ p.43.
\textsuperscript{546} Onis and Bakir, ‘Turkey’s Political Economy,’ pp. 147-164.
In 2000 and 2001, the devastating twin crises hit Turkey. The first crisis broke out when Turkey had been following an IMF programme.\(^{547}\) The 2000 crisis was more of a liquidity crisis that could have been averted had the IMF programme been flexible enough to allow the Turkish Central Bank to inject more liquidity to the economy. The second crisis was different in the sense that it was mostly caused by the regulatory deficiencies and reckless lending practices in the Turkish banking system coupled with the lack of political will and capability to address these long drawn-out problems.\(^{548}\) Together, the twin crises of 2000 and 2001 were very costly for the Turkish economy and people.

The Copenhagen economic criteria were largely in tune with the IMF programme that Turkey started implementing after 2001. They were so complementary that the 2001 Accession Partnership Document stated clearly that Turkey should comply with the structural adjustment programme agreed with the IMF.\(^{549}\) The components of the IMF programme were pointing to a neoliberal agenda: the decline of the state in the economy through privatisation and the depoliticisation of economic governance as well as fiscal austerity and disinflation.\(^{550}\) Similarly, the European Commission was emphasising political instability, excessive public borrowing, state's extensive involvement in the economy, dysfunctional financial system and the existence of barriers for market entry/exit as problems in the Turkish economy's alignment with the Copenhagen economic criteria in the annual progress reports.\(^{551}\) The Commission's assessment of a 'functioning market economy' is based on certain sub-criteria such as the existence of macroeconomic stability; liberalisation of the economy and the retreat of the state from the economy; the existence of an

\(^{547}\) Onis, ‘Beyond the 2001,’ p.413.
\(^{548}\) Onis, ‘Beyond the 2001,’ p.415.
enforceable legal system and a well-developed financial sector; the removal of barriers to enter or exit the market.\textsuperscript{552}

On top of such rules that overlapped with the IMF programme, also important was the EU’s particular emphasis on the provision of support for the Small and Medium scale Enterprises (SMEs). The 2000 Progress Report on Turkey pointed out the inconsistency of Turkish policies on the SMEs and those of the EU, as well as the problems for the development of the SMEs in Turkish economy.\textsuperscript{553} The 2001 Progress Report observed some improvement of Turkey’s policies on the SMEs, especially in terms of the start of an action plan and consultation with the SMEs while formulating the economic reform programme to stabilise Turkish economy after the crisis.\textsuperscript{554} The 2003 Accession Partnership for Turkey prescribed the development and implementation of “a national SME strategy in line with the European Charter for small enterprises and the multiannual programme for enterprise and entrepreneurship [which] should include the improvement of the business environment for the SMEs.”\textsuperscript{555} The EU’s role prescription of supporting the SMEs was especially important in the context of Turkey’s historical path of development strategies. As Bugra has pointed out, historically the SMEs have been considered inefficient by the state elite in Turkey for the modernisation project; hence the favoured trajectory for development had come to be through big business and holding companies.\textsuperscript{556}

A different but very closely related aspect of the EU’s role prescription for Turkey was the rules on democratisation. EU candidacy rules on democratisation and the improvement of political and social rights and freedoms were important elements

\textsuperscript{552} European Commission, \textit{2003 progress report on Turkey}, p.47.
\textsuperscript{553} European Commission, \textit{2000 Progress Report on Turkey}, pp.54-5.
\textsuperscript{554} European Commission, \textit{2001 Progress Report on Turkey}, p.73.
in the 2001 Accession Partnership Document and the subsequent progress reports on Turkey prepared by the Commission. The 1998 Progress Report on Turkey has also pointed out issues surrounding Turkey’s treatment of rights to peaceful assembly and association. The 1998 report stated that associations were restricted in the sense that they could not “invite foreign associations to Turkey, issue public statements or organise any activities outside their premises without obtaining the prior permission of the authorities.” The 2000 report reiterated these criticisms as follows:

Freedom of association and assembly (public meetings and demonstrations) is still not fully respected. NGOs' activities such as conferences or distribution of leaflets require official permission. NGOs are prohibited from establishing umbrella institutions and from arranging institutional collaboration with other NGOs on an international scale (unless permitted by decree of the Council of Ministers).

The 2001 Accession Partnership Document also pointed out the need to consolidate constitutional and legal safeguards on the right of association and peaceful assembly as a political requirement for Turkey's accession.

A very crucial part of democratisation rules was civilianisation. The Turkish military has traditionally occupied a central role in Turkish politics, especially more so in foreign policymaking during the 1990s. The Turkish Armed Forces have considered themselves as an institution above politics in Turkey and perceived themselves to be the guardian of the regime against internal and external threats as chapter four has explained. On the other hand the Commission's Progress Reports on Turkey have always underlined the need for Turkey to ensure civilian control over the military as a candidate country. These rules had important impact on Turkish

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foreign policy-making as domestic actors revised their strategies and discourses in response to them.

5.2 Role performance

The post-crisis era displayed significant improvement in the economic indicators that the EU has underlined. Growth increased and it evolved in a relatively sustainable path, inflation rates were reduced to single-digit numbers, privatisation and foreign direct investment increased remarkably, the budget deficit was reduced and the banking system was regulated through the creation of an independent agency. These indicators were not achieved because it was prescribed by the EU for Turkey; rather the EU’s role prescription that overlapped with the IMF programme was used by the domestic policymakers to ease the implementation of the IMF programme as will be explained below.

In response to the EU’s role prescription of SME support, in 2002 Turkey signed the European Charter for Small Enterprises and steps were taken to improve the business environment and access to technology for the SMEs. Yet, it was still necessary to flesh out the commitment as a strategy. The Turkish government drafted an SME strategy and action plan by January 2004. This action plan has constituted the backbone of Turkey’s SME development strategy, which was developed in accordance with the EU’s candidate role prescriptions and with an aim to use the appropriate resources EU candidacy offers Turkish SMEs. With the EU candidacy role, the Turkish SMEs were given the opportunity to benefit from the EU’s multiannual programmes and framework programmes. The institution responsible for coordinating the Turkish SMEs’ participation in the multiannual programmes was designated as the SME

563 Onis’s compilation from State Planning Organisation data, ‘Beyond the 2001,’ p.422.
Development Organisation, and the one that is responsible for coordinating their participation in the EU’s framework programmes was designated as the Turkish Science and Technology Research Council.\footnote{Bahar Varlı, ‘Avrupa Birliği'nde ve Türkiye'de Küçük ve Orta Olçekli İşletmeler,’ (Unpublished MA thesis, Ankara University, 2010).} Yet, participation in these programmes was only possible by a financial contribution by Turkey to the budget, which was deducted from the pre-accession funds given to Turkey. This financial contribution made it a political choice: resources were to be allocated and it required prioritisation of the SME development to make this decision. An example of the SME development projects that used EU funds was the launch of ‘EU Business Development Centres’ across Turkey by the TOBB. The funding provided by the EU for this project was approximately \(€50\) million and the aim of the centres is to improve competitiveness of Turkish SMEs through consultancy services and sector-specific development projects.\footnote{ABIGEM newsletter, 1 (September 2009)}

In response to the role prescription of civilianisation, the constitutional amendments of 2001 gave the civilian members of the NSC numerical superiority by including deputy Prime Ministers and the Minister of Justice. National Security Council decisions were reduced an advisory character, thereby de-emphasising the priority of its decisions. The seventh reform package (August 2003) made it possible for the Court of Accounts to exercise financial supervision of state properties in the hands of the Turkish Armed Forces. The 2004 Constitutional amendments eliminated the representative of the chief of the general staff from several boards of educational and cultural state institutions. All these reforms were passed with the consent of the Turkish Armed Forces, and raised an interesting question as to how come the most powerful actor in Turkish politics during the 1990s agreed with the curbing of its powers.
5.3 The Institutionalisation of EU Candidate Role and the Actors of Turkey's Foreign Policy towards the Middle East

The post-Helsinki period in Turkey's foreign policy-making towards the Middle East has witnessed cooperation among key actors enabling the 'new' foreign policy toward the Middle East. The actors of foreign policy toward the Middle East are the government, the Turkish Armed Forces, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Parliament and non-state actors such as the business associations.

The first steps of the new foreign policy towards the Middle East were taken during the coalition government of the social democrat DLP, the centre-right MP and the nationalist NAP. The timing of Turkey's start for improving its relationship with its Middle Eastern neighbours is mostly linked to the expulsion of the PKK leader Ocalan from Syria in late 1998 and his capture in 1999, rather than the Helsinki decision of the EU to declare Turkey a candidate to the EU. The leader of the DLP, Bulent Ecevit and his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ismail Cem always had an agenda of improving Turkey's relations with its neighbourhood; however it was difficult to realise this agenda before the capture of Ocalan as the PKK problem was poisoning Turkey's relations with Iraq and Syria altogether.

Therefore, the capture and trial of the PKK leader by Turkey in 1999 presented a window of opportunity to start improving relations with Turkey's Middle Eastern neighbours, especially with Syria. The coalition government responded to the perceived political opportunity presented by the capture of Ocalan, by improving its

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567 The 'new' foreign policy refers to Turkey's soft-power based approach to the Middle East. See chapter four.
568 Interview with a former parliamentarian of DLP, former member of the Turkey-EU joint parliamentary committee, Ankara, Turkey, 7 May 2010. Also interview with the former Secretary General of the Turkish Secretariat General for EU Affairs, Istanbul, Turkey, 25 June 2010.
569 Interview with a former parliamentarian of DLP, former member of the Turkey-EU joint parliamentary committee, Ankara, Turkey, 7 May 2010.
relations with its Middle Eastern neighbours. By 2000 the Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade had already adopted the ‘strategy to develop trade with the peripheral and neighbouring regions’ in line with the government’s foreign policy vision towards the Middle East.\(^{570}\) It is imperative to note that this drive to intensify political and economic relations with the Arab Middle East started after the Turkish government’s codification of using common history, religion and geography as a foreign policy asset in improving relations with the region. The foreign minister of the coalition government from 1997 to 2002, Ismail Cem, has several times argued that Turkey should play a regional role in the Middle East due to Turkey’s common historical and cultural ties with the Middle East in his foreign policy statements. An illustration of this is as follows:

> One of our targets is to become a central, determining country in the growing and developing Eurasia region; our second target is to become an EU member.... We follow several methods to achieve these. First, which is what I have been working on, is that we are establishing a definition of Turkey’s historical geography. Turkey’s historical geography is a determinant of Turkey and our foreign policy. What is Turkey's historical geography? It is the historical geographical space, which is occupied by the societies that we have shared a history, faith, parallel culture, language. This is a very important asset for Turkey... Turkey’s historical geography is the Balkans, Caucasus, Central Asia, Middle East, North Africa, and even Sudan and Yemen in Africa.\(^{571}\)

In another session of the Turkish Parliament, Cem bluntly stated that Turkey had a mission in the 21\(^{st}\) century. He argued that Turkey had a responsibility both to itself, humanity and its own historical geography, which covers the former territories of the Ottoman Empire.\(^{572}\) Yet, Ismail Cem’s ‘regionalism’ was still embedded within the broader westernisation paradigm in Turkish foreign policy. As


\(^{571}\) Ismail Cem, Speech at the Turkish General National Assembly, TBMM archives, volume 31, session 82, 18 April 2000, p.199. Also Ismail Cem, Speech at the Turkish Grand National Assembly, TBMM archives, volume 47, session 24, 5 December 2000, p.92.

\(^{572}\) Ismail Cem, Speech at the Turkish Grand National Assembly, TBMM archives, volume 50, session 35, 18 December 2000, p.443.
explained in chapter four, westernisation as a foreign policy paradigm has been deeply embedded in Turkish foreign policymaking since the proclamation of the Republic. The idea of westernisation as the source of progress and development dates even further back to the 19th century Ottoman Empire.

Turkey's foreign policy in the 2000s can be understood as the outcome of the transition within different articulations of the same paradigm rather than paradigmatic change. The westernisation paradigm as explained in chapter four remained intact, however in different articulations. When Kemalism as the coordinative discourse of the Turkish Armed Forces was articulated with westernisation as a foreign policy paradigm, it caused Turkish foreign policymakers to perceive close diplomatic and economic relations with the west, especially the US, as 'normal'; and close relations with the Muslim Middle East as 'abnormal'. Although there were periods in Turkish history when closer economic ties with the Middle East had been sought, it was only possible when the Kemalist military did not perceive such foreign policy as outside the westernisation paradigm. When the military perceived foreign policy towards the Middle East as being representative of a rival paradigm, it has intervened as was the case in 1997. Therefore, the Kemalist articulation of westernisation had been normalised by the Turkish Armed Forces and the Kemalist elite in Turkish foreign policy, especially through military rule or informal domination of politics. Ismail Cem's foreign policy vision that was centred on establishing balanced relations with both the west and the Middle East was therefore a transition period from Kemalist westernisation to post-Islamist articulation of westernisation. Cem's foreign policy vision was still anchored to a social democratic perspective and he declared that he rejected politics based on religion or race.573

Therefore Cem’s policy was still part of the Kemalist articulation of westernisation, which was based on Kemalist rationality rather than religion.

Enter the JDP with its founding members coming from an Islamist past. The parties they had been members of represented political Islam and they were banned from politics one by one by the Kemalist judiciary and the military. When the JDP was formed out of the ashes of political Islam, it was its priority to convey the message that it had changed. Islamism refers to those social movements that aim for the reordering of politics and society according to Islamic law, post-Islamist in this sense refers to the acknowledgment by the JDP of their Islamist past but at the same time their current rejection of Islamism. When the JDP was founded, the emphasis was on the new party not having anything to do with Islam and the party ideology being one of “conservative democracy.” The central piece in their coordinative discourse as a party, therefore, was their close commitment to the EU candidacy process of Turkey and at the same time stronger political and economic relations with the Muslim Middle East.

The difference between Kemalist westernisation and post-Islamist westernisation of the JDP is that Islam and the Ottoman past are central to the JDP’s foreign policy vision. Yet, the Islam they advocate is seen to be compatible with the westernisation paradigm of Turkish foreign policy (see chapter six). In other words the JDP has articulated westernisation with their post-Islamist coordinative discourse, thereby achieving the “westernisation of Turkish political Islam.” The foreign policy

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574 Among the members of the central executive committee, Abdulkadir Aksu, Ekrem Erdem, Salih Kapusuz and prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan had all been members of WP, which was an Islamist party that was outlawed in 1998.
that was devised within this post-Islamist westernisation paradigm emphasizes the historical and geographical affinities between Turkey and its neighbouring regions due to the Ottoman rule and Islam that covered these regions including the majority of the Middle East.579

The ‘strategic depth’ policy is the crystallisation of the JDP’s post-Islamist articulation of the westernisation paradigm, therefore is a significant and recurring theme in this thesis. Ahmet Davutoglu, who has been the architect of Turkish foreign policy since the first government of the JDP is also the architect of this policy. He delineated the basic assumptions of it in his various scholarly publications. The main departure point of the strategic depth theory is that Turkey should act as a central state within its surrounding regions rather than as a pivotal state. A frequently voiced principle of Turkish foreign policy within the strategic-depth doctrine is that “Turkey can be European in Europe and eastern in the East, because we are both.”580 What sets the post-Islamist articulation of westernisation different from the Kemalist articulation is the emphasis on Islamic faith instead of the Kemalist rationality. The architect of the foreign policy framework of the JDP combines the region stretching from northern Caucasus to the Gulf countries and the southern part of Central Asia together as “the Islamic civilisation.”581 Therefore, the delicate balance between the pro-EU but Islam-oriented coordinative discourse of the JDP is what has given meaning to the post-Islamist westernisation paradigm. The strategic depth policy seeks to achieve closer economic and political relations with the Muslim Middle Eastern countries. Another central pillar of this policy is the commitment of the government to Turkey’s EU candidate role, which is presented as the balancing element that anchors this policy to the west. Taspinar has outlined the main tenets of

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this foreign policy paradigm as complementing ties with the east and those with the west; coming to terms with the Ottoman and Islamic heritage; and a sense of self-confidence in regional politics and self-perception as a regional power.\textsuperscript{582}

It is argued below that the institutionalisation of Turkey's EU candidate role played an important part in causing the shift from Kemalist westernisation to post-Islamist westernisation through the relevant foreign policy actors' strategic usages of the EU's role prescription for Turkey.

5.3.1 The Government and the Turkish Armed Forces

As Turkey's experience of civil-military relations demonstrates, the government has never been the top executive institution in Turkish foreign policy in practice. The Turkish Armed Forces has always held a superior position and drawn the boundaries of legitimate politics in line with their Kemalist coordinative discourse. The Turkish Armed Forces has traditionally occupied a central role in Turkish politics and contributed heavily to the embedding of Kemalism within the Turkish political structure. The Turkish Armed Forces has considered itself as an institution above politics in Turkey, and perceived itself to be the guardian of the regime against internal and external threats.\textsuperscript{583} To this end, it has intervened several times in politics and toppled the government several times either through a direct \textit{coup d'état} or indirectly through using its power indirectly (1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997). These interventions were justified by the pretext of either Islamisation of Turkish politics (1960, 1997) or extreme civil disorder due to clashes between Marxist groups and the nationalists (1971, 1980). In every single episode the ultimate goal was to establish domestic stability in line with the Turkish Armed Forces' vision of Kemalism and the

\textsuperscript{582} Taspinar, 'Turkey's,' pp.14-5.
principles of Kemalism that were going to be prioritised after each intervention depended on the strategic context analysis of the Turkish Armed Forces at the time.

Accompanying this, the Turkish Armed Forces had also held significant constitutional powers especially since the 1982 constitution, which were drafted under the auspices of the Turkish Armed Forces following the 1980 coup. The 1982 constitution increased the role of the Turkish Armed Forces in politics by upgrading the military-dominated NSC from an advisory body to a body whose views will be given “priority consideration” by the Council of Ministers.584 Also, the 1982 constitution gave the military access to monitor certain civilian agencies such as the Higher Education Council and the Radio and Television Supervisory Council.585

The Kemalist articulation of westernisation paradigm that the Turkish Armed Forces has advocated and in fact embedded in Turkish foreign policy has been based on certain assumptions. The Kemalist westernisation paradigm perceives the Ottoman past as backward and non-progressive as opposed to the west, which is the source of progress and civilisation. Islamic faith can never be at the heart of foreign policy according to the Kemalist westernisation paradigm. When Islam was to be allowed in politics; it had to be the kind of Islam that was enlightened and more importantly approved by the Kemalist Turkish Armed Forces.586

In the shifting context of the post-Cold War period, changing discourses on legitimate violence, increased informal networks among actors and the growing influence of technology and media have placed the Turkish Armed Forces in a new context.587 Economic liberalisation, the aggravation of ethnic nationalism, the rise of political Islam has led to increased threat perception by the Turkish Armed Forces.

585 Jenkins, ‘Continuity and Change,’ p.344.
587 Bilgin, ‘Turkey’s Changing’ p.188.
Due to such threat perception, the Turkish Armed Forces increased its domination over Turkish politics. As an extension of its sole authority to define security through the NSC, the Turkish Armed Forces has established itself as an influential actor in the foreign policy process, especially regarding Cyprus and the Middle East. In Bilgin’s words, “during the 1990s, Turkey... experienced a securitisation of its foreign policy whereby certain issues were pulled out of the realm of open debate and discussion by way of declaring them as national security issues.”

As an initial response, the Turkish Armed Forces identified Kurdish nationalism and political Islam as domestic threats to the nature of the republican regime and further “expanded its domain of jurisdiction by redefining the idea of national security.”

This new approach was devised not only through a strategic analysis of the changing context; it was also path-dependent and habitual. Later, this approach turned out to be a not so efficient response to the context. As some of the military commanders later admitted, such hardliner policies created more problems than they solved.

For example, the former Commander of the Land Forces, a renowned Kemalist, recognised such strategic learning as follows in 2007:

The Kurdish problem was to be resolved in its social stage when it amounted to demands for cultural recognition. In that stage, we were taught that there were no Kurds, only a branch of Turks. We could not analyze the demands well back then. Therefore, we could not see the social dimensions of the phenomenon.

As the Turkish Armed Forces’ reading of the strategic context proved to be fallacious by the end of the 1990s, it had to rekindle its efforts to better comprehend the post-Cold War strategic context. Particularly after Turkey was

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declared EU candidate in 1999, the institutionalisation of the EU accession paradigm began to insert additional substance into the strategic environment.

With the 1999 Helsinki decision, Turkish Armed Forces’ position in Turkish politics reached a critical juncture. Endorsing EU candidacy meant the need to secure the Turkish Armed Forces’ consent for the curtailment of its political authority. Not accepting the EU candidate role and the civilianisation rules associated with it would have put the Turkish Armed Forces in a difficult position in the face of its century-old objective of carrying Turkey to western standards of civilisation. The most tightly defined role prescription for Turkey as an EU candidate was the civilianisation of Turkish politics. Without institutionalising this role in Turkish politics, Turkey could not possibly join the EU. On top of the strictly defined nature of this position role, there was high level of public and business support in Turkey for the institutionalisation of this role prescription as it is, without any changes to it. As the then Turkish secretary-general of EU affairs has revealed, when the laws aimed for the civilianisation of Turkey were passed in Turkey, the public support was already ripe for it so that there was not significant public reaction to the laws. Business interests had all been in favour of civilianisation as they were demanding a more favourable business context without the intervention of the Turkish Armed Forces to political and economic life.

As a consequence, the Turkish Armed Forces agreed on endorsing the civilianisation prescription of the EU for Turkey as an institutional objective after going through intra-institutional deliberation. Yetkin, a prominent journalist on civil-military relations in Turkey, has written citing his source in the Turkish General Staff: “the Turkish Armed Forces made an assessment in the process of drafting the first

592 Interview with an EU official, Brussels, Belgium, 9 November 2010.
593 Murat Yetkin, Avrupa Birliği Bekleme Odasında Türkiye (Ankara: İmge, 2000).
National Programme and passed its opinion on the programme to the government as every other state institution. The national programme was drafted in the light of these opinions.\footnote{Yetkin, \textit{Avrupa Birliği}, p.266.} The Turkish Armed Forces remained committed to the civilianisation role prescription throughout the early 2000s. In 2004 the then vice-chief of Turkish General Staff Ilker Basbug made clear the Turkish Armed Forces' position on EU candidacy by arguing that “[Turkey's] relationship with the EU has entered an important episode…. The Armed Forces is showing due diligence to make our country succeed in this process. The same is expected from every institution and organisation.”\footnote{Ilker Basbug, Speech delivered at the symposium entitled ‘An analysis of Crisis Regions and their Impacts on Turkey from a Perspective of Turkey, NATO and the EU,’ (2004).} This reveals the Helsinki decision as an important juncture for the Turkish Armed Forces. In the pre-Helsinki period there was no institutionalisation of the EU accession paradigm, therefore there was no immediate pressure on the Turkish Armed Forces to crystallise its position on the EU reforms and the EU’s role prescriptions for Turkey. In the post-Helsinki period, the Turkish Armed Forces went through an institutional deliberation process and came to adopt the EU’s candidate role prescription and the rules associated with it.\footnote{Interview with Murat Yetkin, journalist, Ankara, Turkey, 23 July 2010.} The process of increased cooperative involvement of the military in developing Turkey's pre-accession strategy is also observed by a senior diplomat as follows:

We sought input from the military representatives. We shared ideas. This way, the military was included in the process, which brought harmonisation of our approaches. The military also felt the ownership of the [EU] process. We noticed that the opinion of the military developed over time.\footnote{Interview with a Turkish diplomat, Ankara, Turkey, 5 August 2008.}

The Turkish General Staff perceived EU candidacy as a step closer to the EU membership of Turkey, a credible anchor for Turkish politics, which would eventually bring socio-economic development as an antidote to Islamic fundamentalism and Kurdish nationalism and a path for westernisation. For example,
former chief of the Turkish General Staff, General Huseyin Kivrikoglu (1998-2002) pointed out that economic development cannot be achieved by staying outside Europe.\textsuperscript{599} In a similar vein, Hilmi Ozkok, the following chief of Turkish General Staff (2002-2006) said:

[t]here might be a situation in which the Kurds in the region... might say that there is no need for a Kurdish state. Suppose Turkey is already in the EU, with its per capita income is over $15 000. Under these circumstances, they might say that there is no need for separation... If Turkey becomes a member; the Kurds might say that they want to belong to such a Turkey.\textsuperscript{600}

The former Chief of General Staff Hilmi Ozkok was a key skilled actor, who contributed to the rearticulation of Kemalism by prioritising the principles such as reformism and catching up with the level of contemporary civilisations, which are compatible with the EU's role prescription over the previously rigid interpretation of Kemalism that was adopted in the 1990s. Ozkok's views on the issues pertaining to Kemalism in relation to the institutionalisation of Turkey's EU candidate role were quite important in many respects. First of all, he was literally the top military officer during the thorniest period of Turkey's EU process from August 2002 to August 2006 when significant EU reforms were passed. Secondly, his ideas contributed to institutional change of the Turkish Armed Forces. Indeed, one interviewee reported that at the time there was a wide spread belief among the policymakers that Ozkok's views were a blessing for the EU reform process during the period.\textsuperscript{601}

Hilmi Ozkok repeatedly stressed that Turkey and the EU shared common values. He argued that Turkey has always sought to work together with the west and approach issues in line with western norms. Of course, there would be certain conditions for Turkey's entry, which any integration project entails.\textsuperscript{602} Consistent with

\textsuperscript{599} Yetkin, \textit{Avrupa Birliği}, p.280.
\textsuperscript{600} Bila, \textit{Komutanlar}, pp.221-2.
\textsuperscript{601} Interview with a former parliamentarian of DLP, former member of the Turkey-EU joint parliamentary committee, Ankara, Turkey, 7 May 2010
\textsuperscript{602} \textit{Yeni Safak} (Turkish Daily), 19 October 2003.
this understanding General Ozkok evaluated tough items on the EU reform agenda in a different light. Regarding the role of the Turkish Armed Forces in politics, Hilmi Ozkok openly criticized the military coups in Turkey, argued that the military should stay out of politics, and promised that from then on the military would abide by civilian decisions. Ozkok argued further against the intrusion of Turkish Armed Forces in politics with a reference to his understanding of real Kemalism when he said:

Some fake Kemalists wanted a Chief of General Staff that quarrels with the government in public view, which goes totally against Kemalism. Would Atatürk, who took off his uniform as he became the political leader of the struggle of the national liberation, have liked such a Turkey in the 21st century? Did his principles not suggest rationality instead of emotions and physical power? ... Real Kemalism requires thinking of his principles and transformations, and to say and do what he would have said and done if he was alive.

An important declaration by Ozkok that demonstrates how he incorporates domestic and international drivers for change in Kemalism as the Turkish Armed Forces’ coordinative discourse, reads as follows:

The Turkish Armed Forces is saddled with new and difficult tasks as a consequence of the reactionary and separatist movements that continue to become even more critical as time goes by. On the other hand, new democratic values and changing concepts of sovereignty make it necessary that we come up with new ideas and doctrines for the better fulfilment by the Turkish Armed Forces of the arduous tasks in question...The Kemalist way of thought, which is free from dogmas and based on reason and science, can and should be reinterpreted. Only then will Kemalism continue to be a guiding light for the future generations as well.

This statement of Ozkok highlights his ideas on the need to reinterpret Kemalism with an eye to the European and domestic challenges that the Turkish Armed Forces faces. The Turkish Armed Forces went along with the EU’s demands

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604 Bila, Komutanlar, p.258. Authors’ translation. Senem Aydin and Fuat Keyman argue that the mere fact that the military remained silent with regards to the parliament’s decision over deployment of American troops on Turkish soil during the Iraqi war “underlines the process of change in the modalities of governance in the country.” Senem Aydin and Fuat Keyman, ‘European Integration and the Transformation of Turkish Democracy,’ Centre for European Policy Studies EU-Turkey Working Papers, 2 (2004), p.22.
605 Milliyet (Turkish Daily), 31 August 2003.
due to their belief that Turkey’s EU membership is both the ultimate point of Turkey’s long drawn-out journey of westernisation and that it is also the most effective way of dealing with domestic pressures emanating from Kurdish separatism and Islamism.606

The previous chief of Turkish General Staff (2006-2008), General Yasar Buyukanit, then commander of Turkish army, followed Ozkok’s path and argued that Turkey’s EU membership is a natural outcome of Ataturk’s goal of civilisationalism and that the Turkish General Staff gives full support to EU candidacy. He also argued that Kemalism should not be seen as a dogma. According to him, Kemalism is not meant to be a narrow ideological framework; but a humanist, modernist and innovative worldview.607 Ilker Basbug, then vice-chief of the Turkish General Staff, made a similar statement in 2004, coupling Turkey’s EU candidacy with the Kemalist goal of reaching contemporary civilisation.608

The Turkish General Staff’s response to Turkey’s EU candidacy reveals that rather than being a veto player with fixed interests or behaving appropriately with the changing norms of legitimacy,609 the Turkish Armed Forces is also a strategic and reflexive actor. It did not respond to the EU’s role prescription for Turkey rationally or appropriately, but it reflected upon its institutional objectives defined by Kemalism and adopted EU candidacy role prescription of the EU through a rearticulation of Kemalism, which enabled the Turkish Armed Forces to adapt itself to the EU’s role prescription for Turkey. Skilled agency on the part of Ozkok and his followers at the helm of the Turkish Armed Forces, was imperative in this rearticulation. Consequently, the coordinative discourse of the Turkish General Staff

607 Radikal (Turkish Daily), 28 September 2004.
608 Ilker Basbug, Speech delivered at the symposium entitled ‘An Analysis of Crisis Regions and their Impacts on Turkey from a Perspective of Turkey, NATO and the EU’ (2004).
609 Zeki Sarigil argues that the Turkish Armed Forces yielded to public opinion. Zeki Sarigil, ‘Bargaining in institutionalized settings: The case of Turkish reforms,’ European Journal of International Relations, 16/3 (2010), pp.463-83. Gareth Jenkins argues the Turkish Armed Forces refrained from influencing politics because it did not want to lose its prestige in the public opinion. Jenkins, ‘Continuity and Change.’
was rearticulated and made complementary with the EU’s role prescriptions for Turkey. Kemalism as a coordinative discourse was rearticulated so that it pointed at innovation, catching contemporary civilisation and reformism as enabling the Turkish General Staff’s adoption of the EU’s role prescription for Turkey.

This process of course led to the resurfacing of old dividing lines within the military ranks through a discursive crystallisation of pro-EU and anti-EU officers. This led to several statements and declarations by senior officers, which were later countered by those representing the official position of the Turkish General Staff. For example Tuncer Kilinc, a high ranking General also the former Secretary-General of the NSC, argued that the EU would never let Turkey in, so Turkey should seek alliances with Russia and Iran. This statement and what followed clearly reveals this divide. After Kilinc declared his anti-EU stance, Ibrahim Firtina, another high-ranking general who is known for usually keeping a low-profile, said in a speech that a colleague showed his activism but forgot his role. Firtina’s speech was taken as a direct criticism of Kilinc and the whole picture is one of contending views on Turkey’s EU candidacy within the military circles, as well as the civilian circles, being debated openly.

All in all, the Turkish General Staff agreed with the EU’s role prescription thanks to the skilled actors who redefined the priorities of Kemalism, the Turkish Armed Forces’ coordinative discourse, in tune with the EU’s candidate role prescription rather than yielding to the demands of a pro-EU public opinion or EU conditionality without any mediation of ideas such as Kemalist westernisation paradigm. Put simply, the Turkish Armed Forces did not retreat from a position of political domination completely, rather their withdrawal was in tune with their

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610 The EU dividing line was only articulated with the existing dividing lines such as pro-intervention and anti-intervention; pro-nationalistic and liberal. See Ioannis Grigoriadis and I. Ozer, ‘Mutations of Turkish Nationalism: From Neo-Nationalism to the Ergenekon Affair,’ *Middle East Policy*, 17/4 (2010), pp.101-13.
611 See Yetkin, *Avrupa Birliği*, p.263.
612 Aydin and Acikmese, ‘Europeanization,’ p.269.
reinterpreted coordinative discourse. This explains certain issue areas that remained relatively untouched by the civilianisation dynamics. With regard to fighting PKK terrorism, which threatens to change the unitary form of Turkish state, they remained dominant, as protecting territorial integrity of Turkey is a goal of the Turkish Armed Forces that goes beyond any reinterpretation of Kemalism. While the Turkish General Staff initially decided to no longer classify neighbours such as Iraq and Syria as security threats,613 which was "to the surprise of many" as the Kurdish leaders of northern Iraq had supported the PKK in the past.614 However, at the same time when PKK terrorism intensified after 2004 the military resumed resorting to military means. As an interviewee has acknowledged, the Armed Forces was still an important actor especially regarding northern Iraq.615 The Turkish Armed Forces orchestrated military operations in Northern Iraq to eliminate the PKK presence there in October 2007. These military operations, however, were undertaken after close coordination with the civilian government, so that the EU framed these operations as Turkish government’s response to growing security concerns that emanate from Northern Iraq.616

It could be argued that although the military dropped its ‘red lines’ regarding other aspects of foreign policy toward the Middle East, it retained its vigilance regarding the PKK terrorism. Yet, even regarding issues pertaining to the PKK terrorism, the Turkish Armed Forces remained committed to its revised coordinative discourse by communicating with the civilian government and seeking legitimacy of its operations in the eyes of the EU. The implementation of the strategic depth policy by the post-Islamist government towards the Middle East was made possible by the military’s endorsement of the EU’s role prescription in the form of

615 Interview with a former civil servant from EUSG and policy analyst, Ankara, Turkey, 9 July 2010.
civilianisation of politics. This led to cooperation between the military and the government in terms of foreign policy towards the Middle East, despite exceptions of PKK-related red lines of the military.617

The most striking element of this cooperation is the harmony achieved between the Kemalist coordinative discourse of the Armed Forces and the post-Islamist discourse of the JDP governments.618 In Robins' words, "[p]ost-Islamists [JDP] and Kemalists had come to face in the same direction as far as foreign policy priorities and the EU were concerned."619 This cooperation between the JDP and the Turkish Armed Forces was largely an outcome of Turkey's EU candidate role that enabled the Turkish Armed Forces to harmonise its discourse on Kemalism with the EU's role prescriptions for Turkey. At the same time, endorsing Turkey's EU candidacy role gave the JDP's post-Islamist coordinative discourse meaning and legitimacy.

The JDP leadership had learned that the party needed to divorce the policies traditionally pursued by Islamist parties in the past and seek legitimacy in the eyes of the secularist establishment, of which the Turkish Armed Forces was the decisive component.620 Therefore, unlike its predecessors, the JDP has adopted Turkey's EU candidate role, which in turn gave it legitimacy and meaning as a post-Islamist party.621 The strong identification with the EU candidate role of Turkey was used to legitimise the party discourse that emphasised transformation from an Islamist political tendency to post-Islamist conservative tendency. This reflects

617 Muftuler-Bac and Gursoy, ‘Is There a Europeanization of Turkish Foreign Policy? An Addendum to the Literature on EU Candidates,’ Turkish Studies, 11/3 (2010), pp.405-27.
618 For an excellent analysis of harmonious cooperation of the government and the Kemalist elite see Robins, ‘Turkish foreign policy,’ pp.289-304.
619 Robins, ‘Turkish Foreign Policy,’ p.292.
620 Secularist establishment here refers to the traditional position of the military and judiciary elite, who had been largely responsible for the closure of previous Islamist parties. However, the changes taking place within these institutions are also taken into account, which will be dealt with later in the analysis of the military’s position.
strategic learning on the part of JDP leadership. The new party drew lessons from the past interactions of Islamist parties with the Turkish Kemalist establishment, which has always had a tendency towards suppression of political Islam. Based on previous experience the JDP leadership revised their strategies to achieve their goals and as part of this revised strategy the JDP embraced the EU candidate role of Turkey and acted as a pro-EU actor since its inception. The JDP leadership adopted the EU's role prescription of civilianisation also to curb powers of the Turkish Armed Forces. An important figure from the leadership of the JDP, Bulent Arinc, explained this learning process in an interview as follows:

Up until 28 February [1997, explained in chapter four] I was an enemy of the EU. I used to consider it treason to talk about Turkey's EU membership. But it [28 February process] turned out to be an eye-opening process, almost like a litmus paper for us. I entered the Parliament in 1995. I personally experienced certain events. While some others were sleeping peacefully in their beds, I could not. We evaluated the developments in a close circle and came to a decision. My experiences during the 28 February process convinced me to advance towards the EU membership target. I believed in the necessity of moving towards that target.

Therefore, the JDP's adoption of the EU candidate role legitimised the JDP vis-à-vis the Turkish Armed Forces, while leading to strategic adaptation on the part of the Armed Forces. This process gave the JDP enough space for manoeuvre regarding the implementation of its post-Islamist strategic depth policy towards the Middle East without interference by the Turkish Armed Forces.

622 The National Order Party was dissolved by the Constitutional Court in 1971 for violating the principles of laicism; WP was abolished in January 1998 by the Constitutional Court on the same grounds. Before its abolition by the Constitutional Court, the military dominated National Security Council gave the WP-led coalition government a list of measures they deemed necessary to fight the rise of political Islam in Turkey. The government could not enact these measures, and the tension led to the resignation of the government. The process is dubbed 'the 28 February process,' which was a military intervention to politics through the pressure exerted on the Islamist WP. Nilufer Narli shows how Virtue Party that was founded in 1997 also as a spinoff of the WP underwent strategic learning and adopted a new strategy of embracing the EU membership process, downplaying the Islamic dress code discourse on the headscarf issue and reframing it as a human rights issue, and finally recruiting well-educated female members to the party, which are all in contradiction to what the WP stood for. Nilufer Narli, 'The Rise of the Islamist Movement in Turkey,' Middle East Review of International Affairs, 3/3 (September 1999), pp.43-4.
5.3.2 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The emergence of the JDP as a single party government with a strong emphasis on Turkey's relationship with both the EU and the Middle East has had repercussions on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs too. The Ministry has been part of the Kemalist civil bureaucracy throughout the Republican history. During the 1990s, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs suffered from the political instability caused by successive coalition governments and political wrangling over bureaucratic appointments. This in turn led to frustration in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As one commentator put it aptly, diplomats were "packed up with nowhere to go" in the period due to such political wrangling and instability. When Turkey was declared an EU candidate in 1999, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has found itself in a strategic opportunity to use its crucial role as the institution with the most intensive knowledge of the EU. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the only institution that had access to EU-related information during the early candidacy period.

The EU candidate role of Turkey and the accompanying demand for expertise empowered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to a certain extent, yet the JDP government's control over the Ministry and especially Prime Minister Erdogan's attacks on its members have been notable. The JDP government's election and their policies that followed caused rifts within the institution between the Kemalist diplomats and those that favour more diversity in Turkey's foreign relations. Therefore the Kemalist faction was mostly in a struggle with the JDP leadership. This struggle was evident in Prime Minister Erdogan's scolding of Turkey's ambassador to Germany in 2006 for not allowing a Turkish woman to use a veiled photo in her

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624 Robins, Suits, p.72.
625 Robins, Suits, pp.74-5.
626 Turkish Probe, 128 (19 May 1995). Quoted in Robins, Suits, p.75.
627 The EU directorate general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs consists of the Department of Accession Negotiations and the Department of Political Affairs.
Also the tension culminated in 2009 when Erdogan dismissively called the retired Turkish diplomats who had criticised him, snobbish. Under the JDP rule and Erdogan's premiership, therefore the Kemalist diplomats were disempowered.

Ahmet Davutoglu's appointment as the Minister of Foreign Affairs further consolidated the strategic depth policy within the foreign affairs bureaucracy. Ahmet Davutoglu, who has held important foreign policy positions since the JDP formed its first government in 2002, first as the Prime Minister's chief advisor on foreign policy (2002-2009) and then as the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2009 was an influential foreign policy actor leading the Ministry. After he assumed office in 2009, Davutoglu first had to deal with the problem of awaiting high level appointments. The choice of Feridun Sinirlioglu, who is an expert on the Middle East as the undersecretary and the complementary appointment of five out of six deputy undersecretaries whose previous posts were in the Middle East reveals the importance of the Middle East in Davutoglu's and the government's strategic vision. Also the high-level appointments he made pointed to a younger generation of diplomats assuming top posts in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Even if his official position came quite late in the JDP governments, Davutoglu "has long been considered the power behind the throne, having advised prime ministers and foreign ministers for the past eight years [since 2002]." Therefore, even if Davutoglu had the formal authority to effect these changes only in 2009, it can be argued that his input was quite influential on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the previous ministers of foreign affairs since 2002.

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629 Erdogan said "I came from politics; I don’t know about the ways mon chers behave. And I don’t want to know." Aras, 'Turkey’s.'
630 Radikal, 24 July 2009. Also interview with a former Turkish diplomat, Ankara, Turkey, 15 May 2010.
632 Al Jazeera, 'Turkey’s New Visionary,' 18 July 2010. Also Foreign Policy magazine dubbed him as "the brains behind Turkey's global reawakening". 'The FP Top 100 Global Thinkers,' Foreign Policy (December 2010).

Davutoglu’s strategic depth policy had been adopted by all the previous Ministers of Foreign Affairs. More importantly, the policy has been adopted by the JDP leader and the Prime Minister Erdogan. No policy can be advocated and formulated by the party members in the cabinet without the approval of the party leader due to the much centralised political party structure in Turkey. Moreover, the Turkish constitution assigns the duty of overseeing the coherence of the governmental decisions to the Prime Minister, which in effect gives the Prime Minister significant control over the policy direction of the government. All in all, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs bureaucracy remained at the back seat of Turkey's foreign policy towards the Middle East, under the shadow of, first the Minister of Foreign Affairs and secondly that of the Prime Minister.

5.3.3 The Parliament

Traditionally, the Parliament has been categorised as a second-order actor in Turkish foreign policymaking. Its constitutional responsibility is to give its opinion on signing international treaties and to authorise the presence of foreign military personnel on Turkish soil as well as sending Turkish troops abroad. Moreover, Turkish political parties are heavily centralised and dominated by the party leaders. Party leaders nominate candidates for parliamentary elections, which has consolidated the culture of impressing the party leader for re-election. Such a culture has bred a lack of attention to issues of common interest such as developing

634 The 1982 Constitution of Turkish Republic, Article 112.
635 See for example Robins, Suits.
636 The 1982 Constitution of Turkish Republic, Articles 90 and 92.
the policy research and parliamentary diplomacy potential of the Parliament as such issues do not necessarily ‘impress’ the party leaders.

Turkey’s EU candidacy has exposed the Parliament to contradictory tendencies.\textsuperscript{638} As Grabbe has argued, EU candidacy empowers national executives over legislatures.\textsuperscript{639} The need to rapidly transpose EU legislation and directives in the accession process brings about less political debate in the parliament and more involvement of the government in pushing the reforms. In Grabbe’s words, the legislative task in the accession process “is presented by the EU as being largely administrative rather than political: candidate countries are not expected to debate the introduction of the \textit{acquis} because it is non-negotiable and community law takes priority over national law for member states.”\textsuperscript{640} The Parliament being rushed into legislation by the executive through the adoption of “some kind of fast-track procedure for getting EU legislation through parliament”\textsuperscript{641} points to the ineffectiveness of parliamentary deliberation in most EU reform packages. In the Turkish case, this was more or less the case. As a secondary actor in foreign policy, coupled with the dominant culture of impressing the party leader, the Parliament had already been quite insignificant and this rubber-stamping duty had made it less influential. Yet, the Turkish Parliament has demonstrated remarkable autonomy from both the government and the Turkish Armed Forces, when it voted against the motion to open Turkish soil to US military use in the 2003 Iraq war. The military showed self-restraint before and during the process of parliamentary voting on the issue, to the extent that the Turkish Armed Forces was criticised by the US Deputy Defence Secretary for not seeing the motion through and making sure it

\textsuperscript{638} This refers to candidate countries only, as there is a larger literature on Europeanization of national parliaments in member countries with a different set of findings.


\textsuperscript{640} Grabbe, ‘How does Europeanization,’ pp.1016-17.

\textsuperscript{641} Grabbe, ‘How does Europeanization,’ p.1017.
Thus, the Turkish Armed Forces’ agreement to civilianisation opened up the possibility for the Parliament to leave its stamp for once in foreign policy towards the Middle East. The Parliament’s deliberation over the motion for the Iraqi war demonstrated to many observers the maturity Turkish democracy reached.

Yet, the Turkish parliament did not use the process of civilianisation to its advantage and exert itself more into the foreign policy making process. As Melen has explained, the Parliament did not try to become active in parliamentary diplomacy and have a more continuous involvement in foreign policy. As Melen has pointed out:

The Parliament should adopt a model like ‘National Endowment for Democracy’ or so. Ministry of foreign affairs is doing its job, the government likewise, that is a different issue. But there is also such a thing called parliamentary diplomacy. Whenever we go abroad, our counterparts expect to see elected politicians from our side. We still handle this through the ministry of foreign affairs.... The expertise lies with the ministry of foreign affairs, however I [the parliament] am the highest institution, I am the highest civic institution, and I should be doing this myself.

Therefore it can be safely argued the Parliament did not strategically use the EU’s democratisation role prescription to its advantage to have a more permanent and more effective involvement in foreign policy towards the Middle East. In other words, the Parliament did not use Turkey’s EU candidacy to become an agent of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. This shows that actors do not functionally use resources whenever they are available, rather actors should first have the reasons to use the resources. The Turkish Parliamentarians did not have the goal to make the Parliament a central foreign policy actor.

To sum up, the EU’s role prescription of civilianisation has been adopted as it is by the Turkish Armed Forces and the JDP. Their perception of the EU’s role prescription of civilianisation as non-negotiable, highly popular among the Turkish

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642 Interview with a JDP parliamentarian, also a member of TR-EU joint parliamentary committee commission, Ankara, Turkey, 21 June 2010; Also Radikal, 8 May 2003.
643 Interview with Murat Yetkin, journalist, Ankara, Turkey, 22 July 2010.
644 Interview with a NAP parliamentarian, Ankara, Turkey, 30 April 2010.
public opinion, and their objectives enabled the institutionalisation of the EU’s role prescription of civilianisation. Their coordinative discourses were complementary with the EU candidate role of Turkey, which enabled the usage of the EU’s role prescription by these actors. The usage of the EU’s role prescription by and large enabled Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Middle East by leaving the post-Islamist JDP in control of foreign policy towards the Middle East, unhindered by the Kemalist military and the largely Kemalist Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

A very important consequence of this change in the relations between the state actors in foreign policy-making is the increased SME presence in the agenda of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. Business interests have become the strongest supporters of adopting EU’s economic and political role prescriptions for Turkey as a candidate country, especially after the 2000/1 crises. Moreover, the expectations of both domestic and external business actors of Turkey’s EU candidate role caused the coupling of political and economic reforms to each other. The continuing adoption of political role prescriptions of the EU was signalling the government’s commitment to the economic role prescriptions.645

5.4 Institutionalisation of the EU’s Economic Role Prescription and Economic Relations with the Middle East

The 2000/1 crises were the definitive moment for the institutionalisation of the EU’s economic role prescriptions in Turkey. The EU’s role prescription for Turkey as a candidate was initially more focussed upon political reform when Turkey was granted candidacy in 1999, leaving the economic reform side of it to the IMF until

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645 Bakir and Onis, ‘Turkey’s,’ p.156.
the 2000/1 crises broke out. According to Onis and Bakir, however, this pattern changed after 2001. The institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU accession prospect persuaded the public that EU membership and its material benefits were also near, thereby raising an expectation and making the public less resistant to the neoliberal economic reforms that the IMF and the EU’s role prescription required. The convergence between the IMF programme and the EU economic rules was also observed and used strategically by Turkish policymakers. In response to the IMF programme, the Turkish government adopted a ‘Programme towards Strong Economy’, which explained the measures to be taken as ‘intended to overcome the crisis, and to help meet the economic criteria for EU membership.’ Public support for Turkey’s EU membership was around 74% in the opinion polls conducted in 2002. According to the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Ismail Cem, “Turkey’s procrastination in making much-needed economic and administrative reforms resulted in a severe financial crisis in early 2001” and the reforms implemented after the crisis were therefore needed for Turkey’s economic recovery. Strong public support for EU membership and the overlapping economic policy prescriptions of the EU and the IMF therefore enabled Turkish policymakers to implement economic and democratic reforms without much opposition from the public.

The EU’s candidate role prescription was also used by Turkish policymakers to rule out more radical measures such as extensive capital controls or direct negotiations with external creditors. The JDP government likewise used the EU candidate role prescriptions for Turkey as a source of legitimacy for the

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646 Bakir and Onis, ‘Turkey’s,’ p.154.
647 Onis, ‘Beyond the 2001.’
649 Bakir and Onis,’Turkey’s’ p.155.
650 Cem, Turkey, p.37.
651 Onis, ‘Beyond the 2001,’ p.418.
continuation of the IMF programme after their election in 2002. Due to the JDP’s pro-SME political stance, the continuation of the IMF programme was not expected. However, the JDP continued the programme. Therefore, the JDP’s SME-based growth strategy needs to be placed in its context first.

The Kemalist elite have traditionally had a growth strategy that was based on development through big holding companies, which are also referred to as the Istanbul capital.653 These big business groups have been outward-looking holding companies, they have supported Turkey’s agreements with the IMF, the neo-liberal agenda that the IMF advocates such as privatisation, fiscal discipline and the retreat of the state from economy.654 The financial capital in Turkey is historically owned by these big holding companies. They are mostly represented by the TUSIAD, which is one of the most influential and politically active business associations, which represents the big business in Turkey. The TUSIAD actively lobbies for democratisation in Turkey and anchors itself to Turkey’s relationship with the EU. Even if some of its members trade with both the EU and the Middle East, it is known to be a more active and influential player regarding Turkey’s EU policy compared to its presence in Turkey’s Middle East policy. Rather, the development of Turkey’s economic ties with the neighbouring countries is seen as a positive development by the TUSIAD, as long as the government remains committed to EU membership objective.655 TUSIAD members are largely too risk-averse to conduct business with politically and economically unstable regions and the ones who are already doing

653 Bugra, ‘Class,’ p.524.
655 Interview with a TUSIAD member, Istanbul, Turkey, 4 June 2010; interview with a former civil servant from EUSG and policy analyst, Ankara, Turkey, 9 July 2010; Ugur and Yankaya, ‘Policy Entrepreneurship,’ Interview with the former Secretary General of the Turkish Secretariat General for EU Affairs, Istanbul, Turkey, 25 June 2010.
business with the Middle East and relatively stable Gulf region have had their own contacts and did not much need the government’s help to enter these markets.  

The JDP is strongly associated with the SME interests, which have first emerged in the 1980s with the liberalisation of Turkish economy. The so-called ‘Anatolian tigers’ are largely involved in the real sector. They are mostly represented by the MUSIAD and the semi-public TOBB. Another association is the Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists of Turkey (TUSKON). The TUSKON is an umbrella organisation for regional-based entrepreneurs’ associations, which was founded in 2005. Whereas TUSKON is an important driver of Turkey’s economic activism towards Africa, TOBB and MUSIAD have been actively involved in trade and economic projects with the Middle Eastern countries.

The JDP election manifesto revealed the details of their SME-based growth strategy. The manifesto declared that the JDP was going to place emphasis on the solution of the problems that the SMEs face such as their financing problems. However, the JDP also committed itself to the continuation of the IMF programme that the previous government started implementing in 2002 with reference to the EU’s candidate role prescriptions. In the election manifesto the JDP committed itself to:

Participating in strong regional integration projects such as the EU, thereby utilising the opportunities provided by globalisation for increasing the welfare of our people. Membership to the EU is our priority with respect to ensuring democratic and economic development. On the other hand, economic and democratic standards, legal and institutional arrangements that are put forward by the EU will be implemented regardless of EU accession conditionality.

Also important was the way the EU candidate position of Turkey was believed to improve foreign direct investment to Turkey. In their manifesto, the JDP

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656 Interview with a Turkish civil servant, Ankara, Turkey, 20 May 2010.
658 Interview with a Turkish civil servant, Ankara, Turkey, 20 May 2010; Zafer Ozcan, ‘Esnaflikta Kuresel Rekabete,’ Aksiyon, 810 (14 June 2006).
has cited continuation of Turkey’s EU candidacy as a measure of attracting foreign
direct investment to Turkey.\textsuperscript{660} While the IMF was seen as a temporary actor who is
responsible for the recovery process, EU candidacy and the EU’s role prescriptions for
Turkey were perceived by international investors as a signal of Turkish economy’s
viability.\textsuperscript{661} Indeed the reports published by financial actors such as Deutsche Bank,
Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch have all underlined the importance of the continuing
institutionalisation of the EU’s political as well as economic role prescriptions.\textsuperscript{662}
Several Turkish interviewees have noted how Turkey’s candidate role contributed to
the inflow of foreign direct investment to Turkey especially from Europe before the
2008 crisis.\textsuperscript{663} The political and economic reforms towards compliance with role
prescriptions of the EU have improved investor confidence in Turkey. Especially the
start of accession negotiations in 2005 boosted expectations of investors from Turkey
in terms of political and economic stability.\textsuperscript{664}

The JDP has committed itself to the improvement of the SMEs’ working
conditions as well as the consolidation of neo-liberalism in Turkey by following the
economic role prescriptions of the EU. In other words, the JDP managed to achieve an
economic policy that satisfied different business interests by using Turkey’s EU
candidate role. On the one hand privatisation was promised to be implemented fully,
the retreat of the state from the economy was to be ensured, macroeconomic stability
was promised through an anti-inflationary policy and fiscal discipline, banking sector
was to be strictly regulated, which all satisfied the big business in Turkey.\textsuperscript{665} Some of

\textsuperscript{661} Bakir and Onis, ‘Turkey’s,’ p.154.
\textsuperscript{662} Bakir and Onis, ‘Turkey’s,’ p.162, fn 3.
\textsuperscript{663} Interview with Erdal Sağlam, journalist, Ankara, Turkey, 15 June 2010.
\textsuperscript{664} Interview with Serdar Sayan, economist, Ankara, Turkey, 17 June 2010. Also Henry Loewendahl and
Ebru Ertugal, ‘Turkey’s Performance in Attracting Foreign Direct Investment,’ European Network of
\textsuperscript{665} Onis, ‘Beyond the 2001.’
these measures such as macroeconomic stability and anti-inflationary policies were also satisfactory for the SMEs. For domestic business including the SMEs,

the combination of political and economic reforms constituted the means for establishing a rule-based economy, thereby transcending the highly unstable and perverse patterns of development of the previous era where economic success largely depended on clientelistic political ties and easy access to state favours.\footnote{Onis, ‘Beyond the 2001,’ p.419.}

However, other measures such as the strict regulation of the banking sector were not fully supported by the SMEs since strict lending standards for banks were likely to squeeze further the already tight credit prospects of the SMEs.\footnote{Onis, ‘Beyond the 2001.’}

At this point, improving political and economic relations with the Middle East as well as the EU’s pro-SME role prescriptions came as a relief for the SMEs. The other leg of the JDP’s economic policy manifesto was to “continue economic cooperation attempts with other regional integration projects and neighbours, with whom Turkey has historical, geographical and economic ties as complementing the integration with the EU.”\footnote{JDP 2002 election manifesto, www.akparti.org.tr (11 July 2011).}

The business associations that represent the SMEs have been benefiting the most from Turkey’s close political relations with the Middle East.\footnote{Interview with a former civil servant from EUSG, Ankara, Turkey, 9 July 2010; interview with a Turkish civil servant, 20 May 2010.} During the 1990s, due to the Turkish Armed Forces’ central role in the making of foreign policy towards the Middle East and the associated securitisation of the Middle East, Turkey’s economic ties with the Arab Middle East were not strong. The SMEs’ economic situation had also been deteriorating in the 1990s due to the 1994 financial crisis, two earthquakes in 1999 and also the 2000/1 crises.\footnote{Pınar A. Erdonmez, ‘Türkiye’de 2001 Yılındaki Mali Kriz Sonrasında Kurumsal Sektörde Yeniden Yapılandırma,’ Bankacilar Dergisi, 47 (2003), p.39 and 53.} The SMEs were affected by price...
instability, high real interest rates and fluctuations in foreign exchange rates especially due to their dependence on imported intermediate and capital goods.\textsuperscript{671}

The institutionalisation of the EU's economic role prescriptions has differentially empowered the SMEs. The EU's pro-SME role prescriptions were willingly adopted by the JDP since the SMEs make up the core domestic constituency of the JDP.\textsuperscript{672} The JDP favours an SME-based, export-oriented growth strategy.\textsuperscript{673} The JDP’s post-Islamist coordinative discourse also overlapped with the MUSIAD-represented “devout bourgeoisie” that mostly consists of the SMEs.\textsuperscript{674} Likewise, the TOBB is another representative of the SME interests in Turkey, which maintains close ties with the JDP. While the government has utilised EU funds and frameworks designated to support SME development in Turkey,\textsuperscript{675} it also opted for shaping legislation in favour of the SMEs when there was a clash with the EU demands, somehow editing the EU’s economic role prescriptions.\textsuperscript{676} For example, the JDP amended the Public Procurement Law that had been prescribed by the EU in order to favour its domestic SME constituency.

The TOBB is a prominent business association in Turkey. The TOBB has been an active organisation with regards to Turkey's policies towards the Middle East. The TOBB has launched the “Industry for Peace Initiative” in 2005 in order to revitalise Erez Industrial Estate in Gaza.\textsuperscript{677} This project brought together the


\textsuperscript{674} Gumuscu, ‘Class,’ pp.835-61

\textsuperscript{675} The EU-Turkish Business Centres (ABIGEM) were established by the TOBB and numerous projects were financed by the SME Development Organization with EU funds since 2002. See Turkish Small and Medium Scale Enterprises Development Organization website. Available at \texttt{www.kosgeb.gov.tr}.

\textsuperscript{676} Civelekoğlu explains these cases in detail. Civelekoğlu, ‘Current,’ pp.75-6.

Palestinian, Israeli and Turkish authorities and civil society organisations with an agenda to create jobs, contribute to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, but also to enable Turkish exporters to enter the American market since Palestinian territories had duty-free access to the US market. As part of this initiative the TOBB has institutionalised a tripartite forum for dialogue among the TOBB, Israeli manufacturers’ association and the Palestinian federation of trade, industry and agricultural chambers. This demonstrates that especially since 2002 the TOBB has gradually become an active player in Turkey’s foreign economic relations with the Middle East within the broader foreign policy coordination of the JDP government.

The MUSIAD is another significant business organisation that represents the SMEs. The MUSIAD is known for its Islamic-orientation. After the 1997 military intervention the association came under scrutiny by the military over the implication that it was financing political Islam. The ideational tie between the MUSIAD and the JDP government is best expressed by one of the founders of the association in an interview, who said “MUSIAD follows the government’s rhetoric. It says neither ‘no’ nor ‘yes’ to Europeanisation.” Although the MUSIAD used to have an anti-EU position during the 1990s, it has switched tracks since 1997. Their opposition was largely due to the ideological orientation of its members and their preferences for a more protectionist economic model. MUSIAD members mostly prefer to be known as devout Muslims and they used to see the EU as a Christian club. In addition, they were SMEs that preferred a more protectionist economic policy, rather than the customs union with the EU and the trade liberalisation associated with

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678 Interview with a senior TOBB-TEPAV analyst, Ankara, Turkey, 8 July 2010.
The change in their strategy happened after the 28 February 1997 military intervention against the Islamist WP, which was also strongly supported by the MUSIAD. With the military intervention, MUSIAD members were also delegitimised in the eyes of the Kemalist military and many of its members were economically hurt by the intervention. Since 1999, the MUSIAD has been benefiting from the institutionalisation of civilianisation as Turkey’s EU candidate role through regaining its lost legitimacy as a non-governmental organisation, which went through a sharp decline with the 1997 military intervention.

Turkey’s EU candidacy role prescription on economic liberalisation and SME support frameworks significantly transformed the Turkish economy especially after 2001. Coupled with the JDP’s SME-based growth strategy, SMEs have grown to the extent that by 2010, almost half of Turkey’s exports were done by the SMEs. A civil servant shared his experience while he was attending a meeting of the EU Reform Monitoring Group of Turkey in an Anatolian city as follows:

We hold Reform Monitoring Group meetings regularly and one of them was held in Konya. There a citizen stood up and said ‘you were going to open an embassy in Niger, what happened? We need state support there.’ These are not big businessmen from TUSIAD; these are ex-artisans who have become traders. Those who reach out to new markets are usually such people, the man on the street. Turkey has got such a power thanks to the EU candidacy process.

Turkey’s SME interest groups are enabled by the civilianisation and macroeconomic stabilisation rules of EU candidacy in general. Coupled with the JDP’s close links with the SME interests, this turned into reaching the capacity to become significant economic actors in the Middle East. Yet, they needed the Turkish government to establish good neighbourly relationships with the Middle Eastern countries. This was particularly an issue for the SMEs represented by MUSIAD and

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683 Former Chairman of MUSIAD, Omer Bolat, in Yeni Safak (Turkish Daily), 18 April 2012.
684 Interview with a Turkish civil servant, Ankara, Turkey, 20 May 2010; Interview with a JDP parliamentarian, Ankara, Turkey, 23 June 2010.
TOBB, which are relatively more risk-taking and adaptive for entering new markets than the big business. This need had to be translated into government action since the Middle Eastern economies are not market economies, where Turkish SMEs cannot enter on their own merits. As a senior analyst from the TOBB has put it,

Middle Eastern economies are not market economies; therefore we need to have good relationships with their governments. You need to have good relationships so that you can access their markets and sign the necessary deals with them for your businessmen to enter those markets... This translates into the necessity to be involved in constructive engagement with these countries, including Iran.685

This led to a process whereby intergovernmental contacts and relations were established first and Turkish businesses entered these markets following initial political contacts and agreements. The Turkish government members’ official trips to these regions are usually accompanied by select groups of business people686 and business diplomats.687 A former MUSIAD chair person has pointed out that the MUSIAD has found it further encouraging to enter the Middle Eastern markets after the Turkish government’s agreements and initiatives with the governments of the region.688 Even the TOBB’s well-acclaimed ‘Industry for Peace Initiative’ in Palestine was encouraged by the Turkish government. As a senior TOBB analyst reveals, the then minister of foreign affairs Abdullah Gul asked TOBB to come up with a concrete and sustainable project in Palestine, of which Turkey can speak proudly.689 After its initiation, the project was solely designed by TOBB and welcomed by the US and European countries that were active in the region.690

685 Interview with a senior TOBB-TEPAV analyst, Ankara, Turkey, 8 July 2010.
686 Interview with Erdal Saglam, journalist, Ankara, Turkey, 15 June 2010; interview with the former Secretary General of the Turkish Secretariat General for EU Affairs, Istanbul, Turkey, 25 June 2010.
687 Mehmet Ogutcu and Raymond Saner, ‘Fine-tuning Turkey’s Economic Diplomacy,’ Eurasia Critic (July 2008)
688 Such as free trade agreements, visa exemption agreements, etc. Interview with a JDP parliamentarian and MUSIAD member, Ankara, Turkey, 13 July 2010.
689 Interview with a senior TOBB-TEPAV analyst, Ankara, Turkey, 8 July 2010.
690 Interview with a senior TOBB-TEPAV analyst, Ankara, Turkey, 8 July 2010.
This chain of events does not mean that the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East has been designed in response to the demands by the SMEs from the JDP. On the contrary, the Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade already had a strategy to improve economic relations with the Middle Eastern countries as early as 2000. Therefore, while the improvement in the SMEs' export potential and the JDP's pro-SME policies fed the virtuous cycle that boosted Turkish exports to the Middle East, the JDP was not the initiator of this policy. It was the coalition government and the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Ismail Cem, who had already had the idea of improving Turkey's political and economic ties with its surrounding regions. The JDP's foreign policy ideas overlapped with the already designed policy and fed into the implementation of it.

The enabling impact of the institutionalisation of Turkey's EU candidate role on the improvement of Turkish SMEs' export potential is indirect yet significant. As the previous analysis has shown, without Turkey's EU candidate role, the rules associated with it, Turkey's IMF-led post-crisis recovery programme could have failed or could have taken a different direction. Also whatever the policy ideas that the politicians might have, they cannot be implemented without the material capacity that turns resources into capabilities, which is what EU candidacy has offered Turkey.

**5.5 Conclusion**

This chapter has explored the impact of the institutionalisation of Turkey's EU candidate role on Turkey's foreign policy actors and their ideas regarding Turkey's foreign policy towards the Middle East. This exploration has been undertaken not from the usual rational choice or sociological institutionalist approach
but from a strategic-relational approach that is sensitive towards usages of Europe and the ideas of Turkish actors.

Already in 2000, the coalition government had put in place a framework to improve trade relations with neighbouring regions. Also the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the coalition government had been eager to establish close political ties between Turkey and the Middle East. Also the capture of the PKK leader in 1999 offered a window of opportunity to implement such policy ideas. Yet, the 2000/1 crises interrupted these flourishing policy ideas and frameworks thereby impeding their implementation. Another potential obstacle in the way of implementing this foreign policy framework was the uncertainty caused by the Turkish Armed Forces’ central role in Turkish politics. As a potential veto power, due to the overarching position it had acquired over the 1990s, the Turkish Armed Forces’ anchoring to civilianisation was crucial.

In the institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU candidate role, the Turkish Armed Forces’ behaviour played an important part. Had the skilled actors at the helm of the Turkish Armed Forces not used Turkey’s EU candidacy as a strategy to anchor Turkey to the west, the institutionalisation of the EU’s civilianisation prescription would not have been possible. The strategic usage was possible due to the Turkish Armed Forces’ Kemalist coordinative discourse, which offers contradictory priorities. Kemalism comprises of westernisation, reformism and catching contemporary civilisations as its principles along with an oppressive interpretation of nationalism, secularism and republicanism. Only by the work of skilled actors who could anchor the EU’s role prescription of civilianisation to the westernisation and reformism principles of Kemalism, was the Turkish Armed Forces’ adaptation to the EU’s role prescription possible.
Secondarily, the JDP government used the EU’s role prescription for Turkey in order to gain legitimacy for its post-Islamist coordinative discourse. Both actors, the Turkish Armed Forces and the JDP, have displayed significant elements of strategic learning from their past. The Turkish Armed Forces has learned that hardliner policies can cause more trouble than they resolve and the JDP has learned that articulating their coordinative discourse with westernisation would bring them political legitimacy and survival. Consequently the Turkish Armed Forces has cooperated with the government in foreign policy towards the Middle East, while the government could have a free hand in the implementation of its post-Islamist strategic depth policy towards the Middle East.

Moreover, cases of non-usage of Europe also merit attention. The Parliament for example did not use Turkey’s EU candidacy role to achieve a more central place in Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Middle East. This was mostly due to the institutional culture that rewards actions of parliamentarians that are directed towards the hub of political power in Turkish political party system, which is the party leader. Coupled with the lack of skilled individual agency, who could have mobilized the parliamentarians around a different institutional goal, this led to the non-usage of Turkey’s EU candidacy role prescriptions by the Parliament.

The EU’s economic role prescriptions were only used after the 2000/1 crises. After the crises, the overlapping prescriptions of the EU candidate role and the IMF enabled Turkish political actors’ usage of Turkey’s EU candidate role as a justification for the economic reforms. The severe economic crisis and Turkish public opinion’s pro-EU attitude enabled the implementation of neo-liberal policies without much resistance. At the same time, the EU candidate role of Turkey constrained alternative post-crisis solutions and locked the reform process in a neo-liberal

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direction. Turkey’s EU candidate role was also perceived by Turkish political actors as a means to attract the much-needed flow of foreign direct investment to Turkey. All these contributed significantly to Turkey’s recovery from the 2000/1 crises within a broadly neo-liberal framework.

Moreover, The JDP has filtered and edited the EU’s economic role prescriptions for Turkey in favour of the SMEs to develop and reach a capacity to boost trade with the Middle East. As it has been explained earlier, it is the SMEs that are ready to undertake the risk of doing business in the highly volatile Middle East, rather than big holding companies. Therefore, the increase in the capacity of the SMEs was also necessary to implement Turkey’s foreign economic policy towards the Middle East. To complete the circle, due to the mainly authoritarian regimes of the Middle East, governmental relations were needed to establish political contacts with the state elite in the region and sign political and trade agreements to boost trade.

All in all, it could be argued that there was an “ambiguous agreement” among various Turkish foreign policy actors on the usage of the EU’s political and economic role prescriptions for Turkey.692 The meaning of these role prescriptions varied for each actor depending on their perceptions of the context, reasons for action and discourses, therefore Turkey’s EU candidate role was institutionalised through this consensus. However, the overarching westernisation paradigm of Turkish foreign policy significantly underlay this consensus. The foreign policy elite from the Turkish Armed Forces and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs shared the westernisation paradigm, which filtered their perception of the EU candidate role of Turkey and was also used strategically by the JDP. The new constellation of foreign policy actors enabled the implementation of the government’s strategic depth policy towards the Middle East coupled with other causes. As explained earlier, there is never ‘the cause’ but always a

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692 Palier, ‘Ambiguous Agreement.’
causal complex. Therefore, in tracing the causal importance of Turkey's EU candidacy, this chapter also touched upon other components in the causal complex behind Turkey's foreign policy towards the Middle East. These other components include the capture of the PKK leader and the JDP's support for the SMEs. Yet, it has been shown that the usage of Turkey's EU candidate role prescriptions, and the consequent form in which Turkey's EU candidate role was institutionalised in Turkish politics, significantly enabled the implementation of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East in the 2000s.

Yet, domestic consensus was not enough and the Turkish government devised specific foreign policy roles to be played in the Middle East to achieve Turkey's political and economic re-entry to the Middle East as a regional actor. The next chapter discusses these foreign policy roles played by Turkey in the Middle East, which enabled the implementation of Turkey's strategic depth policy in the Middle East.
Republican Turkey is the successor of the Ottoman Empire, which dominated a large part of the Middle East for varying periods until its dismemberment at the end of World War I. Partly due to this, Turkey has traditionally been perceived negatively by the dominant Arab nationalist perspective during the Republican history. The Ottoman Empire had been narrated by the dominant Arab nationalist discourse as the former colonial power, which is responsible for the underdevelopment of the region. Another reason for the Arab Middle East’s dislike had been Turkey’s secularism and the abolition of the Caliphate by Republican Turkey. Secondly, on top of this broadly negative discourse on Turkey, sour relations between Turkey and its neighbours, especially the water disputes with Syria, and Turkey’s close ties with the US and Israel had turned the Arab world against Turkey and led to the omission of Turkey from discussions on the emerging regional order in the 1990s.

This picture was reversed in the 2000s. The rapprochement between Turkey and its Arab Middle Eastern neighbours was remarkable. A western diplomat acknowledged Turkey’s new role in the region by pointing out that in the past to understand the Middle East, one could have ignored Turkey but now it is an actor in the region in its own right, it is powerful on military, economic and ideational terms. Such levels of presence in the Middle East would not have been possible had Turkey not been in the possession of necessary resources that are meaningful in the Middle Eastern regional context, especially ideational, to change its negative image in the eyes of the Arab Middle East. Turkey’s image was improved both in the eyes of the

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695 Benli Altunisik, Turkey, p.8.
696 Interview with a western diplomat, Ankara, Turkey, 30 June 2010.
governing, and reformist elite, in large part due to its EU candidacy. This has turned out to be the largest foreign policy resource for Turkey to play a significant role in the Arab Middle East. The chapter first reviews the roles Turkey has played in the Middle East and how Turkish policymakers used Turkey’s EU candidate role in their foreign policy discourse towards the Middle East, thereby giving meaning to Turkey’s role in the Middle Eastern context as an EU candidate. After this review, an analysis will be offered of the selectivities of the Middle Eastern regional context in terms of Turkey’s role as an EU candidate in the Middle East.

6.1 Turkey’s Foreign Policy Discourse in the Middle East

The aim of this section is to explain how Turkey’s EU candidate role was incorporated into Turkey’s foreign policy discourse towards the Arab Middle East. In the following, Turkey’s various role conceptions in the Middle East as explained to a Middle Eastern audience will be outlined first. Secondly, the usage of Turkey’s EU candidate role in this foreign policy discourse will be discussed. Finally the section will conclude by explaining how Turkey’s EU candidate role was used by Turkish policy makers in their foreign policy discourse that is communicated to the Middle Eastern actors.

697 Interview with Leyla Tavsanoglu, journalist, Istanbul, Turkey, 28 June 2010.
698 Interview with the former Head of Turkish Secretariat General for EU Affairs, Istanbul, Turkey, 25 June 2010.
699 There is one important reason why I focus only on the discursive usage of EU candidacy in foreign policy discourse of Turkish actors rather than a set of ideas or proposals that are hypothesised on the basis of EU’s foreign policy goals and the discourse Turkish actors adopted. I could have opted for associating references to democracy, human rights, rule of law outside an explicit context of EU candidacy, which are plenty, as indicators of Europeanisation of Turkey’s foreign policy discourse. However, this would have been tantamount to an assumption that these are solely European values. Such an assumption would lead me to conduct the research with a eurocentric inclination. To avoid this, I opt for investigating Turkey’s foreign policy discourse for EU candidacy-centrism embedded within it, with the exception of cases where the foreign policy actors in question have referred to these values as European values, which would only reveal their eurocentrism rather than mine.
National role conceptualisations, as coined by Holsti, are important analytical bridges between foreign policy actors’ objectives and their perceptions of opportunities and constraints of the historical and spatial context. Turkish policymakers have increasingly portrayed Turkey as a regional collaborator, reformer, example, bridge and EU candidate in the 2000s through their foreign policy discourse. This stands in sharp contrast to the militaristic, hardliner policies adopted by Turkey in the Middle East in the 1990s. Each one of these roles is explained and illustrated below before showing how the EU candidate role was incorporated to Turkish foreign policy discourse towards the Middle East.

6.1.1 Turkey as a Regional Collaborator

This is one of the roles that appeared in Holsti’s original article. According to Holsti’s conceptualisation, this role indicates “far-reaching commitments to cooperative efforts with other states to build wider communities, or to cross-cutting subsystems.”

Turkey’s presence in the region is to some extent justified with reference to this role. First of all, Turkish ministers of foreign affairs have repeatedly referred to Turkey’s common history with the Middle East as a means to place Turkey within the Middle Eastern regional system. For example, Abdullah Gul has made a reference to Turkey’s Ottoman legacy in the region in 2003 as follows: “the peoples of this region have lived together in peace and harmony also during the Ottoman centuries. Therefore, we are a direct witness to the fact that the peoples of this region can live and prosper in peace.”

After a decade of troublesome relations with some of the Middle Eastern countries and several decades of aloofness towards the region (explained in chapter four), Turkish policymakers have justified the country’s place in

700 Holsti, ‘National Role,’ p.265.
the Middle Eastern regional system mainly by reference to the Ottoman past and by arguing that there is more interdependence in the region now than in the past. The Ottoman past as a reference is very clear in Abdullah Gul’s statement in 2007:

The relationship between the Turks and the Arabs; Turkey and the Arab world has a long history. Our peoples are friends and siblings. We share our geography. We share the same religion. We are affected by the same problems, we face the same opportunities. There has been a unity of fate among us since centuries. Improving our relations with the Arab world in every respect, contributing to stability, security and prosperity in the Middle East are among the priorities of our foreign policy.702

Likewise, a former minister of foreign affairs Ali Babacan has stated that Turkey is historically tied to the region and moreover obligated to “do what is necessary” to help alleviate the Middle Eastern problems.703 Another justification used for Turkey’s regional role is the growing interdependence in the region. Ahmet Davutoglu has ably voiced such an argument in 2007, when he said: “Developments in the Middle East are of great interest to Turkey. Not only our historical, cultural and social affinity with the region, also the direct and indirect effects of these developments on Turkey force us to focus on the regional issues.”704

The discourse that is used to justify Turkey’s role as a regional collaborator has therefore had two pillars: that of a common history and a common future due to increasing interdependence in the Middle East.

Regional interdependence has also been linked to calls for and justification of Turkey’s attempts at boosting regionalism in the Middle East. The former Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gul has argued in 2007 that:

[t]he Middle East is experiencing one of the most critical turning points in its history. The problems in the region have become complex and inter-

702 Abdullah Gul, Speech given at the Arab League Ministers of Foreign Affairs meeting, 4 March 2007, Cairo, Egypt.
704 Ahmet Davutoglu, Speech given at the opening session of the 132nd Arab League Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 9 September 2009, Cairo, Egypt. Also Ahmet Davutoglu, “Turkiye-Urdun Dostlugu ve Ortadogu,” Al-Dustour (Jordanian daily), 10 September 2009.
related. It is impossible to address and solve these problems independently from each other... We believe it will be beneficial to have a regional arrangement in the Middle East that would include all countries in the region.\textsuperscript{705}

The same argument has been made by the current minister of foreign affairs Ahmet Davutoglu in 2009. He has stated that “it is not realistic to handle a single event, a single country separately from the broader regional dynamics. Events that take place in the region are extremely dynamic; they involve all the major players of international relations and are inter-related.”\textsuperscript{706} Therefore, successive Turkish Ministers of Foreign Affairs have advocated regionalism in the Middle East as a solution to the region’s interrelated problems and claimed authority with reference to Turkey’s Ottoman past in the region. The components of the regionalism that has been advocated are also important in terms of what type of a regional collaboration Turkey has advanced in the Middle East.

The main building blocks of regionalism evident in the discourses of Turkish Ministers of Foreign Affairs are economic interdependence and cooperation following the European model of integration. Abdullah Gul has explained this in 2004 as follows:

\begin{quote}
We should prepare ourselves to take further step of building overall confidence in our wider region. Like Europe did after two world wars, we should draw our lesson from the successive conflicts and wars that constantly undermined our stability and well-being. With political resolve and inspiration, we can create our own multilateral framework for cooperation and security.\textsuperscript{707}
\end{quote}

Also as Ahmet Davutoglu has argued in 2009, one aspect of Turkey’s foreign policy vision towards the Middle East has been to construct “economic interdependence among the countries of the region, which would benefit every

\begin{footnotes}
\item[705] Abdullah Gul, Speech given at the Arab League Ministers of Foreign Affairs meeting, 4 March 2007, Cairo, Egypt.
\item[706] Ahmet Davutoglu, Speech given at the opening session of the 132\textsuperscript{nd} Arab League Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 9 September 2009, Cairo, Egypt.
\item[707] Abdullah Gul, Speech given at the Iraq’s neighbours meeting, 14 February 2004, Kuwait. Emphasis mine.
\end{footnotes}
country and their people." The underlying logic is that if economic interdependence can be used to foster increased economic and political liberalisation in the region, this would contribute to security and stability in the region and render it better equipped to face global competition. As Abdullah Gul has stated in 2003,

> [r]egional cooperation would improve the functioning of free market economies. The joint investments and initiatives would be strengthened. Obstacles to communication and transportation would be removed. Trade and production would be easier for firms of all sizes. If we achieve these the region as a whole will become globally competitive. This process cannot function without the necessary security and political inputs. Therefore we should establish codes of conduct, confidence building measures and develop conflict resolution methods.

According to Ahmet Davutoglu, such an economic cooperation in the Middle East would also help to bring political understanding, trust and stability to the region.

> Turkey's past experience in the organisations of economic and political cooperation is also used to convince the Middle Eastern elite of Turkey's potential contribution to facilitate regional cooperation. A very good illustration of this can be seen in Abdullah Gul's speech in 2003:

> Turkey is the only country that is both a member of the OIC [Organisation of Islamic Conference] and an accession candidate to the EU. *Turkey’s experiences in arrangements like the OSCE [Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe], the Southern European Cooperation Process and the Stability Pact as well as in the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organisation are equally valuable.... In the light of our experiences, we believe that it is the right time to establish the dynamics of multilateral regional cooperation in the Middle East. Our background in regional collaboration provides us with an opportunity to contribute to transforming the Middle East into a new area of cooperation.*

All in all, Turkey is presented as a country that is tied to the Middle East with a common history and geography, which facilitates regional cooperation in the Middle East. The building block of such regional cooperation is economic

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708 Ahmet Davutoğlu, Speech given at the opening session of the 132nd Arab League Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 9 September 2009, Cairo, Egypt.


710 Ahmet Davutoğlu, Speech given at the opening session of the 132nd Arab League Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 9 September 2009, Cairo, Egypt.

interdependence in the region. However, according to the Turkish Ministers of Foreign Affairs, for economic cooperation and free market economy to succeed in the Middle East there was need for reforming domestic politics and most importantly reforming the interpretations of Islam. Parallel to this logic, another role conceived by the Turkish foreign policy elite for Turkey has been the role of a reform promoter in the region.

6.1.2 Turkey as a Promoter of Reform

Building on the role as a regional collaborator, Turkey has actively presented itself as a force for reform and innovation in the region. First of all, Abdullah Gul has placed special emphasis on the compatibility of “the contemporary level of civilisation” with Islam. In a speech given in 2005, Gul has stated:

We no longer regard the calls for reform as an ill-intentioned outside interference, aiming at derailing our stability and security, nor do we approach them with scare or hesitation. Instead, we consider them a domestic necessity and a way out strategy to be able to cure these illnesses. It gratifies me to see that over the last two years, we have altogether left the first phase—the necessity for reform—behind with our common determination. However, what we need now is to decisively step into the second phase of focusing on how to successfully steer this common desire in a direction which embraces the fundamental requirements of the current level of civilisation without drifting away from our own deep-rooted Islamic assets. This obliges us to launch comprehensive policy engineering in merging the values of Islam with today's realities of the world.  

An important aspect of this role is that Turkey is presented as an Islamic country, which has managed to achieve the synchronisation between Islam and the ‘contemporary civilisation.’ What Abdullah Gul has meant by the requirements of the contemporary level of civilisation is as follows:

For our societies, the 21st century will witness efforts to materialise values such as respect for cultural and religious diversity, institutionalisation of

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democracy, and the protection of human rights including children’s and women’s rights and transparent and accountable government on the basis of rule of law. I strongly believe that these values are not only common values of the European Union, but they are also compatible in essence with the Islamic countries’ common culture and traditions.\footnote{Abdullah Gul, Speech given at the dinner organized for the OIC countries ministers of foreign affairs, 25 October 2005, Ankara, Turkey.}

The former President Ahmet Necdet Sezer has also advocated reform in the region in 2003 in the same manner as Gul:

Can our organisation [OIC] play the role it is supposed to play fully? Do the decisions and suggestions we make and the reactions we give yield the results that we aimed for? It is a fact that we are having difficulty to respond to all of these questions affirmatively. Hence it is a common conviction that our organisation cannot increase its visibility and project its power sufficiently. Under these circumstances, what we have to do as member countries and as the organisation is to take a look at ourselves and to do our homework. We believe it is necessary to find ways to catch up with the times, or even to shape it, without giving up our own values. We think this can be achieved through a serious renovation and reform process. Although at various scales, tides of reform are sweeping every country and regional international organisation today... We are facing a fundamental choice. Either we will not do our homework and settle for our current status, or we will question ourselves, take brave decisions and increase the standing of the Islamic world. We believe that our spiritual values also give us the responsibility to take brave decisions.\footnote{Ahmet Necdet Sezer, Speech given at the OIC 10th Summit, 16 October 2003, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Also Ahmet Necdet Sezer, Speech given at the OIC 31st Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 14 June 2004, Istanbul, Turkey.}

According to Ahmet Necdet Sezer, the goal of the Islamic world should be to catch up with modernity, contemporary civilisation, which have always meant ‘western’ in the Turkish context. Yet, Turkish foreign policy actors in the 2000s have tried to emphasise that these are in fact universal values and that they can also be found in the core principles of Islam. Both Ahmet Necdet Sezer’s and Abdullah Gul’s speeches demonstrate that Turkey is a promoter of reform in the region. While promoting reform to catch up with the contemporary level of civilisation, i.e. democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights and good governance, they do this by arguing that these values are intrinsically shared by Islam. Gul’s speech in 2004 illustrates this point well:
The universal principles and values that aim for the well-being of humanity are obvious and these are also essential to Islamic faith. Therefore, the universal values that have been nurtured by the collective mind and conscience of humanity through the interaction of different civilisations throughout the history are capable of showing the way to Muslim societies. There is a rich and precious essence shared by Muslim societies. This essence is fully compatible with the universal values.  

Therefore, Turkish foreign policy discourse has focused on the necessity of reform in the Muslim Middle East and that it is only possible through the recognition that the values of Islam are in essence compatible with the values of the contemporary level of civilisation (read western values). Furthermore, Turkey has been offered as an example of such a harmony between Islam and democracy. The following section will demonstrate how Turkey has been offered as an example for the Muslim countries in the Middle East by the Turkish foreign policy actors.

6.1.3 Turkey as an Example

Holsti has defined the role of an example as countries emphasising "the importance of promoting prestige and gaining influence in the international system by pursuing certain domestic policies."  

Turkey is portrayed in the foreign policy discourse as an inspiration for other Muslim-majority countries. In Abdullah Gul's words:

"The Turkish experience might serve as a source of inspiration for some other countries. This experience is about an effort to achieve democracy, civil rights and liberties, respect for the rule of law, civil society, transparency and gender equality. Our experience proves that national and spiritual values can be in perfect harmony with the contemporary standards of life."

The JDP government's Islamic credentials have been especially effective in the conceptualisation of this role. Abdullah Gul also underlined this in a speech as follows:

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716 Holsti, 'National Role,' p.268.
I would like to take this opportunity to brief you on our own experience; our experience as a government, less than one year old. To many people, it seemed like a paradox: A government that was formed by a party known to be based on moral and traditional values was implementing a most spectacular economic and political reform campaign in Turkey; reforms that astonished even the liberals at home. There was nothing to be surprised about. We [the AKP government] acted on the premise that highest contemporary standards of democracy—fundamental freedoms, gender equality, free markets, civil society, transparency, good governance, rule of law and rational use of resources were universal expectations.\(^{718}\)

Therefore, in parallel with the role of a reform promoter in the region, the AKP government has also used its own experience as 'a party based on moral and traditional values' that has undertaken liberal reforms at home to highlight the possibility of marrying Islamic values with the 'universal values of humanity'. However, this was not the only component of Turkey's role as an example in the region. Turkey's experiences in institution building and democratisation have also been used as arguments for Turkey's role as an example in the region. For instance, Abdullah Gul has declared that Turkey was ready to share its experience in democratic reform and institution building with Palestine; as well as its experience in democracy and the rule of law with Iraq.\(^{719}\)

To a lesser extent, the same argument that Turkey is an example for the Muslim-majority countries and the Middle East can be found in the former President Ahmet Necdet Sezer's speech in 2006:

The improvement of basic rights and freedoms, the rule of law, the construction of an accountable and transparent administrative structure are foremost in the wishes of our nations. This is also a requirement for staying on the positive side of globalisation.... The most important factor in the success of this process is the endorsement of the transformation by societies. International society's support within the framework of good will and a sense of partnership and its adoption of an approach responding to each country's special circumstances are important in this

\(^{718}\) Abdullah Gul, Speech given at the OIC Business Forum that was held during the OIC 10th Summit, 15 October 2003, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

\(^{719}\) Abdullah Gul, Speech given at the Palestinian Legislative Council, 5 January 2005, Gaza, Palestine. Also Abdullah Gul, Speech given at the Iraq's neighbours meeting, 8 July 2006, Tahran, Iran.
respects. Turkey has been supporting the efforts at transformation in the region with such an understanding and has been sharing its authentic experience with all the willing countries.\textsuperscript{720}

6.1.4 Turkey as a Bridge

This is another category that Holsti has outlined in his original study. According to Holsti, the themes involved in this role “usually imply a communication function, which is, acting as a ‘translator’ or conveyer of messages and information between peoples of different culture.”\textsuperscript{721} Turkish foreign policy discourse has consisted of references to Turkey’s role as a bridge both ideationally and geographically between the Middle East and other regions.

As early as 2002, at the EU-OIC joint forum, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Ismail Cem has argued against identity building processes based on the conflictual relationship between the self and the other:

In both ancient and modern times, history teaches us that the way we address the issue of ‘the other’ determines the dynamics of stability and peace. We have witnessed that trends to ignore or to snub the other, to dominate politically, economically or culturally the other, can only result in confrontation and hostility. We have witnessed as well that harmony, knowledge and welfare are nurtured when different nations communicate with each other, when they feel respect for other’s culture. Political understanding and dialogue provide the platform which generates this web of relationships.\textsuperscript{722}

In line with this role, Turkey has been active in institutional dialogue between “different cultures and religions.”\textsuperscript{723} Abdullah Gul has explained the role of Turkey in the Alliance of Civilizations initiative later adopted by the UN as follows:

The universal tenets of the human civilisation, to which every society has contributed in time individually or collectively is not paid enough attention. The cultural and religious differences which must be seen

\textsuperscript{720} Ahmet Necdet Sezer, Speech given at the opening session of the OIC Parliamentary Union, 12 April 2006, Istanbul, Turkey.
\textsuperscript{721} Holsti ‘National Role,’ pp. 266-7.
\textsuperscript{722} Ismail Cem, Opening speech given at the OIC-EU Joint Forum, 12 February 2002, Istanbul, Turkey.
\textsuperscript{723} Abdullah Gul, Speech given at the OIC conference of ministers of foreign affairs, 19 June 2006, Baku, Azerbaijan.
within the understanding of the 'unity in diversity' are rather perceived as threats. The most functional and trustworthy means to get rid of this impasse and enable common sense to prevail is to immediately establish channels of a genuine dialogue between different cultures and religions, and to support this process with practical measures. In an attempt to foster such dialogue, Turkey has given strong support to the idea of 'Alliance of Civilizations'.

Alongside the role as an ideational bridge between different religions and civilisations, Ahmet Davutoğlu has also highlighted Turkey's role as a geographical bridge when he emphasised that Turkey has attached special importance to the regional transportation networks that would link the Arab countries to Europe, Central Asia and Caucasus. The same emphasis on Turkey's geography was placed by the former President Ahmet Necdet Sezer in 2000 with reference to Turkey's relations with Jordan. Sezer has stated with reference to Turkey's relations with Jordan in 2000 that “Turkey is on Jordan's way to European countries, whereas Jordan is on the way of Turkey to the Middle East.” Another role that is very important in Turkish foreign policy discourse is the role of a mediator, which is explained next.

6.1.5 Turkey as a Mediator

Holsti has defined this role as a state that is “capable of, or responsible for, fulfilling or undertaking special tasks to reconcile conflicts between other states or groups of states.” In the case of Turkey, the mediation role is more of a facilitator of communication between the conflicting parties rather than attempting to convince parties to a certain agreement.

724 Abdullah Gül, Speech given at the OIC conference of ministers of foreign affairs, 19 June 2006, Baku, Azerbaijan
725 Ahmet Davutoğlu, Speech given at the opening session of the 132nd Arab League Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 9 September 2009, Cairo, Egypt.
727 Holsti, 'National role,' p.265.
728 For details of these different roles see, Meliha Altunisik and Esra Cuhadar, ‘Turkey’s Search for a Third Party Role in Arab–Israeli Conflicts: A Neutral Facilitator or a Principal Power Mediator,’ Mediterranean Politics, 15/3 (2010), pp.371-92.
For example, Abdullah Gul has spelled out this role for Turkey in terms of the Israel-Palestine conflict in 2005 as follows: "Turkey's participation in the TIPH [Temporary International Presence in Hebron] that aims to reduce the tension between Israeli settlers and Palestinians in the city of Hebron falls in line with the 'good offices, facilitator and mediator' roles that Turkey has been playing in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process."729 In the same speech Abdullah Gul has also argued that Turkey is well-placed for such a role due to its favourable relationship with both parties:

Turkey sees both sides' return to the negotiation table as the only solution in order to reach a comprehensive agreement that would enable Israel and Palestine to co-exist within mutually defined borders. In this respect, I would like to underline that Turkey is ready to do whatever it can and to make significant contribution to both parties’ peace efforts. As a country that is trusted by both parties and wants to help building peace in the Middle East, it would be an honour for us to make any possible contribution.730 Likewise, Ahmet Davutoglu has pointed out Turkey’s mediator role in the indirect talks between Syria and Israel as an example of Turkey's strategy to adopt missions to provide stability, order and welfare in the region.731

As can be observed in the previous statements, in all these roles Turkish foreign policy actors have used Turkey’s EU candidacy as a discursive resource and justification to a certain extent, either directly or indirectly. However, the most evident linkages are with the role as an example and the role as a bridge. The next section explains how Turkey’s EU candidacy was used by Turkish Ministers of Foreign Affairs while addressing the Arab Middle Eastern and/or broader Islamic audiences. As the interviews have suggested Turkey’s EU candidate role was perceived by

731 Ahmet Davutoglu, Speech given at the opening session of the 132nd Arab League Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 9 September 2009, Cairo, Egypt.
Turkish foreign policy actors as leverage and discursively used as such in Turkey's foreign policy towards the Middle East, the following analysis will show how this was achieved.

Interestingly a public opinion survey conducted across seven Arab countries in 2010 also confirms this perception of Turkish policymakers. 67% of the Jordanian; 72% of the Lebanese; 71% of the Palestinian; 70% of the Syrian and 59% of the Iraqi respondents have said that Turkey's EU candidate role has had a very positive impact on its perception by the Arab Middle East. 732

6.2 An EU candidate in the Middle East

The first role through which Turkey's EU candidate role was explicitly used in Turkish foreign policy actors’ foreign policy discourse was Turkey's bridge role. Successive ministers of foreign affairs have highlighted Turkey's dual identity as both European and Asian and Middle Eastern. Ismail Cem for example has argued in his address to the EU-OIC meeting that Turkey was carrying a special responsibility due to being connected to both the EU and the OIC. 733 Ismail Cem has stated that Turkey was “both European and Asian”. 734 Turkey's role as a bridge between the EU and Asia has been a recurrent argument with various foci over time, i.e. bridging the EU with Asia in general, bridging the EU with the Middle East, and bridging the EU with Islam.

Abdullah Gul for example has argued in 2004 that Turkey’s membership of the EU would demonstrate the compatibility between the EU/Europe and Islam:

733 Ismail Cem, Opening speech given at the OIC-EU Joint Forum, 12 February 2002, Istanbul, Turkey.
734 Ismail Cem, Opening speech given at the OIC-EU Joint Forum, 12 February 2002, Istanbul, Turkey.
Our relationship with the west should not develop on the basis of opposition. Turkey's Islamic identity has never been an obstacle in the way of Turkey's close relations with the west and its participation in western institutions and organisations as an active member. We should develop our integration with the west on the basis of mutual benefits. The completion of Turkey's EU accession process would be a proof that a Muslim society can be compatible with the European societies, united on the basis of common, universal and democratic values.\(^{735}\)

Similarly in 2005 Abdullah Gul has underlined that Turkey's EU accession would also be beneficial for the Islamic world:

As you know Turkey has gained a new status before the EU on 3 October. I am glad that this development is received well in the Islamic world. Indeed, Turkey's new position in Europe will be positive for the Islamic world's relationship with Europe too. Therefore, while Turkey is on course for further integration with the EU, Turkey's relationship with other regions with which Turkey has historical, geographical, humanitarian and religious ties, will strengthen. It is pleasing to know there is international consensus that a Europe that includes Turkey will contribute to peace, harmony, stability and welfare in our region and in the world.\(^{736}\)

Secondly, Turkey has used both its experience as an EU candidate and the EU itself as examples for the reform and regional collaboration prospects in the region. Ahmet Necdet Sezer's speech in 2001 is very illustrative of such a usage of the EU as an example of regional integration for the Middle East:

It is inevitable that the steps taken in the EU towards economic integration and expansion will have impacts on the countries that make up the OIC. The EU will become a more important economic actor on a global scale in ten years, when it completes its enlargement process. In this context, I believe it is beneficial for the OIC countries to observe the EU experience closely and create the favourable conditions for their industries and economies in order to increase their share in international trade. Because, international practice has shown that regional integration processes have increased success and competitiveness of firms and sectors.\(^{737}\)

Therefore, the EU is demonstrated by Sezer as an example of best practice in regional integration to be monitored closely and mimicked by the OIC countries.

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\(^{735}\) Abdullah Gul, Speech given at the OIC 31st Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 14 June 2004, Istanbul, Turkey.


\(^{737}\) Ahmet Necdet Sezer, Speech given at the 17th COMCEC meeting, 20 October 2001, Istanbul, Turkey.
including those in the Middle East. In conjunction with this, by being a candidate of the EU, Turkey is also presented as an example of best practice in reform and catching up with the EU standards. Abdullah Gul’s speech is illustrative in this respect.

In the west and the east, there has been increasing interest in Turkey’s experience of harmonising contemporary values with a traditional identity. Indeed, in my country human rights, equality between men and women and accountability have risen to high standards lately. It has been welcomed by everyone that the universal standards that include *European political criteria* have been adopted.738

An even more conspicuous example can be found in a speech in 2003, where Abdullah Gul has said:

We decreased the number of ministries from 35 to 23, thus making the administration more streamlined and efficient. This was followed by a Public Administration Reform project aimed at the decentralization of most public services. This would give the Central Government more time and space to tackle the global issues while at the same time speeding up the delivery of the services. The Penal Code, the Civil Code and the Press Law are all being further modernized. In the last eight months, the Turkish Parliament adopted three major political reform packages. These were related to the process initiated by the previous governments to upgrade the Turkish legislation on fundamental rights and freedoms *in conformity with Europe*.739

This speech demonstrates how Turkish policymakers portray the EU and Turkey’s EU candidate role as a source of modernisation for Turkey’s public administration and good governance. Also, it reveals how Europe and the EU are used interchangeably by the Turkish authorities. The representation of the EU as ‘Europe’ and administrative modernisation as ‘conformity with Europe’ demonstrates that modernisation and Europeanisation are perceived as synonymous by Turkish foreign policymakers, as was the case in the reforms of the late Ottoman Empire (see chapter four). This is a demonstration that westernisation remains to be the predominant paradigm in Turkish politics, either in the form of Kemalist westernisation that had dominated Turkish politics throughout the Republican era or in the form of post-

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739 Abdullah Gul, Speech given at the OIC Business Forum that was held during the OIC 10th Summit, 15 October 2003, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Islamist westernisation, which 'rediscover[s] the Middle East' to balance the European vocation.

### 6.3 The EU Candidacy of Turkey and the Middle Eastern Context

The EU candidate role of Turkey has significantly enabled Turkey's return to the region. The Arab world has shown immense interest in Turkey's EU candidacy. It is interesting to note that Arab media were the most represented group in the EU's Brussels summit where the decision was taken to start accession negotiations with Turkey, with approximately 200 Arab journalists observing the summit. This was mostly due to the Arab perception of this event as akin to a decision of the EU on its relationship with the Muslim world, rather than only Turkey. Turkey's EU candidate role was perceived by the Arab world as a benefit for regional stability. The EU's decision to start accession negotiations with Turkey on 17 December 2004 in its Brussels summit was received positively and applauded by Arab media on the grounds that this decision could help alleviate the rift between the west and the Muslim world after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the thesis of civilisational conflict.

Moreover, the institutionalisation of Turkey's EU candidate role according to the Copenhagen political and economic criteria was an important resource for Turkey's foreign policy toward the Middle East by giving Turkey power of attraction in the eyes of the elite in the Middle East. Both the reformers and the ruling elite in the Middle East have watched closely Turkey's democratic and economic reformation as

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740 This section is a review to point out the changes in the context that make it strategically favourable to Turkey adopting an EU-centred discourse. However the main empirical focus of the chapter is how this changing context was discursively mediated and used by Turkish officials in the foreign policy discourse.


an EU candidate. Turkish policy makers were aware of this asset and used it discursively to implement its strategic depth policy in the Middle East. The JDP's rise to power is particularly important for the reformists as it symbolises the possibility of combining democracy with Islam. El-Serif and Salha have aptly pointed out that as a result of Turkey’s EU reforms the democratic space in Turkish politics had expanded and a political party with Islamist pedigree could come to power. In a similar fashion Al-Azm argued:

> It is certainly noteworthy that Turkey, the only Muslim country with a developed and explicit secular ideology, tradition and practice, should be also the only major Muslim society to produce a democratic Muslim political party- something like Europe’s Christian Democratic Parties-capable of ascending to power without a catastrophe befalling the whole polity.

The EU factor in this perception was also emphasised by several commentators such as Eltahawy:

> the [JDP] programme avoided direct reference to Islam, proclaiming adherence to Turkey’s secular traditions and promising to encourage women to participate in public life and be active in politics; to repeal discriminatory provisions in laws; to work with women's NGOs; and to "improving social welfare and work conditions in light of the needs of working women". How was the [JDP] able to pull all that off? Enter the "West", in the form of the European Union and Turkey's determination to join it... [I]t seems at times that a twin obsession with women and the West is the defining characteristic of Arab Islamists - the [JDP] has been listening to both women's groups and the European Union, which had demanded a reformed Penal Code as a prerequisite to starting talks in 2005 on allowing Turkey into its club.

744 Interview with the former Head of Turkish Secretariat General for EU Affairs, Istanbul, Turkey, 25 June 2010; for the impact of EU candidacy on economic policy, interview with Serdar Sayan, economist, Ankara, Turkey, 17 June 2010; Interview with a western diplomat, Ankara, Turkey, 30 June 2010.


746 El Serif and Salha, Araplarin Gozüyle, p.6.


The Arab Middle Eastern interest in Turkey cannot be reduced to the political victory of the JDP. As a journalist from the region has observed, Arab interest in Turkey declines if Turkey's EU candidate role is hampered rather than the JDP losing office.\textsuperscript{749} Turkey's economic progress and its western life style are also causes of attraction in the eyes of Middle Eastern reformists and the newly emerging middle class.\textsuperscript{750} Benli Altunisik has also pointed out that "[s]imilar to the discussion on Turkey's political reform efforts, the issue of economic development is being used by critics of the regimes in countries like Egypt and Syria who argue that the states' policies have failed." \textsuperscript{751} As the preceding section has explained, this contextual factor enabled the usage of Turkey's EU candidate role by Turkish foreign policy actors in their foreign policy discourse. One senior politician who has held a high profile foreign policy post in the early years of the first JDP government acknowledged that Turkey's EU candidate role was the major leverage for Turkey in the Middle East and that Turkey's standing in the Middle East would plummet had Turkey cut its relationship with the EU.\textsuperscript{752} Another good example is Syrian President Assad's remarks to Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan during a visit in 2006, where he has stated that it was exciting that Turkey was going to become a member of the EU, as it meant Syria would be neighbours with the EU too.\textsuperscript{753}

The Middle Eastern regional context was also favourable to Turkey's re-engagement with the region as the increasing activism of Shiite Iran in the region was alarming for the Sunni Arab states. Therefore, there was also a strategic selectivity for Turkey to play an active role in the region, promoting increased economic integration, mediating conflicts and regional integration.\textsuperscript{754} Moreover, the US was getting more

\textsuperscript{749} Semih Idiz, 'Araplarin Türkiye İlgişi Nereden Geliyor?' \textit{Milliyet}, 26 June 2010.
\textsuperscript{751} Benli Altunisik, \textit{Turkey: Arab Perspectives}, p.19.
\textsuperscript{752} Interview with a former MEP and member of Turkey-EU Joint Parliamentary Committee, 4 June 2010.
\textsuperscript{753} Interview with a JDP parliamentarian, Ankara, Turkey, 23 June 2010.
\textsuperscript{754} Altunisik and Cuhadar, 'Turkey's Search,' pp.371-92
and more confrontational in its foreign policy towards the Middle East, which also enabled Turkey to play the role of a regional player in the Middle East, in a way demonstrating the union of the west and Islam in the JDP government’s policies.

The preceding analysis has offered a sketch of the change in the Middle Eastern regional context for Turkey. Turkey was perceived as a favourable player due to its ideational and geographical position in the region. The EU candidate role has therefore provided Turkey with a ‘power of attraction’ in the region mainly due to the institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU candidate role and its geographical location acquiring a new meaning as both a European and a Middle Eastern Muslim-majority country. Therefore, Turkey’s EU candidate role and the reforms it has undertaken to that end have altered the Middle Eastern regional opportunity structure by providing Turkey with a foreign policy resource in the Arab Middle East.

6.4 Conclusion

All in all, Turkish foreign policy discourse has produced at times overlapping roles of a regional collaborator, a reform promoter, a bridge, a mediator and an example in the Middle East. The main message remains clear and the same: that Turkey is a significant regional actor, which aims to contribute to the Middle Eastern regional development. By articulating their identity both as Middle Eastern/Islamic and European, Turkish foreign policy actors have represented Turkey as a ‘Middle Eastern country that is also part of the EU’. In doing so, Turkish actors act as the advocates of political and economic liberalisation, rule of law but also economic interdependence and regional economic integration. The projection of Turkey as a European and a Middle Eastern Muslim country has significantly enabled Turkey’s implementation of the strategic depth policy in the Middle East.
This chapter has demonstrated that Turkish foreign policy actors have used Turkey’s role as an EU candidate to communicate Turkey’s foreign policy objectives in the Middle East to the Middle Eastern audience. Therefore, this chapter has demonstrated on the basis of interviews and the analysis of Turkish actors’ foreign policy speeches that the Turkish actors’ discursive usage of the EU candidate role has enabled Turkey to implement its foreign policy towards the Arab Middle East. The Turkish foreign policy actors have perceived Turkey’s EU candidate role as its most important source of power of attraction in the Middle East and tapped into this resource effectively by communicating Turkey’s EU candidate role to the Arab elite through their foreign policy discourse. Turkey’s EU candidate role has most frequently been integrated to the roles of a bridge and an example. Turkey has been portrayed as a bridge for the Middle Eastern countries to the EU both ideationally and geographically. Also the institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU candidate role has been portrayed as qualifying Turkey as an example to be followed by the other Islamic countries.

Had Turkey not institutionalised the EU candidate role it would not have been possible for the Turkish actors to discursively portray Turkey as an EU candidate. According to the definition of Europeanisation of foreign policy advanced in this thesis, the institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU candidate role has to enable and/or constrain foreign policy significantly if it is to be called Europeanisation of foreign policy. In this respect, the discursive usage of Turkey’s EU candidate role has enabled the successful implementation of Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East and these would not have been possible without the institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU candidate role.

Having monitored the reception of Turkey’s EU candidate role in the Arab Middle East, JDP foreign policy actors used Turkey’s EU candidate role as a foreign policy resource. They have drawn upon their ‘experience as an EU candidate’ that is
capable of bridging the EU and the Middle East both geographically and culturally. Such usage demonstrates that Europeanisation can take place not only through two distinct logics of consequences or appropriateness. Instead, Turkish foreign policy actors used ‘universal norms’ and Turkey’s role as an EU candidate strategically to achieve the position of a regional power in the Middle East, thereby demonstrating that roles and norms do not necessarily belong with the domain of the logic of appropriateness and that strategic usage of roles and norms is also possible.

Bearing in mind that the institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU candidate role is not ‘the’ cause but part of the causal complex of Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Middle East in the 2000s, the imperative question to establish the causal significance of EU candidacy is whether Turkey would be able to implement its foreign policy in the Middle East had it not adopted the EU candidate role? The answer lies with the communicative discourse of the actor who used the EU candidate role and the Middle Eastern regional context. If the JDP was not a pro-Islamic party that has adopted the role of an EU candidate, it would be unlikely that the same foreign policy could have had the same success. The combination of the EU candidate role and a conservative Muslim outlook is mostly what has enabled this policy’s successful implementation. As the previous chapter has shown, what makes the JDP different from its Islamist predecessors was its adoption of Turkey’s EU candidate role. Running the counterfactual question in the other direction, the JDP without its pro-EU outlook would also not be successful in the Middle East. However, the context in which the role of an EU candidate is used also makes a difference. As it has been shown, the EU candidacy role only enabled the Turkish actors’ strategy in the Middle East in the context of a favourable regional Middle Eastern context. The civilisational conflict thesis that has characterised the post 9/11 period and increasing activism in the
region by Iran had made the context favourable for Turkey to pursue an active foreign policy in the Middle East.

Another important contextual factor has been the state of the relationship between Turkey and the EU. Turkish actors’ references to the EU candidate role in foreign policy discourse declined after 2005. As chapter four explained, this coincides with the period of the relations between the EU and Turkey cooling down. This cooling down has also been monitored by the Arab elite and therefore crippled the credibility of the EU and Turkey's candidacy in their eyes.\textsuperscript{755} In sum, the EU candidate role has played an important role in this causal complex that enabled Turkey to implement its foreign policy in the Middle East.

The next chapter now turns to the institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU candidate role of alignment with EU foreign policy rules. The impact of the strategic depth policy that the JDP governments have implemented in the Arab Middle East on the institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU candidate role in terms of EU foreign policy rules will be analysed.

CHAPTER SEVEN: TURKEY’S EU CANDIDATE ROLE AND FOREIGN POLICY RULES

This chapter analyses the EU’s role prescriptions for Turkey regarding foreign policy rules that Turkey should align its foreign policy with. These rules are those emanating from the EU’s external trade policy and those emanating from the CFSP. Based on the conceptualisation of Europeanisation explained in chapter three, this chapter shows how the institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU candidate role significantly enabled or constrained Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. It will be argued that the external trade prescriptions regarding the Middle East were largely compatible with Turkey's pre-existing agenda of improving economic relations with the Middle East. But the CFSP prescriptions offered a set of partially compatible prescriptions for Turkish actors to follow. Some of these prescriptions clashed with Turkey's delicately manufactured regional role in the Middle East. Yet, the JDP needed the institutionalisation of the EU candidate role also in terms of its foreign policy rules to be able to give meaning to its strategic depth policy, which led to an arduous task of persuading the EU members and officials that the alternative foreign policy role prescription that Turkey was offering was better for the future of the EU with Turkey.

To this end, this chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section is an analysis of the evolution of the EU’s foreign policy towards the Middle East and an assessment of the EU’s role prescriptions for Turkey regarding the Middle East. Then the perceptions and strategies of Turkish actors towards these rules will be analysed with an eye on the institutionalisation of Turkey's EU candidate role in terms of Turkey's foreign policy objectives.
7.1 The Evolution of the EU Foreign Policy towards the Middle East

The EC/EU has a relatively long history in foreign and security policy cooperation. The idea of foreign policy integration was always present since the earliest stages of European integration. The very first attempt at creating the European Defence Community came as early as 1952, but could not take off due to the French Parliament’s rejection. The Foreign and Security policy domain remained dormant after the failure of the European Defence Community until the 1970s. European Political Cooperation (EPC) was informally introduced in 1970 as a platform for the members of the European Community to coordinate their national foreign policies. It was not until the Single European Act in 1986 when EPC gained legal basis in treaty. Within the EPC framework one of the most significant foreign policy achievements of the EC/EU was realised, the Venice declaration of June 1980 on the Arab-Israeli peace process. The Venice declaration was the culmination of the Euro-Arab dialogue in the late 1970s. With the Maastricht Treaty, the EPC gave way to the CFSP. The CFSP was coined as Pillar II with the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992, which based the EU’s institutional structure on a pillar system. Foreign policy was an intergovernmental pillar, which was strictly considered as a domain reserved for the nation states.

The Maastricht Treaty and the creation of a CFSP pillar, despite intergovernmental, came as a brave step towards creating a European security policy. Not only the fact that it used the taboo words such as security, foreign, policy and

756 Brian White, Understanding European Foreign Policy (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), p.72
757 White, Understanding, p.71.
758 White, Understanding, p.74.
759 David Allen, comment made at the conference ‘The Lisbon Treaty One year on: what progress for European Union foreign policy?’ London School of Economics, London, UK, 4-5 November 2010
760 White, Understanding, p.81
common together;\textsuperscript{761} it also was a symbol of transformation into a political union from a largely economic integration project. As Smith has pointed out, the content was more or less based on the EPC;\textsuperscript{762} however, the language in the Treaty was very significant. The main difference between the EPC and the CFSP is that the latter covers security.\textsuperscript{763} This leap was the outcome of a causal complex whereby the changing international system as well as the internal developments such as the goal to establish the Economic and Monetary Union and the inadequacy of the EPC urged European policymakers to create the CFSP.\textsuperscript{764}

Another important step taken towards improving the EU’s international presence was the introduction of new foreign policy instruments, common positions and joint actions. One more instrument was added to this repertoire later with the Amsterdam Treaty (1997), which is the ‘common strategy’. The dividing line between the common positions and joint actions is quite vaguely stated due to a lack of consensus among member states.\textsuperscript{765} Common positions are defined as instruments “designed to make cooperation more systematic and improve its coordination. The member states are required to comply with and uphold such positions which have been adopted unanimously at the Council.”\textsuperscript{766} Joint actions are supposed to imply a more concrete and visible policy outcome, which are defined as coordinated action utilising all kinds of resources (i.e. human, financial, etc.) by the member states in line with the goals decided by the European Council.\textsuperscript{767} Common strategies as introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam “set[s] out the aims and length of time covered and the

\textsuperscript{761}White, Understanding, p.96


\textsuperscript{764}White, Understanding, p.96. Fraser Cameron, An Introduction to EU Foreign Policy (Park Square: Routledge, 2007), p.29.

\textsuperscript{765}White, Understanding, pp.104-5.

\textsuperscript{766}EU website, http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/common_position_cfsp_en.htm (3 April 2009)

\textsuperscript{767}EU website, http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/joint_action_cfsp_en.htm (3 April 2009)
means to be made available by the Union and the Member States. Common strategies are implemented by the Council, in particular by adopting joint actions and common positions."\textsuperscript{768} The Amsterdam Treaty also established new institutions such as those of the High Representative and the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit inside the Council.\textsuperscript{769} The Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit was created as a response to the criticism that the EU was only reactive to crises rather than undertaking long-term analyses and strategies. The Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit was staffed by the national and Commission officials and based in the Council Secretariat.\textsuperscript{770} The High Representative was to assist in the formulation and implementation of the CFSP decisions, through his participation in the troika with the incumbent and incoming presidencies.\textsuperscript{771} The aim of establishing this post was to ensure continuity in the CFSP, yet this position was not capable of subsuming all the voices in the system and remained only as one of the foreign policy actors of the EU.\textsuperscript{772}

Security was also included in the Maastricht Treaty. The Treaty stated that the CFSP "shall include all questions related to the security of the Union"\textsuperscript{773} as well as directing the Western European Union (WEU) to "elaborate and implement" any decision related to defence.\textsuperscript{774} However the WEU was not capable of implementing decisions related to defence by the time Maastricht Treaty entered into force. Therefore, in the 1992 Petersberg declaration, the WEU Council of Ministers declared that they would only engage in humanitarian, peacekeeping and crisis management related activities.\textsuperscript{775} Yet, the resources pledged by the WEU member states were not enough; thus there appeared a need that could be addressed by NATO. With the

\textsuperscript{768} EU website, http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/common_strategy_en.htm (3 April 2009)
\textsuperscript{769} Cameron, \textit{An Introduction}, p.30.
\textsuperscript{770} Smith, \textit{European Union Foreign Policy}, p.42.
\textsuperscript{771} Smith, \textit{European Union Foreign Policy}, p.42.
\textsuperscript{772} Smith, \textit{European Union Foreign Policy}, p.42.
\textsuperscript{773} White, \textit{Understanding}, p.99
\textsuperscript{774} Smith, ‘Europeanization,’ p. n/a
\textsuperscript{775} Smith, \textit{European Union Foreign Policy}, p.46.
clauses inserted by the Amsterdam Treaty, the Union acknowledged the importance of NATO in providing security for Europe as well as incorporating the Petersberg tasks of the WEU, into the CFSP framework. Petersberg tasks are defined as humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping and crisis management, the WEU was not incorporated into the EU and gradually disappeared as an organisation.\textsuperscript{776}

The biggest leap in establishing EU defence capabilities came in 1998 with the Franco-British St. Malo declaration calling for the EU to devise “the capacity of autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.”\textsuperscript{777} This goal of creating a European Security and Defence Policy was adopted by the EU at the Cologne European Council in June 1999, followed by the European Council in Helsinki in 1999 that made a commitment to develop military capabilities.\textsuperscript{778}

An important question to be resolved in the course of establishment of ESDP was the relationship with NATO and Turkey.\textsuperscript{779} Initially in the 1996 NATO Ministerial Summit in Berlin ministers of NATO member states agreed to let the EU use NATO assets in WEU-led operations. However due to subsequent blocking manoeuvres by Greece and Turkey the implementation had to wait until 2003.\textsuperscript{780} Turkey blocked the EU-NATO arrangements by acting in its capacity as a NATO member from 1999 to 2002.\textsuperscript{781} Turkey was demanding the right of non-EU NATO members to participate in the planning of EU operations that use NATO assets, if a non-EU NATO member flagged up the said operation as threatening their national

\textsuperscript{776} White, Understanding, p.149. Smith, European Union Foreign Policy, p.48.
\textsuperscript{777} Cameron, Introduction, p.74.
\textsuperscript{779} Keukelieire, ‘European Security,’ p.57.
\textsuperscript{780} Cameron, Introduction, p.87.
security or being in geographical proximity.\textsuperscript{782} Turkey's main concern was the possibility that NATO assets could be used in Cyprus against Turkish interests. The deadlock was resolved when the US, UK and Turkey presented a joint document outlining the framework of a future agreement. The compromise was the assurance that the ESDP was never going to be used in the Eastern Mediterranean, thereby alleviating Turkey's concerns.\textsuperscript{783} In March 2003 NATO and the EU concluded a framework for permanent relations, whereby NATO agreed to let the EU draw upon its planning, command structures and military resources on the basis of the so-called Berlin-Plus agreement.\textsuperscript{784}

All in all, the EU has already undertaken plenty of civilian and military operations as part of the ESDP and appeared as an actor on the peacekeeping scene. There have been 23 civilian and military combined ESDP missions up until December 2010.\textsuperscript{785} Among these there have been a few operations in the Middle East, such as operations for training Iraqi officials,\textsuperscript{786} monitoring the Rafah border crossing from Gaza to Egypt,\textsuperscript{787} and a police mission in the Palestinian Territories.\textsuperscript{788}

Despite all the institutionalisation over the years, the CFSP has been found disappointing by some observers.\textsuperscript{789} First of all it was argued that it was eventually an intergovernmental pillar, and reflected national interests even at the lowest levels of the CFSP machinery.\textsuperscript{790} Secondly, the CFSP was highly legalised and institutionalised as opposed to the EPC, which operated on the basis of a club atmosphere. This led to a

\textsuperscript{782} Medina-Abellan, ‘Turkey.’
\textsuperscript{783} Medina-Abellan, ‘Turkey.’
\textsuperscript{784} NATO, ‘NATO-EU: A Strategic Partnership,’ http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49217.htm (2 December 2010).
\textsuperscript{789} For example, Philip Gordon, ‘Europe’s Uncommon Foreign Policy,’ International Security, 22/3 (Winter 1997/98); Smith, ‘Europeanization.’
\textsuperscript{790} White, Understanding, p.101.
“path-dependence phobia” of the decision-makers as they were afraid to create precedents.\textsuperscript{791}

The ESDP operations also fail to save the CFSP from the allegations of incoherence and ineffectiveness since, as Keukeliere has observed aptly, “agreement on ESDP operations is sometimes a surrogate for a coherent common foreign policy on specific issues.”\textsuperscript{792} The main rationale is most of the time proving the EU integration process is ongoing and alive. The Iraqi war and the EU position regarding the Hamas victory in Gaza are the foremost illustrations of such inconsistencies and/or divisions in EU foreign policy. Iraqi War crystallised the division in both policy content and policymaking and the EU response to the election victory of Hamas in the Palestinian Territories revealed the inconsistency across EU policies.

The EU was split down the middle on Iraq when the US showdown started in 2002.\textsuperscript{793} The German response was largely driven by domestic politics as it was election time for Chancellor Schroeder and he ruled out German participation even in a UN-backed operation to Iraq.\textsuperscript{794} The French leadership also refused participation in the US-led operation and wanted to make the UN Security Council the ultimate arbiter in the crisis in order to counter US unilateralism.\textsuperscript{795} UK, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, Slovakia, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Slovenia backed the US-led multinational operation and sent troops or contributed otherwise.\textsuperscript{796} Leaving alone the deep clashes regarding the policy, even the policymaking style was largely divisive and driven by a \textit{directoire} approach. A gang of eight—Spain, Portugal, Britain, Denmark, Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland-- openly declared their support for the US. Germany and France coordinated their positions and made public declarations

\textsuperscript{791} Smith, ‘Europeanization,’ p. n/a.
\textsuperscript{792} Keukeliere, ‘European Security,’ p.68.
\textsuperscript{794} Rosemary Hollis, ‘European Elites and the Middle East,’ in \textit{The European Union and World Politics}, eds., Andrew Gamble and David Lane (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p.146.
\textsuperscript{795} Hollis, ‘European Elites,’ p.146.
\textsuperscript{796} Cameron, \textit{An Introduction}, p.32
underlining that the war was not inevitable.\footnote{Cameron, \textit{An Introduction}, pp.32-3.} Many countries withdrew troops from Iraq at later stages, sometimes due to changes in government.\footnote{For example, Spain’s new Prime Minister Zapatero was committed to withdrawing Spanish troops from Iraq and Spain withdrew from the multinational force in 2004. \textit{BBC news}, ‘Spain PM orders Iraq troops home,’ 18 April 2004.} However the initial response to the Iraqi crisis clearly demonstrated that “for the EU, the more external issues at stake are sensitive to international politics, the more internal divisions matter.”\footnote{Mario Telo, ‘The European Union: Divisions and Unity in European External Policies,’ in \textit{The European Union}, eds., Gamble and Lane, p.45.} The EU reflex to the crisis was simply no coordination except the 17 February 2003 joint declaration urging Iraq to disarm immediately, stating use of force as last resort and committing the EU to work with the US on the matter.\footnote{‘Split EU leaders find Iraq compromise,’ \textit{BBC news}, 18 February 2003.} Although this declaration was presented as showing the EU was united again by the Greek Presidency of the time,\footnote{‘Split EU.’} it was rather “a fairly loose compromise” that glossed over the substantial divisions among EU members over how much longer to wait before military action was to be taken.\footnote{Michael J. Baun and Dan Marek, ‘Czech Foreign Policy and EU integration: European and Domestic Sources,’ \textit{Perspectives on European Politics and Society}, 11/1 (2010), p.8.}

The EU reaction to Hamas’ victory in Gaza in the 2006 elections displayed another inconsistency in EU foreign policy. Ironically, the Arab-Israeli conflict is one issue that the EC/EU has had a common approach for a long time. The EU holds a common position, enjoys a single seat in the quartet that leads the peace talks between Israel and Palestine, and has a special representative in the region.\footnote{Cameron, \textit{An Introduction}, p.116.} The peak of EC/EU activity on this issue was the Venice Declaration in 1980, which meant “[i]n a radical diversion from the US position, the EC also called for the participation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization in peace negotiations and branded Israeli
settlements as ‘illegal’ under international law.”\textsuperscript{804} Another important declaration was the Berlin declaration of 1999, which called for the creation of a viable Palestinian state.\textsuperscript{805} These points make up the backbone of the EU policy towards the Middle East peace process today. The EU objective in the process is “a two-state solution with an independent, democratic, viable Palestinian state living side-by-side with Israel and its other neighbours,” therefore having a regional approach to the resolution of the issue including Israel’s relations with Syria and Lebanon as well as Palestine.\textsuperscript{806} Upon the election victory of Hamas in 2006, the EU faced a dilemma between respecting the outcome of the elections in the context of its democratisation agenda, and cutting its support for a terrorist organisation that was on the EU list of terrorist organisations.\textsuperscript{807} The EU tried to strike a middle position by asking Hamas to renounce violence and recognise the Israeli state’s right to existence, but when Hamas rejected these conditions, the EU suspended its aid to Palestinian Authorities in 2006. As a means to minimise the adverse effects of this suspension on Palestinian people, the EU adopted the Temporary International Mechanism for delivering emergency aid and basic services. This chain of events damaged the EU’s image as they preached “democratisation, yet refused to recognise the winners of a free and fair election in Palestine, which the EU itself had funded and monitored.”\textsuperscript{808}

With the Lisbon Treaty, major changes were made to the decision-making structure of the CFSP. The Lisbon Treaty, which aimed to streamline and simplify the EU decision making system, came into force in December 2009. The treaty abolished the pillar structure created by the Maastricht Treaty and introduced new posts such as the permanent European Council President and the High Representative of the EU for

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{805} ‘Europe’s Role in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,’ p.2.
\item \textsuperscript{806} EU External Action Service website, \url{http://www.eeas.europa.eu/mepp/index_en.htm} (3 March 2011)
\item \textsuperscript{807} Hollis, ‘European Elites,’ p.151.
\item \textsuperscript{808} Hollis, ‘European Elites,’ p.151. Also ‘Europe’s Role in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,’ p.3.
\end{itemize}
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, which are hoped to give the EU more visibility in its foreign affairs. However the same new posts took away the agenda-shaping powers of member state presidencies. This shift in the agenda-shaping powers to the newly created posts raises concerns that if these posts are not used effectively it might lead to a decline in the foreign policy activity of the Union.\textsuperscript{809} It remains to be seen how effective the Lisbon Treaty will render the EU as a foreign policy actor.

Although the EU has largely remained divided in its foreign and security policy, it has built a united and strong front in its external trade policy. As Sapir has aptly pointed out, “[t]rade policy has been the principal instrument of foreign policy for the EC, particularly in the form of trade preferences.”\textsuperscript{810} In the Mediterranean context, the trade regime between the EU and the Mediterranean partners is determined by the 1996 Euro-Mediterranean partnership launched at the 1995 Barcelona Euro-Mediterranean conference. The then non-EU Mediterranean participants were Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, and the Palestinian Authority. Cyprus and Malta also participated in the Euro-Mediterranean partnership but they joined the EU in 2004. Up until the launch of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the EC/EU had bilateral agreements with many of these Mediterranean countries but with the end of the Cold War and the rise of regionalism in the 1990s, the EU also switched tracks from bilateral relations to multilateralism in its structured relationship with the Mediterranean countries.\textsuperscript{811} Another reason was the geographical patronage of certain EU member countries.

\textsuperscript{809} ‘Lady Ashton launches fightback against critics ahead of key talks on EU foreign policy,’ \textit{The Guardian} (UK Daily), 4 March 2010.
the case of the EU’s relations with the Southern Mediterranean, the drivers have been the Mediterranean members of the EU.\textsuperscript{812}

The Euro-Mediterranean partnership covers both bilateral and multilateral relations between the EU and the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern countries, aiming to achieve cooperation and progress in political, economic and social aspects of the relationship.\textsuperscript{813} The Partnership was targeted towards achieving a free-trade area by 2010 between the EU and the Mediterranean partners as well as among the Mediterranean partners themselves. The partnership was legally based on Association Agreements signed by each partner and financial aid by the EU.\textsuperscript{814} This was a mix of political and financial instruments at the Union’s disposal to ensure stability in the region and to boost regionalism in the southern borders of the Union. New layers of institutional cooperation were added onto this basis until 2010 but the free trade area has not materialised yet.\textsuperscript{815}

One of those new layers in the EU-Mediterranean/Middle East structure is the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) that was initiated in 2004. With the initiation of the ENP, the Barcelona process was relegated to a multilateral forum, while bilateral relations between the EU and the southern neighbours were going to be managed by the ENP and its Action Plans.\textsuperscript{816} The main rationale was to give

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{812} Sapir, ‘The Political Economy,’ p.727.
\item \textsuperscript{813} Nicole Alecu de Flers and Elfriede Regelsberger, ‘The EU and Inter-regional Cooperation,’ in International Relations and the European Union, eds., Christopher Hill and Michael Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p.330.
\item \textsuperscript{815} Cameron, An Introduction, p.112.
\item \textsuperscript{816} EEAS website, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/euromed/barcelona_en.htm. (23 September 2011). The nine Arab states (excluding Libya and including the Palestinian Territories) on the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean therefore constitute the primary ‘target’ of ENP on the south.” Cameron, An Introduction, p.114.
\end{itemize}
neighbours “everything but the institutions” in order to ensure stability within the EU's neighbourhood.\textsuperscript{817}

The last layer added to the EU-Mediterranean structure was the Union for the Mediterranean, which originally was a French initiative but got adopted by the Union in 2008. The Union for the Mediterranean was aimed to revitalise EU-Mediterranean relations and render the partnership more visible by funding projects in areas such as economy, environment, energy, health, migration and culture, so as to make a difference in the lives of those living in the region.\textsuperscript{818} The Union for the Mediterranean is framed as a “Union for projects” whereby partners focus on cooperation with cherry picked partners in projects, without any human rights conditionality.\textsuperscript{819} The Union for the Mediterranean incorporates the Barcelona Process. However, it leaves out bilateral relations between the EU and partner countries within the remit of the ENP. Therefore a snapshot picture of the three different EU policies towards the Mediterranean countries displays some sort of a division of labour. The ENP offers development aid and incentives, even if quite vague, in return for improvement in harmonisation with the EU standards including human rights. The Union for the Mediterranean, incorporating the Barcelona process, takes the role of a regional forum focussing on particular sectors and projects, as opposed to the initial holistic approach of the Barcelona process\textsuperscript{820}, offering a functional approach to EU-


Mediterranean cooperation. The bilateral relations including trade are managed through the Euro-Mediterranean Association agreements.

Association agreements have been signed between the EU and Israel (1995), Jordan (1997), Palestinian Authority (1997), Egypt (2001), Lebanon (2002) and an agreement was initialled but failed in ratification with Syria (2008). The EU also supports bilateral or multilateral trade agreements among its Southern neighbours as such agreements are seen to be an essential element in the creation of an overarching EU-Mediterranean regional free trade area.

For the candidate countries, the only most significant role prescription is alignment with the CFSP acquis politique. The CFSP acquis politique includes the joint actions, common positions, statements and declarations, with which the candidate countries are expected to harmonise their foreign policies. In the case of Czech foreign policy, this is portrayed by Baun and Marek as "a relatively easy task since it was for the most part merely a rhetorical exercise." The case of Turkey presents a challenge in this respect. The CEECs were relatively new states with a rather inexperienced civil service in foreign policy, whereas Turkey has had a century-old foreign policy tradition.

7.2 The EU’s Role Prescription for Turkey in the Middle East

The CFSP rules of EU candidacy are largely limited to the alignment with the EU foreign policy acts within the CFSP framework and the resolution of border

821 Aliboni and Ammor, 'Under the Shadow,' p.8.
822 These are the countries that fall within the scope of this thesis, not an exhaustive list of all the Mediterranean countries, with which the EU has signed association agreements. European Union website. http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/regions/ euromed/ (3 May 2011).
823 Baun and Marek, 'Czech Foreign Policy,' p.2.
824 Baun and Marek, 'Czech Foreign Policy,' p.6.
disputes. As one of the interviewees has pointed out, the rule of peaceful resolution of border disputes could be a plausible explanation for Turkey’s changing foreign policy towards the Middle East.\textsuperscript{826} As chapter four has explained, Turkey had strained relationships with its Middle Eastern neighbours in the 1990s. There were incursions into northern Iraq and also Syria had claims for Alexandretta since it lost the district to Turkey in 1939. However, many interviewees confirmed that the resolution of border disputes rule only refers to Turkey’s border disputes with Greece, Cyprus and Armenia and that it does not refer to Turkey’s conflicts in its Middle East borders.\textsuperscript{827} Therefore, only the rule of alignment with the EU positions and acts as well as the harmonisation of Turkey’s foreign trade regime with that of the EU is dealt with in this chapter.

The political dialogue meetings are usually in the format of presentation of EU foreign policy objectives without much discussion.\textsuperscript{828} This has constructed political dialogue meetings as a venue for the EU to express its foreign policy prescriptions for Turkey’s candidate role in general, including matters relating to foreign policy towards the Middle East.

As opposed to the non-binding nature of foreign policy rules that originate from the CFSP, there are also trade rules that are part of the EU’s role prescription for Turkey, which are legally binding and materially effective. Trade being one of the most communitarised of all EU policies presents a highly cohesive policy with enforcement mechanisms for EU members. For Turkey, the role prescription of adaptation to the EU’s external trade policy came with the customs union decision in 1996, even before candidacy, and therefore presented Turkey with a highly cohesive policy template when aligning its trade policy and preferential trade agreements with those of the EU.

\textsuperscript{826} Interview with a former MEP and member of the EU-TR Joint Parliamentary Committee, 4 June 2010.
\textsuperscript{827} Interview with a senior Turkish civil servant, Ankara, Turkey, 20 July 2010; interview with an EU official, Brussels, Belgium, 13 September 2010; interview with a European diplomat, Brussels, Belgium, 6 September 2010. Interview with Murat Yetkin, journalist, Ankara, Turkey, 22 July 2010.
\textsuperscript{828} Interview with a policy analyst and former diplomat, Istanbul, Turkey, 12 July 2010.
Some of these trade agreements were with the Middle Eastern neighbours of Turkey. The remainder of this chapter therefore also traces the role perceptions, conceptions and performance of Turkey vis-à-vis the Arab Middle East in the context of the EU’s CFSP and trade role prescriptions.

Turkey has been in a customs union with the EU since 1996 and article 16 of the customs union decision states that “Turkey shall align itself progressively with the preferential customs regime of the Community within five years as from the date of entry into force” of the decision.\textsuperscript{829} This transition period for Turkey's alignment with the Community's preferential trade regime was to end on 1 January 2001. As Turkey's candidacy was layered onto the existing customs union between the EU and Turkey, unfulfilled customs union rules were also included in the EU's candidacy role prescription for Turkey. This rule is communicated through the Accession Partnership for Turkey and the Commission includes a review of these issues in its annual Progress Reports.

The requirements of the customs union decision were the full alignment of Turkey's Preferential Trade Agreements with those of the EU. The Commission has acknowledged Turkey's efforts at aligning its bilateral agreements with third countries, by negotiating free trade agreements (FTA) with Middle Eastern countries such as the Palestinian Authority.\textsuperscript{830} FTAs were signed with the Palestinian Authority and Syria in 2004, Lebanon in 2010, Jordan in 2010.\textsuperscript{831} The Commission also acknowledged the difficulty for Turkey to initiate negotiations with all countries that have signed a free trade agreement with the EU due to the reluctance of other parties.

\textsuperscript{829} Customs Union decision, Section IV, Article 16. Decision No 1/95 of the EC-Turkey Association Council of 22 December 1995 on implementing the final phase of the Customs Union. Official Journal L 035, 13/02/1996 P. 0001 – 0047.


\textsuperscript{831} European Commission, 2003 Progress Report on Turkey, External Relations, p. n/a; European Commission, 2011 Progress Report on Turkey.
at times, while urging Turkey to continue its efforts to align its FTAs with those of the EU.  

Therefore, third countries’ perceptions of Turkey are also important factors that alter the institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU candidate role in foreign policy. As foreign policy is relational between the interior and the exterior of the state, it is not possible to implement foreign policies without the other party’s responsiveness. This was especially significant in the EU’s candidate role prescription of the alignment of the trade regime.

An important stumbling block in the way of signing FTAs with these countries was that some of them did not respond positively to Turkey’s efforts to initiate negotiations for the FTAs and some of them were reluctant even after the negotiations were initiated. The reluctance of these countries was due to the fact that Turkey’s proposed FTA conditions were overshadowed by those of the EU, since the EU also offered aid whereas Turkey only offered trade. Another reason was Turkey’s lack of good political relations with these countries, which was central in the context of concluding FTAs with Middle Eastern countries.

Due to the customs union between Turkey and the EU, these countries were benefiting from Turkey’s customs union with the EU without having to extend the same privileges to Turkey. Once Turkey entered into a customs union with the EU the risk emerged of goods originating from the EU’s preferential trade partners entering the Turkish market via the EU. As there are no boundaries between Turkey and the EU in terms of circulation of industrial goods as part of the customs union, the

\[833\] Interview with a Turkish civil servant from the Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade, Ankara, Turkey, 28 May 2011; Ahmet Celebi, ‘Avrupa Birliği Serbest Ticaret Anlaşmalarının Türk Sanayi Sektorleri üzerine Etkileri,’ *Durum: Turktrade magazine* (August 2010).
\[834\] Interview with a Turkish civil servant from the Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade, Ankara, Turkey, 28 May 2011.
\[835\] Interview with a Turkish civil servant from the Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade, Ankara, Turkey, 28 May 2011.
\[836\] Ulgen and Zahariadis, ‘The Future of Turkish-EU.’
origin of goods in free circulation is not checked.\(^{837}\) Another factor was that although Turkey joined a customs union with the EU and agreed to implement the EU’s common commercial policy, it had no say over either the countries the EU was going to sign FTAs with or the content of the agreements.\(^{838}\) EU officials argue that when they sign an FTA they urge their free trade partners to also sign an agreement with Turkey. However this informal suggestion that is called the “Turkey clause” is not binding on the partners.\(^{839}\) Coupled with some Middle Eastern countries’ reluctance to sign an FTA with Turkey, this problem has caused resentment in Turkish policy and business circles.

In sum, the foreign policy rules that comprise of the EU’s candidate role prescription for Turkey offer a complex of binding and non-binding political and economic rules. In the next section, it will be showed that there is no systematic convergence or divergence between Turkey’s role performance and the EU’s foreign policy rules. Rather, it will be demonstrated that the causal power of the EU candidate role prescribed by the EU is how they are perceived by Turkish actors and how Turkish actors interpreted, appropriated or changed these expectations in the course of institutionalising Turkey’s EU candidate role.

### 7.3 Role Performance

Many authors have criticised the EU’s foreign policy as reflecting the lowest common denominator of member state foreign policy priorities.\(^{840}\) The same perception persists among the Turkish foreign policy actors. The intergovernmental

\(^{837}\) Interview with a Turkish civil servant from the Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade, 28 May 2011; Celebi, ‘Avrupa Birliği.’

\(^{838}\) Cigdem Nas, ‘Gumruk Birliği ve Türkiye’nin AB Ticaret Rejimine Uyumu,’ *Dunya* (Turkish weekly), 30 October 2010.

\(^{839}\) Nas, ‘Gumruk Birliği.’

\(^{840}\) For a review of such accounts see, for example, Smith, *European Union Foreign Policy*, pp.9-12.
nature of the CFSP and the divisions over foreign policy have led to the perception of
CFSP rules of EU candidacy as “a less imposing requirement... than in other areas of
European integration such as, for instance, agricultural policies.”841 According to a
Turkish civil servant of EU affairs, the EU finds it easier to make statements on issues
and countries that are not of broader international significance, but finds it difficult to
reach a common viewpoint on cases that are in the spotlight internationally.842
Likewise, Turkey’s head of permanent representation to the EU has pointed out that
the Middle East is an issue that reveals the most the EU’s internal divisions.843 Despite
the Union’s unity over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Turkish foreign policy
practitioners do not perceive the EU to be a coherent and effective foreign policy actor
regarding Middle Eastern conflicts. Therefore they perceived foreign policy role
prescriptions of the EU for Turkey as less strictly defined. Turkey's alignment was
selective, limited to those foreign policy decisions that did not clash with the existing
foreign policy ideas of Turkey.

Turkey’s alignment record with the EU statements, declarations, joint
actions and common positions has been geographically skewed. All progress reports
published by the Commission until 2004 have posited that Turkey has successfully
aligned itself with the declarations, statements, joint actions and common positions.844
The 2004 Report praised Turkey’s participation in the EU crisis management
operations, including the EU police mission in Bosnia Herzegovina and Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. However, it pointed out that Turkey's alignment with
CFSP statements has been lower in the case of its neighbours, including the 2004 EU

842 Interview with a Turkish civil servant, Ankara, Turkey, 20 May 2010; interview with a senior Turkish
civil servant, Ankara, Turkey, 20 July 2010.
843 Interview with Selim Kuneralp, Head of Turkey's permanent representation to the EU, Brussels,
Belgium, 6 September 2010.
844 European Commission, 2000 Progress Report on Turkey, p.67; European Commission, 2001 Progress
Report on Turkey, p.99; European Commission, 2002 Progress Report on Turkey, p.127; European
policy on Iraq. The 2005 Progress Report has pointed up a similar geographical divergence. In its 2005 Report, the Commission has observed Turkey’s lack of alignment with the EU rules mainly on a geographical basis. The 2006 report pointed to Turkey’s lack of alignment with the EU’s list of terrorist organizations, which includes Hamas. However, these observations came alongside praise for Turkey’s placing pressure on Syria for compliance with the UN Decision 1636 regarding the UN Commission’s investigation into the assassination of the former Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri. The 2007 and 2008 reports followed with observations on Turkey’s efforts at alignment with the EU positions as well as its efforts at establishing stability in its region, whereas the 2009 report pointed out Turkey’s lack of alignment with the EU on Syria.

There are a few issues that revealed observable divergence between the EU position and Turkey’s position, that of relations with Iraq, Syria and Hamas. In the case of Iraq, Turkey did not align itself with the EU position on Iraq in the aftermath of the Iraqi war. As the Commission has aptly stated:

> it is also clear that Turkey is hesitant to align itself to EU positions on issues which it feels touch its vital foreign policy and security interests, in particular regarding its geographical neighbourhood (Iraq, Caucasus, etc.), human rights and developments in Muslim countries, where it insists on a distinct national position.

For example while the EU welcomed the agreement on the Iraqi Transitional Administrative Law in 2004, Turkey was extremely suspicious of the Law and positioned itself against it. This was due to Turkey’s ongoing concerns about the

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848 European Commission, 2006 Progress Report on Turkey, p.72.
status of Kirkuk, Turcomans and northern Iraq. The transitional Law recognised the
Turcomans, the Turkish speaking community in Iraq, as a minority rather than a
constituent community of Iraq and also established an autonomous Kurdish region in
Northern Iraq. The Law also did not address Turkey's concerns over the rights of
Turcomans in northern Iraq. This reflects Turkey's initial post-2003 red lines vis-à-vis
Iraq: the prevention of a federated or independent Kurdish entity emerging in
northern Iraq, the prevention of the seizure of Kirkuk by such an entity and finally
securing rights for the Turcoman communities in the region. The Transitional
Administrative Law did establish a federal Iraqi state and a Kurdish regional
government that was autonomous, which conflicted Turkey's objectives in Iraq.
However, Turkey dropped its 'red lines' later in the process and fell more in line with
the EU policy of aiming to work towards state and institution building in Iraq. Turkish
businesses' growing presence in Kurdistan was an important driver behind this
change of policy.

For Turkey, cooperation with Syria represented an effective gateway to
the Arab Middle East both politically and economically. In the past, Syria had used
Arab and Third World Forums against Turkey, therefore it served more or less as a
gatekeeper for Turkey to improve relations with the Arab world. Similarly, Syria
also served as a physical transit function for Turkish trade with the rest of the Middle
East. After 2000, Turkey has gone beyond normalisation of its relationship with
Syria and both parties built up mutual trust and institutionalised bilateral cooperation.

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851 Turcomans are deemed as "Iraqi Turks" by the Turkish documents. The Turkish foreign policy elite
adopted the role as the guardian of Turcomans’ rights in Iraq claiming ethnic ties with the community.
852 ‘Irak Işgali ABD ile İlişkileri Golgeledi,’ Radikal, 1 January 2005.
853 Kirisci, ‘Turkey’s foreign policy,’ p. 66.
854 Interview with a former senior Turkish foreign policymaker, Ankara, Turkey, 21 June 2010; Also
Kirisci, ‘Turkey’s foreign policy,’ p.69.
855 Meliha Benli Altunisik and Ozlem Tur, ‘From Distant Neighbors to Partners? Changing Syrian-Turkish
856 Kirisci, “Turkey’s foreign policy,” p.77.
857 Kirisci, “Turkey’s foreign policy,” p.77.
In the meantime, the EU has made several CFSP statements and declarations criticising Syria's human rights abuses, with most of which Turkey did not align itself. This lack of alignment was mentioned in the 2009 progress report by the EU Commission on Turkey. Turkey's lack of alignment demonstrates its ongoing efforts at building close ties with Syria, unhindered by the EU declarations criticising Syrian human rights abuses. While such EU concerns over human rights abuses in Syria coupled with US pressure led to a stalling of the EU-Syria Association Agreement in 2009, Turkey has proceeded with its FTA and visa-exemption agreement with Syria, which were perceived by Syria as demonstrating the reliability of Turkey's policies toward itself.

Another apparent case of divergence is the case of high-level contact with a Hamas delegation after Hamas won the elections in 2006 in the Palestinian Territories. However, in reality there is convergence. The 2006 elections in the Palestinian territories gave Hamas, which is the hardliner group that was infamous for its violent means and uncompromising stance, a victory and the right to form the cabinet. This was received negatively by the US and Israel. In this context a Hamas visit to Turkey took place. Many commentators as well as politicians criticised Turkey for hosting Hamas, which still had not given up arms. Among these critiques the harshest ones came from the US and Israel. Israelis bitterly criticised the visit and likened Hamas to the PKK, and rhetorically asked if the Turkish government would be content with a PKK visit to Israel. US diplomats were as bitter as their Israeli counterparts in expressing their disappointment. Most recently, Robert Wexler, a member of the US Congress, said that he could not understand “why Turkey, a country

858 For the list of EU statements and declarations, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/press/press-releases/search?lang=en&command=r&title=syria&date=01%2f01%2f0001&dodang=EN (2 December 2011). Turkey’s lack of alignment was raised in the 2009 report only.

859 Altunisik and Tur, ‘From Distant Neighbours.’

860 Interview with a Turkish diplomat, Ankara, Turkey, 27 May 2011. The details of this FTA will be discussed in the next section.

861 ‘Wilson says Hamas Visit was Disappointment,’ Turkish Daily News, 5 April 2006.
that has suffered so much from terrorism met with the ‘exiled leader’ of a terrorist gang.”862 This reaction was mainly due to the US and Israeli policy of isolating Hamas and cutting off the financial aid to Palestine until Hamas drops weapons.

European responses to the Hamas visit were rather ambiguous due to the dilemma of how to deny the results of free elections held in Palestine. This dilemma faced by the Union is ably expressed by a Spanish member of the European Parliament who said, “but we cannot push for democracy and then deny the result of free and fair elections.”863 Likewise the then High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Javier Solana, highlighted that the Palestinian people had “voted democratically and peacefully” while acknowledging that Hamas’ victory was going to present the EU with challenges.864 As a result of this dilemma, the EU adopted an official line of getting “the best of two worlds” by boycotting Hamas into renouncing violence, recognising Israel and the past agreements, while using Temporary International Mechanism -TIM to provide basic goods for the Palestinian people.865 This official position adopted by the EU was reflected in the 2006 Progress Report on Turkey, where the Commission pointed up the lack of alignment between Turkey and the EU on the recognition of Hamas as a terrorist organization.

The Turkish government regarded talking to Hamas as a necessary step on the way to resolving the problems, and was behind its move. The then Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gul has stated that they were doing their share for peace in the region. He has also said:

these days are important days. Correct messages should be given. Someone should do something; if the wrong paths are taken, both

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862 Yusuf Kanlı, ‘What was in it for Turkey?’ ANKAM Turkish Foreign Policy, 11 April 2006.
Palestinian and Israeli people will get hurt...Peace negotiations will be at the table, and no doubt there should be no violence.  

The Hamas delegation’s visit was harshly criticised by Israel and the US. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was left in the dark according to US documents and the delegation was only hosted by the JDP, as Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan had to cancel the meeting with the delegation in his capacity as Prime Minister. In domestic politics the visit found warm reception among the JDP electorate that have largely had a pro-Palestinian position. In the international arena the main goal was two-pronged: a genuine belief that Hamas should be engaged before crises erupt in the Middle East. Secondly, the JDP aimed to achieve this goal by asserting Turkey’s regional power in accordance with its post-Islamist strategic depth doctrine that was in tune with the party’s Ottoman nostalgia. In Jenkins’ words, the main “motivation appears to have been simply to demonstrate that Turkey is a major player in the region rather than to make any contribution to alleviating the plight of the Palestinians.”

Relations with Hamas demonstrate an interesting case where there is a strict EU policy, which Turkey contradicted by holding a meeting with the Hamas delegation. However, behind closed doors Turkish officials had coordinated with the EU their meeting with Hamas. The meeting was largely justified to domestic and international opposition as a JDP initiative rather than the government’s official policy.

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869 Robins, ‘Between the EU.’
871 Gareth Jenkins, ‘Comment: Opportunities gained or lost?’ Al-Ahram Weekly, 783 (23 February - 1 March 2006). Also ‘Turkey’s Reform Efforts Wane,’ Deutsche Welle World, 8 March 2006.
872 Interview with a Turkish diplomat, Ankara, Turkey, 3 May 2010.
and the overriding legitimating discourse was that Turkey managed to give Hamas historic and correct messages.\textsuperscript{873}

From the outset, this seems like a severe divergence between the EU position and that of Turkey's. However, a few interviewees pointed out that there was no divergence between Turkey and the EU on the issue of relations with Hamas.\textsuperscript{874} The EU’s divided approach of promoting democratic elections but not respecting the outcome of these elections was due to Hamas being recognised as a terrorist organisation by the EU and that it would be difficult to justify to the EU public opinion contacting a terrorist organisation.\textsuperscript{875} Therefore, informally the EU wanted to have contacts with Hamas and they were content with Turkey’s contacts, while formally criticising them.\textsuperscript{876} Such inconsistencies further magnified the EU policymakers’ perception of the EU’s candidate role prescriptions of foreign policy as non-binding and insignificant.

The preceding review shows a few cases where Turkey failed to align itself with the EU statements, declarations and positions, such as Iraq in 2004, Hamas in 2006 and Syria in 2009. However, there was a substantial level of alignment in other areas such as the Middle East Peace Process and the policy toward Iraq after 2008. Many cases of Turkey’s broad alignment with the CFSP positions such as the Middle East Peace Process are cases where Turkey had congruent foreign policy objectives with the EU.\textsuperscript{877} This shows a selective alignment process where the Turkish government aligned itself with the EU decisions when that served Turkish political

\textsuperscript{873} Jenkins, ‘Comment,’ and Robins, ‘Between the EU.’

\textsuperscript{874} Interview with a former MEP and member of the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee, 4 June 2010; Interview with a Turkish diplomat, Ankara, Turkey, 3 May 2010.

\textsuperscript{875} Interview with former MEP and member of the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee, 4 June 2010.

\textsuperscript{876} Another EU official backed this by arguing that keeping channels of communication open with Hamas would be a good thing as long as the right message of renunciation of violence and recognition of Israel gets through. Interview with an EU official, Brussels, Belgium, 10 November 2010. German Foreign Minister said that they had no objection to a mediation initiative on the part of Turkish government if it could convince Hamas to drop weapons. ‘Berlin to Back Ankara Mediation if Hamas Renounces Violence,’ \textit{Deutsche Welle}, 12 April 2006.

\textsuperscript{877} Interview with a Turkish diplomat, Ankara, Turkey, 27 May 2011.
actors’ own conception of their role in the Middle East or when the issue was not a matter of substantial concern. As Barysch has pointed out, most of the acts [CFSP rules] that Turkey adopted are not of significance for Turkish foreign policy or EU-Turkey relations. However, the picture is different with the matters that are significant for Turkey.\textsuperscript{878}

The priority in the Arab Middle East for the EU is the Middle East peace process.\textsuperscript{879} The Palestinian plight is at the heart of the region’s disputes and it weaves a complex web among Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Palestine and Egypt. In other words, “there can be no durable peace and stability in the Middle East until a just solution to the Palestinian plight is found.”\textsuperscript{880} In this respect, Turkey has always aimed for the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict in order not to “need to maintain the difficult balance between keeping diplomatic and economic relations with Israel and showing solidarity with the Arab and Islamic world.”\textsuperscript{881} To this end, Turkey has first reluctantly started making contacts in the region to facilitate the solution of the Arab-Israeli disputes since 1998-9 as part of the then Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit’s visions and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ismail Cem. This drive intensified under the JDP governments that first took office in 2002. Especially since 2002, Turkey has strived for visibility in the Middle East through its economic initiatives and many attempts at diplomatic facilitation.

Turkey has undertaken several mediation/facilitation efforts in the Arab-Israeli conflict including between Syria and Israel, Palestinian rival organisations Hamas and Fatah, as well as intra-Arab disputes such as Lebanon-Syria and Syria-Iraq

\textsuperscript{878} Katinka Barysch, ‘Why the EU and Turkey Need to Coordinate Their Foreign Policies,’ \textit{Centre for European Reform Commentary} (31 August 2011).
\textsuperscript{879} Interview with a western diplomat, Ankara, Turkey, 30 June 2010. The interviewee said the highest tier for the EU in terms of the Middle East is the Middle East peace process and Iran. Iran falls outside the scope of this study.
as explained in chapter four. In almost all of these initiatives Turkey was praised by the EU Commission. The progress reports repeatedly acknowledged Turkey’s alignment with the EU on the broad Middle East peace process agenda.

Another example of Turkey’s alignment with the EU foreign policy rules is the alignment with the EU’s trade policy towards the Middle East. The EU’s external trade policy overlapped with an existing trend in the Turkish trade agenda from the 1990s to establish FTAs and enter new markets. Indeed, Turkey had signed its first FTA with the European Free Trade Area countries in 1991 and approached the CEECs with the same objective, however without success. Therefore there has already been an ongoing trend in Turkish trade policy towards signing FTAs, which accelerated due to Turkey’s customs union obligations to align its trade policy with that of the EU. The motivation behind signing FTAs with the Middle East has largely been perceived economic benefits associated with developing trade with the Arab Middle East. According to a senior civil servant from the Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade, Turkey’s efforts towards concluding FTAs with its Middle Eastern neighbours would have remained constant had there been no customs union with the EU or the EU candidate role of Turkey. The major difference that the customs union made has been the prioritisation of countries. Signing FTAs with the Middle Eastern partners was seen to be profitable and not problematic as these countries were not competitors for Turkish industries. As a Middle Eastern diplomat has acknowledged, Turkey has remarkable advantage over the Arab Middle East in terms of industrial

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884 Helvacioglu, ‘Türkiye’nin Uyguladığı.’

885 Interview with a Turkish civil servant from the Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade, Ankara, Turkey, 28 May 2011.
Therefore the perceived benefits of signing FTAs with the Middle Eastern countries as part of Turkey's alignment with the EU trade policy were significant for the Turkish governments.887

The FTA signed with Syria was an outstanding case of Turkey moving first before the EU-Syria agreement was ratified and put in effect. Syria and the EU started negotiations for signing the EU-Syria Association Agreement in 1998, which was initialled in 2004. However, it failed to reach the final signature stage due to the assassination of the Lebanese President Rafik Hariri in 2005, and the subsequent international pressure on Syria to cooperate with the International Tribunal on the murder of Hariri as the Syrian intelligence service was suspected to be part of the assassination.888 Another factor was the US' classification of Syria as a rogue state after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent US sanctions on Syria. In early 2009, relations between the EU and Syria deteriorated once more due to some Member States' distrust of Syrian willingness to improve the human rights situation and US pressure on the EU member states and the Czech Presidency to delay the debate on the Association Agreement at the Council.889 Afterwards, the Syrian side also grew colder towards concluding the Association Agreement due to the pressure from domestic industries demanding protection from EU competition. The EU's trade relations remain governed by the 1977 EU-Syria cooperation agreement, which "provides duty free access to the EU market for most Syrian industrial goods, and assistance to Syria's 'production and economic infrastructure'."890 In this context,

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887 Celebi, 'Avrupa Birligi,' and interview with a Turkish diplomat, Ankara, Turkey, 27 May 2011.
Turkey signed an FTA with Syria, which came into effect in 2007, thereby predating the EU’s ratification and implementation of an Association Agreement with Syria.

Therefore the Turkey-Syria FTA was important in the sense that the EU had not ratified and implemented an FTA with Syria at the time; however the EU still applied a preferential trade regime towards Syria. According to a civil servant from the Turkish Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade, the fact that Syria was already benefiting from the EU’s preferential trade regime made the Turkish FTA unproblematic.\(^{891}\) Likewise an official from the EU Council noted that although Turkey did not consult with the EU prior to signing the FTA with Syria that was not a big problem as “a level of differentiation is also expectable”.\(^{892}\) On the other hand, Turkey’s conclusion of an FTA with Syria despite the failure of the conclusion of the EU-Syria Association Agreement gave Turkey credibility in the eyes of the Syrian government.\(^{893}\) Therefore, at this time Turkey did not restrict itself to the EU’s FTAs and has even gone further. In the Syrian case, the FTA with Turkey and the freely circulating goods from Turkey were used by Syrian domestic industries as an argument against the conclusion of the FTA with the EU.\(^{894}\) According to the Wall Street Journal, Syrian industrialists were “already reeling as a result of the country’s 2007 free-trade agreement with Turkey. Scores of firms have been forced to shut, fanning a public backlash against economic liberalization enacted by the authoritarian regime of President Bashar Assad.”\(^ {895}\) Therefore, although there was materially no trade diversion of Syrian exports from the EU to Turkey due to the FTA signed with Turkey and the already existing preferential trade regime with the EU, the FTA with

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\(^{891}\) Interview with a Turkish civil servant from the Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade, Ankara, Turkey, 28 May 2010.

\(^{892}\) Interview with an EU official, Brussels, Belgium, 9 November 2010.

\(^{893}\) Interview with a Turkish diplomat, Ankara, Turkey, 27 May 2011.

\(^{894}\) ‘Syria Stalls on Signing Trade Deal With EU,’ *Wall Street Journal*, 19 November 2009.

\(^{895}\) ‘Syria Stalls.’
Turkey had an ideational effect on Syrian businesses. The experience of the Turkish-Syrian FTA caused Syrian people to perceive the idea of an FTA with the EU negatively.

The preceding account shows that there is not much correlation between the EU’s candidate role prescription for Turkey and Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. There is hardly any pattern in Turkey's foreign policy actions that is either in line or against the EU’s role prescription. However, it will be argued below that there is a deeper pattern, which has occurred due to Turkish foreign policymakers' continuous attempts to alter the EU’s role prescription for Turkey in foreign policy rules in line with Turkey's strategic-depth policy. A research design that utilises independent-dependent variables would not be able to detect any causal relation at this point. Further research into Turkish actors’ foreign policy ideas, the context as well as their discursive strategies reveal that Turkish actors in fact managed to change the selectivities of the EU’s role prescription for Turkey.

7.4 The Foreign Policy Paradigm of Turkey and the EU Foreign Policy Rules

In the pursuit of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East, the foreign policy paradigm of the Turkish policymakers was post-Islamist westernisation, which had been systematically pursued after the JDP came to power in 2002 and the objective was to pursue strategic depth policy in the region mostly for boosting economic integration in the region. As a Turkish diplomat has also revealed:

The priority is not mediation or conflict resolution per se; we are not really achieving many results, and that's perhaps not the point anyway. The point is to be visible, to look like a power, to make our neighbours like
us, to achieve stability which will help economic growth and to increase trade and investments.896

This policy has been reflected in the subsequent JDP government programmes in 2002 and 2003, where both Prime Ministers Abdullah Gul and Recep Tayyip Erdogan highlighted that the spilling of blood in the Middle East worries and upsets especially the Turkish people who have got close historical and cultural ties with the region.897 Likewise, a senior member of the JDP has also underlined in an interview that many Middle Eastern individuals who are aged 90 and over are also Ottoman citizens.898 On the other hand, Prime Minister Erdogan also referred to the Ottoman Empire's central place in the European state system while discussing Turkey's relationship with the EU when he argued that "Turkey's modernisation and civilisation efforts date back to centuries ago. The Ottoman Empire has been part of European history for centuries and played an important role in the emergence of contemporary Europe."899 Therefore the JDP has balanced their advocacy of improved relations with the Middle East, which is former Ottoman territory, by using the Ottoman history in Europe as a counter balance. This balance is what, Taspinar has argued, makes strategic depth policy different from previous episodes of Islamist foreign policy, which only focused on improving relations with the Muslim world (see chapter four).900

The post-Islamist westernisation paradigm and the strategic depth policy that Ahmet Davutoglu carved out of it have defined the contours of Turkey's objectives in the Middle East. These objectives at times overlapped with the CFSP and

896 Crisis Group interview with a Turkish diplomat in the Middle East, February 2010. Quoted by the International Crisis Group, 'Turkey and the Middle East,' p.14.
898 Interview with a former senior foreign policymaker, Ankara, Turkey, 21 June 2010.
899 Recep Tayyip Erdogan, speech at the Turkish General National Assembly, TBMM archives, volume 16, session 87, 29 May 2003.
900 Taspinar, 'Turkey's.'
trade rules of the EU, with which Turkey’s EU candidate role prescribed Turkey’s alignment, thereby creating a shallow convergence between the EU’s and Turkey’s foreign policies in the Middle East.

7.5 Institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU Candidate Role

However, there is a deeper causality than there can be observed in Turkey’s partial alignment with EU candidacy rules on foreign policy. Turkey’s EU candidate role was necessary to give meaning to the foreign policy that was initiated in the beginning of the 2000s and has been pursued till the end of the decade. Turkish actors could not afford to simply not play the role of an EU candidate in foreign policy, they needed the continuation of Turkey’s EU candidate role for giving meaning to their foreign policy orientation. The legitimating power of the westernisation paradigm was perceived as necessary by the JDP leadership, which was operationalised as the party’s commitment to the EU candidacy role of Turkey in both domestic politics and foreign policy. The presence of continuing contradiction between the EU’s foreign policy role prescriptions and Turkish actors’ role performance would threaten the pro-EU role played by the JDP in foreign policy. An example of this has indeed appeared in the form of a ‘shift of axis’ debate in Turkey’s foreign policy.\(^{901}\) Allegations that Turkey has shifted its foreign policy axis from the west towards the Middle East had come to surface and the Prime Minister responded by arguing that on the contrary to these allegations, Turkey was aiming for helping the EU by its foreign policy activism rather than being a burden upon its accession to the EU.\(^{902}\) Put simply, the EU’s role prescription and Turkish role performance needed to be made complementary and Turkish political actors have utilised discursive

\(^{902}\) Candar, “Turkiye.”
strategies to achieve a certain level of complementarity by making references to the institutionalised goal of Turkey's accession to the EU.

The main discursive strategy was to emphasise the central importance of Turkey in the Middle Eastern regional structure. Accordingly, although sometimes defecting from the EU's role expectations, Turkey was acting as a peacemaker and stabiliser in the Middle East thanks to Turkish policymakers' (allegedly) extensive knowledge of the Middle Eastern affairs, i.e. common culture and religion. Turkey as a regional power rather than in perfect compliance with the EU's role expectations in foreign policy would be a greater asset for the EU in the case of future accession of Turkey.

Likewise, a former senior foreign policymaker and a JDP parliamentarian has said: [w]e say Turkey would be an asset for the EU, because Turkey knows the Middle East well. However, the EU alone can be effective in that same region. Therefore we do not claim that cooperation with Turkey is necessary. We only argue that if the EU cooperates with Turkey, it can achieve its goals more efficiently. We say that we are not indispensable but it would be better for you to cooperate.903

A former parliamentarian has also supported this argument that Turkey could be an asset for the EU by saying that "there is an underlying proposition that Turkey can solve problems in the Middle East thereby contributing to the EU’s security."904

A JDP parliamentarian has also claimed that it is important for the EU that Turkey improves its relationship with the Middle East, because Turkey is a buffer between the EU and the Middle East and the Turkish government has been using this role in their dealings with the EU. The interviewee has argued that due to this, the EU has started adopting a more neutral approach to Turkey’s lack of alignment with the

903 Interview with a former senior foreign policymaker, Ankara, Turkey, 21 June 2010.
904 Interview with a former DLP parliamentarian, Ankara, Turkey, 7 May 2010.
foreign policy expectations of the EU. In a similar vein, another JDP parliamentarian has argued that "one of the most important arguments that we put forward is that a country with good relations with its neighbours and especially influential in the Middle East is a much better EU candidate."

Turkey's influence in the region is claimed to be based on Turkish policymakers' knowledge of the Middle East, in other words, the role of a "Middle East expert" is being constructed for Turkey to underpin the argument that Turkey is an influential actor in the Middle East. As another Turkish diplomat has argued "We [Turkish foreign policy elite] grasp those regions [Middle East] better, because we do not see them as foreign. Many of us have personal ties with the countries in that region: Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Egypt. There are Turks still living there, they are our distant relatives."

Although constructing such a role for Turkey with the knowledge requirements of the role, it does not actually reflect the real capabilities of Turkish actors. A Turkish bureaucrat has revealed that despite the discursive strategy of presenting Turkey as having trust-based ties with the Middle East, Turkish actors actually do not know much about the region. Likewise, a senior analyst has supported this view by saying that Turkey does not possess knowledge of the Middle East, because there is not sufficient expertise to analyse the region's dynamics. In his words, "after the third second there is not much in common left to talk about except religion." Indeed, such construction of Turkey as a 'Middle East expert' is in sharp contradiction to the historical aloofness of Turkey from the Middle Eastern affairs. Yet, it should be observed that the Ottoman past and the religious affinities with the actors

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905 Interview with a JDP parliamentarian, Ankara, Turkey, 13 July 2010.
906 Interview with JDP parliamentarian, Ankara, Turkey, 23 June 2010.
907 Interview with a NAP parliamentarian, Ankara, Tukey, 30 April 2010.
908 Interview with a Turkish diplomat. Ankara, Turkey, 3 May 2010.
909 Interview with a senior Turkish civil servant, Ankara, Turkey, 20 July 2010.
910 Interview with a senior TOBB-TEPAV analyst, Ankara, Turkey, 8 July 2010.
in the Middle East has given the post-Islamist conservative government members enough discursive material to build up such a construction.

Yet, the strategy seems to pay off and the EU’s role prescription for Turkey has recently started showing changes. A Turkish diplomat has explained his personal experience confirming this argument as follows:

There was a meeting in Damascus to mediate between Syria and Lebanon in 2008. An informal [Gymnich] EU foreign ministers meeting was going to be held after the Damascus meeting. Under normal circumstances, our minister of foreign affairs is invited to lunch in that meeting and after lunch he gives a maximum 10-minute presentation. This time in 2008, he was invited to the actual meeting and the foreign ministers of 27 member states asked him to tell them about his Damascus visit [and also his views of the conflict in Georgia]. This has never happened before; he was the leading actor in that meeting....These are very exceptional developments; the routine practice is only to attend the lunch. We [national diplomats following EU meetings] cannot even observe the lunch, they set up a screen outside the room and we take notes. In the previous meetings we [the Turkish delegation] used to wait outside for our turn to enter the meeting room. What I mean is although this informal Gymnich type meeting is such a rule-based institution, we [Turkish minister of foreign affairs] were invited to it as a proper participant.911

Although this lengthy quote might seem like the biased view of a Turkish diplomat eager to show the achievements of Turkish diplomacy, the view that Turkey has been able to alter the EU’s role prescription has been also supported by EU officials. An EU official has argued that “[i]n Europe there is a realisation that we have to pay attention to Turkey, Turkey has a positive role, certain linkages that we do not have or certain actions that we cannot take.”912 Another EU official has also acknowledged Turkey's discursive strategy to reconstruct its EU candidate role as an ‘asset for Europe’ in the Middle East. When asked about whether this strategy was successful, he has replied by referring to an article co-authored by the British and

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911 Interview with a Turkish diplomat, Ankara, Turkey, 3 May 2010.
912 Interview with an EU official, Brussels, Belgium, 10 November 2011.
Finnish ministers of foreign affairs in Financial Times and added that Sweden, Italy, Spain and Portugal would also support that article.913

The former Finnish minister of foreign affairs and British foreign secretary declared their countries’ support for Turkey’s accession in the said article and added that Turkey's growing presence in the Middle East, mediating conflicts, advocating and leading integration steps, and advocating reforms, would be an asset for the EU. Therefore, "the EU should not wait until Turkey joins to benefit from the strength of its relationships. But only by having a seat at the table will Turkey be able to contribute fully to the security and prosperity of the EU’s member states."914

Recently, this tendency has come to fruition. In 2011, the EEAS has started regular meetings with the Turkish ministry of foreign affairs. It has been reported that the launch of these meetings was supported by the EU member states stated above as well as France and Germany, who frequently show their opposition to Turkey’s accession.915 The 2011 progress report by the Commission on Turkey has also reported the launch of these talks in these words: "[t]aking into account that Turkey has become more active in its wider neighbourhood, and in view of intensifying dialogue with Turkey on issues of mutual interest informal policy talks were launched in May 2011."916

All in all, in the context of Turkish policymakers having a strong motivation to pursue strategic depth policy, which they believed to be the right policy to be pursued by Turkey, and the EU’s sometimes contradicting role prescriptions, Turkish political actors could succeed in changing the EU’s role prescriptions for Turkey. Therefore, the EU candidate role of Turkey was institutionalised synthetically.

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913 Interview with an EU official, Brussels, Belgium, 9 November 2011
in the domain of foreign policy rules. Using the right strategies within the right context enabled such change.

7.6 Conclusion

Successive Turkish governments have aimed to achieve certain foreign policy objectives in the Middle East, which are broadly embedded within the post-Islamist articulations of the westernisation paradigm. These objectives are codified as the strategic depth policy, which has aimed to exert Turkey into the Middle Eastern regional context as a regional player, mediator of conflicts, a significant economic and political actor.

Within the framework of these foreign policy objectives embedded within a post-Islamist foreign policy paradigm, Turkish foreign policy has demonstrated limited alignment with the EU’s foreign policy role prescriptions for Turkey. However, post-Islamist westernisation foreign policy paradigm of the Turkish government was only meaningful when Turkey's EU candidate role was institutionalised. Inconsistencies between what Turkey does in its foreign policy and what the EU prescribes as its EU candidate role could lead to the breakdown of this system that gave meaning to the post-Islamist westernisation paradigm of the Turkish governments and the subsequent strategic depth policy. Therefore Turkish actors actively sponsored the amendment of the EU’s foreign policy role prescriptions and promoted their alternative role prescription. The Turkish government’s layering of a different EU candidate role prescription in foreign policy was achieved through the strategic usage of the institutional goal of Turkey's accession. Turkish actors argued for a different role for Turkey as an EU candidate by making use of the argument that the active problem-solving role of Turkey in the Middle East, rather than Turkey that
is fully aligned with the EU’s foreign policy acquis, would be an asset to the EU when Turkey becomes a member of the EU in the future. There are indicators that this new role prescription has started to be accepted by the EU actors too.

Therefore, it has been shown in this chapter that candidate countries are not completely passive receivers of EU rules and role prescriptions. On top of the domestic actors’ need to perceive, interpret and appropriate EU’s role prescriptions, they also can change the rules of the game through skilful strategies. The success of these strategies depends on their ability to use strategically the existing institutional structure and paradigms. In other words, the Turkish government has used the EU candidate role to give meaning to its foreign policy paradigm and acquire legitimacy. This was an interactive process of moulding both the EU's role prescriptions and Turkey's foreign policy to achieve a level of consistency among them, so that the meaning system that underpinned the post-Islamist westernisation and strategic depth policy was maintained.

Therefore, this analysis has been a confirmation of the arguments that Turkey's alignment with the EU foreign policy rules has been limited, yet not only in issue areas that are relatively less important for Turkey. On the contrary, Turkish policymakers have consistently pursued the strategic depth policy and even promoted an EU candidate role in foreign policy through active strategies, thereby disproving the argument that “the adoption of the CFSP rules is mainly the candidate country's downloading of the decisions already made by the EU.”

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917 Barysch, ‘Why the EU.’
918 Barysch, ‘Why the EU.’
CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSIONS

This thesis was an exploration of Europeanisation of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. Both Europeanisation and Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Middle East have been heavily debated issues especially since Turkey’s EU candidacy was declared by the EU in 1999.

Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East has long been characterised by a traditional aloofness from the Middle Eastern affairs. This policy has by and large been advocated by the Kemalist articulation of the westernisation paradigm in Turkey, which looked to the west for progress, civilisational standards and represented the Middle East as archaic and conflict-ridden. Although occasionally Turkish political actors have pursued relatively autonomous policies towards the Middle East, for example during the 1960s and a short episode in the 1990s, all these periods ended by the recalibration of foreign policy by the military in line with the Kemalist articulation of westernisation. The 1990s was no exception. The Turkish Armed Forces, confronted by new challenges of a changing international and domestic context had both tightened its grip on politics and adopted a very rigid, secularist and nationalistic interpretation of Kemalism as its coordinative discourse. Turkey’s relations with the Middle Eastern neighbours had been strained, at times coming to brink of war. This picture was reversed in the 2000s. The Turkish Armed Forces was no longer a predominant foreign policy actor, the government was able to pursue an activist foreign policy towards the Middle East. Turkey was presenting itself as a regional power, undertaking mediation efforts and promoting regional political and economic integration. This change was the main empirical puzzle of this research. I have answered the research question of whether and how the institutionalisation of
Turkey's EU candidate role had a causal effect on the making and implementation of this foreign policy.

Foreign policy objectives towards the Middle East have been largely determined by the objective of establishing closer political and economic relations with the Arab Middle East since as early as the minister of foreign affairs of the coalition government of 1997-2002. There was already a policy of improving economic relations with the neighbouring regions in place by 2000. This policy came out due to the then minister of foreign affairs Ismail Cem's belief that Turkey could actually become a significant actor in the Middle East by strategically using the common geography and history shared by Turkey and the Middle Eastern countries. Yet, due to the ongoing poisoning of relations by PKK terrorism until the capture of the PKK leader Ocalan in 1999 and the 2000/1 crises, the impact of the much anticipated Helsinki summit of the EU that declared Turkey an EU candidate could not be fully materialised before 2002.

Since 2002, the policy of improving political and economic relations with the Middle East has been adopted and systematised by the post-Islamist JDP government. The Islamist background of the JDP leadership coupled with the EU candidate role of Turkey gave the party important discursive resources to fully implement a pro-active diplomacy and trade based foreign policy that is communicated to the Middle Eastern regional actors by the use of the party's conservative religious identity and the EU candidate role of Turkey. The SMEs also emerged as leading business actors in trade with the Arab Middle East in the period. While the JDP had become the predominant foreign policy actor, the Turkish Armed Forces and the ministry of foreign affairs have been relegated. This thesis has traced the causal power of Turkey’s EU candidate role over Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. The main finding is that the institutionalisation of EU candidate role
has enabled and constrained certain strategies for Turkish political actors, which are briefly recapped below.

Civilianisation of Turkish politics was enabled by the institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU candidate role. Due to the JDP’s and the Turkish Armed Forces’ usages of the EU’s candidate role prescriptions, civilianisation of Turkish politics was achieved. The underlying westernisation paradigm of Turkish foreign policy enabled the institutionalisation of Turkey's EU candidate role through ideational struggles. In the process, the post-Islamist JDP government subdued the Kemalist Armed Forces by using the EU candidate role prescriptions strategically to legitimise itself in the eyes of the Kemalist elite. At the same time, the Turkish Armed Forces had gone through a rearticulation of its coordinative discourse, Kemalism, as it used the EU candidate role prescriptions for westernising Turkey through EU membership. Without the civilianisation of Turkish politics, Turkey would not be able to implement an activist, diplomacy-based and a pro-integration foreign policy towards the Middle East.

Institutionalisation of the EU candidate role also enabled the consolidation of neo-liberalism in Turkey by making the public more amenable to the implementation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) programme after the 2000/1 crises. At the time of severe economic crisis, Turkish policymakers perceived an opportunity to implement neo-liberal reforms by articulating economic reforms as part of the role Turkey had to play as an EU candidate. The economic reforms that Turkey implemented enabled the macroeconomic stability of the Turkish economy, thereby boosting the SMEs’ export potential both indirectly through anti-inflationary policies, low interest rates and much-needed incoming foreign direct investment to Turkey; and directly through SME support policies and funds. The SMEs’ export potential was needed for the materialisation of Turkey’s foreign policy that is based on increased trade relations with the Middle East.
There have been indirect consequences of the institutionalisation of Turkey's EU candidate role as well. The usage of Turkey's EU candidate role in foreign policy discourse towards the Middle East also reveals that Turkish foreign policy actors perceived Turkey's EU candidate role and the associated role prescriptions as a foreign policy resource in the Middle East. The combination of the Turkish government's Islamic background and Turkey's EU candidate role was used by Turkish foreign policy actors as a resource to construct Turkey as a mediator, bridge and a reform promoter in the Middle East. Without the institutionalisation of Turkey's EU candidate role, playing such roles in the Middle East would not have been possible.

Finally, the institutionalisation of Turkey's EU candidate role in terms of alignment with the foreign policy rules of the EU enabled Turkish foreign policy by giving meaning to the strategic depth policy of the post-Islamist government. The strategic depth policy aimed to establish close ties with all neighbouring regions of Turkey. Diplomatic relations with the Middle East were to be improved by resorting to Islamic and Ottoman narratives of Turkey's role in the Middle East. At the same time Turkey's EU candidate role was giving meaning to the Turkish foreign policy of strategic depth. Yet, Turkey was not in full alignment with the EU's foreign policy rules especially with regard to Syria and Hamas. This cleavage could potentially be used to question the meaning of the Turkish foreign policy framework. Indeed, it happened in 2008 when there emerged criticisms of Turkey's Middle East oriented foreign policy on the grounds that Turkey was dissociating itself from the west. The JDP, knowing this, had been attempting to upload an alternative EU candidate role prescription of foreign policy rules by making references to the common future of Turkey and the EU. As the EU candidacy institution is based on the 'EU accession' paradigm, an alternative role prescription could be promoted within the EU candidacy institution by Turkish actors, who used Turkey's future accession as a discursive strategy. This strategy
seems to have been fruitful based on a preliminary reading of the EU member states’ and EU officials’ declarations and policies.

The main thesis is that the institutionalisation of Turkey's EU candidate role has significantly enabled Turkey's foreign policy towards the Middle East, which is conceptualised as the Europeanisation of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East.

8.1 Foreign Policy Paradigm, Europeanisation and the Middle East

Turkey's long-standing foreign policy paradigm has been westernisation. The westernisation paradigm has also enabled the institutionalisation of Turkey's EU candidate role. Skilled actors such as the former chief of general staff Hilmi Özkok have been able to re-prioritise westernisation as the institutional objective of the Turkish Armed Forces. By articulating Turkey's EU candidate role as necessary for the realisation of Turkey's westernisation, Özkok enabled the Turkish Armed Forces to institutionalise the civilianisation role prescription of the EU for Turkey.

The JDP, which is a conservative party with Islamist roots, has strategically used the westernisation paradigm to legitimise itself and its policies especially in the eyes of the Turkish Armed Forces. Having been banned from politics in the past several times due to their non-Kemalist, anti-western policies, the JDP has learned from the fate of their precedents and strategically adopted westernisation. Westernisation has been articulated with the post-Islamist coordinative discourse of the JDP, thereby giving legitimacy to the party's policies including its strategic depth policy. Whereas the Turkish Armed Forces’ objective was westernisation of Turkey, the JDP's objective was to pursue a proactive foreign policy towards the Muslim Middle East. Yet, their past was an obstacle, therefore they perceived adopting
Turkey's EU candidate role as a way of legitimising their policies as well as civilianising Turkish politics.

Significantly, there was no paradigm replacement. Only a new articulation of the westernisation paradigm was constructed by the JDP and layered onto the existing westernisation paradigm along with the Kemalist westernisation articulation. Confirming Palier's argument of layering, institutional change can also occur through piecemeal promotion of new goals that are compatible with the overarching paradigm. However, it has been argued in this thesis that the compatibility of newly layered goals and institutions with the overarching paradigm is not based on the objective meanings that the goals and paradigms have. On the contrary, the compatibility of the layers is achieved through active discursive construction of compatibility.

The JDP has had to actively construct its strategic depth policy as compatible with the westernisation paradigm to be able to prevent mobilisation of Kemalist groups in policymaking. Likewise, when the restrictively secularist Kemalist articulation of westernisation paradigm of the 1990 was challenged by the emergence of Turkey's EU candidate role, skilled actors in the Turkish General Staff actively rearticulated Kemalism by prioritising reformism, civilisationalism and innovation as the primary principles of their Kemalist coordinative discourse.

Reflecting on the nature of agency and its relationship with structure allowed me to analyse the normatively oriented but strategic behaviour of both the JDP and the Turkish Armed Forces in relation to each other and the EU’s candidate role prescriptions. The assumption that structures do not determine actors' behaviour, but favour strategies in relation to each other and the context enabled me to analyse

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919 Palier, 'Ambiguous.'
how Turkey's EU candidate role was institutionalised through Turkish actors' strategies towards each other and the EU's role prescriptions.

In doing so, this research has not conceptualised domestic actors, domestic and regional opportunity structures as static transmission belts but has acknowledged that they are also part of the change. Rather than coming at a cost, this acknowledgment has opened up the possibility of a more realistic, multicausal analysis. Therefore, this research has analysed the interactive dynamics between policy, polity and politics instead of a narrow focus on policy uploading, downloading and socialisation. It was acknowledged that foreign policy is located within a broader political context, which is in flux throughout the Europeanisation process. Therefore, as much as the direct Europeanisation of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East through the institutionalisation of the EU's foreign policy rules is evident, indirect Europeanisation through the changes in the role of the Turkish Armed Forces, the economic structure of the country and different political actors' perceptions of the EU candidate role prescriptions was also evident in the analysis. Accordingly, the changes in foreign policy actors' ideas, discourses and the domestic and regional opportunity structures they face were combined in a causal complex within a Europeanisation framework.

The overall conceptual, analytical and empirical contribution of this research to the literatures of Europeanisation, Europeanisation of foreign policy and Turkish foreign policy analysis will be explained next. Limitations of the research conducted will also be outlined before briefly discussing future implications of this research.
8.2 Conceptual contributions

The first challenge for this research was to conceptualise the so-called 'EU level' before proceeding with the analysis of its impact. In other words, what about the EU could cause changes in Turkish foreign policy? Is Europeanisation simply an interaction between independent objects, i.e. the EU and Turkey, or is it an interaction between structure and agency? If so, what is the structured context within which the EU and Turkey interact and exert power over each other and over the material and ideational context? To address such questions, EU candidacy is conceptualised as an institutional context, defined in terms of the relational roles and rules it constitutes. Such a conceptualisation is new in the literature. Adapting role theory to strategic-relational ontology and institutionalist advances, I have analysed Turkey's Europeanisation in terms of the institutionalisation of Turkey's EU candidate role and its intended and unintended consequences for Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East.

By conceptualising EU candidacy as an institutional context, I was able to explore the so-called 'EU impact' beyond an analysis of accession conditionality on candidate countries. When the Europeanisation of candidate countries is analysed as the impact of EU conditionality on rule adoption, it is premised on the rational choice assumption that the domestic actors want to achieve EU membership and they adopt rules to achieve membership.920 Although very illuminating in terms of explaining some cases of Europeanisation, this thesis has shown that domestic actors do not always adopt EU rules for becoming EU members. They also use, edit, and even change EU rules. This is the case because domestic actors are normatively oriented but also strategic towards their context and each other while pursuing their objectives. Most of

the time they have their own objectives, which they pursue strategically through using the EU role prescriptions. Therefore, detaching the rules of EU candidacy from the promise of membership allowed me to discuss different motivations of agency in their responses to these rules, also including EU membership aspirations but broadening it.

By the same token, this research has also not assumed domestic actors behave according to a logic of appropriateness. Studies on the Europeanisation of candidate countries that adopt the logic of appropriateness as the nature of actors’ motivation, have focussed on how domestic actors adopted EU rules as they were socialised to EU norms. Such studies have for instance argued that Turkish politicians are socialised to the EU norms of foreign policy. By delinking the rules of EU candidacy from their appropriateness, I was able to trace the process of norm advocacy from a strategic perspective. Actors in the framework I have adopted have various normative orientations towards their context, which they pursue as objectives. Whereas the Turkish Armed Forces’ overarching objective was the westernisation of Turkey, the JDP’s objective was the civilianisation of Turkey. Based on their past experiences, both actors have come to believe that the cure for Turkey’s problems was either westernisation or civilianisation. Quite contrary to the mainstream logic of appropriateness approach, however, both actors are strategic. They assess the material and ideational context, the role prescriptions for Turkey by the EU, their objectives and they pursue their strategies informed by such an assessment. The outcome of this assessment was the JDP’s strategic usage of the EU candidate role and the Turkish General Staff’s strategic usage of EU candidate role for achieving westernisation of Turkey. All in all, the conceptualisation of EU candidacy as an institution within a strategic-relational framework has enabled this research not only to combine the two paths of Europeanisation from a sociological and a rational choice
perspective, but also showed that EU norms can be used strategically and EU resources can be used ideologically.

By focusing on the institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU candidate role and its impact on Turkish foreign policy, this conceptualisation has opened up space to analyse the Europeanisation of foreign policy from the perspective of role theory. Role theory has been applied to Europeanisation only by Aggestam; therefore its application on a candidate country is also a contribution to the literature on the Europeanisation of foreign policy.\(^9\) However, Aggestam has used role theory to bridge national identity with foreign policy behaviour, whereas I bridge foreign policy behaviour with EU candidacy as an institutional context. I adopt Barnett’s ‘position role’ concept without the assumption that position roles strictly constrain their holders. On the contrary, I have conceptualised Turkey’s ‘position role’ as an EU candidate within the candidacy institution as both enabling and constraining Turkish actors, therefore requiring institutionalisation by agency. The value added of a strategic relational conceptualisation of role theory is indeed offering a balanced approach to structure and agency. Accordingly, the institutionalisation of the EU’s role prescription for Turkey as an EU candidate is contingent on Turkish actors’ strategies towards each other and the EU’s role prescriptions.

In this line of analysis, this thesis has suggested that the EU’s economic and political role prescriptions are institutionalised by Turkish foreign policy actors without much contestation. As the civilianisation and the economic role prescriptions of the EU overlapped with Turkish actors’ various objectives such as civilianisation, westernisation, SME support and the consolidation of neo-liberal economic policies, they were institutionalised. The institutionalisation of the EU’s economic and political role prescriptions have also been strategically used as a resource in Turkish

\(^{9}\) Aggestam, ‘Role Conceptions.’
government’s foreign policy discourse towards the Middle East. As the usage of Turkey’s EU candidate role as a foreign policy resource in the Middle Eastern context was rewarded, the EU candidate role was further institutionalised. However, the EU’s foreign policy role prescriptions did not fully overlap with the government’s foreign policy objectives in the region. Yet, the institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU candidate role was necessary to give meaning to the strategic depth policy of the post-Islamist AKP government. Strategic depth policy was based on the balance between Turkey’s EU candidate role and Middle Eastern role in foreign policy. Therefore, the Turkish government promoted an alternative role prescription for Turkey by making references to the institutionalised accession paradigm in Turkey-EU relations. Such entrepreneurship has gradually led to the institutionalisation of the alternative role prescription layered by the Turkish government on the EU candidacy institution.

Finally, this thesis has contributed to Woll and Jacquot’s ‘usages of Europe’ argument in several ways. Firstly, by analysing Turkish policymakers’ usage of ‘Europe’ in the Middle East, this thesis has demonstrated that it is fruitful to analyse usages of Europe in different spatial contexts. Spaces of Europeanisation are not limited to the EU and the traditional public policies, but also include foreign policy and the non-EU regional context. Secondly, the thesis has also contributed to the broader Europeanisation literature by offering an elaboration of the ‘using Europe’ framework. Woll and Jacquot’s framework by and large focuses on the usage of already existing EU resources—both cognitive and material. This thesis has offered a contribution to this literature by showing that the Turkish political elite have not only used the EU resources, but also co-constructed these EU resources to a certain extent. The role of an EU candidate was the resource that was used by Turkish actors and the definition of this role was co-constructed by the EU and Turkish actors. In other words, while

922 Woll and Jacquot, ‘Using Europe.’
Woll and Jacquot offered a critique of the chain of command approaches by their bottom-up account of usage, in this thesis I have argued that the case of Europeanisation of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East is a synthesis of both. The command itself, which is the EU candidate role prescription, was actually co-constructed by the Turkish political elite, which was in turn used by them as a political resource to succeed in their projects.

8.2.1 Broader concept of causation

The broad and anti-Humean concept of causation adopted in this thesis has demonstrated that the EU does not cause domestic change in candidate countries in the form of triggering events inside a vacuum. The EU exerts its causal powers through the candidacy institution that is relational between Turkey and the EU. This institution comprises of roles and rules for Turkey. The institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU candidate role has enabled Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East through its constituting and conditioning powers.

First of all, Turkey’s EU candidate role conditioned Turkish economic structure in a way that it was possible for the Turkish government to implement a foreign policy that is based on Turkey’s economic power, i.e. exports and projects in the Middle East. The conditioning effect of Turkey's EU candidate role was due to the perceptions of economic actors that as an EU candidate Turkey’s economic stability was more likely to be established than the previous period. According to Kurki’s categories, this kind of causation is material cause.923 Secondly, Turkey’s EU candidate role gave meaning to the strategic depth policy of the post-Islamist JDP government. As the policy acquired meaning through balanced relations with both the EU and the

923 Kurki, Causation.
Middle East, the continuation of Turkey’s EU candidate role in a way served as the formal cause of the strategic depth policy.

Moreover, the assumption of causal complexes means that the EU is never ‘the cause’ as there are always multiple causes at work in bringing about a certain political reality. In this case, although the institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU candidate role has enabled Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East, it was the Turkish political actors that used this opportunity and materialised Turkey’s regionally oriented pro-active foreign policy in a context that favoured such a foreign policy.

One of the conceptual contributions of this thesis therefore is reflection on agency, structure and their relationship within Europeanisation. As Kauppi has also suggested, academics partly contribute to the conceptual making of the political reality they analyse, therefore carry responsibility to reflect upon their basic premises. By focusing on the strategies of Turkish actors towards the EU’s candidate role prescription for Turkey, I have fore grounded the objectives and perceptions of Turkish politicians in the institutionalisation of Turkey's EU candidate role. Without making sweeping claims about Turkish actors' socialisation to the given norms of the EU or the mindless pursuit of EU membership, I have conceptualised the grey area between non-membership and membership of the EU, where future members of the EU are constructed. This way, ontological reflection has been capable of opening new research agendas by changing the questions that are asked by scholars. In the case of the Europeanisation of candidate countries, rather than asking whether the logic of consequences or the logic of appropriateness explains better the behaviour of a certain candidate state, the question could be how the EU candidate role is institutionalised in a given candidate state and its intended and unintended consequences.

924 Niilo Kauppi, ‘Political Ontology of European Integration,’ Comparative European Politics, 8 (2010), p.22
8.3 Empirical contributions and limitations

The Europeanisation of foreign policy literature has so far not dealt sufficiently with candidate countries and the Europeanisation of candidate countries has usually been studied with an empirical focus on other public policies. Relevant studies on the Europeanisation of candidate country foreign policies that stand at the intersection of these two literatures have only analysed the downloading of the EU rules by the candidates and the socialisation of the foreign policy elite without offering convincing empirical evidence.

Moreover, most of these studies are journal articles, without too much empirical detail. On the contrary, this thesis builds upon extensive interviews with both Turkish and European policy-makers and documentary analysis. Therefore this study provides new empirical data for the literatures of Europeanisation and Turkish foreign policy analysis.

This research has also contributed empirically by identifying non-Europeanisation of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East as a consequence of the institutionalisation of Turkey’s EU candidate role. For example, the institutionalisation of the EU’s role prescription of peaceful resolution of border conflicts and good neighbourly relations did not feature in the making of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. The empirical research has confirmed that these rules of EU candidacy are mainly devised regarding Turkey’s foreign policy towards Greece and Armenia, not the Middle East.

The limitations of the research need to be addressed and acknowledged as well. As all other research, this PhD project has been limited by time and resource limitations. First of all, individual socialisation to EU foreign policy norms was beyond
the scope of this thesis. Although ontologically I agree with the causal power of ideas, I find individual socialisation researchable only by deploying ethnographic methods and longitudinal analyses of the relevant actors. This is a daunting task for a PhD project that is only permitted to last for 3-4 years. Also, for my research to deploy such a methodology I would have to translate individual socialisation to state socialisation, which is very difficult to achieve if not impossible. Therefore this thesis did not analyse socialisation with the EU norms among the Turkish foreign policy elite.

There are also limitations due to the temporal scope of the research. This research has covered the period from 1999 to 2010, when the substantial part of the fieldwork was finished. Therefore, some of the important developments in the Middle East had to be excluded from the research. The Lisbon Treaty was ratified in November 2009 and came into effect in December 2009. Although the treaty has made remarkable changes to the foreign policy structure of the EU, such as the creation of the European External Action Service, the dust had not settled until early 2011. Neither the European officials nor their Turkish counterparts knew what the organisation of the European External Action Service was going to be like during the fieldwork for this thesis. Therefore the Lisbon Treaty and its effects have remained outside the scope of this research.

More importantly, the Arab spring has taken place in the Middle East and North Africa since the beginning of 2011. Although this change in the Middle Eastern context is not covered by the empirical analysis in this thesis, it is very interesting to note the ideationally path-dependent approach by the Turkish government to the crisis in Syria. When the first protests broke out, the Turkish Prime Minister had the belief that he could convince Syrian President Bashar Assad to reform the political system to alleviate the protests. As the Turkish government had used Turkey’s EU candidate role coupled with the historical, geographical and especially religious ties
with the Middle East successfully in the previous period, they still had the belief that they could convince Assad to liberalise the political system. However, it was soon realised that this was a misjudgement of the changing context, when Assad cracked down on the protestors instead of heeding the Turkish Prime Minister’s calls for reform. While this event marked the beginning of deterioration of the relations with Syria and the rest of the Arab Middle East except Palestine, this is a very fresh demonstration of however strategic and informed political actors are, they are always led by their interpretations of the context, which may prove to be fatally wrong when the context proves them wrong.

8.4 Implications for future research

First of all, the strategic usage of the EU candidate role can be applied to other candidate countries in general and their foreign policies in particular. Especially the bridging role that is adopted by many other candidate countries can be conceptually linked to EU candidacy and its constitutive impact on the roles candidate state actors’ play in their foreign relations.925

Secondly, the discourse adopted by the Turkish policy-makers regarding Islam and its relationship with the Middle East deserves further research. There is a conspicuous call by the Turkish actors for the reformation of Islam, to return to its essence, which are allegedly complementary with the values of the ‘universal civilisation’. On the basis of the predominant westernisation paradigm in Turkey since

the late Ottoman period, analysing whether these so-called universal values are associated with the European values by the Turkish policy elite would be an interesting contribution to the literature on Turkish foreign policy. Such a research would also build a very useful bridge between the Europeanisation of foreign policy and Eurocentrism underlying this process.
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